The American remembrancer; or, An impartial collection of essays, resolves, speeches, &c. relative, or having affinity, to the treaty with Great Britain.

The American remembrancer; or, An impartial collection of essays, resolves, speeches, &c. relative, or having affinity, to the treaty with Great Britain.

Table of contents

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Title page

Advertisement.

CONTENTS.

Speech of Mr. Charles Pinckney, Late Governor of South Carolina, at a very numerous Meeting of the Citizens of Charleston, the 22d July, 1795, to hear the Report of their Committee on the Treaty between Great-Britain and the United States of America. Carefully collected from the Notes of Mr. Pinckney, and afterwards inspected by himself.

J. THOMPSON'S SPEECH. Speech of Mr. J. Thompson, At a Meeting of the Citizens of Petershurg, convened August 1, 1795, to debate on the pending Treaty with Britain.

Wilmington Town Meeting.

To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United States, The Memorial of the Citizens of Wilmington, and its Vicinity, is the State of Delaware,

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT. United States, 14th August, 1795. John Dickinson, James Tilton, Caesar Rodney, Robert Coram, Jacob Broom, Archibald Alexander, John James, Joseph Warner, and Isaac Starr, Esquires.

Ezekiel Price, Thomas Walley, William Bordman, Ebenczer Seaver, Thomas Crafts, Thomas Edwards, William Lettle, William Scollay, and Jesse Putnam, Esquires—Selectmen of the town of Boston.

OBSERVATIONS On the constitutional Power to form Treaties. Extract from one of the Federal Farmer's Letters, dated January 10, 1788.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. I.

No. II.

No. III.

No IV.

No. V.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

CAMILLUS—No. V.—Continued.

No. VI.

No. VII.

No. VIII.

Impressment of American Seamen. PROTEST.

Breach of the Laws of Neutrality.

RESOLUTIONS Unanimously agreed to, at a Meeting of the Citizens of Petersburg on Saturday the 1st of August, 1795.

ADDRESS To the President of the United States.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. 1.

No. II.

Philadelphia Address. To the President of the United States. The Address of the Subscribers, Merchants and Traders of 〈◊〉 City of Philadelphia,

PRESIDENT's ANSWER.

DISSENT Of a Number of the Citizens of Boston.

DISSENT Of a Number of the Citizens of Trenton and its Vicinity, from the Proceedings of the late Town-Meeting.

Proceedings at Trenton.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, at a large and respectable Meeting, convened at the Request of a Number of the Members, and held at their Hall, on Tuesday, August 11th, 1795, by Adjournment, to consider of, and express their Sentiments relative to, the Treaty made by Mr. Jay, in behalf of the United States, with Britain.

RESOLUTIONS Of the Citizens of the Borough of York (Pen•sylvania) and 〈◊〉 Vicinity, at a Meeting held at the Court-house, on Monday, the 17th of August, 1795, for the Purpose of taking into C•••• ••tion, Measures proper to be purs•ed upon the Subject of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States.

FROM THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES.

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Extract of a Letter from Mr. Jay to the Secretary of State, d••d London, 19th November, 1794.

Extract of a Letter from Thomas Pinckney, Minister Plenip•• tiory, to the Secretary of State, dated London, 16th November, 1794.

RESOLUTIONS Of the Citizens of Richmond, generally convened, at the Capital in the said City, on Wednesday the 29th day of July, 1795, for the important Purpose of taking into Consideration the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty. GEORGE WYTHE, Chairman.

August 1st, 1795. REPORT Of the Committee chosen by the Citizens of Savannah (Georgia) convened in Christ-church, on Wednesday, July •9th, 1795.

RESOLUTIONS Of the Inhabitants of Bordenton, Crosswicks, Blackhorse, and Reckless Town, and their several Vicinities, adapted August 8th, 1795.

FROM THE (BOSTON) CHRONICLE. An Essay on Jacobinical Thinkers.

Remarks on the IId Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. III.

No. IV.

No. V.

No. VI.

No. VII.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. IX.

No. X.

No. XI.

RESOLUTIONS Unanimously agreed to, at a general Meeting of the Citizens of South Carolina, in Christ Church Parish, on Friday, the 24th of July, 1795, convened for the Purpose of discussing the impending Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.

Baltimore Address. To the President of the United States.

Morris County Proceedings. Resolutions, Petition and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of Morris County, (New Jersey) respecting the pending Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.

To the President of the United States of America. The Petition and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of the County of Morris, in New Jersey,

Remarks on the VIIth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty. Extract of a Letter from Virginia, dated August 14, to a Gentleman in the City of Philadelphia.

Proceedings at Trenton.

PROCEEDINGS AT TRENTON.

RESOLUTIONS Adopted at a numerous and respectable Meeting of the Citinuns of Powhatan, at their Court-House, on Tuesday the 21st Day of July, 1795, for the Purpose of taking into Consideration 〈◊〉 Proceedings of Gentlemen of Neighbouring Counties, ass•••• at our Court-House, on Saturday, the 4th Instant, in ••• quence of the Troop of Horse belonging to the Brigode being ••• dered to assemble there:—

PROTEST.

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§

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Title page

CONTENTS.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. VIII.

No. IX.

No. X.

No. XI.

No. XII.

No. XIII.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XII.

No. XIII.

No. XIV.

No. XV.

GOVERNOR FENNER's REPLY To the British Vice Consul's Note, enclosing Captain Home's Letter.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, To all whom it may concern.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XIV.

No. XV.

FROM THE PHILADELPHIA GAZETTE. No. I. An Examination of the pending Treaty with Great Britain. To the President of the United States of America.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XVI.

No. XVII.

Proceedings at Lexington.

RESOLUTIONS Of a respectable Number of the Land-holders and other Inhabitants of the County of Amelia (Virginia) assembled at the Court-house, on previous Notice, to take into Consideration the Treaty now pending between the United States of America and Great Britain.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Citizens of Richmond County (Georgia) at a Meeting held in August•, September 1, 1795.

Warren County Proceedings. At a numerous and respectable Meeting of the Inhabitants of the County of Warren (North Carolina) held at the Court-house in Warrenton, on Saturday the 22d of August, for taking into Consideration the Treaty lately passed upon by the Senate of the United States, Mr. William Falkener was unanimously called to the Chair.

ADDRESS Of the Citizens of Charleston (South Carolina) to the President of the United States, transmitted by Thomas Lowndes, one of the Members of the House of Representatives of that State. To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United States.

Judge Stith's Charge. At a Superior Court, begun and held at Savannah, in and for the County of Chatham, on the 4th of August, 1795, Judge Stith delivered the following Charge to the Grand Jury.

RESOLUTIONS Of a Meeting of the Citizens of Camden Town and District, (South Carolina) held at the Court-house, on Saturday the 25th Day of July, assembled for the Purpose of considering the Treaty, lately agreed upon between the United States of Americe and the King of Great Britain.

NUDUM PACTUM. ARTICLE IX.

Proceedings in the Senate of the United States. FROM THE AURORA.

THE LAMENTATION.

FROM THE BOSTON CENTINEL. The Objections to the Treaty, refuted.

No. I.

No. II.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

American Remembrancer, &c. An Examination of the pending Treaty with Great Britain.

No. II. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17.] To the President of the United States of America.

No. III.

No. IV.

The Objections to the Treaty, refuted. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 72.] No. III.

Remarks on Mr. Charles Pinckney's Speech, Delivered at St. Michael's Church (Charleston) the 22d July last, on the Subject of the Treaty: published in the City and State Gazettes of the 4th August, 1795.

Proceedings at Newport, In Town Meeting holden by adjournment on the 19th of August, A. D. 1795.

REPORT.

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Observations on Treaties.

Remarks on the Vth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

Reflections on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. I.

Article II.

Article III.

Article VI.

No. II.

Article VII.

Article IX.

No. III.

Article X.

No. IV.

Article XII.

Article XIII.

No. V.

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Strictures on the late Conduct of the Executive. To the President of the United States of America.

LETTER From the Chairman of a Meeting of the Citizens of Norfolk (Virginia) hold August 5, 1795. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

PRESIDENT's ANSWER.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

STRICTURES On the President's Circular Answer.

Reflections on Mr. Jay's Treaty. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 140.] No. VI.

Article XIV.

Article XV.

Article XVII.

Remarks on Mr. Charles Pinckney's Speech.

FROM THE VIRGINIA GAZETTE. GRACCHUS.—No. I.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XVIII.

No. XIX.

No. XX.

FROM THE AURORA. Sophistry Detected. No. I.

FROM THE LANCASTER JOURNAL. State of Opinions on the Treaty.

FROM THE JERSEY CHRONICLE. Observations on the Disposition of Administration to France and England.

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Remarks on some of the probable Consequences of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

FROM THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER.

ATTICUS—No. I. To the Freemen of the United States.

No. II.

REMARKS ON TREATIES.

Reply of the President of the United States, to the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce. TO THOMAS RUSSELL, Esquire.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

§

ATTICUS—No. III.

No. IV.

No. V.

The Objections to the Treaty, refuted.

No. IV.

No. V.

No. VI.

No. VII.

Mercer County Resolutions. At a numerous Meeting of the Freemen of Mercer County (Kentucky) at the Court-house in Harrisburgh, on the 22d Day of September, 1795 (being the Court Day for the said County) the Time and Occasion of the Meeting having been previously advertised—The following Resolutions were unanimously agreed to, and ordered to be printed.

FROM THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES. American Commerce in Europe.

Savannah Address to the President. Copy of the Address to the President of the United States, which accompanied the Proceedings of the Citizens, convened in the City of Savannah, on the 1st Day of August, 1795. To the President of the United States of America.

PRESIDENT'S ANSWER. To Noble Wimberly Jones, Esq

Lexington Resolutions. At a Meeting of the Inhabitants from sundry Parts of the Commonwealth, at the Court-house in Lexington (Kentucky) on Friday the 28th Day of August, 1795; the Treaty, lately concluded on by Lord Grenville and John Jay, was fully discussed, and the following Resolutions unanimously agreed to.

Williamsburgh Proceedings. At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of Williamsburgh, District of Georgetown (South Carolina) on Saturday the 5th of August, 1795, to consider, communicate, and report their Sentiments on the impending Treaty between the United States and the Court of Great Britain—Captain William Frierson was un• nimously called to the Chair.

Laurens County Proceedings. At a Meeting of the Citizens of Laurens County (South Carolina) at the Court-house thereof, on Wednesday, the 1•th of August, 1795—Sylvanus Walker, Esquire, in the Chair.—

TO CITIZEN PIERCE BUTLER.

FROM THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER. Striking Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

"There is nothing new under the sun."

Plymouth Proceedings. At a Meeting of the Town of Plymouth (Massachusetts) assembled and held at the Court-House in Plymouth, October 28, 1795.

REPORT.

Washington Resolutions. At a Meeting of the Citizens, Inhabitants of Washington District, in the State of South Carolina, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his Britannic Majesty, and the United States of America, concluded at London, on the 19th Day of November, 1794—was taken into Consideration, when the following Resolutions, expressive of their Sentiments on the Subject, were entered into.

ST. JAMES's PARISH. At a numerous Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Parish of St. James's, Goose Creek (South Carolina) on the 8th of August, 1795, the following Resolutions were moved and adopted.

First Fruits of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

FROM THE PETERSBURG INTELLIGENCER.

To the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Memorial and Petition of the Subscribers thereof,

Sophistry Detected [CONTINUED FROM VOL. 2. PAGE 201.] No. II.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XXI.

No. XXII.

No. XXIII.

No. XXIV.

No. XXV.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XVI.

ATTICUS—No. VI.

No. VII.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

FROM THE NEW-YORK ARGUS.

CINNA.—No. I.

CINNA.—No. II.

CINNA.—No. III.

CINNA—No. IV.

§

§

Some observations on a letter said to be written by a gentleman 〈◊〉 character and information in Vermont, and bearing date the 18th July last .

No. II.

American Appeals. The following important case of the Brigantine 〈◊〉 Betsey, W. Furlong, master, was heard and determined in London, by the lords commissioners of appeals, on the twenty-fifth July, 1795.

Observations on the fourteenth article of mr. Jay's Treaty.

FROM THE ARGUS. Camillus refuted by Alexander Hamilton.

CAMILLUS.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON. In Congress, Monday, May 26, 1783. On motion of mr. Hamilton, seconded by mr Izard.

Remarks on the above.

ADDRESS Of the Citizens of Charlestown to the President. To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United-States.

PRESIDENT's ANSWER. To Richard Devens, David Gordwin, Joseph Adams, Richard Frothingham. John Carter, and Eliphalet Newell, Selectmen of Charlestown.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Citizens of Frederic Conniy, Virginia.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

ATTICUS—No. VIII. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 72.] To the Freemen of the United States.

No. IX.

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XXVI.

No. XXVII.

No. XXVIII.

No. XXIX.

No. XXX.

No. XXXI.

No. XXXII.

No. XXXIII.

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Title page

CONTENTS.

CINNA.—No. V. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 102.]

No. VI.

ADDRESS To the Citizens of New York.

Form of the petition, to be transmitted to Congress. To the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled: The Representation and Petition of the Subscribers, Inhabitants of the State of—, and Citizens of the United States,

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. XXXIII.—Concluded.

No. XXXIV.

No. XXXV.

No. XXXVI.

No. XXXVII.

No. XXXVIII.—AND LAST.

To the Editor of the American Remembrancer.

REMARKS ON THE Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, Concluded between Lord Grenville and Mr. Jay, on the Part of Great Britain and the United States, respectively.

PLYMOUTH PROTEST.

At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of the County of Westmoreland, (Virginia) convened, in consequence of writter Invitations circulated through the Country, for the purpose of taking the Opinion of the People on the Treaty lately concluded between the United States and the British Nation, September 29th, 1795.

PRESIDENT'S ANSWER. JOSEPH PIERCE, ESQ

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§

§

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THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OR ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c. RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—AUGUST 20, 1795.—

[Page]

Advertisement.

IT is intended, in the present Publication, to collect together the most valuable Essays, Resolutions, Speeches, &c. respecting the Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.

In the Prosecution of this Plan, the Publisher pledges himself to observe the strictest Impartiality, and on this Observance rests his Pretensions to public Encouragement.

[Page]

CONTENTS.

SPEECH of Mr. Charles Pinckney, at Charleston, July 22d, 1795 Page 5

Speech of Mr. J. Thompson, at Petersburg, August 1st, 1795 Page 21

Proceedings of a Town Meeting at Wilmington, August 4th, 1795 Page 28

Speech of Mr. Casar Rodney, at Wilmington, August 4th, 1795 Page 29

Memorial of the Citizens of Wilmington and its Vicinity to the President of the United States Page 36

Reply of the President to the Citizens of Wilmington Page 38

— to the Selectmen of Boston Page 39

Observations on the constitutional Power to form Treaties Page 40

Camillus, No. I. Page 41.

— No. II. Page 47

— No. III. Page 53

— No. IV. Page 62

— No. V. Page 68

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Speech of Mr. Charles Pinckney, Late Governor of South Carolina, at a very numerous Meeting of the Citizens of Charleston, the 22d July, 1795, to hear the Report of their Committee on the Treaty between Great-Britain and the United States of America. Carefully collected from the Notes of Mr. Pinckney, and afterwards inspected by himself.

HE began by saying, that having been absent in the country, he was prevented from attending their meeting on the 16th—but, conceiving it the duty of every friend to his country, on an occasion so interesting to their commercial rights, he [...] permission to state some observations in support of th [...] op [...]ni [...]n he should give on the treaty.

In doing this, he said he should follow the advice that had just been properly given by the Intendant, and be very moderate. In discussions of such importance, moderation appeared to him essential to the discovery of truth.

It was somewhere very well said, that passion and intemperance never failed to wrest the sceptre from reason; and he hoped they would not, on this interesting occasion, prevent the fair application of argument to the judgment of an assembly so numerous and respectable as that was.

In examining the treaty, it appeared to him necessary previously to trace the manner in which Mr. Jay, had been appointed to this trust, and the instructions he had received; in order to determine how far it was conducted, in its commencement and progress, upon those principles which were conformable to the spirit and intention of that article of the constitution which respects treaties, and to the candor and fairness which ought to govern in all negociations where any thing like reciprocity is to be expected, and where there was no determination, on the part of the government, or its negociator, that unnecessary and dishonorable sacrifices were to be nature.

He said that it must here be acknowledged, that as Mr. Jay's appointment [...] originated in a bre [...]ch, if not of the letter, yet most clearly of the spirit of the constitution—which seems, to have intended, that a judicia [...]y should be e [...]ected in a manner that would re [...]der i [...] independent of the ins [...]ence of [Page]the executive and legislature, or of those prejudices which the most distant connection with either must necessarily produce; and that the same man should not have it in his power to form a treaty, and afterwards, as a judge, prejudiced as he must be by being concerned in its negociation, to decide upon its meaning: so there had appeared, for a considerable time, a determination in a party in our government to force a connection with Great Britain, not only at the risk of this valuable guard to the administration of justice, by establishing a precedent for taking the judges from the bench, while in office, and giving them diplomatic or other appointments, but in a breach of a still more important limitation of the constitution—the one which respects the power of the president to form treaties with the advice and consent of the senate.

By referring to the proceedings of the senate on this occasion, it appears that the president, in a short, unexplanatory message, stated to them, that, from the communications of our minister in Great Britain, our affairs with that court wore a serious aspect; that before we resorted to the last expedient, which had been the scourge of so many nations, he thought negociation preferable, and nominated Mr. Jay as envoy extraordinary on that occasion. He said, his confidence in our minister resident there remained undiminished; but he still was of opinion, the measure was necessary; that such an envoy, going from among us at this time, would have fuller information of the state of things, and carry with him more effectually the sensibility and feelings of the people.

On this message being sent to the senate, it was very properly supposed, by some of the members of that body, that the president ought to have submitted to them the whole of the business upon which Mr. Jay was to have been sent; and a motion to that effect was brought forward, but negatived. Mr. Jay's appointment was consented to; and, as far as he understood to be the fact, he was absolutely sent to negociate a treaty with Great Britain, without his instructions being submitted to the senate, or that body being acquainted with the president's intention to enter into a negociation, which was ultimately to lead to the formation of a treaty of such immense consequence to every part of the union. He had been informed, and he believed his information was correct, that many of the members of the senate at that time were of opinion, Mr. Jay was sent for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the depredations in the West Indies; to demand the delivery of the posts, and the execution of the treaty of peace; and to require a stipu [...]tion, [Page]that our vessels should not in future be liable to seizure or condemnation on any pretence. He was sure that this was the general opinion of the people in this part of the union; and, as he had observed, he understood it to be the opinion of the senate.

If this is the fact, that Mr. Jay's instructions for forming this treaty were not submitted to the senate, nor received their assent, he considered it as a matter of great importance indeed, and that required the most serious attention of the people, how far the constitution ever intended to authorize the president to enter into any negociation with a foreign power, without his having first submitted his intentions and instructions to the senate and received their advice and assent, as well with respect to the necessity of such negociation, as to the propriety of his instructions.

Mr. Pinckney said, his opinion clearly was, that the constitution gave no power to the president to commence a negociation, without previously submitting his intentions and instructions to the senate, requiring their advice and receiving their assent. The words "by and with the advice and consent of the senate" admit no other explanation. He cannot be said to advise with them upon a measure, if he forms a treaty without their knowledge, and merely leaves to them the power of determining whether they will ratify it or not, after it has been solemnly concluded by the minister.

The true construction of this article, and the use the people of the union will one day require to be made of it, is, if the president thought a foreign negociation necessary, that he should previously consult the senate, and be governed by their opinion, how far it would be proper, and upon what conditions, to proceed in it; and that if the senate, without the previous interference of the president, thought a negociation proper, that they should advise it, and that the president should enter upon it. Although a contrary use had hitherto been made of this power, yet Mr. Pinckney said, that it well deserved the attention of the public, whether any other construction ought to be admitted; and that if a different use had been made of it, or if the article was doubtful, or open to any other meaning, whether it was not of greater consequence than any thing that had been agitated since the revolution, that these doubts should be removed, and the meaning he contended for, unequivocally given to the article. If, on the other hand, a power was to be given to the president to enter into negociations with foreigners, without acquainting the senate with their nature, or the connections he wishes to form, and be should merely [Page]leave to them the power of ratifying or not, it must at once be seen, that the agency, which the constitution intended to give the senate, in the formation of treaties, was in a great measure destroyed; and that as it was an unusual, and sometimes a hazardous thing, and productive of war, or other national calamities, for nations to refuse to ratify a treaty after it had been signed by the minister, who, it is to be supposed, was properly instructed, and acted agreeably to the instructions and wishes of those who sent him, there could be no doubt of improper treaties being FORCED upon the people.

If the senate were not to have a right to advise the president to a negociation, which they considered as proper, without his previous interference—if no foreign connection was to take place but of his proposing—it then indeed became an enquiry of the highest importance, how far the people or the constitution of the United States ever intended to place all its foreign connections, all the treaties they may think necessary to their peace and security, to their general interests, or the regulation of their commerce, in the hands of one man: a man in whom, by giving him the right to nominate, they had already placed all the honors and offices of the government; and to which unexampled power in any thing that had even the appearance of a free government, an attempt, was here made to add the all-important one of concluding treaties without the knowledge of the senate, and leaving it to them merely to ratify: a power which, under an unwise use of it, may involve us in wars, abridge our rights, and would, as he should attempt to shew, by such treaties as Mr. Jay's, eventually destroy our navingation and commerce, and the right congress had to regulate them.

He would, upon a proper occasion, enter more largely into these subjects; he had at present mentioned them with a view to prove the necessity of the people's seriously attending to a treaty, in the commencement of which there have been two breaches of the constitution, and which, from the manner of its negociation, must necessarily bring before the public a discussion of the important subjects which on this occasion he had only time very slightly to touch upon.

If, however, a treaty was considered as indispensible, and our trade was in so languid a state that it could not be advantageously carried on without the support of, or a connection with Great Britain, surely Mr. Jay was of all men the most improper that could have been appointed; the most unlikely to obtain those advantages which the humbled and distressed situation of that country gave us a right to expect,—nay, to demand; and without which it is the universal opinion of all the real [Page]friends of their country, it was dishonorable, not to say treacherous, to have entered into any treaty with them.—His dislike to the French—his partiality for British government and measure—h [...] opin [...]ns as secretary, and afterwards as judge, in favor of their claims, were well known. On these points the English minister was sure of his acquiescence in every demand. If he had attempted to say a word in favor of the claims, or even of allowances to his countrymen, his opponent had only to show him his own opinions, and his lips must have been instantly closed.

They could not but recollect his conduct, in the attempt be made in 1785, to barter away the rights of his country, in sacrificing the interests, and of course dissevering the western territory from the union, by ceding to Spain, for twenty-five years, the right to navigate the Mississippi, for which we were to receive a treaty that would not give a single benefit we did not before possess, and which it must always be her interest to allow. Standing, therefore, in this situation as a public man, he was so devoted to the interests of the British, and his opinions in favor of that country were so well known, that it was impossible for us, through such a negociator, to form any but a treaty destructive to our commercial rights, ungrateful and injurious to our allies, and consequently degrading to our national character. However, good may sometimes arise our of evil. If he had not made this public exposure of his conduct and principles, he might one day have been brought forward, among others, as a candidate for our highest office.—But the general and deserved contempt which his negociations have brought both his talents and principles into, will, he trusted, for ever secure his fellow citizens from the dangerous and unwise use which such a man would have made of the important powers vested in a president.

How far, under these circumscances, and many of them must have been known to him, it may have been prudent in the president to send a man who has shown himself so uninformed of the commercial interests of his country, and so miserably deficient in those talents which a negociator required— to oppose him singly, and at their own court, to the talents, experience, and perhaps temptations of their ablest statesmen,— is one of those extraordinary occurrences in his conduct, which, considering the character, general good sense, and unshaken integrity of the president, is difficult to be accounted for.

Such was the negociator; and such were the circumstances under which this treaty has been produced.

[Page] I am now, he said, to examine the treaty,—but as the report of the committee has just been read, it would be unnecessary, and occupy more of your time than you could spare, to enter into a particular discussion of every article; all that can be expected, at present, is to review its leading features, and state how far they misstate against the true interests of our commerce.

The first article admits the return of all persons to this country, whose conduct has rendered them obnoxious, and whose cases have already been decided upon by the state legislatures: a measure repugnant to the feelings of our fellow citizens, and unnecessary in a treaty of commerce.

The second respects the posts. It is well known they are of consequence to the interests of the states concerned in the fur trade, and essential to the peace and security of the inhabitants bordering on the Indians in that neighbourhood. Although the treaty of peace expressly stipulated for their delivery twelve years ago, yet they have been retained, and still are held in defiance of the authority and remonstrances of our government and, notwithstanding they ought to have been delivered at th [...] time fixed by the treaty, they are now offered to be granted a [...] a douceur for surrendering important privileges, and under ci [...] cumstances which either give peculiar privileges to the Briti [...] subjects, or give a right of citizenship to those who have bee [...] and may again become, from their neighbourhood to the Indians, dangerous enemies to the peace and trade of that part [...] the union.

It may easily be seen, from the care which the British [...] nister has taken to word the 3d article, and the easy and ra [...] dy concession which Mr. Jay has made to the British of eve [...] privilege they could think of inserting, that he has very nea [...] yielded to them almost every advantage that could flow to [...] from a trade with the Indians and the western territory.

The article which respects the recovery of debts, is at ow [...] as unnecessary as dishonorably burdensome to our governmen [...] It was a point upon which the creditors had long since m [...] up their minds, and one which a very little firmness on [...] stituents, would have induced them to relinquish; by far [...] greater number of cases had been settled by suit or compromi [...] and it seems to be calculated merely for the purpose of opera [...] a dangerous and extensive door to claims on the treasury the union; claims which, long since, have been laid aside, a [...] many of which, particularly that part which respects the p [...] [...], have originated in the most manifest injusti [...] [Page]But on this subject Mr. Jay had pledged himself. Although he knew it would operate to the ruin almost entirely of that class which have been the greatest sufferers by the revolution, be meant the former merchants of America, such has been his constant and unremitted attention to the support of the British claims, that, as secretary for foreign affairs, as judge, and now as envoy, he has unceasingly and with marked industry and perseverance upon all occasions supported them, against the interests of his fellow citizens, the feelings of humanity, and the honor and gratitude of his country. It also creates a mode of adjudication unusual and unknown to the laws of this country; and leaves it to be determined by chance, whether the majority of the commissioners to be appointed may not be British subjects, and load our funds, at pleasure, with a very heavy debt.

The next point respects the depredations on our commerce in the West Indies, and the compensation it proposes. This was the subject which gave rise to Mr. Jay's mission; for, he said, he believed that had no depredations existed, no such appointment would have been made.—How far he has succeeded in his attempt to obtain compensation, or whether the mode he has adopted, will prove effectual, time alone can discover; at present it appears to be very doubtful, and to depend entirely upon chance. Each party are to appoint two commissioners, whose opinions will be previously well known, and who will carry with them into their adjudications all the passions and prejudices of those who appoint them—it will then depend entirely upon the fifth, who is to be chosen by lot, in whose favor the decision will be: whereas these depredations being notorious breaches of the law of nations, and insulting infringements of our neutrality, the demand should have been spirited and positive, the remedy speedy and complete; no alternative should have been offered; he should have required immediate satisfaction; if they had refused, he should have quitted their court, and left it to his country to have determined what other measures were necessary to pursue. But, instead of this, he has accepted a remote, expensive, and uncertain remedy; and, in return for their refusal of justice, in the most condescending manner has stipulated that all prizes brought in by our allies, and which are said to have been captured by privateers illegally equipped, or taken within our limits, shall be paid for upon certain and fixed principles.

As to the 12th article, which the senate have rejected, there appears but one sentiment throughout the union; there can be but one in the beast of every man of serfs, spirit or honest [Page]in every part of the world; that it is an infamous and degrading surrender of the rights and character of this country, and a mean and ungenerous desertion of the interest of our friends, the French, to whose supplies, at least in the articles they consider as of necessity in their present noble and unexampled struggle for freedom, we are bound by every tie of gratitude and honor to attend. To examine this article fully, state its inequalities, the restrictions it imposes, and the evils that must arise from it, are not within the limits of these observations; nor is it necessary, from the general detestation in which it is hold by foreigners as well as citizens. That for the paltry allowance of being permitted to send vessels of 70 tons to the British West Indies, we are to give up the right to export West India produce, and even the cotton of American growth, to Europe, in our own vessels, is such a glaring and insolent attempt to abridge our rights and gratify the wishes of the British nation in checking our commerce, that, instead of carrying with him the feelings and sensibility of his countrymen, which were certainly sufficiently awake to the conduct of Great Britain, he must have entirely forgot their temper and firmness; he could not have remembered, that, however mild and obedient they generally were to laws founded in equality and a regard to their rights, yet that they loved their country, were attentive to its interests, and impatient of any insult on its government; and that sooner than submit to such ignominious shackles as those he had attempted to impose, however they might wish upon all honorable occasions to avoid them, they would rather risk the dangers and inconveniencies of a war.

He has, however, endeavoured immediately to follow this submissive and dishonourable article with one which he supposes, by having the appearance of a favor, will in some measure atone for its disgraceful concessions; this is the one which respects the trade with their East India settlements. To those who are unacquainted with it, this may at first have the appearance of a favor; but upon examination it will appear to be delusive. Our vessels are to be hospitably received in their ports, and allowed to trade in such articles the importation and exportation of which are not prohibited. It is well known that the commerce of Great Britain with her colonies and establishments in the East Indies, is entirely founded in a monopoly of all their valuable exports and productions; of course our vessels are prohibited from touching them, and c [...] meet with l [...]e of [...] [...]uence to induce them to g [...] there; they can much more advanta [...]outly trade with the Chinese, [Page] who have for ages had so much wisdom as to give particular privileges to NO nations, but to open their ports equally to all, and keep the regulation and management of their commerce in their own hands. Besides, there are different opinions on the nature and consequences of our trade to the East Indies; and it has frequently been represented by men of, considerable knowledge and talents, that, situated as we are at present, and must be for many years, an extensive trade to the East Indies, is an inju [...]ious one; because, at an immense expense, we import from them nothing but articles of mere luxury, most of which, except tea, we could do very well without, or procure elsewhere, in exchange for our productions; and they take from us in payment scarcely any thing but specie.

As to those parts of the treaty which declare what articles are contraband of war, and which recognize a right to seize and detain our vessels by refusing to adhere to a maxim which we ought never to depart from, that free bottoms make free goods; they are injurious in some degree to every part of the union, but particularly so to this state, whose principal exports are provisions. It was indispensible to our interests that the right of searching our vessels on any pretence should have been given up, except in attempts to enter places which were considered as blockaded according to the law of nations.—Unless this is done, we must continually be involved in every war that takes place among the maritime powers of Europe.

We must give up becoming, as neutrals, their carriers, or supplying them, in time of scarcity, with provisions. If we are to consent to their having the right to search our vessels, or de [...]ain them on any condition, except the one above-mentioned, here is an end of any advantages we are ever to expect from being neutral, and our commerce is prostrated at the feet of [...]aritime powers: principles which will justify all the deprelations committed, or authorize similar, are at once established; and we have but one resource left, which is, to endeavour by every means we have in our power, to obtain such a navy [...]s will give protection to our commerce, and weight to the de [...]ands of our government.

He said he had always been of opinion, and the experience of the present war confirmed it, that the growing commerce [...]f the union required the establishment of a naval force; ten [...]r twelve sail of the line, and a few frigates, would be sufficient to answer all our purposes. Our neighbourhood to the West Indies, the convenience of our ports, and the weight [...]re could add to any scale, would always prevent any of the [...]elligerent powers from invading our commerce or interfering [Page]with its rights. Our Mediterranean trade would likewise besecured, and the advantages which would soon accrue to our citizens from having their commerce protected, as well in time of war as peace, would, in a few years, amply repay the expenses of the equipment.

Among the many improper parts of the treaty, he considered this as the most important, and the most seriously injurious to our commerce: and while they continued to insist upon the right to search and detain our vessels, if there had been no other objection, Mr. Jay should have refused to sign the treaty.

As to the 15th, which is a very important article of the treaty, he had endeavoured upon that to obtain the best mercantile information he could; the result is this:—

The first clause places the vessels of America on the same footing with those of other foreign nations. This perhaps is as much as we could expect, consistent with their obligations to other nations; but it ought to be understood, that by this rule, American vessels going to their European ports, pay from 15 to 20 l. on a vessel of 150 to 200 tons, more than a British vessel. To counteract this well became the government of this country; accordingly, the first congress under the new constitution, imposed a duty on the tonnage of all foreign ships, of 25 cents per ton.

The duty imposed on American ships in England was under the denomination of double light money, &c. and the debates in congress show the object of laying the 25 cents per ton, to be what is here mentioned. The next session of Congress, it being discovered that Great Britain had no inclination to treat with us on subjects of commerce,† a further duty was imposed on foreign tonnage, equal in the whole to 50 cents per ton. It was at the same time discovered, that American ships were fully adequate to the carrying all the foreign goods, West Indian, European, and Asiatic, necessary to the consumption of the country: Congress, therefore, passed a law, that on all foreign goods, imported in American ships from Europe or the West Indies, there should be a deduction of ten per cent on the amount of duties prescribed by law. They have since made the goods imported in American ships pay the whole duty, and foreign ships ten per cent. in addition.

It being clearly ascertained, that America could carry on its own India trade, the difference of duty on foreign ships, was [Page]in all India commodities as fifteen to ten, making, in effect, a total prohibition against foreigners in this trade.

Under these discriminating regulations, American commerce and navigation flourished beyond all former example, and almost to exceed belief. Any one, of common observation, may remark the difference in this town. By whose capital and influence, and under what flag, was the commerce of Charleston carried on, prior to 1789? At that time, there was hardly an American house in extensive trade; and there were not six ships under the American flag trading out of Charleston: now American merchants carry on all the trade, and they own more than sixty vessels of large size, and a much greater proportion of smaller vessels in the West India trade.

Our fellow citizens at the northward too, have had exclusively the India trade, by which, besides supplying our own citizens with Asiatic goods at one fourth the price they were before the revolution, they have exported them to the West Indies, and even to Europe, making thereby the balance of trade more favorable to the United States. These restrictions, favorable to American navigation and commerce, did not produce from any European power counter restrictions. The privy council of Great Britain charged a committee of lords, on the subject of trade, generally to report their opinion on these measures: they took the advice of merchants in the cities of London, Bristol, Liverpool, and Glasgow, and the result was, that in their opinion the trade with America was so important, that it ought not to be hazarded by harsh measures, and they recommended an acquiescence in the present restrictions, rather than to endeavour a removal of them by retaliation. Thus, then, the matter stood when Mr. Jay arrived in England; except that, owing to a contingency, America had so increased her navigation as, beyond all dispute, to be fully adequate to the carrying of the produce of the United States.

At this moment Mr. Jay concedes, in the second section of the 15th article, "But the British government reserves to itself the right of imposing on American vessels entering into the British ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal to that which shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of America, and also such duty as may be adequate to countervail the difference of duty now payable on the importation of European and ASIATIC goods, when imported into the United States, in British or American vessels."

In the last part of the 3d section of the same article it says, "It is agreed that the United States will not impose any new or additional tonnage duty on British vessels, nor increase the [Page]now subsisting difference between the duties payable on the importation of any articles in British or American vessels." The operation of this article will be, that as British goods are generally shipped to America on credit, the condition of the credit will be, that then our (British) ships shall have the freight; and it is not an extravagant idea to presume, that the wealth of the British East India Company may be employed to crush the American merchants now in this trade, that they afterwards may enjoy the monopoly of it.

By treaties now existing with other nations, they are to be used, "as the most favored;" and having of right the same privileges of counteracting these discriminating duties, they will of course exercise it. The extent of these injurious consequences need not be predicted to an intelligent man; every one, even of the meanest capacity, must see in them the speedy and total destruction of American navigation, and of course our independent commerce.

There are other parts of the treaty, by which a number of articles are declared to be contraband, that we never consented to consider as such in any other treaties; and attempts are made to make even provisions come under this description.

By these means almost every article of exportation is declared contraband; and whenever there is a war between the maritime powers, the danger of seizure and condemnation to us will be as great as if we were actually at war ourselves.

He said he would only add, that the 23d, 24th, and 25th articles seem to carry with them very strongly the spirit of the 12th. In them the negociator has endeavoured to render this country as unfriendly as he could to the French, to destroy the tranquillity and order of our sea-ports, and to brand our councils with ingratitude. In them he has displayed all his resentment to the only truly useful and valuable ally we have ever had—a nation which wishes to treat with us upon the equality which ought, and indeed must be the basis of every lasting treaty; for without equality few treaties can last.

Vattel, whose authority will not be doubted, says, that "Nations not being less obliged than individuals to have a regard to equity, they ought, as much as possible, to preserve equality in their treaties. When, therefore, the parties are in such a state as to obtain the same reciprocal advantages, the law of nature requireth their treaties should be equal, at least if there is not some particular reason to deviate from that equality; such, for instance, would be gratitude for a former benefit, in the hope of becoming unavoidably attached to a nation."

[Page] This is the language of the law of nations on the subject of the equality of treaties; and comparing the situation of the two countries, at present, it will not be said we were not in a state to obtain reciprocal advantages. We were certainly not bound, by gratitude for former benefits, to make sacrifices in their favor; nor has it ever appeared to be the disposition of our citizens to be so inviolably attached to Great Britain, as to grant them favors which they have never yielded to the more friendly powers of Europe, nor even to those to whom they are highly indebted for the establishment of their freedom. There must then be some other reasons for those uncommon surrenders, upon which the public are not yet sufficiently informed.

These are the outlines of the treaty on which you are to decide. The shortness of the time allowed for deliberations, and the necessity of dispatch, prevented, he said, his going as fully into its consequences as he would wish, or as he may hereafter do, should it ever come before our legislature. Indeed it is much to be lamented, that the legislatures of the different states were not in session at this important time, as the sentiments of the people, expressed through them, would come with more weight. But the president, to whom the address is to be made, will recollect, that by his postponing the consideration of the treaty from January to June, when none of the state legislatures were in session, the people have been forced to express their sentiments in this way, or to be silent on a subject which has been shown to be of the greatest consequence, and to now rest entirely with him. How awful must he feel his situation! The character, honor, and future commercial consequence of his country, depending entirely on his determination. If he refuses the treaty, he will be for ever entitled to the thanks and gratitude of his country, for having again saved it from the attempts of an experienced and ambitious rival. If he ratifies it, such will ever be the love of his country for his past services, they will always lament that a name, which has hitherto been so distinguished, should, at the close of its career, be voluntarily fixed to so injurious and degrading a measure.

As this is the first attempt which has been made by an unequal and improper treaty, to abridge our rights, and controul the power of congress in regulating our commerce, it becomes the duty of the friends of their country to express their sentiments, and to endeavor by every legal means to oppose its consequences, by stating its defects, and preventing, if possible, its adoption.—We should recollect, that treaties, when ratified; have higher authority than laws, because they are declared to be the supreme law of the land, and are irrevocable but by the [Page]consent of all the parties to them. That, however destructive or injurious they may prove to be in their operation, they are without the sphere of legislative redress or interference: that while the right of regulating commerce remains unimpaired in both houses of congress, there can be no doubt of its being properly used. This the unexampled increase of our commerce for some years, clearly proves, and shows the impropriety of fettering it by treaties. Our policy was to have pursued the same measures; and in all cases where any nation invaded our rights and refused to do us justice, to have endeavored by restrictions, or, if necessary, retaliations, to obtain them.

But if, instead of leaving the regulation of commerce to congress, from whose use of it so many benefits have arisen, there should appear a disposition to interfere, by the means of treaties, which may hereafter operate to lessen our shipping, place us more in the power of foreigners, and destroy that competition which is so necessary to our obtaining a proper price for our staples; to all the states, particularly to those which are agricultural, it becomes a matter of the most serious concern. To no state can it be more so, than to South Carolina. We are entirely agricultural; and while our commerce is unfettered, and the present competition for our productions encouraged and protected by law—while we are sure of having American shipping in sufficient numbers to support our commercial rights—our planters will grow rich, the trade of our merchants become every day more extensive and respectable, and our country will be happy. But let it be once known, that, by the interference of an unfortunate and ruinous treaty, a foundation is laid for the diminution of our shipping; that we are not to enjoy the rights of neutrality or an independent commerce; that our vessels are to be liable to seizure, and we are again to look to other nations for the means of transportation, it will at once damp the hopes of our planters and merchants, and injure the value of their estates, check their enterprizing views, and lessen the general happiness. In all enlightened countries, some portion of the happiness of the inhabitants must depend upon the ease with which they can acquire property, and the protection which their government is able to afford it. It is the general pursuit of mankind; and few people can be happy in any country, which either does not or cannot protect them, abroad as well as at home, in their privileges and property. The experience of the last six years has clearly proved that we possess the means of national happiness and prosperity within ourselves; and it will depend upon the [Page]event of this treaty how far we are to cherish or part with them.

He said his opinion always had been, that countries possessing within themselves the means of a growing and extensive commerce, particularly where they consisted of articles of the first necessity, such as provisions and raw materials necessary to the support and manufact [...]res of other nations, ought not, except in very particular cases, to form treaties of commerce. A nation with these advantages always may, by proper laws and restrictions, render its commerce more advantageous to its own citizens than foreigners. By being unfettered with treaties, it continually has it in its power to avail itself of any advantage the imprudence or situation of other countries may offer; and to always keep the staff of its commerce in its own hands. It is the opinion of those who are best informed on this subject, and in which every enlightened man must concur, that thus situated, commerce, excepting the conventions which regard the law of nations, ought not to be the object of negociation.—That every power, in this regard, should depend only on itself. After having made such regulations as it judges best, calculated for its situation, the nature of its riches and the industry of its inhabitants, let it, like England, have courage and constancy enough never to derogate from them in favor of strangers: all its policy should consist in a resolution never to think of forming treaties of commerce, until it finds itself in some happy circumstance, which may authorise it to demand prerogatives of foreign powers, without purchasing them even with equivalents.

These are principles which apply to all countries in similar situations; but to none more forcibly than to our own, particularly as it respects Great Britain.

Our commerce, as has been confessed by their committee of trade, is of the highest importance to Britain. From her European dominions we take her manufactures, and in return send her provisions and raw materials. The balance, which is generally against us, we pay in specie. So lucrative and important must this commerce be to her, that it certainly will always be her interest to continue and extend it without a treaty. From her West India islands, we receive what it is always in our power to obtain from the islands of the other powers; but in time of searcity, which frequently occurs, they are unable to obtain provisions and lumber but from America. They are therefore more dependent on us than we are upon them, and our situation will soon force from them a much more advantageous trade than the treaty proposes.

[Page] Upon the whole of this business, it will be found that the treaty deserves the censure of every friend to his country, and every man else, who wishes to see its commerce extensive and flourishing. Even the most partial of Mr. Jay's friends confess it is a bad treaty, and they do not wish it ratified; but only contend that it is not just so infamous as it is generally supposed to be—But it may here be asked, has he accomplished a single object for which he was sent? Has he obtained complete satisfaction for the depredations in the West Indies, the delivering of the posts, compensation for their detention, and payment for the negroes carried away? Have they, in short, agreed to do any thing towards executing the treaty of peace, without receiving from us in return a surrender of important commercial rights? Instead of stipulating to make our commerce free, as other nations have done, to whom it is by no means so beneficial, they have expressly reserved to themselves the right of searching and carrying off vessels into then ports; while in return, we have granted them every thing they asked, and more than they could have expected, even if they had given us an advantageous treaty.

From what could this extraordinary surrender of our rights have sprung? Was it from ignorance? Was it from design? For the honor of our public councils he hoped not from the latter. Some of his friends have supposed it to arise from a want of perfect knowledge of our exports—That he did not know that in the United States cotton grew, or that they were ever in the habit of exporting West India produce to Europe. From whatever cause it may have arisen, he was sure it could not be conformable to his instructions. The president was too well acquainted with the interests of his country; he must have recollected that her dignity and his own character were too intimately connected: that he could not sacrifice the one without tarnishing the other. He certainly could never have given such instructions. We know we can trust him; and he wished that the event had proved that we could have trusted Mr. Jay as well.

He concluded with declaring his opinion of the treaty to be, that it was injurious to the commercial rights, and degrading to the character of his country; ungrateful to our allies; and that it was our duty by a respectful, but forcible address, to state our opinion, and request the president not to ratify it.

[Page]

J. THOMPSON'S SPEECH. Speech of Mr. J. Thompson, At a Meeting of the Citizens of Petershurg, convened August 1, 1795, to debate on the pending Treaty with Britain.

THE magnitude of the present subject, and the danger of the present crisis, render this meeting peculiarly proper. We are called upon to examine a treaty, which involves the most precious rights, the most valuable interests, the commerce, the peace, and the honor of America. A concise historical detail will unfold the peculiar circumstances in which America stood prior to the embassy which produced this treaty. The king of Great Britain, who has sworn eternal enmity to republics, acceded at an early period to that combination, which has convulsed Europe, in attempting to stifle the liberty of France. Under the obnoxious pretext of attempting to starve thirty millions of men, he issued orders for intercepting the correspondence, and plundering the commerce of neutral nations. He had long viewed with indignant sorrow, the rapid progress which the Americans made, in spite of all the obstacles he could impose by commercial restrictions, or by flagrant violations of the treaty of 1783. The destruction of our rising commerce, the annihilation of our growing navigation, were the objects contemplated by these nefarious orders. They were executed with all the diligence, and all the oppression which rapacity can practice. A patriotic phalanx in congress proposed every expedient which wisdom could dictate, to obtain compensation for these injuries: but our illustrious president, animated by paternal solicitude for the welfare of America, gently insinuated to congress, that the subject was out of their jurisdiction, and appointed our chief justice to perform the honorable duty of declaring the indignation, and demanding the rights of an injured people. If stern aristocracy had not steeled his bosom against the generous sensations of patriotism—if gratitude, sensibility, and honor, had not been enveloped in the sable gloom of political prejudice, he must have been animated by a magnanimity worthy of his country. In the presence of venal pride and courtly profligacy, even at the footstool of the throne, he would have preserved the attitude of dignity, and spoken the language of truth. But basely apostatizing from republican principles, he stooped to offer the incense of flattery to a tyrant, the scourge of his country, the foe of mankind. After a long negociation, in which he [Page]happily practised the arts of diplomatic flattery, he has presented this treaty to his expecting country. It has received, in every article but one, the sanction of the senate. The conduct of that assembly has, indeed, been uniform. Since the establishment of the federal government, it has never deigned to adopt the sentiments of the people, or to communicate in own, except in the dignified form of laws and treaties. The majesty of that assembly has never been polluted by the vile feet of the swinish multitude. The existence of an aristocracy in this country is too often regarded as the chimera of some distempered enthusiast, or the fiction of some dangerous dem [...] gogue I will appeal to the understandings of this audience, if the funding system has not organized a great aristocracy, which has usurped the dominion of the senate, which h [...] often preponderated in the house of representatives, which proclaims itself in servile addresses to our supreme executive, i [...] dangerous appointments, in monstrous accumulations of de [...] in violation of the constitution, in proscriptions of democra [...] and, to complete the climax of political infamy, in this treaty I will ask, if the senate does not discover abject servility, i [...] proposing the ratification of a treaty in which the sine expre [...] sions of friendship are prostituted by being used to a king I will ask, if it was delicate, virtuous, or republican, to lo [...] upon the struggle of a great people for liberty, with cold i [...] difference, to preserve a sullen neutrality, between freemen an [...] despots, and to grant important privileges in peace and i [...] war, to a government tottering under its own abuses, and s [...] bly warring against liberty?

I will now consider each article of the treaty—I will co [...] pare it with the French treaty, and demonstrate to this meeting the necessity of expressing our detestation.

Prior to a discussion of this treaty, it may be proper to observe, that the sequestration proposed in congress, was prefe [...] ble to the system of negociation adapted by the executive The compensation obtained, would have been instantaneo [...] and adequate, the punishment inflicted, severe and just, th [...] measure adopted, energetic and republican. This expedie [...] was opposed, as leading to a war, by a party who conce [...] aristocracy under the gentle form of moderation. Whil [...] declare the triumh of this party, I blush for my country Yes—we hesitated to offend a proud king, who had capture our vessels, enslaved our fellow-citizens, ruined our merchan [...] invaded our territory, and trampled on our sovereignty. Shri [...] ing from this measure, we prostrated ourselves before him smiled in his face, flattered, and obtained this treaty.

[Page] The objections I shall make to it are, first, on account of the articles it does not contain; and, secondly, on account of the articles it does contain. It ought to have been expressly stipulated, that the king of Great Britain should interpose for us his good offices with the piratical states, or at least that he should not negociate a peace between Portugal and Algiers, which should again render those plunderers the tyrants of the ocean. His recent conduct in that quarter had very materially injured us—but no provision against a repetition of it, has been made by our minister. By the French treaty, concluded in the year 1778, in the tumultuous moments which attend the crisis of liberty, by a government so much despised for imbecility, this protection from Algerine corsairs, was expressly given by a king, from whom we had nothing to demand, and every thing to sue, and to whom we granted privileges much less important, than those we now grant.

A stipulation ought to have been insisted on for ample compensation for the detention of the western posts—a detention which has defrauded America of the immense profits of the fur trade, and which has produced a long, bloody, and disastrous Indian war.

A stipulation ought to have been made that British ships of war should protect American ships at sea. Although the artieles relative to armed ships appear to be mutual; yet, since we have no armed ships, we receive no consideration for the privileges we grant theirs. Here another advantage is given to us by the French treaty, which this denies.

As I have been forced to anticipate the comparison between the two treaties, I will now continue it, and then state my objections to the articles contained in the treaty. The French are by treaty to pay no higher duties than the most favored nations pay. In the year 1778, we refused to admit even those generous allies into our ports upon the same terms with citizens. By this treaty the British are to be admitted on the same terms with American merchants. But the French, the Dutch, and the Spaniards, are entitled to pay no higher duties than the most favored nations. If this treaty is ratified, they will be obliged to pay no higher duties than American merchants. This treaty then almost annihilates the distinction between foreigners and natives; which we refused to relinquish in favor of our allies and protectors in the epoch of danger and infancy —Let this prove with what abject humility we prostrate before the British king.

By the 2d article of the French treaty, it is provided, that enemies' property shall not be taken out of American vessels— [Page]the French cannot take out of American vessels British property. By this treaty it is provided, that enemies' property may be taken out of American vessels. The British may take out of American vessels French property. The object of this article was, to give the sanction of America to those atrocious robberies, which have wrested from the wretched West Indian exile, the last pittance of despairing poverty. By the French treaty, the carrying trade of enemies' property, not only from neutral ports to enemies' ports, but from enemies' ports to enemies' ports, is given us—By this treaty, that valuable source of wealth is denied us. By the French treaty it is declared that they shall not intercept American vessels bound with provisions to the ports of their enemies—By this treaty it is declared, that the British may intercept American vessels bound with provisions to the ports of their enemies. The French then cannot intercept American vessels bound with provisions to the ports of Great Britain; but the British can intercept American vessels bound with provisions to the ports of the French republic. The object of this article was to render America accessary to the nefarious scheme of exciting, by the agency of famine, insurrection and disorder, which may either exterminate or enslave the French. The object of this article was to render America a cowardly confederate, concealing, under the venerable form of friendship, the vilest malice. And shall this treaty dissolve the compact made by nature between the two republics, secured by seelings generous and inexpressible, guaranteed by all the soft sensibilities of the human heart? Shall this treaty force the Americans, the first people who sacrificed at the altar of liberty, to join the ruthless despots, who march to desolate France, to restore the altars of a barbarous superstition, and to extinguish the celestial light which has burst upon the human mind? O! my countrymen, when you are capable of such monstrous baseness, even the patriot will invoke upon you the contempt of ages.

The man who can hesitate, after this comparison, to pronounce that our ambassador, and the majority of our senate, prefer British principles and British connections, to French principles and French connections, must be timid in thought, and servile in sentiment. Yes, they prefer that mouldering, Gothic edifice, the British constitution, to the elegant temple of liberty, which philosophy has just erected in France.

The second article of this treaty permits the British subjects, settled in the western posts, to elect to remain British subjects at those posts, even after they are ceded. This article not only [...]iolates the sacred principles of the common law, which declares [Page]that aliens cannot hold landed property, but operates as an indirect repeal of the late law of congress with respect to naturalization. If the president and senate have the power of repealing indirectly, or contravening even remotely, the laws, we are slaves! If they have not this power, a ratification will be an usurpation. Men, situated within the territory of the United States, and holding immense landed property, will, in case of a rupture with Great Britain, be bound to attack our defenceless fellow citizens situated near them, to join the hostile Indians, and raise the war whoop of savage cruelty. By this article, the western posts are ceded by America to Great Britain, until June, 1796. The power of ceding territory can only be exercised by congress. If this treaty is ratified, the president and senate will usurp it. I contend that the cession of those posts for one single day, was as unconstitutional as the cession of them for ten thousand years. Previous arrangements are to be made. What arrangements? Will not the British government propose some unreasonable arrangement, and then justify a further detention of the posts by our refusal to make it?

The third article, like every other, wants that reciprocity which should pervade the whole treaty. In return for the important privilege of trading to all our ports, subject to no higher duties than our own citizens, of bringing to our ports, in vessels of any description, the produce of any country on the face of the globe, we have the poor privilege of carrying to the ports of Great Britain the produce of our own country only, and of trading to the West Indies in fishing boats for two years, provided we covenant not to export any produce imported from those islands. This article is a regulation of commerce. The constitution gives the power of regulating commerce to congress. A ratification will be an usurpation of this power. This objection embraces almost the whole treaty. Boldly assuming the name of a compact concerning commerce, it disdains to render the constitution even the homage of hypocrisy. Here the absurdity of giving to the president and senate the power of making treaties becomes apparent. All treaties either regulate commerce, or cede territory, or conclude a war, by leaving things in statu quo. Treaties of the first and second kind cannot be constitutionally made by the president and senate—Treaties of the third kind hardly ever occur. Besides, our constitution absurdly gives to one body the power of making war, and to another the power of finishing it.

By the sixth article, the American government is to assume the payment of British debts. This assumption is unconstitutional. [Page]All the power of the federal government with respect to debts, is given, by a concise article of the constitution, which declares that congress shall pay the debts of America. It is evident, that no stipulations with respect to debts, can constitutionally be made by the president and senate. This article manifests the aristocratical spirit, of which I have accused our late ambassador and the majority of the senate, by being unconstitutional, by accusing the state legislatures which emancipated America, of atrocious injustice, and by increasing that debt which has already created an influence independent of the people. It increases the ignominious tribute which we now pay to British speculators.

What article of the constitution authorises the president and senate to establish a judiciary colossus, which is to s [...]and with one foot on America and with the other on Britain, and drag the reluctant governments of those countries to the altar of justice? What liberal article provides that the American government shall guara [...]ec to all foreigners the payment of debts due from its citizens? Are Portuguese, and Dutch, and Spanish, and French merchants, to come in, liquidate their accounts, and obtain payment from the government? Or are our new friends, the British, to be preferred for their justice and generosity? Either the American government is to have remedy against the American citizens owing these debts, or not—If it is, then American citizens are to be ultimately bound by the awards of a tribunal composed partly of foreigners, partly sa [...] rized by a foreign potentate, erected neither by the constitution nor the legislature, invested with those discretionary powers, often tyrannically exercised, under the name of equity, proceeding without juries, by process, peculiar and anomalous governed by no established rules, and elevated above appeal. —But if the government is not to have remedy, then the de [...] of solvent American citizens are to be discharged by general taxation, whilst they remain in splendid impunity.

By the seventh article, the claims of American merchant arising from the spoliations, are to be liquidated by an arbi [...] ty tribunal, and to be ratified, not by being paid, but by being funded. This will interweave in some measure the interests [...] the American commerce with the British government. British influence, already enormous, will be extended. A strong p [...] ty of Americans will inculcate the most pusillanimous sub [...] sion to that haughty government, and will view with malig [...] sorrow, the progress of that stream of opinion, which, in sp [...] of learned sophistry, and powerful oppression, is destined [...] sweep its way.

[Page] The ninth article invades the rights of this commonwealth, by contemplating the case of Denny Fairfax.

The tenth article deprives congress of the power of sequestration; and if the president and senate can deprive it of this power, they can deprive it of all powers.

Since the senate have had the modesty to reject the twelfth article, a discussion of that is unnecessary, except to show that the servile condescension of our ambassador startled even them.

The twenty-first article attacks the sacred rights of expatriation. By this article, an American citizen who abjures his country, becomes a citizen of the French republic, and resides there twenty years, may be punished as a pirate, if he accepts a French commission. This article defines piracy. The power of defining piracy is given by the constitution to congress. If the treaty is ratified, the president and senate will usurp this power too.

The twenty-third and twenty-fourth articles are incompatible with the 17th of the French treaty. It is true, that a sweeping clause declares, that stipulations contained in this treaty, shall not affect treaties existing with other nations. But the king of Great Britain denies that the French are a nation. Besides, since the clause expresses nothing more than the law of nations implies, it is mere surplusage. It must be rejected, and then the repugnancy of the two treaties becomes manifest.

I will now recapitulate the usurpations which the president and senate will make if the treaty is ratified. They will usurp the power of making rules with respect to aliens, of ceding territory, of regulating commerce, of paying debts, of regulating duties, of establishing courts, and of defining piracies. The house of representatives will be degraded to a house of commons; summoned to answer an address, to regulate a few subjects of internal policy, and to vote money. But this treaty will not be ratified. The illustrious president, who administers our government, will not abandon, in his venerable old age, the generous maxims, the nice honor, the pure virtue, and the ardent patriotism, which have elevated him to save his country. He will view with indignation, the gigantic wickedness, which seeks, through the medium of a perfidious treaty, to render him an apostate, and to destroy at one blow, the commerce, the constitution, and the honor of his country.

[Page]

Wilmington Town Meeting.

August 4th, 1795.

THIS afternoon, at 4 o'clock, agreeable to public notice, previously given, the citizens of this borough and its vicinity assembled together at the upper market house, to take into their consideration the treaty lately concluded by John Jay, between the United States and Britain.

We were much pleased to see so many of our aged and respectable citizens turn out on this all important occasion, with a number of our old patriots who had retired from public scenes, some of them from a considerable distance. The oldest people say, they never recollect to have seen such an universal convention of the inhabitants of this place, there being upwards of 500 people.

About 5 o'clock, they chose Dr. James Tilton for their chairman, and then adjourned to the Presbyterian meeting house, near the academy, which was so crouded that a great number had to remain outside.

Robert Coram was unanimously chosen their secretary.

Caefar Rodney opened the business of the meeting, by moving the following resolution:

"Resolved, that it is the constitutional right of freemen, peaceably to assemble together, and express their opinions of public measures."

He observed, that it would be unnecessary, he believed, to say any thing on the present occasion, in vindication of this resolution; he had no doubt but that all those who surrounded him, were well convinced that this assembly emanated from the constitution; and in his opinion it was one of the purest streams that flowed from that great fountain.⁽¹⁾ Every reflecting man must be deeply impressed with this important truth, that it was the unalienable right of the people to assemble [Page]and express their sentiments; but at this time it was not only their right, but their bounden duty, when their all was at stake.

The chairman having put the question, the resolution was unanimously adopted.

It was then moved, that the treaty should be read, and a public discussion of its merits take place.

But it was observed by some, that the reading of it would take up too much time; that every body must be supposed now to be acquainted with its contents; and that there were many persons present, who had to return home some distance in the country.

A great number, however, declared that it was essentially necessary, to prevent any reflections being thrown on their proceedings, to have the treaty read, and to permit a free discussion on this occasion. The meeting at New York had been highly criminated on this very account; and they hoped, therefore, that the present assembly would have more prudence than to lay themselves open to the same aspersions which had been cast upon others.

The gentlemen having withdrawn their opposition, the motion was unanimously agreed to.

Whereupon the treaty was read by the secretary.

Mr. Rodney said he was not so anxious to express his own sentiments on this occasion, as he was to hear the opinion of a venerable patriot in that house, whose head had grown grey in the faithful discharge of his duties in the legislative, judicial, and executive departments of government.

John Dickinson then rose, and observed, that he had felt it his duty to appear on this momentous occasion, and publicly avow his sentiments concerning this treaty; but as the hand of age and infirmity was upon him, he hoped that some younger citizen than himself would take the labouring oar, and break the way, in order that the elder might the more easily follow. When that was done, the duty he owed to himself and his country, be said, would compel him to express his feeling on the present occasion.

Mr. RODNEY said, that as it was the wish of the gentleman who had just sat down, that some younger person than himself should lead the way to this discussion, he would offer a sew general observations on the treaty, which they had now fully and fairly before them, for their consideration. He did not intend to go through with it article by article; he only meant to touch slightly on some of the principal objections, and leave the rest to a more able hand; indeed it would be in vain to attempt [Page]to notice every objection, for the subject of objection appeared to him to be exhaustless.

Before he proceeded to the immediate discussion of the treaty itself, he requested permission to make a sew candid remarks upon what he thought (and surely, said he, in a free country, every man has a right to think, and a right to express his opinions, too) the extraordinary manner in which this treaty had been brought about. In the first place, at the very moment when the representatives of the people were deliberating on the best mode of obtaining redress and satisfaction for the injuries and insults we had sustained, and the grievances under which we then laboured; at that moment their proceedings were unfortunately arrested.

In the next place, the chief justice of the United States was appointed (without a resignation) to the important office of minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to the court of Britain; if these measures were not against the letter, they were surely against the spirit of the constitution. Besides, was it ever heard of by any one, that Mr. Jay was dispatched for the purpose of making a treaty with Britain? Was such a thing even whispered within the senate itself?⁽²⁾ Then, unless the terms advice and consent in the constitution, can be construed to mean one and the same thing, the senate were simply called to give their consent to this treaty. What was the construction given to this part of the constitution, on a former occasion, when the minister of the French republic wished to form a new treaty between his nation and ours, on terms of generous reciprocity? Was he not informed by the secretary of state, that the constitution of the United States rendered the advice of the senate essentially necessary on such an occasion; that they were not then in session; and that, therefore, he could enter into no neg [...]ciations on that subject? ⁽³⁾

[Page] He had two general objections to the treaty itself. He was one of those who thought it would be for the real interest of America to have no treaty at all with Britain; five years out of seven she had the sword unsheathed, and the temple of Janus open. As our object ought to be (said he) and I hope ever will be, peace, we should carefully shun all connection with such a nation, for fear of being involved in her quarrels: But at this time, when she was at war with the French republic, our generous and brave ally, who assisted us when struggling in the same cause, and when the flag of freedom drooped under the iron rod of oppression, it was the height of folly to form such a treaty with her: For even supposing France and Britain were equally indifferent to us (and who is there that hears me, whose bosom is so frozen with ingratitude, as to view them [Page]with equal indifference) a treaty so pointedly levelled at the French as this appears to be throughout, and which gives up to Britain privileges which will put it in her power so materially to injure them, might by the law of nations be construed a breach of that neutrality which we seen one and all to be so anxious to preserve.

Mr. Chairman (he proceeded) the omissions in this treaty are numerous and important. If the message of the president is to be taken as the ground-work of the envoy's instructions, and I think it ought, he was sent to procure a friendly adjustment of our complaints; ⁽⁴⁾ and amongst those complaints, what were the first? and which stared us foremost in the face? Our western posts had been detained from us ever since the peace, contrary to treaty; in consequence of which we had been exposed to a ruinous Indian war; property to an immense amount had been taken off by the British, in contravention of the same treaty; our sailors had been cruelly and unjustly pressed from on board our vessels, so that they were unable, for want of hands, to return, if liberty had been given them to depart. Are any damages obtained for the detention of the posts these thirteen years? No! Are any obtained for the blood of our fellow citizens lavished, and the treasures of the people spent in the Indian war? Or for the innocent women and children who have fallen a sacrifice to savage cruelty, and the murdering tomahawk and scalping knife? No! Is the property unjustly carried off by the British, stipulated to be paid for? No! Has any [...] been made to secure our helpless seamen from being dragged from on board our merchant ships? No! After all the losses the [...] interest has sustained on this very account, they have been still left to the mercy of a merciless nation.

The third article, giving the British the benefit of all our Atlantic ports and inland navigation, and entirely excluding us, on their part, from both, requires no comment; it will not, for I am sure it cannot, be contended that there is any reciprocity here.

That article should never have been admitted, which puts the stale claims of British creditors on a footing with our plain demands for the plunder of our merchants; on a footing, did I say? on a far better footing; for while in the one case, by a summary mode of procedure, our citizens are robbed of that [Page]constitutional right, a trial by jury,⁽⁵⁾ deprived of which security, I would not take away the life of a sparrow, or even draw a single feather from its wing, and are compelled to appear before judges, a majority of whom may be British; in the other case, they are obliged to go through the tedious and expensive labyrinth of the law, in British courts of admiralty.

Mr. Chairman (added he) the great object, if I am not mistaken, of our government, has been to continue neutral during the war which at present convulses the greater part of Europe; and yet while we are struggling to preserve this happy situation, in order that the blessings of peace and plenty may pour in upon us, we find in this treaty all the rights of neutrality abandoned, and the axe laid to the root of the very tree from which we expected to gather such abundant fruit. The great principle of neutrality, so essentially necessary to the very existence of commerce, that free bottoms shall make free goods, is here given up; a principle, since the year 1780, established as the law of nations. I know, previous to that year, the arbitrary and superior power of Britain had ruled it otherwise; but then the empress of Russia, in conjunction with Sweden and Denmark, established the armed neutrality, the very second article of which recognized this principle, and in support of which Russia refers to her treaty with Britain in 1734, in which this principle is indisputably established. To these principles the commercial nations of Europe fully acceded—Agreeably to these principles, Britain afterwards uniformly conducted herself during the American war; and to these principles we have rigidly adhered in every treaty hitherto made, and the British themselves in their treaty with France in 1786.⁽⁶⁾

[Page] A great number of articles, in all our other treaties, declared not to be contraband, are here expressly declared to be contraband. Nay, our very provisions, the only freight almost that we have for our vessels, are not excepted; in consequence of which, the British are at this moment seizing all our provisions bound to France, and will no doubt pay us a very reasonable mercantile profit for them. In short, there is nothing but unwrought iron and fir plank we can carry with safety.⁽⁷⁾

The constitution of the United States declares, that congress shall have the power of defining and punishing piracies;⁽⁸⁾ [Page]but by this treaty, they are defined and punished without their consent; and although our treaty with France has the same clause in it, let it be remembered, that the old congress formed that treaty, and that their powers were competent to it. Under this article, while our defenceless sailors are dragged from on board our ships, which are left with the merchant's all, to perish on the ocean, and chained down in British vessels to fight against their friends; those Americans, who, from gratitude, or a love of liberty, engage in the cause of our ally on board their ships, if taken, are to be ignominiously hung!

He said, he had now touched on a few of the leading objections to the treaty; but, as he had before observed, it would be idle to attempt even to glance at them all; he should exhaust himself, and exhaust the audience too. These were his candid sentiments on the treaty at present; he was still however open to conviction, and called on the friends of the treaty, if any such there were within the walls, to come forward and support it, and point out its advantages; he declared he would, and he was sure that respectable meeting would likewise give them, a fair, patient and candid hearing, for he wished the treaty to receive a full and impartial trial. He hoped, that at all events, others would rise and express their opinions on a treaty, which, like the sword of Damocles, was hanging over their heads, suspended but by a hair; a treaty in which the lives, the liberties, and the fortunes of them all were deeply interested; a treaty fraught with more evils than Pandora's box, and which, if not written in the blood, would assuredly be written in the tears, of those innocent men who under it would be robbed of their property.

Mr. Dickiuson then rose, and in a dignified, eloquent, and patriotic address, of near two hours in duration, discussed the subject of the treaty, the dangers and want of reciprocity whereof, he fully evinced.

After a short silence, the question was then put, "Does the treaty meet the approbation of this meeting?" It was unanimously determined in the negative.

On motion of Jacob Broom,

Resolved, That a committee of nine be appointed to draw up a memorial to the president of the United States, expressive of disapprobation of the said treaty, and requesting him to withold his ratisication therefrom.

THE COMMITTEE.

[Page]John Dickinson,

James Tilton,

Caesar Rodney,

Robert Coram,

Jacob Broom,

Archibald Alexander,

John James,

Joseph Warner,

Isaac Scarr, sen.

The citizens then adjourned, to meet again, at the same place, on Saturday the 8th inst. at five o'clock P. M. to receive and consider the report of their committee.

AUGUST 8.

The citizens of the borough of Wilmington, and its vicinity, assembled pursuant to adjournment, John Dickinson, of the committee, then read the report, in the following words, viz.

To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United States, The Memorial of the Citizens of Wilmington, and its Vicinity, is the State of Delaware,

Respectfully sheweth,

THAT your memorialists, gratefully recollecting your eminent services to these states, deeply impressed with esteem for the integrity uniformly evidenced by your conduct, and fully convinced of your sincere affection for your country, are persuaded, that it cannot be disagreeable to you, as know the sentiments of your fellow citizens, on question which they believe to be of vast importance to them and their posterity, when, to withhold such information, might imply their assent to measures which they not only disapprove, but contemplate with distressing aversion, anxiety, and apprehension, and when the information being brought forward, may possibly, by the wisdom of government, be improved for the advancement of the commonwealth—

That, revering constitutional authority as the basis of peace and prosperity, and holding themselves in duty bound to support its decisions, even though they may have opposed their being made, they trust, that on the present occasion, they shall not be exposed to controversies respecting the legitimate exercise of that authority, nor be obliged, in supporting its decisions, to feel an adherence to duty almost as afflicting as a departure from it—

[Page] That for this deliverance, they confidently recur to that portion of neutrality, with which, by the constitution, you are invested, and in which they are so greatly, inseparably, and sacredly interested; and, encouraged by a retrospect to those actions whose tenor designates your character, while they submit to your consideration the following objections against the treaty, lately negociated between Great Britain and these states, they ardently hope, your mind, moved by reasons itself suggests, or observations of others, will be satisfied, that in refusing to ratify it, you will promote the happiness of your constituents—

First. It unnecessarily draws into litigation the boundaries of these states, and establishes a mode of proceeding, by which they may be contracted, without the consent of the nation.

Second. It contains stipulations that ought not to be made without legislative authority.

Third. It fixes terms of commerce and navigation unreasonably advantageous to Great Britain, and highly injurious to these states.

Fourth. It subjects these states to an unjust and oppressive responsibility.

Fifth. It surrenders, on the part of these states, powers essential to national independence.

Sixth. It prejudicially changes the condition of these states, in reference to other nations.

Seventh. It abandons principles concerning the rights of neutrality, which, if duly regarded, must have an auspicious influence on the welfare of these states, and of mankind in general.

Eighth. It alters the position of these states relative to the belligerent powers, in favor of Great Britain, and to the detriment of France; thus relinquishing a declared impartiality, and hazarding the immunities belonging to such a situation.

Ninth. It is in collision with articles of the treaty between France and the United States of America.

Tenth. It exhibits these states to the world as not attentive to the obligations of friendship, gratitude, and public faith.

Eleventh. It is not founded on principles of real reciprocity.

Twelfth. It does not, with sufficient clearness, certainty, and security, provide for the surrender of "all the posts and places" mentioned in the second article, and hitherto detained in contravention, of the treaty of peace.

[Page] Thirteenth. It does not require satisfaction for "the property of the American inhabitants carried away," at the close of the late war, in manifest violation of that treaty.

Fourteenth. It does not adequately obtain redress for the notorious vexations and spoliations recently committed on the vessels and commerce of these states, nor guard against the like in future.

Fifteenth. It does not in any manner provide for the protection of American seamen against the flagrant aggressions constantly practised by the British government, in pressing them to serve on board its ships of war.

The memorial was then read by the secretary, and afterwards read and agreed to by paragraphs; and upon the main question, "Does this report meet the approbation of the meeting?" It was unanimously determined in the affirmative.

On motion, Resolved, unanimously, that the said memorial, reported by the committee, be signed by them, and transmitted to the president of the United States.

Extract from the minutes, ROBERT CORAM, secretary.

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT.
United States, 14th August, 1795. John Dickinson, James Tilton, Caesar Rodney, Robert Coram, Jacob Broom, Archibald Alexander, John James, Joseph Warner, and Isaac Starr, Esquires.

GENTLEMEN,

THE proceedings of a meeting in Wilmington, as contained in a memorial signed by you, and dated the 8th instant, I have received.

As the answer, which I have given, on a similar occasion, to the selectmen of Boston, is applicable to that memorial, I think it proper to transmit a copy thereof to you.

With due respect, I am, Gentlemen, Your most obedient, Go. WASHINGTON.

[Page]

Ezekiel Price, Thomas Walley, William Bordman, Ebenczer Seaver, Thomas Crafts, Thomas Edwards, William Lettle, William Scollay, and Jesse Putnam, Esquires—Selectmen of the town of Boston.

GENTLEMEN,

IN every act of my administration, I have sought the happiness of my fellow citizens. My system, for the attainment of this object, has uniformly been, to overlook all personal, local, and partial considerations; to contemplate the United States as one great whole; to confide, that sudden impressions, when erroneous, would yield to candid reflection; and to consult only the substantial and permanent interests of our country.

Nor have I departed from this line of conduct, on the occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in your letter of the 13th inst.

Without a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with attention, every argument which has, at any time, been brought into view. But the constitution is the guide which I never can abandon. It has assigned to the president the power of making treaties, with the advice and consent of the senate. It was doubtless supposed that these two branches of government would combine, without passion, and with the best means of information, those facts and principles upon which the success of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to substitute for their own conviction the opinions of others; or to seek truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well informed investigation.

Under this persuasion, I have resolved on the manner of executing the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to it, I freely submit: and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these sentiments known as the grounds of my procedure. While I feel the most lively gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country, I can no otherwise deserve it, than by obeying the dictates of my conscience.

With due respect, I am, Gentlemen, Your obedient, Go. WASHINGTON.

United States, 28th July, 1795.

[Page]

OBSERVATIONS On the constitutional Power to form Treaties.
Extract from one of the Federal Farmer's Letters, dated January 10, 1788.

ON a fair construction of the constitution, I think the legislature has a proper controul over the president and senate, in settling commercial treaties.—By one article, "the legislature shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations," &c. and by another article, "the president, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senate, shall have power to make treaties." These clauses must be considered together; and we ought never to make one part of the same instrument contradict another, if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction. By the first recited clause, the legislature has the power, that is, as I understand it, the sole power, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or to make all the rules and regulations respecting trade and commerce, between our citizens and foreigners. By the second recited clause, the president and senate have power generally to make treaties.—There are several kinds of treaties, as treaties of commerce, of peace, of alliance, &c. I think the words "to make treaties," may be consistently constru [...] and yet so as it shall be left to the legislature to confirm commercial treaties. They are, in their nature and operation, [...]y distinct from treaties of peace and of alliance. The latter generally require secrecy; it is but very seldom they interfere wi [...] the laws and internal police of the country: to make them, [...] properly the exercise of executive powers: and the constitution authorizes the president and senate to make treaties, and gi [...] the legislature no power directly or indirectly respecting th [...] treaties of peace and alliance. As to treaties of comme [...] they do not generally require secrecy; they almost always involve in them legislative powers; interfere with the laws and internal police of the country; and operate immediately [...] persons or property, especially in commercial towns: (T [...] have in Great Britain usually been confirmed by parliament:) They consist of rules and regulations respecting commerce; and [...] regulate commerce, or to make regulations respecting commerce, the federal legislature, by the constitution, has the power. I do not see that any commercial regulations can be made in treaties, that will not infringe upon this power in th [...] legislature. Therefore I infer, that the true construction is, th [...] the president and senate shall make treaties; but all commercia [...] treaties shall be subject to be confirmed by the Legislature This construction will render the clauses consistent, and make the powers of the president and senate, respecting treaties, much less exceptionable.

[Page]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. I.

IT was to have been foreseen, that the treaty which mr. Jay was charged to negociate with Great-Britain, whenever it should appear, would have to contend with many perverse dispositions, and some honest prejudices; that there was no measure in which the government could engage, so little likely to be viewed according to its intrinsic merits—so very likely to encounter misconception, jealousy, and unreasonable dislike. For this, many reasons may be assigned.

It is only to know the vanity and vindictiveness of human nature, to be convinced, that while this generation lasts, there will always exist among us, men irreconcilable to our present national constitution; embittered in their animosity in proportion to the success of its operations, and the disappointment of their inauspicious predictions. It is a material inference from this, that such men will watch, with lynx's eyes, for opportunities of discrediting the proceedings of the government, and will display a hostile and malignant zeal upon every occasion, where they think there are any prepossessions of the community to favour their enterprizes. A treaty with Great-Britain was too fruitful an occasion not to call forth all their activity.

It is only to consult the history of nations, to perceive, that every country, at all times, is cursed by the existence of men, who, actuated by an irregular ambition, scruple nothing which they imagine will contribute to their own advancement and importance: in monarchies, supple courtiers; in republics, fawning or turbulent demagogues, worshipping still the idol, power, wherever placed, whether in the hands of a prince or of the people, and trafficing in the weaknesses, vices, frailties, or prejudices of the one or the other. It was to have been expected, that such men, counting more on the passions than on the reason of their fellow citizens, and anticipating that the treaty would have to struggle with prejudices, would be disposed [Page]to make an alliance with popular discontent, to nourish it, and to press it into the service of their particular views.

It was not to have been doubted, that there would be one or more foreign powers, indisposed to a measure which accommodated our differences with Great-Britain, and laid the foundation of future good understanding, merely because it had that effect.

Nations are never content to confine their rivalships and enmities to themselves. It is their usual policy, to disseminate them as widely as they can, regardless how far it may interfere with the tranquillity or happiness of the nations which they are able to influence.—Whatever pretensions may be made, the world is yet remote from the spectacle of that just and generous policy, whether in the cabinets of republies or of king which would dispose one nation, in its intercourses with another— satisfied with a due proportion of privileges and benefits to see that other pursue freely, its true interest with rega [...] to a third; though at the expense of no engagement, not i [...] violation of any rule of friendly or fair procedure. It was n [...] tural, that the contrary spirit should produce efforts of foreign counteraction to the treaty; and it was certain that the p [...] tizans of the counteracting power would second its efforts [...] all the means which they thought calculated to answer the end.

It was known, that the resentment produced by our re [...] lution war with Great-Britain, had never been entirely extinguished, and that recent injuries had re-kindled the flame wi [...] additional violence. It was a natural consequence of this, [...] many should be disinclined to any amicable arrangement wi [...] Great-Britain, and that many others should be prepared to [...] quiesce only in a treaty which should present advantages of [...] striking and preponderant a kind, as it was not reasonable to expect could be obtained, unless the United States were i [...] a condition to give the law to Great-Britain, and as, if obtained under the coercion of such a situation, could only have be [...] the short-lived prelude of a speedy rupture to get rid of the [...]

Unfortunately, too, the supposition of that situation b [...] served to foster exaggerated expectations; and the absurd [...] lusion to this moment prevails, notwithstanding the plain [...] dence to the contrary, which is deducible from the high [...] haughty ground still maintained by Great-Britain against [...]i [...] torious France.

It was not to be mistaken, that an enthusiasm for France [Page]and her revolution, throughout all its wonderful vicissitudes, has continued to possess the minds of the great body of the people of this country; and it was to be inferred, that this sentiment would predispose to a jealousy of any agreement or treaty with her most persevering competitor—a jealousy so excessive, as would give the fullest scope to insidious arts to perplex and mislead the public opinion. It was well understood, that a numerous party among us, though disavowing the design, because the avowal would defeat it, have been steadily endeavouring to make the United States a party in the present European war, by advocating all those measures which would widen the breach betweeen us and Great-Britain, and by resisting all those which would tend to close it; and it was morally certain, that this party would eagerly improve every circumstance which could serve to render the treaty odious, and to frustrate it, as the most effectual road to their favourite goal.

It was also known beforehand, that personal and party rivalships, of the most active kind, would assail whatever treaty might be made, to disgrace, if possible, its organ.

There are three persons prominent in the public eye, as the successor of the actual president of the United States, in the event of his retreat from the station, mr. Adams, mr. Jay, and mr. Jefferson.

No one has forgotten the systematic pains which have been taken to impair the well-earned popularity of the first gentleman. Mr. Jay, too, has been repeatedly the object of attacks with the same view. His friends, as well as his enemies, anticipated that he could make no treaty which would not furnish weapons against him: and it were to have been ignorant of the indefatigable malice of his adversaries, to have doubted that they would be seized with eagerness and wielded with dexterity.

The peculiar circumstances which have attended the two last elections for governor of this state*, have been of a nature to give the utmost keenness to party animosity. It was impossible that mr. Jay should be forgiven for his double, and, in the last instance, triumphant success; or that any promising opportunity of detaching from him the public confidence, should pass unimproved.

Trivial facts frequently throw light upon important designs. It is remarkable, that in the toasts given on the 4th of [Page]July, wherever there appears a direct or indirect censure of the treaty, it is pretty uniformly coupled with compliments to mr. Jefferson, and to our late governor, mr. Clinton, with an evident design to place those gentlemen in contrast with mr. Jay, and, decrying him, to elevate them. No one can be blind to the singer of party spirit, visible in these and similar transactions. It indicates to us clearly, one powerful source of opposition to the treaty.

No man is without his personal enemies. Pre-eminence even in talents and virtue is a cause of envy and hatred of its possessor. Bad men are the natural enemies of virtuous men. Good men sometimes mistake and dislike each other.

Upon such an occassion as the treaty, how could it happen otherwise, than that personal enmity would be unusually busy, enterprising, and malignant?

From the combined operation of these different causes, it would have been a vain expectation that the treaty would be generally contemplated with candour and moderation, or that reason would regulate the first impressions concerning it. It was certain, on the contrary, that however unexceptionable its true character might be, it would have to sight its way through a mass of unreasonable opposition; and that time, examination, and reflection, would be requisite to six the public opinion on a true basis. It was certain that it would become the instrument of a systematic effort against the national government and its administration; a decided engine of party to advance its own views at the hazard of the public peace and prosperity.

The events which have already taken place, are a full comment on these positions. If the good sense of the people does not speedily discountenance the projects which are on foot, more melancholy proofs may succeed.

Before the treaty was known, attempts were made to propossess the public mind against it. It was absurdly asserted, that it was not expected by the people, that mr. Jay was to make any treaty; as if he had been sent, not to accommodate differences by negociation and agreement, but to dictate to Great-Britain the terms of an unconditional submission.

Before it was published at large, a sketch, calculated to produce false impressions, was handed out to the public, through a medium noted for hostility to the administration of the government.—E [...]ssaries flew through the country, spreading alarm and discontent: the leaders of clubs were [Page]every where active to seize the passions of the people, and pre-occupy their judgments against the treaty.

At Boston it was published one day, and the next a townmeeting was convened to condemn it, without ever being read; without any serious discussion, sentence was pronounced against it.

Will any man seriously believe, that in so short a time, an instrument of this nature could have been tolerably understood by the greater part of those who were thus induced to a condemnation of it? Can the result be considered as any thing more than a sudden ebullition of popular passion, excited by the artifices of a party, which had adroitly seized a favourable moment to furorize the public opinion; this spirit of precipitation and the intemperance which accompanied it, prevented the body of the merchants and the greater part of the most considerate citizens, from attending the meeting, and left those who met wholly under the guidance of a set of men, who, with two or three exceptions, have been the uniform opposers of the government.

The intelligence of this event had no sooner reached New-York, than the leaders of the clubs were seen haranguing in every corner of the city, to stir up our citizens into an imitation of the example of the meeting at Boston. An invitation to meet at the city-hall quickly followed, not to consider or discuss the merits of the treaty, but to unite with the meeting at Boston to address the president against its ratification.

This was immediately succeeded by a hand bill, full of invectives against the treaty, as absurd as they were inflammatory, and manifestly designed to induce the citizens to surrender their reason to the empire of their passions.

In vain did a respectable meeting of the merchants endeavour, by their advice, to moderate the violence of these views, and to promote a spirit favourable to a fair discussion of the treaty; in vain did a respectable majority of the citizens of every description attend for that purpose. The leaders of the clubs resisted all discussion, and their followers, by their clamors and vociferations, rendered it impracticable, notwithstanding the wish of a manifest majority of the citizens convened upon the occasion.

Can we believe, that the leaders were really sincere in the objections they made to a discussion, or that the great and mixed mass of citizens then assembled, had so thoroughly mastered [Page]the merits of the treaty as that they might not have been enlightened by such a discussion.

It cannot be doubled that the real motive to the opposition, was the fear of a discussion; the desire of excluding light; the adherence to a plan of surprize and deception. Nor need we desire any fuller proof of the spirit of party which has stimulated the opposition to the treaty, than is to be found in the circumstances of that opposition.

To every man who is not an enemy to the national government, who is not a prejudiced partizan, who is capable of comprehending the argument, and dispassionate enough to attend to it with impartiality, I flatter myself I shall be able to demonstrate satisfactorily in the course of some succeeding papers.—

1. That the treaty adjusts, in a reasonable manner, the points in controversy between the United States and Great-Britain, as well those depending on the inexecution of the treaty of peace, as those growing out of the present European war.

2. That it makes no improper concessions to Great-Britain, no sacrifices on the part of the United States.

3. That it secures to the United States equivalents for what they grant.

4. That it lays upon them no restrictions which are incompatible with their honor or their interest.

5. That in the articles which respect war, it conforms to the laws of nations.

6. That it violates no treaty with, nor duty towards any foreign power.

7. That compared with our other commercial treaties, it is, upon the whole, entitled to a preference.

8. That it contains concessions of advantages by Great-Britain to the United States, which no other nation has obtained from the same power.

9. That it gives to her no superiority of advantages over other nations with whom we have treaties.

10. That interests of primary importance to our general welfare, are promoted by it.

11. That the too-probable result of a refusal to ratify, is war, or what would be still worse, a disgraceful passiveness under violations of our rights, unredressed and unadjusted: and consequently that it is the true interest of the United States, that the treaty should go into effect.

[Page] It will be understood, that I speak of the treaty as advised to be ratified by the senate—for this is the true question before the public.

CAMILLUS.

No. II.

PREVIOUS to a more particular discussion of the merits of the treaty, it may be useful to advert to a suggestion which has been thrown out, namely, That it was foreseen by many, that the mission to Great-Britain would produce no good result, and that the event has corresponded with the anticipation.

The reverse of this position is manifestly true.

All must remember the very critical posture of this country, at the time that mission was resolved upon. A recent violation of our rights, too flagrant and too injurious to be submitted to, had filled every American breast with indignation, and every prudent man with alarm and disquietude. A few hoped, and the great body of the community feared, that war was inevitable.

In this crisis, two sets of opinions prevailed, one looked to measures which were to have a compulsory effect upon Great-Britain, the sequestration of British debts, and the cutting off intercourse wholly or partially between the two countries: the other to vigorous preparations for war, and one more effort of negociation, under the solemnity of an extraordinary mission, to avert it.

That the latter was the best opinion, no truly sensible man can doubt; and it may be boldly affirmed, that the event has entirely justified it.

If measures of coercion and reprisal had taken place, war, in all human probability, would have followed.

National pride is generally a very untractable thing. In the councils of no country does it act with greater force, than in those of Great-Britain. Whatever it might have been in her power to yield to negociation, she could have yielded nothing to compulsion, without self-degradation, and without the sacrifice of that political consequence, which, at all times very important to a nation, was peculiarly so to her at the juncture in question. It should be remembered, too, that from the relations [Page]in which the two countries have stood to each other, it must have cost more to the pride of Great-Britain to have received the law from us than from any other power.

When one nation has cause of complaint against another, the course marked out by practice, the opinion of writers, and the principles of humanity, the object being to avoid war, is to precede reprisals of any kind, by a demand of reparation. To begin with reprisals is to meet on the ground of war, and puts the other party in a condition not to be able to recede without humiliation.

Had this course been pursued by us, it would not only have rendered war morally certain, but it would have united the British nation in the vigorous support of their government, in the prosecution of it: while, on our part, we should have been quickly distracted and divided. The calamities of war would have brought the most ardent to their senses, and placed them among the first in reproaching the government with precipitation, rashness, and folly, for not having taken every chance, by pacific means, to avoid so great an evil.

The example of Denmark and Sweden is cited in support of the coercive plan. Those powers, it is asserted, by arming and acting with vigour, brought Great-Britain to terms.

But who is able to tell us the precise course of this transaction, or the terms gained by it? Has it appeared that either Denmark or Sweden has obtained as much as we have done— a stipulation of reparation for the violation of our property, contrary to the laws of war?

Besides, what did Denmark and Sweden do? They armed, and they negociated. They did not begin by retaliations and reprisals. The United States also armed and negociated, and, like Denmark and Sweden, prudently forbore reprisals. The conduct of the three countries agreed in principle, equally steering clear of a precipitate resort to reprisals, and contradicting the doctrines and advice of our war party.

The course pursued by our government was then in coincidence with the example of Denmark and Sweden—and, it may be added, was in every view the wisest.

Few nations can have stronger inducements than the United-States to cultivate peace. Their infant state in general—their want of a marine in particular, to protect their commerce, would render war, in an extreme degree, a calamity. It would not only arrest our present rapid progress to strength and prosperity, but would probably throw us back into a state of debility [Page]and impoverishment, from which it would require years to emerge.

Our trade, navigation, and mercantile capital, would be essentially destroyed. Spain being an associate with Great-Britain, a general Indian war might be expected to desolate the whole extent of our frontier—our exports obstructed, agriculture would of course languish; all other branches of industry would proportionably suffer; our public debt instead of a gradual diminution, would sustain a great augmentation, and draw with it a large increase of taxes and burthens on the people.

But these evils, however great, were, perhaps, not the worst to be apprehended. It was to be feared, that the war would be conducted in a spirit which would render it more than ordinarily calamitous. There are too many proofs, that a considerable party among us is deeply infected with those horrid principles of jacobinism, which, proceeding from one excess to another, have made France a theatre of blood, and which, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts of the national representation to suppress it, keeps the destinies of France, to this moment, suspended by a thread. It was too probable, that the direction of the war, if commenced, would have fallen into the hands of men of this description. The consequence of this, even in imagination, are such as to make any virtuous man shudder.

It was, therefore, in a peculiar manner, the duty of the government to take all possible chances for avoiding war. The plan adopted was the only one which could claim this advantage.

To precipitate nothing, to gain time by negociation, was to leave the country in a situation to profit by any events which might turn up, tending to restrain a spirit of hostility in Great-Britain, and to dispose her to reasonable accommodation.

The successes of France, which opportunely occurred, allowing them to have had an influence upon the issue, so far from disparaging the merit of the plan that was pursued, serve to illustrate its wisdom. This was one of the chances which procrastination gave, and one which it was natural to take into the calculation.

Had the reverse been the case, the posture of negociation was still preferable to that of retaliation and reprisal; for in this case, the triumphs of Great-Britain, the gauntlet having [Page]been thrown by us, would have stimulated her to take i [...] up without hesitation.

By taking the ground of negociation in the attitude of preparation for war, we at the same time carried the appeal [...] the prudence of the British cabinet, without wounding its pride, and to the justice and interest of the British nation [...] without exciting feelings of resentment.

This conduct was calculated to range the public opinion of that country on our side, to oppose it to the indulgence of hostile views in the cabinet, and, in case of war, to lay the foundation of schism and dissatisfaction.

But one of the most important advantages to be expected from the course pursued, was the securing of unanimity among ourselves, if, after all the pains taken to avoid a war, it had been forced upon us.

As on the one hand, it was certain that dissention and discontent would have embarrassed and enfe [...]bled our exertion [...] in a war produced by any circumstances of intemperance i [...] our public councils, or not endeavoured to be prevented by all the milder expedients usual in similar cases: So, on the other, it was equally certain, that our having ineffectually [...] hausted those expedients, would cement us in a firm [...] keep us steady and persevering amidst whatever vicissit [...] might happen, and never our efforts to the utmost extent [...] our resources.

This union among ourselves, and disunion among our [...] mies, were inestimable effects of the moderate plan, if it [...] promised no other advantage.

But to gain time was of vast moment to us in other sens [...]. Not a sea-port of the United States was fortified, so as to protected against the insults of a single frigate.—Our ma [...] zines were, in every respect, too scantily supplied. It was hightly desirable to obviate these deficiencies before matters ca [...] to extremity.

Moreover, the longer we kept out of war, if obliged to [...] into it at last, the shorter would be the duration of the ca [...] mities incident to it.

The circumstances of the injury of which we more immediately complain, afforded an additional reason for precedi [...] reprisals by negociation. The order of the 6th of November, directed neutral vessels to be bro't in for adjudication. This was an equivocal phrase; and though there was too much ca [...] to suspect that it was intended to operate as it did, yet th [...] [Page]was a possibility of misconstruction; and that possibility was a reason, in the nature of the thing, for giving to the English government an opportunity of explaining before retaliations not place.

To all this it may be added, that one of the substitutes for the plan pursued, the sequestration of debts, was a measure no less dishonest than impolitic; as will be shown in the remarks which will be applied to the 10th article of the treaty.

But is it unimportant to the real friends of republican government, that the plan pursued was congenial to the pacific character which is ascribed to it? Would it have been more desirable that the government of our nation, outstripping the war-maxims of Europe, should, without a previous demand of reparation, have rushed into reprisals, and consequently into a war?

However this may be, it is a well ascertained fact, that our country never appeared so august and respectable as in the position which it assumed upon this occasion.—Europe was struck with the dignified moderation of our conduct; and the character of our government and nation acquired a new elevation.

It cannot escape an attentive observer, that the language, which, in the first instance, condemned the mission of an envoy extraordinary to Great-Britain, and which now condemns the treaty negociated by him, seems to consider the United States as among the first rate powers of the world in point of strength and resources, and proposes to them a conduct predicated from that condition.

To under-rate our just importance, would be a degrading error. To over-rate it, may lead to dangerous mistakes.

A very powerful state may frequently hazard a high and haughty tone with good policy; but a weak state can scarcely ever do it without imprudence. The last is yet our character; tho' we are the embryo of a great empire. It is, therefore, better suited to our situation to measure each step with the utmost caution; to hazard as little as possible, in the cases in which we are injured; to blend moderation with firmeness; and to brandish the weapons of hostility only when it is apparent that the use of them is unavoidable.

It is not to be inferred from this, that we are to crouch to any power on earth, or tamely to suffer our rights to be violated. A nation which is capable of this meanness, will quickly have no rights to protect, or honour to defend.

[Page] But the true inference is, that we ought not lightly to feet or provoke a resort to arms; that, in the differences between us and other nations, we ought carefully to avoid measures which tend to widen the breach; and that we should scr [...] lously abstain from whatever may be construed into reprisals, till after the employment of all amicable means has reduced it to a certainty that there is no alternative.

If we can avoid a war for ten or twelve years more, we shall then have acquired a maturity, which will make it no more than a common calamity, and will authorise us, in our national discussions, to take a higher and more imposing to [...].

This is a consideration of the greatest weight to determine us to exert all our prudence and address to keep out of we as long as it shall be possible; to defer, to a state of manhood a struggle to which infancy is ill adapted. This is the [...] effectual way to disappoint the enemies of our welfare; [...] pursue a contrary conduct may be to play into their hands, and to gratify their wishes. If there be a foreign power which [...] with envy or ill-will our growing prosperity, that power [...] discern that our infancy is the time for clipping our win [...] We ought to be wise enough to see, that this is not a ti [...] for trying our strength.

Should we be able to escape the storm which at this j [...] ture agitates Europe, our disputes with Great-Britain [...] minated, we may hope to postpone war to a distant peri [...] This, at least, will greatly diminish the chances of it. For th [...] there will remain only one power with whom we have [...] embarrassing discussions. I allude to Spain, and the quest [...] of the Mississippi; and there is reason to hope, that this question by the natural progress of things, and perseverance is an amicable course, will finally be arranged to our satisfaction without the necessity of the dernier resort.

The allusion to this case suggests one or two importance [...] [...] flections. How unwise would it have been to invite or fa [...] tate a quarrel with Great-Britain, at a moment when she [...] Spain were engaged in a common cause, both of them hav [...] besides, controverted points with the United States. How [...] will it be to adjust our differences with the most formidable [...] these two powers, and to have only to contest with o [...] them!

The allusion to this case suggests one or two importance [...] [...] flections. How unwise would it have been to invite or fa [...] tate a quarrel with Great-Britain, at a moment when she [...] Spain were engaged in a common cause, both of them hav [...] besides, controverted points with the United States. How [...] will it be to adjust our differences with the most formidable [...] these two powers, and to have only to contest with o [...] them!

This policy is so obvious, that it requires an extraordinary degree of infatuation not to be sensible of it, and not to vi [...] with favour any measure which tends to so important a resul [...]

[Page] This cursory view of the motives which may be supposed to have governed our public councils in the mission to Great-Britain, serves not only to vindicate the measures then pursued, but warns us against a prejudiced judgment of the result, which may, in the end, defeat the salutary purposes of those measures.

I proceed now to observe summarily, that the objects of the mission, contrary to what has been asserted, have been substantially obtained. What were these? They were principally,

1. To adjust the matters of controversy concerning the inexecution of the treaty of peace, and especially to obtain restitution of our western posts.

2. To obtain reparation for the captures and spoliations of our property in the course of the existing war.

Both these objects have been provided for; and it will be shown, when we come to comment upon the articles which make the provisions in each case, that it is a reasonable one, as good a one as ought to have been expected; as good a one as there is any prospect of obtaining hereafter; one which it is consistent with our honour to accept, and which our interest bids us to close with.

The provisions with regard to commerce, were incidental and auxiliary. The reasons which may be conceived to have led to the including of the subject in the mission, will be discussed in some proper place.

CAMILLUS.

No. III.

THE opposers of the treaty seem to have put invention on the rack, to accumulate charges against it, in a great number of cases, without regard even to plausibility. If we suppose them sincere, we must often pity their ignorance; if insincere, we must abhor the spirit of deception which it betrays. Of the preposterous nature of some of their charges, specimens will be given, in the course of these remarks; though, while nothing, which is colourable, will remain unattended to, it were endless to attempt a distinct refutation of all the wild and absurd things which are and will be said. It is vain to combat the vagaries of diseased imaginations. The monsters they engender, are no sooner destroyed, than new [Page]legions supply their places. Upon this, as upon all former occasions, the good sense of the people must be relied upon; and it must be taken for granted, that it will be sufficient for their conviction, to give solid answers to all such objections as have the semblance of reason; that now, as heretofore, they will maintain their character abroad and at home, for deliberation and reflection, and disappoint those who are in the habit of making experiments upon their credulity, who, treating them as children, fancy that sugar-plumbs and toys will suffice to gain their confidence and attachment, and to lead them blindfold, whither soever it is desired.

In considering the treaty, it presents itself under two principal heads; the permanent articles, which are the first ten, and which, with some supplementary provisions, adjust the controverted points between the two countries; and the temporary articles, which are all the remaining ones, and which establish the principles of mutual intercourse as to GENERAL navigation and commerce. The manner of the discussion will correspond with this natural division of the subject.

An objection meets the treaty at the threshold. It is said that our envoy abandoned the ground which our government had uniformly held, and with it our rights and interests as a nation, by acceding, in the preamble of the treaty, to the ide [...] of terminating the differences between the two countries, "it such a manner, as, without reference to the merits of their respeciti [...] complaints and pretensions, may be best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding."

It is observed, in support of this, that our government ha [...] constantly charged the first breaches of the treaty upon Great-Britain, in the two particulars of carrying away the negroes, and detaining the posts; that while the evacuation of New-York was going on, a demand of the surrender of the negroes was made by congress, through our commander in chief, which not being complied with, commissioners were sent, [...] ascertain the number carried away, with a view to a claim of compensation; that early and repeated applications were also. made for the surrender of the Western Posts, which not only was not done, but it is proved by the circumstances, that orders were not given for it, according to the true intent of the treaty, and that there was, from the beginning, a design to infract, and a virtual infraction of the article with respect [...]s this object. All this, it is alleged, has been the uniform language of our government, and has been demonstrated by [...]r. Jefferson to be true, in his letter to mr. Hammond, of the [Page]29th of May, 1792; and it is asserted, that the ground ought not to have been given up by mr. Jay, because it was the standard of the mutual rights and duties of the parties, as to the points unexecuted of the treaty of peace.

A proper examination of these matters is therefore called for, not only by the specific objection which is made to the principle which is contained in the preamble, but by the influence which a right solution is calculated to have, in giving a favourable or unfavourable complexion to the whole plan of the adjustment.

It is true, as suggested, that our government has constantly charged as breaches of the treaty by Great-Britain, the two particulars which have been stated; but it is believed to be not true, that it has uniformly charged them as FIRST breaches of the treaty. Individuals may have entertained this idea. The state of Virginia seems to have proceeded upon it in some public acts; but as far as is recollected, that ground was never formally or explicitly taken by the government of the United States in the above-mentioned letter from mr. Jefferson to mr. Hammond, when, for the first time, an attempt was made to vindicate or excuse the whole conduct of this country, in regard to the treaty of peace, contrary, I will venture to say, to the general sense of well-informed men.

The most solemn act of our government on this head, is an address of congress to the different states, of the 13th of April, 1787.

This address admits contraventions of the treaty on our part; and instead of deriving either justification or extenuation of them from prior infractions by Great-Britain, urges the different states to a repeal of all contravening laws.

But if the fact, in this respect, were admitted to be, as stated by the adversaries of the treaty, it would not authorise their conclusion.

It would not follow, that, because the ground had been taken by the government, it ought to have been pertinaciously kept, if, upon fair examination, it had appeared to be not solid, or if an adherence to it would have obstructed a reasonable adjustment of differences.

Nations, no more than individuals, ought to persist in error, especially at the sacrifice of their peace and prosperity —besides, nothing is more common, in disputes between nations, than each side to charge the other with being the aggressor or delinquent. This mutual crimination, either from the nature [Page]of circumstances, or from the illusions of the passions, is sometimes sincere; at other times, it is dictated by pride or, policy—But in all such cases, where one party is not powerful enough to dictate to the other, and where there is a mutual disposition to avoid war; the natural retreat for both is in compromise, which waves the question of first aggression or delinquency. This is the salvo for national pride; the escape for mutual error; the bridge by which nations, arrayed against each other, are enabled to retire with honor, and without bloodshed, from the field of contest. In cases of mutual delinquency, the question of the first default is frequently attended with real difficulty and doubt.—One side has an equal right with the other, to have and maintain its opinion.—What is to be done, when the pride of neither will yield to the argument of the other? War, or a waver of the point, is the alternative What sensible man, what humane man, will deny, that a compromise, which secures substantially the objects of interest, is almost always preferable to war on so punctilious and unmanageable a point?

Reject the principle of compromise, and the feuds of nations must become much more deadly than they have hither [...] been. There would scarcely ever be room for the adjustment of differences, without an appeal to the sword; and, wh [...] drawn, it would seldom be shcathed but with the destructi [...] of one or the other party. The earth, now too often staine [...], would then continually stream with human gore.

From the situation of the thing, and of the parties, that never could be a rational doubt, that the compromising p [...] was the only one on which the United States and Great-Britain could ever terminate their differences without war; th [...] the question, who was the first delinquent, would have [...] an eternal bar to accommodation, and consequently, that's dismission of that question was a pre-requisite to agreem [...] Had our envoy permitted the negociation to be arrested [...]y obstinacy on this head, he would have shown himself to be [...] diplomatic pedant, rather than the able negociator, and wo [...] have been justly chargeable with sacrificing to punctilio, the peace of his country. It was enough for him, as he did, [...] ascertain by a preliminary discussion, the impossibility of br [...] ing the other party to concede to the point.

An impartial survey of the real state of the question, [...] satisfy candid and discerning men, that it was wise and politic to dismiss it. This shall be attempted.

[Page] It has been observed, that two breaches of the treaty of peace are charged upon Great-Britain; the carrying away of the Negroes, and the detention of the posts. It remains to investigate the reality of these breaches, and to fix the periods when they can be said to have happened.

As to the Negroes, the true sense of the article in the treaty of peace, which respects them, is disputed.

The words of the stipulation are (Art. 7.) that "his Britannic majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets, from the United States."

These terms admit of two constructions; one, that no Negroes, or other articles which had been American property, should be carried away; the other, that the evacuations were to be made, without depredation; consequently, that no new destruction was to be committed, and that: Negroes, or other articles, which, at the time of the cessation of hostilities, continued to be the property of American inhabitants, unexchanged by the operations of war, should be forborne to be carried away.

The first was the construction which was adopted by this country; and the last is that insisted upon by Great-Britain.

The arguments which support her construction, are these:

I. The established laws of war give to an enemy the use and enjoyment, during the war, of all coal property, of which he obtains possession, and the absolute ownership of all personal property which falls into his hands. The latter is called [...]ty: and, except ships, becomes vested in the captors the moment they acquire a firm possession. With regard to ships, it seems to be a general rule of the marine law, that condemnation is necessary to complete investment of the property in the captor.

II. Negroes, by the laws of the states, in which slavery is allowed, are personal property. They, therefore, on the principle of those laws, like horses, cattle, and other moveables, were liable to become booty—and belonged to the enemy, as soon as they came into his hands. Belonging to him, he was free either to apply them to his own use, or to set them at liberty. If he did the latter, the grant was irrevocable, restitution was impossible. Nothing in the laws of nations, or in those of Great-Britain, will authorise the resumption of liberty, once granted to a human being.

III. The negroes in question were either taken in the course [Page]of military operations, or they joined the British army upon invitation by proclamation. However dishonourable to Great-Britain the latter may have been, as an illiberal species o [...] warfare, there is no ground to say that the strict rules of wa [...] did not warrant it; or that the effect was not in the one case, as well as in the other, a change of property in the thing.

IV. The stipulation relates to "Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants;" putting Negroes on the same footing with any other article. The characteristic of the subject of the stipulation being property of American inhabitan [...] whatever had lost that character could not be the object o [...] the stipulation. But the Negroes in question, by the laws [...] war, had lost that character; they were therefore not within the stipulation.

Why did not the United States demand the surrender [...] captured vessels, and of all other moveables, which had falle [...] into the hands of the enemy? The answer is, because common sense would have revolved against such a construction. No one could believe, that an indefinite surrender of al [...] the spoils or booty of a seven year's war was ever intended [...] be stipulated; and yet the demand for a horse, or an or, or a piece of furniture, would have been as completely within the terms "negroes and other property," as a negro; consequently, the reasoning which proves that one is not included excludes the other.

The silence of the United States, as to every other articl [...] is therefore a virtual abandonment of that sense of the stipulation which requires the surrender of negroes.

V. In the interpretation of treaties, things odious or immor [...] are not to be presumed. The abandonment of Negroes, who had been induced to quit their masters, on the faith of o [...] cial proclamation, promising them liberty, to fall again under the yoke of their masters, and into slavery, is as odi [...] and immoral a thing as can be conceived. It is odious [...] only as it imposes an act of perfidy on one of the contracting parties; but as it tends to bring back to servitude, m [...] once made free. The general interests of humanity conspi [...] with the obligation which Great-Britain had contracted [...] wards the Negroes, to repel this construction of the treat [...] if another can be found.

VI. But another, and a less exceptionable construction i [...] found in considering the clause as inserted, for greater caution to secure evacuations without depredation. It may be answered, that this was superfluous, because hostilities having ceased, [Page]she stipulation to surren [...], implied of itself, that it was to be alone without depredation. But, to this the reply is, that a part of the clause manifestly contemplates the case of new depredations, and provides a guard against it, in the promise, that the evacuations shall be made without causing any destruction. To cause destruction is to do some new act of violence. This reflection destroys the argument drawn from the superfluousness of the stipulation in the sense here given to it, and by showing that it must have such a sense in one part, authorises the conclusion, that the remainder of the clause has a similar sense. The connection of the two things, in parts of one sentence, confirms this inference.

These arguments certainly have great weight, and do not admit of easy refutation. It is a fact, too, that the opinions of some of the ablest lawyers of our own country, have, from the beginning, corresponded with the construction they enforce.

It is not enough for us to be persuaded, that some of the negociators, who made the peace, intended the article in our sense. It is necessary that it should be found in the instrument itself, and, from the nature of it, ought to have been expressed with clearness and without ambiguity. If there be real ambiguity in such a case, the odiousness of the effect will incline the scale against us.

It does not remove the difficulty, to say, that compensation for the negroes might have been a substitute for the thing.— When one party promises a specific thing to another, nothing but the thing itself will satisfy the promise. The party to whom it is made cannot be required to accept in lieu of it an equivalent. It follows, that compensation for the negroes would not have been a performance of the stipulation to forbear to carry them away; and therefore, if there be any thing odious in the specific thing itself, the objection to the interpretation which requires it, is not done away by the idea of substituting compensation. For the article does not admit such substitution, and its sense cannot be defined by what it does admit.

Some colour to our sense of the article results from these expressions in the same clause, "leaving in all fortifications, the American artillery that may be therein."—But this expression is not of equivalent force to that of property of American inhabitants. —For example suppose an American ship to have been captured and condemned, it might still be said of her, in a certain sense, this is an "American ship," alluding to the [Page]country of which she had been the ship; but it could not be said in any sense of her, this ship is American property, or the property of American inhabitants. The country of which [...] thing was, may often be used with aptness as a term of description of that thing, though it may have changed owner [...] but the term property, which is synonimous with ownership, can never be used in the present tense as descriptive of an ownership, which has ceased. Moreover, if the expressions in the two cases had been (as they are not) of equivalent force, [...] would not follow that they were to have the same meaning i [...] both cases, being applied to different matters. For an odious consequence in one instance, would be a reason for rejecti [...] a particular sense of a word or phrase, which would be prop [...] in another, to which no such consequence was attached.

Let me now ask this question of any candid man. Is o [...] construction of the article respecting the negroes, so much better supported than that of Great-Britain, as to justify o [...] pronouncing with po [...]tiveness, that the carrying them away was a breach of the treaty?

To me it appears clear, that this must be considered, speaking favourably for us, as a very doubtful point, and that [...] cannot with confidence predicate a breach of the treaty [...] Great-Britain upon this event. If it was one, it happened [...] May 1783.

The affair of the western posts is now to be examined; [...] the detention of them, after the proper point of time for [...] livering them up, was a breach of the treaty, will not be [...] dispute. But what that proper time was, it a serious ques [...] between the two parties.

Our government has contended, that the posts ought to h [...] been surrendered with all convenient speed, after the provi [...] al treaty took effect: and mr. Jefferson, who is much cited [...] the present occasion has shown, by an ingenious and cla [...] rate deduction of circumstances, that this was not only [...] done, but never intended.

But mr. Jefferson has not even discussed the question, which [...] the provisional or the definitive treaty was the act from whic [...] the obligation to perform was to date. This is an import [...] omission; for Great-Britain affirms the definitive treaty to [...] the criterion.

As an original question, much might be said on both [...] The natural relation of the terms provisional or preliminary and definitive seems to exhibit the former as inchoate and imp [...] [...]ct, [Page]and to refer to the latter the conclusive obligatory force and legal perfection. There is room, therefore, to say, that all but the mere cessation of hostilities, or for the execution of which there is no precise point of time fixed in the preliminary articles, is referred to in the definitive treaty.

On the other hand, it may be argued, that a preliminary treaty is as much a national treaty as a definitive one, both being made by an equal and the competent authority; and that there is no good reason why those things which are sufficiently regulated by the preliminary, should not go into immediate and complete effect, equally as if regulated by the definitive treaty; or why the latter should be considered as any thing more than an instrument for adjusting points which may have been left open by the preliminary articles, and for giving more perfect form. Accordingly, there are examples of preliminary treaties going into mutual and full execution, though never followed by definitive treaties.

But, however this question may have stood on principle, the conduct of our government in the particular case has settled it against us, and has completely sanctioned the doctrine of Great-Britain.

If performance was to date from the provisional articles, this applies as well to us to to Great-Britain. It was incumbent upon congress to have notified the treaty, with the proper solemnities, to the different states and their citizens; to have made the recommendations stipulated by the fifth article; and to have enjoined the observance of all those things which we promised on our part. The nature of some of these stipulations rendered it particularly urgent that no time should be lost. But all was deferred till the ratification in this country of the definitive treaty. The 15th of January 1784, is the date of the act which attempts to carry the treaty into effect on our part. This then is a practical settlement by ourselves of the principle, that performance was to date from the definitive treaty.

It is no objection to the position, that our sea ports were previously evacuated; that was matter of mutual convenience; and though done, does not change the state of strict obligation between the parties. Even in the view of liberal and conciliating procedure, the prompt surrender of our [...] a ports are, for obvious reasons, very different things.

But our dilemma is this, if the delay of orders for evacuating the western posts, previous to the ratification of the definitive treaty, was, on the part of Great-Britain, a breach of treaty, [Page]our delay to act upon the points stipulated by us till after th [...] ratification, must have been equally a breach of treaty; and it must have been at least cotemporary with any breach tha [...] could have been committed by Great-Britain.

We are compelled then by our own example to agree wi [...] Great-Britain that she was not obliged to surrender the western posts till after the mutual ratification of the definitive treaty [...] and to abandon the superstructure, however soothing to o [...] wishes, which has been reared upon a different foundation. [...] so, we must look to the period of the exchange of the ratificati [...] in Europe for the date of the orders for evacuating. I have [...] in my possession materials for fixing with accuracy that peri [...] but considering the time of the ratification here and the ti [...] of its probable arrival in England, we are carried to the la [...] end of April or begining of May 1784; so that it is not till [...] bout May 1784, that we can charge upon Great-Britain a d [...] linquency as to the surrender of the posts.

Having now examined the nature of the infractions of [...] treaty of peace charged upon Great-Britain with reference [...] dates I shall, in the next number of this defence, trace some [...] stances of infraction on our part with a like reference. Th [...] conclusions to be drawn from this comparison, if I mistake no [...] will greatly disconcert some articles of the prevailing creed [...] this head, and go far towards confirming what was preliminarily offered to evince the prudence of our envoy in relinqui [...] ing the favourite ground.

CAMILLUS.

No IV.

AN accurate enumeration of the breaches of the treat [...] of peace on our part, would require a tedious research. It will suffice to select and quote a few of the [...] prominent and early instances.

One of the earliest is to be found in an act of this state, [...] granting a more effectual relief in cases of certain trespass [...] passed the 17th March, 1783. This act takes away from any person (subjects of Great-Britain of every description incl [...] ed) who had, during the war, occupied, injured, destroyed [...] received property, real or personal, of any inhabitant without [Page]the British lines, the benefit of the plea of a military order; consequently the justification which the laws and usages of war give, and the immunity resulting from the reciprocral am [...]esty, which, expressly or virtually, is an essential part of every treaty of peace. To this it may be added that it was considered by Great-Britain as a direct infraction of the 6th article of her treaty with us, which exempts all persons from prosecution "by reason of the part they might have taken in the war."

Mr. Jefferson, not controverting the point that the provisions of this act were contrary to the treaty, endeavours to get rid of the inference from it, by alleging three things.—

1st. That it passed antecedently to the treaty, and so could not be a violation of an act of subsequent data.—

2d. That the treaty was paramount to the laws of the particular states, and operated a repeal of them.—

3d. That the exceptionable principle of this act was never sanctioned by the courts of justice, and in one instance (the case of Rutgers and Waddington in the mayor's court) was over ruled.

As to the first point, it is sufficient to answer, that the law continued to operate, in fact, from the time of the treaty rid the 4th of April, 1787, when there was a repeal of the exception [...]ble clause, by an act of our legislature. During the period of [...]our years, many suits were brought and many recoveries had; extending even to persons who had been in the military [...]rvice of Great-Britain.

To the second point, these observations may be opposed.

The articles of the confederation did not, like our present constitution, declare that treaties were supreme laws of the [...]and. The United States, under that system, had no courts of their own, to expound and enforce their treaties as laws. All was to depend upon the comparative authority of laws and [...]eaties, in the judgment of the state courts.

The question, whether treaties were paramount to, and a [...]rtual repeal of antecedent laws, was a question of theory, about which there was room for, and in this country did exist much diversity of opinion. It is notorious, that it has been [...]renuously maintained that however a national treaty ought, a good faith, to be conclusive on a state, to induce a repeal of [...]ws contrary to it; yet its actual laws could not be controverted by treaty, without an actual repeal by its own authority. This doctrine has been emphatically that of the party distin [...]uished by its opposition to national principles.

And it is observable, that congress, not relying entirely up [Page]on the force of the treaty, to abrogate contravening laws, in their address already cited, urge the states to a repeal of those laws. It is likewise observable in respect to the very act under consideration, that the legislature of the state, in April, 1787, thought a positive repeal of the exceptionable clause necessary.

The complaints of a power, whose treaty with us was, [...] fact, violated by the operation of a state law, could never [...] satisfactorily answered by referring to a theoretic, abstract, [...]puted proposition. Such a power might reply with irresisti [...] force: "It is not for us to concern ourselves about the stru [...] ture and meaning of your political constitutions, or the fou [...] of legal maxims deducible from the forms and distributions of power which you have adopted for your governments. It is the act in which alone we are interested — you have stipulated this and that to us—your stipulation in practice is contravened. It is your duty to soe that there are no impediment from conflicting authorities within yourselves, to an exact [...]silment of your promises. If you suffer any such impediment to exist, you are answerable for the consequences."

As to the third point, it is to be observed, that though th [...] may have been no express formal decision of our courts, [...] forcing the exceptionable principle of the trespass act: [...] there never was a decision of a supreme court against it; [...] it may not be amiss to remark incidentally, that the de [...] of the mayor's court, from which mr. Jefferson is glad to [...] rive an exculpation of our conduct, was the subject of [...]vere animadversion at a popular meeting in this city, as [...]diciary encroachment on the legislative authority of the [...]. The truth on this point is, that according to the opini [...] our bar, a defence under a military order was desperate, [...] it was believed that a majority of our supreme court [...] would over-rule the plea. Hence in numerous cases wh [...] might have been used, it was waved; and the endeavo [...] behalf of the defendants, was either to effect on coll [...] grounds, a mitigation of damages, or to accomplish the [...] compromises that could be obtained; even the suit of Ru [...] and Waddington, after a partial success in the mayor's [...] was terminated by a compromise, according to the advi [...] the defendant's council, owing to the apprehension of an [...] favourable issue in the supreme court; and this, notwi [...] ing the defendant was a British subject.

Under these circumstances, which are faithfully repe [...] [Page]is it possible to doubt, that the act in question operated a breach of our treaty with Great-Britain? and this from the commencement of its existence? can we reasonably expect, that nations with whom we have treaties, will allow us to substitute theoretic problems to performances of our engagements, and will be willing to accept them as apologies for actual violations?

It is pertinent to remark, that the British commander in chief very early remonstrated against this act; but the remonstrance produced no effect.

Another act of the state of New-York may be cited as a violation of the treaty on our part, which must have been [...]early cotemporary with that of the detention of the posts. Its date is the 12th of May, 1784; this act confirms, in ex [...]ess terms, all confiscations before made, notwithstanding Errors in the proceedings, and takes away the writ of error up [...] any judgment previously rendered.

This was, in substance, a new confiscation; judgments which from error were invalid, were nullities. To take away [...] writ of error, by which their nullity might be established, [...] to give them an efficacy which they did not before possess; [...], as to the operation, cannot be distinguished from the ren [...]ing of new judgments. To make voidable acts of confis [...]tion valid and conclusive, is equivalent to new acts of con [...]cation. A fair execution of the treaty, required, that every [...]ng in this respect should be left where it was, and forbade [...] remedying of defects, in former proceedings, as much as [...] restitution of new judgments.

Another, and an unequivocal breach of the treaty, is found [...] act of South-Carolina, of March 26, 1784. This act [...]ends the recovery of British debts for nine months, and [...] allows them to be recovered only in four yearly install [...]s, contrary to the express stipulation of the IVth article, " [...] creditors on either side, shall meet with [...] lawful impedi [...]s to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bon [...] [...] debts theretofore contracted."

It is idle to attempt to excuse infractions of this kind, by [...]pleas of distress and inability. This is to make the conve [...]ce of one party the measure of its obligation to perform [...] promises to another. If there was really an impossibility of [...]ent, as has been pretended, there was no need of legisla [...]e obstruction; the thing would have regulated itself; and [Page]the very interest of the creditor was a pledge, that no gene [...] evil could have resulted from allowing a free course to t [...] laws. If such impediments could be justified, what imped [...] ments might not be justified? What would become of the article, the only one in the treaty, to be performed by us, [...] real consequence to Great-Britain?

This infraction by South-Carolina, was prior to that of [...] detention of the posts, by Great-Britain.

But the case of Virginia is still stronger than that of South Carolina. There is evidence which cannot be disputed, th [...] her courts, in defiance of the treaty, have constantly remained shut to the recovery of British debts, in virtue of laws passed during the war.

An act of her general assembly of the 22d June, 1784, [...]ter suggesting as breaches of the treaty by Great-Britain, [...] carrying off of the negroes, and the detention of the posts, a [...] instructing her delegates in congress to request a remonstra [...] to the British court, complaining of those infractions, and [...] siring reparation, and after declaring that the national hou [...] and interest of the citizens of that common wealth obliged [...] assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete fulfil [...] the said treaty, until the success of the aforementioned re [...] strance is known, or congress shall signify their senti [...] touching the premises, concludes with the following re [...] tion:

"That so soon as reparation is made for the foreg [...] fraction, or congress shall judge it indisputably necessary, acts and parts of acts passed during the late war, as inhibit recovery of British debts, ought to be repealed, and payment [...] of made in such time and manner as shall consist with the [...] ted situation of the commonwealth."

The plain language of this resolution is, that there [...] acts passed during the war, which then actually inhibi [...] recovery of British debts; and that for the removal of th [...] hibition, a repealing act by the authority of Virginia was [...]cessary.

However unfounded this position might have been in th [...] here is conclusive evidence that the fact in Virginia was [...] formable to it; that her courts had been, ever since the [...] then were, and until a repealing law was passed, were to continue to be shut against the recovery of British d [...] When testimony of this kind was urged by the British [...]ter, was it possible for our envoy to make any solid [...] [Page]Who could be supposed to know better than the legislature of Virginia, the real state of the fact? When that legislature declared it to be as has been stated, who, or what could contradict it? With what truth has it been asserted, that "it was at all times perfectly understood" that treaties controuled the laws of the states?

Additional proof of the contrary is found in the subsequent conduct of Virginia. On the 12th of December, 1787, the state passed an act repealing all such acts or parts of acts of the late, as had prevented, or might prevent the recovery of debts due to British subjects, according to the true intent of the treaty; but with this proviso, that there should be a suspension of the repeal, 'till the governor, by advice of council had, by proclamation, notified that Great-Britain had delivered up the posts, and was taking measures for the further fulfilment of the treaty by delivering up the Negroes, or by making compensation for them. This denotes clearly, that in the opinion of the legislature of Virginia, there were acts of that state which had prevented and might prevent the recovery of debts according to the treaty.

It is observable, too, that the resolutions of June, 1784, do not even give the expectation of a complete repeal of the impeding laws, in the event of reparation of the breaches of treaty by Great-Britain. They only promise such a modification of them as would permit the payment in such time and man [...] as should consist with the exhausted situation of the common [...]lth; that is, not according to the true intent of the treaty, [...] according to the opinion of the legislature of Virginia of [...]e abilities of the commonwealth.

As the infraction which these proceedings of Virginia ad [...], resulted from acts passed during the war, it of course was [...]eval with the first existence of the treaty of peace, and seems [...] preclude the possibility of any prior breach by Great-Britain. It has been at least demonstrated, that the detention of [...]e posts was not such prior breach; as there was no obligation to surrender 'till after the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive treaty in England.

I pass by the serious contraventions of the treaty in this important article of the debts, which are of a later date, because they do not affect the question of the first breach, though they [...]e of great weight to demonstrate the obligation of the United States to make conpensation.

The argument then, upon the whole, as to the question of the first breach, stands thus—It is a great doubt whether the [Page]carring away of the negroes was at all a breach. If it was one, the trespass act of this state preceded it in date, and went into operation the very moment it was possible to issue process. The detention of the posts is subsequent to breaches of the article concerning their recovery of debts on our part. This, i [...] the case of South Carolina, is determined by the date of her act (March 26, 1784) which is before the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive treaty could have taken place. In that of Virginia, it results from her own testimony, that impediments to the recovery of British debts, created by acts passed during the war, continued from the first moment of the peace until after the year 1787. Or if, contrary to our own interpretation, we are disposed to adhere to the provisional treaty as the act from which performance was to date, we were guilty of a breach in not acting ourselves upon that treaty: a breach, which being co-temporary with the existence of the treaty, seems not to admit of any prior contravention. From all which it follows, that take what ground we will, we must be perplexed to fix the charge of the first breach of the trea [...]y upon Great Britain.

Let the appeal be to the understandings and hearts of [...] did men—men who have force of mind sufficient to refe [...] themselves from the trammels of prejudice, and who dare [...] look even unpalatable truths in the face. Let such men pronounce, whether they are still satisfied that Great Britain i [...] clearly chargeable with the first breaches of the treaty?— Whether they are not, on the contrary, convinced that the question is one so mixed and doubtful, as to render a warm of it, even on the score of intrinsic merit, expedient on [...] part? and especially whether they can entertain a particle of doubt, that it was wiser to wave it than to suffer it to prover final obstacle to the adjustment of a controversy on which the peace of their country was suspended? This was undoubte [...] the alternative to our envoy. In the choice he made, the [...] mate opinion of our enlightened country cannot fail to upplaud his prudence.

CAMILLUS.

No. V.

THE discussion in the two last numbers has shown, if [...] mistake not, that this country by no means stands upon such good ground, with regard to the inexecution of the tr [...]ty [Page]of peace, as some of our official proceedings have advanced, and as many among us have too lightly credited. The task of displaying this truth has been an unwelcome one. As long as a contrary doctrine was either a mere essay of polemical skill, or a convenient ingredient of negociation, it was natural for those who thought differently of it, to prefer silence to contradiction; but when it is made the engine of great errors, of national conduct, of excessive pretensions, which forbid a reasonable accommodation, of national difference, and endangers rupture and war, on grounds which reason disapproves and prudence condemns, it becomes an indispensible duty to expose its hollowness and fallacy.—Reserve then would be a crime. The true patriot, who never fears to sacrifice popularity to what he believes to be the cause of public good, cannot hesitate to endeavour to unmask the error, though with the certainty of incurring the displeasure and censure of the prejudiced and unthinking.

The disposition to infract the treaty, which, in several particulars, discovered itself among us, almost as soon as it was known to have been made, was, from its first appearance, a source of humiliation, regret, and apprehension to those who could dispassionately estimate the consequences, and who felt a proper concern for the honor and character of the country. They perceived that besides loss of reputation, in must sooner or later lead to very serious embarrassments. They have been hitherto mistaken in no part of their anticipations; and if their faithful warning voice, now raised to check the progress of error, is as little listened to as when it was raised to prevent the commencement of it, there is too much cause to fear, that the experience of extensive evils may extort regrets which the foresight of an enlightened people ought to avert.

Citizens of United America! as you value your present enviable lot, rally round your own good sense! Expel from your confidence, men who have never ceased to misadvise you! Discard intemperate and illiberal passions! Aspire to the glory of the greatest triumph which a people can gain, a triumph over prejudice! Be just, be prudent! Listen impartially to the unadulterated language of truth! And, above all, guard your peace with anxious vigilance against all the artful snares which are laid for it! Accompany me with minds open to conviction, in a discussion of unspeakable importance to your welfare!

Weigh well, as preliminary to further investigation, this momentous proposition. "PEACE, in the particular situation [Page]of this independent country, is an object of such GREAT and PRIMARY magnitude, that it ought not to be relinquished, unless the relinquishment be clearly necessary to PRESERVE our HONOUR in some UNEQUIVOCAL point, or to avoid the sacrifice of some RIGHT or INTEREST of MATERIAL and PERMANENT importance." This is the touchstone of every question which can come before us, respecting our foreign concerns.

As a general proposition, scarcely any will dispute it; but in the application of the rule, there is much confusion of ideas; much false feeling and falser reasoning. The ravings of anger and pride are mistaken for the suggestions of honor. Thus are we told in a delirium of rage, by a gentleman of South-Carolina, that our envoy should have demanded an unconditional relinquishment of the western posts as a right; till which was granted, and until lord Grenville had given orders to lord Dorchester to that effect, open to be sent to our president, to be by him forwarded, he should not have opened his lips about the treaty. It was prostrating the dearest rights of freemen, and laying them prostrate at the feet of royalty.

In a case of incontestible, mutual infractions of a treaty, one of the parties is to demand, peremptorily of the other, an unconditional performance upon his part, by way of preliminary and without negociation. An envoy sent to avert war, carrying with him the clearest indications of a general solicitude of his country, that peace might be preserved, was, at the very first step of his progress, to render hostility inevitable, by exacting, not only what could not have been complied with, but what must have been rejected with indignation. The government of Great-Britain must have been the most abject on earth, in a case so situated, to have listened for a moment to such a demand. And because our envoy did not pursue this frantic course; did not hold the language of an IMPERIOUS BASHAW to his TREMBLING SLAVE, he is absurdly stigmatised as having prostrated the rights of freemen, at the foot of royalty. What are we to think of the state of mind which could produce so extravagant a sally? would a prudent people have been willing to have entrusted a negociation which involved their peace to the author of it? will they be willing to take him as their guide in a critical emergency of their affairs?*

[Page] True honor is a rational thing. It is as distinguishable from Quixotism, as true courage from the spirit of bravo. It is possible for one nation to commit so undisguised and unqualified an outrage upon another, as to render a negociation of the question dishonorable. But this seldom, if ever happens. In most cases, it is consistent with honor to precede rupture by negociation, and whenever it is, reason and humanity demand it. Honor cannot be wounded by consulting moderation. As a general rule, it is not till after it has become manifest, that reasonable reparation for a clear premediated wrong cannot be obtained by an amicable adjustment, that honor demands a resort to arms. In all the questions between us and Great-Britain, honor permitted the moderate course; in those which regard the inexecution of the treaty of peace, there had undoubtedly been mutual faults.—It was, therefore, a case for negociation and mutual reparation. True honor, which can never be separated from justice, even requires reparation from us to Great-Britain, as well as from her to us. The injuries we complain of in the present war, were also of a negociable kind. The first was bottomed on a controverted point in the laws of nations. The second left open the question, whether the principal injury was a designed act of the government or a misconstruction of its courts. To have taken, therefore, the imperious ground which is recommended, in place of that which was taken—would have been not to follow the admonitions of honor, but to have submitted to the impulse of passion and phrenzy.

So likewise, when it is asserted that war is preferable to the sacrifice of our rights and interests, this, to be true, to be rational, must be understood of such rights and interests as are certain, as are important, such as regard the honor, security, or prosperity of our country. It is not a right disputable, or of small consequence, it is not an interest temporary, partial and inconsiderable, which will justify, in our situation, an appeal to arms.

Nations ought to calculate as well as individuals; to compare evils; and to prefer the lesser to the greater; to act otherwise, is to act unreasonably; those who counsel it, are impostors or madmen.

These reflections are of a nature to lead to a right judgment of the conduct of our envoy in the plan of adjustment to which he has given his assent.

Three objects, as has appeared, were to be aimed at, on behalf [Page]of the United States. 1st, Compensation for Negroes carried away. 2d, Surrender of the Western Posts. 3d, Compensation for spoliation during the existing war.

Two of these objects, and these in every view the most important, have been provided for; how fully will be examined hereafter. One of them has been given up (to wit) compensation for the Negroes.

It has been shown, as I trust, to the conviction of dispassionate men, that the claim of compensation for the Negroes, is, in point of right, a very doubtful one; in point of interest, it certainly falls under the description of partial and inconsiderable; affecting in no respect, the honor or security of the nation, and incapable of having a sensible influence upon its prosperity. The pecuniary value of the object is, in a national scale, trifling,

Not having before me the proper documents, I can only speak from memory. But I do not fear to be materially mistaken in stating that the whole number carried away, so ascertained as to have afforded evidence for a claim of compensation, was short of 3000 persons, of whom about 1300 were of sixteen years and upwards, men, women, and children. Computing these at an average of 150 dollars per head, which is a competent price, the amount would be 450, 000 dollars, and not two or three millions, as has been pretended.

It is a fact, which I assert on the best authority, that our envoy made every effort in this power to establish our construction of the article relating to this subject, and to obtain compensation; and that he did not relinquish it, till he became convinced, that to insist upon it would defeat the purpose of his mission, and leave the controversy between the two countries unsettled.

Finding, at the same time, that the two other points in dispute could be reasonably adjusted, is there any one who will be rash enough to affirm, that he ought to have broken off the negociation on account of the difficulty about the Negroes? Yes! there are men, who are thus inconsiderate and intemperate! But will a sober reflecting people ratify their sentence?

(To be Continued.)

Notes

†

See the president's message, February 14, 1790.

↵

(1).

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to [...]ssemble, an [...] to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Article III, of the amendments to the federal constitution, proposed by congress, and ratified by the legislatures of [...] several states, pursuant to the fifth article of the original constitution.

↵

(2).

My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London, continues undiminished; but a mission like this, while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for a friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to hostility." Extract from the president's message.

↵

(3).

Mr. Genet, soon after his arrival, communicated the decree of the national convention, of February 15th, 1793, authorising their executive to propose a treaty with us, upon liberal principles, such as might strengthen the bond: of good will, which unite the two nations; and informed us in a letter of May 23d, that be was authorised to treat accordingly. THE SENATE BEING THEN IN RECESS, AND NOT TO MEET AGAIN TILL THE TALL, I APPRIZED MR. GENET, THAT THE PARTICIPATION IN MATTERS OF TREATY, GIVEN BY THE CONSTITUTION TO THAT BRANCH OF OUR GOVERNMENT, WOULD, OF COURSE, DELAY ANY DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO HIS FRIENDLY PROPOSALS. As he was sensible of this circumstance, the matter has been understood to lie over till the meeting of the senate." Extract from Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Morris, August 23d, 1793.

It may be useful to inform the people of America, what those liberal principles mentioned by Mr. Jefferson, were, in the treaty proposed by France, by inserting here the terms themselves.

National Convention, February 19, 1793. Decrees as follows.

1. "That all the ports of the French colonies be open to vessels of the United States of America.

2. "That all produce exported or imported in American vessels, on going out or entering in the colonies, or in France, pay the same as that borne by French vessels."

National Convention, March 26, 1793.

"The national convention, willing to obviate the difficulties which might arise relative to the execution of its decree of the 19th February last, concerning the United States of America; to grant new favors to that nation; and to treat it in its commercial concerns with the French colonies, in the same manner as the vessels of the republic, decrees as follows:

1. "From the day of the publication of the present decree in the French colonies of America, the vessels of the United States of sixty to [...]s burden or under, laden with flour and provisions, as also with the articles of supplies specified in the 2d article of the arret of the 30th of August, 1784, and with bacon, butter, salt salmon, and caudles, shall be admitted into the harbours of the said colonies [...]emft from all duties."

↵

(4).

See extract from the president's message in note 2.

↵

(5).

"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Article IX of amendments to the federal constitution, &c.

↵

(6).

Articles of the armed neutrality.

I. "Neutral bottoms shall enjoy a free navigation, even from port to port, and on the coasts of the belligerent powers.

II. "All effects belonging to the subjects of the belligerent powers, shall be looked upon as free on board such neutral ships, excepting only such goods as are stipulated contraband."

III. In support of this article, Russia refers to her treaty with Brita [...], in 1734, in which it is declared,

"The subjects of either party may freely pass, repass, and trade in all countries which now are, or her [...]after may be, at enmity with the other of the said parties, places actually blocked up or besieged only excepted; provided they do not carry any warlike stores or ammunition to the enemy: as for all other effects, their ships, passengers and goods, shall be free and unmolested."

Indeed the British carried their ideas of free commerce, A. D. 1739, much farther. The following resolution then passed both houses of parliament, and was approved of by the king!

"Resolved, that the subjects of Great Britain have an evident and inviolable right to navigate in the American seas, as well in going to as in returning from any part of the dominions of his majesty; and that it is a manifest violation of this right, to visit such vessels at open sea, under pretext that they are freighted with contraband or prohibited merchandizes."

By the treaty between England and France, A. D. 1786, article XX, "It is stipulated, that every thing shall be deemed free, which shall be found on board the ships, belonging to the subjects of the respective kingdoms, although the whole lading, or part thereof, should belong to the enemies of their majesties."

↵

(7).

By the treaty between Britain and France, in 1786, article XXIII, "tin, iron, lead, copper, brass; all kinds of provisions which serve for sustenance and food to mankind, cordage, cables, sails, sail cloth, hemp, tallow, pitch, tar, rosin, anchors, ship masts planks, [...]imber of all kinds of trees, and all other things proper for building or repairing ships," are declared not to be contraband The same specification of articles, not contraband, is made in our treaties with Holland, France, &c. But by Mr. Jay's treaty, article XVIII, "timber for ship building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and generally what may serve to the equipment of vessels," are declared expressly to be contraband; and provisions are left in jeopardy.

↵

(8).

Federal constitution, article I. section 1. "All legis [...] powers herein granted, shall be vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representation" Section 8. "The congress shall have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations."

↵

*

New-York.

↵

*

No man in the habit of thinking well, either of mr. Rutledge's head or heart, but must have felt, at reading the passages of his [...]peech, which have been published, pain, suprise, and mortification. I regret the occasion, and the accessity of and adv [...]sion.

↵

§

§

§

[Page]

[No. II.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—AUGUST 2 [...], 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. CAMILLUS, No. V.—continued 75

2. — No. VI. 78

3. — No. VII. 82

4. — No. VIII. 90

5. Impressment of American Seamen at Jeremie, by the Commander of the Hermione, July 4, 1795 98

6. Breach of the Laws of Neutrality, by the Commander of the Africa, August 1st, 1795 100

7. Resolutions of the Citizens of Petersburg, August 1st, 1795 102

8. Caius's Address to the President of the United States, July 21st, 1795 106

9. Cato, No. I. 114

10. — No. II. 119

11. Address of a Number of Citizens of Philadelphia to the President of the United States 122

12. President's Answer to the Address 125

13. Dissent of a Number of Citizens of Boston, from the Proceedings of their late Town-Meeting 126

14. Dissent of a Number of Citizens of Trenton from the Proceedings of their late Town-Meeting 127

15. Proceedings at Trenton, August 13th, 1795 12 [...]

16. Proceedings of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, August 11th, 1795 129

17. Resolutions of the Citizens of the Borough of Your (Pennsylvania) August 17th, 1795 130

18. Caroliniensis 131

19. Resolutions of the Citizens of Richmond, July 29th, 1795 13 [...]

20. Report of the Committee chosen by the Citizens of Savannah, July 29th, 1795 134

21. Resolutions of the Inhabitants of Bordenton, Crosswicks, Black Horse, and Reckless Town, August 8th, 1795 139

22. An Essay on Jacobinical Thinkers 141

23. Remarks on the Ild Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty 143

[Page]

CAMILLUS—No. V.—Continued.

WHAT would such a people have said to our envoy, had he returned with this absurd tale in his mouth! "Countrymen! I could have obtained the surrende of your posts, and an adequate provision for the reparation of your losses by unjust captures—I could have terminated your controversy with Great Britain, and secured the continuance of your peace, but for one obstacle, a refusal to compensate for the negroes carried away; on this point the British government maintained a construction of the treaty different from ours, and adhered to it with inflexibility. I confess, that there appeared to be much doubt concerning the true construction: I confess, also, that the object was of inconsiderable value. Yet it made a part of our claims; and I thought the hazards of war preferable to a renunciation of it."

What would his adversaries have replied to him on such an occasion? No ridicule would have been too strong, no reproach too bitter. Their triumph would have been complete: for he would have been deservedly left without advocate, without apologist.

It cannot admit of a serious doubt, that the affair of the negroes, was too questionable in point of right, too insignificant in point of interest, to have been suffered to be an impediment to the immense objects which were to be promoted by an accommodation of differences acceptable in other respects. There was no general principle of national right or policy to be renounced. No consideration of honor forbid the renunciation, every calculation of interest invited to it. The evils of war for one month would outweigh the advantage, if at the end of it there was a certainty of attainment.

But was war the alternative? Yes, war or disgrace.

The United States and Great Britain had been brought to issue. The recent spoliations on our commerce, superadded to the evils of a protracted Indian war, connected with the detention of the western posts, and accompanied with indications of a design to contract our boundaries, obstructing the course of our settlements and the enjoyment of private rights, and producing serious and growing discontent in our western country, rendered it indispensable, that there should be a settlement [Page]of old differences, and a reparation of new wrongs; or, that the sword should vindicate our rights.

This was certainly, and with reason, the general sense of our country, when our envoy left it. There are many indications that it was the opinion of our government; and it is to be inferred, that our envoy understood the alternative to be as has been stated.

Indeed what else could be contemplated? after the depredations which had been committed upon our commerce, after the strong sensibility which had been discovered upon the o [...] casion in and out of our public councils, after an envoy extraordinary had been sent to terminate differences and obtain reparation; if nothing had resulted, was there any choice but reprisals? should we not have rendered ourselves ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of the whole world, by forbearing them?

It is curious to [...]serve the inconsistency of certain [...]. They reprobate the treaty as incompatible with our honor, and yet they affect to believe an abortion of the negociation would not have led to war. If they are fincere, they must thi [...] that national honor consists in perpetually railing, compl [...]ing, blustering, and submitting. For my part, much as I [...] precate war, I entertain no doubt that it would have been [...] duty to meet it with decision, had negociation sailed; that is due regard to our honor, our rights and our interests would have enjoined it upon us. Nor would a pusillanimous pass [...] ness have saved us from it. So unsettled a state of things would have led to fresh injuries and aggravations; and circumstamo [...] too powerful to be resisted, would have dragged us into [...] We should have lost our honor without preserving our pe [...] Nations in similar situations have no option but to accom [...] date differences, or to fight. Those which have strong moti [...] to avoid war, should, by their moderation, facilitate the a [...] commodation of differences. This is a rule of good sense, a [...] maxim of sound policy.

But the misfortune is, that men will oppose imagination [...] fact. Though we see Great Britain predominant on the occea [...] though we observe her pertinaciously resisting the idea of pacification with France, amidst the greatest discourageme [...]; though we have employed a man whose sagacity and integrity have been hitherto undisputed, and of a character far from [...]ible, to ascertain what was practicable; though circumstan [...]s favored his exertions; though much time and pains were bestowed upon the subject; though there is not only his testi [...] ny, but the testimony of other men who were immediately [...] [Page]the scene, and in whom there is every reason to confide, that all was attained which was attainable: yet we still permis ourselves to imagine, that more and better could have been done, and that by taking even now a high and menacing tone, Great Britain may be brought to our feet.

Even a stile of politeness in our envoy has been construed to his disadvantage. Because he did not mistake strut for dignity, and rudeness for spirit; because he did not, by petulence and asperity, inlist the pride of the British court against the success of his mission, he is represented as having humiliated himself and his nation. It is forgotten that mildness in the manner, and sirmness in the thing, are most compatible with true dignity, and almost always go further than harshness and stateliness.

Suppositions that more could be done by displaying, what is called, greater spirit, are not warranted by facts. It would be extremely imprudent on that basis, to trust ourselves to a surther experiment—to the immense vicissitudes in the affairs of Europe, which from moment to moment may essentially vary the relative situations of the contending parties. If there ever was a state of things which demanded extraordinary circumspection, and forbade a spirit of adventure, it is that of the United States at the existing juncture, viewed in connection with the present very singular and incalculable posture of Europe.

But it is asked, to avoid S [...]ylla, may we not run upon Charybdis? —If the treaty should preserve our peace with Britain, may it not interrupt it with France?—I answer, that to me there appears no room for apprehension. It will be shewn in the course of the discussion, that the treaty interferes in no particular with our engagements to France, and will make no alteration whatever in the state of things between us and her, except as to the selling prizes in our ports, which, not being required by treaty, was originally permitted merely because there was no law to forbid it, and which being confined to France was of very questionable propriety on the principles of neutrality, and has been a source of dissatisfaction to the other belligerent powers. This being the case, no cause of umbrage is given to France by the treaty, and is as contrary to her interest as to inclination, wantonly to seek a quarrel with us. Prostrate indeed were our situation, if we could not, without offending France, make a treaty with another power, which merely tended to extinguish controversy, and to regulate the rules of commercial intercourse, and this not only without violating any duty to France, but without giving any preference to another. It is astonishing that those who affect so much nicety about national [Page]honor, do not feel the extreme humiliation of such an idea. As to the denomination of alliance with Great Britain which has been given to the treaty, it is an insult to the understandings of the people, to call it by such a name. There is not a tittle of it which warrants the appellation.

CAMILLUS.

No. VI.

THERE is one more objection to the treaty for what it does not do, which requires to be noticed. This is a [...] omission to provide against the impressment of our seamen.

It is certain that our trade has suffered embarrassments in this respect, and that there have been abuses which have operated very oppressively upon our seamen; and all will join in the wi [...] that they could have been guarded against in future by the treaty.

But it is easier to desire this, than to see how it could have been done. A general stipulation against the impressment of our seamen would have been nugatory, if not derogatory. Our right to an exemption is perfect by the laws of nations, and a contrary right is not even pretended by Great Britain. The difficulty has been, and is, to fix a rule of evidence, by which to discriminate our seamen from theirs, and by the [...] crimination to give ours protection, without covering theirs in our service. It happens that the two nations speak the [...]ame language, and in every exterior circumstance closely resemble each other; that many of the natives of Great Britain and Ireland are among our citizens, and that others, without being properly our citizens, are employed in our vessels.

Every body knows, that the safety of Great Britain depends upon her marine. This was never more emphatically the cafe, than in the war in which she is now engaged. Her very e [...] istence as an independent power, seems to rest on a maritime superiority.

In this situation, can we be surprised that there are difficulties in bringing her to consent to any arrangement which would enable us, by receiving her seamen into our employment, to detain them from her service? Unfortunateds; there can be devised no method of protecting our seamen which does not involve that danger to her. Language and appearance, instead of being a guide, as between other nations, are [Page]between us and Great Britain, sources of mistake and deception. The most familiar experience in the ordinary affairs of society, proves, that the oaths of parties interested cannot be fully relied upon. Certificates of citizenship, by officers of one party, would be too open to the possibility of collusion and imposition, to expect that the other would admit them to be conclusive. If inconclusive, there must be a discretion to the other party which would destroy their efficacy.

In whatever light they may be viewed, there will be found an intrinsic difficulty in devising a rule of evidence, sase for both parties, and consequently, in establishing one by treaty. No nation would readily admit a rule which would make it depend on the good faith of another, and the integrity of its agents, whether her seamen, in time of war, might be drawn from her service, and transferred to that of a neutral power. Such a rule between Great Britain and us, would be peculiarly dangerous, on account of circumstances, and would facilitate a transfer of seamen from one party to another. Great Britain has accordingly perseveringly declined any definitive arrangement on the subject; notwithstanding earnest and reiterated efforts of our government.

When we consider candidly the peculiar difficulties which various circumstances of similitude, between the people of the two countries, oppose to a satisfactory arrangement, and that to the belligerent party, it is a question of national safety, to the neutral party a question of commercial convenience and individual security, we shall be the less disposed to think the want of such a provision as our wishes would dictate, a blemish in the treaty.

The truth seems to be, that from the nature of the thing, it is matter of necessity to leave it to occasional and temporary expedients—to the effects of special interpositions from time to time, to procure the correction of abuses; and if the abuse becomes intolerable, to the ultima ratio; the good faith of the parties, and the motives which they have to respect the rights of each other, and to avoid causes of offence, and vigilance in noting and remonstrating against the irregularities which are committed, are probably the only peaceable sureties of which the case is susceptible.

Our minister plenipotentiary, Mr. Pinckney, it is well known, has long had this matter in charge, and has strenuously exerted himself to have it placed upon some acceptable sooting; but his endeavours have been unsuccessful, further than to mitigate the evil by some additional checks, and by drawing the attention of the British government to the observance of more [Page]caution. A more sensible effect of our representations has been lately experienced; and with attention and vigilance, that effect may be continued, and perhaps increased. But there is reason to sear that it would constantly be found impracticable to establish an efficacious conventional guard.

I proceed now to the examination of the several articles in the treaty, in the order in which they stand.

The first contains merely a general declaration that there shall be peace and friendihip between the contracting parties, the countries and people of each, without exception of persons or places.

One would have imagined that this article, at least, would have escaped a formal objection; however it might have been secretly viewed as the most sinful of all, by those who pant after war and enmity between the two countries. Nothing but the fact could have led to a farmise that it was possible for it to have been deemed exceptionable, and nothing can better display the rage for objection, which actuates the adversaries of the treaty, than their having invented one against so innocent a provision.

But the committeee appointed by a meeting at Charleston, (South Carolina) hare sagaciously discovered, that this article permits "the unconditional return to our country of all persons who were proscribed during the late war."

With all but men determined to be dissatissied, it would be a sufficient answer to such an objection to say, that this article is a formula in almost every treaty on record, and that the consequence attributed to it was never before dreamt of, though other nations besides ourselves have had their proscriptions and their banishments.

But this is not all—our treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783, has an equivalent slipulation in these words (article 6) "there shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic majesty and the said states, and between the subjects of the one, and the citizens of the other." In calling this an equivalent stipulation, I speak with reference to the objection which is made. The argument to support that objection would be to this effect; "Exiles and criminals are regarded as within the peace of a country; but the people of each are, by this article, placed within the peace of the other; therefore proscribed persons are restored to the peace of the United States, and so lose the character of exiles and criminals." Hence the argument will turn upon the word "peace"—the word "friendship" will have no influence upon the question. In other respects there is no difference, in substance, between the two articles. For the [Page]terms "people," "subjects," "citizens," as used in the two treaties, are synonimous. If, therefore, the last treaty stipulates that there shall be peace between the governments, countries, and people of the two nations, the first stipulates what is equivalent, that there shall be peace between the two governments, and the subjects and citizens of each. The additional words, without exception of persons and places, can make no difference, being merely surplusage If A says to B, "I will give you all the money in this purse," the gist is as complete as if he had said, "I give you all the money in this purse, without exception of a single dollar."

But the object of the stipulation, and the subject of the objection, have no relation to each other.—National stipulations are to be considered in the sense of the laws of nations. Peace, in the sense of those laws, defines a state which is opposite to WAR. Peace, in the sense of the municipal laws, defines a state which is opposite to that of crimm [...]lity. They are, consequently, different things; and a subject of Great Britain, by committing a crime, may put himself out of the peace of our government, in the sense of our municipal laws, while there might be perfect peace with him, in the sense of the laws of nations; and vice versa, there might be war with him, in the sense of the laws of nations, and peace in that of the municipal laws.

The punishment of a subject of Great Britain as a felon, would certainly not constitute a state of war between the parties, nor interfere with the peace which is stipulated by this article; though it is declared that it shall be inviolable, and might as well be affirmed to prevent the punishment of future, as of former criminals.

But who, in the contemplation of the laws of the respective states, are the proscribed persons? they must have been understood to have been subjects or citizens of the states which proscribed them—consequently cannot be presumed to be comprehended in an article which slipulates peace between the nations and their respective citizens.

This is not a stipulation of peace between a nation and its own citizens; nor can the idea of expatriation be admitted to go so far as to destroy the relation of citizen, as regards amenability for a crime. To this purpose, at least, the offender must remain a citizen.

There can hardly have been a time when a treaty was formed between two nations, when one or the other had not exiled criminals or sugutives from justice, which it would have been unwilling to remilate. Yet this was [...] [...]cemed an obstacle [Page]to the article, nor has an immunity from punishment [...] been claimed under it, not is there the least ground to assent that it might be claimed under it.

It follows that the objection which has been taken to this article is wholly without foundation. It is humiliating to the human understanding, or disreputable to the human heart, the similar objections should come from sensible men; it is disg [...] ful to have bo resure them. The regard I feel for some of these who have brought it forward, makes it a painful task. How great is the triumph of passion over the judgment, on this [...] casion!*

CAMILLUS

No. VII.

THE second article of the treaty stipulates, that his [...] tannic majesty will withdraw all his troops and garri [...] from all posts and places within the boundary lines assigned [...] the treaty of peace to the United States; and that this eva [...] tion shall take place on or before the first day of June, 1796 the United States in the mean time, at their discretion, extending their settlements to any part within the said boundary line, [...] cept within the precincts or jurisdictions of any of the said posts, that all settlers and traders within the precincts or jurisdiction of the said posts, shall continue to enjoy, unmolested, all th [...] property of every kind, and shall be protected therein; [...] they shall be at liberty to remain there, or to remove with all [...] any part of their effects; also to sell their lands, houses, [...] effects, or to retain the property thereof at their discretion; [...] such of them as shall continue to reside within the said boundary [Page]lines, shall not be compelled to become citizens of the United States, but shall be at liberty to do so, if they think proper, making and declaring their election within a year after the evacuation; and that those who should continue after the expiration of a year, without having declared their intention of remaining subjects of his Britannic majesty, shall be considered as having elected to become citizens of the United States.

This article, which accomplishes a primary object of our envoy's mission, and one of primary importance to the United States, has been as much clamoured against as if it had made a formal cession of the posts to Great Britain. On this point an uncommon degree of art has been exerted, and with no small success. The value of the principal thing obtained has been put out of sight by a misrepresentation of incidental circumstances.

But the fact is, nevertheless, that an object has been accomplished, of vast consequence to our country. The most important desiderata in our concerns with foreign powers are, the possession of the western posts, and a participation in the navigation of the river Mississippi. More or fewer of commercial privileges are of vastly inferior moment. The force of circumstances will do all we can reasonably wish in this respect; and, in a short time, without any steps that may convulse our trade or endanger our tranquillity, will carry us to our goal.

The recovery of the western posts will have many important consequences. It will extinguish a source of controversy with Great Britain, which, at a period, not distant, must have inevitably involved the two countries in a war, and the thing was becoming every day, more and more urgent. It will enable us effectually to controul the hostilities of the northern and western Indians, and in so doing will have a material influence on the southern tribes. It will therefore tend to rescue the country from what is at present its greatest scourge, Indian wars. When we consider that these wars have, four years past, taken an extra million annually from our revenue, we cannot be insensible of the importance of terminating that source of expense. This million turned to the redemption of our debt, would contribute to complete its extinquishment in about twenty years.* The benefits of tranquillity to our frontier, exempting its inhabitants from the complieated horrors of savage warfare, [Page]speak too loudly to our humanity, as well as to our policy, to need a commentary.

The advantages of the recovery of the posts do not stop here; an extension of trade is to be added to the catalogue. This, however, need only be mentioned at this time, as it will come again into view in considering the third article.

But two consequences, not commonly adverted to, require particular notice in this place.

There is just ground of suspicion, corroborated by various concurring circumstances, that Great Britain has entertained the project of contracting our boundaries to the Ohio. This has appeared in Canada—at the British garrisons—at the Indian towns—at Philadelphia, and at London. The surrender of the posts for ever cuts up by the roots, this pernicious project. The whole of our western interests are immediately and deeply concerned in the question.

The harmonious and permanent connection of our westen with our Atlantic country, materially depends on our possession of the western posts. Already had great discontent been engendered in that country by their detention. That discontent was increasing and rankling daily. It was actually one of the aliments of the insurrection in the western parts of Pennsylva [...]. While the posts remained in the hands of Great Britain, dangerous tamperings with the inhabitants of that country were to be apprehended—a community of views between Great Britain and Spain might have taken place, and by force and sedition, events formidable to our general union might have been hazarded. The disposition or prevention of that community of views, is a point of the greatest moment in our system of national policy. It presses us to terminate differences, and extinguish misonderstandings with Great Britain;—it urges [...]s to improve the favorable moment, and stamps with the charge of madness, the efforts to let go the hold which the treaty, [...] mutually ratified, would give us.

Whoever will cast his eye upon the map of the United States, will survey the position of the western posts, their relations to our western waters, and their general bearings upon our western country; and is at the same time capable of making the reslections, which an accurate view of the subject suggests, will discover multiplied confirmations of the position, that the possession of those posts by us, has an intimate connection with the preservation of union between our western and Atlantic territories; and whoever can appreciate the immense mischiefs of a disunion, will feel the prodigious value of the acquas [...]on [...]o such a man, the question may be confidently [Page]put: Is there any thing in the treaty conceded by us to Great Britain, to be placed in competition with this single acquisition? The answer could not sail to be in the negative.

But it is said by way of objection, that admitting the posts will be surrendered at the time stipulated, it is no acquisition by this treaty: it is only the enjoyment of a right which was secured by the treaty of peace.

With as much good sense might it be said, that the stipulation of reparation for the spoliation of our property, or even immediate actual reparation, if it had been obtained, was nothing gained; because the laws of nations gave us a right to such reparation; and it might in this way be proved to have been impossible for our envoy to have effected any thing useful or meritorious.

Let us see what is the real state of the case. Great Britain had engaged by the treaty of peace, to surrender the western posts with all convenient speed; but without fixing a precise time. For the cause, or on the pretext of our not having complied with the treaty on our part, especially in not removing the impediments which the antecedent laws of particular states, opposed to the recovery of British debts, she delayed, and afterwards refused to make the surrender; and when our envoy left this country, there was too much appearance of an intention on her part, to detain them indefinitely, and this after having actually kept them ten years. The treaty of peace was consequently in this particular suspended, if not superseded. It was either to be reinstated by a new agreement, or enforced by arms. The first our envoy has effected; he has brought Great Britain to abandon the dispute, and to fix a precise, determinate time when, at furthest, the posts are to be delivered up. It is therefore to this new agreement, that we shall owe the enjoyment of them, and it is of course, entitled to the merit of having obtained them; it is a positive ingredient in its value, which cannot be taken from it; and it may be added, that this is the first time that the merit of procuring, by negociation, restitution of a right withheld, was ever denied to the instrument which procured it.

But the picture given of the situation of Great Britain, to warrant the inferences which are drawn, is exaggerated and false. It cannot be denied that she is triumphant on the ocean; that the acquisitions which she has made upon France, are hitherto greater than those which France has made upon her. If, on the one hand, she owes an immense debt, on the other she possesses in immense credit, which there is no symptom of being i [...]paited.—British credit has become, in a British mind, [Page]an article of faith, and is no longer an object of reason. How long it may last, how far it may go, is incalculable. But it is evident, that it still affords prodigious resources, and that it is likely for some time to come, to continue to afford them. I [...] addition to this, it is a well ascertained fact, that her government possesses, internally, as much vigor, and has as much national support, as it perhaps ever had at any former period [...] her history. Alarmed by the unfortunate excesses in France, most men of property cling to the government, and carry with them the great bulk of the nation, almost the whole of the farming interest, and much the greatest proportion of other industrious classes. Her manufactures, though probably wounded by the war, are still in a comparatively flourishing condition. They suffice not only for her own supply, but for the full [...] tent of foreign demand, and the markets for them have [...] been materially contracted by the war.—Her foreign comment continues to be immense; as a specimen of it, it may be mentioned, that the ships from India this year, announced to have been seen upon or near the British coast, amounted to 35 in number, computed to be worth between four and five millions sterling. It is no light circumstance in the estimate of her [...] sources, that a vast preponderancy in that quarter of the g [...] continues to nourish her wealth and power.

If from a view of Great Britain, singly, we pass to a view [...] her in her foreign connections, we shall find no cause to o [...] sider her as a prostrate nation. Among her allies, are the [...] greatest powers of Europe (France excepted) namely, R [...] and Austria, or the emperor: Spain and Sardinia continue [...] make a common cause with her. There is no power of Eu [...] which has displayed a more uniform character of persevera [...] than Austria; for which she has very strong motives on the present occasion. Russia, too, is remarkable for her stead [...] to her purpose, whatever it may be. It is true, that here [...] she has not discovered much zeal in the coalition, but [...] are symptoms of her becoming more closely and cordially engaged. If she does, she is a great weight in the scale.

Against this will be set the astonishing victories, heroic [...] ploits, and vast armies of France, her rapid conquests to the Rhine, the total reduction of Holland, the progress of [...] arms in Spain and Italy, the detaching of the king of Pr [...] from the coalition, and the prospect of detaching some others of the German princes; and it will be added, that the continental enemies of France appear exhausted, despairing and enable to continue the war.

[Page] This, if offered only to show that there is no probability that the enemies of France can succeed in the orginal object of the war against her, or can divest her of her acquisitions on the continent, has all the force that may be desired to be given to it; but when it is used to prove that the situation of Great Britain is so desperate and humbled as to oblige her to receive from France, or the United States, any conditions which either of them may think fit to impose, the argument is carried infinitely too far. It is one thing for a country to be in a posture not to receive the law from others, and a very different thing for her to be in a situation which obliges others to receive the law from her, and what is still stronger, from all her friends. France evidently cannot annoy Russia—she cannot, without great difficulty, from their geographical position, make any further acquisitions upon the territories of Austria. Britain and her possessions are essentially safe, while she maintains a decided maritime superiority. As long as this is the case, even supposing her abandoned by all her allies, she never can be in the situation which is pretended by the opposers of the treaty.

But in describing the situation of France, only one side of the medal is presented. There is another side far less flattening, and which, in order to come to a just conclusion, must be impartially viewed.

If the allies of Great Britain are fatigued and exhausted, France cannot be in a better condition. The efforts of the latter, in proportion to intrinsic resources, have, no doubt, been much greater than those of the former. It is a consequence from this, physically certain, that France must be still more fatigued and exhausted, even than her adversaries. Her acquisitions cannot materially vary this conclusion: the low countries, long the theatre of the war, must have been pretty well emptied before they fell into her hands. Holland is an artificial power; her life and strength were in her credit; this perished with her reduction. Accordingly the succours extracted from her, compared with the scale of the war, have been insignificant.

But it is conjectured, that as much has not been done as might have been done; that restitution of the posts has not been procured, but only a promise to restore them at a remote period, in exchange for a former promise, which had been violated. That there is no good ground of reliance upon the fulfilment of this new promise, for the performance of which there ought to have been some surety or guarantee. That the restitution of the posts ought to have been accompanied with indemnification for the detention, and for the expenses of the Indian wars which have been occasioned by that detention, [Page]and by the instigation of British intrigue. That it was better to go to war than to relinquish our claim to such indemnification; or if our present circumstances did not recommend this, it was better to wait till it was more convenient to us [...] enforce our claims, than to give them up.—These are the declamations by which this part of the treaty is arraigned. Let us see if they are the random effusions of enthusiasm, or the rational dictates of sound policy.

As to the suggestion, that more might have been done than was done, it must of necessity be more conjecture and imagination. If the picture given of the situation of Great Britain, was better justified by facts than it is, it would not follow that the suggestion is true; for the thing would depend not on the real situation of the country, but on the opinion entertained of it by its own administration, on the personal character of the prince and of his council; on the degree i [...] which they were influenced by pride and passion, or by reason. The hypothesis, that the dispositions of a government are conformable with its situation, it as fallacious a one as can be entertained. It is to suppose, contrary to every day's experience, that cabinets are always wise. It is, on the part of those who draw the inference, to suppose, that a cabinet, the most violent, rash, and foolish, of Europe, is at the same time moderate and prudent enough to act according to the true situation of the country. Who of our enthusiasts, reasoning from his view of the abased condition of Great-Britain, has not long since imagined that she ought to be on her knees to France, suing for mercy and forgiveness? Yet how different hitherto is the fact! If we carefully peruse the speeches of the leading members of the convention, we shall observe the mena [...] against Britain frequently interspersed with invitations to peace; while the British government maintains a proud and distant reserve, repels every idea of peace, and inflexibly pursues the path of war. If the situation of Europe in general, and of Great Britain in particular, as is pretended, authorized us [...] expect whatever we chose, how happens it that France, with all her victories, has not yet been able to extort peace?

As to the true position of France, we are not left to mere inference. All the official reports, all the private accounts from thence acknowledge a slate of extreme embarrassment and distress; an alarming d [...]rangement of the finances, and a scarcity not distant from famine. so this are to be added, a continuance of violent and destructive conflicts of parties, and the unextinguishable ember [...] of insurrection.

[Page] This fair comparison of the relative situation of the contending parties, will, I know, b [...] stigmatized as blazoning the strength and resources of Great Britain, and depreciating the advantages of France. But the cant phrases of party cannot alter the nature of truth—nor will they prevent the people of the United States from listening impartially to it, or from discerning that it is a mark of fidelity to their interests, to counteract misrepresentation, by placing facts fairly before them, and a duty which they owe to themselves, and which they cannot omit to perform without betraying their own interests, to receive them candidly, and weigh them maturely.

The conclusion is, that all those highly-charged declamations which describe Great Britain to us as vanquished and humbled; as ready to pass under the yoke at command, and to submit to any conditions which we may think fit to prescribe, are either the chimeras of over-heated imaginations, or the sabrication of impostors; and if listened to, can have no other effect than to inspire a delusive presumption, and a dangerous temerity.

But to judge the better of the extravagance of these declamations, it will be useful to go back to the periods when the negociation began and ended. Our envoy arrived in England and entered upon the business of his mission, at the moment when there was a general elation on account of the naval victory gained by Lord Howe, and previous to those important successes, which have terminated in the conquest of Holland; and the treaty was concluded by the 19th of Novemver last, prior to the last mentioned event, and the defection of the king of Pr [...]ffia. The posture of things at the time it was in negociation, and not at this time, is the standard by which to try its merits; and it may be observed, that it is probable the negociation received its first impression, and even its general outline anterior to the principal part of the disasters sustained by the coalesced powers in the course of the last campaign.

It may not be improper to add, that if we credit the representations of our envoy, Great Britain manifested similar dispositions with regard to the treaty at the commencement as at the close of the negociation: whence it will follow, that too much has been attributed in this country to the victories of France.

The subject of the second article will be resumed and concluded in the next number.

CAMILLUS.

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No. VIII.

ONE of the particulars, in which our envoy is alleged to have fallen short of what might or ought to have been done, respects the time for the surrender of the western posts. It is alleged, that there ought either to have been an immediate surrender, or some guarantee or surety for the performance of the new promise. Both parts of the alternative presuppose that Great Britain was to have no will upon the subject; that no circumstances of security or convenience to her were to be consulted; that our envoy was not to negociate, but to command. How unsubstantial the foundation on which this course of proceeding is recommended, has been already developed.

The fact was, that our envoy pressed an early evacuation of the posts; but there was an inflexible adherence, on the other side, to the term limited in the treaty. The reasons understood to have been assigned for it, were to this effect, viz. That according to the course of the Indian trade, it was customary [...] spread through the nations, goods to a large amount; the returns for which could not be drawn into Canada, in a sh [...] er period than was proposed to be fixed for the evacuation; that the impression which the surrender of all the posts to American garrisons might make on the minds of the Indians, could not be foreseen; that there was the greatest reason for caution, as, on a former occasion, it had been intimated to them by public agents of the United states, that they had been fors [...] and given up by the British government; that the protection promised on our part, however sincere, and however competent in other respects, might not be sufficient in the first instance to prevent the embarrassment which might ensue; that [...] these reasons the traders ought to have time to conclude th [...] adventures, which were predicated upon the existing state of things; that they would in future calculate upon the new state of things; but that, in the mean time, the care of government ought not to be withdrawn from them.

There is ground to believe, that there were representatie [...] on behalf of the Canada traders, alleging a longer term than that which was adopted in the treaty, to be necessary to wind up and adapt their arrangements to the new state of things; and that the term suggested by them was abridged several months. And it may not be useless to observe, as explanatory to the reasons given, that in fact it is the course of the trade [...] give long credits to the Indians, and that the returns for good furnished in one year, only come in the next year.

[Page] What was to be done in this case? Was the negociation to break off, or was the delay to be admitted? The last was preferred by our envoy; and the preference was rightly judged.

The consequence of breaking off the negociation has been stated. No reasonable man will doubt, that delay was preferable to war, if there be good ground of reliance, that the stipulation will be fulfilled at the appointed time. Let us calmly examine this point.

The argument against it, is drawn from the breach of the former promise. To be authorized to press this argument, we ought to be sure that all was right on our part.—After what has been offered on this subject, are we still convinced that this was the case? Are we able to say, that there was nothing in our conduct which furnished a ground for that of Great Britain? Has it not been shown to be a fact, that, from the arrival of the provisional articles in this country, till after the ratification thereof, by the definitive treaty, acts of states interdicting the recovery of British debts, and other acts militating against the treaty, continued in operation? Can we doubt, that subjects of Great Britain, affected by these acts, carried complaints to the ears of their government? Can we wonder, if they made serious impressions there, if they produced dissatisfaction and distrust? Is it very extraordinary, if they excited the idea of detaining the posts as a pledge, till there were better indications on our part? Is it surprising, if the continuance of these acts, and the addition of others, which were new and positive breaches of the treaty, prolonged the detention of the posts?—

In fine, was the delay in surrendering so entirely destitute of cause, so unequivocal a proof of a persidious character, as to justify the conclusion, that no future dependence can be made on the promises of the British government? Discerning men will not hastily subscribe to this conclusion.

Mutual charges of breach of faith are not uncommon between nations: yet this does not prevent their making new stipulations with each other, and relying upon their performance. The argument from the breach of one promise, if real, to the breach of every other, is not supported by experience; and if adopted as a general rule, would multiply, infinitely, the impediments to accord and agreement among nations.

The truth is, that though nations will too often evade their promises on colourable pretexts, yet few are so profligate as to do it without such pretexts. In clear cases, self-interest dictates a regard to the obligations of good faith: nor is there any thing in the history of Great Britain which warrants the opinion, [Page]that she is more unmindful than other nations, of her character for good faith.

Yet she must be so, and in an extreme degree, if she be capable of breaking, without real cause, a second promise on the same point, after the termination, by a new treaty, of an old dispute concerning it, and this too on the basis of mutual reparation. It would indicate a destitution of principle, a contempt of character, much beyond the usual measure, and to an extent which it may be affirmed is entirely improbable.

It is a circumstance of some moment in the question, that the second promise is free from the vagueness of the first, a to the time of execution—It is not to be performed with [...] convenient speed, but by a day certain, which cannot be exceed. This would give point to violation, and render it unequivocal.

Another argument, against the probability of performance has been deduced from the supposed deficiency of good reason for the delay, which is represented as evidence of want of [...] cerity in the promise.

Besides the reasons which were assigned for that delay, th [...] are others that may be conjectured to have operated, which [...] would not have been equally convenient to avo [...]; but wh [...] serve to explain the delay different from the supposition of [...] having been calculated for ultimate evasion. If, as we have [...] too much cause suspected, Great Britain, or her representation in Canada, whether with or without orders, had really co [...] nauced the hostilities of the western Indians, it was to be [...] pected, that she should think it incumbent upon her, to [...] them sufficient time to make peace, before an evacuation [...] the posts should put them entirely in our power. She might otherwise, have provoked them to hostilities against her [...] [...]ettlements, and have kindled in their minds, inextingui [...] resentments. It was not certain, how soon a peace should [...] brought about; and it might be supposed, that the dispo [...] to it on our part, might be weakened or strengthened, by [...] proximity or remoteness of the period of the surrender. M [...] over, some considerable time might be requisite, to prep [...] those establishments for the security of Canada, which the [...] linquishment of the posts on our side, would be deemed [...] render necessary.

The latter motive is one, not justly objectionable: the f [...] mer implies an embarrassment, resulting from a culpable policy, which was entitled to no indulgence from us, but which nevertheless, must have had a pretty imperi [...] [...] [...]fluence on the conduct of the other party, and must have created an ob [...] [Page]to a speedy surrender, not easy to be s [...]rmoanted. Taken together, we find in the reasons assigned, and in those which may be presumed to have operated, a solution of the pertinacity of Great Britain on the subject of time, without [...]p [...]ching, on that account, the sincerity of the promise to surrender.

But we have very strong holds, for the performance of this promise, upon the interest of Great Britain: 1st. The interest which every nation has, in not entirely forfeiting its reputation for honor and fidelity. 2d. The interest which results from the correlative stipulation with regard to the indemnification for the British debts, a point upon which there will be no inconsiderable mercantile sensibility. 3d. The interest of preserving peace with this country, the interruption of which, after all that has passed, could not fail to attend the non-surrender of the posts at the stipulated time.

It is morally certain, that circumstances will every day add strength to this last motive.—Time has already done much for us, and will do more. Every hour's continuance of the war in Europe, must necessarily add to the inconveniencies of a rupture with this country, and to the motives which Great Britain must feel, to avoid an increase of the number of her enemies, in desire peace, and, if obtained, to preserve it.

The enemies of the treaty, upon their own calculations, can hardly dispute, that if the war continues another year after the present, the probable situation of Great Britain, will be a complete security, for her compliance with her promise, to surrender the posts. But [...]t us suppose, that a general peace takes place in Europe this winter, what may then be the disposition of Great Britain in June next, as to war or peace with this country?

I answer, that the situation will be, of all others, that which is most likely to indispose her to a war with us. There is no juncture, at which war is more unwelcome to a nation, than immediately after the experience of another war, which has required great exertions, and has been exp [...]nsive, bloody, and c [...] lamitous. The minds of all men then dread the renewal of so great an evil, and are disposed rather to make sacrifices to peace than to plunge afresh into hostilities. The situation of Great Britain, at the end of the war, in which she is now engaged, is likely to be the most discouraging that can be im [...]gined to the provocation of new wars. Here we may discover [...] powerful security for the performance of her stipu [...]ations.

As to the [...]ei of a gua [...]ntee or surety for the sulsilm [...] of the promise, it cannot be s [...]rioully b [...]ved that it was ob [...] ble. It would have been an admission of the party, that there [Page]was a well founded distrust of its faith. To consent to it, therefore, would have been to subscribe to its own humiliation and disgrace, the expectation of which has been shown to be ri [...] culous.

But why was there not equally good reason that we should have given a guarantee or surety for the performance of [...] new promise, with regard to the debts? And if there was [...] have been reciprocity, where should we have convemently [...]o [...] that guarantee or surety? Should we have thought it very [...] putable to ourselves, to have been obliged to furnish it?

The arguments of the opposers of the treaty, are extre [...] ly at variance with each other. On the one hand, they rep [...] sent it as fraught with advantages to Great Britain, without equivalents to the United States—as a premeditated scheme to sacrifice our trade and navigation to hers—as a plan dictated by her, for drawing the two countries into close connection and alliance, and for making our interests subservient to hers; on the other hand, they tell us, that there is no security for the surrender of the po [...]s, according to stipulation. How is [...] one thing to be reconciled with the other? If the treaty is such [...] immense boon to Great Britain, if it be such a master-piece [...] political craft on her side, can there be any danger that [...]e [...] destroy her favorite work, by not performing the conditio [...] [...] which its e [...]icacy and duration must depend? There is no [...] sition better settled, than that the breach of any article [...] treaty by one party, gives the other an option to consider of [...] whole treaty as annu [...]ed. Would Great Britain give us this option, in a case in which [...]e had so much to lose by doing is?

This gl [...]ring collision of arguments, proves how supersf [...] ally the adversaries of the treaty have considered the subject, and how little reliance can be placed on the views they give of it.

In estimating the plan which the treaty adopts, for the settlement of the old controversy, it is an important re [...]ection, that, from the course of things, there will be nothing to be performed by us before the period for the restitution of the posts will have elapsed; and that, if this restitution should be evaded, we shall be free to put an end to the whole treaty, about which there could not be a moment's hesitation. We should then be where we were before the treaty, with the advantage of having strengthened the justice of our cause, by removing every occasion of reproach, which the infractions of the treaty of peace may have furnished against us.

Two other particulars, in which this part of the treaty is supposed to be defective, regard the want of indemnification [Page]for the detention of the posts, and for the expenses of Indian wars.

Those who make the objection, may be safely challenged to produce precedents of similar indemnifications, unless imposed by conquering powers on the vanquished, or by powers of overhearing strength upon those which were too weak to dispute the logic of superior force. If this were the real situation of the United States and Great Britain, then is the treaty inexcusably faulty; but if the parties were to treat and agree as equal powers, then is the pretension extravagant and impracticable. The restitution of the specific thing detained, is all that was to be expected, and, it may be added, it is all that was ever really expected on the part of this country, so far as we may reason either from official acts or informal expressions of the public opinion.

In eases where clear injuries are done, affecting objects of known or easily ascertained values, pecuniary compensation may be expected to be obtained by negociation; but it is believed that it will be impossible to cite an example of compensation so obtained, in a case in which territory has been withheld on a dispute of title, or as a hostage for some other claim (as, in the present instance, for securing the performance of the 4th article of the treaty of peace.) The recovery of the territory withheld is the usual satisfaction.

The want of a rule to adjust consequential damages, is, in such cases, a very great difficulty. In the instance under distaffion, this difficulty would be peculiarly great.—The posts are, for the most part, in a wilderness. There are but two of them which have any adjacent settlements; Point-au-fer, or Dutchman's point, to which a part of a tract of land, called Cald well's Manor, with a few inhabitants, has been claimed as appurtenant; and Detroit, which has a settlement in the town and neighbourhood of between two and three thousand souls. In the vicinity of the other posts, on our side, there is scarcely an inhabitant. It follows, that very little damage could be predicated either upon the loss of revenue from, or of the profits of trade with, the settlements in the vicinity of the posts. The trade of the Indians within our limits would consequently be the basis of the claim of compensation.—But here the ignorance or spirit of exaggeration of the opponents of the treaty has been particularly exemplified. The annual lo [...] from this source has been stated by a very zealous writer against the treaty, who signs himself Cato, at 800, 000 dollars.

Now it is a fact well ascertained, that the mean value of the whole exports from Canada in peltries (which constitute the [Page]returns of Indian trade) in the years 1786 and 1787, was something short of 800, 000 dollars. It is also a fact, in which all men, informed on the subject, agree, that the trade with the Indians, within our limits,* is not more than about on [...] eighth of that which furnishes the peltry exported from Canada. Hence the total product of our Indian trade could not be computed at more than 100, 000 dollars. What proportion of this may be profit, is not easy to be determined; but it [...] certain, that the profits of that trade, from the decrease [...] wild animals, and the inferiority of their kinds, are not con [...] derable. —Many assert, that it is scarcely any longer worth following. Twenty per cent. therefore, would, probably, [...] a large allowance, which would bring the loss on our Indi [...] trade, by the detention of the posts, to about 20, 000, inst [...] of 800, 000 dollars per annum, as has been asserted.

But might not a claim, even of this sum, by way of [...] demnification, be encountered with some sorce, by the o [...] vation, that there is the highest probability that the capital a [...] labour which would have been employed to produce 20, 000 dollars profit on the trade with the Indians, have been quite [...] productively employed in other channels, and consequen [...] that there may have been no loss at all?

Thus we see how erroneous are the data which serve to [...] nify claims, in themselves insignificant, and which, from [...] [Page]great uncertainty of their quantum, are exposed to serious objections. Are claims like these, proper subjects on which to stake the peace of the United States?

The reasonableness of indemnification for the expenses of Indian wars, independent of the unusual nature of the claim, might have been matter of endless debate. We might have been told, that the Indians ascribe those wars to pretensions upon their lands, by virtue of treaties with the former government of the United States, imposed by violence, or contracted with partial and inadequate representations of their nation —that our own public records witness, that the proceedings of our agents, at some of those treaties, were far from unexceptionable —that the wars complained of are to be attributed to errors in our former policy, or mismanagement of our public agents, not to the detention of the posts—that it must be problematical how much of the duration or expenses of those wars are chargeable upon that detention—and, that the posts having been detained by way of security for the performance of the article respecting debts, there was no responsibility for collateral and casual damages. Had we resorted to the charge of their having instigated or prompted those wars, they would have denied the charge, as they have repeatedly done before; and, though we might have been able to adduce circumstances of suspicion against them, they would have contested their validity and force, and, whether guilty or not, would have thought their honor concerned in avoiding the most distant concession of having participated in so improper a business.

In every view, therefore, the claim for indemnification was a hopeless one; and to insist upon it would have answered no other purpose than to render an amicable adjustment impossible. No British minister would have dared to go to a British parliament to ask provision for such an expenditure. What, then, was to be done? Were we now or hereafter to go to war to enforce the claim? suppose this done, and fifty or a hundred millions of dollars expended in the contest, what certainty is there that we should at last accomplish the object?

Moreover, the principle of such a war would require, that we should seek indemnification for the expenses of the war itself, in addition to our former claim. What prospect is there, that this also would be effected? yet if not effected, it is evident that we should have made a most wretched bargain.

Why did we not insist on indemnification for the expenses of our revoiution war? Surely, not because it was less reasonable, but because it was evident that it could not have been obtained, and because peace was necessary to us as well as to our enemy. [Page]This likewise would be the end of a war undertaken to enfore the claim of indemnification for the detention of the posts. We should at length be glad to make peace, either without the indemnification sought, or at best at an expense to carry on the war, without a chance of reimbursement, with which the thing gained would bear no comparison.

The idea which has been thrown out, of leaving the posts in the hands of the British, till we might be better able than, [...] present to go to war for indemnification, is a notable politi [...] expedient. This would be to postone, of choice, the possession of an object which has been shown to be demanded by [...] urgent and important general considerations; to submit to [...] tain and great inconveniencies from that privation, inch [...] probably the continuance or renewal of Indian hostilities I [...] to run the risk, from the growth of the British settlement [...] the neighbourhood of the posts, and various unforeseen cas [...] ties, of their ultimate acquisition becoming difficult and [...] rious: For what? why, to take at last the chances of war, [...] issue of which is ever doubtful, to obtain an object, which [...] obtained, will certainly cost more than it is worth. The [...] penses of war apart, pecuniary indemnification upon any [...] ble scale, would ill compensate for the evils of the future [...] tion, till the more convenient time for going to war should [...] rive. What should we think of this policy, if it should two [...] that the posts and the indemnification too were to be finally bandoned?

CAMILL [...]

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Impressment of American Seamen.
PROTEST.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ss. County, City, and Port of New London.

BE it known and remembered, That at the city of New London, on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1795, before me, the subscriber, a notary public, duly authorised, and living in said city, personally came Cyprian Cook, master of the stay [Page]Crisis, of Norwich, in said state of Connecticut, also Elijah Clarke, passenger on board the sloop Crisis, and being duly sworn, deposed and said:—

That on the 4th day of July, instant, they were lying at anchor, together with upwards of twenty other American vessels, in the port of Jeremie, in Hispaniola, when the English frigate, called the Hermione, stationed at Port-au-Prince, came down to Jeremie, and there came to anchor, and sent his boats on board the said American vessels, and impressed every man from on board said American vessels (except the captains and mates) to the number of sixty or seventy, and by force carried them on board the Hermione, where they were kept for the space of forty-eight hours, without receiving any sustenance, in order to compel the said American seamen to enter on board the Hermione; during which forty-eight hours, the several American captains went to the Britsh commandant, and made complaint to him of the conduct and proceedings of the commander of the said frigate Hermione, when the commandant w [...]wered, "that he could do nothing about the same, as the [...]mmandent of the Hermione did as he pleased."

After which the said American captains repaired on board the Hermione, and made applications, to the commander, for the resteration of their men; when the said commander of the Hermione, called the said American crews up, one by one, and ex [...]d them individually respecting their ages and bodily strength, and out of the sixty or seventy taken as aforesaid, only five were restored; and those, as the commander of the Hermione said, because they were inform and unsit to serve king or country.—These five he returned to the said American captains, treating said captains in the most imperious and insulting manner.—And the depoments further say the sixty or seventy seamen taken as aforesaid, were all American born, except two who were Danes by birth, but had been naturalized in America: and that they returned with the said sloop Crisis, destiture of men, to the port of New London, where they arrived on the 26th July, instant, and farther say not.

CYPRIAN COOK, master.

ELIJAH CLARKE, passenger.

(L. S.) In testimony whereof, &c. LYMAN LAW, notary public.

[Page]

Breach of the Laws of Neutrality.

BE it known unto all it may concern, that on the day [...] the date hereof, before me, Christopher Ellery, pulic notary for the county of Newport, in the state of R [...] Island and Providente. Plantations, in the United States America, came Thomas Bliss, master of the sloop Peggs, of Newport, just arrived from New York, and Louis Ar [...] Pichon, formerly secretary of the legation of the French the United States, passenger on board said sloop, together [...] S. A. Hosser, citizen of Boston, and captain Chabert, [...]: passenger on board said sloop, all of whom, on their [...] declare, that yesterday at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, being [...] first day of August, instant, they were at a distance [...] miles from the light-house, in Narraganset bay, in said [...] bound to Newport; when being opposit [...] the same, a [...] ship of war, the Africa, commanded by Home, fired a [...] shot at said sloop, as a signal to bring her to; that the [...] had then American colours flying; that the master ob [...] signal, soon perceived two beats coming to the sloop, sa [...] [...] ship of war, which heats were manned by a port of th [...] [...] of this ship, and out of which came four or five off [...] [...] of them appearing to be higher in command than the [...] ordered the captain of the said sloop to go near [...] with which order he complied, and soon anchored a [...] the said ship; that, in the mean time, the officers after [...] said master of the sloop several questions, particularly [...] had any passengers on board, and he answering to this [...] in the affirmative, was told by them, that they came [...] pose to take the late French minister, M. Fauchet, who [...] [...] knew to be on board with dispatches; that the master and pasengers then informed them, that M. Fauchet had left the sloop in the morning, at Stonington, where they had been detai [...] two days, by contrary winds; and that he had also left Stonington aforesaid, on horseback, with dispatches and pu [...] papers, which were all taken out of pasteboard boxes; [...] proof of the last affertion, showed the said boxes empty, [...] in number, which M. Fauchet had really left. The officers, [...] satisfied with the answers given, said, their orders were pos [...] and directed them to search all the trunks of the passengen, [...] which proceeding they hoped no one on board would be [...] as their duty required the same; that they accordingly had b [...] the trunks and boxes in the cabin opened, and not finding a [...] papers, they went into the held, where having ordered [...] [Page]Fauchet's servant to open the trunks of his master, they had them emptied, in presence of all the passengers, and out of one of the trunks, they took a bundle of paper, which they gave to one of the officers in care, when the search went on for the other trunks; that they then asked for two other trunks of M. Fauchet, saying, that they had notice of four trunks shipped on board the said sloop, and seeing several other trunks flowed about, they, the said officers, demanded the owners; that one of these, belonging to captain Chabert, afore named, a gentleman engaged in commercial and seafaring business, was overhauled, and the papers, consisting chiefly of sea-books, or journals, examined and put aside with a tin box, containing some papers, with letters directed to different persons in France: that they then fell upon the trunk of M. Pichon, which as they found heavy, they desired to have it opened, threatening, as no one stepped forward with the key, to break the lock thereof; that M. Pichon then went forward, and opened the trunk, which proved to be full of written papers, under clothes; these thrown out, they observed that it was the trunk of M. Fauchet's secretary, and that its containing such a quantity of papers, was a sufficient reason for taking it on board the ship, for the inspection of the captain of the ship; that an officer then went on board the ship with such papers as he thought proper to take with him, that he might receive the orders of the commanding officer relative thereto, and relative to further proceedings; that this officer soon returned, and permitted the sloop to depart, saying that the main object being missed, no further detention was necessary, and returning the papers which he had taken on board the ship; and that the two boats having left the sloop, after a detention of two hours, she came to sail and arrived at Newport in the evening.

THOMAS W. BLISS,

LOUIS ANDRE PICHON,

S. A. HOFFER, and

CHABERT.

In testimony that the aforesaid declaration was made before me, the afore named public notary, as is above set forth, and on the 2d day of August, in the year 1795, and the 20th year of American independence, I have hereunto set my hand and notarial seal, the day and year aforesaid.

(L. S.) CHRIST. ELLERY, Public Notary.

Certifié conforme l'expedition qui sera enregisteré en la chancellerte au consulat de la Republique Francaise à Boston, ce 19 [Page]Thermidor, de l'an 3 de la Republique Francaise, une et indivisible.

Le consul de la Republique Francaise à Boston.

MOZARN

RESOLUTIONS Unanimously agreed to, at a Meeting of the Citizens of Petersburg on Saturday the 1st of August, 1795.

RESOLVED, as the opinion of this meeting, That a strict adherence to the principles of the constitution, ought at all times to be regarded, as the first duty of public officers, i [...] every department; and that it is the Right of the People, [...] only to guard against the exercise of a power which has [...] been delegated, but to see that a power confided to the th [...] branches of congress collectively, shall not be assumed by o [...] only, or by two of them.

The members of this meeting conceive, that the constitutio [...] of the United States, has empowered congress, and not th [...] president and senate,

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes:

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization:

To define and punish piracies:

To declare war, &c. and make rules concerning capture [...] on land and water;—and

To lay and collect taxes, duties, excises, and imposts

And, therefore, that so much of the 3d, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th articles of the treaty, now under consideration, a [...] respects the regulation of trade;

So much of the 2d article as gives to a British subject the rights of a natural-born citizen of the United States; without the previous residence, and other requisites, enumerated in the late act of Congress;

So much of the 21st article as defines and punishes an act therein pronounced to be piracy;

So much of the 17th article as makes a rule in cases where vessels shall be captured or detained, on suspicion of having enemy's property on board;—and,

So much of the 3d and 15th articles as contains a surrender, by two branches of the government of the United States, of a [Page]right entrusted to the whole congress, of laying duties and imposts, on British and other vessels, at discretion;

Are contrary to the constitution, and that the ratification of these clauses would be absolutely void.

The members composing this meeting, view, with no less astonishment than concern, the contempt manifested by the senate, for the constitution of the United States, in advising the president to ratify, provisionally, a treaty, which violates the essential principles of our government, and excludes the house of representatives, from an exercise of powers expressly given to them, as well as to the president and senate. They are of opinion, that the conduct of the senate demands the serious attention of every real friend to the union; and that an attempt so daring and so dangerous, calls for the most pointed and unequivocal censure from the people.

Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting, That the idea on which this treaty is founded, of ‘terminating the differences between the United States and Great Britain, without reference to the merits of their complaints and pretensions,’ is as fallacious as it is new; that it is contrary to the principles sanctioned by the executive in the correspondence between the [...]a [...] secretary of state and Mr. Hammond; and ought to be reprobated by a nation which regards either its honor or its interest.

It is also the opinion of this meeting, That the silence of this treaty, with respect to the slaves and other property carried off by the British troops, contrary to the 7th article of the definitive treaty, is in the highest degree reprehensible; because a claim for compensation, on this account, being a matter of difference, ought, even under the idea above mentioned, to have [...]een brought forward; because such a claim is founded on an [...]xpress obligation created by the treaty of 1783, as well as in [...]u [...]tice and good faith; and because in the correspondent [...] above mentioned, between the late secretary and Mr. Hammond, this claim is ranked, not among those things which are of "smaller [...]oncern," and may therefore "be passed over," but "insisted [...]n," as one, "rendered indispensible by justice to individuals [...] by public policy."

Resolved, also, as the opinion of this meeting, That the 2d [...]rticle of the treaty, under consideration, is materially defect [...]ve, because it does not contain a stipulation on the part of Great [...]ritain, to pay to the United States, a reasonable compensation [...] the various losses sustained, and expenses incurred by the [...]etention of the western posts; that it is vague, in not desin [...]ng the precincts and jurisdiction of the said posts; and so absurd [Page]in requiring the co-operation of the United States, and the governor general, in making previous arrangements concerning the delivery of them, that a belief must be indulged, that a bona fide execution of this part of the treaty, was neither intended by the British minister, nor expected by our own.

Resolved, also, as the opinion of this meeting, That an independent people ought not to conclude a treaty of any kind, with any nation, but on terms of perfect equality. They regard this as a sacred principle, from which every consideration of ho [...] and interest, forbids this country to depart. Under this imp [...] sion, they view with abhorrence a treaty, the stipulations [...] which, even after the 12th article shall be removed, so une [...] vocally admit the pretensions of Great Britain, to a monopoly of commercial advantages, to be well founded.

Resolved, also, as the opinion of this meeting, That the [...] article is unjust, in principle, and will be pernicious in [...] Unjust, because, a government is not responsible for the [...] of its citizens, unless it ratifies or approves them; and the [...] now to be paid by the United States, were due from private [...] dividuals, previous to the adoption of the federal system; [...] because the present government, instead of throwing imp [...] ments in the way of the recovery of British debts, has o [...] ized courts, whose only employment has been to enforce [...] payment: And pernicious, because the circumstances [...] shall entitle a creditor to redress before the commissioner, [...] not enumerated, as they might easily have been, and thus g [...] latitude is left for the exercise of discretionary powers—because it cannot be presumed that the real debtors will appear bef [...] commissioners at a distance, to controvert claims, in which they are no longer interested; and thus a door will be ope [...] to frauds, the extent of which exceeds calculation: And because it tends to a wanton accumulation of the public de [...] already swelled to a size beyond the fears of the friends, or the hopes of the enemies, of the union.

Resolved, also, as the opinion of this meeting, That the [...] article is defective, because it does not contain an express [...] cognition of the illegality of the orders which were issued [...] the British ministry in 1793, and which occasioned the capt [...] complained of by the United States: and because it obliges [...] United States to pay for vessels taken within their limits [...] jurisdiction, though they are not bound to France, or to [...] other nation, in like manner, by their treaties with them; and although in cases of the like nature which may hereafter occur, the 25th article obliges the United States not to pay [Page]but only to use their best efforts to obtain satisfaction from the offending party.

Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting, That in the event of a war, or national difference, it may be both just and politic, to sequester and even confiscate debts, due in this country, to the individuals of a nation at war with the United States; and that, if this power could be relinquished, sound policy requires, that, in the present situation of affairs, it should be retained.

Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting. That as by the law of nations (according to the modern conventions) and by the treaties between the United States and the French, the Dutch, the Swedes and the Prussians, free ships make free goods;—the 17th article of this treaty, which subjects French property in American bottoms to seizure, deserves the most pointed reprobation; because, it will immediately deprive the American merchants, of the benefit of carrying the goods of nations at war with Great-Britain; because, in case of a war between the United States and France, which the PEOPLE forbid! American property, in British neutral vessels, would be secure; and because, in the present state of affaire, it will produce such injury to the French, as will give them just cause of resentment against the partial policy of the American government.

Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting, That the stipulation in the 18th article, making ship-timber, tar, hemp, sails and copper, contraband of war, which are free by our treaties with other nations, is unnecessarily hurtful to the trade of the United States, and manifests the same unfriendly temper to the French.

The members of this meeting are also of opinion, That all good citizens should express their decided disapprobation of the second clause of the 18th article, which authorizes, though not in words, yet in substance, the seizure of American vessels carrying provisions to France.

The members of this meeting solemnly declare their abhorrence of a concession, so incompatible with the object of the late embassy, so derogatory to the honor, so injurious to the interests of America, and so openly and pointedly hostile to the cause of France. They detest a war; they consider it as treason against the happiness of men; but they would cheerfully endure all the calamities which it produces, rather than in any shape be accessary to a combination, which is the scourge of Europe, and the dishonor of the world.

Resolved therefore, as the opinion of this meeting, That this treaty ought not to be ratified by the president and senate of the [Page]United States, even if the British king should consent to a suspension of so much of the 12th article as respects the trade to be carried on, between the United States and the British West India islands.

Resolved, That the chairman of this meeting be requested to adopt such method as he judges best, to furnish the president with a copy of the above resolutions.

The following resolutions were also agreed to by the meeting.

Resolved, That the minority of the senate, who opposed [...] ratification of the treaty with Great Britain, are entitled to th [...] thanks of their country; and that the senators from this st [...] have justified the confidence reposed in them by their constituents.

Resolved, That the patriotic boldness, and magnanimous independence of Stephens Thompson Mason, in having caus [...] the publication of the treaty aforesaid, deserve the most grateful incense that can be offered to a generous mind, the praise of Republicans.

JOSEPH JONES, Chairman.

WILLIAM WHITLOCK, Secretary.

ADDRESS To the President of the United States.

SIR,

THE sentiments which are now respectfully addressed to you, are not, merely, the emanations of a solitary individual; they have been already expressed by thousands of your fellow citizens, whose united voices urge you to adhere to those principles of patriotism, which have so honorably directed all your public conduct, by withholding or suspending the last final act which rests with you for giving effect to the depending treaty between the United States and Great-Britain, or by giving such a direction to the further negociations respecting it, as m [...]y produce a material change from its present form. This treaty is now before the public, and, when the scrutinizing eye of America, shall have viewed it in all its aspects, be assured, sir, that the just and solid objections [Page]which apply to it, will be found to be of a nature too imperious to be resisted by the genuine patriot and guardian of his country's peace. It is not the object of the present address, to enumerate those objections at large; a few of the most prominent only are selected for your serious consideration; of these, the first class may be denominated, omissions on the part of our negociator, and are as follow:

He has omitted to make any convention or stipulation for the protection of American seamen from impressment into the British naval service, or otherwise to secure them against those shameful imprisonments and detentions which have become a national grievance to the United States: although in the 23d article he has stipulated, on behalf of Great-Britain, "that British ships of war, with their officers and crews shall be hospitably received in the ports of the United States, paying due respect to the laws and government thereof; and that the officers shall be treated with that respect which is due to the commissions they bear; and if any insult should be offered to them by any of the inhabitants, all offenders in this respect shall be punished as disturbers of the peace and unity between the two countries."

He has omitted to make any stipulation for the protection and security of the commerce of the United States to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, against the depredations of the Algerines and Barbary corsairs; although he knew that this forms one of the most beneficial branches of our trade, yielding a large annual balance in specie in favor of the United States; and that the policy of our government has been, in all their treaties with the maritime powers, to obtain such a stipulation, it being expressly provided in both our existing treaties with France and Holland, that those powers shall use their good offices and best endeavours to obtain this object—Nor could he be ignorant of what is avowed by lord Sheffield, one of the British king's privy council, to be the true policy of Great-Britain; namely, to countenance and encourage Algerine depredations on the American trade, and to prevent us, as much as possible, from becoming carriers. And this omission is now the more to be regretted, since the recent official intelligence announced in all the newspapers, that the Algerines, under the mediation of Great Britain and Spain, have made peace with Portugal, in consequence of which, the Portuguese cruisers are to be recalled from the Mediterranean, and the Algerines again let loose on the commerce of the United States.

[Page] He has omitted to make any stipulation, or obtain any compensation whatever, for the negroes and other property carried away contrary to the treaty of peace, violating, it is believer, his positive instructions on this head.

He has omitted to except cotton, a staple article of [...] United States, as also melasses, sugar, coffee, and cocoa [...] being the growth, manufacture, or produce of a British West India island, from the disgraceful prohibition imposed by the 12th article, on the export and carrying trade of the United States, admitting British vessels to take and carry away th [...] articles wheresoever grown, from the United States to any [...] of the world, and restraining American vessels, only, from doing.

The next class of objections to the treaty consists of acts [...] commission on the part of our negociator, in stipulations in [...] rious and dishonorable to the United States, as follow:

The second and third articles grant an equivalent for [...] surrender of an absolute right.—By the treaty of peace the [...] were to be absolutely surrendered—The term surrender is [...] prehensive in the law of nations, and, as here used, cana [...] construed to mean less than a total and entire evacuation, [...] and military, of the territories of the United States. Mr. Jay [...] changed the meaning to a mere delivery of the naked wa [...] the posts in June 1796, provided the reason assigned by [...] Grenville in his correspondence with Mr. Jay for this de [...] to wit, "that the British government were uncertain what [...] "ration the surrender of the posts would have on the Indi [...] should not induce a further delay, or total refusal to deliver [...] the naked walls themselves. As to our territory, the Bri [...] are to retain their possession of it, coextensive with the unde [...] limits of the terms, "precincts and jurisdiction," the latter [...] which, it is well known, has been exercised several hundred miles within our territory; and this possession is guarantee [...] them under the protection of the United States, even as [...] subjects, presenting the obnoxious spectacle of a British [...] through a great extent of territory of the United States, [...] establishing that principle, which, in reference to France, [...] been so much deprecated, "of fraternization" under the di [...] dant aspect of a co-mixture of subjects and citizens, of monar [...] and republicans, owing allegiance, some to a foreign prince, [...] others to the republican government of the United States— Again, as it is well known, that all the portages and carrying places now used by the British in their trade with the Western Indians, as well as those nations of Indians themselves, with whom any beneficial trade for surs and peltry can be carrie [...] [Page]on, lie exclusively within the territories of the United States, the permission to the British to use those portages and carrying places, and hold free trade and intercourse with those Indious under the same duties, ferriages, and privileges with citiz [...]ns of the United States, is an absolute grant and concession to the British, without equivalent, of a benefit now wholly ours, tending to secure to them all the advantages of the fur trade, and to rivet their influence over the western Indians; every stipulation relative to navigation and the importation of goods into that country by the citizens of the United States, being calculated to preclude the possibility of any competition on our part. Besides, if the construction of the term "now," in the 9th article of the treaty, should allow British subjects to hold lands within the United States, purchased at any time before the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty, the acquirement of state rights by British subjects may occasion serious questions, is to the power of extinguishing the Indian claims, which the intercourse will turn to the British interest. But, as if our negociator could not sufficiently rivet the chain of British influence [...]ver all the Indians of America, he has agreed, even without the participation or consent of Spain, that the river Mississippi shall be entirely open to both parties; and further that all the parts and places on its eastern side to whichsoever of the parties [...]ging, shall be entirely open to both parties; although he knew that the British hold no port or place whatever on that river; thus, under a covert semblance of reciprocity, conceding to the British the participation in another benefit exclusively ours, without any equivalent for the same, and extending, through these means, their influence over the south western as well as [...]rth western Indians. And all these stipulations, you will he pleased to remember, sir, are, by the treaty itself, declared [...] be permanent, that is, for ever irrevocable without the consent of Great Britain.

The 4th article contains a fruitful source for future war, because it puts the uncertainty it states upon a worse ground than it stood before; it being a well known historical fact, that by a similar omission in the treaty of Utrecht, in not providing a mode for ascertaining definitively the boundary line between the French and British possessions in America, the famous seven years war was produced between those two nations, which terminated in the peace of Paris, and a total relinquishment of all the possessions of France in America to the English.

The 6th article stands unsupported by any principle of treaty or of the law of nations. The able disquisition of Mr. Jefferson on this subject, in his diplomatic correspondence with Mr. [Page]Hummond, is irrefragable on this point; besides, this article is exceptionable in the following instances.

It sanctions claims against the United States for British losses, when the legal impediments comprehended in the treaty of 1783, may not have occasioned those losses. Legal impediments as comprehended in that treaty, cannot extend further than is statutory regulations, peculiarly applicable to British subjects, yet, where the general rules of evidence applied to the ca [...], prevented the recovery, this article authorizes a claim upon the United States for the loss, as in the instances of interest dis [...] lowed during the war, losses sustained by payments in dep [...] ated paper money, and the defeat of evidence to establish open accounts, under the state laws.

It erects a court to controul the courts of the United States, which, and the sorms of proceeding in which, ought to be the only constitutional resort in controversies proper for judici [...]y tribunals. If the court of commissioners should allow a rode of evidence contrary to that deemed admissible by the courts of the United States, the United States are placed in a situation as be made chargeable with the payment of debts, which the [...] ditor could not recover against the debtor in the ordinary cou [...] of justice, allowing full operation to the treaty of 1783; beside a refusal to admit such evidence in the courts of the United States, instantly becomes a legal impediment, to be reli [...]l against by the court of commissioners, even when the d [...] is solvent.

It creates, in the assumption of these debts by the United States, a source of taxation, which is alike to be borne by the innocent observer of the laws, and the guilty infractor of il [...], without any reasonable prospect of being reimbursed by the [...] debtors.

It omits to require, on behalf of the United States, that just set off against these claims which the carrying away the negroes by the British, in violation of the treaty of 1783, allowed the United States to demand.

The 7th article is fallacious and delusory. It does not re [...] the effects of the British orders of November 1793, and January 1794, but allows them full operation; and only affects [...] offer relief in cases where those orders and the law of nations have been illegally or irregularly executed. Instead of pursuing the principle contained in the 6th article, of disregarding the decisions of courts, and placing the merits of the complaint before the commissioners, it obliges the commissioners to act in obedience to the decisions of the British courts, where those decisions have been regular and legal. If then the law of nations [Page]and the orders of November and January have been regularly executed by those courts, the complaints of our government are temediless, and the true ground of those complaints abandoned by the treaty. Besides, the stipulation was unnecessary in cases of irregul [...] or illegal condemnation, except where there was an insolvency on the part of the captors; and therefore the article wears, upon the whole face of it, a total relinquishment, on the part of our negociator, of the merits of our claims, and our merchants have no right to expect one shilling of recompense for their losses. Further, the last clause of this article, does not adhere to the principle supported in the 6th article, but again resorts to the merits of British complaints, and promises compensation; showing, that whenever American demands were submitted upon the principles of equity, the British negociator kept them in the courts for decision; and whenever their demands were urged, our negociator abandoned that principle.

The 9th article is ambiguous, and its construction doubtful; but let that construction be as it may, whenever, in the course of inheritance, alienage shall stop the course of descent, the right by escheat, accruing thereby to individual states, is taken away; and this principle may, and doubtless will, be extended to the territorial rights of the states.

The 10th article reverses the good old maxim, 'that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure;' and our negociator seems to have though that war first, and confiscation afterwards, was better than sequestration first and peace afterwards; since it is impossible to conceive that the greater evil, war, will not generally, if not always, produce the lesser evil, confiscation. But the article is destitute of all equality; Great Britain has fleets and armies, America none. Great Britain, by means of fleets and armies, can enforce the observance of our national duties towards her; we cannot resort to the same means for the same ends: But the annual balance of trade between the two countries is largely in favour of Great Britain; she has always a large amount of property or of debts in our possession, over which, the power of sequestration or confiscation, may be regarded as the American weapon of defence, preventive, equally, of future spoliations and depredations on our commerce, as of war itself. Humanity, therefore, is no less outraged by this stipulation than every principle of policy, justice, and national right.

Thus, fir, have I endeavoured to lay before you the omissions of our negociator, as well as some of the most obvious objections to the ten first articles, which, by the 28th articles, are [Page]all declared to be permanent.—The qualified ratification of the senate, rendering it probable that these ten articles may become the entire treaty, and thus the remaining eighteen articles [...] lative to the trade and commerce between the two countries▪ which are all made to depend on the 12th article, suspended by the senate, may wholly sail, will induce, for the present, a postponement of the considerations resulting from the latter.

The political consequences of the first article, excite the mo [...] alarming sensations; to see, sir, a British colony established within the limits of the United States; to see yielded and ceded to this establishment, a great and undefined extent of our territory; to see the north western boundary of the United States, as it were, purposely left open, in order to secure to the British, the opportunity of future encroachment and enlargement of this colony; to see all our present exclusive benefits of trade and commerce with the Indians, yielded to the British without equivalent, thereby confirming their present influence over the Indian nations, and establishing, through the means of their new colony, a further system of intrigue and influence among all the western inhabitants of the United States to see the principle of alienage prostrated, affording to the British the means, by future or past pretended purchases of the Indians, to establish a claim to a vast extent of the present western territory of the United States; to see a participation y [...] ed in all our posts and places on the Mississippi, extending the chain of British influence through all western America, and drawing a back line on our frontiers from Florida to Canada to see, sir, through all these causes, the completest politi [...] union between Great Britain and the United States, that was ever established between two nations, must fill the American mind with horror. To stand in this intimate political relation with the old, corrupt, and almost expiring government of Great Britain—that government which stands foremost in all the wa [...] of Europe—which is at no time exempt from war for a per [...]d of seven years continuance—and which ever since the establishment of her public blessing, a funded debt, has been distinguished as the common disturber of the peace of the world, ace [...]ds not with the spirit and principles of the free constitution and government of the United States, or with the genius, temper, and feelings of the republican citizens of America.—To the truth of this assertion, you, sir, have borne ample and honor [...] ble testimony, in that memorable letter to Lord Buchan, worthy to be recorded in letters of gold, dated Philadelphia, and April 1793, in which you thus express yourself:

[Page] "My lord, the favorable wishes which your lordship has expressed for the prosperity of this young and rising country, cannot but be gratefully received by all its citizens and every lover of it; one mean to the contribution of which, and its happiness, is very judiciously pourtrayed in the following words of your letter, ‘to be little heard of in the great world of polities;’ these words, I can assure your lordship, are expressive of my sentiments on this head; and I believe it is the sincere wish of united America, TO HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE POLITICAL INTRIGUES, OR THE SQUABBLES OF EUROPEAN NATIONS; but, on the contrary, to exchange commodities and live in peace and amity will all the inhabitants of the earth, and this I am persuaded they will do, if rightfully it can be done. To administer justice to, and receive it from, every power they are connected with, will, I hope, be always found the most prominent feature in the administration of this country; and I flatter myself, that nothing short of imperious necessity can occasion a breach with any of them. Under such a system, if we are allowed to pursue it, the agriculture and mechanical arts, the wealth and population of these states, will increase with that degree of rapidity, as to baffle all calculations, and must surpass any idea your lordship can hitherto have entertained on the occasion."

Whatever, therefore, sir, may have been the views and influence under which our negociator acted, I persuade myself that he has not faithfully pursued either your sentiments, your opinions, or your instructions.

One remaining consideration, sir, will close this address. In all great and critical emergencies of our country, the safest, as well as wisest policy of its administration, will, doubtless, be to resort to and confide in the advice and opinion of the great constitutional council of the nation, composed of the free representatives of the people in both houses of congress assembled. The actual circumstances of the United States, in relation to the treaty with Great Britain, present a great and critical emergency of our country, fraught with questions as awful as any that ever agitated the American people; permit me, therefore, sir, without reference to the past conduct of the executive on this point, to refer you to a striking example, drawn from British history, of a British king on a similar occasion, confiding himself to the same great constitutional council of his nation, with a wisdom and efficacy, which merits to be followed even by an American president. At the close of the famous seven years bloody war between Great Britain and France, preliminary articles of peace were signed at Paris on the 7th of November, [Page]1762; by these articles the political, territorial, and commercial interests of Great Britain were greatly affected. The king laid these preliminary articles before both houses of parliament, on the eleventh of the same month. On the thirteenth, the house of commons addressed him, returning thanks for his gracious condescension, in ordering the said preliminary articles to be laid before them, and declaring ‘that they have considered them with their best attention; and although to make peace and war be his majesty's just and undoubted prerogative, yet knowing how agreeable it must be to his royal mind to be informed of the sense his people entertain of the justice and wisdom of his measures, and his unwearied attention to their welfare, they are impatient to express their approbation of the advantageous terms of the said preliminary treaty, and to lay before him the applause of a faithful, affectionate, and thankful people.’ After this address, on the 22d of November, 1762, the said preliminary articles were ratified by the king, and formed the definitive treaty of peace between the two nations. Deign then, sir, to follow this example; submit the treaty you have caused to be negociated with Great Britain, to the consideration and advice of the two houses of congress, before its final ratification. Receive, in so doing, the affectionate regards, generous confidence, and grateful thank [...] of your fellow citizens of the United States, and thereby secure to yourself another, and an unfading, plaudit to the m [...]e of WASHINGTON.

CAIUS.

Philadelphia, July 21st, 1795.

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. 1.

AS the embassy extraordinary to Great Britain, from the appointment of the envoy, to the conclusion of the treaty, is unequalled in the annals of negociation, it becomes us, the people, who are yet the constitutional sovereigns of the country, to consider it with attention, that it may in future either serve as a friendly beacon to point out a secure harbour in political storms, [...] avoided as a light perfidiously hung out to lure our unsuspecting b [...] on [...]ocks and quicksands.

[Page] It is essential to the due consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of a treaty, to examine the contracting parties; because the same treaty may be good under some, and bad under other circumstances; thus, when Carthage gave up her ships, wealth, and arms in the second Punic war—the treaty might have been considered as good in relation to her then situation, humbled as she was by the Roman arms, and compelled to rely for her existence, as a nation, solely on the justice and humanity of the Roman senate; and yet a treaty of this sort would have been considered as base and abject, if it had been made immediately after the battle of Cannae: and their senate (venal as Carthage then was) would not have been so lost to every patriotic sentiment as to have sanctioned its ratification. Britain, on the day of the signature of the treaty, was involved in a war with the bravest people in Europe; in the whole course of this war, she had experienced continued defeats and disgraces; her treasures were wasted upon allies that either deserted or were too feeble to afford her effectual aid; her debt had grown to the enormous sum of three hundred millions; her navy could only be manned by the most destructive burdens upon her commerce; her manufactures were languishing, her fleets were unable to protect her trade, which had suffered unexampled losses. And while she was sinking under her burdens, her antagonist was consolidating her government, and growing so rapidly in strength, reputation, and vigor, as to threaten her existence as a nation. The United States were, on the other hand, in the highest prosperity; their nu [...]bers had doubled since they had successfully measured swords with Britain; they possessed men, arms, military stores, and an ally, who was alone too powerful for her enemies. Sweden and Denmark, who had received insults from Britain, were ready to make a common cause with her; and as the marine of England and France were nearly balanced, the weight of America, had she been forced into the war, would have turned the scale, and have completed the ruin of the British commerce, without any other effort than that of granting letters of marque. Independent of which, without the violation of their neutrality, by those acts of sovereignty which no one would dispute their right to exercise, they could involve the British trade in the utmost distress, by an additional duty on British tonnage, by granting advantages to rival manufactures, by retaining debts due to her merchants, till the injuries ours had sustained were compensated. By following her example, both in the present and in the late American war, and suffering no part of the public debt to be paid to her citizens, till justice was done us, we could have forced her into [Page]any measure that it was just or proper for us to ask. And indeed, so fully satisfied were the Americans, of every party, on the superiority of our situation, that no doubt was entertained of a favorable issue to Mr. Jay's negociation; and all that his friends lamented, and his enemies rejoiced in, was, that the principal credit of them would be ascribed rather to the victories of France, than to the address of our minister. Under these happy auspices the negociation began: we shall proceed to see how it concluded.

The next point of enquiry is into the objects of the negotiation; for as every treaty is an abridgment of the natural freedom of nations, no wise state ever enters into one, but with a view to remove some evil, or acquire some advantage. It is upon this ground, that many of our most distinguished patriots have been of opinion, that all commercial treaties were injurious trammels and bargains, in which we might probably be overreached at the moment, or which circumstances might them after render inconvenient; that America having nothing to sell but articles of the first necessity to the nations with which [...] deals, and affording a market to their manufactures, her ou [...] trade laws were her best treaties; since she may alter and mod [...] them at pleasure: and, indeed, experience has justified the [...] opinion: independent of the depredations we have suffered fr [...] the war, our trade enjoyed every advantage that we could re [...] sonably wish. A commercial treaty was not the object of Mr. Jay's mission; the British nation in direct violation of the treaty of Paris, refused to surrender the western posts; extended the limits of their jurisdiction, availed themselves of their situation to possess the Indian trade, and stimulated the savages to ravage our frontier: British officers ever accompanying them in their incursions, it became the dignity of the nation to demand a delivery of the posts—reparation for the loss of trade—a compensation for the expence of the war the British had excited with the Indians—a public punishment of the British subjects who had personally appeared in arms against us, with the remo [...]al from office of Lord Dorchester, who had, in his address to the Indians, encouraged them to violate the treaty of peace. M [...] Jay was thought the properest person to make this demand▪ Let us see how far he has justified that sentiment, in fulfilling his duty with respect to this single point.

By the 2d article of the treaty, the British promise to evacuate the Western Posts by the 1st of June, 1796. By the treaty of Paris, in 1783, they promised to evacuate with all convenient speed, which, if we may judge by the speed with which they have found it convenient to evacuate all their posts in [Page]France, Flanders, Germany, Holland, and Brabant, one would have supposed must have meant a much shorter time than eighteen months; so that all that the treaty acquires with respect to the posts, is less than we were entitled to, by the treaty of Paris. Surely we might expect better security than a mere promise from a nation which has already shown, in their violation of the past, the little reliance that can be placed on their future, engagements. By June, 1796, it is not improbable that our situation, or that of Britain, may be changed; what security shall we then have for the performance of the treaty? It is said, as has been already said (by those apologists whose arguments seem determined to find every ministerial measure right) that every treaty is a promise, and that if we are not to rely upon a promise, there can be no treaties.—I answer, that it is the practice of negociators, where the character of the nation, or other circumstances, give reason to suspect a violation of their engagements, not to rely upon a naked promise, but to expect some guarantee or surety for the performance; that in the present case, as the promise was evidently extorted by the pressure of existing circumstances, we should see to the performance while those circumstances continue to exist. It is evident, before Mr. Jay left this country, that the British were so far from intending to evacuate the posts, that they had determined to extend their limits; this may not only be inferred from all the encouragement they gave to the depredations of the Indians, but undeniably proved by Lord Dorchester's speech, which, though disavowed by Dund [...]s, is now admitted to have been made in consequence of express instructions. The promise, then, to evacuate, has been extorted by French victories, by the humiliation of the British nation, and by their apprehension, that we might, at last, be provoked to do ourselves justice, while they were embarrassed with France. Surely, then, the evacuation should have been insisted upon, while these circumstances operated with full force;—what was there to impede an immediate evacuation of Oswego, which is only occupied by a lieutenant's command? what was to prevent our troops being put in immediate possession of Niagara and the upper posts, under an engagement to protect, for a limited time, the British property that remained there? In one week this might have been effected, considering the situation of the posts, upon navigable waters, as well as in one year.—May we not reasonably suppose, that the British still entertain a hope, that peace between them and France, dissentions between the United States and that Republic, the seeds of which are so plentifully sown by the treaty itself, may enable them to violate their second, with the [Page]same impunity that they have their first engagement. If the supposed non-performance of the treaty of Paris (which, however, has been so ably refuted by Mr. Jefferson in his correspondence with Mr. Hammond on that subject; has hitherto serve them as a pretext for retaining the posts; how many such pretence must the complexity and obscurity of the present treaty afford▪ But suppose the war with France to continue, suppose they have the magnanimity to forgive our predilection for the ene [...], suppose the spirit of our own nation to get the better of th [...] disgraceful stupor into which a venal system has lulled it—suppose the increasing imbecility of Britain shall forbid her to [...] for impunity in a further breach of faith, will it still be a [...] ter of little moment, whether or not she retains garrisons in the midst of our territory for twelve months longer or not? are we not at this moment at war with the savages? is not this [...] attended with much expense to the nation, and much private distress? is not the blood of our citizens daily shed? these [...] must continue as long as the posts are in the hands of the British; or a peace, if practicable, must be purchased br [...] United States at very considerable expense: were we to estimate the difference in this point of view, between an imm [...] evacuation, and one that is to take place in June 1796, it would certainly not fall short of one million of dollars, independen [...] of the destruction of our fellow citizens, whose lives are beyond all price.—If to this we add the annual profits of the Indian trade, amounting to 800, 000, it will appear that the United States lose near two millions of dollars, by the retention of the posts, supposing (which is at least problematical) that they shall be surrendered at the period proposed. Those who think w [...] me, that decision on the part of our government, and firm [...] in our minister, could not have failed to effect an immediate restitution of our territory, will know to what account to charge this heavy loss of blood and treasure.

But was the evacuation of the posts all we had a right to ask on that subject; if the retention of them occasioned those expensive Indian wars which have so often drained our treasury and thinned our ranks.—If, for 12 years, we have lost thereby a lucrative branch of commerce, are we entitled to no compensation for these losses? If the honor of the nation has been insulted, both by lord Dorchester and the subjects of Great Britain under his command, are we to expect no reparation for these insults? Have we reason, from what we have seen of Mr. Jay's correspondence with Lord Grenville, to presume that any has been asked? are we not assured that none has been ob [...]ed? What, then, is the beasted article, about which so [Page]much has already been said, which was the only one communicated to the public, as the only one that it was imagined would bear the light? what is it but a declaration on the part of Britain, that though she had already stripped us of millions, though she has occasioned the death of thousands of our fellow citizens, yet she now promises, that if we will let her pocket another million, and pay as much more out of our own treasury for a peace with her Indian allies, she will consent, in case the war with France should continue, and she should be too weak to contend with us, to let us possess our own territory. And what is our submission to these terms, and the unrequited insults we have received, but the lowest political degradation? If it is said that these were the best terms that could be obtained, I boldly deny the assertion; the state of Europe, the state of England itself, their submission to Denmark and Sweden, even to the little state of Genoa, warrant the denial. But should it even have been otherwise, it would have been infinitely better, both in point of honor and interest, to have waited, after having spoken with dignity of our rights, till circumstances should have enabled us to enforce them, than to have relinquished our well founded claim to a compensation of at least ten millions; to have relinquished that satisfaction which our national honor demanded; can we doubt that if we were ourselves too weak, which I am far from supposing, that the magnanimity of France would have permitted her to conclude a peace with England, without procuring us the satisfaction which her guarantee of our territories entitled us to ask? I am warranted in asserting, from the best authority, that she would not.

CATO

No. II.

THE next transaction of the treaty of Paris, for which we were entitled to compensation, is that by which they engaged not to carry off negroes or other property. To enforce this stipulation, the commander in chief, by the order of congress, sent colonel Smith and Mr. Benson to New York; who, finding it impossible to prevent property to a considerable amount from being shipped, took an account of so much as came to their knowledge.—What satisfaction has Mr. Jay procured to the United States for this loss? Are commissioners [Page]appointed by choice or by chance, for the liquidation of these accounts? Has the British government rendered itself liable for them? When Mr. Jay was so solicitous to secure to the British merchants every item of their demands, with interest and damages, would it not have been proper to have reflected upon those his country might claim?

The third demand, and perhaps the best founded of any made by a free country, was that which rel [...]ed, not merely to the violation of our flag, nor to a point of national honor only, nor to the infraction of treaties, or the withholding our ter [...] tories, but to what is infinitely dearer than either, to the p [...] sonal liberty of our citizens. Before Mr. Jay left this country, it had been the common practice of the British to press American seamen, not only from our vessels at sea, but in the very harbour of London, and with such distinguished contempt did they treat us, that the government not only winked at it, but their judiciary, in defiance of their own laws, authorized it. A seaman having found means (a matter of no small difficulty when in the hands of a press-gang) to procure a habeas corp [...], the captain of the ship of war returned on the writ, that he was a British subject; and though the seaman had certificate [...] and witnesses to prove that he was an American citizen, the judge refused to admit them, and declared that the captain's return was conclusive evidence; from which time to the present moment, it has been the common practice of the ships of war, even within sight of our own harbours, to tear that valuable class of citizens from their domestic enjoyments, from the bosom of their families, to be subject to military discipline and imprisonment. By a tame submission to these measures, we withhold that protection which is due to every citizen, and which indeed is the great end of government. We man the fleets of the enemy of our ally; disable our merchants from availing themselves of all the advantages we might derive from our neutrality, and justify our seamen in quitting a country in which they have no security, even for personal liberty, to seek it in foreign service.—Of this resource, however, Mr. Jay has endeavoured to deprive them. Surely it would have been his duty, when he was consigning such as went into the service of our ally, to an infamous death, to have obtained some satisfaction for the wrongs they had suffered while under the protection of their national flag: yet upon this subject the treaty is wholly silent. Perhaps the envoy extraordinary believed, that any stipulation in their favor, would have derogated from his assertion, that America relied solely on the justice and magnanimity of his Britannic majesty.

[Page] If the British merchants are entitled to the payment of those f [...]e demands, which the tyranny of their own government infabled their ruined debtors from discharging, how much more [...]ly may our injured seamen, forced from their native homes, subjected to a brutal tyranny they detested, and compelled to fight against the people they loved; how much more, I say, are they entitled to payment for their loss of time, with interest and damages for the injuries they have sustained? yet no commissioners are appointed to hear their demands; no national security is pledged for their indemnification; no satisfaction is made to the insulted honor of the nation; no officer, that has [...]traged the laws of nature and nations, is punished or even removed from the command which he has so unworthily exercised. On the contrary, Lord Grenville, fearful that the people might at length be wearied with repeated insults, and resent them upon such of their authors as daily frequent our ports and harbours, and repay our mistaken hospitality with insults, hath expressly stipulated, in the 23d article, "That the officers shall be treated with that respect which is due to the commissions they bear; and if any shall be insulted by any inhabitants, all offenders in this respect shall be punished as disturbers of the peace between the two countries." This article not only deserves consideration, as forming a striking contrast to our shameless indifference for the injuries and insults our own officers and men have actually received, but as laying the foundation for future differences with Great Britain, whenever she shall find it convenient to deny us some stipulated right, under pretence that the treaty has been violated. Though this article professes to be mutual, yet it is evidently without reciprocity; because we have sew or no officers who could avail themselves of it, while our cities are crowded with persons who boast a royal commission: These have, upon every occasion, manifested a disposition to assume airs of superiority and to insult our citizens; nor have they been restrained but by the fear of perferal chastisement from lording it over us in our own coffee houses. This article being totally undefined, will be construed by every officer according to his own sense of the respect that he think [...] "due to the commission he bears," and every coffee house [...] must, in future, become the subject of national discussion.

As the treaty appoints no tribunal for ascertaining the r [...] due to a British commission, so also it leaves us in the dark as to the power that is to punish the unfortunate American who fails in the respect due to the swaggering captain of a cu [...], or the fat purser of a frigate; as he is to be considered a [...] orther of the peace of two nation: (to suppose either nation [Page]punish him) and he will probably be delivered up to Great Britain to be treated as a pirate.

Let me ask Mr. Jay, what principle of justice or nece [...]ty dictated this article? Do not the existing laws of the country protect every man? Is it not enough that our constituti [...] have organized courts for the special benefit of foreigners, [...] the injury of our own citizens? Did it become us, with d [...] examples before our eyes of the insolence and injustice of [...] tish officers, to bury in silence the wrongs we had rece [...] from them, and enter into special stipulations in their favor.

CATO.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Philadelphia Address. To the President of the United States.
The Address of the Subscribers, Merchants and Traders of [...] City of Philadelphia,

Respectfully sheweth—

THAT, confiding in the wisdom, integrity, and patrio [...] of the constituted authorities, we have forborne to [...] our opinions on the merits of the treaty pending between G [...] Britain and the United States; though, as merchants [...] traders, our interests are more immediately concerned th [...] those of any other class of men amongst us; as well on account of the indemnity therein stipulated for past losses, as for the security we apprehend it will give to the immense proper [...] employed, by the merchants of the United States, in th [...] foreign commerce.

But seeing, that other citizens have expressed their opi [...] upon this important subject, and fearing lest our silence should be construed into an acquies [...]ce in those opinions, we d [...] it our duty, explicitly and publicly, to avow our approbation of the conduct of the senate of the United States; believing, that a different conduct respecting the treaty, would have subject [...] us to the imminent hazard of war, with all its concomitant evil [...]; and more especially, as provision is made for the e [...] blishment [Page]of public and private credit—a continuance of peace with all the advantages under which our commerce flourishes—and the further improvement of our country, now progressing in a degree elsewhere without example.

These are advantages and blessings, which, in our opinions greatly outweigh all the objections to the treaty, generally; and as further negociations are recommended for obtaining a less limited intercourse with the British West India islands, w [...] hope, that it will be rendered still more beneficial to this country.

Such being our sentiments, we submit them freely; and in confidence, that as they have not been hastily formed, so they will not be less deserving of consideration.

Thomas Willing

Matthew Clarkson

Joseph Ball

Thomas Fitzsimons

Tho. M. Willing

Robert Waln

Archibald M'Call

Joseph Sims

George Plumsted

Robert Stevenson

William Sitgreaves

Josiah Hewes

John Steinmetz

John M. Nesbitt

John Nixon

James C. Fisher

James Cox

Samuel W. Fisher

Richard Rundic

Robert Morris

Nathan Sellers

[...] Wharton

John Miller, jun.

James Pember [...]on

John Nicholson

[...]o. Murgatroyd

William M.Murtrie

Peter Blight

James Yard

Patrick Moor [...]

Zacche [...] Collins

Mark Prager, jun.

James Crawford

Joseph Anthony

William Cramond

J. G. Wachsmuth

Curtis Clay

Philip Nicklin

John Leamy

Is [...] Ha [...]urst

William Montgomery

William Newoold

Henry Pratt

Abraham Kintzing, jun.

James Stewart

James Barr

Thomas Canby

John Wall

Levi Hollingsworth

George Latimer

John Perot

Peter Mackie

John Instone

Robert Smith

Joseph Clark

William Taylor

Samuel Price

Henry Drinker, jun.

Thomas Shaw

Israel Brown

Timo [...]hy Parton

Samuel Hodgdon

William Davis

Abr [...]ham Dubois

Jacob Baker

John Morrell

James Henderson

John Inskeep

John Campbell

Paul Beck, jun.

George Pennock

Elliston Perot

James Hartley

James Boggs

Richard Potter.

William Massey

John Mavbin

John Stille, jun.

Jonathan Willis

William [...]an [...]

Adam Mendenhall

Chamless Allen

Redmund Byrnes

Ebenezer Large

John Thompson

John Waddington

Robert Henderson

Thomas Newhold, j [...].

Anthony Taylor

John Shield [...]

Joseph Cooke

Alexander E [...]ey

Andrew Tybour

Israel Jones

Henry Sheaff

Robert E. Gri [...]ith

Samuel Pleasan [...]

Mark Rodes

Charles Marquedant

Joseph Doonaldson

John Guier

Joseph Gray

William Guie [...]

Jacob Ba [...]ye

William Sheaff

David Evan [...]

George Harrison

S. Sterret

John N. Hagenan

John P. Sanderson

Daniel Drinker

John Poultney

Thomas Poultney

Robert Bass

Richard Wistar

John Hopkins

Abraham Singer

Gideon Hill Wells

Adam Zantzin [...]

G [...]or [...] Kep [...]l [...]

[Page] Michael Roberts

[...]eorge D. Thomson

[...]dward Thomson

[...]homas Roberts

[...]den Shotwell

William Chancellor

John Davis

John Smith

[...]braham Garrigues

[...] Wiltberger

William Smith

[...]eorge Roberts, jun.

[...]d Kempton

[...] Hallowell

[...] Roberts

[...] Reynolds

[...] Davies

[...]h Edwards

[...]am E Maddock

[...]am Holdernesse

[...]ry Baker

[...] Dorsey

[...]ch Francis

[...] Paxon

[...]u [...] Thomas

[...]hn Harland

[...]eter W. Call [...]nder

[...]lam Beaven

[...]hua Cl [...]bbornc

[...]ame, M' Crea

[...]ames [...]acon

[...]o [...]th L. Co [...]tes

[...]oon D. Blanchard

[...] Paschall

William Wells

[...]amuel Wil [...]or

[...]mos Wickertham

[...]obert Wharton

[...]aniel Ruff

[...]oseph Parker

William Folwell

John Redman

[...]harles Harris

John Lorain, jun.

Thomas Cumps [...]on

Philip Wager

John Melbeck

Godfrey Baker

John Baker

Godfrey Haga

John Vaughan

Thomas Coates

[...]rederick Boller

John Jordan

Samuel Mecklin

Edward Penington, jun.

Joseph Hough

[...] Sutter, jun.

George Bickham

Wilson Hunt

Abijah Dawes

William Young, bookseller

James Smith, jun.

Richard R. Smith

John Clark

David Lewis

Francis West

George Dougherty

Jacob Shoemaker

Pearson Hunt

John Simson

William Lucas

Nalbro' Frazier

John Fraxier

John B. Evans

Joseph Richardson

John Sitgreaves

John Travis

Robert Raincy

Robert Gray

Robert Harwood

Israel Whelen

David Lenox

John Duffield

Alexander Fullerton

Joseph C. Fisher

John Carrell

Benjamin Hornor

David Lapsley

John Wagner

John Achley

Samuel Howell

William Miller, jun.

Peter Brown

George Guest

William L. So [...]tag

Israel Pleasants

Jeremiah Parker

John Elmsley, jun.

John Evans

James Lyle

Jeremiah Warder

James Ryan

Joseph Waln

John Ketland

John Philips

John C. Stocker

Richard Thompson

Daniel Smith

George Scott

Francis Gurney

Nathan Lewis

William Steel

John Shalleross

David Walker

Joseph Russell

Jonathan Robeson

James Campbell

Jehn Hollingsworth, j [...].

James Steel

Benjamin Thomas

Thomas Cuthbert

John Rudolph

Richard Sweetman

Seth Willis

William Clark

John M'Dermo [...]

Isaac Lloyd

Aaron Welsh

Richard Flower

Samuel Read

Thomas W. Francis

George Sibbald

Dominick Joyce

Owen Jones

J. Pritchard

Eli Canby

Samuel Clarkson

Leviu [...]s Clarkson

William Allibone

John Skyrin

Malcolm M'Docald

Charles Mulvey

Joseph Lownes

John Welsh

Philip Reilly

Thomas Bell

James Paul

Kearney Wharton

Alexander Tod

James Greenleaf

Thomas Ewing

John Kaigh [...]

Charles Jarvis

Samuel W. Jarvi [...]

John Guest

William Z [...]ne

James Gallagher

Henry Manly

Matthi [...] Keely

Richard Hopkins

Charles Pleasants

Joseph Pleasants

Benjamin Hornor, jun.

John Field

John Stille

Joseph Claypoole

Joseph Anthony, jun.

Josiah Twamley

William Wistar

Edward Sho [...]maker

[...]awrence Seckel

James Miller

Caleb Lownes

[Page] Charles Shoemaker

John Watson

Thomas Callender

George Armroyd

Richard Tunis

Thomas P. Wharton

John Watson

John Wharton, jun.

Samuel Allen

William Rédwood

Mordecai Lewis

Alexander Anderson

E. E. Maddock

Peter Reeves

William Poyntell

George M'Call

Moses Cox

Frederick Kesselman

Charles Robertson

Isaac Oakman

James Sawer

James Steel

Nathan Thomas, jun.

Robert Andrews

Robert C. Latimer

John Miller

Samuel Cummings

Samuel Murdock

William Buckley

John Barnes

John Pinkerton, sen.

Jonathan Harvey

W. B. Goldthwait

James Moore

Benj. W. Morris

George Willing

E [...]hiel King

Thomas Randall

William Lewis

James Bringhurst, jun.

William Harland

Alexander Miller

Samuel Coates

[...] Taggart

Thomas Orr

Richard S. Footman

William Mott

Thomas Bradford

Thomas Hockley

Robert Wescott

James Rees

John Fries

William Dawson

Thomas Shoemaker

Benjamin F. West

Jacob Downing

Edward Bartlett

Emanuel Walker

George Peter

Philip Care

Crooke Stevenson

Jacob Clements

Bankson Taylor

George Meade

Magnus Miller

Richard Footman

James Ash

John Bohlen

Hugh Hodge

Nathan Field

Charles French

Joseph Burroughs

Hugh Ely

Thomas W. Smith

Andrew Hodge

William Drinker

Samuel Spaulding

William Compton

Morris Robeson

William Lippe [...]cott

Joshua Lippencott

John Haworth

Thomas Clifford

[...]ohn Clifford

Jacob Parke

George Fox

Abraham Carlisle

Joseph Ricardo

Jacob Knorr, jun.

Thomas Ryerson

Peter Kuhn

Frederick Heisz

Henry Seckel

Joseph Higbee

Ephraim Clarke

Charles Massey

Thomas Morgan

Edward Randolph

Benjamin Shoemak [...]

John Paul

Samuel Shaw, jun.

Thomas Hammett

Jacob Ridgway

Samuel Shaw

William Sansom

Samuel Meeker

Benjamin Holland

William Miller

Alexander Murray

Thomas Harper

Charles Ross

Hugh Holmes

William Yardley

Patterson Hartsborne

Samuel Jackson

Samuel M. Fox

Thomas M'Ewen

Matthew M'Connell

Thomas Hale.

PRESIDENT's ANSWER.

GENTLEMEN,

I RECEIVE, with great sensibility, your address on the subject of the treaty lately negociated between the United States and Great Britain, expressing your confidence in the constituted authorities, and the concurrence of your opinions with their determinations, on this highly important subject. Such sentiments, deliberately formed, and proceeding from men whose interests are more immediately concerned than those of any other classes of my fellow citizens, cannot fail to strengthen that just confidence in the rectitude of public measures, which is essential to the general welfare.

Go. WASHINGTON.

[Page]

DISSENT Of a Number of the Citizens of Boston.

Boston, July 15th, 1795.

WHEREAS the votes adopted at a late meeting of this town, relative to the treaty of amity, navigation, and commerce, between the United States and his Britannic majesty, 0652 0698 V 2 have been represented as expressing the unanimous sentiments of the merchants and other inhabitants upon that subject.

We, the subscribers, unwilling to be implicated in the [...] ber of those, who approve of the doings of that meeting, [...] reserving to ourselves the right of expressing our opinion, in [...] vidually, upon the merits or demerits of public measures, do hereby declare our disapprobation of, and dissent from, the votes, of said meeting:

Thomas Russe [...]

William Mac [...]ay

M [...]go Mac [...]ay

John C. J [...]

Joseph Russell

Charles Miller

Samuel G. P [...]ki [...]s

David S [...]rs

Theodore Lyman

William Wet [...]re

William Powell

Francis Butle [...]

Edward Edes

Alexander Hill

Stephen C [...]d [...]

Henry Smith

Joseph C [...]lid [...]e

Jonathan Mason

William Phi [...]ip [...], j [...].

Charles [...]ig [...]y

Charles Va [...]gh [...]

Stephen Maggi [...]

Wi [...] [...]

D [...]l S [...]gent

Thomas Amery

James P [...]ion

David Surg [...]t, j [...]r.

Samuel [...]

Samuel P [...]

William Par [...]

Le [...] Gar [...]er

William Brown

T [...]thy William;

Eben Pars [...],

Joseph May

B. C. Cutler

Garham Parsons

Henry Mewham

Samuel [...]iot

Samuel Gardner

M. C. Groves

David P [...]rce, jun.

Sylv [...] Gray

Samuel Paine

Thomas Thompson

Benjamin H [...]er

John Gray

Joseph H [...]d

[...] [...]cy

William Bardman, j [...].

Simon Elliot

Joseph Foster

Perrian May

John May

Jonathan Merry

Nathan Guadale

Joseph Reby

M [...]iel Goodwin

Ephrai [...] [...]iot

E [...]im Morse

Maac Davis

Henry Hill

Jere [...]h Khaler

George D [...]ert

Jer [...]h Howard

Jededi [...]h Parker

John T. Sargen [...]

John Codman,

David Greene

Allen Crocker

Joseph Laughton

Joseph Pope

Henry Hunter

Samuel Wallis

James Cutler

Benjamin B [...]ssey

John Amory, jun.

P. Conner

Samuel Salish [...]ry

Francis Amory

Mi [...]t Th [...]yer

[...]el Miller Thayer

Joseph Ripley

[...] B [...]lch

William Richards [...]

Joseph Carnes

John Wins [...]ow

Thomas Gre [...]l [...]af

Lewis Ca [...]

Edward Cu [...]ing

Luke P [...]ker

Samuel S [...]r

William Sp [...]

Thomas Br [...]wer

Stephen Higg [...]son, j [...].

Samuel S [...]li [...]ry, j [...].

Paul Revere

J. B [...]ssey

Jere [...]i [...] Bum [...]d, j [...].

Jo [...] Davis, jun.

Robert Davis

Jo [...]ah K [...]apy

[Page] Edward Edes, jun.

Joseph Hussey

William Mackay, jun.

William Stackpole

Charles Miller, jun.

Lewis Hayt

William Stevenson

Isaac Rand

Benjamin Russell

Ebenezer Lewis

Samuel Smith

Isaac Davis, jun.

William Dall

J [...]siah Qu [...]ncy

James Clark

John Crease

William Cravain

Lemuel Hayward

Joseph Whipple

Edward Tuckerman

Nathaniel Curtis

Ezra Whitney

Ephraim May

Richard Faxon

Daniel Greenleaf

Ebenezer Frothingham

Moses May

Stephen Rawson

Samuel Davenport

Samuel Sprague

Moses W. Dana

Isaac Vose

A. L [...]ngford

Daniel Weld

Zeva Thayer

Aaron Warren

David Cobb

Samuel Bowen

John Williams

B. Butler

Thomas Dennie

John M. Lean

Charles Vose

Rufus Davenport

William Porter

John Bosson

William Wood

John Osborne

Robert Robbins

L. Edes

Benjamin Fossenden, jun.

Elisha Ticknor

John Kennedy

Samuel Ridgway

Francis Greene

Amos Lincoln

William Smith

Thomas Curti [...]

John Howe

Benjamin Sumner, jun.

John Webb Checkley

Joseph Crocker

Moses Eayres

William Ellison

Daniel Bates

John Homans

Jonathan Hunnewell

James Ray

P. R. Dalton

Henry Roby

Redford Webster

Thomas Hearsey

Samuel Beales

Andrew Leach

Samuel Dan [...]orth.

DISSENT Of a Number of the Citizens of Trenton and its Vicinity, from the Proceedings of the late Town-Meeting.

Trenton, August 14th, 1795.

A PUBLICATION having appeared in the New Jersey State Gazette of the 4th instant, containing certain resolutions disapproving of the proposed treaty between the United States and Great Britain, said to have been adopted at a general meeting of the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, held the 29th day of July, 1795—We, the subscribers, citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, not having concurred in, and not approving of, the said resolutions, thus publicly testify the same, and declare our entire saitsfaction and confidence in the constituted authorities of our country, and our determination to acquiesce in such measures as have been or may be finally adopted, relative to the said treaty, by such constituted authorities.

[Page]

Citizens of Trenton.

* Isaac Smith

* Samuel Leake

Philemon Dickinson

Charles Axford

* James F. Armstrong

James Ewing

George Campbell,

James B. Machett

Maskell Ewing

Samuel Dickinson

* J. Rhea

B. Smith

Thomas Yardly

Peter Howell

A. Hunt

Arch-bald W. Yard

Pontius D Stelle

John Guild

Abraham G. Claypoole

Lambert Cadwalader

Aaron Dunham

George Davis

William Hay

John Coryell, junr.

Ogden Woodruff

John Riggs

Joseph Bond

* An. Dn. Woodruff

N Belleville

Nathan Beakes

Ebenezer Cowell, jun.

* A. Chambers, jun.

J. Chambers

Peter Teale

Bernard Handlon

Silvester Doyle

Jonathan Doan

Benjamin Jones

Robert Taylor

Micajah How

George Holcomb

George Beatty

Mahlon Reed

William Reeder

Joseph Brittain

Job Scott

Abraham Bloodgood

Rens. Williams

Joshus Wright

William Rippin

Charles Axford, jun.

Jo [...]iah Appleton

Thomas Rippin

John Harding

William Patterson

John Robinson

Alexander Chambers

Tretwell Wright

John Musgrove

Stephen Welch

James Yard

Henry Pike

James Monjoy

Robert Murry

Isaac Yard

George Rozell

William Yard

William Musgrove

John Hooton

Anthony Biship.

Citizens of the vicinity who happened, occasionally, to be in town.

Robert Pearson,

Robert Pearson, jun.

William Pearson.

N. B. Those persons to whose names a [...]cris [...]s are placed, were out of town before notice of the meeting was given, and did not attend said meeting; and of the other subscribers, it is said, not more than three or four persons attended, who totally disapproved of the said proceedings.

Proceedings at Trenton.

AT a numerous and respectable meeting of the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, convened on the 13th August, 1795, at the state-house, General Frelinghuysen, one of the senators of this state in the congress of the United States, attended, and at the request of the citizens present, consented to give his sentiments on the treaty now depending between the United States and Great Britain; whereupon it was

Resolved (without reference to the merits of the said treaty) That the meeting have the fullest confidence in the honor, virtue, and integrity of Frederick Frelinghuysen, one of the senators of [Page]this state; that this meeting are fully of opinion that in voting for the said treaty, he was actuated by the purest principles of patriotism; and that the thanks of this meeting be given to him for the candor with which he has stated the reasons which induced him to vote for the said treaty.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, at a large and respectable Meeting, convened at the Request of a Number of the Members, and held at their Hall, on Tuesday, August 11th, 1795, by Adjournment, to consider of, and express their Sentiments relative to, the Treaty made by Mr. Jay, in behalf of the United States, with Britain.

A MOTION was made to have the treaty read, which was done: it was then moved to discuss, and pass upon, the teaty, article by article—this motion was objected to, because the subject had been so fully and so publicly discussed, and the members had had so much time to study the treaty, and deliberately to form their opinion, that every one must be ready for the question—it was therefore dispensed with.

A motion was then made in the words following, viz.

Resolved, as the opinion of the chamber, That the recommendation of the senate to the president of the United States, to ratify the treaty, as amended by them, was wise and, prudent; because it settles, in a fair and amicable manner, points of difference between the two nations, which must otherwise necessarily subject our country to a humiliating submission to British impositions and injuries, or induce a war, with all its horrors and distresses, to seek redress; and because, when considered collectively, the tendency of the treaty must be to promote and extend, rather than to injure and restrain, our commerce.

This motion gave rise to a lengthy and free discussion of the object at large, after which the question was put by the president, when the same was adopted with one diffentient only.

Another motion was then made in the words following, viz:

Resolved, therefore, That the chamber cannot but lament and disapprove every attempt to excite an opposition to the treaty, in the minds of the people, and to detach their considence [Page]from the government of the union; because in a government like ours, a firm reliance of the people in the wi [...] and integrity of those authorities, which they have the [...] [...] constituted to manage their public concerns, and a cheerful [...] quiescence in the decisions of rulers of their own appoint [...], are indispensible to secure the peace, the honor, and the happiness of the community.

This motion was also put by the president, after a short [...] cussion, and was adopted with one diffentient only.

Another motion was then mode in the words following, [...].

Resolved, That the president of the chamber be reque [...] to forward an authenticated copy of the preceding resolution to the president of the United States, and to publish the [...] in the public newspapers.

This motion was put also and passed unanimously.

The question upon the whole was then put by the president, [...] ter a few observations, and passed unanimously in the aff [...].

THOMAS RUSSELL, President

RESOLUTIONS Of the Citizens of the Borough of York (Pen [...]sylvania) and [...] Vicinity, at a Meeting held at the Court-house, on Monday, the 17th of August, 1795, for the Purpose of taking into C [...] [...]tion, Measures proper to be purs [...]ed upon the Subject of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States.

AFTER a full and deliberate discussion of the subject the following resolutions were moved, and unani [...] adopted.

1 st. Resolved, That although we consider it the constitution right of the citizens of the United States to address the [...] dent by way of petition, memorial, or remonstrance, [...] subject, concerning which the constitution has vested him with a negative or affirmative; yet, that there may be [...] situations in which it would be exceedingly improper, and inconsistent with their duty, so to do.

2d. Resolved, That we consider the present occasion as [...] of those, on which it would be highly improper to advise the [...]s [...]d [...] n [...]t to give his affirmative to the pending treaty, [Page]a such conduct would seem to be interfering with the con [...]uted powers, which ought never to take place but in cases of the greatest necessity; that it would betray a want of con [...]idence in the senate, and in the president; that it would [...]nd to weaken our government, and give foreign nations a bad opinion of its wisdom and stability; and that it would have a direct tendency to encourage animosities, factions, and divisions among ourselves.

3d. Resolved, That we have a full and entire confidence, that the president of the United States will never exceed his constitutional powers, and that in the exercise of them he will combine, as he always hitherto has done, wisdom with integrity.

4th. Resolved, That we deem the constitutional guard upon the executive as sufficiently strong, even where less confidence is due, in requiring the advice and consent of two thirds of the senate as an essential requisite to the ratification of treaties.

5th. Resolved, That we cheerfully leave the Treaty between this country and Great Britain where the constitution has directed it to be left; feeling the most perfect reliance that the honor and interest of this country, will be fully considered in a decision upon it.

Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted by the chairman of this meeting, to the president of the United States.

JOHN EDIE, Chairman.

FROM THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES.

§

Philadelphia, 13th August, 1795.

Mr. F [...]nns,

MUCH has been said as to the part Mr. Thomas Pinckney, the minister from the United States, resident with the court of London, had in the negociations which ended in the treaty of amity, commer [...] and navigation with that court, lately ratified be a constitutional majority of the senate of the United States; and the author of a paragraph in the Aurora of Tuesday, undertakes to say that the reports of Mr. P [...]ckney's having approved of the treaty, were calumnious to Mr. [...] ney and false.

[Page] The enclosed extracts, which are sent to you for publication, will serve to inform the public on this point, and will show the author of the paragraph in the Aurora, that he is mistaken.

I do not suppose that any person of common sense or the smallest information, will consider a treaty as good or but because made or approved by this or that minister. The instrument should certainly be weighed and judged of by its own intrinsic merits or defects. Nor do I believe that any senator who voted for the treaty did so in blind compliance with the opinion of any other man, however respectable the author of that opinion might be.

The integrity and true patriotism of Mr. Pinckney are above all suspicion. His great abilities, his thorough acquaintance with, and his anxious attention to, the interests of America will never be doubted by those who know him. What then will the opposers of the treaty say, when they read the sentiments of a minister whom they profess to admire, who was on the sp [...] fully acquainted with the real situation of affairs, and the di [...] culties Mr. Jay had to encounter in the negociation, and whose letter to the secretary of state shows, in the most plain and unequivocal terms, the dreadful alternative, A WAR, the United States must have encountered.

CAROLINIENSIS

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Jay to the Secretary of State, d [...]d London, 19th November, 1794.

"I OUGHT not to omit mentioning the acknowledgements due from me to Mr. Pinckney, with whom I have every reason to be satisfied, and from whose advice and opinion have derived light and advantage in the course of the negociation. His approbation of the treaty gives me pleasure, not merely because his opinion corresponds with my own, but also, from the sentiments I entertain of his judgment and candor.

"My own opinion of the treaty is apparent from my having signed it;—I have no reason to believe or conjecture, that one more favorable to us is attainable."

Extract of a Letter from Thomas Pinckney, Minister Plenip [...] tiory, to the Secretary of State, dated London, 16th November, 1794.

"MR. JAY communicated freely with me on this subject during the course of the negociation; and I have witnessed the great difficulties which have occurred in adjusting several of the articles. Although some points might have been arranged more beneficially for us, if the treaty had been dictated entirely by the [Page]United States, yet when it is considered as a composition of differences, where mutual complaints had rendered mutual concessions necessary to establish a good understanding, I think it may fairly be said, that as little has been conceded by Mr. Jay, and as much obtained for the United States, as, all circumstances considered, could be expected: the business, upon the whole, has been concluded more beneficially for us than I had any hope we could obtain by negociation six months ago, and, in my opinion, places us in a more advantageous situation than we should have been in by becoming parties to the war."

RESOLUTIONS Of the Citizens of Richmond, generally convened, at the Capital in the said City, on Wednesday the 29th day of July, 1795, for the important Purpose of taking into Consideration the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty.
GEORGE WYTHE, Chairman.

THE citizens of Richmond, awfully impressed with the momentous crisis of American affairs—hold it not only their right, but their bounden duty, to express their sentiments to the chief magistrate of the United States, on a subject which ought to engage the mind of, and be carefully examined by, every citizen of America—and which, no doubt, has called forth the attention of a great part of Europe—we mean the proposed treaty between America and Great Britain, as lately made public. And though they feel a secret satisfaction, in the firm belief, that the executive of the United States coincides in opinion with them; yet, as the situation of the head of that department, under the particular circumstances of the present case, may wish for the general sentiment of his fellow citizens, before an exercise of his own judgment on so important a subject, is finally made; a judgment, not to be recalled by him or us, without the most dreadful consequences, perhaps, ensuing; they therefore proceed to state their opinion thereon.

Resolved, unanimously, That, considering the creaty now offered by Great Britain to America, to be

Insulting to the dignity,

Injurious to the interest,

Dangerous to the security, and

Repugnant to the constitution, of the United States:

[Page] We, the citizens of Richmond, hold it, therefore, not only unbecoming freemen to be silent, but that under the strong impressions, which mature reflection has rivetted on our minds, we should deem it criminal, in the highest degree, not to give our entire and pointed disapprobation of this instrument.

Resolved, That Dr. Fouthee, Mr. John Mayo, Mr. Richard Adams, senior, Mr. Henry Banks, Mr. Andrew Dunscomb, Mr. Samuel M'Craw, Mr. Alexander Quarrier, Mr. Thomas Mason, and Mr. John Stewart, be appointed a comtaittee to frame an address to the president of the United States, on the foregoing principles, and report to a meeting to be held at this place to-morrow afternoon at for [...] o'clock.

Resolved, That the citizens are earnestly; requested to attend at the time and place specified in the preceding resolution.

Teste, JAMES RIND, Secretary,

August 1st, 1795. REPORT Of the Committee chosen by the Citizens of Savannah (Georgia) convened in Christ-church, on Wednesday, July [...]9th, 1795.

THE committee appointed by their fellow citizens to take into consideration and arrange their objections against a certain treaty between plenipotentiaries of the United States and his Britannic majesty, signed on the 10th of November, 1794, Report,

That reciprocal benefit and mutual advantage are the only proper inducements for national negociations, and ought to be the basis of all treaties between sovereign and independent nations.

That the objects which presented themselves for a negociation with Great Britain, at the time when Mr. Jay was appointed to that mission, were in their nature truly interesting to the justice, honor and happiness, of the United States; among which we consider the procuring a compliance with the treaty of peace, obtaining compensation for recent spoliations on the property of American merchants, and preventing future repetitions of such injuries, as the most important. That, by the treaty above referred to, neither of these objects has been accomplished, [Page]nor has any political or commercial benefit in favor of the United States been attained; but on the contrary, a variety of concessions have been made to Great Britain, in violation of the treaty of 1783, and of our engagements with France and other nations, in subversion of the rights of the people, and if ratified, to the eternal disgrace and reproach of our government.

That the said treaty is calculated to contravene the acts of banishments and attainder, passed during the late American war, and to authorize the return of all persons included in them, without any condition, although that power is exclusively vested in the legulatures of the respective states.

That, by the treaty of peace, the right of property of the north western territory within the boundaries designated therein, was vested in the United States; and had that treaty been complied with, would, long ago, have been disposed of for their use: that the treaty lately made, whilst it necessarily implies an aggression, or at least a failure on the part of Great Britain, provides, not only an indemnity, but also, at our expense, a compensation to her subjects, and clogs the surrender of an acknowledged right, withheld for eleven years, with provisions tending to lessen the value of such surrender. This article and the next prove that Great Britain has so contrived the present treaty as to part with nothing on this head, even after the 1st of June, 1796, but the mere possession and expense of the posts in question. By the stipulation in savor of her settlers, whether they remain British subjects, or disguise themselves as American citizens, it is evident the profits of their trade will centre in Great Britain, and the connections and influence continue as extensive as ever with the Indian tribes; two objects appearing to your committee of more importance than the mere occupation of the ground; besides, as, from the nature of this trade, and the manner of carrying it on, there will be abundant opportunity, so there can be little doubt that (in a people so recently leagued in war with the savages against us) there will be sufficient inclination to des [...]nd the American revenue.

That it gives to the subjects of a foreign nation the uncontrolable power and night of passing through the territory of the United States; a privilege which is contrary to the policy of all nations: that the navigation of the river Mississippi, although a right of the United States which cannot be q [...]stioned, may not be brought into operation without great difficulty and expense; and that therefore a participation of it ought not to have been stipulated for, without some reciprocal obligation, by which the beneficial effect of this right would have been pro [...]ed [Page]that, by our exclusion from the ports within the limits of the Hudson's bay company, the advantages of the Indian trade will be confined to British subjects: that it provides for the establishment of a tribunal unknown to, and in violation of, the constitution, which will have the power of reviewing the decisions of our courts, constitutionally made, and of impeaching the justice and legality of those d [...]cisions; the fifth commissioner is to be elected by lot, and upon this principle, we conceive it is to be determined by chance, merely, whether the United States are to be encumbered with the payment of large sums of money to British merchants, and to an unlimited amount. Your committee view this article as the more unwarrantable and un [...] cessary, because they are confident that in this state no legal impediments have been created against the recovery of de [...] due to British creditors since the treaty of 1783, but that, on the contrary, the courts of the United States have for several years past been in constant and active operation, for the purpose of enforcing the recovery of their demands, without an [...] equitable allowance for the hardships and distresses of the war, or even for losses wantonly occasioned by the government and subjects of that nation. That, on the other hand, legal impediments have been created against the recovery of debts [...] American citizens in Great Britain, of which the celebrates case, Nut versus Wright, is one among many instances which might be cited.

It is entirely silent on that important subject, the restoration of negroes, and other property carried from this continent by the British troops, in direct violation of the treaty of 1783, is the disappointment, and, in many instances, ruin of the unfortunate citizens of the United States, who have suffered by this unwarrantable measure; whereas the British government and courts of law, where attempts have been made to recover by that means, have repeatedly held out assurances of compensation.

We consider that part of the treaty which makes provision for compensating the losses sustained by citizens of the respective parties, by means of illegal spoliations, as manifestly and grossly unequal and partial, and that, so far as it respects American citizens, it is altogether ineffectual, on their pa [...]s no application can be made to the commissioners until it shall have been ascertained, by going through a tedious course of judicial proceeding, whether any remedy can be obtained in that way: then the applications and proofs must be produced in Great Britain; whereas British subjects may apply immediately it home, and r [...]eve compensation, although the courts of [Page]admiralty of the United States have been, and are constantly open to compel restitution where it is has appeared that captures of British property have been illegally made.

It provides for the subjects of his Britannic majesty of every description, without regard to banished persons, to hold lands in the territories of the United States in like manner as if they were natives; and at the same time holds out that American citizens may do the same in her dominions, where it is well known that, by the English laws, aliens are incapacitated from holding real estates; and the comparative quantity of lands held by the citizens of the one power and subjects of the other, bears no manner of proportion.

The privilege offered by this treaty of trading to the West Indies is so limited as to the burden of vessels, that it can afford little or no benefit; it leaves all the advantages subject to the controul of existing and future legislative restrictions and prohibitions: Even this paltry privilege is rendered of very small use to American merchants, by their being positively restricted from exporting the produce of the West Indies to any part of the world in their own vessels; and, in exchange for this pretended advantage, the treaty has relinquished the right of exporting cotton, the growth of our own soil, and one of the most important staples of the southern states, in American vessels to foreign ports.

Your committee deem it necessary to observe fully on the article relating to the West India trade, although its operation is suspended by the senate; and they cannot forbear to remark, that this article, so far as it respects the privilege of trading with small vessels, is the only one in that treaty which contains the smallest appearance of benefit to the United States.

It therefore appears to your committe extraordinary that the representatives of the people in senate, instead of rejecting this unequal and unrighteous contract altogether, have ratified every part except the 12th article, in consequence of which, every other article may be enforced, and this may be [...]llifiea, whereby the object of the West India trade will be put entirely out of view.

It appears to your committee that the clause which restrains the congress of the United States from increasing the tonnage of British vessels, is calculated to suppress the American revenue, is an infringement of a constitutional right, and will induce the necessity of straining the obnoxious measure of direct taxation to an impolitic degree.

We find that the said treaty, instead of preventing any further spoliations, on our property by the British, contains [...] [Page]provision calculated to promote repetitions of those injuries.

That it authorizes the capture and detention of our vessels even on suspicion, and carrying the same into British ports, whenever met by British vessels, without any stipulation that compensation shall be made for unnecessary or unsounded [...] tentions: That it authorizes searches of American vessels in every instance: That these stipulations are contrary to the general law of nations, interfere with the engagements between the United States and France, and expose American seamen [...] arrest and de [...]ention by British vessels.

It enumerates and acknowledges as contraband of war, various articles which by all our treaties with other nations are acknowledged not to be so, and invests Great Britain with [...] power of declaring what articles shall be considered, in future, as contraband. It enables that nation to defeat all the advantages which otherwise might accrue to the United States fr [...] a state of neutrality, during the existence of European [...] and also is calculated to deprive a sister republic of all the advantages to which she is entitled by existing treaties with us.

It violates a natural right inherent in every freeman, by p [...] venting the citizens of these United States from expatria [...] themselves, when they deem it necessary, and engaging [...] foreign service.

It contains stipulations relative to the right of bringing a [...] ed vessels and prizes into our seaports, which are incompatible with our engagements to France, made at a time when we were under the most solemn and strict obligations to that nation, which, instead, of being impaired by acts of ingratitude and perfidy, we are anxious to have continued and confirmed by good faith and friendly offices.

There is no object contained in this treaty that we conceive will warrant the secret manner in which the whole progress of it has been conducted, and lament that it did not receive a more, open and public discussion, in which case it is presumable that the present embarrassment and agitation of the public mind might have been averted.

Your committee, deeply impressed with the weight of these objections, and with a sense of the many injuries which would result to the United States from a final ratification of the said treaty, considering that it is a prostitution of the sovereignty of the United States and a wanton sacrifice of the rights of this free nation.—DO recommend that an address be prepared, and transmitted to the president of the United States, acconpanied with the objections above stated, by which it may be requested that he will not ratify the said treaty.

[Page] Resolved, That Mr. Habersham, Mr. Clay, and Mr. Noel, he a committee to prepare an address on the above subject to the president of the United States.

Mr. Habersham, from the committee, reported an address, which was agreed to.

Ordered, That two copies of the address be engrossed, and that Mr. chairman do sign the same in behalf of the citizens present, and cause the report, address, and proceedings, to be transmitted, both by land and water, to the president of the United States, with all possible expedition.

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting be given to Messrs. Brown, Bloodworth, Butler, Burr, Jackson, Langdon, Martin, Mason, Robinson, and Tazewell, who were a minority in the senate in opposition to the said treaty, for their virtue, integrity, and patriotism.

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting be given to the chairman, and gentlemen composing the committee, for their atention to, and faithful discharge of, the trust to which they were appointed.

Ordered, That the proceedings of this meeting be published and attested by the secretary, and that the chairman do cause the same to be distributed in the several counties of this state.

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy taken from the original.

PETER S. LAFFITTE, Sec'ry.

RESOLUTIONS Of the Inhabitants of Bordenton, Crosswicks, Blackhorse, and Reckless Town, and their several Vicinities, adapted August 8th, 1795.

THE treaty with Great Britain, negociated by Lord Grenvilie and Mr. Jay, being duly read and considered, the following resolations were proposed, and conanimously adopted, viz.

1st. Resolved, That the very preanible of the treaty sills us with mortification and astonishment, in as much as it abandons the high claims, the positive losses, and that honorable reparation [Page]demanded throughout the union, and so explicitly declared by our chief magistrate, as necessary to be insisted upon, and which were held up to the people as justly to be expected, o [...] his appointment of an envoy extraordinary, to Great Britain, for that purpose, only.

The memorial of the citizens of Philadelphia, dated the 25th ultimo and signed by Wilham Shippen, junior, as their chairman, having been, on motion, read,

2d. Resolved, That the said memorial expresses our sense of the separate articles, and general tendency of the said treaty, a [...] they respect our commerce, our common interest, our ho [...], and our safety.

3d. Resolved, Tha [...] we do not comprehend the policy wh [...] leads us from the love and protection of a sincere, powerful, and friendly nation, into the arms of an old, inveterate, un [...] terable foe; from [...]om we have received nothing but injury, dupl [...]city, and insult.

4th. Resolved, That so long as the government of Great Britain continues hostile to the rights of man, to the independence of other nations, and to those very principles on which we have formed our respective governments, we conceive their open comity much less dangerous than their pretended friendship, and that their secret influence is more to be dreaded th [...] their declining power.

5th. Resolved, That it be recommended to our fellow citi [...] to consider of some speedy remedy, by which that part of the federal constitution, which empowers twenty senators, under a less virtuous executive, to sacrifice the interest, honor, and the existence of these states, either through pride, ignorance, vanity, or corruption—to consider whether it be not necessary for our common security, against future attempts to lay us prostrate at the feet of our natural enemy, that two-thirds of the house of representatives, as well as the senate, shall consent to the forming or ratifying treaties with foreign nations; and whether the constitution ought not to open the doors of the senate, [...] cept on some extraordinary occasions, or during a war.

6th. Resolved, That Stephen Thompson Mason is entitled to the thanks of this meeting, and of every good citizen, and real friend to the constitution of the United States, for [...] patriotic and independent conduct in rending the veil of se [...] torial secrecy, and thereby disclosing to the world the treaty, lately concluded by John Jay and the minister of the king of Great Britain, [...]ouching the dearest rights, and most essential interests of a free people.

[Page] On motion, Resolved, That the proceedings of the present meeting be immediately transmitted, by the chairman, to the president of the United States.

By order of the meeting, JOSEPH KIRKBRIDE, Chairman. State of New Jersey, Bordentown, August 10, 1795. Attest, NATHAN ROCKHILL, Secretary.

FROM THE (BOSTON) CHRONICLE. An Essay on Jacobinical Thinkers.

Messrs. Adams & Larkin,

I SAY the treaty is a good one, Messrs. Printers, and all those are fools and Jacobins that do not say so. I say so, not because I think so, for I do not think about it, and there is none but your Jacobins who think any thing respecting it. I say they are all Jacobins that presume to think any thing about this subli [...] instrument. For what did we choose the senate for, and send [...]m to Philadelphia, but to think for us. To save the trouble of thinking upon such things, we chose them, and gave them the exclusive right of thinking upon them; and did they not accept that [...]rust, whereby it became a bargain, which the people have not now a right to violate? I say it was a bargain, a sacred contract, that they should think for the people, and that the people should think all their thinkings right and proper, and sound and just. He, therefore, that dares to think on those matters, which we have given the senate the sole, exclusive right to think on, is an Antifederalist and a Jacobin; and I am surprised that any good Federalist should think otherwise. Is not this what that trumpet-tongu'd asserter of the people's rights, Mr. Hamilton, I as unweariedly been preaching up? Has he not proved it again and [...]gain, as clear as the sun in the late [Page]hot weather? I am amazed then the people should be pryi [...] and searching and peeping into things they have no busi [...] with. This very thing, Messrs. Printers, has been the curse [...] all governments, and I fear it will prove the bane of ours. Th [...] occasioned continual tumults in old Rome; the Roman sen [...] could, and doubtless would, have governed the people [...] enough; but the people would always be questioning and p [...] posing their whys and wherefores, which kept the senate from governing the state as they would. Just so it was in France; a [...] if this cursed inquisitive temper had never infected the g [...] people of America, we might have avoided all the horro [...] [...] our late bloody and cruel war. It was this restless temper, [...] drove the king of England to pour his battalions into our co [...] try, and spread desolation through the land; all the evils [...] an eight years war, were brought upon us by the same inquisitive and meddling disposition, which for some time has been and in spite of Mr. Hamilton's admonitions, still continues a raise its gorgon head among us. It is strange the people will [...] learn wisdom by such bitter experience, but even while sma [...]ing under the English lash, of the last war, will still indulge [...]e same disposition which then brought it upon them. They [...] still listen to the syren voice of those very Jacobins, who his died the flames of the last war, as if they had already forgott [...]n the miseries it had involved us in. "Let the people" th [...] remember, that it is their sacred right to submit and obey; and that all those who would persuade them, that they have a right to think and speak on the sublime, mysterious, and to them incomprehensible, affairs of government, are factious Democr [...] and outrageous Jacobins.

Let us then with one voice say, we will not think, but pay passive obedience to those twenty senators who are paid, and well paid, for thinking for us.

It is a troublesome business to be always thinking upon our rights and liberties; let then Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Grenville, and Mr. Jay, think and do for the United States; and I think, by putting the burden of thinking on them, we make a good bargain; and upon those principles I am in favor of the treaty.

PASSIVE OBEDIENCE and NON-RESISTANCE.

August, 1795.

[Page]

Remarks on the IId Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

BY the 2d article of Mr. Jay's treaty, the settlers and traders within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, now held by the British within the boundary lines of the United States, may remove, with all their effects; they may sell their lands, houses, or effects, or retain the property thereof, at their discretion. Such of them as shall continue to reside within those boundary lines, may remain British subjects if they choose, or become citizens of the United States—in the latter case they are bound to take the oath of allegiance.

The enemies of the treaty have endeavored to excite an alarm, under the pretence, that as the limits of the precincts or jurisdiction of those posts are not defined, the same may reach to vast extents of country, throughout which are or may be planted, even colonies of people devoted to the interest of Great Britain. But nothing can be more unfounded.

The posts withheld, contrary to the treaty of peace, are two on Lake Champlain, in the state of Vermont; one perhaps at Oswegatchie; and those of Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackanac.

All these posts are military stations, either without any British settlers about them, or with but a few families, except the post of Detroit. Detroit was originally settled by the French. The attention of the inhabitants was devoted to the Indian trade; and consequently they cultivated very little land. By the peace of 1763, Detroit, with all Canada, was ceded to Great Britain. Since that time a few American, English, Scotch, and Irish settlers and traders, have joined the old French inhabitants: but Detroit still remains an inconsiderable village. The settlers within its jurisdiction are chiefly planted along the border of the river: but their settlements are of such small extent, and so little land has been cultivated, that they have not been able to furnish a surplus of provisions sufficient to seed its small garrison of two or three hundred men. For the consumption of these few troops, flour has been sent from the United States and Lower Canada, and pork from Ireland.

What, then, can be the "jurisdiction" of this post? Common sense would suppose it of very small extent; that it was co-extensive with the settlers; and, in the utmost latitude, comprehended no more of the land at and about Detroit, than belonged to them at the signature of the treaty. The rest of the [Page]country belongs to the Indians; who, though hitherto under the influence, can in no sense be said to be within the jur [...]sdiction of Detroit.

To form a just idea of the possible extent of the landed property of these people, [...]t will be necessary to recur to the tr [...]aty of peace between us and Great Britain. By that treaty, D [...]troit became a part of the United States; and had we then gamed possession of it, its inhabitants would doubtless have been considered as citizens. Or if any preserved remaining British subjects, they must have been debarred all the privilege▪ of [...] ship. But whether citizens or British subjects, the tr [...]aty of peace secured to them all their [...]nded and other property, and Mr. Jay's treaty does no more. Will it be said, that since the treaty of peace they may have purchased immense tracts of land of the Indians; and that these also will be held under Mr. Jay's treaty? The idea is perfectly groundless.

By the 1st article of the treaty of peace, Great Britain cedes and relinquishes to the United States, "all claim to the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof," consequently, the lands of the British subjects within the precincts or jurisdiction of Detroit, and any other British posts within the territory of the United States, can be of no greater extent now, than they were at the treaty of peace. If the king of Great Britain, or any of his governors of officers, have since made grants of lands within the boundaries of the United States (a thing not probable) such grants are mere nullities. The lands so attempted to be granted, being by that treaty the absolute property of the United States, the British subjects could not afterwards acquire any property in them; and consequently they cannot hold them by Mr. Jay's treaty.

One word concerning the inhabitants of Detroit. They are chiefly French, with whom it is to be presumed we shall find no difficulty in fraternizing; and of the others, whether originally Americans or English, Scotch or Irish, many, and probably the majority, are already well disposed towards the United States, and eager to enjoy all the advantages of our free government and citizensh. [...] small remnant; some of them ma [...] [...] the British side of the line; and other [...] the purposes of trade at Detroit. These ca [...]not possibly excite uneasiness, any more than the British subjects, whom, for the like purpose, we freely admit into all our seaports.

A FREEHOLDER

Phil [...]phia, August 19, 179 [...].

Notes

*

From a note of the editor of the Argus, it is inferred, that [...] piece has been sent to him, charging the writer of Camillus [...] having liberated some person from jail to insult or fight those who are called respectable whigs— The suggestion is a total falschood. The writer of Camillus has not recently liberated any person [...] jail—though if he had, it would not be the first instance that [...] ble actions have been misconstrued and imputed to him as cri [...]. This is a specimen of the detestable arts which are employed to [...] resentment against the supposed author of C [...]illus; what does all this mean?

↵

*

This is a rough calculation, but it cannot materially err.

↵

*

An account of peltries exported from Canada in 1786 and 1787.

1786. | 1787.
Beaver skins | 116, 509 | 139, 509
Martin do. | 58, 132 | 68, 132
Otter do. | 26, 330 | 26, 330
Mink do. | 9, 951 | 17, 951
Fisher do. | 5, 813 | 5, 813
Fox do. | 6, 213 | 8, 913
Bear do. | 22, 108 | 17, 108
Deer do. | 126, 000 | 102,656
Raeoon do. | 108, 346 | 140, 346
Cat do. cased | 3, 026 | 4, 526
Do. do. open | 2, 925 | 1, 825
Elk do. | 7, 515 | 9, 815
Wolf do. | 12, 287 | 9,687
Carcajoux do. | 503 | 653
Tiger do. | 77 | 27
Seal do. | 157 | 125
Muskrat do. | 202, 456 | 240, 456
Deer do. dressed | 5, 488 lbs. | 1, 788 lbs.
Castors | 1, 454 lbs. | 1, 434 lbs.

↵

§

§

§

[Page]

[No. III.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CARFY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—SEPTEMBER 4, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. CATO, No. III. Page 147

2. —No. IV. Page 152

3. —No. V. Page 156

4. —No VI. Page 162

5. —No. VII. Page 169

6. Camillus, No. IX. Page 174

7. —No. X. Page 181

8. —No. XI. Page 191

9. Resolutions of the Inhabitants of Christ Church Parish, South Carolina, July 24th, 1795 Page 20 [...]

10. Baltimore Address to the President of the United States Ibit

11. Resolutions, Petition and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of Morris County, New Jersey, August 15th, 1795 Page 203

12. Remarks on the VIIth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty Page 206

13. True Statement of the Proceedings at Tr [...]nton, August 13th, 1795 Page 207

14. Resolutions of the Inhabitants of Powhatan, Virginia, July 21st, 1795 Page 212

15. Protest of Captain Osborne, at Jeremie, July 14th, 1795 Page 21 [...]

16. Letter from the British Consul at Rhode Island to Governor F [...]nner Page 215

17. Letter from the Commander of the British Ship Africa to the British Consul at Rhode Island Ibi.

[Page]

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 122.]

No. III.

HAVING touched upon the demand, which, under the treaty, we are entitled to make for the loss of property carried off, I have since examined official documents, to wit, the letter of the commander in. chief, and the report of our commissioners, from which it may be fairly estimated, at about one million of dollars. As this was the first infraction of the treaty, and made without the slightest pretence, there can be no doubt of the justice of our demand, as well for interest as principal, which would raise the aggregate amount to about one million seven hundred thousand dollars. Is it not very extraordinary that Mr. Jay should neglect an object of so much moment, while he was so sedulous in loading the United States with the private debts of British merchants? If (which there is the best founded reason to deny) there is really any thing due on that score, surely no better fund can be conceived for its discharge than this well-authenticated claim upon the British government. What makes this omission the more extraordinary, is, that the president, while commander in chief, congress in the year 1783, and at various periods since, and Mr. Jefferson very lately, have uniformly treated this article as very important, insisted upon its fulfilment, and procured such authentic documents of its amount, as to leave Britain without the smallest apology for its inexecution.

The next object of Mr. Jay's negociation was to obtain satisfaction for the insults our national flag had sustained, and redress for the injuries done our trade in violation of the laws of nations. These may be divided into two classes,

1. Acts authotized and ordered by the court of St. James's.

2. Acts done by individuals under colour, but in abuse, of those orders.

The first class must, necessarily, govern the decisions of their maritime courts, which, though professing to be [...]aled by the laws of nations, always take the direction of the sovereign as the expositor of those laws. Thus, when Mr. Pitt seized, in time of profound peace, all French vessels, and thereby outraged every principl [...] of natural law, the British courts of admiralty found no difficulty in condemning them. When, in the same was, to pr [...]ve [...] [Page]the Dutch from availing themselves of their neutrality, to acquire the carrying trade, he made prize of every ship loaded with French produce, the courts of admiralty condemned them without hesitation, and justified their conduct by the orders they had received. Indeed it would be a solecism to say, that the king ca [...] [...]rame instructions, and give orders for making prizes, and that his courts have power to over-rule those orders, and punish the subject that obeys them; since it must often happen, that the interest of the state may justify a breach of the code of nations, without its being proper to communicate to the ordinary courts the principles upon which this justification is formed. Accordingly, we find it the constant practice what a new edict is issued, to send it to the maritime courts as [...] rule for their conduct in determining of prize or no prize. And the courts of appeal in prize cases consist of commissioners of appeal, of whom a majority must be privy counsellors (22 Gen. II. chap. 3.) the reason for which is, that their decisions, as judges, may conform to the instructions they give as privy counsellors. The second class of injuries, arising from abuses committed by individuals under colour of such orders and instructions, are always corrected (not, however, without a great expense and delay) by the inferior courts of vice-admiralty i [...] the first instance, or by appeal, if their decisions are erroneo [...] This distinction will be important in discussing the 7th article of the treaty. Let us now examine the causes of complaint [...] the subject of the detention or capture of vessels and cargo [...] as arising under both these.

1st. Orders were issued for detaining our vessels going to France, loaded with provisions, even before the war broke out; and we were compelled to part with our property at such prices as the British market afforded, though a better one was open to us in France.

2d. They issued orders to take all our vessels going to France with provisions; and shortly after, in the most perfidious manner, without any notice, without even publishing their intention in England, lest we should learn it from thence, instructed their armed ships in the West Indies, to make prizes of all neutral vessels sailing, either to or from the French island. These several cruel and unprovoked attacks upon our commerce, cannot be palliated by any law of nations, however obsolete, and were attended with the following serious evils to this country, for which we are entitled to a national compensation.

1. It dishonored our flag, which is a serious evil to us as a commercial nation; since it is the firmness we manifest i [...] maintaining the respect due to that, which must make the basis [Page]of our carrying trade; for who will trust their merchandize to [...]ips which may be violated with impunity?—Who employ vessels from which his property may be ravaged, without the most distant hope, that the sovereign under whose protection he has placed it, will vindicate his rights?

2. The loss of that property which the country would have acquired, had not many been deterred by these measures from entering into this branch of commerce.—As this cannot be [...]ated as the loss of an individual, it must be considered as a general loss by which the whole community is affected, and for which, therefore, the whole community were entitled to a recompense in damages.

3. The actual loss of property, first by the detention and limitation of the price of the articles taken, and the still greater loss by condemnation of ships and cargoes, for which nothing was paid.

4. The individual loss of seamen who were discharged from their ships, compelled by force, or reduced by absolute want, to enter into the British service in the West Indies, where great [...]mbers of them died of the diseases of the climate, and the [...]sage of their oppressors. I have already observed that the treaty makes no kind of provision for these worthy and unhappy citizens, or for the families of those that have perished; disgraceful and unfeeling omission! Besides this loss, for which the individual was entitled to a compensation, the nation might demand exemplary damag [...] [...]r the indignities and actual loss of strength in the de [...]th o [...] [...]oval of many valuable citizens, and the loss of many v [...]sel, at a time, when by their employment, so great a profit would have resulted to the community.

The above enumerated evils were the effect of the express act, and emanated from the special authority, of the British government. In addition to this, we suffered losses under the unauthori [...] acts of individuals, who, in some [...]nstances, plundered and procured the condemnation of vessels that were not liable to capture by the special instructions to which I have alluded. But the number of these were comparatively small; and for these courts of adjudication were always open; and yet, by a most extraordinary fatality, Mr. Jay overlooks all these flagrant injuries committed by the British king against the United States as a nation, and for which they are without remedy, but by a national compensation, and neither asks nor procures any redress.

The nature of Mr. Jay's application is explained in his courtly note to Lord Grenville. This contains no complaint of any of the instructions I have alluded to, or any other, expressive of the injury that one nation had done to the other, but merely in the [Page]case of individuals. His words are, that great and excessive injuries have, under colour of his majesty's commission and authority, been done to a numerous class of American merchants, (not to the American nation) the United States can, for reparation, have recourse "only to the justice, authority, and interposition of his majesty." Through the whole of this note, he speaks of nothing further than individual compensation for individual injury, leaving the two nations entirely out of sight as nations; and indeed if he had intended any thing more, if he had had the instructions I have mentioned, in view, it would have been impossible for him to have made use of so many p [...]egyrics on the justice and h [...]anity of his Britannic majesty. In speaking of our seamen (which he doth with such pathos as [...] lead us to hope for some spirited demand in their favor) he contents himself with only requesting, that they may be libera [...]l, and unmolested in future, without a word of compensation for the past.—The reply of Lord Grenville is in the same [...] Not a word of the instructions, not a word of apology to [...] American nation, not a word of compensation, except for [...] irregularities committed by individuals, &c. The British [...] i [...] supposed in all these proceedings, to be immaculate. Now [...] us examine the article, and see how completely Mr. Jay su [...]t that he was envoy for a great nation, and sunk into the [...] solicitor of some merchants, whose cause he has managed so [...] as to leave them in a much worse state than he found the [...] since he took from them the protection of their own gove [...] ment, to leave them the chicanery of courts in which the [...] instructions that occasioned their losses, must be admitted [...] laws sufficiently valid to justify them.

The 7th article exactly pursues the principles established in the note, to wit, that the United States are entitled to no recompense; that the government of Great Britain has done us no injury, and that "divers merchants and others" only have to complain of the irregularity of some captures and condemnations, which it supposes the courts of admiralty are, for the most part, competent to decide upon. But that if it should happen, that there are any losses for which adequate compensation cannot be obtained, provided that the party claiming has been guilty of no neglect or delay, such compensation shall be ascertained by commissioners, and his Britannic majesty engages to pay them. As this article says nothing about opening the courts, it must have been understood by both parties, that they were necessarily open, independent of the treaty; so that all the advantage, if any, that may result from appeals, were rights that individuals in every civilized nation may claim, and which many [Page]had exercised before Mr. Jay's mission. In this respect, then, nothing was effected by his negociation, unless it was, that the time for bringing appeals is said to have been enlarged; but of this, the treaty says nothing; this too, must therefore, depend upon the will of the king of Great Britain, or on the rules his courts chuse to establish. All that Mr. Jay has then done in this important business, that involved the honor of his country, the great interests of its commerce, the rights and liberties of its citizens, and the property of individuals, many of whom have been ruined by the loss of their capital, is to obtain a promise of compensation in such cases as are so singularly circumstanced as not to be within the reach of legal redress. When we come to view this article, stripped of its unnecessary verbiage, it will appear to mock with delusive hopes, the men that it affects to relieve. Let us enquire what is to be the business of the commissioners, and of what nature and kind the causes that are to come before them.

They are not to relieve against captures under the order of April, November, or January. 1st. Because neither of these are complained of, and the preamble of the article expressly re [...]es to the [...]njuries "divers merchants and others" complain of having sustained by irregular captures or condemnations of their vessels and other property under colour of authority and commission, &c. Now it would be absurd to suppose, that this can have any reference to what is done by the express order of the sovereign, or to any act but such as is an abuse of that order and authority; but these abuses make but a small part of our cause of complaint (which goes to the order itself) and are besides necessarily relievable in a court of appeals, without the intervention of a minister extraordinary; and were so before the treaty. The great cause of complaint, the instructions, which are the laws of the court of admiralty, not being complained of, all condemnations fairly made under them, must be confirmed by the treaty. What then are the commissioners to do? They are not to revise the decisions of the courts; they are not [...] interfere where the injured party has neglected to appeal. The decrees of the courts are to be absolute with respect to them; nor can they, as far as their powers may be collected from the treaty, bind the crown of Great Britain in any case whatever, in which the party claiming the benefit of their decision does not first show that he has commenced and carried through his suit in the British court of appeals, that their decree was in his favor (for without doubt their judgment is meant to be conclusive, or else the commissioners would only be a second court of appeals, which would be a solecism not [Page]even hinted at in the treaty or preceding negociations) that th [...] captor is insolvent; that his securities have been prosec [...] [...] judgment, and that they are also insolvent, in this case; a [...] this appears to me the only possible case in which the comm [...] oners may [...]ind the crown to pay what has been recove [...] its courts.

Now I would ask any man who reflects a moment [...] delays of the British courts, and on the maze of law, whi [...] must be had, before a single cause can be brought before [...] commissioners, whether the whole article is not a moc [...] justice, whether any cause can be ready for this tribunal in [...] years, though by the limitation expressed, the claims m [...] entered within eighteen months, and whether it would [...] much cheaper for the United States to pay the sew person [...] may possibly be relieved by this mode, the amount of their [...] ses, than load themselves with the expense of so useless a [...] mission?

CATO

No. IV.

HAVING stated, in the preceding numbers, the [...] ing national points, which were supposed to m [...] object of Mr. Jay's negociation; having shown that the [...] leaves the greatest part of them untouched, and seals a [...] of indisputed rights, in order to procure, in return, a [...] for the surrender of our own territory at a distant day, [...] nugatory engagement for compensation to a few sufferers, [...] cases may be peculiarly situated; while the rights of the [...] the great mass of the merchants, and the whole body of men are shamefully abandoned; I proceed now to cons [...] treaty in a commercial point of view, in which I am [...] say, we shall seek in vain for some advantages to comp [...] these disgraces; some proof to testify the assertion of our e [...] that "the United States confide in his majesty's justice [...] humanity." The same gloomy features distinguish every pa [...] it, whether it is seen in a commercial or economical view: [...] merchants, our seamen, our manufacturers, our citizens, [...] allies, our government, and our honor, all are treated [...] equal contempt. But one interest seems to have been atten [...] to, throughout the whole negociation—the interest of the B [...] nation; such setters are put upon our own, that our envoy [...] tainly intended that our ministers should hereafter say, wi [...] truth, what he had only intended as a proof of his p [...] [Page] [...]ddress, "that the United States can, for reparation, have [...]ecourse, only, to the justice, authority, and interposition of his majesty." Little means, alas! will be left them for the ex [...]ise of their own authority, if this treaty should ever become [...] law of the land.

In considering the commercial articles, I shall begin with the [...]dian trade, after having submitted a few rules, to the force of which every well-informed man will readily subscribe.

1st. That, all things else being equal, that trader who has the greatest capital, most knowledge of trade, an established set of customers, and the most extensive acquaintance with the dealers in the commodities he buys and sells, will be able to maintain himself against any rival merchant that does not enjoy these advantages.

2d. That if, in addition to this, he has advantages in the transportation of his goods—in the sale of the commodities he purchases—and in the establishment of factories—he must ruin all competitors. By the treaty of peace, our boundaries are fixed, and the British are to evacuate our territory without any stipulation, whatever, in favor of British merchants or traders; by this treaty, therefore, so much of the fur and peltry trade, at least as lay within our own territory, was necessarily and exclusively ours; as we possessed all the posts at which the trade had been carried on for a century past, and most of the portages. As our communication from the sea was much easier than by the St. Lawrence, we could furnish English goods cheaper, and, of course, would have continued the Indian trade in its usual channel, even from the British sides of the lakes, nor could [...]y, by any means, have prevented it, without giving such disgust to the Indians as would have made them dangerous neighbours.

Lord Grenville's treaty with Mr. Jay stipulates, that the British traders may continue to live at our posts; to hold the property they possess; to trade in every p [...]rt of our territory as [...]ly as our own citizens; and to navigate our rivers from the s [...] as high as our own citizens may, that is, to the highest port of entry, and from thence to navigate our inland waters. It must follow, then, that under these cirumstances, they stand exactly upon the same footing with our own citizens. It will also be admitted, that having been for twelve years in the exclusive possession of the Indian trade—having, in general, much larger capitals—having an extensive acc [...]aintance among the Indian nations, and with the Canadians, who are the general carriers in that country, American traders will not be able to maintain a competition with them, even if they had no other [Page]advantages than those I have enumerated. But this, unhappily, is far from being the case; first, they have, of course, a right to settle factories in every part of their own territory; their factors being always upon the spot, and cultivating an acquai [...] ance with the natives, will certainly be able to command the trade of their country, and thus render absolutely useless the stipulation which admits American traders to travel into that territory; for it is observable, that the navigation act, 12 Charles II. chap. 18, which is preserved in full force, by the 14th article of the treaty, prevents our establishing any factory [...] trading house, or residing as merchant-factors within the [...] tish territories, out of Europe; while the treaty permits the British to reside in any part of the United States; to hire and possess houses and ware-houses for the purpose of commerce, &c. so that while, by this means, they have an exclusive trade in their own territory, not withstanding the apparent grant of a right to us, they have all the advantages our citizens enjoy [...] ours, with those they have acquired from large capitals, knowledge of the trade, &c. Our trader may, indeed, travel, like a pedlar, through their country with his shop upon his back; but cannot have any fixed residence at which to open a sto [...]. Were not Mr. Jay a chief justice, I should be tempted to believe that he did not know of the provision of the act of 12th Charles II. chap. 18, which he has kept in full force by [...] 14th article of the treaty.

This exclusive trade in their own country, by means of the factories they may establish, gives them another considerable advantage; it is well known to merchants, that the more [...] tensive any branch of commerce is, the less liable to interruptions, the more profitable it must be, and of course, the be [...] it enables the trader to undersell his competitors. If then ou [...] merchants can only trade in our territories, and there with, [...]o advantage over the British—and if the British merchant can trade with equal advantage in our territory, and superior in the British territory—the last can employ a greater capital in his commerce; and as the Indian trade is liable to frequent interruptions by wars and bad seasons, which may prevail in our country, while that of the British is unmolested, the whole capital of our trader remains inactive, while a considerable part of that of the British trader is employed. This again must reader the competition very unequal.

A writer who has shown much more anxiety to maintain, than candor in defence of, the treaty, has overlooked all these circumstances which will effectually prevent our traders from contending with the British, and which, i [...] fact, amount to as [Page]absolute surrender of this important branch of commerce, and consoles us with the hope of being able to find a market for East India goods, through the intervention of this treaty. I must confess, that I have yet to learn, that any East India articles consumed by the Indians, on the north of the lakes, will exceed one hundred dollars a year; perhaps the writer means, that the inhabitants of Canada will receive them through this channel; if we should even admit this, which, however, we shall be able to show is highly improbable, yet it would appear a very insignificant advantage, when we reflect that the whole number of inhabitants in Canada, and Labrador, as appears by a census, taken by General Haldiman, amounted, in 1784, including Upper Canada, to only 123, 082 souls: but few of these are in the habit of drinking any tea, and all are too poor to consume any but the coarsest articles; so that the whole consumption of Canada, in India goods, if we had a monopoly of that trade, would fall short of what is consumed in the little state of New Jersey; and we should certainly make a miserable exchange, if for this we sacrifice a branch of commerce of such immense importance, as the Indian trade.

But what can be more absurd than to suppose that articles which come duty-free from Britain (a drawback being allowed on exportation) and are carried into the heart of the settled parts of Canada in the same vessels that bring them from Europe, cannot be sold cheaper than the same articles, subject to a heavy duty, and carried an immense distance by land, and an expensive inland navigation? this indeed may not apply to the upper posts; but who are the consumers of East India articles in those cold, poor, and barren regions?

In short, the more any one considers this article, the more fully he will be convinced, that it contains a complete and absolute surrender of the fur trade, the greater part of which we might have exclusively possessed under the treaty of peace, had not Lord Grenville prevaried on Mr. Jay, to introduce a rival who will always be too powerful for us. And what renders this circumstance the more peculiarly oppressive, is, that this article is to be permanent; Lord Grenville was too sensible of its importance, to permit any time or circumstances to unloose these galling fetters.

This article is not less exceptionable in a political, than in a commercial, view. We know from sad experience, the cost and danger of Indian wars; we know, too, from the same experience, that they can be, and have been, fomented by Britain, whenever her interest or her malevolence prompted her to distress us. By permitting the British [...]der [...] to remain amongst [Page]the Indians, and to extend themselves to every village, we add to their influence; and by the terms of the 26th articie, are prohibited from expelling them, even in case of war with Britain herself, unless their conduct should render them suspected, and not even then in less than twelve months from the publication of the order. What but the blindest infatuation could induce our minister to stipulate that a secret, nay, even an open enemy should remain without restraint among savages, whom the slightest circumstance stimulates to war? Did we not know what we formerly should suffer from a few Canadian priests and traders residing among the Indians, and how many endeavours were used by the government, to get the Six Nations to [...] them? It will be said, this article is reciprocal, and that [...] their agents remain within our lines, ours remain also wi [...] theirs: this, however, is not the fact; for if at any time a war should break out, our traders (if we should have any, which I much doubt) will, for their own safety, retire from places [...] remote as the British territories; besides that, not having any right, as I have before shown, to reside within the British [...] ritories, out of Europe, which is expresely prohibited by the [...] vigation act, and no such right being given by the treaty— [...] must follow, that no American merchant or trader, not set [...] in Europe, can have the least benefit by this provision; wh [...] hundreds of British emissaries may, under the pretence of tra [...] maintain the most dangerous stations in the heart of our country. What, fir! Is it not sufficient to have abandoned our [...] men without having a compensation for their injuries? [...] the unhappy farmer, when the care and attention due [...] growing family compels him to relinquish the charms of foo [...] and retire to labour and solitude in distant forests, must [...] pains, too, be aggravated by your treaty? Must artful emissaries, even of an open enemy, be permitted to stimulate savages, too ready of themselves, to bloody deeds? Must every land as well as every sea, witness the apathy with which the liberty and lives of our best and bravest citizens are abandoned?

CATO.

No. V.

I AM at some loss to understand what is intended by the following word in the 3d article—"And in like manner, all goods and mere [...] [...] whose importation, into the United States shall not be [...] prohibited; may freely, for the purposes [Page]of commerce, be carried into the same, in manner aforesaid, by his majesty's subjects; and the same shall be subject to no higher, or other duties, than would be payable by the citizens of the United States on the importation of the same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said states." The manner aforesaid, alludes to the former part of the article, which gives the British a right to navigate our rivers from the sea to the highest ports of entry for foreigners, and from thence by land into the Indian country. The only natural construction of these words, is, that the British shall have a right to import into the United States upon the same terms as Americans; and yet I can hardly conceive that Mr. Jay could intend, in the face of a law of the United States (Act making further provision for the payment of the debts of the United States, chap. 39. sec. 2.) which imposes an additional duty of ten per cent. on articles imported in vessels not of the United States; I say, I should hardly conceive that he should presume to enter into such stipulation directly in the face of a law of the United States, and that, too, in favor of a nation whose navigation act is at war with our commerce; did it not breathe the same spirit with the 12th, 14th, and 15th articles, all of which strike directly at the navigation of these states. Nor do I know any other construction that can possibly be put on the words, which I have stated at large, that every reader may judge for himself. It is, however, possible, that Mr. Jay may have intended (for never was a public instrument drawn with less precision than the one before us) that this provision should only extend to goods brought in for the purposes of the Indian trade; yet how the words can be made to bear this co [...]ruction, I am at a loss to conceive. But should even this be admitted to be the true meaning, it will again prove the extreme solicitude of the framers of the treaty, to secure to the British the whole benefit of the Indian trade; without this article, goods might be purchased of our merchants, for the purpose of this commerce, which would, on account of the ten per cent. difference, have been imported in American vessels; but this slight advantage, it seems, was deemed too much for the sacrifice of the whole profits of the Indian trade. It is therefore stipulated, that the British shall navigate our rivers to the highest port of entry for foreign vessels, and that upon this construction they shall pay no foreign duty for the articles they import; so that all that the British merchants will have to do, will be to establish factories at the ports of entry, and under pretence of the Indian trade (if it should be thought that the words should be confined to that) import in British bottoms, upon the same terms as we d [...] [Page]in our own ships: and as by the 15th article, our vessels at to pay a duty, which is to countervail the duty paid here b [...] the British, that is, ten per cent. every article imported th [...] way, as Indian goods, will yield ten per cent. more profit to the British merchant, taking the outward and homeward voy [...] into consideration, than it will to the American, and the avenue law be eluded. But supposing it possible to prevent the [...] goods so imported into New York, for instance, and there [...] on board river vessels, and from thence carried by land and by inland navigation for a considerable distance, from being [...] before they get into the western territory; yet even then this provision must operate as a bounty on British vessels, in p [...]eser [...]ce to all other foreigners, and as an encouragement of ten per cent. in favor of the British merchant, who carries on the Indian trade, to the prejudice of our own commerce and [...] own revenue. Thus, to make myself more fully underst [...], a British merchant sends in his own ship, articles intended [...] the Indian trade, or indeed any other, under that pretence; be has a right to enter them without paying any other duty th [...] the American does; and his return cargo pays no duties is England. The American merchant ships in his own vessel the same articles, on the same terms; but by the general operation of the 15th article, Britain has a right to lay on the return [...] go a duty of ten per cent. The words of the article are, " [...] the British government reserves to herself the right of impos [...]g on American vessels, entering into the British ports in Eu [...], a tonnage duty equal to that which shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of America, and also such duty as may he adequate to countervail the difference of duty-now payable [...] the importation of European and Asiatic goods, when imported into the United States in British or American vessels." If, then, against all obstacles, the American merchant should carry on the Indian trade, will he not, by this circumstance, be compelled to import and export in British vessels? By the 12th article, British vessels may import into the United States from their islands, without paying greater duties than the Americans; this again is in direct opposition to a law of the United States above cited.

By the same article, our boats of 70 tons, which his majesty consents (for it seems this article is a gift and bounty of his majesty, and not, like the rest, matter of agr [...]ement) are also to pay an equal tonnage duty in the islands with that the British pay here. Now I would ask, if it is possible to devise a more effectual way to put the whole West India trade into hands of the British?

[Page] 1st. They pay only American duties. 2d. As the American must pay in the islands, what tonnage the British pay here, the tonnage would be exactly even; but as the American vessel also pays a tonnage duty in our own ports of 6 ce [...], which the British do not pay in their own islands, it must follow, that the British carrying on the West India trade, will pay 6 cents less tonnage upon the whole out and return voyage, than the American; and as four voyages may be made in a year, the American will pay in the course of the year, 24 cents per ton more than the British ship, though the ship is unlimited as to sue, which we know to be an important circumstance in the cheapness of navigation; that our minister should not be content to put the British upon a par with the American, in the [...]ice of existing laws, and laws too that cannot be altered, because they are pledged for the discharge of the funded debt, seems so monstrous a misdemeanor, that it will hardly be believed even by those who have read the treaty over with attention.

I therefore transcribe the very words; "and the said American vessels shall be subject there to no higher tonnage, duties or charges, than shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of the United States." Now British vessels pay a tonnage in our ports of 50 cents, which, according to the express words of the [...]eaty, we must pay in their ports, in addition to which, by our own laws, our vessels are subject to a tonnage of six cents; so that when the British pays fifty the American will pay fifty-six cents per ton upon his outward and homeward voyage, that is, fifty under the British law, and six under our own. If, in addition to this, i [...] is considered that the British are empowered to settle as factors or merchants in all our ports, and not even to be molested in case of a war, and on the other hand it is expressly prohibited by the British navigation act, for Americans to settle or establish a trading house—if it is also considered, that any British ship having carried out her cargo, may be governed by circumstances, and go where she chooses for a better market, while the American must necessarily return to our ports—it will follow, that the whole trade of the British West Indies must be carried on in British bottoms, and our merchants either be precluded from this trade, or consent to act the humble part of factors to British merchants: the vessels formerly employed in this trade, must necessarily [...]ot at our wharves, and our seamen be turned over to Great Britain, to support her commerce, and, whenever she thinks proper, to plunder and distress our own. It may be said, that we have at present no West India trade but by permission;— [Page]but it should be recollected, that that permission grows out [...] the necessities of the islands; that it always existed in s [...] shape; that during the war their ports must be open to us, a [...] probably for two years after, till the wan [...]s, occasioned by the war, are supplied; so that this article extends only to the vert period in which we may presume with certainty upon th [...] commerce on fair and equal terms.—Were it even otherwise as it is now notorious that the islands cannot subsist without us, by prohibiting their ships from carrying articles that they cannot do without, it would necessarily follow, that they wo [...] be compelled to open their ports to us, upon our own terms But at all events, we must be very considerable losers by thi [...] treaty; for supposing that trade would, independent of the treaty, have been carried on in British bottoms, we then gained, at least the 10 per cent. the foreign duty on their import which duty would operate as a bounty upon our trade wi [...] other foreign West India islands, as well as similar articles imported from the East Indies, and thus contribute to extend [...] navigation and commerce in one quarter, while it restrai [...] i [...] in another; we should, indeed, by this means, have less of the produce of the British islands, but more of the produce [...] other countries; our exports to the British islands would [...] nue as they were, because they could not do without the [...] our imports from them would diminish, and the foreign [...] kets from which we supplied the deficiency of British s [...] &c. would afford an additional market for exports. But al [...] the evils of this article do not even stop at the point I have mentioned. By this treaty, we are not only to lose the bene [...] of the trade with the British, but also with the French i [...] who now kindly open their ports to us; by the second article of our treaty with France, we mutually agree, that neither will "grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect [...] commerce and navigation, which shall not immediately bec [...] common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same save freely, if the concession was freely made, or on allowing [...] same compensation, if the concessions were conditional." The French, then, the moment this treaty is ratified, have a right [...]n case they admit [...]s to visit their islands with vessels of seve [...] [...]ons, to come to our ports, free of foreign duty upon the [...] [...]les they import, and may also impose a tonnage duty of [...] [...]s on our vessels, and of course navigate to and from o [...] [...] cents cheaper than our own vessels; and can [...] after the causes of disgust which this treaty will gi [...] th [...], that they will delay a moment to exchange our free trade [...] [...]ands, into that [...]me [...]omm [...]ce which we me [...], [Page]accept as a bounty from Britain? Lord Grenville, however, conceiving that the transfer of our whole West India trade and navigation, was not sufficiently ruinous to our commerce, asks and obtains from our polite envoy, in return for his majesty's condescension in accepting so great a part of our trade, that we would also prohibit the exportation of melasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, in American vessels, either from his majesty's islands, or from the United States, to any part of the world, reasonable sea-stores excepted. The few apologists that the treaty has yet found, affect to believe, that the restriction is to be confined to such of the above articles as are imported only from the British islands; but the words are express, "that the United States will prohibit and restrain the carrying any (not any such) melasses, &c." and the reason they will urge in defence of the only true and obvious construction, would be, that as one cask of coffee cannot be distinguished from another, if any was exported, that which came from their islands would be exported; and thus we would, in this circuitous route, acquire a certain proportion of the carrying trade. That this is a part of a general system for the ruin of our navigation (Britain always having dreaded us as a rival) will appear from the instructions for armed ships, of the 8th of January, 1794, which remain unrevoked, and, as far as we have yet learned, uncensured by Mr. Jay. By that their armed vessels are instructed "to bring in for lawful adjudication all ships with their cargoes that are laden with goods, the produce of the French West India islands, for any port of Europe." How then stands our trade as to the exportation of those important articles? 1st. We are not to ship them from the French islands 2d. We are not to ship them from the British islands. 3d. We are not to ship them from the United States. From the East Indies we cannot ship them; because the East India cargoes being assorted for our markets, must first land here, after which, by the tenor of the treaty, we are not to re-ship them; nor can we even ship the cotton which is the product of our country; the prohibition being express, that we shall not export any. Now let us see the amount of the exports, and determine how far it is wise to lay ourselves under these humiliating restrictions.

From the 1st of October, 1791, to the 30th of September, 1792.

Cotton exported 138, 328 lbs.

Coffee 2, 136, 742

Cocoa 6, 000

Brown sugar 1, 122, 156

Loaf duto 21, 760

Melasses 12, 340 gals.

[Page] Humiliating as this article is, when I come to consider the 14th and 15th articles, it will appear, that neither this nor the loss of the Indian trade, are the severest blows aimed by this treaty, at the commerce and navigation of the United States.

CATO.

No. VI.

HAVING had occasion to show, in considering the treaty in a mere commercial view, that it contained an express relinquishment of the Indian trade; that it placed the West Indian commerce upon so disadvantageous a footing, as to render foreign nations our carriers, not only in that trade, but in the exportation of many articles (as sugar, cotton, coffee, cocoa) that we might import from the West Indies, or raise among ourselves; I proceed now to show, that our vessels will become equally useless in the European trade, if the treaty goes into effect. By the simple operation of her navigation laws, Britain had possessed herself of almost the whole of the carrying trade between the United States and her dominions. From October 1789 to September 1790, both inclusive, the amount of ou [...] exports to Britain and her dominions were of the value of [...] millions three hundred and sixty-three dollars; and our imports from thence, upwards of fifteen millions two hundred thousand dollars; making, together, upwards of twenty-four millions five hundred thousand dollars, on which commerce we paid Britain a balance of near six millions, while we gained from hence a balance of more than two millions and one half; yet this immense trade with Britain only employed 43, 580 tons of American vessels, while the trade to France employed 116, 410 tons, though our trade with her was less than one-fifth of our trade with Britain. The extreme injury the United States sustained by thus suffering a foreign nation to run away with their carrying trade, and, of course, cutting the sinews of their commerce and maritime strength, was urged as the best argument for the formation of the federal government; as, by that means, we should acquire the means of making restrictive laws upon the commerce of nations that oppressed ours. We accordingly find, that very early after the formation of our government, tonnage duties were imposed upon foreign vessels; and the immediate effect of them was to add new vigor to our navigation; it will appear by the present state of our tonnage, [Page]compared with that I have given, that, under the operation of this law, we were progressing so fast to a considerable degree of rank among maritime nations, as to incur the jealousy of that ambitious and selfish people, who fancy themselves the lords of the ocean, and consider every other that attempts to navigate it, as intruders upon their rights. To this cause we must attribute, in part, the various attacks that they have, from time to time, made on our commerce; it remained, however, to give it the fatal and final blow, which should put it out of our power to carry for ourselves or others: and the honor of effecting this was reserved for our envoy extraordinary, and a majority of that body to whom the states had confided our dearest rights. I have already observed, that the 12th article, taken together with the instructions of the 8th of January (at this moment in force) effectually precludes us, not only from the carrying trade of British or French islands, even though France has generously admitted us to carry from hers on the most favorable terms, but has actually cut off the carriage of our own commodities and certain others, of foreign and domestic growth, from our own states; and that the trade of India-goods is so managed also, as necessarily to fall to the share of Britain, to the exclusion of ourselves. Let us now see on what footing our European trade will stand: 1st. In time of peace, and next, when Britain shall be at war. By our tonnage and revenue laws, our ships had an advantage in the trade to Britain, of 44 cents the ton; and the discriminating duty of near 10 per cent. operated as a premium upon our own shipping; yet even this by no means countervailed the effect of the navigation law, and other restraints upon our commerce. But still under the operation of these statutes of the United States, our trade and navigation flourished, and was increasing; and as we reserved a right in our own hands, in case of new burdens, to impose further duties upon those that injured us, we had the most perfect security against any further legal attacks upon our commerce. Because, such was the nature of our commodities as to be essential to the nations with whom we dealt; while a variety of markets could furnish upon nearly equal terms, those that we wanted. To Britain we paid an annual balance of near six millions of dollars: which she must necessarily, and perhaps for ever, have lost, if, by a commercial warfare, she diverted it into any other channel. What, however, she did not dare to attempt openly by her laws, she has fully effected by her treaty.

By the 14th and 15th articles, we agree, that she shall impose upon our American vessels, a tonnage duty, equal to what her ships pay here; that the shall also impose a duty which shall [Page] countervail the foreign duty on American vessels. At first vie [...]; this appears to be just; for why, say the apologists of the treaty, should she not impose upon your trade the restrictions you impose on hers? Does not France reserve a right to do the same? Undoubtedly; had the article stopped at this point, it would have been perfectly just; and the navigation of each nation would have then depended upon the means they respectively had of building, victualling, and sailing their ships, which is exactly the case between us and France. But unfortunately the articles referred to, while they affect to be reciprocal, leave in full force the British navigation act, and all their other re [...] tive laws, by this artful appendix to the 14th article, to [...]: "But subject always, as to what respects this article, to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively." Had the matter even rested here, it might again have been recip [...] (though extremely unwise on our part) since, while it lest the British trade laws in force, it also lest ours in equal force. But this was not the intention of the contracting parties. Wor [...]s of reciprocity were very well to make a parade with; they would deceive the ignorant and super [...]cial reader; but the greatest p [...]i [...]t was, while it preserved to Britain the navigation and co [...] cial acts, by which they have raised their commerce at the [...] pense of other nations, to beat down the barriers with which we fenced ours, and even to take from us the means, by [...] future arrangements, of preventing the ruin of our trade.

Mr. Jay, therefore, agrees, in the 14th article, that all [...] laws, as well as those of Britain, shall remain in force; but in the 15th article he evades the provision so far as respects us, and expressly stipulates, that we shall lay no additional charge upon Britain to contervail her navigation and other restrictive laws; but that she may, while she preserves them in full force, impose a tonnage and other duties to contervail those we had imposed, in order to enable us to bear up against them. I ask them in what this article is reciprocal? Britain had alrendy gone as far as she dare go, in oppressing our trade, and now consents, if we will permit her to continue all the burdens she has imposed upon us, and at the same time agree to let her lay such others as she thinks equivalent for our having presumed to relieve ourselves, that she will agree with us that no further partial curies shall be imposed by either. Let us enquire into the effect of these articles upon our commerce and national character.

1st. As it is obvious, that the present flourishing state of our navigation, is, in a great measure, owing to the operation of the laws I h [...]ve m [...]n [...]oned; it must follow, that whatever countervails the [...] of those laws, must [...] it back to the [Page]state in which it was. Now, as the profits of every voyage are calculated on the outward and homeward voyage, if we pay in the British dominions exactly what they pay here, the charge upon the whole voyage is the same. If then, previous to the passing our tonnage laws, the British, by the operation of their navigation laws, had such advantage over us, in our own commerce, as to employ two hundred and thirty thousand tons of their shipping, as they did in 1789; while the whole of American shipping employed in the trade with Britain and its dominions, amounted, in the same year, to only 3, 580 tons, less than one-sixth part of the whole quantity engaged in the interchange of commodities between the two nations—it must follow, that we shall again be reduced, in consequence of the treaty, to our former humiliating situation; our seamen must go into the service of the nation that is again to navigate for us; and our ship-builders, and the numerous trades connected with them, must starve, or seek some other employment, since our merchants will no longer have occasion for ships, and the British merchants are not permitted to use those we build. It is observable, too, that the tonnage duty, which Britain is to lay, is not a countervailing duty, like that on goods imported, but is to be, in the words of the article, "equal to that which is payable by British vessels in the ports of America." Now foreign vessels pay 50 cents here; of course, 50 cents may be imposed on our vessels in Britain; but our own vessels also pay six cents a ton at home, so that on every voyage to the British dominions, and home again, they will pay 56 cents, while the British pay only 50; and as the voyage may be performed three times a year, the American ship will pay on the whole, 18 cents a ton annually more than the British; and it may be a question, whether we have any right to repeal the law laying the home duty, as it was imposed and enacted when the treaty was made and ratified, and as the repeal would put the British vessels in a less advantageous situation than they were in at the time the treaty was made. But the discour [...]ement does not rest here, except so far as our trade may be co [...]sined to the city of London; for in every other port we pay an [...]tra light money of 1s. 9d. sterling a ton, which is about 39 cents; so that an American vessel going to Bristol, Liverpool, &c. and returning, will pay (besides the 50 cents the British are to impose [...] 6 cents American tonnage, and 39 cents extra light money, that is, 45 cents more a ton than a British vess [...] [...] same voyage, and which in three voyages, or one year, will amount, on a vessel of 400 tons, to 540 dollars, extra charge on American vessels. Thus then we give an annual and no inconsiderable [Page]bounty to British vessels, to the prejudice of our own navigation. I believe that this is the first instance in the history of nations, in which a commercial one has given greater encouragement to foreign ships than to her own. But the evil d [...] not stop here; equalizing duties are to be imposed, what these are to be, is not ascertained by the treaty; but as the power to impose them is reserved to the British parliament, what is to prevent their exceeding their just measure? But supposing they are really inclined not to go beyond the right reserved by the treaty, what is to be the rule of that right? The duties we impose upon their commodities amount to 12 per cent. on the India, and, at the average, to about 10 per cent. on other [...]icles. Are they to lay a duty which will amount to a mean of the relative quantities of these articles? if they are, how i [...]i [...] to be found, as the relative proportion between the importa [...] of these articles is continually fluctuating? or is the coun [...] vailing duty to amount to as much on the whole of the arti [...] imported from the United States, as the whole duty paid a [...] foreign articles imported in British ships into the United St [...]? this seems to be the true construction of the article. If so, [...], as our imports from the British dominions, exceed our exp [...] to them by more than one third, and supposing the average of the duty they pay here to be 10 per cent. the duty upo [...] exports, if carried to any of the British dominions, in Ame [...] vessels, must amount to 15 per cent. otherwise the whole [...]y will not be equalized. The advantage that this will give to [...] tish ships over ours, particularly when they bring our cheap and bulky articles, or such as pay no duty, is too obvious to [...] upon. But this is not the only effect of this equalizing d [...]; as Britain has a right to choose the articles on which she may impose it, she has in some sort the regulation of our trade, so far as it may be carried on in American vessels; thus, suppose she should put the greatest part of this equalizing duty upon the most bulky articles, it would necessarily follow, that those articles must either rot on our hands, seek another market, [...] go in British ships, which would pay no duty at home. Could a more effectual way be devised to exclude us absolutely from carrying our own commodities? It may be said, that, independent of the treaty, Britain might have imposed these duties; true, and independent of the treaty, we might have met her with other duties.

2d. As the British must necessarily be the principal carrie [...] between us and their dominions; so they will be, in a great measure, the carriers between us and foreign nations: because, while by their navigation act they absolutely forbid us to enter [Page]their ports with any commodities not the growth and manufacture of our own country; they bring the commodities of other nations upon the same terms as those might by whom they were raised; and they can take back a return cargo to Britain, or its dominions, with greater advantage, than we can carry our own produce, by the whole difference of the tonnage, and countervailing duties, with six cents more added, if they return to London, and 45 cents if to any other port in the British dominions; and from thence again return with British commodities to the original port. It is evident, that the benefits attending such privileged ships, must give their owners great advantages over others; and as they can only be held by British subjects, who are by the terms of the treaty to be in every respect upon a footing with our own merchants, while they enjoy all those additional advantages as British subjects, it requires no great foresight to discover, that the whole trade of America must be engrossed by them. Nor does it require much more, to see that the leading objects of this treaty are, to establish the navigation and commerce of Britain upon the ruins of our own—to fill the Atlantic ports, and the western territory, with British merchants and factors—to establish a certain degree of rank for British officers, whom the humiliated American is directed, under pain of being "confidered as a disturber of the peace of both nations, to treat with the respect due to his commission;"—to put such setters upon our legislature as would for ever bind them to the will of that imperious nation—to disgust our republican allies, and leave us only to the justice and humanity of the man who has urged our slaves to cut our throats—savages to murder our women and children—Barbarian pirates to enslave our mariners—and his own banditti to profane our churches, burn our dwellings, and rob, plunder, and massacre our citizens. If we compare this treaty with many speeches, made about the period of Mr. Jay's appointment, with the support he has avowedly received from the British faction, with the warmth with which he engaged in the controversy between our government and the French minister—if we add the readiness that ardent or vindictive men feel, to suppose every thing right, which strengthens their party—we shall be less surpised at the treaty contravening the existing laws of the country, where they bore hard upon the British, or its giving them such additional encouragement as should induce them to pour in their myrmidons to support and strengthen the hands of government, against native Americans, and the friends and well-wishers to foreign and domestic republics—whom the courtiers have dared to calumniate with the names of antifederal and jacobin.

[Page] Mr. Pinckney informs us in his letter to Mr. Jefferson, that Lord Grenville, in stating the principles on which they had issued the instructions of the 8th of January, 1794, made use of these terms, "the second was one, that he [Lord Grenville] could not mention to me officially, but that he still thought it right I should be apprised of, that no misconception of their motives might be entertained; that he was aware of the delicacy of speaking to a foreign minister, concerning the internal state of his country; neither could he expect an answer from me on the subject. But that the second reason was, to take away every pretext from evil-disposed persons among us [the citizens of the United States] who, according to the intelligence he had received, were endeavouring to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, and in short, to reduce us to the present situation of France." It is evident from this communication, that Lord Grenvi [...]e supposed that all those persons in America, who felt for the [...] of their country—who were irritated at the piracies of the British, and the insults and injuries we had suffered—which, I believe, included every native American not holding an office, a seat in Congress, or money in the funds, were the oppos [...] of our own government.

As the instructions alluded to, directed the taking our [...] going from the French West Indies to any port in Eu [...] Lord Grenville must have conceived, that the way to strengthen the hands of our government, was to destroy our commerce-imprison our seamen in unhealthy climates, and lessen our [...] nection with France; the whole was evidently thrown out [...] Mr. Pinckney, to induce him to enter into conversation with him on the subject of such a convention between the two governments, as should engage America in a war with France, permit Britain to plunder our trade, and in return lend her aid for the support of our government.—The whole speaks this plain language, "the friends of Britain in America, are the friends of your government; the enemies to British depredations are the enemies of your government, and Jacobins who love the French; let us make a common cause of it; we can mutually assist each other." Mr. Pinckney was too prudent to enter into any discussion with Lord Grenville on this delicate subject; I hope Mr. Jay has been equally so.

That the cause of the treaty, and the cause of Britain, have gone hand in hand in this country, will not, however, be disputed, by those who know the birth, patronage, and affections of its advocates; and as this dangerous instrument has a tendency to destroy our connection with France, to cut the sin [...] [Page]of the national strength, to compel us to rely on Great Britain, and to import supporters of our government from thence. we cannot doubt its being the offspring of a preconceived system.

CATO.

No. VII.

"THERE shall be," says the 14th article, "between all the dominions of his majesty in Europe, and the territories of the United States, a reciprocal and perfect liberty of commerce and navigation," &c. I am a little surprized that the words reciprocal had not smote Mr. Jay's conscience, when the very sentence in which he uses it, holds forth partial advantages to Britain, and none to America. Why must all the territories of the United States be laid open to British merchants; whilst ours are confined only to the spot precisely on which they find no interest in settling? Were we permitted to settle and carry on trade in the East or West Indies, on the footing of natives, many would find an interest in availing themselves of it. But what American merchant will think of establishing a mercantile house in England, unless in partnership with a native of that country? in which case the article is useless to him. Is it not evident, that this is part of the system I hinted at in my last? It will be still more so, when we reflect, that several modes of retaliation were proposed by Mr. Jefferson, as the means of compelling Britain to treat us as we merited, in return for the great benefit we permitted her to derive from our commerce. Among others, he suggests, "that where a nation refuses permission to our merchants and factors to reside within certain parts of their dominions, we may, if it should be thought expedient, refuse residence to theirs, in any or every part of ours, or modify their transactions."

The framers of the treaty apprehended, that in the course either of commercial or political events, such prohibition, or some partial restraint, might become necessary: they, therefore, without any equivalent, bound the hands of this country; while the only restraints which Britain would ever find it expedient to impose, were left in full force.—It is remarkable, that all the means that have ever been proposed for counteracting the restrictive laws of Britain, either by individuals, by states, and by congress [...]se [...]f, have been carefully examined by our negoc [...]tor; not to advance them by his treaty, but precisely [Page]to take from his country the means of carrying them into effect. The several importing states, prior to the orga [...] tion of the federal government, thought it necessary, by p [...] tial laws on the British trade, to force her to put ours upon a better footing; in this opinion, the popular branch of congress twice agreed. It was determined by this treaty to put it in future out of our power; and we bind ourselves to let the British continue their restrictions, but to impose none. Congress agree to a tonnage and duty which is to give the [...] tion of the United States some advantage over that of foreigners. Mr. Jay agrees (in consideration, I suppose, of the [...] treatment we have received from that nation) that though these regulations shall affect others, they shall be of no avail against Britain. It has been proposed to make the British debts [...] swerable for British depredations. Mr. Jay (fearful that [...] ter should not be left for another embassy extraordinary) [...] sure again to bind our hands; and all this without any [...] of equivalent. Can any body suppose that these extraordinary stipulations were accidental? Is any man so blind, as [...] see in them the acts of a party determined to strengthen themselves by a foreign alliance, and to wrest from the hands of their antagonists the weapons by which their ally might be annoyed? In a royal government, and where the population amounts to ten or twelve millions, a few scattered merch [...], with very limited capitals, are of no moment, and cannot have the slightest influence upon the government: but is this the case in a republic, where the population is thin, where wealth creates almost the only distinction, where the sea [...] give the tone to the politics of the country? Will any [...] say, that circumstances may not arise in such a country, i [...] which it would be extremely imprudent to permit the whole commerce to be carried on by foreign merchants, whose [...]itals will probably be infinitely larger than our own, and even suffer them to remain with us (as the treaty does) when we are at war with their native country? I would not be understood to advocate the removal of any class of men, while [...] danger is to be apprehended from them: but it would be certainly unwise to deprive ourselves of a right to do it, and to prevent the admission of too numerous a band of them, if political or commercial circumstances should render it proper. Why, with so much greater cause of apprehension than Britain, should we be more fearless? She does not permit the citizens of the United States to reside for the purposes of trade in any of her dominions out of Europe. She certainly does this, either because she supposes that they may be dangerous, or because [Page]she wishes to secure the trade to her own subjects; and should either of these motives operate with less force on us?

This article concludes with the following words, "But subject always as to what respects this article, to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively;" this must mean subject to the laws which existed at the time of the signature or ratification of the treaty; for otherwise, either party might, at will, defeat the provisions it contained, and render the whole a dead letter, which is too absurd to suppose.—In order to see, then, how far this provision is reciprocal, we will examine what laws, relative to the commerce of the two countries, were in force at that or this time.

1st. We impose upon British vessels, in common with other foreigners, a tonnage duty of 50 cents, that is, 44 beyond what our citizens pay;—this, however, is more than countervailed by the clause in the 15th article, which permits them to lay an equal tonnage upon our ships.

2d. We impose extra duties which may average 10 per cent. on the cargoes of foreign ships; this, however, is countervailed by the right the British reserve, to impose an equivalent duty. It must follow, then, that their commerce with us is absolutely free, and stands upon the same ground, as that of our own citizens. If then our commerce with Britain is equally free, the article is reciprocal; if, on the other hand, our trade is shackled by the laws which are left in force, then the article is not reciprocal.

1st. Then, Britain prohibits our trade with several parts of her dominions, except in British vessels.

2d. She imposes near 40 cents extra light money, a ton, upon our vessels, except in the port of London; this, with the 50 cents tonnage we have given her a right to lay, and the 6 cents our own vessels pay at home, make a premium on her vessels, or a duty on ours, equal to 46 cents a ton, to the disadvantage of our own navigation.

3d. She compels us, in our trade with her, to navigate only with American seamen, which is a peculiar disadvantage to a nation which, like ours, is always receiving useful hands from other countries.

4th. She does not permit her citizens to make use of American-built vessels; that is, she discourages our ship-builders; while, by the treaty, we encourage hers.

5th. She does not permit American vessels to bring her any commodities, except such as are the growth and manufacture of our own country, while we permit her to bring us the commodities of every country.

[Page] 6th. She prohibits our carrying articles from one of her ports to another; while she may carry from one of our ports to another, subject to an extra tonnage duty, of 44 cents.

7th. She prohibits the exportation of many articles to this country from her European dominions.

8th. She prohibits the importation of salted fish, bacon, salt provisions, whale-oil, &c. and even grain, for home consumption, except when the price of wheat is above 50 s. sterling the quarter.

9th. She lays a very heavy duty upon a variety of the articles of this country, tobacco and rice, particularly; while we lay none upon her but such as by the treaty we have allowed her to equalize.

10th. She does not permit our citizens to settle for the purposes of commerce, in any part of her dominions out of Europe.

All these restrictions, and some slighter ones that might be mentioned, are imposed on us by laws, which, by the 14th article, we have preserved in full force; at the same time, that we have agreed, that the only two checks we had placed on her commerce and navigation, shall be done away; for a countervailing duty, or a repeal of the duty, amounts exactly to the same thing; except so far as the repeal would affect the revenue, that no new ones shall be imposed. Would not any body have imagined, that this long list of burdens would have made Lord Grenville blush to ask, or Mr. Jay to grant, countervailing duties, when all we had done, was already countervailed, at least ten fold. Where is the reciprocity of this article? What could be our envoy's inducement to enter into it? Were we afraid, that our merchants would not be suffered to settle in Britain without it? Was it an object of any moment if they did not? was he fearful that they would lay new burdens upon us? was not the catalogue of oppression as full as it could be? had not Britain herself already acq [...]esced near six years in the justice of our imposing a duty upon her shipping and merchandizes? has she stipulated for qualizing duties with other nations, on whom she has imposed similar burdens, and who in return have taxed her trade? is the [...]e a nation in the world, from whom she derives so many advantages as from us, or who burdens her trade so little? and have we no right to any return for all this? could the British court have objected, if we were to treat on the [...]ing of reciprocal advantage [...], if M [...]. Jay had stated each of these restrictions, and demanded an equivalent for it, if it would break in too much on their system to remove them? Lord Grenville [...] ow [...] to meet them by similar [...] that if we [...] to do so, it was [Page]from a spirit of conciliation, and because that we believed, that the equivalent might be settled by treaty to mutual advantage. But to submit to all, to ask no equivalent, to relinquish the right of doing ourselves justice, was a most unheard-of desertion of the interests of our own country. It was one which no other nation in the world would suffer to pass with impunity, and which I grieve to think a single native of America can be found to justify.

It is true, that this article proposes, that two years after the present war, the contracting parties may treat for the equalization of the duties, &c. but that in the mean time it is to remain on the footing the treaty places it. Upon what ground was this discussion postponed? if Mr. Jay was sent to make a treaty, why did he not make it, but leave it open to future discussion? is it probable that at the end of the war (which may last several years, and two years after, that is, when Britain has had time to recruit her strength and her finances, she will be more moderate in her views, than at this moment, when she is overwhelmed with calamities? Is it probable, that at that period our trade will be of more consequence to her than now, that she has lost two important branches of it, Holland and France? It should be recollected, that the exportations from the British dominions to the United States, taken on the medium of two years, 1784 and 1785, exceed one-third of all her manufactures exported to all the rest of the world.

At that time, Holland, which, next to America, is their best customer, had not declined their market. At present it will not be extravagant to allege, that the United States consume two-fifths of all the British manufactures that are exported to foreign nations. The distress that a rupture with us, or any interruption of our commerce, would occasion in England, is beyond calculation. This, then, was the moment to treat upon the most advantageous terms, or to exert our inherent right to do ourselves justice by our own laws. It is in knowing how to take advantage of such circumstances, that true policy consists. Every one remembers how much the president's foresight was commended in having seized upon this moment to send a special envoy. But this envoy, it seems, thought differently from the president, and agrees formally, that we shall take no advantage of the ground on which we stand; but that, when Britain may have recovered what she has lost, then we will treat.

Is there any kind of connection between the present war and our commercial regulations with Britain? If not, why have any reference to the war, in setting the time for making our arrangements? Why but to give Britain still greater advantages [Page]than she dare to ask now? If the present arrangement will as I have shown, oppress our commerce and destroy our [...]igation—if it banishes our seamen, and starves our ship car [...] ters—if it puts our whole trade into the hands of foreign [...] even for a time—how many years will it take, under the wi [...] and best arrangements, to recover the ground we had lost?—Every thing must be re-created; and the discouragement [...] must then give to foreign navigation, after having lost our own, must create a temporary distress, which will be felt by every order of people. This distress will again be the argument for new humiliations, and our subjugation to Britain be re [...]d [...] perpetual. Is the present moment was (contrary to the g [...] sentiment) that in which we could not treat to advantage, why treat at all? Why relinquish every thing, to gain nothing?

CATO.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. IX.

IT was my intention to have comprised in two numbers, the examination of the 2d article; but on experiment, it was found expedient to add a third. I resume, for a moment, the subject of indemnification for the detention of the posts.

As an inducement to persist in this claim, we are assured, that the magnanimity of France, would have procured for us, its establishment. In the first place, this supposes that we we [...] to have become a party in the war; for otherwise it would be silly to imagine, that France would, on our account, embarrass herself with a difficulty of this sort. In this case, and supposing the object accomplished, still the injuries, losses, and expenses of war would have greatly overbalanced the advantage gained. But what certainty have we, that France will be able to dictate terms, even for herself? Could we expect or rely, after the terrible and wasting war, in which she has been engaged, that she would be willing to encumber the making of peace, with additional obstacles, to secure so trifling a point with us? Would it be even humane, or friendly in us, to ask her to risk the prolonging [Page]of her calamities, for so trivial an object? A conduct like this, with reference either to France, or to ourselves, [...]uld resemble that of the gamester, who should play millions against farthings. It is so preposterous in every sense, that the recommendation of it, if sincere, admits of but one construction, namely, that those who recommend it, wish our envoy to have acted not as if he had been sent to make peace, but as if he had been sent to make war, to blow and spread the desolating f [...]ames of discord and contention.

There is a marked disingenuousness, running through the observations, which are made to the prejudice of the treaty: they endeavour constantly to have it understood, that our envoy abandoned, without effort, the claims which have not been established.—Whence is this inferred? Is it from the silence of the treaty? Surely we can only expect to find there what was agreed upon, not what was discussed and rejected. The truth is, that as well on this point of indemnification, for the detention of the posts, as on that of compensation, for the negroes carried away, our envoy urged our pretensions, as far, and as long, as he could do it, without making them final obstacles to the progress of the negociation.

I shall now enumerate and answer the remaining objections, which have appeared against this article. They are these: 1. That the posts to be surrendered, instead of being described in general terms, should, for greater certainty, have been specially enumerated; that now the uncertainty of a part of the boundary line, may furnish a pretext for detaining some of them. 2. That the expressions "precincts and jurisdictions," which are excepted from our right of settlement, previous to the surrender, are so vague and indeterminate, as to be capable of being made to countenance encroachments. 3. That it was improper to have stipulated, for the inhabitants, the option of residing and continuing British subjects, or of becoming American citizens: that the first was to establish, by treaty, a British colony, within our limits; the last to admit, without the power of exception, bi [...]ter enemies of the country, to the privileges of citizens. 4. That the securing to those inhabitants, the enjoyment of their property is exceptionable, as being a "cession without equivalent of an indefinite extent of territory." This is the character given to it by the meeting at Philadelphia.

The answer to the first objection, is, that the enumeration proposed might have included the very danger which is objected to the provision as it stands, and which is completely avoided by it. The principal posts occupied by the British, are known and might easily have been enum [...]ated; but there is a possibility of [Page]there being others not known, which might have escaped. Last year there started up a post, which had not been before hea [...]d of, on the pretence of an old trading establishment. Who knows with absolute certainty, how many similar cases may e [...] in the vast extent of wilderness, as far as the lake of the Wo [...]d [...] which, for several years past, has been inaccessible to us? If our envoy's information could have been perfect, at the time of his last advices from America; between that period and the signing of the treaty, changes might have taken place, that is, trading houses might have grown into military posts, as they did in the case referred to; a case, which, in fact, happened after the departure of our envoy from the United States. Was it not far better than to hazard an imperfect specification, to use terms so general and comprehensive, as could not fail, in any circumstances, to embrace every case? Certainly it was; and the terms "all ports and places," which are those used in the treaty, are thus comprehensive. Nothing can escape them.

Neither is there the least danger that the uncertainty* of a part of the boundary line, can be made a pretext for detai [...] the posts, which it was impossible to enumerate. This [...] appear from an inspection of the map—The only uncertain p [...], of the boundary line (except that depending on the river. St. Croix, which is on a side unconnected with the position of the posts) is that which is run from the lake of the Woods to the Mississippi.—The most western of our known posts, is at Michillimackinac, at or near the junction of the lakes Huron and Michegan, eastward near eleven degrees of longitude of the lake of the Woods, and about ten degrees of longitude of that point, on the Mississippi, below the falls of St. Anthony, where a survey, in order to a settlement of the line, is to begin. Moreover, our line, by the treaty of peace, is to pass through the lake Huron, and the water communication between that [...] and lake Superior, and through the middle of lake Superior, and thence westward through other waters, to the lake of the Woods; that is, about half a degree of latitude more northward, and about eight degrees of longitude more westward, than any part of the lake Michegan. Whence it is manifest, that any closing line, to be drawn from the lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, must pass at a distance of several hundred miles from Michillimackinac. If the British, therefore, should be [Page]disposed to evade the surrender, they will seek for it some pretext more plausible than one which involves a palpable geographical absurdity. Nor can we desire a better proof of the ignorance or disingenuousness of the objectors to the treaty, than their having contrived one of this nature.

The general terms used, were to be preferred, for the very reason, that there was a doubt about the course of a part of the boundary line; for, if there should chance to exist any post now unknown, so near the line as to render it questionable, in the first instance, on which side it may fall; the moment the line is settled, the obligation to surrender will be settled with it.

The second objection loses all force, when it is considered, that the exception can only operate till the first of June next, the period for the surrender of the posts; and that, in the mean time, there is ample space for settlement, without coming to disputable ground. There was, besides, real difficulty in an accurate definition. What the precincts and jurisdictions of the posts are, is a question of fact. In some instances, where, from there being no settlements, over which an actual jurisdiction had been exercised, a good rule might have been, the distance of gun shot from the fortifications, which might have been settled at a certain extent in miles, say three or four. But in some cases an actual jurisdiction has been exercised, under circumstances which created obstacles to a precise definition. The case of Caldwell's manor, in the vicinity of Dutchman's point, is an example. There, a mixed jurisdiction has been sometimes exercised by the British, and by the state of Vermont, connected with a disputed title to that manor; one party claiming under an ancient French grant, and the other under the state of Vermont. Detroit and its vicinity would also have occasioned embarrassment. From the situation of the settlements, and of a number of dispersed trading establishments, a latitude was likely to have been required, to which it might have been expedient to give a sanction. In such situations, where a thing is to last but a short time, it is commonly the most eligible course, to avoid definition. It is obvious, that no ill can result from the want of one, if the posts are surrendered at the time agreed; if not, it is equally plain, that it can be of no consequence, because the whole article will be void.

The third objection becomes insignificant, the moment the real state of things is adverted to. This has been described in a former number for another purpose, but will now be recapitulated, with one or two additional facts. The first posts, beginning eastward, are, Point-au-fer and Dutchman's point, on like Champlain. The whole number of persons in this vicinity, [Page]over whom jurisdiction has been claimed by the British, may amount to an hundred families. But the claim of jurisdiction here, has been only occasionally and feebly urged; and it is assorted in addition, by well informed persons, that the ab [...] mentioned families have been, for some time, regularly represented in the legislature of Vermont, the ordinary civil jurisdiction of which state has, with little interruption, been extended over them. At neither of the other posts, to wit, Osweg [...], Niagara, the Miami, Detroit, Michillimackinac, is there any settlement, except at Detroit, where, and in the vicinity of which, there may be between two and three thousand persons, chiefly French Canadians, and their descendants. It will be understood, that I do not consider as a settlement, two or three log houses for traders.

It follows, that the number of persons who can be embraced by the privileges stipulated, is too inconsiderable to admit of attaching any political consequences whatever to the stipulation▪ Of what importance can it possibly be, to the United States, whether two or three thousand persons, men, women and children, are permitted to reside within their limits, either as British or American subjects, at their option? If the thing was an object of desire to Great Britain, for the accommodation of the individuals con [...]erned, could it have merited a moment's hesitation on our part? As to residence, it is at the courtesy of nations at peace to permit the residence of the citizens of each other within their respective territories. British subjects are now free by our laws, to reside in all parts of the United States. As to the permission to become citizens, it has been the general policy and practice of our country to facilitate the naturalization of foreigners. And we may safely count on the interest of individuals, and on that desire to enjoy equal rights which is so deeply planted in the human breast, that all who resolve to make their permanent residence with us, will become citizens.

It is true, that there may be a few obnoxious characters (though I do not recollect to have heard of more than two or three) among the number of those who have acquired by the stipulation, a right to become citizens of the United States. But would it ever have been worthy of the dignity of the national wrath, to have launched its thunders against the heads of two, or three, or half a dozen despicable individuals? Can we suppose that, without a stipulation, it would have been thought worth the while to make a special exception of their cases out of the operation of our general laws of naturalization? And if this had not been done, would they not have found means, if they desired it, after the lapse of a sh [...]rt period, to [Page]acquire the rights of citizens? It is to be observed, that citizens of our own, who may have committed crimes against our laws, not remitted by the treaty of peace, would find no protection under this article.

Suppose the stipulation had not been made, what would have been the probable policy of the United States? Would it not have been to leave the handful of settlers undisturbed, in quiet enjoyment of their property, and at liberty, if British subjects, to continue such, or become American citizens, on the usual conditions? A system of depopulation, or of coercion to one allegiance or another, would have been little congenial with our modes of thinking, and would not, I am persuaded, have been attempted.

If, then, the treaty only stipulates in this respect, what would have been the course of things without it, what cause for serious objection can there be on this account?

The matter of the fourth objection can only derive a moment's importance from misapprehension. It seems to have been imagined, that there are large tracts of land, held under British grants, made since the peace, which are confirmed by the part of the article that gives the inhabitants the right of removing with, selling, or retaining their property.

In the first place, it is to be observed, that if such grants had been made, the stipulation could not be deemed to confirm them; because our laws must determine the question, what is the property of the inhabitants; and they would rightfully decide, that the British government, since the treaty of peace, could make no valid grants of land, within our limits. Upon the ground even of its own pretensions, it could not have made such grants. Nothing more was claimed, than the right to detain the posts as a hostage. The right to grant lands pre-supposes much more, a full right of sovereignty and territory.

But in the second place, it has always been understood, and upon recent and careful enquiry is confirmed, that the British government has never, since the peace, made a grant of lands within our limits. It appears, indeed, to have been its policy, to prevent settlements in the vicinity of the posts.

Hence the stipulation, as it affects lands, does nothing more than confirm the property of those which were holden at the treaty of peace; neither is the quantity considerable; and it chiefly, if not altogether, depends on titles acquired under the French government, while Canada was a province of France.

In giving this confirmation, the treaty only pursues what is a constant rule among [...]ivilized nations. When territory is ceded or yielded up by o [...]e nation to another, it is a common practice [...] [Page]if not a special condition, to leave the inhabitants in the enjoyment of their property. A contrary conduct would be disgraceful to a nation; nor is it very reputable to the objectors to the treaty, that they have levelled their battery against this part of it. It is a reflection upon them too, that they employ for the purpose, terms which import more than is true, even on their own supposition, and are, therefore, calculated to deceive; for the confirmation of property to individuals, could be at most a cession only of the right of soil, and not of territory, which term has a technical sense, including jurisdiction.

Let it be added, that the treaty of peace, in the article which provides "that there should be no future confiscations nor prosecutions against any person or persons, by reason of the part which he or they might have taken in the war; and that no person should, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or property," did substantially what is made an objection to the treaty, under consideration. It will not, I believe, be disputed, that it gave protection to all property antecedently owned, and not confiscated. Indeed it is a question, whether the stipulations cited, would not have effected, with regard to other rights than those of property, a great part of what is regulated by the last treaty. Its provisions, in this particular, were, perhaps, in the main, unnecessary, further than to obviate a doubt which might have arisen from the suspension of the treaty, by the withholding of the posts.

Thus have I gone through every objection to the second article, which is in any degree colourable; and I flatter myself have shown not only that the acquisition made by it, is of great and real value, but that it stands as well as circumstances permitted, and is defensible in its details. I have been the mo [...] particular in the examination, because the assailants of the treaty have exerted all their ingenuity to discredit this article, from a consciousness, no doubt, that it is a very valuable it [...] of the treaty; and that it was important to their cause, to envelope it in as thick a cloud of objection as they were able to contrive. As an expedient of party, there is some merit in the artifice; but a sensible people will see that it is merely artifice. It is a false calculation, that the people of this country can ever be ultimately deceived.

CAMILLUS.

[Page]

No. X.

THE object of the third article is connected with that of the second. The surrender of the posts naturally drew with it an arrangement, with regard to inland trade and navigation. Such an arrangement, convenient in several respects, appears to be in some respects necessary. To restrain the Indians on either side of the line, from trading with the one party or the other, at discretion, besides the questionableness of the right, could not be attempted without rendering them disgusted and hostile. The truth of this seems to have influenced the conduct of Great Britain and France, while the latter was in possession of Canada. The 15th article of the treaty of peace of Utretcht, in the year 1713, allows free liberty to the Indians on each side, to resort for trade to the British and French colonies. It is to be observed, too, that the Indians not only assist on a right of going to trade with whom they please, but of permitting whom they please to come to trade with them, and also to reside among them for that purpose.—Thus, the southern and south-western Indians within our limits, maintain a constant intercourse with Spain, established on the basis of treaty—nor has their right to do it, been hitherto contested by the United States.—Indeed, on what clear principle of justice could this natural right of trade, of a people not subject to our ordinary jurisdiction, be disputed? This claim, on their part, gives a corresponding claim to neighbouring nations, to trade with them. Spain would think the pretension to exclude her inadmissible—And Great Britain would have thought the same, if she had found it her interest to assert the right of intercourse; views which would always be seconded by the Indians from regard to their own interest and independence. It was a point, therefore, which it much concerned the preservation of good understanding between the parties and with the Indians, to regulate on some equitable plan; and the more liberal the plan, the more agreeable to a natural course of things, and to the free participation of mutual advantages, the more likely was it to promote and prolong that important benefit.

In the second place, the expediency of some arrangement was indicated by the circumstance of the boundary line between the parties, running for an extent of sixteen hundred miles through the middle of the same rivers, lakes, and waters. It may be deemed impossible from the varying course of winds and currents, for the ships of one party to keep themselves constantly within their own limits. without passing or transgressing [Page]those of the other. How, indeed, was the precise middle [...]e of those great lakes to be always known?

It appears evident, that to render the navigation of thes [...] waters useful to, and safe for, both parties, it was requisite that they should become common. Without this, frequent forfeitures to enforce interdictions of intercourse might be incurred—and there would be constant danger of interference and controversy. It is probable, too, that when those waters are better explored in their whole extent, it will be found that the best navigation of those lakes is sometimes on the one side, sometimes on the other, and that common convenience will, in this respect, also be promoted by community of right.

Again—It is almost always mutually beneficial for bordering territories to have free and friendly intercourse with each other—This relates not only to the advantages of an interchange of commodities, for the supply of mutual wants, a [...] to those of the reciprocal creation of industry, connected with that interchange, but also to those of avoiding jealousy, collision, and contest, of preserving friendship and harmon [...].— Proximity of territory invites to trade—the bordering inhabitants, in spite of every prohibition, will endeavour to carry it on;—if not allowed, illicit adventures take place of the regular operations of legalised commerce—individual interest leads to collusions to e [...]de restraining regulations—habits of infracting the laws are produced—morals are perverted—securities, necessarily great, in proportion as they counteract the natural course of things, lay the foundation of discontents and quarrels. Perhaps it may be safely affirmed, that freedom of intercourse, or violent hatred and enmity, are the alternative in every case of contiguity of territory.

The maxims of the United States have hitherto favored a free intercourse with all the world. They have conceived, that they had nothing to fear from the unrestrained competition of commercial enterprize, and have only desired to be admitted to it on equal terms. Hence, not only the communication by sea has been open, with the adjacent territories, on our continent, as well as with more distant quarte [...] of the globe; but two ports have been erected on lake Champlain for the convenience of interior commerce with Canada: and there is no ristriction upon any nation, to [...] by the M [...]pi to the only port which has been established for that [...] the union. These arrangements have created neither blame nor critism.

Our envoy, therefore, in agreeing to a liberal plan of intercourse with the British territories in our neighbourhood, [...] [Page]conformed to the general spirit of our country, and to the general policy of our laws. Great Britain, in acceding to such a plan, departed from her system of colonial monopoly, a departure which ought to be one recommendation of the plan to us; for every relaxation of that system paves the way for other and further relaxations. It might have been expected, also, that a spirit of jealousy might have proved an obstacle on the part of Great Britain; since, especially if we consider the composition of those who inhabit, and are likely to inhabit Canada, it is morally certain, that there must be, as the result of a free intercourse, a far greater momentum of influence of the United States upon Canada, than of Canada upon the United States. It would not have been surprising, if this jealousy had sought to keep us at a distance, and had counteracted the wiser policy of limiting our desires by giving us possession of what is alone to us truly desirable, the advantages of commerce, rather than of suffering our wishes to be stimulated and extended by privation and restraint.

New ideas seem of late to have made their way among us. The extremes of commercial jealousy are inculcated.—Regulation, restriction, exclusion, are now with many the favorite topics—instead of feeling pleasure, that new avenues of trade are opened, a thousand dangers and mischiefs are pourtrayed when the occasion occurs. Free trade with all the world seems to have dwindled into trade with France and her dominions. The love-sick partizans of that country appear to regard her as the epitome of the universe, to have adopted for their motto, "All for love, and the world well lost."

These new propensities toward, commercial jealousy, have been remarkably exemplified with respect to the article immediately under consideration. Truly estimated, it is a valuable ingredient in the treaty; and yet there is, perhaps, no part of it which has been more severely reprobated.—It will be easy to show that it has been extremely misrepresented, and that what have been deemed very exceptionable features, do not exist at all.

We will first examine what the article really does contain, and afterwards what are the comparative advantages likely to result to the two countries.

The main stipulation is, that "it shall at all times be free to his majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United States,—and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the boundary line, freely to p [...]s [...] and re [...], by land and inland navigation, into the [...], and countries of the two parties on the con [...]ent of A [...] [...] the [Page]limits of the Hudson's Bay company only excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other."

The subject matter of this stipulation is plainly inland trade and commerce, to be carried on by land passage, and inland navigation. This appears, 1st, from the terms of the article. The subjects and citizens of the two parties, and also the Indians dwelling on each side the boundary line, are freely to pass and repass. In what manner? by land and inland navigation: to what places? into the respective territories and countries of the two parties, on the continent of America (the country of the Hudson's Bay company only excepted). They are also to navigate all the lakes, rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other. This right to navigate lakes, rivers, and waters, must be understood with reference to inland navigation; because this gives it a sense conformable with the antecedent clause, with which it is immediately connected, as part of a sentence; because the right to pass and repass, being expressly restricted to land and inland navigation, it would not be natural to extend it by implication, on the strength of an ambiguous term, to passage by sea, or by any thing more than inland navigation; because the lakes and rivers have direct reference to inland navigation, showing that to be the object in view; and the word "waters," from the order in which it stands, will most consistently with propriety of composition, be understood as something less than lakes and rivers, as ponds, canals, and those amphibious waters, to which it is scarcely possible to give a name; and because the waters mentioned are "waters thereof," that is, waters of the territories and countries of the two parties on the continent of America; a description which cannot very aptly be applied to the sea, or be supposed to include navigation by sea to the United States, or from them to the British territories. It is true, that nations, for various purposes, claim and exercise jurisdiction over the seas, immediately adjacent to their coasts; yet this is subject to the common right of nations, to the innocent use of those seas for navigation; and it is not, prima facie, presumable, that two nations, speaking of the waters of each other, would mean to give this appropriate denomination to waters, in which both claimed some common right.—The usual description of such waters in treaties is, "the [...] near the countries," &c.—But were it otherwise, still the [...]gating from the [...] s [...] into those waters, could not be [...] and might be [...]

[Page] The above construction is confirmed by the general complexion of the treaty. It is the manifest province of the eighteen articles, which succeed the first ten, to regulate external commerce and navigation. The regulations they contain, are introduced thus, by the 11th article: "It is agreed between his majesty and the United States of America, that there shall be a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce, between their respective people, in the manner, under the limitations, and on the conditions specified in the following articles."—Then follow articles, which provide fully and distinctly for trade and navigation between the United States and the British West Indies, between the Asiatic dominions of Great Britain and the United States; and lastly, between the European dominions of Great Britain and the United States. These eighteen articles properly constitute the treaty of commerce and navigation between the two countries. Their general scope, and some special provisions which they contain, prove that the object of the third article is local and partial; that it contemplates exclusively, an interior commerce, by land and inland navigation (except as to the Mississippi) and particularly that it does not reach at all our Atlantic ports. An instance of one of the special provisions alluded to, will be cited in the further examination of this article.

In opposition to this construction, much stress is laid upon the provisions which immediately succeed the clauses that have been quoted. They are in these words: "But it is understood, that this article does not extend to the admission of vessels of the United States into the seaports, harbours, bays, or creeks of his majesty's said territories, nor into such parts of the rivers in his said territories as are between the mouth thereof, and the highest port of entry from the sea, except in small vessels trading bona side between Montreal and Quebec: nor to the admission of British vessels from the sea, into the rivers of the United States, beyond the highest ports of entry for foreign vessels from the sea!" The last, it is said, contains an implication, that under this article, British vessels have a right to come to our highest ports of entry for foreign vessels from the sea, while we are excluded from the seaports of the British territories on this continent.

But this is altogether an erroneous inference. The clauses last cited are inserted for greater caution, to guard expressively against any construction of the article, by implications more or less remote; contrary to the actual regulations of the parties, with regard to external commerce and navigation. Great Britain does not n [...] permit a trad [...] by sea to Nova Scotia and Canada. [Page]She therefore declares that the article shall not be deemed to contravene this regulation. The United States now permit soreign vessels to come to certain ports of entry from the sea, but exclude them from other more interior ports of entry, to which our own vessels may come.* It is therefore declared on their part, that the article shall not be construed to contravene this regulation. This was the more proper, as the right of inland navigation might have given some colour to the claim of going from an outer to an inner port of entry. But this negative of an implication [...] which might have found some colour in the principal provasion, can never be construed into an affumative grant of a very important privilege, foreign to that principal provision. The main object of the article, it has been seen, is trade by land, and inland navigation. Trade and navigation by sea, with our sea ports, is an entirely diflerent thing. To inser a positive grant of this privilege, from a clause which says, that the right of inland navigation shall not be construed to permit vessels coming from the sea, to go from the ports of entry, to which our laws now restrict them, to more interior ports, would be contrary to reason, and to every rule of sound construction. Such a privilege could never be permitted to be founded upon any thing less than a positive and explicit grant. It could never be supported by an implication drawn from an article relative to a local and partial object, much less by an implication drawn from the negative of another implication. The pretension, that all our ports were laid open to Great Britain by a covert and side-wind provision, and this without reciprecity, without a right of access to a single sea port of the other party in any part of the world, would be too monstrous to be tolerated for an instant. The principles of equity between nations, and the established rules of interpretation, would unite to condemn so great an inequality, if any other sense could possibly be found for the terms from which it might be protended to be deduced. It would be in the present case the more inadmissible, because the object is embraced and regulated by other parts of the treaty on terms of reciprocity.

The different mode of expression, in the clause last cited, when speaking of the British territories, and when speaking of the United States, has furnished an argument for the inference which has been stated. But this difference is accounted for by [Page]the difference in the actual regulations of the parties, as described above. The object was on each side to cust an implication interfering with those regulations. The expressions to effect it were commensurate with the litte of the fact on each size; and consequently do not warrant any collateral or special infer [...]nce.

The only positive effect of these clauses is to establish, that the navigation from Montreal to Quebec, shall be carried on in what are called "small vessels, trading bone side between Montreal and Quebec." In determining their sense, it merits some o [...]servation, that they do not profess to except from the operation of the general provisions of the article, the sea ports, &c. of the British territories; but declare, that it is understood that those provisions do not extend to them. This is more a declaration that the antecedent provisions were not so broad as to comprehend the cases, than an exception of the cases from the operation of those provisions.

Those who are not familiar with laws and treaties, may feel some difficulty about the position, that particular clauses are introduced, only for greater caution, without producing any new effect; but those who are familiar with such subjects, know, that there is scarcely a law or a treaty which does not offer examples of the use of similar clauses; and it not unfrequently happens, that a clear meaning of the principal provision is rendered obscure by the excess of explanatory precaution.

The next clause of this article is an exception to the general design of it, condfirming the construction I have given. "The river Mississippi shall, however, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to both parties; and it is further agreed, that all the ports and places on its eastern side, to which soever of the parties belonging, may freely be resorted to and used by both parties, in as ample a manner as any of the Atlantic ports or places of the United States, or any of the ports or places of his majesly in Great Britain."

If the general provision gives access to all our ports, which must be the doctrine, if it gives access to our Atlantic ports, then it would equally have this effect with regard to the Mississippi. But thus [...]use [...]ly im [...] the contrars, not only by introducing a special provision for the parts of the Mississippi, but by introducing it expressly, as a farther or additional agreement; the words are, "it is further e [...]y [...]." &c. and these ports are to be enjoyed by each party, in as ample a manner as any of the [...]tle ports or places of the United States, or any of the parts or ple [...] his ma [...]ly in G [...]at Britain. This reference to our Atlantlc p [...]rt [...], [...] them with the ports of Great [Page]Britain, shows that the Mississippi ports are to be regulated by a rule or standard different from the ports for that inland navigation, which is the general object of the article; else, why that special reference? why not have stopped at the words "used by both parties?" If it be said, that the reference to our Atlantic ports implies, that they are within the purview of the article, let it be observed, that the same argument would prove that the ports of Great britain are also within its parview, which is plainly erroneous; for the main provisious are expressly consined to the territories of the parties on this continent. The conclusion is, that the reference is to a sa [...] ard, out of the article, and depending on other parts of the treaty.

It may be useful to observe here, that the Mississippi ports being to be used only in as ample, and not in a more ample manner, than our Atlantic ports and the ports of Great Britain, will be liable at all times to all the regulations, peivileges, and restrictions of the ports with which they are assorted.

The next clause is a still further refutation of the construction which I oppose.

"All goods and merchandize, whose impertation into his majesty's said territories in America shall not be entirely prohibited, may freely, for the purposes of commerce, be carried into the same, in the manner aforesaid, by the citizens of the United States; and such goods and merchandize shall be subject to [...]s higher or other duties than would be payable by his majesty's subjects on the importation of the same from Europe, into the said territories: and in like manner, all goods and merchandize, whose importation into the United States shall not be wh [...]lly prohibited, may freely, for the purposes of commerce, be carried into the same, in the manner aforesaid, subject to no higher or other duties than would be payable by the citizens of the United States, on the importation of the same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said States: and all goods not prohibited to be exported from the said territories respectively, may, in like manner, be carried out of the same by the two parties respectively. paying duty as aforesaid."

The words, "in the manner aforesaid," occur twice in these clauses, and their equivalent, "in like manner" once. What is the meaning of this so often repeated phrase? it cannot be presumed, that it would have been inserted so frequently without having to perform some office of consequence. I answer, that it is evidently the substitute for these other words of the main provision, "by land [...] inland navigation." Th [...] is "the manner [Page] [...]sind."— This is the channel, through which goods and merchandizes passing, would be subject to no other or higher duties than would be payable in the British territories by British subjects, if imported from Europe; or in the terriories of the United States, by citizens of the United States, if brought by American vessels into our Atlantic ports. No other reasonable use can be found for the terms. If they are denied this sense, they had much better been omitted, as being not only useless, but as giving cause to suppose a restriction of what, it is pretended, was designed to be general—a right of importing in every way, and into all parts of the United States, goods and merchandize, if not entirely prohibited, on the same duties as are payable by our own citizens when brought in our own [...]ssels.

These words, "whose importation into the United States shall not be entirely prohibited," is a further key to the true sense of the article. They are equivalent to these other words, "whose importation, into all parts of the United States shall not be prohibited."—The design o [...] this clause is to prevent importation, through the particular channels contemplated by the article, being obstructed by a partial or by any other than a general prohibition. As long as certain goods may be introduced into the United States through the Atlantic ports, they may also be brought into them through the channels delignated by this article, that is, by land and inland navigation. The making a prohibition in the given case to depend on a general prohibition, is conclusive to prove, that the article contemplates only particular channels. On any other supposition, the clause is nonsense. The true reading, then, of this part of the article, must be as follows: "Goods and merchandize, whose importation into all parts of the United States shall not be prohibited, may freely, for the purposes of commerce, be carried into the same, in manner as [...]resaid, that is, by land and inland navigation, from the territories of his majesty on the continent of America."

There are still other expressions in the article, which are likewise an index to its meaning. They are these, "would be payable by the citizens of the United States, on the importation of the same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said states." This reference to a rate of duties, which would be payable on importation into the Atlantic ports, as a rule or guide for the rate of duties, which is to pre [...]an in the case meant to be comprehended in the article, is full evidence that importation in the Atlantic ports is not included in that case. The mention of importation in American vessels, confirms this conclusion [Page]as it shows that the article itself contemplates, that the discrimination made by our existing laws may continue.

But the matter is put out of all doubt by those parts of the fifteenth article which reserve to the British government the right of imposing such duty as may be adequate to countesvail the difference of duty, now payable on the importation a European and Asiatic goods, when imported into the Unites States in British and American vessels; and which stipulate, that "the United States will not INCREASE the now subsisting difference between the duties payable on the importation of any articles in British or American vessels."

This is a demonstration, that the treaty contemplates, as consistent with it, a continuance of the present difference of duties on importations in American and British vessels; and consequently, that the th [...]d article, which stipulates equal duties, as to the cases within it, does not extend to importations into our Atlantic ports, but is confined to importations by land and inland navigation. Though this article be of temporary duration, yet as an evidence of the sense of the parties, it will always serve as a rule of construction for every part of the instrument.

These different views of the article establish, beyond the possibility of doubt, that, except with regard to the Mississippi, inland trade and navigation are its sole objects—that it gra [...] no right or privilege whatever in our Atlantic ports—and that with regard to the ports of the Mississippi, it only establishes this principle, that Great Britain shall always enjoy there the same privileges which by treaty or law she is allowed to have in our Atlantic ports.

I remark incidentally, for a purpose which will appear hereafter, that as far as this article is concerned, we are free to prohibit the importation into the United States at large, of any British article whatever, though we cannot prohibit its importation partially, that is, morely from her territories in our neighbourhood, by land or inland navigation; but we may prohibit the importation by [...] from those territories; [...] i [...] there any other part of the [...] this is prevented.

The remaining clauses of t [...] article [...]lish the following points: "That no duty of entry [...] by either party on pe [...]tries brought by land [...], into the respe [...]ve terri [...]ories;" that [...] with their own goods, [...]ll, [...] or duty upon them; but goods in bale [...], or other [...], unusual among Indians, shall not be con [...]idera [...] [...] their [...]; that toils and [...] paid [Page]by natives—that no duties shall be paid by either party on the mere transit of goods acress portages and carrying places from one part to another of the territory of the same party; that the respective governments will promote friendship, good neighbourhood, and amicable intercourse, by causing speedy and impartial justice to be done, and necessary protection to be extended to all who may be concerned therein.

I shall conclude this paper with an observation or two on the meaning of the terms, inland navigation. These terms have no technical meaning defined in the laws of either country, nor have they any precise meaning assigned by the law of nations. They, however, ex vi termini, exclude navigation from the sea; and as a general rule, I should say, that inland navigation begins there, where sea navigation ends. Where is this? I answer, at the ports of entry from the sea. By the laws of Great Britain and of the United States, all rivers are arms of the sea as far as the tides flow—It would be a consequence of this principle, that sea navigation would reach to the head of tide water. But some more obvious and notorious rule ought to govern the interpretation of national compacts. The ports of entry from the sea are conceived to be the proper rule.

In the case under consideration, the general spirit of the article may require, that all the waters which divide the territories of the parties should be in their whole extent common to both.—As to other communicating waters, accessible under the article, the reciprocal limit of the right will be the ports of entry from the sea. This is to be understood with the exception of the Mississippi, to the ports of which, access from the sea is granted under the qualification which has been pointed out.

CAMILLUS.

No. XI.

THE foregoing analysis of the third article, by fixing its true meaning, enables us to detect some gross errors, which have been principal sources of prejudice against it.— One of these is, that the article gives to the other party a right of access to all our ports, while it excludes us from the ports of the British [...] in our neighbourhood.—It has [Page]been clearly shown, that it gives no right of access to any one of our Atlantic ports, and that it gives only a qualified and conditional access to the ports which we may have on the Mississippi, to be regulated by the privileges at any time allowed by law or compact in our Atlantic ports, and liable to cease with the cessation of those privileges.—The charge, therefore, of want of reciprocity in this particular, vanishes, and with it all the exceptionable consequences which have been the fruit of the error. Such is the assertion of DECIUS, that a British trader may set out from Canada, traverse our lakes, rivers and waters to New York, and thence to Philadelphi [...], while we are precluded from the navigation of the St. Lawrence, and other British rivers lower than the highest ports of entry from the sea. It would be an indulgent construction of the article, not to st [...]p the British trader at Hudson, as the highest port of entry from the sea, and the boundary of inland navigation; but he could certainly have no claim of right under it, to go from New York to Philadelphia, because [...]e must necessarily go by sea to arrive at the first place, and no such permission is stipulated by the article. Such, also, is the assertion of CATO, that Great Britain is admitted to all the advantages of which our Atlantic rivers are susceptible. The rivers, upon which no part of their territory borders, and which their vessels can only approach by sea, are certainly excepted.

Another of the errors referred to, is this, that goods and merchandize may, under this article, be imported into any p [...]rt of the United States, upon the same duties as are now payable when imported by citizens of the United States, and in vessels of the United States. It has been clearly proved, that there is no pretence for this position, and that equality of duties c [...]ly applies to importations from the British territories, in our neighbourhood, by land and inland navigation.

CATO, DECIUS, and other writers against the treaty, have fallen into this strange error, and have founded upon it much angry declamation. The first, however, embarrassed in his construction, by the provision which reserves to Gr [...]t Britain the right of laying countervailing du [...]ies, endeavours to escape from it by distinguishing between goods imported for Indian trade, and those imported for other uses. Whatever may be the case with regard to the latter, the former, he is convinced, are certainly entitled to admission into our Atlantic ports, on the privileged rights of duty; though he is very naturally perplexed to see how the discrimination could be maintained in practice. But where does he find room for this distinction? Not in the provision [...] [Page]in the clause of the third article, to which he gives the interpretation, for that is directly against his distinction. The goods and merchandize, for the privileged importation of which at provides, are restricted to no particular object—have no special reference to Indian more than to other trade: on the contrary, they are expressly to be imported for "the purposes of commerce" at large; so that in the cases in which they are privileged, they are equally so, whether it be for a trade with our citizens or with Indians. The distinction therefore, only proves the embarrassment of its inventor, without solving the difficulty. A curious assertion has been made on this article of duties. It has been said, that while we are obliged to admit British goods on the same duties with those paid by our own citizens, or importation in our own vessels, Great Britain, under the right to lay, countervailing duties, may incumber us with an additional ten per cent. Can any thing be more absurd than the position, that the right to lay countervailing duties exists in a case, where there is no difference of duty to countervail? The term is manifestly a relative one, and can only operate where there is something on our side to be countervailed or counterbalanced, and in an exact ratio to it. If it be true, that a very high law character is the writer of CATO, we cannot but be surprised at such extreme inaccuracy.

Other errors, no less considerable, will appear in the progress of the examination; but it will facilitate the detection of these, and tend to a more thorough understanding of the article, to state in this place some general facts, which are material in a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the article, to the respective parties.

1st. The fur trade within our limits is, to the fur trade within the British limits, as one to seven, nearly; that is, the trade with the Indians, on the British side of the boundary line, is about seven times greater than the same trade on our side of that line. This fact is stated as the result of repeated enquiry from well informed persons for several years past. It will not appear extraordinary to those who recollect how much the Indians on our side are circumscribed in their hunting-grounds, and to what a degree they are reduced in numbers by the frequent wars, in which they have been engaged with us: while the tribes on the British side of the line are not only far more numerous, but enjoy an immense undisturbed range of wilderness. The more rapid progress of settlement on our side than on the other, will fast merease the existing disparity.

2d. Our communication with the sea is more easy, safe, and expeditious, than that of Canada, by the St. Law [...]ence. Accordingly, [Page]while our vessels ordinarily make two voyages in a year, to and from Europe, the British vessels, in the Canada trade, are, from the course of the seasons, and the nature of the navigation, confined to one voyage in a year. Though hitherto, from temporary circumstances, this difference has not made any sensible difference in the price of transportation; yet in its permanent operation, it is hardly possible that it should not give us a material advantage in the competition for the supply of European goods to a large part of Canada, especially that which is denominated Upper Canada. The city of Hudson, distant 124 miles from the city of New York, is as near to the junction of the river Cataraquy and lake Ontario, as Montreal, which last is near four hundred miles distant from the mouth of the St. Lawrence. When the canals, now in rapid execution, are completed, there will be water communication the whole way from the city of Hudson to Ontario.

3d. The supply of East India goods to Canada, is likely to be always easier and cheaper through us, than in any other way. According to the present British system, Canada is supplied through Britain. It is obvious how much the charges of this double voyage must enhance the prices of the articles, when delivered in Canada. A direct trade between the East Indies and Canada, would suppose a change in the British system, to which there are great obstacles; and even then, there are circumstances which would secure to us an advantageous competition.—It is a fact, which serves to illustrate our advantages, that East India articles, including teas, are, upon an average, cheaper in the United States than in England.

The facts demonstrate that a trade between us and the British territories in our neighbourhood, upon equal terms as to privilege, must afford a balance of advantages on our side. As to the fur trade, for a participation in one eighth of the whole, which we concede, we gain a participation in seven-eighths which is conceded to us. As to the European and East India trade, we acquire the right of competition upon equal terms of privilege with real and considerable advantages of situation.

The stipulation with regard to equal duties, was essential to the preservation of our superiority of advantages in this trade, while it would not interfere with the general policy of our regulation, concerning the difference of duties on goods imported in our own and in foreign bottoms; because the supplies which can come to us through Canada, for the reasons already given, must be inconsiderable—because, also, di [...]tance would soon coun [...], [...]n ex [...]ses of transportation, the effect of the defference of duties in our market—and because, in the [Page]last place, this difference is not very sensible, owing to the large proportion of goods which are imported in the names of our own citizens. I say nothing here of the practicability, on general grounds, of long maintaining with effect this regulation.

Is it not wonderful, considering the real state of the trade, as depending on locality, that the treaty should be charged with sacrificing the fur trade to the British? If there be any sacrifice, is it not on their side: when the fact is, that the quantity of trade in which they admit us to equal privileges is seven times greater than that in which we admit them to equal privileges?

The arguments against the treaty on this point, are not only full of falsity, but they are in contradiction with each other.

On the one hand, it is argued that our communication from the sea, with the Indian country, being much easier than by the St. Lawrence, we could furnish English goods cheaper, and of course could have continued the Indian trade in its usual channel, even from the British side of the lakes; nor could they have prevented it, without giving such disgust to the Indians, as would have made them dangerous neighbours.—On the other hand, it is argued, that from superiority of capital, better knowledge of the trade, a better established connection of customers, the British will be able to supplant us, even in our own territories, and to acquire a monopoly of the whole fur trade.

Propositions so opposite cannot all be true. Either the supposed faculty of supplying English goods cheaper, which, it is said, would give as a command of the Indian trade, even on the British side of the lakes, not in the power of the British to prevent, overbalances the advantages which are specified on the other side, or it does not—If it does not, then it is not true, that it could draw to us the trade from the British side of the lakes—If it does, then it is not true, that the British can supplant us in the trade on either side the lakes; much less that they can obtain a monopoly of it on both sides.

Besides, if it be true that the British could not prevent out trading with the Indians on their side, without giving them such disgust as to make them dangerous to their neighbours; why is it not equally true, that we could not prevent their trading with the Indians on our side, without producing a similar effect?—And if they have re [...]y a sup [...]tity of advantages, why would they not, on the principle of this argument, attract and divert the trade from us, though [...] right to [Page]trade with the Indians in each other's territories had not been stipulated?

The difficulty of restraining the Indians from trading at pleasure, is an idea well founded, as has been admitted in another place.—But there result from it, strong arguments in favor of reciprocation of privileges in the Indian trade, by treaty. One of them, its tendency to preserve peace and good understanding, has been already noticed; another arises from the consideration, that it will probably be the policy of the British to maintain larger military establishments on their frontier, than we shall think eligible on ours, which will render it proportionably more easy to them to restrain their Indians, than it will be to us to restrain ours. This greater difficulty of excuting restraints on our side, is a powerful reason for us to agree, mutually, to throw open the door.

It will not be surprising, if, upon some other occasion, the adversaries of the treaty should abandon their own ground, and instead of saying the treaty is faulty, for what it stipulates on this point, should affirm, merely that it has no merit on this account, since it only does what the disposition of the Indians would have brought about without it—But it is always a merit to divest an advantageous thing of cause of dispute, and to fix, by amicable agreement, a benefit which otherwise would be liable to litigation, opposition, and interruption.

As to relative advantages for carrying on the trade, the comparison ought to be made with caution. That which has been stated on our side, namely, greater facility in conveying the materials of the trade from Europe to the scene where it is to be carried on, is a real one, and in process of time may be expected to make itself to be felt; yet hitherto, as before observed, it has had no sensible effect.

Of the advantages which have been stated as belonging to the other side, there is but one which has substance, and this is previous possession of the ground. But even this, from the very nature of it, is temporary—With our usual enterprise and industry, it will be astonishing if we do not speedily share the ground to the full extent of our relative advantages.

As to superiority of capital, it amounts to nothing. It has been seen, that the capital requisite for the whole trade is small. From a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling would be a high statement.—The whole of this, if we were to monopolize the entire trade, could not create a moment's embarrassment to find it, in the opinion of any man who attends to the great pecuniary operations which are daily going on in our country. But that very capital which it [Page]represented as our rival, could be brought into action for our benefit in this very trade. The solution is simple. Our credit will command it in obtaining the foreign articles, necessary for the trade, upon as good terms as the British merchants who now carry it on. The same objection of superiority of capital may with as much reason be applied to any other branch of trade between us and Great Britain. Why does it not give her a monopoly of the direct trade between her European dominions and the United States? The argument, if valid, would prove that we ought to have no commerce, not only with Great Britain, but with any nation which has more commercial capital than ourselves.

As to superior knowledge of the particular branch of business, there is still less force in that argument. It is not a case of abstruse science or complicated combination. And we are in no want of persons among us, who are experimentally acquainted with the subject.

As to customers for the proceeds of the trade, we should stand upon as good a footing as the British merchants. What we did not want for our own consumption, might be sent upon equal terms to the very markets to which they send theirs; and to others which might be found preferable, because less well supplied with the kind of articles.

As to whatever may depend on enterprise, we need not fear to be out-done by any people on earth. It may almost be said, that enterprise is our element.

It has been alleged, that our trade with the Indians would be interrupted by bad seasons and occasional wars, while that of Great Britain would be steady and uniform. As to the casualties of seasons, it is evident they must fall upon Great Britain as much as upon us, unless we suppose the elements in conspiracy against us; and as to wars, the possession of the posts would essentially change our situation, and render it peculiarly advantageous for preventing or repressing hostilities; so that with equally good management, our territories would not be more exposed than the British.

But the intrigues of the British traders residing among our Indians, would excite them to hostility. It could not be the private interest of the traders to do this; because, besides being amenable to punishment, if discovered—besides, that both the traders and the Indians within our limits, by the possession of the posts, would be under our controul—wars interrupt of course the hunting of the Indians, and so destroy their means of trading.

[Page] As to Great Britain, she never could have had but one interest to prompt Indian hostilities, that was, to induce the United States to relinquish a part of their boundary. The restitution of the posts will put an end to this project. In regard to trade, she and her traders will have a common interest with us, and our traders, to keep all the Indians at peace, for the reason assigned above. This interest will be the stronger, because the best communication even with her own Indians, will be partly through our territery; and it would be impossible that it should not be impeded and interrupted by the operations of war between us and the Indians In fact, under the circumstance of common privileges, there is every possible link of common interest between us and Great Britain in the preservation of peace with the Indians.

In this question of danger to our peace by the British participation in the trade with our Indians, the difficulty of restraining the Indians from trading with whom they please (which is admitted by the argument of both sides) is a very material consideration. Would there not be greater hazard to our peace from the attempts of the British to participate in a trade from which we endeavoured to exclude them, seconded by the discontents of the Indians, than from any dispositions to supplant us, when allowed a free competition, when as cause of dissatisfaction was given to the Indians, and when it was certain, that war must interfere with their means of carrying on the trade? The security for our peace appears to be much greater in the latter, than in the former state of things.

A suspicion is also suggested, that Great Britain, without exciting war, will indirectly trammel and obstruct our trade. To objections which suppose a want of fair dealing in the other party, it is very difficult to answer. All that a treaty can do, is to establish principles which are likely to operate well, if well executed. It is no objection to its merits, that the benefits aimed at may be frustrated by ill faith. The utility of any compact between nations must presume a sincere execution. The reverse may disappoint the best conceived plan: and the security against it must be the mutual interest to perform, and the power of retaliation. If Great Britain acts with infidelity or chicanery towards us, we must retract the privileges granted on our side.

Another objection which is made, is, that while the British would have a right to reside among us, to hire houses and warehouses, and to enjoy every convenience for prosecuting the trade systematically, we should not be entitled to similar privileges with them, having only a right to pass "like pedlars [Page]with our shops upon our backs." These are the expressions of CATO.

The position is founded on that clause of the British act of navigation, which forbids any but a natural born or naturalized subject to exercise the occupation of a merchant or factor, in any of the British dominions in Asia, Africa and America.

In the first place, it is to be observed, that as far as the article under discussion is singly concerned, there is no pr [...]ence to say, that one party has greater rights as to r [...]id [...]ce than the other. If, therefore, Great Britain can prevent our citizens residing in their territories in our neighbourhood, we are free by this article to apply to them a similar exe [...]sion. And any right of residence which may be claimed under any other part of the treaty, will be temporary.

In the second place, the prohibition of residence in the act of navigation, proceeds on the ground of excluding foreigners from carrying on trade in the territories to which it extends. But the third article expressly gives us a right freely to carry on trade and commerce with the British territories on this continent, a right which necessarily includes the privilege of residing as merchants and factors. For wherever an END is granted, the usual and proper means of enjoying it, are implied in the grant. Residence is a usual and necessary mean of freely carrying on trade. Without it, the right to trade becomes essentially nugatory. This reasoning has peculiar force in relation to inland trade. And it agrees with decisions at common law, and with the opinion of Lord Coke, who tells us that "of an house for habitation an alien merchant may take a lease for years, as incident to commerce; for without habitation be cannot merchandize or trade." This, among other things, he informs us, was resolved by all the judges assembled for that purpose, in the case of sir James Crost, in the reign of queen Elizabeth; and we learn from it, that the right to hire houses and warehouses is derived from the right to trade, as its incident. The same principle, in t [...], has been recognized in other cases.

The whole of the article is an innovation upon the British act of navig [...]tion. Being abrogated as to the principal thing, there is no difficulty in supposing it so as to incidents; on the other hand, to pretend to exclude us from the right of residence, could not be deemed a fair execution of the article. Hence we find, that the want of reciprocity in this particular, also fails, and with it the supposed disadvantage on our side in the supposed competition for the trade.

CAMILLUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

RESOLUTIONS Unanimously agreed to, at a general Meeting of the Citizens of South Carolina, in Christ Church Parish, on Friday, the 24th of July, 1795, convened for the Purpose of discussing the impending Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.

RESOLVED, That this meeting do lighly approve of the conduct of their fellow citizens in Charleston, in opposing the impending treaty between Great Britain and the United States, and do most heartily concur in the report of their committee on that subject.

Resolved, That the chairman of this meeting do transmit this proceeding to John Mathews, Esq chairman of the meeting in Charleston.

JOSHUA TOOMER, Chairman.

Baltimore Address.
To the President of the United States.

WE, the undersigned citizens of the United States, inhabitants of Baltimore town, beg leave respectfully to represent, that the treaty lately negociated with Great Britain, and announced to us through the public prints, has excited in our minds the most serious apprehension and alarm for the interest and safety of our commerce, the rights of our fellow citizens, and the dignity of our government. Under these impressions, convinced as we are, of your unremitting concern for the interest and happiness of America, we think it our duty to disclose to you, freely, our sentiments on the subject, lest our silence might be interpreted into an approval of the act, and to prevent, as far as the influence of our opinions may operate, a ratification of it.

A treaty that professes to establish a firm, lasting, and inviolable peace, and sincere friendship between the contracting parties, without referring to their respective complaints, and as far as may be, removing them, wants that evidence of a pacific [Page]disposition which is necessary to give it effect; and leaves room for doubts and jealousies incompatible with its object:— In this respect, the treaty with Great Britain appears essentially defective: our complaints are not redressed, nor is such effectual provision made for removing them, as might have been under every circumstance of the case; and which justice and good faith required should have been made.—Our territory and frontier posts, the subject of frequent reclamation, and held in riolation of a former treaty, are to be surrendered at an unnecessarily distant period—a remote hope of recovery, after much expense and perplexity in the usual mode of legal proceedings, and much injury from the depreciation of their capitals, is the only compensation procured for our suffering merchauts, who have been unjustly depreived of their property in the prosecution of a fair trade; nor has any effectual provision been made to remedy the evil or prevent future spoliations of our commerce, under like frivolous pretexts.—No restitution whatever is made or contemplated to be made, for a large amount of property, carried off from the southern states, contrary to the late treaty of peace.—Our seamen, citizens of the United States, arbitrarily and unjustly take from our ships and detained on board British ships of war are not restored; nor is any security contemplated against future aggressions of the same kind. Proper concessions on these points, and provisions of adequate remedy for these evils, would have been indicative of a just and friendly disposition, and ought, we conceive, to have accompanied the act of ratification.

But we have other objections to the treaty. It contemplates an inconsistent establishment or colony of men within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, enjoying some of the most important privileges of citizens, but exempt from the burdens, and owing no allegiance to its government. Many mischiefs, we conceive, might result from such an establishment; among which, from the evident want of reciprocity, in the advantages of navigation ceded in the lakes, and other western waters, may justly be apprehended, the monopoly of a lucrative fur trade, by this description of settlers. From the admission of British ships to be the carriers of our bulky products, on terms of perfect equality with our own, we anticipate a material loss in the value of our shipping; and consequently, a great injury to a numerous class of people employed in ship-building, and in the manufacture of cordage, iron, and other articles, necessary to this extensive branch of business; and we fear what is contemplated as an equivalent for this important sacrifice, will not be found such in fact.

[Page] We cannot view but with the most lively concern and regret, that article of the treaty, which authorizes the seizure of enemies' property in neutral ships. This is a cession of vast importance to America as a trading nation. Situate as she is, remote from the powers of Europe; pacific in the temper and disposition of her citizens, and in the principles of her government; she is not likely to be embroiled in wars. The advantages, then, that would result from her being the carrier of property for the contending nations, are too evident to require elucidation, and too important to be given up without an equivalent. The principle of free ships making free goods has been formally acknowledged by the government of the United States to other neutral powers, when she was engaged in war—It has been granted to her by treaties with different nations: it has long been contended for, and has been acknowledged by several of the respectable powers of Europe. By giving up this point, to a nation so frequently engaged in wars, we give our consent to the most vexatious and injurious restrictions on our commerce, and of our national rights as a neutral nation, without any thing that can be called an equivalent.

America is not in a condition, to benefit by the apparent reciprocity in this article of the treaty; nor likely soon to be in a situation that will require it.

We have doubts of the policy, on our part, of agreeing to that article which precludes the United States from entering into treaties, inconsistent with some of its provisions, whereby America would be prevented from a renewal of her beneficial treaties, existing with the French Republic, and other European powers; and from making such other treaties at any future period, as may be deemed adviseable.

To enumerate minutely, the many evils which may be apprehended from a treaty, so partial and unequal in is provisions, and wherein man [...] of our just complaints are entirely unnotic [...]d, would be unnecessarily trespassing on your time; and to point out defects which we are persuaded will not have escaped your notice. We, therefore, content ourselves with the observations we have already made; adding only, that we retain the most grateful remembrance of your steady, enlightened patriotism, which has saved our republic from impending ruin, on many memorable occasions; and that we look to you as our only hope of deliverance from the evils we anticipate in an adoption of the proposed treaty; earnestly entreating you to with-hold the sanction of your name, from a compact evidently so unjust, and so derogatory to the interest and dignity of America.

[Page]

Morris County Proceedings.
Resolutions, Petition and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of Morris County, (New Jersey) respecting the pending Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.

ON August 5th, 1795, a respectable number of people, from various parts of the county, met together in Morris Town, by previous notice, for the purpose of considering whether it would not be expedient to call a general meeting of the county, in order to deliberate upon the treaty of commerce, &c. pending between the United States and Great Britain, and to take the sense of the people, then assembled, on sa [...]d treaty.

The treaty was read, a number of forcible objections were made to it, and it was agreed, one voice dissenting, that a general meeting of the county should be called on Saturday the 15th instant. A committe of nine was appointed, and requested to draw up such address to the president of the United States, as would be most suitable to the occasion, to be presented at the ensuing meeting, for the approbation of the people. The moderator and clerk were requested to give notice of said meeting by advertisements in the county, and in the Newark and Elizabeth Town papers.

Agreeably to the aforesaid notice, on August 15th, the people assembled at the court house of the county, and proceeded to elect a moderator and clerk; the treaty was read and considered— objections were stated, and no reply was made in contradiction to them: the committee then handed forward their report, which was read and considered, and is as follows.—

The committee previously appointed for taking into consideration the treaty of commerce, &c. between the United States and Great Britain, as agreed t [...] their respective ministers, report the following resolution [...] proper to be adopted on the present occasion.—

Resolved, That it is the duty of the citizens of these States to watch with a jealous eye, and carefully to guard against every attempt to destroy and infringe the right [...] liberties, and privileges of the good people of this coun [...] which they have recently obtained at the expense of so [...]uch blood and treasure; whether such attempt to wrest them from us, be by an open and avowed act of violence, or by the insidious arts of our enemies, or by the corrupted or misguided judgement of considential or professed friends.

[Page] Resolved, That, in discharge of this duty, and in the exercise of the privilege of freemen and friends to the liberties of our country, the moderator of this meeting do, in the name and behalf of the people of this county, at their county meeting assembled, as soon as possible, subscribe, and transmit to the president of the United S [...]ates, the substance of the following remonstrance and petition.

To the President of the United States of America.
The Petition and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of the County of Morris, in New Jersey,

Sheweth—

THAT your petitioners having maturely considered the treaty of amity, navigation, and commerce, proposed [...] be established between these United States and Great Brit [...], do humbly conceive the same is not founded on those principle of equal justice and reciprocity, that ought to be the basis of all national contracts, and which alone can lay a lasting and permanent foundation for mutual satisfaction and peace betw [...] the two countries.

We apprehend it would be an unnecessary intrusion on the time and patience of the president, to enumerate and state, p [...] ticularly, all the objections that occur in reading and considering this extraordinary diplomatic instrument, especially as the m [...] of them have been designated, and as we are informed, been already presented to the president from various parts of the continent.

We cannot, however, but observe in general, that the argument urged by the advocates of the treaty appears to [...]s [...] founded, viz, That the unequal concessions and sacrifices made therein by America to Great Britain, are the necessary price of peace with her. If this position were true, it remains a doubt whether the price would not far exceed the purchase. We would farther observe, that on the ratification of this treaty, we have no other security for the delivery of the western p [...] in June, 179 [...] than we had for the evacuation of them with all convenient speed, as stipulated in the treaty of peace of 1783. But suppose they were actually given up, agreeable to treaty, what do we obtain thereby but the privilege, if it may be called one, of keeping garrisons there at our own expense; wh [...], by [...]he ag [...]eement, the British have the entire [Page]monopoly of the fur trade, and that through our territory; with this singular advantage of keeping a colony of British subjects within our jurisdiction, not bearing allegiance to our government, which, to our frontier settlement, may be of more serious consequences than at first view is apprehended; and who can say that an insurrection like the one lately suppressed in Pennsylvania, among such privileged subjects of Great Britain, would not terminate in an open rupture with their sovereign? Nor do we conceive, that we shall by this treaty be more secure in our commerce than neutral vessels were by the law of nations under the recognition of our independence; nor can we extend our credulity in the faith of that nation so far, as to suppose that our naval commerce will be less abridged by them, or our seamen less exposed to insult than heretofore, unless we wholly relinquish all trade with her enemies a [...]ndall others, where it may interfere with her interest. But we ought to remember, that the nation which will suffer her honor to be insulted, or her natural rights to be invaded with impunity, will not long have either the one or the other to lose.

If the horrors of war, which we sincerely deprecate, are to be set in competition with the loss of our natural rights and privileges, we are not able to distinguish the advantages to be derived from a treaty which submits them, rather than to have them taken from us without. The latter seems to us preferable; as in that case, whenever we thought fit and proper, and circumstances were favorable, we might assert our right without being stared in the face by a treaty that had previously resigned them. Besides, stipulations so manifestly unjust and unequal (though the temper and circumstances of the moment may procure a ratification) will not fail to be a continued source of dissatisfaction and complaint, and produce mutual infractions of the treaty, and most probably will accelerate rather than retard hostilities between the contracting parties.

From our present view of this [...]ct, and with a sincere desire to serve and promote the best [...]est of our country, in full confidence that the president of the United States will exercise that prudence and precaution with which his command and exalted administration has ever been distinguished, we intreat that he will at least suspend the final ratification of the said treaty with Great Britain, until the people of the United States shall assemble in congress by their representatives, and by them be advised on a matter so interesting and important.

No objections being offered against the above report, it was Unanimously resolved, That the people do approve of said report, and enjoin it upon the moderator of this meeting to [Page]perform the resolution, therein contained, of having the same speedily conveyed to the president of the United States.

It was then moved and

Resolved, without a dissenting voice, as the sense of the meeting, That the gratitude and applause of the people of the United States are justly due to those members of the senate who voted against the ratification of the said treaty, and also, that the particular thanks of this meeting are hereby acknowledged to S. T. Mason, one of the senators from Virginia, who first publicly disclosed the aforesaid act, which is pregnant with consequences the most interesting to every class of citizens of this country.

By order of the Meeting, ALEX. CARMICHAEL, Moderator.

WILLIAM CAMPFIELD, Clerk.

Remarks on the VIIth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty.
Extract of a Letter from Virginia, dated August 14, to a Gentleman in the City of Philadelphia.

EVERY time I read the treaty, new objections occur, or old ones penetrate deeper into the subject. Did you ever observe the effect of the latter clause of the 7th article, as it asserts a claim on the part of the United States against France for whatever shall be paid under it to Great Britain? In Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Genet, he says "Unless vessels captured as the 7th article states, shall be restored, if the United States make compensation for them, they will consider the sums paid as autho [...]ing a claim on the part of the United States against France." It is remembered, that Genet asserted a right on the part of France, to arm privateers in our ports, under the French treaty. This dispute has never been adjusted between the United States and France; when then the treaty surrenders to Great Britain an equivalent for the captures made by French vessels, in order to charge France with the amount of that equivalent, not to apprize our friend and ally, that such a circumstance was meditated before it was agreed to, is an unjust procedure towards France, and tends to involve us in a disagreeable altercation with that nation.

[Page]

Proceedings at Trenton.

Trenton, August 20th, 1795.

AS various misrepresentations have already been made respecting the vote taken at the town meeting, held at the state-house in Trenton, on Thursday the 13th inst. and though the account thereof [See page 128.] so far as it goes, contains the truth; yet not the whole truth, it is deemed proper to publish the following as a true and incontrovertible statement of the proceedings which took place with regard to the resolution adopted at the meeting.—

At a numerous and respectable meeting of the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, assembled on the 13th August, at the state-house,

Aaron Woodruff in the chair,

General Frederick Frelinghuysen, one of the senators of this state in the congress of the United States, attended, and, at the request of the citizens present, consented to give his sentiments on the treaty pending between the United States and Great Britain.

The following resolution was then moved by the Rev. Mr. Armstong, and seconded by Mr. C. st

"Resolved, That this meeting have the s [...]llest confidence in the honor, virtue and integrity of the said Frederick Frelinghuysen —that this meeting are fully of opinion, that in voting for said treaty, he acted on the purest principle of patriotism; and that the thanks of this meeting be given to him, for the candor with which he has stated the reasons which induced him to vote for the said treaty."

This resolution was objected to by Mr. Mott and Mr. Throckmorton, upon the principle, that it might be deemed by the public as an implied contradiction [...]o the vote of the former town meetings, disapproving of the said treaty—which contradiction it was evident this meeting did not mean to make; that all that was intended, was to acquit Gen. Frelinghuysen of the implication (which, it was conceived, had been conveyed by the resolution of the former town meeting) of a want of independence, integrity, and patriotism; and so far, and no farther, was this meeting willing to go.

It was answered by Mr. R. Stockton, that nothing more was meant or intended; and that, from a view of the resolution, it could not possibly be taken to be a contradiction of the vote of the former meetings, in disapprobation of the treaty.— [Page]Mr. Craft, in particular, declared, that if he could imagine that it could be construed in any manner to contradict the vote of the former meeting, he should hardly have been so inconsistent with himself as to have seconded the motion; and that he would still vote against it with all his heart; for that Gen. Frelinghuysen had not convinced him that he was wrong; and he believed that every person present remained of his former opinion—but he did not think the resolution carried the implication held up—it went no further than to acquit the General of an imputation (which nobody ever meant to make) that he had voted for the treaty under an undue or improper influence.

In reply, it was observed, that if nothing more was intended, there could be no reason against stating the resolution in such terms as to avoid all doubt about the meaning.

But it was insisted on by Mr. R. Stockton, and several others, that the question should be put upon the resolution a [...] it stood.

The question was accordingly put by the chairman, and lost by a very large majority.

Whereupon it was moved by Mr. Throckmorton, and seconded by Mr. Craft, that the resolution be amended so as to read as follows, viz.

Resolved (without reference to the merits of the said treaty) that this meeting have the fullest confidence in the honor, virtue and integrity of the said Frederick Frelinghuysen—that this meeting are fully of opinion that in voting for the said treaty, he was actuated by the purest principles of patriotism, and that the thanks of this meeting be given to him, for the candor with which he has stated the reasons which induced him to vote for the said treaty.

And the question being put upon the resolution, as amended, it was agreed to.

After this statement of facts (which no person of candor can contradict) the public are left to judge of the truth of the representations which have been made, with regard to the proceedings of the meeting; and what would have become of the only vote that the friends of the treaty thought proper to attempt, had it not been for the conciliating disposition manifestly discovered by two or three of the very persons most strenuously opposed to the treaty, of which description of persons, it is believed, there was a majority of four to one.

[Page]

PROCEEDINGS AT TRENTON.

Trenton, August 20.

WHEREAS at a general town-meeting of the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, convened at the state-house, on Wednesday the 29th July, 1795, pursuant to public notice given, "for the purpose of taking into consideration measures proper to be pursued upon the subject of the pending treaty between Great Britain and the United States," it was, among other things, unanimously resolved, "That it is the constitutional right and patriotic duty of the citizens of the United States, to express, on every important occasion, the public sense of public measures." It was further resolved (without a dissenting voice) "that it is at this time, in a peculiar manner, the bounden duty of every friend to his country, to express the public opinion upon an instrument, so extraordinary and momentous in its nature as the treaty of amity, navigation and commerce, lately projected between lord Grenville, on the part of Great Britain, and John Jay, envoy extraordinary, on the part of the United States; —degrading to the national honor —dangerous to the public interest—and destructive of the agricultural and commercial views of the United States."—It was further resolved (without a dissenting voice) "That the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, having heard a full discussion upon the subject of the treaty, do, upon the most cool and dispassionate consideration, disapprove of the said treaty, and hope, by this public expression of their sentiments, to prevent, as far as possible, its ratification by our Supreme Executive." And whereas a publication has appeared in the New Jersey State Gazette of last Tuesday,* insinuating to the world, that the said resolutions were not adopted at a general town-meeting; and testifying, that the subscribers to the said publication "did not concur in, and did not approve of, the said resolutions; and declaring their entire satisfaction and confidence in the constituted authorities, and their determination to acquiesce in such measures as have been, or might be finally adopted, relative to the said treaty, by such constituted authorities," thereby casting a necessary implication, that those persons who attended the said town-meeting, and concurred in the said resolutions, would not submit to such measures of government as might be finally adopted, with regard to the said treaty.

NOW, WE, the subscribers, citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, while we lament that, on an occasion of this nature, means should have been taken to prevail on unguarded individuals to unite in that public testimonial, contrary to their [Page]known sentiments—DO, in this public manner, declare and make known to the world, that we conceive it to be a right established and confirmed to us by the constitution, peaceably to assemble together and make a public expression of our sentiments on all public measures; a right which ought to be relinquished by freemen, only with their lives. And, WE DO ALSO thus publicly testify and declare our concurrence in, and entire approbation of the said resolutions of the general town meeting of the citizens of Trenton and its vicinity, herein before stated, with regard to the pending treaty: But while we are making this public declaration of our sentiments, as well with [...]gard to our interest and constitutional rights, as with regard to the s [...]d treaty, we do in the same manner declare to the world, as we have heretofore uniformly done, that we shall consider it our duty, and the duty of every good citizen and friend to his country, to acquiesce in such constitutional measures as may be finally adopted, by our representatives, not only with regard to the present treaty, but all other the acts and doings of government.

Moore Furman

James Mott

Joseph Milnor

Joseph Brearly

Randle Rickey

Gershom Craft

J. W. Vancleve

Smid. Hill

Ell [...]t Howel

John Potts

Jeremiah Woolsey

J. Bellenjean

George Henry

Joseph Butler

Nathan Wright

Joseph Brumley

David Snowden

Henry Drake

Joseph Disorow

Edward Baker

Barzilla Braman

Joseph Cowell

James South

Peter Brown

Obadiah Howell, junior

Jonathan Cook

Robert Beatty

John Parks

Joseph Wiggins

Edward B [...]me

John Mu [...]

David M [...]an

[...]njamin Hibbs

Absalom Hay

J. Sumption

John Hay

Thomas Hall

Zebulon Chambers

Frederick Long

John Crone

James James

Jacob Herbert

John D. Pinkerton

George Jobs

Will [...]m Baber

Anthony Cook

William S. Moore

David Taylor

Paul Haughey

John Hughes

George Miller, junior

John Deppold

Jos. Davis

John Tucker

William Gran

R. W. Furman

John Morton

Benjamin Laurence

James Kirkpatrick

Joseph Palmer

James Hankinson

Israel Hart

Nicholas Rednor

Jos. McCreight

Nicholas Ju [...]s

John James

Benjamin Vancleve

Joseph L. Bascom

Richard Throckmor [...]o [...]

Thomas Atkinson

Jonathan Bryant

William Tindall

Joseph Morgan

John Rozell, junior

Aaron Howell

Samuel Taylor

E. H. Gordon

Edmund Burk

John McCollum

Flisha Cook

Ezekiel Howell

Jesse Roscow

Lewis Morford

Mildred Priest

Richard Hankins

David Wrighter

Job Moore

Ephraim T. Silver

Robert Alexander

John Cox

John Brown

Robert Russell

Ephraim Howell

Amos Howell

Francis Clacker

Robert Hos [...]er

Robert McN [...]el [...]

Lewis Evans

T [...]o [...]h [...] Tit [...]

[Page] David Rhea

Aaron Dollas

Asher Co [...]nan

Daniel Carp enter

Robert Chapman

Peter Merthor

[...]manuel Coryell, junior

George Fly

Matthias Day

John Wiggins

William Dougl [...]ss

John Merris

Michael Bettenger, junior

William Potts

John Moody

Joseph Jeakins junior

John Sutterly

Thomas Scott

Thomas Yard

James Phillips

George Beatty

Ralph Hart

John Sanderland

Asher Hart

Raiph Hart, junior

Asher Temple

Benjamin Hart, junior

Joseph Mathes

Iaac Morford

James Bowen

Jesse Burrows

John Water

Benjam'n Yard

John Dean

William Cannon

John Can [...]pheil

John Yare

Henry Hany

John Keenes

David Waters

John Taylor

Joab Mershon

Francis Witt

Erael Hunt

[...]iah Smith

Samuel Cook

Richard Hudnut

Joseph Tindall

John Paradise

Samuel Cornell

John Campbell

John Maxwell

James Conlon

John Lawrence

John Hunt, janor

Robert Updike

John Clann

Thomas Ashmore

Phillip M Laughlin

Abraham Voerneis

Robert Heming

Robert Shaw

Barni [...] Hagaman

James Mattrus, junior

Wilson Appleton

Thomas Britton

Richard Brown

Miles Donavan

Alexander M'Cloud

John Clunn, junior

John Howell

Samuel Beakes

Samuel Titus

John Drake, semior

John Vancleve (major)

Jos. Moor

Timothy Hart

Patrick Dougherty

Rynler Quick

Alexander Smith

Thomas Claridge

Jethro Yard

John Coleman

Stephen Fricker

Phineas Atkinson

John Felter

Josiah Ferrers

Thoma [...] Clarke

Joseph Moore

Peter Nevius, junior

Nathaniel Temple

Benjamin Hendrickson

Elijah Hendrickson

Jacob Dean

Benja. Hendrickson, jun.

Samuel Lanning

Joseph Lanning

Israel Hendrickson

Jacob Hendrickson

Henry Drake (capt.)

Andrew Stout

John Hunt

Ralph Hunt

Augustine Moore

Foster Hart

Benjamin Merrill

William Merrill

Richard Tobin

Henry Reed

Jenathan Muithead

Joseph M'Cully

Nathaniel Burrough,

Thomas Wiggins

Aaron Hart

Charle; Willing

Charle, Holi

Andrew Titus

George Simmins

Jacob Hise

Richard Hudnut

Andrew Hoff

Cornelius Hoff

John Marshall

Andrew Smith

Amos Hart

Job Phillips

Albermarle Collins

Septimus Evans

Joseph Gee

Enoch Anderson

Jeremiah Buzhart

Lott Howell

James Hooper

Robert Mannington

Edmund Conner

Robert Reves

James Thompson

John Phillips

John Stephens

Job Rozell

Job Cook

Aaron Cook

Samuel Coal [...]

David Hutchinson

Jonathan Hutchinson,

Samuel Moore

James Rogers

Hezekiah Smith

Peter Frankford

Ellett Tucker

James Saltar

Samuel Pinkerton

Micajah Hart

Jacob Wycoff

Isaac Brearly

George C. Maxwell

John Vandegriit

John Morris, junior

Henry Jones

Zepheniah Ph [...]er

Cooper Atkinson

Michael Becknell

John Carpenter

Richard Hunt

David Dye

John Bell

Robert Fagans

John Cubberl [...]

William Foor [...]

John Appleto [...]

John Wiligus

Thomas Butch [...]r

David Cubberty

Alexander Ma [...]r

[Page] Abel Appleton

Robert Nelson

John Walton

Exra Taylor

Andrew Bowne

Jacob Minton

John Phares

William Napton

Amos Hutchinson

Jacob Stelle

Obadiah Eldridge

Samuel Stout

George Britton

Elijah Applegate

Isaac Tindall

Robert Carson

Gilbert Covenhoven

Robert Phares

William Appleton

Matthias Musgrove

Robert Cunningham

Richard Bainbridge

George Smith

Barnt De Klyn

George Anderson

George Anderson, junior

Jabez Ashmore, junior

Daniel Denny

Daniel Hartupe

Ely Anderson

Noah Howell

Benjamin Jones

Nathaniel Moore

Jabez Ashmore

John Pinkerton

Cornelius Bowne

William Walton

William Erwine

Andrew Rowan

Humphrey Fagan

Ephraim Welsh

RESOLUTIONS Adopted at a numerous and respectable Meeting of the Citinuns of Powhatan, at their Court-House, on Tuesday the 21st Day of July, 1795, for the Purpose of taking into Consideration [...] Proceedings of Gentlemen of Neighbouring Counties, ass [...] at our Court-House, on Saturday, the 4th Instant, in [...] quence of the Troop of Horse belonging to the Brigode being [...] dered to assemble there:—

IT is represented to us, that on the aforesaid meeting, [...] tain illiberal and unmerited censures were exhibited, in a public and formal manner, by a man not of the county, a men [...] stranger, against certain officers of the federal government, ba [...] in a particular and pointed manner against the president of the United States; in order, therefore, to express our diffent and disapprobation, and moreover to disclaim all political counestion with men of the foregoing description, and to avert th [...] [...]odium that must necessarily result from an acquiescence to such measures—We have assembled, and do

RESOLVE—That, In the name of the county, we point [...] ly and unequivocally disavow such sentiments, in as much [...] they tend to the destruction of that confidence which [...] good citizen ought to havé in government, and to the alie [...] tion of their affections from the officers thereof, who, particularly the president, will continue to share our warmest affection so long as the prosperous situation of government evinces th [...] wisdom of their deliberations.

That, Every attempt to alienate the affections of the people from the officers of government, is an open violation of g [...] [Page]order, and cannot be justified by any, whose situation and circumstances in life, would make it their interest to prefer order and government to anarchy and confusion.

That, We cannot help expressing our astonishment at the want of delicacy in gentlemen attempting to sow the seeds of anarchy in a country where they are not inhabitants, among people too, who are as remarkable for their attachment to order and good government, as for their abhorrence to every measure calculated for its destruction.

That, The spirit for disorganization, which at present so strongly features the turbulent, has united, and deserves the united disapprobation of, all good patriots.

That the president, though neither unerring in his judgment nor omnipotent in his execution; for his firmness, virtue, and wisdom, which calculate him for the meridian of a republic— deserves our esteem, regard, and warmest applauses; and whilst we disdain to adore him as a Deity, with equal reluctance would we with-hold his tribute, and wish to canonize him as the father of his country.

That, It is the firm and unbiassed opinion of this assembly, that the president never has, by mal-administration, or misrule in government, incurred a forfeiture of the esteem and affections of his fellow citizens; but, on the contrary, that his public and private life are both superior to stricture.

That, It is the sense of this meeting, that the character of the president, cannot be aided by eulogies, but only requires for its support, investigation.

On a motion being made and seconded,

Resolved, That the proceedings of this day be published.

BRETT RANDOLPH, Chairman.

JOSIAH SMITH, Secretary.

PROTEST.

BEFORE the notary in the jurisdiction of Jeremie, there dwelling in the parish of St. Louis, island of St. Domingo, in the West Indies, under-written in presence of the witnesses hereafter named, who have signed the same—

Was present in person, Mr. Samuel Oshorne, captain of the sloop Friendship, of New York, at anchor in this road this fortnight, and on his departure and return; assisted by Mr. Thomas Praderes, interpreter of the English language in this [Page]town, whose requisite oath we have provided ourselves with; who told us,

That, at half past two o'clock in the afternoon of this day, the boat of the ship Regulus, at anchor this morning in this road, came on board of his vessel, commanded by an officer of the said ship, and took out of the said vessel the following men;

David Murcie, master;

Thomas Dick, negro man;

William Bennet, negro man;

Thomas Danny, negro man.

That he has no more on board of his vessel than the cook and a lame sailor.

That this exaction becomes so much the more disadvantageous to him, as he has no more men; and that the approaching season, subject to violent storms, exposes his vessel to the greatest dangers.

That he does not suppose that this exaction may be authorized; and that in all cases, for the security of his owners, and all those whom it may concern, and for any cause that may arise by reason whereof, he is desirous of making this his authentic declaration.

Wherefore, as much in his name individually, as in the name of his owners. Messrs. C. C. Westphal and Co. and of all others whom it may concern, he makes here all protestations resulting, and which may result from the exaction which has been committed on board of his vessel on those white and black sailors, and still from all losses, charges, damages, and interests which he bears and may bear; intending to sue Thomas Oakes, captain of the said ship, and any one it may concern; besides reserving to himself all his rights, reasons, actions, and pretensions, in order that they may be made use of when proper, and in the manner specified by the laws and ordinances which may relate to this matter, and especially in case the sloop should be lost.

This present declaration being read, and explained by the interpreter to the captain, he has acknowledged it to be true and sincere; so the interpreter told us.

Done and transacted at Jeremic, in our office, the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, and the fourteenth of July, at four o'clock, P M. in presence of Delassaux and Chinon, merchants, living in this town, known and requisite witnesses.

[Page] The parties have signed with us, notary, after a second perusal and explanation of this present declaration.

SAMUEL OSBORNE,

PRADERES,

DELASSAUX,

CHINON,

LEPINE, Notary.

§

Newport, August 2, 1795.

SIR,

THE following is a copy of a letter I received from Captain Home, of his Britannic Majesty's ship Africa, which I take the most early opportunity of forwarding to your Excellency, having the honor to be, with due respect and esteem,

Your Exceelency's most obedient, and very humble servant, THOMAS W. MOORE.

His Excellency Arthur Fenner, Esquire, Governor and Commander in Chief of the State of Rhode Island.

§

Africa, off Rhode Island, 31st July, 1795.

SIR,

I DID expect to have the pleasure of seeing you on board the Africa; but as that is not the case, I am obliged to send an officer to you, under the present circumstances, and to desire that you will lay my letter before the governor, or other chief magistrate of the island, which is to contain these several requests:—

First, that there may be delivered up to me, immediately, an officer who was taken on board a British sloop, while in Newport, and consined on board the French frigate now in Rhode Island; these violent proceedings being contrary to the law of all nations in a neutral port.

In the second place, that you may receive the aid of the civil power in this island, to send on board the Africa all British [Page]or others, who have been captured in any vessels, and set at liberty in these states; not a feigned and pretended aid, but such as our nation has a right to expect from the United States: And 3dly,

That I may be permitted to buy such refreshments as my ship's company are in need of; and that in case I send my own boats on shore, my people and officers shall not be liable to in [...]ts from any of the inhabitants, or others, of whatever description; and to represent in plain terms to the governor, that if my officer who carries this letter, or any other officer or people whom I may send upon these just and lawful occasions, receive from any one individual, whether of the nature of a mob or otherwise, any affront or insult, I WILL IMMEDIATELY COME IN WITH HIS MAJESTY's SHIP UNDER MY COMMAND, AND PROTECT MY OWN PEOPLE: and further, that if the government or states here, are, in such cases as I have mentioned, guilty of such a breach of neutrality, I will then look upon myself in the same manner, as not bound to observe the neutrality of these ports; and I am resolved to be treated in the same manner in all respects, whatever, as they do those of the French Republic.

And I am the more plain in the nature of my present demands, as I have received a hint, that if I send my people on shore, while the Medusa lies at Newport, that they will be considered as spies. In this case I want to spy nothing; I am in full possession of every intelligence regarding that ship, which I want to be possessed of.

And I require a written answer from the governor of Rhode Island to these demands, and that, without loss of time.

I am, &c. R. HOME.

Thomas Wm. Moore, Esquire, his Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Rhode Island.

Notes

*

This uncertainty, it is to be observed, results not from the late treaty, but from the treaty of peace. It is occasioned by its being unknown, whether any part of the Mississippi extends far enough north, to be intersected by a due west line from the lake of the Woods.

↵

*

An example of this is sound in the state of New York. Foreign vessels can only enter and malade at the city of New York: vessels of the United States may [...]ter at the [...]ty of Hudson, and unlade there and at [...]l [...]y.

↵

*

See page 127.

↵

§

§

§

[Page]

[No. IV.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET [...]

—OCTOBER 1, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. CATO, No. VIII. Page 219

2. —No. IX. Page 223

3. —No. X. Page 229

4. —No. XI. Page 234

5. —No. XII. Page 239

6. —No. XIII. Page 244

7. Camillus, No. XII. Page 253

8. —No. XIII. Page 263

9. —No. XIV. Page 269

10.—No. XV. Page 278

11. Governor Fenner's Reply to the British Vice Consul's Note enclosing Captein Home's Letter Page 287

12. President's Revocation of the British Vice Consul's Authority Page 288

[Page]

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 174.]

No. VIII.

THE article relative to the trade of India, is in itself of too little moment to require much of our attention. The fact, with respect to that trade, is, that as the merchandizes carried to India consist of commodities which the European nations cannot conveniently supply, together with money and necessaries for refitting their ships: As the proceeds of these cargoes are employed in purchasing India goods from the factors of the European nation at whose port we trade, there is a clear prosit in admitting us freely to their ports, and thereby rendering such ports the entrepots between the United States and India. Should one nation only do this, and the others exclude us, the one that admitted our vessels, would thereby acquire a double prosit; first, upon the India goods sold to us; second, upon the sale of the commodities we brought them. This is so well understood by all the European nations that have establishments in India, that our vessels are freely admitted into their ports (a very few excepted, that have a monopoly of a particular commodity) and France has put our trade with hers upon the most favorable footing. The restrictions in the treaty have thus narrowed, instead of enlarging, our advantages in trading to the British factories; but as all the others are open to us, she will be compelled to receive us or lose our commerce; and as her ports afford no peculiar advantage, neither the one nor the other merits our attention: the article, as far as it goes, is not good; but one can hardly call it bad, when connected with the rest of the treaty; the deficiency of grace in a single feature does not attract our notice, when the whole face is strikingly deformed.

I proceed now to examine the effect of the treaty upon the commerce of this country when Britain shall be at war. It will be admitted, that the nature of our government, and our situation, remote from the polities and interests of ambitious powers in Europe, will enable us for the most part to live in peace. It will also be admitted, that a maritime nation that cultivates peace, may add greatly to her commerce and navigation, if [Page]she can carry on her trade with the belligerent powers, while theirs is diminished by the conflict. In order to do this, it is essentially necessary, that she should be able to make the powers at war respect her flag, and the rights of neutrality.

With this view, therefore, commercial nations have always endeavored by treaty, to protect their commerce from the interruptions which the principles of the old law of nations (now indeed sufficiently exploded) afforded either of the belligerent powers a pretence to interpose. In looking back thro' the treaties which the nations of Europe have for one hundred and fifty years past formed, with a view to this object, we find principles laid down and established by them, in these respects totally different from the rules which the writers on the law of nations, borrowing their maxims from barbarous ages, have recorded. For it should be remembered, that the law of nations is no written code, but a collection of those principles which govern the conduct of civilized nations, with respect to each other; which principles can only be collected from their practice, and the theory established by their treaties: and as the laws of a community are calculated to promote the interest of the members of that community, and are repealed or go into disuse when they are found not to answer this purpose, so the laws of nations also change with their refinements and civilization. If, therefore, a man were to look into the laws of any ancient state, he would find many things that would appear to him absurd, and contrary to humanity, which still maintained their place in the statute book. Thus in England, be would find the trial by Battle Laws against Witchcraft, and a variety of ridiculous local customs, which would greatly shoc [...] his feelings, until he was told that all this trash had gone into disuse, though the laws were never formally repealed.

So, in looking into the writings upon the laws of nations, be would find attempts upon the common rights of humanity, upon the independence of neutral nations, justified by the maxims of writers, who, for the most part, are pedants that reverence antiquity, and make no allowance for the change that the increased commerce and intercourse of nations have occasioned. Thus Vattel, to justify the capture of vessels going to a blockaded port, tells us, that Demetrius, about two thousand years ago, hung the pilot and mariners of a vessel that carried provisions to Athens, which he had blockaded. The writers on the laws of nations in Algiers, could justify their practice by more recent and valid precedents But when we look into the practice of nations, we find that their sentiments, expressed in all their treaties, for a series of years, have refuted [Page]these opinions, and established a code more consonant to reason and humanity. To strengthen those laws, is peculiarly the duty and interest of a nation, that will probably be seldom engaged in a war, and always deeply interested in the freedom of commence and navigation. As far back, therefore, as the year 1630, and ever since, I find the commercial nations declaring by treaty, what shall be considered as contraband, and limiting this strictly to arms and ammunition, and instruments of war, actually made up for that purpose; stipulating that free ships shall make free goods—declaring that full credit shall be given is ship's papers; that armed vessels shall not come within cannon shot of a neutral ship, but send their boat on board, with only three men at most, to examine papers, but not search.— In short, the treaties for one hundred and forty years back, relative to this object, are drawn in the very words of the treaty between the United States and France; as they are again repeated in the late treaty between England and France. For this striking similarity I refer to the treaty between Spain and the United Provinces, in 1650, and to a long series of conventions between various nations since; in which I can safely declare, I have not yet, after the most diligent search, found a single treaty in which the same latitude is given to the word contraband, as Mr. Jay has given it in his treaty with Lord Grenville: no [...] have I met with one, though such possibly may exist, in which as provision is made to guard the neutral ship from search and spoliation.

The twenty-second article of the treaty between Great Britain and France, confines the word, contraband, to arms, ammunition, and military stores; and the twenty-third article expressly excludes cordage, sails, tar, rosin, pitch, masts for ships, plank, timber of all hinds, and all other things proper for either building or repairing ships.

The same principles are followed in our treaty with France, Holland and Sweden, and the same, as I have stated, are to be found in treaties near one hundred and fifty years back; so that notwithstanding a loose expression in Vattel, velative to naval stores, we may consider it as now settled by the uniform acknowledgment of nations, as expressed in their treaties, that contraband must, in its nature, be confined to arms and military stores. But were it otherwise, as the object of every treaty is to gain some advantage which you did not before enjoy by the laws of nations, or to remove some doubt which might be entertained on those laws; no nation ever enters into a treaty in order to enforce an established law, unless that law is beneficial to it. What then could Mr. Jay's inducement be, after we had [Page]obtained from France, Holland and Sweden, express stipulations exempting naval stores, &c. from the list of contraband—After three great nations of Europe had, by their treaties, and by their formal accession to the principles of the armed neutrality, declared that these articles were not contraband—after Britain had at length made the same recognition by her treaty with France—after the president of the United States had expressly, in his proclamation, referred to the modern law of nations for the meaning of the word contraband, and in his enumeration of contraband articles, had excepted all those that are excepted in our treaty with France—I say, what could be Mr. Jay's inducement to declare, in the 18th article of his treaty, the following staple commodities of this country contraband— "Also timber for ship-building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly for the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron and fir pl [...]ds only excepted?" Is there any reciprocity in this stipulation? Was it probable that the United States would soon be at war with any nation, to whom Britain would carry these commodities? Was not Britain already at war with a nation who furnishes us a good market for them? Are they not staples of our country, which we have a very considerable interest in shipping? What equivalent does the treaty hold out to us for relinqui [...] this important branch of commerce? Is it usual for nations [...] compliment away their commerce without any equivalent? [...] Mr. Jay assert, that these were contraband by the modern [...] nations? Will he give the lie to the president's public declaration, that they were not? Or is common politeness too much for our own executive, while the most servile adulation it lavished on the monarch of Britain? But supposing that they were actually contraband, had we not a right to expect that Britain would agree to their exemption from that character is her treaty with us, as she had done in her treaty with her n [...] ral enemy—and as France, and every other nation with whom we have treaties, had done with us when we were in a much less important state, than we are at present? Do not the common principles of humanity, and the interests of all commercial nations, combine in striving to narrow the evils of was, and lessen its effects on neutral nations? The venerable Franklin, with this view, inserted in his treaty with Sweden, a stip [...] lation for an uninterrupted commerce in private ships, even if the contracting parties were at war with each other; but the chief justice of the United States thinks it his duty to stop the progress of civilization, and to recall the barbarism of past ages, even at the expense of the dearest interests of his country. What [Page]answer, sir, would you make to this venerable sage, if he was to rise from his grave, and to charge you with sacrificing the interests, with tarnishing the honor, of your country? If he was to allege, that you had, in this article, violated the rights of nations, and done all in your power to re-plunge us into that state of barbarism from which we had so happily emerged? What answer, sir, would you make? Would you borrow the words of Macbeth? "Thou canst not say, I did it; why dost thou shake thy hoary locks at me!" True, sir, you did it not.— But Pitt did it! Grenville did it!—did it! and twenty others did it!

CATO.

N. B. An inaccuracy of expression in some of my former numbers, may induce a belief, that the discriminating duty on foreign bottoms is ten per cent. on the value of the cargo, when, in fact, it is only ten and an half per cent. on the amount of the duty; or, in other words, one-tenth additional duty.

No. IX.

IT has been usual in treaties, to confine every distinct matter to a separate article: thus the 22d article of the treaty between France and Britain, declares what is contraband; the 23d article expressly specifies the exceptions. But Lord Grenville's treaty, as if with a view to render the subject as obscure as possible, crouds a variety of distinct matter into the same article, which makes it much more difficult to reason on the subject, unless the reader will be at the trouble of turning to the article at the time that he hears the commentary upon it. The article before us contains three distinct matters; first, it enumerates contraband, without excepting any one article shipped from the United States, other than unwrought iron and fir plank; as is usually done in similar cases, and which would have been peculiarly proper in the present case, because of the sweeping words, "and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels;"—words of such extent as to include a very considerable portion of our exports, which by this article, are to be forfeited.

The second member of this article is extremely difficult to define. I shall, therefore, give the very words of the treaty, that every reader may judge for himself, and if he can peruse them without the most lively emotion, I shall not hesitate to [Page]declare, that he is no native American. "And whereas [...] difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which, alone, provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniencies and misunderstandings which might thence arise; it is further agreed, that whenever such articles, so becoming contraband, according to the existing law of nations, sh [...]ll, for that reason, be seized, the same shall not be considered c [...] cated; but the owners thereof shall be speedily and compl [...]ly indemnified," &c.—The first member provides that in [...] a vessel's going to a blockaded port, she shall not be con [...]i [...], till after notice of such blockade.

The second, then, does not refer to the case of a port which is blockaded; but must refer to some other cases, in which Mr. Jay admits, that provisions and other articles, not usually contraband, may be rendered such. Now I know of no case in which provisions, and more especially other articles not usually contraband, can be considered as such. It is true, Vattel has this [...] expression in the enumeration of contraband: "Lor [...]i [...]es meme en certaines occasions où l'on espere de reduire [...] par la famine." "Even provisions where they hope to [...] the enemy by famine." I have shewn that great change [...] have taken place in modern times with respect to the laws of [...] ons; that every nation has, in its treaties, expressly exc [...] provisions; and that England has herself done so in her [...] treaty, even with France. But admitting Vattel's words in [...] utmost latitude, they can only refer to the case of a place blockaded; and this is referred to in another part of the article, [...] therefore not intended by this, which alludes to some [...] case.

If there are really cases to which it can properly apply, independent of a blockaded place, as the object related to the whole remaining trade of America (that in lumber and [...] stores having been before ceded) surely it was the duty of our minister, particularly as he was a lawyer, and must be supposed competent to the subject, to have specified those cases as accurately as possible, and to have confined them to the narrowed possible limits, where any doubts could have been entertained on the subject: this was necessary, not only to put his countrymen upon their guard, to enable them to make some estimate of their risk and loss; but to point out to them the cases in which they might appeal with success. But, says the treaty "it is difficult precisely to determine the cases." Why so, sir? Are the cases so very numerous, or are they so doubtful? If both, or either, they called for the more care and accuracy in the enumeration [Page]and definition. Are they not ultimately to be decided some where? Or is the difficulty of deciding, to justify the capture of every American vessel loaded with provisions, or any other article; for the articles which are to become contraband, are as undefined as the occasion which makes them such? I again ask, sir, by what rule is this question, so important to our commerce, to be decided? You say, by the law of nations! but where is this law to be found? The writers on the law of nations, like the writers on every other law, differ from each other; but if the cases are precisely laid down, why not state them? Was the chief justice of the United States less capable of doing this than the captain of a Providence privateer? These cases could either be defined with precision, or they could not: in the first case, they should have been stated; in the last they should not have been affirmed by the signature of our envoy. But when an American vessel is brought into a British port, the maritime judge must do what the chief justice of the United States and Lord Grenville could not do; he must determine, whether her cargo, consisting of provisions and other articles, is or is not within the case in which they may become contraband. Now, let me ask, sir, whether, after what we have seen of their decisions, it was prudent to leave the whole commerce of these United States to their mercy, by giving them an unlimited power to judge, in cases of so much intricacy, that you yourself could not agree upon them? Do you reflect, sir, that you have, by this very article, authorized them, even if, contrary to their usual practice, they conform to the law of nations, to condemn every vessel going to any port of France, or their colonies, with provisions, or returning from their islands to any port in Europe, loaded with the produce of those islands, and that they derive this right from the very words of your treaty? The rule of the law of nations, as laid down by Vattel, and which is also a rule of the civil law, is thus: "that if he who can and should explain himself clearly and fully, neglects to do it, so much the worse for himself; he shall not be admitted afterwards to make restrictions, which he has not expressed." Now, the court of Great Britain has officially told us, that she has a right by the law of nations, under the peculiar circumstances of France, to interdict all trade in provisions with her or her islands; as also to prevent any part of the produce of her colonies from being carried in neutral vessels to any port in Europe; the clamours excited by neutral powers, and the apprehension of drawing upon herself new enemies, made her suspend some of these constructions: but with respect to us, as appears from Mr. Pinckney's and Mr. Hammond's [Page]letters, she still keeps up the right, as she says, under the law of nations. Her courts, conforming to this sentiment, [...] uniformly condemned a great number of cargoes, agreeably [...] the law of nations, say they, as expressed in those instructions. During the whole of Mr. Jay's negociation, there was no formal revocation of them, but their admiralty courts proceeded to condemn. Under these circumstances, Mr. Jay agrees, [...], That there are cases (other than those of blockaded ports) in which provisions and other articles are contraband; and he agrees too, in effect, that the British courts of admiralty [...] determine what those cases are; does not this amount to an implicit relinquishment of our construction of the law of nation [...] Are we not the party whose interest it is (agreeably to the doctrine laid down by Vattel) to explain ourselves clearly and fully; and does not our neglect to do it (agreeably to the same authority) justify the British construction of the law of national. Does it not relinquish our claim for every injury we have suff [...] ed under the very instructions which Mr. Jay was sent to [...] monstrate against? And this fully proves, what I before a [...] ed, that Mr. Jay's commissioners could give no redress to [...] citizens for the loss of their property, under those instructions. That the British have viewed the treaty in this light, is [...] from the orders that they have lately renewed for the [...] our vessels going to France or Holland, dating their order [...] the time in which they might reasonably suppose the [...] would have been ratified here.

These observations apply with equal force to the third member of this article: For as the British claimed a right to declare a whole nation at a time in a state of siege, even [...] that nation had beat them out of the field, to capture and condemn all vessels going to any port of such nation, and as [...] as this moment agree, that our vessels might be so captured [...] condemned, without defining, or in any part limiting the words, blockade and siege, do we not tacitly agree to their construction of the term? Repugnant as this definition is to the established and known laws of nations, it is very remarkable, that where the most rigid construction of the laws of nations can be made to operate against us, in order to preserve them in full forts, and in contradiction of the settled practice of modern times, Mr. Jay has added to these laws, the weight of a national stipulation against his constituents—but where the writers on natural law advance a principle, beneficial to us, Mr. Grenville's treaty cautiously avoids putting it out of doubt, or giving it any additional force. Thus Vattel declares, "That it is now received, that full faith and credit should be given to certificates and sea [Page]letters, &c. that the master of the ship presents, unless a fraud appears, or there be good reason of suspicion."—Lib. III. chap. vii. (114)—and in every treaty of commerce, and navigation, that has been made, for upwards of one hundred years back, this principle is enlarged upon, and violences in boarding a ship, to examine her papers, guarded against by fixing that the a [...]med ship shall remain at a distance, that the neutral vessels shall be boarded by two or three men only, that full faith shall be given to papers, &c. Yet not one word of this is to be found in Mr. Jay's treaty, except a mere vague agreement, that neither party shall injure the other in their persons or estate, and shall make good all damages and be punished for outrages, without defining what these outrages are, or fixing a line, which it should always be an outrage to pass.

That the British idea of outrage differed from ours, we know; for Mr. Jay himself possessed the fullest evidence of outrages committed by captains of men of war and privateers, in plundering our vessels, and pressing and ill-treating our seamen; yet we hear of no officer that has lost his ship or commission on this account: and as to private suits, every man knows, that the expense and distance will prevent their being brought. With all the treaties hitherto entered into by the United States before him, as well as all other treaties made for a series of years past, which are accurate on this point, could Mr. Jay be ignorant of the common practice of nations? Was he ignorant, that the abuses we daily suffered at sea, in the boarding our ships, with numerous bodies of armed men, in the contempt manifested for our papers, in breaking up the hatches, and endangering the ship, were among the causes of complaint that the president sent him to prefer? If he was not, why are not these evils guarded against by an express stipulation, that faith shall be given to papers, that no ship shall be searched or detained, where her papers are fair, and she does not refuse to show them! why are not privateers ordered to remain without gun shot (as in our treaty with France, and the treaty of France with Britain, &c.) while no more than two, or at most three hands are admitted on board the neutral ship? Why are vague and general terms substituted for these wholesome provisions, unless it be with design to subject our commerce to unceasing insults?

The same abandonment of our navigation runs through every commercial article. By the seventeenth, the British are empowered (contrary to the principles of the armed neutrality, which have evidently changed the law of nations, by the general consent of the great community of civilized nations, and to which Britain herself has in effect acceded, in this particular, by her [Page]late treaty with France) to take enemies' property from on board our vessels. One would have imagined, even if the law of nations had been clearly against us, that mere delicacy, with respect to the nations with whom we have treaties, by which we can protect the property of their enemies from them, would have induced us to refrain from a stipulation, by which we voluntarily sacrificed their property under the protection of our flag [...] their enemies.

But that Mr. Jay did not think the law of nations on this point settled, appears from the last parts of the twelfth arti [...] after the war: but one would certainly have expected, that [...] this article rendered every vessel we have, liable to search [...] detention, that two points would at least have been settled [...]— 1st. That such papers would have been agreed upon, as would have saved the risk and danger of a search at sea. 2d. T [...] when a vessel, brought into port on suspicion of having enemy's property on board, was dismissed, she should have her freight and demurrage, &c. paid immediately: that none [...] hands should be taken out of her [...] that she should be, [...] time she was taken, till she left the port; at the risk of the [...] tors.—Yet we do not find a single stipulation of this kind [...] article, none even for port charges or law expenses, if [...] wrongfully brought in.—But it is left wholly to the discre [...] of the courts of admiralty, whether they will give any or [...] damages, &c. That they will give none in most cases, past experience has fully confirmed.

If it is said, the law of nations entitles neutral ships to damages, &c. I ask whether the law of nations has hitherto been the law of the British courts of admiralty? And, whether [...] express stipulation would have given us too great a se [...]rity against West India and Bermuda judges? I ask, whether the neglect to make any precise stipulation in this case, is not a new proof, of what I have before observed, that where the law of nations was favorable to us, no stipulation is made to enforce [...] and that where it is unfavorable, there it is strengthened by an express provision? an instance of both occurring in this very article.—Doubts might be entertained, whether neutral ships should not protect enemies property—these doubts are determined against us, by the express words of the article; while our right to freight, &c. is left to Judge Green's construction of the laws of nations.

CATO.

[Page]

No. X.

IT may not be improper now to review our commerce, as it would stand, were the treaty carried into effect. The Indian trade from Canada, alone, produced at public sales in London, in 1784, £. 230, 000 sterling. The duties thereon were in round numbers, £. 17, 000. The tonnage of furs and peltry, about 1000 tons. The exports from Canada in furs, exceeded in 1785, that of the preceding year, about £. 70, 000 sterling, and has, I believe, continued to increase; so that this branch of trade may be fairly estimated at near 100, 000 dollars yearly. As ninetenths of the Indian nations, who carry on this trade (if the territories of the Hudson Bay company are excepted) live within the boundaries of the states, as we enjoyed every advantage in the right to the posts and postages, the greatest part of this valuable trade must have been ours, had not Mr. Jay thought proper to cede it, in effect, to the British, as I have before stated. The Indian trade, in the sourthern part of our territories, is principally in peltries, which are too bulky to be transported in any other way than upon large rivers; the Mississippi will be the out-let for a very great proportion of them. This commerce must have been exclusively ours; for though, by the treaty of Paris, the British might navigate the Mississippi; yet, as they did not own a foot of land upon either of its banks, it became impossible for them to avail themselves of this advantage; whereas the United States possessing all the Indian country, in the vicinity of that river, and the east bank for many hundred miles, could, when they pleased, establish factories, and monopolize that commerce; and in addition to this, carry on a very important (though illicit) trade with the Spaniards, who own the opposite bank. This our minister extraordinary was too munificent to allow us to avail ourselves of. He therefore provides, in the third article, "that all the ports and places, on its eastern side, to whichsoever of the parties belonging, be freely resorted to and used by both parties, in as ample a manner as any of the Atlantic ports or places, &c." then comes a clause declaring, "that all goods and merchandizes, whose importation into the United States is not wholly prohibited, may freely, for the purposes of commerce, be carried into the same, in the manner aforesaid, by his majesty's subjects; and such goods and merchandizes shall be subject to no other or higher duties than would be payable by the citizens of the United States on the importation of the same in American vessels, in the Atlantic ports of the said states." I have already shown, that the effect of this last provision is to give British ships a bounty proportioned [Page]to the amount of the equalizing duty on the out and house voyage, taken together, to the prejudice of American vessels; which, with the perfect equality of rights, that they hold i [...] common with our own citizens, and an addition of 46 [...] extra tonnage, and light money, with which, as I have before shown, our vessels will be charged, must put this important commerce into the hands of the British. This, I presume, [...] have been the intention of our minister, when he speaks of the ports on the eastern bank of the Mississippi, to which soever of the parties belonging; for, as the British have no ports on the eastern side, Mr. Jay must have looked forward to a time when these extraordinary bounties to their commerce and perfect security for their establishment, should have enabled them to po [...] themselves of that country; and that, though the article is not reciprocal at present, by the prudence and good management of our envoy, it may, in time, be rendered so. This article i [...] perpetual; so that bidding an eternal farewell to all comm [...]e with our own country, we turn our anxious eyes to some other to supply its place: The terms on which our good friends, the British, propose to open their islands to us, are such, it [...], as even our senate cannot approve; are such as Camill [...]-himself abandons; it may, however, be some consolation to [...] know, that these islands, whose trade we were to purchase [...] the dereliction of several very valuable branches of comm [...] are not of so much importance as the advocates of Britain w [...] have us suppose, and for that reason I insert the following tables:

Sugar imported into the United States in 1790.

From the French islands, | 9, 321, 829 lb.
Dutch ditto, | 2, 707, 131
Danish ditto, | 2, 833, 016
| 14, 861, 976
British ditto, | 2, 230,647
| 17, 092,623

So that, after all, were our other branches of commerce lest unfettered, we should be able to do without that of the British islands, which only amounts to about one-eighth of the whole West India trade. And such is the dependence of those islands upon us, that they must either starve or be supplied by us upon our terms. As this was too obvious to escape the attention of Lord Grenville, and our minister, they have provided, 1. That we shall impose no new duties on tonnage; that is, in other words, that, treat us as she will, Britain shall still have the [Page]right to carry our produce to her islands in her own vessels, to the exclusion of ours. 2. That she shall also, if she pleases, prevent our carrying our produce to the French or Dutch islands, or their produce to Europe, at least during a war, which has been, for one hundred years back, thirty years out of seventy; since she has nothing to do but to declare them in a state of siege, or to allege that the articles are contraband, or that this is one of the cases in which they may become contraband, though not generally so; and she will then be justified, by the treaty, in carrying them into her own ports, where seamen may be pressed on board their ships of war, seduced to swear that the cargo is enemies' property, and thus the whole be confiscated; or if this great evil should be avoided, compel the owner to pay his own expenses, and to take whatever the captor shall deem a reasonable profit, without any regard to the loss he sustains, in the breaking up his voyage, &c.

In peace, France will, with justice, avail herself of the article which entitles her to put her trade upon the same footing as that of the most favored nation, become her own carrier, and banish our vessels from her islands, as we have permitted the British to exclude us from theirs. Europe, perhaps, will be more favorable to us. But here again we have, by the equalizing duty, and the extra-tonnage and light money, rendered it impossible to carry our commodities to Britain in our own vessels; while we, at the same time, bind ourselves not to give such advantages to other nations as would open new markets for them. Britain then must continue to navigate; for no other merchants must monopolize our commerce; her officers must strut upon our exchanges with all the "dignity due to their commissions;" her high commissioned courts may drag us from one end of the continent to the other; must establish new rules of jurisprudence; and you, my unhappy fellow citizens, must be content with the humble offices of hewers of wood and drawers of water, to these insolent islanders.

During the war, the concessions relative to contraband amount to an absolute prohibition of any trade in naval stores, timber, provisions, and any other article, which the British please to call contraband, under existing circumstances, either with France or Holland.

The new treaty with the Algerines, will exclude you from Portugal, and render your voyages to Spain dangerous.

With the Baltic we have little commerce that will bear a war-freight, other than in the West India produce, which Britain has said we shall not carry to Europe; and Mr. Jay has acceded, expressly in the 12th, and impliedly in the [...]th article, [Page]to this prohibition; so that the commerce of the world (the East Indies and Great Britain alone excepted, and this latter, as I have said, can only be carried on, in peace at least, in British bottoms is interdicted to us. During war, indeed, we may continue to carry, while the insurance is less on our ships than on those of Britain, provided that our seamen will choose to continue in a service in which they are liable to repeated insults; provided that the wants of the British mary shall permit them to leave us any, of which there may be some doubts, as we just learn that a single frigate (since the treaty was advised to be ratified) pressed 35 of our seamen upon our own coast, and another, the Hermione, no less than 70 in the West Indies: A ship, too, we are informed, loaded with provision, has been carried into England, agreeably to an exp [...] stipulation in Mr. Jay's treaty, either under pretence that the provision is contraband, or that it is enemies' property; and before any investigation into the merits of the capture, every seaman is taken out and put on board a frigate.

Our whole stock of seamen does not much exceed 12, 000. How long this will last, with such deduction, and the i [...]e lose of those of our sea-faring citizens who are carried i [...] the islands, and compelled to serve on board ships of war in that unhealthy station, I am unable to say. Now let me [...], w' ther our commerce is not upon a much worse footing, th [...] it was before Mr. Jay [...] to England? Whether every injury, for which he was [...] to seek redress, has not been re [...]d with double rigour? Whether by yielding that the British may, of right, search [...]ur ships, and confiscate the property of [...] allies, which they before did by force, we have not ceded to those allies a right to declare that our ships shall no longer p [...] tect the property of their enemy? Can we expect, that they will suffer their treaties to entangle them, and extend protections to their enemies? It is not to be expected; they will be compelled, by necessity, to treat us, as we have agreed that the British shall treat us; in which case, as Britain will not let us trade with France or Holland, France and Holland will interdict our commerce with Britain, Spain, and Portugal; and thus the trade and navigation of this country be finally destroyed, by the means that were intended for its protection.

How different has Mr. Jay's conduct been from Mr. Pinckney's! Read his letters to Lord Grenville. He maintained our right to protect neutral property; he protested with firmness against the absurd idea of naval stores and provisions being contraband; he saw the wide difference between admitting a thing to be right, and yielding to the necessities of the moment, which [Page]circumstances might hereafter enable us to contend against with success. Indeed it may be doubted whether the right given by treaty to take enemies' property out of our vessels, is not a "privilege or immunity" granted to the commerce and navigation of Great Britain; in which case, by the third article of our treaty with France, they have also a right to claim it; which establishes an important distinction between suffering this from necessity, and granting it by treaty.

The ill effect which this treaty must have upon our national character, exceeds all calculation. A young nation, like a young man, is bound to be particularly solicitous on this head; nor can any thing be more repugnant to the interest and honor of the country, than the shocking indifference that our ministerial writers and their newspapers endeavour to inculcate on this head. Thus they say, "We are growing rich in spite of all these injuries; let us mind our business—let us submit. We shall hereafter be strong, when we may bluster at our leisure." What should we think of the tutor that should inculcate on a young man the same maxims? "Suffer yourself to be kicked and cuffed now, while you are young; let your sister be ravished, and your wife be debauched, by the letcher who permits you to get money. What though he insists upon sharing a part of it with you, and now and then lays his cudgel over your head? Submit now to smile upon him; by and by you will be as strong as he is, and then you may bully him in turn."— What, I say, should we think of such a tutor, but that he was a villain and a scoundrel, who was leading his pupil through the dread of present evil to debase his character, and to invite infinitely greater evils in future, than those he feared to meet at present. What first raised the American character, and acquired for it the admiration of the world? Was it tame submission to [...]e injuries of Britain? Was it a scrupulous calculation of what we might gain, or what we might lose, by the controversy? No, my fellow citizens; it was a bold resistance. It was an ardent passion for honor and freedom, that left all calculation of personal interests out of sight, and counted every thing was lost, if these were not won.

CATO.

[Page]

No. XI.

Fellow Citizens,

IN my former numbers, I endeavoured, 1st, To shew that the object of Mr. Jay's mission, so far as related to a compensation for the injuries received, and security against future aggression, was not accomplished. While I was yet writing, the renewal of them proved, beyond contradiction, that my remarks were well founded, and that the British construction of the treaty was unhappily too similar to my own; since they only waited to give sufficient time for its ratification, to recommence, with added violence, their depredations on our trade, and their outrages against our citizen seamen. I then examined the treaty in a mere commercial light, without indulging myself in those general reflections which arose naturally from the articles under consideration. I proceed now to consider it in a political point of view—Would to God, my fellow citizens, I could here find some source of consolation, some ray of light, to irradiate the sullen gloom!—But alas! every step we take, plunges us into thicker darkness. We might, perhaps, have submitted to past losses; have seen our commerce given away without an equivalent; our navigation ruined; our seamen (I blush with shame and indignation, while I say it) our citizen seamen delivered over to the insolence of brutal tyrants, could our national honor have been preserved in future—could [...] ances, formed by interest and gratitude, have been left [...] paired—could peace have been established upon firm and honorable terms—could the private rights of our citizens, the public ones of our government, have remained unviolated—but the indiscriminate ruin of all these is too much to be borne in silence. Even the coward-advocates for peace, feel their spirits arise at the unexampled indignities which this treaty imposes. And for what? Are we nearer peace (if by peace is meant the security of our persons and property, from foreign depredations) than when Mr. Jay left this country? Is there a single outrage which we suffered before, which is not continued to this moment? And yet the advocates for the treaty are continually ringing in our ears, the blessings of peace, the horrors of war; and they have the effrontery to assure us, that we enjoy the first and have escaped the last, merely (to borrow a ministerial term) through the instrumentality of the treaty. Does any body believe, that if we had continued to suffer the British to plunder our trade, to man their ships with our seamen, to possess our frontiers in quiet, the they would have declared war upon [Page]us, at least till they had conquered France? And can any man deny, that it would have been better to have preserved this darling, but base-born bantling, which excites our blushings while we fondle it, by mere submission, than to legitimate the bastard, and compel ourselves for ever to maintain it upon the same disgraceful terms, by marrying its lewd mother? In a political view, the treaty is bad; as it detaches us from engagements which our interest and honor equally invite us to maintain: as it sacrifices our friends to our enemies, and holds forth to the world, that those nations who treat us worst, will share the greatest portion of our attachment; and that, like fawning spaniels, we can be beaten into love and submission, notwithstanding the corrupt maxims that were circulated under the signature of Pacificus, with a view to promote the league of despots against France.

Notwithstanding the indecent attempts that were made about the same time, by several members of congress, to shew that we owed her no affection, the principles of gratitude have still maintained their ground in this country; and they have been strengthened by the necessity which every American felt, of securing some ally against the design which Britain almost openly avowed, of again reducing this country, when her means, strengthened by the interest she had in our councils and in our commercial cities, should afford her a prospect of attempting it with success. It is singular to observe the extreme solicitude with which a party, among us, have endeavoured to detach the affections of this country from the only nation with whom its true interest would prompt it to form a close and strict alliance, not only because its government is similar to our own, but because its commerce is more advantageous to us than that of any other nation in the world; while its manufactures are such as can supply the greatest part of our wants, its demands for our produce are so much larger than that of any other nation, that she actually pays us a considerable proportion of that balance in money which we are compelled to remit to Great Britain on the losing commerce which we carry on with her. It will be remembered here, that near two millions of our former exports to England, were consumed in France, and as much more in other countries. It will be remembered, too, she gives the highest encouragement to our navigation, while her insular rival uses every means to depress it. Yet whenever any attempt has been made to encourage this commerce or strengthen this alliance, the most violent clamours have been excited by the British faction, aided by our own royalists, and the slightest incidents have been seized with avidity to render her [Page]obnoxious. Thus the imprudent warmth of Mr. G—t called forth all the zeal of the party; ministers, chief justices, senators, &c. joined in full cry, to run down the French nation, under the appearance of regard for the honor of their own, while they were so totally regardless of its interests as to overlook the offers that he brought, of such commercial advantages as might have made us see with contempt, the narrow policy of the British government in excluding us from their islands, which the liberality of France must have compelled her to open to us on our own terms.

And yet these very men have heard with the utmost indifference the insulting speech of Lord Dorchester—the insolent correspondence of H—d, which went, both in matter and manner, far beyond any thing written by G—t; and while they discouraged a connection with France, founded upon mutual advantages, they meanly supplicate Britain to treat with us upon her own terms, and contrive that this treaty should serve the double purpose of connecting us with her, and detaching us from France. At the same time, they have the effrontery to assert, that the treaty contains no article which can reasonably give umbrage to France, or which in any way derogates from the friendship that should subsist between the two nations. I shall proceed briefly to consider the truth of this assertion.

In the enumeration of contraband, Mr. Jay has included articles which are essential to France, and which have not been considered, as far as I have been able to discover, as contraband in any treaty for 140 years past. In admitting that provisions may be contraband in any case (except when going to a place blockaded) Mr. Jay has also admitted, what no treaty ever before did, though tyrants have sometimes claimed a right to stop them. The United States had evidently no interest in either of these articles; of course they could not be reciprocal, nor is any equivalent offered for them. France and Britain were at war: these articles were protected in going to the latter by our treaty with France; so that in admitting them to be contraband, [...] necessarily confine the sale of them to Great Britain, and exclude France from availing herself of our commerce in these articles, unless at the utmost risque and expense; we make their generosity in excepting them from the list of contraband (if they really were such by the law of nations) afford the means of furnishing them to their enemy: for if our treaty with France and Britain were similar in this respect, the risque and expense would have been equal in going to either country; and both would have obtained these commodities upon pretty much the same terms. It is evident, then, that these articles could only have been diclated by [Page]a spirit hostile to France, and as such they are a direct breach of our neutrality.

Vattel, in enumerating the cases in which a neutral nation may carry on a commerce with the belligerent powers, has these words, which directly apply to the case before us: "If they (the neutral nation) refuse to sell me any article, and take measures to supply my enemy with it in abundance, with a view to favor them, this partially is a breach of the neutrality." Whatever has been said with respect to the above article, applies with equal force to the right that the treaty gives to Britain to confiscate the property of their enemy found on board our vessels, contrary to the modern law of nations, and their own admission of its principles in their treaty with France. But if any thing was wanting to show the hostility of these articles, it could be found in the time we had pitched upon to enter into them, and that we had stipulated for their continuance. 1st, as I have said, France was actually at war. 2d, By the 12th article it is agreed that these provisions shall continue in force during the present war, and for two years after, when the parties "will renew their discussions, and endeavor to agree, whether in any, and what cases, neutral vessels shall protect enemies' property; and in what cases provisions, and other articles, not generally contraband, may become such."

From this it is evident, that these were questions of doubt in the minds of the contracting parties; they were speculative questions, as capable of solution in the present moment, as at any future period; the discussion of them could have no reference to a war between powers with whom we were at peace; the declaring, therefore, that this doubt should be construed as unfavorably as possible to France, and directly in favor of the British, even to the partial injury of our own commerce, without any apparent equivalent, and that, too, during the war, how long soever it may last, is so unequivocal a proof of hostility, that it is impossible to mistake the intention of the contracting parties, which, reduced to plain language, is this: "these articles may be inconvenient in future; but as the execution of them will be very injurious to France, whose reduction we both wish, we agree that his Britannic majesty shall have the full benefit of them, for the present; and when, by this operation, he shall have reduced France to submission, we will agree to modify them, so as to render them conformable to our interests." Injurious as these articles are to our commerce, the baseness and perfidy of them are so much more so to our national character, that the first of these considerations is almost lost in our resentment of the last. By the 24th article it [Page]is expressly stipulated, that no power at war with Britain shall sell their prizes in our harbours.

Now by the law of nations, independent of treaties, any nation may carry her prize to a neutral port, and sell it, Vat. 3 lib. ch. vii. 132; and accordingly, France has hitherto been permitted, without any express stipulation in her treaty, so to do. To withdraw this right, now, in the midst of a war, though not expressly against the law of nations, has certainly a most ungracious and unfriendly appearance; especially as it is done without our being able to apologize for it by any interest that we can have, at least during this war, in the stipulation. As it was foreseen, at the time that the treaty was entered into, that Holland must be conquered, and that she would make an ally of France; the 25th article, which admits the British to bring their prizes into our ports, and forbids the armed vessels of any other nation (France excepted) to enter them, unless forced by stress of weather, &c. and which agrees that we shall not in future, let any other nation share this favor, is certainly no evidence of a friendly attachment either to France or Holland; and yet these powers were our friends and allies, when Britain was our bitterest foe. I forbear to remark upon the stipulations we have made in favor of the navigation of Britain, as speaking the same unfriendly language; since this is a less aggression and will undoubtedly be returned upon us by other nations; so that the whole loss will ultimately [...] upon ourselves, and the crime carry with it its own punishment. The liberality which France manifested to us in our distress— the succour she afforded us—and the unexampled generosity she manifested in taking no advantage of our situation, to impose unjust or hard conditions upon us, certainly should have rendered us cautions of favoring a nation, that has wantonly, and without the slightest provocation, declared herself her enemy, and used the most barbarous and unjustifiable means to distress her. We should have shuddered at being parties to a compact, to starve 26 millions of our fellow creatures—at the thought of aiding Britain in her endeavours to repeat in Europe the horrid barbarities she had committed in India. We should, even if we had no obligations to France, and been blind to our own interest, we should still, for the sake of humanity, have resisted a treaty, which admitted, that the necessaries of life could, in any case, be justly withheld from a famished nation. But if all these motives had no weight with us, we should have reflected on the forbearance, the delicate regard that France has shown to our circumstances, even in the midst of her distress. By our treaty we have guaranteed her islands to her; [Page]these islands are attacked; she is entitled to the benefit of our guarantee. Yet she has forborn to ask it, as she believed it inconsistent with our interest to go into the war. Can we expect the same forbearance, after the predilection we have manifested for her most inveterate enemy? if not, are we prepared to choose between a breach of faith with her, the relinquishment of her guarantee of our independence, or a war with Britain?

CATO.

No. XII.

AS every neutral nation may, without forfeiting that character, suffer the belligerent powers to dispose of prizes in their harbours—as the United States will generally be at peace, while Britain is engaged in wars, 30 years out of 70, very considerable advantages would result from this circumstance.—During a general European war, the commodities of all nations would be sold (as prize goods generally are) at a low rate, would supply our own wants, and be transported in our vessels to every part of the globe, and the demand for commodities and mechanics, necessary to the fitting of vessels, would add to our wealth and stimulate our industry.—To relinquish these advantages without an equivalent, is certainly very unwise, particularly when it is considered, that our situation in the neighbourhood of the colonies of all the maritime powers, must render the free admission of some and the exclusion of their enemies, extremely important to them. We have, therefore, been very tenacious of this privilege, and denied it even to Holland, who may be considered as one of our earliest allies. Yet the 24th article of Mr. Jay's treaty expressly stipulates, that no foreign nation, at war with Britain, shall sell her prizes in our harbours, excludes their armed vessels, and stipulates that similar privileges shall be granted to no other nations; and all this without any equivalent—For though the provision i [...] mutual, yet the advantage is entirely on one side—1st, Because Britain being our only natural enemy (by natural enemy is understood one whose interests clash, either because of the contiguity of their territorries, or rivalry in their pursuits) it is highly improbable that we shall be engaged in any war in which she is not a party against us. 2d, Because our distance from Europe will prevent our being often engaged in those controversies which convulse that quarter of the globe. 3d, Because there is no [Page]naval war in which Britain is not a party; if we should happen to be engaged on the same side with her, we should mutually use each others ports without a treaty; if we should be opposed to her, the treaty will cease to operate; so that in every view, we have made a very important concession in this particular, without having acquired any thing in return. The article is extremely exceptionable in another point of view. The construction is so doubtful, that a similar article gave birth all the controversy between our government and Mr. Genet. It would certainly have been prudent then to have varied the expression, and steered clear of this ambiguity in treating with a nation who wrests every possible doubt to her own advantage—and who finds chief justices and senators, and ministers extraordinary, and advocates, among ourselves, ready to support her constructions, be they ever so absurd.

By the 15th article, we are prohibited from imposing any specific duty on British articles, which we do not extend to all other nations, from increasing our tonnage duty or imposing any greater charge on the importation of goods in British bottoms than now subsists. I have already shown the mischievous effect of this article upon our navigation. I will now consider it, as it regards our political relation with other nations.— Treaties are bargains, in which something is given in return for some other received. Those, then, that put it out of their power to give, cannot hope to receive. Suppose, for instance, we should find it convenient, in order to procure a market for our fish and oil, to bargain with France for their free admission into her ports, and promise in return to receive her manufactures of silk at a less duty than we impose upon the same articles brought from elsewhere. This is the policy of Britain with respect to Portugal, whose wines she favors in preference to those of other nations, in return for advantages she derives from her commerce.—This article puts such a bargain entirely out of our power; yet suffers Britain to continue her restrictions upon a variety of our commodities. While it remains in force, no treaty whatever in favor of our manufactures, navigation, or commerce, can be entered into with other nations; thus, notwithstanding we have not any equivalent from Britain, in return for this article, any relaxation of her oppressive system of navigation, we bind our hands with respect to every other nation—and while she closes one door upon us, promises to leave our commerce and navigation imprisoned without making the smallest effort to open another.

The tenth article of the treaty partakes of the evils of the above, in the want of reciprocity, and in depriving us of the [Page]means of doing ourselves justice, without recurring to arms, when the laws of nations with respect to us are violated. By this article, neither the debts due to individuals, nor money in the funds, are to be sequestered or confiscated. First, this is not mutual; because it is well known that few Americans trust their money in British funds, since the establishment of our own. And a balance of about ten millions (exclusive of stock) is due from our citizens, on the general average, to the subjects Britain. By the law of nations, this property may be sequestered; though, in general, it has been the practice of late, since the commercial connections of nations have multiplied, not to forfeit it, and that, principally, because the balances being mutually due, little advantage would accrue to the nation.

As to the justice or injustice, it never has been made a question; the rule of nations is, "that the property, either private or public, of an enemy, may be taken," and I believe it would be difficult to show, that it was more just to rob the merchant of his goods at sea, because his sovereign was at war, than to forfeit his debts; both being equally the property of an enemy, both tending equally to distress the individual, and neither being a violation of a private contract, because the nation who makes the forfeiture is no party to such contract. If the rights of humanity are considered, a capture at sea is a much greater breach of them, since it is frequently attended with the loss of life, and always with the loss of liberty. The stigma, therefore, that our minister was pleased to introduce into the treaty on this subject, could only have been intended as an illiberal reflection upon those virtuous men in our national legislature, who conceived this a proper fund, out of which to compensate the losses committed by the unjust violences of Britain. That there are cases in which the sequestering and even the forfeiture of debts would be proper, can hardly be disputed; as, for instance, where it might prevent the aggressor from going into a war, by the fear of losing a considerable stake in the hands of his enemy. Where a war has actually broke out, and the sum due is so great as to disable the debtor nation from carrying it on with effect, if she suffered so large a balance to be remitted to her enemy; or where the enemy nation relies on that balance, to support her military operations; surely it will not be disputed, that in either of these cases, in which the safety of the nation so evidently required it, it would be highly imprudent and unjust to the people, to suffer such debts to be paid. So likewise, where the creditor nation had manifested the most hostile intentions, had stimulated barbarians to lead your people into captivity—had employed savages under their [Page]influence, to break up your frontiers, and to murder your wives and children—had, without any pretence from justice, or the laws of nations, compelled your people to fight under their banners against your allies—and had given such interruptions to your commerce, as to distress and ruin your merchants— surely it would be but a slight retaliation for these wrongs, to say to such nation, "we will detain in our hands the balance due to you, till you make ample compensation for the injury you have done us, and if you do not us us justice, we will apply the money ourselves." Our situation is very peculiar; the balance we owe to Britain, including stock in the funds, banks, &c. cannot be less than twenty-five millions of dollars, a much greater sum than the whole circulating specie of the United States. If it should be known in Britain, that a war with us was intended, as much as possible of this capital would instantly be withdrawn from America; the consequence would be, if the government should not interpose to prevent the evil, and retain the money, that in the moment that we wanted credit most, at the entrance into a war, the nation would be bankrupt; the banks and merchants to whom it would look for supplies, would be ruined and unable to afford them aid, while the credit of Britain, supported by our payments, would enable them to effect our destruction.

Again, by the laws of civilized nations, unnecessary and wanton destruction is prohibited; but the seaport towns of America are extremely exposed. Should Britain, in a war with us, or even without war, under some trifling pretence, think proper to burn our towns, and by this means ruin the merchants that were indebted to them, would it not be just in the government, to retaliate upon their merchants, by retaining these debts, until compensation was made, or even to make compensation themselves out of this money? and where is the difference between making it answer one breach of the law of nations more than another? Why is it less proper to compensate the seamen who have lost their liberty, the family who have lost a father or a son, or a merchant who has lost his property, by the most direct violence; than the citizen whose wharf and store are wantonly burned? The truth is, that this debt in our hands had a very considerable influence upon the politics of Britain, with respect to us. There is a great portion of the monied men, who generally go with administration, that would be sensibly affected by the forfeiture, and who are tremblingly alive to every operation of our government with respect to it; while we can work upon their fears, they will always be the advocates for peace with us; remove their apprehensions, and [Page]they will go with administration. There is great reason to believe, that the propositions in congress to sequester this debt, produced the relaxations in their predatory system that took place immediately after. Now, that Mr. Jay has convinced them that they have nothing to fear in future, they have renewed them with equal violence. Can any thing be a better commentary upon the treaty, than the present conduct of their marine? I know that much will be said in reply to this, on the sanctity of public credit, &c. which may indeed prove what I shall readily admit, that so violent a remedy should not be recurred to on slight occasions; but nothing can be said to prove, that no occasion will justify such recurrence, or to convince a free people, that their representatives are not the proper judges of the occasion.

The strict law of nations, as laid down both by Vattel and Binherst, is, that such debts may be forfeited; the USUAL practice is, to stay the payment, but, not forfeit the debts; and the constant practice is, to pay the proceeds of real property, held by the subject of an enemy; into the public treasury, and yet this case is much stronger than the case of debts; because the holder of real property derives his title from the state itself; but it is deemed absurd to let property pass from a state (when at war) to its rival, in order to feed the fire that is to consume themselves.

Let me ask, if a contract were made, during peace, by the merchants of one nation to deliver arms and ammunition to the merchants of another, and a war was to break out, or even to be rendered probable between these nations, would it be wrong to stop the delivery of those arms, though they should have been actually paid for? And is money less a necessary of war, in the present state of things, than arms? Should we be less weakened by paying all the current specie of the country, stopping our banks, and sinking the public funds, than by sending away a few tons of powder, or some hundred stand of arms? But if the law of nations on this subject is clear, to what purpose enter into new stipulations to give it a more binding force? A breach of the law of nations by an enemy, often renders that right which would otherwise have been wrong; retaliation is one of the laws of nations; but that law, so frequently essential to the support of our rights, is, by this article, entirely taken away, so far, at least, as relates to this object. And yet, this is the ground on which we might retaliate with the greatest prospect of success. But in any event, as we will always be the debtor nation, to what purpose are our hands bound? What equivalent do we receive for this important concession? The [Page]having it in our power to hold this up in terrorem, if we never made any other use of it, might answer important purposes. Who can say, that it may not be at sometimes proper to discourage the British from engrossing too great a share in our stocks and banks, or even giving too great a credit to our merchants? we already see the influence they have acquired over the politics of the country by means of these.

The fact is, that this article is dictated by the same principle that pervades so many others in the treaty; our trade and navigation are surrendered to the British. Colonies of their merchants and factors are to be established on the north and on the west, on the sea coast and on the Mississippi Our banks are to be placed in their hands, and that the thraldom of the country may be complete, every encouragement is to be held out to their brethren in England, to extend their credit and fetter the country by the excess of their debt; at the same time, all the resources of the country are to be surrendered to them, even out last farthing is to be drawn away, whenever it may be found necessary to bring us back to our former state of dependence upon their sovereign. Would it not have been wiser in America, to have submitted to the stamp act, with the advantages we enjoyed under the British government, than by yielding to this treaty, to render ourselves equally dependant, without enjoying the rights of subjects? All that she would have drawn away in taxes, would not have equalled our present debt; our seamen would not have been treated so harshly as they now are; our commerce would have been less deranged; and the disgrace of slavery would have been less degrading, if we never had been free.

CATO.

No. XIII.

THE few advocates that the treaty has yet met with, pretend to be zealously attached to the constitution of the United States; and endeavour to persuade weak minds that the opposition to it has originated in opposition to the federal government, and in party views and party principles; yet unfortunately for them, it has so happened, that the states in which there is least of party spirit, manifest most warmth and most unanimity in their opposition. Thus South Carolina, and the city of Charleston particularly, Maryland, Delaware, Jersey, and New-Hampshire, have contained no antifederal party; yet [Page]they are more decided in their disapprobation of the treaty, than New York, Philadelphia, or Boston, where such parties have been supposed to exist. Is it not evident, then, that the support the treaty has received, has originated in party principles, aided by the British interest; while the principal opposition, originating with men who are distinguished for their attachment to the federal government, must be attributed to pure and disinterested patriotism, at whose shrine they have sacrificed their predilection for men and measures, where that predilection clashed with their committee's reports?

It is remarkable, too, that if we look over the list of names of the persons who were members of congress in 1775 and 1776, and subtract from them persons immediately connected with the government, and who may be supposed to have influenced the treaty, we shall find them decided in their opposition to it, even though many of them have for years past retired from politics, and in no sort interfered in the parties of the day.

In Carolina, both the Rutledges and Gadsden.—In Virginia, Jefferson, Madison, the grave and moderate Chancellor Wythe, who himself presided at the meeting that addressed the president on the subject of his proclamation, which was then deemed a test of violent federalism, together with every distinguished citizen of that important state, not holding an office.—In Delaware, the celebrated John Dickinson, the Pennsylvania farmer, whose enlightened pen was among the first, and certainly the most distinguished, that has been marshalled on the side of American freedom.—In Pennsylvania, Governor Mifflin, Chief Justice M'Kean.—In New Jersey I believe none of the old members of congress are now living; but the uniform sentiment of that federal and patriotic state, may be urged as a proof of what their sentiments would have been, had they lived to blush at this blot on their country's honor.—In New York, Floyd and Livingston are known to be decidedly opposed to the treaty. What are those of Schuyler and Duane, Lewis and Morris, the only surviving members, Jay excepted, I know not. That Mr. Jay, though he has made the treaty, does not approve of its principles (unless, in leed, Mr. Jay the negociator, is a different man from Mr. Jay the writer of an address to the citizens of New York on the subject of the federal government) is obvious; for that address, if examined, will be found to urge our union as a mean to regulate our commerce, or to compel foreign nations to relax their impositions, and even to open their islands to us; I speak from memory, not having the address before me. Now, if this sentiment was just then, when our numbers, wealth, and resources, were much [Page]less than at present; and when Britain was at peace, and one hundred millions less in debt than at this day, Mr. Jay must necessarily disapprove now of a treaty, which puts it out of our power to regulate our own commerce; which confirms all the restrictions that we then considered as hostile to our trade and navigation, and an infinite number of new ones, that did not then exist: which, instead of opening their islands, closes them upon us, unless we will consent to purchase an insignificant right to visit them in boats, by a disgraceful surrender of an important part of our commerce. So that we may, on the fullest proof, deduced from his unbiassed declaration, under his own hand, number Mr. Jay among those who in sentiment disapprove of the treaty. The opinions of the then members of Connecticut, if any of them survive, or those of Mr. Samuel Adams or of Mr. Paine (who, however, holds an office) I am unacquainted with. Neither of the gentlemen who then held a place in congress, from Rhode Island, are now living. The only surviving member of that day from New Hampshire (Mr. Langdon) has given his most decided opposition to the treaty; though in so doing, he left his friends in the senate in whom he had most confidence, and the party with which he [...] generally voted. As far as I have yet learned, not one native American, who in those trying times directed the councils of America, and is or has been unconnected with the present administration, has manifested a sentiment favorable to this disgraceful treaty. How little credit then must those advocates [...] it deserve, who endeavour to prop their miserable edifice, by representing its opponents as a factious few, and men ignorant of the great interests of their country?

To this positive evidence of the sense of Americans, upon this subject, may be added very important negative testimony, deduced from the character of its most stedfast supporters. Without having a reference to men in office (whose views it may be improper to explain) we find every British subject, and every man who has been uniformly hostile to American independence, on the side of the treaty. That a few others, who wish well to their country, have acquieseed in the measure, I am ready to acknowledge; attachment to party, personal friendship, a considence in some on whom they are used to repose their political sentiments, family connection, will, in every question, have more or less influence. But as all these profess themselves decided friends to the constitution of the United States, I am persuaded that they will change their sentiments when they are convinced of the un [...]s [...]itutionality of the treaty, of its being at war with every check, with every provision, [Page]by which it guards against the intrusion of one branch upon the rights of another, and which, if suffered, would terminate in despotism.

It will be found that no ratification by the president and senate can carry this treaty into effect, without the concurrence of congress; nor, in some points, even with such concurrence, without the aid of the state legislatures.

No rule is better established, than, that in construing any legal instrument, the whole must be taken together; that if two different parts appear to militate against each other, such a construction, if possible, is to be given them, as to render each sensible without rejecting either; for it is absurd to suppose, that contradictions can be intended, or that unmeaning provisions would be purposely inserted. The constitution of the United States has desined the powers of its different branches—to the executive, it has given a power to make treaties; to the judiciary, a right to judge of all cases arising under such treaties; to congress, a right to regulate commerce with foreign nations and with the Indians, to define piracy, to establish offices, to settle the salary of officers, and to raise and appropriate money. These powers are perfectly distinct from each other, and may be all exercised without interference—Thus the president and senate may make treaties of peace, of alliance, of neutrality, &c. but not such treaties as shall abridge the rights, either of congress or of the judiciary, as to those matters that are expressly reserved to them.

On the other hand, congress shall not interfere, in any treaties, as to those objects which are not expressly reserved to them; nor can they take from the judiciary the right to determine all questions arising on treaties, while such treaties remain in force. On any other construction, one branch of the constitution might possess itself of all the powers reserved to the others. Thus, if the power to make treaties includes a right to regulate commerce, to raise money, to declare war, to appoint officers and settle their salaries, to establish new courts and new rules of jurisprudence, to place in other hands, rights reserved to the judiciary of the United States, to naturalize foreigners, to define and punish piracy and other offences against the United States, then the president and senate, by combining with a foreign nation, can invest themselves with all power, and congress and the judiciary must become useless. If, for instance, the president and senate can agree that three British and two Americans, or vice versa, may draw money at their discretion out of the public treasury, they must, as incident to the power, have a right to appropriate public money, [Page]to controul appropriations already made, and to fill the treasury, if empty, by taxes. For it would be absurd to say, that they have a right to give away public money, and yet that they have no money to give: a clear power always supposes every thing necessary to effectuate such power. If it is said, that they may stipulate for the payment of money; but that congress may or may not, at their discretion, raise and appropriate it to the use designated by such stipulation, then it will follow, that no treaty, which comprises powers reserved to congress, can be binding, until they give it their sanction: in such case, any ratification by the president and senate, until they obtain the assent of congress, must be nugatory; and as it may, also, involve us in disagreeable discussions with foreign powers, it must be intended that they have no right to such useless and perhaps dangerous ratifications. If, indeed, every article made a distinct treaty (which I believe will hardly be contended) then they might, without such assent, ratify these articles which did not interfere with the rights of congress, but as to all others they have no power. If, on the other hand, after a treaty is entered into, congress have no discretion, but must necessarily enact laws to carry it into effect, all the powers of government would be resolvable into the president and senate, and congress are a mere instrument in their hands. And to the millions Mr. Jay has already given away by the treaty, might be added, all the wealth of the United States. A treaty of commerce might tax even our exports in the face of the constitution; for surely if such a treaty can prohibit the exportation of certain commodities as the 12th article does, it might tax them, inasmuch as a prohibition involves greater power than taxation.

If they can create new crimes by treaty, and define the punishment of them, the whole criminal code is subjected to the will of the president and senate. If they can exempt a favorite nation from the operation of existing laws, they may impose burdens upon others: for to repeal a law is not less a legislative act than to make one. Their being able to effectuate this by treaty only, and not in ordinary cases, instead of diminishing, adds to the evil, and the danger the constitution would incur by this construction; since it would thereby enable them to call in a foreign power, to aid in their usurpations; and as such creaties might be kept secret till every necessary measure was taken to enforce them, all resistance to oppression would be vain; nor could the president or senate incur any risk by any attempt to seize all powers under pretence of a treaty, if we once admit that a right to make treaties includes every other [Page]power of government. There are so many absurdities involved in these positions, that it becomes our duty to shew that they do not exist in the constitution, but are to be avoided by an easy and natural construction. First, it appears from the powers given to congress, that they are in every instance to retain their free agency, and cannot be compelled by any other branch of the government to do any act—the words of the constitution are, "congress shall have power;" then follows the enumeration of their powers. They cannot then be forced to raise money in consequence of any treaty, nor to do any other act, derogatory to the rights vested in them. The laws they have passed, or shall pass, in pursuance of such powers, remain in full force, notwithstanding any treaty the executive may form, derogatory to them; nor is there a word in the constitution that sets treaties above the laws of the United States; both together with the constitution itself, are called supreme laws, as contra-distinguished to the laws of particular states only. The words in article VI. of the constitution are, "This constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And the judges in every state, shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It will certainly not be pretended, that treaties are superior to the constitution, under which they are made; on the contrary, as it is held that laws themselves have no force in opposition to the constitution; so it may be inferred from the order in which they are placed, as well as the reason of the thing, that treaties are inferior in force to laws.—Were it otherwise, when a treaty was once ratified, however it might be abused, how destructive soever it might be to the United States in its operation, we never could get rid of it; because the judges, who are sworn to observe the laws, would enforce it. And yet there are many cases, enumerated by the writers on the law of nations, in which a treaty may be justifiably broken; and numberless reasons may exist with the sovereign of the country for violating it.

The only true and sound construction of the constitution is, that treaties are to have the force of laws; but, like all other laws, are subject to the will of the sovereign, that is, to congress; that the power of the president in making treaties, can only extend to cases that are not reserved by the constitution to congress; that whenever he negociates as to other objects, his negociations must be authorized by a prior or subsequent law. Though this construction may involve some inconveniencies, yet [Page]it avoids absurdities. It gives force to every part of the constitution; it rejects no provisions in it, nor makes one part clash with another. It is consistent with the practice in mixed governments—thus, in Britain, the king may make treaties; but, when money is necessary to carry them into effect, when they clash with the laws of the nation, a legislative provision is necessary to give them effect. And the parliament can at any time make laws in the face of a treaty; though, until such laws are made, the treaty is respected by the courts. Whatever has been said with respect to the rights of the president and senate, as opposed to the exclusive rights of congress, applies with equal force to the rights of states; where the treaty is made relative to objects not surrendered by them, the treaty that is binding upon them, must be constitutionally made, and consist with the powers yielded to the federal government; otherwise the president might barter away the independence of individual states, which makes a necessary part of the constitution of the United States, and which is expressly guaranteed.

Now, let us apply these principles to the treaty—And to begin with the sixth article. By this article commissioners are to be appointed, two by the British king, two by the president and senate; the fifth by the other four, or by lot. These commissioners are to sit as a court, to determine questions relative to the demands of the British merchants—They are to examine the parties on oath, to fix their own rules of evidence, and to decide not by the laws of the country, but according to their ideas of j [...]tice and equity. Their decision is to be both arbitrary and final.

The first enquiry is into the right of the president and senate to appoint the commissioners contemplated by this article. If they have any such right, it must be derived from the constitution; for it will not be pretended that the king of Great Britain can give them new rights, or that they can enlarge their own power, by entering into a treaty with a foreign nation. Yet the only powers the president and senate have, relative to this object, are, to "appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein provided for, and which shall be established by law." Here the officers that the executive may appoint, are enumerated; and so careful is the constitution to prevent their using any improper discretion, in the creation of unnecessary officers, that it expressly limits the powers of appointment as to all others, to such as shall be es [...]shed by [...]ve. The only question, then, is, whether the commissioners contemp [...] by the treaty are in [Page]the class of enumerated officers—They are not ambassadors, consuls, judges of the supreme court, nor are they established by law. To say that the treaty is a law, and that therefore all officers established by treaty, are established by law, would only be to argue in a circle, and to go back [...]o the point we started from. It would be to assert, that every thing might be done by treaty, which could be done by law; and, as I have before said, that under the form of a treaty, the president and senate might assume all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary. The question then is, whether they are the public ministers contemplated by the constitution? It is evident, from the words public ministers, following the word ambassadors, and preceding the word consuls, that diplomatic ministers only could be intended; since it takes the highest and lowest of these, and uses general words to "other public ministers," to designate the various intermediate grades. But surely, commissioners, who are to hold their sessions in our own country, and to determine questions of private jurisprudence, cannot in this sense be denominated public ministers; as well might we call the auditor a public minister, because he settles the accounts of strangers and citizens; or the attorney general, whose duty it is to see that the subjects of foreign princes are not maltreated. In one sense, indeed, not only they, but every other officer of the state, is a public minister; but that this is not the sense of the constitution, is evident from its enumerating certain public officers, as, for instance, judges of the supreme court (who, [...] is extensive sense, are also public ministers) and from its [...] [...]ring the right of appointment, as to all others; "to such as shall be established by law" it is evident, that the constitution must have assixed some specific idea to the words "other public ministers." What that idea was, appears clearly from the context; and it would be the grossest abuse, to extend it to a species of officers that never existed either in this, nor, as I believe, in any other country in the world. In the third section, the same idea is still pursued—"He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers."

The constitution also preserves a right to vest the appointment of officers (other than those enumerated) either in the president alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments. By what authority, then, can Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville, or the president and senate, over-rule the constitution, and assume a power to controul the rights of congress, to create the office, and to place it in such hands as they think proper, under the above limitations? But such are the powers of these commissioners, as even congress itself cannot authorize, without [Page]viclating the constitution.—They are to determine upon certain rights, which British subjects claim under the treaty of Paris, which was an existing treaty at the time the constitution was acceded to; of course, must have been in contemplation when the second section of the third article of the sederal constitution declared, "that the judicial power shall extend to ALL CASES in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." "In all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party."

Now, let me ask, whether the cases that are to fall under the jurisdiction of these commissioners are not, 1st, A case under a treaty made? and 2d, whether the United States are not parties? What power then exists either in the president and senate, or even in the legislature, to assume this right, which the union has vested in a judiciary, whom it has expressly declared to be independent of both: Or will it be said, that the power of making treaties, implies a right to trample under foot every check that the constitution has provided against the abuses of either branch of government? Should the treasurer of the United States pay money out of the treasury in pursuance of any adjudication of these commissioners, and be afterwards called to an account for the same, before the judges of the supreme court, could he expect that they would suffer him to issue an order which clashes with their own powers and derogates fr [...]e constitution? I know that incoveniencies may arise fr [...]re not existing a power in the United States to determine controversies arising under treaties by the intervention of commissioners; I know also, that great security is derived from having the true construction of them determined by the courts, and preventing the misapplication of public money, by leaving the disposition of it to tribunals that are bound by none of the solemn forms of law: Whether the inconvenience does or does not over-balance these advantages, is at present out of the question. It is sufficient for me, and should be for the executive, that such is the constitution: If it is defective, let it be amended; but while it exists, it is sacred.

The eighth article also provides for the payment of this high commission court, and settles, that their salaries and expenses shall be regulated by treaty; so that the president and the senate are not only to appoint officers unknown to, and in the face of, the constitution, but to assume a right which they never yet have presumed to exercise, even where the officers were legally appointed, that of fixing their salaries—and this tou in concurrence with his Brit [...]nnic majesty.

CATO

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 199.]

No. XII.

THE remaining allegations, in disparagement of the third article, are to this effect

1. That the exception of the country of the Hudson's Bay company, owing to its underfined limits, renders the stipulations in our favor, in a great measure, nugatory.

2. That the privileges granted to Great Britain in our Mississippi ports, are impolitic, because without reciprocity.

3. That the agreement to forbear to lay duties of entry on peltries, is the surrender, without equivalent, of a valuable item of revenue, and will give the British the facility of carrying on their fur trade through us, with the use of our advantages.

4. That the articles, which will be brought from Europe into Canada, coming duty free, can be afforded cheaper than the same articles going thither from us, charged with a heavy duty on their importation into the United States, and with the expense of a long transportation by land, and inland navigation.

5. That the population of Canada, which, by a census in 1784, amounted only to 123, 082 souls, is too small to render the supply of European and Asiatic commodities, throu [...], of so much importance as to bear any comparison with [...] loss by the sacrifice of the fur trade.

6. That the intercourse to be permitted with the British territories will fa [...]tate smuggling, to the injury of our revenue.

7. That the much greater extent of the United States than of the British territories, destroys real reciprocity in the privileges granted by this article, giving, in fact, far greater advantages than are received.

These suggestions will be discussed in the order in which they are here stated:—

1. It is true, that the country of the Hudson's Bay company is not well defined. Their charter, granted in 1670, gives them "the sole trade and commerce of and to all the seas, bays, streights, creeks, lakes, rivers, and sounds, in whatsoever latitude they shall be, that he within the entrance of the streights commonly called Hudson's Streights, together with all the lands, countries, and territories upon the coasts and confines of the said seas, streights, bays, &c. which are now actually possessed by any of our subjects, or by the subjects of any other Christian prince of state"

[Page] To ascertain their territorial limits, according to charter, it would be necessary to know what portion of country, at the time of the grant, was actually possessed by the subjects of Great Britain, or of some other Christian prince or state; but though this be not known, the general history of the country, as to settlement, will demonstrate, that it could not have extended far westward, certainly not to that region which is the scene of trade in furs, commonly called the north west trade, carried on by the Canada company from Canada; the possession of whi [...], as far as possession exists, is recent. We learn from a traveller who has lately visited that region, that one of this company's establishments is in lat. 56, 9, N. long. 117, 43, W. that is, about 20 degrees of longitude westward of the lake of the Woods; and it is generally understood, that the entire scene of the trade of this company is westward of the limits of the Hudson's Bay company.

Canada, on the north, is bounded by the territories of the Hudson's Bay company.—This is admitted by the treaty of Utrecht, and established by the act of parliament in 1774, commonly called the Quebec act.—The treaty of Utrecht provides for the settlement of the boundaries by commissaries. I have not been able to trace whether the line was ever actually so settled; but several maps lay down a line as the one settled by the treaty of Utrecht, which runs north of the lake of the Woods.

In a [...] [...]us situated, the United States will justly claim, under the article, access to all that country, the trade of which is now carried [...]through Canada. This will result both from the certainty that there were no actual possessions, at the dare of the charter, so far interior, and from the fact of the trade being carried on through a different channel, by a different company, under the superintendance and protection of different government, that of Canada. It may be asked, why was the article embarrassed by the exception of the country of the Hudson's Bay company? The answer is this, That the charter of this company gives to it a monopoly within its limits, and, therefore, a right to trade there could not have been granted, with propriety, to a foreign power, by treaty. It is true that it has been questioned, whether this monopoly was valid against British subjects, seeing that the charter had not been confirmed by act of parliament. But besides that this doubt has been consined to British subjects, it would appear, that, in fact, the company has enjoyed the monopoly granted by its charter, even against them, and with at least the implied approbation of parliament. In the year 1749, petitions were preferred to the [Page]house of commons, by different trading towns in England, for rescinding the monopoly, and opening the trade.—An enquiry was instituted by the house. The report of its committee was favorable, to the conduct and pretensions of the company, and against the expediency of opening the trade; and the business terminated there.

This circumstance of there being a monopoly, confirms the argument drawn from the fact, that the north west trade is carried on through Canada by the Canada company: a decisive presumption, that the scene of that trade is not within the country of the Hudson's Bay company, and is, consequently, within the operation of the privilege granted to us.

Though it will be partly a digression, I cannot forbear, in this place, to notice some observations of CATO, in his Xth number—After stating, that in 1784 the peltry from Canada sold in London for 230, 000 l. sterling, he proceeds to observe, that, excluding the territories of the Hudson's Bay company, nine-tenths of this trade is within the limits of the United States; and, though with studied ambiguity of expression, he endeavours to have it understood, that nine-tenths of the trade which yielded the peltry, that sold for 230, 000 l. sterling in 1784, was within our territories. It is natural to ask, how he has ascertained the limits of the Hudson's Bay company (which, at other times, is asserted, by way of objection to the article, to be altogether indefinite) with so much exactness as to be able to pronounce what proportion, if any, of the trade carried on through Canada may have come from that country, [...]wards the calculation which has led to the conclusion, that nine-tenths of the whole lies within our limits? The truth is indubitably and notoriously, that whether any or whatever part of the peltry exported from Canada may come from the country of the Hudson's Bay company, seven-eights* of the whole trade which furnishes that peltry, has its source on the British side of the boundary line. It follows, that if it were even true, that only one-tenth of the whole lay in that part of the British territory, which is not of the Hudson's Bay company, inasmuch as only one-seventh of it lies within our limits, the result would be, that the trade, in which we granted an equal privilege, was to that in which a like privilege is granted to us, as oneseventh to one-tenth, and not, according to Cato, as nine to one. This legerdemain, in argument and calculation, is really too frivolous for so serious a subject. Or, to speak more properly, it is too shocking, by the spirit of deception which it [Page]betrays. Cato has a further observation, with regard to the trade with the Indians, in the vicinity of the Mississppi, and from that river into the Spanish territories.—The product of all this trade, he says, must go down the Mississippi, and, but for the stipulation of the third article, would have been exclusively ours; because, "by the treaty of Paris, though the British might navigate the Mississippi, yet they did not own a foot of land upon either of its banks; whereas the United States possessing all the Indian country, in the vicinity of that river and the east bank for many hundred miles, could, when they pleased, establish factories and monopolize that commerce." This assertion, with regard to the treaty of Paris, is in every sense incorrect; for the seventh article of that treaty, establishes as a boundary between the dominions of France and his Britannic majesty, "a line drawn along the middle of the river Mississippi, from its source to the river Iberville, and from thence by a line drawn along the middle of this river and the lakes Maurepas and Pont Chartraim to the sea," and cedes to his Britannic majesty all the country on the east side of the Mississippi. By the treaty of Paris then, his Britannic majesty owned all, except the town and island of New Orleans, the territory on the east side of the Mississippi, instead of not having a foot of land there.

What part of this territory does not still belong to him, is a point not yet settled. The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, supposes that part will remain to Great Britain; for one line of boundary between us and her, designated by that treaty is a line due west from the lake of the woods to the Mississippi. If, in fact, this river runs far enough north to be interfected by such a line, according to the supposition of the last mentioned treaty, so much of that river, and the land upon it, as shall be north of the line of intersection, will continue to be of the dominion of Great Britain. The lately-made treaty, not abandoning the possibility of this being the case, provides for a survey to ascertain the fact; and in every event, the intent of the treaty of peace will require, that some closing line, more or less direct, shall be drawn from the lake of the Woods to the Mississippi. The position therefore, that Great Britain has no land or ports on the Mississippi, takes for granted, what is not ascertained, and of which the contrary is presumed by the treaty of peace.

The trade with the Indian country on our side of the Mississippi, from the Ohio to the lake of the Woods (if that river extends so far north) some fragments excepted, has its present direction through Detriot and Michillimachinac, and is included [Page]in many calculations, heretofore stated, of the proportion which the Indian trade within our limits, bears to that within the British limits. Its estimated amount is even understood to embrace the proceeds of a clandestine trade with the Spainsh territories; so that the new scene suddenly explored by Cato, is old and trodden ground, the special reference to which cannot vary the results that have been presented. It is still unquestionably and notoriously true, that the fur trade within our limits, bears no proportion to that within the British limits. As to a contingent traffic with the territories of Spain, each party will be free to pursue it according to right and opportunity; each would have, independent of the treaty, the facility of bordering territories. The geography of the best regions of the fur trade, in the Spanish territories, is too little known, to be much reasoned upon; and if the Spaniards, according to their usual policy, incline to exclude their neighbours, their precautions along the Mississippi will render the access to it circuitous: a circumstance which makes it problematical, whether the possession of the opposite bank is, as to that object, an advantage or not, and whether we may not find it convenient to be able, under the treaty, to take a circuit through the British territories.

2. It is upon the suggestion of Great Britain having no ports on the Mississippi, that the charge of want of reciprocity in the privileges granted, with regard to the use of that river, is founded. The suggestion has been shown to be more peremptory than is justified by facts. Yet it is still true, that the ports on our side bear no proportion to any that can exist on the part of the British, according to the present state of territory. It will be examined in a subsequent place, how far this disproportion is a proper rule in the estimate of reciprocity. But let it be observed, in the mean time, that in judging of the reciprocity of an article, it is to be taken collectively. If, upon the whole, the privileges obtained, are as valuable as those granted, there is a substantial reciprocity; and to this test, upon full and fair examination of the article, I freely refer the decision. Besides, if the situation of Great Britain did not permit in this particular, a precise equivalent, it will not follow that the grant on our part was improper, unless it can be shown, that it was attended with some inconvenience, injury, or loss to us; a thing which has not been, and I believe cannot be shown. Perhaps there is a very importantly beneficial side to this question. The treaty of peace established between us and Great Britain, a common interest in the Mississippi; the present treaty strengthens that common interest. Every body knows, that the use of the river is denied so by Spain, and that it is an Indispensible outlet to [Page]our western country. Is it an inconvenient thing to us, that the interest of Great Britain has, in this particular, been more completely separated from that of Spain and more closely connected with ours?

3. The agreement to forbear to lay duties of entry on peltries, is completely defensible on the following grounds, viz. It is the general policy of commercial nations to exempt raw materials from duty. This has likewise been the uniform policy of the United States; and it has particularly embraced the article of peltries, which, by our existing laws, may be imported into any part of the United States free from duty. The object of this regulation is the encouragement of manufactures, by facilitating a cheap supply of raw materials. A duty of entry, therefore, as to such part of the article as might be worked up at home, would be prejudicial to our manufacturing interest; as to such part as might be exported, if the duty was not drawn back, would injure our commercial interest. But it is the general policy of our laws, in conformity with the practice of other commercial countries, to draw back and return the duties which are charged upon the importation of foverign commodities. This has reference to the advancement of the export trade of the country; so that, with regard to such peltries as should be re-exported, there would be no advantage to our revenue from having laid a duty of entry. Such a duty, then, being contrary to our established system and to true principles, there can be no objection to a stipulation against it.— As to its having the effect of making our country the channel of the British trade in peltries, this, if true, and it is indeed probable, could not but promote our interest. A large proportion of the profits would then necessarily remain with us, to, compensate for transportation and agencies. It is likely, too that to secure the fidelity of agents, as is usual, copartnerships would be formed, of which British capital would be the principal instrument, and which would throw a still greater proportion of the profits into our hands. The more we can make our country the entrepot, the emporium of the trade of foreigners, the more we shall profit. There is no commercial principle more obvious than this, more universally agreed, or more generally nerally practised upon, in countries where commerce is well understood.

4. The fourth of the above enumerated suggestions, is answered, in its principal point, by the practice just stated, of drawing back the duties on importation, when articles are reexported. This would place the articles, which we should send into the British territories, exactly upon the same footing, as [Page]to duties, with the same articles imported there from Europe. With regard to the additional expense of transportation, this is another instance of the contradiction of an argument, which has been relied upon by both sides, which is, that taking the voyage from Europe in conjunction with the interior transportation, the advantage, upon the whole, is likely to be in our favor. And it is upon this aggregate transportation, that the calculation ought to be made. With respect to India or Asiatic articles, there is the circumstance of a double voyage.

5. As to the small population of Canada, which is urged to depreciate the advantages of the trade with the white inhabitants of those countries, it is to be observed, that this population is not stationary. If the date of the census be rightly quoted, it was taken eleven years ago, when there were already 123, 082 souls. It is presumable, that this number will soon be doubled; for it is notorious, that settlement has proceeded for some years with considerable rapidity in Upper Canada; and there is no reason to believe that the future progress will be slow. In time to come, the trade may grow into real magnitude; but be it more or less beneficial, it is so much gaified by the article; and so much clear gain, since it has been shown not to be true, that it is counterbalanced by a sacrifice in the fur trade.

With regard to the supposed danger of smuggling, in the intercourse permitted by this article, it is very probable, it will be found less than if it were prohibited. Entirely to prevent trade between bordering territories is a very arduous, perhaps an impracticable task. If not authorized, so much as is carried on must be illicit; and it may be reasonably presumed, that the extent of illicit trade will be much greater in that case, than where an intercourse is permitted, under the usual regulations and guards. In the last case, the inducement to it is less, and such as will only influence persons of little character or principle, while every fair trader is, from private interest, a centinel to the laws; in the other case, all are interested to break through the barriers of a rigorous and apparently unkind prohibition. This consideration has probably had its weight with our government in opening a communication through lake Champlain with Canada; of the principle of which regulation, the treaty is only an extension.

7. The pretended inequality of the article, as arising from the greater extent of the United States than of the British territories, is one of those fanciful positions, which are so apt to haunt the brains of visionary politicians. Traced through all its consequences, it would terminate in this, that a great empire [Page]could never form a treaty of commerce with a small one; for, to equalize advantages according to the scale of territory, the small state must compensate for its deficiency in extent, by a greater quantum of positive privilege, in proportion to the difference of extent, which would give the larger state the monopoly of its trade. According to this principle, what wretched treaties have we made with France, Sweden, Prussia, and Holland! For our territories exceed in extent those of either of these powers. How immense the sacrifice in the case of Holland; for the United States are one hundred times larger than the United Provinces.

But how are we sure, that the extent of the United States is greater than the territories of Great Britain on our continent? We know that she has pretensions to extend to the Pacifice Ocean, and to embrace a vast wilderness, incomparably larger than the United States, and we are told, as already mentioned, that her trading establishments now actually extend beyond the 56th degree of north latitude, and 117th degree of west longitude.

Shall we be told (shifting the original ground) that not extent of territory, but extent of population is the measure? Then how great is the advantage which we gain in this particular, by the treaty at large? The population of Great Britain is to that of the United States, about two and a half to one; and the comparative concession by her in the trade between her European dominions and the United States, must be in the same ratio. When we add to this the great population of her East India possessions, in which privileges are granted to us, without any return, how prodigiously will the value of the treaty be enhanced, according to this new and extraordinary rule!

But the rule is, in fact, an absurd one, and only merits the notice which has been taken of it, to exhibit the weak grounds of the opposition to the treaty. The great standard of reciprocity is equal privilege. The adventitious circumstances, which may render it more beneficial to one party than the other, can seldom be taken into the account, because they can seldom he estimated with certainly; the relative extent of country or population, is of all others, a most fallacious guide.

The comparative resources and facilities for mutual supply, regulate the relative utility of a commercial privilege; and as far as population is concerned, it may be laid down, as a general rule, that the smallest population graduates the scale of the trade on both sides, since it is at once the principal measure of what the smaller state can furnish to the greater, and of what it can take from the greater; or, in other words, of what the [Page]greater state can find a demand for in the smaller state. But this rule, too, like most general ones, admits of numerous exceptions.

In case of a trade by land and inland navigation, the sphere of the operation of any privilege can only extend a certain distance. When the distance to a given point, through a particular channel, is such that the expense of transportation would render an article dearer than it could be brought through another channel to the same point, the privilege to carry the article through that particular channel to such point, becomes of no avail. Thus the privilege of trading by land or inland navigation from the British territories on this continent, can procure to that country no advantage of trade with Princeton in New-Jersey, because supplies can come to it on better terms from other quarters. Whence we perceive, that the absolute extent of territory or population of the United States, is no measure of the relative value of the privileges reciprocally granted by the article under consideration, and, consequently, no criterion of the real reciprocity of the article.

The objectors to the treaty have marshalled against this article a quaint figure, of which from the use of it in different quarters, it is presumable they are not a little enamoured; it is this, that the article enables Great Britain to draw a line of circumvallation round the United States. They hope to excite prejudice, by presenting to the mind, the image of a siege or investment of the country. If trade be war, they have chosen a most apt figure; and we cannot but wonder, how the unfortunate island of Great Britain, has been able so long to maintain her independence amidst the beleaguering efforts of the number of nations with whom she has been imprudent enough to form treaties of commerce; and who, from her insular situation, have it in their power to beset and hem her in on all sides. How lucky it is for the United States, that at least one side is covered by Spain, and that this formidable line of circumvallation cannot be completely perfected! or rather how hard driven must those be, who are obliged to call to their aid, auxiliaries so preposterous!

Can any good reason be given, why one side of a country should not be accessible to foreigners, for purposes of trade, equally with another? Might not the cultivators on the side from which they were excluded, have cause to complain, that the carriage of their productions was subject to an increased charge, by a monopoly of the national navigation; while the cultivators in other quarters enjoyed the benefit of a competition between that and foreign navigation? and might not all the inhabitants have a right to demand a reason, why their [Page]commerce should be less open and free, than that of other parts of the country? Will privileges of trade extend the line of territorial circumvallation? Will not the extent of contiguous British territory remain the same, whether the communications of trade are open or shut? By opening them, may we not rather be said to make so many breaches in the wall, or intrenchment, of this newly invented circumvallation? if indeed it be not enchanted!

The argument upon this article, has hitherto turned, as to the trade with the white inhabitants of the British territories on European and East India goods. But there can be no doubt that a mutually-beneficial commerce in native commodition ought to be included in the catalogue of advantages. Already there is a useful interchange of certain commodities, which time and the progress of settlement and resources cannot fail to extend. It is most probable, too, that a considerable part of the productions of the British territories will find the most convenient channel to foreign markets through us; which, as for as it regards the interest of external commerce, will yield li [...] less advantage, than if they proceeded from our own soil or industry. It is evident, in particular, that as far as this shall be the case, it will prevent a great part of the competition with our commodities which would exist, if those productions took other routes to foreign markets.

In considering the subject, on the side of a trade in home commodities, it is an imporrtant reflection, that the United States are much more advanced in industrious improvement, than the British territories. This will give us a material and growing advantage. While their articles of exchange with us will essentially consist in the products of agriculture and of mines, we shall add to these, manufactures of various and multiplying kinds, serving to increase the balance in our favor.

In proportion as the article is viewed on enlarged plan and permanent scale, its importance to us magnifies. Who can say how far British colonization may spread southward and down the west side of the Mississippi, northward and westward into the vast interior regions towards the Pacific Ocean? Can we view it as a matter of indifference, that this new world is eventually laid open to our enterprize, to an enterprize seconded by the immense advantage already mentioned, of a more improved state of industry? Can we be insensible, that the precedent furnishes us with a cogent and persuasive argument to bring Spain to a similar arrangement? And can we be blind to the great interest we have, obtaining a free communication [Page]with all the territories that environ our country, from the St. Mary's to the St. Croix.

In this large view of the subject, the fur trade, which has made a very prominent figure in the discussion, becomes a point scarcely visible. Objects of great variety and magnitude, start up in perspective, eclipsing the little atoms of the day, and promising to grow and mature with time.

The result of the whole is, that the United States; make by the third article of the treaty a good bargain—that with regard to the fur trade, with equality of privileges and superior advantages of situation, we stake one against seven, or at most one against six—that as to the trade in European and East Indian goods and in home productions, we make an equal stake with some advantages of situation—that we open an immense field of future enterprize—that we avoid embarrassments and dangers ever attendant on an artificial and prohibitory policy, which, in reference to the Indian nations, was particularly difficult and hazardous—and that we secure those of a natural and liberal policy, and give the fairest chances for good neighbourhood between the United States and the bordering British territories, and consequently of good understanding with Great Britain, conducing to the security of our peace. Experience, no doubt, will demonstrate that the horrid spectres which have been conjured up, are fictions; and if it should even be slow to realize the predicted benefits (for time will be requisite to give permanent causes their due effect in controuling temporary circumstances) it will at last prove, that the predicted evils are chimeras and cheats.

CAMILLUS.

No. XIII.

THE fourth and fifth articles of the treaty, from similarity of object, will naturally be considered together. The fourth, reciting a doubt, "whether the river Mississippi extends so far north-westward, as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the lake of the Woods, in the manner mentioned by the treaty of peace" agrees, that measures shall be taken in concert between the two governments, to make a joint survey of that river, from a degree of latitude below the [Page]falls of St. Anthony, to the principal source or sources thereof, and of the parts adjacent thereto; and that if in the result it should appear that the said river would not be intersected by such a line as above mentioned, the two parties will proceed by amicable negociation, to regulate the boundary line in that quarter as well as all other points to be adjusted between them, according to justice and mutual convenience, and the intent of the treaty of peace. The fifth, reciting that doubts have arisen, what river was truly intended under the name of the river St. Croix, mentioned in the treaty of peace, and forming a part of the boundary therein described, provid [...] that the ascertainment of the point shall be referred to th [...] commissioners, to be appointed thus: one to be named by his Britannic majesty, another by the president of the Uni [...]d States, with the advice and consent of the senate, the third by these two, if they can agree in the choice; but if they cannot agree, then each of them to name a person, and o [...] of the persons named, one drawn by lot in their presence to [...] the third commissioner—These commissioners are to mee [...] Halifax, with power to adjourn to any place or places they [...] think proper—are to be sworn to examine and decide [...] question according to the evidence which shall be laid be [...] them by both parties—and are to pronounce their decisi [...] which is to be conclusive, by a written declaration under thei [...] hands and seals, containing a description of the river and particularly the latitude and longitude of its mouth and of i [...] source.

These articles, though they have been adjusted with critical propriety, have not escaped censure. They have even in one instance been severely reprobated, as bringing into question, things about which there was no room for any—and which a bare inspection of the map was sufficient to settle.

With regard to the Mississippi, there is no satisfactory evidence that it has ever been explored to its source.—It is even asserted, that it has never been ascended beyond the 45th degree of north latitude, about a degree above the falls of St. Anthony. Fadeus's map in 1793, will serve as a specimen of the great uncertainty which attends this matter. It notes that the river had not been ascended beyond the degree of latitude just mentioned, and exhibits three streams, one connected with the Marshy Lake in that latitude, another with the White Bear Lake near the 46th degree, and the third with the Red Lake in the 47th degree; denominating each of the two first, "the Mississippi by conjecture," and the last, "Red Lake River, or Laboutan's Mississippi,"—all of them falling considerably [Page]short, in their northern extent, of the lake of the Woods, which is placed as high as the fiftieth degree of north latitude. Thus stands this very clear and certain point, which, we are told, it was disgraceful on the part of our envoy to have suffered to be brought into question.

There is, however, a specific topic of blame of the article which has greater plausibility. It is this, that it does not finally settle the question, but refers the adjustment of the closing line to future negociation, in case it should turn out that the river does not stretch far enough north to be intersected by an east and west line from the lake of the Woods. I answer, that the arrangement is precisely such as it ought to have been. It would have been premature to provide a substitute till it was ascertained that it was necessary—This could only be done by an actual survey—A survey is therefore provided for and will be made at the joint expense of the two countries.

That survey will not only determine whether a substitute be requisite or not; but it will furnish data for judging what substitute is proper, and most conformable to the true intent of the treaty.—Without the data which it will afford, any thing that could have been done, would have been too much a leap in the dark. National acts, especially on the important subject of boundary; ought to be bottomed on a competent knowledge of circumstances. It ought to be clearly understood how much is retained, how much is relinquished. Had our envoy proceeded on a different principle, if what he had agreed to had turned out well, it would have been regarded as, the lucky result of an act of supererogation—If it had proved disadvantageous, it would have been stigmatized as an act of improvidence and imprudence.

The strong argument for having settled an alternative is the avoiding of future dispute. But what alternative could have been agreed upon, which might not have bred controversy? The closing line must go directly or indirectly to the Mississippi—which of the streams reputed or conjectured to be such, above the falls of St. Anthony, is best emitted to be so confidered? To what known point was the line to be directed? How was that point to be identisied with adequate certainty? The difficulty of answering these questions, will evince, that the danger of controversy might have been increased by an impatience to avoid it, and by anticipating, without the necessary lights, an adjustment which they ought to direct.

The facts, with regard to the river St. Croix, are these: the question is, which of two rivers is the true St. Croix. The dispute concerning it is as old as the French possession of Nova [Page]Scotia. France set up one river; Great Britain another. The point was undecided when the surrender of Nova Scotia by the former to the latter, put an end to the question as between those parties—It was afterwards renewed between the colonies of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts Bay, which last, in the year 1762, appointed commissioners to ascertain, in conjunction with commissioners which might be appointed by the province of Nova Scotia, the true river, but no final settlement of the matter ensued.

The treaty of peace gives us for one boundary, the river St. Croix, but without designating it. Hence it has happened, that not long after the peace was concluded, the question, which had been before agitated between France and Great Britain, and between the provinces of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, was revived between the state of Massachusetts and that province, and it has ever since continued a subject of debate.

A mode of settling the dispute was under the consideration of congress in the year 1785; and powers were given to our then minister at the court of London, to adjust the affair, but nothing was concluded. And we learn from a letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, dated the 15th December, 1791, that it then also, engaged the attention of our government; that the ascertaining of the point in dispute was deemed a matter of "present urgency," and that it had before been the subject of application from the United States to the government of Great Britain.

It is natural to suppose, that a dispute of such antiquity, between such different parties, is not without colourable foundation on either side: at any rate, it was essential to the preservation of peace that it should be adjusted.

If one party could not convince the other by argument, of the superior solidity of its pretensions, I know of no alternative but arbitration or war. Will any one pretend that honor required us in such a case to go to war, or that the object was of a nature to make it our interest to refer it to that solemn, calamitous, and precarious issue? No rational man will answer this question in the affirmative. It follows, that an arbitration was the proper course, and that our envoy acted rightly in acceding to this expedient. It is one, too, not without precedents among nations, though it were to be wished, for the credit of human moderation, that they were more frequent.

Is there any good objection to the mode of the arbitration? It seems impossible, that any one more fair or convenient could have been devised, and it is recommended by its analogy to what is common among individuals.

[Page] What the mode is, has been already detailed, and need not be repeated here. It is objected, that too much has been left to chance; but no substitute has been offered, which would have been attended with less casualty. The fact is, that none such can be offere [...].—Conscious of this, those who make the objection have not thought fit to give an opportunity of comparison by proposing a substitute. What is left to chance? Not that there shall be a final decision; for this is most effectually provided for. It is not only positively stipulated that commissioners, with full and definitive power, shall be appointed, but an ultimate choice is secured, by reserring, in the last resort, to a decision by lot, what it might not be practicable to decide by agreement. This is the ne plus ultra of precaution. Is it that this reference to lot leaves it too uncertain of what character or disposition the third commissioner may be? If this be not rather a recommendation of the fairness of the plan, how was it to remedied? Could it have been expected of either of the parties, to leave the nomination to the other? Certainly not. Would it have been advisable to have referred the ultimate choice to some other state or government? Where would one have been found, in the opinion of both parties, sufficiently impártial? On which side would there have been the greatest danger of a successful employment of undue influence? Is it not evident, that this expedient would have added to equal uncertainty, as to character and disposition, other casualties and more delay? Should it have been left to the two commissioners, appointed by the parties to agree at all events? It might have been impossible for them to come to an agreement, and then the whole plan of settlement would have been frustrated. Would the sword have been a more certain arbiter? Of all uncertain things, the issues of war are the most uncertain. What do objections of this kind prove, but that there are persons resolved to object at all events?

The submission of this question to arbitration has been represented as an eventual dismemberment of empire, which, it has been said, cannot rightly be agreed to, but in a case of extreme necessity. This rule of extreme necessity is manifestly only applicable to a cession or relinquishment of a part of a country, held by a clear and acknowledged title; not to a case of disputed boundary.

It would be a horrid and destructive principle, that nations could not terminate a dispute about the title to a particular parcel of territory, by amicable agreement, or by submission to arbitration as its substitute; but would be under an indispensible obligation to prosecute the dispute by arms, till real danger to [Page]the existence of one of the parties should justify, by the plea of extreme necessity, a surrender of its pretensions.

Besides, the terms in which writers lay down the rule, and the reason of it, will instruct us that where it does apply, it relates not to territory as such, but to those who inhabit it, on the principle that the social compact entitles all the members of the society to be protected and maintained by the common strength in their rights and relations as members. It is understood, that the territory between the two rivers in dispute, is either uninhabited, or inhabited only by settlers under the British. If this be so, it obviates all shadow of difficulty on our side. But be it as it may, it would be an abuse of the rule, to oppose it to the amicable adjustment of an ancient controversy, about the title to a particular tract of country, depending on a question of fact, whether this or that river be the one truly intended by former treaties between the parties. The question is not, in this case, shall we cede a part of our country to another power? It is this—To whom does this tract of country truly belong? Should the weight of evidence be on the British side, our faith, pledged by the treaty, would demand from us an acquiescence in their claim. Not being able to agree in opinion on this point, it was most equitable and most agreeable to good faith to submit it to an impartial arbitration.

It has been asked, among other things, whether the United States were competent to the adjustment of the matters without the special consent of the state of Massachusetts. Reserving a more particular solution of this question to a separate discussion of the constitutionality of the treaty, I shall content myself with remarking here, that our treaty of peace with Great Britain, by settling the boundaries of the United States without the specific consent or authority of any state, assumes the principle, that the government of the United States was of itself competent to the regulation of boundary with foreign powers— that the actual government of the Union has even more plenary authority with regard to treaties, than was possessed under the confederation, and that acts, both of the former and of the present government, presuppose the competency of the national authority to decide the question in the very instance under consideration. I am informed, also, that the state of Massachusetts has, by repeated acts, manifested a corresponding sense on the subject.

A reflection not unimportant occurs here. It was perhaps, in another sense than has been hitherto noticed, a point of predence in both governments to [...]er the matter in dispute to arbitration. If one had yielded to the pretensions of the other, it [Page]could hardly have failed to draw upon itself complaints, and censures, more or less extensive, from quarters immediately interested or affected.

CAMILLUS.

No. XIV.

THE sixth article stipulates compensation to British creditors for losses and damages which may have been sustained by them, in consequence of certain legal impediments, which, since the treaty of peace with Great Britain, are alleged to have obstructed the recovery of debts bona fide contracted with them before the peace.

To a man who has a due sense of the sacred obligation of a just debt, a proper conception of the pernicious influence of laws which infringe the rights of creditors, upon morals, upon the general security of property, upon public as well as private credit, upon the spirit and principles of good government; who has an adequate idea of the sanctity of the national faith, explicitly pledged—of the ignominy attendant upon a violation of it in so delicate a particular as that of private pecuniary contracts—of the evil tendency of a precedent of this kind to the political and commercial interests of the nation generally—every law which has existed in this country, interfering with the recovery of the debts in question, must have afforded matter of serious regret and real afflicton. To such a man, it must be among the most welcome features of the present treaty, that it stipulates reparation for the injuries which laws of that description may have occasioned to individuals, and that, as far as is now practicable, it wipes away from the national reputation the stain which they have cast upon it. He will regard it as a precious tribute to justice, and as a valuable pledge for the more strict future observance of our public engagements; and he would deplore as an ill-omened symptom of the depravation of public opinion, the success of the attempts which are making to render the article unacceptable to the people of the United States. But of this there can be no danger. The spontaneous sentiments of equity, of a moral and intelligent people, will not fail to sanction, with their approbation, a measure which could not have been resisted without inflicting a new wound upon the h [...]nor and character of the country.

Let those men who have manifested by their actions, a willing disregard of their own obligations as debtors—those who [Page]secretly hoard, or openly and unblushingly riot on the spoils of plundered creditors, let such men enjoy the exclusive and undivided satisfaction of arraigning and condemning an act of national justice, in which they may read the severest reproach of their iniquitous principles and guilty acquistions. But let not the people of America tarnish their honor by participating in that condemnation, or by shielding with their favorable opinion, the meretricious apologies which are offered for the measures that produced the necessity of reparation.

The recapitulation of some facts will contribute to a right judgment of this part of the treaty.

It is an established principle of the laws of nations, that, on the return of peace between nations which have been at war, a free and undisturbed course shall be given to the recovery of private debts on both sides.* In conformity to this principle, the 4th article of the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, expressly stipulates, "that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts theretofore contracted."

Two instances of the violation of this article have been already noticed, with a view to another point; one relating to certain laws of the state of Virginia, passed prior to the peace, which, for several years after it, appears to have operated to prevent the legal pursuit of their claims by British creditors. Another, relating to a law of the state of South Carolina, which suspended the recovery of the debts for nine months, and after that period permitted the recovery only in four years instalments.

But these were not all the instances; there were other laws of South Carolina prolonging the instalments, and obliging the creditors [...]o receive in payment the property of debtors at appraised values; and there were laws of Rhode Island, New Jersey, North Carolina, and G [...]orgia, making paper money a le [...]al tender for the debts of those creditors; which, it is known, sustained a very great depreciation in every one of those states. These very serious and compulsory interferences with the rights of the creditors, have received from Decius, the soft appellation of a modification of the recovery of British debts. Does he expect to make us believe, by this smooth phrase, that the right to recover the full value of a debt in sterling money, is satisfied by the obligation to take as a substitute, one half, one third, or one fourth of the real value in paper?

[Page] It must necessarily have happened, that British creditors have sustained, from the operation of the different acts alluded to, losses more or less extensive, which the mere removal of the legal impediments which occasioned them could not repair. In many instances, the losses must have actually accrued and taken their full effect: in others, where no proceedings may have been had, the lapse of so many years must have created inabilities to pay, in debtors who were originally competent, who might have been made to pay, had there been a free course of justice.

The removal of the impediments, therefore, by opening of the courts of justice, was not an adequate satisfaction. It could not supersede the obligation of compensation for losses which had irretrievably accrued by the operation of the legal impediments, while they continued in force. The claim for this was still open on the part of Great Britain, and still to be adjusted between the two nations.

The excuse, that these laws were retaliations for prior infractions of treaty by Great Britain, was in no view an answer to the claim.†

In the first place, as has already been proved, the fact of such prior infractions was too doubtful to be finally insisted upon, and was, after a fruitless effort to obtain the acquiescence of the other party, properly and necessarily waved; so that it could not serve as a plea against reparation.

In the second place, if that fact had been indubitable, the species of retaliation was unwarantable. It will be shown, when we come to discuss the 10th article, that the d [...]bts of private individuals are in no case a proper object of reprisals; that independent of the treaty, the meddling with them was a violation of the public faith and integrity; and that, consequently, it was due as much to our own public faith and integrity, as to the individual who had suffered, to make reparation. It was an act demanded by the justice, probity, and magnanimity of the nation.

[Page] In the third place, it was essential to reciprocity in the adjustment of the disputes which had existed concerning the treaty of peace. When we claimed the reinstatement and execution of the article with regard to the posts; it was just that we should consent to the reinstatement and execution of the article with regard to debts. If the obstruction of the recovery of debts was the equivalent by way of retaliation for the detention of the posts, we could not expect to have restitution of the thing withheld, and to retain the equivalent for it likewise. The dilemma was, to be content with the equivalent, and abandon the thing; or to recover the thing, and abandon the equivalent: to have both was more than we could rightly pretend. The reinstatement of the article, with regard to the debts, necessarily included two things, the removal of legal impediments as to the future recovery; compensation for past losses by reason of those impediments. The first had been effected by the new constitution of the United States; the last is promised by the treaty.

Did our envoy reply, that the reinstatement of the article with regard to the posts included likewise compensation for their detention? Was it an answer to this, destitute of reason, that our loss, by the detention of the posts, which resolved itself essentially into the uncertain profits of a trade that might have been carried on, admitted of no satisfactory rule of computation; while the principal and interest of private debts afforded a familiar standard for the computation of losses upon them: that, nevertheless, while this was the usual, and must be the admitted standard, it is an adequate one in cases where payment is protracted beyond the allowed term of credit; since the mere interest of money does not countervail among merchants, the profits of its employment in trade, and still less the derangements of credit and fortune, which frequently result to creditors, from procrastinations of payment; and that the final damage to Great Britain, in these two particulars, for which no provision could be made, might well exceed any losses to us by the detention of the posts?

In the last place, the compensation stipulated was a fine qua non with Great Britain, of the surrender of the posts, and the adjustment of the controversy which had subsisted between the two countries. The making it such may be conceived to have been dictated more by the importance of the precedent, than by the quantum of the sum in question. We shall easily understand this, if we consider how much the commercial capital of Great Britain is spread over the world. The vast credits she is in the habit of extending to foreign countries, renders it to [Page]her an essential point to protect those credits by all the sanctions in her power.—She cannot forbear to contend at every hazard against precedents of the invasion of the rights of her merchants, and for retribution where any happen. Hence it is always to be expected, that she will be peculiarly inflexible on this point: and that nothing short of extreme necessity can bring her to relax in an article of policy, which perhaps not less than any other, is a necessary prop of the whole system of her political economy.

It was, therefore, to have been foreseen that whenever our controversy with Great Britain was adjusted, compensation for obstructions to the recovery of debts would make a part of the adjustment. The option lay between compensation, relinquishment of the posts, or war. Our envoy is entitled to the applause of all good men, for preferring the first. The extent of the compensation can on no possible scale compare with the immense permanent value of the posts, or with the expenses of war. The sphere of the interferences has been too partial to make the sum of the compensation, in any event, a very serious object; and as to a war, a conscientious or virtuous mind could never endure the thoughts of seeing the country involved in its calamities, to get rid of an act of justice to individuals, whose rights, in contempt of public faith, had been violated.

Having reviewed the general considerations which justify the stipulation of compensation, it will be proper to examine if the plan upon which it is to be made, is unexceptionable.

This plan contains the following features,

1. The cases provided for are those, "where losses and damages occasioned by the operation of lawful impediments (which since the peace have delayed the full recovery of British debts, bona fide contracted before the peace, and still owing to the creditors, and have impaired and lessened the value and security thereof) cannot now, for whatever reason, be actually obtained in the ordinary course of justice.

2. There is an express exception out of this provision, of all the cases in which losses and damages have been occasioned by such insolvency of the debtors, or other causes, as would equally have operated to produce them, if no legal impediment had existed, or by the manifest delay, or negligence, or wilful omission, of the c [...]aim [...]nts.

3. The amount of the losses and damages, for which compensation is to be made, is to be ascertained by five commissioners to be appointed as follows; two by his Britannic majesty, two by the president with the advice and consent of the senate, the fifth by the unanimous voice of these four, if they can agree, if they cannot agree, then to be taken by lot out of two persons, one of whom to be named [Page]by the two British commissioners, the other by the two American commissioners.

4. These rive commissioners, thus appointed, a [...]e, before they proceed to the execution of their trust, to take an oath for its faithful discharge. Three of them to constitute a board; but there must be present one of the two commissioners named on each side, and the fifth commissioner.— Decisions to be made by majority of voices of those present. They are first to meet at Philadelphia, but may adjourn from place to place as they see cause.

5. Eighteen months after the commissioners make a board, are assigned for receiving applications; but the commissioners, in particular cases, may extend the term for any further term, not exceeding six months.

6. The commissioners are empowered to take into consideration all claims, whether of principal or interest, or balances of principal and interest, and to determine them according to the merits and circumstances thereof, and as justice and equity shall appear to them to require—to examine persons on oath or affirmation, and to receive in evidence, depositions, books, papers, or copies, or extracts thereof, either according to the legal forms existing in the two countries, or according to a mode to be devised by them.

7. Their award is to be conclusive; and the United States are to cause the such awarded in each case to be paid in specie to the creditor without deduction, and at such time and place as shall have been awarded; but no payment to be required sooner than twelve months from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.

This provision for ascertaining the compensation to be made, while it is ample, is also well guarded.

It is confined to debts contracted before the peace, and still owing to the creditors. It embrances only the cases of loss or damage in consequence of legal impediments to the recovery of those debts which will exclude all cases of voluntary compromise, and can include none, where the laws have allotted a free course to justice. It can operate in no instance where, at present, the ordinary course of justice is competent to full relief, and the debter is solvent; nor in any, where insolvency or other cause would have operated to produce the loss or damage, if no legal impediment had existed, or where it has been occasioned by the wilful delay, negligence, or omission of the creditor.

If it be said, that the commissioners have nevertheless much latitude of discretion, and that in the exercise of it they may transgress the limits intend [...]d, the answer is, that the United States, though bound to perform what they have stipulated with good faith, would [...] bound to submit to a manifest [Page]abuse of authority by the commissioners. Should they palpably exceed their commission, or abuse their trust, the United States may justifiably, though at their peril, refuse compliance. For example, if they should undertake to award upon a debt contracted since the peace, there could be no doubt that their award would be a nullity. So likewise there may be other plain cases of misconduct, which, in honor and conscience, would exonerate the United States from performance. It is only incumbent upon them to act, bona fide, and as they act at their peril, to examine well the soundness of the ground on which they proceed.

With regard to the reference to commissioners to settle the quantum of the compensation to be made, this course was dictated by the nature of the case. The tribunals of neither country were competent to a retrospective adjustment of losses and damages, in many cases which might require it. It is for this very reason of the incompetency of the ordinary tribunals to do complete justice, that a special stipulation of compensation, and a special mode of obtaining it, became necessary. In constituting a tribunal to liquidate the quantum of reparation, in the case of a breach of treaty, it was natural and just to devise one likely to be more certainly impartial than the established courts of either party. Without impeaching the integrity of those courts, it was morally impossible that they should not feel a bias towards the nation to which they belonged, and for that very reason they were unfit arbitrators. In the case of the spoliations of our property, we should undoubtedly have been unwilling to leave the adjustment in the last resort to the British courts; and by parity of reason, they could not be expected to refer the liquidation of compensation in the case of the debts to our courts. To have pressed this would have been to weaken our argument for a different course in regard to the spoliations. We should have been puzzled to find a substantial principle of discrimination.

If a special and extraordinary tribunal was to be constituted, it was impracticable to contrive a more fair and equitable plan for it than that which has been adopted. The remarks on the mode of determining the question respecting the river St. Croix, apply in full force here, and would render a particular comment superfluous.

To the objection of the Charleston committee, that the article erects a tribunal unknown to our constitution, and transfers to commissioners the cognizance of matters appertaining to American courts and juries, the answer is simple and conclusive. The tribunals established by the constitution do not [Page]contemplate a case between nation and nation arising upon a breach of treaty, and are inadequate to the cognizance of it.— Could either of them hold plea of a suit of Great Britain plaintiff, against the United States, defendant? The case, therefore, required the erection or constitution of a new tribunal; and it was most likely to promote equity to pass by the courts of both the parties.

The same principle contradicts the position, that there has been any transfer of jurisdiction from American courts and juries to commissioners. It is a question not between individual and individual, or between our government and individuals, but between our government and the British government; of course, one in which our courts and juries have no jurisdiction. There was a necessity for an extraordinary tribunal to supply the defect of ordinary jurisdiction; and so far is the article from making the transfer imputed to it, that it expressly excepts the cases in which effectual relief can be obtained in the ordinary course of justice.

Nations acknowledging no common judge on earth, when they are willing to submit the question between them to a judicial decision, must of necessity constitute a special tribunal for the purpose. The mode by commissioners, as being the most unexceptionable, has been repeatedly adopted.

I proceed to reply to some other objections which have been made against the provision contained in this article.

It is charged with affixing a stigma on the national character, by providing reparation for an infraction, which, if it ever did exist, has been done away, there being now a free course to the recovery of British debts in the courts of the United States.

An answer to this objection has been anticipated by some observations heretofore made. The giving a free course to justice in favor of British creditors, which has been effected by the new constitution of the United States, though it obviates the future operation of legal impediment, does not retrospectively repair the losses and damages which may have resulted from their past operation. In this respect, the effects continued, and reparation was due. To promise it, could fix no stigma on our national character. That was done by the acts which created the cause for reparation. To make it, was as far as possible to remove the stigma.

It has been said, that the promise of compensation produces injustice to those states which interposed no legal impediments to the recovery of debts, by saddling them with a part of the burden arising from the de [...]quencies of the transgressing states. [Page]But the burden was before assumed by the treaty of peace. The article of that treaty, which engaged that there should be no lawful impediments to the recovery of debts, was a guarantee by the United States of justice to the British creditors. It charged them with the duty of taking care that there was no legal obstacle to the recovery of the debts of those creditors, and consequently with a responsibility for any such obstacle which should happen, and with the obligation of making reparation for it. We must, therefore, refer to the treaty of peace, not to the last treaty, the common charge which has been incurred by interference in the recovery of British debts. The latter only carries into execution the promise made by the former. It may be added that it is a condition of the social compact that the nation at large shall make retribution to foreign nations for injuries done to them by its members.

It has been observed, that Mr. Jefferson has clearly shown, that interest in cases like that of British debts, is liable, during the period of the war, to equitable abatements and deductions; and that, therefore, the discretion given to the commissioners on this head ought not to have been as large as it appears in the article.

Mr. Jefferson has, no doubt, offered arguments of real weight to establish the position that judges and juries have, and exercise, a degree of discretion in any article of interest; and that the circumstances of our war with Great Britain, afford strong reasons for abatements of interest. But it was foreign to his purpose, and accordingly he has not attempted to particularise the rules which ought to govern in the application of this principle to the variety of cases in which the question may arise: and he has himself noted that the practice in different states and in different courts, has been attended with great diversity. Indeed, admitting the right to abate interest under special circumstances, in cases in which it is the general rule to allow it, the circumstances of each case, are, perhaps, the only true criterion of the propriety of an exception. The particular nature of the contract, the circumstances under which it was entered into, the relative situation of parties, the possibility or not of mutual access; these and other things would guide and vary the exercise of the discretion to abate. It was, therefore, right to leave the commissioners, as they are left, in the same situation with judges and juries:—to act according to the true equity of the several cases or of the several classes of cases.

Let it be remembered, that the government of Great Britain has to consult the interests and opinions of its citizens, as well as the government of the United States those of their citizens [Page]The only satisfactory course which the former could pursue, in reference to its merchants, was to turn over the whole question of interest as well as principal, to the commissioners. And as this was truly equitable, the government of the United States could make no well-founded opposition to it.

CAMILLUS.

No. XV.

IT is the business of the seventh article of the treaty, to provide for two objects: one, compensation to our citizens for injuries to their property, by irregular, or illegal captures, or condemnations; the other, compensation to British citizens for captures of their property within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, or elsewhere, by vessels originally armed in our ports, in the cases in which the captured property having come within our posts and power, there was a neglect to make restitution.

The first object is thus provided for;

1. It is agreed, that in all cases of irregular and illegal captures or condemnations of the vessels and other property of citizens of the United States, under colour of authority or commissions from his [...] majesty, in which adequate compensation for the losses and damages sustained, cannot, for whatever reason, be actually obtained in the ordinary course of justice, full and compl [...] compensation for the same will be made by the British government to the claimants; except were the loss or damage may have been occasioned by the manifest delay or negligence, or wilful omission of those claimants.

2. The amount of the losses and damages to be compensated, is to be ascertained by five commissioners, who are to be appointed in exactly the same manner as those for liquidating the compensation to British creditors.

3. These commissioners are to take a similar oath, and to exercise similar powers for the investigation of claims with those other commissioners: and they are to decide according to the merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity, and the laws of nations.

4. The same term of eighteen months is allowed for the reception of claims, with a like discretion to extend the term, as in the case of British debts.

5. The award of these commissioners, or of three of them, under the like guards as in that case, is to be final and conclusive, both as to the justice of the claims, and to the amount of the compensation.

And, lastly, his Britannic majesty is to cause the compensation awarded, to be paid to the claimants in specie, without deduction, at such times and places, and upon the condition of such releases or assignments, as the commissioners shall prescribe.

[Page] Mutually and dispassionately examined, it is impossible not to be convinced, that this provision is ample, and ought to be satisfactory. The course of the discussion will exhibit various proofs of the disingenuousness of the clamours against it; but it will be pertinent to introduce here, one or two samples of it.

It has been alleged, that while the article preceding, and this article, provide effectually for every demand of Great Britain against the United States, the provision for this important and urgent claim of ours is neither explicit nor efficient, nor co-extensive with the object, nor bears any proportion to the summary method, adopted for the satisfying of British claims.

This suggestion is every way unfortunate. The plan for satisfying our claim, except as to the description of the subject which varies with it, is an exact copy of that for making compensation to British creditors. Whoever will take the pains to compare, will find, that in the leading points, literal conformity is studied; and that in others, the provisions are assimilated by direct references; and will discover also, this important distinction in favor of the efficiency and summariness of the provision for our claim—that while the commissioners are expressly restricted from awarding payment to British creditors, to be made sooner than one year after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, they are free to award it to be made the very day of their decision, for the spoliations of our property. As to compensation for British property, captured within our limits, or by vessels originally armed in our ports and not restored, which is the only other British claim that has been provided for, it happens that this, forming a part of the very article we are considering, is submitted to the identical mode of relief, which is instituted for making satisfaction to us.

So far, then, is it from being true, that a comparison of the modes of redress provided by the treaty, for the complaints of the respective parties, turns to our disadvantage, that the real state of the case exhibits a substantial similitude, with only one material difference, and that in our favor; and, that a strong argument for the equity of the provisions on each side, is to be drawn from their close resemblance of each other.

The other suggestion alluded to, and which has been shamelessly reiterated, is, that Denmark and Sweden, by pursuing a more spirited conduct, had obtained better terms than the United States. It is even pretended, that one or both of them had actually received from Great Britain a gross sum on account— in anticipation of an ultimate liquidation.—In my second number, the erroneousness of the supposition, that those [Page]powers had obtained more than the United States, was intimated; but the subsequent repetition of the idea, more covertly in print, and very openly and confidently in conversation, renders expedient an explicit and peremptory denial of the fact. There never has appeared a particle of evidence to support it; and after challenging the asserters of it to produce their proof, I aver, that careful enquiry, at sources of information, at least as direct and authentic as theirs, has satisfied me, that the suggestion is wholly unfounded, and that at the time of the conclusion of our treaty with Great Britain, both Denmark and Sweden were behind us in the effect of their measures for obtaining reparation.

What are we to think of attempts like these, to dupe and irritate the public mind? Will any prudent citizen still consent to follow such blind or such treacherous guides?

Let us now, under the influence of a calm and candid temper, without which truth eludes our researches, by a close scrutiny of the provision, satisfy ourselves, whether it be not really a reasonable and proper one. But previous to this it is requisite to advert to a collateral measure, which was also a fruit of the mission to Great Britain, and which ought to be taken in conjunction with the stipulations of this article. I refer to the order of the British king in council, of the 6th of August, 1794, by which order, the door before shut by lapse of time, is opened to appeals from the British West India courts of admiralty, to be brought at any time which shall be judged reasonable by the lords commissioners of appeals in prize causes. This, of itself, was no inconsiderable step towards the redress of our grievances; and it may be hoped, that with the aid which the government of the United States has given to facilitate appeals, much relief may ensue from this measure. It will not be wonderful, if it should comport with the pride and policy of the British government, by promoting justice in their courts, to leave as little as possible to be done by the commissioners.

I proceed now to examine the characteristics of the supplementary provision made by the article, in connection with the objections to it.

It admits fully and explicitly the principle, that compensation is to be made for the losses and damages sustained by our citizens, by irregular or illegal captures, or condemnations of their vessels and other property, under colour of authority (which includes governmental orders and instructions) or of commissions of his Britannic majesty. It is to be observed, that the causes of the losses and damages are mentioned in the disjunctive, "captors or condemnations;" so that damages by [Page]captures, which were not followed by condemnations, are provided for as well as those where condemnations did follow.

A cavil has been raised on the meaning of the word, colour, which it is pretended, would not reach the cases designed to be embraced; because the spoliations complained of, were made, not merely by colour, but actually by virtue of instructions from the British government.

For the very reason that this subtil and artificial meaning ascribed to the term, would tend to defeat the manifest general intent of the main provision of the article, which is plainly to give reparation for irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of American property, contrary to the laws of nations—that meaning must be deemed inadmissible.

But in fact, the expression is the most accurate that could have been used, to signify the real intent of the article. When we say, a thing was done by colour of an authority or commission, we mean one of three things; that it was done on the pretence of a sufficient authority or commission not validly imparted, or on the pretence of such an authority or commission validly imparted but abused or misapplied, or on the pretence of an insufficient authority or commission, regularly, as to form, imparted and exercised. It denotes a defect of rightful and just authority, whether emanating from a wrong source, or improperly from a right source; whereas the phrase "by virtue of," is most properly applicable to the valid exercise of a valid authority. But the two phrases are not unfrequently used as synonimous. Thus, in a proclamation of the British king, of the 25th of May, 1792, he, among other things, forbids all his subjects, by virtue or under colour of any foreign commission or letters of reprisals, to disturb, infest, or damage, the subjects of France.

In whose mouths does the article put the expression? In those of citizens of the United States? What must they be presumed to have meant? Clearly this; that by colour of instructions or commissions of his Britannic majesty, either exercised erroneously, or issued erroneously, as being contrary to the laws of nations; the citizens of the United States had suffered loss and damage by irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their property. W [...]t is the standard appealed to, to decide the irregularity or illegality to be redressed? Expressly the laws of nations. The commissioners are to decide "according to the merits of the several cases, to justice, equity, and the laws of nations." Wherever these laws, as received and practised among nations, pronounce a capture or condemnation of neutral property to have been irregular or illegal, though by colour of an authority or commission of his Britannic majesty, [Page]it would be the duty of the commissioners to award compensation.

The criticism, however, fails on its own principle, when tested by the fact. The great source of grievance, intended to be redressed by the article, proceeded from the instruction of the 6th of November, 1793. That instruction directs the commanders of ships of war and privateers, to stop and detain all ships laden with goods, the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions and other supplies for the use of such colony, and to bring the same, with their cargoes, to legal adjudication in the British courts of admiralty. These terms, "legal adjudication," were certainly not equivalent, upon any rational construction to condemnation. Adjudication means simply, a judicial decision, which might be either to acquit or condemn. Yet the British West India courts of admiralty appear to have generally acted upon the term as synonimous with condemnation. In doing this, they may be truly said, even in the sense of the objection, to have acted by colour, only, of the instruction.

The British cabinet have disavowed this construction of the West India courts; and have as we have seen, by a special act of interference, opened a door which was before shut to a reversal of their sentences, by appeal to the courts in England. We find, also, that the term adjudication is used in the XVIIth article of our late treaty as synonimous, only with judicial decision, according to its true import. This, if any thing were wanting, would render it impossible for the commissioners to refuse redress on the ground of the condemnations, if otherwise illegal, being warranted by the pretended sense of the words legal adjudication. But in reality, as before observed, their commission will be to award compensation in all cases, in which they are of opinion, that, according to the established laws of nations, captures or condemnations were irregular or illegal, however otherwise authorized; and this in contempt of the quibbling criticism which has been so cunningly devised.

2d, The provision under consideration, obliges the British government, in all cases of illegal captures or condemnations, in which adequato compensation cannot, for whatever reason, be actually had in the ordinary course of justice, to make full and complete compensation to the claimants, which is to be paid in specie to themselves, without deduction, at such times and places as shall be awarded.

They are not sent for redress to the captors, or obliged to take any circuitous course for their payment, but are to receive it immediately from the treasury of Great Britain.

[Page] 3d, The amount of the compensation in each case is to be sixed by five commissioners, two appointed by the United States, two by Great Britain: the fifth by these four, or in case of disagreement, by lot. these commissioners to meet and act in London.

It seems impossible, as has been observed and shown in the analogous cases, to imagine a plan for organizing a tribunal more completely equitable and impartial than this; while it is the exact counterpart of the one which is to decide on the claims of British creditors. Could it have been believed, that so palpable an error could have been imposed on a town meeting, in the face of so plain a provision, as to induce it to charge against this article, that in a national concern of the United States, redress was left to British courts of admiralty? Yet, strange as it may appear, this did happen even in the truly enlightened town of Boston. The just pride of that town will not quickly forget, that it has been so compromitted.

The truth is, that, according to the common usage of nations, the courts of admiralty of the belligerent parties are the channels through which the redress of injuries to neutrals is sought. But Great Britain has been brought to agree to refer all the cases, in which justice cannot be obtained through those channels, to an extraordinary tribunal; in other words, to arbitrators mutually appointed.

It is here that we find the reparation of the national wrong which we had suffered.—In admitting the principle of compensation by the government itself, in agreeing to an extraordinary tribunal, in the constitution of which the parties have an equal voice, to liquidate that compensation, Great Britain has virtually and effectually acknowledged the injury which had been done to our neutral rights, and has consented to make satisfaction for it. This was an apology in fact, however it may be in form.

As it regards our honor, this is an adequate, and the only species usual in similar cases between nations; pecuniary compensation is the true reparation in such cases—governments are not apt to go upon their knees to ask pardon of other governments—Great Britain, in the recent instance of the dispute with Spain about Nootka Sound, was glad to accept of a like reparation. It merits remark, incidentally, that the instrument, which settles this dispute, expressly waves, like our treaty, reference to the merits of the complaints and pretensions of the respective parties. Is our situation such as to authorise us to pretend to impose humiliating conditions on other nations!

It is necessary to distinguish between injuries and insults, which we are too apt to confound. The seizures and spoliations [Page]of our property fall most truly under the former head. The acts which produced them, embraced all the neutral powers, were not particularly levelled at us, bore no mark of an intention to humble us by any peculiar indignity or outrage.

These acts were of June 8th, and of November 6th, 1793. The seizure of our vessels going with provisions to the deminions of France, under the first, was put on the double ground of a war extraordinary in its principle,* and of a construction of the laws of nations, which, it was said, permitted that seizure; a construction not destitute of colour, and apparently supported by the authority of Vattel, though, in my opinion, ill founded. It was accompanied also by compensation for what was taken, and other circumstances, that evinced a desire to smooth the act. The indiscriminate consiscation of our property, upon the order of the 6th of November, which was the truly flagrant injury, was certainly unwarranted by that order (and no secret one has appeared)—and the matter has been so explained by the British government. It is clear that evils suffered under acts so circumstanced, are injuries rather than insults—and are so much the more manageable as to the species and measure of redress. It would be Quixotism to assert that we might not honorably accept in such a case, the pecaniary reparation which has been stipulated.

But it is alleged, in point of interest, it is unsatisfactory— tedious in the process—uncertain in the event; that there ought to have been actual and immediate indemnifications, or at least, a payment upon account.

A little calm reflection, will convince us, that neither of the two last things was to be expected. There was absolutely no criterion, either for a full indemnification, or for an advance upon account. The value of the property seized and condemned (lay out of the case, damages upon captures where condemnation had not ensued) was not ascertained, even to our own government, with any tolerable accuracy. Every well informed man will think it probable, that of this, a proportion was covered French property.—There were, theresore, no adequate data, upon which our government could demand, or the British government pay, a determined sum.—Both governments must have acted essentiall by guess. Ours could not in honor or conscience have made even an estimate but upon evidence. It might have happened, that a sum which appeared upon the evidence that had been collected, sufficient, might have proved on further evidence insufficient. Too little, as well as too much, [Page]might have been demanded and paid. But it will perhaps be said, that some gross estimate might have been formed; and that of this, such a part might have been advanced upon account, as was within the narrowest probable limit, liable to eventual adjustment. Let us for a moment suppose this done— what good end would it have answered? How could the United States have distributed this money among the sufferers, till it was ascertained which of them was truly entitled, and to how much? Is it not evident, that if they had made any distribution, before the final and perfect investigation of the right of each claimant, it would be at the risk of making mispayments, and of being obliged to replace the sums mispaid, perhaps at a loss to the United States, for the benefit of those who should be found to be better entitled? Would it have been expedient for our government to have incurred this risk to its constituents? And if the money was to be held undistributed till an investigation of claims was completed, to what purpose the haste about an advance?

On the other hand—Is it in this loose, gross way, that nations transact affairs, with each other? Do even individuals make indemnifications to one another, in so lumping a manner? Could it be expected of Great Britain, that she would pay, till it was fairly ascertained what was to be paid; especially when she had too much cause to suspect, that a material proportion of the property claimed, might turn out to be French? Would it have been justifiable on our part, to make her compliance with such a demand, the sine quo non of accommodation and peace? Whoever will believe that she would have complied with so humiliating a requisition, must be persuaded that we were in a condition to dictate, and she in a condition to be obliged to receive any terms that we might think fit to prescribe? The person who can believe this, must be, in my opinion, under the influence of a defirium, for which there is no cure in the resources of reason and argument.

If it must be admitted, that it was matter of necessity, that investigation should precede payment; then I see not what more summary mode could have been devised. Who more capable of proceeding with dispatch, that arbitrators untrammelled with legal forms; vested with powers to examine parties and others, on oath, and to command and receive all evidence in their own way? Here are all the means of expedition divested of every clog.

Eighteen months are allowed for preferring claims, but the commissioners are at liberty to adjust them as fast as they are preferred.—In every case in which it appears to them bona fide, [Page]that the ordinary course of justice is inadequate to relief, they may forthwith proceed to examine and decide. There is no impediment, no cause of delay whatever, more than the nature of a due investigation always requires.

The meeting of the commissioners at London, was recommended by the circumstance that the admiralty courts were likely to concentre there a considerable part of the evidence, on which they were to proceed; which upon the whole, might favor dispatch, as well as more complete justice. In many cases, the decisions of those courts may come under their review.

As to the uncertainty of the event, this, as far as it may be true, was inseparable from any plan, bottomed on the idea of a previous investigation of claims: and it has been shown, that some such plan was reasonable and inetitable.

It may also be added, that the plan affords a moral certainty of substantial justice, which is all that can rationally be expected in similar affairs; compensation, where due, is explicitly stipulated. A fair and edequate mode of deciding and liquidating it has been settled. All the arguments which were adduced to prove the probability of good saith, in regard to the posts, apply equally to this subject. The interest which every nation has in the preservation of character, and which the most profligate dare not entirely disregard—the consideration of defeating the fulfilment of the stipulations on our part—the size of the object, certainly not of great magnitude—the very discouraging situation for replunging suddenly into a new war, in which the present war will in every event leave Great Britain. These are reasons which afford solid ground of assurances that there will be no evasion of performance.

As to the commissioners, two of the five will be of our choice, a third may be so likewise; but should it prove otherwise, it will be surprising if one of the other three, all acting under oath, and having character at stake, shall not be disposed to do us reasonable justice.

3d, While their power is co-extensive with all losses and damage; from irregular or allegal captures or condemnations, their sentence in each case is to be conclusive, and the rules which are to govern it as prescribed by the article, are the merits of each case, justice, equity and the law of nations. What greater latitude could have been desired to be given? What greater latitude could have been given? What else in the case was there to have been provided for? What is meant by the assertion, that the provision is not commensurate with the object?

The general and unqualified reference to the laws of nations, dismisses all pretence to substitute the arditrary regulations of [Page]Great Britain as rules of decision. Her instructions or orders, if incompatible with those laws, are nullities.

Thus the treaty unfetters the question between us and her, from the commencement of the war, and with her own consent, commits them at large to a tribunal to be constituted by mutual choice.

Will any man of candour and equity say, that a better provision ought to have been expected than has been accomplished?

The alternative was immediate indemnification, by actual payment in whole or in part, without examination of the extent or justice of claims; or suture indemnification, after a due investigation of both in some equitable and effectual mode. The first was attended with dissiculties on our side, and with solid objections on the other side. The last was therefore the truly reasonable course, and it has been pursued on a very proper plan.—The causes of loss and damage are fully embraced. They are referred to the decision of an unexceptionable tribunal, to be guided by unexceptionable rules, and the indemnification which may be awarded, is to be paid fully, immediately, and without de tour by the British government itself. Say ye impartial and enlightened, if all this be not as it ought to have been!

CAMILLUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

GOVERNOR FENNER's REPLY To the British Vice Consul's Note,⁵ enclosing Captain Home's Letter.

SIR,

Providence, August 5, 1795.

I AM to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, which came to hand this morning.

With regard to the application of Captain Home, such was the indecency of his letter to you, and such his sabsequent conduct, in searching and capturing Captain Bliss within the limits and jurisdiction of the state, that I must wait for instructions from the president of the United States, to whom I shall transmit a so [...] account of the behaviour of Captain Home by the next mail.

I am not a little surprized that you, sir, in your character as vice consul of his Britannic majesty, should be instrumental in offering this unprovoked and unprecedented insult to the state.

I am, with due esteem and regard, Sir, your most humble servant, A. FENNER.

Thomas W. Moore, Esquire, his Britannic Majesty's Vice Consul, for Rhode Island, &c.

[Page]

GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, To all whom it may concern.

THOMAS WILLIAM MOORE, Esquire, having heretofore produced to me his commission, as vice consul of his Britannic majesty, within the seate of Rhode Island, and having thereon received from me an exequatur, bearing date the 5th day of December, 1792, recognizing him as such, and declaring him free to exercise, within the said state, such functions and powers, as may be given or permitted, by the laws of the land, to the consuls of nations, between whom and the United States, no treaty or convention exists, for permitting specific powers and functions, to be exercised by their consuls reciprocally: And the said Thomas William Moore, having, on the second day of August, 1795, transmitted to the governor of the state of Rhode Island, a letter, dated the 31st of July, 1795, addressed to him the said Thomas William Moore, and written by captain Rodham Home, commander of the British ship of war, Africa, then lying at or near the port of New Port, in the said state: which said letter is conceived in terms of menace and insult against the authority of the United States: And the said Thomas William Moore having participated in the commission of the said menace and insult, by transmitting the letter as aforementioned, having perfect knowledge of its contents: And it being no longer proper, and consistent with the respect due to the government and authority of the United States, that the said Thomas William Moore should continue to exercise any of the functions or powers heretofore allowed in virtue of his said commission of vice consul.

These are therefore to declare, That I do no longer recognize the said Thomas William Moore as vice consul of his Britannic majesty, in any part of these United States, nor permit him to exercise any of the functions or powers heretofore granted. And I do hereby wholly revoke the said exequatur heretofore given, and do declare the same to be absolutely void, from this day forward.

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States of America to be hereunto assixed.

Done at the city of Philadelphia, the fifth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, and of the independence of the United States of America the twentieth.

GO. WASHINGTON.

END OF VOL. I.

Notes

*

Some statements rate it between six-eights and seven-eighths.

↵

*

Grotius, b. iii, c. xx. [...]. xvi.

↵

†

It may not be improper to observe, that this excuse implies a palpable violation of the then constitution of the United States. The confederation vested the powers of war and of treaty in the Union. It therefore lay exclusively with congress to pronounce, whether the treaty was or was not violated by Great Britain, and what should be the satisfaction. No state, individually, had the least right to meddle with the question, and the having done it was an usurpation on the constitutional authority of the United States

It might be shown, on a similar principle, that an confiscations or sequestrations of British debts, by particular states, daring the war, were also unconstitutional.

↵

*

Though this country has viewed the principle of the war favorably, it is certain that Europe generally. the neutral powers not wholly excepted, has viewed it in a different light, so that this was not a mere pretence.

↵

5

See page 215.

↵

§

§

§

[Page]

[No. V.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME II.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—OCTOBER 10, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. CATO, No. XIV. Page 3

2. — No. XV. Page 8

3. Juricola, No. I. Page 14

4. Camillus, No. XVI. Page 18

5. — No. XVII. Page 24

6. Proceedings at Lexington (Massachusetts) August 13th, 1795 Page 34

7. Resolutions of a respectable Number of Land-holders and other Inhabitants of Amelia County (Virginia) Page 43

8. Proceedings of the Citizens of Richmond County (Georgia) September 1st, 1795 Page 46

9. Proceedings of the Inhabitants of Warren County (North Carolina) August 22d, 1795 Page 49

10. Address of the Citizens of Charleston (South Carolina) to the President of the United States Page 51

11. Judge Stith's Charge to the Grand Jury for the County of Chatham (Georgia) August 4th, 1795 Page 52

12. Resolutions of the Citizens of Camden Town and District (South Carolina) July 25th, 1795 Page 54

13. Nudum Pactum Page 56

14. Proceedings in the Senate of the United States Page 57

15. The Lamentation Page 59

16. The Federalist, No. I. Page 61

17. — No. II. Page 67

[Page]

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM VOL. 1. PAGE 252.]

No. XIV.

THE numerous faults of the 6th article compel me reluctantly to make it the subject of another number; and the rather, as we shall thereby anticipate similar objections, which we should otherwise be obliged to notice in several. The appointment of commissioners without the concurrence of congress —the ascertaining their salaries by treaty—their assumption of a jurisdiction over matters arising under treaties and cases in which the United States are parties, in derogation of the rights of the supreme court, having been shown to violate the constitution—it will, I believe, be readily admitted, that no power exists in the president and senate, to appropriate money to the payment of British debts, unless with the concurrence of congress; and that the treaty, therefore, is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it pledges them absolutely to do an, act which they may or may not do at their discretion. Whether in the exercise of this discretion, they could constitutionally, agree to this article? or whether if they could, it would be just or politic? are questions that remain to be examined. The right of the president and senate, to appoint commissioners with judiciary powers, has already been discussed. The right of congress to establish officers by law, is also limited. 1st, To the president and senate. 2d, To the courts of law. 3d, To the heads of departments. 4th, To the president alone. No power a vested in them to allow the appointment of any officer by lot, and much less to admit that his Britannic majesty should exercise the right of appointing judges for the trial of causes in which they are themselves to be the parties. 2. No power exists in congress, to take from the supreme court the right to determine all cases arising under treaties—all cases in which the United States are parties. The determination of these cases is not less exclusively the right of the judiciary, than the making of laws exclusively of congress. 3. In examining these powers, I find none that enables them to change the rules of evidence—to alter the established laws of the country, or to authorize courts so to do. These rights, therefore, not being given to congress, I presume are exclusively invested in the state legislatures; and, of course, I am [Page]led to doubt the right that congress themselves have, to empower any five men, to examine the plaintiff on oath, and to receive in evidence, written depositions, papers, copies, or extracts, authenticated in any such way "as the said commissioners shall see cause to require or allow." A right so extensive, so liable to abuse, particularly when accompanied with the power to decide finally and arbitrarily, should, I think, be tolerated in no free stare.

The justice or policy of the assumption of the debts of individuals, by the United States, must be determined by a reference to the treaty of Paris, and the subsequent measures of the United States. By the 5th article of that treaty, it was agreed, "That creditors on either fide shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." It is observable, that this article gives the creditors on neither side any claim upon the states, but leaves them to prosecute the individual, and the ordinary courts of law to determine their rights. In consequence of which, some debtors have discharged all that was due; others have been more negligent.

Upon what principle can the British creditor charge the community, with debts due from delinquent individuals? It is said, that laws were passed to restrain the payment of debts for a certain period—yet whoever will turn to Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Hammond on this subject, will find, that these laws in no one instance have operated to the prejudice of the British creditor; that the right of congress to make treaties, under the old confederation, being unlimited, the state courts always construed the treaty as a law which over-ruled state laws—so that the British creditor has had the full effect of the treaty. Mr. Jefferson's reasoning was so conclusive on this head, that Mr. Hammond, notwithstanding his rage for writing and the able aid he had at Philadelphia, did not pretend to answer his arguments; but, after some delay, evaded them by saying that he had sent his letters to England. Lord Grenville also (as appears by Mr. Pinckney's letters) was so struck with the force of his reasoning, that instead of answering it, he commends it in the highest terms; nor did it ever meet with a reply, until Camillus took up the gauntlet as the British champion.—It is true, indeed, that his arguments on this subject, partake so much of the quibbles of the bar, are so inconsistent with the stile of reasoning adopted by statesmen, that, probably, Lord Grenville disdained to use them—With all his ingenuity, he has not, however, adduced [...] a British creditor's being obstructed by our courts in the recovery of his debts. But, admitting that [Page]there had been temporary obstructions arising, either from the situation of the country or the breach of treaty on the part of Britain, all that she could possibly ask, was, that these obstructions should be removed. Now it is admitted that this has been done for more than six years past; so that the British creditor, from that period, at least, has had the full effect of the treaty. Upon what pretence, then, must the United States step in between him and his debtor? Why must the farmer and mechanic be charged with the debt of the merchant, and states that owe nothing, that never have made laws of the nature complained of, pay the debts of those that owe much?

But supposing (contrary to the most obvious principles of reason and justice that the United States should be liable to the British creditors; surely it would have been sufficient to place them in the situation of the debtor, and submit themselves to the rules of law which prevailed in the state where the debt was contracted; these are known to be various in the different states—in some, for instance, land and slaves are not liable to be sold in fee, for debts, nor were so when the debt was contracted; in such states the debtor being dead, &c. it will be very difficult to get at the property in the hands of the heir. In others, such assignments and conveyances may have been made, as to put the recovery out of the creditor's power—In others, laws, limiting the time for the recovery of debts to a short period may have barred the demand. All these are risks the creditor knew-he was to run, when he made his contracts.—The United States, who were no party to this contract, can certainly not be bound to secure the British creditor against them, while it leaves them to operate against their own citizens. But, what is still worse, even the rules of law, both in the decision and in the admission of evidence, are to be relaxed in favor of British creditors. What circumstance, either in the treaty or in reason, can convert all these common law causes into proper subjects for courts of equity? What shall carry them even beyond the rules established in courts of equity, which, like courts of law, are bound by certain known principles—while these commissioners are to determine, agreeably to their own (perhaps wild and undeterminate) ideas of equity and justice? [...] of equity, for instance, would not permit the compla [...] [...] [...]ch to influence the question; yet these commissioners are [...] [...]wered to examine "all persons that shall come before them on oath," nor will any courts admit of extracts as evidence; yet so solicitous has Mr. Jay been to swell the amount of British debts, and to increase the public debt, that every thing, copies, papers, depositions, books, extracts, are to be admitted in evidence.—It [Page]is very extraordinary, that when we complain of an immense loss of property, by the depredations committed upon our trade, by order of the British goverment, and which, of course, they are bound to compensate—that Mr. Jay's treaty sends us first to their courts of admiralty to determine the questions of right, which courts must necessarily determine agreeably to the spirit of the very instructions we complain of, nor in any case apply to his commissioners till such admiralty co [...]rts have decided upon it. The Americans must go through all the delays, and sustain all the expense of suits in British courts, to obtain redress for loffes which the British government has occasioned, while the British creditor is to charge the United States with debts which they do not owe, without the expense of a suit in any court, and under the advantages of having all the forms of law relaxed in his favor.—This is certainly a new species of reciprocity, which nothing but the inventive genius of Mr. Jay, sharpened by the warmest attachment to Britain, could have discovered. It is a little extraordinary, too, that when this article was under consideration, Mr. Jay should not have reflected, that the 4th article of the treaty of Paris was mutual, that it related to debts of either side; yet Mr. Jay has made no stipulation for the payment of debts due to us from British creditors.

It is true, that they have passed no laws to obstruct the recovery of them. But it is also true, that without such laws their courts of equity have undertaken to prevent their being recovered. And I need only appeal to the treasurer of this state (New York) to show the amount that has been paid in discharge of debts due from persons whose estates have been forfeited, and which such persons were liable to pay to their creditors: and that, too, in many cases in which suits had actually been brought in England, and the causes stopped by their courts. If my memory, serves me, affidavits to this purpose, from respectable merchants of New York, will be found on the files of our house of assembly. It cannot be denied, that where the state has discharged such debts, they are creditors to the amount, and that under the express words of the treaty of Paris, they have a right to recover. Yet Mr. Jay has carefully excluded them from the benefit of this article; since he well knew, that the amount of debts due from British subjects to the states and to individuals, exceeded the demands of British creditors. Is any so blind as not to see in this article a continuation of that system which forms the strength of government upon the most corrupt principles? A public debt is thought necessary to keep the government together; as if government [Page]wanted any strength but that which she derived from the sense the people had of the advantages they derived from it.—New debts are, therefore, to be created under every possible pretence. New debts will occasion new taxes—new taxes new officers—and new officers new supporters of the government, at the expense of the yeomanry of the country; for it is observable, that the public creditors, bank holders, &c. pay no taxes; those burdens are all borne by those who maintain their state, and nothing is left for these lordlings to do, but to watch over the safety of government, and sing hosannas to the highest. It was necessary to dry up the resources of the country, lest the irritation occasioned by British insolence, and the confirmation of them by treaty, should at length rouse the spirit of the people; lest, being too rich, they should revolt against that virtuous supporter of our government, the British nation!

It was foreseen, too, as Camillus acknowledges, that clamours would be excited by the treaty. The British party might be too weak to silence them. It was a refined stroke of policy to strengthen their hands by the addition of such merchants as had unsettled accounts in Britain. The assumption of these debts by the general government, like the assumption of the state debts, cannot fail to make many partizans; nothing can be more convenient for the merchant, than that the farmer, the shopkeeper, the mechanic, the landholder, should discharge the debts he owes, while he is tearing them to pieces for the principal, interest, and profit upon that very capital which the state assumes. It may be said that this may be recovered against him by the state: but every body knows how negligent public bodies are in the recovery of debts—how impossible it will be for them to arrange all the little items of evidence on which the creditor recovers before the commissioners, especially where he is not consined to strict legal proof. And at all events, what advantages will not the debtor derive from many years delay? Can we wonder that some merchants are found in our cities to advocate a treaty, which enables them to ride on the necks of their fellow citizens! should we not rather be surprised (when the British subjects are deducted) to find that number so very small? is it not at once a proof of their virtue, and the egregious vices of the treaty?

CATO.

[Page]

No. XV.

THE seventh article is subject, in a constitutional view, to all the objections which have been noticed in the 6th. Nothing, therefore, remains but to examine its political character. The first thing that strikes us, is its studied obscurity, and the extreme solicitude of the parties to render Mr. Jesserson obnoxious to the censure it might naturally be supposed to draw after it, by appearing to make it originate in his letter to Mr. Hammond, written at the moment when the irritation occasioned by the controversy with Mr. Genet was highest, and when it was doubtful whether a rupture with France would not have compelled us, according to the then favorite system, to throw ourselves into the arms of England. This letter, as was natural under these circumstances, carries our concessions to Britain, far beyond any thing which the laws of nations will warrant. These only require the restorations of vessels taken in the ports or waters of the neutral nations if they can be recovered; every capture under such circumstances being an insult to the nation within the jurisdiction of whom such capture was made. They also consider it as an unfriendly act, voluntarily to suffer the vessels of either party to arm themselves against the other; and should any vessel which had been so armed, enter their ports with prizes, it would be strictly consonant to the laws of nations, to order such vessel to depart with her prize.—But no writer that I have met with, gives the neutral nation a right to seize a prize, taken on the high seas, and to restore it to the original owner;—or much less, binds them to pay for the prizes so taken, which never entered their ports, merely because the vessel by which it had been captured, had privately, and without the consent or knowledge of the neutral government, armed in her ports. Mr. Jefferson's letter declares the president's opinion to be, that as by treaty with three nations, we are bound to use all the means in our power, to restore vessels taken in our ports, waters; or seas near our shores; so he thought the same protection should be extended to the vessels of Britain, though we had no such treaty with her—that if in any particular case, we had forborn or should forbear, for political reasons, to use the means for the restoring of such vessels, he then thought we should be bound to make compensation; but otherwise, where we had used means, and those means proved ineffectual, as we should not be bound to make restoration to the nations with whom we had treaties—he gave no opinion, that it ought to be done to Great Britain; that the same principle should be extended, even to captures made on the high seas, by vessels armed [Page]in our ports, provided the prizes were brought into our ports. He concludes, as the result of these sentiments, "And hence, you see, sir, that the president contemplates restitution or compensation in cases before the 7th of August [1793] and after that date, restitution, if it can be effected by any means in our power." From this it appears, that though the president's opinion was declared as to some cases, yet that as to others he gave no opinion. If, then, the article had referred, as some have contended, to the letter, for a definition of the cases in which compensation was to be made, it would be wholly indefinite, and it must have been left to the discretion of the commissioners, a majority of whom may be British subjects, to declare the cases in which the United States shall be liable. As it was, however, possible that a majority of these commissioners, had the question been left to be construed by Mr. Jefferson's letter, would not have extended it to the length Lord Grenville wished, this discretion was taken from them; and the cases, in which the United States should be liable, carried not only far beyond what the president had declared to be his opinion, to wit, "The case of prizes taken in our waters, which we had used no means to have restored, and prizes taken upon the high seas, by vessels armed in our ports, if brought into our horbours." The treaty renders us liable, in every possible case, whether it was or was not in our power to restore the prize; whether it was taken upon the high seas, and sailed to our own or foreign ports. Nor is the letter referred to in any part of the article, in order to define the case intended by the article, but merely (if it had any other object than that I have mentioned) to prevent a second investigation of the question, where the engagements contained in the letter had been already fulfilled. This will appear from the preamble, which is always considered as a key to the article. "And whereas certain merchants and others, his majesty's subjects, complain, that in the course of the war they have sustained loss and damage by reason of the captures of the vessels and merchandize, taken within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, and brought into the ports of the same, or taken by vessels originally armed in ports of the United States; it is agreed that in all such cases, where restitution shall not have been made, agreeably to the tenor of the letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, &c. the complaints of the parties shall be referred to the commissioners," &c.

It is observable, that there is not one word in the article, that confines the judgment of the commissioners to cases in which we either connived at the capture, or used no means to restore the prize; nor to the case of prizes, which, after having [Page]been captured on the high seas, came into our ports; but extends the provision to all cases of vessels taken in our waters, provided they ever entered into our ports, notwithstanding our having been unable to recover them; or wherever taken, if by vessels armed in our harbours, whether they came into our ports or not. The article contains a complete and ample definition of the cases intended, so that the mention of the letter cannot be designed, in any sort, to limit the sense; it does not even say that restitution shall be made agreeably to the tenor of the letter, but "but where restoration has not been already made agreeably to the tenor of the letter," then, in all cases of captures, as described in the preamble, the commissioners shall determine the amount, and the United States shall pay. The reference to the letter was to answer the double purpose—first, of rendering the writer odious, who, Camillus tells us, was Mr. Jay's rival in his further pursuit of power, and to preclude the captors, whose prizes had been taken from them agreeably to the tenor of the letter, from a second hearing before the commissioners. Thus, then, Mr. Jay has, without any warrant from his own government, without any equivalent from the British, without any justification drawn from the law of nations, mortgaged the United States for uncertain and immeasurable sums. It was not enough, it seems, to relinquish our well founded claim, for compensation for the detention of our posts—the loss of our fur trade—the property carried off. It was not enough to charge the yeomanry of the country with the debts of the merchants; but, in addition to this, we must pay a very considerable part of the havoc that has been made by French privateers on British property, and this, too, without any real or pretended equivalent, and while our trade was suffering under British depredations. One would really suppose that the treasures of the United States were inexhaustible; that the art of government consisted not in relieving the burdens of the people, but in adding to their load, that they might crouch the more before their lordly masters; that instead of seeking for the support of government by convincing the people of its influence on their happiness, the object was to work upon our fears only—to assemble a chosen corps of stock jobbers about —I had almost said the throne—to make new debts, in order to acquire new recruits to this valuable band—to impose new taxes, that the uneasy sensations occasioned thereby, may afford a pretence to armed supporters of government to exert their benign influence—to strengthen these by innumerable officers, by boards of commissioners ( [...]ess than thirteen of which are provided for by this treaty, by ministers extraordinary, to put [Page]the concluding hand to a variety of matters that are purposely left unfinished by the treaty); by bands of surveyors, who are, at the expense of the union, to run over the interior of the country. In short, by adopting every expense which the profusion of a corrupt government has encouraged in Britain.

CATO.

N. B. As the space allotted for this paper will not admit of my entering upon a new article, I will indulge myself in a short note, in order to observe, that Camillus having done me the honor to notice some of my remarks, it will give me peculiar pleasure, when I can do it without breaking in upon the course of my observations on the treaty, to address myself to him in reply to his. For the present I confine myself to request, that his readers and mine will suspend their judgment of it, until an investigation of his law and his facts shall enable them to judge of both with some degree of precision. Genius is with difficulty retained within the limits of either; and as a specimen of the boldness with which it sometimes overleaps both, I will only refer back to one of his late papers. In speaking of the Indian trade, he asserts, that seven-eighths of their trade, exclusive of the Hudson Bay territories, is drawn from the north side of the lakes; the position I maintain, is directly the reverse. As neither of us will probably think it delicate to balance the testimony we have received from individuals, we must recur to other data, to confirm or refute our respective assertions. Those I shall assume, are so consonant to known and established facts, that I think I may rely upon Camillus's candour to admit them. My first position is, that savage nations hunt chiefly for subsistence, and to procure necessaries which they cannot do without; that the proportion of this which each enjoys is much the same in the respective tribes on either side of the lakes; that, therefore, where the greatest number of savages live by the chase, the greatest quantity of furs and peltry will be collected, with this difference, that the Indians that are nearest the market, will be most careful of those they collect; will wear finer, and exchange more; they will also have a greater taste for luxuries, which will stimulate their industry and increase their ardour for the chase; that the bleak regions on the north side of the lake are more thinly inhabited than those on the south, where not only the difference of latitude, but the effect of the large bodies of waters in softening the north-west winds, renders the climate much milder, and better fitted for the habitation of those who live a savage [Page]life. The great trading stations are, therefore, all on the south side of the lakes.

But let us, for the present, wave all those circumstances, which are so well known to operate upon the relative proportion of savages to the territory they inhabit; and let us take the extent of territory as in part the rule by which to determine the number of inhabitants; it will even then be found, that the trading country of the United States is near four times larger than that of Canada, exclusive of the limits of the Hudson's Bay company. Camillus professes to be ignorant of the extent of their boundary, which, I must own, surprises me; since he assures us, that he has made the fur trade an object of enquiry for years back; and more particularly as it appears, from the whole course of his writing, that he can command any materials in the power of Mr. Jay. It is hardly conceivable, that this gentleman, when treating on the subject of those limits in London, where every document of this kind could be instantly acquired, would have been so extremely negligent, as not to have possessed himself of the settlement by the commissioners, after the treaty of Utrecht, and the still more extended claim of the company, to which, without doubt, the utmost latitude will now be allowed. The southern boundary of the Hudson Bay company, as settled by commissioners, subsequent to the treaty of Utrecht, is the forty-ninth degree of north latitude, in the whole extent, till it meets with the head of Moose river, which brings it one third of a degree more south, thence it runs a north-east course, nearly parallel with the St. Lawrence river, along the heights that divide the waters which fall into Hudson's Bay, from those that run into the St. Lawrence. This line runs within twenty miles of the north side of the lake of the Woods; supposing, as the latest geographers do, that lake to lie in forty-eight degrees and forty minutes north latitude. If, therefore, a line run from that lake due west, should intersect the Mississippi, or if not, till it intersects a line drawn from the head of that river, due north, till in meets the west line so drawn from the lake of the Woods, which must, in that case, be our boundary, it will only leave a strip of country of less than 30 miles in extent, to the north; nor will it be much broader on the north of lake Superior. To the west of the Mississippi, the British have no claim. Should the lake of the Woods lie one half a degree higher, which is very probable, if we judge from most maps of that country, our line will overtop that of the Hudson Bay company. But whether it does or not, the only Indian territory on the north side of the lakes, of the least consequence, is the space surrounded by the lakes, and bounded [Page]on the east by the Ottawa river, which empties itself at Montreal. The country east of that, I presume, cannot be frequented by our traders any more than the country east of the Hudson: And by their deducting both these from our account, and placing the Mississippi four degrees to the west of the lake of the Woods, the British Indian territory will be found (after deducting the great lake and settled country on both sides) to be, to that of the United States, as 15 is to 55. As to any territory to the west of the Mississippi, I know of no ground whatever on which it can be claimed by the British; the west and north west coasts of America being actually possessed by Spain and Russia, who made the first discoveries there, and not by Britain) even if we should hold so absurd a doctrine, as to suppose that either one or the other could give a title to that great inland territory. After this statement of facts, if we take into consideration the infinitely greater population of the southern than the northern nations, it will not, I believe, be deemed extravagant to assert, that the Indian trade on our territory is ten times greater than that on the British side of the lakes. How greatly, then, must. Camillus have been deceived, even though he has been for years past, as he tells us, collecting information on this subject? How suspicious should it render him and his readers, when he makes assertions relative to matters with which he has taken less time to make himself acquainted? The limits of this paper will not permit me to travel from his facts to his law, or to compliment him upon the ingenuity with which he makes a judgment, in the reign of Elizabeth, a commentary upon an act which passed in that of Charles the Second, half a century afterwards. It would, perhaps, have been more in point, to have shown any one decision of Lord Coke, in which a bare implication was said to over-rule an express statute. But an extraordinary defence requires as extraordinary means of defence. As I greatly respect the talents of Camillus, I cannot but with sympathy enter into his feelings, when this rash undertaking compels him to sin against his better judgment,

CATO.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

FROM THE PHILADELPHIA GAZETTE. No. I. An Examination of the pending Treaty with Great Britain.
To the President of the United States of America.

SIR,

NOTWITHSTANDING the great happiness, which results from free government, it remains to be regretted by the temperate friends of liberty, that party-spirit and party-measures are "consequential ills which freedom draws." The people of the United States, enjoying in their social connection, an unequalled portion of the natural rights of individuals, have been from that cause, peculiarly subjected to the operations of party-causes and party-springs. Local circumstances, inaccurately appreciated, have contributed to increase the evil; and the accidentally unequal course of some of the first advantages, which resulted from our re-union and reform in 1789, had a strong, though temporary, effect upon large portions of the people, disposing them to suspicions, jealousies, and fears.

At a time, when the United States were under these circumstances and impressions, an unexampled conflict arose in the old world. Though our remote situation has saved us from being inveloped in the devouring flame, even the broad Atlantic has not interposed a sufficient distance to screen us from the wide and mighty fire, with which Europe is consumed: and upon this occasion the zealous agents of more than one nation have been led, by their passions and our own, into more than ordinary operations upon our private opinions and our public councils.

It has been happy for this country, sir, that the influence of these causes has not been extended to your mind. It is a most comfortable reflection to considerate men of all parties, that you have been actuated by a sincere desire of common good in our domestic operations, and by impartial views in our foreign relations and concerns.

It is hoped, that the freedom of these preliminary remarks will not give offence to any of our fellow citizens. They are made solely from a conviction, that in our free government it is an object of primary importance to be aware of existing [Page]causes of prejudice and heat at the moment of interesting discustions. It is hoped, sir, that these prefatory observations will appear to be pertinent, as they regard your present delicate and important relation to the subject, which it is proposed to examine—a relation which attracts to you the undivided solicitudes of the American people and of their friends and foes. May the God, whom we serve, fill your mind with the knowledge of what concerns our peace, at this awful moment, when he hath ordained the swords of all civilized nations (except this highly favored people) to be either prepared for defence, or to be most destructively exercised against each other.

In considering the treaty, lately concluded between Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville, three questions arise.

I. Whether it is expedient to adopt it, as it was made.

II. Whether it is expedient to reject it, without further endeavors to adjust the subject matters: and

III. Whether it is expedient to pursue further amicable measures, satisfactorily and equitably to adjust the subject matters.

On the first question, the senate appear to have been unanimous in judgment, that "it was not expedient to adopt the treaty as it was made," because two-thirds of that body have advised you to procure certain alterations, and the remainder of that body voted for some other alterations. Your own sentiments upon the necessity of amendments are unknown, and it is the object of this examination respectfully to lay before you such considerations, as appear to recommend the employment of this term of suspension to procure all such meliorations of the treaty, as candid and reasonable investigation shall point out. This contribution to the collection of materials, whereon you will form your ultimate determinations, may prove to be very small. But that reflection ought not to restrain well intentioned individuals from contributing their mites to the public service.

On the second question, it appears, that the senate were also unanimous in their judgment, that "it is not expedient to reject the treaty without further friendly endeavors to adjust the subject matters." For the opponents to the act of the senate, explicitly recommended further amicable negociation of the treaty with Great Britain: and the act itself, carried by a respectable majority,* advises that mode of procedure.

On the third question, stated above, the members of the senate appear likewise to have been unanimous, "that it is enpedient[Page]to pursue further amicable measures to adjust satisfactorily and equitably the subject matters of the treaty."

It has been already observed, sir, that the course of the business has not yet unfolded the state of your mind. It is yet unknown, whether the patriotic and respectable citizen, who was charged with the business on the part of the United States, was able to accomplish all the objects of his instructions, conformably with your judgment; and it is also unknown, whether he was led, by the course of the negociation, to contract for objects, which your instructions had not anticipated, though his general powers may duly include them.

Although every member of the senate has discountenanced the twelfth article, as it now stands, yet as it is advised that amendments be procured, one remark on a point apparently important will be here offered. Besides the great deviation from reciprocity in regard to the tonnage of our vessels and of theirs in the West India trade, the stipulations respecting goods are also unequal. In our limited vessels we may import only such articles as can now by the British laws be exported from the West India islands. These are about six enumerated articles, one of which is rarely exported. But in their ships of unlimited size they can export all West India articles, which now may, by the laws of the United States, be imported into this country—that is to say, every thing which is or can be produced by nature, or by cultivation, and every thing manufactured in the West India islands. Whether this was perceived and intended, and, if it was intended, why so clear a departure from reciprocity was agreed to, appear, sir, to be sit objects of your consideration.

In order accurately to determine the importance of this plain discrimination against us, it may be useful to inspect the list of the commodities, which British vessels may import into the United States by their own application of an act of parliament to this article, and which cannot be imported in our vessels during the existence of the treaty. The principal articles are at present as follow: cotton, indigo, limes, lemons, oranges, turtle, dried and salted hides, yams, mahogany and other cabinet woods, lign [...] vitae, fustic, logwood and other dye woods. As the productions of the West Indies shall be varied and extended by agricultural enterprize, our privilege will be constantly narrowed, and their unequal right, under the treaty, extended in proportion.

There are parts of the pending treaty, which carry the appearance of new or extended grants to aliens of the right to hold lands, and which would enable foreigners to receive them by descent and purchase within the United States. Serious [Page]doubts exist, whether the formation and establishment of the regulations concerning the tenure, acquisition and descent of lands within the states, has been in any, the least degree, committed by the acts of the conventions to the general government. The raising of this question is sufficient, sir, to insure it due consideration from you, whose judgment on the constitution is your guide. If it be said, that the passages referred to in some degree confirm what the ancient law and the treaty of 1783 had been before secured to those foreigners, then it may be enquired, whether a precise and explicit reference back to that former state of things would not have been most prudent and safe. But it will not be disputed that the present treaty goes beyond the rights of the untenati. It may be politic to admit foreigners to hold lands, and it may be right to secure such as have been conveyed in trust to discharge just debts; but if the state legislatures have now that power exclusively, from the entire omission of a grant of it to the general government, it will be questioned, whether that part of the treaty can be ratified, without a retrospective amendment of the constitution, or the consent of the legislatures of those states, in which any of the lands may lie. If it is urged, that a former treaty gave all or some of these privileges to French citizens, it may be observed, that such doctrine is of a very recent date, that it might appear on investigation to be erroneous, that the French treaty was made under the old confederation of the states, and underwent a different ratification, and was not made under the present definite constitution. It may prevent uneasiness and inconvenience to anticipate, in time for thorough examination, the possibility, that the judicial courts might decide against the existence of any power in the general government over the tenure, and particularly over the acquisition, and the descent of lands within the several states.

I have the honor to be, with sincere and perfect respect, Sir, Your most obedient, and Most humble servant, JURICOLA.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM VOL. I. PAGE 287.]

No. XVI.

THE second object of the seventh article, as stated in my last number, is "compensation to British citizens, for captures of their property within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, or elsewhere, by vessels originally armed in our ports, in the cases in which the captured property having come within our power, there was a neglect to make restitution."

This precise view of the thing stipulated, is calculated to place the whole subject at once before the mind, in its true shape; to evince the reasonableness of it, and to dismiss the objections which have been made, as being foreign to the real state of the case. These objections are, in substance, that the compensation promised is of great extent and amount; that an enormous expense is likely to be incurred; and that it is difficult to prove, that a neutral nation is under an obligation to go the lengths of the stipulation.

These remarks obviously turn upon the supposition, erroneously entertained or disingenuously affected,—that compensation is to be made for all captures within our limits or jurisdiction, or elsewhere, by vessels originally armed in our ports, where restitution has not, in fact, been made. Did the stipulation stand on this broad basis, it would be justly liable to the criticism which has been applied to it.—But the truth is, that its basic is far more narrow—that instead of extending to all those captures, it is confined to the particular cases of them only, in which the captured property came, or was, after the capture, within our power, so as to have admitted of restitution by us, but restitution was not made, through the omission or neglect of our government. It does not extend to a single case, where the property, if taken within our jurisdiction, was immediately carried out of our reach—or where, if taken without our jurisdiction, it was never brought within our reach—or where, if at any time within our reach, due means were employed without success to effect restitution.

It will follow from this, that the cases within the purview of the article, must be very few—for, except with regard to three prizes, made in the first instance, where special considerations restrained the government from interposing, there has been a regular and constant effort of the executive, in which our courts have efficaciously co-operated, to restore prizes made within our jurisdiction, or by vessels armed in our ports. The [Page]extent or amount, therefore, of the compensation to be made, can by no possible means be considerable.

Let us, however, examine if the construction I give to the clause be the true one.

It is in these words:—"It is agreed that in all such cases where restitution shall not have been made agreeably to the tenor of the letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, dated September 5th, 1793, a copy of which is annexed to this treaty, the complaints of the parties shall be and hereby are referred to the commissioners to be appointed by virtue of this article, who are hereby authorized and required to proceed in the like manner relative to these as to the other cases committed to them; and the United States undertake to pay to the complainants in specie, without deduction, the amount of such sums as shall be awarded to them respectively," &c.

The letter of Mr. Jefferson, by this reference to it, and its annection to the treaty, is made virtually a part of the treaty. The cases in which compensation is promised, are expressly those in which restitution has not been made, agreebly to the tenor of that letter.

An analysis of the letter will of course unfold the cases intended.

1. It recapitulates an assurance before given by a letter of the 7th August, to the British minister, that measures were taken for excluding from further asylum in our ports, vessels armed in them to cruise on nations with which we were at peace, and for the restoration of the prizes the Lovely Lass, Prince William Henry, and the Jane of Dublin; and that, should the measures of restitution fail in their effect, the president considered it as incumbent on the United States, to make compensation for the vessels. These vessels had been captured by French privateers, originally armed in our ports, and had been afterwards brought within our ports.

2. It states, that we are bound by our treaties with three of the belligerent nations,* by all the means in our power, to protect and defend their vessels and effects in our ports or waters, or on the seas near our shore, and to recover and restore the same to the right owners, when taken from them; adding, that if all the means in our power are used, and fail in their effect, we are not bound by our treaties to make compensation. It further states, that though we have no similar treaty with Great Britain, it was the opinion of the president, that we should use [Page]towards that nation the same rule which was to govern us with those other nations, and even to extend it to captures made on the high seas and brought into our ports, if done by vessels which had been armed within them.

3. It then draws this conclusion, that having, for particular reasons, forbore to use all means in our power for the restitution of the three vessels mentioned in the letter of the 7th of August.—The president thought it incumbent upon the United States to make compensation for them: and though nothing was said in that letter, of other vessels, taken under like circumstances and brought in after the 5th June, and before the date of that letter, yet when the same forbearance had taken place, it was his opinion, that compensation would be equally due. The cases, then, here described, are those in which illegal prizes are made, and brought into our ports, prior to the 7th of August, 1793, and in which we had forborn to use all the means in our power for restitution. Two characters are made essential to the cases in which the compensation is to be made; one, that the prizes were brought within our ports—the other, that we forbore to use all the means in our power to restore them.

4. The letter proceeds to observe, that, as to prizes made under the same circumstances, and brought in after the date of that letter, the president had determined, that all means in our power should be used for their restitution; that if these failed, as we should not be bound to make compensation to the other powers, in the analogous case, he did not mean to give an opinion, that it ought to be done to Great Britain. But still, if any case shall arise, subsequent to that date, the circumstances of which shall place them on a similar ground with those before it, the president would think compensation incumbent on the United States. The additional cases of which an expectation of compensation is given in this part of the letter, must stand on similar ground with those before described—that is, they must be characterised by the two circumstances of a bringing within our ports, and a negle [...] to use all the means in our power for their restitution. Every where the idea of compensation is negatived, where the prizes have not come within our power, or where we have not forborn to use the proper means to restore them.

The residue of the letter merely contains suggestions for giving effect to the foregoing assurances.

This analysis leaves no doubt that the true construction is such as I have stated. Can there be any greater doubt that the expectations given by the president, in the first instance, and which have been only ratified by the treaty, were in themselves proper, and have been properly ratified?

[Page] The laws of nations, as dictated by reason, as receive and practised upon among nations, as recognised by writers, establish these principles for regulating the conduct of neutral powers.

A neutral nation (except as to points to which it is clearly obliged by antecedent treaties) whatever may be its opinion of the justice or injustice of the war on either side, cannot, without departing from its neutrality, favor one of two belligerent parties more than the other—benefit one, to the prejudice of the other—furnish or permit the furnishing to either, the instruments of acts of hostility, or any warlike succour or aid whatever, especially without extending the same advantage to the other—cannot suffer any force to be exerted, or warlike enterprise to be carried on from its territory, by one party against the other, or the preparation or organization there, of the means of annoyance; has a right and is bound to prevent acts of hostility within its jurisdiction; and, if they happen against its will, to restore any property which may have been taken in exercising them. These positions will all be found supported in the letter or spirit of the following authorities; Barbeyrac's note on Puffendor [...], b. viii. c. vi. s. 7. Grotius, b. iii. c. xvii. s. 3. Bynkershoeck, b. i. c. viii. p. 61—65. c. xi. p. 69 —70. Vattel, b. iii. c. vii. Bynkershoeck cites examples of restitution in the case mentioned.

Every treaty we have made with foreign powers, promises protection within our jurisdiction, and the restoration of property taken there. A similar stipulation is, indeed, a general formula in treaties, giving an express sanction to the rule of the laws of nations in this particular.

An act of congress, of the 5th June, 1794, which is expressly a declaratory act, recognises at large the foregoing principles of the laws of nations, providing, among other things, for the punishment of any person, who, within the United States, fits out and arms, or attempts to fit out and arm, or procures to be fitted out and armed, or is knowingly concerned in furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent to be employed in the service of a foreign state, to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects or citizens of another foreign state, with which the United States are at peace; or issues or delivers a commission for any such ship or vessel, or increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, in the service of a foreign state at war with another foreign state, with which the United States are at peace; [Page]or within the territory of the United States, begins or fets on foot, or provides or prepares the means of any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the dominions of any foreign state, with which the United States are at peace.

And our courts have adopted, in its fullest latitude, as conformable, in their opinion, with those laws, the principle of restitution of property, when either captured within our jurisdiction, or elsewhere, by vessels armed in our ports. The supreme court of the United States has given to this doctrine, by solemn decisions, the most complete and comprehensive sanction.

It is therefore, undoubtedly, the law of the land, determined by the proper constitutional tribunal, in the last resort, that restitution is due in the above mentioned cases.

And it is a direct and necessary consequence from this, that where it is not made by reason of the neglect of the government, to use the means in its power for the purpose; there results an obligation to make reparation. For, between nations, as between individuals, wherever there exists a perfect obligation to do a thing, there is a concomitant obligation to make reparation for omissions and neglects.

The president was therefore most strictly justifiable, upon principle, in the opinion which he communicated, that, in the cases of such omissions or neglects, compensation ought to be made. And in point of policy, nothing could be wiser: for had he not done it, there is the highest probability, that war would have ensued.

Our treaty with France forbids us expressly to permit the privateers of the enemy to arm in our ports, or to bring or sell there the prizes which they have made upon her. We could not, for that reason, have made the privilege of arming in our ports, if it had been allowed to France, reciprocal.—The allowance of it to her would, consequently, have been a clear violation of neutrality, in the double sense of permitting a military aid, and of permitting it to the one, and refusing it to the other. Had we suffered France to equip privateers in our ports, to cruise thence upon her enemies, and to bring back and vend there the spoils or prizes taken, we should have become by this the most mischievous foe they could have. For, while all our naval resources might have augmented the force of France, our neutrality, if tolerated, would, in a great degree, have sheltered and protected her cruisers. Such a state of things no nation at war could have acqui [...]sced in. And as well to the efficacy of our endeavours to prevent equipments in [Page]our ports, as to the proof of the sincerity of those endeavours, it was essential that we should restore the prizes which came within our reach, made by vessels armed in our ports. It is known, that notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the government to prevent it, French privateers have been clan-destinely equipped in some of our ports, subsequent to the assurances which were given, that the practice would be discountenanced. If prizes made by such vessels were suffered to be brought into our ports, and sold there, this would be not only a very great encouragement to the practice, but it would be impossible that it should be regarded in any other light than as a connivance.

In such circumstances, can we blame our chief magistrate? Can we even deny him praise, for having diverted an imminent danger to our peace, by incurring the responsibility of giving an expectation of compensation? The conjuncture we may remember was critical and urgent. Congress were at the time in recess. A due notice to convene them in so extensive a country, can hardly be rated at less than three months.

In this situation our envoy found the business. It is not true, in the sense in which it has been advanced, that he was to be governed by the fitness of the thing, unmindful of the opinion of the president. An opinion of the chief magistrate of the union, was to a diplomatic agent an authority and a guide, which he could not justifiably have disregarded.—The claim of compensation, on the other side, was greatly fortified by this opinion: Nor was it a matter of indifference to our national delicacy and dignity, that the expectation given by it should be fulfilled. It would have been inde [...]ent in our envoy to have resisted it. It was proper in him, by acceding to it, to refer the matter to the ultimate decision of that authority, which, by our constitution, is charged with the power of making treaties. It was the more proper, because the thing was intrinsically right. Every candid man, every good citizen, will rejoice that the president acted as he did in the first instance—that our envoy acted as he did in the second—and that the conduct of both has received the final constitutional sanction.

The opinions of Mr. Jefferson, when they can be turned to the discredit of the treaty, are with its adversaries oracular truths. When they are to support it, they lose all their weight. The presumption, that the letter referred to had the concurrence of the judgment of that officer, results from a fact, generally understood and believed, namely, that the proceedings of the president, at the period when it was written, in relation to the [Page]war, were conformable with the unanimous advice of the heads of the executive departments.

This case of British property captured by privateers originally armed in our ports, falsifies the assertion of the adversaries of the treaty, that the pretensions of Great Britain have been fully provided for. She had a colourable ground to claim compensation for all captures made by vessels armed in our ports, whithersoever carried in, or howsoever disposed of, especially where their equipment had been tolerated by our government. This toleration was to be referred, as well from a forbearance to suppress those vessels when they came within power, as from an original permission. Had compensation been stipulated on this scale, it is not certain that it would not have amounted to as much more than that which has been promised, as would counterbalance our claims, for negroes carried away, and for the detension of the posts. But instead of this, it is narrowed down by the treaty to such prizes of those vessels as were brought within our ports, and in respect to which we forbore to use all the means in our power for restitution. Here, then is a set off against doubtful and questionable claims relinquished on our side. Here, also, is another proof how much the antagonists of the treaty are in the habit of making random assertions. But can we wonder at it, when we reflect that they have undertaken to become the instructors of their fellow citizens on a subject, in the examination of which they unite a very superficial knowledge with the most perverse dispositions?

CAMILLUS.

No. XVII.

THE eighth article provides merely, that the commissioners to be appointed in the three preceding articles, shall be paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the parties, at the time of the exchange of the ratification of the treaty; and that all other expenses attending the commissions, shall be defrayed jointly by the two parties, the same being previously ascertained and allowed by a majority of the commissioners; and that in case of death, sickness, or necessary absence of a commissioner, his place shall be supplied in the same manner as he was first appointed— the new commissioner to take the same oath or affirmation, and to perform the same duties as his predecessor.

[Page] Could it have been imagined, that even this simple and equitable provision was destined not to escape uncensured? As if it was predetermined, that not a single line of the treaty should pass without the imputation of guilt; nothing less than an infraction of the constitution of the United States has been charged upon this article. It attempts, we are told, a disposition of the public money, unwarranted by and contrary to the constitution.—The examination of this wonderful, sagacious objection, with others of a similar complexion, must be reserved for the separate discussion which has been promised of the constitutionality of the treaty.

Let us proceed, for the present, to the ninth article.

This article agrees, that British subjects, who now hold lands in the territories of the United States, and American citizens who now hold lands in the dominions of his Britannic majesty, shall continue to hold them, according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein; and may grant, sell, or devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if they were natives;—and that neither they, nor their heirs or assigns, so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incidental thereto, shall be regarded as aliens.

The misapprehension of this article, which was first ushered into public view, in a very incorrect and insidious shape, and was conceived to amount to the grant of an indefinite and permanent right to British subjects to hold lands in the United States, did more, it is believed, to excite prejudices against the treaty, than any thing that is really contained in it. And yet when truly understood, it is found to be nothing more than a confirmation of those rights to lands, which, prior to the treaty, the laws of the several states allowed British subjects to hold;— with this inconsiderable addition, perhaps, that the heirs and assigns of those persons, though aliens, may hold the same lands: but no right whatever is given to lands of which our laws did not permit and legalize the acquisition.

These propositions will now be elucidated.

The term, hold, in the legal code of Great Britain and of these states, has the same and that a precise technical sense—It imports a capacity legally and rightfully to have and enjoy real estate, and is contradistinguished from the mere capacity of taking or purchasing, which is sometimes applicable to the acquisition of a thing, that is forfeited by the very act of acquisition. Thus an an alien may take real estate by purchase, but he cannot hold it. Holding is synonimous with tenure, which, in the feudal system, implies fealty, of which an alien is incapable. Land, therefore, is forfeited to the government, the instant it passes [Page]to an alien. The Roman law nullifies the contract entirely; so that nothing passes by the grant of land to an alien: but out law, derived from that of England, permits the land to pass for the purpose of forfeiture to the state. This is not the case with regard to descent, because the succession or transmission there, being an act of law, and the alien being disqualified to hold, the law, consistent with itself, casts no estate upon him.

The following legal authorities, selected from an infinite number of similar ones, establish the above positions, viz. COKE on LITTLETON, page 2, 3.—"Some men have capacity to purchase, but not ability to hold. Some, capacity to purchase and ability to hold or not to hold, at the election of themselves and others. Some, capacity to take and to hold. Some, neither capacity to take nor to hold, And, some are specially disabled to take some particular thing.—If an alien, Christian or Infidel, purchase houses, lands, tenements, or hereditaments to him and his heirs, albeit he can have no heirs, yet he is of capacity to take a fee simple, but not to hold."—The same, page 8. "If a man seized of land in fee, hath issue an alien, he cannot be heir, propter defectum subjectianis."—Blackstone's commentaries, book II. chap. xviii. § 2. "Alienation to an alien is a cause of forfeiture to the crown of the lands so alienated, not only on account of his incapacity to hold them, but likewise on account of his presumption in attempting, by an act of his own, to acquire real property." Idem, chap. xix. § 1. "the case of an alien born, is also peculiar; for he may purchase a thing; but, after purchase, he can hold nothing, except a lease for years of a house, for the convenience of merchandize."

Thus it is evident, that by the laws of England, which it will not be denied, agree in principle with ours, an ALIEN may take but cannot hold lands.

It is equally clear, the laws of both countries agreeing in this particular, that the word hold, used in the article under consideration, must be understood according to those laws, and therefore can only apply to those cases in which there was a legal capacity to hold—in other words, those in which our laws permitted the subjects and citizens of the two parties to hold lands in the territories of each other. Some of these cases existed prior to the treaty of peace; and where confiscations had not taken place, there has never been a doubt, that the property was effectually protected by that treaty—Others have arisen since that treaty, under special statutes of particular states. Whether there are [...] others depending on the principles of the common law, need not be enquired into here, since the late [Page]treaty will neither strengthen nor impair the operation of those principles.

Whatever lands, therefore, may have been purchased by any British subject, since the treaty of peace, which the laws of the state wherein they were purchased did not permit him to acquire and hold, are entirely out of the protection of the article under consideration; the purchase will not avail him; the forfeiture, which was incurred by it, is still in full force. 'As to those lands which the laws of a state allowed him to purchase and hold, he owes his title to them, not to the treaty.

Let us recur to the words of the article, "British subjects, who now hold lands, shall continue to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein." But it has been seen, that to hold lands is to own them in a legal and competent capacity, and that an alien has no such capacity. The lands, therefore, which, by reason of the alienage of a British subject, he could not, prior to the treaty, legally purchase and hold—he cannot, under the treaty, continue to hold. As if it was designed to render this conclusion palpable, the provision goes on to say, "According to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein." This is equivalent to saying, they shall continue to hold as they before held. If they had no valid estate or title before, they will of course continue to have none—the expressions neither give any new, nor enlarge any old estate.

The succeeding clauses relate only to descents or alienations of the land originally legally holden. Here the disability of alienage is taken away from the heirs and assigns of the primitive proprietors. While this will conduce to private justice, by enabling the families and friends of the individuals to enjoy their property by descent or devise, which it is presumable, was the main object of the provision, there is no consideration of national policy that weighs against it. If we admit the whole force of the argument, which opposes the expediency of permitting aliens to hold lands (and concerning which I shall barely remark here, that it is contrary to the practice of several of the states, and to a practice from which some of them have hitherto derived material advantages) the extent to which the principle is affected by the present treaty is too limited to be felt, and in the rapid mutations of property, it will every day diminish. Every alienation of a parcel of the privileged land to a citizen of the United States, will, as to that land, by interrupting the chain, put an end to the future operation of the privilege; and the lapse of no great number of years may be [Page]expected to make an entire revolution in the property, so as to divest the whole of the privilege.

To manifest the unreasonableness of the loud and virulent clamour, which was excited against this article, it has been observed by the friends of the instrument, that our treaty with France not only grants a much larger privilege to the citizens of France, but goes the full length of removing universally and perpetually from them the disability of alienism, as to the ownership of lands. This position has been flatly denied by some of the writers on the other side. Decius in particular, after taking pains to show that it is erroneous—that the terms "goods moveable and immoveable," in the article of our treaty with France, mean only chattels real and personal in the sense of our law, and exclude a right to the freehold and inheritance of lands, triumphantly plumes himself on the detection of a fallacy of the writer of certain "candid remarks on the treaty," who gives the interpretation above stated to that article.

The error of Decius's interpretation, proceeds from a misunderstanding of the term goods, in the English translation of the article, to which he annexes the meaning assigned to that term in our law, instead of resorting, as he ought to have done, to the French laws for the true meaning of the correspondent term biens, which is that used in the French original. Goods, in our law, no doubt, mean chattel interests: but goods or "biens" in the French law, mean all kinds of property, real as well as personal. It is equivalent to, and derived from, the term bona, in the Roman law, answering most nearly to "estates" in our law, and embracing inheritances in land, corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, as well as property in moveable things.

When it is necessary to distinguish one species from another, it is done by an adjective—"biens meublés ét immeublés," answering to bona or res mobilia, or immobilia, things moveable and immoveable, estates real and personal.—The authorities at foot* will show the analogy of these different terms in the three different languages; but for fixing the precise sense of those used in the treaty, I have selected and shall quote two authorities from French books, which are clear and conclusive on the point.—One will be found in the work of a French lawyer, entitled, Collection DE DECISIONS NOUVELLES, ET DE NOTIONS RELATIVES A LA JURISPRUDENCE ACTUELLE, [Page]under the Article BIENS†, and is in these words, viz. "The word bien has a general signification, and comprehends all sorts of possessions, as moveables, immoveables, purchases, acquisitions by marriage, inheritances, &c. It is distinguished into these particulars, moveables, immoveables, purchases, and inheritances, subdividing inheritances into p [...]ternal and maternal, old and new. Moveable biens are those which may be moved and transported from one place to another, as wares, merchandizes, and current money, plate, beasts, household utensils, &c. Immoveable biens are those which cannot be moved from one place to another, as inheritances, houses, &c. Biens are distinguished again into corporeal and incorporeal" Another‡ is drawn from the celebrated institutes of the French law, by Mr. Argou, and is in these words, "Biens—This is in general whatever composes our riches. There are two sorts of biens, moveable and immoveable. Moveable, all that may be transported from one place to another. Immoveable, lands or what is presumed to have the nature of land. They are distinguished into two kinds, real and fictitious. Real are not only the substance of the earth, which is called fonds; but all that adheres to its surface, whether from nature, as trees, or from the hand of man, as houses and other buildings. The others are called fictitious, because they are only real by fiction, as offices which are vendible, and subject to fiscal reversion, rent-charges," &c. The signification of bona in the Roman law, corresponds, as was observed above, with that of biens in the French. "Bonorum appellatio universitatem quandem, et non singulas res demonstrat;" which may be rendered, "The appellation of BONA designates the totality [Page]of property or estate, and not particular things."—And hence it is, that the cessio bonorum of a debtor is the surrender of his whole fortune.

Both these terms, "bona" and "biens," are indiscriminately translated goods, estates, effects, property. *—In our treaty with France they are translated "goods;" but it is evidently a great mistake to understand the expression in the limited sense of our law. Being a mere word of translation, it must be understood according to the meaning of the French text; for it is declared in the conclusion of the treaty, that it was originally composed and concluded in the French tongue. Moreover, the term goods, when used in our language, as the equivalent of the term bon [...], or biens, is always understood in the large sense of the original term; in other words, as comprehending real and personal estate, inheritances as well as chattel interests.

Having now established the true meaning of the terms "goods moveable and immoveable," let us proceed with this guide to a review of the article.

Its first and principal feature is, "that the subjects and inhabitants of the United States, or any of them, shall not be reputed AUBAINS in France. This is the same as if it had been said, "they shall not be reputed ALIENS." For the definition of AUBAINS, as given in the work before first cited, is this— "AUBAINS are persons not born under the dominion of the king," the exact equivalent of the definition of ALIEN in the English law. If our citizens are not to be reputed aliens in France, it follows, that they must be exempted from alien disabilities, and must have the same rights with natives, as to acquiring, conveying, and succeeding to real and other estate. Accordingly the article, having pronounced that our citizens shall not be reputed aliens in France, proceeds to draw certain consequences. The first is, that they shall not be subject to the droit d'aubaine. The droit d'aubaine was, under the monarchy, one [...]f the regalia; it was the right of the prince to succeed to all estates or property situate in the kingdom, belonging to foreigners, who died without legitimate children, born in the kingdom.

It is to be observed, that the laws of France permitted foreigners to acquire and hold even real estates, subject to the right of the sovereign, in case of demise without issue born under his allegiance. But this right of the sovereign, as to [Page]American citizens, is abrogated by the treaty; so that their legal representatives, wherever born, may succeed to all the property, real or personal, which they may have acquired in France.

And, in conformity to this, it is further declared, that they may, by testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their goods, moveable and immoveable (that is, as we have seen, their estates, real and personal) in favor of such persons as to them shall appear good; so that their heirs, subjects of the United States, whether residing in France or elsewhere, may succeed to them, ab intestato, without being obliged to obtain letters of naturalization.

These are the stipulations on the part of France; and they amount to a removal from the citizens of the United States, of alien disabilities in that country, as to property. I say as to property, because, as to civil and ecclesiastical employments, it seems to have been a principle of the French law, that the incapacity of foreigners could only be removed by special dispensations, directed to the particular object.

What are the correlative stipulations on the part of the United States? They are in these terms, "the subjects of the most Christian king shall enjoy, on their part, in all the dominions of the said states, an entire and perfect reciprocity, relative to the stipulations contained in this article. But it is at the same time agreed, that its contents shall not affect the laws made, or that may be made hereafter in France, against emigrations, which shall remain in all their force and vigour; and the United States on their part, or any of them, shall be at liberty to enact such laws relative to that matter, as to them shall appear proper."

Since, then, the article removes from our citizens the disabilities of aliens as to property in France, and stipulates for her citizens, an entire and perfect reciprocity in the United States, it follows, that Frenchmen are equally exempt in the United States from the like disabilities. They may, therefore, hold, succeed to, and dispose of, real estates.

It appears that the sense both of the French and of the American government has corresponded with this construction.

In the year 1786, the Marquis Bellegarde and the Chevalier Meziere, sons of the two sisters of General Oglethorpe, represented to the Count de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, that they met with impediments to their claims from the laws of Georgia, prohibiting aliens to hold lands. Mr. de Vergennes communicated their complaint to Mr. Jefferson, our then minister in France, observing, that the alien disabilities [Page]of the complainants having, in common with those of all Frenchmen, been removed by the treaty between the two countries, they ought to experience no impediments on that account, in the succession to the estate of their uncle, and that the interfering laws of Georgia ought to be repealed so as to agree with the treaty.

Mr. Jefferson, in reply, states the case of the complainants, proving that they were precluded from the succession for other reasons than that of alienism; and then adds, that as the treaty with France having placed the subjects of France in the United States on a footing with natives, as to conveyances and descents of property, there is no necessity for the assemblies to pass laws on the subject, the treaty being a law, as he conceives, superior to those of particular assemblies, and repealing them when they stand in the way of its operation.

Where now, DECIUS, is thy mighty triumph? Where the trophies of thy fancied victory? Learn that in political, as well as other science,

"Shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,

And drinking largely sobers us again."

The fixing the true sense of the article in the treaty with Great Britain, is alone a refutation of most of the objections which have been made to it, by showing, that they apply not to what really exists, but to a quite different thing. It may be useful, however, to pass them briefly in review with some cursory remarks.

The article, it is said, infringes the rights of the states, and impairs the obligation of private contracts, permits aliens to hold real estates against the fundamental policy of our laws, and at the hazard of introducing a dangerous foreign influence; is unequal, because no American has been hardy enough, since the peace, to purchase lands in England, while millions of acres have been purchased by British subjects in our country, with knowledge of the risk—is not warranted by the example of any other treaty we have made; for if even that of France should contain a similar provision (which is denied) still the difference of circumstances would make it an inapposite precedent; since this was a treaty made, flagrante bello, in a situation which justified sacrifices.

These objections have been formally and explicitly urged. One writer, afraid of risking a direct assertion, but insidiously endeavoring to insinuate misconception, contents himself with putting a question. What (says he) will be the effect of this article as to the revival of the claims of British subjects, traitors or exiles?

[Page] As to the infraction of the rights of the states, this, it is presumed, must relate to the depriving them of forfeitures of alien property. But as the article gives no right to a British subject to hold any lands which the laws of a state did not previously authorize him to hold—it prevents no forfeiture to which he was subject by them, and, consequently, deprives no state of the benefit of any such forfeiture. With regard to escheats for want of qualified heirs, it depended on every proprietor to avoid them by alienations to citizens.

As to impairing the obligation of private contracts, it is difficult to understand what is meant. Since land, purchased by an alien, passes from the former proprietor, and becomes forfeited to the state, can it be afterwards the subject of a valid private contract? If the effect of the article was to confirm a defective title derived from the alien, how could this impair the obligation of any other private contract concerning it? But whatever may be intended, it is enough to say, that the article does not confirm the title to any land which was not before good. So that the ground of the objection fails.

As to permitting aliens to hold land, contrary to the policy of our [...]ws, it has been shown, that, on a true construction, it only applies to the very limited case of the alien heirs and assigns of persons who before rightfully held lands, and is confined to the identical lands so previously holden; that its greatest effect must be insignificant; and that this effect will continually decrease.

As to the millions of acres, said to have been purchased by British subjects since the peace, it has been shown, that if by the laws of the states in which the purchases were made, they were illegally acquired, they still remain in the situation in which they were before the treaty.

As to there being no precedent of a similar stipulation with any other country, it has been proved, that, with France, we have one much broader. The idea, that this was a sacrifice to the necessity of our situation, flagrante bello, is new. Are we then to understand, that we in this instance gave to France, as the price of her assistance, a privilege in our country, which leads to the introduction of a foreign influence, dangerous to our independence and prosperity? For to this result tends the argument concerning the policy of the exclusion of aliens. Or is it, that no privilege, granted to France, can be dangerous?

Those who are not orthodox enough to adopt this last position, may, nevertheless, tranquillize themselves about the consequences. This is not the channel through which a dangerous [Page]foreign influence can assail us. Notwithstanding all that has been said, it may, perhaps, bear a serious argument, whether the permission to foreigners to hold lands in our country, might not, by the operation of private interest, give us more influence upon foreign countries, than they will ever acquire upon us, from the holding of those lands. Be this as it may, could we not appeal to some good patriots, as they stile themselves, by way of eminence, for the truth of the observation, that foreign governments have more direct and powerful means of influence than can ever result from the right in question?

Moreover, there was a peculiar reason for the provision which has been made in our last treaty, not applicable to any treaty with another country. The former relative situation of the United States and Great Britain, led to the possession of lands by the citizens of each in the respective territories. It was natural and just to secure by treaty their free transmission to the heirs and assigns of the parties.

As to the revival of the claims of traitors or exiles; if property, confiscated and taken away, is property holden by those who have been deprived of it, then there may be ground for alarm on this score. How painful is it to behold such gross attempts to deceive a whole people on so momentous a question! How afflicting, that imposture and fraud should be so often able to assume with success the garb of patriotism? And that this sublime virtue should be so frequently discredited by the usurpation and abuse of its name!

CAMILLUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Proceedings at Lexington.

At a Meeting of the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the Town of Lexington (Massachusetts) legally assembled, August 13th, 1795, to know the Sentiments of the Town, upon the Commercial Treaty between the United States and the British Nation, as agreed to by Mr. Jay.
BENJAMIN BROWN, Esquire, Moderator.

THE said treaty was read—a conversation upon the subject took place; and observations, obviously occurring, were freely and candidly made upon the treaty: And a committee [Page]was chosen, to take into consideration the said treaty, and report thereon at the adjournment.

At the meeting, according to adjournment, September 7th, the committee submitted the following draught, as an attempt to express the sentiments of the town, on the interesting subject committed to their consideration.

Claiming it as one among the unalienable rights, for which we have fought and bled, and which we hold dear and sacred, as freemen, and citizens of a free state, freely, candidly, and firmly, to express our sentiments upon any public measure, which appears interesting to us, our fellow citizens, state, of nation; and having deliberately attended to, and considered, the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between Great Britain and the United States of America, agreed upon and signed by the Right Honorable William Wyndham, Baron Grenville, on the one part, and the Honorable John Jay, Esquire, on the other; and which hath been ratified, with certain exceptions, by the senate of the United States.

We, the inhabitants of the said town of Lexington, in town meeting assembled, unhappily find ourselves constrained to observe, that, from the general sentiments and principles of the treaty at large, the most natural construction of the several articles contained in it, or the measures and regulations therein stipulated and held up to view, we cannot even flatter ourselves with the prospect of those benefits and advantages, political, civil or commercial, which, as free citizens and an independent nation, we had a right to expect, in such a negociation as this.

That, viewed in comparison with existing treaties of amity and [...] merce, between France and the United States, and the United States of Holland and the United States of America, we do not find that fair and perfect reciprocity of privileges and advantages, in the present treaty, as evidently appears in them. On the contrary, as it appears to us, the stipulations of the present treaty, in several instances, at least, in their operation, must tend, directly or indirectly, to deprive us of the benefits and privileges intended to be secured to the citizens of the United States, as a neutral nation, by those treaties. Particularly in those articles of the present treaty, where provisions and other articles, not explicitly contraband of war, by the known and established law of nations, are made liable to capture and adjudication, the parties making compensation, as they may see fit, as specified in said article. This, as we think, at once throws an important branch of the trade of he United States, as a neutral nation, into the hands and on the mercy of the British [Page]government. Besides, admitting this privilege to the British, the French and the Dutch may claim the same: For, by treaty, they are entitled to the privileges of the most savored nation. The consequences are too obvious to need a mention.

By the second article, provision is made for the delivering up the western posts, held by the British within the limits of the United States, after twelve years detention, contrary to express stipulation of the treaty of peace, in 1783. And though it is too obvious to need any proof, that the detention of these posts hath been to the great injury of the United States, in the progress of their settlements and trade with the Indians;— but, above all, in fostering and encouraging, if not actually supporting, a long, expensive and destructive war with the Indians; yet no provision is stipulated for any, the least, compensation for those injuries. Neither is there, in any part of the treaty, any provision made for compensation for Negroes, or other property carried off by Britons, contrary to the express prohibition in the treaty of peace between Britain and the United States. Whereas the most ample provision is made, in the 6th article, for the payment of private debts, to British subjects, contracted before the peace, out of the public treasury, with interest for the same, to the utmost farthing. What is the justice, what the reciprocity of these measures and stipulations of the treaty, we leave to the principles of equality and common sense to determine. The contrast is too glaring to need, or even admit of, illustration.

In the same article, it is provided, after the evacuation of said posts, &c. "That all settlers and traders within the precincts or jurisdiction of said posts, shall continue to enjoy all their property of every kind, and shall be protected therein. They shall be at free liberty to remain or remove, to sell or retain. They shall not be compelled to become citizens of the United States, or to take an oath of allegiance to the government thereof: But they shall be at full liberty to do so, if they think proper, and they shall make and declare their election, within one year after the evacuation aforesaid."

How far the precincts or jurisdiction of these posts do or may extend, we are yet to learn; but be they greater or less, by this article, all who, within the time prescribed, declare their election to continue British subjects, are at free liberty so to do. And thus hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of British subjects and citizens, with the children of them, to a thousand generations, may claim an indisputable right to all the benefits and privileges of natural born subjects and citizens, in their persons, property and estate, and yet have no connection with, [Page]dependence upon, or obligations to, the government of the land in which they dwell, save only for protection. This unlimited indulgence appears to us to be utterly inconsistent with all principles of sound policy, and of most dangerous tendency.

To say nothing of an undue British influence, on our internal affairs, arising from this quarter; the moment a war begins between Britain and the United States, they become, of all men, the most dangerous: And whether they continue with us or go from us, they may, and, to prove themselves faithful to the prince or state of whose government they are subjects, they must, become the most injurious; as they will have it in their power to give the best information to the enemy, and, as pilots, to lead and conduct them where they can injure us most, and have the best prospect of success against us.

Of the same nature, on the same general principles, liable to the same objections, and of equally dangerous tendency to the United States, is the 9th article in said treaty. And though there is an appearance of reciprocity, in the stipulation, that "British subjects who now hold lands in the territories of the United States, and American citizens who now hold lands in the dominions of the king of Great Britain, shall continue to hold them, according to the nature and tenure of their estates and titles therein; and may grant, sell, or devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if they were natives," &c. Yet when it is considered, that by well known laws of the British government, aliens are incapacitated to hold real estates, the article appears to be nugatory and delusive; or even suppose this not to be the case, this article will, at any rate, be in favor of Britain, and detrimental to the United States, as "The quantity of lauds, held by the citizens of the United States in the British dominions, will, probably, bear no proportion to the quantity held by the subjects of Britain, in the United States."

How far the United States, or the citizens thereof, may avail themselves of benefit, profit or advantage from the liberty stipulated for the subjects of Britain, the citizens of the United States, and also the Indians, freely to pass and repass the boundary line, by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties, for the purposes of trade and commerce, as agreed in the 3d article, we are much in doubt: And from attending to the nature and probable consequences of such a stipulation, are led to suppose that the inconveniencies attending, and sacrifices which must be made, by acceding to, this agreement, will greatly overbalance every benefit that would be like to accrue to the United States [Page]or their citizens: And that under an appearance of reciprocity, the balance would turn greatly in favor of Britain. But be this as it may, it is certain, that by excepting the country within the limits of the H [...]dson's Bay company, the United States are deprived of a great part of the fur trade with the Indians, to which, by local situation, they have as good a claim as Britain. By this means all reciprocity is destroyed, and such an exception appears both ungenerous and unjust.

Not less unequal is the stipulation, in the paragraph immediately succeeding, in the same article; for all vessels of the United States are expressly excluded admission into any of his British majesty's "Sea ports, harbours, bays or creeks, in his said territories, or into such parts of the rivers, in his majesty's said territories, as are between the mouth thereof and the highest ports of entry from the sea;" barely excepting "small vessels trading bona fide between Montreal and Quebec," under certain regulations:—While British vessels may claim admission into all sea-ports, bays, harbours, and even into all rivers, to the highest ports of entry for foreign vessels, in the United States. No comment is necessary. The very words of the treaty itself, naturally lead us—with astonishment, not to say, indignation—to ask, What equality—what reciprocity is here!

It is added, in the very next sentence, in this article—"The river Mississippi shall, however, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to both parties; and it is further agreed, that all the ports and places on its eastern side, to which soever of the parties belonging, may freely be resorted to, and used by both parties, in as ample a manner as any of the Atlantic ports or places of the United States, or any of the ports or places of his majesty, in Great Britain." Upon which we shall only observe;

That we are utterly at a loss to account for an idea or principle suggested, that the ports and places of resort for vessels, shipping, &c. on the eastern side of the Mississippi, may belong either to Britain or the United States, be British ports, or ports of the United States, promiscuously and indefinitely, as if the land, on the eastern side of the said Mississippi, was the property of, and held in common by, both nations: whereas, by the treaty of peace, it is explicitly declared, that the boundary of the territory of the United States, on that quarter, should be "by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi, until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the 3 [...]st degree of north latitude."

Upon the same principles we see not but with equal propriety, British ports and places of resort for vessels, shipping, [Page]&c. might be established on the western side of the Atlantic for like purposes, on the territory of United States, from Georgia to Nova Scotia; and with equal advantage, perhaps, to the states and citizens of them. The truth is, while mutual advantage, perhaps, might result to the citizens and subjects of both the contracting nations, by opening their ports to each other, on terms of equality, it is hard to find principles to justify the policy, or even safety of admitting another nation to establish ports and places of resort, in the manner stipulated in this article, as it appears to us.

Whatever "doubt may have arisen concerning the river truly intended under the name of the river St. Croix, mentioned in the treaty of peace, as forming a part of the boundary therein described,"—we cannot feel satisfied with the mode of adjustment, proposed in the 5th article of the treaty▪ To us it appears impolitic, unreasonable and unjust, that the title to so great an extent of territory, as is drawn in question by said doubts, should be risqued on the casting of a die, or the drawing of a lot.

The treaty professes to have "no reference to the merits of the complaints and pretensions of the contracting parties;" yet, as we have already observed, "those of the British are fully provided for, while a part only of those of the United States are attended to;" vide and comp. art. 6th and 7th.

We are more especially dissatisfied with this treaty, as, with our fellow citizens in Boston, we conceive, "that the capture of vessels and property of the citizens of the United States, during the present war, made under the authority of the government of Great Britain, is a national concern; and claims arising from such captures ought not to have been submitted to the decision of their admiralty courts; as the United States are thereby precluded from having a voice in the final determination of such cases; and because the indemnification proposed to be made, is to be sought by a process tedious and expensive, in which justice may be delayed to an unreasonable time, and eventually lost to many of the sufferers, from their inability to pursue it; and because this mode of indemnification bears no proportion to the summary method adopted for the satisfaction of British claims." Vide proceedings at Boston, article 4th.

However disagreeable to the feelings of a benevolent heart it may, at first sight, appear, to arrest the property of unoffending individuals of foreign nations; yet, in the course of events, certain circumstances may arise, in which such property may be the most interesting and effectual pledge for the peace, safety, independence, and even existence of a nation. We canno [...] [Page]therefore, admit the idea of the necessary, justice, or policy of the total prohibition of such a measure, as we find in the 10th article of the treaty. Nor can we suppose the sequestration of the debts of individuals, for the common safety of a nation, to be any more inconsistent with the principles of equity, or commutative justice, than what every day takes place between contending nations at war, under the sanction of law and the highest authority, in privateering and otherwise, in almost every act and event of war.

The 12th article, in every point of view, appears to us unprofitable, degrading, and humiliating to the United States; And although the senate have declined to ratify a part of it, yet, as it will remain after the alteration the senate hath proposed, it will cut off a very advantageous part of our trade, in the exportation of certain West India articles, from wheresoever imported, and even some articles, the produce of the United States, to any part of the world. Nor are the regulations and restrictions on the trade to the East Indies, less degrading and destructive, as stipulated in the 13th article.

The succeeding articles relating to commerce, to articles contraband of war, to mutual privileges of vessels entering the ports of the contracting parties—whether of war or for commerce, and many other matters connected therewith; while, in various respects, under the veil of reciprocity, they obviously fail of promising equal advantages to the United States and their citizens; are, in many important instances, as direct contraventions of privileges expressly stipulated, in treaties, in favor of France and the United Provinces of Holland: and cannot fail to operate accordingly.

A saving clause is, indeed, introduced in the 25th article, providing, "that nothing in this treaty contained shall be construed to operate contrary to former and existing treaties, with other sovereigns or states." How this proviso can be consistently or sincerely pretended, we are totally at a loss to determine; when it is evident, that the greater part of the latter articles, which are temporary, are obviously intended to operate in favor of the contracting parties, particularly Britain, in the course of the present war, as well as afterwards; and of consequence must, in a degree, be subversive of benefits and advantages stipulated in favor of France and Holland, in our treaties with them.

It is immediately subjoined, that "the two parties agree that while they continue in amity with each other, neither of them will in future make any treaty inconsistent with this or the preceding article." So that whatever advantages with other nations may offer, on these points, the United States are totally excluded [Page]from availing themselves thereof, during the existence of this part of the treaty.

But what appears most of all interesting and alarming to us, and to the citizens of the United States at large, in the treaty, is yet to be mentioned.

It appears to us inconsistent with the spirit, the principles, and the very letter of the constitution of the United States, and, in many instances, subversive of them.

In society and government, an executive, be it the supreme, evidently supposes a legislative as at the foundation and above it; and the executive as acting under it, obedient to its laws and directions, and accountable to it.

In the social compact, or constitution of a nation, the powers of legislation are the first and supreme powers delegated by the people, who are the sovereign, and, of right, have and retain the controul of all the powers of government, in society, at pleasure.

All other powers of government, the supreme executive, as well as others, are founded in, dependent upon, and grow out of, the legislative.

All other powers, therefore, the supreme executive not excepted, are to look up to this, and to realize that they can, constitutionally, do no one thing or act, in the administration of government, but what is founded in the laws actually made by, and consistent with the powers vested in, the legislative. So that, in the present case, though the constitution hath vested the president and senate of the United States, with the general power of making treaties: yet this power, at highest, is but a subordinate power; and whenever assumed or carried beyond the laws of the land, or to the subversion or infringement of the powers, by the people in social compact, vested in the legislative, in the formation of treaties; such treaties are subversive of themselves, and, ipso facto, null and void. And this, we humbly conceive, (in a degree at least) is the truth of fact, in the present instance.

By the constitution, the congress, as supreme legislative of the United States, is vested with power—"To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes:"—"To establish an uniform rule of naturalization:"—"To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, &c."—"To desine and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas:"—"To make rules concerning captures on land and water:"—To grant and appropriate monies, as it is expressly declared, that "no monies shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law."

[Page] Each of these powers, vested by the constitution in congress, as the supreme legislative of the United States, appear to us to have been assumed, infringed, violated, or superseded, in various instances, by the general principles, particular articles, or special regulations of the treaty before us.—For satisfaction and proof, we beg leave to refer to the following articles, viz. the 2d, 3d, 9th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th, and 21st, in each of which, one or other of the above mentioned powers, vested in congress, as the supreme legislative of the United States, obviously appears to have been assumed, infringed, violated or superseded, as well as by general principles in the treaty at large.

Upon the whole—upon the most careful attention to, and the most mature, dispassionate, and candid consideration of, the treaty before us, we are of opinion, That it is unequal, impolitic and unjust; that it is degrading to the dignity of an independent nation, and, in its tendency, to the rights, the privileges, the property, and prosperity of the United States: And that as we have hitherto been, to a great degree, happy and prosperous, without any treaty with Britain since the peace, so we should much sooner prefer no treaty of this kind, or even a return to a state of colonization, than the adoption of this.

The foregoing report, being read and attentively considered, was unanimously adopted by the town.

Voted, That the proceedings of the town be presented to his excellency the governor and the honorable the council, requesting them to call the general court together, as soon as convenient, to consider the subject of the treaty, and to do or act upon it, as in their great wisdom they shall think meet. Also,

Voted, That the Reverend Jonas Clark be requested to take the charge of the proceedings of the town upon the treaty, and present them to his excellency the governor.

Attest, BENJAMIN BROWN, Moderator.

[Page]

RESOLUTIONS Of a respectable Number of the Land-holders and other Inhabitants of the County of Amelia (Virginia) assembled at the Court-house, on previous Notice, to take into Consideration the Treaty now pending between the United States of America and Great Britain.

1. RESOLVED, That the people of the United States have a right to assembled, for the purpose of expressing their opinion of the conduct of those employed in the administration of the government, and of the tendency of every important public measure.

2. Resolved, That the people of the different towns in these states, who have expressed their sentiments and feelings, in disapprobation of the treaty proposed between the United States and Great Britain, have acted in a manner becoming the citizens of a free government, and have fully conveyed to the federal executive, the opinion of the merchants and traders on this momentous subject.

3. Resolved, That it is the duty of the agricultural part of the union, also to express their sense of the probable effects of an instrument so novel and so comprehensive as the treaty lately presented to the public, as this meeting conceives it embraces most of the important relations in which we are placed as citizens, or in which we stand as connected with foreign nations; and because, should it be ratified by the president, and submitted to by the people, we should be deprived of many, the most important, benefits resulting from that memorable contest, which terminated in our independence.—These conclusions appear to the members of this meeting, as fair deductions, and such as will inevitably result from a ratification of the treaty.

1st, Because, the 2d, 3d, 12th, 14th, 15th and 21st articles are direct violations of the constitution, so far as the regulations therein respect those matters which are exclusively vested in the congress by that constitution, viz.

"To lay and collect taxes, duties, excises and imposts; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; to define and punish piracies."

[Page] 2d, Because, The second article authorizes aliens to possess all the benefits of American citizens, if they should choose to become such, and without complying with the rules prescribed by law; or it establishes a British colony within the limits of the United States, with most dangerous privileges, and it gives these advantages to men who have been the chief agents in exciting the Indians to a tedious, bloody, and expensive war; and being our bitter and irreconcilable enemies, they are placed in the most favorable situation imaginable, to co-operate in inflicting the most deadly and irreparable injuries, at some future period, on our western frontiers.

3d, Because, By the 6th article, compensation is to be made out of the public revenue, to British creditors, for losses and damages in debts contracted previous to the adoption of the federal constitution, although, immediately after its adoption, courts were established at a great expense, whose business has consisted in enforcing their collection; and the treaty of peace only stipulated that there should be no legal impediment to their recovery; and because by this article, new and unheard of powers are given to a tribunal, whose mode of proceeding will be materially different from any heretofore known in America, excluding juries, and attended with the singular circumstance of banishing all kind of defence to any claims which may be set up, by assuming the payment of debts due from individuals: and after thus enticing men to the commission of frauds and perjuries; for any claims they may establish before a set of commissioners, the majority of whom may be probably of the British nation, payment is to be made out of the treasury of the United States; by which means a vast addition will, undoubtedly, be made to the public debt, which is thus to be increased at the will of a set of commissioners, a majority of whom may feel anxious for our political destruction; and though this extraordinary concession is made for the supposed infraction of the treaty of 1783, on the part of America, not the least notice is taken of, [...]or is any compensation provided for, the damages sustained by our citizens in being deprived of their negroes and other property, being carried off by the British army in direct violation of the 7th article of the said treaty; though this infraction must have preceded any infraction on the part of America; and thus, in this stipulation, there is not even the appearance of reciprocity preserved.

4th, Because, In the 7th and some succeeding articles, there is a shameful and most pernicious direliction of the principle which has been acceded to by many of the powers of Europe, a principle most advantageous to the United States, and which [Page]has been carefully attended to in her treaties with the other powers of Europe. These articles we consider as most shameful and pernicious, [...]nasmuch as they appear calculated to depress the agricultural and commercial interest of those states, and at the same time operate most cruelly against that gallant people, who so generously and effectually afforded us their powerful support, when the armies and fleets of Great Britain had a near prospect of completing our subjugation.

5th, Because, There is no redress given for former injuries, nor even a stipulation to prevent a repetition of those injuries, in future, to a most useful and meritorious class of our fellow citizens, the seamen, who have been frequently and wantonly seized, when engaged in their laborious occupation, torn from their families and dearest connections, and compelled to serve on board British ships of war, to assist in plundering their countrymen, and in endeavouring to enslave a nation, who formerly contributed so much to give freedom to this country.

6th, Because, The whole treaty, in all its aspects, appea [...]r [...] to be entirely calculated for the aggrandizement of Great Britain, and the e [...]tension of her comme [...], to the destruction of American prosperity, and, even [...]lly, her independence, and to the [...] of that connection with France, formerly so advantageous, and which, the [...] of this meeting still conceive, will best conduce to our wealth and population, and to the preservation of the republican form of government which we YET profess to hold dear.

Resolved, therefore, That the members of this meeting, are induced by their feelings towards France, which her former magnanimous and essential services to America, and her present arduous struggles have excited—by their feats of the numerous evils that would result from a connection so unequal, and so close with Gréat Britain—and by their anxious wishes to preserve, unimpaired, that temple of liberty and independence, which has been reàred at such an expense of blood and treasure, to disapprove the treaty; and, being ardently solicitous that it may not become the supreme law of the land, they take leave to request of the president to withhold his signature therefrom.

Resolved, That Stephens Thompson Mason has proved himself worthy the confidence of the people; because he remembered and r [...]spected the power from which he derived his authority, and that the thanks of this meeting are due to him and the virtuous nine, who voted with him against the ratification of the treaty.

[Page] Resolved, That the secretary take some speedy mode of conveying to the president and the public, the foregoing resolutions, as containing the opinions and feelings of this meeting, in the hope that their sentiments, being added to the general voice of the people of these states, may prevent the ratification of the proposed treaty.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Citizens of Richmond County (Georgia) at a Meeting held in August [...], September 1, 1795.

WE, the citizens of [...]i [...]mond county, being assembled [...] the court-house square, in the town of Augusts, and having taken into our serious consideration the treaty lately [...] tered into between the United States and Great Britain, say that by recurring to the message of [...] president of the [...] States, at the time of the [...] of Mr. Jay, it is [...] that the object of his appointment was "a friendly adjustm [...] of our claims." And that "going immediately from the United States, [...]ch an envoy will [...]ry with him a [...] knowledge [...] the existing temper and sensibility of our country; and wi [...] th [...] be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness, and to cultivate peace with sincerity."

This appointment took place when a bill was before congress, for restraining the intercourse with that nation; and th [...] object of an extraordinary mission to the court of London, [...] declared in the message, embracing the subjects which gave rise to the bill, the same was relinquished in favor of the executive proceedings—and America waited, with patience, th [...] result. This has been a proceeding stiled a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, signed in London by Mr. John Jay and the British minister for that purpose, in November last, and since approved by the senate of the United States, with an exception as to the 12th article.

And it appears to us, that the treaty so entered into, does not correspond with the objects of this appointment; or that it is calculated to promote the prosperity of the country which made it. On the contrary, it appears, that the envoy lost sight of the causes which were declared to lead to his appointment, [Page]and to have subscribed to engagements suited to the present circumstances of England, only.

To see, and to be convinced of these truths, it is only necessary to have recourse to this instrument itself.

The basis of all national treaties, reciprocity of interest, has been laid aside; and our commerce put under the controul of England.

In the East Indies, it is to exist only by her guardianship and direction. To the West Indies we may go in small vessels, until she shall see cause to reconsider the state of her possessions in that quarter.

Her fleets and armies may commit any depredations upon our coasts and sea-ports; and no reprisals can take place until a plaintive demand is made, and a tedious negociation gone through, in which she would have time to fasten upon all the strong holds of the union.

We are restrui [...]ed from allowing any favor to other nations, without extending them to h [...]; and several articles of commerce are declared to be contr [...]d, which are contracted to be otherwise by existing treaties. So that, in the first instance, we cannot [...]or those to whom we are indebted and ineli [...]ed; nor, in the second, fulfil our solemn [...]; by which we make the world our en [...]ies for the preca [...]i [...] favor of England.

The [...] of the treaty of peace, in respect to the removed negroes, has been relinquished; and compensation for the spoliations complained of, is made to depend on a dilatory process, and the uncertainty of chance: while future captures and detentions are made lawful.

The tribunals of justice are censured in general terms; and made the ground of superseding their authority by a commissioner of chance, which may involve some of the states in millions of expense.

Privateers giving security in an inconsiderable sum, will scarcely restrain them. It will rather be a license for capture, by subjecting them to the penalty only, in taking the richest vessels; nor does it appear, that such security could be availed by an American citizen.

Even the exception to the 12th article, has been partially made; for it appears, that the senate has approved the whole of the treaty, except so much of that article "as respects the trade which his majesty hereby consents may be carried on between the United States and his islands in the West Indies, in the manner and on the terms and conditions therein specified." So that the other part of the same article, which prohibits [Page]the exportation of cotton from the United States, is not included in the exception.

This is particularly injurious to this state; for the cultivation of cotton has become, within these few years, one of the greatest conveniencies to the citizens; and the improvements in machinery are extending its cultivation. It is light and portable; and is the article most conveniently carried to market, to obtain foreign necessaries. A prohibition to export it would, therefore, be sensibly felt; and may have a direct tendency to disaffect the minds of the people to the general government.

But it is said, that it may be exported in British bottoms. Admit this, and the injury is increased by the addition of insult. To be restrained from exporting the produce of our own fields, in our own vessels, is to submit, not to treat.

In fact, if this treaty is ratified, and its several parts allowed to operate, as the supreme law of the land, essential articles of the constitution will be [...] the necessity of a congress superseded; any other [...] of law, being inferior, would be useless and null.

It will remove the boundaries of the United States, as [...] ed by the definitive treaty, upon the [...] of our independence [...] and they must remain [...]oat, unless again made by " [...], or more faithful negociators.

Should the troops be removed from the western posts, which have hitherto been detained in violation of a former treaty, at the distant period of the second engagement, the [...] subjects are to remain, and to continue the see of their possessions. This is an actual cession of the key of the lakes to the crown of England, and, with it, the trade of the savage [...] It is consenting to establish the British empire in the bosom of the union, to the dishonor of our sovereignty, and at the risk of our safety.

But we are disgusted with the detail; and, in short, such are the concessions to the crown of Great Britain, that, to these who recollect, or will review, the causes assigned in the declaration of our independence and separation from that nation, it will appear astonishing, that such articles could ever have been subscribed, in the same age, with the same king and nation, and in the name of the people who had profusely shed their blood to support the former.

We cannot but consider, therefore, that, to ratify the said treaty, would be an abuse of the mercies of Heaven, by whose blessing and protection we established our liberty, independence, and government; an entire disregard of the fate and welfare of our republican friends and allies, the French nation; [Page]and an abandonment of the true interests of the United States.

And we do sincerely and earnestly recommend it to the president of the United States, to withhold his signature from the same; assuring him of our affectionate attachment and confidence, and of our utmost reliance on his wisdom, patriotism, and firmness.

Resolved, That the foregoing proceedings be signed by the committee, and transmitted, without delay, by the chairman, to the president of the United States, by land and water.

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting be given to Stephens Thompson Mason, a senator from Virginia, for his timely promulgation of the said treaty.

Signed this 1st September, 1795.

GEORGE WALTON, Chairman.

Committee.

Edward Telfair,

Thomas Cumming,

Seaborn Jones,

Nathaniel Cooke,

Adam Boyd,

James Harris,

John Twiggs,

Thomas R. Corn [...],

Abraham Jones,

Robert Watkins,

Eli [...] Palmer,

Ambros [...] Gordon,

John Milton,

Littl [...]berry Bostick.

Warren County Proceedings.
At a numerous and respectable Meeting of the Inhabitants of the County of Warren (North Carolina) held at the Court-house in Warrenton, on Saturday the 22d of August, for taking into Consideration the Treaty lately passed upon by the Senate of the United States, Mr. William Falkener was unanimously called to the Chair.

ON motion of Colonel William Johnson, seconded by Colonel Wyatt Hawkins,

It was ordered, That the treaty be read; which being done, the following address was proposed to be transmitted to the president; and on motion (with but two dissenting voices) the [Page]chairman was requested to forward the same by such conveyance as he might deem most respectful and proper.

To the President of the United States.

WE, the inhabitants of the county of Warren, in the state of North Carolina, having assembled for the purpose of taking into consideration, the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, lately passed upon by the senate—being desirous of evidencing our hearty concurrence with the almost unanimous sense of our fellow citizens, who deem many parts of it inimical to the constitution, and most of it disadvantageous to the interests, and derogatory to the honor and dignity, of the United States—most respectfully (for reasons we forbear to state, as it would only be reiterating what you have been generally addressed with) intimate—That it is our earnest wish you will refuse ratifying the same; by which, we humbly conceive, you will evince that your attachment to the constitution of the United States, is unalterable, and your real to promote the happiness and welfare of your constituents, umbating and undiminished.

Signed by order of the meeting, held at the cour [...]-house in Warrenton, the 22d of August, 1795. WM. FALKENER, Chairman.

Resolved, That the ten members of the senate, who voted against the recommendation for a conditional ratification of the treaty, deserve the thanks of this meeting, and merit the approbation of their fellow citizens.

Resolved, That S. T. Mason, by giving his fellow citizens an opportunity of knowing the treaty, exemplified a truly independent and patriotic conduct.

Signed by order, W. A. RICHARDS, Sec'ry.

[Page]

ADDRESS Of the Citizens of Charleston (South Carolina) to the President of the United States, transmitted by Thomas Lowndes, one of the Members of the House of Representatives of that State.
To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United States.

SIR,

WITH the freedom of men who are sensible of their own rights, but with the sincere deference which true republicans must ever pay to the constitution which themselves have framed, to the laws which themselves have authorized, and to the chief magistrate of their own choice; and with all that reverence and affection which Americans justly owe to the man who has most eminently distinguished himself by his important services, his incorruptible integrity, and the wisdom of his councils; we venture to express to you the painful apprehensions and alarms which have been excited in our minds, by the perusal of this treaty now pending between the United States and his Britannic majesty: having considered it with the most careful attention, we are confirmed in our fears, that the ratification of it would prove ruinous, or highly injurious, to the best interests of our country. Having not time to go into a lengthy detail of all the objections to which we think the treaty liable, we have contented ourselves with stating a few only of those which have most forcibly impressed themselves on our feelings, and this statement, put into the form of a report,* we transmit to you, with a full persuasion that you will give it that weight and consideration which the reasons on which it is founded, may justly merit. Confident as we are, that our fellow citizens in other parts of the union, impelled by sensations similar to our own, and actuated by motives purely patriotic, will, with equal respect to your station and to your person, come forward with like representations: we conjure you to suspend, for a short time, at least, the ratification of this instrument, that the general sense of the community, if they should think proper to express it, may be known on so interesting a measure.

The pleasing conviction with which your undeviating conduct has ever inspired us, of the rectitude of your mind, will not permit us to doubt, but that you will rejoice to avail yourself of the light which, from every source, may be thrown on an [Page]obscure and intricate subject; and that, if the arguments offered by us, or by any of the rest of your fellow citizens, shall appear to be substantially founded, and conclusively to evince the injurious tendency of this treaty; you will altogether withhold that assent which would entail its evils on our country. As we are convinced that, in all your public conduct, you have acted and ever will act, with a purity of intention that must ensure the approbation of your own conscience; so it is our ardent wish, that on all occasions it may also be with that happy conformity to the general sentiments of your constituents, that will preserve to you, and, if possible, increase the universal affection which it is your peculiar glory and happiness to possess.

JOHN MATHEWS, Chairman.

A true copy, JOHN SANDFORD DART.

Charleston, July 19th, 1795.

Judge Stith's Charge.
At a Superior Court, begun and held at Savannah, in and for the County of Chatham, on the 4th of August, 1795, Judge Stith delivered the following Charge to the Grand Jury.

FELLOW CITIZENS OF THE GRAND JURY,

I HAVE observed, with sincere pleasure, the spirited, firm, and patriotic measures of my fellow citizens of this city, in opposition to the pending treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, lately entered into between the United States and the king of Great Britain; an example so truly laudable and necessary, that, I have no doubt, it will be followed in each of our sister counties.

This subject has been so fully discussed by abler hands, that I shall forbear to enter into a detail of those prominent features of humility and disgrace to the dignity of the American character, with which every article abounds. When it was thought necessary that an envoy extraordinary should be deputed by the American republic to the court of London, and when the chief justice of the United States was invested with that important appointment, we were flattered with the expectation, that he was expressly charged to demand of the British king, an [Page]unequivocal fulfilment of certain stipulations in the treaty of peace, which that monarch had, contrary to good faith, neglected, and, indeed, refused to comply with, and immediate and adequate compensation for flagrant violations of other stipulations in the said treaty, and for the most wanton and injurious depredations committed on our citizens, and their commerce, by the British ships of war and privateers, authorized and sanctioned by the British cabinet, in direct violation of the law of nations and the rights of neutrality. On any other basis, a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with that nation, must be felt as an insult to the American people. I have read this pernicious instrument with attention, and with a mind, I trust, favorable to a just estimate of such advantages as might be derived to us from its adoption; but alas! widely devious from the public hope and expectations, to the American mind it presents nothing but a dishonorable submission to our most inveterate enemies, insult and injury to our warmest friends and allies, and perhaps makes the first instance in history, wherein, after a special embassy for the particular purpose, a negociation between two independent nations has terminated by a treaty which contains not even a solitary advantage to the party who made the application.

The spirited resolutions and address of this city, and similar measures in a sister state, while they discover a proper respect for the government, at the same time evince a due attention on the part of the people, to the preservation of their inestimable privileges, and may, perhaps, be a mean of averting the evils which would inevitably result from a ratification of the treaty.

If happily the president should withhold his assent to it, there will yet remain this melancholy truth, that the dearest interests of the American people are prostrated at the foot of a single individual; and, however highly I may think of the virtues of that individual, yet, while human nature is frail, I shall consider the trust too momentous to be confided even to him. It will then be our duty, as citizens, to enquire, what is the real source of this important evil, and by what means a repetition of it may be avoided. I confess myself partial to, and a warm admirer of, our constitution; but am not blind to its faults; among the greatest of which is, the power given to the president, with the advice of two-thirds of the senate, to make treaties with foreign nations, and its declaring such treaties to be the supreme laws of the land. They ought then, surely, to undergo a fair, open, and public discussion, and be approved of with those legislative forms and solemnities, which are necessary to the passing of other acts, before they assume [Page]the dignity and efficacy of supreme laws. Happily for America, her constitution contains in itself a principle by which its errors may be peaceably corrected, whenever the finger of experience shall point them out. An occasion now presents itself, on which to exercise, with singular propriety, "that healing principle," the power of amendment, and which it is the duty of every good citizen to recommend in the strongest terms to the attention of congress, and the state legislatures. By thus making improvement the result of experience, our government will arrive to a degree of perfection unknown in the annals of human institutions. To you, and to my fellow citizens at large, I submit these important considerations.

It will be needless for me to reiterate to you the ordinary duties you are now called to perform. Your experience as grand jurors, and your attachment to the public order and tranquillity, sufficiently assure me that your exertions will be properly directed. It is with pain I observe a very numerous docket of appeals, some of which appear to be of long standing; they will demand, in a particular manner, your pointed attention, and I trust will have it.

W. STITH, ju [...].

RESOLUTIONS Of a Meeting of the Citizens of Camden Town and District, (South Carolina) held at the Court-house, on Saturday the 25th Day of July, assembled for the Purpose of considering the Treaty, lately agreed upon between the United States of Americe and the King of Great Britain.

AFTER a free and liberal communication of sentiments on the occasion, the following resolutions were agreed to.

Resolved unanimously, That it is the duty, as well as the right, of freemen, on all great public occasions, that concern the honor and welfare of the republic, to come forward and declare their sentiments, with freedom and firmness; to the end that those who are entrusted with power, may be admonished to use that power, only for the good of the people, who have placed it in their hands, and beware to violate the sacred trust.

[Page] Resolved unanimously, That the aforesaid treaty strikes us, in every point of light, with astonishment and indignation. It appears to us mean, slavish, and obscure, no wise equally binding; but conferring all advantages on the one side, and imposing all restraints on the other; degrading to the dignity of an independent republic, and insulting to the honor and spirit of a brave and free people: And that we think it not only infamous in these respects, but utterly incompatible with our just claims, rights, and interests.

Resolved unanimously, That Great Britain has always invariably pursued a policy hostile and insidious to the United States, and that she is now engaged in a war, dangerous to our independence and existence as a nation. Sound policy, therefore, as well as resentment for past and present injuries, should powerfully persuade us to seize on the moment of her prostrated strength and humbled ambition, to derive, from the necessity of her situation, terms, which, in more prosperous circumstances, we might in vain expect from her justice.

Resolved unanimously, That the treaty appears to us, in every shape, calculated to dissolve those bands of affection and interest, which ought to connect us, in a friendship inviolate, with the people of France, a great and regenerated people, who cherish, in their utmost purity and ardour, those sacred principles, which have laid the foundation of our freedom, in the blood of our dearest citizens! The sympathy of these principles, as well as gratitude for past friendly and important services, should unite the two nations together, with a tie that it should be deemed criminal to touch.

Resolved unanimously, That greater concessions are made, by this treaty, in favor of Great Britain, than America, in any former period, could have been brought to consent to; and which, in her present promising condition, she must disdain to think of.

Resolved unanimously, That it is the interest and duty of all nations to cultivate the blessings of peace, and that we deprecate the calamities and desolation of war; but that war, with all its horrors, ought much to be preferred to peace, upon such disgraceful and dishonorable terms.

Resolved unanimously, That we hold in high estimation, our fellow citizen Pierce Butler, and the other nine minority members in the senate, for their steady and patriotic opposition to the said treaty.

Resolved unanimously, That Jacob Read, and the other nineteen supporting members, by their endeavours to saddle the United States with the said detestable treaty, have ren [...] ed [Page]themselves, in our opinion, unworthy of any further public trust of republicans.

Resolved unanimously, That the chairman do sign these resolutions, and that they be printed, to the intent that our ideas of the said treaty, and our opinion of its author, supporters, and abettors, may be made known.

ZACHARIAH CANTEY, Chairman.

NUDUM PACTUM. ARTICLE IX.

"IT is agreed that British subjects who how hold lands in the territories of the United States, and American citi [...]e [...] who now hold lands in the dominions of his majesty, shall continue to hold them, &c. as if they were natives."

Any body who has a knowledge of the laws of Engla [...] (and surely the chief justice of the United States must [...] have some knowledge of them) knows, that American citizens do not now hold one acre of land in the dominions of his majesty; for, aliens are incapacitated by the English laws, from holding any real estate.

"Aliens are incapable of taking by descent or inheriting Wherefore, if a man leaves no other relations but aliens, his land shall escheat to the lord." Black. Com. 2 vol. page 249.

It is a fact not less known, on the other side of the question, that British subjects now hold millions of acres of land in the territories of the United States.

Where then are the benefits, reciprocally to ensue to the contracting parties? The Americans have granted a privilege to British subjects, and one too which is seldom granted by any nation, and received absolutely nothing in return. Yet this [...] cle of the treaty is so artfully worded, that one who reads it, not knowing the fact to be otherwise, would naturally conclude it to be a fair contract, where something was given in exchange for something. The reverse, however, is the truth. As a valuable privilege, therefore, was granted by the American envo [...] extraordinary, to his majesty's subjects, for which he neither receives, nor stipulated to receive any manner of consideration whatever, why did he not word the article truly, in the form of [Page]a grant or donation, and not falsely in the langua [...]e of a contract, where no contract was made?—Why this gross imposture, this damnable attempt of imposition on the citizens of the United States?—An imposition attempted, not in this article only, but in every article throughout the treaty. The whole treaty, from the subtile, specious diction or wording of it, is calculated to hold out the plausible appearance of mutual advantage to the contracting parties, when, in substance, the advantage is all on the side of his majesty. The contract, therefore, is not only a nudum pactum, but a daring, presumptuous fraud.

JOHN DOE.

Proceedings in the Senate of the United States.
FROM THE AURORA.

July 24th, 1795.

Mr. Backs,

A VERY palpable mis [...]statement is made in the Gazette of the United States of the 21st, relative to the proceedings of the ten members of the senate, who were opposed to the treaty, on Mr. Guna's motion. The motion of Mr. Guna is as follows:

"Whereas it is alleged by divers American citizens, that negroes and other property, to a considerable amount, were carried away in contravention of the 7th article of the treaty of peace between the United States and his Britannic majesty:

"Resolved, That the senate recommend to the president of the United States to renew, by friendly negociations with his said majesty, the claims of the American citizens to compensation for the negroes, and other property so alleged to have been carried away; and in case the disagreement, that has hitherto existed relative to the construction in this behalf, of the said article, cannot be removed by candid and amicable discussions, that it be proposed, as a measure calculated to cherish and confirm the good understanding and friendship, which it is desired may prevail between the two countries, that commissioners, be appointed in the manner directed by the 6th article of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, concluded [Page]between the United States and his said majesty, with authority to ascertain and decide, as well the interpretation of the 7th article, in this respect, as likewise the amount of the losses sustained by the alleged violation of the same.

"But the senate are of opinion, that the negociation on this subject should be distinct from, and subsequent to, that recommended by their act of the 24th instant, respecting the trade and intercourse between the United States and his said majesty's islands in the West Indies."

On motion to divide this motion, and to agree to all that is contained from the word "whereas" to the word "same" at the end of the first paragraph of the resolution, the yeas and nays were required, and it passed in the affirmative, yeas 27, nays 1.

Thus it appears, that the "virtuous ten" must have been in favor of the resolution, any thing in the Gazette of the United States to the contrary, notwithstanding.

But let us proceed to the exposition of further untruth, and show, that a motion was made by one of the vert [...]es, ten, [...] give real and not pretended effect to the resolution.

A motion was made by Mr. Jackson, to amend the last paragraph of the motion under the consideration of the Senate viz—

"But the senate are of opinion, that the negociation on th [...] subject should be distinct from, and subsequent to, that reco [...] mended by their act of the 24th instant, respecting the [...] and intercourse between the United States and his said majesty [...] islands in the West Indies"—to read as follows:

"And the senate are of opinion, that the negociation on [...] subject should be considered AS PART of the negociation recommen [...] by their act of the 24th instant, respecting the trade and in [...] course between the United States and his said majesty's i [...]a [...] in the West Indies."

Whereupon, an amendment, after the division of a motion, was objected to, as not being in order; and on an appeal to the president, it was by him determined in the affirmative.

And on the question to agree to the amendment proposed, the yeas and nays were required, and it passed in the negative.

Yeas 11

Nays 17

On the question to the last clause of the original motion. The yeas and nays were required—Yeas 18—nays 11. So the question was lost, there not being two-thirds of the senators present, in the affirmative.

[Page] The public will be enabled to determine from the foregoing statement, how far they may rely on the truth and accuracy of the Gazette of the United States.

The virtuous ten were for exacting a rigid fulfilment of the treaty of peace; and were for making the compensation for negroes a part of the present treaty; but the heroes of the Gazette of the United States had different views; they wished nothing appended to their darling brat, that should prevent it from receiving the warm embraces of Great Britain, and, therefore, wanted a distinct negociation on this subject. British creditors are comprehended in the present treaty; but justice to American citizens was to be reserved for future negociations, wholly distinct from the treaty of amity.

When mutilated extracts and positive untruths, are thus attempted to be palmed upon the public, what are we to suppose of a cause, that must be supported by such means? The treaty itself is the best commentary upon the views of the majority of the senate; and no attempt whatever can possibly succeed, with the treaty before our eyes, to lessen "the virtuous ten" in the estimation of the people of the United States. They have acted the part of patriots; they have scorned to make their country tributary to Great Britain; and the people from New Hampshire to Georgia will be their eulogists. As faithful and upright servants of the people, the people will do full justice to their merits, and every such attempt, as that made in the Gazette of the United States, must bring disgrace and contempt upon the author.

NO ENGLISHMAN.

THE LAMENTATION.

O THE Jacobins! Messrs. printers, the Jacobins! the Jacobins! What shall we do? The whole continent are turning. Jacobins. For all the continent are condemning the treaty; and all who do condemn the treaty, are Jacobins. What is to be done? From Georgia to Maine, they act as if the d—l was in them; yet I hope, and trust, and pray, that there is still a chosen few, who have preserved themselves from the contagion of this universal mania. Only, Messrs printers, only let the people know who they are, that take the lead in these impious transactions, and I am sure they will no longer be influenced by them, as I am sure they do not know them. I will tell them, I will enlighten their dark understandings, I will shew the [Page]swinish multitude" that the ringleaders of this cursed business, are blinded by partiality and hatred; and that they, ever since 1775, have been prejudiced against our new, I mean our old friends, the British. To begin then at the fouth; there is that arch rebel, John Rutledge, many years a member of the old continental congress, in time of war; what better could be expected from him? is it yet forgotten, that when he was governor of South Carolina, and the British had possession of Charleston, his capital, that he hung all the British he could catch; as well as all such as would not assist him in fighting them? and don't you think he knows, that if the treaty takes place, and the British again bear rule, that they will hang him in turn; what better then could you expect from such a man as he? Self-preservation, our parson says, is nature's first law: and if he knows, that the British will hang him if they come, is it not natural for him to try to prevent their coming? 'Tis true, our president did make him judge of the supreme court of the United States; but he afterwards suffered his own state to buy him off, by creating him their chief justice with a higher salary. I hope, therefore, the people will not be influenced by the doings of such a man. As for old governor Matthews, his colleague, he is not a farthing better; for don't we all remember how the British sent him in irons to St. Augustine, and kept him six months in a dungeon, after Charleston was taken. Is it not, therefore, natural for him to thirst for revenge? In addition to all this, was be not known, during the whole war, in congress, and as governor of Carolina, to be among the most inveterate enemies of the British? to such men, therefore, I hope the people will not trust; and though they assembled a large body of men in Charleston to oppose the treaty, you may depend on it, those men hated the British, as much as they did, and were all enraged Jacobins.

Then, again, there is Norfolk and Porsmouth in Virginia, they too have assembled, and expressed their abhorrence of the treaty. Now every body knows that, in the late war, those towns were burnt by the British; is it not, therefore, natural for them to turn Jacobins, and endeavour to keep them out of their country, that they may not have a chance to burn their towns again? but all the world must see, that this is an unjustifiable prejudice, and all the world ought to be above the influence of it. As for Baltimore, has it not been the asylum of the French; they have an attachment to French principles, because they are favorable to America. It is plain, therefore, as a pike staff, that interest governs them, and that they are all Jacobins. Then for Philadelphia, though they have assembled in [Page]thousands and ten thousands, to condemn the treaty, yet if you examine the first of their committee for drafting resolutions, your wonder will soon cease; at its head you will find that rebel, chief justice M'Kean, president of the old continental congress, aided by a long string of others of the same kidney, all sworn foes to royalty, and inveterate republicans, brooding on the prejudices they imbibed in our war against Britain.

FROM THE BOSTON CENTINEL. The Objections to the Treaty, refuted.

No. I.

THE constitution of the United States empowers the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senate concur.

In pursuance of a power thus vested, the senate of the United States did consent to and advise the president of the United States, to ratify the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, concluded at London, the 19th of November, A. D. 1794; on condition, that there be added to said treaty an article, whereby it shall be agreed to suspend the operation of so much of the 12th article, as respects the trade which his said majesty thereby consents may be carried on between the United States and his islands in the West Indies, in the manner, and on the terms and conditions, therein prescribed.

A copy of this treaty was sent by Mr. Mason, one of the senators from Virginia, to the editor of the Aurora, in Philadelphia, that it might be published.

On Tuesday the 7th of July, the editors of the Chronicle advertised, in the Mercury, that a copy of the treaty before referred to, was brought by express from Philadelphia, and was for sale at their office, and at Larkin's book store, in Cornhill.

On the 8th of July, a notification, issued by order of the selectmen of Boston, notifying the inhabitants to meet on the 10th, agreeably to the request of a number of inhabitants, to take into their most serious consideration, such measures as might be deemed expedient, relative to the treaty pending between the United States and Great Britain.

On the 9th of July, the editors of the Chronicle published in their paper, the eight first articles of the treaty.

[Page] The foregoing was the only publication of the treaty, prior to the meeting of the inhabitants on the 10th, except a publication of its supposed contents, by some one who had read it, and which, on comparison with Mr. Mason's copy, appears to be incorrect.

On the 10th, the inhabitants met in Faneuil Hall, where, 1500 of the citizens, without reading the treaty there, voted their disapprobation, and not one appeared in favor of it.

A committee of fifteen was appointed, "to report the reasons, in writing, which led to the disapprobation of the treaty."

On the Monday following, being the 13th, the committee reported the objections of the town, before the reading of which, the treaty was read.—The objections were then accepted by the town, without one dissenting voice; and a vote passed, directing their immediate transmission to the president of the United States, and expressing "their earnest hope and confident reliance, that the reasons assigned would have their influence to withhold his signature from the ratification of this alarming instrument."

The senate met on the 8th June, from which time to the 24th, the merits of the proposed treaty were discussed, with a [...] the advantages that could be derived to this discussion, from examining documents that show the real state of our commere [...] —the relation of this country to others—the grounds of ou [...] complaints against the British, with their answers—the ground [...] of complaint the British had against this country, with the answers of America. On the 24th, the senate advised the president to ratify the treaty, in manner and on the conditions specified in the first part of this paper.

A concurrence of two-thirds of the number present was necessary to constitute a vote of the senate on this subject; and it is understood, that this majority included all the senators from New England (except Mr. Langdon, of Portsmouth, and Mr. Robinson, of Vermont) one senator from New York, all from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, one from Kentucky, one from South Carolina, and one from Georgia.— Virginia and North Carolina were the only states in the union, whose senators were unanimous against its ratification.

Unless the present conduct of these senators, in advising the president to ratify the treaty, has deprived them of the confidence of their fellow citizens, it may be truly said, that, as individual members of the community, none stand higher i [...] the public estimation, as men of pure morals, found understanding, industrious and steady attention to those duties, with which they have been entrusted. Their conduct, as public men, [Page]has been tried and known in times the most critical and dangerous; and has received the just tribute of applause, from a grateful country, for having preserved it from the distresses of anarchy and war.

Duty of ourselves demands that we should respect the legal and constitutional doings of those we have appointed to administer [...]ur public affairs; at least so far as not to declare to the world, "That their acts are highly injurious to the commercial interests of the United States, derogatory to the national honor and independence, and may be dangerous to the peace and happiness of their citizens,"—without the most careful investigation of the subjects, and without the most substantial reasons in support of charges which so deeply wound the honor of the government, and the character of those who have constitutionally done the act, thus boldly accused.

Men who love their country, will endeavour to support its government, at least will refrain from grossly criminating its conduct, until they have been convinced that no good reasons can be offered, for that which to them may at first appear doubtful. Such men ought not instantly to enlist under the hanners of its avowed opponents, nor hastily surrender their judgments to those who have uniformly calumniated all those acts, which time and experience have sanctioned, as wise, and productive of greater prosperity than is enjoyed in any other country. Men who know the value of character, from a just regard of their own—who have sensibility duly to appreciate the worth of public same—will be cautious how they attempt to inflict a wound on the reputation of others, which, if aimed at themselves, would produce the most painful sensations.

The town of Boston has given its reasons for assertions which have so deeply wounded the honor of the government; and which assertions, if true, must extremely weaken the confidence of the people in the superiority of their own constitution.

Permit, therefore, Mr. Russell, a fellow citizen, through the medium of your paper, to examine the solidity of their reasons, in proof that this declaration, that "the treaty, if ratified, will be highly injurious to the commercial interests of the United States, derogatory to their national honor and independence, and may be dangerous to the peace and happiness of their citizens."

The first is, "This compact (meaning the treaty) professes to have no reference to the merits of the complaints and pretensions of the contracting parties; but in reality the complaints and pretensions of Great Britain are fully provided for, while a [Page]part only of those of the United States have been brought into consideration."

The words of the treaty are, that "the parties being desirous, by a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, to terminate their differences, in such a manner, as (without reference to the merits of their respective complaints and pretensions) may be the best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding." The words of the treaty are copied here, that, by comparing them with the first reason of the town, the public may judge of their true import, and not be induced to bel [...]ve, that the two nations met together, with the design of terminating their differences, and, at the same time, disregarded the real subjects of controversy.

The great charge in this reason is, that the complaints and pretensions of Great Britain are fully provided for, while a part only of those of the United States have been brought into consideration.

It is to be presumed, that the committee meant here, that the minister on the part of America, never brought into consideration all the complaints and pretensions of his country. Because, if brought into consideration, and proved to be unfounded, or, for any reason, waved, it could not be expected, that such consideration, or the reasons which refuted the complaints, should appear in the treaty; it would be useless and unprecedented.

That the American minister did not bring them into consideration, is an assumption of a fact by the committee, for which they have not given any evidence.

If the correspondence and arguments used by the minister who negociated the treaty, were before the town, or the committee—or if they had such information of their doings, as could be relied on—it would probably have been stated. Candour requires, that before a charge of gross neglect is believed against any man, some evidence should be adduced to support the charge.

That every complaint and pretension of the United States was duly made and enforced by the American minister, is to be presumed from his known fidelity, understanding, and patriotism. It may also be inferred from the following considerations:

The president of the United States undoubtedly gave him instructions on this head. The report made of the negociation, would show whether any thing was neglected on the part of the United States. This report was probably before the senate.

[Page] It is not presumable, that the president would accept the report of his minister as satisfactory, or consider the negociation as completed, unless every matter of importance was brought into consideration; or that the senate would recommend to the president, to ratify a treaty that was to terminate all differences, where it appeared to them that the complaints of our own country were not brought into consideration. Further, it is not probable, that the minority of the senate, who had before them the whole negociation, would have neglected to state this, if it had existed, as a reason for rejecting the treaty; whereas, in the communication made by Mr. Mason, no such charge appears, nor in the motions of Mr. Tazewell and Mr. Burr. It may, therefore, fairly be inferred, until the town or its committee please to give some evidence to the contrary, that every complaint and pretension of the United States, was brought into consideration.

The second reason is, "Because, in the stipulation which surrenders our posts on the western frontiers, no provision is made to indemnify the United States, for the commercial and other losses they have sustained, and the heavy expenses to which they have been subjected, in consequence of being kept out of possession for twelve years, in direct violation of the treaty of peace."

In this reason, the town must intend that no treaty should be acceded to, unless the British nation would first agree to indemnify the United States for all losses, that arose from our not being in possession of the posts the last twelve years.

This would be on the part of Great Britain to acknowledge that the inexecution of the treaty of 1783, was entirely her fault—This is probably a matter, she would dispute; and we are in candour obliged to acknowledge, that the 4th article of that treaty, which relates to payment of debts, was opposed by some of the states very soon after, if not before the definitive treaty was signed; and that it continued unexecuted in some of the southern states, until the federal government was established. If she can justly impute the first breach to the United States, our claim of indemnity, for her violation, must be doubtful. But supposing it otherwise, and that it be clear to us, that she retained the posts wrongfully, and without any just provocation on our part—Is it probable that she would so humiliate herself, as to confess she was the only party who had acted wrong, and avow herself the author or cause of all the calamities which have, or which we suppose have been derived from the inexecution of the treaty, and now submit to pay all the damages that had arisen therefrom?

[Page] In the various wars that have taken place for the wrongful detention of territories; few, if any, are the instances, that the vanquished nation has paid for the injuries and losses that have arisen from such detention.

The most that is commonly attained, is a restoration of such territory. Independent nations, owning no superior, qualified to judge of their conduct, will seldom acknowledge they have done wrong, especially when possessed of power to support their own cause. It is wise both in a minister, and a nation, to refrain from insisting on points, which would only produce crimination, and recrimination, without advancing the great objects of their negociation. Let the candid consider, if it is probable, that any reasoning they could suggest, would have induced Great Britain, to accede to such a stipulation as this objection supposes.

If not, would it be wise in us to refuse the posts, and still suffer the evils we feel from being deprived of them—or attempt to gain them by force? If successful in this latter mode, is it probable, that, at the end of a war, we could induce Britain to pay us the losses suffered by the twelve years detention, added to the duration of hostilities, and the further expenses of a war, undertaken to regain them? There are few men, who will say such an event can be calculated on—If, thou, it is not probable that Great Britain could be induced by arguments to accede to this stipulation, nor that we could have attained it by war, it must certainly be considered wise in the minister to accept the posts, and in the senate to advise the ratification of the treaty, notwithstanding she did not stipulate to pay the losses consequent on her detention of them.—It ought also to be remarked, that although much has been said about me [...]ing a demand of the posts, nothing has been intimated in public, that a demand should be made for damages, for not relinquishing them before; much less, that we should refuse to receive them, unless we could be paid for such damages, or that we would attempt to gain such damages by war; especially when it had never been hinted, that the United States would hazard a war even to gain the posts.

A FEDERALIST.

[Page]

No. II.

THE third reason of the town of Boston against ratifying the treaty, is, because no indemnification is to be made to the citizens of the United States for property taken from them at the close of the war, the restitution of which is provided for by the same treaty.

The words of the treaty of 1783, referred to by the town, are probably these, "His Britannic majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes, or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies," &c. &c.

It is understood, that the United States contend, that this description applies to negroes, remaining within the British lines after the peace, but who, having been captured, or invited by proclamation, had fled to the British during the war. The British government contend for another construction, and say, that negroes captured in war, or who, invited by proclamation, had taken refuge with them during the war, could be considered as American property, no more than ships taken, or horses strayed to them during the war. That, on the capture of negroes by the British, or the acceding by the negroes to the terms of their proclamation, they ceased to be the property of the Americans.

If this reasoning of the British be not satisfactory to the people of the United States, candour will oblige them to admit, that the British government may think it just, and consequently, a point extremely hard, if not impossible, to be obtained from them, since the concession would imply a sacrifice of the public faith, which had been pledged to the negroes. It is not known, that the British carried away other property.

The amount in value, depending on this point, is greatly exaggerated, having been stated, in conversation, at many millions of dollars; while it is known, from authentic documents, that the whole number of negroes, to whom the provisions in the treaty could possibly relate, fall short of 3000, that being the total carried away after the peace, including many free negroes, and many slaves, who, with their proper masters, had taken refuge within the British lines. Let any man make the probable deduction for free negroes, and those slaves who accompanied their masters, and consider that the remainder included those of extreme old age, and the youngest infants, the sick and the well, the worthless, and those of value, and he must be convinced, however unsatisfactory the construction given by the British may be to his mind, that the evil [Page]is not of great magnitude, by no means sufficient to press an indemnity for, in hazard of the property taken from our citizens on the ocean, in hazard of our peace, and other articles of the treaty, which may be considered beneficial to the United States.

The fourth reason is, "Because the capture of vessels and property of the citizens of the United States, made under the authority of the government of Great Britain, is a national concern; and claims, arising from such captures, ought not to have been submitted to the decision of their admiralty courts; as the United States are thereby precluded from having any voice in the final determination of such cases, and because the indemnification proposed to be made, is to be sought by a process, tedious and expensive, in which justice may be delayed to an unreasonable time; and eventually lost to many of the sufferers, from their inability to pursue it; and because this mode of indemnification bears no proportion to the summary method adopted for the satisfaction of British claims."

The first charge here is, that claims arising from captures made on American property ought not to have been submitted to the decision of their admiralty courts.

In the year 1753, the king of Prussia complained to the king of Great Britain, that the property of his subjects had been unlawfully captured and condemned on the high seas, by subjects of the king of Great Britain. The reply then was, that the property had been regularly tried in the admiralty courts of Great Britain, which courts tried causes according to the universal law of nations, and the stipulations of treaty; that affairs of this kind are and can be cognizable only in the courts belonging to that power where the seizure is made.

In our own country, the British minister complained to Mr. Jefferson, then secretary of state, that certain subjects of his king were injured by an inability to obtain their just demands.

Mr. Jefferson replied, "that no nation can answer for perfect exactitude of proceedings in all their inferior courts—it suffices to provide a supreme judicature, where error and partiality will be ultimately corrected. With this qualification, we have heretofore been in the habit of considering the administration of justice in Great Britain, as extremely pure. The administration of justice is a branch of the sovereignty over a country, and belongs exclusively to the nation inhabiting it— When a cause has been adjudged, according to the rules and forms of the country, its justice ought to be presumed.—If any instances of unlawful impediments have existed in any of [Page]the inferior tribunals, they would, like other unlawful proceedings, have been over-ruled on an appeal to the higher courts. If not over-ruled, then a complaint to the government would have been regular, and their interference probably effectual. If your citizens would not prosecute their rights, it was impossible they should recover them, or be denied recovery: and, until a denial of right through all the tribunals, there is no ground of complaint."

Here it appears, that, in other cases, and with other nations, this has been thought just by Great Britain: and, in our own country, the doctrine has been adopted towards Great Britain, and acquiesced in on her part.

It ought likewise to be remarked, that most of the seizures complained of by the American citizens, have been made by privateers owned by private individuals; and that every British subject has a right, which neither king nor minister can deprive him of, to have his cause tried by the courts of his country; and it is not impossible that some claims may have been made by Americans, where the property is liable, by the law of nations, to be condemned. It ought also to be remembered, that the British government made provision for the regular bringing forward to trial, causes, which, from certain circumstances of the claimants, had, by strict law, lost their right to a trial in the supreme courts of admiralty; and that our own government has sent a person to procure papers and documents from the courts of vice admiralty, to support the claims of our citizens; to enter appeals, and give security for their prosecution, free of expense, to the claimants. The trial by admiralty courts is supported, alluded to, and enforced by many treaties. "In this method, all captures at sea have been tried, during all the late wars, by the European powers, and submitted to by the neutral powers. By courts of admiralty, acting according to the laws of nations, and particular treaties, all captures at sea have immemorially been judged of, in every country of Europe; any other method of trial would be manifestly unjust, absurd, and impracticable." Thus the law and customs of nations have been stated by the ablest and most respectable civilians of the present age.

It may justly be inferred, that the evils of the unfortunate people, whose property has been captured, will be redressed, in a manner known and practised by other nations, in similar cases, and recognized as right by ourselves;—that the injuries, apprehended by the town for the sufferers, from the expense attending the suits, and their incapacity to pursue their claims, have been fully provided for by the American government.

[Page] To provide against evils which this method might not reach, it is expressly warranted, in the 7th article of the treaty, "that in all cases where adequate compensation cannot, for whatever reason, be now actually obtained, had, and received, by the said merchants and others, in the ordinary course of justice, full and complete compensation for the same, will be made by the British government to the said complainants."

The other part of the charge, contained in this reason, is, that the mode of indemnification bears no proportion to the summary one adopted for the satisfaction of British claims.

The same 7th article of the treaty stipulates, that the declaration of the president, as contained in Mr. Jefferson's letter, of the 5th of September, 1793, to Mr. Hammond, shall be carried into execution. This letter, which is annexed to the treaty, states, that having, for particular reasons, forborne to use all the means in the power of the United States, for the restitution of certain vessels, the president thought it incumbent on the United States to make compensation therefor.

The government of the United States, voluntarily forbearing to make use of all the means in their power to obtain justice for certain British subjects, is certainly a different case from captures by British subjects, of American property, on which the British government expressly stipulates, that she will make use of all the means in her power to obtain restitution from the captors, of property wrongfully taken; and, if these means are inadequate, from whatever reason, she will make full and complete compensation to the complainants. The American government having decided, that the demand of the British minister was right, chose between two evils, viz. That of compelling restitution from the wrong-doer when in their power, or making compensation itself.—It chose the latter.

The British government chose the former; and Mr. Jefferson declares, in the letter before referred to, "that where all the means in the power of the nation are used to obtain restitution, and they fail; he did not mean to give an opinion, that restitution ought to be made by the government;" but, in this case, Mr. Jay has induced the British government to use all the means in their power, and make compensation, when these fail.

It is presumed, that a reference to the article in the treaty, Mr. Jefferson's letter, and a consideration of the law of nations, as recognized by Europe and America, will convince all candid men, that the fourth reason of the town ought to have no weight against the treaty.

[Page] The fifth reason is, "Because this compact admits British subjects to an equal participation with our own citizens, of the interior traffic of the United States with the Indians, through our whole territorial dominions, while the advantages ostensibly reciprocated to our citizens, are limited both in their nature and extent."

It hath been well understood, by men acquainted with the country, occupied by the Indians, within the territory of the United States, and that which falls within the British dominions, that by far the greatest proportion of furs are collected within the British dominions. If this is true, much is gained to the United States by the fur trade, while Britain has nothing in return, but the liberty of traversing a wilderness, from which no traffic can be obtained. A little reflection will convince us, that our means of paying for such furs, and our export trade, opened by this treaty, are really superior to the benefits derived to Britain, and will prove a source of great wealth to the Americans.

While we are possessed of an extent of sea coast, so immense, compared with that of Great Britain, it will readily be seen, that the European and Asiatic goods (the latter of which can be afforded on better terms by us, than the subjects of Great Britain) exported from the United States, into their interior countries, must greatly exceed any quantities the British colonists can bring into the United States on that quarter. The embarrassments attending an importation from Europe into Canada, New Brunswic, and Nova Scotia, by sea, and confined as those inhabitants of the countries are in their trade to the mother country, compared with our advantages of supplying them, by our easy communication with them, and with every part of the world, will convince all candid men, that the advantages, of this part of the treaty, are chiefly on our side.

But still it may be said, they have a right to come into our country, and we have not a right to enter the seaports of their colonies in our own vessels. If it appears from an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the article of the treaty here referred, to that we receive more than we grant, it must be admitted that this reason ought not to prevail against a ratification of the treaty.

By the treaty we are equally admitted into each other's territory on the land board, for the purposes of traffic. Before the treaty is ratified, neither enjoys this right. They enter our seaports as freely now, as they can by the treaty—we are not permitted to enter theirs. This instrument gives them no new right on the sea board. It does not diminish any we possess. Under [Page]the treaty, we can carry on commerce with their colonies by land. From reasons before stated, our trade there must be very advantageous, while theirs in our territory cannot be disadvantageous.

By this article, therefore, it appears we have gained much, for which we have given but little, if any thing; for none will pretend, that by the means of the lakes, the British colonists can under-sell the American merchant; still less will any pretend that we do not gain immensely more of the fur trade than we grant.

The sixth reason is, "Because the alien duty upon our merchandize, imported into the United States by British subjects, in their own bottoms, is, if not wholly suspended, at least contracted not to be increased."

The 15th article of the treaty contains a stipulation of both parties, that places their ships and merchandizes reciprocally on the footing of the most favored nations, and merely reserves a right to the British government, to impose on American vessels, entering into British ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal to what British vessels pay in American ports, and such duty as may be adequate to countervail the difference of duty, now payable on the importation of European and Asiatic goods, when imported into the United States, in British or in American vessels.

This must be the article to which the sixth reason alludes— and it certainly cannot be "derogatory to our national honor and independence" to be willing to meet the British nation on terms of equality; when it is considered, that we have similar articles in our treaties with France, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia; that it is common in most of the modern treaties, and especially was of late inserted in the treaty between France and Great Britain; at least, it behoves those who make the objections, to show in what consists our power to compel a nation to trade with us, on terms by which we shall impose heavier duties on her trade, than we do on others, while she imposes no heavier duties on us, than she does on others. In general terms, it has been said, that the treaty was not reciprocal —here is an objection, that it is reciprocal.

A FEDERALIST.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Notes

*

This majority of two to one, has been considered as a bare majority, because it was a bare quorum.

↵

*

France, Holland, and Prussia, and our treaty with Sweden includes a like proviso.

↵

*

Justinian's Institutes, Lib. iii. Tit. 10, 11, 12, 13. Lib. iv. Tit. 2. Domat's Civil and Public Law. Prel. Book, Tit. 3, Sect. 1, 2. Book iv. Sect. 1.

↵

†

Biens. Le mot, bien, a une signification generale, & comprend toutes sortes de possessions, comme meubles, immeubles, acquĕts, conquĕts, propres, &c.

On distingue dans l [...]s biens des particuliers, les meubles & les immeubles, Jes acquĕts & les propres: & entre les propres, les paternels & les maternels, les anciens & les naissans. Les biens meubles sont ceu [...] qui peuvent se mouvoir & se transporter d'un lieu en un autre, comme des denrees, des marchandises, de deniers comptans, de la vaisselle d'argent, des bestiau [...], des utensiles d'hotel. Les biens immeubles sont ceux qui ne peuvent se mouvoir ou se transporter d'un lieu dans un autre, comme des heritages, des maisons, &c.

↵

‡

Biens—C'est en generale tout ce qui compose nos richesses; il y a deux sortes de biens, les meubles & les immeubles; meubles, tout ce qui peut etre transpor [...]é d'un lieu [...] un autre: immeubles—biens en fonds, ou qui sont presumé avoir la nature de fonds—On distingue deux sorts d'immeubles, les réels, & les fictifs; les immeubles réels sont non seulement la substance mem [...] de la terre qui est ce qu'on appelle le fond, mais tout ce qui est adherent à sa surface, foit par la nature, comme les arbres, soit par la main des hommes, comme les maisons & autre batiments—On a appelle l'autre espece d'immeubles, immeubles sictifs; parce qu'ils ne sont tells que par fiction; de ce nombre sont les offices venaux, casuels, & les rentes constitutes.

↵

*

See authorities before cited: [...] Puss [...]dorff, book viii. ch. 5. sect. 8. Groti [...]s, book iii. ch. 5. sect. 11, 12. V [...]te [...], book 1. ch. 20. sect. 245, 246, 247.

↵

*

See Appendix to Mr. Jay's Treaty, page 175.

↵

§

§

§

[Page]

[No. VI.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME II.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—OCTOBER 24, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. JURICOLA, No. II. Page 75

2. — No. III. Page 82

3. — No. IV. Page 88

4. The Federalist No. III. Page 95

5. Remarks on Mr. Charles Pinckney's Speech Page 103

6. Proceedings at Newport, August 19th, 1795 Page 111

7. Observations on Treaties Page 113

8. Remarks on the Vth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty Page 116

9. Decius, No. I. Page 118

10. — No. II. Page 124

11. — No. III. Page 128

12. — No. IV. Page 133

13. — No. V. Page 136

14. Strictures on the late Conduct of the Executive Page 141

15. Letter from the Chairman of a Meeting of the Citizens of Norfolk (Virginia) held August 5th, 1795, to the President of the United States Page 144

16. President's Answer ibid.

[Page]

American Remembrancer, &c.
An Examination of the pending Treaty with Great Britain.

No. II.
[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17.] To the President of the United States of America.

SIR,

IT is respectfully conceived, that there are few points of objection to the treaty, which require a more dispassionate and full examination, than that which turns upon the omitted compensation for the negroes taken away in 1783. It is not pertinent to urge, as hath been done, in favor of an erroneous construction of the treaty of peace, that there is, strictly speaking, no property in men. It is very unhappy, indeed, but it is also true, that the census of 1791 proves the existence of such property, as well in the eastern and middle, as in the southern states; and that the laws of both the contracting nations, still continue to maintain this property in men, in many parts of their respective dominions. Were a general manumission instantly to take place, the ablest friends of the treaty will candidly acknowledge, that political order, the best result of human wisdom and virtue, would, for a long time, be banished from our land.

Thus much has been said upon this point, because suggestions of a local aspect, and calculated to beget heat and to excite prejudices (which, though truly amiable, are unfavorable to fair discussion) have been occasionally made by writers on the treaty.

It is understood, that the British government have formerly, or recently urged the following objections to our allegations, that they first infringed the treaty of peace by carrying away the negroes from New-York.

1st. They have observed, as it is said, that it was an evident misconstruction of the treaty, and might even be deemed offensive to them, to say that they had stipulated to commit such a breach of faith, as their delivering up to slavery, men, who had been induced among them by promises of protection and freedom.

[Page] 2dly. That the negroes were property in America; that a part of them were taken in war by the British troops and were consequently "booty" to them, and no longer the property of the American inhabitants; that the words of the stipulation are, "Negroes and other property of the American inhabitants."

3dly. That another part of the negroes had come within their lines, and were to be considered "as strays."

4thly. That the article concerning the negroes in the treaty of peace, might refer and apply to those negroes which belonged to the American inhabitants within the British lines.

In considering these answers, which, it is sincerely meant, sir, to state fairly, a great inconsistency occurs between the first and third reason. In the first reason it is alleged, that the negroes were induced (i. e. led) within the British lines; that is, that they went thither for an object aforethought; for an object promised to them, for an object previously desired by them, for an object, which was so well understood between the parties, that it could not be taken away, consistently with the maxi [...]s of one of them, concerning morals, faith, and policy. But in the third reason, it is alleged, that some of the negroes were as "strays" in the British camps and lines, though induced (led or attracted) thither by the strongest allurements and influences, though free human agents, at least, in that particular; possessing intellectual minds, knowing the places from which and through which they went, and whither, on reflection, they intended to go and did go, and at which places of destination, they accordingly stopt, and demanded the objects, for which they purposely went thither, and that, too, upon the faith of promises of the British commanders, which they had heard before they left the places from which they are alleged to have "strayed."

But further, if any part of the negroes were "strays" they were not "booty" taken in war by an enemy. Consequently the property of the American inhabitants was not changed by capture. No capture had taken place, and they ought not to have been carried away from their owners. All such negroes must have come within the words used, which are, "any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants." Moreover as the restoration of strays, on paying charges, is dictated no less by common honesty and custom, than by the treaty, it was but a small concession to that spirit of justice, friendship, and liberality, which was mutually professed at the settlement of peace.

The 4th reason will appear to be quite unfound. The article concerning the negroes was manifestly intended to restrain the [Page]British forces from taking away certain objects. This could not have been proposed by the British commissioner, but, indeed, required some delicacy to be brought forward by the American commissioners, as it might convey an imputation or suspicion of plunder against the British troops. It is material, sir, that the mind should be satisfied, that this article was demanded on the part of the United States, because it must be clear that the American commissioners could not have meant by it, to bring forward a stipulation to preserve the property of the obnoxious American inhabitants, who were found within the British lines. It is equally clear, that the British commissioner could not but consider it as an insult to him and his nation, if the American commissioners had required a formal promise, that their generals and admirals should not despoil the unfortunate people within their lines (in the moment of leaving them) of their negroes and other property. There is much solicitude for the loyalists, manifested by the British government in the old treaty, but not for the negroes. A kind disposition to them probably was not at all wanting; but in the variety and importance of other objects, they may have been overlooked by the British commissioner at Paris. The first attraction of attention to the situation of these negroes has probably been in New-York, where the promises of the generals and admirals, and of the officers commanding the black corps, brought the case personally home to some of them, and the negroes themselves would prove strong, though simple, remonstrants against the measure. Their case was serious and hard, and it was humane and prudent to let them go, under the idea of a compensation in money.

If it appears satisfactorily reasonable, that the article in question, of the treaty of peace, could not be particularly intended to prevent the British from carrying away the negroes belonging to the people within their lines, then it will follow, that the stipulation could have no meaning at all, unless it applied to those who had left their master's houses without the lines, and repaired to the British camps, or were picked up in the course of their marches: That is, the stipulation could have only applied to those claimed by our government in all its departments and in every stage of our affairs. It is held to be conclusive against any construction of a treaty, that such construction involves "an absurdity;" and surely it is perfectly irrational to make a solemn stipulation, which has no object to which it can apply or refer.

The words, "any negroes", are very explicit, and do not carry the idea of property at all. It was the duty of the British commissioner to have proposed a clear and definite exception [Page]of any portion of them to which he thought they had acquired a title. Not doing so, we have a right to the broad meaning of the word "any" The United States might consider the negroes in two divisions, one part as taken in war, and another part (the greatest) as going voluntarily into the British lines. The property in the latter was not altered or affected by capture. They were, by the laws, "runaways." The master's legal right was not impaired. The words, "any negroes," would include both descriptions, and the subsequent words, "other property," might follow, as a part, at least, of the negroes continued the property of American owners. Moreover; some of the negroes were taken upon the high seas, and upon the bays of Chesapeake and Charleston; and, since the most strict ideas drawn from the laws of property and war are recurred to, it may be fair to say, that the property in them could not be changed, until after a regular trial and condemnation in a court of admiralty in each case. This was done by the American privateer-owners, when they took negroes in their prizes, and was wanting, no doubt, in many cases in New-York. Those negroes remained, therefore, the property of the American inhabitants.

When an expression, in so solemn and important an instrument as a treaty, is constructed and inserted in the utmost latitude (as "any negroes") it is dangerous to truth, to the harmony of the contracting parties and to their peace, to narrow it down by inferences from subsequent words. A slight relative inaccuracy in a following expression may destroy the meaning, utility, and effect of language, the most clear and unequivocal. In the instance before us, sir, this really appears to be the case. The words "other property" are made, by Great Britain, to narrow unduly the preceding words. Taking in all that has happened and all that was talked over, the passage might have been fairly construed thus: all captured and runaway negroes and property of the American inhabitants.

The conduct of this government, at the moment of the fact, was attended with unanimity, was decided, and clear. Two opinions were not entertained upon the subject. A very able friend of the pending treaty (Mr. Hamilton, of New York) moved a resolution on the 23d May 1783, in his place in congress, "that a considerable number of negroes, belonging to the citizens of these states, have been carried off contrary to the true intent and meaning of the said (preliminary) articles." This motion was seconded by Mr. Izard (of South Carolina) and carried without a division. Consequent measures were, at [Page]the same time, adopted by congress to obtain satisfaction from the British government.

Your own opinions and convictions, sir, on this point, at that time, are generally understood to have been decided, that the carrying away the negroes, as it was done, was an infraction of the treaty. Your own memory, sir, your correspondence with congress and with the British commanders, and your instructions to Mr. Benson, Lieutenant-colonel Smith, and Mr. Parker, the American commissioners, place within your power the sure means of ascertaining the ideas you entertained upon the subject.

From the three unsuccessful motions in the senate, made by Mr. Burr, Mr. Tanewell, and Mr. Gunn, which severally had for their object further amicable negociation for the value of the negroes, and for one or the other of which three motions every member of the senate (except, it is believed, two who were sick) voted, it may be considered as the unanimous opinion of the senate, that this claim was not placed by the treaty, upon a just and satisfactory footing. But, sir, the circumstances preceding the treaty of peace, throw considerable light upon the tr [...] meaning of the article relative to the negroes. It appears from the extracts and minutes in Mr. Jefferson's "Papers relative to Great Britain,"* which accompanied your message to congress, of the 5th of December, 1793, that the American commissioners at Paris, in 1782, had held up to the British commissioner, general claims for negroes and other property carried away in the course of the war from the several seaports, which had been occupied, as posts, by the British forces. It appears, that the retrospective claim was not u [...]imurely admitted into the tr [...] ty; but this discussion with Mr. Oswald will go far so convince an impartial judgment, that his ideas in the stipulation against the further carrying away of negroes and other property, wer [...] that no removal of the black people, who had not been [...]man [...] pated by the American inhabitants, was to be permitted by the British commanders, in the intended evacuation of New-York, wherein it was well known to both parties, that great numbers were collected. Had this been refused by the British commissioner, without an offer of their value, it is easy to pe [...] ceive, that the American commissioners would not have agreed to remove the lawful impediments to the recovering of the British debts. The United States would profit by a rigid adherence to strictly legal ideas in the treaty of peace, because all debts legally extinguished, had so completely ceased to be [Page] debts, that the fifth article could not apply to them. These were many.

But, sir, the propriety of the British commanders holding the negroes taken on land as "booty," admits of some observation. Civilized nations do not now deem it proper, that their forces should take as booty, the property of private persons, not actually sound in arms. It is not at all uncommon to pay individuals for horses, forage, fuel and provisions. The shocking effects of the principle of "booty," have been commuted for the more humane measure of contribution. The war was of a peculiar character and nature; and for that and other reasons, it was not to be expected, that, in the moment of reconciliation, Great Britain was to lose sight of these ideas, nor that the would be governed by summum jus, in her stipulations with the United States. Her agreement not to carry away any more negroes, was a measure consistent with "the liberal, manly, and candid manner" in which Mr. Oswald is declared, by Mr. Adams, Doctor Franklin, and Mr. Jay, to "have conducted the negociations for peace." It appears reasonable to suppose, that a commissioner, so characterized, would be desirous to remove from the final act of amicable separation, to which both parties had agreed, every thing which might wound the American feelings, or keep alive the painful sensibilities, which had resulted from the immense destruction of an invasive war. He well knew, that the American commissioners had represented the parts of this country which owed money to Great Britain, as in some degree incapacitated from paying their debts, by the loss of the negroes, which had already been taken away: and though he might be averse to admit the large schedule of losses of which the negroes, previously removed, formed a great part, he might naturally compromise the claim for the past and for the pending, by agreeing in the most latitudinary terms and ideas, that the troops of his nation should inoffensively and harmlessly depart without carrying away "any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants." Upon critical reflection, it will be perceived that this expression is not entirely wrong, though inaccurate, seeing that there was one description of the general mass of negroes to be left, who are now admitted to be property by both parties: namely, those belonging to the inhabitants within the lines.

Writers upon the interpretation of treaties may be properly consulted upon this subject. They justly admit us to reason from the general views of the contracting parties. These have been already noticed in the preceding detail, and it is hoped, sir, that the length and particularity of the statement will be excused on [Page]account of the great importance of the facts, as evidences of the highly probable or real views of the parties.

It is another rule of interpretation, that when late exceptions are made, by a promising party, to the most extensive meaning of the words used, he may be reminded, that he ought, at the time, to have modified the promise, by altering the expression. "Any negroes," including all without exception, the party promising cannot now narrow the meaning of those words, by suggestions from his own mind or by calling in a subsequent expression to limit the right of the United States.

It is also a rule, that neither party has a right to interpret. a treaty as he pleases. So that differing in their ideas, as the two governments do, the United States have a right to some equal mode of settling the claim. Two feigned cases, one to be tried in the highest court of each country, and to determine the matter in favor of that party which might prove successful in both, are suggested with deference and some doubt. If the courts differed in their decrees, we should be, at least, as well as we are. Commissioners, with all the lights derived from the two hearings, might then terminate the matter. Now Great Britain prescribes the sense of the article contrary to our ideas, and, of course, contrary to rule. (See Vattel, book 2. ch. 7.)

It is to be remembered, that the rules of interpretation, laid down in the law of nations, are considered as binding upon all reasonable governments.

It has already been remarked, that every interpretation, which leads to absurdity, is to be rejected. On this rule, it may be further observed, that it would be really absurd to suppose, that the British commissioner meant to avoid injury to the raisers of our produce, or that the American commissioners meant to save the planters and farmers from being incapacitated from paying their debts, by restraining the carrying away of the few domestic slaves belonging to the people, residing in New-York.

Proposing to continue the examination of this very important point in a future paper, I have the honor to subscribe myself, with unfeigned and perfect respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, and Most humble servant. JURICOLA.

[Page]

No. III.

IT is proposed, sir, respectfully to offer to you, in this paper, some further reflections upon the article, in the treaty of peace with Great Britain, relative to the negroes.

It appears to be fair, in the construction of the treaty, to consider what would have been the effect of reasoning, similar to that opposed to the United States, if resorted to in construing other parts of the same instrument. The American artillery was, by the same article, to be left in all the evacuated fortifications. Let us suppose, as was indeed really the case, that the cannon, originally belonging to all the fortifications in America, had been cast in Europe. It might have been urged, that these were never American in one sense, and in another sense, that they had ceased to be American, having become British by capture. Then the article about American artillery would have become absurd, for it would have been a formal stipulation, without any object, to which it could apply. This case is very strong, because the artillery appurtenant (in the strict legal and orthographical sense of that word) to the fortifications, was originally the property of the old royal government, had been assumed, with the powers of government, by the people, had been thus acquired, by those who were one party to the treaty, by force, and had been taken in battle after the declaration of the independency of the United States, from the armies of that sovereign body politic by the armies of the other sovereign body politic, in the course of an existing and known war; the said artillery being instruments of war belonging to the adverse power, and not private property appertenant, by its nature, to agriculture and menial household service.

In like manner, the same article and sentence of the treaty of peace obligate Great Britain to restore and deliver all archives, records, deeds, and papers, belonging to any of the states or to their citizens, unto the proper states and persons to whom "they belong;" and this is accompanied with a declaration, that it shall be so done, although the said objects, so stipulated to be delivered, may have been, and were, acquired during the course of the war. Here we perceive, that the objects of the stipulation are considered as belonging to those from whom they were previously acquired in the course of the war. If the names and nature of the articles were different, it still will appear, that no precise distinctions against the proper or owning rights or claims of the Americans were meant to be set up. Had the arguments, or distinction now used against the United States, been at all [Page]contemplated by Mr. Oswald, he would not, in the same sentence, have expressly stated other objects, acquired by his nation in war, "to belong" to the American states and private persons.

The reasonings, in the books upon the law of nations, in regard to booty, have been generally applied to clearly personal property of alien enemies, taken by the army of one country in its marches, battles, sieges, and assaults, from the citizens of the other country. There is an absolute and undeniable peculiarity in the object in question, and in the manner and circumstances by which the British troops acquired it, constituting a real difference between it and either the ordinary objects of "booty," on the one hand, or the manner of making "booty" on the other, as contemplated and allowed by the military articles in the law of nations. The difference in quality between this and every description of personal property whatever, is manifest and great. And although this fact places the American interest, in the present question, in a most painful light, yet this disagreeable circumstance cannot impair the stipulations of a treaty between two powers, both actually maintaining and acknowledging, at the time of the contract and ever since, the force of those laws, which relate to the object.—Laws countenanced by the one, as a parent, in the infancy of the other—laws, which, ere the manhood of the United States was acknowledged by the parent country, they had marked with a determined hand and a sincere heart, for gradual abolition and extinction.

Such and so great is the difference between this species of property and all others, that we must apply to it, with proportionate circumspection and candor, all the ordinary rules and reasonings about the subject of "booty," of war.

But if there should be found a great difference between this and the objects of military booty, creating reasonable doubts, whether it can be completely subjected to the rules concerning booty, the difference, in regard to the manner of acquiring ordinary military booty and that of acquiring this object, is much more considerable and important. It was not by force of arms, nor by stratagem, nor by surprize, nor by the ordinary and allowed operations of enemies, but it was by sending to places to which arms or military stratagem or enterprize were not extended, and there openly loosening the bands and laws of that civil society, which had been established by the British and American—by the party attracting it, and by the party deprived of it. It is also to be remembered, that those bands and [Page]laws of society then were, and still are existing unimpaired in the dominions of the party so acquiring it.

There are methods of obtaining the possession of the property of an alien enemy, which would render the property so acquired, not "booty of war." For example; a military officer of one nation remaining for a time within a town of an hostile nation, under the sanction of a passport and flag, carries off the whole military chest of the enemy of his nation: or, a detachment of the troops of one nation, obtain the military chest of their enemy, from its escorting party, solely and confessedly by means prohibited by the laws of war. Will property acquired in these ways be considered, as "booty" of war? Or will it be considered as the acquisition of irregular individuals, by no means to be retained by the acquirers, but to be restored to the owner, particularly so far as it shall be possessed at the moment of reconciliation and peace? The acquisition of [...]merican property, by offers of emancipation, is believe first to have taken place under the governor of Virginia before the declaration of independence, who probably under a dangerously incorrect idea of the power of maintaining martial law, went into the distinct and very different operation of an attempt to effectuate, by his proclamation, the annihilation of a legal property, of great aggregate value. When a practice has been commenced by one in very considerable station, it is too often followed by others, without due enquiry into its legality and propriety.

The governor of Virginia was not a person, on several score [...], who might be expected cautiously to settle new and nice matters, upon grounds perfectly and absolutely correct, in the outset of a warm and distracting civil contest, which it then was. At the present time, no prerogative or power, founded in common or statute law, occurs to recollection, by which the chief executive magistrate of Great Britain, or of a British colony (without the rest of the legislature) could abolish any right of property existing within his jurisdiction, and that without indictment, information or conviction of crime: much less could he destroy the existing legal relation between any two of those classes, who form, together with others, the body of members of the civil society. Persons legally bound to others for a term of years, or for a longer time, could not solely by his executive power, be released therefrom. It is a measure which may be dispassionately affirmed to destroy the bands of the society—a measure which the legislature only (if that [...] effect—a measure, as it should appear to reason, no [...] pract [...]ure in peace, no [...] a [...]owa [...]e in war, and abstained [Page]from by most of the British governors of that time, the pain of which, and part of the injuries of which, the stipulation of the treaty of peace was well calculated to remove. There are very few, indeed, it is believed, sir, of the wise and good of either country, but what now sincerely wish, that the measure of thus calling forth the unhappy blacks, had never been resorted to.

A brief and simple remark, sir, aptly follows the preceding examination of the strict legal ground on which the object in question stood, as property or not property: That, as the British commissioner first used words of promise, including all the negroes, and as he afterwards follows with the words "other property," he must have considered all the negroes as property, notwithstanding the changes of situation, which they had undergone. It does not appear, by the notes of the American commissioners, that he ever opposed to their complaints or representations about the negroes carried away, in the several preceding years, that they had been, or, indeed, that those remaining were, legal booty of war, and not objects for compensation. The reason of a stipulation, that is, the motive which led to the making of it, and the end then proposed, is considered, and justly, as one of the most certain means of establishing the true sense; and great attention, says Vattel, ought to be paid to it, whenever it is required to explain an obscure, equivocal, and undetermined point, either of a law, or of a treaty, or to make application of them to a particular case. We are not left, in this case, to vague conjectures. The injuries which one party had sustained, by the attracting and carrying away of numbers of negroes by the other party, the bitterness of spirit it had occasioned, and the desire to prevent such injuries, which could no longer wound an enemy, on account of the return of peace, and which would have gone far to banish the necessary spirit of reconciliation, rendered it a matter of found sense and reasonable business, to exclude rigid ideas about comparatively inconsiderable objects of property, useless to the British government, and to deliver up all the negroes, to which no private British claim was made. The difficulty of the faith pledged to the negroes, absent and unrepresented, was very probably overlooked, amidst the many and great objects which were to be adjusted. And here it may be observed, that, if Great Britain had promised an impossibility, which promise might have taken place, an equitable compensation, or the relinquishment of the consideration promised therefor by the United States, ought to have settled the matter. It will appear, from the papers of the time, to every person, who has faith in [Page]the truth of Mr. Adams, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Jay, or Mr. Laurens, that this consideration was, the removal of the legal impediments to the recovery of the British debts. Leave us these descriptions of our property, and take you those, was the natural language: the quid pro quo. The American commissioners agreed to every article to which their conceptions of their powers extended. And here it is very material, indeed, to observe, that, if the course of the business and the communications between the American and British commissioners had not effectually and accurately fixed the design of the stipulation, it is wisely permitted by the law of nations, in order to promote the peace of mankind, to conjecture the meaning of the parties. Now no suggestion or conjecture, as to the object on which the stipulation could operate, is offered, except that the offended American commissioners may have thereby meant to require Great Britain to engage, that she would not despoil the unfortunate people within their lines, at the moment when she was leaving them to undergo serious difficulties, on account of their being found in that situation. This construction, perfectly odious as it regards Great Britain, the rules of interpretation of the law of nations, forbid. To the objection drawn from the odium, in which the necessity to ask of them such a stipulation would have involved the British, is to be added the objection, strong indeed in my judgment, that the American commissioners would not demand a stipulation, exclusively in favor of those with whom they were very highly offended, and omit to secure a great mass of property, much of it belonging to those political friends with whom they had gone through the war, and whose case was particularly recommended to them by congress.

It will be just remarked here, that the stipulation does not say, the negroes and other property, but any negroes, or other property. In a general view, the words, the negroes and other property, would appear to be more nearly and accurately relative, than the words, any negroes or other property. The word "other," placed as it is, has rather the appearance of a casual incorrectness, than as intended to limit the sense of the broadest possible words, which precede it, viz. "any negroes," leaving us room to believe, that Mr. Oswald did not make doubts or difficulties concerning the ideas of property or ownership, notwithstanding all the circumstances which the negroes might have undergone. It must be admitted, too, that the British idea of the interpretation does not free the word "other" from incorrectness. For "any," taken alone, will include slaves, and free and indented negroes, and yet "other," followed by "property," does, in their sense, include only one description, being a [Page]very small proportion of the whole number of the negroes. This may appear like wire-drawing the subject; but such appearances are inevitable, in cases involving verbal criticism.

Another, and great, difficulty would result from not extending the stipulation beyond the slaves of persons within the British lines. Peace being concluded, their negroes could not be removed, whether British or American property; so that, as to them, the stipulation was, in a second view, unnecessary. There would, therefore, be no object, on which the stipulation could operate. The rules for interpreting the law of nations, it is believed, do not permit any subsequent words to be so construed, as to render a preceding stipulation or entire provision null and void.

It appears not improper to remark, that one party cannot reasonably plead, that a thing is odious, which he has contributed to create in the country or conduct of the other party, and which is continued to be maintained by law in his own dominions. To enslave men is, indeed, in every view an offensive and disagreeable business; but in the sense of an odious stipulation under the law of nations, any power which maintains by law the purchase of men, never before slaves, and transports them from their connections, cannot plead, that a stipulation could not be intended in a certain sense, because it might make them return men, set free, back into slavery. It is not here meant to insinuate the slightest reproach to Great Britain on this subject. It is confidently believed, that she will steadily pursue a safe and suitable plan of abolishing the slave trade, and slavery itself, throughout her dominions. In regard to the odiousness of the breach of faith, it has been already observed, that it is probable the particular situations of all the negroes were not adverted to. No faithless intention towards them is believed to have existed in the British government or commissioner. The United States did not long insist upon a specific performance of the stipulation. There is no reason, therefore, to doubt, that they would have cheerfully acquiesced in an equitable compensation, instantly upon its being desired; and nothing but compensation is now possible. When a stipulation is made by an agent, employed as Mr. Oswald was, on a sudden, a very able merchant, but not a lawyer, nor versed in diplomatic business, distant from the scene to which the negociation relates, and, consequently, not impressed with every minute circumstance, that had occurred in the operations of the two powers, in a distant country, it is not unnatural to suppose, that he might have contracted for an unobserved point or two, which could not with propriety be complied with, on account [Page]of engagements to which he did not advert, or even on account of the impossibility of performance. If the matter stipulated were ever so unfavorable (and in that sense odious) or if it were impossible, the right of the other party in a clear case, to have the unfavorable or (as the law of nations terms it) the odious stipulation executed, or the impossible one compensated, would be in full force. The United States, waving the execution of the odious inadvertent stipulation from a becoming respect to the feelings and honor of the other party, evidences an accommodating disposition, to settle the matter by equitable compensation.

Several important observations, on this point, of some length, yet remaining, I conclude for the present, with assurances of the sincere and perfect respect, with which

I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient and most humble servant, JURICOLA.

No. IV.

IT has been observed by an able writer (under the signature of Camillus) who favors a ratification of the treaty, without any further amendments, that negroes, by the laws of the states, in which slavery is allowed, are personal property. He, therefore, argues, that, like horses and cattle, and other moveables, they were liable to become "booty." But, sir, this opinion of Camillus, though on a point cardinally important to the argument, if against him, appears to be incorrect. In Virginia, negroes did not go to the executors of the deceased, but passed, by the laws, with lands and other real estate, by descent, to the heir at law. They were also subject to the same laws of dower as real estate. They were likewise capable of being entailed, according to the laws concerning real estate. This situation of the laws, was in that very quarter, wherein the British governor, alluded to above, commenced that executive infringement of them, which has formed the unsound foundation of the opinion, that the blacks could be so attracted or induced from home, as to become "booty of war." It is very important to this argument, that above half the slaves, in the late American provinces, belonged to the people of Virginia, where the foregoing state of law prevailed.

[Page] It is not only clear, that a conciliating mind, like Mr. Oswald's, must have considered it as highly eligible for Great Britain, so to conduct the act of separation from this country, as to leave no cause of dissatisfaction on account of so irritating a matter as spoil; but it is certain, that in his transactions with the United States, he must have considered them as part of the British empire, resisting its general government, and not as an alien enemy. This must have been his notion of the matter; for the parliament in 1782, held it necessary formally to authorize the executive power, to acknowledge the future existence of this country, as a distinct political sovereignty: and his mission was founded on that act of the parliament. Moreover, congress considered this unrelinquished pretension, as so important and proper an idea for them to provide against, that about the same time they resolved, that such an acknowledgment, ought to precede a negociation. From these facts on both sides, it is clear, that the two parties, even while opposed in arms, were not precisely in the situation of two alien hostile powers, different from, and unconnected with, each other, de jure, de lege, and de facto. Before the declaration of independence, the laws of war had but a certain extent of operation, on account of the municipal laws: and it is important to observe, that Great Britain, to the last hour of the war, strictly adhered to this idea in her deportment towards the United States and to foreign nations, who aided them. Wherefore, as she had some considerable advantages in the contest, from that principle, she cannot regularly set it aside, in order to apply the laws of "booty" of war, to this property of the other party, which was not acquired by military means. It has been observed, that she did not deliver up ships in consequence of the treaty, and no doubt this very principle, constituted a part of her reasons; she, considering the vessels of the United States as condemnable for breaches of the statutes passed by her parliament, to shut the American ports and prohibit intercourse. Private ships and cargoes were constantly condemned on the ground of those municipal laws, or the laws of the empire, as she held them, and not upon the laws of war and of nations.

Here it appears necessary, to notice by the way, an inadvertent, but material incorrectness in a writer on the treaty, wherein ships are mentioned as the only species of property, which does not become booty to an enemy, by the mere capture or acquiring of possession. It cannot be doubted, that all property whatever composing the cargoes of ships, all money and baggage of passengers, all passenger slaves, being the servants of passengers or of the ship's officers, and all slaves who are mariners [Page]or a part of the crew of the ship, must be libelled and condemned, in a court of admiralty, and cannot be held by the laws of booty. There is one description of property, which has never yet been seized or retained by any civilized power, whether taken by land or sea; and that is, servants or apprentices, bound for terms of years. Yet Lord Dunmore's proclamation is believed to have extended to bound white persons. It would be particularly painful and inconvenient to Great Britain, and especially on the breaking out of a war, if the time of service of the numerous apprentices on board her private ships, which terms of time are the fair and actual property of their masters, should be libelled in the courts of admiralty, of a foreign country, and decreed to be the lawful property of the captors. This may place in a clearer light, the mighty evils which may be induced by destroying the legal relations, subsisting between persons in the same civil society, by a military proclamation, resorted to by the executive power in a domestic quarrel, or by a foreign enemy in an ordinary war. To take apprentices and bound servants on land, and to make the right of their time of service "booty" of war, would extend the evil, though it accords with the principle of the British proclamation. To transmit such proclamations into countries remote from the reach of arms, offering freedom from their indentures, to all such servants and apprentices, as should leave their masters' houses, thereby dissolving the bands of society, and the existing municipal laws of property, would lead, in a few years, to modes of warfare, which would immensely increase its dreadful calamities.

There existed formerly in the kingdom of Great Britain itself, a description of slaves, well known to lawyers by the name of Villeins. These slaves were subject to the laws of real estates, and not to the rules of distribution concerning personal property. They were included among the hereditaments of that day. This is conceived to be an important circumstance to discountenance the general soundness of the idea, that a British commissioner could reasonably deem slaves to be personal property.

The conduct of sovereigns holding slave countries, may be considered as important on this subject. In the numerous and frequent wars between the European nations, having West India colonies, the measure of emancipating the blacks had never been adopted, as a proper and justisiable mode of warfare. It is not irrelative to this argument to remark, that Mr. Oswald was a grea [...] West India merchant, and he may have remembered, that the blacks, in the conquered and restored islands, always followed the lands, and were also restored.

[Page] Further: A circustance of great importance indeed to Great Britain and her slave colonies, in relation to this very description of property, was pending during the time of the American negociation at Paris. A number of valuable West India islands had been taken by the French from the British in and between the years. 1778 and 1782. These were, St. Kitts, Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincents, Tobago, Dominica, Nevis and Montserat. To these may be added, New Providence and the Bahamas, taken by Spain. Many of the slaves on those islands, by the arguments offered against the United States, were "booty." Their case was that of capture before the capitulations or without a capitulation, in ordinary war between two distinct sovereigns, not commenced by an unlawful attempt to abolish a legal interest by an act of a secondary executive magistrate, and continued by military commanders and others, infringing the legislative jurisdiction, if their jurisdiction extended to such an act for the consideration moving thereto. It is possible, that the apprehension of so embarrassing a difficulty, and so deep an injury to the British West India islands, which were to be restored, may have contributed to influence the British commissioner to be silent about impediments to the American claim to "ary" of the negroes. Certain it is, that Great Britain derived extensive advantages from the circumstance of the negroes on the restored islands, not being considered as booty; and equally certain it is, and highly meriting the candid consideration of Great Britain, as to the past and future, that the deeply indebted planters of those islands, could not have paid their debts to their British creditors, had considerable numbers of their negroes been kept from them upon the plea, that they were booty to the armies of France.

It is of very great importance to this American claim, and to the argument in favor of the United States, that the laws existing in regard to the whole body of the negro slaves belonging to Great Britain, at the time of the preliminary treaty of peace, considered them in the light of real estate. They descended with the lands to the heir, and were subject to the laws of dower, as lands. They were not put on the same footing as personal property. The laws of Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbadoes, are here referred to. Those islands were the greatest and most respectable British West India colonies, having, by accredited accounts, in 1782, near 300, 000 slaves. It is to be observed, that of all the West India islands, those three alone, remained to Great Britain on the 20th November, 1782; all the rest and the Florida slave colonies, were taken by the French and Spaniards. The captured islands were returned in the ordinary [Page]general terms; and in numerous instances, the question of slaves being booty, and the right of carrying the slaves away, might have been raised by the French and Spaniards, upon the principles now urged by Great Britain, against the United States.

It is likewise of some consequence on this subject, that the French colonial laws, which were founded on the customs of the city of Paris, contemplated this new description of property, in certain respects, with some of the ideas attached to immoveable property. The plantations and negroes thereon, of persons dying intestate, vested in the heirs, and could not be sold during their minority. But the goods and chattels (as we call them) could be sold. It is also understood, that they were distinguished by the laws concerning dower, settlements, and the return of estates of persons, dying without issue, to the source, from which they came to the deceased.

Some ideas concerning the right of poslliminium appear to have an important relation to this case. Upon the foundation of that right, the Roman law (the parent stock of the civil law and law of nations) treated slaves, taken in war, in a manner opposite to that in which things, now called personal property, were treated. They were not subject to the rules of booty, which worked a change of property by the mere acquiring of possession, as is the case with respect to those things at present termed goods and chattels; but slaves were returned, like real estates, contrary to those rules, to their former owners, on a pacification. This idea in the ancient law of nations (with the laws of villeinage) has no doubt had some influence in fixing the practice of leaving the proprietors of the captured West India islands in possession of their slaves, in all cases wherein their lands were not confiscated. Although the islands of. Grenada and the Grenadines were conquered, without a capitulation, by France, in 1778, no pretence was set up by the French on returning those islands at the peace of 1783, according to the treaty, that the slaves were retainable and might be carried away by them as "booty" of war, because not included in the words, which returned the territory. The position, that the property in a captured slave remains to an owner, so as to give a sufficient foundation to claim him in case he shall be in the first owner's country at the close of the war, receives the greatest countenance from the ancient law of nations, and from the recent proceedings thereunder between Great Britain and her ordinary enemies. Wherefore, it seems that the proclamation of Lord Dunmore is as destitute of support from [Page] [...]he law of nations, and the practice thereon, as from the municipal statutes of his former government.

There still exist, unhappily, throughout the world, too many instances of perpetual and hereditary slavery. No quarter of the globe is entirely free from it. Whatever may be the virtuous dispositions of many individuals and of several nations, it is evident, that this painful practice cannot be ended in a day; nor would too sudden an abolition promote the comfort of those unhappy men. While it is permitted to continue, it will add infinitely to the misery of slaves, if they are to be considered hereafter, like the cattle on a farm, as capable of becoming booty in war; and it must subject to distraction and utter ruin, all those vulnerable and defenceless islands and colonies, in which these unhappy people form a large majority of the population.

On a calm review of the grounds of this American claim upon Great Britain, it will appear, that the acquisition of the blacks by the British forces was commenced and largely executed by an unprecedented act of a civil governor, contrary to the laws of the land by which he was bound; that it was continued by unprecedented acts of the British military commanders, contrary to the law and usage of notions, by which they were bound—that any description of property thus irregularly acquired against the municipal law and the law of nations, could neither have been rendered the property of the acquirers, nor capable of being disposed of by them, nor capable of being retained by them; but that it ought to have been restored by them, even if it were, strictly speaking, personal property; and that consequently, had it been indisputably of that description, it could not have been carried away, because of the manner in which it was obtained. It will also appear, that a majority of the description of property in question was held, in the United States, as real and inheritable estate, consequently not subject to the laws of booty; that this was particularly the case throughout the whole of the late jurisdiction of the earl of Dunmore; that the ancient law of England made the villein or English slave likewise inheritable estate, and passed him like the lands; that the laws of all the remaining. British West India islands in 1782, contemplated the negroes as real estate; that the French colonial laws considered them, in several very important particulars, like immoveable property; that the ancient Romans held them to be, like lands, within the laws of postliminium, in opposition to the rules concerning "booty" in war; that the prescriptive law of nations, as established by the practice of Great Britain, France, Spain, &c. restored them after war, as [Page]and with real estates, not only in capitulating islands, conquered from each other, but even, as in the case of Grenada and the Grenadines, in islands conquered unconditionally, or without capitulation; that therefore, by those general pre-established rules, both written and prescriptive, which bound the French not to carry away the negroes from the restored British islands, especially from Grenada and the Grenadines, the British were bound not to carry away from the United States any negroes, which were acquired from the Americans, even if nothing had been said of negroes of other property in the treaty of peace.

It is moreover hoped, sir, that it has been made to appear to have been the real intention and meaning of both parties to the treaty of peace, that no negroes should be carried away. This is evidenced, it is conceived, by the representations, before and at the moment, of the American commissioners, and by the omission of counter representations, and the consequently implied acquiescence of the British commissioner; likewise by the words of the treaty itself in regard to the negroes, fairly construed and interpreted by the rules drawn from reason and the law of nations, and supported by similar provisions, concerning the American artillery, archives, papers, &c. and lastly, this idea of the meaning of the parties appears to be rendered necessary and inevitable by the impossibility of finding any other meaning, which either party could think it useful or proper to make the subject matter of a stipulation.

How far this measure of the British commanders, if really contrary to the law of nations and to the treaty of peace, is the first fact of the nature of an infraction on either side, and how far it ought to be compensated, if it was an infraction of the law of nations or of the treaty, though it should prove not to have been the first breach of the treaty, remains to be considered.

I have the honor to be, With sincere and perfect respect, Sir, Your most obedient and most humble servant, JURICOLA.

☞ THE publication of JURICOLA's Examination was dis [...]ontinued, when the ratification of the treaty was announced.

[Page]

The Objections to the Treaty, refuted. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 72.]
No. III.

THE 7th reason is, "Because the commerce we have hitherto enjoyed in India, in common with other nations, is so restricted, that in future it will be of little or no substantial benefit to our citizens."

In the first place, it ought to be remarked, that, according to the rights claimed by all nations, having colonies, to which all other nations have acceded, we have no positive right to go to any of the colonies of the British crown; and that, unless such right is obtained by treaty, the British may inhibit our trading, or even entering the ports of their colonial possessions, without affording any just cause of complaint. The right of confining the trade of colonies to the parent country, and excluding all strangers from any participation therein, is as old and as universal, as any claimed by the present commercial nations of Europe.

By our treaty with France, his most christian majesty agrees to continue to the subjects of the United States, the free ports which have been and are open in the French islands of America: in all of which free ports the said subjects shall enjoy the same agreeably to the regulations which relate to them.

An arret of the king of France, on the 30th of August, 1784, declares the free ports in the islands of America, and the regulations they shall be subject to—the size of vessels—the articles they may carry in, and bring away. The vessels are to be sixty tons at the least, and the merchandizes, wood, salt, beef, fish, rice, maize, vegetables, skins, furs, rosin, pitch and tar. Salt beef and fish are subjected to a duty of three livres per quintal, beside the general duties on the cargo: which three livres are converted into a bounty on the French fishery. The articles, permitted to be taken away in return, were limited to tassia and melasses—and goods imported there from France. Commissioners were to be appointed to reside in these free ports, to see that the regulations were strictly complied with; and the more securely to guard the trade, the merchants and captains of vessels, residing in those ports, were authorized to choose from among themselves, commissioners who should assist in watching the foreign vessels and denouncing negligencies. By our treaty with the United Netherlands, it is is expressly [Page]agreed, "that the United States, their subjects and inhabitants, shall leave to those of their high mightinesses, the peaceable enjoyment of their rights in the countries, islands, and seas, in the East and West Indies, without any hindrance or molestation." It appears, then, that the right of excluding foreigners from a direct trade to their colonies, and confining the trade of the colonists to the mother country, is not only practised among all the European nations, but has been expressly recognized by the United States of America. Hence it clearly follows, that every relaxation of the colonial system must be considered as a favor to that nation, in whose behalf it is so relaxed. This used to be our reasoning on the arret of [...]he king of France, admitting us, in common with other foreigners, into the West Indies, however limited in the tonnage of the vessels, and in the cargoes permitted to be imported and exported.

This is considered to be the permanent state of things. In times of great scarcity in the islands, they have been free for the importation of certain other articles. In times of war, the French have generally opened their colonies to all foreigners, because it is more important to have their seamen on board their ships of war, than be the sole suppliers and carriers for their colonies. During the last war, in the year 1779, the French opened the trade of their West India islands to neutral nations: the consequences were alarming to the merchants of France; and representations were made against the measure from Bourdeaux, Nantz, and other large towns; and immediately on signing the preliminary articles of peace, this permission to neutral nations was withdrawn.

The same was done at the Havannah. While Louisburg and Canada were colonies of France, they were not allowed a direct trade to the West Indies. And such has been the jealousy of European nations respecting their colonies, that Franc [...] once passed a decree, ordering the governors of their West India colonies to seize and confiscate ships and cargoes coming within a league of the shores of their islands.

The right we enjoy, without treaty, of going into the British East Indies, is merely permissive in that nation. The trade has been but of few years.—Lord Sheffield, in his argument against admitting the Americans into the West India islands, remarks, "That the Americans have no more pretensions to go to our West India islands, than to our East India settlements; yet the latter would be thought a very extraordinary step."

The sentiments of this writer have been much adopted by the British government, relative to their West Indies, since the revolution, and may, therefore, give us some idea what that nation [Page]thinks of our right to a commerce with their East India settlements. If Great Britain should refuse to admit our vessels into her East India possessions, it would be no just cause of complaint on the part of the United States. France and Spain, as has been shown, opened the trade of some of their colonies, during the last war, to all neutral nations; and immediately on return of peace, that trade was again confined to the parent countries. Neither the United States, nor any other nation, who had enjoyed the benefits of this free trade, pretended to claim a continuance, because it had been permitted to them, or to deny the authority of these two nations to prohibit them entering their colonial possessions, much less to make complaint at being denied a privilege, before indulged to them.

Having, then, no rights of commerce in the British East Indies, which that nation may not take from us, without just cause of complaint on our part, let us consider what are the restrictions imposed on the trade by treaty, and whether it will not continue to be a substantial benefit to our citizens, notwithstanding these restrictions.

By the 13th article, there is an express stipulation on the part of the British king, that we shall freely carry on a trade with the British East Indies, paying a tonnage duty on our vessels, no higher than British vessels pay in American ports, and no higher duties on the importation and exportation of their cargoes, than shall be payable on the same articles, when imported or exported in British vessels; the articles exported to be carried to the United States, and there unladen; and both parties, whenever it shall be found necessary, shall adopt such regulations as shall be necessary to the due observance of this stipulation.

Two questions arise on this part of the article—first, supposing the trade to be absolutely confined to the carrying of merchandise of any sort, not absolutely prohibited, to the British East Indies, and the importing from those settlements, directly into the United States, all articles not absolutely prohibited.

Is a trade, thus limited, substantially beneficial? We must either procure the produce of that country, directly from the East Indies, making payment there, in such articles as shall be convenient for us to carry, and suited to their market, or we must buy them in Europe, and pay for them there.

Taking for granted, then, that there is no profit on the cargo carried to the East Indies (though sometimes very great profits are made on the outward cargo) let it be considered, that, in the first place, we procure all our East India goods at [Page]the first cost, from the hands of the producer. In the latter, they are purchased with all the additional charges of freight to Europe, commissions, and profits of every man concerned in procuring them in India, sending them to Europe, and selling them there; and when it is remembered, that the trade from Europe is exclusively vested in companies, which pay an immense sum for this monopoly, and is at vast expense for the support of military and civil establishments, to secure their trade and possessions, and the orderly management of their concerns; all which must be charged on the goods, before they are sold in Europe; it cannot be doubted, that the direct trade to and from the British East Indies, will continue to be substantially beneficial. Indeed, it is a well authenticated fact, that East India goods are twenty-five per cent. cheaper in the United States than in Europe; and, if imported from Europe by us, the charge must be made of at least ten per cent. more, which would arise for commissions and exchange. It is clear, then, that we should procure our East India goods from thirty to forty per centum cheaper, under this article, than without the permission to go to the East Indies, which it secures to us; the difference may be fairly called a substantial benefit to our citizens. This is the case in times of peace; in time of war the difference will be greater, the charges in Europe being greatly accumulated by war-freight and insurance.

The other question that arises on this article, is, are we, that is to say, both nations, constrained to keep this trade thus limited? Has not Britain the power to grant, and the United States the capacity to exercise, the right of carrying East India goods to Europe, if both parties consent? When two make a contract, in which no other is interested; may they not dissolve it, if both please? If dissolve it, may they not grant to each other larger and greater benefits than are stipulated in the contract? Does stipulating to grant a right, by an individual or a nation, preclude a power to extend that right, or grant or permit the exercise of others? Is there any moral or natural incapacity in the United States, to receive an extension of the commerce, granted in that article? Is there any in Great Britain to grant? The answer must be clear, and will readily show, that the having certain rights, by express stipulation, cannot interfere with the grant or permission of others.

Has any other power a right, then, to prohibit Britain from permitting, and America from exercising, other rights? It is not pretended there is any.

If the treaty is ratified, and Great Britain shall choose to demand of us to make such regulations as will insure to them, [Page]that the vessels of the United States shall carry the goods laden in the East Indies, to the United States, and there unlade them, we shall be bound to do it. But as this is a stipulation on our part, and for her benefit, if she chooses to wave it, and clear out our vessels from her ports for Europe, they will have a right to go there. The custom house clearance would be an express consent on her part, and our right could not be contested by any one.

A mistake of the treaty, has induced some people to suppose there are more restrictions on this trade, than is fairly warranted by the article.

It has been supposed, that the coasting trade of India, now enjoyed, is henceforth absolutely interdicted. The words are, "it is also understood, that the permission granted by this article, is not to extend to allow the vessels of the United States to carry on any part of the coasting trade of the British territories." The legal, natural import of these words is, by virtue of this article, no right shall be claimed to the coasting trade of the British territories in India. The words are intended to prevent a right by implication; which the generality of the terms, expressing our authority to trade there, might be construed to include. It certainly takes away no right drawn from other clauses. If a right to the coasting trade of India, can be founded on other principles, or derived from other sources; this article certainly does not infringe that right: for the words are, "that the permission granted by this article, is not to extend," &c. We are surely then in possession of all the rights we were entitled to without the treaty.

Great Britain, unless the treaty is ratified, may restrict us from the coasting trade of her territories in India, and also from all trade there, even that of direct importation and exportation. If the treaty is ratified, she will possess, notwithstanding that, the right she had before, and no greater, to prohibit us from that coasting trade; but she will not possess a right to refuse us the direct trade of importation and exportation from her East India settlements. Before the treaty is ratified, she may permit to our vessels the coasting trade—after it is ratified, she may permit the same.

By our treaty with the United Netherlands, we recognized, in express terms, their colonial [...]ights in the East and West Indies. Nobody ever doubted they were free to permit, and we to exercise, the right of [...]ading to their colonies: and accordingly they have permi [...]ed to us, and we have enjoyed, a very lucrative, tho [...] restricted trade to some of them, especially to S [...]ua [...] and Demarara.

[Page] The 8th reason offered by the town against ratifying the treaty, is, "Because in every stipulation respecting our intercourse with the colonial possessions of Great Britain, the whole commerce of the United States, in such intercourse, is colonized in return."

The writer of these remarks is at a l [...]ss to comprehend the precise meaning of the town in this reason. Does it mean that if we are permitted to trade with the colonies of Great Britain, we can trade with those colonies only, or that we cannot export the articles we obtain there, from the United States to any other country?

Some nations have surrendered the whole commerce of their colonies to an exclusive company; others, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular part of the mother country—whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either m [...]a [...]fleet, and at a particular season; or, if single, in consequence of a license. Other nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects, who may carry it on from all the different parts of the mother country, and who have occasion for no other license than the common dispatches of the custom house.

This is an account of the conduct of parent countries to their colonies, by the celebrated Adam Smith, in his treatise on the wealth of nations. Anderson, in his origin of commerce, speaking on the same subject says, "By every principle of justice, of the law of nations, and the customs of the other powers of Europe, who had settlements and di [...]ant dependencies, the mother country had an exclusive right to trade with, and to forbid all others from having any intercourse with them. Such an exclusive right cannot be denied to be the very essence of colonization."

The above quotations are made for the purpose of obtaining a clear idea of the rights of nations having colonies, and the obligations and restrictions of such colonies; that by examining the state of our commerce under the treaty, we may conclude, whether, conformable to any just idea affixed to the terms, "colonizing commerce." it can be truly said, "that the whole commerce of the United States in such intercourse is colonized in return." By colonizing commerce must then probably be understood, restricting commerce to a particular country, and particular people.

The 3d and 13th articles of the treaty appear to be the only ones that respect our trade to the British [...] the 3d, we may trade freely by land in their colonies, [...] carry there all sorts of goods, and bring back any thing in return [Page]We are still free to procure the like articles, from any other part of the world—and what we bring from those colonies, we may export wherever we please.

There is no restriction as to the articles to be imported into their colonies, or exported from them by us, nor as to the place to which we may export the articles, so brought from them.

The colonists may come into the United States, in the same manner, and for the same purposes, as we enter their territories: but there is no restriction that we will sell only to them; or which gives to them any exclusive privilege, that the same rights granted to them by treaty, we are not free to grant to all the world.

The 13th article gives us a right to trade to the East Indies; but contains no contract, that we will not buy elsewhere, the like articles, that we procure from their settlements—neither does it say, that they shall have the exclusive privilege of trading with us—and the merchandizes brought into the United States, from those settlements, are as free to be exported to any part of the world, as though that article did not exist—There does not appear any thing like that sort of restriction on us, or exclusive right to them, that can justify the terms, "colonizing the whole commerce of the United States, in such intercourse, in return."

The 9th reason given by the town, is, "Because the clause by which the British government reserves to itself the right of imposing on American vessels, entering British ports in Europe, a duty which shall countervail the difference of the duty payable on the importation of European and Asiatic goods, into the United States, in British or American bottoms, places it in the power of that government, to enable British subjects to become the importers of Asiatic and European goods, into the United States, to the exclusion of our own citizens."

It is really difficult to comprehend how the reservation here mentioned, can be attended with the consequences suggested by the town.

If our vessels enter their ports on equal terms as we permit their vessels to enter ours, it is hard to conceive, that we should be the losers—we make a rule, which the treaty supposes more against them than the rule by which they assess our vessels. It is not probable that a nation of equal power, would consent to terms manifestly unequal; neither is it reconcileable with the common principles of equity and justice, for a nation to object to that part of the bargain, which reserves equal rights. At any rate, it may be fairly stated, that it is no objection to the treaty; [Page]for it gives Great Britain no new powers on this subject. She possesses a right of countervailing the difference mentioned, without any aid of the treaty—and may exercise it whenever she pleases. By the treaty she obligates herself to impose no higher duties on our vessels, than she does on those of all other nations.

The 10th reason is, "Because, although the terms of said treaty appear to be reciprocal in many instances; yet, from the local situation and circumstances of the United States, and the pacific system of policy they have adopted, that reciprocity is merely nominal and delusive."

The town leaves the world to conjecture what are the consequences flowing from the local situation and circumstances of the United States, and the pacific system they have adopted, that render the reciprocity purported by the terms of said treaty, to be merely nominal and delusive. Perhaps the president may see them from the assertion of the town; but surely it was due from the town to the people of the United States, to point out the delusion which had been overlooked by the minister and government of the United States. Not being able to detect this delusion without further light, the writer must pass over this reason, with a request to his readers, that they would not assent to this assertion, without examining the treaty for themselves, and at least, desiring the committee or selectmen of Boston, to expose the fraud before they pass censure on their whole government, for being deluded blockheads, or something worse.

The first part of the 11th reason is, "Because it prevents the United States from imposing any further restrictions on the British trade alone."

If it were not the town of Boston, so respectable for wisdom and good sense, that offered this reason, one would hardly suspect that the reason originated in any thing, but a disposition to prevent all pacific arrangements with that nation. For no one will believe, that Britain, or any other nation, who is not an humble, vanquished suppliant—would ever consent to make a treaty, by which she should place us on the same terms as the most favored nations; and we reserve to ourselves the right to treat her, on terms less favorable than we do others. In our treaty with France, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia, we have reciprocally agreed to place each other on such terms. It is not wonderful that Mr. Jay could not induce the British nation, to bind themselves to treat us, as well as they do others, and leave us at liberty to treat them worse than we do [...]ers, when they give up privileges in Europe, equal to what we received from other powers, with whom we had treaties, and some very important ones, not received from them; such as [Page]a trade with the East India settlements, and their colonies on the American continent. The 6th and 9th reasons, and this part of the 11th, may possibly serve as a comment on the 10th.

A FEDERALIST.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Remarks on Mr. Charles Pinckney's Speech, * Delivered at St. Michael's Church (Charleston) the 22d July last, on the Subject of the Treaty: published in the City and State Gazettes of the 4th August, 1795.

IT has been said, by a writer much admired, that "however useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when, like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic; the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which the malady casts on surrounding objects." From this cause, probably, have proceeded many of the fears and apprehensions excited by the treaty.

The speech in question begins with a violent attack on the president, for having committed two breaches of the constitution, the one in having appointed the chief justice of the United States, envoy extraordinary to Great Britain; the other in having given him instructions, respecting a treaty, without consulting the senate.

1st, No part of the constitution is quoted to show that the appointment of Mr. Jay infringed it: but an inference is drawn from a supposed inconsistency in sending a man to negociate a treaty, respecting which he might be called on to give a judicial opinion. This objection might as well have applied to his original appointment as chief justice, having previously negociated a treaty, respecting which he might be called upon to give an opinion from the bench. The objection would be as good against appointing any man a judge who had ever negociated a treaty, as against appointing any man a negociator who had been a judge. Perhaps the objection would be as strong against placing [Page]on the bench any man who had publicly expressed an opinion on a treaty, which he might be required to consider as judge, or a member of the legislature who had been concerned in making a law, which he might afterwards, as judge, be called upon to expound, or, in short, a hundred other such cases. Had there been a constitutional incompatibility, in that case, the instant Mr. Jay accepted his commission as envoy, he would have ceased to be chief justice; because, where the constitution creates an incompatibility, it vacates instantly one office, by the acceptance of the other. Either, therefore, there was an incompatibility, or there was not. If there was, then the instant Mr. Jay accepted his commission as envoy, he ceased to be chief justice; and all the noise about sending the chief justice, was idle and ridiculous; if there was no incompatibility, then all the noise about violating the constitution, was equally idle and ridiculous. Was there a greater violation of the constitution in taking one of the judicial department to be an envoy, than one of the legislature? yet Mr. Monroe, being senator, was appointed minister to France. The constitution is silent about both; the inconsistency applied equally to both: But there was not a whisper of disapprobation at the appointment of the latter. Personal, and not public motives, account for this difference. Mr. Monroe, indeed, resigned his office of senator, after his appointment: Mr. Jay might have done the same. At the time of the appointment, the same objection applied to both; it depended on the discretion of both, to resign or not. Last year, the governor of Pennsylvania sent the chief justice of that state as a special envoy or commissioner, to negociate terms of peace with the insurgents, and to make a treaty or convention, respecting which he might be called upon, as chief justice, to give an opinion from the bench. The president, at the same time, sent one of the judges of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, o [...] the same mission: not a syllable of disapprobation was uttered against either appointment. The probable evils which have been threatened by the chief justice of the United States remaining on the bench, after negociating the treaty, are done away; for he has actually resigned.

2d, The president is charged with having violated the constitution by withholding from the senate a knowledge of the instructions he gave to Mr. Jay. The speech tells us, "that it was supposed by some of the members, that the president ought to have submitted to them the whole of the business upon which Mr. Jay was to have been sent; but a motion to that effect was brought forward and negatived:" The senate, who are certainly competent judges of their own rights, and not likely to surrender [Page]them, then conceived they had no right to call on the president for the instructions. The speech tells us, "that many of the members of the senate were of opinion, at that time, that Mr. Jay was sent for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the depredations in the West Indies, to demand the delivery of the posts, and the execution of the treaty of peace; and to require a stipulation that our vessels should not in future be liable to seizure or condemnation on any pretence;" and the conclusion drawn, is, that those and others, alone, were the subjects on which Mr. Jay was supposed by the senate to be sent to negociate; and yet in another place it tells us, that a motion was made in the senate, to require the president to submit the whole of the business upon which Mr. Jay was sent; consequently, the senate must have believed that th [...]se were not the only objects, about which he was sent. The speech then lays down this doctrine, in positive terms, "that the constitution gives no power to the president to commence a negociation, withou previously submitting his intentions and instructions to the senate, requiring their advice, and receiving their assent;" and the words of the constitution "to make treaties, by and with the advice and consent of the senate," are the text for this strange commentary.

The extent of the position is, "that the president has no power to enter into any negociation whatever, without previously consulting the senate and receiving their opinion, advice, or assent, as well with respect to the necessity of such a negociation, as to the propriety of his instructions;" a position, inconsistent with the very principles of our constitution, as well as of every other among civilized nations; repugnant to the practice which has prevailed since the first operation of the present government, and to the practice which now prevails in France, where democratic principles are carried to the utmost extent; a position which would reduce the president from being the supreme executive of the union, to the mere organ and instrument of the senate.

By the constitution "the executive power is vested in the president of the United States." Were there no limitation to this power, in relation to treaties, there would result to the executive, as such, the power of making treaties. But the constitution, in specifying the powers of the president, has wisely limited this power, and has declared, after mentioning the various duties of the president, some of which he may perform without the intervention of any other branch of the government, that "he shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties."

[Page] This limitation of the executive power cannot be extended further than the clear import of the terms; it can apply only to the making of treaties, and not to the negociations which precede them. The president may, therefore, of his own mere motion, commence or enter on any negociation, and give what instructions he may think proper to his agent; but the negociation, when completed, cannot constitute or make a treaty, which shall be obligatory on the nation, without the advice and consent of the senate, that is, without they consent to the treaty which he shall lay before them, and advise him to ratify it. This construction is the just one, is consistent with reason and propriety, has been the construction put upon the constitution by the senate themselves, in all the treaties which have been made since the year 1789, under the present government, and is the practice established even by the republic of France, where the committee of public safety, their present executive, without consulting the convention, negociate with foreign powers, and conclude treaties, which are afterwards laid before the convention, to be ratified, as appears by the report on the subject of negociations, by Cambaceres, lately published, and by their proceedings in the treaties with the grand duke of Tuscany and the king of Prussia. A contrary construction would be replete with difficulties and embarrassments, which would nearly prevent the formation of any treaty, or would deprive our government, in its negociations, of those advantages of secrecy, dispatch, and the chance of events, which all other governments possess. The doctrine laid down in the speech is, that "no negociation can be commenced, no instruction can be given, without the previous consultation and approbation of the senate." In order to test th [...] doctrine by the touchstone of reason, let us enquire into in operation. The senate consists of thirty members and the vice-president of the United States, residing in various parts of the union, in New Hampshire and Georgia, in Vermont and Kentucky, and, in a few years, will have members living in the province of Maine and in the South Western Territory: this body has, like the other branch of the legislature, its stated annual session, at the close of which the members return to their respective homes and families. It is not a stationary privy council to the president, residing at the seat of government; and, except in the cases of consenting to treaties and appointments, it has no executive duties whatever to perform; it is, by the constitution, a branch of the legislature; and is only added, as a restraint on the executive, in the two cases mentioned. Suppose, then, instructions submitted to them by the president, in relation to a certain negociation, and approved [Page]and transmitted to Europe; various occurrences may, immediately on their arrival, require a change in them; the loss of a battle, the death of a king, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening, to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the tide of events, so as to require an entire change of instructions. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either, should be left in a capacity to improve them: to discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs, is the business of those who preside over them. In all these cases, should the president be required to convene the senators, from the borders of the St. Croix to the St. Mary's, and from the Atlantic to the Ohio or lake Champlain, to reconsider and renew their instructions, it is evident, that the opportunity would be lost; secrecy and dispatch, so necessary in negociations, would be unattainable; and it would require ages to bring any treaty to a conclusion. Such a construction would be a felo de se; for it would amount to this, that no treaties should ever be made; which was certainly not the intention of the constitution. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered, from the want of secrecy and dispatch, that the constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which, in negociations, usually require the most secrecy and the most dispatch, are those preparatory measures, which facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negociation. The constitution has so wisely disposed of the power of making treaties, that, although the president must, in concluding them, have the consent of the senate, yet he can, in the first instance, have every advantage which may be derived from dispatch, secret intelligence, or change of events. Suppose, that, during the recess of the senate, circumstances in Europe were suddenly to exist, which would offer a most favorable opportunity for a treaty; if the president were restrained from even instructing our ministers, on the subject of a future negociation, without convening the senate, the opportunity would be irrecoverably gone; and the doctrine goes all the length of this; for it precludes the entering on any negociation whatever, without the previous and precise instructions of the senate.

Such would be the embarrassments and dangers resulting from that position; on the other hand, by leaving it to the executive to negociate, and to the executive and senate to conclude, every advantage is secured, every disadvantage is avoided; for, if the senate do not approve of the treaty, they can reject it, and desire the president to renew the negociations: [Page]and this can be no possible cause of war, as the speech supposes; for foreign nations, with whom we negociate, will know that the articles, signed by the minister, are of no effect, until ratified by the president and senate; it is always expressly declared, that they shall not be binding, until ratified by the president and senate.

We find, then, by the constitution, that the executive power is vested in the president; and I have advanced, that every power of an executive nature is incident to the president, where it results from the nature of the federal government, and is not limited and restricted by some special provision. The association of the senate with the president, in relation to this point, is limited merely to the making treaties, which are then the supreme law of the land; and does not extend to the entering on, or commencing negociations, which are not the law of the land, but mere instruments of writing, mere obligations in embryo, which have no effect or validity, and do not become treaties, until approved by the senate. The difference between commencing a negociation and making or concluding a treaty, is too obvious to be questioned: the limitation, then, being confined to the making or concluding the treaty, all the other preparatory powers result to the executive, as such, by virtue of the constitution.

The opinion of congress in 1789, in an analogous case, where the interposition of the senate was much more plausible than the present, may throw some light on this subject. A proposition was introduced by a member, whose bias in favor of the most democratic principles is well known; in which the power was given to the president, of removing all executive officers at his mere will and pleasure. It was objected to, on the idea, that as, by the constitution, the president could not appoint those officers without the consent of the senate, so it was intended by the constitution, that he could not displace them without the consent of that body; the various inconveniencies which would flow from this construction were in reply enumerated; and it was urged, that, the constitution being silent on that point, the power necessarily resulted to the president, as the executive power, it being an executive trust: on this principle, the motion passed both houses, and is now the law of the land.

The right of the senate to advise the president to enter into a negociation, is a distinct question, and not involved in the present consideration, and, therefore, unnecessarily introduced; the only question, pertinent to the subject, is, whether he may commence a negociation, without their advice; and of this the preceding reflections leave no doubt.

[Page] It is said in the speech, that the right given to the president, So nominate to offices, has already placed in the hands of one man, all the honors and offices of the government; and that this is an unexampled power in any thing that had even the appearance of a free government.

If this power is a salutary one, we should rejoice at his p [...]ssessing it; if a pernicious one, why did the convention give it? who is to blame, but those who created it—who so much to blame, as those who wished his power to be out of the reach of the people for eight or ten years, instead of four? The convention, some say, without authority, presented us a constitution which we were obliged to adopt or reject in toto, a government to bind us for ages: the president, by constitutional authority, as has been shown, presented to the senate a treaty, the most injurious part of which must expire in two or three years; which is the most culpable? if there are dangerous powers in the constitution, the convention, certainly, for creating them, not the president for conforming to them. The nomination to offices is certainly a high trust; but it may be questioned, whether it gives the influence attributed to it: where there is one appointment, there are often a dozen disappointments—where one friend is made, a dozen enemies spring up—and human experience would justify us in suspecting, that disappointments will have created more enemies to the president, on this occasion, than appointments have ever procured him friends. The remark, that the power is unexampled in any thing like a free government, is altogether erroneous. In Pennsylvania, the governor makes all appointments, except sheriffs and coroners, without any countroul. In New York, the governor nominates nearly all officers to the council of appointment, consisting only of four members, and has besides a casting vote. In Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maryland, the governor, with the consent of the council, makes nearly all appointments.

The opinions of Mr. Jay, are next animadverted on, in the speech, as disqualifying him from being a proper envoy to England. If Mr. Jay's supposed partiality to that country, and supposed dislike to France, were objections to his being sent to Great Britain, undoubtedly Mr. Monroe's avowed partiality for France, and his avowed hatred of Great Britain, were at least as powerful objections to his being sent to France; yet Mr. Monroe was selected by the president, for that very reason, and the choice was generally approved of. It did not follow, that, because Mr. Monroe would have been willing, in the senate, to have voted advantages to France, without any equivalent, that, in the execution of his trust, as envoy, he would not [Page]have stood out to secure us advantages by treaty; neither did it follow, that, because Mr. Jay, like a conscientious man, declared his opinions, as a judge, when his duty required it, he would not forego his own opinions, and, in pursuance of his instructions, as an envoy, do the best he could for his country. instructions, as an envoy, do the best he could for his country. —According to the reasoning in the speech, Mr. Jay should have been sent to France, because his dislike to that country would have stimulated him to concede nothing to it, and to wring from it every thing he could; and Mr. Monroe to England, for similar reasons.—Others, however, who had more correct ideas on the subject, conceived, that this would have been an inversion of the natural order of things, and of the accustomed course of diplomatic proceedings, which has been, to send to foreign courts persons likely to be acceptable to them. Had Mr. Jay been sent to France, and Mr. Monroe to England, the probability is, that both appointments would have given offence. More stress, however, is laid on Mr. Jay's supposed dislike to France, than circumstances would warrant. If Mr. Jay, in his negociations at Paris, in 1783, found the then minister, Count de Vergennes, disposed to sacrifice the essential interests of the United States, to the then over-bearing policy of France—and, ten years afterwards, found citizen Genet (in 1793) at Philadelphia, trampling under foot the authority of the president, and the independence of our government—and, on both occasions, expressed his disapprobation of their attempts—it does not thenceforth follow, that he bears any dislike to the French nation, or would be desirous of engagements hostile to her interests. Indeed, the care with which it is expressly declared, in the treaty with Great Britain, that no part of it shall be construed, in any respect, to interfere with our former treaties, is a proof of a contrary disposition; and one of the highest panegyrics which has ever appeared on Mr. Jay, is from a Frenchman, celebrated for his republicanism and patriotism, Brissot. Neither does it follow, that opinions, expressed by individuals at home, would preclude them, on foreign embassies, from asserting claims, inconsistent with those opinions; if so, Mr. Jefferson would have been a more improper negociator than Mr. Jay, on one of the most important, and, to some, most offensive parts of the treaty; for he had expressly and publicly recognized the right of the British nation to capture the property of their enemies [...] board our ships. But ministers speak the language of their employers, and are governed by their instructions, to which their own private opinions always yield: there can be no doubt, that Mr. Jefferson would have exerted all his great talents to [Page]accomplish that important point, of free ships making free goods, notwithstanding he had acknowledged the law of nations to be otherwise. The remark, therefore, that Mr. Jay was devoted to the interests of the British, is an unfounded calumny against a man, who, however mistaken he may have been, in sacrificing too much to the preservation of peace, or however he may have under-rated our strength, or over-rated that of the other party, or however misinformed or uninformed he may have been, is believed, by all who know him, to possess a purity of mind and an integrity of heart, which cannot be affected by the little attacks of private pique and resentment, or disappointed malignity; whatever opinions the public may entertain of his talents, certainly his yielding the point "free ships not making free goods," which the speech calls the worst part of the treaty, will not place him on a worse footing in the public estimation, in the event contemplated by the speech, than his supposed competitor, Mr. Jefferson, who explicitly abandoned that point, when secretary of state, whose partizans, in combination with all those, whom Mr. Jay's ungracious manners have ever offended, eagerly avail themselves of the present clamour, to build up the reputation of the one on the ruins of that of the other.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Proceedings at Newport, In Town Meeting holden by adjournment on the 19th of August, A. D. 1795.

THE committee appointed at a town meeting, legally convened on Friday last, to take into consideration the treaty now pending between Great Britain and the United States, having reported their opinion thereon, it was Resolved, That this meeting do approve said report; that a fair copy be made out; that it be signed by the moderator, and that the town council of the town of Newport be requested to transmit the same to the president of the United States without delay, as the sense of this meeting on said treaty, together with this resolve.

REPORT.

The committee, to whom was referred, by their fellow citizens, the consideration of the treaty of amity, commerce, and [Page]navigation, now pending between his Britannic majesty and the United States, report, That they have considered the said treaty with attention, and disapprove of the same, for the following reasons:

Because the detention of the western posts hath been very injurious to the United States, and for which no compensation is contemplated in said treaty.

Because the 3d, 13th, 15th, and 17th articles of the treaty, which regulate the trade, commerce, and navigation between Great Britain and the United States, are most decidedly advantageous to the former, and will be very destructive to the commerce and navigation of the latter.

Because the 4th and 5th articles render the boundaries of the United States, as settled by the treaty of 1783, doubtful, and may occasion a great loss of territory to the United States.

Because the demands of British creditors are fully attended to, and their complaints redressed, agreeably to the stipulation of the treaty of 1783; whereas the claims of the American citizens, for property carried away, by the British, in violation of the same treaty, are passed over in silence.

Because the mode pointed out for American citizens to obtain compensation for the spoliations committed on their commerce, is remote, expensive, and uncertain; which in justice, we conceive, ought to have been immediate and complete; whilst the stipulations for restitution to be made by the United States, for the property taken by privateers equipped in said states, or captured within the limits thereof, is speedy and energetic.

Because, by the 9th article, a privilege is bestowed on the subjects of Great Britain, in expression reciprocal, but, considering the difference in the circumstances of the two nations, wanting an equivalent, and invading the rights of individual states.

Because we think it impolitic, to give up by treaty, the power of attaching British property in the United States, in case of national differences and discontents.

Because, in this treaty, certain articles of export are considered as contraband of war and just objects of confiscation, which, in our own treaties with other nations, are considered as [...]ree.

Because the 23d and 24th articles are calculated to embroil the United States with the French republic, and will probably make our sea-ports the scenes of riot and disorder. They also ten [...] to make a common cause between the United States and Great Britain, and to distress our allies.

[Page] Because no provision is made in the treaty to protect and secure our seamen, that valuable class of citizens, from being impressed into the British service; and no stipulation is therein contained for the relief of those now detained on board British ships of war.

Your committee would further observe, that the treaty contains many sentences of doubtful construction; that it is deficient of the reciprocity, which ought to be the basis of all contracts; that it is an infraction of the friendship and gratitude which the republic of France may justly claim from the United States, and that it may be ruinous to the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, of the United States.

Committee.

Oliver R. Warner,

Edward Simmons,

Thomas Rumreill,

Samuel Vernon,

John L. Ross,

Thomas G. Pitman,

Caleb Green,

Joseph Briggs,

Christopher Ellery,

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Observations on Treaties.

Messrs. Adams and Larkin,

I MUST request the attention of the public, through the medium of your Chronicle, to the following passage in the federal constitution; it is in the 2d section of the sixth article. It provides, "that this constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges, in every state, shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state, to the contrary, notwithstanding."

It must be visible, from this passage, that treaties stand precisely on the same footing with other laws, and have no authority over them. They are supreme, nor as they refer to the [Page]federal constitution, but simply in their relation to the constitutions and laws of any state; and the judges are directed thus to consider them. How far they may be extended, so as to alter the local constitution, is a very delicate question, and of great importance to be considered; for if their power extends to the full length which the president seems to suppose, in his answer to the town of Boston, there is not a government in the union, the constitution of which does not lie at the mercy of the executive power, supported by two-thirds of the senators, provided the republican form is retained. The federal constitution, it is true, has guaranteed a republican constitution to every state in the union; but this provision is extremely vague and indefinite. Republican forms of government may be more tyrannic than monarchical. The governments of Holland and Venice, were not so free as the ancient government of France, or the present government of England.

If the president, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the federal senators, has an absolute power to make treaties, they may sweep away all the laws and constitutions of the several states, without any check from the one I have already mentioned.

Every body knows, that the federal constitution, at the time of its being proposed, was not fully approved by a large majority of the people; although it was then adopted, from the presumed necessity of some form of government being accepted at that period. The power, with respect to treaties, was not then understood; it was acknowledged by its friends, to have been a mere appeal to the common sense of the citizens, on a fair experiment of its merits. It admits of improvement and alteration, by an article inserted in it. If the construction of that article by the president, respecting his power to make treaties, be just, it is high time the inhabitants should demand a revision of the federal compact—that new checks should be provided, to restrain this exorbitant power.

But if the president, with two-thirds of the senators, are now vested with an absolute, uncontrouled right to make treaties, obligatory to the utmost extent, what then are the powers to restrain them? It is provided, in the first article of the federal constitution, that the congress "shall" regulate foreign trade. The English trade is a material part of our foreign commerce. The treaty, which the president has ratified, virtually declares, that the congress shall not in future regulate our trade with Great Britain. The constitution provides also, that the legislature shall regulate our trade with the Indian nations; may not the president and senate make such a treaty as shall also wrest [Page]that important privilege from the house of representatives, and thus monopolize all the patronage and benefits annexed to it?

Either the treaty is constitutional, or not; if the latter, it is a nullity; if the former, the powers of the whole congress can be controuled, and even annihilated, by a part.

Under the old confederation, we were distinguished by our imbecility at home, but we appeared with dignity abroad. In our diplomatic arrangements with foreign nations, we certainly were infinitely superior to what we had a right to expect. We were then in our childhood, and yet the vigour of our policy had the stamp of adolescence. Every treaty we then formed, and we formed four with four of the most considerable nations in Europe—with France, with Holland, with Prussia, and with Sweden—recognized the rights of a free trade, as an essential claim, resulting from our independence, as a nation, and of our remote situation from the vortex of the European politics, in which we were determined never to be involved. But how contrary is this conduct to our present! While the right of a free navigation is maintained in those national engagements, to the utmost latitude, our late treaty with England has set them all aside, and placed our navigation on so precarious an establishment, that nothing but the distresses or generosity of the French republic can save us from total ruin. In this late specimen of out talents in negociation, we have counter-worked, at a stroke, all we have been doing from the first moment of the revelation. What will hinder the French from taking the same freedom with our trade which the British are now taking every moment?

Before this treaty, we had necessity to plead; but we have now consented to permit the exercise of a power over our navigation, which has never yet been acknowledged by a nation. The British now have a right, by compact, signed and sealed, to every thing they wished to do, and infinitely more than they ever expected to obtain. They are permitted to take our provisions bound to France; will not, then, the French take our provisions bound to England, Spain, and Portugal? The British are permitted to take and condemn all our naval stores, found in our vessels; will not the French and Dutch claim the same privilege? The British are permitted to take and condemn French goods in American bottoms; will not the French and Dutch cruisers take and condemn all English goods, in the same manner? It is well known, that nearly all outward bound commodities, of the growth or manufacture of Great Britain, are shipped on credit to these states, and are [Page]insured in England previous to their exportation. All these vessels are thus rendered liable to capture, and the goods to condemnation. For every treaty with the powers enumerated, stipulates, with great precision, that no future privilege shall be extended to another nation, which shall not equally extend to them. If this be the case, and I have no doubt of it, and the republic is not restrained by more than common generosity, she will do as the British do; their conduct will be her rule; and our blind confidence in our present corrupt policy, will be rewarded by an extent and variety of sufferings beyond example.

DIPLOMATICUS.

Remarks on the Vth Article of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

IN the treaty announced in the public papers, between his Britannic majesty and the United States; it appears by article the 5th, that the river St. Croix, our eastern boundary, is to be ascertained by commissioners appointed in the manner following: "One commissioner shall be named by his majesty, and one by the president of the United States, by and with the consent of the senate thereof; and the said commissioners shall agree on the choice of a third, or, if they cannot so agree, they shall each propose one person, and of the two names so proposed, one shall be drawn by lot, in the presence of the two commissioners." Not being presen [...], nor informed, what notice was taken of this part, at the late meeting of the inhabitants of this town, it may not be amiss to suggest a few hints, on this subject, by one who has endeavoured for some time past, to obtain information respecting the dispute.

The mode of settlement seems more like a reference, or arbitration; with this difference, that, like a lottery, it will p [...] ponderate on the side, which draws the lucky prize, and, of course, will give force and sanction to the claim.

It is a fact, incontrovertible, that the Eastern River of Passamaquady, called by the Indians, Mag-ga-gau-da-wick, was known by public notoriety, for the two last centuries, as the true St. Croix. There are records of a settlement made between the courts of Versailles and St. James, about the years [...] and 1622, establithing this river; and the several treaties between [Page]the two nations, until Nova Scotia was last ceded to Britain, confirmed it. Since which, some local disputes arose between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, but were always terminated the same way. Even during the administration of Governor Bernard, who was well known never to favor the interest of this country, it was then proved by indisputable evidence to be the veritable St. Croix; and though it is not essential, in this case, still it may be observed, that when the Royalists moved from Penobscot to St. Andrews, the entrance of Shuduck river) in 1783, it was publicly noticed among themselves, as presumptuous, being uncertain of a right in so doing. What has been done, since the revolution, on this subject, is too recent, and so well known, it needs no comment.

Thus the boundaries were, and ought to be established. Consequently that valuable extent of territory, which lies between the said St. Croix, and the river Shuduck (which the British now call the boundary) is the indubitable right of Massachusetts.

As this article in the treaty now stands, the claim is made equal; so that should the commissioner on the side of the United States draw the person he proposes, we may have a chance to secure what was before our own—if, on the other hand, the British commissioner draws the person, Britain obtains a property, she has no title to, separate from her connections with Massachusetts. From these circumstances, it may be easy to conclude, that those commissioners, or arbitrators, should have been independent, disinterested persons, unconnected with th [...] dispute; authorized to hear both parties, and determine accordingly; but if it is executed under the present—it is like a man who takes a purse of money from his pocket, lays it on the table, and calls to another to draw lo [...]s who shall have it.

The author of this is no way influenced by any person or party, but writes from a full conviction of the importance of the subject to this country. He presumes that from inadvertence, or imperfect information, this part has not been properly attended to, and relies, that, in due time, such attention will be paid to the object in contemplation, that our country may not be deceived, and deprived of any of those advantages and rights, which, in justice, are its due.

BOSTON, August, 1795.

[Page]

Reflections on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

No. I.

IT was not difficult to foresee that the treaty with Great Britain would excite much public discussion—It is only to be lamented, that the knowledge of it has been withheld so lon [...] that the investigation can now answer no other valuable purpose, than to bring the president acquainted with the sentime [...] of his fellow citizens. It was also easy to foresee, that the leaders of a certain party would strenuously advocate every article. No one, except themselves, augured any good from the miss [...] of Governor Jay. The joy they manifested upon the first new of a treaty, while its stipulations were a profound secret, [...] the arts which were practised, to make the public believe, that America had obtained complete redress, and that without [...] unreasonable concession on her part, evidenced a determin [...] to spare no pains to obtain its ratification. Those, however, [...] originally opposed the embassy, early predicted, that it w [...] terminate in a fruitless negociation, or in a treaty highly d [...] vantageous to this country. This sentiment was strengthen [...] what little transpired of the correspondence between L [...] Grenville and Mr. Jay. America saw with concern, a ci [...] who held one of the most dignified offices in her gift, addre [...] his majesty in the stile of a suppliant, and placing her sole r [...] [...]ce on the magnanimity, justice, and benevolence of a monarch, whose conduct towards her had ever been marked [...] breach of faith, rapine, and cruelty. The treaty is at [...] arrived: the same influence which procured the embassy, [...] been industriously exerted to obtain its ratification. These e [...] have succeeded too well; twenty senators have agreed to all but one article. I shall make no reflection on these gentlemen, who for this purpose were a bare majority. But the manner in which the business was conducted, leaves too much room to fear, that the most important interests of our country have been sacrificed to gratify party zeal. It is, certainly, somewhat extraordinary, that long before the treaty was known, the vote of each of these gentlemen was reckoned upon with the utmost certainty.—It is not my intention to acquit those who oppose the treaty from their share of this baneful spirit.

The censure of many is accompanied with too much acrimony. There is, however, another class, who will probably decide upon its merits: I mean the moderate men, and real patriots, who, scorning to be be led by others, will take th [...] [Page]trouble of judging for themselves. To persons of this description, these remarks will be addressed. Previous to discussing the treaty itself, we must not pass unnoticed the mysterious secrecy which has inveloped a transaction of the last moment to the happiness and prosperity of America.—Is not this secrecy, alone, a proof that the senate conceived it disgraceful and prejudicial to the United States? The public clamour which they saw would be excited, might have deferred them from the hardy step of giving it their assent; whereas, they well knew, that if it was not divulged until ratified, many, who might have been violent in their opposition, would, as good citizens, submit to it as soon as it became the supreme law of the land. There might be a propriety in the secrecy observed by the president; but the senate ought to have afforded the public the same opportunity of judging of it, which they have of canvassing every bill in its passage towards a law. Instead of this, they take care that no part of it shall transpire, except the time limited for the surrendering the western posts, and that some kind of provision was made for indemnifying our merchants. Neither Governor Jay, nor the senate, were at any pains to conceal these points of the treaty, while they carefully withheld the sacrifices which were to be the price of those benefits. The senate, indeed, go further, and, as if afraid or ashamed of what they had done, enjoin their members, even after their act of ratification, not to make any part of it public; and Mr. Mason, who deserves the thanks of his country, is censured for disregarding an injunction, which was nugatory in its nature, and reflected no great honor on the legislature of a free people.

Another preliminary remark may be made here, as it will assist in forming a just estimate of this convention. It is this, the first impressions made by the perusal of it, were universally unfavorable; all men, and all ranks, united in condemning it— A gloom, co-extensive with its circulation, took place.—Those who were silent as to its defects, could not forbear to express a wish, that it had never been made, and readily agreed, that we should be much better without it. Had a petition immediately been prepared to be presented to the president, against its ratification, nine merchants in ten would have signed it: and not a mechanic would have refused. When the people with one voice condemn a measure, of which they are competent judges, it furnishes a violent presumption against the expediency of it.

This general clamour, and discontent alarmed the envoy, and those, who had predetermined to support him. Recourse was had to their usual industry and arts. Some took their stand at the [Page]coffee houses, others ran about the streets; but notwithstanding their diligence, the most vigorous exertions and prudent conduct on the part of its opponents, were necessary to prevent Mr. Jay's effigy and the fruits of his negociation from being consigned to the flames in one part of the city,* while the British merchants were feasting him in another.

We come now to the treaty. The preamble itself, is not free from objection. The differences between the two countries are to be terminated "without reference to the merits of their complaints." This is surely an unprecedented mode of setting public or private controversies (especially in the time of peace) the merits of which should never be lost sight of, and ought [...] form the basis of a settlement. It is easy to see why Great Britain wished to keep them out of sight.—Whoever reads the correspondence between Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Hammond, [...] admit, that the former has, in a satisfactory, candid, and elegant manner, answered every excuse made by the British, for their non-execution of the treaty of peace. The futility of one of her claims was so gross, that it needs only to be mentioned to receive our disapprobation: among other matters, Great Britain [...]imed compensation for the estates of the loyalists, wh [...] had been confiscated during the war, and sold afterwards, Mr. Jefferson, in a course of reasoning which forces conviction, [...] is eminently the case with all the controversial performances [...] that great statesman, shows that those sales amounted to [...] infraction on our part. By the treaty, congress were only bo [...]d to recommend to the different states a restitution of confi [...] property. This recommendation was not binding upon the [...] they might comply with it or not, as they pleased. Indeed, congress, as he observes, could only recommend; and so was it understood by the British commissioners, as this matter underwent a very full discussion. Such, also, was the understanding of the British ministry and parliament—Thus it appears, that this claim was without foundation; and yet it was placed upon an equal footing, by this extraordinary preamble, with our demands for negroes wantonly stolen—ships most wickedly plundered—and a great extent of territory wrongfully detained.

Article II.

The second article would have been better and less liable to future difficulty and construction, if it had defined particularly from what places his majesty was to withdraw his troops, instead of saying generally from within the boundary "lines assigned by the treaty of peace:" for it appears, that those very lines are a matter in dispute, and hereafter to be settled. [Page]As this boundary will, certainly, not be adjusted by next June, it will furnish a pretext for holding those sorts a few years longer, and put us to the expense of a second embassy. Why not declare, that Michillimackinac, Detroit, Niagara, Oswego, Oswegatche, Point-au-ser, Dutchman's point, &c. should be delivered up? This would have been explicit; but, as we progress, we shall find, that precision and perspicuity are not very striking features in this ministerial lucubration. The time limited for their evacuations is another objection to the article; it is too remote to hope for its performance. If peace takes place this summer, none will be surprised if Great Britain continues her garrisons where they now are! Nor is it very pleasing, that the inhabitants within this territory may remain in it, and continue British subjects.

That clause of this article, which permits us to extend our settlements within the said boundary, is also by far too indefinite The exception to it may be so explained, as to defeat the permission altogether. It is in these words, "except within the precincts or jurisdiction of any of the said posts:" who is to determine, how far this jurisdiction may extend? Lastly, as the treaty of peace gave us these posts, what great benefit is obtained by this article? Who would regard the second promise of a man who had already, without any excuse, violated the first?

Article III.

The advantages conceded to Great Britain, by the third article, are much greater than those which we derive in return. Considering the extent of the United States, it is evident, that the mutual liberty here granted, to pass by land or inland navigation into each other's respective territories, upon this continent, is a much greater acquisition to Great Britain than to us; not only the territory of the former is small, when compared with our own, but the whole fur trade, which we might have secured to ourselves, will now not only be participated by, but probably fall altogether into the hands of, British traders, notwithstanding our country is much more extensive, and our rivers and lakes more numerous, than those of Great Britain, into all of which she has free admission; the latter has taken care, very unjustly, to exclude our vessels from the "sea-ports, harbours, bays, and creeks of his majesty's said territories," and also from "such parts of the rivers as are between the mouths thereof and the highest port of entry from the sea, except in small vessels trading between Montreal and Quebec." Where is the consideration for this manifest inequality? [Page]A British trader may set out from Canada, traverse our lakes, and pass with his merchandize down the Hudson or Delaware to New York or Philadelphia, with his own vessel. Why ought we not, in return, to have the free navigation of the Saint Lawrence and other British rivers? Instead of this, we are stopped, in our passage down, at the highest port of entry, and must there hire British vessels to pursue our voyage, or sell our cargoes for the best price we can get.

There is a curious proviso, in this article, which deserves notice. Upon a cursory reading, it appears to lay Great Britain under a similar restraint, but the least attention will discover this not to be the case. It is this, "British vessels from the sea are not to be admitted into our rivers beyond the highest port of entry for vessels from the sea." What can Great Britain wish for more? would her sea vessels ever attempt, if permitted, to go further than the highest port of entry.

That part of this article, which interdicts the laying of duties on peltries brought by land or inland navigation, is also highly unequal and disadvantageous to America. The peltry, which we shall carry through the British dominions, considering the construction of this article, must be inconsiderable indeed—while we may expect, that very great quantities will annually be brought through the United States, by his majesty's subjects, all of which must pass free of duty. Nay, under this article, Great Britain may import into any part of the United States, European, East and West India goods, upon which we can impose no other or higher duties, than are payable by our own citizens.

The fourth article concludes nothing; and the fifth leaves too much to chance.

Article VI.

The mode of adjusting the sum due to British creditors, agreeably to the sixth article, will be unjust towards those states which have interposed no lawful impediments in the way of recovering such debts, as they must also bear part of the burden, and thus suffer for the delinquency of others. Whoever reads Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Hammond, of the 29th May, 1792, will acquit the United States of much, if not of the whole of the censure which has been so liberally bestowed by Great Britain, for the non-payment of British debts, which has been urged in excuse by her, for the infractions of a treaty, which were committed long before she could have known what America had done, or would do, upon this head. Mr. Jefferson has taken infinite pains to investigate this [Page]matter, which he has done not only like a statesman, but a consummate lawyer. It results, from his researches, that, Great Britain having broken the treaty, by a refusal to evacuate the upper posts, and carrying away more than three thousand negroes, some of the states, urged by dire necessity, and the calamities of a long war, only modified the recovery of debts—

1. By indulging their creditors with longer and more practicable terms of payment.

2. By liberating their bodies from execution, on delivering property to the creditor, to the full amount of his demand, on a fair appraisement.

3. By admitting, in some instances, the payment of executions in paper money.

4. That, notwithstanding these regulations, which were moderate and of short duration, it was at all times perfectly understood, that treaties controuled the laws of the state. That the federal and state judiciaries have so decided; that, upon this principle, the courts are every where open to British creditors, who have been, for some time, in the habit of recovering their debts at law.

These statements, and the deductions of Mr. Jefferson, are supported by the opinion of some of the first lawyers in the different states, which are subjoined to his letter. If, then, no lawful impediment exists in the way of these debts, why not leave the creditors to the ordinary course of law, and why fix a stigma on the United States, by providing for an infraction of the treaty of peace on their part, which, at present does not exist. Great Britain was unwilling to omit so favorable an opportunity of extorting from our minister a concession, of which she will, one day or another, make proper use. It is also to be regretted, that the article of interest has been passed, sub silentio, in this part of the treaty.

Mr. Jefferson has shown, in the letter alluded to, that interest, being no part of the debt, may be disallowed in many cases, and has cited a great variety of instances, from English law-books, in which it is not given; some of which apply with too much force to the situation of the parties in question, not to be mentioned. He observes, that a great national calamity has been adjudged a sufficient cause to suspend the payment of interest; that, in the present case, the law of the creditor party had cut off the personal access of his debtor; that the transportation of his produce or money to the country of his creditor was interdicted; that, where the creditor pre [...]nts payment of both principle and interest, the latter, at least, [Page]is justly extinguished; that the departure of the creditor, leaving no agent in the country, would have stopped interest of itself—the debtor not being obliged to go abroad to seek for him; that

The declarations of congress and our plenipotentiaries, previous to the definitive treaty, and the silence of that instrument, afford proof, that interest was not intended on our part, nor insisted upon by the other; and that, upon the whole, it was the proper province of the judiciary to determine in what cases interest ought or ought not to be allowed.

If these positions of Mr. Jefferson be defensible, we cannot but wish that this article had been more explicit, as too much is now left to the discretion of commissioners, some, and perhaps a majority of whom, will be British subjects, and even British creditors.

DECIUS.

No. II.

Article VII.

THE seventh article is wholly exceptionable. It places at too great a distance, the compensation to which our citizens are entitled, for the most unheard-of and atrocious acts of piracy; they are thus not only kept out of a large part of their capitals, for a long time, but any species of restitution becomes extremely precarious and problematical. The captures being, in many cases, admitted to be unjust, the British government should, at least, have advanced a sum on account, to be distributed immediately among those who had suffered. Never was a claim better founded; never was time more favorable to enforce it: if Great Britain can procrastinate, until a peace, the settlement of her depredations, her views will be answered. By refusing or delaying, upon one frivolous pretence or other, to nominate commissioners, the whole article may be rendered abortive.—Complaint will then come too late.—If we permit, I had almost said, if we give her a right, to insult and plunder us, when we are at peace, and she involved in war with the most powerful nation on earth, it will be but prudent to acquiesce, when she is restored to the state in which we now find ourselves.

The other branch of this article will also bear very unequally on the United States; if they are to be charged with all the [Page]prizes therein referred to, no one can foresee what will be the amount. It is said, that, long since, Mr. Hammond stated the demand at eighteen hundred thousand pounds sterling. It is no excuse in those who defend the treaty, to say, that the president had already pledged the government to this measure; he had no right so to do; and we are now enquiring, not what the president has done, but what is proper and incumbent on the United States.—It will be difficult to show that a neutral nation is obliged to go the lengths which the present treaty imposes upon us.

Article IX.

This article infringes the rights of the different States, and impairs the obligation of private contracts; nor is it reciprocal, except in appearance and on paper. It has long been the policy of the English law to exclude aliens from holding real estates of inheritance. We have pursued this policy, and the reasons, assigned by Blackstone, apply much more forcibly to America, than to his own country.—"If," says he, "an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance, equally permanent with that property, to the king of England, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes to his own natural liege lord: besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence, and feel many other inconveniencies." Considering the population of Great Britain, and the energy of her government, supported by a standing army, there can be no great danger, at present, from a relaxation, on her part, in this principle; but with a country, whose population is as thin as ours, and whose government is yet in its infancy, too great care cannot be interposed to prevent the influence which the too easy acquisition of real property cannot fail to give to foreigners. I am aware, that this article does not extend to future purchases; but, even limited as it is, it is unjust and unequal. Unequal, because no American has been hardy enough to purchase real estates in Great Britain, while millions of acres are held by her subjects in this country, who knew, at the time of the purchases, the risk which they ran in making them. Unjust—because, if the present proprietor be an alien, the land is already forfeited to the state which originally granted it, "by way of punishing him," says Blackstone, "for his presumption, in attempting to acquire any landed property;" or, which will be yet a harder case, it may have already been granted to some of her citizens. In either case, it is not easy to conceive upon what principle such a stipulation could find place in a [Page]treaty of commerce. Had the agreement referred to f [...] acquisitions, it would have been impolitic and unequal, [...] no individual hardship or loss would have resulted from it. [...] has been said, that a provision similar to this, is to be found in our treaties with other nations; as far as it is retrospection [...] it is not true; and it will be found, upon examination, th [...] generally speaking, personal property alone is the object of the articles alluded to in those treaties. The United States have treaties of amity and commerce with France, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia. The first was made, flogr [...] bello, in 1778, when it would have been justifiable in the United States to have made some sacrifices to obtain the friendship and assistance of so powerful a nation; but, to their honor be it remembered, that, scorning to take advantage of the distressed and embarrassed situation of America, they made with her two treaties; the direct end of one of which was, to secure her independence; and the object of the other was, to extend her commerce, and was botto [...] upon the broad basis of perfect reciprocity and equality. This will appear more abundantly hereafter, when we come to compare other parts of this treaty with the one lately ma [...] with Great Britain. As far as it respects the article now [...] consideration, it may be doubted, whether any of the subj [...] or citizens of the countries just mentioned can hold a fee [...] ple, in real estate, without being naturalized. Let these treaties speak for themselves.

By the eleventh article of the French treaty, "the inhabitants of the United States shall not be reputed Aubains [...] France, and, consequently, shall be exempted from the [...] d' Aubains, or other similar duty, under what name soever.—They may, by testament or otherwise, dispose of their [...] moveable and immoveable, in favor of such persons as they please; and their heirs, subjects of the United States, may succeed them ab intestat, without obtaining letters of naturalization."—"The subjects of the most Christian king shall, is the said states, enjoy an entire and perfect reciprocity, relative to the stipulations contained in this article." This article, then, only speaks, of goods moveable and immoveable—The term immoveable, as connected with goods, can never be extended to a fee simple in lands.—The distinction between chattels r [...] and personal, is well understood by lawyers—the former are immoveable, and the latter moveable; but neither comprehend an estate in see in lands—"Chattels real," says Sir Edward Coke, "are such as concern the realty—as, terms for years of land, and the like; and these are called chattels real, being interests [Page]issuing out of or annexed to real estates, of which they have one quality, viz. immobility, which denominates them real; but want the other, viz. a sufficient legal indeterminate duration:" and this want it is that constitutes them chattels. "The utmost period," says Blackstone, "for which they can last, is fixed and determinate, either for such a space of time certain, or until such a particular sum of money be raised out of such particular income, so that they are not equal in the law to the lowest estate of freehold, a lease for another life." Conformably to this construction, the lawyers with us have ever advised the citizens of France, either to be naturalized, before they purchase real estates, or to obtain an act of the legislature for the purpose. Thus it appears, that all the advantage of this article, with France, is on the side of America; for, without any stipulations for the purpose, a French citizen might, at common law, hold a chattel real, and dispose of any property in goods, money, and other personal estate, as he pleased, and, if he had died intestate, this personal property would have descended to his representatives; whereas, without it, the king of France, upon the death of an American, would have been entitled to all he was worth, by the droit d'aubaine, or jus alibinatus.

In our treaties with the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia, this right to hold and dispose of property, is, in express terms, confined to personal estate, which, it is obvious, their citizens would have enjoyed, without any treaty for the purpose: Of course, in all of them, the provisions are favorable to America. This article would not have deserved so much notice, but with the view of detecting the fallacy of those, who attempt to justify some of the exceptionable parts of this treaty, by a reference to what they call similar stipulations, in those which already bind us to other nations. More fallacies of this kind will be detected in the sequel. It will also serve to show, what reliance is to be placed upon the assertions of the author of certain "Candid Remarks on the Treaty," which appeared in the Daily Advertiser of the 4th instant.—This writer asserts, that, by the 9th and 11th articles of our treaty with France, we have agreed to "an absolute abolition of alienism, in respect to the holding of lands; so that a Frenchman may purchase, take, hold, and convey lands within the United States, as an American citizen."—The truth is, that the ninth article regulates certain fishing rights, and says not a word on the subject under consideration, and we have already seen, that no such right is granted by the 11th article, whose object is confined to goods alone.

DECIUS.

[Page]

No. III.

Article X.

THIS article, like many others, has the appearance [...] reciprocity; but when the situation of the two countries is attended to, this apparent equality vanishes, and Great Britain alone derives advantage from it. It provides, that "neither the debts due from individuals of one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares nor monies which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated." The advocates of this clause contend, that it is unjust and impolitic, that such confiscations should ever take place, and that, therefore, America has conceded nothing. This is begging the question; for if it can be proved to be lawful, ju [...], and politic, to sequester to the public use, property in this situation, it may reasonably be asked, why have the United [...] agreed to abstain from it without an equivalent on the part of Great Britain. It is true, Great Britain promises the same forbearance on her part; but upon a moment's reflection, it will occur, that this promise, even if observed, is in reality no consideration. Millions are due to the subjects of Great Britain from the government and from individuals of the United States while, comparatively speaking, our citizens hold nothing in the British funds or banks, and have few, if any demands upon the subjects of that nation. Let us now examine the right of [...] nation in this respect. Bynkershook, and most respectable writ [...] on this subject, recognizes the right of a nation to seize the property of its enemies found within its own limits in whatever form it exists, whether in action or possession. The following i [...] a liberal translation of his own words. "Since it is a condition of war, that enemies may be deprived of all their rights, it is reasonable that every thing of an enemy found among his enemies, should change its owner and go to the treasury. It is, moreover, usually directed, in all declarations of war, that the goods of enemies, as well those found among us, as those taken in war, shall be confiscated. If we follow the mere right of war, even immoveable property may be sold, and its price carried into the treasury, as is the custom with moveable property. But i [...] almost all Europe, it is only notified that their profits during the war shall be received by the treasury; and the war being ended, the immoveable property itself is restored by agreement to the former owner." Quest. Jur. pub. lib. ch. 7. And again, in the same chapter, "what I have said of things in action be [...] [Page]rightly confiscated, holds thus, if the prince really exacts from his subjects what they owed to his enemies, it is rightfully paid; if he shall not have exacted it, peace being made, the former right of the creditor revives. Accordingly, it is for the most part agreed among nations, that things in action being confiscated in war, the peace being made, those which were paid are deemed to have perished, and remain extinct, but those not paid revive, and are restored to their true creditors." The doctrine of Vattel accords with that already cited. "He who declares war," says he, "does not confiscate the immoveable goods possessed in his country by his enemy's subjects. In permitting them to purchase and possess them, he has, in this respect, admitted them into the number of his subjects; but the income may be sequestrated for hindering the remittance of it to the enemy's country." And again, "when Alexander by conquest became absolute master of Thebes, he remitted to the Thessalians, an hundred talents, which they owed to the Thebans. The sovereign has naturally the same right over what his subjects may be indebted to his enemies. Therefore he may confiscate debts of this nature, if the term of payment happens in the time of war; or at least he may prohibit his subjects from paying while the war lasts." Book III. chap. V.

Mr. Jefferson, also, who is not apt to advocate a doctrine merely because it suits his present purpose, when speaking of the rightful acts of war, says, "It cannot be denied, that the state of war strictly permits a nation to seize the property of its enemies found within its own limits, or taken in war, and in whatever form it exists, whether in action or possession." I shall not conceal, that, although this practice is strictly permitted by the laws of nations; yet those sovereigns of Europe, who act with good faith, have generally departed from this right, so far, that public funds are generally exempted from confiscation, and seizure. Great Britain, however, regardless of the conduct of other nations, has, if we are rightly informed, confiscated or sequestrated, during the present war, debts of both these descriptions; although Vattel says, that a state ought never to touch the sums which it owes to the enemy. From what has been said, it results, that the United States, in case of a war with Great Britain, have an undoubted right to confiscate any debts due by their citizens to the subjects of Great Britain, and that if they choose to adopt the conduct of that nation, they might confiscate or sequester the property which they hold in our funds.

Indeed this right, in its fullest latitude, may fairly be contended for, from the care which Lord Grenville has taken to [Page]restrain the exercise of it. It is worthy of remark, by the 21st article of the treaty lately made between the French and Dutch republics, it is agreed, "That the French republic shall use their good offices with foreign powers in favor of the United Provinces, in order to obtain payment of the sums due them before the war."—And in an English ministerial paper, published since this treaty, it is said, "that the declaration of war, on the part of the Dutch, is considered, at the present moment, as by no means unfavorable for the interests of England; as it furnishes her with the best reasons for confiscating an immense property in that country belonging to Holland."

If then it be strictly permitted to sequester and confiscate property of this species, why surrender the right without an equivalent? Why give up this powerful means of self-defence, and that to a nation, who, from the first moment of her being obliged to acknowledge our independence, has treated us with the most persevering contempt? "It is with concern" says Mr. Jefferson in his letter to Mr. Pinckney, "I am obliged to observe, that so marked has been the inattention of the British court to every application which has been made to them on any subject by this government (not a single answer, I believe having ever been given to one of them, except in the act of exchanging a minister) that it may become unavoidable in certain cases, where an answer of some sort is necessary, to consider their silence as an answer." Why then, I repeat, should we surrender to such a nation the most powerful weapon of defence which is placed in our hands? Is it unjust or impolitic to confiscate the property of a nation, which, without any pretence, plunders us of ours on the high seas? Is it not more unjust and impolitic to lay our citizens at their mercy? For such must now be their unfortunate situation, as we have parted with the only means of making them retribution. It is well known, what a powerful effect was produced in England by the bare proposal to sequester the British debts. The clamour excited against the ministry, by the persons who would have been immediately affected by it, produced a revocation of some of the obnoxious edicts of which we complained. And yet, as if our fleets were able to cope with those of Great-Britain, and protect our trade, we have voluntarily, and without consideration, sacrificed this powerful engine of defence and terror, although it was almost the only effectual one within our power. If in any case, it be impolitic or unjust, we can forbear on such occasions to exercise the right; and we might then deserve some credit for our forbearance; but when bound by treaty to forego, much of the [Page]credit, which would otherwise be due to our moderation, will be lost.

One observation more, and I have done with this article. The secure footing upon which bank stock is placed by it, will render, it an object with the king of Great Britain, as a source of influence, as well as of interest. He had already speculated in our funds. It will not, therefore, be surprising, if, after this, he or his minister should invest a very large sum in this way; nay, what is to prevent him, considering the length of his purse, from engrossing all the shares of these different institutions which have multiplied so wonderfully since the peace, or at least a sufficient number to secure the uncontrouled direction of them? I leave it to others to picture the distressed and abject situation of our country, should her whole capital be administered by his Britannic majesty, or by those of his appointment. How will our public operations be cramped in time of war, or upon any sudden emergency, should his majesty deem it inexpedient to accommodate the government with a loan, at the same time, by withholding from our citizens put it out of their power to supply her wants? Even, in time of peace, it must be humiliating to an American to be obliged to British directors for a loan. They will, sometimes, no doubt, be most graciously accommodated with a small sum, provided there be more than sufficient to answer the extravagant demands of his majesty's most loving subjects. These evils may appear to some, distant and chimerical. Some, however, are already felt; for of what countrymen are the directors generally composed? and others will follow a ratification of the treaty, as naturally as an effect does its cause. I am aware, that in the bank of the United States, and in some others, a non-resident stockholder cannot give his vote by proxy for a director. This difficulty will easily be obviated, not indeed by his majesty's personal attendance, although such a visit might not be impolitic, but by holding this species of stock in the name of his ambassador, who will always be on the spot. If it should be necessary to divide it a little, in order to extend his influence, he will not be at a loss for friends. Some of our senators may think it an honor, and perhaps a duty, to hold part of the royal stock in their own name, and to represent and obey the real owner in all matters which relate to their respective institutions.

These ten articles are to be permanent. We might, therefore, reasonably hope, that in some of them, at least, could be found an advantage to the United States. But we search for it in vain. The more we examine the instrument, the greater is our surprise and concern, that our interests have been so little [Page]attended to, and that Great Britain has given us no one thing in return for concessions which are important to her, and will sooner or later be severely felt and reprobated by America.

One palpable omission is discoverable in the perpetual part of this contract. It has occurred to every one, and respects the compensation which was due to our citizens for the negroes which were carried away, at the peace; as by the seventh article of the treaty of peace, his Britannic majesty stipulates, that be would with all convenient speed and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies from the United States. Notice was received by Sir Guy Carleton of this treaty in the beginning of April, 1783, after which no negroes should have been carried away—Yet, as early as the sixth of May, a large number had been already embarked for Nova Scotia, of which General Washington complained, as a violation of the treaty— In Sir Guy Carleton's answer, dated 12th May, 1783, he admits the fact, but supposes he had no right to deprive them of their liberty. He mentions, however, that he had preserved an accurate register, by which the name of the proprietor, and the value of the negro, might be ascertained, in order that an adjustment might take place by compensation, if it really was the intention of the treaty, that they should be restored. Under this pretext, Sir Guy embarked, between the months of April and that of November, when the evacuation took place, three thousand negroes, who were inspected by our commissioners, and a very large number more, in public and private vessels, of whom they were not permitted to take inspection.—"Here then," says Mr. Jefferson, "was a direct, unequivocal, and avowed violation of this part of the seventh article, in the first moments of its being known—An article which had been of extreme solicitude on our part, and on the fulfilment of which depended the means of paying debts, in proportion to the number of labourers withdrawn; and when, in the very act of violation, we warn and put the commanding officer on his guard, he says directly, he will go through with the act, and leave it to his court to adjust it by compensation." Yet this compensation, after being delayed twelve years, is formally abandoned, in a manner as direct, unequivocal, and avowed, as that in which the infraction was committed, and that, too, in a moment when all America believed Mr. Jay was sent to demand justice for this, among other grievances—Our only consolation for this palpable sacrifice, is the reflection, that if compensation for the negroes had been granted, some very extravagant consideration would have been exacted by Great Britain, and, in all [Page]probability, obtained, considering the complaisant mood in which the negociation appears to have been conducted on our part. Perhaps, then, i [...] is owing to this omission, that the treaty wants one other exceptionable article. I shall only add here, that the negroes carried away, registered and unregistered, could not have amounted to less than five thousand, who, at two hundred and fifty dollars a man, were worth one million, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; a sum more than sufficient to pay all the old British debts, due from American citizens.

The eleventh article stipulates, that there shall be, between the two countries, a reciprocal and perfect liberty of navigation and commerce, under certain limitations and conditions, expressed in the articles which follow.

We are happy, at length, to arrive at an article, which promises something like reciprocity and perfect equality. We hope our envoy will not again lose sight of these corner stones of a treaty, and that Great Britain, tired or ashamed of obtaining every thing she has yet asked, will manifest a disposition somewhat more liberal than has yet appeared. The reader will judge whether this has been the case. His expectations, however, must not be too sanguine, or his disappointment may be still greater than mine was.

DECIUS.

No. IV.

Article XII.

AS even a majority of the senate, who do not appear to have been very difficult to please, have disapproved of this article, few partizans of the treaty can be found hardy enough to advocate it. The doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, which is again becoming so fashionable, ought to teach them the propriety of being silent; for how can the senate do wrong? But, notwithstanding the negative of the senate, and exceptionable as it is in every part, some few there are, who have represented it as a vast acquisition to this country, and express great regret at the stipulated suspension. Some indeed say, that the advocates of this description neither received their birth, education, or attachments, in this country. It is matter of surprise to no one, that those should be pleased with the treaty, who boast the honor of receiving their first [Page]breath in any part of the British dominions. But that Americans should be found so lost to a sense of dignity and their country's interests, as to coincide in sentiment with them, is matter of serious concern.

By this article, his majesty consents, that it shall be lawful, during the war, and two years after, for Americans to carry to any British West India island, from the United States, in their own vessels, not exceeding seventy tons, any merchandise of the growth, manufacture, or produce of the United States, which it is or may be lawful to carry to the said islands, from the said states, in British vessels. This permission, insignificant as it is, may at any time be defeated, by the British parliament declaring, that British vessels shall not export h [...] [...] from the United States, in British bottoms; at that moment, our right to carry those articles will cease, and the West India trade be confined to her colonies; but, if such interdiction does not take place, surely many vessels of this size will not be concerned in this trade, and, of course, the whole will be carried on in British bottoms. Not even an Albany stoop will be permitted to visit those islands. This article will not only confine to British bottoms the trade between these states and the West Indies, but, as if it was a real advantage to America, we have stipulated not to export, to any part of the world, even our own cotton, nor any melasses, sugar, coffee, or cocoa. But as this article was not ratified, owing to the firmness of one of the majority, a senator from Massachusetts, it cannot be necessary to pay it a very minute attention. We cannot, however, suppress our astonishment, that an American ambassador should have set his signature to an article so pernicious and disgraceful to America. We become almost willing to pardon the member from Boston, for supporting the other articles, ruinous and unequal as they are, for his steady opposition to this one. While we are upon the West India trade, it cannot be impertinent to contrast the conduct of the French republic with that of Great Britain. On the 19th of February, 1793, the national convention decreed:

1. "That all the ports of the French colonies be open to vessels of the United States of America."

2. That all produce, exported or imported in "American vessels, on going out or entering in the colonies, or in France, pay the same duty as that borne by French vessels."

3. "That the executive power negociate with the congress of the United States, to obtain, in favor of the French merchants, a like reduction of the duties granted by the present [Page]law to Americans, and thereby more closely cement the benevolent ties which unite the two nations."

While we admit the liberality of our ally, and execrate the opposite spirit of Great Britain, we are at as great a loss to account for the coldness and neglect with which our government received and continues to treat these generous overtures, as for the anxiety which some of its members discover, to form a commercial connection with the other nation, upon principles directly [...]d to the equality held out by the first. The tim [...] [...] arrive, when America may wish her government had acted [...]th [...] [...].

Article XIII.

By this article, our commerce with the British "territories in the East Indies," is regulated. Vessels belonging to American citizens, are to be admitted and hospitably received, in all the British sea-ports in the East Indies, and may freely carry on trade between those territories and the United States, in all articles of which the importation or exportation to or from thence shall not be entirely prohibited; under a restriction not to export, when Great Britain is at war, without the permission of government, any military or naval stores or rice.

"Our vessels are to pay in the said ports no higher tonnage duty than is paid for British vessels in our ports, nor are we to pay higher duties or charges, on the importation or exportation of merchandise, than is paid on the same articles, when imported or exported in British vessels; but it is expressly agreed, that the vessels of the United States shall not carry any of the articles exported by them from the said British territories, to any port or place, except to some port or place in America, where the same shall be unladen. Nor are our vessels to carry on any part of the coasting trade of the said British territor [...]. Nor are we to settle or reside there, or go into the interior parts, without permission of the British government [...]ab [...]ished there. We may also touch at the island of Saint Helena, for refreshment, subject to such regulations as the British government may, from time to time, establish."

This being the article, about which the friends of the treaty have exulted most, it was thought proper to give it pretty well at length. It has been asserted, that, by it, important commercial rights are secured to our citizens, in their navigation and trade with the British East Indies. To form a just estimate of these advantages, attention must be had to the commerce of the contracting parties, at the time of forming the treaty. If it is placed on a better footing, we have gained, [Page]provided we have not paid too great a price. But if our commerce in the East Indies is restrained by this article, it will be somewhat difficult to point out any advantage we have acquired by it. The merchants, who are certainly the most competent judges in these matters, contend, that the trade of the United States to the East Indies, is placed on a much worse footing than before. They assign, among others, the following reasons: 1st, That American vessels carry a small proportion of salted provisions to Bombay, where they take in cotton and sharks fins on freight to China, which was so considerable, as to enable them to lay in a return cargo to great advantage. A ship of five hundred tons would clear thirty thousand dollars.

2d, The American ships going to Bengal, frequently found very advantageous freights to some free port in Europe. The customary freight was from ten to fifteen pounds sterling a ton. It is supposed that nine-tenths of our trade to the British East Indies was carried on in this way.

3d, The direct trade of Bengal and Bombay was trifling until the sugar plantations in the West Indies were destroyed. We then imported sugar from the East Indies to advantage; but on the restoration of peace. this trade cannot be pursued but to a disadvantage—the voyage being too long, the sugar not so strong as that of the West Indies, and the supplies from the islands being sufficient for any use we can make of them, the former not answering to refine. Saltpetre is an article which we may import to advantage: in peace we want but little of it, and in war it is prohibited.

DECIUS.

No. V.

COTTON is low in the East Indies, but not of a good quality. It will not answer for importing, while we can have that of the West Indies and our own, the staple being too short for water spinning. White goods, with some gold and silver muslins, may be imported from Bombay and Calcutta, and some printed muslins from Madras; but the consumption of this country would not require three cargoes in a year, unless we printed them. The French use many; but they import them to print, and vend them in Europe and the West Indies. Almost all white goods may be had on the Hoogley, just above Calcutta, at a place called Besunpoor, a Danish port, on lower terms than at Calcutta, also at Chandanagore, a French port, [Page]at the mouth of the Ganges. From the Isle of France we import coffee and indigo; they raise cotton, which, for the reasons above mentioned, is seldom imported, and because it answers better in China. Coffee answers well, as the price is lower and the quality better, than that from the West Indies. We export to that place, salted provisions, and some naval stores; and our vessels are frequently employed in carrying slaves and cattle, from Madagascar and the Main, for the use of that colony.

From this cursory view of our commerce with the East Indies, it appears, that were we excluded altogether from the British settlements, we could obtain the same articles upon as easy or better terms, at other ports. This must be the reason, why Great Britain has so long permitted the trade in question; or perhaps a better one is, some immediate benefit she derives from it; for it will not be contended, that a nation who has done us no one act of kindness, during twelve years of peace, has been influenced in this part of her conduct, by affection for us, or any other worthy motive. Notwithstanding, then, that this trade has heretofore been carried on, by the mere permission of the British government, it was no more precarious, or likely to be interrupted or stopped, than the trade we carried on with her European ports. As well might it be said, that Great Britain had hitherto merely permitted us to export her manufactures, and to run in debt every year to her merchants, and as this right may be restrained or prohibited whenever she pleases, it is a great acquisition to have secured it, in such way as to be liable to no interruption. If, then, it be true, that we enjoyed the East India trade in as great a latitude before, as at present, with the addition of the coasting trade of that country, which principally rendered it worth pursuing, why relinquish the latter, without acquiring any extension of the former? for as to its permanency, it has already been shown, that it was as much so, as the interest of Great Britain could render it. Nay, why not only give up the carrying trade; but stipulate expressly, that we will carry to no part of the world, except to the United States, the East India goods we export from the British settlements. I know it has been said, that we are not restrained by this article, from exporting from the United States, the goods we bring from those factories in the hast Indies. It is much to be regretted, that in an instrument of this kind, any room should be left for construction or for doubt, as to the true mea [...]g and intention of the parties. This is too frequently the case with this treaty, which, considering the power with which it is made, should have [...] [...]ab [...]y precise, and free from every doubtful and equiv [...]al expression. We know [Page]too well, that if construction is resorted to, Great Britain, being the more powerful nation, will be able to put her own upon it; and we have too much reason to fear, from what has already happened, that even those who now contend for a contrary construction, will be complaisant enough, to accede to the one adopted by the English ministry. For we have men among us, and they are called patriots, who have justified that nation for her repeated violation of faith to this country, and particularly for her non-observance of the treaty of peace, although Mr. Jefferson, not by reasoning alone, but by facts, has proved that she was not to be justified in a single instance.

It is from this conduct of some of our citizens in office, that Great Britain has been encouraged to persevere in her faithless system towards us, and to demand from us stipulations which an unfortunate war of ten years ought never to have extorted from us. It was a circumstance of additional misfortune to the United States, that the late envoy, for reasons which will never perhaps be developed, was among the foremost in justifying the conduct of Great Britain. From his efforts, therefore, it was impossible for Americans to expect favorable terms. I acquit him, however, and that most sincerely, of any bribery or corruption, in this negociation, so strongly charged upon him by many. I rather believe, that he has been cajoled into the measure—and that from a belief that any treaty whatever, with Great Britain, would be pleasing to a certain party among us. Rather, therefore, than disappoint the expectations of those people, he has affixed his seal to an instrument, which must meet the marked disapprobation of every man in America, except such only as form the British faction, from whom alone, the United States have to apprehend any kind of danger to their constitution and liberties. This dissatisfaction manifested itself in a most emphatical manner, on the late anniversary of our independence. Even on that auspicious day, when it is usual to bury personal animosity, and to check the effusions and gall of party spirit, how unanimously have different societies and companies, without any previous concert, not only in this city, but in other parts of the state and union, expressed their abhorrence of the measure! Toasts, significant of their displeasure, have already appeared from every part; and among the variety which that day gave birth to, is one to be found, which discovers even a partial approbation of the treaty? Not even the merchants, who had invited Governor Jay to a public dinner, before the c [...]nt [...]nts of the treaty had transpired, had the complaisance, after his excellency's retiring, to lisp a syllable in its favor, either by a t [...]ast or in any other way.

[Page] Alarmed at an opposition so sormidable, and conscious, that the measure cannot be defended, those who feed a peculiar interest in forcing it upon us, begin to resort to their old cry of anti-federalism. A calm observer, in the Daily Advertiser of the 11th, remarks, that "a few weak-minded persons have been imperceptibly led astray, and almost sacrificed their principles on the altar of faction and disappointment, under the garb of republicanism; they have wisely chosen the late treaty for their rallying point, and over the back of this hobby horse, aimed a deadly blow at the constitution."—Instead of answering the numerous objections which are daily made to the treaty, this writer aims an undistinguished consure against all who oppose it. All those who cannot see what those champions have not yet discovered themselves, that the treaty is an eligible one for this country, are, forsooth, weak-minded, or anti-federalists. —It is not easy to discover any connection between the fate of this treaty and the constitution. The true friends of the constitution may be opposed to the treaty, as, on the other hand, its enemies may advocate it: whether this be really the case, is left to the people, if they be not too weak-minded, to determine. Be not deceived, fellow citizens; those who oppose the treaty, are as firm friends to the constitution as any among you; they know its excellencies, and are not afraid to speak of its defects, as time and operation discover them; for what human work is perfect? They wish not only that it may be maintained, but that it may be defended from the encroachments of a set of men, who, while accusing you of a desire of overthrowing the government, are destroying the first principles of our association, and by constructions, usurpation, and otherwise, are either assuming to themselves or granting to others, powers and authorities not warranted by the constitution. Is there a man among us who has ever advised you to oppose any measure of government? Do we dispute the right of the senate and president to make treaties? No; but we insist upon the right (and it was the exercise of this right which secured our freedom and independence) of giving our sentiments upon any act which it is proposed to make the rule of our conduct and the supreme law of the land; we claim the privilege of petitioning and remonstrating against a measure, which ignominiously sacrifices to our first and greatest enemy, our just demands, and must, in time, prostrate at her feet, our very sovereignty and independence. We think we are not to blame for exposing to view the secret machinations of one branch of the legislature to form a disgraceful connection with any nation. In sine, we claim the right of thinking for ourselve, uninfluenced by office or other [Page]unworthy considerations, and we thank God, that the unbiassed voice of America, as far as it has been heard, from the several states where our disgrace has been published, is on our side. —We rejoice at this circumstance, because such united and unconcerted marks of displeasure, we yet hope, may induce the president to suspend his sanction, and thereby give himself a new title to the endearing appellation of the father of his country.

But it is time to return to the 13th article—we left it in doubt, whether Americans could carry to Europe, or elswhere (except to their own country) the articles they export from the British East Indies; for, if they cannot, it is conceded, that such a restriction, together with a formal dereliction of the coasting trade, were considerations too valuable and disproportioned for the permission given us in the former part of the article. I say, we cannot, and that, confused as the phraseology is, it will admit of no other reasonable construction. "It is expressly agreed (these are the words of the treaty) that the vessels of the United States shall not carry any of the articles exported by them from the said British territories (or, in other words, any British East India articles) to any port or place, except to some port or place in America, where the same shall be unladen." If, then, the articles have been exported by us, from the British territories in the East Indies, under which clause is it, that we claim a right to carry them to Europe, or elsewhere? If such privilege was intended, why oblige us to unlade them in the United States? or why not, in express terms, secure the permission? Hence it follows, that this article, instead of extending our commerce, may be regarded among the most obnoxious of the treaty; and I am well informed, that our merchants, who are immediately concerned in the East India trade, view it in that light: British factories will soon be established in our principal sea-ports; and, in a few years, the whole of this trade must fall into their hands. Well might Mr. Pitt boast, on the floor of the house of commons, that he was not ashamed of his treaty with this country; his still in finance has been long admitted; his abilities, as a negociator, ought never hereafter to be called in question.

DECIUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Strictures on the late Conduct of the Executive.
To the President of the United States of America.

SIR,

YOU must be sensible that no measure of the British, since you was engaged in politics, has been more generally reprobated by the people of America, than the late treaty; which, not only as it respects the eventual surrender of this country into the hands of our inveterate enemies, the British, but even the secret mode of conducting this business, has naturally led the citizens to view it with a peculiar jealousy.

The apparent objects of Mr. Jay's mission, are so opposite to what he has accomplished in his treaty, that it was not conceived possible that you would justify his conduct. The objects of it we have under your own communications. It is therein declared, that you meant to give "solemnity" to his mission. You arrested the proceedings of congress on this explicit declaration, that you intended to vindicate the rights of the people, and express their "feelings." The confidence placed in you, reconciled even the advocates for other measures, to the issue of your solemn appeal to the British court. This is so evident to have been the voice of your constituents, at the time Mr. Jay was appointed, that even the tories suspected that something interesting would take place in vindication of our national honor; and that you would feel yourself bound to support your proclamation, agreeably to the modern law of nations. But, strange to say, your ambassador has destroyed the very ground upon which your proclamation was founded, and has made a treaty in direct violation of it. You mentioned the modern [...], on the contrary he has expressly declared the reverse. You was so particular on this point, as to italicise the term "modern;" but in opposition to this declaration, he has consented to the ancient law of nations, which is, no more, nor less, than the particular law of Britain.

When your proclamation was first issued, several towns met to approbate it; and even many of those persons who are now addressing you in behalf of the treaty (whose political principles, by the way, have, in no instance, been remarkably friendly to the rights of the people) were in favor of the proclamation.— [Page]But, as if some strange fatality attended the affairs of America, those very persons are for relinquishing the spirit of your proclamation, which they were so anxious to support, and are now urging you, contrary to the sentiments of ninety-nine hundredths of their fellow citizens, to ratify a treaty which destroys the very essence of it.

Wherein, sir, has Mr. Jay been successful in his negociation, that you or they can approbate his conduct? You was either mistaken in your proclamation, or Mr. Jay must be guilty of acting contrary to his instructions. But the latter does not appear, and yet it is said, that you have ratified his treaty, while nothing is handed to the public to convince them that you was mistaken in vindicating their neutrality upon the "modern law" of nations. This, at least, we ought to be gratified with; for notwithstanding the confidence placed in you, we are left in a disagreeable dilemma; for if we justify the treaty, we must condemn your proclamation; or if we are in savor of the proclamation, we must reprobate the treaty.

We request of you then, sir, to let us know the reasons, why you cannot vindicate your primary conduct, before we are obliged to accede to the propriety of Mr. Jay's negociation. If you was precipitate in your proclamation, by guaranteeing to the United States, their neutrality, on the "modern law of nations"—if you was equally hasty in declaring that Mr. Jay was sent to vindicate, with firmness, the rights of the United States—if these things were done without mature deliberation, and you are now obliged to retreat, "We, the people," as friends to you, and to themselves, would thank you to let them know the reasons, why you have altered your sentiments?

In politics, as in religion, we ought to be furnished with some arguments of the "hope that is within us;" but as the treaty business stands at present, your friends are puzzled to vindicate your conduct against the common sense of that class of citizens, who reason from no other source than what they conceive to be the welfare of their country.

About the same time that Mr. Jay was sent on his embassy to England, to vindicate our rights, Mr. Monroe was sent to France, with an explicit declaration, to draw closer the bonds of alliance between the two republics. In this instance, the people were pleased. Mr. Jay went to demand indemnification on the principles of our being a neutral nation, agreeable to the "modern law;" while Mr. Monroe was sent to form a more intimate alliance with France. A benediction accompanied your commission on this occasion, that "God would take the republic under his holy keeping." But it seems, that while the French [Page]were willing to enter into the most beneficial commercial alliance with America, they were disregarded, when at the same time Mr. Jay was hurrying on his business, under all the advantages of his most gracious majesty's levees, and the entertainments of Pitt, and his condjutors.—And still further, when he arrived in America, be is closeted under all the injunctions of profound secrecy, and the decisions of the senate are urged to be ratified "without delay," with only the suspension of one article.

What, sir, are the people to think on this procedure; or what are the French to conjecture? Must not the latter suppose, that there is an earnest desire to link this country in a treaty with England, rather than with them? You cannot, sir, suppose that the French are so blind, as not to notice this apparent partiality; and provided they should resent it, or consider it as an insidious piece of conduct on our part, it would be a serious question among the citizens, to assist part of the government, in opposition to that nation which helped us when we required their assistance.

These, sir, are important considerations. They require a serious deliberation before they are rejected. The Americans feel an attachment to France, and they cannot be easily turned aside from wishing them success. They have every reason to respect the French, and they have as cogent reasons to reprobate the English. We esteem you, sir, for what you have done, in company with the American army, and the French navy and soldiers; but you may excuse the citizens of America, if they still retain an affection for their allies, and are unwilling, through the instrumentality of any man or body of men, to come again under the controul of the British.

We fought to obtain our rights, and we trust in heaven that we shall be able to hand them down to our posterity. It is of but little consequence by whom we are sacrificed, whether by Lord North or Judge Jay.

On this question, we mean to respect you; but the liberties of America have been purchased at too dear a rate to be lost without a strugyle for their maintenance.

A REPUBLICAN.

[Page]

LETTER From the Chairman of a Meeting of the Citizens of Norfolk (Virginia) hold August 5, 1795. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Norfolk, August 6, 1795.

SIR,

BY direction of a meeting, held at the court-house of this county, yesterday, I transmit their proceedings relative to the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between the United States and his Britannic majesty, now under your consideration; they are so expressive in their sentiments of the consequences attending the adoption of it, that I hope your opinion will coincide with their wishes, and that they will have their weight, with others on the same occasion, to prevent the evil tendency that is predicted, by a ratification thereof.

With sentiments of the highest respect, I am, Your most obedient servant, THOs. NEWTON, Chairman.

PRESIDENT's ANSWER.

United States, Philadelphia, August 31, 1795.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 6th instant, inclosing the proceedings of the meeting at Norfolk on the 5th, relative to the treaty lately negociated between the United States and Great Britain—on subjects so complex and relative a nature as those embraced by the treaty, a diversity of opinion was to have been expected—my determination, which is known to have been in the affirmative of the treaty, as advised and consented to by the senate, was formed after the most mature deliberation and with a sincere regard to the public good. Though it cannot be uninteresting to me to know, that the wishes of a part of my fellow citizens have been contravened by this decision; yet, if the purity of my intentions will entitle me to their approbation, it has not been forfeited on the present important occasion.

With due respect, I am, Your obedient, G. WASHINGTON. Thomas Newton, Esq

Notes

*

See Carey's Edition, pages 100—103.

↵

*

See Vol. I. page 5.

↵

*

New York.

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

[No. VII.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME II.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—NOVEMBER 14, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. STRICTURES on the President's Circular Answer Page 147

2. Decius, No. VI. Page 154

3. Remarks on Charles Pinckney's Speech Page 160

4. Gracchus, No. I. Page 174

5. Camillus, No. XVIII. Page 176

6. —No. XIX. Page 181

7. —No. XX. Page 186

8. Tully, No. I. Page 199

9. State of Opinions on the Treaty Page 201

10. Observations on the Disposition of Administration to France and England Page 203

11. Remarks on some of the probable Consequences of Mr. Jay's Treaty Page 207

12. Atticus, No. I. Page 210

13. — No. II. Page 212

14. Remarks on Treaties Page 215

15. Reply of the President of the United States, to the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce Page 216

American Remembrancer, &c.

[Page]

STRICTURES On the President's Circular Answer.

The two branches ought not to substitute for their own conviction, the opinions of others.—

President's circular answer.

I BELIEVE there never was a bolder absurdity published, than, that in a representative government, the representative body is not bound by the opinion of the body constituent: for if it be true, that the representative body be not thus bound, representation is neither trust nor agency, but another name for the worst species of despotism, where the will of the many is controuled by the opinion of the few. It is true, that many specious sophisms have been invented within these few years, to quibble away the sovereignty of the people of the United States: but my conscience impels me to believe, that the man who cheats his fellow citizens out of their liberties, by false logic, is a more detestable character, than he, who, with a false key, opens the doors of his neighbour's house, rifles him of his substance, inasmuch, as liberty is more precious than wealth.

The only writer I know of, who has written expressly on this subject, is Noah Webster, junior, Esquire, attorney at law. This gentleman says, in his fourth chapter on governments, "That the people ought not to give binding instructions to representatives. That the right of election is the only constitutional right which they can, with propriety, exercise." These positions, he says, convey the same idea; and, if true, they contravene, in some measure, a fundamental maxim of American politics, which is, that the sovereign power resides in the people. Most unquestionably, if these positions are true, then is the maxim false. But, says this gentleman, "I am not desirous of subverting this favorite maxim: but I am very desirous it should be properly qualified. The people have a right to advise their representatives in certain cases, in which they may be well informed: but this right cannot often be exercised with propriety or safety; nor should their instructions be binding or their representatives." Here is a right which cannot often be exercised with propriety or safety, and, when exercised, is not binding: a right, qualified by the logical dexterity of a lawyer, to be no right at all: a camelion kind of [...]ight, which, like the consciences of some folks, assumes all shapes, but the shape of [Page]consistency and of truth. But what is the reason that this is a right and no right—that it is to be exercised and not exercised —that it is a right, and not binding—and, like Mr. Dexter's republicanism, means any thing or nothing? Why, forsooth, "because people live remote from each other, and cannot always be acquainted with the general interest of the state; they cannot know all the reasons which may be offered for or against a measure, by people in distant parts of the state: they cannot tell at home, how they themselves would think and act in a general assembly of all the citizens." So that because every man is not omniscient and omnipresent, the people are to be deprived of all controul over their own representatives. According to this doctrine, legitimate human government never can exist. Let us consider the tendency of these arguments. It is admitted, that, where the whole society can convene, there is no necessity of representation. But, according to Mr. Webster's arguments, a society could avail itself of no benefit or purpose, by actual convention of the whole; every individual being excluded, by his doctrine, of the right to vote; for as he cannot know the interests of the whole, therefore, he cannot decide upon any question in which those interests are involved. This doctrine of Webster's is very similar to Blackstone's doctrine of the community of goods. The earth and all things thereon, says Blackstone, was given by the creator to man, in common; but as it was given to man in common, no man could exercise private or particular dominion over any part of that which was given in common, without violating the community of goods; since the property belonged equally to all. But as it is plain such a community of goods in practice, would be a mere nullity; so is Mr. Webster's community of interests. A whole society meet in convention, to decide upon the interests of the whole: but this decision is impossible to be effected, according to Mr. Webster's doctrine; for the individuals, or the parts of the society, cannot vote; because they are not the whole; but the whole includes all the parts; therefore, the whole cannot vote, because the parts cannot; therefore, neither the parts nor the whole can vote; therefore, the whole is a mere nullity.

We are every day told, that a representative is not only to represent the persons who elected him, but he is to represent the whole state; and, therefore, he cannot be bound by the opinion of his electors. If the fallacy of this argument be not already sufficiently exposed, we might deny that it can apply to the United States; as it contains the position of universal representation, which can only be bottomed upon universal election, a thing not known in these states.

[Page] What sort of a representative would a person chosen in the district of Maine, or the territory north west of the Ohio, make for the people of South Carolina or Georgia? It is evident at first blush, that such a representative might know no more of the interests of his pretended southern constituents, than the man in the moon; and if a knowledge of the interests of the whole, be essential to enable a part of the people to give, with propriety, binding instructions to their representatives, surely a little knowledge is necessary, to constitute a man a representative of the whole; and how is the inhabitant of the district of Maine, to discover a knowledge of the interests of the people of Georgia? It may be answered, through the medium of the representatives of the people of Georgia. But may not the representatives of Georgia, deceive the inhabitant of the district of Maine on this subject? and is it not absurd to the last degree, to say that a representative ought to desert the interests of his own electors, with which he is well acquainted, in order to guard the interests of a people foreign to him; who are represented by express delegations from themselves; and of whom all his knowledge must be taken upon the trust of other people? Such arguments, of universal representation, cannot apply to the United States; because the local divisions of states still exist, and the representation is founded upon local and not general principles. If, indeed, the representatives were elected out of the whole union, they would be general, and not local representatives; but even then, the principle, that the representative body is bound by the will of the body constituent, will hold good: as this principle is commensurate with every possible degree of representation. If the representative is local, he may be restrained by local instructions. If he is general, or continental, he may be restrained by general, or continental instructions.

But it is said that a man ought not to be settered with instructions, but should be suffered to go independent to congress. I can form to myself the idea of the animal, represented by Horace, that had the body of an horse, the head of a man, and the wings of a bird, but a trustee independent of his truster, an agent independent of his principal, or a representative independent of his constituent, is a thing that I cannot conceive; and to say that a representative ought to go to congress unfettered with instructions, is very much like saying he ought to go to congress, not to represent his constituent, but to represent himself.

This sort of logic, that in a free country a representative is bound to represent himself, prevailed to such a degree, about [Page]the time that the federal government was formed, that a person chosen to represent Sandwich, in Massachusetts, in convention, refused to be fettered, as he called it, and resigned his appointment, because his constituents instructed him to vote against the federal constitution. Among the reasons urged by Mr. Bourne, the person in question, for declining the service of his fellow citizens, are the following: "Under the restrictions with which your delegates are fettered, the greatest ideot may answer your purpose, as well as the greatest man. The suffrages of our fellow men, when they neither repose confidence in our integrity, nor pay a tribute of respect to our abilities, can never be agreeable." I am not disposed to question the sincerity of Mr. Bourne, on this occasion. His conclusions are, however, totally false; for it does not follow, because a representative is bound to express the will of his constituents, that, therefore, the greatest ideot will answer the purpose as well as the greatest man. Generals of armies, and admirals of navies, are almost always bound by instructions, and yet it never entered any man's head, that an ideot was a proper person to command an army or a fleet; and if such commander breaks his orders, he is sure to get broke himself; and the maxim in commerce is, to break your owners rather than to break your orders. In short, whatever Webster's or Bourne's notions of ideotism may be, it is evident, that the wisest man will always discharge the duties of a representative best, however his instructions may be. The rest of his arguments are equally stupid: for the suffrages of our fellow men are, in themselves, the most sacred deposits of confidence in our integrity, and the most transcendent tributes of respect to our abilities, which we can possibly receive. And yet Mr. Webster tell us, that he would rather be the author of this stupid address, than all the laboured dissertations written upon the federal constitution.

If the representatives from any district are not bound by the opinions of such district, but, on the contrary, are bound to consider the interest of the United States, generally, then it may be asked, with what propriety can the district displace the representative, at the next election? and yet the districts are vested, by the constitution, with this power. Here are representatives, bound to attend to the general interests of the whole continent, and yet subject to be displaced by the districts, for such attention. It is evident, that the constitution, by apportioning the representation to particular states, i [...] tended, that the particular interests of each state should be specially attended to, by the representation flowing from it. And all arguments, controverting this evident principle, are more sophistry, [Page]calculated to deceive, and pave the way for hereditary representation, or a representation for life. For, if the principle is once admitted, as constitutional, that the representatives from any state are bound to attend to the general interest of the United States, the interest of their own state to the contrary notwithstanding, I see no reason why congress may not declare themselves hereditary legislators for the United States, exnecessitate rei; because, if they are bound to maintain the general welfare, they ought not to be controuled by partial interests: and as the exercise of election manifests such controul, it ought to be abolished.

As this is a very important topic, I shall follow Mr. Webster a little. "The very doctrine of representation in government, excludes the right of giving binding instructions to deputies. The design of choosing representatives, is, to collect the wisdom of the state; the deputies are to unite their councils; to meet and consult for the public safety. But positive instructions prevent this effect: they are dictated by local interests, or opinions formed on an imperfect view of facts and arguments; in short, they totally counteract the good effects of public deliberations, and prevent those salutary measures which may result from united councils. They make the opinions of a small part of the state, the rule for the whole; they imply a decision of a question, before it is heard; they reduce a representative to a mere machine, by restraining the exercise of his reason; they subvert the very principles of republican government. And, further, a representative is bound by oath to act according to his judgment, and for the good of the people: his instructions forbid him to use his judgment; he must then abandon either his orders, or his oath; perjury or disobedience is his only alternative."

In answer to all this, it may be said, that arguments, equally specious, may be urged against the consistency of the attributes of the deity, the exercise of religion, the utility of virtue, or even against the possibility of our existence. But appearance is not reality, nor is specious sophistry, truth. If a man says two and two make five, and the half of five is three, I say, the man is either a fool or a knave; that he either is himself deceived, or seeks to deceive others. So, when Mr. Webster tells us, that the doctrine of representation excludes the right of giving binding instructions to deputies, he either does not understand the common acceptation of the word representation, or he means to play the sophist. The meaning of the word representation, is, bearing or exercising the character or power of another; and if the doctrine of bearing or exercising the [Page]character or power of another, excludes the bearing or exercise of such character or power, then a thing is and is not; after which deduction, it would be folly in any man to reason with Mr. Webster, were not the public interests involved in the decision.

But "The design of choosing representatives, is, to collect the wisdom of the state. This statement is not correct; it ought to be the will [...] the state; for, however the wisdom of a state may be suppered to be manifested, in the debates of a legislative body, yet the decision is by vote, which is the expression of will, and not of wisdom; as many persons decide by vote, upon a question, in the discussion of which they have been totally silent. And it frequently happens, that a minority have all the wisdom and truth on their side, but are obliged to submit to the will of the majority.

Again, "The deputies are to unite their councils, to meet and consult for the public safety; but instructions prevent this effect." I will be bold to assert, that there never was on earth an union of councils, upon any great and interesting question; and, until liberty is swallowed up in despotism, there never will be. The celebrated declaration of independence was carried by a majority of one only; the federal constitution met with much opposition, and the senate of the United States was equally divided, upon every question, for several weeks of the last session; so that, to effect this fancied union of councils, which is as little to be expected as a similarity in all our faces and dispositions, and which, if effected, would prove the most intolerable of all tyrannies, the people of the United States are to be prevented from all controul over their representatives.

Again, "They make the opinions of a small part of the state, a rule for the whole." An assertion of this kind could only have proceeded from a man, who, being educated in the habit of indiscriminately supporting truth and falsehood, has lost all distinct perceptions of both, and is calculated to confute, not to convince. If the representatives in congress, from any particular state, had the privilege of voting exclusively, and that such votes of one state should bind the whole, there might be some truth in this assertion; but, when the whole representatives, from all the states, vote on the same question, it is as difficult to conceive how a part can rule the whole, as it is to conceive that a part is greater than the whole.

But, "a representative has sworn to act according to his judgment; and his instructions forbid him to use his judgment; hence perjury or disobedience is the alternative." Oaths have [Page]been thought necessary, in courts of justice, as obligations binding on the consciences of men, over which the court can exercise no other controul; but the exercise of office is another matter, and, I presume, the controul, which a properly organized body constituent has and preserves over its representatives, supersedes the necessity of oaths altogether. But even if it did not, a man's judgment might, without any violation of his conscience, dictate to him the impropriety of setting up his own will, in opposition to the will of his constituents.

It is the fate of sophists, to be eternally contradicting themselves; and this very gentleman, who has exhausted so much rhetoric, to prove the impropriety of instructions to representatives, after telling us, that the powers of a representative should be wholly discretionary, when he acts as a legislator, says, "but, as an agent for a town or a small society, he may have positive instructions. His constituents, in the last case, are competent to instruct him, because they are the whole body concerned; but, in the first instance, they are but part of the state, and not competent to judge fully of the interests of the whole." I would beg leave to ask him, if a town is a whole state? it is not. How, then, can a town, according to Webster's principles, give instructions? it cannot. But, after spinning out forty pages of sophistry, he concedes all that is contended for, to wit, that towns may give binding instructions, because they are the whole body concerned. But, in what sense, is a town the whole body concerned? in no other sense, but that the whole town is the whole body constituent; and no sensible man ever thought, that any part less than the whole, or a majority of the whole body constituent, could, of right, give binding instructions to the representatives; but the whole body or a majority of the whole body constituent may; which, I believe, I have sufficiently proved, and is conceded by Mr. Webster.

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Reflections on Mr. Jay's Treaty. [CONTINUED FROM PAGE 140.]
No. VI.

Article XIV.

BY this article, "the subjects of his Britannic majesty have liberty to come, with their ships and cargoes, to the lands, countries, cities, ports, places, and rivers, within the whole extent of the United States, to enter into the same, to resort, remain, and reside there, without any limitation of time, also to hire and possess houses and ware-houses, for the purpose of their commerce, and in which they are to enjoy the most complete protection and security." As this article excludes a British subject from no part of the United States, it might be expected that our citizens, in return, should enjoy the same liberty of trading to and residing within every part of the British territories. —No such thing—By it we can only go to a small part of his majesty's dominions, viz. those in Europe, where we have been in the habit of going ever since the peace, without any treaty, and without any molestation, Great Britain finding her interest in permitting us so to do.—Our envoy, ever true to the principle of inequality, which he has made the basis of his treaty, has brought it into conspicuous action in this place; as if anxious to circumscribe our commerce, he never loses an opportunity of imposing some restrictions or limitations on it.

Article XV.

Upon this article, no other observation is necessary, than that it tends very unnecessarily to shackle the government, in regulating our commerce with foreign nations, which, by the constitution, is vested in congress, and that it must always have been a matter of much solicitude with Great Britain, to prevent our passing such discrimination laws, on this subject, as circumstances and necessity might render proper.—The reader is left to discover what benefit we can derive from it.—Passing over the 16th article, which regulates the appointment of consuls, we come to those parts of the treaty which have ever appeared to me the most exceptionable. I mean those which regulate our intercourse and comme [...] with other nations, in times of British wars. Was a stranger, unacquainted with the history of the [Page]two contracting parties, to peruse this compact, he would imagine the United States were almost constantly engaged in war, and that her envoy, jealous of the neutral situation of Great Britain, and afraid of the supplies she might furnish to the enemies of his country, had taken care to impose every restriction he could think of, on her commerce and action, during those periods of hostility. What would be his surprise, if, after drawing this conclusion, he was informed, that the United States, except the war which emancipated them, have never been embroiled in any foreign quarrel? That, on the contrary, the ambition or injustice of Great Britain urges her to take part in almost every war which breaks out in Europe or Asia; that America is nearly 3000 miles from the scene of action, and the vortex of European politics; that she is a peaceable, commercial nation; that her interest consists in observing a strict neutrality, not by withholding all supplies from the belligerent powers, and sullenly shutting her ports against them all, but by an open, unreserved, and equal communication and trade with all of them. Instead of this, we shall find, in some of 'the articles which follow, the most unheard-of restrictions upon our commerce, and the most wanton sacrifices of the thousand advantages which we were entitled to, as a commercial country; principles, which this country, in common with several other maritime powers, had advocated and adopted, for a series of years, have been most wantonly abandoned. Articles, which were never before esteemed contraband, have been inserted in the black list; and such is the constant spirit of the parts to which I allude, that not an American vessel can cross the ocean, in time of war, without manifest hazard of becoming lawful prize to a British cruiser.—A more minute attention to this part of the treaty, will but too much justify observations, which, at first view, may appear harsh and ill-founded. To elucidate more fully the striking inequality of these parts of the treaty, they will be contrasted with those which we have with other nations.—The task will be painful and nauseous; in every line we shall encounter some new sacrifice; at every period, we shall execrate the result of a mission, which has fixed an indelible stain upon our national honor, and published to the world, that we no longer deserve to be free.

Article XVII.

"It is agreed, that, in all cases where vessels shall be captured or detained, on just suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or of carrying to the enemy any of the articles, which are contraband of war, the said vessel shall be brought [Page]to the nearest or the most convenient port; and if any property of an enemy shall be found on board such vessel, that part only which belongs to the enemy, shall be made prize, and the vessel shall be at liberty to proceed with the remainder, without any impediment. And it is agreed, that all proper measures shall be taken to prevent delay, in deciding the cases of ships or cargoes so brought in for adjudication, and in the payment or recovery of any indemnification, adjudged or agreed to be paid to the masters or owners of such ships."

In this article we have solemnly relinquished a point, which, to us, was of more value than the amount of all the depredations on our trade, added to the immense sums due to us, for the negroes, and to the losses we have sustained, by the detention of our posts. As a neutral and trading people, and as a nation, likely, with common prudence, ever to continue at peace with all the world, we should have insisted, even at the risque of war, especially when making a treaty, that free vessels should make free goods. With what people are we afraid of going to war, that we are so anxious to restrain the vessels of Great Britain from carrying their effects? There is but one country with which our government appears solicitous to embroil us, and that is France. Should such a war really take place (which God forbid, as it would certainly be followed by a civil one) is it probable Great Britain would become carriers for the French? and if she did, would our government dare to authorize her citizens to make prize of any property on board of her vessels? What would we not submit to, in time of war, if, when not pressed by this calamity, we sacrifice a principle for which we have been contending ever since we became a nation, and which we have uniformly adhered to, in our conventions with other nations? As early as 1781, it was an instruction to the captains of American armed vessels, that they should permit all "neutral vessels freely to navigate on the high seas or coast of America, except such, as were employed in carrying contraband goods, or soldiers to the enemies of the United States." Jour. of Cong. 7. vol. p. 80. What were then deemed contraband goods will be shown, when we come to consider the next article of this memorable treaty. Several of the maritime and commercial states of Europe, had already armed to maintain their neutrality; and congress, we see, not only respected the principle of this association, but did all they could to give it complete operation, by a solemn ordinance, which they passed on the 7th of April, 1781. It need not be contended, that there is no nation on earth so much interested and benefited by the observance of this principle, as America. Let us attend only to the present [Page]war: what benefit might we not derive from it, if our vessels could afford protection to the property of belligerent powers? Having seen that congress, even in time of war (it will be remembered, that America was then without a senate devoted to Great Britain, and that those who were then deemed patriots, were really such) when it might have been her interest to pursue the wicked, piratical system of Great Britain, respected the rights of neutrality, and would not touch the property of her enemy, if found on board of a neutral vessel; and all her treaties hitherto, have secured to her this important, this [...] luable right, of carrying even the property of an enemy, [...] any part of the globe. Let us contrast the seventeenth article of Mr. Pitt's treaty (for such it ought to be called) with the 23d article of the one concluded by the venerable Franklin, with our good ally the French. The disgust occasioned by the former will not be much diminished, while we peruse the latter. "It shall be lawful," says this article, "for all and singular, the subjects of the most Christian king, and the citizens, people and inhabitants of the said United States, to sail with their ships, with all manner of liberty, and security, no distinction being [...]de, who are the proprietors of the merchandizes laden thereon, from any port, to the places of those who now are, or hereafter shall be at enmity with the most Christian king, or the United States. It shall likewise be lawful for the subjects and inhabitants aforesaid, to sail with the ships and merchandizes aforementioned; and to trade with the same liberty and security, from the places, ports, and havens of those who are enemies of both, or either party, without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only directly from the places of the enemy aforementioned, to neutral places; but also from one place belonging to an enemy, to another place belonging to an enemy; whether they be under the jurisdiction of the same prince, or several. And it is hereby stipulated that free ships shall also give a freedom to goods; and that every thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the confederates, although the whole lading, or any part thereof should appertain to the enemies of either, contraband goods being always excepted. It is also agreed in like manner, that the same liberty be extended to persons who are on board a free ship, with their effects; that although they be enemies to both or either party, they are not to be taken out of that free ship, unless they are soldiers, and in actual service of the enemies."

If Mr. Pitt had graciously permitted Mr. Jay to insert a similar stipulation in the treaty before us, in what an envied situation [Page]would it have placed America! At present, she must even forego the advantages she might derive from the French treaty for if we permit the English to seize French property on bound our vessels, can it be expected that France will abstain from similar treatment? Between the two, what is to become [...] American vessels? Let Mr. Jay and his friends answer. In the twenty-fourth article of our treaty with the United Netherlands, the "liberty of navingation and commerce is extended to all [...] of merchandizes, excepting only those which are distinguished under the name of contraband or merchandizes prohibited." What these are, will be seen by and by, "so that all effects and merchandizes," continues this article, "which are [...] expressly before named, may, without any exception, and in perfect liberty, be transported by the subjects and inhabitans of both allies, from and to places, belonging to the enemy, excepting only the places which at the same time shall be besieged, blockaded, or invested, and these places shall only be held for such, which are surrounded, nearly, by some of the belligerent powers." In our treaty with Sweden, we find the same regard paid to our mutual interests. The seventh arti [...] deserves to be copied at full length, as a contrast to the [...] the same subject in the English treaty. The reader in reque [...] to compare them attentively; and he will find his indignation kindled against any one who shall be hardy enough to adv [...] the latter. It is in these words: "All and every the subjects and inhabitants of the kingdom of Sweden, as well as those of the United States, shall be permitted to navigate with their vessels in all safety and freedom, and without any regard to those to whom the merchandizes and cargoes may belong, from any part whatever [...] and the subjects and inhabitants of the two states shall likewise [...] permitted to sail and trade with their vessels, and with the save liberty and safety to frequent the places, ports, and havens of powers, enemies to both or either of the contracting parties, without being in any wise molasted or troubled, and to carry on a commerce, not only directly from the ports of an enemy to a newtral port, but even from one port of an enemy to another port of an enemy, whether it be under the jurisdiction of the same, or of different princes. And as it is acknowledged by this treaty with respect to ships and merchandizes, that free ships shall make the merchandizes free, and that every thing which shall be on board of ships belonging to subjects of the one on the other of the contracting parties, shall be considered as free, even though the cargo or a part of it should belong to the enemies of one or both; it is nevertheless provided, that contraband goods shall always be excepted, which, being intercepted, [Page]shall be proceeded against according to the spirit of the following articles. It is likewise agreed that the same liberty be extended to persons who may be on board a free ship, with their effects, that although they be enemies to both, or either of the parties, they shall not be taken out of the free ship, unless they are soldiers in the actual service of the said enemies." After perusing these several articles of our treaties with other nations, let the reader return to the one which has excited this compa [...], and mourn over the lost dignity and interests of his country. It will be said that by the laws of nations, free vessels [...] not make free goods. That this was the case formerly is conceded; but when those nations which have a right to alter this law are using their utmost efforts to bring about a change, dictated by humanity and reason, why should we formally give our assent to a measure which must not only retard this amelioration, but deprive us of the salutary operation of the treaties we have already made? We shall be told, as in other cases, th [...] Mr. Pitt insisted upon this stipulation, and that the terms were the best which Mr. Jay could obtain. This reasoning may satisfy a party, when hard pressed, to support the tottering reputation of a leader; but in private life, a man would deserve a p [...]e in B [...]d [...]am who should assign no other reason for making a [...] bargain with his neighbour, than that the other would not [...]ent to a good one. On such, occasions, nations, as individuals, should exercise their free agency, and refuse to treat with those [...]o, at every step, are extorting unreasonable concessions. In the next article, which will presently furnish matter for animad [...]sion, we shall also find ample field for censure. By the one which we have just considered, we are interdicted from carrying [...]y species of enemies' property; in that which follows the prohibition may be extended by construction, even to our own goods which will in every case run great hazard of being seized and confiscated.

DECIUS.

[Page]

Remarks on Mr. Charles Pinckney's Speech.

[CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 111.]

WITH respect to the negociation about the Mississippi, in 1786, which seems to be dragged in here without any obvious propriety, it may be remembered, that Mr. Jay's opinion, on that occasion, had the sanction of a majority of congress—that it was then thought, by many of the wisest men in America, a salutary arrangement for the Atlantic states— that the eastern states were generally of that opinion—that a minority in congress, for the benefit of a small part of the union, obstructed a measure which was then deemed generally be [...]ial—and that even now it may be considered as problematical, whether the arrangement would not have eventuated more beneficially for the western territory than any other which can be promised.

The insinuation against the president, for having sent a [...] who has shown himself "so uninformed of the commecial interests of his country, and so miserably deficient in the talents of a negociator, and for having opposed him singly, and at their own court, to the talents, experience, and, perhaps, temptations of their ablest statesmen," will fail of its intended effect. Mr. Jay's conduct in Spain, in France at the treaty of 1783, his talents and experience, and known integrity, were sufficient inducements with the president to select him for this mission. There may indeed be men, whose vanity may lead them to believe, that they would have negociated a better treaty—men, no more to be compared to Mr. Jay, for virtue or abilities, than a farthing candle to the sun, and whose vanity, in supposing themselves his superiors, in these respects, can only be surpassed by their folly, in having had pretensions and expectations so ill-founded and ridiculous.

In complaining of the article relating to British debts, the speech observes, that the creditors had long since made up their minds on certain points, and that by far the greater number of cases have been settled by suit or compromise; so much the better; all those cases, in which the creditors have been satisfied, will not be touched by the treaty. The article will only affect the others, where the debtors are insolvent. If Mr. Jay, in his negociation of the treaty of 1783, honestly meant, that [Page]bona fide debts were to be paid, it would have been inconsistent in him to deny it, either as judge or secretary of foreign affairs: Humanity is perhaps as much concerned in paying a fair debt to a factor or agent in England, who had shipped goods to this country, and was responsible to the manufacturers, and liable to be imprisoned there for non-payment, as in shielding from the law a rich debtor in this, who withheld payment: Honor as much required that our national faith should be kept, and that bona fide debts should be paid by solvent debtors. The stipulation agreed to by Mr. Jay is not to distress individuals, but to make the nation answerable for losses arising from a breach of the treaty.

On the subject of spoliations, the speech chalks out the line of conduct Mr. Jay should have taken: "He should have required immediate satisfaction; if refused, he should have quitted their court, and left it to his country to have determined what other measures were to be pursued: but, instead of this, he has accepted a remote, expensive, and uncertain remedy." This is the line of conduct the speaker would leave taken: "his demand should have been spirited and positive—no alternative would have been offered." But suppose his instructions had not been of that spirited and positive nature, and that some other alternative had been pointed out by them—and he had disobeyed them, after having accepted the mission, knowing those instructions? On his return, he would have been universally condemned, and some other less positive gentleman would have been sent. The former minister at that court, as distinguished for his spirit as his virtues, but whose spirit, regulated by good sense and sound discretion, would have been more wisely directed, complained for several months to the British court, of the spoliations committed under the orders of the 8th of June, 1793, without threatening to quit the country: in this, he conformed to the instructions of the executive; in Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Pinckney, of September 7, 1793, after complaining of those spoliations, he adds, "The president, therefore, desires that you will immediately enter into explanations, on this subject, with the British government. Lay before them, in friendly and temperate terms, all the demonstrations of the injury done us by this act, and endeavour to obtain a revocation of it, and full indemnification to any citizens of these states, who may have suffered by it in the mean time. Accompany your representations with every assurance of our earnest desire to live on terms of the best friendship and harmony with them, and to found our expectations of justice on their part, on a strict observance of it on ours. Desirous of [Page]furnishing no colour of offence, we do not wish you to name to them any term for giving an answer: urge one as much as you can, without commitment." The remedy accepted by Mr. Jay, is probably the remedy designated in his instructions; it is certainly the usual remedy in similar cases. But it is called remote; and what would the speech have substituted? Why Mr. Jay must have quitted Great Britain, made his report to the president, who must thereupon have convened the senate, according to the doctrine laid down in the speech, to reconsider their instructions, and, after all, at the distance of many months, the senate would have done precisely what they have done—advised the president to accept the terms: Mr. Jay would have returned to England, and this remote remedy would have been made more remote by at least a twelvemonth: it is called expensive; and what would the speech substitute? Why, Mr. Jay must have returned home, and the United States, after the expense of some thousand dollars for the extra session of the senate, must either have had the expense of another embassy, or the more serious expense of ten or fifteen millions of dollars by a war, to obtain a compensation of half a million!! The remedy pointed out by the speech does not then appear preferable to Mr. Jay's.

Mr. Jay is next charged with having, in the most condescending manner, stipulated that all prizes brought in, &c. shall be paid for, &c. Mr. Jay stipulated no such thing. The president and stipulated in 1793, that certain prizes, [...]s specified in Mr. Jefferson's letter, annexed to the treaty, should be paid for. Mr. Jay, conformably to that letter and his instructions, agrees that the cases not already paid for, coming within the principles therein fixed, shall be referred to the commissioners.

After the speech had informed us that the 12th article was held in general detestation by our own citizens, it may appear superfluous to add the detestation of foreigners. The detestation of our own citizens was quite sufficient to condemn it. But the flourish about our friends seems misapplied. The articles, prohibited by that article, are molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and cotton: It may be queried whether our vessels carry much of them to supply our friends; the general course of the present trade of re-export in those articles, seems to be to other parts of Europe. It is not, however, meant to contend this point, with those who have obtained the best mercantile information.

The animadversion on the article respecting the East India trade, is either not understood, or the article itself is not understood by the commentator. It permits the citizens of the United States "to carry on freely a trade between the British territories in the East Indies and the United States, in all articles [Page]of which the importation or exportation respectively, to or from the said territories, shall not be entirely prohibited; that is, it places our citizens upon the same footing exactly as the East India company, and upon a better footing than the people of Great Britain, who cannot carry on such trade. Because advantages favorable to the United States are conceded in this article, the notable discovery is now made, that the trade is injurious; so the same persons, who a few years ago would have rejoiced at a stipulation, permitting our vessels of 60 tons to enter the British islands, now call the stipulation for 70 tons a paltry allowance. Had the British possessions in the East Indies been shut to us by the treaty, what clamour should we not have heard at being deprived of such inestimable advantages?

It has been asserted, in the course of these observations, that the complaint against Mr. Jay. for recognizing the right to search our vessels on suspicion of having on board enemy's property, is ill sounded: A recurrence to Vattel, whose authority, the speech tells us, is not to be doubted, and to Mr. Jefferson's letters, authorities equally undoubted, will confirm the assertion. Present experience proves, that the speaker is altogether mistaken, when he says, "that, if we recognize this right, we must give up the idea of benefitting by the dissentions of European powers, and becoming their carriers, and that our commerce will be prostrated at the sect of the maritime powers." One would suppose, that a person who had obtained the best mercantile information, would have known, that, notwithstanding Mr. Jefferson, our secretary of state, in conformity with the doctrine of that undoubted authority, Vattel, did, two years ago, recognize that right, and the British vessels of war have constantly exercised it, yet that our carrying trade has increased, and our commerce has flourished, within the two last years, in a manner unexampled in the history of nations. And what is very extraordinary, the speaker, in contradiction to his own assertions in this place, tells us in another, that the American commerce and navigation flourished beyond all former example and almost to exceed belief; and that now, American merchants, in Charleston, carry on all the trade, and own more than sixty vessels of large size, and a much greater proportion of smaller vessels in the West India trade; all this, in spite of the recognition of that alarming right made two years ago, and in spite of the constant exercise of it, which is, to destroy our carrying trade and prostrate our commerce! To be sure, there must have been a wonderful exertion of ingenuity to collect together in one [...] of a newspaper, so many contradictions!

[Page] This part of the treaty seems to be the most offensive to the speaker; it is the article which has brought down upon Mr. Jay his most severe reprobation; he considers it the most important, the most seriously injurious to our commerce; and if there had been no other objection, Mr. Jay should have refused to sign the treaty. And yet, wonderful to relate, it is perfectly conformable to the law of nations, as laid down by that undoubted authority, Vattel; it is recognized by our government, and, under the exercise of it, instead of the most serious injury to our commerce, our commerce and navigation have flourished, almost to exceed belief. In short, if there is any part of the treaty less liable to objection than another, this is the article.

To compel Great Britain and other maritime powers (for the northern powers have now given up this point) to change the acknowledged law of nations, the speech recommends the establishment of a navy of twelve sail of the line and a few frigates. However such a thing may be desirable, and may hereafter be expedient, the idea of an early establishment of that kind is perfectly chimerical. To protect our commerce from the depredations of the Algerines, congress resolved, in January, 1794, to build and equip six frigates: At this day, the keels are scarcely laid; when they will be launched, God knows; when that happens, there is but little prospect of their being manned; and if they are, they will float at an expense of a million and a half of dollars outfit, and half a million of annual expense, without allowing for misfortunes or contingencies. —What the expense of the speaker's navy will be, may be easily computed. Seven or eight millions of dollars for outfit, and two or three millions of annual expense, will not come up to the mark. Nor is that the principal difficulty: This fleet will be wanted during the wars of the maritime powers, to protect our commerce and preserve our neutral rights.—But, on these occasions, the extension of our carrying trade absorbs all our seamen; and if any could be obtained for the public ships, it would be at an intolerable expense. If we should be at war, then the spirit of privateering would draw off the greatest part of our seamen. And after all, what would ten or twelve ships of the line and a few frigates accomplish, when opposed to the enormous fleets of the maritime powers of Europe? Whatever, therefore, we may do in the article of a navy some years hence, it is self-evident, that our strength and resources must at present be applied against our enemies in a very different shape.

On the 14th and 15th articles, it is remarked in the speech, that the first clause places the vessels of America on the same [Page]footing with those of other foreign nations, which is as much as we could of right expect, consistent with their obligations to other nations: But that by this rule, American vessels going to their European ports pay from 15 l. to 20 l. on a vessel of 150 to 200 tons, more than a British vessel. Certainly we cannot complain, if we are put on the footing of the most favored nation: as to the extra duty, paid by American vessels in all the ports of England, but London, for light money, which is one shilling and nine-pence per ton, it is the same as is paid by all other foreign nations; in all other respects, our ships are upon the same footing with those of Great Britain. It is here worthy of remark, that the extra duty paid in the United States by a British vessel, more than an American, is greater than the extra duty paid in Great Britain by an American vessel, more than a British; for example, in the United States an American vessel pays six cents, a British fifty cents, per ton; the difference on a vessel of 200 tons is twenty pounds ten shillings and eight-pence, and on a vessel of 300 tons, twenty-nine pounds sixteen shillings—besides the difference of ten per cent on the duties; whereas the difference in England, in favor of a British vessel of 200 tons, is only seventeen pounds ten shillings, and of 300, only twenty-six pounds five shillings, and no discrimination in the duties: And, in one respect, our vessels are on a better footing in England than those of the most favored nation; for while they pay upon the carriage of several of their own commodities, additional duties, called alien duties, our ships are exempt from them.

In 1789, congress laid a tonnage duty of 25 cents per ton on all foreign vessels, and made the discrimination of ten per cent. on the duties on goods imported, in favor of American bottoms, as above mentioned. In 1790, the tonnage duty was increased to 50 cents, not in consequence of the president's message, as stated in the speech, which was in February 179 [...] (not 1790). That message provoked no commercial restriction at that time, but was the foundation of a reference to the secretary of state, which produced his report, in January 1794. An examination of this part of the speech furnishes another striking contradiction; it is here said, "that our fellow citizens at the northward have had exclusively the India trade, by which, besides supplying our own citizens with Asiatic goods, at one fourth the price they were before the revolution, they have exported them to the West Indies, and even to Europe, making thereby the balance of trade more favorable to the United States." The speaker, in thus excelling the benefits of the East India trade, must assuredly have forgot his attempt to disparage that [Page]trade, in a preceding paragraph, where he was obliged to mention some advantage acquired by the treaty, and his having therein said, "that the advantage was delusive; that an extensive trade to the East Indies was injurious; because, at an immense expense, we import from thence nothing but articles of mere luxury, most of which, except tea, we could do very well without, or procure elsewhere, in exchange for our productions; and they take from us, in payment, scarcely any thing but specie."

These restrictions, on the part of our government, it is said, did not produce any counter restrictions, on the part of England. But the merchants of several large commercial cities in Great Britain, as appears by the report to the privy council, in the spring 1791, did complain of them as being un-reciprocal, as imposing burdens on their navigation and commerce in our ports, which they did not impose on our navigation and commerce in theirs. In fact, the sole discrimination of ten per cent. on the duties in favor of American bottoms, second nearly the monopoly of the carriage of the manufactures of Great Britain to this country, and was severely felt by the ship-owners of these cities. They were wise enough, however, to recommend negociation instead of retaliation to the privy council, Mr. Hammond was sent to the United States; and our government conceiving, that, notwithstanding we had imposed certain restrictions on the commerce of England, [...] our intercourse was not on such a footing as we had a right to expect: Mr. Jefferson, in his very first letter to Mr. Hammond, of 29th November, 1791, says, "with respect to the commerce of the two countries, we have supposed that we saw, in several instances, regulations on the part of your government, which, if reciprocally adopted, would materially injure the interests of both nations: On this subject, too, I must beg the favor of you to say, whether you are authorized to conclude or to negociate arrangements with us, which may fix the commerce between the two countries on principles of reciprocal advantage?" In reply to this letter, Mr. Hammond assured him, that though he was not authorized to conclude, yet he was fully authorized to enter on a negociation on that subject: Mr. Jefferson, conceiving that such authority was inadequate, dropped the subject, and confined his ensuing negociations entirely to the infractions of the treaty. These facts, while they demonstrate that a disposition existed, on the part of our government, so long ago as November, 1791, to enter into a commercial treaty with England, exculpate, at the same time, Mr. [Page]Jay, altogether, from the charges insinuated against him of having volunteered these commercial arrangements.

The speech proceeds to observe, that "at this moment Mr. Jay concedes, in the second section of the 15th article, the following proviso. "But the British government reserves to itself the right of imposing on American vessels, entering into the British ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal to that which shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of America, and also such duty as may be adequate to countervail the difference of duty now payable on the importation of European and Asiatic goods, when imported into the United States, in British or American vessels." There is no concession by Mr. Jay: the British government actually possessed the right to lay such countervailing duties, and might have exercised it whenever it was thought expedient; it could not be expected that, after declaring that the intercourse between the two countries should be carried on, on principles of perfect reciprocity, we should insist on continuing certain discriminating duties, and bind the other party up from reciprocating them: this would have been inconsistent with ourselves, after making the want of reciprocity on their part, the basis of our commercial complaints. The speech itself in another place, acknowledges that their receiving our vessels on the same footing as other foreign nations, "was perhaps as much as we could of right expect, consistent with their obligations to other nations;" and yet, it has been shown that in some instances, our vessels are, by existing regulations, received on better terms than those of other nations. This being the case, could we expect that they should surrender by treaty, a right which we reserve to ourselves, and which they have reserved in relation to all other nations? The French have reserved in their treaty with us, a similar right; and no nation can ever be required to relinquish it.

The stipulation, "that the United States will not impose any new or additional tonnage duties, on British vessels, nor increase the now subsisting difference between the duties pay able on the importation of any articles in British or American vessels," is said, in the speech, to be calculated "to induce the British shippers to refuse a credit to our merchants, unless they ship their goods in British bottoms."

Credit being, in the opinion of many modern theorists, a very bad thing, if the clause should produce the expected operation, it will, in their opinion, certainly do some good. But it is surprising that this operation should not have taken place ever since the year 1789, when the difference of duties commenced. The operation has, during a period of six years been [Page]quite the reverse of the speaker's suggestion; for notwithstanding the difference of tonnage duty and the discrimination of ten per cent. the British merchants have shipped their goods in American bottoms, and given the usual credit to our merchants; and the speaker tells us, that by the operation of those duties, our commerce and navigation have flourished almost to exceed belief. How then an agreement not to increase those duties should provoke an hostility of disposition on the part of the British merchants, which has not for six years existed, when there was no such agreement not to increase them, is not easily discovered!! The speech says further, on this article, "That it is not an extravagant idea to presume, that the wealth of the British East India company may be employed to crush the American merchants now in this trade (meaning, I suppose, the East India trade) that they afterwards may enjoy the monopoly of it."

If the restrictions on British East India vessels have been hitherto so effectual as "to secure the exclusive trade to our northern fellow citizens," as the speech informs us, it does not well appear how agreeing not to increase those restrictions will give the monopoly to the British; the idea, if not extravagant, is certainly a very extraordinary one. The import of this article is merely, that we will not increase the discriminations now subsisting; why should we, when they have been found sufficient to raise our commerce and navigation to a pitch of prosperity almost to exceed belief—when we thereby prevent the other party from imposing on our commerce higher than corresponding duties, and when, in fact, the whole article will be again in our power in the course of two or three years?

It is then said, "that by treaties now existing with other nations, they are to be used as the most favored nation—and having of right the same privilege of counteracting the discriminating duties, they will, of course, exercise it." And have they not such a right at present? unquestionably. Can we now impose on any nation with whom we have a treaty, any discriminating duties, which she cannot counteract? And if, possessing that right, the discriminating duties which have been imposed for six years, have not had injurious consequences, but on the contrary have raised our commerce and navigation to the highest prosperity, then none but the meanest capacity can see in this clause the speedy and total destruction of American navigation.

We are next told, that by other articles of the treaty, the catalogue of contraband articles is increased, and attempts are made to make even provisions come under this description. With respect to provisions, the article seems misunderstood. Vatth, [Page]whose authority, the speech tells us, will not be doubted, has laid it down, that in certain cases which he mentions, pro [...]s [...]s are, by the law of nations, contraband, and liable to be confiscated. Mr. Jay, differing in this point, from the speaker, has d [...]ted, the authority of Vattel, and has disputed with the British government the right, under the law of nations, to seize provisions as contraband in those cases. After discussions on that point, what is stipulated in the treaty? The British government engage, that whenever provisions shall become contraband, according to the existing law of nations, they shall not be confiscated, but the owners shall be indemnified, with a reasonable mercantile profit, with freight and demurrage. What then was Mr. Jay given up? It is expressly stipulated, that the seizures shall be only in cases where they are warranted by the existing law of nations: Mr. Jay refused to acknowledge that they were contraband by the law of nations in any particular case; he would not consent to a specification of any one case; he would not stipulate for any one thing which might preclude us from denying the existence of such a law of nations: the introductory part of the clause is, therefore, to this effect; "whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone, provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniencies and misunderstandings which might thence arise," &c. If the British government insisted, that in certain cases mentioned, provisions were contraband, and Mr. Jay insisted that they were not, and on appealing to Vattel, it was found that such was the opinion of that writer—if, further, the law of nations was supposed to give, in the cases mentioned, the right not only of seizing, but of confiscating such provisions, and there was no other mode of deciding ultimately on the right, but by an appeal to the sword; Mr. Jay may have conceived, that he was making the best terms for our citizens, by stipulating, that where, by the existing law of nations, and in those cases only, provisions should be contraband, that they should not be confiscated, but paid for with a mercantile profit, and freight and demurrage. By this clause, nothing appears to be given up by our government, which may continue to deny the existence of such right, under the law of nations, and to resist it either by remonstrance, by commercial regulations, or by arms. In the mean time, and until the question shall be decided, our citizens will be paid for their property, instead of having it confiscated.

But admitting the clause to be an injurious one, the speaker, of all persons, seems to be the least entitled to complain. He has [Page]told us that Vattel is an author of undoubted authority, and he has also told us, "that if Mr. Jay had attempted to say a word in favor of the claims of his countrymen, his opponent had only to show him his own opinions, and his lips must have been instantly closed." Suppose, then, the speaker, instead of Mr. Jay, had been sent on this mission, and Lord Grenville had discovered, in the course of the negociation, that the speaker thought Vattel a writer of undoubted authority, and, that on his denying the authority under the law of nations to make provisions contraband in any case whatever, Lord Grenville had produced an assertion from Vattel to this effect, that "all provisions are to be considered as contraband, and as such liable to confiscation, in the case where the depriving an enemy of these supplies, is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to reasonable terms of peace:" What could our negociator have replied? "Had he attempted to say a word in favor of the claims of his countrymen, his opponent had only to show him his own opinions, and his lips must have been instantly closed." According, then, to his own assertions and doctrines, Mr. Jay has obtained much better terms, in relation to this point, than he could have done. He proceeds to remark, that "whenever there is a war between the maritime powers, the danger of seizure and condemnation to us will be as great as if we were actually at war ourselves." The experience of the last two years, and his own statement of the flourishing state of our navigation, during that period, are sufficient refutations of that assertion.

In his comments on the 23d, 24th, and 25th articles, he unjustly charges Mr. Jay with endeavoring to render this country as unfriendly as he could to the French; and nothing can be more unfounded than the whole of this charge; there is not a tittle of it which can bear the test of truth; there is not a tittle of those three articles which can produce any such effect; there is not an argument to prove it; the whole is mere vague declamation. One would suppose, that a person who had taken so much pains to acquire the best mercantile information, and who had so high an opinion of Vattei's authority, would have bestowed some pains on a perusal of the French treaty, on the perusal of the treaty under consideration, and then would have read Vattel on the subject of treaties: Had he pursued this course, it must have resulted in a full conviction, that the French treaty stands completely unimpaired in every point: he would have learned, that in the construction of treaties, a different rule prevails from the construction of laws, and that a posterior treaty does not abrogate a prior one; that Mr. Jay, notwithstanding this rule (that nothing might be left to construction) [Page]has inserted an express stipulation, that no part of this treaty shall, in any wise, be construed to affect or impair any former treaty; and that, consequently, whenever there is a war between France and England, the French treaty will be paramount in every respect to the British treaty, and the French will enjoy in our ports, to the exclusion of the British, every right and advantage now secured to them by their treaty.

Such are the strictures on the several clauses of the treaty: The rest of the speech consists of miscellaneous remarks which shall not be overlooked.

The first which occurs, is a very just observation, and we have to regret that it is so soon after flatly contradicted. It is this, "that equality must be the basis of every lasting treaty, for without equality, few treaties can last." The contradiction which follows it is this; "all the policy of a nation should consist in a resolution never to think of forming treaties of commerce, until it finds itself in some happy circumstances which may authorize it to demand prerogatives of foreign powers, without purchasing them even with equivalents." Which of these positions does the speaker mean to inculcate? are we, in the construction of his speech, to follow the rule which applies to the construction of laws or treaties? if we observe the one, then the latter position abrogates the former; if we observe the other, then the first position stands unimpaired: in this dilemma, perhaps the best clue to his intentions is the desire he has shown of exhibiting the last position in the most striking light, and that the sentiment in capitals, is the capital sentiment he wishes to enforce. In this idea we may be confirmed by the general tenor of his observations, which inculcate inequality in treaties as their only basis.—If the speaker thinks no treaty can be lasting without equality, what must we think of his wise policy, which recommends treaties without equality? If all nations ought to pursue thi [...] wise policy—if both parties are to demand prerogatives, and not purchase them with equivalents —it requires considerable ingenuity to discover, how treaties can ever be made: this is a new kind of reciprocity, with the benefits all on one side.

These remarks, which the ingenuity of the speaker alone can reconcile, are followed by two indecent insinuations, one against Mr. Jay, the other against the president. The first is, "that there must be some other reasons for these uncommon surrenders, upon which the public are not yet sufficiently informed." —This insinuation, coupled with the allusion to Mr. Jay's having been exposed to the temptations of the British court, and another allusion at the close of the speech, though couched [Page]in more ambiguous and decorous language, than was either spoken at St. Michael's, or retailed afterwards in the public prints, leaves no room to doubt a wish to fix, in the public mind, a marked imputation on the moral character of Mr. Jay. If Mr. Jay has, from corrupt motives, sacrificed his country's interests, I most sincerely pray to God he may be detected and punished; but his signing the treaty is not in itself a sufficient cause of suspicion or insinuation: As well may we suspect the twenty senators, among whom are men as pure and virtuous as ever breathed. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a mind very susceptible of such impressions, as well as a heart very liable to be shaken, who can think it probable, that two thirds of the senate, as well as Mr. Jay, have been guilty of such infamy. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained. Should it, however, be found to be the case, the treaty, like other fraudulent contracts, would be null and void by the law of nations. In this charge, it has not, however, been even shown, what these uncommon surrenders are, and wherein they differ from the stipulations in our former treaties.

The insinuation against the president is, "his postponing the consideration of the treaty from January to June." The treaty, it is well known, did not reach Philadelphia until the 7th of March: the president never saw it before that day; and the senate had adjourned on the third. Those members, who had to return home to the extremities of the union, could not, with convenience, re-assemble before the month of June, the second Monday in which had been fixed for their meeting, before they adjourned.

No one will deny, that "any treaty which may operate to lessen our shipping, and destroy that competition which is so necessary for our obtaining a proper price for our staples, becomes a matter of serious concern." But has it been proved, that the commercial articles of this treaty, as ratified by the senate, will produce this effect? Is there any thing in them, which diminishes, in the smallest degree, the efficacy of those regulations, which have given such a spring to our commerce? Not a syllable. Is it desired to lay further restrictions on foreign commerce? That would indeed be a matter of serious concern: would any thing tend more to destroy that competition, which is so necessary to our obtaining ready freights and a quick demand for our staples, than to exclude, by heavy restrictions, the shipping of other nations, or to give a monopoly to particular nations? There is one thing, and one only, which would be still worse, and that is, WAR, which seems [Page]to be now a favorite measure with many, who would perhaps be among the first to be tired of it.

The remainder of the speech consists of sundry objections similar to those slated in the committee's report, and of general principles, applicable to commercial nations, on which no comments are necessary. From a review of the whole of it, it will be found to contain the most extraordinary collection of errors, self-contradictions, and unfounded accusations, that ever was heard of in the annals of political declamation. The author may, indeed, be said to have surpassed all his predecessors; for it may be safely asserted, that history can produce no instance, where such a mass of astonishing and glaring contradictions and inconsistencies has been condensed into the compass of half a newspaper: To the merit of a most surprising ingenuity, in this respect, he is fairly entitled, if to no other.

Perhaps, it will be thought that the writer of these strictures is a friend of Mr. Jay's. He positively denies it; he has a very slight personal acquaintance with Mr. Jay, and has had some personal reasons to dislike him. That gentleman's manners are not such as to gain him friends; experience, on the contrary, has evinced, that he has many bitter personal enemies. But those, who remember his long and faithful services, who know his tried attachment to his country, and the integrity of his heart, ought not, without proof, to abandon him to public infamy. He has been attacked with a virulence, which public motives alone seem not to have required; he has been attacked in his absence; were he here to defend himself, or had the attack not affected his moral character, the writer of this would have been silent. But when base and corrupt motives are explicitly and publicly charged on a old public servant—on a man who has near twenty years held high and important stations under our government—on the present chief magistrate of a sister state—when, through his side, the purity and honor of our government and country are deeply wounded—when the president himself is charged with a double violation of the constitution, and with ignorance, or something worse, in the appointment of Mr. Jay—when attempts are made to sow the seeds of opposition to the government and laws, by misinforming the people, and exciting, by such misinformation, an abhorrence of their constituted authorities—when, through the whole of this, a tissue of errors and contradictions is discernible, to be silent would be to acquiesce in the mischievous consequences of such proceedings, would be to co-operate in promoting the confusion and anarchy which are their inevitable result.

Charleston, August 12, 1795.

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FROM THE VIRGINIA GAZETTE. GRACCHUS.—No. I.

GREAT events have roused the people of America from that lethargy in which they ingloriously reposed, and have excited an attention, mingled with anxiety, peculiarly favorable to political discussions. Whilst that lethargy existed, the American revolution appeared incomplete to the philosopher, who only contemplates the effects of political innovations upon the human character. The Americans retained many of the prominent features of the English temper. They were not, like the English, ambitious, perfidious, rapacious, and vindictive; but, like the English, they arrogantly deemed their constitution perfect, and their government immaculate—Like the English, they acquired a faith in administration, approaching to bigotry, an attachment to persons, approaching to idolatry. Whilst a vestige of this character remained, enlightened patriotism could only speak in "afflicted tones." But the French revolution has diffused a blaze of light over the American world. It has communicated a fervor, an energy, a sublimity of character. It has destroyed that timidity which could not gaze upon the divine aspect of liberty, which appointed a high priest to that "immortal daughter of reason," and which offered homage to her, only through the medium of flattery to him.

It is to my country, thus completely regenerated, candid, moderate, impartial, and democratical, that I address, with confidence and sincerity, some investigations into the principles, and some observations on the conduct, of our federal government—I am not one of those cold beings, who can conceal their opinions and stifle their feelings.—When I examine some measures, and when I denounce some men, I may be transported with an ardour, which moderation may deem violence, which calumny may call factiousness.

A party, animated by the most dangerous principles, have long deluded this country, by extolling the excellencies of the federal government, by proclaiming dangerous conspiracies against its existence, and by stigmatizing their own enemies, as the foes of tranquillity, of union, and virtue—This party, active in the convention of 1787, and clamorous in all the state conventions, have allured to their standard many of the ci-devant heroes and patriots of America; have usurped the name of Federalists; have denounced their enemies; have seized the most [Page]important offices of state; and established an influence independent of the people—They boldly denominated the generous patriots, who opposed the adoption of this government, because their "under standings were enlightened by prophecy," anarchists, impelled by atrocious passions to involve their country in misery—An enemy to the federal constitution, according to their logic, is an enemy to liberty—and an enemy to the system of administration, or to the most contemptible secretary of one of the departments, is an enemy to the federal constitution.

But the period has arrived, when the artifices of this party can no longer impose, when the machinations of this party can no longer enthral the minds of the people—They will disdain to be marshalled against each other in hostile array, to march under the banner of absurd and artificial distinctions, and to be inflamed to hostilities by the cant terms of men, who despise their principles and attack their rights—The penetrating politician perceives the downfal of American aristocracy, in the ratification of a treaty which has been deprecated by rour millions of men, and imposed upon them by twenty and ONE— The people feel oppre [...]ion, they will humble their oppressors —The magic power of gratitude, which so long enchained them to one man, has ceased to operate—The superstition, which impelled them to adore a frail mortal, as a being elevated above the passions of humanity, born to humble Britain, to break the chains of a whole continent, to guard liberty and to establish government, has flown to the* gloomy mansion of exiled follies. In subsequent numbers, I will detail the violations which our good constitution has suffered: I will expose the pernicious tendency of the policy which has hitherto been pursued—I will delineate some characters, and demonstrate the necessity of adopting constitutional modes of reform and punishment.

GRACCHUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

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Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 34.]

No. XVIII.

IT is provided by the tenth article of the treaty, that "neither [...] due from individuals of one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor monies, which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national difference, be sequestered or confiscated; it being unjust and impolitic, that debts and engagements, contracted and made by individuals, having confidence in each other, and in their respective goveraments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by national authority on account of national differences and discontents."

The virulence with which this article has been attacked, cannot fail to excite very painful sensations in every mind duly impressed with the sanctity of public faith, and with the importance of national credit and character; at the same time that it furnishes the most cogent reasons to desire, that the preservation of peace may obviate the pretext and the tempration to fully the honor, and wound the interests of the country, by a measurs which the truly enlightened of every nation would condemn.

I acknowledge, without reserve, that in proportion to the vehemence of the opposition against this part of the treaty, is the satisfaction I derive from its existence, as an obstacle the more to the perpetration of a thing, which, in my opimon, besides deeply injuring our real and permanent interest, would cover us with ignominy. No powers of language, at my command, can express the abhorrence I feel at the idea of violating the property of individuals, which, in an authorized intercourse in time of peace, has been confided to the faith of our government and laws, on account of controversies between nation and nation. In my view, every moral and every political sentiment unite to consign it to execration.

Neither will I diffemble, that the dread of the effects of the spirit which patronizes that idea, has ever been with me one of the most persuasive arguments for a pacific policy on the part of the United States. Serious as the evil of war has appeared, at the present stage of our affairs, the manner in which it was to be apprehended it might be carried on, was still more formidable, in my eyes, than the thing itself. It was to be feared, that in the fermentation of certain wild opinions, those wise, just, [Page]and temperate maxims, which will for ever constitute the true security and felicity of a state, would be overruled; and that a war upon credit, eventually upon property, and upon the general principles of public order, might aggravate and embitter the ordinary calamities of foreign war. The confiscation of debts due to the enemy, might have been the first step of this destructive process. From one violation of justice to another, the passage is easy. Invasions of right, still more fatal to credit, might have followed; and this, by extinguishing the resources which that could have afforded, might have paved the way to more comprehensive and more enormous depredations for a substitute. Terrible examples were before us; and there were too many not sufficiently remote from a disposition to admire and imitate them.

The earnest and extensive clamours against the part of the treaty under consideration, confirm that anticipation; and whi [...]e they enhance the merit of the provision, they also inspire a wish, that some more effectual barrier had been erected against the possibility of a contrary practice being ever, at any ill-fated moment, obtruded upon our public councils. It would have been an inestimable gem in our national constitution, had it contained a positive prohibition against such a practice, except, perhaps, by way of reprisal for the identical injury on the part of another nation.

Analogous to this is that liberal and excellent provision, in the British Magna Charta, which declares, that "if the merchants of a country at war with England, are found there in the beginning of the war, they shall be attached without harm of body or effects, until it is known in what manner English merchants are treated in the enemy's country; and if they are safe, that the foreign merchants shall also be safe."* The learned Lord Coke pronounces this to be jus belli or law of war:— And the elegant and the enlightened Montesquieu, speaking of the same provision, breaks out into this exclamation—"It is noble that the English nation have made this one of the articles of its liberty."† How much it is to be regretted, that our magna charta is not unequivocally decorated with a like feature; and that, in this instance, we, who have given so many splendid [Page]examples to mankind, are excelled in constitutional precaution for the maintenance of justice!

There is, indeed, ground to assert, that the contrary principle would be repugnant to that article of our constitution, which provides, that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The spirit of this clause, though the letter of it be restricted to the states individually, must, on fair construction, be considered as a rule for the United States; and if so, could not easily be reconciled with the confiscation or sequestration of private debts in time of war. But it is a pity, that so important a principle should have been left to inference and implication, and should not have received an express and direct sanction.

This position must appear a frightful heresy in the eyes of those who represent the confiscation or sequestration of debts, as our best means of retaliation, and coercion, as our most powerful, sometimes as our only means of defence.

But so degrading an idea will be rejected with disdain, by every man who feels a true and well informed national pride; by every man who recollects and glories, that in a state of still greater immaturity, we atchieved independence without the aid of this dishonorable expedient*; that even in a revolutionary war, a war of liberty against usurpation, our national councils were too magnanimous to be provoked or tempted to depart so widely from the path of rectitude; by every man, in fine, who, though careful not to exaggerate, for rash and extravagant projects, can nevertheless fairly estimate, the real resources of the country, for meeting dangers which prudence cannot avert.

Such a man will never endure the base doctrine, that our security is to depend on the tricks of a swindler. He will look for it in the courage and constancy of a free, brave and virtuous people—in the riches of a fertile soil—an extended and progressive industry—in the wisdom and energy of a wellconstituted and well-administered government—in the resources of a solid, if well supported, national credit—in the armies, which, if requisite, could be raised—in the means of maritime [Page]annoyance, which, if necessary, could be organized, and with which we could inflict deep wounds on the commerce of a hostile nation. He will indulge an animating consciousness, that, while our situation is not such as to justify our courting impradent enterprises, neither is it such as to oblige us, in any event, to stoop to dishonorable means of security, or to substitute a crooked and piratical policy, for the manly energies of fair and open war.

That is the consequence of the favorite doctrine, that the confiseation or sequestration of private debts is our most powerful, if not our only, weapon of defence! Great Britain is the sole power against whom we could wield it, since it is to her citizens alone, that we are largely indebted. What are we to do, then, against any other nation which might think sit to menace us? Are we, for want of adequate means of desence, to crouch beneath the uplifted rod, and, with abject despondency, sue for mercy? Or has providence guaranteed us specially against the malice or ambition of every power on earth, except Great Britain?

It is at once curious and instructive to mark the inconsistencies of the disorganizing sect. Is the question, to discard a spirit of accommodation, and rush into war with Great Britain? Columus are filled with the most absurd exaggerations, to prove that we are able to meet her, not only on equal, but superior terms.—Is the question, whether a stipulation against the confiscation or sequestration of private debts ought to have been admitted into the treaty? Then are we a people destitute of the means of war, with neither arms, nor fleets, nor magazines— then is our best, if not our only weapons of defence, the power of confiscating or sequestrating the debts which are due to the subjects of Great Britain; in other words, the power of committing fraud, of violating the public faith, of sacrificing the principles of commerce, of prostrating credit. Is the question, whether free ships shall make free goods, whether naval stores shall or shall not be deemed contraband? Then is the appeal to what is called the modern law of nations; then is the cry, that recent usage has changed and mitigated the rigour of ancient maxims. But is the question, whether private debts can be rightfully confiscated or sequestered? Then ought the utmost rigour of the ancient doctrine to govern, and modern usage and opinion to be discarded. The old rule or the new is to be adopted or rejected, just as may suit their convenience.

An inconsistency of another kind, but not less curious, is observable in positions, repeatedly heard from the same quarter, [Page]namely, that the sequestration of debts is the only peaceable mean of doing ourselves justice and avoiding war. If we trace the origin of the pretended right to confiscate or sequester debts, we find it, in the very authority, principally relied on to prove it, to be this (Bynkershoeck, quaestiones juris publici. 1. s. 2.) "since it is the condition of WAR, that ENEMIES may be deprived of all their rights, it is reasonable, that every thing of an enemy's, found among his enemies, should change its owner, and go to the treasury." Hence it is manifest, that the right itself, if it exist, pre-supposes, as the condition of its exercise, an actual state of war, the relation of enemy to enemy. Yet we are fastidiously and hypocritically told, that this high and explicit act of war, is a peaceable mean of doing ourselves justice and avoiding war. Why ae we thus told? Why is this strange paradox attempted to be imposed upon us! Why, but that it is the policy of the conspirators against our peace, to endeavour to disguise the hostilities, into which they wish to plunge us, with a specious outside, and to precipitate us down the precipice of war, while we imagine we are quietly and securely walking along its summit.

Away with these absurd and incongruous sophisms! Blush, ye apostles of temerity, of meanness, and of deception! Cease to beckon us to war, and at the same time to freeze our courage by the cowardly declaration, that we have no resource but in fraud! Cease to attempt to persuade us, that peace may be obtained by means which are unequivocal acts of war. Cease to tell us, that war is preferable to dishonor, and yet, as our first step, to urge us into irretrievable dishonor. A magnanimous, a sensibre people, cannot listen to your crude conceptions —Why will ye persevere in accumulating ridicule and contempt upon your own heads?

In the further observations, which I shall offer on this article, I hope to satisfy, not the determined leaders or instruments of faction, but all discerning men, all good citizens, that, instead of being a blemish, it is an ornament to the instrument in which it is contained; that it is as consistent with true policy as with substantial justice; that it is, in substance, not without precedent in our other treaties; and that the objections to it are futile.

CAMILLUS.

[Page]

No. XIX.

THE objects protected by the 10th article, are classed under four heads:

—1. Debts of individuals to individuals:

2. Property of individuals in the public funds:

3. Property of individuals in public banks:

4. Property of individuals in private banks.

These, if analised, resolve themselves, in principle, into two discriminations, viz. private debts, and private property in public funds. The character of private property prevails throughout. No property of either government is protected from confiscation or sequestration by the other. This last circumstance merits attention, because it marks the true boundary.

The propriety of the stipulation will be examined under these several aspects: the right to confiscate or sequestrate private debts or private property in public funds, on the ground of reason and principle—the right as depending on the opinions of jurists and on usage—the policy and expediency of the practice —the analogy of the stipulation with stipulations in our other treaties, and in treaties between other nations.

First, as to the right on the ground of reason and principle.

The general proposition on which it is supported, is this, "That every individual of a nation, with whom we are at war, wheresoever he may be, is our enemy, and his property of every kind, in every place, liable to capture by right of war."

The only exception admitted to this rule, respects property within the jurisdiction of a neutral state; but the exemption is referred to the right of the neutral nation, not to any privilege which the situation gives to the enemy proprietor.

Reason, if consulted, will suggest another exception—This regards all such property as the laws of a country permit foreigners to acquire within it or to bring into it. The right of holding or having property in a country, always implies a duty on the part of its government to protect that property, and secure to the owner the full enjoyment of it. Whenever, therefore, a government grants permission to foreigners to acquire property within its territories, or to bring and deposit it there, it tacitly promises protection and security. It must be understood to engage, that the foreign proprietor, as to what he shall have acquired or deposited, shall enjoy the rights, privileges and immunities of a native proprietor, without any other exceptions than those which the established laws may have previously declared. How can any thing else be understood? Every state, when it has entered into no contrary engagement, is free to permit or not to permit foreigners to acquire or bring property [Page]within its jurisdiction; but if it grant the right, what is there to make the tenu [...]e of the foreigner different from that of the native, if antecedent laws have not pronounced a difference? Property, as it exits in civilized society, if not a creature of, is, at least, [...] and defined by, the laws. They prescribe the manner in which [...] be used, alienated, or transmitted; the conditions on which it may be help, preserved, or forfeited. It is to them we are to look for its rights, limitations, and conditions. No condition of enjoyment, no cause of forfeiture, which they have not specified, can be presumed to exist. An extraordinary discretion to resume or take away the thing, without any personal fault of the proprietor, is inconsistent with the notion of property. This seems always to imply a contract between the society and the individual; that he shall retain and be protected in the possession and use of his property, so long as he shall observe and perform the conditions which the laws have annexed to the tenure. It is neither natural nor equitable to consider him as subject to be deprived of it, for a cause soreign to himself: still less for one which may depend on the volition or pleasure, even of the very government to whose protection it has been confided: for the proposition, which affirms the right to confiscate or sequester, does not distinguish between offensive or defensive war; between a war of ambition on the part of the power which exercises the right, or a war of self-preservation against the assaults of another.

The property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permission of its laws, may justly be regarded as a deposit, of which the society is the trustee. How can it be reconciled with the idea of a trust, to take the property from its owner, when he has personally given no cause for the deprivation?

Suppose two families in a state of nature, and that a member of one of them had by permission of the head of the other, placed in his custody some article belonging to himself—and suppose a quarrel to ensue between the two heads of families, in which the member had not participated by his immediate counsel or consent—would not natural equity declare the seizure and confiscation of the deposited property to be an act of perfidious rapacity?

Again—suppose two neighbouring nations, which had not had intercourse with each other, and one of them opens its ports and territories for the purpose of commerce, to the citizens of the other, proclaiming free and safe ingress and egress —suppose afterwards a war to break out between the two nations, and the one which had granted that permission, to seize and convert to its own use, the goods and credits of the merchants [Page]of the other, within its dominion. What sentence would natural reason, unwarped by particular dogmas, pronounce on such conduct? If we abstract ourselves from extraneous impressions, and consult a moral feeling, we shall not doubt that the sentence would inflict all the opprobium and infamy of violated faith.

Nor can we distingush either case, in principle, from that which constantly takes place between nations, that permit a commercial intercourse with each other, whether with or without national compact. They equally grant a right to bring into and carry out of their territories the property which is the subject of the intercourse, a right of free and secure ingress and egress; and in doing this, they make their territories a sanctuary or asylum, which ought to be inviolable, and which the spirit of plunder only could have ever violated.

There is no parity between the case of the persons and goods of enemies found in our own country, and that of the persons and goods of enemies found elsewhere. In the former there is a reliance upon our hospitality and justice; there is an express or implied safe conduct; the individuals and their property are in the custody of our faith: they have no power to resist our will; they can lawfully make no defence against our violence; they are deemed to owe a temporary allegiance; and for endeavouring resistance, would be punished as criminals; a character inconsistent with that of an enemy. To make them a prey, is, therefore, to infringe every rule of generosity and equity; it is to add cowardice to treachery. In the latter case, there is no confidence whatever reposed in us; no claim upon our hospitality, justice or good faith; there is the simple character of enemy, with entire liberty to oppose force to force. The right of war consequently to attack and seize, whether to obtain indemnification for any injury received—to disable our enemy from doing us further harm—to force him to reasonable terms of accommodation—or to repress an overbearing ambition, exists in full vigour, unrestrained and unqualified by any trust or duty on our part. In pursuing it, though we may inflict hardship, we do not commit injustice.

Moreover the property of the foreigner within our country, may be regarded as having paid a valuable consideration for its protection and exemption from forfeiture; that which is brought in, commonly enriches the revenue by a duty of entry. All that is within our territory, whether acquired there or brought there, is liable to contributions to the treasury, in common with other similar property. Does there not result an obligation to protect that which comtributes to the expense of its [Page]protection? will justice sanction, upon the breaking out of a war, the confiscation of a property, which, during peace, serves to augment the resources and nourish the prosperity of a state?

The principle of the proposition gives an equal right to subject the person as the property of the foreigner to the rigors of war. But what would be thought of a government which should seize all the subjects of its enemy found within its territory, and commit them to durance, as prisoners of war? Would not all agree that it had violated an asylum which ought to have been sacred? That it had trampled upon the laws of hospitality and civilization? That it had disgraced itself by an act of cruelty and barbarism?* Why would it not be equally reprehensible to violate the asylum which had been given to the property of those foreigners?

Reason, left to its own lights, would answer all these questions in one way, and severely condemn the molestation, [...] account of a national contest, as well of the property as person of a foreigner found in our country, under the license and guarantee of the laws of previous amity.

The case of property in the public [...] is still stronger th [...] that of private debts. To all the sanctions which apply to the la [...]er, it adds that of an express pledge of the public saith to the foreign holder of stock.

The constituting of a public debt or fund, transserable without limitation or distinction, amounts to a promise to all the world, that whoever, foreigner or citizen, may acquire a title to it, shall enjoy the benefit of what is stipulated. Every transferee becomes, by the act of transfer, the immediate proprie [...] of the promise. It mures directly to his use, and the foreign promisee no more than the native, can be deprived of that benefit, except in consequence of some act of his own, without the infraction of a positive engagement.

Public debt has been truly defined, "A property subsisting [...] the faith of government." Its essence is promise. To confiscate or sequester it is emphatically to rescind the promise given, [...] revoke the faith plighted—It is impossible to separate the two ideas of a breach of [...]aith, and the confiscation or sequestration [...] of a property subsisting only in the faith of the government by which it is made.

When it is considered, that the promise made to the foreigner is not made to him in the capacity of member of another fociety, but in that of citizen of the world, or of an individual in [Page]the state of nature—the infraction of it towards him, on account of the fault, real or preteded, of the society to which he belongs, is the more obviously destitute of colour. There is no real affinity between the motive and the consequence. There is a confounding of relations. The obligation of a contract can only be avoided by the breach of a condition express or implied, which appears or can be presumed to have been within the contemplation of both parties, or by the personal fault or crime of him to whom it is to be performed. Can it be supposed that a citizen of one country would [...]end his money to the government of another, in the expectation that a war between the two countries, which, without or against their will, might break out the next day, could be deemed a sufficient cause of forfeiture?

The principle may be tested in another way—Supppose one government indebted to another in a certain sum of money, and suppose the creditor government to borrow of the citizen of the other an equal sum of money. When he came to d [...] and payment, would justice, would good faith, permit the [...]po [...]ing to his claim, by way of set off, the debt due fro [...] [...] government? Who would not revolt at such an attem [...] [...]ould not the individual creditor answer with conclusive [...] [...]hat in a matter of contract he was not responsible for the soc [...], of which he was a member, and that the debts of the society were not a proper set off against his private claim?

With what greater reason could his claim be refused on account of an injury which was a cause of war, received from his sovereign, and which had created on the part of the sovereign a debt of reparation? It were certainly more natural and just to set off a debt due by contract to the citizen of a foreign country against a debt due by contract from the sovereign of that country, than to set it off against a vague claim of indemnification for an injury or aggression of which we complain, and of which the reality or justice is seldom undisputed on the other side.

The true rule which results from what has been said, and which reason sanctions with regard to the right of capture, is this—"It may be exercised every where except within a neutral jurisdiction * or where the property is under the protection of our own laws;" and it may perhaps be added that it always supposes the possibility of rightful combat, of attack, and defence.

[Page] These exceptions involve no refinement—they depend on obvious considerations, and are agreeable to common sense and to nature—the spontaneous feelings of equity accord with them. It is, indeed, astonishing that a contrary rule should ever have been countenanced by the opinion of any jurist, or by the practice of any civilized nation.

We shall see in the next number how far either has been the case, and what influence it ought to have upon the question.

CAMILLUS.

No. XX.

THE point next to be examined is the right of confiscation or sequestration, as depending on the opinions of jurists and on usage.

To understand how far these ought to weigh, it is requisite to consider what are the elements or ingredients, which compose what is called the law of nations.

The constituent parts of this system are,

1. The necessary or internal law, which is the law of nature applied to nations; or that system of rules for regulating the conduct of nation to nation, which reason deduces from the principles of natural right, as relative to political societies or states.

2. The voluntary law, which is a system of rules resulting from the equality and independence of nations, and which, in the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their pretensions, proceeding on the principle of their having no common judge upon earth, attributes equal validity, as to external effects, to the measures or conduct of one as of another, without regard to the intrinsic justice of those measures or that conduct. Thus captures, in war, are as valid, when made by the party in the wrong, as by the party in the right.

3. The pactitious or conventional law, or that law which results from a treaty between two or more nations. This is evidently a particular, not a general law, since a treaty or pact can only bind the contracting parties: Yet, when we find a provision universally pervading the treaties between nations, for a length of time, as a kind of formula, it is high evidence of the general law of nations.

4. The customary law, which consists of those rules of conduct, that, in practice, are respected and observed among nations: Its authority depends on usage, implying a tacit consent and agreement. This also is a particular, not a general law, obligatory [Page]only on those nations whose acquiescence has appeared, or, from circumstances, may fairly be presumed. Thus, the customary law of Europe may not be that of a different quarter of the globe. The three last branches are sometimes aggregately denominated the positive law of nations.

The two first are discoverable by reason; the two last depend on proof, as matters of fact. Hence the opinion of jurists, though weighing, as the sentiments of judicious or learned men, who have made the subject a particular study, are not conclusive, as authorities.—In regard to the necessary and voluntary law, especially, they may be freely disregarded, unless they are found to be adopted and sanctioned by the practice of nations: For where REASON is the guide, it cannot properly be renounced for mere OPINION, however respectable. As witnesses of the customary laws, their testimony, the result of careful researches, is more particularly entitled to attention.

If, then, it has been satisfactorily proved, as the dictate of sound reason, that private debts, and private property in public funds, are not justly liable to confiscation or sequestration, an opposite opinion of one or more jurists could not controul the conclusion in point of principle. So far as it may attest a practice of nations, which may have introduced a positive law on the subject, the consideration may be different. It will then remain to examine, upon their own and other testimony, whether that practice be so general as to be capable of varying a rule of reason, by the force of usage; and whether it still continues to bear the same character, or has been weakened or done away by some recent or more modern usage.

I will not avail myself of a position, advanced by some writers, that usage, if derogating from the principles of natural justice, is null, further than to draw this inference, that a rule of right, deducible from them, cannot be deemed to be altered by usage, partially contradicted, fluctuating.

With these guides, our further enquiries will serve to confirm us in the negative of the pretended right to confiscate or sequester in the cases supposed.

The notion of this right is evidently derived from the ROMAN law. It is seen there, in this peculiar form, "Those things of an enemy which are among us, belong not to the state, but to the first occupant,"* which seems to mean, that the things of an enemy, at the commencement of the war, found in our country, may be seized by any citizen, and will belong to him [Page]who first gets possession. It is known, that the maxims of the Roman law are extensively incorporated into the different codes of Europe; and particularly, that the writers on the law of nations have borrowed liberally from them. This source of the notion does not stamp it with much authority. The history of Rome proves, that war and conquest were the great business of that people, and that, for the most part, commerce was little cultivated. Hence it was natural, that the rights of war should be carried to an extreme, unmitigated by the softening and humanizing influence of commerce. Indeed the world was yet too young—moral science too much in its cradle —to render the Roman jurisprudence a proper model for implicit imitation: accordingly, in this very particular of the rights of war, it seems to have been equally a rule of the Roman law, "That those who go into a foreign country, in time of peace, if war is suddenly kindled, are made the slaves of those among whom, now become enemies by ill fortune, they are apprehended."† This right of capturing the property and of making slaves of the persons of enemies is reserved, as we learn from Cicero, to the right of killing them; which was regarded as absolute and unqualified, extending even to women and children. Thus it would seem, that, on the principle of the Roman law, we might rightfully kill a foreigner, who had come into our country during peace, and was there at the breaking out of a war with his country—Can there be a position more horrible, more detestable?

The improvement of moral science in modern times, restrains the right of killing an enemy to the time of battle or resistance, except by way of punishment for some enormous breach of the law of nations, or for self preservation, in case of immediate and urgent danger; and rejects altogether the right of imposing slavery on captives.

Why should there have been a hesitation to reject other odious consequences of so exceptionable a principle? What respect is due to maxims which have so inhuman a foundation?

And yet a deference for those maxims has misled writers who have professedly undertaken to teach the principles of national ethics; and the spirit of rapine has continued, to a late period, to consecrate the relics of ancient barbarism with too many precedents of imitation—Else it would not now be a question with any, "Whether the person or property of a foreigner, being in our country with permission of the laws of peace, [Page] [...]ould be liable to molestation or injury by the laws of war— merely on account of the war?"

Turning from the ancients to the moderns, we find, that the learned Grotius quotes and adopts, as the basis of his opinions, the rules of the Roman law; though he, in several particulars, qualifies them, by the humane innovations of later times.

On the very question of the right to confiscate or sequester private debts, his opinion, as far as it appears, seems to be at variance with his premises, steering a kind of middle course. His expressions (L. III. C. XX. Sec. XVI.) are these, "Those debts which are due to private persons, at the beginning of the war, are not to be accounted forgiven (that is, when peace is made) for these are not acquired by the right of war, but only forbidden to be demanded in time of war; therefore, the impediment being removed, that is, the war ended, they retain their full force." His idea appears from this passage to be, that that the right of war is limited to the arresting of the payment of private debts during its continuance, and not to the confiscation or annihilation of the debt. Nor is it clear, whether he means, that this arrestation is to be produced by a special act of prohibition, or by the operation of some rule of law, which denies to an alien enemy a right of action. This feeble and heterogeneous opinion may be conceived to have proceeded from a conflict between a respect for ancient maxims, and the impression of more enlightened views, inculcated by the principles of commerce and civilization.

Bynkershoeck is more consistent: Adopting, with Grotius, the rule of the Roman law in its full vigour, he is not frightened at the consequences, but follows them throughout. Hence he bestows a chapter upon the defence of the proposition, quoted in a former number (to wit) that,* "Since it is the condition of war, that enemies may, with full right, be despoiled and proscribed, it is reasonable that whatsoever things of an enemy are found among his enemies, should change their owner and go to the treasury;" and in several places he expressly applies the rule to things in action, or debts and credits, as well as to things in possession.

In confirmation of his doctrine, he adduces a variety of examples, which embrace a period of something more than a century, beginning in the year 1556, and ending in the year 1657, and which comprehends, as actors on the principle which [Page]he espouses, France, Spain, the States General, Denmark, the bishops of Cologne, and Munster. But he acknowledges that the right has been questioned; and notes particularly, that when the king of France and the bishops of Munster and Cologne, in the year 1563, confiscated the debts which their subjects owed to the confederate Belgians, the states general, by an edict of the 6th of July, of that year, censured the proceeding, and decreed that those debts could not be paid but to the true creditors, and that the exaction of them, whether by force or with consent, was not to be esteemed valid.

If from the great pains which appear to have been taken by this learned writer, to collect examples in proof of his doctrine, we are to conclude that the collection is tolerably complete, we are warranted in drawing this inference, that he has not cured any defect, which reason may discern in his principle, by any thing like the evidence of such a general, uniform, and continued usage, as is requisite to introduce a rule of the positive law of nations, in derogation from the natural.

A minority only of the powers of Europe are shown to have been implicated in the practice; and among the majority, not included, are several of the most considerable and respectable. One of these, Great Britain, is represented as having acquiesced in it, in the treaties of peace, between her and some of the powers who went into the practice, to her detriment, by relinquishing the claim of restitution—But war must, at length, end in peace; and the sacrifice a nation makes to the latter, is a slight argument of her consent to the principle of the injuries which she may have sustained. I have not been able to trace a single instance in which Great Britain has, herself, set the example of such a practice; nor could she do it, as has elsewhere appeared, without contravening an article of magna charta, unless by way of reprisal for the same thing done towards her. The suggestion of an instance in the present war with France, will, hereafter, be examined. In such a question, the practice of a nation, which has, for ages, figured pre-eminently in the commercial world, is entitled to particular notice.

It is not unworthy of remark, that the common law of England, from its earliest dawnings, contradicted the rule of the Roman law. It exempted from seizure, by a subject of England, the property of a foreigner brought there before a war; but gave to the first seizer, or occupant, the property which came there after the breaking out of a war. The noble principles of the common law cannot cease to engage our respect, while we have before our eyes so many monuments of their excellence in our own jurisdiction.

[Page] It also merits to be dwelt upon, that the United Netherlands, for some time the first, and long only the second in commercial consequence, formally disputed the right, and condemned the practice of confiscating private debts, though themselves, in some instances, guilty of it.

And it is likewise a material circumstance, that Bynkershoeck, who seems to have written in the year 1737, does not adduce any precedent later than the year 1667, seventy years before his publication.

The subsequent period will, it is believed, be found upon strict enquiry, equally barren of similar precedents. The exceptions are so few,* that we may fairly assert, that there is the negative usage of near a century and an half, against the pretended right. This negative usage, of a period, the most enlightened as well as the most commercial in the annals of the world, is of the highest authority. The former usage, as being partial and with numerous exceptions, was insufficient to establish a rule.—The contrary usage, or the renunciation of the former usage, as being general, as attended with few or no exceptions, is sufficient even to work a change in the rigour of an ancient rule, if it could be supposed to have been established. Much more is it sufficient to confirm and enforce the lesson of reason, and to dissipate the clouds which error, and some scattered instances of violence and rapine, may have produced.

Of the theoretical writers, whom I had an opportunity of consulting, Vattel is the only remaining one, who directly treats the point. His opinion has been said to favor the right to confiscate and sequester. But when carefully analized, it will add to the proofs of the levity with which the opposers of the treaty make assertions.

After stating, among other things, that "war gives the same right over any sum of money due by a neutral nation to our enemy, as it can give over his other goods," he proceeds thus —"When Alexander, by conquest, became absolute master of Thebes, he remitted to the Thessalians, a hundred talents, which they owed to the Thebans. The sovereign has naturally the same right over what his subjects may be indebted to his enemies; therefore he may confiscate debts of this nature, if the term of payment happen in the time of war; or, at least, he may prohibit his subjects from paying, while the war lasts. But at present, in regard to the advantage and safety of commerce, all the sovereigns of Europe have departed from this rigour. [Page]And as this custom has been generally received, he who should act contrary to it, would injure the public faith; for strangers trusted his subjects only from a firm persuasion, that the general custom would be observed. The state does not so much as touch the sums which it owes to the enemy. Every where, in case of a war, funds credited to the public, are exempt from confiscation and seizure."*

The first proposition of the above passage, amounts to this, that "a sovereign naturally, that is, according to the law of nature, may confiscate debts, which his subjects owe to his enemies, if the term of payment happen in the time of war; or, at least, he may prohibit his subjects from paying while the war lasts."

So far as this goes, it agrees with the principle which I combat, that there is a natural right to confiscate or sequester private debts in time of war; so far Vattel accords with the Roman law and with Bynkershoek.

But he annexes a whimsical limitation, "If the term of payment happen in the time of war"—and there is a marked uncertainty and hesitation—the sovereign "may confiscate, or, at least, he may prohibit his subjects from paying while the war lasts." It is evident, that the circumstance of the time of payment can have no influence upon the right. If it reaches to confiscation, which takes away the substance of the thing, the mere incident of the happening of payment must be immaterial. If it is confined to the arresting of payment during the war, the reason of the rule, the object being to prevent supplies going to the enemy, will apply it as well to debts which had become payable before the war, as to those which became payable in the war. Whence this inaccuracy in so accurate a thinker? Whence the hesitation about so important a point, as whether the pretended right extends to confiscation or simply to sequestration? They must be accounted for, as in another case, by the conflict between respect for ancient maxims and the impressions of juster views, seconded by the more enlightened policy of modern times.

But while Vattel thus countenances, in the first part of the passage, the opinion, that the natural law of nations authorizes the confiscation or sequestration of private debts, in what immediately follows, he most explicitly and unequivocally informs us, that the rule of that law in this respect has been abrogated by modern usage or custom; in other words, that the modern customary law has changed in this particular the ancient natural [Page]law. Let his own words be consulted—"At present," says the, "in regard to the advantage and safety of commerce, all the sovereigns of Europe have departed from this rigour: and as this custom has been generally received, he who would act contrary to it, would injure the public faith; for strangers trusted his subjects only from the firm persuasion that the general custom would be observed."

This testimony is full, that there is a general custom received and adopted by all the sovereigns of Europe, which obviates the rigour of the ancient rule; the non-observance of which custom would violate the public faith of a nation; as being a breach of an implied contract, by virtue of the custom, upon the strength of which foreigners trust his subjects.

Language cannot describe more clearly a rule of the customary law of nations, the essence of which, we have seen, is general usage implying a tacit agreement to conform to the rule —The one alleged is denominated a custom generally received, a general custom; all the sovereigns of Europe are stated to be parties to it, and it is represented as obligatory on the public faith, since this would be injured by a departure from it.

The consequence is, that if the right pretended did exist by the natural law, it has given way to the customary law; for it is a contradiction, to call that a right, which cannot be exercised without breach of faith. The result is, that by the present customary law of nations, within the sphere of its action, there is no right to confiscate or sequester private debts in time of war. The reason or motive of which law is the advantage and safety of commerce.

As to private property in public funds, the right to meddle with them is still more emphatically negatived.—"The state does not so much as touch the sums it owes to the enemy—Every where, in case of a war, funds credited to the public are exempt from confiscation and seizure." These terms manifestly exclude sequestration as well as confiscation.

In another place, the author gives the reason of this position, Book II. Chap. XVIII. [...]n reprisals, the goods of a subject are seized in the same manner as those of the state or the sovereign. —Every thing that belongs to the nation is liable to reprisals as soon as it can be seized, provided it be not a deposite trusted to the public faith. This DEPOSITE is found in our hands, only in consequence of that confidence, which the proprietor has put in our good faith, and it ought to be respected, even in case of open war.—Thus it is usual to behave in France, England, and elsewhere, with respect to the money which foreigners have placed in the public funds." The same principle, if he had reflected [Page]without bias, would have taught him, that reprisals could rightfully extend to nothing that had been committed with their permission, to the custody and guardianship of our laws, during a state of peace; and consequently, that no property of our enemy, which was in our country before the breaking out of the war, is justly liable to them. For is not all such property equally a deposite, trusted to the public faith? What foreigner would acquire property in our country, or bring and lodge it there, but in the confidence, that, in case of war, it would not become an object of reprisals? Why then resort to custom for a denial of the right to confiscate or sequester private debts? Why not trace it to the natural injustice and perfidy of taking away in war, what a foreigner is permitted to own and have among us in peace? Why ever have considered that as a natural right which was contrary to good faith tacitly pledged? This is evidently the effect of too much deference to ferocious maxims of antiquity, of undue complaisance to some precedents of modern rapacity.

He had avoided the error, by weighing maturely the consequences of his own principle in another case: "He who declares war, (says he) does not confiscate the immoveable goods possessed in his country by his enemy's subjects: in per mitting them to purchase and possess those goods, he has, in this respect, admitted them into the number of his subjects," (that is) he has admitted them to a like privilege with his subjects, as to the real property they were permitted to acquire and hold. But, why should a less privilege attend the license to purchase, possess, or have other kinds of property in his country? The reason, which is, the permission of the sovereign, must extend to the protection of one kind of property as well as another, if the permission extends to both.

Vattel advances in this and in the passage quoted immediately before it, the true principles which ought to govern the question —though he does not pursue them into their consequences; else he would not have deduced the exemption of private debts, from confiscation or sequestration, from the customary law of nations, but would have traced it to the natural or necessary law, as founded upon the obligations of good faith; upon the tacit promise of security connected with the permission to acquire property within, or bring property into, our country; upon the protection which every government owes to a property of which it legalizes the acquisition, or the deposit within its jurisdiction; and in case of immoveable goods or real estate, of which he admits a right to sequester the income, to prevent its being remitted to the enemy, he would have perceived the necessaty [Page]of leaving this effect to be produced by the obstructions intrinsically incident to a state of war; since there is no reason why the income should be less privileged than the substance of the thing.

It appears, then, that the doctrine of Vattel, collectively taken, amounts to this, that there is a natural right of war in certain cases to confiscate or sequester enemy's property found within our country; but that, on motives relative to commerce and public credit, the customary law of Europe has restrained that right, as to private debts, and private property, in public funds. His opinion, therefore, favors the principle of the article of the treaty under examination, as consonant with the present European law of nations—and it is an opinion of greater weight than any that can be cited; as well on account of the capacity, diligence, information, and the precision of ideas, which characterise the work in which it is contained, as on account of the recency of that work.*

A question may be raised—Does this customary law of nations, as established in Europe, bind the United States? An affirmative answer to this is warranted by conclusive reasons.

1. The United States, when a member of the British empire, were, in this capacity, a party to that law, and not having dissented from it, when they became independent, they are to be considered as having continued a party to it. 2. The common law of England, which was and is in force in each of these states, adopts the law of nations, the positive equally with the natural, as a part of itself. 3. Ever since we have been an independent nation, we have appealed to, and acted upon, the modern law of nations as understood in Europe—various resolutions of congress during our revolution—the correspondencies of executive officers—the decisions of our courts of admiralty, all recognized this standard. 4. Executive and legislative acts, and the proceedings of our courts, under the present government, speak a similar language. The president's proclamation of neutrality, refers expressly to the modern law of nations, which must necessarily be understood of that prevailing in Europe, and acceded to by this country; and the general voice of our nation, together with the very arguments used against the treaty, accord in the same point. It is indubitable, that the customary law of European nations is, as a part of the common law, and by adoption, that of the United States.

But let it not be forgotten, that I derive the vindication of the article from a higher source, from the natural or necessary law [Page]of nature—from the eternal principles of morality and good faith.

There is one more authority which I shall cite in reference to a part of the question; property in the public funds. It is a report to the British king in the year 1753, from Sir George Lee, judge of the prerogative court, Dr. Paul, advocate general in the courts of civil law, Sir Dudley Rider and Mr. Murray, attorney and solicitor general,* on the subject of the Silesia loan, sequestered by the king of Prussia, by way of reprisal, for the capture and condemnation of some Prussian vessels. This report merits all the respect which can be derived from consummate knowledge and ability in the reporters; but it would lose much of its weight from the want of impartiality, which might fairly be imputed to the officers of one of the governments interested in the contest, had it not since received the confirming eulogies of impartial and celebrated foreign writers.—A mong these, Vattel calls it an excellent piece on the law of nations.

The following is an extract:—"The king of Prussia has pledged his royal word to pay the Silesia debt to private men. It is negociable, and many parts of it have been assigned to the subjects of other powers. It will not be easy to find an instance, where a prince has though fit to make reprisals upon a debt due from himself to private men. There is a confidence that this will not be done. A private man lends money to a prince upon an engagement of honor; because a prince cannot be compelled, like other men, in an adversary way, by a court of justice. So scrupulously did England and France adhere to this public faith, that even during the war, they suffered no enquiry to be made whether any part of the public debt was due to the subjects of the enemy, though it is certain many English had money in the French funds, and many French had money in ours."

The universal obligation of good faith is here reinforced on a special ground, by the point of honor; to confirm the position that money which a sovereign or state owes to private men, is not a proper object of reprisals.

This case of the Silesia debt is the only example, within the present century, prior to the existing war, which I have been able to trace, violating the immunity of private debts, or private property, in public funds. It is a precedent that can have little weight, not only from singularity, but from the character of its author. Frederick was a consummate general, a profound [Page]statesman; but he was very far from being a severe moralist. This is not the only instance in which he tarnished his saith; and the friends of his same must regret, that he could not plead on the occasion those mighty and dazzling reasons of state, which are the specious apologies for his other aberrations.

It is asserted, that the present war of Europe affords examples of the practice, which I reprobate, and that Great Britain herself has given one. The present war of Europe is of so extraordinary a complexion, and has been conducted, in all respects, upon such extraordinary principles, that it may truly be regarded as an exception to all general rules, as a precedent for nothing. It is rather a beacon, warning mankind to shun the pernicious examples, which it sets, than a model inviting to imitation. The human passions, on all sides, appear to have been wrought up to a pitch of frenzy, which has set reason, justice, and humanity, at defiance.

Those who have nevertheless thought fit to appeal to the examples of this very anomalous war, have not detailed to us the precise nature or course of the transactions to which they refer; nor do I know that sufficient documents have appeared in this country to guide us in the enquiry.

The imperfect evidence which has fallen under my observation, respects France and Great Britain, and seems to exhibit these facts.:—

France passed a decree sequestering the property of the subjects of the powers at war with her; and in the same or another decree, obliged all those of her citizens, who had monies owing to them in foreign countries, to draw bills upon their debtors, and to furnish those bills to the government, by way of loan, or upon certain terms of payment.

The government of Great Britain, in consequence of this proceeding, passed ten different acts, the objects of which were to prevent the payment of those bills, and to secure the sums due for the benefit of the original creditors. These acts appoint certain commissioners, to whom reports are to be made of all French property in the hands of British subjects, and who are empowered to receive and fell goods and other effects—to collect debts, and to deposite the proceeds in the bank of London, or in other safe keeping, if preferred or required by parties interested. The monies deposited are to be invested in the purchase of public stock, together with the interest or dividends arising from time to time, to be eventually accounted for to the proprietors. The commissioners have, likewise, a discretion, upon demand, to deliver over their effects and monies to such [Page]of the proprietors as do not reside within the French dominions.

I shall not enter into a discussion of the propriety of these acts of Great Britain.—It is sufficient to observe, that they are attended with circumstances which very essentially discriminate them from the thing for which they were quoted. The act of the French government was in substance a compulsory assumption of all the property of its citizens in foreign countries. This extraordinary measure presented two options to the governments of those countries—One, to consider the tranfer as virtually effected, and to confiscate the property as being no longer that of the individuals, but that of the government of France—the other, to defeat the effect of her plan by buying up the property for the benefit of the original creditors, in exclusion of the drafts which they were compelled to draw. Great Britain appears to have elected the latter course. If we suppose her sincere in the motive, and there is fairness and fidelity in the execution, the issue will be favorable, rather than detrimental, to the rights of private property.

I have said, that there was an option to confiscate. A government may rightfully confiscate the property of an adversary government. No principle of justice or policy occurs to forbid reprisals upon the public or national property of an enemy. That case is foreign, in every view, to the principles which protect private property. The exemption stipulated by the 10th article of the treaty is accordingly restricted to the latter.

It appears, that the government of France, convinced by the effect of the experiment, that the sequestration of the property of the subjects of her enemies was impolitic, thought fit to rescind it.—Thence, on the 29th of December, 1794, the convention decreed as follows:

"The decrees concerning the sequestration of the property of the subjects of the powers at war with the republic, are annulled. Such sums as have been paid by French citizens into the treasury, in consequence of those decrees, will be reimbursed."

In the course of the debates upon this decree, it was declared, that the decrees which it was to repeal, had prepared the ruin of commerce, and had severed, against the rights of nations, the obligations of merchants in different states. This is a direct admission, that the sequestration was contrary to the law of nations.

As far as respects France, then, the precedent, upon the whole, is a strong condemnation of the pretended right to confiscate or sequester. This formal renunciation of the ground [Page]which was at first taken, is a very emphatical protest against the principle of the measure—It ought to serve us too as an instructive warning against the employment of so mischievous and disgraceful an expedient. And as to England, as has been shown, the precedent is foreign to the question.

Thus we perceive, that opinion and usage, far from supporting the right to confiscate or sequester private property, on account of national wars, when referred to the modern standard, turn against that right, and coincide with the principle of the article of the treaty under examination.

What remains to be offered will farther illustrate its propriety, and reconcile it to all reflecting men.

CAMILLUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

FROM THE AURORA. Sophistry Detected. No. I.

THE sophistry and deception used by the writers in favor of the treaty, are, undoubtedly, as extraordinary as ever were attempted to be imposed upon a thinking people like the Americans.—Camillus, the most zealous and the most casuistical of its defenders, seems, throughout his whole performance, to proceed on the idea, that his mere assertions will be received, without doubt or enquiry, as oracular truths. But he will find himself miserably disappointed. His never-ending columns will be narrowly scanned; and, laborious as the attempt must be, the grain of wheat will be selected from the immense heaps of surrounding chaff. I shall take the liberty, occasionally, to lay a few extracts from his numbers, before the public, through the medium of your paper, Mr. Bache, with very concise comments; as their absurdity and fallacy are so self-evident, ‘"As to be hated, need but to be seen."’

This British patriot, who advocates so elaborately the most minute and doubtful rights of England, when he treats on the case of our unfortunate, oppressed, and abandoned sailors, impressed [Page]out of American vessels, to serve against France, and even to aid in the piracy which is every day practised on our commerce, adduces the following defence of the shameful direliction of those useful and worthy men, observable in the treaty; "the good faith of the parties" (let not the ridicule of this argument stisle your resentment, reader, yes—the good faith of England) "and the motives which they have to respect the rights of each other, and to avoid giving causes of offence, and vigilance in noting and remonstrating against the irregularities which are committed, are, probably, the only peaceable sureties of which the case is susceptible."

The barefaced disingenuity prevalent in this paragraph, of holding out an idea of reciprocity, as if there was any probability of our impressing British seamen, can hardly be censured; as it is neither more nor less, than the spirit which runs through the treaty itself; therefore let that pass.

But what shall be said of a man, who pretends to be an American, and yet tells us, that we can have no other peaceable sureties, for the protection of a most valuable class of our citizens, than the "good faith of England!" His conscience must have smote him when writing the words. Was he unacquainted with the experience America has had of English "good faith," during the present war? Did he not know the immense extent of the depredations our merchants had sustained, by a reliance on English "good faith?" Where was the operation of that "good faith," when the captain of the Hermione impressed every man, except the captains and mates, on board above twenty American vessels at Jeremie? What dependence can be placed in this "good faith," when our sailors are impressed in the very port of London, notwithstanding the reclamations of our consul?

But besides the "good faith" of our new allies, we have a further security in "the motives which the parties have to respect the rights of each other, and to avoid giving causes of offence." Of what avail are these motives? Have not the British, almost throughout this war, seemingly studied "to give offence" to America, if that were possible? Has not insult been accumulated on injury? Has their "respect for our rights" been displayed by Rodham Home, in his piratical attempt to seize Mr. Fauchet within our jurisdiction? Where were the "regard for our rights" or "the motives to avoid giving causes of offence," when the Algetine orders, of the 6th of November, were issued? Where is the wish to "avoid giving causes of offence," when our vessels are, even now, seized and carried into England? Where is "the regard for our rights," when the captain of the Thetis [Page]informs us he has orders to seize all our vessels bound to, or from France? in fine, have the British nation betrayed a single symptom of "good faith" towards the United States—of "regard for our rights," or of a disposition to "avoid giving offence?" Surely not. And can, therefore, any terms of reprobation and obloquy be too severe for the man who attempts to lull us to sleep by his artifices, until we are caught in the vortex of destruction, through the perfidy of those on whom America has devolved her dearest interests?

TULLY.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

FROM THE LANCASTER JOURNAL. State of Opinions on the Treaty.

THERE remains no longer a doubt that the president has affixed his signature to the treaty—but, whether in the execution of this act, he has acted conformably to the voice of a majority of the citizens of the United States, requires at least an investigation.

We find, that in New York, the chamber of commerce, at a small meeting (of about 33 members) procured a vote of approbation, and communicated that to the president as the sense of the whole body of merchants, in that great commercial city.

In Boston, not more than thirty-two of the actual merchants were supposed to appear in support of it.

In Philadelphia where the mania seemed to have the most effect, and where the influence of bank directors, stock jobbers, &c. had its full weight, 410 are said to have signed the address in favor of it.—But are these all merchants? No! Among them are shop-keepers, booksellers, brokers, gentlemen, &c.— an intermixed phalanx.

So far the mercantile interest, which the president has vouchsafed to say, is "directly affected." Of those whose interests could not be "affected," as they were not merchants, the number is few indeed.—A meeting near Trenton, and one in the populous borough of York, were among the principal; and I think I may venture to assert, that not more than 400 of this class of partizans have collected in the whole.

[Page] Thus may we form some idea of the respectable and formidable support the treaty has received—1000 merchants, stock-jobbers, bank-directors, and a few influenced artizans, &c.

Now let us search for something like a contra or supra credit, to overbalance this tremendous debit. In Charleston, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Portsmouth, where the meetings against the treaty were nearly unanimous in their voice, at least 25, 000 citizens are supposed to have attended—add to this, the numerous meetings throughout the union—a recapitulation of which would be here endless.

"But," say the sticklers of government "respectability of character is on our side; and the opponents of the treaty are perfectly unacquainted with its merits."

Strange infatuation, or criminal deception, must be the ground plan of this building; and such a foundation can never support the fabric. Out of at least 40, 000 independent citizens of the United States, who preserve the spirit and dignity of exercising their right on this interesting occasion, cannot a sufficiency of respectability be procured, to outweigh that of 1, 000 flatterers of administration!

But to expatiate on, or to extend this part of the subject, is needless, I believe every unprejudiced mind must be fully persuaded, that the general voice was opposed to the treaty.

Though the president must have been acquainted with the facts, yet he has thought proper to sanction it; and, as he informs the select men of Boston, that he only pursued the dictates of his conscience, it becomes our duty to acquiesce in his decision.

With due deference to these considerations, it may not be improper to enquire into some of the probable consequences to result from the ratification.

Already do we find the French (in consequence, no doubt, of the success the treaty has met with from government) are making encroachments on our trading vessels; and we have reason to fear, that before long, it may be necessary to send an envoy extraordinary to France, to claim indemnification for Gallic spoliations on our commerce. But no treaty may be dreaded as the result.

Attempts at bawling the government into a compliance with the will of the people, would be impolitic, as it might have a disorganizing tendency. But let us enquire if we have no peaceable resource of amendment.

The citizens of the United States, confident of the disadvantages of the treaty, applied in a respectful manner to the [Page]head of their government, and amply stated its defects. Independent of a non-compliance, they, perhaps, have not even received that attention which they had a right to expect.

As to the character and affections of the president, no American, I trust, entertains an opinion tending to criminate him. That he is not infallible, is certain, and that he has erred, is probable; but if so, we still possess too great a confidence in him to imagine it any thing but an "error of the judgment, and not of the heart."

If then the treaty is proved to be a public evil, let us trace it to the origin of its ratification: and the star chamber movements of a mysterious senate, whose works are in darkness, and whose doors and ears are closed to the admission of public opinions, may lead us, at least, to a probable discovery.

Perhaps, then, it is here the calamity exists—here that the government is defective—and here only that the organs of administration are disconsonant with the voice of the people.

The means of redress are obvious. The constitution of our country has anticipated our necessities. Let us individually and collectively inspect the past conduct of our RULERS—and let the purity of elections be the rallying point of reform.

MENTOR.

FROM THE JERSEY CHRONICLE. Observations on the Disposition of Administration to France and England.

FOR the better information of my fellow citizens of this state, it may be of great importance to republish some facts, that cannot be denied, as to the conduct of the president of the United States, respecting our connexions with France and Great Britain. They will demonstrate an uniform disposition to evade a nearer alliance with France, and a closer intercourse with England. As early as the 14th of February, 1791, the president of the United States, in a message to congress, says: "Soon after I was called to the administration of the government, I found it important to come to an understanding with the court of London, on several points, interesting [Page]to the United States, and particularly, to know, whether they were disposed to enter into arrangements, by mutual consent, which might fix the commerce of the two nations on principles of reciprocal advantage, &c. but I do not infer any disposition, on their part, to enter into any arrangements, merely commercial," &c.

On the 13th of December, 1791, Mr. Hammond, the English minister, being arrived, a letter was addressed to him by Mr. Jefferson, then secretary of state, which must have come from the orders of the president, saying: "as you are fully authorized to enter into a negociation, for the purpose of arrangeing the commercial intercourse between the two countries, I have the honor to inform you, that I am ready to receive a communication of your full powers, for that purpose, at any time you may think proper, and to proceed immediately to their object." Now, it does not appear, that any communications were made to the senate, or that they were consulted, as to any of these objects.

But, upon further investigation, Mr. Hammond had no powers to treat with us.

On the arrival of Mr. Genet, he communicated a decree of the national convention of France, to Mr. Jefferson, authorizing him to propose a treaty with us, on liberal principles, such as might strengthen the bonds of good will, which unite the two nations, &c. &c.

Mr. Jefferson, by order of the president, replies in the following words; his letter is dated, 23d August, 1793: "the senate being then in recess, and not to meet again till fall, I apprised Mr. Genet, that the participation, in matters of treaty, given by the constitution to that branch of our government [meaning the senate] would, of course, delay any definitive answer to his friendly proposition." His letter concludes, "by assuring the national convention, that the president will meet them with the most friendly dispositions, on the grounds of treaty, as soon as he could do it by the forms of the constitution."

Observe, citizens, I state facts. Nothing was done by the president, as to the observance of these promises, when the senate did meet, nor has any thing been done with the advice of the senate, towards that nation, to this day; and I am informed, from good authority, that the French nation proposed by this treaty to give to our citizens and our ships, all the advantages and privileges of their own, in every part of their dominions.

On the 16th of April, 1794, a message was sent to the senate of the United States, by the president, at the very moment [Page]when the house of congress had made most salutary regulations, to preserve and increase our growing commerce, announcing, that he had nominated John Jay as envoy extraordinary to Great Britain. The message is in the following words:

"Gentlemen of the senate: The communications I have made to you, during your present session, from the dispatches of our minister in London, contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain; but as peace ought to be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last resource, which so often has been the scourge of nations, and cannot fail to check the advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated, I have thought proper to nominate John Jay, as envoy extraordinary from the United States to his Britannic majesty. My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London, continues undiminished; but a mission like this, while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for a friendly adjustment of our complaints: going immediately from the United States, such an envoy will carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our country, and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness, and to cultivate peace with sincerity."

I will now draw some conclusions from the above facts, leaving it to the good sense of the people of this state to determine, whether they are not such, as naturally arise from this statement, taken from the records and proceedings of our government.

It is evident, that the president has uniformly sought a more intimate connexion with Great Britain; that he has waved the advice and participation of the senate, offering to treat on his own authority; that Great Britain has uniformly evaded a treaty, until an embargo threatened the ruin of her islands, and until the French nation had accomplished the ruin of her designs, and nearly the ruin of the nation.

That the forms of the constitution have slept, as innocent and insignificant, when compared to the friendly overtures of England; but have been held up as insurmountable barriers against the friendly offers of France.

That the senate (except such as were known to favor British connexions) were ignorant, like the rest of our citizens, that Mr. Jay's mission was to make a treaty of commerce and amity with Great Britain. That they had no grounds to suppose or suspect, from the president's message on his appointment, that he could possibly have held up an object, containing the wishes of the whole nation, when he was to be instructed to abandon that object. The senate were made to believe it necessary [Page]to send a special envoy, on a special occasion, to carry with him the sensibility of the nation, to vindicate our rights with firmness; they were told that Mr. Pinckney deserved confidence, as to all matters not important and momentous: had they been informed, that a treaty of commerce and amity was to wind up the just expectations of the sufferers; that all our injuries must be forgotten; that we must bow to insults, and kiss the tyrant's rod; I trust that even the senate would have had spirit enough, miserable advisers as they are represented, to have replied, "That, since we must be degraded, there is no necessity of sending a special envoy, to make it still more mortifying."

"If Mr. Pinckney, who is now in London, is a fit person to represent us, he is able to make a treaty of commerce."

But, to ask advice of the senate to sanctify an intended trick upon the feelings and sensibility of the country, might have led to a disappointment; a majority might have put a negative on Mr. Jay's instructions; but, what is still more important, the whole plan would have been made known to, and have been blasted for ever by the united voice of, the people.

In my next letter, I shall demonstrate clearly, that the treaty, in question, absolutely annihilates all those soothing expectations, and all that sensibility, which we find stated and acknowledged, in the president's message to the senate, on the appointment of Mr. Jay; that the nation has been secretly, I will not say treacherously, divorced from France, and most clandestinely married to Great Britain: we are taken from the embraces of a loving wife, and find ourselves in the arms of a detestable and abandoned w—e covered with crimes, rottenness, and corruption.

A POLITICAL WATCHMAN.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

[Page]

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE. Remarks on some of the probable Consequences of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

THE reply of the president of the convention of France to noble M. Querini, the Venetian ambassador, deserves the particular attention of the citizens of the United States.

"Governed (he observes) by a wise constitution, directed solely by the principles of justice and reason, and the purest maxims of morality—France is on the point of enjoying the objects of her wishes, liberty, equality and union, the fruits of so many sacrifices and labours.

"France, always great, will reply to generous proceedings, by proceedings equally generous. When, on all sides, our rising republic was assailed in its cradle, and the event appeared to be uncertain, the Venetian senate, not content with keeping within the bounds of neutrality, received with distinction the envoy of the French republic.

"We love to talk of, and publish our gratitude. The measure was so much the more noble, as it exposed our faithful ally to much embarrassment.

"France, under a despotic you [...], might be ungrateful and treacherous; but France, restored to freedom, becomes a republic, which cannot be otherwise than grateful.

"Tell your nation that she may number amongst the most pure and zealous of her allies, the French republic. Holland, comprized in our treaty with Spain, proves that we do not forget our friends."

This affectionate address cannot but endear France to every benevolent heart. The language is pathetic, and the sentiments sincere. Far from the parade of courtly etiquette, and the cold civilities of a levee, the president of the convention welcomes the ambassador with all that fraternal affection, which the common cause of Liberty inspires.

But these words are more particularly worthy the attention of the Americans, "France, always great, will reply to generous proceedings, by proceedings equally generous." As it respects the United States, can this republic think our conduct "generous?" Is it "generous" to issue a proclamation on the "modern law of nations," and publicly to declare to the French, that on that ground, the United States meant to establish their neutrality, and [Page]yet admit the British to violate it, by taking our vessels going to France, loaded with provisions, and other articles, expressly declared in the aforesaid law to be free? Is it generous to refuse the overtures of France, for a commercial treaty, founded on the most liberal principles, and at the same moment send over a minister to the court of Britain, apparently for the purpose of obtaining indemnification for their captures; though, at the same time, he was authorized to make a treaty of commerce, in a secret manner, without any information to the French republic, on the subject? More especially when it was so secret, that our minister in France, was kept ignorant of the whole business?

Is it generous to enter into a treaty with Britain, to surrender the ground of "impartial neutrality" as to the modern law of nations, to admit articles as contraband, which were declared, by the president's proclamation, to be free, and directly clas [...] with our previous promise to France, that "free ships, shall make free goods?"

Is it generous that our treaty with England, should be so greatly detrimental to France, as to expressly declare, "that timber for ship-building, tar, or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, and unwrought iron and fir plank only excepted, shall be objects of confiscation, whenever they are attempted to be carried to an enemy?

Is such a prohibition "generous," as it respects France, when our treaty with that republic, expressly declares, that "in general, all provisions, which serve for the nourishment of mankind and the sustenance of life; furthermore, all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, cables, sail cloth, anchors and any part of anchors; also ship's masts, planks, boards, and beams; and all other things proper either for building or repairing ships, and all other goods whatever, which have not been worked into the form of any instrument for war, by land or sea, shall not be reputed contraband?"

Is it "generous" to admit by treaty the provisions destined to France to be carried into England, to be disposed of at such a price as the ministry shall say is a reasonable compensation, when they are admitted to be sold in France at public market, and at the highest price?

In short, it is needless to query any longer upon the subject. The features of the treaty too strongly evidence our partiality for the English, and enmity to the French. The nation now begin to see our conduct, and begin to express their resentment. Their late orders to their agents to stop the shipment of provisions, no doubt, is in consequence of the treaty; as they find [Page]by this instrument, we have surrendered every right of our neutrality, destroyed every vital principle of the president's proclamation, and completely thrown ourselves under the sole controul and influence of the British nation. They find we have forsaken them, and instead of acting agreeably to the declaration made by Mr. Munroe, "to draw the bonds of our alliance closer," we have, by Mr. Jay's negociation, severed the connexion, and rushed into the arms of the British.

This treaty will lower the produce of the United States, 100 per cent. Our ships will perish at our wharves—our tradesmen will be thrown out of employ—and, in return, we shall be blessed with a land tax, to discharge British debts, and our sea-ports and trading towns soon be thronged with British and Scotch agents and factors. Blessed effects of Mr. Jay's treaty!!!

Can France express that cordiality to the United States, as she does to Venice? Or are our proceedings towards her, such, that we can expect any thing, in return, but her resentment?

The fate of America is suspended on the treaty, which involves in it a question, whether we will return, by a clandestine treaty, to Britain, to be again subject to her insolence and arbitrary measures, or whether we will support that "modern neutrality" pledged, to the United States, by the president.

The treaty, made by Mr. Jay, is in direct opposition to the president's proclamation; upon what principle he has ratified it, requires, therefore, an explanation more copious than he has deigned to express in his letter to the town of Boston, and the other citizens who have addressed him on this momentous subject.

It is in the power of America, by commercial restrictions, to vindicate her national honor, without any danger of a war; as we have as much right to say, that we will not import British manufactures, as France has to say, she will not purchase American provisions. The Americans may as well say, that they would declare war against France, for her late orders to her agents, as the British pretend to go to war with America, for preventing the importation of their manufactures. The war is a mere bugbear of the British faction, and those who are concerned in the English trade; as these very persons know that if Mr. Madison's resolutions or a non-importation had taken place, Britain would have been obliged to make peace with France.

But to our disgrace, and possibly ruin, we have tampered too long with the magnanimity of this generous republic. Our narrow policy, for the support of a set of bank speculators, it is to be feared, has for ever separated France from America.

A REPUBLICAN.

[Page]

FROM THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER.

ATTICUS—No. I.
To the Freemen of the United States.

FELLOW-CITIZENS,

AT length the illegitimate imp, the abortion of liberty, has crawled from its sculking place, and, contrary to the wishes of its parent and of its god-fathers, has peeped into day. Divested of the darkness which encompassed it, we may now behold and examine the foul blotches that overspread it, and trace a pestiferous malady oozing from every pore. That imagination must have possessed an uncommon portion of poetic phrenzy; it must have boldly soared into the regions of extravagance, and have viewed human nature in its utmost deformity, that could have figured to itself a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, so replete with hostility to a generous and magnanimous ally, and so prolific of enmity to the essential rights of a free, sovereign, and independent people.

Yes, citizens of America, we have virtually, though not formally, become a party in the confederacy of despots against liberty, and have surrendered the rights of an independent nation into the hands of Great Britain. We have become her colonies in jact, though not in form; and our honor and our interests, our gratitude and our liberty, are placed under her guardianship. The treaty formed with France, in the hour of danger and adversity, when the heavy clouds of tyranny had darkened our horizon, and were ready to burst upon our heads, has been paralized by our government; and the nation, against which every arm should have been nerved, and every mind electrified with abhorrence, is to usurp the place due to gratitude and liberty. Now the wisdom and policy of our administration, nay, its patriotism too, will receive a full exposition, from the treaty itself—Now the vindication of our rights with firmness will be seen in its meridian splendor—now the adjustment of our complaints will exhibit itself in all its brilliancy—and now that temper and sensibility of our country, which was to aid, if not direct, the negociation, will stand unmasked, and prompt sensations, at which conscience should start back with horror. Let us, my fellow citizens, take a view of this mimitables bantling—its royal charms will smooth its constitutional [Page]deformity, and enamour us into an oblivion of violated rights and usurped authority. We were tickled with the high prospects of commercial advantage, which we were to derive from our intercourse with the British West Indies; let us view the article upon which those prospects are bottomed, and then say, whether the man who could assent to such terms, can possibly be considered as the friend of his country? We shall be at liberty to trade to his Britannic majesty's possessions in the West Indies, in vessels not exceeding seventy tons, and bring from thence the produce of those islands; but we shall not be permitted to export sugar, coffee, cocoa, melasses, or cotton, to any part of the world. This article robs us, at a blow, of the carrying trade, and deprives us of the privilege of exporting West India produce, although imported from other islands —Nay, there is not an exception in favor of cotton, the growth of our own country; and it is well known, that we export cotton from some of the southern states to a considerable amount. Does not this article justify the opinion, that we have again become the colonies of Great Britain? Does it not give rise to a belief, that the man who put his seal to it, could not be a friend to America? The art with which it is incorporated with the other articles of the treaty, excepting the first ten, shows that either this was to be accepted, or the whole must totter, and, rather than such an immaculate conception should be stifled in embryo, we have accepted the treaty with a most extraordinary provision.

You will see, fellow citizens, that the treaty, in all its parts, is prohibitory upon America—You will discover, that the United States were an inferior party in the contract, and that when his Britannic majesty only permits and consents, we agree and are bound—You will see France pointed at, though not literally designated, and every provision, that can possibly militate against her, solemnly stipulated—You will see her excluded from renewing the bonds of good will, which unite the people of both countries, and which she had proffered to renew, when Great Britain was plotting against our liberty and peace— You will see our country degraded, and throwing itself upon the mercy of a British tyrant.

Under these circumstances, I ask, nay, I demand of you, fellow citizens, whether the revolution was designed to rid ourselves or a foreign, in order to establish a domestic, tyranny? Whether it was for the benefit of a whole people, or to aggrandise a few individuals? The question is in time and in place; for if any individual among us, can pursue the dictates of his own feelings, or his own whims, at the expense of the most solemn [Page]and sacred covenant, and in contradiction to the universal voice of a whole people, then have we overturned foreign to make room for domestic domination. The next attempt that we may anticipate, will be upon the freedom of the press; for a conduct so repugnant to every sense of propriety, as that of the administration, cannot bear the ordeal of the press; and it must endeavour to shelter itself, by imposing a silence upon the only voice that can speak daggers to injustice, and awaken the public mind to tyranny. Did my imagination create it, or is it really true! Methinks there is already a consultation of such sort, and that the patriotic and virtuous editor of the Aurora is to be the first victim!

Our good faith to France, my fellow citizens, will become proverbial; and our rigid adherence to national honor, and national obligation, must procure many admirers and many friends. We have not only formed a treaty with Great Britain, directly to the prejudice of our allies; but we have deceived those allies, and dishonored ourselves, by declaring to them, that the object of Mr. Jay's mission was only to obtain a redress of wrongs. The French minister here was officially informed, that the mission, as set forth in the president's message to the senate, contemplated only an adjustment of our complaints; and our minister in France, in answer to an application of the French government, gave official information, that a redress of wrongs only, was the object of Mr. Jay's n [...]gociation. Thus have we added insult to injury, and, by means of it, exposed ourselves to the just indignation of a great, gallant, and triumphant people. This Punic faith requires no commentary of mine—it has stamped upon it, in lines too strong to be misinterpreted, and too indelible to be obliterated, an image, which must excite abhorrence in the mind of every virtuous American.

ATTICUS.

June 29th, 1795.

No. II.

INGENUOUSNESS ought to be as much the attribute of a freeman as independence, and the forfeiture of the former is too frequently the prelude to the prostitution of the latter. The man that can act a double, or an uncandid part, in one transaction, can do so in many; for if his conscience or principles are not at all times powerful enough to restrain him, [Page]temptation may, any time, seduce him from the path of political justice or moral rectitude. I alleged, in my first essay, that France was deceived by the professions of our administration, and that at the time we assured her we were only aiming at an indemnity for robbery, and a surrender of the posts, we were, in fact, negociating a treaty with Great Britain. This deception does not stand alone; for the title of the treaty bears the same, if not a stronger stamp of political unrighteousness. It is called a "treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, by their president, with the advice and consent of their senate." I aver, that the senate knew not that a treaty was to be negociated: for the president was silent on the subject in his message; and when a motion was made in the senate, to request the president to inform the senate of the whole business with which the envoy was to be charged, it was negatived; how then could it be denominated a treaty, negociated "with the advice and consent of the senate?" Two conclusions are naturally drawn from this circumstance—that the executive must have believed the constitution made the advice of the senate necessary, or he would not have had it placed on the very face of the treaty; and that a deception was practised by inserting the advice of the senate to a treaty concluded in London, when the senate was not consulted.

This supercession of the constitution, and arrestation of the prerogative of the senate, may be considered as non-essential, as the senate had an ultimate decision upon the treaty. A little consideration will show the fallacy and danger of this reasoning; for if the president has the right to dispense with the advice of the senate, he has an equal right to dispense with their consent, and render their participation with him in matters of treaty altogether nugatory. "The president shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." The intention of this clause appears to be, to guard against the exorbitant power delegated to the president, by rendering the advice of the senate necessary to a negociation. They are the joint judges of the propriety of forming a treaty, as well as the arbiters of it, when it is made. If the president had the exclusive power to negociate treaties, it would be a kind of dictatorship, an exclusive sovereignty, that would enable him to form treaties in such a way, as would render it extremely hazardous in the senate to refuse their consent. Our rights may be bartered away by treaty, our liberties made an affair of hazard, as is the case in the treaty before us Could a free people have intended a [Page]delegation of such powers to a senate, much less to an individual? They never intended to establish a species of royalty in fact, though not in name, and put it in the power of one man to legislate for them, by means of treaties.

In the preamble of the treaty, fellow citizens, we find this remarkable clause: "His Britannic majesty and the United States of America, being desirous by a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, to terminate their differences in such a manner, as, without reference to the merits of their respective complaints and pretensions, may be the best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding." With this clause staring us in the face, in the preamble of the treaty, what had we to expect from the treaty itself? Well, indeed, might Great Britain negociate with us, when we so complaisantly waved our complaints and pretensions! The president, in his message to the senate, nominating John Jay as envoy extraordinary, speaks of the mission being designed to procure a friendly adjustment of cur complaints. "But a mission like this," says the message, "while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world, a solicitude for a friendly adjustment of our complaints:" and in the introduction to the treaty, these very complaints are abandoned! Strange paradox indeed, that the mission should have expressly contemplated an adjustment of our complaints, if the message was not an entire deception, and that a reference to those complaints should have been formally disavowed! When agreements of this kind are entered into, the injuries of the parties are supposed to be equal, and their demands the same; but in this case, were our respective complaints and pretensions mutual?

Had we robbed Great Britain! Had we kept possession of a part of her territory, which was to have been surrendered by solemn and positive stipulation? Had we invaded her territory, and made military settlements within her jurisdiction? Had we joined the savages against her, and assisted in butchering her subjects? Had we impressed her seamen, contrary to every rule of justice, and obligation of humanity? Had we offered her every outrage and every indignity, which one nation could offer to another? Whence then the mutuality of complaints and pretensions, that made a reference to them a thing so much to be deprecated, as to be entirely laid aside? So extraordinary a phenomenon as this, is certainly not to be met with in diplomatic history. It will stand alone upon the list of wonders, and serve as a high water mark of prostitution of a nation's rights. Surely the envoy could not have been so far intoxicated with the pleasure of kissing the quee [...]'s hand, having already [Page]passed the meridian of gallantry, unless we could suppose him to be in his dotage, as to have forgotten that we had complaints to redress, and pretensions to satisfy! Surely Grenville's wine did not possess the qualities of the waters of Lethe, to have effaced from his remembrance that he was an American envoy, and that America had been grievously injured, and barbarously outraged!

Fellow citizens, had our condition been a desperate one—had we been so humbled as to have had no resource left but in the clemency of Great Britain—had the energy of freedom been succeeded by the palsy of despotism—then, indeed, might we have waved every reference to our injuries and our dishonor: but in the zenith of vigour and prosperity, to abandon our claims, and, with a beggar's suppleness, demand our own in charity, is such a flagitious departure from every principle that ought to animate the American bosom, that we ought at the same time to pity and despise the man who could so far forget his own and the dignity of his country.

ATTICUS.

July 15th, 1795.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

REMARKS ON TREATIES.

SOME very mistaken notions appear in circulation on this subject, the essence of which you find in a late paper, where a writer calls a treaty an act more binding than the constitution, and more influential than any law. This is surely heresy against the constitution. All that is said in that instrument about treaties, is as follows:

In art. 2. sect. 2.

"The president shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators concur."

In art. 3. sect. 2.

"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."

In art. 6.

"This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof—and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

[Page] Now, surely, from all this, it is apparent, that, in the order stated, the constitution stands first, as the supreme law of the land; next, the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof; next, treaties: Undoubtedly, therefore, no act can be more binding than the constitution; no treaty more influential than any law passed by the three branches of the government; otherwise, in fact, two branches of the government would supersede entirely the authority of the third—How the judges would decide, should these three supreme laws happen to differ, remains to be seen. It is also worthy of enquiry, what authority could absolve us from a treaty made the supreme law of our land, supposing it violated by the other contracting party? It can hardly be supposed we should go on to continue to consider it as obligatory, when it should have been broken by the party with whom it was made.

OBSERVER.

Reply of the President of the United States, to the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce.
TO THOMAS RUSSELL, Esquire.

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 13th instant, covering a copy of the dissent,* of a number of citizens of Boston, expressing their disapprobation of the votes adopted at a late meeting in that town, relative to a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between the United States and Great Britain; and also a copy of the proceedings of the Boston chamber of commerce, on the same subject.

While I regret the diversity of opinion which has been manifested on this occasion, it is a satisfaction to learn, that the commercial part of my fellow citizens, whose interests are thought to be most directly affected, so generally consider the treaty, as calculated, on the whole, to procure important advantages to our country.

This sentiment, I trust, will be extended in proportion, as the provisions of the treaty become well understood.

With due respect, I am, Sir, Your obedient, GO. WASHINGTON.

United States, 22d August, 1795.

Notes

*

See Milton's Limbo of Va [...]ity.

↵

*

Si Mercatores sint de terra contra nos guerrira, et tales inveniantur in terra nostra in principio guerr [...], attachientur sine damno corporum suorum vel reru [...], donec s [...]iatur a nobis vel a capitali justiciario nostro quo modo mercatores terrae nostrae tractantur qui tune inveniantur in terra illa contra nos guerirra; et si nostri salvi sint ibi, alii salvi sint in terra nostra. Magna charta, cap. XXX.

↵

†

Spirit of Laws, book XX. chap. XIV.

↵

*

The federal government never resorted to it; and a few only of the state governments stained themselves with it. It may, perhaps, be said, that the federal government had no power [...] subject; but the reverse of this is truly the [...]ase. The federal government [...] power. The state governments had none, [...] to exercise it. This position is fou [...]d on [...] ground that the confiscation or sequestration of the debts of an enemy is a high act of [...] war, necessarily and exclusively incident to the power of making war, which was always in the sederal government.

↵

*

All that can rightfully be done, is to oblige the foreigners, who are subjects of our enemy, to quit our country.

↵

*

There are exceptions to this exception; but they depend on special circumstances, which admit the principal exception, and need not be particularized.

↵

*

Digest. XLI. tit. 1. "Et quae [...] hostile [...] a pud no [...]," &c.

↵

†

[...] subito exarcissa [...], [...] um servi effi [...] [...] qu [...] jam ho [...]es [...]uo facto depre [...]nduntur." Digest. l [...]b. XI. IX. tit. XV. i. xii.

↵

*

Quaestionum Juris Public. libe [...] I. caput VII. "Cum ea sit belli conditio ist hostes sint omni j [...]re spoli [...]ti pros [...]riptique, [...]a [...] [...]is est quascunque res hosti [...]m apud hostes inventas, dom [...]um mutare et fisco cedere."

↵

*

The case of Pr [...] and the Silesia loan, is the only one I have found.

↵

*

Book III. Chap. 5. sect. 77.

↵

*

It appears to have been written about the year [...]60.

↵

*

Sir George Lee, was afterwards the very celebrated Chief Justice Lee, and Mr. Murray was the late Lord Mansfield.

↵

*

See vol. I. pages 126, 129.

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

[No. VIII.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME II.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARRET-STREET.

—NOVEMBER 14, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. ATTICUS, No. III. Page 219

2. — No. IV. Page 222

3. — No. V. Page 225

4. The Federalist, No. IV. Page 228

5. — No. V. Page 240

6. — No. VI. Page 247

7. — No. VII. Page 259

8. Resolutions of the Freemen of Mercer County (Kentucky) September 22d, 1795 Page 265

9. American Commerce in Europe Page 266

10. Savannah Address to the President of the United States Page 267

11. President's Answer Page 268

12. Resolutions of a Number of the Inhabitants of Kentucky, at the Court-house in Lexington, August 28th, 1795 Page 269

13. Proceedings of the Inhabitants of Williamsburgh (South Carolina) August 5th, 1795 Page 270

14. Proceedings of the Citizens of Laurens County (South Carolina) August 12th, 1795 Page 273

15. Address of the Citizens of Laurens County, to Pierce Butler Page 277

16. Striking Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty Page 278

17. There is Nothing new under the Sun Page 280

18. Proceedings of the Town of Plymouth (Massachusetts) October 28th, 1795 Page 283

19. Resolutions of the Citizens of Washington District (South Carolina) November 19th, 1795 Page 285

20. Resolutions of the Inhabitants of St. James's Parish (south Carolina) August 8th, 1795 Page 287

21. First Fruits of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation Page 288

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

ATTICUS—No. III.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 215.]

AFTER reading the preamble, we might shut our eyes upon the treaty, and augur its contents; for when a reference to the merits of our complaints is positively forbidden in the introduction, it would be folly to look for an adjustment of them in the treaty it self. In this, to be sure, we have acted with much christian meekness; we have forgotten and forgiven; and, with a submission very uncommon to men or to nations, after being smote upon one cheek, we have held the other. To evidence our humility, however, it was not essentially necessary to commission the chief justice to prostrate the American character and interest, at the foot of the throne of his majesty, George the third—we might have been silent to our outrages, passive under our indignities, and groaned beneath our wrongs, without having them reverberated from the throne of a despicable despot. The "solemnity of the occasion" would then have been less awful; for America might have mourned over her injuries, without inviting the world to behold her degradation. Let the light of investigation, however, now shine upon such a work of darkness; let its caverns be explored; let the trap doors to liberty, be unequivocally marked out, that the unsuspecting, and yet confident, American, may behold in those dismal recesses, the guillotine of his country's rights and independence. Be assured, my fellow citizens, the moment the treaty acquires a legal existence in our country, that moment we naturalize an hydra, which will require an Hercules to exterminate him—that moment we sign the death warrant of our liberty, and toll the bell for its execution.

Let us take a view of the 2d article, which is to relieve us from the ills of Pandora, that have issued, in the most hideous shapes, upon the citizens of our frontier, from the western posts, and have drained the United States of many millions of dollars, and much of the blood of their citizens. The treaty of peace solemnly stipulated, that his Britannic majesty should "with all convenient speed, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets, from the United States, and from every port, place, and harbour, within the same;" and the present treaty provides [Page]for the surrender of the posts in June, 1796. Near twelve years have elapsed since the definitive articles, of the treaty of peace, were signed at Paris; and yet these posts still remain in the possession of the British, and if "all convenient speed" can be interpreted to mean twelve years, the evacuation, in June 1796, may be expounded to mean a century. We had a reliance upon the faith of Great Britain, at that time, and she proved perfidious; we have renewed that reliance, under another instrument, and we flatter ourselves she will be more scrupulous in the observance of the contract! Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat; we seem to be marked for destruction, and folly is paving the way for it.

By this article, the king has been "graciously pleased" (to use the language of the envoy) to permit the United States to extend their settlements within their own boundary line, at their discretion, except within the precincts or jurisdiction of any of the posts. What a favor! The treaty is said to contain no reciprocity; but is not this reciprocity enough! To be permitted to extend our settlements within our own territory, is an indulgence, for which we cannot be sufficiently grateful! What a pity the envoy did not obtain his majesty's gracious permission to enlarge the boundaries of Philadelphia or New York! So "great, good, and dear a friend" could certainly not have refused "such an envoy" such a request!!!

The vocabulary of submission appears to have been ransacked, to suit the American part of the treaty (if any part can be strictly called American) and the rights which valour gave, and blood confirmed, we seem now to receive as a boon.—Does not this article contain a tacit confession, that Great Britain had a right to prevent our settlements within our own boundary line? Why was it not stipulated equally on the part of Great Britain, that she should be allowed to extend her settlements, at her discretion, within the Canadian limits? She never would have stooped to such an insult.

But what are WE to understand by the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts? The British have given a very liberal allowance of territory to that jurisdiction, and, in some instances, they have been modest enough to claim an extension of precincts to the Ohio.—Who is to draw the line? No doubt this will receive an exposition, in the usual way, and a British lexicon will be found to explain this knotty point. We have an administration so complaisant, that they never can find it in their hearts to cavil with his majesty George the Third. Whatever quirks and quibbles may be made use of to French sans culottes, a king is certainly entitled to more deference and more respect. [Page]—Quere. Is the settlement which Simcoe made at the rapids of the Miami, and about which a hollow vociferation was made, within the precincts and jurisdiction of the posts? That eunuch of a statesman, whose political gender remains yet to be defined, and who is "every thing by turns, and nothing long," will deign to inform us.

The most extraordinary part of this article, fellow citizens, remains yet to be considered—a part which allows a British colony to be established within the jurisdiction of the United States. British subjects shall have their election either to remain subjects of Great Britain, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, or to become American citizens! We have often been stunned with the "imperium in imperio:" but what will be now said of a British imperium in an American imperio! We cannot charge this to self-creation, when the first of our government has given it a being. By this article, we have given a carte blanche to conspiracy, and a premium for insurrections against our government. By the constitution of the United States, treason consists "in levying war against the United States, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."—Now I would ask, whether, according to the second article of the treaty, a British subject, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, who has not elected to become an American citizen, can be guilty of treason? May he not levy war, give aid and comfort to OUR enemies, without incurring the penalties to which American citizens are subject?

"They shall not be compelled to take any oath of allegiance to the government;" but, owing allegiance to Great Britain, by positive compacts, is he not furnished with a security against punishment for acts, which are treasonable to us, but which his sovereign calls on him to perform? The tacit condition of being subject to the laws, cannot surely operate against a specific grant; and a British subject, within that jurisdiction, seems to be excluded from the general principle comprehended in the law of nations. In the 26th article, a remedy is provided against British merchants who shall transgress our laws; but, in the article before us, nothing of the sort is contemplated. If there was not to be a difference between the persons comprehended in the 29th article, and those comprehended in the 2d, why were they not equally expressive? It appears, that his majesty was desirous of securing a corps within our territory, that would always be devoted to him, whenever he should call for their services, and, in case of a war, they might prove useful instruments, as useful as the savages, in carrying his gracious intentions into effect.

[Page]

[...]

[Page]

[...]

[Page]

How this article is made to harmonize with the territorial. rights of the individual states, guaranteed by the constitution, must be left to those to determine, who have the wonderful faculty of making the constitution mean any thing or nothing. The constitution says, that "the congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all useful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state." Have any of the states claims upon the territory within the jurisdiction of the posts? If they have, are not those claims prejudiced by the cession to British subjects, of lands acquired even since the treaty of peace? If congress is charged with the power of making rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, does this power extend to the president and senate?

Violation of constitution, prostration of character and of rights, and an ignominious submission to outrage and insult, have gone hand in hand in this transaction. The ermine of American honor has received a stain almost too foul ever to be effaced, and confidence a wound which will defy the healing powers of time. Before it be too late, fellow citizens, exercise an unalienable right, and speak with a decision, that shall make your servants pause, before they barter away your dear-bought privileges.

ATTICUS.

July 21st, 1795.

No. IV.

THE telescope of Herschel is necessary to discover the advatages said to be contained in the treaty with Great Britain; for they are so distant and so obscure, that, like the mountains in the moon, they can only be seen through an extraordinary magnifying medium. We are told, that the oftener we view the treaty, the more we will like it; but although a repetition of impression diminishes our sensations, even with respect to the beauty or deformity of things, the treaty stands an unrivalled exception; for the oftener we gaze at it. the more do the features of deformity unfold themselves to shock the sense. Reciprocity ought to be the basis of all commercial treaties; but this instrument discovers such favoritism, that we look in vain for equality; for while the ghost of reciprocity is to be [Page]our portion, the substantial reality is embraced by Great Britain. In illustration of this, let us refer to the 3d article, and pursue the ignis fatuus through the bogs and quagmires contrived for the ingenuous and unsuspecting American.—

"It is agreed that it shall, at all times, be free to his majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line, freely to pass and re-pass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties on the continent of America (the country within the limits of the Hudson's Bay company excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other. But it is understood, that this article does not extend to the admission of vessels of the United States into the sea ports, harbours, bays, or creeks of his majesty's said territories; nor into such parts of the rivers in his majesty's said territories, as are between the mouth thereof, and the highest port of entry from the sea, except in small vessels trading bona fide between Montreal and Quebec, under such regulations as shall be established to prevent the possibility of any frauds in this respect. Nor to the admission of British vessels from the sea into the rivers of the United States, beyond the highest port of entry for foreign vessels from the sea. The river Mississippi shall, however, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to both parties; and it is further agreed, that all the ports or places on its eastern side, to whichsoever of the parties belonging, may freely be resorted to, and used by both parties, in as ample a manner as any of the Atlantic ports or places of the United States, or any of the ports or places of his majesty, in Great Britain."

Unequal as are the benefits which the contracting parties have to bestow, these benefits are far from being reciprocal to the United States, although the whole inland navigation, forming a semicircle from the mouth of the Mississippi to the river St. Lawrence, together with the Atlantic waters, are thrown open to Great Britain. Are the territories and countries of the two parties on the continent, equal, and if they are equal, are the privileges granted to both, the same? for there must be an entire equality, to constitute the boasted reciprocity.—What are the limits of the Hudson's Bay company, from which there is to be an exclusion?

The returns of the Hudson's Bay company from America, are in value £. 29, 340 sterling, annually, and from the limits of this company we are to be totally excluded.—This company engrosses the most valuable part of the fur trade, as the country over which their privileges extend, abounds with animals [Page]whose furs are preferable to those inhabiting a less northerly region. Thus we have not only refused interfering with a profitable branch of their commerce, but we have afforded them an opportunity of extending it to our own prejudice; for when their traders are at liberty to make settlements within our territory, to "hire and possess houses and ware houses" we are wholly interdicted, and, therefore, there can be no doubt on which side the current of advantage will run.

We have granted Great Britain the free navigation of all our waters, internal and Atlantic, to the highest port of entry, when she has excluded us from the limits of the Hudson's Bay company, and all her Atlantic ports in America. The privilege of trading between Montreal and Quebec, if it can merit this appellation, is on the other side; for the inhabitants of New York, bordering on Canada, will derive their supplies from thence, and thus afford an additional outlet for British manufactures. It is a question, and the expression of this article will warrant it, how far we are liberty to avail ourselves of the privilege granted by the treaty of peace, to dry our fish, or to take them in any place where the jurisdiction of Great Britain is acknowledged? By the treaty of peace we are allowed "to take fish on all the coasts, bays and creeks of his Britannic majesty's dominions in America, and to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labradore, so long as the same shall remain unsettled;" by the present treaty we are barred this privilege— "But it is understood, that this article does not extend to the admission of vessels of the United States into the sea ports, harbours, bays or creeks of his majesty's said territories." It may be said, that this article cannot be intended to prejudice a previous treaty, and that this must have been understood—To this I answer, that, if the positive stipulation in the treaty of peace, that his majesty should withdraw all his armies, &c. from the United States, without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants," could be set aside, it is not difficult to conceive, that the privilege of taking and curing fish might be equally dispensed with by the treaty manufacturers.—It is no forced construction of the article, to suppose it; and the unequivocal expression of it, will justify such a belief.

We have not yet been able to trace a reciprocity in this article; but perhaps we shall find it in the Mississippi. This river is to be open to both parties and all the ports and places on its eastern side, to whichsoever of the parties belonging, may freely be resorted to. Where are the ports and places on the Mississippi, [Page]belong to Great Britain? Does this article yield a quid pro quo? Perhaps this stipulation in favor of the beloved friend of our administration, is intended to accelerate the negociation with Spain, which has been so long pending! Will Spain consent to open the Mississipi to us, when we have divided the benefits with Great Britain? Can it be supposed that she will have less jealousy of both, than she had of one? Events will determine these questions; and I have no scruple in supposing, that our negociation with Spain will be exceedingly embarrassed, if not broken off, by this injudicious and impolitic clause. It is not improbable that the French republic will possess Louisiana, and if they should, will this article be a letter of recommendation to them? We have acted so honorably, so candidly, so affectionately, and so uprightly with France, that she certainly could refuse us nothing we would ask of her.

We are said to have a constitution; and the citizens who were not entirely satisfied with its adoption, and those citizens who can see defects in the administration of it, are stiled "antifederalists." I would now ask, fellow citizens, by what title those are to be hailed, who are undermining that constitution by the exercise of improper power? The constitution says, that congress shall have power "to establish an uniform rude of naturalization throughout the United States," but by the ad article of the treaty, the president and senate have established a rule of naturalization within the precincts and jurisdiction of the posts. The pretended federalists will supply a name for so daring an attack upon a constitution which they have extolled as the perfection of human wisdom.

ATTICUS.

July 29th, 1795.

No. V.

THE ground of regular defence being abandoned by the Jayites, recourse is had to bush fighting; and we are told, that it is improper and dangerous to deliver the opinion of an aggregate body on the measures of government. This is considered as an attempt to dictate to our government, to controul its actions, nay, to awe it into compliance with the popular voice. Whether the popular voice, in a popular government, ought to dictate public measures, I shall proceed to consider; and, from this digression, return again to the treaty.

[Page] If the propriety or the right of many to give an opinion on public measures is a questionable thing, the right of an individual must altogether vanish; for the right or wrong, the propriety or impropriety, in a republican sense, is proportionate to the many or the few, who deliver an opinion. If a majority is to direct the public will, then the expression of that majority must be proper and just; and the nearer the approach to that majority, the stronger the right to a direction of that will. A nation has the right to will; and this will, in a legitimate government, can only be expressed by the majority, and ought only to be operative, when this is ascertained; surely, then, the right is in an ascending series, from an individual to the majority. If the right of many is then to be questioned, what will become of the pretensions of an individual? for it surely will not be contended by a republican, that one man shall have more consideration and more rights than a number. The majority of the people of America declared themselves independent of Great Britain; and this was supposed by them a meritorious and just declaration, and dare not, even now, be questioned by the aristocrats, but, according to the present doctrine, this was an unpardonable act; for it was an attack upon the "constituted authorities," it was a subversion of the settled order of things. The majority of the people of the United States, made a constitution for their government; and [...]hinged the old system of things under the confederation; surely this was an unjustifiable act; for it was a measure which deranged the constituted authorities. It the people had a right to throw off their allegiance from Great Britain, if they had a right to subvert the confederation and establish a constitution, will their right be questioned to express disapprobation of an iniquitous law? Dare a question be agitated, whether they have the right to give an opinion to the constituted authorities, nay, to change the constituted authorities themselves? Suppose the majority of the people were to declare the present constitution anti-republican, that it was unfriendly to their liberties, who would dispute their right to make another? will such ephemerons as Fenno and Webster oppose such a will, or controvert such a doctrine? Who will be bold enough to say, that the people have not the right to will their own happiness, under any form of government, and under what laws they please? Is our government a purchase in fee simple, or an inheritance, that the people have no right to interfere in its operations?

Is ours a government of the people, or of the officers of government: If it is a government of the people, they certainly [Page]have the right to say by what rules they will be regulated; for it is a solecism to say, a man is his own governor, when he is denied a voice on public measures. If it is a government of the rulers, then is our system changed, and, instead of a republic, we are in oligarchy. Although the doctrine which I have been combating, implies that we are not a government of the people, but that of an oligarchy, will any one, on that side of the question, come forward and avow the sentiment? Art and design have too much to do with it to be thus explicit.

To proscribe town meetings, or indeed any other mode of collecting the sense of the people, is not extraordinary for men who have a point to gain. It is as easy for them to panegyrize as to condemn, when their purposes can be accomplished; and, contradictory as this may seem, the fact will appear, by referring to the Gazette of the United States, or any other paper under the same influence. When the president's proclamation of neutrality appeared, the legality and propriety of it were severely arraigned, and, under these circumstances, it was thought proper to convene town meetings, in many parts of the states, to approbate the measure. The merchants of Philadelphia had a meeting, and marched in grave and solemn procession to deliver their address, in its favor, to the president. If aggregate opinions were not improper, at that time, by what rule of ratiocination will they be condemned now? Were they more orderly then than they are now? This certainly will not be alleged; for there is not an instance upon record, in which a town meeting was conducted with more order, more decorum, and more harmony, than the late one at the state house. Perhaps they were composed of a better order of beings at that time; and, from their superior consideration, legitimized a thing in themselves, that would have been criminal in others.

When men apply their scaling ladders to the citadel of republicanism itself, no wonder they should attack its out-posts; for if the citadel is not consecrated against invasion, its lines cannot expect security. Look into the Minerva and the Gazette of the United States, and behold republicanism itself arraigned; what security have we then to expect for an attribute, that is denied to the being itself! When essays and paragraphs in favor of monarchy can find a channel to the public eye, we must not be surprised at the more insidious means of undermining liberty. We well know that government does not wish an expression of the public sentiment which arraigns the propriety of its measures; and we cannot doubt that every means will [Page]be used, to prevent that sentiment from converging to a focus; we must, therefore, expect that every artifice, which cunning and sophistry can suggest, will be employed to confute and confound. Insulated opinions are treated with indifference; but combined ones speak to the fears, as well as to the interests of rulers, and command attention; every means will, therefore, be used to prevent a co-operation in the people, and hence the proscription of the late town meetings.

From this view of the subject, fellow citizens, I am warranted in the inference, that town meetings, or any other meetings, in which the sense of the people can be collected, are republican and proper; and that no one will dispute their propriety, whose interest is not distinct from that of the whole people. That they should be proscribed by men who have ambition to gratify, and other feelings to cherish, is not in the least surprising; for Esau sold his birth-right for a mess of pottage; and Judas sold his master for thirty pieces of silver.

As argument fails, recourse must be had to other means to make the treaty acceptable; and hence the proscription of town meetings, the calumnious epithet of Jacobin and anti-federalist, and the appeals to our fears and to our affections. Artifices like these, fellow citizens, you will be on your guard against; they are designed to seduce your understandings and your American feelings, which must ever rise up in judgment against an instrument, abhorrent to every true friend of his country.

ATTICUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

The Objections to the Treaty, refuted.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 103.]

No. IV.

THE other part of the 11th reason is more serious, and is "Because it is stipulated that neither the debts due from individuals of one nation, to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor monies, which they may have in the public funds, or in any public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated. It is far [Page]from being impossible, that the exercise of this right may, in the opinion of the national legislature, contribute to preserve the peace of our country; and protect the rights and property of the citizens from violation: we therefore esteem it highly impolitic that the public faith should be pledged that it shall never be exercised, under any circumstances whatever."

It will not be denied, after some little reflexion, by the inhabitants of Boston, that credit is of the last importance to the people of the United States. It is that which nurtured our infancy, which now gives spring and vigour to all our exertions, public and private. Its invigorating effects have been evidenced in the history of the publie, and of individuals, in such strong and recent colours, as to leave no doubt that we are indebted to that, for our rapid advance to wealth and importance. Let the town of Boston be contemplated with its great and thriving commerce. Is it not mutual confidence, is it not credit that supports the greatest part? Consider the wealth that is flowing in upon us from every country, confided to the honor of our merchants, and the justice of our laws—Weaken this confidence, wound credit but in the smallest degree, and you will see a thousand hands, which now labour for their own emolument, and the public prosperity, palsied in an instant.

There is scarce an individual who would not revolt with horror at the suggestion, that, because his nation was at war with the nation of his creditor, he should refuse to pay what was justly due. It is grown into a maxim, the truth of which is instantly felt, and assented to by every man of probity, that so far as respects himself, no national differences ought to weaken the obligations he is under to an individual.

The writer of these remarks firmly believes, that there is not a citizen of Boston who would declare, he considered himself discharged from the debt, due by him, because there was a war between his own nation, and that of his creditor.

Foreign credit is the parent of domestic credit. There is no man, who will view the extent and importance of the former, but will be convinced, that an injury to that will annihilate the latter, and with it all the domestic labour and industry, originating from, and supported by it.

Do the inhabitants suppose that the government would attain any thing by sequestering or confiscating the debts of individuals? Let them recur to their own experience of what took place the last war, when individuals were required to pay into the public treasury what was due to their absent creditors; and they will be convinced, that instances of compliance were so rare, as to leave no doubt that f [...]w were the men who had honesty [Page]enough to pay any one, but pres [...]ed, at great hazards, to pay their creditors.

With respect to money in the public funds, the practice of nations and the authority of the most eminent writers on public law, has, long s [...]nce, condemned the practice of sequestering or confiscating them—and it is laid down as the acknowledged law, among all the modern nations, that "a state at war, does not so much as touch the sums which it owes to the enemy—Every where, in case of a war, funds credited to the public, are exempt from confiscation and seizure." The policy of a conduct, in the United States, less scrupulous in regard to national faith and honor, may justly be questioned. The baneful effects of war on the morals of a people, are always lamented as the greatest calamity that awaits that dreadful pestilence. Can there be any thing more destructive of that righteousness which exalteth a nation, than the example set by a government, of converting the confidence placed in it, by an unsuspecting individual, into a trap to deprive him of his property! The principle, adopted at the fountain head, would soon spread through all the branches, and involve in deeper distress, the unfortunate victims of war, than all the losses of quiet and property. War, in its mildest form, is to be deprecated as the greatest evil. War, thus commenced, would be destructive of private confidence, and leave us the slav [...]s of vice and immorality, without character and without credit. The reason states, that "It is far from being impossible that the exercise of this right may, in the opinion of the national legislature, contribute to preserve the peace of our country, and protect the rights and property of the citizens from violation."

Few men who are actuated by a pure love for their country, would wish to derive its safety from a conviction in the world, that it has abandoned those principles of honesty, and regard to public and private farm, which are commonly practised among nations.

But supposing there are such, let them remember that our own citizens have property in other countries—that the consequence of depriving foreigners of the confidence now entertained in our laws and government, if they choose to risque their property in America, will be a payment on our part for every risque they run—that means will not be wanting by which their credits may be secreted from public grasp. Let us go further, and grant that suspicions of war with this country, could not have guarded men, thus advised of our principles, from being ensnared—that we were so sudden in commencing hostili [...]es, as to afford no chance of escape; and to give to this disastrous [Page]and disgraceful warfare, all the effect that could possibly slow from it—is it probable such a measure would prevent war, would protect the rights and property of our citizens from violation? Would not the nation thus injured, immediately make reprisals, long before we could build ships of war to support this seizure, or call home our own defenceless property. Let it be remembered, in contemplating this subject, that the nations of Europe have large sleets; that we are without any; that our vessels sail unguarded, and unarmed; every moment liable to be taken, while theirs are, in many instances, protected with military force.

Such a principle, once adopted, temptations to war would be multiplied to a nation whose interest is concerned in the cultivation of peace. War must be carried on by credit, either borrowing at home or abroad. The current revenues of no country are sufficient to meet the expenses of war. In proportion to our credit, or want of it, must we pay for the means of fighting our enemy. There can be no doubt but a war undertaken with such an opposition to the received maxims of public faith, would be attended with difficulties and expenses in the procuring of money, that would infinitely outweight any amount of property thus sequestered or confiscated. As little doubt can there be, that at the making of peace we should be willing to contract for the payment of property thus detained.

It may be fairly inferred, that no such right, as the town contemplates, exists, according to the law of nations—that if such right did exist, it could in no case be expedient to exercise it. But that the insertion of such an article in a treaty, should be an objection to its ratification, speaks a language, which, it is sincerely hoped, the town, on more nature reflection, will completely discard.

The reverse of the position is more true, viz. That a conviction on the mind of all foreigners, that the United States would in no instance, touch the credits or property of aliens, confided either to their private citizens or the public saith, would contribute to preserve the peace of our country, and protect the rights and properties of the citizens from violation. The more and absol [...]tely certain this was made to foreigners, with the more confidence would they place their monies and other property in our country. Beside the beneficial effects derived from this credit, is case of any national difference or misunderstanding, there would be a large and influential part of the foreign community deeply interested in preserving the peace of America; in protecting from violation the rights and property [Page] [...] [Page]as it was called. Thus much is certain, that Russia, who was the most potent of the league, is now in close alliance with Britain, and, of course, would not promote the system she adopted the last war.

We have conceded no new rights; we have not surrendered any principles advantageous to ourselves. The law stands precisely as it did before the treaty; and it is not probable, that the United States had any boon to offer, which could induce Britain to invert the rule, as now acknowledged by nations. When it is considered, that she is at war, and we at peace— and that she appears to found her greatest hope of success against her enemies on her naval strength, it should also be remembered, that though France expressly stipulated, in her treaty with the United States, that the goods of her enemies, on board our vessels, should be free, yet, in many instances, she has chosen to swerve from this stipulation, and capture and confiscate the property of her enemy on board our ships.

The words of the reason, that the treaty "precludes the hope of receiving any advantage," &c. (if the principle before mentioned is what the town alludes to) extend further than is warranted by the treaty; for, in that instruments, there is the following stipulation—"The said parties will also renew their discussion, and endeavour to agree, whether in any, and in what cases, neutral vessels shall protect enemies' property." It can hardly be said, that a treaty "precludes all hope" of a benefit, when the parties have expressly contracted to renew a discussion thereon, and endeavour to agree in what cases it shall be made.

The 16th reason is, "Because it not only surrenders the right of carrying the property of any nation at war with Great Britain, in our vessels freely, but abandons all pretensions even to the freight."

It has been shown, in the remarks on the 15th reason, that we have no right, by the law of nations, to carry the property of a nation at war with Great Britain, free from seizure. If, therefore, the treaty expressly recognizes the principle, that enemy's property is liable to confiscation, though on board the vessel of a friend, it does no more than the government has done before. It surrenders no right; for no right thus to protect enemics' goods, exists between us and Great Britain.

The reason further states, "That the treaty abandons all pretensions even to freight."

The writer of these remarks has looked, with attention, through the treaty, to find the clause on which this assertion [Page]is made; he can really find none that will support it. "Effects belonging to an enemy, found on board a neutral ship, are seizable by the rights of war; but, by the law of nature, the master is to be paid his freight, and not to suffer by the seizure." There is nothing in the treaty to controvert this principle, declared by Vattel. It cannot be doubted, that in all cases, where, prior to the ratification of the treaty, freight is payable for goods of an enemy to Britain, found on board of an American vessel, the same will be equally payable, when the treaty is ratified, if that event should take place. For there is nothing in the treaty, that can imply a relinquishment of our rights, by the law of nations, much less an abandonment of all pretensions to freight, in such cases. In the latter part of the 17th article of the treaty, there is an express agreement to pay freight, where, by law, it could not be demanded.

The 17th reason is, "Because it permits the British nation to convert provisions, destined to other nations at war with them, to their own use, on payment of what they may deem a reasonable profit; a measure not only injurious to the interests of the American merchant, but which will prevent our citizens from carrying those supplies to other countries, which, by the laws of nature and nations, they have a right to do, without molestation."

It is presumed, that the town, in this reason, refers to the 17th article of the treaty. An examination of that article will show, that the town has mistaken its import; and that, instead of surrendering a right, it acquires one, to which we are not entitled, unless the treaty is ratified. All writers on the law of nations agree, that there are cases, in which provisions are contraband; though it would seem, by the generality of the expressions of the town, in the last paragraph of this reason, that there is a right to carry supplies, in all cases, without molestation. It can hardly be believed, that this was the meaning of the town; yet, if any should think thus, they may have the consolation to reflect, that there is nothing in this treaty, that prevents an endeavour to support such a proposition— the words being, "where, by the existing law of nations, they are contraband." Now, if there is no case, where, by the law of nations, they are contraband, then there is no right to seize them under that article.

The article in the treaty, states, "That whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone, provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniencies [Page]and misunderstandings which might thence arise: It is further agreed, that whenever any such article, so becoming contraband, according to the existing law of nations, shall for that reason be seized, the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or, in their default, the government under whose authority they act, shall pay the full value of all articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident to such detention." Hence it is clear, that the treaty does not give any new right to the British nation; it does not permit the taking provisions, &c. in any case where she is not authorized by the law of nations—it permits the taking them only where, by the existing law of nations, they are contraband. Here is no cause of complaint.— The other part of the article is a positive advantage to the nation at peace; for it expressly contracts to pay for such provisions, where, by law, the nation seizing them would be under no obligation to pay, viz. in cases, where, by the existing law of nations, they are contraband; and in no other case are they seizable by treaty. The article goes further; it not only stipulates for payment, but for complete and speedy indemnification, reasonable profits, freight and demurrage, and that the government shall pay, if the individual captors shall sail. It is injurious to the interest of the American merchant, that, in cases where his property is, by the law of nations, justly forfeited, the treaty secures to him full and complete indemnification, payment with profit, freight and demurrage? Will our citizens be prevented from carrying supplies to other countries, because the hazards are lessened—because, in every event, they are sure of making a good voyage? Surely the answers will contradict the reasons of the town.

The 18th reason given by the town, is, "Because it limits the power of congress, delegated to them by the constitution, to regulate our commerce with foreign nations, by prescribing conditions, and creating impediments to the exercise of that power."

The constitution, in the distribution of powers, as completely vests the powers delegated to the president and senate, as it vests those it delegates to congress. The president has power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties; when, therefore, he thus makes a treaty, it is as much an act of the whole people of the United States, as any law of congress. Is he limited as to the kind of trea [...] he shall make? There is no limitation in the constitution. But then it is said, "Congress has a right to regulate commerce with foreign [Page]nations; and, as this treaty regulates commerce with a foreign nation, it limits the power of congress;" and suppose it does, if it is a constitutional act, the limitation is as legal, as though the constitution had declared in express terms, that congress should have a right to regulate commerce, where it was not otherwise regulated by treaty. Perhaps it may be said, that the constitution intended such treaties, as did not interfere with the powers delegated to congress. The inference, from this construction, would be, that no commercial treaty could ever be made; and, looking at the powers of congress, it will be doubtful if any other treaty can be made, or if the United States can make any treaty—for congress has no power to make a treaty—and if the president, who, with the advice and consent of the senate, is alone authorized to make treaties, can make no treaty, which respects any of the powers, vested in congress, there is no man or body of men authorized to treat with foreign nations.

Treaties, generally speaking, are mere treaties of peace, or treaties of commerce; congress has power to make war, grant letters of marque and reprisal. If the president with consent of the senate, makes a treaty of peace, according to the reasoning of the town, he limits the power of congress, which has authority to make war, and in the treaty spoken of there is a stipulation, that there shall be a firm and inviolable peace between the parties—It is equally objectionable on this ground, as on that of regulating commerce. If the United States should be at war with any nation, on such construction, they must remain eternally at war—congress has declared war—has done an act which that body alone had a right to do; the president, by making peace, does not barely limit a power to act; but does that which is in direct violation of an act constitutionally done by congress, and operates as an absolute repeal of their declaration of war. Such a construction of the constitution is not to be admitted.

We ought never to admit a construction of any instrument, which leads to an absurdity, or to the destruction of any part; we ought to reconcile all parts thereof, if possible, so that every portion of it may take effect, and no word but what may operate in some shape or other. Let us endeavour to construe this instrument by these rules:—The president, with the advise and consent of the senate, makes a treaty of peace with a nation, with whom the United States are at war. He has done an act which he thought wise; the next or the same day, congress receives such information, as, in their opinion, renders it expedient to declare war. This militates with what was done; [Page]but it by no means follows that either was wrong; or that the constitutional power of either was limited by their constitutional acts. Both have exercised that power which each had a right to exercise. The state of war was complete until the president made peace; and the state of peace, the true and legal state, until congress declared war, which repealed the doings of the president.

In a treaty of commerce, it is contracted, that duties shall be no higher than at present. Afterwards congress chooses to impose higher duties, and actually does impose higher than is stipulated in the treaty. The treaty is contravened, and the nation must abide the good or evil consequences that flow from the measure, in like manner as it would, if congress should choose to declare war, and annul an article which declares, there shall be a perpetual peace, as is the case in some treaties. If this construction is right, there can be no limitation, even in terms, of the power of congress, especially when it is recollected, that a bare majority of both houses, with the president, is sufficient to pass a law, while two-thirds of the senate is necessary to make a treaty. But suppose any doubt this construction, and in the case of an imposition of higher duties than is stipulated by the treaty, the party, considering himself injured by the law, refuses to pay; a suit is commenced, and the cause, in the last instance, is decided by the supreme judicial court, who are authorized to determine whether such an act be, or not, conformable to the constitution. If the act of congress is determined to be unconstitutional, the treaty could not be called a limitation of the power vested in them by the constitution; since it appears that the constitution did not vest in congress a power to make such act. Therefore, in no case, can the treaty be called a "a limitation of the power of congress, delegated is them by the constitution."

The foregoing has been attempted to obviate the objection of the town as stated, and to show that there can, neither in fact nor terms, be any limitation to the powers vested in congress— In the opinion of this writer, there is a short, but equally satisfactory answer to those who fear a real interference in the departments of government, from the wording of the constitution. —The people of the United States were well aware, that there were two modes of regulating commerce—one by treaty, where nations are disposed to treat on terms beneficial to each other; the other, where nations are unwilling thus to treat, by laws constitutionally made.—Under this impression they framed their constitution.—If nations are unwilling to treat with the United States on the rights of commerce, or we are unwilling [Page]to treat with them, congress is the constitutional body to make laws, regulating the commerce between them and us.—If nations are willing to treat on their and our commercial relations commercial nations, all of whom will probably regulate our trade by this partial standard."

It may be answered, that we are under no obligation to make other treaties, because we have made this; and if, in the course of two years, from a cessation of the war in which Great Britain is now engaged, it should appear to be injurious to us, we can drop all its load of commercial burdens, and embarrassments.—It might have been well in the town to have stated the peculiar embarrassments the treaty imposes upon us, and which are to be avoided by its destruction. It surrenders no rights we now enjoy, but grants some we had not before, and renders absolute what was before precarious. Our other treaties admit us to trade in Europe, as the most favored nations. The treaty with Great Britain does the same. It also admits us into their East India settlements, and their colonies on the continent of North America, to trade with them on terms highly favorable to our commerce. No other nation has granted to us like advantages. The treaty with France admits us into certain free ports in the West Indies, under regulations not mentioned in the treaty, but varying according to the will of the ruling power.

The last reason, is, "Because, in the opinion of the inhabitants of this town, the nature and extent of the exports of the United States are such, that in all their stipulations with foreign nations, they have it in their power to secure a perfect reciprocity of intercourse, not only with the home dominions of such nations, but with all their colonial dependencies."

It is not wonderful, that the town of Boston should violently oppose the treaty, if such be their opinion; but then they should equally wish for the annulling of all the existing treaties. —Restrictions and regulations should be imposed on all foreign commerce, till those treaties are destroyed, or such trade can be obtained. But as the town has not chosen to give their reasons for this opinion, it is not impossible the president may trust to the experience of the United States, from the treaties already made, and his own knowledge of the temper of foreign powers [Page]on this subject, rather than to the opinion of the town of Boston, however respectable.

A FEDERALIST.

No. V.

THE first number of the Constitutionalist, in answer to the Federalist, expresses his fears of the danger that may arise, from the smallest branch of the legislature possessing a power to make treaties, independent of the larger. This remark is aimed against the constitution, that if it has no other effect, it may prepare the mind of the reader for his construction: which, if true, will be a death blow to the treaty, and end all contest on account of its expediency. The town, on being convinced of this, may remain quiet and undisturbed; for if made by people who have no power, it can never be a law—it, is a mere dead letter.

After quoting various passages of the constitution, which describes the powers of congress, he considers it as clear, that no treaty can be made, in which the organ authorized, by the constitution, to make treaties, shall exercise any of, those powers. The constitution would, according to this writer, read thus—The president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall have power to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senate concur; and provided always, that such treaties do not relate to peace or war, that they do not regulate commerce with foreign nations—and that they do not provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United States.

It would be strange, if the people of America had made such a constitution, as prevented them from any negociation with foreign powers—on such construction, this would be the case. The president and senate are the only body empowered to make treatin [...]; and, according to this reasoning, their power is so restrained, that it can never be exercised on such subjects, as nations treat upon. The mere stating the consequences of such construction, is sufficient to show its absurdity; and to convince any reasonable man, that it originated in no regard to the constitution.

Does it follow, because the constitution vests a power in two bodies to do an act, that the exercise of such power by either will be wrong? If by either, then both—and the power is void. If commerce cannot be regulated by treaty with foreign nations, because a power to regulate commerce is given to congress; [Page]then congress cannot regulate commerce, because the president and senate have power to make treaties, in which is undoubtedly included a power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

The people of the United States, as has been elsewhere remarked, willing to provide for the two common methods of regulating commerce, viz. by legislative acts, and by treaties, appointed congress to make laws where those were necessary; and the president, with consent of the senate, to make treaties where that method was attainable, and thought most beneficial. The power, vested in this latter organ of the people, is as full and complete, as that of making laws in the ordinary mode of legislation, is in the other.

The wisdom and caution of the people, is, in no instance-more signally displayed than in thus vesting a power to make treaties. Promptitude in seizing the fittest occasion, secrecy and dispatch, are often necessary in the forming of treaties. Such qualifications are not be found in large bodies. Hence the wisdom of vesting a power of negociation in the president. To avoid too great haste, imprudence, or want of knowledge, which might arise from an individual, the people appointed the senate (two-thirds of which must concur) to weigh and discus [...] the merits of a treaty, and sanction it with their approbation, before the president can render it obligatory on the United. States.

When it is considered, that the senate will ever be composed of some, who have been of that department, nearly six year [...], at least, their knowledge of the laws of the United States, of its foreign and domestic relations, of the state of its commerce, and what regulations will most advance its prosperity, cannot be questioned. These qualifications render that body pre-eminently sit for the duty of advising the president, in his negociations, with foreign powers. The secrecy used in such affairs, and which is so bitterly exclaimed against by this writer, is indispensably necessary to the safety and prosperity of the people. It avoids the violent opposition, which arises from the influence and intrigue of foreigners, or of those who prefer the interest of a foreign nation to the interest of their own. The people appointed the president and senate to regulate their affairs with foreign nations, and neither directed, nor authorized them to take the advice of any man or body of men. To have communicated their transactions while in train, would have been to hazard the interest of the people; and such a breach of trust as to have justly exposed themselves to the severe reprehension of those for whom they acted.

[Page] Under the confederation, the powers of congress were not greater on this subject, than those of the president and senate, under the present constitution. Congress then made treaties of alliance and commerce. The treaties were discussed, and ratified in secret. If it had been otherwise, the peace, happiness, and independence of the country might have been greatly endangered. Does any one believe, that the court of France would have negociated with our ministers, if they had supposed the negociation would instantly be made public—and that after a treaty was formed, instead of being discussed in congress, it was to combat all the assaults of foreign influence in the cities of America?

It is highly probable, that had it not been for the secrecy, as well as the consummate skill and firmness of Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, foreign influence would have prevented the explicit acknowledgment of our independence by Great Britain, and our right to the fisheries.

In the important treaties, negociated and ratified under the confederation, there never was a lisp against them, because they were transacted in secret. The people knew that their rights depended on this mode of conducting such business; and no one was hardy enough, then, to interfere with the essential rights of the people. Let those who clamour at the president and senate for doing the business entrusted to them, in the manner which the experience of all nations, especially of the United States, has stamped as alone safe and wise, show that foreign influence and domestic intrigue is less to be apprehended now than formerly—that the people's rights will be better conducted by them, than by those whom the people have chosen.

The objection to the treaty, because the president and senate had no power to make such, will appear still more extraordinary, when it is remembered that the whole ground of bringing forward the commercial resolutions, by Mr. Madison, the winter before last—of their recommendation by Mr. Jefferson, then secretary of state, was to induce Great Britain to make a treaty with the United States. The resolutions were to apply only to nations, who had no commercial treaty with the United States; and they were supported against Great Britain, because it was said she would make no treaty with us. Both parties then agreed, that if commerce was regulated by treaty, it was out of their power; and the supporters of the resolutions advocated them, on the probability of their forcing Great Britain to regulate commerce by treaty. But if they had been blest with half the logic of the Constitutionalist, they would have seen that it was wrong and insi [...]ous in the president, to have directed [Page]Mr, Jefferson to write to Mr. Hammond, demanding "if he was authorized to conclude or negociate arrangements with us, which might six the commerce between the two countries, on principles of reciprocal advantage"—in Mr. Jefferson, to have made "proposals of friendly arrangement to Great Britain, on the subject of commerce"—and because of that government's unwillingness to enter into such arrangements with the executive, to have proposed to congress, to commence a system of prohibitions, duties and regulations, to produce what he thought might be better done by treaty. The house of representatives (whom this writer seems to have mistaken for congress, speaking of the senate's consenting to a ratification of the treaty, he says, "assumes powers constitutionally vested in the house of representatives") instead of debating whether or not it was the intention of the British nation, to treat with us on commerce, should have addressed the executive on the insidious conduct of demanding powers from a man, authorizing him to treat, and proposing to him to negociate on subjects, on which they themselves were not authorized to treat.

A particular objection is made to the 6th article of the instrument, because it stipulates for the payment of certain British debts; to execute which stipulation, it will be indispensably necessary to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, or excises. —It is doubtless true, that congress must lay and collect taxes to make this payment, if the treaty is ratified. The president and senate have done what they thought just and right; and it remains for congress to do what is necessary on their part, to fulfil the engagements of the United States.—"Congress is to pay the debts, and provide for the general welfare of the United States." And no good man can doubt, but that body will do what their duty directs. It is true, congress may refuse to do this—so they might refuse to pass any laws; but it is not a supposeable case. The constitution is framed on the idea that every part of the government will do that, which it is authorized to do for the public good. What is to become of our unhappy fellow citizens in Algiers, if the doctrine advanced here is true? Congress cannot make a treaty for their redemption; because congress cannot make any treaty. The president can make none for their redemption; because he must incur a debt to the United States, and to pay that debt, it may be indispensably necessary to lay and collect taxes. What a nerveless arm do these people give to the constitution! Under a pretence of supporting it, they destroy the power of the nation, and the liberties of their fellow citizens.

[Page] The Constitutionalist says, the Federalist was incorrect in his statement of the occurrences of the meeting; but does not even hint in what he was incorrect, unless it be in the statement made of the publication of the treaty prior to the meeting. The Federalist, after stating the publication of the treaty, in Boston, as allowed to be true by the Constitutionalist, says, the foregoing was the only publication of the treaty, prior to the meeting of the inhabitants on the 10th, except a publication of its supposed contents, by some one who read it: and which, on comparison with Mr. Mason's copy, appears to be incorrect. The Constitutionalist says, "The inhabitants of this town, through the medium of several newspapers, had read nearly a counterpart, in substance, of the treaty, before the arrival of the express from Philadelphia, with Mr. Mason's copy." The only incorrectness, charged against the Federalist, is, in saying, that this counterpart in substance, as it is called, was incorrect. Some of the reasons, on which he said this was incorrect, are as follows, viz.—In the 7th article, as stated in this counterpart, it says, "By this the United States are to refund the value of English prizes taken in our waters, or by privateers fitted out in our ports." In the copy of Mr. Mason, it is not so. The United States are to refund only in such cases, where they forbore to use all the means in their power to obtain restitution. In the counterpart, as it is called, 9th article—"The subjects and citizens of the contracting parties shall hold real estate in each others territories, with the same advantages as the citizens and subjects of the respective states." This is grossly wrong, and well known to have caused much of the zeal excited against the treaty. In the treaty, the holding of lands is limited merely to those who now hold lands, their heirs and assigns. In the 13th article of this supposed counterpart, it is said, that we can carry nothing that we export from the East Indies, to any country but the United States, and that we cannot partake of the India carrying trade. This was an article that gave more umbrage to the inhabitants of Boston than any other.

By inspecting Mr. Mason's copy, it appears, that the goods exported from East India are to be carried to America; that we have an express stipulation for a direct trade to and from India; that we are perfectly free to export from America, to any part of the world, the goods we import from India; that the coasting trade, and the trade from India to other parts of the world, rest on precisely the same sooting as they did before, except that which is stipulated in another article, that they will [Page]not refuse to us any privileges in the trade which they may grant to other nations.

In this counterpart, it is stated, under the 13th article, "As it is difficult to determine the cases in which provisions carried to an enemy are contraband; to avoid dispu [...]e; in these cases, should such provisions be seized, the owners shall be paid for them, also their freight, &c. and a reasonable mercantile pro [...]."

By an examination of the article in Mr. Mason's copy, it appears, that provisions are never to be seized, but in cases where, by the existing law of nations, they are contraband, and even then they are paid for. In the one case, it was a manifest giving up of rights, now enjoyed, of carrying provisions; while, by the accurate copy, it is a clear and decided advantage to our citizens: stipulating for payment of freight, profit, and demurrage, in cases where, by the law of nations, we had forfeited all claim to any thing. Can it be said that the Federalist was wrong in stating, that this counterpart was incorrect?

It is conceded by the Constitutionalist, th [...] this counterpart was what the inhabitants of the town had read and consulted, previous to their meeting, and that the preparatory steps to the town meeting were totally unconnected with Mr. Mason's copy of the treaty—This confirms what the Federalist had suggested, and sully accounts for the warmth that was so visible against the treaty. If, preparatory to the meeting, the real copy had been read and consulted on, there is little reason to doubt, that a majority of the inhabitants would have been well satisfied with it,—The Constitutionalist need not discover his anger, at an imputation, that Mr. Bache excited the patriotism of the petitioners for the town meeting. It was not even hinted by the Federalist. They are perfectly welcome to the whole merit of the thing and to the reputation of their spirited resentment against the treaty, before they had reed i [...]; as the Constitutionalist declares, that some days before the arrival of Mr. Mason's copy, they had drawn their petition for a town meeting.

The Constitutionalist says, the committee could not know what the two ministers, while in the act of forming the treaty, brought into consideration; and, therefore, could not have intended, in the objection, the assertion with which the Federalist charges them. The Federalist did not charge the committee with knowing what the two ministers brought into consideration—He says, they assumed a fact for which they did not choose to give any evidence. He gave in his opinion, that they [Page]did not know; if they did, it would have been stated as the. Federalist presumes.

The Federalist then concluded, that the committee meant, by the words, brought into consideration, that they were not the subject of negociation; that such is certainly the natural meaning of the terms; and it was evidently the design of the committee then; because they go on and state, as objections to the treaty itself, their complaints not being provided for; and nobody could be so uncandid as to believe, th [...] they endeavoured to stretch their objections into many articles, intending the same thing, until the explanation made by the Constitutionalist. He now says, that all the evidence the committee had, on this subject, is derived from these complaints and pretensions not being mentioned in the treaty itself. Then they ma [...] two charges on the same subject: 1st. We object to the weary, because our complaints have not been considered, by which we mean, provided for and allowed; for the Canstitutionalist says, the committee did not know what passed in the negotiation; and 2dly, We object to the treaty, because our conplaints are not provided for and allowed; or else the charge is, that the consideration did not appear in the treaty, that it, that the whole negotiation old not make a part of the treaty—this last would be [...] absurd to impute to any body.

Until the Constitutionalist had stated, that the and objection was not of a sufficient weight to prevent the ratification of the treaty, it was really supposed, that the town meant each of their reasons as a support of their general charge against the treaty, for being derogatory to national honor, &c. &c. but a se [...]s now, that the second objection was only part of a [...] son, whether half a reason, a 10th or 20th pars of a reason, we are not informed—possibly the 20th p [...]; the whole [...] objections forming one reason sufficiently important to prevent ratification; if this be the ease, and the smallest part fails, the objection to its ratification falls. It is said, that the British debts are to be pat in one scale, and the damages for deten [...] of posts in the other; but it seems this would not keep [...] beam even; for Mr. Madison states, that the an [...] loss by detention of posts, amounts to one million two hundred thousand dollars, making more than fourteen millions of dollars; now it is presumed, that this would more than balance the unpaid debts—and the clamour would have been equally great against Mr. Jay and the senate, if a stipulation had not been made for payment of the whole; for it is not to be believed, that men who feel so much more keenly for the public interest than those whom the people have appointed to guard and protect [Page]them, would have quietly given up fourteen millions of dollars, for one million. In answer to an observation made by the Federalist, that damages for detention of territories were rarely, if ever given, after long and expensive wars, terminating in favor of the party dispossessed; it is said, that such is the magnanimity of conquering nations, that they are willing to take the territory demanded, without insisting on any damages. This is a new history of the politics of nations, as well as the feelings of the human heart. Whether true or not, if such would be the issue of a contest for the posts, as seems conceded by the Constitutionalist, it will certainly be considered wise by the people of America, that the minister was willing to take the posts now, without damages for detention, rather than involve his country in war, to obtain them and damages, when even those, who oppose the treaty on this ground, think the issue of a war, would, if we were conque [...]s, give or no more than we now have with peace, and without expense.

A FEDERALIST.

No. VI.

THE Federalist, in his remarks on the third reason of the town, did not mean to state the reasoning of the British, on the 7th article of the treaty of 1783, as in his opinion, conclusive against the demand of the American minister, for the value of negroes embarked from New York, and supposed formerly to have been the property of Americans. In those observations he gave no opinion. The weight of the reply by the British minister, must ever depend on its own intrinsic merit —and every candid American will give to it, all due force. The Federalist stated, that, under such circumstances, it was not supposeable, the British nation would recede from their construction. If that was to be presumed, the agent for America ought not to have adhered to his, as a point indispenfible; because, by breaking off all negociation on that account, be gave up the forts; he gave up all indemnification for our property captured on the ocean, and also the commercial advantages of the treaty.

The merchants of Massachusetts will consider, if they are willing to surrender all claim to their property captured by the British—to saddle themselves with an Indian war, at the annual expense of a million of dollars, in a vain attempt, to gain, [Page]by force, indemnity for a few slaves, once the property of their southern brethren.

The Constitutionalist says, "That after a communication of the treaty to the British general, every species of the property of the American inhabitants, ought to have been held sacred; yet, in the succeeding month, a large number of negroes did embark for the British provinces." It may be true, that a number of negroes did embark for the British provinces; but it by no means follows they were American property.

It is agreed, that all the negroes which were embarked, were found in New York, by Sir Guy Carl [...]ton, and that he arrived there during the war. It is not pretended, that any negroes were taken from their proper masters, or from any parts of the United States, under the controul of the American government after the receipt of the treaty, by the British generals. Those negroes were either property, or they were free people. [...] property, they were as liable to be lost and acquired by the rights of war, as any other property. It is not disputed, that the negroes which embarked from New York, were either captured in war, or invited by a proclamation, declaring they should be free on acceptance of the terms therein proffered. Had the southern gentlemen any more right, under the treaty of 1783, to claim negroes of the first class, than the New England men, their vessels, or other goods, taken during the war? They were both equally property in the view of a so [...] ern merchant. Human [...]n flesh, provided it is black, and a ship, are held in the same light by slave-holders, differing only as [...] their value in the market.—If captured during war, wa [...] not the propeaty completely changed? It was in a vessel; why not then equally so with a slave, which was as much property as a vessel? The Constitutionalist is desired to point out the di [...] ence if there be any.

The other class was composed of such, as induced by the British proclamation, had left their masters, and withdrawn themselves into the British lines. It will not be denied, that this is a rightful mode of depriving an enemy of property. After they had arrived within the British lines, it will not be contended, that the British could deliver them up, without a manifest breach of faith. They had ceased to be American property, as much as a vessel that had drifted from a port in the United States, into a port of the British. Had then the southern citizens any more claim for these negroes, than the New England men for their vessels, drifted from their own, into the port of their enemy? The same reasoning applies to both, and appears just.

[Page] Such has been said to be the reasoning of the British minister in answer to Mr. Jay's repeated applications on this subject. Before Mr. Jay is blamed for not obtaining payment for the negroes, or the senate for consenting to the treaty, though silent on this subject, those who affect to say that the treaty should not be ratified unless compensation is made, ought to give it a satisfactory answer.

But it is said, that Sir Guy Carleton was charged by General Washington, with having violated the treaty, in suffering the embarkation of negroes; that he acknowledged the truth of the charge, by his precautions in ascertaining the number, and thereby gave an indirect opinion that restitution should be made for them. The mere ascertaining the number cannot support this construction. It is equal evidence, that, in his opinion, no claim for restitution could be maintained. Could h [...], a [...] an officer of the British crown, consistently with any of the principles on which men generally act, violate the treaty, and, at the same moment, give to the complaining party, evidence of the violation, when fully within his power to have refused it? It is not presumeable. Examine the words of his letter; and it will appear that he did not admit the possibility of a British minister having made a treaty, that bears such a construction. They are as follow, viz. "The negroes in question, I have already said, I found free when I arrived at New York; I had therefore no right, as I thought, to prevent their going to any part of the world they thought proper.

"I must confess, that the m [...]ve supposition, that this King's minister could deliberately stipulate in a treaty, an [...]g [...]gement to be guilty of a notorious brea [...] of the public faith, towards people of any complexion, seems to denote a l [...]s friendly disposition than I could wish, and I think less friendly than we might expect. After all, I only give my opinion. Every negro's name is registered, the master he formerly belonged [...], with such other circumstances as serve to denote his value, that it may be adjusted by compensation, if that was really [...] intention, and meaning of the treaty. Restoration, where inseparable from a breach of public saith, is, as the world, I think, must allow, utterly impracticable."

The commissioners appointed by General Washington, to superintend the embarkation from New York, and see that no American property was carried away, at the close of the business, make report to him of their doings, wherein they say: "Sir Guy Carleton affected to distinguish between the cases of such negroes as came within the British lines, in consequence of the promises of freedom and indemnity, held out in the [Page]proclamations of his predecessors, and such as came in, either previous to the proclamations, or subsequent to the cessation of hostilities. Negroes of the first description he supposed not included in the treaty, as the public faith had, prior to the treaty, been ple [...]ed to th [...] for their security against the claims of their former masters."

The Constitutionalist wishes to have it believed, that among 3000 negroes, there were none sick, none so young or so old, as to be of little value; that they were all prime slaves; and that free negroes were so enraptured with this land of liberty (where, to be sure, such people are held as slaves) that they would not go with those, who acknowledge them free, and where the laws would protect them with equal security, as in America; and that, under a military government, those who were really slaves, could not be compelled to go with their proper masters. On these, and his observations on the value of so many thousand human beings, the Federalist need make [...] remark. The Constitutionalist much under-rates the understandings of the Americans, if he supposes that any advantage can be derived to his arguments, from such attempts at imposition.

The [...] question before the public is—wo [...]d the British [...] tion [...]c [...]ds [...] a construction that destroyed their public faith? It is not probable they would. What then was the wi [...]est [...]p to be [...] on the part of America? To accept the treaty thus; or, in order to establish a construction, to say the [...], doub [...]l, give up all hopes of obtaining the po [...]ts p [...]ably, s [...]cri [...] our navigation, now [...]ting unprotected, and i [...] ly abandon our c [...]ti [...]e [...]s, whose property has been captured on the oc [...]. No man can doubt but that to undertake a was, for such a purpose, would be the height of madness; that nothing but l [...] and disgrace could follow it. To give to this objection all the consequence that is attempted, betrays extreme thoug [...]ness, if nothing worse—Beside sacrificing all that [...] gai [...] by treaty, it would be wantonly sporting with the treasure and li [...]es of Americans, for an object of dubious right, trivial i [...] its value, and confessedly unattainable.

The Constitutionalist mistakes, if he thinks the Federalist stated that any treaty between the kings of Great Britain and Prussia had regulated the law of nations in that particular case—He stated, that the king of Prussia, in 1753, complained that the property of his subjects had been unlawfully seized on the high seas by British subjects, and condemned—That the answer by the British court was, that all captures at sea were tried by admiralty courts, and that this was the immemorial custom [Page]of Europe. The Constitutionalist says, that this doctrine, though just, does not apply to our cases; that they are not similar.

Of what do the United States complain? of unlawful captures at sea; of what did the king of Prussia complain? of unlawful captures at sea.—The United States and Prussia were respectively at peace, when the captures were made, and Britain at war. What was the doctrine stated, and acknowledged true by the Constitutionalist? "That by courts of admiralty, acting according to the law of nations, and particular treaties, all captures at sea now are, and have been immemorially judged of, in every country of Europe, and submitted to by neutral powers, and that any other method of trial would be manifestly unjust, absurd, and impracticable." This he agrees to be according to the usage of nations—He is desired to point out the distinguishing mark in property claimed by the American merchants, as captured from them by the British, which is not included in the terms all capture [...] at sea. He is desired likewise to show wherein the doctrine [...]id down by Mr. Jefferson [...]es not apply.

In a treaty of peace, made in 1763, between the king of Great Britain, the king of France, and the king of Spain, it is expressly stipulated, that "the d [...]ision of the [...] in time of peace, by the subjects of Great Britain, on the Spaniards, shall be referred [...] [...]rts of justice of the admiralty of Great Britain, conformably to the [...]es [...] among all nations; so that the validity of the [...]id p [...]i [...]s, between the British and Spanish nations, shall be decided and j [...]ged, according to the law of nations, and according to [...], in the courts of justice of the nation who shall have [...] the capture."

In the treaty of peace made between France and Great Britain in 1783, it is stipulated, that the decision of the pri [...] and seizures made prior to the hostilities, shall be referred [...] the respective courts of justice: so that the legality of the said prizes and seizures be decided according to the laws of nations, and to treaties, in the courts of justice of the nation which shall have made the capture, or ordered the seizure.

Thus we see, that after long and expensive war [...] by the most powerful nations on the globe, this mode of trial and obtaining compensation for seizures made in time of peace, was considered right, and acquiesced in. It is not, therefore, probable, that after immense expense of blood and treasure in a war with England, if successful, we should obtain better terms. Is it not wise, then, to accept that with peace, which, in the [Page]most prosperous event of a war, would be all we could expect to gain?

He attempts to derive force to the reason of the town by saying that the United States have agreed to a more summary mode of trial of the British claims; and as an equivalent, they should have granted a like mode. A little attention to the causes of complaint on the part of the British, will show, that a determination by commission will only take place, where it is impossible for the ordinary course of judicial proceedings to reach the evil.—First, The British debts due in 1783. The treaty authorizes commissioners to take cognizance only of such debts as where, by the operation of various impediments, created by law, British creditors have been prevented from obtaining justice, and where judicial courts connot now procure them compensation. If they can obtain justice in the courts of law, they are obliged to resort there. The commissioners cannot sustain their complaints. It establishes this summary mode to compensate for losses, occasioned by our not permitting British creditors to have the advantage of the laws of the land, which was expressly stipulated in the treaty of peace. For redress of our complaints, the courts are open, and what we cannot obtain in this way, shall be made up to us by commissioners. Surely it will not be said, that we have agreed to a more summary mode of trial for British complaints, than they have for American complaints.

The other ground of complaint on the part of the British, is in permitting their vessels to be taken in our ports, or by privateers fitted out in our harbours; and forbearing, for particular reasons, to make use of all the means in our power to prevent their being captured, or to obtain restitution when captured. It is well remembered what the particular reasons were—A foreigner, intent on involving our country in a war, and supported by an unprincipled faction of Americans, created such a ferment as rendered it hazardous to attempt executing the laws.

The government forbore to afford them justice in our courts, at that time. It cannot now; those who then insulted the sovereignty of our country are fled, and have taken the property with them—It would be a mockery of justice to refer the British complainants to our courts, when neither their property, nor the persons who injured them are within our jurisdiction. It will not be pretended that these complaints are in a similar state with ours.

The Constitutionalist concedes that the country occupied by Indians within the British territory, contains, by far, the greatest [Page]proportion of furs, but then it is said, that this is not advantageous, because the British traders can supply their stores from the United States. By his own statement, then, the advantage is double. We can purchase largely of furs, and can pay for them by the sale of goods. Is it disadvantageous to have a new market open, where we can buy a valuable article, either for our use at home, or for exportation to foreign countries? because a market is likewise opened, where we may vend many goods imported from Europe and Asia, at our own prices; for this writer says, by reason of ice in the St. Lawrence, the British traders cannot import goods from Europe more than half the year—and will be obliged to supply their stores from the United States.

In the next paragraph he says—"They will also be able, however extraordinary the grant of this privilege may appear, to import their goods into any port of the United States, and from such Atlantic port transport the same throughout our whole territory, free of an alien duty, upon the same terms as our own citizens"—What this writer would intend here cannot be conjectured—He certainly cannot intend to say, that British subjects can import goods into the Atlantic ports of the United States, at less duties than they did before the treaty—If he does he intends to deceive his readers—There is not a word in the treaty that gives such right—Goods imported into the Atlantic ports by British subjects are liable to the same duties before and after the ratification of the treaty. If they should choose to import all their goods into the Atlantic ports of the United States, and pay us duties, and transport them through our territories, what would be the injury to us? None—We should be great gainers. And no sensible man could ever suppose any other than beneficial consequences, if all the British colonies were to be supplied through the United States.

In the next sentence, the note is entirely changed, and it is there asserted, "that British traders have such large capitals and such connexions with the Indians; and Americans have such small capitals and without such connexions, that the article can be of no advantage to the Americans." His only meaning here can be, that we can neither have a market for importation or exportation. He is requested to reconcile the contradiction between this and the former part of the paragraph; where he gives us to understand that the British traders must be supplied from the United States, because they cannot import more than half the year by sea. He says, "Asiatic goods under the treaty cannot be afforded on better terms, by American citizens, than by British subjects; because the British government reserves [Page]to itself the right of imposing on American vessels entering into the British ports in Europe, a t [...]nnage duty equal to that which shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of America; and also such duty as may be adequate to countervail the difference of duty now payable on the importation of European and Asiatic goods, imported into the United States, in British or American vessels." The Constitutionalist is desired to point out how this article can possibly produce the consequences he predicts, or what relation it has to this subject. We import our Asiatic goods, direct from Asia. We do not import them from any British ports in Europe.

It has not been denied, that Asiatic goods are a third cheaper in the United States than in England, whence the colonists must get them, unless they import them from America. How then can it be said, with or without this wonderful reason, which, with equal aptness, might be applied to increase the clamour on the negro business, that Asiatic goods cannot be afforded on better terms, by American citizens, than by British subjects? He goes on to say, "that more is required than the naked assertion of the Federalist, to prove, that the American citizens will be able to import the goods, that are consumed by the Indians, into the United States, upon better terms than British subjects can import the like merchandizes into the British provinces." It is true, and the knowledge of every reflecting man is what supports the assertion; but, lest the assertion of the Federalist should not be believed, for the reasons given by him, the Constitutionalist endeavours to confirm it, by telling us, that the British traders will have an advantage in buying of us, rather than importing by the river St. Lawrence; that the British can even import into the Atlantic ports of the United States, and thence transport by land into the interior of their own country, on better terms than they can into their own ports.

This writer asserts, "that the British subjects could not enter our ports as freely before the treaty as they may in case of its ratification, for they were before subject to an alien duty, which will be completely suspended by its ratification." The assertion of the Federalist was, "they, speaking of the British, enter our sea-ports as freely now as they can by treaty." This is true; and the Constitutionalist is desired to show a word in the treaty, that lessens the duty now paid, by British subjects, in our sea-ports.

After allowing that the traffic with the Indians is within the British territories, he remarks, that "just removing her posts, over the line of intersection, between the two territories, by [Page]which means her settlers and trading houses, will remain an insurmountable barrier to the traffic of our citizens with the Indians within the British territories." By treaty we have a right to go into all their territories, by land, or inland navigation, not merely to their posts. Pray then, Mr. Constitutionalist, tell us how her settlers and trading houses will be an insurmountable barrier to this trade?

The fur trade, he says, will not be worth a pepper corn, Mr. Jefferson says, "delaying to surrender us the posts cuts us off from the fur trade, which, before the war, had been always of great importance, as a branch of commerce, and as a source of remittance, for the payment of our debts to Great Britain." Mr. Madison stated the fur trade, withheld by the posts, worth 200,000 dollars per annum.—But the article, which admits us into a fur trade, six times greater, to say the least, than that derived from a mere surrender of the posts, this advocate of the committee calls a mere pepper corn!!

The 15th article of the treaty is brought forward as an objection of immense weight against the treaty. Let us see how it stands. It is acknowledged, that British vessels now pay an higher duty in American ports, than American vessels pay in British ports. The parties stipulate to treat for the more exact equalization of duties, within two years after the present war, and agree that, in the interval, the difference now subsisting shall not be increased. This is, in its nature, a very temporary arrangement; and, without an express stipulation, hardly any language can be more strong, that Great Britain will not raise her duties. She must equally raise them on all other nations, if she does on us; and their duties have remained the same for many years.

He asks the Federalist, whether any such article exists in our other treaties. The answer is, no. The reason is, because, at making those treaties, no such difference subsisted, and there was no national government authorized to impose duties. And further, let it be remarked, that this article is equally beneficial to the other powers, with whom we have stipulated not to impose higher duties, than those paid by the most favored nations. The horrible event, therefore, of offending our allies, need not be apprehended from this article.

The Constitutionalist allows, that all the assertions made by the Federalist, respecting the right of nations having colonies, are true; and observes, that there are but few, in this enlightened country, who are so ignorant as not to know, that unless we gain a right by treaty, Great Britain may prohibit our trading, or even entering the ports of her colonial possessions, [Page]without affording us any just cause of complaint. Every admission, then, of American vessels into her colonies must be considered a grant in our favor, of certain acknowledged rights.

It is unnecessary to remark, that by the confession of this writer, he, and those whose cause he attempts to advocate, complain of the article ceding us certain rights in the East Indies, without any just cause of complaint. Having an absolute right, according to the Constitutionalist, to deny us all trade, the permission of even a partial commerce must be considered an advantage gained by the treaty.

The Constitutionalist is requested to point to any thing that we give in exchange for this important trade to the East Indies. Here is the cession of a right which it is acknowledged Great Britain was under no obligation to grant, for which in return we have granted nothing; but they say the treaty wants a reciprocation of benefits from Britain to America.

The Federalist expressed no admiration, nor even an opinion of the writings of Lord Sheffield; he only quoted his words: he has frequently quoted the Constitutionalist—By the same rule it may be concluded, he admires the writings under this signature—to draw such conclusions from such premises, is a species of logic yet unknown to the Federalist—he forbears any further remarks—he writes merely with a view of pointing to the truth—to lead men to think and act for themselves.

The Constitutionalist, after having fully and completely allowed the rights of Britain to an exclusive trade with her colonies, and absolute want of a right in us to trade there, unless ceded by treaty, has the wisdom to contend that we ought not to receive any by stipulation; and that the treaty ought not to be ratified because of an article which gives us a valuable trade to her colonies.

But then he implies that a trade to the East Indies will not be substantially beneficial, because, in his opinion, on comparison with its present advantages, it will not be equally so as now. This may be offered as a sample of logic—it is certainly neither truth nor common sense, to say that a thing cannot be substantially, or positively good, because it has been better.

Goods are usually sold cheaper in Ostend than here—proof offered—they are sometimes imported from that country to this. India goods are sometimes imported from England into America; therefore, they are cheaper there, than here. They are sometimes imported from France into America. According to such reasoning, it would not be difficult to prove that almost every article of commerce is cheaper in every part of the world, with which we trade, than in America. Do merchants never send [Page]goods from one port to another, but when they are dearer in the place sent to, than in the place sent from? This would be to suppose certain knowledge in a merchant of the different markets, in distant quarters of the world, not only of times past and present, but of future times. This would be a kind of prescience extremely valuable, but not yet attained. Do merchants never send goods to a port for a remittance, because they are cheaper in the place sent to than the place sent from? The Constitutionalist says, goods sent from America to the East Indies, are generally sold at a loss.

Suppose, for a moment, that the reason given supports his assertion, what has it to do with our trade to Asia? The true question by a merchant would be, where can I procure Asiatic goods on the cheapest and best terms? If in Ostend, rather than in India, it will be better to import such goods from Ostend than India. But until it can be shown, that India goods can be imported on better terms from Europe, after the merchants have added their profits, than from Asia, it is probable the trade will continue, and be considered a beneficial one, although they are sometimes imported from Ostend.

This reason, though it came out modestly in the first part of the paragraph, in the latter part is made to prove that not only our trade to India will in future not be beneficial, but that we might obtain our India goods in Ostend cheaper than in Asia. What a pity, that this reasoning had not been brought to the public eye, before this late hour. The merchants of Salem and Boston had more than thirty vessels, chiefly ships, in the year 1793, amounting to more than five thousand tons, stupidly pursuing a voyage of fifteen months, at three times the expense that it would have cost them to have obtained the same profits from Ostend, in five months, according to this writer —for the charge of five per cent. to procure bonds exists no where but in his imagination. There is not a word in the treaty rendering bonds necessary. The increase of twenty per cent. likewise, which he has conjured up, has no other foundation. The words of the treaty are, "neither is this article to be construed to allow the citizens of the said states to settle or reside within the said territories, or to go into the interior parts thereof, without the permission of the British government established there; and if any transgression should be attempted against the regulations of the British government in this respect, the observance of the same shall and may be enforced against the citizens of America, in the same manner as against British subjects or others transgressing the same rule." It cannot be denied by any who read this part of the article, that we have the [Page]same right after as before the ratification of the treaty; and a candid man would have thought, that putting our citizens on exactly the same footing as their own, would have rescued this part of it, at least, from censure; especially when we consider the immense expense Great Britain incurs for securing this trade to her own subjects. It is yet possible that the merchants will continue to rely more on their own calculations, than this sublime logic of the schools.

The Constitutionalist agrees that Great Britain may prohibit us from all trade in her East India settlements, without just cause of complaint on our part—That she has stipulated to grant that which we could not claim of right, and which she has not stipulated to grant to any other nation—That having stipulated to grant us certain rights, does not impair her power to permit us the exercise of others—That our rights by permission will be as strong after, as before a ratification of the treaty—Yet he concludes that we are expressly prohibited by treaty from all trade not absolutely granted. This appears to be a palpable contradiction in the Constitutionalist—He may, however, console himself by setting down this remark as a self-evident proposition—He says, "America had certainly a right to expect the same indulgences would have been secured to her citizens in their intercourse to the British settlements in India, as are enjoyed by other nations." (Indulgences—Strange that this writer would use such a term as applying to us from Britain.) Let it be remarked in answer to this observation; that other nations have no indulgences secured to them. Further, Great Britain cannot prohibit us any indulgences without prohibiting them to other nations, according to the 15th article of the treaty, wherein it is said, "Nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the exportation or importation of any articles, to or from the territories of the two parties respectively, which shall not equally extend to all other nations."

He says that "British vessels by the treaty, receive from us indulgences, which are not allowed even to our allies." This is not true—It cannot be supported by a word in the British treaty. And the treaty between us and France, expressly stipulates, that her subjects shall enjoy and receive every right and immunity that other nations do or shall enjoy.

The Constitutionalist supports the 8th reason of the town, by asking, whether in other treaties, there is any stipulation that we will export goods directly from India to America.— The answer is, there is not; and the reason is obvious. No other nation has permitted us by treaty, to go to India. There is no restriction of a trade there, in our treaties with other [Page]powers, because they do not allow us to trade there at all. This may be put down in the class of self-evident propositions. The Federalist rejoices that he has so many; wherever he finds any in the writings of his opponents, he will certainly pay them the tribute of acknowledgment.

He has mentioned some of the errors, and contradictions of the Constitutionalist. There are others so self-evident, that it would be an affront on the public, to suppose they can be read, without being instantly seen and felt.—Such are those on the clause by which Great Britain reserves a right to place her duties on a par with ours. This is an article which appeals so forcibly to our sense of justice for its fitness, that objections to it could not have been thought possible; and it cannot escape the notice of the most cursory observer, that all who attempt to support their objections, constantly assume premises, or draw conclusions so apparently false, as to convince their readers of the very reverse of what they intended.

A FEDERALIST.

No. VII.

THE fourth number of the Constitutionalist in support of the town's committee, "that the reciprocity contained in the treaty, was merely nominal and delusive," offers the 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 28th articles. The observations, therefore, made by the Federalist, on the third, sixth, seventh, tenth, and twenty-eighth articles, and which have remained uncontroverted by the Constitutionalist, have satisfactorily proved, as he trusts, that they are highly beneficial to the United States; that the third opens to us a very lucrative trade, and liberali [...]es the colony system in our favor, more than Great Britain has ever done to any other nation, and more than any other nation has ever done to the United States—which trade, by the acknowledgment of the Constitutionalist, she might have withheld without any just cause of complaint on our part; that the twenty-eighth article secures to our citizens payment for provisions, in cases where, by the existing law of nations, such provisions would have been justly forfeited. It is not denied, that this is the natural and obvious construction of the article; indeed words could not have made this plainer. What then can be the motives of writers who see and confess this to be the true sense of the terms; and, at the same time, assert that "by [Page]this stipulation the United States surrender to Great Britain the right never before restricted, to send certain articles to France, and even legalize her arbitrary seizure of them." Do they think that a falsehood, because it is repeated, can be palmed on the public for truth? Or do they think because they frequently tell of their love for the people, and their respect for an enlightened public, that they can thus insult their understanding, at the expense of truth and common sense?

The ninth article is considered as extremely injurious—and the Constitutionalist has been pleased to remark that British subjects now hold vast tracts of land in the United States, in fee simple, and that American citizens now hold a few rods of land in the British dominions, in fee tail only. Whence this writer assumed this fact is not known—It is believed to exist only in his own imagination.

Among the artifices attempted to impose on the public, none have been more industriously used, than that of exciting an idea in the people, that their lands were to be holden by British subjects, and that this article would even deprive them of their own soil.—The most ridiculous falsehoods have been circulated in conversation, and in the public papers; such as have shown the utmost contempt for the understandings of our fellow citizens, with a view of frightening weak and childish minds. The words of the article merely extend to lands now holden. It gives a British subject no right to buy real estate; he cannot acquire lands by purchase under this article. It contains no other right than is in the treaty of peace; with this addition, that they who now hold lands may convey them by devise or otherwise— Whereas by a rigid construction of the article in the treaty of peace, and the law respecting a right to hold lands by aliens, the best subjects could only hold lands during their lives, and if a descent was cast before a conveyance, the lands became escheated to the government.

Until the last session of congress, any alien, being a free white person, who had resided two years in the United States, and one year in any particular state, and could give satisfactory proof to any court of record, that he was a person of good character, on taking an oath to support the constitution of the United States, might become a citizen of the United States. This naturalized not only the alien, but also all his children under twenty one years of age. Thus cheap and easy was the mode not only of acquiring a right to hold lands, but of most of all the rights that could in any case appertain to a citizen.

The state of Georgia the last winter, sold many millions acres of land, and in their deeds of cession enacted, that if [Page]aliens purchased, they should hold the same, with all the privileges that could appertain to them, if citizens. In the month of May, [...]ast, the state of Connecticut proposed to sell a tract of land, containing several millions of acres—and, in their act, they expressly authorized their committee to make sale of the land, and execute deeds thereof to any persons, whether inhabitants of the United States, or others. It is said, that in the state of Pennsylvania, any aliens may purchase and hold lands. In our treaty with France, Frenchmen are expressly authorized to hold lands. After such an expression of the sense of the people, on the subject of aliens holding lands, it cannot be presumed, that it is in the power of the most ranting madman to impose a belief on the weakest, that a clause in the treaty which permits British subjects to retain and convey the lands they now hold, can be of the smallest evil.

The Constitutionalist says there was no doubt in the ministers who negociated the treaty, as to the name of the river St. Croix, mentioned in the treaty of peace. The ministers themselves say there were doubts, and the senate has acceded that there were doubts as to the name of the said river—whom will the public believe—their own officers, men of their own choosing, and speaking of their own apprehensions, or an anonymous writer, who pretends to know more of the sentiments of men, than they know themselves?*

The 6th article is nominal and delusive, as this writer asserts, because it is not therein stipulated that commissioners shall be appointed to decide on debts due from British subjects to citizens of the United States, and lost by lawful impediments. If such a stipulation had been inserted, it might well have been termed nominal and delusive; for it is well known that there is not the smallest pretence for saying that any lawful impediment exists in Great Britain, since the treaty of peace, against the recovery of debts due to American citizens, by the operation whereof, full and adequate compensation cannot now be obtained in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.

[Page] The quotation from Vattel, respecting the manner in which republics treat with monarchs, is fully agreed by the Federalist —and the character of our envoy, long since established in the grateful remembrance of his countrymen, would not suffer a doubt in the mind of any man, that this equality of republics would be fully vindicated by him. The treaty of commerce, which is the subject of discussion, has only added another proof of his ability, in vindicating the rights of republics. In the treaty of peace, which he, with his compatriots, so ably negociated at Paris, he gave the fullest evidence of his skill and power in treating on equal terms with royal governments, though opposed by an insidious ally, and deceitful court. At that time the same men, who now attempt to destroy his well earned fame, would have prostrated the republic of America at the feet of a royal court, now acknowledged to be the most corrupt and perfidious in Europe. The firmness and abilities of Mr. Adams, the vice-president, and Mr. Jay, saved our country from the disgrace.

The suggestion that the Federalist can be offended by the establishment of a doctrine like that mentioned by Vattel, excites no other emotions in his breast than those of contempt.

From the establishment of the federal constitution to the present moment, there has been a party in the United States, which with unceasing and active malignancy has opposed the freest republic on earth—This party, nevertheless, boasts of its republicanism.

The Constitutionalist in his fifth number, in vindication of the 11th reason of the town, and in opposition to the treaty, because it expressly stipulates, that in case of war, debts, neither public nor private, shall be confiscated, seems to concede that credit has been of great efficacy in producing the prosperity of our country; and that, in the last war, nothing was gained by a sequestration of debts—considers such truths as irrevelant to the subject. Surely if the people are satisfied, that credit has produced and is producing the most conspicuous advantages to this country, they will avoid every thing that tends to impair credit, for by lessening that, they will assuredly lessen their advantages.—If, in the last war, they essayed this method of deriving benefit, and found it unsuccessful, they will call for complete proof of its supposed advantages, before they attempt it again. The question he makes, is—Has the United States a right, by the law of nations, to confiscate such debts? He asserts that they have, and to prove the assertion, quotes Vattel; but either overlooked a very material part of a paragraph, respecting private debts, or for some purpose, did [Page]not choose to bring it into view. Immediately following his first quotations, and between that and his last quotation, are these words—"But at present, in regard to the advantage and safety of commerce, all the sovereigns of Europe, have departed from this rigour; and as this custom has been generally received, he who should act contrary to it, would injure the public faith; for strangers trusted his subjects only, from a firm persuasion, that the general custom would be observed." Vattel is here speaking of debts, due from individuals of one nation to those of another; and this is the writer quoted by the Constitutionalist, to support the right of confiscating private debts. Which are we most to admire at, the weakness of the committee's advocate, or his audacity in thus attempting to impose on the public?

If we had occasion to remark on the meanness and falsity of conduct in excluding an intermediate passage that so completely destroyed a doctrine the Constitutionalist was labouring to support, we can feel nothing but contempt for a writer who insults the public understanding, by making the following quotation, viz.—"A state at war, does not so much as touch the sums which it owes to the enemy. Every where, in case of a war, funds credited to the public, are exempt from confiscation and seizure." And then asserts, that he has demonstrated, that "a right to sequester or confiscate monies in the public s [...]nds, does exist according to the law of nature and nations."

The Constitutionalist says, "the situation of European nations, might have led them to this custom, but they have not recognized the same by any national compacts or treaties." The word custom, as quoted from Vattel, referred to private debts, as any one may see, who will turn to Vattel, 3d book, chap. 5th, sect. 77.

The Constitutionalist, with his usual disposition to pervert the truth, applies it to the last quotation from Vattel, which respects monies credited to the public. The Constitutionalist further asserts, in speaking of a right to confiscate debts generally, "the exercise of this right, has never yet been restricted by treaty. It has, by common consent, rested entirely with the wisdom and humanity of nations."

These assertions of the Constitutionalist, are absolutely untrue, There is scarcely a treaty made in the last century between any of the European nations, but what restricts the right to confiscate debts, and recognizes the doctrine, as laid down by Vattel, to have originated from custom. In the treaty between Russia and Great Britain, 12th article, it is stipulated, "that if the peace should come to be broke, the persons, ships, and [Page]commodities, shall not be detained, or confiscated; but they shall be allowed, at least, the space of one year, to sell, dispose, or carry off their effects;—and they shall farther be permitted, either at or before their departure, to consign the effects which they shall not as yet have disposed of, [...]o such persons as they shall think proper, in order to dispose of [...]hem as they desire, and for their benefit; which debts the debtors shall be obliged to pay in the same manner as if no such rupture had happened." In the treaty made between Spain and Great Britain, in the year 1667, is the following article; "if a war shall happen, the respective subjects and people shall have notice thereof, given them in time, viz.—six months to transport their merchandize and effects, without giving them in that time, any molestation or trouble, or retaining or embarrassing their goods or persons." In the treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, concluded in 1642, the 18th article is as follows; "in case of difference, two years are allowed on both sides, to transport their merchandizes and goods, and, in the mean time, there shall be no injury or prejudice, done to any person or goods, on either side." In the treaty between Russia and Denmark, 35th article, it is stipulated, "merchants shall have a year to depart, may sell, part with, or remove their effects, and those who owe them money, shall be obliged to pay their debts, equally as if no rupture had happened." In the treaty made between France and Great Britain, in the year 1786, it is agreed, in the 2d article, "that if at any time there should arise any misunderstandings, breach of friendship, or rupture between the crowns of their majesties, the subjects of each of the two parties, residing in the dominions of the other, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade therein, without any manner of disturbance, so long as they behave peaceably, &c. &c. and in case their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should be obliged to order them to remove, the term of twelve months shall be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they may remove with their effects and property, whether intrusted to individuals or to the state."

The 20th article of our treaty with France, the 3d of that with the United Netherlands, and the 23d with that with the king of Prussia, restrict the exercise of this right which the Constitutionalist says, never has yet been restricted by treaty. —What confidence can be placed in a writer, who makes such false assertions, to induce the people to adopt principles which are exploded by all the civilized world; and which, even the barbarians of Algiers have abandoned, as too disgraceful for their character?

[Page] After a review of the assertions of the Constitutionalist, in his 5th number, none can wonder at his attempts to ridicule morality, and his exclamations at what he is pleased to call a saint-like zeal against injustice.

After all, the public cannot avoid the conclusion, that writers like the Constitutionalist, who object to the treaty, on account of the article respecting the confiscation of debts, are guilty of the grossest affectation. For no one can suppose, from the display they are pleased to make of their own principles, that any restriction by treaty would bind them to respect the rights it contracted for.

A FEDERALIST.

Mercer County Resolutions. At a numerous Meeting of the Freemen of Mercer County (Kentucky) at the Court-house in Harrisburgh, on the 22d Day of September, 1795 (being the Court Day for the said County) the Time and Occasion of the Meeting having been previously advertised—The following Resolutions were unanimously agreed to, and ordered to be printed.

RESOLVED, as the opinion of this meeting, That Humphrey Marshall, one of the senators from this state in the congress of the United States, has betrayed the trust reposed in him, by voting for the conditional ratification of the treaty, lately concluded between America and Great Britain, and has thereby proved himself unworthy the confidence of the people of Kentucky.

Resolved, therefore, That it be recommended to the legislature of this state, to instruct the said Marshall to vote against any further ratification of the said treaty upon every future occasion on which it may be brought before the senate; and to refuse his assent to any other treaty with Great Britain, which shall sacrifice the honor, the faith, the independence, the just privileges, or the true interest of the United States.

Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting, That that part of the federal constitution, by which it is declared, that the senators in congress shall hold their offices for a term of six years, is dangerous to the liberties of America, destroys their responsibility, and may enable them to carry into execution, schemes regnant with the greatest evils.

[Page] Resolved, therefore, That it be recommended to the legislature of this state, to instruct our representatives in congress, to propose an amendment to that constitution, by which the time of the service of the senators shall be abridged, and by which it shall also be declared lawful for the legislature of a state, to recall its senator, during the time for which he shall be elected, and to make a new appointment, for the residue of the term.

FROM THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES. American Commerce in Europe.

MR. FENNO,

OUR commerce in Europe, hath been of late carried on chiefly in our own shipping, which accounts, in part, for their wonderful augmentation in number and size. Part of our commerce to Europe is, in fact, an indirect West India trade; the jealous policy of Spain, having led her to shut her West Indies to all nations, we have, with some exceptions, been included in the universal prohibition: but, on the other hand, wanting our supplies, she takes them at Cadiz, St. Andero, Ferrol, &c. and transports the flour from thence, in her own ships, to the Havanna, Curracoa, &c. Even this is a much better footing for us than Britain proposes in the 70 tons article; because it gives our shipping a freight to Europe, in common times, of one to one and an half dollar per barrel, forming an immense object of profit to the United States; which, indeed, augments the price to the Spanish planter in the West Indies; but is not otherwise injurious to us than as it hampers and makes circuitous the intercourse with our neighbours, and shows a strange conduct in the government, whose subjects must eat stale and dear flour by this circuitous channel, when they might have it so much cheaper and fresher, direct. Our chief trade in Europe with Spain, therefore, consists in a sale of flour for her West Indies, which we are chiefly paid for in specie, or bills on London of equal value, remitted in payment for manufactures we take from Britain. With the Italian states we have but little intercourse: they produce grain and rice in abundance, usually, themselves: tobacco and fish are the only articles we could sell to advantage there; but for this we must wait, not till the nations of Europe make peace, but till we can make peace with Algiers and Morocco, which, I suppose, will happen [Page]by and b [...] Portugal and the Canaries take off considerable quantities of grain and lumber for their own consumption; it goes, generally, in our vessels, and we are paid partially in wines, but chiefly in bills on London, which so far goes to pay off our balance to England. With respect to France, our trade is generally in grain, flour, tobacco and rice, in that quarter: —the peace must benefit this immensely; for it is to be presumed the republic will not suffer, as formerly, farmers general to monopolize tobacco, and British ships to carry it, to our and their great prejudice: I anticipate, therefore, an immense increase, at the peace, in our commercial concerns with our good old friends and allies. Our chief trade in England is in buying her manufactures, for which we pay in the balances due us from the rest of Europe. Holland takes off rice and tobacco, and pays partially dry goods, but chiefly in bills of exchange. The Hanse towns, the 12th article would have nearly destroyed our trade with, which is growing immensely important in supplying Germany, the Swiss, &c. with the surplus West India produce, we receive for our trade to Hispaniol [...], &c. It is supposed upwards of 400 large ships are now employed in this commerce, which must all have been put out of employ by the 12th article, had it prevailed. We receive from the Hans [...] towns a few goods of the Baltic, but chiefly bills on London to pay for manufactures there. From Russia we import canvas, hemp, iron, tallow, &c. and pay partially in New England rum, but chiefly, I believe, in bills on London, arising from other branches of our commerce.

A. B.

Savannah Address to the President.
Copy of the Address to the President of the United States, which accompanied the Proceedings* of the Citizens, convened in the City of Savannah, on the 1st Day of August, 1795. To the President of the United States of America.

SIR,

THIS accompanies the proceedings of a very considerable number of the citizens of the United States, convened in the city of Savannah, for the purpose of taking into consideration [Page]the impending treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, expressive of their sentiments thereon.

To a people who feel for their country, and have its welfare at heart, it must be a very unpleasant task to complain of public measures; but whatever painful sensation it may excite, it is a duty they owe to themselves and posterity to notice any act militating against their rights and interests. In this light we have viewed the treaty; and under that impression have stated our objections, which we hope will appear to be well founded.

We feel a confidence, sir, that in laying our grievances before you, they will be attended to; and that the man who was so instrumental in establishing our rights and liberties, will not take any step to impair them.

In giving our opinions on so momentous a subject, we conceive that we have expressed the sentiments of a large majority of the citizens of this as well as of the other states. Should this be the case, we doubt not but you will meet the wishes of your country, by withholding your signature from a treaty, which, if ratified, will be productive of the most ruinous consequences to the United States.

By order of the citizens, N. W. JONES, Chairman.

Savannah, Georgia, August 1, 1795.

PRESIDENT'S ANSWER.
To Noble Wimberly Jones, Esq

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of the 1st inst. with the proceedings of the meeting at Savannah, relative to the treaty lately negociated between the United States and Great Britain.

My determination on this important subject, and the general principles upon which it has been formed, have been already promulgated to the public. Next to the consciousness of having discharged my duty, according to my best judgment, nothing could have afforded me a greater pleasure, than to have found my decision consistent with the wishes of my fellow citizens. On this occasion I have, however, been directed by the great principle which has governed all my public conduct—a [Page]sincere desire to promote and secure the true interest of my country.

With due respect, I am, Sir, your obedient, GO. WASHINGTON.

Lexington Resolutions.
At a Meeting of the Inhabitants from sundry Parts of the Commonwealth, at the Court-house in Lexington (Kentucky) on Friday the 28th Day of August, 1795; the Treaty, lately concluded on by Lord Grenville and John Jay, was fully discussed, and the following Resolutions unanimously agreed to.

RESOLVED, That the citizens now assembled have the undoubted right, at all times, to express their opinions publicly, on every measure of government, and that on none can it more behove them, than on the proposal of a treaty with any foreign power, as a treaty is not constitutionally a subject of discussion in the house of the people's immediate representatives.

That the treaty concluded on by John Jay with the British government, contains a catalogue of terms and conditions, shameful to the American name;

Because the American character is disgraced by its very language, it being on the part of Great Britain, couched in terms haughty and imperious, and on the part of America, in language submissive and humiliating.

Because it does expressly contraven [...] our treaty with our only natural allies, the French, and it is thereby a base infraction of the rights of amity and gratitude, which they are entitled to from us; in behalf of a government who cordially despise us, and who, in conjunction with their allies the Indians, have never ceased to spill our blood, and plunder our property for twenty years.

Because it has let the subjects of this hostile and treacherous government into a participation of our right to navigate the Mississippi, and has thereby dispelled every hope of obtaining an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain on that subject.

Because, by it, we tamely and submissively agree to receive, when it suits the British king, the posts on the lakes, without any concessions or reparation for their detention.

[Page] Because Jay has dared to cede, and that to British subjects, a part of the American soil, and has, moreover, submitted the bounds of such cession, to the discretion of the British king.

Because the whole of the British debts, with interest, are saddled, ultimately, on the whole people of the United States; a thing not ever asked for, or expected by the most griping creditor.

Because it has waved all claim for the value of the negroes plundered and carried off in violation of the treaty of 1783, to the total ruin of many of the owners.

But lastly and principally, because this government is and has long been totally destitute of that, without which, treaties become only plots and robberies, FAITH. Her magnanimity shows itself, through the Indian's tomahawk and scalping knife; her friendship in the Algerine cruisers; and her truth, honesty, and justice, in violating the treaty of 1783, in detaining the posts, in her commercial regulations, and in her late robberies of the American vessels.

The alliance of such a corrupt, degenerate, and sinking government, ought religiously to be avoided by the American people.

That H. Toulmin, James Hughes, and James Brown be a committee to prepare an address to the president, expressive of our sentiments upon this subject, and that they make a report to this meeting at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, on the next Fayette court day.

Adjourned to meet at the court-house at the time above mentioned.

JOHN CAMPBELL, Chairman,

JOHN NANCARROW, Clerk.

Williamsburgh Proceedings.
At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of Williamsburgh, District of Georgetown (South Carolina) on Saturday the 5th of August, 1795, to consider, communicate, and report their Sentiments on the impending Treaty between the United States and the Court of Great Britain—Captain William Frierson was un [...] nimously called to the Chair.

AFTER a calm, dispassionate and mature discussion of every article of said treaty, the following declaration and resolutions were agreed to:

[Page] Actuated neither by party spirit, prejudice nor malevolence; uninfluenced by the proceedings of the unwise and intemperate; strangers to intrigue, but (we hope) fortified against it; we declare our sentiments of our present political situation to the world.

At a time when another nation is struggling to secure liberty, it becomes us to be watchful of our own. Nineteen years have now elapsed since the independence of our country was declared; our blood, our treasure, and the lives of many of our friends and fellow citizens, were sacrificed to purchase it. We conceive that we should be unjust to our lives, and traitors to our country, to remain silent when insidious attempts are made to wrest from us our dearest privileges. As a portion of the people we feel as they do, and our interests are inseparable. Attempts have been made to vilify the people, by traducing the popular societies, loading them with slander, contumely, with every epithet of reproach, and representing them as enemies to their country, and disturbers of the public peace; these "self-created societies," the organs of the public mind, the guardians of the rights of the people, like to the hundred eyes of Argus in preventing illicit intrigues, will be dreaded, despised, or censured, by none but the guilty and base. An honest man, whether in the humble paths of private life, or in public national trust, need never be afraid of the strictest scrutiny.—The designs of the traitor as of the private assassin, may be known only to himself: but overt actions speak for themselves. When the base designs and conduct of men in authority are so glaring, it is a duty, which every man owes to his country, to come forward to declare his sentiments and expose such as have abused their power and perverted their trust. Such are the principles and such has been the conduct of Mr. Jay, as appears from his former opinions, and late conduct as envoy; by his principles, always favorable to the unjust claims of our former enemy, and by his conduct attempting to undermine the liberties of his fellow citizens, to load them with unmerited obloquy, and to raise up this monster of aristocracy, the enemy of mankind, and the scourge of nations. We are sorry that we have not been disappointed in our expectation of Mr. Jay's negociation; but we are deceived in the object of his mission: we were told that he was sent to demand the delivery of the western posts and compensation for our domestics, carried away by the British plunderers, as the former treaty of peace gave us a right to demand; we were told that he was instructed to demand satisfaction for the depredations committed on our merchant vessels and goods, on the high seas; but we were never told, that he had any instructions [Page]to form a treaty, insulting to our national honor, prejudicial to our domestic happiness, and injurious to our rights and interests, as citizens of a free nation. The event, however, has justified our opinion of the envoy, and our expectation of his negociation.

Resolved, therefore, That feeling indignant at the many attempts made by some of our men in trust against the exercise of our rights in endeavouring to bring us under the tyrannical insolence of Great Britain, we will co-operate with our fellow citizens, on every just and lawful occasion, in opposing and counteracting every attempt to degrade the citizens of America.—That although peace is the greatest of all blessings, yet war, with all its attendant horrors, is to be preferred rather than to accept of it at such disgraceful and dishonorable terms as are held forth to us in said treaty.

Resolved, That we consider this treaty as militating against the principles of our constitution, as subjecting the commerce of this country to Britain—as a surrender of the power of congress to form commercial regulations; and in particular as hostile to the people of France, with whom we ought to be on the terms of friendship, if we were under no obligations of gratitude, and if we had not been bound by a former treaty with that nation.

Resolved, That in the present situation of this country, we conceive treaties with any foreign power, not only unnecessary, but impolitic, and especially with Great Britain, who has not fulfilled the former treaty of peace, and whose faith cannot be depended on.

Resolved, That our fellow citizen Charles Pinckney, has our warmest thanks, for his noble, manly, and spirited speech* delivered at the meeting in the city of Charleston, on the 22d of July, and printed in the City Gazette of the 4th instant.

Resolved, That our fellow citizen, Pierce Butler, has merited the thanks of all his constituents that are real friends to their country, for his steady and patriotic opposition in the senate of the United States, to the aforesaid treaty; we present him ours, unfeignedly; and we hold in high estimation the other minority members of the senate of the United States, on the 24th of June last.

Ordered, That the chairman and secretary do sign these resolutions, and that they be printed in the City Gazette, that our opinion of men and measures may be made known.

WILLIAM FRIERSON, Chairman,

JAMES BURGESS, Sec'ry.

[Page]

Laurens County Proceedings.
At a Meeting of the Citizens of Laurens County (South Carolina) at the Court-house thereof, on Wednesday, the 1 [...]th of August, 1795—Sylvanus Walker, Esquire, in the Chair.—

ON motion, resolved, That five persons be chosen, by ballot, as a committee to report on the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, between the United States and his Britannic majesty, on Wednesday, the 19th instant, at the said court-house; and upon counting the votes, it appeared that the following gentlemen were chosen: Thomas Wadsworth, John Hunter, Samuel Saxon, Lewis Saxon, and Sylvanus Walker, Esquires.

On motion, resolved, That this committee do draw up an address to major Pierce Butler, approving his conduct with respect to the said treaty, as, also, to testify their resolution to support him in this and every laudable action.

The meeting adjourned till Wednesday, the 19th instant, at 10 o'clock, A. M. when

The committee met, according to adjournment, in the presence of a numerous collection of the citizens of the county aforesaid.

Sylvanus Walker, Esquire, resigned, and Jonathan Down [...], Esquire, was called to the chair.

Resolved, That the treaty of amity, &c. be read, and that it be taken into consideration, paragraph by paragragh; and laid before the citizens, together with the report and resolutions of the committee; and, upon taking their opinion on the same, it was unanimously agreed, that the report and resolutions be adopted, which are as follow:

The committee, to whom their fellow citizens referred the consideration of the treaty, signed at London, on the 19th of November, 1794, between his Britannic majesty and the United States, called a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, report—That they have investigated the same, as time and circumstances would permit, and are of opinion, that it cannot be the basis of amity and friendship; because, on the one side, it is arrogant and dictatorial, and, on the other, pusillanimous and submissive.

Therefore, resolved, That it is the opinion of the citizens of Laurens county, in the state of South Carolina, that the following, among the other objections, ought, of right, to obstruct its ratification.

[Page] 1. The preamble is an open declaration, that the merits of the complaints and pretensions of the contracting parties shall not be taken into consideration.

2. The 1st article of the treaty abrogates laws of the different states, and makes provision for the return of persons who were banished only for crimes of the deepest dye, a sight of whom will open the wounds which time had kindly cicatrized.

3. The 2d article has done, for the enemies of the United States, what neither a seven years war, nor eleven years peace could accomplish; it gives them protection in our bosom, while they continue to demonstrate the most inveterate hatred, both against our citizens and government. It procrastinates the evacuation of posts held by British forces within our boundaries, which, by right and sound policy, ought to have preceded all negociation. It even holds that up as a favor granted, which the United States ought to have demanded as their right. —Besides, the United States make a cession, the limits of which to them are unknown, as his majesty may (for ought they know) have granted to the above described persons, all the lands within their precincts or jurisdiction, and which, by this treaty, the United States guarantee to them the quiet possession of.

4. The 3d article is not only altogether partial in favor of Britain, but authorizes an intercourse between the subjects of his Britannic majesty and the Indians within the territories of the United States, which will be a constant source of irritation and disturbance, and may finally lead the United States into a war, not only with the Indians, but the British themselves, which this treaty ought to have made provision against.

5. By the 6th article, the United States undertake to make good such losses on debts to British creditors as have been occasioned by legal impediments, when no such impediments have existed in any of the states that did not equally apply to citizens of the same; and because no indemnification is made to the citizens of the United States, for property taken from them at the close of the war, the restitution of which is provided for by the treaty of 1783.

6. We think the 7th article, as it respects the injured citizens of the United States, altogether illusory, and calculated only to deceive, while the United States are bound to make good the damage (not done by our citizens, but) committed by other nations on our coasts.

7. The 9th article gives to aliens some of the precious rights of citizens, while they continue without the controul [Page]of the federal and state governments; which we think both unjust and impolitic.

8. The 10th article cedes what the United States most indubitably ought to retain; and more especally so respecting Britain, the whole of whose conduct towards the United States and citizens thereof, has been limited by the want of power more completely to distress us. By this article, the United States cede the only possible present means of restraining that wanton nation in her unbounded insults, which she has (since first capable) offered to all nations. It is also an undue restraint on the powers of congress, constitutionally committed to them by the people of the United States, and ought never to be abridged by treaty.

9. By the 12th article, the United States obtain his majesty's consent to supply his subjects in the West Indies with the prime articles of life; and even that, in the first instance, in a most cramped manner, and subject to such regulations, in future, as the British government shall think fit to impose; for which ideal favor, the United States have ceded a most lucrative branch of the carrying trade, and agreed to give British ships a preference in our own ports, in transporting all West India goods, and even cotton, the produce of our own states. As this article is temporary, it declares that, before its expiration, the contracting parties will endeavor further to regulate the said trade, as the then situation of his majesty may require, without mentioning the situation of the United States. It also postpones the consideration, whether neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property, until after the close of the present war, during which time, America being at peace, ought to have been her great harvest.

10. The 17th article is a formal acknowledgment, that Britain is the legitimate legislator of the marine world; that the orders of her admiralty shall be considered as the law of nations. This unequivocal declaration of what shall be right, in future, will, doubtless, have weight in determining what is past, and not only preclude the recovery of our most equitable demands, for unheard-of (in the history of any civilized nation) depredations made on our commerce, but also lead our allies to distrust our fidelity, by which our citizens may lose their property, and the United States their allies.

11. The 18th article is a sacrifice of American commerce to British interest.—Our produce, of almost every kind, is contraband in time of war (which, for the last hundred years, has, with Britain, been three of war to four of peace) during which, in future, Britain has only to declare the world in a [Page]state of blockade, and the United States must trade with her, or no where.

12. The 20th and 21st articles create doubts, what construction the British mean, in future, to give to the word Pirate. —Should an American be robbed of his property, by a British privateer or ship of war, on the high seas, would he be permitted to expatriate himself and take a commission under some power at war with his Britannic majesty, in order to make reprisals! or, if he did, might he not, by this treaty, be taken, tried, and suffer as a pirate, when he is pursuing the only mode in his power, in order to obtain restitution for unmerited injuries, and which his country, by this treaty, has refused to redress?

If he may be thus taken and suffer, we think it unjust, while the barbarous practice of privateering is carried on to such unheard-of lengths by that wanton nation: at the same time, the United States allowing, nay, even compelling persons emigrating to this country to expatriate themselves, before they can become citizens of these states.

13. In the 23d article, his Britannic majesty pretends to grant, as a favor, what the most barbarous nations seldom refuse, viz. giving aid in distress.

14. The 24th and 25th articles have a direct tendency to lead our allies to doubt, whether we are not inimical to them and their cause, which (as it respects the people) is not true, however it may be with the government.

Whereupon, resolved, That it is the opinion of the citizens of this county, that, if the said treaty should be ratified, the United States, so far as it respects their commercial situation, are far worse than colonial.

Resolved, That the thanks of the citizens of this county be given to the ten patriotic senators, who voted against the ratification of the said treaty, in the senate of the United States.

Resolved, That the thanks of the citizens of this county be given to S. T. Mason, one of the senators from Virginia, for his firmness in publishing the treaty, so long kept secret from the good citizens of these states, by which means they are made sensible of their dangerous situation, and enabled to express their disapprobation thereof.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of the citizens of this county, that the said treaty has a general tendency to mislead the people, and to restrict the legislative powers of congress, and is a most flagrant violation of the federal constitution.

[Page] Resolved, That the citizens of this county do approve of the proceedings of the citizens of Charleston, in their address to the president of the United States, requesting him not to ratify the said treaty.

Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing proceedings, attested by the chairman, be immediately transmitted to the honorable John Mathews, Esquire, chairman of the citizens of Charleston, and that he be requested to notify the same to the president of the United States.

On motion of the citizens of this county, resolved, That thanks be given to the select committee of the same, for their care and firmness with regard to the treaty.

Resolved, That the address to Major Butler, presented by the committee, be adopted, and a copy thereof sent to him.

True extracts of the proceedings, attest. the 20th day of August, 1795, by JONATHAN DOWNS, Chairman.

TO CITIZEN PIERCE BUTLER.

SIR,

YOUR fortitude excites our admiration, your virtue, our esteem, and your attention to our interest, our gratitude. Be assured your opposition, in the federal senate, to the ratification of the treaty, signed at London on the 19th of November, 1794, has our fullest approbation, and merits, our warmest applause and firmest support. We, sir, have examined it with care, and anxiously sought that reciprocity which is so artfully held up as the basis of friendship; but, to our great surprise, only find it cautiously worded, and wonderfully calculated to deceive the good citizens of these states, by holding up phantoms as though they had existence, and representing ideal as though they were real advantages. We conceive it altogether illusory, as to any sensible or possible good that can result to the United States as a government, or the citizens thereof as individuals. We are sorry to say, that in this treaty, we behold our constitution violated, our commerce bartered for illusions, our allies justly led to distrust us, and we ourselves made the sport of caprice and British polities. We think the treaty altogether nugatory, as to the end proposed, and highly derogatory [Page]to us as sovereign states. We lament there were no more, yet we rejoice there were so many, in the senate, who spoke the language and acted the will of the people. This is but a tribute due to patriotism, and we rejoice, sir, to pay it to you. While natives forge the language and sentiments of free-born citizens of these states, what do we behold! A man not by chance of birth an American, but one by reason and by choice, who is more firmly attached to the federal government, and the dignity thereof, that even its indigenous sons. Our hope, sir, is, that you will stand fast in virtue, be firm and true to the rights of the people; then will we not fail to do you justice as you pass through life; nor shall history record those virtuous acts but with eclat, and say to posterity, This man, this SENATOR, deserved well of his country.

By virtue of a resolve of the citizens of Laurens county, met at the court-house of the same, on the 19th day of August, 1795, you are addressed by,

Sir,

your most obedient and very humble servant, JONATHAN DOWNS, Chairman of the Committee.

FROM THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER. Striking Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

CITIZEN OSWALD,

The following Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, with Great Britain, are presented, through the Medium of your Independent Gazetteer, to the serious Consideration and calm Reflection of the Citizens of the United States.

I. IT begets a base and unnatural political connexion between a republican government and a monarchy.

II. It sacrifices to that connexion, past injuries, a reparation for wrongs, and the most essential interests of commerce, that an independent nation can yield.

III. It prostrates the constitution of the United States, at the feet of the president and senate, rendering that fundamental charter of our rights any thing or nothing, as the president and senate shall, in their discretion, by treaty determine.

[Page] IV. It declares war against the independent and constitutional rights of congress, by attempting to take away their power to decide on any question similar to those proposed in the session of congress before the last, by Messrs. Madison, Dayton, and Clarke: viz.

1. Mr. Madison's, for restricting the commerce with Great Britain.

2. Mr. Dayton's, for sequestering British property.

3. Mr. Clarke's, for suspending the commercial intercourse with Great Britain.

V. It enlarges the ground of this warfare, by attempting to divest congress of the power

To regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes;

To levy and collect duties of impost and excise;

To define and punish piracies on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations;

To grant letters of marque and reprisal;

To declare war—

An which powers are, by the constitution of the United States, expressly vested in congress.

VI. It seeks to maintain this warfare, by arraying the president and senate, supported by Great Britain, on one side, against the representatives of the people, their constituents, and the constitution of the United States, on the other side; thus introducing foreign intrigue and influence into our public councils and domestic politics, and engendering causes of disaffection, disunion, and intrigue.

VII. It insidiously aims to dissolve all connexion between the United States and France, and to substitute a monarchic, for a republican ally; virtually, if not expressly, violating our neutrality, in the following instances:—

1. By admitting and legalizing seizures for adjudication, in all cases of suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or of carrying to the enemy, articles which are contraband of war.

2. By declaring to be contraband "all timber for ship-building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp and cordage, and, generally, whatever may serve directly for the equipment of vessels."—ALTHOUGH GREAT BRITAIN, IN HER COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE, HAD HERSELF DECLARED THOSE VERY ARTICLES NOT TO BE CONTRABAND.

3. By admitting seizures of vessels laden with provisions, in all cases, under the frivolous pretext of "difficulty of agreeing [Page]on the precise cases, in which alone, provisions and other articles not generally contraband, may be regarded as such."

4. By placing Great Britain on the footing of the most favored nation, and stipulating "That no prohibition shall be imposed on the exportation or importation of any articles, to or from the territories of the two parties, respectively, which shall not extend to all other nations."

5. By bettering the condition of Great Britain, pending the war with France; thereby increasing her resources, and enabling her to prosecute and continue the war with that republic.

VIII. It records and perpetuates the dishonor of America, and the political depravity of her government; exhibiting the sad spectacle of the United States, servilely cringing to the corrupt monarchy of Great Britain, for a close and intimate alliance, at the sacrifice of the most essential political and commercial interests; whilst, pointing the finger of hostility to France, it seeks, in the hour of her difficulty and distress, to wound that magnanimous republic, which was no less the instrument of American emancipation from British tyranny and oppression, than she is now the guarantee of that independence, which we have thus so shamefully abused, by negociating the present inglorious and disgraceful treaty.

AMERICANUS.

"There is nothing new under the sun."

THAT I deny; for it must be a new thing to all the world to read the sentiments of the president of the United States, who know that he is the same identical man who was, during the late American war, the commander in chief of the American army.

As a small proof—in his late answer to the merchants and traders in the city of Philadelphia, who approved of the treaty, he has the following very extraordinary expression: "Such sentiments, deliberately formed, and proceeding from men whose interests are more immediately concerned than those of any other class of citizens."

Has the adulation, which has been poured upon him, from all quarters, for these twenty years past, so bewildered his senses, that, relinquishing even common decency, he tells 408 [Page]merchants and traders of the city of Philadelphia, "that they are more immediately concerned than any other class of his fellow citizens," in a treaty, which embraces so many various and important objects, in no respect connected with trade or commerce?

A treaty so repugnant to the sentiments of the best patriots of this country, as to have occasioned a manly, firm, but constitutional opposition, from one end of the continent to the other.

An opposition which he ought to have respected—an opposition which must and will be respected—an opposition that [...], ultimately, while constitutionally, enforce all that success which it so justly merits.

A treaty which children cannot read without discovering that it tends to disunite us from our present ally, and unite us to a government which we abhor, detest, and despise.

A government, which, in compliance with his sentiments, often expressed in the most energetic terms, when he was our worthy commander in chief, our children were learned to lis [...] their detestation of.

Has that government altered its system of arrogance and despotism? Or has he altered his sentiments of freedom?

That it continues the same, is certain; that the is greatly changed, I most firmly believe.

Should this conduct produce a serious rupture amongst ourselves (which God forbid) how many of these 408 would court the honor of being his body guard, provided he should think proper to expose himself to danger?

How many of them have most fervently prayed for his and our destruction, during the late war?

Ought he not to have considered, that many amongst those who addressed him from the same city, requesting that he would not ratify the treaty, stood, in the public view, amongst the foremost and most sincere friends of their country; and are employed, at this moment, in some of its highest offices and trusts?

Does his answer to them, in point of complaisance and politeness, though they consist of several thousands, bear any analogy to that transmitted to the 408 merchants and traders?—Who, I hope, to prevent mistakes, will for ever hereafter be distinguished by the significant title of, "The president's 408 respectable friends in the city of Philadelphia."

And, that their real respectability may be more fully verified, I most sincerely hope, further, that their absolute occupations—the yearly amount of their dealings—their political sentiments [Page]and actions during the late war—the length of time they have been real citizens of America, &c. will be exhibited to public view, by some impartial biographer, in a handsome volume, neatly gilt and lettered, like themselves.

But why should I go farther than this state, to show the impropriety of his expression, or the respectability of those who oppose his present wishes?

At his own table (it was an expression made use of for the public ear, or it would not now be revealed by me) I have heard him observe, in an hour of his own and of his country's most extreme distress, that "the people of the United States ought to be particularly thankful to a kind Providence, through whose conspicuous bounty, George Clinton had been appointed governor of the state of New York;" and yet this very Mr. Clinton, if I am not very much misinformed, is as unshaken an opponent to the treaty, as any man in the United States.

Let me ask, on the other hand, who are the most numerous, the only consolidated class of inhabitants (for many of them are not citizens) who speak in favor of it?

The answer flushes on my mind quick as lightning: every m [...]n, who, in our struggle for obtaining a right to establish that government which enabled us to fix the president in his present exalted station, was known to him and us, as our individual and joint enemy, by the despicable title of tory, as he and we then esteemed, in a political point of view, the men of that description.

But, gracious heaven, what a change has this deleterious instrument effected? Not a man of that description now, who does not speak of the president as of an angel from heaven, and of the treaty, as a gift of the first magnitude, procured through his divine influence, as the only remedy against the errors of republicanism, and the influence of the rabble!

Those men, too, while they are the warmest friends of the president, are the most inveterate enemies of a Clinton, a Jefferson, a Burr, a Madison, and all others who embrace, or even countenance their sentiments and opinions.

Reflection, on this uncommon instance of human inconsistency, leads me to a very weighty question, which I most earnestly entreat the president to answer to himself, having first seriously considered the unexampled change both of his friends and opposers, from Georgia to New Hampshire: It is this; Have your old friends deserted you? Or have you deserted what was formerly yours, and still is their favorite cause, "The rights of man?"

[Page] This question comes not from an anarchist, but from one who loved, admired, respected, revered, and almost adored, General Washington, and who has received the written thanks of that great man, for his exertions in that cause, of which his beloved commander in chief was then the great defender.

Gratitude and respect for the virtuous conduct of his former general will never be obliterated from his mind; and a due obedience to his present president shall be punctually paid, as long as the love of his country, and a determination to preserve its constitution unimpaired, can possibly admit.

An Old Soldier of '76.

New York, August, 1795.

Plymouth Proceedings. At a Meeting of the Town of Plymouth (Massachusetts) assembled and held at the Court-House in Plymouth, October 28, 1795.

ANDREW CROSWELL, Esquire, was chosen moderator.—and Messrs. Stephen Sampson, Andrew Croswell, Samuel Jackson, Jesse Harlow, William H. Jackson, Abner Bartlet, Robert Brown, Joseph Croswell, Lemuel Morton, Nathaniel Curves, and Seth Holmes, were appointed a committee to consider the treaty, lately entered into by the president of the United States and the king of Great Britain, and make report to the town.—Captain Jesse Harlow being in the committee,—and Abner Bartlet was not present.

The meeting was then adjourned the term of two hours, at the expiration of which, they met, when the following report was made, viz:

REPORT.

The committee, appointed by the town, to consider the treaty entered into by Mr. Jay with the government of Great Britain, beg leave to report as follows:

Philosophy and reason have, at last, to the honor and advantage of mankind, decided questions long obscured by ignorance, and contested by despotism. They have established on grounds, never again to be shaken, the equal rights of mankind, the sovereignty of the people, the responsibility of the magistrates, and the rights of every citizen, freely to discuss, and freely to give his opinion on, all public measures and public men.

[Page] This right may be more important in its operation, but cannot be diminished, by the numbers associated to exercise it— whether the association be self-created, or grounded on the imperious authority of those who are only the servants of the public.

The inhabitants of the town of Plymouth, strongly impressed with the above sentiments, so congenial to their conduct in the American revolution—alarmed by the ruinous nature and tendency of the treaty, lately negociated by Mr. Jay, with the king of Great Britain, have thought it their duty, on this occasion, to assemble in town-meeting, to give their marked and decided reprobation of the said treaty, in all its parts.

The numerous objections to this treaty have been so fully detailed, so forcibly stated, and so conclusively deduced from its several parts, by many very respectable meetings of citizens, as not only to preclude the necessity, but propriety, of a repetition. We, therefore, forbear the disagreeable task of delineating the picture of a business, suspicious in its origin—dark and insidious in its progress—without reciprocity, the only basis of treaties—without policy—without gratitude to our best friends—violating the constitution of the United States, and prostrating the American character at the shrine of British arrogance, with no object, apparent to us, but to embarrass and distress the republic of France, and to break down the republican system of this country.

Before we conclude the business of the meeting, our duty impels us to the more pleasing task of expressing our respect and gratitude to the ten senators of the minority, whose patriotism formed an honorable opposition: and particularly to one of them, who drew from secrecy and darkness, and exposed to the public vi [...]w, the treaty, before it had arrived to its stage of maturity. We place our hopes and confidence in divine providence, so often and so signally interposed in favor of America, and, under that, in the virtue and patriotism of the congress of the United States, to relieve our apprehensions, by their adopting such measures, as shall effectually secure us against the impending dangers and distresses of the treaty with Great Britain.

Per order. STEPHEN SAMPSON.

Then, voted unanimously, to accept said report, and directed the town clerk to give a copy thereof to the moderator, and he to get it published in the Chronicle.

Attest, EPHRAIM SPOONER, Town-Clerk.

[Page]

Washington Resolutions.
At a Meeting of the Citizens, Inhabitants of Washington District, in the State of South Carolina, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his Britannic Majesty, and the United States of America, concluded at London, on the 19th Day of November, 1794—was taken into Consideration, when the following Resolutions, expressive of their Sentiments on the Subject, were entered into.

RESOLVED, That although an undue, and over-jealousy of public officers is often, in its consequences, impolitic; yet freemen always have the right, and in many cases it becomes their absolute duty, to exercise that right, of enquiring fully, and with freedom, into the measures and conduct of the servants of the public. On this occasion, the magnitude of the present subject of deliberation, and the ruinous consequences of Mr. Jay's treaty, if finally ratified, to the trade, agriculture, and various interests of the United States of America, induce us to join our other fellow citizens in opposing a system founded on inequality, and on principles of themselves, as to one party, unequal and unjust; and we will, in expressing this our disapprobation, point out a few of the many injuries that America would feel from the operation of the said treaty.

Resolved, That the restriction on American vessels trading to the West Indies, to 70 tons, and all remittances of West India produce made in them confined to American markets only; and the prohibiting cotton to be exported from America, unless in British bottoms, though the product of our own country, and now becoming a valuable and increasing staple in South Carolina and Georgia, whilst British vessels of any tonnage, with or without excepted articles, are allowed to trade to any port or place they please; is a manifest injustice to America, and degrading to her as a nation, having neither equivalent nor reciprocity on her side, and ought, therefore, to be discarded as incompatible with her honor and interest as a sovereign and independent government.

Resolved, That the board or court of judicature, established by the 6th article of the treaty, is highly dangerous; as the mode of procedure and the kind of testimony to be admitted, are in the breasts of the judges only, and are not to be confined to any of the known rules of law or equity. Add to this, a majority of the judges may be British subjects, who will be deciding between the United States and their fellow subjects, for [Page]unknown and large sums of money, thereby exercising an indefinite and unlimited power over the funds of the United States, contrary to the constitution and against the safety of the government.

Resolved, That it is impolitic and unjust for the United States to oblige themselves to make good the defalcations of the debts of the British creditors in America, for a supposed infraction of the treaty of 1783, when no satisfaction is made by the British government to America, for the injury done her by the detention of the posts, or for the thousands of negroes carried off from her citizens in direct violation of that treaty.

Resolved, That the apparent equal right of the parties mutually to settle, and carry on trade, on the eastern banks of the Mississippi, is ill founded and fallacious; as the British, long since, had ceded to the Spanish government all claims of territory they had on the said river to the south of the 31st degree of north latitude, the now south boundary of the United States; and to the north up the said river, they themselves think they have no claim, otherwise their plenipotentiary, Mr. Grenville, would not have supposed that a line running due west from the lake of the Woods would pass above the source of that river, and on that supposition had an article put in their treaty with us, appointing commissioners to ascertain and fix that part of the boundary: therefore, the allowing British subjects to make settlements and establish factories, if they choose, on the banks of the said river, is giving them privileges they have no colour of right to, and that without an equivalent on our part: a privilege, which, in the event, from their manner of trade and influence among the numerous tribes of Indians, might endanger the peace of the United States. Also, we conceive the right given by treaty to both parties to use in common the bays, rivers, creeks, ports, harbours, &c. is unequal, and leaves these states without a sufficient equivalent for the advantages they give up—for whilst a British subject has a right to pass, settle and trade, where and how he pleases in any part of the United States, a citizen of America is prohibited from trading, or even going into the limits of the territory of the Hudson's Bay company, the only part of his Britannic majesty's possessions in North America, where it would be advantageous to have the privilege, as nearly the whole of the fur trade with the northern tribes of Indians passes through that channel.

Resolved, That in all the commercial parts of the treaty, the British have greatly the advantage; and although the appearance of reciprocity is kept up, yet, on investigation it will be found [Page]that the United States would enjoy the shadow only, and not the substance of almost any one equal advantage.

Resolved, That in our opinion, the president of the United States would act worthy his uniform great and good character, by refusing to sign the said treaty.

Resolved, That the sense of the people, who did not attend our meeting, be taken at the ensuing reviews, which are orpered at five different places, of the five regiments of this brigade, composed of Washington district, and the result, being properly certified, be published in the City Gazette.

THOMAS FARRAR, Clerk.

September 6, 1795.

I DO certify, That the foregoing resolutions were publicly read to the people at each of the different reviews; that others were offered in addition to those, some of which, however, were rather of the inflammatory kind: but as the object of the people was only to show their disapprobation to the treaty, by endeavoring to point out a few of the most-prominent objections against it, in the language of mildness and moderation, they did, therefore, unanimously agree to the foregoing resolutions, as offered to their consideration.

Certified the 29th of September, 1795.

ROBERT AND ERSON, B. G.

ST. JAMES's PARISH.
At a numerous Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Parish of St. James's, Goose Creek (South Carolina) on the 8th of August, 1795, the following Resolutions were moved and adopted.

RESOLVED, That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, now pending between the United States of America and Great Britain, is derogatory to the honor, and extremely prejudicial to the interests of this country.

Resolved, therefore, That this meeting concur in sentiment with their fellow citizens in Charleston, and highly approve the measures taken and resolves entered into by them.

[Page] Resolved, That the chairman do sign and transmit these re [...]lves to the honorable John Mathews, chairman of the citi [...]ens in Charleston.

By order of the meeting, HENRY DEAS.

First Fruits of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation.

1st, AMITY.

AMOST insolent and despicable letter from a captain of a British man of war, to the governor of Rhode Island, [...]ing to lay the town of Newport under contribution—or, [...] case of resistance, to reduce it to ashes—for which, and for [...]ency's sake, the British consul and messen [...] of the letter has [...]een dismissed from holding any office in these stares, by pro [...]mation—a pretty instance of AMITY!

2d, COMMERCE.

The capture (already known) of twenty-eight of our vessels, [...] with provisions for France and other ports (including the [...] Hercules lately sailed from this port for London inself, and [...]ied into Halifax) under the specious promise of ten per cent. profit, when they might have obtained 100 per cent. in their destined ports; some months have elapsed since their being carried into England, and no instance yet known of payment being made for one of them. A pretty instance of COMMERCE!!

3d, NAVIGATION.

The condemnation of several of our ships in British courts of admiralty, on the most palpably-false and frivolous grounds, announced in this country, since the 18th of August, the day the finishing stroke was put to the treaty, made between his most gracious majesty and the United States of America, and signed the 19th of November last, by

Grenville, John Jay.

A very pretty instance indeed of NAVIGATION!!! ha, ha, ha,

Blessed be the treaty makers! By their fruits, ye shall know them!

END OF VOL. II

Notes

*

Our own government has expressly stated, that there were doubts respecting the river St. Cro [...], intended by the treaty of peace—Mr. Jefferson, secretary of state, in a letter to Mr. Hammond, British minister, written with the express view of bringing into discussion the disputable points, and infractions of the treaty of A. D. 1783. says.—"A difference of opinion, too, having aris [...]n as to the river intended by the plenipotentiaries to be the boundary between us and the d [...]ious of Great Britain, and by them called the St. Croix, which name, it seems, is given to two different rivers, the ascertaining of this point, becomes a matter of pres [...]nt urgency: it h [...]s heretofore been the subject of applications [...]m us to the government of Great Britain."

↵

*

See Vol. I. page 134.

↵

*

See Vol. 1. page 5.

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

[No. IX.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME III.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MAREET-STREET.

—NOVEMEER 28, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. Address to the Independent Citizens of Virginia Page 3

2. Memorial and Petition of a number of the Citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia to the General Assembly thereof Page 4

3. Tully, No. II. Page 12

4. Camillus, No. XXI. Page 15

5.—No. XXII. Page 24

6.—No. XXIII. Page 36

7.—No. XXIV. Page 45

8.—No. XXV. Page 56

9. Cato, No. XVI. Page 63

10. Atticus, No. VI. Page 67

11. — No. VII. Page 70

American Remembrancer, &c.

[Page]

FROM THE PETERSBURG INTELLIGENCER.

To the Independent Citizens of Virginia.

THE president of the United States, in his letter to the selectmen of Boston, dated 28th of July, 1795, copies whereof have since been transmitted to similar meetings of the people in other parts of the United States, having, as it is conceived, virtually refused to view the representation of the people as a source of information worthy of his consideration, in deliberating upon the propriety of ratifying or rejecting the late treaty between Great Britain and the United States, as recommended by the senate—and having, as it is believed, first refused his consent thereto, until Great Britain should withdraw her infamous orders for seizing provisions in America [...] vessels bound to France—and since [...]at time, during the continuance of the same orders, in the [...]t of [...]erous r [...]se [...]tions from the people in almost all parts of the United States, disapproving the fatal instrument, ha [...] [...]lly proceeded [...] its ratification, and given it all the energy which his constitutional functions could effect; and having, by these proceedings, rendered all further representations and applications to him, upon the subject, absurd and nugatory—It is important, when such inattention to the public voice is manifested, that the people should boldly exercise their right of addressing their objections to all other constituted authorities, within the United States, who possess any agency relative to this highly interesting subject.

Upon this principle, the following Petition to the General Assembly of Virginia, in virtue of their constituti [...] [...]ght of appointing senators for this state, to the congress of the United States, is submitted to the independent citizens thereof. It is presumed, that the time, previous to the meeting of the assembly, is too short to afford that general circulation of the petition throughout the state, which is desirable: but it is hoped, that such patriotic citizens, as may approve its contents, will be active in favoring their fellow citizens with an opportunity of testifying, in like manner, their approbation, by their respective subscriptions thereto.

[Page] Through these means, one more effort may be made, by a declaration of the public sentiment, to prevent the final ratification and ultimate energy of an instrument, which is deemed fatal to the interests, the happiness, and perhaps, finally, to the liberty and independence of the United States.

October 12, 1795.

To the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Memorial and Petition of the Subscribers thereof,

Respectfully sheweth—

THAT they have seen and maturely considered the twenty, lately negociated with Great Britain, and con [...]ionally [...] [...]y the presid [...] [...]d s [...]e of the United States.

That they [...] of the condition [...] the [...] the [...] twenty ought to [...], and [...] again receive, [...] of the constituted [...], [...] it can be s [...]ly [...]ding on the United States [...] [...] the [...] of that part of the [...] [...]y, which re [...]s to [...] the United States and the West Indi [...], must [...]e [...], [...]i [...] [...] new article proposed to be a [...]le [...]l; and in as much as the connexion established by that article, between the ports suspended, and the temporary resi [...] of the treaty, constitute them essentially conditions of each other, and must involve the latter in the [...]te of the former, whereby a change will be made, both in the form and substance of the instrument, that will be equivalent [...] compact.

Th [...] [...] present [...]age of the transaction, they d [...] it their right [...]nd their duty, to pursue every constitutional and proper mode of urging those objections to the treaty, which, in their judgment, require to be entirely removed, before it ought to be finally established.

That under this conviction, they submit the following observations to the consideration of the general assembly.

I. Even "waving the merits of the respective complaints and pretensions of the two parties," as to the inexecution of the treaty of peace, it is reasonable to view the two parties as equally culpable, or equally blameless, and to determine that the execution [Page]of the treaty of peace equally by both ought to have been provided for. Yet, whilst the United States are to comply, in the most ample manner, with the article unfulfilled by them, and to make compensation for whatever losses may have accrued from their delay; Great Britain is released altogether, from one of the articles unfulfilled by her, and is not obliged to make the smallest compensation for the damages which have accrued from her delay, in fulfilling the other.

These equitable and reciprocal claims of the United States are not even allowed the chance of arbitration.

This inequality of terms, is greatly aggravated by other concessions, on the part of the United States, which, besides adding to the violation of the constitution, artfully introduced in this treaty, may, in a great measure, defeat the good consequences of a surrender of the western posts, if that article of the treaty should be faithfully executed by Great Britain.

The British settlers and traders, within an indefinite tract of country, are allowed to retain both their land and allegiance at the same time, and consequently to keep up a foreign and ho [...] influence over the Indians, within the limits of the United States.

The Indians, within these li [...]s, are encouraged to co [...]i [...] their trade with the British, by the permission to bring their goods, duty free, from Canada, where the goods being charged with no such impost as is payable on the goods of the United States, will be offered for sale with that tempting preference; a regulation also, but too likely to cloak the fraud of s [...]gg [...]ng traders in a country otherwise favorable to them.

Under a like semblance of reciprocity, the advantage secured to the United States in the fur trade, by their possession of the carrying places, is abandoned to the superiority of [...]i [...]h capital, and the insecurity of the Canada duty or duties [...]n imposts.

A part only of the posts, harbours, and bays, of a [...]gle British province, is made free to the citizens [...] United British province, is made free to the citizens [...] United States, in consideration of a freedom of all their [...], harbours, and bays, to British subjects. The goods and merchandize of the United States not entirely prohibited by Canada (but which, in fact, are always prohibited, when partial and temporary admissions are not dictated by necessity) may be carried there in consideration of a free admission from Canada, of all goods and merchandize not entirely prohibited by the United States, where there never is, in fact, this entire prohibition. A like stipulation, liable to the like observation, is extended to the exports of the United States, and the province of Canada. [Page]There are further instances of a nominal and delusive reciprocity.

In the case of the Mississippi, there is not even an oftensible or nominal reciprocity. The posts and places on its eastern side, are to be equally free to both parties; although the treaty itself supposes that the course of the northern boundary of the United States, will throw the British beyond the very source of that river. This item of the treaty is the more to be noticed, as a repetition and extension, under such circumstances, of the stipulated privileges of Great Britain on the Mississippi, will be construed into a partiality in the United States, to the interests and views of that nation on the American continent, not likely to conciliate those from whom an amicable adjustment of the Mississippi is expected; and was, no doubt, intended by Great Britain as a snare to our good understanding with the nation most jealous of her encroachment and aggrandizement.

II. Without remarking the inexplicit provision for redressing past spoliations and vexations, no sufficient precautions are taken against them in future. On the contrary, by omitting to provide for the respect due to sea-letters, passports and certificates, and for other customary safe-guards to neutral vessels, "a general search warrant" (in the strong, but just language if our fellow citizens of Charleston) is granted against the American navigation. Examples of such provisions were to be [...]o [...]d in our other treaties, as well as in the treaties of other nations. And it is matter of just surprize, that they should have no place in a treaty with Great Britain, whose conduct on the seas, so particularly suggested and enforced every guard to our rights that could be reasonably insisted on.

By omitting to provide against the arbitrary seizure and imprisonment of the American seamen, that valuable class of citizens remains exposed to all the outrages, and our commerce to all the interruptions, hitherto experienced from that cause.

By enpressly admitting, that provisions are to be held contraband, in [...] other than when bound to an invested place, and implie [...] [...]itting that such cases exist at present—not only retrospective sanction may be given to proceedings against which an indemnification is claimed, but an apparent license is granted to fresh and more rapacious depredations on our lawful commerce; and facts seem to show, that such is to be the fruit of this impolitic concession. It is conceived, that the pr [...]text, set up by Great Britain, of besieging and starving whole nations, and the doctrine grounded thereon, of a right to intercept the customary trade of neutral nations, in articles not contraband, ought never to have been admitted into a treaty [Page]of the United States—Because,

1. It is a general outrage on humanity, and an attack on the useful intercourse of nations.

2. It appears, that the doctrine was denied by the executive, in the discussions with Mr. Hammond, the British minister, and that demands of compensation, founded on that denial, are now depending.

3. As provisions constitute not less than two-thirds of our exports, and Great Britain is nearly half her time at war, an admission of the doctrine sacrifices, in a correspondent degree, the intrinsic value of our country.

4. After a public denial of the doctrine, to admit it, in the midst of the present war, by a formal treaty, would have but too much of the effect, as well as the appearance, of voluntarily concurring in the scheme of distressing a nation, whose friendly relations to the United States, as well as the struggles for freedom in which it is engaged, give a title to every good office which is permitted by a just regard to our own interest, and not strictly forbidden by the duties of [...]trality.

5. It is no plea for the measure, to hold it up as an alternative to the disgrace of being in [...] tarily treated in the same manner, without a faculty to re [...]ess ourselves. The disgrace of being plundered with impu [...]y, against our consent, being, under no circumstances, so g [...] as the disgrace of consenting to be plundered with imp [...]ity [...]. By annexing to the implements of war, en [...]rated as con [...]nd, the articles of ship timber, tar or ro [...]in, copper in she [...] saids, hemp, and cordage, our neutral rights and national [...] are still further narrowed. These articles were excluded from the contraband list, by the United States, when they were themselves in a state of war. (See ordinance relating to captures on fourth of December, 1781.) Their other treaties expressly declare them not to be contraband.

British treaties have done the same; nor, as is believed, do the treaties of any nation in Europe, producing these articles for exportation, allow them to be subjects of confiscation. The stipulation was the less to be admitted, as the [...]pro [...]y assumed by it, is a mere cover for the violation [...] that principle—most of the articles in question, being among the exports of the United States, whilst all of them are among the imports of Great Britain.

By expressly stipulating with Great Britain, against the freedom of enemy's property in neutral bottoms, the progress towards a complete and formal establishment of a principle in the law of nations, so favorable to the general interest and security of commerce, receives all the check the United States could give to it. Reason and experience have long taught the propriety of considering free ships as giving freedom to their cargoes. [Page]The several great maritime nations of Europe, have not only established, at different times, by their treaties with each other, but, on a solemn occasion, jointly declared it to be the law of nations, by a specific compact, of which the United States entered their entire approbation (see their act of the 5th of October, 1780). Great Britain alone dissented. But she herself, in a variety of prior treaties, and in a treaty with France, since, has acceded to the principle. Under these circumstances, the United States, of all nations, ought to be the last to combine in a retrograde effort on this subject, as being, more than any other, interested in extending and establishing the commercial rights of neutral nations.—Their situation particularly fits them to be carriers for the great nations of Europe, during their wars; and both their situation, and the genius of their government and people, promise them a greater share of peace and neutrality, than can be expected by any other nation—The relation of the United States by a treaty on this point, to the e [...] of Great Britain, was another reason for avoiding this stipulation. Whilst British goods, in American vessels, are pro [...]ed against French and Dutch captures, it was enough to leave French and Dutch goods in American vessels, to the [...]dinary course of judicial determination, without a volu [...]y a positive, and invidious provision for condemning them [...] [...] everlooked, that a clause in the treaty proposes to [...], at some future period, the discussion of the principle now [...]tled; but the question is then to be, not only in what, but whether in any cases, neutral vessels shall protect enemies property; and it is to be discussed at the same time, not whether in any, but in what cases, provisions, and other articles not bound to invested places, may be treated as contraband. So that when the principle is in favor of the United States, the principle itself is to be the subject of discussion; when the principle is in favor of Great Britain, the application of it only, is to be the subject of discussion.

III. Whe [...]ever the law of nations has been a topic for consideration, the result of the treaty accommodates Great Britain in relation to one, or both of the republics at war with her, as well as in the abandonment of the rights and interests of the United States.

Thus American vessels bound to Great Britain, are protected by sea papers, against French and Dutch searches; but when bound to France or Holland, are left exposed to British searches, without regard to such papers.

American provisions in American vessels, bound to the enemies of Great Britain, are left, by treaty, to the seizure and [Page]use of Great Britain; but provisions, whether American or not, in American vessels, cannot be touched by the enemies of Great Britain.

British property, in American vessels, is not subject to French or Dutch confiscation—French or Dutch property in American vessels, is subjected to British confiscation. Articles of ship building, bound to the enemies of Great Britain for the equipment of vessels of trade only, are contraband—bound to Great Britain for the equipment of vessels of war, are not contraband.

American citizens entering as volunteers in the service of France or Holland, are punishable: but American volunteers joining the arms of Great Britain against France or Holland, are not punishable.

British ships of war, and privateers with their prizes, made on citizens of Holland, may freely enter and depart the ports of the United States; but Dutch ships of war, and private [...] with their prizes, made on subjects of Great Britain, are to receive no shelter or refuge in the ports of the United States. —This advantage in war is given to Great Britain, not by a treaty prior to an existing war, but by a treaty made in the midst of war, and expressly stipulating against a li [...] article of treaty, with the other party, for equalizing the advantage.

The article prohibiting confiscations and sequestrations, is unequal between Great Britain and the United States; American citizens have little, if any, interest in private or bank stock, or private debts, within Great Britain. So, where much would be in the power of the United States, and little in the power of Great Britain, the power is interdicted: Where more is in the power of Great Britain than of the United States, the power is unconfined. Another remark is applicable—When the modern usage of nations is in favor of Great Britain, the modern usage is the rule of the treaty; but when the modern usage is in favor of the United States, the modern usage is rejected, as a rule for the treaty.

IV. The footing on which the treaty places the subject of commerce, is liable to insuperable objections. 1. The nature of our exports and imports, compared with those of other countries, and particularly of Great Britain, has been thought, by the legislature of the United States, to justify certain differences, in the tonnage and other duties, in favor of American bottoms; and the advantage possessed by Great Britain, in her superior capital, was thought, at the same time, to require such countervailing encouragements. Experience has shown the solidity of both these considerations. The American navigation [Page]has, in a good degree, been protected, against the advantage on the side of British capital, and has increased in proportion; whilst the nature of our exports, being generally necessaries, or raw materials, and our imports consisting mostly of British manufactures, has restrained the disposition of Great Britain to counteract the protecting duties afforded to our navigation. If the treaty is carried into effect, this protection is relinquished, and congress are prohibited from substituting any other. Then the British capital, having no longer the present inducement to make use of American bottoms, may be expected, in whatever hands operating, to give the preference to British bottoms.

2. The provisions of the treaty, which relate to the West Indies, where the nature of our exports and imports gives a commanding energy to our just pretensions, instead of alleviating the general evil, are a detail of particular humiliations and sacrifices. Nor will a remedy by any means be found, in a revision of that part alone of the treaty.

If Great Britain should accede to the proposition of the se [...], and the treaty be finally established, without that part of it, but in all its other parts: She will, in that event, be able to exclude American bottoms altogether from the channel of intercourse, and to regulate the whole trade with the West Indies, in the manner heretofore complained of, whilst the United States will be completely dispossessed of the right and the means of counteracting monopoly, unless they submit to an universal infraction of their trade, not excepting with nations whose regulations may be reciprocal and satisfactory.

3. The treaty, not content with these injuries to the United States, in their commerce with Great Britain, provides, in the 15th article, against the improvement or preservation of their commerce with other nations, by any beneficial treaties that may be attainable.—The general rule of the United States, in their treaties, sounded on the example of other nations, has been, that where a nation is to have the privileges of the most favored nations, it shall be admitted gratuitously to such privileges only as may be gratuitously granted, but shall pay, for privileges not gratuitously granted, the compensation paid by others; this prudent and equitable qualification of the footing of the most favored nation, was particularly requisite in a treaty with Great Britain, whose commercial system, in relation to other countries, being matured and settled, is not likely to be varied by grants of new privileges that might result to the United States. It was peculiarly requisite, at the present juncture, also, when an advantageous revision of the treaty [Page]with France is said to be favored by that republic; when a treaty with Spain is actually in negociation; and when treaties with other nations, whose commerce is important to the United States, cannot be out of contemplation.

The proposed treaty, nevertheless, puts Great Britain, in all respects, gratuitously, on the footing of the nations most favored, even as to the future privileges, for which the most valuable considerations may be given; so that it is not only out of the power of the United States to grant any peculiar privileges to any other nation, as an equivalent for peculiar advantages in commerce or navigation, granted to the United States; but every nation, desiring to treat on this subject with the United States, is reduced to the alternative, either of declining the treaty altogether, or of including Great Britain, gratuitously, in all the privileges it purchases for itself. An article of this import is the greatest obstruction, next to an absolute prohibition, that could have been thrown in the way of other treaties; and that it was insidiously meant by Great Britain to be such, is rendered the less doubtful, by the kindred features of the treaty.

4. It can be no apology for the commercial disadvantages, that better terms could not be obtained. If proper terms could not be obtained, at that time, commercial articles, which were no wise essentially connected with the objects of the embassy, ought to have waited for a more favorable season. Nor is a better apology to be drawn from our other treaties. These not only [...]id many of the sacrifices in the new treaty; but the chief of them were the guarantees or the auxiliaries of our independence; and, in that view, would have been an equivalent for greater commercial concessions than were insisted on.

V. The president and senate, by ratifying this treaty, usurp the power of regulating commerce, of making rules with respect to aliens, of establishing tribunals of justice, and of defining piracy. A formal demonstration of every part of this complex proposition is not requisite. We will prove, that this treaty is dangerous to liberty, and that the constituted authorities, who have given it their sanction, have flagrantly violated their duty, by an appeal to the constitution itself, to that explicit instrument, which we formed as the unerring guide of our representatives, but which some of them have dared to violate.

VI. A treaty, thus incompatible with our constitution, thus unequal in its conditions, thus derogating from our national rights, thus insidious in some of its objects, and thus alarming in all its operations, is not only unworthy of the voluntary [Page]acceptance of an independent and happy people, but is an abject sacrifice, which ought to have been rejected with disdain, in the most humiliating and adverse circumstances. It is sincerely believed, that such a treaty would not have been listened to at any former period, even when Great Britain was most powerful, and the United States most feeble. To pretend, that, however objectionable the instrument may be, it ought to be considered as the only escape from a hostile resentment of Great Britain, which would evidently be as impolitic, as it would be unjust on her part, IS AN ARTIFICE TOO CONTEMPTIBLE TO ANSWER ITS PURPOSE. It will not easily be supposed, that a refusal to part with our rights, without equivalents, will be made the pretext of war on us; much less that such a pretext will be founded on our refusal, to mingle a sacrifice of our commerce and navigation, with an adjustment of political differences. Neither is there any evidence in history, or in human nature, that nations are to be bribed out of the spirit of encroachment and aggression, by humiliations, which nourish their pride, or by unreasonable concessions, which extend their resources and their power. To do justice to all nations—to obtain it from them by every peaceable effort, in preference to war—and to confi [...] in this policy, for avoiding that extremity, or for m [...]ing it with [...]r [...]ess, under the blessing of heaven, when it may be forced upon us, is the only course of which the United States can never have reason to repe [...]t.

The petitioners, r [...]lying our the wisdom and patriotism of the general assembly, pray that the objections to the treaty, comprised in these observations, may be taken into their serious consideration; and that such measures towards a remedy may be pursued, as may be judge most conformable to the nature of the case, and most consistant with constitutional principles.

Sophistry Detected [CONTINUED FROM VOL. 2. PAGE 201.] No. II.

CAMILLUS, already proverbial for prolixity and verbosity, has gone beyond his usual tediousness on the subject of sequestration [...]d confiscation. He has devoted [Page]to the investigation no less than four or five entire numbers, of length sufficient to exhaust the patience of even a pensioner of Britain. But by this elaborate discussion, he has not gained a proselyte.

When he can seize a single sent [...]ment, in any writer on the laws of nations, that favors this part of the treaty, he lays as much stress upon his opinions as the priests of Apollo ever did on the Delphian oracles. But every opinion opposed to his, however sanctioned—every fact, however well authenticated, he endeavours to invalidate or explain away.—Artful and sophist as he is, he has, by one single sentence, overturned the fabric he has expended so much time to erect. He has conceded enough to satisfy every rational man of the fallacy of his arguments. He has acknowledged, that there are cases, in which not only the sequestration, but the confiscation, of property, may be justifiable.

But lest it should be pretended, that a strained as unwarranted construction is put on his words, I shall give the sentence at length, that the reader may judge for himself: "It would have been an inestimable gem in our political consti [...]tion, had it contained a positive stipulation against such a practice ( [...] that of sequestration and confiscation) except, perhap [...] [...] WAY OF REPRISAL FOR THE IDENTICAL, INJURY, ON THE PART OF ANOTHER NATION.

It is plainly and justly deducible from the sentence:

1st. That when any nation sequesters the property of another nation, the latter has a just right, "by way of reprisal, for the identical injury" to sequester the property of the subjects of the aggressor.

2d. That when any nation con [...]is [...]tes the property of the subjects of another nation, that nation has a right, "by way of reprisal," to sequester or confiscate the property of the subjects or citizens of the offending nation. Thus, then, there are two cases in which sequestration, and one in which confiscation, is justifiable. This might be sufficient to evince the fallacy of Camillus. But from these positions flow more satisfactory consequences.

If a nation suffers as flagrant, or a mo [...] flagrant injury, than the sequestration or confiscation of the property of her citizens, she has, a fortio [...]i, a right, "by way of reprisal," although not for exactly "the identical injury," to sequester or confiscate the property of the citizens or subjects of the offending power.

The question is then simply this, are there, any violations of the laws of nations, with respect [...] [...]e rights of property, as [Page]great or greater than the sequestration or confiscation of property? That there are, England has debarred even Camillus of the power of denying. Let us suppose, for sake of argument (and this will surely be allowed a supposable case) that a piratical nation, before issuing any declaration of war, clandestinely grants letters of marque and reprisal to all her vessels, and this conducted in such an artful manner as to reach all quarters of the globe about the same period, and thus render the commerce of an unsuspecting rival an inevitable prey to a band of lawless robbers. Can the Federalist, can Curtius, can Camillus, deny that this is a more heinous violation of the law of nations, and a more deep and lasting injury, than the sequestration or even confiscation of an equal value of property within the territory of the piratical nation?—Surely, if they have the audacity to deny it, they will find few of the enlightened citizens of America to coincide in opinion with them.

Suppose, further, that the aggrieved nation had, in its own territory, property of the subjects of the other nation, of equal value with that which had been thus piratically plundered, would it not be a right, nay a duty, to seize it, for the purpose of making restitution to the sufferers? Unquestionably it [...]uld.

Again, let us suppose (and this, likewise, will be allowed a very supposable case) the same, or any other [...] nation, to have issued orders, on the 6th of November, 1793, o [...] on any other day in any other year, to her cruisers, to seize the vessels of any neutral, and carry them into her ports "for legal adjudication," that the "Algerine" judges in her admira [...] courts had construed "legal adjudication" to mean "condemnation," and that the neutral nation, without any real or pretended violation of the rights of neutrality, should be basely and perfidiously plundered of her property, to an in [...]lculable amount.

Is not this a more heinous violation of the laws of nations, than would have been the sequestration of property in the country of the aggressor? Does the difference of place, in which the robbery is perpetrated, constitute any essential difference in the turpitude, the villainy of the deed? And if it be lawful, in the case of the lesser crime, to retaliate by sequestration or confiscation, can the superior enormity of the other annul the right of the sufferer?

If a robber or murderer meets me on the highway, and stabs me, am I to defend or avenge myself in no other way, than in the "identical" one, in which he was guilty? Am I not to attempt resistan [...] because I have no weapons of defence [Page]but pistols, and have been attacked with a sword? ‘Away with these absurd and incongruous sophisms! Blush, apostle of temerity, of meanness, and of deception! Why will you persevere in accumulating ridicule and contempt upon your own head?’ *

The laws and modern practice of nations proscribe sequestration and confiscation of the property of the citizens or subjects of other nations within our territory. So do they equally proscribe robbery on the high seas, in time of peace. And the government that commences hostilities, by a violation of the law of nations, in either mode, has no right to complain for having justice executed, and punishment inflicted on her, by the same or any other more convenient violation of the law of nations.

By the modern laws of war, prisoners are entitled to good treatment, unless they forfeit their rig [...] by misconduct or crime.—But suppose a nation to resort to flow but certain methods of exterminating its prisoners, such, for instance, as infected, corrupted, or even poisoned victuals—or the pestilential and destroying vapours of prison-ships (ANOTHER VERY SUPPOSABLE CASE)—is the suffering nation obliged to observe the rigid rules of the laws of war? Is it, for [...]n of being dishonored, to allow its best citizens to fall victims to the insatiable cruelty of a barbarous enemy? Surely not. And if a violation of the laws of war is to be punished by a similar or other violation, it is equally certain, that a violation of the laws of nations demands vengeance, in a similar manner.

TULLY.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM VOL. 2. PAGE 199.]

No. XXI.

SINCE the closing of my last number, I have accidentally turned to a passage of Vattel, which is so pertinent to the immediate subject of that paper, that I cannot refrain from interrupting [Page]the progress of the discussion, to quote it; it is in these words (b. 3. ch. 4. sect. 63.) "The sovereign, declaring war, can neither detain those subjects of the enemy, who are within his dominions at the time of the declaration, nor their effects. They came into his country on the public faith. By permitting them to enter his territories, and continue there, he incitly promised them liberty, and security for their return." This passage contains, explicitly, the principle which is the general basis of my argument, namely, that the permission to a foreigner to come, with his effects into, and acquire others within, our country, in time of peace, virtually pledges the public faith for the security of his person and property, in the event of war. How can this be reconciled with the natural right (controuled only by the customary law of nations) which this writer admits, to confiscate the debts [...]e by the subjects of a state to its enemies? I ask once [...] can there be a natural right to do what which includes a violation of faith?

It is plain, to a demonstration, that the rule laid down in this passage, which is to just and perspicuous as to speak o [...] viction to the heart and understanding, unites the natural with the [...]ary law of nations, in a condemnation of the prene [...] to confiscate or sequester the private property of our enemy, found in our country at the breaking our of a war.

Let us now proceed to examine the policy and expediency of such a pretension.

In this investigation, I shall assume, as a basis of argument, the following position, That it is advantageous to nations to have commerce with each other.

Commerce, it is manifest, like any other object of enterprize or industry, will prosper in proportion as it is secure. Its security, consequently, promoting its prosperity, extends its advantages. Security is indeed essential to its having a due and regular course.

The pro [...]sion of a right to confiscate or sequester the effects of foreign merchants, in the case in question, is, in its principle, fatal to that necessary security. Its free exercise would destroy external commerce; or, which is nearly the same thing, reduce it within the contracted limits of a game of hazard, where the chance of large profits, accompanied with the great risks, would tempt alone the adventurous and the desperate. Those enterprises, which, from circuitous or long voyages, slowness of sales, incident to the nature of certain commodities, the necessity of credit, or from other causes, demand considerable time for their completion, must be renounced. [Page]Credit, indeed, must be banished from all the operations of foreign commerce; an engine, the importance of which, to its vigorous and successful prosecution, will be doubted by none, who will be guided by experience or observation.

It cannot need amplification, to elucidate the truth of these positions. The storms of war occur so suddenly and so often, us to forbid the supposition, that the merchants of one country would trust their property, to any extent, or for any duration, in another country, which was in the practice of confiscating or sequestering the effects of its enemies, found within in territories, at the commencement of a war. That practice, therefore, would necessarily paralize and wither the commerce of the country in which it obtained. Accordingly, nations attentive to the cultivation of commerce, which Formerly were betrayed, by temporary considerations, the particular instances of that atrocious practice, have been led, by the experience of its mischiefs, to abstain from it in later times. They saw that to have persisted in it would have been to abandon competition on equal terms, in the lucrative and beneficial field of commerce.

It is no answer to this, to say that the exercise of the right might be ordinarily suspended, though the right itself wight be maintained, for extraordinary and great emergencies.

In the first place, as the ordinary for [...]earence of its [...] would be taken by foreigners for evidence of an intention never to exercise it, by which they would be enticed into [...] deposites, that would not otherwise have taken place; a departure from the general course would always involve an act of treachery and cruelty.

In the second place, the possibility of the occasional exercise of such a right, if conceived to exist, would be, at least, a flow poison, conducing to a sickly habit of commence; and, in a series of time, would be productive of much more evil than could be counterbalanced by any good which it might be possible to obtain in the contemplated emergency, by the use of the expedient.

Let experience decide—Examples of confiscation and sequestration have been given—When did the dread of them prevent a war? when did it cripple an enemy, so as to disable him from exertion, or force him into a submission to the views of his adversary? When did it even sensibly conspire to either of these ends? If it has ever had any such effect, the evidence of it has not come within my knowledge.

[Page] It is true, that between Great Britain and the United States, the expectation of such effects is better warranted than perhaps in any other cases that have existed; because we commonly owe a larger debt to that country, than is usual between nations, and there is a relative state of things, which tends to a continuation of this situation.

But how has the matter operated hitherto? In the late war between the two countries, certain states confiscated the debts due from their citizens to British creditors, and these creditors actually suffered great losses. The British cabinet must have known, that it was possible the same thing might happen in another war, and on a more general scale; yet the appearances were extremely strong, at a particular juncture, that it was their plan, either from ill-will, from the belief that popular opinion would ultir [...]ly drag our government into the war, from the union of these two, or from other causes, to force us into hostilities with them. Hence it appears, that the apprehension of acts of confiscation, or sequestration, was not sufficient to deter from hostile views, or to insure pacific dispositions.

It may be pretended, that the menace of this measure, had [...] to restraining influence on the subsequent conduct of Great Britain. But if was ascribe nothing to the measures which our government [...]lly pursued, under the pressure of the provocations received, we at least find, in the course of European events, whether solution of a change of policy in the cabinet of Great Britain, than from the dread of a legislative piracy on the debts due to their merchants.

The truth unfortunately is, that the passions of men stifle calculation; that nations the most attentive to pecuniary considerations, easily surrender them to ambition, to jealousy, to anger, or to revenge.

For the same reason, the actual experiment of an exercise of the pretended right, by way of reprisal for an injury complained of, would commonly be as inefficacious, as the menace of it, to arrest general hostilities.—Pride is roused; resentment kindled; and where there is even no previous disposition to those hostilities, the probability is, that they follow. Nations, like individuals, ill brook the idea of receding from their pretensions under the rod, or of admitting the justice [...] an act of retaliation or reprisal, by submitting to it. Thus w [...] learn, from the king of Prussia himself, that the sequestrations of the Silesia debt, instead of procuring the restoration for which it was designed, was on the point of occasioning an open rupture between him and Great Britain, when the supervention [Page]of a quarrel with France diverted the storm, by rendering him necessary as an ally.

Perhaps it may be imagined, that the practice of confiscation or sequestration would be more efficacious to wound and disable Great Britain, in case of a war, than to prevent it. But this also is a vain chimera! A nation, that can, at pleasure, raise by loan twenty millions sterling, would be in little danger of being disconcerted or enfeebled in her military enter-prizes, by the taking away or arresting of three or four millions due to her merchants. Did it produce distress and disorder among those whom it affected and their connexions? If that disorder was sufficient to threaten a general derangement of mercantile credit, and, with it, of the public finances, the pending war affords an example, that the public purse or credit could be brought successfully into action for the support of the sufferes. Three or four millions of exchequer bills applied in loans, would be likely to suffice, to prevent the partial evil from growing into a national calamity.

But we forget, that as far as the interruption of the payment of the debts due to her merchants could be supposed to operate upon Great Britain, war itself would essentially answer the purposes of confiscation or sequestration—By interrupting trade and intercourse, it is in fact, in a great degree, a virtual sequestration. Remittances to any extent become impracticable. There are few ways, in which, on account of the st [...] of war, it is lawful to make them; and debtors are, for the most part, enough disposed to embrace pretexts of procrastination.

[...]he inconvenience of deferred payment would, therefore, be felt by Great Britain, with little mitigation, from the bare existence of war, without the necessity of our government incurring the discredit and responsibility of a special interference.

Indeed, as far as the dread of eventual loss can operate, it ought, in a great measure to have its effect exclusive of the idea of confiscation. Great Britain must want reflection, not to be sensible, that, in making war upon us, she makes war upon her own merchants; by the depredations upon our trade destroying those resources from which they are to be paid. If she be indifferent to this consideration, it will be because she is governed by some motive or passion powerful enough to dispose her to run the risk of the entire loss—in the reliance of obtaining indemnification by the acquisitions of war, or in the terms of peace.

[Page] Will it be said, that the seizure of the debts would put in the hands of our government a valuable resource for carrying on the war? This, upon trial, would prove at fallacious as all the rest. Various inducements would prevent debtors from paying into the treasury. Some would decline it from conscientious scruples, from a doubt of the rectitude of the thing— others, with intent to make a merit with their creditors of the concealment, and to favor their own future credit and advantage —others, from a desire to retain the money in their own employment—and a great number, from the apprehension that the treaty of peace might revive their responsibility to the creditors, with the embarrassment to themselves of getting back, as well as they could, the monies which they had paid into the treasury. Of this, our last treaty of peace, in th [...] opinion of able judges, gave an example.—These causes and others, which do not as readily occur, would oppose great obstacles to the execution of the measure.

But severe laws, inflicting heavy penalties, might compel it—Experience does not warrant a sanguine reliance upon this expedient, in a case in which great opportunity of concernment is united with strong motives of inclination or interest— It would require an inquisition, justly intolerable to a free people —penalties, which would confound the due proportion between crime and punishment, to detect, or to deter from concealment and evasion, and to execute the law—Probably no means lese efficacious than a revolutionary tribunial and a guillotine would go near to answer the end.—There are but few, I trust, to whom these would be welcome means.

We may conclude, therefore, that the law would be ev [...]d to an extent, which would disappoint the expectations from it, as a resource. Some monies, no doubt, would be collected, but the probability is, that the amount would be insignificant, even in the scale of a single compaign—But, should she collection prove as complete, as it ordinarily is, between debtor and creditor, it would little, if at all, exceed the expense of one campaign.

Hence we perceive, that, regarding the measure, either as a mean of disabling our enemies, or as a resource to ourselves, its consequence dwindles, upon a close survey; it cannot pretend to a magnitude, which would apologize, either for a sacrifice of national honor or candor, or for a deviation from the true principles of commerce and credit.

But let us take a further view of its disadvantages.

A nation, in case of war, is under no responsibility for the delinquencies or frauds of its citizens, who are debtors to those [Page]of its enemy, if it does not specially interfere with the payment of the debts which they owe. But, if it interposes its authority to prevent the payment, it gives a claim of indemnification to its adversary, for the intervening losses which those delinquencies or frauds may occasion.—Whether, on the making of peace, this would be insisted upon or waved, might depend much on the good or ill success of the war; but every thing which adds to the catalogue of our enemy's just pretensions, especially when the fortune of war has been pretty equal, is an evil, either as an additional obstacle to speedy peace, or as an ingredient to render the terms of it less advantageous to ourselves. And it is, therefore, unwise in a government to increase the list of such pretensions, by a measure, which, without utility to itself, administers to the indolence of negligent, and to the avidity of fraudulent, individuals.

Further—Every species of reprisal or annoyance, which a power at war employs, contrary to liberality or justice, of doubtful propriety, in the estimation of the law of nations, departing from that moderation, which, in latter times, serves [...] mitigate the severities of war, by furnishing a pretext or provocation to the other side to resort to extremities, serves to embitter the spirit of hostilities, and to extend its ravages. War is then apt to become more sanguinary, more wasting, and every way more destructive. This is a ground of serious reflection to every nation, both as it regards humanity and policy; to this country it presents itself, accompanied with considerations of peculiar force. A vastly-extended sea-coast, overspread with defenceless towns, would offer an abundant p [...]y to an incensed and malignant enemy, having the power to command the sea. The usages of modern war forbid hostilities of this kind; and though they are not always respected, yet, as they are never violated, unless by way of retaliation for a violation of them on the other side, without exciting the reprobation of the impartial part of mankind, sullying the glory; and blasting the reputation of the party which disregards them, this consideration has, in general, force sufficient to induce an observance of them. But the confiscation or sequestration of private debts, or private property in public funds, now generally regarded as an odious and unwarrantable measure, would, as between us and Great Britain, contain a poignant sting. Its effect to exasperate, in an extreme degree, both the nation and government of that country, cannot be doubted. A disposition to retaliate, is a natural consequence; and it would not be difficult for us to be made to suffer beyond any possible degree of advantage to be derived from the occasion of the retaliation. [Page]It were much wiser to leave the property of British subjects, an untouched pledge for the moderation of its government, in the mode of prosecuting the war.

Besides (as, if requisite, might be proved from the records of history) in national controversies, it is of real importance to conciliate the good opinion of mankind; and it is even useful to preserve or gain that of our enemy. The latter facilitates accommodation and peace; the former attracts good offices, friendly interventions, sometimes direct support, from others.—The exemplary conduct, in general, of our country, in our contest for independence, was probably not a little serviceable to us in this way; it secured, to the intrinsic goodness of our cause, every collateral advantage, and gave it a popularity among nations, unalloyed and unimpaired, which even stole into the cabinets of princes. A contrary policy tends to contrary consequences. Though nations, in the main, are governed by what they suppose their interest, he must be imperfectly versed in human nature, who thinks it indifferent, whether the maxims of a state tend to excite kind or unkind dispositions in others, or who does not know, that these dispositions may insensibly mould or bias the views of self-interest.— This were to suppose that rulers only reason—do not feel; in other words, are not men.

Moreover, the measures of war ought ever to look forward to peace. The confiscation or sequestration of the private property of an enemy must always be a point of serious discussion, when interest or necessity leads to negociations for peace. Unless when absolutely prostrate by the war, restitution is likely to constitute an ultimatum of the suffering party. It must be agreed to, or the war protracted, and at last, it is probable, it must still be agreed to. Should a refusal of restitution prolong the war for only one year, the chance is, that more will be lost than was gained by the confiscation. Should it be necessary finally to make it, after prolonging the war, the disadvantage will preponderate in a ratio to the prolongation. Should it be, in the first instance, assented to, what will have been gained? The temporary use of a fund of inconsiderable moment, in the general issue of the war, at the expense of justice, character, credit, and, perhaps, of having sharpened the evils of war. How infinitely preferable to have drawn an equal fund from our own resources, which, with good management, is always practicable!—If the restitution includes damages, on account of the interference, for the failures of individuals, the loan will have been the most costly that could have been made. It has been elsewhere observed, that our treaty of peace with [Page]Great Britain gives an example of restitution. The late one between France and Prussia gives another. This must become every day more and more a matter of course, because the immunity of mercantile debts becomes every day more and more important to trade, better understood to be so, and more clearly considered as enjoined by the principles of the law of nations.

Thus we see, that in reference to the simple question of war and peace, the measure of confiscation or sequestration is marked with every feature of impolicy.

We have before seen, that the pretensions of a right to do the one or the other, has a most inimical aspect towards commerce and credit.

Let us resume this view of the subject. The credit, which our merchants have been able to obtain abroad, essentially in Great Britain, has, from the first settlement of our country to this day, been the animating principle of our foreign commerce. This every merchant knows and feels;—and every intelligent merchant is sensible, that, for many years to come, the case must continue the same. This, in our situation, is a peculiar reason, of the utmost force, for renouncing the pretension in question.

The exercise of it, or the serious apprehension of its exercise, would necessarily have one of two effects.—It would deprive our merchants of the credit, so important to them, or it would oblige them to pay a premium for it, proportioned to the opinion of the risk. Or, to speak more truly, it would combine the two effects; it would cramp credit, and subject what was given to a high premium. The most obvious and familiar principles of human action establish, that the consideration for money or property, lent or credited, is moderate or otherwise, according to the opinion of security or hazard, and that the quantity of either to be obtained, on loan or credit, is in a great degree contracted or enlarged by the same rule.

Thus should we, in the operations of our trade, pay exorbitantly for a pretension, which is of little value, or rather, which is pernicious, even in the relations to which its utility is referred. What folly to cherish it! How much greater the folly ever to think of exercising it! It never can be exercised hereafter, in our country, without great and lasting mischief.

Instead of cherishing so odious a pretension, as "our best, our only weapon of defence,"—wisdom admonishes us to be eager to cast it from us, as a weapon most dangerous to the [Page]wearer, proscribed by the laws of nations, by the laws of honor, and by every principle of sound policy.

Every merchant ought to desire that the most perfect tranquillity, on this point, in foreign countries, should facilitate to him, on the best and cheapest terms, the credit for which he has occasion. And every other citizen ought to desire, that he may be thus freed from a continual contribution, in the enhanced price of every imported commodity he consumes, towards defraying the premium which the want of that tranquillity is calculated to generate.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXII.

THE analogy of the stipulation in the 10th article, with stipulations in our other treaties, and in the treaties between other nations, is the remaining topic of discussion. After this, attention will be paid to such observations, by way of objection to the article, as may not have been before expressly or virtually answered.

The 20th article of our treaty of amity and commerce with France, is in these words:

"For the better promoting of commerce, on both sides, it is agreed, that if a war shall break out between the said two nations, six months, after the proclamation of war, shall be allowed to the merchants in the cities and towns where they live, for selling and transporting their goods and merchandizes; and if any thing be taken from them, or any injury be done them within that term by either party, or the people or subjects of either, full satisfaction shall be made for the same."

The 18th article of our treaty of amity and commerce with the United Netherlands, is in these words:

"For the better promoting of commerce, on both sides, it is agreed, that if a war should break out between their high mightinesses, the States General of the United Netherlands, and the United States of America, there shall always be granted to the subjects on each side, the term of nine months, after the date of the rupture or the proclamation of war, to the end that they may retire with their effects, and transport them where they please, which it shall be lawful for them to do, as well as to sell and transport their effects and goods, with all freedom and without any hindrance, and without being able [Page]to proceed, during the said term of nine months, to any arrest of their effects, much less of their persons; on the contrary, there shall be given them, for their vessels and effects which they would carry away, passports and safe conducts for the nearest ports of their respective countries, and for the time necessary for the voyage."

The 22d article of our treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden, is in these words:

"In order to favor commerce, on both sides, as much as possible, it is agreed, that in case war should break out between the two nations, the term of nine months after the declaration of war shall be allowed to the merchants and subjects respectively, on one side and on the other, in order that they may withdraw with their effects and moveables, which they shall be at liberty to carry off or to sell where they please, without the least obstacle—nor shall any seize their effects, and much less their persons, during the said nine months; but on the contrary, passports, which shall be valid for a time necessary for their return, shall be given them for their vessels and the effects which they shall be willing to carry with them—and, if any thing is taken from them, or any injury is done to them by one of the parties, their people and subjects, during the term above prescribed, full and entire satisfaction shall be made to them on that account."

The 23d article of our treaty of amity and commerce with Prussia, contains this provision:

"If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country, then residing in the other, shall be allowed to remain nine months, to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance."

These articles of four, and the only commercial treaties we had with foreign powers, prior to the pending treaty with Great Britain, though differing in terms, agree in substance; except as to time, which varies from six to nine months. And they clearly amount to this, that upon the breaking out of a war between the contracting parties in each case, there shall be, for a term of six or nine months, full protection and security to the persons and property of the subjects of one, which are then in the territories of the other, with liberty to collect their debts,* to sell their goods and merchandizes, and to remove, [Page]with their effects, wheresoever they please. For this term of six or nine months, there is a complete suspension of the pretended right to confiscate or sequester, giving, or being designed to give, an opportunity to withdraw the whole property which the subjects or citizens of one party have in the country of the other.

The differences between these stipulations and that in the article under examination are chiefly these: the latter is confined to debts, property in the public funds and in public and private banks, without any limitation of the duration of the protection—The former comprehends, in addition, goods and merchandizes, with a limitation of the protection to a term of six or nine months; but with the intent and supposition that the term allowed may and will be adequate to entire security. The principle, therefore, of all the stipulations is the same; each aims at putting the persons and property of the subjects of one enemy, especially merchants, being within the country of the other enemy at the commencement of a war, out of the reach of confiscation or sequestration.

The persons whose names are to our other treaties, on the part of the United States, are Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. The three first are to the treaty with France—Mr. Adams is singly to that with the United Netherlands—Dr. Franklin singly to that with Sweden, and these two, with Mr. Jefferson, are jointly to that with Prussia—The treaty with Sweden was concluded in April 1783; that with Prussia, in August, 1785. These dates repel the idea, that considerations of policy, relative to the war might have operated in the case.

We have, consequently, the sanction of all these characters to the principle, which governed the stipulation entered into by Mr. Jay, and not only from the ratification of the former treaties at different periods, distant from each other, by different descriptions of men in our public councils, but also from there never having been heard, in the community, a lisp of murmur against the stipulation, through a period of seventeen years, counting from the date of the treaty with France, there is just ground to infer a coincidence of the public opinion of the country.

I verily believe, that if, in the year 1783, a treaty had been made with England, containing an article similar to the 10th in the present treaty, it would have met with general acquiescence. The spirit of party had not then predisposed men's minds to estimate the propriety of a measure according to the agent, rather than according to its real fitness and quality. [Page]What would then have been applauded as wise, liberal, equitable, and expedient, is now, in more instances than one, under the pestilential influence of that balesul spirit, condemned as improvident, impolitic, and dangerous.

Our treaty with Prussia, the 23d article of which has been cited, is indeed a model of liberality, which, for the principles it contains, does honor to the parties, and has been in this country a subject of deserved and unqualified admiration. It contradicts, as if studiously, those principles of restriction and exclusion, which are the foundations of the mercantile and navigating system of Europe. It grants perfect freedom of conscience and worship to the respective subjects and citizens, with no other restraint than that they shall not insult the religion of others. Adopting the rule, that free ships shall make free goods, it extends the protection to the persons as well as to the goods of enemies.—Enumerating, as contraband, only "arms, ammunition, and military stores," it even provides that contraband articles shall not be consiscated, but may be taken on the condition of paying for them. It provides against embargoes of vessels and effects. It expressly exempts women, children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artizan, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, and places, and in general, all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, their houses, fields, and goods, from molestation in their persons and employments, and from burning, wasting, and destruction, in time of war; and stipulates payment at a reasonable price for what may be necessarily taken from them for military use.—It likewise protects from feizure and confiscation, in time of war, vessels employed in trade, and inhibits the granting commissions to private armed vessels, empowering them to take or destroy such trading vessels, or to interrupt their commerce; and it makes a variety of excellent provisions to secure to prisoners of war, a humane treatment.

These particulars are stated as evidence of the temper of the day, and of a policy, which then prevailed, to bottom our system with regard to foreign nations upon those grounds of moderation and equity, by which reason, religion and philosophy has tempered the harsh maxims of more early times. It is painful to observe an effort to make the public opinion, in this respect, retrograde, and to infect our councils with a spirit contrary to these salutary advances towards improvement in true civilization and humanity.

If we pass from our own treaties, to those between other nations, we find that the provisions, which have been extracted [Page]from ours, have very nearly become formulas in the conventions of Europe. As examples of this may be consulted, th [...] following articles of treaties between Great Britain and other powers (to wit) the XVIIIth article of a treaty of peace and commerce with Portugal, in 1642—the XXXVIth article of a treaty of peace, commerce, and alliance with Spain, in 1667 —the XIXth article of a treaty of peace, and the [...]d of a treaty of commerce with France, both in 1713, and the XIIth article of a treaty of commerce and navigation with Russia, in 1766.

The article with Portugal provides, that if difficulties and doubts shall arise between the two nations, which give reason to apprehend the interruption of commerce, public notice of it shall be given to the subjects on both sides, and afte [...] that notice, two years shall be allowed to carry away the merchandize [...] and goods, and in the mean time, there shall be no injury or prejudice done to any persons or goods on either side.

The articles with France, in addition to the provisions common in other cases, particularly stipulate, that during the ter [...] of the protection (six months) "the subjects on each side shall enjoy good and speedy justice, so that during the said space of six months, they may be able to recover their goods and effects, entrusted as well to the public, [...]o private persons."

The article with Russia, besides stipulating an exemption from confiscation for one year, with the privilege to remove and carry away in safety, provides additionally, that the subjects of each party "shall be further permitted, either at o [...] before their departure, to consign the effects which they shall not as yet have disposed of, as well as the debts that shall be d [...] to them, to such persons as they shall think proper, in order [...] dispose of them according to their desire and for their benefit which debts, the debtors shall be obliged to pay in the sam [...] manner as if no such rupture had happened."

All these articles are, with those of our treaties, analagou [...] in principle, as heretofore particularly explained, to the 10th article of the treaty under discussion. That of the British treaty with France designates expressly debts due from the public a [...] well as those due from private persons. That with Russia go [...] the full length of our tenth article; empowering the creditou [...] on each side to assign the debts, which they are not able to collect within the term of their residence, to whomsoever they think fit, for their own benefit, and declaring that these deba [...] shall be paid to the assigns in the same manner as if no rupture had happened.

There is a document extant, which may fairly be supposed to express the sense of the government of France, at the period [Page]to which it relates, of the foundation of these stipulations. It is a memorial of Mr. Bussy, minister from the court of France to that of London, for negociating peace, dated in the year 1761, and contains these passages: "As it is impracticable for two princes, who make war with each other, to agree between them which is the aggressor with regard to the other, * equity and humanity have dictated these precautions, that where an unforeseen rupture happens suddenly and without any previous declaration, foreign vessels, which, navigating under the security of peace, and of treaties, happen, at the time of the rupture, to be in either of the respective ports, shall have time and full liberty to withdraw themselves.

"This wise provision, so agreeable to the rules of good faith, constitutes a part of the law of nations, and the article of the treaty, which sanctifies these precautions, ought to be faithfully executed, notwithstanding the breach of the other articles of the treaty which is the natural consequence of the war.

"The courts of France and Great Britain used this salutary precaution in the treaties of Utrecht and Aix la Chapelle."

These passages place the [...]urity stipulated in the treaties for the persons and property [...] subjects of one party found in the country of another, at the beginning of a war, upon the footing of its constituting a part of the law of nations, which may be considered as a formal diplomatic recognition of the principle for which we contend. As this position was not itself in dispute between the two governments, but merely a collateral inference from it, applicable to vessels taken at sea, prior to a declaration of war, it may be regarded as a respectable testimony of the law of nations on the principal point.

If the law of nations confers this exemption from seizure upon vessels, which, at the time of the rupture, happen to be in the respective ports of the belligerent parties, it is evident that it must equally extend its protection to debts contracted in a course of lawful trade. Vessels are particularly mentioned, because the discussion turned upon vessels seized at sea. But the reference to the treaties of Utrecht and Aix la Chapelle shows, that the minister, in his observation, had in view the whole subject matter of the articles of those treaties, which provide for the security of merchants and their effects in the event of war.

[Page] This conformity in principle, of the article under examination, with the provisions in so many treaties of our own and of other nations, taken in connexion with the comment of [...]tional and full evidence that our envoy, in agreeing to it, d [...] not go upon new and untrodden ground; that, on the contrary, he was in a beaten track; that, in pursuing the dictates of reason, and the better opinion of writers, as to the rule of the law of nations respecting the point, he was, at the same time, pursuing the examples of all the other treaties, whic [...] we had ourselves made, and of many of those of other countries.

It is now incumbent upon me to perform my promise of replying to such objections to the article as may remain una [...] swered by the preceding remarks. It is with pleasure I no [...] that the field is very narrow—that, indeed, there scarcely [...]mains any thing which is not so frivilous and impotent as [...]most to sothid a serious replication—it will therefore be [...]aim to be brief.

It is said, there is only an a [...] reciprocity in the ar [...]ticle, millions being due on o [...]e, and little or nothing on the other.

The answer to this is, that no right being relinquished, on either side, no privilege granted, the stipulation amounting only to a recognition of a rule of the law of nations, to a promise to abstain from injustice and a breach of faith, there is no room for an argument about reciprocity further than to require that the promise should be mutual, as is the case— This is the only equivalent which the nature of the subject demands or permits—It would be dishonorable to accept a boon merely for an engagement to fulfil a moral obligation— Indeed, as heretofore intimated, the true rule of reciprocity is stipulations of treaties, is equal right, not equal advantage from each several stipulation.

But it has been shown, that the stipulation will be benefici [...] to us, by the confidence which it will give on the other side, obviating and avoiding the obstructions to trade, the injuries to, and incumbrances upon, credit, naturally incident to the distrust and apprehension, which, after the question had been once moved, were to be expected [...]mdash;Here, if a compensation were required, there is one—Let me add as a truth, which, perhaps, has no exception, however uncongenial with the fashionalbe patriotic creed—that, in the wise order of providence, nations, in a temporal sense, may safely trust the maxim, that [Page]the observance of justice carries with it its own and a full reward.

It is also said, that having bound ourselves by treaty, we shall hereafter lose the credit of moderation, which would attend a forberance to exercise the right. But it having been demonstrated, that no such right exists, we only renounce a claim to the negative merit of not committing injustice, and we acquire the positive praise of exhibiting a willingness to renounce explicitly a pretension, which might be the instrument of oppression and sraud—It is always honorable to give proof of upright intention.

It is further said, that under the protection of this stipulation the king of Great Britain, who has alr [...]dy speculated in our funds (the assertors would be puzzled t [...]ing proof of the fact) may engross the whole capital of the bank of the United States, and thereby secure the uncontrouled direction of it—that he may hold the stock in the name of his ambaslador, or of some citizen of the United States, perhaps a senater, who, if of the virtuous twenty,* might be proud of the honor—that thus our citizens, in time of peace, [...] experience the mortification of being beholden to British directors, for the accomm [...]dations they might want—that, in time of war, our operati [...]ight he cramped at the pleasure of his majesty, and according as he should see fit or not to accommodate our government with loans—and that hoth in peace and war we may be reduced to the abject condition of having the whole capital of our national bank administered by his [...]itannic majesty.

Shall I treat this rhapsody with seriousness or ridicule?

The capital of the bank of the United States is ten millions of dollars, little short, at the present market price, of three millions of pounds sterling; but, from the natural operation of such a demand, in raising the price, it is not probable that much less than four millions sterling would suffice to complete the monopoly. I have never understood, that the private purse of his Britannic majesty, if it be true, as asserted, that he has already witnessed a relish for speculation in our funds (a fact, however, from which it was natural to infer a more pacific disposition towards us) was so very ample as conveniently to spare an item of such size for a speculation across the Atlantic. But, perhaps, the national purse will be brought to his aid—As this supposes a parliamentary grant, new taxes and new loans, it does not seem to be a very manageable thing, without disclosure [Page]of the object, and, if disclosed, so very unexampled an attempt of a foreign government would present a case completely out of the reach of all ordinary rules, justifying, by the manifest danger to us, even war and the confiscation of all that had been purchased. For let it be remembered, that the article does not protect the public property of a foreign government, prince, or state, independent of the observation just made, that such a case would be without the reach of ordinary rules. It may be added, that an attempt of this kind, from the force of the pecuniary capital of Great Britain, would, as a precedent, threaten and alarm all nations. Would consequences like these be incurred?

But let it [...] supposed, that the inclination shall exist, and that all difficu [...] about funds have been surmounted—Still, to effect the plan, there must be, in all the stockholders, a willingness to sell to the British king or his agents, as well as the will and means, on his part, to purchase. Here, too, some impediments might be experienced: there are persons who might choose to keep their property in the shape of ban [...] stock, and live upon the income of it, whom price would no [...] readily tempt to part with it. [...], there is an additional obstacle to complets success:— [...] [...]ted States are themselves the proprietors of two mi [...]oons of the bank stock.

Of two things, one, either the monopoly of his Britannic majesty would be known (and it would be a pretty arduous task to keep it a secret, especially if the stock was to stand, as suggested, in the name of his ambassador) or it would be unknown and concealed under unsuspected names: In the former supposition, the observations already made recur. There would be no protection to it from the article; and the extraordinary nature of the case would warrant any thing—Would his majesty or the parliament choose to trust so large a property in so perilous a situations?

If, to avoid this, the plan-should be to keep the operation unknown, the most effectual method would be to place the stock in the names of our own citizens. This, it seems, would be attended with no difficulty; since even our senators would be ambitious of the honor: and if they should have qualms and fears, others more compliant could, no doubt, be found amongst the numerous secretaries or adherents of Great Britain in our country: probably some of the patriots would not be inexotable, if properly solicited. Or, in the last resort, persons might be sent from Great Britain to acquire naturalization for the express purpose.

[Page] In this supposition, too, the article would be at the least innocent. For its provisions are entirely foreign to the case of stock standing in the names of our own citizens. It neither enlarges nor abridges the power of the government in this respect.

Further, how will the article work the miracle of placing the bank under the management of British directors? It gives no new rights, no new qualifications.

The constitution of the bank (section the 5th, 7th of the act of incorporation) has provided, with solicitude, these important guards, against foreign or other sinister influence—

1. That none but a citizen of the United States shall be eligible as a director.

2. That none but a stockholder, a [...]ly resident within the United States, shall vote in the elect [...] by proxy.

3. That one fourth of the directors, who are to be elected annually, must every year go out of the direction.

4 That a director may, at any time, be removed and replaced by the stock holders at a general meeting.

5. That a single share shall give one vote for directors, while any number of shares, in the same person, [...]partnership or body politic, will not give more than thirty votes.

H [...]e it is impossible, th [...]e bank can be in the management of British directors— [...]ish subject being incapable of being a director. It is also next to impossible, that an undue British influence could operate in the choice of directors, out of the number of our own citizens. The British king, or British subjects out of the United States, could not even have a vote by attorney, in the choice. Schemes of secret monopoly could not be executed, because they would be betrayed, unless the secret was confined to a small number. A small number, no one of whom could have more than thirty votes, would be easily over-ruled by the more numerous proprietors of single or a small number of shares, with the addition of the votes of the United States.

But here again it is to be remembered, that as to combination with our own citizens, in which they were to be ostensible for any pernicious foreign project—the article under consideration is perfectly nugatory—It can do neither good nor harm, since it merely relates, as to the exemption from confiscation and seizure on our part, to the known property of British subjects.

It follows, therefore, that the dangers pourtrayed to us from the s [...]culating enterprizes of his Britannic majesty, are the vagaries of an over-heated imagination—or the contrivances of a spirit of deception—and that so far as they could be supposed to have the least colour, it turns upon circumstances, [Page]upon which the treaty can have no influence whatever. In taking pains to expose their futility, I have been principally led by the desire of making my fellow-citizens sensible, in the instance, as in others, of the extravagancies of the opposers [...] the treaty.

One artifice to render the article unacceptable has been [...] put cases of extreme misconduct, on the other side, of flagr [...] violations of the law of nations, of war, of justice, and [...] humanity; and to ask, whether, under such circumstances, [...] confiscation or sequestration of debts would not be justifiabl [...] —To this the answer is, that if circumstances so extraordinary should arise, as, without the treaty, would warrant so ext [...] ordinary a [...]t, they will equally warrant it under the treaty For cases [...] kind are exceptions to all general rules. They would excuse the violation of an express, or positive, as [...] as of a tacit or virtual pledge of the public faith: which [...] seribes the whole difference between the existence and [...] [...]istence of the article in question. They rosemble those [...] of extrema necessity through [...]essive hunger, for instance which, in the eye [...] the law of nature, will execu [...] the ta [...] of the property of another, [...] those cases of extreme [...] of authority of releve, which [...] [...]nuting un [...]ocally [...] ran [...]y, are admitted to just [...] [...]cible resistance to the [...] blished authorities. Ca [...]tu [...] of government, lawn [...] all give way to cu [...]ians of such a description—the p [...] of obligation is, to distinguish them with sincerity, and [...] to indulge our passious and interests, in substituting puttend [...] for real cases.

A writer, who disgraces by adopting the name of CICE [...] makes a curious remark by way of objection. He affirms th [...] the article is nugatory, because a treaty is dissolved by a state [...] was, in which state the provision is designed to operate. If [...] be true, the article is at least harmless, and the trouble [...] painting it in such terrific colours might have been spared. [...] it is not true. Reason, writers, the practice of all nations a [...] [...]ed in this position, that those stipulations, which contemp [...] the state of war, in other words, which are designed to ope [...] in case of war, preserve their force and obligation when [...] taken place.* To what end else all the stipulations which hav [...] been cited from so many treaties?†

[Page] Previous to a conclusion I shall observe, barely with a view to accuracy, that the article leaves unprotected all vessels, goods and merchandizes, every species of property, indeed, except debts between individuals and the property of individuals in the public funds and in public and private banks. With this exception, whatever before may have been liable to confiscation of sequestration, still remains so, notwithstanding any thing contained in this article.

To over-rate the value and force of our own arguments is a natural foible of self-love—to be convinced without convincing others, is no uncommon fate of a writer or speakes—but I am more than ordinarily mistaken if every mind open [...]conviction, will not have been satisfied by what has been offered—that the tenth article of the treaty lately negociated with Great Britain, does nothing but confirm, by a positive agreement, a rule of the law of nations—indicated by reason, supported by the better opinion of writers, ratified by modern usage, dict [...] by [...] tice and good saith, recognized by formal acts and doth [...] of different nations, witnessed by diplomatic testimony, sanotioned by our treaties with o [...] [...]ountries, and by treaties between other countries—and [...]mable with sound policy and the true interests of the United States.

The discussion has been drawn out to so great a length, because the objections to this article are amongst those which have been urged with the greatest warmth and emphasis against the treaty, and its vindication from them, if satisfactory, must go far towards securing to it the public suffrage. Citizens of America! it is for you to perform your part of the task, it is for you to weigh with candour the arguments which have been submitted to your judgments; to consult, without bias, the integrity of your hearts; to exile prejudice and to immolate on the after of truth, the artifices of cabal and falsehood! There can then be no danger that patriotism will have to lament, or national honor to blush at, the sentence which you shall pronounce.

The articles, which adjust the matters of controversy between the two countries, all those which are permanent, have now been reviewed. Let me appeal to the consciences of those who have accompanied me in the review—if these articles were all [Page]that composed the treaty, would it be the better, that they should exist—or that all the sources of rupture and war with Great Britain should have survived the negociation to exting [...] them, and [...]hould still actually subsist in full vigour? If ev [...] enlightened and honest man must prefer the former—then [...] me make another observation, and put another question. The remaining articles of the treaty, which constitute its commercial part, expire by their own limitation at the end of twelve years. It is in the power of either party, consistently with the Instrument, to terminate them at the end of the expiration of two years after the present war between France and Great Britain.

Is it at al [...] probable that they can contain any thing so injurious, considering the short duration, which may be given to them, as to counterbalance the important consideration of pe [...] serving peace to this young country; as to warrant the exc [...] sive clamours which have been raised: as to authorize the h [...] rid calumaies which are vented; and to justify the system [...] efforts which are in operation to convulse our country and [...] hazard even CIVIL WAR?*

CAMILLI [...]

No. XXIII.

THE proceeding articles having adjusted those controver [...] which threatened an open rupture between the two countries, it remained to form such dispositions relative to the intercourse, commerce, and navigation, of the parties, as should appear most likely to preserve peace, and promote their mutual advantage.

Those who have considered with attention the interests of commerce, will agree in the opinion, that its utility, as well [...] general prosperity, would be most effectually advanced by a t [...] abolition of the restraints and regulations with which the jealousies and rival policy of nations have embarrassed it. But though we are not chargeable with having contributed to the establishment of these errors, so discouraging to the industry and perplexing in the intercourse of nations, we found them so deeply rooted and so extensively prevalent, that our voice [Page]and opinions would have been little regarded, had we expressed a desire of a system more liberal and advantageous to all.

The rights of commerce among nations between whom exist no treaties, are imperfect.

"The law of nature," says Vattel, (b. 1 s. 89) "gives to no person whatever, the least kind of right to sell what belongs to him, to another who does not want to buy it; nor has any nation that of felling its commodities or merchandize to a people who are unwilling to have them. Every man and every nation being perfectly at liberty to buy a thing that is to be sold, or not to buy it, and to buy it of one rather than of another."— "Every state has constantly," continues the same author, "a right to prohibit the entrance of foreign merchandi [...] and the people who are interested in this prohibition have no right to complain of it."—States by convention may turn these imperfect into perfect rights, and thus a nation, not having naturally a perfect right to carry on commerce with another, may acquire it by treaty. A simple permission to trade with a nation, gives no perfect right to that trade; it may be carried on so long as permitted; but the nation granting such permission is under no obligation to continue [...] perfect right in one nation to carry on commerce and tr [...] with another nation can alone be procured by treaty.

From the precarious nature of trade between nations, as well as from the desire of obtaining special advantages and preferences in carrying it on, originated the earliest conventions on the subject of commerce. The first commercial treaty that placed the parties on a more secure and better footing in their dealings with each other than existed in their respective intercourse with other nations, inspired others with a desire to establish, by similar treaties, an equally advantageous arrangement. Thus one treaty was followed by another, until, as was the case when the United States became an independent power, all nations had entered into extensive and complicated stipulations, concerning their navigation, manufactures and commerce.

This being the actual condition of the commercial world, when we arrived at our station in it, the like inducements to render certain that, which, by the law of nations, was precarious, and to participate in the advantages secured by national agreements, prompted our government to propose to all, and to conclude with several, of the European nations, treaties of comme [...]e.

Immediately after the conclusion of the war, congress appointed Mr. Adams, Doctor Franklin, and Mr. Jefferson, joint [Page]commissioners, to propose and conclude commercial treaties with the different nations of Europe. This commission was opened at Paris, and overtures were made to the different powers (including Great Britain) through their ministers residing at Paris. The basis of these numerous treaties, which congress were desirous to form, was, that the parties should respectively enjoy the rights of the most favored nations. Various answers were given by the foreign ministers, in behalf on their several nations. But the treaty with Prussia was the only one concluded, of the very great number proposed by the American commissioners. Mr. Adams, in 1785, was removed to London, Dr. Franklin soon after returned to America, and Mr. Jefferson succeeded him as minister at Paris. Thus failed the project of forming commercial treaties with almost every power in Europe. Treaties with Russia, Denmark, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal, would have been of importance; but the scheme of extending treaties of commerce to all the minor powers of Europe, not omitting his holiness the pope was, it must be acknowledged, somewhat chimerical, and could not fail to have cast an air of ridicule on the commissions that with great solemnity were ope [...] [...] Paris.

The imbecility of our nationa [...] [...]ernment, under the articles of confederation, was understood abroad as well is [...] home; and the opinions of characters in England, most inclined to favor an extensive commercial connexion between the two countries, were understood to have been opposed to the formation of a commercial treaty with us; sinee, from the defects of our articles of union, we were supposed to be destitute of the power requisite to enforce the execution of the stipulations that such a treaty might contain.

We must all remember the various and ill-digested laws for the regulation of commerce, which were adopted by the several states as substitutes for those commercial treatics, in the conclusion of which our commissioners had been disappointed —the embarrassments which proceeded from this source, joined to those felt from the derangement of the national treasury, were the immediate cause which assembled the convention at Philadelphia in 1787. The result of this convention was the adoption of the present federal constitution, the legislative and executive departments of which each possess a power to reg [...] late foreign commerce; the former, by enacting laws for that purpose, the latter, by forming commercial treaties with Foreign nations.

The opinion heretofore entertained by our government, repecting the utility of commercial treaties, is not equivocal; [Page]and it is probable that they will, in future, deem it expedient to adjust their foreign trade by treaty, in preference to legislative provisions, as far as it shall be found practicable, on terms of reasonable advantage. In the formation of the regulations that are legislative, being ex part [...], the interest of those who establish them is seen in its strongest light, while that of the other side is rarely allowed its just weight. Pride and passion too frequently add their influence to carry these regulations beyond the limits of moderation: restraints and exclusions, on one side, beget restraints and exclusions on the other, and these retaliatory laws lead to, and often terminate in, open war: While, on the other hand, by adjust [...] the commercial intercourse of nations by treaty, the preten [...]ns of the parties are candidly examined, and the result of the discussion, it is fair to presume, as well from the experience of individuals in private affairs, as from that of nations in their more important and complicated relations, establishes those regulations which are best suited to the interests of the parties, and which alone afford that stability and confidence so essential to the success of commercial enterprize.

That our present gover [...]ment have thought a commercial treaty with Great Britain would be advantageous, is evident, not alone from the special and distinct commission given to Mr. Jay to form one; but likewise from the letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, of the 29th November, 1791, which was the first letter to that minister after his arrival; in which the executive says: "with respect to the commerce of the two countries, we have supposed that we saw, in several instances, regulations on the part of your government, which, if reciprocally adopted, would materially injure the interests of both nations; on this subject too, I must beg the favor of you to say, whether you are authorized to conclude or to negociate arrangements with us; which may fix the commerce between the two countries on principles of reciprocal advantage."

Further, from the first session of congress, to that during which Mr. Jay's appointment took place, efforts were made to discriminate, in our revenue and commercial laws, between those nations with whom we had, and those with whom we had not, commercial treaties—The avowed object of which discrimination was, to place the latter nations on a less advantageous commercial footing than the former, in order to induce them likewise to form commercial treaties with us; and it cannot be forgotten by those, who affect to suppose that it was not expected that a treaty of commerce would be formed by [Page]Mr. Jay, that Mr. Madison's commercial resolutions, which were under consideration at the time of Mr. Jay's appointment, grew out of, and were built upon, a clause of Mr. Jefferson's report of the 26th December, 1793, which asserts that Great Britain discovered no disposition to enter into a commercial treaty with us. The report alluded to is explicit in declaring a preference of friendly arrangements, by treaties of commerce, to regulations by the acts of our legislature, and authorizes the inference, under which the commercial resolutions were brought forward, that the latter should be resorted to, only when the former cannot be effected.

The power of the executive to form commercial treaties, and the objection against the commercial articles before us, as an unconstitutional interference with the legislative powers of congress, will, in the sequel, be distinctly examined, together with other objections on the point of constitutionality.

Against the policy of regulating commerce by treaty, rather than by acts of the legislature, it is said, that the legislative acts can, but that a treaty cannot, be repealed. This remark is true, and of weight against the formation of commercial treaties which are to be of long duration, or, like our commercial treaty with France, which is per [...]ment. For, as we are yearly advancing in agriculture, manufactories, commerce, navigation, and strength, our treaties of commerce, especially such as, by particular stipulations, shall give to the parties other rights than those of the most favored nation, ought to be [...] short duration, that, like temporary laws, they may, at an early day, expire by their own limitation, leaving the interests of the parties to a new adjustment, founded on equity and mutual convenience.

Of this description are the commercial articles of the treaty with Great Britain; for none of them can continue in force more than twelve years; and they may all expire, if either party shall choose it, at the end of two years after the peao [...] between France and Great Britain.

Did the limits assigned to this defence admit a review of the commercial and maritime codes of the principal European nations, we should discover one prevailing feature to characterize them all; we should see the general or common interest of nations, every where, placed in a subordinate rank, and their separate advantage adopted, as the end to be attained by their respective laws—Hence, one nation has enacted laws to protect their manufactured, another to encourage and e [...]end their navigation, a third to monopolize some important branch of trade, and all have contributed to the creation of that complicated [Page]system of regulations and restraints, which we see established throughout the commercial world.

One branch, and a principal one of this system, that which establishes the connexion between the several European nations and their colonies, merits our particular attention. An exact knowledge of this connexion would assist us in forming a just estimate of the difficulties that stand in opposition to our claim of free and full participation in the colony trade of Great Britain.

Unlike the plan of colonization adopted by the ancient governments, who, from the crouded population of their cities, sent forth and established beneath their auspices new and independent republics, the colonies of modern times have been planted with entirely different views; retained in a state of dependence on the parent country, their connexion has been made subservient to that spirit of monopoly, which has shown itself among all the commercial powers. Every European nation has its colonies, and for that reason prohibited all foreigners from trading to them.

Important political events arise and pass in such quick succession, that we are liable to forget facts and opinions familiar to us in periods within the [...]linary powers of recollection.— No subject was more critically examined, or generally understood before the American revolution, than that which respected the connexion between Great Britain and her colonies! all were then agreed, that the colony trade and navigation were subject to the restraints and regulations of the parent state. It was not against this dependence and commercial monopoly that the colonies complained! They were willing to submit to them. It was the unjust attempt to tax them, to raise a revenue from them, without their consent, which combined that firm and spirited opposition, which effected a division of the empire—thus the congress of 1775, in their last address to the inhabitants of Great Britain, say, "We chearfully consent to such acts of the British parliament as shall be restrained to the regulations of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empure to the mother country, and the commercial benefit of its respective members! excluding every idea of taxation internal or external for the purpose of raising a revenue on the subjects in America without their consent." The "colonial codes of other nations are marked with the same spirit of monopoly:—thus Portugal shuts out all foreigners from the Brazils as well as from her Asiatic possessions, Spain from South America and her West India islands, France excludes all foreigners from her Asiatic dominions, and [Page]limits within narrow bounds their intercourse with her colonies in the West Indies. Holland guards, with the miser's vigilance, the access to her spice islands, and imitates, though with somewhat less rigour, the policy of the other powers in her We [...] India possessions.—And England, by her act of navigation, which has been in operation for more than a century, asserted, and hitherto has uniformly adhered to the like system of exclusion and monopoly.

Notwithstanding the intimate alliance, the family compact, between France and Spain, the former has not been able [...] procure admission into the Spanish colonial territories whe [...] she might have acquired immense wealth by the sale of her manufactures, her wines, and her brandies.—Holland, though a part of the Spanish monarchy long after the discovery of America, and the establishment of the Spanish power in th [...] quarter of the world, was unable after her separation from Spain, and the acknowledgment of her independence, eve [...] in the zenith of her splendid power upon the ocean, to obta [...] by force or treaty a share in the Spanish colony trade to Sou [...] America—The rival wars between the English and the Dutch towards the close of the last co [...]ry, which originated in co [...] mercial competition and jealo [...] were successively termin [...] without England yielding the s [...]allest departure from the [...] clusive commercial system, contained in her act of navi [...] tion.

Great Britain, though maintaining her exclusive laws aga [...] other nations at different periods, has shown the strongest [...] fire to share in the rich trade of Spain with her colonies—T [...] war that commenced in 1739, was occasioned by the firm, [...] irregular, opposition of Spain to the contraband efforts of the British traders.

The impediments Great Britain has uniformly met in her attempts to extend her settlement in the Bay of Hondura [...], to form establishments at Faulkland Island, and more recently at Nootka Sound, afford additional proofs of the fixed policy of Spain on the subject of her colony trade.

Portugal, whose political safety more than once has appeared to depend on the efficacious aid of Great Britain, does not yie [...] to her ally any portion of her valuable colonial commerce.

So uniform and persevering has been the practice of nations on this point, that in the latest treaties of commerce between France and Spain, between each of these powers and Great Britain, between Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Portugal, we do not discover, that any one of these powers, has consented to admit the others to a participation in the trade [Page]and navigation to their respective colonies—the Assiento contract for the supply of negroes to the Spanish colonies, which has been made by Spain with several powers, is an unimportant and solitary exception to this rule.

Montesquieu calls this law appropriating the colony commerce to the benefit of the parent state, "A fundamental law of Europe." "It has been established," says this enlightened Frenchman,—"That the metropolis or mother country alone shall trade in the colonies, and that for very good reasons; because the design of the settlement, was the extension of commerce, not the foundation of a city or now empire. Thus it is still a fundamental law of Europe, that all commerce with a foreign colony shall be regarded as a mere monopoly, punishable by the laws of the country; and in this case we are not to be directed by the laws and precedents of the ancients, which are not at all applicable."

"It is likewise acknowledged that a commerce established between the mother countries, does not include a permission to trade in the colonies; for these always continue in a state of prohibition." [Montesquieu, Liv. xxi. chap. xvii.]

This subject is of too gr [...] importance not to be pursued a little further. Principles co [...]ed with it, and such as will continue to operate whether we sanction or condemn them, remain to be disclosed. It is true that the principal end of the dominion that the European powers have held over their colonies, has been the monopoly of their commerce, "since in their exclusive trade (as has been observed by a sensible writer on the subject) consists the principal advantages of colonies, which afford neither revenue nor force for the defence of the parent country;" but this is not the sole object. Some nations, and among them Great Britain, have viewed the exclusive navigation and trade to their colonies, in the light in which they have seen their coasting trade and fisheries; as a nursery for that body of seamen, whom they have considered not only as necessary to the prosperity and protection of commerce, but as essential to the defence and safety of the state.

The situation of Great Britain in this respect is peculiar: when compar [...]d with several of the neighbouring powers, her numbers and military forces are manifestly inferior. The armies kept on foot in peace, as well as those brought into the field in war, by the great nations in Europe, are so decidedly superior to those of Great Britain, that were she a continental power, her rivals would easily be an overmatch for her. The ocean is her fortification, and her seamen alone are the soldiers who can defend it. When Great Britain shall become an [Page]inferior maritime power, when her enemy shall acquire a dec [...] sive superiority on the sea, what will prevent a repetition of those conquests the examples of which we find in her early history? No subject has been more profoundly thought on tha [...] this has been in Great Britain. Her policy, from the date of her navigation act, has been guided by these considerations— that her national safety depends on her wooden walls, is a ma [...] im as sacred in Britain, as it once was in Athens. Her statesmen, her merchants, her manufacturers, and her yeomanry comprehend and believe it.

It is then surprising, that we see her so anxious to encourag [...] and extend her navigation, as to exclude as far as practicable, foreigners from any share of her fisheries, her coasting, and her colony trade? Does not candour require us to admit, since her national defence rests upon her navy, which again depends on her seamen, which an extensive navigation can alone supply, that Great Britain having more to risk, is among the la [...]t powers likely to break in upon or materially to relinquish that system of exclusive colony trade, that has so long and uniformly prevailed among the great colonizing powers?

America has her opinions, perhaps prejudices, on the subject of commerce: she is, and, at [...]ast until she shall become a naval power, will continue to be, without colonies. But [...] laws manifest a similar spirit with those of other nations, in the regulations which they prescribe for the government of her fisheries and her coasting trade. The object of these laws is a [...] exclusion of foreign competition, in order to encourage and i [...] crease her own navigation and seamen; from which resources not only in wars between other nations, but likewise in those [...] which she may be engaged, important commercial and national advantages may be expected. These opinions deserve attention [...] they have already had and will continue to have a suitable influence with her government. But we should remember, that other nations have likewise their opinions and prejudices on these subjects; opinions and prejudices not the less strong or deeply rooted for having been transmitted to them through a series of past generations. Thus in England, not only the public opinion, but what is more unconquerable, the private in [...]rests of ma [...]y individuals will oppose every change in the existing laws that may be supposed likely to diminish their navigation, to limit their trade, or in any measure to affect disadvantageously their established system of national commerce.

It cannot have escaped notice, that we have among us characters who are unwilling to see stated the impediments that stand in the way of the commercial arrangements, which they [Page]contend, should be conceded to us by foreign nations, and who are ready to charge those who faithfully expose them, with an inclination to excuse or vindicate the unreasonable denials of our commercial rivals, and with a desire to yield up the just pretensions of our country. The artifice seems too gross to be dangerous with a sensible people, but the public should notwithstanding be on their guard against it.—They should dispassionately examine the real difficulties to be encountered in the formation of our commercial treaties. They should enquire and ascertain how far other nations, seeking the same advantages, have been able to succeed. They should further compare the treaty in question with those we have before made with other nations.—the result of such investigation so far from warranting the condemnation of the commercial articles of the treaty before us, it is believed would demonstrate that these articles make a wider breach in the British commercial system than has ever before been made; that on their commercial dispositions they are preferable to any treaty we have before concluded, and that there is rational ground to believe that the treaty will have a tendency friendly to the agriculture, the commerce, and the navigation of our country.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXIV.

HOWEVER uniform may have been the law of Europe in relation to their colonial establishments, no pains have been spared to create an opinion that France has been guided by a more liberal policy than the other colonizing powers, and that the regulations of her colony trade were essentially dissimilar from theirs; moreover that her disinterestedness was so great, that she not long since proposed to our government to establish by treaty, a trade between us and her West India colonies equally free with that which prevails in her own intercourse with them. The object of these attempts is readily perceived.

As there was no probability, that Great Britain would consent to our trading with her West India colonies on the same terms as she herself does, as it was foreseen that limitations and conditions would accompany any agreement that should be made on this subject; to extol the liberty of France, and exclaim against the monopolizing views of Great Britain, were deemed suitable means to excite a prejudice against the expected adjustment [Page]of the commercial intercourse between us and the British West India colonies.

A comparison of the footing by which our trade stood with the French and British West India colonies, after the completion of our revolution, and before the present war in Europe, with a concise exposition of the real views of France on the subject of a new commercial treaty, will best demonstrate the want of candor and patriotism in those Americans, who have submitted to become agents in propagating these errors.

France, like England, has endeavoured to secure the greatest possible portion of advantage to herself, by her colonial laws, and the concessions yielded to foreigners have been only such deviations from an entire monopoly, as her own interest has rendered indispensable—France, in imitation of the English navigation law, as early as 1727, established an ordinance, confirming to the mother country the monopoly of the trade to her colonies, and excluding thereby all foreigners—Experience proved the necessity of moderating the rigour of their ordinance, and relaxations in favor of a limited foreign intercourse existed at the time when our commercial treaty with France was concluded, by the thirtieth article of which, it is agreed, that France will continue to the citizens of the United States, the free ports, which have been and are open in their West Indi [...] islands, to be enjoyed agreeable to the regulations which relate to them—A system of regulations relative to the trade of foreigners with the French islands, was promulgated in 1784: This ordinance established one free port at St. Lucie, another at Martinique, another at Gaudaloupe, another at Tobago, and three others at St. Domingo, to which foreign vessels of the burthen of sixty tons and upwards might carry for sale, woods of all sorts, pit coal, live animals, fatted beef, salted fish, rice, Indian corn, vegetables, green hides, peltry, turpentine, and tar—This was followed by the arrets of September, 1785, which by imposing heavy duties on foreign salted fish, and establishing large bounties on those of the national or French fishery, materially affected the foreign commerce with the French islands in this important article of supply and consumption.

Such were the duties on the foreign, and the premiums on the national fish, that together they would have been equivalent to a prohibition of the former, had the national fishery been able to supply the consumption.

In return for these articles which alone were permitted to be imported by foreigners into the French islands, and which it will be observed excluded some of our principal staples especially [Page] flour, they were allowed to purchase and bring away of the productions of the islands, only melasses and rum.

All cotton, coffee, sugar, and other productions (rum and melasses excepted) were prohibited; and we could, except occasionally by local relaxations of the general law, rightfully obtain none of them from the French West India islands— This was the footing of our trade under our treaty and the standing edict which preceded the French revolution, and even this was liable to still further limitations, whenever France should think proper to impose them; the treaty securing only a right to as free a commerce as France should grant to other foreign nations.

Great Britain has permitted the importation into her West India colonies of all the foreign articles, allowed by France to be imported into her islands (salted fish and salted beef excepted) and she moreover permitted the importation of foreign tobacco, flour, meal, biscuit, wheat, and various other grains which France prohibited—In return for these commodities, Great Britain permitted the exportation from her islands to our country, of rum and melasses, and moreover of sugar, coffee, cocoa, ginger, and pimento, together with such other articles as are allowed to be carried from their islands to any other foreign country.

Great Britain prohibited the importation and exportation of most of these articles to and from all foreign nations, except the United States—France permitted the intercourse with her colonies, under the same limitations to us in common with all other foreign nations.

The articles received from us by Great Britain, for the supply of her West India islands, exceeded in variety those received from us by France for the supply of her islands, the British West Indies were, therefore, in the ordinary and established course more extensive customers to us than the French West Indies. Again, the articles which we received from the British West Indies and which we were prohibited from receiving from the French West Indies, were among the most valuable of their productions, and, from the force of habit, some of them are included in the catalogue of articles of the first necessity in our consumption. In point of supply, therefore, the British were better furnishers, their colonial laws being much less restrictive than those of France.

Though the regulations of the British West India trade were more favorable to our agriculture than those of France, and though the articles with which we were supplied from the British islands were more numerous and valuable than those obtained [Page]from the islands of France, the colony system of the latter was preferable to that of the former in relation to our navigation. France permitted our vessels of and above sixty tons burthen, to carry and bring away the articles, not prohibited in the foreign trade with her islands, while Great Britain confined the trade to her own vessels and excluded those of all foreign nations.

Difference of situation, and not of principle, produced this variety or distinction in the colony system of the two nations. France being able from her resources to supply most of the articles requisite for the consumption of her West Indies, and from her great population, having a proportionate demand for the productions of her islands, she has been carefully restrictive in the trade between her colonies and foreign countries as to the articles of import and export.

All the productions of her islands, must go to the mother country, except rum and melasses; these articles were not confined to France, because they would have directly interfered with the valuable manufacture of her brandies. On the other hand, Great Britain, being less able from her internal resources to supply the articles necessary for the consumption of her West Indies, and her population, or home demand not requiring the whole productions of her islands, she has been more liberal in the trade allowed to be carried on between her colonies and foreign countries as to the articles of import and export. But her navigation being adequate to the whole trade of all he [...] dominions, while that of France required the addition of forreign bottoms, Great Britain has excluded entirely from her colony trade the foreign vessels of all nations, while France has admitted them to share in the foreign trade permitted to her West India islands.

Both France and Great Britain relax their colonial laws, in times of occasional scarcity and when they are engaged in war; during which, the intercourse with their West India possessions is laid more open to foreigners. The catalogue of supplies is sometimes enlarged, and Great Britain, as well as France, during these relaxations, permits American vessels to resort to, and engage in the commerce of, their islands.

It is notwithstanding from the permanent laws alone of these nations, that we are able to infer their views in relation to their colony trade! the exceptions and deviations that become necessary by reason of accidental scarcity or the embarrassments of war, serve only to explain more clearly the principles of the permanent system.

[Page] The result of this comparison affords no support for the assertion that France has been less exclusive, or more liberal in her colony system, than Great Britain—both these nations have in the establishment of their colonial laws alike disregarded the interests of foreign nations, and have been equally under the controul of the principles of self-interest, which ever have, and ever will govern the affairs of nations.*

Nothing can be more erroneous, than the opinion that any nation is likely to yield up its own interest, in order, gratuitously, to advance that of another. Yet we frequently hear declarations of this kind, and too many honest citizens have surrendered themselves to this delusion—Time and experience will cure us of this folly.

Equal artifice has been practised, and no less credulity displayed, on the subject of a new treaty of commerce, which it is boldly asserted, France from the most disinterested motives has offered to us. It should be recollected that France already has a treaty of commerce with us, a treaty that is not limited to two years, nor twelve years, but one that is to endure for ever—This treaty is as favorable to France as she can desire, or we in our utmost fondness be disposed to make—It secures to her our acquiescence in an exclusion from her Asiatic dominions, and in fresh regulations as her interest shall dictate relative to our intercourse with her West India possessions—It excludes us from her fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland, which she was unwilling to share with us, and it gives to her every commercial favor or privilege which by treaty we may yield to any other nation, freely when freely granted, and when otherwise on yielding the same equivalent—her productions, her manufactures, her merchandizes, and her ships may come into all our ports to which any other foreign productions, manufactures, merchandizes, or ships may come—they are severally to pay only the lowest duties paid by any other nation, and no other nation in its intercourse and trade with us, is, in any instance, to have a preference over her—A variety of other regulations are inserted in this treaty useful to France and not particularly disserviceable to us.

This treaty has been religiously observed and executed on our part; France has repeatedly violated it in the article which makes enemy goods free in neutral bottoms, while it is understood [Page]she has faithfully observed it in the article, that makes neutral goods lawful prize when found in enemy bottoms.

If it be true, that nations in justice to themselves are bound to decline the abandonment of their own interest, for the purpose of promoting at their own expense and detriment, the interest of others, ought we too readily to credit an opposite opinion? Ought we not to expect full proof of the sincerity of those declarations, that are intended to produce a belief of this disinterested and self-denying course? Ought not the very proposal of such a measure, from its extraordinary nature, inspire circumspection, and put a prudent nation on its guard? If moreover, the overture should occur at a moment when we are ascertained that those who make it, desire, and are, in fact, pursuing objects incompatible with the disinterestedness which it avows? If while it is said we wish that you should remain [...] peace with those who hold this language, neglect no means is engage our citizens to violate their neutral duties and thereby expose their country to war; if when we are told "we rejoice in the freedom of a sister republic," all the arts o [...] [...]ntrigue, so much more dangerous by our unsuspicious temper, and unlimited affection for those who practise them, were employed to alienate our attachment from our own government, and [...] throw us into a state of anarchy; if when the facinating proposal of opening new channels of commerce, which were to give unbounded riches to our merchants was received with more caption than was desired, we are told that in case of refusal, [...] evasion (mark the generosity) France would repeal her existing laws which had been dictated by an attachment to the Americans. What must have been our infatuation, what the measure of our folly, had we given implicit credit to words so much a variance with cotemporary actions? But it is asked, do not the letters of Mr. Genet to Mr. Jefferson, which have been published, prove that France desired and offered to enter into a new disinterested and liberal treaty of commerce with us? The question shall be fairly examined.

There are two letters from Mr. Genet on this subject—Immediately after his arrival at Philadelphia, in a letter to Mr. Jefferson of the 23d May, 1793, he says—"The French republic has given it in charge to me to propose to your government to consecrate by a true family compact, by a national covenant, the liberal and fraternal basis, on which it wishes to establish the commercial and political system of two people, whose interests are inseparably connected."

If the object of this proposal was a revision of our commercial treaty, in order to render the intercourse between us more [Page]free and advantageous, this minister was singularly unfortunate in his expressions—He might have employed the fine phrase of consecrating by a true family compact, by a national covenant, the liberal and fraternal basis on which it was wished to establish the commercial system of the two countries, and have been intelligible; but when he tells us, that he is instructed to open a negociation with our government, for the purpose of establishing the commercial and political system of the two countries, what are we to understand? That trade and its regulations are alone in view? Or that a family compact establishing the political, as well as the commercial system of the two nations, must include likewise the league or treaty of alliance, whereby the strength and wealth of the two nations should be closely united in the prosecution of a common object?

This ambiguous overture, if its meaning is not too plain to allow the epithet, was received in the most friendly manner by our government, and on the suggestion that the senate are united with the president in making treaties, it was understood between Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Genet, that the subject should be deferred till the meeting of congress.

Before that period, however, Mr. Genet, in a letter of the 30th of September, 1793, renews the proposal to open the negociation relative to the proposed family compact between us and France; and proves to us that our benefit was its principal exclusive object, by affectionately intimating in the conclusion of his letter, that he is further instructed to tell us, in case of refusal or evasion on our part to enter into this family agreement, that France will repeal the laws dictated by the attachment of the French for the Americans.

Had it before been doubted whether political engagements relative to war, were intended to be connected with the proposed treaty, these doubts must have disappeared on the receipt of this second letter from Mr. Genet; the intimation that the laws of France which operated favorably to our trade with their dominions, would be repealed, in case we refused or evaded the conclusion of a new treaty, cannot be reconciled, with the belief, that this treaty was sought for from motives purely commercial, or solely to enlarge and add prosperity to our trade.

Mr. Genet at this time had so outraged our government as to have compelled them to request his recall, he must, therefore, have been convinced, that no conscience would be held with him except on points of urgent importance, and such as would not admit of delay—He was, therefore, answered by Mr. Jefferson on the 5th of November, that his letter had been [Page]laid before the president, and would be considered with all the respect and interest that its objects necessarily required; and i [...] Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Morris of the 23d of August, we are informed that our government were desirous to go into a commercial negociation with France, and, therefore, requested that the powers given to Mr. Genet on that subject should be renewed to his successor—It has not appeared that this was ever done—His immediate successor, Mr. Fauchet, it is believed, gave no evidence of his having any powers relative to a commercial treaty; and if reports, which arrived with the present minister, having great marks of authenticity, may be credited, he has power only to digest the articles of such a treaty, not to conclude one.

Notwithstanding the internal evidence contained in the two letters of Mr. Genet was sufficient to have satisfied a sensible people, that something beyond a commercial treaty was connected with the proffered negociation, and though this conjecture acquired strength from the cautious procedure of our government on the occasion: yet these letters, and that procedure, have been pressed upon the public as conclusive evidence, that France had offered, and our government refused, to enter into a new treaty of commerce, that would have been highly beneficial to our trade and navigation.

The refutation of this opinion so injurious to a reasonable and salutary confidence in the integrity and patriotism of o [...] own executive government, and which the agents of its propagation, had spread far and wide, might have been more difficult, had not the minister of France for the purpose of justifying his own conduct, published his hitherto secret instruction.

By these instructions it appears, that the essential object of this proffered negociation, was to engage the United States to make common cause with France in the war then foreseen, and which soon broke out with Spain and England—That the advantages to be yielded by a new commercial treaty were to be purchased by our uniting with France in extending the empire of liberty, in breaking up the colonial and monopolizing-systems of all nations, and finally in the emancipation of the new world *—This was laying out a large and difficult work, in the accomplishment whereof arduous and numerous perils must be met, to encounter which we were called by no obligation to others, to avoid which we were admonished by all the duties which require [Page]us to cherish and preserve our own unparalleled freedom, prosperity and happiness.

However contradictory this extraordinary project may appear to the friendly communications that had been made by the French government to ours, however repugnant to the soothing declarations pronounced by Mr. Genet, of the fraternal and generous sentiments of his country towards ours, and of the republican frankness and sincerity that should characterise his deportment;—let the following extracts from his instructions published by himself in December, 1793, be consulted in confirmation of this statement, and as an authentic exposition of the genuine views of the French executive council in the mission of Mr. Genet—viz.

"The executive council have examined the instructions given to the predecessors of the citizen Genet in America, and they have seen with indignation, that while the good people of America have expressed to us their gratitude in the most lively manner, and given us every testimony of their friendship, both Vergennes and Montmorin have thought that the interests of France required, that the United States should not obtain that political order and consistency of which they were capable, because they would thereby quickly attain a strength, which they might probably be inclined to abuse. These ministers, therefore, enjoined it upon the representatives of Louis XVI. in America, to hold a passive conduct, and to speak only of the personal vows of the king for the prosperity of the United States. The same machiavelism directed the operations of the war of independence, the same duplicity presided in the negociations of the peace. The deputies of congress had expressed a desire that the cabinet of Versailles should favor the conquests of the Floridas, of Canada, of Nova Scotia: but Louis and his ministers constantly refused their countenance—regarding the possession of those countries by Spain and England, as useful source [...] of disquietude and anxiety to the Americans."

After declaring that the executive council proposes to itself a different course, and that it approves of the overtures, which had been made as well by General Washington, as by Mr. Jefferson, to Mr. Ternant, relative to the means of renewing and consolidating the commercial regulations between the two countries, they proceed to declare furt [...]er "that they are inclined to extend the latitude of the proposed commercial treaty (observe, the first proposal of a new commercial treaty came from us, and not from France) by converting it into a national compact, whereby the two people should combine their commercial with their political interests, and should establish in intimate concert [Page]to befriend, under all circumstances, the extension of the empi [...] of liberty, to guarantee the sovereignty of the people, and [...] punish the nations who shall continue to adhere to a coloni [...] system, and an exclusive commerce, by declaring that the ve [...] sels of such nations should not be received into the ports of the two contracting parties. This agreement which the French people will support with all the energy that distinguishes them, and of which they have given so many proofs, will quickly contribute to the emancipation of the new world. However vast this project may appear, it will be easily accomplished, if the Americans will concur in it, and in order to convince them of this, no pains must be spared by the Citizen Genet. For independent of the benefits that humanity will draw from the success of this negociation—France, at this moment, has a particular interest that requires us to be prepared to act with efficacy against England and Spain, if, as every circumstance announces, these powers, in hatred of our principles, shall make war up [...] us." In this state of things, we ought "to employ every means to re-animate the zeal of the Americans, who are also intere [...] ed that we should disappoint the liberticide designs of Geo [...] the third, of which they likewise may possibly be an object. "The executive council has reason to believe, that these reflections, joined to the great commercial advantages, which we a [...] disposed to grant to the United States, will decide their government to agree to all that the Citizen Genet shall propose [...] them on our part—But as from the rumours respecting [...] interior, our finances, and our marine, the American administration may observe a wavering timid conduct! The execution council, in expectation that the American government will finally decide, to make common cause with us, charges th [...] Citizen Genet to take such steps as shall be most likely to ser [...] the cause of liberty and the freedom of the people."

In a supplemental instruction, the executive council say, "as soon as the negociation concerning a new treaty of commerc [...] shall be practicable, Citizen Genet must not omit to stipulate a positive reciprocity of the exemption from the American tonnage duty." The mutual naturalization of French and American citizens, so far as respects commerce, that has b [...] proposed by Mr. Jefferson and approved by the executive council (this it is presumed, in the eyes of certain characters, would be free from objection, though the naturalization by treaty, of the subjects of any nation but France, would be treason against the constitution and against liberty) "will render this exemption from the tonnage duties less offensive to the powers who have a right by their treaties to claim the same exemption, for [Page]the casus faederis by this mutual naturalization will be entirely changed in respect to them—The reciprocal guarantee of the possessions, of the two nations, stipulated in the XIth article of the treaty of 1778, must form an essential clause in the new treaty to be concluded! The executive council, therefore, instructs Citizen Genet early to sound the American government on this point, and to make it an indispensable condition of a free trade to the French West Indies, so interesting for the United States to obtain. It concerns the peace and prosperity of the French nation, that a people whose resources and strength increase in a ratio incalculable, and who are placed so near to our rich colonies, should be held by explicit engagements to the preservation of these islands—There will be the less difficulty in making these propositions relished by the United States, as the great commerce which will be their price, will indemnify them before hand for the sacrifices they must make in the sequel— Besides, the Americans cannot be ignorant of the great disproportion between their means and those of the French republic! that for a long time the guarantee will be merely nominal for them, while it will be real on the side of France. And moreover that we shall, without delay, take measures to fulfil it on our part, by sending to the American posts, a force sufficient to shelter them from all insults and dangers, and to facilitate their intercourse with our islands and with France"—"and to the end that nothing may retard the conclusion of the negociations of Citizen Genet with the Americans, and that he may have in his hands all the means which may be employed in forwarding the success of his exertions to serve the cause of liberty, the council, in addition to the full powers hereunto annexed, has authorized the minister of marine to supply him with a number of blank letters of marque, to be delivered to such Frenchmen or Americans, as should equip privateers in America—the minister of war will likewise supply him with commissions in blank for the different grades in the army."*

These were extraordinary means to enable the French minister to conclude with our government a pacific treaty of commerce. The above extracts, though not an entire translation of the whole of Mr. Genet's instructions, many parts of which are foreign to the point in discussion, are a faithful abstract of such parts of them, as relate to the principles and conduct of [Page]the French monarchy towards us, and are as explanatory of the views of the executive council on the subject of a [...] treaty of commerce— [...]t will, I think, prove, if the assertion [...] of that council are to be credited, that the gratitude, of which we have heard so much, ought not to be demanded on account of the principles that influenced the monarchy of France during our war, or subsequent to the peace—and furthermore it will prove that the real view of the French executive council in the mission of Mr Genet, was to engage us by advantages to be conceded in a new comme [...]cial treaty, to make common cause with France, in the expected war with Great Britain and the coalesced powers. If then the established footing of our trade with the French West Indies, like that of our trade with the British islands, has been dictated by that colonial system of monopo [...], which forms a fundamental law in Europe—and if moreover the opinion that we could have procured a new and more lib [...] treaty of commerce with France, without plunging our country in the present war, is an error, that has been artfully imposed on the public—by exposing these truths, the examination of the treaty with Great Britain is at once freed from the objections and aspersions that have proceeded from these errors.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXV.

IT will be useful, as it will simplify the examination of [...] commercial articles of the treaty, to bear in mind and [...] serve the division, that we find established by the 12th, 13th and the 14th and 15th articles; each respects a parti [...] branch or portion of the trade between the two countries, the regulations whereof differ from, and are severally independent of, each other—Thus one is relative to the West Indies—another to the East Indies—and the third, distinct from both the former, respects our trade with the British dominions in Europe.

That Great Britain will consent to place our trade with [...] West India colonies upon an equally advantageous footing wi [...] her own, is improbable; this would be doing what none of the great colonizing nations has done, or is likely to do—it would be to relinquish the principal ends of the establishment, and defence of her colonies; it would be equivalent to making [...] islands in the West Indies the common property of Great Britain [Page]and America for all commercial and profitable purposes; and exclusively her own in the burden of support and defence.

The senate have, however, and, I think, wisely, considered the terms and conditions, on which it is agreed by the 12th article, that we should participate in the trade of the British West Indies, as less liberal than we may, with reason, expect— The exclusion of all vessels above the burden of seventy tons, would diminish the benefits and value of this trade; and though we cannot calculate upon obtaining by future negociation a total removal of a limitation on this subject, it is not altogether improbable that a tonnage something larger may be procured.

Those who are conversant with our present intercourse with the West Indies can best determine whether many vessels under seventy tons burden are not, at this time, profitably employed in that trade: it is believed to be true, that previous to our independence, vessels of this burden were much engaged in that employ as well in the southern as in the eastern states.

This limitation, though disadvantageous, is not the strongest objection to the 12th article: the restraining or regulating of a portion of our trade, which does not proceed from, and is independent of the treaty, forms a more decisive reason against the article than any thing else that it contains.

The cause of this restraint is found in the commercial jealousy and spirit of monopoly, which have so long reigned over the trade of the colonies—Under our treaty with France and the French colonial laws, it has been shown that we could not procure from the French islands sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton, or any of the other productions, melasses and rum excepted.— Great Britain has seen it to be compatible with her interest to admit us to share more extensively in the productions of her islands; but she has desired to place limitations on this intercourse. To have left it entirely open and free, would have been to have enable us not only to supply ourselves by means of our own navigation, but to have made it an instrument of the supply of other nations with her West India productions.

When we reflect upon the established maxims of the colony system, and moreover when we consider, that an entire freedom of trade with the British West Indies might, at times, materially raise the price of West India productions on the British consumers, the supply of whom is essentially a monopoly in the hands of the British planters, we shall be the less inclined to believe that Great Britain will yield an unrestrained commerce with her West India possessions to any nation whatever.

[Page] But if this was the object of the restraint, it may be asked why it was not confined to such enumerated articles as were o [...] the growth or production of her own islands, instead of being so extended as to comprehend all melasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and cotton, including even the cotton of the growth of our own country? It is very possible that the circumstances of our native cotton's becoming an article of export to foreign markets might not have occurred to our negociator—This would be the less extraordinary, as heretofore it has not been cultivated, except in a very limited degree, and as an article of export rather in the manner of experiment than otherwise; and, as moreover, from the expense and difficulty of separating the seeds from the cotton, we have been hardly able hitherto to class cotton among our exports. Its cultivation is said latterly to have become an object of attention, in Georgia and South Carolina—still however it cannot yet be considered as a staple commodity—But from the recent ingenious and simple machine for spinning cotton, it is hoped that the cultivation may be extended, so that not only our own domestic manufactures may be relieved from a dependence on foreign supply, but the catalogue of our valuable exports enriched by the addition of this inestimable production.

In answer to the question that has been stated: it may be further observed, that these enumerated articles, though the productions of different territories, being so much alike as not easily to be distinguished, it is probable that the difficulty [...] discriminating the productions of the British islands from those of a different growth, was supposed to be so great, that an apprehension was entertained that the prohibition to re-export the former would be easily evaded and illusory, while the latter remained free.

This apprehension, however, it is believed, was carried too far; as, on a minute examination of the subject it will be found, that our laws relative to drawback, with a few analogous provisions in addition, can be made sufficiently to discriminate and identify on re-exportation, all such articles of the growth of the British islands, as may be within our country, and that they will afford the same security for a faithful and exact execution of the prohibition to re-export such articles as that on which our own government relies against frauds upon the revenue. The application of these laws, with the requisite additions and sanctions, [...]y be secured by a precise stipulation for that purpose [...] [...]ary, in such manner as would afford an adequate g [...] [...] material evasions.

[Page] But though the conduct of the senate in withholding their assent to this article, is conceived, upon the whole, to be well judged and wise, yet there were not wanting reasons of real weight to induce our negociator to agree to it as it stands.

The inviolability of the principles of the navigation act had become a kind of axiom, incorporated in the habits of thinking of the British government and nation. Precedent, it is known, has great influence, as well upon the councils as upon the popular opinions of nations!—and there is, perhaps, no country in which it has greater force than that of Great Britain—The precedent of a serious and unequivocal innovation upon the system of the navigation act, dissolved as it were the spell by which the public prejudices had been chained to it. It took away a mighty argument derived from the past inflexibility of the system, and laid the foundation for greater inroads upon opinion, for further and greater innovations in practice. It served to strip the question of every thing that was artificial and to bring it to the simple test of real national interest, to be decided by that best of all arbiters, experience.

It may, upon this ground, be strongly argued that the precedent of the privilege gained was of more importance than its immediate extent—an argument certainly of real weight, and which is sufficient to incline candid men to view the motives that governed our negociator in this particular, with favor, and the opinion to which he yielded with respect. It is perhaps not unimportant by way of precedent, that the article, though not established, is found in the treaty.

Though the 12th article, so far as respects the terms and conditions of the trade to the British islands, forms no part of the treaty, having been excepted, and made the subject of further negociation, it may nevertheless be useful to take notice of some of the many ill-founded objections that have been made against it: of this character, is that which asserts, that the catalogue of articles, permitted to be carried by us to the British islands, may be abridged at the pleasure of Great Britain, and so the trade may be annihilated.

The article stipulates that we may carry to any of his majesty's islands and ports in the West Indies, from the United States, in American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons, any goods or merchandizes "being of the growth, manufacture or production of the said states, which it is or may be lawful to carry to the said islands, from the said states, in British vessels;" not all such articles as it is and may be lawful to carry, but in the disjunctive, all such as it is or may be lawful to carry; in other words, all such articles as it is now lawful to carry, [Page]together with such others as hereafter it may be lawful to carry; the catalogue may be enlarged, but cannot be diminished. It may also be remarked incidentally, that this objection sounds ill in the mouths of those who maintain the essentiality of the supplies of this country, under all possible circumstances, to the British West Indies; for if this position be true, there never can be reasonable ground of apprehension of too little latitude in the exportation in British vessels, which is to be the standard for the exportation in ours.

This article has been further criticised on account of the adjustment of the import and tonnage duties payable in this trade, and it has been attempted to be shown that the footing on which we were to share in the same would, on this account, be disadvantageous, and the competition unequal. What is the adjustment? The article proposes that British vessels emplo [...] in this trade shall pay, on entering our ports, the alien tonnage duty payable by all foreign vessels, which is now fifty cents per ton; further, the cargoes imported in British bottoms from the British West Indies, shall pay in our ports the same impost or duties, that shall be payable on the like articles imported in American bottoms; and on the other side, that cargoes imported into the British islands, in American bottoms shall pay the same impost or duties that shall be payable on the like articles imported in British bottoms—that is to say, the cargoes of each shall pay in the ports of the other only native duties, it being understood that those imposed in the British West Indies, on our productions, are small and unimportant, while those imposed in our ports, on the productions of the West Indies, are high, and important to our revenue.—The vessels of each shall pay in the ports of the other an equal alien tonnage duty, and our standard is adopted as the common ru [...].

Is not this equal? can we expect or ask British vessels should pay an alien tonnage duty in our ports, and that American vessels should enter their ports freely, or on payment only of native tonnage duties? can we in equity require them to pay, [...] the importation of their cargoes in British vessels, an addition of ten per cent. on the duties payable on the importation of the like articles in American vessels, and at the same time demand to pay no higher or other duties on the cargoes carried in our vessels to the British islands, than those payable by the [...] on the like articles imported in British vessels? the very slating of the question suggests to a candid mind an answer, that demonstrates the injustice of the objection. To expect mo [...] were to expect that in a trade in which the opinions and practice of Europe contemplate every privilege granted for a foreign [Page] [...]ation as a favor—we were by treaty to secure a greater advantage to ourselves than would be enjoyed by the nation which granted the privilege.

But it is added, that our laws impose a tonnage duty of six cents per ton on the entry of American vessels engaged in foreign trade, and it is not known that British vessels pay any tonnage duty on their entry in their ports in the West Indies— and so uniting the two entries, that is, the entry in the West Indies, and the entry on a return to our ports, an American vessel will pay fifty-six cents per ton, when the British vessels will pay only fifty cents per ton—If the British government impose no tonnage duty on their own vessels, and we do impose a tonnage duty on ours, this certainly cannot form an objection against them. They are as free to refrain from the imposition of a tonnage duty on their own ships, as we are to impose one on ours—If their policy is wiser than ours in this respect, we are at liberty to adopt it, by repealing the tonnage duty levied on American navigation, which, if we please, may be confined to the particular case; the effect of such a measure as far as it should extend, though the duty is small, would be to add a proportionable advantage to our shipping in foreign competition. But the object of the articles in this particular is to equalize, not the duties that each may choose to impose on their own vessels, but those that they shall impose on the vessels of each other: and in this respect the article is perfectly equal— It is perhaps the first time that the objection of inequality was founded on a circumstance depending on the laws of the party affected by it, and removeable at his own option.

This view of the subject authorizes a belief, that, in the revision of the article, a modification of it may be agreed to that will prove satisfactory. Indeed, from the short duration of the article, taken in connexion with the expressions made use of towards the close of it, relative to the renewal of the negociation, for the purpose of such further arrangements as shall conduce to the mutual advantage and extension of this branch of commerce, we may infer that Great Britain contemplates a more enlarged and equal adjustment on this point.

The relaxations which now exist in the colonial systems, in consequence of the necessities of war, and which will change to our disadvantage with the return of peace, have been considered by some as the permanent state of things. And this error has had its influence in misleading the public in respect to the terms and conditions on which we may reasonably expect to participate in trade to the West Indies—But let it be remembered, that the restoration of peace will bring with it a restoration [Page]of the laws of limitation and exclusion, which constit [...] the colonial system. Our efforts therefore should be directed to such adjustment with Great Britain on this point, as will [...]cure to us a right after the return of peace, to the gre [...] attainable portion of the trade to her islands in the West Indies.

It has been alleged, should the expected modification of this article retain its present stipulation on the subject of impo [...] and tonnage duty, that as France by treaty may claim to enjoy the rights and privileges of the most favored nation, she would demand an exemption from the ten per cent. on the duties upon the productions of the West Indies imported in foreign bottoms, and would moreover be free to impose an alien tonnage on our vessels entering her ports in the West Indies, equal to that imposed on her vessels in our ports. This is true —But in order to make this demand, France must agree, by treaty, to open all her ports in the West Indies, to give [...] right to import into them, flour, bread, tobacco, and such other articles as Great Britain should permit, and which France by her permanent system prohibits; she must also concede to us a right to purchase in her islands, and bring away, sugar, coffee, and pimento, which by the same system she also prohibits; she must do all this, because, by our treaty with her, [...] can only entitle herself to a special privilege granted to another nation, by granting on her part to us the equivalent of w [...] was the consideration of our grant. Should France be inclined to arrange the trade between us and her islands, we certainly shall not object; because, besides the right to such an arrangement, it would be more advantageous to us than that which now regulates our intercourse with her West Indies.

So much of the twelfth article as respects its duration and the renewal of the negociation previous to the expiration [...] two years after the conclusion of the war, in order to agree [...] a new arrangement on the subject of the West India trade, [...] well as for the purpose of endeavouring to agree whether any, and in what cases, neutral vessels shall protect enem [...] property, and in what cases provisions, and other articles n [...] generally contraband, may become such, form a part of the treaty as ratified by the president. These clauses sufficiently explain themselves, and require no comment in this place. Th [...] however, prove one point, which is, that after every effort [...] the part of our negociator, the parties were not able to agree i [...] the doctrine that free bottoms should make free goods, nor [...] the cases in which alone provisions and other articles not generally contraband, should be deemed such. Leaving, therefo [...] [Page]both these points precisely as they found them (except in respect to provisions, the payment for which, when by the law of nations liable to capture as contraband, is secured) to be regulated by the existing law of nations, it is stipulated to renew the negociation on these points at the epoch assigned for the future adjustment of the West India trade, in order then to endeavour to agree in a conventional rule, which, instead of the law of nations, should thereafter regulate the conduct of the parties in these respects.

The eleventh article has been passed over in silence as being merely introductory and formal.

CAMILLUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONCLUDED FROM VOL. 2. PAGE 13.]

No. XVI.

THE 9th article stipulates that such British subjects as now hold lands in the territory of the United States, shall continue to hold them according to the tenure and nature of their respective estates, and may sell, grant or devise them as if they were natives, and renders this stipulation mutual. Though this article may not be extensively dangerous, yet it merits our attention, as it appears to infringe the constitutional independence of the respective states—Congress alone have the power to naturalize; but neither congress, nor any member of the federal government, appear to me to have any right to declare the tenure by which lands shall be holden in the territories of the individual states, without naturalization. This is an act of sovereignty which is confined to the state legislatures, and which they have not ceded to congress, about which, therefore, I am led to doubt the right of the president and senate to treat.—"Powers not delegated to the United States, being expressly reserved to the States or the people thereof."—Is this right of the states abridged by the power of the president and senate to make treaties? Are not their powers to treat confined to such objects as the constitution entrusts to the federal government? [Page]Had they stipulated that the governor of New York should always be a native of Britain, or that British subjects should, on their arrival, be members of the city corporation [...] freemen of the city; we should, I believe, have pronounced this article void, as an intrusion upon the rights of the s [...] and an assumption of powers not vested in the parties treati [...]. Is it less so to declare the terms on which individuals shall hold lands in the territories of the respective states—to give rights to strangers which citizens cannot enjoy, the rights of landholders without the burdens—the right of holding real property without being bound to defend it—the right to be protected in the possession of that property by states to whom they owe no allegiance, and against whom they may even make war without incurring a forfeiture?

Happy British subjects! As merchants you may enjoy in every part of our country, all the privileges of our fellow citizens.—As creditors, you are entitled to recover your debt [...] without being compelled to submit to the forms of suits, or [...] usual rules of evidence—As officers, you are to command our respectful homage.—As land-holders, you are to possess our lands in peace, while the burden of defending them devolves on u [...] your former equals, your present vassals.—The produce of [...] soil is to be diverted from every other port but yours.—Our few men are to fight your battles, but to be treated as pirates i [...] they appear in arms against you.—Our statesmen condescend [...] be your apologists, and our legislatures are bound in future [...] do no act which may affect your interests! While congr [...] only are entrusted with the power of declaring the rules of naturalization, left one state by making the terms too ea [...] should intrude citizens upon others, can it be constitution for the president and senate to exercise the more dangerous power of investing the lands of the respective states in foreig [...] ers who shall not be compelled to defend them? If the right exists as to British subjects who now hold lands, it may be extended, on some future occasion, to all who may hereaf [...] choose to purchase. It is true the article does not go th [...] length; but the principle, that justifies it, as far as it has go [...] will apply equally to every extension of it. It may not be improper to remind those who view this article with indifferents, of the quantity of land held in Georgia, by companies who [...] avowed object is to fell it in Europe. If I am rightly informed, it greatly exceeds all the land retained by the state. In New York, the lands commonly called Morris's, M [...]Comb's, a [...] Scriba's purchases, equal in quantity all the remaining lands [...] the state. They have had agents for some time past in England [Page]for sale of these lands. If is was effected before the ratification, or at least before the signature of the treaty, as much land may be held in this state by British subjects as by American citizens. If they were held in trust, which is highly probable, the person in whose favor the trust was created, is now secured from forfeiture, since they are to hold "according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles," &c. The British construction of this article will give them the full benefit of their purchases; it may then happen, even under the present treaty, as it now stands, that the greater part of the lands of the two states, at least, belong to British subjects, who may look to their own sovereign for protection, even against the state whose lands they hold. What dangers and difficulties may not this expose the states to? If it is admitted that the president and senate can by treaty stipulate without the consent of a state, that their lands may be held by British subjects, what principle is there in the constitution which prevents their making the same stipulation in favor of the British king, or their transferring all the vacant lands in every state to him? These were formerly invested in him, and I doubt not that if he were to set up a claim under this article, that he would find advocates among us to support it. Let it be remembered that the exercise of these powers by the president and senate is only derived from an implication founded on their right to make treaties. I would ask, whether a stronger implication in favor of an exclusive right in the state governments to make regulations relative to this object, is not found in the third section, fourth article of the constitution—"Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property of the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular states." The claim of states to declare the tenure on which their lands shall be held, has never been disputed; and so jealous have some of them been of it, that they have repeatedly refused to admit foreigners to hold lands without naturalization.

Several articles, which appear to me exceptionable, remain to be discussed; but, circumstances, arising from the present unhappy situation of the city, compel me to lay aside my pen. When these circumstances cease to operate, I may again resume it. I trust, however, that enough has been said to show, that the treaty has obtained no adequate compensation for the injuries we have suffered. That it has relinquished important claims that we had upon the British government. That it has given no protection to our seamen. That it is injurious to our commerce, [Page]and ruinous to our navigation. That it takes from us the me [...] we possessed of retaliating injuries without the hazard of a wa [...]. That it pledges the country for immense sums of money, which it does not owe, while it curtails our demands upon Britain. That it gives the British subjects a variety of privileges in [...] country, which are but partially returned to us. That it counteracts the existing laws, and violates the federal constitution, and that it infringes the rights of individual states. It is p [...] ble, that in stating my idea of the treaty, I may have run into errors; all I can say, is, that if I have, none of them [...] intentional; that having no party to serve, no personal interest to promote, I have only spoken sentiments, which an ard [...] love for a country, which I have long served, has inspired, without wishing to mislead. I beg my fellow citizens to re [...] lect, that if the treaty will bear the construction I have given it, though an ingenious commentator may put a different [...] upon several articles; that still the objections I state will re [...] in force, since it is not the weakest, but the strongest nation [...] construes the articles that admit of doubts, of which we ha [...] a striking instance in this very tr [...]ty.—In the treaty of pea [...], the words of the article relative to the taking away negroes, [...] are express, the intention was acknowledged at the time by the commissioners on both sides, and not doubted by either government; yet we find that Camillus has, by implications, [...] given it a meaning, which he says renders it doubtful: [...]e justifies Mr. Jay in relinquishing our claim.—If this is just reasoning in the mouth of an American writer, it will still be m [...] so in that of Britain; and the most unfavorable construction of the treaty, will be the true one with respect to us; because every doubt is to be construed against us. This argument is [...] dered much stronger from the circumstances under which [...] Jay treated; for if when they were more unfavorable to Britain, than we can again hope to find them, doubtful constructions were to be construed to her advantage, by the admis [...] of our envoy, they must, in future, be so. Let us not that form our opinions of the treaty from distant implications, or [...] mote deductions, drawn from fanciful reasonings on the la [...] of nations.

The express words of the treaty are our only true guide. Where they contain unfavorable stipulations, or where they neglect explicitly to declare our rights, their plain and obvious meaning is to enforce the first, and to abridge the last. Of th [...] we have already sufficient proof in the construction they ha [...] put on some parts of the treaty by their late instructions. [...] should, before I close, apologize for many errors, either of the [Page]copyist or the press, or both. It has so happened, that most of the copies were made under such circumstances as not to have been submitted to my inspection, which, together with the errors of the press, multiplied by the different impressions it has gone through, have introduced many mistakes, which the candid reader will correct. It is also proper that I should mention an error of my own in the seventh number, which has not been noticed: but which, as I have no wish to mislead, I am bound to correct. In enumerating the impositions of Britain, I stated, that she laid heavy duties on our commodities, rice and tobacco particularly, and added, that we laid none upon her, but such as by treaty we allowed her to [...]ualize—The last part of this article is an error, which th [...] hasty manner in which these papers have been written, betra [...]d me into, and which I take these means to acknowledge, lest (though of no great importance) it might tend to deceive those who had not at hand the proper means of correcting the mistake.

CATO.

ATTICUS—No. VI.

[CONTINUED FROM VOL. 2. PAGE 228.]

THE hero of the funding and excise systems, the parent of that immaculate axiom, which would do honor to Constantinople, that a public debt is a public blessing, has entered the lists as the champion of his darling brat, The Treaty. He is brandishing his usual weapons, sophistry and seduction, but not with his accustomed success; for since his character has been fully understood, he has become as harmless, as to his influence upon the people, as a toad or a cock-roach; and, like those animals, he excites sensations which are those of aversion more than of dread. Divested of that instrumentality which he employed but too successfully against his country, the circle of his corruptions must be narrowed, and the whips and stings of an accusing conscience must now be substituted for the supreme agency in the affairs of the United States.— The political heresies which he laboured to establish, with all the zeal of a fanatic, have unfortunately acquired an influence where they may still prove dangerous, and the unlimited ascendency that he seems yet to maintain over minds, which [Page]ought to be free from such flavish shackles, shadows the prospects that are opening to the American world.

He has again raised the war whoop, and expects, by his hideous yells, to terrify you, fellow citizens, into an abando [...] ment of your rights, a prostitution of the first blessings [...] free people. Have the funding and excise systems parali [...] your energies, that, like children, you are to be terrified by scare crows? No! For whatever calculations he may [...] made in this respect, his public blessings have not yet tran [...] formed you into the eunuchs of liberty, and as you were [...] to be intimidated by the roaring of the British lion during the revolution, you cannot be alarmed at the brayings of an animal, who has only covered himself with his skin.

The war-whoop of "Camillus" begat the negociation, and benumbed the faculties of our country; and he expects, by the magic of his yelpings, to give life to an abortion, that, like the fabled Basilisk, would look liberty to death. If the threat of war is to produce a renunciation of our rights as a nation, and of our freedom as a people, we had better divest [...] selves of the trouble of our independence, and place ourse [...] formally under the guardianship of a foreign power!—Did [...] cry of war terrify us into a compliance with the dictum [...]f Great Britain, to bind us in all cases whatever? Did it ma [...]e us swallow the tea, which, like the treaty, was to have palsied us into slavery? Did it make us cringe to his Britannic majesty, and "lick the hand, just raised to shed our blood?" We [...] our energies greater at the commencement of the late revolut [...], than they are now! Or have we become more corrupt? This is the rub, fellow citizens—the instrumentality of a funding system, aided by British influence and directed by another W [...] pole, had not then enervated us. We were strangers to corruption, and principle incited us to the maintenance of our rights. Is the question war or slavery? War is the alternative annexed to a rejection of the treaty by Camillus, and slavery the alternative of its acceptance, in the mind of every well-wisher [...] his country. If war or slavery is then the question, rather [...] the temple of Janus be for ever open, than that liberty should be made a peace offering to a British tyrant. But will that [...] vereign, upon "whose goodness and justice," we have placed such reliance, let loose the dogs of war, if the "detestable faction," the people, refuse his friendship, as expressed by the treaty? Should they be hardened, will not twenty righteous is found, twenty who are uncontaminated with republicanism, [...] save Sodom? Stern, indeed, must be that justice, inflexible [Page]that goodness, which would not save a sinking land on account of a few righteous, that might be found within it!!

No! No! "Camillus"—your "great, good, and dear friend," is too much occupied with his neighbours on the other side the channel, to find time to attend to us—Like the bear who was surrounded by hornets, he is too busy to be attracted by any thing at a distance. The plethora of his body politic has been too much reduced by the French bayonet, to be in vigor-to attack men who once treated him so roughly. We fear him not—we want no proxies to fight our battles; and if your nerves are too weak, or your reverence for majesty too great, cease your attempts to communicate your weaknesses to the athletic freemen of America. Confine your seductions to your present circle; for by keeping them within those limits, you may escape, for a time, the contempt and detestation which menace you.

But if war is such a dreadful calamity, so much to be deprecated, that the phantoms of it alone unstring the cob-web nerves of "Camillus," what will be our condition, when the grisly monster Mars, arrayed in all his terrors, rushes to revenge the injuries and perfidies done to the French republic? Does he suppose, that war can become an evil only when waged against his idol, Great Britain? Would the part which we should take in the league of despots, should the treaty obtain, soften the horrors or mitigate the distresses of war? Would a war with the French republic prop a funding system, that he seems so careless about it? Should his bastard be legitimized, there can be little doubt, that France would consider it as an infraction of our neutrality, as a supercession of our engagements with her, and as a virtual, though not formal, accession to the confederacy of tyrants against her. Circumstances, my fellow citizens, will justify the suspicion, that a war with the French republic would be considered as a thing devoutly to be wished by Camillus and his friends, and that the treaty was formed with a solicitude for that event. There seems to have been a deliberate plan to exterminate liberty, and this was to have been effected by throwing off the connexion with France, and consolidating ourselves with Great Britain.—In the arms of despotism, liberty would have been suffocated; and in the arms of a British tyrant her fate would have been inevitable.

The increase of affection for France, in the breasts of the American citizens, since she became a republic, seems to have produced a serious alarm among the Aristocratic faction of the United States; and hence the repugnance to treat with her [Page]anew—hence the Machiavelian construction of every thing which was due to her—and hence the solicitude to form the unnatural alliance that has manifested itself in the treaty. That the government of the United States has been making rapidstrides towards aristocracy, no unprejudiced man, at this time of day, will deny; and that a connexion with Great Britain was sought for, to facilitate this object, no one, who has noticed the steps of our administration, and has read the treaty, unbiassed by party spirit, will controvert. If there was not an extraordinary predilection for Great Britain, would the United States have been passive under the many outrages they have sustained—would they have suffered, in silence, their seamen to be impressed, like slaves, on board British ships of war, and would they have beheld the unparalleled insult, without emotion, that has been offered to our nation, in the attempt to seize a minister of France, within the limits of our own territory!! Heaven, earth, and hell, would have been conjured, if an attempt of the sort had been made upon the minister of Great Britain: and yet those fiends are by treaty ‘to be treated with that respect which is due to the commissions which they bear; and if any insult should be offered to them, be any of the inhabitants, all offenders, in this respect, shall be punished as disturbers of the peace and amity between the two countries’!!

Fellow citizens, I have digressed from the treaty; but you will think it excusable, as you know the cause; for the man who can behold the bare-faced attempts upon our rights, and the audacious outrages upon our country, without the strongest emotions, is unworthy of the freedom and inheritance of the revolution.

ATTICUS.

August 8th, 1795.

No. VII.

A SOLEMN, an awful silence pervades the world of American politics, portentive of some great event. The signature, the unexpected signature of the president to the treaty, has momentarily paralized the American mind, as if by etherial impulse; and it has not yet recovered from the incubus of astonishment and grief, with which it was oppressed. The omnipotence of truth will, however, at last prevail; and though the Americans are grateful, they are just; and that [Page]sense of justice will prevent a barter of their own rights and their own happiness for the gratification of any individual, however high his own claim to an unlimited contrul over his country. The conflict of jarring feelings, the strife between gratitude and self-love, has, for a moment, suspended the voice of injured freemen; but the feeble mound of gratitude will not long resist the impetuous and imperious cataract of self-preservation.—Gratitude! What means it when in contact with political justice! What means it, when thrown in the opposite balance of our happiness! Does an individual claim more feeling than ourselves, our families, our country! Does he demand sentiments in hostility to our own repose! Human nature must undergo a revolution before this can come to pass, and virtue yield its throne to vice.

The services of the president, during the revolution, are decked in all their charms, to seduce us from a question of his present motives. He is held up to us as the high priest of liberty, to give absolution to our own sensations. The amiable virtue, gratitude, is appealed to in our bosoms, to neutralize our indignation, at his having signed the treaty, after the general sentiments of his country had been made known to him, in opposition to it. Had his signature been given immediately after the adjournment of the senate, and before an universal expression of disapprobation of it had taken place, ingenuity might have found a cover for him; but the public mind seems to have been designedly wrought up to the highest key of expectation, that the contempt of it might be more strongly disclosed. Is gratitude to put a seal upon our lips under such circumstances? Are freemen to be treated with the most marked contumely, and to be passive under it like slaves? Is the president to receive more reverence than our constitution, and more devotion than liberty! Let us be consistent, and either renounce our constitution, and our pretensions to freedom, or rally round them in contradiction to the will of an individual. I will endeavour to prove to you, my fellow citizens, in the course of these letters, that our constitution has been totally disregarded, and that the president has substituted his will, for the will of the people— that he has thwarted the affections of the people, and in contempt of their attachment to the republic of France, and aversion from Great Britain, has deceived the one, and crouched to the other. If gratitude is due to the president, has not France likewise a claim to it? Shall he prove ungrateful to her, and we prove grateful to him? Shall he practice deception upon the best friend of our country, a friend to whose generous aid he owes his present greatness,—and shall we prove perfidious [Page]enough to give it our countenance? Shall he take Great Britain into his bosom, Great Britain who sought to enslave us, who has been guilty of every baseness and every outrage against us, and shall we be obliged to smile upon the monster, and receive the kiss of Judas? Shall he greet the tyrant George, as his "great, good, and dear friend;" and shall we be obliged to recognize such sacrilege of liberty? Shall he colonize us anew, and shall we be obliged to subscribe the shameful compact? Shall that independence, which he assisted to establish, be prostrated by him at the feet of Great Britain—shall that constitution, the sacred bond of union and dear bought inheritance of the revolution, be trampled under foot by him, and gratitude still be chaunted in our ears? Was the revolution designed to make him a monarch, and a few speculators noblemen! Is this the gratitude that is demanded? Are we to establish a political infallibility, and consecrate a political pope in our country? Is it longer to continue impious to arraign presidential measures? If so, I will preach up a reformation, and dare to be a Luther i [...] politics.—I will strive to unmask the idol we have set up, and show him to be a man—and a man too, not fashioned according to the model of liberty. In signing the treaty, the president has thrown the gauntlet; and shame on the coward hea [...], that refuses to take it up. He has declared war against the people, by treating their opinions with contempt—he has forfei [...] his claim to their confidence, by acting in opposition to the [...] will,—and shall we not dare to speak our injuries, and pr [...]cla [...] our wrongs!

Fellow citizens, we are on the eve of some great event—o [...] liberties are [...] jeopardy, and we must either rescue them from the precipice, or they will be lost to us for ever. One hope offers itself to us, and a consolatory one too, the house of representatives of the United States. As we have looked in vain for patriotism from the president, let us turn our eyes towards that body—they are our immediate representatives—they feel ou [...] wants, participate in our injuries, and sympathize in our distresses. They never will submit to having our country degraded —they never will be passive under the outrages upon our constitution —they never will be the instruments of voting away their own and the people's rights. As our application to the president has been treated with scorn, let us make our appeal [...] that body, which has the power of impeachment—and we shall not find in them, the step fathers of their country. A treaty which has bartered away their rights, cannot, will not be submitted to—Let us, then, my fellow citizens, rally round our representatives, and we may [...] be free!

ATTICUS.

August 21st, 1795.

Notes

*

See Camillus No. 18.

↵

*

The term "debts," is only expressed in the Prussian treaty, but there are in the other treaties, terms which include debts, and this is the manifest spirit and intent of all.

↵

*

Thus we find it the sentiment of this minister, that it is impossible for two princes who make war with each other, to agree which is the couressor with regard to the other. And yet Mr. Jay was to extort from Great Britain an acknowledgment, that she was the aggressor with regard to us, and was g [...] of pusillanimity in waving the question.

↵

*

Those who advised to a ratification of the treaty

↵

*

Vattel, B. iii ch. x.

↵

†

This writer is as profligate as he is absurd —Besides impu [...] to Camissus, [...] general terms, a number of things of which he never dreamt, he has [...] effrontery to forge, as a literal quotation from him (calling it his own language [...] designating it by inverted commas) a passage respecting the impressing of seamen, which certainly not in terms, nor even in substance, upon fair construction, in to be found in anything he has written—Not having all the numbers of Cicero at hand, I may [...]take, in attributing to him the principal sentiment, which is from memory but I have under my eye the number which witnesses his forgery.

↵

*

In applying the character of dishonesty and turpitude to the principle of confiscation or sequestration—I am far from intending to brand as dishonest [...] all those whose opinions favour it—I know there are some ardent spirits charge able with the error, of whose integrity I think well.

↵

*

The opinion heretofore cited of Montesquieu, a Frenchman, agreeing with facts, is a positive testimony that the principle of the French system, like the English, i [...]o [...]opoly.

↵

*

This mad scheme, the joining in which was to be the price of the proffered advantages, has since been renounced by France herself; as a political chimera.

↵

*

This measure countenances a conclusion, that it was the intent of the in [...]tructions, he should take the measures he did with regard to privateering and military expeditions from our territories, to force us into the war in spite of the [...] wavering and timid conduct of our administration.

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

[No. X.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME III.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY RICHARD FOLWELL, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—DECEMBER 16, 1795.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. Cinna, No. I. Page [...]

2. —No. II. Page [...]

3. —No. III. Page [...]

4. —No. IV. Page [...]

5. Resolutions of the Franklin Society Page [...]

6. Reflections on Mr. Jay's Treaty No. I. Page [...]

7. —No. II. Page [...]

8. American Appeals Page [...]

9. Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty Page [...]

10. Observations on the XIVth article of Mr. Jay's Treaty Page [...]

11. Camillus refuted by Alexander Hamilton Page [...]

12. Remarks on do. Page [...]

13. Address of the Citizens of Charlestown to the President Page [...]

14. President's Answer Page [...]

15. Proceedings of the Citizens of Frederic County, Virginia Page [...]

American Remembrancer, &c.

[Page]

FROM THE NEW-YORK ARGUS.

CINNA.—No. I.

Citizen Greenleaf,

TO expatiate on the justice, power, and resources of Great-Britain—to justify all her acts, however wanton and unjust—to depreciate his own country, and to place her in the wrong upon every occasion, are favourite themes with CAMILLUS. Hence it was no matter of surprize to find him in his third number, attempting a formal vindication of Great-Britain for carrying away the negroes, and ridiculing our claim, on that subject. As this is the first number that contains any thing like argument, it ought not to pass unnoticed. By the treaty of Paris, his Britannic majesty agreed "not to carry away any negroes from the United States." This, says Camillus, must mean either negroes which had been, or which at the cessation of hostilities continued to be American property. When the meaning of an instrument is doubtful, there cannot be a safer or fairer way to obtain its true sense, than by considering its circumstances, and the views of the parties at the time of making the contract, and that they acted with good faith to each other. To apply this rule; during the late war, many negroes had been taken by, or had voluntarily joined the armies or gone into the garrisons of Great-Britain. To reclaim them, and prevent their being carried away, was an object which our commissioners had much at heart; and it is not easy to conceive how this object could have been expressed in plainer or less ambiguous terms. It will be remembered, that Franklin had an agency in that treaty; and perhaps no man ever excelled him in perspicuity and pertinency of expression; that those negroes and those alone were in the contemplation of both parties, results from the very nature of the case. It could not be necessary to guard against new depredations of this kind—peace being made, all hostilities of every kind ceased. As well might a clause have been inserted, to prohibit ships of war, of the different parties, from making [Page]prizes during the peace; as the captains of such vessels would have been treated like pirates, so might every negro, or his value, been recovered by a regular course of law, from any person who had taken him after the peace, without any stipulation in the treaty for that purpose. To confine this article, therefore, to an engagement to abstain from further plunder, is rendering it altogether negative and useless; which is never to be supposed, and cannot be presumed to have been the intention of either party. The reasoning of Camillus is constrained and contradictory; in one breath, he likens the negroes to "horses, cattle, and other moveables, and as such liable to become booty;" in the next considering them "as rational beings, and as entitled to liberty under British proclamations, he concludes it would have been odious and immoral to let them pass again into slavery." Let us bestow a moment, for a moment will suffice, to detect the sophistry of each of these arguments.

Admitting that slaves may become booty, and that their property becomes vested in the captor, has he not a right to restore them, if he pleases, at a peace? did not this city belong to the king of Great-Britain by conquest? and did he not agree to evacuate it, rather than continue an unequal war? did not the American artillery, which he found in our forts, belong to him by the same right; yet he agreed to leave it behind? when he finds how ably his infractions of the treaty are defended by our own citizens, he will, no doubt, regret that he evacuated New-York as soon as he did; for the same argument [...]d by Camillus to justify his detention of the western posts, would apply equally strong to his having kept garrisons till this time in our sea-ports, the prompt evacuation of which this writer considers rather as a matter of grace in his majesty, than of strict obligation on his part. To return—as the negroes which were taken, belonged to the king, he might prefer restoring them to their former owners, rather than be encumbered with their maintenance, which would probably have been the consequence of giving them freedom; to have sold them, would have ill comported with his dignity. It must be considered also, that in restoring them to their masters, he would take care to receive an equivalent for such concession. What this equivalent was, none but the commissioners can know; perhaps they agreed to recommend the tories to mercy in consideration of his majesty's restoring the negroes: whatever the inducement may have been, he promises, by an expression as latitudinary as can well be devised, not to carry [Page]away any of them, that is, he will leave them all whether acquired by capture or enticed away by his royal offers. If an exception had been intended, in favor of any class, it would have found its way into the treaty: none being made, the description must either be nugatory, or extend to all the blacks, who were then living, and in the power of his troops, arming them against their masters, and not in making amends for such an abominable warfare, by sending them home again. But if such promises were really made, or if a treaty of amity and alliance, offensive and defensive, actually existed between his Britannic majesty, and who had not been actually carried from the continent before the treaty, the other position cannot be supported without charging the king with the greatest duplicity and want of good faith, which I shall not offend Camillus so much as to suppose his majesty capable of. It would be odious and immoral, says he, to return to their former masters, negroes who had joined them on a promise of liberty. Any other but Camillus would have thought the immorality consisted in alluring away the swarthy domestics of America. Why not be explicit, and explain with good faith, to the plenipotentiaries, the solemn engagement he was under; instead of stipulating a specific return, an equivalent might then have been agreed upon; or if faith must be broken, either with the negroes, or with the United States, would it not have been a less reflection on Great-Britain, to give up the former, whom she was no longer able to protect, (as she did the tories) and to whom she was probably under no other than immoral engagements, contained in proclamations, issued upon the sole authority of some savage officers, than to break, in the very moment of signing, a solemn compact, formally and deliberately entered into with the latter? was she not under as solemn engagements to the tories who had espoused her cause, and received protections from her generals; yet their persons and properties were abandoned, or, which was the same thing, placed upon the precarious footing of a recommendation on the part of congress, for favor and pardon to the legislatures of the different states. Not a man of this description who had been banished, could return without a law for the purpose. Does Camillus imagine that the interests of these Africans lay nearer the heart of their gracious monarch, whose virtues and humanity he takes so much pleasure in blazoning, than those of his own deluded subjects, who, notwithstanding his deliberate sacrifice of them, continue as firmly as ever devoted to him.

[Page] But if his majesty be really (what no one but Camillus [...] suspect) so scrupulous about doing an odious action, or brea [...] ing his plighted faith to his black allies, why justify him for keeping his wo [...] at our expense? If he be as just, magnanimous, and ben [...]v [...]nt as our envoy has represented him, why does he not pay for the liberty which he thought it his duty to confer on our slaves? Will Camillus pretend that his majesty's abhorrence of s [...]avery induced him to carry these people away? The West-India I [...]ands will testify against him—his majesty, like some people among ourselves (I do not mean the quakers, for I really believe them to act from principle) is a great advocate for manumission, when his own interest or those of his subjects are not [...]ected by it, or when the United States, notwithstanding his unbounded affection for them) are alone injured by it.

As soon, then, as the British king found that his recent engagements with this country could not be executed specifically without violating his antecedent promises to the negroes, instead of quibbling, and putting on his agreement a construction which rendered it a dead letter, he would have acted more consistent with the character ascribed to him by the friends of the present treaty, by candidly communicating his embarrassments to our government. We should readily have consented to a pecuniary compensation; Camillus, it is true, asserts, that "when a party promises a specific thing, nothing but the thing itself will satisfy the promise."—If Camillus be a lawyer, he certainly knows that nothing is more common than a satisfaction in damages for the breach of a promise to do a specific thing; and that in a great variety of cases it is the only satisfaction to which the law can or will compel the deliquent party; and that such damages being paid, the promise is as completely satisfied as by doing of the specific thing. Thus, if a person contract to deliver me a ship, or a horse which he afterwards sells to another, or to come nearer to the case before us, he engages to restore me a negro which he afterwards sends away, and thus puts a specific performance out of his power, my only claim against him is for a compensation commensurate to the injury sustained by his breach of promise. It would be absurd in the extreme for America, at this time, to insist upon a return of those negroes. Many are dead; and of those who survive, the greater part must be in the decline of life, and would be of little use to their former masters. A compensation then is all that can be asked; this is precisely the controversy between the two governments. The United States (and Camillus will not contend against their right so to do) release G. Britain from [Page]a specific compliance, and insist upon an equivalent in money. With what other view, then, but to deceive, does Camillus observe, that "the party to whom a promise is made, cannot be required to accept in lieu of in an equivalent? Did he not know that the United States were willing to receive, and asked for nothing more than an equivalent, so that there could be no necessity of enquiring into the right of Great-Britain to force them to it?

It is proper to subjoin, that the construction of this article by Camillus, is opposed to the interpretation which our goverment have uniformly put upon it, is contrary to the explanation of it by mr. Jefferson, whose correspondence with mr. Hammond is recommended, as the best antidote against the mischievous and humiliating doctrines, so warmly inculcated by this writer. Every American will turn with pleasure from a laboured panegyric of the British government, a strenuous and uncandid vindication of all its arbitrary proceedings towards this country, and from the degrading representation of the United States, which fill so many columns of Camillus, to the manly, energetic, dignified, and yet candid examination of Jefferson. In the writings of this invaluable statesman, he will discover the true source of controversy between the two countries. He will be shocked at the perfidy and duplicity of Great-Britain, and will be astonished at the forbearance of the United States, under the most aggravated and unprovoked insults and injuries. It is a work which should be in the hands of every man. It will teach us to love and respect our country, a duty which cannot be too strongly inculcated, when pains are taken to infuse a contrary sentiment.

I shall only ask, if Camillus is right, how happened it, that a majority of the Senate, at their late session, agreed to advise the President to renew negociations with his majesty for a compensation for the negroes who had been carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty of peace? When so many respectable authorities concur respecting this aggression, it would evince a becoming modesty in Camillus to retract an opinion which ought to find advocates only in the British Cabinet.

CINNA.

July 29, 1794.

[Page]

CINNA.—No. II.

FAITHFUL to his promise, and meditating an attack upon mr. Jefferson, whose arguments have hitherto been unanswered; CAMILLUS, in his 4th essay, proceeds to instance certain infractions of the treaty of peace on our part;—an accurate enumeration of these breaches would require, says he, [...] tedious research: and who, sir, has imposed upon you this odious task? Does the duty of a patriot, or a citizen, demand it of you? Would not your talents and ingenuity be better employed in vindicating the injured honor and rights of your country? Does it become you to rack invention to cover her w [...] obloquy, and to hold her up as a faithless and treacherous [...] tion? Does it comport with the character of a citizen of the United States, after their minister had silenced the objection of the British ambassador, to justify a perfidious prince for his breaches of faith and his violences towards America? will it answer any valuable purpose to stigmatise the legislature of you own state, for acts which preceded the treaty, and which wer [...] suggested by the spur of the occasion, and by a regard to self-defence? Will the recollection produced by a review of the conduct of the different parties during the war, be profitable, [...] conciliating? Will not every American recur to the history [...] those times to discover, not only the reasons which dicta [...] but a justification of the acts of which you complain? If [...] pursues the enquiry with pure motives, he will be astonished not that the state of New-York did so much, but that her moderation was as great as it was. He will recollect, with e [...] tions of pain and indignation, that the state was not only invaded, and its capital, and some of its most fertile districts i [...] possession of a foreign enemy; but that she had also to enco [...] ter a more sanguinary foe, in those, from whose birth, situati [...] and connection, she was entitled to expect support and [...] cour, in her arduous conflict for independence. These men [...] only turned their arms against their country, but, outstripp [...] British cruelty, they introduced a warfare, which would [...] disgraced the savages of our wilderness. The peaceful farmer the aged inhabitants of either sex, whose years and infirmit [...] were respected by the troops of Great-Britain, and her m [...] less auxiliaries of Germany, found no quarter from this implacable and intestine foe. Their depredations were circu [...] scribed by no principle or rule of war—thirsting for reven [...] [Page]rapine, plunder and secret death were their pursuit. Their success was proportionate to their malice. America being unable to extend her protection to an immense frontier, her citizens were driven from their farms—their property made a prey of; and they deemed themselves happy, when they could escape from assassination into exile and penury. Our seas and coasts swarmed with privateers, fitted out by these internal enemies; and even the Indians of America were piloted by them, to the peaceful dwellings of her citizens, and female and infants' scalps were often displayed as the joint triumph of those monsters of the human race! Who then can be astonished, that these provocations, which were repeating every day, should excite the most lively sensations of indignation and resentment? Who then can wonder, that our legislature should pass an act, which was not only extorted by a sense of injury, and the exigencies of the times, but was peculiarly calculated to protect our c [...]zens from future plunder, and held out a gleam of hope to these who had already been stripped of their all, by this ruthless and unfeeling band? Forgive me, sir, if I describe your present friends in glowing colours. Humanity wished to forget forever, deeds of cruelty and horror, at the bare mention of which, the most obdurate and rugged heart rovolts. America was content to drop the curtain on a tragedy, the catastrophe of which had confounded the adversaries of her freedom and sovereignty. This state in particular, [New-York] although her trade and frontiers had suffered the most, early manifested a conciliating and forgiving spirit. Persons who had betrayed the most rancorous temper, and had been banished for their enmity and poverty of spirit, were permitted to return to the bosom of their offended country. Men who had evidenced not only in principle, but in action, the most rooted hostility to our freedom and government, were permitted to remain, and to become a part of the great body politic. Instances, without number, of forbearance, lenity, and even of tenderness, forgiveness, and sincere reconciliation, might be produced; even rewards and public honors and offices have been bestowed on these men. Far from condemning a policy, to which, however, there were many objections, I glory in the liberality and munificence of my country. Nor was it my wish to rescue from oblivion, a memorial of the conduct of those who have been objects of their country's generosity and forgiveness. Camillus has courted, nay provoked the discussion. When it becomes necessary to exculpate our country from the reproach of cruelty and breach of saith, we must be permitted [Page]to return to the times which produced the act, which, it is pretended, fixes this stigma upon her. If Camillus had taken this trouble, he would have seen so much room for recrimination, that in tenderness to the feelings of these unhappy men, he would have forborne some of his severe animadversions on the conduct of this state.

Having stated some of the provocations and inducements, we come now to the law itself, in which Camillus discerns one of the earliest breaches of the treaty of peace, on our part; Camillus was not more unhappy in reminding us of the conduct of the tories, than he is unfortunate in this first proof which lie instances of our breach of faith. The law to which he refers, is well known by the appellation of the trespass act. This law passed the 17th March, 1783. A mind, not warped by prejudice, nor disposed to deceive itself, is at some difficulty to imagine how an act, passed six months before the definitive treaty was signed, and more than a year, according to Camillus, before it became binding on the king, can be tortured into an infraction of that very treaty. At the time of passing this law, the legislature had a perfect right so to do; nay, it was part of their duty,—the war yet raged with unabated rigor: as the royal cause became more and more desperate, its friends became proportionably alert in their efforts to revenge a success, to which they could not reconcile themselves. Their last cruelties exceeded any of a former date. Every measure therefore, which tended to curb the licentiousness of our domestic foes, to mitigate or check the horrors of a civil war, and to protect those of our citizens whose remote residence prevented their receiving any adequate security from the American army, was not only prudent, but necessary, justifiable, and humane. It was also believed, that few, if any, of the depredations and robberies, which were committed by the new levies and refugees, were at the time sanctioned by any military order; their own fury, and a thirst for plunder and revenge led them on; yet if a military order was admitted to justify their conduct, how easy would it have been to obtain one? Every man who had stolen a horse, a cow, or other property, without any authority, and converted the proceeds to his own use (and there were thousands who pursued no other business) would have sheltered himself from a just compensation, under an order, which might at any time have been procured. The legislature also knew for it was composed of the most enlightened and meritorious patriots of the day, notwithstanding the [...]dium which is now to be fixed upon it) that if any of the provisi [...] [Page]of the act should clash or interfere with any treaty made with Great-Britain, they would of course cease to operate, and that our courts would give effect to those clauses only which might not undergo such repeal.

Camillus, it is true, does not admit that treaties, made under the confederation, were paramount to the antecedent laws of the sta [...]s. Proceeding, however, with more caution than usu [...] [...]e does not flatly deny the position, but contents himself with observing, that it was a "question of theory, about which there was room for, and in this country did exist, much diversity of opinion." What is meant by any law being a question of theory, I do not well comprehend. What is the law in any particular case, in a foreign country, we have ever been taught to consider a question of fact and not of theory; and lord Mansfield declares, that such laws must be proved as facts. What the law may be, in any given case, may be a matter of uncertainty, and not known to every one, but it is still a question of fact, whether it be, as stated by one person or another. Where this diversity of opinion prevails, courts of justice alone can settle the question; and until this is done, we must resort, for information, to our national engagements, and the opinions of professional men. I do not mean to admit, that our courts have not determined the question; for it will be seen in the sequel, (and it is somewhat mysterious that it should have escaped the penetration of Camillus) that our courts have solemnly adjudged in favour of the treaty, when interfering with a contrary municipal regulation.

The question deserves a more minute examination; for if it can be shown, that all state laws, contravening the treaty of peace, were thereby repealed, and rendered null as to their future operation, all the elaborate reasoning of Camillus, and its superstructure, will be overthrown, and he himself be compelled, however reluctantly, to impute the first infraction to the account of Great-Britain. The proposition is so self-evident to an American lawyer, that without any proof, it forces the same conviction on his mind, as the plainest axioms of Euclid, "that the whole is greater than a part," or, "that all right angles are equal to one another," do upon that of a mathematician. To prove either, appears a work of supererogation; however, as the doubt is raised, we will attempt a solution of it.

By the 9th article of the confederation, "the United State; in congress assembled, have the sole and exclusive right of entering into treaties and alliances." These articles were acceded [Page]to by this state, by a solemn act of its legislature, passed the 6th of February, 1778. The people, therefore, of this state were as much parties to the treaty of Paris, as if they had been present in their proper persons, and individually affixed their signatures to it. How then could its binding force upon them ever become a question? Has Great-Britain ever entertained a doubt on the subject? Can one party to a contract annul it without the other's consent? Hence it follows, not only that treaties made under the confederation, were supreme laws of the land, but that they were so in a sense much more extensive and emphatical than could be applied to an act of the legislature. While the latter could be repealed or altered, the former could no wise be effected by a legislative act. Of little force, therefore, is the observation of Camillus, that "in the opinion of the legislature of Virginia, there were acts which had prevented, and might prevent the recovery of debts, according to the treaty." The legislature of Virginia may make, but cannot expound even its own laws, much less laws or compacts to which that state was only one of many parties. Their exposition belongs solely and exclusively to the judicial department. These (but perhaps it was unknown to Camillus) are the sentiments of the legislature of that very state. In an act of October, 1787, it is declared, "that it does not belong to the legislature to decide particular questions, of which the judiciary have cognizance, and that therefore it was unfit for them to determine on the validity of certain payments." The opinion, therefore, of any legislature on laws which already exist, is entitled to no attention; much less does such an opinion diminish the obligation or efficacy of them. Even in passing laws, if they exceed their authority (which may be the case) courts of justice will disregard and refuse to carry them into effect. If a case had been cited, of the supreme judicial tribunal of Virginia rendering a judgment conformable to what is stared as the opinion of its legislature, it would have been in point, and not easy to reconcile to the injunctions of the treaty.

After producing this opinion, Camillus demands, with an air of triumph and satisfaction, as if he had detected mr. Jefferson in a misrepresentation; "with what truth has it been asserted, that it was at all times perfectly understood, that treaties controuled the laws of the states? I answer, because it could not be otherwise, and that not only mr. Jefferson, but several professional and other characters of eminence, whom he consulted, (for extensive as his own experience was, he did not think it derogated from a minister of a free nation to collect information [Page]from his fellow citizens) concurred in this opinion. It may well be doubted, whether any lawyer has ever seriously advocated a contrary proposition. "It resulted," says mr. Jefferson, "from the instrument of confederation, among the states, that treaties made by congress, according to the confederation, were superior to the laws of the states." He adds, "we may safely affirm this to have been the general sense of those at least who were of the profession of the law." Mr. Jefferson, we shall see, did not speak at random, nor without authority, nor is he chargeable with the smallest misrepresentation. It gives me pleasure, I confess, to rescue the character of this gentleman, which has forced the admiration of America, from the aspersions of an anonimous writer, whose lucubrations hitherto may be regarded rather as a formal censure of his official conduct, than a vindication of the English treaty. Does it excite surprize, that Camillus wishes to render him odious? In his own writings the reason may be discovered. "Mr. Jefferson," says he, "is a candidate for the presidential chair!"

Governor Collins, mr. Channing, district attorney for Rhode-Island, governor Huntington, mr. Lewis, district attorney for Pennsylvania, mr. Monroe, a senator from Virginia, and now minister in France, and mr. Harrison, our district attorney, and a gentleman of well learned legal reputation, have all sanctioned an opinion, which Camillus would fain persuade us is a matter of doubt. The name of Hamilton, whose legal acquirements, and other splendid talents, have so often astonished his fellow citizens, and whose authority it is presumed, will not be disputed by Camillus, may also be added to a list already respectable. In the case of Waddington and Rutgers, which has been oftener mentioned than its importance deserved, he was council for the defendant, and advised his client to rely on the treaty of peace, which plea was allowed by the court. It will not be impertinent here to notice a remark of Camillus, not as a proof of candour, but of his solicitude to mislead: "though," says he, "there may have been no formal decision of our courts, enforcing the exceptionable principles of the trespass act, yet there never was a decison of a supreme court against it." Did not Camillus know, that the supreme court had decided against principles as exceptionable in other acts, merely because they were at war with the treaty of peace? He knew it, and it would have been no reflection on his candour to have stated the instances. Not having done so, the following extract of a letter from mr. Harrison to mr. Jefferson, will remind him of some cases in which he was probably [Page]concerned as counsel for one of the parties.—" [...]wor [...] operation of this act," says he, speaking of the act relative [...] debts due to persons within the enemy's lines, "became so [...] after the peace, a subject of much complaint, grounded upon that article of the treaty which forbids any impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts, and that which declares that no person shall suffer any future loss in his person, liberty, or property. With regard to British creditors, who were supposed to be the proper object of the 4th article of the treaty, the superior courts of the [...] soon restrained the operation of the act, and I do not know of a single instance where they have been held to be affected by it." Here then we have not only decisions of our superior courts in poi [...] but are told, by a gentleman of great accuracy, that there i [...] not one instance to the contrary. How powerful is tru [...] deception may continue f [...]r a day, but the veil will soon be [...] and fallacy and error, however sophistically arrayed, wi [...] stripped of their ornaments, and exposed to public view. [...] this be a caution to all who read Camillus, to suspend [...] opinion until his assertions are examined. I forbear, for [...] sake of brevity, to transcribe the opinions of the other ge [...] men who have been named, although they are equally stro [...] and more direct in point than that of mr. Harrison. They [...] all as positive as language could render them, and bear [...] norable testimony in favour of America. They should be [...] sulted by those, who, like mr. Jefferson, "will be glad to [...] an exculpation of our conduct," which is glanced at by [...] writer as a disingenuous trait in his ministerial carcer. Go [...] nor Livingston also, in a letter dated 15th June, 1789, to [...] same minister, declares, that "he does not know a single [...] stance, in which the state of New-Jersey had contravened [...] treaty." It would be endless to cite proofs on this subject.

Treaties, then, from the very nature of our union, being [...] supreme laws of the land, it results necessarily, that its provis [...] could not be controuled by the laws of any state, and that no [...] could reasonably complain of the existence of such acts, whi [...] by the treaty, were rendered nugatory, until obedience to th [...] was enforced by the courts to whom the exposition of [...] acts and treaties was delegated. Let Camillus produce a [...] instance of the supreme judiciary of any state rendering ju [...] ment contrary to the plain sense of the treaty—until such [...] amples are produced, it becomes us to defend our country [...] the unjust imputations of the British ministry and their age [...] and not by subtile and sine-spun distinctions and doubts, [...] [Page]efficacy to their calumnies. Among the subterfuges, calculated to fix a reproach upon the United States, may be classed the remark of Camillus, that, "under the confederation, they had no courts of their own to expound and enforce their treaties as laws." We are at a loss which to censure most in this observation; its want of candour, or the unqualified reflection it carries with it on the state judiciaries. If treaties were laws of the land, which, perhaps, was never seriously doubted, were not the state judges, then, as much as the federal judges are now, sworn and bound to conform to, and make them the rule of their decisions? He subjoins, with becoming delicacy, "it was believed that a majority of our supreme court bench would over-rule the plea of a military order." How was this discovery made? did the judges favour him with an extra-judicial opinion? or was he gifted with the spirit of divination? Thus, belief, surmises, and suspicions must be resorted to, to fix upon our state, the ignominious charge of breaking her solemn enga [...]ents with foreign powers. To the credit of our bench, it ought to be mentioned, that it has, ever since the peace, been filled with characters of the most unblemished reputation and integrity, and that the confidence inspired by their decisions, has been so great, that perhaps in no state in the union, is less business done in the federal court, than in New-York. It would hardly receive credit, was I to mention how very few civil actions have been commenced in these courts, since their organization in this state.

It cannot be necessary to follow Camillus through his invidious enumeration of the other acts of this, and other states, which he considers as violations of the treaty; the same answer applies to all. The treaty could not be controuled by any state [...]; but it is alleged, that in some cases, repealing acts were deemed necessary by the legislatures of the different states. This does not alter the case. It was done for the greater caution, and furnishes proofs of a sincere spirit of accommodation. [...]n some states, a repeal would probably not have taken place, of their legislatures had not observed the laws in question had already yielded to the superior mandates of the treaty.

But admitting, for a moment, that legal impediments once [...]xisted to the recovery of British debts, will it be contended that they continued to operate at the time of the negociation between mr. Jay and lord Grenville? if not, why fear to meet [...]he question, and discuss the respective claims of the two countries? If America had done wrong, what could Great-Britain [...]sire more, than a redress of the injury which had already [Page]taken place? mr. Jay could have informed lord Grenville, [...] confidence, that for six years past, our courts were open [...] British creditors, and that probably few, if any, remained [...] satisfied. This would not have pleased his lordship. Kno [...]ing that Great-Britain had nothing at present to complain of, [...] that our demands were of the most serious and extensive nature, he sedulously avoided a discussion, which a mere [...] in diplomatic controversy, could have managed on our part, [...] as to refute every possible objection of his lordship. Every "enlightened American," therefore, cannot but regard the pretended apprehensions of our envoy to meet so plain a question as a base dereliction of his country's honor, as a mean sa [...] fice of her rights; as an ill-timed delicacy, and as a [...] unwarrantable concession to Great-Britain.

CINNA.

New-York, August 9th, 1795.

P. S. It has been thought best to subjoin the opinions of [...] gentlemen above referred to; they harmonize, and are so [...] in point, that we shall find it impossible to withhold our [...] from mr. Jefferson's proposition in its greatest latitude, " [...] treaties made by congress, according to the confede [...] were superior to the laws of any state."

Governor Collins says, "the treaty, in all its obsolute [...] has been fully complied with; and to those parts that [...] merely recommendatory, and depend upon the legislative disc [...] the most candid attention has been paid;" plainly implying says mr. Jefferson, that the absolute parts did not depend [...] the legislative discretion.

Mr. Channing, speaking of an act passed before the [...] says, "this act was considered by our court, as annulled [...] treaty of peace.

Governor Huntington says, "the courts of justice ado [...] the treaty as a principle of the law."

Mr. Lewis—"the judges have uniformly and without [...] tation declared in favour of the treaty, on the ground of its [...] ing the supreme law of the land."

Mr. Monroe—"both court and counsel, in Virginia, [...] ed the opinion, that the treaty would controul any law of state opposed to it."

The senators and representatives in congress from Mary [...] in a note to mr. Jefferson, inform him, "that the legi [...] of Maryland, enacted a law declaring the treaty the supreme [...] of the land, which was," they add, "but a compliance in [...] [Page]with what had, in effect, taken place, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive treaty."

William Tilghman, a lawyer of Maryland, writes as follows: "we have recognized the treaty as the law of the land, by a particular act of assembly; and our judges have given one very striking proof of their impartiality in the construction of it. I allude to the decision of the general court in favor of British creditors, against a number of Maryland citizens, who, during the war, deposited paper money in the treasury, under the sanction of a law, at that time existing, in satisfaction of their debts: whether the treaty should have such retrospect as to avoid these payments, was certainly a doubtful point."

If these instances, an enumeration of which would have occasioned no "tedious research," (mr. Jefferson having been at the pains of collecting them) do not dissipate the doubts of Camillus, if he really entertains any, neither will he believe, if one rise from the dead. It affords matter for serious reflection, that the talents of this gentleman, should be so strenuously exerted to traduce his country, when ample materials were at hand, not only for exculpation, but for eulogy and commendation.

CINNA.

August, 10th, 1795.

CINNA.—No. III.

IF Camillus, instead of vindicating mr. Jay, at the expense of his country's faith, had recurred to his official reports, while secretary for foreign affairs, an apology would have presented itself, not quite so grateful perhaps to the pride of his friend; but less constrained, and more agreeable to truth, than the one which he has assigned. It is well known that mr. Jay, while at the head of that department, either from want of information, or from taking a less comprehensive view of the subject than his successor did, or from some other less pardonable motive, in very unqualified language, not only excused Great-Britain for her infraction of the treaty, but threw the whole censure on this country. It was easily foreseen that the negociation in the hands of a man, thus committed, must either [Page]prove abortive, or terminate, as it has done, dishonorably to America. A virtuous minority in the Senate, remonstrated in vain against an appointment which was not only a direct attack upon the constitution, by destroying the independence of the judiciary, but which, from the character of the envoy, augured nothing but disappointment and ignominy. Mr. Jay's hostility to the French revolution was also well known. This enmity betrayed itself, not only in his more private sentiments and conversation, but was most conspicuously displayed in the libel, which he, in concert with one of our senators, publishest against the minister of that republic. The manifest object of that too-celebrated certificate was to discredit the French cause, and to extinguish that enthusiastic ardour for its success, which had become almost universal in the United States. The attack upon mr. Genet terminated unfortunately and disreputably for the contrivers of it: it was not therefore to be expected that a man (whose very friends impute to him, a temper bordering on the vindictive) should over forgive the triumph of a minister, who not only exonerated himself from the charge, but in a manner the most public and [...] equivocal, convicted his antagonists of having propagated a deliberate misrepresentation. It will be recollected, that mr. Jay's own witness proved the innocence of mr. Genet. What could America look for from an envoy, whose mind had been recently embittered against the French, by a personal defeat, but as many marks of animosity towards that people as could decently be inserted in a public treaty. These observations may at first appear impertinent, and no wise connected with the merits of the treaty; but when Camillus, and every other writer in favor of it, uniformly represent mr. Jay as the properest man in America to have been entrusted with the negociation, and hence infer that it cannot be bad, it becomes useful to examine the position, and to show, as has been done, that a more unfit character could not have been sent upon so important an embassy.

It may be said, the documents afterwards collected by the industry of mr. Jefferson, and his masterly reasoning upon them, placed the questions, which had been conceded by mr. Jay, in a light which dissipated all objections, and carried conviction to every unprejudiced mind. That mr. Jay, therefore, would have nothing to do but to bring forward the arguments which had already been managed with so much success by the American secretary. But those who reason in this way, forget how difficult it is for a man who stands committed on record, to renounce his errors. From pride of opinion, and inordinate [Page]self-esteem, no one is exempt; how then were we to hope that mr. Jay, after hazarding opinions on this side of the Atlantic, which had already proved the bane of his country, in all her subsequent negociations with Great-Britain, should recede immediately on his arrival at the court of St. James's, where every pains and flattery would be practised, to keep him in good humour? Besides, his sentiments being in possession of the British minister, might be used to great advantage, if he attempted to change his ground. Rather, therefore, than recede at the expense of his reputation, and at a certainty of being self-convicted of contradiction and inconsistency, every subtility and finesse would be put in use, and in the last resort, the interests of America would be regarded as a small sacrifice to personal honor. The envoy well knew, that however important these sacrifices might be, men would not be wanting to applaud the wicked deed, and to blazen to the world his past services and patriotism. The event has corresponded with his expectations. Instead of declaring, which would have been the language of sincerity and candor, that it was impossible for mr. Jay, who was already committed, to invite a discussion with the British cabinet, every deception is practised to impose upon the public, a belief that such discussion, in the hands of any one, must have been inauspicious to the United States, and the efforts of mr. Jefferson, to rescue us from the base imputation of his predecessor in office, are contemptuously stiled "a mere essay of polemical skill, or a convenient ingredient of negociation."

Citizens of America! be on your guard. Since the epoch of your independence, a more important crisis than the present, never presented itself. To entice you into an approbation of a compact too degrading to be vindicated, arts, as base as the instrument itself, are put in practice—your confidence in a minister, who never ceased to defend your rights, and who was forced from his high station by the prevalence of a British faction, is attempted to be shaken. His manly and energetic exposition of your violated rights is turned into ridicule—his candor is impeached, and his patriotic labours in your service are branded as the offspring of "hollowness and fallacy." Men, like these, are, if you follow the pernicious counsel of Camillus, to be "expelled from your confidence." These are the men against whom you are cautioned, as laying "artful snares for your peace !" Are unsupported suggestions, like these, the effusions of patriotism and virtue? Do they not betray, notwithstanding a thousand professions to the contrary, a mind hostile to your internal peace, and tainted with the corruptions of a [Page]Bitish court! If you pursue such intemperate advice, and expel from your confidence, men of the description glanced at by Camillus, where will the expulsion end? a proscription more dreadful than that of Robespierre will succeed. The first and best patriots of America will fall victims, and all to gratify the insatiable ambition of a few aspiring individuals, who can brook no opposition, and unless they can controul public affairs, are perpetually disseminating calumnies, and sowing the seeds of civil dissention and discord. This is remarkably the case with the writer, whose defence, as it is hitherto ludicrously termed, has occasioned these remarks. His preliminary observations, and but little else has yet appeared in his first six numbers, are calculated to impress a belief, that an opposition to the treaty originated with the personal enemies of mr. Jay, or with those who have been uniformly opposed to the general government. These remarks partake more of intemperance and illiberality than of argument. As an address to the passions, they may be overlooked, but if they are designed to convince our reason, we turn from them with pity and contempt. What, sir, are the personal enemies of mr. Jay dispersed from one end of the continent to the other? Many respectable names, who stand foremost in the opposition, are, or have been, his friends. They regret the wounds which his feelings must sustain by their opposition to an association in which he has borne so conspicuous a part; but the calls of patriotism have stifled those of friendship, and it is a circumstance, certainly not favourable to the treaty, that many men, who had been in the habits of intimacy, and of thinking well of mr. Jay, have been most undisguised in their expressions against it. That mr. Jay has his personal enemies, is not doubted; no man is without them; and perhaps it would be difficult to assign any good reason why he should be exempt from this common lot of humanity: but that these enemies have invariably arrayed themselves under the banners of opposition, remains for Camillus to prove.

The other assertion is less excusable, because Camillus well knew, that among those who opposed the treaty, were some of the best friends to the national government; some who had not only signed, but had ever warmly supported the constitution of the United States. The names of Langdon, Pinckney and Rutledge, appear to the constitution of the United States. I should prove as tedious as Camillus, were I to enumerate all the instances which occur of the most zealous federalists, who have every where appeared among the opposers [Page]of this infamous compact. Not only the political characters, but the measures pursued by those who condemn the treaty, have fallen under the lash of his pen. No excuse can be offered for his misrepresentations on this subject—That the town meeting of Boston denounced it the very day after its arrival, and, without a reading, is an assertion directly opposed to all the testimony we have of their proceedings. The account of our own town-meeting, and of the manner in which it was obtained is too gross to impose on any of the citizens of New-York. Who are intended by the "leaders of the clubs" who were seen harranging at every corner, to stir up the citizens of [...]imitate the example of Boston, I am at a loss to ascertain. [...]me of the most active enemies of the treaty belong to no club at all; and instead of taking pains to induce the citizens to assemble such was the universal execration in which the [...]ty was regarded in New-York, that it was with some dif [...]ty the meeting was postponed to so late a day. That a [...]ectable body of the merchants endeavoured to moderate [...] violence, and promote a spirit favourable to discussion, [...]ports as little with the fact as several of the assertions which have been already noticed. The truth is, that two or [...]ee zealous partisans, alarmed at the increasing opposition [...] jealous of the effect which a legal and peaceable expres [...] of our sentiments might have on the president, collected a great haste, and at a late hour of the night, a few merchants, [...]spectable neither for their numbers, their patriotism, nor, [...]lities. It is in the power of Camillus to give their names [...] the public, who will then judge between him and me. These merchants lent their names to an address prepared, probably their leader, and containing a proposition as absurd as it, [...] insiduous. The citizens of New-York had too much [...]ood sense to be the dupes of it; they discovered, in the pro [...]osal to discuss, not only a reflection on their understandings, [...] late, a decision on a subject too momentous to their in [...]rests, to be longer delayed. When would the discussion have [...]ded? A few days after this meeting, the defence of Camillus [...]eared, and he has not yet finished the first article!—The [...]tizens, therefore, after having maturely considered the trea [...] and attended to a discussion which it had undergone for [...] than three weeks in the public prints, assembled, it is [...] not to listen to a "respectable body of lawyers or merchants," but to unite with their-fellow citizens of Boston in [Page]an address to the president against its ratification. In [...] bers, respectability, good order, and decorum, no assembled this city ever exceeded the one which took place on the when the resolutions were agreed to.

Before this meeting is dismissed, I must be permitted advert to certain measures which have been pursued by a [...] ty in this city in consequence of it. The resolutions [...] scarcely sent on to the president, before serious attempts [...] made, not only to represent the meeting as illegal, turbu [...] and unconstitutional, but to incite our fellow-citizens belief, that measures were adopting to overthrow the government, and to introduce anarchy and confusion. With [...] view, invitations were secretly distributed among the [...]ri [...] of order, to meet privately and in the night. The first [...] ing was so very thin, that it was thought prudent not to [...] ceed to business—a second attempt was made, which [...] ed but little better. After sending away those who were [...] posed not to harmonise in sentiment with the lead [...] business was opened—Philippic succeeded philippic [...] those who had exercised a right, secured to them by the [...] [...] stitution of the United States, of "assembling peace [...] petitioning government." Every art, seconded by all the [...] ers of eloquence, was practised to infuse the most horri [...] [...] picions into their minds against their absent fellow- [...] The result was, as has been asserted, and not contra [...] a determination to sign an instrument, pledging themse [...] each other to support the government and constitution [...] United States.—To carry into effect so laudable an [...] committees are to be appointed in each ward, to call the citizens for their signature.

Citizens of New-York! be not rash or precipitato— association, which at first view appears harmless and [...] praise-worthy, is big with consequences, fatal to your i [...] nal peace and happiness. Are we not already under the [...] ties of an oath to support the constitution and laws [...] country? Is it not our interest so to do? Notwithstanding the wicked calumnies of our enemies, have we ever di [...] ed in our words or actions, a spirit hostile to the one [...] other? Have we ever since the adoption of the consti [...] opposed any laws of the United States? Have we not, [...] contrary, manifested a patriotic jealousy, upon every occ [...] when attempts have been made to violate its sacred injunction Because then, in this awful crisis, we came forward, and [...] our warning voice with that of America, against a [...] [Page]fraught with destruction, are we to be stigmatised as anarchists?—are we to be separated from our fellow-citizens, and pointed at as seditious enemies of our country? Can those who advise you to so invidious a proceeding, be actuated by friendship for you, or a zeal for the public good? Are not rather personal aggrandizement and importance, their real objects? Unaccustomed to the smallest controul, they had rather arm citizen against citizen, than sink peaceably into obscurity, or experience a disappointment in a single scheme of their projection. Let those, therefore, who wish to increase the dissention which already unhappily prevails in this city, and those only, countenance this association. To ask a fellow-citizen to sign it, carries with it an insult, and will probably be regarded and resented as such by the greater part of the community. Such a request must proceed from suspicions of their patriotism or honesty. Good men want no additional tie, bad men will disregard any. To the honor of mr. Will [...]ocks, it ought to be mentioned, that he vehemently opposed, [...]ut without effect, nocturnal meetings of that nature, and ex [...]tiated, at some length, on their dangerous tendency.

After unwearied pains to prejudice his readers against the adversaries of the proposed treaty—Camillus proceeds to alarm our fears, and to compel us (to use his own expression) [...] "surrender our reason to the empire of our passions." The [...]o [...]rors of war are presented to the affrighted imagination, as [...] certain consequences of a rejection of this treaty by America. What, sir! is the treaty so fundamentally bad, that nothing but an apprehension of the waste of war, and a display of torrents of human blood, can reconcile us to it? but whence the probability of a war? will Great-Britain, exhausted as she is by her contest with France, be anxious to make new enemies? Will her subjects urge her to the conflict? Will they not rather, as they have already done, take the part of America, and endeavour to compel the ministry to reasonable terms of accommodation? Is our commerce an object of no importance to Great-Britain? Is the aid we could furnish to the French in the reduction of the West-India islands, a matter of no moment? But if a war must take place, before our differences can be adjusted, will it be an advantage to America to postpone it until a general peace takes place in Europe? Will not Great-Britain alone gain by the delay? Nothing but our extreme pusillanimity will ever involve us in a war with Great-Britain. We shall permit her, by our tamenese and submission, to proceed so far that she will hardly know how to recede with [Page]honor. It is a fact, that at this moment, we experience [...] than one half of the evils of a state of war, without deri [...] from it any one of its advantages; patience under our accu [...] lated insult and injuries, is magnified by Camillus into "dignified moderation," and our "government," by mean submission to a licentious tyrant (whose depred [...] on the ocean exceed those of the pirates of Barbary) has [...] quired," according to this writer, "a new elevation." [...] to heaven the evils we have to complain of, were past [...] might then estimate the costs, and it might be prude [...] to hazard a war for the sake of compensation. But the [...] ries we have remonstrated against, are repeating and inc [...] ing every day. Our ships are daily captured, our seamen [...] pressed, our public dispatches opened, and our very har [...] afford no protection to the minister of an ally; and yet [...] this despot we are to form an unequal treaty. Our [...] freezes with horror, at a bare mention of the unnatural [...] nection; and yet to bring it about, our constitution [...] violated, our characters and rights prostrated—outrage [...] insult must be ignominiously submitted to—American [...] must receive a stain too foul ever to be effaced—and [...] confidence a wound which will baffle the healing [...] time. Rouse, then, citizens of America! exercise, [...] be too late, an alienable right. Convey to the president fair, but respectful language, your sentiments on the im [...] ing danger. He will listen to the voice of his fellow [...] and pause before he barters away their dear-bought [...] leges.

CINNA

August 11, 1795.

CINNA—No. IV.

CAN there be a stronger proof of the demerits of the [...] ty, than the mode which is pursued by Camillus is defence? Instead of proceeding directly to a discussion of different articles, his readers are not permitted to form a ju [...] ment until they are satisfied that Britain has been as in [...] culate as she is haughty and powerful—That America, [...] been treacherous, ought to be as humble and submissive [...] is weak and defenceless—That the opponents, to a man, [...] [Page]actuated by personal malignity towards mr. Jay, or a wicked desire to overthrow the government, and introduce anarchy and civil discord—and that a war with Great-Britain will be the inevitable consequence of a rejection. These remarks have already been opposed by others, which, unless I mistake, have not only detected their sophistry, but exposed their pernicious tendency. Admitting all these matters to be exactly as stated by Camillus, how do they justify an inference that the treaty is a good one? They may prove that Great-Britain cannot be expected to make an equal commercial connection with this country; but will it thence follow, that we are bound to make a disadvantageous one with her? No opinion is better founded, or prevails more universally, than that the fewer European connections we form the better. We possess the means of a growing and extensive commerce. The articles we export, particularly provisions and raw materials, being of the first necessity towards the support and manufactures of other countries, there is no danger of not finding a market for them. To Britain, in particular, our commerce is of the highest importance. In return for the manufactures which we take from her European dominions, we send her provisions and raw materials, The balance, which is generally against us, we pay in specie. It will, therefore, certainly be her interest and policy to continue and extend a trade so lucrative and important, without a treaty. If she chooses to keep all her West-India ports shut against us, we can obtain from the islands of other powers the same articles which they produce; and, in times of scarcity, which very frequently occur, they must have recourse to America for provisions and lumber. In every respect they are more dependent upon us, than we are upon them; and we shall soon force from them a much more advantageous trade than we can expect to obtain by treaty.

Thus circumstanced, America should keep the staff of commerce in her own hands. She ought not, except in very particular cases, to form treaties of commerce. If she remains unfettered, she may avail herself of any advantage which may offer from the imprudence or situation of other countries. Let her make such regulations as are best calculated to promote a spirit of enterprize—to add to her riches, and to increase the industry of her inhabitants, and let her have courage and constancy enough, never to depart from them in favour of strangers. In her present defenceless and infant state, it is next to madness to attempt forming a connection with this nation, without making sacrifices, and consenting to restraints far beyond [Page]those which the laws of nations impose, which ought perhaps to form the only rule between two commercial powers. But if a treaty with Great-Britain, under any circumstances, be proper, why insert in it matters which have no relation to commerce, and which properly form materials for a separate connection? I mean the respective complaints of the two governments against each other. By inserting provisions for an adjustment of these complaints in a treaty of commerce, Great-Britain has not only exacted unreasonable concessions for them on our part; but if a ratification does not eventually take place, the whole ground must be again travelled over, and probably at a time when Great-Britain will be in a situation to hold a tone still more haughty and imperious than she now does. Perhaps, indeed, this was one reason which induced the advisers of the measure to keep from the senate the real object of mr. Jay's mission; certain it is, that from the president's message, they had as much reason to believe that an alliance, offensive and defensive, was in agitation with Great-Britain, as a treaty of commerce; and yet by the constitution, all treaties are to be made "by and with the advice and consent of the sena [...]." The plain meaning of this clause is, that no treaty shall be negociated without the advice, nor ratified without the consent of the senate. This construction has been sanctioned on other occasions, by the president himself. Even with Indian treaties, he has, previous to negociation, submitted to them the contents and taken their advice on every part.

The term, advice refers naturally and obviously to negociation. Would it not be absurd to say, that advice was necessary after a thing was done? Consent alone could then be required. There is, besides, a manifest propriety in the president's consulting the senate before hand. The person employed to negociate would then act with the greater confidence, knowing, that his instructions proceeded not from the president alone, but were the result of the accumulated wisdom of the senate: there would be less danger, also, of a refusal to ratify on their part, which may sometimes be productive of national jealousies, wars and other calamities, it being unusual not to ratify a treaty made with a minister properly appointed and instructed. Thus, whether we consider the policy of making any treaty with Great-Britain, as an abstract question, or the secret and clandestine manner in which the present one originated, we shall find much room for doubt and censure. But it will be said, we have already treaties of commerce with France [Page]and other nations; true, and the one with France, though in every respect more favourable than the one under consideration, has been the occasion of much perplexity and embarrassment to our government in the present war. Let ever so much care be used to make them explicit, and leave no room for construction, still doubts will arise, in the solution of which, not only the parties immediately concerned, but other nations, become deeply interested. This has been the case with the French treaty. Mr. Genet, in behalf of his republic, contended that the right of arming privateers in our ports, and other privileges, were secured to it by the treaty; all the other belligerent nations became parties to, or were interested in the controversy; and had not our government opposed a claim, which was certainly ill-founded, a war with them might have been the consequence. But if we had no treaty at all with France, we might, as a neutral nation, have opened our ports to the privateers and prizes of all the powers at war, without giving offence to any. Our other treaties, therefore, instead of militating in favour of such conections, furnish very strong▪ and, if I may use the expression, very feeling arguments against them.

While on this subject, I cannot forbear to remark, that a nation weak at sea, as America now is, and must ever continue, unless a different system is speedily adopted, can never promise herself any good from the strictest commercial stipulations on the part of a nation which is emphatically become mistress of the ocean. With such a power we had better have no connections, except such as arise out of the laws of nations. We shall not only be inclined, but compelled to observe our engagements, while Great-Britain will regard them only as long as she finds it her interest, and will laugh, if not insult us, when we complain of her infractions.

I come now to the sixth number of Camillus, in which he accounts for no provision appearing in the treaty against the pressing our seamen. The object is admitted to be of the last importance to the United States; but Camillus is at a loss to know how it could have been done. "A general stipulation against it," says he, "would have been nugatory, if not deregatory." Could there be any thing derogatory in Great-Britain saying she would abstain from an infamous practice, which perhaps no nation but America ever submitted to so long and so patiently. If her existence and safety depend upon her maritime superiority, is this superiority to be maintained at our expense? Is one of our most useful classes of citizens [Page]to be forced into her service, and add to her aggrandizement, to the ruin of our own commerce? and when we ask her to stipulate against such outrages in future, is insult to be added to injury? Are we to be told, that until the Americans change their language and looks, it is impossible to discriminate between the seamen of the two nations? Methinks every seaman found on board of an American vessel, and speaking English, should be, prima facie, deemed a citizen of the United States, and should be protected as such, until he was proved a deserter from, or a subject of Great-Britain. If the captain of an American frigate should take it into his head to press into our service the crew of an English merchatman, merely because they spoke English, and looked like Americans, would Great-Britain submit to the indignity? but if our flag is not to protect them, where is the difficulty of each man being furnished with a certificate of his birth or citizenship, authenticated according to a prescribed form? No, says Camillus, who has always an answer ready, when Great-Britain is to be exculpated, this mode is liable to deception, and therefore cannot be relied on. Truly, sir! your ingenui [...] astonishes me. Because, now and then, an imposition may [...] practised; because a perjury may sometimes be committed all our mariners are to be at the mercy of Great-Britain. Why not be explicit, and tell the truth at once. Great-Britain finding it very convenient to man her navy with our seamen, and her national safety being at stake, insists upon, and will exercise, the right of taking them wherever she find [...] them. She would not, therefore, consent to abstain from a practice which she well knows we dare not to resent. Our minister would have acted with becoming dignity, if he had broke off the negociation, until she had consented to an article of more importance to this country than all the others put together, and which would have made some amends for the innumerable advantages which Great-Britain derives from the treaty. The rights and security of these much-injured and useful men have been most wantonly abandoned: nor do they alone feel the effects of this abominable species of dep [...]dations. The merchants, too, by the exorbitant rise of wages, which must advance in proportion to the numbers of seamen [...] in this way, suffers most severely—and, in a little time, if [...] practice continues, the United States will hardly be able to man a single frigate. Humanity pleads as loudly as interest, in favor of the stipulation; but alas! we find few articles [...] [Page]the whole instrument, which, as they affect America, have been dictated by either of those sentiments.

Another part of the reasoning of Camillus must not be overlooked. "Our right to an exemption," says he, "is perfect by the laws of nations; and a contrary right is not even pretended by Great-Britain." It were to be wished that Great-Britain would rest contented with a bare pretension to this right. Unfortunately, she exercises it every day; and thousands of our fellow-citizens, notwithstanding the exemption to which they are entitled, are dragged from their own vessels into a service which they execrate. If the laws of nations secure us an exemption, where could be the harm of a declaratory article to that effect? Other parts of the treaty, when against America, have been justified by some, and probably will be by Camillus, because of their conformity to the laws of nations. Thus it has been said, and no doubt will be repeated, that by those laws, free vessels do not make free goods, and that therefore, mr. Jay yielded nothing, when he consented to an article of that kind. Why then should not Great-Britain humour us in our turn? If mr. Jay is justifiable for doing us a greater injury with one stroke of his pen, than he can repair if he lives to the age of Methusalem, because the law of nations was on his side, why not expect, any, insist upon the same complaisance from Great-Britain? to what inconsistencies and shifts are sensible men driven, when they vindicate a bad cause! to what an abject state, my countrymen, are you reduced! Great-Britain is become sole arbiter of your rights, and the men whom you have loaded with honors and offices, and who for years have drawn all their support from your coffers, and who ought in gratitude to defend you, not only consent to surrender your persons and liberties, but insult your understandings by an attempt to make you believe that they have studied your true interests in so doing— God forbid! that some dark and wicked project should lurk behind all this mysterious conduct. Time alone can discover, why Americans are to be dragooned just at this time, at the evident hazard of a rupture with France, into this new and disgraceful connection. Events, yet in the wo [...] of time, must develope whether Great-Britain has promised any, and what aid to a certain party, in the attempts it may make, to strengthen the government, and give it, as it is modestly called, a little more energy. In the mean while, let us be vigilant, and we shall defeat every attempt upon our independence, and cover [Page]with confusion those who dare to raise a sacrilegious hand against our free and happy constitution.

We are now arrived with Camillus at the first article of the treaty. The way has been tedious and disagreeable. He has told us, out of pure patriotism, many unpalatable truths. Thank God, notwithstanding all his pains and eloquence (for even his enemies must allow him to write well) my former good opinion of my country is unshaken. Her conduct with respect to Great-Britain will bear the strictest scrutiny. She has, indeed, been more finned against than finning. If I am mistaken, the delusion is pleasant, and I hope Camillus will not think me obstinate, when he is assured, that hitherto I have not discovered the strength of any ground he has thought proper to take.

In discussing the first article, Camillus encounters an objection, stated by the Charleston committee. It must be confessed, there does not appear to be much force in the objection, and yet, as some British subjects were proscribed during the war, it may be a doubt whether those of that description will not be permitted to return under the treaty. It was, at any rate, hardly worth while to find fault with this article, and perhaps somewhat puerile in Camillus to take so much trouble, seriously to combat, what the objectors themselves could not have laid much stress on. The committee had, perhaps, discovered so many faults in the other articles, they thought it impossible [...]here should be an innocent one in the whole treaty, whatever its appearance might be.

CINNA.

August 13, 1795.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

§

SOUTH-CAROLINA—WASHINGTON DISTRICT. September 16, 1795.

THE Franklin, or Republican Society of Pendleton county, having, by the watchful vigilance of their standing committee, on a most pressing occasion, been called together to give their opinion on a public measure—a right they will not tamely relinquish, nor resign but with their lives!—having taken into consideration the ruinous treaty proposed and signed by John Jay, the American ambassador, with his Britannic majesty [Page]—a treaty a [...] detestable in its origin, as contemptible in its event!—a treaty which can never be enforced but by the bayonet!—having fully weighed it in all its articles—and taking into view, that when the complaints of a brave and powerful people are observed to increase in proportion to the wrongs they have suffered!—when, instead of sinking into submission, they are rouzed to resistance! the time must come at which every inferior consideration will yield to their security—to the general safety of the empire!

There is a moment of difficulty and danger, at which British flattery and falsehood can no longer deceive, and simplicity itself can be no longer misted!—that period has at length arrived.

When we see a man improperly appointed to negociate one of the most important treaties, because not properly, not constitutionally advised—that this man was the most improper, because his attachment to Britain, and aversion to France, were notorious!—and that he was altogether an objectionable character, because, (in admitting doubts to be started by Britain about our line, and to which he acceded!)—instead of showing a thorough knowledge of this country—appears to have been wretchedly ignorant, and consequently either shamefully imposed on, or corruptly influenced!—who, instead of using that policy which should have "extorted from Britain, in her present state of humiliation, (and which could not be hoped from her justice)" a reparation of reiterated wrongs!— was the first man to propose to submit to a treaty, which, it adopted, must blast us in the opinion of Europe as the most [...]sillanimous nation that ever existed!—a treaty which, in [...] its hardened features, betrays insult and contempt!—a treaty, not only thus made odious, but which abridges, in every respect, our rights, and which sports with our just claims [...]nd interests!—we demand, when such glaring, ruinous [...]onduct appears, is permitted, is sanctioned! have not the [...]eople just grounds of complaint—would not silence be cri [...]inal?

Therefore resolved, That when a public measure dares not [...] arraigned, "because it is the offspring of the highest public [...]aracter"—then liberty lies prostrate—then despotism be [...]ins!—and heartily adopting the sentiments of our fellow- [...]itizens of Camden, (at the same time reprobating denuncia [...]ons against orderly associations) with them we do insist, that it [...] both the duty and right of freemen, on all great, public occasions, in which the honor and welfare of the republic is [Page]concerned, to come forward and declare their sentiments with freedom and firmness—that those who are entrusted with power, may be admonished to use that power only for the good of the people, who placed it, for that especial purpose, in their hands; and to teach them to be cautious how they violate the precious, the sacred trust.

Resolved, That on the appointment of John Jay as an extraordinary ambassador to Britain, we were led to believe [...] our rights would have been vindicated with firmness, a rep [...] ration of our wrongs obtained!—on the contrary, even [...] the signing of a treaty of amity, our flag is the common sport [...] Britain, and our sailor fellow-citizens and property at the mercy.

Resolved, That we were induced by profession to believe [...] administration sympathized in the cause of an ally wres [...] for liberty—a great and regenerated people, who cheris [...] their utmost purity those sacred principles which have laid [...] foundation of our freedom in the blood of our dearest citizen [...] but that ally has been treated with insincerity, even at the [...] ment our inveterate enemy, and the foe of human happi [...] been invited to our bosom! and when British tyranny and [...] can leave not a doubt, on a single unprejudiced mind, that [...] about to give that nation a footing in law among us which [...] converted to our ruin!

Resolved, That by the constitution of the United States treaties are to be made "by and with the advice and [...] the senate"—that is, no treaty shall be negociated without advice first taken, nor accepted without the consent of the [...] —But the senate, as such, were ignorant of the principl [...] basis of the treaty itself. We admit they were made acqui [...] with the appointment of Jay, but did not instruct him, [...] informed of his instructions. He was instructed, or he was [...] if he was! we will drop the curtain! if not, and acted of and himself, we shall lament the want of a guillotine! For wh [...] it ever conceived to be possible that America could entertain th [...] surd and dangerous idea of trusting any man, (but especi [...] Jay) to negociate with such a government as Britain— [...] explicit instructions!—The obvious construction of the [...] the constitution, which makes the advice of the senate necc [...] has been given by the President himself, when a treaty was [...] posed by France. Mr. Genet was empowered to propose [...] "on liberal principles, such as might strengthen the bonds of good which unite the two nations," but on making his proposal [...] executive, he was informed "that the participation in [...] of treaty, given by the constitution to that branch of gover [...][Page]world [...]arily delay any answer to his friendly proposition, the senate [...] then in recess, and not to meet again until the fall."—In the negociation with Great-Britain, the senate was in cession, and yet were they called on to advise? Did they give instructions? They did not! We allow this most interesting business was taken up in the senate by our patriotic citizen Butler—but, from a want of formality, he was opposed—and this important matter died away, because it was not orderly! —In the treaty also with the C [...]eeks, the president required the advice of the senate before he began to treat, and actually laid the outlines of a treaty before them previous to the negociation.

Resolved, That we consider it becoming in a high degree the duty of the house of representatives of the general government, to enquire into so bold an attack on the palladium of our rights—'tis impossible they can suffer so flagrant a breach in the constitution to pass unnoticed!—The president and senate will certainly endeavour to reconcile their conduct to the wounded feelings of their fellow-citizens.

Resolved, That so far as is depending on his own integrity and good wishes to the United States, we are still willing to behold in Washington the same good and great man! But is it not possible, at least respecting Jay's treaty, that he may have been wrongly advised?

Resolved, That it is highly probable our generous and brave ally, however well-disposed towards us, viewed, with some emotion of indignation, at the least, the uncandid manner in which their proposition for a treaty was received and rejected by our government; and now find themselves under the necessity of calling on us to declare honestly and openly, our intentions towards them—whether we will adopt the first supreme law of the land under the patronage of France or of England? The period has at length arrived to know our ultimatum— the mask has been strippen off by mr. Jay—and the majority of twenty in the senate, we conjecture, will be cautious how far they pledge themselves to their constituents on the utility of an English treaty, provided France should show her disapprobation, or consider herself neglected.

Resolved, That admitting (what is insinuated by a member of congress for this state, the advocate and defender of British systems and British tyranny!) that the treaty proposed by France, he suspects, could not be obtained on eligible terms, bu [...] at the price of joining with her in the war—we do insist, tha [...] at the time alluded to, the honor, the interest of America earnestly [Page]called on us, to enter heartily into measures opposed to the dreadful league formed against a generous and natural ally, whose welfare should and must be inseparable from our own! The moment Britain openly declared against France, should have been our signal for action!—The united voice of the continent proclaimed the general, the generous sentiment!— But the grateful feelings of a whole people were sunk in the timidity of its government!

Resolved, That (reflecting on the present interesting moment, when an eventual war with Britain may be reasonably expected from a further discussion of mr. Jay's friendly treaty) we deprecate, with the strongest emotions of apprehension, a difference between America and France!—War with England, will be war with Spain! Our government knows it! Even the neutrality of France, under such circumstances, can be anticipated but with very unpleasing sensations.

Resolved, That we view with surprize the industry used not to disclose the articles of mr. Jay's treaty—affecting and practising all the secrecy of monarchy, so opposite to open and republican principles.—Will it, dare it be contended, that the people have no right to ask, nay, to demand information on the posture of their affairs?—Secrecy robs them of this right, and makes twenty greater than the whole. Is this republicanism?—Is this liberty?—Monarchs and conclaves make a trade of secrecy— it suits their designs—but neither monarchs nor conclaves are, as yet, in unison with the sentiments, nor the wishes of the American people. There is no authorized secrecy in our government, and to infer such a right from the practices of other nations, is a prostitution of republican principles. The constitution of the United States gives to the president and senate the power of making treaties, but it communicates no ability to hatch those things in darkness. A treaty! which is to be the supreme-law-of-the-land! and yet the people not to be informed of the terms of this law until binding upon them! until the opportunity for amendment is past!—Secrecy and mystery marked the conception, birth, and parentage of this [...]ump of abortion and deformity.—The president received the treaty in January, when congress were sitting, and did not submit it to the senate till June!—when it was impossible any one legislature in the union could be in session to give the alarm!—The press alone had the glory of the discovery and reprobation of this horrid political monster!—It is also worthy of note, that on the 29th of said month (January) the president approved "an act of congress, to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," [Page]and that a few months afterwards the senate (alone) approved a treaty which renders said act null and void, in favour of "all settlers and traders (the rooted enemies of America) within the precincts or jurisdiction (a large extent of country) of the posts."—Should this treaty be ratified, 'twill be out of the power of congress to remedy its evils without hazarding a war—And it may with safety be presumed, that nine-tenths, at least, of the citizens of America, look with indignation and abhorrence on the inglorious attempt made by mr. Jay, and his advisers, to chain fifteen independent states as a dangling appendage to the crown of Great-Britain!

Resolved, That insurmountable objections lie against the treaty, were there no others, while the value of the negroes and other property carried away contrary to the seventh article of the treaty of 1783; and the loss and damage in blood and treasure sustained by the United States, from the detention of posts, remain unsatisfied for by the British government—the amount of which should have been ascertained by the commissioners to be appointed to liquidate the claims of British creditors, and set off against the principal of their debt; for, as to interest, during the war, they have not the shadow of a claim.—No man entertains a doubt, (even the British, nor the governor of Canada himself, have been sufficiently hardy to deny it) that the Indians were excited to war against us,—and that the supplies for their warfare were derived from a trade authorized by the British government, and protected by these posts which of right were our's, and ought to have been used for our defence—This war has cost us, annually, calculating the loss of the fur trade depending on the posts, above one million three hundred thousand dollars, more than would have been sufficient for the defence of our frontiers if the posts had been in our possession. Let this sum, and the amount of their piratical depredations, the whole continent says, be made a set-off against British claims.

Resolved, That by the article regulating the West-India trade, nothing can be more evident than that Britain meditated to wrest from America the carrying-trade, an immense share of which she has lately possessed, as appears by the astonishing increase of our seamen and shipping; but we trust 'twill never be forgotten that the protection of a free carrying-trade was one of the primary objects for which the federal government was established.—Let not, then, our national government have the discredit of doing any thing by which the limits of our navigation may be fettered.—Let us not concur with the British ministry, in eminently promoting the British commerce at the [Page]expense of our own!—Not satisfied with innumerable depredations on our shipping, the British government wants their total destruction by this insidious article, confining our vessels to seventy tons, mere boats, whilst they reserve to themselves the right of navigating in any size vessels they please, in the same pursuit of trade. By this deceptive article, we alone granted—have been prevented from exporting in our own bottoms any articles of West-India produce, and even of cotton, an article of our own growth, and becoming a very important one in this and the sister state of Georgia (even in our own district) —while the vessels of Britain, and every other nation, would be at liberty to export from American ports every article of West-India, and some of our own produce, to all parts of the world.

Resolved, That the adopters and warm advocates for this treaty must have regarded a favourite policy, a close connection with Britain and British systems, more than pecuniary benefit or [...] dignity; for, setting aside all reciprocity, no one advantage can we gain by any regulation in the treaty, distinct from a [...] greater to be obtained by the British nation.

Resolved, That the article restricting the subjects or citizens of either party from accepting commissions in the army or navy [...] any foreign power, is a gross violation of the natural rights of man—and, as such, should have been indignantly spurned at!

Resolved, That we join heartily in sentiment with that truly patriotic and staunch republican, the chief justice Rutledge, that mr. Jay should have demanded an unconditional relinquishment of the Western Posts as a right, until which had been granted, and until the British minister had given orders to that effect, mr. Jay should not have opened his lips about a treaty! What amity could be expected from a government. at the instant of negociation, forcing the tomahawk and scalping-knife into the hands of savages, to the destruction of great numbers of our immediate frontier fellow-citizens! It was, truly, prostituting the dearest rights of freemen, and laying them prostrate at the feet of royalty. In 1793, the executive pressed the demand of the Western Posts, with a spirit becoming the representative of a nation of freemen, an ultimatum was required on the subject, by December of that year, and how were we treated? With a conteptuous silence, and fresh injuries heaped upon us depredations on our property, as unwarrantable as the robberies of an Algerine, or the plundering of a savage! And, we [...] it possible to sully the name of the British government with an additional shade of infamy, the same would be afforded by the [Page]circumstance of their treatment to this country, involving in it the black design of starving a people, whose only crime has been the defence of freedom. Such treatment, it was natural to imagine, would have roused us to retaliate; and the immediate representatives of the people, according with the sentiments of their constituents, made an attempt to extort redress by means of a provisional retaliation. But, in one instance, the senate, in another the supreme executive, checked them in their honorable career; and the energetic portion of the government, with unparalleled weakness, humbly sued for the friendship of a nation which ever treated us a foes; rejecting, at the same time, (the better to secure her smiles) the proffered amity of another nation, to which, in a great measure, we owe our existence, as a free people, and which has also other strong claims to our gratitude and friendship!

Resolved. With that tried veteran and patriot, the venerable Gadsden, That we consider all connections by treaties with Great-Britain, equally impolitic and dangerous. Dangerous, because (whilst her government is monarchical and unregenerated) we shall insensibly give her such a footing among us, and consequently so great an ascendancy over our councils and government, as may eventually sap our independence, and subvert our constitution! And impolitic, because 'tis our interest, by the utmost individual and national exertions, (particularly our southern states) to arrive at an independent transportation of our commodities—to become the carriers of their own produce, for, 'tis an alarming fact, established on the best authority, that by the almost constant wars in which Britain is engaged (she having had in the last one hundred years, forty-two of war, and fifty-seven years and nine months of peace, which is three of war to every four of peace) and that by being so largely the exporters of our produce, she carrying two-fifths of the whole exports of the United States, the difference of freight, insurance and charges, amounts, on an average of peace and war, to one million, three hundred and ninety-two thousand, eight hundred and fifty-seven dollars, taxed annually on our agriculture by British wars, during their continuance, and our dependence on British bottoms, and so much more than we should pay did we but raise our own shipping to be competent to the carriage of all our own productions, and that, beside this, many of our bulky articles, not bearing a war freight, cannot be exported. While Britain, then, is the carrier of two-fifths of our produce, our independence is incomplete, and ever will be, if we tamely suffer such negociators as mr. Jay, to form treaties [Page]with that nation, calculated to keep up a servile and ruinous dependence, by the immoderate, the excessive use of her manufactures. Let us wear nothing but what is American— eat nothing, drink nothing but what is American—this would soon raise the head of America. Let the people of Britain be driven to poverty and despair by acts of their own government! and what would be the consequence? An acquisition of te [...] of thousands of really useful citizens to the United States, which form the natural asylum to the people of the old world, to snatch them from a wretched existence, from slavery—to the enjoyment of plenty, happiness—to liberty!

Resolved, That we ever considered the appointment of Jo [...] Jay, as extraordinary as it was unconstitutional extraordinary because underrating the abilities of our then ambassador: a man, in every respect justly possessing the confidence of the union— especially, as there is good ground for asserting, that major Pinckney's energetic and firm representation had insured the in mediate cession of our Western Posts—and a treaty, at least [...] favorable as any nation could have expected from England.

Resolved, That roused at length into a sense of our danger, we pronounce for war, with all its horror [...], rather than see our country approve of measures which will effect her annihilation. A treaty! to be bought at the expense of infamy! purchased at the loss of the affection of an ally, as generous is friendship as glorious in arms! No! magnanimous nation truly worthy of liberty! we will cherish, we will respect thy opinion! we will not suffer thy esteem to be taken from us! we will prove to the world, and, above all, to the English government, that we will not be the dupes of their insidious policy—their craft—their ambition!—Oh, ye Jays of America, who boast of wisdom so exalted, penetration so profound—how is it possible you have not yet listed up the veil which hides from your eyes the low sinister politics of the English government! How is it ye do not see to what a degree it abuses ye! and what a trick it has put upon the "solemnity" of your solemn ambassador!

Resolved, That the much-esteemed names of Langdon, of New-Hampshire; Robinson, of Vermont; Burt, of New-York; Brown, of Kentucke; Mason and Tazewell, of Virginia; Bloodworth and Martin, of North-Carolina; Butler, out fellow-citizen, of South-Carolina; and Jackson, of Georgia— the patriotic senators—be held in our highest veneration and most marked esteem.

Resolved, That the public report, not contradicted, fixes on [Page]Jacob Read, our unworthy senator—corrupt motives for his acquiescence in a treaty which would have made his country infamous!—would have restored her back to Britain! We therefore do not hesitate to declare him, (with his nineteen quondam coadjutors) undeserving of any further public confidence: And, guided by an opinion founded in a knowledge of human nature, we do insist, that if not lost to all the sine feelings of the heart, 'twill be impossible they can withstand that immense torrent of opprobrium which will rush upon them; they must resign! they cannot, in future, transact any public business!

Resolved, That as the power of finally making and ratifying treaties by the president and two-thirds of the senate alone, has, in the present case, been proved to be of a most alarmingly dangerous nature; that our very existence as a free people, had been put at stake; that had not a good providence influenced even the twenty of the senate to reject one article, which, from necessity, must arrest the hand of the president from signing it, we say, that had not the providential care, which we have so often experienced, interposed, we had been a lost, an undone people, without pity, and without friends!

Therefore, Resolved, That our members be earnestly called on, at the next meeting of the assembly, to propose an amendment to the federal constitution, so far as respects the power of making treaties. That a president, and twenty senators, perhaps fourteen (for that number makes a quorum) shall have the sole power of making treaties, which must be, necessarily, the supreme law; must be binding on every individual, which swallow up the sovereignty and independence of each state! No! the people now see the folly of giving such a power into the hands of fourteen men, which, at all times, may supercede every existing law in the union! 'tis too much! Without a disposition to judge uncharitably of men, we say 'tis possible that twenty or fourteen men may be tempted, may be bribed to betray the precious trust reposed, in them by their fellow-citizens! And we repeat, that as it is notorious Britain carries all her points by corruption, (look in lord North's estimate during the American war; you will there find one million for contingents or secret service! Has not France, throughout her struggle, complained she felt British corruption in her very vitals! and shall America expect to escape her baneful influence!) then 'tis possible that twenty or fourteen men may be led to sell even their country! We, therefore, again urge it on our representatives, to bring forward an amendment, by which congress at large, and congress alone, shall have the power of [Page]forming treaties, at least of ratifying them. We venture to pronounce the people will not be satisfied short of this: from one extreme of the continent to the other, this will be the universal language. We know, in framing the federal constitution, the objection to giving the house of representatives this power, jointly with the senate and president, was, that negociations generally required the greatest secrecy, and that was not to be expected from so large a body. Curse on such secrecy! it has undone our country! An American assembly, aloof from the combinations of Europe, should have no secrets! No government in the known world, like our's, ever gave such an extensive latitude as we allow to the president and senate; even the most arbitrary kings never possessed any thing like it! In France, under the old government, appearances at least, were kept up; the king's edicts were never of force until registered in parliament. In England they proceed with diffidence in making treaties— far from being considered as legal without a parliamentary sanction, the preamble always states that "his majesty would endeavour to obtain a law for ratifying the treaty." Such is the language and conduct of monarchs, and what is our's? [...] blush! we blush!

Resolved, That while we stigmatize the man, and execrate his conduct, (John Jay) we rejoice he has been made an instrument to draw forth the whole united voice of the people of Ameri [...] in detestation of his treaty! We congratulate each other, that from this truly marked circumstance, our great, our generous ally, will form proper, a true judgment of the disposition [...] the United States! that she will distinguish between the people and a part of its government! that they will see our hearts never ceased to beat in unison with their's!—of all possible temporal evils which could ever fall upon us, we deprecate [...] difference with France!

Resolved, That we pledge ourselves to our brethren of the republican societies throughout the union, as far as the ability and individual influence of a most numerous society can be made to extend, that we will promote every constitutional means to bring John Jay to a trial, and to justice. He shall not escape, if guilty, that punishment, which at once will wipe of the temporary stain laid on us, and be a warning to traitors, hereafter, how they sport with the interest and feelings of their fellow-citizens!

Resolved, That every compliment is due to the watchful zeal of our fellow-citizens of Charleston; to the great ability shown by their committee in their elucidation of the treaty. [Page]We warmly embrace and adopt their report: it demonstrates great moderation; but, with such provocation! we would not have been quite so tender!

Resolved, That we heartily approbate the representation of our wrongs made by our own district (Washington) it proves that we are neither defective in knowledge, nor deficient in duty; that we know our interest as citizens, that we feel a tender concern for the whole commonwealth of America: this we will teach as the first of principles to our children; we will endeavor to impress on them the nonsense and folly of involving themselves with the people of Europe, eternally cutting each other's throats; we will urge to posterity, that America need only lie still; that let her markets be but well supplied, all Europe will be the buyers; that they cannot do without us; to have no connection with the old governments by treaties, no written agreements; for the omission of a comma may involve us in a war! In this happy, but envied situation, had a gracious providence placed us; and, guided by these principles, we should have had no wars. But, the daemon of discord entered into a Jay, and he flew to England to blast our rising hopes, to involve us with compacts and treaties!

Resolved, That in the investigation of this business, not to have discovered warmth—a warmth resulting from the glowing picture of danger which our country exhibits, by a tame submission in its government, to the most flagrant and daring outrages! would have betrayed a stoicism unworthy of the subject, unworthy of the sons of 1776! And should it be considered that unnecessary asperity has discovered itself to a nation, of whom we ought and must be jealous while the crown is upon its present head, we wish to make known to the world, and to Britain and Ireland in particular, that we discriminate between the honest and the slavish parts of their people, between the two nations and their governments! Yes, congenial and generous souls! we know you always longingly anticipated our welfare and rank among nations, and ever participated in our distresses, and in our happiness. No! 'tis your government that we hold in abhorrence!—a government, with one exception, singularized from all the nations of the world by the number and extravagance! by the foulness and blackness of its crimes!

Resolved, finally, That the vice-moderator, the corresponding secretary, and secretary of the society, do sign the foregoing resolutions; and that they be generally printed, as expressive of our abhorrence and detestation of a treaty, which gives to the English [Page]government more power over us as states, than it ever claimed over us as colonies, and which, if Britain had been left to her generosity, she would have been ashamed to propose!— a treaty, involving in it pusillanimity, stupidity, ingratitude, and treachery! to blast the rising grandeur of our common country, of our infant empire!

SAMUEL LOFTON, sen. Vice-moderator.

J. MILLER, Corresponding Secretary.

Ed. TATE M'CLURE, Secretary of the Society.

§

Some observations on a letter said to be written by a gentleman [...] character and information in Vermont, and bearing date the 18th July last *.

I Will not venture to ascertain what was the real view of the letter writer; he is, at all events, very wroth with the citizens of great cities, principally, as it appears to me because he suspects they will dare to intermeddle in politics, without obtaining his permissions or at least without being on his side. It is impossible, however, to avoid observing [Page]that without his knowing what had really happened in these cities, the obvious errors in the treaty are so conspicuous, and, in contradiction to his will, obtrude themselves so forcibly on his brain, as to compel on his mind a suspicion, that mobs will be raised, while his with appears clearly to be, that no opposition should be made against its obtaining the president's signature; should even its commercial errors be ruinous to the trade, and its political errors destructive to the liberties and peace of this country.

I know the people of Vermont well—they are quite good citizens; but they are likewise firm and inflexible patriots.

They know the value of their rights, and they will, if necessary, maintain them at every risque.

I will first, therefore, make a few observations on such parts of this extraordinary instrument, as appears to me most evidently wrong, and most pointedly demonstrative, that either the head or the heart of the man who framed it, was ill calculated for executing the high trust reposed in him.

And secondly, assign some reasons why the people of Vermont, as well as of other parts of this extended country, will pursue every constitutional method in then power, to prevent its becoming the supreme law of the land.

The second article is, in my opinion, an indelible stain upon the honour and dignity of the nation; for, by agreeing that the posts shall not be delivered up till the first of June 1796, without any stronger obligation on the part of the British for the surrender of them at that period, than we had at the treaty of peace, it is tacitly agreed, that the unjust retention of them was no infraction of that treaty.

Where was that genius of America, which governed its councils at the termination of the war? who, in a firm and manly tone, told this haughty and imperious government of Great-Britain, that, "we will not speak on the subject of peace till you have first acknowledged our independence."

Or are our present claims to these posts, after being absolutely ceded to us by a former treaty, made with that very government, less valid or less conclusive, than a claim to that independence which we then, in such unqualified terms, declared, should actually form the basis of the treaty? No, but our then ministers were different men, and had very different views from what some of them have at present.

If the third article is construed literally, it certainly does not provide for a free trade between Vermont and Canada, by the way of Lake Champlain. The words are, "but it is understood [Page]that this article does not extend to the admission of vessels of the United States, into the sea-ports, harbours, bays or creeks of his majesty's said territories; nor into such parts of the rivers in his majesty's said territories, as are between the mouth thereof and the highest port of entry from the sea, except in small vessels, trading bona fide between Montreal and Quebec."

St. John's, at the bottom of Lake Champlain, is, strictly speaking, a British port of entry, where the American vessels, as well as all craft from Canada, for any part of that Lake, have entered and cleared out, ever since the peace; the Vermont trade, therefore, by this useful lake, must, on a rigorous construction of that article, stop at that port.

How far the people of that state may esteem themselves obliged to mr. Jay, for leaving so beneficial a branch of their trade, subject to such an indefinite, uncertain construction, I will not say.

The actual evil which may arise from the ninth article, depends in a great degree, upon the quantity of land now held by British subjects. If, as is said by many, they at this moment hold several millions of acres, the present proprietors may, either on their lease or sale thereof, to actual settlers, make it a condition, that they shall remain British subjects; in this case, a short time would probably discover the benefits which would accrue from having one or two millions of British subjects actual settlers on our frontiers, who, the treaty declares, "shall not, as far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens;" a due attention to the twenty-sixth article of the treaty, will possibly enable many good republicans to discover mr. Jay's real intentions; for even in case of war, though they shall remain British subjects, they cannot be compelled to quit the country as long "as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws." Many of us remember the distresses suffered by the patriots of this country last war, by only a few of such men being amongst us. It was best, perhaps, not to have these two articles of the treaty too near each other.

But I would ask "the gentleman of character and information in Vermont," by what part of the constitution of the United States, congress at large, much less the senate and president, have the power of declaring that aliens shall, in any instance, have a right to hold lands within any one state?

I am safe in averring, that each state has hitherto claime [...] the exclusive priviledge of granting or prohibiting that right.

And the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, [Page]after granting to congress, "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," explicitly declares, that "nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state."

Does the letter writer imagine, that the people of Vermont, because they are known to be truly federal, will tamely submit to see their state deprived of a privilege so important and extensive, and so pointedly guarded to them by the constitution of the United States, without ever remonstrating against it?

I wish to heavens that the letter writer was the only man in America, who would sacrifice the rights of his state, to the predominancy of his party.

The tenth article, which declares, that "neither the debts due from individuals of the one nation to the individuals of another, nor shares, nor monies which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated," carries, I readily acknowledge, the appearance of honor and honesty, on the very face of it; but unfortunately in making the distribution of the consequences of that stipulation, entered into between the contracting parties, all the benefits arising therefrom go to the side of the British only, and all the disadvantages to the side of this country; we having scarce any money in their funds, or any debts due by them to us; while they have immense sums under our controul, which ought to have been maintained in that situation, for the express purpose of being a preventative against such a predatory, disgraceful warfare, as they have waged against us, with impunity, for upwards of two years.

Fat am I from thinking, that either a sequestration or confiscation ought to take place on any slight or frivolous occasion. May the honor and integrity of the United States become proverbial throughout the habitable world.

To explain myself by a homely, but I think, striking simile, I will suppose that our friend, mr.—, who is a man twice as strong as I am, had frequently met me in the highway, and had sometimes severely drubbed me, at other times, had thrown me in the mud, and ruined my clothes; that I had made frequent remonstrances against this ill treatment, but in vain, having, to all my mild remonstrances, and humiliating petitions, received from him, nothing but vindictive, and supercilious replies; that at last I loaded a pistol of his, which happened [Page]to be in my house, put it into my pocket, and threatened to blow his brains out the next time he ever attacked me on the highway; that I then sent a friend, on whose good sense and integrity I strongly relied, for the purpose of adopting some mode for terminating all our disputes.

That this friend, after having settled on terms in many respects very favourable to mr.—, stipulated, in the most positive manner, that, though it was profitable and convenient for him still to leave his pistol with me, I should never attempt to use it in my own defence against him, even to save my own life, notwithstanding a future attack, on his part, should be equally violent, virulent, and unprovoked, as those which he had formerly made on me, my friend obtaining at the same time, a promise from mr.—, equally obligatory on him, that he would never use against me, a little popgun, which my friend very well knew could not possibly injure me more than by taking a button off my coat.

In this state of the case, ought I to retain a good opinion of either my friend or of any other person who advised him [...] the measure? I hesitate not to answer that I never would [...] the least considence in him again, but should ever look upon him, and them, with a jealous eye, as men, who, from some sinister and wicked motives, were meditating my destruction especially as they were perfectly sensible, that both my inte [...] and inclination would prevent me from ever beginning an attack upon him, or even from intentionally giving him offence.

The 17th article declares, that the goods of an enemy to Great-Britain, found on board any of our vessels, shall be made prize of.

This, it is admitted, is agreeable to the common law of nations, as that law formerly stood; for Vatel says, page 507, that "effects, belonging to an enemy, found on board a neu [...] ship, are seizable by the rights of war; but, by the law of nature, the master is to be paid his freight, and not to suffer by the seizure."

Mr. Jay carefully adhered to the first part of this maxim. It is certainly very favourable to the British. The second part, which respects the payment of the freight, is neglected: it certainly would have been very favourable to the people of the United States.

But, when our worthy president issued his proclamation of neutrality, he predicated it upon the modern law of nations: an adherence to which would have prevented our minister [Page]from entering into a positive stipulation for such an ignominious concession.

The twenty-third article of our treaty with France, the tenth with Holland, the seventh with Sweden, the twelfth with Prussia, and the third with the emperor of Morocco, all respectively stipulate, in the most express terms, that free ships shall make free goods, though these goods should belong to the enemy of either of those nations. Though I am not a merchant, common sense points out to me, on the first blush, the extensive advantages which must have accrued to our carrying-trade, by an adherence to the same plan in our present treaty with Great-Britain. Did the recollection of the innumerable favours which Great-Britain has heaped on us from the nineteenth April, 1775, to the very moment at which he signed the treaty, overwhelm our ambassador with neck-loads of gratitude, that he forgot that this article was diametrically opposite to our stipulation with every other nation with whom we had a treaty?

I do not mean, that our other treaties precluded him from the right of entering into this stipulation. I only wish to show, that, while France and other friendly nations had voluntarily granted to us this inestimable privilege in our very indigent days, our ambassador, though to the highest prejudice of that nation, meanly and cringingly ceded it to Great-Britain, in the height of our prosperity! Or did he imagine it would please his countrymen, to proclaim to the world, that, like true spaniels, they fawned most on those from whom they had the severest whippings?

I feel for the honor of my country, and pray to my God, that, though she is fallen, it may not be for ever.

But perhaps this part of the treaty, as well as several other parts, were entered into for the express purpose of distressing the French nation, and thereby occasioning a rupture between them and us. If this was really mr. Jay's policy, I think it is far from being improbable, that we may soon reap the fruits of his labour, by fully experiencing the good or bad effects thereof.

The eighteenth article, regulating what is in future to be deemed contraband, is so superlatively humiliating and degrading to ourselves; so plainly and unequivocally levelled against the success of our ally, that even Camillus finds himself compelled to make a wayward apology for it.

Poor Camillus, thou wast then driven to thy last shift indeed, and heaven knows that thou art possest of more of them [Page]in the defence of a bad cause, than any man of thy country was ever before.

In this, as in the former article, our extraordinary ambassador has stipulated, that naval stores, &c. shall be deemed contraband, and liable to capture; though it will appear by the twenty-fourth article of our treaty with France, the twenty-fourth with Holland, the tenth with Sweden, the thirteenth with Prussia, and the third with the emperor of Morocco, that we have contracted, that they shall not be contraband. Nay, what as far as is possible, adds to the disgrace of this part of the treaty, even Great-Britain herself, in her commercial treaty, with France, declares that they shall not be contraband.

What opinion our ally will entertain of our friendship for her—what opinion the world at large will entertain of our magnanimity, good faith, and gratitude as a nation, and in what degree of estimation our minister will be held by his fellow citizens at some future period, time only can fully unravel.

If even the extacy of joy, upon being permitted the honor of kissing the queen's hand, was so excessive, as to obliterate from his mind, that cotton was a branch of the produce of his country, it is scarcely possible to suppose, that the pleasure continued so extremely ravishing during the whole negociation, as to make him forget that there were two such states as Virgi [...] and North-Carolina, a great proportion of whose trade, by this shameful concession, he was sacrificing at the shrine of them bitterest enemy.

The twenty-first article defines what piracy is, and determines what the punishment thereof shall be, by saying, "that if any subject or citizen of the said parties respectively, shall accept any foreign commission or letters of marque, for arming any vessel to act as a privateer against the other party, and be taken by the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the said party, to treat and punish the said subject or citizen, having such commission, or letters of marque, as a pirate."

The eighth section of the constitution of the United States, declares, that "congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations."

The curse of oblivion seems to have pervaded our minister's brain in every part of this treaty, which did not embrace some point favourable to the British; for here again, he has forgot that the house of representatives are an absolute (though in his opinion, probably a very trifling) part of congress; and as they were not to be consulted about the propriety or impropriety of [Page]this treaty, he ought to have seen that he was entering into an agreement which the senate could not approve of, nor the president ratify, without a palpable breach of the constitution.

But for argument's sake, I will for a moment suppose it constitutional, and I will likewise acknowledge, that by the twenty-first article of our treaty with France, the nineteenth with Holland, and the twenty-third with Sweden, the same crime was by our then congress (not by a part of it) deemed a piracy; but must, at the same time, insist, that the manner of punishment is described in a very different way. In each of these treaties the words are these, "and if any person of either nation shall take such commissions or letters of marque, he shall be punished at a pirate."

In our treaties with Prussia and the emperor of Morocco, it is stipulated, that "subjects, nor citizens of either party, shall take commissions from any power with whom either of the contracting parties may be at war;" but no punishment whatever is affixed to the breach of that article.

By our treaty, then, on this head, with the first three nations above mentioned, the offender against the article was. I conceive, upon complaint made, or information lodged, to be tried, as the constitution directs, by a jury of his countrymen conspicuous for their moderation, lenity and justice; and, if strong extenuating circumstances appeared in his favour, should even the jury esteem themselves obliged to condemn him, agreeable to the letter of the law, they might, nevertheless, forcibly recommend him to that branch of the government, in whose hands the pleasing power of showing mercy is so wisely placed.

As no punishment is annexed to the crime by our treaty with the other two powers, the offender must have been trie [...] upon common principles.

Mr. Jay has the honour of being the first American minister, who ever had the courage by public act, to declare, in express terms, that his fellow-citizens are liable to be condemned as pirates, by a British court of admiralty, for an act of which the law of nations renders even the criminality doubtful.

What does he really say on this head of the treaty? Exercising his most inventive talents to enrage his fellow-citizens to some improper unconstitutional act, he virtually tells them, I see that you still remain equally attached to, equally enamoured with the principles of liberty, as you did when I was a pacific bellower in that cause, and therefore, that your attachment to the French nation, in her present contest, may lead some [Page]of you to engage as volunteers in her service, depending upon that principle in the laws of nations, declared by Vatel, [...] 594, in the following words, "volunteers taken by the [...] are treated as if part of the army in which they fight." Nothing can be more reasonable. They, in fact, unite themselves this army. They support the same cause, no matter whether it be from obligation or free will.

But, continues Mr. Jay, I will risk deviating materially from the words of every treaty hitherto entered into by the United States, should my act even be an unconstitutional one, and declare that, if fighting in this cause you are taken by the English, it shall be in their power to hang you as pirates.

Gracious God! ye heroes who were the glorious copartne [...] of the brave little French army at the siege of York-Town, and shared with them the honor of fighting, bleeding and conq [...] ing in the cause of freedom! can you believe, that your [...] commander in chief will ever give his sanction to such as all as this? The question, I acknowledge, is unnecessary; for ( [...] few who wish to embroil us with that nation excepted) you [...] universally exclaim—he never—never will do it.

Permit me only to add, that it is an insult even to ask him.

No. II.

I WILL now beg leave to recapitulate the parts of [...] treaty, which I have deemed reproachable: let my ob [...] vations thereon speak for themselves.

1st. The surrender of the posts ought to have been made the basis of the treaty; instead of which they are to be [...] until the first of July, 1796.

2d. The third article, amonst other objections to it, is so worded, as to afford at least strong pretensions for preventing the people of Vermont from any inland trade with Ca [...], further than St. John's at the bottom of the Lake Champla [...].

3d. The ninth article allowing British subjects to hold [...], is not only unconstitutional, but, as by the 26th article, they may, even in case of a war, remain still as British subjects, provided they behave peaceably, we may have within our very, bowels one or two millions of British subjects, whom we cannot, without a breach or saith, expel from this, during the that we are engaged in a war with their country.

4th. The tenth article yields up the only shield of protection [Page]we are possessed of against such a predatory war as Great-Britain has carried on against us for these two years past; while our minister (as shall hereafter be showed) has neglected to stipulate in return for many of these advantages granted to us in our other treaties.

5th. The seventeenth article shamefully surrenders to the wanton plunder of the British robbes, the right of capturing the property of our ally when found in our vessels, though our treaty with every other nation, particularly with that very ally, for the purpose of softening the rigours of war, declares that "free ships shall make free goods."

Surely our minister might at least have permitted this part of the treaty to have stood on the existing principles of the law of nations, without sanctifying a British right in the plunder of our ally's property, and the destruction of almost beneficial part of our own trade.

6th. The eighteenth article, which permits naval stores, &c. to be deemed contraband, though all our other treaties expressly stipulate that they shall NOT be deemed contraband, meets with a much more severe chastisement, than it could possibly receive from any observation of mine, through the pen of the partial, and; probably well-paid Camillus, who admits, "that it is the most indefensible part of the treaty."

7th. The twenty-first article, which substantially delivers to the fangs of a British tyrant to be punished by him as a pirate, every citizen of the United States, whose heart, throbbing for an opportunity of discourting his love of freedom, may lead him to risque his life in the defence of "the rights of man," merits, and must meet with the execration of every man who loves this country, and the rational liberty hitherto enjoyed therein.

Having now pointed out, from the army, a few of the most glaring execptionable features of the treaty, the well known children of our minister, by the actual sin of commission, I will next endeavour to exhibit some of those, which art equally distinguishable, but have arose from the sin of omission.

In the sixth article of the treaty, a circumspect core is taken "that full and complete compensation is to be made, to British merchants, and others his majesty's subjects, who had debts due from citizens of the United States, and who, by the operations of various lawful impediments since the peace, &c. have, not received full and adequate compensation for their losses and damages." But how much greater have the losses and damages been to the United States by the detention of the posts! When we take into view all the consequences of [Page]the Indian war and the loss of the for trade, how are we [...] prized to find, that not a word is lisped about "a frill [...] complete compensation" to be made on that account!

If, agreeable to mr. Jay's opinion, both parties have b [...] the treaty, is it reasonable, or just, that the one should be pa [...]l for the demages arising therefrom, and the other should not I especially as mr. Jefferson has proved the breach did not e [...] mence with us.

Our minister, too, hod forgot to obtain payment for the negroes which Great-Britain promised, in the treaty of po [...]e, should not be "carried away," and yet were carried away [...] the amount of many thousands!

The British Camillus, it is true, endeavours to show, that they ought not to be paid for; but I well remember to [...] seen in the journals of congress, a pointed motion of the American mr. Hamilton's (soon after the peace) remonstration against their being carried away; and most then believe, [...] mr. Hamilton was then a man of equal good sense, and [...] more friendly to the interests of the United States, that [...] mil [...] is now.

As Great-Britain is admitted, by all parties, to be the greatest maritime nation in the world, it must likewise be ad [...] that our minister should have been equally guarded in p [...] ing for us, as far as he possibly could, the same favourable [...] pulations, in case of a rupture with her, or any other power as we have entered into with other nations.

Mr. Jay's friends say, that he is a man of firmness; I [...] sure that, as an ambassador, he has proved himself a cons [...] man; for it will appear, that he has been equally ne [...] in this part of his duty as in others already pointed out.

By the sixth article of our treaty with France, the fifth [...] Holland; the twenty-second with Prussia, and the t [...]ist [...] nato article with Sweden, each of these powers respecti [...] agree, in case of their having a common enemy with us, that they will [...] our vessels, wherever demanded, and defend that in the some manner or they would their own.

Has Great-Britain made any such provision?—No.

By the fourteenth article of our treaty with France, [...] belonging to us, loaded on board their enemy's vessels, at [...] time previous to two months after the declaration of war, [...] when by them, shall be restored to us; and by the fifth article [...] our treaty with Holland, and the fourteenth with Swe [...] our goods taken by them in the same situation, shall be refuted, provided they were loaded at any time previous to six months after the declaration of war, and the owner of the [Page]goods did not know of the war being declared. Has Great-Britain made any such promise?—No.

The twenty-fourth article of our treaty with Prussia makes provision for the kind and hospitable treatment of prisoners, in a manner which does honor to human nature, and stands as an eulogium on that philanthropy of disposition, which has so conspicuously shined in all the acts of a Franklin and a Jefferson.

Is there any such stipulation with Great-Britain?—No.

Was it necessary?

Let the history of the sugar-house at New-York and Jersey prison ship, during the last war, determine this question.

I will at the same time confess, that if mr. Jay is equally careful of the person of the present governor of this state, [New-York] as he was of his own at the time Esopus was burnt, by the marauding army of his favourite nation, there is no risk that his excellency will suffer from this neglect, as he will not become a prisoner till the British reach the mountains of Kent. A desire to obey his excellency's orders will produce an explanation of this, whenever he is pleased to require it.

I am aware, that it will be observed, that as there were two parties to the treaty, it was impossible for mr. Jay to obtain all he wished—Granted—But, does it follow from thence, that in the humiliating manner he has done, we were to yield up to the ambitious and supercilious arrogance of the other party, whatever she, in the agonizing frenzy of departing greatness, might think proper to require.

What opinion must the other nations entertain of either our honor or independence, whose treaties with us are demonstrated to be so much more in our favor, than the one mr. Jay has thought proper to submit to?

We boast of our increase in wealth, in numbers, in respectability as a nation, all arising from the good management of the political machine, by those who have the present direction thereof: and yet this treaty must give the lie direct to that assertion in the opinion of every man, not intimately acquainted with our true situation; because it abjectly crouches beneath the galling yoke of Great-Britain, and servilely grants to her what no other nation, in the hour of our greatest distress, before we had even thrown off our swaddling bands, ever attempted to demand of us.

I will quit this first part of my promise, and proceed to my second, by showing some reasons, why the people in Vermont, as well as in other parts of this extended country, will pursue [Page]every legal method in their power, to prevent its becoming the supreme law of the land.

It is well known, that there has been, for many [...] throughout the yeomanry of this country, a settled spirit of enmity against the British government, arising, amongst other causes, from the remembrance of their savage and active cruelties, during the last war, the hatred displayed to us during the peace, and their unparalleled depredations on our trade, since the commencement of their war with France.

And as this treaty entitles the people of that nation to rights and liberties within each state, which cannot be constitutionally granted but by the state itself; that part of the yeomanry who wish not to see the constitution infringed on, or the power of their respective states fritter'd down to that of small [...] porations, will universally oppose it.

It is intended to disunite us from our ally, to whom [...] yeomanry of this country get every day more and more [...] tached; and they will therefore oppose it.

It subjects them to unconstitutioal punishment, for esp [...] ing the cause of freedom, by granting their assistance to [...] very ally; and they will therefore oppose it.

It was formed in contradiction to the expressed wishes of their immediate representatives in congress; and they will therefore oppose it.

They will reflect, that the British West-Indies are dependa [...] on us for their very existence, as is fully demonstrated by the [...] quent petitions of their inhabitants to the British parliament. That we consume upwards of two-fifths of all the ma [...]factures exported from Great-Britain—that the balance of [...] with us is about twelve millions of dollars yearly in her favour. That had she compelled us to war, our privateers would [...] distressed her trade in a degree exceeding the bounds of [...] lation; of which opinion, the number of British prizes brought into our ports last war, affords undeniable proof—and that is a very short time she must have lost all her possessions on the continent of North-America—That, under these considerations a wise, a firm, an honest minister could not have failed it procuring us terms at least reciprocally beneficial. And therefore, they will oppose this heterogenous treaty, begot in the dark; and ushered forth to public view, against the exp [...] will of its legitimate parents, who, conscious of its deformity, wished to conceal it from the penetrating eye of their countrymen as long as possible.

But it will be objected, that twenty senators having gives [Page]their sanction to its adoption, is prima facie evidence that it must be a most excellent treaty—Granted.

And it will be answered, that ten senators being warmly opposed to it, and every tory in the country extolling it as the greatest proof that heaven ever furnished, of its watchful attention over the honor, liberty, peace, prosperity, welfare, and independence of the United States, is likewise prima facie evidence that it is a most d—n—able treaty. And the sensible yeomanry of this country, after subtracting the one evidence from the other, and finding the balance greatly against the treaty, will therefore more firmly oppose it.

Many other arguments might be produced; but I shall stop here, and assign some additional reasons, why I am of opinion, that the yeomanry of Vermont will, in a particular manner, oppose it.

Their connection with Canada has given them frequent opportunities of viewing the supercilious, haughty deportment of many of the British officers, to whom the etiquette of that government led them to make application; and they have observed their deep-rooted contempt of republicanism and republican manners. They will, therefore, oppose an intimacy of national connection.

That state has been superior to most, and inferior to none, in point of federalism; and they will, therefore, be delicately careful in preventing their darling constitution from being, in the smallest degree, impaired or infringed on.

The citizens of that state, even their professional men of all descriptions, are (speaking generally) warm admirers of the French cause, though they do not attempt to justify all their actions: and as many of the leading features of this treaty have a strong tendency to distress that cause, they will oppose it with an energy, proportionate to their love of rational liberty, and of the rights of man.

But taking for granted, what the editor of the Minerva asserts, that the unknown letter-writer in Vermont, is, "A gentleman of character and information," I will oppose his sentiments by those of another citizen of that state, known by his writings and his pleadings to be really "a gentleman of character and information."—I mean judge Chipman, who, in the year 1793, previous to this bustle about French and English politics, wrote "sketches on the principles of government," in which he exhibits maxims, perfectly consonant with those maintained by the present opposers to the treaty, and equally repugnant to those displayed by the learned [Page]letter writer, whose principal aim, as far as he chooses [...] explain himself, appears to be a strong desire of proving, [...] it is improper for the people to investigate the treaty, but to trust to the well-known abilities and integrity of the constituted authorities—and in attempting this, his language is extremely indecorous, and even indecent; indeed, he seem [...] to have borrowed much of his stile from the editor of the Minerva.

The letter-writer says, in great heat, "we are apprehensive that some of the large cities will endeavour to set their mobs in motion, with a view to dictate to the president and senate. Be assured we will reject the federal government, before we will be governed in the country by the mobs of Philadelphia, New-York, or [...]ston."

And does it comport with thy opinion of the people of these cities, mr. letter writer, that they cannot meet quietly and form resolutions on a subject, not only of the utmost importance to themselves, but their posterity, without becoming rioters? Has your vanity, on being permitted to correspond with the editor of the Minerva, so misled your understanding, as to make you suppose the citizens of Vermont could be so far duped as to believe, that a riotous mob, and a Boston to [...] meeting, were synonimous terms?

Are you so extremely credulous, my little lord pomposity, [...] to imagine, that this, thy pigmy threat, "of separation from the federal government," will intimidate the freemen of Vermont, from searching into the cause of the present agitation of the public mind, which has taken place from the one end of this extensive continent to the other, or that it will deter them from giving their opinion thereon, in a firm, manly and decent manner?

Or do you believe, my little disappointed snipper-snapper, that the additional yelping of a half a dozen more such whi [...] as thyself, would meet the same attention and respect, as the solid, serious and patriotic advice given by your fellow-citizen, the judge?

Let us see then what he says:—

In page 77, he observes, "that when we find an infringement on the liberties of the people, admitted in the administration, we ought not to excuse ourselves from searching the cause."

The same worthy patriot, in showing the advantages which arise from the dissemination of useful knowledge, in page 152, makes use of this remarkable expression: "let there be no restraint on the liberty of the press, no check upon PUBLIC [Page] or private discussion, but what is imposed by the manners, morals, taste, and good sense of the age."

These two are the express sentiments of those who oppose the treaty;—but, possibly, my little wild politician, you will insist that the judge meant to confine "public discussion" to the country only; and yet I suspect, that it would bring a blush even into thy face, to be called on for a good argument to show cause why the citizens of great mercantile cities should be prevented from "discussing publicly," an instrument, christened under the title of treaty of commerce and navigation.

Our letter writer is for trusting every thing to the constituted authorities.

The worthy judge on the other hand, in page 159, makes an observation which we can have no reason to doubt is strongly impressed on the president's mind, in the present business—"In the making of laws, a great regard must be had to the circumstances, manners, and sentiments of the people, as well as to the principles of the constitution—the laws must be the best which the people can bear."

To suppose, therefore, after admitting this principle, that the president would ratify the present treaty, in contradiction to the sentiments of so respectable and so decided a majority of the people, is supposing that he would gratify his own inclination, at the hazard of commotions, which would not only be extremely dangerous to the community, but would probably be attended with his own political destruction. And, how could the president have known, that the people were so universally opposed to this treaty, provided, as our letter writer seems to wish, they had been perfectly silent on the subject.

Was this treaty to be ratified, I am well convinced that the citizens of Vermont would almost universally oppose it, from a hearty concurrence with their worthy judge, in the following sentiment, for they cannot be ignorant, that this treaty is in direct opposition to the expressed will of the house of representatives, who wished to obtain justice from Great-Britain, not by the fawning slattery and cringing submission of a groveling, prostituted mind, but by that calm, deliberate, but stern firmness, in support of our natural rights, necessary for maintaining that respect and attention which our situation, our growing greatness, and the extensive advantages of our trade and commerce gave us a right to claim from the nations of the world. Was, then, the president to give his sanction to this treaty, we should have the senate in favour of, and the house [Page]of representatives, our best guardians, opposed to, the instrument, which (if it is not unconstitutional) would become the supreme law of the land.

The citizens of Vermont, in that case, would draw many of their arguments from the pure republican fountain which the judge has laid open to them, in page 140, where he says, "Public discussion, and mature deliberation, in the making of laws, are indispensibly necessary.—The senate and house of representatives should have equal powers. No law should [...] without the concurrence of both."

Are we to suppose, then, that the president will join the senate in sanctioning a law, supposing it even constitutional, which he knows to be repugnant to the wishes of the house of representatives, and nine-tenths of the people? Cursed be he who entertains such an opinion of him. Such an act would not be an error, it would be a crime.

I may, however, be possibly asked—Should the president think himself justifiable in ratifying the treaty, ought not the people to rest contented, and view it as the supreme law of the land? I hesitate not to answer, They ought not.

It will then be their duty to convoke town-meetings, and petition their immediate representatives in congress to declare, whether the privileges of that house have not been gros [...]ly infringed on? Whether, in certain parts of that treaty, the senate have not exceeded their constitutional powers?

For I perfectly agree with the learned judge, whom I have so often quoted, in his opinion, page 117, "That the government, that is, those organized bodies who are entrusted with the powers of government, are bound by the constitution, but have no power in themselves, to make, alter or controul any of its laws."

And it appears to me very clear, that the power granted to the president, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senate present, to make treaties, could never, by the framers of the constitution, have been intended to controul those important and extensive rights, entrusted to congress at large, in two precedent clauses of that same constitution, viz. "The powers of regulating commerce with foreign [...] tions," and "of defining and punishing piracies," which powers are granted in the most express terms, and not, therefore, to yield to mere implication, especially when the admission of that implication would be contradictory to the gen [...] of the whole constitution.

Is it possible to suppose, that it was intended to authorize eleven members of the senate, with the president, legally to regulate [Page]the commerce of such an extensive mereantile country as this, and that their regulation was to be binding on the people, without a possibility of constitutional redress, however disagreeable it might be to them, to the majority of the senate, and to the whole house of representatives? And yet this might happen, if the power of making treaties embraces all the objects our present treaty makers wish. For the power is granted to the president, and two-thirds of the senators present. As the senate consists of only thirty members, and as it is provided by the constitution, that a majority of them shall form a quorum, it is in the power of sixteen members to conclude a treaty; and as eleven members make more than two-thirds of those sixteen, they, with the president, would fully be empowered, by the constitution, to have formed the present pending treaty, momentous as it is, in contradiction to the wishes, informally declared, though in the most decided terms, of nineteen senators, the whole house of representatives, and the whole of the people.

I again ask, is it possible our constitution could have intended to clothe any twelve men with such immense, such uncontroulable, such irrevocable powers?

But I hear some people say—Should the president ratify this treaty, and should the house of representatives, regardless of the petition of the people, permit it to rest on its present footing, unnoticed by them, what are the people to do in that case?

It must be acknowledged, that, in such a case, we should be placed, not only in a difficult, but a very dismal situation: It would be the crisis for determining, whether the term, majesty of the people, was, like the children's rattle, used merely to keep them from murmuring and complaining; or whether, in this land of liberty, it had an absolute and real existence, calculated for much more important purposes.

But it is improper even to suppose, what there is so little probability of ever experiencing; for I again repeat, that the president never will give his sanction to an irrevocable act, which he has the most convincing proofs of the great body of his fellow citizens viewing with hatred, horror, and contempt.

I shall conclude with calling heaven to witness, that no man more fervently wishes than I do, to see the citizens of the United States unanimous in their obedience to the laws of the land, as long as those laws are founded on the immutable principles of justice, good saith, and national honor.

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American Appeals.
The following important case of the Brigantine [...] Betsey, W. Furlong, master, was heard and determined in London, by the lords commissioners of appeals, on the twenty-fifth July, 1795.

FROM the ship's papers and depositions of the captain and crew, produced in evidence on this cause, it appears that the brigantine Betsey, belonging wholly to mr. George Patterson, of Baltimore, cleared out from that port on the nineteenth December, 1793, for the island of St. Bartholomew's and a market. That inquest of a market she went directly to Guadaloupe, where she arrived on the eighth of January following. Here she discharged her cargo of provisions, and took in one of West-India produce. With this cargo she was proceeding to Baltimore, when she was met, and captured by the privateer sloop of war, Agenoria, Willis Morgan, commander and taken into Bermuda.

Her cargo consisted of sugar, coffee, and other goods, belonging, in certain specified proportions, to the captain William Furlong, and to messrs. George and William Patterson.

On the fourth of April, 1794, proceedings on behalf of the captors were commenced. On the twenty-third of April following, the vessel was claimed by captain Furlong, on behalf of mr. George Patterson, and the cargo on behalf of himself, a citizen of the United States, and of messrs. George and William Patterson, both also lawful citizens of the United States, and who had been for many years before resident in Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, where their families and houses of trade were. Mr. George Patterson has been alleged to be a native of Ireland—there is some doubt as to this fact—it is not contended, however, but that he was actually a citizen of the United States. It appears that he went over to Guadaloupe for a special purpose, as the agent of his brother, and not with the view of residing there—on the contrary, that [...] proposed returning without delay to Baltimore, as his place of residence.

On the twenty-first of May, 1794, the cause was brought on for a hearing, before John Green, esq judge of the vice admiralty court of Bermuda; and on the twenty-third of said month, the vessel with her "boat, tackle, apparel and furniture, and all and singular her cargo and lading, were adjudged and condemned as lawful prize to the captors by the said judge: [Page]and the claimant, captain Furlong, ordered and directed to pay the taxed costs of suit."

The true ground of judge Green's decree appears to have been, according to his own words, because "she had come immediately from a French port, declared by authority to have been blockaded by his Britannic majesty's fleets and armies." It seems the "authority" that "declared" the French islands in a state of blockade, was admiral sir J. Jervis; and the evidence of this act before the court was a copy of a letter from this officer, to Thomas Griffith, esq of Barbadoes, of which the following is an exact transcript:

Boyne, in Fort-Royal Bay, Martinico, 18th March, 1794

SIR,

THE several French West-India islands and to be considered as under blockade from the arrival of the armament at Barbadoes, the sixth of January: therefore all neutral vessels, trading with these islands within that period, are clearly intended to come within the king's order in council, dated the sixth November, 1793.

I am, Sir, Your humble servant, J. JERVIS.

Thomas Griffith, esq.

THE vessel and cargo condemned, on the twenty-third of April, were delivered to the captors by order of the judge, at an appraisement of four thousand six hundred and ninety-eight pounds, six shillings and seven-pence, Bermuda currency; which is stated to have been far below the actual value of the said vessel and cargo.

An appeal was immediately entered from this sentence, and the claimants prayed the restitution of their property, for the following reason, assigned by their counsel, sir William and sir John Scott.

"Because the ship and cargo were clearly and indubitably the property of American subjects, engaged in a fair and licit trade."

On the part of the captors, the reasons assigned by their counsel, mr. Erskine and dr. Nicholle, for the affirmance of the [Page]sentence passed by the judge of the vice-admiralty court, [...] Bermuda, were as follows:

"Because the proprietors of ship and cargo are natural or British subjects, supplying the enemy with provisions.

"Because the vessel, under a pretended destination [...] neutral port, had gone directly to an enemy's port, then is a state of blockade, and was returning from thence at the time of the capture, with a cargo the produce of such blockaded port which she had taken in barter for the cargo of provisions [...]e had carried thither.

"Because the sole owner of the ship and cargo, was at the time of the capture, an inhabitant of the enemy's territory."

On Saturday, the twenty-fifth of July last, the lords commissioners of appeals, heard counsel in behalf of the appellant and respondent.

Sir William Scott, on the part of the claimant and apellant stated, that American ships in the time of peace, wer [...] the constant practice of carrying flour and provisions to [...] French West-India islands. It is true, that an order of co [...] was made on the sixth of November, 1793, and an instruction on it, directing all ships carrying supplies to, or bringing [...] duce from the French West-Indian islands, to be brought i [...] adjudication. But this order was never considered to extend [...] a condemnation, and it was revoked, and another instruction issued on the eighth of January, 1794.

Sir William Scott here referred to the cases of the Fair Lady, the Hetty, the Liberty, and the Essex, as tending to e [...] blish the free trade of the Americans to the French West-India islands.

Lord Manefield expressed [...] doubts as to this broad affection of sir William Scott. And.

Sir W. Wyn [...] called the attention of the board, to the [...] clamation made by general Rochambeau, the government Martimique, that he should, under the circumstances [...] island, permit the importation of provisions for a limited [...] but otherwise would adhere to the French colonial laws.

Mr. Erskime, the respondent's counsel, agreed to argue [...] case on its particular circumstances.

Sir W. Scott in continuation contended, that as to [...] blockade, the British arms had not invested the island, [...] way to show their intention to make it the primary object [...] their attack, at the time of the capture of this vessel.

Sir John Jervis's letter, introduced into the cause, furnish no sufficient suggestion to induce the court to concede the [...] sertion peated of blockade to be well founded.

[Page] As to mr. George Patterson, the owner of the ship, and [...] a moiety of the cargo, it is contended that he is a native of Ireland, and the doctrine of inalienable allegiance, as it formerly stood, is set up as a bar to his claim.

The independence of the American states has done away that doctrine, as to all persons settled there at the time of such independence; and the great number of persons who have emigrated to America since the independence, will require a most serious consideration before the doctrine will be applied to them.

Lord president Mansfield asked sir William Scott, if he meant to contend that an Englishman could get rid of his allegiance by going to America more than he could by going to Russia, or any other country in Europe?

Sir William Scott declined the enquiry, but repeated his affection that the magnitude of the question from the number of persons gone to America from this country, would requi [...] the most serious deliberation of this board, before the doctrine [...]ded to, was enforced to their prejudice.

The master of the rolls observed, that the question would probably require some understanding between the two countries.

Sir William Scott proceeded; he remarked, that as to are George Patterson's birth and residence, the third witness contradicts the other two, and says, he believes mr. Patterson was born in America; so that the fact is not proved; and as to his residence, he appears to have gone to Guadaloupe on the present occasion only, and to have had no residence there; and as to the clearing out for St. Bartholomew, upon which much stress is laid, the fact is, the ship was cleared out for that island, (which is Danish) and for a market.

Mr. Erskine in reply, declared he was more convinced than our that he was founded in asking for confirmation of the sentence of condemnation, as it is evident that the urgent, want of provisions was the sole inducement to let the ship take back the cargo of sugar and coffee, without which she could only have taken melasses.

He contended that the voyage may strictly be considered as masked, the island of St. Bartholomew being a kind of emporium, and the words "for a market," a mere cover; and as to the seizure of the cargo by the French, it is evident that the owner was so well reconciled as to talk of sending a further cargo. He did not ask for condemnation on the letter of sir John Jervis; he admitted the assertion of sir William Scott, as [Page]to its want of logical accuracy. Self-preservation, however, was essential, and as much a principle with nations as with individuals, and the political existence of this country justified his expectation of condemnation.

Martinique was then reduced; and mr. Patterson must have known it, and been well assured that Guadaloupe was an immediate object of the British arms.

America, he contended, was entitled to no more and no less than other nations; and he had no doubt but that if mr. Patterson should, on further enquiry (if it should be thought necessary to make it) appear to be a British subject by birth, his property would be liable to condemnation.

The counsel having closed their arguments, the lords, viz. the earl of Mansfield, lord president of the council; sir R. P. Arden, knight, master of the rolls; sir W. Wynne, knight; Silvester Douglas, esq took the same into consideration, and made and declared their decree in the following words:

§

The lords having heard the proofs read, and advocates and proctors on both sides, under all the special circumstances of the case, by their interlocutory decree, pronounced against the appeal, affirmed the sentence appealed from, and remitted the cause.

(Signed) ARDEN, Register of his majesty's high court of appeals for prizes.

From the above statement and decision, it appears that the prospect of an indemnification by appeal, is delusive. The circumstances attending this capture, are as favourable as any that can be brought before "his majesty's high court of appeal for prizes." To look for indemnification from this quarter, is nothing more not less, than exposing ourselves to have insult added to outrage.

At this early period of the business, we find the operation of the treaty. The property of the American merchant is become the mere sport of the lords of the admiralty. If this is the effect in this instance even before the complete ratification of the treaty, what may we not expect when it become in full force? Does this decision express the temper and feelings of the citizens of the United States, which mr. Jay was expressly commissioned to represent? Are those captures the amount of claims to be set off against the "legal impeci [...]s" [Page]of the British? If they are, what balance will be on the side of the Americans? Not a shilling—but the amount of millions will become a clear debt against the United Staten. Thus, by mr. Jay's treaty, we have submitted our claims to the decision of the lords of the admiralty, who, no doubt, will decide in every case as they have in the preceding; while the claims of the British are admitted to be settled by commissioners, who, no doubt. will draw an immense balance in favor of the English. Who then is to discharge this debt? The American citizens. The merchant who has already lost his property must be further taxed to pay British subjects. The farmer who has had nothing to do in contracting it, must be called on by a land tax. The fact is, we had better have waved our claims for indemnification, and quietly, passively, and submissively, like good subjects of Britain, have acquieseed in their depredations. By mr. Jay's negociation, we not only lose our property by Bermudian piracy, but have brought on ourselves British claims—which were never contemplated by the ministry, till they found that mr. Jay was disposed to admit them.

The insults offered to this country, are without parallel. We must be held in abhorrence by all European nations, and despised for our pusillanimity even by the British themselves. Our friends in England pity us, and our enemies laugh at us. The former pity us, that we have not maintained our national character, by those weapons of commerce and sequestration, which we so fully possess, and which would have made Britain more cautions in her conduct towards us. The latter laugh at us, that we have so soon become the dupes of the British nation by negociation. God only knows what will be the event; but this is certain, that the strides of Britain to again possess themselves of this country, are too alarming not to awaken the fears of every patriot. Their connections in America, the residents already among us, and those we may expect within a few years, it is to be [...]red will become too strong a phalanx to be baffled by the exertions of the honest yeomanry of the United States. The freedom, sovereignty and independence of our country are prostrated to Britain. Not a trait of them remains, and the fourth of July (unless prevented by the vigilance of the citizens) will be obliterated as a day of festival, in America. [Baltimore Telegraphe.]

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Observations on the fourteenth article of mr. Jay's Treaty.

BY the fourteenth article of the treaty concluded between our government and that of Great-Britain, the subject of the king of Great-Britain may be brought to America when they are sucking babies, and remain in the country till they are grey-headed, and still be British subjects; as it is being born in the king's dominion, which constitutes them British subjects, and that they cannot alienate their allegiance, is a point fully established in the twenty-first article of the treaty, where it is agreed, "That if any subject or citizen of the said parties respectively, shall accept any commission, or letters of marque, for arming any vessel to act as a privateer against the other party, and be taken by the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the said party, to treat and punish the said subject, or citizen, having such commission, or letter of marque, as a pirate." By the principle lately established, those who are born in the dominions of the king [...] Great-Britain, and those born within the limits of the United States, cannot alienate their allegiance. For if a man born in the United States, may go to France, alienate his allgiance, become a French citizen, engage in their navy, and he taken by the English, by what law of nature or nations, does our executive pronounce it lawful to treat and pubish a French citizen as a pirate? If it be acknowledgd, that the intention of the framers of the treaty, was to prevent the citizens of the United States form entering into the service of foreigner, would it not have been sufficient to habe declared them alien, as they expatriated themselves by their own volutary act? but if they are still to be deemed American citizens, it only remain to enquire by what constitutional or legal authority did the a [...] thors of the late treaty, presume to pass sentence upon, and give up an American citizen to foreigners, to suffer an ignontinious death by their hands; when it is declared, in the seventh article of the amendments to the federal constution, "That no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger. Nor shall be compelled in any crimaind case to be a [Page]witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, &c."

Article eighth. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of council for his defence."

There ar [...] clear and pointed stipulations, in favour of the constitutional privileges of every American citizen, of which they cannot be divested, even by an act of congress, who alone have the exclusive authority to desine and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations; see the eighth section of the first article of the constitution.

This being a fair state of facts, it only remains to enquire, First, Whether congress have ever presumed to make a law to sentence an American citizen to suffer death as a pirate for attempting to alienate his allegiance by entering into the service, of another nation, and acting against any other foreign nation, being enemies of the nation of which he became a member? Secondly, If congress have never make such a law, and it be granted that those which affect the life of a citizen, are the most important and solemn parts of legislation—can it be rationally supposed, that the senate and executive of the United States, can have a right to legislate, in this most important case, paramount to the whole legislative body? Thirdly, Has it ever been constituted felony, by the law of nations, for a subject or citizen, to emigrate in time of peace, to another country, swear allegiance to such state, and become a subject or citizen, provided the person so emigrating, never acts inimically against his parent state? Fourthly, When the doctrine of inalienable allegiance, as agreed upon in the late treaty, comes to be fairly established, and acted upon, will not many thousands who migrated to the United States from Great-Britan since our treaty of peace, who have been naturalized, and taken the oath of allegiance, be disfranchised? For if their first allegiance be indissoluble, the last of course must be nagatory; as they cannot be bona fide British subjects, and American citizens at the same time. So that messrs George and William Patterson, of Baltimore, in Maryland, may yet fall into the hands of the incensed Briton, and be tried, convicted, and executed [Page]for high treason; for that they, the said George and William, being both British subjects by birth, and not having the fear of God before their eyes, had attempted to alienate their allegiance, by emigrating to Maryland, in the United States of America, and then and there, did feloniously, with malice aforethought, [...]aid and abet the enemies of their most gracious lawful sovereign, by furnishing them with provisions, notwithstanding all the French West-India island were under sentence of starvation, and were closely blockaded, by a proclamation of sir John Jervis, for more than two months before said proclamation was issued, and while he was yet a great distance from them; so that his majesty's British American subjects, might have timely notice of his gracious intention towards the inhabitants of the French West-India islands, and not involve themselves in the crime of high treason, by seeding those whom his most humane and gracious majesty intended to starve.

A. Z.

N. B. The proclamation was issued on the eighth of March, and the farcical paper blockade, commenced on the 6th of January preceding.

FROM THE ARGUS. Camillus refuted by Alexander Hamilton.

CAMILLUS.

"IT is true, as suggested, that our government has constantly charged as breaches of the treaty by Great-Britain, the two particulars that have been stated; but it is believed to be not true, that it has uniformly charged them as first breaches of the treaty—individuals may have entertained this idea— the state of Virginia seems to have proceeded upon it, in some public acts; but, as far as it is recollected, that ground was never formally or explicitly taken by the government of the United States, till in the abovementioned letter from mr. Jefferson to mr. Hammond, when for the first time an attempt was made to vindicate or excuse the whole conduct of this country [Page]in regard to the treaty of peace, contrary, I will venture to say, to the general sense of well informed men."

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
In Congress, Monday, May 26, 1783. On motion of mr. Hamilton, seconded by mr Izard.

Whereas, by the articles agreed upon on the 30th of November last, by and between the commissioners of the United States of America for making peace, and commissioners on the part of his Britannic majesty, it is stipulated, that his Britannic majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes, or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets, from the said United States, and from every port, place, and harbour within the same:—and whereas, a considerable number of negroes belonging to citizens of these states have been carried off therefrom, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the said articles:

Resolved, that the copies of the letters between the commander in chief, sir Guy Carleton, and other papers on this subject, be transmitted to the ministers plenipotentiary of these states for negociating peace in Europe; and that they be directed to remonstrate thereon to the court of Great-Britain, and take proper measures for obtaining such reparation, as the nature of the case will admit.

Ordered, that a copy of the foregoing resolve be transmitted to the commander in chief; and that he be directed to continue his remonstrances to sir Guy Carleton, respecting the permitting negroes belonging to the citizens of these states to leave New-York, and to insist on the discontinuance of that measure.

Remarks on the above.

If, then, congress, as early as May 1783, complained of this infraction, they must have regarded it as the first breach; for Great-Britain had not yet had time to hear of what was passing in this country on the subject of the treaty, much less [Page]to complain of any violation on our part. It will be recollected, that the treaty had been received by congress early is the preceding month.

By this resolve, it also appears, that colonel Hamilton thought the treaty binding from the signature of the provis [...] articles; but Camillus contends, that it was not so until the exchange of the ratification of the definitive articles which took place more than one year later.

Nor is this the only instance in which our government formally and expi [...]tly took this ground, although one would be led to con [...]inde from Camillus, that to mr. Jefferson alone belonged the credit of discovering it.

On the 11th April, 1783, congress agreed to a proclamation, declaring a cestation of ho [...]es; and only four days after,

Resolved, that the commander in chief be instructed to make the proper arrangements with the commander in chief of the British forces, for receiving possession of the posts is the United States occupied by the troops of his Britannic majesty, and for obtaining the delivery of all negroes and other property of the inhabitants of the United States in possession of the British forces, or any subject of, or adherent to his said Britannic majesty.

Again, on the 9th August, 1786, congress resolved, that the secretary for foreign affairs cause to be made out separate lists of the numbers, names, and owners of the negroes belonging to the citizens of each state, and carried away by the British, in contravention of the treaty, and that he transmit the said lists to the executives of the states to which they respectively belong.

Will not Camillus have the candour, after these concurring proofs, to retra [...]so much of his assertion as is opposed to them Such conduct is the only amends he can make for the misapprehension he has excited on a subject which may still prove of great importance to America, the negociations between her and Great-Britain not being yet finished.

The above resolves, and particularly the first, prove unequivocally, that col. It. cannot be the author of Camillus, an imputation which his enemies are indefatigable in fixing on him—No man who knows that gentleman can believe, that he should so soon forget an act of which he himself was the mover, and to which, as a public character, he must frequently have recurred. This is not the only instance in which the opp [...]nents of the treaty have attempted to asperse his character.

PHILO-CINNA.

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ADDRESS Of the Citizens of Charlestown to the President.
To GEORGE WASHINGTON, President of the United-States.

Commowealth of Massachusetts. Charlestown (near Boston) July 22, 1795.

SIR,

THE treaty now pending between the United States of America and Great-Britain, having much engaged the attention of this part of the country; the inhabitants of this town have been led legally to convene in their corporate capacity, agreeable to the constitution of the commonwealth, for the purpose of taking the same into consideration—and have

Voted, That this town do disapprove of the treaty now pending between the United States, and Great-Britain, as it has been read.

Voted, That this town do disapprove of the treaty as modified by the senate of the United States.

Voted, That the selectmen be requested to transmit the doings of this meeting to the president of the United States.

In compliance with the last mentioned vote, we have the honor to transmit said votes, and to submit them to your consideration; fully persuaded, that every sentiment of your heart, with every action of your life, are directed toward the public good. We are,

With the profoundest esteem and respect, &c.

Signed by the respectable the selectmen [...] Charlestown.

PRESIDENT's ANSWER.
To Richard Devens, David Gordwin, Joseph Adams, Richard Frothingham. John Carter, and Eliphalet Newell, Selectmen of Charlestown.

GENTLEMEN,

I Received your letter of the 22d of July, containing the votes of the inhabitants of the town of Charlestown, who were convened to take into consideration the treaty pending between the United States and Great-Britain.

My assent to the treaty, as advised and consented to by the [Page]senate, and the principles which governed my determination, are now publicly known. In this, as in every other exercise of the powers committed to me by the constitution, I have aimed to promote the public good, and to merit those sentiments of personal confidence which are expressed in your communication.

With due respect, I am, gentlemen, your obedient, G. WASHINGTON.

United States, August 31st, 1795.

PROCEEDINGS Of the Citizens of Frederic Conniy, Virginia.

At a numerous and respectable meeting of the citizens [...] Frederic county, held agreeably to notice given in the publi [...] papers, at the court-house of said county, on Tuesday, the 1st of December, 1795.

General Daniel Morgan being appointed chairman, and having taken his seat, the citizens present, with one dissenting voice only, after mature deliberation, and hearing the subject fully discussed; came to the following resolutions, to wit:

1st. Resolved, that the conduct of the president of the United States, in ratifying, agreeably to the advice of two thirds of the senate of the United States, the treaty of amity commerce, and navigation, between the United States of America and Great-Britain, negociated by John Jay, esq is entitled to, and meets with, the entire approbation of this meeting.

2d. Resolved, that Daniel Morgan, Charles Minn Thruster, Robert White, jun. Charles Magill and Joseph Caldwell, be [...] appointed a committee, for the purpose of transmitting to the president the sentiments and proceedings of this meeting.

(Signed.) DANIEL MORGAN, Chairman.

Notes

*

FROM THE MINERVA.

The following is an authentic extract of a letter from a gentleman of character and information in Vermont; for the truth of which we pledge ourselves. It comes from a man of seventy-six, and is dated July 18. 1795.

"The treaty of peace has now become a general subject of conversation, but is not as yet enough known to form the public mind. It is impossible for the madmen in politics to communicate their madness to the substantial and numerous body of country farmers. They do not reverence the customs, manners, or violent party, inflammatory writings of your zealous political [...] natics. And while those kind of writers please themselves with the conceit that they are enlightening the age and the world, they have no idea in what contempt their productions are viewed in the country. In sentiment and information, they are below the understanding of every country farmer; and the declamatory, violent stile sinks them still lower, in rural estimation. We are apprehensive that some of the large cities will endeavour to set their mo [...] in motion, with a view to dictate to the president and senate. Be assured we will reject the federal union, before we will be governed in the country, by the mobs of Philadelphia, New-York, or Boston. Moderation, in such a case, would be an error;—and the moment your mobs are set agoing, you establish a distinction between town and country, which you will not easily get rid of. The greatest and worst of all political events that the country would suffer, would be to have the government of it, under the direction of such tumultuous, outrageous, lawless assemblies.

"The above is to carry to you some idea of the horror we entertain of a mob-government. Be so good as to remember the articles of business."

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

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[No. XI.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME III.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—DECEMBER 28, 1795.—

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CONTENTS.

1. ATTICUS, No. VIII. Page 147

2.—No. IX. Page 150

3. Camillus, No. XXVI. Page 153

4.—No. XXVII. Page 162

5.—No. XXVIII. Page 170

6.—No. XXIX. Page 180

7.—No. XXX. Page 188

8.—No. XXXI. Page 195

9.—No. XXXII. Page 204

10.—No. XXXIII. Page 211

American Remembrancer, &c.

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ATTICUS—No. VIII.
[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 72.] To the Freemen of the United States.

Fellow Citizens,

IT was my intention when I began these letters, to consider the treaty in all its relations; but as the merchants and traders of Philadelphia, and the chambers of commerce of New York and Boston have held up the idea of unimportance to our commerce, have deemed it a thing unworthy the attention of any other people than merchants, and not worth the risk of displeasing Great Britain, I will not differ with them, more especially as the president has given them an exclusive privilege to think on this subject; but I will proceed to examine the constitutional and political features of this monster of "horrid mien, that to be hated needs but to be seen." Not being in the habit of weighing my rights and my happiness in a gold scales, I can the more readily dismiss the commercial consideration of the treaty; and as a few merchants and traders have insolently and presumptuously monopolized the right to judge of things relating to commerce, they certainly will not deny others the exclusive privilege of deciding upon the constitutional and political parts, of which they seem to be wholly ignorant. This is a quid pro quo, and has more reciprocity in it than the wifest and most profound of the addressers can point out in the treaty.

The unconstitutional origin of the treaty, has been already shown in the "letters of Franklin," to which I take the liberty to refer you, my fellow citizens, while I proceed to show the unconstitutionality of the instrument itself. The treaty has established a rule of naturalization, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the western posts, by which British subjects can become American citizens within any term of one year. The constitution expressly declares, that congress shall have power " [...] establish an uniform rule of naturalization, throughout the United States." Here then the president and senate have not only usurped the power of congress, to establish a rule of naturalization, but they have been guilty of a two-fold breach of the constitution, by making that rule not "uniform." During the last session of the federal legislature, an uniform law of naturalization [Page]was passed, by which a five years residence is made necessary to obtain citizenship; but this law has been superseded by treaty; and a British subject may become an American citizen in one week after the surrender of the posts! The most desperate "Antifederalist" could not have aimed a more deadly blow at the constitution than the treaty has done; and if rendering the constitution a nose of wax, can be called disorganization, Jacobinism, or anarchy, the president and senate are the greatest disorganizers, the most furious Jacobins, and most violent anarchists, in the United States. If a compact, which ought to be held sacred, and which ought to be construed and executed strictly, can be interpreted to mean any thing that floats in the mind, or flutters in the heart of the president, the security which we promised ourselves is at an end, and we are literally in the situation of our new allies, Great Britain; we have a constitution in the clouds.

The constitution declares, that "Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, or of any particular state." By the treaty, the president and senate, instead of "congress," have made rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, and have prejudiced their claims, as well as the claims of individual states. The 2d article of the treaty guarantees to "all settlers and traders, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, all their property of every kind." Part of this property belongs to the United States, and part to individual states; and, notwithstanding, the president and senate have made rules and regulations respecting it. The constitution is solemnly prohibitory upon every department of the government, with respect to the claims of the United States, or of individual states, when it declares, that "nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state;" and in defiance of this solemn prohibition, this article was formed and ratified! The treaty of peace stipulated, that the posts should be surrendered with all convenient speed; and from the date of the ratification of that treaty, all real property, not actually held by Britist subjects there, became vested in the United States, and of individual states; now, as a considerable part of the territory comprehended in the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts [...] taken possession of by the British subjects since the treaty of peace, no department in the government could guarantee such possession; as the claims of the United States, and of individual states, became prejudiced thereby. Admitting a right to make [Page]rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, that right appertains exclusively to congress.

The constitution declares that "congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." By the 3d article of the treaty this power is assumed by the president and senate; for it declares, that "no duty of entry shal ever be levied by either party on peltries brought by land or inland navigation into the said territories respectively, nor shall the Indians, possing or repassing with their own proper goods and effects, of whatever nature, pay for the same any impost or duty whatever." The power of congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, is thus destroyed by a single coup of the presidential and senatorial hands.

By the constitution "the judical power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish." By the 6th article of the treaty, a judicial power is given to five commissioners, two of which are to be appointed by Great Britain, and "the award of the said commissioners is to be final and conclusive, both as to the justice of the claim, and the amount of the sum to be paid to the creditor, or claimant." Here is a judicial power given by the president and senate to five commissioners, two of whom are to be foreigners, and a third may also be a foreigner; and these commissioners are to have a final decision upon the property of the people of the United States. To congress alone is given the establishment of a judicial power; but even congress would hardly adventure so to profane the constitution, as to establish a mongrel tribunal of foreigners and citizens. The president and senate, in the name of the United States, undertake "to cause the sum awarded by the commissioners to be paid in specie to such creditor or claimant without deduction, and at such time or times, and at such place or places as shall be awarded by the said commissioners." The constitution declares, that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives," and that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The situation in which the president and senate ha [...] placed the United States by this article, give them the power of raising revenue, and of making appropriations of money according to their whim; for as a treaty is a solemn stipulation between nation and nation, every infraction of that treaty is a ground of war. If then the house of representatives refuses to originate a revenue to carry this stipulation in the treaty, into effect, it may be considered as an infraction of the [Page]tr [...]ty, and a war may be the consequence. Was the constitut [...] the president's guide when he formed such an article? Did he mean by it to brow-beat the house of representatives into his Anglican measures? Did he flatter himself that the freemen of America would consent to any thing, to a prostitution of their constitution, to a derediction of every thing valuable to them, rather than unsheath the sword against his "great, good, and dear friend?" But the commissioners are to six the time when, and the place where, the monies awarded are to be paid. Do not the president and senate undertake to raise a revenue, when they agree to pay the award of the commissioners at the time they shall agree upon? Is this leaving the raising of revenue to congress, as pointed out by the constitution? The president and senate have agreed to appropriate the monies of the United States without any law but their own will!

Fellow citizens, these are not imaginary things, conjured [...] by a distempered or discontented mind—they are plain fa [...], which are comprehensible to every capacity, and merit the [...] rious attention of every man who feels an interest in the [...] fare of his country. If the president can torture the consti [...] on into a justification of such conduct, it lives but in name, is an ideal existence, which can be fashioned according to [...] whim or caprice of the man who administers it. Such a m [...] ery of republicanism must rouse the indignation of every [...] corrupt citizen, and animate him to an endeavour to fix [...] rights upon a more certain and permanent basis. If a sub [...] sion can be had to such a state of things as the president [...] created, at this moment, when our constitution has scar [...] risen from its cradle, we may bid adieu to liberty, and [...] philosopher and the patriot may bemoan the degraded state [...] human nature, that has suffered the fairest prospects of happiness to be overshadowed by a pretended man of the people.

ATTICUS.

August 28, 1795.

No. IX.

A MISTAKE has happened in the vocabulary of o [...] country, and instead of Jacobinism, Jacobitism has reared its snaky crest among us. Passive-obedience and non-resistance are now the order of the day, and he who will not subscribe to the divine attributes of the president is excommunicated, and the [Page]dire interdict of Anarchist, Antifederalist and Traitor is fulminated against him with all the fury which characterized the vatican of Hildebrand. But if such appellations are bestowed, and with such liberality, on the friends of the constitution, on those who wish its chastity preserved, and with a vestal purity secured from the rude attacks of the ravisher; by what characters shall we designate those, who with unseeling heart make their barbarous assaults, as if liberty's goddess had turned harlot? Can language be too strong, or acumen too poignant to describe or to punish the incendiaries of virtue?

The Knights of the funding system, the Janizaries of government, the Jacobites and their PRETENDER, are in alarm— [...]ey have sounded the tocsin, and have pronounced a woe upon those who do not fall down and worship the golden image which Nebuchadnezzar has set up. Pompey's entrance into the sanctum sanctorum did not excite more horror and dismay in the Israelites, than lifting the mask from the president, and displaying his natural visage, have raised in the noble orders or our country. To touch the hem of the garment of this fabled high priest of liberty would beget distress in such interested bigots; but to strip him of his pontifical robes, and show him unworthy of them, would be in their estimation, to dress nature in mourning, and extinguish the lamp of liberty for ever. When men have purposes to answer, nothing can be too absurd for them to practise; and hence the Egyptian priest, to savor his own views, had conferred divinity upon an ox. It is high time that a superstitions veneration for a man, and a frail one o [...], should be exiled from the mansion of liberty. It is high time the temple of freedom should no longer be profaned by idolatrous worship, and be usurped by usurers, brokers, stockjobbers, and speculators. When men are substituted for principles, liberty is as much outraged, as when the Deity is supplanted by a priest. No longer the dupe of the artifice which has been practised but too successfully upon the honest and unsuspecting American, he has at length shaken off the lethargy of confidence that made him slumber over his wrongs, and he now carries his crimination to the source of all his [...]s and all his disgraces. There is justice in this, there is manliness, and he who shrinks from such a task, or feels terror at its performance, is unworthy the name of freeman. What! Shall the cal's paw of Hamilton deter freemen from speaking their sentiments by the cry of "treason?" Is the Jacobite language of the [...]esident's new ally already legitimised among us, that it has become treason to publish our sentiments? Alas! what a dearth [...] nerve among the Jacobites, when a whiffett is deputed to [...] [Page]the duty of a sturdy mastiff! Let such animals bark, my fellow citizens, while we proceed to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the treaty, and trace in it the real "traiturs" of our country.

The 8th article of the treaty is a further interference with the constitutional power of Congress to raise money, and make appropriations; for it declares, that "the commissioners shall be respectively paid in such manner as shall be agreed upon between the parties; and all other expenses attending the said commission shall be defrayed jointly by the two parties, the same being p [...] ously ascertained and allowed by a majority of the commiss [...]" Who are "the parties" in this case? The king of Great Britain the president and the senate. Who agree to pay the exp [...] of this commission? The king and the president and the [...]e [...]. Do not the president and senate pledge themselves by this [...]icle to raise and appropriate money to satisfy the expenses of [...] commission? Does the constitution recognize a right in them to make monied contracts? From whence did they derive this [...] rogative? Did they receive a new commission of powers [...] the president's new ally? If the president and senate can [...] tract debts for one dollar, they can do it for a million, the right is the same in extent that it is in degree; and by treaty [...] may mortgage the United States. Is this presidential and [...] torial contract the constitutional mode of "raising and app [...] ating money according to law?" The conduct of the president it this case, in point of usurpation, is not unlike that the pursued in 1776, when he was only the officer of congress, in raising [...] and increasing their pay without any authority from that po [...] under whom he acted, and from whom he held his commission. The necessity of this case cannot be pleaded in extenuation of breach of a solemn contract.

In the amendments to the constitution we find the following article: "The powers not delegoted to the United States by the [...] stitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the s [...] respectively, or to the people." The 9th article of the treaty o [...] tains the following extraordinary stipulation; "It is agreed that British subjects who now hold lands in the territories of the United States, and American citizens who now hold [...] in the dominions of his majesty, shall continue to hold th [...] according to the nature and tenure of their respective est [...] and titles therein: and may grant, sell and devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if they were natives; [...] that neither they nor their heirs or assigns shall, as far as [...] respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident ther [...], be regarded as aliens." By what part of the constitution have the [Page]president and senate the power of regulating the tenure of real estates? We look in vain for such a grant in the constitution, even to congress itself; this right then, not being delegated to the United States, nor "prohibited" by the constitution to the states, is "reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Shall the president dare to invade the chartered rights of the states? Shall he not only expunge the letter and the spirit of the constitution, but shall he add to it such parts as are in coincidence with his arbitrary views? Shall the constitution be converted into wax by him, ready to receive the impression of a Caesar or a Cromwell?

This article has a reciprocity in words; but let me ask, what number of American citizens hold real property in his Britannic majesty's dominions? Can figures calculate the number of acres which British subjects hold in the United States? Their patents swarm over our country like the locusts of Egypt, and in a little time not a shrub or a plant will be seen in republicanism or morals that shall have escaped their ravages.

Fellow citizens, when we consider these things, on whom does the charge of ingratitude rest? On the people who have idolized the president, and have advanced him to the greatest honors and the utmost powers which can be communicated by freemen, or on the president, who has abandoned the people, and has considered the voice and the interest of a faction, instead of the voice and the interest of his country?

ATTICUS.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 63.

No. XXVI.

THE British trade to their possessions in their East Indies, as well as to China, is a monopoly vested by the legislature in a company of merchants. No other persons in Great Britain, nor in any of her dominions or colonies, can send a [Page]vessel to, or prosecute trade independent of the company, with any part of Asia. The right to trade with their possessions in India is not only refused to all British subjects, the India company excepted, but is one, that Great Britain has never before yielded by treaty to any foreign nation. By the terms of the charter to the India company, among a variety of limitations, they are restrained and confined to a direct trade between As [...] and the port of London; they are prohibited from bringing any of the productions of India or China directly to any part of America, as well to the British colonies as to our territories; and moreover they are restrained from carrying any of the productions of Asia, directly to any part of Europe, or to any port in Great Britain, Scotland, or Ireland, except the single port of London.

The 13th article stipulates, that our vessels shall be admitted in all the sea ports and harbours of the British territories in the East Indies, and that our citizens may freely carry on a trade between said territories and the United States, in all such articles, of which the importation or exportation shall not be entirely prohibited; provided only, that when Great Britain is [...] war, we may not export from their terriories in India, without the permission of their local government thers, military stores, naval stores, or rice. Our vessels shall pay in this trade, the same tonnage duty as is paid by British vessels in our ports; and our cargoes on their importation and exportation shall pay no other or higher charges or duties than shall be payable on the same articles when imported or exported in British bottoms; but it is agreed that this trade shall be direct between the United States and the said territories; that the article shall not be deemed to allow the vessels of the United States to carry on any part of the coasting trade of the British territories in India, nor to allow our citizens to settle or reside within the said territories, or to go into the interior parts thereof, without the permission of the British local government there.

The British trade to their territories in the East Indies is carried on by a corporation, who have a monopoly against the great body of British mechants. Our trade to the same territories will be open to the skill and enter prize of every American citizen. The British trade to these territories is direct, but confined to the port of London; our trade to the same must likewise be direct, but may be carried on from and to all our principal ports.

The article gives us a right in common with the India company to carry to these territories, and to purchase and bring from thence, all articles which may be carried to or purchased [Page]and brought from the same, in British vessels: our cargoes paying native duties, and our ships the same alien tonnage as British ships pay in our ports. This trade is equally open to both nations; except when Great Britain is engaged in war, when the consent of the British local government is required in order to enable us to export naval stores, military stores, and rice; a limitation of small consequence: none of the articles except nitre being likely to form any part of our return cargoes. Though this article is one against which the objection of a want of reciprocity (so often, and so uncandidly urged against other parts of the treaty) has not been preferred, it has not however escaped censure.

It is said that we are already in the enjoyment of a less restrained commerce with the British territories in India, and that the treaty will alter it for the worse: in as much as we thereby incapacitate ourselves to carry on any part of the coasting trade of the British territories in India, and as we relinquish the profitable freights to be made between Bombay and Canton, and likewise those sometimes obtained from the English territories in Bengal to Ostend.

It would seem a sufficient answer to say, that this trade has heretofore existed by the mere indulgence of those who permitted it, that it was liable to variations, that a total exclusion, especially had it been of us in common with other foreign nations, could have afforded no just ground of complaint: That the relaxation which has hitherto given us admission to the British India territories, was not a permanent, but a mere temporary and occasional regulation, liable to alteration, and by no means to be demanded as the basis of an intercourse to be adjusted by compact, with a foreign nation, which would no longer leave the power of alteration in either of the parties.

But in respect to the first objection, the article amounts to this, that the rights which it does grant, shall not by implication be construed to give a right to carry on any part of the British coasting trade in India.

If we have before shared in this trade by permission, nothing in the article will preclude us from enjoying the same in future. If we did not participate in it, nothing in the article impairs either the authority of the British local government to permit our participation or our capacity to profit by such permission— This objection, therefore, falls to the ground, since the coasting trade remains as it was before the treaty was formed.*

[Page] Further, according to my information—It is not the tr [...] between the East Indies and China, as has been erroneou [...] supposed by some persons, but the exportation of rice and oth [...] articles, which are exchanged between the British territo [...] in the hither and further Indies, that is denominated the co [...] ing trade of the British territories in India. The importa [...] of this trade is not well understood; nor am I able to say whether we have heretofore been allowed to carry it on. If [...] have, the little that we have heard of it, leads to an opini [...] that it is not an object of much consequence. Let it, however be granted that hereafter we shall not be allowed to engage i [...] it. Shall we have more reason to complain of this exclusi [...] than we have that we are refused a share in the coasting [...] of the European dominions of Great Britain? or that we [...] excluded from the coasting trade between their islands in [...] West Indies? Or than the British themselves have, that by [...] prohibiting tonnage duty (being fifty cents per ton on entry [...] a foreign vessel, when our own coasting vessels pay only [...] cents per ton, for a year's license) they are excluded from sha [...] in our coasting trade; a branch of business that already employs a large proportion of our whole navigation, and it [...] increasing.

In respect to the second and third objections, it may be [...] marked, that so far as the trade has been heretofore enjoy [...] it has been in consequence of an exception from, and relaxa [...] on in, the system by which the European commerce has [...] regulated; that having depended on the mere occasional p [...] mission of the local government, we may safely infer (thou [...] it may have been supposed incompatible with the discretion [...] powers, vested in that government, to confer by treaty a p [...] tive right to carry on the trade in question) that so lo [...] and as often as the interest that has heretofore induced the ga [...] of this permission shall continue or exist, the permission will [...] continued or renewed. The stipulation, restraining the tra [...] may, if the parties see fit, be dispensed with, and the tr [...] may be enlarged, or made free:—It being a contract only between them and us, the parties are free to remodify it; [...] without a formal alteration, if those in whose favor the restra [...] is made, consent to remove it, the other party is released from the obligation to observe it.*

[Page] Again—Surat, which is in the neighbourhood of Bombay, is the emporium of the Guzeat, and of the northern portion of the Malabar coast; the cottons shipped from Bombay to Canton, are frequently first sent from Surat to Bombay. Surat belongs to the native powers to which we have free access. If the transportation of cotton and some few other commodities from the coast of Malabar to Canton is an important branch of our commerce, what will prevent our prosecuting it from Surat or any other free port in the hither Indies?

That it may be undertaken from the ports of the native powers is rendered probable, by the circumstance, that these freights are supplied principally or alone by the native or black merchants, whose residence would naturally be in the ports under native jurisdiction more frequently than in those under the jurisdiction of any of the foreign powers.

But is it not true (and will not candour admit it) that the trade to the Asiatic dominions of the European powers has usually been confined to the nation to whom such territories belong? In our treaty with Holland, have we not even stipulated to respect their monopoly of this trade? And by our treaty with France, a nation whose liberal policy is said to have laid us under eternal obligations of gratitude, have we acquired the sligh [...]st pretentious, much less a right, to resort to, or trade with any part of their Asiatic territories?

A late decree of the convention which opened to us the ports in their West Indies, likewise laid open their remaining territories in Asia—But this measure proceeding from the necessities of the war and their inability to carry on their foreign commerce, will change hereafter, as heretofore it has done, with the establishment of peace—Did this opinion require to be strengthened, it is abundantly confirmed by the navigation act, decreed by the convention: The operation whereof is suspended for the same reason that induced the opening to foreigners that trade to their colonies and territories in the West and East Indies.

The British for more than a hundred years excluded foreigners from a share in their East India trade; for a few years past [Page]they relaxed in the rigour of this system. We have availed ourselves of this circumstance, and shared with them in their India commerce. But this permission can be viewed only as an occasional departure from a general law; which may be affected by a change of circumstances, the duration of which, therefore, is uncertain. The loss and inconvenience to which our merchants may be exposed from the prosecution of a trade, depending on regulations arising from inconstant circumstances, and which frequently vary, may, in some measure, be guarded against, where the scene is not remote, and the alterations in the laws can be known soon after they are made. But in the Astatic and our other distant commerce, it is of importance that the laws under which an adventure is begun, should be permanent. Losses to a considerable amount have been experienced by some of our merchants, who have undertaken distant voyages in the expectation of the continuation of these temporary regulations. The trade, for example, to the Cape of Good Hope which the Dutch government ordinarily monopolize to their own people) was some time since opened to foreigners, and some of our citizens profited by it; but others who had engaged in large adventures to that market, suffered no small disappointment and loss in finding themselves excluded, upon their arrival by a repeal of the permission to foreigners to trade there. It must then be considered as an important object secured, in respect to the principal proportion of our India trade, that alone which is capable of being pursued as a branch of our commerce, that the treaty turns a favor into a right, and that our direct intercourse with the British territories in the East Indies, in all respects as broad as that of Great Britain herself (except in the articles of rice, naval and military stores, when Great Britain is engaged in war) instead of being an uncertain and hazardous trade, as heretofore, from its precarious nature, it has been, will, hereafter, be as certain as any in which our merchants shall engage.

It is further alleged, by way of objection to this article, that it does not secure to our citizens a right to reside and settle in the British territories in India, without the consent of the British local government. The [...]servation that has been made on a similar objection, in respect to the coasting trade in India, is equally applicable to this. The article leaves subjects precisely in the situation in which it found them. But let it be remembered that the disproportion between the numbers of the native Indians and the foreigners inhabiting their country, is more than one thousand of the former to one of the latter—that the most exact discipline and subordination among the foreigners [Page]are therefore essential to the preservation of the British authority over that country—that no foreigner, or even a British subject, is allowed to reside there, except in the character of a servant of the company, or of a licensed inhabitant—that it has long been held as a sound opinion, that unrestrained liberty to the Europeans to emigrate to, and settle among the Indians, would, in a short time, overturn and destroy the British empire in India—This danger would by no means be diminished by conferring a right upon the Americans, freely to reside and settle in India—that we shall be allowed to reside and settle there by permission of the local British government, is fairly to be inferred from the article. But an absolute right to an entire liberty on these points, might evidently be dangerous to the British government over India—and in prudence could not have been stipulated.

The advantageous footing, on which the trade is placed, is so evident, that those who had no reliance on the objections urged against it, but who, nevertheless, have been unwilling to allow the treaty any merit on the score of this article, have endeavoured to show that our India trade is of little importance, and of small value.

Whatever article can be supplied by the India company, may likewise be supplied by us, and some of them on better terms by us, than by them: The reports of the committee of the directors of the East India company, published in 1793, when their charter was renewed, afford useful information on this subject, and disclose facts which show the advantages that we shall possess in this trade over the company. They admit, that in the articles of iron, wines, canvas, cordage, arms, and naval and military stores, foreigners can enter into a ben [...]cial competition with them, and that canvas and cordage, and we may add, all naval stores and several other articles, can always be furnished in India by foreigners, cheaper than by the company.

If we appreciate the advantage we have over them, in such particles of supply as are of our own growth or production, as well as in the wines not unusually procured by touching at Madeira on the outward voyage to India, and compare it with the advantage that they have over us in the few articles of choice, which they purchase at the first hands, and which we must import in order to re-export to India, it is probable that our cargoes to India, will, on the whole, be laid in as advantageously, [...]f not more so, th [...] those of the India company. If we consider the vast ex [...]ent of territory, the numerous population, and the established manufactures of India, so far from supposing [Page]that a free trade to that country will be of little value to a young and enterprising nation, whose manufactures are still in their infancy, we ought rather to conclude that it is a country with which we should be solicitous to establish a free trade [...] intercourse.

Every one who has bestowed the slightest attention upon [...] foreign manufactures consumed in our country, must have [...] served the general and increasing use of those of India, [...] to the better terms on which they can be procured from [...] than from Europe. Though no document is at hand that [...] show the value of the annual importations from India, it is stated by Mr. Coxe, in his View of the United States, [...] the amount in value of our importations from Asia is [...] than one fifth of the value of our whole annual consu [...] of foreign commodities. It is true that the porcelai [...], [...] nankeens, and teas of China, form a large portion of this [...] nual importation. But, after a full deduction on this acc [...] a great and profitable branch of our commerce will be [...] in our trade to the East-Indies. It should be remembered, [...] that it is not the consumption of our own country that reg [...] the quantity of India goods that we import; other cou [...] have been supplied through us with the fabrics and produ [...] of both India and China. The treaty will enlarge this de [...].

Several circumstances calculated to give our trade with [...] an advantage against foreign competition, and a prefere [...] our trade with Europe, are deserving of attention.

First. The direct trade between us and Asia, including [...] East Indies as well as China, cannot be prosecuted by th [...] iish rish East India company, their ships being obliged to rem [...] the port of London, and there to discharge.

Second. The difference between the duties on Asiatic [...] imported in American bottoms direct from Asia, and the [...] imposed on the same goods in foreign bottoms from A [...] from Europe; being on all articles a favorable discrimi [...] and in the articles of teas, the duties on those imported i [...] reign bottoms being fifty per cent. higher than on those i [...] ed in American bottoms.

The particular difference of duties on Asiatic goods im [...] ed in American and in foreign bottoms, so favorable to our [...] navigation, will not be affected by the right reserved by [...] Britain to impose countervailing duties in certain cases;* [Page]right being relative to the intercourse between the United States and the British territories in Europe.

Third. The European intercourse with Asia is, in most cases, conducted by corporation or exclusive companies—and all experience has proved that in every species of business (that of banking and a few analagous employments excepted) in conducting of which, a competition shall exist between individuals and corporations, the superior economy, enterprize, zeal, and perseverance of the former, will make them an overmarch for the latter; and that while individuals acquire riches, corporations, engaged in the same business, often sink their capital and become bankrupt. The British East India company are more overburdened with various terms and conditions, which they are required to observe in their Asiatic trade, and which operate as so many advantages in favor of their rivals in the supply of foreign markets. The company, for example, are obliged annually to invest a large capital in the purchase of British manufactures to be exported and sold by them in India; the loss on these investments is considerable every year, as few of the manufactures which they are obliged to purchase, will sell in India for their cost and charges—Besides, from the policy of protecting the home manufactures, the company are, in a great measure, shut out from supplying India goods for the home consumption of Great Britain. Most of the goods which they import from India, are re-exported with additional charges, incurred by the regulations of the company, to foreign markets, in supplying of which we shall be their rivals, as from the information of intelligent merchants, it is a fact that Asiatic goods, including the teas of China, are on average, cheaper within the United States than in Great Britain.

Fourth. The manufactures of Asia are not only cheaper here than in Europe, but in general they are cheaper than goods of equal quality of European manufacture—So long as from the cheapness of subsistence and the immense population of India (the inhabitants of the British territories only being estimated at forty millions) the labour of a manufacturer can be procured from two to three pence sterling per day, the similar manufactures of Europe, aided with all their ingenious machinery, is likely, on a fair competition, in almost every instance, to be excluded by those of India. So apprehensive have the British government been of endangering their home manufactures by the permission of Asiatic goods to be consumed in Great Britain, that they have imposed eighteen per cent, duties on the gross sales of all India muslins, which is equal to twenty-two percent, on their prime cost: The duties on courser India goods [Page]are still higher, and a long catalogue of Asiatic articles, including all stained and printed goods, is prohibited from being consumed in Great Britain.

The British manufacturers were not satisfied even with this prohibitory system—And on the late renewal of the company's charter, they urged the total exclusion from British consumption of all India goods, and moreover proposed that the company should be held to import annually from India a large amount of raw materials, and particularly cotton, for the supply of the British manufacturers.

Those facts are noticed to show the advantages to be derived from a free access to the India market, from whence we may obtain those goods which would be extensively consumed even in the first manufacturing nations of Europe, did not the security of their manufactories require their exclusion.*

CAMILLUS.

No. XXVII.

THE third article contains the terms and conditions of the trade and intercourse that it authorises between us and the British colonies on the American continent. The twelsth article was intended to adjust the trade between us and the British islands in the West Indies. The thirteenth article secures to us a direct trade with the British territories in the East Indies; and it is the office of the fourteenth and the fifteenth articles, to ascertain and establish the terms of the intercourse and trade between the territories of the United States and the British dominions in Europe.

The fourteenth article establishes a perfect and reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation between the territories of the United States and of the British domini [...]ns in Europe; stipulates that the people and inhabitants of the two countries respectively, namely, of the Unit [...] States, and of the British dominions in Europe, shall [...] liberty to come with their ships and car [...]oes to the p [...] [...], and places of each other, within the territories and dominions aforesaid, to resort and reside [Page]there, without limitation of time, to hire houses and stores for the purpose of commerce; and that the merchants and traders on each side shall enjoy, for their commerce, the fullest protection and security, subject, notwithstanding, in respect to the stipulations of this article, to the laws of the two nations respectively.

As this article, in the customary language, employed in the introductory articles of commercial treaties, speaks of a perfect liberty of commerce and navigation, without excepting any commodity, or specifying any impost or duty, it was possible that a latitude or freedom of trade, inconsistent with the revenue laws, and policy of the two nations, might have been claimed under it; hence the propriety of the provision with which the article concludes, and which reserves to the parties respectively, the power of avoiding this inconvenience, by continuing and enacting such laws as may be proper for the purpose.

But as under this power again, partial duties, and even partial exclusions, might have been established, whereby ships and merchandizes, as well as the articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of one of the parties, might have been made liable to higher duties and imposts in the territories of the other, than the ships and similar merchandizes, and articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of other nations; or whereby one of the parties might prohibit the importation or exportation, by the other, of any article to and from his territories, the importation or exportation whereof was at the same time free to some other nation: In order to prevent such inequalities, and to secure effectually to the parties, a right to carry on their trade with each other on terms equally advantageous and extensive, with those established by either, with any other nation: The fifteenth article stipulates—

1. That no other or higher duty shall be exacted or paid, on the ships and merchandizes, nor on the articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of one of the parties, on their entry or importation into the territories of the other, than shall be payable on the like ships, and merchandizes, and on similar articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other nation.

2. That no article, the importation or exportation of which by either party, to or from the territories of the other, is prohibited, shall be imported or exported, to or from the same by any other foreign nation; and that every article allowed to be imported or exported to or from the territories of either party, [Page]by any foreign nation, may be imported or exported to or from the same, by the parties respectively.

By these stipulations it is agreed, that the people and inhabitants of the United States and of the British dominions in Europe, shall have the right to carry on trade between the said territories in all articles and commodities in which any other foreign nation may trade with either of the parties; that the impost or duties on any article in the course of such trade, shall be no other or higher than the lowest imposts or duties paid by any other foreign nation on the like article; that both parties shall remain free, totally to prohibit the importation or exportation, to or from their respective territories, of any species of goods or merchandize, or to increase the existing duties, or to impose new ones on the importation of any species of goods or merchandizes, into their respective territories; such prohibitions and duties operating equally against all foreign nations. So far as respects the interchange of commodities between the parties, these stipulations breathe the spirit of reciprocity: the residue of the fifteenth article principally relates to the navigation which the parties shall employ in this trade.

The first clause of the 15th article, in the spirit of those treaties which mutually confer the right of the most favored nations, stipulates that no other or higher duties shall be paid by the ships of the one party in the ports of the other, than such as are paid by the like vessels of all other nations.

By our laws, a difference exists between the tonnage d [...]ty paid by an American vessel, and that paid by a foreign vessel in our ports—the American vessel pays only six cents per ton on her entry—the foreign vessel, on her entry, pays fifty cents per ton, and about twenty per cent. more duties on all teas imported from Europe, and ten per cent. more duties on the importation of other goods, than are payable on the importation of the same goods, in an American vessel.

By the British laws, the differences between the duties paid by British and foreign vessels in the British ports in Europe, is less than that which exists in our ports:—the consequence is that a British vessel, of a given burden, pays considerably mo [...] tonnage duties in the trade between our territories and the British ports in Europe, than is paid by an American vessel of the same burden, engaged in the same trade.

The trade being laid open to both parties, the principle o [...] equalization of duties was very naturally deemed an equitable basis of treaty. This could be effected by lowering the American alien duties to the British standard, or by raising those of Great Britain to the American standard. The former might [Page]have been inconvenient to our revenue, especially since, if it was not general, it would have formed, in respect to foreign nations, an unpleasant discrimination in our laws.

The American tonnage duty, therefore, was left to operate; and by the 15th article is is agreed, that the British government shall reserve a right to raise the tonnage duty on our vessels entering their ports in Europe, so as to make it equal to the tonnage duty payable by their vessels entering our ports: And in order to balance the difference of duties on goods imported into our ports by American or by British vessels, the effect whereof is the same as that which proceeds from an alien tonnage duty, the article further agrees, that the British government shall reserve a right to impose such duty as may be adequate to effect this end. The preceding clause of this article stipulates, that the vessels and cargoes of each shall pay no higher, or other duties, than those imposed on the like vessels and cargoes of all other nations; it was, therefore, necessary to reserve a right to increase against us, their alien tonnage duty, and to impose the countervailing duty in question; as, without such reservation, the same could not have been done, unless by laws equally operating against all other nations—which would have been unjust in reference to such of them as might not, like us, have discriminated in their duties between their own and foreign vessels.

Two methods have been suggested, by which this countervailing power might be executed.

One by imposing a pro rota duty on the importation of goods into the British ports in Europe by American vessels, equal to the difference between the duties payable in our ports on the importation of goods by American or British vessels.

The other, by imposing the identical duty on the exportation of goods from the British ports in Europe, by American vessels, which forms the difference between the duties payable on the importation of the same goods into our ports by American or British vessels.

As the articles imported by our vessels into the British ports in Europe, are dissimilar from those imported from the same into our ports, one rule of difference would not effect the equalization sought for; and as our difference of duties is not the same on all articles, being higher on some than on others—and as, moreover, the quantities and amount of different articles differ widely, and are liable to continual proportional variations, no uniform average rule of countervailing these differences can be devised; the correct execution, therefore, of this power, in [Page]the method first suggested, is impracticable, and, it is presumed, must be discarded.

The power, then, it would seem, can only be equitably exercised by imposing on the articles which we shall export in American vessels from the British ports in Europe, a duty identically the same as that which constitutes, in any case, the difference of duty payable in our ports, on the same articles imported from the British ports in Europe, by a British or American vessel. Thus they may impose on tea and other Asiatic goods, as well as on the European goods, which we shall export from the British ports in Europe, the identical duty or the same sum which constitutes the difference of duties payable in our ports on the importation from thence of the same articles by an American or a British vessel.

The right to countervail our alien tonnage duty by imposing an alien tonnage duty on our vessels entering the British ports in Europe, equal to that which shall be payable on their vessels entering our ports, will continue so long as the commercial treaty shall endure, and will apply to any future increase of the tonnage duty on foreign vessels that we may establish; it is however stipulated in the conclusion of the fifteenth article, that we shall abstain from increasing the tonnage duty on British vessels, and also from increasing the difference that now exists between the duties payable on the importation of any articles into our ports in British or in American vessels, until the expiration of two years after the termination of the war between France and Great Britain. But we are free to increase the one or the other, after the expiration of that period; and though the British government will have a right to countervail, by additional tonnage duties, on our vessels, any increase of that duty on their vessels; yet they will have no right to countervail any increase of the difference between the duties payable on the importation of any articles into our ports, in British or in American vessels, unless by a duty common to all foreign nations; the right reserved on this subject, being confined to the difference that now exists, will not reach such future increase.*

From this analysis of the 14th and 15th articles, we are the better enabled to perceive the truth of the following propositions.

[Page] 1. As, for the purpose of encouraging or protecting the agriculture and manufactures of Great Britain, several of our productions, in common with similar productions of the other nations, are prohibited from being imported into the British ports in Europe; we are free, whenever our interest shall require it, also to exclude any of the productions of the British dominions from being imported into our ports, extending such exclusions, as they do, to the like manufactures and productions of foreign nations.

Should that part of the twelfth article, which has not been ratified, in its modification retain the stipulation relative to the importation of coffee, sugar, and the other productions of the West Indies, it would constitute an exception to this proposition. But as the West India productions are dissimilar to those of our own country, they would not fall within the reason of these prohibitions, and, therefore, the exception would be of no consequence.

2. As, for the like reasons, some of our productions are subject, in common with the like productions of other nations, to high, or prohibitory duties in the British ports in Europe, we are free, likewise, to impose similar duties on any of the productions or manufactures of the British dominions, extending such duties, as they do, to the like productions and manufactures of other foreign nations.

3. As the navigation act of Great Britain, in order to extend their own shipping, has heretofore confined the importation of foreign productions into the British ports, to British ships, and to the ships of the country producing the same; the 15th article appears to contain an important innovation on this celebrated act; inasmuch as, by the most obvious construction of the terms, it gives us a right to import from our own territories into the British ports in Europe every article and description of goods and merchandizes, which any nation in their own ships is allowed to import—In consequence whereof, while all other foreign nations are prohibited and restrained from importing in their own vessels into Great Britain any goods or merchandizes, except those of their own particular growth, produce, or manufacture, we, by the treaty, have a right to carry from our ports to the British ports in Europe, not only goods and merchandizes of our own growth, produce, or manufacture, but also all such goods and merchandizes, the growth, produce; or manufacture of any foreign nation, as a nation producing or manufacturing the same, would import in their vessels into Great Britain.

[Page] 4. Should it ever be politic to exclude all foreign vessels from importing, or exporting, any species of goods, wares, or merchandizes, by confining their importation or exportation to our own vessels; we are perfectly free to do so; with the exception, relative to the West India productions, referred [...] under the first proposition; thus, for example, we may prohibit the importation of all Asiatic goods, except in American bottoms.

That these articles of the treaty leave our navigation and commerce as free, and secure to us as extensive advantages as have before been procured by our commercial treaties with foreign nations, will be seen by the following comparison:

1. By the articles before us, the parties restrain themselves from imposing any other or higher duties on the vessels and cargoes of each other, than they impose on the vessels and cargoes of all other nations; and also from imposing a prohibition of the importation or exportation of any article to or from the territories of each other, which shall not extend to all other nations. By the third and fourth articles of our treaty with France, and by the 2d and 3d articles of our treaty with Pr [...]ssia, it is stipulated, that the subjects and citizens of the respective parties, shall pay, in the ports, havens, and places of each other, no other or greater duties or imposts, of whatsoever nature they may be, than those which the nations most favored shall be obliged to pay: and moreover, that they shall enjoy all the rights, liberties, privileges and exemptions is trade, navigation, and commerce, which the said nations do, or shall enjoy: and by the 2d article of the former, and the 26th article of the latter treaty, the parties agree mutually, not to grant any particular favor, in respect to navigation [...] commerce, which shall not immediately become common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same favor, if freely granted, or on allowing the same compensation, if the concession was conditional.

The stipulations in the three treaties are, on these points, equivalent.

The 2d and 3d articles of our treaty with Holland, and the 3d and 4th of our treaty with Sweden, likewise contain mutual stipulations, that the subjects and citizens of the several parties shall pay in the ports, havens, and places of their respective countries, no other or higher duties or imposts than those which the nations most favored shall pay; and that they shall enjoy all the rights, liberties, privileges, and exemptions in trade and navigation, which the said nations shall enjoy.

[Page] 2. The articles before us, after stipulating that there shall be between our territories and the British dominions in Europe, a reciprocal and perfect liberty of commerce, declare, that the same shall be subject always to the laws of the respective countries. The introductory articles of our treaties with France, Holland, and Sweden, after asserting the intentions of the parties to take equality and reciprocity as their basis, likewise leave each party at liberty to form such regulations respecting commerce and navigation as it shall find convenient to itself—and the 2d and 3d articles of our treaty with Prussia, after stipulating the rights of the parties, respecting the duties and imposts, and the freedom of their navigation and trade, likewise require their submission to the laws and usages established in the two countries.

3. The articles before us, in their provisions relative to navigation, stipulate, as has been already observed, in common with our other treaties, that the ships of the parties shall not be subject to higher or other duties, than those paid by all other nations. They go farther, and agree to vary this rule, so far as shall be necessary to equalize the tonnage duty imposed by the parties on the ships of each other. Our treaty with France is the only one in which we discover a similar stipulation.—France had a high alien tonnage duty on all foreign vessels transporting the merchandize of France from one port to another port in her dominions. We had a less alien tonnage duty on foreign ships employed in a similar trade: though not equally extensive; the case is parallel to that which exists between us and Great Britain. We have a high alien tonnage duty on all foreign vessels entering our ports; Great Britain has a less alien tonnage duty on foreign vessels entering her ports. In our treaty with France we reserve a right to countervail the alien tonnage duty imposed by France; and in like manner, in our treaty with Great Britain, she reserves a right to countervail the alien tonnage duty imposed by us. The object, in both instances, has been to place the navigation of the parties on the footing of exact equality.

The preceding exposition of these articles, illustrated by the comparison of their provisions, with the analagous articles of our other treaties, would be sufficient to vindicate them against the objections to which they have been exposed.—It is, however, thought adviseable to take notice of such of these objections as are likely to have any influence on the public opinion— This will be done in a subsequent number.

CAMILLUS.

[Page]

No. XXVIII.

AN extraordinary construction of the last clause of the fourteenth article has been assumed by the writer of Cato; his mistake in this instance has been the foundation of many of the errors with which that performance abounds. The article stipulates that there shall be a perfect and reciprocal liberty of navigation and commerce between our territories and those of Great Britain in Europe, subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. This navigation and commerce, says Cato, must be subject to, and de [...]i [...]ed and regulated by the laws and statutes of the two countries, which existed at the time of making the treaty, all future laws, that either party might be disposed to make, relative to the same, being excluded.

The reason assigned, in support of this interpretation, is, that the article would be nugatory, did not the laws and statutes alluded to, mean only those in existence at the making of the treaty; since future laws might impair or destroy wh [...] the article confers.

Nothing in the expressions themselves requires this [...] pretation.

The customary and established meaning of them in o [...] treaties would lead to a rejection of it.—The object of [...] clause is not the limitation of the legislative power of the parties, but the subjection of their mutual navigation and commerce to their respective laws.—This end is most fully atta [...] ed by understanding the parties to mean their future as well [...] their existing laws. Besides, the interpretation must be [...] as will not destroy the use and meaning of other parts of [...] treaty. If this construction is just, some of the most imp [...] ant stipulations of the fifteenth article would really be [...] useless. For instance, if the laws, existing at the time of making the treaty, are alone to prevail, the articles of commerce, [...] mitted or excluded by those laws, must remain entitled to a [...] mission or liable to exclusion. Why then say in the fifteen article, "that no prohibition shall be imposed on the exporta [...] on or importation of any articles to or from the territories [...] the parties respectively, which shall not extend to all other [...] tions." If a prohibition, applying to all foreign nations, [...] be imposed (as the clause allows) this would be a new or [...] sequent law, varying the law existing at the time of making the treaty, and consequently defeating the construction in question.

[Page] The reason adduced by Cato to support his construction is equally defective with his interpretation itself. The fourteenth article is in general terms, and similar, as has been shown, to the introductory articles of other treaties; so far from the last clause thereof being capable of destroying the preceding stipulations; it is the peculiar province of the next article to ascertain the points which the parties mutually agree to except from their legislative power. In all cases not thus excepted, the navigation and commerce of the parties is subject to their existing or future laws.

It is not necessary to remark on the several objections which have proceeded from the opinion that the treaty restrains us from imposing prohibitory duties and exclusions: they are but subdivisions of the error that has been just combatted.

Another objection which has been stated by several writers, and much laboured by Cato, is, that under the right reserved to the British government to countervail an alien tonnage duty, by the imposition of an equivalent one on our vessels entering their ports, they would gain and we should lose.

Several methods are adopted to prove this opinion. The observation that we have a tonnage duty on our own vessels, and that Great Britain has none, is repeated by way of objection against this as well as against the proposed adjustment contained in the 12th article. The same reply already given might be sufficient in this place.

But is it true that British ships entering their own ports in Europe are wholly free from a tonnage duty? the contrary is the fact; since it is understood, that they pay a tonnage duty for the support of light houses, and some other institutions, connected with their navigation, which, in all their ports, exceeds the tonnage duty of six cents per ton, that we levy on the entry of our own vessels employed in foreign trade. But Great Britain (it is alleged) will not only impose in virtue of this reserved right, fifty cents per ton on our vessels entering her ports, but in every port except that of London, she will furthermore exact one shilling and nine pence sterling, or thirty nine cents per ton, for light money and Trinity-dues more than is paid by her own vessels; this, added to the difference before stated, would have, it is said, a very discouraging effect upon our navigation. Our tonnage duty is a tax not divided and appropriated, like the light money, or Trinity-dues, in Great Britain, to specific, and particular objects—but when levied, goes into the treasury with the duty of impost, and stands appropriated to the various objects to which that duty is appropriated—among those objects is the support of light-houses—it is [Page]not the object to which the tax is applied that gives a denomination; whether it goes to support the civil list, or to pay annuities, or to maintain light houses, or to support hospitals, it is equally a tonnage duty. A tonnage duty then of a certain amount, is now paid by American vessels entering the ports of Great Britain. This duty is not uniform, being less in London than in the other ports, and, in some instances, less than the tonnage duty paid by British ships entering our ports—The object of this clause (8th of the 15th article) is [...] equalize the alien tonnage duties of the parties. Hence the reservation of a right to the British government, to impose on our vessels entering their ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal to that which shall be payable by British vessels in our ports. It would be against the manifest views of the parties as well as against the explicit terms of the article, to impose a tonnage duty (whether for light money, Trinity dues, or any other purpose) which should exceed that which shall be payable by British vessels in our ports.

The right reserved is expressly to impose on our vessels as equal, not a greater tonnage duty than we shall impose on their vessels. This objection, therefore, must be abandoned.

But again, it is urged, that our navigation, should it [...] Scylla, must perish on Charybdis: for we are gravely told by Cato, that under the right reserved to the British government to impose such duty as may be sufficient to countervail, [...] which is equivalent, to balance the difference of duty payable on the importation into our ports of Asiatic or European goals by American or by British vessels, our ships will be thrown [...] of the trade with the British European dominions; because under this right, the British government will impose a duty on [...] productions carried to their ports in our own ships, equal [...] the whole duty payable on the goods and merchandizes impor [...] ed into our ports by British ships; and as the goods [...] merchandizes which we receive from them exceed in value th [...] that they receive from us by one-third, and as the duty to [...] countervailed is at least ten per cent. ad valorem on the go [...] received from them, the consequence will be, that the coun [...] vailing duty must amount to fifteen per cent. on the value [...] all our productions carried in our own ships to the British po [...] in Europe, while the same will be free in British ships. A m [...] extravagant construction,* or an argument more inaccurately formed can scarcely be imagined.

[Page] The countervailing right is not applicable to the whole duty payable on goods and merchandizes imported into our ports in British ships, but expressly confined to the difference of duty now payable on the same when imported by American or by British vessels—This difference is one-tenth part of the duty upon all European goods, that is to say, these goods pay one-tenth part more duty when imported in British vessels than is paid on the same when imported in an American vessel; in all cases, therefore, where our impost is ten per cent. ad valorem, the difference of duty to be countervailed amounts to only one per cent. on the value of the goods, instead of ten percent. as is alleged by Cato; in the instance of teas imported from Europe the difference is greater: again it is not an aggregate sum, that is to be apportioned under this countervailing right, for this sum would be liable to constant variation according to the quantity and species of goods imported into our ports from time to time by British vessels; and besides, the British government possess no means whereby the amount thereof could be ascertained.

Cato feels and admits the force of these remarks as decisive against an average duty, without perceiving that they possess equal strength against his project of countervailing the whole duty paid on the importation of goods and merchandizes into our ports by British vessels; for the same variation in the amount, and the same want of the means to ascertain it, will operate in both cases. The reasons which he himself employs to prove that an average duty cannot be ascertained, equally show the impracticability of the method which he considers as the one that will be employed in the execution of the countervailing right reserved to the British government. It has before been stated, that the natural as well as the equitable mode of executing this power will be to impose a duty on the goods imported by us from their European ports exactly the same as makes the difference of duty on the importation thereof into our ports by American or by British vessels.

Admitting that the execution of the countervailing right reserved to Great Britain will do no more than place the navigation of the parties on an equal footing in their mutual intercourse, still we are told that for this, likewise, the treaty is blameable, because even equality will be such an advantage to our rival, that we shall be unable to maintain the competition.

This objection brings with it a quality rarely to be discovered in the opinions of the cavillers against the treaty. Their usual error is a false and magnified estimate of the comparative resources, strength and importance of our country; in this instance, [Page]shifting their ground, they fall into the opposite extreme, and contend for our inferiority in a branch of business in the p [...]osecution of which, we are unquestionably able to meet a fair competition with any nation.

With what propriety could we have proposed or expected an adjustment of our intercourse by which our vessels should have been placed on a better footing than those of the other party? As the trade was mutually beneficial, why could we, more than Great Britain, ask for an arrangement that should subject our rival to comparatively heavier burdens? Does any considerate man believe, that it would have been proper for us to ask, [...] that there is the least probability that Great Britain would have acceded to, an arrangement on the subject of our mutual navigation, that should have secured to us advantages denied to them? To place the navigation of the parties on an equal fo [...] ing, was all that could be rationally expected by either—and [...] far from such a settlement being injurious to us, the contrary has long been the opinion both here and in Great Britain.— If it is true, that we are unable to maintain a competition with the British navigation, how are we to account for the jealousy that is understood to have shown itself on their part on [...] subject?

But the fact is otherwise—British ships cannot be built [...] equipped as cheap as American ships, nor are they victualling and manned* on as good terms. Our country abounds [...] excellent materials for ship-building. Great Britain is in a g [...] measure dependent upon other countries for a supply of th [...] The materials for the construction of ships are much che [...] in America than in Great Britain; and intelligent character in Great Britain as well as in America have affirmed, that [...] American merchant ship of any given burden, can be built a [...] equipped for sea one-third cheaper than a British, Dutch, [...] French ship of equal goodness. Mr. Coxe informs us, that [...] cost of an American ship, built of our live oak and cedar, i [...] from 36 to 38 dollars per ton, completely finished; while [...] oak ship in the cheapest part of England, France, or Holland fitted in the same manner, will cost from 55 to 60 dollars per ton. The capital employed on the American merchantme [...] i [...] therefore one-third less on any given amount of tonnage th [...] that employed in the same amount of British tonnage; [...] the money requisite to build and equip for sea two British [Page]merchant ships, will be sufficient to build and equip for sea three American merchant ships of the same burden and of equal goodness. It is not only the difference in the first cost, but to this should be added the difference of interest and insurance, the annual amount whereof is ascertained by the value of the ships.

If we add to this, the comparative advantages that we possess in victualling and manning our vessels, independent of the acknowledged and distinguished skill and enterprize of our seamen, it may be safely affirmed, that no American who knows the character of his countrymen, and who is not ignorant of our peculiar resources for ship-building, will doubt our superiority in an equal and fair competition with any other nation.

It is further alleged, that the treaty wants reciprocity, inasmuch as the whole territory of the United States is laid open to the British navigation and commerce, while, in return, the British territories, in Europe only, are opened to us. The short answer to this allegation is, that it is not true.—All the British territories in Europe are laid open to us; all their territories in Asia are also opened to us; the treaty likewise opened all their territories in the West Indies. The article relative to this branch of trade, as has already been observed, is excepted from the ratification of the treaty, and made the subject of future negociation. The British territories on our continent, that of the Hudson's Bay company excepted, are also opened to us in like manner as ours are opened to them. The intercourse is confined on both sides to the interior communications, the inhabitants of those colonies being equally destitute of a right to resort, by sea, with their ships to our ports and harbours as we are of the right to resort, by sea, with our ships to their ports and harbours.

The territory of the Hudson's Bay company, the island of Newfoundland and the establishments on the coast of Africa, are the only British dominions to which the treaty, in its original form does not give a right of intercourse and trade.

The settlement in the Bay of Honduras is on Spanish lands, and the right of precedence is conceded for specified objects, beyond which the Spanish government are vigilant to restrain the settlers.

Spain may possibly be induced to allow us a right in common with Great Britain, to cut mahogany and die woods in this region; but Great Britain cannot, consistently with her convention with Spain, share with us the privilege that she enjoys,

[Page] Newfoundland is a mere establishment for the British fisheries. The African trade has been, and might hereafter be pursued, if our humanity and the force of public opinion did not impede it, without procuring a right to resort to the British ports in that quarter; and in respect to the unsettled territory of th [...] Hudson's Bay company, about which so much has been noti [...] and written, it is of no sort of importance, except in a small Indian trade that employs two or three annual ships which arrive there in August, and escape in September; besides, that this trade belongs to a company who possess a right to the exclusive enjoyment of it even against their fellow citizens. It is finally alleged that the treaty will bind up and restrain our gogernment from making more specific and beneficial treaties of commerce with other nations.

Those who urge this objection, have generally placed great reliance on another objection, which asserts that the treaty with Great Britain violates the constitution, because it amounts to a regulation of commerce, the power to regulate which is vested in congress and not in the executive.—Yet these very characters, in the next breath, maintain that the treaty is bad, because it precludes our executive government, (for no other power can make treaties) from making more minute and beneficial commercial treaties with other nations.—If these observations can be reconciled, it must be thus—The constitution [...] not authorize the executive, with the aid of the senate, [...] make a commercial treaty with Great Britain, having ve [...] in congress the power to regulate the trade between us and [...] nation; but it allows the executive to make commercial trea [...] with any other nation, which may establish the most mat [...] and minute commercial and revenue laws, without affecti [...], the power vested in congress to regulate trade.—That we [...] have characters among us sufficiently intemperate to wish [...] such was the constitution, I am not prepared to deny;—b [...] that such a construction can be made out, yet remains to be proved.

The objection, as usual, is made in a loose and inaccu [...] manner; literally interpreted, we should infer that the treaty contained an article, hereby we had agreed with Great Britain, that we would not form any future treaties of commerc [...] with any nation: But no such stipulation exists.

Is it meant by the objection to be alleged, that we can [...] no commercial treaty, whereby for an advantage yielded [...] our part, we may acquire a privilege in return, unless we [...] the same advantage to Great Britain gratuitously and without receiving from her the equivalent?

[Page] Admitting the truth of this objection, it might be replied: So on the other hand, Great Britain can form no commercial treaty, whereby, for an advantage yielded on her part, she may acquire some privilege in return, unless she yields the same advantage to us gratuitously and without receiving from [...] equivalent; and as Great Britain, whose commercial rela [...]s are equally extensive with ours, and whose capital far exceeds ours, is equally restrained on this point, our chance of gain would be fully equal to our chance of loss.

But the allegation is not generally true, and the objection, when examined, will be found to be of little weight, even with those who may imagine that nations do sometimes make good bargains by the purchase of privileges and exemptions in their foreign trade. The case that has been chosen to enforce the objection, shall be employed to invalidate it.

Admit that the treaty with Great Britain is in operation— that the oil and provision merchants of the United States, and the wine and brandy merchants of France are desirous of a treaty between the two countries, whereby those commodities shall be received from each other on low duties or freely—admit farther, that the governments of the two nations are disposed to make such a treaty (this is the case again put by the opposers of the treaty as impracticable) what will restrain the conclusion of this treaty? The disadvantage that will arise from our treaty with Great Britain? No, for Britain produces neither wines, nor brandy made from wines, with which she could supply us; she therefore could gain nothing, nor should we lose any thing by the conclusion of such a treaty. All that will be requisite, therefore, in the formation of such treaties, will be to choose for the purpose such articles of the growth, manufacture, or produce of any country with whom we desire to treat as are not common to it and the British dominions, and any skilful merchant will quickly make the selection—Hence it appears that the objection is not well founded in point of fact.

But though it may be practicable, will it be politic in us to conclude no commercial treaties of this character with any nation? If we resort to precedents as guides, we shall discover few, the history of which would encourage us. Indeed they are a description of conventions not often formed between nations.

They are of difficult adjustment, and necessarily increase the provisions of the commercial code, sufficiently intricate, when only one rule prevails in respect to all nations. Besides, however perfect may be the right of nations in this respect, yet [Page]when the productions of one nation are received at lower duties, than the like productions of another, the discrimination will scarcely fail to awaken desires and to produce dissatisfaction from their disappointment.

Again, unless we are prepared, at the expense of the whole to procure advantages or privileges for a part of the community, we shall doubt the policy of such stipulations. Between two manufacturing nations, in each of which the manufactures have attained to great perfection—a tariff of duties may be established by treaties, in the payment of which the manufactures of the two countries might be freely exchanged and mutually confirmed; such was the commercial treaty between France and Great Britain in the year 1786. But the subject was so intricate and involved such a variety of apparently independent circumstances, such as the price of provisions, the amount and the manner of levying of the taxes, and the price of the [...] materials employed in their respective manufactures, that [...] ther part felt entire confidence in the equity and reciprocity of the treaty: and with all the skill [...] n [...]ciation, that France in a superior degree has been supposed to have possessed, the opinion of that nation has finally been, that the treaty was b [...] densome and disadvantageous to them.

We have another specimen of this species of treaty in a sh [...] convention between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703— the object was to procure a favorable market for dissimilar commodities, and such as were not the common production of the two countries. But this treaty, which has been so much appla [...]ded, is essentially defective in point of reciprocity. England ag [...] to admit the wine of Portugal on payment of two-thirds of the duty that shall be payable on French wines—and in return, Portugal agrees not to prohibit the English woollens. She does [...] agree to receive them exclusively of the woollens of other countries, nor to admit them on payment of lower duties. The advantage therefore is manifestly on the side of Portugal. By the treaty of commerce between France and Great Britain, concluded in 1786, it was agreed, that the wines of France imported into Great Britain should pay no higher duties than [...] which the wines of Portugal then paid: The consequence m [...]st have been a reduction, without compensation or equivalent from Portugal, of the existing duties on the wines of that country brought into Great Britain, equal to one-third of the amount of such duties. This is an instance of inconvenience and loss, resulting from the species of treaties, which it is alleged as an objection to the treaty concluded between us and [Page]Great Britain, that we are prevented by it from making with other nations.

A small compact nation, likewise, who excel in some one species of manufacture, that is established throughout their territory, and in the conducting and success whereof there is a common interest, may find it useful to procure the exclusive supply of some foreign market: provided, in this as in all other bargains, the compensation shall not be too high. But in a nation like ours, composed of different states, varying in climate, productions, manufactures, and commercial pursuits, it will be more difficult to enter into treaties of this kind. Should Great Britain, for example, be inclined to admit our fish oils freely, or on payment of low duties on condition that we would receive their woollens or hardware freely or on payment of low duties—would the middle and southern states be satisfied with such a treaty?—would they agree to a tax on their estates sufficient to supply the deficiency in the revenue arising from the relinquishment of the impost on British woollens or hardware? Would it not be said, that such a tax was a bounty out of the common treasury, on a particular branch of business pursued alone by a portion of the citizens of a single state in the union? Instances might be multiplied in the illustration of this subject; but they will readily occur to every man who will pursue a little detail in his reflections. We have once made an experiment of this kind—its fate should serve as a caution to us in future. By the eleventh and twelfth articles of our treaty with France, it was agreed, that France should never impose any duty on the melasses that we should export from the French West Indies; and in compensation of this exemption, that we should never impose any duty on the exportation of any kind of merchandize by Frenchmen, from our territories, for the use of the French West Indies. These articles produced much dissatisfaction in congress: It was said to be a benefit that would enure to the use and advantage of only a part, but which must be compensated by the whole. Those arguments which will show themselves in future, should similar conventions be formed, were displayed on this occasion. The treaty was ratified, congress applied to the king of France to consent to annul these articles—this request was granted—and the articles were, by the several acts of the parties, annulled.

Not only the few instances of the existence of these treaties among the nations, added to the peculiar difficulties which we must meet in their formation, should lead us to doubt their utility, but also the opinion of our own country, which, if explicit [Page]on any point, has been repeatedly so in the condemnation of this species of national compact.

The introductory article of our commercial treaty with France, asserts, that the parties willing to fix on an equitable and permanent manner, the rules which ought to be followed relative to their correspondence and commerce "have judged that the said end could not be better obtained, than by taking for the basis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity, and by carefully avoiding all those burden some preferences which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment and discontent."

The same language is employed in our subsequent treati [...] with Holland and with Sweden; the public voice is unequivocal on this subject.

On the whole, the more closely this question is examined, the more doubtful will the policy appear of our entering into treaties of this description. We shall have to encounter not only the intrinsic difficulties that always attend a fair and prec [...] adjustment of the equivalents, together with the national [...] contents that proceed from errors on this point; but moreover a still greater embarrassment from the circumstance that [...] great staple exports are not the common productions of the whole union, but different articles are peculiar to different pa [...] thereof. If, notwithstanding, our government shall discover [...] instance in which, consistent with the common interest and so [...] policy, such a treaty might be desirable, we have scope sufficient to form it without incurring loss or disadvantage by the operation of our treaty with Great Britain.

CAMILLUS

No. XXIX.

THE sixteenth article is entirely conformable to the usage and custom of nations. The exchange of consuls had already taken place between us and Great Britain; and their functions and privileges being left to the definition of the law of nations, we shall be exempt from those unpleasant controversies that too often arise from special conventions, which enlarge the consular privileges, power, and jurisdiction.

The agreement that either party may punish, dismiss, or send back a consul for illegal or improper conduct, is calculated to prevent national misunderstandings, and to secure a respectful [Page]deportment in the consular corps. I have not observed that this article has been disapproved of from any quarter.

The seventeenth article which respects the capture and detention of the vessels of the parties on just suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or contraband of war, has been the object of intemperate censure—with how much justice it shall be the business of this paper to examine.

The principal complaint, is not, that the article exposed our own property to loss by capture, for this is not the case, but that it does not protect enemy's property on board our vessels. The defence of the article will rest upon the proofs which shall be exhibited, that it is in conformity with, and supported by, the clear and acknowledged law of nations—that law which pronounces that enemy's goods on the high seas are liable to capture, and as a necessary mean to this end, that neutral ships are there liable to examination or search.

The law of nature (as heretofore observed) applicable to individuals in their independent or unsocial state, is what, when applied to collections of individuals in society, constitutes the natural or necessary law of nations. An individual in a state of nature, for reparation of injuries, or in defence of his person and property, has a right to seize the property of his enemy, and to destroy his person.

Nations always succeed to the rights that the individuals who composed them enjoyed in a state of nature: and hence it is that by the law of nations, from the earliest annals of society, the goods or property of one enemy has been considered as liable to be seized and applied to the use of another. This right must be so used as not to injure the rights of others: Subject to this limitation, it is perfect, and an interruption of it by another is an injury. As in a contest between two individuals in a state of nature, no third has a right, without becoming a party in the controversy, to protect the property, or defend the person of either of the parties: So in a war between two nations no third nation can act out of its own jurisdiction, consistent with the duties of neutrality; or, without becoming a party in the war, protect the property of, or defend either of the parties. Though nations are, in respect to each other, like individuals in a state of nature, the resemblance is not in every particular perfect—Individuals in a state of nature have not only the inferior dominion or private ownership of property, but the entire and perfect dominion over it. In society the latter right belongs exclusively to the nation, while the former belongs to the several members that compose it. Immoveable things, such as lands, which are denominated the territory [Page]of a nation, are the immediate and special objects of this perfect dominion or paramount property. Moveable things are [...] proper obje [...] of inserior dominion or private ownership, and are no otherwise the objects of the national or paramount [...] perty than as they happen to be within its territorial limits. T [...] perfect dominion, or jurisdiction of a nation, in respect to [...] perty, extends over, and is bounded by, the lands thereof and the waters appurtenant to the same.

As soon, therefore, as moveable things pass out of those limits, they cease to be under the dominion or jurisdiction of the nation, the private property of whose members they may [...].

This private property, in moveable things, may be enjoyed within the territory of a nation, by those who are not members thereof. Hence in a war between two nations, a mem [...] of one of which owns moveables within the territory of a [...] or neutral nation, such moveables or property are not liable [...] seizure by reason of the war; because, being within and [...] the exclusive jurisdiction of a third nation, it would [...] injury to the right of such nation to go there and seize the [...] Soo long as such moveables remain within a foreign terr [...] they are objects of its dominion and protection; but as [...] they are carried out of the same, they cease to be any [...] under its jurisdiction or protection.

In a war between two nations, all the members of [...] are enemies to the other, and all the property of the [...] members, as well as the strictly national property, is lia [...] seizure. In general the character of the owner, whether [...] my or friend, decides whether property is liable to captu [...] reason of war; but the validity of the capture depends not [...] on the goods being enemy's property, but likewise on th [...] [...] that the place of capture is one in which the right may be [...] ercifed without injury to the rights of a neutral nation. [...] the property of an enemy is liable to capture only within [...] respective territories or jurisdiction of the belligerent nation, [...] in a place not within the territory or jurisdiction of any nati [...]. In either of these places the right may be exercised with [...] injury to the rights of neutral nations—The limitation of [...] right, so far as respects enemy's property found within [...] territory of one of the parties on the breaking out of war, [...] before been discussed and placed, I flatter myself, on solid principles.

The main ocean not being within the territory, or subject to the exclusive dominion or any nation, is a place, where enemy goods may lawfully be captured. An impediment by [Page]any third nation to the exercise of the right of capture on the ocean by either of the belligerent parties, would be an injury.

As the goods of an enemy, within the territory of a neutral state, are under the protection thereof, the law of nations, for the reasons that have been stated, will not permit us to take them: in like manner, we have no right to take them if they are on board a ship, whilst the ship is in a neutral port, whether the ship itself is a neutral one, or belongs to an enemy, because the port is a part of the territory.—When the goods of an enemy are on board the ship of an enemy, and the ship is in the main ocean, there is no doubt of our right to capture both the goods and the ship, because they are then in a place which is not the territory of any nation. But when the goods of an enemy are on board a neutral ship, and the ship is in the main ocean, though we have a right to take the goods, we have no right to take the ship, or to detain her any longer, than is necessary to obtain possession of the goods—for the ocean itself is no territory—and neutral ships, as they are moveable goods, can not be parts of the neutral territory; and consequently are no more under the protection of the neutral state, than the same goods would be, if they were passing through an unoccupied country in neutral carriages, or on neutral horses.

A neutral ship (says Rutherford in his institutes, whose reasoning on this question I adopt) may indeed be called a neutral place; but when we call it so, the word place does not mean territory, it only means the thing in which the goods are contained. Though the goods of the enemy had been on board a ship belonging to the enemy, we might have said, in the same sense, that they were in a neutral place, if they had been locked up there in a neutral chest. But no one would imagine, that such a neutral place, as a chest, can be considered as a part of the territory of the neutral state, or that it would protect the goods. Notwithstanding, a neutral chest is as much a neutral place as a neutral ship.

A ship, though a moveable thing, is under the jurisdiction of a nation whilst it continues in one of its ports—but as soon as it is out at sea, only the private ownership, or inferior dominion, of the ship remains, and it ceases to be under the dominion or jurisdiction of the nation. The case will be the same, if, instead of supposing the ship to be the property of a merchant, we suppose it to be the property of the nation.

For though we cannot well call the property which the nation has in such a ship, by the name of private ownership: yet, when the ship comes into the main ocean, the jurisdiction or [Page]paramount property ceases, and the right that remains is [...] inferior kind of property, which has the nature of private ownership. If the jurisdiction, which a neutral state has over the ships of its members, or even over its own ships, cea [...] when the ships are out at sea; the goods of an enemy, th [...] are on board such ships, cannot be under the protection of th [...] nation, in the same manner as if the ships had been in one of its ports, or as if the goods had been on its land.*.

Notwithstanding a neutral nation, when its ship is in th [...] main ocean, has no jurisdiction over the ship itself, as if it was a part of its territory, yet the nation, or some of its member, which is the same thing, will continue to have the inferior [...]or [...] of property, or ownership in it. This species of property will protect the ship from capture, though the enemy's goods o [...] board her may lawfully be taken.

But here a difficulty occurs—This inferior kind of property, called private ownership, to distinguish it from the jurisdiction, over things, is an exclusive right; those who have such ownership in things, whether private or public persons, have a right to exclude all others from making use of such things; and [...] this means, the rights of others are often hindered from [...] ing effect.

Wild beasts, birds, and fishes, are, till they are catched, [...] common to all mankind; and I, in common with others, ha [...] a right to take them, and thereby to make them my own— [...] I cannot hunt, or shoot, or fish, without perhaps something using the soil or water of another man; and as I have no [...] to use these without his consent, he may justly hinder me f [...] doing any of these acts, as far as his right of property exte [...] Thus by private ownership I am prevented from taking [...] things, as I should otherwise have a right to take, if they d [...] not happen to be in such places as he had an exclusive right [...] In like manner, though I have a right to take the goods of [...] enemy, when they are out at sea, yet may not the effect [...] this right be prevented by the inferior property or ownership which a neutral nation, or its members, have in the ship [...] which the goods are? If the law of nations is nothing but [...] law of nature applied to the collective persons of civil societ [...] instead of saying that the law of nations has decided other [...] we should disclose a natural reason why it should determi [...] [Page]otherwise. When I have merely a right to acquire property in a thing that is common to all mankind, but cannot do it without the use of what is already the property of some other man; this man neither does me an injury, nor encourages or protects others who have injured me, by excluding me from the use of what belongs to him. But when we have a right in war, upon account of the damage which the enemy has done us, to take goods of the enemy, and these are in a neutral ship: if the neutral state, though it has property in the ship, should make use of its right of property to protect the goods against us, this protection makes it an accessary to the injury, which is the foundation of the claim upon the enemy to obtain reparation of damages, and consequently is inconsistent wi [...]h the notion of neutrality.

But whilst this answer removes one difficulty, it brings another. If a neutral nation makes itself accessary to the damages done by the enemy, by protecting such enemy goods as she has a right to take for reparation of damages, when these goods are out at sea in one of its ships: Why might the same nation, without becoming in like manner an accessary, protect the same goods when the ship is in one of its ports, or when the goods are on land within its territory? A law of nations, which is natural as to the matter of it, and positive only as to the objects of it, will furnish an answer to this question.

Every state has, by universal acknowledgment and consent, by the law of nations, an exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory. As long, therefore, as a state keeps within its own territory, and exercises its jurisdiction there, the protection its question is not a violation of our rights—but when its ships are in the main ocean; as they are then in a place out of its territory, where, by the law of nations, it has no jurisdiction, this law will allow us to take notice of the protection, which it gives to the goods of an enemy, and to consider it as an [...]cessary to the damages done by the enemy, [...] gives them protection.

In respect to the right of examination or search, if the end it lawful, and the examination or search a necessary mean to attain this end, the inference is inevitable, that the examination or search i [...] likewise lawful.

If the question, whether enemy goods are seizable on board a neutral ship, were really doubtful; yet the right to search neutral ships must be admitted for another reason. All agree that arms, ammunition and other contraband articles, may not be carried to an enemy by a neutral power—without searching vessels at sea, such supply could not be prevented. The right [Page]to search, therefore, results, likewise, from the right to so [...] contraband goods. Again, the state of war authorizes the capture of enemy ships and goods—But on the main ocean, which is the great high-way where the ships and goods of all nations pass; how are the ships and goods of an enemy to be distinguished from those of a friend? No other way than by examination and search. Hence then the right of search is deducible from the general right to capture the ships and goods of an enemy.

It would undoubtedly disembarrass the commerce of neutral nations were passports and ships papers received, in all cases [...] conclusive evidence of the quality and property of the cargo. And did treaties, in fact, effectually secure an exemption [...] rude and detrimental inquisitions upon the ocean, they would become objects of inestimable worth to the neutral po [...]. But, notwithstanding the existence of stipulations in [...] other treaties which aim at giving some force to similar credentials, can it be said, that our ships have been visited with le [...] ceremony, by one party, than by the other? And may not the experience of other nations, as well as that of our own [...] appealed to, in proof of the opinion, that these stipulati [...] however exact and positive, are too little regarded by [...] class of men, to restrain and govern whose conduct they [...] instituted?

The right of search ought to be used with moderation, [...] with as little inconvenience as possible to the rights of national not engaged in the war. And the law of nations, on the [...] hand, requires the utmost good faith on the part of the [...] tral powers. They are bound not to conceal the property of [...] enemy, but on the contrary, to disclose it when examina [...] shall be made; in confidence of this impartiality, the la [...] nations obliges the powers at war to give credit to the [...] cates, bills of lading and other instruments of ownership [...] duced by th [...] masters of neutral ships, unless any fraud ap [...] in them, or there be good reason for suspecting their validity. [...] right of search is always at the peril of those who exercise [...] the right, notwithstanding, must be acknowledged to be in [...] bitable.

The reasoning employed to prove that all neutral ships, [...] main ocean, are liable to search, and enemy goods on [...] them to capture, is supported by the ablest writers on public law, and their decision is believed to be unanimously in [...] favor.

The Italian states were the first among modern nations, who cultivated the interests of commerce, and before the passage [...] [Page]the Cape of Good Hope, Venice and Genoa, distributed the manufactures of Asia throughout Europe. They, therefore, first defined the rights of navigation. Their maritime regulations are collected in a work called "Consolato del Mare;" I do not possess the collection, but find the following quotation from it in Grotius.*

"If both the ship and freight belong to the enemy, then, without dispute, they become lawful prize to the captor; but if the ship belong to those that be at peace with us, and the cargo be the enemy's, they may be forced by the powers at war, to put into any of their ports, and unlade; but yet the master must be satisfied for the freight of them."

Grotius, that learned, and persecuted friend of liberty, whose life and great talents were dedicated to the service of mankind, and who displayed so much ability and learning in defending the freedom of the seas, and of commerce, is clearly of opinion, that enemy goods are not protected by neutral bottoms; he even goes farther, and allows that such property occasions great presumption, that the vessel is, likewise, enemy property,† Bynkershook is of the same opinion.‡ Puffendorf‖ and Heinecius§ agree in this law, and Vattel who is the latest writer, is explicit in his opinion; "without searching neutral ships at sea," says he, "the commerce of contraband goods cannot be prevented—There is then a right of searching. Some powerful nations have, at different times, refused to submit to this. At present a neutral ship refusing to be searched, would, from that proceeding alone, be condemned as lawful prize." "Effects belonging to an anemy, found on board a neutral ship, are seizable by the rights of war; but by the law of nature, the master is to be paid his freight, and not to suffer by the seizure. The effects of neutrals, found on board an enemy ship, are to be restored to the owners, against whom there is no right of confiscation."

Other authors of respectability might be qu [...]; but those already named will be acknowledged as the a [...], and their authority the most decisive of any that can be cited—so strong, clear and uninterrupted, are the authorities of the writers on [Page]public law in relation to these points, that the advocates [...] opposite rule, may be challenged to produce a single authority of approved respectability in support of their opinion.*

CAMILLUS.

No. XXX.

ADMITTING that it was the law of nations that [...] my's goods might be seized in neutral ships, it is al [...] by Cato and other writers, who have appeared on the [...] side, that the treaties which have been formed between nations have annulled this law, and established another in its ste [...], equally extensive and binding on the whole civilized world.

In discussing this allegation, we should remember, that all nations are in a state of equality, and independent of each other. No law, other than the necessary or natural law of nations, is binding on any nation without its consent, expre [...] or tacitly given. A law among nations cannot, like a civil a municipal law, be annulled, or enacted by a majority, or [...] portion short of the whole. By agreement between two or [...] nations, the operation of a law already in existence, may [...] suspended so far as respects themselves; but such agree [...] works no change of such law, in relation to the rights or [...] ties of other nations. The same is true of any rule of active, established by convention between two nations; such rule [...] obligatory on the parties that form the contract, but is wh [...] without effect and nugatory in respect to all other nations. [...] less then all nations have concurred in the design to a [...] this law, it must still exist; and treaties containing opposite [...] pulations, can be considered in no other light, than as exceptions to the s [...]me, in which certain nations have seen it th [...] interest to [...].

Tho' one nation may have agreed with another to suspend [...] operation of this law, and to substitute the rule that free [...] make free goods, and enemy ships enemy goods, there [...] have been some peculiar reason that induced the parties to fo [...] this convention with each other, that would not apply in aspect to any other nation.

A nation may advance its interest perhaps by forming such a treaty, with one nation, and injure it by forming it with [Page]another—Because a nation has, in some instances, or for a limited time, formed stipulations of this sort, it cannot from thence be inferred, that it has thereby, in any sense, expressed its consent to a total repeal of a law, the operation of which it has agreed to suspend only for a limited time, and in respect to a particular nation. Commercial treaties, in which we discover these stipulations, though not always, are commonly limited in their duration. This limitation is a strong argument against the doctrine which these treaties are cited to establish. For so many years, say the parties, we will suspend the operation of the law. When the treaty expires by its proper limitation, or is dissolved by war, the rule of the treaty ceases, and the law is again in force between the parties, and, prescribes to them, in common with other nations, their rights and duties in this respect.

The law of nations, that authorizes the capture of enemy goods in neutral ships, requires the restoration of neutral goods captured in enemy ships: The treaties, which stipulate that free ships make free goods, stipulate also that enemy ships make enemy goods. I have discovered no instance of the former stipulation, that has not been accompanied by the latter: though I have found instances of the latter stipulation unaccompanied by the former.—This is the case in the treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Spain and England, concluded at Madrid in 1667. Those, therefore, who contend that the law of nations has been repealed in one instance, must also insist that it has been repealed in the other.—If the number of stipulations is to be received as evidence, the proof is stronger of a repeal in the latter than in the former case.—But will any one seriously maintain, that a nation would have a right to confiscate the goods of a neutral power found on board an enemy ship, without an express stipulation on the part of such neutral state consenting to the same?—Would England or Spain, for example, have a right to confiscate American property captured in a French ship? Would America [...]var, have a right to confiscate the neutral property of Spain, Portugal, Denmark, or Russia, found on board an enemy ship? Has any nation ever confiscated property under this circumstance? If not, the inference is clear, that these stipulations are exclusively relative to the parties who form them, and that the rights of other states remain under the protection of the law of nations.

But according to Cato, this reasoning may be just, yet inapplicable; for he maintains that all nations have consented to the establishment of this conventional law. "As far back as 150 years," says this writer, "and ever since, I find that the commercial [Page]nations have stipulated in their treaties, that free ships shall make free goods, that full credit shall be given to ships papers, and that armed vessels shall not come within cannon shot of a neutral ship, but send their boats on board with only two or three men at most, to examine papers, but not to search, and that the treaties (by which is understood all the treaties) for 150 years back, relative to this object, are drawn in the words of the treaty between the United States and France."

Struck with the fulness of this assertion, I have carefully examined such collections of treaties, as I have been able to procure, and going back to the year 1645, I have given a patient search to all the public conventions between Great Britain and the several powers of Europe since that period. I find, that since that epoch, Great Britain has concluded commercial treaties with Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Danizie, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.

In the treaties with Holland and with France, she has agreed to the stipulation, that free ships should make free goods, and enemy ships, enemy goods. In Chalmers's collection of treati [...], a similar stipulation is contained in the 23d article of the trea [...] of alliance, concluded in 1564, between Oliver Cromwell a [...] the king of Portugal; but in other collections, in which the treaty is found, it does not contain a stipulation that free th [...] shall make free goods; and it has been denied, from a rep [...] able quarter on the part of Great Britain, that she has ever acceded to this principle, except in the instances of her treat [...] with Holland and France; neither of which exist any longer, the former having expired long since, and the latter being dissolved by the present war. Her treaties with Spain, Dantzie, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, do neither of them contain this stipulation. On the contrary, the 12th article of the treaty with Sweden, and the 20th of the treaty with Denmark, [...] of which is now in force, and has been so for more than a century, as like [...] the 14th article of the treaty with Dantzie, declares, tha [...] lest the enemy's goods and merchandize should be conceabled under the disguise of the goods of friends, it is stipulated, that all ships shall be furnished with passports and certificates, by which it shall be manifest to whom the articles, composing the cargoes, belong:" and the two first of these treaties, moreover, declare it "to be injurious to protect the property of enemies," and establish special guards to prevent the same.

In relation to the full credit to be given to ships' papers, and the manner of boarding neutral vessels,—in the treaties with [Page]Spain, France, and Holland, it is stipulated, that full faith shall be given to the passports, and that the boarding shall be by two or three men only. But the treaties with Portugal and Russia are destitute of any stipulation on this subject, except that in the latter it is agreed,* that "the searching of merchant ships shall be as favorable as the reason of the war can possibly admit, toward the most favored neutral nation, observing, as near as may be, the principles of the law of nations that are generally acknowledged."† In the treaties with Dantzic, Denmark, and Sweden, passports are required for the purpose of distinguishing, according to the solemnities of those treaties, the enemy property on board the ships of the parties; and it is stipulated, that credit shall be given to such passports, except in cases of just and urgent cause of suspicion, when, say these treaties, the ship ought to be searched; an exception, that fully recognizes the right to search, essentially does away the security intended by the passports. But neither of these treaties contain any regulation relative to the manner of boarding neutral vessels.

This research, though made with care, may have been imperfect; the result thereof is, that there are only two, possibly three, of these eight nations, with whom Great Britain has ever agreed to the stipulation, that free ships shall make free goods; only three of them with whom she has stipulated, that full credit shall be given to passports or ships' papers, or with whom the manner of boarding is settled. Instead, therefore, of that uniformity and universality in the stipulations in the commercial treaties, concluded within the last 150 years, so confidently asserted by Cato, we see that in five instances out of eight, of treaties concluded between Great Britain and the principal powers of Europe, within that term, they have on each of these points, given their sanction to a law directly in opposition to the assertion of this adventurous writer.

Yet, says Cato, "the principles of the ar [...]d neutrality, by the general consent of the great community of the civilized world, changed the law of nations."—It is a singular logic that proves the agreement of nations by their disagreement, and their consent to a principle, by their drawing forth their fleet to dispute it. The armed neutrality, with those who understand its history, will not be relied on by way of proving a change in the law of nations, brought about by universal consent.

[Page] It will not be denied that this league, which was aimed principally against Great Britain, failed to accomplish its purpose, and that it expired with the American war. Nothing has been heard of it during the present war; and it is notorious, that Russia, and Holland before its conquest, were under agreements incompatible with the views of that association. The northern powers of Europe under the countenance of France, united to support the principles of the armed neutrality; but the league did not include all the neutral powers; and of the powers engaged in the war, at that period, Spain consented to observe the principles contended for by the confederacy, on condition that Great Britain would agree to them, who, so far from agreeing, openly resisted them.

On the same principle, by which it is contended that this association introduced a new law of nations, might the a [...] leagues between certain nations to prohibit all commerce wh [...] ever with an enemy, be appealed to in proof of an alteration of the law of nations in this respect. England and Holland [...] tered into such a league against France, in the year 1689; [...] other instances are mentioned by Grotius; yet no one has ever imagined that thereby any change was wrought in the law [...] nations.

The objection that has arisen from the dissimilarity between this article and those relative to the same subject in our [...] treaties, is equally defective with those already considered. The objection proceeds from an opinion that the law of nations [...] been changed, and that the stipulations in our other treaties are evidence thereof. The observations that have been off [...] on this subject, are equally applicable to this objection, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat them.

Not only reason, and the authority of jurists, but likewise the practice of nations, where they have been unrestrained [...] particular convention [...], may be appealed to in support of th [...] doctrine.

The practice of France, of Holland, even subsequent to particular stipulations, regulating this subject between themselves, has, in respect to other powers, been conformable to the law of nations—The ordinances and maritime decisions of France may be consulted to show what her practice has been, and that of Holland is evident by the convention of 1689, between her and England. The practice of Spain is understood to be the same; and in an instance that occurred during the American war, she carried the law to its utmost rigour, in assigning as a cause of condemnation of a neutral Tuscan ship, her forcible resistance of the right of search. Her capture of American [Page]ships, during the present war, on suspicion of their cargoes being enemy property, affords additional evidence of her practice and opinions on this subject. In respect to Great Britain, from the general notoriety of the fact, it seems, in some sort, unnecessary to add, that she has immemorially adhered, in her general practice, to the law of nations in its widest interpretation on this subject. In a few instances, and perhaps for special reasons, as was the case in respect to the treaty with Holland, concluded in 1667, she has entered into opposite stipulations; but at this time, unless it may be with Portugal, Great Britain has no such treaty with any nation.

So undisputed was the law on this subject, and so uniform the practice of nations in cases, not governed by a conventional rule, that congress, in the commencement, and through the greater part of our revolution war, authorized our ships of war and privateers, to capture enemy property on board neutral ships, and our admiralty courts uniformly restored neutral property found on board enemy ships. This practice continued years after the conclusion of our treaty with France, which contains a stipulation, that free ships shall make free goods, and enemy ships enemy goods; no person, during that period, having supposed that thereby the law was altered in respect to other nations.

Towards the close of the war, to favor the views of the armed neutrality, in which league the United States were not a party, but whose opposition to Great Britain they naturally approved; congress, in an ordinance on the subject of captures, ordained that neutral bottoms should protect enemy goods—but here they stopped. Thus far the authority was indubitable, because it was exercised only in abridgment of their own rights. Being engaged in war, they could not by their own act, enlarge their rights, or abridge those of neutral ships; the extent of both being defined and settled by the public law of nations. They, therefore, never authorized the capture and condemnation of neutral goods found in enemy ships, nor could they have authorized the same, without a manifest violation of the rights of the neutral powers.

It is finally alleged that the article, if sound in its principles, is defective in those provisions which are requisite to protect and secure the neutral rights of the parties; inasmuch as it does not contain an explicit stipulation for the payment of freight on enemy goods, nor for the payment of damages for the detention or loss of neutral ships taken without just cause. I do not recollect to have met with any precise stipulation on these points, in the commercial treaties between other nations.—None such, [Page]if my recollection be right, are found in any of our other twenties; and I think it would be somewhat difficult to form [...] as would afford to the parties a more satisfactory security than that which arises from the law of nations—a neutral ship is entitled to freight for enemy goods captured on board her; but this right, if so admitted, may be forfeited by the ir [...]g [...] conduct of the neutral, by the possession of false or double p [...] pers, by the destruction of papers, or by those fraudulent concealments and evasions, which are inconsistent with fair and impartial neutrality. A ship taken and detained without just cause, is, together with her cargo, at the risk of the cap [...] from the moment of capture; and in cases of partial or [...] loss, or of damages by detention, the owner is entitled to f [...] and complete indemnification. But in case the neutral ship i [...] under such equivocal and doubtful circumstances, as a [...] probable cause to believe that either the ship, or cargo, is enemy property, a situation not to be reconciled with an open [...] fair neutrality, in such case, though on trial both ship and cargo should turn out to have been bona [...]ide neutral property, yet the captors may avail themselves of her equivocal situation and character, in mitigation, if not, under very peculiar circumstances, in total discharge of damages. No stipulation, therefore, without these exceptions, would have afforded to [...] parties adequate security against such irregularities, and [...]th them, its want of precision would have left the subject as it [...] [...]ands, to be regulated by the known and approved provi [...] of the law of nations.

These provisions being well understood, the article co [...] with a stipulation against delays in the admiralty, and in the payment and recovery of the damages it shall decree.

This examination, I flatter myself, has fulfilled its obje [...], which was to prove, that the article relinquishes no right [...] we possessed [...] a nation, that it is agreeable to, and supp [...] by, the law of nations. A law in relation to this subject, [...] with the origin of maritime commerce, and the principles whereof have immemorially operated among nations.

It was desirable that a stipulation, similar to that co [...] in our other treaties, should have been obtained. But the time was unfavorable to the attainment of this object: and, as with great propriety has been observed by Mr. Jefferson, in [...] of our government—"since it depends on the will of o [...] nations as well as our own, we can only obtain it, when they shall be ready to consent." By the 12th article, the parti [...] agree to renew the negociation on this point, within the compass [Page]of two years after the conclusion of the present war; when perhaps the restoration of peace, and other circumstances, may prove more propitious to our views.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXI.

I RESUME the subject of the two last papers for the sake of a few supplementary observations.

The objections to the treaty, for not containing the principle, "that free ships make free goods," as being the relinquishment of an advantage, which the modern law of nations gives to neutrals, have been fully examined, and, I flatter myself, completely refuted.

I shall, however, add one or two re [...]ctions by way of further illustration. A pre-established rule of the law of nations, can only be changed by their common consent. This consent may either be exprest, by treaties, declarations, &c. adopting and promising the observance of a different rule, or it may be implied, by a course of practice or usage. The consent, in either case, must embrace the great community of civilized nations. If to be inferred from treaties, it must be shown that they are uniform and universal. It can, at least, never be inferred, while the treaties of different nations follow different rules, or the treaties between the same nation and others, vary from each other. So also as to usage. It must be uniform and universal, and, let it be added, it must be continued. A usage adopted by some nations, and resisted by others, or adopted by all temporarily and then discontinued, is insufficient to abolish an old, or substitute a new rule of the law of nations. It has been demonstrated, that no consent of either description has been given to the rule, which is contended for in opposition to the treaty.

The armed neutrality, so much quoted, is entirely deficient in the requisite characters. Its name imports that it was an armed combination of particular powers. It grew up in the midst of a war, and is understood to have been particularly levelled against one of the belligerent parties. It was resisted by that power. There were other powers, which did not accede to it. It is a recent transaction, and has never acquired the confirmation of continued usage. What is more, it has been virtually abandoned by some of the parties to it—and among [Page]these, by the principal promoter of it, the politic and ent [...] prising Catharine. It is, therefore, a perversion of all just ideas, to ascribe to such a combination the effect of altering a rule of the law of nations.

In most important questions, it is remarkable that the opposers of the truth are as much at variance with each other as they are with the truth they oppose. This was strikingly exemplified when the present constitution of the United States was under deliberation. The opposition to it was composed of the most incongruous materials—the same thing is observable in relation to the treaty.—And one instance of the contrariety applies to the rule cited above.

While some of the adversaries of the teeaty complain of the admission of a contrary principle by that instrument, as the abandonment of a rule of the present law of nations; others, conceding that there is no such rule yet established, censure that admission as a check to its complete and formal establishment and as a retrograde step from this desirable point.

The objection in this form is more plausible than in the other, but it is not less destitute of substance. If there has been any retrograde step, it was taken by the government prior [...] the treaty—authentic documents, which have been commu [...] cated by the executive to congress, contain the evidence of this fact.

Early in the year 1793, some British cruisers having stopped vessels of the United States, and taken out of them arti [...] which were the property of French citizens, Mr. Genet, [...] then minister of France, in a letter of the 9th of July of th [...] year, made a lively representation upon the subject to our government, insisting, in a subsequent letter of the 25th of that month, in which he recurs to the same point, that the pri [...] ples of neutrality established, that friendly vessels make friends goods; and in effect, that the violation of this rule by Gr [...] Britain was a violation of our neutral rights, which we w [...] bound to resent.

The reply of our government, is seen in a letter from ou [...] secretary of state to that minister, of the 24th of July—It [...] in these terms—"I believe," says Mr. Jefferson, "It cannot be doubted, but that by the general law of nations, the go [...] of a friend, found in the vessel of an enemy, are free, and the goods of an enemy, found in the vessel of a friend, are lawful prize. Upon this principle. I presume, the British armed vessels have taken the property of French citizens found in ou [...] vessels in the cases above mentioned; and, I confess, I should be at a loss on what principle to reclaim them. It is true that [Page]sundry nations, desirous of avoiding the inconveniencies of having their vessels stopped at sea, ransacked, carried into port, and detained under pretence of having enemy goods on board, have, in many instances, introduced, by their special treaties, another principle between them, that enemy bottoms shall make enemy goods, and friendly bottoms friendly goods; a principle much less embarrassing to commerce, and equal to all parties in point of gain and loss; but this is altogether the effect of particular treaty, controuling, in special cases, the general principles of the law of nations, and, therefore, taking effect between such nations only as have so agreed to controul it."

Nothing can be a more explicit or unequivocal abandonment of the rule, that free ships make free goods, and vice versa, than is contained in this communication. But this is not all: In the letter, from Mr. Jefferson to our minister in France, of the 26th of August, 1793, instructing him to urge the recall of Mr. Genet, the subject is resumed, the position asserted in answer to Mr. Genet, insisted upon anew, and enforced by additional considerations: Among other suggestions, we find these, "We suppose it to have been long an established principle of the law of nations, that the goods of a friend are free in an enemy's vessel, and an enemy's goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend. The inconvenience of this principle has induced several nations latterly to stipulate against it by treaty, and to substitute another in its stead, that free bottoms shall make free goods, and enemy bottoms, enemy goods. We have introduced it into our treaties with France, Holland, and Russia; and French goods, found by the two latter nations in American bottoms, are not made prize of. It is our wish to establish it with other nations:—But this requires their consent also, is a work of time, and, in the mean while, they have a right to act on the general principle, without giving to us or to France, cause of complaint. Nor do I see, that France can lose by it on the whole—For though she loses her goods, when found in our vessels, by the nations with whom we have no treaties—yet she gains our goods when found in the vessels of the same and all other nations; and we believe the latter mass to be greater than the former."

Thus, then, stood the business antecedent to the treaty. Great Britain, adhering to the principle of the general and long established law of nations, captures French property in our vessels, and leaves free our property in French vessels. We acquiesce in this practice, without even a remonstrance or murmur. The French minister complains of it, as contrary to the principles of neutrality—We reply, that, in our opinion, it is not contrary to those principles—that it is fully warranted by the [Page]general law of nations—that treaties, which establish a different rule, are merely exceptions to that law, binding only on the contracting parties; that having no treaty of the sort with Great Britain, we should be at loss on what ground to dispute the legitimacy of her practice. We do not simply forbear to oppose—We do not offer to France as an excuse for our forbearance, that it is inconvenient to us, at the moment, to assert a questionable right at the hazard of war—But we tell her peremptorily, that in our opinion, no such right exists, and that the conduct of Great Britain, in the particular case, is justified by the law of nations—neither do we wrap the motive of our forbearance in silence, nor content ourselves with revealing it confidentially to France alone; but we publish it without reserve to the world, and thus, in the presence of Great Britain, and of every other nation, make a formal renunciation of the pretension, that "free ships shall make free goods, and enemy ships enemy goods:" no counter declaration is heard from either house of congress.

It was impossible to give a more full sanction to the opposite principle than was given by this conduct, and these public and positive declarations of our government. It was impossible more completely to abandon the favorite ground. It is puerile to attempt to discriminate between the force of this species of renunciation and that of an admission of its propriety by treaty. The conduct of a government avowed and explained, as in motives, by authentic public declarations, may assert or renounce a pretension as effectually as its compacts—Every nation, with whom we had no contrary stipulation, could say to us as [...] before as since the treaty with Great Britain, "your government has explicitly admitted that free ships do not make free goods, and you have no right to complain of our not observing that rule towards you." Candour, therefore, would oblige us to say that the treaty has left this point where it found it—that it has only not obtained from Great Britain a concession in favor to establish, but which cannot be claimed as matter of right. Though, therefore, it may not have the merit of strengthening, it has not the demerit of weakening the ground.

The difference in our position, in this respect, before and since the treaty, amounts to this, that before the treaty the government had abandoned the ground through one organ, Mr. Jefferson; by the treaty, it continued the abandonment through another organ, Mr. Jay—if we consider the organ as the [...]oluntary cause in each case, (the presumption of which is equally fair in both cases) and if there be any blame, it falls more heavily [Page]on Mr. Jefferson than on Mr. Jay; for the former founded and made the retreat, and the latter only did not advance from the disadvantageous post to which he had retreated. In other words, Mr. Jay did only not recover the ground which Mr. Jefferson had lost. And we know that, in general, it is a far more difficult task to regain than to keep an advantageous position.

But, in truth, no blame can justly be imputed in either case. The law of nations was against the rule which it is desired to introduce. The United States could not have insisted upon it as matter of right; and in point of policy it would have been madness in them to go to war, to support an innovation upon the pre-established law. It was not honorable to claim a right, and suffer it to be infracted without resistance. It is not for young and weak nations to attempt to enforce novelties or pretensions of equivocal validity. It is still less proper for them to contend, at the hazard of their peace, against the clear right of others. The object was truly not of moment enough to risk much upon it. To use a French proverb, "The play was not worth the candle." In every view, therefore, it was wise to desert the pretension.

So also, in the midst of war, like that in which Great Britain was engaged, it were preposterous to have expected, that she would have acceded to a new rule, which, under the circumstances of her great maritime superiority, would have operated so much more conveniently to her enemy than to herself. And it would have been no less absurd to have made her accession to that rule the sine qua non of an arrangement, otherwise expedient. Here again the play would not have been worth the candle.

The importance of the rule has artfully been very much magnified, to depreciate proportionably the treaty, for not establishing it. It is to be remembered, that if something is gained by it, something is also given up. It depends on incalculable circumstances, whether, in a particular war, most will be lost or gained. Yet the rule is, upon the whole, a convenient one to neutral powers. But it cannot be pretended that it is of so great a value, as that the United States ought to adopt it as a maxim, never to make a treaty of commerce, in which it was not recognized. They might by this maxim forego the advantages of regulating their commercial intercourse in time of peace with several foreign powers, with whom they have extensive relations of trade, by fixed and useful conventional rules, and still remain subject in time of war to the inconveniencies of not having [Page]established, with those powers, the principle to which they make that sacrifice.

Though, therefore, it be a merit to a certain extent in a treaty to contain this principle, it is not a positive fault or blemish, that it does not contain it. The want of it is not a good cause of objection to a treaty otherwise eligible.

Let me add, too, in the spirit of Mr. Jefferson's letter, that however it may be our wish to establish the rule with other nations besides those with whom we have already done it, this requires their consent also, of course their conviction, that it is their interest to consent; and that, considering the obstacles which lie in the way, the attainment of the object must be "a work of time." It pre-supposes, in some of the principal maritime powers, a great change of ideas, which is not to be looked for very suddenly. It was not, therefore, to have been expected of our envoy, that he was to have accomplished the point at so premature and so favorable a juncture.

The assertion, that he has abandoned it, is made in too unqualified a manner. For while he admits the operation for the present, of the general rule of the law of nations, he has, by the 12th article, engaged Great Britain in a stipulation, that the parties will, at the expiration of two years after the existing war, renew their discussion, and endeavour to agree whether in any, and what cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property. It is true, it will be in the option of Great Britain then, to agree or not: but it is not less true that the principle is retained with consent of Great Britain in a negociable state. So far perhaps some ground has been retrieved.

I confess, however, that I entertain much doubt as to the probability of a speedy general establishment of the rule, that friendly ships shall make friendly goods, and enemy ships enemy goods. It is a rule against which, it is to be feared, the preponderant maritime power, to whatever nation this character may belong, will be apt to struggle with perseverance and effect, since it would tend to contract materially the means of that power to annoy and distress her enemies, whose inferiority on the sea would naturally cause their commerce, during war, to be carried on in neutral bottoms. This consideration will account for the resistance of Great Britain to the principle, and for the endeavours of some other powers to promote it—and it deserves notice, that her last treaty with France was severely assailed by some of the chiefs of opposition, for containing a stipulation in favor of that principle. The motive for consenting to it, in this instance, probably was, that the stipulation was likely to be rendered, in a great degree, nugatory by the relative situation [Page]of the two nations, which, in almost any war in which one of the two was engaged on one side, would probably render the other a party on the opposite side.

If these conjectures be right, there is a reflection which lessens much the value of stipulations in favor of the rule; that so long as one or more of the maritime powers disavow it, there will be a strong temptation to depart from a scrupulous observance of such stipulations, as we, in relation to France, have experienced in the present war.

In the course of the arguments against the 17th article, for virtually admitting the right of search in time of war, the objectors have had the temerity to cite the opinion of Vattel, as being opposed to that right; and a mutilated quotation has given an appearance of truth to the assertion. It has been heretofore shown, by passages extracted from his work, that his opinion, so far from denying explicitly, supports the right to search. But it may be useful to examine the part of it which has been tortured into a contrary inference.

After affirming the right of search (B. 3. chap. 7, 8. 14) he proceeds thus, "but to avoid inconveniencies, violence, and every other irregularity, the manner of the search is settled in the treaties of navigation and commerce. According to the present custom, credit is to be given to certificates and bills of lading produced by the master of the ship." Hence it is alleged the right to search is turned into the right of inspecting the ship's papers, which, being entitled to credit, are to preclude further scrutiny.

But what immediately follows, destroys this conclusion! the words "unless any ground appear in them, or there be very good reasons for suspecting their validity," are subjoined to the clause just quoted. This admits clearly, that the ship's papers are not to be conclusive—But that, upon just cause of suspicion, the papers may be disregarded, and the right of search may be exercised.

Who is to be the judge of the credit due to the papers and of the just cause of suspicion? Manifestly the officer of the belligerent party, who visits the neutral vessel. Then what does the whole amount to?—Merely this—That ship's papers are entitled to a certain degree of respect and credit; how much, is left to the discretion of the officer of the belligerent party!—who, if he be not satisfied of the fairness and validity of the papers, may proceed to their verification, by a more strict and particular search, and then if he still sees, or supposes he sees, just cause of suspicion, he may carry the vessel into a port of his own country, for judicial investigation—In doing this, he acts at his peril, [Page]and for an abuse of his discretion exposes himself to damages and other punishment.

This is the true and evident sense of Vattel, and it agrees with the doctrine advocated in these papers, and, I will add, with the treaty under examination.

The 17th article admits, that the vessels of each party for just cause of suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or of carrying to the enemy contraband articles, may be captured or detained, and carried to the nearest and most convenient port of the belligerent party, to the end that enemy's property and contraband articles on board may become lawful prize. But so far from countenancing any proceeding without just cause of suspicon, or from exonerating the officer of the belligerent party from a responsibility for such proceeding, it leaves the law of nations, in this particular, in full force, and contemplating that such officer shall be liable for damages, when he proceeds without just cause of suspicion, provides that all proper measures shall be taken to prevent delay in deciding the cases of ships or cargoes brought in for adjudication, or in the payment or recovery of any indemnification adjudged or agreed to be paid to the masters or owners of such ships. Besides which, the 19th article stipulates, in order that more abundant care may be taken for the security of the respective subjects and citizens of the contracting parties, and to prevent their suffering injuries by the men of war and privateers of either party, that the commanders of ships of war and privateers, shall forbear doing any damage to those of the other party, committing any outrage against them; and that if they act to the contrary, they shall be punished, and shall also be bound in their persons and estates, [...] make satisfaction and reparation for all damages, and the interest thereof, of whatever nature the said damages may be. And further, after establishing that the commanders of privateers shall, before they are commissioned, give security to satisfy all damages and injuries, it adds, that in all cases of aggressions their commissions shall be revoked and annulled.

These provisions not only conform to, and corroborate the injunctions of the laws of nations: but they refute the assertion, that the treaty is altogether deficient in precautions for guarding neutral rights; since those above-mentioned are among the most efficacious.—It is not presumable that any stipulations have been or can be made which will take away all discretion from the marine officers of the belligerent parties; for this would be a total surrender of the rights of belligerent to neutral nations, and so long as any discretion [...] le [...]t, its right or wrong exercise will depend on the per [...]onal character of each officer: [Page]and abuses can only be restrained by the penalties that await them. Those stipulations of treaties, then, which re-inforce the laws of nations as to the infliction of penalties, are the most effectual of the precautions which treaties can adopt for the security of neutral rights; and in this particular the treaty with Great Britain is to the full as provident as our other treaties. In one point I believe it is more so; for it expressly stipulates a revocation of the commissions of the commanders of privateers, for the aggressions they may commit.

Is not the passage last cited from Vattel a true commentary on those stipulations, for regulating and mitigating the right of search, which are found in our own and other treaties? Do they not all intend to reserve to the belligerent party a right of judging of the validity and fidelity of the papers to be exhibited, and of extending the search or not, according to the circumstances of just suspicion which do or do not appear? and if this be their true construction, as it certainly is their construction in practice, which our own experience testifies, to what, after all, do they amount, more than without them the laws of nations, as universally recognized, of themselves pronounce? What real security do they afford more than the treaty with Great Britain affords?

It is much to be suspected, that there will always be found advantages essentially nominal, operating or not according to the strength or weakness of the neutral party; which, if strong, will find abundant foundation in the acknowledged laws of nations on which to rest the protection of its rights.

It has been said to be just matter of surprize, that these precautions should have no place in a treaty with Great Britain, whose conduct on the seas, so particularly suggested and enforced every guard to our rights that could be reasonably insisted on. Observations of this kind assume constantly the supposition, that we had it in our power to fashion every provision of the treaty exactly to our own taste, and that the ideas of the other contracting party were to have no influence even upon the minor features of the contract. But this supposition is absurd; and a treaty may still be entitled to our approbation, which adjusts acceptably the great points of interest, though in some of its details it falls short of our desires. Nor can any well-informed man sincerely deny that it was to have been expected, that an adjustment of the particulars in question, would fall short of our ideas. It may be answered, that we were then at liberty not to make the treaty; so we were; but does it follow that it would have been wise to split on such points?—upon a just estimate, their intrinsic value is very moderate.

CAMILLUS.

[Page]

No. XXXII.

THE eighteenth article of the treaty, which regulates the subject of contraband, has been grievously misrepresented; the objections used against it with most acrimony, are disingenuous and unfounded! Yet while I make this assertion, which, I flatter myself, I shall be able to prove, I shall not pretend to maintain that it is an article completely satisfactory. I even admit that it has one unpleasant ingredient in it, and I am convinced that our envoy must have consented to it with reluctance.

But while candour demands this concession, it equally admonishes us, that, under the circumstances of the moment, the points in this respect to be adjusted were peculiarly unmanageable —that the position of the other party rendered an arrangement, entirely agreeable to us, impracticable; that without compromise nothing could have been regulated; that the article made no change for the worse in our prior situation, but i [...] some particulars made our ground better; and that estimating truly the relative circumstances of the parties, there is no probability that any thing more acceptable could have been established.

I will add, that a degree of imperfection, which may fairly be attributed to this article, is far from being of such im [...] ance, as, on solid calculations, ought to defeat the treaty— [...] clear right is abandoned, no material interest of the nation injured.

It is one thing, whether every part of the treaty be satisfactory —another, and a very different thing, whether in the aggregate it be eligible or not, and ought to be accepted or rejected. Nations could never make contracts with one another, if each were to require that every part of it should be adjusted by its own standard of right and expediency. The true question always is upon the collective merits of the instrument; whether, upon the whole, it reasonably accommodates the opinions and interests of the parties. Tried by this test, the treaty negociated with Great Britain, fully justifies the acceptance of it by the constituted authorities of our country, and claims the acquiescence of every good citizen.

The most laboured, and, at the same time, the most false of the charges against the eighteenth article is, that it allows p [...] visions to be contraband in cases not heretofore warranted by the laws of nations, and refers to the belligerent party, the decision of what those cases are.—This is the general form of [Page]the charge. The draft of a petition to the legislature of Virginia, reduces it to this shape. The treaty "expressly admits, that provisions are to be held contraband in cases other than when bound to an invested place, and impliedly admits, that such cases exist at present."

The first is a palpable untruth, which may be detected by a bare perusal of the article.—The last is an untrue inference, impregnated with the malignant insinuation that there was a design to sanction the unwarrantable pretension of a right to inflict famine on a whole nation.

Before we proceed to an analysis of the article, let us review the prior situation of the parties. Great Britain, it is known, had taken and acted upon the ground, that she had a right to stop and detain, on payment for them, provisions belonging to neutrals, going to the dominions of France. For this violent and impolitic measure, which the final opinion of mankind will certainly condemn, she found colour, in the sayings of some writers of reputation, on public laws.

A passage of this kind, from Vattel, has been more than once quoted, in these terms, "Commodities, particularly used in war, and the importation of which, to an enemy, is prohibited, are called contraband goods. Such are military and naval st [...]res timber, horses, and even provisions in certain junctures, when there are hopes of reducing the enemy by famine." Heinecius* countenances the same opinion, and even Grotius seems to [...]an towards it.†

The United States, with reason, disputed this construction of the law of nations! restraining the general propositions which appear to favor it, to those cases in which the chance of reducing by famine was manifested and palpable, such as the cases of particular places, bona fide, besieged, blockaded or invested. The government accordingly remonstrated against the proceeding of Great Britain, and made every effort against it which prudence, in the then posture of affairs, would permit. The order for seizing provisions, was, after a time, revoked.

In this state our envoy found the business, pending the very war in which Great Britain had exercised the pretension, with the same administration which had done it, was it to have been expected that she would, in a treaty with us, even virtually or impliedly have acknowledged the injustice or impropriety of the conduct? Here was no escape, as in the instance of the [Page]order of the 6th of November, 1793, in the misconceptions of her officers. The question was to condemn a deliberate and unambiguous act of the administration itself. The pride, the reputation, and the interest of that administration forbade it.

On our side, to admit the pretensions of Great Britain was still more impossible.—We had every inducement of character, right, and interest against it. What was the natural and only issue out of this embarrassment? Plainly, to leave the point unsettled; to get rid of it; to let it remain substantially where it was before the treaty. This, I have good ground to believe, was the real understanding of the two negociators; and the article has fulfilled that view.

After enumerating specifically what articles shall be deemed contraband, it proceeds thus, "And whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniencies and misunderstandings which might thence arise: It is further agreed, that whenever any such articles, so becoming contraband according to the laws of nations, shall, for that reason, be seized, the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, [...] in their default, the government under whose authority they act, shall pay to the masters or owners of such vessels, the [...] value of all articles with a reasonable mercantile profit the [...] together with the freight and also the demurrage, incident [...] such detention."

The difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases in which a [...] cles, not generally contraband, become so, from particular [...] cumstances, is expressly assigned as the motive to the stipula [...] which follows.—This excludes the supposition that any [...] whatever were intended to be admitted or agreed. But this [...] ficulty rendered it expedient to provide against the inconveni [...] cies and misunderstandings which might thence arise—a pro [...] sion, with this view, is, therefore, made, which is that [...] liberal compensation for the articles taken—The evident in [...] of this provision is, that in doubtful cases, the inconvenienci [...] to the neutral party being obviated or lessened by compensation there may be the less cause of temptation to controversy and rupture—the affair may be the more susceptible of negociation and accommodation. More than this cannot be pretended; because it is further agreed, "that whenever any such articles, so become contraband, according to the existing laws of nations, shall, for that reason, be seized, the same shall not be confiscated, [Page]but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified," &c.

Thus the criterion of the cases, in which articles, not generally contraband, may, from particular circumstances, become so, is expressly the existing law of nations; in other words, the law of nations at the time the transaction happens. When these laws pronounce them contraband, they may, for that reason, be seized; when otherwise, they may not be seized. Each party is as free as the other to decide whether the laws of nations do, in the given case, pronounce them contraband or not, and neither is obliged to be governed by the opinion of the other. If one party, on a false pretext of being authorized by the laws of nations, makes a seizure, the other is at full liberty to contest it, to appeal to those laws, and, if it thinks fit, to oppose, even to reprisals and war. This is the express tenor of the provision—there is nothing to the contrary; nothing that narrows the ground; nothing that warrants either party in making a seizure, which the laws of nations, independent of the treaty, permits; nothing which obliges either party to submit to one, when it is of opinion the law of nations has been violated by it.

But as liberal compensation is to be made in every case of seizure, whereof difference of opinion happens, it will become a question of prudence and expediency, whether to be satisfied with the compensation, or to seek further redress. The provision will, in doubtful cases, render an accommodation of opinion the more easy, and, as a circumstance conducing to the preservation of peace, is a valuable ingredient in the treaty. A very different phraseology was to have been expected, if the i [...]ention had been, to leave each party at liberty to seize, agreeably to its own opinion of the law of nations, upon the condition of making compensation—The stipulation would thus have been: "It is agreed, that whenever either of the contracting parties shall seize any such articles so becoming contraband, and which shall, for that reason, be seized;" this makes, not the opinion of either party, but the fact of the articles having become contraband by the laws of nations, the condition of the sei [...]re.

A cavil has arisen on the term "existing," as if it had the effect of enabling one of the parties to make a law of nations for the occasion. But this is a mere cavil.

No one nation can make a law of nations; no positive regulation of one state, or of a partial nomination of states, can pretend to this character. A law of nations is a law which nature, agreement, or usage has established between nations; as [Page]this may vary from one period to another by agreement or usage, the article very properly uses the term "existing," to denote that law, which at the time the transaction may happen, shall be then the law of nations. This is a plain and obvious use of the term, which nothing but a spirit of misrepresentation could have perverted to a different meaning.

The argument against the foregoing construction is in substance this (viz.) it is now a settled doctrine of the law of nations, that provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, can only become so when going to a place besieged, blockaded, or invested—cases of this kind are fully provided for in a subsequent part of the article; the implication therefore is, that something more was intended to be embraced in the antecedent part.

Let us first examine the fact, whether all the cases of that kind are comprehended in the subsequent part of the article. I say they are not—the remaining clause of the article divides itself into two parts. The first describes the case of a vessel sailing for a port or place belonging to any enemy, without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded, or invested; and provides, that, in such case, the vessel may be turned away, but not detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, confiscated, unless after not [...]ce she shall again attempt to enter: The second [...]efer bes [...] the case of a vessel, or goods, which had entered into [...] or place before it was besieged, blockaded, or invested, [...] [...]ares that the one or the other shall not be liable to confis [...], but shall be restored to the owners thereof. These a [...] th [...] only cases described or provided for. A third, which occ [...] on the slightest reflection, is not mentioned: the case of a v [...] sel going to a port or place which is besieged, blockaded or invested, with notice of its being in that state when she commences her voyage, or previous to her receiving notice from the besieging, blockading, or investing party. This is left to the operation of the general law of nations, except so far as it may be affected in respect to compensation by the antecedent clause. Thus the fact, which is the foundation of the argument, fails, and with it, of course, the argument itself.

But had this been otherwise, the conclusion would still have been erroneous—the two clauses are entirely independent of each other, and though they might both contemplate the same cases in whole, or in part, they do it with an eye to very different purposes.

The object of the first is to lessen the danger of misunderstanding, by establishing this general rule, that wherever articles, not commonly contraband, become so from particular circumstances, [Page]according to the law of nations, they shall still not be confiscated, but, when seized, the owners of them shall be indemnified.

The object of the last is to regulate some special consequences with regard to vessels and goods going to, or which had previously gone to places besieged, blockaded, or invested; and in respect to which the dispositions of the laws of nations may have been deemed doubtful or too rigorous. Thus it is held, that the laws of nations permit the confiscation of ships and goods going to places besieged, blockaded, or invested; but this clause decides, that if going without notice, so far from being confiscated, they shall not even be detained, but shall be permitted to go withersoever they please. If they persist after notice, then the contumacy shall be punished with confiscation. In both instances the consequence is entirely different from every thing in the antecedent clause.

There, there is seizure, with compensation. Here, in one instance, seizure is forbidden, and permission to go elsewhere is enjoined. In the other instances, the offending things are confiscated, which excludes the idea of compensation. Again, the last part of the last clause stipulates in the case, which it supposes, the restoration of the property to its owners, and so excludes both seizure and compensation. Hence it is apparent the objects of the two clauses are entirely foreign to each other, and that no argument nor inference whatever can be drawn from the one to the other.

If it be asked, what other cases there can be, except those of places besieged, blockaded, or invested? and if none other, what difficulty in defining them? why leave the point so vague and indeterminate? One answer, which indeed has already been given in substance, is, that the situation of one of the parties prevented an agreement at the time; that not being able to agree, they could not define; and the alternative was to avoid definition—The want of definition only argues want of agreement. It is strange logic to assert, that this or that is admitted, because nothing is defined.

Another answer is, that even if the parties had been agreed that there were no other cases than those of besieged, blockaded, or invested places, still there would have remained much room for dispute about the precise cases, owing to the impracticability of defining what is a besieged, blockaded, or invested place. About this there has been frequent controversy; and the fact is so complicated, puts on such a variety of shapes, that no definition can well be devised, which will suit all. Thence nations, in their compacts with each other, frequently do not [Page]attempt one; and where the attempt has been made, it has left almost as much room for dispute about the definition as there was about the thing.

Moreover, is it impossible to conceive other cases than those mentioned above, in which provisions and other articles not generally contraband might, on rational grounds, be deemed so? What if they were going expressly, and with notice, to a besieging army, whereby it might obtain a supply essential to the success of its operations? Is there no doubt that it would be justifiable in such case to seize them? Can the liberty of trade be said to apply to any instance of direct and immediate aid to a military expedition? It would be at least a singular effect of the rule, if provisions could be carried without interruption for the supply of a Spanish army besieging Gibra [...], when, if destined for the supply of the garrison in that place, they might, of right, be seized by a Spanish fleet.

The calumniators of the article have not had the candour [...] notice that it is not confined to provisions, but speaks of provisions and other articles. Even this is an ingredient which combats the supposition that countenance was intended to be gi [...] to the pretension of Great Britain with regard to provisions, which, depending on a reason peculiar to itself, cannot be d [...] ed to be supported by a clause including orther articles, to whi [...] that reason is entirely inapplicable.

There is one more observation which has been made against this part of the article which may deserve a moment's atten [...]. It is this, that though the true meaning of the clause, be [...] as I contend for, still the existence of it affords to Great [...] a pretext for abuse which she may improve to our disadvanta [...] I answer, it is difficult to guard against all the perversions [...] contract which ill faith may suggest. But we have the [...] security against abuses of this sort, which we have against those of other kinds, namely, the right of judging for oursel [...] and the power of causing our rights to be respected. We have this plain and decisive reply to make, to any uncandid const [...] tion which Great Britain may, at any time, endeavour to [...] "The article pointedly and explicitly makes the existing law of nations, the standard of the cases in which you may rightf [...]y seize provisions and other articles not generally contraband. This law does not authorize the seizure in the instance in question; you have consequently no warrant under the treaty for what you do."

The same disingenuous spirit which tinctures all the conduct of the adversaries of the treaty, has been hardy enough to impute [Page]to it the last order of Great Britain, to seize provisions going to the dominions of France.

Strange, that an order issued before the treaty had ever been considered in this country, and embracing the other neutral powers besides the United States, should be represented as the fruit of that instrument!* The appearances are, that a motive no less imperious than that of impending scarcity, has great share in dictating the measure, and time, I am persuaded, will prove that it will not ever be pretended to justify it by any thing in the treaty.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXIII.

THE course thus far pursued in the discussion of the 18th article, has inverted the order of it, as it stands in the treaty. It is composed of three clauses; the two last of which have been first examined—I thought it adviseable, in the outset, to dispose of an objection which has been the principal source of clamour.

The first clause of that which remains to be examined, enumerates the articles, which, it is agreed, shall be deemed contraband of war. These are, "all arms, and implements serving for the purpose of war, such as cannon, musquets, mortars, petards, bombs, grenadoes, carcases, saucisses, carriages for cannon, musquet-rests, bandoliers, gunpowder, match, salt-petre, balls, pikes, swords, head-pieces, cuirasses, halberts, lances, javelins, horse furniture, holsters, belts, and generally all other implements of war; as also timber for ship-building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron and fir planks only excepted."

All which articles are declared to be just objects of confiscation, when attempted to be carried to any enemy of either party.

It is well understood, that war abridges the liberty of trade of neutral nations; and that it is not lawful for them to supply either of two belligerent parties with any article deemed contraband of war; nor may they supply any article whatever to a [Page]place besieged, blockaded or invested. The former case includes a special catalogue of articles which have an immediate reference to war—The latter extends to all kinds of goods and merchandize. The penalty in both cases is confiscation.

These positions have not been disputed. The only question which has been or can be raised, must respect the enumeration of the articles which are to be considered as contraband.

In comparing the enumeration in the present treaty, with that of our former treaties, we find the differences to be these. Our former treaties include "horses," and one of them "soldiers," which our present does not; but our present includes "timber for ship-building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, said, hemp, and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron and fir planks only excepted," which are not to be found in our former treaties.

It is alleged that the including of these articles is an extention of the list of contraband beyond the limit of the [...] law of nations; in support of which allegation, it is affirmed, that they have been excluded by the uniform tenor of the treaties which have been formed for more than a century past.

Though this position will not, upon careful examination, appear correct; yet it is so far founded, as to claim an acknowledgment, that the article under consideration has, in this instance, pursued the rigor of the law of nations. It was to this, I alluded, when I observed that it contained one unpleasant ingredient.

It is a fact, that far the greater proportion of modern [...] ties exclude naval stores or articles for ship-building; yet this is not universally the case.

By the third article of the treaty of alliance and comment between Great Britain and Denmark, in 1670, the parties agree "not to furnish the enemies of each other with any provisions of war, as soldiers, arms, engines, guns, ships or other necessaries for the use of war, nor to suffer the same to be furnished by their subjects." An explanation of this article was made by a convention, dated the 4th of July, 1780, which, after enumerating as contraband, the usual catalogue of military implements, adds, in the precise terms of our article, "as also timber for ship-building, tar, rosin, copper i [...] sheets, sails, hemp, and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron, and fir planks only excepted."

In a series of treaties between Great Britain and Portugal, down to the year 1703, I do not discover that there has ever [Page]been a regulation of the articles which are to be treated as contraband, between these powers.

And between Sweden and Great Britain, the 11th article of a treaty, entered into in 1661 (and still in force unaltered, though a subsequent commercial treaty was made between these powers as late as 1776) subjects to confiscation equally all articles called contraband, and especially money, provisions, &c. The specification not being complete, naval stores are left upon the open ground of the law of nations; but money and provisions are superadded—This latitude would bear little doubt as to the intention to include naval stores.*

It appears from these specimens, that there is not a perfect uniformity in the conventions between nations; and that no purely positive law of nations can be deduced from that source.

If we call to our aid the principles of reason and natural justice, which are the great foundations of the law of nations, we shall not discover, in this instance, data as certain as could be wished, for a satisfactory conclusion; and the soundest determination, which we can adopt, will be, that beyond a certain point, the question is in a great degree arbitrary, and must depend materially upon conventional regulation between nation and [Page]nation.—Hence it is there is so great a diversity in the stipulations of different parties on this point; indicating that there is no absolute rule. Hence also it is, that several nations, at different times, being at war, have thought themselves authorized to regulate and announce, by public declarations, the article which they would consider and treat as contraband.

The opinion of writers will be found to support the article as it stands, in the particular, which is now the subject of discussion.

Vattel, we have before seen, (B. B. C. 3. 6, 7. s. 112) expressly ranks naval stores and timber under the denomination of contraband goods.

Hienecius (de navibus, &c. Chap. I. S. 10, 11 and 14) accords in the same position to the extent of whatsoever appertains to the equipment of vessels.*

Bynkershook is less explicit. After laying it down as the general rule that naval stores or the materials of ships, are not contraband, he proceeds thus—"Yet it sometimes happens that the materials of ships may be prohibited, if an enemy is [...] great want of them, and without them cannot conveniently carry in the war;" † and he afterwards cites, with approbation, several edicts or proclamations, which the states general, in different wars with different nations, have published, declaring those articles contraband—thus referring it to the belligerent party to judge of, and pronounce the cases when they may rightfully be deemed so—And the same idea seems to have been adopted by Grotius ‡ and some other writers on public law—I have not met with one whose opinion excludes naval stores from the list of contraband.

Grotius, in discussing this question, divides goods into three classes,

1. Those which are of use only in war, as arms, &c.

2. Those which serve only for pleasure;

3. Those useful for peaceable as well as for warlike purposes, "as money, provisions, ships and naval stores"

—concerning which he argues in substance, that the first class are clearly contraband; that the second class are clearly not contraband; and that the third class may or may not be so, according to the state and circumstances of the war; alleging, that if necessary to our defence, they may be intercepted, but upon condition of restitution, unless there be [Page]just cause to the contrary; which just cause is explained by the examples of sending them to a besieged, or blockaded place.

The reasoning about the third class has a very inconvenient latitude. It subjects the trade of neutral nations too extensively to the discretion of belligerent powers; and yet there is a serious embarrassment about drawing the true line, one which will duly conciliate the safety of the belligerent, with that of the neutral, party.

What definition of contraband, consulting reason alone, shall we adopt? Shall we say, that none but articles peculiar to war ought to receive this denomination? But is even powder exclusively applicable to war? Are nitre and sulphur, its chief ingredients, peculiar to war? Are they not all useful for other purposes; some of them in medicine, and other important arts? Shall we say, that none but articles prepared and organized for war, as their primary object, ought to have that character? But what substantial difference can reason know, between the supply to our enemy of powder, and that of sulphur and salt-petre, the easily convertible materials of this mischievous compound?

How would either of these definitions, or any other, comport with what those of our treaties which are thought unexceptionable, in this particular, have regulated, or with what is common in the treaties between other nations? Under which of them shall we bring horses and their furniture?

If we say, that in wars by land, these are instruments little less important than men, and, for that reason, ought to be comprehended; it may be asked in return, what can be more necessary in wars by sea, than the materials of ships, and why should they not, for the like reasons, be equally comprehended?

In wars between maritime nations, who transfer its calamities from the land to the ocean, and wage their most furious conflicts on that element, whose dominions cannot be attacked or defended without a superiority in naval strength, who moreover possesses distant territories, the protection and commercial advantages of which, depend upon the existence and support of navies, it is difficult to maintain, that it is against reason, or against those principles which regulate the description of contraband, to consider as such the materials which appertain to the construction and equipment of ships.

It is not a sufficient objection, that these articles are useful for other purposes, and especially for those of maritime commerce—Horses are of primary utility in agriculture; and it has been seen that there are other articles indisputably on the [Page]list of contraband, which are entirely within the principle of that objection.

Rutherforth, a sensible modern writer,* after truly observing, "that the notion of contraband goods is of some latitude, so that it is not easy precisely to determine what are and what are not of this sort—that all warlike stores are certainly contraband, but that still the question returns, what are to be reckoned warlike stores?"—after noticing the division of articles by Grotius and the difficulties with regard to the third class—draws this conclusion, that "where a war is carried on by sea as well as by land, not only ships of war which are already built, but the materials for building or repairing of ships, will come under the notion of warlike stores." This is a precise idea, and, it must be confessed, on principle, not an irrational one.

If we resort to the opinions which have been entertained and evidenced in our own country, they will be found to have given great extent to the idea of contraband—Congress, by an act of May the 3th, 1777, establishing the form of commissions for privateers, authorize them "to attack, subdue, and take all ships and other vessels whatever, carrying soldiers, arms, gunpowder, ammunition, provisions, or any other contraband goods, to any of the British armies or ships of war, employed against the United States. And in their act of the 27th of November, 1780, acceding, in part, to the rule of the armed neutrality, they declare, that contraband shall be thereafter confined to the articles contained under this character, in our treaty with France; indicating, by this, their opinion that the list of those articles is abridged by that treaty. If the first mentioned act was well founded (and there are strong reasons for it) it establishes that even provisions may be contraband, if going directly to invading fleets and armies; which affords an instance of their being so (analogous to be case heretofore put of a besieging army) in addition, to the cases of places besieged, blockaded, or invested. And as to naval stores, I assert a belief, that the common opinion of those persons in this country, whose contemplation had embraced the subject, included them in the catalogue of contraband.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

Notes

*

The terms used clearly denote this and nothing more; they are—"It is also understood that the permission granted by this article is not to extend to allow." This does not negative any pre-existing indulgence, but merely provides that the main grant shall not convert the revocable indulgence, if any there was in this particular, into an irrevocable right by treaty.

↵

*

This has been affected to be questioned on account of what is called [...] peremptoriness of the expressions (to wit) "It is expressly agreed that the [...] of the United States shall not carry, &c." But there is no real room for [...] question—In a contract between two parties, whether individuals or nations. where a restraint is imposed upon one for the benefit of another, it is always an implied condition of the restraint that it shall continue, unless dispensed with by the party for whole benefit it is imposed—Thus the British government in India may remove the restraint, by continuing the indulgence in this respect heretofore granted—And it seems to me clear that the laws which the United States are to pass, for enforcing the prohibition, may, with good faith, be qualified with this provision, "unless by permission of the British government in India."

↵

*

Perhaps from the certainly of the rights which it confers, it may be foreign capital to extensive enterprizes, in which the United States will be [...] trepot between India an a great part of Europe

↵

*

Great Britain has made it a s [...]rious point, in which she has in more than one ins [...]nce sure [...] powers (the emperor was one) to reno [...]ce [...] with India, from that own te [...] [...] this [...] to us. And yet it is not [...] ly d [...]nied merit, but eliminated, in the very particular.

↵

*

How r [...]diculous, then, the argument, if the basis of it were otherwise true, that the treaty, by tying up the government from future discrimination, has prostrated our navigation be [...]re Great Britain? can a restraint which is only to operate the short term of two years after the termination of the present war, have the mighty effect of [...]acr [...]ing our navigation?

↵

*

If I mistake not, the assertion [...] [...]s-to the whole duty, has been ret [...] ed; but the residue of his error [...] his point remains unrecalled.

↵

*

In the comparison in this particular, we must combine the number of ha [...] with the terms of compensation according to which the vessels of the two [...] tries are navigated.

↵

*

The jurisdiction here spoken of is relative to property, and altogether distinct from what is termed personal jurisdiction, which respects the relation between the society and its members—This latter species of jurisdiction is [...] confined to the territorial limits of a nation.

↵

*

Grotius. Book 3, chap. 1. sect. 5. Note.

↵

†

Grotius. Book 3. chap. 4, sect. 8—Book 3, chap. 6, sect. 6.

↵

‡

Bynkershook, quest. jur. pub. lib. 1. cap. 13 and 14.

↵

‖

Puffendorf.

↵

§

Heinecius de navibus cap. 2 sect. 114, 115, 116.

↵

*

This subject will be resumed and pursued under different aspects in another number.

↵

*

Treaty of 1776, article 10.

↵

†

Treaty with Dantzic of 1706, article 20.

↵

*

Law of nature and nations. B. 2. C. 9. S. 201. Navibus ob vect.

↵

†

Book III, Chap. I. and V. 3. Chap. I. and X.

↵

*

As reasonable would it be to place to its account the similar order which was issued before the mission of an envoy was thought of.

↵

*

An opinion has been propagated that Sweden armed in concert with Denmark, in order to maintain the neutral right of carrying corn and flour to France, in opposition to the convention of March, 1793, between Great Britain and Russia; and that, in consequence of this proceeding, the remonstrances of these powers have proved more successful than we have been in obtaining satisfaction from Great Britain.

This opinion is throughout, an error, made, use of by those whose persevering aim has been, by silencing truth, reason, and moderation, and inflaming the angry passions of the community, to involve the country in anarchy and war.—The authors of this imposture, as well as the exalted patriots who have seen in the memorial of our envoy, the humiliation of our country, are referred to a "collection of state papers relative to the war against France," published by Debret, in 1794. The perusal of the Swedish state papers; as well as the memorials of the able and prudent B [...]rnstorss, may teach these gentlemen a little of what is deemed good manners on these occasions.

So far from even remonstrating, much less arming on account of the British instruction of June, 1793, when that order was notified at Stockholm, by the British resident there, the government of Sweden, by their resident at London, acknowledged, in terms too respectful to be repeated in the hearing of our exclusive patriots, that Sweden was perfectly satisfied with the instruction; since, instead of payment, which the order insurred, all provisions, in virtue of an existing treaty between the two nations, were liable to confiscation when seized, on their way to an enemy.

This note is added for the purpose of refuting a popular error, and not to vindicate the instruction alluded to, which I consider as an injury to the rights of neutral nations, that has not been justified by the answers th [...] have been given by Great Britain to the [...] and Du [...]sh [...].

↵

*

Vela, Restes et si quoe alia ad apparatum nauticum pertinent.

↵

†

Quandoque tamen accidit ut et navium materia prohibeatur, si hostis eaquam maxime indigeat at absque ea commode bellum gerere haud possit—Quaestionum juris Publici L. 1 chap. X. page 80.

↵

‡

B. iii. C. 1. V.

↵

*

Institutes of Natural Law, book II. chap. x. xix.

↵

American Remembrancer, &c.

American Remembrancer, &c.

§

[Page]

[No. XII.]

THE American Remembrancer; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, SPEECHES, &c.

RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

VOLUME III.

PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY HENRY TUCKNISS, FOR MATHEW CAREY, NO. 118, MARKET-STREET.

—JANUARY 20, 1796.—

[Page]

CONTENTS.

1. CINNA, No. V. Page 219

2. — No. VI. Page 226

3. Address to the Citizens of New York Page 233

4. New York Representation and Petition Page 236

5. Camillus, No. XXXIII.—concluded Page 238

6. — No. XXXIV. Page 240

7. — No. XXXV. Page 245

8. — No. XXXVI. Page 253

9. — No. XXXVII. Page 259

10. — No. XXXVIII.—and last Page 266

11. Remarks on the Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, &c. By a Citizen of the United States Page 276

12. Plymouth Protest Page 310

13. Resolutions adopted at a Meeting of the Inhabitants of Westmoreland County (Virginia) September 25th, 1795 Page 311

14. Answer of the President of the United States Page 312

American Remembrancer, &c.

[Page]

CINNA.—No. V.
[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 102.]

CAMILLUS, and all those who have preceded him, in considering the second article of the treaty, assert that it accomplishes a primary object of the envoy's mission, and one of great importance to the United States. He then details, at some length, the important advantages which must result from an acquisition of the western posts. Although there be nothing new in these details, I am glad he has gone into them, as such a view will enable us properly to appreciate the article in question.

Camillus states, that a recovery of these posts will extinguish a source of controversy between the two countries—will enable us to controul the hostilities of certain Indian tribes, which have already cost four millions—will extend our trade— will prevent Great Britain from contracting our boundaries— and will promote an harmonious and permanent connexion between the western and Atlantic countries.

That all these benefits would have accrued to the United States from an unconditional surrender of these posts, cannot be doubted. I say, unconditional, because when we come to the third article, we shall find, that as far as an extension of trade is concerned, Great Britain has taken care not only to come in for a participation of the fur trade, but that this clause is so constructed, as to secure to her, especially when her local situation is considered, an almost exclusive right to this lucrative branch of it. If the surrender of these posts will be of such immense moment to the United States, and their detention a proportional detriment, how happens it that the acquisition is not better secured than it is? You say, it is true, that the object is "accomplished:" from which expression, taken by itself, it might be inferred, that a restoration had actually taken place, that being the natural and obvious meaning of the word which is here made use of. It is not intended in this place to charge Camillus with an intention to deceive, because from other parts of this number, the period limited for this purpose is ascertained. But he will allow me to ask, as has often been done already, why the differences between the two countries could not have been adjusted in a separate instrument? [Page]and why so remote a period is fixed for an evacuation, which might certainly have been made in a much shorter time?

Great Britain and the United States mutually complained of infractions of the treaty of peace. The former charged as with impeding the recovery of debts; and we, on the other hand, remonstrated, among other things, against her detention of the western posts. Without reviving here the question of, who was first in fault? which would only lead to repetition, and does not admit of much new light, it may be demanded, as the United States have, by the 6th article, not only admitted the truth of the allegation against them, but provided for, and actually assumed, and pledged their faith for payment of the principal and interest of all the British debts of this description; why, after so solemn and entire removal of the sole ground of complaint, did not our envoy insist upon a more prompt execution of those parts of the treaty which had been violated by Great Britain? It is evident that actual payment was not made by her a condition precedent; for [...] less than eighteen months are allowed for the exhibition [...] claims after the commissioners meet. She, therefore, consi [...] ed the promise on the part of our government as equival [...] to a complete performance of such parts of the treaty as [...] alleged had been infringed by us. It became her duty, th [...], the moment this obstacle was removed, to withdraw her g [...] risons, in the words of that treaty, "with all convenient speed." These terms have been called ambiguous, although Gro [...] Britain herself, by her conduct immediately subsequent to the treaty, assigned to them a meaning which they plainly import and which none but a sceptic would ever have called i [...] question. It we may judge by the time employed in re [...] ing from other parts of the United States, and particularly from this city (New York, whose evacuation was comple [...]d in the fall of 1783) we may conclude, that the garrisons from these posts might have all been withdrawn in fewer weeks than our envoy has granted months for the purpose.

Taking together this article, so far as it respects the contemplated evacuation, and the sixth article, abstracted from other parts of the treaty, perhaps no other reasonable objection can be offered against them, except the unreasonable time allowed t [...] Great Britain to perform her part of the stipulation. But when it is considered, that this article makes part of a treaty of commerce, replete with the most injurious concessions from the United States, some of which have undoubtedly been insisted upon as considerations for it; who will be hardy enough to expatiate [Page]upon advantages which bear no comparison with the sacrifices which have been incurred to obtain them? It will readily occur, to every reader, that if America refuses to ratify a single article, this one which has been excepted as the chef d'oeuvre of our negociator, must also become a dead letter. Every friend to his country must fervently wish either that the president will have virtue and firmness enough to refuse it his sanction, or that the king, in a fit of pride, will not consent to the modification proposed by the senate. That honorable body may yet, without intending it, have promoted the salvation of their country.

But admitting a ratification to take place, is not every page a fruitful source of doubts and altercations? If about so plain and short an instrument as that which gave us peace, disputes immediately arose between the two countries, and continued without adjustment for more than ten years—if the plainest expressions, and one of the most important articles, were quibbled into unmeaning and nugatory stipulations—if the constructions of Great Britain, although manifestly repug [...]ant to the sense of the contracting parties—to the subject matter of the compact, and to the plain import of the terms, has been warmly supported by men of talents and character among ourselves, who can say that similar discussions and difficulties will not very soon take place respecting an agreement, containing as many pages as the other does sentences, and embracing a much greater variety of matter? In such an event, the charge that we have first broken the treaty will be renewed; we may retort it if we please; but the posts will be detained until the differences are settled, for which purpose another embassy extraordinary must be recurred to; and who can insure that we shall then be able to command the diplomatic skill and talents of Governor Jay? Notwithstanding, therefore, Camillus considers this object as accomplished, it may fairly be regarded as distant as ever, or at least depending on such a variety of intervening incidents, as may probably defeat it altogether. It has frequently been urged, that nothing but a desire to procrastinate, and finally to break her engagements, if circumstances render it prudent, could have induced Great Britain to insist upon so unreasonable a time to perform what good faith demanded of her, the moment we satisfied the breach, alleged to have been made by us, and which she could have no interest in deferring to a remote day, if she ultimately intended to comply with her promise. To garrison so many forts must be a great expense, to say nothing of the troops who might be much more profitably employed elsewhere. The views, therefore of the British [Page]cabinet in retaining them so long, can neither be honorable, nor of the most pacific nature. They foresee, that if any controversy arises between the two governments, which is almost unavoidable, Great Britain will have a pretext for not carrying into effect this stipulation. They also foresee, or hope, that peace will, in the mean time, be restored to Europe, and that the king will have it in his power to make such use of intervening occurrences as circumstances may render prudent. On the part of America, no propitious event can reasonably be expected. Determined as she is to abide by all her engagements, which she has evinced in every trying situation, hers was the present moment! It is almost past; if she neglects, as an inconsiderate individual, to improve it, which has too long been the case, years of remorse and regret must follow.

If America could have commanded events, a more fortunate coincidence could not have occurred than those which succeeded each other, in rapid and astonishing progress, during the whole of her negociation; a more brilliant campaign, than the one on the part of our ally, is not furnished in the annals of hist [...]. Success every where crowned her arms—although singly opposed to the coalesced powers of Europe, she not only expe [...]d which surpass belief. Great Britain, with an obstinacy bordering on despair, expected her fate, which all Europe considered inevitable. Could a more auspicious season for negociation have been desired? Our information from Great Britain corresponded with the sanguine expectations which the reiterated defeats of the combined armies, composed in part of British regiments, could not fail to excite. Every letter from London was repla [...]e with the successful career of our envoy. He was represented [...] obtaining every thing he asked; the mercantile interest of that country had arranged itself on his side. Disgusted with the conduct of their own court, and alarmed at the probable cons [...] quence, the merchants, in a body, or by deputation, even before Mr. Jay's arrival, waited on Mr. Pitt, and extorted, [...] his fears, or a sense of justice, a relaxation in the prod [...] system, which was pursuing towards the United States. Nothing was talked of on either side of the Atlantic, but the gracious reception of the American minister, and the distinguished attentions which he received. Even the royal family vied with the ministers in their efforts to render his visit as pleasing as possible; and when intelligence arrived, that a treaty was signed, [...] a man doubted but the terms of it corresponded with this for [...] nate concurrence of circumstances. The effect of these ex [...] gerated accounts upon a late election is well known. Wh [...], [Page]after all this, can believe that this golden opportunity has been permitted to escape, and that the fears of Great Britain have been allowed to subside without our compelling her to do us justice? Who can believe that she has had address enough to send our envoy home with a treaty which has kindled throughout the continent a flame greater than any excited by her former indignities or vexations? Camillus will smile, as he always does, at the idea of addressing the apprehensions of Great Britain, or laying hold of her fears to extort from her that redress which a sense of justice should long since have induced her to grant. Philo-Camillus has resented, in very intemperate language, my calling Camillus an apologist of Great Britain. I must be excused for not retracting an appellation, which is not less courted by Camillus, than deprecated by his friend.

Does not the 7th number of the Defence furnish new proofs of the epithet which has been applied to Camillus? Every picture which represents the situation of Great Britain as critical, is termed by him "exaggerated or false." If her armies and those of her allies have been defeated by land, she is, notwithstanding, "triumphant on the ocean." If she owes an immense debt, "her credit is unimpaired" and "her resources are prodigious." If some discontents prevail, "her government is vigorous, and was never better supported." If her manufactures are injured, "they are still in a flourishing situation." If her commerce is annoyed, "it is, notwithstanding, extensive, and prosperous." If she is in difficulties or distress, "she is still haughty and overbearing." Truly, sir! while you thus ring changes on the strength and resources of Great Britain, who can be blamed for suspecting your motives? Injured as we are, would it not have been a better proof of your amor patriae, if you now and then brought into view, and no one can do it better, some of the resources of your own country? Your language constantly reminds us of the conduct of the royalists at the commencement of the late war. They expatiated, in very similar terms, on the folly, and even madness, of opposing by force, acts of the British parliament. They asserted, and with too much truth, that we were without men, without arms, without military knowledge, without money, without ships, without forts, without credit, and without any of the common means of defence; that our commerce would be ruined, our towns reduced to ashes; and our country laid waste. America, although the evils which she then complained of were inconsiderable, when compared with the aggravated insults and wrongs she is now submitting to, spurned at the thousand dangers which awaited her. Disdaining to submit, she [Page]risked all to obtain redress. Heaven smiled on her god-like efforts, and the bloody and unequal contest terminated in freedom and independence.

It will not be without use to take a cursory view, in this place, of some, of our resources, in case we are forced into war with a nation whose vexations, want of faith and justice, will scarcely leave us any other alternative. War, at any time, and under any circumstances, is an evil to be seriously deprecated; but it is a calamity, against which no human prudence or foresight, can, at all times, guard us. It is profitable, therefore, to know our own strength and importance, not that we may become insolent, and provoke aggressions, but that we may resent, in a dignified manner, those to which we may be exposed from the injustice or pride of other nations. It is not by tamely crouching to insults and indignities that we can long hope for the invaluable blessings of peace; it is by being just to others, and compelling others to be just to us. We may suffer in the conflict; but while our conduct is remembered, our public character will command respect, and no nation will gladly seek occasions to quarrel with us. The concessions we have been in a habit of making to Great Britain, and the returns we have received, have not only debased us abroad, but have damped the ardour of our youth, who cannot too early be taught to respect their country, and to resent the injuries she may receive. The pusillanimous language with which our public prints abound, would better suit the minions of an arbitrary despot, than the citizens of a free and enlightened nation. Patriotism and the love of liberty are almost extinct, and we must not be surprized, if the virtuous and heroic deeds of our countrymen who conducted us to the temple of freedom, and gave us a seat among the nations of the earth, are soon stigmatized as the Jacobinical efforts of discontented Democrats and Anarchis [...]s. These are the mild epithets which are constantly applied by a certain party, to the best patriots among us, for no other reason, than because, feeling for the prostrated honor and violated rights of their country, they urge the government to a more manly expression of their sentiments, and a more spirited vindication of their wrongs.

In case of war with Great Britain (which is by no means probable, if we act with becoming spirit) what are the evils to be apprehended?—Her most zealous partizans ridicule the idea of her ever obtaining a footing in this country. At the distance of a thousand leagues, reduced as her army already is, and at war with a great maritime power, it cannot be dreaded that she will be able to transport to this country, troops adequate to such [Page]an attempt. If she had the means, her experience in the last war must satisfy her, that no conquest she can attempt will be an equivalent for the enormous expense of making and holding it. During the last war, although she recruited her armies in this country, although she subsidized several German princes, yet, with all this strength, added to her own, the only permanent acquisitions she made were a few acres on our sea coasts. Many of the disadvantages with which America then had to contend exist no longer. Among these may be reckoned, a cruel internal foe, whom, for a long time, we did not dare to punish as traitors. Yet many well-intentioned, weak-minded perso [...], whose opinions and wishes were on the side of their countr [...], but dreaded too much the power of Great Britain, and the punishment which invariably follows an unsuccessful rebellion, openly to espouse her cause, total want of military skill, no regular government or constituted authorities, for committees and conventions could hardly be deemed such, no arms, a weak and undisciplined militia, no credit, nor any other means of representing money but by the pernicious circulation of a paper currency. Great Britain, it will also be remembered, was then in the zenith of her power, and at peace with all the world, which she had enjoyed without interruption since the treaty of Paris, in 1763, a period of more than twelve years. Under all these discouraging circumstances, America unsheathed the sword. She [...]ered, it is true; but in the midst of calamities, which she can never experience again, she achieved prodigies of valour; and a success exceeding her most sanguine hopes, finally crowned her arms. What is our situation at present? We have constitutions and governments of our own choice—Our general government is as well obeyed, notwithstanding daily allegations to the contrary, as any in the world —We shall no longer fight with halters about our necks, or with a gibbet in view—We have men, whose military skill and experience, acquired in the late war, will be inestimable—We have not only credit, but other means of raising a revenue, without again recurring to the depreciating and fluctuating medium of paper—We have a militia exceeding half a million of men, well disciplined and accoutred, and officered, in many instances, by persons who have received military lessons in the field of danger and of death—Great Britain has added millions to her debt; her commerce, if not ruined, has greatly suffered by the French privateers; her manufacturers are out of employ, and clamorous, and, what is no unimportant consideration, we shall have a powerful ally in France, who has stemmed the united force of Europe, has conquered some of [Page]her enemies, and compelled others to sue for peace. This subject will be resumed in my next number, and further notice taken of the seventh essay of Camillus.

CINNA.

New York, August 15, 1795.

P. S. I am abused for my intemperate expressions with respect to Camillus. I neither know him, nor does he know me. My conclusions are drawn from his writings. If [...] be a patriot, he takes uncommon pains to make the world think otherwise. He calls me a Jacobin for defending my country; and he and his friends are angry with me when I suspect his patriotism for making such defence necessary. No good will result from being personal. Let principles, and not men, be our objects. Against arguments, and not motives (except when they may be fairly inferred from our public conduct or writings) be our attack. By his defence (for I know nothing more of him) shall my judgment be formed of Camillus. By my reply (which is all he will probably ever know of me) he is at liberty to make up his opinion of me. Ridicule and abuse are no more tests of truth, than flowing numbers or fine-turned periods. A question more momentous, than the one in which we are engaged, has not been agitated since our existence as a nation! Let us be warm, but not rude. With the talents of Camillus, the ta [...] would be easy to convince any unprejudiced person, that our very independence hangs on a rejection of the treaty. But nature is seldom as lavish of her gifts as she has been to Camillus; I must be content, therefore, to pursue, in plain and unadorned language, a duty which birth and citizenship impose upon me, and in which I have no object unconnected with the welfare and happiness of my country.

No. VI.

IT is objected by some, who are for enduring every extremity, rather than incur the hazards of war, that our trade will be ruined by British cruisers, and that the revenue arising from it will fail. That our intercourse with foreign nations will undergo some interruption, and our commerce be exposed to considerable risk and injury, cannot be denied; but let us not look only at the dark side of the picture; if our trade to other nations is impeded, their ships will find no difficulty in obtaining access to us; they will assert their neutral rights; and, being no longer colonies, Great Britain will have no pretentions [Page]to interdict this communication, unless, indeed, she should attempt to starve the United States, and by proclamation blockade every port in the union. Such of these nations, as have not had the weakness or complaisance of America, to sacrifice to Great Britain, the protection which neutral bottoms should over afford, even to enemies' goods, may transport our property in safety to any part of the globe. It may well be doubted, then, whether our imports will be much less in times of war than at present, and [...]ven our exports in neutral vessels, and our own, will be considerable. Our merchants often mention, with astonishment, the number of vessels, which arrived safe during our revolutionary contest; when even neutral bottoms could not reach us without the same hazard of being captured and condemned as our own. But the commerce we should carry on, and that of neutral countries, would not be the only sources of revenue; our privateers would cover the ocean. Does not the commerce of Britain hold out allurements, and afford an extensive source of wealth to our enterprizing merchants and mariners? The duty on prize goods, added to that on the importation of goods in the ordinary way, would not only prevent a diminution of the revenue, but carry it beyond its present point. Who would believe, that in the maritime courts of only three of the counties of Massachusetts, namely, of Suffolk, Essex, and Middlesex, there were libelled, during the last war, no less than one thousand and ninety-five vessels, with their cargoes, and thirteen cargoes which had been taken from vessels abandoned after their capture, making in the whole eleven hundred and eight! Mr. Coxe, in his View of the United States, assures us, that the records of those counties authenticate the fact. He also adds, that the number of vessels belonging to Great Britain, in 1774, as stated by a British premier, in his place in parliament, was, 6219, whereof 3908 were British built, and 2311 were American built. "What havoc then," exclaims Mr. Coxe, "did these fishermen make among the British merchantmen? above a sixth of all their vessels, were brought by these people as prizes into the markets of the United States, with cargoes to an immense amount, composed of every species of military and domestic supply, in a season of the utmost emergency: it appears too, that these prizes were no less than a fourth part of all the British built ships of that nation. The opinion of the most candid and best-informed estimaters, founded on careful enquiry, countenance the presumption, that fifty-five per cent. of all the vessels, captured by the people of Massachusetts during the war, were taken before their arrival; so that there is the utmost probability, that the whole number [Page]of vessels, which were captured by the shipping of these three counties, was 2450 sail. How great a derangement was this to the British commerce; and how heavy must have been the expense of salvage paid to the re-captors; how great the number of marine prisoners; how serious the interruption to the manning of the navy? "It would appear," says Mr. Coxe, "that the armed vessels of our principal fishing state, captured, in the course of the late war, near one half of the merchant ships, ordinarily belonging to Great Britain, and abo [...] three-fourths of the number of her nat [...] built ships."

A striking proof is exhibited, in what precedes, of the serious impression made by our vessels on the navigation of Great Britain, at a time too, when it might reasonably be thought she had nothing to fear from us. The source from which this information is drawn, precludes the possibility of error. It may be added, that such were the apprehensions then entertained of American privateers, that insurance of British merchantmen was more exorbitant than in any war, in which that kingdom had been engaged for fifty years past, although no maritime nation, with whom she had contended during that period, had been so deficient in ships of war, as the United States. If America, then, in her very infancy, when she had to contend with a thousand difficulties, which are now surmounted, and can never occur again, was able thus to annoy the greatest naval power in Europe—who can estimate the wounds which she may now inflict on her commerce, in the present advanced state of her population and shipping? She would indeed find us an unprofitable and troublesome enemy; without the means of retaliation, she would have every thing to apprehend from America. Her trade, as well as that of Spain, Holland, and Portugal, passes by our coasts; and the injury and losses to which it would be exposed, are incalculable.

But not in her trade alone, would Great Britain be vulnerable; her colonial possessions on the continent, must fall into our hands. If the gallant Montgomery, at the head of a few hundred men, raised in haste, badly armed, and although brave, mere novices in discipline, reduced, in an inclement season, the whole province of Canada, except its capital, which, but for his unfortunate and much-lamented death, would also have opened its [...]tes to the American arms; what may we not expect [...] [...]he formidable force we should now be able to send again [...] [...]? The inhabitants of Vermont alone, which was then but beginning its settlement, would more than suffice for its conquest. I make no account of the disposition of the inhabitants, who are represented as highly incensed against the British, [Page]and anxiously waiting a favorable occasion to shake off their yoke, and become part of the United States. Nova Scotia too, and the adjoining settlements, would be an easy prey to the militia of Massachusetts and the Province of Maine. These important acquisitions to the United States would more than countervail any loss they could possibly sustain. Nor would any part of the West Indies, in case of an American war, long continue colonies of Great Britain. France, with the aid she might derive from this country, could not sail to reduce them. Her fleets and armies, destined for such an expedition, after recruiting in the United States, might proceed, full of health and well-provisioned for the islands.

The evils to Great Britain would not stop here. Her subjects hold great part of the public debt of the United States, and our citizens are indebted to them, to the amount of many millions sterling. Britain being the aggressing nation, and the war not only of her seeking, but manifestly unjust on her part, the principles of self-preservation would dictate, and her own conduct, and the laws of war justify, the sequestration of this property. Mr. Jay, it is true, with more complaisance to Lord Grenville, than delicacy to his own government, has declared such conduct impolitic and unjust. Congress, and in particular Mr. Dayton, who moved the measure, will not soon forget so handsome a compliment from a minister, whose respect for the legislature of his own country, whatever his private sentiments might be, ought to have checked this intemperate effusion. Mr. Jay appears to have thought an excuse necessary for an article, by which we yield much, without gaining any thing; and was, therefore, determined to insert one even at the expense of congress and the honour of his own country.

The tenth article will probably undergo an investigation hereafter; we proceed, therefore, to enumerate some other distresses to which an American war might expose Great Britain. The injury to her trade, from our privateers, has already been stated; but if not a single vessel of this description was fitted out, still her commerce would suffer beyond estimation. The interruption of her trade to this country, would be an evil which admits of no alleviation. In the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety one, we took from Great Britain, excluding Ireland and the British East Indies, in British manufactures, to the immense value of very near four millions of pounds sterling. It also appears, from authentic public documents, that the vessels of Great Britain, loaded in the United States, in 1791 and 92, were about equal in tonnage to all the British vessels, cleared out of that kingdom for Russia, Denmark, Norway, [Page]Sweden, Prussia, Poland, Hamburgh, Bremen, and Germany in general. Will a nation, not infatuated, readily plunge into war with America, and encounter so great a loss as must inevitably ensue from a stagnation of trade; for the uncertain and precarious advantages to be reaped from such a state of things? If we have no security in her wisdom or justice, may we not place some reliance on her interest, which will be so sensibly and directly affected by a cessation of all intercourse between her and the United States? what will be the clamours of her manufacturers, many of whom are already idle and starving, when such valuable consumers, as the Americans, are compelled, by the injustice of their own government, to withdraw their custom? What must be the difficulties and discontents of the merchants, when all remittances from this country not only cease, but when their debtors here may be rendered unable, in the course of the war, to pay any part of their dues, even on the return of peace? What, but an universal spirit of distrust and dissatisfaction must pervade the whole kingdom, which is now panting for peace, when it is discovered, that the minister, by his violence and rashness, instead of restoring to it so great a boon, has precipitated it into a new war, which cannot fail to be unpopular, and as long as such extensive commercial connexions subsist between the two countries, must be execrated in proportion to the ruin and distress which will ever accompany it? Those who affect to despise the public opinion of Great Britain, betray an ignorance of the history of that kingdom. However strong the present attachment to their constitution—however well supported the crown may be—whatever backwardness or apprehension may be discovered at the mention of a revolution, after some of the unfortunate excesses which have been perpetrated in France, the voice of the people, in much more arbitrary reigns, has made itself heard, and ministers, who have been favorites of the crown, and supported with all the patronage and weight of royalty, have been compelled to yield to the imperious, torrent, or have been brought to the block in their attempt to withstand it.

To conclude, from what happened in England in the last war, that one with America at present will be popular, would be to reason from mistaken premises. At that time an act of parliament had declared us in rebellion, and the general acceptation and belief corresponded with the declaration. The very term carried with it something that enlists the feelings of mankind against those, who are branded with the odious epithet. Many wise men in England, were in sentiment with this country, while she confined her object to redress of grievance, and [Page]sought it by petitions and addresses; but when she took up arms, and more especially when she declared herself independent, views, hostile to the mother country, were imputed to her from the beginning, and a measure, extorted by dire necessity, and a sense of self-preservation, was considered, as full evidence of an original and early design to separate the colonies from the mother country. Although nothing could be more fallacious, and, in point of fact, more erroneous than such an inference, it had its effect; and either from real abhorrence of its attempt, or from a fear to avow their real sentiments, the American cause, for some time, lost ground in England.

At present, we are not only an independent people, but have been formally recognized in that character by the king and parliament of Great Britain. The justice or injustice, as well as the advantages and injuries of the war, would, therefore, become objects of enquiry in England, the result of which could not fail to be favorable to the American government and character. It could not escape the most cursory observer, that with a sincere disposition to cultivate peace, justice, and good understanding with all mankind, we had been most cruelly insulted and outraged by the British cabinet. Corresponding sentiments would take place, and the throne and parliament would be environed with petitions for peace; for, even in that country, it is yet lawful for the subject to convey, in respectful language, his complaints to the supreme authority of the nation, without incurring the appellation of Jacobin or Anarchist. What would be the effect of a war on the public debt of Great Britain, besides a prodigious accumulation, cannot be ascertained. Its present enormous bulk must fill thinking men with serious apprehensions for the consequences of a further increase. It already exceeds what the most intrepid financier would dare to call a public blessing. When we consider what an enormous sum was added to it by her attempt to reduce this country to unconditional submission, and the immense expense attending the operations of war, whose scene is so distant as America, it would excite no surprize, should a national bankruptcy be the consequence of another similar exertion. Private bankruptcy must follow, and public, as well as individual ruin must ensue. No man yet has forgotten the numerous failures and private distress which immediately succeeded the late rupture with France, the shock of which must have been inconsiderable, compared with what would happen on a breach with this country.

But, say those, who are, at all events, for peaceful measures, your sea ports are defenceless, and will be laid in ashes. Degrading [Page]as my opinion is of the public conduct of Great Britain, I cannot bring myself to believe, that she will pay so little regard to the laws of war and humanity, as to conduct it in a way so totally repugnant to both. The burning of defenceless towns, or even those which are fortified, unless in attempts to reduce them, is an imputation so horrid, that it can only be made to excite our alarms. It is an evil not to be seriously apprehended. It is a possible, but not a probable danger. Desolating as the last war was, which raged with all the bitterness of civil fury, when neither principles, character, nor humanity were respected, how few of our towns were consumed: If then this calamity was but partially experienced during a controversy, in which a breach of faith and humanity towards rebels, was deemed no stain on the national character of Great Britain, why are we to apprehend this merciless warfare at present? It will neither be the policy nor interest of our enemy to conduct it in this way. The sea ports are emphatically the residence of their best friends. Destroy them, and by whom will the injury be felt? Principally by the advocates, not the enemies of Great Britain; by her apologists, not by our friends. Burn the sea ports, and what becomes of the British debtors? Set fire to our cities, and America, having lost all, she will become a desperate and implacable foe. But has Great Britain no defenceless towns? If justice and humanity have lost their influence on her councils, still motives of interest will not be wanting to restrain her from such barbarous displays of her superiority. Will she not dread retaliation? If America cannot, will not France be able to return the infamous warfare in kind? Will not all Europe applaud a deed provoked by her own cruelties and wantonness? Let us turn then from the disgusting apprehension, chimerical in the extreme. While France is at war, she can always, and it will be her interest to, furnish a fleet sufficient for the protection of those of our towns which are most exposed. Twelve ships of the line and as many frigates, which we ought to have of our own, will more than suffice for the purpose. Many of them are capable of fortification, and it would be no discredit to the government to employ more activity in putting them in a better state of defence. It is become so common, to attribute every effusion of patriotism to the worst of motives; that it is with some reluctance I dare to remind my fellow citizens, of the united voice of America, when similar apprehensions were excited to deter her from any opposition to the claims of the British parliament. I must, however, be so consonant to the feelings of many of the patriots of that day who yet survive, and whose principles are not adulterated by [Page]pensions and offices, that I cannot withhold the pleasure it must afford them. "No, sirs," says congress, with one voice, addressing themselves to the people of Great Britain, "we never will, while we revere the memory of our gallant and virtuous ancestors, we never can surrender these glorious privileges for which they fought, bled, and conquered; admit, that your fleets could destroy our towns, and ravage our sea coasts; these are inconsiderable objects; things of no moment to men, whose bosoms glow with the ardour of liberty. We can retire beyond the reach of your navy, and, without any sensible diminution of the necessaries of life, enjoy a luxury, which, from that period, you will want; the luxury of being free!" This was the language of America, when she had infinitely more to apprehend than at present. Whither has the spirit, that dictated it, taken its flight? Where is now that public virtue, which not only manifested itself by those solemn expressions, which are now ridiculed as the frantic ravings of a distempered imagination, but carried into exercise, resolutions which astonished those to whom they were addressed, and which, any but men struggling to be free, would have shuddered to adopt? What, I repeat, is become of this spirit and patriotism? Are they laughed to scorn? Or do they cease to warm and animate the sons of Columbia? Heaven forbid! A few years of peace and luxury cannot have enervated their limbs, extinguished their martial fire, or stifled, in their generous breasts, sentiments which were once esteemed their ornament and pride. They want but to be rouzed into action. Should a necessity exist, and the gallant youth of America be summoned to their country's standard, may we not indulge the fond hope, that they will pant to entwine their brows with laurels, gathered in the walks of glory and honor, and burn to emulate, if not surpass, their illustrious fathers in heroic efforts, to avenge the public cause?

CINNA.

New York, August 18, 1795.

ADDRESS To the Citizens of New York.

IF ever a period existed in the history of any people, in which great prudence and circumspection were essential to the preservation of public liberty, that period is now completely [Page]realized in the affairs of this country. To preserve our constitution of government in its present limited, and happy form; to guard against the encroachments, and the ambitious views of men, with whom the arm of power is entrusted; to prevent the executive magistrate from interfering with and exercising legislative authorities; to maintain inviolate our national independence, and to give stability and energy to those political rights and liberties which are guaranteed by the first terms of the social compact; is indeed an arduous, but it is a necessary duty; a task which requires the most intimate union of patriotism and talents, of deliberation and caution, with fortitude and firmness.

Shall we ever remain embarrassed, as we hitherto have been, by the unhappy dissentions which so long have enlisted us under the dangerous banners of party? Subdued by prejudices, and governed by delusion, shall we ever continue unmindful of the dictates of truth and reason? Shall resentment and passion be always substituted for solid argument, and the invidious tongue of calumny be permitted to stifle enquiry? If we really, with sincerity, regard our own rights and liberties, if we are, in truth, attached to the constitution of our country, the resolution must be formed to defend them from all invasion, from whatever quarter the attack may originate.

The late treaty with Great Britain has long been transmitted to public discussion; already we perceive the undisguised aversion of our countrymen to that most odious of instruments: In vain do we search for its admirers among the steady patriots of our country. They are only to be found among the missionaries of Britain, and among the advocates of unlimited authority. These, indeed, have attempted to influence your prejudices, in favor of particular men, to excite your apprehensions, to seduce your understandings, and betray your judgments, into a compliance with the unnatural compact; but all in vain. Truth is omnipotent, and will, eventually, discomfit their insidious attempts.

Were we not told, and did we not believe, that the sole object of negociation was "a friendly adjustment of our complaints?" was it not officially intimated, that our envoy would "carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our country, and thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness?" Were we apprized, or who of us had reason to imagine, that the secret views and real intentions of our cabinet, was to strengthen the bands of political connexion, between this country and the monarchy of Great Britain? At the moment the property of our industrious merchant was wrested from his [Page]possession by the rapacious hand of violence; when our rights, as a neutral nation, were invaded, and the honor of our flag most basely injured and insulted, in short, when all the finer feelings of the American people were kindled into indignation at the perfidious combination against the common rights and liberties of mankind; the executive part of our government, regardless of the dignity of their country, and unmindful of the sentiments of the people, have concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with the most unprincipled of nations—Yet this is not all. We see in that baneful instrument, our commercial interests abandoned to British rapacity, our constitution violated, and its security submitted to the mercy of future administrations; we perceive a branch of the government attempting to bind us in particulars to which we had never, either expressly, or virtually, given our assent, and endeavouring to establish, as a constitutional principle, its unlimited right to bind us in all cases whatsoever.—With pain we view that branch attempting to draw the peculiar powers of the legislature within the vortex of its own authority; to invade the sovereignty of the constituent members of our union; to dispense with the existing laws and statutes of our country; to destroy the personal security and liberties of our fellow citizens, and, in time, to distort every feature that has either proportion, symmetry, or beauty, in our federal constitution. Such is the operation and nature of the present treaty. Such the injuries for which the American people unite to obtain redress.

To the House of Representatives of the United States—to the constitutional organs of the people, assembled in their legislative capacity, composed of men freely chosen from the body of the people by the voice of their country—actuated by their common sentiments, impelled by their general sensibilities, and authorized to declare the public will, we must submit our representations, in them repose our hopes of redress; in that high deliberative assembly we must place our trust, for the preservation of public liberty, and the safety of the constitution.

Citizens of New York! your countrymen throughout the United States have adopted a memorial to be transmitted to their public representatives. To that memorial they have affixed their signatures.—Their attention is placed upon you wi [...]h an anxious solicitude that plainly bespeaks the importance of the occasion. Remember, that the preservation of public liberty is one of the most essential duties of social life. It remains then for you to evince to the world, that while you are zealously anxious to preserve the blessings of peace and order, and civil government, [Page]you are equally determined to preserve the liberti [...] and constitution of your country.

Form of the petition, to be transmitted to Congress.
To the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled: The Representation and Petition of the Subscribers, Inhabitants of the State of—, and Citizens of the United States,

Respectfully Sheweth,

THAT, viewing, with deep and anxious concern, the present awful crisis in the affairs of our common country, and influenced by an equal solicitude for the security of our rights and liberties, and the preservation of peace with all the world, we hereby exercise our constitutional right of petition, on a subject as momentous as any that has ever agitated the feelings, or affected the interests, of a free people.

The treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Great Britain, lately negociated by the authority of the president of the United States, and conditionally ratified by the senate, has been submitted to, and undergone a full and public discussion: And your petitioners, having given to it an impartial and deliberate consideration, feel it a solemn and paramount duty, which we owe to ourselves and our posterity, to convey to you our free and unb [...] affed opinion thereon; in doing which, with due deference to the constituted authorities of our country, whose sanction to the instrument in question, has been, in any manner, expressed, we declare, that to your respectable body alone we now look up, as that great and dernier constituted authority, which, having a more general and equal participation than any other department of the government, in the common interests and feelings of the people, and, moreover, possessing a constitutional controul and decision on all questions of peace and war, are pecul [...]arly the guardians of the public peace, liberty, and welfare.

We regard, with the most lively apprehension, all those stipulations in the said treaty, which, being of a political nature, have a tendency, directly or indirectly, to involve us in the [Page]political intrigues of European nations, to infract the treaty of alliance with France, and to give occasion for, and produce the sad spectacle of war, between that magnanimous republic, and the republic of the United States; stipulations with which, in our judgment, the said treaty unhappily too much abounds— And we cannot be less apprehensive, under those direct and manifest encroachments on the constitutional powers of congress and the rights of the people, which, in the exercise of an assumed power on the part of the president and senate, have been made by the said treaty, in the following instances:

1. In the regulation of commerce with a foreign nation;

2. In the regulation of trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes;

3. In regulating the territory of the United States, and of individual states;

4. In establishing duties and imposts;

5. In establishing a rule of naturalization;

6. In constituting a tribunal of appeal, paramount to the supreme judicial court of the United States;

7. In changing the tenure of, and establishing a rule to hold, real estates;

8. In defining piracies, committed upon the high seas, and declaring the pun [...]hment thereof;

9. In depriving free citizens of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in the case of piracy, as defined and punished by the said treaty; and,

Lastly; in attempting, in various other instances, to restrain and limit the legislative authority of congress.

Wherefore, solemnly protesting against the exercise of power by the president and senate, in any of the foregoing cases, without the concurrence of congress, as manifestly tending to absorb all the powers of government in that department alone; to establish, as the sole rule of legislation over all the great foreign and domestic concerns of the United States, the mere will and absolute discretion of the president and senate, in conjunction with a foreign power; and finally to overturn and effect a total change in the present happy constitution of the United States. We, your petitioners, most earnestly pray, that the representatives of the people, in congress assembled, will, in their wisdom, adopt such measures, touching the said treaty, as shall most effectually secure, free from encroachment, the constitutional delegated powers of congress, and the rights of the people, and preserve to our country an uninterrupted continuance of the blessings of peace.

[Page]

Defence of Mr. Jay's Treaty.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 216.]

No. XXXIII.—Concluded.

NEVERTHELESS, from the number of modern treaties, which exclude from that list naval stores, and moreover from the manifest interest of nations, truly considered, to [...] row the rights of war in favor of those of peace; this clause of the treaty, which takes a different route, is to be regretted as pursuing the rigour of the law of nations—Still, however, it cannot be objected to, as a departure from the law; and agreeing with the course observed by Great Britain antecedent to the treaty, it does not place our trade in these articles upon a worse footing than it was, independent of the treaty.

The period of the negociation was most unpropitious to a change for the better—in the midst of any maritime war, a belligerent nation, enjoying a naval superiority, was like to have been tenacious of a right which she supposed herself to possess [...] intercept naval supplies to her enemy—But in a war, in which it was more than ordinarily possible that the independent existence of a nation might depend on the retaining a naval superiority, it was to have been foreseen that she would not cons [...] to relinquish such a right. The alternative was, to insert the article as it stands, or to omit it wholly.

Had it been omitted, the condition of naval stores would have been the same as with it. But our merchants would th [...] have continued to be exposed to uncertain risks, which is alway a great inconvenience. It is desirable, in similar cases, to [...] a fixed rule. Merchants can then accommodate their speculation to the rule; and causes of national contention are avoided.

It is in this view to be regretted, that the cases when provisions may be treated as contraband, could not have been agreed upon; but as this was impracticable, the next best thing has been done, by establishing the certainty of compensation in all such cases. This gives one important species of security, obviates one source of contention. And if really there may be other cases than the universally admitted ones, in which provisions can fairly be deemed contraband (as that designated by the a [...]t of congress of May 1777) the securing of compensation wa [...] truly a point gained by the article.

[Page] But while I confess, that the including of naval stores, among contraband articles, is an incligible feature of the treaty, I ought to declare, that its consequences to the interests of the United States, as it regards the trade in those articles in time of war, do not appear to me important—War between other nations, when we are at peace, will always increase the demand for our bottoms, so as to require much additional building of vessels, and probably in that way to produce a more beneficial species of employment of the naval stores our country affords, than that of their exportation for sale.

The adversaries of the treaty are eagle-eyed to spy out instances in which it omits any favourable minutes which are found in our other treaties; but they forget to balance the account by particulars which distinguish it favorably from those treaties. Of this nature is the omission of horses from the list of contraband, and still more the salutary regulations with regard to vessels and their cargoes going to places besieged, blockaded, or invested. I do not discover that these useful provisions or their equivalents, are in either of our treaties with France, Holland, or Sweden.

It has been said, in reference to this article, "whenever the law of nations has been a topic for consideration, the result of the treaty accommodates Great Britain, in relation to one or both of the republics at war with her, as well as in the abandonment of the rights and interests of the United States,"—And the following examples are given, to each of which will be annexed a reply.

I. "American vessels, bound to Great Britain, are protected, by sea-papers, against French and Dutch searches; but when bound to France or Holland, are left exposed to British searches, without regard to ships' papers." The truth of this proposition depends on another, which is, that the sea-papers are to be absolutely conclusive; but reasons have been given for doubting this construction, which, it has been remarked, does not obtain in practice. And it is certainly a violent one, inasmuch as it puts it in the power of the neutral, to defeat the rights of the belligerent party, in points of great consequence to its safety.

II. "American provisions, in American vessels, bound to the enemies of Great Britain, are left by the treaty to the seizure and use of Great Britain; but provisions, whether American or not, in American vessels, cannot be touched by the [...] nemies of Great Britain." The construction of the treaty, upon which this difference is supposed, has been demonstrated to be erroneous.—The difference, therefore, does not exist.

[Page] III. "British property, in American vessels, is not subject to French or Dutch confiscation.—French or Dutch property in American vessels, is subject to British confiscation." This was the case before the treaty, which makes no alteration in the matter.—Moreover, it is counterbalanced by this circumstance;— That American property, in British vessels, is subject to confiscation by France or Holland; but American property, in French or Dutch vessels, is not subject to confiscation by Great Britain.

IV. "Articles of ship-building, bound to the enemies of Great Britain for the equipment of vessels of trade only, are contraband.—Bound to Great Britain, for the equipment of vessels of war, are not contraband." This, also, was the case before the treaty, which, consequently, has not in this particular more than the former, produced any benefit to one party, to the prejudice of the other. I forbear to dwell upon the article of horses, as falling under a contrary discrimination;—nor shall I insist on the additional circumstance, that all American goods not generally contraband, if going to a place besieged, blockaded, or invested by French or Dutch forces, are liable to confi [...] cation by France or Holland; if going to a place besieged, blockaded, or invested by British forces, are not liable to confiscation by Great Britain.

Differences of these several kinds are the accidental [...] of the varying views of different contracting powers, and [...] slender grounds of blame or praise of the respective contracts made with them.

The form of the criticisms last stated, leaves little doubt that it was designed to insinuate an intention in this article to fa [...] the Monarchs of Great Britain, at the expense of the Republics of France and Holland. The candor of it may be judged of by the two facts, first, that it makes no alteration, i [...] this view, in the antecedent state of things; and secondly, that the relative situation of Holland, as the enemy of Great Britain, is subsequent to the adjustment of the article.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXIV.

THE remaining articles of the treaty principally relate [...] those maritime regulations, that are usually inserted in modern treaties between commercial nations—and on that consideration, as well as from their evident utility in enabling us to [Page]distinguish with precision between what is, and what is not lawful, in relation to those points—they are entitled to our approbation; still however even some of these customary articles, whose object and meaning are so well understood, have been deemed exceptionable.

The first paragraph of the nineteenth article, in order to prevent injuries by men of war, or privateers, enjoins (as before noticed) all commanders of ships of war and privateers, and all other citizens or subjects, of either party, to forbear doing any damage to those of the other, or from committing any outrage against them: and decleres, that if they act to the contrary, they shall be punishable, and moreover bound in their persons and estates to make full satisfaction and reparation for all damages, of whatsoever nature the same may be.

These prohibitions are conformable with the laws of [...] United States: If under colour of authority, those to whom the same does not relate, shall receive injury, the act, according to its circumstances, is an offence, for which the offender is not only answerable to his own country, but moreover to the injured party, to whom he is bound to make full and complete reparation.

The open and explicit views of the parties, and their mutual engagement to put this law in execution against all offenders, will be a salutary check upon the too frequent irregularities that occur in the course of war between maritime nations. The paragraph is a copy of a similar one contained in the fifteenth article of the commercial treaty between France and Great Britain, concluded in 1786, and agrees with the fourteenth article of our treaty with Holland. In order to guard still more effectually against the injuries to which the citizens and subjects may be exposed from the private ships of war of each other, the next paragraph stipulates, that all commanders of privateers, before they receive their commissions, shall be subjected to give security, by at least two responsible sureties, who have no interest in the privateer, in the sum of fifteen hundred pounds sterling, or six thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars; or, if the privateer is manned with more than one hundred and fifty men, in the sum of three thousand pounds sterling, or thirteen thousand three hundred and thirty-three dollars, to satisfy all damages and injuries committed by such privateers, her officers, or any of her men, against the tenor of the treaty, or the laws and instructions for the regulation of their conduct; and in case of aggression, the commission of such privateer shall be re-called and made void.

[Page] This particular regulation has been frequently introduced in modern treaties, and exists in this precise shape in the last treaty of commerce beeween France and Great Britain; I have found no instance where a larger sum has been mentioned. It has, with little consideration, been made an objection to this regulation, that the amount of the bonds are not adequate [...] compensate or satisfy the damages that may be committed by these privateers.

The preceding part of the article gives the injured party a remedy against the persons and estates of the aggressors; [...] bonds are not required for the exclusive purpose of being th [...] fund, to which the injured may have recourse for satisfaction; but principally for the purpose of excluding from the command of privateers, those dissolute and irregular characters, who are not [...]trained by either moral or political ties, and for whose good behaviour, responsible and disinterested men would not become bondsmen. The same principle is developed in the civil administration of every nation. In cases of pecuniary trust, it is a common and useful precaution, to require surety for the faithful discharge of the office; and the principal advantage of this regulation is to secure the employment of virtuous and upright officers. The amount of the bonds required on these occasions is sufficient for this purpose, though inferior to the property confided to them.

Thus the treasurer of the United States, who has the custody of millions, gives bonds for only one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, the collectors of New York and Philadelphia for fifty and sixty thousand dollars; sums very far short of the public money of which they are in the receipt, yet sufficient to secure the public against characters of doubtful integrity. The adequacy of the sums, in the particular case, is moreover [...] denced by the law and practice of our own country. In the resolution of congress, of the third of April 1776, which, [...] far as regards this point, remained in force throughout the American war, congress required that the commander of ev [...]y privateer, before his commission should be delivered to him, should give bonds, with sureties, to the president of congress, in the sum of five thousand dollars, if the vessel was of or under one hundred tons; and of ten thousand dollars, if the vessel was upwards of one hundred tons, to observe the rules and instructions prescribed for their government. These sums are one quarter less than these required by the article before us.

The last paragraph requiring the judges of the admiralty courts to furnish formal and du [...]y authenticated copies of their proceedings in cases of the condemnation of vessels or cargoes, [Page]belonging to the citizens or subjects of the parties, is pursuant to that reasonable course of proceeding, which ought always in this and similar cases to prevail.

The twentieth article, which is in prevention of piracy, has the sanction of numerous precedents. A pirate is the common enemy of all mankind.—All, therefore, should unite in refusing him assistance and refuge, and in the establishment of such regulations relative to the sale of his plunder, as, by shutting against him every market, may thereby annihilate the motives to his piracy.

The twenty-first article stipulates, that the citizens and subjects of the parties, shall do no acts of hostility or violence against each other, nor accept commissions or instructions so to act from any foreign state being an enemy to the other party.—That the enemies of either nation shall not be allowed to invite, or endeavour to enlist, in their military service, any of the citizens or subjects of the other; and the laws, prohibiting such offences, are to be punctually executed. The article farther stipulates, if any citizen or subject of either party, who has accepted of a foreign commission to arm a privateer against the other, it shall be lawful for the said party to treat and punish the said citizen or subject, having such commission, as a pirate.

The general tenor of this article is in comformity with the spirit of our preceding laws on this subject; it is moreover in perfect unison with the duties of neutrality; those duties which a just regard to the principles of integrity, as well as our enlightened pursuit of our own interest, require us faithfully to perform.

Two objections have been offered against this article; one, that it precludes such of our citizens as, with a view of acquiring military knowledge, would otherwise engage volunteers in foreign service—the other, that it makes every citizen and subject, of either party, who has accepted a foreign commission to arm a privateer against the other, and who shall be taken in possession of such commission, liable to be punished as a pirate.

In respect to the first objection, if, by a rigorous construction, the case is included within the prohibition, it should be remarked, that it is applicable only to such engagements as commence and are made in time of mutual war. If we have citizens, who, with the view of military education, are inclined to engage in foreign service, though from past experience there is not much reason to conclude that the examples would be numerous, they have full scope, as I understand the article, in the periods of peace, to enter into any of the regular armies of [Page]Europe, that they may prefer; and being thus engaged, they are free to make the campaigns of war against Great Britain, if that is their passion, without injuring this article. The prohibition seems to be against engaging in the military service of a nation, previously in the condition of "enemy" to one of the parties.

The second objection has even less plausibility than the first; the disingenuous means that have been used to excite a rep [...] bation of this clause of the article, manifest the want of truth and patriotism of those who have employed them: passion and the spirit of opposition have asserted, that the provision before us is so extensive as to place the subordinate officers and private men, on board of a privateer, within the predicament of her commander; nay, that all persons, citizens, or subjects, of either nation, who would accept commissions, or enter, in any capacity, in a foreign army or navy, would, in consequence of this stipulation, be liable to be treated and punished as pirates. It is sufficient, after noticing these attempts to impose upon the public, to observe that the stipulation expressly confines the punishment, in question, to the commanders of privateers, who, contrary to the laws of the land, and the clear and equitable obligations of the members of a neutral nation, shall be taken with such commission; and that it does not extend to the under officers or crew, much less to such persons, as contrary to the preceding inhibition of the article, should accept commissions in a foreign army or navy. In respect to such misdemeanors in all cases (except that of equipping and commanding a privateer, which will expose the commander, when taken, to be punished as a pirate) the offence is cognizable only by the nation within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed, or of which the offender is a citizen, or subject; and, by our laws, is punishable only by fine and imprisonment.

A perversion of the sense of the clause, stipulating, that "the law against all such offences and aggressions shall be punctually executed," has been attempted, though nothing can be be more innocent or unexceptionable. Its plain meaning is, that each party, in the cases falling within its jurisdiction, shall faithfully put in execution its own laws against the offences and aggressions, in contravention of the article. A stipulation between the governments, to execute laws on a certain subject, can mean nothing else than that each shall execute its own laws on that subject, in the cases appertaining to its jurisdiction.

Though most of the objections preferred against the treaty are marked with that illiberal spirit which characterizes the [Page]party who have unceasingly laboured to bring into discredit the government of the country, yet few of them have been less veiled than this which condemns a stipulation intended to curb and restrain the few dissolute and daring characters, who, from the least worthy of all motives that lead to military enterprize, might otherwise engage in this piratical warfare.

What virtuous citizen would feel himself justified in accepting such command? What must be the morals of those instructors, who contend for a freedom to commit, what humanity and honor forbid? Every treaty that we have concluded with other nations, is enriched with this stipulation; not only our own treaties but those between other nations contain it. How is it that we no where discover a trace of disapprobation, either on the part of our statesmen, or from an enlightened people, against a series of treaties, formed by different public ministers, and ratified by a succession of congress, each of which contains a provision that the crime of accepting a foreign commission to arm and command a privateer, against a nation with whom we are at peace, shall be treated and punished as piracy? Is it that our virtue has become less severe? our morality more indulgent? or is it that our predecessors were less vigilant in defending the rights of the citizens, than the ostentatious patriots of the present day? But it is time to dismiss an objection entirely destitute of integrity and decency.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXV.

THE twenty-second article bears upon its face its own justification—It is pursuant to those maxims which enlightened moralists recommend, and just nations respect. It prescribes a course of conduct the most likely to procure satisfaction for injuries, and to maintain peace, and is therefore entitled to the approbation of all good men and real patriots—It is particularly valuable to a weak nation, or a nation in its infancy, as an additional guard against sudden and unforeseen attacks of more powerful rivals.

The first paragraph of the twenty-third article, provides for the hospitable reception of the public, or national ships of war of the parties, in the ports of each other; and engages that the officers of such ships shall be free from insult, and treated with decorum and respect.

[Page] The practice which our government has adopted in relation to these points, independent of parties, is agreeable to [...] provision.* And though the stipulation will be of less i [...] ance to us than it would be, were we possessed of a respec [...] naval force, yet it may be useful—By our treaty with France, our ships of war have a right to enter their ports only in [...] of urgent necessity, and not freely and for mere conve [...]e.

With Spain and Portugal we have no treaties, and [...] quently not an ascertained or perfect right to use their [...]— Our navigation must be protected from the Barbary powe [...] [...] force or by treaty. It is questionable whether the latter mo [...] [...] prove effectual without the support of the former; con [...] have therefore resolved to equip a small naval force, for [...] special object of protecting our trade against the Alge [...], and the other Barbary powers. Some port convenient to [...] scene of its cruising will be of essential advantage to the e [...] ency and success of its employment: not only the po [...] Great Britain, but likewise the port of Gibraltar will, by [...] article of the treaty, be open to us; and our frigates will [...] there entitled to a hospitable reception, and their o [...]ic [...] [...] that respect which shall be due to the commissions which [...] bear.

The other paragraph of this article, provides, in case [...] [...] merican vessel by stress of weather, danger from ene [...] [...] other misfortune, should be obliged to seek shelter in any [...] tish port, into which, in ordinary cases, such vessel could [...] claim to be admitted, that she shall be hospitably received [...] mitted to refit, and to purchase such necessaries as [...] want; and, by permission of the local government, to [...] part of her cargo as may be necessary to defray her expe [...] Our treaty with France contains a similar provision; but the astrictions with which it is guarded are less than those of the article before us.

The twenty-fourth article stipulates, that it shall not be [...] ful for any foreign privateers, commissioned by any nat [...] war with either of the parties, to arm the vessels, or to [...] exchange their prizes in the ports of either of the parties; [...] that they shall not be allowed to purchase more provisions [...] shall be necessary to carry them to the nearest port of the [...] on from whom they received their commission; and the [...] ty-fifth article stipulates that the ships of war and private [...] [...] either party may carry whithersoever they please, the [...] [Page]and goods taken from their enemy; and that such prizes, on their arrival in the ports of the parties, shall not be searched, seized, detained, nor judicially examined touching the validity of their capture, but may freely depart—and furthermore, that no shelter or refuge shall be given in the ports of one of the parties to such as have made prizes upon the citizens or subjects of the other. Though the law of nations is explicit, that one nation having formed a particular stipulation with another, is not capable, by a subsequent treaty with a third nation, to do away, or annul its former stipulations, but that the elder treaty, in such case, remains in full force, notwithstanding such posterior and contradictory treaty; yet, in order to remove all cavil on this point, and to maintain a [...]rupulous regard to good faith, even in appearance as well as in reality, and especially in relation to our treaty with France, the article further declares "that nothing in the treaty contained shall be construed, or operate contrary to former and existing public treaties with other sovereigns or states," and adds, that neither of the parties, while they continue in friendship, will form any treaty inconsistent with this, and the preceding article—this last clause has been censured as an undue restraint; while it is in fact a mere redundancy; as long as a treaty between two nations continues in force, it is against good faith for either to form a treaty with another nation inconsistent with it—if the treaty is once disclosed, by whatever means, no treaty with another nation can be inconsistent with it—The clause, therefore, only converts into an express promise, what without it is an implied one, that the parties will not contravene their stipulations with each other by repugnant engagements with a third party—The disingenuity on this point has gone so far as to torture the clause into a positive stipulation against any treaty with another power conferring peculiar advantages of commerce upon that power. It is a sufficient reply to this, that the clause is expressly confined to the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth articles; determining nothing as to the other articles of the treaty. The general principle of this last objection has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere.

The article concludes with a mutual engagement, that neither of the parties will permit the ships, or goods, of the other to be taken within cannon shot of the coast, nor in any of the bays, ports, or rivers of their territories; and in case of such capture, the party, whose territorial rights are violated, shall use his utmost endeavours to obtain full satisfaction for the vessels or goods taken. This stipulation is conformable to the duty and practice of nations who have entered into no special engagements [Page]requiring the same, and agrees with a common p [...] vision in public treaties.

Hitherto we have prudently avoided granting to any nation a right to arm their privateers or to fell their prizes in our p [...]ts; our laws are explicit in prohibiting such equipments; and [...] exclusion thereof, contained in the twenty-fourth article, i [...] agreeable to the declared policy of the country. We have engaged in our treaty with France to prohibit her enemies from selling their prizes within our ports; but not having engaged to permit France to sell her prizes therein, we were free [...] agree with Great Britain, that her enemies shall, likew [...] be prohibited from selling their prizes within our territory. [...] clause in the twenty-fifth article denies all refuge to the [...] of war and privateers that have made prizes upon either of [...] parties; and the last clause of the twenty-fourth article stip [...] lates, that foreign privateers, enemies to either of the pa [...] shall not be allowed to purchase more provisions than su [...]ti [...] to carry them to the nearest port of the nation from whom [...] received their commissions.

These clauses will operate only against such nations [...] not, by an elder treaty, secured a right of reception [...] ports of the parties—Still, however, it is alleged that [...] articles violate our treaty with France. It has already been [...] served that the treaty contains a clear and explicit agree [...] of the parties, excepting from its operation all former exist [...] public treaties—Out treaty with France is an antecedent [...] existing public treaty, and consequently excepted, in all its [...] from the operation of the treaty before us—Whatever right [...] privilege, therefore, is secured to France in virtue of [...] treaty, she will continue to enjoy, whether the same res [...] the reception of her public ships of war, privateers or pri [...] in our ports, or the exclusion therefrom of those of her e [...] mies.

Could there be a doubt on this point, the practice of oth [...] nations, and especially that of France, on the very point, wo [...] effectually remove it.—The fifteenth and thirty-sixth article [...] the commercial treaty of Utrecht, between France and G [...] Britain, contain the same stipulations as the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth articles of the treaty before us. That treaty was in existence and force, at the time of forming our treaty with France, yet France found no difficulty in the insertion of the same stipulations in her treaty with us. She could not have considered their insertion in the treaty with us as a violation of her treaty with Great Britain, otherwise good faith would have to strained her—The war that soon after took place between [Page]France and Great Britain, dissolved the treaty of Utrecht. Our treaty with France remained in force; yet, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-six, France and Great Britain entered into a commercial treaty, the sixteenth and fortieth articles of which renew the stipulations contained in the fifteenth and thirty-sixth articles of the treaty of Utrecht.

If France was free, first to form these stipulations with us, in 1778, notwithstanding her prior and existing treaty with us, we must be equally free in a treaty with the same, or any other power, to agree to similar stipulations. Both were free, and neither violates their former engagements, by assenting, as we have done, to these stipulations in a posterior treaty.

It is further alleged, that these articles are injurious to the interest of the United States, because they prohibit, in certain cases, foreign privateers to rendezvous in our ports, and to sell within our territory, the prizes they may have taken.—If it is desirable to render out principal sea ports and cities scenes of riot and confusion, if it is politic to divide our citizens, by infusing into their minds the hostile spirit with which the nations at war are animated against each other, if we are prepared to see the prostration of public authority, and to behold the laws trampled upon by armed banditti, if we are ready to invite our citizens to abandon their regular and useful employments, and to engage, as adventurers, even against each other, in the pursuit of plunder, then is the objection well-founded, then is the restraint pernicious, then is the stipulation worthy of condemnation —But if to establish the reverse of all this, is the effort and aim of every wise and prudent government, the stipulation in question demands the approbation of all virtuous citizens.

But were none of these consequences to be apprehended from the free admission of the privateers of all nations engaged in war, and the permission to sell their plunder, it would, notwithstanding, be against the interests of the United States to allow the same. It is a sound commercial principle, that the interest of buyers, as well as sellers, is best promoted by a free competition.—The great number of the sellers of foreign manufactures and productions, afford the best market for the buyers —The great number of buyers of our productions, afford the best market for the sellers—foreign privateers are precarious sellers, and buyers only for their own consumption—They drive away and banish from our markets, both buyers and sellers. When our coasts are lined with foreign privateers that rendezvous in our ports, the merchant ships of all nations, not excepting our own, will be liable to interruption, and discouraged from coming to our markets; and these of the belligerent [Page]powers will be generally excluded—Our markets might, perhaps, derive supplies from the prizes that such privateers should take, so as, in some degree, to compensate for the deficiency that would proceed from the exclusion of foreign merchantmen; but this supply would be uncertain, irregular, ill-assorted, and partial, while the principal commercial detriment would [...] without mitigation, that of a partial or total destruction of foreign competition in the purchase of our agricultural and other productions.

If, moreover, it is the duty, as well as the interest, of [...] United States, to observe an exact and scrupulous neutrali [...], amidst the wars of other nations, one of the most efficaciou [...] means of effecting that purpose, will be, to remove every [...] tation that might lead our citizens to an opposite course— [...]o allurement would be more likely to seduce them from their duty than that which is offered by the expected gains of priva [...] [...] —no avenue of political mischief should, therefore, be clo [...]e carefully closed.

If these articles are exceptionable, in any respect, it is that in imitation of the analogous articles in our treaty with Fra [...] they allow the privateers of the parties, in cases not incou [...] out with former treaties, to rendezvous in, and their p [...] to be brought into, each others ports and harbours: It wo [...] in my judgment, have been the true policy of the United S [...] as well as with the view of maintaining an impartial and [...] cided neutrality in the wars of Europe, from a participation [...] which our remote situation, with due prudence, is an exe [...] tion; as likewise, in order to promote, in the most advanta [...] ous manner, our national prosperity, totally and for ever to [...] excluded all foreign privateers and prize [...] from our ports and harbours.

But having entered into these stipulations with France, [...] which she has the use of all our ports against all other nations we having the use of her ports only against those nations [...] have not an elder treaty with her, it would have manifested a [...] unwise partiality to have refused to enter into similar stipulations with other nations who might desire them.

The twenty-sixth article provides, in case of a rupture between the parties, that the merchants and others of each nation, residing in the dominions of the other, may remain and continue their trade during good behaviour? in case, however, their conduct should become suspicious, they may be remoted, and a twelvemonth after the publication of the order of removal is to be allowed for that purpose: But this term is not to be granted to such persons as act contrary to law, or are guilty of [Page]any offence against the government: all such persons may be forthwith removed or sent out of the respective dominions of the parties. The residue of the article is calculated to ascertain the condition of the parties, when the rupture shall be deemed to exist—each nation remains the exclusive judge of the foreigners among them, and will be able to decide from their behaviour, how far their residence may be compatible with the public safety. In case of suspicion only, that their residence will prove detrimental, they may order them to depart, reasonable time being allowed them to collect their effects—On the one hand, the article affords to the parties perfect security against the irregular and suspicious conduct of foreigners, who may be among them on the breaking out of war, and, on the other, consults with that liberality which the modern usage of nations sanctions, the safety and convenience of those, who, under the faith of the respective governments, have chosen a residence in the dominions of the parties.—Our treaties with France, Holland, and Sweden, secure to the merchants of the respective parties a limited period, after the commencement of war, within which they may collect their effects, and remove; and the article before us relative to this subject, is a transcript of the second article of the treaty of commerce, of 1786, between France and Great Britain—The objection, therefore, to there being a certain term within which they cannot be removed upon bare suspicion lies against our other treaties and against almost all the treaties of Europe for many years—The pretence to order away upon mere suspicion would defeat all the stipulations, that allow a certain term to collect, fell, and remove debts and effects; and for that reason could not be supported.

The remainder of the article which gives an option to each party, either to request the recall, or immediately to send house, the ambassador of the other without prejudice to their mutual friendship and good understanding, is a valuable feature—The power "immediately to send home," without giving offence, avoids much delicate embarrassment connected with an application to recall—It renders it easier to arrest an intriguing minister in the midst of a dangerous intrigue, and it is a check upon the minister by placing him more completely in the power of the government with which he resides.—These last circumstances are particularly important to a republic, one of the chief dangers of which, arises from its exposure to foreign intrigue and corruption.

The twenty-seventh article, which provides for the delivery of all persons, charged with murder or forgery committed within the jurisdiction of one party, and who have taken refuge [Page]within the territories of the other, is a regulation of peculiar worth between nations whose territories are contiguous [...] each other—Without such regulation, the case, with which the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes, might escape punishment, especially on the frontiers, by passing out of one jurisdiction into the other, would, in a great measure, destroy the security against these offences, that arises from the fear and certainty of punishment—The provision, that such delivery shall not be made unless upon the exhibition of such evidence of criminality, as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had there been committed, will prevent vexatious requisitions, and is a caution due to the rights of individuals.

The twenty-seventh, and concluding article, establishes, that the first ten articles of the treaty, shall be permanent; that the remaining ones, except the twelfth, which, with the twenty-fifth, constitute the body of the commercial part of the treaty, mall be limited in their duration to twelve years; and reciting that the twelfth will end, by its own limitation, at the end of two years after the termination of the present European [...] further establishes, that, within the last mentioned term, and in time to perfect the business by the expiration of that term, the discussion of the subject of the twelfth article shall be renewed, and if the parties cannot agree on such new arrangement, concerning it, as may be satisfactory, that then all the said remaining articles (in other words, all but the first ten) shall cea [...] and expire together. This article, which is an entirely independent one, obviates the doubt, affected to be entertained, whether the exception in the ratification, with regard to the twelfth article, did not do away the stipulation by which the continuance of the treaty, except the first ten articles, beyond the term of two years, after the expiration of the war, is made to depend on a further arrangement of the West India trade. This separate article is positive and conclusive, absolutely an [...]ulling the treaty at that time, if such an arrangement be not made, and thereby places it in the power of either party so as manage the matter as to put an end to all the commercial part of it, except what relates to inland trade and navigation with the neighbouring British territories, at the end of the short period of two years from the termination of the existing war. This alone is sufficient to confound all the high-charged declamations against the tendency of the treaty to ruin our trade and navigation.

CAMILLUS.

[Page]

No. XXXVI.

IT is now time to fulfil my promise of an examination of the constitutionality of the treaty. Of all the objections which have been contrived against this instrument, those relating to this point are the most futile—If there be a political problem capable of complete demonstration, the constitutionality of the treaty, in all its parts, is of this sort—It is even difficult to believe, that any man in either house of congress, who values his reputation for discernment or sincerity, will publicly hazard it by a serious attempt to controvert the position.

It is, nevertheless, too much a fashion with some politicians, when hard pressed on the expediency of a measure, to entrench themselves behind objections to its constitutionality—Aware that there is naturally in the public mind a jealous sensibility to objections of that nature, which may predispose against a thing otherwise acceptable, if even a doubt, in this respect, can be raised—They have been too forward to take advantage of this propensity, without weighing the real mischief of the example. For, however it may serve a temporary purpose, its ultimate tendency is, by accustoming the people to observe, that alarms of this kind are repeated with levity and without cause, to prepare them for distrusting the cry of danger, when it may be real: Yet the imprudence has been such, that there has scarcely been an important public question, which has not involved more or less of this species of controversy.

In the present case, the motives of those who may incline to defeat the treaty, are unusually strong for creating, if possible, a doubt concerning its constitutionality.

The treaty, having been ratified on both sides, the dilemma plainly is between a violation of the constitution, by the treaty, and a violation of the constitution, by obstructing the execution of the treaty.

The VIth. article of the constitution of the United States, declares, that "the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." A law of the land, till revoked or annulled, by the competent authority, is binding, not less on each branch or department of the government than on each individual of the society—Each house of congress collectively, as well as the members of it separately, are under a constitutional obligation to observe the injunctions of a preexisting [Page]law, and to give it effect.—If they act otherwise, they infringe the constitution; the theory of which knows, in such case, no discretion on their part—To resort to first principles for their justification, in assuming such a discretion, is to go out of the constitution for an authority, which they cannot find in it—it is to usurp the original character of the people themselves—it is, in principle, to prostrate the government.

The cases must be very extraordinary that can excuse so violent an assumption of discretion. They must be of a kind to authorize a revolution in government;—for every resort to original principles, in derogation from the established constitution, partakes of this character.

Recalling to view, that all but the first ten articles of the treaty are [...]able to expire at the termination of two years af [...]r the present war; if the objection to it in point of constitutionality cannot be supported—let me ask, who is the man ha [...] enough to maintain, that the instrument is of such a nature [...] to justify a revolution in government?

If this can be answered in the affirmative, adieu to all the securities which nations expect to derive from constitutions of government. They become mere bubbles, subject to be blo [...] away by every breath of party—The precedent would be [...] tal one—Our government, from being fixed and limited, [...] become revolutionary and arbitrary—All the provisions which our constitution, with so much solemnity, ordains "for for [...] tic tranquility, providing for the common defence, prom [...] the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to [...] selves and posterity," evaporate and disappear—

Equally will this be the case, if the rage of party spirit [...] meditate, if the momentary ascendency of party, in a participle branch of the government, can effect, and if the people can be so deceived as to tolerate—that the pretence of a violation of the constitution shall be made the instrument of its actual violation.

This, however, cannot be—There are already convinc [...] indications on the very subject before us, that the good se [...] of the people will triumph over prejudice and the acts of p [...] —that they will finally decide according to their true intere [...] and that any transient or partial superiority, which may exist, if abused for the purpose of infracting the constitution, will consign the perpetrators of the infraction to ruin and disgrace. But alas! what consolation would there be in the ruin of a party for the ruin of the constitution?

[Page] It is time to enter on the momentous discussion. The question shall be examined in the four following views—1. In relation to the theory of the constitution—2. In relation to the manner in which it was understood by the convention who framed it, and by the people who adopted it—3. In relation to the practice upon a similar power in the confederation—4. In relation to the practice under our present constitution, prior to the treaty with Great Britain—In all these views, the constitutionality of the treaty can be vindicated beyond the possibility of a serious doubt.

1. As to the theory of the constitution—The constitution of the United States distributes its powers into three departments, legislative, executive, judiciary.—The first article defines the structure, and specifies the various powers, of the legislative department—The second article establishes the organization and powers of the executive department—The third article does the same with respect to the judiciary department—The fourth and fifth, and sixth articles, which are the last, are a miscellany of particular provisions.

The first article declares that "all legislative power granted by the constitution shall be vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives."

The second article, which organizes and regulates the executive department, declares that the "executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of America;" and proceeding to detail particular authorities of the executive, it declares that the "president shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." There is in no part of the constitution any explanation of this power to make treaties, any definition of its objects, or delineation of its bounds—The only other provision in the constitution respecting it, is in the sixth article, which provides, as already noticed, that all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;—and this notwithstanding any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary.

It was impossible for words more comprehensive to be used than those which grant the power to make treaties. They are such as would naturally be employed to confer a plenipotentiary authority—A power "to make treaties," granted in these indefinite terms, extends to all kinds of treaties, and with all the latitude which such a power, under any form of government, can possess—the power "to make" implies a power to act authoritatively [Page]and conclusively, independent of the after-clause which expressly places treaties among the supreme laws of the land. The thing to be made is a treaty.

With regard to the objects of the treaty, there being no specification, there is, of course, a charte blanche. The general proposition must, therefore, be, that whatever is a proper subject of compact, between nation and nation, may be embraced by a treaty between the president of the United States, with the advice and consent of the senate, and the correspondent organ of a foreign state.

The authority being general, it comprizes, of course, whatever cannot be shown to be necessarily an exception to it.

The only constitutional exception to the power of making treaties is, that it shall not change the constitution; which results from this fundamental maxim, that a delegated authority cannot alter the constituting act, unless so expressly authorized by the constituting power. An agent cannot new-model his own commission.—A treaty, for example, cannot transfer the legislative power to the executive department, nor the power of this last department to the judiciary; in other words, it cannot stipulate that the president, and not congress, shall make laws for the United States, that the judges, and not the president, shall-command the national forces.

Again, there is also a national exception to the power of making treaties, as there is to every other delegated power, which respects abuses of authority in palpable and extre [...]me cases. On natural principles, a treaty, which should manifes [...] betray or sacrifice the private interests of the state, would be null. But this presents a question foreign from that of the modification or distribution of constitutional powers. It applies to the case of the pernicious exercise of a power, where there is legal competency. Thus the power of treaty, though extending to the right of making alliances offensive and defens [...], might not be exercised in making an alliance, so injurious to the state as to justify the non-observance of the contract.

Beyond these exceptions to the power, none occurs that can be supported.

Those which have been insisted upon, towards invalidating the treaty with Great Britain, are not even plausible. They amount to this, that a treaty can establish nothing between the United States and a foreign nation, which it is the province of the legislative authority to regulate in reference to the United States alone. It cannot, for instance, establish a particular rule of commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain; because it is provided in the constitution, [Page]that congress "shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations." This is equivalent to affirming that all the objects upon which the legislative power may act, in relation to our country, are excepted out of the power to make treaties.

Two obvious considerations refu [...]e this doctrine. One, that the power to make treaties, and the power to make laws, are different things, operating by different means, upon different subjects; the other, that the construction resulting from such a doctrine would defeat the power to make treaties, while its opposite reconciles this power with the power of making laws.

The power to make laws is, "the power of pronouncing authoritatively the will of the nation as to all persons and things over which it has jurisdiction:" or it may be defined to be "the power of prescribing rules binding upon all persons and things over which the nation has jurisdiction." It acts compulsively upon all persons, whether foreigners or citizens, and upon all things within the territory of such nation, and also upon its own citizens and their property without its territory in certain cases and under certain limitations. But it can have no obligatory action whatsoever upon a foreign nation or upon any person or thing within the jurisdiction of a foreign nation.

The power of treaty, on the other hand, is the power by agreement, convention, or compact, to establish rules binding upon two or more nations, their respective citizens and property. The rule established derives its reciprocal obligation from promise, from the faith which the contracting parties pledge to each other—not from the power of either to prescribe a rule for the other. It is not here the will of a superior that commands; it is the consent of two independent parties that contract.

The means which the power of legislation employs, are laws which it enacts, or rules which it enjoins; the subject upon which it acts is the nation of whom it is, the persons and property within the jurisdiction of the nation. The means, which the power of treaty employs, are contracts with other nations, who may or may not enter into them—The subjects upon which it acts are the nations contracting and those persons and things of each to which the contract relates—Though a treaty may effect what a law can, yet a law cannot effect what a treaty does. These discriminations are obvious and decisive; and however the operation of a treaty may, in some things, resemble that of a law, no two ideas are more distinct, than that of legislating and that of contra [...]ing.

[Page] It follows that there is no ground for the inference pretended to be drawn, that the legislative powers of congress are excepted out of the power of making treaties. It is the province of the latter to do what the former cannot do—Congress (to pursue still the case of regulating trade) may regulate by law, our own trade and that which foreigners come to carry on with us; but they cannot regulate the trade which we may go to carry on in foreign countries; they can give to us no rights, no privileges there. This must depend on the will and regulations of those countries; and, consequently, it is the province of the power of treaty to establish the rules of commercial intercourse between foreign nations and the United States. The legislative may regulate our own trade, but treaty only can regulate the national trade between our own and another country.

The constitution accordingly considers the power of treaty as different from that of legislation. This is proved in two ways, I. That while the constitution declares that all the legis [...] tive powers which it grants shall be vested in congress, it vests the power of making treaties in the president with consent of the senate. II. That the same article by which it is declared that the executive power shall be vested in a president, and in which sundry executive powers are detailed, gives the power to ma [...] treaties to the president, with the auxiliary agency of the [...] nate. Thus the power of making treaties is placed in the [...] of executive authorities; while the force of laws is annexed [...] its results. This agrees with the distribution commonly ma [...] by theoretical writers, though perhaps the power of treaty, from its peculiar nature, ought to form a class by itself.

When it is said, that congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, this has reference to the d [...] tribution of the general legislative power of regulating trade between the national and the particular governments; and serves merely to distinguish the right of regulating our external trade, as far as it can be done by law, which is vested in congre [...] from that of regulating the trade of a state within itself, whi [...] is left to each state.

This will the better appear from the entire clause. "The congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes," which is the same as if it had been said, The whole powers of regulating trade by law shall reside in congress, except as [...] the trade within a state, the power to regulate which shall remain with such state. But it is clearly foreign to that mutual regulation of trade between the United States and other nations, which, from the necessity of mutual consent, can only be performed [Page]by treaty. It is indeed an absurdity to say, that the power of regulating trade by law is incompatible with the power of regulating it by treaty; since the former can, by no means, do what the latter can alone accomplish; consequently, it is an absurdity to say, that the legislative power of regulating trade is an exception to the power of making treaties.

Laws are the acts of legislation of a particular nation for itself. Treaties are the acts of the legislation of several nations for themselves jointly and reciprocally. The legislative powers of one state cannot reach the cases which depend on the joint legislation of two or more states. For this, resort must be had to the pactitious power, or the power of treaty—This is another attitude of the subject, displaying the fallacy of the proposition, that the legislative powers of congress, are exceptions to, or limitations of, the power of the president, with the aid of the senate, to make treaties.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXVII.

IT shall now be shown, that the objections to the treaty, founded on its pretended interference with the power of congress, tend to render the power of making treaties, in a very great degree, if not altogether, nominal—This will be best seen by an enumeration of the cases of pretended interference.

1st, The power of congress to lay taxes, is said to be impaired by those stipulations which prevent the laying of duties on particular articles; which also prevent the laying of higher or other duties on British commodities than on the commodities of other countries, and which restrict the power of increasing the difference of duties on British tonnage and on goods imported in British bottoms.

2d, The power of congress to regulate trade is said to be impaired by the same restrictions respecting duties, in as much as they are intended, and operate, as regulations of trade—by the stipulations against prohibitions in certain cases; and, in general, by all the rights, privileges, immunities, and restrictions in trade, which are contained in the treaty; all which are so many regulations of commerce, which are said to encroach upon the legislative authority.

3d, The power of congress to establish an uniform [...]ule of naturalization, is said to be interfered with, by those provision [Page]of the treaty which secure to the settlers, within the precincts of the British posts, the right of becoming citizens of the United States, and those which, in certain cases, remove the disability of alienism as to property.

4th, The power of congress "to define and punish piracies and felonies, committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations," is said to be contravened by those parts of the treaty, which declare that certain acts shall be deemed piracy, which constitute certain other things offences, and stipulate the reciprocal punishment of them by each.

5th, It is also said that the constitution is violated, in relation to that provision which declares, that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law"—by those parts of the treaty which stipulate compensations to certain commissioners, and indemnifications to Great Britain, in certain cases to be adjusted and pronounced by the commissioners; and generally, by all those parts which may involve an expenditure of money.

6th, The constitution is said to be violated in that part which empowers congress to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property of the United States, by those provisions of the treaty which respect the adjustment of boundary in the cases of the rivers St. Croix and Mississippi.

Lastly, The constitution is said to be violated, in its provisions concerning the judiciary department, by those parts of the treaty which contemplate the confiding to the determination of commissioners certain questions between the two nations.

A careful inspection of the treaty with these objections i [...] view, will discover, that of the 28 articles which compose it, at least seventeen are involved in the charge of unconstitutionality; and that these seventeen comprise all the provisions which adjust past controversies, or establish rules of commercial intercourse between the parties—The other eleven, which are the 1st, 10th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 22d, 23d, and 24th, except the first, are made up of provisions which have reference to war; the first merely declaring that there shall be peace between the parties—And it is a question, even with respect to all of those, except the 1st, and 10th, whether they also are not implicated in the charge; in as much as some of their dispositions have commercial relations. Is not this alone sufficient to bring under a strong suspicion the validity of the principles which impeach the constitutionality of the instrument?

[Page] It must have been observed that the argument in the last number is applicable to all the legislative powers of congress, as well as to that of regulating trade, which was selected, by way of illustration, on the ground of its being common to all—Indeed the instance of the regulations of trade is that which is most favorable to the opposite doctrine—Since foreign nations are named in the clause; the true intent of which, however, has been explained.

The same reasoning, too, would extend the power of treaties to those objects which are consigned to the legislation of individual states; but here the constitution has announced its meaning in express terms, by declaring, that the treaties which have been and shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding—This manifestly recognizes the supremacy of the power of treaties over the laws of particular states, and goes even a step farther.

The obvious reason for this special provision, in regard to the laws of individual states, is, that there might otherwise have been room for question—whether a treaty of the union could embrace objects, the internal regulation of which belonged to the separate authorities of the states. But with regard to the United States there was no room for a similar question.

The power of treaty could not but be supposed commensurate with all these objects to which the legislative power of the union extended, which are the proper subjects of compacts with foreign nations.

It is a question among some theoretical writers—whether a treaty can repeal pre-existing laws? This question must always be answered by the particular form of government of each nation. In our constitution, which gives, ipso facto, the force of law, to treaties, making them equal with the acts of congress, the supreme law of the land, a treaty must necessarily repeal an antecedent law contrary to it; according to the legal maxim that "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant."

But even in those forms of government, in which there may be room for such a question, it is not understood that a treaty containing stipulations which require the repeal of antecedent laws, is, on that account, unconstitutional and null. The true meaning is, that the antecedent laws are not, ipso facto, abrogated by the treaty—But the legislature is, nevertheless, bound in good faith, under the general limitation, stated in another place, to lend its authority to remove obstacles which previous laws might oppose to a fair execution of a treaty.

[Page] One instance of the inconsistency, prevailing in the arguments against the treaty, negociated by Mr. Jay, is observable in this point. To get rid of the infractions of our treaty of peace with Great Britain by certain laws of particular states, it is stre [...]uously maintained that treaties controul the laws of states. To impeach the constitutionality of the treaty under consideration, it is objected, that, in some points, it interferes with the objects of state legislation. The express provision of the constitution in this particular, quoted above, has not been sufficient to check the rage for objection.

The absurdity of the alleged interferences will fully appear, by showing how they would operate upon the several kinds of treaties usual among nations. These may be classed under three principal heads.

1. Treaties of commerce,

2. Treaties of alliance,

3. Treaties of peace.

Treaties of commerce are, of course, excluded; for every treaty of commerce is a system of rules devised to regulate and govern the trade between contracting nations; invading directly the exclusive power of regulating trade which is attributed to congress.

Treaties of alliance, whether defensive or offensive, are eq [...]lly excluded, and this on two grounds—1. Because it is their immediate object to decline a case or cases in which one nation shall take part with another in war, contrary, in the sense of the objection, to that clause of the constitution which gives to congress the power of declaring war; and 2. Because the succours stipulated, in whatever shape they may be, must involve an expenditure of money—not to say, that it is common to s [...]ipulate succours in money, either in the first instance or by way of alternative. It will be pertinent to observe incidentally, in this place, that even the humane and laudable provision in the seventeenth article, which all have approved, is within the spirit of the objection; for the effect of this is to restrain the power and discretion of congress to grant reprisals, till there has been an unsuccessful demand of justice. Nothing can better illustrate the unreasonable tendency of the principle.

Treaties of peace are also excluded, or, at the least, are so narrowed as to be in the greatest number of cases impracticable —The most common conditions of these treaties are restitutions or cessions of territory, on one side or on the other, frequently on both sides, regulations of boundary—restitutions and confirmations of property—pecuniary indemnifications for injuries or expenses—It will, probably, not be easy to find a precedent of a treaty of peace, which does not contain one or more of these provisions, as the basis of the cessation of hostilities, [Page]and they are all them naturally to be looked for in an agreement which is to put an end to the state of war between conflicting nations.

Yet they are all precluded by the objections which have been enumerated: pecuniary indemnifications, by that which respects the appropriations of money; restitutions or cessions of territory or property, regulations of boundary, by that which respects the right of congress to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory and property of the United States—It is to be observed, likewise, that cessions of territory are almost always accompanied with stipulations in favor of those, who inhabit the ceded territory, securing personal privileges and private rights of property; neither of which could be acceded to on the principles of that objection, which relates to the power of naturalization; for this power has reference to two species of rights, those of privilege and those of prope [...]y. And act allowing a foreigner to hold real estate is so far an act of naturalization; since it is one of the consequences of alienism, not to be able to hold real estate.

It follows, that if the objections which are taken to the treaty, on the point of constitutionality, are valid, the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, can make neither a treaty of commerce nor alliance, and rarely, if at all, a treaty of peace. It is probable, that on a minute analysis, there is scarcely any species of treaty which would not clash, in some particular, with the principle of those objections; and thus, as was before observed, the power to make treaties, granted in such comprehensive and indefinite terms, and guarded with so much precaution, would become essentially nugatory.

This is so obviously against the principles of sound construction, it, at the same time, exposes the government to so much impotence in one great branch of political power, in opposition to a main intent of the constitution—and it tends so directly to frustrate one principal object of the situation of a general government, the convenient management of our external concerns, that it cannot but be rejected by every discerning man who will examine and pronounce with sincerity. It is against the principles of sound construction; because these teach us, that every instrument is so to be interpreted, as that all the parts may, if possible, consist with each other, and have their effect. But the construction which is combated would cause the legislative power to destroy the power of making treaties. Moreover, if the power of the executive department be inadequate to the making of the several kinds of treaties, which have been mentioned, there is, then, no power in the government [Page]to make them; for there is not a syllable in the constitution which authorizes either the legislative or judiciary departments, to make a treaty with a foreign nation. And our constitution would then exhibit the ridiculous spectacle of a government without a power to make treaties with foreign nations: a result as inadmissable as it is absurd; since, in fact, our constitution grants the power of making treaties, in the most explicit and ample terms, to the president, with the advice and consent of the senate. On the contrary, all difficulty is avoided, by distinguishing the province of the two powers, according to ideas which have been always familiar to us, and which were never exposed to any question till the treaty with Great Britain gave exercise to the subtilties of party spirit.

By confining the power to make laws within its proper sphere, and restricting its actions to the establishment of rules for our own nation and those foreigners who come within our jurisdiction—and by assigning to the power of treaty the office of concerting those rules of mutual intercourse and connexion, between us and foreign nations, which require their consent as well as our own; allowing to it the latitude necessary for this purpose, a harmonious agreement is preserved between the different powers of the government: that to make laws, and that to make treaties; between the authority of the legislative and the authority of the executive department—Hence,

Though congress, by the constitution, have power to lay taxes, yet a treaty may restrain the exercise of it in particular cases. For a nation, like an individual, may abridge its moral power of action by agreement; and the organ charged with the legislative power of a nation may be restrained in its operation by the agreements of the organ of its federative power, or power to contract: let it be remembered, that the nation is the constituent, and that the executive, within its sphere, is no less the organ of its will than the legislature.

Though congress are empowered to make regulations of trade, yet they are not exclusively so empowered—But regulations of trade may also be made by treaty; and, where other nations are to be bound by them, must be made by treaty.

Though congress are authorized to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, yet this contemplates only the ordinary cases of internal administration, in particular and extraordinary cases, those in which the pretensions of a foreign government are to be managed—a treaty may also confer the rights and privileges of citizens; thus the absolute cession and plenary dominion of a province or district, possessed by our arms in war, may be [Page]accepted by the treaty of peace, on the condition, that its inhabitants shall, in their persons and property enjoy the privileges of citizens.

The same reasoning applies to all the other instances of supposed infraction of the legislative authority:—with regard to piracies and offences against the laws of nations; with regard to expenditures of money, with regard to the appointment of officers, with regard to the judiciary tribunals, with regard to the disposal and regulation of the national territory and property —In all these cases, the power to make laws and the power to make treaties are concurrent and co-ordinate—The latter, and not the former, must act, where the co-operation of other nations is requisite.

As to what respects the commissioners agreed to be appointed, they are n [...], in a strict sense, officers. They are arbitrators between the two countries. Though in the constitutions, both of the United States and of most of the individual states, a particular mode of appointing officers is designated—Yet, in practice, it has not been deemed a violation of the provision to appoint commissioners or special agents for special purposes, in a different mode.

As to the provision, which restricts the issuing of money from the treasury, to cases of appropriation by law, and which, from its intrinsic nature, may be considered as applicable to the exercise of every power of government, it is, in no sort, touched by the treaty. In the constant practice of the government, the cause of an expenditure, or the contract which incurs it, is a different thing from the appropriation for satisfying it. Thus the salary of a public officer is fixed by one law, the appropriation for its payment by another. So, the treaty only stipulates what may be a cause of expenditure. An appropriation by law will still be requisite for actual payment.

As to the disposal and regulation of the territory and property of the United States, this will be naturally understood of dispositions and regulations purely domestic, and where the title is not disputed by a foreign power. Where there are interfering claims of foreign powers, as neither will acknowledge the right of the other to decide, treaty must directly or indirectly adjust the dispute.

So far then it is from being true, that the power of treaty can extend to nothing upon which, in relation to ourselves, the legislative power may act—that it may rather be laid down as a general rule, that a treaty may do between different nations whatever the legislative power of each may do with regard to itself. The exceptions to this rule are to be deduced from the [Page]unfitness and inconvenience of its application to particular cases, and are of the nature of abuses of a general principle.

In considering the power of legislation in its relations to the power of treaty, instead of saying, that the objects of the former are excepted out of the latter, it will be more correct, indeed it will be entirely correct, to invert the rule, and to say, that the power of treaty is the power of making exceptions, in particular cases, to the power of legislation. The stipulations of treaty are, in good faith, restraints upon the exercise of the last mentioned power. Where there is no treaty, it is completely free to act. Where there is a treaty; it is still free to act in all the cases not specially excepted by the treaty. Thus, congress is free to regulate trade with a foreign nation, with whom we have no treaty of commerce, in such manner as they judge for the interest of the United States; and they are also free so to regulate it with a foreign nation with whom we have a treaty, in all the points which the treaty does not specially except. There is always, therefore, great latitude for the exercise of the legislative power of regulating trade with foreign nations, notwithstanding any treaties of commerce which may be formed.

The effects of a treaty to impose restraints upon the legislative power, may, in some degree, be exemplified by the case of the compacts which the legislature itself makes, as with regard to the public debt. Its own compacts are, in good faith, exceptions to its power of action. Treaties with foreign powers, for obvious reasons, are much stronger exceptions.

CAMILLUS.

No. XXXVIII.—AND LAST.

THE manner in which the power of treaty, as it exists in the constitution, was understood by the convention in framing it, and by the people in adopting it, is the point next to be considered.

As to the sense of the convention, the secrecy with which their deliberations were conducted, does not permit any formal proof of the opinions and views which prevailed in digesting the power of treaty—But from the best opportunity of knowing the fact, I aver, that it was understood by all, to be the intent of the provision to give to that power the most ample latitude —to render it competent to all the stipulations, which the [Page]exigencies of national affairs might require; competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among nations; and competent, in the course of its exercise for these purposes, to controul and bind the legislative power of congress —And it was emphatically for this reason, that it was so carefully guarded; the co-operation of two-thirds of the senate, with the president, being required to make any treaty whatever—I appeal for this, with confidence, to every member of the convention—particularly to those in the two houses of congress. Two of these are in the house of representatives, Mr. Madison and Mr. Baldwin: It is expected, by the adversaries of the treaty, that these gentlemen will, in their places, obstruct its execution—However this may be, I feel a confidence that neither of them will deny the assertion I have made—to suppose them capable of such a denial were to suppose them utterly regardless of truth. But, though direct proof of the views of the convention on the point, cannot be produced; —yet we are not wholly without proof on this head.

Three members of the convention dissented from the constitution; Mr. Mason, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. Randolph. Among the reasons for his dissent, published by Mr. Mason, we find this clause, "By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the executive and senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legis [...]ation, which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the house of representatives where it could be done with safety." —This shows the great extent of the power, in the conception of Mr. Mason: in many cases amounting to an exclusive power of legislation; nor did he object to the extent, but only desired that it should have been further guarded, by certain distinctions, and by requiring, in certain cases, the assent of the house of representatives.

Among the objections to the constitution, addressed by Mr. Gerry to the legislature of Massachusetts, we find one to have been, "that treaties of the highest importance might be formed by the president, with the advice of two-thirds of a quorum of the senate."—This shows his idea of the magnitude of the power; and impliedly admitting with Mr. Mason, the propriety of its extent, he seems only to have desired that the concurrence of the senate should have embraced two-thirds of the whole body, instead of two-thirds of a quorum. But how small and how insignificant would the power of treaty be, according to the doctrine lately promulgated, with regard to its constitutional limit?

[Page] As to the sense of the community in the adoption of the constitution, this can only be ascertained from two sources, the writings for and against it, and the debates in the several state conventions—while it was under consideration.

I possess not, at this moment, materials for an investigation, which would enable me to present the evidence they afford—But I refer to them, with confidence, for proof of the fact, that the organization of the power of treaty, in the censtitution, was attacked and defended with an admission on both sides, of its being of the character which I have assigned to it—Its great extent and importance—its effect to controul, by its stipulations, the legislative authority, were mutually taken for granted, and, upon this basis, it was insisted, by way of objection— that there were not adequate guards for the safe exercise of so vast a power; that there ought to have been reservations of certain rights, a better disposition of the power to impeach, and a participation, general or special, of the house of representatives in the making of treaties.

The reply to these objections, acknowledging the delicacy and magnitude of the power, was directed to show that its organization was a proper one, and that it was sufficiently guarded.*

[Page] The manner of exercising a similar power under the confederation shall now be examined.

To judge of the similarity of the power, it will be useful to quote the terms in which it was granted. They are these, "The United States in congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subject to, or from prohibiting the importation or exportation of any species of commodities whatsoever." (Article IX.)

It will not be disputed that the words "treaties and alliances" are of equivalent import, and of no greater force than the single word "treaties." An alliance is only a species of treaty, a particular of a general;—and the power of "entering into treaties," which terms confer the authority under which the former government acted, will not be pretended to be [...]ronger than the power "to make treaties," which are the [...]rms constituting the authority under which the present government acts; it follows, that the power, respecting treaties, under the former, and that under the present government, are [...]milar.

But though similar, that under the present government is more comprehensive; for it is divested of the restriction in the provision cited above, and is fortified by the express declaration, that its acts shall be valid notwithstanding the constitution or [Page]laws of any state.—This is evidence, (as was the fact) of a disposition in the convention to disembarrass and reinforce the power of treaty. It ought not to pass unnoticed, that an Important argument results from the proviso, which accompanies the power granted by the confederation, as to the natural extent of this power. The declaration that no treaty of commerce shall be made restraining the legislative power of a state from imposing such duties and imposts on foreigners as their own people are subject to, or from prohibiting the importation or exportation of any species of commodities whatsoever is an admission,

1. That the general power of entering into treaties, included that of making treaties of commerce, and

2. That without the limitation in the proviso, a treaty of commerce might have been made which would restrain the legislative authority of the state in the points interdicted by that proviso.

Let it not be said, that the proviso, by implication, granted the power to make treaties of commerce, under which congress afterwards acted; for besides that this is inconsistent with the more obvious meaning of the clause, the first article of the confederation leaves to the states individually every power [...] expressly delegated to the United States in congress assemb [...] The power of congress, therefore, to make a treaty of commerce and every other treaty they did make—must be vindicate [...] on the ground that the express grant of power to enter into treaties and alliances is a general, which necessarily included as particulars the various treaties they have made, and the various stipulations of those treaties.

Under this power, thus granted and defined, the alliance with France was contracted: guaranteeing, in the case of a defensive war, her West India possessions, and when the casus foederis occurs, obliging the United States to make war for the defence of those possessions, and consequently, to incur the expenses of war.

Under the same power, treaties of commerce were made with France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia—Besides that every treaty of commerce is necessarily a regulation of commerce between the parties, it has been shown in the antecedent comparison of those treaties,* with that lately negociated, that they produce the specific effects of restraining the legislative power from imposing higher or other duties on the articles of those nations than on the like articles of other nations, and [Page]from extending prohibitions to them which shall not equally extend to other nations the most favored; and thus abridge the exercise of the legislative power to tax, and the exercise of the legislative power to regulate trade.

These treaties likewise define and establish the same case of piracy, which is defined in the treaty with Great Britain. Moreover, the treaty with France, as has been elsewhere shown, with regard to the rights of property naturalizes the whole French nation.

The consular convention with France, negociated, likewise, under the same power, grants to the consuls of that country, various authorities and jurisdictions, some of a judicial nature, which are actual transfers to them of portions of the internal jurisdiction and ordinary judiciary power of the country; the exercise of which our government is bound to aid with its whole strength. It also grants exemptions to French consuls from certain kinds of taxes, and to them, and French citizens, from all personal service; all which are extremely delicate interferences with our internal policy and ordinary jurisdiction.

Under the same power, the treaty with Morocco was formed, which, besides various other regulations relative to war, and [...]ral relative to trade, contains the rule, that neither party [...] make war without a previous demand of reparation; in re [...]raint of the general discretionary power of congress to de [...] war.

Under the same power, the treaty of peace with Great Bri [...] was made—This treaty contains the establishment of a boundary line between the parties, which, in part, is arbitrary, and could not have been predicated upon precise antecedent right. It also prohibits the future confiscation of the property of adherents to Great Britain: declares that no person shall, [...] account of the part he took in the war, suffer any future [...] or damage in his person, liberty, or property, and provides for the release of such persons from confinement, and the discontinuance of prosecutions against them.

It is difficult to conceive a higher act of controul, both of the legislative and judiciary authority, than by this article. These provisions are analagous in principle, to those stipulations which, in the second and ninth articles of the treaty under examination, have given occasion to constitutional objection.

Under the same power, various treaties with Indians, inhabiting the territory of the United States, have been made; establishing arbitrary lines of boundary with them: which determine the right of soil on the one side and on the other. Some of those treaties proceed on the principle of the United States [Page]having conquered the Indian country, and profess to make gratuitous concessions to them of the lands which are left to their occupation. There is also a feature of importance common to these treaties, which is the withdrawing of the protection of the United States from those of their citizens, who intrude on Indian laws, leaving them to be punished at the pleasure of the Indians.

Hence it appears, that, except as to the stipulations for appointing commissioners, the treaties made under the confederation, contain all the features, identically or by analogy, which create constitutional objections to the treaty before us: They restrain, in certain instances, the legislative power to lay taxes; they make numerous and important regulations of trade; they confer the benefit of naturalization as to property; they define cases of piracy; they create causes of expenditure; they direct and modify the power of war; they erect, within the country, tribunals unknown to our constitutions and laws, in cases to which these are competent—whereas the treaty with Great Britain only provides for the appointment of arbitrators in cases to which our tribunals and laws are incompetent; and they make dispositions concerning the territory and property of the United States.

It is true, that some of the treaties made under the for [...] government, though subsequent to the proposing of the articles of confederation to the states, were prior to the final adoption of these articles; but still it is presumable that the treaties were negociated with an eye to the powers of the pending national compact. Those with Great Britain, Sweden, Russia, and Morocco, and the convention with France, were posterior to the completion of that compact.

It may, perhaps, be argued, that a more extensive construction of the power of treaty, in the confederation, than in one present constitution, was countenanced by the union in the same body of legislative powers with the power of treaty. But this argument can have no force, when it is con [...]ide [...] that the principal legislative powers with regard to the objects embraced by the treaties of congress, were not vested in th [...] body, but remained with the individual states—Such are the power of specific taxation, the power of regulating trade, the power of naturalization, &c.

If in theory the objects of legislative power are excepted out of the power of treaty, this must have been equally, at least, the case with the legislative powers of the state gove [...] ments as with those of the United States—Indeed the argument was much stronger for the objection, where distinct governments [Page]were the depository of the legislative power, than where the same government was the depository of that power and of the power of treaty.—Nothing but the intri [...]i [...] force of the power of treaty could have enabled it to penetrate the separate spheres of the state governments. The practice under the confederation for so many years, acquiesced in by all the states, is, therefore, a conclusive illustration of the power of treaty, and an irresistible refutation of the novel and preposterous doctrine, which impeaches the constitutionality of that lately negociated—If the natural import of the terms used in the constitution were less clear and decisive than they are, that practice is a commentary upon them, and fixes their sense. For the sense in which certain terms were practised upon in a prior constitution of government, must be presumed to have been intended, in using the like terms in a subsequent constitution of government for the same nation.

Accordingly, the practice under the present government before the late treaty, has corresponded with that sense.

Our treaties with several Indian nations regulate and change the boundaries between them and the United States—And in addition to compensations in gross, they stipulate the payment of certain specific and perpetual annuities. Thus a treaty in August, 1790, with the Creeks (article 5) promises them the pearly sum of one thousand five hundred dollars—And similar features are found in subsequent treaties with the Six Nations, the Cherokees, and the North Western Indians—This last has just been ratified by the unanimous voice of the senate. It stipulates an annuity of 9500 dollars—and relinquishes to the Indians, a large tract of land which they had, by preceding treaties, ceded to the United States.

Hence we find that our former treaties under the present government, as well as one subsequent to that under consideration, contradict the doctrine set up against its constitutionality—in the important particulars of making dispositions concerning the territory and property of the United States, and binding them to raise and pay money. These treaties have not only been made by the president, and ratified by the senate, without any impeachment of their constitutionality, but the house of representatives has heretofore concurred, and without objection, in carrying them into effect, by the requisite appropriation of money.

The consular convention with France stands in a peculiar predicament. It was negociated under the former government, and ratified under the present; and so may be regarded as a treaty of both governments, illustrative of the extent of the power of treaty in both. The delicate and even the extraordinary [Page]nature of the provisions it contains, have been adverted to. Though all reflecting men have thought ill of the propriety of some of them, as inconveniently breaking in upon our interior administration, legislative, executive, and judiciary; only acquiescing in them from the difficulty of getting rid of stipulations entered into by our public agents under competent powers, yet no question has been heard about their constitutionality. And congress have, by law, assisted their execution by making our judicial tribunals, and the public force of the country, auxiliary to the decrees of the foreign tribunals which they authorize within our territory.

If it should be said, that our constitution, by making all former treaties and engagements as obligatory upon the United States, under that constitution, as they were under the confederation, rendered the ratification of the convention a matter of necessity—the answer is, that either the engagements, which it contracted, were already conclusive, or they were not—if the former, there was no need of a ratification; if the latter, there was no absolute obligation to it. And, in every supposition, a ratification, by the president, with the consent of the senate, could have been predicated only upon the power given in the present constitution in relation to treaties; and to have any validity, must have been within the limit of that power.

But it has been heretofore seen that the inference from this instrument is no less strong, if referred to the power under the confederation, than if referred to the power under the present constitution.

How happens it, that all these invasions of the constitution, if they were such, were never discovered, and that all the departments of the government, and all parties in the public councils should have co-operated in giving them a sanction? Does it not prove that all were convinced, that the power of treaty, applied in our exterior relations to objects, which, in the ordinary course of internal administration and in reference to ourselves, were of the cognizance of the legislative power? and particularly that the former was competent to bind the latter in the delicate points of raising and appropriating money? If competent to this, what legislative power can be more sacred, more out of its reach?

Let me now ask (and a very solemn question it is, especially for those who are bound by oath to support the constitution) Has it not been demonstrated that the provisions in the treaty are justified by the true and manifest interpretation of the constitution—are sanctioned by the practice upon a similar power under the confederation, and by the practice in other instances under the present government?

[Page] If this has been demonstrated, what shall we think of the candor and sincerity of the objections which have been erected on the basis of a contrary supposition? Do they not unequivocally prove, that the adversaries of the treaty have been resolved to discredit it by every artifice they could invent? that they have not had truth for their guide, and consequently are very unfit guides for the public opinion, very unsafe guardians of the public welfare?

It is really painful and disgusting to observe sophisms so miserable as those which question the constitutionality of the treaty, retailed to an enlightened people, and insisted upon with so much seeming fervency and earnestness—It is impossible not to bestow on sensible men, who act this part, the imputation of hypocrisy—The absurdity of the doctrine is too glaring to permit even charity itself to suppose it sincere—If it were possible to imagine that a majority in any branch of our government, could betray the constitution, and trifle with the nation, so far as to adopt and act upon such a doctrine—it would be time to despair of the republic.

There would be no security at home, no respectability abroad. Our constitutional charter would become a dead letter. The organ of our government for foreign affairs would be treated with de [...]is [...]on whenever he should hereafter talk of negociation or meaty. May the great Ruler of nations avert from our coun [...] so grievous a calamity!*

CAMILLUS.

To the Editor of the American Remembrancer.

THE following Remarks on the treaty lately concluded between the United States and Great Britain, were written very soon after that instrument was made known to the public, and before the [...]tification of it, by the president of the United States, took effect. The writer had not seen any of the voluminous productions in defence of the treaty, which have appeared, in the different gazettes of the United States, under the signatures of Camillus, Curtius, A Citizen, &c. &c. And even had he seen them, he would not have thought it necessary, or in [...]out on him, to answer or detect all the sophistry and fallacious arguments and statements they contain. In the course of this investigation, he hath c [...]ndidly endeavoured to weigh the real merits of, and objections to, the treaty, with the impartiality of a person actuated neither by party zeal, nor any worse motive, but by a stedfast attachment to the United States alone, the principles of the revolution, and the prosperity of the government.

[Page]

REMARKS ON THE Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, Concluded between Lord Grenville and Mr. Jay, on the Part of Great Britain and the United States, respectively.

BY A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES.

Sic vos non vobis.

—Virgil.

Not for yourselves, ye merchants, shall ye toil.

Not for yourselves, ye farmers, plough the soil,

Not for yourselves, ye soldiers, laurels gain,

Not for yourselves, ye sailors, brave the main.

—Anonymous:

"By presenting many propositions at once, which are to be voted for in the lump, they hide what is destined to promote their own private views, or give a colour to it by joining it with things which they know will take hold of the mind of the people."

De Lolme on the British Constitution.

THE treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, lately concluded in London between Lord Grenville and Mr. Jay, on the part of the king of Great Britain and the United States, respectively, is one of the most important subjects ever agitated in America since she became an independent nation; it seems, indeed, to have engrossed the public mind more than any other, the adoption of the federal constitution, only excepted.—Reason, prejudice, and passion, equally prompt to the discussion of it, and every individual enlists himself u [...] the banners of one or the other. This renders a temperate enquiry into its merits, without regard, either to the original framers, or its subsequent advocates or enemies, an object of the first importance. I shall, therefore, leave it to others to discuss, whether the late envoy extraordinary entered upon, and concluded it, in pursuance of general or particular instructions, either from the president of the United States alone, or by and with the advice and consent of the senate; or whether, he pursued the di [...]tates of his own better judgment, without any authority whatsoever. If, however, there should appear any thing in the treaty to condenm, decen [...]y, and established precedent, will require, that it should be considered as the act of the minister, only; more especially as the sanction of the supreme executive magistrate of the United States has been hitherto with h [...]ld, as we have every reason to believe.

[Page] But, before entering into a discussion of the articles of the treaty, it may not be improper to advert, not only to existing circumstances at the time it was concluded, but to some antecedent events, which may be presumed to have had some operation upon the minds of the nations, whose mutual friendship is, by this instrument, proposed to be conciliated, and perpetually cemented. For a treaty (so far as relates to a free republic at least) ought to be considered as the act of the nation, and not merely of the government, only; or, in other words, of the parties who conclude, sign, and ratify them. To this end, due attention should be paid to the prevailing sentiment of the nation, so as to remove every obstacle to that cordiality, and unfeigned friendship, which treaties of amity are intended to promote.

It is just twenty years since the United States of America, stimulated by the tyrannical usurpations of the present king of Great Britian, declared the good people of these states absolved from their allegiance to that prince, and that all political connexion with Great Britain ought to be totally dissolved. A cruel civil war was waged against them during a period of eight years, the calamities of which were heightened by every wanton act of depredation, oppression, and insult, that rapacity, cruelty, and a vindictive spirit could prompt men to com [...]. Our slaves were excited to rebel against us; the savages [...] our frontiers were basely stimulated to add, to the sangui [...]ary measures of the British enemy, their own more inhuman mode of warfare. Our towns were wantonly consumed to [...]es, and our country every where laid waste. Our property was seized for the use of the armies of our enemies; or destroyed, without compensation, and without compunction or restraint: Thousands of our negroes, the cultivators of the soil in the southern states (and forming the greater part of the moveable property of their masters) were enticed or forced away from their service—Eighty thousand of our fellow citizens are supposed to have fallen victims to the offended majesty of that vindictive monarch, whose name was more execrated among us, than ever Nero's was at Rome. Inability to prosecute the war longer, produced a peace; but it was peace without forgiveness, without friendship, and without sincerity. During the long course of hostilities, every sentiment of regard and of mutual confidence had been extinguished on the part of both nations, and the peace concluted between them, was rather calculated to perpetuate, than to extinguith the remembrance of their mutual ani [...]sity. The citizens of the middle and southern states complained that their [...]ticular interests had [Page]been overlooked, or sacrificed, by some of the articles of the treaty. The northern states found their trade abridged, by the very instrument which they supposed would have secured its unlimited extension. Thus even the treaty of peace had no other recommendation, in the eyes of the people of America, than the termination of hostility. His Britannic majesty, on the ether hand, appears not to have entered into it with good faith. The western posts, which were to have been delivered up "with all convenient speed," were forcibly detained in the possession of his troops; and the negroes and other property taken from the people of America, were, in direct violation of the treaty, carried away without compensation. An equal disposition to evade, or violate some of the articles of the treaty was attributed to several of the states, and mutual complaints and recriminations took place between the two nations. The restraints imposed upon our West India commerce by his Britannic majesty; his supposed ill offices towards us, in exciting the depredations of the Barbary states upon our commerce; and in fomenting discontents among the Indian nations, and even stimulating and aiding them in acts of hostility against us, occasioned those wounds to inflame and fester anew, which had been, at best, imperfectly cicatrised.

The aversion of his Britannic majesty to enter into any commercial treaty with the United States, had manifested itself, in the rejection of all overtures made for that purpose by the present vice-president of the United States, who was sent thither to effect such a negoci [...] [...] p [...] long after the conclusion of the peace.—The adoption of the federal constitution removed all those obstacles, which, it was pretended, prevented the court of Great Britain from entering into negociations with us. It did more.—It removed every barrier to the full and complete execution of the treaty of peace, on the part of the United States, by rendering that treaty a part of the supre [...] law of the land: the federal courts, in their decisions, manifested the most unequivocal disposition to give to the treaty the most favorable construction on behalf of British creditors.—It was the expectation of all, that the energy of the federal government would not fall to extort from his Britannic majesty an equal compliance with the treaty on his part.

The constitution, at the time of its adoption, was regarded as the guarantee of a free trade with the West Indies, and with every other part of the world; it soon became matter of wonder and of dina [...]s [...]action, that it had not produced these effects. It was finally made known that the executive of the United States had taken measures to discover the sentiments of [Page]the British court on the subject of a treaty of commerce, and that the proposition still continued to be treated with disrespect. —In the mean time, France was engaged in a revolution, the principles of which were supposed to bear so great an analogy to our own, that every American felt himself interested in her success.—Our prayers were continually offered up in her behalf, and it was concluded that the cords of amity would be drawn as closely as possible between the two republics.—His Britannic majesty was not long in joining the alliance formed among the enemies of the new republic. America soon found herself made a party in the war, by her sufferings: the spoliations on our commerce are well known; they have been felt through every part of the United States. Not only our vessels with their cargoes were seized and confiscated, because engaged in commerce with the enemies of his Britannic majesty; but our citizens were abused in their persons, imprisoned or impressed into the service of a sovereign whom they detested, under pretext that they were his subjects. Innumerable acts of piracy were committed by a swarm of privateers which infested our coasts; nor was the insolence practised by his Britannic majesty's sea officers inferior to the depredations of the privateers. Stimulated by resentment, and a desire of retaliation, some of the citizens of America took commissions from, or entered into the service of, their sister republic. They were prosecuted for exercising a natural right, not repugnant to any treaty, or known law of the land. These prosecutions were, by the sufferers and their friends, considered as an act of supererrogation in our government, founded on a partiality to British interest, in opposition to that of France. Every act of concession or conciliation on the part of the United States, seemed to give new life and vigour to the arrogance, insolence, and depredations of the British ships of war and cruisers. The Indians, whose hostile disposition towards us was supposed to be the effect of British perfidy, prosecuted the war against us in a stile altogether new, and gave reason to presume that they were not only aided with arms, ammunition, and warlike stores, by the British government, but that they were actually assisted by the officers and militia, if not by the regular troops of that nation. CONGRESS, to whom it belongs to decide upon a just cause of war, and to regulate commerce, roused by so many reiterated acts of aggression, had resolved upon some cautionary measures to secure indemnification for injury, and to retaliate upon a nation from whom so many vexations were daily received. The representatives of the people concurred in the measures proposed, by a great majority—the senate were divided— [Page]the vice-president held the balance in his hand, and the scale preponderated against the representatives of the people. At this moment of effervescence in the public mind, the late envoy extraordinary was appointed; the object of his mission was supposed to be a demand of reparation of injuries, and a compliance with the terms of the violated treaty of peace.

From this short recapitulation of preceding events, it will appear, that the public mind was by no means prepared to enter, with cordiality, into a state of amity with a nation whose government had, for twenty years, incessantly persecuted the United States, either by open acts of hostility, or the insidious arts of secret animosity. It was, therefore, reasonably expected, that a treaty, whose object was to bind the two nations in amity with each other, would contain within it every thing necessary to soften asperity—to subdue resentment—to satisfy claims, and to conciliate affection. To determine how far this expectation has been fulfilled by the present treaty, it will be necessary, not only to state what it contains, but also, what it does not contain. I shall begin with the former; and, in order to do it with the more regularity, I shall take it article by article.

The preamble states the motives to the treaty to be, the defire "of terminating the differences between his Britan [...] majesty and the United States, in such a manner, as, with out reference to the merits of their respective complaints and pretensions, may be best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good under-standing." Such a preamble would either lead us to expect the most liberal concessions in favor of the United States, or a total dereliction of their complaints by the envoy extraordinary. On the part of his Britannic majesty such a waver might be considered, if not a mark of great magnanimity, at least, of great condescension, whilst his ships of [...] and privateers were in the full career of plunder on the commerce of our unresisting citizens. Nor can it be altogether denied, that his majesty, as well as the United States, had some cause to murmur at the events of his reign:—He had lost an immense territory, which he had regarded as his hereditary right, jure divino, and had spent above an hundred millions sterling of his subjects' money in the attempt to retain it in subjection to him. He might be compared to an unlucky sportsman whose over-charged gun had bursted, burnt his singers, given him a sound douse in the chaps, and knock'd out half a dozen of his teeth, in attempting to shoot a partridge: —and America to the poor bird itself, which had got a grievous wound, in spite of the unskilfulness of the aukward [Page]marksman. Considering, however, the presumable object of the mission of the envoy extraordinary, it appears somewhat unaccountable upon what grounds he could-suppose himself authorized to relinquish the discussion of the complaints of the United States, unless indeed he apprehended that his Britannic majesty's choler might be so far roused by it, as again to reject a negociation, and compel him to return to America re infecta: * or, perhaps, he was sensible, that in the adjustment of such a variety of claims as America was entitled to insist on, the business might be so far procrastinated as to lessen the glory of the achievement; or, perhaps, retard his return to his nauve country, in time to accept that accumulation of honor which there awaited him. But let us now proceed to examine the treaty, some of the articles of which I shall pass over without observation, as being either of little moment, or customary in similar treaties; whilst upon some others I may wish to detain the reader's attention.

1. Of eight and twenty articles which the treaty contains, the first ten are declared to be permanent; the remainder are of limited duration. The first stipulates, in the ordinary form, that there shall be peace, "and true and sincere friendship between his Britannic majesty and his successors, and the United States, and between the people, respectively, without exception of persons or places."—To render this article effectual, it will be necessary that the subsequent articles should contain all such things as "are calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding between the nations:" otherwise, this article will ever remain in the same state of inexecution, as those relating to the negroes and the western posts, in the treaty of peace.

II. The second article stipulates that his Britannic majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all posts and places within the United States, on or before the first day of June, 1796. This, by the treaty of peace, ought to have been done, at least, a dozen years ago; and it appears somewhat strange that the immediate performance of it was not made a condition, precedent to any further negociation, except for reparation for the spoliations on our commerce, &c. for how can we be assured that his Britannic majeste will observe more good faith in the performance of this treaty, than the former, if an excuse can be found to evade it? The only difference [Page]that this part of the second article makes between our present and former situation is, that the detention of the posts, hitherts is evidently sanctioned by the present treaty; and all compensation for former breaches of faith, and aggressions in this respect, most generously waved, on the part of the United States; it must be confessed, however, that this article furnishes an interpretation of the words "with all convenient speed," in the former treaty; which, in all future negociations, with his Britannic majesty, may be understood to mean a dozen years.

The same article provides that the settlers and traders, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the western posts, may continue to reside there, without being compelled to become citizens of the United States, or to take any oaths of allegiance to the government thereofs, or remove and dispose of their lands and other property, at their election. This, as it respects traders, and other transient persons, is just and proper: as it relates to landholders it will be made the subject of future remark, when we examine the ninth article.

III. The third article contains a variety of stipulations, some of which appear to be reciprocally liberal, whilst others manifest a spirit of accommodation and concession, on the part of the United States, which very few are likely to feel, in any degree, equal to the envoy extraordinary.—If it be true that the most important stations for carrying on the fur trade, &c. are within the territories of the United States, which, I am told, is the case, Great Britain will be no small gainer by that equal intercourse, which this article permits upon the lakes and the waters thereof, as also the free use of the Mississippi,* and the portage places in the territories of the United States and Great Britain, respectively. But the total exclusion of American vess [...] from the sea-ports, harbours, creeks, and rivers of the British American territories on the Atlantic, gives to this article a very disadvantageous turn for the commercial interests of the United States; thereby securing to the British nation a decided and perpetual pre-eminence over them in the trade with the north-western parts of the American republic; since all articles for exportation to foreign parts, must either go down the St. Lawrence and be exported to Britain, in British ships, or be brought over land to the head waters of Hudson's river, or some other less convenient communication with the Atlantic ports of the United States—Foreign goods must be transported [Page]to the western territories in like manner. The communication from the lakes to Quebec, by the river St. Lawrence, is so much easier than to New York, by the river Hudson,* and the advantages (if I am rightly informed) in every respect so much greater, as to preclude all competition on the part of the United States. Hence it seems probable that Great Britain will continue to monopolize the trade on the lakes, and finally, the whole trade of the American north western territory. Other causes than those already mentioned will contribute to promote this. British traders are already settled at the most advantageous stations for carrying on commerce, and probably have possessed themselves of all the land at those places, which the preceding article secures to them for ever. An American going there to settle would find himself under all the disadvantages of attempting to establish himself in a foreign country, and exposed to all the ill offices which jealousy could suggest.

I shall not here enquire how far the United States had a right to insist on the free navigation of the river St. Lawrence, at least for their vessels bound from one part of the United States to another, reserving that question for another place; but it is observable, that while our vessels are totally excluded from the Atlantic ports of Canada, &c. the vessels of those countries may freely navigate our rivers† as far as the highest ports of entry for foreign ships, in any part of the United States. This want of reciprocity will be excused by the advosates for the treaty, by a general reference to colonial laws; to which I shall offer an answer in its proper place.

Commercial regulations, not founded in experience, can never be adopted with too much caution. They ought never to find a place in a perpetual treaty; for whatever inconvenience or disadvantage result from them, it cannot be removed without hazarding a war; since it can never be expected that a commerical nation, tenacious of her interests, will ever resign an advantage that is once secured by a perpetual treaty. Such a nation is the British.

[Page] IV. and V. As these articles relate altogether to an amicable adjustment of some doubts respecting our boundaries, I presume they are proper enough for that purpose.*

VI. The sixth article recites, that it is alleged, by divers of his majesty's subjects, that debte, bona fide contracted before the peace, stil remain owing to them by the citizens of the United States, "and, that, by the operation of various lawf [...] impediments since the peace," the recovery has been delay [...] and the value and security of the debt lessened. It stipul [...], therefore, for the appointment of a board of commissioners, part British and part American, to examine all complaints referred to them, "and to take into consideration all claims, whether of principal or interest, or balances of principal and interest, and to determine the same respectively, according to [...]quity and justice;" they may also examine all persons that may come before them, and receive in evidence written depositions, books, [...] papers, or copies or extracts thereof, duly authenticated; and their award shall, in all cases, be final and conclusive, both [...] to the justice of the claim, and the amount to be paid to the creditor; which amount the United States undertake to cause [...] be paid in specie, on condition of such releases, or assigum [...] to be made by the creditor, as the commissioners may direct.

I have been greatly at a loss to suppose a case to which this article can apply; at length, however, I think I have stumble [...] upon two, perhaps a third—but I am not presumptuous enou [...] to insist that I am right in either. The first, I have supposed [...] be the case of a debt confiscated or sequestered during the was, where the debtor has pleaded such confiscation or sequestration in bar of the plaintiff's claim. When this question was discu [...] in the federal court of Virginia, the chief justice of the United States gave it as his opinion, that the treaty of peace annualled [...] the acts of sequestration passed by the several states, though, [...] that time sovereign and independent, and avoided all acts done [...] pursuance thereof. † A majority of the court were of a differ [...] opinion. Whether it was the intention of the envoy extraordinary to restore to the opinion of the chief justice that weight, which it had lost on the occasion alluded to, I will not pretend to decide; but if my conjecture be just, the British claimant [Page] [...]algre the decision of a constitutional court of judicature may now rest secure of his claim, without any abatement. The second case applicable to this article, I presume, will arise from the operation of an act of the legislature of Virginia, passed in the year 1787, repealing all acts of assembly which prohibited the recovery of British debts, with a suspending clause, until the British posts in the United States should be delivered up, and measures taken for the further fulfilment of the treaty, by delivering up the negroes of the citizens of that state, taken away contrary to the seventh article of the treaty of peace. How far this legal impediment might operate to delay the debt of a British creditor, or to lessen its value, or security, I cannot presume to say; yet I should conclude that the adoption of the federal constitution a few months after, did very effectually remove this legal impediment. The third case, I am in [...]ined, from the special wording of this article, to suppose, refers to those cases where suits have been brought, and a verdict been given for the defendant; or the principal debt recoverted either without interest (if any such case has happened) or with a deduction of interest during the war. In these letter cases, the chief justice of the United States had instructed the jury to give interest without any deduction. They uniformly disregarded the instruction; it was necessary to provide some remedy in this, as well as in the first mentioned case, and it is probable that the opinion of the chief justice of the United States will be paid due respect to, by the commissioners to be appointed in virtue of this article. The liberality of the envoy extraordinary in this article, evinces, at the same time, the most serupulous regard to the punctual adherence to the spirit of treaties, on the part of the United States, and his extreme politeness and generosity in passing over in silence those causes, which gave rise to the legal impediments thus happily removed. Nothing renders a treaty more respectable than such exalted instances of magnanimity in the framers of it.*

[Page] It has been hinted that this court of commissioners (a part of whom, as was before observed, are to be British) who are thus to liquidate legal claims by one individual against another, is an encroachment upon the functions of the federal judiciary, and a violation of the constitution. The question is delicate and important; there is, moreover, an obscurity in this article, which makes it difficult to ascertain its real import. It may not be improper to notice some parts of it, with a view to the discussion of this question.—1st, The award of the commissioners shall be final in all cases, both as to the justice of the claim, and the amount to be paid the creditor, 2d, The United States undertake to cause the sum awarded to be paid, &c. on condition of such releases or assignments to be given by the creditor, as the commissioners may direct—Is it meant that the award shall be final and conclusive between the creditor, and the original debtor? If so, he must be made a party defendant, and that, I presume, by regular process: he must be heard in his defence; he ought to have compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses; the truth of the facts put in issue are to be tried and determined by the commissioners. IT BELONGS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS TO DO ALL THESE THINGS; and [Page]the trial of matters of fact put in issue must there be by a JURY. Again, the United States undertake to cause the money awarded to be paid. How? By process of execution against the defendant's body or estate? Or, out of the treasury of the United States, trusting for reimbursement to the assignment from the creditor? How are they to recover in virtue of this assignment? By harrassing the debtor with a new suit, or is he bound to all intents and purposes by the award of the Commissioners? These things are difficult to be understood, and still more difficult to reconcile to that clause of the constitution, which declares that the judiciary power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress may, from time to time, establish; that the judges shall hold their offices during good behavious; that they shall take an oath to support the constitution of the United States; and that the jurisdiction of these courts shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, or laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority. The great tenderness of the envoy extraordinary for the case of British creditors, seems to have made him forget that he presided in one of those courts, whose jurisdiction extends to all cases arising under treaties; a circumstance which can only be attributed to his being so much engrossed by his new office, as not only to forget the functions and duties of that which he had left behind, but even the constitution of his country.

VII. The succeeding article relates to the compensation to be made to the citizens of the United States, for the spoliations and depredations committed on our commerce, and to the subjects of Great Britain for such captures as have been made within the jurisdiction of the United States, or by vessels armed therein. For this purpose a similar board of commissioners, with nearly similar powers, are to sit in LONDON, who are to decide the claims referred to them according to justice, equity, and the laws of nations; and the British government undertakes to pay the sum awarded to the claimants in specie, without deduction. But it would seem that the commissioners are not to take cognizance of any cases, but such wherein adequate compensation cannot be now actually obtained in the ordinary courts of justice; with a further exception of such cases, where the losses have been occasioned by the manifest delay, negligence, or wilful omission of the claimants.

Of all the injuries to which mankind are exposed, those committed on the high seas are most easily perpetrated, and most difficult to be prevented, or punished. The conduct of privateersmen differs in nothing from that of pir [...]es, except in [Page]the circumstance of obtaining a previous licence to exercise their nefarious practices. That of the commanders of ships of war but too often partakes more of the insolence of a bashaw than the courtesy of a soldier of honor. The spoliations committed on the property of the citizens of America by these two classes of men, must have been often attended with circumstances of inconvenience to the suffers, far beyond the apparent amount of the injury offered. I have known a profitable voyage defeated, and the vessel finally lost, by being plundered of a few sail-needles, and twine, to the value of less than four dollars. The detention of an hour, or being turned out of her course for a day, may prove equally fatal to a merchant ship. These are injuries for which no reparation in damages, estimated merely according to the value of the thing taken, or the time of detention, can make adequate satisfaction; acts of depredation and violence committed by persons unknown, to whose residence we are strangers, or whose residence is at too great a distance to follow them in hopes of satisfaction, are frequently submitted to, from despair of obtaining any compensation. Thus is will happen that a thousand instances of oppression will remain unatoned for, from the nature of the injury itself, and the place where offered. The immense distance is which the claimants must repair, to prosecute their claims, whother by original action, by appeal, or by reference to this bou [...], of commissioners, will be found, in three cases out of fou [...], [...]n insurmountable obstacle to the full attainment of justice. [...] the commissioners been appointed to sit in any part of th [...] United States, or even in one of the West India islands, instead of London, the probability of reparation to the sufferers would have been much increased. Let the operation of this article be ever so favorable to the claimants, there must always remain a very considerable balance unsatisfied. The liberality of the United States in the case of captures made within their jurisdiction, &c. seems to have been more readily accepted, than copied by the British negociator.

VIII. and IX. Article the eighth relating solely to the compensation to be made to the several boards of commissioners, I shall pass it over without observation. The ninth, however, deserves no small attention—It is thereby agreed, that British subjects and American citizens who now hold lands in America, and Great Britain, respectively, shall continue to hold the same, and may grant, sell, or devise the same to whom they will, in like manner as if they were natives; and that neither they nor their heirs or assigns shall be regarded as aliens, so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto.

[Page] According to the principles laid down in Calvin's case [Co. rep. part 7.] when two countries, which have been under allegiance to the same prince, separate, all those of either country born before the separation takes place, may hold, or inhetic lands in that country from which they are thus separated. Upon this principle the treaty of peace secured to the owners of lands in America, being British subjects, all their possessions in lands at that time held by them. And the reasonalbe construction seemed to be, that they should have their whole lives to dispose of them, or to become American citizens; if they did neither, the lands would be liable to escheat at their death, for defect of heirs, unless some ante-natus, or some American citizen, could establish his claim therero, either as heir, or devisee. For it was held, that the common law, which excludes aliens from inheriting, was not altered, or intended to be altered, by that article. And the reasons for that opinion were not without weight in the minds of those who maintained them; since they conceived that the principle of excluding aliens from holding lands was founded in found policy; adopting herein one of the reasons of the common law of England, "that the nation might in time be subject to foreign influence."—In giving the most liberal construction to the treaty of peace, they did not apprehend it was meant to contravene a principle so long established among their ancestors, and so generally understood. As to acquisitions of lands, made by British subjects, in America, since the peace, the question, whether these are within the reason of the case of ante-nati, has not occurred: whenever it does, it is not impossible that a distinction may be taken between a title acquired by descent or devise, and one by actrual purchase, since the commune vinculum has been broken. But the treaty now under discussion hath totally subverted the wholesome muxims of the common law, and of sound policy, both in the second and the ninth article, by virtue of which the subjects of Great Britain, though equally aliens as the subjects of China, may hold and transmit to their latest posterity, "according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein," lands lying in the United States, "and held by them at presente"—The second article very liberally grants to British subjects all their usurped possessions in lands within the jurisdiction of the western posts. How far this undefined term may extend, it is difficult to conjecture, whether one, five, or fifty miles.* The claim of jurisdiction, made by Governor Simcoe last summer, extended, [Page]if [...] [...]istake not, a good way within the limits of Vermont, and not less than twenty miles from his nearest post. At this rate the cession of soil made to the subjects of Great Britain may be very extensive, and if they have been granted to hold by feal [...]y to the crown of Great Britain, the ninth article confirms the tenure.* It does more; it exempts their lands from the operation of those laws which would limit the d [...]ration of estates, if such be the nature of their estates therein. It will be said that this article is reciprocal; nothing can be more fallacious: it is probable that the subjects of Great Britain at this day own ten thousand times as much land in America, as is owned by American citizens in England. Under the sanction of this article, though not within the strict wording of it, it is probable that the quantity of lands holden by British subjects in America will be ten times as great, in a few years, as at present, so that America will, in great measure, be tenanted by the vassals of British landlords. † The high price of lands in England will, probably, induce many land-holders there to exchange their property for more extensive estates in America; nor will there be wanting temptations to the monopolizers of that article to engross as large a portion of the soils as of the funds of the United States. What influence this may have over the body politic it is not hard to conjecture; especially if his Britan [...] majesty himself, who is reported to be a considerable stockholder in the American funds, should feel the same inclination to speculate in lands: he might, probably, in a few years engross so large a portion of them, as to revive his claim of supreme lord of the United States of America.

X. The tenth article stipulates that there shall be no sequestration or confiscation of debts, or property in the funds, or in public or private banks, in any event of war between the two nations.—One of the reasons upon which this article was probably founded, was slightly touched upon above—His Britannic majesty, it is said, either allured by the prospect of [Page]higher interest, or alarmed for the security of his immense property in the European banks, has lately condescended to become a creditor of the United States. The word subjects is dropped in this article, and the more comprehensive term individuals, is substituted for it: this being nomen generalissimum, may be supposed to extend to the king himself; for the rule that the king is not bound by any law, unless he be specially named therein, does not apply to those laws where he is to derive a benefit from general words. As this article, therefore, was not so much calculated to bind, as to benefit him, it was unnecessary, and would have been indecent to name him specially. His majesty's example has, there is great reason to believe, been followed by a number of his subjects—I know a gentleman who purchased half a million of dollars in the three per cents, in one day, for persons residing in London. The effect of this article will probably be a considerable increase of British stockholders.

But this article deserves further consideration in another point of view. When Great Britain, in the course of the late war, began to exercise every act of depredation upon the property of the people of America, as well as cruelty upon their persons, the states, then sovereign and independent, by way of retaliation, thought proper to sequester and confiscate British property in America.* And when his Britannic majesty's ships of war and privateers, commenced their present system of spoliation and aggression on the commerce of the citizens of America, the house of representatives in congress, by a very large majority, resolved to sequester British property in the United States, in order to secure some indemnification to their suffering constituents. This measure, as was formerly mentioned, was lost in the senate by the casting vote of the vice-president. The precedent was alarming, and might be renewed when the vice-president might not hold the balance in his own hands. The chief justice of the United States had judicially declared (tho' that opinion was over-ruled) that the states had no right to confiscate or sequester their enemies' property; the envoy extraordinary made no difficulty in giving a diplomatic sanction to these opinions, nor did he hesitate to remove all the horrors which his Britannic majesty may be supposed to have felt, on the score of his money in the funds and banks of the United States.—If national justice were always administered without regard to the right of the strongest, very far should I be [Page]from condemning an article intended to secure private property, and to confirm private confidence. But, every stipulation that abridges the exercise of defensive measures by a weak nation, how repugnant soever such measures may appear to the ordinary rules of justice, in civil cases, is, in fact, the subjection of such a nation, and all its rights, to the insolence, injustice, and rapacity of the stronger.—If a state of war between two nations will justify seizing the property of their respective people, by violence, wheresoever it can be found, will not the same cause justify us in indemnifying ourselves at the expense of our enemy in any other mode? And if the relative force of the two nations renders this impossible by other means, by what refinement in political morality are we forbidden to avail ourselves of such means of retaliation or indemnification as the nature of things permits? Suppose Great Britain still obstinately to persist in her depredations on our commerce, and detention of the western posts; suppose her to renew the war which she formerly waged with such fury and cruelty against America; what act of retaliation could America commit, or how recompense herself for her losses, but by confiscating the property of British subjects, or by carrying the war into Canada? If humanity were to decide which of these measures ought to be preferred, she would probably determine very differently from the envoy extraordinary.—She would tell us, that if satisfaction could be obtained without the effusion of human blood, that mode should be first adopted, rather than to carry havoc, devastation, and murder among a people whose only fault consisted in their being the subjects of our enemy, and our nearest neighbours. —Could we draw the lion's teeth and pare his nails, [...] might treat on terms of mutual reciprocity and equality: [...] till this can be effected, the stipulation in this article must [...] mind us of that league between the wolves and the shee [...] whereby the latter surrendered the dogs, their only defence, as hostages to the former. The balance of trade, already too great in favor of Great Britain, will hourly accumulate: and if British subjects can hold lands, and possess property in our funds and banks, without danger of loss, we may rest assured that these advantages will be turned to their proper account.—The moment a man becomes a debtor, beyond his ability to pay, his independence is totally lost. It is the same with nations that are, at the same time weak and poor. Our commercial intercourse with Great Britain being renewed upon the most beneficial footing for her, will render the United States, with the aid of this article, and the preceding, a nation of debtors [Page]both public and private, to her merchants, her monied men, her ambitious land-holders, and even to her sovereign himself.

The preceding articles, it will be remembered, are all permanent. If once ratified, they will be irrevocable; for the advantages thereby secured to Great Britain are so great, that she must be struck with blindness, indeed, should she ever agree to rescind one of them.—The seventh, the only one which promises any thing for America, except admission into the western posts, has been shown to be inadequate to a full and complete indemnification of the citizens of the United States, for the injuries they have sustained. Nor has Britain yielded any thing in any one of them, for which she has not gained a full equivalent and something more.—But though it requires very little skill in political arithmetic, to see on which side the balance lies, it may require ages to calculate the amount.

XI. and XII. Though no temporary advantage can ever be deemed an equivalent for permanent disadvantages, such as we have just noticed, it might have been reasonably expected that the succeeding articles of the treaty would have procured some recompence to the United States for such important concessions. It is, however, doubtful whether any one of the remaining articles stipulates for a single advantage on our behalf, for which we do not sacrifice thrice as much as it is worth.—The eleventh article stipulates "that there shall be reciprocal and entire perfect liberty of navigation and commerce under certain limitations and restrictions," not one of which is either a limitation or restriction upon Great Britain, but altogether upon the United States. For example—ships of any burden, belonging to Britain, may freely enter any of the ports of the United States, and bring or carry away any commodities they please, and whither they please; whilst the freedom of navigation and commerce, by American citizens, is restricted to vessels not exceeding seventy tons burden, if bound to the British West Indies; all American vessels whatsoever being totally excluded from the British sea-ports on the continent, by the third article already mentioned. This license to trade with the British Islands, is by some persons represented as very important, even under this restriction. From the nature of the case it can only extend to the article of provisions, when they are not prohibited; for by the laws of England, neither tobacco, nor any other production of the United States, except provisions, lumber, naval stores, and horses, can be imported into the islands from the United States, even in British bottoms. Vessels of seventy tons burden are too small for the lumber trade.—The demand for naval stores and horses in the British islands, is not likely to form any [Page]very important branch of commerce with them: the admission of salted provisions is altogether arbitrary, or, if you please, [...] cretionary, depending upon the supplies which can be fur [...] ed from Great Britain and Ireland; the treaty does not [...] the case in this respect—they may still be admitted or rejected they have been often admitted, and as often prohibited, with the last ten years; sometimes the admission has been [...] sined to British bottoms; at others, extended to all vessels [...] soever, without limitation as to their burden. I appeal to the [...] peated proclamations authorizing the importation of provisi [...] foreign bottoms, which have appeared in the gazettes of all [...] islands, and of the United States, for a dozen years, post, to prove this fact. It is a most important fact, and shows that [...] existence of the British sugar colonies depends upon the United States of America. For the policy of Great Britain, ever [...] the peace, has been to exclude the citizens of America. [...] their vessels from any intercourse or commerce with her [...] colonies; a relaxation from this policy has never been p [...] but by the most cogent necessity; the frequent repetition [...] proclamations, inviting our vessels into their ports, pro [...] [...] cogent necessity to be very frequent, also; which fully au [...] this conclusion, that those colonies could not be subsisted without [...] of the United States. This being the case, it was in our power [...] tate our own terms, instead of submitting to such as are at [...] degrading and destructive to our commercial interests.—We [...] be told that the conduct of Britain is agreeable to the [...] law of all nations. But this law presupposes that the [...] country is capable of supporting her colonies without the [...] any foreign country whatsoever. This is not the case with [...] Britain—She must, therefore, submit to reasonable terms [...] a nation abounding with those things, without which her [...] cannot exist, or sacrifice her colonies. This would be equal [...] wise, inhuman, and unjust on her part. The necessity of intercourse between the United States and her colonies [...] therefore, altogether on her part, though the submission [...] striction is upon ours, only. A decrepid veteran without [...] weapon for his defence, dictating terms of submission to [...] bust young soldier with arms in his hands, would scarcely [...] hibit a more extraordinary instance of successful arrogance [...] of abject condescension.—The commerce with the sugar [...] was one of those strong holds of negociation, on the p [...] [...] the United States, which ought never to have been aband [...] The envoy extraordinary could not have been ignorant of [...] nor of the sentiments of a large majority of that body to [...] in conjunction with the senate and the president, it belongs, by [...][Page]constitution, to regulate commerce with foreign nations. His zeal for negociation seems to have made him lose sight of every other object: and no doubt, from the expedition, with which this important treaty was concluded, every obstacle, which might for a moment retard its completion, was instantly waved on the side of the American negociator.

Not less extraordinary is the stipulation contained in the succeeding clause of the same article, which declares, that during the continuance thereof, the United States will prohibit and restrain the carrying any melasses, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, in American vessels, either from the sugar islands, or the United States, to any part of the world, except the United States. Never was a more humiliating concession proposed or acceded to, in a commercial treaty. The interdiction extends not only to the produce of the English sugar islands, but to similar productions from any other part of the globe. This was a decided stroke at the commerce between America and the possessions of every other nation in the West Indies, whether French, Dutch, Spanish, Danish, or Swedish! Britain supposing the produce of her islands sufficient for the consumption of the United States, or rather, determining, if possible, to limit their consumption to what her islands can supply, thus secures a monopoly by interdicting the exportation of any surplus of their productions, or similar productions of other countries; and moreover, lays a foundation for the right of searching all our vessels, and, upon the slightest pretext, detaining or carrying them into her own ports for adjudication, if it should appear that they have on board any of these articles beyond reasonable sea-stores. Surely by some strange effect of magic, the envoy extraordinary had lost ali memory of events subsequent to the year 1763, and conceived himself bound to receive as law, whatever the British secretary of state was pleased to dictate to him! Or was this concession the result of his fears for the fate of the French colonies, that they would either be desolated, or become an appendage to Great Britain? Or did he conceive that such a restricted commerce as he has stipulated for with the British colonies, clogged with restrictions upon our commerce with all other parts of the globe, was more valuable than all our West India trade put together? Surely the productions of those islands must have been rendered precious beyond measure in the eyes of the envoy extraordinary when he consented to this article!

There is yet another light in which this article must be placed, to give us a full view of its merits. Congress, that is, the house of representatives and senate, with the concurrence of [Page]the president of the United States, are the consitutional org [...] for the regulation of commerce. Here, the envoy extraordinary undertakes to regulate it by means of the president and senate, only, without reference to the house of representatives; thus taking upon himself to new-model the constitution, or to dictate a law to congress. For either the president and senate must regulate commerce, pursuant to this article, without the concurrence of the house of representatives, or that house in bound, [...]olens volens, to pass a law pursuant to this article Whether that house will manifest the same compliance with the opinions of the envoy extraordinary, as he apears to have shown to those of the British secretary of state, remains to be seen hereafter.

XIII. Weary of concessions without consideration—of compliances without ostensible motives—and of humiliations [...] degrading even for colonies, I turn my eyes towards that gleam of liberality which appears, on the part of Great Britain, in the 13th article, by which some conveniencies have been p [...] cured for our citizens trading to the East Indies. Yet even hers, restrictions evince the jealousy of that nation; no American citizen being permitted to reside in any of her territories in that quarter of the globe, in which she has acquired so extensive a [...] influence; whilst British subjects may be lords of manors in the United States from generation to generation. The 15 th article, expressly reserving to the British government "the right of imposing such a duty as may be adequate to countervail the difference of duty now payable on the importation of Europo [...] and Asiatic goods when imported into the United States in British or in American vessels," has, in truth, frittered away the commercial advantages to have been expected from this article, to nothing more than a grant of the ordinary rights of hospitality.

XIV. and XV. Tho 14th article, relating wholly to the intercourse between the British European territories, and the United States, reciprocally, secures those rights which a [...] common between civilized nations in peace. But the 15th article virtually extends to Great Britain all the commercial advantages granted by America to the most favored nations. The favors of the United States, like those of a lady of pleasure, have been granted to so many, as to be from henceforth beneath the solicitation of any.—The first grant of them to Franc [...] gained a cordial return of affection: The last grant will probably annihilate the recollection, as well as the value, of the first. To detach the United States from the affectionate attachment to that nation, which gratitude and a variety of concurrent causes had produced, as it has been the constant desire [Page]of Great Britain, was, unquestionably, one of the great objects of the present treaty, as we shall have occasion to observe hereafter.

XVI. and XVII. The former of these articles relating only to the appointment of consuls, I shall pass it over. The latter stipulates, that vessels captured or detained on just suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or contraband goods, shall be brought to the nearest, or most convenient port for adjudication. The alternative leaves to the captor the right of determining between the nearest and the most convenient port; and the latter will, in all cases, be determined by the convenience of the captor, instead of the party arrested. It sanctions the right of stopping, searching, detaining, and carrying out of the course of her voyage, any vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, during any war that Britain may be engaged in; that is, upon a general average, about one half her time and ours. It might have been expected that the envoy extraordinary in his great ambition to meliorate the laws and usages of nations, would have insisted, that free ships should make free goods; that the commerce of a neutral nation should not be interrupted by those at war, except in the case of contraband good carrying to an enemy; that no search should be permitted upon the high seas, under any pretext whatsoever; that no ship of war, or privateer should approach within cannon shot; nor chace nor turn any neutral vessel out of her course; nor send more than two or three men to enter on board of her; and that full faith and credence should be given to the sea letters with which such vessels might be furnished. Examples of similar stipulation might be found in our treaties with France, Holland, Sweden, and Prussia; and even his majesty of Morocco has condescended to insert some of them in his treaty with us. But his Britannic majesty's ships of war and privateers are not to be restrained from any measures which their suspicions may lead them to pursue, if they "forbear doing any damage or committing any outrage;" words of such latitude of import, as to sanctify a thousand injuries and provocations, such as were touched upon under the seventh article, for which no compensation can ever be obtained; or even expected, without pursuing the offender half over the globe. Upon what ground, we may ask, was this distinction made? Are the officers and crews of his Britannic majesty's ships of war and privateers so remarkably observant of the rights of neutral nations, and the laws of courtesy, that we should trust them more than any others? The envoy extraordinary must surely have forgot, that to put a stop to their insolence and rapacity was one of the most important objects of his mission.

[Page] XVIII. Concession following concession fills up almost the whole that remains to be considered of this ill-favored treaty. Ship-timber, tar, hemp, sails, sheet-copper, and generally whatever may serve directly for the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron and fir plank excepted, are by this article added to the list of contraband goods, though expressly excepted by former meaties with other nations. Upon what principle was this new concession made to Great Britain, in preference to all other nations? Was it, because these articles are deemed of the first necessity to France during the present war? Did the envoy extraordinary recollect that most of these are staple commodities of the United States? That to make them contraband amounts to an actual prohibition of the exportation of them in our own vessels, whenever Great Britain chooses to go to war? Will nor the powers at war with Great Britain, challenge an equal right to consider these articles as contraband, and seize and confiscate them in their turn, if destined for our new, favorite ally?

The same article admits, that provisions and other articles in general not contraband, may, in certain cases, become contraband, according to the existing law of nations. Until the present war with France, the right of interdicting commerce between a neutral nation and an enemy, was, by the modern h [...] of nations (a term for which the envoy extraordinary in his judicial capacity always affected great respect) confined to the single case of a place besieged, or blockaded. * True it is, that England, and the United Provinces, something more than a century a [...], agreed to notify to all states, not at war with France, that they would attack, and previously declared every ship bound to, or [...] ing out of the harbours of that kingdom, lawful prize. This p [...] dent was copied by the enemies of France in the present [...] Sweden and Denmark, on the former occasion, as well as on th [...] ter, entered into a treaty for maintaining their rights, and obtaining satisfaction, and they obtained it accordingly on both occasion America, on the contrary, kisses the rod, and crouches beneath the lash of the insolent dictatress of nations. The effect of this submission will probably amount to a total prohibition of the trade of America, with all nations against whom Great Britain is engaged in a war. There is not in all Europe, and sca [...]ly in the world, a country so little capable of being put into a state of siege, or blockade, as France. Yet we have seen her [Page]formally declared to be in that state; we have, in consequence, seen our commerce with her prohibited, our vessels seized, their cargoes converted to the use of the captors; and our envoy extraordinary has given his sanction to all these proceedings; stipulating only, that in future cases, a reasonable mercantile profit (of which the owner has no right to judge) shall be allowed for the cargoes thus diverted from that channel, which the prospect of a beneficial voyage had induced the merchant to pursue; and that the vessels shall be paid their freight. Even the governors of the little West India Islands belonging to Great Britain, assume the right of circumscribing, and prohibiting the commerce of America, by [...] laring all the French islands, in a state of blockade, whilst they have not force enough to protect their own governments.* How degraded must that nation be, whose commerce may be interdicted by the proclamation of a colonial governor, or a military commander in the service of a foreign nation!

XIX. The nineteenth article stipulates, that the commanders of ships of war and privateers shall forbear doing damage, or committing any outrage on those of the other party; and if they act contrary, they shall be punished and make reparation. I have before noticed the probable effect of this stipulation; it may prevent some few enormous injuries, but will not in the least check lesser abuses. That insolence, and those less atrocious acts of vexation and oppression, which the bashaws of the sea, and those licensed pirates, privateersmen, are so prone to commit, will still continue to be exercised with all the wantonness of conscious security, and impunity. A cruiser belonging to one of the British islands, stops a ship bound to Europe; searches her; rifles her; insults the captain; abuses his seamen; impresses some of them, under pretext that they are British subjects; and after all these atrocities, permits the ship to proceed. What satisfaction can be obtained in such a case? Shall the master of the merchant ship alter his voyage, and go to the port to which the privateer belongs, to obtain reparation? The idea is absurd. He must submit to the ill treatment he has received, and consider his deliverance from the hands of such ruffians, as ample recompence for his sufferings. Had the envoy extraordinary condescended to look into our treaty with France, or Holland, he might have found an additional article, more effectually calculated to give security to commerce, as [Page]well as to the persons of those engaged in pursuit of it, [...] [...] viding, "That if the ships of one of the parties shall [...] with, either sailing along the coasts, or on the high fo [...] any ship of war or privateer of the other, the said [...] war or privateers, for the avoiding any disorder, shall rem [...] of cannon shot, from the merchant ship; but may send a [...] board and may enter her, to the number of two or three men [...] to whom the master shall exhibit his passport; and thereupo [...] merchant ship may pursue her voyage, so as it shall not be [...] ful to molest, or search her in any manner, or to give her [...] or to force her to quit her intended course." One such a [...] was worth a thousand, stipulating for indemnification from [...] vers, or the punishment of rascals whose vagrant life effect [...] screens them from the pursuit of justice. Why then was [...] an article omitted in a treaty with Great Britain? We [...] seek the cause in that spirit of concession and submi [...] which breathes through every article of this coup d'essai of [...] envoy extraordinary.

XX. The reciprocal exclusion of pirates, and punishm [...] such as may receive, harbour, or assist them, for which [...] article stipulates, is among the few unexceptionable arti [...] [...] this treaty.

XXI. How far the first part of this article, prohibitin [...] [...] people of either party from accepting commissions from th [...] [...] mies of the other, may be contrary to sound policy, I with [...] undertake to decide. I rather incline to the opposite op [...] [...] yet I entertain some doubt of its constitutionality, in one [...] spect. The prohibition as to privateers corresponds who [...] treaties with other nations; and it is most devoutly [...] wished, that the civilized nations of the globe would ag [...] suppress so infamous a practice, as that of privateering, [...] gether; had the envoy extraordinary introduced such a [...] into his new diplomatic code, it would have done him no [...] honor than he expected to derive from the suppression of [...] siscations, and sequestrations.

XXII. Another article stipulating for due forbearance [...] reprisals, in case of injuries, forms a proper article in a tr [...] of amity—but alas! what reprisals has the envoy extra [...] nary left it in the power of the United States to com [...] in case of injuries from Great Britain, even after compens [...] shall be refused.!

XXIII. Secures the rights of hospitally to British ships of war, in all cases, in American ports, as also to American ships of war (when such things shall hereafter exist) in British ports; th [...] same hospitality is, in case of distress, extended to any American [Page]vessel, in British ports not otherwise open to them, under certain regulations and restrictions.

XXIV. and XXV. The former prohibits privateers belonging to an enemy of either party, from arming themselves, or selling their prizes in the ports of the other. This is conformable to our treaties with other nations; the letter stipulates for the admission of ships of war, privateers, and their prizes, into the ports of the respective nations; but these articles are not to be construed, or operate contrary to former existing treaties. Similar provisions are contained in our treaties with France, Holland, &c. It seems to me, however, to be very questionable, whether good policy would not rather have led the United States to discountenance, as much as possible, the practice of privateers, at least, resorting to their ports in any case, but that of absolute distress. The practice of privateering is a violation of the rights of humanity, and is pregnant with the destruction of every moral principle among individuals. The depredations committed by these [...]c [...]nsed pirates, have no effect upon the final issue of the war: they are attended with ruin and distress to thousands of innocent individuals, without affecting the strength of the nation; and the calamities they bring upon peaceable and harmless men, are often more numerous and destructive, than any of the national operations in war. If they are admitted into the ports of neutral nations, their presence is a restraint upon its commerce; for it is well [...]town that the purpose of their vi [...]t, is to act the spy upon their intended prey; for which they often [...]e in wait even at the entrance of the port where they have been hospitably received, and supplied with the means of pursuing so nefarious an occupation.

The same article also stipulates for the protection of the ships of each party within cannon shot of the beasts, or within the bays, rivers, or ports of the other. This acticle is conformable to former teaties; yet I doubt how far the United States can otherwise comply with it, than by making satisfaction for what they have no power to prevent.

XXVI. This article stipulates for the security of the persons and effects of merchants, in the event of war between the two nations; in which case, while they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws, they may continue to reside and carry on their trade; but if their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should think proper to order them to remove, they shall be allowed twelve months to do so, with an exception, as to such as shall act contrary to the established laws. There is a spirit of liberality in this article, [Page]highly conformable to that policy which commercial [...] ought to promote. It is, moreover, in appearance, per [...] reciprocal. The misfortune is, that America has sc [...] merchant residing within the British dominions, being ca [...] from all her colonial territories, by stut. 12. Car. 2. and [...] the East Indies by the present treaty; whilst our p [...]r [...] towns, nay, every part of our country, swarms with [...] merchants. The benefit of this article to the citizens [...] United States, in comparison of those of Great Britain, [...] a cent to an eagle.

XXVII. Murderers, and persons guilty of forgery, a [...] be given up, on both sides. The prevention of moral evil [...] object worthy the attention of politicians, as well in their [...] tional compacts, as in their civil institutions. This a [...] therefore, if it can be reconciled to the federal constitu [...] which is doubtful, must receive our cordial approbation, [...] together with the 20th and 21st, may be considered as fou [...] in perfect reciprocity and equality. Happy should I have [...] bestow the same encomium upon all the preceding.

XXVIII. The last article provides for the duration [...] former: the first ten, as we have before observed, me p [...] nent; the twelfth is to continue two years from the end [...] war, in which Britain is now engaged; the [...] to twelve pears from that period. Happily for the United [...] the article [...]ited to the [...] [...]ation, proved a [...] block to the ratification of the whole. Should the p [...] [...] the United States conceive himself to be bound by the [...] the senate, it has been supposed to [...]e in the power of [...] in ratify the perpetual articles, without ac [...] to and amendment of the article objected to. Whether [...] was for [...]s [...] cannot be kno [...]n. It is, however, pres [...]bl [...] [...] the wisdom of the president will guard him against an [...] which might commit the United States so far. Whilst [...] cle of a treaty is under discussion, the whole must be [...] as in a state of negociation and diseusion; and for this [...] because it is possible the object of the one party in acceding [...] the other articles, was merely with a view of obtaining [...] terms, as are insisted [...]n in that one article. Viewing the [...] in this light, and that it is still practicable, in the cou [...] [...] negociation, not only to obtain the rescission of s [...]me, but [...] amelioration of several of those articles which the zeal of [...] envoy extraordinary prompted him to accede to: and, [...] over, to procure the admission of such as appear to be indi [...] sably necessary to constitute a part of the proposed treaty; [...] that the senate must again act upon the whole treaty so second fo [...] [Page]I shall notice some things which it does not contain: and which, to a less liberal negociator, might have appeared, not altogether unworthy of attention.

1. It does not contain any stipulation for compensation on account of the detention of the western posts, twelve years after they were to have been given up, by treaty. I have heard that the value of the fur trade formerly carried on by the citizens of the United States, amounted yearly to near a million dollars. The British magazines, some few years past, stated the value of the Canadian fur trade at as many pounds sterling. I cannot presume to be correct in this, as I write from memory. But if either sum be near the truth, this article would have amounted to some millions of dollars, in account against his Britannic majesty.

2. It does not contain any stipulation of compensation on account of the negroes, and other property belonging to the citizens of the United States, carried away in violation of the seventh article of the treaty of peace. The value of this concession (I know not with what accuracy) has been estimated at two millions of dollars,* more, in favor of his Britannic majesty.

3. It does not stipulute for any compensation to be made to the citizens of the United States, for the arbitrary, violent, and insolent detention, imprisonment, and impressment of their persons (while peaceably engaged in commerce) on board the ships of war, and privateers of Great Britain, during the present was with France; nor for the manifold other personal injuries received from them. Were this article to be estimated and assessed by a jury of freemen, such, as to the honor of the British nation, have often appeared in their courts of judicature, the damages would probably be more than commensurate to those which may be awarded for the spoliations on our commerce.

4. It does not provide for the prevention of such nefarious acts in future. Whilst Americans speak the same language with the subjects of Great Britain, there will not be wanting a colour for such acts of violence and oppression. Our treaty with Holland stipulates, "that merchants, captains and commanders of vessels, public or private, may freely take into their service, and receive on board their vessels, seamen or others, natives or inhabitants of the respective countries." The concessions made to Great Britain would surely have entitled us to expect a similar [Page]clause in the treaty with her—At any rate, some stipulation which might secure the citizens of America, whether on the high seas, or on our coasts, and even within our own bays and ports, that personal liberty which hath been so often violated, with impunity, by British sea officers and privateersmen, during the present war between his Britannic majesty and France, seems absolutely necessary; otherwise the citizens of America will, by their sufferings, be made parties in every war in which arrogance, ambition, revenge, or other motives, may prompt his Britannic majesty to engage.

5. It does not stipulate that the Indians, inhabiting within the territory, or on the borders of the United States, shall not receive any aid or supply, whatsoever, in arms, or other necessaries for war, from the British government or their merchants, &c. in case of war or hostility between them and the United States.

6. It does not stipulate that Great Britain (instead of exciting the Algerines to annoy our commerce, and enslave our citizens, as we have too much reason to believe she has done) should use her good offices with them in favor of the United States.

7. It does not stipulate for the free navigation from the [...]ake [...] to the Atlantic, through the waters immediately communicating therewith.

It may be asked—What right have we to require that Great Britain should accede to the three last mentioned articles?— The answer is not difficult:

1st, The Indians within the territories of the United Stat [...] are, in respect to all other nations, but more especially Great Britain, who formerly claimed, and has now renounced, th [...] sovereignty over them, subject to the United States. The Indians themselves, is their several treaties with the United State [...] recognize their sovereignty, and acknowledge themselves [...] their protection. As between the United States and all oth [...] nations, the Indians are to be considered as a tributary, dep [...] ent people. Consequently the United States have a right to [...] [...] pulate that other nations shall not aid them against the United States. They had good reason to suspect Great Britain of havi [...] lately furnished them with such aid: they had good reason to [...] pect pect that the hostilities lately practised by these people, upon our western frontiers, had been fomented, nay, even cond [...]ed by the agents of Great Britain.—Let the letters of the presend secretary of state to Mr. Hammond, the British minister, and the message from the president of the United States to congres [...] upon this subject, be my vouchers. Having reason to suspect such ill-offices to have been done us, we had a right to insi [...] [Page]that a nation to whom we were about to bind ourselvee, by more than ordinary ties of amity, should, with good faith, engage neither to repeat such ill-offices, nor suffer them to be repeated by any of her subjects. We had a right to expect an immediate assent to such a proposition from a nation ready disposed to enter into a state of amity with us.—Good policy would, moreover, have dictated the reservation of the right of prohibiting the importation of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores, into the United States by way of the lakes, although such importation was not prohibited elsewhere. Under the existing article [...]o such prohibition can be made, unless it be general. The British subjects, settled at the ports of the United States, on the lakes, may now "freely, for the purposes of commerce, import all such articles, and transport them whithersoever they think proper, and vend them to whomsoever they please, within the territories of the United States"—that is, to Indians as well as others It is not improbable that a few years may shew us more clearly the full effect of this generous considence and indulgence.

2d, If the examples of France and Holland may be cited as precedents, it will be found that the treaties with both, stipulate for their good offices with the states of Barbary.—The strong ground that there is to suspect his Britannic majesty's ill-offices, in that quarter, as well as with the Indians, might have suggested to the envoy extraordinary the good policy of engaging a monarch so remarkable for his good faith, to desist from his persecutions, and to promise assistance in procuring the enlargement of our fellow citizens who have been reduced to a state of slavery by those barbarians.

3d, The navigation from the lakes into the Atlantic is a concession which appears to stand nearly upon the same ground as the free navigation of the Mississippi. In a treaty, where, among numberless advantageous concessions, the free navigation of all our tide-waters is granted, it might have been reasonably expected that egress and ingress should have been permitted between the waters of the lakes, and those of the Atlantic. For without such a communication between the different ports of the United States on the western waters, and upon the Atlantic, the residents on the former must be constrained to export all their commodities, which cannot be brought down the Hudson, or other less convenient routes, to Great Britain; and that too, in British ships: for the vessels of the United States not being permitted to enter the St. Lawrence from the sea—and no vessel being permitted to trade from Canada, except such as are British, the citizens of America (if any should ever obtain [Page]a settlement on the lakes) must export all their bulky commodities, in the ships of that nation, to Great Britain or her colonies only. This, therefore, must operate as a monopoly [...] favor of Great Britain, in respect to all bulky articles, and giv [...] her a preference in every other: and though in this case w [...] had not the same power of dictating our own terms, as in th [...] communication with the West India islands, so able a negoci [...] tor as the envoy extraordinary was supposed to be, might assu [...] edly have obtained a concession in this place, as a retribution for the favors granted to Great Britain in the other. This w [...] the rather to have been expected, as the envoy extraordinary could not but be aware that Spain would avail herself of [...] good a reason for not yielding to our demand of the free navigation of the Mississippi. Will not our concessions in this treaty, strengthen the tone of her refusal? When the envoy extraordinary, then minister for foreign affairs, endeavoured [...] persuade congress to cede the navigation of the Mississippi [...] Spain for twenty-five years, he contended that the acceptance of such a concession on the part of Spain, would operate [...] a tacit acknowledgment of the right of the United States ever after. I will not controvert this diplomatic inferen [...] though, probably, the court of Spain would not have been [...] complaisant.—But in the treaty with Great Britain, we [...] nothing that could, either immediately or eventually, give [...] the chance of a similar benefit. On the contrary, the sub [...] is consigned, in silence, to perpetual oblivion.

From the preceding investigation of this treaty, are we [...] fully justified in drawing the following conclusion:—That

As a treaty of AMITY, it is partial and defective;

As a treaty of COMMERCE, it is not reciprocal;

As a treaty of NAVIGATION, it is humiliating;

And it is, in other respects, destructive to the prosport [...] security, and independence of the United States; and s [...] versive of the CONSTITUTION?

1. It is partial, and defective as a treaty of amity; because while it provides the fullest satisfaction for the pretended c [...] of complaint, on the part of Great Britain*, no adequate r [...] ration is obtained for former injuries, and breaches of fai [...] towards the United States†, nor any security against a wa [...] [Page]repetition of them*: and because there is not that interchange of good offices secured in this, as in former treaties between the United States and other nations.†

2. As a treaty of commerce it is not reciprocal, because it concedes to the merchants, subjects, and ships of Great Britain, greater privileges than are granted to the citizens and ship [...] of the United States within the territories of Great Britain.‡

3. As a treaty of navigation it is humiliating; because in exposes the vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, to be stopped, searched, and turned out of their course upon suspicion, in cases where those of Great Britain cannot be exposed to similar inconveniences‖; and because, by limiting the size of our vessels, in certain cases, it has an evident tendency to degrade the maritime interest and force of the United States. ‖

4. It is, in other respects, destructive to the prosperity, security and independence of the United States; because it cedes to the subjects of a foreign nation, the right of soil within an undefined extent of territory, whose value and importance to the United States is conceived to be immense§: because it admits aliens to hold and inherit lands within the United States, and to reside therein, whilst they may be subjects, owing allegiance to a sovereign actually engaged in war with the United States §; because it tends to detach us from our ancient ally, the French nation, by giving a preference to her most inveterate enemy¶: and because it deprives the United States of the right of self-defence, and the means of retaliation in case of hostility**, or unjust aggression from a nation whose arrogance and injustice we have more than once experienced.

5. It is subversive of the constitution of the United States; because it establishes a tribunal imcompatible with the constitution, and assigns to it jurisdiction in cases expressly vested by the constitution in the judicial courts of the United States††; and because the decisions of this tribunal are paramount to the judgments of the constitutional courts ††; and because it tends to wrest from the whole body of congress its constitutional powers, and to transfer the same to a part of that body only; or [Page]to subject the measures of one of the component parts of congress to the absolute controul of the other two.*

A variety of other observations, equally important, might, no doubt, have suggested themselves to a person who had full leisure to examine this subject, and may be met with in the several publications that have already appeared. Without pretending to abilities extensive enough to embrace the whole, I shall now hasten to a conclusion.

I am well aware that it will be contended by the advocates for the treaty, that a refusal to ratify it will bring on a war; or must continue matters between us and Great Britain, in their present state of unredressed wrongs, and a passive acquiescence therein. I shall add a few words by way of answer.

1. As to the danger of producing a war. 1st, The refusal [...] enter into a state of amity, or strict commercial connexion, or to form a treaty on any subject, with a nation with whom [...] are at peace, unless such refusal should amount to a denial of just compensation for injuries complained of, is no cause of war between nations. Whenever Great Britain may choose to commence a war with the United States, she will not want a pretext. At present the treaty itself is the most unequivocal proof, that she hath scarcely the shadow of complaint; for the cases to which the sixth article can extend, even with all the latitude which the liberality of the envoy extraordinary hath given it, are not attributable to the want either of national faith or justice, but to the operation of those means of self- [...] sence which the law of nations permits, or of general laws, founded on the emergencies of the times. The detention of the western posts, alone, would more than balance the account, in a single year, if stated according to the principles of justice. As to the captures made within the jurisdiction of the United States, or by vessels armed therein, Mr. Jefferso [...] letter shows the readiness of our government to remove [...] cause of complaint, on that head. 2d, Great Britain derives such immense advantages from her commerce with America, that nothing short of a state of lunacy could prompt to [...] terrupt it, for the sake of reparation on either of the before mentioned accounts. 3d, The immense property which [...] merchants, her monied men, and even her sovereign holds in the funds and banks of the United States, or have due to them from individuals, is, until the present treaty shall be ratified, a further security against those hostile aggressions, to which the [Page]fear of sequestration, or confiscation, gave so sudden and unexpected a check. 4th, She has her hands so full already, that, much addicted as she is to hostility, she will, probably, for the present, avoid increasing the number of her enemies.

2. As to the redress of wrongs. This is so partial and inadequate in the present treaty, that no great injury can accrue from delaying to accept it; nor does the treaty contain such security against the repetition of them, as should prompt us, on that account, to accept of the partial compensation that it holds forth. Much less are the compensation and security provided by the treaty, such as ought to be accepted in lieu of those claims which are passed over in silence. The surrender of the western posts, were it not by the terms of this treaty an object greatly diminished in its importance to the United States, is an event still so remote (not to add uncertain) as not to justify the precipitate adoption of a measure calculated to impair the value of the acquisition, or render it totally useless.

3d, The suspension of the 12th article, by the advice of the senate, having effectually retarded the final ratification of the treaty, the same train of negociation which must be resorted to, for the adjustment of that article, so as to be acceptable to the senate, may doubtless be recurred to for adjusting other objectionable points.

No inconvenience, therefore, can reasonably be apprehended from the non-ratification of the treaty in its present form. Having been communicated to the people, the executive are now better able to form a judgment of the public mind, and to weigh objections which perhaps had not before occurred; and the people of the United States with confidence hope, that the president will not only attend to their reasons, but pay respect to the general will of that people, whose affectionate confidence and authority he possesses on the present momentous occasion. How far these remarks may accord with the general wishes and sentiments of the people, it remains for him to determine.

When the constitution of the United States was adopted in Virginia, the convention, among the other amendments, proposed, "That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate; and no treaty, ceding, contracting, or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States or any of them; or their or any of their rights or claims to sithing in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made, but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity; nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of [Page]three-fourths of the whole number of members of both houses [...] [...] tively."—North Carolina proposed the same amendment. [...] the present occasion, the people of the United States will [...] led to consider, how far some am [...]dment to this part of the constitution is become necessary.

COLUMBUS.

Virginia, August 6, 1795.

PLYMOUTH PROTEST.

WHEREAS at a meeting of the inhabitants of the town of Plymouth, on the 28th day of October [...] "for the purpose of taking into serious consideration the t [...]ty entered into by the president, and twenty senators, and the government of Great Britain," it was hastily determined [...] dispense with the legal qualifications of voters; in consequen [...] of which determination, a large number of the inhabitan [...] immediately withdrew themselves, conceiving the meeting to [...] no longer a legal meeting of the town. Notwithstanding [...], sundry persons remained, and calling themselves the town of [...] mouth, proceeded to pass a resolution, reprobating in str [...] [...] indecent terms, the conduct of the supreme executive of [...] United States. We, the subscribers, inhabitants of the to [...] Plymouth, holding in just abhorrence such irregular proceeding [...] think [...]t our duty, publicly to manifest our "marb [...]d and [...] disapprobation" of the same, for the following reasons:—

First. Because the treaty having received the sanction of [...] constituted authorities (so far as depends on the decision of [...] authorities) has become, in the language of the constituti [...] "the supreme law of the land"—any attempts, therefore, [...] counteract its operation, is an open and avowed opposition [...] the general government, and highly alarming to the peac [...] [...] the community; as the insurrection in the western counties [...] Pennsylvania, probably originated in meetings conducted [...] equal temper and moderation.

Second, Because the persons assembled at this meeting [...] incompetent to decide on the merits of so complex an in [...] ment, as the treaty, very few of them ever having seen or [...] it; and every thing relative to the whole business, being pre [...] prepared by the original movers of the meeting, who, in all [...] stances, have been hostile to the federal constitution and [...] administration of it, from its first establishment.

Third, Because such meetings, and the efforts made to [...] vene them, by practising on the passions of the honest, though uninformed, are, in the extreme, dangerous in a republican [Page]government, having a direct tendency to introduce the empire of licentiousness, which is only a short prelude to the more perma [...] one of despotism.

Fourth, Because the strictures made on the treaty, in the aforesaid resolutions, are a mere repetition of certain inflammatory sentiments, which have been echoed and re-echoed to the public; and while they contain the most unfounded, indiscriminate censure on illustrious and amiable patriots, whose important, meritorious services, rendered their country, ought to endear them to every friend of it, pay the highest eulogium to Stephens Thomson Mason, a senator of the United States, for a notorious breach of official confidence.

October 30th, 1795.

(Signed by Seventy-two Names.)

At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of the County of Westmoreland, (Virginia) convened, in consequence of writter Invitations circulated through the Country, for the purpose of taking the Opinion of the People on the Treaty lately concluded between the United States and the British Nation, September 29th, 1795.

JOSEPH PIERCE, Esquire, Senior Magistrate, in the Chair.

THE treaty was read—and, after some explanations of its object and tendency, the following resolutions were entered into, without a dissenting voice:

Resolved, That we continue to possess undiminished confidence in our government; and that we sincerely believe its due preservation, in all its parts, essential to our rights, liberties, and happiness.

Resolved, That we deem it the duty of all good citizens, to check, by every lawful means, the wicked and cunning machinations employed with industry and art, by certain individuals, their [...]ools, and adherents, to withdraw the confidence of the people from their government, without which confidence, no free political system can long endure; and that with deep regret, we have marked a certain set of men, exerting themselves on every occasion, which, in the course of things, has presented itself, for the obvious purpose of destroying a government, established by a majority of freemen, necessary to each others happiness, and who have experienced a wonderful prosperity under the practice thereof.

Resolved, That in the late negociation with Great Britain, its primary object, the preservation of peace, has been completely [Page]effected, which, of itself, is all-important; and that very considerable additional good has also been acquired by the surrender of the western posts, which leads to the termination of Indian warfare, and compensation for the spoliations on our commerce.

Resolved, therefore, That we feel ourselves perfectly satisfied with the government of the United States in this late transaction; and are fully persuaded, that the same signal wisdom and love of country which has invariably marked the conduct of the president, and eminently produced good to his fellow citizens, will be found to have directed his councils throughout his arduous administration—and we do, for ourselves, determine to support and maintain, with our lives and our fortunes, the constituted authorities of our country; against foreign and domestic enemies of every sort and description.

JOSEPH PIERCE, Chairman.

PRESIDENT'S ANSWER. JOSEPH PIERCE, ESQ

Sir,

I HAVE received your letter of the 29th ult. covering resolutions of a meeting of the inhabitants of the county of Westmoreland relative to the treaty with Great Britain.

The approbation therein given of this measure, and the assurances of supporting the constituted authorities of our country, cannot but be pleasing to all who know the value of regular government.

No wish, while I fill the office I now have the honor to hold, can be more ardent, than that the acts of my administration should give satisfaction to my constituents. The contrary will always give me pain. I know but one sure method to merit the first, or to avoid the latter, and that is, to pursue steadily such measure (of an executive nature) as appear to be most conducive to their interest and happiness. This, to the best of my judgment, has been my invariable endeavor; and I cannot but hope that the ratification of the treaty (agreeably to the advice and consent of the senate) will be viewed in this light, when it is better understood than it seems to be at present.—For the expression, of personal confidence in me, I feel very sensibly.

I am, Sir, with due respect, Your obedient, Go. WASHINGTON.

United States, 9th Oct. 1795.

END OF THE THIRD AND LAST VOLUME.

Notes

*

See Mr. Jefferson's letter of September 9th, 1793, to Mr. Hammand [...] so his letter, of the same date, to Mr. Van Berckel.

↵

*

The Federalist No. XLII. has these passages, "the power to make treaties and to receive and send ambassadors, speak their own propriety—Both of them are comprised in the articles of confederation, with the difference only that the former is disembarrassed by the plan of the convention, of an exception by which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the states." This plainly alludes to the proviso which has been cited and commented upon. "It is true that when treaties of commerce stipulate for the appointment of articles, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties." And in number LXIV. are these passages, "the power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode and with such precautions as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good." There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued, and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with, and be made to promote it." "Some are displeased with it (that is, the power of treaty) not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative authority;" "others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme law of the land."

It is generally understood that two persons were concerned in the writings of these papers, who, from having been members of the convention, had a good opportunity of knowing its views—and were under no temptation at that time, in this particular, to misrepresent them.

In the address and reasons of dissent of the minority of the convention of Pennsylvania to their constituents, "they state, that they had su [...]gested the following propo [...]n, [...]ng others for an [...] to the constitution, "That no treaty which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of the United States in congress assembled, shall be valid until such laws shall be repealed or made conformable to such treaty." This shows that it was understood that the power of treaty in the constitution extended to abrogating even pre-existing laws of the United States, which was thought exceptionable; while no objection was made to the idea of its controuling future exercises of the legislative power— The same address states, in another place, that the president and senate "may form treaties with foreign nations, that may controul and abrogate the constitution and laws of the several states."

In the 2d volume of the debates of the convention of Virginia, which is the only part I possess—there are many passages that show the great extent of the power of treaty in the opinion of the speakers on both sides—As quotation would be tedious, I will content myself with referring to the papers where they will be found (viz) 91, 99, 131, 137, 143, 14 [...], 150, 186. It will, in particular, appear, that while the opposers of the constitution den [...]ed the power of the house of representatives to break in upon, or controul the power of treaties, the fri [...] is of the constitution did not affirm the contrary, but merely contended, that the house of r [...]pres [...]ntatives might check by its inft [...] the president and senate—on the subject of [...]ties.

↵

*

Articles 2d, 3d, and 4th of treaty with France, 2d, 3d, and 20th of treaty with Russia, 2d, and 3d of treaty with Holland, 3d and 4th of treaty with [...]edon.

↵

*

It is very probable, that a treaty with Algiers is now on its way to the Uni [...]l States, which may be expected to contain similar stipulations with that with M [...]occo—This treaty, which will have cost the United States no trifling sum, and will be of very great value to our trade, must equally fall, on the doctrine which I oppose.

↵

*

Whilst the treaty was in discussion before the senate, a certain gentleman, high in office, who was once ambassador at the British co [...], was h [...]rd to declare, that be could have procered a b [...]ter treaty, but de [...]d doing so because he thought it not sufficiently advantage [...] to America.

↵

*

It may, with no small propriety, be asked, on what part of the eastern side of the Mississippi his Britannic majesty possesses any territory? I know of none; and it might, perhaps, puzzle the envoy extraordinary himself to point it out.

↵

*

Mothing appears more questionable than that policy, which lays open the navigation of our rivers to those maritime powers with whom we may be eventuall engaged in war. Experience might have taught us this truth in the course of our war with Great Britain.

↵

†

The writer, for want of a correct map, and description of those parts of the United States is unable to descend to such particulars as would illustrate this part of his subject.

↵

*

See this subject properly discussed, in the American Remembrancer, vol. IL page 116.

↵

†

The political morality of the states was highly imp [...]ched for their conduct in confiscating and sequest [...]ring British property, [...]ebts, &c. It seems at this day forgotten, that on the 27th of November. 1 [...]7 [...], [...] [...]ly [...] mende! that [...] states, as appears by [...]eir jo [...]rral [...], of that date.

↵

*

Since this pamphlet was transcribed for the press, I have had an opportunity of conversing with an intelligent and well-informed gentleman, who has suggested that an additional, and even the pri [...]ipal object of the sixth article, prob [...] bly is, to enable. British reditors to obtain c [...]mpensation from the government of the United States, for the depreciation of money [...]lu [...]ily received by themselves or their agents, during the war; which payments, according to the g [...]n [...]ral laws of the land, as well between citizens as others, were to b [...] rat [...]d according to the no [...] nal amount, without any regard to the actual depre [...]i [...]tion of money at the time of payment. And further, to reviv [...] and e [...]ablise [...]ll [...]us on the part of British subjects, against citizens of the United States, at the commencement of the revolution [...]ar, the recovery of which was suspended, [...]ing the continuance of the war, by the creditors themselves, being then considered or declared alien enc [...]ies, and, as such, incapable of suing in our courts. This legal impediment having lessened the value, or diminished the security of their debts, they now claim as indemnification, for the same, against the United States. If these conjectures [...]e well-founded, and I see no reason to doubt them, how much better was it to have been a TORY, at that time, than a WHIG!!! How many American w [...]igs lost their debts, nay, their whole estates, by the operation of those very laws, which eventually will have s [...]card the debts of th [...]r [...]mies! This article, it is supposed, was made a precede [...]t condition to the adnu [...]lion of the seventh, relating to compensation to be made for spoliations upon our commerce, to which this [...] poise was previo [...]sly secured.—When we recollect that nine-tenths of these last-mentioned claims, on the part of British creditors, rest upon no other evidence than old mercantile ledgers and journals, often most maccurately, and not always [...] fairly kept; that the commissioners are not bound to proceed upon legal testimony [...] evidence, only, but according to circumstances; that they may receive copies or extracts, even of books and papers, without producing either the original or a full copy; that the debtor, in these cases (unless he be made a party defendant, as in case of a s [...]it) will not appear (even if called upon, and, in most instances, cannot be found) to contest the justice of the claim; and that there is an equal chance that a majority of these commissioners will be British; there can be little reason to doubt that the operation of this article will be fully a [...]quate to countervail (if I may be permitted to borrow a diplomatic phrase from another part of the treaty) all the advantages which we are slattered with the hopes of, from the seventh article. Add to this, that every conjecture, respecting the intende [...] operation and effect of this article, authori [...]e [...] the conclusion, that this court of commissioners is to be para [...] to the [...]stituti [...]l [...]ts, both of the several states, and of the federal government; that it may examin [...] matters of fact with [...]ut the aid of a jury; and may re-examine matters [...]f fact t [...]ied by a jury, contrary to the rules of the common law, and contra [...] to the [...] of the [...]atified [...] to the [...]stitution.

↵

*

The same gentleman to whom I am indebted for the hiat contained in the note on article 6, informs me that the cession of territory to British subjects, comprehended in the second article, will probably amount to a grent more than equal to the states of Virginia and Kentucky, in extent, and of the most valuable lands in the United States.

↵

*

How far this article may tend to revive the proprietary rights of Lord Fair fax's heirs or devisees, and the Maryland and Pennsylvania proprietaries, any be worthy of more censideration than I have been able to bestow upon the subject.

↵

†

The settlements now making in some part of the state of New York by an English gentlement, whose name, I think, is Pulteney, upon an estate containing about half a million of acres, may serve as an evidence of the probability of this conjecture.

↵

*

This was done at the "earnest recommendation" of Congress, November 27, 1777.—See their journals.

↵

*

The rights of neutral nations in respect to their commerce, and the s [...]se that our government entertained of them two years ago, are admirably shown, in a letter from Mr. Jefferson, when secretary of state, to Mr. Pinckney not then minister at the court of Great Britain, dated September 7, 1793. See the papers accompanying the president's message of December 5, 1793, page 147.

↵

*

And such a proclamation, as appears by a late case, has been considered by the court of delegates in England, upon a appeal from Bermuda, to be a sufficient ground to render a vessel liable, though her voyage had been begun and her passage almost finished, before it issued.

↵

*

I have lately been informed, that this estimate, independent of twelve years interest, is too low. My authority adds, that this article, after some discossi [...], was entirely given up, by the envoy extraordinary!!!

↵

*

See remarks on article 6.

↵

†

See remarks on article 7. See also page 303.

↵

*

See remarks on articles 7. and 19. See also page 303.

↵

†

See page 303, 304, 305.

↵

‡

See remarks on articles 3.12.13.26.

↵

‖

See remarks on articles 12.17.

↵

§

See remarks on article 9.

↵

¶

See remarks on article 18.

↵

**

See remarks on article 10.

↵

††

See remarks on article 6. and note thereon.

↵

*

See remarks on article 12. last part.

↵

Information about this book

Title statement

The American remembrancer; or, An impartial collection of essays, resolves, speeches, &c. relative, or having affinity, to the treaty with Great Britain.

Publication

Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, MI :

Date

2011-05.

ID [DLPS]

N21598

ID [TCP]

N21598

ID [STC]

Evans 28389

ID [NOTIS]

APW8914

ID [IMAGE-SET]

28389

ID [EVANS-CITATION]

99015183

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Series

Early American Imprints, 1639-1800 ; no. 28389.

Notes

(Evans-TCP ; no. N21598)

Transcribed from: (Readex Archive of Americana ; Early American Imprints, series I ; image set 28389)

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Source

— The American remembrancer; or, An impartial collection of essays, resolves, speeches, &c. relative, or having affinity, to the treaty with Great Britain., Carey, Mathew, 1760-1839, ed..

Extent

3 v. ; 21 cm. (8vo)

Printed by Henry Tuckniss, for Mathew Carey, no. 118, Market-Street.,. Philadelphia: :: --August 20, 1795[-January 20, 1796].--. (In twelve numbered parts. Edited by Mathew Carey.) ("Advertisement. It is intended, in the present publication, to collect together the most valuable essays, resolutions, speeches, &c. respecting the treaty between the United States and Great Britain. In the prosecution of this plan, the publisher pledges himself to observe the strictest impartiality, and on this observance rests his pretensions to public encouragement."--v. 1, p. [3].) (Vol. 1: 288 p.; v. 2: 288 p.; v. 3: 312 p.)

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