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SPEECH, TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, DELIVERED JANUARY 14, 1794, By JAMES MADISON, OF VIRGINIA, IN SUPPORT OF HIS PROPOSITIONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE COMMERCE of the UNITED STATES, AND IN REPLY TO WILLIAM SMITH, OF SOUTH-CAROLINA.

NEW-YORK-PRINTED AT GREENLEAF's PRESS. —1794—

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SPEECH OF MR. MADISON, IN CONGRESS, JANUARY 14, 1794.

HE began by observing, that he had expected, from what was intimated yesterday, the sequel of what was then said against the resolutions before the commit­tee; but as there was a silence in that quarter, and no other member has risen on either side of the question, he himself would request the attention of the committee.

It had been much pressed, that in the discussion of this subject, it should be viewed in its commercial re­lations only. He was perfectly willing to meet every object that could be urged on that ground: But as he conceived it impossible to do full justice to the interests of the United States, without taking some collateral considerations into view; he should be obliged, in the course of his remarks, to point at the political dispositi­on and conduct of some of the nations of Europe to­wards this country.

The propositions immediately before the committee, turned on the question, whether any thing ought to be done at this time, in the way of commercial regulations, towards vindicating and advancing our national interests. Perhaps it might be made a question with some, whe­ther, in any case, legislative regulations of commerce were consistent with its nature and prosperity.

He professed himself to be a friend [...] the theory which gives to indust [...] s [...]ee co [...]rse, under the [...] of individual [...] the guidan [...] [...] individual sagacity. He was persuaded, that it would be happy for all nations, if the barriers erected by prejudice, by [Page 4] avarice, and by despotism, were broken down, and a free intercourse established among them. Yet to this, as to all other general rules, there might be exceptions: And the rule itself required, what did not exist, that it should be general.

To illustrate this observation, he referred to the navi­gation act of Great Britain, which, not being counter­balanced by any similar acts on the part of rival nations, had secured to Great Britain no less than eleven-twelfths of the shipping and seamen employed in her trade. It is stated, that in 1660, when the British act passed, the foreign tonnage was to the British as one to four: In 1700, less than one to six: In 1725, as one to nine­teen: In 1750, as one to twelve: In 1774, nearly the same. At the commencement of the period, the ton­nage was but 95,266 tons: At the end of it, 1,136,162.

As another illustration, he mentioned the case where two countries happened to be in such a relation to each other, that the one, by discouraging the manufactures of the other, might not only invigorate its own, but transplant the manufacturers themselves. Here the gain would be a clear one; and the effect evidently consistent with the principle of the theory.

To allow trade to regulate itself, is not, therefore, to be admitted as a maxim universally sound. Our own experience has taught us, that, in certain cases, it is the same thing with allowing one nation to regulate it for another. Were the United States, in fact, in com­mercial intercourse with one nation only, and to oppose no restrictions whatever to a system of foreign restric­tions, they would, of necessity, be deprived of all share in the carriage, although their vessels might be able to do it cheapest; as well as of the only resources for de­fence on that side, where they must always be most [...]. A small burden only in foreign ports on [...] vessels, and a perfect equality of foreign [...] in our own po [...] would gradually banish the latter altogether.

This subject, as had been remarked on a former oc­casion, was not a novel one: It was co-eval with our political birth, and has at all times exercised the thoughts [Page 5] of reflecting citizens. As early as the year succeeding the peace, the effect of the foreign policy, which began to be felt in our trade and navigation, excited universal attention and inquietude. The first effort thought of, was an application of Congress to the states for a grant of power, for a limited time, to regulate our foreign commerce; with a view, to controul the influence of unfavorable regulations in some cases, and to conciliate an extension of favorable ones in others. From some circumstances then incident to our situation, and par­ticularly from a radical vice in the then political system of the United States, the experiment did not take ef­fect.

The states next endeavored to effect their purpose by separate, but concurrent, regulations. Massachusetts opened a correspondence with Virginia and other states, in order to bring about the plan. Here again the effort was abortive.

Out of this experience, grew the measures which terminated in the establishment of a government com­petent to the regulation of our commercial interests, and the vindication of our commercial rights.

As these were the first objects of the people in the steps taken for establishing the present government, they were universally expected to be among the first fruits of its operation. In this expectation, the public were disappointed. An attempt was made in different forms, and received the repeated sanction of this, branch of the legislature, but they expired in the senate: Not, in­deed, as was alledged, from a dislike to the attempt al­together but the modifications given to it. It has not appeared, however, that it was ever renewed in a dif­ferent form in that house; and for some time it has been allowed to sleep in both.

If the reasons which originally prevailed against mea­sures such as those now proposed, had weight in them, they can no longer furnish a pretext for opposition.

When the subject was discussed in the first Congress at New-York, it was said, that we ought to try the effect of a generous policy towards Great Britain; that we ought to give time for negociating a treaty of com­merce; [Page 6] that we ought to await the close of negociations for explaining and executing the treaty of peace. We have now waited a term of more than four years. The treaty of peace remains unexecuted on her part; though all pretext for delay has been removed by the steps taken on ours. No treaty of commerce is either in train, or in prospect. Instead of relaxations in former articles complained of, we suffer new and aggravated violations of our rights.

In the view which he took of the subject, he called the attention of the committee particularly to the subject of navigation, of manufactures, and of the discrimina­tion proposed in the motion, between some nations and others.

On the subject of navigation, he observed, that we were prohibited by the British laws from carrying to Great Britain the produce of other countries from their ports, or our own produce from the ports of other coun­tries, or the produce of other countries from our own ports; or to send our own produce from our own or other ports in the vessels of other countries. This last restriction was, he observed, felt by the United States at the present moment. It was, indeed, the practice of Great Britain sometimes to relax her navigation act so far, in time of war, as to permit to neutral vessels a circuitous carriage; but as yet the act was in full force against the use of them for transporting the produce of the United States.

On the other hand, the laws of the United States al­lowed Great Britain to bring into their ports, any thing she might please, from her own or from other ports; and in her own or in other vessels.

In the trade between the United States and the British West-Indies, the vessels of the former were under an absolute prohibition; whilst British vessels in that trade enjoyed all the privileges granted to other, even the most favored nations in their trade with us. The inequality in this case was the more striking, as it was evident, that the West-Indies were dependant on the United States for the supplies essential to them, and that the circumstances which secured to the United States this [Page 7] advantage, enabled their vessels to transport the supplies on far better terms than could be done by British vessels.

To illustrate the policy requisite in our commercial intercourse with other nations, he presented a com­parative view of the American and foreign tonnage em­ployed in the respective branches of it, from which it appeared, that the foreign stood to the American as follows:

Spain,1 to 5
Portugal,1 to 6
The United Netherlands,1 to 15
Denmark,1 to 12
Russia, 
France,1 to 5
Great Britain,5 to [...]

It results from these facts, that in proportion as the trade might be diminished with Great Britain, and in­creased with other nations, would be the probable in­crease of the American tonnage. It appeared, for ex­ample, that as the trade might pass from British channels into those of France, it would augment our tonnage at the rate of ten to one.

The above calculation, he said, had been made out on the documents of 1790, and on the amount of the tonnage entered in the several ports. A document, stating the amounts of the actual tonnage in the Ameri­can trade, had been just reported to that house. If this, which was liable to some remarks that might hereafter be made, was to be substituted, it afforded another cal­culation, diminishing the excess in favor of Great Britain, but augmenting it in favor of the United States in most of the other instances.

According to this calculation, the foreign to the American tonnage might be stated as follows:

Spain,1 to 16
Portugal,1 to 17
United Netherlands,1 to 26
Denmark,1 to 15
Russia,1 to 14
France,1 to between 4 & 5
Great Britain, nearly as3 to 1

[Page 8] Such a disproportion, taking even the reduced one, in the navigation with Great Britain, was the more mortifying, when the nature and amount of our exports are considered. Our exports are not only for the most part, either immediately necessaries of life, or ultimate­ly as necessaries to manufactures, necessaries of employ­ment and life to manufacturers, and must thence com­mand a sure market wherever they are received at all: But the peculiar bulkiness of them furnishes [...] advant­age over the exports of every other country; and parti­cularly over those of Great Britain. If such [...] advant­age belonged to that nation, the policy which governs her navigation laws, would probably have given the ex­clusive carriage to her own [...]ttoms. It is equally in our power, if so selfish a principle should be forced up­on us, to secure to our bottoms the same monopoly; leaving to other nations with which we trade, the like exclusive carriage of their exports. The regulation would, to be sure be mutually inconvenient; and, by forcing the vessels of each party to return empty from foreign markets, be so far a tax on the intercourse.— This effect, however, did not disprove the power in general which the character of our exports gave us, over the carriage of them, nor lessen the argument drawn from it. Examine it in relation to Great Britain. The bulk of her exports to us, compared with that of ours to her, is as nothing. An inconsiderable quantity of shipping would suffice for hers, whilst ours can load about 222,000 tons: Including the articles she exports from the West-Indies to this country, they bear no pro­portion to ours. Yet in the entire trade between the United States and the British dominions, her tonnage is to that of the United States as 156,000, employing 9360 seamen, to 66,000, employing 3690 seamen. Were a rigid exertion of our right to take place, it would ex­tend our tonnage to 222,000, and leave to Great Britain employment for much less than the actual share now enjoyed by the United States. It could not be wished to push matters to this extremity. It shewed, however, the very [...]qual and unfavorable footing on which the carrying [...] the great resource of our safety and res­pectability, [Page 9] was placed by foreign regulations, and the reasonableness of peaceable attempts to meliorate it. We might at least, in availing ourselves of the merit of our exports, contend for such regulations as would reverse the proportion, and give the United States the 156,000 tonnage, and 9360 seamen, instead of the 66,000 ton­nage and 3690 seamen.

He here adverted to the discount of ten of ten per cent. on the duties paid by goods imported in American bottoms; remarking, thai it was not founded on the true policy of encouraging our shipping. It was not the imports, but exports, that regulated the quantity of tonnage.— What was imported in American vessls, which would otherwise return empty, was, no doubt, a benefit to the American merchant, but could slightly only, if at all, increase the mass of our tonnage. The way to effect this, was to secure exportations to American bot­toms.

Proceeding to the subject of manufactures, he observ­ed, that it presented no compensations for the inequali­ties in the principles and effects of the navigation sys­tem.

We consume British manufactures to double the amount of what Britain takes from us; and quadruple the amount of what she actually consumes.

We take every thing after it has undergone all the profitable labor that can be bestowed on it: She receives in return, raw materials, the food of her industry.

We send necessaries te her: She sends superfluities to us.

We admit every thing she pleased to send us, whe­ther of her own or alien production. She refuses not only our manufactures, but the articles we wish most to send her; our wheat and flour, our fish, and our salted provisions. These constitute our best staples for exportation, as her manufactures constitute hers.

It appeared by an authentic document he had exam­ined, that of the manufactured articles imported in 1790, amounting to 15,295,638 dollars, 97 cents. we received from and through Great Britain, 13,965,464 dollars, 95 cents.

[Page 10] During the same year, the manufactures imported from France, the next great commercial country, and consuming more of our produce than Great-Britain, amounted to no more than 155,136 dolars, and 63 cents.

To give a fuller view of our foreign commerce, he stated the balances with the several nations of Europe and their dominions, as follow:

 Dollars. 
Spain,1,670,797in favor of U. States.
Portugal,1,687,699do.
United Netherlands, [...]91,118do.
Sweden,32,965do.
Denmark,126,949against the U. States.
France,2,630,387in favor of U. States.
Great Britain,5,922,012against the U. States.

This [...]normous balance to Great Britain is on the ex­ports to her. On her conjumption, the balance is still greater, amounting to nine or ten millions; to which again is to be added, her profits on the re-exports in a manufactured and raw state.

It might be said, that an unfavorable balance was no proof of an unfovarable trade; that the only important balance was the ultimate one on our aggregate com­merce.

[...] there was much truth in this general doctrine, was admitted; at the same time it was equally certain, that there were exceptions to it, some of which were con [...]ei [...]ed to be applicable to the [...]s;ituation of the United States.

But whether the doctrine was just or not, as applied to the United States, it was well known, that the rea­soning and practice of other countries were governed by a [...]on [...]ary doctrine. In all of them, an unfavorable balance, to be paid in specie, was considered as an evil. Great Britain, in particular, had always stulied to pre­ [...]t as much as she could. What, then, may be the [...]ffect on the policy of a nation with which we have the most friendly and beneficial relations, when it sees the balance of trade with us not only so much against her but all the sp [...]cie that pays it, flowing immediately into [Page 11] the lap of her greatest rival, if not her most inverate enemy.

As to the diserimination proposed between nations having, and not having, commercial treaties with us, the principle was embraced by the laws of most, if not all, the states, while the regulation of trade was in their hands.

It had the repeated sanction of votes in the house of representatives, during the session of the present govern­ment at New-York.

It has been practised by other nations, and in a late instance against the United States.

It tends to procure beneficial treaties from those who refuse them, by making them the price of enjoying an equality with other nations in our commerce.

It tends, as a conciliatory preference, to procure bet­ter treaties from those who have not refused them.

It was a prudent consideration, in dispensing com­mercial advantages, to favor rather those whose friend­ship and support may be expected in case of necessity, than those whose disposition wore a contrary aspect.— He did not wish to enter at present, nor at all, if un­necessary, into a display of the unfriendly features which marked the policy of Great Britain towards the United States, He should be content to lay aside, at least for the present, the subject of the Indians, the Algerines, the spoliations, &c. but he could not forbear remarking generally, that if that, or any other nation, were known to bear us a settled ill-will, nothing could be more im­politic, than to foster resources which would be more likely to be turned against us, than exerted in our favour.

It had been admitted by the gentleman who spoke yesterday (Mr. Smith, of South-Carolina) to be a mis­fortune, that our trade should be so far engrossed by any one nation, as it is in the hands of Great Britain. But the gentleman added nothing to alleviate the misfortune, when he advised us to make no efforts for putting an end to it. The evils resulting from such a state of things, were as serious as they were numerous. To say nothing of sudden derangements from the caprice [Page 12] with which sovereigns might be seized, there were casualties which might not be avoidable. A general bankruptcy, which was a possible event, in a nation with which we were so connected, would reverberate upon us with a most dreadful shock. A partial bank­ruptcy had actually and lately taken place; and was severely felt in our commerce. War is a common event particularly to Great-Britain, and involves us in the embarrassments it brings on her commerce, whilst o [...]s is so disproportionately interwoven with it, Add, the influence that may be conveyed into the public councils by a nation directing the course of our trade by her capital, and holding so great a share in our pec [...]iniary institutions; and the effect that may sin­ally, ensue on our taste, our manners, and our form of government itself.

If the question be asked, what might be the conse­quence of counter-efforts, and whether this attempt to vindicate our public interests would not produce them? His answer was, that he did not in the least apprehend such a consequence, as well because the measure af­forded no pretext, being short of what was already done by Great-Britain in her commercial system, as be­cause she would be the greatest sufferer from a stagna­tion of the trade, between thtwo countries it we should force on such a crisis.

Her merchants would feel it. Her navigation would feel it. Her manufacturers would feel it. Her West-Indies would be ruined by it. Her revenue would deep­ly feel it. And her government would feel it thro every nerve of its operations. We [...]o should suffer in some respect, but in a less degree; and, if the virtue and temper of our fellow citizens were not mistaken, the experiment would find in them a far greater readi­ [...]s to bear it. It was clear to him, therefore, that if Great-Britain should, contrary to all the rules of pro­bability, stop the commerce between the two countries, the issue would be a compleat triumph to the United States.

He dwelt particularly on the dependance of British manufacturers on the market of the United States. He [Page 13] referred to a paper in Anderson's history of commerce, which states the amount of British manufactures at £ 51,310,000 sterling, and the number of souls em­ployed in, and supported by them, at 5,250,000. Supp­posing the United states to consume two and a half mil­lions of British manufactures, which is a moderate esti­mate, the loss of their market would deprive of subsist­ence 250,000 souls. Add 50,000 who depend for em­ployment on our raw materials. Here are 300,000 souls, who live by our custom. Let them be driven to poverty and despair by acts of their own govern­ment, and what would be the consequence? Most pro­blably an acquisition of so many useful citizens to the United States, which form the natural asylum against the distresses of Europe. But whether they should re­main in discontent and wretchedness in their own country, or seek their fortunes in another, the evil would be felt by the British government as equally great, and be avoided with equal caution.

It might be regarded be observed, as a general rule, that where one nation consumed the necessaries of life produced by another, the consuming nation was depen­dant on the producing o [...]. On the other hand, where the cosumption consisted of superflukies, the produc­ing nation was dependant on the consuming one. The United States were in the fortunate situation of enjoy­ing both these advantages over Great-Britain. They supply a part of her dominions with the necessaries of life. They consume superfluities which give bread to her people in another part. Great Britain therefore is under a double dependance on the commerce of the United States. She depends on them for what she her­self consumes: she depends on them for what they con­sume.

In proportion as a nation manufactures luxuries must be its disadvantage in contests of every sort with its customers. The reason is obvious. What is luxury to the consumer is a necessary to the manufacturer. By changing a fashion, or disappointing a fancy only, bread may be taken from the mouths of thousands whose industry is devoted to the gratifications of artifi­cial wants.

[Page 14]He mentioned the case of a petition from a great bo­dy of buckle makers presented a few years ago to the prince of Wales, complaining of the use of strings in­stead of buckles in the shoes, and supplicating his roy­al highness as giving the law to fashions, to save them from want and misery, by discontinuing the new one. It was not, he observed, the prince who petitioned the manufacturers to continue to make the buckles, but the manufacturers who petitioned their customer to buy them. The relation was similar between the Ameri­can customers and the British manufacturers. And if a law were to pass for putting a stop to the life of their superfluities, or a stop were otherwise to be put to it, it would quickly be seen from which the distress and suplications would flow.

Suppose that Great Britain received from us alone the whole of the necessaries she consumes; and that our market alone took off the luxuries with which she paid for them. Here the dependence would be compleate; and we might impose whatever terms we please on the exchange. This to be sure is not absolutely, [...] but in proportion as it is the case, her depe [...] [...] on us.

The West-Indies however are a [...] example o [...] com­pleat dependence. They cannot subsist without our food. They cannot flourish without our lumber, and our use of their ruin. On the other hand we depend o [...] them for not a single necessary, and can supply ourselves with their luxuries from other sources. Sugar is [...] oniy article about which there was ever a question, and he was authorised to say, that there was not at the most, one sixth of our consumption supplied from the British Islands.

In time of war or famine the dependenee of the West-Indies is felt in all its energy. It is sometimes such as to appeal to our humanity as well as our interest for relief. At this moment, the governor of Jamaica is making proclamation of their distre [...] li [...]er there­fore there was a case where one country could dictate to another the re [...]ula [...]ions of trade between them, it is the case of the United States, and the British West-Indies. [Page 15] And yet the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) had considered it as a fa [...]or that we were allowed to send our provisions in British bottomsand in these on­ly, to the West-Indies. The favor reduced to plain lan­guage in the mouth of their planters, would run thus:— We will agree to buy your provisions rather than starve, and let you have our rum, which we can sell no where­else; but we reserve out of this indulgence a monopoly of the carriage to British vessels.

With regard to revenue, the British resources were extremely exhausted in comparison with those of the United States.

The people of Great-Britain were taxed at the rate of 40s. a head: the people of the United States at not more than 6s. a head: less than one-sixth of the British tax.

As the price of labor which pays the tax is double in the United States, to what it is in Great-Britain, the burden on American citizens is less than one-twelfth of the burden on British subjects.

It is true indeed that Britain alone does not bear the whole burden. She levies indirect taxes on her West-Indies and on her East-Indies; and derives from an ac­quiesence in her monopolizing regulations, an imper­ceptible tribute from the whole commercial world.

Still however the difference of burden in the two countries is immense.

Britain has moreover great arrears of unfunded debts. She is threatened with defects in her revenue even at this time. She is engaged in an expensive war. And she raises the supplies for it on the most expen­sive terms.

Add to the whole that her population is stationary if not diminishing, whilst that of the United States is in a course of increase beyond example.

Should it still be asked whether the impost might not be affected and how a deficiency could be supplied [...] he thought sufficient answers might be given.

He took for granted that the articles subjected to the additional duties would continue to come according to the demand for them: And believed if the duties were [Page 16] prudently adjusted, the increase of the duties would ba­lance the decrease of importation.

Our country is able to import, and probably will im­port, in proportion to our exports. Our exports amount, say to, twenty millions of dollars. If we im­port less from one country we shall import more from another. If we import less of some things we shall im­port more of other things: and according to our im­ports will be our revenue.

Suppose Great-Britain to make the rash and impro­bable experiment of prohibiting all commerce with the United States: She does not consume more than one-fourth of our exports; and we derive perhaps nearly half our revenue from the productions of other coun­tries. In this point of view we should at the worst have three-fourths of our exports to pay for our reduced im­ports; and consequently a balance of about five mil­lions of specie flowing into our country. The faculty which this would give to operations of revenue, togeth­er with the consideration that the labor employed on one fourth of our ordinary exports, would be employed for internal purposes, might assure us that a judicious gov­ernment would easily be able to provide the means of supplying the deficiency of impost.

But it was superfluous to enter into calculations of this sort. He recurred to the utter improbability that such a contingency should happen. He was fully persuaded, that the resolutions, if agreed to, would not impair the revenue.

It is objected, that Spain and Portugal, who are good customers to us, and the latter particularly friendly, having no commercial treaty with us, will come with­in the operation of the resolutions.

Several answers mabe given to this objection.

  • I. They do not manufacture the articles in question so as to be sensibly affected.
  • 2. They employ but little tonnage in our trade: Spain 2,689 tons only; Portugal 2,340 tons only: They are supposed to be little anxious to increase the foreign branches of their carrying trade, being content with the internal trade carried on with their own dominions. As [Page 17] they have no navigation act within the purview of the resolutions, they would not be exposed to the retaliating clauses on that subject.
  • 3. If friendly, they can be admitted to treaty on eqitable conditions whenever they please.
  • 4. They can easily be excepted, if thought expe­dient, either by a general proviso that the resolutions shall not extend to nations having no navigation act such as is therein described; or by providing that they shall not extend to countries south of Cape-Finisterre, a dis­tinction familiar to the British statute-book.

It is said that Great-Britain treats the United States as wll as she treats other nations, and therefore they ought to be satisfied.

If other nations were willing to bear unequal regu­lations, or unable to vindicate their rights, it was no example for us.

But is it true that the same degree of reciprocity sub­sists between the United States and Great-Britain, as between Great-Britain and other countries? He did not admit this to be the case. Where treaties existed, they stipulated in many instances, mutual and equal condi­tions of intercourse. He gave an example in the treaty of Methuen, in which the admission of Britis [...] wool­ens by Portugal was balanced by the admission of Por­tugal wine, by Great-Britain. The treaty with France of late date, was another example, where a variety of reciprocal privileges and countervailing duties, were minutely provided for. Where no treaties existed or where they were silent, there were often legal regula­tions reciprocating the regulations of Great Britain. He referred to the laws of Sweden and Denmark on the subject of manufactures a [...] instances.

It is said Great-Britain treats us as well as other na­tions treat us. What nation he asked, had such a navi­gation act? What nation besides, excludes us from a circuitous trade? What nation excludes us from carry­ing our own commodities in our own bottoms, where the carriage is allowed to her bottoms?

It is said, that at least Great-Britain treats us s well as we are treated by France, who will be favored by the resolutions. This point was particularly labored yes­terday, [Page 18] by the gentleman from South-Carolina (Mr. Smith) who made a comparison of those two coun­tries the principal basis of the discussion. As they were in fact the two countries which stood in the most im­portant relations to the United States, the subject re­quired a pretty accurate view of their respective dispo­sitions, regulations, and intercourse with this coun­try.

On the subject of the dispositions of France and Great-Britain towards the United States, the gentle­man (Mr. Smith) was of a very different opinion, Mr. Madison observed, from that expressed in the message of the President. The message informed the house, that France had generally manifested a friendly disposition towards the United States, had granted advantages to their commerce, and had actually made overtures for placing it permanently on a better footing. While the language of the communications, with respect to Great-Britain, sufficiently proves that there was no room for compliments of a like kind to that nation.

He meant to shew, however, from a particular re­view, in what light the two nations stood to us; and for that purpose should submit to the committee com­parative statement, as the gentleman had done, of their commercial policy towards us. He premised, however, that he could not follow the example of recurring to a period antecedent to the French revolution for evidence in relation to France. Mr. Smith seemed to think, that the order of things subsequent to that period, could not be regarded as a settled order. He (Mr.Madison) on the contrary, considered it as the only settled order. He hoped and believed, that the revolution was not a fugitive thing, as some might wish, but that it was irreversibly estab­lished; and that the new republic would flourish for ever on the ruins of the ancient monarchy. He should not, however, he said, reject from his enquiry, what was done previous to the date of the republic in favor of the United States, because it could not be reasonably supposed that the disposition of the nation would be less favorable now, than it was under the former govern­ment.

[Page 19]He then proceeded to a view of the footing on which the commerce stood with the British and French do­minions.

Wheat and Flour. In France free, that is to say (under a duty of one-eighth per cent. as a custom-house regulation, merely for ascertaining the quantity imported.—This remark is to be applied to several other articles, which will be mentioned as free.

In Great-Britain wheat and flour are prohibited, until the price is up at 6s3 sterling a bushel; which as to the United States, may be deemed a perpetual prohibi­tion.

In the French West-Indies, these articles are also free; and as he at first stated, by a general law which had been suspended from time to time; but being told that he was mistaken, the articles being prohibited by a general law, and free only by suspensions, he said, that although his documents gave him other information, he should leave the fact for further examination; adding, however, that it was not essential, as the actual practice and disposition of France on this subject were chiefly to be regarded.

In the British West-Indies these articles were free, but in British bottoms only.

Rice. In France free. In Britain under a duty of 7s4 sterling the hundred. In the French island un­der a duty of one per cent. In the British, free in Bri­tish bottoms.

Salted Fish. In France under a duty of 8 livres the kental. In Britain prohibited. In French islands admitted under some discouragements, which did not however prevent a great consumption. In the British islands prohibited.

Salted Beef. In France under a duty of 5 livres a kental. In Britain prohibited.—In French islands un­der a duty of 1 per cent. and 3 livres a kental. In Bri­tish islands prohibited.

Salted Park. In France, under a duty of 5 livres a kental in some ports; prohibited in others. In Bri­tain under a prohibitory duty of 44s9 a kental. In the British and French islands prohibited.

Indigo. In France under a duty of 5 livres a ken­tal. [Page 20] In Britain [...]re [...]. In the British and French is­lands prohibited.

W [...]le Oil. In France under a duty of 7 livres 10 [...]ols [...] [...]arrel of [...]. In Britain under a duty of [...] 18 [...]3 a [...] West-Indies prohibited.

Ta [...] Pitc [...] and Tarpen [...]ine. In France under a [...] [...]ner [...]. In Britain, under duties, t [...] and pitch [...] per barrel, turpe [...]tine 2s3 per 100lb.

[...] is off a footing pretty similar in the two [...]. So [...] wood, pot and pearl ash and flax­sced.

India [...] Corn, Wood, Live Animals (except horses and [...]les, which [...] in the French islands pay a duty [...] [...] per cent. In the British they are free, in British bottom [...] pro [...]t [...]ted in American bottoms.

Ships. In France, [...] to be naturalized. In Bri­tain prohibited.

If proceeded to state the comparative amount of our exports and imports in [...] commerce with the two na­tions, and the balances on them as before shewn. He noticed particularly the excess of the exports to the French West-Indies which amounted to 3,284,656 dollars, over those to the British, which amounted to 2,357,583: Observing the importance of that market, and the more especially as it supplies the article of molasses, the only raw material imported into the Unit­ed States, and otherwise so much valued as an article of consumption. He adverted also to the superior pro­portion of American tonnage in the trade with the French dominions, as had also been before shewn.

From this review, he [...] the committee to infer the [...]ue policy of the United States with regard to their commerce, in its t [...] [...] considerable branches. He thought it clear, that [...] every view it was incumbent [...]n the United States [...] the connection and in­tercourse with the French nation. As a market for our produce, their vast [...], and their use of our ar­ticles of [...], were peculiarl [...] precious to our agricultu [...]. They could do better without our trade tha [...] [...] they shewed more dispo­sition to [...] [...]hat was by no means to be disregarded, they were [...] only considerable power on [Page 21] the face of the earth, sincerely friendly to the republi­can form of government established in this country.

Of all the objections which Mr. Madison had heard suggested against the resolutions, the most extravagant and chimerical was the idea of a war with Great-Bri­tain in consequence of them. He was at a loss to say whether such an objection were a greater insult to the character of that nation or to the understanding of America. At the utmost the propositions go only to a reciprocity. They do not in fact go so far. On what imaginable pretext then can Great-Britain make was upon us. If we were no longer colonies, but indepen­dent states, we surely can do what all independent sta [...]es do, regulate our trade as may soit our own interests.— And Great-Britain can have the least right of any na­tion to complain of it, because it is her own example which we follow. If war therefore should be made on us it would only prove a fixt predetermination to make it. And in that case pretexts more plausible than any commercial regulations could easily be found or framed for the purpose.

The next ground on which he examined the subject was it's operation among the several parts of the uni­on. It was admitted and regretted, that the immediate benefits and burdens would not be equally distributed among all the states. More than a due share of the former would flow to the northern division: More than a due share of the latter would fall on the southern.— This was unavoidably produced by the unequal advanc­es made in manufactures and navigation; and it was an inconvenience that had necessarily taken place in a vari­ety of other instances. It would be found, however, on a fair attention to the subject, that the inequality would be less than at first appeared.

With respect to manufactures, the southern states were at least equally interested in encouraging and distri­buting a competition for our market, among different nations of Europe, instead of being so much in the hands of a single one.

The duty on the siner articles imported would fall on those most able to bear it; and would be pretty equally diffused through the union.

[Page 22]The duty on the coarser articles would be saved in proportion to the progress made in manufactures among ourselves; and he was able to say, with great pleasure, that those carried on, not in public factories, but in the houshold or family way, which he regarded as the most important way, were nearly, if not quite as far advanced in the southern country as in the middle and northern. Virginia was proceeding with great spirit in this branch of industry. North-Carolina he understood was doing the same; and there was no reason why the more south­ern states would not avail themselves of the resource, especially as they enjoyed superior advantages in the article of cotton, a primary material for the business.

The exports would not be materially affected, unless Great Britain should, contrary to all probability, re­nounce the benefits of the trade in them, and expose her West-India island to the danger of famine; and in that Case, the inconveniences would not be local, but general.

Even in the article of tonnage, the inequality at pre­sent, though considerable, was not so great as he had imagined, before he examined the real state of it. It appeared, from the official reports lately made on that subject, that the states south of Pennsylvania (which has about her due share) have within one-third of their due quota. Georgia has more than her share. South-Caro­lina nearly her share. North-Carolina has three-eighths below her share. Virginia has about half her share. Maryland has more than her share. Delaware less than her share.

This computation is not, perhaps, very accurate, because it is founded on the relative population of the states. It should rather have reference to the value and volume of the produce exported from the several states: But as several of them carry on their trade through their neighbors, this rule of calculation would, in fact, be more uncertain than the other.

Whatever be the rule, Virginia, he remarked, was the state that appeared most deficient; her exports, both in value and bulk, being in full proportion to her po­pulation, and her tonnage being more short of that, than could be said of any state. He had every reason, not­withstanding, [Page 23] to believe, that the great body of the people of Virginia would cheerfully concur in any tem­porary sacrifices that might be necessary to vindicate our public rights, and our commercial interests.

It was a consideration that ought to have great weight with the southern states, that a home market for their naval [...]ores would be extended by every measure favor­ing our own navigation; and that they must soon begin themselves to turn to effect their natural advantages for ship-building. Having the materials on the spot, they would not be long in imitating their northern brethren. North-Carolina was singularly favored in this particular. There was not a single article used in the various compo­nent parts of a ship, which she did not po [...]ess, or could not raise within herself.

The capacity of the United States, to provide w [...] celerity for the transportation of her produce, was strong­ly attested by what they had effected before the revo [...] ­tion. In the marine of the British empire, whilst the United States were part of it, the American built ships were to the British built as 23 to 40. New-England furnished about three-fifths of the formar.

In two points of view, the southern [...] were pe­culiarly interested in promoting our navigation.

First—As they are, in some respects, the weaker part of the union, and have most wealth exposed on the sea, they have most need of that protection which re­sults from extensive marine resources. The existence of these will either prevent attack, or can readily be turned into the means of repelling it.

Secondly—As they have so much valuable and bulky produce to carry to market, it is their interest to possess a conveyance for it, that may be as little affected as possible by the contingencies and wars of other nations; and particularly of Great Britain, a nation which is so frequently at war, and which has so disproportionate a share in our carrying trade. This subject, he said, had been placed in so striking a view by the Secretary of State, in a former report on the fisheries, that he should rely on the patience of the committee in reading the observations and calculations to which he alluded. He here read the following note at the end of that report;

[Page 24]"That the encouragement of our carrying business is interesting, not only to the carrying stat [...], but in a high degree also to the others, will result from the fol­lowing facts:

The whole exports of the United States may be stated at 25,000,000 Dollers.

Great Britain carries two-fi [...]hs of these in value, that is to say, 10,000,000 Dollers.

Freight and insurance on this in times of peace, are about twenty-two and one half percent. 2,250,000 Dollers.

The same charges in war are very vari­ous, according to the circumstances of the war; we may say, however, fifty-five per cent. 5,500,000 Dollers.

The difference between peace and war, freight and insurance, then is annually, 3,250,000 Dollers.

Taxed on our agriculture by British wars, during their continuance, and our dependance on British bot­toms.

Of the last one hundred years, Great Britain has had *forty-two years of war, and fifty-eight of peace, which is three of war to every four of peace, nearly.

 Y.M.1989.May.Y.M. 
Peace.481697.sept.84War.
1702.May.
 641712.August.103 
1718.Dec.
 581721.June.26 
1727.March.
 1241727.May.02 
1739.Oct [...].
 701748.May.87 
1755.June.
 1571762.Nov.75 
1778.June.
 621763.March.49 
1789.May.
 579  42  
[Page 25]

In every term of seven years, then, we pay three times three million two hundred and fifty thousand dol­lars, or nine million seven hundred and fifty thousand, which, averaged on the years of peace and war, are annually and constantly one million three hundred and ninety-two thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven more than we should, if we could raise our own shipping to be competent to the carriage of all our productions. Besides this, many of our bulky articles, not bearing a war freight, cannot be exported, if exposed, to that, so that their total loss is to be added to that before estimat­ed.

This was a demonstration of the interest the United States had, particularly the southern states, in obtaining an independent transportation for their commodities; and the effect of the present war to which Britain as a party. In depriving them of the ordinary foreign re­source, is bringing the evidence home to their feelings [...] present moment.

I had been asked what ground there was for con­cluding, that Great-Britain would be led by the measures proposed, to change her policy towards the United states. He thought we had the best ground for relying on such an effect.

It is well known, that when she apprehended such measures would be taken, she manifested a readiness to admit a greater reciprocity into the commerce between the two countries. A bill for the purpose was brought into the house of commons by the present minister, Mr. Pitt, and would probably have passed into a law, if hopes had not sprung up that they should be able to maintain their exclusive system. Knox, an under se­cretary, appears from a collection of papers published by him, to have been the chief advisers in the cabinet, as Lord Sheffield was the great champion before the public, of this experiment. It was founded according to both these w [...]sses, on a belief—1st. That Nova-Scotia and Canada, would soon be able to feed the West-Indies, and thereby make them independent of sup­plies from the united States.—2dly. That the gene­ral government [...] was so feeble that it could not exec [...] [Page 26] plan of retaliating restriction—and, 3dly. That local interests and prejudices predominated so much among the states, that they would never even agree in making an attempt.

It is now thoroughly understood and admitted by the most biassed judges, that the British continental colo­nies cannot supply the islands: that as well as the isl­ands, they depend frequently for essential supplies on the United States. This calculation therefore has failed Great-Britain.

The next has been completely destroyed by the change of our former frail confederacy, into a govern­ment which is found to be adequate to all its national objeds. —This hope has therefore in like manner fail­ed.

The only remaining hope that can induce Great-Britain to persevere in the plan of conduct she has adopt­ed towards the United States, lies in the supposed diffi­culty of reconciling their different interests and local pre­judicies. The present occasion will decide whether this hope also shall be withdrawn from her; or whether she is to be inspired with fresh confidence in pursuing her own interests without a due respect either for our in­terests or for our rights

He could not but view the present as perhaps the final chance of combining the opinions and interests of the several quarters of the Union in some proper and adequate plan. If at a moment when so many occur­rences conspire to unite the public councils; when the public mind is so well disposed to second all equitable and peaceable means of doing justice to our country; and when our commerce is so critically important to the vital resources of Great-Britain, it should be found that nothing can be done, he could foresee no circumstances under which success was to be expected. To reject the propositions therefore, whilst nothing better was substituted, must convey the most unfavorable impressi­ons of our national character, and rivet the fetters on our commerce, as well as prolong other causes which had produced such injurious consequences to our coun­try. He would not permit himself to apprehend that [Page 27] such would be the event of the deliberations of the com­mittee.

As it appeared, he said, that most of the objections against the proposed Resolutions, had been made by those who meant to combat them, and that a question would soon be called for; it might perhaps be expect­ed that he should review those objections, and assign the reasons which induced him to continue in the opinion he at first entertained. He wished it not to be under­stood, that he meant to examine every particular argu­ment, which in the course of so extensive a discussion, had been opposed to the measure. The committee must have perceived, that some of them had been of a nature not to merit an answer; and that others had sufficiently answered themselves. He should extend his observations to such topics only as might be thought to need explanation, and to have an influence on the ques­tion.

Previous, however, to this general survey of the ground which had been travelled over he should so far presume on the patience of the committee, as to recur to the original opposition made by the member from South-Carolina (Mr. Smith) and to take notice of some particulars in what had been urged by him, which were left unanswered at the time.

The gentleman had thought proper to introduce his discourse with a very unmerited attack on the late Secre­tary of State, and to mingle with it a variety of cri­ticisms on the facts and opinions stated in his report, on the subject under consideration. The spirit and manner in which the attack had been made, and which could not have escaped the attention of the committee. would be left in that silence which may best express the sentiment they must have inspired. He should indeed have thought it less necessary to take further notice than he had already done, of the matter of the gentleman's remarks, if attempts had not been made, particularly by a friend of the gentleman (Mr. Ames) to give a weight to his statements and inferences, which it would be shewn they did not merit: and if the task did not afford [Page 28] an opportunity of eludicating some particular points relied on, by the opponents of the resolutions.

It was made a charge against the secretary of State, that he takes no notice of the higher duty imposed by Great-Britain on other foreign tobacco, than is impos­ed on American (the former being 3s6 ster. a pound, the latter 1s3) whilst he takes care to mention the high duty imposed on the American; although the discri­mination is in favor of the United States, and is against Portugal, a country in particular connection with Great-Britain; and although the high duty of 1s3 is immaterial to the United States, being paid by the consumer of the Tobacco in Great-Britain.

It was unfortunate for the gentleman that this charge is fallacious in every member of it.

  • 1. The discrimination is not in favor of the Unit­ed States, either in its intention, or in its operation; not in its intention because it was made in reference to this country, when it was a part of the British Em­pire, and not in reference to us as Independent States; not in its operation, because if the discrimination were abolished, it would bring no rival of our tobacco into the British market. This is proved by the fact, that in other markets, as that of France, where no such discrimination exists, the American tobacco is without a rival. It was well known that this and the other apparent favors to this country, were a remnant of the Old Colonial code, which having become a dead let­ter in the Statute book, had not yet been struck out of it.
  • 2. If the discrimination had no effect in favor of the United States, it could not for the same reason, be a prejudice to Portugal. If it were necessary and pro­per to go into the enquiry, more direct proofs could be given on this point.
  • 3. High duties do affect the United States which produce the article, though paid by the British consum­ers. They have a double effect: They lessen the quan­tity called for; and by lessening the competition, they lessen also the price. This was a truth that could need no comment.

[Page 29]It was to be remarked however, that the zeal of the gentleman on this subject, was such, that it had led him to extend the fallacy of his reasoning to rice, the staple article of his own State. This article pays a duty of 7s4 ster. per hundred weight, but like the duty on tobacco, being paid by the consumer, was said to be of little concern to us.

Call the price of rice 10s sterling: the duty is 7s4. The whole class of people then, in Great-Britain, be­tween the class who cannot afford to eat rice at the price of 10s. and the class who are willing to eat it at 17s4 are prohibited the consumption by the duty. Was this a circumstance of no concern to the rice planters? The gentleman should have been reminded of his error by his own arguments.

As an apology for the duty imposed in Great-Britain, he tells us it was meant to prevent the use of rice as a Substitute, for the bread-stuffs produced by Great-Bri­tain herself. Without the preventing duty then, rice would have been Substituted in place of wheat, in the opinion of the British Parliament, and the demand for it, in the British market, so far increased.

As a merit in the British West-India regulations over those of France, it was stated by the gentleman, that rice in the West-Indies is a common food; that in the British, the importation of it is free; in the French, subject to a duty, though an inconsiderable one. In Britain then, where there is a high duty, rice is not an article of common food; in the islands where there is no duty, it is a common food; and the advantage of the British West-India market to us over the French, is, that the duty in the latter favors cheaper Substi­tutes.

Another proof of the disposition of Great-Britain to favor the United States in the West-India market, is the prohibition of all foreign rice but the American.— The same remark may be repeated here, which was ap­plied to the dis [...]mination in favor of our tobacco. It is an old colony regulation that has no effect whatever. What other foreign rice could be brought to the West-Indies? Is it the East-India rice? that is prohibited [Page 30] by its distance. Is it the rice of Portugal? that is pro­hibited by the laws of Portugal, and probably also by the lower price of the Carolina rice.

The inference which the gentleman had drawn from the comparative regulations of Great-Britain and France on the subject of rice was so curious that it was worth a moment's attention.

The facts, Mr. Madison observed, stood thus. In France the duty is 1-3 per cent. In Great-Britain 7s4 sterling a hundred. In the French islands the duty is 1 per cent. In the British free with a prohibition of other foreign rice.

As the duty of 1 per cent. is scarcely sensible, and the prohibition, as shewn, is merely nominal, the ine­quality in the islands may be regarded as too immateri­al to affect the comparison.

Passing to the two parent states, the duty in France is 1-8 per cent.—The duty in Great-Britain, 50 or 60 per cent.

Here then is nearly an equality in one part, and a dif­ference of 50 or 60 per cent. in the other part of the two dominions; and yet the gentleman could say, it was not easy to pronounce, whether the article of rice stands on a better footing in the system of the one, than in the system of the other.

Another charge against the secretary of state is, that his report calls the discriminating duties in Great-Britain in favor of American wood, small, whereas they are con­siderable, and in several instances high.

Mr. Madison said he had not found leisure to trace this branch of our exports into all the details necessary to decide in what degree the duties were small or con­siderable, and in what proportion the several dutied ar­ticles went to Great-Britain. He observed in general that the greater part of our woods were exported to the West-Indies, not to Great-Britain. That in the ship­woods at least the Ba [...]ic nations were not rivals to the United States. It was known that Sweden and Den­mark were so deficien [...] in Out that their public navies were supplied from Germany, and that the ship timbers of Russia were transported a thousand or twelve hun­dred [Page 31] miles from her interior dominions. The Fir, of which the Swedish and Danish merchant ships were built, does not last more than seven or eight years, and could not therefore be a rival to the durable woods of the United States.

He observed also that lumber, and particularly the ship woods of the country, were so precious and so sure of being in demand, that they never could fear a rival, or need a foreign bounty. This was an article very different from such as were an annual product of the earth, and as could be raised wherever the climate and soil permitted according to the occasional demand. The forests that were to supply the ship yards were the growth of centuries, and where once destroyed, as they generally are in Europe, are rarely replaced at all, and never can become the rival to America, which enjoys them as the spontaneous gift of nature.

To enhance the merit of the British regulations, the gentleman had told us, that wood was subject to a duty of 1 per cent. in the French Islands, and in the British free, with a prohibition of other foreign wood. This was of little consequence. The duty was a trifle, and falling on a necessary article to be got no where else, probably was paid by the French islariders. And the prohibition was ideal, the American wood being the only resource for the British market.

The article of Fish, was admitted by the gentleman himself to be more favored by the French than the British system, though he admits it with reluctance and diminishes the difference as much as possible. The case however is so clear, and the facts so palpable, that they speak for themselves. Under the French regulations, this important article of our commerce is subject to duties only, in Europe and the West-Indies. Under the British, it is under prohibition in both. The amount of the whole export is 382,237 quintals of dry, and 57,424 barrels of pickled fish. Of this the French consumption, is 252,171, quintals and 45,164 barrels; that is, nearly 2-3ds of the dry, and 4-5ths of the pickled fish.

[Page 32]Here Mr. Madison, proceeding to the subject of whale oil, called the attention of the committee parti­cularly to the representation and language of Mr. Smith as to the conduct of France, in inviting the fishermen of Nantucket to remove and settle at Dunkirk. Mr. Smith, he said, had not only undervalued the monopoly of the French market granted to the United States, but had, by a mutilated quotation of a report of the secre­tary of state on the fisheries, changed the true aspect of the attempt to draw away the Nantueket fishermen. The fact was, that although the conduct of France was very different from what was to have been wished, as well as from what was contemplated by the marquis la Fayette, who had patrionized the interest of fisher­men, yet that the project of tempting them to emigrate had originated in Great-Britain, and was a counter pro­ject on the part of France. How the gentleman hap­pened to omit the antecedent attempt of Great-Britain, and thereby exaggerate that of France, Mr. Madison did not undertake to explain: but it was the more ex­traordinary, as the whole account of the transaction was contained in the same page of the report, nay, in the same paragraph, from which the gentleman had extract­ed his information.

Here he read the passage in that report and produced the British statute, inviting the whale fishermen, by an offer of certain privileges, to emigrate to Great-Bri­tain.

A further charge against the secretary of state is that in his statement of the tonnage of the United States employed in the trade with the French and British do­minions; he founds it, not on the actual number of ships, but on the number of entries. This charge was as singular as it was uncandid.

The report stated the fact, that the American tonnage entering our ports from the several nations with which the United States traded, was so and so; and in this statement, it pursued the official returns made on the subject. What more was to be required?

In giving the fact, the Secretary imposed on no one, In cause he stated the tonnage to be entry tonnage, as it really was.

[Page 33]He followed the best guide that existed, an official re­turn from the proper offices.

No return of the actual tonnage, as distinguished from the entry tonnage, had at the time, ever been made from any office, or called for by any act, of Congress.

The first return ever made in the latter form, was called for since the Resolutions on the table were pro­posed.

These considerations might have restrained the gen­tleman from this unwarranted attack on the accuracy of the Report.

But he ought at least to have been sure, that whilst he was charging the secretary with following an erro­neous guide, he was himself following one that was not erroneous. The examination of this point involved facts which merited the particular attention of the committee.

The statement of the entry tonnage of the United States in foreign trade for 1792, lately called for and reported, is 415,331 tons. The statement of the act­ual tonnage for the same year is 239,394 tons.

On comparing these two quantities, it was evident that both could not be right. If the entry tonnage was no more than was stated, it was inconceivable that the actual tonnage cauld be as much as was stated. It would allow the vessels in the European and West-India trades together, but some what more than one voyage and a third a year. It could never be supposed, that this corresponded with the fact. How then was the incon­sistency in the two statements to be explained? Mr. Madison said, as he did not know by what rule the actual tonnage was made up, he would form no con­jecture on the subject. He hoped, and wished that some gentleman more conversant with it, would solve the phenomenon. He did not call on the gentleman from South-Carolina, because he most of all, must be puzzled to account for it; having stated that our vessels in the trade to Europe make two voyages, and in the West-In­dia trade four voyages a year.

Besides the evidence contained in this comparison of the aggregate tonnage in the two different forms, in [Page 34] which it had been reported, the existence of error some where, and probably in the account of the actual ton­nage, resulted from a comparative view of our exports to the British dominions, for the two years of 1790 and 1792, and of the whole tonnage American and British employed in conveying them.

In the former year, the exports were 9,363,416 dollars. In the latter, 8,269,495 dollars: the excess for 1790, 1,093,921 dollars.

The entry tonnage, British and American, for 1790, was 273,580 tons.

The British entry tonnage, for 1792, was 206,384 tons. The actual American tonnage, for 1792, was, according to the official statement, 66,582 tons: which, turned into entry tonnage, according to the proportion of the whole actual, to the whole entry tonnage for that year, makes the American entry tonnage, in the trade to Great Britain, about 95,000 tons. Adding this to the British entry tonnage of 206,384 tons, the British and American together, for 1792, amounts to 301,384 tons; which exceeds the tonnage of 1790 no less than 27,804 tons.

According to this calculation, which embraces the actual tonnage as stated to the house, there would be 27,804 tons more, employed in transporting 1,093,921 dollars less: making our tonnage to increase in that proportion as the employment of it decreased.

There was a possibility, Mr. Madison observed, that the course of trade in the two years might be such, that more of the vessels employed in the exportations to Great Britain might be entered in 1790 as coming from some other country, than in 1792; but as there was no known circumstance which authorized this solution, and as it seemed demonstrable in general, that error existed somewhere in the statements, and most proba­bly in those of the actual tonnage, he concluded, that it ought to be referred to that source; and, consequent­ly, that the guide followed by the Secretary of State, to wit. the entry tonnage, the only one he had to fol­low, was not more inaccurate, than the actual tonnage would have been, which guided the member from South-Carolina.

[Page 35]Another position of the secretary of state on which a charge is founded is, "that the greater part of what Great-Britain receives from the United States is re-exported." This position, Mr. Madison reminded the committee, related to Great-Britain, without com­prehending the West-India islands; which formed a distinct branch in the secretary's report. How far it was liable to the exceptions taken against it, would ap­pear from an examination of facts.

To obviate criticisms, Mr. Madison said he would take for the basis of his calculations, the statement giv­en in detail by the gentleman himself, of the exports for 1790 to the French and British dominions; which though not extended to every item, approached so near to a full view of the trade, as to be adequate to the pur­pose.

In the statement the exports to Great-Britain stand at 6,651,429 dollars: from which must be subtracted, for the comparison, the amount of the several re-ex-portations as far as they can be liquidated.

Tobacco. It appears from an official document, that the tobacco exported to Great-Britain in 1791, was 67,286 hogsheads. A return for another year states the quantity to be 52,505 hogsheads. It appeared from the revenue returns of Great-Britain, that the consumption of this article amounted to 9,600 hogsheads. The pro­portion re-exported might then be reasonably set down at four-fifths of the quantity imported.

Rice. To obtain the proportion of rice re-exported, we may take the medium quantity imported for three years immediately preceeding the revolution, which, according to a table in Anderson's History of Com­merce, was 486,543 cwt. By another table for the same period, the medium quantity exported was 349, 653 cwt. The difference marks the consumption, and is 136,890 cwt. The quantity exported to Great-Bri­tain from the United States in 1792, was 58,978 bar­rels, equal to 294,890 cwt. Comparing the quantity consumed with this quantity, it appears that more than half, though less than two-thirds, is re-exported—call [Page 36] the re-exportation one-half only of the present import [...] ­tion.

Indigo. According to a statement in Anderson, the medium importations into Great-Britain, for three years immediately preceeding the revolution, were about thrice the mediun quantity exported. Call the proportion re-exported now, however, one-fifth only, which is probably below the fact.

From these proportions, and the data furnished by the gentleman's own statement, results the following justi­fication of the report of the Secretary on the point.

   Dollars
Exports to Great-Britain--6,651,429
Tobacco2,754,493dolls. 
Consumed 1-5th,550,898dolls. 
Re-exported. 2,203,595 
Rice773,852  
Consumed 1-2,386,926  
Re-exported, 386,926 
Indigo,473,830  
Consumed 4-5379,064  
Re-exported, 94,766 
Wheat and flour, perhaps the whole re-exported: and more was carried to Great-Britain in the two succeeding years tho the aggregate exports thith­er were less than in the year here taken: say however, that one­fourth was consumed and let the amount stand, according to the gentleman's statement, at1,087,840  
Consumed 1-4,271,960  
Re-exported, 815,880 
   3,501,067

[Page 37] Here, then, it appears, that their exportations of the four articles alone, of Tobacco, Rice, Indigo, & Wheat, are greater than the whole consumption in Great-Bri­tain, of the articles imported from the United States, although the most uafavorable year has been taken, for the enquiry; and, consequently, that the position of the Secretary of State, was well founded.

If it were necessary to investigate the full amount of re-exportations, several articles might have been added to the list, such as Whale Oil, Ginseng, Flax-Seed, &c.

Nor would it be unfair, perhaps, to include the pri­mitive value of the articles, re-exported in the new forms givtn to them by art, A great proportion of what is sent from the United States to Great-Britain, in a rude state, is worked into articles of merchanize, and exported in the course of trade. Take for exam­ple, the two articles of Pot and Pearl Ashes, and Indi­go.

The amount of the export of the former to Great-Britain, is stated at 747,078 dollars; of which, if no part is re-exported in its unaltered state, the whole en­ters into British manufactures. Supposing one-third of these particular manufactures, to be exported, which appears to be nearly the general proportion, the value of Pot and Pearl Ashes re-exported, is 249,026 dollars. The Indigo used in Great-Britain has appeared to be 379,064 dollars, one-third of which re exported as an ingredient in manufactures, is 126,354 2-3 dollars— Tnese two items alone amount to 375,280 2-3 dollars; and with many others, might be added to the mass of re-exportatios. But they are stated rather to throw light on the general character of our trade with Great­Britain, than to be relied on in the present case, which has been sufficiently elucidated by moredirect and sim­ple views of it.

Mr. Madison proceeded to apply the calculations he had made, to the question discussed by Mr. Smith, in re­lation to the comparative importance of the French and British markets to the productions of the U.S.

By deducting the 3,501,067 dollars, re-exported, from the 6,651,429 dollars, imported into Great-Bri­tain, [Page 38] he reduced her actual consumption to 3,150,360 dollars, to which adding the 1,805,744 exported to the West-India market, the whole British consumption stands at no more than 4,956,106 dollars. On campar­ing this with the exports to the French dominions (which re-export none of any consequence) to wit, 4,424,336, the subject took a very different aspect from that which had been given to it.

But there was, Mr. Madison observed, a circum­stance of the utmost importance to a fair view of this question, which had been wholly overlooked by the gen­tleman from S. Ca [...]lina, and which cut up his calcula­tions by the roots. The re-exportations from Great-Britain were not only to be subtracted from the con­sumption of Great-Britain but in a great degree being made to France, were to be added to the value of her market to the agriculture and commerce of the United States.

The re-exportation from Great-Britain to France, could not be accurately fixed by any documents to be had here. In general, they were known to be great. He would, he said, confine himself to the two articles of Tobacco and Flour, of which he estimated the amounts as follow:

The Tobacco exported from the United States, ap­pears to be about 100,000 hogsheads. It is valued in the return of our exports at 4,349,567 dollars. It is known that France consumes about 1-4 of the whole quantity exported, that is, 1,087,392 dollars. It appears, by the return of our exports, that the direct exports of this article to France, stands at 384,642 dollars. The indiract supplies then to France, not appearing in the returns of our exports, and to be added to them, is 702,750 dollars.

Of the Flour and Grain sent to Great Britain, allow­ing, as above stated, 1-4 to have been there consumed, which is probably beyond the truth, the re-exportation amounted to 815,880 dollars. It is well understood, that France was the market where these articles were finally consumed. The account may now be stated.

 dollars
To the French Market, directly exported for consumption,4,424,336
Tobacco indirectly exported for do.702,705
Wheat and Flour indirectly exported for do.815,880
Total of French consumption,5,942,921
Total of British do.4,956,106
Excess of French consumption,986,815

Thus it appears, without taking into the account the other articles re-exported to France, that the market of that country for our exports, was worth to the Unit­ed States nearly a million more than the market of Great-Britain—and yet the gentleman from South-Car­olina had represented the British markets as exceeding the French in the annual amount of between three and four millions; and had pronounced, without hesitation, that Great-Britain in reference to our productions, was a more important customer than France, almost in the ratio of two to one.

Mr. Madison returning to the Secretary's report said, he hoped after what had been shewn, it would be need­less to trouble the committee with further remarks on the subject. In dismissing it however, he could not do justice to his own impressions, without declaring his entire confidence, that the report would be regarded by all discerning and unprejudiced judges, as one of the many monuments which its Author had left behind him, of the zeal, the talents, and the pat [...]otism with which he had discharged the duties of his station; and that he had carried with him into retirement, a purity, both in his public and private name, which nothing that could be said within or without the walis of Congress, could tarnish.

Having gone through the particular observations into which he had been led by the attack made on the report of the Secretary of State before the committee, he should proceed, to a more general view of what had been urged by the opponents of the resolutions he had intro­duced.

[Page 40] Among other things it had been alledged in the latter stages of the debate, that the friends of the resolutions, had involved themselves in inconsistency, by shifting the ground of argument from commercial to political con­siderations. In answer to this charge, he remarked, that if in any instance of his public life he was free from the charge of inconsistency, it was on the subject of vindicating our national interest, against the policy of Great-Britain towards us; that in all the public stations with which he had been honored since thp peace and on every occasion which had occurred, his conduct had been marked by an adherence to this principle: that the resolutions he had last proposed were founded on this principle: that if in the first arguments supporting them, he had dwelt chiefly on commercial topics, it would be recollected that he kept the door open for political ones, if the turn of the discussion should re­quire them: that he had forborne to enlarge on the political sides of the question, because he thought it defensible on commercial grounds, and was willing to meet it on those grounds, because he did not wish to mingle, unnecessarily, irritating ideas in the discussion, and because he had supposed that every thing relating to the treaty of peace the Indians, the Algerines, the spolistions, &c. were sufficiently imprinted on every mind, and would have all the effects they ought to have, without being particularly enforced.

Whilst he could thus repel the charge of inconsisten­cy brought against himself; it must be evident, he thought, how much room there was for retor [...]ing the charge. In the early stages of the discussion, there seemed but one sentiment as to the conduct of Great-Britain, at least in a political view: the difference turn­ed on the question, whether we could or ought to coun­teract her conduct, In the latter stages of the discussion, palliations if not justifications had been multiplied and labored; not only with respect to her commercial policy, but with respect to the detention of the posts, the In­dians, the A [...]gerines, and even the spoliations of our neutral commerce; on the unlawfulness of which our [Page 41] executive had grounded the remonstrance and demand of indemnification lying on the table.

In addition to this, he stated the inconsistency be­tween those who maintained and those who rejected the theory of leaving commerce perfectly free; the in­consistency of rejecting this theory, and yet refusing to meet restrictions one side with restrictions on the other; the inconsistency of condemning a commercial discri­mination between nations, as contrary to the wise ex­ample of Great-Britain, and, claiming for Great-Britain the credit of making such discriminations in favor of the United States: The inconsistency of predicting, that the measure would destroy the revenue, and insisting, that the dutied articles would continue to be imported from the same source, through more expensive channels: The inconsistency of exclaiming against topics and remarks which may awaken the passions, and endeavouring themselves to alarm our fears; of exhorting the committee to con­sult its judgment alone, and substituting for argument continued addresses to the imagination.

Particular pains, he remarked, had been taken to exhibit a picture of our national prosperity, which might flatter our wishes, and forbid experiments. It was readily admitted, he said, that there were many features in the face of our affairs, which were proper themes of mutual congratulation, whether compared with the situation of other countries, or with our own, under other circumstances. And it gave him much pleasure to add, that the degree of prosperity we enjoy­ed, though not to be exclusively credited to the change of our federal government, or to particular measures under it, according to the exaggerations of some, was yet so far, and so evidently the fruit of that change, as to do honor to the people of America in adopting it. He mentioned two innovations making part of the constitution, which must alone have had a power­ful effect in meliorating the condition of this country, to wit: The prohibition of paper money or other violations of contracts, and the abolition of inco­herent and rival regulations of trade, among the several [Page 42] states. But notwithstanding the flourishing state of our affairs, when viewed under certain aspects, it was equal­ly certain that there were others, which suggested very different reflexions.

He then went into a review of the actual state of our commerce, particularly in ralation to Great-Britain; and of the several injuries of another sort, which that nation had superadded to her commercial restric­tions.

He repeated what he had formerly maintained, that there was more of reciprocity in the footing of com­merce between Great-Britain and other countries, and between other countries and the United States, than between Great-Britain and the United States. To prove the first point he remarked, that in some instances Great-Britain had treaties with other countries which defined and stipulated reciprocal privileges; in other instances, her restrictions were counter-vailed by laws imposing restrictions on her. To prove the second point, he remarked, that no other nation with which the United States carried on commerce, had a navigation act similar to that of Great-Britain.

With respect to the intercourse between the United States and Great-Britain, there was, he insisted, a want of reciprocity throughout, that must strike the most su­perficial observer.

In the article of navigation this had been sufficiently pointed out, and being admitted on all sides, need not be repeated.

In the trade between the two countries, our best staples, wheat and flour, fish and oil, salted provisions, which amount to considerably more than one-third of our exports, were shut out of her markets; whilst all her best staples, her woolens, her cottons, her manu­factures of the metals, of leather, and of silk, were ad­mitted on moderate duties, and enjoyed in a man­ner a monopoly of our market.

In the articles of superfluity mutually admitted, there was nothing to compensate the inequality in other cases. Our tobacco paid a tax of four or five hundred per cent. our [...] fifty or sixty per cent and our [...] of [Page 43] of every sort would not be admitted if we were ever so able to send them. On the other hand, her superfluities were received under duties, which in general did not exceed from seven and an half to fifteen per cent.

In the West-India trade, besides the exclusion of our vessels, whilst her own were left free, there were a number of our productions which were not admitted into the market there, whilst our laws refused nothing that was brought to the market here.

He next turned, his attention to the injuries and losses we suffered in other respects.

As he had not possessed himself of the evidence, he should, he said, leave it to those who had, to shew how far the Indians were or were not spurred on to war against us, by the agents or partisans of Great-Britain. It was a sufficient ground of complaint, that the posts were wrongfully detained; that the detention had a bane­ful influence on the sentiments and conduct of the In­dians; and that the supplies for their warfare, were de­rived from a trade, authorised by the British govern­ment, and protected by the posts which of right were ours, and ought to be used for our defence. He combin­ed this proceeding of Great-Britain, with the law­less seizure of our vessels under her instructions of the 8th of June last, observing, that whilst on one side, she violated the laws of nations, by carrying on a trade in contraband articles with those at war with us; she was on another side, violating the laws of nations, by inter­cepting our trade with those at war with her, in articles not contraband.

The Indian war he observed, cost us annually a sum, exceeding by one million, the sum that would probably be sufficient for the defence of our frontiers, if the posts were in our hands. The fur trade depending on the posts might, he thought, be fairly valued at two hundred thousand dollars more.

The Algerine depredations appeared to have proceed­ed from the [...]ps taken in pursuance of the views of the British government. If they were not immedietely pointed against us, it must have been known that our [...] would be the v [...]lim. The evil therefore may at [Page 44] least be charged to an unfriendly disregard of our inter­ests, if not to a positive hostility to them. The pecu­niary amount of this evil, cannot be rated at less than the expence of the armament proposed as a remedy.— This is stated at six hundred thousand dollars for the outsit; and he did not expect that the annual expence would average much less; to which may be added, at a very low computation, for insurance remaining after the armament, two hundred thousand dollars.

The spoliations committed on our neutral commerce by Great-Britain, must be of considerable, though very uncertain amount; and the consequential detriment to our trade in general from these interruptions and dan­gers, of a very great, though equally uncertain amount. In order to bring both within a safe estimate, he said he would state the former at the limitted sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and the latter at no more than four hundred thousand dollars.

In addition to the foregoing estimates he said there was another item, which though of a different character, fell under a comprehensive view of our situation; and being reducible to an amount tolerably definite, ought to find a place here. He referred to the statement be­fore quoted from a reoprt of the Secretary of State, which shewed that the loss to the United States from a dependance on British bottoms for the carriage of their produce was no less annually, in time of war, than three million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and in war and peace everaged, no less than one million three hundred ninety-two thousand eight hundred fifty-seven dollars. Allowing about one third of this carriage for the reasonable share of Great-Britain (and for reasons formerly derived from the character of our exp [...]orts this was a full share) the annnal loss from the dependance might be called about one million of dollars.

[Page 45]

These calculations he recapitulated thus:Dollars.
Indian war1,000,000
Fur trade200,000
Algerine depredations600,000
Insurance not reduced by the naval armament200,000
British spoliations150,000
Consequential detriment to our trade400,000
Dependance on British bottoms1,000,000
 dols. 3,550,000

From this view of things, it was impossible to deny, that however prosperous the United States might be in some respects, they were in others laboring under vio­lations of their rights and interests, which demanded the serious attention of the legislature. Besides the unreci­procal footing of their commerce, and the indignities offered them, it was seen that they were burdened with an enormous extra expence, and involved in unjust loss­es, amounting to more than three and an half millions of dollars a year; a tax nearly equal to the heavy one they had been obliged to impose on themselves.

Having taken this view of our situation, he proceed­ed to consider how far a remedy was comprised in the resolutions before the committee, by tracing the proba­ble operation of them, it passed into a law. [In this stage of his observations, the hour of adjournment being nearly arrived, he sat down, with an intimation that the subject would be renewed.]

Resuming the train of his observations, he proceed­ed to explain the remedial operations of his proposi­tions.

First. —They will make the British nation sensible, that we can, by just and pacific means, inflict conse­quences which will make it her interest, to pay a just regard to our rights and interests.

To enforce this tendency, he enlarged on the ideas he had formerly expressed in relation to the dependance of Great-Britain on the commerce of the United States and the obvious and essential dependance of the British-West-Indies, on the supplies of the United States.

[Page 46] On the latter subject, he entered into a particular re­ply to the member from Massachusetts (Mr. Ames) who had argued, that the British regulation of the trade between the United States and the West-Indies, was conformable to the pinciples of the Colony system as established by the commercial nations of Europe, and could not therefore be reasonably com­plained of. 2. That the West-Indies could obtain sup­plies from other quarters, and did not therefore depend on the United States; nay, that there was danger, by forcing these supplies into other channels, of our losing that branch of trade altogether. 3. That the trade would hardly employ more than a dozen brigs, and was therefore not worth contending for.

In answer to the first argument of Mr. Ames, Mr. Madison undertook to shew, that Great-Britain had not pursued, but violated the principles of the colony sys­tem. The true spirit of this system, he said, was to confine the trade between the parent country and the colony, to their own vessels, and to allow as little trade as possible, between the colony and foreign countries; out when a trade with a foreign country became neces­sary to the colony, to allow the foreign vessels the same carrying privileges allowed to their own. Colonies, he said, were to be considered as parts of a common empire. The trade between one part and another, as between London and Kingston in Jamaica, was to be considered equally an internal trade with the coasting trade between London and Liverpool, or the trade be­tween different ports of the United States: and might, if deemed expedient, be equally restrained to domestic bottoms. But when a trade was opened between a colony and a foreign country, the case was changed: the foreign country became a party, and had a reci­procal claim to the use of its bottoms, as much in the trade with the colony, as with any other part of the empire to which the colony belonged. In support of this doctrine. Mr. Madison referred to the example of every nation in Europe, except that of Great-Britain, which had American colonies. Denmark, Sweden, the United Netherlands, France, Spain and Portugal, had [Page 47] their colonies, as well as Great-Britain; and some of them rigorously attached to the principles of the co­lony system: yet not a single one of these nations had refused, whenever, a trade was permitted at all between the colonies and another country, to make the car­riage common to the vessels of both the parties. Great-Britain alone had attempted a monopoly in such cases for her own vessels. Her example therefore was an innovation on the colony system, as well as an infraction of the rights of reciprocity.

In answer to the 2d position of Mr. Ames, he denied that permanent supplies of provisions and lumber could be derived from any other part of the world than the United States: not from the northern parts of Europe, which either did not produce, or were too remote to send them: not from the southern parts of Europe, which depended themselves on the northern parts and on America: not from Great-Britain, which imported bread, for her own use, amounting one year with ano­ther according to the report of the committee of the privy council, to the sum of near three hundred thous­and pounds sterling, and was certainly not an exporter of lumber: not from Ireland, which could not pretend to rival the United States in any article but that of salt provisions; and this was so much dearer that a prohi­bition alone of ours, could gain a market for hers. The gentleman had relied on the capacity of Ireland to ex­tend her cultivation of wheat, so as to spare supplies of this article also. Such a revolution in her interior state was not very probable. But he ought at least to have remembered, that as the pasture lands of Ireland should be turned into wheat fields, her export of beef would decrease, in proportion as the might be enabled to export bread.

It was a waste of time, Mr. Madison said, to dis­prove by minute enquiries, the possibility of supplying the British West-Indies from the old continent, on terms that would not be worse than abandoning them altogether. The truth was, that the gentleman (Mr. Ames) had, in this particular, gone beyond the most [...]uguine advocates of the British policy, Mr. Knox and [Page 48] Lord Sheffield themselves, who limited their ultimate hopes of supporting the West-Indies without the aid of the United States, to the remaining possessions of Great-Britain on this continent. He would proceed, he said, to shew what foundation there was for the opinion of these gentlemen, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, in favor of this resource.—And he was able to give the most full and decisive evidence in the case, by recurring to an authentic document of our own, from which it appeared, that the continental col­onies of Great-Britain, instead of being able to furnish the West-India colonies, were themselves dependant for the very articles wanted there, on the supplies of the United States.

In the official statement of our exports for the year as late as 1791, most of the articles sent to the British continental colonies were of a sort and an amount so directly to the point, that he hoped the committee would excuse him for repeating them in detail. He stated them as follows:

Bread Stuffs and Roots.
Wheat3,15bushels.
Rye,2,201 
Barley,32 
Indian Corn,80,734 
Oats,314 
Buck Wheat,26 
Peas and Beans,1,418 
Rice,84tierces.
Flour,27,197barrels.
Ship-stuff,2,515 
Rye-Meal,1,774 
Indian Meal,2,396 
Buck-Wheat, do353 
Bread,29,290 
Crackers,364Kegs.
Potatoes,20bushels.
Onion,525 

Meats, &c.
Beef,284barrels.
Pork,351 
[Page 49] Bacon,881lbs.
Fresh Pork,29,334 
—Beef,92,269 
Mutton,561carcases.
Tongues,30barrels.
Butter,33firkins.
La [...]d,5,720lbs.
Cheese,1,826 

Live Stock.
Horned Cattle,312 
Horses,39 
Sheep,1,517 
Hogs,178 
Poultry,361dozen

Wood.
Shingles,43,000 
Staves and Heading128,000 
Handspikes,2 
Hoops, [...]00 [...] 
Laths,3,000 
Blocks,100 
Oar-rafters,857 
Trunnels,1,500 
Oak-Planks and Boards,14,267 
Pine, do.27,000 
Maple and beach do.7,500 

The total of the exports, including a few articles under other heads, amounted to two hundred seventy thousand two hundred fifty and nine dollars.

Here then, it is seen, that not only in the bread stuffs and meats of every sort, but in the articles of lumber and live stock, for which, by universal acknowlege­ment, the West-Indies must depend either on the United States, or the British Continental colonies; the latter are so far from being a rival to us, or a re­so [...]e to the West-Indies, that they continue at this day, to supply their own deficiencies from our mark­et.

Mr. Madison said, that he should not have employ­ed so much of the time of the committee on this head, if the gentleman (Mr. Ames) had not attempted to re­vive [Page 50] the arguments with respect to Canada and Nova-Scotia, which had misled Great-Britain in her politi­cal calculations and her present views. He had heard the language of the gentleman on this subject, with astonishment. That Mr. Knox, and [...]ord She [...]held, British subjects, viewing the prospect with British eyes, at the distance of three thousand miles, in the year 178 [...] when little enquiry and no experiment could assist th [...], should have run into the error, was perhaps not so marvellous. But, that an enlightened Citizen of America, seeing with American eyes, living in the neighborhood, as it were, of the scene, in a state whose wharves afford proofs of the daily depen­dance of the British Continental colonies for the neces­saries of life, on the market of the United States, should in the year 1994 [...] the opinion that those colonies could supply [...] is after a trial of nine years had probably forced the [...]hors of the opinion, Knox and Sheffield themselves, to abandon it, could not be heard without some surprize; and must be considered at least as the fullest proof, that the gentleman had not given sufficient attention to the present subject, to claim that weight which was in general due to his observations.

Mr. Madison said he was not less surprised at the 2d position of the gentleman from Massachusetts, viz. that the West-India trade could be carried on by a doz­en brigs; and consequently, was not an object worth our pursuit. The plain answer to this argument was, to state the fact, that the shipping entered in one year from, the British West-Indies, was not a dozen brigs, but 107,759 tons.

Besides the immediate importance of this auxilliary resource for our navigation, he remarked, that there were two consideration which enhanced the value of the object: one, that as the West-India articles could be brought cheaper in American vessels they would come cheaper to American consumers; the other, that as our supplies would at the same time be carried cheaper to the West-Indies, the people there could afford to con­sume the more of them.

It had been urged, that the proposed restrictions on the trade with Great-Britain would produce clamors [Page 51] here as well as there, and that Congress might be oblig­ed recede, before the British Government would be under the necessity of doing so. To this Mr. Madison re­plied, that he was under no such apprehension. He thought more favorably of the good sense as well as virtue of his follow citizens. On the side of Great-Britain it had been shewn there would be the greatest distress, and the least ability to bear it. The people there were not accustomed, like the people of the United States, to self denying regulations. They would not have the same confidence in the justice of their cause. And it was particularly worthy of remark, that [...] people of Great-Britain would be disheartened, and the government alarmed, by reflecting, that their losses from the shift­ing of commerce into other channels, and not only of their manufactures, but manufacturers, to other places, would be permanent and irretrievable; where [...]s on our side, they would be temporary sacrifices for durable and valuable acquisitions.

Secondly—The resolutions would have the effe [...] of increasing our marine, and thereby at once cheapening and securing the carriage of our productions, and pro­viding for our safety. These advantages having been already sufficiently explained, need not, he said, be again. developed.

It had been remarked by a member from Massachu­setts (Mr. Ames) that if as stated by a report of Mr. Jefferson, Great-Britain was so often at war, her wars, by depriving us of her shipping, would soon have the wished effect, of replacing it with American shipping. This reasoning Mr. Madison said, supposed what was contrary to prudence and probability. What merchants would build ships, which a peace, always more or less in prospect, would throw out of employment; unless it were for special purposes, where the momentary gain might outweigh the eventual sacrifice.

It had been said that our tonnage was proved by the official returns to be increasing with an unexampled ra­pidity. To this Mr. Madison answered, That the in­crease ought not to be compared with other examples, but with our own natural faculties, and reasonable [Page 52] expectations—that the increase of our population re­quired an annual increase of at least five per cent; that an assumption by foreigners of American names, had probably increased the apparent quan [...]i [...]y of our ship­ing; that the war, or preparations for i [...], [...]y withdraw­ing foreign shipping, had probably also had some little temporary effect; that the principal cause of the in­crease, was the extention of our trade with the French dominions, which some members seemed so little in­clined to secure and foster, by measures which appeared to him best fitted for the purpose.

He reminded the committee of an argument, which had, on former occasions, been much pressed by several mercantile members, for encouraging our own navi­gation; to wit: that American vessels, from a spirit of enterprize and a unison between private and public interests, would explore new fields of commerce, and new markets for our produce, which foreign carriers would leave unattempted. The trade to China, opened by American vessels, had been often ascribed to this cause. Mr. Madison said, the argument seemed to be countenanced also, by the present state of our Mediter­ranean trade; which had since our independence, been confined by the Barbary corsairs to foreign bottoms. Previous to the revolution, when American vessels could be the carries, the trade was very considerable. Since the exclusion of our vessels, though the carriage of our produce is safe in British, and several other foreign vessels, yet this branch of trade had withered as much as most others have grown. In 1790, the ex­ports cleared for the Mediterreanean, were but 21,726 doliars; and in the year following, the imports no more than 11,522 doliars.

Thirdly. Another effect incident to the proposed measure, would be an additional encouragement to do­mestic manufactures.

A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Dexter) had said, he could read no such tendency in the proposi­tions. Mr. Madison thought it impossible to read the propositions with attention, and not perceive, that they must have the like tendency with the other means, by [Page 53] which manufactures had been promoted. If the duties already laid, were calculated to produce this effect, an increase of those duties in any instance, must have a tendency to increase the effect. In answer to the ob­jection, that a change in the policy of Great-Britain, might put an end to the additional duties, and ensnare those who should proceed under the influence of them, he remarked, 1. That the same might be said in some degree of the regulations now in force. A treaty with Great-Britain might stipulate changes which would af­fect our manufacturers. But as there was a just con­fidence, that the interests of this class of citizens would in this case be attended to by the government; it might be expected, that equal attention would be paid to them, in any other case. 2. The progress of things in this country, and the probable accession of foreign manufacturers, might be relied on to support whatever undertaking shall have once got a footing.

Fourthly. The proposed resolutions would favor an advantageous competition and distribution of our trade, among the manufacturing nations of Furope. At pre­sent, it may he said to be monopolized by one; so great is the disproportion of its manufactures which come to our market. That this is an evil, has been admitted, and cannot be doubted. It exposes us to the greatest and most sudden embarrassments from the caprice, the passions, the mistaken calculations of interest, the bank­ruptics, and the wars of a single foreign country. Ma­ny of these embarrassments are felt at the present mo­ment. If it were possible to liquidate them into a pe­cuniary statement, it would be found that, in a perma­nent view of our interest, there would be [...]conomy in making very considerable temporary sacrifices, for the purpose of dividing our custom among a number of competitors. It was not true, that Great-Britain alone can supply the manufactures we want. France, the United Netherlands, and several other nations, are capable of supplying us with a variety of articles, as well as the nations from which they now come; and, if invited to our markets by prudent encouragements in the first instance, will soon learn to fashion their manu­factures [Page 54] to the wants and tastes of this country. The policy of favoring particular branches of trade, even at some expence, in order to guard against the evil of depending on a single one, was examplisied by the con­duct of Great-Britain herself. Although he viewed her discriminations generally, respecting us, in the light he had explained; yet, he thought it possible, that in the instance of naval stores and ship-timbers, it might be her intention to foster a rivalship in a more distant quarter, in order to provide against a casual privation of the supplies of a nearer quarter. These articles are as essential to the marine of Great-Britain, as her mar­ine is essential to her greatness. Were she to have no resource but in the Baltic, a war with the Baltic powers might be fatal to her. It may be wise in her, there­fore, to keep open the A [...]rican resource, even at the price of a tax on herself. In this case, she must quar­rel with both the Baltic powers and the United States at the same time, before the supplies will be cut off.

A member from Massachusetts (Mr. Dexter) had not, Mr. Madison said, been very consistent in his reasoning on the subject. He had contended against all attempts to excite a beneficial competition, on the idea that no competition could be beneficial which would not spring up of itself; and yet he had warned us against the dan­ger, that Great-Britain, by exciting a competition against the United States, in those parts of Europe, which most resemble the infant situation of our country, might establish new sources from which supplies would afterwards spontaneously flow to her, without being ever again wanted from the United States. The same re­mark was applicable to the reasoning of the other gentlemen who had represented the danger of exciting a permanent rivalship for the West-India market, in fa­vor of Canada and Nova-Scotia.

Fifthly. The plan of the resolutions tended to con­cilliate nations in treaty, or disposed to be in treaty with us, into arrangements still more favorably to our commerce. This argument had peculiar weight in relation to France. It had been said, that Great-Bri­tain was our best customer. The fact, he said, was [Page 55] that we were her best customer; but that France was our best customer. We consume more of British manu­factures than any other nation in the world consumes. France consumes more of our productions, than any other nations consumes.—He referred to the statement he had before offered for proof of this. Her consumption was also of the most, valuable kind; and, under favorable regulations, would be a very growing one. It consisted of wheat and flour, salt provisions, and fish; articles which were not admitted by Great-Britain; and which, without the market of France, would, glut every other. Of our fish she consumed five eigths of the whole exportation. Her use of our live animals was another important consideration. It amounted, in the list of our ex­ports, to 352, 795 dollars, for the year 1791. In the same year, the British demand amounted to no more than 62, 415 dollars. The superior proportion of navi­gation we enjoyed in the French channels of inter­course had already been shewn. In examining the policy of cultivating and securing the French market, he said it ought not to be forgotten, that the profits and revenue arising from the rum distilleries, depended on an article obtained almost, if not altogether, from the French dominions alone; and which was the only raw material of any consequence imported into the United States. It was paid for also, as had been much urged on other occasions by members on the opposite side, in the worst fish, which could find a vent in no other part of the world. The molasses imported into the United States in one year, amounted to upwards of seven millions of gallons, more than one half of which went into the state of Massachusetts. He took no­tice also of the article of sugar, as rendered of great im­portance by our habits and our finances; and of which more than one half was supplied by the French West-Indies. Out of 17, 142, 723 lbs. imported, 9, 321, 829 lbs. were received from that source. The residue came from the Danish, Dutch, and British dominions, in the following proportions, to wit: Danish, 2, 833, 016 lbs. Dutch 2, 707, 231 lbs. British 2, 280, 647 lbs. That statement was taken from the imports of 1790, the [Page 56] only year he had been able to examine on this point.

It had been said, Why grant privileges before a mu­tual grant should be secured by positive stipulation? Why throw away, by a legal regulation, what ought to be the price of treaty [...]le answered, that the legal regulations threw nothing away, as it was always revo­cable: that in the present instance, it was only meeting the legal regulations of which France had set the exam­ple: that instead of being a bar to treaty, such a course of proceeding, more than any other, would smooth the way to it, by explaining the objects, and establishing a confidence, on both sides—that it would be happy, if in all cases, where treaties are in view, this open and con­ciliatory process, could take the place of that reserve and mysterious negociation, with which the parties ap­proach each other. Were Great-Britain desirous of forming amicable arrangements by treaty, he asked what readier or more prudent step could she have taken for the purpose, than to have followed the example set her, by holding out in her laws, the spirit in which she was willing to meet us in negociation?

Having gone through these explanations, Mr. Madi­son entered into a view of the principal objections to the resolutions proposed.

1. It was said they would diminish the revenue, and endanger the funds.

With respect to the public debt, his general ideas had been expressed by several who had spoken before him. He acknowledged that he had disliked and opposed the modification given to it; but after it had received the sanction of law, he had entertained no other wish on the subject, than that the debt might be honorably discharg­ed as fast as the circumstances of the country would permit. This he was well satisfied was the prevailing sentiment of the great body of the people. He did not believe, that there was a single state in the union, or any considerable part of a single state, that did not acquiesce (where they did not approve) in the provisions which had been made in behalf of the public croditors. At the same time, he was equally sure, that it never was either meant by Congress, or understood by the public, that [Page 57] in mortagaging the impost for their security, it was t [...] be an hos [...]age to foreign countries for our unqualified acquiescence in their unequal laws, and to be worne, as long as the debt should continue, as a badge of nati­onal humiliation. The nature of the obligation could certainly import no more in favor of the creditors, than that the fund appropriated should be applied, as far as requisite, to their use; unless equivalent funds should be substituted; nor more against the public, than that all deficiencies in the funds should be made up, whether arising without, or in consequence of, a change in the laws. If it should happen, then, that in consequence of any measure, dictated by the general good, the impost should become inadequate to its object, all that could be exacted by the public creditors, would be some other provision that would supply the defalcation; and it ought not to be doubted, that the people at large, whose good was pursued, would readily support whatever other provision might become indispensible. He had made these remarks, however, with reference to an event, which he did not by any means admit to be probable. The more he had revolved the subject, the more clear­ly it appeared to him, that a very operative addition might be made to the duties on the enumerate articles, without endangering the aggregate product of the im­portations. And he entirely concurred in opinion with those who had observed, that the greatest injury which could be done to the class of citizens holding the pub­lic paper, was to represent their interests as more to [...] regarded than any national considerations whatever; and to oppose to the latter, even the most imaginary contingences to the former.

2. It was objected, that the operation of the resolu­tions would be more favorable, in some instances, to nations in treaty than was merited; and more unfavor­able, in others, to nations not in treaty, than was po­litic.

In answer to this abjection, he observed, that Swe­den and Prussia, two of the nations in commercial treaty, had but little intercourse with us; would be in [...]w. respect but little affected; and, besides, the treaties [Page 58] with them were limited to a short term, the greatest part of which had clas [...] [...].

France and the United Netherlands, the two other nations to [...], [...]ould not reasonably be grudged the advantage [...] might derive from treaties, for which we had [...] go received a valuable consideration in their assistance towards the establishment of our in­dependence.

As to the nations not in treaty—

Denmark would not be affected. She had no navi­gation act, within the description of the resolutions; and could not feel the duties on manufactures. The whole of the imports from Denmark amounted in the year 1791 to 9,957 dollars only. Her islands also, with which the trade is carried on in our vessels, depend for their subsistence on our market.

Russia has little or no shipping in our trade, and it would not be effected if she had; as she has no such na­vigation act. Her unwrought iron may come as before. Duck and sheeting are the only two manufactures on which the resolutions would sensibly operate; and with respect to these, as will presently be observed, it would be easy to make special exceptions.

The Hanse Towns, having no navigation act, would not be affected in that respect. Linens are the only articles falling within the proposed enumeration; and might, if thought requisite, be easily excepted.

Spain, has little shipping in our trade; has no nagi­gation act, such as is to be reciprocated; and would not be sensibly touched by the duties on manufactures. She also needs our exports, and will be influenced by that consideration.

It had been asked, why Spain, against whom we had complaints as well as against Great-Britain, ought not to be equally an object of our regulations? He said that such a question could be best answered when the com­munications from the President relating to Spain, should be taken up.

Portugal, like Spain, will not be affected in her na­ [...]igation; nor sensibly, if at all, in the article of manu­ [...]ctures; and is, more than Spain, supplied with neces­saries [Page 59] [...] our market. According to Zimmerman, Portugal does not raise within herself, more bread than will feed her three months in the year. It is certain that she depends much on external resources, and that occasions are frequent when she can find them no where else than in the United States.

Mr. Madison said, he considered these explanations as a sufficient answer to the objection. He would add, however, that there were other answers, some of which had been before hinted, that would afford an option of modes for the exemption of nations not in treaty.

Besides the opportunity which such nations have of removing all difficulties, by meeting us in liberal trea­ties, they may be provided for; either by limiting every part of the measure to nations having a navigation act: Or by limiting it to nations within a geographical descrip­tion; a practice familiar to the British code: Or by naming the nations to be excepted; a practice also fami­lar to Great-Britain: Or by naming the particular ar­ticles, to be excepted; a practice no less familiar to that nation.

By some or other of these modifications the commit­tee could be at no loss to accommodate the plan, to their own sense of propriety, and the public good.

Here Mr. Madison took occasion to remark, that much of the argument against the resolutions, had pro­ceeded from an inattention to their import, and would be answered by a simple explanation of them.

The first resolution, which was immediately the sub­ject of debate, decided nothing with respect to a discri­mination between different nations. It declared only, in general, that the situation of the United States re­quired something to be done, in the way of commercial restrictions and duties. And yet it had been combat­ed by many members, as if a vote in favor of it would involve all the enbarrassing preferences which their fan­cies could suggest.

The succeeding resolutions on the subject of addition­al duties on manufactures, and of a variation of the ton­tage duties, were founded on a discrimination between nations in treaty, and nations not in treaty; but admit­ted, [Page 60] as he had observed, of whatever modifications or exceptions, might be judged equitable orpolitic. The proposed reduction of the tonnage of vessels in treaty, had been suggested by the complaint made by France of the existing tonnage on her vessels, as exceeding the burden imposed by her on ours, as well as an unkind return for the commercial benefits of which the United States were partaking under her laws. At present the tonnage imposed by us, on all foreign vessels was the same. This would not seem to be right on any prin­ciple, unless the tonnage imposed on our vessels, by all foreign nations, was the same, which was not to be pre­sumed. Whether the change he had proposed, would be an amendment of the existing law, was a point to be examined. It was certainly a part of the plan which he did not regard as the most essential.

With respect to the resolutions reciprocating navi­gation laws, it was evident, he said, that these had no reference to the question, whether a nation were in a treaty or not. They would operate equally, where­ever there might be the same departure from the princi­ple of reciprocity. If they should bear on one nation particularly, it would be because they ought to do so.

3. It had been much insisted, that trade ought to be free to find its proper channels, under the conduct of merchant [...]; that the merchantile opinion was the best guide, in the case now depending; and that that opin­ion was against the Resolutions.

[...] ans [...]er to this objection, he said, it was obvious to [...], that in the very terms of the proposition, trade ought to be free, before it could find its proper channel. It was not free at present, it could not, therefore, find the channels in which it would most advantageously flow. The dykes must be broken down before the wa­ters could pursue their natural course. Who would pretend, that the trade with the British West-Indies, or even with Great-Britain herself, was carried on under the present restrictions, as it would go on of itself, if unsette [...]ed from restrictions on her part, as it is on [...]. Who would pretend, that the supplies to the West-Indies, for example, would not flow [...] in Ameri­can [Page 61] bottoms, if they flowed freely? Who would pre­tend that our wheat, our flour, our fish, &c. would not find their way to the British market, if the cha [...]els to it were open for them.

It seemed to have been forgotten, that the principle of this objection struck at every regulation in fever of manufactures, as much, or even more, than at regula­tions on the subject of commerce. It required the every species of business ought to be left to the sagacity and interest of those carrying it on; without any inter­ference whatever, of the public authority, He was himself, in general, a friend to this theory: but there were a variety of exceptions to it, arising out of particu­lar situations; as must be admitted by all who would mingle practical with theoretic views; and as has been already decided by a number of our laws.

With respect to the mercantile opinion, he was dis­posed to pay all due attention to it. The mercantile class of citizens was certainly an enlightened and [...] res­pectable one. Their information ought always to be received with respect, and their interest protected with care. But it did not follow that their opinion, even on questions of trade, ought to be consulted as an oracle, by those who were equally bound to watch over the in­terests of every class or citizens, and over the joint con­cerns of the whole. There were considerations of different kinds which suggested caution on this sub­ject.

However intelligent and constant the merchant might be, in directing his operations, for commercial purposes, he might not be equally in the habit of com­bining with these, the various other national objects which the Legislature might be bound to consult.

The interest of the mercantile class may happen to differ from that of another class; and possibly both may differ from that of the whole community. For exam­ple; it is, generally speaking, the interest of the mer­chant to import and export every thing: the interests of manufacturers to lessen imports in order to raise the price of domestic fabrics, and to check exports, where they might enhance the price of raw materials. In this case it would be as imp [...]oper to allow the one to [Page 62] judge for the other, as to allow either to judge for the whole.

It may be the interest of the merchant, under particular circumstances, to consine the trade to its established chan­nels; when the national interest would require those chan­nels to be changed or enlarged. The best writers on political oeconomy have observed, that the regulations most [...]nfriendly to the national wealth of Great Britain, have owed their birth to mercantile counsels. It is well known, that in France, the greatest opposition to that liberal policy which was as favorable to the true inter­rest of that country as of this, proceeded from the in­terest which merchants had, in keeping the trade in its former course.

If, in any country, the mercantile opinion ought not to be im [...]citly followed, there were the strongest reasons why it ought not, in this. The body of mer­chants who carry on the American commerce, is well known to be composed of so great a proportion of indi­viduals who are either British subjects, or trading on British capital, or enjoying the profits of British con­signments, that the mercantile opinion here, might not be an American opinion; nay, it might be the opi­nion of the very country of which, in the present in­stance at least, we ought not to take counsel. What the genuine American mercantile opinion would be, if it could be collected apart from the general one, Mr. Ma­dison said he did not undertake positively to decide. His belief was, that it would be in favor of the resolu­tions.

It could scarcely be necessary, he said, to add, that his remarks were not meant to be, as they were not in fact, the least reflection on any part of the mercantile order among us. They only suppose, what in political rea­sonings ought always to be supposed, that the prejudices of birth and personal interests will be a bias on the judg­ment.

4. It had been an objection to the resolutions, that they might deprive us of the aid of British capital and credit, which were necessary to the prosecution of our commerce.

[Page 63]Mr. Madison did not admit, either that the effect would happen, or that it would be runious to our com­merce.

Unless Great-Britain should, of her own choice, put a stop to the commercial intercourse with us, which, for reasons before given, would be so much more hurtful to hersels than to this country, that it never could be presumed; the resolutions would operate only by abridging some of our importations, and by varying the channels of others. Her capital, as far as requi­site here, might continue to be employed here.

On the general question concerning our dependance on British capital and credit, he observed, that it could not be denied that more use was made of them at pre­sent, than was either necessary or beneficial. Credit, when extended to consumers, as was the case through­out the southern states, was extremely injurious; as had been well explained by a member of Virgima (Mr. Nichols) and as he himself had equally witnessed, When confined to merchants, it might, within certain limits, be an advantage; but it was not only his own opinion, but that of better judges, that the credit given to our merchants, was, at present, excessive and injurious.

In order to form a very, precise judgment on this subject, it would be necessary, he said, to calculate the amount of our own capital, and its proportion to the amount of our trade. This was a thing, he supposed, which could not well be done. If he had concurred in the doctrine, of which so much had been heard, both within and without doors, that a sunded debt and banks of discount, were equivalent to active capital, he should have a ready answer to the difficulty. The paper of the two kinds in the United States, cannot amount to less [...] one hundred millions of dollars; whilst the amount of our exports or our im­ports, does not exceed one fourth of that capital.

It is true, a part of both the public and the bank stocks, is in foreign hands; but with the most ample de­ductions on that account, the [...]adu [...], if operating in any considerable degree as active capital, would be a competent resource.

As he did not however view the doctrine in the par­ticular [Page 64] light in which it had been painted; it would be more to his purpose, to observe, that there was certain­ly in this country a real mercantile capital to a very respectable amount—that this was fast increasing with our increasing population and wealth—that if the for­eign capital of one country should be withdrawn, the vacancy would probably, by degrees, be occupied by that of other foreign nations; that if it should happen otherwise, there was reason to believe, that a restriction of our use of foreign credit, would be rather salutary than disadvantageous; that in fine, as long as we had twenty millions of dollars worth of produce, wanted by other nations, and were willing take for it, twenty millions worth of what they wished to part with, he was under no apprehension that the means of effectuat­ing an exchange, would not be found. Both mer­chants and capital would quickly be generated by such a state of things, if they did not previously exist.

5. It had been observed by several members, in al­lusion to the alledged proportion of British manufactures consumed by us to the entire mass of her manufactures, that Great-Britain would never part with her naviga­tion act, in order to avoid a loss of four per cent, in the demand for her manufactures.

To this objection he answered, that the comparison ought to be of our consumption, not with the entire mass of her manufactures, but with the part entering into her foreign trade; and then the loss would not be four per cent, but, at least twenty per cent; that this would not be the only loss she would sustain, if she should be unwise enough to stop the intercourse between the United States and her dominions; that it had been al­ready shewn, that when, she apprehended a restrictive system on our part, she was willing to prevent it, by re­laxing her restrictive system; that in times of war, when an adherence to that system would distress her, she frequently suspends her navigation act; that at this moment it is suspended in relation to the West-Indies; that there could be little doubt if the temporary neces­sity were likely to be made permanent by firm and ju­dicious measures on our part, that the remedy, for it would be made permanent also.

[Page 65]6. It was objected that the present was an improp­er time for such resolutions.

The principal reason given for this was, that the negociation between the secretary of state and the Bri­tish minister here, was still depending. To shew that this reason was unsound, Mr. Madison went into an historical view of what had passed in reference to com­mercial arrangements. Heread the message of the Pre­sident to the House of Representatives, on the 14th of February, 1791, acquainting them, that steps had been taken to ascertain the dispositions of the British court on the subject, and that there was no ground for favor­able expectations. He stated that in consequence of this communication, a committee was appointed, who reported that foreign vessels ought not to be allowed to bring into the United States any articles not of the pro­duce or manufacture of the country to which they belong, and that an additional duty of twelve and an half [...]eents ought to be laid on all distilled spir­its, the production of any country or place from which vessel of the United States were not permitted to bring them; that it being very near the end of the session, when this report was made; it was referred to the secre­tary of state, with an instruction to report to the next session an account of the foreign commercial regula­tions affecting the United States, with his opinion, &c. that at the next session; a letter was received from that officer, intimating that in the actual state of circum­stances, the report would not be given in; unless called for by the House; that at the present session, the report now before the committee, was given in, without being called for; and was therefore a proof, that the circum­stances which had caused the delay, had vanished, and that at present there was nothing in train, according to the opinion of the secretary of state, which ought to restrain the Legislature from proceeding in the busi­ness.

In answer to suggestions, that the British minister had in the correspondence with the secretary of Stat [...] lately communicated by the President, manifested a favorable disposition, which had not been improved— Mr. Madi­son [Page 66] recu [...]red to the passages which related to this point, He read from the first letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, dated Nov. 29, 1791, a paragraph request­ing Mr. Hammond "To say, whether he was authoris­ed to conclude, or to negociate arrangements with us, which may fix the commerce between the two countries on principles of reciprocal advantage?" To this request, Mr.Hammond, on the 30th of Nov. 1791, answered, "That the king was sincerely disposed to promote and facilitate the commercial intercourse between the two countries, and that he was authorised to communi­cate to this government, his majesty's readiness to enter into a negociation for establishing that intercourse upon principles of reciprocal benefit. On Dec. 6, he wrote to Mr. Jefferson in order to prevent misapprehen­sion, that although he was not yet empowered to CON­CLUDE any definitive arrangement with respect to the commercial intercourse, he still meant it to be under­stood, that he was fully authorised, to ENTER into a ne­goication for that purpose, &c. The reply of Mr. Jefferson on the 13th of Dec. informed Mr. Hammond, that he had laid letters before the President, and was ready to receive a communication of his full powers, for entering into the negociaion, &c. This was followed on the next day by a letter from Mr. Hammond, stating, That he had no special commission, to CONCLUDE any de­finitive arrangement upon the subject of commercial intercourse—but that he conceived himself fully com­petent to enter into negociation, and the discussion of principles that might be the basis of such definitive ar­rangement —and that this opinion of his competency was founded on the instructions which were to regulate his personal conduct, and the general plenipotentiary character in which he had been sent and received.

This letter, Mr. Madison observed, closed the cor­respondence on the subject of commercial arrange­ments, being justly considered by the executive as a final proof, that the powers of Mr. Hammond were in­competent, and irrelative to the object; and that it would be improper to open a formal negociation with him, under them. His instructions might be a rule and [Page 67] a warrant to himself, but not being even exhibited, could be no evidence of his authority, to the executive. And his plenipotentiary commission in the ordinary form, could never be understood as relating to the special objects he proposed to discuss. According to the usage of nations, a special commission is, in such cases, al­ways furnished and required. Mr. Madison was per­suaded, that no sovereign in Europe would listen for a moment to such a claim as that of Mr. Hammond, and that the British court would have been offended at such an one from an American minister. He thought there­fore, that the executive had equally consulted dignity and prudence, in silently dropping the subject in the manner they did, until Mr. Hammond should receive and produce adequate powers in the accustomed form; as might reasonably be expected, if his court was duly disposed to meet the United States, in an amicable ar­rangement of commerce by treaty.

That the construction put by Mr. Hammond on his powers, was inadmissible, appeared to Mr. Madison to result from the construction itself. Either the general Plenipotentiary commission was to be taken in the technical and limited sense in which it is applied to the ordinary diplomatic objects of a stationary public min­ister; or in a literal sense, without regard to such limi­tation. In the former sense, it clearly does not extend to negociations for a treaty. In the latter sense it would ex­tend to the conclusion of a treaty, and not merely to ne­gociation, as Mr. Hammond explains and limits it.

Mr. Madison adverted next to the state of the corres­pondence relating to the treaty of peace. It appeared, he observed, that as long ago as the 29th of May, 1792, the Secretary of State had addressed to Mr. Hammond, a full explanation of our rights and demands, under that treaty—that on the 2d of June, Mr. Hammond in­formed the Secretary, that he should transmit it with­out delay for the consideration of his court; and ac­cordingly did forward it in the course of a few days; that on the 13th Nov. 1793, previous to the present meeting of Congress, Mr. Hammond was desired by the Secretary, in pursuance of a charge from the Pre­sident, [Page 68] to let him know whether an answer could yet be given to the letter of May 29, 1792. Mr. Hammond re­plied, that it could not, but that he was confident t [...]e de­lay was to be ascribed to the continuance of the cause alluded to in a former answer to a similar request.

The cause alluded to, was the interesting posture of things in Europe, which it was said, had diverted the attention of the British government to objects of a more pressing nature; and this consideration had been urged by several members, as an apology for the silence observed towards the United States. Mr. Madison thought very differently. The interval between the receipt of the letter written by the Secretary in May, 1792, and the accession of Great-Britain to the war against France, had been sufficient for the purpose of preparing and sending the proper instructions to Mr. Hammond. Mr. Madison added, that the prospect of being engaged in new controversies of a more serious kind, instead of justifying an inattention to an existing one, ought to have quickened the efforts for a previous settlement of the latter. This is the course dictated by prudence, to nations as well as to individuals; and where a right dis­position concurs, it is the natural course.

It had been mentioned as a further reason against the commercial propositions, at this time, that they might draw upon us the resentments of the Combined powers. Mr. Madison could see no ground for such an appre­hension. The Combined powers were pretty fully oc­cupied with France; they could have no pretext for concerning themselves with us, in a case where we did not concern ourselves with them; and there was the less room for imagining that the combination could misconstrue the measure into an offence against them, as two of the parties, Prussia and the United Nether­lands, were in treaty with the United States, and are fa­vored by the propositions.

7. It was finally contended, that admitting our situ­ation to be such as had been described, the mode pro­posed was an objectionable one.

Mr. Madison said he had no predilections for the mode that could prevent his giving a ready preference [Page 69] to a better, if a better should be offered. And unless it should be said, that the Legislature ought to adjourn without doing any thing for the public relief, he thought it incumbent on those who object to one proposition to substitute another that would be less objectionable. By this he meant a proposition not merely better in itself, but one that would probably be thought so, both withen and without doors; and be more likely to coincide with the sentiments of every part of the union, as well as to conciliate a majority of voices in the public councils.

The first question, he said, was whether any thing ought to be done. If this be decided in the affirma­tive, as he presumed to be the sense of the majority of the committee; and if war was not in contemplation as of course was taken for granted; the next question could only lie betwen negociation, and commercial regulation. Negocition it had been shewn was in no train, or prospect, that could justify reliance on it. Commercial regulations alone remained. They would be pacific in their operation. They were the means best suited to the remper of our constituents. And he sincerely belived, that, if judiciously framed, they would be more likely to answer the reasonable purposes of the community, then any others that could be proposed.

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