LETTER I.

IT is the duty of every citizen to contribute all in his power towards the information of the public mind, or the general good. This obligation is so impe­rious, that no man can evade it, without meriting the character of a luke-warm patriot, or of an enemy to the public happiness. As far as my powers go they shall be exercised on those two objects, and that too with the fullest determination to permit neither char­acter nor station to draw me aside from a candid state­ment of facts, and as candid a deduction from them.

The Constitution of the United States ought to be to the people of this country what the Alcoran is to the Mahometans—It is to politics what that is to religion, and ought to be as sacred to the one, as that is to the other. The exposition of its text ought to be uniform, at least when interpreted by the same person.—A vari­egated construction of the same part, by the same per­son at different times, cannot but lead us to think it an instrument, contrived for the accomodation of those [Page 2]who administer it, rather than of the people. My object in this essay is to shew, that the Executive has inter­preted the same parts of the Constitution, variously at different times; and that he has thereby converted the great charter of our country into a thing of chance, liable to the direction of whim, caprice or design.

By the first construction of the treaty making power by the Executive, his power was co-ordinate only, and not omnipotent; but by his last construction he has completely absorbed in himself, the right of making treaties under all circumstances, and in all their varieties. This assertion I will illustrate by facts. In the year 1790 or 1791, it was deemed expedient to make some arrangement with Algiers, for the security of our sea­men, and the protection of our commerce.

As monied engagements were necessarily involved in such a negociation, the Executive did not think himself constitutionally authorized to negociate a treaty, in which were contained such stipulations, without first having a resolution of Congress, communicating such a power. By his direction the Secretary of State wrote to the chairman of a committee of Congress, appointed on this subject, and enclosed a resolution which he wished to be adopted, purporting the assent of Congress to such a negociation. Thus it appears from the then construction of the Constitution by the Executive, that he did not conceive himself authorized to make monied contracts, without first obtaining the assent of Congress thereto.—But in the Treaty, which he negociated with Great Britain, he abandoned this ground, and pledged the United States for the pay­ment of millions of dollars, on his own individual autho­rity.

Again, in the Treaty which he negociated with the Creek Indians, he thought the advice of the Senate, necessary before he entered upon the negociation. To [Page 3]obtain this he went in person to the Senate, and sub­mitted to them the outlines of a treaty. Objections were made to some of its parts, and amendments were made before the Senate would give their advice in favour of the negociation.—But in the negociation with Great Britain, the Senate were not even apprized that a Trea­ty was to be made, much less was their advice taken upon the subject. By the Constitution, the "advice and consent" of the Senate are necessary to the ma­king of treaties, and it is obvious, that the Executive understood advice to mean a different thing from con­sent, when he contemplated a Treaty with the Creek Indians. Thus then there has been a manifest differ­ence in the construction of the Constitution by the Ex­ecutive in these two cases, the advice and consent of the Senate having been taken in the one case, and their consent only in the other. How are we to understand this difference of the Executive with himself? What are we to suppose of a Constitution, susceptible of such opposite constructions? What security are we to look for in an administration, capable of torturing the charter of freemen to mean opposite things? What bulwark have the people against the introduction of ar­bitrary power, when their solemn political covenant can be moulded at will, and according to the views of the Executive?—These things require serious considerati­on; for in vain have we seceded from the arbitrary power of Great Britain, if we are to substitute the will of an individual for the constitution of our coun­try.

LETTER II.

IT is incumbent on freemen to enquire—it is essen­tial to their independent existence to know how their [Page 4]affairs are administered—without inquiry they cannot be informed, without a knowledge of facts they can­not ascertain, whether they are advancing or retrogra­ding in political truth. Subjects and slaves should alone endeavour to bury the poignacy of their conditi­on in ignorance—citizens, to retain their rank, ought to have the torch of investigation ever in a blaze. Every measure is a wrong one that is abashed by scru­tiny; every public servant gives cause for suspicion, whose conduct cannot bid defiance to the severest ani­madversions. Truth cannot suffer from investigation; upright character cannot be injured by free inquiry; the moment, therefore, expedients are employed to keep truth at a distance, or to circumvallate cha­racter by adventitious lines, suspicion has food to in­dulge upon, and honesty cause for alarm.—Our go­vernment and its administrators have had divine qua­lities ascribed to them—if then their merit is equal to the eulogium of their admirers, nothing I can advance can bring their reputation into question; on the con­trary, they must derive additional lustre from the at­tempt to cast a shade over their virtues, and, there­fore, a conduct like mine ought to be approved, whose endeavours to expose defects, if unsupported, must re­coil upon the author, and render merit more illustri­ous. To know merit, it is necessary to search for it; to be enamoured of it, it is necessary to know it, how far wrong then are those, who condemn the freedom of inquiry into the men and measures of our govern­ment. Censures upon a free press are libels upon truth and virtue, and as the diamond receives fresh lustre from friction, untainted virtue must acquire additi­onal brilliance from the rudest contacts. I will pro­ceed to my subject, and shew a conduct in the Exe­cutive towards the French Republic, that would en­tangle a man's honour in private life in inextricable dif­ficulty.

When Mr. Genet, the first Minister under the French Republic, arrived in this city, he communica­ted [Page 5]his powers and his wishes, and those of his govern­ment to our Executive, to enter into a new treaty, ‘on liberal principles, such as might strengthen the bonds of good will which unite the two nation.’ This friendly proposition was answered by the Executive, that ‘the Senate was in recess, and that he would meet them as soon as he could do it, by the forms of the constitution,’ and thus the proposition was refused, under a pretext, that the forms of the Constitution would not them admit of a negociation.

Let us now enquire how those forms operated in a late negociation, when the present Secretary of State was appointed a commissioner to draught a codicil to the last will and testament of American Independence— the British treaty. Scarcely had the House of Repre­sentatives decided to make appropriations to carry the British treaty into effect, when a memorial from the British Charge d' Affaires announced to the Executive an interference of existing treaties with that con­cluded with Great Britain. Without giving this me­morial time to breathe, and to recover from the fa­tigue, which its haste occasioned, the Secretary of State was commissioned by the President to enter into a negociation with the British Charge d' Affaires, and to form a Treaty Dictionary, by which all treaties, subsequent to the British treaty, were to be defined, and expounded. The appointment of the Secretary of State to this duty is declared in the commission, to be agreeably to the laws of the United States, and the law, authorizing the delegation of such a trust to the Secretary of State, was passed the 27th of July, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine. Under a law then, which existed before the Republic of France had a being, was the present Secretary of State appointed to negociate with a British minister, and yet when the minister of the French Republic pro­posed a negociation on the 23d of May, 1793, he was informed by the Executive, "That the participation in [Page 6]matters of treaty, given by the constitution to that branch of our government, would of course delay any definitive answer to his friendly proposition," and that he would, ‘meet them with the most friendly dispositions on the grounds of treaty, proposed by the National Convention, as soon as he could do it by the forms of the Constitution.’ The Senate was in recess, to be sure, when Mr. Genet made the pro­position, and they might as well have been in recess, when the new treaty was negociated between Phineas Bond and Timothy Pickering; for they were not ap­prized of the negociation, until the article was com­pleted and sent to them to be registered.

One of two inferences obtrude themselves involun­tarily upon the mind from the foregoing facts—either that the President conceived he had not a power to en­ter into a negociation, without the advice of the Se­nate, and, therefore, that he was guilty of a wilful vi­olation of the Constiution in the negociation of the new explanatory article; or, that the existing laws gave him such an authority, and, therefore, that he was guilty of a violation of his own and the faith of the United States, in declaring to Mr. Genet, the mi­nister of the French Republic, that he had no power, by the forms of the Constitution to enter into a negoci­ation with him, as the Senate was in recess.

We have heard much, lately, about public faith; but what kind of faith is it, which impelled the first Executive Magistrate to declare to the French minis­ter, that the forms of the Constitution prohibited trea­ting with him, and yet under the same forms negoci­ated a treaty with a British Commissioner? The nerves of certain gentlemen, who were staunch advo­cates for high toned Executive power, were tremu­lously alive when the faith of the United States, sup­posed to be pledged by the Executive, was in danger of inexecution as to the British Treaty; but how stands [Page 7]the account of honor since the last negociation? If it is a just maxim, that nothing can be politically right which is morally wrong, in what system of political morality are we to search for an extenuation of a breach of faith with one nation more than another? I will leave to casuists to determine the degree of turpitude in deception and falsehood to a friend, and in abject submission to a perfidious and tyrannical enemy.

LETTER III.

IN my last letter I purposely avoided considering the probable effects of our punic faith to France. It was not my intention to anticipate the conclusions which would naturally arise in every honest mind. The facts stated must bring a blush into the cheek of every Ame­rican, who feels for his country's honor, and who has not forgotten, that France engaged in a war against Great Britain to aid us in the establishment of our in­dependence, and that she is now at war with the same nation, who headed the crusade against her, to establish her own and the rights of man. The suffusion of vir­tuous sensibility must be increased by the information, that Mr. Fauchet, the successor of Mr. Genet, re­newed the proposition to treat, and that he never received a positive answer to his request.—When our Executive had refused treating with Mr. Genet, under the pretext already stated, Mr. Morris, our Minister at the Republic of France, was desired "to explain to the Executive of France this delay, which had prevented, as yet, our formal accession to their proposition to treat; and to assure them, that the President would meet them with the most friendly dispositions on the grounds of trea­ty, proposed by the National Convention, as soon as he could do it by the forms of the Constitution," and to re­quest, [Page 8] "that the powers of Mr. Genet be renewed to his successor." The powers of Mr. Genet, were re­newed to his successor. Mr. Fauchet proposed to treat, but was played off with diplomatic finesse! By what name shall we distinguish this conduct? In what moral code shall we find an apology for a breach of solemn and plighted faith? Mr. Morris was desired, to "assure" the Executive of France, that the Presi­dent would meet them, with the most friendly dispositions on the grounds of treaty, and yet, when Mr. Fauchet made his overtures he could obtain no positive answer —Does this management comport with the professions made by cur Government to the Republic of France, through Mr. Monroe? Does it accord with the won­derful letter written by the President to Mr. Adet, on the receipt of the French Flag? Well might Mr. Adet now exclaim in turn, "Wonderful People!" when our Government has become a phenomenon of hypocrisy and treachery. I could swell the black catalogue by adding other instances of the grossest deception, but at present I shall content myself with barely stating, that when Mr. Fauchet expressed his apprehensions about Mr. Jay's mission, he was informed, that nothing more was intended by it, than to demand a reparation, for the spoliations upon our commerce, and that he had no powers to do any thing, which could militate against the interest of France—And yet the British treaty, was the offspring of this mission!!!

As fear has been the operative motive in the admis­sion of the British Treaty, I might here shew cause for alarm to the funding order, and to the mamalukes of administration by maintaining, that we have given the French Republic a sufficient inducement to treat us with severity—we have by a Treaty with her ene­my, actually changed the existing state of things, and thereby furnished ample cause for considering us as in combination against her—we have declared a neutrality, co-incident with the "modern" usage of nations, and [Page 9]we have, by subsequent stipulations, abandoned this ground, and left a question, decided by the modern law, to be determined after the conclusion of the pre­sent war—We have increased the number of contra­band articles, contrary to the same modern law, and thereby given evident advantages to Great Britain, at the expence of the French Republic. We have thus violated our neutrality, by "favouring the arms of one, to the detriment of the other."

"A neutral nation," says Vattel, "desirous safely to enjoy the conveniencies of that state, is in all things to shew an exact impartiality between the par­ties at war; for should he favour one, to the detriment of the other, he cannot complain of being treated by him as an adherent, and confederate of his enemy; his neutrality would be a fraudulent neutrality, but of which no nation would be the dupe."

Have we shewn an exact impartiality between the parties at war? Have we not favoured one to the de­triment of the other? Has not our neutrality been a fraudulent one? Have we nor declared, the "modern usage of nations," to be our guide, and have we not abandoned this usage to prejudice France, and to be­nefit Great Britain? Does not the British treaty contain stipulations calculated for the present war, and are these not to be considered as a deriliction of our neutrality? Did not the President's edict of neutrality declare, that "the duty and the interest of the Unit­ed States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers?" Did we treat France with "sincerity?" Did we exercise "good faith" towards her? Has our conduct been "friendly and impartial?" Let the answer to citizen Ge­net's proposition—the continual embarrassments thrown in the way of the French Republic, and the British treaty, speak our sincerity, our good faith, our friend­ship, and our impartiality.

[Page 10] I will now shew, that in defiance of our pretended neutrality, in defiance of every obligation of honor, and gratitude, and good faith, our administration balanced as to the part they would take in relation to the French Republic. Indeed nothing but the universal sentiment of enthusiastic affection, displayed by the people of the United States, on the arrival of Mr. Genet, could have subdued the Machiavelian policy, exhibited in the fol­lowing queries.

The foregoing queries were transmitted for consider­ation to the heads of the departments, previously to a meeting to be held at the President's house. The text needs no commentary. It has stamped upon its front in characters, brazen enough for idolatry itself [Page 12]to comprehend, perfidy and ingratitude. To doubt in such a case was dishonorable, to proclaim those doubts treachery. For the honor of the American character, and of human nature, it is to be lamented, that the records of the United States exhibit such a stupendous monument of degeneracy. It will almost require the authenticity of holy writ to persuade posterity, that it is not a libel ingeniously contrived to injure the repu­tation of "the saviour of his country."

LETTER IV.

THE proceedings of our government, during the "six years glorious administration," have such an extraordi­nary aspect, that it will be difficult to impress a belief of the reality of the transactions. That men, who had the reputation of patriotism, should be the first to com­bine with a tyrant against republicanism, and the fore­most in the exercise of inordinate powers, are facts too stupendous for ordinary comprehension, and no­thing but the evidence of our own senses, could re­move the scepticism created by such a palpable deviati­on from the right line of rectitude. The queries de­tailed in my last letter merit a serious consideration: they are an ample commentary upon the proceedings of the Administration since the promulgation of the famous bull of neutrality. Indeed they will throw abundant light upon the conduct of the Executive towards the French Republic since that period. Such a key will be sufficient to unlock the mysteries of our cabinet. It will open Pandora's box, but dread­ful to relate! Unlike it even hope—the hope of amendment will be left behind. At present I shall not interfere by my remarks with the reflections which must arise in the minds of Americans; but I will [Page 13]proceed to another subject of as extrordinary a kind as need be looked for in the catalogue of wonders— the explanatory article lately negociated by Phineas Bond, and Timothy Pickering. This precious morceau I will now submit to the public, but request as a preli­minary, that they will fortify themselves with all their philosophy to be the better enabled to contemplate with composure its sublime perfections.

"Explanatory Article."

"WHEREAS by the third article of the treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, concluded at Lon­don on the 19th day of november, 1794, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of Ame­rica, it was agreed that it should at all times be free to his Majesty's subjects and to the Citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on ei­ther side of the boundary line assigned by the treaty of peace to the United States, freely to pass and re­pass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two contracting parties on the continent of America (the Bay Company on­ly excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and com­merce with each other, subject to the provisions and limitations contained in the first article: And whereas by the 8th article of the treaty of peace and friend­ship concluded at Greenville on the 3d day of Au­gust 1795, between the United States, and the nati­ons or tribes of Indians called the Wyandots, Dela­wares, Shawanees, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawati­mies, Miamies, Elkias, it was stipulated that no per­son should be permitted to reside at any of the towns or hunting camps of the said Indian tribes as a tra­der, who is not furnished with a licence for that pur­pose, under the authority of the United States, which latter stipulation has excited doubts, whether in its ope­ration [Page 14]it may not interfere with the due execution of the said article of the treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation; and it being the sincere desire of his Britannic Majesty, and of the United States, that this point should be so explained as to remove all doubts, and promote mutual satisfacton and friendship: and for this purpose his Britannic Majesty having named for his Commissioner, PHINEAS BOND, Esq his Ma­jesty's Consul General for the middle and southern States of America, (and now his Majesty's Charge d' Affaires to the United States) and the President of the United States having named for their Commissioner, TIMOTHY PICKERING, Esq Secretary of State for the United States, to whom, agreeably to the laws of the United States, he has entrusted this negociation. They, the said commissioners, having communicated to each other their full powers, have, in virtue of the same and conformably to the spirit of the last article of the said treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigati­on, entered into this explanatory article, and now by these presents, explicitly agree and declare, that no sti­pulations in any treaty subsequently concluded by ei­ther of the contracting parties with any other state or nation, or with any Indian tribe can be under­stood to derogate in any manner from the rights and free intercourse and commerce secured by the aforesaid third article of the treaty to the subjects of his Majesty, and to the citizens of the United States, and Indians dwelling on either side of the bounda­ry line aforesaid; but that all the said persons shall remain at full liberty freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective terri­tories and countries of the contracting parties on ei­ther side of the said boundary line, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other, according to the stipulations of the said third article of the treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. This explana­tory article, when the same shall have been ratified by his Majesty, and by the President of the United States; [Page 15]by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the respective ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be added to make a part of the said treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, and shall be permanently binding upon his majesty and the United States.

"In witness whereof, we the said commissioners of his Majesty the King of great Britain and the United States of America, have signed this expla­natory article, and thereto affixed our seals.

"Done at Philadelphia, this fourth day of May, in the year af our Lord 1796.

P. BOND. (Seal).

T. PICKERING. (Seal).

IN the formation of this article the American Puf­fendorf who negociated it seems to have forgotten that he was not the Secretary of State to Sancho Pan­cha, and that he was not fabricating an explanatory law for the island of Barataria. If such were his vi­sions, they might have made a figure in the renown­ed adventures of The Knight of la Mancha; but Ame­ricans have not yet been gifted like him, that they are able to see a "citadel" in a wind mill, or an army in a flock of sheep. I will submit to this colossal jurist an extract from Vattel, and leave to the intelligent freemen of the United States to decide, how far we have acted with good faith towards Spain and the In­dian tribes in the admission of this explanatory article. ‘The third general maxim, or principle, on the sub­ject of interpretation is: that neither the one nor the other of the interested or contracting powers has a right to interpret the act, or treaty at pleasure. For if you are at liberty to give my promise whatever sense you please, you will have the power of obliging me to do whatever you have a mind, contrary to my inten­tion, [Page 16]and beyond my real engagement; and recipro­cally, if I am allowed to explain my promises as I please, I may render them vain and illusive, by gi­ving them a sense quite different from that in which they were presented to you, and in which you must have taken them in accepting them.’ Our executive has undertaken not only to intrepret but to explain away the Spanish and Indian treaties "at pleasure;" for it is a fact of public notoriety, that neither Spain nor the Indian tribes have been consulted. Indeed such was the precipitancy with which this explanatory article was concluded. That I much doubt whether the om­niscient negociator himself was aware of its effects. His hurry seems to have been as great as it was to uncloath himself of a set of opinions hostile to the ad­ministration, the moment he became a member of the Privy Council of his Columbian Majesty.

LETTER V.

FROM the contemplation of the incomprehensible perfections of the explanatory article and its negociator —from a survey of this prodigy in intellectual endow­ments, whose almighty mind disdains American limits— from a view of that philantrophy, which scorns to epitomize human benefits, by the selfish policy of coun­try—from him, whose sympathy for Great Britain can only be exceeded by his abhorrence of the Republic of France, I revert to the consideration of the queries contained in my third letter—In justice to the "suc­cessor in form to his predecessors," I must acquit him from having had any agency in them—They smell too strongly of St. Omers to admit the supposition for a moment, that such a Secretary of Sate could compre­hend, much less have conceived them.

[Page 17] It will be remembered, that Citizen Genet arrived at Charleston, on the 8th of April 1793—that the queries were submitted to the heads of the departments, on the 18th of the same month—that the proclamation of neu­trality was issued on the 22d, and that the French Minister did not arrive in this city, until the 16th of May—Scarcely had the news arrived in this city, that a Minister from the Republic of France had landed at Charleston, before the queries were manufactured, and transmitted for consideration to the different heads of departments—Ten days only intervened between the arrival and the queries, just time enough for informa­tion to be received from Charleston—Four days after the date of the queries, the edict of neutrality was usher­ed into the world, to the astonishment of every repub­lican in our country. It appears clearly then, that the edict of neutrality was occasioned by the arrival of Mr. Genet, from its appearing immediately after information was received of his arrival at Charleston. If the ex­ecutive could reconcile himself to a promulgation of a proclamation of neutrality, under unconstitutional and other circumstances, the other arrangements in the view of the queries followed of course. The procla­mation indicated as little regard to the constitution as the queries did to our treaties, and the one was not more perfidious, than the other was an arrogant assump­tion of power, and the man who could contrive the one could execute the other. The proclamation was the first link in the chain, and no doubt the order would have been pursued, as the second question related to the recognition of the minister of the Republic of France, had not an universal sentiment of affectio­nate recognition by the people, displayed itself on his passage through the country from Charleston to this ci­ty—Numerous addresses were presented to him, and but one feeling seemed to actuate the American peo­ple. Under these circumstances it would have made the refusal to acknowledge the Minister ‘a serious bu­siness [Page 18]indeed,’ and as there was no appearance of ‘a counter current’ at that time, the executive must have been reluctantly dragged to obey the voice of the peo­ple—as a demonstrative proof that it was the intention of the executive to pursue the system plainly indi­cated by the queries, the letter of "Pacificus," writ­ten about this time, may be adduced. These letters were ascribed, and never denied, to the Secretary of the Treasury, the virtual President of the United States, whose baneful councils directed the affairs of the Union. The doctrines they contain are calculated to destroy the favourable disposition of the people of this country towards the French Republic, and to pave the way for the execution of the plan contemplated in the que­ries. Listen to this apostle of monarchy, and no doubt can remain of his intention to detach us from the French Republic. ‘If there was any kindness in the decision, demanding a return of kindness from us, it was the kindness of Louis the 16th; his heart was the depo­sitory of the sentiment—let the genuine voice of nature then, unperverted by political subtelties, pronounce whe­ther the acknowledgement, which may be due for that kindness, can be equitably transfered from him to others, who had no share in the decision—whether the princi­ple of gratitude ought to determine us to behold with indifference his misfortunes, and with satisfaction the triumphs of his enemies’—To receive a minister from the Republic of France must have been supposed by him to be a transfer of kindness from the king, ‘to others who had no share in the decision▪’ To acknow­ledge the treaties still in operation must have been con­cluded to be an indifference to the misfortunes of the monarch; and a satisfaction in the triumphs of his enemies! And to shew kindness to the people of France, and a satisfaction at the downfall of despotism, in the eyes oft his high priest of slavery, must have been to sin against ‘the ge­nuine voice of nature.’ Under impressions like these, no wonder he should have created doubts, whether as mi­nister from the Republic of France should be received, [Page 19]whether the treaties between that Republic, and the United States should be considered as still in operati­on, and whether a minister from the regent of France should be received—his intimacy with Talon at that time, who was believed to be a missionary of the no­minal regent, made it no doubt a desideratum with him, that a minister from the regent should be recei­ved.

To remove all doubt about the sentiments of the Se­cretary of the Treasury respecting the French Repub­lic, I will make a few more quotations from "Pacifi­cus. In a case so circumstanced," says this crusader against Republicanism, ‘does it, can it consist with our justice or our humanity, to partake in the angry and vindicative pas­sions which are endeavoured to be excited against the un­fortunate Monarch’ ‘Would gratiude dictate to a people situated as are the people of this country, to lend their aid to extend to the son the misfortunes of the father?’

‘If too (as no sensible and candid man, will deny) the extent of the present combination against France is in a degree to be ascribed to imprudences on her part; the exemption of the United States in still more manifest and complete. No country is bound to par­take in hazards of the most critical kind, which may have been produced or promoted by the indiscretion and intemperance of another.’ Can repugnance be stronger than that evidenced in the foregoing questions? Must we not be irresistibly urged to the belief, con­sidering the omnipotence of the Secretary in our coun­cils, that the intention was to refuse acknowledging a minister from the Republic of France, to renounce the treaties, or hold them suspended until the monar­chy was re-established, and to recognize a minister from the regent? Why the appeal to our justice and humanity in favour of the "unfortunate monarch;" why that sympathy for the "son," if it was the intenti­on of the Executive to recognize their "enemies?" Would the Secretary of the Treasury have been so em­phatic [Page 20]in pleading the cause of Louis and his son, if his feelings had been in unison with the triumphs of the nation? His cloquence in favor of royalty was too animated, to excite a doubt of his sensibility for its cause, or his apathy for the Republic. Notwith­standing the eagerness he displayed during the western insurrection to parsue certain innocent men to the gibbet to favour his purposes, yet when the cause of kings was to plead, he seemed melted by humanity, and the ferocity of his nature appeared to be convert­ed into lamb-like softness!! Was the combination against France owing to her imprudencies or to her re­volution? The Secretary here pleads the cause of the coalition, by ascribing the combination against France to her imprudencies, rather than to the revolution. This is in exact coincidence with his views; for if he could make France appear to be the agressor, his purposes would have been answered, and the Uni­ted States, in his estimation, must have been absolved from their engagements. If the revolution itself was an imprudence, or an act of "indiscretion and intem­perance," then indeed have we no honour to look for, for our secession from the despotism of a British mo­narch, and, perhaps, it would not be uncharitable to believe, that the Secretary intended to characterize all revolutions as acts of imprudence, indiscretion and in­temperance. The resistance of France against despo­tism, her energy in opposition to the coalition of ty­rants was considered as imprudence, indiscretion and intemperance, and, therefore, the United States were to renounce their treaties with her, or hold them suspen­ded, until the government of despotism should esta­blish, their "exemption" being "manifest and com­plete!!"

If the present Secretary of the Treasury had made it a problem, whether the treaties between France and the United States ought to be considered as still in operation, I could have found an apology for him, in the limitation of his mind to the arithmetical rules [Page 21]of addition and multiplication; and had the present Secretary of State laboured under the same difficulty, an ample excuse might have been found for him, as he is "the successor but in forms to his predecessors;" but that the ex-Secretary of the Treasury should have sug­gested difficulties, who seems to have made all writers his study, from Machiavel to Vattel, can only find a solution in his known aversion from the Republic of France, and devotion to monarchy. Vattel and Burla­maqui are books as familiar to him as Machiavel, and although he has the latter in his heart, he has the for­mer in his head, and can quote them, as the devil does scripture, for his purposes. These writers and others of like description, must have taught him, that the treaties between France and the United States are real and not personal, and that notwithstanding the change in the form of government, the treaties continued in full force. To make it a question then, whether the treaties were to be considered as still in operation, was implying a desire to set them aside, which would doubt­less have been attempted, if all things had conspired to render such a breach of faith safe.

LETTER VI.

EITHER the Executive must have been supremely ig­norant of the Laws of Nations, or his moral sense must have sympathized with that of the Secretary of the Treasury. The law of nations being precise on the reality of our treaties, can leave him but the al­ternative of the grossest ignorance, or the basest treach­ery.—No intention can be clearer, than that the ad­ministration wished to keep aloof from our engagements with France, and intention in this case constitutes the highest grade of criminality. To manufacture difficul­ties [Page 22]against the fulfillments of our national faith, view­ing the causes which led to our relation to France, in­dicated an estrangement from principle, for which I am at a loss for an appropriate name. I will now refer to the authorities of which the Secretary seems so fond, when they can be cited, or perverted to an­swer his purposes. Vattel and Burlamaqui, to whose works I shall have recourse, will substantiate the reality of our Treaties with France, and will furnish decisive evidence against the querist.

[Page 23] Speaking of personal alliances he asks. ‘But whe shall judge if the King be dethroned lawfully, or by violence? An independent nation acknowledges no judge. If the body of the nation declares the King deprived of his rights by the abuse he has made of them, and deposes him, it may justly do it when its grievances are well founded, and no other power has a right to censure it.’

On real alliances he offers the following sentiments. ‘The same question presents itself in real alliances and in general, in all alliances made with the State, and not in particular with a king for the defence of his person. An ally ought doubtless to be defended against every invasion, against every foreign violence, and even against his rebellious subjects, in the same manner a republic ought to be defended against the enterprizes of one who attempts to destroy the public liberty. But it ought to remembered, that an ally of the state or nation, is not its judge. If the nation has deposed its king in form, if the people of a republic have driven out their magistrates, or set themselves at liberty, or acknowledged the authority of an u­surper, either expressly or tacitly; to oppose these do­mestic regulations, by disputing their justice or validity, would be to interfere in the government of the nation. and to do it an injury. The ally remains the ally of the state notwithstanding the change that has happened in it.’

Let us now enquire whether the treaties between France and the United States are real or personal, and whether we had a right to make a question to "re­nounce" or hold them "suspended" until the restorati­on of the monarchy. In the 11th article of the Trea­ty of Alliance we find the following words: "The two parties guarantee mutually from the present time and for over against all other powers" &c. And in the first article of the Treaty of Amity, and Commerce, we have the following words : "There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the most Christian King, his heirs and successors, and the Uni­ted States of America. And the terms herein after mentioned shall be perpetual between the most Chris­tian [Page 25]King, his heirs and successors, and the said United States."

The Treaties then between France and the United States being public Treaties, having been made for the good of the two nations, and having been made with the king, for himself and successors for ever, and the terms in them being declared perpetual, it follows evi­dently, that the treaties are real, and therefore in com­plete operation, notwithstanding the change in the go­vernment from a monarchy to a republic, and that a question to renounce them or hold them suspended must have been dictated by ignorance or depravity.

My conclusions on this subject are already drawn; but the people of the United States will decide, whe­ther ignorance or perfidy originated a set of queries, which go to the destruction of our national faith, and to dissolve the ties between the United States and their best friend; a friend without whose aid the President's fame and power might have terminated in the ignomi­nious fate of a rebel. Was it honour—was it gratitude —was it a love of liberty—was it a sympathy for hu­man happiness which gave birth to the queries? Au­thority, and that too from an author, which the Secre­tary himself, in his character of "Pacificus," calls "one of the best writers on the laws of nations," has stamped an unquestionable reality upon our treaties with France; how then the President could conjure up the difficulties contained in the queries, remains with him to explain. That no ignoble motive may have operated upon him is devoutly to be wished; but the act ap­pears so foul, that charity itself is struck dumb. When we review the conduct of the Executive from that pe­riod to the present: the partialities for Great Britain, and the frigidity to France—the refusal to treat with the latter, and the extreme anxiety to be in union with the former—the arrestation of the proceedings of the National Legislature to act with energy against [Page 26]Great Britain, when she was robbing us and aiding in the butchery of our citizens, and the deliberate plan to ruin the minister of he French Republic—the Trea­ty of Amity with Great Britain under every circum­stance of aggravated injury and barbarity, and not­withstanding Jay's instructions declared, that there were "satisfactory proofs that British agents were guilty of stirring up and assisting the Indian tribes against us:" When we review these things, it will be difficult to be­lieve, that the motives which led to them can have any claim to indulgence.

LETTER VII.

‘DOES the war in which France is engaged appear to be offensive or defensive on her part? Or of a mixed and equivocal character?’ These are among the questions which are to shed a lusture around the Executive! Did an equivocal war ever enter the head of any man, who was not of equivocal virtue? War may be equivocal as to its issue; but that it should be equivocal as to its character could only be imagined by the most refined sophist—I might, with at least equal propriety, ask, whether the President's council chamber was of a mixed and equivocal character? For so jesuiti­cal is the complexion of the queries, that they look as if they had issued from an apartment of St. Omers— Anatomists tell us of Hermaphrodites: but never yet was an Hermaphrodite war conceived, unless in the council chamber of the President of the United States—Machiavel may contain the ingredients of such a com­position, and so may "Pacificus;" but excepting among those two kindred spirits and their disciples, a war without a gender would be deemed as much a phoenomenon, as "Pacificus" without vice. Questions [Page 27]of this sort mean more than they express; they are like a vane which shews the direction of the wind, and I do not hesitate to affirm from their cast, that our Treaties with France would have been pat in durance, had not the voice of the people silenced the whispers of the Executive conclave.

"Pacificus" calls Vattel "the best writer on the laws of nations," and no doubt the manufacturer of the queries must have known, that Vattel says, "war is either offensive or defensive;" in his whole work he has not a syllable about equivocal war. Can the author of the queries be of the epicene gender himself, that he has made war an anomaly? As "the best writer on the laws of nations," knows no such thing as an equivocal war, and as a distinction which he does not recognize is resorted to by the Executive, it must be evident, that this substitution of his own opinion for the law of nations must have been advanced to render abortive the Treaties between France and the United States. The bull of neutrality verifies this conclusion; for it was predicated on the idea, that the treaties de­pended on the Executive fiat.

And here the assumption of the Executive to inter­pret treaties at his pleasure, might call our attention—The proclamation of neutrality pre-determined our re­lations with France, previously to the arrival of the minister of the Republic in this city; and although we had a Treaty of Alliance with France, and her minister ought to have been a party to the interpretation, yet in defiance of the positive law of nations on this subject, did the Executive undertake to impose his own in­terpretation. I have on another occasion cited Vattel; but I will again bring his opinion into view, that no doubt may remain of the truth of my assertion—"The third general maxim, or principle, on the subject of interpretation is: that neither the one nor the other of the interested, or contracting powers has a right to inter­pret [Page 28]the act or treats at his pleasure; for if you are at liberty to give my promise whatever sense you please, you will have the power of obliging me to do whatever you have a mind, contrary to my intention, and beyond my real engagement: and reciprocally, if I am allowed to explain my promises as I please, I may render them vain and illusive, by giving them a sense quite different from that in which they were presented to you, and in which you must have taken them in accepting them."

That the proclamation of neutrality was itnended as an interpretation of the Treaties, is not only obvious from the instrument itself; but it is confirmed by the opinions of Secretary Pacificus—"It has however been admitted, says this cormorant of monarchy, that the declaration of neutrality excludes the idea of the clause of guarantee."—If the laws of nations are the rules by which governments measure the justice or in­justice of things, what would be the verdict of the world should the Executive be tried by the text already quoted? He interpreted a solemn covenant between two nations, "at his pleasure," and in contradiction of a stipulation, that, to say no more, admitted of doubt, did he declare the United States to be in a state of neutrality, to the exclusion of the clause of guarantee!! By assuming to himself the authority to interpret the treaties between France and the United States, at bis pleasure, the President has viclated those treaties, and has done France an injury. "As the engagements of a treaty, says Vattel, impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, they produce on the other a per­fect right. To violate a treaty, is then to violate the perfect right of him with whom we have con­tracted, and this is to do him an injury." How our neutrality has been observed, has been already glanced at; but how France will view it, begins now to mani­fest itself.—If her forbearance could continue longer, she must be more than mortal.

[Page 29] Admitting the doctrines of the Secretary, as held forth in the letters of "Pacificus," and taking for granted, what remains to be proved, that our alliance is purely defensive, I deny the invalidity of the clause of guarnatee. In my next letter I will prove, that Great Britain made the first declaration of war against France, that so far from having acted with imprudence, or intem­perance, that France courted the friendship of Great Bri­tain, and was treated with the utmost insolence, and that the clause of guarantee remains in full force, notwith­standing the affertion of Pacificus in behalf of the ad­ministration, that "the declaration of neutrality excludes the idea of the clause of gaurantee."

If the law of nations, as has been shewn, proncunces sentence of condemnation upon the Executive, how will the case appear in foro conscientie? How will the Presi­dent acquit himself to his own feelings, (for I take it for granted he has feelings left) in endeavouring to alienate our country from her best friend? Will his sensations be unmixed with remorse, when he casts a retrospective eye on the events of the late Revolution? Can be have forgotten that France was our sheet-anchor, that her assistance brought the Revolution to a speedy and prospe­rous issue, to say no more, and that the "unequalled pros­perity" of which he boasts, is in a degree owing to her? Can the unequalled barbarities of Great Britain, exer­cised upon the defenders of our Revolution, be already effaced from his memory? Has he forgotten the prison­ships and jails, those receptacles of misery and death, where the wretched prisoner was doomed to expne by inches? Can the groans of the miserable captives, who died in lingering torture with grass in their mouths, in the jail of this city, be obliterated from his remembrance since he has become President of the United States? Can the more than savage barbarity exerelsed on the mi­litia at the billet near this city, where the wounded prisoner was placed upon the same pile with the dead, and con­sumed [Page 30]to ashes, be already forgotten? If so, we might exclaim with the poet, "Ye gods! what havoc does am­bition make among your creatures!"

The name of a Frenchman ought to be dear to every American who sympathised in his country's cause, and infamy ought to attend the man who would endeavour to obliterate the affectionate impression. The benefits we have derived from France, the forbearance which the has exercised, and the cause in which she is embarked, ought to rivet us to her, unless we view our Indepen­dence as a misfortune, and our Liberty as a curse.

LETER VIII.

THE guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States remains in full force, and is obligatory upon us, the proclamation of neutrality, the declaration of Secretary Pacificus, and the treaty with Great Britain to the contrary notwithstanding. Great Britain was not only the first aggressor, but she made a vir­tual declaration of war against France, before the formal declaration took place on the part of the Franch Repub­lic. It is the act itself which we are to consider; for as the practice of the British nation is to make war first, and to declare it afterwards, we are to revert to the act itself to prove that the declaration of war was first made by Great Britain. In the treaty of navigation and commerce between Great Britain and France, signed at Versailles on the 26th day of September, 1786, is contained a clause which stipulates, that war shall not be deemed to exist until the recalling of sending home of the respective ambassadors and ministers. This clause is contained in the second article of that Treaty, a part of which I will recite to prevent all doubts on the subject.

[Page 31] ‘Article II. For the further security of commerce and friendship between the subjects of their said maje­sties and to the end that this good corrspondence may be preserved from all interruption and disturbance, it is concluded and agreed, that if at any time there should arise any misunderstanding, breach of friend­ship, or rupture between the crowns of their majesties, which God forbid! (which rupture sball not be deemed to exist until the recalling or sending home of the respective ambassadors and ministers) the subjects of each of the two parties, residing in the dominion of the other, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade therein, without any manner of disturbance, so long as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws and ordinances,’ &c.

It appears then, from this article, that a rupture was to be deemed to exist, or that an actual declaration of war was to be inferred from the recalling or sending home the respective ambassadors and ministers. Facts will now decide the question, that Great Britain declared war first against France, and therefore that France is acting on the defensive.

Immediately after the deposition of the King, Lord Gower, the English minister at Paris, was recalled by the British court. For a considerable time after the recall of Lord Gower, Mr. Chauvelin, the French minister at the court of London, was continued there by the Execu­tive Council. On the 17th of December 1792, Mr. Chauvelin presented a memorial to Lord Grenville, in which he informed him "that the Executive Council of the French Republic thinking it a duty which they owe to the French nation, not to leave it in the state of sus­pence into which it has been thrown by the late measures of the British government, have authorized him to demand with openness, whether France ought to consider England as a neutral or hostile power; at the same time being soli­citous, [Page 32]that not the smallest doubt should exist respecting the disposition of France towards England, and of its de­sire to remain in peace." To a memorial, fraught with such friendly and pacific sentiments, Lord Grenville returned the most arrogant and insulting answer. "He acknowledged the receipt of a note from Mr. Chauve­lin, styling himself minister plenipotentiary of France, and informed him, that since the unhappy events of the 10th August, the king had suspended all official communication with France, and that he could not be treated with in the quality and under form stated in his note." Notwithstanding the insulting and irritat­ing conduct displayed by the British ministry, Le Brun the minister of foreign affairs in France, transmitted a memorial in answer to Lord Grenville's letter, replete with pacific sentiments. He repeated "the assurances of their sincere desire to maintain peace and harmony between France and England, and declared it was with great reluctance that the Republic would see itself forced to a rupture much more contrary to its in­clination than its interest." Lord Grenville's reply to this memorial was, if possible, more insolent and irri­tating than the first. He informed Mr. Chauvelin by note, that his majesty would not receive his new letters of credence from the French Republic. On the 24th of January 1793, the British court dismissed the French minister by a letter from Lord Grenville in the following terms: "I am charged to notify to you, Sir, that the character with which you have been invested at this court, and the functions of which have been so long suspended, being now entirely terminated by the fatal death of his Most Christian majesty, you have no lon­ger any public character here; and his majesty has thought fit to order that you should retire from this kingdom within the term of eight days." The Ex­ecutive Council discovered the extremest solicitude to preserve peace with Great Britain: for although the in­solent brutality of Lord Grenville was extreme, the Ex­ecutive Council further condescended to send Mr. Maret [Page 33]as a confidential agent, to endeavour to endeavour to conciliate the British court. As Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed before his arrival he did not feel himself authorised to make known his powers; but he announced his arrival to Lord Grenville, who took no notice of him. Thus was the rupture complete by treaty. The declaration of war then being made by Great Britain, by recalling her ambassador and sending home the minister of France, the Executive Council resolved unanimously on the 1st of February, that the Republic of France was at war with the king of Great Britain.

From the foregoing facts who will dare to say, ex­cepting our administration and their minions, that Great Britain did not first declare war against France, and that she did not treat France with the utmost insolence, arro­gance, and brutality? Did France discover the "indis­cretion and intemperance" which Secretary Pacisicus dwells upon with so much rapture? Did she exhibit those "angry and vindictive passions," that called forth all his pathos in favour of Louis and his son? Her for­bearance was exemplary, and the ultima ratio was in her own defence. These "partizans of war and confusion," to speak in Presidential language, displayed a temper and moderation honourable to their cause and human nature.

Taking Pacisicus' assertion now for granted, that our alliance with France is defensive, I pronounce that the clause of guarantee is obligatory, Great Britain having declared war first according to treaty, and that we are bound to fulfil it, whenever France shall think proper to make the demand.

Public Faith has been echoed and re-echoed by our administration and its minions, while the British Treaty hung in suspence in the House of Representatives, till the reiterated cries almost produced a belief that they imagined it a substance. The review of their conduct to France however, has demonstrated, that with them it [Page 34]is only a shadow—a fit article of traffic which may be hawked about as best suits interest or ambition. There is not a feature in our public transactions with France, which has not a perfidious cast, and were we diposed to cite examples of the deepest hypocrisy, and most trea­cherous policy, we need not travel without the purvieu of our Executive administration.

LETTER IX.

‘DOES any article in either of the Treaties prevent ships of war other than privateers, of the powers op­posed to France, from coming into the ports of the United States to act as convoys to their own mer­chantmen? Or does it lay any other restraint upon them more than would apply to the ships of war of France?’ These questions have been fully answered in favour of Great Britain by the conduct of the Execu­tive. Was additional evidence necessary to substantiate the existence of a plan hostile to the French Republic, the free ingress and egress of British ships of war into and from our ports would complete the mass of testimony. Whenever the subtlety of construction, or perhaps more properly misconstruction, could be used to injure France and benefit Great Britain, it has been the almost invari­able resort of the Executive. A most extraordinary and palpable latitude has been given to the ships of war of Great Britain in flagrant violation of express and un­equivocal stipulations. By the 17th article of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and the United States, it is expressly declared, that "no shelter or refuge shall be given in their ports to such (speaking of ships of war) as shall have made prize of the subjects, peo­ple or property of the parties; but if such shall come in, forced by stress of weather or danger of [Page 35]the sea, all proper means shall be vigorously used, that they go out and retire from thence as soon as pos­sible." Pacificus himself with all his talents at riddle and perversion, would be puzzled to make even a plau­sible defence for the Executive if tried by this article. Several of the ships of war of Great Britain have been constantly cruising on our coast to intercept French pro­perty; they have captured French property to a consi­derable amount, and yet these same ships of war have been permitted to enter our ports ad libitum unforced by stress of weather, or danger of the sea! The patron­age which has been thus given them by the Executive, has enabled them to keep their stations on our coast and more effectually to harrass the commerce of the French Republic. The Thetis, Thisbe, Hussar, Cleopatra and Prevoyante frigates have been perfectly at home in our ports, and have been as much at their ease as if we had no stipulations to the contrary, and had been colonized anew. His Britannic majesty's dockyard at Norfolk, would make the presumption strong, that our Executive, if not the United States, was in alliance with the "mag­nanimous" George. Thus has the Executive given ‘shelter and refuge in our ports to such as have made prize of the people and property’ of the French Republic, in open violation of our public faith!

If the people of the United States are insensible to such outrages upon our public faith, because they are committed by him, who is styled the "Saviour of his Country," can they expect that France will be the dupe of such flagrant injustice? Will a name sanctify hypocrisy and perfidy there? A solitary breach of na­tional faith may have claimed her indulgence, but when these breaches are multiplied to an aggravated excess, we cannot expect further forbearance. Injury and in­sult have their limits, and friendship itself will resist when the ultimate point is exceeded; and that our Ex­ecutive has passed the ne plus ultra cannot any longer admit of doubt. Our public faith, like Falstaff's honor, [Page 36]has been an affair of calculation, and like the fides punica will soon become proverbial.

"Should the future Regent of France send a minister to "the United States, ought he to be received?

Can a question of this sort, coming from the Chief Magistrate of the United States, be read without the strongest emotions of horror and indignation? Must we not lament the profound hypocrisy or the fall of the man who could conceive such a proposition? Had the politics of Pitt found entrance into our councils, that a proposition to receive a minister from the Regent should have been agitated in both countries nearly at the same time? A minister from the Regent of France! Gra­cious God! that such an idea should ever have found its way into an American bosom! While the dread of British shackles had not yet left the memory—while the hilarity of emancipation still vibrated in our hearts— while the impression of the benefaction of France was yet warm in our bosoms—while the horror of tyranny appeared to us in its most vivid colours, was the dark project conceived of receiving the infernal agent of des­potism!! Was it WASHINGTON who entertained the thought! He who headed the armies of America to repulse tyranny! He whose command extended over those brave Gallic legions, who traversed the Atlantic to give us freedom! Is this the Apostle of Liberty— the Saviour of his Country—the Benefactor of Mankind! Where was the pretended sympathy for a great and gal­lant nation, struggling for the same rights which they had contributed to establish! Had power obtunded every philanthropic sentiment, every sensation in favour of liberty, that Frenchmen embarked in support of Hea­ven's best gift to man, could not awaken a solicitude for their cause, and a sensibility for their sufferings! A minister from the Regent of France!!

[Page 37] Without forcing an interpretation this question plainly reads thus: Shall the United States become a member of the confederacy against the French Republic? To have received a minister from the Regent would have been a signal of hostility—it would have unfurled the crusading banner, and our Executive must have taken up the cross against liberty in concert with tyrants. No na­tion admitted a representative from the Regent but those in open hostility against to Republic, and I believe no nation made a question about it, but those who were or wished to be of the coalition. When we consider the extreme intimacy which subsisted between Secretary Paci­ficus, and Talon, the agent of the Regent, this question receives the stamp of greater solemnity, and removes all doubt of the favourable disposition of the Executive to­wards the government of bastiles and lettres de cachet.

I have in a former letter demonstrated that our Trea­ties with France are real, and that notwithstanding the change in the government from a monarchy to a repub­lic, the Treaties between the United States and her are completely obligatory. It cannot now be necessary to discuss the legal impropriety of receiving a minister from a wandering Regent, it being a ramification of the sub­ject already considered; for if the Treaties were not obli­gatory, we had a discretionary power to receive or refuse a minister from the Regent; but if they were, no such discretion could exist; the question, therefore, partakes all circumstances considered, of a higher de­gree of turpitude than any that has presented itself.

LETTER X.

THE last query in the Presidential arrangement re­lates to the necessity or expediency of convening Con­gress, and applies more immediately to our own situa­tion. The question itself implied a belief in the necessi­ty of Congressional deliberation on the then posture of affairs, and it is fair to infer from it, that, until other­wise instructed, the Executive supposed, that he alone was neither constitutionally nor morally qualified to decide upon the measures which were proper. His letter to the heads of the departments covering the queries sanc­tions this opinion. In this he admits the delicacy of our situation, and supposes much consideration will be necessary to the forming of a plan of conduct. As this letter will establish two point, the importance of the state of things in the opinion of the Executive, and his mode of transacting the business committed to him, I will give it at full length.

Although the situation of the United States was con­fessedly delicate, and much consideration was necessary to the adoption of proper measures; and although Con­gress alone has the right to decide upon measures in which are implicated war, yet, whatever qualms may have existed anterior to the meeting, did the Executive determine, or his council for him, that his fiat should be supreme, and that his own omniscience was commensu­rate to every object. These opinions, and the conduct consequent upon them, were the source of all our misfor­tunes and of all our distractions. They exhibited in the Chief Magistrate of a free peoble, an usurper, whose arro­gance was not to be restrained by an over-weening fond­ness for fame, or by the limits of our Constitution. They were the stepping-stone to future measures which were to throw our country into the arms of Great Britain, which were to draw the cords of connection between the Execu­tive and his "great, good and dear friend" into a gordian knot and to alienate the freemen of America from their best friend, the Republic of France. The assumption of power in the Executive to act independently of Congress in things in which their decision were constitutionally essential, was the key-stone in the arch, and bound to­gether the system manifested in the queries. Had Con­gress been convened, different measures might have been adopted. That disgraceful act of usurpation, the Edict of Neutrality, might have been prevented, and the neutrality of the United States might have been dig­nified and honourable, instead of abject and fraudulent. I might say, and with truth, "that during the six years" glorious administration, we have had a government of individual will indeed of that of the people; for the Ex­ecutive had but [...] say, Let there be, and there was— [Page 40]Virtually, Congress have been a committee of ways and means—a parliament, somewhat after the ancient rigime of Frances to register edicts. Even information as to the affairs of the union, of which as individuals they are a part, and as Republicans they have a right to de­mand, was denied them. This conduct plainly evinced that the Executive imagined Congress had no right to deliberate but to act, and that according to the informa­tion he should think proper to give, and the promptitude he should conceive fit to direct. In this instance his de­portment was analogous to that of Louis 16th to the notables. They refused their concurrence to the new ter­ritorial impost, unless the accounts and estimates of the government were submitted to their inspection. The king refused this a-la-mode de President, and said, that he was determined to introduce the impot territorial, and and that it therefore became them to debate, not the prin­ciple of the measure, but the most equitable form it could assume. Congress were to debate not the propriety of carrying the Treaty into effect, but the most equitable way of making provision for it, the readiest way of giv­ing effect to the Executive will! Ignorance was as well adapted to this end as information, and as the Roman pontiff prohibits the sheep of his flock from a knowledge of the bible to keep up his infallibility, in like manner was the infallibility of the Executive to be sustained, by mystery and concealment.

Royal as well as papal importance has displayed itself in our Executive transactions. Proclamations have issu­ed from the "United States" as from a hot bed. We have had a Proclamation of Neutrality, a Proclamation for a day of thanksgiving (as if we had a Vatican and a Tiara) and a proclamation declaring a supreme law of the United States before it had passed through all the necessary forms! Thus is the thing taking effect in substance which was contemplated in form, and that kind of government meditated by Secretary "Pacificus" in and out of the convention, beginning to be realized. [Page 41]We are now to have the "sauce to the same pig" which the chaste Secretary endeavoured to obtain in the Con­vention; for circumstances will warrant the conclusion, that the aim is, to assimilate our government to a mo­narchy. Every measure seems to squint towards this darling object, and hence irredeemable debts, excise systems, national banks, loans, federal cities, reports for raising re­venue by an officer unknown to the Constitution, and depend­ant upon the Executive—hence the plan to excite the West­ern Insurrection to increase the national debt, to furnish a pretext for a standing army, and to supply arguments against the cause of republicanism—hence the pious wish of the more pious Secretary, in the presence of "the Benefactor of Man­kind!" that the insurgents would burn Pittsburgh!

When the question to convene Congress was proposed, Congress had been somewhat purged of its dross. Fewer bank directors and stockjobbers held seats in that body, and as their intentions with respect to high toned government were rather problematical, hence the determination not to convene them, but to substitute the will of the Execu­tive for the will of the Representatives of the People.

LETTER XI.

THE Constitution has solemnly recognized but a sin­gle Executive. It has ordered, that Executive respon­sibility should be an unit. Were it placed upon a rack, and "Pacificus" himself the torturer, it could not be made to confess, that the heads of the departments were by it created accomplises in Presidential decisi­ons. If the Constitution has recognized a Council at all, it is the Senate: for certain Executive measures are expressly directed to be acomplished "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." In ther enumera­tion [Page 42]of the powers of the President, the Constitution says, "he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principle officers in each of the Executive Depart­ment, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." In the laws organizing the Depart­ments of the Governments we find certain duties alot­ted to them: but we cannot discover any thing like an authority to make the Heads of the Departments an Ex­ecutive Council. But although neither the Constitu­tion, not the laws of the United States acknowledge an Executive Council, the President has thought proper to metamorphose the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury and of War, and the Attorney General of the United States into such a body. He has established a rule to commit things not relating to the duties of their respective offices to their advice and decision. Numbers in this Coun­cil decide the great interests of the nation. This "self-created" Council manufacture memorials to foreign nations, speeches to Congress, and answers to the peo­ple. They deliberate and decide upon what measures are proper for the Executive to pursue, and thus in many instances substitute their own advice to that of the Senate, which is constitutionally authorised to give advice. Mr. Randolph tells us in his Vindication, that a memorial relative to the Treaty was to be presented to the British minister, and that this memorial was to be submitted to the self-created Council The President in his letter of the 29th July, tells Mr. Randolph, that "the memo­rial, the ratification, and the instructions, which are framing, are of such vast magnitude, as not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn the ratification, and the instructions, which are framing, are of such vast magnitude, as not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn conjunct revision." In his letter of the 18th of July, written at Baltimore, he desires "that the address of the people of Boston should be taken into considera­tion by the Secretaries and Attorney General." Mr. Randolph mentions, that "they were collected imme­diately upon the receipt of the letter; and did not at once agree, whether an answer should or should not be returned." In reference to the memorial, Mr. Ran­dolph [Page 43]further says, "on the evening of the 11th of Au­gust, I observed to him (the President) in the presence of Messrs. Pickering and Bradford, that the sooner the memorial was revised by the gentleman jointly, who were prepared with their opinions, the better; and he replied, that be supposed every thing of this sort had been settled."

From these facts it would appear, that the Constitu­tion designed the Executive Department as a Puppet Shew, where the first Magistrate was to play Punch, and the Heads of the Department the Jugglers!!!

It is a circumstance not more alarming than extraor­dinary, that a Council to which no responsibility is at­tached, should be created by the President, where the most momentous transactions of the Executive Depart­ment are determined on by a plurality of voices. In questions relating to Treaties, this Council decides whe­ther a Treaty shall be made—thus the advice of the Se­nate, constitutionally requisite, is superceded by the ad­vice of a Council unknown to our lows or to our Con­stitution! We find by the letter which covered the que­ries, that even a question which had relation to war, was to be decided by this self-created Council. Instead of petitions or memorials to the President, the people ought in future to make their application to this Coun­cil; for more success has often resulted from an applica­tion to a Monarchs Valet de Chambre, than from an ap­plication to the Monarch himself.

The king of Great Britain has a Council where Exe­cutive measures are determined a little a-la-mode de President; but this Council is responsible, and by the Constitution the king can do no wrong. Is it the inten­tion of the Executive to shift the responsibility attached to his office from himself to his Council, and thereby to introduce the royal principle, that he can do no wrong? A Constitution in the estimation of a quondam Secretary [Page 44]being nothing more than "paper and parchment," it may be deemed very casy to impress upon this paper and parchment any character he and his machine may think proper. Perhaps the attempt may soon be less covert, and then the people will be convinced that a man may affect a prodigality of patrictism to become the tyrant, instead of the Saviour of his Country.

When in connection with this most extraordinary mode of transacting the affairs of the Executive Depart­ment, we survey the characters who give laws to the Uni­on, our feelings are not much relieved; for as the Pre­sident himself has pronounced them to be but the "suc­cessors in form to the deliberative talents of their predeces­sors," patriotism cannot suppress its anxiety, when our dearest interests are committed to such hands. An auk­ward Prothonotary may make a more clumsy Secretary of State, and a still more aukward Privy Counsellor. He may have a versatility of vision, by means of which he can see beauty or deformity in political objects according to the station he occupies. He may "throw the vessel of State up into the wind" through his ignorance of political tactics; but the attributes of a man calculated to govern freemen are neither folly, hypocrisy nor phrenzy.

The man whose utmost range of capacity went no fur­ther than to state an account, or to tell you that two and two made four, and that twice five made ten, might pass in a subordinate station in the Treasury: but would it not be viewed as madness or wickedness to place such a man in a situation where his voice might determine the sate of millions? He might be well qualified to head a hand of Connecticut intruders, "or friends to order," and to tie a sorry Prothonotary, or a brawny Sachem by the leg in the woods who would attempt to oppose him; but would such qualifications entitle him to the rank of a Privy Counsellor? Every sentiment of justice revolts at the idea.

[Page 45] The people of the United States made a Constitution for their government, in which certain duties are pre­scribed to the different departments created by it, and certain boundaries established. This Constitution they expected would be administered with fidelity, and accord­ing to its true intent and meaning. They assented to it as a republican form of government, calculated to pre­serve the freedom of the citizens, and to restrain the licen­tiousness of the usurper as well as the anarchist. They viewed it as a solemn and sacred covenant, and not a piece of paper or parchment. Let them now retrace its progress. I am not like the shepherds boy to cry wolf! wolf! when the wolf is not in view: but all I solicit from my fellow-citizens is, deliberately and dispassion­ately to reflect on the facts submitted to them, and if no wolf then appears, I will in silence lament the corruption which has already enervated the minds of men, a revo­lution destined to freedom, but which a blind confidence will convert into bondage.

LETTER XII.

HAVING taken a cursory view of the queries, I come now to the consideration of the explanatory arti­cle to the British Treaty. Viewed in all its relations this article is as complete a libel upon the American character as the utmost ingenuity of the administration could devise. It is a climax of weakness and wicked­ness. Whether we consider it in reference to ourselves, or to those nations with whom we have made treaties— whether we regard in it the assumption of power in the Executive to act independently of the advice of the Se­nate, and making it a mere registering body, or whe­ther we view it as an emanation from that self created [Page 46]Council, which has been substituded by an Executive fiat to the legal Council of the nation—whether we re­gard the Executive and this Council as arrogating to themselves the stile and authority of Amphyctions, and interpreting laws for nations, sovereign and independent as we are—whether we consider the deception practis­ed upon Spain and the Indian tribes by the introducti­on of stipulations into our treaties with them which we could not fulfil, or the prostration of honour and national character in entering into subsequent stipula­tions which are at war with former ones—surveying it in all its aspects, it appears designed, as the apple of Juno, for jealousy and discord.

I will proceed to the consideration of that article in the Spanish Treaty, which relates to the navigation of the Missisippi. The explanatory article of the British Treaty either dismisses this article altogether, and by means of it renders abortive the whole Treaty, or it im­poses an obligation upon the United States to render the navigation of the Missisippi free to the subjects of Great Britain. Had no explanation of this sort been entered into, it is fair from the article itself to suppose, that the United States would not have been under the same obligation to Great Britain; but as they have expressly declared by Treaty, that no stipulations in any Treaty can be un­derstood to interfere with the rights and free intercouse and commerce secured by the third article of the treaty with Great Britain, the British Treaty then becomes a political decalogue, by which the people of the United States are bound to measure their actions.

The fourth article of our treaty with Spain is in the following words:

‘It is likewise agreed, that the western boundary of the United States which seperates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is in the middle of the channel or bed of the river Missisippi from the northern [Page 47]boundary of the said states to the completion of the thir­ty-first degree of latitude North of the Equator. And his Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navi­gation of the said river in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean shall be free only to his subjects, and the citizens of the United States, unless he should ex­tend this privilege to the subjects of other powers by special convention.’

Let us now compare this article with that part of the third article of the British Treaty which relates to the navigation of the Missisippi.

‘The river Missisippi shall, however, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to both parties; and it is further agreed, that all the ports and places on the Eastern side, to whichsoever of the parties belong­ing, may freely be resorted to, and used by both par­ties in as ample a manner as any of the Atlantic ports or places of the United States or his Majesty in Great Britain.’

The eighth article of the treaty of peace is in the following words:

‘The navigation of the river Missisippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain, and to the citizens of the United States.’

What is the result of the comparison of the Bri­tish and Spanish Treaties?—The British says the river Missisippi shall forever remain free and open to the sub­jects of Great Britain; the Spanish Treaty on the con­trary says, it shall be free only to the subjects of his Ca­tholic Majesty and the citizens of the United States. From the terms of the article it will be observed, that it conveys the idea of a right on the part of the Uni­ted States to the navigation of the Missisippi; for if [Page 48]they had not a right themselves they could not grant it to another, and guarantee this right to the subjects of Great Britain; if then, the United Sates are possess­ed of the navigation of the Missisippi, they are bound to possess Great Britain of it. As long as we had not the use of that river ourselves, Great Britain could not exact from us the right to navigate it; but no soon­er do we become seized of it ourselves, than the ob­ligation commences to extend it to them.

The clause in the explanatory article to this point reads thus:

‘And do by these presents explicitly agree and de­clare, that no stipulation in any treaty subsequently con­cluded by either of the contracting parties with any other state or nation, or with any Indian Tribe, can be understood to derogate in any manner from the rights of free intercourse and commerce secured by the aforesaid third ar­ticle of the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation to the subjects of his Majesty, and to the citizens of the United States, and the Indians dwelling on either side of the Boundary Line aforesaid.’

The Spanish Treaty is posterior to the British Trea­ty, and therefore, any clause in that treaty which in­terferes with the treaty with Great Britain is complete­ly done away by the explanatory article. How then is the difficulty to be solved? Is Secretary "Camillus" ready with some new logic (for I cannot believe that the successor in form understands the article to this day) to convince us that the two Treaties harmonise? Is not the conclusion irresistible, that we must either renounce the navigation of the Missisippi ourselves, or confirm it to Great Britain in common with ourselves, and thereby incur a war with Spain?

There is a wonderful aptitude in the Executive, by which I do not mean the successors in form to their pre­decessors, [Page 49]to interpret things so as to answer the purposes of the day. The French Treaty has experienced the in­genuity of Executive exposition, and has been made to mean any thing or nothing according to the wishes of the British ministry. Perhaps Spain may be equally pliant with France, and submit to the interpretation which the Executive may think fit to give. Indeed such has been the success at imposition, that perhaps Spain may be persuaded, that so far from the navigation of the Missi­sippi being injurious to her if extended to Great Britain, that she will receive abundant benefits by even admitting the subjects of his Britannic majesty to the mines of Mex­ico and Peru; for as many of the people of the United States have been so far imposed upon as to be made to believe that the British Treaty is a good and proper one, the Spaniards may, with the same original prospect of success, and certainly with equal justice, be persuaded that Great Britain ought to have the right to navigate the Missisippi, for that she is the best friend, the best neighbour and the most peaceable, the most benevolent, and the most disinterested nation upon earth. Thirty-nine long winded numbers may work miracles upon the Spa­nish court, unless indeed their natural love of ease should make them loath a farrago of falsehood and perversion. Perhaps the effect may be as wonderful as that experienced by the President, who could see more difficulties and sa­crifices in the British Treaty every time he read it, and yet after all, feel himself so much converted (I will not say as St. Paul was) as to lose sight of common decorum and propriety in promulgating it as the supreme law of the land.

LETTER XIII.

THE more the explanatory article is viewed, the dar­ker does it appear. It is a foul leprosy upon the body politic, which ages will hardly cleanse. That the Ex­ecutive should have made a Treaty with the Indian Tribes posteriorly to the British Treaty, and recognize stipu­lations repugnant to the anterior treaty, can scarcly find an apology even from an idolater. Is this pub­lic faith? Is it common honour? Is it common ho­nesty? ‘The several principles already established, says Burlamaqui, concerning the validity of con­ventions in general, agree to public Treaties, as well as to the contracts of individuals. In both, therefore, there must be a serious consent, pro­perly declared, and exempt from error, fraud and violence.’ Let us test the Executive negociation with the Indian Tribes by this rule. A Treaty was conclu­ded with the Indian Tribes at Greenville on the 3d of August, 1795. In this treaty it was stipulated, Ar­ticle 8th, ‘Trade shall be opened with the said Indian Tribes; and they do hereby respectively engage to af­ford protections to such persons, with their proper­ty, as shall be duly licensed to reside among them for the purpose of trade, and to their agents and ser­vants; but no person shall be permitted to reside at any of their towns or hunting camps as a trader, who is not furnished with a licence for that purpose, under the hand and seal of the superintendant of the Department North West of the Ohio or such other person as the President of the United States shall authorize to grant such licences; to the end that the said Indians may not be imposed on in their trade. And if any licensed trader shall abuse his privilege by unfair dealing, upon complaint and [Page 51]proof thereof, his licence shall be taken from him, and he shall be further punished according to the laws of the United States. And if any person shall intrude himself as a trader, without such license the said Indians shall take and bring him before the Su­perintendant or his Deputy, to be dealt with accord-to law. And to prevent imposition by forged licen­ses, the said Indians shall, at least once a year, give information to the Superintendant or his Deputies, of the names of the traders residing amongst them.’

The treaty with Great Britain was concluded at London the nineteenth day of November, 1794, and was ratified by the Senate the 24th of June 1795. In this Treaty and in the 3d article of it, we find the fol­lowing stipulation. "It is agreed, that it shall at all times be free to his Majestys subjects, and to the citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line, freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two contracting parties on the continent of America (the country within the limits of the Hudsons Bay Company only excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other."

It is no compliment to a mans penetration to dis­cover, that these two articles are at war with each o­ther—to do away the collision was the object of the explanatory article. Let me now ask, whether, in the negociation with the Indian tribes, there was "a seri­ous consent, properly declared, and exempt from error, fraud and violence? Was there no fraud in stipu­lating with the Indian Tribes, that no person should be permitted to reside at any of their towns or hunt­ing camps as a trader, who was not furnished with a lisence for that purpose," when an anterior Treaty declared that British subjects should possess this right?

[Page 52] The face of the 8th article of the Indian Treaty shews, that they considered it as an important stipula­tion; for the licenses were to be granted "to the end that the Indians might not be imposed on in their trade." Was there no fraud in pretending to secure the Indians against imposition in their trade by Treaty, and then an­nulling the promised security by an explanatory article? Was there no fraud in making a Treaty, and then ex­plaining it away without the consent of the other par­ty? Was there no fraud in an American Secretary of State and a British Charge d'Affaires interpreting an Indian Treaty at pleasure?

I have already proved, that the Executive had no right to interpret a Treaty at his pleasure; but that there is the same reciprocity of interpretation due, that there was in the contract. As then the Executive in­terpreted the Indian Treaty at his pleasure, he violated that Treaty, and was guilty of a breach of the laws of nations. "He who violates his Treaties, says Vattel, violates at the same time the law of nations; for he despises the faith of Treaties, that faith which the law of nations declares sacred, and he does all in his power to render it vain.—Doubly guilty, he does an injury to his ally, he does an injury to all nations, and wounds the whole human race."

Further. "It is shewn by the law of nature, that he who has made a promise to any one, has conferred upon him a true right, to require the thing promised; and that, consequently, not to keep a perfect promise, is to violate the right of another; and is as manifest an in­justice, as that of depriving a person of his property. All the tranquility, the happiness, and security of the human race, rests on justice; on the obligation of paying a regard to the rights of others. The respect of others for our rights of domain and pro­perty constitute the security of our actual possessi­ons; [Page 53]the faith of promises is our security for the things that cannot be delivered or executed upon the spot. There would be no more security, no longer any commerce between mankind did they not believe them­selves obliged to preserve their faith, and to keep their word. This obligation is then as necessary, as it is natural and indubitable between the nations that live together in a state of nature, and acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order and peace in their society."

Did the Executive make a promise to the Indian Tribes in the 8th article of the Treaty with them? If he did, and that promise was rescinded without their consent, did he not violate the rights of those Indian Tribes? Is not the violation of that right a violation of the Treaty, and a violation of the laws of nations, which renders him "doubly guilty, as he does an injury to his ally, as he does an injury to all nations and wounds the human race."

For what purpose, let me ask, did the Executive make a Treaty, which he must have known, unless we suppose him profoundly ignorant of the British Treaty, could not be fulfilled? Was it ad captandum vulgus, that he also might be stiled "the prince of peace?" Was it that another pretext might be afforded the In­dians, in our violation of one of the articles, to keep up a frontier war, that a Major General and others might be provided for, and the public debt be made susceptible of multiplication? Was it that the nucleus of a standing army might be completely formed? The insecurity of Treaties with savages has furnished sub­jects for many an animated harangue; but have the United States more to boast of than savages in this instance? Did not the Executive deceive the Indians by entering into a contract with them, that "no person be permitted to reside at any of their towns or hunt­ing camps as a trader who was not furnished with [Page 54]a license for that purpose," when by the British Trea­ty, the subjects of Great Britain were exempted from this obligation? Mr. Jay's instructions states in un­equivocal terms, that "we have satisfactory proofs, some of which, however, cannot, as you will discern, be well used in public, that British agents are guilty of stirring up and assisting with arms, ammunition and warlike instruments and implements, the differ­ent tribes of Indians against us;" was it, then, for the purpose of giving British agents a better opportu­nity of exciting the Indians against us, that they are thus permitted to rove at large, although prohibited by the Indian Treaty? Would the obligation to have a license restrict them too much, by placing them upon a footing with Amercan citizens? Was it the object of the Executive to have a greater solicitude for a British subject than an American citizen?

If uncivilized nations feel the obligation of Treaties less than those who are more advanced in refinement, does this furnish an argument for deceiving them? Chi­canery in negotiation is a stain upon the national cha­racter, and how our Executive will acquit himself in having made a Treaty with the Indian tribes repugnant to another Treaty anteriorly made, we shall perhaps, discover, when the dark mist of secresy which surrounds his cabinet shall be dissipated.

LETTER XIV.

THE explanatory article annihilates the security which the Indians promised themselves under the Grenville Treaty; and what is very remarkable, the 8th article of this Treaty is but a transcript of the 7th arti­cle of the Treaty concluded with the same Indians at [Page 55]Fort Harmer, in the year 1789, long before the Bri­tish Treaty was thought of, and long before a British faction was matured, or a Chief Magistrate of the Uni­ted States had become its patron—nay its head. De­ception in this instance must have been reduced to a science, or why was an article from the Fort Harmer Treaty, copied almost verbatim unto the Grenville Treaty? Had not the Indians the best of reasons to suppose, that the former Treaty was recognized as far as related to the 7th article, when not only the substance but the form of that article was retained in the last Trea­ty? Perhaps I should not go too far in asserting, that this article has a priority to the British Treaty, inas­much as it is a part of the Treaty of 1789, and that the Executive was not constitutionally authorized to ren­der it subservient to the views and interests of Great Britain. This, however, I shall not insist upon, as my object is to shew that such is the British cast of our Executive, that neither the faith nor the interests of the nation are cords strong enough to bind the Admi­nistration when in collision with the wishes of the British Cabinet.

Although I never could assent to that plenitude of wisdom ascribed to the Executive and although I never could discover evidences enough to satisfy my mind that he was a Solomon, yet I am unwilling to believe him so ignorant of the alphabet of the laws of nations, as not to know, that he was deceiving the Indians by admit­ting stipulations in his Treaty with them, which his idolatry for Great Britain, had already rendered nugatory by a Treaty with her.

The preference, the unqualified preference given to British subjects at the expence of American citizens by the explanatory article, perhaps, ought not to excite new astonishment, when we consider, that British in­terests have generally had more attention, and have excited more solicitude, than the interests of Americans [Page 56]Indeed were any additional testimony, more than the world is in possession of, necessary to substantiate the identity of the following passage in certain private let­ters, "I love my King, you know I do; a soldier and a good man cannot but love him," the uniform prostra­tion of our national interest and character at the feet of his beloved King, would subdue the most stubborn scepticism. When British subjects are allowed more privileges, even within our own territory, than Ameri­can citizens—when American citizens are surrendered to impressment, even without a murmur from the Exe­cutive, to man the British Kings navy to fight against their deliverers, and against those who were once re­cognized as friends and as allies—when under the fullest conviction, that Great Britain was aiding the Savages in their murderous warfare, our Executive would kiss the knife and the tomahawk of those bloody assassins, by greeting the King as his "great good and dear friend"— when honour the most sacred, and rights the most estimable are prostrated in humble submission before a perfidious and barbarous Monarch, where is the care for American interests—where is the solicitude for Ame­rican rights—where is the concern for American secu­rity —where is the feeling for American honour and independence? If such is the reign of idolatry that the voice of justice cannot now be heard, posterity will deal impartialy with the man who has paralyzed his countrys efforts;—who has leagued himself with a Government, the sworn foe to Liberty; who has ren­dered a Treaty, the price of our independence, mere paper and parchment; and who has endeavoured to convert a nation of Freemen into a race of Eunuchs.

Having demonstrated that the Spanish and Indian Treaties have been violated in two of their most essen­tial articles, it remains only to prove, that by the laws of nations both Treaties are annulled. "We cannot consider the several articles of the same Treaty, says Vattel, as so many particular and independent Trea­ties; [Page 57]for though we do not see an immediate connec­tion between every one of these articles, they are all connected by this common relation, that the contract­ing powers pass them with a view to each other, by way of compensation—I should never perhaps have passed this article if my ally had not granted me a­nother, which in its own nature, has no relation to it. Every thing comprehended in the same treaty has then the force and nature of reciprocal promised, at least if they are not excepted in due form. Gro­tius says very well, that all the articles of a Treaty have the force of conditions, which by a default are rendered null."

Again. "Lastly, the peace is broken by the vio­lation of any of the express articles of the Treaty. This third manner of breaking it is most decisive, the least susceptible of chicanery and evasion. Who­ever fails in engagements, as far as in him lies, an­nuls the contract; this is beyond all doubt."

Let me now ask, whether in the Spanish or Indian Treaties provision is made, that the violation of one ar­ticle shall not invalidate the whole treaty? For with­out a specific provision of this fort, it is undeniable, that both Treaties are rendered ineffectual, should the par­ties think proper to avail themselves of our miscon­duct. If Spain and the Indian Tribes, pitying the the weakness and depravity of our administration, and scorning to visit its sins upon the heads of the people, [Page 59]should consider the Treaties as still in operation, we shall be under greater obligations to their magnanimity, than to the wisdom and virtue of our government.—How they will view the subject remains yet to be seen; for it is not probable they are, as yet, in possession of the explanatory article.

LETTER XV.

TO give a complete portrait of the character and disposition of the Executive, the infractions of the treaty with France must be taken into the colouring. A full detail of these would cap the climax of baseness, hypo­crisy, and perfidy. It shall be my task to enumerate those which have not escaped my memory, and I shall leave the rest to be supplied by the recollection of every man, who has been an attentive spectator of the interest­ing senes which his country has exhibited.

The proclamation of neutrality is first in order; for until France became a Republic, the Executive was attentive to the engagements which had been made with the monarch. Most probably had she continued under the old regime, and a war with Great Britain had been conducted under ever circumstance of inveteracy and and desperation, the Apostle of Liberty at the head of our affairs, would have either became a party with her, or he would have maintained a neutrality unsusceptible of the character of fraudulent. France however became a Republic, and a proclamation of neutrality was issued. I have already demonstrated, that the clauses in the Trea­ty of Alliance which related to us, admitting the Treaty to be purely desensive, were completely operative, as Great Britain made the first actual declaration of war [Page 60]against France. If this be true, and no honest man can deny it, upon what foundation does the proclamation of neutrality rest? Is it not an evident and a palpable con­travention of the Treaty? Could we remain neutral and yet fulfil the clause of guarantee? At the time of the arrival of the minister of the French Republic here, we were in a state of peace with Great Britain: this state of peace must have continued until hostilites were either commenced or declared by one of the parties, whence then the necessity of a delaration of neutraliy? The pro­clamation then was intended to neutralize the Treaty with France, and to determine the conduct of the United States, before they were called upon to fulfill their nati­onal faith—It was telling France, that we were detemin­ed to take no part in her differences, whatever may have been our engagements to the contrary. Did any other nation except the United States issue proclamtions of neu­trality? If no nation with whom France was not con­nected by Treaty pursued this system of policy, what must be said of the United States, who in the face of a Treaty of Alliance made this manifestation?

In the Treaty of Alliance there is a reciprocal guaran­tee. France guarantees to the United Sates her inde­pendence, and we guarantee her West India posses­sions, and this may be said to be truly the casus federis.— If the independence of the United States had been at­tacked, would it not have ben a paramount obligation in France to fly to our assistance, without weighing the circumstances which led to it in a gold scales? Perfidy would have been a mild term in our mouths against her if she had hesitated, much more refused—But instead of our independence the West India possessions of France are attacked—how stands the clause of guarantee then in this case? If France was obligated to aid us in case our independence was attacked, we were equally bound to aid her in case her West India possessions were attacked, The casus federis is reciprocal, and the charge of perfidy in case of failure, applies equally to both parties—No [Page 61]truth can be more apparent, then that the proclamation of neutrality was an infraction of the Treaty.

The privilege allowed British ships of war to enter our ports, after having made prize of the property be­longing to French citizens, affords another instance of disregard to national saith. I have in a former letter cited the article of the Treaty to this point. It is so unequivocal, that Machiavel himself would hardly have the front to cavil about it—Not only have British ships of war found access to our ports; but the Africa at­tempted to seize the minister of France within the ter­ritory of the United States! After a months delibera­tion, the Africa was ordered to quit the port for this unexampled outrage; but this did not happen until the Medusa was ready to sail! The Cleopatra retook the Pamela within the capes, and yet this same Cleopatra is permitted to enter our ports at pleasure, without any indemnity having been made for the capture, or any satisfaction for the outrage upon our sovereignty.

The most rigid look-out has been kept by the adminis­tration that French privateers should not be armed in the United States. Punctilio has been refined upon to embarrass all armed vessels belonging to the French Re­public, while British vessels have been actnally armed in our ports, without the least hindrance from the go­vernment —Out of many instances I will mention a few, to remove any doubts of the facts.—At Baltimore the Trusty was publicly armed as a privateer, notwith­standing the remonstrances of the Consul. In the months of May and June 1793, several British and one Dutch vessel were armed at Charleston, and yet when French merchantmen were attempted to be armed for self-defence, the government immediately interposed and prevented them. At Norfolk several French mer­chantmen, who were arming for self-defence, were arrested by order of the administration in 1794, and although the minister complained, his complaints were disregard­ed [Page 62]The Argonaut captured the corvette lEsperance and sent her into Lynn Haven bay, where she was re­fitted and sent on a cruize. In this case the minister complained likewise, but he received neither satisfaction nor indemnity.

I could swell the black catalogue of infractions to a size, which would perhaps appal the Executive himself; but I have already exhibited an ample specimen of the good faith of our government, and shall now content my­self with the addition of the last outrage upon national honour by the government—the revocation of the right to sell French prizes in our ports—Not content with making the Spanish and Indian Treaties subservient to Great Britain, the Executive seemed determined to make the British Treaty the Athanasian creed of polities, and ex­communicate the heretical Treaty with France. This Treaty was a memento of British disgrace, and one of the monuments of our independence; no wonder then the Executive should wish to remove so offensive a thing from the view of his "great, good and dear friend."

Although the right to sell prizes within our ports is not expressly granted by Treaty, it was acknowledged by the Executive, and prizes were made sale of, until the finish­ing hand was put to the British Treaty. If the right was not supposed to exist in the Treaty with France, upon what principle was it allowed by the Executive? Either the French have a right to sell their prizes, or the have not—If they have a right, it is a daring viola­tion of Treaty to retract it—If they have not a right, the Executive made an inroad upon our neutrality by permitting it. He has contradicted thereby his own edict of neutrality, and is an offender against the declared will of the first Magistrate of the United States! Was ever injustice or absurdity more apparent!

But why was the revocation reserved until the con­summation of the British Treaty? Was not the Re­public [Page 63]of France repeatedly assured, that nothing in this Treaty contradicted the privileges of the Treaty with her? It has been asserted, that the revocation was pre­dicated on the collision between the two Treaties—Can this be possible? Can the administration be so com­pletely immersed in iniquity, as to have bottomed the revocation upon a Treaty subsequently concluded? This would be not only a contradiction of themselves, but a contradiction of the established law of nations, and of the eternal and immutable principles of justice. The Spanish and Indian Treaties were made to cede to the British Treaty, because they were junior Treaties. This was the opinion of the Executive as expressed in the ex­planatory article.

But why was this revocation reserved until the will of the representative body was known? This will seemed clearly to be, that the prohibition to sell prizes should not contravene existing engagements, and even the Se­nate of the United States made this amendment to the bill. Does the Executive mean to persist in his con­tempt of the people by treating with contempt the opi­nion of their representatives? When Jay was appoint­ed a missionary to manifest our repentance for being in­dependent, the will of the representatives had a differ­ent tendency and, inter alia, to oppose this will was the object of the Executive. The revocation had its rise in a mixed feeling, in which the same contempt was an ingredient, and manifested the same domineer­ing spirit, which dictated the arrogant and imperious answer to the petition from the people of the town of Boston against the ratification of the Treaty.

Why was it reserved for the present Chief Justice to declare, that French prizes should not be sold in the United States? Was there too much virtue in the ci­devant chief justice to expect such a declaration from him, that it was not made before? When Dionysius turns land-jobber what may we not expect!

[Page 64] Hitherto it has been an affair of Executive cognizance alone, whether prizes should or should nat be sold; but all of a sudden the chief justice undertakes to pro­nounce upon it, and declares its illegality. Here again we undertake to interpret Treaties at pleasure, in defiance of the laws of nations.

If anything could impress the world with an abhorrence and contempt for the American character, the conduct of the Executive towards France would be indelible. The ingratitude, hypocrisy, and perfidy of the govern­ment towards her, must remain a lasting monument of infamy against the United States; and pity it is that the people are obliged to participate in the disgrace. What ought to add to the remorse of the Executive is, that while our conduct has served to estrange from us our best friend, it has not conciliated the good will of that na­tion to whom every thing has been sacrificed—Their contempt and barbarities have risen in a degree equal to our prostitution, and we are daily witnessing outra­ges, that would produce a blush even in the most pro­fligate and abandoned.

LETTER XVI.

IN the enumeration of the infractions of the Treaty with France, I purposely omitted the acquiescence of the Executive in the impressment of our seamen. This is an infraction of a solemn nature, both in relation to our allies, and as applicable to ourselves, and deserves a spe­cific consideration. It is a virtual opposition to France, and stamps our government as an accessory in the war [Page 65]against that Republic. Would, could our administra­tion submit to such outrages as those committed upon our flag, and to the barbarities exercised upon those sail­ing under it, without being in secret combination with the nation committing them? Scarcely a day elapses without an account of further impressments. Not a week passes over our heads without a recital of some hor­rid barbarity exercised upon the American mariners— barbarity sufficient to rouse the revenge of any man, not dead to the feelings of humanity and to his countrys in­terests. Have the walls of the American divan been rendered impenetrable to the agonizing cries of Ameri­can citizens? Has Pitt with his magic wand described a circle about the Executive conclave, that American feelings and American interests are denied admittance? What spell has been put upon the administration, that those they are bound to protect, excite no more solici­tude than if they were inhabitants of California? When it was rumoured that the Executive Directory intended to call us to account for our persidies, a ci-devant trea­sury officer, and the chief juggler of the legerdemain tricks of our government, expressed his hope, that the patriotism of the southern States would lead them to an union with the eastern against France, in case she should carry such intention into effect! This Judas Iscariot of our country felt hot for war when the Republic of France was the object of it; but every outrage, every barbarity, and every indignity was to be endured, ra­ther than energetic measures should be adopted against his idol Great Britain. No wonder our country lies prostrate and is at them mercy of a British minister, when the chief automaton is made to respond to so unprincipl­ed and profligate a creole!

The willing submission of the Executive to the impress­ment of our seamen to man the British navy is not only an infraction of our Treaty, but is a positive contraven­tion of our neutrality. In speaking of the conduct to be observed by a neutral nation, Vattel makes the fol­lowing [Page 66]remarks. ‘Let us then see wherein this impar­tiality, which a neutral nation is to observe, consists It relates solely to war, and includes two articles, one not to give any succours when there is no obliga­tion, nor freely to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or any thing of direct use in war. I say, to give no succours, and not to give equally, for that a state should at one and the same time succour two states, would be absurd, as besides it would be impossible to do it equally.’

‘A nation that without any other motive than the pros­pect of gain, is employed in strengthening my enemy, with­out regarding how far I may suffer, is certainly far from being my friend, and gives me a right to consider and treat it as an associate of my enemy.’

Have not the United State succoured Great Britain by conniving at the impressments of our seamen? Are not numbers of our seamen on board British ships of war? By permitting this, are we not strengthening the enemy of France, and giving her a right to confider and treat us as an associate of that enemy? Is not this a violation of our neutrality and an infraction of our Treaty? The Treaty of Alliance stipulates that we shall aid France; but instead of aiding her, we are aiding her enemy!

The conduct of our administration in permitting the impressment of our seamen and leaving them to their fate, reflects the deepest dishonour on the government. The little Republic of Genoa scorned an humiliation less extravagant, and resisted an attempt of British en­croachment with a manliness, which has rendered her respected. Poor America is degraded almost below contempt! We have exhibited less spirit than the Ca­ribbs of St. Vincents when the British government in 1768 attempted to dispossess them of their rights. They disdained to prostrate themselves without a struggle, they resisted and succeeded, and obliged the government of [Page 67]Great Britain to confirm their rights by a Treaty. ‘The Treaty between the Caribbs of St. Vincents and the king of Great Britain, says a modern historian, is a monument of historical curiosity, singularly valu­able as a striking confirmation of the utility and im­portance of the magnimous maxim, in no circum­stances to despair of the commonwealth.’

Even the Caribbs of St. Vincents would have blushed at a submission to such an outrage as that committed on capt. Jessop. What nation besides the American, would tamely bear to have a captain of a vessel sailing under their flag, scourged by order of a command­er of a British vessel of war, until he was ready to expire under the torture? What must be the principles or sensations of an administration, that could acquiesce in such barbarity and outrage? Can such men be stiled the guardians of American honour, rights, or indepen­dence?

Already have the British upwards of two thousand American seamen impressed on board their ships of war, and yet our administration is as easy under it as if Great Britain was defending our rights, and protect­ing our commerce. The impressments are continuing daily; no spirited exertions on the part of the Executive to prevent it, any yet some among us dare to talk of na­tional faith and neutrality! This is, I suppose, one of the ingredients in a "six years glorious administration!" Speaking of the disturbances in the colonies, Lord Chat­ham made the following memorable reflection.

‘Better were it for them to perish in a glorious conten­tion for their rights, than to purchase a slavish tranqui­lity at the expence of a single iota of the Constitution.’ How much to be lamented that a man possessing such a mind and such an heart was not the Chief Magistrate of the United States. Our commerce would then have been free from restraint, and our seamen would then have found sympathy and protection.

[Page 68] The spirit which animated our country to resist Bri­tish tyranny and to declare independence is, alas, par­alized by systems, artfully contrived to render the mind pliant to the views of an insidious and ambitious admi­nistration. Funding and band systems, with the specu­lations which have grown out of them, have substituted an avarice of wealth, for the glory and love of country. Had America in the year 1775 been what she is now, a nation governed by stock jabbers, stockholders, bank directors and brokers, we should have hugged the fet­ters which Great Brain had then forged for us.—War and all its horrors would have been conjured up to our view, and our affrighted souls would have clasped the pelf as a substance. more precious than liberty. We would have rather purchased "a slavish tranquility at the expence of the fairest gift of Heaven, than to have suf­fered our lust of wealth to meet with a moments in­terruption from the "dreams of poets" or "the reve­ries of philosophers."

I have many more facts at command in relation to the conduct of our administration. The proposition of the Republic of France to naturalize all mercantile citi­zens and thereby to give them a free trade to all their possessions, on condition that the United States would do the same; incalculable in benefit as this would have been to our country, even this proposition was treated by our administration with the same indifferent and disregard which has characterised all its actions in relation to that Republic. Other facts of importance might likewise be presented to the public attention, but as these letters have increased beyond my expectation, and as my avo­cations interfere too much with a continuance of them, I will reserve the balance to some more convenient oc­casion. Matter enough has already been given to the people of the United States to cause hem to reflect se­riously; matter enough to rouse them from their torper. I have shewn the cloven foot of the administration, and if this is not sufficient to alarm, the people must conti­nue [Page 69]in their idolatry and sink into slaves. That they may be awakened to their true condition, and seek and apply a remedy before it is too late, ought to be the wish of every friend to humanity, and well wisher of his country.

The following letter was written in answer in answer to some sirictures which were made on the explanatory article to the British Treaty; as it is the product of the foregoing author of the letters, and may serve to throw additonal light on the explanatory article itself, the editor has thought proper to publish it among the collection.

THE confession of ignorance disarms even the satyrist, unless indeed that confession has the countenance of self sufficiency. Understanding to be sure is the gift of heaven, and the want of it ought no more to expose a man to insult or derision, than a want of symmetry of features. He only is fair game who attempts to take the moat out of his neighbours eye while the beam is sticking in his own. Your correspondent "Agrico­la makes a parade with his ignorance in political matters," and yet endeavours to convict a writer in your paper of sophistry and falsehood. How a man ig­norant of his subject should be able to comprehend it, to me, I confess, is a mystery, and did not charity forbid the supposition, I should be led to imagine, that Agricola conceived himself an Achiles in politics, while he attempted to impose a belief upon the world, that he imagined himself only an infant. As my ob­ject is truth I will not take advantage of his weakness; but shall consider his remarks with more charity then he felt when he meant a reply to Paulding.

For a man ignorant as he confesses himself to be, he has gone say indeed in his assertion, that "the two [Page 70]instruments (speaking of the British and Spanish Trea­ties) do not interfere at all." I cannot supposed that he even read the explanatory article, or he certainly would have been less bold in his assertion; for it is confessedly predicated on the idea of such interference. If there was no interference, whence the necessity, whence the use of an explanatory article?

‘When we agree to grant privileges to another coun­try, says this very able advocate of government, we grant what we possess at the time of donation and nothing more.’ Did we or did we not possess the right to navigate the Missisippi at the time the ex­planatory article was agreed upon? If we did, and Agricola himself will hardly deny it, does he not stand convicted by his own position? Does not the ex­planation article expressly declare ‘that no stipulations in any Treaty subsequently concluded by either of the contracting parties with any other state or nation, or with any Indian Tribe, can be understood to derogate from the rights of free intercourse and commerce se­cured by the aforesaid third article of the Treaty to the subjects of his majesty?’ What free intercourse and commerce were secured by the third article of the British Treaty? ‘The river Missisippi shall, however, according to the Treaty of peace be entirely open to both parties.’ This is one of the privileges granted by that article. Although at the time the British Treaty was concluded we were not in actual possession of the navigation of the Missisippi, and the right on the part of the British to navigate in depended, as did ours, on a contingency, yet, if even a dilemma existed before the conclusion of the explanatory article, that article removes all doubts and completely confirms the right of Great Britain to navigate that river, in as ample a manner as we possess it ourselves.

The British Treaty was prior to the Spanish, and granted a right which we claimed but did not pessess. [Page 71]The Spanish Treaty cedes to the United States the navi­gation of the Missisippi and confirms the right thereto, with an express reservation, that no other nation should possess it, unless by special convention with his Catholic majesty. The Spanish Treaty then was a repeal of that clause in the British Treaty which granted this right to Great Britain; but to guard against this, a new article is entered into confirmatory of such right. Had no ex­planation taken place doubts might have arisen; but the explanation has left no room for further negotiation. Anxious to anticipate even the wishes of Great Britain, our administration determined to place the United States in a dilemma rather than she should not receive our en­tire homage.

I would ask Agricola again, whence the use of an ex­planatory article if the Treaties are not discordant? He would not surely insinuate that such was the passion of our Administration for treating with Great Britain, that they would treat about nothing? Paulding himself could not convey a more bitter sarcasm. The fact is, the two Treaties are hostile, and that the explanatory article was designed, inter alia, to secure to Great Britain the navi­gation of the Missisippi.

The river Missisippi is a highway possessed in common by Spain and the United States. The use of this high­way is given by the United States to Great Britain. Could we transfer a right which we did not possess? If we possessed the right and made a division of such right to amother, we became bound to fulfil the contract; for as a Treaty is a contract between two nations, each nation obli­gates itself to fulfil its part. Under a knowledge, that we had imparted our right to Great Britain did we nego­tiate the Spanish Treaty. If then we meant that Great Britain should not possess the right to navigate the Missi­sippi we deceived her when we declared she should, if we meant she should, and at the same time agreed with [Page 72]Spain, that she should not, we deceived Spain, and where the deception rests I will leave to Agricola to ex­plain. In one or other of the cases our faith is commit­ted, and it will require all Agricolas talents to white wash, the Exccutive.

In cases where cessions are made by Treaty, the party ceding is bound to fulfil the contract. Thus when Spain ceded to France the Spanish part of St. Domingo, she formally put the Republic in possession of it. We have made a formal cession of the right to navigate the Missisippi to Great Britain, and we are bound to give efficacy to such cession, and in carrying into effect such stipulation, we expose ourselves to war. Great Britain has a right to call upon us to fulfil our Treaty with her. If we refuse we risque a war with her, and if we comply we hazard a war with Spain! This is the wisdom and virtue of our government.

The triumphant interrogatories of your correspon­dent, Sir, rather excite pity than any other sensation. He asks ‘if one nation chooses to open all her ports and rivers to another, does if follow, that any future ac­quisition of territory must be made equally free; and all future advatanges imparted in like manner?’ Did not the British Treaty specifically grant to Great Britain the right to navigate the Missisippi? And although the Spanish Treaty is posterior, does not the explanatory ar­ticle, which is posterior to the Spanish Treaty confirm the cession? From the complexion of this defence, as well as from its manner I should be tempted to believe that the negotiator of the explanatory article had en­tered the lists himself; for it has strongly imprinted upon it that ability which has manifested itself since he became successor in from to his predecessor.