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THE TWO TRIALS OF JOHN FRIES, on an Indictment for TREASON; TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF REPORT OF THE TRIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PERSONS, FOR Treason and Insurrection.

In the Counties of Bucks, Northampton and Montgomery, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Begun at the City of Philadelphia, April 11, 1799; continued at Norristown, October 11, 1799;—and concluded at Philadelphia, April 11, 1800; before the Hon. Judges, IREDELL, PETERS, WASHINGTON, and CHASE.

TO WHICH IS ADDED, A copious Appendix, containing the evidences and arguments of the counsel on both sides, on the motion for a new trial; the arguments on the motion for removing the case to the county where the crime was committed, and the arguments against holding the jurisdiction at Norristown.

TAKEN IN SHORT HAND BY THOMAS CARPENTER.

[COPY-RIGHT SECURED.]

PHILADELPHIA: Printed and sold by WILLIAM W. WOODWARD, No. 17 Chesnut near Front street. 1800.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following very important and interesting trial, and the law arguments on the different motions made to the court, has been long kept from the public eye; but no longer than inevitably necessary—It would have been imprudent, (if not unlawful) to have published a first trial, when a second was pending. The reporter has curtailed the second trial as much as possible—not repeat­ing, but referring to the testimony given on the first trial; but he has given at length all new evidence that occurred. The testimony is accurately reported—he believes the ar­guments and opinions to be so, and, to make it so, wherever opportunity offered, he has submitted it to the inspection of the gentlemen themselves: when he could not, he trusts unimportant inaccuracies, if any, will be pardoned.

It is probable, several of the names are wrong spelled, but, without more trouble than necessity demanded, it could not well be otherwise.

ERRATA.

Page 157, note, dele "no."

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CONTENTS.

  • CHARGE to the Grand Jury Page 1
  • Indictment of John Fries Page 17
  • Names of the Jurors Page 18, 17 [...]
  • Exordium of Mr. Sitgreaves Page ibid
  • Exordium of Mr. Rawle, on the second trial Page 17 [...]
  • Testimony of William Henry, Esq Page 24,82, & 180
  • Testimony of William Barnet Page 23, 182
  • Testimony of John Barnet Page 31, 182
  • Testimony of Christian Winters Page 34, 183
  • Testimony of Christian Roths Page 35
  • Testimony of William Nichols, Esq Page 37, 184
  • Testimony of Philip Sehlaugh Page 41, 183
  • Testimony of Joseph Horsefield, Esq Page 41
  • Testimony of John Mohollan, Esq Page 44
  • Testimony of Jacob Eyerley, Esq Page 45, 84
  • Testimony of Samuel Toon Page 52, 183
  • Testimony of Andrew Shiffert Page 56, 184
  • Testimony of John Dillingher Page 57, 185
  • Testimony of William Thomas Page 5 [...], 187
  • Testimony of George Mitchel Page 64, 191
  • Testimony of James Chapman Page 67, 84, 187
  • Testimony of John Rodrick Page 70, 187
  • Testimony of Cephas Childs Page 73, 84, 189
  • Testimony of Judge Peters Page 79, 84
  • Examination of John Fries Page 80
  • Testimony of Jacob Steinher Page 83
  • Law points to support the charge, produced by Mr. Rawle Page 85
  • Mr. Dallas in the defence Page 8 [...]
Witnesses called by the prisoner.
  • John Jamieson Page 110
  • Jacob Huber Page 113
  • Israel Roberts Page ibid, 189
  • Everhard Foulke, Esq Page 115, 188
  • Mr. Ewing, in behalf of the prisoner Page 117
  • Mr. Sitgreaves, for the prosecution Page 121
  • Mr. Lewis, in answer Page 135
  • Mr. Rawle, in summing up the evidence Page 151
  • Charge by Judge Peters Page 204
  • Charge by Judge Iredell Page 164
  • SECOND TRIAL Page 177
  • Testimony of Christian Heckavelter Page 185
  • Testimony of John Romick Page ibid
  • [Page 4] Testimony of John Oswald Page 186
  • Testimony of Isaac Schymer, Esq Page ibid
  • Testimony of James Williamson, Esq Page ibid
  • Testimony of Daniel Wiedner Page 190
  • Charge of Judge Chase Page 196
  • Address to the prisoner, and sentence Page 200
  • Conrad Marks arraigned—his jury and the verdict Page 209
  • George Gettman and Frederick Hainey arraigned—their Jury and verdict Page 210
  • Sentence
  • Anthony Stahler arraigned—his jury and the verdict Page 211
MISDEMEANORS,
  • Persons tried and sentenced May 10th, 1799. Page 212
  • Charge of Judge Iredell to the jury Page 215
  • Address to the prisoners Page 218
  • Sentence Page 219
  • Trial of Jacob Eyerman (the minister) October 16, 1799 Page 220
  • Charge of Judge Washington to the jury Page 224
  • Submissions and sentences of several persons to the court, May 1st, 1800 Page 226
APPENDIX No, I, after the trials.
  • Motion that the trial ought to have been held in the proper county where the crime was committed Page 1
APPENDIX No. II.
  • Motion for a new trial Page 11
  • Depositions and oral testimony of Nicholas Mayer and others, to prove the disqualification of a juror, John Rhoads Page 21
  • Deposition and testimony of John Rhoad, in answer Page 27, 38
  • Argument upon the evidence Page 29
  • Testimony of George Yone, confronted with John Rhoad Page 40
  • Judge Peters' opinion, on the mo [...]ion for a new trial Page 208
  • Motion against jurisdiction at Norristown Page 46
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A CHARGE
Delivered to the GRAND JURY of the UNITED STATES, for the District of Pennsylvania, in the Circuit court of the United States for said dis­trict, held in the city of Philadelphia, April 11th, 1799, by JAMES IREDELL, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the UNITED STATES.

GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY,

THE important duties you are now called upon to fulfil, naturally in­crease with the increasing difficulties of our country. But however great those difficulties may be, I am persuaded you will meet them with a firm and intrepid step, resolved, so far as you are concerned, that no dishonour or calamity (if any should await us) shall be ascribable to a weak or im­partial administration of justice.

If ever any people had reason to be thankful for a long and happy enjoy­ment of peace, liberty and safety, the people of these states surely have. While every other country almost has been convulsed with foreign or domestic war, and some of the finest countries on the globe have been the scene of every species of vice and disorder, where no life was safe, no property was secure, no innocence had protection, and nothing but the basest crimes gave any chance for momentary preservation; no citizen of the United States could truly say that in his own country any oppression had been permitted with impunity, or that he had any grievance to complain of, but that he was required to obey those laws which his own representatives had made, and under a government which the people themselves had chosen. But in the midst of this envied situation, we have heard the government as grossly abused as if it had been guilty of the vilest tyranny, as if common sense or common virtue had fled from our country, and those pure principles of re­publicanism, which have so strongly characterized its councils, could only be found in the happy soil of France, where the sacred fire is preserved by five Directors on ordinary occasions, and three on extraordinary ones—who, with the aid of a republican army, secure its purity from violation by the Legislative representatives of the people.—The external conduct of that government is upon a par with its internal.—Liberty, like the religion of Mahomet, is propagated by the sword. Nations are not only compelled to be free, but to be free on the French model, and placed under French guardianship. French arsenals are the repository of their arms, French treasuries of their money, the city of Paris of their curiosities; and they are honoured with the constant support of French enterprizes in any other part of the world. Such is the progress of a power which began by de­clarations that it abhorred all conquests for itself, and sought no other fe­licity but to emancipate the world from tyrants, and leave each nation free to chase a government of its own. Those who take no warning by such an awful example, may have deeply to lament the consequences of neglecting it.

The situation in which we now stand with that country is peculiarly c [...]itical. Conscious of giving no real cause of offence, but irritated with injuries, and full of resentment for insults; desirous of peace, if it can be preserved with honour and safety, but disdaining a security equally fallaci­ous and ignominious at the expence of either; still holding the rejected [Page 2] Olive Branch in one hand, but a sword in the other—we now remain in a sort of middle path between peace and war, where one false step may lead to the most ruinous consequences, and nothing can be safely relied on but unceasing vigilance, and persevering firmness in what we think right, leaving the event to Heaven, which seldom suffers the destruction of nations, without some capital fault of their own.

Among other measures of defence and precaution which the exigency of the crisis, and the magnitude of the danger, suggested to those to whom the people have entrusted all authority in such cases, were certain acts of the legislature of the United States, not only highly important in themselves but deserving of the most particular attention, on account of the great discontent which has been excited against them, and especially as some of the state legislatures have publicly pronounced them to be in violation of the constitution of the United States. I deem it my duty, therefore, on this occasion to state to you the nature of those laws which have been grossly misrepresented, and to deliver my deliberate opinion as a Judge, in regard to the objections arising from the constitution.

The acts to which I refer you will readily suppose to be what are com­monly called the Alien and Sedition acts. I shall speak of each separate­ly, so far as no common circumstances belonging to them may make a joint discussion proper.

1. The Alien Laws, there being two.

To these laws, in particular, it has been objected.

1. That an Alien ought not to be removed on suspicion, but on proof of some crime.

2. That an Alien coming into the country, on the faith of an act sti­pulating that in a certain time, and on certain conditions, he may become a citizen, to remove him in an arbitrary manner before that time, would be a breach of public faith.

3. That it is inconsistent with the following clause in the constitution, (Art. I. sect. 9.)

"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight? but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dol­lars for each person." With regard to the first objection, viz. "That an alien ought not to be removed on suspicion, but on proof of some crime." It is believed that it never was suggested in any other country, that aliens had a right to go into a foreign country, and stay at their will and plea­sure without any leave from the government. The law of nations, un­doubtely is, that when an alien goes into a foreign country, he goes under either an express or implied safe conduct. In most countries in Europe, I believe, an express passport is necessary for strangers. Where greater liberality is observed, yet it is always understood that the government may order away any alien whose stay is deemed incompatible with the safety of the country. Nothing is more common than to order away, on the eve of a war, all aliens or subjects of the nation with whom the war is to take place. Why is that done, but that it is deemed unsafe to re­tain in the country, men whole prepossessions are naturally so strong in favour of the enemy, that it may be apprehended they will either join in arms, or do mischief by intrigue, in his favour? How many such instances [Page 3] took place it the beginning of the war with Great Britain, no body then objecting to the authority of the measure, and the expediency of it being alone in contemplation! In cases like this, it is ridiculous to talk of a crime, because perhaps the only crime, that a man can then be charged with, is his being born in another country, and having a strong attachment to it. He is not punished for a crime that he has committed, but depriv­ed of the power of committing one hereafter to which even a sense of pa­triotism may tempt a warm and misguided mind. Nobody who has ever heard of Major And [...]e, that possesses any liberality of mind, but must be­lieve that he did what he thought right at the time, though in ray opini­on it was a conduct in no manner justifiable. Yet how fatal might his success have proved! If men, therefore, of good characters, and held in uni­versal estimation for integrity, can be tempted when a great object is in view, to violate the strict duties of morality, what may be expected from others who have neither character nor virtue, but stand ready to yield to temptations of any kind? The opportunities during a war of making use of men of such a description are so numerous and so dangerous, that no prudent nation would ever trust to the possible good behaviour of many of them. Indeed most of those who oppose this law seem to admit that as to alien enemies the interposition may be proper but they contend it is improper before a war actually takes place to exercise such an authority, and that as to neutral aliens it is totally inadmissible. To be sure the two latter instances are not quite to plain, the objection I am considering be­longs equally to them all; for if an alien cannot be removed but on con­viction of a crime, then an alien enemy ought not to be removed but on conviction of treason, or some other crime shewing the necessity of it. If, however, we are not blind to what is evident to all the rest of the world, equal danger may be apprehended from the citizens of a hostile power, be­fore war is actually declared as after, perhaps more, because less suspicion is entertained; and some citizens of a neutral power are equally dangerous with the others. What has given France possession of the Netherlands, Geneva, Switzerland and almost all Italy, and enables her to domineer over so many other countries, lately powerful and completely independent, but that her arts have preceded her arms, the smooth words of amity, peace, an universal love, by seducing weak minds, have led to an unbound­ed confidence, which has ended in their destruction, and they have now to deplore the infatuation which led them to court a fraternal embrace from a bosom in which a dagger was concealed.

In how many countries, alien friends as to us, dependent upon them, are there warm partisans not nominally French citizens but compleatly illumina­ted with French principles, electrified with French enthusiasm, and ready for any sort of revolutionary mischief! Are we to be guarded against the former and exposed to the latter? No, gentlemen, If with such examples before their eyes, congress had either confined their precaution to a war in form, or to citi­zens of France only, losing all sense of danger to their country in a regard to no­minal distinctions, they would probably justly have deserved the charge of neglecting their country's safety in one of its most essential points, and hereafter the very men who are now clamorous against them for exercising a judicious foresight, might too late have had reason to charge them, (as many former infatuated governments in Europe may now fairly be charged by their miserable deluded fellow citizens) as the authors of their country's [Page 4] ruin. But those who object to this law seem to pay little regard to con­siderations of this kind, and to entertain no other fear but that the Presi­dent may exercise this authority for the mere purpose of abusing it. There is no end to arguments or suspicions of this kind. If this power is proper it must be exercised by somebody. If from the nature of it is could be exercised by so numerous a body as Congress, yet as Congress are not constantly sitting, it ought not to be exercised by them alone. If they are not to exercise it, who so sit as the President? What interest can he have in abusing such an authority? But on this occasion, as on others of the like kind, gentlemen think it sufficient to shew, not that a power is likely to be abused (which is all that can be prudently guarded against), but that it possibly may, and therefore to guard against the possibility of an abuse of power, the power is not at all to be exercised.

The argument would be just as good against his acknowledged powers, as any others, that the legislature may occasionally confide to him. Sup­pose he should refuse to nominate to any office? or to command the army or navy? or should assign frivolous reasons against every law, so that no law could be passed but with the concurrence of two thirds of both houses! Suppose Congress should raise an army without necessity, lay taxes where there was no occasion for money, declare war from mere caprice, lay wanton and oppressive restraints on commerce, or in a time of imminent danger trifle with the safety of their country, to gain a momentary breath of populari­ty at the hazard of their country's ruin! All this they may do. Does a­ny man of candour, who does not believe every thing they do wrong, ap­prehend that any of these things will be done? They have the power to do them because the authority to pass very important and necessary acts of legislation on all those subjects, and in regard to which discretion must be lest, unavoidably implies that as it may be exercised in a right manner, it may, if no principle prevent it, be exercised in a wrong one. If the state legislatures should combine to choose no more senators, they may abolish the constitution without the danger of committing reason. If to prevent a House of Representatives being in existence, they should keep no law in being for a similar branch of their own, deeming the abolition of the government of the United States cheaply purchased by such a sacrifice, they may do this. They have the same power over the election of a President and vice President. What is the security against abuse in any of these cases? None, but the precautions taken to procure a proper choice, which, if well exercised, will at least secure the public against a wanton abuse of power, though nothing can secure them absolutely against the common frailty of men, or the possibility of bad men, if accidentally inverted with power, carrying it into a dangerous extreme. We must trust some persons, and as well as we can submit to any collateral evil which may arise from a provision for a great and indispensable good that can only be obtained through the medium of human imperfection. At the same time it may be observed, that in the case of the President or any executive or judicial officer wantonly abusing his trust, he is liable to impeachment, and there are frequent opportunities of changing the members of the legislature, if their conduct is not acceptable to their constituents.

The clause in the constitution, declaring that the trial of all crimes, ex­cept by impeachment, shall be by jury, can never in reason be extended to amount to a permission of perpetual residence of all sorts of foreigners, [Page 5] unless convicted of some crime, but is evidently calculated for the security of any citizen, a party to the instrument or even of a foreigner if resident in the country, who when charged with the commission of a crime against the municipal laws for which he if liable to punishment, can be tried for it in no other manner.

The second objection it, "That an alien coming into the country, on the faith of an act stipulating that in a certain time and on certain con­ditions he nay become a citizen, to remove him in an arbitrary manner before that time would be a breach of public faith."

With regard to this, it may be observed, that undoubtedly the faith of government ought under all circumstances, and in all possible situations, to be preserved sacred. If therefore, in virtue of this law, all aliens from any part of the world had a right to come here, stay the probationary time, and become citizens, the act in question could not be justified, unless it could be shewn that a real (not a pretended) over-ruling public necessity to which all inchoate acts of legislation must forever be subject, occasion­ed a partial repeal of it. But there are certain conditions, without which no alien can ever be admitted, if he stay ever so long; and one is, that during a limited time (two years in the case of aliens then resident; five in the case of aliens arriving after) he has behaved at a man of a good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. If his conduct be different, he is no object of the naturalization law at all, and consequently no implied compact was made with him. If his conduct be conformable to that description, he is no object of the alien law to which the objection is applied, because he is not a person whom the President is empowered to remove, for such a person could not be deemed dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, nor could there be reasonable grounds to suspect such a man of being concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government, in which cases alone the removal of any alien friend is authorised. Besides any alien coming to this country must, or ought to know, that this being an Independent nation, it has all the rights concerning the removal of aliens which belong by the law of nations to any other; that while he remains in the country in the character of an alien, he can claim no other privi­lege than such as an alien is entitled to; and consequently, whatever risque he may incur in that capacity, is incurred voluntarily, with the hope that in due time by his unexceptionable conduct, he may become a citizen of the United States. At there is no end to the inge­nuity of man, it has bees suggested that such a person, if not a citizen, is a denizen, and therefore cannot be removed as an alien. A denizen in those laws from which we derive our own, means a person who has receiv­ed letters of denization from the king, and under the royal government such a power might undoubtedly have been exercised. This power of de­nization is a kind of partial naturalization, giving some, but not all the privileges of a natural born subject. He may take lands by purchase or devise, but cannot inherit.

The issue of a denizen born before denization cannot inherit; but if born after may, the ancestor having been able to communicate to him in­heritable blood. But this power of the crown was thought so formidable that it is expressly provided by act of parliament, that no denizen can be [Page 6] a member of the Privy Council, or of either House of Parliament, or have any office of trust civil or military, or be capable of any grant of lands from the crown. Upon the dissolution of the royal government, the whole authority of naturalization, either whole or partial, belonged to the several states, and this power the people of the states have since devolved on the Congress of the United States. Denization therefore (in the sense here used) is a term unknown in our law, since the right was not derived from any general legislative authority, but from a special prerogative of the crown, to which parliamentary restrictions afterwards were applied. So much so, that if an act of Parliament had passed, giving certain rights to an alien with restriction; exactly similar to those of a denizen. I imagine he would not have been called a denizen; because the royal authority was not the source from which his rights were derived. As to acts of natu­ralization themselves, they are liable in England, by an express law to certain limitations, one of which is, that the person naturalized is incapa­ble of being a member of the privy council, or either house of parliament, or of holding offices or grants from the crown. Yet I never heard, nor do I believe that such a person was ever called a denizen; for which, as there is no foundation in precedent, or in the constitution of the United States, I presume it is a distinction without solidity. Fixed principles of law cannot be grounded on the airy imagination of man.

The third objection is, "That it is inconsistent with the following clause in the constitution, viz.

"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the con­gress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on said importation not exceeding ten dollars for etch person."

I am not satisfied, as to this objection, that it is sufficient to over-rule it, to say the words do not express the real meaning, either of those who formed the constitution, or those who established it, although I do verily believe in my own mind, that the article was intended only for slaves, and the clause was expressed in its present manner to accommodate different gentlemen, some of whom could not bare the name slaves, and others had objections to it. But though this probably is the real truth, yet, if in attempting to compromise, they have unguardedly used expressions that go beyond their meaning, and there is nothing but private history to elu­cidate it, I shall deem it absolutely necessary to confine myself to the written instrument. Other reasons may make the point doubtful, but at present I am inclined to think it must be admitted; that congress prior to the year 1808, cannot prohibit the migration of free persons to a particu­lar state, existing at the time of the constitution, which such state shall, by law, agree to receive. The states then existing, therefore, till 1808 may (we will say) admit the migration of persons to their own states, without any prohibitory act of congress.—This they may do upon prin­ciples of general policy, and in consistence with all their other duties. The states are expressly prohibited from entering into an engagement or contract with another state, or engaging in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger, as will not admit of delay. The avenues to foreign connection being thus carefully closed, it will scarcely be con­tended, that in case of war, a state could, either directly or indirectly, [Page 7] permit the migration of enemies. If they did, the United States could certainly without any impeachment of the general right of allowing mi­gration, in virtue of their authority to repel invasion, prevent the arrival of such. And as such invasion may be attempted without a formal war, and Congress have an express right to protect against invasion, as well as to repel it, I presume Congress would also have authority to prevent the arrival of any enemies, coming in the disguise of friends, to invade their country. But, admitting the right to permit migration in its full force, the persons migrating on their authority must be subject to the laws of the country, which consist not only of those of the particular state, but of the United States. While aliens, therefore, they must remain in the cha­racter of aliens; and, of course, upon the principles I have mentioned, be subject to a power of removal, in certain cases recognized in the law of nations; nor can they cease to be in this situation, until they become citizens of the United States; in which case they must obey the laws of the union as well as of the particular state they reside in. But, gentle­men argue as if because the states had a right to permit migration the migrants were under a sort of special protection of the state admitting it, left the United States, merely to disappoint the purpose of migration, should exercise an arbitrary authority of removal without any cause at all. It would be just as consistent to say, that if such migrant was charged with a murder on the high seas, or in any fort or arsenal of the United States, he should not be tried for it in a court of the United States, left the court and juries, out of ill will to the state; should combine to procure his conviction and punishment, in all events, to defeat the state law. The two powers may undoubtedly be made compatible, if the legislatures of the particular states, and the government of the United States do their duty; without which presumption, not an authority given by the constitution can exist. They surely are more compatible than the collateral powers of taxation, which, under each government, go to an unlimited extent, but the very nature of which forbids any other limitation than a sense of mo­ral right and justice. If we scepticize in the manner of some gentlemen on this subject, suppose each legislature should tax to the amount of 19 [...] in the pound; each has the power; but is such an exercise of it more apprehended than we apprehend an earthquake to swallow us all up at this very moment? All systems of government, suppose they are to be admi­nistered by men of common sense and common honesty. In our Country, as all ultimately depends on the voice of the people, they have it in their power, and it is to be presumed they generally will chuse men of this des­cription: but if they will not, the case to be sure is without remedy. If they chuse fools, they will have foolish laws. If they chuse knaves they will have knavish ones. But this can never be the case until they are generally fools or knaves themselves, which, thank God, is not likely ever to become the character of the American people.

Having said what I thought material as to the alien laws, upon the particular objections to them, I now proceed to discuss the objections which have been made to what is called the sedition act, one of which equally applies to the alien laws as well as to this. But I think it proper previously to read the law itself.

The objections (so far as I have heard them) to this act are as follow:

[Page 8] 1. (And this applies to the alien law also) That there is no specific power given to pass an act of this description, though in the particular specific powers given there is authority conveyed as to other offences spe­cially named.

2. That this law is not warranted by a clause in the constitution, con­veying legislative authority, which after designating particular objects, adds:

"And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry­ing into execution the foregoing powers, and all other power vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any de­partment or officer thereof."—Because it is not necessary and proper to pass any such law in order to carry into execution any of those powers.

3. That admitting the former positions are not maintainable, yet the exercise of this authority is compatible with the following amendment to the constitution, viz.

"Congress shall make no law respe [...]ting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the full exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

With regard to the first objection, I readily acknowledge, that soon after the constitution was proposed, and when I had taken a much more superficial view of it than I was sensible of at the time, I did think Congress could not provide for the punishment of any crimes but such as are specifically designated in the particular powers enumerated. I deli­vered that opinion in the convention at North-Carolina, in the year 1788, with a perfect conviction, at the time, that it was well founded. But I have since been convinced it was an erroneous opinion, and my reasons for changing it I shall state to you as clearly is I am able.

It is in vain to make any law unless some sanction be annexed to it, to prevent or punish its violation. A law without it might be equivalent to a good moral sermon, but bad members of society would be as little in­fluenced by one as the other. It is, therefore, necessary and proper, for instance, under the constitution of the United States, to secure the effect of all laws which impose a duty on some particular persons, by providing some penalty or punishment if they disobey. The authority to provide such is conveyed by the following general words in the constitution, at the end of the objects of legislation particularly specified: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." A penalty alone would not in every case be sufficient, for the offender might be rich and disregard it, or poor, though a wilful offender, and unable to pay it. A fine, therefore, will not always answer the purpose, but imprisonment must be in many cases added, though a wise and humane legislature will always dispense with this, where the importance of the case does not require it. But if it does, from the very nature of the pu­nishment, it becomes a criminal, and not a civil offence; the grand jury must indict, before the offender can be convicted.

This general position may be illustrated by a variety of instances under the penal code of the United States, which have, I believe, never been objected to as unconstitutional, though there have never been wanting [Page 9] penetrating and discerning members who were ready enough to take ex­ceptions where they found any plausible ground for them. I shall enume­rate a few.

In the act entitled, an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States ( [...]ol.1 Swift's edition, p. 100) among other crimes specified, are the following.

Murder or larceny in a fort belonging to the United States. Misprisi­on of felony committed in any place und [...] the sole and exclusive jurisdic­tion of the United States. Stealing or falsifying a record of any court of the United States. Perjury in any court of the United States. Bribing a judge of the United States. Obstructing the execution of any kind of process issuing from a court of the United States.

In the collection act, 1 vol. p. 237, it is provided, that in all cases where an oath is by that act required from a master or other person having command of a ship or vessel, or from an owner o [...] assignee of goods, wares, and merchandize, his or her factor or agent, if the person so swearing shall swear falsely, such person shall, on indictment and conviction there­of, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court, before whom such conviction shall be had, so as the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the term of imprisonment shall not ex­ceed twelve months.

In the act laying duties on distilled spirits, (vol. i. p. 324) in the 39th section it is provided as follows:

"If any supervisor, or other officer of inspection, in any criminal pro­secution against them, shall be convicted of oppression or extortion in the execution of his office, he shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, or i [...]risoned not exceeding six months, or both, at the discretion of the court; and shall also forfeit his office."

These instances deserve great consideration; because I believe no can­did man will deny that these provisions were constitutional exercises of authority, within the scope of the general authority conveyed, though not specially named as objects which it should be competent for Congress to provide for. And they certainly derive weight from the consideration, that the principle of them (which I believe was the case) was never ob­jected to, thou [...] the expediency of some of the provisions may have been.

In further illustration of this subject, I shall state a case which was determined in this court—The United States against Worrell, published in M.. Dallas's reports, p. 384. Where there was an indictment against the defendant for attempting to bribe Mr. Coxe, the Commissioner of the Revenue. The defendant was found guilty, and afterwards a motion was made in arresting judgment, assigning, together with some technical ob­jections, this general one, that the Court had no cognizance of the offence, because no act of Congress had passed creating the offence and prescrib­ing the punishment, but it was solely on the foot of the common law. The very able and ingenious gentleman who is the reporter of that case, and was the defendant's Council in it, in the course of his argument, makes the following observations, part of which are remarkably striking and pertinent to my present subject: ‘In relation to crimes and punish­ments, the objects of the delegated power of the United States are enu­merated and fixed. Congress may provide for the punishment of coun­terfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; and, [Page 10] may define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations. Art. i. 8. And so, likewise, Congress may make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for car­rying into execution, the powers of the General Government. But here is no reference to a common law authority: Every power is matter of definite and positive grant; and the very powers that are granted cannot take effect until they are exercised through the medium of a law. Congress had undoubtedly a power to make a law, which should render it criminal to offer a bribe to the commissioner of the Revenue; but not having made the law, the crime is not recognized by the Federal code, Constitutional or Legislative; and consequently, it is not a sub­ject on which the Judicial authority of the Union can operate.’ So far the observations of the defendant's Counsel Judge Chase, who on that occasion differed from Judge Peters, as to the common law jurisdiction of the Court, held, that under the 8th section of the first article, which I am now considering, although bribery is not among the crimes and of­fences specially mentioned, it is certainly included in that general provi­sion; and Congress might have passed a law on the subject which would have given the Court cognizance of the offence. Judge Peters was of opinion, that the defendant was punishable at common law; but that it was competent for Congress to pass a Legislative act on the subject.

I conclude, therefore, that the first objection is not maintainable.

With regard to the second objection, which is, that this law is not war­ranted by that clause in the constitution authorising Congress to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, the powers specially enumerated, and all other powers vested, by the constitu­tion, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof: because, it is not necessary and proper to pass any such law, in order to carry into execution any of those powers—it is to be ob­served, that, from the very nature of the power, it is, and must be, discre­tionary.—What is necessary and proper, in regard to any particular sub­ject, cannot, before an occasion arises, be logically defined; but must de­pend upon various extensive views of a case, which no human foresight can reach. What is necessary and proper in a time of confusion and ge­neral disorder, would not, perhaps, be necessary and proper in a time of tranquillity and order. These are consderations of policy, not questions of law, and upon which the legislature is bound to decide according to its real opinion of the necessity and propriety of any act particularly in con­templation. It is, however, alledged, that the necessity and propriety of passing collateral laws for the support of others, is confined to cases where the powers are delegated, and does not extend to cases which have a reference to general danger only. The words are general, ‘for carry­ing into execution the special powers previously enumerated, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the Uni­ted States, or any department or officer thereof.’ If, therefore, there be any thing necessary and proper for carrying into execution any or all of those powers, I presume, that may be constitutionally enacted. Two ob­jects are aimed at by every rational government, more especially by free ones; 1. That the people may understand the laws, and voluntarily obey them. 2. That if this be not done by any individual, he shall be com­pelled to obey them, or punished for disobedience. The first object is, [Page 11] undoubtedly the most momentous; for, as the legitimate object of every government is the happiness of the people committed to its care, nothing can tend more to promote this than that, by a voluntary obedience to the laws of the country, they should render punishments unnecessary. This can never be the case in any country but a country of slaves, where gross misrepresentation prevails, and any large body of the people can be induced to believe that laws are made either without authority, or for the purpose of oppression. Ask the great body of the people who were deluded into an insurrect [...]on in the western parts of Pennsylvania, what gave rise to it? They [...]ill not hesitate to say, that the government had been vilely mis­represented, and made to appear to them in a character directly the reverse of what they deserved. In consequence of such misrepresentations, a ci­vil war had nearly desolated our country, and a certain expence of near two millions of dollars was actually incurred, which might be deemed the price of libels, and among other causes made necessary a judicious and mo­derate land tax, which no man de [...]ie [...], to be constitutional, but is now made the pretext of au [...]thor insurrection. The liberty of the press is, indeed, valuable—long may it preserve its lastre! It has converted barbarous na­tions into civilized ones—taught science to rear its head—enlarged the capacity—increased the comforts of private life—and, leading the ban­ners is of freedom, has extended her sway where her very name was un­known. But, as every human blessing is attended with imperfection, as what produces, by a right use, the greatest good, is productive of the gr [...]ate [...] evil in its abuse, so this, one of the greatest blessings ever bestow­ed by Providence on his creatures, is capable of producing the greatest good or the greatest mischief. A pen, in the hands of an able and virtu­ous man, may enlighten a whole nation, and, by observations of real wis­dom, grounded on pure morality, may lead it to the path of honour and happiness.—The some pen in the hands of a man equally able, but with vices as great as the other's virtues, may, by arts of sophistry easily at­tainable, and inflaming the passions of weak minds, delude many into opinions the most dangerous, and conduct them to actions the most crimi­nal. Men who are at a distance from the source of information must rely almost altogether on the accounts they receive from others. If their ac­counts are founded in truth, their heads or hearts must be to blame, if they think or act wrongly. But, if their account [...] are false, the best head and the best heart cannot be proof against their influence; nor is it pos­sible to calculate the combined effect of innumerable artifices, either by direct falsehood, or invidious insinuations, told day by day, upon minds both able and virtuous. Such being unquestionably the case, can it be to­lerated in any civilized society that any should be permitted with impunity to tell falsehoods to the people, with an express intention to deceive them, and lead them into discontent, if not into insurrection, which is so apt to follow? It is believed no government in the world ever was without such a power. It is, unquestionably possessed by all the state governments, and probably has been exercised in all of them: Sure I am, it has in some. If necessary and proper for them, why not equally so, at least, for the go­vernment of the United States, naturally an object of more jealousy and alarm, because it has greater concerns to provide for? Combinations to defeat a particular law are admitted to be punishable. Falsehoods, in or­der to produce such combinations; I should presume, would come within [Page 12] the same principle, as being the first step to the mischief intended to be prevented; and if such falsehoods, with regard to one particular law, are dangerous, and therefore ought not to be permitted without punishment—Why should such which are intended to destroy confidence in government altogether, and, thus, induce disobedience to every act of it? It is said, libels may be rightly punishable in monarchies, but there is not the same necessity in a republic. The necessity in the latter case, I conceive great­er, because in a republic more is dependent on the good opinion of the people for its support, as they are directly or indirectly the origin of all [...], which of coar [...]e must receive its bias from them. Take away from a republic the confidence of the people, and the whole fabric crum­bles into dust.

I have only to add, under this head, that in order to obviate any proba­ble ill use of this large and discretionary power, the constitution and cer­tain amendments to it, have prohibited in express words the exercise of some particular authorities which otherwise might be supposed to be com­prehended within them. Of this nature is th [...] pro [...]ibitory clause relating to the present obje [...]t which I am to consider under the next objection.

4. That objection is, [...]at the act is in violation of this amendment of the constitution. ( [...]d vol. Swift's Edition, p, 455. Article 3d.)

‘Congress shall make no law re [...]pe [...]ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.’

The question then is,

Whether this law has abridged the freedom of the press?

Here is a remarkable difference in expressions as to the different ob­jects in the same clause. They are to make no law respecting an esta­blishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: or abridg­ing the freedom of speech, or of the press. When as to one object they entirely prohibit any act whatever, and as to another object only limit the exercise of the power, they must in reason be supposed to mean diffe­rent things. I presume, therefore, that Congress may make a law re­specting the press, provided the law be such as not to abridge its freedom. What might be deemed the freedom of the press, if it had been a new subject, and never before in discussion, might indeed admit of some con­troversy.—But so far as precedent habit, laws and practices are concerned, there can scarcely be a more definite meaning than that which all these have affixed to the term in question.

We derive our principles of law originally from England. There the press, I believe, is as free as in any country of the world, and so it has been for near a century. The definition of it is, in my opinion, no where more happily or justly expressed than by the great Author of the Com­mentaries on the Laws of England, which book deserves more particular regard on this occasion, because for near 30 years it has been the ma [...]al of almost every student of law in the United States, and its uncommon excellence has also introduced it into the libraries, and often to the favour­ite reading of private gentlemen; so that his views of the subject could scarcely be unknown to those who framed the Amendments to the consti­tution, and if they were not, unless his explanation had been satisfactory, I presume the Amendment would have been more particularly worded, to guard against any possible mistake. His explanation is as follows:

[Page 13] ‘The Liberty of the Press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state. And this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publicati­ons, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when publish­ed. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments [...]e pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but it he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal he must take the consequence of his own [...]. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a Licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controversial points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writ­ings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be ad­judged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foun­dations of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Nei­ther is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument heretofore used for the restraining the just freedom of the press, that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it, will entirely lose its force when it is shewn (by a reasonable exercise of the laws) that the press cannot be abused to any bad purpose, without incurring a suitable punishment: whereas it never can be used to any good one, when under the controul of an Inspector. So true will it be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the press.’ 4 Black. Com. 151.

It is believed, that iv every state in the union the common law princi­ples concerning libels apply; and in some of the states words similar to the words of the amendment are used in the constitution itself, or a contem­porary bill of rights of equal authority, without ever being supposed to exclude any law being passed on the subject. So that there is the strong­est proof that can be of a universal concurrence in America on this point that the freedom of the press does not require that libellers shall be pro­tected from punishment.

But in some respects the act of congress is much more restrictive than the principles of the common law, or than perhaps the principles of any state in the union. For under the law of the United States the truth of the matter may be given in evidence, which at common law in criminal prosecutions was held not to be admissible; and the punishment of fine and imprisonment, which at common law was discretionary, is limited in point of severity, though not of [...]nity. It is to be observed too, that by the express words of the act both malice and falshood must combine in the publication, with the seditions intent particularly described. So that if the writing be false, yet not malicious, or malicious and not false, no conviction can take place. This therefore fully provides for any pub­lication arising from inadvertency, mistake, false confidence, or any thing [Page 14] short of a wilful and atrocious falshood. And none surely will contend that the publication of such a falshood is among the indefeasible rights of men, for that would be to make the freedom of liars greater than that of men of truth and integrity.

I have now said all I thought material on these important subjects. There is another upon which it is painful to speak, but the notoriety as well as the official certainty of the fact, and the importance of the dan­ger make it indispensable. Such incessant calumnies have been poured against the government for supposed breaches of the constitution, that an insurrection has lately began for a cause where no breach of the constitu­tion is or can be pretended. The grievance is the land tax act, an act which the public exigencies rendered unavoidable, and is framed with par­ticular anxiety to avoid its falling oppressively on the poor, and in effect the greatest part of it must fall on rich people only. Yet arms have been taken to oppose its execution: officers have been insul [...]ed: the authority of the law resisted: and the government of the United States treated with the utmost defiance and contempt. Not being thoroughly informed of all particulars, I cannot now say within what class of offences these crimes are comprehended. But as some of the offenders are committed for treason, and many certainly have been guilty of combinations to resist the law of the United States, I think it proper to point your attention particularly to those subjects. The provisions in regard to the former, so far as they may at present be deemed material or instructive, are as follow:

(Here the passages referred to were read.)

The only species of treason likely to come before you is that of levy­ing war against the United States. There have been various opinions, and different determinations on the import of those words. But I think I am warranted in saying, that if in the case of the insurgents who may come under your consideration the intention was to prevent by so force of arms the execution of any a [...], of the Congress of the United States al­together (as for instance the land tax act, the object of their opposition) any forcible opposition calculated to carry that intention into effect was a levying of war against the United States, and of course an act of treason. But if the intention was, merely to defeat its operation in a particular in­stance, or through the agency of a particular officer, from some private or personal motive, though a higher offence may have been committed, it did not amount to the crime of treason. The particular motive must however be the sole ingredient in the case, for if combined with a general view to obstruct the execution of the act, the offence must be deemed treason.

With regard to the number of witnesses in treason, I am of opinion that two are necessary on the indictment as well as upon the trial in court.

The provision in the constitution, that the two witness must be to the same overt-act, (or actual deed constituting the treasonable offence) was in consequence of a const [...] which had prevailed in England, that though two witnesses were required to prove an act of treason, yet if one witness proved one act, and another witness another act of the same species of treason, (as for instance that of levying war) it was sufficient; a decision which has always appeared to me contrary to the true intention of the law which made two witnesses necessary—this provision being, as I con­ceived, intended to guard against fictitious charges of treason, which an un­principled [Page 15] government might be [...]ed to support and encourage, even at the expence of perjury, a thing much more difficult to be effected by two witnesses than one.

An act of Congress which I have already read to you (that commonly called the sedition act) has specially provided in the manner you have heard, against combinations to defeat the execution of the laws. The combinations punishable under this act must be distinguished from such as in themselves amount to treason, which is unalterably fixed by the con­stitution itself. Any combinations, therefore, which be [...]e the passing of this act, would have amounted to treason, still constitute the same crime. To give the act in question a different construction, would do away alto­gether the crime of treason as committed by levying war, because no war can be levied without a combination for some of the purposes stated in the act, which must necessarily constitute a part though not the whole of the offence.

Long, gentlemen, as I have detained you, for which the great importance of the occasion, I trust, is a just apology, it will be useful to recollect, that ever since the first formation of the present government, every act which any extraordinary difficulty has occasioned, has been uniformly opposed before its adoption, and every art practised to make the people discontent­ed after it: without any allowance for the necessity which dictated them some seem to have taken it for granted that credit could be obtained without justice, money without taxes, and the honour and safety of the United States only preserved by a disgraceful foreign dependence. But, notwithstanding all the efforts made to [...]llify and undermine the govern­ment, it has uniformily rose in the esteem and confidence of the people. Time has disproved arrogant predictions; a true knowledge of the princi­ples and conduct of the government has rectified many gross misrepresen­tations; credit has risen from its ashes; the country has been sound full of resources, which have been drawn without oppression, and faithfully ap­plied to the purposes to which they were appropriated; justice is imparti­ally administered; and the only crime which is fairly imputable is, that the minority have not been suffered to govern the majority, to which they had as little pretension upon the ground of superiority of talents, patriotism, or general probity, as upon the principles of republicanism, the perpetual theme of their declamation. If you suffer this government to be destroy­ed, what chance have you for any other? A scene of the most dreadful confusion must ensue. Anarchy will ride triumphant, and all lovers of or­der, decency, truth and justice be trampled under foot. May that God whose peculiar providence seems often to have interposed to save these United States from destruction, preserve us from this worst of all evils! And may the inhabitants of this happy country deserve his care and pro­tection by a conduct best calculated to obtain them.

SIR,

THE Grand Jury of the Circuit court of the District of Pennsylvania, have heard with great satisfaction, the Charge delivered to them, on the opening of the Court.

At a time like the present, when false philosophy and the most danger­ous [Page 16] and wicked principles are spreadig with rapidity, under the imposing garb of Liberty, over the fairest countries of the Old World—they are convin­ced, that the publication of a Charge, fraught with such clear and just observations on the nature and operation of the constitution and laws of the United States will be highly beneficial to the citizens thereof.

With these sentiments strongly impressed on their minds, they unani­mously request, that a copy of the said charge may be delivered to them, for publication; especially for the information of those, who are too easily led by the misrepresentations of evil disposed persons, into the commission of crimes, ruinous to themselves, and against the peace and dignity of the United States.

Isaac Wharton, Foreman, J. Ross, Edward Pennington, Philip Nicklin, Joseph Parker Norris, Benjamin W. Morris, Thomas M. Willing, Robert Ralston, John Craig, Samuel Coates, David H. Conyngham, John Perot, James C. Fisher, Daniel Smith, Gideon Hill Wells, William Mon [...]omery, W. Bulkley.
Honorable Judge IREDELL.
To the Gentlemen of the Grand Jury of the United States, for the dis­trict of Pennsylvania. Gentlemen,

I receive with great sensibility the honor of this address, from gentle­men whom I personally respect so much. Believing, as I have long done, that the constitution and laws of the United States afford the highest de­gree of rational liberty which the world ever saw, or of which perhaps mankind are capable, I have seen with astonishment and regret, attempts made in the pursuit of visionary chimeras, to subvert or undermine so glo­rious a fabric, equally constructed for public and private security. It can­not but be extremely pleasing to me, that the sentiments on this subject I delivered in my charge, should meet with your entire approbation; and as you are pleased to suppose the publication of them may be of some service in correcting erroneous opinions, I readily consent to it, consider­ing your sanction of them as giving them an additional value, which will increase the hope of their producing a good effect.

JAMES IREDELL.
[Page 17]

INDICTMENT.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN AND FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT OF THE MIDDLE CIRCUIT.

THE GRAND INQUEST of the United States of America, for the Pennsylvania District, upon their respective oaths and affirmations, do present, That John Fries, late of the county of Bucks, in the District of of Pennsylvania, he being an inhabitant of, and residing within, the said United States, to wit, in the district aforesaid, and under the protec­tion of the laws of the said United States, and owing allegiance and fidelity to the same United States, not having the fear of God before his eyes, nor weighing the duty of his said allegiance and fidelity, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, wickedly devising and intend­ing the peace and tranquility of the said United States to disturb, on the Seventh day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hun­dred and ninety nine at Bethlehem, in the county of Northampton, in the district aforesaid, unlawfully, maliciously and traitorously did compass, imagine and intend to raise and levy war, insurrection and rebellion against the said United States; and to fulfil and bring to effect the said traitor­ous compassings, imaginations and intentions of him the said John Fries, he, the said John Fries afterwards, that is to say, on the said Seventh day of March in the said year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety nine, at the said county of Northampton in the district afore­said, with a great multitude of persons, whose names at present are un­known to the Grand Inquest aforesaid, to a great number, to wit, to the number of one hundred persons and upwards, armed and arrayed in a, warlike manner, that is to say, with guns, swords, clubs, staves and other warlike weapons, as well offensive as defensive, being then and there un­lawfully, maliciously and traitorously assembled and gathered together, did falsely and traitorously assemble and join themselves together against the said United States, and then and there, with force and arms, did falsely and traitorously, and in a warlike and hostile manner, array and dispose themselves against the said United States, and then and there, with force and arms, in pursuance of such their traitorous intentions and pur­poses aforesaid, he the said John Fries with the said persons so as aforesaid traitorously assembled, and armed and arrayed in manner aforesaid, most wickedly, maliciously and traitorously did ordain, prepare and levy public war against the said United States, contrary to the duty of his said alle­giance and fidelity, against the constitution, peace and dignity of the said United States, and also against the form of the act of the Congress of the said United States, in such case made and provided.

WILLIAM RAWLE, Attorney of the United States for the Pennsylvania District.

The prisoner having been set to the bar, pleaded NOT GUILTY.

The pettit jury impannelled, consisted of the following gentlemen:

  • [Page 18]WILLIAM JOLLY, City
  • SAMUEL MI [...]CHELL, Bucks
  • RICHARD LEEDOM. ditto
  • ANTHONY CU [...]HBERT, City
  • ALEXANDER FULLERTON, City
  • JOHN SINGER. City
  • WILLIAM RAMSAY, Bucks
  • SAMUEL RICHARDS, City
  • GERARDUS WYNKOOP, Bucks
  • JOSEPH THORNTON, City
  • PHILIP WALTER, Northampton
  • JOHN RHOAD, Northampton,

Some difficulties arose as to the two latter gentlemen being qualified, they being Germans, and not sufficiently understanding the English lan­guage: however it was agreed that any difficulties of that nature might be explained to them, and it was urged that they would understand many of the witnesses better than others, several of those being Germans also, and could not speak English, on which account Mr. Erdman was sworn for interpreter.

MR. SITGREAVES opened the trial as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

BY the indictment which has been just read to you, you perceive that John Fries, the prisoner at the bar, has put himself on trial before you, on an accusation of having committed the greatest offence which can be perpetrated in this, or any other country, and it will devolve on you to determine, according to the evidence which will be produced to you, on the important question of life or death. It is the duty of these that pro­secute, to open to you, as clear as they are able, those principles of law which apply to the offender, and then to state to you the testimony with which the accusation is supported. This duty has devolved upon me, and I hope, while I regard my duty as accuser, I shall do it in such a way as shall do no injustice to the prisoner. However, if I should be incorrect, there are sufficient opportunities for me to be corrected by the vigilance which the council engaged on behalf of the prisoner will use, and the or­der which the court will observe. These are sufficient to correct any mis- [...]tements, but I will use my utmost endeavours to be guilty of none.

The prisoner is indicted of the crime of treason. Treason is defined in the constitution of the United States, Section 3. Art. 3. in the words following:

"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com­fort."

This crime appears to be limited to two descriptions: the one, levying war against the United States, and the other adhering to its enemies. With respect to the latter branch of the description, there will be no oc­casion [Page 19] for any explanation, or to call your attention in the least to it, be­cause it is not charged upon the prisoner; he if charged with having committed treason in levying war.

This expression, phraseology, or description as adopted by our constitu­tion, is burrowed from a statute of Great Britain, passed in the reign of Edward III. which has, ever since it passed, commanded the veneration and respect of that nation, almost equal with their great charter: it is considered as a great security to their liberties. Indeed the uniform and unanimous consent given to this statute, through a great lapse of time, by the most able writers on law; its never having undergone the least al­teration amidst the most severe scrutinies, and its adoption into the consti­tution of the United States, without the least amendment, are sufficient encomiums to prove its worth. I shall state to you, as far as is necessary to the present application of that statute, the most able and judicious ex­positions, but without recurring to a variety of authorities which might be quoted.

The crime of treason, as it has been laid down by those writers, gene­rally allowed to be the most able on law, whose accuracy is unquestionable, is the highest crime that can possibly be committed against the good go­vernment of a nation, and a considerable inroad into the liberties of a subject. In discussing this crime I shall only recur to the notes which I have taken, and my own knowledge of the law; if that statement should he inaccurate, there are sufficient opportunities for amendment in the course of this trial, Treason consists in levying war against the govern­ment of the United States: it may confidently he said not only to con­sist in joining or aiding the hostile intentions of a foreign enemy; nor is it confined to rebellion in the broad sense in which that word is generally understood; or in the utter subversion of the government and its funda­mental institutions: but it also consists in the raising a military force from among the people for the purpose of attaining any object with a design of opposing the lawful authority of the government by dint of arms, in some matter of public concern in which the insurgents have no particular interest distinct from the rest of the community. This is the best des­cription of the crime treason, as it relates to the matter before you, which I am able to give. A tumultuously raising the people with force, for the purpose of subverting, or opposing the lawful authority of the government in which those insurgents have no particular interest distinct from the people at large.

Agreeable to the division made in the definition of treason by Lord Hale, it must consist both in levying war, and in levying war against the government of the United States. Reflecting levying of war, it is to be understood, agreeable to the most approved authorities, that there must be an actual military array, I mention this because I think it proper to be particular in so essential and important an enquiry, and because I think we shall prove to you that this was actually done by the prisoner. Ano­ther thing I wish you to bear in mind is, that war may be sufficiently levied against the United States, although no violence be used, and al­though no battle be fought. It is not necessary that actual violence should take place, to prove the actual waging of war. If the arrange­ments are made, and the numbers of armed men actually appear, so as to procure the object which they have in view by Intimidation, as well as by actual force , that will constitute the offence.

[Page 20] It must be war waged against the United States. This is an impor­tant distinction. A large assemblage of people may come together; in whatever numbers; however they may be armed or arrayed, or whatever degree of violence they may commit, yet that alone would not constitute treason: the treason must be known; it must be for a public and not a private revenge; it must be avowedly levying war against the United States; if people assemble in this hostile manner only to gratify revenge, or any other purpose independent of war against the United States, it will only amount to a riot; but if it is an object in which the person has no particular interest, this constitutes the offence of treason. There are a variety of instances which might be produced in order to illustrate this definition of the law, but it is not necessary to turn to them. Suffice it to say that it is the intention or end for which an insurrection is raised, which constitutes the crime. This of course you will have in mind when the testimony is gone into. I will just observe, as applicable to this case, that one instance which is defined, of the crime of treason is, to defeat the operation of the laws of the government; any insurrection, I will be bold to say, to defeat the execution of the public laws, amounts to treason; Having given you this explanation of treason, so far as I suppose is con­nected with the present awful occasion, I shall now proceed to state the amount of evidence we mean to produce, in order to prove that the un­happy prisoner was guilty of that high crime.

It will appear, gentlemen, from the testimony which will be presented to you, that during the latter months of the year 1798 discords prevailed to an enormous extent throughout a large portion of the counties of Bucks, Northampton, and Montgomery, and that considerable difficulties attended the assessors for the direct tax in the execution of the duties of their assessment. It is not in the nature of this enquiry to explain for what purpose, or by what means the opposition was made: it is not ne­cessary to say whether the complaints urged were well or ill founded, be­cause it is a settled point that any insurrection for removing public griev­ances, whether the complaints be real or pretended, amounts to treason, because it is not the mode pointed out by law for obtaining redress. It will then be sufficient to show you that discontents did exist, and that in various townships of those counties; that in several townships, associations of the people were actually formed, in order to prevent the persons charged with the execution of those laws of the United States from performing their duty upon them, and more particularly to prevent the assessors from measuring their houses: this opposition was made at many public town­ship meetings called for the purpose, in many instances resolutions were entered into, and reduced to writing, solemnly forewarning the officers whose duty it was to execute the laws, and these, many times accompa­nied with threats if they should perform that duty. Not only so, but discontents prevailed to such an height, that even the friends of the go­vernment in that part were compleatly suppressed, by menaces against any who should assist those officers in their duty: repeated declarations were made, both at public, as well as at private meetings, that if any person should be arrested by the civil authority, such arrest would be followed by the rising of the people, in opposition to that authority, for the purpose of rescuing such arrested prisoners: it will appear to you farther, gentlemen, in the course of evidence, that during those dis­contents, indefatigable pains were taken by those who were charged with [Page 21] the execution of the laws, to calm the fears, and to remove the misappre­hensions of the infatuated people; for this purpose they road and explained the law to them, and informed them that they were misled into the idea that the law was not in force, for that it actually was; at the same time warning them of the consequences which would flow from opposition, and this was accompanied with promises that even their most capricious wishes would be gratified on their obedience. The favour was in many instan­ces granted, that where any opposition was made to any certain person executing the office of assessor, in some townships proposals were made for the people to choose for themselves, but notwithstanding this accom­modating offer, the opposition continued.

After having showed to you the general extent of this combination and dangerous conspiracy, which existed in all the latitude I have opened to your view, we shall next give in evidence full proof, that the consequen­ces were, actual opposition and resistance: in some parts violence was actually used, and the assessors were taken and imprisoned by armed par­ties, and in other mobs assembled to compel them, either to deliver up their papers, or to resign their commissions; that in some instances they were threatened with bodily harm, so that in those parts, the obnoxious law did remain unexecuted in consequence of this alarm. Seeing the state of insurrection and rebellion had arisen to such a height, it became necessary, in order to support the dignity, and indeed the very existence of the government, that some means should be adopted to compel the execu­tion of those laws, and warrants were in consequence issued against cer­tain persons who had so opposed the laws: These processes being put into the hands of the marshal of the district, were served upon some of them: in some instances during the execution of that duty the marshal met with insult, and almost with violence: having however, got nearly the whole of the warrants served, he appointed head quarters for these pri­soners to rendezvous at Bethelem, where some of them were to enter bail for their appearance in the city, and others were to come to the city in custody, for trial. It will appear to you, that on the day thus appointed for the prisoners to meet, and when a number of them had actually as­sembled agreeable to appointment, that a number,—parties in arms, both horse and foot, more than an hundred men, accoutred with all their mili­tary apparatus, commanded in some instances by their proper officers, marched to Bethlehem, collected before the house in which were the marshal and prisoners, whom they demanded to be delivered up to them, and in consequence of refusal, they proceeded to act very little short of actual hostility, so that the marshal deemed it prudent to accede to their de­mands, and the prisoners were I berated.

This, gentlemen, is the general history of the insurrection, I shall now state to you the part which the unfortunate prisoner at the bar took in those hostile transactions. It will appear that the prisoner is an inhabi­tant of the township of lower Milford in the county of Bucks, that some­time in February last a public meeting was held at the house of one John Kline in that township, to consider in relation to this house tax, what was to be done: that at that meeting certain resolutions were entered into, and a paper signed; (we have endeavoured to trace this paper, so as to produce it to the court and jury, but have failed) this paper was sign­ed by fifty two persons and committed to the hands of one of their num­ber: [Page 22] John Fries was present at this meeting, and assisted in drawing up the paper, at which time his expressions against this law were extremely violent, and he threatened to shoot one of the assessors, Mr. Foulke, through the legs if he did proceed to assess the houses. Again, the pri­soner, at a vendue, threatened another of the assessors, Mr. S. Clarke, that if he attempted to go on with the assessments he should be commit­ted to an old stable, and there fed on rotten corn: we shall further prove that upon its being intimated by force of them to Mr. Chapman, princi­pal assessor, that if they might choose their own assessors things would go on quietly, he directed that they should do so, but still they continued in opposition to the law, and would not choose an officer at all. A general meeting was called to read and explain the law to the people, and thus remove any wrong impressions and mis-apprehensions: the principal as­sessor was at that meeting, but the rudeness, opposition and violence, used by the people, prevented him from doing so, which was an evident proof that they did not want to hear the law, and that they understood enough of it to oppose it: thus the benevolent intentions of that meeting was frustrated. We shall farther show you that the assessor of lower Milford was intimidated so as to decline making the assessments, and that the prin­cipal assessor together with three other assessors, were obliged to go into that township to execute the law; that they proceeded in the execution of their duty during a part of the day of the 5th of March last, without any impediment; that at eleven o'clock in the morning Mr. Chapman met, at the house of Jacob Fries in lower Milford, with the prisoner, when he, the prisoner, declared his determination not to submit, but to oppose the law, and that by the next morning he could raise 700 men in opposition to it: that upon Mr. Chapman telling him, that many houses were assessed, the prisoner flew into a violent passion, absolutely declaring that it should soon be in this country as it was in France. We shall farther shew you, that at another time during the same day the prisoner met with two of the assessors Mr. Rodrick and Mr. Foulke, whom he warned not to proceed in the execution of their duty, accompanied with threats that if they did, they would be hurt, and left them in a great rage. Farther, he proceeded to collect parties, with whom he went in search of those men, and attacked them in executing their duty, one of them es­caped, but the other he took, but not having got Mr. Roderick, who ap­peared to be a particular object of resentment, he let Mr. Foulke go, telling him he would have them again the next day. He told Mr. Clarke that if he had met with Rodrick he would not have let him go so easy, and declared to him solemnly and repeatedly, that it was his deter­mination to oppose the laws. We shall farther show you that, after ha­ving discharged Foulke, he proceeded to Collect a large party in the town­ship, in order to take the assessors is the next day. Accordingly on the day following a numerous party, to wit, about 50 or 60, the greatest part of whom were in arms, collected together and pursued the assessors, and not finding them in that township, pursued them into another, in order, net on­ly to chase them out of the township, but generally to prevent them exe­cuting their duty. This party collected, not only many of them in arms, but in military array, with drum and fife, and commanded by this Captain Fries and one Kuyder: Fries himself was armed with a large horse pis­tol. Thus equipped, they went to Quaker town, in order to accomplish [Page 23] their purpose, where they found the assessors, two of whom they took, but Rodrick tied. Fries ordered his men to fire at the man who fled, and the piece was snapped, but did not go off. Fries did then compel Foulke to deliver up to them his papers, but not finding in them what they ex­pected, they were returned, but at the same time exacting a promise that he, the assessor, should not proceed in the valuation of the houses in lower Milford. Fries was in many instances extremely violent against this law, and preremptory in his determination not to submit to it, as will appear by the evidence.

When they left Quaker town they met with a travelling man who ex­pressed some good will towards the government, and for that expression, they mal-treated him very much, and expressed their general dislike to all who supported the same principles. During the time they were at Quaker town, intimation was received that the marshal had taken a number of persons prisoners in consequence of opposing the execution of this law, whereupon a determination was formed amongst these people to go and effect their rescue, and the people of Milford were generally invited to assist in this business. When they were going, the parted halted at the house of John Fries, and then a paper was signed, by which they bound them­selves volunteers to go upon the execution of this design, this paper was written by the prisoner at the bar, and signed by him and the rest: there­in they engaged to go and rescue the prisoners who had been arrested by the marshal. On the morning of the next day 20 or more of them met at the house of Conrad Marks, in arms, to go on with their design. John Fries was armed with a sword, and had a feather in his hat. On the road, as they went forward they were met by young Marks, who told them that they might as well turn about, for that the Northampton people were strong enough to do the business without those from Bucks county: some were so inclined to do, but at the instance of Fries and some others, they did go forward, and actually proceeded to Bethlehem. Before the arrival of these troops, a party, going on the same business, had stopped at the bridge, a small distance from Bethlehem, when they had been met by a deputation from the marshal, whom be had prevailed on to go and meet them, in order to advise them to return home: they agreed to halt there, and send three of their number to declare to the marshal what was their demand: it was during this period that Fries and his party came up, but it appears that when they came, Fries took the party actually over the bridge and that he arranged the toll with the man, and ordered them to proceed. With respect to proof of the pro­ceedings at Bethlehem, it cannot be mistaken: he was there the leading man, and he appears to enjoy the command. With the consent of his people he demanded the prisoners of the marshal, and when that officer told him that he could not surrender them, except they were taken from him by force, and produced his warrant for taking them, the prisoner then harrangued his party out of the house, and explained to them the necessity of using force; and that you should not mistake his design, we will prove to you that he declared, "that was the third day which he had been out on this expedition, that he had had a skirmish the day before, and if the prison­ers were not released he should have another that day. NOW you observe," resumed he, "that force is necessary, but you must obey my orders, we will not go without taking the prisoners; but take my orders, you must [Page 24] not fire first: must be first fired upon, and when I am gone, then you must do as well as you can, as I expect to be the first man that falls." He farther declared to the marshal; that they " would fire till a cloud of smoak prevented them seeing one another; and executing the office of commander of the troops which at that time over awed the marshal and his attendants, harrangued the troops to obey his orders, which they accor­dingly did, and the marshal was really intimidated to liberate the prison­ers; and then the object was accomplished, and the party dispersed, amidst the huzzas of the insurgents. After this affair at Bethlehem, it will be given you in evidence that the prisoner frequently avowed his opposition to the laws, and justified that outrage; and when a meeting was after­wards held at lower Milford to choose assessors, the prisoner refused his assent to the accommodating object of the meeting, and appeared as violent as ever.

These are some of the points we mean to prove before you. I shall therefore at present proceed to introduce our testimony.

William Henry, Esquire, sworn.

COUNCIL.

Were you at Bethlehem on the 7th of March last?

WITNESS.

I arrived there on the evening of the 6th—we had heard that there was a party of men would collect, for the purpose of rescuing the prisoners who were there in custody of the marshal, in consequence of that I went to assist the, marshal, and, if possible, prevail on the people to desist.—The witness said he was one of the judges of the court of common please for the county of Northampton—About ten o'clock on the morning of the 7th two men with arms arrived at the tavern where we were, the name of one was Keifer, and the other Paulus: they were called into the house, and enquired of by the marshal as to their intention in coming armed, they appeared to be diffident about an answer; after first saying they came upon a shooting frolic, Keifer said they were come in order to see what was best to be done for the country: after that came in several others three of them were David Shaef, Jacob Kline, and Philip Tesch, armed and on horse back, two of them in uni­form, with swords and pistols: the two first men were placed with the marshal in a separate room, in order to await the issue; at this time a considerable number of people had assembled. Henry Shankwyler was in company with the three men: the marshal first went and spoke to these men as to their intention, I also walked out for the same purpose, request­ing them to withdraw, and not appear in arms in order to obstruct the process of the United States laws: Shaeff and Kline answered that they were freemen, and might go where they pleased with their arms: I told them that they ran great risk by appearing in arms for such a purpose as I feared they were come.

COUNCIL.

Were these three, the whole of the armed men present?

There came in a number, but I don't know how many particularly, as they mixed among the croud.

We requested them to deliver up their arms, but they refused. I also, at the same time told Shankwyler that it would be best for him to surrender himself, and not oppose the process, the others gave me answer, that they had come to accompany their friend Shankwyler, and to see that no inju­ry was done to him. After this I returned into the lower back room of the house, by this time there were a number more collected round the house, but mostly armed. I don't recollect whether it was before these [Page 25] three men arrived or not, that the marshal had sent off four men of his posse, in order to meet the men with arms who were coming forward, and after we were up stairs there were three men arrived as a deputation from the armed body, making enquiry as to the intention of the marshal in taking these prisoners: with these 3 men the 4 deputed by the marshal had returned from the armed body that was the other side of the bridge, in order to learn the marshal's object. The marshal assured them of the legality of the process, and reasoned with them as to the consequences of opposition, or threats to him, or preventing him from executing his duty, but I believe he liberated the two men that were first put in confine­ment, and returned them their guns again. During the time that these two men were in confinement we examined their guns, and found that they were both loaded. I was pretty much in the lower part of the house backward, and there was much of the proceedings of these people I did not see, in the front of the house, but I endeavoured to converse with as many as I knew, informing them of the badness of their conduct, and the consequence of it, but it appeared to be to no effect, as I knew. About one o'clock I think I first saw what was called the main body of this armed force, marching up the street: there was a party of horse preceded the foot came riding up two a breast, I am not certain whether they had their swords drawn, but I believe they had, and then followed the foot, march­ing up in Indian (single) file, when they came up the foot marched twice round the tavern, and placed themselves in front of the house, where they stood some time drawn up in single rank, I believe they were rifle-men they continued there till the rescue was effected. During this time I frequently heard that the prisoners were demanded by them, and they, in­sisted on their release.

Cross examination.

Did you hear the demand made?

No, I did not, but I heard in the house that it had been made; I also heard that they intended to force their passage up stairs. I observed a party coming up stairs, particularly one, whom I did not know, [...]pointing a rifle up the stairs, as though levelling it at some particular person. The people appeared very noisy in the lower part of the house, all this time, I frequently heard the cry of " deliver up the prisoners," and it appeared to come from the party at the foot of the stairs. During the affair, I am not certain whether it was previous to this or not, I looked out and saw six or eight men at the foot of the stairs and the prisoner on the stairs conversing with the marshal: while I was standing there, there was an old man, whom I understood afterwards to be John Kline, came running in from the front door, and called for captain Fries in German, telling him there was his sword; (offering it) I think he called three different times, on which I observed the prisoner wave his hand and tell him to wait, it was not quite time yet; shortly after the prisoners were given up. I was not by to be able to hear the conversation between the marshal and the prisoner.

ATTORNEY.

Did Fries appear to take the command of the men?

I saw Fries going backward and forward among them as though he had; and I saw him marching into the town in front of the foot men.

COURT.

Did you see him acting, or busying himself?

[Page 26]

Yes, I saw him at different times passing to and fro.

Did any officer stay with the men that were drawn up in array before the house?

I noticed captain Staeler particularly, giving orders to his troop, and with his sword drawn.

Did you see any communication between Fries and Staeler?

Not that I recollect.

After the prisoners were delivered up, the principal part of the men marched off: I particularly heard captain Jarrett call to his men: I do not recollect hearing Fries.

Did they take the prisoners with them?

No. I heard two or three men in the back room say that they must see the prisoners, and insisted they should be let go before they would leave, and particularly they enquired for the minister, one Jacob Ireman, he was a prisoner, and at that time actually in custody.

COURT.

What were these prisoners in custody for?

They were arrested for combinations and misdemeanours.

There was, among the company in the lower room, a man who declar­ed himself very violently; he said if the damned stamplers* had only fired a shot, we would have shewed what we could do. He was one of Staeler's company. He really expressed a wish that it had been done. The words were spoken in German.

ATTORNEY.

Were many, or any of these people in a military dress as well as arms?

There was twelve or fourteen of the horse: I believe there were none of the foot, except that about ten or twelve had cockades of blue and white, blue and red, &c.

COURT.

Had they cartouch boxes, or any other means of carrying am­munition?

They had shot pouches, particularly the rifle company, and I believe all who had guns. Keefer, who was first disarmed had a powder horn in his pocket: his piece was a common fowling piece, the others were mostly rifles, as far as I could perceive from the window.

How many armed men were there?

I did not count them, but there appeared about an hundred, or rather above that number. The whole croud assembled I think could not have been less than 400.

What number of persons had the marshal with him for his posse com­mitatus to arrest these people?

I think fourteen or fifteen.

How many prisoners do you think there were?

I believe eighteen or nineteen.

Cross examination.

Did you ever gather more than you have now dated, of the intention of these people in assembling there?

I have frequently heard that they meant to oppose the laws.

What was the object declared by the people themselves at that time?

[Page 27]

I understood that releasing the prisoners was the object they had in view, both from themselves and from several persons with whom they had conversed on the subject.

Was there a process against these persons who arrived, and were de­tained by the marshal?

No.

COURT.

Did you suppose, from the conversation you heard, that it was these two prisoners who were intended to be released, or the prisoners held in custody by the marshal against whom process was issued?

I supposed those prisoners who were taken by warrant by the marshal. I suspected that the two persons who first came, came with improper views, and as such ought to be confined, and wished them to be kept till we law those persons who were coming with arms.

What did the deputation from those armed men demand?

They demanded the release of those two men, and they were released previous to the coming up of the armed men.

Cross examination.

At the time that Fries was conversing, with the marshal, although you had not an opportunity of hearing what passed, was there any violence in his manner, or any appearance of rage in him?

As to his own particular conduct, I cannot say, for it was but a few moments that I had time to notice hi: I saw no particular violence in his manner.

Did you hear Fries communicate to the croud the question he proposed to the marshal, and the marshal answer respecting these prisoners?

No I did not; this I heard in the general conversation.

You never saw Mr. Fries but at the time he was conversing with the marshal, and at that time not with any violent appearance.

I saw him both before and after, passing to and fro, but did not know the man's name, but seeing a feather in his hat, I supposed him to be a man of consequence.

At the time this sword was offered to Fries, he did not take, nor did appear to have any arms about him?

No.

Was there any thing said, during this transaction about bailing these prisoners?

There was a demand made by Shankwyler, in the room of the lower part of the house, a short time previous to the actual release, but the marshal told Shankwyler that his command was to take him before the judge, and he could not admit him to bail.

Was there, or not, a general overture made to bail these prisoners?

Not that I recollect: there was much conversation on this subject in different parts of the house, but not as coming from the party; but I believe it was observed that if they could be bailed, it was probable the party might be influenced to withdraw, but this did not come from the party themselves.

You mention that there were upwards of an hundred men in arms, and that the aggregate present was about 400, do you consider every indivi­dual who was there as partaking of this riot?

[Page 28]

No. Though there were many of them that appeared there unarmed, were very violent in their expressions, and generally they were in opposi­tion to the government.

During this period, were there any commissioners, or assessors there?

There was Mr. Eyerly, commissioner for that district, Mr. Balliott, and the principal assessor, and I believe two other assessors, if not more.

Were any acts of violence offered to these officers during that time?

Not that I saw.

Did These officers remain in the house, or go down among the people?

They remained in the house I believe: they arrived there on Wednes­day, the evening preceding.

Did they hear that there was a probability of the prisoners being res­cued?

Yes.

Did those people declare that they would not leave the place till they had seen the prisoners at liberty?

Yes.

What became of the prisoners?

I believe the most part of them left the house in a short time after. I understood they were, generally, not desirous of being rescued. They expressed themselves so in my presence, and when they were delivered up, they entered into some kind of obligation to deliver themselves up in Philadelphia.

COURT.

Did These prisoners or the greatest part of them appear any way desirous of being released?

No, they did not: on the reverse, they were very apprehensive of the consequences of getting into the mob.

These prisoners were many of them from your county, and you were pretty generally acquainted with them, did it appear that the prisoners were acquainted with those who came to rescue them?

The greater part of them were not, especially those who came from Lehi township. Twelve or thirteen of them I knew.

ATTORNEY.

HOW far did the parson live from Bucks county?

Forty miles, I suppose.

COURT.

Did those persons who came armed, profess to be particular friends to any of them?

Not that I heard or knew of.

WILLIAM BARNETT, sworn.

Were you at Bethlehem on the 7th of March, and if you were, relate the circumstance that transpired.

I was summoned to attend the marshal on the seventh of March at Bethlehem, as one of his posse. I came there about 11 o'clock in the forenoon: I was there but a very little time, when I understood there were some men coming with arms: the marshal then appointed four of us to go out to meet them, in order to prevail upon them not to come into the town. We went on about a mile from Bethlehem, and crossed the Lehi, and there we met a party of horsemen first: they were armed. I did not know any of them, but understood they were from Northampton county, near about Millar's town. When we came up to them, we asked [Page 29] them for their commanding officer. They made answer that they had no officers; they were all commanders. We then told them what our errand was—to try to prevail upon them not to go on any farther, but they did not seem to mind it much. We were with them but a very little time, before there was a company of rifle men came up, they were armed as well as the others. We told them our errand, but they did not seem to mind us. We then returned, and came on with them to the bridge of the Lehi, where we halted. There we talked with them a great while, but still they wanted to go on. We told them we came from the marshal, and asked them what they wanted by going into Bethlehem with their arms. They said the marshal had two of their men that had come to Bethlehem under arms, and had put them under guard, and they wanted them, and they would have them two men set at liberty, and one of the name of Shankwyler. As I found that they were determined to go, I asked if they would not allow that if any one had done wrong, they ought to suffer for it: They agreed that they ought, but they should not be taken to Philadelphia, but have been tried in Northampton county. When we found that they were determined to go on, we agreed that they had better send two or three men over to the marshal, and not to go bodily. Which they agreed to, and appointed three men to go, and they sent them over.

ATTORNEY.

Was there not some stipulation that you should return the men safe.

Yes there was; they were afraid these three men would be confined also; but we promised them that we would see them safely returned. We then all went over together to the tavern at Bethlehem, where the marshal was. They spoke to him, told him what their business was, and he gave the two men up to them. When they were given up, we went back, with them, in order to go to where we had left the remainder of the men. Going down through Bethlehem, we met a party of horsemen, and we stopped them: they were armed; part of them were light horse­men; and part were other horsemen: they all had swords or some arms or other. The light horse had their swords drawn. We told them that they had better go back, and not go up into the town, but they seemed very anxious to go up. One of them made answer something like this: "This is the third day that I was out, I had a fight yesterday, and I mean to have another to-day if they do not let the prisoners clear.

JURY.

What prisoners did you understand him to mean, the two men?

He did not say any more than the prisoners.

ATORNEY.

Who, was the man that said so?

To the best of my knowledge the prisoner was the man: I never saw the man before, but I took notice of him then.

Had he any arms?

He had a sword. This was a distinct body from those we had left at the bridge; these were others who had come up during the time we were gone.

COURT.

John Fries had not come up when you left them, had he?

I do not know that he was there at that time; the first time I saw him, was as I came back.

ATTORNEY.
[Page 30]

Had the two men whom the marshal gave up proceeded down the street, towards the party, and met with them at that time?

I did not take notice where they went to after they were released; they went on up town.—When I saw the riflemen coming forward, I stopped till they came up, and then spoke to them: they seemed that they would go on, but they promised that they would do nothing.

Did you let them know that the two persons whom they had demanded were liberated?

Yes, I did, and the three men who went with us told them also.—The horsemen did not wait one moment, but hurried on: they all then march­ed up town, and formed right in front of the tavern: I returned with them. After they were formed there, I was among them, and talked with them a great deal, but could not do any thing with them:; If there was ten or twelve that agreed to be moderate the others would all insist upon it, that they would have the prisoners, all of them. We [...] there for nearly or quite two hours. This man, whom they called captain Fries, came out and mentioned to his men that he would now have the prisoners, if any of them would go into the house with him: he had been in backward and forward several times. He said he should go foremost. He told them that he would ask the favour of them, that they were, none of them to fire first, if they went in. He mentioned to them likewise, that there were some armed men on the stairs belonging to the marshal. I did not expect he would go in: I was talking to some men there, when I looked round and saw some of the men at the door: he said he would go foremast: he signified, talking in German, that he should get a blow or a stroke: the nearest translation was, " I shall get it."—I looking round, saw the men going in at the door, and I followed them in: they were armed men. I did not see the prisoner after he had mentioned them words. I got in, between the men and the stairs at the foot of the stairs: they halted there, I got in there, in order to keep them back from going up stairs; I was there but a few minutes, when I saw the prisoners coming down stairs.

ATTORNEY.

Did you notice any particular circumstances that took place at this time?

WITNESS.

They were determined to go on; a little fellow among them, I do not know who he was, seemed to be very angry.

Were they at that moment asking for the prisoners?

Yes, they said they would have the prisoners.

What was the conduct or expressions of the marshal at that time?

I do not know, I was not so near as to hear any thing: after the pri­soners were set at liberty, they were all gone in a few minutes; they seemed to be much pleased that they had them.

Repeat particularly what captain Fries said, when he told the men to come forward.

He said if he did get it, they should not be scared, they then must do as well as they could: he said he expected to get some stroke; he told them they must take care of themselves: I do not recollect that he said they should shoot, yet I recollect something he said; I think it was "slay strike or do as well as you can." The prisoner at the bar went before, and he rather wished the men to follow him.

[Page 31] On being questioned again as to the words used by the prisoner: the witness repeated it in German, which was translated in the court to mean that he expected to get it, and if he did, they must strike, and stab, and do as well as they could. Seblaget, steehet and macht so gut as ibr konnet.

Cross examination.

I understand you to state, that when you went out at the request of the marshal, it was to speak to these people, and that they told you their object was to obtain the liberation of the two men belonging to their party.

WITNESS.

Yes.

Do you not recollect any thing said about giving bail for the appear­ance of these prisoners?

No, I do not.

As soon as these prisoners were released did the croud begin or disperse?

Yes, immediately.

Then they did not attempt to attack, or use with violence any person with a view to liberate these prisoners?

No, not that I saw.

They did not seem to have any other object in view than to get the pri­soners at liberty?

No, getting the prisoners at liberty was all.

COURT.

Did none of them say any thing about the tax law?

WITNESS.

I did not hear them say any thing.

What became of the prisoners after they were liberated?

I believe they all went to their homes.

Did you observe no violence whatever?

No, I did not either by violence or by words hear the prisoner, nor any other person attempt at any thing, more than what I have said.

JOHN BARNETT, sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Relate to the court what occurred on the 7th of March at Bethlehem.

WITNESS.

On the 7th of March in the morning early, just as I got up, the deputy marshal handed me a summons, at which I was a little fluttered till I read it over. The summons was, that I should be at Beth­lehem at 10 o'clock, to aid and assist the marshal in executing the laws of the United States. He also sent me some blank summons, desiring me to summon as many more as I pleased. I put Christian Winters, and John Mohollan's names down; we could not find any more good persons for that business. About 10 o'clock I arrived at Bethlehem. I was there but a very short time, when somebody came in, and said he had met 20 men at one place, 10 at another, &c. walking towards a tavern, on the road, about 3 or 4 miles from Bethlehem; I cannot recollect its name. The marshal, Mr. Irely, Mr. Henry, Mr. Balliott and others agreed that they thought it would be best to send three or four men to meet them, and to stop them on the road: it was then to be decided who should go. I mentioned that I thought John Mohollan and William Barnett could do more with them, than any body else. They were agreed upon as was Christian Roth (or Rote) and another, but Isaac Hatsel went in his place. This was, conformable to agreement, two federalists and two anti-fede­ralists. They went and met them, I remained at the house. They were [Page 32] not gone very long, indeed I think it was just as they were getting upon their horses, there was two men, arrayed, and with arms; one had a rifle, and the other a smooth bore piece. When they were come into the yard, the marshal went down into the yard to them, and talked to them; what he talked to them, I did not hear. However he took their arms away from them, and carried them up stairs, and put them by themselves. Directly after that, there was five or six horsemen came, I was informed that there was one man of them named Shankwyler. The marshal and judge Henry went down to meet them, they asked them what they come there for: they said, they only came there to be Shankwyler's bail: and judge Henry then asked them what they did with their arms? They said they did not mean any harm with them. They then got off their horses, and went into a room with the judge and the marshal: what they said there, I do not know, for I did not hear them. Presently after there came up a troop of horse, and behind them there was two companies of riflemen. They marched up right into the yard and formed before the door of the tavern.

How many riflemen do you suppose there was?

About 50.

Had the light horse their swords drawn?

Yes.

How many do you suppose there were in the whole?

On a rough calculation I suppose 130 or 140 armed men.

How many was there of the marshal's posse?

About 16 or 17.

After they had formed a line in the yard, about 15 or 20 minutes Captain Jarret arrived, when they gave three huzzas. He then went in­to the house and talked with the Marshal: the Marshal requested him to get the men to withdraw. He professed he would. He had arrived from Philadelphia, whither he had been to give bail. After this, Jarrett staid at the tavern about two hours. The men kept regular order, and never separated. The Marshal appointed four of us, me and three others to keep the guard of the stairs, armed with pistols, two at the bottom, and two at the head. I served my time, and the second time I was ordered on guard by Capt. Henry Snyder, I staid on the platform at the turn of the stairs, when Fries, the prisoner, came up to me, and wanted to go up stairs. I told him that he could not be permitted to go up stairs with­out the Marshal's leave. I then asked him what he wanted? He answer­ed that he wanted to see the Marshal. I told him that I expected he could see him, and told some men at the head of the stairs to call the Marshal out of the room. He came out, and I then told him these two gentlemen wanted to talk to him. He said I should let them pass. As Fries was the first man, I let him pass on between me and the other guard. The other man wanted to go up, but I told him that one at a time was enough, and that when the other had done, he would be permitted to talk to him too. Fries then went up and told the Marshal what he came for: he replied that he was come for the release of the prisoners. I stood close by them when they were talking. The Marshal made answer that he could not give them up to him; he then told the Marshal that he would [Page 33] have them. Well then, said the Marshal, you must get them as well as you can; for he said it was out of his power to deliver them up; he dared not to do it. Fries then told the Marshal that he had a skirmish yester­day, and he expected to have another one to day; he then said to the Marshal, "As for you Marshal, I will vouch that none of my men will hurt you, but as for the other company I will not vouch for.

Do you know what he meant by the other company?

No.

Where was Mr. Balliott and Mr. Irely at this time?

They were in the room where they commonly were, up stairs.

What answer did the Marshal make to that?

I do not know.

With that both of them marched off. I remained on guard. A little while after this, I saw the men coming in at the door, and they got into the entry, with arms. I did not know one of those who came in except Fries: he returned with those armed men. He had a sword in his band, but I think it was in its scabbard. When they got into the entry, they were pressed upon by the posse, who soon got them clean out of the door. I then got off guard. The language of the men was, that they would have the prisoners. I could not hear many of their expres­sions, because I was chiefly up stairs, but I heard them say they would not leave the ground till they had the prisoners. The marshal at this time had gone back into the room. Before the prisoners were released I was relieved. When they made the second attempt, I was up stairs, looking out of the window. I believe Christian Winters took my post. These prisoners were at this time up stairs in a room by themselves.

How many prisoners were there?

About sixteen or eighteen.

Where was Shankwyler at this time?

He was down stairs in the back room, he was not taken up stairs at all.

Do you know any of the other prisoners?

No.

COURT.

Did there appear to be any kind of acquaintance, or friendship between Fries and any of the prisoners?

No, I believe there was not.

Did they appear to wish to be rescued?

No, the prisoners said they did not wish to be rescued by those people, they said that they knew none of those people that were before the door. If they had done any thing wrong, they said they were willing to go any where to take their trials. The minister, and the Lehi people were all there.

Cross examination.

Was there any violence offered?

WITNESS.

I saw them point their guns toward the window often enough.

Was any violence offered to any person, besides what was offered to the marshal?

No.

Did you hear these men say that they came there for any other purpose than to rescue the prisoners?

No, I did not, and I believe that was all.

COUNSEL.

NO violence of manner or expression was used while Fries was talking to the marshal, was there?

WITNESS.
[Page 34]

NO, he had his sword in his hand, and in its scabbard at that time, and the other man had his sword, and a regimental coat on.

During the time that you were there, did any person offer Fries his sword?

Not that I know, I did not hear any person.

You did not hear any one cry out, here Mr. Fries, here is your sword?

No, I do not recollect it.

CHRISTIAN WINTERS, sworn.

I was summoned on the 7th of March to go up to Bethlehem, and I went accordingly: when I came there, which was about 11 or 12 o'clock—about the middle of the day, the first man that I say come there armed was one Keifer: another, I think his name was Paul, came with him to the tavern: the marshal went out, and brought them into the house, and took them up stairs: I was on guard at that time, and with another, I was set to stand guard by them. As we were in the room together, I asked them one thing or another, and amongst the rest, what they came there for. Keifer told me that he heard they had to meet there to-day, and that they had to decide about the laws; or to see how it was made out about the laws; I then asked him what made him carry a gun with him; why, he told me, ever since he had been a little boy, he was fond of shooting, and therefore, whenever he went out on a frolic, he liked to take his gun along, for he liked to hear it crack once in a while. I told him that he really put himself in a great deal of trouble, he told me that he meant no harm by it; that he thought he could carry his gun when he pleased. After I was relieved from my post, I went to the back door, and saw several people who said that they would not wish to be taken to Phi­ladelphia, they would be tried in their own county: they were not in arms. I then went up stairs where the prisoners were; I went into the front room where Mr. Eyerly, Mr. Henry and more were; I was then put to the top of the stairs, and got orders that I should not let any body up or down without their orders. I had a pistol with me. Nothing happened while I staid there, but after I was relieved, I saw Mr. Fries standing on the platform of the stairs, talking to the marshal. I could not then hear all that passed, but what I heard him say was " I have been out, either two or three days on this business, and I had a skirmish yesterday, and I expect I will have another to-day." He said that if the marshal did not give up the prisoners he would have one to-day. This was something like his words, though I stood at a little distance. I heard the marshal say he could not give them up. This was his meaning, but there were so many words I could not make out.

COUNCIL.

Had Fries a sword with him?

I did not take notice. There was nobody that I could see with the marshal but Fries. Afterwards he went down the stairs, and I then went down stairs, and went out of the front door. After that I saw a com­pany come in with arms; I did not see Fries come in with them. I ask­ed what they were after; I could not make out who it was, but some­body said, we will obey our captain's orders. I then went back, and went to the platform of the stairs, one of the guard asked what was the matter? I told him there was danger coming on. He then handed me his pistol, and another man handed me another pistol, and I staid on the platform in the front. At this time there was judge Mohollan, and I [Page 35] think major Barnett, and some others. At the same time there were several under the stairs. I told them to stand back, they were doing wrong if they did not I must do a thing I should be sorry for. I kept my thumb to the pistol all the time: they then stepped back, and had some talk, but I could not make out their expressions. They then went out of the door again, and the prisoners came down. The marshal came on to the platform, and I left my place. The marshal sent me down to learn the name of a person.

COURT.

Had you any conversation with the people out of doors?

WITNESS.

I had a good deal, and told the consequences of their con­duct. They said that they were all against the prisoners coming down to this place, they should be tried in their own county. I did not hear any thing about the laws, they merely complained about the prisoners being taken down to Philadelphia, and nothing about the laws at all.

ATTORNEY.

Had you not a dispute with one of them?

WITNESS.

Yes, I was sent down by the marshal to enquire a man's name; he wanted to know what I asked him for; he seemed to be scared: he said he did not mean to do any harm to any one. I do not know his name. When I spoke to this young man, one came up and said don't tell this damned Stampler. The meaning of this word I think is about this stamp act; they called these people Stamplers that told them the conse­quences of this conduct. It is thought a term of reproach. The man who called me stampler struck at me, but did not hit me; they told me his name was Henney.

Cross examination.

The people daparted as soon as the prisoners were released, did they not?

WITNESS.

Yes.

Did you use no ill language to the man who struck at you?

I called him a rascal, or something that way.

CHRISTIAN ROTHS, sworn.

On the 7th of March, I was summoned to go to Bethlehem, but did not know what it was for. About 11 o'clock I got to Bethlehem, when I came, Mr. Eyerly came to me, and told me some men were coming there to rescue the prisoners, I thought it not possible, but he told me it was certain. When we had been there about three hours, there came two men on horseback, and had their arms, whereupon Mr. Marshal, myself and Mr. Philip Sheltz went down and asked them what they were about. They told us they were informed that there were a number of men met there to-day, so they said they came there to see how they came on: they did not say what they heard they were to meet for. We took them and put them into the house under guard, and took their arms from them. I then thought there was something in what Mr. Eyerly had mentioned to me. I then made an observation to Mr. Eyerly if he did not think it proper that one or two men should go and prevent these people coming. Mr. Eyerly told the marshal of it, and he thought it would be proper, there should be some men go. I agreed that if no one else would go, I would go by myself. I do not know who spoke to the others; but I, judge Mohollan, major Barnett, and—, went out. We met them within a mile of Bethlehem. I did not know a single man of them, but judge Mohollan and major Barnett spoke to them first, but I did not understand what they said. I went farther back, to the rear: I said to [Page 36] them what in the world are you about men; you will bring yourselves in­to great trouble. One of them mentioned, we don't know you: I men­tioned if you know me or not, you will thank me for it. I said, if you do not do as I advise you, you will be sorry for twenty years after this; so there was one of them that levelled his gun at me: said I, little man, consider what you are about; don't be too much in a hurry: then some of his comrades pushed him back. Then that man hallowed out, march on, don't mind this people: I do not know his name. They then marched on to the bridge, and there we stopped them again. They then agreed amongst themselves that they would send three men with us to the marshal, to see if they could get the two prisoners we took at first, liberated, and gave their honour that none of them should come over the bridge with arms. We then went with these three men to the tavern, at Bethlehem. They then went to the marshal and agreed with him, and the two pri­soners were discharged, but he sat down their names. I do not recollect their names. When these two men were discharged, we went to go back with them again, but when we came to the lower end of Bethlehem, there was that company and another coming on, and there was no stop­ping them again.

ATTORNEY.

Did they know these men were discharged before they passed the bridge?

WITNESS.

I do not know.

How far is the bridge from Bethlehem?

About half a mile.

Do you know which way these two men went?

They went with us I think, but I am not sure. I endeavoured to stop them to reason with them, but they would not, and I then told them if they were determined not to hear, they might do as they pleased.

Did you see the prisoners, in this company?

No, I did not see this man at all to my knowledge.

As I came back to Bethlehem, I went up stairs to Mr. Eyerly and the marshal. The men paraded before the tavern, and there I think they were for two hours.

How many do you suppose there were in arms.

I suppose 120 men or upwards, were drawn up.

Did you see those two men that were first kept prisoners?

Yes, I saw them mix along with these people.

Were the light horse armed?

Yes, some of them, and with there uniforms.

Had they their swords drawn?

No, not till they came near to the tavern, then they drew their swords, a great number of them. Before we started from the bridge, we asked them again what they were about? they told us that they were inform­ed that they had taken a number of prisoners, and that they would take them to Philadelphia, and put them in gaol there, and no bail would be taken for them: we asked them what prisoners it was they meant? they mentioned one name only that I recollect, which was one Shankwyler. They mentioned that they would not suffer Shankwyler to be put to gaol in Philadelphia: they mentioned that they would give bail ten double for him, or that they might put him in gaol in our own county, and try him in our own county. I saw one Schwartz come up into the room where the marshal was.

COURT.
[Page 37]

Was not you among them after they came to Bethlehem?

No, I was not. Old Schwartz said he had two sons in the company, and they were two of the prettiest boys in the company.

Did you see any of the people in the yard levelling their guns at the window?

No.

Cross examination.

Was there any other of this company besides Schwartz that came up into the room?

No.

Did any one abuse, threaten or insult Mr. Eyerly.

Not that I know of. I heard no threats against any one.

COLONEL NICHOLS, the Marshal, sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Mr. Nichols, please to relate the transactions which led to the subject of the indictment against the prisoner, and the affair at Bethlehem.

WITNESS.

Some time between the 20th and 26th of February the warrants I now hold in my hand were given to me by the attorney of the district, with orders for me to go to Northampton county to execute them. I sat out on the 26th and after serving some subpoeneas on the road, in order to get some evidence about some matters that were wanted to be in possession, I got to Nazareth en the first of March, next morning, Mr. Eyerman and myself went into Lehi township to serve some warrants upon some persons who had given their opposition to the house tax law. I think we got twelve of them that day, the others were not to be found. I think there were five of them, however they came in afterwards. We then returned to Bethlehem, and there met with Col. Balliott. We went then to Macungy township, and there we met with no difficulty till we went to the house of George Syder; I had a subpoene on him: he and his wife insulted us very much; his wife began abusing us first, and he came out with a club, and would by no means be pursuaded to receive it I suppose not understanding it: I gave it to a Mr. Schwartz, a neigh­bour, who undertook to deliver it to him. We then proceeded to Mil­lar's town, a few miles farther: on the way we stopped at the house of the Rev. Mr. Buskirk, where we left our horses, and walked into the town, to the house of George Shaeffer, to serve a warrant on him; but were informed that he was not in town. We returned to the tavern, about the centre of the town, and there we saw a considerable number of people assembled. Mr. Eyerly and myself walked over to Shankwyler. As we walked out, many people ran after us, and many ran past us, and getting into the house, filled the long room. There appeared to be about fifty men. Near the house in which Shankwyler lived, we concluded it was bad policy to ask for him, for by that means it was not likely we should find him. And therefore as colonel Balliott knew him, I got him to point him out to me; but upon observing me, he withdrew into the croud, I followed him, and laid hold on him, and told him he was my prisoner in the name of the United States. I told him I was the marshal of the United States for the Pennsylvania district. He retreated towards his barn. He afterwards called out that he would not hurt the marshal, but Eyerly and Balliott were damned rascals: after this the people called out to each other Schlaget, Schlaget: (strike, strike) This seemed to be the general voice of the people. There was one of the Shaeffer's seemed to be a prominent character; it was David.

[Page 38] I told them the consequence of their attempting to strike: I had a pair of pistols, and finding the danger we were in, I pulled open the buttons of my great coat, that I might, if necessary, get a ready gripe at them: whether they saw them or not, I cannot say, but when they found that I was determined not to suffer these people to be abused, they were then a little quiet: they, however, pulled the cockade out of Mr. Bullion's hat, and I believe would have done more violence to him, had they dared. I called on Shankwryler to go with me to Bethlehem, and thence to Phila­delphia, but he swore he would not: I told him the consequence of resist­ing the authority of the United States, that it would be ruin to him; he declared and swore he would resist he would not submit, be the conse­quence what it might. I told him it would ruin his interest and family; he said he would do it, if it was to the destruction of his property, and children. However, he finally agreed to meet me at Bethlehem, but never promised to submit, or surrender himself at prisoner. He spoke a good deal about the stamp act, and the house tax; that seemed to be the bone of contention, and he said he had fought against it, and would not submit to it now; I told him he appeared to be too young to have fought on either side during the war: he then said, his father had, he then added that there were none in favour of those laws but tories, and officers of government. I told him that, as to tory, that could not apply to me, that I had had a share in the revolution, and that I was as fond of liberty as any of them. We came away, and as we came out, Mr. Ey­erly and Mr. Balliott came out of the door, they huzzaed for liberty: I told them that I should join them in that, if they would huzza for liberty of the right kind; but this was licentious liberty. We then went with a constable to arrest Adam Stepham, Herman Hartman, and Daniel Everly. When I returned, I was informed that the rescue of the prisoners at Beth­lehem was intended. This was on the sixth of March. I could scarcely conceive it possible; I thought it was somebody for their own diversion had raised it merely to alarm us, until we got to Bethlehem, where we got that night. There we were informed that the report was serious, and that it would be attempted by a body of armed men. On which I consulted with judge Henry, Mr. Balliott, Mr. Eyerly, Mr. Horsefield, and general Brown. I had taken a bond of the Lehi people, with sureties for their appearance. I sent Mr. Weed over the mountain to arrest Ire­man, the minister, and John Fox, which he did. Seeing this matter very serious and important, I requested general Brown to remain at Bethlehem, as he had very great influence in that county: he said he was so near home, that he should go home, as he had been so long from his family. I then asked him to return in the morning, but he seemed to think there was no necessity for it, and did not. I then consulted what steps it would be necessary to take; I had seen an attorney, and told him I was ordered to call a posse commitatus in case of necessity, and also that I was ordered that they should not be an armed force; I then spoke to judge Henry, expecting that he could call out armed men, but he told me he could not, for he had received similar instructions. We then concluded to call about 20 men. He called this posse from the neighbourhood of Bethlehem and Easton, about 18 of them came in. About 10 or 11 o'clock two men riding into the yard, dismounted, and placed themselves opposite the door, by the side of each other; one of them had a long smooth bore gun, and [Page 39] the other a rifle. Some people in the house went out to speak to them, and asked them what brought them there: they seemed to be at a loss for an answer; I think one of them said they came out on a shooting fro­lic: I then asked them what they meant to shoot: they did not know, nor could they explain the object of their coming. I asked them what they meant to do: one of them said they meant to do what was best for the country. I then supposed that they would all come in by straggling parties, and therefore thought it was the best way of making the business easy, was to lead them into the house, which I did, and put their arms into the garrett. Shortly after, three horsemen, armed, and, I think, in uniform came into the yard with Shankwyler: I went and spoke to them, and some went with me. I asked Shankwyler if he was come to deliver himself up; he answered no. I asked him what he came for, if he did not come to surrender himself, he answered that he came to see his part­ner: on farther enquiry I found he meant his accuser. By this time the people were collecting very fast, and same persons mentioned that there was an armed force down by the bridge. On consulting with the gen­tlemen who were with me, it was agreed that a few men should be sent to speak to them, and warn them of the danger they were in if they per­sisted in the measure which we supposed they intended. It was accord­ingly agreed that four gentlemen should go, which they did, and in a little time returned with three of their force, as a deputation from them to speak to me. I asked them what was meant by this armed force, and and what they intended by it: they answered me that they wanted to pre­vent my taking the prisoners to Philadelphia. I told them that could not be, nor must be; nor must it be attempted, they had much better go back, and tell the people to go to their respective homes. I think they asked me, particularly for the two men who had first been made prisoners; I for­get whether I gave them up then, or some short time after; however, they were given up, and their guns were given up to them: they were both loaded, and one of them was putting a new flint into his gun, in the yard, before I went out to speak to them. The same gentlemen who went down to speak to them at the bridge, went down to them again, and, a short time afterward, we observed that they were coming up in force, up the street, Mr. Muhollan riding with the foremost of them, and speaking to them: the horsemen, such as had swords, had them drawn: the infan­try marched with trailed arms. The prisoner at the bar was at the head of the infantry, with his sword drawn: the horse marched into the yard, and formed in front of the house, the infantry marched round the house, and the captain, with the leading file, came in at the upper gate. I had a great deal of conversation with different persons among them, who seem­ed to take a lead. They were all strangers to me, I told them the conse­quences of their attempting to rescue the prisoners; I told them they might rest assured that things of this kind would be severely punished by the government; that it would be considered an high offence, and that every insult offered to me, would be an insult to the United States. I had a good deal of conversation with the prisoner at the bar, without knowing that he was captain Fries, till he made himself known to me. I remonstrated strongly against the measures, and told them the consequence, but they seemed regardless of it, and seemed determined that I should give them up.

ATTORNEY.
[Page 40]

Did they speak of any prisoners in particular?

WITNESS.

NO, they speak generally of the prisoners.

Did the prisoners speak of them as particular friends neighbours, or acquaintances?

No, the measure was his object. During this conversation, he was without his sword. The substance of the conversation was, he demanded of me the prisoners; I refused to give them up, and told him the conse­quences of his demands. On his still insisting, I told him that he and those about him would be severely punished for this conduct, that he would surely be hanged. He said they could not be punished: he said something to the effect that the government were not strong enough to hang him, for that if the troops were brought out, they would join him.

ATTORNEY.

Did he give any reason for wishing to rescue those prison­ers?

His reason was, that he was opposed to those laws: the Alien law, the stamp act, and the house tax law, and said they were unconstitutional. He also spoke of bringing people charged with crimes to Philadelphia to be tried as an oppressive thing: they had no objection, he said, to be tried in their own courts, and by their own people. We parted, and met in the croud two or three times, for the house was much crouded: he still demanded of me the prisoners, I told him I could not give them up: I told him I was commanded to bring them to Philadelphia: he insisted upon having them, and I that he should not. He then went and talked to his people, and came to me again. He told me that if I did not give them up, he would not answer for the consequences: he told me that he would not hurt me: he was the oldest captain in the rank, but he would not answer for them that were with me: that he took command of the whole by rank. By this time captain Jarrett came in, and by this time there was much noise and huzzaing. I was told that this noise was on ac­count of the arrival of captain Jarrett: I wished him pointed out to me in confidence, that, as he had come to submit to the laws, he would be able to persuade others to do the same. He was to me; he had a pair of pistols in his hand. He shewed me that he had entered into re­cognizance for his appearance. I then begged him to use his influence in persuading the people to disperse, and go to their respective homes, and told him what would be the consequence if they did not. His answer was, that he had no influence; that he could do nothing. After this, I consulted with judge Henry and others, what was best to be done; it seemed to be their opinion that I had better submit, and give up the pri­soners: I told them I would not do it, I would immediately march the prisoners to Philadelphia, and if the armed mob thought proper to take them from me, they might, it would then be their act, and not mine: I went to them, and told them to prepare for march immediately, for that we would set off to Philadelphia. The Lehi prisoners said they would not do so, they would not expose themselves to so much danger, but if I would suffer them to go to their homes, they would meet me in Philadelphia on the Monday or Tuesday following. I met Mr. Fries about the foot of the stairs, and he still persisted in his demand of the prisoners, that I must give them up.

Cross examination.

Had he a sword with him?

WITNESS.
[Page 41]

I do not think he had a sword at that moment. I refused, and went into the back room, and a person whom I did not know, told me, that if I did not give them up 1 should not be hurt, but the life of Balliott, Eyerly and Henry were in danger. This was not an armed man. I did not like to expose the lives of those men, so I rescued them. Fries came in directly, and said I had not given up Ireman, the minister. I told him I had; he then went out, and came in again, and said he was without. He then mounted and went off.

ATTORNEY.

Did you really apprehend any danger to the gentlemen who were with you?

WITNESS.

I did apprehend that the lives of those gentlemen would be in danger if I refused the prisoners.

Who had you then in possession as prisoners?

We had Fox, Ireman and some others who had not surrendered them­selves, besides the Lehi people.

PHILIP SCHLAUGH,

When I was at Bethlehem, which I expect was the 7th of March, the first I saw was that the company was ordered in rank, and when that was done, this Fries was in the entry of the house, where he was speaking loud. I enquired who that was, they said it was captain Fries; He said them who was the greatest tories in the last war, them was the head leaders now; then I went out of the house, and he went up to the marshal, and when he came out again; he went up to his company, and told them " Well brothers, I went up to the marshal, and asked him about the pri­soners, and told him I would have the prisoners, but the marshal told me he dare not give them up willingly; I tell you, brothers, we have to pass four or five centries, but I beg you not to fire first on them, till they first fire upon us: I shall be the foremast man; I shall go on before you, and I expect I shall get the first blow." Then he turned himself round. Mr. Mulhollan, and others begged him that he would not go on in this matter, they would rather go and speak to the marshal that he should deliver up the prisoners willingly, if they would absolutely have them.

Did the men rush on when he told them this?

Yes, they followed him. He then said to them, you must not fire first, but if they do fire upon you, then I will order you to fire too, and help yourselves as well as you can. I did not wait till the prisoners were re­leased, for when I heard this, I thought there was going to be warm work, so I got upon my horse, and rode off to Easton as fast as I could.

Thursday May 2. JOSEPH HORSEFIELD, esquire, qualified:

ATTORNEY.

Please to relate the particulars of the affair at Bethlehem as far as came to your knowledge.

WITNESS.

I live in Bethlehem; am a justice of the peace there, and was there on the 7th of March.—Shortly before the last general election, the spirit of discontent and opposition was sensibly felt in the county of Northampton; there were different meetings called in different parts of the county, among others, I was informed there was one at which the militia officers were particularly to attend, which I understood was intended to prepare a ticket for the election. At that meeting, sundry resolutions were passed, which appeared in public prints, among others, one was that petitions should be formed to obtain a repeal of the alien [Page 42] and sedition laws, and the land tax act. I was informed that the cap­tains of the militia companies were to be served with a copy of each of these petitions: I was likewise informed that this was done, and a five penny bit each paid freely for a copy, though the Germans love their money so well. I think the people were told that the petitions merely contained a request for the repeal of the house and land tax law. I have seen none of them. On the election day, the people pretty generally collected and, at least in the district where I had a right to vote, the spirit of opposition against the measures of government were so universal, that a friend of government, by saying one word in favour of it, was ready to be abused and I understood it was so in every election district in the county, and the county in general gloried that they had gained the day. Nothing mate­rial occurred, to my knowledge, from that time till the marshal arrived there.

ATTORNEY.

Did the assessments go on regularly before that time?

WITNESS.

No.

What do you know of that fact?

I never was present at any opposition myself, for I mostly stay at home.

Did not the spirit of opposition which had begun before the election, increase before the marshal arrived?

It daily increased.

In the beginning of March, the marshal of the United States arrived at Bethlehem, I think about the 3d. I having some personal acquaintance with that gentleman, waited on him, when he told me he was sent to the county on business for the United States, and desired me to inform him where several certain persons resided, against whom he had precepts from the district judge. I acquainted him with the courses and distances. He then went to Nazareth, and returned again about the fifth, telling me he had summoned a number of persons in Lehi township, and that they were to be at Bethlehem on the 7th. On the 6th in the evening, I was in­formed he had returned from Millar's town, and on the 7th in the morn­ing I went up to town, when he told me that he expected there would be some disturbance that day, and also told me that he had issued summons's for the posse commitatus. Between 10 and 11 o'clock the posse came, I think they were about 14 in number. A considerable number of people from the neighbourhoood of Bethlehem, had collected, unarmed. Mr. Dixon arrived from Emaus about 11 o'clock, and informed the marshal that on his way he met with a number of people collected at a tavern called Reiter's, in arms, both horsemen and footmen, about 6 miles from Bethlehem, and that he met a number on the road, partly armed, partly unarmed. About half past eleven, two men arrived at Bethlehem armed, from that quarter: they were disarmed and sent up stairs into a room; about the same time a number of persons arrived from Lehi township, who were also sent up stairs by the marshal in a room by themselves: they were about eleven in number. I was present when Mr. Eyerly spoke to these prisoners, telling them that an armed force was formed with intention to rescue them; the prisoners answered that they by no means wished it: that they would submit to go with the marshal rather than be rescued. In about an hour, I was looking out of the window up stairs, and saw riding into the yard a number of horsemen, besides some footmen; 1 said to the marshal, I thought it was best for us now to go down and [Page 43] see these people. I went down and asked one of them what was his name, he answered Daniel Shaeffer. He had a sword at his side, and two pistols: next to him, on horseback, was Henry Shankwyler, next to him was another horseman accoutred in the same manner; his name was Phi­lip Daesch; there were also John Dillinger and Jacob Kline, not in uni­form but with swords in the scabbard. I asked them what they wanted: we are all civil people and have no arms, was my observation to them. Dillinger who seemed to speak for them, said that yesterday the marshal had taken Shankwyler and some other of their neighbours prisoners, that they were come to see Shankwyler's partner (accuser.) The marshal told them that the United States was the accuser of Mr. Shankwyler. Dillin­ger said he thought it was not right that he should be taken to Philadel­phia. The marshal said that the judge had ordered it so. I told him that I thought they were unacquainted with the government of the Uni­ted States, and 1 thought they were in a very critical and dangerous situ­ation; that the United States in less than 20 days could muster 10,000 men, which power I thought they could not with stand, and that it was best for them to surrender the prisoners to the marshal, and go home. They said that Shankwyler and the others were their neighbours, and that they would wait and see what should become of them. They did not mention the others names. I asked whether any more armed men would be there; Jacob Kline answered, 50 more. With that we went into the house. After dinner the people collected very fast, and Dillinger began again to speak in behalf of Shankwyler. The marshal told him it could not be otherwise, go he must: Shankwyler answered that he had a family to take care of, and that he would not go. With this, the mar­shal and myself walked up stairs, and there saw a great number of armed people round the house, 1 think 120 or 130, and about 250 unarmed. I suggested to the marshal that my suspicions were very gloomy; that I doubted whether he would succeed in taking off the prisoners, for I had quietly heard among the people that were in the house, and out of doors, that nothing should satisfy them but the delivery of the prisoners in front of the house was drawn up a number of men armed. I went up stairs and there I perceived several times, guns pointed up to the window of the second story at which I began to feel very disagreeable. Mr. Ey­erly, Mr. Balliott, Mr. Henry, and the others were occasionly at the windows, though I do not recollect Eyerly being at the window, but the others were: I walked down stairs, and there saw men armed close before the door, pressing in: I pressed through them, and heard two men say if Henry, and that damned Eyerly, and that damned pot gutted Balliott were there, they would tear them to pieces; this man did not attempt to come into the house. I thought this was bad news, and I walked back again, and proceeded my way up stairs, and desired Mr. Levering (the tavern keeper to close the bar) thinking there was madness enough with­out stimulating it, which was immediately done. I desired the marshal not to protract the delivery of the prisoners to the law. Mr. Mohollan and several others there pushed them back, but just then I heard some of the officers say, "boys, in the ranks, in the ranks."

COURT.

Were those two men whom you heard use the words just now related, passing in at the door.

WITNESS.
[Page 44]

NO, they staid in the yard.—I looked out of the window again up stairs, and there I saw a second pressure, to come in at the door some of the men who were in the ranks thumped their guns upon the ground, and jumped, pronouncing some unintelligible shrieks, savage like shrieks. I begged the marshal, for God's sake to deliver up those men up stairs, for the rescue was perfect in my opinion: the closing of the men would be only butchering, and I had no doubt the government of the United States would not let its dignity be trampled upon in this way. The marshal still continued to hessitate. By this time a number of per­sons had got into the house, adorned with large three coloured French cockades. The posse staid up stairs at this time: I then worked my way down stairs again, in order to be ready for a jump. By this time I un­derstood that the prisoners were delivered. After the prisoners were gone about ten minutes, there was not a single armed man in, or about the house: some of the neighbours who had collected were still there, some of whom were approving, and others disapproving of the conduct of the insurgents, but in my opinion, the majority were approving.

Have you any knowledge of the conduct of the prisoner at the bar, at Bethelethem?

No, I never saw him till I came down to this place, but I frequently heard the name of captain Fries called.

Cross examination.

Did you see Mr. Henry or Mr. Balliott in the room, looking out of the window?

WITNESS.

Mr. Balliott looked out of the window but stepped back again pretty quick, afraid of the muzzles of the guns.

COURT.

At the time that judge Peters issued warrants for the appre­hension of those people, do you think any magistrate in the county could have issued them, and made them returnable to himself?

WITNESS.

I look upon it that the state justices were a nullity. Many people came to me, asked me if the saw was dead: I told them No, they should first hear of me being dead.

Cross examination.

Was there any applications made to any of the justices of the peace?

Not to my knowledge, but I think the justices of the peace could do nothing with it.

JOHN MOHOLLAN, Esq sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Was you at Bethlehem on the 7th of March?

WITNESS.

Yes.

Please to inform the court and jury what took place there.

WITNESS.

The reason that I was there was from a summons I had received to attend the marshal that morning. Agreeable to that sum­mons I went there about 11 o'clock, and we went at the direction of the marshal to meet the force over the bridge. Christian Roths, William Barnett, and J. Hartsell went with me.

He then related the occurrence of the meeting the companies, and the delegation of three men from them, which was much similar to the testi­mony of William Barnett, and Christian Roths.

COURT.

At what time did you first hear that the marshal had these two men in custody?

WITNESS.

The first time I heard of it was by the men over the bridge.

[Page 45]

What became of those two men?

I cannot tell; the marshal told me they were discharged, but I do not recollect seeing them.

Did you see the prisoner among this party?

No, not to my knowledge, if I had I should not have known him, for I never heard of him before. Having met with those horse men before we came back to the bridge, we returned with them, and all made an halt in the yard. I spoke all I could to dissuade them from the purpose about which they came, but all to no purpose. I had no answer that I could understand, for they generally spoke in German or broken English, which I could not understand. I always understood, generally, that they wanted the prisoners, and that they wished to give in security, and let them be tried in the county: that if they had done any thing that was wrong, it was right they should suffer, but that it was not right to take them to Philadelphia. I heard major Barnett say this who interpreted what they said in German. After being a considerable time engaged with people as actively as I could, but it appeared to be but to little purpose, I then went up stairs with a view to take something; as I was returning the stairs were so crouded I could not easily get down. Coming down I saw a per­son whom I understood to be captain Fries, and the marshal standing talk­ing to him. I believe it was the prisoner at the bar. I heard them talk a few words: the marshal said that they were not doing right, and they must suffer: but I cannot recollect any thing particularly that was said, but I observed that he often made a demand of the prisoners, but that he should not be hurt; that he would be answerable for himself and the company, that none of his men should hurt him that day, but that he would not be answerable for any others that did not belong to his com­pany. I think he repeated this twice. I was there but a few minutes. I made some observations to the men advising them to consider what they were about, for I considered it dangerous, and very wrong to proceed in this way. At this time there was a noise in the entry: I was afraid something had happened, so I went down, but I do not recollect seeing Fries, the whole day afterwards. There was a great deal said, but none of them spoke to me in English.

JACOB EYERLY, qualified.

ATTORNEY.

We wish you to relate what you took notice of at Beth­lehem.

WITNESS.

AS to what happened on the seventh of March, I am not able to say much. I was out with the marshal the day before, when he served the process. As we heard that the rescue was intended. It was agreed by the marshal to send express to Easton, in order to obtain the posse to aid him in the execution of his duty: they accordingly arrived between 10 and 11 o'clock, to the number of 15 or 16. Mr. Dixon of Emaus told us that he had seen about 20 armed men at Reiter's tavern, and some at another tavern, besides some on the road, and that he understood from them that they were coming to rescue the prisoners. It was then agreed to take these prisoners, who had surrendered, up stairs. There were a number of people now collected now from the neighbourhood, and then it was agreed to send the deputation to meet the armed men. About that time I went down stairs into the back room, and there I saw those two men whose arms had been taken from them; I did not see them come in. [Page 46] I then went up stairs again, this was the last time I went down stairs, till after the prisoners were released. I then saw those three men come with Shankwyler. I did not hear what passed, but saw Mr. Horsefield and judge Henry go to them. Sometime afterwards, I saw an armed force coming in, a great many on horseback, and many footmen with muskets on their shoulders: the horsemen had their swords drawn. The greatest part of those on horseback came from Bucks county. Afterwards, the marshal came up stairs and said that they were determined to have the prisoners, and he believed that Mr. Balliott and myself would be in danger of our lives if we went out of the house, and then desired me to undertake to guard the stairs, and told me to give orders that if any body would come up with force, they should shoot them. I placed the guard on the stairs, at first there was but two. Some of the posse were at this time below talking to the people. After some time the guard told me that they got so violent, and threatened to come up stairs with violence, and requested of me that I might double the guard, which I did. As I was in the room. I looked out of the window and saw a company of rifle men, all with three coloured cockades, marching Indian file round the house: I counted them, there were 42 in that company: another person besides myself was counting them, but I do not recollect who it was, though I rather think it was Mr. Balliott: they marched twice round the house. Another time when I was walking about the room a person who was along with me, I do not recollect who, told me that they were pointing their guns up to the window, and that he was sure it was dangerous for me to show myself at the window.

Objection was here made by the council for the prisoner, against any hearsay evidence.

ATTORNEY.

Had you not reason to believe that your life was in dan­ger?

WITNESS.

There is not the least doubt upon my mind, from what I heard, and from what I say, and from the marshal's testimony, but if I had gone to any place where they could have done it, but they would shoot me, because the people in general appeared to be in such a rage that there was no reason in them.

Some farther objections was made by the council as to his ideas of the state of things, but the court declared it right to shew the general im­pressions he felt.

ATORNEY.

Did you, or not, abstain from shewing yourself at the window, or amongst the people.

WITNESS.

Yes, as much as possible. There was nothing particular that I saw, except at one time when I was in the room, I heard a terrible huzza: this was in the afternoon. On this I went to the window to see what produced this noise, and I saw that captain Jarrett had arrived: the had just dismounted his horse, and had his pistols, in his hand, and was walking up toward the stairs. I did not remain long at the window, but just looked out, and saw him come in, and shortly after he came up into the room where I was; he had not his pistols with him then: I had that moment received a letter from Mr. Rawle, attorney of the district, that Mr. Jarrett had surrendered himself and given bail, and that he declared he was a strong friend to government. I then said to him, if you are a friend to government, as you profess to be, you ought to go down and tell [Page 47] your people to desist: to which he made no reply at all. He walked about in the room for some time, and then wept down stairs. I did not see any thing more till the prisoners were released. The only time I saw Mr. Fries, the prisoner, was a few minutes before the prisoners were delivered up. I walked our of the room and saw Mr. Fries upon the head of the stairs, speaking with the marshal: shortly after, the prisoners were request­ed to go down, but the minister staying a little while up in the room, there was a call made for him particularly, and therefore I went and re­quested him to go down. Shortly after, the armed men went off. I look­ed out of the window and saw Mr. Jarrett parading his light horse in rank before the door. He then gave orders to march, and they went off.

ATTORNEY.

Did you perceive any thing of the prisoner after this?

WITNESS.

No, that was the only time I saw him during the day.

You were one of the commissioners appointed to carry into execution two acts of Congress; one for assessing houses, and the other for laying a direct tax?

Yes.

Was there not, before this time, a general opposition to the execution of this law throughout the county of Northampton?

After I had received my commission, which was sometime in August 1798, I had received a letter from the secretary of the treasury, requesting me to take some pains to find out suitable characters to serve at assessors. I did, in consequence of that, write some letters to some of my friends, in the counties of Northampton, Luzerne and Wayne, which constituted my division: in Wayne and Luzerne, I found no difficulties whatever, but received a number of applications sufficient, and accompanied with recom­mendations. In Northampton county I was not so successful; I had but two recommendations from that county; it was therefore necessary for me, from the best information which I could obtain, to endeavour to find men of suitable characters in each township; and likewise to get a num­ber of blank commissions, in case some of those appointed should refuse to accept of the office. I received information at Reading, at the time the board of commissioners met, from the commissioner in Bucks, that he had received information from a gentlemen in Philadelphia (Mr. Chapman) that he had travelled through a great part of Northampton county, and that in every tavern where he stopped, this tax law was the general topic of conversation, and that great pains was taken to find out who the per­sons were that were friends of the government so much as to be assessors, in order to persuade them not to accept of the appointment. Although I could not believe it was the case at that time, yet I found it was the case afterwards.

Cross examination.

Do you know this traveller?

WITNESS.

No.

Agreeable to my duty, I gave notice to the assessors to meet me at a certain place. I should have first said that I appointed the assessors agree­able to the best information I could collect, I took one man from each township, such as was thought qualified for the business. I sent them their commissions, and with them notices to meet me at a time and place appointed in order to receive from me their instructions.

He then mentioned the names of the assessors, and the townships to which they were appointed.

[Page 48]

I appointed a meeting of the assessors of the third district at Nazareth, on the 3d Thursday in November, two of them did not attend, and some of the others who did attend begged to be excused from serving. I asked their reason, and told them I could not very well excuse them, they told me that the people in their different townships were very much opposed to the law; that they thought it was dangerous for them to accept of it. I found that they, as well as the people, had a wrong idea about the law; and I was so happy that day as to prevail upon all those that wished to be excused accepting the appointment, upon explaining the law to them, to accept it. The next day I met the assessors of the second district at Al­lentown, where all attended but one. I had the same difficulty there as at the other place, and it was not without much difficulty that those who did appear, that they did accept of the appointment. I then left the blank commissions with Mr. Balliot, and requested him to appoint some persons in the room of Mr. Home, who had refused. The Monday fol­lowing met the assessors of the other district at Chesnut Hill township. Previous to that I had seen Mr. Kearne, who was the assessor, appointed at Easton; when I mentioned to him that he was appointed an assessor, he told me that it would not suit him to accept of it. I requested of him that he might name some suitable person, and qualified for it, and I would be willing to accept him. He mentioned Jacob Snyder, and told me he would notice Mr. Snyder to meet me with the rest. When I came there two of the assessors did not appear, and one from Hamilton did not appear willing to accept of it, but after a great deal of explaining and persuading, it was prevailed upon. Just as we were going, Synder came, he told me that be had received his notice, and that he was not willing to accept it; that the people were very much opposed to the law, and he did not very well understand it himself, but he thought he would endeavour to get some information, and that when he came there, the information he received was such, that he was determined to go after me, and accept of the ap­pointment, if he were to ride 50 miles in order to accept of it, for that he had been wrong informed about the law. I then went up to Wayne county where I had no difficulty, except that one assessor told me that he was persuaded with difficulty to accept of the appointment. As I was going to Luzerne county, the assessor from Hamilton township, (Nicholas Michael) came after me, and told me that he had been obliged to fly from his house in the night to save his life, and begged of me to accept of his resignation; I told him I could not accept of it, but that I would see per­fect justice done. At any request he went with mo to Easton, where we went to see for Mr. Sitgreaves, attorney of the district, but not finding him at home, we went to Judge Trail, in order to take his deposition. He begged that I would grant the favour for him to consider of it till the next morning; I did, and next morning he came to me and begged me " Mr. Eyerly, for God's sake put me to jail, so that I may be secure of my life, for if I inform against these people, I and my family shall be ruined. I told him that I would do no such thing, for that I had too much friendship for him; that I would give a few lines to the constable to request him to call a township meeting, and I would meet him in the town­ship. I requested Mr. Henry to go there with me: I had reason to be­lieve that this opposition arose from misrepresentation, which I supposed was given to the people by a few gentlemen, who had travelled through [Page 49] the county a few days since. When we came to Hamilton township, there were about 60 or 70 persons assembled, three or four of them in uniforms, their arms was behind the door at the house of Mr. Hellers. I then told them that I was come as their friend, and without any design of taking the least advantage of their conduct in opposing the assessors: that I had come to read the law to them, and explain it. I did so, and pointed out the impositions practised on them. Mr. Henry assisted me as much as he could, but all to very little purpose. The assessor after this again begged me, for God's sake, to accept of his resignation. AS there was a number of them that complained against the assessors. I proposed to them that though I had no authority to it, yet if I thought it would be a favour to grant them that indulgence to elect their own assessor themselves, I would grant him the appointment. They told me they would do no such thing, for said they " if we do this, we at once acknowledge that we will submit to the laws, and that is what we wont do. I then enquired for a suitable man, and John Huston was mentioned, who was likewise elected assessor under the county rates. I called him into a room, and requested him to accept the appointment, he told me it was im­possible at the present time, but he should, whenever things appeared more favourable, so that he could go through, be willing to do it.

I hear that the business is now done.

ATTORNEY.

Please to relate who were the persons that travelled through that county, and encouraged the opposition.

WITNESS.

The last week in December, or the first of January I re­ceived a letter from Mr. Heckavelter, the assessor of upper Milford: by which, he informed me that he was stopped, by a regular deputation from the township meeting, consisting of 3 men. I sent a line to Mr. Heck­avelter, and wished him to give notice to Mr. Schymer, Mr. Moretz, and some of the leading men in the township, that I would meet them at such a time, and explain the business to them. When I came, in conse­quence, within 4 miles of the place, I was requested by a friend, not to go, for that the people, were so violent, that if I did go I should certainly be killed: I replied to them that I would go, I was not afraid of any of them. I took Mr. Henry along with me; when we came there, I found about 60 or 70 persons collected at the house of John Schymer. I suppose a­bout 20 of them had French cockades in their hats, red, blue and white. Mr. Schymer then took me into his own room; there were about eight or ten in the room. Mr. Schymer asked me if I had seen the petitions, he gave one of them to me, and requested that I would read it, which I did in the presence of another person; there were but two in the company that understood English. While I was reading, these two men began to shake their heads, they said it was not such a petition as they had been told. I then asked them whether the general opposition was not on account of the stamp tax, and the house tax; they said yes. I then told them there was not a word in this petition against the stamp act; they seemed to be al­together satisfied, and said that they had been made to believe it was. I then went into the next room, where the people collected: some of them appeared to be extremely violent and very abusive. I told them I had not came there to be abused by any body; that I had come there as a friend, to inform them of the law which it was important should be understood. There was a report among them that it was no law; I read the law to them, and explained it in the German language, and told them it was their [Page 50] duty to submit to it. One of them of the name of George Shaeffer jumped up before me, and said, Mr. Eyerly, it is no law; I told them that if they did not believe me, they might enquire of Squire Schymer whether it was or not. Mr. Schymer told them it was a law; upon which Shaef­fer replied, " admitting it is a law, we will not submit to it". He then farther said, here I am, take me to gaol, but you shall see how far you will bring me. Upon which a great many of them jumped up and said, yes by God, if they shall only attempt to take any one to jail, we would soon have him out again. Some of them made use of very abusive language against the assessor, calling him a tory rascal and the like; and as the ass­essor had requested me to accept of his resignation because it was not in his power to go through with it, I proposed to them, that if they had any objections against the assessor, that they should elect one, and I would give him his appointment; to which some of the most sensible and most mode­rate replied, no, if it must be done Mr. Heckavelter shall do it, and some of the others said, we will do no such things if we do, we at once acknow­ledge that we submit to the law, and that is what we will not. I then went over to the tavern close by, with Mr. Schymer, when Mr. Hecka­velter came to me, and told me that he was in danger; that there was three of the Shaeffers were going to give him a licking: I requested him to stand by me, and I would see him safe. We then went off.

Cross examination.

Did they come up to beat him?

WITNESS.

Yes they did, all three of them. Mr. Heckavelter told them he would not have any thing to do with them, and they charged him something respecting a liberty pole at Millars town.

Did they threaten to beat him on account of his going on with the laws as assessor?

No.

ATTORNEY.

But it was no private quarrel was it?

WITNESS.

No, Mr. Heckavelter told me it was not.

When was the liberty pole erected?

Two weeks before that, but after the dissentions arose.

Were those poles erected any where, but where this opposition prevailed?

With a few exceptions: there was one place where the law was fully executed, and some others that followed the example, where the law was executed:

Was the law executed at Millars town?

It was not executed there, nor at upper Milford till about two or three weeks ago at farthest. I then agreed to go to Millars town, where one of the Shaeffer's lived. Mentioning this to an assessor, (John Roming) he requested I would not do it; he told me that the people were so violent that he would not go upon his duties if any body would give him £.500 to do it, if he did, he must run the risk of losing his life. I then desisted.

ATTORNEY.

The laws were not excuted till after the army came up, and not before were they?

The witness was going on to say what be had been told, but hearsay evidence was inadmissible.

—I then went to Mr. Trexlers where I saw Mr. Bobst, who gave me information of Heidelberg, Wiessenberg, Lynn, and Low Hill: he told me that at a meeting at one of those places the people had drawn up a paper not to submit to the laws: he then told the people that they were [Page 51] certainly doing wrong, and that they would bring themselves into trouble if they went on that way: upon which they (the people themselves) destroyed the paper. He said the same of Heidelberg. He likewise informed me that in the township where he lives it was impossible to execute the laws.

At what time were the laws executed in those four townships?

Since the troops have been there. He went so far as to say that all in the township opposed the execution of the law, except three or four.

Hearsay evidence stopped again by the council, because the constitution provides that the accused shall be confronted with his accusers.

Mr. Rawle contended, that, as he wished to shew the court and jury the general state of that country, the hearsay evidence of Mr. Eyerly in his official capacity as commissioner, to whom reports of the assessments were made, was admissible.

So far as explained the general temper was allowed.

WITNESS.

—In Penn township the assessor did not meet us, he refused to accept the appointment, well aware of the difficulties that would occur, and a general rule was admitted to meet those difficulties. I received information from Mr. Balliott that he had found a man in that township who was willing to execute the office. At my request, he sent him a commission, but the man was obliged, before he took the oaths, to return it again, declaring it was impossible to do it. This was sometime in Ja­nuary. Sometime afterwards he wrote to me of another man who would accept. I requested him to sign his commission. I received information while the marshal, Mr. Balliott and myself were about the county, that as soon as the people, in the township knew that he had received his com­mission they raised a mob.

When was Penn township assessed?

About ten days ago.

COURT.

Had you not reason to believe that, owing to the opposition in that township the law could not be executed?

WITNESS.

It could not.

Was there similar opposition in any other township?

In Moore township there was some opposition, but when the assessor was opposed he called a town meeting. That township has been assessed about two months.

Mr. Lewis insisted that if such evidence were allowed, it would be ne­cessary to produce the commissions of these officers, and he could see no reason why themselves could not have been present as evidences on the prosecution, instead of that testimony coming through Mr. Eyerly.

Mr. Rawle contended that if it was necessary to prove commissions, there would be no end to the enquiry.

ATTORNEY.

Were you present at any other meetings?

WITNESS.

No.—On the first or second of March last, when the mar­shal came to Nazareth, and told me that he had process against a num­ber of persons in Northampton, county, he requested me to go with him: I went with him, first to Lehi township, where the marshal served process upon those people for opposing the assessments, without any difficulty: we then came to Bethlehem, and then to Emaus: the first house the marshal had to serve in was a subpoena upon George Syder, where, after being Abused by the house, we were sworn at and abused by him: he had a large club in his hand.

COURT.
[Page 52]

Did he abuse you before you spoke to him?

WITNESS.

Yes.—He called us rascals, highway robbers and the like: the marshal told him he only had a subpoena to appear at Philadelphia to give testimony; to which he answered, in German, he would be damned if he would go. The marshal finding he could do nothing with him, re­quested Daniel Schwartz sen. to read and explain it to him, and we left it with him to serve. We then went to Millars town to serve a warrant on George Schaeffer, but we were told he was gone to Philadelphia: we went to Seward's tavern. The marshal and myself then went to Shank­wyler's where there was at least 50 assembled in the room. Not knowing Shankwyler, Mr. Balliott pointed him out, and the marshal took him: while the marshal was talking with Shankwyler, the croud inclosed upon us, and abused us very much, and in a very menacing manner, accompa­nied with an almost universal cry of strike, strike, strike, so that for some time we did nor know what would be the consequence. The marshal this time was persuading Shankwyler to submit, telling him the conse­quence of opposition: he at first declared he would not, but at length he said he would do as Jarret did. Some of the people then said, that if Shank­wyler was to be taken out of his house, they would fight as long as they had of drop of blood in their bodies. The marshal then turned round to the croud, when they were so violent, and told them that Mr. Balliott and myself were under his protection. I forgot to mention that while the marshal was talking to Shankwyler in the bar, one of the persons pre­sent tore the cockade from Mr. Balliott's hat, while he was turning round to speak to the marshal: Mr. Balliott did not for the present know but it was a blow some one had given him. They then made back a little. Having found it impossible to do any thing farther, Shankwyler promised to meet the marshal at Bethlehem. We then went out of the room, but before we came out of the house there was a terrible huzza in the room. I then sent for a constable at the request of the marshal, to go with him and show him the persons and places of those against whom he had pro­cess. I remained while he served the process' at Mr. Irexler's, and it was there we first received information that an attempt would be made the next day to rescue the prisoners. We arrived at Bethlehem that evening the 6th of March, and then the occurrences happened of which I have given testimony as far as I know.

Some conversation here occurred respecting the testimony of Mr. Eyer­ly where he said he had appointed assessors: Mr. Eyerly corrected him­self, that he meant he had recommended them to the board. But Mr. Lewis said he should expect the records to be produced to the court, that the manner and legality of the appointments might be seen.

SAMUEL TOON, sworn.

Testimony translated by Mr. Erdman.

ATTORNEY.

Where do you live when at home?

WITNESS.

At upper Milford in Northampton county.

Do you belong to any company of light horse?

Yes, to captain Jarrett's.

What is your station?

A trumpeter.

Were you requested by any body to go with a party to Bethlehem; by whom, and at what time?

[Page 53]

On the 7th of March, about 8 o'clock I went to the house of Daniel Schwartz.

Did you go, or were you sent to Schwartz?

I went of my own accord, because I heard that the light horse were to meet there, when I came, there was one of the light horse there, named Samuel, the son of Daniel Schwartz. I asked him who ordered the com­pany together, and what they were about to do? he said that John Fogle the lieutenant had directed them to meet at Guise's tavern, about 3 miles from Bethlehem, on this side: he then asked me if I would go along. I answered, no. Daniel Schwartz had another son named Daniel, who wanted to go along, but the old man would not allow it, because he had no regimentals or uniform.

ATTORNEY.

What is meant by uniform?

WITNESS.

The cap and coat.—Old Schwartz then told his son that he should go to a neighbour, and should borrow his coat and my cap. I would not lend my cap, because I told him I might want it myself, if I could get an horse, as I told him I had it in my heart to go.

Do you know what they were going for, or was it mentioned at all?

I did not know that morning what they were going for—If that is all your excuse for not going, old Schwartz said he would lend me his horse, and give me a dollar in the bargain. His son, young. Daniel he would not allow to go along, but he begging very hard, he would allow him to go as hostler, to take care of the horses. They went, some of them as far as Guise's tavern, some of them were in regimentals, and some not. I and Schwartz's two sons went, and when we came to Guise's there was no officers.

How many went from Schwartz's house?

Six: Henry Staeler, myself, Adam Stahlnaker, and Schwartz's three sons.—When we came within half a mile of Guise's, we overtook, a com­pany of riflemen of about 30 strong. They had no officer with them. Stahlnaker was one of the lieutenants, but did not meddle with the com­pany, nor was he in regimentals, nor in arms. They waited about two hours for Fogle, the first lieutenant, but he did not come. Captain Jar­rett was down at Philadelphia. When I found there was no one to take the command, I determined to go no farther: then there began a quarrel among them, some of them were willing to go, and some of them were not. Stahlnaker and myself then proposed to go to Bethlehem, and we would bring them advice what was doing there, if they would wait an hour, and then they would know what was best to do. I then took off my regimentals, and put others on, belonging to my brother-in-law, the tavern-keeper. Some were willing to do this, some were not. They then went after me, and told me that I must put on my regimentals, and take my trumpet. I refused this, and told them, I would not go a step farther unless there was some officer who would' take the command and answer for it. They then agreed to it, and chose Andrew Sochiffert: He then said he would accept of it, if they would follow him, obey his or­ders, or his advice. They then went on to Bethlehem.

Did the number increase?

The rifle passed by, but the number of horsemen did not increase.

How many horsemen were there?

There were only about eight or nine at Guise's, but there were a great [Page 54] number of our people on horseback, here and there one of them with a gun. When we were about half a mile on this side the bridge, we were met by four persons from Bethlehem.

Had you settled what you were going for?

I had no intercourse with any one of them on the subject, because I was always a good way before the troop.

Did you not hear at the tavern?

No, I did not hear any particular reason for going to Bethlehem.

Why did you go with them?

Because I was afraid of getting into trouble, and yet I was afraid if I went there.

Why afraid?

Because I supposed they would take the prisoners.

Why did you suppose so?

Because I heard here and there one or two say that they would not suffer the prisoners to go to Philadelphia with the marshal.

Did you blow the trumpet as you rode a head?

Yes.

What passed when you met with these four gentlemen?

These four men persuaded us to go back again, and there was here and there one that was willing to go back, among whom was Schiffart the captain: as they would not follow him; he laid down his commission again. They then went all in confusion, till we came to the bridge: all mixed one with another.

What did those people do who refused to go back?

There came one to them and told them that the two rifle men were prisoners, which irritated them very much, and they said they would go and get them; they would have them.

Was this before or after the gentlemen arrived from Bethlehem?

It was after they arrived, that they heard those two men were impri­soned?

What was the conversation between those deputies and the people?

I do not recollect much of their discourse, but I heard a good deal of altercation between them: they were determined that the prisoners should not go to Philadelphia, and that they would go to Bethlehem.

COURT.

What prisoners did they say?

WITNESS.

I do not know: they only said the prisoners. However these deputies brought them so far that they agreed not to go to Beth­lehem.

ATTORNEY.

Upon what terms?

The gentlemen told them they would bring themselves into great trou­ble, for an army would be marched against them. There was no condi­tions or terms made besides this. They then proceeded and chose some people to go with them to the marshal, to see whether he would give up these two men, and then they would return to their homes. They then requested me to go over as one of the deputies with two others: one of them was Yiesly, a rifle man. I agreed to go, provided they would re­main there till we returned. We then went, but without any arms, but we were scarce over the bridge before a great part of the light horse fol­lowed us, and arrived at the tavern before we could come there.

ATTORNEY.

What light horse was that?

[Page 55]

I did not observe them all, for they rode very fast, but it was the com­pany I belonged to.

Had any of the Bucks county people come up at that time?

Not any that I know of.—When I came to the tavern I did not want to go in, but Mr. Mohollan and the others took us into the marshal; but the greatest part of our company had come in, and therefore I could not tell what to say for them in their behalf. When I came to the mar­shal, he asked what was their design: I answered that I did not know; but Yiesly demanded of him the two riflemen who were made prisoners, but I cannot say for certain whether he demanded any more prisoners of him. The marshal then read the orders which he had from judge Peters: We then went out of doors.

Did not the marshal deliver up these two men.

Not at that time.

Did you all go back to join your companies?

I cannot say whether the two others did or not. I remained where I was.—About half an hour after the rifle company arrived; marched round the house, and formed in ran [...] before the house.

Cross examination.

Was this before the two prisoners were given up.

I am not sure whether it was or not, because I do not know the time they were given up, for I went up in the room with Mr. Balliott and Mr. Eyerly.

Did any horsemen come with the riflemen?

There came now and then some horseman, some armed, and some un­armed, and they hurried into the yard.—When I saw them standing in a rank I went down stairs, and asked captain Staeler how he came over when he promised not to came over. His answer was, that the Bucks county people had come, and they all come over together. They first staid behind the house: the house was all in confusion.

ATTORNEY.

What did they ask for, or demand?

WITNESS.

I heard some of them say that they wanted the prisoners out, and that they would force themselves into the house. I came out of the house several times to pacify them, and so did Shankwyler come out twice to speak to them.

ATTORNEY.

Did you see the prisoner at the bar?

WITTNESS.

Yes, I saw him once speaking with the marshal about half way up the stair case.

Did you see him come down and speak to the people who were in the yard?

As they wanted to go in by force, he told them they should wait a little, for that he would speak to the people inside a little more first.

Did you hear what he said to them afterwards?

No, he then went away, and they forced themselves in at the door. I with some others tried to keep them back all we could.

Did you succeed in keeping them out of the house at that time?

I succeeded in keeping them off, but one of them was very anxious to get in, and told the people that they should pull off their gloves, in order to feel the trigger, and cock the better.

Who was this?

It was Jacob Ingleman.—Staeler then formed his, company in a rank. One Henry Hoover, who was standing in the entry after they had formed. [Page 56] seemed to think the time too long, and said if they would only send eight men to him, he would soon have the prisoners. The people then got in, one after another, and the entry became almost full. I believe at that time the prisoner at the bar came and told them not to be afraid, but that they might now march on.

COURT.

At the time Fries said that, were the men in or not?

They were in the entry, and a great many people were there: I was in the back of the house, they then marched towards the stairs where the guards had left. The marshal was then quite alone, and he told them he would deliver up the prisoners. The prisoners then, came down stairs I believe, for I did not know them: I had not the least personal acquaintance with one of them.

Was Fries any way distinguished by his dress, or sword, or cockade?

I never was acquainted with Fries before: he had on then a great coat, a cocked hat, and a black feather: I did not see him with a sword.

Cross examination.

Did you hear what passed between Fries and the marshal on the stairs?

No, I was standing below; I only saw him there.

Did Fries speak English or Dutch?

Sometimes he spoke English sometimes German.

Friday, May 3. ANDREW SHIFFERT, sworn.

Testimony translated.

Was you one of the armed party that went to Bethlehem on the se­venth of March?

Yes.

To what company did you belong?

To Jarrett's company.

Inform the court and jury how you came to go, what your motive, and what the object of the expedition.

I was informed by John Hoover that all the light horse were to meet at Martin Ritter's at ten in the morning: I was not at home when he came but I was informed of it. I then went over to Ritter's the next morning, (on the seventh of March) and when I came there, I asked what was to be done. Their answer was, that they were going to Bethlehem to release the prisoners.

COURT.

What prisoners?

WITNESS.

The prisoners from the marshal.

To what township do you belong?

To Salisbury. I told them that if they were to do this, they would find what would be the consequences. The others said that if they got the prisoners clear that day, there would be nothing done, it would be all over: that if they came with arms against them it would be all at an end.

If who went with arms?

If the soldiers went with arms.

Did not you enquire who had appointed them to meet?

No.

Did you not ask when you were at Ritters?

No. At Ritter's I wanted to go home, but they would not let me, telling me that Fogle would be at Guise's tavern, whereupon I agreed to go so for with them. Coming there, Fogle was not there, and I and Sa­muel [Page 57] Toon wanted to go home, for there was no officers there. They then agreed to choose an officer, when the choice fell upon me; I told them I would not go with them without they would obey my orders, and not say any more about taking the prisoners from the marshal. They professed to do so, whereupon we proceeded to within half a mile of the bridge, and there we were met by four gentlemen from Bethlehem, and as they repeated again that they would have the prisoners, I said I would have no more to do with them. They then went into Bethlehem, but I did not go with them, but in about two hours I went in to see what they were about: I staid this side of the bridge 'till then. When I got to Bethlehem I was informed that they had got the prisoners out. I remain­ed there about half an hour and then rode home, so that I know not what happened.

Did you hear that the marshal had taken two men prisoners, at what time and where?

I heard that two men were disarmed: I heard it on this side the bridge.

Did you hear it while the rifle company, and the others were there to­gether?

It was a person who came from Bethlehem that told of it, but I cannot tell who.

Was it before the deputation arrived?

I cannot tell, but I did not hear it before.

Had the Backs county people come up before you left that place where you staid on this side of the bridge?

Yes, I saw them ride up at about two o'clock.

COURT.

Was Jarrett's and Staeler's companies gone over the bridge when the Bucks county people went over?

The light horse were, but I am not fare of Staeler's.

Did you enter into conversation with the Bucks county people?

No, not any.

The evidence here was closed so far as related to the affair at Bethle­hem: Mr. attorney then introduced the following, preceding and succeed­ing events to show the state of the country, and the prisoner's intention.

JOHN DILLINGHER, sworn.

Testimony translated.

ATTORNEY.

Where is your home?

WITNESS.

In upper Milford, Northampton county, about six miles from Millars town.

Do you know of any rumour or report in your neighbourhood that the marshal was coming up to arrest some persons, before he came?

It was talked of, as suspected that some persons would be arrested.

COURT.

On what account?

I can give no account of that. The report was that they would be arrested to be taken to Philadelphia.

Was it reported, or any proposition made among the people that if any body should be brought to Philadelphia, that it should not be suffered?

It was said, that if any person was to be arrested innocently, it would be very hard for such a man, and he ought not to be suffered to suffer. And further it was said that somebody had sworn against Shankwyler that he had two pistols and a sword on his table, and that he had sworn that if the assessors should come, he would shoot them. I and my neighbours [Page 58] said that Shankwyler never owned a pair of pistols, nor did they believe any were ever there except a traveller brought them there. [He kept a tavern] I then heard that the marshal had arrested some persons at Mil­lars town. The following day (6th of March) captain Staeler came to my house, and I asked him whether he had been in Millars town. He answered yes. I asked him whether it was true that Shankwyler had been arrested by the sheriff. (Because at that time the term marshal was not known to them.) Staeler answered, yes, and that he was to be the fol­lowing day at Bethlehem, and asked me whether I would go to Bethlehem likewise, and told me that more people were going up to see, I said I should also like to go and see, provided the people would save themselves from getting into trouble. I then dressed myself to go away: Staeler asked me if I would not take my rifle with me.

COURT.

Were you one of captain Staeler's rifle company?

WITNESS,

No.

What company did you belong to?

To no one particularly; only the militia—I then answered no, for what? He then informed me that there were a number of people to meet at Ritter's tavern, whence he heard they were to proceed to Bethlehem, and they would go there pretty early, to exercise a little, and that I should go in the ranks to make a show, because his company was not compleat.

COURT.

Was it muster day?

No, but they had frequent meetings in order to exercise themselves. I then agreed that I would take my rifle so far as that. As I was dres­sing when he came, he asked me what I was dressing for: I told him that I was going to my mother in law, to fetch her some flax to spin; she lives in Bucks county, about a mile on this side of Conrad Marks's house. Whereupon, he (Staeler) desired me to tell young Marks that the light horse were going to Bethlehem, and that he should go likewise if he pleased. Before I came to Marks's, I saw a light horseman crossing the road into another road: when I came to Marks's I saw only his wife and children and a strange man thee: I asked Marks's wife what light horse man that was; she answered it was her son; I asked where he was go­ing: she said he was going over yonder where they were assessing houses, to go against the assessors. I then left the message Staeler directed me.

Did you go farther into Bucks than where your mother-in-law lives?

No. I entered into no other house than Marks's and my mother's.

What time of the day were you at Marks's?

About one o'clock.

Did you not mention to John Schymer, Esq that the people would not stand by him, and that he would not be supported, when it was reported that a warrant was [...]ued against him, but that if he remained firm, he would?

I do not reccollect any such thing.

WILLIAM THOMAS, sworn.

ATTORNEY.

DO you live in Bucks county?

WITNESS.

Yes.

Did you go to Bethlehem on the seventh of March?

Yes.—On the fifth of March we heard that the assessors were going round to assess the houses in Bucks county: they had assessed a few of the houses about already: my brother was at Jacob Hoover's, and I was [Page 59] there when he told me to tell two of our neighbours to let the assessors go round.

Were you not on the 6th of March desired to join the party going to Bethlehem?

On the 6th in the morning I was at Jacob Hoover's and he told me to go to Adam Broutler and Peter Coome to tell them to come to his house. On the road I met captain Kouder: he told me I must come along back again down to the mill, for his company was coming together there that day: when we came there, several were met, and they were beating the drum: part of them were armed. There were about 15 there in the whole. We then went to Jacob Fries's tavern; then the people said they went to see the assessors, but I dont know what for.

COURT.

Where there any more at Fries's than those who came from the mill?

WITNESS.

Yes there were a great many more, I think about thirty. John Fries and Kouder then sent some (two) horsemen named John Gett­man and Conrad Marks, the former had a gun, to see if they could find the assessors.

ATTORNEY.

What were they to do?

WITNESS.

Why, their directions was, that if they could find them they should bring them to Quaker town, or to Jacob Fries's tavern. Af­ter the horsemen were gone, then the order was for the company to go to Quaker town.

Were the party pretty generally armed?

A great many were not, and many who were not had clubs. I cannot tell how many were armed, but the greatest part had either arms or clubs.

Was there a drum and fife?

There was when we were at Quaker town.—We all stood in a rank, and fired off, and hallowed huzza. One party went to Enoch Roberts's tavern, and the other to David Zeller's, and soon after we were there, the assessors came along. They were esquire Foulke, John Rodrick, and Cephas Childs. I was at Zeller's when they came along, and they all began to run out of the tavern. When I came out they had Foulke by his horse's bridle, and him by one leg, and they told him to get off. It was captain Kouder that had hold of him; then John Fries came up and told him to get off. Jacob Hoover came up, I think before Fries, and tol Kouder to go away and not abuse the man, and he took hold of the bridle and spoke to him. Fries told Foulke to get off, he wanted to speak to him. Then George Mumbower came up, and stood at the back of the others, giving one of them a knock with the butt of his gun, and told them to pull him of; Jacob and John Hoover told them they should not abuse the man, for he would get off without. With that the esquire rode up with them to the shed, and got off. They then went into the tavern together. Then John Fries told him that he had forewarned them yes­terday not to assess the houses, and yet they had come to day again; he then told him that he should show his writings, what he had done in the township. Which he did, and John Fries read them, and gave them to him back again. I then went into another room, and when I came out again, Childs, the other assessor, was sitting on the table, with five or six about him. When I came up to him, I told him that they should not abuse him, for I used to know him: at this time they were abusing him?

ATTORNEY.
[Page 60]

How were they abusing him?

By speaking to him; I do not recollect what they said, but they told him he should not have gone about when they had forwarned him the day before, and they made him promise that he would not come again till farther orders—till they knew how the law was. They told him they thought they had as fit men in their township as what he was, and they wished to choose a man in the same township if they must have it done. As to Rodrick, I did not see him.

ATTORNEY.

Did you hear any cry of "fire" after Rodrick?

WITNESS.

No.

Did you see any gun snapped after him?

No.

Did you see any thing relating to a travelling man named captain Sea­born?

Yes, he was there, he was drunk, and some of them asked him whether he was for liberty or government, he said government: Peter Gobble said if he said that again he should be whipped. They were all pretty well drunk, but I was not drunk.

Was Fries drunk?

I do not recollect ever seeing him drunk: Kouder was, and so might Fries for what I know, but I had known him some time, and knew he was a sober man.

Did you hear any talk about tories there?

Yes, they talked of tories and stamplers: Foulke was one they called a tory, and so were several others.—A young fellow then went in to strike Seaborn, but I told him he should not strike a man that was drunk: I knew him when he lived at the river. He struck him once or twice, but I told him if he struck him again, I would strike him. Then we went down to Jacob Fries's, and there captain Kouder told me that I should be at Marks' the next day, to go along with them to Millar's town. It was now dark, and I had not seen John Fries come then. He told the same to the rest of the company. I then went home and went to bed. After I was home about a quarter of an hour, John Gettman and John Fries's [...] came to our house, but I was in bed. Gettman had a gun at my house, (he was a gunsmith.)

What age was young Fries?

About fifteen or sixteen—I went next morning to Marks' tavern in consequence of a massage they had left for me that night before with my mother. By ten o'clock we were all there.

Was John Fries there?

Yes.

He named 13 more who were there.

Young Marks went off soon after sun rise to Millar's town to tell them we were coming. John Fries's son went with us, but his father's horse got lame, and he was obliged to go back with it.

Were all these people armed?

Yes, all but Marks and old Kline.—The prisoner had his sword with him.

COURT.

Had any one the command of the men?

WITNESS.

Yes. John Fries had the command but he did not command till he got to Bethlehem, he gave no orders on the road.

ATTORNEY.
[Page 61]

What was the substance of the conversation before you went from the tavern?

Why, that they were going to Millar's town: I did not know that they were going to Bethlehem.

Did you hear any conversation about the intention of the march?

Yes. That we were going to Millar's town, for should there be pri­soners there, Marks said that he wanted us to show ourselves.

What were you to show yourselves for?

I do not know what for.

Were you to assist to bring the prisoners down to Philadelphia?

I do not know.

What was the intention of the Northampton people?

Why, they had a mind to take the prisoners again: I understood that the night before at Fries's and along the road before we got there. About three or four miles from old Marks', we met young Marks; he said it was not worth while to go to Millar's town, that the prisoners were up at Bethlehem, and that they had all gone there.

Who had gone there?

The Northampton people—the light horse. Some was then for going back again: some, as they had come so far, was for going up to Bethle­hem, to see what was going on there, so we went on.

Who told you to go on?

Old Marks and John Fries said that as they were come so far on the road, they would go up and see what was doing there. Then we went on about a mile, and stopped at Ritters where they fed their horses: there was a liberty pole there. Then we went on to Bethlehem. When we came to the bridge, there the people had stopped, there was some riflemen and some light horse. Some asked the reason why they stopped there: they said they could not get over, the bridge was shut: then John Fries rode un, and asked whether they required toll or not; they said, yes. Then he told them to count his men, and told us to follow him.

Did he speak generally?

Yes.—The words he used was, now boys, follow me. I do not know whether he counted all or only his own men.

Did you hear any thing at that time of those men whom you found there having sent three men to Bethlehem?

I heard of their having taken two or three men under guard.

Who paid the toll?

I do not know, we did not, we were all mixed together.

Did you not hear of three men being sent forward?

No, I did not.—I heard of their having taken some prisoners.

Had you heard before you come to the bridge of these two prisoners?

No.

Did the whole party follow Fries over the bridge, or only the Bucks county people?

I believe only the Bucks county people, without it was some few.

What became of Staeler's Riflemen?

Why they came pretty soon after over the bridge.

You were all on horseback?

Yes.

[Page 62]

Did not the others come over the bridge at the same time it was open­ed for you?

I did not look back; all that I can say, wh [...]: we got up to the tavern, they were pretty close after us.

What distance is it from Marks' to Bethlehem?

About twenty miles.

When we got over the bridge, there were two men met us, and said we should not hurt them; Fries told them that he should hurt nobody without they hurt him first. Then Judge Mohollan came and spoke with him afterwards, but I do not know what either he, or Fries said. When we got up to the tavern at Bethlehem, the whole of Staeler's rifle-company were there. They marched round the house twice; we did not stand in ranks, we were separate. They wanted one to go up and talk with the marshal, and they from Bucks and Northampton said John Fries was more fit to go up than e'er a man that was there. Then John Fries and one Hoover went up stairs. After a while Hoover came down, Fries staid up when he came down, he kept dashing and swearing, and said force should do: give him nine or ten of the best riflemen in the company, and he would storm the house; a great many of them told him he should not do it, he said he would, Jacob Hoover, George Mitchel and Mr. Mohollan endeavoured to keep him off.

Did this Hoover belong to Staeler's company?

I think he did.—Then Fries, when he came down stairs, he fetched some writing down with him, that he got from the marshal, which he read to the company. He said the marshal dared not give up the prison­ers, and therefore that they would take them by force of arms. At this time the Bucks county people were separate from the others.

COURT.

Who did Fries speak to?

WITNESS.

He spoke to the whole of them.—Then he asked, what shall we do now—take them by force of arms or how? Several of them said, since they come so far now they would have them. Frederick Henry said since they were come so far, it was a damned shame not to have them. Then Fries went up stairs again, and said he would go and talk to them once more. When he came down again, he said that the marshal dared not give them up, without they took them by force of arms. They then told him that he should go and do something pretty soon, for it was getting late. Some of them said it was better to let Fries have the whole command of all the men. Then it was concluded to go into the house, and he spoke five or six times.

Was it agreed that Fries should have the whole under his command? I do not know. I only heard what that one man said, and he thought him the fittest person.

Did Fries hear this? where was he?

He was in the yard before the door, and near enough to hear it.

You did not hear him object to taking the command?

I do not know whether he heard what that man said.—Then Fries, when it was concluded to go into the house said, For God's sake don't fire boys, till I am fired upon first: he said this three or four times over. Then we moved on to go in, he was before us.

COURT.

HOW many followed him?

[Page 63]

I do not know, but a good many at last. I could not see who they were, the house was so full. Then Fries went up and talked to the marshal about half way up stairs. Henry told me that Fries was telling the marshal that if he did not give up the prisoners, they would fire on them, so that they should not see each other for smoke. After that, the door was opened, and I saw some of them come down.—Some came down while Fries was talking to the marshal.

Then they were not all down?

There was some not down; they called for them, and they came down.—Fries said he was glad Hoover did not go in along with him, because he was too much of a fool; he thought this would not have done so well as it did: he did not want him there.

Did you retire from Bethlehem altogether when you had got the prisoners?

Did Jarret's troop go with you?

I saw some light horse before us.

Did you see Fries go to the minister after he was released?

Yes, he went to him in another room: he pulled off his hat to the mi­nister, and told him he must thank him that he had got out, he said he was out, but he could thank him for all.

The marshal was again called to reconcile some seeming difference in the relation of the last conversation Fries held with the marshal, and of the prisoners coming down at twice.

The marshal said that the last conversation he held with the prisoners was at the foot of the stairs.—Mr. Fries declared that he would force his way up stairs, if I would not give them up; I told him that this would be punished with the utmost severity, but that if he was determined to rescue the prisoners, he should not go up stairs, but that I would go up, and order them down. Finding myself not in a situation to resist his force, I went up and ordered them down.

Cross examination.

Had any prisoners left the room before you went up stairs?

No.

ATTORNEY.

Had you any Conversation with him afterwards?

Yes, he returned and said that we had not given up Ireman, that I must deliver him up with the rest: I told him they were all gone: he then went out and returning again said he was there; and went off. At that time all the prisoners went out.

Cross examination.

Have you any recollection of what Thomas swears that Henry told him, respecting firing so that you should not see each other for smoke?

No. I cannot be particular in that; I cannot recollect it so as to give evidence upon it. There were many very serious threats, else I should not have given up the prisoners.

Cross examination.

At any time when you were in conversation with Fries, did any of the prisoners come down stairs?

No, not the Lehi prisoners: there might be others that would not sub­mit, but none from the room in actual custody, not to my knowlege: if they did, it must have been while I was speaking to them in the croud, it was possible for them to do it at that time.

[Page 64]

Were they not guarded?

They were in the room, and that guard remained there till I went up; it was placed there to prevent any person going up or down.

Cross examination.

After this conversation with Fries, you went up stairs to order the prisoners down. Were they all there in the room at that time?

I believe so, but I did not count them.

Well, upon your order did they come down; and did you come down with them.

Yes, I came down with them.

ATTORNEY.

When the prisoners came down stairs and you with them, do you recollect having a short conversation with Fries at the side of the stairs?

Yes, but there was but a very short one.

Cross examination.

Did you lead, or follow the prisoners in coming down stairs?

I am not certain, but I believe I followed them.

GEORGE MITCHEL sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Where do you live?

I keep tavern in lower Milford township, Bucks county.

Inform the court whether there was any opposition to the house tax law in your township.

There was great disturbance and discontents respecting this house law; it happened that there was a meeting advertised for the 8th of February, at the house of John Kline, to consult about the house tax law.

Were any names signed to the advertisement.

None that I recollect.—A number of the inhabitants met, it was pretty late in the day: they all seemed discontented, but they were in doubt whether it had passed into a law or not. There was something in the news paper of an amendment, which made them doubt whether it was in force. They formed an instrument of writing, but I cannot recollect the particulars of it. It was drawn up by John Fries; I assisted him. We passed home after that. I had no particular conversation with any body after the paper was signed: it was signed by about 50 or 52 of the inhabitants.

Do you recollect whether captain Kuyder was directed to give any no­tice by that meeting?

I do recollect something; I think it was that captain Kuyder should give notice to the assessors not to come forward till they had informed themselves farther, whether it was a law or not.

Cross examination.

Who put up the notice of this meeting?

WITNESS.

I am not sure: perhaps it was myself. John Hoover, and several, had talked about it, and we thought we would call a meeting. Was Fries present when you agreed to call this meeting? No.—This was on Friday: on the Monday following James Chapman came to my house, and told me I should tell Jacob Hoover that he should give notice over the creek (I live nearly at the end of the township) that if they would choose an assessor of their own, they should be welcome; and any man that was capable of the business would be admited into the office. There was one Valentine Hoover came to my house that same day, he lives over the other side, and I told him what Mr. Chapman had [Page 65] told me, likewise, I informed Jacob Hoover that day myself. Who op­posed it I dont know, but it was reported that it was not adopted. Squire Foulke sent me word to advertise a meeting. Israel Roberts and Samuel Clark called on me and told me. They informed me that Mr. Foulke was of opinion that the people were ignorant of the law, and he would read it for them, and explain it to them: this was the purpose of the meeting. So we advertised the meeting to be held at my house.

What time was this?

Sometime in February toward the latter end. It was on a Saturday, and there were a great many of the inhabitants at the meeting, squire Foulke and Mr. Chapman attended it. The people behaved very disor­derly; but I cannot recollect any of the conversation that passed. Jacob Kline came in and asked me what the meeting was intended for. I told him that I understood by squire Foulke, that the Germans were very igno­rant of the law, and that he called them together, to read, and explain it to them; I desired him to try to pacify the people, and I believe he did his endeavour, but it proved in vain: at least they did not read the law. I did not understand. that any body offered to read it, he thought it was in vain, there was such a clamour.

Did they say any thing to you?

After Mr. Chapman was gone, Marks asked me how I came to meddle with the advertisement.

Was John Fries at the meeting?

No.—I don't recollect any thing afterwards till the assessors came, which was the 5th of March. They took the rates of my house and my neighbours.

Who were the assessors?

Mr. Childs, Mr. Foulke, and Mr. Rodrick.—I went from home the rest of the day, and the next morning when I returned (sixth of March) I heard there had been an uproar about driving away the assessors. It was talked of that they were going to Millars town the next day. Hear­ing of such an uproar, I thought I had business at Millars town. so I con­cluded to go and hear what was going on: they talked they were going to meet the Northampions who were going for the relief of the Prisoners.

Did you know the names of any of the prisoners?

No.—So we came at Marks's; (7th of March) when we came there, there was a talk at Marks's house about going to the tavern above Emaus: Marks said his son would bring word. We went on then till we me [...] young Marks, and he beckoned that we should halt, or go back, so we did; he said he had been up at Ritter's tavern, and they bad started before he came there.

Who went with you?

He mentioned eighteen names.

Who were the commanders?

I do not know of any in particular who took the command.—Some wished to go to see Bethlehem, some to see the bridge, so they concluded to go on.

COURT.

Did you hear John Fries say any think about going on?

I cannot say who were for going on, and who were not. We were overtaken by several people going to Bethlehem on the road.

COURT.

Were they armed or not?

[Page 66]

None that I can recollect.—When we got to the bridge at Bethlehem, there were a great many armed men, and light horse, and two rode over the bridge towards us, from the other side. I did not hear the conversa­tion that passed at the bridge; but after a while we went over to Bethle­hem.

After you got to Bethlehem, what did you observe, respecting Fries?

There was a great many of the company that was formed before the house, who seem to speak out that they would have the prisoners. Fries went in, I saw him start to go in, but I did not hear who ordered him, or who desired him. A short time after, in the course of five or ten minutes, Henry Hoover came out to us, and said he was sergeant of their company, and he was chosen to demand the prisoners. He said he went up stairs, and somebody gave him a push, and had like to have tumbled him down stairs, and he came out in a great passion. He went on in a great rage, and I catched hold of him: he said if they would only give him ten men, he would storm the house. A short time after that, I observed Fries come out, and he said "silence" to the people there. He seemed to be as much among Staeler's company as among ours. He then afterwards said, "Gentlemen, an officer of the United States says he cannot deliver up the prisoners, unless they are rescued by force of arms: so, he said, if you are willing, we will, I will go foremast, but if we do, I beg of you, none of you fire till they fire on us first, till I give the word, and if I drop, then you must take your own command." He repeated these words, at least, once more. I heard nothing afterwards of the proceedings in, no [...] out of the house, that I recollect.

Was there some time after this, a meeting held at Marks's?

Yes.

After the proclamation?

A meeting was held on the 18th of March.

What was the object of the meeting?

To choose a committee of the three counties of Northampton, Bucks and Montgomery.

Why these three counties?

Because there were none else in the proclamation.

What was the meeting held for?

To consult what was best to be done, and it was determined to leave it to the committee.

Was John Fries there?

Yes.

Did you put any question to him relative to the affair at Bethlehem?

No. After the meeting I had some conversation with him: while the committee was sitting I said to him: John Fries, you never intended to resist the law, did you? He made me answer, yes, I did.

What laws were you talking about?

We did not in particular mention any laws.

Was there a meeting after this at your house, and what time was that?

It was on Easter Monday, March 25.

What was the object of that meeting?

That was to appoint an assessor. The one that was appointed was to do the business, if he pleased, if not, the person they chose was to do it, or both together.

[Page 67]

Was John Fries at that meeting?

At the beginning of it he was, but I do not recollect that he was a [...] the time they gave in their votes.

Did he unite in the choice of the assessor?

Several did not wait because there was no opposition, and they thought there was no occasion.

Did he, or did he not express himself as much against the law as ever?

He said it would not suit him to vote now, as he had been against the law throughout.

Did not many of those who had been opposed to the law before, vote for the assessor now?

Yes.

Cross examination.

At the meeting at Marks's, was it not generally agreed that there should be a submission to the laws?

Yes.—After the business was over, they made mention of it, but I do not know that they made any report of it.

Did not Fries, with all the rest, agree to the submission?

I cannot say.

COURT.

Was there any agreement to do it?

Why, I believe the people never knew to the contrary but there would be a return made.

Cross examination.

Was it not recommended to submit?

Yes.

And was it not agreeable to the meeting?

Yes, I believe it was; I heard no opposition to it?

ATTORNEY.

Was not the return made in writing?

Yes.

Did not 'squire Richards propose that there should be a submission sign­ed there?

No, I do not recollect any such thing.

Cross examination.

Was it a general design of the meeting to conform and submit to the laws?

On the 15th of March we received the proclamation, and that evening I took it down to Frederick Henny's; William Thomas went with me: I read the proclamation to Frederick Henny, and he was agreed to sub­mit; he made no opposition.

Cross examination.

When Fries said it would not suit him to vote for the assessor, did he say he continued in opposition to the law at that time?

I don't know that he did, but he seemed rather opposed, at that time, to the laws or the appointment of an assessor.

Cross examination.

Was this proclamation communicated to the meet­ing on the 18th of March?

Yes it was; after I had read it to Henny, I told him to take it to others. I thought it was proper to get a petition sent to the President.

JAMES CHAPMAN.

ATTORNEY.

You are a principal assessor under the act for laying a di­rect tax are you not?

Yes, for twelve townships, (which he named).

How did the assessments go forward under your care?

I believe in all but lower Milford the assessments were carried into ef­fect without opposition, or in a majority of the townships, except some [Page 68] little threatenings. The assessor of lower Milford was taken sick soon after he got his instructions, and so did not proceed. His name was Sa­muel Clark: I called upon him afterwards, to know whether he was able to proceed or not: he thought he should be able in a few days: I had occasion to go to Newtown, and was several days from home, but found there was nothing done respecting it; I found the people had had a meet­ing, and there appeared to be great opposition to the rates being taken. The day after I returned from Newtown, Clark called upon me, and told me he thought it was not safe to go about, from the disposition of the people at that time. I told him that I would meet him the next day at George Mitchel's tavern in Milford, and meet the people to know what their complaints were. I met Clark at a house just by, and he told me he would be in at Mitchell in a few minutes. I examined Mitchel, to know what was their complaints: Mitchel signified that the people were dissa­tisfied that the assessor was appointed without their having a choice: for they wished to choose for themselves. I told Mitchel if they would choose, a man of character, I would use my influence with the commissioner to have him appointed, and I desired him to give notice of it to Jacob Hoo­ver. I wrote to the commissioner stating the situation we were in, and told him what I had done, but he seemed not to be willing to indulge them with it.

COURT.

Who was the commissioner?

WITNESS.

Seth Chapman was commissioner for that district.—I told him it would ease the minds of the people if it were done. At length he consented, but seemingly with reluctance. However they never chose one.

Was it made known to the people?

I do not recollect that it was.—I met him at a meeting of the assessors which was held at the house of John Rodruck. On my return home I was told, I think by 'squire Foulke, that the township was advertised to meet at Mitchel's. He said if I would attend there he would meet me. I got there between one and two clock, Just as I got to the house, be­fore I went in, I saw ten or twelve people coming from towards Hoover's mill, about half of them were armed, and the others with sticks. I went into the house, and twenty or thirty were there. I sat talking with some of my acquaintance that were well disposed to the law. Conrad Marks talked a great deal in German, how oppressive it was, and much in op­position to it, seeming to be much enraged. His son, and those who came with him seemed to be very noisy and rude; they talked all in German, which as I did not know sufficiently, I paid but little attention to them. They were making a great noise; huzzaing for liberty, and democracy, damning the tories, and the like. I let them go on, as I saw no disposition in the people to do any thing toward forwarding the busi­ness. Between four and five I got up to go out; as I passed through the croud towards the bar, they pushed one another against me.

Was there any offer made to explain the law to them?

No, none while I staid; they did not seem disposed to hear it.

Cross examination.

You did not say a word to them about it?

No, I did not. They did not mention my name the whole time of my being there, but they abused Eyerly and Balliott, and said how they had cheated the public, and what villains they were. I understood it was respecting collecting the revenue, but I did not understand near [Page 69] all they said. I recollect Conrad Marks said that Congress had no right to make such a law, and that he never would submit to have his house taxed.

Cross examination.

Fries was not there, was he?

No.—They seemed to think that the collectors were all such fellows; the insinuation was that they cheated the public, and made them pay, but never paid into the treasury.—After getting through the croud to the bar, I suppose I was fifteen minutes in conversation with Mitchel: he said per­haps they were wrong, but the people were very much exasperated. No­thing very material happened, and I asked Mr. Foulke if it was not time to be going. So I got into the Sleigh and went off; soon after they set up a dreadful huzza and shout. I stopped at Jacob Fries's tavern, and waited for Mr. Foulke, who soon came: Clark, the assessor was likewise there. After talking a little more on the subject, Clark still persisted in not having any thing to do with it, for he thought it was not safe for him. We thought it was best to give the other assessors notice, as their assessments were nearly finished, to meet us at a certain day to take the rates in that township. I then wrote to the other assessors, re­questing them to meet at Quaker town, on the 4th of March, Rodrick, Childs and Foulke met me there: we waited till evening, but no others came; [...]o we agreed to meet at my house next morning at 9 o'clock. We met, and I went with them to Milford, to Samuel Clark's, but he was not at home. It was thought best for me to go to see for Clark, as he was engaged in a moving. I went to Jacob Fries's tavern to wait for him; they went to Mitchel's to take the rates, Clark soon came: he told me he could not undertake to take the rates, for that he might as well pay his fine if it cost him all he had, for they were so opposed to it at any rate, that he could not think himself safe, for at least he should receive some private injury. Finding he would not do it I said no more. John Fries was coming up just then: he told me he was very glad to see me: he told me that he understood I had been insulted in their township at one of their meetings: he was very sorry for it: he mentioned 'Squire Foulke as well a [...] myself: had he been there, he said, it should not have been done: I turned it off by this: that there was not a person among them that spoke a word to me. I told him I thought they were very wrong in opposing the law as they did: he signified that he thought they were not, and that the rates should not be taken by the assessors. I told him that the rates certainly would be taken, and that the assessors were then in the township taking the rates. I repeated it to him, and he answered "my God!" if I was only to send that man (pointing to one standing by) to my house to let them know they were taking the rates, there would be 500 or 700 men under arms here to-morrow morning by sun rise. He told me he would not submit to the law. I told him I thought the people had more sense than to rise in arms to oppose the law in that manner: if they did, go­vernment must certainly take notice of it, and send an armed force to en­force the laws. His answer was that "if they do, we will soon try who is strongest." I told him they certainly would find themselves mistaken respecting their force, he signified he thought not: he mentioned to me the troop of horse in Montgomery county, and the people at upper and lower Milford, and something about infantry, who were ready to join. He said he was very sorry for the occasion, for if they were to rise, God [Page 70] knew where it would end: the consequences would be dreadful; I told him they would be obliged to comply: he then said huzza, it shall be as it is in France, or will be as it is in France, or something to that effect. He then left me and went off.

Cross examination.

Did Fries appear to be intoxicated?

No, not that I know. I scarce ever saw him intoxicated.—A short time after he was gone, on the same day, the assessors came to Jacob Fries's tavern. We then ordered our dinners there, and I believe it was Childs undertook to take the rates of Jacob Fries's house. We had not gone out of the room after dinner, till John Fries came in, he addressed himself to 'Squire Foulke, telling him he was very sorry to see him there; he was a man that he had a great regard for, but that be was opposed to the law himself. "I now wa [...] you, said he" not to go to another house to take the rates, if you do, you will be hurt." He did not Wait for any reply, but turned himself about, and went off out of the room; I do not recollect any thing farther was said to him. He seemed much irritated. The assessors concluded to proceed upon their business.

Rodruck and Foulke agreed to go together, and Childs went by him­self: this was an agreement between themselves.

Cross examination.

Had Mr. Clark's appointment been vacated?

There had been no meeting of the assessors since Mr. Clark had re­fused, complaining that he found it inconvenient to proceed with the assess­ment.

Was this new arrangement communicated to the board of assessors at all.

No.

The council for the prisoners doubted the legality of the appointment of Mr. Foulke, since the law had provided that an assessor must be appoint­ed by the board of commissioners, and not otherwise.

Mr. Chapman said it was established at the meeting at Rodricks, which was called in order to see what business had been done, and then an arrangement was made that in case of the inability or unwillingness of Clark to do the business in lower Milford, it should be done by the whole, and therefore it was done, without the place of Clarke being vacated.

Cross examination.

Were there any minutes of the assessors kept?

There was no more than a memorandum.

ATTORNEY.

When you had this conversation with John Fries, was it in any respect founded on the alteration of the assessors, or was it a general declamation against the law?

He did not mention any thing of that at all.

Saturday May 4th.

Mr. Dallas gave notice that he should expect the gentlemen engaged in the prosecution to produce the records of the assessors.

JOHN RODHICK sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Were you one of the assessors under the direct tax law, appointed for lower Milford?

Yes.

Have you your warrant?

—Produced it. Dated November 5, 1798.

I suppose you took the oaths the law directed?

Yes.

Did you act as assessor in any other part of your district previous to go.

[Page 71]

Yes.—There were twelve townships in our district, and there were six assessors to serve them.—He named them.—We were all six sworn at a meeting held at my house, by the commissioner, Seth Chapman: 'squire Foulke got his warrant afterwards; he was appointed, I think, in addition to Samuel Clark.—We met the commissioner on the 16th of February, when it appeared all the other townships were nearly done, except lower Milford; at that meeting all attended but Clark.—The principal assessor [...] James Chapman was likewise there. We were informed that lower Mil­ford was not done, for Clark was afraid to go about. The commissioner told the principal assessor that he must inform the other assessors, that if any thing could be done in it, we must try to do it. We all agreed that we would.

Was Mr. Foulk appointed before this meeting?

Yes, and he was present at it.—Not long after this, we got orders from the principal assessor to meet him at Quaker town on the 4th of March, and to go the next day to get the rates at Milford. There were only three of us attended. We agreed to meet at the principal assessor's house the next morning, which we did, and thence we went to Clark's to have him to go with us: he was not at home, however we proceeded on, taking the rates, Mr. Childs, Mr. Foulke and myself. We had taken between 50 and 60 assessments when we came to the house of Jacob Fries.

Were the people at home when you took the rates?

All were at home, I think, except one, and there we left a notice. When we came to Jacob Fries's we met the principal assessor. After din­ner, while we were sitting at the fire, John Fries came into the room: we had a room by ourselves. He said he heard we were come to take the rates of the township; we told him yes. He said he would warn us not to proceed, else we should be hurt. He said he was sorry for 'squire Foulke, and I believe Mr. Chapman he mentioned, for he always respected them very much. He said he was opposed to the law, and he would not submit to it. He then left the room. He seemed to be a little in a passion. We got on our horses, and proceeded at taking the rates: I and Foulke went together, and Childs by himself to some who we thought were quiet people. We proceeded on till about sunset, when we were going to the house of one Singmaster, and as we turned down a lane, out from the road, we heard somebody hallow to us: we stopped, and few it was John Fries and five men more. We stopped, and they came walking towards us. John Fries was in the front. Fries said that he had warned us not to proceed, and we would not hear, and now they were come to take us prisoners. I believe I asked by what authority: with that he made a grapple at the bridle of my horse; I wheeled ray creature round, and he just catched hold of my great coat, but he could not hold. I rode off then: after I had got a­bout two rod, I turned my creature round again; and he was a little way from the rest. I told him I was surprised at his conduct, that he had be­haved so. He began to damn and curse, and walked back towards the other men: he mentioned that if he had a horse, he would soon catch me.

ATTORNEY.

Was he near his own house then?

WITNESS.

He was about two or three miles from it.

I rode up nearer to those other men: they had stopped esquire Foulke: as Fries returned back to his men, he said, men, let Foulke go as we can­not get Rodrick; to morrow morning we will have him, I will have [Page 72] 700 men together to morrow, and I will come to your house, and will let you know that we are opposed to the law. We then went and took the assessment of Singmaster's house. We had agreed before we left Jacob Fries's, that we would meet the principal assessor the next morning, to see what course we should take.

Cross examination.

Was Singmaster at home?

Yes.—So we met: we said then that it was not worth while to at­tempt any thing more, we could not proceed on. James Chapman then wrote a letter to the commissioner to state matters. We then agreed to quit taking the rate at lower Milford at that time, as we thought we should not be able to do any thing. When we were going home through Quaker town (on the 6th of March) Cephas Childs rode before us. I and 'squire Foulke rode together. When we came to Quaker town, Childs turned into 'squire Griffith's: we found a great many people armed with guns, and with uniforms, so I said to Foulke, here is Fries, and his com­pany. I said, we wont stop if we can help it: I rode through them, but when I had got half through them, they hallowed to me to stop; a great many hallowed, and came running on both sides the road, some with their clubs and muskets to strike me.

COURT.

Did they strike you?

WITNESS.

No, they did not, I rode quickly through them.

COURT.

Did they strike at you?

I saw them running to come to strike.—I had passed Roberts's tavern, and when I come to Zeller's tavern, there was John Fries at the porch; he hallowed to me to stop, for I was going to pass by, and not to stop and give myself up: there was another man with me. They followed me to stop me: I stopped and wheeled my creature round, and asked Fries what he wanted. They damned me, and told me I should deliver myself up; I told him as long as he used such language, I would not. There was or­der then given to fire at me.

COURT.

Who gave the order?

That I cannot tell, but there was two men standing close together at Zeller's door, they pointed their guns: as I saw that, I rode off.

Cross examination.

Then, as you were so near, you can tell whether it was Fries or not who ordered them to fire.

I did not hear him.

How far were you from the porch?

Five or six rod.

Were Fries and you face to face?

The other company were still coming up at this time: they hallowed them to stop me. The last I heard was, they hallowed out to get horses to pursue me, but they did not pursue me.

Cross examination.

Had Fries, or the other people the gun at this time that the order was given to fire?

I cannot say that Fries had any thing in his hand at that time, but the others had clubs.

COURT.

How far was Fries from you at that time?

I do not know: perhaps five or six rods. There was an old man stand­ing with him.

ATTORNEY.

Have you seen that old man since?

Why, I thought I saw him, or some one like him the other day in the city. I believe I have seen him in the court since the court began.

[Page 73]

Before you met with Fries, did you meet with any opposition that day in taking the rates for lower Milford?

Why they talked of giving us some, but still they gave it in: Nobody prevented us.

Cross examination.

Who made out the lists for the rates taken by you?

'Squire Foulke:—there were a great many Germans, so I enquired, and Foulke put it down.

When did you first know that the rates were not taken in lower Mil­ford?

On the 16th of February.

Did you know of their being an intention of appointing Mr. Foulke before he was appointed?

I do not know.

Was Foulke appointed on account of Clark's absence, or merely to go into that township?

I understood he was appointed to assist Mr. Clarke: he was appointed by the commissioner.

CEPHAS CHILD, qualified.

Were you one one of the assessors under the act for the valuation of houses?

Yes.

In what county?

In Bucks.

—He here shewed his warrant, and proved his qualification, dated November 5, 1798.

At the meeting at Roderick's when we were qualified, we had our instructions given us by the commissioner: he informed us that there were six assessors to twelve townships, which we were all equally concerned in assessing, and it would be proper for us to point out which townships we would severally take. I think this meeting was about the latter end of December. I made some objections, because I could not talk the German language: they said that could make no difference, because we were at liberty to call the others to assist us. To that I assented, and we all agreed as to our districts: Milford and Richland were assigned to Clark. I took Hill-town and New-Britain. I agreed reciprocally with Clark to assist him, and he me, as he could talk German, and in Hill-town there were many Germans. This was agreed in the presence of the whole, and likewise Rodrick I made the same agreement with. I believe that this kind of arrangement was generally made by the whole, to assist each other. Accordingly Clark and myself fixed upon a day when I should come and assist him for two days, and another time was appointed for him to assist me. I had made some beginning in my own district before that day came. Before we separated, the assessor pitched upon an early day to make our return of what we had done, in order to examine whether we had proceeded right or not. I went up to Clark's agreeable to appoint­ment, and found he was not able to go on: I therefore attended to my own district.

ATTORNEY.

Why was he not able to go on?

He was sick and unable.—We met to make our returns at Rodrick's Everhard Foulke, I think, met with us, I know nothing of his appoint­ment. This was on the 5th day of the Bucks court (6th of February.) Not having gone through our business, we were to meet on the 16th [Page 74] again. Foulke, I understood at the former meeting, had been appointed. When we met, enquiry being made what we had done: Foulke told James Chapman that he dared not go into the township, for he understood that some threats were thrown out against him, and he rather wished that the people would appoint some other person, themselves, to do it. The commissioner did not seem to agree with it, but at last consented that if such could be done, he should not materially object: finally, he consented so far as to intimate to James Chapman, that if they should make such an offer, and appoint one, he would recommend him, if not, he said we must go and assist in that township. There were some proposals made who of us should go, excuses were made, and then the commissioner informed us that we were all enjoined as much to assess that township as our own. Upon which he told the principal assessor that if it did not go on, he was to write to us, and we were to attend to the call. I received a letter about the first of March, or the last of February from the principal assessor, that he had been to Milford, and it did not seem likely the assessments could go on, and I was ordered to meet the rest in Quaker town on the 4th of March. Accordingly, Foulke the principal assessor and myself met there. We had word from two others that they were not able to come. We concluded to call upon Clark to go with us, and divide the township so as to compleat it in a short time. The next morning we met to begin the business, we went to Clark's but he was not at home. It was agreed then that we should go on with the rates, and James Chapman was to go to Jacob Fries's to wait for Clark. The first house we went into was Daniel Wiedner's, I went in first, and told him I was come to take down the rates, under the revenue act of the United States: he appeared to be very angry; I reasoned with him, telling him, if he wished to read the law he might: I told him the consequences of opposition, but he might have ten days to consider of it, and give in his account if he chose to take that time. He seeing me thus said, "take it now since it must be done," he gave me his account accordingly, and appeared contented. He said farther, "we have concluded not to take it, as we expect the act will be repealed." He meant they had concluded not to take till they knew what Congress would do with the law. I made reply to him that I be­lieved that was already done, for I had seen a report of a committee of Congress, that it was inexpedient to repeal it, and it was not done.

COURT.

Did he offer to read the law?

No. He made some remarks, but I told him it was very wrong. I cannot tell what he said in particular. One thing I think was, that the assessors were to have very extravagent wages. "It does not matter," he said, "you may as well give in my return." I did not get on my horse till I got up to Mitchell's where the other two assessors were. Wide­ner went out a little before me, and he was there when I came, walking about, seemingly very angry; I again reasoned with him. Another ob­jection he made was, that the houses of high value was to pay nothing, while smaller ones, and of small value was to pay high. I forgot to say that after the rates of Wiedner's land was taken he returned and said he had forgot, there was another piece of land: he then sat down with an heavy sigh and said. "They will play the devil with me; what shall we do." I asked him what he meant, he made no answer. I told him I hop­ed every one would be as well convinced as he was. I took several houses [Page 75] in my way, and went to Jacob Fries's. As I was going in at the door, I met John Fries, who shook hand with me, told me he was glad to see we, and asked me to take a drink. He came in again after we had done dinner and said "I forbid you going to any other houses in the township: he then mentioned that Foulke and Chapman, or Rodrick were men he much esteemed. He said if we did go to any other houses, we should be, or would be, hurt. We then proceeded to assess. Where English people lived there appeared no objection, except at one place. The people there said, that if they did give in the account, there were some ordinary people in the neighbourhood, and they would be set on by them to do them an injury. That afternoon I went to David Roberts's: his wife seemed very anxious, and wished her husband had been there, for she said I should not go home alive. I went afterwards when he was at home, and he said he had no objection, only for his neighbours. After some conversation he said the people there had agreed not to let the rates be taken yet: he said they had already chosen an assessor in their own township: I told him I wandered they did not let him go on: he signified that he was a person of an obnoxious character, and therefore they did not wish to ac­cept of him. In our return home, I called at 'Squire Griffith's: as I got oft my horse, his wife told me that they were come there to take us, and that there were 40 or 50 men there, and she did not know what they were about. A little girl just after came in and said that they had hold of 'Squire Foulke's horse by the bridle, going to take him: I went to the window, and saw them all round him. I did purpose to go out, but at their persuasion I staid. The little girl came in again, and said they had taken Mr. Foulke into Enoch Roberts's tavern. After a short time Fries came over into the house where I was sitting: he took me by the band, and I rose up; he said, Mr. Childs, you must go with me to my men, as we walked along he said "I told you yesterday that you should not go to another house, and if you did you would be hurt, and we are now come to take you prisoner, if we find that you will go on with the assessments." My answer was, we are obliged to fulfil our office, and we cannot do otherwise, unless we are prevented. I was endeavouring to inform him of the manner in which I had obtained the warrant, in hopes that I should prevail upon him to go on with the business, as Roberts had proposed, but he would not hear me. When we went into the house. he addressed him­self to his men and me: "here are my men"—"here is one of them."

COURT.

By this it appeared that he had the direction. Did he seem angry?

He appeared to be angry, but he did not appear to show any revenge to me, or to talk angry.—I do not recollect that I knew any one in the house, except the tavern keeper. Some of them soon began to use rough language. A person then came behind me, and caught me by the collar over the shoulder, and said, "damn you Rodrick, we have got you now, "damn you, you shall go to the liberty pole and dance round it;" the house was then crouded as full as it could croud, and they pushed me up so close, that I could not turn round sometimes for a considerable time: the person who caught me, seemed to wish to keep behind me, but he still kept hold of me: during this time I had several thumps, which seemed, more with the knee than the fist. After some time he got to see my face: he damned me that I was not Rodrick, but that I was the other damned [Page 76] son of a bitch that he saw sitting at Rock hill, he had mistaken me. A short time after this, a person came up to me and said "keep a good heart, and you will not be hurt." I turned, or endeavoured to turn to them and said, "I am not Rodrick, nor did I ever assess in Rock hill:" he said "you are a damned liar." With that there were still more of them came up, and pressed about me more, and more took hold of me. There was a good deal of talk, some in German, and some in English. I then told them that my name was Cephas Childs; that I was not a man known in the county, but I had no doubt many of them, though they did not know my face, knew my name: by that there was some who knew me there as Coroner of the county; that man then said "if he is Childs, he is no better than the other." He asked me where I assessed: I told him: a number of them asked how they liked it where I had been. I told them some of them had appeared dissatisfied in the first instance, but as I believed, every man almost in the townships where I assessed were satisfied, they again said I was a damned liar, for the people had told them that they would join them in the suppression of it, and my own neighbours would fight against me. I told them I thought I knew better than they; that if I was well informed they would not do so. then they began again at me. Then they asked me if I had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States of America: I told them I had: they asked me when: I told them I could not recollect the time, but I knew it was as soon as the law required it of me: they asked me if I was a friend to the government of the United States; I told them I was: they then began to damn the government, and the governor, and shoved me about, many of them taking their Maker's name in vain: there then was a person who spoke very good English: they damned the house tax and the stamp act, and called me a stampler repeatedly: they damned the alien law and sedition law, and finally all the laws: the government and all the laws the present Congress had made. They damned the Constitution also.

What Constitution?

They did not mention what Constitution, whether of this state or of the United States. They damned the Congress, and damned the presi­dent and all the friends to government, because they were all tories, for that none were friends to the present government except tories. They asked me if I had been out in the last war: first I told them the law did not require me to go, and then I said I was under the tuition of my parents: they said they had fought for liberty, and would fight for it again. They said they would not have the government, nor the President, and they would not live under such a damned government: "we will have Washington;" others said "No, we will have Jefferson, he is a better man than Adams: huzza for Jefferson."

Who said so?

All of them.—They then insisted on my taking an oath of allegiance to them, alledging that if I did so, I should not be hurt. They insisted on it several times, till at length I had no way to wave it, and then I ask­ed them what their government was. One answered Washington: I said I had taken an oath of allegiance to Washington's government al­ready. They then said Jefferson; we will have none of the damned [...]amplers, nor the house tax. So they went on. They said they embo­died [Page 77] themselves to oppose the government; they meant to do it, and that was their design in coming there.

Who said so, and what were the precise words?

I do not know who said it, but the words were these "We are deter­mined to oppose the laws, and we have met to do it; the government is laying one thing after another, and if we do not oppose it, they will bring us into bondage and slavery, or make slaves of us: we will have li­berty." And then they mentioned the number of men that had joined them, or sent them word that they would join them. They mentioned, some an hundred, some more, some less, that they had there would do it, besides, they had all Northampton county to a man would join them, ex­cept some tories as they called them. Between Quaker town and Dela­ware river, I recollect they said they could raise 10,000 men if they should be wanted to oppose the sedition and alien laws. I cannot be certain, but I think he said (as he spoke in German) and fifty other damned laws. However I am not certain as to the number. They likewise said that General Washington had sent them account that he had 20, 000 men all ready to assist them in this undertaking to oppose the laws. I begged them not to believe it, for it could not be, and somebody was endeavour­ing greatly to impose upon them: I thought I knew the situation of things better, and as for General Washington, I was sure he never would undertake such conduct as that.

JURY.

Did they speak in the German language at that time, or English?

A great many of them spoke in German, but one or two of them spoke very good English, but they were altogether Germans. This passed while I was in custody.

Cross examination.

What do you mean?

WITNESS.

Why Fries took me in there and left me in custody and went away.

COURT.

Did he order them to keep you in custody?

Not that I know of.—They said Gen. Washington had certainly wrote to them so and so. One of them said he would be damned if it was not so, for he had seen the letter from Washington; or something to that effect. During this time they were constantly pushing me; one would come to my back and get his knee up: they would endeavour to push me on the stove, one or two had hold of my hips and endeavoured to throw me down, others seemed ready to lick me, and particularly after this conver­sation about Washington. About that time Captain Fries came toward me and seemed very much surprised: He said, Mr. Child, I understand some of my men have abused and insulted you. He really did appear to be very serious; he said he would not allow me to be abused; he appear­ed to be really distressed for the usage I had received, and if I would tell him who it was, he said he would make him behave himself. He then told me to come into the room. He said he respected me, and did not wish me to be abused. I told him I thought it hard that he should leave me amongst a parcel of intoxicated people. I do not particularly recollect what I said, but he told me he hoped I would not impute that conduct to him: I told him I was not much injured, and therefore hoped he would not think about it. He said his men were civil men, and seemed to wonder such a thing had happened. I think he then gave me some­thing to drink. He took me into a room, the farthest side of which [Page 78] seemed to be empty. When I got in there, he demanded my papers while I had been an assessor. While he was with me no person insulted me, indeed some of them, when he came forward into the room where I was pushed off, out of the way. I then told him all that I had done, and reasoned with him, but notwithstanding that, he insisted on my papers; I then told him I had no papers about me relative to the assessment.

Cross examination.

Who were in the room at the time the request was made for the papers?

I do not recollect any body particularly, but there were a great many crowded into the room after me.—He insisted that I had the papers, I told him I had not got the papers, he said I had, and he would have them. I told him I had no papers about me, but what related to my onice of Coroner. I was going to deliver up to him my county tax papers, but he said I had other papers, I said I had not. He then looked on those I had given him, and saw Hilltown at the top, then he said Hoho! my boys, we have got what we wanted, and then turned about and went away. He left the pocket book, taking the papers with him. There was a consi­derable huzza made, and they most of them followed him out of the room. They were gone but a few minutes till they rushed in again as hard as they could rush, without Fries, and some got hold of me. They brought Daniel Weidner along with them: some had pistols, guns, clubs, Sec. and some swords. They seemed very angry, and were pushing upon me while some endeavoured to put them off. Wiedner came up to me, and insisted on the return of the rate I took of him yesterday, he said he would have it. I desired him just to acknowledge to the truth, Did not he give it me freely yesterday: this while a person had hold of me, some of them stepped up and said it was fair. I then asked him, did I not say I would not take the measure of your house by force, but you gave me the rates with a free will? Yes, he said, but I was not forced, and therefore I want it again. Some of them then went out, and directly others came in and shook me very hard: one came in and threatened me, and said I should be shot; some brought in their guns and shewed them to me, and told me if I should be seen in Milford township on the business, I should be shot.

Weider went off. This person with the sword threatened a good deal.

ATTORNEY.

Who was he?

He was called Marks, the elder. I believe him to be the same man I have seen here.—While I was in this conversation, William Thomas came forward and said he knew me, and that they should not abuse me. That gave me an opportunity of talking farther, and then I reasoned with them of the bad tendency of such conduct, and told them that I re­ally thought if I had the law with me, I should persuade them to allow of it. One of them who had abused me before, came to me and acknow­ledged he had abused me, and was sorry for it, and wished me to forgive him. I think his name was Smith, but I am not sure. After passing some time in conversation, Fries came back again with the transcript, and delivered it me, and told me as near as I can recollect in these words; I must go home, and must never come back again to assess, or I should be shot, and insisted on my promising I would not do it. My reply was, that from the pains I had taken, I had left the township with a view of not re­turning to it, unless compelled by authority, and from their present treat­ment, if they ever catched me going back without that authority, I would [Page 79] give them leave to shoot me. He then told me, Foulke and you may in­form the government what has been done as soon as you please, we can raise 1000 men in one day, and we will not submit to it.

Did they say they were opposed to all the laws?

They said there were a number of laws they were opposed to, and one of those laws was now putting in execution, and they appeared to think if that was stopped, the others would be. This was how I understood it. The words were that they were determined to oppose the laws, and not let them be put into execution; there were so many laws coming on it was time to stop them, and if they were known to oppose them, they ex­pected the others would not be brought forwards.

Cross examination.

Was Fries present when these words were used?

No.

Monday, May 6.

JUDGE PETERS (one of the Bench) sworn.

ATTORNEY.

Will your honour please to give the Jury an account of the circumstances of your issuing warrants in Northampton county, and of circumstances within your knowledge previous to the examination of John Fries on the 6th of April.

WITNESS.

The first time I heard officially of this uneasiness in the counties of Bucks, Northampton and Montgomery, was sometime in Fe­bruary, I cannot precisely recollect what time. I had heard of it before as a piece of news, but this was the first time I heard it officially: it was by depositions being sent to me by the attorney of the district (Mr. Sit­greaves) relative to a number of persons. After that I examined some witnesses relative to it, and upon the whole I concluded to issue my war­rants against the parties charged. Being much engaged in the district court, the attorney of the district drew up the form of the warrants for my signature and approbation. We had concluded, by way of case to the people, that these warrants should be drawn up in a form of order for the defendant to appear before some justice of the peace, or judge of the coun­ty in order to give bail for their appearance at the circuit court of the United States. Neither of us then knew of those insurgents, as it turned out afterwards to have got to such a head. But I doubted myself of the propriety of the form and substance of the warrants, because I thought that the justice, or judge before whom bail was taken, ought to be ac­quainted with the whole case, and ought to have the proof of the fact before him, on which the proof of the warrant was found. I had some doubt too, whether it was legally right for persons taken by my warrants to go before an inferior magistrate. For though a justice of the peace of any state has a right by the laws of the United States to take cognizance in the first instance of crimes against the United States, and bind over the offenders to the proper court, yet I did not think that, as such justice had not had the original cognizance of the matter, there would be a propriety in my ordering him to take secondary notice of it. While I was hesitating on this point, I received informati­on of the length to which, at that time, this opposition to the law had ar­rived. I doubted very much, and this thought was afterwards clearly confirmed to me, whether the magistrates of those counties, and particu­larly Northampton, would choose to take cognizance of such offences, or would chose to do any business concerning them. There were two of [Page 80] the magistrates, one of them a justice of the peace, the other a state judge, who had done themselves much honour in persevering so far as they did in endeavouring to bring those criminals to justice. But finally it turned out that they were obliged to abandon even every endeavour towards ex­ecuting this business. So that the law, and the public authority, so far failed as it respected that county, that the judicial authority of the Unit­ed States became entirely prostrate. I found that tome of the very per­sons who were charged before me were magistrates, and I wish I could [...] that they were the only magistrates who were engaged in this business. [...] were the reasons that induced me to alter the form of my warrants. I found that too many magistrates were concerned in flattering the pre­judices of the people, and engaging in seditions practices, and encouraging the people in their mistakes for me to trust them, and I finally found that there were but two magistrates that could be depended upon, and they told me that they were insulted in the performance of their duty for the United States: of this I had good evidence. And farther: it arrived to such a pitch that I could not get one of these gentlemen even to issue a subpoena to examine witnesses, and save them the great trouble and ex­pence of coming before me. This was the opinion of those two gentle­men; one of them wrote me, and the other informed me, that they were afraid to perform such an act. They could not only not get persons to serve the process, but they could not get the witnesses to appear before them. This I do not bring as a charge against any particular person, but as a reason why the warrants were thus issued. Another reason was that those people had taken up the fallacious notion that they would not appear before me, and therefore I thought it best, though this should not have been my leading motive, to convince them that every person in this dis­trict ought to obey a warrant issued by me, and appear at such time and place as I directed; the whole district being to be considered the same as a county in respect to a state.

The witness then produced the warrants, dated February 20, 1799. One of which was read.

The marshal wrote to me official statements at sundry times of the diffi­culties he met with, and at one time informed me that the prisoners had been rescued, by force of arms, from his possession. The account he gave me it is unnecessary to state, being much similar to what has been given in evidence: He took some engagement from those prisoners, particularly those of Lehi township, that they would appear before me, which, the pri­soners themselves told me, was chearfully given. I understood from them, and other channels, that they several times attempted to come down before me and deliver themselves up, but they were prevented by persons who interrupted them, and would not let them come.

ATTORNEY.

Was John Fries brought before you after you got up there?

Yes: I had previously issued my warrant against him.

Was this the examination he signed in your presence?

[Showing the witness Fries's confession] which was as follows:

The examination of John Fries—6th April 1799.

The examinant confesses that he was on the party which rescued the prisoners from the marshal at Bethlehem: that he was also one of a party that took from the assessors at Quaker town, their papers, and forewarned [Page 81] them against the execution of their duty in making the assessments. The papers were delivered with the consent of the assessors, but without force; perhaps under the awe and terror of the numbers who demanded them, and were by this examined and delivered to the assessors. He confesses that at the house of Jacob Fries, a paper was written on the evening preceding the rescue of the prisoners at Bethlehem, containing an associa­tion agreement of the subscribers to march for the purpose of making that rescue, but he is not certain whether he wrote that paper: He knows he did not sign it, but it was subscribed by many persons, and delivered to the examinant:—He does not know where that paper is—The exami­nant confesses also, that some weeks ago, he wrote (before the assessors came into that township) an agreement which he, with others signed, pur­porting that, if an assessment must be made, they would not agree to have it done by a person who did not reside in the township, but that they would choose their own assessor within their township—A meeting has been held in the township since the affair at Bethlehem, for the purpose of making such a choice: the examinant went to the place of election, but left it before the election opened.—The examinant further acknow­ledges that his motive in going to Bethlehem to rescue the prisoners was not from personal attachment, of regard to any of the persons who had been arrested, but proceeded from a general aversion to the law, and an [...] to [...] and prevent its execution. He thought that the acts for the [...] and collection of a direct tax did not impose the quota [...] citizens, and therefore was wrong. He cannot say who originally pro [...]cted the rescue of the prisoners, or assembled the people for the purpose— [...] township seemed to be all of one mind; a man un­known to the [...] came to Quaker town and said the people should meet at Conrad [...]'s to go to Millar's town. The examinant says that on the march of [...] people to Bethlehem, he was asked to take the lead, and did ride on [...] the people until they arrived at Bethlehem—The examinant had no [...] took no command, except that he desir­ed the people not to fire [...] should give them orders, for he was afraid, as they were so much [...], that there would be blood shed.—He begged them for God's sake [...] to fire, unless they had orders from him, or unless he should be shot do [...] and then they might take their own command.—That he returned [...] papers of the assessors which had been delivered into his hands, back to [...] asessors privately, at which the people were much enraged, and suspected him (Fries) of having turned from them, and threatened to shoot [...] between the house of Jacob Fries and Quaker town.

JOHN FRIES.
Taken 6th April, 1799, before RICHARD PETERS.
WITNESS.

It is my constant practice to tell [...] prisoner that he is not bound to be evidence against himself: I did not make any promise or threats to extort it from him, but he chose to make a voluntary confes­sion, which if they do not choose to do, I commit t [...]m without it. I am particularly delicate on this subject of confession, and I do not like to encourage it.

JUDGE IREDELL.
[Page 82]

The gentlemen of the jury will observe that the law requires a judge to examine a prisoner, and it is left quite at the option of the man to confess or not.

The council for the prisoner hoped, as it was a case of treason, upon which the law and constitution was extremely cautious how evidence was admitted, the jury would consider that proof of the overt act must be given by two witnesses independent of any confession the prisoner might make.

WITNESS.

The prisoner appeared to me to be not at all disinclined: his manner was that of a man not having done any thing wrong, but perfectly collected, and possessed of his faculties. It was read to him af­terwards, to which he accorded, and, thinking a part not fully enough ex­plained, added the latter part.—I have now brought it to my recollection that there were three magistrates in that county, instead of two, to whom we were peculiarly indebted for assistance.

Cross examination.

Were any others applied to besides those three?

Some were, but we found much disinclination to do the business, and herefore thought it quite unnecessary to apply farther.

JUDGE HENRY, again called.

He was asked his situation, and the particulars of the opposition being such as either to disable, or affright the magistrate from their duty.

He deposed that he was an associate judge of the common pleas for the state. He issued a number of subpoeneas about the 15th of January to make some enquiries respecting the opposition to the tax law; these were issued at the instance of Mr. Eyerly, one of the commission [...] and others could not proceed in the execution of their duty and particu­larly in Lehi township. The witnesses generally appeared much afraid at opening themselves: and he could say that among the people, there were many much opposed to the law. I agreed to meet a number of per­sons at Trexler's, commonly known as Trexler's town: there captain Jar­rett appeared with a part of his company of light horse. Shortly after the arrival of Mr. Eyerly, Mr. Balliott and myself, the people seemed to be walking about, and looking in at the [...]indow, and seemed to make game at us, and mouths: I observed Hen [...] Shiffert in particular;—they were mostly in uniform.

ATTORNEY.

Was it muster day?

No: I understood it was the several conversation there that Jarrett meant to display his consequence, [...] to intimidate.

Cross examination.

Who did [...] hear this from, was it from the light horse?

No: I believe, it was from Mr. Trexler.

ATTORNEY.

Did the witnesses be afraid?

Yes, one man in particular appeared to be in great terror: when he was called up to give his testimony, he cried like a child, and begged for God's sake that we would not ask him, for that the people would ruin him when he returned home. Indeed all the witnesses were much agi­tated.

Did you or did you not discover a general opposition to the execution of this law?

Yes, I did.

COURT.

Was you not apprehensive of danger?

Yes I was [...] the threats which were given.

[Page 83]

Do you imagine there were any magistrates in the county that went so far as you?

Yes, several of them.

Cross examination.

How many witnesses did you take the examination of, at Trexler's?

I think eight or nine.

Did they do any thing to injure you except make mouths at you?

No, I sent for the captain, and requested him to keep his men in order, for all I wanted was to examine witnesses. There was no farther than, insult offered to us.—The captain assured me, he would do all that lay in his power.

Cross examination.

How far is Trexler's from lower Milford in Bucks?

Ten or twelve miles.—From Lehi to lower Milford? Thirty.—From Hamilton to lower Milford? Thirty one.—From Bethlehem to lower Milford Sixteen. Upper Milford in Northampton, and lower Milford in Bucks join each other.

JACOB STERNHER, sworn.

Testimony translated.

ATTORNEY.

Where do you live?

In Macungy.

Do you recollect any talk in your township of the assessors coming there to measure houses?

Yes, it was said that they were to measure them.

How long ago?

They talked in the winter about it.

What was the talk in your neighbourhood respecting the conduct of Millar's town, when the assessors came there to measure the houses?

I was told that one man (inadmissible)

What was the general talk?

I never went into company, and therefore I cannot say what it was.

When were the houses measured in Macungy?

About three weeks ago they begun to measure.

Do you know if any houses were measured before the army went up into that country?

Not that I know of in that township.

Was you at Trexler's before judge Henry?

Yes.

Did you hear any threats against judge Henry, Mr. Eyerly and Mr. Balliott by the people there?

No, I did not.

Were there any there, who said they would come to harm, if they con­tinued measuring the houses?

No, I did not hear any.

Did you hear any of the people say, while those gentlemen were there, that the assessors should not come to measure their houses?

Yes, I heard some people say that they were not willing to have their houses measured yet, and they wished it to be told to those gentlemen.

Was you not desired by the people in Millar's town to inform the as­sessors that they should not come into that township to make the assess­ment, or he would be hurt, or meet with an accident?

Yes, a man told me to tell the assessor so.

[Page 84]

Did the person say any thing about pistols and a sword?

Yes, he desired me to tell the assessor that there was a man there who had pistols and a sword.

Who did he say the man was?

He did not mention who.

Mr. CHAPMAN and Mr. CHILDS were called again at the sugges­tion of Mr. Dallas to be asked how the measurement of a house was taken?

It was always in every instance given by the owner, we never measur­ed any houses. Size, length and breadth was told us, or the proprietor had ten days to send it in: we left a note for those people that were not at home.

Did the people who were at home in Milford mention the dimensions of their houses?

Yes.

Mr. Chapman proved the letter which was mentioned in his evidence to have been written by him to the commissioner.

Mr. Sitgreaves produced and read the warrants under which those per­sons at Bethlehem were held: also the commission from the President of the United States, appointing one of the commissioners under that act.

Mr. EYERLY again called.

Cross examination.

How far did Fox live from lower Milford?

In lower Sochon township; about ten miles.

How were the principal and assistant assessors appointed?

At the time I received the notice from the first commissioner that was appointed in the commission, the commissioners were to meet at Reading on the 22d of October. After a board were met, every commissioner was desired to make a plan of his division, and to divide it into such a suitable number of assessment districts, as to have the law executed in a reasonable time: at the same time each commissioner was requested to make out lists of persons qualified for the office of assessors in each division. As soon as this was done, as the law gives a power to the Secretary of the Treasury to reduce the number of assessors if too large, the clerk made cut a list, and sent it to the Secretary of the Treasury; a list was also en­tered in the Commissioners book. Some few alterations were made in some districts afterwards, but at the time the board was sitting. After this was done, the form of the warrant was agreed upon by the Com­missioners, and ordered to be printed. They were then filled up, and every warrant signed by all the Commissioners. A rule was then adopt­ed to call all the assessors together in each district, and the Commissioners was to meet and qualify them and give them instructions.

Mr. DALLAS.

I presume a record was kept, where is it.

I do not know; it was left in possession of the clerk, he lives at Reading.

After the proclamation was issued by the President, was there not a meeting of the Commissioners with the assessors in some townships?

I do not know.

Has there, to your knowledge, been any resistance to the operation of the law since the issuing of the proclamation?

I do not know of any—I was in Philadelphia.

ATTORNEY.

Was the country in a pacific state, except where the army matched.

No.—After the President had issued his proclamation I wrote up to the principal assessor in Northampton county, and to Mr. Balliot, to request [Page 85] them to go on, and have their returns made in a certain time, and to give notice to all the other assessors so to do. I received answer an from Mr. Balliott that he had received information that it was impossible to do the business in the execution of the law.

ATTORNEY.

Did you endeavour to get the business executed?

Yes.

Did you succeed?

No.

Did you attribute it to the neglect of the assessors?

No.

To JUDGE PETERS.

ATTORNEY.

Did you not discover manifest signs of terror coming from the districts where the army had not marched?

WITNESS.

Yes, in many instances, some very strong, it was even at­tempted to raise troops to oppose the army if they went up. There were one or two instances of testimony given to me that troops were endea­voured to be raised, and nothing, I believe, but the rapidity of the pro­gress of the troops prevented its execution. I did believe that unless the army had gone through the whole country, there would have been the most atrocious instances of violence.

Did not some of the witnesses give their testimony under great reluct­ance, owing to fear?

Yes, I had, in some instances, to state the protection of the United States, and their determination to lay hold of persons who should threaten, in order to stimulate them: some said, after they had given their testi­mony, that they were afraid to go home. I can really say, that, in ge­neral, they were the most unwilling witnesses I had ever examined. I got evidence that some of them were forming associations for actually opposing the troops. One man was even afraid because I was in his house, asking for some refreshment, as, he said, he should be suspected for harbouring me; however, after I had expressed my own security, he seemed satisfied.

Mr. Dallas gave notice that, though they wished to give as little trou­ble on the part of the defendant as possible, yet he should produce two or three witnesses in order to shew that this indisposition, which was mani­fested to permit the assessment, was owing to the uncertainty those people were in, of the real existence of the law, and that the prisoner himself had declared that it was no law, and that they had no idea of opposing Con­gress by force of arms, but that they wished for time, in order to ascer­tain its real existence, and if the law was actually in force, that they wish­ed, agreeable to their former custom, to appoint assessors from their own respective townships: also we mean to show that Fries was perfectly ac­quiescent after the proclamation, and that Mitchel was entirely mistaken as to the expressions said to be used by Fries at the meeting at Conrad Marks's. However, as we wish to have time previously to examine the witnesses we mean to bring, we shall not be able to produce them at this stage of the trial.

Mr. RAWLE, then opened the constitutional definition of treason, as consisting of only two parts: "levying war against the United States, and aiding the enemies of the United States." As it is only the first of these species of treason the prisoner is charged with, it is only necessary to as­certain [Page 86] what is meant by levying war against the United States. Mr. Sitgreaves has stated that, levying war against the United States consisted, not only in a broad sense of rebellion openly manifested, with an avowed intention of subverting the government and constitution of the country, but also with force of arms, or by numbers sufficient for that purpose, to cause an impression of terror: these, either one, or all together, used to prevent the execution of the laws, or of any particular law of the United States from motives, not of a special but of a general nature—is treason. This position I believe is perfectly correct, and has already received the sanction of a court of the United States, respecting the insurrection in the western parts of Pennsylvania. See a Dallas 348. Mitchel's case—This doctrine is laid down in terms short and concise and is such as is founded on the particular authority of all the writers on English law.

Page 355. Bradford—attorney. The design of the meeting was avow­edly to oppose the execution of the excise law; to overawe the govern­ment; to involve others in the guilt of the insurrection; to prevent the punishment of the delinquents, &c.

Patterson (Justice)—The first question to be considered is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the ex­cise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason; it is an usurpation of the authority of the government; it is high treason by levy­ing war. Taking the testimony in a rational and connected point of view, this was the object. It was of a general nature, and of a national concern.

Let us attend, for a moment, to the evidence. With what view was the attack made on General Neville's house? Was it to gratify a spirit of revenge against him as a private citizen, as an individual? No:—as a private citizen he had been highly esteemed and beloved; it was only by becoming a public officer, that he became obnoxious, and it was on ac­count of his holding the excise office alone, that his house had been assail­ed, and his person endangered.—They were arrayed in a military manner; they affected the military forms of negociation by a flag; they pretended no personal hostility on General Neville; but they insisted on the surren­der of his commission. Can there be a doubt, then, that the object of the insurrection was of a general and public nature.

Page 340. Patterson (Justice) in the charge against Rigol.

With respect to the intention, there is not, unhappily, the slightest pos­sibility of doubt: To suppress the office of excise, in the fourth Survey of this state; and particularly, in the present instance, to compel the resigna­tion of Wells the excise officer, so as to render null and void, in effect, an act of Congress, constituted the apparent, the avowed object of the insur­rection. Combining these facts and this design, the crime is high treason.

This you will perceive, gentlemen of the Jury, is not preventing the execution of all the laws, or all the authority of the government, but of "an act of Congress." It is an usurpation of the authority of the go­vernment, and thus it is levying war, and is high treason. Taking it in this point of view, this was the very object of the insurgents at Northampton, and was of a public, of a general, and not of a private or special nature. In the case I referred to, the prisoner acted different from the prisoner at the Bar; he acted in a subordinate station; he does not appear to be a first character in that treasonable enterprize.

[Page 87] Gentlemen, the law thus laid down by the court upon that occasion was derived from the English authorities to which I shall now refer you. 4. Blackstone, p. 81. defines that branch of treason of which we are now treating—"Levying war against the King (substitute here the U. States for King) is, pulling down all enclosures, meeting houses, prisons or brothels"—Although bawdy houses are illegal, yet by any individuals not authorised, taking the authority which alone is vested in the government, it is an usurpation of the authority, and the act being of a general, and not of a special nature, is treason. Lord Chief Justice Hale, whose name will ever be endeared by the piety, the humanity, and the found legal learning which characterised him, has a chapter upon this subject of le­vying war against the King. 1. Hales pleas page 105. He says to march with colours flying, drums beating, &c. if on a matter of a pub­lic or general nature, is high treason, but if on a private quarrel or for a private purpose, it is not treason. Treason in levying war, by this defi­nition, consists of two sorts. First, marching expressly, or directly against the King's forces: secondly, interpretatively, or obstructively; doing a thing of a general nature. Page 133. If to pull down a particular inclosure, it is only a riot, but if to pull down all inclosures, it is levy­ing war against the King, because it is generally against the King's laws.

Foster, p. 211. Insurrections in order to throw down all inclosures, to alter the established law or change religion, to inhance the price of all labour or to open all prisons—all ris [...]ngs in order to effect these inno­vations of a public and general concern by an armed force, are, in construc­tion of law, high treason, within the clause of levying war. Insurrections, likewise, for the reformation of real or imaginary evils of a public nature, and in which the insurgents have no special interest,—risings to effect these ends by force and numbers, are, by construction of law, within the clause of levying war.

1. Hawkins, Chap. xvii. Sect. xxiii. p. 37. is much to the same effect. Douglass, 570. in the case of Lord G. Gordon. The case there on the part of the prosecution was an attempt to force the repeal of an act of Parliament, and this was called high treason, although the defendant was not convicted. Keyling p. 70. on the case of Messenger, Appletree and others, and 75, ibid.

It will probably be said by the defendant's Council that this should be simply considered as a rescuing prisoners from the custody of the Marshal, and that is not treason, and that a number of crimes of a less degree must be committed in order to make it treason, as Arson, Burglary, and Murder. But I would observe, that when these crimes are committed, one or more of them, they are not component parts of treason, but they lose their qualities and their name in the absorbing crime—treason. So when general Nevil's house was burnt, it was said only to amount to Arson: to that it was answered by Judge Patterson, were it not for the treasonable purpose with which this was done, it would be so, but the guilt rose to treason in the intention. Admitting it is a crime, and wor­thy of a punishment, the question is, whether, or not, it must be consi­dered as one of the means made use of to obtain the end in view. 1. Hale 133. If a man break open prison, except where a person is convict­ed for treason, it was ruled to be only a great riot: if several were res­cued thereby, it was a riot and [...], except those persons rescued were [Page 88] convicted for treason, and where it was without any particular view to the persons themselves, and where the prisoners were unknown, then the rescue becomes a part of the treasonable act, and that, with other facts constitutes [...]e person guilty of treason. In 4 Blackstone you will find an answer to what Mr. Dallas said this morning ought to be in favour of the prisoner: to wit, an ignorance of the existence of the law.

Suppose every man who would profess himself ignorant of the existence of a law was exculpated from the observance of it, or from the conse­quences of breaking it, to what would that doctrine lead! It would be for the interest of every man who wished to oppose a law, to keep himself under the shelter of this want of knowledge, in order that he might sin with impunity—without knowing it. This is a mistaken fact, and an er­ror in point of law. I make these observations, not because I suppose that the defence will be seriously set up, or that, did it exist, you would be in the least guided by it, but under the impression that when you come to examine all the facts, you will discover that it was not so.

Unless these points which I have laid down are controverted, I shall not trouble you with more points of law, and shall leave the observations I am farther to make, to a later period of the case.

MR. DALLAS.

May it please your Honors: GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

IT has become so uncommon in the state of Pennsylvania to be employ­ed in a cause, upon the issue of which the life of a fellow creature depends that, I am confident, the court and jury, as well as the council on both sides, are prepared to give a solemn, candid and patient attention to the present investigation. It is, gentlemen, a question of Life or Death; and if what we have heard is true, that the prisoner is a husband, and a father, it is a question whose importance extends beyond his own life, to the ex­istence and well-being of a miserable family. If I should manifest there­fore, an extraordinary solicitude to secure the attention of the jury, as long as the occasion shall require, these considerations would, I think, fur­nish a sufficient excuse: yet, permit me to add to my justification ano­ther remark. It is not only the life of John Fries, and the well-being of his family, that are at stake on this trial, but, we all know, that the im­pressions made on your minds, and communicated to the public by your verdict, may reach the lives and families of many more unhappy men now under indictments for a similar crime. I must confess, that I feel agitated by the prospect: for, if it appears so awful, so interesting, as it evidently does, to the court and audience, how must it affect us who are the council for the prisoner, charged with the developement of every principle and of every fact, that can tend to an acquital? As it relates to the Council for the prosecution, the difficulties are comparatively small. They have had an opportunity amply to explore all the facts; to calcu­late the effects to be produced, and to point their testimony precisely to the object of the charge. We, who are council for the prisoner, are ig­norant [Page 89] of the man and of his connections. Till you were impannelled, we knew nothing of the evidence to support the prosecution; and could; therefore, be little prepared to encounter and repel it, Besides, in all our enquiries for the means of defence, as well as in our examination of the witnesses, we have been embarrassed by the foreign language in which the parties have spoken. That some of you, however, as well as the op­posite council understand the German, has been a source of consolation to us; for, it is your province to decide on the facts.

But these are not the only obstacles which we have to encounter. I am sure I shall not be misunderstood when I say, that the prosecution appears to be strongly marked with the authority and influence of government.

It is, I grant, incumbent upon the government to exercise its powers [...]or the punishment of crimes; but it is essential to a fair discussion of every accusation, that the acts of the government should not be estimated as proofs of the prisoner's guilt. Thus, though you find by the proclama­tion of the President (which, doubtless, he thought, with a wife and up­right intention, was required by the extraordinary circumstances of the times) that the disturbances in Northampton were deemed overt acts of treason by his advisers; and though this denunciation was followed by the march of a considerable army for the express purpose of subduing and apprehending the traitors; you will recollect, that you are to decide whether treason has been committed, from the evidence of the witnesses, and not from the opinions of the government. Again: great inconveni­encies have been experienced by many meritorious citizens, who relin­quished the pursuits of business, and the pleasures of domestic life, to assist in the suppression of the insurgents; but you will not allow the irri­tation and resentment proceeding from this source, to transfer from your judgments to your passions, the determination of the cause. Far be it from me to contend that outrages have not been committed, which are disreputable to the state or society at large, and to the character of Penn­sylvania in particular; or to endeavour to shelter from the punishment of the law, the instigators and perpetrators of such offences. Every citizen is interested, and is bound to assist in detecting, prosecuting, and punish­ing the offenders; but every citizen, let it be remembered, is still more interested, that even the greatest criminals should only be punished in the manner and to the degree which the law prescribes. However we may differ on speculative points of politics abroad, however we may be disposed to approve, or to disapprove, the measures of administration, and however we may controvert or assist, the constitutionality, or the expedi­ency, of particular laws, all party spirit, all personal animosity, must be abandoned when we are called upon to act as ministers of justice; or we shall, in the indulgence of a moment's vengeance, overthrow those barriers which are our own security, and the pledge of safety to posterity.

Whatever you may have thought, whatever you may have said, what­ever you may have heard, in other scenes, must now be obliterated from your minds. The character of private citizens, with all the privileges of private opinion and feeling, is here exchanged for the character of pub­lic functionaries, with all the restraints of law and justice. Your opini­ons as private men, will only be regarded according to their intrinsic me­rit; but your verdict as a jury will be forever obligatory, bearing all the authority of a precedent.

[Page 90] Though, then, a proclamation has issued, an army has marched, and po­pular resentment has been excited, we claim an unbiassed attention; and circumscribing your view of the subject to the evidence, we confidently ex­pect a fortunate result. What has happened in England upon a similar occasion, we think will happen here. The British Privy Council an­nounced a traitorous conspiracy to the British Parliament. The British Parliament declared that the party recognized and confirmed the charge of high treason and thus the whole weight of public authority in that coun­try, legislative and executive, instituted a prosecution, which was, after­wards, conducted with the greatest zeal and talents—with such zeal and talents as the present prosecution has displayed. What was the event? A jury (that inestimable palladium) without fear, and without favour, ex­amined and pronounced that no treason had been committed. I allude to the recent cases of Horne Tooke and Hardy.

I shall, I presume, be excused, if I intimate to you some other disad­vantages under which the prisoner's case labours; for, it is not merely necessary to produce evidence, to explain, extenuate, or refute the charge; we must guard your minds against any previous bias, any latent pre-de­termination to convict. The accused gentleman, and his companions, you will recollect, are not upon their trial among persons, with whom they have been accustomed to live. This is a disadvantage, which every candid man will acknowledge. They are to be tried, likewise, by a jury, select­ed and returned by the marshal, the very officer who has been personally insulted, and whose appointment depends on the will and pleasure of the executive magistrate—that magistrate by whom the offenders have already been described as traitors. I mean not to cast the least reflection upon the laws of Congress, nor upon the officers of the government; but to make a general remark on the defective state of our judicial institutions. The conduct of the marshal has, indeed, been highly exemplary through­out the transaction; and when with such powers he returned such a jury as I have the honor to address, he manifests an impartiality and independ­ence of character, that entitles him to the respect and plaudits of his country. Nor is it here that the prisoner's disadvantages terminate: but I hope, I believe, that never 'till this day was the Press employed in a base and sanguinary attempt to intimidate the jury and council from a faithful execution of their duty in a capital case! Since, however, the jury have been summoned; nay, since the court have been sitting upon this very trial, there have been the grossest, the most insidious practices in a public newspaper, to warp your sentiments, and to deprive the unfortu­nate prisoner of the benefit of the best talents, which the bar of Pennsyl­vania can afford. On the other hand, a gentleman, whose abilities we all respect, and whose long residence in the offending counties must great­ly facilitate the progress of the prosecution, is associated, without censure, and certainly without being answerable, in the duties of the attorney of the district. While our ignorance of characters, and circumstances per­plexes the defence; his accurate information and experience enable him to probe every witness to the quick, and forcibly to combine and inter­weave all the incidents of the transaction. But his motives are pure [...] for, if he does arraign; if he does convict; if he does punish; it is be­ [...]ause his patriotism and public spirit enable him to soar far beyond the [...] affections of a neighbourhood.

[Page 91] Gentlemen, in this situation we appear before you as advocates for the prisoner. I declare that as far as my mind is capable of being im­pressed by a sense of duty, I feel a terror lest any thing should be left undone, or unsaid, which is essential to the cause: and, therefore, compli­cated as the discussion must necessarily be, accept, I pray you, my senti­ments under the following heads.

First, I will endeavour to establish such points of law, as seem to me to be applicable to the facts which have been given in evidence.

Secondly, I will consider the general state of the discontents, and how far the rescue at Bethlehem was connected with the previous disturbances.

Thirdly, I will take a review of the conduct of the prisoner in particu­lar.

I. With respect to the crime of treason, I hold the constitutional act in my hand by which it is defined. The gentleman who opened this pro­secution, has very justly said, that the words of the definition were bor­rowed from a statute very much admired in the English code; but I do not think that he has very justly added, that, because the United States have borrowed the language of the statute, they have, also, adopted all the inferences and expositions of the British courts. It appears, indeed, that Lord Hale (I. Vol. p. 132) thought, that even the English courts had carried their decisions on the statute too far, and emphatically warns the judges from proceeding further in the dangerous doctrine of "construc­tive treasons." Speaking of past cases, he says ‘those resolutions being made and settled, we must acquiesce in them, but, in my opinion, if new cases happen for the future, that have not an express resolution in point, nor are expressly within the words of 23 Ed. 3. though they may seem to have a parity of reason, it is the safest way, and most agreeable to the wisdom of the great act of 23 Ed. 3. first to consult the parliament and have their declaration, and to be very wary in multiplying constructive and interpretative treason, for we know not where it will end.’ It should be premised, that in that celebrated statute of 25 Ed. 3. on which is founded our definition of treason, there was a provision made, that if the overt act charged, or the crime supposed to be committed, did not come, specifically, within the words of the statute, the judges should not pronounce it high treason, but must refer it to the parliament. Hale, the great and good, applauds the provision; and when he says, that the courts have gone far enough, does not the strength of his expression imply, that they had gone too far?—"Be very wary in multiplying constructive trea­sons, for we know not where it will end." Now, it is said, that because we have brought the words "levying war" from the English statute, we, therefore, adopt all the interpretations of the English courts; but I deny the proposition, because I think it is dangerous as well to the policy of our constitution as to rights of individuals. In the same statute of the 25 Ed. 3. there is another crime, called compassing the king's death; and levying war has been construed to be an overt act of that species of trea­son. Hence the gentleman will find that there is some confusion in the English books on the doctrine of levying war, considering it sometimes as a substantive and independent of treason, and at other times considering it merely as evidence of a traitorous design against the life of the monarch. It is impossible to conceive, indeed, any thing more absurd than construc­tive treason, as it has been applied to compassing the death of the king. [Page 92] Any man who should use a single expression, a loose word, among friends, or enemies, that could be tortured, by the most circuitous process, into any thing like a wish for the king's death, was termed a traitor. In Black­stone's Commentaries, it is mentioned, that an innkeeper, ludicrously de­clared that his son was heir to the crown; meaning that he was heir to the tavern, which had the sign of a crown; yet, the expression was construed into treason, and the man suffered as a traitor. In another instance, the king killed a deer belonging to one of his poor subjects, who upon the first impulse of his resentment, wished the deer, horns and all, in the king's belly; and the man was also hanged as a traitor. So far will constructi­on go, and, in such a manner may a man's life be endangered! If construc­tive treasons are admitted in this country, no man will be safe: It may destroy my life; it may destroy your's.

In England this species of treason is considered in two lights; levying war against the person of the monarch, and levying war against his autho­rity. I wish you to know precisely upon what footing this distinction prevails in England, because I shall ask you presently, what species of treason ought to be considered as adopted by the principles, as well as the terms of our constitution. Levying war against the person of the mo­narch consists in any attempt to dethrone him; either with a view to change the government, or merely to supplant the person who administers it. The act is unequivocal, and meets the common sense of every man. But levying war against his authority, is so indefinite, that any thing and every thing may be made treason; the intemperance of a mob, as well as the hostility of an army. Independent of all technical reasoning, then, let me ask you, upon the suggestions of common sense, whether you per­ceive more in the recent occurrences than a great riot; a lawless disturb­ance of the public peace, a daring rescue? Was there in the mind of any man, till the denunciation contained in the proclamation of the President, and the march of the army, an idea that treason had been committed? Till then, the guilt in obstructing the execution of the laws was not deno­minated treason, nor was the punishment expected, death!

In order, however, to examine this point of law more minutely, and to apply it to the facts, let me observe that from the English books (whose authority, however, is not implicitly admitted) two general propositions are to be collected:

First, The intention must be to levy war.

Secon [...] War must be actually levyed against the government.

When I say, emphatically, that the intention must be to levy war, I mean that the intention, free of all constructive matter, must be to com­mit that description of crime, which the gentleman concerned for the pro­secution calls "levying war." Without that precise intention, however criminal the intention may be in other respects, the offender cannot be guilty of treason. A man, or a mob, may intend to commit a crime; a man may be armed, or a mob may be arrayed, for the purpose; and the utmost force may be used to accomplish it; but it is no treason, unless the intention was treasonably to levy war: though it may be arson; or it may be riot, &c. If the avowed object is to subvert the government; to drive Congress from its legislative function; to seize the President, &c. and instead of the established order of things to introduce anarchy, or mo­narchy, the act would be plainly and unequivocally within the meaning of levying war.

[Page 93] It is true, that the English books go further; and consider an attempt by force to obstruct the execution of all laws, or to compel the repeal of a particular law, as a constructive treason within the description of le­vying war. But the obstruction of all laws is, in fact, an attempt to subvert the government, and to compel the repeal of a law, is a very dif­ferent thing from a temporary interference with its execution. Conceding therefore, as far as the English authorities go, and as far surely, as the in­terests of our government can require, there is no precedent of a construc­tive treason to warrant a conviction in the present case; the opposition was not directed against all laws; nor was there any force employed to com­pel a repeal of the obnoxious Act. In Foster 211, as read by Mr. Rawle, you will find the reference is particularly made to the case of forcing the repeal of a law, or laws, &c. and not a word about opposition to the execution of a particular law. What, then were the origin and cha­racter of the late rising of the people? Was it not an opposition given to certain officers merely from a doubt of the existence of the law; or till the people had ascertained whether other counties conformed to the assess­ments, or till the inhabitants of townships were indulged in appointing their own assessors? Let me ask you, whether these characteristics are within the scope of the law of levying war? Remember what Hale says, "Do not let a parity of reasoning allure you; be very wary that you do not add to the catalogue of constructive treasons. Judge Blackstone too, has been quoted by Mr. Rawle (Vol. 4. p. 81) where he speaks of treason as an "attempt to reform religion, or the laws;" but I intreat your attention to the distinction which the passage itself is calculated to establish. Eve­ry one knows that the term reform the laws, means repeal the laws. The current of Legislative power is uniform. Those who made, can alone an­null a law, and if a reformation is produced, it must be by applying to the legislature. If the application is made with force, or menaces, the English writers declare, and we may safely allow that it would be an act of levy­ing war. But where is the analogy between that case, and the case of resisting a subordinate officer, while executing his part of a particular law?

Now gentlemen, I challenge the prosecuting council to say, in what part of the evidence it has appeared, that these insurgents went further than to declare that the law did not please them; that though they did not mean to compel Congress to repeal it, they had some doubts, and wished to ascertain whether it existed or not; to know whether the country in general had submitted to it; to know whether General Washington was not dissatisfied with it, and to see whether they could not get the assessor appointed by themselves. Under these impressions many irregularities oc­curred, but I ask the adverse council to point out if they have discovered through the whole course of the business, any insurrection existing, any traitorous design, till the meeting at Bethlehem; or whether till that moment the people of Northampton could be said to have been guilty of any crime?

We are told that the case of the western insurgents in 1794, is in point; and that the decisions upon the trials that then took place, are precedents on the present occasion; but, with great deference, I declare that it seems impossible to bring cases more dissimilar into view, where violence has been committed in both. At this stage of the argument however, I [Page 94] shall only remark, that whatever may have been the language of the judge, who then presided, I am sure the attorney of the district will be good enough to recollect, and candid enough to state, that the opposition, though in its origin, excited against the excise law, was conducted with the avow­ed purpose of suppressing all the excite offices, and compelling Congress to repeal the act, See 2 Dallas Rep. 346.

Let us for a moment, gentlemen, trace the motives of the people, by looking at their conduct not at large, but in the lawless scene at Bethle­hem. What did they do? why they rescued the marshal's prisoners; but the moment they had effected the rescue, did they not disperse? Their whole object then was consummated; for, I must presume that they contempla­ted nothing farther, as I see them attempt nothing more; and yet the time was very favourable to accomplish a more extensive design, if it had ever been meditated. Men intending to compel, by every hostile means, the repeal of a law, when they had in their hands the obnoxious agents of that law (Mr. Balliott, Mr. Eyerly, the marshal and others) would hardly have let the moment pass without some effort to triumph in their advan­tage. It was, indeed rumoured to be their intention to dispatch Mr. Ey­erly; but where does it appear? Was he not compleatly in their power? Was he not constantly in their view, though he incorrectly says that he was constantly out of their view? No: I repeat that the rioters having accomplished the rescue, dispersed; and will you, under such circumstances, in a case of life and death, determine that they came to commit treason? rejecting the plain fact, and adopting a constructive inference? But if they proceeded no farther than I have stated, let us again look to the law of England, to define their crime, as distinguished from treason? and you will not cease to bear in mind that you must establish the distinction. Hales pleas vol. 1 p. 133—4. Bacon's abridgment vol. 6. p. 513—4—5.

Foster Sect. 2. 210 "risings to maintain a private claim of right, or to destroy particular inclosures, or to break prisons, in order to release par­ticular persons have not been holden to amount to levying war within the statute.

Upon this principle a rising of the weavers in London, to destroy all en­gine-looms, machines, &c. did not amount to levying of war—for the judg­es considered it merely as a matter of private quarrel between men of the same trade, about a particular engine, which those concerned in the riot thought detrimental to them."

Now, if we should be fortunate enough in the course of this business to show that, however criminal these people may be, yet, that taking it alto­gether, their intention was only to acquire information, to see what really was the state of the country, and to procure township officers of their own appointment: if so, though they achieved the rescue, we have done with the indictment for treason; the verdict must conform to the evidence, and the judgment to the verdict. That the offence is an aggravated misde­meanour, I will not deny; but it ought to be distinguished from Treason; and, I think, I shall soon evince that it never was within the view of our legislature to consider it as the treason contemplated by the constitution. Give me leave, then, to ask (and I beg, gentlemen, as this is a matter of construction, that you, who are to fix the intention, will give candid at­tention) whether the facts prove more than the breaking open a particular prison, in order to rescue particular prisoners? Was not the matter of a [Page 95] partial, local nature, to make a particular, and not a general rescue, for which a particular prison (if it may be so described) was violated? And as to the previous opposition what was it more than a partial obstruction of particular officers, to prevent in a particular township, the execution of a particular law. At Kline's the people said to the ex-assessors, "we will not let you come into our township 'till we know whether it is a law or not; and if we must be assessed, it shall be by assessors of our own township." A gentleman in behalf of the prosecution has told us, that we are to re­ceive as authority all the adjudications given to the them "levying war" in England: But if I can produce an authority higher than the English parliaments, or the English courts to prove that the present case ought not to be included in the description of treason, I presume he will not reject it because it is American: I mean the authority of our own legislature. Before, however, I turn to the act of Congress, I will attract your atten­tion, gentlemen, by one proposition. If the legislature has explicitly classed an offence under a particular head in the penal code, it is incon­sistent and absurd to search for it, and punish it under another head. For instance, if the legislature has declared that rescuing prisoners, not under sentence of death, should be punishable only with fine and imprisonment, it would be inconsistent, by arguing, in a circle, that a rescue with force and numbers, is a combination for the purpose of preventing the execution of a law, and that such a combination is treason, by levying war. 1 Hales pleas 151. Keyling 75. Foster p. 200. Sect. 7.

If the offence to which I refer had been treason, it would not have consisted with the wisdom of the legislature to make it a misdemeanour: and on this ground it is, that I now ask you to reflect, which species of levying war, the direct or the constructive, was within the view of the framers of our constitution? Did they not intend to exclude every de­scription of constructive treason? But to proceed; if I can demonstrate, that every thing which has occurred of a criminal nature, from the com­mencement of the business, to its consummation, and regarding every pre­vious discontent as tending to the particular rescue at Bethlehem (which is the utmost the opposite council will pretend) has been considered by the legislature of the United States, (whose acts I repeat, are entitled to more respect than all the British authorities, parliamentary or judicial) as high misdemeanours, and not as treason; then I am entitled to insist, that the con­stitutional provision does not embrace the case; or if it does embrace the case that Congress, possessing the power to declare the punishment of trea­son, has limited the punishment of one species of the offence at least, to fine and imprisonment. Listen to the act, "If any person or persons shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist or oppose any officer of the United States in serving, or attempting to serve or execute any mesne, process, or warrant, or any rule or order of any of the courts of the United States, or any other legal or judicial writ [...] process whatsoever, or shall assault, beat or wound any officer, or other person duly authorized in serving or executing any writ, rule, order, process or warrant aforesaid, every person so knowingly and wilfully offending in the premises, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months, and fined not exceed­ing three hundred dollars," Shall it be contended then, that obstructing the marshal, who was employed in serving process, constitutes the crime of treason! If it did so, there was no kind of necessity for this law.

[Page 96] Is there an ingredient in the whole of the conduct, while obstructing the marshal in the service of his process, that is not embraced in this le­gislative description? But let us take another step: the process is exe­cuted, the prisoners are apprehended, and actually in the custody of the marshal; and if it is treason, under the Constitution, to take them out of his custody, would Congress be justifiable in treating the offence simply as a misdemeanour? And yet such absurdity is imputed to the national le­gislature, since in the 23d section of the same law, it is enacted, that "if any person, or persons shall by force set at liberty, or rescue any person, who shall be found guilty of treason, murder, or any other capital crime, or rescue any person convicted of any of the said crimes, going to execu­tion, or during execution, every person so offending, and being convicted thereof, shall suffer death: and if any person shall, by force, set at liberty, or rescue any person who before conviction shall stand committed for any of the capital offences aforesaid; or if any person or persons shall by force set at liberty, or rescue any person committed for, or convicted of any other offence against the United States, every person so offending shall, on con­viction, be fined, not exceeding 500 dollars, and imprisoned not exceeding one year," Thus, if a malefactor was actually under the gallows when rescued, the rescue would have been but a capital offence; and the same consequence is now attempted, where the persons rescued had been admitted to their parole, and were in custody of the officer, merely upon mesne pro­cess. It was a matter of honour that made them resign themselves to his custody, and it was, in effect, a matter of form that he kept them in cus­tody: for, we find, that as he took their parole to meet him at Bethle­hem, so at the moment of the rescue, he took their parole to meet him in Philadelphia, which they have all punctually done.

Here then you find, gentlemen, that we have two of the prominent fea­tures of this case reduced to the form of positive law: to wit, the ob­struction of the marshal in the service of his process, and the rescue of prisoners from his custody. But there is another circumstance to which I would wish, likewise, to lead your attention. You find there was an in­disposition to allow a particular class of officers to make the assessments; and the people urged, that if it was to be done, it should be done by their own assessors. In this important point, therefore, the particular officers, and not the law, form the object of resentment and opposition. On this distinction, I have the respected authority of Mr. Bradford, the late attor­ney general of the United States, for asserting that the offence was riot, not treason. In his argument in the United States v. Mitchel (2 Dallas Rep. 354.) he states that ‘an opposition was lately made to the appointment of a particular judge, in Mifflin county, and he was forcibly driven from the bench. But the offence was prosecuted merely as a riot, upon this principle of descrimination, that the design was not to prevent the go­vernor from appointing any judge, but only to displace an unpopular individual.’ So even if the unpopular assessors, instead of being fore­warned not to enter the township, had been forcibly expelled from it, the offence would not have been treason, but not.

I am arrived, however, to the last and conclusive evidence of the sense of Congress upon this subject: from which it will be proved that the same cautious, and in respect to punishment, the same benevolent, legislature, had considered all that the ingenuity of any gentleman can suggest as [Page 97] criminal in the lawless career of the rioters, and defining the offence to be a misdemeanor, excludes the idea of its being a treason. Let us turn to the act commonly called the sedition act. Congress have there declared, that fine and imprisonment should be the only punishments for the offence which appears on the evidence to have been committed by the prisoner. I ask you, gentlemen, to reflect one moment upon the testimony that you have heard upon this trial, while I analyse the first section of the law. Has John Fries been guilty of a combination and conspiracy to obstruct the execution of the laws? In this act, his punishment is prescribed. Im­prisonment and fine. Did he intimidate a public officer? Here is the punishment. Is there in the whole transaction any councilling, or advis­ing, or any efforts towards producing an insurrection, it is punishable by this law. The law contains these descriptions of offence: First, combina­tion with intent to oppose any measures of government, or to impede the operation of the laws of the United States. This offence, notwithstanding its generality, is only punishable with fine and imprisonment. Secondly, an intimidation of persons, who are applied to for the purpose of execut­ing a law, so as to prevent their accepting the office, or having accepted it, to deter them from discharging the duties annexed to it. This is the offence that will be urged upon you: all the disturbances of Northampton county; all the tittle tattle and alarms of commissioners and assessors, will be arrayed against the unfortunate prisoner to affect his life: and the ag­gregate will be swelled into the size, and depicted in all the malignity of treason, though the law says it is nothing more than a misdemeanour. "Yes," you will hear it exclaimed, "Fries is the leader; he is the very life of the mob: it was he who advised, he who addressed, he who alarm­ed, he who intimidated, he who rescued!" Did he so? Then this law will punish him for a high misdemeanour; but I can discover no law to punish him for treason. I am sensible that if I err in my opinion, those who pro­secute will be able to discriminate, between the case proved by the evi­dence, and the case defined in the sedition law. I have not the ingenuity to perceive it; and I hope you will only give that weight to the respec­tive arguments which they respectively merit. Nay, I am persuaded, that the humanity of the prosecuting council, will induce them to abstain from any harsh exposition of the principle, as well as from any strained applica­tion of the evidence, involved in the controversy. The law provides for combinations formed for all these purposes, whether they have been carri­ed into effect or not, the simple punishments of fine and imprisonment. Simple do I call it! respecting this man, do we not know how exemplary it may be rendered. Suppose the judge was to impose a fine of 5000 dollars, can 5000 dollars come from the purse of John Fries? And if it cannot come from his purse, then the power of remission is in the chief magistrate alone; and unless he thinks that the public will sustain no in­jury from the convict's liberation, his sentence of five years may be pro­tracted to an imprisonment for life, and the total deprivation of the means by which his family can be rescued from wretchedness and ruin. It is not therefore, a simple punishment. But, permit me to repeat, that every description that can be given of the disturbances in the northern counties, is to be found in the law I have referred to; and if the legislature, which must be supposed to be as wife, as guarded, and as well-informed, as courts, or juries, in regulating the interests of the community, has thought proper [Page 98] thus to describe the crime, and prescribe the punishment, shall we pre­sume to be more wise, and assume a power to be more penal? If the le­gislature was contented to class these actions with misdemeanours, shall the designation be expunged by this court, or arbitrarily transferred to the catalogue of constructive treasons? Shall a jury sitting here;—shall a judge sitting there;—declare that though the offence is unequivocally pointed out by law, yet in their ideas of distributive justice, the penalty ought to be enhanced, and the man ought to be hanged! In every autho­ritative book, in regard to criminal cases, the most liberal interpretations are given to laws which mitigate punishments. Then let us suppose that the legislature when the sedition law was passed, contemplated the crime of treason without a view to the distinction of direct and constructive treason. The crime is defined by the constitution, but the punishment is not; and, therefore, an early act of Congress, agreeably to the power vest­ed in that body, affixed the punishment of death: but, it will not be de­nied, that Congress might at that time have inflicted only the punishment of fine and imprisonment, as is the case in the penal code of Pennsylvania. If, therefore, Congress has the power to modify the punishment and if we discover in the Sedition act a full description of treason, whether direct or constructive, ought we not to consider it, upon the liberal principle of expounding penal statutes, as an intended mitigation of the punishment, and a virtual repeal of the pre-existing sanctions? If there is any incon­sistency in the two laws, so that they cannot stand together, the former must be presumed to be annulled by the latter, and the greater punishment is superseded by the less, because enacted subsequent to it. The word in­timidate, used in the Sedition act, is of extensive meaning; it is not a mere feeling which would arise from saying you will suffer among your fellow citizens; it is a feeling which operates upon the mind from an ap­prehension of personal danger, and may be the effect of every species of force or menace. 1 Hale's pleas 3 and 6 Bacon 513. These authorities show what arraying in arms is, with a view to commit a crime; but prove that if the intention is not treasonable, it is not treason, however violent the act might be, and whatever may be the military array of the actors; and the intimidation to which the law applies, embraces every description of force that can possibly be contemplated, in order to accomplish the me­ditated purpose;—the obstruction of process,—the rescue of prisoners, the surrender of office;—or the resistance of a law. Foster 219 Sect. 10. "Attacking the king's forces in opposition to his authority upon a march, or at quarters, is levying war against the king. But if upon a sudden quarrel, from some affront given or taken, the neighbourhood rise and drive the forces out of their quarters, that would be a great misdemeanour, and if death should ensue, it may be felony in the assailants, but it will not be treason, because there was no intention against the King's person or go­vernment."

1 Hale's pleas 146. "If any of the King's troops be killed, it is felo­ny." An open resistance to the justices of Oyer and Terminer in the county of Surry was felony. Here a sudden attack upon the King's troops on their march, though this must be considered as a direct attack upon the government, yet, if any quarrel arise between them and the people, it is no treason. So, in the present instance, all the object of these people was to obtain a little time to procure information. To that we attribute their [Page 99] conduct toward Rodrick Childs and other officers: it arose from the im­pulse of the moment, and though directed against public officers, ought not to be denominated levying war against the government. The whole purpose and extent of every violent word or gesture, terminated in the intimidation of those officers. Do we hear a variety of men whispering to Eyerly he was in danger of his life? Look at the fact: he goes the rounds with the marshal, to serve the process against the very men, who are alleged to have pronounced the threat, yet no danger attends him: he appears repeatedly at the windows at Bethlehem amidst the tumult, yet no outrage is offered: the active leaders of the mob level guns at him, yet not a trigger is drawn! It was in short, a mere system of inti­midation, without a design to use force, much less to commit treason. Nay, I will pledge myself in saying that there was great art used on the part of the prisoner to accommodate the matter with the officers in every stage of the transaction, and to prevent personal injury or any kind of vi­olence. The case of the judges of Oyer and Terminer, referred to in Hale, is surely as strong as the present. Those judges were as much au­thorised then, as the assessors are now; and the non-reception, or acknow­ledgment of both, as public functionaries was the offence.

The acts committed during this scene of tumult, ought to be punished, and I hope will be punished; but as acts of riot and sedition, not as acts of treason.

I am sensible that it is possible to draw distinctions, to refine upon the meaning, and pervert the language of the act: but on principles of hu­manity, I am confident the gentlemen opposed to us will abstain from a mere exercise of ingenuity and eloquence, while we, who contend in favor of life, have a claim to every indulgence; a right to the benefit of every shade of discrimination.

It has been laid down by the opposite council, that there must be gene­rality of object, in order to constitute the crime of treason. If an insur­rection takes place, by which it is designed to oppose all the laws, it needs no reasoning to convince any man that a subversion of the government is intended, and that this is treason: But this I contend, is the only species of treason which ought to be recognized under a republican form of govern­ment, and to which alone the language of our constitution can be fairly applied. I am justified in the position, because the legislature has asserted it. If the constitutional language may be satisfied in that manner, the diversity introduced by the legislature ought at least to be judicially res­pected; so that when the legislature having provided the punishment of death for levying war, provides a different punishment for offences, which according to the English books would be construed into that very species of treason, we are bound to say that the English constructions are falla­cious and that taking advantage of Lord Hale's advice, the framers of our constitution have not only rejected the past decision (by which they were never bound as the English judges are) but have guarded against the accumulation of interpretative treason. When, therefore, I say that to oppose all laws, and to resist all the authority of the government, is a palpable levying of war, which requires no technical aid to define or ex­plain, I go as far as the terms of the constitution necessarily demand; and I think we are not authorised to go farther. I think I am right, al­so, when I say, that the legislature has distinguished the offence committed by the prisoner, from treason, and provided a different punishment for it.

[Page 100] Recurring to the western trials, let me repeat that the direct, the avow­ed object of the insurrection of 1794, was to suppress all excise offices, and to compel a repeal of the excise law; but can it be pretended that on that occasion, or on any occasion, a verbal menace to an officer, the rescue of a prisoner, or a temporary resistance to the execution of a law, arising from a doubt of its existence, was declared to be treason? Where shall we stop gentlemen, if such constructive treasons are allowed? It is im­possible for human genius, or human study to provide a barrier against the consequences. The framers of our constitution, the legislature of the union, one would imagine had taken every practicable precaution against the admission of constructive treasons; but if we are to adopt the expo­sitions, and the principles of exposition, of the English courts, the wisdom of our own country has been exercised in vain. If a forcible opposition to the partial execution of a single law, by a particular set of officers, is treason as the gentlemen allege, with a parity of reason, it may be pro­nounced, that a non-compliance with any lawful requisition of an author­ised officer, constitutes the same crime. Open that door, and the mischief will be carried much farther, will become more dangerous to civil liberty, and personal safety, than any thing which, the metaphysical disquisitions on the crime of compassing the King's death, have generated in En­gland. If any act that will interfere with carrying the laws and measures of government into effect, is treason, what a privileged order our public officers instantaneously become, what an enviable security they attain! Upon the whole discussion of this point of law, then, I conclude, that on the legitimate definition of levying war as applied to our form of govern­ment; and on the authority of the American legislature, no treason has been committed. There was no force employed against the government; no general object to overthrow the constitution and laws; no direct at­tempt, by arms or intimidation, to compel Congress to repeal the obnoxi­ous act: but the whole was a great and unjustifiable riot—seditious in its origin; daring in its progress; and iniquitous in its effects.

I proceed to the consideration of another point of law, and enquire that supposing this case to be treason, how is it to be proved? The first clear rule is, that the overt act must be proved in the county in which it is said to have been committed, as on the present indictment in the county of Northampton. 4 Hawkins ch. 46. sect. 184, 5, 6. p. 454. It was mentioned by Mr. Sitgreaves, that the specific overt act, with which Fries is charged, was rescuing the prisoners at Bethlehem; but this does not ap­pear on the face of the indictment. If, however, that act was treason, then not only the act, but the traitorous intention, must be proved in the proper county, as the intention and the act, are both essential to the crime. Now, for a moment, overlook the general narrative of discontents and disturbances, dismiss from your minds all the previous, and all the subsequent transactions, and confining your ideas precisely to the affair at Bethlehem, pronounce whether there appeared at that time and place any thing more than a design to rescue the prisoners? It is, I assert, my right to call for full proof of guilt, where the indictment states that the guilt was incurred. At Bethlehem, then, from the commencement to the close of the tumult, who can trace an act of levying war against the United States? The truth is, that before John Fries came on the borders of Northampton county, the military array, of which you will hear a great [Page 101] deal by and by, had taken place; and the people had got to the bridge of Bethlehem. But there is no evidence that any of the active men in op­posing the assessors, were present at the bridge, at the time the rescue was contemplated; and from the first convening at Schwartz's 'till the mo­ment of their taking the prisoners, what were the views of the party, as declared to Messrs. Henry, Balliott, and Eyerly? Why, that they came there simply to rescue the prisoners. The sincerity of the declaration is corroborated by the powerful consideration, that if there was a design to annihilate the laws, or to persecute and injure the officers, the opportunity as I before observed, could never be more favourable to ensure success. Such facts speak stronger than the strongest language: And is it not con­clusive, that a rescue only was in view, when we hear, that in less than ten minutes after the surrender of the prisoners, the whole multitude dis­persed, leaving the commissioners, assessors, justices and marshal uninjured and unannoyed upon the spot? There is one incident, however, which, perhaps you may notice: one of the two persons who were detained at Bethlehem in the morning, on being asked how he came there, said that he understood there was to be a meeting about those laws, and that he came to see what would be done about them; but with this single excep­tion, it is observable that not a word was said at Bethlehem respecting the existence, execution, obstruction or repeal of any unpopular act; not a word escaped but in relation to the rescue of the prisoners. In that rescue, the prosecuting council say they discover the generality of object, which even the English doctrine calls for in the definition of treason by a constructive levying war; and insist that the particularity of object, which would extenuate and reduce the crime, is not to be found. Is it so contended, because the demand of surrender, was not founded on a tie of consanguinity? because an uncle, a brother, a father, a son, were not imprisoned? This, surely, is not a legal idea of particularity. But all the law regards is to be found in the present case. The party assembled with a view to release a particular set of prisoners, and not prisoners generally. Shankweiler was one who was there; three or four came with him to see that he should not be used ill, and to offer bail for him. What was their language at the bridge? "They have taken our neighbours; but if they have done wrong, they ought to be tried in their own county." That they should be transported to Philadelphia was the great objection—was the motive to the rescue: that they have been transported to Philadelphia, is a great inconvenience, is the principal difficulty in the defence.

Thus, then, in point of proof the prosecution is defective: it is not merely an act of violence, but a traitorous intention that must be shown at the place where the violence was committed. No such intention has appeared in evidence; while on the contrary we have pointed you to the parts of the evidence which prove that the people did every thing that they intended to do, and the moment they obtained their object, dispersed. With this view of the subject, why does the government prosecute for a capital offence? If this prisoner is acquitted on the present indictment, there is no probability of his escaping with impunity: though his life may be spared; there is no doubt but the attorney of the district, will present a bill against him under the act to which I have so repeatedly referred.

On the principle of the law that I have stated, 'till the overt act is compleatly proved in Northampton, the intention as well as the deed, I [Page 102] take it you cannot go to another county for evidence, by proving there an independant and substantive act of treason. It is immaterial to Fries, as it respects this charge, what he did in the county of Bucks. He met at Kline's: and though I will deny the impropriety of his conduct at that meeting, no lawyer will assert that it amounted to treason. He did not meet at Mitchel's; but wherever he did attend, we cannot perceive any thing in his conduct, but a vague dislike of the land tax, and a steady re­gard for the safety of the assessors. It is immaterial what he did, and what he said, in the county of Bucks: the offence must be proved in all its parts in the county of Northampton.

And here, gentlemen, I am naturally led to guard you against another instrument in the system of state prosecutions, called accumulative treason, as dangerous and as unjust an instrument as constructive treason, of which I have already spoken. Accumulative treason, is, the artful combination of a number of circumstances, which in their original, unconnected situa­tion were unimportant, but being thus combined become gigantic, and frightful to the eye. Mere indiscretions committed at different times, in different places, and under various impulses, collected into a mass, and ex­hibited at a moment, may be made to assume the complexion of the most odious crimes. None of the acts committed out of Northampton ought to be brought into the account against the prisoner, till, at least, the act of treason has been proved, legally proved, to have been committed there. For those extraneous acts, if they do not amount to substantive acts of treason, indictable where they were committed, he may be rendered res­ponsible under the sedition law, or under the general law against rioters. If his actions in another county ought not to be taken into view, the reason is stronger for excluding his words. Words spoken may be an high misdemeanour, but can never amount to treason. 4 Black Com. 259. and yet it is attempted to prove the present charge by the aid of loose, equi­vocal, and ambiguous conversations. With respect to such evidence, arising under circumstances that are not clearly stated, communicated with­out regard to the order and connection of facts, and depending on the memory of persons agitated by terror, or by resentment, can it be neces­sary to caution an upright and enlightened jury? Take them, if you will, the language of the law declares that they cannot constitute treason; but the language of humanity instructs you totally to disregard them.

Let me advert to another circumstance with respect to the evidence. It is not necessary laboriously to distinguish what is hearsay evidence and what is not: and I admit that the testimony, which applies to a descrip­tion of the general state of the country, is not to be disregarded, because it is of the nature of hearsay. Upon the detail, however, of specific facts, the rule is strict and beneficial. Whatever was heard from a second per­son, when that person might himself have been brought as a witness; or whatever has passed in relation to the prisoner, at a time when he was ab­sent; the law will not allow to be the foundation of a verdict upon the present trial. Included in this description is every piece of information, all the tittle tattle, that passed between the subordinate and principal asses­sors or commissioners. Again: the assessors told the commissioners that the law could not be executed; but this is matter of opinion, which must be founded on facts; and you must take the facts, not the opinion, as your guide. Nor can a correspondence official or unofficial, between pub­lic [Page 103] officers, be estimated as evidence on the trial of a third person. If it can be estimated as evidence, then it will be always in the power of the officers of government, to fabricate and produce evidence that will inevi­tably convict an obnoxious individual. God forbid that ever this should be the case here; but the temptations to an abuse of power are not want­ing. Without meaning a reflection upon Mr. Eyerly, it cannot be over­looked, that he, who was the commissioner for executing the unpopular law, had been recently an unsuccessful candidate for Congress; and if a base motive could actuate him, do we not perceive his opportunity, to avenge the defeat upon the active opponents of his election? Official re­ports are necessary to maintain the connection between officers of different grades;—the facts stated in them are binding upon the reporters, and the reports are themselves sufficient evidence to be acted upon by the officers to whom they are made: but was it ever tolerated, was it ever conceived, that an official statement of facts should be conclusive in any case, even in a case of property, affecting the rights of a private citizen, in a court of justice. The facts depend upon books and vouchers, constituting an of­ficial record, and the books and vouchers, or authenticated copies, or ex­emplifications, can alone be admitted as legal evidence upon a trial at law.

There remains another point of law, to be introduced to the notice of the court and jury. I take it for granted, that no man can be said to oppose a law, unless the law exists; no man can oppose a measure of government, unless his acquiescence is lawfully required. The judges will not view my position in the mistaken light which Mr. Attor­ney did, that the commission of every officer from the assessor to the President must be produced, before any act in execution of the land tax law could be performed: No, Sir; I contend not for so extravagant a, doctrine: but I assert, that every man who resists a public officer de facto, and in consequence of the resistance is indicted, has a legal, settled right to demand upon his trial, proof of the authority of the officer. In the first instance, the party who resists, does it at his peril;—but if the person claiming to act as an officer, had no warrant, or commission, the resistance was justifiable, and the defendant must be acquitted. Let us apply this principle. The law being enacted by congress, it is an incontestable, though sometimes harsh rule, that ignorance, shall be no excuse for disobeying it: but suppose that a man, calling himself an assessor should come into my house, and insist on going from room to room to take the rates, without shewing me his warrant; and that in consequence of his refusal I should turn him out, and he should prosecute me;—what is the result? If he was de jure an officer, I am liable to the penalty of the act; but if he was not, then I am not only innocent, but entitled to an action of trespass against him for his intrusion.

We have, with this view of the case, repeatedly called for proof of the appointments of the assessors, in conformity to the act of Congress. Such ap­pointments could only be legally made by a majority of the board of com­missioners for the division, at a regular meeting. Now, as the evidence proves, that one of the assessors was not so appointed; and that bundles of blank warrants were left in the hands of each commissioner, to be filled up with any names he pleased; which task in one instance a commissioner assigned to an assessor; sufficient is shewn to justify our exacting on a [...]pital trial, the best evidence of regular appointments, that the case will [Page 104] admit: the bést, the only evidence, is the record of the commissioners, which the law directs to be kept by the clerk of the board. There can indeed, be no room to justify the transfer of the discretion and authority vested in the commissioners by Congress: it is not like the common case of blank certificates, to authenticate, ministerially, the signature of a magis­trate, notary, &c. which, I as a public officer have often filled up on be­half of the Governor: but it is the case of a discretion, arising from the judgment, information, and integrity of the party, who is confidentially appointed to exercise it;—such a discretion as is vested in the Governor to appoint Judges, of which he could not have transferred to me, in the shape of blank commissions, without, I believe, exposing both of us to the jeopardy of impeachment.

2. Having thus delivered my sentiments upon the points of law, that arise on the evidence, I shall now enter upon the consideration of the se­cond proposition,—‘the general state of the discontents in the northern counties; and how far the rescue at Bethlehem was connected with the previous disturbances.’

And here I find, gentlemen, that the source, from which proceeds much if not all, of our political good, discharges, likewise, much, if not all of our political evil: I mean the business of elections. You will recollect the testimony of Mr. Horsefield.

That gentleman, when he wished to give you a description of the ori­gin of all the mischief that we deprecate, pointed his finger emphatically, at the election of 1798. Now, I pray that I may not be misunderstood in the progress I shall make through the scene which is thus disclosed; let it not be supposed, that I am depraved enough to justify the misconduct that has been exhibited; because I am firm enough to contend, that it did not proceed from motives directed to Treason, nor lead to consequences that amount to Treason. At the eve of our election, it is natural for the citizens of a free country, to canvass what has been done by the public agents; to applaud the good, and reprobate the bad: and in doing this they exercise a right; nay, they perform a duty. No intelligible and candid man will say that the constitution of a representative republic can be preserved in a vigorous and healthy state, unless the people, from whom it denies its vital principle, are vigilant and virtuous in the exercise of the elective franchise. For this purpose they retain the right of opinion; and though they may use it upon mistaken, or erroneous grounds, if they use it fairly and peaceably, there is no power to controul or obstruct them.

I ask, then, what were the ostensible causes of discontent? They will be delineated by the opposite council as spectres of the most visionary, yet most horrible aspect; but notwithstanding any sincere abhorrence of the manner in which the discontent has been manifested, I cannot admit that the causes did not afford a legal ground for exercising the right of opini­on. For instance, the alien and Sedition laws. They are a novelty in this country, and their novelty might alone attract the popular attention and displeasure. But were the inhabitants of the northern counties of Pennsylvania the only dissatisfied citizens? Peruse the debates, examine the files of Congress, and you will find the most pointed declarations of the public opinion, the most unequivocal marks of dissatisfaction, through­out the United States. Exercising the right of opinion, the people dis­approved the laws, and the law makers. Exercising the right of Elec­tion [Page 105] they endeavoured to promote the success of those candidates, who would regularly procure a repeal of the laws. Again: the stamp act was strongly objected to, and produced the nick name of "Stamplers," which was applied generally to the friends of government. Now, in my opinion, there cannot be a more convenient mode of taxation than an imposition on stamps; but that was not the opinion of the people of Northampton and Bucks. They had imbibed a prejudice against a stamp act in the year 1775, and not considering properly the ground of American oppositi­on to the tyranny of taxation without representation, they confounded the name with the principle of the law. I repeat that I do not agree with them, but I contend that they had a right to speak freely on the subject.

Again. The house tax was objected to; not from the real, but from the imaginary burdens which it imposed; for if it had been intended to devise a tax for the relief of the poor, at the cost of the rich, for the be­nefit of the country at the expence of the city, there could not, I think, be a more ingenious plan than the present law exhibits. The opposition must evidently, therefore, have arisen from misconception, or misinforma­tion. But if their opinion of the law was sincere, however erroneous, it is entitled to indulgence. The fallibility of the human understanding, and the frailty of our passions, must be respected in every wise and bene­volent system of politics, or law. A man who honestly acts under a false impression of facts, may be pitied as a weak man, but he ought not to be punished as a wicked one. Then, the rioters were under an evident delusion, as to the principle of the land tax, the purity of the government, and the compensation of public officers. They had not the ordinary ac­cess to information, since our laws are published in English, and most of them only understood German: and this being a question of property, they acted upon the first blind impulse of their avarice, proving the truth of Mr. Horsefield's observation, "that the Germans are fond of their money, and do not like to part with it." But still there is a criterion which in applying a rule of law ought always to be regarded:—I mean the moral character, and mental attainments, of the men who are ar­raigned. If a discontent exists, we cannot fairly expect the same mode of expressing it, from illiterate, uncultivated men, the scattered inhabi­tants of a remote district, that we may reasonably exact from men of edu­cation and manners, formed by the luxury and refinements of a metropo­lis: These will take care, if they do express their discontents, to avoid personal indignity, and legal embarrassments; while those, without skill to ascertain the limits of the law, as without delicacy to respect the invi­olability of the person, rarely act without being riotous, or complain with­out being abusive. Plain men, then, have but plain ways to manifest what they feel; and they ought not to be tried and condemned by a more perfect, and generally, a more artificial standard. A disturbance similar to the one under consideration is not uncommon in England; but the go­vernment, instead of entering prosecutions against the discontented, for treason, has sometimes thought it proper to acquiesce in the wishes of the people. We all remember the popular influence in depriving Lord North of the reins of government. The attempt of a minister (Mr. Pitt) to involve that nation in a war with Russia, was a very unpopular mea­sure; murmurs and complaints reverberated through the kingdom, and, finally, he was obliged to abandon his project The shop tax was [Page 106] sanctioned by all the branches of the Parliament; but it generated cla­mours so loud and so acrimonious, riots so numerous and so outrageous, resistance to lawful authority so daring and so injurious, that the govern­ment itself might justly be said to be assailed; and the act of parliament to be repealed by force and intimidation; yet, not a single indictment for high treason was projected. Hence it is that I think risings of the peo­ple, like the present should be viewed with the determination to punish, [...] account of delinquency, but, also, with the disposition to mitigate on account of prejudice, or ignorance. In a country where party spirit beats high, there should be peculiar caution on the subject: For, even in the present case, has not the joy testified by the triumphant majority at the late election, been classed with the symptoms of popular discontent and hostility to the government? Nor will it be denied that there actually did arise in the minds of the people a serious doubt, whether the law was in existence or not; and although, I repeat, that ignorance is not a legal ex­cuse, yet you must take into view the state of information, before you can ascertain the degree of guilt. Under this ignorance, in this state of doubt, can the refusal to permit the assessors to enter a particular town­ship, be construed into a fixed and deliberate intention of levying war a­gainst the government? Though the law had been enacted, we find that the subject of the law had been brought anew before Congress, and peti­tions were sent in abundance praying for a repeal. These discontented people might have supposed that a repeal was effected, or intended; though we, who were at the seat of government, knew the object of the revision was merely to amend, and not to rescind the law. At the meeting at Kline's (acting, probably, under the mistake that I have suggested) there was an express declaration, that the people did not think the law was in force at that time: And here let me remark, that the prisoner, who is called the great parent of the discontents, was not present at Kline's, which appears to have been the first step in the opposition to the land tax. Such was the state of information at that period. Mr. Horsefield has said that there were general discontents prevailing throughout the country: but his allegation is too vague, too comprehensive, to be understood or acted upon. The citizens of a free government have a right, if they ap­prehend that a violation of their constitution is intended, or if they think that any encroachment is made on the bulwarks of liberty, or property, to express their opinion; but is it practicable so to express that opinion as not to encounter from their political opponents the charge of discontent and sedition? How, in the present instance, was the popular discontent expressed? At first petitions to the government were proposed, framed and subscribed. This was the result of Kline's meeting; and in this, I pre­sume, no hostility, no levying war, can be discovered. At every subse­quent meeting, whether convened by the assessors, or by the people them­selves, the reliance on legislative redress was never abandoned; though, it is true there was great intemperance of manner and of language. The assessors were sometimes interrupted in their journies, and sometimes jost­led in the croud; and the unmeaning epithets of Stamplers and Tories, were rudely applied to the friends of government. But however censura­ble, where is the treason in such proceedings? A rioter and a traitor are not synonimous characters; and let us say what we please about nick-names and slander, the society that patiently submits to the scurrility of the Phi­ladelphia [Page 107] newspapers, will never be disgusted or enraged at the indecorum or vulgarity of the northern insurgents. But the insurgents went further; they intimidated the assessors: and is that treason? No; it is the very gist of the offence for which the sedition act explicitly provides. Is it not the very phrase of that aft, that if any persons shall combine to intimidate an officer from the performance of his duty, he shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour, and be punished with fine and imprisonment? Now let us go step by step through the evidence, and I defy the most inquisiti­onal ingenuity to discover any thing beyond the design, and the effect, of a system of intimidation. Is there any actual force resorted to? No! I find the bridle of one assessor seized, and his leg laid hold of; but the man is not pulled of his horse, nor is he the least injured in his person. I find that a witness thinks that he heard the word " fire" given, and that he saw two men from a neighbouring porch, present their rifles at another assessor: well, did the riflemen fire? No. They had guns; their guns were probably, loaded; and if any thing more than intimidation was me­ditated, how shall we account for their not firing? But we hear a great deal of the personal jeopardy of the commissioners and assessors; and yet who of them sustained an injury? Mr. Chapman, Mr. Foulke, and Mr. Childs are, generally speaking, treated as men of merit and consideration; and, in particular wherever the prisoner met them, they were respected and protected; as at Jacob Fries's and Robert's taverns. To repel the plea for favour founded on such correct department towards the officers, we shall be told, that the prisoner was an artful man, that he was the leader; and it will be strongly urged against him, that he called on the officers to sur­render the public papers. Of his conduct as a leader, I shall speak here­after; and of his demand of the papers, it is surely sufficient to observe, that in opposition to the sense of the rioters, and at the risque of his life, he returned the papers, privately, in the same state in which he had receiv­ed them.

Having spoken of the Assessors, I would wish, likewise, to review the evidence with respect to Mr. Eyrely, the commissioner, and Col. Nichols, the marshal.

[Here Mr. Dallas entered into an investigation of the evidence, to shew, that although the people acted violently at the several meetings which Mr. Eyerly had called to explain the law to them: that although Mr. Eyerly accompanied the marshal in his whole progress for serving process, and that although he was conspicuously present at Bethlehem, no personal violence was ever offered to him, or to the marshal; and all the ill-treatment they encountered, amounted to no more than an attempt to intimidate them, but which they both declared was without effect. Mr. Dallas then continued as follows.]

And are we to be to told, Sir, that these acts without force, without any apparent object but to intimidate the assessors of a particular district; that district acts of inconsiderate riot and folly shall, when connected and com­bined, constitute a deliberate treason, by levying war against the United States If no treason was actually perpetrated, if none was intended, when the trans­actions occurred I insist, that nothing previous to them, nothing ex post facto, can make the prisoner a traitor; the intention at the time must have been treasonable; or the act can never be punished as treason.

Let us now, however, proceed to enquire into the circumstances of the [Page 108] rescue at Bethlehem, and its connection with the previous disturbances. I think the evidence is strong in support of the assertion, that the sole, in­dependent, consummate object of the assembling of the people at that place, was to rescue these prisoners. Is there any satisfactory proof of a combination between the people of Northampton and of Bucks? I know that an expression is said to have escaped the Prisoner, that, in this gene­ral discontent with respect to the land tax, certain persons of a part of Northampton would join the inhabitants of Lower Milford: but let the foundation of his opinions be tested by the facts, and it evidently a­rose, not from negociation, conspiracy and compact, (as the prosecution supposes) but from a general knowledge, which he possessed in common with thousands, that the land tax was unpopular throughout the adjacent country. It is enough, however, for the defence, that no combination, or correspondence, is proved; since the rule declares, that in legal con­templation, what does not appear, and what does not exist, are the same. You do not find the people of Bucks attending any meetings but in their own county; nor entering into the county of Northampton at all previ­ously to their appearance at Bethlehem.

Gentlemen, it might surely be expected, that a concerted insurrection for treasonable purposes, prevailing throughout the three counties of Bucks Northampton and Montgomery, and cemented by common interests and passions, would have been inspired and conducted by one common council: but is there the slighted proof of such a co-operation? I am aware of the communication made by Captain Staeler to the son of Conrad Marks; but the communication itself was merely accidental; and amounts to no­thing more than the request of one individual of Northampton to an individual of Bucks. I am aware, likewise, that a message was received at Quaker town (as one of the witnesses says) mentioning the arrest of the Northampton prisoners, and inviting the people of Bucks to assist in rescu­ing them. Who brought this message, and to whom it was delivered, I don't recollect; but it seems, that a compliance was resolved on; and a paper expressing the resolution, was prepared and signed by Fries, with a number of other persons. But was the object of the invitation, or of the resolution to comply with it, treason, or rescue;—to commit a riot, or to levy war against the United States? I repeat, that the sole, indepen­dant, and exclusive purpose was to rescue a particular set of Prisoners.

Now, if in the previous part of this transaction, nothing has struck your minds as traitorous in the acts, or the intention of the people, I beg you to follow me, gentlemen, with strict attention to a consideration of the object that was actually effected, and the means of effecting it. The object was to obtain a rescue; a rescue was effected, but it was effected with circumstances of military array: will this alter the original charac­ter of the riot? No, sir:—If the people did not repair to Bethlehem with a traitorous intention, their arms and military equipments will not convert them into traitors. As on the one hand, I grant, that the circum­stance of military array is not necessary to an act of treason, if the, intenti­on is traitorous, so I insist, on the other hand, that the circumstance of military array will not constitute treason, without such intention.

[Here Mr. Dallas entered into an investigation of the evidence in re­lation to the assembling of the people, their march to Bethlehem, an their conduct there. In the course of the detail he endeavoured to estab­lish, [Page 109] that the sole object of the rioters was to rescue the prisoner; that no injury was offered, or intended against the marshal, the commissioners, the assessors, or the posse comitatis; and that although the prisoner was forced into a conspicuous station among the rioters, his conduct had been marked with civility towards the public officers, and a solicitude to avoid the effusion of blood. On the last of these points, Mr. Dallas concluded as follows:

And here permit me to remark, that if the conduct of John Fries was such as to justify his being selected as a subject for capital punishment, I cannot see the policy or justice of the selection; nor forbear from depre­cating the consequences of the precedent. A good man may sometimes affect to join a mob, with a view to acquire and to exercise an influence in suppressing it: or an intelligent and temperate man may, for a while, be associated for an illicit purpose, with a furious and ignorant rabble, who ill naturally look up to him as a leader: but in either case, the power and the disposition to avert, or to limit outrage, will be dangerous to the prominent individual who displays them; and his only safety is in mingling with the crowd, whatever may be the direction or the devastation of the storm!

Gentlemen of the jury, I have now gone through two of the general propositions, into which I divided the consideration of the defence; and, in the course of my observations, I have anticipated much that related to the third proporsition—the particular conduct of the prisoner. I should here, therefore, break off, as I feel that my strength, and I fear that your patience are exhausted: but that the proclamation of the President de­mands a moment's further attention. By the laws of the United States it is provided, that, under certain circumstances, the President may call out the militia to suppress an insurrection, having previously published a pro­clamation, requiring the insurgents to disperse. This proclamation is ob­viously in the nature of an admonition; and if the admonition produces the effect, I ask, whether in the present, as in every other case, it ought not to produce impunity? Then I argue, on general principles, that if the rioters did peaceably retire to their homes upon this authoritative warn­ing, they ought to be sheltered from punishment for any offence previously committed. Nor is the argument without a sanction from the positive authorities of the law. 1 Hale 138: And the court will recollect, that the principle is incorporated into the statute, which is usually called in England, the riot act. There must surely, be some object in requiring the President to issue his proclamation; and the one which I suggest is equally benevolent and politic. On the present occasion it produced an immediate and decisive obedience to the laws. Besides when we recollect, that the President has the power to pardon offences, to discontinue prose­cutions, and to grant a general amnesty, as in the case of the western insur­rection; why may we not consider the proclamation as emanating from that attribute of mercy, since no specific formula is prescribed, by which its exercise shall be expressed, or announced?*

[Page 110] Mr. Dallas then proceeded to point out the differences in the nature, progress and turpitude of the Northampton insurrection, and of the western insurrection: 2 Dallas'a reports 349, and analysing again the case of lord George Gordon, he contended that upon that authority alone, the prisoner ought to be acquitted. In the case of lord Gordon, the direct, the avow­ed object, was to obtain the repeal of a law; and as petitions and remon­strances were unavailing, a body of 40,000 men were convened and mar­shalled to surround, intimidate, and coerce the Parliament. Riot, arson, murder, and every species of the most daring outrage and devastation, en­sued; and yet, the only prosecution for high treason was instituted against the leader of the association; and that prosecution terminated in an ac­quittal. View, then, the riots of lord George Gordon in their origin; estimate their guilt by the avowed object; aggravate the scene with the cotemporaneous insults and violence offered to the persons of peers and commoners; and close the retrospect with the horrors which the British metropolis endured for more than eight days; and then say, (exclaimed Mr. Dallas) what was the guilt of John Fries compared with the guilt of lord George Gordon;—what is there in the English doctrine of treason that has justified an acquittal of the latter;—what is there in the Ameri­can doctrine of treason, that will justify a conviction of the former?

Gentlemen: I can proceed no longer. The life of the prisoner is left, with great confidence, in your hands. There are attempts to make him responsible under the notion of a general conspiracy, for all the actions and all the words of meetings, which he never attended, and of per­sons whom he never saw. But this is too, too harsh, in a case of blood; It is inconsistent with the humanity, the tenderness of life, which are cha­racteristics of the American people, and especially of the people of Penn­sylvania. Nor is it called for by the policy, or practice, of those who administer our government. I believe that to the chief magistrate, to every public officer, to every candid citizen, it will be matter of a gratifi­cation, if after so fair, so full a scrutiny, you should be of opinion, that treason has not been committed. Such an event will by no means ensure impunity to the delinquent; for, though he has not committed treason, though the punishment of death is not to be inflicted; the violation of the laws may be amply avenged upon an indictment of a different nature. The only question, however, now to be decided is, whether the offence proved, is like the offence charged, treason against the United States. The affirmation must be incontestably established, as to the fact and the inten­tion, by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act: but remem­ber, I pray you, what the venerable lord Mansfield stated to the jury on lord Gordon's trial,—remember, that it is enough for us, in defence of the prisoner, to raise a doubt; for, if you doubt (it is the principle of law, as well as of humanity) you must acquit.

The council for the prisoner then called the following witnesses.

JOHN JAMIESON.

COUNCIL.

We wish you to inform the court and jury, what you know, of the conduct of John Fries.

WITNESS.
[Page 111]

Sometime after last February court, John Fries came to my house; I had heard, on my way coming to Newtown, that there was to be a meeting at Kline's. I asked him whether there was many people there, and what they had done. He told me there was, and they had agreed not to allow the assessments to be made in the township as yet; he said the reason was, because they did not know whether there was a law passed on it or not; I told him I really believed there was, for though I had not seen it myself, I had heard of it. He likewise told me that Mitchel had undertaken to draw up an instrument of writing, but he could not go through with it, and that he called upon him to assist him to do it, which he did.—On the 6th of March, I had occasion to go to the town­ship meeting on account of a pauper which was likely to become charge­able, calling at Jacob Fries's, I had been there but a short time, before a parcel of men came there, some with arms, and some without. They called for liquor, freely. They then proceeded to make enquiry whether any body knew whether the assessors were going about the township or not: I do not know whether they got any information or no, but they agreed to go up to Quaker town; after they were gone a little while, Jacob Fries and I concluded that we would ride up after them: we went to the house of Enoch Roberts. We went into a room, but nothing oc­curred there, and I then asked Jacob Fries if he would ride down to Da­niel Penrose's: after we had been there some short time, one of the fami­ly told us that our horses were getting loose, so we went out, and there we saw Mr. Rodrick, who halted; he appeared to be much frightened; so I asked him what was the matter, he told me they had catched Foulke and Childs, and that he was afraid they would kill them, and insisted on my going back to try to prevent them being hurt: I told him I would not, except he would too; he said he would if I would engage they should not hurt him; I told him I would not do that, for I did not know what they had against him. However, at his desire I went to town, and when I got there, I think I was told they had Foulke in the stable; so I rode up, and called him by name, and I think he answered me. At my desire, he came into the house: while we were walking along, I told him it was a pity he should assess the township till they were more reconciled: I told him I thought the best way to quiet the people, was to shew them the small as­sessments he had made, and promise not to go about again till they were satisfied. He said he was willing to do that. We then walked into the room, and soon after we were there, Conrad Marks walked towards us with a kind of sword in his hand, though I believe sheathed, and said to Foulke " What, I hear you are going about this business again; did not I tell you not to do this business, but I cannot tell you in English like as I could in Dutch; but it is for the sake of those few dollars that you go about this business." Foulke answered him that he did not do it for the sake of the money. Marks answered, " did I not tell you that it you could not do without, come to my house and I would keep you four or five days; but if you had to do this for half a crown a day, the devil would not send you about the township. I then told Marks what I had advised Foulke: he said if he would do that, he would use him like a gentleman. Then the affair of Captain Seaborne* took place, which seem­ed [Page 112] to draw the attention from Mr. Foulke. I saw John Fries looking over some papers, but I did not know what they were, I went away.—

A day or two after the affair at Bethlehem, John Fries came to me and told me the circumstances, much the same as was related by the mar­shal to the best of my knowledge: he then said he did not know what to do with these Germans, for that they had got it grafted in them that general Washington was opposed to this law, and that, so poor a man as he was, he would not grudge half the expence of a man to go and get his opinion on purpose to satisfy the Germans. The next knowledge I got about it, was from two gentlemen who came from Philadelphia in order to carry the proclamation about, and they gave me some proclamations, desiring me to do all I could to get submission to the laws. I spoke to many of them, and there was a meeting called at Marks's on the Monday following. There were 150 people or more there from the three counties. It was agreed by several people that it would be best to have men chosen to form a committee, from the three counties, to consult what to do for the best. This was agreed to, and four men were chosen from each coun­ty. I was one of four chosen from Bucks, with George Kline, David Ro­berts, and Conrad Marks. Dr. Baker, 'squire Davis, and I think 'squire Jarrett were some. We unanimously agreed to recommend to the people, as near as I can recollect, to desist from opposing any public officer in the execution of his office, and enjoined upon the citizens to use their influ­ence, to prevent any opposition, and to give due submission to the laws of the United States, dated 18th of March.

Was there any opposition at all when this was reported?

I did not hear any body but did consent to what was done by the committee. The people of lower Milford thought it would be necessary to have the assessments taken. David Roberts said that he believed Mr. Chapman would agree for them to appoint an assessor in their own town­ship. It was then agreed that we should ride to him to know; which we did next day: he said he had once made the offer, but it was now out of his power. He then said Mr. Clark had been first appointed, and that he had not yet given up his commission, and he did not know how another could be appointed now; that if Mr. Clark would go about it, it would answer the end. On returning home, I called at Frederick Henny's, and desired him to draw out some German advertisements, and send them over towards Marks's, to desire the people to meet, and consent to let Clark go about. I believe he did it. At the time of appointment, the people met at Mitchel's, perhaps there were about 40 there. John Fries, and Fre­deric Henny were there. The people in general agreed to let Clark go about, I believe Fries and Henny did not vote. I went to Fries and ask­ed the reason: he said he had no objection to the people voting for him, and he wished it was done; but as he was first opposed to Clark going about the township, he thought it would not be right in him to vote. I believe Henny said about the same.—I saw Fries again a few days before he was taken: he told me he had heard a report which troubled him more than any thing in his life: I asked him what it was: he said that a report was in circulation that he was collecting up men to assist the French: he said, "da [...] the French, if they were now to come to invade this country, so old a man as I am, I would venture my life against them; but I want no­thing [...]o do with them.

COUNCIL.
[Page 113]

Did Fries make any opposition at Marks's?

WITNESS.

No, I heard of no opposition.

Has his house been assessed?

I do not know.

Cross examination.

Was there any proposition made there about signing a submission paper?

I do not recollect any.—I recollect Fries said that if he was called up­on, or summoned, he would come forward and deliver himself up.—This he said at Marks's.

JACOB HUBER.

COUNCIL.

Was you at the meeting at Conrad Marks's?

WITNESS.

Yes.

What happened there?

It was after the proclamation, and we were choosing the men to meet in the committee, Fries and I got a talking together. He says, now Jacob, you see the error we got into by going to Bethlehem. I answer­ed to him, that the assessors would have to go about and assess the houses; he said they should not assess his before he gave them a dinner, then they might take the assessment of his house; and if I am not at home, said he, my son will give them a dinner.

After this meeting, what was the general situation of the township?

Quiet. John Fries was peaceable and quiet as any man could be; I never afterwards heard of the least opposition.

Cross examination.

Did you see George Mitchel at Marks's?

Yes.

Was you much with him?

No, no conversation with him; he was clerk of the meeting.

ISRAEL ROBERTS.

COUNCIL.

Please to relate to the court and jury what you know of this affair.

WITNESS.

After the proclamation arrived in our neighbourhood, there was a statement in the next weeks' newspaper, stating the conduct of John Fries, which I procured, and took to John Fries. After looking over the paper, he seemed pretty submissive, but said nothing: he appeared, I thought much distressed in his mind. I told him that I wanted to have some conversation with him, relative to it. I then asked him whether he had rightly considered this matter? whether he had not run himself into danger inconsiderately, and told him the consequences as I thought might attend it. He said he never had considered it so much as he had within a few days before. He said he had not slept half an hour for three or four nights, and that he would give all he was worth in the world if the matter was all settled, and he clear of it: he likewise faid, if the government would send for him, he would go with him, even if a little child was sent.

What was the general state of the township of Milford after the pro­clamation was read?

I do not know, I believe there was some little opposition to the law.

Was any opposition made by the prisoner?

I do not know that there was.—I recollect that John Fries farther ex­pressed himself to me at that time, that he was charged with taking part with the French, which he took very hard, and signified his determina­tion [Page 114] to defend the country against any invasion, if any army should in­vade our land, he would, at any time lay all this aside, and turn out against them, and particularly France.*

There was a meeting at Mitchel's after that, to choose an assessor; Fries was there; he was asked to vote, but he said he would have nothing to do with it.

COUNCIL.

Did you hear him express any doubts of the existence of the law?

WITNESS.

Yes, more than once, I heard him say that he did not believe it was and established law, and therefore he was determined to oppose it.

COUNCIL.

What time did he say so?

WITNESS.

I think it was the 5th of March.

Cross examination.

Where was he then?

Not far from Jacob Fries's tavern, on the road. He said he would oppose it, till he had known other counties had agreed to it, then, said he, we must submit; but he would choose lower Milford should be the last.

Cross examination.

At the last meeting at Mitchel's, did there or did there not appear a disposition to wait till they should have assistance from any other place.

Yes, it was said that a letter had arrived to George Mitchel from Virginia, stating that there were a number of men, I think 10,000 on their way to join them: that letter was traced from one to another, through six or eight persons, till at last it came from one who was not there!

Were not some of the company at that time in arms and uniform?

Yes.

COURT.

Do you recollect what was said when the letter was mentioned.

I do no recollect, but they appeared to be more opposed to the law than they were before.

ATTORNEY.

Was there any declaration, from any person there, that they had their own laws, and would submit to no other?

Not that I recollect.—At the meeting at George Mitchel's at which Mr. Foulke and Mr. Chapman was present, which was held for the pur­pose of explaining the law, there were a number (about 12) came up in uniform, and armed with a flag and liberty on it. They came into the house, and appeared to be very much opposed to the law, and in a very bad humour. I proposed to read the law to them; they asked me how I came to advertise the meeting: I told him I did it with the consent of a few others: he asked me what business I had to do it: I told him we did it to explain the law. He looked me in the face and said, " We don't want any of your damned laws, we have laws of our own," and shook the muzzle of his musquet in my face, saying, " This is our law, and we will let you know it."—There were four or five who wished to hear it, but others forbid it, and said it should not be read, and it was not done.

Cross examination.
[Page 115]

Did you see Fries on the evening of the 5th of March?

Yes I did.—He asked me if they had assessed my house? I told him they had: he then asked me if I had told any body of it; I said I had not: he then added that he had forbade them to come into the township, as he did not believe it was an established law, and others should be gone through with first. I think he then added that they could not get hold of Rodrick: they had got Foulke, but let him go, and added if they had got Rodrick they would have put him under guard for that night.

Did he appear in a good temper?

No, he did not, and he seemed very much opposed to the law.

ATTORNEY.

Was Fries' objection to the tax law, or to what particu­lar law?

He did not express his opposition to any one that I heard, but to the law for assessing houses, that night: in a conversation I had with him be­fore, he appeared to be opposed to the alien and sedition law also.

ATTORNEY.

Did he seem to talk about its being unconstitutional?

I do not recollect—I know that he expressed himself a number of times, that he did not believe it was an established law.

ATTORNEY.

Did he mean by that, that the law had ever passed, or that it might be amended?

I took it that he did not believe the law had ever passed; he seemed to doubt of its being established.

EVERHARD EQULKE.

COUNCIL.

What was the conduct of John Fries at Quaker town on the 6th of March.

WITNESS.

AS I was coming from the house of James Chapman with the other assessors (John Rodrick and Cephas Childs) when I came nearly opposite Enoch Roberts's, I saw the prisoner at the Bar, and a number of others with their arms, (though I don't know that he had any, but the others had.) Some of them held them nearly as high as my horse's side, on a level, with their arms hanging down. I spoke to them as I passed and rode on till I got nearly to the other tavern, David Zellers's. When I got there, a number run out and cried "stop." Some of them address­ing me by name, desired me to stop; which I did in a pleasant manner. Before any of them got to me, I think John Fries came over from Ro­berts's; when he was about a rod from me, he called me by my name, and told me he had told me yesterday that he would take me to day, and he was now come to do it, or it should now be done, I don't know which he said. Captain Kuyder then ran up, and seized my horse by the bridle, and a number of others came round me; the prisoner did not come him­self. Some of the people there (Jacob and John Huber) came and took Kuyder off, and be then seized me by the foot, and endeavoured to dis­mount me, but he failed. He then again took hold of the bridle, but Habers released me again. Fries came up and said, "Foulke, you shall be taken, if you will get off, there shall no man hurt you." He took hold of the bridle, and ordered Kuyder to hold it; I rode up to the stable, got off, and went into the house. When in the room, which was very thick of people, the prisoner came and demanded my assessment papers. I told him that I did not like to give them up; he told me not to hesi­tate, but to do it. In that situation I gave them to him, and told him [Page 116] I was in hopes he would not take them away without giving them to me again when he had looked at them.—I then went into another room with some of them, who exclaimed much against the law. Huber said they were not willing to submit to it yet. Fries then gave me the assessment papers again unhurt, and told me that he had used me better than I de­served, and that if I had a mind I might return him to court, which I had before threatened. He then went with me to the bar, and took me to my horse through the mob, and held the bridle while I got on, and I rode off.

Then you received no injury?

No.

Cross examination.

Did, or did not the prisoner at the bar in the course of conversation at Quaker town express any consciousness that he had been engaged in a dangerous enterprize?

Yet, he said he knew, or thought he had transgressed the law in such a manner as to endanger his life, and that I might return him if I would.

ATTORNEY

Did he speak of any force that was expected to assist him?

He did not that, he did the day before, when he attacked Roderick and me in the road. He said there would be 700 men there to morrow morn­ing, pointing to Jacob Fries's house.

COUNCIL.

Are not you an assessor for lower Milford?

I was appointed assessor for the whole district.

What time were you appointed?

I do not know.

Have you your warrant?

Not with me.

Was your appointment so ear [...] [...] November?

I believe not.

Was it early in February?

I believe it was.—It was on the last day of the court. (January 28.)

Was it the same kind of warrant as other assessors had?

Yes.

Who delivered the warrant to you?

James Chapman brought it to me at my house.

When you were at Quaker town there was a cry for the papers from you, were these papers respecting the rating of houses under the land tax?

Yes.

When were you first applied to, to become an assessor for that district?

Perhaps about two weeks before.

Who by?

By James Chapman, and several other neighbours.

Do you know whether there was a meeting of the board of commission­ers for the purpose of appointing you?

I cannot say.

[Page 117]

MR. EWING, After the evidence on the part of the prisoner was closed, rose and ad­dressed the jury as follows:

May it please your honors: AND YOU, GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY.

YOU are now gentlemen in the discharge of the most important duty, which possibly has, or ever can fall to your lot as members of society.—This is a cause of the greatest magnitude, of the first impression.—Its impor­tance is derived not only from a consideration that the life of the prisoner is now at stake, but also from the precedent that your verdict will establish in similar cases in future. From this view of it, it claims the highest and most serious attention that can be bestowed upon it.

When I address you on this occasion, I feel diffident, lest my ideas should not be cloathed with that perspicuity, or clearness, that I could wish; or my sentiments delivered with that ease or Elegance that might ensure success. I shall rely upon your goodness to forgive any innacuracy of style or sentiment that your penetration may discover in my address to you.

When I address you on this occasion it is with an anxiety of mind, which I never before experienced, when I reflect upon the possible issue of this cause with respect to the unfortunate prisoner at the bar.

The situation of the public mind, now roused to resentment; the place where this subject is made matter of enquiry; together with the preju­dices that may exist against the defendant, all conspire to form strong ob­stacles to the defence which I shall attempt on this occasion. But when I consider your characters gentlemen, I am fully persuaded, that you will suffer no circumstances of this kind to bias your impartial judgments, to destroy that inflexible integrity which chracterizes you; or prevent this defendant from receiving from your hands (which is all he asks) a fair, a candid and impartial trial; that you will hear his cause under every pre­sumption of his innocence, until the contrary is proved by the most uncon­trovertible evidence—That it is essential to the very existence of every government; that it is essential to the preservation of life, liberty and property, that offences should be punished, and that the crime of treason, the highest that a member of society can commit, is what I will admit, but I contend that it is equally essential to the existence of a government, and to our security as members of it, that every man indicted, should have a fair trial; to have the offence defined with certainty, and proved in such a manner, as to leave no possibility of doubt on the minds of the jury.

That this man has been guilty of a flagrant violation of the law, an offence for which he deserves to suffer, and which the good of society re­quires should be punished, is what I readily admit; but I do contend, and I assert with confidence, because I think the law will bear me out, that no act the prisoner has committed can be construed treason, by the most rigid, or strained construction of law.

[Page 118] Gentlemen permit me to observe, that in proportion to the nature and magnitude of an offence, so ought the evidence to be.—As the accusation against this man is of the deepest dye, as it is the highest possible offence against the laws and government that he could commit; so should the proof of it come from the purest sources, and be of that nature as to esta­blish the crime beyond the possibility of a doubt.

He is indicted for the crime of treason:—happy for us that we are not now left to the construction of judges;—to the opinions of men of any kind, or we might be led astray in a variety of instances, and at times in­troduce accumulative treason. The people of this country, knowing the magnitude of this object, and the propriety of good security against such constructions ingrafted into the constitution, the definition of the crime, and transmitted to us unimpaired. Congress recognized the constitutional definition, by ingrafting also the very words of the constitution into the act for the punishment of crimes: they have there prescribed the punish­ment; they have said that the perpetrators of this crime shall suffer death. We are now to consider how far the defendant is guilty of treason, as laid in the indictment. I had meant to have gone more largely and fully into this subject from the authorities of law writers of eminence; but my learned colleague has so ably, in so masterly a manner handled this cause, that less remains for me to do. I shall endeavour to show you what is to be understood by levying war against the government of the United States, and think I can rest on that ground with safety, to prove to your satisfaction, that the prisoner has not been guilty of the crime of treason.

The defence rests upon three grounds.

First. That he has not been guilty of the crime charged in the indictment.

Secondly. If he has been guilty of any crime at all, the act of Congress has sufficiently defined it, and prescribed the punishment not to be capital.

Thirdly. I contend that the proclamation of the President should operate as a pardon to take off the guilt of actions done previously there­unto, if not continued in.

Judge Iredell here interrupted Mr. Ewing, respecting the pardon; and said that a plea must be put in, if that was insisted on, but the prisoner must plead guilty to plead pardon. The proclamation was read by Mr. Ewing, in which he observed, there was no pardon promised.

Mr. Dallas said he had begun speaking on this point before, but was interrupted from explaining his idea: he thought there was much differ­ence between an assemblage before and after an admonition to disperse: it doubtless would have been treason had they continued in arms, but their future actions put a construction upon their past actions, and proved that they were guilty of riot, and not treason.

Mr. Ewing continued.—This opposition arose from ignorance; they did not know, that the law was in force; and the first time they knew that, was by the proclamation, when they actually did disperse, and sub­mit to the law.

The prisoner at the bar is not guilty of the treason laid in the indict­ment, for First, there must be a traitorous intention, and Secondly, that in­tention must be carried into effect. In order to prove that, we must trace his conduct through Bucks county, and then proceed to Bethlehem, where the act of treason is said to have been committed. In order to discover what is meant by levying war, we are obliged to resort to the authority, [Page 119] or decision of English courts on the statute of Edward the III. but though every thing that has been done there, is not to be considered as a pro­per precedent for us here, yet there are some rules and constructions in England that will apply to particular cases here.—Wherever a set of men take up arms to oppose themselves, to the government generally: to sub­vert the laws, or to reform them; in that case they are said to levy war against the government. The great criterion to distinguish what amounts to this crime is the quo animo, or the intention with which the act was done. The object must be of a general nature, and not an assembly to do a particular act, this would not be treason. I shall now show by the con­duct of the prisoner that his views were not of a general nature, and that it was by no means marked with that degree of malignity which the coun­cil for the prosecution have represented. You will consider that the resi­dence of the prisoner was remote from the seat of government; and from that source of correct information, which as a member of society he ought to have received, whereby to regulate his conduct. The people with whom he conversed were unacquainted with your language, warmly, and perhaps superstitiously attached to old established laws and customs of the place where they resided. Having been accustomed to be taxed and assessed by men of their own choice; men whose conduct they had a right to scrutinize, and whom they had used to bring to account: You need not be surprized that these people would at least hesitate at admitting in­novations into their customs: the ideas which struck them naturally were, "From what source can this law arise, that should send a stranger into our townships to make assessments; a right which exclusively, as we think, belongs to us?" They did not feel such prejudice against this law, consider­ed as to its effects but from the manner of its breaking upon their view: The introduction of this new principle alarmed them, but they assembled not to oppose the law, but to gain time for information of the real existence of it. Under this delusion they laboured, because they had not the advan­tage we have, of enjoying information, and the illiterate state they were in operated as a great source of their opposition. This ignorance and de­lusion was peculiarly manifested throughout all their conduct. Their first meeting was held to consider whether it was a law or not; not being sa­tisfied about it, and disappointed in their information, they met again, in order to tell the assessors not to come about their township to make the assessments, until their doubts were removed: the assessors went on how­ever, and all this while the people were enveloped in darkness. They warn the assessors; they tell them "we don't want to repeal this law by violence"—No, if they had, arresting the assessors would not have done it, they must have gone to an higher source; and if they had gone there with a determination to repeal or oppose it, the act might have received the stamp of treason. I deny that they arrested any of the officers of the go­vernment in the execution of their duty: we have repeatedly asked upon what authority these men acted; we have asked, and have not obtained satisfaction, and we therefore presume the authority does not exist; and where there is no law, there is no transgression. But suppose they had produced their authority, to what would their opposition have amounted? To a riot, and no farther. What course did Fries take in this scene? Humanity and tenderness, wherever his interposition was necessary, and be was present, characterized him. So far from subverting the govern­ment: [Page 120] so far from preventing the execution of its laws; so far from in­juring, or punishing these assessors while entirely in his power: he pre­vented the very people who were with him from doing those acts, and he himself was industrious to release them, and lead them into a place of safe­ty. If conduct like this is to be construed into the crime of treason; what act, I ask, will not by and by: if this is treason, it is unhappy for us, for thousands in the United States have been guilty of the same thing. Because a law exists, must we acquiesce implicitly—have we not a right as freemen, to think—have we not a right to object to it? It is impossible that we should be all of one mind, with respect to the beneficial consequences of a law—some difference of opinion will necessarily exist. The opposition was manifested in different places, but it was all to the same law; but the opposition did, in no instance amount to a traitorous intention, nor was it ever manifested in their conduct from the beginning to the end. I ask you, if Fries ever took any active part in it, so as to distinguish him as their leader? It has been declared that he opposed the law, and likewise that he took men to Bethlehem to rescue the prisoners, but we do not find there was any command given. There was a differ­ence of opinion on their way, whether they should go to Bethlehem or not: If he had commanded these men, and had intended to levy war against the government, some of them would not have returned; but he would have led them on to the object without consultation. Trace him towards Bethlehem: there were several who could not pass the bridge, because toll was demanded: when he came up he said "count my men." No doubt he meant only the men of his own company, because we do not hear that he paid for more than his own. It does not appear that he had any commu­nication whatever, informing him that such a party were to meet there that day, much less can it be imagined there were any treasonable com­munication. He went up with his men, but we find while another com­pany formed before the house, his men stood aloof; they did not form there in the ranks, nor did they come there for that purpose. The consi­deration that some of their country people were taken prisoners, and they thought it was unconstitutional and oppressive for them to be taken to Phi­ladelphia to be imprisoned and tried, induced them to insist upon the res­cue. What did they say?—"We will bail them: if they are guilty, they ought to suffer." Bail is refused: the marshal could not have granted that request, but they did not know that. When they found this their proposal was rejected, they determine they will have the men. Then John Fries appeared—a man who had used the assessors respectfully: a man whose character was that of humanity—he was chosen to go in to the marshal to demand the prisoners. One said he should be commander of them; but it does not appear that he did take the command at all; but we hear of two others who commanded on that day. Fries went in and con­versed on the release of the prisoners with the marshal, who with great firmness said, that they must be taken from him. He went out again, and the men being pretty warm, he checked them: went a second and third time: all his aim was to prevent the shedding of blood; he pledged himself to the marshal that no harm should come to him from him or his company.

If the object of these people had been of a general nature, men so ob­noxious in the county as Balliott, Henry and Eyerly would not have es­caped [Page 121] their vengeance, or resentment, when they were so much within their power: had their conduct been stamped with treason, they would not have been satisfied with rescuing the prisoners: the officers would have suffered, but not one we find was hurt. One strong trait, worthy your observation is, that their view in going to Bethlehem was not to prevent the operati­on of the law, but simply to rescue the prisoners; and in this, their con­duct cannot amount to more than a riot and rescue: an offence defined as well as its punishment, in an act of Congress. As the overt act must be laid in the county where the offence was committed, and if it is true that treason was not committed at Bethlehem, where shall we look for it? the gentlemen will not attempt to prove, I presume, that the beginning of the treasonable act was in Bucks county, and its completion at Beth­lehem. But Bucks has nothing to do with the present indictment at all, and ought not be brought into view.

Mr. Ewing then referred to Foster 210, and 1 Hale 143 and Lord George Gordon's case, each of which, he said, far exceeded the case of the prisoner at the bar. But, he observed, as the time and patience of the jury, to which he felt himself so much indebted, and which had been so severely tried already in this lengthy trial; and as the defence had been so ably handled by Mr. Dallas, and what remained would be, he had no doubt, well conducted by the justly acknowledged great talents of another learned advocate, he should forbear enlarging. The verdict you give, gentlemen, said he, will not only be of vast moment to the prisoner, but will also establish a precedent for future similar cases, and it will be to your immortal honour if you preserve and decide with impartiality and firmness; while on the contrary, it will be a source of shame and disgrace if you do otherwise, through the influence of prejudice or the operation of external circumstances. I can safely trust the life of my client in your hands, under a consciousness that those feelings of humanity, and a just estimation of the evidence, will outweigh all other considerations, and thus will your righteous verdict gain you the gratitude of you country, the ap­probation of your own consciences, and the warmest thanks of the defend­ant.

MR. SITGREAVES.

With submission to your Honours. GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY.

I ACKNOWLEDGE the propriety of an observation which dropped from one of the council for the prisoner in the course of his address to you: that is, that those who are concerned for the prosecution in criminal cases should not endeavour, by their eloquence or ingenuity to divert the attention of the jury from the truth, or to stretch that truth so as to give them more unfavourable impressions on the facts than they will bear. This I must acknowledge would have been unnecessary advice to me, be­cause the views I shall be able to take of this subject will be but feeble and imperfect. In the course of my limited and short experience, I have [Page 122] been but little conversant with criminal courts, and have paid but little attention to the criminal code, and never have been engaged in a case so important as the present, my public duties having, for some years past drawn me from the bar. It may not be wondered, then, if I have not been able to bring into this court talents equal to meet those called to the assistance of the prisoner. I must therefore say I shall not be able to do justice to the case. I confess I feel a desire that those persons who have been guilty of this second outrage and disgrace brought on the state of Pennsylvania, may feel the punishment the law inflicts. I hope you and every one who hears me will join in this sentiment, for on it hangs much of our peace and security. I have no objection to going still farther—my lot is cast in that part of Pennsylvania where this unfortunate circum­stance occurred: I feel particularly for the good order, peace, and pros­perity of that part of the state, but I have unhappily seen it in such a situation that all the harmony of society was destroyed, and if I were not to feel a strong desire that peace, harmony, and good order should be re­stored, I should be destitute of humanity; for we all know that crimes can only be prevented by inflicting suitable punishments on the delinquents. I wish, gentlemen, that the law should be executed against those who were criminal, but when I say so, let me not say that I wish the prisoner at the bar to be executed: No, my earnest wish is, that the general good of society may be procured: this man must be tried by the evidence that [...] brought against him, and upon that alone he must stand for his guilt or innocence.

Having said thus much, I begin now to premise one or two things which I think should be altogether set aside, but which has been much insisted upon. You have been told that the prisoner appears here on the charge of treason, under all the disadvantages of denunciation by the Pre­sident of the United States in his proclamation. Any of the assertions of that proclamation are not to have weight on your minds, nor will it ope­rate against the prisoner: he is to be tried by the evidence only, and you [...] not to regard any thing you have heard out of doors before this trial commenced: nothing should operate to doom the prisoner to an harder [...]te than the law, supported by fair testimony provides. It is also as true that nothing contained in that proclamation should operate to the benefit of the prisoner: if it should not convict him, no more should it acquit him. The analogy which has been drawn does not exist between this proclamation and the riot act of England, as you have been told, but even [...] did, the inference would not be just. You were told that all who dis­ [...]se on the reading of that act, are pardoned for crimes previously com­ [...]ted: it is not so. But more of that presently. The proclamation of the President was issued for one purpose, and the riot act, in England, is [...]ad for another. The President has no authority to call forth a military power but under certain circumstances: wherever a combination should [...] which are too strong for the civil power to quell, then the military [...] be called in to aid the civil, but with a humanity intending to pre­sent the effusion of human blood, and to call out military force as seldom as possible, the law has provided that a proclamation shall be previously [...]ed, that the offenders may disperse peaceably to their homes: but there is not a a syllable about pardon in it. The President has the power to par­ [...], it is true, but he has not done it by that proclamation.

[Page 123] The riot act, which passed in the reign of George I. was enacted in order to prevent tumultuous assemblies: if people refused to depart wi [...] ­in one hour after it was read, they were guilty of felony, for which they were to suffer death, although the offence before was only a misdemean­our, yet the refusal to depart makes it felony, but it cannot be pretended that any such departure excused them from the riot, but on the contrary, prosecution and conviction frequently takes place for that crime, although they should disperse [...] and therefore it does not affect the merits of the case. The proclamation is as a blank paper before us, and therefore we must examine this case upon its own independant merits.

Gentlemen, in summing up this case on the part of the United States, the method most natural to adopt is,

First. To consider the law as relating to this subject.

Secondly. What was the amount of the offences perpetrated at Bethlehem, and.

Thirdly. Enquire whether the facts produced in evidence are such a [...] [...] convict the prisoner, and make him guilty of the charge in the indictment, as applying to his particular case.

First, with respect to the law on treason. I should have expected it was well understood that there would have been no difference amongst us, [...] ever we might differ on its application to the prisoner, yet unfortunate there is, and we must endeavour to meet those objections. The st [...] ­ment which was made to you at the opening by myself, and a statement by the attorney of the district, I believe to be correct: I am confir [...] in that opinion, and have no doubt it will be given to you by the co [...] in the charge as correct. We are not at this day to distract ourselves with theory: The law of Edward 3 of England, called by some " [...] sacred statute," and by others the parliament who enacted it, is call [...] "The Blessed parliament," that law and our constitution have adopted [...] same words. The judges in England, as eminent for their patrioti [...]m [...] eminent for their tenderness, and as eminent for their ability as any [...] were in this country, have solemnly settled this particular in a va [...] of instances and unfortunately, young as this country is, there has been the necessity for a court of the United States for this district to settle [...] principle likewise. The adjudications under this statute were made by [...] all well known for their love of liberty. We have no need to conjure [...] a different exposition, or different form of construction, than what [...] already been admitted in both countries: indeed it is what cannot [...] shaken at this day. It is, that all insurrections by a multitude of people with intention to usurp by violence or intimidation the lawful authority, of the government in matters of a general and public concern, in which the insurgents have no interests distinct from the rest of the community [...] TREASON. From the best consideration I have been able to give the subject, I have formed this definition, which I believe comprises [...] whole that can be said about it, and I believe no more: I think this assertion will appear to be justified by the best authorities. If this description is just, the offence is clearly settled and amounts to "levying war against the United States." In the most essential parts, I think the rule has been settled by the council for the prisoner.

The Intention, which constitutes the gist of the offence, is proved to have been to some general object; if the intention was to gratify [...] [Page 124] private concern or interest, even if there be all the apparatus of war, as guns, fifes, drums, &c. whatever violence should be committed under it, it cannot amount to treason, because the intention is not to a public matter, whatever other crime it may amount to, and whatever enor­mities may be committed. This may be the case, in order to gratify some particular passion, or some particular interest. It is the intention, which distinguishes treason from other crimes: Riot, is generally much like it, but not being of a public nature, is only a misdemeanour: Treason on the contrary, is the greatest crime known to the laws of any country. Lord Mansfield at the trial of lord George Gordon, expresses the same opinion. If this is a true position, it is certainly an irresistable inference, that insurrection for the purpose of suppressing and preventing the execu­tion of a public law, is to prevent or obtain a public object, and of course must be high treason within the rule of our constitution. Yes, this has been repeatedly denied, by the gentleman, to be high treason; nay, he even went on so far as to say that in England, no such thing had taken place; he says it must be a combination to oppose alt the laws; or at least, to force the repeal of a law. Gentlemen, I think I have stated enough, to convince you that this is erroneous: If treason is the unlawful pursuit of an object of a public nature, then the suppressing of a public law is treason. But I would not have you rest on my definition if I can­not bring you full proof in favour of it. See 1 Hawkins Chap. 17, Sect. 25. 1 Hale, 133. And this position is confirmed still further, by a pre­cedent of our own. 2 Dallas, 346, &c. I consider this settles the question beyond all doubt, and it ought to rest so forever, the decision was so seri­ous and solemn in both countries. I shall assume this as an acknowledged point throughout the whole of my enquiry. I should have added the opinion of Mr. Erskine in lord George Gordon's trial. Speaking on the treason statute, he says, None of them have said more than this, that war may be levied, not only by destroying the constitution, or the government itself, but by assuming the appearance of war, to endeavour to suppress a law which it has enacted.

It is certain that British cases go much farther, and if it was necessary and the case required it, it could be justified by decisions in England upon points infinitely less strong, than those I have quoted: points which were settled at a very early period, which neither the parliaments nor the courts have ever interposed to change. Cases of public grievances, whether real or pretended, whether they grow out of law, or out of practice, as pull­ing down all enclosures, &c. which are the invasions of private right, from its universality—is high treason. Again, usurping the powers of the go­vernment by pulling down all bawdy houses, is High treason. The case referred to by Mr. Bradford in Mifflin county was, that a particular judge was driven from the bench: they did not oppose the sitting of the court, but they had a resentment against the individual, and therefore the prosecution was for riot. This will assist us in our farther enquiries upon the present occasion. This crime is said not to be treason but a rescue and bare ob­struction of process, and within the sedition law, or within a clause of the penal code, and therefore not treason. But whatever nature an offence may be, of itself, if it is accompanied with this particular act of treason, the act becomes treason: I willingly admit that a rescue of prisoners may be without treason: a person may be willing to risk the law rather than [Page 125] his friend should suffer, and may therefore rescue him; this would be but misdemanour: If ten men in arms go to an officer and rescue his pri­soner, if it be done in a private manner, it is no more than a misdemean­our; but if these same ten men in arms go from motives of a public nature, then it becomes treason. The intention therefore, makes the crime to differ.

It is said farther that the legislature of the United States have passed a solemn opinion upon it, and that they have called it no more than a combination of certain facts; a rescue, &c. against which it has provided, and therefore it cannot now be called treason.—I think this received a good answer by judge Wilson, 2 Dallas 351, and the objection was so­lemnly over-ruled by the court. The sedition act was not made at that time to be sure, but if it had, there can be no doubt but it would receive the same answer, and meet the same fate by this judge if read in objec­tion. But the first section of the sedition act describes a different sort of combination, and is not levying of war. There must be of necessity a conspiracy in levying war, but there may not be in an unlawful combina­tion.

JUDGE PETERS.—Whatever the crime would have been without a treasonable intention, with a treasonable intention would constitute the overt act.

MR. SITGREAVES.—The cases in the books are strongly demonstrative of this particular. 212 Foster. Benstead's case. "Certain unpopular mea­sures having passed in the council, the odium was thrown on the archbishop of Canterbury. A paper was pasted up in London, exhorting the appren­tices to rise and sack the archbishop's house at Lambeth, and accordingly some thousands went with a declaration that they would tear the arch­bishop in pieces."

It was not attacking the individual, but the officer that became high treason. The same with respect to the attack on general Neville's house during the western insurrection; the attack on him was, because he was an officer, and therefore being upon the office and not the man, it was upon the government, and high treason.

Such is the general opinion of treason; the great enquiry will now be what was the intention with which the offence at Bethlehem was perpe­trated? It is allowed to be a rescue; it is conceded also that there was an obstruction of process: If it was so it was part of the general system which being of this public nature, obtains the magnitude and operation of treason. Before I go into the examination of this, I will make an obser­vation on what has been said: that the overt act must be proved in the county where it is laid. I heard this position, but I did not discover my application of it, and therefore I am at a loss to know how to treat it. There exists in England, and in the state of Pennsylvania, a form in the direction to the grand jury, which deserves notice; they are sworn to en­quire for the body of the county. This causes considerable difficulty par­ticularly where something done out of the county is required as an in­gredient in the charge, and if the beginning of a crime was in one county, and its completion in another, the difficulty would be greater; but even those difficulties are remedied. The idea of his honour judge Peters the other day, appears to be sound. That a district is the same as it respects the United States, as a county is to a state, and therefore, the grand jury [Page 126] are drawn, not from the body of the county, but from the body of the district, and the whole extent of the district is equally connected with the venue if it be laid there. As to the evidence, therefore, I consider the crime may be laid in one county, and proved in another. 2 Hawkins, chap. 46, Sect. 182. I consider whatever rule applies in England or in our state governments relative to counties, is the same respecting districts under the general government of the United States; likewise, if the overt act be proved in the county where it is laid, you may go out of the coun­ty for evidence to show the intention with which it was committed. This, I think, cannot be denied. In Foster 9, we see that an overt act not laid, may be brought as evidence to support one that is laid, in order to shew the intention.

With respect to hearsay evidence, the rule of law is, that the circum­stance of the oral testimony is regarded, as it may tend to establish other evidence, though of itself it be no proof. There are a variety of instan­ces in which it is necessary to be admitted, though there is a rule against it in others. In all cases where proof is to be made by evidence of gene­ral reputation it is useful: so upon this occasion, it is competent to us to prove the general state of the country; if proper to shew the general state of a country where insurrection prevails, it is as proper in order to shew the general combination, the design and intention, because it may be the only effectual way of coming at that knowledge. For instance: this in­formation which was received by the commissioner in the discharge of his official duty is proper evidence to shew why the law was not carried into effect, and consequently the criminal spirit of the country. Popham's re­ports 152.

Mr. Sitgreaves then went into the case of lord George Gordon, which had not been represented to the jury by Mr. Dallas to his satisfaction. He related the circumstances of that riot at length. He said the acquittal of that gentleman was not a certain proof of his innocence: doubts might have arisen on the minds of the jury as to the sufficiency, or charac­ter of the evidence, or there may have been a contradiction of testimony, by which all the credit of it would be taken away. Besides, it did not appear to him that the act of High treason was committed; the multitude who accompanied Lord George to the Parliament house did not go to compel a repeal of the law, or to overawe the Parliament, but from a re­port that the numerous signatures were not rightly obtained, they went to stamp truth on the instrument, and convince Parliament of the respectabi­lity of the signers. Besides the main point of evidence of what a person heard Lord Gordon say in the Lobby, was received doubtfully by the ju­ry. Many things went to make the testimony not so unambiguous as it ought to be on a trial for life or death, and on that account perhaps the learned judge charged them, if a doubt hung upon their minds, to acquit the prisoner. Upon the whole no inference can be drawn from that case.

Gentlemen, another extraordinary position was taken by both the council in defence of the prisoner. It was said that it could be no offence to rescue prisoners who were taken up for acts committed against men who acted without authority, nor to oppose men who had not authority to assess under this law. It was attempted to be shown you that some of the as­sessors had not received their warrants agreeable to the act of Congress, [Page 127] and thence all the outrages were tolerated! I do not suppose that the gentlemen engaged for the prisoner means to go beyond the case in which they are engaged, but I must say that their zeal on this occasion has introduced a dangerous principle—if the apostle of any insurrection had come reeking from the gore of Europe, and had preached up to you this doctrine, he could not have done it more compleatly than those gen­tlemen; agreeable to this the whole country may raise themselves into array against to the who de facto exercise the authority of the government and the laws, ye [...] if called to account the court must be informed, if the ingenuity of the council can find a fault in the appointment of the persons engaged in the execution of the laws, that they have not transgressed the laws and upon that account! Is not this at oncesapping the foundation of so­ciety, and by a kind of encouragement of insurrection, striking hard at the root of all government? This is an opposition in my opinion upon a dangerous and destructive ground. I am not disposed at this time to en­ter into any argument whether it is necessary to prove the appointment of the officers, but admitting it is true, that upon the indictment of per­sons for obstruction of process or obstruction of a public officer in his duty, is no offence without he prove his due appointment, yet it does not follow that facts given in evidence to prove an outrage, should require all that strictness of examination. You will observe that the prisoner does not stand charged with any thing but the rescue at Bethlehem, he is not now charged with the offences he committed in Bucks, or any where else, much less with any thing where he was not present. These previous transactions are given you to show the intention with which the last out­rage was committed: it is only to shew the tendency of the design. These gentlemen exercised the offices, and it does not appear that there was the least doubt expressed in those counties of their authority, neither by the prisoner nor any person whatever who associated with him, at any time or on any occasion: their opposition was not founded on any such pretext, but it grew merely out of the law, and therefore it must appear that the outrage was an unequivocal fact, conducted with the intention, so far as we can collect, to defeat the law. On these grounds there is no necessity for proof of due appointment. But what are the objections, or what proof do they require. There is no pretensions to a doubt respecting the legal appointment of any officer, but the two assessors at Penn in Northampton, and Milford in Bucks: Mr. Eyrely himself tells you that all the rest were appointed by the board of Commissioners, and that at Penn, the as­sessor refused, and Mr. Balliot had the blank to fill up. Respecting the other Mr. Foulke supplied the place of Clark who held his appointment, and Mr. Foulke was appointed to assist him. How then, gentlemen, from those two cases, could a general inference be warranted that the appoint­ments were irregular, and upon that ground these outrages be justified?

We have heard much about the danger of following English prece­dents, and about the words high Treason. There is a species of treason in England which cannot exist here; that is, conspiring against the life of the king, and speaking of mere words which have frequently been con­strued into that crime. It has been a question of great doubt whether words can be called treason, but in that country or this, it is necessary to prove the intention with which a crime was committed, and therefore mere words, though it is true cannot convict, yet if a man has done a [Page 128] lawless act, we may exemplify the design by words, even of the prisoner himself. With respect to an action done publicly and notoriously, that is a matter capable of positive and absolute evidence, plain to the senses; those who see it can tell of it, but there can be no way of diving into the heart: if the party himself, from that recess, should develope his designs, these declarations made, either by himself or others who heard him, can prove the intention of his actions, and for that purpose is good evidence.

Gentlemen I have now said all which I think necessary with respect to the law on treason. I am confident I have not done justice to it; but what I have omitted will be amply supplied by the attorney of the dis­trict, and their honours upon the bench.

I shall now proceed to investigate the facts as they have appeared in evidence, and apply the law to those facts, in order to show you what share of guilt the prisoner transacted. In doing which I shall only select the most prominent features of the testimony which may go to prove my position.

First with respect to levying war. I think it will require but few words to show that there has been an insurrection in the three counties; that at Bethlehem there was a multitude of people in arms, amounting to the full sense of the words of "levying was with arms:" the insurgents had all the apparatus and accoutrements of a regular military force, and they went there in military array. This is proved by fifteen witnesses (not by two merely). It is farther certain that this multitude of people perpe­trated atrocious and lawless offences, and in contempt of all legal autho­rity, after solemn, reiterated and repeated warning; that the marshal, conformable to that humanity which characterized him, sent a deputati­on to them, requiring them to go home, and to abandon their purpose; that he selected persons who were most likely, from their political opinions to procure the object, but nothing would do for them short of what they set out upon, and the mission failed.

We will next consider for what purpose this outrage was committed: It was said to be simply for the purpose of releasing the prisoners: this was the abstract and naked design. If such is the fact, the prisoner must be acquitted, but if he had an object beyond that: if it should appear that this was one link in the chain of opposition to the laws, then it a­mounts higher; it amounts to treason. It is my purpose to show you that their designs were higher than a mere rescue, and that it did not flow from any particular regard to the prisoners in custody, but it was a public opposition, and one means used with a view to prevent the execu­tion of a law of the United States. Gentlemen, the mere recital of one or two facts will be sufficient to bring this home to the mind of any man who is not determined to shut his eyes against plain testimony.

It is in full and compleat proof before you, that in the counties of Northampton and Bucks, the opposition was almost general, and that in the township of Milford; all along the river Lehi, and both sides of the mountain; there was an union in opposition to the law, uniformly conduct­ed with system, menace, and threats; that the persons who thought pro­per to assist in the execution of that law, were previously intimidated not to accept of it, and after they had accepted, they were prevented from executing it, and in many places, until the march of the army, the law did actually remain unexecuted. I shall not state to you the particulars [Page 129] of this evidence, but remark that the system was general, and that it was accompanied with threats and menace, and that the friends of the law, and those who were peaceably inclined, were prevented, under the influence of this terror, from speaking their minds on the occasion; and even the magistrates of the country were so impressed, or so intimidated, as not to perform the duties of their office: That the law was complete­ly prostrate, and persons who would have given testimony against them for these proceedings were afraid to do it. In the course of this pro­ceeding, it was repeatedly declared, that if any person should be arrested for opposition to the law, that they should be supported. This system of menace was general; it was not an opposition grounded particularly upon the obnoxious characters of persons who were employed in the ex­ecution of the law, but upon the law itself: There was an offer of a particular commissioner to use his influence, that they might choose their own officer, but that would not satisfy their object—no, they said if they accepted that offer it would be approving the law, and that they would not do. Mr. Eyerly the commissioner, had been for many years the representative of this district in the Legislature: Mr. Balliott had been in the Legislature, in the Council, and in the state convention, which proves they were men of confidence in their district, and that the par­ticular dislike now exemplified was not to them as men, but as officers under the law. One of the council for the prisoner went minutely into all their views, and the veins through which they acted, and endea­voured to palliate, or excuse the conduct of these insurgents; while, at the same time he appears to know what were the views of government in prosecuting the delinquents; but there is no necessity to answer that, because the prisoner is not on his trial for obstruction of process. I most solemnly disavow that political party spirit enters at all into this prosecution, and beg the jury will dismiss all party spirit and prejudice from their minds: However we may differ on points of law, we must agree with them that the people had a right to examine and explain the law, and express their dislike to this or any other law. Their opposition to this law might have been right, or wrong; it does not alter the case and God forbid that any motive of the kind should influence us to re­venge; These are natural rights under a free government, which every citizen has a right to exercise. We are not now enquiring into the nature, or grades of any, or all those particular offences; whether this particular outrage is a riot, or that a misdemeanour, or whether it a­mounts to treason, we are simply shewing to you, from the evidence collected, the weight and force of those facts; to wit, that there was opposition to this law, and that universally, and that these people did their utmost, to endeavour to stop the execution of the law; and that these acts were in strict union with the last act at Bethlehem, of the in­tention of which, the previous acts collectively are plain proof, for cer­tain it is, that an act illegal in its nature, may receive colour and com­plexion from one that is strictly legal. Suppose a man had reduced his thoughts on this subject to writing, without any intention of communi­cating it to any person; suppose in that writing his intentions are fully declared with which such writing was drawn; then this act, though in­nocent in itself, would be competent evidence to shew the intention with [Page 130] which a subsequent outrage was perpetrated, and it would be in full proof to show that a violent opposition to the laws in that country par­ticularly to the and for the valuation of houses, and that it was not from a personal or private motive, but generally an aversion to the law itself, so that a long time after the period fixed for its execution, the law actually remained unfulfilled. In several parts the people returned to a sense of their duty and submitted to the laws, and happy would it have been for the government as well as themselves if they had all done it; for then this investigation would have been prevented: but in some parts, the marshal, and those who were with him, who were not volun­teers as has been insinuated, out acted in conformity to their duty as public officers.—These were insulted, arrested and obstructed as officers; The marshal was abused by numbers of people at Millar's town, and he was not able, though he touched Shankweiler, to execute process on him. Gentlemen, all I ask of you, is to connect the circumstances in your minds; the general course of events which gave rise to what after­wards was consummated at Bethlehem. The prisoners who were res­cued were desirous of accompanying the marshal to Philadelphia; they would rather not be liberated;—they were taken from various parts of the country, unknown to each other, and more so to the persons who rescued them: there was no private attachment, regard, or resentment; What therefore could be the motive of the insurgents? Could it be in­terest? No, it would be bad policy to spend dollars to oppose a tax law rather than cents to support it. Was it a private distinct interest they had, which did not concern the community? If not, agreeable to Judge Foster, it was treason. I have said that these prisoners were not known to the insurgents; I would make the exception of Shankweiler; but you will observe that he never did surrender himself to the custody of the marshal, and though some said they were come to see him as a neighbour, others to see his partner, (accuser) &c. yet he was not de facto in custody: It could not be to rescue him that this large armed body met, because he could have been safe by keeping at home. But one solemn fact respecting the others demands a solemn inference: The Lehi prisoners had cordially submitted to the law, and thus desired to recommend themselves to the mercy of the government by penitence, and actually at last gave the marshal their individual assurances to meet him at Philadelphia: I ask then by way of inference what becomes of all the private object, or the neighbourhood esteem necessary to vindi­cate these insurgents? It was not for the prisoners' sakes, but through opposition to the law that they did this act, for it is plain that the per­sons in custody of the marshal were afraid as much to trust themselves in the hands of the mob, as Mr. Eyerly or Mr. Balliott were. They doubtless had a treasonable, a rebellious determination to oppose the go­vernment; the previous declaration of the party was, that "if any persons were there in confinement who were opposed to the law they should be rescued," was a plain indication of their opposition to the law, and that this rescue was a part of the general opposition. Mr. Sitgreaves then went into a review of the evidence respecting the meetings at Upper Milford, and at Schymer's, where, he said, opposition to the law marked the conduct of the people, but at Lower Milford, the prisoner at the [Page 131] bar by his own confession, eminently displayed his intention; three wit­nesses corroborated the fact; "This was the third day he had been out on this business; he had a skirmish yesterday, and would have another to day (7th of March) if the prisoners had not been given up." This clearly proves that the business at Milford was closely connected with that at Bethlehem; thus being all parts of one whole, the former acts are full and compleat evidence of the latter. In Lower Milford they resolve that the law should not be executed yet, because they did not know it was a law: In reply to this we may say, it is inconceivable to suppose that any people should be so stupid as to doubt the exis­tence of a law, when the assessors were actually going about the country in conformity to it; this is incredible notwithstanding the charity we are forced to have for these people's ignorance. They farther resolved, that their township should be the last to submit* to it, if it was a law. Is not this as much as to say, If others assist us in rebellion we will go on, but if all submit, then we will also. No thanks to them. The assessors found it so, for they were chased, insulted, and finally obliged, to abandon the township, and yet, in that township the utmost possible means were used to convince them of their errors. At Mitchel's it was proposed to read the law, but in vain; they "did not want any damned laws." An offer was made to them to choose their own assessor, which was likewise treated with disdain: They set the most solemn warning of consequences at defiance, and defied even the government itself; some­times vainly fluttering themselves, that they had all the people coming to their assistance, they set at nought the judicial authority, because; they supposed they had arms and numbers sufficient to support their opposition. At Quakers town they resolved to go to the rescue, and there we find them all declaring opposition to the law, and defiance to the government: They were engaged in these acts when they received? information from Northampton county that the prisoners were in custody, and then they signed a resolve to go to rescue them.

Gentlemen, when these facts are taken into view, so immediately preceding, and so directly pointing to what took place at Bethlehem, can you hesitate, as honest men desiring to do justice, and speak impartially between the prisoner at the bar and his country, that he went there, not merely to rescue prisoners, but to execute a part of the general op­position to that law of the United States? If he has done so, he is guilty of Treason. Let us now attend to the evidence which grows out of the avowal of the parties themselves at Bethlehem at the time of the outrage. These are previous indications, which certainly point as tru­ly to the intention, as the needle points to the pole.

Two persons appeared in arms just at the arrival of the posse: the Marshal thought proper to take and disarm them: upon being ques­tioned, they answered they came there in order to see what was best to be done for the country. They did not come to assist Shankweiler; they did not profess to have any friendship for the prisoners, but to see whether the interest of the country was to be promoted by treason and rebellion. Can there be a stronger proof than this that the object was of [Page 132] a public, and not of a private nature. Keifer said he heard "it was to be made out about them laws." This is positive proof that it was to be settled that day, whether the laws or the people were to be triumphant; if they could overawe the marshal, probably they thought they were to be trium­phant. It is true this was not the declaration of the prisoner at the bar, but of another person: upon this you will observe, that where a great num­ber embark with one general object and design, the acts and declarations of each are chargeable to all, and are proof against each and all. 6 Term. case of the king against Stone. Though a man does not act or say one word, yet abetting the object, it leaves him equally responsible for the whole with those who actually speak or do. That this design was of a public na­ture I farther prove, because it was not this, that, or the other prisoner they demanded but "the prisoners," without knowing who were in the custody of the marshal: they would not go from the ground until they had the whole of them. After the marshal had liberated them, suppos­ing one was left, the demand was made for him, and the marshal was forced to give them proof that he was gone. Indeed the conference of Mr. Fries with the marshal is sufficient to show the object, and surely the application of his own conduct to his own case will not be disputed. Jamieson tells you that Fries' own story was correspondent with that de­livered by the marshal: referring to the marshal's testimony it appears that Fries, in conversation with him, when he delivered up the prisoners, expressly avowed that it was not out of any friendship or attachment, but that his motive, was opposition to the laws; that the laws were un­constitutional, and that he would not submit to them, and for this reason he had come to take the prisoners, and he would persevere until he had them. The marshal told him "you will be hanged." He treated that with contempt, and told him it was not in the power of the Govern­ment, for if they were to send a military force, they would join in oppo­sition to the law with them, Now this is a declaration of Mr. Fries, their leader; their spokesman; their representative, and shall we not give credit to it? From this declaration, and the concurrent testimony, I think there cannot be discovered a crevis at which a doubt is to enter. Mr. Fries, when he came into the entry, talking loud, and with an im­portance becoming his dignity, gave his general opinion upon politics, saying that those who were now at the head of affairs, were all tories during the war, and in this way found fault with the laws. I do not find fault with the word "tories." I believe it bears analogy with the ridiculous word "Stamplers," and only can tend to show the general disapprobation expressed against the government, but when a variety of things concur, of whatever little importance they may be in themselves, they are increased by their accumulative weight, and thus become wor­thy of notice.

Gentlemen, it is farther given in evidence that, during the time they were at Bethlehem, there were repeated threats of violence thrown out against Mr. Eyerly, Mr. Balliott and Mr. Henry, on which account the the marshal desired them not to shew themselves to the people: these gentlemen who had been the confidential and favorite friends and ser­vants of the people are now in a dangerous situation, the objects of re­sentment, which resentment, we have good reason to conclude was oc­casioned by their offices under the government.

[Page 133] Mr. Sitgreaves then answered some of the remarks of Mr. Dallas on the conduct of Mr. Eyerly, and explained away the inconsistancy of his testimony. He said it was clear that John Fries, the prisoner was an active and influential character through this dark scene, in which he was recognized by all who were there, even by persons who had not known him before: he was not merely an aider and abettor of Treason, though that would have made him guilty of it, but a leading man; a conductor of the violence committed.

You will remember that when the marshal sent forward a deputation to those at the bridge, they were prevailed upon to halt, and attend to their propositions: when they agreed and promised upon their honours not to pass the bridge until the return of their own deputation from the mar­shal; though the horse did go over, yet the foot remained until the pri­soner at the bar came up with his men. He instantly appeared the pro­minent, the active leader of the expedition; he settled the toll with the keeper, and they all went over. When Samuel Toon upbraided Cap­tain Staeler at Bethlehem with breaking his word and passing the bridge, his answer was we came over with Captain Fries and the Bucks county people. When the main body was coming up, he marched at the head of the footmen: when Mr. Mulhollen met them, the answer was receiv­ed from Fries. It was he who was appointed by them to go to the marshal. Here let me make a remark upon what has been dwelt upon as a circumstance much in his favour; that is, that Fries always did his utmost toward the prevention of violence. Let not the merit of any man's actions be withheld: I agree in that with the council that he has avoided the effusion of human blood, and appeared to endeavour to pre­vent every severity, so far as was compatible with the accomplishment of his purpose: Nay, I will say that Mr. Fries has shewn an Urbanity and Humanity towards the assessors in Bucks county which has done him credit and honour. But let us not forget that every fact which displays his humanity, at the same time establishes his influences, and more—his authority over those who were with him. When he came into the room where they were abusing Mr. Childs, he says "point out the man who committed this outrage and he shall be punished" when he was gone, they began upon Mr. Childs again. At Bethlehem, when he told the people not to go on yet, we find them obey him, and if he had carried it farther, they still would have obeyed him. Thus you see, gentlemen instead of this rendering him assistance, it confirms his controul over them and makes him principal in the transaction. Again, amidst all his Ur­banity did he not execute the whole of his purpose? Did he not say "Foulke, you shall be taken" notwithstanding the respect he had before professed? Did he not, when he said to Mr. Childs he was very sorry, for what had happened, demand and obtain his papers? Did he not say to the marshal, my men shall not hurt you, but I will have the prison­ers? As much as to say all this shall be done as easy as possible, but it shall be done. While we admit his humanity on the one hand, we still find it coupled with his purpose, his determination to obtain his object. Twelve witnesses prove that the prisoner was active at Bethlehem so far then it is in full proof by six times the number the Constitution calls for. He was not only at Bethlehem a commander, but he was there a volun­teers [Page 134] he came there from a great distance; he was industrious, and made a great Sacrifice of his own private interest to go there; he came out of his own county to accomplish the general purpose for which they had assembled: he went there with all the insignia of military rank. I have observed that he was emphatically the great spokesman between the Marshal and the people, and therefore he alone was admitted up stairs; he came out to explain to his men the success of his embassy: that the marshal had said he could not comply: that he had arrested these people at the command of the judge, and at last, when the marshal told him he could not deliver them without force, he calls upon them to the onset; he tells them he would be their leader; begs of them not to fire first; tells them they must go through an armed party on the stairs, and if he should drop, they must fire again, and do as well as they could for themselves. In consequence of his invitation, they went into the house: and at that critical moment the marshal delivered up the prison­er to them, to prevent violence.

I need only refer you to the testimony brought by the prisoner to prove that he was constantly active in the grand business of opposition through the whole course. He wrote the paper at Kline's and at Fries' to in­vite them to go to Bethlehem; he warned the assessors not to go on with their business, not even to another house. He declared he had a great regard for them, but it was against the law he shewed this hatred; to which he said he never would submit. He defied the government, telling how many men he had ready. In conversation with Chapman, he told him the number he could raise; Chapman told him it was impossible; that they could not cope with the number govern­ment would send "we'll try then who is strongest" he replied: He went away in a great passion when told that the assessments going on, then, said he, it shall soon be as it is in France."He seems to have anticipated all the horrors of a civil war; for when told of the conse­quences, he said, if they once began, he knew not where it would end. He appeared to argue the point with as much zeal as though he thought he could prevail upon the government to desist from enforcing the tax. "You shall not go to another house," he said: but finding they did go he attacked them at Singmaster's, with a determination to take Rodrick prisoner, but not taking him, he let Foulke go whom he had taken, and promised to take them the next day, he took two of them the next day, but let them go on a promise to desist from assessing; at the same time declaring his determination not to submit to this law, but that it should be repealed. The party then resolved to go to Bethlehem, but they did not separate, till he had procured from them their signatures to an engage­ment to go and accomplish their purpose. When on the march to Bethle­hem, and met by young Marks, he was one who prevented their returning, and they actually did proceed, and got to Bethlehem, where this scene concluded.

Here then gentlemen the evidence closes. We find this man is not of a yielding texture; he still continued in his opposition even at the time there was a recommendation to submit to the laws: at a meeting Marks's it was determined to recommend submission to the officers, and all the laws of the United States, and to desist from opposition to the laws. This is proof that there had been opposition to the Laws in the three [Page 135] counties. When these things were done Mitchell asked Fries if he ever did intend to oppose the laws. "Yes I did," was his answer.

In the testimony of Mr. Roberts we have proved the general state of opposition, as well as the guilt of the prisoner: this witness was called by the prisoner's council. To be sure he proved the prisoner's penitence and submission. If he had not been guilty he could not have been penitent. He said he had not slept for several nights: an acknowledgment so much the more pertinent to prove that he had been doing what he knew was wrong.

Gentlemen of the Jury.—I have endeavoured to show you this sub­ject in all the points of view I am able, so as to give you a right under­standing of the facts; and permit me to declare to you that I have not wilfully perverted either the law or the facts to the best of my know­ledge; yet it is possible I may have done it, if so you will be undeceived in those particulars by the court.—Gentlemen, you have a solemn duty to perform: we have all had a disagreeable and tedious undertaking I pray you to do it in such a way as may do justice to the prisoner and the bar, and at the same time consider how much the happiness, the peace, and tranquility of your country, depends upon a fair, impartial and conscienti­ous verdict, which there is no doubt but you will deliver.

MR. LEWIS.

With submission to your Honors. GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

IT is now become my duty to address you on behalf of the prisoner at the bar, who is arraigned before you on the important issue of Life or Death: I do it with the more confidence, because I have not been able to learn from the council for the prosecution, a single instance of English law that comes up to the present case, in good times or in bad times, so as to denominate it Treason, except in a determination during the bloody reign of Henry VIII, and that is mentioned among the evils of the time: I have not been able to find it under any existing circumstances whatever, and yet any person who is the least acquainted with English history or law, must know that the excise law and the shop tax, as well as some others, have led to riot and insurrections, and a variety of trials have been held upon them. It may be right to make the experiment upon the present case; but, unless this prosecution is warranted, established in good times, and upon solid grounds, I am sorry to say, but truth compels me to declare, that it is a burning torch in the hand of a madman; it is a flaming sword in the hand of a tyrant, and has done immense injury in England. I know there is no intention in the attorney in this case, to do any thing that is wrong; yet I wish more reflection had been used, before the prosecution had gone on. Thus it was in England respecting Hardy, Took, The [...]wel, and [Page 136] others; those who most understood the whole of the charges were not satisfied to call their crime a misdemeanour, though there was no direct point in ancient or modern law, warranting any other indictment, yet the experiment was tried, but an English jury appreciated it in its pro­per light, and they resolved to do nothing which their ancestors had not done, not even in the application of constructive treason; and therefore after a mature discussion they returned a verdict of Not Guilty. When, on the present occasion, the causes and proceedings are duly considered, I am satisfied you will feel it a duty you owe to the prisoner now be­fore you, and to your country, to pronounce a like verdict. It is not because a circumstance any way similar to this has once taken place, and been argued upon the same grounds, that therefore it is right it should take place upon the present occasion; adopting a principle of this kind has often made courts in arbitrary times, take gigantic strides, over the sta­tute of Edward III, so that a man could not know how to look, act, speak, or even think, without difficulty and danger. I have said that I am not able except during the mandatory reign of Henry VIII, to find the trace of a single instance where rescue, under any circumstances what­ever, 'as been found to amount to treason, and if succeeding ages did not consider themselves bound by that practice, I trust you will not sit here to establish a law, but to give it such a construction as justice de­mands of you. I have undertaken this cause the more readily, because I do not undertake to justify, to palliate, nor to excuse; but I censure the transactions which have given rise to this trial as much as the coun­cil for the prosecution does: I am sensible as they are, that those peo­ple violated the law without cause; and I came not here to set up a mock excuse for them: No, it is my opinion that they merit exemplary punishment, but that punishment must be conformable to law, or, when once the law is overturned, the consequences will be incalculable; of­fences higher than the present may be committed with impunity by some, while those of less grade will be severely punished in others. It is not for me to say that the prisoner is entirely innocent: To me, to the court, and to you it is totally immaterial whether he has acted wisely or foolishly; guilty or innocently, if not guilty of the offence upon which he now stands upon his deliverance. I may be asked here how I came to defend a man, who I admitted had violated the law, and in some degree sat the government at defiance. My reasons are these: It is the priviledge of every man to have a fair trial, and not to be con­demned without being heard, especially in affairs of an highly criminal nature; few men are capable of defending themselves before a court, and in a capital case, from the perturbation of their minds, still less so than in any other: And woe betide that country, where a man so charged should not be entitled to every assistance that he can procure. By the statute of William III, which is the first that ever allowed coun­cil at all, the court were obliged to assign council, who were obliged to render all the assistance in their power; the same is allowed by our act of Congress, (p. 112. Sect. 29.) for without that, he may be considered as condemned unheard, and the public mind would be left unsatisfied as to the innocence or guilt of the accused. Those who have entertain­ed the surprise I have hinted at, at my being thus engaged, have doubt­less [Page 137] acted from the bed of motives, but, not satisfied with this, and wish­ing to spill the blood of a man before he is proved guilty, some ca­lumniating scoundrel has, in a public print, had the hardihood, during the present trial, to impute to the unhappy prisoner's council, the base influence of gold, when all concerned know very well that the prisoner has not a farthing to give, and not a farthing, nor even a promise of any, was ever given to those who have undertaken his defence. I will say no more respecting this vile attempt, but that the law says no pub­lication shall take place which may tend to influence a court or jury, while a trial is pending, and therefore it is an high contempt thrown upon the court, and upon you, and the probability is that either the author or the publisher will be brought to answer for his conduct.

There is one thing, gentlemen, I would wish to caution you against: there are many citizens who suppose that the troops will never turn out again unless a conviction takes place on the present occasion, and that an insurrection will soon appear again: but this is paying a poor compli­ment to our volunteer troops, to suppose they would not be satisfied without shedding blood: Gentlemen, let no arguments or considerations have weight with you but what are supported by law, and then decide, regardless of the consequences. Another matter I would caution you against, is one with which I found very considerable difficulty to cope, but at length I diverted myself of it, and I pray you to do the same: I mean all kind of prejudice as to the party tried and trying. Our Con­stitution, and our laws, are wisely calculated to preserve the happiness and interest of ourselves and posterity: our Government is composed of tried patriotic characters, and our political bark, with such men at the helm, need not tear a storm; but notwithstanding this, it is villified and abused: These are grounds for prejudice to work upon, and it is diffi­cult, I can say by experience, to avoid its influence; but when we come to the sacred temple of Justice, even if to decide between A and B, on a matter of trifling property, we are sworn to an impartial and unpre­judiced decision; and how much more is it demanded of us in a case of life and death? It is necessary to enter that temple diverted of opinion or bias, otherwise there is not a fair scope for our reasonable faculties to act, nor can our consciences be acquitted of guilt. I will take the liberty of reminding you that your oath is "that you will well and tru­ly try, according to evidence;" this obliges you to expel every thing from your minds which you might have heard out of doors respecting the whole business of the insurrection, excepting such only as is proved by the evidence. Your present situation, gentlemen, imposes upon you a duty which is highly important; important as it concerns your coun­try, the prisoner, and likewise yourselves: it concerns him, because his life or death is, in some measure placed in your hands; it is upon your verdict it depends whether he shall continue with industry to spend the remainder of his life with his family and friends, or whether he must leave them all, and be suspended between heaven and earth to a gazing multitude. Your decision is of importance to your country, because we are now treading upon the dangerous, and, I had almost said, unbeaten ground of constructive treason, and because it may and will operate as a precedent to future proceedings. Nor is it less important to yourselves [Page 138] because, if owing to honest intention, and mistaken views you should go farther than a reflecting moment would dictate, in some circumstance of a public nature which might possibly occur, the work would be irretrievably done, the reflection would come too late, and pardon would be out of the question.

I will now proceed to consider the particular offence imputed in the indictment to John Fries▪ the prisoner at the bar, by which he must be convicted, if at all. [Mr. Lewis, here read the indictment.] To this indictment he has pleaded not guilty, and you are sworn to decide upon the issue. The question is not whether he has, or has not been guilty of a riot, or rescue: he may have been guilty of an high misdemeanor, of this or the other description, but the question is, has he ordered, pre­pared, and levied war against the United States? That is the language of our constitution, and the act of congress formed thereupon. In order to insure the conviction of this man at all events, it has been stated to you, and that with no small degree of confidence, that, as the framers of our constitution have adopted the words of the English statute, the courts are bound to admit the expositions which have taken place upon it, from time to time in the English courts: though we have laws of our own, yet in order to know the true meaning of our constitution we are to go back into the remotest and most dark ages of English history, to understand its meaning! The English statute, or the opinions of the courts of justice are equally become part of the code in that country it is true, and it was as possible for the framers of our constitution to have extended the one as the other to this country, had they chosen so to do, but their not doing it, is a presumptive proof that it was not acceptable. To me it appears strange that while the English statute is not in force here, the English construction of that statute should! that is a position I never mean to subscribe, but controvert it from the beginning to the end, of this case. As we have enacted laws of our own, and have not ex­tended the laws of England to this country, we must put our own con­struction upon them, and not the determination of an English court. Neither the English laws, nor the opinions of English judges are to be regarded any farther than is consistent with our good, to appreciate which the situation of the times when those opinions were given, and whether the judges were dependant or independant are important con­siderations. I do not mean to find fault with English decisions in gene­ral: I believe that with regard to property, since the judges have been rendered independant of the crown, it is as wisely administered as the laws of any part of the globe are: but they were not always in a situa­tion to give impartial opinions, when they held their station at the will of an arbitrary monarch, who could hasten or delay causes at his plea­sure, to which the judges were the most obsequious tools. Such has been the decisions of some periods respecting treason. But it is not true that the very words of the English statute are adopted in our con­stitution; they very materially differ: the statute of Edward III, does not provide that confession must be made in open court if received at all: it does not specify that two witnesses shall be necessary to esta­blish the fact, but it was left to the court upon principles of common law [...] nor does it say a single word about an overt act. Since, then, the [Page 139] two statutes are so dissimilar in important points, it would be very wrong to admit of the same construction in both. So careful was our govern­ment of the lives of our citizens, viewing the injuries other countries had sustained by indefinite laws, they provided that the crime should be put in the indictment, and supported by the testimony of two witnesses. In England there might be one witness to one overt act, and another to another.

But I stall now proceed to show what does, or what does not amount to levying war: in doing this, we are not to go back to corrupt times, under corrupt judges, nor do I think the observations of those judges are in the least obligatory upon our courts, but how far they will be re­spected, in another question; we may rest assured they will be regarded no farther than reason will suggest. This I consider of importance, not only at present, but to posterity. Most of our laws, it must be remember­ed, are from England, and were brought with our ancestors as their birth-right: this was the case wherever British subjects emigrated, but as soon as we became independant states, we enacted laws of our own, although in a great degree copied from British states, but they became new under our constitution.

I think gentlemen, I shall be able to shew you, upon the opinions of men sound in law knowledge in England, that the definition of treason in our constitution will not bear the construction that has been put up­on theirs at an early period. We have an express and distinct meaning of this crime in our own acts of Congress. An act passed 1790 (Vol. 1, page 100). Sect 1 shows what treason is, and particularises wherein it shall consist. Sect. 5 defines the punishment which should be inflict­ed on a rescue of persons committed to custody, or in the hands of the officer. But there was another act passed defining the precise circum­stances attending this case, this was passed after the declaration of the judges on the case of the western insurrection, and from its being enact­ed subsequent to all others upon this species of crime, appears to me to be binding upon our courts: I mean the Sedition act. It appears to reach the present case in the fullest extent; the language of that act is, whoever shall combine or conspire, &c. shall be guilty of a high misdemea­nor: this act does not specify the number: a township, a county, or twelve counties equally is within the law. Combining to prevent the execu­tion of the law: this reaches the action, whatever may be the number or force used: it is a misdemeanor and shall be punished with fine and im­prisonment, not death. Whether the object shall or shall not be effected, the law says the punishment shall be the same. Here then is a solemn declaration made by the legislature itself, the same body that enacted the punishment of death to what they termed treason by a prior law, and surely that authority had the greatest right to put a construction on, or make an alteration in their on law. If there is a legal definition of the crime committed by the prisoner at the bar, this act contains it: every case is here provided for by the punishment of fine and imprison­ment, and had a prosecution taken place under this act, a conviction would have been certain, and the punishment would have been [...]gorous, and exemplary.

[Page 140] Under this head of English construction, I would ask how it can ap­ply to us, when we consider that before the act of William III, no per­son charged with high treason was allowed council to plead for him, unless he stated some objection in point of law which made an argument necessary, and even then he could not do it without first admitting the truth of the fact charged against him, and yet all the decisions of English courts alluded to were formed before that period! Further. Not only was the accused not allowed council, but if he had hundreds of the most respectable witnesses to prove the falsity of the allegations, he never had a right to b [...]ing them forward untill the reign of William III. These decisions, gentlemen, of the English courts, which are called up as pre­cedents for us to regard, were formed under these arbitrary circumstances: No council allowed even though the prisoner was deaf and dumb, nor witnesses, if he could even prove he was hundreds of miles distant at the time. Further, to show what dependance can be placed on the sayings of these men, you will observe that untill the time of William III. all the judges held their commissions during royal pleasure only, and even untill the first of George III, the judges were never compleatly indepen­dant, and of course were obliged to study the royal pleasure; their opi­nions being extorted before the trial commenced. The consequence of all this is plain, that no impartial opinion could be given. It was com­mon before trial first to closet these dependant judges and bring them to submission, if their opinions ran counter. Bacon, the greatest, wisest, but meanest of mankind, thus stooped to become the tool of his master. Those who could not thus be brought over were despised, and more ob­sequious persons placed in their room, and it was not 'till they could have a decision thus formed that persons were brought on their trial for high treason. And yet we are referred to these persons to tell us what is the meaning of our own statute on treason! Thus it was that many of the best citizens of England fell a sacrifice, and for no other purpose, many of them, than because they possessed exalted virtue. During the existence of this state of things, the judges would set silent on their bench during a trial for life, and hear the crown officers, instead of acts and expressions of humanity to the unhappy prisoner, abuse him with the most opprobrious and insulting language. Influenced by this mean­ness, Sir Edward Coke, while attorney general, descended to abuse the great and good Sir Walter Raleigh, with the vile epithets of Traitor, Viper and Spider of hell, &c. turning away from him with the greatest scorn: and this was the manner in which trials were commonly manag­ed. See Foster, 234.

It was well known that the statute of Edward III, made no provision whatever respecting the charging of an overt act in the indictment, nor does it say any thing about proof, but a statute enacted in the reign of Edward VI, made two witnesses necessary in cases of high treason, but Foster says no great regard was paid to this better statute 'till near a century after, and the reason assigned was that it was not for the safe­ty of the crown, or to the common well known rules of legal evidence. It was common to admit one witness of his own knowledge, and ano­ther by hearsay, if it was even from the mouth of that one, and at the third or fourth hand, and frequently the depositions were taken out of [Page 141] court to be read, rather than bring them into open court. This must appear an uncommon representation of the administration of justice, but it is a fair picture of the times under which the decisions took place which are brought against us. At the period in which the seven bishops were tried, lord Cambden declares that justice Powel was the only honest man that sat on the bench. Blessed justice! I know that since the judges have become independant men in England, there has been as much independance in their conduct as in any country; but then, as Hale tells us, these decisions had already taken place, and therefore they must Seabode by; but he takes care to caution future judges how they introduc­ed new cases by putting new constructions. The question now is, whe­ther this court and jury are prepared to be bound by judges thus princi­pled and thus circumstanced, to form a decision upon our own law. I contend that these decisions are by no means binding upon us, we have the sedition law, which comprehends the whole case. In 1 Hale 132, and 1 Blackstone 69, it appears to be lamented that the independant judges of later days have no power to alter the rules of law established in the dark ages of English jurisprudence, otherwise, we have reason to believe, they would not be in existence at this day. Lord Kenyon, when council for lord George Gordon, declared, that he did not think the parliament of Edward III, ever had any design that constructive trea­son should exist at all, or any wish to leave room for it to be introduced. We are certainly, therefore, unentrammelled by every foreign rule, otherwise the question would be, what rules we should adopt, and what not. It is a rule in law that statutes affecting life, should never extend beyond the letter of the law, so as to leave the possibility of a doubt. If that is a rule respecting penal statutes in general, abundant more so is it necessary respecting the high crime of treason. Above all things, if bad times should even happen in this country, and bad times may come here as well as they have in all other countries, it will be of vast import­ance that the law should be known precisely: it will be of consequence to a citizen to know on what law he is to be tried, if he becomes the devoted object of any one's resentment, or commits a crime: it is of consequence that the flood gates of usurpation and tyranny should never be left open, and the liberties of our citizens be thrown away ad libitum on the uncertain ground of construction. 1 Blackstone 88. Foster 58. we read that it ought to be "clearer than life itself."

We now come to examine the true, full, just, and reasonable meaning of our own treason statute; for I do not admit that constructive treason ought to exist at all. A line is drawn, and if we ever cross it, where are we to stop? Treason against the United States, we find, consists in "levying war against them, &c." The question is, what is levying war? Levying war may fairly extend to the three following things:

First. Where a body of men take up arms, and array themselves in a marshal manner against the government, with a view to put an end to its existence. This is its plain natural meaning, but cannot be said to have been transacted by the prisoner at the bar, and therefore requires no farther definition.

Secondly. It is expressly levying war, if a part of the union, throw off all allegiance and authority of the United States, totally disregarding [Page 142] its laws and institutions, and act as a divided people as though they did not belong to them.

Thirdly. Where laws have been enacted by the union, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, and a number of people, being dis­satisfied, should, of their own authority, by numbers, or force of arms, take possession of the legislative or executive authority, and by this force of arms or numbers should undertake to compel either of the departments of government to act as they dictate, thus robbing the government of its legitimate power, by assuming it themselves.

No doubt the good of posterity was intended in the constitutional de­finition of treason, and we are to touch it with a trembling hand indeed, lest it moulder, and grow into, God knows what. Now, as this is an act which was deliberately formed, if we go upon the dangerous ground of construction, that cannot be done so deliberate: No, I say it was to be handed down pure to posterity, and we ought not even to depart from a letter of it. If liberty of construction is to take place in any degree, by so much it tends to render the constitution vague and uncertain, and we know not where it will end. If the constitution only intended the three definitions of levying war which I have laid down, it is clear that a man cannot overstep those constitutional limits without intending to do it. Go beyond this, and you leave jurors and judges to make the constitution any thing and nothing: a mere nose of wax, to be moulded into any form at their will, and they may be excused, because left to exercise their own judgment upon it, but lord Hale has charged you not to do this, even though encouraged by a parity of reasoning: agreea­ble to his apprehensions, it is deducible that if ever we have a bad pre­sident, presidential encroachment may wrest the constitution to every thing that may serve any particular purpose. But God forbid either should ever happen.

Stating these as expressly levying of war, (and I know of no other) I call upon the prosecutors to produce a single instance, except in the inconsistent reign of Henry VIII, wherein the rescue of one or more prisoners, by one or more people, has ever been said to amount to trea­son. I may go farther, and ask those gentlemen whether a refusal to obey the law, and resist the officers who came to execute it has ever been called treason but by themselves? We find that universality, a de­sign to pull down all prisons, &c. is requisite to make the offence trea­son: it is only a general opposition to the government. But why are we to look for universality if we are to take a case like this, and call it treason? If an officer of the government, (agreeable to this doctrine) goes to execute process, and that process is resisted by one individual, does he not deny the authority of the government? Yes, as much so as though 50 or 100 were engaged in it: the whole intent the mal amens being exercised to resist it, it becomes treason. The offence now char­ged constitutes nothing more nor less than opposition to legal authority. The pulling down of a single meeting house, a single brothel, or a single prison, was not allowed to be a denial of the authority of the government in antient usage, but when it was done with a general intent, it became treason. Now we contend that except the universality and generality of design in the act charged can be pointed out, it does not amount to [Page 143] treason. When I said I know of no case whatever when resisting the exe­cution of law amounted to treason, I should have mentioned the excep­tion of resisting the militia law: this must be considered in a light of resisting the army, because it is part of the general army that this law provides, and opposing the army in any way would be treason, but re­sisting or opposing any other laws is only a misdemeanor, except an at­tempt be made to subvert all laws. Gentlemen, I repeat the exhorta­tion; beware of constructive treason; it is a dangerous thing to admit into our tribunals; it is like the scythe of death, levelling alike the great and small, the guilty and innocent: whoever reads its history will see war, famine and pestilence; a dangerous disease without a medicine to cure it: beware how you establish a system in which your progeny, as well as yourselves, are materially interested. If it were possible for pos­terity to glance an eye on the proceedings of this day, no doubt but they would wonder, and await the important event with anxiety: It is put­ting your liberties into the hands of tyrants, if tyrants should ever torment this country, to prevent which you are now called upon to establish a rule for preventing injustice, should injustice ever appear. Montesquie says 4 Blackstone 75

The reason of this is plain; it is the point made use of by a govern­ment when it becomes corrupt, and should be disposed, by taking advan­tage of its power, to injure the people. Where constructive treason is not allowed, there can be no ground for apprehension from that dange­rous weapon. But we are told that by adopting the words of the sta­tute of Edward III, (which is not the case) we have admitted all the authorities of the courts of Great Britain. This I deny, we read the consequences of such a proceeding throughout the English books: See Keeling 7. Hale 134. 4 Blackstone 75, 79, 80. When once this dan­gerous principle was introduced, the courts soon ran to enormous ex­tremes: and should you pronounce the prisoner guilty to morrow, it would be the established law of the United States, so far as a jury could do it. But there is one thing worthy of your notice: the parliament of Edward III, from the experience they had, defined treason in as clear terms as they could, they did not know but new cases might arise, in which case they provided what no honest judge could object to; they provided that if new cases should arise, the judges should not call it treason untill the the parliament had determined it to be so; so extremely were they afraid of constructive treason that they would not trust a judge, even if there was a similarity to former cases, nothing was to be left to construction, or be called treason by the courts but direct levying of war. But the parliaments were so much under the crown that it could have been more safely trusted to the courts. However we are not bound either by the statutes of Edward III, or William III, because, as I stated before, they are not in force here, much less the decision of the judges or the parlia­ments under them: We must put a construction upon our own statute, alone confining it to the express word of levying war. This is an im­portant question, and you are required to deliberate fairly and fully, un­influenced in any manner whatever, but by your consciences.

Judge Hale 1 p 131 makes distinction between express and constructive treason: you will there see that the time when constructive treason began [Page 144] and flourished, was in those dark, gloomy, troublesome and bloody days, when England was drenched with the blood of her best citizens; when the soil was enriched with their gore, and yet to authorities passed at such times are we referred by the council for the prosecution, and upon those authorities are we to place our Constitutional definition of trea­son. Enhancing servants wages was one of the cases those gentlemen relied on, and we admit that it was denominated treason to rise for that purpose. Supposing that construction was not pronounced by the king or by his judges, but by the most upright decision, how might it operate on this case? Why, we admit that wherever a body of men in arms go and surround the legislative or executive authority, to compel the repeal of a law, it would be levying war: the wages of servants in those days was fixed by act of Parliament, and it could not be enhanced legally, but by an act to do it, and therefore any armed mob, going for the purpose of obtaining this object, is a treasonable assembly, because the object is to compel parliament to alter the law. Another definition re­ferred to, is the pulling down inclosures, prisons, &c. generally. In referrence to that I would ask if the one now before the court is not a new case? If it is not I am at a loss to find a new case. It has even been held that any number of men assembled to rescue any number of persons, provided they did not go with a view of prostrating all prison­ers, and releasing prisoners generally, is only a great riot. It is a new case in England, and it is so here, and therefore ought to be cautiously handled. 6 Hume 402. in the case of Lord Stafford.

I shall now proceed more particularly to state my reasons for alledg­ing that the crimes with which the prisoner is charged are fully com­prehended, and punishment provided for them in the Sedition law. This I shall consider first, as it relates to the rescue independantly. Secondly I shall make some observations on the law, independant of the rescue, and thirdly, both together.

It is admitted, that the mere rescue of the persons from the custody of the marshal at Bethlehem, would not amount to treason, and it would not be necessary for me to say a word about that were, it not for the following reasons. Speaking of pulling down meeting houses, brothels, prisons, &c. the crime is defined: 4 Blackstone 129, "offences against public justice, is obstructing the execution of lawful process." This, there can be no doubt, is an offence at common law, and persons found guilty of a rescue of a person convicted of a crime, is adjudged guilty of the same crime, and would be punishable accordingly, had it not been for our act of Congress, (the Sedition act) but that act reduces a rescue, generally, to misdemeanor. Bat agreeable to law, persons rescuing others not committed for treason, does not amount to treason. A case in 4 Blackstone 86. the party himself was guilty of felony at common law by making escape, but I believe it to be an entire new doctrine to make the offence of the accessories or assistants higher than those who are rescued: Rescue of persons for felony has been always felony, trea­son, treason, &c. I think therefore it is clear to prove that every exer­tion has been used to attempt to make treason of this crime, by the gentlemen, but it is as clear that they have searched and tried in vain.

[Page 145] But it is farther said, that this business assumed a generality, and that the object was to defeat a law of the United States, for which purpose a number combined and conspired together, and more effec­tually to accomplish this they rescued the prisoners, and therefore com­mitted treason. Were I to admit this I might call upon the gentle­man to support his conclusions by authority, to show that preventing the execution of process, or releasing prisoners before they were carri­ed to jail, is treason. I repeat that the only case mentioned is in the disgraceful days of Henry VIII. which I think is inadmissible. But I deny the fact: I deny that there was any combination or conspira­cy between the people of lower Milford in Northampton county and those of Bucks county at all upon the business. First, the people of both counties were alike averse to this law, and for similar reasons. I believe there are many unprincipled men who wish to injure their country, and go about preaching up sedition to the people, which com­municated in different directions, catch fire in the same manner, and perhaps at nearly one period; hence it is that their prejudices and opposition may appear from the same cause, without parties holding the least correspondence. I ask you whether there is a tittle of evi­dence to prove that ever the prisoner went into Northampton county till this circumstance occurred? was there any communication by writing, or any other way? no, not at all. Upon what foundation can a conjecture arise then, that there was a combination? You are not to try by conjecture, or wild supposition: No, you are sworn to "well and truly try according to evidence." Does it appear, I ask you to recollect, gentlemen of the jury, that he was instigated to this conduct by any intercourse in any way held with Northampton coun­ty? No, it does not; but there is a strong presumption that the dis­contents took root and grew to that state without any combination at all. But whether or not treason was committed in Milford township, is not for you at present to say; the overt act is laid at Bethlehem, and there it must be proved, that he levyed war upon the United States with a number, or by force sufficient for the purpose, and [...] with them he combined and conspired, &c. If he did this at all, [...] did it on the 7th of March, for it does not appear that he ever [...] there before in his life; now if there was a conspiracy, it must appear that he acted previously and in concert with others, and the act would have been alike chargeable to all; but this does not appear. It is true Fries was heard [...] say ‘we will oppose you, and all the people of Northampton will join us,’ but this could easily arise from his ha­ving heard that the people of Northampton were dissatified with the law, but it does not fellow that, because there were discontents in Northampton county, he should be responsible for their actions, parti­cularly since it all, at least, depends upon conjecture. Keeling 19 has a case to answer this, where rebellion existed in two parts at one time, but it was determined that this might happen without corres­pondence, since no such evidence appeared, and therefore no notice was taken of it. Then, gentlemen, if I were for a moment to admit that John Fries had committed treason in Bucks county, which I deny, it would be immaterial upon the present occasion, because upon every [Page 146] indictment for treason, the overt act must be proved in the county. But it is said that doctrine does not apply, each state being to the whole United States, as a county to the state, because the grand jury have the district at large to inquire for; and therefore it is immaterial whether laid in one county or the other. If this be sound law, dread­ful indeed must be the situation of the people of the United States, if the government should ever fall into different hands from these in which it is now happily placed, because an attorney may, at any time, keep a person, arraigned for a capital offence, in ignorance, till he comes to the place of trial, and of course not be prepared to repel it at a ve­ry distant place from where the act is laid. But this, I will be bold to say, cannot be law. My reasons for thinking so are, First, the law of Congress called the judiciary act, sect. 29, vol. 1. page 67, says, that in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed:" here I would remark that the law takes notice, not of a State or a district, but of a county, and therefore the analogy drawn by Mr. Sitgreaves, that a district to the United States, is the same as a county to a state, is not in point. The trial is to be had in the county unless the judges shall determine that it cannot be had there without great inconvenience, (See Foster 194) but let the of­fence be where it may, twelve jurors must be summoned from the county, see 237 of the same book: if we examine these authorities they will appear different from what they were represented. 2 Haw­kins C 46, sect. 34, is an authority to prove that upon a plea of not guilty to a specific charge as to place, &c. in an indictment, if the least variance appears from that place, it is sufficient to acquit the party, and is fatal to the prosecution. It is not necessary for me again to say that you are totally to exclude from your views whatever the prisoner did in Bucks county, since the charge is laid in Northampton, and since an acquittal from that charge will not prevent a prosecution in Bucks county. If it appears that no treason was committed by him on the 7th of March at Bethlehem, you must pronounce him not guilty.

Mr. Lewis then reviewed the testimony of Dellinger on the cir­cumstances which led to the expedition to Bethlehem, which he con­tended had nothing to do with it, save the quo animo. It appeared that they heard Shankwieler was to be there, but it is not pretended that going there upon that account would be treason, and particular­ly as Shankwieler was not in custody, and it does not appear that the prisoner knew of any others being there at that time. Then the ob­ject particularly was to see Shankwieler. When they came to the bridge, it appeared to them that two men were detained at Bethele­hem, and it seems they went forward to rescue them. In this they were justifiable; for if the law was violated, it was by Major Nicholls, in making an arrest which the law did not authorize him him to do. They were illegally detained, and it was lawful for any body to go and rescue them. 2 Lord Raymond, 1301. I am not disposed to blame the marshal; but I cannot justify him in point of law: his situ­ation, no doubt, rendered it a prudent measure; but it was detain­ing men by false imprisonment, and was enough to alarm all the peo­ple of the state. I mention the circumstance only to prove that there can be no rescue, unless the persons liberated are legally confined. [Page 147] Instead of Fries being guilty for that action, a very worthy man (the marshal) was guilty of assault and battery in the act of detention. If this is fact, how does the affair stand afterwards respecting universali­ty and design? I have justified Fries and the others in leaving the bridge to go up to Bethlehem, and the laws of their country will jus­tify them, because it does not appear that they knew these people were discharged. When they got to Bethlehem, it appeared there were a number of persons under arrest; for, it does not at all appear in evidence that they ever heard before that Fox, Ireman, or the Lehi prisoners, were there: The gentlemen on the other side only presume it; but you, gentlemen, must not go upon presumption. ‘You must well and truly try, and true deliverance make, according to evi­dence.’ It does not appear they knew of it; they came from a great distance, and from quite another part of the country than where the Bucks county people came from; Fox and Ireman had been just brought in, and none of them knew they were there: however, when they were got there, upon a lawful occasion, hearing of a number of persons being confined there, and that they were to be taken to Phila­delphia for what they considered to be no crime, they generally waxed warm, but Fries was cool, he endeavoured to pacify them: he had brought his sword with him, but when he was appointed an embassador of peace to treat with the marshal, he left it behind him.

The whose of the transaction must be viewed as a sudden affray, like numerous cases mentioned in Hale, Foster, &c. where great and sudden riots arose. Where is the proof, I ask, of combination, of as­sociation or of correspondence? None at all: they came there to a man without the least treasonable views, for it was merely by chance they came there at all. There was much rage among the people upon the first impressions, the knowledge of the prisoners in custody made, and had it not been for the cool conduct of the prisoner at the bar, blood and massacre would have been the immediate consequences, for no doubt liquor was operating pretty much in their brains. An alterca­tion took place: they insisted on the prisoners, and in the prosecution of his delegation, from the preremptory demands of the people, he made use of language which I admit was unjustifiable, and violating the law, for which he ought to be punished, but not with death. 1 Hale 153. But further: the persons were not in prison, they were only in custody of the marshal: these are materially distinct; the releasing of per­sons taken to prison, is only a misdemeanor while releasing them af­ter they are in prison, which is in some measure the sanctuary of the law, is felony: 4 Blackstone 130. The breaking open of prisons ge­nerally is treason, but in no case is the releasing prisoners before they are taken there. Keeling 75.63. Lord Gordon's trial, Demarree's case 4 slate trials 844 and 900. It would not have been treason, therefore, if a number of persons had actually conspired to rescue these prisoners from the marshal, nor even if they had been confined in a gaol, instead of a room, because it was not a general design to break open all prisons, but one only: but on the contrary they were not in prison they were only in custody of the officer who served the process; how then, in the name of reason and common sense will it be made to [Page 148] amount to treason when it would not, if they had been in gaol. But says the gentlemen, we will not call it rescuing of prisoners, but a ge­neral obstruction of the execution of the law, and the means here used was to support that general object. The rescue is of itself a specific offence, and of itself admitted by Mr. Sitgreaves to be only a misde­meanor. If it is so, how is it possible to convert a misdemeanor into a treason, and thus to take away the life of a man when imprisonment only is his desert! But what ground is there alledged for this position? It is said that the arming and arraying a number of men was with this intent. I deny the fact, and it has by no means been proved. The cases referred to in England are treason to a demonstration. Enhansing servant wages could not be done by force but by surround­ing the parliament house, and this was justly denominated waging war against the king. Any rising to alter religion must be effected the same way: Religion is established by law in England, and tha [...] law must be altered by the parliament, therefore it could not be forcibly al­tered but by levying war. 4 Blackstone 81. Reforming the laws must be done the same, if at all. 1 Hawk. C 17. se [...]t 25. see Erskine in Gordon's trial 32. Not only open rebellion, but resisting the laws as enacted is treason. The laws are a proof of the authority of the commonwealth, and resisting those laws is making the parties inde­pendant of the commonwealth, and therefore a defiance of the authori­ty of the state. Lord Mansfield in the charge on the same trial says, among other enumerations, that combinations, &c. to arrest the execu­tion of militia laws is treason. This strongly merits observation. Why does the learned and experienced Lord Mansfield particularly spe­cify militia laws and no other? Why does he not say to arrest the exe­cution of any law? Why the militia law? For the best of all reasons, the same reason as the taking or attacking a fort or a cattle belong­ing to the king, because that is the place where he keeps his military forces, and because the military is the strength of the kingdom, and this is resisting the military authority. Therefore it must be allowed that a resistance of militia laws are upon a very different footing than any others, and in time of danger resisting this law would prevent the militia being drawn into the field when there is occasion for them.

Now, gentlemen, these things all considered plainly show that what is now attempted is a novel experiment, like modern philosophy, an entire new thing, saving the solitary instance in the reign of Henry VIII, and it is clear that the resistance of no law is treason, but the militia law. I agree also with the doctrine Lord Mansfield lays down that any attempt to oppose the laws by intimidation and violence is levying war, and treason.

It is unnecessary for me to turn to the books to prove that confes­sion of the party, or words spoken by him, taken perhaps in the time of fear, are not to be regarded by you. This was so plainly improper, that the law of William III, making two witnesses necessary, or con­fession in open court, was enacted: I need only turn to our own laws (judiciary act.) There must be one of two kinds of proof: the party in open court must confess, for confession out of court cannot avail even if made before 10,000 witnesses: or else two witnesses must prove [Page 149] the same overt act, and he must be convicted upon that indictment, if any. If you are to go to all parts of the country for heated words, heard by any body, in any circumstances, I must consider it as a very scandalous abuse of the statute of Edward III. I think it impossible to hesitate at what was the meaning of Congress when they made this act, and therefore shall barely recur to the evidence.

Here is a proof, that the prisoner came up to Bethlehem, where he acted in a certain manner; but the gentlemen concerned for the pro­secution, think that does not sufficiently indicate his design, and there­fore they travel to Jacob Fries's, to Kline's, and a number of other places: now suppose you convict him, I intreat you to inquire from what evidence you do convict him? Is it from the overt act commit­ted at Bethlehem, or from that and other circumstances together? If this is the broad ground upon which you go, do you convict him upon the evidence of two witnesses, to the same overt act, transacted at the same place? No, you do it upon the evidence of two, and a number of other evidence besides, on a variety of circumstances. Let me sup­pose for a moment, that two witnesses had come forward, and given an account of his conduct at Bethlehem, but that evidence was not sufficient to answer the indictment: you hear of such and such con­duct at Quaker town, at Kline's, &c. &c. I ask, would he have been convicted upon the evidence of those two independent of any other? No, he would not. This is by no means agreeable to the statutes of William III, or Edward VI, and in my view totally inad­missible. What is the consequence of such a verdict? Why, a man charged with murder, assault or what not, may know who the wit­nesses against him are, while one charged with treason, the highest possible crime, may not know, if you can travel from town to town, and from county to county for the evidence; if you can bring cor­respondence, &c. from every part, of which the prisoner knew nothing until brought before the court. No man would be safe in the ad­mission of such things, but you must form your opinion alone from the evidence of two witnesses relating to the act committed at Bethlehem agreeable to the indictment. The statutes, and our act of Congress mean and intend to prevent this kind of rambling over the whole state for evidence, or indeed upon the doctrine of the gentleman, not­withstanding the act says otherwise, they can with equal propriety go throughout the United States to collect evidence to support the pro­secution, which was never seen nor heard of before.

I now contend, gentlemen, that the case of the prisoner at the bar does not come within the statute of treason; and I also contend that it does come within one of two other acts, for the judiciary act 22 and 23 sections, page 109, vol. 1. speaking of resistance of process and rescue, compleatly extends to the prisoner. No, say the gentlemen, it is not a mere rescue, but a rescue for certain intentions and designs. Have the Congress distinguished any particular design, or have they not in this law? No they have not: then permit me to say where Congress have not distinguished it, nor the books, it is not for judges nor juries to distinguish: it belonged to Congress to make or except such cases as they thought proper, they have not thought proper; and you have no right whatever to do it.

[Page 150] But lest my objection should appear of weight to except it from the judiciary act, there is a very good law, but which has been shamefully villified and abused, called the sedition bill, providing fine and imprisonment for any high misdemeanor, under which, us I ob­served before, the very actions of the prisoner are defined. This act has passed since the trials of the western insurgents in 1794, so that the opinions of the judges respecting treason at that time, is most clearly and fairly superceded by this act, which has pointed out, whatever has heretofore caused doubts about the meaning of treason in the statute, and thus put an end to any judicial construction. That act provides, that if any persons should combine or conspire together, to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate any per­sons holding places or offices under the United States—This last, is one of the many little things collected together, in order, that when brought into a mass, they may amount to treason—It goes on, that if they should advise, attempt, or procure any insurrection, riot, or unlawful assembly or combination, he or they shall be deemed guilty of an high misdemeanor. The very crimes which are here enumerated are charged upon John Fries, the prisoner at the bar: whether it is carried into effect or not. Now, if any act or description can be more just than this, I should wonder; it answers precisely every part of the crime charged, and every concomitant circumstance. Now the ques­tion is, whether or not, as the constitution did not define the punish­ment of treason, and as a misdemeanor is described here, to be what some have thought used to be levying war, and as the punishment is less, than what the other law respecting treason enacts; whether this should not operate as a repeal of the former law, so far as related to these points. As to the cases of Vigal and Mitchel, western insur­gents, I should doubt whether it would affect them at all, even if the law had then existed, because the circumstances very much differed from the insurrection in Northampton county. Wells and Nevil were inspectors, and their offices were strictly belonging to the United States, and were deposits of the United States, and equally under the protection of the law, with castles or citadels: in addition to this, the officers of government were driven from their own homes, and upon pain of death, they dared not approach their homes. Their offices were burnt by the insurgents, and there was no law that touched their case but the constitutional act defining treason; on which account, they were tried and convicted under it. I would introduce these ideas, to show you, that the decisions then formed by the court, are inapplicable at this time, since the Sedition act is since passed, and agreeable to these circumstances, which materially differ from those of 1794.

It is now time to close. Gentlemen, the task which you have to perform is very serious, and very important; but I will not insult your under­standings, by saying more than my indispensible duty claims from me, in behalf of the prisoner. You will, I have no doubt, consider the case calmly, wisely, and deliberately. You know the law, under the direction of the court: and I have no doubt, you will decide accord­ing to the impulse of your consciences. I will only add, that the prisoner received, and has held his life from the authority of Him, who is all-wise great and good, and by Him only, can it be destroyed, except he has [Page 151] violated those equitable laws made by his country for the preservation of peace and order in society: he is therefore entitled to an equitable verdict: if he has done the acts named in the indictment, I have no doubt, you will pronounce him guilty: if he has forfeited his life, go he must, and if he is to go, it is not in the power of men to prevent it. I shall therefore rest assured, that you will give a conscientious verdict, upon which you are bound to answer.

MR. RAWLE.

AFTER his exordium, in which he expressed the importance of his situation as public accuser—he hoped that while his duty peremptorily imposed upon him, the necessity of doing justice to the United States, he should not be divested of candour towards the unfortunate prisoner at the bar, to whom he hoped full justice would be done. He proposed in the first place to collect the detail of transactions, the clear and unequivocal train they had been testified by the several witnesses, not only called to support the prosecution, but unhappily for the prisoner, corroborated by the witnesses called by himself. In the second place he should apply these facts to the laws and Constitution of the United States: from both of which he thought it would evident­ly appear to the jury that the prisoner was guilty of treason in levy­ing war against the United States.

The prisoner stood indicated for opposing in a warlike manner, two laws of the United States, the one entitled "an act providing for the valuation of lands and dwelling houses," &c. passed July 9, 1798, and the other entitled an act for levying a direct tax within the United States, passed July 14, 1798. agreeable to these acts certain commis­sions and assessors were to be appointed to carry the provisions thereof into execution. It appeared in evidence that Mr. Eyerly, one of the witnesses produced, had received a commission conformable thereto in a part of Pennsylvania, which he received in August, 1798, together with a request from the secretary of the treasury, that he would find suitable characters to serve as assessors to act in the division assigned to him. In the execution of this request Mr. Eyerly found very great difficulties, although there was a perfect acquiescence in all other parts of the union. Many whom he nominated declined on account of the unpopularity of those laws, although Mr. Eyerly very industriously, and in a praise worthy manner endeavored to remove those objec­tions.

In order to show the general difficulties there was in the execu­tion of these officers' duty. Mr. Attorney recited the testimony of Mr. Eyerly (page 47) and its confirmation by Mr. Chapman, Mr. Henry and others. He also went into an examination of the testi­mony demonstrative of the difficulties the assessors found in the execu­tion of their duty and the insult they frequently meet with, when en­gaged in their pacific efforts to explain the law to the misled rabble [...] [Page 152] But sorry was he to say, that these commendable efforts were out­weighed by the influence of certain leaders, among whom he found several captains of militia, and Fries with the rest: he throughout the whole scene appeared the most prominent, and instead of attend­ing to the good advices given him by his best friends, flew in a rage and renewed his opposition. A part of the effects of their hostility was accomplished in preventing Mr. Clark from fulfilling the office which he had undertaken, and the general reluctance there was in others, and indeed finally the abandonment of the assessments; for it appeared that, not only those who were unwilling to give their rates, refused, but those who were willing, were intimidated from do­ing it. To such a pitch was intimidation and dissaffection arrived, that he was sorry to say, the very Magistrates of the peace had so far ne­glected their duty as to join the opposition, and nearly all of them, from one or other of these motives, refused to issue process for the apprehension of delinquents, or examine persons who opposed the laws: and those who did attend to their duty, found the greatest dif­ficulties to procure the attendance of evidences, who were prevented by the impulse of fear from coming forward. Many attempts were made to pacify these deluded people, who were under the most baneful advice, and the attempts accordingly miscarried, even though propo­sitions were made in some townships to indulge them with the choice of their own assessors.

Their town meetings were sometimes attended by military bodies, in all the parade of war, with arms, music, and colours flying, who constantly employed the most violent and indecent menace towards the officers of the United States, which made even their personal safety doubtful. In this state of things, the marshal of the district was dis­patched to serve process on a number of the violaters of the public peace, and having served several warrants in Lehi township, he went to Lower Milford, and thence to Millar's town, where the gentlemen who were with him, assisting in the duty, met with repeated insults and even personal abuse. The assessors were still unable to proceed in measuring the houses, and finally obliged to abandon the business altogether; some of them having been compelled to resign on account of the opposition they met with, and the threats which were thrown out, so that they were in actual danger of their lives if they had pro­ceeded. While these officers were going the tour of their duty, in defiance of opposition, the principal leader, and indeed principal mover of the insurrection, John Fries, makes a distinguished figure upon the stage: he was not yet apprised that they had proceeded to assess the houses in his township, as soon as he learnt that they had, deaf to the arguments and reasoning of Mr. James Chapman, he flies into a rage, and exclaims, pointing to a man near him, ‘If I were to send that man to my house to inform them that the assessments were going forward, I should have 700 men here by day light to-morrow, and not only that, but we have men in Montgomery, and all Northamp­ton county to join us.’ This, gentlemen, certainly evinces a gene­ral opposition to the law, as clearly as words can do it. When told that the assessments were going on, it operated on him like an electric [Page 153] shock, and he sullenly retired having first adverted, with threats, to the melancholly scenes which has transpired in France. He after­wards meets the assessors at Jacob Fries's, to some of whom he expresses much respect, but certainly not very much like a friend or a neigh­bor, if we consider the anger which he displayed. No; it was not friendly admonition, it was the mark of enmity in disguise, and the special declaration of war: this will be evinced in observing the affair near the house of Singmaster: (p. 71.) Fries, with some attendants, met three of the assessors, one of whom (Mr. Rodrick) they endea­vored to seize. Fries was at the head of the band, but missing his mark, and taking Foulke he let him go, with a threat that they should all be taken the next day: on the next day, when the assessors were to meet at Mr. Chapman's, Fries, and his party, met at Jacob Fries's, whence they march in military pomp to Quaker town to exe­cute their threat. They ride up to the tavern, and there, after dis­charging their [...]ieces, give an huzza to the much profaned name of Liberty. When the assessors came into the town, swolled with large drafts of guilt and whiskey, the latter of which it appears that Fries kept clear of, but of the former he had a large portion. Seeing Mr. Rodrick ride through the town, they ordered him to stop, which he refusing, the cry of fire was given. Mr. Rodrick did not know who it was gave the word, but they levelled at him. However, gentle­men, on the other side say, they did not fire. This is the kind of defence which is held up to you: if they had fired, perhaps it would have been said, they did not hit; if they had hit, that they did not kill, and if they had killed, then it would have been only homicide! Mr. Foulke next came, he was stopped by a number, and among them Fries appears. So far as relates to the prisoner at the bar, it appears to have been his studied object to abstain from actual violence and outrage at all times; but his plans are regularly accomplished, not­withstanding his seeming moderation; and from his attention towards Mr. Foulke, and some others, it was clearly proved that the officer, and not the man, was obnoxious. Fries had told Mr. Foulke the preceding evening that he would come to his house, and bring se­ven hundred men with him, rather than that the law should be exe­cuted.

The opposition to the assessors, the general transactions of the 6th of March, and the resolution they entered into to go and liberate the prisoners the next day, Mr. Rawle said he considered as the beginning of the treason. On this day, (March 6th) the prisoner at the bar, the cool, deliberate leader and adviser of this assembly, whose minds and measures were those of their leader, in which he exhibited his power, particularly on the arrival of Mr Foulke, commanding him to get off his horse, and come into the house, when he demanded his papers; but, on that gentleman making some demur, he broke out, ordering him not to hesitate, on which they are delivered up, and then it, was he made use of the declaration, that they would not submit to the law, till the other states had submitted. ‘The law shall be re­pealed; we will not submit,’ he said: this we have from a respect­able witness. When the papers were returned, it was with a strict [Page 154] injunction not to proceed in the assessments, accompanied with a bra­vado: "You may return me if you think proper." Having done this, there was another assessor who was to be also brought, and mal­treated (Mr. Childs.) Fries goes to a neighboring house, and ac­costs him in a friendly manner, telling him he must go and see his men. When arrived, he leaves him amongst his men. It is un­necessary here to recapitulate the orgies of that transaction, in which the venerable name of Washington was used by their profane lips: they even extend their madness so far as to call upon Mr. Childs to swear allegiance to them. Suffice it to say, that the whole period of his stay was filled with hustling and abuse; but being a robust man he was not hurt. When Fries returned they were quiet, and he ex­pressed concern at the treatment, and inquired for the man who did it, but soon he makes a demand of the papers, which being given, he went out exulting at the acquisition; mean while Mr. Childs was again ill used, and which again ceased on the return of Fries, who being dis­appointed in their contents returns the papers. Mr. Childs, in this situation, does what any man would do, promises not to go into the township again to assess, and the assessments were perfectly stopped in Lower Millford. If this had been a mere local matter; if no pro­mise of assistance had been received, if no preconcerted, but unexe­cuted plan had not been designed, their labors might have rested here, having accomplished their professed purpose of effectually pre­venting the assessments going forward amongst them; but their views were more hostile to the government, under which they were protect­ed, and which was that moment extending its wings to shield them from assault, in common with their fellow-citizens. Their triumph was incomplete; "nothing was done, while aught remained to do" was their language; for, upon returning to the house of Jacob Fries, a message was sent by Dillinger, at a late hour, to give more general notice that next morning they were to go to Bethlehem in order to rescue the prisoners. Shankweiler and others were named as the pri­soners whom they were to rescue. This, gentlemen, is an important proof of the system with which this rescue was conducted, in which it is clear the people of Northampton and Bucks were connected: those people of Bucks were informed that certain persons of North­ampton had been arrested by a Judges' warrant, and were to be taken down to Philadelphia; but, they reasoned to themselves, ‘If this is permitted, our plan will fall through; our intimidation of the as­sessors will be at an end; they will proceed in their business, and we shall not be able to carry our plan of defeating the law; we ourselves shall be taken next. No; Shankweiler, and all the others, must be liberated.’ The message is communicated; and with a view of holding to this steady purpose, all who were present, the pri­soner at the bar drew up a writing, binding those who subscribed it to meet at Millar's town the next morning: What are the particulars of that instrument we are ignorant, it not having been produced to us; but, I am sorry to say, upon his own declaration, that he never signed it: in this he appears to desert his comrades, and leave them in a predicament into which he had led them; for, having gone so far, [Page 155] they would not think of abandoning their plants. The next morning they met by appointment; their proceeding would then have been stop­ped by intelligence given them by young Marks, but on consultation, the prisoner at the bar says, "No, we will proceed as we come so far." They proceeded until they came to the bridge.

During this period the Marshal, who had been dispatched up to serve warrants from the judge of the district, arrived, and after a variety of instances of opposition, as related by himself (p. 37) by Mr. Henry (p. 24) and by Mr. Eyerly (p. 45.) He was going forward in the execution of his duty as well as he was able, but being informed of the design which was formed to rescue the prisoners who had promised to meet him at Bethlehem, by virtue of the powers deputed to a She­riff, he procures a Posse Commitatus to assist him, on which account, ow­ing to the generally dissatisfied state of the neighborhood, he was for­ced to send so far as Easton for some of those aids. The next day the Marshal was ready to receive his prisoners: two men armed then made their appearance.

Mr. Rawle here retorted pretty strongly on Mr. Lewis's reference to 2 Lord Raymond 1301. adverting to the false imprisonment (as that gentleman called it) of Keifer and Paulus at Bethlehem, previous to the commencement of the general outrage, in which he recited the evidence respecting the arrival of those two men, and justified the Mar­shal for his prudent precaution to prevent the shedding of blood, be­cause, from his information, he appeared to be in a delicate and dan­gerous situation. I would rather, Mr. Rawle exclaimed, spend my life in voluntary exile on the bleak shores of Botany Bay, than live at large in a country where a Marshal in the execution of such an in­valuable duty, should be held up as an object of guilt: this is at once destroying all that we hold dear—our judicial system, on which depends our security. The act was laudable, because it was an act of personal safety and general prudence.

Mr. Rawle then proceeded to examine the evidence until the arrival of Fries at Bethlehem, contending that neither the arrest of those two men, nor that of Shankweiler particularly, who had never surrendered himself prisoner at all, was the cause of the assembling Fries and the party at Miller's town, their march from Milford, or their arrival at the bridge near Bethlehem: it was not till after their arrival at the bridge that the party were informed of the detention of these two men, when they sent to demand them. They were liberated, but in order to beg this armed force to come no farther, the Marshal dispatches four of his posse to reason with them. But the object was not yet attain­ed, for while these two men were delivering up, the Marshal perceives the prisoner at the head of his party, with a sword drawn, marching up with all the appurtenances of war, although the others had enga­ged to await an answer at the bridge. They appeared to be instigated to pass the bridge by the arrival and example of Fries, and from that moment affairs assumed the awful spectacle which the Marshal had been Previously led to apprehend, and this John Fries who had obtained the rank of a Captain in the Militia, which he ought to have used solely to defend his country, prostitutes his command to the base and dan­gerous [Page 156] purpose of rebellion against the government. All the evidence agree that the only leader; the only distinguished character; the on­ly ambassador, negociator, and adviser that appeared throughout the whole transaction was the prisoner at the bar: It is he that goes first to demand the prisoners: a recital of his conduct may be seen in Tho­mas's and Mitchel's testimony, corroborated by others. He declares, ‘Gentlemen, if you are willing we will take them, I will go fore­most; none of you fire till they fire on us first; till I give the word; if I drop, then take your own command.’ To give him all the cre­dit due to his humanity it is observable that he wished to obtain his ob­ject by intimidation, but if it was not attainable by threats, force must be resorted to. No doubt there must have been a moment when he at­tended to personal safety; as commander, and foremost man in a nar­row passage, he must have fallen first, he had a very fair chance of re­ceiving a blow or a bullet, and therefore that precaution for his men not to fire became indispensible. The object of these insurgents was not to commit murder, the prisoner is not charged with it, but to pre­vent the execution of the law, and this was to be obtained better without a loss of life than with it, but the expressions of Wm. Barnet, reciting those of the prisoner, were "Stick, Stab, and do as good as you can, as I expect first to get it."

Gentlemen, Treason may sometimes, and indeed often does call in­to its aid the commission of acts horrid and atrocious, but such atro­cities are not necessarily component parts of Treason. Actual homi­cide, destruction, or seizure of property may, and often does occur: if the Marshal on that unhappy occasion had stood out five minutes long­er, I leave it to yourselves, or to any dispassionate person to judge whether lives—more than the life of the prisoner would not have been lost, and still the crime would have been but Treason; But that it did not arrive to such an horrid scene we are indebted to the judicious con­duct of the Marshal, who acted above all praise: influenced by the advice of two of the neighboring magistrates, whose powers were in­sulted and suspended, and who must, with himself, have fallen a sacri­fice in the execution of their duty, he determines to make the surren­der: ‘the rescue, said Mr. Horsfield, I considered was perfect, other­wise the destruction of human lives was certain: you are a stiff Of­ficer. (to the Marshal) When I see those guns levelled at the win­dow: when I hear those savage shricks, I now think you will be jus­tifiable in giving up the prisoners.’ The Marshal, after much hesi­tation, acted very laudably in giving them up without farther opposi­tion. I grant that Mr. Eyerly and Mr. Balliot retired unhurt, but observe, gentlemen, they were not the object; the liberation of the prisoners, and thus preventing the Marshal executing process, was their only aim, and when they obtained that, they desisted from farther vi­olence.

I might with propriety apply to this Treason words which were used for a different purpose by Pope,

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole:"

A general plan of opposition to the law was contemplated, and the release of the prisoners was but one of the parts, if not of ‘one stupen­dous [Page 157] whole,’ it was of one great system. Having obtained their ob­ject, they retired from their successful expedition, the trumpeter sound­ing the triumphal blast before the conquerors, in defiance of the legal authority of the United States, and thus departed, we hear no more of them.

These are facts;—not founded on the testimony of a single witness, which is sufficient to convict a man in common cases; nor are they confined to the testimony of two witnesses, which is all the constitution requires; but they are corroborated by numerous witnesses, produced in order to remove every doubt from your minds as to the material facts of the crime. There is no case in our books more clear than the present, the evidence is so uniform, that even the ingenuity and talents of the prisoner's counsel have not been able to contest one fact that has been related; indeed the whole is so fair, that the most incredulous must be satisfied of the accuracy of the charge, independant of the confession of the prisoner, which confirms the whole: it proves to a demonstration that his main object was nothing less than to prevent the execution of the laws which all men are bound to obey.

Gentlemen, the counsel for the prisoner have endeavored to di­minish the force of that voluntary confession by telling you that no man can be convicted upon his own confession out of Court, nor with­out the testimony of two witnesses: the same arguments have been used to nullify the expressions which we have produced proof that the pri­soner frequently made use of, from which we evidently discover his inten­tion. I allow that no man should be convicted for treason unless upon the testimony of two witnesses, or confession in open Court; but when all the facts necessary to substantiate the crime proved by two witnesses, the declarations of the prisoner, as well as his confession may be produced as good evidence as to his intention, and this is not necessary to be proved by two witnesses; this tends to show the designs of his heart, which can only be known to his Creator and himself. These declara­tions should be known to the Court, in order to discover the intention with which the crime was perpetrated. In the case of Lord Gordon, the words said to have been used by him in the lobby of the house was not rejected by the jury because it required two witnesses, but on account of the improbability of a declaration having been publicly used which no more than one individual could be produced to prove. We have proved by two witnesses that the overt act was committed by the prisoner, and have produced much corroborative testimony, in which we have not been confined to two, having heard it from twelve respectable witnesses. If we have succeeded to prove the intention, it is sufficient for the law, and if you believe the testimony, it indubita­bly substantiates the fact.*

I shall now proceed to consider what is the law arising upon these facts, in going into the examination of which, I shall put out of the [Page 158] question two objections, one of them only has been produced, the other having barely been alluded to, rather than held up.

A proclamation was issued by the President, on which Fries did then go to his home, whereupon it has been argued that no instance can be produced to prove a prosecution being commenced for acts committed prior to the reading of the riot act in England, if the mob thereupon dispersed, because they had complied with the proclamati­on. It is right in part: if the people do not disperse, the remaining mob are guilty of felony: but I ask the gentlemen has the defence been at all set up on the ground of compliance with the proclamation? In the riot at Drury Lane theatre by the footmen; and that which was held up in which the earl of Essex and others were engaged, ma­ny of the rioters did disperse in consequence of the riot act being read, and yet were afterward punished for the enormities they committed while they were there. Alike trivial is the objection respecting the undue appointment of assessors. It is sufficient that such a person acts as commissioner or assessor, if he usurps that power the law has provi­ded a remedy by other means than the dangerous one of an insurrecti­on to know merely whether▪ A. B. or C. are regularly appointed to office. There are legal modes of application to ascertain the fact; there is the whole board of commissioners, or even an higher power may be applied to, to ascertain the authority, and no virtuous honest citizen would think of opposition on that account. We do not think it necessary to trouble the court, since it was fully in the power of the prisoner's council to have brought the commissioners under this act before them, but not having availed themselves of it, nor pressed it home to your notice, gentlemen, why was such a scare-crow insinu­ated, but to mislead you? there can be no doubt of the legality of those commissioners, if there was, it would not alleviate the crime of rebellion. But that was never used, neither by the prisoner himself, nor any of the insurgents, as a ground for the rebellion; it was not even a colouring for it, nor does it appear that the insurgents ever doubted in the smallest degree, the legality of the appointments, their declarations were repeatedly "no assessors shall act in the township, nor shall any assessments be made." No doubt was ever made of the pow­ers used by the officers, and therefore the opposition to the law is alone to be considered.

Having disposed of those two points, I wish now to impress upon your minds a most solemn conviction, to wit, That the law under which the prisoner at the bar stands indicted, without being in the least doubtful, ambiguous, obscure, or perplexing, is well defined in, and composes a part of the Constitution of the United States, art. 3. sect. 3. It is certainly momentous that you should be fully satisfied of the true meaning of that part under which the present crime is placed, to wit, "levying war against the United States." I would premise that the indictment is worded precisely in the usual form, and that the only question now is, what is that levying war with which the pri­soner is charged?

To ascertain what is levying war, it is necessary for us only to consider what is the nature of civil and political society in the United [Page 159] States. The government is the organ which the people collectively have thought it their duty and interest to establish for their mutual safety—their will, publicly expressed in the laws, is the legitimate will of the majority of the people: all our laws are the acts of this majo­rity, and it is a radical principle, which will not be controverted, that the will of the majority is always binding upon the minority, and should be acquiesced in quietly by them, whether the administration of that government be in the hands of one person, or of many; those, therefore, who do not choose to continue in that society, ought to withdraw quietly from it, rather than disturb the quiet of the whole. Allegiance is a quiet submission and acquiescence to the supreme power—In monarchical governments it is placed in the king; but the citizens of America know of no allegiance but to the laws, for they alone are the binding principle by which society at large is kept in domestic peace and security. If, therefore, deviating from this allegi­ance to the laws, measures are taken to disturb the public peace by a resistance of the laws, accompanied by force of arms, or by the inti­midation of numbers sufficient for the purpose, and it be applicable on­ly to a grievance of a public or general, and not of a particular or private interest, such resistance then becomes the crime of treason, and particularly so if the views are to bring about the suspension or repeal of any of the [...]ws; for there is no particular kind of law liable to exception; it is treason, because it is an attempt to overturn the fun­damental principles of society, by endeavoring to impose into the system the will of a minority, which has no right to be there; it is creating a new agency, a new species of legislature, and eventually dissolving the powers legally ordained. This definition may apply as well to any one law as to all the laws, for each is equally stamped with public approbation, and to none particularly is sanctity attached, all proceeding from one power, those who undertake to resist any one, may with equal propriety resist the whole, and treason appears to me to be the inevitable inference, otherwise it would be impossible to ascertain the limits at which this dangerous licentious conduct must stop, we should be at once thrown back into a state of natural society; which God prevent. I ask the gentlemen who argued for this distinction, to point out to me which law may be resisted with impunity! If one may be, the evil principle will go on to another and another, and where will it stop!

I have no occasion again to recur to the authorities we have produ­ced which the gentlemen pass over as the acts of bad times, cor­rupt judges, a profligate court, &c. The counsel with all their learning and industry seem to be satisfied with this general discharge of our au­thorities, but whatever might have been the baseness of the attorney generals of those times, the meanness of the judges, the profligacy of the court, or the merits of the prisoner, we stand upon broad established, and general ground, which is not pretended to be obligatory upon us merely because it has heretofore been decided, nor is it obligatory in England upon that account, although you have been so told, but we go upon it, because it is right. That Sir Walter Raleigh was gross­ly abused by Sir Edward Coke as notorious; it was the bad practices of [Page 160] those times, but this reference more regards the proceedings on trials, than the decisions: the decisions uniformly were, that usurpation of public authority in a certain manner, amounted to Treason. What! shall a man be permitted to attack the government by piecemeal? to take out a plank here and a plank there, till our political ship sinks, and such conduct not be called a treasonable division of the govern­ment! With respect to the authorities wherein it was stated to be necessary that the design should be to pull down meeting houses, brothels &c. generally in order to constitute high treason, it must be observable that it was the assumption of the legal powers which constitu­ted the crime; to pull down meeting houses as such, was interfer­ing with the toleration granted by government, and therefore treason­able. With respect to Bawdy houses, government, and not individu­als, have a right to correct them, and if individuals pretended to cor­rect the evil, they were attainted of high treason.

We are told that no case is to be found in which a mere rescue is called treason. Hale 133, in my opinion is an authority in point. Bethlehem was the prison of the United States under the marshal, there the marshal held several persons in custody, and levying war, or attempting by force or intimidation to deliver those prisoners out of his custody is certainly treason. Here we stand upon [...]ttled ground we say, and I appeal, gentlemen, to your recollection, [...] there was no particular view to relieve any particular person, but that the words were "Shankweiler and others" the claim was general, and the object was general—the repeal of the law was that object, and these were the means used to obtain it. This is declared to be treason [...]en by that great and virtuous man who is held up to your notice as guarding us to beware of introducing more constructive treasons: Sir Matthew Hale, whose very name carried authority at the period of 1668, and with him, all the judges upon mature deliberation, have declared this to be sound law. As Burglary, Arson and Murder may be made the means of treason, so may rescue; Treason must have some means: sometimes the most atrocious, sometimes the means may be newly invented, but because newly invented it cannot lessen the crime with respect to the murder of Sir Theodosious Boughton, by capt. Don­nelan in England, because it was merely by a draught of laur [...]l water (which in that country is poison)—a new invention for murder, the counsel might have argued against the conviction because no former case had occurred, as well as that the innocence of this rescue should be held up, because new. But there was no such thing. A strong and important part of the combination was actually carried into effect, and it was not absolutely necessary to prove the rescue in order to prove the treason: it has been evidently shown to you in the trans­actions at Quaker town, so that the rescue was only a part, and the termination of the general plan so far as it proceeded.

I have no need to take up more authorities to prove that this is trea­son: it was so before the birth of our constitution: this principle was coeval with the reign of Edward III, in 1340. I take it to be a true and incontrovertible principle, that when we sind an act, on which previous decisions have been made, those decisions have been acted [Page 161] upon, and we should think proper to pass that act by engrafting it in­to, and making it a part of our constitution, those decisions are of course adopted as our direction, whereby we are to understand the ap­plications of that act. I would barely observe that while those gentle men are telling us that we are not to have recourse to those volumes of laws, (which we ought all to be acquainted with, as volumes of science, explanatory of the code by which we are bound) they them­selves resort to the same species of authority, to endeavor to prove that treason under the act of Edward III, is not treason in America. We have heard much about constructive and interpretative treason, and constructive levying of war. Agreeable to the form of government in England, the king is recognized as king in two capacities, one in his natural, as king, and one in his political, as sovereign: now, when that part of treason called compassing the king's death is mentioned, it refers to his natural capacity, but when of levying war against the king, it refers to his political capacity, and it was therefore necess [...]y to show the distinction between different species of treason: this latt [...] is termed constructive treason; but from the variety of its modes of introduction, cannot be so well defined; but its existence is necessary in order to support society and preserve it [...] this is what is termed levying of war; it may consist in opposition [...] the king's forces, or by threats or force attempting to compel the [...] to remove his ministers, or alter established laws. If you expu [...]e what is direct levying of war, there can no such thing as treason he found; either the law is wrong, or the arguments used on the other side. Gentle­men, the law is established, but the argument's vanish like vapour be­fore the morning sun; what, then, in England is called constructive levying of war, in this country must be called direct levying of war. The framers of our constitution were as learned, and as wise as any gentlemen now at the bar; they certainly saw that this was the only kind of direct of levying of war that could exist in this country, and therefore if they had not intended that what was called constructive in England should constitute what they called "levying of war against the United States," they would not have introduced the crime at all: this is an absurdity they never would have been guilty of.

The learned gentleman admits that resistance against one particular law may be termed constructive treason, and may be the crime of treason here: he says that resistance to the militia law would be a re­straint upon the principle dependance of the government, and therefore treason; gentlemen try our arguments by this test, and see whether re­sistance on the present occasion is not equally so. I ask you what is to be­come of the militia, the standing army, the eventual army, or the civil power itself, if you are unable to raise revenue? Who will fight, who will trans­act your civil concerns if they are not paid? If by opposing revenue laws the government itself as well as the army is fundamentally undermined, is it not at least as much treason as though the militia law alone were more openly (but not more effectually) attacked? Nothing is so much enti­tled to respect and submission as laws which are the direct means of keeping society together. At the present time, when the feudal sys­tem is no more, but from necessity subsistance must be obtained from [Page 162] employment and labor, the defence and preservation of the country must come from the revenue, and to destroy that is to give a mortal wound to the government itself.

Mr. Rawle then went into a review of some of the circumstances, alluded to by the opposite counsel, which characterize the insurrection, and the trials thereupon in 1795, which he insisted, though those gentlemen would not allow it, were very similar in circumstances to the unhappy affair now before the court, in which he drew the follow­ing parity between the cases:

In 1794, the disturbance was to prevent the execution of one law—the excise law:

In 1799, the house and land-tax laws.

In 1794, four counties were engaged in opposition.

In 1799, but 3: Northampton, Bucks, and Montgomery.

In 1794, the excise officers were attacked and prevented executing their duty.

In 1799, the assessors were the same.

In 1794, the insurgents collected into an army, in battle array, dis­playing their ensigns of triumph, with numbers sufficient to procure their object; say, 6000 men in Braddock's field.

The object of 1799, was to do it in a similar manner, and they actually did, by their military appearance and boasts of much larger increase, impress a general opinion of their power, sufficient to ac­accomplish their purpose.

In 1794, the insurgents made public declarations that the excise law should never be executed.

In 1799, were not declarations of the same nature made by these insurgents; for that other counties, and even other states would sup­port them, and it should never be done?

The object of 1794, was to obtain a repeal of a law—the excise law.

In 1799, it was the same, so far as related to them—the house and direct tax.

In 1794, the excise officers were compelled to promise, that they would not execute the law in that part of the country.

In 1799, the same promise is exacted, and obtained respecting Low­er Milford and other parts. There was some difference, it is true, as the gentleman stated, some of the officers at that time being banished from their houses, on pain of death. It was farther argued, that there was this striking distinction; that General Nevil's house might be considered as a castle of the United States, because it was an office of excise; but the analogy still holds good; it was General Nevil's dwelling-house, however, that was attacked; the attack was made on­ly because he was an officer employed in the superintendance of a tax they disliked: Mr. Levering's tavern at Bethlehem was made the pri­son of the United States, and there was an executive officer of the United States, it was as much so as any other prison in the Union: this was the castle, the fortress of the United States, to protect which the marshal had assembled his posse commitatus, provided with weapons [Page 163] of defence. I consider this, therefore, a more violent breach of the law than the attack upon General Nevil's house; so far as it went—admitting that no guns were fired, nor lives lost, nor was any house burnt, otherwise so far as it went the case was rather stronger than the former. Happy is it for the prisoners that the scene of riot was not farther from the seat of government: if it had been more remote from the power of government, we cannot calculate upon the consequences, or increase of revolt and excess which would have been evinced. I will not pretend to anticipate them, for I wish not to inflame my own mind by the sad calculation, nor the minds of the jury; I only wish the facts to appear in their native colours.

Why then can we entertain a doubt, viewing all these circum­stances, that the prisoner is guilty of treason? There can be none. We are told that the legislature have parted a law, entitled the Sedition Act, which shows the offence of the prisoner; and that the opinion of the legislature was to bring under this law the constitutional definition of treason, making it a misdemeanor! To me, of all the weak argu­ments which have been brought in behalf of the prisoner, this is the weakest. This law, which has been cried up from one end of the continent to the other by some persons as unconstitutional, is now to be brought into court to explain away what the constitution positively defines to be treason. If this ever had been the intention of the legislature, there certainly would have been something like treason, something like levying of war introduced into that bill, but we find no such thing; the words do not at all occur in it, and that it is not intended, I think is clear. Sedition and treason are two distinct crimes, and two distinct punishments are enacted to meet them. The description of crime in the sedition act, is those who combine with intent to impede the operation of the law, and those who intend to raise an insurrection—these are to be considered as guilty of an high misdemeanor. Now, those who conspire to commit treason are not considered guilty of treason; the treason must have been carried into effect. It cannot be treason for a man to counsel, advise, or attempt to procure insurrection with intent to impede the operation of any law of the United States; but this is declared to be a misdemeanor, whe­ther executed or not. Besides, the word "treasonable," is not inse [...]ed in the sedition law: thus, if a man be indicted for taking the pro­perty of another, unless the word feloniously is introduced, he is not liable to the charge. So in this case, the act must be traitorously done, or it is not treason. To show the absurdity of this doctrine, we need only for a minute suppose, that in the commission of any of the crimes specified in the sedition act, lives should be lost, houses burnt, &c. The laws of the United States have previously declared, that such offenders should be punished with death, and surely it ought to be carried into execution—not be mitigated by a future law to t [...]e mere penalty of 5000 dollars, and five years imprisonment. If this was the intention of the legislature, might it not, at least, be expected that they would have declared so in the act; but they have manifested no such intention, in that, nor in the present instance, with respect to which, had they done it, they would have overleaped their constitution­al [Page 164] powers; for the constitution is an ark, into which the legislature itself dare not place its feet; if they were to do it, the judiciary have the power, and it is their duty to bring them back again, and say, "You have gone too far:" They can as much restrain an unconsti­tutional act, as Congress can make a constitutional act. This consti­tution gave Congress the power to declare the punishment that should be inflicted on what it had defined to be treason. Congress had no­thing to do with the crime, and if they have declared it, as the gen­tleman supposes, they have done it without authority, and it can be [...] no avail whatever. But no, they have rather, in the act alluded to, declared what should not be considered treason, or removed doubts upon that head. This being the case, the same opinion which operated on the judges in 1795, is still in force; because no legislative act has intervened to change it. Certain it is, that Congress did not intend to enact an unconstitutional punishment for treason; but if they had intended it, they have not a right to do it, nor have they done it.

Now, gentlemen, whether these things are as we have represented, or not, are for you to judge, and decide upon your information, if you are satisfied that the prisoner at the bar was engaged in the affair at Bethlehem, and that affair was connected with other previous ar­rangements, you must convict him, otherwise you must not. We consider, and think the evidence must prove to you, that all are parts of the same whole, were began long before the 7th of March; and that they partly existed in Northampton and partly in Bucks counties. It must be upon a full conviction in your minds that the treason was committed by him in Northampton county, that you can convict the prisoner: and if you have not that full conviction, I firmly hope you will acquit him; if you have, you are bound to pronounce him guilty.

CHARGE OF JUDGE IREDELL.

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

I AM persuaded that every person, who has attended to the present very awful and important case upon which you are now called to decide, must be impressed with a just respect for the patience and attention you have shown, through the long period which unfortunately has been taken up; but this, though much personal inconvenience must have been experienced, not only by you, but by all concerned, is unavoid­able; none of us can repent that, in a case of such moment as the present, the time which is absolutely necessary for a complete investi­gation, has been employed.

Gentlemen, it is with great satisfaction to me, on the present occa­sion, that my ideas on the points of law directing our conclusions, upon which it is the duty of the court to give opinion, absolutely [Page 165] coincides with that of the respectable judge, with whom I have the honor to sit. Before I state to you any observation, with regard to the facts which have appeared from the evidence, I shall previously deliver my opinion upon some points of law, so far as they are un­connected with the evidences; those which are, I shall speak to in their proper place.

This, gentlemen of the jury, is an indictment against the prisoner at the bar, for levying war against the United States; the first in­quiry therefore is, what is meant by these words of our constitution. ‘Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them,’ &c. These words are repeated verbatim, I believe, in an act of Congress, called the Judiciary Act, defining the punish­ment of the crime of treason, pursuant to constitutional authority. This crime being defined in the constitution of our country, becomes the supreme law, and can only be altered by the means therein point­ed out, and not by any act of the legislature; and, therefore, the re­petition of the words of the constitution in the judiciary act is quite unnecessary, as the only power left to Congress over this crime was, to describe the punishment: the same act, in another part, makes pro­vision for the method of trial. Agreeable to their power, Congress have described the punishment, and thereby declared the crime to be capital. It is clear therefore, that, as the constitution has defined the crime, the Congress, drawing its sole authority from that constitution, cannot change it in any manner, particularly as it is so declared; yet the counsel for the prisoner say, that the legislature have given it a legislative interpretation, and that their interpretation is binding on this court. They say that Congress did not mean to include the offence charged upon the prisoner at the bar, under the definition of levying war; because the sedition aft describes a similar offence, and because a rescue is provided for in another act, the punishment extend­ing no farther than fine and imprisonment. Several answers may be given to remove these objections:

First, If Congress had intended to interpret these words of the con­stitution, by any subsequent act, they had no kind of authority so to do. The whole judicial power of the government is vested in the judges of the United States, in the manner the constitution describes; to them alone it belongs to explain the law and constitution; and Congress have no more right nor authority over the judicial expositions of those acts, than this court has to make a law to bind them. If this was not an article of the constitution, but a mere act of Congress, they could not interpret the meaning of that act while it was in force, but they may alter, amend, or introduce explanatory sections to it. In this we differ from the practice of England, from whence we re­ceived our jurisprudential system in general; for they having no con­stitution to bind them, the parliament have an unlimited power to pas [...] any act of whatever nature they please; and they, consequently, can­not infringe upon the constitution. The very treason statute of Ed­ward, III. itself, contains a provision giving parliament an authority to enact laws thereupon, in these words: ‘Because other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which cannot be thought [Page 166] or declared at present: it is thought, that if any such does happen, the judges should not try them without first going to the king and par­liament, where it ought to be judged treason, or otherwise felony. On this point Sir Matthew Hale was very careful, lest constructive treason should be introduced.

This, gentlemen, you will observe, only relates to any case not specified in that act. But, on the occasion now before you, it is not attempted, by any construction or interpretation, that any thing should be denominated treason, that is not precisely and plainly within the constitution. No treason can be committed except war has actually been levyed against the United States.

But farther, nothing is more clear to me than that Congress did not intend in any manner whatever, to innovate on the constitutional definition of treason, because they have repeated the words, I think, verbatim in their own act, with regard to the rescue and obstruction of process which is mentioned in the act alluded to: it will not be pretended, by any man, that every rescue, or every obstruction of an officer in serving process, or even both together, amounts to high treason, or else to no crime at all: No; the crimes are differently spe­cified, and rescue or obstruction of process may be committed without that high charge. This, I think, was sufficiently explained by the counsel for the United States. Suppose 1000 men rise in arms, avowedly to destroy the government, and in the execution of their de­sign commit murder, burn houses, purloin property, &c. does it make the design less evident, because they committed other atrocious crimes in order to obtain their main views? No; it was to destroy the government, and that crime would be charged upon them, being the higher crime, which the concomitant ones only tended to aggravate, as they were committed, not for the purpose of committing murder, but to intimidate the government, and accelerate their object. With regard to what is stated in the sedition act—combinations and conspi­racies to raise an insurrection,—these, gentlemen, may be committed without the parties being guilty of treason: men may combine and conspire for a private purpose; possibly to injure an individual, mere­ly to gratify some private motive: if so, they come within that act, and that only. It is only when they carry their projects farther; when they aim at the destruction of the government, that the nature of the offence attains the aspect of, and essentially becomes treason; and therefore it is necessary to prove the intention, otherwise there can be no treason. There can be no levying war without a number of persons unite, and that number cannot levy war without some previous intention; and therefore under this law, there being no previous in­tention defined, but merely an unlawful combination, the act termed treason in the constitution, it is plain it is not intended, nor is it of the nature of treason.

With regard to the authority from which the opinion of this court is founded, and of which you have heard much already, I shall trou­ble you with a very few observations. When this constitution was made, it was in the power of those who formed it either to define treason or not, or, if they thought proper to do so, to do it in what [Page 167] manner they chose, in which they might have followed the example of the country whence their ancestors came, to which they were ac­customed, and in which they were most experienced in their own se­veral states, where the crime of levying war was denominated trea­son. I believe this has been generally followed through the states; in some I know it has. This term of levying war is an English ex­pression, borrowed from the statute of Edward III; but notwithstand­ing this, the principal provisions respecting treason are taken from an act of the British parliament in the reign of William III, which is principally calculated to guard the independence of the court against the power of the crown, and the prisoner against his prosecutors. Now, I must confess, as these able and learned framers of our consti­tution borrowed the act, in terms, from the British statute alone, an authority with which they were familiar, that they certainly at least meant that the English authorities and definition of those terms should be much respected. Those gentlemen knew as well as any counsel at the bar, the danger of constructive treasons: they knew how to guard themselves against the bad times of English history, and were equally acquainted with the better, and more modern decisions. Would it not have been natural for men so able, so wise, so cautious of their liberties, had they entertained a doubt of their insufficiency, to have introduced some new guards, some new interpretations, and not to have left us in later times in the dark, exposed to so much danger as the gentlemen of the bar apprehend? Gentlemen who know any thing of that country, know that arbitrary times have ex­isted, and also that a number of decisions have taken place since that period. I do not believe that any judge since the revolution in En­land have ever considered that he was bound to follow every arbitrary example of the English courts, or the crown laws which had taken place in dark ages. Can any man suppose that, if a man was to be prosecuted for either of the crimes referred to by one gentleman (Mr. Lewis) so absurd a prosecution would be for a moment indulged by the judges of this age. No, they would highly resent such an in­sult offered to an enlightened court. Such instances have ever been reprobated as much by the courts, as by the gentleman who quoted them.

With respect to this doctrine of precedent, I will take the liberty of submitting to you a case of a civil nature; suppose it a case of great moment; suppose in this court, or any other from which an appeal could not be had, a solemn decision had been had respecting a title to a piece of land; upon this adjudication a gentleman wishes to purchase this land, taking this title to a lawyer he is confirmed in the opinion that the title is good, and that he is safe because of the decision of the court. On the faith of this decision alone the man lays his money out, and therefore it must be important how precedents are formed. If precedent is so important in a civil case, how much more so must it be in one like the present. If a case is new altogether, and no precedent can be found, it ought to be much in favor of the prisoner, but if a solemn declaration has once been made that such and such facts constituted a certain crime, that declaration ought to [Page 168] be abode by, and for this plain reason: every man ought lo have an opportunity to know the laws of his country (if he will take pains to inform himself) lest he should involve himself in guilt ignorantly. The propriety and necessity of this must be manifest, and if so, it is as ne­cessary that the proceedings of our courts should be uniform, otherwise their can be no dependance upon their judgment. If, therefore, a point has been settled in a certain way, it is enough to direct any court to settle a future case of a similar kind in the same way, be­cause nothing can be more unfortunate than when courts of justice deviate in decisions on the same evidence.

This leads me, gentlemen, to point out to you a consideration of great magnitude: this is not the first time, as I have been informed, that these questions have been discussed in the court. During the trials of the persons concerned in the western insurrection, they were discussed, and I have no doubt with great ability on both sides. Judges Patterson and Peters were then on the bench, and after all the dis­play of splendid talents used in argument on both sides, and all the authorities produced that men were capable of, from the best judg­ment that could be formed, the court, without hesitation, declared itself in favor of the prosecution. As I do not differ from that de­cision, my opinion is, that the same declaration ought to be made on the points of law at this time. Vide Dallas's reports 355.

It is, however, objected, that after this solemn decision had taken place, the Legislature, by the sedition act, settled the matter dif­ferently, and that we are bound by that act. This has been answered, so as to remove it beyond all doubt, and concessions were made at the bar sufficient to remove the seriousness of this objection out of the way. It was acknowledged that if it had been an opposition to the militia act, then the crime would have been treason; or if it had been done to compel the repeal of an act, it would have been treason. For my part, I cannot perceive what kind of sanctity there is in the militia act more than any other, that should make any opposition to that act particularly serious: all the acts of congress flow from the same authority, and all tend to the same end, to wit, the happiness and security of the community: individuals may differ in their views of the magnitude of them; some may think the militia law, some the revenue law, some another, but the Legislature have thought all these laws equally necessary, and they having thought so, it is our duty to obey them all alike. But, if the opposition to the militia law, by force of arms, is to have this extraordinary sanctity, because it strikes immediately at the existence of the government, then I should be glad to know what can be said about a revenue law? Go­vernment cannot exist a day without revenue to support it! Farther: opposition by force to one law, is of the same nature as opposition to all the laws; the offence is levying war against the government; op­posing, by force of arms, an act of congress, with a view of defeat­ing its efficacy, and thus defying the, authority of the government, is equally the same in principle, if done in one instance, as it could be in many. In monarchical governments it will sometimes happen that a rebellion breaks out in an endeavor to destroy one monarch, and set [Page 169] another on the throne: in such a case the treason plainly and unequi­vocally displays itself, and there can be no doubt about it; but this cannot occur in a republican form of government: men are seldom found who will be guilty of such open treason, as to come forward, in the face of day, and declare their design to destroy the constitution or all the laws. No, if men of sense go to promote insurrection, whether they mean to destroy the government or not, they must be wicked; they go about their design by more insidious means, art will be used, and pains taken to promote a dislike to a certain law, this evil prejudice is encouraged until it becomes general among the peo­ple, and they become as ripe for insurrection as in the present case. Nor would the evil cease with the destruction of one law: they may declare they mean to stop at that one act, but having destroyed it, and finding their power above that of the government, is it not to be apprehended that they would destroy another, and another, and so on to any number they disapprove of: if they would not be particular in one case, they would not in another. During the western insur­rection the ex [...]ise law was unpopular: in this case it is the house tax act, and if this is permitted, it will be impossible to know where we can rest secure, nor how soon the government itself will fall a prey. This reason may account for the introduction into the English statute book, and our constitution, with the determination of the courts in both countries, of the principle that an attempt by force and violence to impede the operation of a single act shall be treason, and under the description of levying war, as much as what shall at first appear more dangerous, since the effect may be the same.

There is another preliminary point, meriting a few observations, that is with respect to the proclamation of the President. It was contended that, because that proclamation required the people to dis­perse, and commit no more crimes, it amounted to a pardon of all they did before. It is sufficient to observe here, that had this ob­jection been seriously made, a plea of pardon upon the ground of that proclamation must have been preferred, or it could not have been admitted. But the plea was not made, nor if it had, would it have been effectual, because, if this did amount to a pardon, it did so only on certain conditions; the attorney of the United States and the party are both allowed to show whether or not the prisoner has complied with the conditions of the pardon. It is possible also that the pardon has not been offered in such a manner as the constitution permits, in which case the attorney must be permitted to put in a demurrer. Of the force of these objections the court are to decide, and of course the plea must be referred to them.

Again, this pardon might have been pleaded in due season. Of this the counsel for the prisoner were informed, and had time to con­sider, but they did not choose to avail themselves of it. But if it had been proposed, nothing is more clear to me than its insufficiency; for in my view, the proclamation contained no pardon at all. The cir­cumstances which gave rise to, and the nature of the proclamation, ran thus: Certain information was received by the government of a [Page 170] disturbance having broken out in that part of the country, which, baffled the power of civil authority, but as it is necessary to prevent any insurrection with as little trouble as possible, after inferior means have failed, the law provides that the President shall make proclama­tion, inviting and commanding such disturbers of the public peace to disperse in quietness to their homes by a certain time: this must be done before the military can be ordered out against them. This is in order to prevent more people joining the standard of rebellion after­wards, and to admonish others not to commit farther crimes, but there is not a word in the proclamation implying an offer of pardon for any thing committed before.

The riot act of England was cited in support of this doctrine, but there is no similarity in the two cases: that act says, a magistrate shall go to the mob, and endeavor to prevail upon them to disperse, if he cannot do it, he reads the act, and if they still continue combined, they are guilty of felony, but then this felony is a crime created merely by that act, but even that act does not intimate that they should be pardoned for crimes committed before the magistrate came, even if they do disperse. Instances to the contrary might be cited.

Having now, gentlemen of the jury, stated my opinion in the best manner in my power on the law, independant of the facts, or the particular application of that law to the prisoner at the bar, I shall, agreeable to my duty, state to you in the best manner I am capable of, the nature of the issue which you are now called upon to deter­mine. It is an issue of an aspect the most awful and important that any juror can ever be called upon to determine. It is your duty to divest yourselves of all manner of prejudice and partiality one way or the other. Dismiss from your minds as much as you can all which you might have heard or thought on this case before you came into this court, and confine your opinions merely to the evidence which has been pro­duced. No extraneous circumstances whatever ought to have the least weight with you in giving your verdict: you ought not, and I hope you will not take into your consideration at all whether the safety of the United States requires that the prisoner should suffer, on the one hand, or whether on the other, it may be more agreeable to your feelings that he should be acquitted. It is solely your duty to say whether he is guilty of the crime charged to him or not. No man can con­ceive that the interest of any government can possibly make it requi­site to sacrifice any innocent man, and I can rest perfectly satisfied, which I have no doubt you also are, that this government will not, and God forbid any considerations whatever should ever influence such an action.

I do not think it necessary to go into a minute detail of all the evidence which have been produced, it would be only mispending time. The general scenes which passed at Bethlehem must be fully in your mind; these scenes are supported upon the evidence of twelve witnesses, but I think it my particular duty to bring to your recol­lection those parts of that transaction in which the prisoner at the bar was concerned, leaving the rest as much as possible out of view. On [Page 171] this occasion I must request the gentlemen of the bar, if in my in­stance I should err in stating the evidence, that they will correct me; but I shall endeavor to be accurate.

The judge here stated the prominent features of the evidence given by Messrs. Henry, John Burnett, William Barnet, Winters, Col. Nichols, Schlaugh, Horsefield, Eyerly, Toon and Mitchel, so far at related to the conduct of the prisoner at Bethlehem, which, he said, he thought proper to state first, because the offence charged in the in­dictment was said to be committed at Bethlehem. Gentlemen, he continued, if you are not well satisfied, that the overt act of treason was committed at Bethlehem, and that that overt act is supported by the evidence of two witnesses at least, you will not find the prisoner guilty.

Now, gentlemen, is the proper time for me to state one or two points concerning the law of evidence, of which you have heard much from the bar. As I observed, there must be two at least to prove that the act of treason was committed at Bethlehem. It is the opi­nion of the counsel for the prisoner that you must be convinced, not only of the fact by two witnesses,—not only that he was concerned in a certain act, but that you must have the evidence of two wit­nesses, at least, by evidence drawn from the same place, that it was done with a treasonable intention, before you can pay any attention to any other evidence whatever. The fact is, that when the overt act is proved by two witnesses, it is proper to go into evidence to show the course of the prisoner's conduct at other places, and the purpose for which he went to that place where the treason is laid, and if he went with a treasonable design, then the act of treason is conclusive. In this I am supported by a very respectable authority on crown law: Foster in the case of Deacon, from which it appears that it is enough, to prove that a rebellious assembly of armed men were there, and that the prisoner joined them. In order to prove to you fully the design with which the prisoner went to Bethlehem and joined in this great outrage, I shall select some of the evidence respecting those previous transactions; it is not necessary to state the whole.

The judge here read the evidence of James Chapman, John Rod­rick, Cephas Childs, and William Thomas respecting the conduct of Jacob Fries, on the 5th of March, and respecting the meeting with Foulke and Rodrick near Singmaster's; and also the transactions of the 6th, at Quaker town which evidence he said so confirmed each other, that no doubt could be entertained.

We now come to the confession of the prisoner, voluntarily made on his examination before judge Peters. Here is a point of law re­lied on by the prisoner's counsel—that no man should be convicted of treason but on the evidence of two witnesses, or upon confession in open court. This is the provision in England as well as here, and the meaning is, that no confession of the prisoner, independant of two wit­nesses, or without the facts have been established by two witnesses, should be sufficient to convict him: but if two witnesses have proved a fact, the confession of the party may be received by way of confir­mation of what has before been sworn to. In former days in Eng­land [Page 172] it was allowed that confession out of court and the proof of the witnesses should be sufficient to warrant a conviction; but happily our constitution would not admit it, if an hundred would swear to it, that danger is wisely avoided. Instances enough are in the recollection of the court, of a civil and criminal nature where confessions have been received, but the jury are to judge from other evidence how far that is to be regarded.

Evidence may sometimes be given which may be doubtful, and wants corroboration; you will judge whether that is or is not the case at present. But if the confession of the prisoner should go to confirm the evidence, if sworn to by two witnesses at least, it may be received, but unless it does go to corroborate other testimony, I do not think it admissible. You will consider whether any part of this confession has not before been proved by two witnesses: if it has, it goes to corrobo­rate what they say, if it has not, you are to disregard it. I think there ought to be great caution in receiving, as evidence, a confession which any man makes himself, because it possibly might be obtained from him by artifice or intimidation, with respect to this confession, you have the testimony of my honorable colleague, judge Peters, that he gave the prisoner deliberate warning, that he was not bound to con­vict himself, and that no intimidation was used. Whatever objec­tions, then, there may be as to confession in general, it does not ap­ply in this case, because it was voluntarily given.

The prisoner on his part introduced some witnesses, thinking they would be favorable to him: one of them appeared to be so in his testi­mony, which I shall endeavor to relate, the other three did not an­swer his expectation [The judge related the evidence of John Jamie­son.]

With regard to the point of law stated respecting the sufficiency of the warrants, the evidence to this fact shows the general disposition of that part of the country to resist the execution of the law, and pre­vent it by force or intimidation; our means of showing that, is their conduct towards the assessors. Those who were appointed to that office, so far as they had it in their power, showed a deposition to act as such. It is contended that their warrant ought to have been produ­ced. With respect to the blank commission which there was a sus­picion was unlawfully filled up, there ought to have been the books produced, but it was not material. This indictment it will be obser­ved, is not for any resistance to the assessors, or obstruction of them in the discharge of their duty. I suppose it is not necessary to show that these officers were de facto engaged in the execution of the law; that they were considered as assessors, and no suspicion ever was entertain­ed but that they were properly authorized to be assessors. This doubt if there was any, could be removed by reference to a very respectable authority. It was sufficient if the warrants, given under the seal of the commissioner, were produced to the court.

The honorable judge entered pretty largely into the examination of the objection respecting Mr. Foulke's appointment in the place of Mr. Clarke, which he contended was not material, since the warrant was filled and he acted under it.

[Page 173] With respect to another point of objection stated at the bar, that the marshal in detaining the two men at Bethlehem was liable to an action, he said that under the circumstances of that period he could not, because, under certain circumstances, he was warranted to call out the posse commitatus i. e. the power of the county, to assist him, if he was likely to be overpowered: it could not be presumed that the circumstance did not empower and warrant him to call them out, and therefore we may conclude that danger was really to be apprehended, and those apprehensions must be heightened by the arrival of those two men in arms. In the opinion of judge Henry, who was present, the danger was such as to justify the act of detention of those two men. Was it with a view of depriving these men of their liberty? No, but supposing them to become with intent to assist in the rescue which they acknowledged they had heard was contemplated.

Gentlemen, in looking to the law on this point, I do not think it is encroaching at all upon the liberty of any man to take him in custody: an officer in such an action must be at his peril, and could only be justified on the exigency of the circumstance: if he did it unnecessari­ly, a jury would teach him to take care how he sported with the li­berties of his fellow citizens; but supposing, from good evidence that he was in danger of assault, if he waited the United force of the as­sailants, shall it be contended as unreasonable, that the marshal should take measures of self-defence while it was in his power, and detain what he might reasonably suppose a part of them? He surely acted the part of a prudent man, and was justifiable in the act.

Before I dismiss this general subject, I think it an indispensible duty which I owe, to declare that, excepting the single instance, wherein I do perceive some impropriety of conduct, in the filling up the blank, commission, what has been disclosed in the course of this examination of the conduct of the commissioners or assessors, has reflected on those officers the greatest honor: at the same time they acted with industry, fidelity, and firmness, in the discharge of that duty they did all in their power to make it easy to the people, accommodating themselves to endeavor to give full satisfaction, undeceiving the deluded, and re­moving the errors which the people had fallen into. If the people still continued in ignorance and opposition, those gentlemen acquitted themselves of blame, and their conduct merited high praise.

As to the plea of ignorance, the law says ignorance shall excuse no man, other wise, how could it be possible to prove whether a person knew the law or not: if ignorance could excuse a man of crimes, no crime would be brought to justice, or there must be, what is not to be expected, some self evident proof of the guilt. A compleat knowledge of the laws cannot be expected to find every corner of our country; but thus much we may say, to remove those kinds of excuse; if a man does not know when a law is passed, he knows how to obtain that information, and the law itself; for if he cannot come to Phila­delphia, or some other town where they may be purchased himself, he has opportunity of sending from time to time. But in the present case any doubt could have been removed by application to the assessors, who were ever ready and willing to show the law, and therefore no plea of ignorance can possibly be set up.

[Page 174] Having spoken in commendation of the conduct of the commissi­oners and assessors, perhaps it is also my duty to say that the conduct of the marshal has been equally exemplary: he did every thing in his power, by fair and honorable means, to avoid going to extremity, and as long as he had a hope of retaining his prisoners, he displayed a degree of courage which few men would do; he even offered to ex­pose his life to this armed mob, by proceeding with the prisoners to Philadelphia, which he would have done but for the advice of three or four gentlemen with him, who thought it madness to proceed. He accordingly desisted, and in the event delivered up the prisoners.

This trial has lasted so many days, that we must be all very much fatigued; and I declare, gentlemen, I have scarce had power to examine the various points with minute attention, much less to pre­pare so proper a statement of them as I intended to have done; the fa­tigue I have felt many nights at going out of this court has prevented me doing it: under these circumstances I have no doubt of your ex­cuse, which I shall the more readily meet, since your fatigue must also be very great.

Gentlemen of the Jury. The occasion is undoubtedly the most awful and important that ever could arise in any country whatever: the great question for you to decide is, whether the prisoner has been guilty of levying war against the United States at Bethle­hem, in the county of Northampton, as charged in the indictment, or not—in order to discover the nature of his conduct, you must ex­amine into the motive with which he went to Bethlehem: it is neces­sary for you to examine the whole of his previous actions relating thereto: if it should appear to you that the prisoner formed a scheme, either on the way or at Bethlehem, by any kind of force to obtain this object, then, in my opinion, you ought to declare him guilty of the charge laid in the indictment. On the contrary, if you think he had no public and evil motive in view, he is not guilty of the crime.

Before I dismiss you, gentlemen, I would remind you of one considera­tion which must impress your minds: a great and important end of bring­ing persons guilty of public crimes to justice is to preserve inviolate the laws of our country: men who commit crimes ought to be punished, otherwise no safety nor security can be had. On the other hand, it is of consequence, that no man's life shall be taken away unjustly; if a man is not guilty of a crime, he ought not to be punished for it; and it cannot be for the interest of the country to put a man to death for what he has not committed: therefore you are not to regard the consequences, but determine merely by the facts in a manner for which you will be answerable at a future day, as well as myself, for all the conduct of our lives, as well as for the verdict you now give.

Mr. LEWIS stated a question to the court, whether the overt act laid in the indictment in a certain county, must not be proved to the sa­tisfaction of the jury, both as to fact and intention in the same coun­ty, or whether the overt act did not include both fact and intention. To which judge Iredell replied, that he considered Foster's crown law as settling that point—when two witnesses are produced, which proves the overt act laid in the indictment, there might be then evidence [Page 175] drawn from other countries respecting the intention: this is the opi­nion of judge Foster, and it is my opinion. But there is another thing: it goes to a point which is inadmissible; it is not for the court to say whether there was a treasonable intention or act as charged in the indictment; that is for the jury to determine; we have only to state the laws, we therefore should have no right to give our opinion upon it. Again, if no evidence could regularly be admitted out of the county until both the fact and intention were established where the crime is laid, the consequence would be, that there ought to be some way of taking the opinion of the jury, whether they believed that the crime was committed at Bethlehem, before the court could pro­ceed to extraneous testimony! This cannot be done, a jury must give verdict upon all the evidence collectively; if the evidence is admitted, then the jury is bound to respect the weight of it: the competency of that evidence is for the court to decide, but the jury must estimate its weight.

The question for you to decide at this time, gentlemen of the jury, is, whether upon the testimony of two witnesses there is ground to believe the act was committed, and whether, from the prisoner's con­duct at Bethlehem or elsewhere, it is proved to be with a treasonable intention.

JUDGE PETERS—I think the overt act and the intention constitute the treason; for without the intention the treason is not compleat. If a man goes for a private purpose, to gratify a private revenge, and not with a public or general view, it differs materially. The inten­tion may possibly be gathered at the place where the act was com­mitted, or it may not; if not, evidence is admissible to prove it else­where.

The jury then withdrew, and the court adjourned for about three hours, when they returned with the verdict GUILTY.

Judge Iredell then dismissed the jury, with the thanks of the court for their patience and attention during the very fatiguing trial.*

Mr. Wynekoop, the foreman of this jury, made a short reply thereto, and the court adjourned.

[...]
[Page 177]

TRIAL OF JOHN FRIES, FOR TREASON: Recommenced, an account of a Motion made by MR. LEWIS for a new Trial; grounded on the disquali­fication of JOHN ROADS, one of the Jurymen on the former Trial. (See Appendix, No. II.)
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT.

JOHN FRIES was again arraigned on the indictment for treason *, before the Honorable SAMUEL CHASE and RICHARD PETERS, Esquires.

The prisoner pleaded, NOT GUILTY.

MR. LEWIS and MR. DALLAS, before engaged to plead for the prisoner, on account of the conduct directed by the court, to be ob­served by the counsel, withdrew their assistance; so that the prisoner was left without counsel; and on being asked by the court, if he would wish to have some assigned, he did not accept the offer.

THURSDAY, April 24.

Before the jurors were sworn in, they were individually asked (upon oath) these questions: "Are you any way related to the prisoner?" [Page 178] They all answered, "No." ‘Have you ever formed or delivered an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, or that he ought to be punished?’ The answer generally was, ‘Not to my know­ledge.’ Some of the jurors said, they had given their sentiments generally, disapprobatory of the transaction, but not as to the prisoner particularly. These were admitted.

One of the jurors (Mr. Taggert) after he was sworn, expressed himself to the court to be very uneasy under his oath: he then meant that he never had made up his mind that the prisoner should be hung, but very often had spoken his opinion, that he was very culpable; he did not, when he took the oath, conceive it so strict, and therefore wished, if possible, to be excused.—The court informed the juror, it was impossible to excuse him, now he was sworn.

The court informed the prisoner, that he had a right to challenge 35 without showing cause, and as many more as he could show cause for. Thirty-four were challenged, and the following admitted and sworn on the jury:

Samuel Wheeler, Foreman; Henry Pepper; John Taggert; Cor­nelius Comegys; Ephraim Clark; Thomas Bailey; Lawrence Cauff­man; John Edge; Charles Deshler; Henry Dubois; Isaac Dehaven; John Balliot.

Counsel for the Prosecution, MR. RAWLE, MR. INGERSOL.

MR. RAWLE

Then opened the charge exhibited in the indictment—He observed, that the jury must be aware of the very unpleasant duty he had to perform: he felt an extreme difficulty of situation—called forth by his duty to exhibit a charge against the prisoner at the bar of the highest magnitude, who now stood to answer, unattended by any legal advice; he felt impressed with the necessity of sticking more than usually close to the line of his duty, which he should endeavor to dis­charge as faithfully as possible. And he trusted that, while the jury felt their relation to their unfortunate fellow-citizen at the bar, they would, at the same time, make all suitable allowance for any errors which might appear on his (Mr. Rawle's) part, though it was sincere­ly his desire to avoid any, either in laying down the facts or the law, which he should do under the direction of the court; and, he hoped, that the jury would carefully sift and examine the law and testimony which his duty called upon him to advance, in order to substantiate the charge.

MR. RAWLE then proceeded to open the charge—he said, he should be able to prove, that John Fries, the prisoner at the bar, did oppose the execution of two laws of the United States; to effectuate which [Page 179] he was provided with men, who, as well as himself, were armed, with guns, swords, and other warlike weapons, which, by their numbers and military appearance, were sufficient to accomplish their purpose, which was, not only to intimidate the officers of the government appointed to execute the above laws themselves; but to release from the custody of the marshal of Pennsylvania a number of persons who were held in prison by the said marshal, and to prevent him executing process upon others. All this was done, as stated in the indictment by a combina­tion and conspiracy to oppose those laws, by a large body of armed men, of whom the prisoner at the bar was the chief, and commander.

MR. RAWLE then proceeded, under the direction of the court, to state the law.—The treason whereof the prisoner was charged was, "Levying war against the United States." U. S. Const. Art. 3. Sect. 3.

What he asked, was levying war against the United States?

He conceived himself authorized, upon good authority to say, levy­ing war did not only consist in open, manifest, and avowed rebellion against the government, with a design of overthrowing the constitution: but it may consist in assembling together, in numbers and by actual force, or by terror opposing any particular law or laws. Again, there can be no distinction as to the kind or nature of the law, or the par­ticular object for which the law was passed, since all are alike the acts of the legislature, who are sent by the people at large to express their will. Force need not be used to manifest this spirit of rebellion, nor is it necessary that the attempts should have been successful, to con­stitute the crime. The endeavor, by intimidation to do the act, whe­ther it be accomplished or not, amounts to treason, provided the object of those concerned in the transaction is of a general nature, and not applied to a special or private purpose.

In order to effect the object of those embarked in crimes of this high nature, it is well known that various means are necessarily employed; various acts may be perpetrated to accomplish the main end: they may proceed, by the execution of some enormous crimes, as burglary, arson, robbery, or murder, either, or all of them; but even if one or all of these crimes were committed, except the purpose should be of a general nature, they may form distinct and heinous offences; but the perpetra­tors may not be guilty of treason. If a particular friend of the party had been in the custody of the marshal; if even a number sufficient for the purpose should step forward and rescue such a person, if it was not with a view to rescue prisoners generally, it would amount to no more than a rescue; but, if general, it is treason. It is the views of the party that fixes the crime, and therefore only the design is necessa­ry to be known.

To prove that this doctrine was well established in the United States, Mr. Rawle turned to 2 Dallas, 346 and 355, stating the opinions of the court in the cases of Vigal and Mitchel, charged with, and con­victed for treason. The attack on Gen. Nevill's house was of this general nature, because he was an officer appointed to execute the obnoxious law; and being to the officer and not to the man that they objected, it was thought to be treason, and that decision was well grounded.

[Page 180] He observed, that the clause in our constitution was founded on a statute which was passed in England, to prevent the ever increasing and ever varying number of treasons, upon the general and undefined opposition to royal prerogative: the situation of things was such, previous to that period, as to call forth from the stateman, from the philosopher, and from the divine, even in those dark ages, the most ve­hement complaints: in attendance to these reasonable and just mur­murs, the statute was passed.

Mr. Rawle was then producing an authority, when Judge Chase said, the court would admit, as a general rule, of quotations which referred to what constituted actual or constructive levying war against the king of Great Britain, in his regal capacity; or, in other words, of levying war against his government, but not against his person, be­cause it was of the same nature as levying war against the United States would be applied here: so was that part called adhering to the king's enemies:—they may, any of them, be read to the jury, and the deci­sions thereupon,—not as authorities whereby we are bound, but as the opinions and decisions of men of great legal learning and ability. But even then, the court would attend carefully to the time of the decisions, and in no case must it be binding upon our juries.

Mr. Rawle quoted Hawkins, B. 1. chap. 17. sect. 23. as an autho­rity of authenticity to prove, that not only those who rebelled against the king, by taking up arms with the avowed design of dethroning him; but those who withstood his lawful authority, and who endea­vored to oppose his government; who withstood the king's forces, or attacked any of hiss fortresses—those, in fine, whose avowed object was of a public and general and not of a private and personal nature, were guilty of high treason. He also read Sir John Friend's case from Holt, 681. and Damarree and Pinchases' case, 8 State Trials, 289.

JUDGE CHACE begged the attorney to read only those parts of the cases which referred to what could be treason in the United States, and nothing which related to compassing the king's death.—It would be found, he observed, by an attention to the last case, that because the intention, was a rising to demolish ALL meeting-houses, generally, it was considered to be an insurrection against the toleration act, by numbers and open force, setting the law at defiance. This would be found to be the opinion in Foster 213.

Mr. RAWLE said, thus he conceived it—even if the matter made a grievance of was illegal, the demolition of it in this way was, ne­vertheless, high treason, because of the people so assembled taking the law into their own hands; thus in Foster it would be seen that demolishing all baudy-houses, as such was high treason, as much as demolishing all meeting-houses, being equally an usurped authority. He also read Douglas 570, Lord George Gordon's case, when it was Lord Mansfield's opinion that any attempt, by violence, to force the repeal of a law, or to prevent its execution, is levying war, and treason.

He considered, from those few authorities, that he was justifiable in saying that a rising, with intent by force to prevent the execution [Page 181] of a law as well as laws in general, preventing the marshal executing his warrants, and preventing the other officers charged with the ex­ecution of the laws in question, amounted to levying war, agreeable to the constitution of the United States.

Mr. RAWLE then proceeded to state the most prominent facts which could be produced in the course of the evidence, in which it would fully appear, he presumed, that John Fries, the prisoner, was the most active in his opposition to those laws and to every attempt to car­ry them into effect; that he in every instance showed his aversion of, and opposition to the assessors, and determination by threats and me­naces to prevent them doing their duty, and that whenever any force was used, or terrific appearances held up, he was the commander and gave the orders to his men who, at times in great numbers joined him; and that finally by threats and intimidation, equally the same in the eyes of the law as force, he, the prisoner, did attain his object [...] to wit, the release of a number of prisoners who were confined for op­posing the execution of the law, and were actually in custody of the marshal in a house at Bethlehem, which by reason of his having pri­soners there, and his having an armed posse to protect his lawful au­thority, was to all intents a fortress of the United States—and further that he did, compleatly for a time, prevent the execution of the laws intended, in those parts, and thus did bid defiance to all lawful autho­rity.

COURT, to the prisoner,

John Fries, you will attend to all the evidence that will be brought against you; will attend to their examination, and ask any questions you please of the several witnesses, or of the court, but be careful to ask no questions wherein you may possibly criminate yourself, for re­member, whatever you say to your own crimination, is evidence with the jury, but if you say any thing to your justification, it is not evi­dence, the court will be watchful of you, they will check any thing that may injure yourself: they will be your counsel, and give you eve­ry assistance and indulgence in their power.

WILLIAM HENRY, ESQ called.

See his former testimony page 24, and page 82.

Mr. Henry related the first information he received of this oppositi­on to the laws in question, and their unwillingness to suffer the as­sessments. That on application by Mr. Eyerly (the commissioner) he issued a number of subpoeneas to bring before him sundry persons to examine these facts, which he found ineffectual from the intimidations of a number of people who were met where the examinations were to be held. The witness, understanding that the marshal was to meet a number of persons upon whom he had executed process, thought it proper to go to Bethlehem on that day, in order to prevent any extre­mities that might be attempted. He related the arrival of Keefer and Paulus and others, and afterwards of about 70 or 80 foot, generally armed with guns, having shot pouches and powder horns, and also of about 50 light horsemen with swords and pistols, that of these men [Page 182] Fries, appeared to be the leader; that he was the person engaged in negotiation with the marshal for the prisoners, whom the witness un­derstood he said he would have. That there were frequent cries out of, "we will have the prisoners," and frequent threats thrown out, particularly against Mr. Eyerly, Mr. Balliot, and himself (the wit­ness,) sometimes pointing their guns to the windows.

COURT.

Was the prisoner present at these threats?

WITNESS.

I cannot recollect, as I was about in different parts of the house—one person I saw cock his piece several times to those standing on the stairs. One of the riflemen came into the back room and swore, that if these damned stamplers had given them an oppor­tunity, they would have shown them how they could have fought, and they would show them yet.

How long has the word stampler been in use in those parts?

Only since about the fall of '98.—The witness farther deposed, that Fries was distinguished from the rest by a black feather in his hat—that the persons who were in custody of the marshal resided from 30 to 40 miles from most of those who came to rescue them, and near 40 miles from where Fries lived.

WILLIAM BARNETT (see page 28.)

Being one of the posse, was appointed by the marshal to meet and endeavor to prevail on the armed party not to come into Bethlehem; he deposed that he mentioned to them the western insurrection, and told them of the consequences of resistance, but to no effect: Fries, the prisoner, said, he had had a fight yesterday, and would have an­other to-day; the witness expected he had been in a frolic. That the captain of the riflemen seemed determined to release the prisoners, and indeed that was their common cry. The witness asked them if they would not allow that if the prisoners had done wrong, they should suffer for it: they answered they had no objections to that, but they should not be dragged to Philadelphia, they should be tried at Easton, their own county town. They appeared to be in liquor a little.

The witness was asked if he had any recollection about who would get the first blow, or who were expected to fire on them (Fries and his followers.) The witness had not a perfect recollection of it.

ATTORNEY.

Do you not recollect any person saying "you must stay, strike, and make as good as you can, if I fall or get the first blow," or something like that, in the German language.

WITNESS.

I do not recollect any such words.

JOHN BARNET (see page 31.)

Deposed that he was one of the posse at Bethlehem; that he saw the armed men come into the town, the horse with their swords drawn, as usual, when they went to war. When the witness stood guard on the stairs, Fries and another wanted to go up; Fries had his sword, and the other a pistol: upon their asking for the marshal, [Page 183] he was called, and Fries was let up to him, but the other was not suffered to go up: one at a time the witness thought was enough. The witness heard some of the prisoners at Bethlehem say, that they did not know the men who rescued them, nor did they know of their coming, or wish to be rescued.

CHRISTIAN WINTERS (see page 34.)

Was one of the marshal's posse—he related some conversation be­tween the marshal and the prisoner on the stairs: after he was relieved from that station, he went down, when he asked the people out of doors what they were doing: they said they would obey their cap­tain's orders; the witness did not know what captain they meant; they were all strangers to him.

ATTORNEY.

Did any man strike at you!

WITNESS.

No, but after the affray was over, there was one of them walked under the stairs with his sword, of whom the marshal sent me to inquire his name: he answered he did not mean to do any harm. Another said he did not mind these damned st [...]mplers.

PHILIP SCHLAUH (see page 41.)

Deposed that he was at Bethlehem on the 7th, of March where he saw the prisoner at the bar, who said to his company that he had been up with the marshal, and that the prisoners were refused by the mar­shall, who said if they were taken it must be by force—"Now boys," said he, "I give you my orders; we don't mean to hurt any body; we have to pass between 4 or 5 centries, I expect I shall get the first blow, and when I get the first blow yo [...] [...] do as well as you can; will you agree to it boys?" "Yes" they [...]

Judge Peters

—Do you recollect the very [...] Fries mentioned?

WITNESS.

The very words were, striking his breast "I shall be the foremast man, I expect I shall get the first blow, then do at well as you can."

ATTORNEY.

Did he say any thing about firing?

WITNESS.

No.

COURT.

Do you remember any words he used?

WITNESS.

No.

Christian Winters returned—Having forgot to mentioned that when the demand was made of the marshal, he told the prisoner he could not deliver up the prisoners: Fries said "you are not to be blam­ed; you do your duty, and I give you my word you shall not be hurt by my men, as for the rest I cannot answer."

SAMUEL TOON (see page 51.)

Related Something of the company proceeding to the bridge, the conversation and occurrences there, and the mission to Bethlehem, in which he, and two others were sent for the release of Kiefer and Paulus—That when Stahler's company were drawn up before the [Page 184] house, one of them, named Henry Hoover, said if he only had eight men, he would go up and rescue the prisoners, when the witness heard Fries answer that he should not behave himself so, for that was not the way to go on. After a little time Fries said to his company "come on boys, dont be afraid." This was after he had been up with the mar­shal. They then wanted to press up stairs, and then the prisoners were delivered up. The witness heard no other expressions from Fries.

ANDREW SHIFFERT (see page 56)

On the company meeting at Ritter's tavern the witness asked them what they were going to Bethlehem for? They said "to release the prisoners." Then said the witness, you must either fight or hide your­selves in the Buck wheat straw. Ritter answered there was no danger of that, for when they come to see so many in arms they would soon draw back, and would let the prisoners free.

ATTORNEY.

Was there any thing said about whether to go with arms or without arms?

WITNESS.

There was nothing said against it, that I know of. I told them I would rather go home.

WILLIAM NICHOLS (marshal) (see page 37.)

Related the receipt of the warrants, which he produced, and the first part of his progress; also the circumstance that occurred with Shankweiler, and of the commencement and progress of the affair at Bethlehem. Reasoning with the prisoner at the bar, and his still persist­ing in his demand of the prisoners, the witness said that it was a cow­ardly thing to oppose an individual thus placed, but that if he had 20 armed men, the prisoners should not be rescued. The prisoner laugh­ed at that: on telling him that an armed force would be sent up, he answered that they were able to come against any force.

COURT.

Did he show any particular regard for these prisoners, or what was his assigned reason for demanding them?

WITNESS.

No he did not, he said the law was a bad one, and ought not to be executed.

Question by the prisoner.

*—When the conversation passed between you and I, did I not ask you if these prisoners could not be admitted to bail?—I said I would come forward and risk my life, that you should not be hurt—Was it so or was it not?

WITNESS.

Very possibly, but I do not recollect i [...].

Had I any arms when I came up to you.

Not at that time.

The court then adjourned to dinner, first having placed the jury un­der two sworn bailiffs, and qualified each juror not to speak to any one nor suffer any one to speak to them, touching the matter relative to the trial of this issue.

[Page 185] JOHN DILLINGER (see page 57.)

Deposed his having left a message at Young Marks's house for him to meet the next day to go to Bethlehem, and that Stahler who sent him, said it was very hard to let these men (the prisoners) suffer by going down to Philadelphia. Being at Bethlehem the next day, the witness saw the prisoner at the bar there: hearing an uproar, the wit­ness went into the house, where he heard the prisoner (Fries) say, "draw near boys, don't be afraid."—I pushed the people back, as did several others there.

JUDGE PETERS.

Was it a common muster day?

WITNESS.

No, I believe not.

CHRISTIAN HECKAVELTER qualified.

The witness resided in upper Milford township—Soon after I re­ceived my warrant as assessor of the township and was proceeding on the business, I was told by my neighbors that the people of the town­ship would not allow me to do it. After I had been to a few houses, I was told if I went on, it should be at my peril—this was the latter end of November I believe. I then returned home, and informed Mr. Balliot and Mr. Elliot, in order to consult them, what should be done. They agreed to call a township meeting to collect the minds of the people. After it was held, I received from a deputation of three men appointed for that purpose, information that I must desist, for there was no such law in existence. After that Mr. Eyerly in­formed me he had called a meeting of the people at squire Schymer's, he took me with him. A number of people assembled there, some armed and some without arms. Mr. Eyerly told them he was come to ex­plain the law to them. There was a question among them whether it was a law or not; some said it was not in existence, and that it was a law of his own making, for that he was able enough to make such a law himself; I believe it was agreed among them that they would not have their houses measured.

COURT.

Was there not frequent threats thrown out?

WITNESS.

Yes there was; they also gave it as their positive de­claration that they would not submit to the law; this was their com­mon opinion.

ATTORNEY.

Do you know any thing of papers being pasted up with swords, pistols, or threats, being painted or drawn on them?

WITNESS.

No.

JOHN ROMICK,

Deposed that he was an assessor, in Macungy township

—Not long after I received my commission, a women came to me, and said I should not go on with that business, before I was prepared with an iron cap: another old women soon after told [...] I should not venture to that business of measuring houses: I would come in bad condition with it. I told her I did not think it, because they were all Christians there [Page 186] about, and I believed christians would not hurt me. The talk was, that in some houses they kept hot water against the assessor came round to do his duty. After that I heard there, that there had been several meetings like complots, or conspiracies to obstruct the assessors, on that account I was frightened to make a beginning. I heard that Mr. Heckavelter was stopped. Hearing that there was to be a meet­ing at squire Schymer's I went there, where Mr. Eyerly explained the law.

ATTORNEY.

After that, did the people let you go on?

WITNESS.

No.

Q.

Was there any sedition papers put up near you?

A.

Yes, about three miles off—near Millar's town, but I cannot tell what they were; I never read them.

JACOB OSWALD

Deposed, That he was appointed assessor for Lynn township: That about December, 1798, he came to about the ninth plantation, when he was stopped by the people.—I heard that there was to be a town­ship meeting held, so I went, and took two constitutions with me, and the proclamation of General Washington to the Western insurgents in 1794. I also showed them my orders, and the act of Congress. They thought Congress had no right to tax them: I showed them that Congress had a right. They said, I should stop till the lower townships began to measure, as Philadelphia and Germantown; so I was forced to stop. The township was not assessed till after the light horse went up there, and then the liberty poles were cut down.

ISAAC SCHYMER, ESQ

Was an assessor for the township of Williams and Lower Sauchon; he deposed, That he was proceeding on his business; and, on account of the talk of opposition, wrote to a neighboring assessor to go about with him, but that he refused on that very account: he then went by himself; at one place he was stopped, when the man said to the wit­ness, he would abuse him if he pretended to measure his house. The witness said, he did not mean to quarrel with him; he must make his returns to him in ten days. The man also said, there would be danger in his going to take the rates.

In Lower Sauchon the witness also met with opposition: the men had gone from their homes; but a quantity of women were gathered there, and compelled him to desist.

JAMES WILLIAMSON, ESQ

Deposed, That he was an assessor in Northampton county: That soon after he had received the appointment, several of his near neigh­bors came and warned him not to go about the township: That he attempted many houses, but they would give him no information; whereupon he told them to bring their rates in ten days, according to [Page 187] law: they answered, they would not bring them, they would make no returns: every one said, he should offend his neighbors if he did. I then thought it best to put up advertisements for them to meet toge­ther, on a certain day, to consult what it was best to do: a very large party of them met. After a little time, three or four seem to wish to disturb the meeting. One of them asked for my authority: I showed them my appointment: they seemed to be much opposed to what was done: I reasoned with them, but to no purpose; many of them said, it was no law. I read the law to them: they were pretty well satisfied while I was reading, till I came to where the valuation was mentioned, then one of them cried out, it was a damned law, and they never would submit to any such law. I told them it was a law, and as long as it was a law, we must support it; they said they never would, and signified they would [...]ather fight against it. I told them that fighting was attended with dangerous consequences, for that men lost their lives in it; but they said they would rather die than submit to it, or live under it; they had fought against such laws, and they would again. They told me, that I should not go about to collect the returns, they never would suffer it to be done; I should let the business alone, and if any damage occurred to me by being fined, the township should reimburse me. The whole body seemed to rise and give their assent to this.

JAMES CHAPMAN, ESQ

Related nothing in his testimony different from his deposition in the former trial, page 67.

JOHN RODRICK (see page 72.)

Did not vary from his former testimony, but shortened it, in the less important parts.

WILLIAM THOMAS (page 58.)

Depose, That Fries and Kuder sent Marks and Gettman to bunt (he before said find) the assessors: That upon their entering Quaker town, on the 6th of March, the people fired all their pieces. He related their conduct to Mr. Foulke and Mr. Childs there, and the meeting next morning to go to Millar's town, and thence the circumstance till the arrival at their bridge; that they had a drum and fife which was played, and that they were commanded by John Fries and Kuder.—He deposed, That Fries said to his men, ‘For God's sake don't fire except we are fired on first; after I am killed, then help yourselves as well as you can.’—That about 30 followed Fries into the house, of which he was one; some had arms, and some had not. Fries had his sword.

COURT.

What did you go in the house for?

WITNESS.

Why, Henry called me, and said I must come along.

Q.

Did you know any of the prisoners?

A.
[Page 188]

No; none of them.

COURT.

What did you go up to Bethlehem for?

WITNESS.

Why, old Marks said, it was to show ourselves; but I cannot tell what for.

Q.

Was it to take the prisoners?

A.

I do not know myself. The people of Northampton were go­ing up to take the prisoners, and we went to show ourselves.

Q.

Were you armed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How did the people go away after they got the prisoners?

A.

Why, they got away as fast as they could: those that were on horseback rode away as fast as they could, and those on foot ran away.

PRISONER TO THE WITNESS.

When I came out to you and told you that the marshal had showed me his order, had I any arms, or a sword?

A.

No. The last time, when you told the men they must rescue the prisoners by force, you had a sword.

COURT.

Did you hear the people cry out, they would have the prisoners?

A.

Yes; one Hoover, particularly.

PRISONER.

Did you ever see me at any of the township meetings, except at Kline's?

A.

I never saw the prisoner at any meeting at all, as I was not at the meeting at Kline's: I was only at the meeting at Mitchel's.

WITNESS.

After we had come from Bethlehem three or four days, I told the prisoner that I heard the light horse was coming up: the prisoner said no, it was all settled and quiet: if they sent a child of ten years old, he (the prisoner) would help the marshal to take them.

EVERHARD FOULKE, ESQ (page 115.)

Deposed, That he was an assessor in Lower Milford: That he pro­ceeded on in the assessment until he met the other assessors, and the principal assessor, James Chapman, at Jacob Fries's tavern, where they dined together; and after dinner the prisoner came into the room, and said, he was sorry to see them there upon that business: he warned them not to proceed any farther; if they did they should be hurt; and then he immediately left the room, without even an answer. He then mentioned the circumstance near Singmaster's, as related by Mr. Rodrick (p. 71.) the prisoner seized the deponent's horse, but let him go again, saying, he would take him the next day: That they had 5 or 700 men in arms, and would come to his house and take him. He heard the firing at Quaker's town; the circumstances which occurred there he related. Having taken the assessment papers, the prisoner returned them, saying it was more than the witness deserved.

Q.

Did they say any thing about getting the law repealed?

A.
[Page 189]

I am not certain.—The other people said they would submit; but not till after the other states did: Fries said, they would never submit.

COURT.

YOU are a magistrate, are you not, sir?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Fries know it?

A.

Yes; he had many times known me in that capacity.

PRISONER

—When I took you from the people to the back kitch­en, and away out of the house backward, and helped you on your horse, Did I or not desire you to go out of the way, so that the peo­ple should not see you?

WITNESS.

Yes, you did take me out the back way, and said, Captain Kuder was then commanding the people in the front of the house: you did desire me to keep out of their way.

CEPHAS CHILDS (see page 73.)

Related some of the prominant transactions at Quaker town, where he was much abused, though not by the prisoner; but his papers, as coroner, were taken away by the prisoner, and returned to him; when, having been warned not to proceed, the witness told the prisoner he would not return to it in that capacity, unless forced to it by law, as he had left it. One person who abused the witness said, he had fought for liberty, and would fight for it again; but he afterwards returned, seemed sorry for it, and several times afterwards, acknow­ledged his crime, and hoped forgiveness. The general language of the people was abuse to the "damned laws," as they called them.

ISRAEL ROBERTS (page 113.)

In several conversations with the prisoner, he heard him express his dislike of the law. Having procured the law, and heard the prisoner say that he had never read it, he desired him to examine it, which the prisoner said he would do, and asked leave to take it home.—The wit­ness afterwards asked his (Fries's) son, what his father thought of the law? he answered, not much, he believed. At a meeting held (per­haps at Mitchel's, p. 65 and 68.) an attempt was made to read the law, but they would not suffer it: one man said, he knew the law; another said, they wanted to hear none of our damned laws, nor would hear it, and, stamping his musket on the floor, said, ‘This is our law; we have made a law of our own, and we are determined to support it.’—On the 5th of March I met John Fries, when he appeared to be very ill humoured: I asked him what was the matter? he said, the assessors had been about, and they should not do it. He asked me, if they had taken the dimensions of my house? I said they had. He asked me, if I had told any body of it? I said not. He seemed very much opposed to the law, and said, his township should not be assessed till other parts were gone through.

Q.

Did you ever hear him say any thing about war?

A.
[Page 190]

I have heard him say many times if there was a war he would be in it: if the French, or whoever invaded the country, he would oppose them. I mentioned to him that government would send up an army. He said if they did, they would turn about and join them, he was of opinion.

ATTORNEY.

Did you ever recollect hearing him say, that if a be­ginning was made it would go on well?

A.

I do not.

FRIDAY, April 25. DANIEL WIEDNER.

Q.

Did you, on the 6th of March, see a party of men marching down the road from Jacob Fries's?

A.

Yes; I saw a body of men march to Fries's, and then to Quaker town; some were armed, and some unarmed. I went after them as far as Fries's.

Q.

Had they a drum and fife?

A.

Yes; they had when they came by my house, and by Jacob Fries's too.

Q.

Did you see the prisoners with them?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who appeared to have the command?

A.

The prisoner and capt. Kuder.—They wanted somebody to go after the assessors: so Gettman, Marks, and two more went.

Q.

Who wanted them to go?

A.

The prisoner at the bar.

Q.

What were they to do with them when they got them?

A

Why they were to bring them to Quaker town.

Q.

Were any of these four men who went after the assessors armed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How many of them were armed?

A.

I think Marks and Gettman were, or all of them; I am not sure. I think one of the four was the prisoner's son: I do not know whether he was armed.

Q.

Did you not meet at Marks's the next morning to go to Beth­lehem?

A.

Yes. When we left Marks's, we went on towards Ritter's ta­vern, and before we got there, Marks's son was coming back, and held up his sword for us to stop: he said that he thought it was all over before now; they were gone from Ritter's tavern. Some agreed to go back, some said since they were gone so far they would go through.

Q.

Of which was the prisoner at the bar?

A.

I think he was for going on.

COURT.

Was William Thomas among you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was he for going on, or not?

A.
[Page 191]

I cannot recollect.—We then went on to Bethlehem.

Q.

Did the prisoner go into the house at Bethlehem, and what hap­pened there?

A.

Why, he went into the house, and when he came out, he said, the marshal would not give up the prisoners without we should take them by force, and if they had a mind to take them, he would go foremost. Fries and the rest then went in, but I don't recollect whe­ther he had a sword at that time: he had one when we were going to Bethlehem.

GEORGE MITCHEL (page 64.)

Related the ground of going to Bethlehem, and their arrival there.

COURT.

Did you see any of the people before the house point their guns?

A.

No, not to my knowledge.

Q.

Did you hear any threats used to Judge Henry or any other?

A.

Not that I know.

PRISONER.

At Marks's, the time I said I meant to oppose the law, the room was pretty full of people; in what part of the room was it?

A

It was on the right hand side of the room, on the bench.

Q.

Was there any people by?

A.

Not that I recollect.

COURT.

Be cautious what you say, John Fries.

PRISONER.

Do you not remember that I said (after the committee was agreed to) I would come forward to the government, if they would send the order by a child of ten years old, if I was sent for?

A.

Not that I recollect.

The counsel for the prisoner here rested their evidence. The prisoner was asked if he had any witnesses to produce: he answered, None.

MR. RAWLE

Said he felt himself so very peculiarly situated in this case, that he would wish the opinion of the Court. The unfortunate prisoner at the bar appeared to answer to a charge, the greatest that could be brought against him, without the assistance of counsel, or any friend to advise with.—To me, said Mr. R. the evidence against the pri­soner is extremely strong. It will be recollected, that in opening the evidence, I informed the jury what points I should prove: I opened my ideas of constructive law, and produced a few authorities in sup­port of my opinions. I believe it will be found, that in no material point have I failed to substantiate what I first gave notice that I could prove. I therefore conceive the charges are fully confirmed.

[Page 192] But although, if this trial was conducted in the usual way, and counsel were ready to advocate the cause of the prisoner, it would now be proper on my part to sum up the evidence as produced to the jury, and apply it to the law, in order to see whether the crime was fixed or not—under the present circumstances, I feel very great re­luctance to fulfill, what would in other circumstances be my bounden duty, lest it should appear to be going farther than the rigid requisiti­on of my office compels me to. I therefore shall rest the evidence and the law here, except the court think that my office as public prosecu­tor demands of me to do it, or that I should not fulfil my duty without doing it.

JUDGE CHASE.

—It is not unfrequent for a prisoner to appear in a court of justice without counsel, but it is uncommon for a prisoner not to accept of legal assistance. It is the peculiar lenity of our laws that makes it the duty of a court to assign counsel to the person ac­cused. With respect to your situation, sir, it is a matter entirely dis­cretionary with you whether you will state the evidence and apply it to the law or not. There is great justice due to a prisoner arraigned on a charge so important as the present: there is great justice also due to the government. On the one hand an innocent person shall not be made to suffer for want of legal assistance; on the other a guilty person shall not escape through an undue indulgence, or the failure of the accuser in a duty his office may require of him. If you do not please to proceed, I shall consider it my duty to apply the law to the facts, the prisoner may therefore offer what he pleases to the jury.

PRISONER.

I submit to the court to do me that justice which is right.

JUDGE CHASE.

That I will, by the blessing of God, do you eve­ry justice.

JUDGE PETERS.

Mr. Attorney, while you are justifiable in con­sidering the situation of the prisoner, that he might not suffer by any partial impressions you may make on the jury, there is another consi­deration deserving attention—there is justice due to the United States. Though I see no difficulty in resting it here, yet, possibly persons who may have come into court since the trial commenced may expect something of a narrative of the transactions, and such a narrative may be of great help to the jury. I wish it to be done for the due execu­tion of public justice, and, God knows, I do it not with a desire to injure the prisoner, for I wish not the conviction of any man. It is a painful task, but we must do our duty. Still I think you are at li­berty to fulfil your own pleasure.

MR. RAWLE would, then, under a solemn impression that it was his duty, take up some part of the time of the court and jury in rela­tion to the prisoner at the bar, a task rendered far more painful on his part, from the circumstance of the prisoner's appearing there (unex­pectedly) without counsel to plead his cause. In as few words as pos­sible he would endeavor to collect the most prominent features of the testimony which had been produced, and to apply it to the law.

[Page 193] As he stated before, Mr. Rawle said, levying war in the United States against the United States, was a crime defined by the constituti­on; in relation to the republican form of government existing among us it could only consist in an opposition to the will of the society, of which we all are members, declared and established by a majority; in short, an opposition to the acts of Congress, in whole or in part, so as to prevent their execution, either by collecting numbers, by a dis­play of force, or by exhibiting that degree of intimidation which should operate, in either way, upon those charged with the execution of the law, either throughout the United States or in any part thereof, to procure a repeal, or a suspension of the law by rendering it impractica­ble to carry such law or laws into effect in the place so opposing, or in any other part. This offence he considered to be strictly treason against the United States.

The question then is, how far the case of the prisoner and his con­duct merits this definition? In order to be informed of that it was necessary to call to recollection the evidence, so collected, as to display the train and progress which marked its footsteps from its first dawning, till its arrival at the fatal deed denominated treason.

It will first be observed by the testimony of several respectable wit­nesses (Messrs. Heckavelter, Ramich, Schymer, Ormond, and Wil­liamson) that attempts were made and executed, by a combination, in which, unfortunately for him, the prisoner at the bar was very ac­tive, to prevent the assessors from doing the duty required of them when they accepted their office, and that this combination existed both in Northampton and Bucks counties, and to such a degree that it was impossible to carry the law into effect. In lower Milford more parti­cularly we have the evidence of four respectable gentlemen (Mr. Chap­man, a principal assessor, and Mr. Rodrick, Mr. Foulke, and Mr. Childs, three assessors) who were employed in the execution of those laws. These gentlemen say that they met with such opposition at an early period of the insurrection, as deterred Samuel Clark from under­taking the business at all, although he had taken upon him the office. From this difficulty, Messrs. Foulke, Rodrick and Childs determined that they would proceed to assess lower Milford township together, which they attempted, and did not desist until compelled by the extreme opposition which their respective testimony relates to have happened on the 5th and 6th of March, in their progress to, and at Quaker's town, which ill usage is all corroborated by other witnesses. This spirit of opposition to the laws, as exhibited generally, is also related by Mr. Henry and Col. Nichols, the marshal, wherein it appears that process could not be served, and that witnesses could not be subpoenead, being deterred from the threats made to them by this extensive com­bination; and that in the serving of process personal abuse was given, as well as to the assessors who attempted to execute the law. In short the law was prostrate at the feet of a powerful combination.

Mr. RAWLE here called to view the occurrences in Bucks county, as deposed by Messrs. Foulke, Rodrick, Chapman, Thomas, Mitchel, and Wiedner, exhibiting a disposition to insurrection by a great num­ber of persons, and who engaged in its acts; he referred to the meeting [Page 194] at Jacob Fries's, where John Fries, the prisoner at the bar, expressed himself as determining to oppose and continue hostile to the laws. The circumstance afterwards near Singmaster's, where Mr. Rodrick made his escape, and where, as well as at other times, the prisoner forbade those officers to proceed, under threats of personal danger. It ap­peared Mr. Rodrick had given offence, not by his conduct, but be­cause he came from a distance of ten or twelve miles into that town­ship to prosecute his duty. However the assessors met the next day, but were stopt at Quaker town, where they were extremely abused.—To be sure, while the prisoner at the bar was in the room, and when­ever he was present, their abuse was suspended, when he absented himself, it was renewed. The papers were taken from Mr. Childs, and also from Mr. Foulke, but returned, because they were not the identi­cal papers. Here it must be observed in justice to the prisoner that one more of his few good actions appeared, which Mr. Rawle wished in his heart had been more numerous.—Fries assisted Mr. Foulke to get out of the house the back way, and advised him to keep out of the way of the men.

On the evening of that day they went up to Miller's town: here Mr. Rawle called to mind the message delivered by John Dillinger for convening the meeting the next day; this message was the fruits of a consultation held at the house of Jacob Fries, after they left Quaker town, when they determined to proceed to Millar's town the next morning. The next morning they met and went on as far as Ritters, where it appeared they were stopped for a short period by young Marks, who had been sent forward, with information that the prisoners were gone on to Bethlehem: a doubt being started whether they would not be too late, it was debated, and at last determined to go forward: of this latter opinion was the prisoner at the bar. It was in evidence that none of those people knew the prisoners whom they were going to release: this Mitchell and others swore.

Here Mr. Rawle thought commenced the overt act in the indict­ment; hitherto only the general opposition to the law, and the inten­tion with which the after conduct was perpetrated, appeared.—They proceeded to Bethlehem, and here the officer of militia, the man who derived his power from the people, the prisoner, Captain John Fries, whose duty, it was to support the law and constitution of the United States, made a most distinguished figure. At Bethlehem it appeared that the prisoner was to step forward to effect the surrender of the pri­soners, and of course to lay prostrate the legal arm of the United States. These prisoners were in the lawful custody of the marshal, he had lawful process against them from the district judge; they were in the house appointed for their safe keeping until they should be remo­ved; he kept guard over them, and in order to execute his office he had provided, by virtue of the powers given to the sheriff in the seve­ral counties agreeable to law, an armed force called a posse committatus, or the power of the county. This force (about 16 or 17) he suppo­sed sufficiently great to prevent the prisoners in his charge being libe­rated, it appeared, however in the sequel that they were not sufficient for that purpose.—The prisoner with an armed force arrived at Beth­lehem, [Page 195] and proceeded on his mission to the marshal: he had a sword when he marched his men into the town; but it appeared that he left it when he entered on his other business, to wit, demanding the surrender of the prisoners; the marshal answered, that he could not deliver them up. John Fries then returned to his men; and from the testimony of Mitchel, Barnet, and Schlaugh, (this was an import­ant part of his conduct) he said, ‘They must be taken by force; the marshal says he cannot deliver them up; if you are willing, we will take them by force: I will go foremost; if I drop, then take your own command.’ Words were followed by actions; they went into the house, and the prisoners were given up.

This, Mr. Rawle thought, was an unquestionable, full and complete proof of the commission of the overt act, and that overt act is high treason, as laid in the third and fourth counts of the indictment, to wit, that they did, by force prevent the marshal from executing law­ful process, to him directed; and, secondly, that they did deliver, and take from him certain persons, whom he had in lawful custody; and, further, this was done by force and arms, of men arrayed in a warlike manner, and by a number exceeding one hundred persons. This the indictment justly calls levying war, and treason.

To him Mr. Rawle said, there was no doubt but the act of levy­ing war was completed in the county of Bucks, independently of all those actions at Bethlehem; for there the prisoner and others were armed, and arrayed with all the appearances of war: with drums and fifes, and at times firing their pieces; and this to oppose the laws and prevent their execution, and there, by this force, they executed one, and the main part of their plan; they there did set the law at de­fiance: that was part of their grand object, and was done with a ge­neral, and not with a particular view, an essential ingredient in treason. Whether these actions were to be considered as a separate act of treason, or whether they were to evince the intentions of the party, it certainly must be considered as testimony, and such as must have an important weight towards the verdict.

Gentlemen, said Mr. Attorney, you will consider how far the indi­vidual witnesses are deserving your credit; if you consider them worthy of being believed, and if the facts related apply to the law which I submitted to your consideration, and which, from the silence of the court, I think you must consider as accurate, if not I shall stand corrected by the court,—there can be but little doubt upon your minds, that the prisoner is guilty: if it be not so, in your opi­nion, you must find him otherwise.

I have endeavoured to do my duty with integrity. I have advanced nothing but what appears to me to be clearly substantiated; but with you, gentlemen, and with the court, I leave the truth of the opinion.

COURT.

John Fries, you are at liberty to say any thing you please to the jury.

PRISONER.

It was mentioned, that I collected a parcel of people to follow up the assessors, but I did not collect them; they came and fetched me out from my house to go with them.

I have nothing to say, but leave it to the court.

[Page 196]

JUDGE CHASE Then addressed the JURY as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

JOHN FRIES, the prisoner at the bar, stands indicted for the crime of treason, of levying war against the United States, contrary to the constitution.

By the Constitution of the United States, art. 3. sect. 3. it is de­clared, ‘That treason, against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them; or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

By the same section it is further declared, ‘That no person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act; or on confession in open court;’ and that ‘the Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason.’

Too much praise cannot be given to this constitutional definition of treason, and the requiring such full proof for conviction; and declar­ing, that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

This constitutional definition of treason is a question of law. Every proposition in any statute (whether more or less distinct, whether easy or difficult to comprehend) is always a question of law. What is the true meaning and true import of any statute, and whither the case stated comes within it, is a question of law, and not of fact.—The question is an indictment for levying war against (or adhering to the enemies of) the United States, is—‘Whether the facts stated do, or do not amount to levying war,—within the contemplation and construction of the constitution?

It is the duty of the court in this case, and in all criminal cases, to state to the jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the jury are to decide on the present, and in all criminal cases, both the law and the facts, on their consideration of the whole case.

It is the opinion of the court, that any insurrection, or rising of any body of people, within the United States, to attain or effect, by force, or violence, any object of a great public nature, or of public and general (or national) concern, is a levying of war against the United States, within the contemplation and construction of the constitution.

On this general position the court are of opinion, that any such in­surrection, or rising to resist, or to prevent, by force or violence, th [...] execution of any statute of the United States, for levying or collecting taxes, duties, imposts, or excises; or for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, or for any other object of a general nature or national concern, under any pretence, as that the statute was unjust, burthensome, oppressive, or unconstitutional, is a levying war against the United States, within the contemplation and construction of the constitution.—The reason for this opinion is, that an insurrec­tion [Page 197] to resist or prevent, by force, the execution of any statute of the United States, has a direct tendency to dissolve all the bonds of society, to destroy all order, and all laws; and also, all security for the lives, liberties, and property of the citizens of the United States.

The court are of opinion, that military weapons (as guns and swords, mentioned in the indictment) are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to levying war; because numbers may supply the want of military weapons; and other instruments may effect the intended mischief: The legal guilt of levying war may be incurred without the use of military weapons, or military array.

The court are of opinion, that the assembling bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a [...]warlike manner, for purposes only of a PRIVATE nature, is NOT TREASON; although the judges, or other peace officers should be insulted, or resisted; or even great outrages committed to the persons, or property of our citizens.

The true criterion to determine whether acts committed are treason, or a less offence, (as a riot) is the quo animo or the intention with which the people did assemble. When the intention is universal, or general as to effect some object of a general public nature, it will be treason; and cannot be considered, construed, or reduced to a riot. The commission of any number of felonies, riots, or other misdemean­ors cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount to treason; and, on the other hand, if the intention and acts combined amount to treason, they cannot be sunk down to a felony, or riot. The intention with which any acts (as felonies, the destruction of property, or the like) are done, will show to what class of crimes, the case belongs.

The court are of opinion, that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, that they are only guilty of a high mis­demeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution, BY FORCE,—that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither lessens, nor increases the crime; whether by one hundred, or one thousand persons, is wholly immaterial.

The court are of opinion, that a combination, or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason, unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination, or conspiracy, into execution; some actual force, or violence, must be used, in pursuance of such de­sign to levy war; but that it is altogether immaterial, whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with the intention, will constitute the crime of levying war.

This opinion of the court is founded on the same principles, and is, in substance, the same, as the opinion of the circuit court, for this district, on the trials (in April 1795) of Vigol and Mitchell, who were both found guilty by the jury, and afterwards pardoned by the late President.

At the circuit court for the district (April term 1799) on the trial of the prisoner at the bar, Judge Iredell delivered the same opinion, and Fries was convicted by the jury.

[Page 198] To support the present indictment against the prisoner at the bar, two facts must be proved to your satisfaction:

First. That some time before the finding of the indictment, there was an insurrection (or rising) of a body of people in the county of Northampton, in this State, with intent to oppose and prevent, by means of intimidation and violence, the execution of a law of the United States, intituled "An Act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, the enumeration of slaves within the United States;" OR, of another law of the United States, intituled "An Act to lay and collect a direct tax within the United States:" and that some acts of violence were committed by some of the people so assembled, with intent to oppose and prevent, by means of intimi­dation, and violence, the execution of both, or of one of the said laws of congress.

In the consideration of this fact, you are to consider and determine with what intent the people assembled at Bethlehem, whether to effect, by force, a public or a private measure.

The intent with which the people assembled at Bethlehem, in Northampton, is a necessary ingredient t [...] the fact of assembling, and to be proved like any other fact, by the declarations of those who assembled; or by acts done by them. When the question is, "What is a man's intent?"—It may be proved by a number of connected cir­cumstances; or by a single fact.

If from a careful examination of the evidence, you shall be con­vinced, that the real object and intent of the people assembled at Bethlehem was of a public nature, (which it certainly was, if they assembled with intent to prevent the execution of both of the above-mentioned laws of congress, or either of them) it must then be proved to your satisfaction, that the prisoner at the bar, incited, encouraged, promoted, or assisted in the insurrection, or rising of the people, at Bethlehem, and the terror they carried with them, with intent to op­pose and prevent, by means of intimidation and violence, the execution of both the above-mentioned laws of congress, or either of them; and that some force was used by some of the people assembled at Bethlehem.

In the consideration of this fact, the court think proper to assist your inquiry by giving you their opinion.

In treason, all the participes criminis are principals; there are no accessaries to this crime. Every act, which in the case of felony, would render a man an accessary, will, in the case of treason, make him a principal. To render any person an accomplice and principal in felony, he must be aiding and abetting at the fact; or ready to afford assistance, if necessary. If a person be present at a felony, aid­ing and a assisting, he is a principal. It is always material to consider whether the persons charged are of the same party; upon the same pursuit; and under the expectation of mutual defence and support.—All persons present, aiding, assisting, or abetting any treasonable act, are principals. All persons, who are present and countenancing, and are ready to afford assistance, if necessary, to those who actually [Page 199] commit any treasonable act, are also principals. If a number of per­sons assemble and set out upon a common design, as to resist and pre­vent, by force, the execution of any law, and some of them commit acts of force and violence, with intent to oppose the execution of any law, and others are present to aid and assist, if necessary, they are all principals. If any man joins and acts with an assembly of people, his intent is always to be considered and adjudged to be the same as theirs; and the law, in this case, judgeth of the intent by the FACT. If a number of persons combine or conspire to effect a certain pur­pose, as to oppose, by force, the execution of a law, any act of vio­lence done by any one of them, in pursuance of such combination, and with intent to effect such object, is, in consideration of law, the act of all who are present when such act of violence is committed. If per­sons collect together to act for one and the same common end, any act done by any one of them, with intent to effectuate such common end, is a fact that may be given in evidence against all of them; the act of each is evidence against ALL concerned.

I shall not detain you at this late hour to recapitulate the facts;—you have taken notes, and they have been stated with accuracy, and great candor, by Mr. Attorney.

I will only remark, that all the evidence relative to transactions be­fore the assembling of the armed force at Bethlehem, are only to sa­tisfy you of the intent with which the body of the people assembled there. If either of the three overt acts (or open deeds) stated in the indictment, are proved to your satisfaction, the court are of opinion, that it is sufficient to maintain the indictment; for the court are of opinion that every overt act is treasonable.

As to accomplices—they are legal witnesses, and entitled to credit, unless destroyed by testimony in court.

If, upon consideration of the whole matter (law as well as fact) you are not fully satisfied, without any doubt, that the prisoner is guilty of the treason charged in the indictment, you will find him not guilty; but if, upon consideration of the whole matter, (law as well as fact) you are convinced that the prisoner is guilty of the treason charged in the indictment, you will find him guilty.

The jury retired, for the space of two hours, and brought in their verdict, GUILTY.

After the verdict was given, Judge Chase, with great feeling and sensibility, addressed the prisoner, observing that as he had no counsel on the trial, if he, or any person for him, could point out any flaw in the indictment, or legal ground for arrest of judgment, ample time would be allowed for that purpose.

FRIDAY, May 2.

The Court this morning called before them Charles Deshler, a ju­ror on the above trial of John Fries, who, on the first evening of the said trial, on the adjournment of the court, separated from the jury and retired to his lodgings. Mr. Hopkinson, in behalf of Mr. Desh­ler, produced his own affidavit, and that of two others, which proved, [Page 200] that on the said evening, Charles Deshler was inadvertently separated from his brethren by the crowd, in going out of the jury box; that he did not know to what place the jury had adjourned; that he then proceeded to his lodgings, where he cautiously avoided all conversation respecting the trial depending.—The court, satisfied by this represent­ation, of the innocence of Mr. Deshler, ordered that he be discharged, and that the before-mentioned affidavit be entered on the record of the court.

JUDGMENT. Judge Chase's Address.

The prisoner being set at the bar, Judge Chase, after observing to Hainey and Gettman that what he had to say to Fries would apply generally to them, the judge proceeded—

JOHN FRIES—You have been already informed, that you stood convicted of the treason, charged upon you by the indictment on which you have been arraigned, of levying war against the United States.—You have had a LEGAL, FAIR and IMPARTIAL trial, with every indulgence that the law would permit. Of the whole pannel, you PEREMPTORILY challenged thirty-four, and, with truth I may say, that the jury who tried you, were of your own selection and choice. Not one of them before had ever formed and delivered any opinion respecting your guilt or innocence. The verdict of the jury against you was founded on the testimony of many creditable and unexception­able witnesses. It was apparent from the conduct of the jury, when they delivered their verdict, that if innocent they would have acquitted you with pleasure; and that they pronounced their verdict against you with great concern and reluctance, from a sense of duty to their coun­try, and a full conviction of your guilt.

The crime of which you have been sound guilty is treason; a crime considered, in the most civilized and the most free countries in the world, as the greatest that any man can commit. It is a crime of so deep a dye, and attended with such a train of fatal consequences, that it can receive no aggravation; yet the duty of my station requires, that I should explain to you the nature of the crime of which you are convicted; to show the necessity of that justice, which is this day to be administered; and to awaken your mind to proper reflections and a due sense of your own condition, which I imagine you must have reflected upon during your long confinement.

You are a native of this country—You live under a constitution (or form of government) framed by the people themselves; and under laws made by your representatives, faithfully executed by independent and impartial judges. Your government secures to every member of the community equal liberty and equal rights; by which equality of liberty and rights I mean, that every person, without any regard to [Page 201] wealth, rank or station, may enjoy an equal share of civil liberty, an equal protection of law, and an equal security for his person and pro­perty.—You enjoyed, in common with your fellow-citizens, all those rights.

If experience should prove, that the constitution is defective, it pro­vides a mode to change or amend it, without any danger to public or­der, or any injury to social rights.

If Congress, from inattention, error in judgment, or want of in­formation, should pass any law in violation of the constitution; or burthensome, or oppressive to the people, a peaceable, safe and ample remedy is provided by the constitution. The people themselves have established the mode by which such grievances are to be redressed; and no other mode can be adopted, without a violation of the constitution and of the laws.—If Congress should pass a law contrary to the con­stitution, such law would be void, and the courts of the United States possess complete authority, and are the only tribunal to decide, whe­ther any law is contrary to the constitution.—If Congress should pass burthensome or oppressive laws, the remedy is with their constituents, from whom they derive their existence and authority. If any law is made, repugnant to the voice of a majority of their constituents, it is in their power to make choice of persons to repeal it; but until it is repealed, it is the duty of every citizen to submit to it, and to give up his private sentiments to the public will. If a law burthensome, or even oppressive in its nature or execution is to be opposed by force, and obedience cannot be compelled, there must soon be an end to all government in this country.—It cannot be credited by dispassionate men, of any information, that Congress will intentionally make laws in violation of the constitution, contrary to their sacred trust, and so­lemn obligation to support it. None can believe, that Congress will wilfully, or intentionally, impose unreasonable and unjust burthens on their constituents, in which they must participate. The most igno­rant man must know, that Congress can make no law that will not af­fect them equally, in every respect, with their constituents. Every law that is detrimental to their constituents, must prove hurtful to themselves. From these considerations, every one may see, that Con­gress can have no interest in oppressing their fellow-citizens.

It is almost incredible, that a people living under the best and mild­est government in the whole world, should not only be dissatisfied and discontented, but should break out into open resistance and opposition to its laws.

The insurrection in 1794, in the four western counties of this state (particularly in Washington) to oppose the execution of the laws of the United States, which laid duties on stills, and spirits distilled, within the United States, is still fresh in memory: it originated from prejudices and misrepresentations industriously disseminated and dif­fused against those laws. Either persons disaffected to our govern­ment, or wishing to aggrandise themselves, deceived and misled the ignorant and uninformed class of the people. The opposition com­menced in meetings of the people, with threats against the officers, which rip [...]ned into acts of outrage against them, and were extended [Page 202] to private citizens. Committees were formed to systamatize and in­flame the spirit of opposition. Violence succeeded to violence, and the collector of Fayette county was compelled to surrender his com­mission and official books; the dwelling house of the inspector (in the vicinity of Pittsburgh) was attacked and burnt; and the marshal was seized, and obtained his liberty on a promise to serve no other process on the west side of the Alleghany mountain. To compel sub­mission to the laws, the government were obliged to march an army against the insurgents, and the expense was above one million one hun­dred thousand dollars. Of the whole number of insurgents (many hundreds) only a few were brought to trial; and of them only two were sentenced to die (Vigol and Mitchell) and they were pardoned by the late President. Although the insurgents made no resistance to the army sent against them; yet not a few of our troops lost their lives, in consequence of their great fatigue, and exposure to the severity of the season.

This great and remarkable clemency of the government had no ef­fect upon you and the deluded people in your neighborhood. The rise, progress, and termination of the late insurrection, bear a strong and striking analogy to the former: and it may be remembered, that it has cost the United States 80,000 dollars. It cannot escape observa­tion, that the ignorant, and uninformed are taught to complain of taxes, which are necessary for the support of government, and yet they permit themselves to be seduced into insurrections which have so enor­mously increased the public burthens, of which their contribution can scarcely be calculated.

When citizens combine and assemble with intent to prevent by threats, intimidation, and violence, the execution of the laws, and they actually carry such traitorous designs into execution, they reduce the government to the alternative of prostrating the laws before the insurgents, or of taking necessary measures to compel submission. No government can hesitate. The expence, and all the consequences therefore, are not imputable to the government, but to the insurgents.—The mildness and lenity of our government are as striking on the late as on the former insurrection; Of nearly 130 persons who might have been put on their trial for treason, only five have been prosecuted and tried for that crime.

In the late insurrection, you, John Fries, bore a conspicuous and leading part. If you had reflected, you would have seen, that your attempt was as weak, as it was wicked. It was the height of folly in you to suppose that the great body of our citizens, blest in the enjoy­ment of a free republican government of their own choice, and of all rights civil and religious,—secure in their persons and property, and conscious that the laws are the only security for their preservation from violence, would not rise up as one man to oppose and crush so ill-founded, so unprovoked an attempt to disturb the public peace and tranquillity. If you could see in a proper light your own folly and wickedness, you ought now to bless God, that your insurrection was so happily and speedily quelled by the vigilance and energy of our govern­ment, aided by the patriotism and activity of your fellow-citizens, who [Page 203] left their homes and business and embodied themselves in the support of its laws.

The annual, necessary expenditures for the support of any extensive go­vernment, like ours must be great; and the sum required, can only be obtained by taxes, or loans.—In all countries the levying taxes is un­popular, and a subject of complaint. It appears to me, that there was not the least pretence of complaint against, much less of opposition and violence to, the law for levying taxes on dwelling-houses; and it becomes you to reflect that the time you chose to rise up in arms to oppose the laws of your country, was when it stood in a very critical situation with regard to France, and on the eve of a rupture with that country.

I cannot omit to remind you of another matter, worthy of your consideration.—If the marshal or any of the possee, or any of the four friends of government, who were with him, had been killed by you, or any of your deluded followers, the crime of murder would have been added to the crime of treason.

In your serious hours of reflection, you ought to consider the conse­quences that would have flowed from the insurrection, which you in­cited, encouraged, and promoted, in the character of a captain of mili­tia, whose incumbent duty it is to stand ready (whenever required) to assist and defend the government and its laws, if it had not been im­mediately quelled. Violence, oppression and rapine; destruction, waste, and murder, always attend the progress of insurrection and rebellion; the arm of the father would have been raised against the son; that of the son against the father; a brother's hand would have been stained with brother's blood; the sacred bands of friendship would have been broken, and all the ties of natural affection would have been dissolved.

The end of all punishment is example; and the enormity of your crime requires that a severe example should be made to deter others from the commission of like crimes in future. You have forfeited your life to justice—let me therefore earnestly recommend to you, most seriously to consider your situation—to take a review of your past life, and to employ the very little time you are to continue in this world, in endeavors to make your peace with that God, whose MERCY is equal to his JUSTICE. I expect that you are a Christian; and as such I address you. Be assured my guilty and unhappy fellow-citizen, that without serious repentance of all your sins, you cannot expect happiness in the world to come; and to your repentance you must add faith and hope in the merits and mediation of Jesus Christ. These are the only terms on which pardon and forgiveness are promised to those, who profess the Christian religion. Let me therefore again entreat you to apply every moment you have left, in contrition, sorrow, and repen­tance. Your day of life is almost spent, and the night of death fast approaches. Look up to the Father of Mercies, and God of Comfort. You have a great and an immense work to perform, and but little time in which you must finish it. There is no repentance in the grave; for after death comes judgment; and as you die, so you must be judged. By repentance and faith, you are the object of God's mercy; but if you will not repent, and have faith and dependance upon the merits [Page 204] of the death of Christ, but die a hardened and impenitent sinner, you will be the object of God's justice and vengeance. If you will sincere­ly repent and believe, God hath pronounced his forgiveness; and there is no crime too great for his mercy and pardon.

Although you must be strictly confined for the very short remainder of your life, yet the mild government and laws which you have en­deavored to destroy, permit you (if you please) to converse and com­mune with ministers of the gospel; to whose pious care and consolation in fervent prayers and devotion, I most cordially recommend you.

What remains for me is a very painful, but a very necessary part of my duty. It is to pronounce that judgment, which the law has appointed for crimes of this magnitude. The judgment of the law is, and this Court doth award "that you be hanged, by the neck, until dead:" And I pray GOD ALMIGHTY to be merciful to your soul!

The following Charge, by Judge Peters, was delivered to the Jury before the Charge of Judge Iredell, in the first Trial, and ought to precede it in Page 164, but was unavoidably omitted in its proper place.

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

AS this case is important, both in its principles and consequences, I think it my duty to give my opinion, formed with as much deliberation as the intervals of this lengthy trial would permit, on the most prominent points of law which have been made in this cause. I have condensed my sentiments into as short a compass as possible. I shall leave remarks on the evidence, and more enlarged observations on the law, to the presiding judge, who will deliver to you the charge of the court. At his request I state my individual opinion, though I do not always deem it necessary, when there is an unanimity of senti­ment in the court.

1. It is treason "in levying war against the United States" for per­sons who have none but a common interest with their fellow-citizens, to oppose or prevent, by force, numbers or intimidation, a public and general law of the United States, with intent to prevent its operation, or compel its repeal. Force is necessary, to complete the crime; but the quantum of force is immaterial. This point was determined by this court on a former occasion, which was, though not in all cir­cumstances, yet in principle and object, very analogous to the subject of our present inquiries. I hold myself bound by that decision, which on due consideration, I think legal and sound. I do not conceive it to be overshadowed, or rendered null, by any legislative construction contained in any subsequent act of congress. The law, though esta­blished by legislative acts, or settled by judicial decisions, may be al­tered by congress, by express words, in laws consistent with the con­stitution. [Page 205] But a mere legislative construction, drawn from any act by intendment, ought not to repeal positive laws, or annul judicial decisions. The judiciary have the duty assigned to them of inter­preting declaring and explaining,—the Legislature that of making, altering, or repealing laws. But the decision of a question on the constitutionality of a law is vested in the judiciary department. I consider the decisions in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, in full force, and founded on true principles of law. The authorities from British precedents and adjudications are used as guides in our decisions. I will not enter into a discussion whether we are bound to follow them; because they are precedents,—or because we think them reasonable and just.

If numbers and force can render one law ineffectual, which is tan­tamount to its repeal, the whole system of laws may be destroyed in detail. All laws will at last yield to the violence of the seditious and discontented. Although but one law be immediately assailed, yet the treasonable design is completed, and the generality of intent desig­nated, by a part assuming the government of the whole. And thus, by trampling on the legal powers of the constituted authorities, the rights of all are invaded by the force and violence of a few. In this case, too, there is a direct outrage on the judiciary act, with intent to defeat, by force and intimidation, the execution of a revenue law, enacted under clear and express constitutional authority. A deadly blow is aimed at the government, when its fiscal arrangements are for­cibly destroyed, distracted and impeded; for on its revenues its very existence depends.

2. Though punishments are designated, by particular laws, for cer­tain inferior crimes, which, if prosecuted as substantive offences, and the sole object of the prosecution, are exclusively liable to the penal­ties directed by those laws, yet, when committed with treasonable ingredients, these crimes become only circumstances or overt acts. The intent is the gist of the inquiry in a charge of treason; and is the great and leading object in trials for this crime.

The description of crimes, contained in the act, commonly called the Sedition Act, lose their character, and become but component parts of the greater crime, or evidences of treason, when the trea­sonable intent and overt act are proved. So it is with rescue of pri­soners; which, in the present case, was not an independent offence, but an overt act of the treason. These were crimes—misdemeanors—at common law; and might have been punished by fine and im­prisonment when substantive independent offences. But, when com­mitted with treasonable intent, are merged in the treason, of which sedition, conspiracy and combination are always the harbingers. I do not think that the acts relating either to sedition or rescue have al­tered the principle, though they have defined and bounded the punish­ments. The law, as to treason, is the same now, as if those offences were still punishable at common law. The Sedition Act cannot con­stitutionally alter the description o [...] the crime of treason, to which the combination and conspiracy to perpetrate this offence, with force and numbers, are essential attributes. Numbers must combine and conspire [Page 206] to levy war. But if these indispensible qualities of the crime are, by the Legislature, declared only misdemeanors, and separated from the treasonable act, the Legislature nullify the description of treason con­tained in the constitution; and so indirectly alter and destroy, or make inefficient, this part of that instrument. The congress neither possess, nor did they intend to exercise, any such power. They could not (nor did they so intend) place the crime declared in the constitution to be treason, among the inferior class of offences, by describing some of its essential qualities in the Sedition Act, and prescribing punish­ments, when they solely constitute substantive and independent offen­ces. Congress can only (as they have done) prescribe the punishment for treason, regulate the trial, and direct the mode in which that pu­nishment is to be executed.

3. However indisputably requisite it may be to prove, by two wit­nesses, the overt act for which the prisoner at the bar stands indicted, yet evidence may be given of other circumstances, or even of other overt acts, connected with that on which the indictment is grounded, and occurring or committed in any other part of the district, than the place mentioned. Although the prisoner be not on his trial, nor is he now punishable, for any other than the overt act laid, other overt acts and other circumstances, parts of the general design, may never­theless be proved, to shew the quo animo—the intent—with which the act laid was committed. Indeed the treason would be complete, by the conspiracy, in any part of the district, to commit the trea­sonable act at Bethlehem, if any had, in consequence of the conspira­cy, marched or committed any overt act for the purpose, though the actual rescue had not taken place. So we thought in the cases of the western insurgents, that the treason, concocted at Couche's fort, would have been complete, if any had only marched to commit the crime; though the design had not arrived to the disgraceful catastrophe it finally attained. Indisputable authorities might be produced to sup­port this position.

4. The confession of the prisoner may be given in evidence as cor­roboratory proof of the intent, or quo animo. But, although proved by two witnesses, being made out of court, it is not of itself sufficient to convict. Two witnesses are necessary to prove the overt act. But the intent may be proved by one witness, collected from circumstances, or even by a single fact.

5. The doctrine of constructive treason has produced much real mis­chief in another country; and it has been, for an age, the subject of discussions, among lawyers, other public speakers and political writers. The greater part of the objections to it are totally irrelevant here.—The subject of them is unknown, and may it ever remain so, in this country. I mean the compassing the death of the king. It will be found that the British judges, since the days of political darkness and bigotry have passed away, are to be found among the most able and decided opposers of the abuses of this doctrine. They do not follow decisions and precedents rooted in bad times, because they find them in their law books. On the contrary, on a fair investigation it will be proved, that those contrary to justice, reason and law are reject­ed [Page 207] It is not fair and sound reasoning to argue against the necessary and indispensable use of construction, from the abuses it has produced. What is there among the best of human (and I wish I could not add divine) systems which has not been perverted and abused? That there must be some defined sense and interpretative exposition made of the terms "levying war," and when, and in what circumstances, it is le­vied "against the United States," cannot be denied. The able coun­sel, in this case, who has said the most on this subject, and travelled the farthest into the gloomy, dark and tyrannical periods of the British history and jurisprudence, for melancholy and disgusting proofs of atro­ [...]ious abuses, and even crimes, committed under color of law, has, unavoidably, himself furnished also proofs of the necessity we are under of some constructive or interpretative expositions. He, at first, confined these expositions to three cases. Now if there is a necessity of one, it shews that without supplementary interpretation, the law would be a mere dead letter. Aware of the dangerous lengths to which the abuses of construction have been carried, courts and juries should be cautious in their decisions; but not so much alarmed about abuses, as to refrain from the proper and necessary use of interpretation. I do not then hesitate to say, that the position we have found established, to wit, that opposition, by force and numbers, or intimidation with intent to de­feat, delay or prevent the execution of a general law of the United States, or to procure, or with a hope of procuring, by force and num­bers, or intimidation, its repeal or new execution, is treason by levy­ing war against the United States. And it does not appear to me to be what is commonly called constructive, but open and direct treason, in levying war against the United States, within the plain and evident meaning and intent of the constitution.

6. As to the objections, founded on want of proof of regular ap­pointments under, and of the proper execution of the law called the house tax law, I do not see that they apply. If the prosecution was definitely for opposing one or more officer or officers of this tax law, the proof might be more [...]igidly required. But as all the necessary use made of these collateral and subordinate circumstances, relative to the tax law officers, is for the purpose of showing the quo animo or intent with which the treason alledged was committed, I consider them as not relevant in this cause. It is even enough in criminal prosecu­tions, more directly aimed at the specific offence of opposing au offi­cer, that he was an officer de facto.

7. As to the disarming and confining the two Videlles, or advance, of the armed insurgents, by the marshal at Bethlehem, I think him legally as well as prudentially justified in his conduct. Even a consta­ble has a right to restrain and confine, under strong circumstances of suspicion, persons whose conduct or appearance evidence an intention to commit illegal and violent acts. Much more so was the marshal (having notice of an intended rescue of his prisoners) justifiable in seizing and disarming two of the armed body, against whom existing circum­stances raised strong and evident suspicion. But I think this has been made more important than it really is. Because the release of these men was not the object of, or even know to the prisoner at the bar [Page 208] and his party, when they commenced their treasonable march, for the release of the prisoners in the marshal's custody, at Bethlehem.

8. The President's proclamation should have been pleaded as a par­don, if it was intended to be relied on as such. This not having been done, it is not legally before us. But since it has been mentioned, I think it necessary to declare it as my opinion, that it does not ope­rate as a pardon to precedent offences. It is directed by law as a step, preparatory to applying an armed force, against those supposed to have committed crimes and embodied for unlawful purposes. It is a hu­mane warning, calculated to prevent the effusion of blood? Its allega­tions of facts, or its injunctions, have no operation in the trial of the prisoner at the bar.

Whether the prisoner is or is not guilty of the treason laid in the indictment, in the manner and form therein set forth, it is your pro­vince to determine. It is the duty of the court to declare the law; though both facts and law, which I fear are too plain to admit a rea­sonable doubt, are subjects for your consideration. We must all obey our public duty, whatever may be our private feelings. Mercy is not deposited in our hands. It is entirely within the constitutional autho­rity of another department.

The following opinion of Judge Peters on the motion for a new trial was put into our hands after the sheet was printed were it should have come in, which is page 45 of the appendix.

ALTHOUGH I am not perfectly satisfied with the testimony, which is contradicted by the juror on his oath; I will allow it to be taken for granted; and meet the question on principle. I am in sentiment against granting the motion for a new trial. Because—1. The juror said no more than all friends to the laws and the govern­ment were warranted in thinking and saying, as the facts appeared then to the public. Fries being generally alledged to be the most prominent character, it was on this account, and not with special or particular malice, that Rhoad's declaration was made.

2. If a juror was rejected on account of such declarations, trials, where the community at large are intimately affected by crimes of such general importance and public notoriety, must be had, in all pro­bability, by those who only openly or secretly approved of the con­duct of criminals. This would be unjust and improper, as it affects the government in its public prosecutions. Little success could be expected from proceedings against the most atrocious offenders, if great multitudes were implicated in their delusions, or guilt.

3. It is natural for all good citizens when atrocious crimes, of a public nature, are known to have been committed, to express their abhorrence and disapprobation, both of the offences and the perpetra­tors. It is their duty so to express themselves. This is not like the [Page 209] case of murder, or any offence against as individual; or where seve­ral are charged and none remarkably prominent. In this latter case selecting one out of the mass might evince particular malice.

4. I have no doubt that declarations of an opposite complexion could be proved; and yet the jurors were unanimous in their verdict. The defendant has had a fair, and I think an impartial trial.

But as a division in the court, might lessen the weight of the judg­ment if finally pronounced, and the great end of the law in punish­ments being example, I, with some reluctance, yield to the opinion of judge Iredell. Although justice may be delayed, yet it will not fail, ei­ther as it respects the United States, or the prisoner.

SATURDAY, April 26, 1800. CONRAD MARKS

Was arraigned on an indictment for treason*. He pleaded, Not Guilty.

The following PERSONS were admitted and sworn on the JURY.
  • Richard Downing,
  • Thomas Morris,
  • Jacob Grim,
  • Eli Canby,
  • Richard Roberts,
  • Francis Gardner,
  • John Jacobs,
  • Benjamin Morris,
  • Anthony Oberly,
  • John Longstreith,
  • William Davis,
  • Llwellin Davis.

The cause was opened by the attorney of the district, (Mr. Rawle) who stated the nature of the offence of which the prisoner stood in­dicted, and adduced a number of witnesses on the part of the prosecu­tion. Several witnesses were also produced on the part of the prisoner. Mr. Ross and Mr. Hopkinson, who were the counsel assigned by the court for the prisoner, very ably and ingeniously defended his cause, at some length; and were fully answered by Mr. Ingersol on the part of the prosecution. Judge Chase, in an elegant, learned and feeling charge, addressed the jury, informing them of the law, and reciting the facts as they appeared in evidence. The jury retired about twenty minutes past 11 o'clock at night. Judge Chase informed the jury, pre­vious to their retiring, that the court would wait till twelve o'clock, to see if they could agree on their verdict; and that they must return to court and inform whether they could agree or not. At that hour the jury returned and informed the court, that they could not agree. The judges ordered that the jury be kept together in some conve­nient [Page 210] place till Monday morning at ten o'clock, to which time the court adjourned.

On Monday morning the jury returned a verdict, NOT GUILTY.

An indictment was afterwards filed against the defendant for con­spiracy, obstruction of process, rescue and unlawful combination, on which he submitted to the discretion of the court.

Without any farther examination, the court being fully apprised of his conduct, Judge Chase passed the following sentence:

That he be imprisoned two years, and fined 800 dollars, at the ex­piration of which, to give security for his good behavior, himself in 2000 dollars, and two sureties in 1000 dollars each, and to stand com­mitted till the sentence is complied with.

Before the sentence, Mr. Ross addressed a few words to the court in his behalf: he observed, that though his client had offended against the laws of his country, yet he had been deceived into his opposition: it had been said, from what he thought undoubted authority, that no such law was in existence. As this was the case, and as his circum­stances were low, he hoped the court would consider his situation.

JUDGE CHASE said, he was a most atrocious offender; he had not the least doubt but he was guilty of treason in a high degree, and that the verdict ought so to have been found, and be have been made an example of. There must have been some mistake as to evidence, or the jury could not have returned a verdict of NOT GUILTY.

MONDAY, April 28. GEORGE GETTMAN & FREDERICK HAINEY

Were arraigned on an indictment for treason, to which they plead­ed, Not Guilty.

The Counsel for the Prisoners were Mr. EDWARD TILGHMAN and Mr. MOSES LEVY.

The following PERSONS were the JURY:
  • Francis Gardner,
  • Samuel Evans,
  • William Preston,
  • Richard Roberts,
  • William Lane,
  • Godfrey Baker,
  • Samuel Clarkson,
  • Peter Shyner,
  • Samuel Allen,
  • John Stroud,
  • Philip Arndt,
  • William Davis.

The trial took up two days; and on Wednesday morning the jury returned with a verdict of GUILTY.

[Page 211]

WEDNESDAY, April 30. ANTHONY STAHLER

Was arraigned on an indictment for treason, to which he pleaded, Not Guilty.

The Counsel for the Prisoner were, MR. HOPKINSON and MR. ROSS.

The following were sworn on the JURY:
  • Richard Robinson,
  • Charles Deshler,
  • George Illig,
  • John Scarbord,
  • John Jones,
  • John Edge,
  • Jacob Grim,
  • David Jones,
  • William Preston,
  • Thomas Morris,
  • Peter Eler,
  • Abraham Heed.

The jury, on Thursday morning, returned with a verdict of NOT GUILTY.

The attorney lodged a detainer on a charge of conspiracy, &c. and on Friday morning the grand jury returned against him a true Bill. Indictments for treason had been found against Philip De [...]ch and Jacob Klein; but Mr. Attorney entered a nolle proseque thereupon, and prosecuted for conspiracy, rescue, &c. upon which the grand jury returned true Bills.

They submitted to the court; and after examining a few witnesses, and ascertaining their circumstances as near as possible, the court sen­tenced each of them to be imprisoned eight months, to be fined 150 dollars, and to enter into recognizance for their good behavior for one year, themselves in 400 dollars each, with two sufficient sureties.

[Page 212]

A BRIEF REPORT OF THE TRIALS
Of Henry Shiffert, Christian Ruth, Henry Stahler, Da­niel Schwartz, sen. Daniel Schwartz, jun. and George Shaeffer, on an indictment for an unlawful conspiracy in the counties of Northampton and Bucks, to impede the operation of the act laying a tax on houses and land by opposing the assessors in the execution of their duty; for obstructing William Nichols esq the marshal in the execution of process, and for assisting in the rescue of several persons held in custody by the said marshal.

THE jury being impannelled, Mr. M'Kean appeared as counsel for the prisoners generally, and Mr. Dallas more particularly for George Shaeffer.

COLONEL NICHOLS

The marshal was the first evidence called. He related the cir­cumstances which occurred at Millar's town as it respected the rescue of Shankweiler, (see page 37.) and the absence of Shaeffer, who hear­ing that a bill of indictment was found against, him came to the city to deliver himself up.

SAMUEL TOON

Was next called. His deposition related to the conduct of the two Schwartz's and Stahler, differing very little from his former re­lation see (page 53 and 55) He was advised by old Schwartz to go to Bethlehem and take his trumpet, but was unwilling, however, at length he complied.

[Page 213] ANDREW SHIFFERT

Related the same facts in substance as before, (page 56.) He saw Christian Ruth going to Bethlehem, and while he was present heard some person say they would take the prisoners from the marshal.

WILLIAM BARNETT

And Christian Roth's testimony related to the conduct of the elder Schwartz at Bethlehem page 36.

WILLIAM HENRY, ESQ

Was next sworn. He related the affairs generally as before respect­ing the conduct of Stahler page 26. and Shiffert page 82. also of old Schwartz, who appeared to pride himself in having two fine boys at Bethlehem.

JOHN FOGLE

A lieutenant in Jarrett's troop related some of the circumstances previous to the march to Bethlehem—his evidence had nothing striking in it, as he did not go himself, except that Shiffert at Millars town advised him to go to Bethlehem; and that if they would not take bail for Shankweiler, they would not let them go to Philadelphia.

JOHN MORETZ

Deposed that he saw Stahler with others who said that they would go to Bethlehem to see what they were going to do with the prison­ers—they did not say they would release the prisoners—he did not know them any way active in breeding discontents. At a meet­ing to read the law, (page 49) one, he believed George Shaeffer said it was no law, and if it was, they would not submit to it. He talked very loud, and appeared much dissatisfied.

JACOB EYERLY

Went through his former evidence of the meeting at Schymer's page 49. and related the general state of discontents through that part, and the prostrate state of the laws: many he said objected to suffer the execution of the house law, because it was not signed by Mr. Jefferson as Vice President (he being absent at its passing)—Old Schwartz told the witness that two of his sons were there at Bethle­hem, and that he had persuaded Toon to go, promising him a dollar, and lending him an horse, advising him to take his trumpet that they might make a good appearance: that Daniel Schwartz, jun. tore off Mr. Balliott's cockade at Miller's town, and that they were both very abusive.

[Page 214] CHRISTIAN HICKAVELTER

Deposed, That he was an assessor in Upper Milford; he related the great difficulties attending the execution of his duty. Did not know any thing more of the defendants than what was related by Mr. Eyerly of George Shaeffer, page 49. He spoke of the elder Schwartz as a very quiet good neighbor,

JUDGE PETERS

Then was sworn, to prove an examination of Schwartz, sen. taken before him, which acknowledged that he had persuaded Toon to go to Bethlehem, and that he was there himself, but that he did nothing, nor said any thing about the rescue; but that he went merely out of curiosity.

JACOB SERNHER

Deposed, That he was told by George Shaeffer to tell Judge Henry to inform the assessors not to come into Millar's town to assess the houses; for that there was a man in town who was provided with a sword and pistols, and that he would not suffer the houses to be as­sessed. He did not mention to the witness who the man was.

DANIEL REISCH

Deposed, That George Shaeffer had told him that he would not suffer his house to be measured, and he was a damned stampler if he suffered them to measure his: That if the assessor came into their town, he should not come out again with his life: that they had bound themselves together to oppose the execution of the law; and if he, the defendant, was to be put to prison, there would be fifty men unite to take him out.

JOHN SCHYMER, ESQ

Related the circumstance of the meeting at his house, as deposed by Mr. Eyerly, and that Shaeffer was very violent*.

The evidence being gone through, Mr. M'Kean rose in the defence, in the course of which he went through a variety of authorities to prove, that no conspiracy was formed, because no compact whatever was entered into by the parties to support each other, each individual acting and speaking, so far as they went, separately. Here he read, 1 Hawk, 346. chap. 72, and the Sedition Act. sect. 1. As to the rescue he said, it did not appear that the defendant were engaged, for [Page 215] a rescue could not be accomplished without force, but no force what­ever had been proved upon them, 4 Blackstone, 131, and 345; 2 Hawk. c. 21. sect. 1—3; Pierre Williams, 484; 6 Comments, 230, and 2 Hawk, c. 19, sect. 5, were the authorities he read. As to the opposition to the law, it appeared that they had doubts, which, in their uncultivated state, and extreme want of knowledge, were well ground­ed, that the law was in existence. He then concluded with a review of the part which the defendants were severally said to have taken in the transaction.

JUDGE PETERS

Read the legal definition of force in 2 Hawkins, page 37.

MR. DALLAS went into a lengthy defence of George Shaeffer, after which Mr. Rawle, attorney for the district, went into a definition of the different counts in the indictment of conspiracy, unlawful com­bination, rescue, and obstruction of process, applying the evidence so as to bring the charges home on the several defendants: that they all had been guilty of conspiracy he thought incontrovertible; because when a conspiracy was formed, all who were ever present, as well as those more actively engaged in it were guilty, though some might be superiors and some subordinate. All the defendants were assembled, and therefore partook of the crime. Five of them were seen at Beth­lehem: Andrew Shiffert saw Ruth going to Bethlehem, and Toon saw him at Bethlehem in company with the disturbers of the public peace. Old Schwartz was at Bethlehem, and was engaged in counselling and advising an unlawful assembling there, which was calculated to defeat the act. Young Schwartz was at Bethlehem, and also was engaged in the insult upon Mr. Balliott to tear off his cockade. George Shaeffer was at Bethlehem; but, though not in arms, though not guilty of the rescue, was frequently engaged in opposition to the law, in conspiracy against it, and in obstruction of process, on which account he may be ranked among the most guilty. On the whole, he considered that each of them partook of the crimes charged in the indictment.

JUDGE IREDELL, in his charge to the jury, observed, that there were three counts in the indictment: First. Conspiracy to prevent the execution of the law: to raise a conspiracy, several must be en­gaged, but it must be observed that every one engaged, or joined there­with, was guilty of the conspiracy. It was not necessary, under this indictment, as under that lately before the court for treason, that two witnesses should substantiate any one fact, one would do; nor was it necessary that any writing or agreement should be drawn between the parties to create it a conspiracy: a meeting was held, the object of which was but too well authenticated by previous conduct.

The second count concerned the rescue of the prisoners. It had been stated that actual force must be used to make it a rescue: the learned judge said, that if the object was obtained by intimidation, and the prisoners were surrendered, it did not differ from force in the [Page 216] least, in a legal view: for if an highway-man was to put a pistol to the breast of another, and demand his money, as had been stated by Judge Peters, in the case, 2 Hawk 37, and the money was delivered, it was a robbery, though the pistol had not been fired. The question was, were not the threatenings held out to the marshal the immediate cause of his surrendering the prisoners, in order to prevent lives being lost? With regard to the arrest, no doubt could be entertained that the Lehi prisoners, as well as Ireman and Fox, were compleatly in the marshal's custody. There are only two kinds of escape, one is voluntary, and the other is negligent: the former is where the officer is agreeable to the escape, the latter, as in the case before the jury, is, the officer not having power to keep them, suffers them to go at large.

The third count respects obstruction of process. The judge said he did not think it right to convict either of the defendants of the whole three counts, because the rescue necessarily implied obstructions of process, no man could be guilty of a rescue without obstruction of process, and therefore the counts resolved themselves into two; if it was the opinion of the jury that either of them were guilty of the whole, the verdict need only be given on the two first, to wit: con­spiracy and obstruction of process. As to the conspiracy, it cannot be possibly doubted but there was one.

The judge then took up the individual conduct of the several de­fendants, after the following order:—First.

DANIEL SCHWARTZ, SEN.

By the evidence of the marshal and of William Barnet, he was seen at Bethlehem, but he behaved civily, and was come there to know what they were doing. Christian Ruth saw him there. Judge Henry deposes, that he appeared to pride himself in his two fine boys who were there. Mr. Eyerly did not know that he was active there, but he appeared quite jovial: he said he had two sons there; that he re­quested Toon to go there, and advised him to take his trumpet to look well. It was given in evidence, when told of his son pulling Mr. Balliott's cockade from his hat, that if he had seen his son do it, he would have whipped him, and he appeared to be sorry so much insult was given to the marshal at Millar's town. Mr. Schymer says he was at the meeting at his house, but cannot say he misbehaved.

DANIEL SCHWARTZ, JUN.

The marshal thinks he saw him at Millar's town, where he seemed to be a pretty active and busy young man. Toon saw him at Beth­lehem, but without uniform, and cannot say he misbehaved, or inter­fered. Mr. Eyerly saw him at Millar's town behaving very abu­sive, and threatening to beat them, and he thinks it was him who tore the cockade from Mr. Balliott's hat.

[Page 217] HENRY SHIFFERT,

The marshal, saw at Bethlehem, and he believes he was armed. Toon saw him there, and with a sword, which he drew. Fogle saw him at Millar's town, when he taid, that if they would not take bail for Shankweiler, they would not let him go to Philadelphia.

HENRY STAHLER,

The marshal also thinks he saw at Bethlehem. Andrew Shiffert saw him, both there and on the road, in uniform. Moretz saw him on the road, and he said he was going to see what was become of those prisoners. He was in uniform, with a sword. Toon says that Stahler said he would not interfere in the rescue.

CHRISTIAN RUTH

Was seen at Bethlehem by Toon, in uniform, with a sword. An­drew Shiffert saw him there and on the road. Some persons in his presence said, that they would take the prisoners from the marshal.

GEORGE SHAEFFER

Was seen at Bethlehem by Shiffert, but without arms or uniform. William Barnet saw him there; he said he was come there only to see some of his neighbors going to Philadelphia; he said if the marshal wanted to take him, he would give himself up: he did not appear to be one of the rioters. Judge Henry saw him at Bethlehem; he did not appear to be violent, or use any offensive language; he saw him much out of doors with the company, but not active. John Moretz saw him at the meeting at Schymer's, where he talked very loud, as though he wished to prevent Mr. Eyerly reading the law; and on some of them doubting whether it was a law or not, be said, even if it was, they would not submit to it. Mr. Eyerly and Mr. Schy­mer deposed the same, and that, he added "here I am, take me to gaol, but you shall see how far you will bring me;" on which a number adds, "Yes, let them but take one to gaol, we will soon have him out again." Mr. Heckawelter says, that he told him he had abused his father something about a liberty pole, and that be was come to give him a licking for it, for which he followed him. Mr. Sterner says, he told him to tell Judge Henry about the man with sword and pistol, who would oppose the assessors. Mr. Re [...]sch deposed, that the defendant said he was a damned stampler, if he suffered his house to be measured; he would not: that if the assessor came into his town­ship, he would not come out again alive; and if they were to take him to prison, there would be fifty men to take him out again. Mr. Schymer said, that the defendant was very much against choosing as­sessors, and was pretty violent; that he abused Mr. Heckawelter about the liberty pole.

[Page 218] The judge said, he should forbear speaking particularly as to the nature of the combination or conspiracy; but, if it was not prede­termined, after meeting together there, the very act of meeting be­came a conspiracy; if the defendants came there after it began, not having a previous knowledge of it, it was their duty to have with­drawn themselves; but if they did engage themselves voluntarily and knowingly, though they knew nothing of it before, it was deemed in law equally as much a combination as though they had predeter­mined it.

The jury withdrew, and next morning returned with the following verdict:

CHRISTIAN RUTH, HENRY STAHLER, and HENRY SHIFFERT, GUILTY, as to the rescue.

DANIEL SCHWARTZ, sen. GUILTY of the conspiracy, in advising an unlawful combination.

GEORGE SHAEFFER, GUILTY of the conspiracy, in advising, and GUILTY as to the rescue.

DANIEL SCHWARTZ, jun. NOT GUILTY.

The prisoners being severally called to the bar, Judge Iredell addressed them to the following effect:

"George Shaeffer, Henry Stabler, Henry Shiffert, Chris­tian Ruth, and Daniel Schwartz,

"THOUGH the crimes of which you have been convicted, in some "respects, are different in their nature, yet they all have refer­ence to one common object, that of defeating, by force of arms, the execution of an act of the Congress of the United States.—You and your confederates succeeded so far, as totally to prevent, in one mode or other, the execution of that act, in a very important part of this state. The act thus daringly opposed, which was for the collection of tax on lands and houses, was framed with particular anxiety for the relief of the poorer part of the community, and the burthen of it must fall principally on the rich. The ignorance of it which was affected, was without the least color of excuse, because information was offered, which was repeatedly rejected, and in some instances with tumult and disdain. Neither could you fairly alledge any ground for discontent, on account either of the character or conduct of the officers concerned, because the former appears to have been perfectly unexceptionable, and the latter in general meritorious in the highest degree, as they united with that firmness which their duty required, every endeavor consistent with it, to give all the information in their power, and to execute the law in the manner most convenient for the people. By your ill conduct, however, and that of your associates, a considerable part of the three counties was inflamed into a state of insurrection; the [Page 219] law in question lost all its efficacy: officers were insulted—and at length that daring and infamous outrage was perpetrated at Bethlehem where a body of the militia itself marched in military array, and by force rescued a number of prisoners from the custody of the marshal, whose conduct on that occasion for courage, discretion, and propriety in every respect, is above all praise. In consequence of such defiances of the constitution and laws of your country, and the numbers and strength by which they were supported, it became the indispensible duty of the government to exert the powers with which it was invested to suppress this combination, and bring the principal perpetrators of it to a trial for the offences they had committed. The civil magistrates having lost all their authority, (notwithstanding some of them exerted themselves in an extraordinary manner, which deserves the lasting es­teem and gratitude of their country) a melancholy necessity arose for employing a military force, which chiefly consisted in volunteer corps, who had nobly embodied themselves to defend the constitution, and laws of the United States, whenever any occasion should arise, though undoubtedly hoping that their services would be required, rather against the foreign enemies of their country, than any within the bosom of it. The services of these gentlemen have been attended with great benefit to their country, and great honor to themselves; but there is too much reason to fear they must have sustained much personal in­convenience, for which, as well as for other private injuries, and a great additional expence and inconvenience to the public, the authors of those outrages are alone accountable. You have each of you un­dergone a fair and impartial trial, and have been convicted of one or more offences charged against you, for which it is now the duty of the court to pronounce the sentence of the law upon you. The dis­cretion which the law has confided to us, we have endeavored to exe­cute to the best of our judgment, considering on the one hand the ne­cessity of making proper examples to deter others from the commission of the like offences, which it seems to have been supposed would always pass with impunity, and on the other hand paying a due regard to the various circumstances which appear to have discriminated the conduct of each of you.

The sentences were as follow:

That George Schaeffer, convicted upon two counts of the indictment, viz. conspiracy and obstruction of process, pay a fine of 400 dollars, and be imprisoned for eight months, for the first offence; for the se­cond that he pay a fine of 200 dollars, and be imprisoned four months, after the expiration of the first term: and at the conclusion of the twelve months imprisonment, that he give security for his good be­havior for two years, from the expiration of the period of his impri­sonment, himself in the sum of 1000 dollars, and two sureties in the sum of 500 dollars each.

That Daniel Schwartz, senior, convicted of conspiracy, pay a fine of 400 dollars, be imprisoned for eight months, and give security at the close of that period for his good behavior for one year, himself in 1000 dollars, and two sureties in 500 dollars each.

[Page 220] That Christian Ruth, convicted of aiding in the rescue, pay a fine of 200 dollars, be imprisoned for eight months, and give security for his good behavior for a year, himself in 1000 dollars, and two sure­ties in 500 dollars each.

That Henry Stahler, convicted of aiding in the rescue, pay a fine of 200 dollars, be imprisoned for eight months, and give a like se­curity with Schwartz and Ruth for his good behavior.

That Henry Schiffert, convicted also of aiding in the rescue, pay a fine of 50 dollars, be imprisoned eight months, and give security for good behavior for twelve months, himself in 500 dollars, and two sureties in 250 dollars each.

The prisoners each to pay the costs attending the prosecution be­fore they are discharged from prison, and stand committed until the sentences be complied with.

The court, taking into consideration the circumstances of the par­ties, proportioned the penalties accordingly.

An abstract of the trial of JACOB EYERMAN, on an indictment for breaking prison, conspiracy to oppose the law for laying a direct tax, and a tax on houses, and for counselling and advising an un­lawful combination and conspiracy—

Before the honorable BUSHROD WASHINGTON and RICHARD PE­TERS, esquires, in the circuit court of the United States, held at Norristown, in the county of Montgomery, and state of Pennsylva­nia.

WEDNESDAY, October 16, 1799.

The prisoner being arraigned, pleaded Not Guilty.

After the jury were sworn, Mr. Rawle, attorney for the district, opened the prosecution by stating to the jury the sum of the indict­ment to be divided into three separate and distinct charges, proceeding from the same transaction, and partaking of the same guilt:

First, he said he should prove that there was or warrant issued by the judge of the district to take the person of the prisoner into the custody of the marshal, which was effected, but that he did break prison and go at large, until by another warrant he was afterwards taken in the state of New-York.

Secondly, He should prove that the prisoner was engaged in a con­spiracy, to oppose the operation of two laws of the United States, by intimidating the assessors while in the discharge of their official duty.

Thirdly, That the prisoner did counsel and advise an unlawful com­bination and conspiracy to prevent those laws being carried into effect.

It was only three years and a half since he came into this country,—and though he had assumed the respectable character of a minister of the gospel; though in that capacity he was bound to preach up submission to the laws of the country, yet, in that short time, he had [Page 221] recommended, both by his advice and example, in opposition to those laws by which the whole community were bound.

Mr. Rawle then related some circumstances that ocourred at Beth­lehem, to which place the defendant was brought prisoner, and in the custody of the marshal, but availing himself of the opportunity there given to the prisoners to escape, instead of again delivering himself up, he immediately fled, left the country, and sequestrated himself in a remote part of the state of New-York, where he was discovered, and again taken into custody. This, he said, was punishable at com­mon law, independent of the sedition law lately passed, which only went to explain the common law, and in many cases to ameliorate its rigor.

Col. NICHOLS the Marshal,

Deposed, that he received a warrant, by virtue of which the pri­soner was arrested, and brought into his custody at Bethlehem, and that he was rescued, together with the other prisoners, by an armed force on the 7th of March last. The witness then related the trans­actions attending his journey to, and at Millar's town, and at Bethle­hem previous to the rescue.* After the prisoners were rescued, John Fries expressed a great solicitude for the safety of Eyerman by return­ing, not having seen him among the others, and asking me where was the minister? I told him that he was out of the house; he said he was not, however he went out again, and there seeing him, ap­peared perfectly satisfied. After this man was liberated, captain Jar­ret said he could now march off his men. Upon the whole it seemed that Eyerman's deliverance was a particular object with those people. He promised when in the room that if he was rescued he would meet me the day following at Philadelphia to deliver himself up, but he did not, and I never knew what become of him till he was brought back by the deputy marshal of New-York.

JACOB EYERLY,

Commissioner for the district, related the appointment of the assess­ors in the different townships, and deposed, That the prisoner, at a meeting held in Hamilton township, told the people that Congress had no right to pass such a law, and if the assessors were to come to his house he would tell them so, and not let them proceed to take his rates.

Mr. Eyerly and Judge HENRY both, informed the court of the ge­neral distracted state of that part of the country, notwithstanding their endeavors to quiet the minds of the people by explanation and advice so that the magistracy could not execute their duty with safety; nor could the evidences called against those who had opposed the assessors, be prevailed upon, without great difficulty, to give their testimony, through a dread of the rage of the people.

[Page 222] JOHN SERFASS, ESQ

Deposed, That he resided in Chesnut hill township, Northampton county: that he was appointed an assessor under the law for laying a direct tax: so soon as the people heard that he was appointed, they were much uproared against it. The people were to assemble to consider the law, and I resolved to go to tell the people they were doing wrong: accordingly I went, and there were 40 or 50 people assembled; but they were not in a military dress. This was sometime in December. After I was there a short time, Jacob Eyerman, the prisoner, came in, he began to rip out in a violent manner against this taxation, saying, that Congress had made laws which were unjust, and the people need not take up with them, if they did all kinds of laws would follow, but if they would not put up with this, they need not with those that would come after, because it was a free country; but in case the peo­ple admitted of those laws, they certainly would be put under great burdens. He said he knew perfectly well what laws were made, and that the President nor Congress had no right to make them. The people in general thought that the minister was right, but I told them that he was leading them wrong. I asked them whether they had heard or seen the laws? They said no. I then told them the words, as near as I could recollect, but I found very little heed taken of it. Mr. Eyerman said, that the people should not let the assessors take down their taxation, and that they might abuse them ever so much, there was no law could hurt them for doing it.

I shortly afterwards gave notice to the people to meet at the same house, in order to explain the law to them. Accordingly they met, and I explained the law to them, and when I left them, they appeared very peaceable.

The second day of Christmas this man preached at a private house; as soon as sermon was done, he went to the house of Conrad Crazy, but he no sooner came in, than he began to run out against the taxation very much. There were about fifteen or sixteen people present. He repeated then that he knew the laws very well, and that Congress and the government only made such laws to rob the people, and that they were nothing but a parcel of damned rogues, and spitz bube, * but that they (the people) had no right to submit to it. I told him that I had told him before to quit doing that, that it was not his duty; that his duty was to preach his sermon, and to quiet the people, or decide be­tween them: if he went on that way I should bring him to such da­mage as he would not like. With that he did quit.

ATTORNEY. Did he, at that, or any other time, advise you not to be an assessor?

WITNESS. Yes. He told me often that it was better for me not to take up with that commission, perhaps it might injure me, for I might meet with some evil.

Were the people of your township much opposed to the law?

Yes, they were so violent that I knew but one man that was the same side as myself.

[Page 223] Did you think that such proceedings would have taken place, or, if they had, that it would have arisen to such an height, if it had not been for the parson.

I am fully convinced it would not. I knew of no other person there who went about to advise the people to opposition. He said he had a book of the laws, and either that there was no such law in it, or else that the constitution forbade such laws.

COURT. Did Eyerman appear to be a simple sort of a man, easily to be led astray, or deluded?

WITNESS. NO, he was not thought so, he was always thought a very good preacher.

PRISONER to the WITNESS. Did I not tell you at Crazy's house that I did not think any the worse of you for being an assessor, be­cause you were sworn to support the government, and had a right to speak for it?

WITNESS. At that house, when I spoke against his conduct, he said "aye, Mr. Serfas is right, he is sworn to support the govern­ment."

PRISONER. Did I not pray for the government, President and Vice-President?

WITNESS. Yes, you did when in the pulpit, but when you were out you prayed the other way.

JOHN SNEIDER,

Deposed that he lived in Hamilton township, and knew the prisoner, who told the deponent that a body should lay out against that house tax. As much as he understood, the prisoner meant, to take arms against it.—He said that if we let that go forward, it would go on as in the old country, but that he (the prisoner) would rather lay his black coat on a nail, and fight the whole week, and preach for them Sundays, than it should be so.

ATTORNEY. How long has this man been at Hamilton?

WITNESS. About eighteen months.

The township was always peaceable I suppose before he came amongst you?

Yes, and I believe if he had not come, nothing would have happen­ed of the kind.

SIMON HALLER,

Deposed that he resided in Hamilton township, and knew the pri­soner, who was very well liked as a preacher until lately. That the prisoner appeared to be in opposition to the house tax law, but who was the leader of it he knew not. That the prisoner came to the de­ponent's house, where conversation began about the house tax, where­upon he said he did not care whether they put up with it or not, for he had no house to tax. A person present answered but you have a great quantity of books to tax. The prisoner answered that "if any body would offer to tax his books he would take a French, a Latin,

[Page 224] an Hebrew, and a Greek book down to them, and if they could not read them, he would slap them about their ears till they would fall to pieces." The deponent saw the prisoner at Hartman's when he talked much against the tax, but could not recollect what. The occasion of the people coning together then, was, that there was preaching that day. The prisoner continued preacher to that congregation till he was taken up.

JUDGE PETERS,

Deposed that he issued a warrant to apprehend the prisoner, but he never saw him until brought from New-York. He also represented the general state of the country to be such that, knowing the county magistrates could not execute their duty, he was obliged to issue his warrants as judge of the district.

The evidence here closed, but the prisoner, his pecuniary circum­stances not enabling him to employ any counsel, refused to make any defence, but just observed that if he had been guilty of any thing, it was contrary to his knowledge, and he hoped, if the jury should find him guilty, that they, and the court would take his case into conside­ration, and punish him as slight as possible, and he would endeavor in the future course of his life to do better.

Ma. RAWLE in a short address to the jury quoted 2 Hawkins page 243. to show that the prisoner was in lawful custody, and page 245. what was the force which in law made breach of prison. page 249 stated that whoever broke from lawful confinement was guilty of mis­prison, which was punishable by fine and imprisonment.

The act commonly called the sedition act, he said, spoke of the se­cond and third counts in the indictment. (Conspiracy, and counselling a conspiracy.) Respecting the crime of conspiracy he quoted 2 Haw­kins page 119. which refers to Blackstone page 392.

He just referred the jury to the testimony, to prove what part the the prisoner had taken in either, or all the crimes alledged.

JUDGE WASHINGTON delivered a charge to the following effect:

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,

IT cannot be necessary that the court should detain you long in the charge on the present occasion. The crimes with which the prisoner before you is charged are, first, a combination with others, for the purpose of opposing the government: secondly, advising and exciting others to this opposition; and thirdly, in rescuing himself from the hands of the marshal, in whose lawful custody he was.

Opposition to government seldom breaks out into overt acts, unless some previous combinations have been made by persons who think themselves strong enough to do it with effect; and this seldom happens, until some person or persons, more knowing, and more wicked than the general mass of society, endeavors to advise and mislead the ignorant and unwary, or less designing. Thus to form a powerful combination, there must be a regular chain for that precise purpose.

[Page 225] The offence or offences with which the prisoner is charged is infe­rior to overt acts, and the punishment is less. The only question for you to determine is whether, upon evidence, the prisoner has been guil­ty of all or either, of the offences laid to his charge. It would be tedious and, I think, unnecessary for me to go through the testimony, because it must be fresh in your minds. Respecting a combination to oppose an act of Congress, the general circumstances for your inquiry are such as will satisfy you of the existance of such a combination. This, I think, is proved by the frequent meetings of the people in the different townships of the counties of Northampton, Bucks, and Mont­gomery, the declarations of the people when convened, and the threats so frequently thrown out by them against the government, and the of­ficers of government. Attempts were frequently made, not only by the prisoner, but by others to disunite the people, and to deter the public officers from executing the duty reposed in them, and which they were sworn to perform, by pointing out to them the dangers to which they were exposed, would they carry those laws into execution. Unless you discredit the testimony which has been laid before you, and that there is no cause for doing, it appears to the court that the proof is as clear against him as any thing can possibly be.

That he was the prime cause and adviser of this opposition appears to be proved by many witnesses, the respectability of whom has not been pretended to be doubted.

Respecting the rescue, the attorney of the district has precisely laid down the law to you. It does not follow, because a man escapes from prison, or from the custody of an officer, (which is the same in law) that therefore he is an offender within the law for which he was commit­ted: nor does it follow that he did not break prison, because the act of force was executed by others who were in combination with him, and he in consequence thereof made his escape. He consented, and showed that consent, by his escape, for whether the force was used by himself or others, is immaterial.

From all the testimony, it appears that the prisoner, in his previous conduct, took pains to stir up the discontents, and that the armed force came to Bethlehem to rescue him, by their earnestness to set this man, particularly, at liberty. Farther, his subsequent conduct proves his offence, for if he had not been liberated by his own consent, he would have done as the others did, who left the custody of the mar­shal at the same time: he would have given himself up afterwards; but on the contrary, he fled from his country, and secreted himself, until taken by a new warrant in another district.

Gentlemen, it is your business to bring these facts into one view, and decide whether the prisoner is guilty of one, two, or all of the counts in the indictment: as you think, so you are bound to find.

In about 15 minutes the jury returned with a verdict ‘GUILTY of all the three counts.’

[Page 226] Several other persons (upwards of twenty) were arraigned for misde­meanors, and submitted to the court, respecting whose conduct some evidences were heard.

No sentences were passed at this session, because, on account of some irregularities in the form of convening the court, it was obliged to adjourn, and the whole of its proceedings were rendered invalid.

Eyerman, at the next term submitted himself to the court, when he was sentenced to be imprisoned one year, to pay a fine of fifty dol­lars, and then to give security for his good behavior one year, himself in 1000 dollars, and two sureties in 500 dollars each.

FRIDAY, May 2.

The following persons, who submitted themselves to the discretion of the court, and respecting whose crimes and circumstances some ex­amination took place, received the sentences severally annexed to their names, for conspiracy, rescue and unlawful assembly.

Henry Jarret 1000 dollars, a years imprisonment. Conrad Marks 800 dollars, 2 years imprisonment. Valentine Kuder 200 dollars, 2 years imprisonment. Jacob Eyerman 50 dollars, 1 year imprisonment. Henry Shankweiler 150 dollars, 1 year imprisonment. Michael Smyer 400 dollars, 9 months imprisonment. Henry Smith 200 dolls. 8 months imprisonment. Philip Desch 150 dollars, 8 months impri­sonment. Jacob Kline 150 dollars, 8 months imprisonment. Harman Hartman 150 dollars, 6 months and 1 day imprisonment. Philip Ruth 200 dollars, 6 months imprisonment. John Everhart 100 dolls. 6 months imprisonment. John Huber 150 dollars, 6 months impri­sonment. Christ. Sox 200 dollars, 6 months imprisonment. John Klein, jun. 100 dollars, 6 months imprisonment. Daniel Klein, Jacob Klein, Adam Briech, G. Memberger, 150 dollars each, 6 months im­prisonment. George Gettman, William Gettman, 100 dollars each, 6 months imprisonment. Abraham Shantz, H. Memberger, Peter Hager, 100 dollars each, 4 months imprisonment. Abraham Samsel, P. Huntsberger, 50 dollars each, 3 months imprisonment. Peter Gable, Daniel Gable, Jacob Gable, 40 dollars each, 2 months imprisonment.

Each of the above persons were required to enter into recognizance for their good behavior.

[Page 1]

APPENDIX. No. I. TRIAL OF JOHN FRIES FOR TREASON. Motion of Mr. Lewis for removing the Trial.

MR. LEWIS preferred the following motion to the Court in writing.

AND now the prisoner, JOHN FRIES, being placed at the bar of this Court, at the city of Philadelphia, being the place ap­pointed by law for holding the stated sessions thereof, and it being de­manded of him if he is ready for his Trial for the Treason in the In­dictment mentioned, he moves, ore tinus, that his trial for the same offence may not be proceeded on here, and that the same may be had in the county in which the same acts of treason in the said indictment mentioned are laid, and where the offence therein mentioned is alleged to have been committed.

He stated this motion to be founded on an act of Congress entitled the judiciary act, passed 24th September, 1789. Sect. 29, "That in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence." He stated the advantages resulting from this section to the accused to be, that a man might be tried by his peers, where he is known, and where there can be no difficulties to procure witnesses in his behalf. This inestimable right, he said, was one of the grounds of complaint to the United States, which promoted their separation from the mother country, and this was one cause of her taking up arms. This advantage, Congress had held in just estimation, and upon this, no innovation was to be admitted, on which account the most pointed and positive terms were used, and the divisions of vicinage reduced to coun­ties. But nevertheless, he observed, this rule had an exception, which was where "manifest inconvenience" occurred, twelve jurymen were to be summoned from that county, and therefore before the court could consider themselves authorized to proceed to the trial in that place, their honors must be well satisfied that trial could not take place in the county of Northampton without "manifest inconvenience." These words did not refer to the inconvenience the judges might feel in tr [...] ­velling, [Page 2] or the time spent, but an inconvenience arising from some cause which Congress did not foresee at the time of the passing of the act. The trouble and inconvenience to the judges could be no greater than to the prisoners, whom the government had brought to this city.

Mr. Lewis said he was aware of an objection which would be raised to the force of the section above quoted, founded on a subsequent law passed March 2d, 1793. sect. 3. which directs that a judge of the su­preme court, with a district judge, "may direct special sessions of the circuit courts to be holden for the trial of criminal cause, at any con­venient place within the district, nearer to the place where offences may be said to be committed, than the place or places appointed by by law for the ordinary sessions." The places appointed by law for the state of Pennsylvania are, York town and Philadelphia. This he pre­sumed must refer to causes of a civil nature, or to criminal acts of a less grade than what is peremptorily required in the act first quoted from, to govern "cases punishable with death." The same act says, that trials in capital cases should be elsewhere, and not at the stated places, unless manifest inconvenience attend it. And what, he asked, was the great inconvenience in the present case? Was there any ob­jection of a nature to render it improper or impossible to try the pri­soner in that county? It was true that a considerable number of per­sons in that county had been misguided, but was it to be inferred thence that all were? Or that a fair trial could not be had there? No doubt an able and impartial jury might be obtained in that place, and there­fore an impartial trial could be had. In bad times, with corrupt judg­es, if ever such a time, and such judges should unhappily be in this country, the section of 1789 would form a protection to the citizen a­gainst any innovation of his privilege, and prevent them dragging him from his family and friends to a distant part, where he might be un­known, to be tried.

Surely it could not be urged that the safety of the United States, or the protection of the court, made it necessary to try this cause in Phi­ladelphia. The prisoners might have been confined in the gaols of that county; the troops of the United States were even now remaining there, to protect the law.

The vicinity of that spot to the witnesses who beheld the transactions was an additional argument for the plea. Some to be sure had come to the city, others perhaps might come forward, sickness or age might ope­rate to prevent some coming. It was also inconvenient to the prison­er in preventing his neighbours or relatives affording him that comfort which they might wish. But all this, he said, was immaterial, the law was definite, and nothing could supercede its mandate. Here was a list of ninety-eight witnesses, furnished the prisoner by Mr. Attorney, who were to appear against him, and hence the necessity of time and opportunity being allowed the prisoner to examine that numerous train of evidence, and to prepare to controvert them.

Mr. Lewis then referred to a similar motion which he made before the court, respecting a person tried for high treason in the Western In­surrection, in 1795, for which he referred to Dallas's reports, page 18, vol. 3. The motion was then rejected, but upon different grounds [Page 3] than could possibly be now urged. Judge Wilson stated it as the opi­nion of the court, the plea being made at a previous court, that the circuit court, at which the prisoner was to be tried was so near, that there was not time to send to the witnesses and bail, on account of the great distance of the county, from the city, as they were subpoened to attend at the next session. The reason was, that the Supreme court could not order a special session to over-rule the stated session, aad therefore the inconvenience was great and manifest; but no such ex­cuse could hold good in the present case: the mandatory language of the former clause must be obeyed.

Further, he observed, that a man might be charged with the crime of treason, and committed for that crime, or bound over, if the case would allow it, yet it was impossible to know that he would be indicted for treason by a grand jury, and no court held previous to the indict­ment, could say whether it was a case punishable with death, or a mis­demeanor, and therefore the time to move the plea was the present time, after the indictment was returned, and when the defendant was arraigned for trial, and till then the motion would be inapplicable. He observed that he considered this motion of considerable importance to the prisoner, and not to him only, but to every citizen of the United States: this was the security of his rights, and those of every man in the court, and therefore he hoped the justice of the court would grant the plea.

MR. SITGREAVES said he had not been able to distinguish whether this motion had been preferred to the court as a matter of unqualified right, or whether it was merely an application, as a matter of favour in this particular instance, but he would attempt an answer to both. With respect to the 29th sect. of the judiciary act, if the first part of the paragraph was to stand alone, without a qualification, it would be a positive direction, and would not bear an objection, yet there would be a difficulty arise how it could be executed: But it was not so. At the time that law was passed, there were stated places, as well as stated times for holding the federal courts, there was no provision whatever for hold­ing them elsewhere than the appointed place, although the judges had special powers to alter the time of holding them: whether that reason, or some other, excited the legislature to put the discretion as to place in the judges also, he could not tell, but although the first direction is positive, an alternative is immediately introduced: twelve Jurors sum­moned from the county where the crime was committed may suffice, at the discretion of the court, and this second branch of the rule is to a­void what the court may judge a great inconvenience, against which no general rule of common law can provide.

In order to prevent any mis-interpretation, and remove the embarrass­ments, which a wrong use of the law of 1789 might produce, the pro­vision of March 1793 still defines that discretion, without making any material alteration: that says "the court might be held at any con­venient place within the district, nearer to the place where the crime was committed than the place for holding the stated session." Certain it is that this provision does not require it to be held in the same county; indeed it is extremely questionable, whether the court have au­thority [Page 4] to remove it there; they may nearer the place, but the word "nearer" excludes the place itself; if the place was intended, the phra­seology would be more accurately inserted. He would now remark that no place nearer the scene of insurrection than this city could have been selected, and here the discretion of the court had fixed it. The law must have been made for one of two reasons: either for the facility of public justice, or to favour the prisoner. Respecting the first, the crime was committed, not in one county only, but in three adjoining counties, and therefore agreeable to the arguments of the gentleman, the trial must be held in three counties, by three juries, and the wit­nesses be harrassed to appear three times; but even if the court should determine upon one of those counties for the trial, which was to be selected?

MR. LEWIS questioned the propriety of this argument, since it ap­peared all the cases of treason except one (in Bucks) happened in North­ampton county, and no inconvenience could accrue from holding the trials at one place.

MR. RAWLE said that he should produce evidence to prove the crime of treason committed in the three counties.

MR. SITGREAVES proceeded to state that as the act of 1793 as well at 1798 left a discretion for the court to determine according to ex­isting circumstances, and not according to any known definite princi­ples of law, it would be impolitic, if not illegal to hold the court in the county, this city being, agreeable to one argument next to one of the counties, and on the other view, the stated place for holding the courts, the arguments must fall, and the motion be rejected. Philadelphia, he said was as near to the place where the crime was committed as the court house of that county, and here it was probable the purposes of public justice could be most compleatly answered.

If then the argument was not supported on public convenience, it must be the convenience of the prisoner which the gentleman aimed at, but he had failed to show any such thing, and therefore had precluded any answer. He had argued for the comfort of the prisoner; having his neighbors about him, &c. but it must be observed that the residence of the prisoner was in Bucks, whereas the crime was committed in Northampton, and there he must have been tried, if the decision should turn in favor of his arguments. Now, Philadelphia was as much an adjoining county to Bucks, as Northampton, and therefore as much his vicinage, and each place of holding the courts at about equal points of distance from his residence. Even if it was held in Northampton coun­ty, it would neither facilitate the trial, nor be of advantage to the person.

Another question he would suggest was, whether this application was made soon enough. It was nearly, or quite a week, since the in­dictment was given to the prisoner, and it was a much longer time since he was committed: if it was proper that any application should be made to the court, either as a matter of right or of favour, it ought to have been made in due time, so as not to delay or defeat the ques­tion of public justice. It would be unnecessary to say that the ques­tion was fully determined in the year 1795, and if it was a matter of [Page 5] law, and as such mandatory, every case which was the [...] decided on, was a case of mis-trial, and the whole court and council must have been guilty of a great dereliction. But he believed it was asked of the court at that time, not as a matter of right, but of favour, and it ap­peared by the report quoted, that if the favour could have been grant­ed, it would, but the decision was against the possibility of it, and cer­tainly stronger reason would have weighed for it then than now, on which account there is now at least, equal grounds for refusing it.

MR. RAWLE observed, that while he professed as much humanity as any gentleman in court, yet as council for the prosecution he felt as much desire for the just execution of public justice. He could scarcely persuade himself that the gentleman who moved the court could be se­rious at this late period of the business,—after seven days had elapsed since the indictment was found, after all the inconveniencies of a pre­paration for trial had been incurred this new, this additional inconve­nience of summoning the witnesses and jurors to another place, could not be either to the advantage of the prisoner, or agreeable to a just construction of the law adverted to. The law of March 1793 does not apply to a case which the offence first charged would make capital so as to effect life. The question seriously was, Mr. Rawle said, whether granting the motion would not deprive the country of prose­cuting the trial at all, or even after had full proof of the guilt of the prisoner it would not prevent the court of the power of passing sen­tence. The act read by Mr. Sitgreaves gave the Judge the power to hold courts throughout his whole district, 226, Vol. 2, Laws U. S. but the act of 1789, which fixed the place, only gave the court power as to times of holding special sessions 51, Vol. 1. The 29th section of that act was absolutely very ambiguously worded, because the fifth sec­tion of the same act had put it out of the power of the court to re­move as to place. Whatever, then, was the intention of the Legisla­ture, the courts had not power to effect a change, and when an act failed in explaining the intention, the intention could not be carried into execution, to remedy the inconvenience of the court, being bound in all cases as to place the clause of 1793 p. 226 passed.

Mr. Rawle contended that a special court was more than an adjourn­ed circuit court: it was a substantive court of itself, held for special purposes, and could not issue certiorari for any other court; if there­fore, a special court was to be held for this trial, it must begin de noca: a new grand jury, and a new petit jury must be called; the witnesses must be summoned anew, which would be a bad precedent, besides a great delay. The impropriety was evident: after a bill had been found the prisoner had seen a list of the Jury and witnesses; after having had time to calculate its chances, at the seventh day of the proceeding, he came forward to remove the trial! If the prisoner had not had time to enquire into the character of the jurors or witnesses, some other rea­son would have been given, but as nothing of that kind had been at­tempted, and as the inconveniences of delay and removal were so mani­fest, he trusted the court would not accede to the motion.

MR. DALLAS declared that it was not the design of the council for the prisoner to try experiments by the present motion; they con­ceived [Page 6] that he had a right to be tried, in the county where the crime was charged: the act of Congress was mandatory unless "manifest in­conveniences" should appear. He conceived that distance could not be an inconvenience, because the act contemplated the possibility of crimes being committed in Allegany as well as in Chester county. Nor could time; the importance of a capital trial was not to be so played with; Congress designed that an impartial trial should be had in all cases, without regard to such trivial objections. He was sure the honourable court would not consider their personal inconveniences as meant, and therefore should not mention it. Mr. Dallas wished it to be observed that the crimes were recently committed, and public justice had not been long suspended, and even if the present motion was acceded to, the hand of public justice might shortly give the blow, by appointing an early special session. It was not certain before the court sat, that a bill would be found for high treason, merely because the parties were bound over for high treason; and therefore the prisoner might not be able to meet that charge: again, the time since the bill was found and the party informed, and served with the enormous list of 98 witnesses, has been very short; it was Wednesday last, seven days only, two of which must be left out, Thursday having been the fast day, and Sunday inter­vening. Many of these witnesses and jurors he had never seen nor heard of, and it was necessary he should have time to enquire who they were; there had been no catches on the part of the prisoners. It would be an easy thing for the court at this time, since all the parties were upon the spot, to bind them over to appear again. In the case read by Mr. Lewis, judge Wilson expressly declared that there was a desire in the court to comply, but the difficulties were insurmountable. With respect to the other cases, the mandatory language of Congress impo­sed a necessity on the officers of justice, where it was possible. The clashing of courts, he presumed, could not be held up for excuse at this time: he did not know how much time the present circuit might con­sume, but as the supreme court would not meet untill August, no doubt there could be a period for the business of a special court spared during the recess; but if the period should be filled up, in the August session arrangements might be made to hold one. With respect to the hold­ing of district courts, Mr. Dallas observed, that the law, Vol. 1, p. 49, 50. allowed a discretion as to the place of holding them; page 51, gives dis­cretion, as to the circuit court, to the judges of supreme court with respect to time: these provisions respected all cases alike, within the jurisdiction of those courts, but the subsequent act referred to, made an exception with regard to cases of a nature highly criminal, or capital: certainly then, if ever the Congress meant there should be a trial at all in the proper county, one like the present must come under that inten­tion. The language of the two acts, page 67, Vol. 1, and 226, Vol. 2, Mr. Dallas observed was different. He first declared, that cases punish­able with death should be tried in the county, &c. The second, that special circuit courts may be holden nearer the place where the offences may be said to be committed than the place of the ordinary sessions; but one thing was worthy of notice: the first relates only to offences punishable with death, while the other is worded at crimes only; of [Page 7] whatever nature. Cases of insurrection and rebellion [...]st have been in the view of the Legislature, and in them it would be very probable part of more than one county would combine, and they could have ex­cepted such cases if it had been meant so to do. It was farther said that part of the crimes were committed in two counties, and therefore the prisoner had deprived himself of the common law vicinage. This was not clear: the vicinage where the offence was committed would at any rate have it in their power to declare what they had seen of the conduct of the prisoner. As to the stage at which the application was made, no loss of time had been made, and if it was, it would be extreme­ly severe, if in the power of the court to order it otherwise, that the prisoner in so important a case should be injured thereby. On the whole, he trusted, without manifest inconveniency should appear, that the court would grant the motion.

MR. LEWIS said it was strange, mischievous and unfounded doctrine that this application had not been made in time: three clear days from the notice of the indictment being allowed by law to the prisoner, he was not bound to answer the indictment until yesterday: the trial did not then proceed, and he appeared this day, but in his sincere opinion, from mature reflection, two three nor four days should have weight with the court, because the act of Congress was binding upon them, whatever the learned gentlemen had advanced to the contrary: he had a right to demand it, and if their honors, the judges, proceeded to hold the trial in any but the right place, they, and not the prisoner, would offend. Mr. Attorney had supposed if this was granted, all which had been done would be null and viod, grant this for a moment, did Mr. Attorney or John Fries direct the proceedings of the grand jury, &c. certainly the attorney. In this Mr. Lewis believed he had done strictly [...]ight, here was the proper place for the issue to be joined; but Northampton is the proper place for the trial of that issue. It was objected because it was said the crime was committed in three counties; but suppose it were in three or thirty counties, the overt act in the bill is laid in one county only, and there only does the law support the claim for trial. The two laws referred to are unnecessary in capital cases, if they do extend to them at all, because the first law makes ample provision not only as to time, p. 51, but as to place, p. 67. and is not superceded by the other. With reference, to the law, of 1793, page 227, which says, that criminal causes may be tried nearer to the place where the offences were said to be committed, the argument was taken up by Mr. Sitgreaves to mean nearer to the county; hence he says that Philadelphia county is the adjoining one of the insurgent counties. In the Indictment Bethlehem is mentioned as the place; now the law di­rects a special session to be held nearer to Bethlehem than is Philadel­phia, that act does not say whether it shall be held in or out of the coun­ty, but near the place. The gentleman appeared to have thought he was in another place, and not at the bar, in his view of the discretionary power of the court, which would leave it to be regulated according to the ebbs and flows of the passions of the judges, or the temper of the times; but he should recollect this discretion was of a legal, and not of a political nature, which the necessity of the case called for. All that [Page 8] must be considered to operate on the question is, whether justice can­not be done between the United States and the prisoner, if the trial is held in the county of Northampton; if it can, we rise to claim this as the right of John Fries, and nearly allied to the interests of every citi­zen.

JUDGE IREDELL said it was held by judge Hale, that an indictment was part of the trial; if so, he fould be glad to be told what they were to do with the present indictment, if the trial was to be removed? if so, the prisoner must be indicted as well as tried in the county. Foster 235, and 236. Another question would be, could the court order the dismissal of the indictment?

JUDGE PETERS could not see how part of the proceedings of this court could be transferred to a special court, and therefore how it could be removed to the county, and while a doubt remained, it would never do to renovate a criminal case of so much importance, he could not see the force of the reasoning in favour of the removal. He thought that however humanity ought to lean towards a prisoner, still the proceed­ings of the court ought to ensure justice to the United States, and to the prosecution, and therefore that public justice ought to be as well guarded as the prisoner's convenience: a fair and impartial trial ought to be had, which he was certain could not be held in the county of Northampton, and if he were now applied to in his official capacity to take the necessary steps for that event he would refuse.

MR. RAWLE said there were opportunities enough for a motion like this to be made before a bill was found, after the parties were bound over. The accused ought to be preparing for trial from his first com­mitment, to remove all the inconveniences which delay until after the proceedings were going on would occasion: it appeared to him to a­mount to a technical trap, laid to involve difficulties. It was well known that the prisoner could not wait till it was too late to obtain many privileges to which he was entitled by an earlier attention to his interests, of which the present was one. With respect to the difficul­ties his honor, Judge Iredell, had mentioned on the indictment, they were too serious and important to be dispensed with.

JUDGE IREDELL delivered his opinion to effect as follows:—With regard to the lateness of the application, as it does not relate to the merits of the defence, I think the arguments in favour of the motion preponderate, and that no advantage should be taken from the prisoner without full ground. It is evident that, in this case a number of circum­stances might be mentioned which would render a trial inconvenient in the county of Northampton. I am inclined to think with the council for the prisoner, that the court have the power to order a special court to be held there if they should think proper, and therefore I should not scruple to admit it, if all concurrent circumstances admitted its prudence. The question then i [...], whether according to the legal discretionary pow­er of the court, this court think it their duty to admit the force of the motion. When these offences were first known to have been com­mitted, and when the gentleman with whom I have the honour to sit was in that country, it was possible for a court to have been ordered there for trials, but it appeared to those with whom the power rest­ed, [Page 9] to be improper. And why?—The president in his proclamation had publicly declared that the lawful authority of that county could not be carried into execution without the aid of a military force. Would it not therefore have been improper for us to order a special court to be held at that place? If a special court could not have been held there, the only thing to be done was to bind the parties over to this court.

There are two very important difficulties in the way of this motion, I say important, because they are such as no gentleman of the law can be perfectly clear upon them. First whether, if we order a special court, we can order, by any process known to the law, this indictment to be transferred to that court. This is a doubt stated by judge Wilson, of the supreme court at the time of a former motion alluded to; and I am inclined to think this was a great reason which guided the decision, otherwise a doubt would not have been intimated. If this cannot be done, what would be the consequences of the removal of the case? If this indictment were to be taken there, with a doubt in point of law on it, a motion might be made after trial, for a new trial, that not being regular, part having been held in another place. Whether this would be moved or not I cannot say, but I know at best it is doubtful. The court therefore ought to proceed in the clearest manner not to run the risk of defeating the prosecution of a cause so important. It is the great desire of this court to do the most impartial justice between the public and the prisoner, and not from private humanity on the one hand, or resentment on the other, to lean either way. As to the common law principles of vicinage, there are advantages and these are disadvantages attending it. The advantages are, that the parties are known by, and know their jurors and witnesses, that their characters may be viewed, and the most impartial justice done. But if nearly one whole county has been in a state of insurrection, can it be said that a fair trial can be had there? We may at least presume it could not, because the pre­sident of the United States ordered a military force there, to enforce the execution of the laws. It was by this military force that the pri­soners are now convened in this city, and I have reason to believe from the opinion and knowledge of the judge with whom I now act, that it would be exceeding improper to hold the trials there. It was hinted that troops are still there, and they could promote the execution of justice; but what sort of justice is that of the sword? If they would operate at all it would be by intimidation, and this would be to the prejudice of the prisoner, and in no respect in his favour. This con­sideration alone in my opinion would make it "manifestly inconvenient." for a trial to be held there. With respect to the principles of common law, the gentlemen well know that the venire may be changed, that is, that parts of the jury may be summoned from other counties. I do not know whether there is a power in the courts to change the venire in England in a criminal case, but I know that in some difficult cases, where partiality was to be apprehended an act of parliament has been passed to remove the trial: this was done respecting the rebellion in Scotland, for the manifest reason of partiality. This proves that we ought not to look to one side only, but to both, and then form our determination. [Page 10] Upon the whole I am clearly of opinion that if the motion could be granted without running the risk of these uncertainties, but certain in­conveniences, it would not be expedient to grant the motion, and there­fore the trial must go forward.

[Page 11]

APPENDIX No. II. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OF JOHN FRIES, FOR TREASON.

MAY 14.

MR. LEWIS informed the court that the other day in coming into court, he received a slight information, which he thought it his duty as advocate for the prisoner, to make far­ther enquire into, but it was not till this morning that he had been able to procure the depositions of witnesses to prove a fact, on which he meant to ground a motion. He read the depositions to the court, which imported that John Rhoad, one of the jurymen on the trial of John Fries, had declared a prejudice against the prisoner, after he was summoned as a juror on the trial. He now found that he could procure other affidavits to the same fact, on the ground of which he "moved a rule to show cause why there ought not to be a new trial."* He expressed himself aware of the lateness of the period, verdict having been given, but the impossibility of proving the fact earlier, was a suffi­f [...]ent apology. He should forbear to enter into the merits of the mo­tion at present.

Rule was granted and made returnable to-morrow morning.

Wednesday, May 15.

MR. DALLAS said it became his duty as advocate for the prisoner, to lay before their honours the grounds on which they had moved for a new trial in the case of their unfortunate client, in which he was sen­sible some little violence must be offered to his feelings in whose be­half it was made, and particularly if judgment should at last be pro­nounced upon him; but whatever the event, it became their duty to pre­fer it, and he was certain that upon examination into the facts, they must be justified in producing them, as the event must alter the decision which had taken place. He was satisfied that the court, without di­rect reference to authorities, would be inclined to listen to any thing that could be offered upon good grounds in favour of life, or the chance [Page 12] of life. With this confidence, he relied on the favourable attention which would be paid by the court, and that the intervention of any trifling error in the proceeding, may not expose the defendant to the danger of a favourable decision.

In making the motion, Mr. Lewis had laid before the court some affidavits in order to prove tint one of the Jurors, after he had been summoned to attend the trial did declare that the man should be con­victed: in addition to that circumstance, the following reasons should have been assigned in favour of the motion:

First, That the marshal has, without any order or direction from the court or judges for that purpose, returned a greater number of jurors than he was by law authorized to do:

Secondly, That he returned them from such parts of the district as he thought proper, and without the direction of the court or judges:

Thirdly, That the trial ought to have been held in the county where the offence was committed, except manifest inconveniency should ap­pear, and it does rot appear from any part of the record of the court that any inconveniency did prevent it, for whatever were the acts of the court they ought to have been placed on the record, which not being done, is good ground for a motion.

JUDGE IREDELL, did not think that the Court were bound to assign a reason for their judgment on the record of their proceedings, besides it was an high contempt at this time to call for the renewal of an ar­gument whereon a solemn decisive opinion was delivered: he asked what part of the law required it: if it was at that time omitted, it was in the power of the court to order it now; or if they did not or­der the reasons to be inserted, the mere decision on the face of the re­cord was enough to make it authoritative.

MR. DALLAS said there was no intention of offering a contempt to the court, and if there honors would attend they would be convinced there was not.—The judiciary act 29th section p. 67, vol. 1, Contem­plates two things, first, trial shall be had in the proper county without great inconvenience should appear, but if it should so appear to the court, then, secondly, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from the county. From this it appears that before the second branch of this clause can be executed, there must be a determination upon the first; it must be evident that there are too great inconveniencies to ad­mit of the trial being held there, and then the second must take place; and further that it must be the act of the court to direct that twelve jurors shall be summoned from the county. The court have great latitude in this discretion; they have power to take the whole sixty from the county they please, but not less than twelve; if therefore this discretion is given, and given to the court, it is not in the power of any ministerial officer to exercise it without the direction of the court: they are to be returned as the "court shall direct." "These words more particularly relate to another branch of the section, to wit: from what part of the district from time to time the rest shall be called. The venire in this case was made returnable on the 11th of April, this precept directs that the marshal shall return a list of sixty petit jurors, and twenty four grand jurors, who appear to be all returned from the [Page 13] county of Philadelphia. Your honors will observe that the marshal has authority to summon not more than 60, nor less than 48. In this return he has summoned 60 from Philadelphia county, whereas twelve at least ought to have been summoned from Northampton. The autho­rity of this venire then is at an end, for it cannot be pretended upon any authority or precedent, in a civil or criminal case that a marshal or Sheriff has ever attempted to exercise such a power without a pre­cept in form, commanding him: and the award appearing upon the record. This venire is completely satisfied, and all the authority given has been exercised in the return of 60, and if he has returned more he must show authority for it. With respect to the western insurrection, Judges Patterson and Peters did not adopt the state regulations with regard to the number of jurors, but any deviation from that must be on the sole authority of the court. 2 Dallas 341, 2. Mr. Patterson was of opinion that the common law proceedings of the court of King's bench ought to guide their proceedings upon a question of this nature, since the act of Congress says nothing about number, but refers to state pro­ceedings, which is guided by that common law. To show the pro­ceedings of Kings bench, and to prove that the court alone had the direction of the venire Mr. Dallas quoted the following authorities: 4 Blackstone 344, 3 Blackstone 352 Cooks Littleton 155, or Keyling 16 2 Hales pleas 263.—besides he said the same section gave direction as to the manner of issuing writs of venire facias when returned by the court p. 68, to issue from the office of the Clerks of the COURT. It is there­fore incumbent on those who vindicate the legality of the marshal's proceedings, to show that he acted with authority, viz. from the clerk's office directed by the court. To show what authority he had to sum­mon 89 jurors, when not more than 60 was usual; to show his authority for summoning seventeen from Northampton and twelve from Bucks. If you take it as one return it is a return of 89 jurors upon a precept which directs no more than 60, if you take the surplus number over 60 as a separate return, there is no authority at all for making it.

Mr. Dallas said he did not mean to controvert, for he respected the opinions of the Court, but respecting holding the trial in the county, he would refer to the 8th amendment to the constitution, p. 456, vol. 3. in these words, "In all criminal cases the accused shall be entitled to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and dis­trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law." Then referring to the ju­diciary act, and finding it there declared that the offender should be tried in the proper county, the question then is, whether this is not es­tablishing a district as it respects capital crimes, except "manifest in­convenience" prevent. If so, the place where the court is now sitting is to be considered a foreign county, now where by certiorari an indict­ment is removed in the king's bench, and where the jurors are to come from a foreign county, then time must be allowed for the precept to issue, which must be in the rule of the record, 2 Hawk. c. 27, sec. 1. This court is sitting in the state of Pennsylvania, and the jurisdiction of the court is co-extensive with it, and so is King's bench with the whole nation of England: the process of this court may be sent into [Page 14] any county in the state, so may that of King's bench to any county in England, 4 Hawk. c. 41, p. 376—2 Hales pleas 260—4 Hawk. b. 2, c. 27, p. 171. Douglas 590. In the present precept there does not appear to be a return of 89 jurors authorised, but that 89 have been returned: the supplementary return was made by the marshal without any act of the court, and with any venire being duly issued, or any a­ward to summon this jury to try the prisoner. Seven of the persons who were on the list impannelled to try John Fries, and who have gi­ven vi [...]dict, are not at all on the list summoned for the trial: how came those seven persons then on this trial, respecting whom no venire was issued? They were not called to attend by any process of the Court! This was not the case in the western insurrection, for then, though a greater number was summoned, it was upon the solemn deci­sion of the Court, and by their order that the venire was issued. [he read the venire then issued] In that proceeding every thing is re­gular: the marshal receives express orders to summon 12 jurors from Allegany, &c. but where are similar directions in the present case? 4 Blackstone 369—4 Hawk. c. 31, sect. 4. p. 240. ibid c. 27, sect. 104, p. 175, are authorities to explain what is mis-trial, and are a jus­tification of the present application for a new trial. Hence it appears that a mis-return of jurors is such an error, if they actually pass, as to make a mis-trial, and the verdict is of course void. In this case 60 is returned upon a schedule with the names annexed, and on another schedule a return by the marshal of 17 from Northampton county, and 12 from Bucks, to which the marshal signs his name, but no process was issued for these supplementary 29 names, and it is clear from the instrument that 60 compleated the return, only five of whom were on the trial of the prisoner, and the other seven had no right to try him, being drawn from a list which no proceeding had authorized. Where there has been no process, no trial can proceed. Law of Errors, p. 65. We see what is the effect of a person intruding himself into the jury, who has not been lawfully summoned, 4 Hawk. c. 25, p. 16—the verdict is void, ibid. p. 17. This will be granted. Mr. Dallas here recapitulated the objections he had stated, and added that merely the appearance of the jurors, nor their having been sworn, or having given verdict were objections sufficient to overturn the motion.

He next made a few observations on the conduct of the juror, which he said was not merely an expression of opinion, but a previous determination, and an expression of fear if the prisoner should be ac­quitted, so that it was impossible to hesitate that, if this was true, the juror did not give verdict upon evidence, but was influenced by a previ­ous bias, and prejudiced determination: his going into the box with this partial mind, deprived the prisoner of that chance which the law deter­mines he shall have. It is necessary that every jury should enter this box free from malice; but it was not so: this juror laboured under particular impressions, unfavourable to John Fries, because he concei­ved he had been the leader of, and brought on this disturbance, and therefore [...] to be hung: this will be proved to have been more than once the language of the juror, and that he indulged himself in [...] expressions. After running from place to place, influenced by a [Page 15] vindictive spirit of prejudice, to express his desires, can it be contend­ed that he was capable of deciding on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, by the weight of the testimony only? There cannot be found a stronger case in the books. It is not necessary or right to go into the testimony, or any of the circumstances of the crime of the prisoner, to see whether the verdict was right or wrong; but it is necessary to view the determination of this juror, who wished them all hanged, and particularized Fries, First, his words were, "we will hang them all: then he said, "I myself shall be in danger, unless we do hang them all." This is not merely an opinion generally expressed, but the lan­guage of design to convict at all events. If eleven out of twelve ju­rors had been of opinion that an acquittal should take place, and this individual supposing he was in danger had declared this opinion, and pointed out his view of the probable consequences, would not the voice of the eleven be changed to guard against this danger? 4 Hawkins, c. 4 [...], sec. 28. p. 399, supports the doctrine generally, that if a juror [...] declared his opinion before hand, that the party is guilty, or will be hanged, or the like, it is good cause of challenge: but if from his knowledge of the case, and not from ill-will to the party, he has only declared his opinion, it is no cause of challenge. But even resent­ment has not the influence upon a man's conduct which self-preserva­tion has: ill-will is not the only ground of challenge; interest is as much so: if a man had laid a wager another would be hung, this is not ill-will, but would viciate the juror. Therefore we must conclude that "ill-will" in the above authority, is put merely as an instance. Whether these words were spoken in warmth or not, is immaterial; for it would be no alleviation; it is impossible that they should have been expressed without ill-will; and therefore the man is not impar­tially qualified to pass upon the life or death of the prisoner. Salkeld 645 and 11 Modern 118. Upon the general ground of what could be with propriety called misconduct in the person summoned to discharge the duty of a juror with impartiality, he observed there could be no doubt upon the propriety of their asking a new trial, nor upon the jus­tice of one being granted.

MR. LEWIS mentioned 5 Bacon, 251—2 (old edition) and 4 Black­stone 354—5, in order to show, that in criminal cases there should be no new trial, unless it should appear that the former trial had been at­tended with fraud, &c. and that a new trial in those cases might be granted after conviction, it Modern, 119. 5 Bacon, 243, and 3 ibid, 258 (old edition.) If he has declared his will, touching the matter, it shall be cause. 4 Blackstone, 346, (old edition.) The direction re­specting the venire, he said, was entrusted to the law and not to the marshal, and by that direction was exercised by the judges in 1795, and if that was neglected, it was not legally executed. The court could, as then, order the jury to be called from all parts of the State, and not to be left to the marshal. 5 Bacon 242. is an instance in which a son was sworn into the jury, (being the same name of John Pierce) instead of the father who was the person summoned to attend, whereupon a new trial was granted, because the trial was held by only eleven qualified persons as juro [...]. If the sheriff did not follow the [Page 16] direction of the law in respect to the venire, it was good cause for a new trial.

MR. SITGREAVES said he did not think it necessary to controvert the position which had been advanced by the gentlemen on the other side: that the court have full power to order a new trial after con­viction in certain criminal cases, as well as civil under certain circum­stances; but notwithstanding the authority of the court to grant new trials was ascertained in some of the books, yet it would appear that this power had never been exercised in any capital case; no such case had been referred to, and he believed could not be found; he imagined the reason why it could not, was, although courts had the full power, yet the peculiar solemnity of a trial for a capital offence, and the great caution which was used to guard the security of the prisoner against improper bias, or wrong proceeding that may respect his guilt or inno­cence, with sufficient mounds to prevent intrusion, and therefore con­viction in such a case had not yet been set aside. With respect to the qualification of a juror, objections as to the array or to the poll ought to be received by a court with uniform caution, after trial and verdict is passed, because there is so full and ample opportunities given to the prisoner to deliberately enquire and make a good choice: the whole pannel which are summoned, must be given to the prisoner; a certain time must be allowed before he can be called upon to answer the charge, sufficient for him to enquire the character, interest, affec­tion, or partiality of the men: having this time and opportunity, so carefully secured to him by positive institutions of law, it is not to be wondered that objections afterwards should be cautiously received by the courts. After having these opportunities for examination, the law gives power to the prisoner to challenge 35 jurors arbitrarily, or without assigning a reason, and after that as many more as he can assign just cause of objection to, and they will also be set aside if his objection is well founded. To depart from this general view, and make the particular application, which is by no means irrelevant in a question of this nature, it is observable that the prisoner has actually had more than common power to select a jury to his mind: of this whole list 33 did not appear, and of the number that remained the prisoner chal­lenged 35, so that he had 68 entirely in his power as much as though all had been present, and he had challenged 68. With respect to Mr. Rhoad the juror, there is something worthy of remark: When Mr. Rhoad came to be called, and there was some difficulty suggested as to his knowledge of the English language, although the court and prosecuting council saw the force of the objection, he was retained at the instance of the council for the prisoner, because they had exhausted all their challenges, and they did not know that the next would be so agreeable.

MR. SITGREAVES next stated to the court what he thought to be the unquestionable principles of law on the point in question.—If a mo­tion for a new trial is received in a court for a criminal cause, it is under the same rule and circumstances as for a civil cause, and in both depends on the discretion of the court, and that discretion ought to be governed, not by any precise set of rules now known in law, but in any [Page 17] way that will best perpetuate justice, except there should appear a mandatory, imperative rule. If the law says that upon conviction of a certain crime, a certain punishment shall ensue: this is peremptory, and the court have no power to depart from ordering that punishment. Wherever a discretion it left, it is meant that the court may use that discretion, according as the nature of the case may require, and this is left in the conscience and mind of the court alone, agreeable to cir­cumstances which grow out of the justice applying to the particular case. In the present case therefore, the court are not to be governed by any set of precise rules, but by an opinion of what will best per­petuate public justice. To be sure it is a rule, that a new trial shall be granted where a verdict is given against evidence, but even then it has been frequently refused, where they see the case it plain. In civil causes it has been refused, when not to the interest of justice to grant it. 2 Burrows, 936.

JUDGE IREDELL said he had not discovered any dictu [...], which distinguished civil from criminal causes, so that equal justice ought not to be administered; but if either, surely a criminal case called most strongly for justice: it would never do to apply casts so far, as to say, that if one man upon a jury was discovered not to be fully impartial, a new trial should not be granted, when a man's life was at stake.

JUDGE PETERS said he always understood, that the power of granting a new trial, was in the discretion of the court; and that its opinion ought not to be turned by any vagaries, which should be pre­sented, but be governed by a reference to legal discretion; but at the same time, he could not say that the court ought to throw entirely out of their view, all the evidence which had been given in the trial, and every thing that had been done. If in the scale of justice, there should appear to be any error, and the case is any way doubtful, then the court will take advantage of a tri [...]le, in order to grant a new trial, but where the court has been fully convinced that the verdict is right, then the evidence ought to have some weight, as well at the law.

MR. DALLAS observed, that the motion was not in any regard to evidence, if so, the weight of evidence must be considered; but it was alone on the point of law, totally independent of evidence.

MR. SITGREAVES contended, that where a trial was necessary for the purposes of justice, it rested between the judge and his conscience, and he was not to be governed by any precise state of facts here or there: if, as is unquestionably the case on the present occasion, a trial has been held, which for the patience of investigation given to it by the court and jury, has scarcely had its equal in this, or my other country; where the prisoner has had every indulgence, and every ca­pacity of talents, which this state can afford, to a [...]ist him in his de­fence; if after all this, a conviction has been the result of this minute and laborious examination, it will at least be allowed, that the objec­tion which should have the ultimate effect of setting aside a decision and investigation so solemnly and deliberately taken, should be ground­ed upon no slight matter, but that the rea [...] [...] compleatly [Page 18] authenticated, so as not to leave a doubt, or the least ambiguity. If the facts related in the affidavits, had been known to the prisoner, and mentioned when the juror came for his array, undoubtedly, the legal investigation would haw taken place, and a solemn decision passed thereon, which if true, would have been to disqualify the juror. Mr. S. explained the different modes of challenge, and proceeded to question the relation of the affidavits—that these were words, said to be spoken a considerable time before the trial, "some days:" the trial had been nine days before the court, and it was probable, this declaration must have been made fifteen days at least, that this impor­tant and often repeated conversation should rest all this time in the minds of the witnesses, without a disclosure, was very extraordinary, particularly so, when it was considered that they attended the court every day, and at last the affidavits rested on the memory of the wit­nesses, which must be very liable to mis-apprehension and error. This is good reason for the objection, that the application is too late, and ought, in a matter of so much importance, to have been mentioned sooner, if in the knowledge of so many people, at such repeated con­versations as the gentlemen conceived.

Mr. Sitgreaves was proceeding here to read a written declaration of Mr. Rhoad (the juror) as to the circumstances of the conversation, which as it was not sworn to, was objected by the prisoner's counsel; the juror was at length sworn, and the deposition was read to the court. Mr. Sitgreaves said he read this, to show how easy it was to misapprehend not only the meaning of words, but the words them­selves. Another thing to be observed was, two of the witnesses them­selves at that moment, were prisoners out upon bail, under indictment for misdemeanor, and therefore the affidavit of so respectable a citizen as the juror, denying the fact, left a serious doubt as to the truth of the others' depositions, but more as to the probability of mistake in the relation. Mr. S. then went into a comparison of the affidavits, which he contended were very dissimilar, and had much the appear­ance of wrong statement. Whatever may be the difference of opi­nions, as to the discretion of the court, when they are fully satisfied that the crime is well ascertained, both as to law and evidence, yet it would not be doubted as the unquestionable right of the court, to institute the most severe scrutiny in a matter which endangers the whole of the former proceedings; the former proceeding which must be valid, unless the most unequivocal testimony shall intervene to change it.

Mr. Sitgreaves said the conversation was of a general nature, and not to the prisoner in particular, agreeable to the affidavits generally; it spoke of the general effects of the insurrection in that country: in­deed it was not to be expected in a matter of such public concern as that unhappy affair, but every man would express his opinion, and particularly those who resided on the spot; therefore it could not evince any prejudice, and consequently not be lawful challenge to the juror. He referred to 3 Bacon new edition Letter E section 12. One affi­davit only particularized Fries; and yet it appeared from Mr. Rhoad's deposition to relate to one conversation only, therefore it was evi­dent [Page 19] that the relations differed, and were of course of a suspicious nature. If a man draws a deduction from what he has heard, or from his own knowledge of an event, and not from "ill will," it is no proof of prejudice or partiality, he is still "indifferent" and open to impres­sion: there must be an expression of malice, of determination, to a particular case, and in a particular way.

Just cause of challenge may be, if one of the grand jury is impan­nelled on the petit jury, because he may be said to have already "pas­sed upon the case in issue" 2 Hawk. 29. C 43. Where an action is dependant between a juror and defendant, it is then challenge to the favor, Viner 21 title juries h. d. Cook Littleton 157 d. Nothing that is merely an expression of opinion is cause of challenge: nothing but what flows from a malicious heart against the prisoner in particular; all the cases show the distinction, and there is not a single case in which the declaration of a juror has been made cause of challenge but to the favor, in which case triers are appointed by the court to examine whether this predisposition does or does not appear. The present case therefore is not cause of particular challenge, but of challenge to the favor, which was not made in time. Mr. Sitgreaves then referred the court to some authorities 2 Rolls abridgment 657—21 Viner title trial 266 and 272—1 Salkel 153 and one which occurred in this state when one Ann Clifton, was convicted for murder, and one of the jur­rors had made declaration before he was sworn respecting the guilt of the prisoner.

JUDGE PETERS said that he had given the marshal directions to summon jurors from Bucks and Northampton: he was not certain whether it was given in writing or verbally, but left it should not have been in writing he now gave it to the prothonotary of the court. At the first appearance of it, he did not know whether it amounted to treason, and therefore he thought particular directions not necessary, but afterwards, finding it more serious, he gave the directions which had guided the marshal.

MR. RAWLE thought it easy to prove that the marshal was fully authorized to summon from what part of the state he pleased, unless the court interfered by a special direction, and then he was bound to obey the mandate. The marshal no doubt understood that he was to summon from the state at large, conformable to the directions of the law. With respect to the western insurrection, the fiat of the court was obtained, but it was not so in the present case. Mr. Rawle, he [...]e appealed to the prothonotary to know whether any instance of a special direction of the court respecting venire had occurred since that period in any capital case. Mr. Caldwell answered there had not.

Mr. RAWLE went on to mention the progress which had been made, and the time and opportunities of which the prisoner might have availed himself, but these he had neglected, and at this period, he came forward by his counsel to challenge the array! Challenge, he observed, was of two kinds, the poll and the array; if challenge was made to the poll, and the trial went on, challenge to the array could not be made, because exception was before made, but he thought it was clear the [...] was passed at which he might hive availed himself of the chal­lenge [Page 20] to the array. It was contended that the marshal had not made a proper return to the venire, but authority had not been produced to prove the point, yet authority could be found to prove that after the poll bad passed, even before the trial, the array could not be challenged, because that was passed too, but to what a much greater length had the present objection been delayed? After having taken the chance of the verdict, and finding it unfavorable, then to say it was irregular, and for a reason which might have appeared sooner, he quoted 12 Mod. 567 and 584. 2 Lord Raymond 84, refering to the time when excep­tion may be made.

Farther, after all the chances which a prisoner could have, and com­plaints made of irregularity as to the venire, the objection was far­ther extended to a man who was summoned from the very county where the crime was transacted! Upon this man the prisoner was willing to put himself for trial, rather than one he did not know. See Danver's abridge. 354, 5 and 7. With respect to the number returned. Mr. Rawle referred to Crookjames 467. 2 trials per page 599. 21 state trials, 707. There might be more than 60 returned; in regard to the western insurrection he said there were 108 summoned. The words of the v [...]ire directing the marshal are, that he cause to come to the court, so many a certain day; it is therefore proper that a certain num­ber should attend, and to ensure the number necessary to meet the challenge, the marshal usually summons a greater number than are mentioned, but if a greater number do attend, then the super-numera­ry are stricken off. In the present case the number in the venire was exceeded by 29, and yet 38 less attended at any one time than were summoned, the prisoner had been tried by one of these 5 [...] seven of whom were from his own neighborhood, and men in whom he thought he could place his life with safety. In order to confine the number within some bounds so as not to exceed reason in case a marshal or sheriff could be found to make that improper use of his power, and take the citizens from their business or their homes unnecessarily, an officer so offending can be prosecuted for misdemeanor, but this was not the case. Where there is more than a sufficient number sum­moned for the purpose of trying a civil cause, which in Pennsylvania is confined to 48, and more than that number should attend, and one of them sworn on the trial is taken from those over the 48 that at­tend, then no doubt it would be mistrial, because the summons was unlawful; so in the present case, if one of the jurors had been of the 48 over the number 60, had more than 60 attended it would have been a mistrial, because the venire ordered the marshal to cause but 60 to appear, (but that objection even would have been insufficient at this stage of the trial) and more he had no right to bring.

As to the propriety of summoning 12 from Bucks and 17 from Northampton, there appears to be no wanton exercise of power in the marshal, because he acted under the authority of the judge of this court. The gentlemen could not show an authority which made it necessary for the marshal to have a certificate to empower him to do this, and if it was necessary, the certificate of the judge appearing upon the record would make it valid. But even if had not receiv­ed [Page 21] the authority of the judge, the act of Congress would have been a sufficient warrant for his conduct. P. 67 vol. 1. twelve at least are to be summoned from that county, and 17 are summoned. The act of sum­moning is properly the business of the marshal, if he has official notice, in any shape, that such a trial for a capital offence is coming forward, which would entitle the prisoner to be tried by twelve jurors from the proper county if he makes the provision which the law requires, he has absolutely and completely acquitted his office, as well technically as formally. The return which has been produced embraces the whole number of 89, sixty of whom are of the county of Philadelphia, and if there is any technical alteration in the form necessary to give it legal precision and effect, it is now in time to alter it, but there is none ne­cessary.

Mr. RAWLE said he considered this proceeding as having received the full sanction of the court, in the certificate given by the judge. First because no opposition had been made to it, and secondly because (the whole number not having appeared) it was not excepted to at that time. The list out of which the seven jurors from the country were taken, he called a supplementary list, which completed the for­mer list, and though not annexed to that pannel was connected with it, filled up and made a part of it, on which an award was entered. The cases referred to had respect to a foreign country, but in a dis­trict, one county was not foreign to another, and therefore Bucks, Northampton and Philadelphia, stood in one exact situation. 2 Hawk C. 41. B. 2. Dyer 118.

Mr. RAWLE concluded by saying that he looked upon all the pro­ceedings in the present case as perfectly regular and compleat, to which no exception could justly be taken by the prisoner, and he hoped the effort would miscarry, since every means had been used in the defence during the long and patient investigation which had taken place, and after a vredict had been so solemnly pronounced by men whom the pri­soner had such a fair means of chusing to answer his best purpose.

The attorney general, and council agreed, and the court ordered that the deponents should give testimony, and be cross examined in court, on each side. Also that the witnesses should be examined separately, and kept out of the court, so as not to hear the evidence given by each other.

Thursday May 16.
NICHOLAS MAYER's Deposition.*
The United States, v. John Fries.

[Page 22]

NICHOLAS MAYER of the city of Philadelphia being duly sworn, maketh oath, and faith, that some time after John Fries, above-named, was brought to this city, this deponent went to a place called Lesher's yard, near the Northern boundaries of the city of Philadelphia, and in going into it, he saw several people there from Northampton coun­ty, and among others, Mr. John Rhoad of the said county, who af­terwards served, as this deponent is informed, as a juror, on the trial of the above indictment, against the said John Fries—That the people then present were talking about the said John Fries, and one of them said, "some people think he will be hung." This deponent answered "I do not think he will be hung." On which the said John Rhoads said " what of it, if Fries will be hung—such a man like him ought to be hung, who brings on such a disturbance."—That some of the per­sons with whom the said John Rhoads was then talking appeared to be of a different opinion from him, and they were disputing about it; and the said John Rhoads appeared to be quite serious and a little warm, in what he then said respecting the said John Fries; and this deponent further saith, that he never mentioned any part of the foregoing con­versation to the said John Fries, nor hath he any reason to believe that the said John Fries hath any knowledge thereof.

NICHOLAS MAYER.
Sworn in open Court, May 14, 1799.(A true copy,) D. CALDWELL, Clk. Circuit Court.

NICHOLAS MAYER's oral Testimony interpreted.

MR. LEWIS

—You were present at a conversation in which John Rhoad a juror on the trial of Fries, was in conversation on the event of the insurrection, &c. please to inform the court the particulars of it.

WITNESS.

The words I heard from Mr. Rhoad were spoken in German, it was at Scidell's tavern in the Northern Liberties—when I came into Lesher's yard I saw several people there from Northamp­ton county whom I knew, among others was one Mr. Rhoad, whom I know very well: they were talking about Mr. Fries: one man stood up and said he thought Mr. Fries would be hung, I replied myself that I did not think he would be hung; with that Mr. Rhoad began to say, in German, "what of it, if Fries was hung; such a man as Fries ought to be hung," and he appeared to be very warm, which sur­prised me. I went away then, and left them still arguing about it; they were talking about Fries.

COURT.

Do you remember the time?

WITNESS.

I cannot remember exactly: it was some time after Fries was brought to town; perhaps three or four days.

COURT.

Did you go into the house at all?

[Page 23]

No, I was not in the house.

Do you remember whether Harman Hartman was present or not?

No, there were some people there, but I do not know who.

Do you know Daniel Heberly?

No, I do not.

COURT.

Do you remember whether Rhoad said any thing, and what, as to Fries bringing on the disturbance?

I cannot say as for that.

After the question was put the same again, upon a short recollec­tion the witness said. Yes.

Do you think you heard all that passed upon that subject?

No, I did not.

The United States, vs. John Fries.

DANIEL HEBERLEY of Macungy township, in Northampton coun­ty, being duly sworn, maketh oath and saith—That a day or two be­fore the above indictment commenced, he, this deponent was at the house of an inn-keeper in this city, whose name he does not recollects where he saw John Rhoad, one of the jurors on the trial of the above indictment, and several other persons who were conversing respecting the said John Fries, and the other insurgents, when the said John Rhoad said "that they should hang all these chaps, and that they "ought not to be permitted to live in the country."—This deponent never mentioned any part of the said conversation to the said John Fries, nor hath any reason to believe that he hath any knowledge thereof.

DANIEL HEBERLEY.
Sworn in open Court, May 14, 1799. (A true copy.) D. CALDWELL, Clk. Circuit Court.

DANIEL HEBERLEY's testimony interpreted.

MR. LEWIS.

Relate to the court whether you were present at a conversation between Mr. Rhoad and others about John Fries, and where and when it occurred.

WITNESS.

It was on a Monday or Tuesday, I am not certain which, of the first week after I came to town, and it happened in Sei­dell's room.

ATTORNEY.

Were you not down twice?

WITNESS.

Yes, but this was the last time: (about the 24th of April, he came to town the 22d,) they were talking together, Rhoad and Shankweiler at the stove, about the business they were come down to the city upon—I did not pay very particular attention to all that they said, but I understood so much as was said, that they would hang the whole tote of them, but particularly Fries: Rhoad said this: I did not pay particular attention to the rest, but this I particularly minded in order to tell his comrades, that he might be struck off the [Page 24] list of jurymen, and not come upon the jury: so I immediately inform­ed captain Jarrett of it.

COURT.

Have you had any conversation with Jarrett to day?

WITNESS.

No, I did not speak to him, but I saw him in the court.

COUNSEL.

Did Rhoad say any thing like this: that these people ought not to live in the country, and if he did, what was it?

WITNESS.

I paid no attention to that: I was not very near, and did not hear that: there was a pedlar in the room that laid his pack on the table between Rhoads and me.

COURT.

Did or did not Rhoad keep saying other things although you do not know what they were?

WITNESS.

I know that he spoke more to Shakweiler about it, but I do not recollect what it was.

The United States, vs. John Fries.

HARMAN HARTMAN of Macungy township, in Northampton coun­ty, being duly sworn, maketh oath and saith, that about three or four days before the trial on the above indictment commenced, he, this deponent was at the house of — Seidel, inn-keeper near the north­ern boundaries of the city of Philadelphia, where he saw John Rhoad, one of the jurors on the trial of the above indictment; and several o­ther people who were converting respecting the said John Fries and other persons late charged with treason, when some of the persons pre­sent said "it was hard they should be so long in prison and so far from home," when the said John Rhoad answered "it was very right, he was glad of it, and that they should hang every one of them." And the said John Rhoad further said "that he should not be safe at home if they did not hang them all." This deponent never mention­ed any part of the above to John Fries, nor hath he any reason to believe that he hath any knowledge thereof.

HARMAN HARTMAN.
Sworn in open Court, May 14, 1799. (A true copy.) D. CALDWELL, Clk. Circuit Court.

HARMAN HARTMAN's Testimony interpreted.

WITNESS.

I was at Seidell's tavern three or four days before the jury were called upon, to try Fries—the Monday or Tuesday before the trial began. There was a conversation held by several persons saying it was very hard for them that they must be down here, and some of them in gaol. Whereupon Rhoads said he was glad it went so, or he (Rhoads) should not be safe if they were at home: they ought all to be hung.

COUNCIL.

Who was by at the time besides Shankweiler?

WITNESS.
[Page 25]

There was another person bye, named Adam Stephan, from that part of the country, that heard it.

COURT.

Did he mention Fries's name or not?

WITNESS.

I cannot particularly say, I did not pay particular at­tention at that time, but they had considerable conversation, and that was the purport of it.

Were many people in the room?

Yes, the room was very full, and I was engaged in conversation myself, therefore I did not attend particularly.

COURT.

Did you hear the whole conversation, or only a part of it?

Only part of it: I came in, and they were then conversing already.

ATTORNEY.

Was Heberley in the room?

Yes, Heberley, Stephan, Shankweiler and more, but I do not re­collect them.

Do you know Nicholas Mayer?

No, I do not.

ATTORNEY.

Who did you mention this conversation to after­wards?

WITNESS.

I do not recollect that I mentioned it to any body.—

I afterwards passed by several times, and saw Rhoad speaking to other persons: I thought it rather hard before they knew what the crime was, that they should say so much.

Did you mention it to no one? Recollect.

I believe I mentioned it to some of the people who lodged in the same house: Henry Jarrett was one of them.

ATTORNEY.

Had you any conversation with Jarrett to day upon the subject?

WITNESS.

I spoke to him this morning out of court, but nothing particular. Since that I mentioned it to Henry Schiffert, Valentine Keenly and Dewald Aldbrecht, but cannot particularly recollect what time I mentioned it.

COURT.

Did you mention to any of them before the trial came on?

WITNESS.

Yes.

COUNSEL.

Did you ever mention it to Fries?

WITNESS.

NO, I never had an opportunity—I never knew his name 'till this disturbance took place.

HENRY SHANKWEILER, sworn. Testimony interpreted.

Were you present at any conversation between Rhoads and others respecting Fries, &c.

WITNESS.

Yes; it was at Sidell's tavern.

When?

It was the week after I came down—since the court began.

ATTORNEY.

What time of the week?

WITNESS.

I think towards the latter end—Thursday or Friday.

COUNSEL.

What passed there?

WITNESS.

Rhoad said it was very well it happened, or went on so, for they should be no longer safe at home else.

[Page 26]

What went so?

That the people were taken prisoners.

Relate how the conversation began, and what were the very words, as near as you can.

WITNESS.

Some of the country people said it was very hard they were brought down here prisoners; in answer to that Rhoad used these words. Rhoad further said, that they ought to be hanged, and Fries must be hanged, for he had been the leader of it, or of them to go to Bethlehem, and he took the prisoners from the Marshal.

ATTORNEY.

Were Hartman and Heberly present?

WITNESS.

Yes, I slept with them in the same room.

Do you now sleep with them?

Yes.

COURT.

Did they sleep in the same room with Rhoad?

Yes, all three of us.

COURT.

Did the conversation pass in that room?

WITNESS.

The conversation was down stairs, where they were, in the bar room drinking; but he related the same up stairs too.

COUNSEL.

DO you know John Fries?

The first time I saw him was at Bethlehem.

Did you ever see him since?

Only here in court, except once at Mark's, when I came to Phila­delphia to deliver myself up.

Did you ever tell Fries of this?

No.

HENRY JARRETT, sworn.

COUNSEL.

DO you know Daniel Heberley?

Yes.

Did he communicate to you, and at what time, a conversation be­tween Rhoad and others about Fries?

WITNESS.

I cannot particularly mention the day, but one day he came to me in the court house at yon window, telling me that I must tell either Fries or his attorney that he should challenge him, because he had said at Seidell's tavern that Fries must be hung.

Did he tell you any thing farther?

No.

How long was this before the trial begun?

I cannot tell, but it was before.

Did you tell either Fries or the counsel?

I believe I did not, but I think, if I am right, I told it to some­body.

I had not seen Fries, only in the bar, and never told him.

After a short pause, the witness thought he had told it to Judge Mulhollan, but was not certain. I told it several times, but I can­not swear when or to whom.

Evidence against the motion.

JOHN MULHOLLAN, sworn.

He deposed that he had a distant idea, something like a dream, but had no recollection of what it was. On the court applying the ques­tion, [Page 27] he did not recollect any thing said to him by Mr. Jarrett about challenging Rhoad, but he was not certain whether he did not say that he would not like to be tried by him.

COURT.

Did he assign any reason?

WITNESS.

No, I believe not.

COURT.

Had you any conversation afterwards with John Fries on that subject, or did Fries ever consult you as to the challenge of his jurors?

WITNESS.

No, never.

COURT.

Nor his counsel?

WITNESS.

Yes, they asked me what I knew of the jury: I told them nothing, but from the temper of the times I would rather lie in prison for years than be tried at this time.

COURT.

Did you mention to Fries what Jarrett told you?

WITNESS.

I do not know; I took but little notice, but let it pass on.

The deposition of JOHN RHOAD.
United States, vs. John Fries.

Having heard three depositions read in the above cause, to wit: the depositions of Herman Hartman, Daniel Heberley and Nicholas Mayer, I do solemnly declare, that I never did use the expressions im­puted to me by these deponents.

I recollect that I was in conversation with sundry persons at Sei­dell's tavern, at which, the said Hartman, Heberley and Mayer were present, in which the late disturbances in Northampton county were mentioned, and I there expressed myself to the following effect, and no other effect nor purpose whatever, viz. ‘That unless a stop was put to such proceedings, as have lately taken place in Northampton county, especially at Bethlehem, I would not wish to live in that part of the country.’

And I have not, at any other time expressed myself to the effect, stated in those affidavits.

I further declare, that I went to the trial of the said John Fries, with a mind perfectly open to conviction, as to his guilt or innocence, and that before I assented to the verdict, I deliberately weighed and considered all that had been adduced in his favor.

JOHN RHOAD.
Sworn in open Court, May 15, 1799. D. CALDWELL, Clk. Circuit Court.

The oral Testimony of JOHN RHOAD (interpreted.)

Mr. SITGREAVES.

Do you recollect any conversation between Shankweiler, Heberly, Hartman and yourself at Seidell's tavern?

WITNESS.

Yes, perfectly well, but I do not recollect that they were all present: some of them I know were. They said it was hard for them (Fries and others that were here) to come down, as they were [Page] in poor circumstances, it would cost them so much trouble and expence, whereupon I said that it had been very hard for us (the witness and others in that country) in the winter and in the spring to be up there: I think I said that if the government had not power to bring those people to trial, or before the court, we could not live in the country, nor in any other country: whereupon they said that the prisoners got severely punished for it; I said that the punishment would be accor­ding as the law would inflict. They then dispersed—this was in the yard, before the door at the side of the house.

ATTORNEY.

Had you any conversation of the same kind in the room or by the stove?

WITNESS.

Yes, I talked about it with Hartma [...] near the stove.

What time?

It was in the first week, toward the latter end of the week, near as I can recollect, but I cannot perfectly recollect. Hartman did not say it plain, but he as much as gave me to understand that it was hard, or not right that they (the prisoners) should come into that trouble, for that two might swear against me and bring me to the same place; I thereupon said that neither two nor ten of them could bring me to the same place, as I had never drawn in the same yoke with him, (Hartman) against the government. If they were to swear, I would prove before all the magistrates in the place, that I never had any thing to do with it, but was always in favor of government. This is all I can recollect.

ATTORNEY.

Was there nothing at this conversation said about Fries and the other people?

WITNESS.

No, I then went away from the stove.

COURT.

Did you ever talk with Shankweiler about it?

WITNESS.

I believe he was present.

Did you to Herberly?

He was likewise there—in the house or at the door.

COURT.

Do you recollect saying to either of them that they (the prisoners) ought to be hanged—either in the stove room or in the bed room?

WITNESS.

I do not recollect that I said any thing. I took par­ticular care not to say any thing of that kind, since I have been sum­moned on the jury, because I new it was necessary to take care.

COURT.

Some were saying you were warm: were you warm or offended in consequence of what Hartman said to you?

Yes, it was disagreeable to me, and offended me, else I should not have said so much.

ATTORNEY.

At the first time you come down had you conversa­tion with Nicholas Mayer, or any body else?

I do not recollect: I know I have seen Nicholas Mayer before, but cannot say where.

How long did you stay in town the first time?

From evening till the next day at noon only—I came in about eight o'clock, and went away about three or four next day.

COURT.

Did you say any thing about the proceedings at Bethle­hem in Northampton county?

WITNESS.
[Page 29]

I recollect that there was a talk, but I cannot recol­lect the conversation itself.

Do you recollect saying that you would not wish to live in the coun­try, except a stop was put to such proceedings?

Not at that time, but I believe I recollect something of the kind afterwards.

COURT.

What did you say?

WITNESS.

I said that if the government had not the power to punish the evil, or evil doers, I would not wish to live in such a coun­try. I do not recollect any more.

COUNSEL.

At this last time did you see Nicholas Mayor?

I did see him; but I am not certain whether it was before the door, or in the house.

COURT.

When did you come to town the second time?

WITNESS.

On the 22d of April, at eight in the morning.

COUNSEL.

Had you any conversation with Mayer then?

I never had any conversation with him, but I saw him in the yard.

MICHAEL SNYDER was next sworn as to the character of John Rhoad the juryman; he deposed that he had known him 27 or 28 years, during all which time he had been a good character, and a man of veracity. He did not think he would talk farther then he could make appear.

JOHN MORETZ deposed that he had known him about 25 years, he was a very clever honest man; a man of truth as much as he knew of him: he could say nothing against him.

PHILIP WALKER did not know him very particularly, but he ne­ver heard any thing amiss of him: as much as he knew of him he was an honest man.

JACOB ARNOT junior had been acquainted with Mr. Rhoad some years, and believed him to be a man of unblemished character, as good as any in that country.

MR. SITGREAVES said he would not have troubled the court again, upon this question, had circumstances rested as they were before the evidence, but upon investigation palpable differences would be discover­ed between the affidavits and the verbal relations, not only of the de­ponents with themselves, but which other. He then analized and compared the affidavits of Mayer, Heberly and Hartman, which he only recommended to the examination of the court, and he thought the difference must appear so essential as to give a serious doubt of the accuracy or truth of either, while the character of Mr. Rhoad was unimpeachable.

MR. LEWIS said if any trifling difference appeared in the affida­vits from the relation, it was easily accounted for in the manner the affidavits were taken: those of Heberly and Hartman, were taken in his office, and interpreted by a German, from whom he had very great difficulty to collect the meaning in English. Only one of these affi­davits were taken by himself, the other by Mr. Ewing, a young gen­tleman, student in his office [Mr. Ewing corroborated the fact: "that he could not understand what the interpreter said."]

[Page 30] MR. LEWIS then mentioned the grounds upon which the rule to show cause had been granted; whether either, or all of these grounds had weight in them, he would not undertake to assert; but certain it was, that it was the duty of the prisoner's counsel to lay them before the court, and wait the event, which if favourable, would cause a new trial: if not, they should be satisfied with having discharged their duty; in either case, they should cheerfully submit to the opinion of the court; and he was sorry to see that the last question, to wit, That the trial ought to have been held in the proper county, had given any discomposure the court: he then explained the reason, to show the court that it was not agitated out of any disrespect to their former decision, which was that "manifest inconvenience" did prevent the trial being held there, but this did not appear on the record. In cri­minal prosecutions, and especially capital cases, it was usual for the prisoner's counsel to avail themselves of every slip and inaccuracy, and therefore he was excuseable in the present. He quoted 4 Bur­rows, 252.

It was common for the court to err, and in such a case, he consi­dered himself in duty bound to point it out to them, and he was satisfied if that error was of consequence enough, the court would grant a rule thereupon, and thus retract from their former opinion, which they were fully authorised to do. He referred to [...] Blackstone 391—1 Burrows, 393.

MR. LEWIS then went on to point out the propriety of granting a new trial in criminal as well as in civil cases, although the prosecu­ting counsel, had enforced the want of precedent, as a reason against it; indeed he said it was evidently of more consequence, and there­fore he supposed it had been the more strongly opposed: a man's life and his fame was of more value than a part of his property, and he had no doubt that, whatever might have been the verdict, the court would go as far in granting it. It was admitted that the court had the power, if it had the power, there was no doubt but the honorable judges would exercise it according to their conviction.

Mr. LEWIS said the council for the prisoner did not come forward to prove that the verdict was given against evidence, but to insist that the prisoner had been tried by eleven jurors only, for the other stood indifferent as he stood unsworn, they went further—they went to prove that there was an essential error in the pannel, and thus the prisoner was bereft of those benefits, to which the law entitled him. If we prove this, said he, we do not address ourselves to the discretion of your honors; it is not a matter of will, it is a matter of justice, to which we are entitled. As it respects the evidence, you are not at all to consider its weight: the evidence may be clear, and yet the verdict may be wrong given, because of the incompetency of the ju­rors. The gentlemen have said the period for application is past—it is too late,—but with all their talents and industrious researches, those learned gentlemen have not been able to produce a single au­thority to support the doctrine that it is too late; after conviction, or even after condemnation, the court have authority to order a new trial; no time is specified to limit the discretion, if the reasons are [Page 31] good. If the law has not distinguished the period, those gentlemen are certainly unwarranted in saying it is too late. 2 Strange, 968, is a case where an argument was held on a plea for new trial, but not a single argument is used, that a new trial could not be held on capital cases: that seems to be taken for granted.

It was argued against a new trial, in capital cases, that the court proceeded more deliberately, and more cautiously, and because the prisoner was allowed a challenge of his jury. The argument amounts to this: because the law requires more caution, and gives the prisoner more advantages where his life is at stake, for that reason, he should have less advantage and less indulgence, or in other words, because the benignity of the law allowed more benefits in the awful event of life or death; therefore in another point, essential to the prisoner, he should be bereft of an advantage, enjoyed by one indicted for an as­sault, or in a common civil cause. It may be argued, that the bene­volence of the executive, may extend mercy to the prisoner, because of any irregularity in evidence or proceeding, but this will not satisfy the law; it is an hazard at best, while the law gives him the certain advantage of a new trial. The power and right of granting a new trial in some cases, is admitted; now if any of the witnesses or jurors could be proved to have perjured themselves, the evidence being first given, and the verdict pronounced; this, it will be allowed, would have weight to grant a now trial; but the case before the court, goes as far, if not farther; and if there should appear an extreme error in summoning, the jury, or that one of the jurors had disqualified him­self from wearing the characteristics of an unbiassed man, then it must equally appear, that there has been an infringement of a legal right, sufficient to lay the foundation of a second hearing.

Another doctrine that was insisted on was, that it was discretionary in the court; that where they were satisfied with a verdict, although against evidence, no new trial ought to be granted: there may be in­stances of a civil nature, in which that doctrine will be allowable, but they differ materially from the one now before the court, and therefore will not apply: that application may go to the favor of the court, where they see the evidence strong, but no favor can be exer­cised, nor is any asked in this case; we only appeal to the justice of the case.

It was said by one of the gentlemen, that this juror's declaring his sentiments, was only cause of challenge to the favor, for which triers ought to have been appointed, and the qualification or disqualification of the juror been determined by them, but for which it was now too late. Mr. Lewis denied the position. He had already proved, both on his own declaration, and by the evidence, that it did not come to their knowledge, until after the verdict was given, and therefore they came forward as soon as they were obliged: this was allowed a suf­ficient excuse in Salkeld 645, and 11 Modern 119, and therefore the objection was unimportant. The witnesses could not inform John Fries, for he was in gaol; he could not know it, until yesterday morn­ing when the motion was made in court, for the witnesses had no knowledge of each other, so as to be able to communicate it. 3 Bacon [Page 32] 258—9, says, that ‘it is particular cause of challenge, if a juror has declared his opinion touching the matter.’ In causes of particular challenge, the court is to inquire into the truth of the fact, and no triers are to be called, and if they find the cause a true one, they are not to judge, nor to be left to discretion, but, they must try the issue again. This is the doctrine of ancient law and usage, 266 Bacon. Then all the argument about triers is out of the question, the question is, whether the juror stood indifferent, or whether he was under the influence of bias, and a prejudiced mind: the law compels the issue to steer clear of friends or enemies: no partiality whatever is to pre­dominate; but can any man in the world, say that Rhoad's mind was free from prejudice, when he took opportunities to make such declara­tions?

MR. LEWIS then went into an examination of the evidence and depositions. Now suppose the court to believe the fact nearly as stated by the evidence, Mr. L. asked, whether it was possible, consistent with law or justice, to believe that a just verdict was given, or that any man ought to suffer under such a verdict? Suppose the whole twelve to have made similar declarations, it would require no argument to convince the unbiassed that the consequence must be fatal.

It has been attempted to be proved, that even such a declaration was no ground of challenge, if it was not made from malice; but what is the meaning of an independent man? It means a man who stands on the high ground of justice and impartiality, and is not warped by prejudice, nor warmed by resentment—quite free from interest in the issue: also a man whose judgment has not been made up in favor of either the one party or the other, for if it has, though he may be an honest and well meaning man, it is not likely that his mind would be freely given according to evidence. Without he is free from these entanglements upon his mind, he will—he must err. Now, it appears by the evidence of even Mr. Rhoad himself, that he was warm, and might have forgotten the expressions, and nothing can be shown, but that Mayer, the witness, who has lived in thas country, is a man of good character; however, he must be supposed so, until he can be proved otherwise. Mr. Lewis remarked, that the witnesses spoke of different conversations: Mayer of one, when Rhoad came first to town; the others of two afterwards, in the room where they were sitting, and in the bed-room. He contended that no material, although a verbal difference did exist; but the testimony of Rhoads differed materially from them all; his verbal testimony and deposition was also different, as might be seen. But Mr. Lewis said, he doubted whether the testimony of Rhoad in this matter, was legal evidence or not, because it was a matter in which he was materially concerned, how­ever they had not much objected, as there was a considerable diffe­rence in evidence going to a court, and to a jury; he had no doubt, their honors would make the necessary allowance.

Although Rhoad was not sworn at the time he used these ex­pressions, he was summoned on this trial, and it was on high misde­meanor, whether it was indictable or not, he would not say, but it was a very imprudent disposition: to encourage or even suffer. In [Page 33] Salkeld, 153, Cook's case, chief justice Holt holds, that if a man ought not to be compelled to prove that he is a party, neither should he be allowed to prove that he is not a party, by his own evidence: this ap­plies to Rhoad giving evidence, in which his character is concerned. 4 state trials 747—8 the case appears more fully: such a conduct is here declared to be scandalous, and a misdemeanor, and the man ought not to be on any jury. By four witnesses, neither inconsistent with them­selves, nor with each other, Mr. Lewis said this fact was clearly proved, and he thought incontrovertibly so: of the respectability of those witnesses, he knew nothing; but nothing disrespectful had been proved, and consequently not their incompetency.

JUDGE PETERS said that he did not know about their swearing falsely, nor could he say any thing about Mayer, but of the others he well knew that one was extremely stupid, and the others deeply pre­judiced, on which account, their evidence should be carefully scrutini­zed, and carefully received.

The necessity of great precaution and care, Mr. Lewis was willing to admit; but this stupidity was a good apology for their not revealing the fact, until it was drawn from them: their ignorance indeed, was deducible from the whole of their conduct, and the opposition they made to the government, but it did not strike at their credibility: uninformed, and misinformed as they were, their verity might be good. They were under indictments, and therefore perhaps afraid to speak; besides, coming from different parts of the country, they knew not John Fries: but let their offence or situation be what it may, they may be honest men, and men of truth and integrity, and therefore they must stand upon as good a footing as witnesses could stand.

We must take it for granted then, said Mr. Lewis, that the juror made these declarations, and if so, according to the law of England, and of the United States, he is disqualified from the office, otherwise, that most invaluable right, trial by jury, would be eminently impaired.

MR. LEWIS then examined some authorities which had been quo­ted by the prosecuting counsel, some of which were irrelevant, and some he thought not at all applicable. With respect to the case of Ann Clifton, as quoted from the Pennsylvania practices, the juror de­clared that ‘he did not know how any body could do otherwise than bring her in guilty, but he did not speak as a juryman. The court were of opinion, it was not sufficient to grant a new trial. The ob­jection of the court was not because it was a capital case, but they gave as a reason, that these words were not sufficient to vitiate a ju­ror: his mind as a juror, he declared was still open to conviction.

It was stated, that the application ought not to be listened to, be­cause the prisoner had the challenge of sixty eight in effect, out of the whole pannel: how this was meant to be applied, he could not dis­cover, but one fact was plain, that the smaller number there were summoned above 35, the better choice there was for the prisoner, and therefore the whole number cannot be made to exceed 60, agreeable to common law. Mr. Lewis then observed, that one remark of Mr. Rawle, that Mr. Rhoad was the last they could challenge, but they would rather have him, than trust to the next, was a plain implication [Page 34] that they were ignorant of the fact, instead of militating against the motion. In order to remove every suspicion of inaccuracy from the former testimony, he said, he had happily been able to procure one, whose respectability could not be questioned, and which he should now introduce to the court.

GEORGE YOHE, sworn.

COUNSEL.

Were you present when any conversation took place between Rhoad and other respecting Fries and others?—relate the particulars.

WITNESS.

A few days after Mr. Rhoad came down, he was at my house, sitting at my stove, with two other gentlemen, farmers I believe: they were having conversation a good while before I came out of the bar, when I stood up by them: they were talking about the insurgents and Mr. Fries, and those who came from Northampton: they were mentioning that those people there, who were not of the same opinion as those now brought down, were in danger, and some of them ought to be hung, and Fries in particular. One of them mentioned that if Fries knew that, he would not have him on the jury; Rhoad said that it was not his wish to come on the jury. I heard no more, but returned into my bar.

COURT.

Do you recollect that Mr. Rhoad mentioned any reason, why they ought to be hung?

WITNESS.

No, I do not recollect.

COUNSEL.

You are confident that he said Fries in particular?

Yes.

Cross examination.

What language was it spoken in?

WITNESS.

German.

Did Rhoad lodge at your house at that time?

No.

Who were present at the time?

I do not know who they were.

To whom did you mention this circumstance, and how came you first to be brought before the court?

I mentioned that such things were said in my house, when I heard that it was brought forward; that was the first time.

How long had you known Rhoad before?

Six or seven years.

COURT.

Do you recollect any persons particularly, who were pre­sent at that time?

WITNESS.

No, there were more people present, but they were at the other end of the room.

How long was it since?

It was soon after they came down; he was here ever since.

Friday, May 17.

MR. LEWIS resumed his argument in favor of the evidence, which he said, had not Mr. Yohe came forward, the others being suspected, would have been a question, whether the negative testimony of Mr. Rhoad, in which he was a party, or the positive testimony of four others, who were not concerned, had the most weight; but now, [Page 35] taking it for granted, that Rhoad is mistaken, it can be only accounted for in two ways: first, that his memory failed him; or secondly, that he was extremely prejudiced: imputing nothing corrupt to him, still we cannot allow him to be less so than any one of the five witnesses we have brought to controvert his assertions: allowing him not to be free from prejudice, he cannot be supposed to be capable of judging for himself.

MR. LEWIS then mentioned another objection founded on the act which says, ‘in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be held in the county,’ &c. To remove this, one of two things must take place: the court in whom is the discretion, must, from facts within their own knowledge, or facts laid properly before them, order it elsewhere; otherwise secondly, it must take place in the city of Philadelphia, as a matter of course, as the law has, without a contrary necessity, fixed on the county, no entry need be made: but if that necessity did exist, it ought to be entered. How the order was taken, and by what application the court was removed, he would not say, all he contended for, was, that it must appear the court did so adjudge it, and for good reasons. The court could not be changed, but under certain circum­stances; these occurring must appear on the record of the court. A motion was agitated on this point, and decided against, but all that appears upon record, is that the motion was refused: whether amend­ment can or cannot be made after trial, he would not contend, but he had doubts. He quoted Hawk. C. 22, 129. Lord Raimond 1 [...]1.

Farther. The court did not direct from what part of the state the jury were to come, but left it to the marshal, or else the marshal ex­ercised it without authority or power. To him the judiciary act sect. 29 appeared too plain to be mistaken, or to be open to construction: by this it appeared that part of judicial proceedings was left—not to the marshal, but to the judge of the court, and on him it was enjoined as a duty, which, if left to the marshal, would give just cause of excepti­on in the power of the prisoner: This was the practice of the mar­shal; a practice entirely new, and could have no manner of weight, because the contrary was the positive law of the land, and if so, nothing could contravene it; it was so except that power was transferred to the marshal from the court, for if this could be left, be did not see why a great part of the duty of a judge could not be left for the mar­shal to exercise as well! The marshal could upon the same principle, assume the bench and try causes, because the law in that part of his duty does not assign it more to the judge than in the other. Certain duties were assigned to the judge, to the clerk, and to the marshal, to which each was respectively bound. The first state trials were in 1795, and there both the judges gave the order in court, how the jury should be summoned, directing that at least 48 should be sum­moned to attend for the trial of certain persons, and at least 12 from the proper counties—48 were to come from the state at large. The venire facias must be signed by the judge and sent to the marshal as his direction, otherwise a separate order of direction so signed, though not on the venire may answer the purpose. Respecting the twelve from the county, Mr. Lewis said he concurred in sentiment, that it [Page 36] was not necessary the direction should be given, because the law re­quired it as indispensible, on which account he supposed it was that judge Peters just reminded the marshal that capital acts had been committed in certain counties. In answer to this it was said that the whole directions were given by the judge, but he contended that the whole must be in conformity, and must come from the court, and the marshal could not take it up of his own accord. It was said that there had been but one instance of this special order; true, but there had no more than one instance occurred to occasion it. If Congress had not thought it a power necessary to be exercised by a judge, it would not have been a law, and though exercised but once, or although not at all it was equally so, for the law may sleep, but it cannot die, nor will it be called up, but when occasion demands.

Farther. The marshal, without any direction from the court, or a judge thereof, has returned a greater number of jurors than he was legally authorized to do. By the act of Congress, a single judge is empowered to hold court in certain cases, but if that judge was to give an order out of the time of holding court, it would be considered as an act of the judge and not of the court, and therefore not an of­ficial nor legal order. The venire in the present instance is not signed by the judge, but by the clerk, wherein a return of sixty is authori­zed, but not a word about the county, therefore the sixty are summon­ed from the state: thus the venire goes to the marshal, whom the judge sees, and informs him that the case is capital, on which account, in addition to the sixty returned in the venire, he makes a due and regular return of twelve from one county, and seventeen from another, signed with his own name: no doubt this was in consequence of the intimation received from the judge. He had before gone as far as his authority led him, and now he annexes twenty-nine in a separate paper under the same order, which gave no such directions, but only that not less than forty-eight nor more than sixty should be summon­ed. The pannel is compleated, but whether the intimation or order of the judge was given before or after, we know not: to give the in­timation was right, but a wrong use was made of it, for those from the county ought to have been included in that pannel, which he might have included, by first striking out the same number, any time before it came into court, and there his power would have end­ed, and every thing would have been right except his having had no order from the judge; but twenty-nine more are annexed, which not being done under the venire was improper, and if it had been, it would have been equally so, because not authoritatively given. The court have power to direct such a return as they think proper, under the di­rection of the law, but if this is the act of a clerk, judge or marshal, it is irregular. Part of the number of sixty, and not beyond it, should come from the county, except the express order, of, and signed by the court, should otherwise direct. But in this case even the twelve is exceeded, and seventeen more annexed: under that venire he might have returned the whole from the county, but he could return no part above sixty. Here is a certificate produced by his honor Judge Peters, signifying that he had told the marshal it was a capital case, and [Page 37] twelve must be summoned from the county of Northampton: this is to be filed as an excuse for the surplus, for there cannot be an addi­tional venire! In the trials of 1795, there were 108 jurors summon­ed, 72 from the state at large and 36 from three counties named, but that was by different pannells, and the same could have been done now in the like way, and with the like authority, but this surplus is not to be annexed to the single pannel. This certificate of the judge cannot amount to any thing whatever, and his honor could not have meant to give it as any thing like legal authority, all the official acts of a judge must be in writing, some way or other in order that he may be made responsible, otherwise it must; depend upon his memory, and too much upon his will. But this never can be meant as a legal act.

In 1795 an act of Assembly of Pennsylvania, limited the greatest number of the jurors to be summoned from the state at large to sixty, and not less than forty-eight. The court determined that they could not be governed by act of alterably but by common law. See 2 Dallas, but still the matter was left to the judges, and not the marshal: the judges exercised discretion according to circumstances, but the act of Congress requiring twelve from the county remains binding, and is preserved as an invaluable privilege to which every man is entitled; he can be tried by men of his own neighborhood, and surely if this is such a privilege in common law, and esteemed in England as well as America, he has a much greater chance of getting his neighbors from the smaller number than from the greater; and if this number is farther exceeded by twenty-nine, the chance is still less. The marshal may be a man of virtue—such is the present marshal; but a man of a different character might succeed him, and he is to hold his place during will and pleasure. Now if it is considered as a privilege that a man should have as many of his neighbors as he can to try him, and the increase of number diminishes that privilege, and, increased to a certain extent, almost annihilates it, and if it is considered that the marshal has this authority, (which I deny) how little chance has the prisoner, and how much power has the marshal over him! For this reason the law in­trusts the court with this power, and will not, nor has ever intrusted it to the marshal. (He here quoted 3 Bacon 245, and Keyling 16.) The cases referred to by Mr. Rawle; Mr. Lewis said was done by se­parate pannels, as in 1795—2 Hale, 263—4 Black. 344—11 Mod. 1—and 5 Bacon, 244.

When these directions are not complied with, the proceedings are null and void, for the sheriff not following the order of the court are good reason for a new trial, and therefore we conclude that the present jurors, seven of them actually serving, not being summoned by the order of the court, but by an assumed power of the marshal, both as to place and number, makes a mis-trial. 21 Viner, 172, has a case similar to the present: one person on the jury was illegally admitted, accordingly the court set aside the verdict: on the present occasion there are seven illegally admitted. There was a case when two in­dictments were brought in, and two pannels summoned, but it hap­pened that the one summoned to try A, tried, B, and vice versa:—they were tried and both convicted; but on the plea, new trials were [Page 38] ordered because they were not the men summoned for the purpose—2 Hawk. C. 27, sect. 108, 9, 10. See law of errors 65. The authori­ties referred to show how it may be amended—the court are bound to render all which has been done null and void. In Aurundell's case, 6 Cook, the error was as to the jury process for murder: the court set aside the verdict, seeing that while there was error in the jury process, his life had not even been put in danger: every thing else was regular—the jury was returned from the parish where the of­fence was laid; (the very parish, and not the city was named,) the trial went on, and no challenge was made in the array, but for the above reason all was set aside, and a venire facias de novo granted.—Thus it may be seen challenge to the array after challenge to the poll is not too late, if good cause be assigned—2 Lord Raymond, 884.

The gentleman on the other side has opposed a specious argument as to number, to wit, that the words of the venire are, you shall cause to come before the court such a number, and therefore, although a much greater number were summoned, and no more than the legal number appear in court, there is no cause of complaint, but this is the common form of a venire. But in what manner is the officer to com­pel the pannel to appear before the court? By summoning them, o­therwise they are fined. In a legal view as it respects the venire, they did all appear before the court. Hale, Blackstone, nor any of the authorities say how many shall come, but how many shall be sum­moned.

Mr. LEWIS here concluded a very laborious investigation of the points of law referring to the motion, and submitted them to the con­sideration of the court, trusting that if his client was at last to fall a victim, it would be to the sword of justice, and not to the present state of public opinion, seeing that the important proceedings on his case would operate as a precedent to be transmitted down to posterity. He would leave the event with full submission, impressed with a firm reliance on the impartial and just decision of the court.

Mr. DALLAS observed that the jurors were not alone summoned from Northampton county, but five on the jury were from Bucks county.

Mr. RAWLE answered that there was a bill of indictment for treason committed in Bucks county, and therefore the marshal had summoned them to be ready. They could as well be on the present jury as those from Philadelphia, since there were twelve summoned from the proper county, and the law not departed from in that respect.

The court, observing that the deposition of Mr. Rhoad, and the evidence given by Mr. Yohe contradicted each other, suggested the propriety of confronting the witnesses in open court, in order to distin­guish where the error was, accordingly

JOHN RHOAD was called.

COURT.

Do you recollect being at the house of George Yohe, since you came to town to attend court?

WITNESS.

Yes.

Do you recollect being engaged in any conversation relative to the insurgents.

[Page 39]

Yes, there was some conversation about it.

Did you talk about John Fries?

I cannot recollect; it was a general talk about the business, but not of Fries in particular.

What did you say? Recollect.

There was not much said—there was one behind the settle talked about setting up liberty poles, but I did not know the man. Yohe said that if they put up liberty poles it would do no harm, because for liberty they could do what they pleased. Whereupon I said that the liberty poles had occasioned a great deal of offence and dispute. The man then went away, when I said to Yohe that that man seemed very merry: he answered that he was there every day, and that he got drunk. I do not recollect any thing more that was said, I was not above five minutes in the house.

COURT.

Were you there at any other time?

WITNESS.

Not in the house, but I was before the door.

Where did you lodge the first night you came to town?

At Seidell's.

Do you recollect any other person who was present at this time be­sides Yohe and the drunken man?

No.

Do you recollect sitting by the stove at any time, in conversation with two farmers about this insurrection?

No.

Do you recollect being at Yohe's any other time?

I was at Yohe's no more than that once, and then did not sit down.

MICHAEL SNYDER, sworn.

ATTORNEY.

What did Mr. Yohe say to you after he went out of court yesterday; did he not tell you, that you were present when Rhoad made use of the words alluded to?

WITNESS.

Yes, he said, I believe you was there when he said it.

Do you know any thing about it?

I do not know that I saw Rhoad there at all: I lodged in the house, but was sometimes in, and sometimes out of it. I told him I did not know about it.

GEORGE YOHE again called.

COURT.

The court are very desirous of your giving evidence to day, on the subject you did yesterday, in the presence of Mr. Rhoad, left there should be a misunderstanding.

WITNESS.

Mr. Rhoad was sitting in my room at the stove, some days after he came down, two other gentlemen with him; they had some conversation before I came out of my bar, when I stood behind the stove: they were talking about the people that came from North­ampton, and the insurrection, and mentioned Mr. Fries: Mr. Rhoad said that those people who were not of the same opinion as these in­surgents who came down, were not safe; and Rhoads farther said, that some of them ought to be hung, and Fries in particular. I re­turned into my bar, and then I was called into another room. I sat there some time afterwards, but did not hear any thing in particular.

COURT.
[Page 40]

Had they been sitting there sometime before?

Yes.

What time of the day was it?

I cannot tell, but I think it was in the forenoon.

Can you tell who the other men were?

I cannot, they were strangers to me, and appeared like farmers.

Did you know any more who were in the room?

There were six or seven more, I think Michael Snyder was one, but I think there were none within hearing.

Was any thing said about Mr. Rhoad being on the jury?

Nothing that time that I recollect. I knew before that he was one. The man that was sitting by his side, said that if Fries knew that, he would not have him on the jury; he replied, that he wished he would not have him.

Do you recollect any thing else?

No.

MR. RHOAD went to explain to Mr. Yohe some part of the conver­sation, but Mr. Yohe could not recollect it, as he said he went in and out about his business. Mr. Yohe said Mr. Rhoad was often in his house, which contradicting what Mr. Rhoad had sworn before, that ‘he was never in the house but once, and then not five minutes, and did not sit down,’ the court asked Mr. Rhoad to recollect whether he was never there but once. He then answered, that he believed he was twice, or perhaps three times, before he was called upon the jury.

COURT to MR. RHOAD.

Was that after you was summoned down on the jury or before?

RHOAD.

The last time I came down, and before the jury were sworn. I came there to inquire about a man, and I believe it was one of the men who was sitting with me at the stove.

To MR. YOHE. Did you sit down with them?

No. I stood a little, and returned to the bar.

MR. RHOAD having said he never sat down, Mr. Yohe reminded him of some of the circumstances, and said that he was sitting there more than half an hour; but Mr. Rhoad could not be brought to re­collect it.

COURT to RHOAD.

Do you recollect either of the two men that were in conversation with you?

RHOAD.

I do not recollect seeing any person there, that I was acquainted with, but Mr. Snyder.

COURT to YOHE.

Was this a serious conversation about the pri­soner?

YOHE.

I do not know, but I thought so. I knew he was sum­moned upon the jury, on that very account, I took particular notice.

The court desired Mr. Yohe to repeat the words used by Mr. Rhoad in the same language, (German.) He did so, and Mr. Erd­man the interpreter, declared them precisely what had been before sworn to.

MR. RHOAD declared again that he never had said so.

The examination here closed, and the court adjourned for about four hours, to give the judges opportunity of examining the autho­rities.

[Page 41]

In the Evening the Court again meet.

JUDGE PETERS observed that the opinion of lord chief justice Trevy, in 4 State Trials was much to the point, but that question was not determined by the court. In a question of so much national importance as the present, Judge Peters thought it his duty to give au opinion.—A man who lives in the county where insurrection has happened, his impressions of injury from the repetitions of such scenes will be stronger than might be expected in other men, and therefore all that Rhoad said about it being unsafe for the friends of govern­ment to live there, is accounted for, and no way improper for him to speak. I think Rhoad an honest man, and do not think he had any malice against Fries more than any of the rest, but I think he must have forgotten. As to what appeared to strike Mr. Lewis with such force, does not appear to me important. I think the proceedings might have been more regular, but yet I think they were regular enough to stamp the event with a sufficient sanction. The proceedings were much the same as the court of Oyer and Terminor, when the sheriff summons a number more than is wanted, in order to have them ready, and when twelve are wanted, they are taken out of that num­ber. This venire issued by the same course as all others do, perhaps not knowing the offences would be capital, [...] it appearing otherwise afterwards, agreeable to act of Congress some were summoned from the proper counties. The venire says the number is not to exceed 60, yet these words do not designate more than those in the practice of Eng­land which directs 12, but 24 is generally returned. To be sure the court might have given the order, but I do not see how this could be done without the defendant lying in gaol, or a special court being hold­en. There is some weight to be sure in the arguments on that point, but they are not so important as they were held up to be. The mar­shal having ready a certain number, when the issue was joined, then, and not before, was the number who did appear, made to appear in court. The pannel was returned, and furnished to Fries, on which, the trial was suffered to proceed, and on that account I think it ap­pears it was approved of by the court, which is a sufficient designation.

JUDGE IREDELL—The question which the court have now to de­cide is certainly as important an one as ever was before a court. With regard to any interest, the government could be supposed to have in the event, or the feelings of private humanity or compassion as men, for the very unhappy situation of the prisoner—these must both be sacrificed to that impartial justice which our duty preremptorily com­mands us to exercise according to the best of our capacities. Sure I am that it is always my disposition so to be influenced, as I am con­vinced it is also of the judge with whom I have the honor to sit on the bench.

It is admitted, I believe on both sides, that it is in the power of the court in criminal cases to grant a new trial in favor of the prison­er, though they cannot to his perjudice, and it must be readily ad­mitted that it must be the most obvious considerations, which could possible under it the duty of the court, lest they too readily grant a [Page 42] new trial: for if the power is placed in a court, it is proof that it must, or might be sometime exercised, and if ever proper occasion arise for the exercise of it, it must depend on some particular, strikingly ap­plicable circumstances.

With regard to the particular circumstance now brought forward, that one of the jurymen made certain declarations unfavorable to the justice, a prisoner has a right to expect, I must confess that until the evidence yesterday given by Mr. Yohe, I was not satisfied that he had said any such thing as could give the court full ground to believe him improperly biassed, so as to admit just cause for a new trial; but that testimony corroborating the testimony of those before given on which, independantly, we could place but little dependance, strikes me with great force, otherwise I should have entertained some doubt owing to their different relations of apparently the same event. This caution was invigorated by the very excellent character which the juror had borne. From this I have every reason to believe that he has not willfully done any thing wrong, nor sworn to any thing which he does not believe to be true. From the relation, it was difficult to arrange the particular parts of the conversation so as to make it accord at any interval of time, on which account I was extremely desirous that Mr. Rhoad and Mr. Yohe should be confronted, and questions put to re­mind each other of [...] facts, so as both might accord; but it does appear that Mr. Rhoad's memory is extremely defective in some ma­terial points, and therefore, without any impeachment we may pre­sume it was a gross mistake. It is the clear opinion of the court in 4 State Trials, that if a juryman, not out of particular malice against the individual, but from any other cause appears to have formed a pre­determined opinion, he was not fit to be a juryman, and it was there­fore good cause of challenge. In that case the expressions used were much similar to the present case: that opinion appears to be grounded upon the supposition that were a man, from any ill motives, or other­wise, forms an opinion strongly on his mind, an improper bias is ex­tremely difficult to get clear of, and will influence an honest man un­warily to give a wrong verdict, and to these circumstances every man is liable. It is impossible for me to resist the impression, from the number of depositions produced, that Mr. Rhoad must, at different times, have used expressions similar to those related by Mr. Yohe, but I can readily conceive that such expressions were used with an inno­cent intention, and without meaning to prejudice himself from after­wards serving as an honest juryman, yet I cannot be certain, but it might originate from a predisposed opinion of the guilt of the man, and therefore it must render him less able to discriminate facts, but if no such idea of guilt did exist, according to the authority stated, it would be good cause of challenge, if known, but if not known until after verdict is given, it would then be sufficient time, for what is good cause of challenge previous to trial, is good ground for a motion after verdict. It is very much to be regretted that the witnesses who heard these declarations did none of them communicate it to the counsel or the prisoner before the jury were sworn, because he might have been set aside, and much unnecessary public expence and disstress to the un­fortunate [Page 43] man, besides delay of the execution of justice, in this par­ticular case, been prevented.

It being admitted that the court may grant a new trial in criminal cases upon sufficient cause to show, and it following that they ought to do it if shown, I farther think that if there is cause of challenge before, there is equal cause, if it is proved that the juror was biassed, to order it, after verdict is pronounced, whatever delay or inconve­nience may result therefrom; that can be no reason to withhold a pri­viledge to which a prisoner is entitled: from these views, I think it my duty to vote for a new trial in the present case, as the fact ap­pears too clear to be controverted. In this event, there will be still an opportunity for the prisoner to be freed, and justice be done between himself and his country.

With regard to the point of law, if my mind had not been clear on the evidence respecting the juror, I should have been decidedly against a new trial, and accordingly should have taken the trouble more fully to have delivered my sentiments; it being so, I shall now make but a few general remarks. As to the point, that the record should evince the proceedings of the court, otherwise they are invalid, with reasons why trial could not be held in the county, I think there is no necessity of the reasons appearing on the record of court. If the question had stood simply upon this ground, it would have been immaterial; but it did not: application was made to the court, after several indictments were found, alledging that the trials ought to be held in the county, whereupon the court declared opinion, that "great inconvenience" prevented a compliance with the motion: but farther, it appeared to be gone out of the power of the court, because the indictment had been found in this court, which must be considered a part of the trial; and the law means the whole proceeding shall be in one place, so that the indictment must have been found in that county, otherwise the trial by jury could not be held there. These were the reasons which operated to influence the court to refuse the application. In this dilemma, it was impossible for the court to say the trial should not proceed here; and had it been removed, a new indictment could not have been found; if it had, the trial could not proceed upon two indictments. The only times for considering this question, I believe, was, when this man was charged with the offence, before he was committed, or even after the court sat, and before the indictment was brought into court. If it had been the opinion of the judge who committed him, that trial could be held there, then it could have been referred to the supreme court, who, if they had been of the same opinion, would have ordered a special court. But from the state of that county, no one can believe that trial could have been held there in any way conducive to justice, or so as to make the proceedings of the court such as they ought to be, because the President has declared, by proclamation, that the law could not be executed without military assistance, which I never wish to see guard a court of justice as matter of choice, though unavoidable ne­cessity may sometimes make it prudent.

With regard to the summoning the jury, it is to be observed that the practice now used, was an established usage of this court for [Page 44] many years past, which is a sanction sufficient, if no positive law nul­lifies it. The venire, issued in this form, in my opinion, did issue with the sanction of the court, and had the same effect, as though the express order of the court had been annexed. It appears that it was not known, at the time the venire issued, that any cases were punish­able with death, and of course not necessary to include a special pro­vision for twelve to come from the county. Mr. Lewis made a con­cession, which, if right, did away the whole of this objection: he said, that upon the marshal's receiving information (whether it came from the judge or not) that a case punishable with death had occurred, he had a right, without any order from the court, written or verbal, to summon a greater number of men than in other cases: the words of the law are, not that he should summon twelve, but twelve at least; but be observed that this should not exceed, but be included in the number sixty. I do not know what authority he had to limit the number to sixty, in this or any other case. The law intends that a prisoner shall have a chance of men from his own neighborhood; cer­tainly then the greater the number which comes from it, his chance is proportionably increased, therefore it can never prejudice the prisoner. I think that if the marshal should extend the discretion given him to an unnecessary number, it would operate to the vexation of the per­sons summoned, and they alone would have cause to complain. For­merly, by law, a sheriff was directed to summon twelve, but by usage, he actually did summon twenty-four, yet all above the twelve appeared to acquiesce, and it could not be of disadvantage: so in the grand-jury for twenty-four, forty-eight was summoned: the power was as­sumed and not complained of. I presume that if the marshal had authority to return that number, without a venire or precept, he was not limited as to number; and that when they came here, they formed the jury attending court. I am farther of opinion, that when the pannel was presented to the prisoner, that pannel obtained the full sanction of the court, as much as though they had given the order.

So far as to substance. With respect to form, the words are, after joining the issue, "let the jury come." That is a direction given by the court to the marshal to summon the jury, but as it would be in­convenient for him to summon the jury after this order, which is for him to do it without delay, those jurors already summoned appear in court, so that if it was entered upon record it would appear that after the prisoner was arraigned, and issue joined, the marshal had directed these men to come, and they had come. It appears to me that whe­ther the marshal summoned the jurors of his own accord, or whether they were summoned under the express order of the court after issue was joined, in substance and in form the law is so far complied with as to do perfect justice. Though I am not certain that my opinion on these points of law are right, not having had much time to exa­mine, yet I am strongly of that opinion at present; however I have thought less and said less upon them than if the main object of the mo­tion rested on it.

Sensible of the importance of the question, and that if life is once lost it can never be recovered; having aside the question which in­volves [Page 45] doubt, and resting on the facts which have appeared before the court, I deem it my duty to say that A NEW TRIAL OUGHT TO BE GRANTED.

JUDGE PETERS. Upon the points of law urged, I should have thought proper to have given my opinion, although they would have materially differed from that of a gentleman whose law knowledge I much respect; yet I think it at this time unnecessary to say any thing farther than that I agree in the opinions of the gentleman with whom I sit.

As to the other point, to wit the conduct of this juror, I confess that my mind is not compleatly made up: I think that all which can be said on that is, that no juryman ought to go into that box with prejudice upon his mind. In a case which the public at large must feel materially interested, it is impossible to keep the mind from being affected; all the citizens will have their feelings; the question then in, whether this one individual had or had not particular malice against the prisoner? If not the evidence would weigh lightly on my mind: upon this point I confess myself to have doubts.

These very striking expressions the juror swears he cannot recollect using, although the others swear that he did use them. I am still doubtful, from the light opinions I entertain of all the witnesses ex­cept one, whom I do not know, but if any impressions are made upon my mind favorable to the motion, his evidence has made them, other­wise I could not hesitate what opinion to form.

I know the event of a refusal; I know that a division of the court will be the consequence, and the man must be left to the mercy of the executive. Individual punishment is nothing to public example; on the other hand the consequences of a new trial would be to delay the exercise of justice. I am satisfied that the prisoner has had a fair and impartial trial, with all the advantages he could desire; but as I think public example is the only object which the law contemplates, and as that public example will have a far more forcible effect when every excuse is removed, and the public fully satisfied with the pro­ceedings of this court, which may not be the case if a division of the court takes place, I rather yield my opinion to the necessity, than a conviction of the justice of a new trial. On these accounts I submit to say that THERE SHALL BE A NEW TRIAL.

[Page 46]

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Directed by the judge of the district to be held at Norristown, proclama­tion whereof was made by the marshal. Begun October 11th, 1799, BEFORE JUDGES BUSHROD WASHINGTON, AND RICHARD PETERS, Esquires,
JOHN FRIES and the other prisoners for treason and misdemean­or were brought up at this court, but a sufficiency of jurors did not appear to proceed to trial.

MR. DALLAS contested the jurisdiction of the court upon the general position that an indictment found in the city and county of Philadel­phia, could not be tried at a court holden at Norristown. The constitution and laws of the United States, he observed, were founded upon this princi­ple: that the criminal should always be tried as near the place where the crime was committed as circumstances would admit; which was to be in the county, unless manifest inconvenience should operate to prevent it. The circuit court could appoint special courts for the trial of criminal cases, but not for civil cases. Laws of United States p. 226 vol. 2.

But the district judge ordered the court to be holden at this place, agreeable to the powers he was vested with by the quarantine and health law, passed February 25th 1799. Sect. 5th and 7th reads thus: Sect. 5th It shall be lawful for the judge of any district court of the United States, within whose district any contagious or epidemical dis­ease shall at any time prevail, so as in his opinion, to endanger the life, or lives of any person or persons confined in the prison of such district, in pursuance of any law of the United States, to direct the marshal to cause the person or persons confined as aforesaid, to be removed to the next adjacent prison, where such disease does not pre­vail, there to be confined until he, she, or they, may be safely removed back to the place of their first confinement, which remove shall be at the expence of the United States.

Sect. 7. That whenever, in the opinion of the chief justice, or in case of his death, or inability, of the senior associate justice of the supreme court of the United States, a contagious sickness shall render it hazardous to hold the next stated session of the said court at the [Page 47] seat of government, it shall be lawful for the chief or associate justice, to issue his order to the marshal of the district within which the su­preme court is by law to be holden, directing him to adjourn the said session of the said court to such other place within the same, or any adjoining district as he may deem convenient; and the said marshal shall thereupon adjourn the said court, by making publication thereof in one or more public papers printed at the place, by law ap­pointed for holding the same, from the time he shall receive such or­der, until the time by law prescribed for commencing the said session. And the district judges shall, respectively, under the same circum­stances, have the same power, by the same means, to direct adjourn­ments of the district and circuit courts within the several districts to some convenient place within the same respectively.

Neither time nor place could be changed in civil cases, but both time and place might be changed in criminal cases.

MR. DALLAS then proceeded to apply these laws to the present mo­tion: supposing that the place of trial ought to have been at or near where the crime was committed, yet it was determined at the March term that it should not be held nearer than at Philadelphia, although Norris town was nearer than Philadelphia. It was then laid down as an established principle by both the judges, that the indictment was part of the trial, and where the trial was commenced, there it must be concluded; and therefore a motion to remove the prisoners for trial to the county where the offences were committed, were over­ruled.

First, he would observe, that the trial ought to have been held in the county: the judiciary act, vol. I. p. 67, provided that the trial should be in the county where the crime was committed. Subsequent to that, an amendment to the constitution (8th) was passed, providing, "That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." From this Mr. Dallas conceived it clear, that what was called district in the constitution was synonimous county in the law, and recognized that expression, and therefore he thought they ought to be tried in one of those counties, and at no other place.

But in criminal cases, there was a discretionary power in the court, or in the district judge, to remove the court in case of contagious sickness, as well as a power to remove the prisoners.

The 5th section only provides for the removal for safe keeping of the prisoners to the next adjacent prison, until they can with safety return. The court could be taken any where; but the prisoners could not be taken any where: it must be only to the "next adjacent prison, where such disease does not prevail." Norris town, he contended, was not the next adjacent prison: it was to be the next prison, to an adjacent prison, and to one where the sickness does not prevail, if it was in the power of the court to dispense with one of these reasons, it was with all. Norris town was 17 miles from Philadelphia, Chester was but 15, the difference to be sure was but small, but if the words of the law were not binding in every part, the same discretionary power might have removed the court 100 miles. [Page 48] The prisoners were therefore not to be tried, but to be kept till they could be removed back with safety.

JUDGE PETERS said, he contemplated Chester, but he had heard that there were some cases of the fever there, and he knew it had before been much afflicted with it; he therefore did not consider himself so closely bound as to be forced to go there.

Mr. DALLAS said, vague report was not to be attended to, or he be­lieved it would be a reason against going almost to every place: a court was held at Chester on the 9th inst. He believed Chester an­swered the perfect description of the law. But, he said, the prisoners were removed, not merely for safe-keeping, but for trial; however, he conceived the former decision, "that the trial was begun where the indictment was found," must prevent the trials being held any where but in Philadelphia, because the indictments were found there. Though a habeus corpus was powerful in its operation, yet it was certainly not meant to be in direct opposition, and to supercede an act of congress. Nor was the personal inconvenience of the court to be considered; the act of congress was peremptory, and could not be dissented to from any cause, without it was by a repealing clause.

He hoped the court would give an opportunity to his colleague (Mr. Lewis) who was now absent, to give his ideas on the subject. He was sent for, and expected shortly.

MR. RAWLE contended, that there was no division contemplated but that by which the United States were divided into 13 districts; he thought it impossible to conceive that "district" meant a county, and therefore the reference to the 8th amendment of the constitution, he thought, no support to the argument.

With respect to the power of the court to try the causes, Mr. R. thought it clear, that as both in civil and criminal cases, the courts could be removed, both with respect to time and place, under certain circumstances, so could the business of the court also; this was a matter of course, and therefore the power of habeus corpus, to bring all the prisoners up, was in the court. If it were not so, in vain would be the provision (at times of sickness) of the constitution, which directed a speedy trial, because inevitable delay must take place, or the lives of the court and jury, as well as of the prisoners, be in great hazard. He conceived, that the 5th section, which provided for the removal of the prisoners, was scarcely conformable to that part of the constitution which provided for a "speedy" trial, because, if the con­struction was, as supposed, by the other counsel, it infringed on the prisoner's right: they had no power to keep a man in long confine­ment, until his guilt was ascertained; and no prevalence, of disorder could authorise them to it.

The gentleman said, that they were to be taken away for safe-keeping, until they could be returned in safety to the prison from whence they were taken. Now, suppose, for instance, those to be removed, who had been sentenced for eight months imprisonment, and that time expired, whilst they were at some other prison, on account of the prevailing sickness, could it be supposed that the law contem­plated that they should be kept till they could with safety be returned? He presumed not.

[Page 49] Would they not thereby have suffered false imprisonment by being confined longer than the judgment of the court ordered? Most cer­tainly they would.

As to the next convenient prison, Mr. Rawle thought the wor [...] were not very perspicuous, not sufficiently, he thought, at to measure geometrical distances to a nicety. He took it to be one of those cases which would bear a reasonable and circumstantial construction, and which was left in the judgment of the judge, whether it was conve­nient and safe to be rigorously executed, or not: there might be an alarm of disorder sufficient to warrant the judge to say, that it was not safe to lodge the prisoner in one place, and, as another was about the same distance, where no such alarm existed, he thought himself jus­tifiable in ordering their removal to the latter: for though there was provision to remove them once, there was no provision to remove them away again, even in case of alarm, except it was back to the same prison they first were in. Upon the whole, as to removal, he thought the judge had executed his duty and his clemency. If it had not been right, the prisoners should have complained at the time of their removal, but they were all perfectly satisfied.

With respect to the effect the removal would have to the jurisdic­tion of the Court, he thought the arguments at the last court respect­ing trial in the same county, would not apply. He [...] to the argument of Judge Wilson in the case of Hamilton, Dallas Reports, 2 vol. p. 760. The Court had power in every county in the state, because the whole state constituted but one district, in which the law directs them to be tried.

He did not suppose the matter of convenience was any question at all: nor did he believe the Judges would be in the least guided by it.

As to the business began in Philadelphia, in as much as the indict­ment was there brought in, it was stated, that the trial must be con­tinued there. This might be also the means of delay, which the constitution provided against; but he believed the argument could be answered in another way. The court was held in Philadelphia, and this business was continued, and therefore wherever the court sat, therefore its business must follow it. What would be the effect else, of an indictment being found in Norris-town, and the cause being continued over? Must the court remove back here at another session, to try the cause here? This would bring the court into a continual state of vibration, and justice be much delayed. He thought the court was competent to take up what remained of former sessions.

MR. DALLAS hoped the court would consider the great inconveni­ence of the trials, especially on the treason cases, now going on: the deranged state of the country, owing to the disorder which had driven numbers of citizens from their homes, would make it ruinous to the prisoners; it would prevent the prisoners the opportunity of inquir­ing the characters of the jurors, and also of procuring witnesses. It would doubtless endanger his life.

Agreeable to Mr. Rawle's argument, Mr. Dallas contended, that the 5th and 7th sections of the Quarrantine Law were at war with each other, and not only so, but with the general policy of the laws and [Page 50] constitution. But these two sections, in his opinion, were distinct in their nature and object, and no repealing clause had ever been passed, and therefore each part must be carried into effect. The 8th section provided for the removal of the prisoners, but there was not a word about trial in it. By the 7th section it would appear, that the district judge might take the court to Pittsburg if he pleased; he was not re­strained at all; but there was no such power given to him respecting prisoners; he could not take them farther than the nearest prison of safety. How could these two sections be reconciled? Why were not the two sections formed upon one principle, if they were so connected as the gentlemen supposed? Of what avail would it be to take a court to a place where there was no power of taking the prisoners, who must be tried, before that court? But so it might be, if the reasoning which had been given was right. Had not the 5th section been introduced by the legislature, then, indeed the whole jurisdiction would have been removed with it.

With respect to the indictments that might be found in Norris town, the court having been held agreeable to the 7th section of that law, the question of precise distance being set aside, undoubtedly they would go to wherever the court would remove. Inasmuch as justice could not be done to the prisoners, and inasmuch as the former deci­sion prevented the trial being held any where but at the place in which it was begun, he hoped the trials would not be proceeded on.

MR. LEWIS arrived in court, and apologised for not being able to attend earlier: he had not sufficiently weighed the motion, he said, to be able to add any thing to the ground ably argued by his col­league, and therefore wished to leave it to the decision of the court.

JUDGE WASHINTON said, nothing was more clear than that the fifth and seventh sections of the Quarrantine Law were, for different purposes: the [...]th only relates to the removal of prisoners, that they might not fall a prey to any contagious disease that might occur wheresoever they may be confined; and this removal was not for the sake of trial, but for safe keeping. It was doubtful, previous to the passing of this act, whether the marshals had power to remove them, whatever might be the cause, or however dangerous to them to re­main in prison; but against this doubt and danger, Congress provided. The 7th section applies altogether to the removal of the court for the purpose of trial of causes, both criminal and civil. But all the acts that have been mentioned may be reconciled together, and all with the consti­tution. The count, without any restriction as to the place of its session, if a contagious disease shall occur, are to be convened for the purpose of trying causes at the stated session; and, it is to be remembered, that this is not a new, nor a special court, but an adjourned stated court, merely removed from one spot to another, to be holden there: of course, all the trialas pending, and before the court at any former term, are to come on at the place so changed; for the court is the same: the arguments of Mr. Attorney were sound, and need not be repeated.

On these grounds, the court thought that the trials ought to go on, and therefore the motion was over-ruled.

[Page 51]

WILLIAM W. WOODWARD, No. 17, Chesnut Street,

HAS just published the First and Second volumes of Dr. Witherspoon's works, in two large and hand­some Octavo volumes—the last volume will be published in about three weeks, and will be exceeding valuable, as it will contain among other useful and entertaining mat­ter, Lectures on Moral Philosophy and Criticism, which are now printing from the original—and the Publisher is happy to say that it will be correct, as a gentleman who was intimately acquainted with the Doctor and his hand­writing, is assisting the printer in correcting the press—The complete sett in 3 volumes, will be 6 dolls. 75 cents.

The Publisher has on hand, a few copies of the late IMPORTANT TRIAL OF WILLIAM COBBETT.

This was an action brought against him for a libel, by Dr. Benjamin Rush—price 371/2 cents, printed on the same type and paper, and a page of an equal length and width of the present trial, and will make a very handsome octa­vo volume when bound together.

WILLIAM W. WOODWARD Keeps on hand a large and general assortment of books and stationary.

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In 25 numbers, are for sale as above. Those gentlemen who subscribe for the whole, will be furnished at 25 cents each; but those who purchase but a few copies, will be charged according to the size of the different publications. As they are printed, they are forwarded from New-York. Five numbers are already received.

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