THE alarm which the anti-federaliſts feel, at the idea of changing the mode of election in this ſtate, ſo as to counteract the policy of their party in Virginia, is perfectly natural and well founded—And their conduct, in attempting to raiſe a clamor againſt the meaſure, is altogether conſiſtent with the principles whereby their party has, at all times, been actuated. To change the mode of election in Virginia, ſo as to deprive the federaliſts in that ſtate of all ſhare in the choice of electors, was, as they well knew, the only ſtep which could give their party a chance of ſucceſs. Therefore they took it; and it was applauded by the party throughout the union, as a maſter-ſtroke of policy. Blind and fooliſh as they are, they did not recollect, or did not foreſee, that the blow was capable of being retorted on their own heads.

Finding now that this retort is likely to be made, they wake from their ſhort dream of ſucceſs, and cry out againſt the meaſure, as in the higheſt degree unjuſt. They now affect a wonderful ſolicitude about the "rights of the people," which they ſay would be invaded and even deſtroyed, by the meaſure of chooſing electors by the legiſlature. Having firſt taken the ſtep themſelves, for their own benefit, they are now wonderfully alarmed leſt the federal party ſhould take it alſo, and thus reſtore the balance of fair choice.

But they do not recollect, that the rights of the people are as effectually preſerved by a choice by the legiſlature, as in any other mode. The conſtitution is the work of the people; the expreſſion of their will, and the fence placed by themſelves round their rights. Nothing, therefore, which is expreſsly authoriſed by the conſtitution, can be contrary to the rights of the people. Whatever is done purſuant to the conſtitution, is their own act, flowing from their own authority, and therefore not only conſiſtent with their rights, but even an exerciſe of thoſe rights.

But the conſtitution provides, that the electors ſhall be appointed in ſuch mode as the legiſlature of each ſtate ſhall direct.—Conſequently, any manner of chooſing which the legiſlature ſhall direct, is conformable, and not contrary, to the rights of the people.

Virginia, they tell us, did not reſort to a choice by the legiſlature, but only to a general ticket, which is ſtill a choice by the people, and therefore fair and proper. Shallow pretext! Does not a general ticket in Virginia produce preciſely the ſame effect, that a choice by the legiſlature would have produced? Does it not as effectually deprive the federaliſts, who are the minority in the ſtate as well as in the legiſlature, of the ſix votes which they would have gained by the diſtrict election? Every man muſt ſee that it does, and that, therefore, there is no ſort of difference between the two modes, except that the choice by the legiſlature is attended with the leaſt trouble, tumult and inconvenience, and for that reaſon preferable to the other. The reſult is preciſely the ſame; but by the choice by the legiſlature, it is produced with leſs inconvenience than by a general ticket.

Virginia, they further tell us, was not the firſt to take this ſtep. She was forced into it, in ſelf-defence, and in order to counteract the policy of other ſtates. But this is a miſtake in point of fact. Virginia ſet the example of chooſing the mode, with a view to a particular election, and to this particular election.—Pennſylvania had no eſtabliſhed mode—ſhe had choſen in different ways at different elections. The law under which the laſt choice was made, was a temporary law, and had expired when the legiſlature of that ſtate laſt met. The federal party contended for a diſtrict election; that mode of which the anti-federaliſts of this ſtate are ſo greatly enamored. The anti-federaliſts in that ſtate, acting in perfect concert with thoſe of Virginia, oppoſed this faireſt of all poſſible modes of election, and oppoſed it with ſuch violence and obſtinacy, that they prevented any law from paſſing, and ſeem fully reſolved rather to leave their ſtate without a vote, than to yield to diſtrict elections. So much for the attachment of the anti-federaliſts in Pennſylvania to this faireſt of all poſſible modes, with which the ſame party here are ſo much in love.

Why are they in love with it here? Becauſe they expect to gain ſome votes to their party by it. Why are they oppoſed to it in Pennſylvania and Virginia? Becauſe they expect their party to loſe ſome votes by it there. The end therefore is the ſame, namely, to enſure the ſucceſs of their party, although the means are different: and their great ſolicitude for the "rights of the people" turns out, in this caſe as in ſo many others, to be nothing more than a deſire to promote their own views. Thoſe rights are ſacrificed without the leaſt heſitation, whenever the ſacrifice can promote a party purpoſe.

In all the other ſtates, except Pennſylvania, the mode of election was fixt, and the federaliſts were well content to let it remain ſo. They were content that this election ſhould be made, according to the ſame principles that governed the former. But the anti-federaliſts ſet the example of change, where it ſuited their purpoſe to make it. Having done ſo, they ſtickle violently to preſerve the old mode, where that happens to ſuit them beſt.

It is ſaid by their advocates, that they attempted to change the mode in New-York, and to introduce a diſtrict election, inſtead of a choice by the legiſlature. This example is unfortunate. The anti-federaliſts themſelves introduced the choice by the legiſlature in New-York, in ſpite of the efforts of the federaliſts; and their object was to promote the election of general Clinton, as vice-preſident, in oppoſition to Mr. Adams. When they found that this work of their own hands was likely to operate againſt themſelves, they wiſhed to change it, and to reſort again to diſtrict elections.

We are told that the legiſlature of Maryland, at its laſt ſeſſion, had the general ticket ſcheme of Virginia before its eyes, and yet took no ſtep to counteract it; and this is uſed as an argument againſt calling the legiſlature. But here again theſe ignorant perſons miſtake or miſtate the fact. The legiſlature of this ſtate never had the Virginia general ticket ſcheme before its eyes: It had adjourned long before that ſcheme was adopted in Virginia, and even before the intention to adopt it was publicly avowed. The law for carrying it into effect, was one of the laſt acts of the ſeſſion. It was not introduced till a day or two before the adjournment, and then was hurried through with indecent haſte. We all know the feint that was practiſed, moſt probably with a view to deceive the legiſlature of Maryland, on the ſubject of this law. It was talked of; the pulſe of the legiſlature was felt; the ſcheme was well matured and completed. Now in order to gain time, and to deceive the oppoſite party, by which means ſome of them might be prevailed on to go home, its authors gave out that it was abandoned. One of their chiefs, colonel Taylor, carried his duplicity ſo far as actually to go home, giving out that he was gone for the ſeſſion. The ſcheme being ripe for execution, he ſuddenly returned, the bill was introduced, and puſhed through the two houſes with unprecedented celerity; and then the legiſlature adjourned. All this was ſome time after the legiſlature of this ſtate had adjourned. Conſequently, that body never had the meaſure under its eye, and nothing can be inferred from its omitting to take any countervailing ſtep.

The truth of the whole matter is, and it need not be concealed, that while the mode of chooſing electors remains on its preſent footing, variable according to the will of the ſtate legiſlatures, variations will be made, in ſome ſtates, to ſerve the canditate who may happen to be the favorite there. This has been done in Virginia. The anti-federaliſts began the game. Other ſtates muſt play it againſt them, in order to prevent the election from becoming perfectly unfair; from being controled by the minority. Maſſachuſetts has ſet the example of this retort; and the anti-federaliſts, awaking from their golden dream of power and office, begin to quake and cry out. Maryland, I have no doubt, will follow up the blow; in which caſe their defeat is certain. This they well know; and hence their new found ſolicitude for the "rights of the people," which they utterly diſregard, for diſtrict elections, which they firſt ſet aſide.

Let an uniform and fixt mode of chooſing electors be propoſed, and the federaliſts will agree to it. They will even propoſe one themſelves, at the next ſeſſion of congreſs. All then will ſtand on the ſame ground; and the mode of choice cannot be changed to ſuit party purpoſes of the moment. But while this mode remains changeable, if one party be allowed to change it where it ſuits them, and to prevent change where the other party might gain by it, the election becomes manifeſtly unfair, in its general reſult, which is the only proper method of conſidering it; and the caſe put by the "Marylander," at which your correſpondent the "Voter," is ſo much diſpleaſed, the caſe of a man attacked with a bludgeon and defending himſelf with his fiſt, manifeſtly occurs.

Leſt it ſhould be pretended that ſuch a ſtep on the part of Maryland, as is in queſtion, would render the general reſult of the election unfair, I pledge myſelf to ſhew, on a future occaſion, and to ſhew from a fair and accurate ſurvey of the continent, that if diſtrict elections were every where eſtabliſhed, the reſult would be ſtill more favorable to the federal party, who have a large majority in the nation at large, than it can be, ſuppoſing Maryland to follow the example of retort ſet by Maſſachuſetts, and to adopt the mode of choice by the legiſlature. In the meantime I remain a diſpaſſionate, though not an indifferent

ON a former occaſion I pledged myſelf to prove, by a fair ſurvey of the continent, and a ſtatement of the ſtrength of parties in each ſtate, that if diſtrict elections for preſident and vice-preſident were univerſally eſtabliſhed, which ought to be, and I truſt will be, done by an amendment of the conſtitution, Mr. Jefferſon could have no chance of being elected; but on the contrary, that the reſult, in that caſe, would be far leſs favorable to his party, than even in caſe Maryland, to counteract the meaſures of his ſupporters, ſhould adopt, for this time, the plan of chooſing by the legiſlature.

Col. Mercer indeed aſſerted, in a late public ſpeech, that the democrats would come in, meaning that Mr. Jefferſon would be elected, unleſs nineteen twentieths of the freemen of America ſhould be prevented from expreſſing their ſenſe in the election: but this aſſertion, like ſo many others of the ſame gentleman, ſerved only to ſhow that he was utterly ignorant, or utterly regardleſs, of the facts. Let us ſee who theſe nineteen twentieths of the freemen of America are. We will begin with New-Hampſhire, and counting the number of votes in each ſtate as we paſs, proceed to Georgia and Kentucky.

New-Hampſhire has ſix votes. The elections there have always been by a general ticket. The anti-federaliſts, who never could gain a vote in this mode, have aſſerted that they could get one by a diſtrict election. More than one they have never claimed. Let them have it. • The elections in Maſſachuſetts, which has ſixteen votes, have heretofore been of a mixt nature; the greater part of the electors being choſen by diſtricts, the reſt by the legiſlature. The anti-federaliſts do not pretend, that a diſtrict election would give them more than two in this ſtate. They claim no more. The truth is that they would have very little chance for more than one: but we will give them all they claim. 2 Rhode-Iſland gives four votes, and Connecticut nine: The choice is by the legiſlature in the firſt, and by a general ticket in the laſt. The anti-federaliſts do not pretend, that, by any mode of election, they could get a vote in either of theſe ſtates.   Vermont gives four votes—choice by the legiſlature. Here they might get one by a diſtrict election; though it is not very certain. We will however allow it to them. 2 New-York gives twelve votes—choice by the legiſlature. In no ſtate are parties more equally divided than in this. The majority leans ſometimes to one ſide, and ſometimes to the other, and has generally been governed by the city election. Out of the city, there is, in the legiſlature recently choſen, a clear majority for the federal party. Were electors choſen by diſtricts, there is, therefore, the utmoſt reaſon to ſuppoſe, that ſix votes would be on one ſide, and ſix on the other; and in that manner they may be ſafely counted. 6 New-Jerſey gives ſeven votes—choice by the legiſlature. By diſtricts three of theſe might be given to the anti-federal party; though no ground of probable calculation exiſts for more than two. We will, however, give them three. 3 Pennſylvania gives fifteen votes—choice ſometimes by diſtricts, and ſometimes by a general ticket. The federal party have always, till the preſent legiſlature, poſſeſſed a clear and even a large majority in both branches. Even now they have a majority in the whole legiſlature; their majority in the ſenate being ſeven, and that of the anti-federaliſts in the other houſe, only two. But if we take the votes on the election for governor, as a fair criterion of the ſtrength of parties, we ſhall find that the anti-federaliſts are in the proportion of eight to ſeven. Mr. M'Kean had, I think, 38,000 votes, and Mr. Roſs 33,000. The difference, I perfectly recollect, was about 5000, not more, and the whole number about 70,000. It muſt be recollected, moreover, that the majority of Mr. M'Kean was given by the two inſurgent counties of Berks and Northampton, which were almoſt unanimous in his favor; and that in the reſt of the ſtate Mr. Roſs had a clear majority. It is alſo to be remembered, that a majority of the counties was in favor of Roſs; and that a vaſt number of the votes for M'Kean, were obtained by the impoſitions practiſed on the Germans, relative to the houſe tax; which have ſince been detected and done away by the actual aſſeſſment. From theſe datums we may very ſafely conclude, that, by a diſtrict election, the anti-federaliſts could not gain more than nine votes in Pennſylvania—that number we will allow themThe fair calculation, indeed, is, that they could get but eight, eight to seven being their proportion, in the votes given for governor.. 9 Delaware chooſes by the legiſlature, and gives three votes; of which, by a diſtrict election, the anti-federaliſts might probably, though by no means certainly, obtain one. 1 Maryland choſe firſt by a general ticket. The preſent eſtabliſhed mode is by diſtricts. She gives ten votes, of which the anti-federaliſts have not the leaſt probability of getting more than three by the diſtrict election, ſhould it continue. There are but two diſtricts on which they count with confidenc; that compoſed of Baltimore and Harford counties on the weſtern, and that compoſed of Queen-Anne, Talbot and CarolineThis appears to be a miſtake, Caroline county belonging to another diſtrict. It need not, however, be remarked, that this miſtake makes no difference in the calculation. counties on the eaſtern ſhore: And even in thoſe they are by no means ſafe. They have hopes of two other diſtricts. The cities of Baltimore and Annapolis, with the county of Anne-Arundel, compoſe one; the counties of Waſhington and Allegany the other. In the firſt of theſe they even affect to be confident; but their ſecret convictions are far different. They know that in the election between general Smith and Mr. Wincheſter, they had a majority in Baltimore town of only 300, and that many who ſupported gen. Smith, are now decidedly for the federal elector. They alſo know that in the election between Mr. Thomas and Mr. Sprigg, there was in the city of Annapolis and Anne Arundel county, a much greater majority for the federal candidate; and that, conſequently, ſhould things remain as they were, the latter majority muſt overpower the former, and the federal elector be carried. They therefore found their hopes, entirely, on the vain expectation of a change in their favor in the public ſentiment; of which there is not the leaſt proſpect or appearance. As to Allegany and Waſhington, it is leſs certain. The former county is known to be nearly unanimous for the federal candidate, while the latter, which is much larger, and the ſtrong ground of the anti-federaliſts, is much divided. From this ſtate of things nothing certain can be concluded. At the laſt election, Mr. Lynn, of Allegany, who had but little ſtrength in Waſhington, was the federal candidate. The election was extremely cloſe, but he ſucceeded. In the preſent, Mr. Williams, of Waſhington, who is very ſtrong in that county, and will be as ſtrongly ſupported in Allegany, which is a moſt federal county, as Mr. Lynn himſelf, is the candidate; from which arrangement a much more favorable reſult than that of the laſt election, may be expected. Upon the whole we may conclude, that the anti-federaliſts have ſome chance, though but a ſmall one, in theſe two diſtricts; and that in the other two the probability is ſtrongly in their favor. This will warrant the further concluſion, that no probable ground exiſts for the expectation, on their part, of more than three; and nothing like certainty of more than two. We will, however, allow them three. 3 Virginia gives twenty-one votes; and always choſe by diſtricts, till that mode was altered by the late legiſlature to ſerve the purpoſe of the preſent election, and ſilence the voice of the people in ſix or eight diſtricts. It is well known, that had the diſtrict election been ſuffered to remain, the federaliſts had the utmoſt probability of gaining ſix votes, and very fair proſpects of eight. We will take only ſix, and allow the other fifteen to the anti-federaliſts. 15 North-Carolina gives twelve votes—choice by diſtricts. The moſt recent and authentic information, authoriſes the confident expectation of five votes, and gives ſolid ground for counting on ſeven. We will take five only, and leave the ſeven others to the anti-federaliſts. 7 South-Carolina gives eight votes, and has always choſen by the legiſlature, which is ſtill the eſtabliſhed mode. Out of the ſix repreſentatives from that ſtate, five are now decidedly federal—three have almoſt always been ſo. From this circumſtance it may fairly be preſumed, and I believe there can be no doubt of it, that on a diſtrict election, there would be at leaſt four votes out of eight for the federal candidate. I believe that the number would be greater; but take it at four, and it leaves for the anti-federaliſts 4 Georgia gives four votes: choice by a general ticket. There is great reaſon to ſuppoſe that on a diſtrict election, there would be at leaſt one for the federaliſts. We will, however, being uncertain on that point, give the whole four to the anti-federaliſts. 4 Tenneſſee gives three, and Kentucky four votes. The former choſe laſt time by the legiſlature; what the preſent mode is I do not know. The latter, I believe, chooſes by diſtricts. We will give all theſe votes to the anti-federaliſts, though one in Tenneſſee might be hoped for. 7   63

Thus it appears that were diſtrict elections univerſally eſtabliſhed, the anti-federaliſts, on the moſt liberal allowance, could get but ſixty-three votes in all the ſtates, out of one hundred and thirty-eight, of which it requires ſeventy to make a majority. That is, that if the ſenſe of the nation could be expreſſed, by the faireſt of all poſſible modes, a general election by the people in diſtricts, there would be a large majority of the nation againſt that candidate, whom his friends are now attempting to ſmuggle in, by changing the mode of election from diſtricts to a general ticket, where it ſuits their views, and clamoring, at the ſame time, for diſtrict elections, where they hope to get ſomething by them.

In Virginia they began the game. They took away the fair mode of diſtrict elections, and ſubſtituted a general ticket, whereby the voice of ſix federal diſtricts was ſilenced in the election of preſident. In Pennſylvania they contended to the laſt for a general ticket, and refuſed to the federaliſts a diſtrict election, on the faireſt diviſion of the ſtate, which was repeatedly offered to them. A perſon, indeed, under the ſignature of "A Pennſylvanian," who is ſaid to be Mr. Dallas, has had the unaccountable effrontery to aſſert, in a paper of this city, that the anti-federaliſts in the Pennſylvania legiſlature, did not object to the principle of a diſtrict election, but to the mode of dividing the ſtate; an aſſertition which that perſon himſelf, and every man in Pennſylvania, knows to be falſe. In Maryland, on the contrary, theſe ſame friends to Mr. Jefferſon, hypocritically affect the moſt violent attachment to diſtrict elections, raiſe a loud clamor about the rights of the people, and contend, tooth and nail, for that very mode which their coadjutors have aboliſhed in Virginia, and prevented in Pennſylvania; hoping by theſe means to cheat the federal party, who conſtitute the majority in Maryland, as well as in the nation at large, out of their choice, out of their right, as a majority, to have a preſident of their choice, and to impoſe on the nation a chief magiſtrate to whom the majority is unqueſtionably oppoſed. In a ſubſequent number, I will examine, more at length, this pretence about the rights of the people, whereby they are attempted to be cheated, in fact, out of their rights; and the foundations of this clamor, by which the good ſenſe of the majority is attempted to be impoſed on, and a preſident to be choſen by a factious minority. In the meantime, I will aſk the federaliſts in Maryland, who conſtitute the majority by the confeſſion even of their opponents, what is the right which they hold moſt dear? Is it not to have a preſident of their own choice? If ſo, will they ſuffer themſelves to be defrauded of this dear and ſubſtantial right, by a few cant phraſes; by the artifices of the enemies of government in other ſtates, aided by their noiſy clamors in this? Should ſuch be their conduct, I ſhall indeed be an acquieſcent, but an aſtoniſhed

IT has formerly been ſhewn, by a fair ſurvey of the continent, and a reference to public and undeniable facts,See the preceding number, and the calculations and statements there made, which have not been denied or disputed. that were diſtrict elections eſtabliſhed in Virginia, Pennſylvania, New-York, and throughout the union, Mr. Jefferſon could not poſſibly get more than ſixty-three votes, out of one hundred and thirty-eight; which is the whole number of votes for preſident and vice-preſident. This number is ſeven ſhort of a majority. The majority of the nation is therefore oppoſed to Mr. Jefferſon, and in favor of Mr. Adams, general Pinckney, or ſome other federal candidate.

The anti-federaliſts of Virginia, who are a majority in that ſtate, knowing this to be the true ſtate of the matter, aboliſhed the diſtrict election in their ſtate; where Mr. Adams and general Pinckney would, upon that plan, have got ſix votes at leaſt. By this ſtep they took ſix votes from thoſe candidates, and gave them to Mr. Jefferſon. Situated as the election actually is in the other ſtates, theſe ſix votes, taken from Mr. Jefferſon's opponents by depriving them of diſtrict elections, and added to him, will ſecure him the election, though the majority of the nation is againſt him; unleſs Maryland, where the federaliſts are a decided majority, ſhould take the ſame ſtep in her own defence. Unleſs by ſetting aſide diſtrict elections, for the preſent, Maryland ſhould deprive the anti-federaliſts of their influence in this ſtate, as the federaliſts of Virginia have been deprived of their influence in Virginia, and ſhould reſtore the election to its fair balance, the preſident of the United States will be choſen by the minority of the nation. This it is the determination of the federaliſts of Maryland, that is of the majority, to do; not by ſtealth and underhandedly, but openly, upon fair and avowed principles, and with the concurrence of a majority of the people.

The anti-federaliſts, alarmed at the idea of ſeeing their unjuſt advantage thus ſnatched out of their hands, and the election of preſident placed again under the controul of the majority, make a terrible outcry againſt this plan. They become, all at once, the zealous defenders of diſtrict elections; which they have ſo lately trampled under foot on the other ſide of the Potowmac, and do now obſtinately oppoſe in Pennſylvania. They ſay that the right to diſtrict elections, which they themſelves have aboliſhed in Virginia in order to promote the election of Mr. Jefferſon, and do now reſiſt in Pennſylvania for the ſame purpoſe, is a moſt ſacred right; and that an attempt to change them, even for this time alone and in order to counteract the plans of the ſame party in Virginia, ought to be treated by the people of Maryland, as an invaſion of their deareſt conſtitutional privileges.

The foundations of this clamor I now intend to examine. I intend to enquire into the nature and extent of this conſtitutional right. I intend to ſhew that the ſubſtantial conſtitutional right of the people of Maryland, which is a right to have a preſident whom they approve, is in fact invaded by thoſe who make this clamor; and can be protected and ſecured by no other means, than a change in the mode of chooſing electors. I intend to ſhew that ſhould the electors be appointed by the legiſlature, they will be, to all intents and purpoſes, choſen by the people of the ſtate at large.