No. 1.

AS attempts are making very dangerous to the peace, and it is to be feared not very friendly to the constitution of the United States—it becomes the duty of those who wish well to both to endea­vour to prevent their success.

The objections which have been raised against the proclamation of neutrality lately issued by the Presi­dent, have been urged in a spirit of acrimony and invective, which demonstrates that more was in view than merely a free discussion of an important public measure; that the discussion covers a design of weak­ening the confidence of the people in the author of the measure, in order to remove or lessen a powerful obstacle to the success of an opposition to the govern­ment, which however it may change its form, accor­ding [Page 6] to circumstances, seems still to be adhered to and pursued with persevering industry.

This reflection adds to the motives connected with the measure itself to recommend endeavours, by pro­per explanations, to place it in a just light. Such explanations at least cannot but be satisfactory to those who may not have leisure or opportunity for pursuing themselves an investigation of the subject, and who may wish to perceive, that the policy of the govern­ment is not inconsistent with its obligations or its ho­nour.

The objections in question fall under four heads:

1. That the proclamation was without autho­rity.

2. That it was contrary to our treaties with France.

3. That it was contrary to the gratitude, which is due from this to that country, for the succours rendered us in our own revolution.

4. That it was out of time and unnecessary.

In order to judge of the solidity of the first of these objections, it is necessary to examine, what is the nature and design of a proclamation of neutra­lity.

The true nature and design of such an act is—to make known to the powers at war, and to the citizens of the country, whose government does the act, that such country is in the condition of a nation at peace with the belligerent parties, and under no obligations of treaty, to become an associate in the war with either of them; that this being its situation, its intention is to observe a conduct conformable with it, and to per­form towards each the duties of neutrality; and as a consequence of this state of things, to give warning to [Page 7] all within its jurisdiction to abstain from acts that shall contravene those duties, under the penalties which the laws of the land (of which the law of nations is a part) annexes to acts of [...].

This, and no more, is conceived to be the true im­port of a proclamation of neutrality.

It does not imply, that the nation which makes the declaration will forbear to perform to any of the warring powers, any stipulations in treaties which can be performed, without rendering it an associate or party in the war. It therefore does not imply in our case, that the United States will not make those dis­tinctions, between the present belligerent powers, which are stipulated in the 7th and 22d articles of our treaty with France; because these distinctions are not incompatible with a state of neutrality: they will in no shape render the United States an associate or par­ty in the war. This must be evident, when it is con­sidered, that even to furnish determinate succours of a certain number of ships or troops, to a power at war, in consequence of antecedent treaties having no parti­cular reference to the existing war, is not inconsistent with neutrality: a position well established by the doctrines of writers, and the practice of nations ^*

But no special aids, succours, or favours having relation to war, not positively and precisely stipulated by some treaty of the above description, can be afford­ed to either party, without a breach of neutrality.

In stating that the proclamation of neutrality does not imply the non-performance of any stipulations of [Page 8] treaties, which are not of a nature to make the nation an associate or party in the war, it is conceded, that an execution of the clause of guarantee contained in the eleventh article of our treaty of alliance with France would be contrary to the sense and spirit of the proclamation; because it would engage us with our whole force, as an associate or auxiliary in the war; it would be much more than the case of a definite limi­ted succour, previously ascertained.

It follows, that the proclamation is virtually a ma­nifestation of the sense of the government, that the United States are, under the circumstances of the case, not bound to execute the clause of guarantee.

If this be a just view of the force and import of the proclamation, it will remain to see, whether the President in issuing it acted within his proper sphere or stepped beyond the bounds of his constitutional authority and duty.

It will not be disputed, that the management of the affairs of this country with foreign nations, is con­fided to the government of the United States.

It can as little be disputed, that a proclamation of neutrality, when a nation is at liberty to keep out of a war in which other nations are engaged, and means so to do, is a usual and a proper measure. Its main ob­ject and effect are to prevent the nation being immedi­ately responsible for acts done by its citizens, without the privity or connivance of the government in contravention of the principles of neutrality ^*

[Page 9]An object this of the greatest importance to a country, whose true interest lies in the preservation of peace.

The enquiry then is, what department of the go­vernment of the United States is the proper one to make a declaration of neutrality in the cases in which the engagements of the nation permit, and its inte­rests require such a declaration.

A correct and well informed mind will discern at once, that it can belong neither to the legislative, nor judicial department, and of course must belong to the executive.

The legislative department is not the organ of in­tercourse between the United States and foreign na­tions. It is charged neither with making nor interpre­ting treaties. It is therefore not naturally that organ of the government, which is to pronounce the exist­ing condition of the nation, with regard to foreign powers, or to admonish the citizens of their obliga­tions and duties as founded upon that condition of things; still less is it charged with enforcing the ex­ecution and observance of those obligations and those duties.

It is equally obvious, that the act in question is foreign to the judiciary department of the government. The province of that department is to decide litiga­tions in particular cases. It is indeed charged with the interpretation of treaties, but it exercises this func­tion only in the litigated cases, that is where contend­ing parties bring before it a specific controversy. It has no concern with pronouncing upon the external political relations of treaties between government and govern­ment. This position is too plain to need being insisted upon.

[Page 10]It must then of necessity belong to the executive department to exercise the function in question, when a proper case for the exercise of it occurs.

It appears to be connected with that department in various capacities—As the organ of intercourse be­tween the nation and foreign nations—as the inter­preter of the national treaties in those cases in which the judiciary is not competent, that is, in the cases between government and government—as that power which is charged with the execution of the laws, of which treaties form a part—as that power which is charged with the command and application of the pub­lic force.

This view of the subject is so natural and obvious, so analogous to general theory and practice, that no doubt can be entertained of its justness, unless such doubt can be deduced from particular provisions of the constitution of the United States.

Let us see then if cause for such doubt is to be found in that constitution.

The second article of the constitution of the Uni­ted States, section first, establishes this general pro­position, that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."

The same article in a succeeding section proceeds to delineate particular cases of executive power. It declares among other things, that the President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; that he shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties; that it shall [Page 11] be his duty to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

It would not consist with the rules of sound construc­tion to consider this enumeration of particular au­thorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or qua­lifications; as in regard to the co-operation of the Se­nate in the appointment of officers and the making of treaties; which are qualifications of the general exe­cutive powers of appointing officers and making trea­ties; because the difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all the cases of executive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this inference. In the article which grants the legislative powers of the government, the expres­sions are, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." In that which grants the executive power, the expres­sions are, as already quoted, "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."

The enumeration ought rather therefore to be considered as intended by way of greater caution to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power: leaving the rest [Page 12] to flow from the general grant of that power, interpre­ted in conformity to other parts of the constitution, and to the principles of free government.

The general doctrine of our constitution then is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifica­tions which are expressed in the instrument.

Two of these have been already noticed—the par­ticipation of the Senate in the appointment of offi­cers, and the making of treaties. A third remains to be mentioned—the right of the legislature "to de­clare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal."

With these exceptions the executive power of the union is completely lodged in the President. This mode of construing the constitution has indeed been recognised by Congress in formal acts, upon full con­sideration and debate. The power of removal from office is an important instance. And since upon ge­neral principles, for reasons already given, the issuing of a proclamation of neutrality is merely an executive act: since also the general executive power of the union is vested in the President, the conclusion is that the step which has been taken by him, is liable to no just exception on the score of authority.

It may be observed that this inference would be just, if the power of declaring war had not been ves­ted in the legislature, but that this power naturally in­cludes the right of judging, whether the nation is un­der obligations to make war or not.

The answer to this is, that however true it may be, that the right of the legislature to declare war, includes the right of judging whether the nation be under obligations to make war or not, it will not fol­low, [Page 13] that the executive is in any case excluded from a similar right of judgment in the execution of its own functions.

If the legislature have a right to make war on the one hand, it is on the other, the duty of the executive to preserve peace till war is declared; and in fulfilling that duty, it must necessarily possess a right of judging what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the country impose on the government; and when in pursuance of this right it has concluded, that there is nothing in them inconsistent with a state of neutrali­ty, it becomes both its province and its duty to en­force the laws incident to that state of the nation. The executive is charged with the execution of all laws, the laws of nations as well as the municipal law, which recognizes and adopts those laws. It is consequently bound, by faithfully executing the laws of neutrality, when that is the state of the nation, to avoid giving a cause of war, to foreign powers.

This is the direct and proper end of the proclama­tion of neutrality—it declares to the United States their situation with regard to the powers at war, and makes known to the community, that the laws incident to that situation will be enforced. In doing this, it conforms to an established usage of nations, the ope­ration of which, as before remarked, is to obviate a re­sponsibility on the part of the whole society, for secret and unknown violations of the rights of any of the warring parties by its citizens.

Those who object to the proclamation will readily admit, that it is the right and duty of the executive to judge of, or to interpret, those articles of our treaties which give to France particular privileges, in order to the enforcement of those privileges: But the necessary [Page 14] consequence of this is, that the executive must judge what are the proper bounds of those privileges—what rights are given to other nations by our treaties with them—what rights the law of nature and nations gives and our treaties permit, in respect to those nations with whom we have no treaties; in fine, what are the reci­procal rights and obligations of the United States, and of all and each of the powers at war.

The right of the executive to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, may serve to illustrate the relative duties of the executive and legislative depart­ments. This right includes that of judging, in the case of a revolution of government in a foreign country, whether the new rulers are competent organs of the national will, and ought to be recognized or not: And where a treaty antecedently exists between the United States and such nation that right involves the power of giving operation, or not, to such treaty. For until the new government is acknowledged, the treaties be­tween the nations, as far, at least, as regards public rights, are of course suspended.

This power of determining virtually in the case supposed upon the operation of national treaties, as a consequence of the power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, is an important instance of the right of the executive to decide the obligations of the nation with regard to foreign nations. To apply it to the case of France, if there had been a treaty of al­liance offensive and defensive between the United States and that country, the unqualified acknowledgement of the new government would have put the United States in a condition to become an associate in the war in which France was engaged, and would have laid the legislature under an obligation if required, and there [Page 15] was otherwise no valid excuse, of exercising its power of declaring war.

This serves as an example of the right of the exe­cutive in certain cases, to determine the condition of the nation, though it may consequently affect the pro­per or improper exercise of the power of the legisla­ture to declare war. The executive, indeed, cannot controul the exercise of that power further than by its exercise of its general right of objecting to all acts of the legislature; liable to being overruled by two thirds of both houses of Congress. The legislature is free to perform its own duties according to its own sense of them; though the executive in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the legislative decisions.

From the division of the executive power, there results in reference to it, a concurrent authority in the distributed cases.

Hence in the case stated, though treaties can only be made by the President and senate, their activity may be continued or suspended by the President alone.

No objection has been made to the President's hav­ing acknowledged the Republic of France, by the re­ception of its minister, without having consulted the Senate; though that body is connected with him in the making of treaties, and though the consequence of his act of reception is to give operation to the treaties heretofore made with that country. But he is censur­ed for having declared the United States to be in a state of peace and neutrality with regard to the powers at war; because the right of changing that state and de­claring war belongs to the legislature.

[Page 16]It deserves to be remarked, that as the participation of the Senate in the making of treaties, and the pow­er of the legislature to declare war, are exceptions out of the general "executive power" vested in the Presi­dent, they are to be construed strictly, and ought to be extended no further than is essential to their execu­tion.

While therefore the legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation from a state of peace to a state of war—it belongs to the "exe­cutive power" to do whatever else the law of nations, co-operating with the treaties of the country, enjoin in the intercourse of the United States with foreign powers.

In this distribution of powers, the wisdom of our constitution is manifested. It is the province and duty of the executive to preserve to the nation the blessings of peace. The legislature alone can interrupt those blessings, by placing the nation in a state of war.

But though it has been thought advisable to vindi­cate the authority of the executive on this broad and comprehensive ground, it was not absolutely necessary to do so. That clause of the constitution which makes it his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully ex­ecuted," might alone have been relied upon, and this simple process of argument pursued.

The President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our treaties and the laws of nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the laws, must first judge for himself of their meaning. In order to the observance of that conduct which the laws of nations, combined with our treaties, prescrib­ed to this country, in reference to the present war in Europe, it was necessary for the President to judge for [Page 17] himself, whether there was any thing in our treaties incompatible with an adherence to neutrality. Having judged that there was not, he had a right, and if in his opinion the interests of the nation required it, it was his duty as an executor of the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of the nation, to exhort all persons to ob­serve it, and to warn them of the penalties which would attend its non-observance.

The proclamation has been represented as enacting some new law. This is a view of it entirely erroneous. It only proclaims a fact with regard to the existing state of the nation, informs the citizens of what the laws previously established require of them in that state, and warns them that these laws will be put in execution a­gainst the infractors of them.

No. II.

THE second and principal objection to the proclamation, namely, that it is inconsistent with the treaties between the United States and France, will now be examined.

It has been already shewn, that it is not inconsistent with the performance of any of the stipulations in those treaties, which would not make us an associate or party in the war, and particularly that it is incompa­tible [Page 18] with the privileges secured to France by the se­venteenth and twenty-second articles of the treaty of Commerce; which, except the clause of guarantee, constitute the most material discriminations to be found in our treaties in favour of that country.

Official documents have likewise appeared, in the public papers, which are understood to be authentic, that serve as a comment upon the sense of the procla­mation in this particular, proving that it was not deem­ed by the executive incompatible with the perform­ance of the stipulations in those articles, and that in practice they are intended to be observed.

It has, however been admitted, that the declaration of neutrality excludes the idea of an execution of the clause of guarantee.

It becomes necessary therefore to examine whether the United States would have a valid justification for not complying with it in case of their being called upon for that purpose by France.

Without knowing how far the reasons, which have occured to me, may have influenced the President, there appear to me to exist very good and substantial grounds for a refusal.

The alliance between the United States and France is a defensive alliance. In the caption of it, it is deno­minated a "treaty of alliance eventual and defensive." In the body of it (article second) it is called a defen­sive alliance. The words of that article are as follow, "the essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sove­reignty and independence absolute and unlimited of the United States, as well in matters of government, as of commerce."

The predominant quality or character then of our alliance with France is, that it is defensive in its prin­ciple, [Page 19] of course the meaning, obligation and force of every stipulation in the treaty must be tested and deter­mined by that principle. It is not necessary (and would be absurd) that it should be repeated in every article. It is sufficient that it be once declared, to be understood in every part of the treaty, unless coupled with express negative words excluding the implica­tion.

The great question consequently is—what are the nature and effect of a defensive alliance? When does the casus federis, or condition of the contract take place, in such an alliance?

Reason, the concurring opinions of writers, and the practice of nations will answer:—"when either of the allies is attacked, when war is made upon him, not when he makes war upon another;" in other words, the stipulated assistance is to be given to the ally when engaged in a defensive, not when engaged in an offen­sive war. This obligation to assist only in a defensive war, constitutes the essential difference between a de­fensive alliance, and one which is both offensive and defensive. In the latter case there is an obligation to co-operate as well when the war, on the part of our ally, is offensive, as when it is defensive. To affirm, therefore, that the United States are bound to assist France in the war in which she is at present engaged, would be to convert our treaty with her into an alliance offensive and defensive, contrary to the express and reiterated declarations of the instrument itself.

This assertion implies, that the war in question is an offensive war on the part of France.

And so it undoubtedly is with regard to all the powers with whom she was at war at the time of issu­ing the proclamation.

[Page 20]No position is better established, than that the pow­er which first declares or actually begins a war, whate­ver may have been the causes leading to it, is that which makes an offensive war. Nor is there any doubt that France first declared and began the war, against Austria, Prussia, Savoy, Holland, England and Spain.

Upon this point there is apt to be some incorrect­ness of ideas. Those who have not examined subjects of such a nature, are led to imagine that the party which commits the first injury, or gives the first pro­vocation, is on the offensive side in the war, though be­gun by the other party.

But the cause or the occasion of the war, and the war itself, are things entirely distinct. Tis the com­mencement of the war itself, that decides the ques­tion of being on the offensive or defensive. All wri­ters on the laws of nations agree in this principle, but it is more accurately laid down in the following ex­tract from Burlamaqui ^*

"Neither are we to believe (says he) that he who first injures another, begins by that an offensive war, and that the other who demands the satisfaction for the injury received is always on the defensive. There are a great many unjust acts, which may kindle a war, and which, however, are not the war itself; as the ill treatment of a prince's ambassadors, the plundering of his subjects, &c."

"If therefore we take up arms to revenge such an unjust act, we commence an offensive but a just war; and the prince who has done the injury, and will not give satisfaction, makes a defensive but an unjust war."

"We must therefore affirm, in general, that the first who takes up arms, whether justly or unjustly, [Page 21] commences an offensive war, and he who opposes him whether with or without reason, begins a defensive war."

France then being on the offensive in the war in which she is engaged and our alliance with her being defensive only, it follows, that the casus federis, or condition of our guarantee cannot take place; and that the United States are free to refuse a performance of that guarantee, if demanded.

Those who are disposed to justify indiscriminately every thing in the conduct of France, may reply, that though the war in point of form may be offensive on her part, yet in point of principle, it is defensive; was in each instance a mere anticipation of attacks me­ditated against her, and was justified by previous ag­gressions of the opposite parties.

It is believed, that it would be a sufficient answer to this observation to say, that in determining the le­gal and positive obligations of the United States, the only point of enquiry is, whether the war was in fact begun by France, or by her enemies—that all beyond this will be too vague, too liable to dispute, too much matter of opinion to be a proper criterion of national conduct; that when a war breaks out between two na­tions, all other nations, in regard to the positive rights of the parties, and their positive duties towards them, are bound to consider it as equally just on both sides—that consequently in a defensive alliance, when war is made upon one of the allies, the other is bound to fulfil the conditions stipulated on its part, without in­quiry, whether the war is rightfully begun or not—as, on the other hand, when war is begun by one of the allies, the other is exempted from the obligation for [Page 22] assisting, however just the commencement of it may have been.

The foundation of this doctrine is, the utility of clear and certain rules for determining the reciprocal duties of nations—that as little as possible may be left to opinion, and to the subterfuges of a refining or un­faithful casuistry.

Some writers indeed of great authority affirm, that it is a tacit condition of every treaty of alliance, that one ally is not bound to assist the other in a war mani­festly unjust. But this is questioned on the ground which has been stated by other respectable authorities. And though the manifest injustice of the war has been affirmed by some, to be a good cause for not executing the formal obligations of a treaty, I have no where found it maintained, that the justice of a war is a con­sideration which can oblige a nation to do what its for­mal obligations do not require; as in the case of a defen­sive alliance to furnish the succours stipulated, though the formal obligation did not exist, by reason of the ally having begun the war instead of being the party attacked.

But if this were not the true doctrine, an impar­tial examination would prove that, with respect to some of the powers, France is not blameless in the circumstances which preceded and led to the war with those powers; that if she received, she also gave causes of offence, and that the justice of the war, on her side, is in those cases not a little problematical.

There are prudential reasons which dissuade from going largely into this examination, unless it shall be rendered necessary by the future turn of the discus­sion.

[Page 23]It will be sufficient here, to notice cursorily the following facts.

France committed an agression upon Holland, in declaring free the navigation of the Scheldt, and acting upon that declaration; contrary to Treaties in which she had explicitly acknowledged and even guaranteed the exclusive right of Holland to the navigation of that river, and contrary to the doctrines of the best writers, and the established usages of nations in such cases.

She gave a general and just cause of alarm to na­tions, by that decree of the 19th of November, 1792, whereby the Convention, in the name of the French nation, declare that they will grant fraternity and as­sistance to every people who wish to recover their li­berty, and charge the executive power to send the ne­cessary orders to the generals to give assistance to such people, and to defend those citizens who may have been, or who may be vexed for the cause of liberty; which decree was ordered to be printed in all lan­guages.

When a nation has actually come to a resolution to throw off a yoke, under which it may have groaned, and to assert its liberties, it is justifiable and meritorious in another nation to afford assistance to the one which has been oppressed, and is in the act of liberating it­self; but it is not warrantable for any nation before­hand to hold out a general invitation to insurrection and revolution, by promising to assist every people who may wish to recover their liberty, and to defend those citizens of every country, who may have been, or who may be vexed for the cause of liberty: still less to commit to the generals of its armies the dis­cretionary power of judging, when the citizens of a [Page 24] foreign country have been vexed for the cause of li­berty by their own government.

The latter part of the decree amounted exactly to what France herself had most complained of—an in­terference by one nation in the internal government of another.

Vatel justly observes, as a consequence of the li­berty and independence of nations—"that it does not belong to any foreign power to take cognizance of the administration of the sovereign of another country, to set himself up as a judge of his conduct or to oblige him to alter it."

Such a conduct as that indicated by this decree has a natural tendency to disturb the tranquillity of na­tions, to excite fermentation and revolt every where; and therefore justified neutral powers, who were in a situation to be affected by it, in taking measures to re­press the spirit by which it had been dictated.

But the principle of this decree received a more particular application to Great Britain, by some sub­sequent circumstances.

Among the proofs of this are two answers, which were given by the President of the National Conven­tion, at a public sitting on the 28th of November, to two different addresses; one presented by a deputation from "The Society for Constitutional Information in London"—the other by a deputation of English and Irish citizens at Paris.

The following are extracts from these answers:

"The shades of Penn, of Hambden and of Syd­ney, hover over your heads; and the moment, without doubt; approaches, in which the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain."

[Page 25]"Nature and principles draw towards us England, Scotland and Ireland. Let the cries of friendship re­found through the two Republics."—"Principles are waging war against tyranny, which will fall under the blows of philosophy. Royalty in Europe is either de­stroyed, or on the point of perishing, on the ruins of soeodality: and the declaration of rights placed by the side of thrones, is a devouring fire which will con­sume them—Worthy Republicans," &c.

Declarations of this sort cannot but be considered as a direct application of the principle of the decree to Great Britain; as an open patronage of a revolu­tion in that country; a conduct which proceeding from the head or the body that governs France, in the pre­sence and on behalf of that body, was unquestionably an offence and injury to the nation to which it rela­ted.

The decree of the 15th of November is another cause of offence to all the governments of Europe. By that decree "the French nation declares, that it will treat as enemies the people, who refusing or re­nouncing liberty and equality, are desirous of preserv­ing their prince and privileged casts or of entering into an accommodation with them,&c." This decree was little short of a declaration of war against all nati­ons having princes and privileged classes.

The incorporation of the territories, over which the arms of France had temporarily prevailed, with and as a part of herself, is another violation of the rights of nations, into which the convention was be­trayed by an intemperate zeal, if not by a culpable ambition.

The laws of nations give to a power at war nothing more than a usufructuary or possessory right to the ter­ritories [Page 26] which it conquers; suspending the absolute property and dominion till a treaty of peace or some­thing equivalent shall cede or relinquish the conquer­ed territory to the conqueror. This principle is one of the greatest importance to the tranquillity and se­curity of nations—facilitating an adjustment of their quarrels and the preservation of ancient limits.

But France by incorporating with herself, in seve­ral instances, the territories she had acquired, violated this important principle and multiplied infinitely the obstacles of peace and accommodation. The doctrine, that a nation cannot consent to its own dismember­ment, but in a case of extreme necessity, immediately attached itself to all the important territories: while the progressive augmentation of the dominions of the most powerful nation in Europe, on a principle not of temporary acquisition, but of permanent union, threa­tened the independence of all other countries and gave to neighbouring neutral powers the justest cause of umbrage and alarm. It is a principle well argreed and founded on the best reasons, that whenever a particu­lar nation adopts maxims of conduct contrary to those generally established among nations, calculated to dis­turb their tranquillity and to expose their safety, they may justifiably make a common cause to oppose and control such nation.

Whatever partiality may be entertained for the general object of the French revolution, it is impossible for any well informed or sober minded man not to con­demn the proceedings which have been stated; as re­pugnant to the general rights of nations, to the true principles of liberty, to the freedom of opinion of mankind: and not to acknowledge as a consequence of this, that the justice of the war on the part of France, [Page 27] with regard to some of the powers with which she is engaged, is from those causes questionable enough to free the United States from all embarrassments on that score; if it be at all incumbent upon them to go into the inquiry.

The policy of a defensive alliance is so essentially distinct from that of an offensive one, that it is every way important not to confound their effects. The first kind has in view the prudent object of mutual defence, when either of the allies is involuntarily forced into a war by the attack of some third power. The latter kind subjects the peace of each ally to the will of the other, and obliges each to partake in the wars of policy and interest, as well as in those of safety and defence, of the other. To preserve their boundaries distinct, it is necessary that each kind should be governed by plain and obvious rules.

This would not be the case, if instead of taking the simple fact of who began the war as a guide, it was necessary to travel into metaphysical niceties about the justice or injustice of the causes which led to it. Since also the not furnishing a stipulated succour, when it is due, is itself a cause of war, it is very requisite, that there should be some palpable criterion for ascertaining when it is due. This criterion, as before observed, in a defensive alliance is the commencement or not, of the war by our ally as a mere matter of fact.

Other topics calculated to illustrate the position, that the United States are not bound to execute the clause of guarantee, are reserved for another paper.

No. III.

FRANCE at the time of issuing the proclamation was engaged, and likely to be engaged in war, with all, or almost all Europe, without a single ally in that quarter of the globe.

In such a state of things, it is evident, that how­ever she may be able to defend herself at home, (of which her factions and agitations have furnished the only serious doubt) she cannot make external efforts in any degree proportioned to those which can be made against her.

By this situation of things alone, the United States would be dispensed from an obligation to embark in her quarrel.

It is known, that we are wholly destitute of naval force. France, with all the great maritime powers united against her, is unable to supply this deficiency. She cannot afford us that species of co-operation, which is necessary to render the efforts useful to her, and to prevent our experiencing the destruction of our trade and the most calamitous inconvenience in other respects.

Our guarantee does not respect France herself. It does not relate to her own immediate defence, it re­lates [Page 29] merely to the defence and preservation of her American colonies; objects of which (though of considerable importance) the might be deprived, and yet remain a great, a powerful, and a happy na­tion.

In the actual situation of this country, and in re­lation to an object so secondary to France, it may fairly be maintained, that an ability in her to supply in a competent degree our deficiency of naval force, is a condition of our obligation to perform the guarantee on our part.

Had the United States a powerful marine, or could they command one in time, this reasoning would not be solid; but circumstanced as they are, it is presumed to be well founded.

There would be no proportion between the mis­chiefs and perils, to which the United States would ex­pose themselves, by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the nature of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that which it would be in their power actually to render her, by becoming a par­ty.

This disproportion would be a valid reason, for not executing the guarantee. All contracts are to receive a reasonable construction. Self preservation is the first duty of a nation; and though in the performance of stipulations relating to war, good faith requires, that the ordinary hazards of war should be fairly encounte­red, because they are directly contemplated by such stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards should be run; especially where the object for which they are to be run, is only a partial and particular interest of the ally, for whom they are to be run.

[Page 30]As in the present instance; good faith does not require, that the United States should put in jeopardy their essential interests, perhaps their very existence, in one of the most unequal contests in which a nation could be engaged to—secure to France—What?—Her West-India Islands, and other less impor­tant possessions in America—For it is to be remem­bered, that the stipulations of the United States do in no event reach beyond this point. If they were upon the strength of their guarantee, to engage in the war, and could make any arrangement with the belligerent powers, for securing to France those islands and those possessions, they would be at perfect liberty instantly to withdraw. They would not be bound to prosecute the war one moment longer.

They are under no obligation in any event, as far as the faith of treaties is concerned, to assist France in defence of her liberty; a topic on which so much has been said, so very little to the purpose, as it regards the present question.

The contest in which the United States would plunge themselves, were they to take part with France, would possibly be still more unequal, than that in which France herself is engaged. With the possessions of Great Britain and Spain on both flanks, the numerous Indian tribes under the influence and direction of those powers, along our whole interior frontier, with a long extended sea coast, with no maritime force of our own, and with the maritime force of all Europe against us, with no fortifications whatever, and with a population not exceeding four millions—it is impossible to imagine a more unequal contest, than that in which we should be involved in the case supposed; a contest from which [Page 31] we are dissuaded by the most cogent motives of self preservation, as well as of interest.

We may learn from Vatel, one of the best writers on the laws of nations, that "if a State which has pro­mised succours finds itself unable to furnish them, its very inability is its exemption; and if the furnishing the succours would expose it to an evident danger this also is a lawful dispensation. The case would render the treaty pernicious to the State and therefore not ob­ligatory. But this applies to an imminent danger threa­tening the safety of the State; the case of such a dan­ger is tacitly and necessarily reserved in every trea­ty ^*"

If too (as no sensible and candid man will deny) the extent of the present combination against France is in a degree to be ascribed to imprudences on her part; the exemption to the United States is still more manifest and complete. No country is bound to par­take in hazards of the most critical kind, which may have been produced or promoted, by the indiscretion and intemperance of another. This is an obvious dictate of reason, with which the common sense and com­mon practice of mankind coincide.

To the foregoing considerations it may perhaps be added, with no small degree of force, that military sti­pulations in national treades contemplate only the or­dinary case of foreign war, and are irrelative to the contests which grow out of Revolutions of Govern­ment; unless where they have express reference to a Revolution begun, or where there is a guarantee of the existing constitution of a nation, or where there is per­sonal alliance for the defence of a prince and his family ^†

[Page 32]The Revolution in France is the primitive source of the war, in which she is engaged. The restoration of the monarchy is the avowed object of some of her enemies—and the implied one of all them. That question then is essentially involved in the principle of war; a question certainly never in the contempla­tion of that government, with which our treaty was made, and it may thence be fairly inferred never in­tended to be embraced by it.

The inference would be that the United States have fulfilled the utmost that could be claimed by the nation of France, when they so far respected its deci­sion as to recognise the newly constituted powers; giving operation to the treaty of alliance for future occasions, but considering the present war as a tacit exception. Perhaps too this exception is in other respects due to the circumstances under which the engagements be­tween the two countries were contracted. It is impossible, prejudice apart, not to perceive a delicate embarrassment between the theory and fact of our political relations to France.

On these grounds, also, as well as that of the pre­sent war being offensive on the side of France, the Uni­ted States have valid and honorable pleas to offer against the execution of the guarantee, if it should be claimed of them by France. And the President was in every view fully justified in pronouncing, that the duty and interest of the United States dictated a neutrality in the war.

No. IV.

A THIRD objection to the proclama­tion is, that it is inconsistent with the gratitude due to France, for the services rendered us in our revolu­tion.

Those who make this objection, disavow, at the same time, all intention to advocate the position, that the United States ought to take part in the war. They profess to be friends to our remaining at peace. What then do they mean by the objection?

If it be no breach of gratitude to refrain from join­ing France in the war—how can it be a breach of gra­titude to declare that such is our disposition and in­tention?

The two positions are at variance with each other; and the true inference is, either that those who make the objection really wish to engage this country in the war, or that they seek a pretext for censuring the con­duct of the chief magistrate, for some purpose very different from the public good.

They endeavour in vain to elude this inference by saying, that the proclamation places France upon an equal footing with her enemies; while our treaties require distinctions in her favour, and our relative si­tuation [Page 34] would dictate kind offices to her, which ought not to be granted to her adversaries.

They are not ignorant, that the proclamation is re­concileable with both those objects, as far as they have any foundation in truth or propriety.

It has been shewn, that the promise of a "friend­ly and impartial conduct" towards all the belligerent powers is not inconsistent with the performance of any stipulations in our treaties, which would not include our becoming an associate in the war; and it has been observed, that the conduct of the executive, in re­gard to the seventeenth and twenty-second articles of the treaty of commerce, is an unequivocal comment upon those terms. The expressions indeed were na­turally to be understood with the exception of those matters of positive compact, which would not amount to taking part in the war; for a nation then observes a friendly and impartial conduct, towards two conten­ding powers, when it only performs to one of them what it is obliged to do by the positive stipulations of antecedent treaties; those stipulations not amounting to a participation in the war.

Neither do those expressions imply, that the United States will not exercise their discretion, in doing kind offices to some of the parties, without extending them to the others; so long as those offices have no rela­tion to war: For kind offices of that description may, consistently with neutrality, be shewn to one party and refused to another.

If the objectors mean, that the United States ought to favour France, in things relating to war, and where they are not bound to do it by treaty; they must in this case also abandon their pretension of being friends to peace. For such a conduct would be a vio­lation [Page 35] of neutrality, which could not fail to produce war.

It follows then that the proclamation is reconcile­able with all that those who censure it contend for; taking them upon their own ground, that nothing is to be done incompatible with the preservation of peace.

But though this would be a sufficient answer to the objection under consideration; yet it may not be with­out use to indulge some reflections on this very fa­vourite topic of gratitude to France; since it is at this shrine we are continually invited to sacrifice the true interests of the country; as if "all, for love and the world well lost" were a fundamental maxim in politics.

Faith and justice between nations are virtues of a nature sacred and unequivocal. They cannot be too strongly inculcated, nor too highly respected. Their obligations are definite and positive, their utility un­questionable; they relate to objects, which with pro­bity and sincerity generally admit of being brought within clear and intelligible rules.

But the same cannot be said of gratitude. It is not very often, between nations, that it can be pro­nounced with certainty, that there exists a solid foun­dation for the sentiment—and how far it can justifia­bly be permitted to operate is always a question of still greater difficulty.

The basis of gratitude is a benefit received or intended, which there was no right to claim, origina­ting in a regard to the interest or advantage of the par­ty, on whom the benefit is, or is meant to be confer­red. If a service is rendered from views relative to the immediate interest of the party, who renders it, [Page 36] and is productive of reciprocal advantages, there seems scarcely in such a case to be an adequate basis for a sen­timent like that of gratitude. The effect would be disproportioned to the cause, if such a service ought to beget more than a disposition to render in turn a correspondent good office, founded on mutual interest and reciprocal advantage. But gratitude would re­quire more than this; it would require, to a certain extent, even a sacrifice of the interest of the party o­bliged, to the service or benefit of the party by whom the obligation had been conferred.

Between individuals, occasion is not unfrequently given to the exercise of gratitude. Instances of con­ferring benefits, from kind and benevolent disposi­tions or feelings towards the person benefited, without any other interest on the part of the person who con­fers the benefit, than the pleasure of doing a good ac­tion, occur every day among individuals. But among nations they perhaps never occur. It may be affirm­ed as a general principle, that the predominant mo­tive of good offices from one nation to another is the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them.

Indeed the rule of morality is in this respect nor exactly the same between nations as between indivi­duals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter, in proportion to the greater magni­tude and importance of national compared with in­dividual happiness, to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct. Exist­ing millions, and for the most part future generations are concerned in the present measures of a govern­ment:—while the consequences of the private actions [Page 37] of an individual, for the most part terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow com­pass.

Whence it follows, that an individual may on nu­merous occasions meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at the expence of, his own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar course; and if it does so ought to confine itself within much stricter bounds ^* Good offices which are indifferent to the interest of a nation performing them, or which are compensated by the existence or expectation of some reasonable equivalent—or which produce an essential good to the nation to which they are rendered, without real detriment to the affairs of the nation rendering them, prescribe the limits of national generosity or benevolence.

It is not meant here to advocate a policy absolutely selfish or interested in nations; but to shew, that a policy regulated by their own interest, as far as justice and good faith permit, is, and ought to be their prevailing one; and that either to ascribe to them a different principle of action, or to deduce from the supposition of it argu­ments for a self-denying and self-sacrificing gratitude on the part of a nation, which may have received from another good offices, is to misconceive or mistake [Page 38] what usually are and ought to be the springs of nation­al conduct.

These general reflections will be auxiliary to a just estimate of our real situation with regard to France: of which a closer view will be taken in a succeeding paper.

No. V.

FRANCE, the rival, time immemo­rial, of Great Britain, had in the course of the war, which ended in 1763, suffered from the successful arms of the latter the severest losses and the most mor­tifying defeats. Britain from that moment had ac­quired an ascendant over France in the affairs of Eu­rope, and in the commerce of the world, too decided to be endured without impatience, or without an ea­ger desire of finding a favourable opportunity to de­stroy it, and repair the breach which had been made in the national glory. The animosity of wounded pride conspired with calculations of the interest of the state to give a keen edge to that impatience and to that desire.

The American revolution offered the occasion. It attracted early the notice of France, though with [Page 39] extreme circumspection. As far as countenance and aid may be presumed to have been given prior to the epoch of the acknowledgment of our independence, it will be no unkind derogation to assert, that they were marked neither with liberality nor with vigour; that they wore the appearance rather of a desire to keep alive disturbances, which would embarrass a ri­val power, than of a serious design to assist a revolu­tion, or a serious expectation that it would be effec­ted.

The victories of Saratoga, the capture of an army, which went a great way towards deciding the issue of the contest, decided also the hesitations of France. They established in the government of that country a confidence of our ability to accomplish our purpose, and as a consequence of it produced the treaties of al­liance and commerce.

It is impossible to see in all this any thing more than the conduct of a rival nation, embracing a most promising opportunity to repress the pride and dimi­nish the dangerous power of its rival, by seconding a successful resistance to its authority, and by lopping off a valuable portion of its dominions. The dismem­berment of this country from Great Britain was an obvious and a very important interest of France. It cannot be doubted, that it was the determining mo­tive and an adequate compensation for the assistance afforded us.

Men of sense, in this country, deduced an en­couragement to the part which their zeal for liberty prompted them to take in our revolution, from the probability of the co-operation of France and Spain. It will be remembered, that this argument was used in the publications of the day; but upon what was it [Page 40] bottomed? Upon the known competition between those powers and Great Britain, upon their evident interest to reduce her power and circumscribe her em­pire; not upon motives of regard to our interest, or of attachment to our cause. Whoever should have alleged the latter, as grounds of the expectation held out, would have been then justly considered as a vi­sionary or a deceiver. And whoever shall now ascribe the aid we received to such motives would not de­serve to be viewed in a better light.

The inference from these facts is not obscure. Aid and co-operation founded upon a great interest, pursued and obtained by the party affording them, is not a proper stock upon which to engraft that enthu­siastic gratitude, which is claimed from us, by those who love France more than the United States.

This view of the subject, extorted by the extrava­gancy of such a claim, is not meant to disparage the just pretensions of France upon our good will. Though neither in the motives to the succours which she fur­nished us, nor in their extent (considering how pow­erfully the point of honour in such a war reinforced the considerations of interest when she was once enga­ged) can be found a sufficient basis for that gratitude which is the theme of so much declamation: Yet we shall find in the manner of affording us those succours just cause for our esteem and friendship.

France did not attempt, in the first instance, to take advantage of our situation to extort from us any humiliating or injurious concessions, as the price of her assistance; nor afterwards in the progress of the war, to impose hard terms as the condition of parti­cular aids.

[Page 41]Though this course was certainly dictated by po­licy; yet it was an honourable and a magnanimous policy; such a one as always constitutes a title to the approbation and esteem of mankind; and a claim to the friendship and acknowledgement of the party, in whose favour it is practised.

But these sentiments are satisfied on the part of a nation, when they produce sincere wishes for the hap­piness of the party from whom it has experienced such conduct, and a cordial disposition to render all good and friendly offices, which can be rendered without prejudice to its own solid and permanent interests.

To ask of a nation so situated, to make a sacrifice of substantial interest; to expose itself to the jealousy, ill-will, or resentment of the rest of the world; to hazard, in art eminent degree, its own safety, for the benefit of the party who may have observed towards it the conduct which has been described—would be to ask more than the nature of the case demands, more than the fundamental maxims of society authorise, more than the dictates of found reason justify.

A question has arisen, with regard to the proper object of that gratitude, which is so much insisted up­on; whether the unfortunate Prince by whom the as­sistance received was given; or the nation of whom he was the chief or the organ. In interests the nation­al justice to form right conceptions on this point.

The arguments which support the latter idea are as follow.

"Louis the XVI. was but the constitutional agent of the French nation. He acted for and on behalf of the nation; 'twas with their money and their blood he supported our cause. 'Tis to them therefore, not to him, that our obligations are due. Louis the XVI. [Page 42] in taking our part, was no doubt actuated by state po­licy. An absolute prince could not love liberty. But the people of France patronised our cause with zeal, from sympathy in its object. The people there­fore, not its monarch, are entitled to our sympa­thy."

This reasoning may be ingenious, but it is not founded in nature or fact.

Louis the XVI. though no more than the constitu­tional agent of the nation, had at the time the sole power of managing its affairs, the legal right of direct­ing its will and its forces. It belonged to him to assist us, or not, without consulting the nation; and he did assist us without such consultation. His will alone was active; that of the nation passive. If there was any kindness in the decision, demanding a return of kindness from us, it was the kindness of Louis XVI.; his heart was the depository of the sentiment. Let the genuine voice of nature then, unperverted by po­litical subtleties, pronounce whether the acknowledg­ment, which may be due for that kindness, can be equitably transferred from him to others, who had no share in the decision. Whether the principle of gra­titude ought to determine us to behold with indiffer­ence his misfortunes, and with satisfaction the triumphs of his enemies.

The doctrine, that the prince is only the organ of his nation, is conclusive to enforce the obligations of good faith between nation and nation; in other words, the observance of duties stipulated in treaties for na­tional purposes—and it will even suffice to continue to a nation a claim to the friendship and good-will of an­other, resulting from friendly offices done by its prince; but it would be to carry it too far and to render it too [Page 43] artifical, to attribute to it the effect of transferring that claim from the prince to the nation, by way of opposition and contrast. Friendship, good-will, gra­titude for favours received, have so inseparable a re­ference to the motives with which, and to the persons by whom they were rendered, as to be incapable of being transferred to another at his expence.

But Louis XVI. it is said, acted from reasons of state without regard to our cause; while the people of France patronised it with zeal and attachment.

As far as the assertion with regard to the monarch is founded, and is an objection to our gratitude to him, it destroys the whole frabric of gratitude to France: For our gratitude is, and must be, relative to the services rendered us. The nation can only claim it on the score of their having been rendered by their a­gent with their means. If the views with which he rendered them divested them of that merit which ought to inspire gratitude—none is due. The nation no more than their agent can claim it.

As to the individual good wishes of the citizens of France, as they did not produce the services rendered to us as a nation, they can be no foundation for na­tional gratitude. They can only call for a reciproca­tion of individual good wishes. They cannot form the basis of public obligation.

But the assertion takes more for granted than there is reason to believe true.

Louis the XVI. no doubt took part in our contest from reasons of state; but Louis the XVI. was a hu­mane kind-hearted man. The acts of his early youth had entitled him to this character. It is natu­ral for a man of such a disposition to become interest­ed in the cause of those whom he protects or aids: [Page 44] and if the concurrent testimony of the period may be credited, there was no man in France more personai­ly friendly to the cause of this country than Louis the XVI. I am much misinformed if repeated declara­tions of the venerable Franklin did not attest this fact.

It is a just tribute to the people of France to ad­mit, that they manifested a lively interest in the cause of America; but while motives are scanned, who can say how much of it is to be ascribed to the antipathy which they bore to their rival neighbours; how much to their sympathy in the object of our pursuit? It is certain that the love of liberty was not a national sen­timent in France, when a zeal for our cause first ap­peared among that people.

There is reason to believe too, that the attachment to our cause, which ultimately became very extensive, if not general, did not originate with the mass of the French people. It began with the circles more immediately connected with the government, and was thence diffused through the nation.

This observation, besides its tendency to correct ideas, which are calculated to give a false direction to the public feeling, may serve to check the spirit of il­liberal invective, which has been wantonly indulged against those distinguished friends of America, who, though the authors of the French revolution, have fal­len victims to it; because their principles would not permit them to go the length of an entire subversion of the monarchy.

The preachers of gratitude are not ashamed to brand Louis the XVI, as a tyrant, and La Fayette as a traitor. But how can we wonder at this, when they insinuate a distrust even of a—!!!

[Page 45]In urging the friendly disposition to our cause, manifested by the people of France, as a motive to our gratitude towards that people, it ought not to be forgot­ten, that those dispositions were not confined to the in­habitants of that country. They were eminently sha­red by the people of the United Provinces, produced to us valuable pecuniary aids from their citizens, and eventually involved them in the war on the same side with us. It may be added too, that here the patronage of our cause emphatically began with the community, not originating as in France with the government, but finally implicating the government in the consequen­ces.

Our cause had also numerous friends in other coun­tries; even in that with which we were at war.—Con­ducted with prudence, moderation, justice, and huma­nity, it may be said to have been a popular cause a­mong mankind, conciliating the countenances of prin­ces, and the affection of nations.

The dispositions of the individual citizens of France can therefore in no sense be urged as constituting a pe­culiar claim to our gratitude. As far as there is foun­dation for it, it must be referred to the services ren­dered to us; and, in the first instance, to the unfor­tunate monarch that rendered them. This is the con­clusion of nature and reason.

A further view of this subject is reserved for ano­ther paper.

No. VI.

THE very men who not long since, with a holy zeal, would have been glad to make an auto de fe of any one who should have presumed to assign bounds to our obligations to Louis the XVI. are now ready to consign to the flames those who venture even to think, that he died a proper object of our sym­pathy or regret. The greatest pains are taken to excite against him our detestation. His supposed perjuries and crimes are founded in the public ear, with all the exaggerations of intemperate declaiming. All the un­proved and contradicted allegations which have been brought against him are taken for granted, as the ora­cles of truth, on no better grounds than the mere ge­neral presumptions—that he could not have been a friend to a revolution which stripped him of so much power—that it is not likely the Convention would have pronounced him guilty, and consigned him to so ig­nominious a fate, if he had been really innocent.

It is very possible that time may disclose facts and proofs, which will substantiate the guilt imputed to Louis: but these facts and proofs have not yet been au­thenticated [Page 47] to the world; and justice admonishes us to wait for their production and authentication.

Those who have most closely attended to the course of the transaction, find least cause to be convinced of the criminality of the deceased monarch. While his counsel, whose characters give weight to their asser­tions, with an air of confcious truth, boldly appeal to facts and proofs, in the knowledge and possession of the Convention, for the refutation of the charges thought against him—the members of that body, in all the debates upon the subject which have reached this country, either directly from France, or circu­itously through England, appear to have contented themselves with assuming the existence of the facts charged, and inferring from them a criminality which, after the abolition of the royalty, they were interested to establish.

The presumptions of guilt drawn from the sugges­tions which have been stated, are more than counter­balanced by an opposite presumption, which is too obvious not to have occurred to many, though I do not recollect yet to have met with it in print.—It is this:

If the Convention had possessed clear evidence of the guilt of Louis, they would have promulgated it to the world in an authentic and unquestionable shape. Respect for the opinion of mankind, regard for their own character, the interest of their cause, made this an indispensible duty; nor can the omission be satis­factorily ascribed to any other reason, than the want of such evidence.

The inference from this is, that the melancholy catastrophe of Louis XVI. was the result of a suppo­sed [Page 48] political expediency, rather than of real crimi­nality.

In a case so circumstanced, does it, can it consist with our justice or our humanity, to partake in the angry and vindictive passions which are endeavoured to be excited against the unfortunate monarch? Was it a crime in him to have been born a Prince? Could this circumstance forfeit his title to the commiseration due to his misfortunes as a man?

Would gratitude dictate to a people, situated as are the people of this country, to lend their aid to extend to the son the misfortunes of the father? Should we not be more certain of violating no obligation of that kind—of not implicating the delicacy of our na­tional character—by taking no part in the contest—than by throwing our weight into either scale?

Would not a just estimate of the origin and pro­gress of our relations to France, viewed with reference to the mere question of gratitude, lead us to this re­sult—that we ought not to take part against the son and successor of a father, on whose sole will depended the assistance which we received—that we ought not to take part with him against the nation, whose blood and whose treasure had been in the hands of the father, the means of the assistance afforded us?

But we are sometimes told, by way of answer, that the cause of France is the cause of Liberty; and that we are bound to assist the nation on the score of their being engaged in the defence of that cause. How far this idea ought to carry us, will be the sub­ject of future examination.

It is only necessary here to observe, that it pre­sents a question essentially different from that which has been in discussion. If we are bound to assist the [Page 49] French nation, on the principle of their being em­ed in the defence of liberty, this is a ground altoge­ther foreign to that of gratitude. Gratitude has refer­ence only to kind offices received. The obligation to assist the cause of liberty, has reference to the me­rits of that cause, and to the interest we have in its support. It is possible, that the benefactor may be on one side—the defenders and supporters of liberty on the other. Gratitude may point one way—the love of liberty another. It is therefore important to just conclusions, not to confound the two things.

A sentiment of justice more than the importance of the question itself, has led to so particular a discus­sion respecting the proper object of whatever acknow­ledgment may be due from the United States, for the aid which they received from France during their own revolution.

The extent of the obligation which it may impose is by far the most interesting enquiry. And though it is presumed, that enough has been already said, to evince, that it does in no degree require us to embark in the war; yet there is another, and a very simple view of the subject, which is too convincing to be o­mitted.

The assistance lent us by France was afforded by a great and powerful nation, possessing numerous armies, a respectable fleet, and the means of rendering it a match for the force to be contended with.—The posi­tion of Europe was favourable to the enterprise; a general disposition prevailing to see the power of Great Britain abridged.—The co-operation of Spain was very much a matter of course, and the probabi­lity of other powers becoming engaged on the same side not remote.—Great Britain was alone and likely [Page 50] to continue so—France had a great and persuasive in­terest in the separation of this country from Britain. In this situation, with much to hope and not much to fear, she took part in our quarrel.

France is at this time singly engaged with the greatest part of Europe, including all the first rate powers, except one, and in danger of being engaged with all the rest. To use the emphatic language of a member of the National Convention—she has but one enemy, and that is all Europe. Her internal af­fairs are without doubt in serious disorder.—Her na­vy comparatively inconsiderable. The United States are a young nation; their population, though rapidly increasing, still small—their resources, though grow­ing, not great; without armies, without fleets—capa­ble, from the nature of the country and the spirit of its inhabitants, of immense exertions for self-defence, but little capable of those external efforts which could materially serve the cause of France. So far from ha­ving any direct interest in going to war, they have the strongest motives of interest to avoid it. By embarking with France in the war, they would have incompara­bly more to apprehend, than to hope.

This contrast of situations and inducements is a­lone a conclusive demonstration, that the United States are not under an obligation, from gratitude, to join France in the war. The utter disparity be­tween the circumstances of the service to be rendered, and of the service received, proves that the one can­not be an adequate basis of obligation for the other. There would be a want of equality, and consequently of reciprocity.

But complete justice would not be done to this question of gratitude, were no notice to be taken of [Page 51] the address, which has appeared in the public papers (the authenticity of which has not been impeached) from the Convention of France to the United States; announcing the appointment of the present Minister Plenipotentiary. In that address the Convention in­forms us, that "the support which the ancient French Court had afforded the United States to recover their independence, was only the fruit of a base specula­tion: and that their glory offended its ambitions views, and the ambassadors of France bore the criminal orders of stopping the career of their prosperity."

If this information is to be admitted in the full force of the terms it is very fatal to the claim of grati­tude towards France. An observation similar to one made in a former paper occurs here. If the organ of the nation, on whose will the aid given us depended, acted not only from motives irrelative to our advan­tage, but from unworthy motives, or as it is stated, from a base speculation—if afterwards he displayed a tem­per hostile to the confirmation of our security and prosperity, he acquired no title to our gratitude in the first instance, or he forfeited it in the second. And the nation of France, who can only claim it in virtue of the conduct of their agent, must together with him renounce the pretension. It is an obvious principle, that if a nation can claim merit from the good deeds of its sovereign, it must answer for the demerit of his misdeeds. The rule to be a good one, must apply both ways.

But some deductions are to be made from the sug­gestions contained in the address of the Convention, in reference to the motives which evidently dictated the communication. Their zeal to alienate the good will of this country from the late monarch, and to in­crease [Page 52] the odium of the French nation against the mo­narcy, which was so ardent as to make them over­look the tendency of their communication, to disarm their [...] among us of the plea of gratitude, may justly be suspected of exaggeration.

The truth probably is that the base speculation charged, amounts to nothing more than that the go­vernment of France, in affording us assistance, was directed by the motives which have been attributed to it, namely, the desire of promoting the interest of France by [...] the power of Great Britain, and opening a new channel of commerce to herself—that the orders said to have been given to the Ambas­sadors of France to stop the career of our prosperi­ty are resolvable into a speculative jealousy of the ministers of the day, left the United States, by becom­ing as powerful and great as they are capable of be­coming under an efficient government, might prove formidable to the European possessions in America. With these qualifications and allowances, the address offers no new discovery to the intelligent and unbias­sed friends of their country. They knew long ago that the interest of France had been the governing motive of the aid afforded; and they saw clearly enough, in the conversation and conduct of her a­gents, while the present constitution of the United States was under consideration, that the government of which they were the instruments, would have pre­ferred our remaining under the old form for the reason which has been stated. They received also, that these views had their effect upon some of the de­voted partizans of France among ourselves, as they now perceive, that the same characters are embody­ing themselves with all the aid they can obtain, un­der [Page 53] the [...] influence, to resist the [...] of that government of which they [...] the establish­ment.

All this was and is seen, and the body of the peo­ple of America are too discerning to be long in the dark about it. Too wise to have been misled by fo­reign or domestic machinations, they adopted a con­stitution which was necessary to their safety and to their happiness. Too wise still to be ensnared by the same [...], they will support the government they have established, and will take care of their own peace, in spite of the insidious efforts which are making to detach them from the one, and to disturb the o­ther.

The information which the address of the Conven­tion contains, ought to serve as an instructive lesson to the people of this country. It ought to teach us not to over-rate foreign friendships—to be upon our guard against foreign attachments. The former will generally be found hollow and delusive; the latter will have a natural tendency to lead us aside from our own true interest, and to make us the dupes of foreign influence. They introduce a principle of action, which in its effects, if the expression may be allowed, is anti-national. Foreign influence is truly the Gre­cian Horse to a republic. We cannot be too careful to exclude its entrance. Nor ought we to imagine, that it can only make its approaches in the gross form of direct bribery. It is then most dangerous, when it comes under the patronage of our passions, under the auspices of national prejudice and partiality.

I trust the morals of this country are yet too good to leave much to apprehend on the score of bribery. Caresses, condescentions, flattery, in unison with our [Page 54] prepossessions, are infinitely more to be feared; and as far as there is opportunity for corruption, it is to be remembered, that one foreign power can employ this resource as well as another, and that the effect must be much greater, when it is combined with the other means of influence, than where it stands alone.

No. VII.

THE remaining objection to the Procla­mation of neutrality, still to be discussed, is that it was out of time and unnecessary.

To give colour to this objection it is asked—why did not the Proclamation appear when the war com­menced with Austria and Prussia? why was it forborne, till Great Britain, Holland and Spain became engag­ed? why did not the government wait till the arrival at Philadelphia of the Minister of the French Repub­lic? why did it volunteer a declaration not required of it by any of the belligerent parties?

To most of these questions solid answers have al­ready appeared in the public prints. Little more can be done than to repeat and inforce them.

Austria and Prussia are not maritime powers. Con­traventions of neutrality as against them were not likely to take place to any extent, or in a shape that would attract their notice. It would therefore have been useless, if not ridiculous, to have made a formal declaration on the subject, while they were the only parties opposed to France.

[Page 55]But the reverse of this is the case with regard to Spain, Holland and England.—These are all commer­cial maritime nations. It was to be expected, that their attention would be immediately drawn towards the United States, with sensibility and even with jea­lousy. It was to be feared, that some of our citizens might be tempted by the prospect of gain to go into measures, which would injure them and commit the peace of the country. Attacks by some of these pow­ers upon the possessions of France in America were to be looked for as a matter of course. While the view of the United States as to that particular, were problematical, they would naturally consider us as a power that might become their enemy. This they would have been the more apt to do, on account of those public demonstrations of attachment to the cause of France, of which there has been so great a display. Jealousy, every body knows, especially if sharpened by resentment, is apt to lead to ill treatment; ill treat­ment to hostility.

In proportion to the probability of our being re­garded with a suspicious and consequently an unfriend­ly eye, by the powers at war with France; in propor­tion to the danger of imprudencies being committed by any of our citizens, which might occasion a rupture with them—the policy on the part of the government, of removing all doubt as to its own disposition, and of deciding the condition of the United States, in the view of the parties concerned, became obvious and urgent.

Were the United States now what, if we do not rashly throw away the advantages we possess, they may expect to be in fifteen or twenty years, there would have been more room for an insinuation which has been thrown out—namely, that they ought to have [Page 56] secured to themselves some advantage, as the consi­deration of their neutrality; an idea, however, of which the justice and magnanimity cannot be com­mended. But in their present situation, with their present strength and resources, an attempt of that kind could have only served to display pretensions at once excessive and unprincipled. The chance of obtain­ing any collateral advantage, if such a chance there was, by leaving a doubt upon our intentions, as to peace or war, could not wisely have been put for a single instant in competition with the tendency of a contrary conduct to secure our peace.

The conduciveness of the declaration of neutrality to that end was not the only recommendation to the adoption of the measure. It was of great importance that our own citizens should understand, as soon as possible, the opinion which the government enter­tained of the nature of our relations to the warring parties, and of the propriety or expediency of our taking a side or remaining neuter. The arrangements of our merchants could not but be very differently affected, by the one hypothesis or the other; and it would necessarily have been very detrimental and per­plexing to them to have been left in uncertainty. It is not requisite to say how much our agriculture and o­ther interests would have been likely to have suffered by embarrassments to our merchants.

The idea of its having been incumbent on the go­vernment to delay the measure for the coming of the minister of the French Republic, is as absurd as it is humiliating. Did the executive stand in need of the logic of a foreign agent to enlighten it as to the duties or interests of the nation? or was it bound to ask his consent to a step which appeared to itself con­sistent with the former and conducive to the latter?

[Page 57]The sense of our treaties was to be learnt from the treaties themselves. It was not difficult to pronounce beforehand, that we had a greater interest in the pre­servation of peace, than in any advantages with which France might tempt our participation in the war—Commercial privileges were all that she could offer of real value in our estimation, and a carle blanche on this head would have been an inadequate recompence for renouncing peace and committing ourselves volun­tarily to the chances of so precarious and perilous a war. Besides, if the privileges which might have been conceded were not founded in a real permanent mutual interest, of what value would be the treaty that should concede them? ought not the calculation, in such case, to be upon a speedy resumption of them, with, perhaps, a quarrel as the pretext? on the other hand, may we not trust that commercial privileges which are truly founded in mutual interest will grow out of that interest; without the necessity of giving a premium for them at the expence of our peace?

To what purpose then was the executive to have waited for the arrival of the minister? was it to give opportunity to contentious discussions—to intriguing machinations—to the clamours of a faction won to a foreign interest?

Whether the declaration of neutrality issued upon or without the requisition of any of the belligerent powers, can only be known to their respective mini­sters and to the proper officers of our government. But if it be true that it issued without any such requi­sition, it is an additional indication of the wisdom of the measure.

It is of much importance to the end of preserving peace, that the belligerent powers should be thorough­ly convinced of the sincerity of our intentions to ob­serve [Page 58] the neutrality we profess; and it cannot fail to have weight in producing this conviction that the de­claration of it was a [...] act—not stimulated by any requisition on the part of either of them—proceeding purely from our own view of our duty and interest.

It was not surely necessary for the government to wait for such a requisition; while there were advan­tages and no disadvantages in anticipating it. The benefit of an early notification to our merchants, conspired with the consideration just mentioned to re­commend the course which was pursued.

If in addition to the rest, the early manifestation of the views of the government has had any effect in fixing the public opinion on the subject, and in coun­teracting the success of the efforts, which, it was to be foreseen would be made to disunite it, this alone would be a great recommendation of the policy of having suffered no delay to intervene.

What has been already said in this and in preced­ing papers, affords a full answer to the suggestion, that the proclamation was unnecessary. It would be a waste of time to add any thing more.

But there has been a criticism several times repeat­ed, which may deserve a moment's attention. It has been urged, that the proclamation ought to have con­tained some reference to our treaties, and that the ge­nerality of the promise to observe a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers, ought to have been qualified with expressions equivalent to these—"as far as may consist with the treaties of the United States."

The insertion of such a clause would have intirely defeated the object of the proclamation, by rendering the intention of the government equivocal. That [Page 59] object was to assure the powers at war and our own citizens, that in the opinion of the executive, it was consistent with the duty and interest of the nation to observe a neutrality in the war, and that it was intend­ed to pursue a conduct corresponding with that opini­on. Words equivalent to those contended for, would have rendered the other part of the declaration nuga­tory; by leaving it uncertain, whether, the executive did or did not believe a state of neutrality to be consistent with our treaties. Neither foreign powers nor our own citizens would have been able to have drawn any conclusion from the proclamation, and both would have had a right to consider it as a mere equivocation.

By not inserting any such ambiguous expressions, the proclamation was susceptible of an intelligible and proper construction. While it denoted on the one hand, that in the judgment of the executive, there was nothing in our treaties obliging us to become a party in the war, it left it to be expected on the other—that all stipulations compatible with neutrality, ac­cording to the laws and usages of nations, would be enforced. It follows, that the proclamation was, in this particular, exactly what it ought to have been.

The words, "make known the disposition of the United States," have also given a handle to cavil. It has been asked, how could the President undertake to declare the disposition of the United States? The people, for aught he knew, may have been in a very different sentiment—Thus a conformity with republi­can propriety and modesty, is turned into a topic of accusation.

Had the President announced his own disposition, he would have been chargeable with egotism, if not presumption. The constitutional organ of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations—when­ever he speaks to them, it is in that capacity: it is in [Page 60] the name, and on behalf of, the United States. It must therefore be with greater propriety, that he speaks of their disposition than of his own.

It is easy to imagine, that occasions frequently oc­cur in the communications to foreign governments and foreign agents, which render it necessary to speak of the friendship or friendly disposition of the United States, of their disposition to cultivate harmony and good understanding, to reciprocate neighbourly offices, &c. &c.—It is usual, for example, when public ministers are received, for some complimentary expressions to be interchanged. It is presumable, that the late re­ception of the French minister did not pass, without some assurance on the part of the President, of the friendly disposition of the United States towards France. Admitting it to have happened, would it be deemed an improper arrogation? if not, why was it more so, to declare the disposition of the United States to ob­serve a neutrality in the existing war?

In all such cases, nothing more is to be understood than an official expression of the political disposition of the nation inferred from its political relations, ob­ligations and interests. It is never to be supposed, that the expression is meant to convey the precise state of the individual sentiments or opinions of the great mass of the people.

Kings and Princes speak of their own dispositions. The magistrates of republics, of the dispositions of their nations. The President therefore, has evidently used the style adapted to his situation, and the criticism upon it is plainly a cavil.