COMPARATIVELY, society is in political science, what infants are respecting knowledge, in a state of ig­norance. Notwithstanding the laborious researches of ancient and modern politicians; notwithstanding the rapid and colossian advances made in the United States in this branch of human knowledge, the world has not, even at this late period, discovered one single princi­ple which, like the lemmas in mathematics, may be laid down as incontrovertible. And yet until this be done until the rights of man shall be demonstrated like the propositions of Euclid, and the generality of mankind be made acquainted therewith, the possession of liberty, even when once established, cannot be secure! We are deficient in the developement of fundamental principles, sufficiently clear and undoubted. And yet it is neces­sary to have unerring standards by a collation with which we might determine, when the proceedings of legisla­tures are in unison therewith and promotive of the gene­ral weal. Until we arrive at this stage of political sci­ence and make mankind acquainted with its principles, the wars, the usurpations, the tyrannies, the dissonance, and the bickerings which destroy the life and solace of man, will not cease to exist: tho' we shall find, as indeed we now do, that in proportion as we advance in the knowledge of this most necessary science, and that knowledge becomes general, the condition of man will be meliorated.

The principle of equality will lead us to this ultimate point. It is on this principle alone that the liberty of [Page 10] man is founded; and this is the criterion whereby we may determine, with considerable precision, the degree of liberty existent in states. If the science of govern­ment ever be reduced to clear and determinate rules, it will be through the medium of political equality. For we invariably find that governments become despotic in the ratio that constituent power diminishes; or in other words, in proportion as governments become independent of the controul of the people, the people become the slaves of governments.

On the other hand, in proportion as the people possess the controuling power of the state according to a known and mutually established rule, they will be politically happy. For as man never wills that knowingly, which tends to destroy his happiness, so he will never will the existence of laws which will lessen his felicity. If the beatification of man depended upon himself, and its at­tainment was within his own grasp, his felicity would be complete, since he would never will its attenuation. If this reasoning holds good individually considered, it is not less so with respect to nations, which are composed of individuals. Therefore a government whose body shall be animated by the sentiment of the people, and its actions dictated by their will, will not, knowingly, do that which will lessen the happiness of the whole. If such a government should ever err, it would be from want of knowledge (which is not probable) not from design. It is the difference of the being of equality which constitutes the difference between the political state of the people of Russia and those of the United States. The former, slaves of the most abject condition, have no more power to controul or influence the govern­ment of Russia than they have to controul or influence our own. Why? Because those who administer that govern­ment do not depend upon the people for their offices: be­cause they are not amenable to the people for their con­duct. The people therefore are of no farther considera­tion in the state, than as subjects of the taxation & instru­ments to operate the will of government. As if ordained by God, they live and labour only to conduce to the hap­piness of their tyrants, and to nourish the merciless [Page 11] hand that smites them. In the United States, tho' po­litical equality is not as perfect as it might be, yet every man feels and maintains the dignity of his station. The government is really the government of the people. It was they who modelled the body and breathed into it the breath of life. If it should answer not the end design­ed, they have the same right to amend that they had origin­ally to institute it. Such is the difference between the political state of the two countries.

And what is the cause that has produced this differ­ence? A want of the establishment of political equality, together with a want of knowledge of its importance, sufficiently extensive and correct to continue its being. These are inseparable companions in a national view, both in their progress and declension. We cannot at­tribute the political superiority of the people of the United States over those of Russia to any other cause than their superior weight and importance in the state. Take away the weight and importance of the citizens of these states from their government; make the government as independant of the controul of the citizens as that of Russia, & it will become a vortex that will absorb the earn­ings and the happiness of the country; and the people, no longer the free and enlightened citizens of America, will become the slaves of its pleasure.

Such is the nature and importance of political equa­lity, that where it is not, the people, governed by a few men who by various means have usurped the powers of the state, must necessarily be vassals. If the establish­ment of this principle in ancient Rome, had been as universal as it is universally just; the dagger of Brutus, to rid the world of a tyrant, would have been unneces­sary. To us who enjoy an equality in the state unknown in other countries; it would be difficult to conceive the possibility of a man, however transcendent his talents and vicious his heart, to become a second Caesar; and so very improbable is such a case, that the citizens, secure in the consciousness of their importance in the commonwealth, never dream of such an event. The wholesome equality of the state, and the consequent de­fusion [Page 12] of political knowledge, are the best safe-guards of the liberty of the people, and alone competent to curb the ambition and repress the attempts of the designing.

The law of equality is the law of God: and as its great author is immutable and eternal, so is this primeval principle. Nor is it likely that revolutions will cease until its establishment be as universal as man. What is it that has propelled the government of England to the precipice on which it now stands? The want of this equality, which like the repulsive power in the natural world, confines governments within their own bounds. Give us that weight in our national council to which by nature we are entitled; give us universal suffrage, is the exclamation of every honest, thinking man, from the two extremes to the centre of the kingdom. And if this equality had prevailed in the state a century back, is it presumable that the people would have been plunged into so many ruinous wars as they have been during that period? those who think so will do well dispassionately to examine the proceedings of the house of representa­tives of the United States in the present contest with France. The wise and manly conduct displayed by this branch of the government is an effect; of what? of the controuling power of the people operating upon its proceedings. Suppose for a moment the President of the United States invested with the prerogative of declar­ing war, like the King of England; and the House of representatives, the conservatory of the republic, as much under his controul as the House of Commons in England is under that of the Minister; is it not probable that war would long ago have been declared? Those who have attentively observed the conduct of the executive; who have read his communications to the two houses; his addresses to the addressors, and judiciously consider­ed the spirit of enmity manifested throughout, will hardly answer in the negative. At any rate, of this no man will doubt, that the United States have had as much cause to declare war against France as England had to com­menace the present one: and yet in the former case war has not been declared, but in the latter it has; and that [Page 13] too, notwithstanding the decided aversion manifested thereto by a very large proportion of the people. They clearly foresaw and predicted that no good could result from such a measure: and their predictions have been verified. But they were dragged into it by a govern­ment over which they had no influence, and whose power they could not controul but by open and active resistance. To what cause then shall we ascribe this difference but to the influence the people have over their government on the one hand, and the want of that in­fluence on the other? and what gives this influence but the equality established in the republic? Nothing. Here then we have a remarkable instance of the differ­ence between a government created and essentially moved by the people, and one established over them. The proceedings of the former are regulated by wisdom and an ardent solicitude to promote the general good: those of the latter by an insatiable desire to enrich the few concerned in wielding the hidious machine by the general wreck of every thing valuable to man.

Such is the operating force of this principle, and so well is it understood in practice by the ill-disposed of every country, who have gained power in states, that arbitrary government cannot be established without cir­cumscribing constituent power^*. In this they are cor­rect. Constituent power cannot be wrested from the people without proportionately endangering their liberty. The equality of man, the rightful foundation of legiti­mate governments cannot be abridged without a propor­tionable abridgment of public liberty. If, for example, our representatives are dependent upon their constituents for offices in the state, it necessarily follows, that in pro­portion as constituent power decreases, their indepen­dence, or disregard of the interests of the people, in­crease. By the same unerring rule the dependence of [Page 14] our representatives increase with the increase of constitu­ent power. Of course, in the degree that this power prevails in states, the will of the people will prevail in the governments.

Whether the effects herein mentioned have, or not, resulted from the principle laid down, every man will determine for himself. But of this no one will doubt who has in the least examined into men and measures; that in those countries where the people have the least power, governments are the most despotic, and the peo­ple the least happy: as in England, the continent of Europe, and in oriental countries. It is therefore the business of the politician to explore and exhibit the cause. And here I think it is; the people of the United States are, beyond all doubt, more politically happy than any people of which we have knowledge; and that too I am convinced, because a greater equa­lity prevails in the republic.

Hitherto we have written only of the effects in order to clear the way to examine and exhibit more perspicu­ously the nature and extent of the equality of man. This subject has claimed the attention of the ablest wri­ters. Such indeed was the opinion of Mr. Locke con­cerning the equality of man, that he makes it the foun­dation of all the freedom and felicity that man can enjoy. In his chapter "of the state of nature" he observes,

"A state of equality, wherein all the power and juris­diction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same rank▪ promiscuously born to all the same advan­tages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordina­tion or subjection, unless the Lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."

"This equality of man by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself and beyond all ques­tion, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation [Page 15] to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the du­ties they owe one another, and from which he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are."

"The like natural inducements hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one measure, if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as every man can wish even to his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, un­less myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered to them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer; there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them; my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality be­tween ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason has drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant." Locke on Gov. p. 177-8. § 4. 5. Lon. E. 1772.

But notwithstanding the sound arguments of these celebrated authors, of numberless others before and since their days, and what is, we think, of much greater force, the practical assertion of this equality in the United States, we still see its authenticity questioned and even denied. And indeed so we do truths the most obvi­ous by men whose desires and propensities are vicious, & by those whose erroneous judgments resistlessly lead them into involuntary error. We shall nevertheless enquire into the being and nature of political equality, and endeavour to shew that governments not founded upon this princi­ple, in its amplitude, are unjust, and that too exactly in proportion that the practice is an aberration from the principle.

[Page 16]The present condition of society, even in the best regu­lated states, affords no exact standard to ascertain the truth or falsehood of political equality. To determine this point satisfactorily, and to fix it on permanent ground, we must have recourse to something anterior to custom. For if we make custom the touchstone of the problem, we shall find that it is incapable of furnishing ground for satisfactory solution. Custom establishes nothing with respect to rights; since, universally considered, it is in­capable of furnishing matter out of which a proposition may be made that shall be universally true. For example, inequality obtains most in governmental regulations; but yet it does not universally obtain. Therefore we cannot make inequality an universal proposition in the science of government. We have a living and potent exception in the popular branch of our own govern­ment which destroys the universality of the postulate. This reasoning will also apply with equal force against the being of equality in practice; since we have numer­ous instances of governments founded indeed upon the despotism of a single individual, which destroys practical equality as an ubiquitous proposition. Custom therefore furnishes no rule capable of affecting the subject one way or other. When two customs therefore prevail diametri­cally opposite, how shall we determine the truth of either? By recurring to principles of being antecedent to both.

To do this we must divest ourselves as much as possible of the ideas that habit has excited and fixed in the mind, and view the subject apart from the prevailing practices of men. We must trace and endeavour to discover the principle by which civil society must be regulated if justly constructed: and instead of permitting the forms & prac­tices of government so to take possession of the mind as wholly to obliterate even the remembrance of first prin­ciples; suffer unshackled reason to glance into the illi­mitable field of nature, and to contemplate principles, of nature unchangeable, in their pure and unadulterated state. For the principle of civil government, like that by which a clock is regulated, has separate being from he machine; so that notwithstanding the machinery [Page 17] may be imperfect, yet the imperfection [...] not the principle by which it ought to be regulated.

To understand then the nature of political equali­ty we must advert to the condition of man in a state of na­ture, i. e. antecedent to the formation of civil cove­nants. We shall then be able clearly to perceive the on­ly equitable mode in which civil governments can be constructed.

But it has been asserted that there never was a period when men lived together without civil law, and thence inferred, that that state of nature mentioned by various authors is a mere chimera. It may therefore be neces­sary to refute this erroneous hypothesis in order to clear the way for the admission of the doctrine of equality. This we shall do in a two-fold manner:

First, Theoretically; and

Second, By the aduction of a practical example of men living together in a state of nature; i. e. without laws to govern them, and actually and mutually making covenants for themselves as if laws had never been.

First. We think it succeptible of exact demonstration that there has been a time when men lived together to­tally without human laws. The very existence of laws proves that there must have been a period whether known or not to ourselves, when no law or rule of action made by men did exist. For example, when we see fleets built and towns erected, what are we to conclude but that they are the productions of men whose being must have been prior to our own? In the same manner the being of human law is an effect: of what? Of the being of man antecedent to that of law. Law being made by man, if man had not existed law would not have been. The existence of law demonstrates the previous existence of man, from whom they spring; in the same manner that the being of human intelligence ^b. demonstrates the pre-existence of God the great cause of every thing that is. Both are the effect of their predicates. [Page 18] Therefore, [...] as self-evident as that one and one when combined make two, that if laws exist they had beginning and if beginning, there must have been a time when men lived together without law.

But tyranny itself, which incessantly bends its baneful force to lock up the intellectual powers of man, has, without intending it, furnished the world with a recent instance of men living together in a state of nature, abso­lutely without civil rules, and mutually coalesing to make laws for themselves in that just and equitable mode for which we contend. The case to which we allude is a memorable one; it was a great mean of laying the founda­tion of a great and happy commonwealth, a land of patri­ots and of sages, and the best refuge of oppressed men. It is that of Mr. John Robinson and the venerable band of patriots who fled from the tyranny of the English go­vernment, and sought, in the wilds of New-England, for that liberty and repose so criminally withheld from them in their native land ^c..

This religious band which minors and adults, con­sisted of one hundred and one persons were, what is termed in ecclesiastical language, puritans. Puritanism at that day [In the reign of James I.] was deemed an innovation of the Dogmas of the established church. And at all established churches do, and from their nature perhaps ever will, persecute and tyranize over Disen­ters, we have here a memorable instance of their infuriate spirit and of the sad effects of these baleful establish­ments. No sooner was primitive Christianity attempted to be revived and the frippery and inanity of church establishments attacked, than the engine of state, moved by sacerdatal power, singled out as victims of its ven­geance, [Page 19] all those who did not worship self-existence in the manner prescribed by this pious government. Uni­formity of religious sentiments and worship were the ostensible, but the gratification of church ambition, and the furtherance of church emolument, were the real ob­jects in view. The former, if real, was impracticable. The latter, alass! is not so: nor will the world cease to be infested with these pestilential establishments until mankind begin to reason and to act like rational beings: They will then see their inutility; they will then per­ceive the wicked purposes to accomplish which they are wholly devoted. For surely nothing can be more blas­phemous than to punish men for not universally thinking alike! This is the worst, the most inequitous, and the most intollerable of tyrannies. It would be as easy for tyrants, ecclesiastical or civil, to callapse the earth & sun as to make men to think and to act alike. Uniformity of action must flow from uniformity of thinking; and uniformity of thinking from human intelligence, uni­formly and universally perceiving alike; which perhaps cannot result from the present organic conformation of man. And indeed if we did universally perceive alike, then acts of constraint would be unnecessary; but as we do not nor cannot, nothing can possibly result from con­straint but victims and hypocrites.

But church authority seldom reasons well or much. An act was passed for punishing all who refused to come to church, or were present at any conventicle or meet­ing. The punishment was imprisonment till the con­victed agreed to conform, and made a declaration of his conformity. If that was not done in three months, he was to quit the realm, and go into perpetual banishment. In case he did not depart within the time limited, or re­turned afterwards without a licence, he was to suffer death." Ramsey's history of the revolution p. 6. L. E. 1793.

Such was the nature of this unjust and merciless act that the Puritans were necessiated either to feal their own infamy by professing to conform to what in good con­science they could not; to suffer death as some of them [Page 20] actually did, ^(d) or to go into perpetual exile. Mr. Ro­binson and his virtuous associates preferred the last al­ternative. They sailed from England in the year 1620, destined to America. But as they were victims of the tyranny of the state; as they were going into exile to avert consequences to them infinitely more disagreeable, so they sailed from England destitute of the protection of government. They had neither patents conceding to them extensive dominion, nor constitutions of govern­ment for the regulation of their civil life. As the go­vernment drove them out of the "realm," so it abdicat­ed the protection it owed them while within it. They were therefore left as much to themselves with respect to having no law, but having laws to form, as if they were the only persons upon the globe. In this light they viewed their situation and acted accordingly. For we find that, before they stepped a foot on American ground, a meeting was mutually called to consider the propriety of making a constitution by which they should be govern­ed after landing ^(e) They entered into a "solemn com­pact," ^(f) to which they all subscribed their names, there­by making it the basis of their government.

From these historical evidences we learn,

First, that when Mr. Robinson and his co-exiles ar­rived at the coast of America, they found themselves in an absolute state of nature, i. e. a body of men about to [Page 21] enter upon and to cultivate an unknown land, totally without law to govern them. But as they were likely to continue in a gregarious state, it was necessary, for the furtherance of the ends for which governments are in­stituted, that they should enter into that "solemn cove­nant." Here then was the beginning of that body poli­tic, and though its component parts were but few, yet if the principle on which they proceeded be just, it will apply with equal force and precision to indifinite num­bers. That compact, like every other, must, in its ope­ration affect every one within its jurisdiction; and as all were to be affected by it, it belonged to all to have an equal share in its conformation. Accordingly we find that every adult was not only present at its making and his presence considered necessary to its legitemacy, but that they all signed the agreement. The latter is consi­dered as a circumstance peculiar to the case, but the for­mer as a right that can never be impaired ^(g).

We are then got so far. We find that a state of na­ture has a real being, and that however men may abuse [Page 22] those rights which flow from that state, yet the abuse neither affects the abstract principle nor weakens the claim of man to its full fruition. In what then does this equality consist for which even in a state of nature, we contend? Not in bodily strength or symmetry; not in men­tal capacity or the acquirement of knowledge, for in these we see no universal equality; but in the equal right which every man has, when at years of discretion, in the affairs of that government, instituted by and for the benefit of that society of which he is a component part.

A state of nature is a state of perfect freedom and equality; and as it is a state of freedom and equality so it is a state of peril and insecurity. Good government is alone competent to correct the evils to which every man is exposed in a state of nature. For where there is no law common to all, individual reason is the only mea­sure of men's actions which must necessarily render the possession of life, and liberty, and property, extremely uncertain. Nor could real offences, in such a state, be punished. For where is the authoritative tribunal to de­termine the magnitude of offences and the punishment due thereto? There is none. And as there is no com­mon standard to determine, so there is no power to re­tribute offences but such as reside in individuals. It is to soften these asperities of nature that men unite in civil society, that they agree to rules of action that shall apply to those covenanted, and to lodge the power of pu­nishing offences against the common weal, in the hands of the body politic. To transfer this power, partially, to judge and to punish from individuals, in whom it originally resided, to the whole society, is a principal end of go­vernment. For (all things considered) a state of nature would be preferable to that of the civil state, if in it men could be secure from those injuries of which the civil state takes cognizance. But as they cannot, and as it is necessary for the safety of mankind that crimes should not go unpunished, civil government founded upon uni­versal justice, is the proper and only corrective.

The great end of government is security. This in­cludes the protection of life, liberty, and property. Men can have no other motive for uniting in civil socie­ty [Page 23] than the attainment of these primary objects. This protection can only be effected by placing the power to judge of and to punish offences somewhere. For no me­thod hath yet been devised, and perhaps never will be, calculated to render men incapable of perpetrating of­fences. All that society can do, even in its best state, is to punish transgression according to its degree of tur­pitude. Governmental example and wholesome laws may do much, but they cannot make bad men good. Punishing the offences of some, and forbidding, general­ly, the commission of certain acts under pains and penal­ties, are the great means of protecting the whole. Legisla­tive, executive, and judiciary powers, are all founded upon the reasonable presumption that offences against the well being of society will be committed, and the ne­cessity, for the end of general protection, that provision should be made for their rightful punition. There are, doubtless, other objects which come properly within the province of internal legislation. But protection is the mighty one and punishment the great mean to accomplish it. And however multiform the means employed may be, yet the end is eternally and identically the same.

Such are the great points to be attained by men quit­ting the state of nature and individually submitting their actions to be judged by one common standard erected by mutual consent and for reciprocal advantage.

And here we shall endeavour to shew the nature of political equality, which we conceive susceptible of such clear demonstration that if we fail in demonstrating the reasonableness and universality of the principle, the fault will be our own.

Suppose a given number of men, say one thousand, living together in the state of nature, strangers to law, but, conscious of its importance, mutually coalescing to institute rules by which the whole shall be goverened. Now it is obvious that, if the principle that will apply to one thousand be just, it will not be less so when appli­ed to one million, or one hundred millions. The prin­ciple and its operation will be precisely the same, and to apply it to any number it is only necessary to extend [Page 24] the idea as the numbers increase. Previous to entering into this pact they must all needs be equal, that is, no one could possess more privileges than another. Corrupt es­tablishments only have created political distinctions in constituent rights. For in a state of nature, in which there is no law, there cannot be privileged superiors; and where there is no privileged superiors fictitiously cre­ated, the indubitable equality of men, standing upon the broad ground upon which God hath placed them cannot be denied. The chief object to be attained by commu­ting the state of nature for that of civil society is protec­tion. Now protection is equally due to all concerned. To whom then does the right of making this compact belong that shall effect the lives, and liberty, and pro­perty of the whole? clearly, if of sane mind and mature age, to every one of the number covenanting, whose ev­ery thing will be affected thereby. If one half, for in­stance, should assert that they have the exclusive right to make a compact for the other, whence did they derive that right which does not belong to the whole? no one can tell. It is clear they could have no such right. If the right belong to any, then by this undoubted axiom "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time;" it is impossible the right can belong to one without belonging to the whole. "Things which are equal to the same are equal to one another." ^(h) There­fore, men being equal, if the right to institute belong to one man it equally belongs to another: It cannot belong to a part without belonging to the whole. Again, "The whole is greater than its parts." ⁽ⁱ⁾ But the parts must forever retain the properties and qualities of the whole in the ratio of their quantity of matter. So it is with a Government. The right to begin, to erect, and con­tinue a Government belongs solely to the community or whole for which it is intended. Divide that community into the smallest possible number, say one, and by parity of reasoning it will be found that as the right appertains to the whole, so in equal proportions, it appertains to [Page 25] to its parts: and consequently, if the right belongs to one man, it equally belongs to another.

Such is the essence, the foundation, and such our ideas of political equality. And so earnestly do we wish to be right in this matter; and so thoroughly are we convinced that the principle here laid down is correct, that should we be herein mistaken we desire to be corrected by argu­ment: And we shall esteem ourselves favored by any one who will point out the error.

Now as it would be palpably unjust and an act of great violence for one half of the number mentioned to de­prive the other of their right of suffrage in the conforma­tion of the original compact, so it would be proportion­ately unjust in any other given number. If ninety nine hundredths should combine to deprive the hundredth person of his right of elective franchise, tho' the crime would differ in degree of turpitude, it would nevertheless be of the same kind. This necessarily follows from the principle already advanced and explained, viz. that the right of suffrage cannot belong to one man without be­longing to another; that it cannot belong to a part with­out belonging to the whole; and the whole being made up of parts, it follows that equal parts must have equal rights. Therefore, every person who is deprived of this right, sustains an act of great violence, and is thereby, in appropriate language, made a slave. For what can be greater slavery than to be subject to the will and controul of our fellow men? It is in this that slavery consists: It is against this base villainage that the free mind of man perpetually revolts.

Every disfranchisement, however few the number dis­franchised, is unjust, and originates in power not in right. To illustrate this position we will suppose a case. Sup­pose when the federal compact was made, twelve states of the United States had combined to extend that confed­eration to the thirteenth, and "to bind it in all ca­ses whatsoever," without allowing the state its right to an adequate share in the choice of the government;— would not such a proceeding have been a gross violation [Page 26] of the rights of the state? As the federal compact was in­tended for the government of the whole, had not each state an equal right, according to its population, in the choice and formation of that government which should bind the whole? Most certainly. If one state possessed the right, so did another, and so did the whole. Such an assumption would have been a palpable infraction of the rights of the state, and predicated only on the power of the twelve states to bind the thirteenth. This is obvi­ous. And is it less so for a larger or smaller number of people to combine to deprive any portion of the com­munity of their equal rights as men? The supposed dis­memberment of the state, and the supposition of the twelve states combining to bind the thirteenth to their will, stands precisely on the same ground. In principle they are parallel: In practice both cases are unjust ac­cording to the number of people disfranchised. And hence it is evident that for governments to he justly con­structed, they must be founded upon the universal equal­ity of man; & that where they rest not upon this broad ba­sis, they are usurpations in proportion that this equality is wanting.

Privation of constituent rights, whether on an exten­sive or small scale, necessarily places mankind in a state of sentimental warfare; and there is no possible method of extirpating these seeds of dissonance and dissolution, and of rendering universal satisfaction, but by giving to mankind their equal rights. Nor will this warfare be confined to mere sentiment longer than the injured and inslaved become sufficiently powerful to resist the tyran­ny. And then, both theory and modern history evinces that, impatient of unreasonable and unnecessary restraint, and indignant at the galling thought that a large moiety of mankind live only to subserve the wants of the other; they burst forth like resistless torrents; sweep away the odious and unsufferable tyranny, and involve for a time, both the innocent and the guilty in indiscriminate chaos and bloodshed. But though the act be dire, yet it is ne­cessary. Though revolutions are evils during their ex­istence, yet, their seeds being sown in the inequality [Page 27] of men, it is to be expected that, nurtured by the genial warmth of patriotism, and the unextinguishable love of man for the enjoyment of liberty, the period of their maturity must arrive. This was the case with these states: this was the cause which impelled and precipitat­ed France into her present revolution, and called into being that potent republic. But as liberty, with her con­sequent order and happiness, has arisen from the revolu­tion of the former, so, we doubt not but that equal li­berty, and order, and happiness, will result from the latter.

Political inequality, like every act of violence, has nothing to defend it but force. It is a crime of the most attrocious kind. It is engendered in wickedness; it is nourished by venality; it is upheld by power: and it continues to be, until both become too weak for its sup­port; and then, like useless and exploded kings, it de­scends to its natural level. Its strong hold is ignorance; consequently, as the human mind becomes illumined, the huge colossus crumbles into dust, and oppressed man, rising from his dungeon, resumes the station assigned him by his maker.

That political inequality is founded solely on power, and is in its nature the highest species of injustice, will appear still more evident by pursuing the subject a little further. For this purpose we beg the reader to bear in mind the idea of a given number of men, jointly leaving the state of nature and uniting to establish a government for mutual advantage. This done, admit the assump­tion of the rights of the whole by one half the given number. Could a government so constituted be binding upon that half whose assent thereto had never been re­quired, and in the instituting of which they had nothing to do? We answer no. The consent of all the parts is indispensibly necessary to the legitimacy of the govern­ment. The assent of the whole to particular modifica­tions is not nor cannot be expected. In all such cases the assent of the majority of the whole must forever be final. But what we contend for is the equal right of all to give being to and continue the existence of govern­ment. [Page 28] For as the consent of the parties is necessary to make valid a contract between two men, so the consent of all the parts of the community is alike necessary to make valid a national compact. Both these positions flow from the same source, viz, that one man cannot of right be bound by another against his consent—To be free from such bondage is the only security we have for the preservation of every thing estimable to man. National freedom, & the right of self-preservation, apper­tains equally to all men. But of what importance are these invaluable blessings if one part of mankind can, when they please, deprive the other of these first of all gifts? They are of none. That liberty which should never be surrendered but with life, that preservation in the state, which should never be lost sight of, would be of no value.

But there is another branch of this doctrine which re­quires investigation and developement. For the purpose of reconciling a large moiety of mankind to their state of slavery, a doctrine has been sedulously propagated, that in the civil state it is necessary to give up a great propor­tion of our natural rights in order to secure the enjoy­ment of the rest. This doctrine has much plausibility and force where thought and investigation is wanting. It is therefore well calculated to delude the ignorant, and is much inculcated by those who profit by the fraud. It is universally propagated in despotic countries. A large proportion of Englishmen are laid asleep with the pow­erful opiate. The senate and the bar resounds with this enslaving doctrine; and three-fourths of the people are at this moment ready to solace themselves with the very comfortable idea, that the fewer privileges they enjoy in the kingdom, the more they comply with the just princi­ples of civil government. Alass! what state is there to which uninformed men cannot be reduced by the perfi­dy and cunning of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny?

In order to give this topic an ingenuous discussion, and to bring it fairly before the tribunal of the public and of reason, we shall cite the opinions of two respectable au­thorities who differ widely on this subject. These are [Page 29] Mr. Locke and Mr. Vattel. Though we confess, that had the mind the researches and the information of Vattel, which enabled him to reason on this subject with the strength and precision of Locke, yet any one who reads his book, will easily perceive that he was an advocate for kingly power, and that a prepossession of this noxious sentiment must have biassed his mind on this point. We shall ne­vertheless consider the position apart from the conside­ration of men: we shall examine the principle and de­cide accordingly.

[Page 30]Though M. de Vattel has not gone as far in giving up men's rights as some ministerial civilians and heredi­tary statesmen in Europe, yet, it would have been no more than fair to have told us what these surrendered privileges are of which he speaks. He seems to have contented himself with the simple declaration that we have "surrendered a part of our privileges to the sove­reign." It is easy to make such an assertion, but it is not as easy to prove its truth in principle. If he meant it as a mere fact, when applied to some states, its authenti­city cannot be doubted. Indeed he might have gone farther. Nineteen twentieths of the people of England have scarcely any privileges. The same may be said with equal truth of those of Germany, Russia, Prussia, of al­most all Europe, and certainly of all Asia. But this was not his meaning. He as well as others who have carried the point further than himself, advance it as the regular operation of principle, necessary and unavoidable on men entering the civil state; and on this ground we shall pro­ceed to consider it.

If the words that men "have surrendered a part of the privileges of nature to the sovereign," have any im­port, [Page 31] it is this, that every person, on entering the civil state, necessarily surrenders to the contracting parties or "sovereign," a part of the privileges appertaining to him in the state of nature. In order to determine this position it is necessary to destinguish what privileges there are in the state of nature which men cannot enjoy in the civil state. Until this be done, we shall prate like par­rots, without having in the mind a clear and distinct per­ception of the things of which we speak. Here then we declare without hesitancy or ambiguity, that we know of no privileges appertaining to men in the state of nature which they cannot enjoy in the civil state compatibly with the just principles of civil government.

What privileges are there belonging to man in the state of nature, the fruition of which are necessarily denied them in the civil state?

It may be said that in the state of nature the actions of men are not restrained, that there being no authority established by law to punish offences, men are free to do what they please. So far as this relates to the power of man to do wrong in the state of nature, without being subject to punishment by the regular operation of law, the position is correct; but certainly not so as to right. Rea­son exclaims as loudly against injustice in the natural as in the civil state. It is not that because there is no law to punish injuries done in the natural state that men are free to commit them; since the same injuries done to our fellow men in the natural, are as great offences against reason and justice as they are against law in the civil state, which is no more than the exposition of that reason & jus­tice which equally pervades both. If a man in the state of nature should invade and sack his neighbour's property, deprive him of life or limb, or immure him in durance during his pleasure; would such acts be crimes of less magnitude in the eye of reason because in that state there is no law to punish such offences? Certainly not. Rea­son, on which punative laws against burglary, house-breaking, murder and the like are founded, condemns the commission of these offences in the state of nature, as much as the laws founded there on will punish their per­petration [Page 32] in the civil state. Mutual justice, and that love of self-preservation predominant in every man, solemnly and powerfully forbids us, in every state, to injure each other in life, liberty, or property. For if I respect not these things in others, how can I expect others to respect them in me? This is reason, which in the state of nature, is the law of that state; and which in the civil state, is the foundation of all the good laws with which man­kind have ever been blessed. Therefore, as it never was the right of man to do wrong, and as it would be wrong for one man to injure another, so it cannot be a privilege of the natural state to commit injustice, which, in a well regulated civil state would not pass unpunished. But if any one should still incline to the opinion that to do wrong is a privilege of the state of nature, to such we observe, that the sooner this unreasonable privilege be "surrendered to the Sovereign," and thence banished forever from the presence of man, the better; nor should we in the civil state lose much liberty by its flight.

But if the perpetration of offences oppugnant to reason and justice, be a privilege of the natural, it is also, we contend, equally a privilege of the civil state. Men have the same power to violate the great maxims of justice in the civil, that they have in the natural state. The civil state does not nor cannot deprive men of the power to commit injustice. They still retain the capability of per­petrating crimes which shock humanity and inflict mise­ry upon human beings. But tho' they have the power to commit them in both, yet they have not the right in either. As men may commit murder, the most horrid of all crimes, in the natural, so they may in the civil state. Nor is this or any other crime less justifiable in the one than in the other. The only difference that we perceive, in this respect, between the two states, is this, that in the civil state laws compels submission to their regular opera­tion. Whereas there being no law in the natural state to compel obedience, offenders add to their offences by re­sisting that punishment which reason prescribes and indi­vidual safety requires.

But we will allow, to shew the absurdity of the posi­tion, [Page 33] that to do wrong or to commit injustice, is a pri­vilege of the natural state; yet, for what purpose is it necessary that this privilege should be surrendered by individuals to the state unless to be exercised by the so­vereign to whom the surrender is made? And if to be exercised by the sovereign or whole, how is it to operate but by abusing its parts? If this supposed privilege of nature be so exceedingly baleful that individuals cannot use it in the civil state without injuring each other, and the whole, how much more injurious would it be for the state to possess and exercise it? What must be the situa­tion of the state when saturated with this load of abomi­nation? Would the mighty mass of peccancy and injus­tice lie dormant in the body politic? No. Would there be no danger of fermentation? Yes. Like vesuvius it would belch forth and scatter over the pale of its influ­ence, its deteriorating lava. And is it more justifiable for a nation to do wrong than for an individual? Be­sides if it ever was a privilege of men to do wrong in any state, to surrender it is impossible. To render man­kind incapable of violating moral justice, it is necessary to invert nature, to create man anew, and of purer ma­terials. The business of society is to prevent as far as possible the commission of offences, and where it cannot reasonably to chastise them. Therefore, as it never was a privilege of the natural state to infringe the law of rea­son, it follows that that which never was a privilege can never be surrendered.

But as men have conceded to the civil state a power to punish offences committed against the safety of its mem­bers, have they not, by the concession, surrendered a right appertaining to them in the state of nature? If we were to answer this question in the affirmative, it would make nothing for those who contend that men cannot enjoy in the civil state their natural rights; since, the power to punish wrongs is conceded equally by the whole; is founded upon a rule of mutual justice, and established by mutual consent. This rule can never ope­rate to suppress or prevent acts promotive of the general [Page 34] good. Its great province is to punish, in a fair and ra­tional way, actions which violate the law of reason, disturb puplic repose, and lessen puplic happiness. But to this question we answer, that so far from men surrendering any of their natural rights by lodging this power in the civil state, that they thereby acquire privileges which, in the natural state, they cannot possibly enjoy.

If men, in any case, surrender to the civil state, on entering therein, any of the rights which flow from the state of nature, it is by investing in the sovereign punitive powers. In the natural state the right of punition ap­pertains only to the sustainers of injury. For though all offences against the law of reason are real offences against the safety of all within their reach, and are truly punisha­ble; yet, it is by compact only that those who are not real and immediate sufferers come by power to punish them. But in the natural state it will readily occur to every one that the power to punish must be frequently wanting in injured persons. For he who is wicked and daring enough to commit murder, robbery, or any of the less offences in the natural, which, by the laws of the civil state, merit legal chastisement, will not voluntarily, submit to a just retribution of punishment. To compel submission to an equitable rule equally established, forms a principal part of civil government. But though in this association a power to punish infractions of its rules is vested, yet, the natural right of each individual is not thereby impaired. Every man, who, in the civil state, sustains criminal offence, has the same right to punish the criminal by law that he has in the natural state by reason. So that, on entering the civil state, we surrender not our natural right of punishing personal injuries. In the com­mutation we lose nothing: on the contrary we gain by the change. For if, in the civil state, criminal offence be committed against me; though I myself have the right to prosecute the offender to punishment, yet, if unable, from whatever cause, the state must prosecute for me. This privilege of the civil belongs not to the natural state. It is merely acquired by and results from men combining together for reciprocal protection. So that, [Page 35] in the civil state, the natural right of individuals to pu­nish offences committed against them, is not only pre­served in its purity and fulness, but they have, in addi­tion, the whole community to aid them. Therefore, so far from inverting society with punitive power, being a surrender of natural rights or privileges, that is a sub­stantial and happy enlargement of natural liberty.

From what has been said, it results,

First, that men never had, in the natural state, a right to do wrong. And as it is evident that no one can sur­render what he never possessed, so, this cannot be one of the supposed privileges surrendered to the civil state.

Secondly, that if it ever was the right of men to do wrong, that right must forever appertain to them in every state: since, the right must be determined by reason, whose laws are unalterably the same. And as reason can­not approve or sanction that in one man which injures the rights of another, or violates equal justice; so, to do wrong, or to violate equal justice, cannot be a privilege of the state of nature.

Lastly, the placing power in the civil state, to punish offences committed against its safety, does not impair one jot the right which belong to men in the state of nature, of individually punishing individual injuries. But on the contrary this right is not only preserved in its pris­tine state, but is additionally strengthened by the additi­tional accession of the conjoint protection of the society or sovereign.

Whither then shall we seek for the "surrendered pri­vileges?" Diogenes with his lanthorn and acumen would find it difficult to discover them. Of what do they consist? It is plain that governments cannot be consider­ed in any other light than as restraints upon those actions which, in every state, defies the law of reason; but which, in the natural state, cannot conveniently be punished.

A brief analysis of our actions will make this appear evident.

All the vast and vastly diversified actions of men may be classed under three heads:

[Page 36]First, virtuous actions, or such as promote individual and general good

Secondly, indifferent ones, or such as produce neither good nor evil consequences to society. And,

Thirdly, vicious actions, or such as are evidently pernicious to individuals and to the state.

With respect to the first—It is evident that govern­mental laws can have nothing to do with virtuous actions. Governments are neither instituted to prevent nor to punish them. And where they do either, they are go­vernments of violence, not of justice.

With respect to the second—Laws are always indif­ferent where actions are so. They cannot, take cogni­sance of actions which neither produce good nor bad consequences to the state. They are with these as with virtuous ones, mere unimportant and dormant parch­ments They cannot operate; since, men cannot, a­greeably to reason and to just laws, either be punished or rewarded for actions as devoid of utility as they are of evil consequences.

In regard to the third.—Here laws operate within their province. The power placed in the civil state to punish crimes committed against the law of reason, which, in the natural state, cannot conveniently be punished, here operate in its full force and to accomplished the de­signed end, viz. that men may be free from violence and injustice. The sole design of government is to prevent men from violating the sacred rights of each other, and, where it cannot, to punish offenders. Governments are of no other use among men. Nor can they operate in any other manner without committing the identical injus­tice to prevent which they are instituted. Their powers then being solely confined to the prevention and punish­ment of actions subversive of justice, and which violates the law of reason, on which civil laws are founded, it is clear, that, in civil societies standing upon universal jus­tice, men do not nor cannot surrender any of the rights or privileges appertaining to them in the state of nature.

Having shewn that men cannot, consistently with rea­son and justice, relinquish, on entering the civil state, any [Page 37] of the immunities which appertain to the state of nature; we shall now briefly enquire,

How the supposed privileges are to be relinquished, al­lowing them to be relinquishable; whether according to justice, and if so, to whom are they to be surrendered?

We imagine that even the esteemers of the spurious and trammelling doctrine of surrendering natural privil­eges to the civil state, do not wish to be understood that a partial and unjust relinquishment is what they contend for. To be consistent with themselves they must allow, that if by the regular and inevitable operation of enter­ing the civil state, it be really necessary for one man to surrender thereto a given portion of privileges, it is al­so equally necessary for each and every one to give up the same portion. If this be not their meaning; if they do not pay due deference to reason and justice, their dis­courses may be considered as mere political delusion and finesse, by which, at one stroke mankind are meant to be divided into two parts, the one to govern, limited only by power, and the other implicitly to obey. But in this we neither discover philosophy nor philanthropy; we neither see reason or justice; which if they abandon, they are not worth contending with. We shall therefore sup­pose them to be actuated by pure principle, & advocates for pure and universal justice: and on this ground we pledge ourselves to shew the utter impossibility of making such surrender.

This then may, we conceive, be laid down as an ax­iom, that if is be necessary and unavoidable for one man, on entering the civil state, to surrender to that state, a given quantity of natural privileges, it is equally necessa­ry and unavoidable for every one of the contracting par­ties to surrender an equally given quantity. If it be ne­cessary for one man, it is also equally necessary for ano­ther, and for the whole.—A position so self-evident is not susceptible of additional proof. Suppose, then, the citizens of the United States, who are adults, to consist of one million; and that they shall all surrender to the State an equal number of privileges: Axiom "if equals be taken from equals the wholes are equals;" therefore, [Page 38] if the supposed surrender of privileges be equally made the identical equality of the natural state, it must necessa­rily and unavoidably prevail in the civil; since, by taking from each individual an equal quantity of natural privil­eges, the whole must necessarily be equal; and conse­quently be left in the same state of perfect equality in which they were prior to entering into the civil state, and the supposed surrender of natural privileges. Of conse­quence, to relinquish natural privileges on entering the civil state is absolutely impossible, according to our ideas of reciprocal justice; and therefore, the position is desti­tute of just and rational foundation.

Besides, when each individual in society has surren­dered an equal number of natural privileges, to whom, in the name of common sense, are they given? Is it possible for a state to contain more than the whole of its inhabi­tants? every man will answer no. And when the whole have surrendered an equal number of privileges, who is there to receive them? The answer is easy, no one. But perhaps it will be said, the state. But of whom is the State composed? Of the identical whole who have, it is supposed, made the surrender; which brings the conclu­sion to the same point. Therefore, natural privileges cannot be suerrndered to the civil state, where equal right and justice prevail.

This exposition of political equality is not local: the principle will apply to the civil concerns of men, where­in they may be found. Nor can its reasonableness be overthrown: for its basis is God; therefore, its truth cannot be shaken. Power, centered in the hands of wicked and ambitious men, may indeed prevent its prac­tice; and the admirers of policy, subversive of justice, may advocate its balefulness; but on the subject of poli­cy, hear the Poet.

Thus it is evident that all just governments emenate strictly from the people; that is, from their univer­sal equality and consent. National compacts, there­fore, being the property of the people, are to be considered at all times revocable by them. They have the same right to alter or to annul them, and to institute others, that a man has to delapidate his own house, and to erect another in its stead. Both these rights flow from the same source, viz. that every man has a right to dis­pose of his property in such way as may appear most conducive to his happiness. But as wise nations do not nor will not change their constitutions upon light and tri­vial grounds, so, a wise man will not, for light and trivial causes, destroy or materially alter his own house. So that, notwithstanding they have the right, yet, wisdom, calmly and deliberately exercised, must at all times de­ptermine the exediency of the change.

It is a question of importance to the citizens of New-York, and has some claim to their attention, whether the corporation of the city, all things considered, is or not of public utility; and if not, to what cause its inutility is attributable? It is time to determine the utility of ci­vil politics by the beneficial effects they produce; espe­cially one of such vast expence, and possessed of such immense and deliterious influence as that of our corpo­ration. The heterogenious causes which first brought incorporations into being in modern Europe, and which entitled them to some deference, do not now, nor never did exist within these states. We are neither borne down by the imperiousness of baronial tyranny on the one hand, nor moved to compassionate the sufferings of vas­sals on the other. ^(j) Those dark and barbarous times [Page 40] are passed. But European incorporations produced ad­vantages, when first instituted, which do not nor cannot accompany them in the United States. They introduc­ed a degree of liberty within their jurisdictions favorable to the citizens and quite unknown beyond their limits. And though they produced but partial good, yet they were proportionately serviceable. But it would be dif­ficult to conceive what corporations have to do with li­berty within these states, except to banish it as speedily as possible from them. In a republic like this, where re­presentative systems of government prevail in great a­bundance and perfection; and where a greater degree of liberty is enjoyed without then within their jurisdictions, while they can be but of little service to the citizens, they are capable of an infinity of mischief.

This chapter is intended to shew the propriety of alter­ing the present mode of appointing the Chief Magistrate of the city. For this purpose we solicit the attention of the reader to the establishment of the following proposi­tions.

First. That the present mode of appointing the Chief magistrate of the city is unjust.

Second. That to ensure a pure administration of the Mayoralty, it is essential that the Mayor be elected by the citizens over whom he presides.

Lastly. That until the citizens enjoy this right, how­ever noxious the Chief magistrate may be, they have no power to remove him.

In politics there is, perhaps, no maxim clearer than this, that the people, for whom a Government is intend­ed, have the exclusive right of "choosing their own gov­ernors." For laws being, of right, founded upon the [Page 41] united conduct of men and instituted for their safety, those for whose benefit they are intended are the only proper persons to determine the fitness of men to make and to administer them— The least interference with this right of self-judgment is unjust. For though A. may be more competent to judge of the concerns of B. than B. himself, and on that account his judgment may be some­times solicited, yet for A. to judge for B. by established rule, against his consent, and with power to bind him by his decisions, is a most unsufferable tyranny. To this conclusion every one will assent. And yet if we test the appointment of the mayor by this rule we shall find that it is sounded upon it. This we shall do; and that we may be the better understood we shall shew, from the constitution the manner of his appointment.

In Art. 18. of the constitution, it is provided, "That all officers, other than those who by this constitution are directed to be otherwise appointed, shall be appointed in the manner following, to wit: the assembly shall, once in every year, openly nominate and appoint one of the senators from each great district, which senators shall form a council for the appointment of the said officers, of which the governor for the time being, or the lieutenant governor, or the president of the senate, when they shall respectively administer the government, shall be president and have a casting voice, but no other vote: and with advice and consent of the said council, shall appoint all the said officers; and that a majority of the said council be a quorum; and further, the said senators shall not be eligible to the said council for two years successively." Greenleaf's edition of the laws of New-York, 1798.

Particular provision not being made in the constitution for the election of the mayor, his appointment falls within the province of this council, which, after a delusively refining process, consist of four senators, one from each district of the state. To evince the injustice of this mode of appointment we shall shew by analogy that the right of appointing or electing the mayor and (of course eve­ry corporate officer now appointed by the council) ap­pertains [Page 42] exclusively to the people within the pale of the corporation: and consequently for other persons to ex­ercise that right is unjust. But as the legislature may, by another part of the constitution of the state take this privilege from the council and transfer it to the citizens within the corporate jurisdiction, it is only for them re­spectfully to command it and it must be done.

It is meet that the corporation should acknowledge the constitution of the state as its supreme guide and that all its proceedings should be in coincidence with its prin­ciples. For this purpose, as the corporation depends upon the suffrage of the state for its being, it is necessa­ry that the legislature should take cognizance of its pro­ceedings, but only where they are incongruous with the constitution. Under this restriction only the people with­in the corporation should be left to regulate their own concerns.

The business of the corporation, as it respects intern­al police, is as distant from that of the agregate state, as legislation in one state is from that of another. The corporation is an insular polity, instituted for local pur­poses: Its boundaries, its jurisdiction, its powers, ex­tend not beyond the confines of the island. ^(k) It is in­tended solely to affect the people within its limits or it is not. If it be not, if its jurisdiction be not bounded by a known division of the state, its rights and its powers must be commensurate with it. But this no one will as­sert. If its jurisdiction extend not beyond the bounds of the city, and it be intended solely for the citizens, which every one must acknowledge, then by the same rule that the people of the state have the sole right of electing the legislature thereof, viz. that of managing their own concerns, those of the city have the exclusive right of electing city officers. The business of the city being distinct from that of the entire state, the state ought not, after suffering a provincial government to be erect­ed within it, to interfere in its ulterior regulations, ex­cept as before said, where those regulations clash with the [Page 43] constitution. To interfere in any other case is as unjust as it would be for one state to interfere in the internal le­gistation of another.

This self-management of self-concerns, is the vital part of government. Accordingly we find that, where there is danger of foreign interference, governments ve­ry properly repel it with suitable pertinacity. But fo­reign interference is in its nature relative. The federal government would justly term that foreign interference which, contrary to the exclusive management of its own concerns, should be attempted to be introduced into it by a foreign government. So, for the federal government to interfere in the internal regulation of the respective states, would be foreign interference. And so if this state should intermeddle in the internal political arrangements of Connecticut, notwithstanding the juxta-position of the two states, yet, the interference would be as unjust and foreign as if it came from transatlantic parts. This neces­sarily flows from this thesis, that seperate body politics ought to manage their own concerns. This is the right of self-judgment for which we contend, and which is as applicable to our corporation considered with the state, as it is to one state considered with another.

If it be fit and requisite for the council to appoint the mayor of the city, it is equally so for them to appoint the aldermen, which they do not. But in the present mode in which this business is transacted, we see nothing of those cheering improvements, which, generally, have so justly and eminently distinguished American politics. The appointment of the mayor by the council is a faith­ful transcript, implicitly taken, but existing under dissi­mular circumstances, of that established in the charter of George II. At that era England held dominion over these states, and it was consonant with her usual policy towards them to suffer the citizens to enjoy a few unim­portant privileges, such as electing alderman, constables and so on; but to take especial care that with respect to important offices such as mayor, recorder, sheriff, &c. they should be appointed by the governor, who was ap­pointed by the king. The better to keep the citizens in [Page 44] vassalage, and at the same time pleasingly to reconcile them to that gloomy state, they were suffered to enjoy those petty privileges. Like a cunning conqueror who, to perpetuate his conquest and to reconcile the conquer­ed to the conqueror, the king was graciously pleased to allow the citizens to enjoy privileges from the exercise of which, it was conceived, no injury to his domination could result. But surely there is no occasion for the state legislature to treat the people of the city, in this respect, as they were wont to be treated by this British king. It is impossible for the legislature to entertain the idea that imparting to the citizens the right of electing their copo­rate officers, would be dangerous to their power. But if they could, that power is unjust which does not flow from, and the exercise of which does not comport with the liberty of the people; and therefore its reduction could not be reasonable ground for regret. But the interest of our government is not incompatible with that of the citizens. The interest of the one is the interest of the other. They are identically the same. But this was not the case with the government of Great Britain whose object was taxa­tion, & therefore the deeper the people were immerged in slavery the more of their income might be extorted from them. On the other hand every thing estimable to America demanded that she should rid herself of the de­testable yoke as soon as circumstances would permit.

The appointment of the mayor by the council, like every other act not founded upon reason, is irreconcila­ble even with itself. Nor is it probable that if the con­stitution had been discussed in a period of peace, the pre­sent mode would have been recognized. But having once had being, like many other errors, it has been continued. If the citizens can regulate their corporate concerns in part, without legislative interposition, why may they not in the whole subject to constitutional checks for unconstitutional aberrations? The state compels the corporaion to defray its own expence and at the same time deprives the citizens of the right of electing their city of­ficers! This is an extensive branch of that system against which the United States contended, and what is still more [Page 45] strange was even acted upon by the State during the con­flict!

That the citizens of the corporation have a right to regulate their own business is acknowledged by the State Legislature, as it respects city expence, with which the State has nothing to do as to contribution. Why do not the State provide, by general tax, for defraying the ex­pence of the city? Because that expence being incurred by city regulations only, it would be unjust for those liv­ing beyond its limits and who are not partakers of its benefits, to bear any part of its burdens. In this res­pect the city is considered as a sort of integer, acknowl­edging, certainly, the supremacy of the State, but left to itself as to revenue regulations. But if those living without the limits of the city ought not on that account to bear any part of its expence, for the same reason they ought to have no concern with its internal police. For the State to appoint charter officers to rule over the citi­zens, and to incur expences which must be borne solely by them, is comparable to quartering State soldiers of equal permanence and expence on a particular Town, The freedom of the citizens in both cases is alike viola­ted; and the injustice of the one can only be equalled by the injustice of the other.

That the citzens have the Chief magistrate thus impo­sed upon them, can admit of little doubt. To prove this it will only be necessary to advert to the manner of his appointment. The council by which he is appointed, is thus composed. Every citizen who pays taxes to the State, and rents a house of the yearly value of forty shil­lings is eligible to vote for assemblymen. Senators are elected by citizens possessed of freehold estate of the value of an hundred pounds, free of incumbrance. The two houses being thus composed, the assembly elect from the Senate the council of appointment. In this council the southern district, in which the city is comprehended, has one member, who can only be presumed to represent the city, since the district of which he is the representa­tive, includes it. It would be a misapplication of words to term this Senator the representative of the city, whose [Page 46] votes, compared with those of the district at large, are certainly not more than as one to six. But if he was the representative of the city and the only person who ap­points the Mayor, still, the placing in his hands by the state▪ the right of the citizens to judge themselves of the fitness of persons to fill the Mayoralty, is unjust. To take from the people this right of self judgment, is dan­gerous to liberty. Of this no one, possessed of the or­dinary senses of a man, will doubt. We have countless and striking facts which invite our attention every day in Europe of the awful effects which result from this sur­render. Nor are we without instructive lessons in our own country of its dangerous tendencies. ^(l.) It is a spe­cies of that virtual representation so much admired by Monarchists, but which is so utterly inconsonant with the genius of republican America. It is the negation of constituent immunities, and the never failing operator of the slavery of man.

But allowing this Senator to be the representative of the city, and that it is meet he should judge for the citi­zens, still he is only one opposed to three persons in the Council. And who are they? People who reside out of the district in which the city is, and who, for ought we we know, never saw it. These gentlemen surely will not be called the representatives of the city. In them the cit­izens have no choice. They are the deputies of districts whose interest may not accord with that of the city, and whose sentiments may be repugnant to those of the [Page 47] citizens. They are men over whom the citizens of New-York have no controul. They may therefore impose upon them a Chief-magistrate of turbulent & acerberous disposition, and who in every respect is opposed to their sentiments and wishes. And where is the remedy?

It is to be expected, from every thing the world has hitherto furnished, that the sentiments and adminis­tration of the Mayor will accord with considerable exac­titude with the sentiments of those by whom he is ap­pointed. This has been peculiarly verified by the present incumbent. The members of the council of appoint­ment for years back have been federalists; and so is the Mayor who has held that office ten years. What has been the consequence? Every one who is acquainted with his general administration need not be told of the partiality he has exhibited towards those of federal sentiments, and the rancour and enmity to Republicans. No one is so ignorant as not to know what he has done both in public and private life to exalt the one and to sink the other. But this was to have been and may in future be expect­ed, unless the Legislature should, in their wisdom, give to the citizens the right of his election. This is the only radical cure.—In the city there is a large and unequivo­cal majority of republicans; but what will this avail the citizens unless it should be so far the case throughout the States, as that in the Assembly there should be a constant majority; or even then, unless in the senate there should be one republican Senator from three of the four districts? The citizens might still be saddled with a Mayor of sentiments hostile to their own; and who, like Burke's king, would hold the Mayoralty in "contempt of their choice." Is this freedom? Is this representation? Is it political justice.

To secure a faithful execution of office and a decent respect for the sentiments of the people, it is essential that the officers of government be elected by them. To make them independent of this only source of power, is to make the people subservient to their views. This is an inversion of order. This is political injustice. Where­as to make them really dependent upon the people is of itself sufficient to induce measures consistent with their [Page 48] happiness, and to impel even a Nero to deeds of justice and of mercy.

To accomplish this end in the present case, it is ne­cessary that the citizens within the limits of the corpora­tion, who are eligible to vote for assemblymen, should elect the Mayor. In this case, if his reliance upon them should not, contrary to rational calculation and univer­sal experience, induce a just administration, they might at the end of the period for which he should be elected, supercede him. This is a necessary part of election, that the people may, by ingenuous discussions, determine how far those whom they have honored with their trust & con­fidence, merit their continuance. But at present, tho' the citizens may speak of the administration of the Mayor, yet having no choice in his election however iniquitous that administration may be, they cannot remove him. They may indeed hope that he may be a good man, and if it should so happen it is well; but if not, they have him "for better and for worse;" they are obliged to bear with him. The prevalence of republicanism throughout the state may produce a salutary change of men; and this is the only ground of hope from the present mode of appointment. But though a change thus effected would be acceptable; yet for the citizens constantly to rely upon this contingence, even should it be as constantly realized, would be improper inasmuCh as the state and not themselves would furnish the city with its Chief Ma­gistrate. ^(m)

Such are the peculiar hardships under which the citi­zens labour from the present system!

Where the success of actions depend upon efforts pro­portioned to the end, men exert themselves with cheer­fulness. [Page 49] But, when by uncommon exertions the attain­ment of objects ardently desired borders on impossibility, the necessary excitement to ultimate success diminishes; and instead of being aroused to actions apportioned to the magnitude of the prize, we are too apt to succumb under the incumbent and unpleasing pressure. Such is the gloomy prospect of the citizens of New-York from the present mode of appointing the chief magistrate! There are no exertions of which they are capable, ab­stractedly considered from the rest of the state, by which they can at all effect the mayor. If, as before said, the city should continue to send republican representatives to the assembly, and by a fortuitous concurrence of cir­cumstances the other parts of the state should not, what power have they to remove the mayor however much his removal might be desired? None. Where then is the liberty of the citizens in this respect? To say that men are free when their freedom depends upon the will of others, is as great a contradiction as to say that the same thing can be and not be at the same time. Free­dom consists in one man being free from the restraints of others. But in this respect the citizens are as much bound by the will of the state, in a matter which, of right, only concerns themselves, as a slave is by the will of his owner: and the influence they have in the appoint­ment of the mayor is little more than if he was appointed by the king of England.

Such a system ill accords with justice and the political improvements of America. Nor is it consistent with the wisdom of the legislature to suffer its continuance.. It peculiarly behoves the present legislature seriously to consider this subject. Much indeed depends upon it. Beneficial effects will doubtless result from a change of men at the present juncture. But permanent good can only be expected from a radical change in the system. Let the legislature give to the city the right of electing its Chief Magistrate, and by so doing the independance of the citizens and perhaps the freedom of the state, will be preserved. This, we repeat, is the only source from [Page 50] which durable good can be expected. For if from in­attention or any other cause the republicanism of the state should not, at the next session, predominate in the assembly, what may be done by this, may be undone by the next legislature. Whereas if the citizens once pos­sess the right of electing the mayor, it would not be an easy matter at any subsequent period, to wrest it from them.