'TIS the right and the duty of a free people▪ to watch attentively the movements of eve­ry department of public trust. Whether those whom they employ, fill executive, judicial, or le­gislative stations, still they are equally the servants of the people, and amenable to them, for their con­duct. This great political truth, is now rapidly spreading itself throughout the other regions of the earth, and liberating mankind from the tyranny which has long oppressed them. In America, it was never doubted.

'Tis particularly their duty to watch attentively the conduct of the legislature. Whilst that branch preserves its independence and integrity, they are safe. They have nothing to apprehend either from the noxious quality of the laws, or their invasion by the other departments of the government. It forms a bulwark of sufficient strength, to baffle eve­ry danger, that may assail them from without. But whenever it loses these indispensible qualifications, their security is gone, unless they can immediately repair the breaches that are made.

Unhappily, this branch from which alone real danger may be apprehended, is best fortified against the suspicion of it. 'Tis the nature of an executive trust, where the operations are directed by a single hand, especially if they are extensive and important, to inspire jealousy and distrust; to warn every ci­tizen [Page 4] to stand on his guard, and observe its course. But with the representative, the case is different: Many considerations arising from the mode of his appointment, and his duty, tend to connect him, in more intimate confidence, with his constituents. This propensity should therefore be resisted with decisive force, for otherwise it will open a door, through which the public rights may be invaded with success.

These observations apply in a greater or less de­gree to every free government; but they apply with peculiar force to the government of these States. Many circumstances exist in our system which tend in a certain degree, to weaken the checks of the se­veral departments upon each other, and to lessen the responsibility of the representative to his consti­tuent. Of these some perhaps will be eternal, as pro­ceeding from causes beyond the reach of human re­medy. Others of the adventitious kind have been added. That we may however perfectly compre­hend our true situation, and the ruling policy of our councils, from the adoption of the government to the present time, it may be proper to notice a few of these in both respects. They will enable us to decide with greater propriety, on the transac­tions which I mean more particularly to lay bare, to the public inspection.

'Tis inseparably incident to a federal govern­ment, for reasons too well understood to require illustration, that the representation should be com­paratively thin. Hence it follows, that as each mem­ber must represent a great extent of territory, and considerable number of inhabitants, he can in ge­neral be but little known to his constituents in the commencement. They must of course take his me­rits, and vote for him, in a great measure, in the first instance, upon trust. And the extent of the territo­ry [Page 5] over which our government in particular is or­ganized, will prevent their ever being well acquaint­ed with him afterwards. 'Tis scarcely possible to com­municate that regular and thorough information, of all transactions, from the seat of government to the extremities, so indispensibly necessary to enable the constituent to judge with propriety of the conduct of his representative. This, in equal degree lessens the responsibility; for a representative acting on a dis­tant theatre, never seen, and seldom heard of, by his constituent, except through the medium of his own correspondence, has little to fear from his censure.

In a single well organized government, the wis­dom and purity of its administration, are essential­ly promoted by the jealousy which takes place be­tween the several branches of each other, and e­specially between the legislative and the executive. This justifies the policy of the distribution, and pre­serves in full force the check intended by it. But the obvious tendency of the federal principle is to dissipate this jealousy, and enfeeble the check be­tween the several departments of the national go­vernment. A coalition with the State sovereign­ties, naturally unites them together, to resist a fo­reign pressure. And this proportionably contributes to destroy the independence of the legislature, and diminish the responsibility of its members.

These infirmities, and especially the latter, are in a great measure without cure; it were however rational to expect, that the most wholesome remedies would have been applied, so as to fortify the sys­tem against any malign effects which could possibly be avoided. But the contrary has been the course of our administration. Active and successful efforts have been made to increase the evil where it was a natural one, and to accumulate others of the arti­ficial kind. The best expedient which policy could [Page 6] dictate, to remedy those inconveniencies resulting from the extent of territory, was by opening their doors, to subject their legislative discussions to the free and common audience of every citizen, and to promote the free and rapid circulation of the news­papers. But has this been done? On the contrary, have we not seen with amazement, one branch of the legislature, withdraw itself into a sequestered chamber, and shut its doors upon its constituents, still guarding them with obstinate perseverance, al­though more than one half the union have required that they be opened? Have we not likewise seen the free circulation of the news-papers, clogged with taxes which amount almost to a prohibition? Are these things the mere effect of accident, or are they the result of cool deliberation? contemplating ob­jects dreadful to this country.

These considerations demonstrate, that it is diffi­cult to preserve in the members of the national legis­lature, that degree of responsibility to their constitu­ents, which the principle under other circumstan­ces admits of; and that those who have been called to that station, since the organization of the go­vernment, have shewn an earnest desire to rid them­selves of that portion of which it is capable. They likewise demonstrate that from causes which are na­tural, the several branches, instead of forming a per­fect check upon each other, and thereby securing to the people a purity in the administration of each, are to a certain degree impelled in a contrary direc­tion, and forced together, into a constrained and politic harmony, for common defence.

But this propensity, however strong it may be, has been powerfully aided by some institutions of great force and efficacy. A charm has been formed of sufficient strength to draw them together, if the repulsive power had been naturally ten times greater [Page 7] than the attractive one really is. An immense debt has been accumulated, from every region of the union, and of every possible description, constituted into funds of almost perpetual duration, and sub­ject from its nature upon the slightest incidents, to constant fluctuation, with a power in the Secretary of the Treasury, through the medium of the sinking fund, to raise it at pleasure^*. And upon the basis of this debt, a bank of discount has been formed, allied by its charter to the government itself, and in a great measure subjected to the direction of the same officer.

The experience of other countries has shewn that the dealers in the public funds, and especially those whose fortunes consist principally in that line, have no interest and of course feel but little concern, in all those questions of fiscal policy which particu­larly affect the land-holder, the merchant, and the artist. Although these classes should groan, under the burdens of the government, yet the public cre­ditor will be no otherwise affected by the pressure, than as he receives what has been gleaned from their industry. The tax never reaches him, till the mo­ney is counted out quarterly from the public coffers, in discharge of his claim. They are the tenants of the farm, he the landlord and the man of revenue. The disparity of their interests, and the difference of their sensations, respecting the objects to which they point, in a great measure separate them in society. Knowing that they live upon the labour of the other classes, the public creditors behold them with jea­lousy, suspect a thousand visionary schemes against [Page 8] their welfare, and are always alarmed and agitated with every the most trifling incident which hap­pens. And having one common interest which con­sists [...]mply in the imposition of high taxes and their rigid collection, they form a compact body and move always in concert. Whilst the administration finds the means to satisfy their claims, they are always de­voted to it, and support all its measures. They therefore may be considered in every country, where substantial funds are established, and their demands punctually paid, as a ministerial corps, leagued to­gether upon principles to a certain degree hostile to the rest of the community.

But this dread of the other classes, and subservi­ence to fiscal policy, have been increased here be­yond what was ever experienced before, and by cau­ses extremely natural. The trifling consideration given for the debt, by the present holders, with the comparative merit of their characters, with that of the officers and soldiery of the late army, and the well known sense which the community entertain on that subject, must inspire a distrust that will dis­quiet their peace for a time. The claims of justice although from motives of policy, they may be sup­pressed, yet the cries which they raise, are terrible to those who live on the usurpation. Nor can the gay festivity, nor the pomp and splendour it supports, shield them from the admonition. This throws them blindly into the hands of those who patronize their interests. In addition to which, the policy and ope­ration of the sinking fund, by which the rise of stocks is in a great measure regulated, must contribute greatly to subject the party interested to the controul of those who direct its application.

If then the certificate-holders or dealers in the funds in general, are subservient to the views of a department faithful to their interests, is it reasonable [Page 9] to expect that such as have, or may hereafter be­come members of Congress, will prove less so? Be­ing on the great theatre of speculation and gain, and possessed of more correct information, with the means of turning it to better account, will they a­bandon their occupation and slight the opportunity offered, of becoming thrifty? In what condition would the land-holder, the merchant, and the artist, find themselves, if they should be represented in the national legislature by persons of this description on­ly? might they not count at least upon high taxes and their rigid collection? 'Tis the first principle of a free government, that those who impose the tax should feel the effect, but here it would be not only violated, but reversed. What security would the people have in any of the departments of govern­ment, whose checks were destroyed by an interest which supervened every consideration of public good?

But the proprietors of bank stock, are still more subservient to this policy, than any other class of public creditors. The institution itself being found­ed on the same paper system, must communicate the same interests to those within its sphere. And in other respects, it possesses a strength and energy, to which the common members of the fiscal corps, are strangers. The superiority of its gains invigorates the principle common to all; but the constitutional subordination to the head of that department, sanc­tifies under the cloak of authority, that degree of subservience which a sense of shame, among inde­pendent men, might occasionally forbid.

The bank however should not be considered sim­ply in the light of an institution, uniting together with greater force, the members of the fiscal corps. As an engine of influence, capable under the ma­nagement authorized by its principles, of polluting every operation of the government, it is entitled to [Page 10] particular attention. In this view a concise illustra­tion, may not be deemed improper. The stocks are low, and the command of money for a short term only, would enable the holder to clear with certain­ty such a sum. A question of moment is depending, and a member of Congress may obtain a discount with the bank for that sum. He makes the pur­chase. The party aiding this operation with the bank, has likewise the direction of the sinking fund: its monies are seasonably and publicly exhibited at the market, and the stocks rise. The gain has been made, and the demands of the bank may likewise be answered. Or perhaps he is indigent, pressed by dif­ficulties, and seeks to be thus relieved: or his note has been already deposited in the bank, and to some amount, and the day for repayment approaches, has he the means? and if he has not, how shall he be reliev­ed from this painful dilemma? Shall the indulgence be extended again and again, and by the intercession of this person? Have the members of the legislature sufficient independence, virtue, and firmness, to withstand these temptations? And are there not oc­casions in the operations of every government, when those possessed of such means of influence, will find it their interest to avail themselves of it, to quiet the opponents to their measures? Have not such arisen in the course of our government, which commenced, as it were, but yesterday?

The contamination would however have been par­tial, and the practicable means of influence abridg­ed, if the alliance of the bank had been confined to an executive department only. With a minister in that branch, a negociation with the members of the legislature, would have been difficult, as certain forms subsisting between the departments of govern­ment, put them at a distance from each other. Se­duction does not operate by means direct or overt. [Page 11] If not abandoned and at auction, the integrity of a member must be assailed more gently, and without the appearance of a bribe. It must be forced on him, under the mask of friendship. It became there­fore necessary, to bring the legislature into more in­timate contact with this monied machine, and for this purpose to appoint several of its members bank directors. In England, the minister of finance is a member of parliament; by him negociations may be carried on in person; but here the constitution forbade it; this then was the next best alternative. Thus organised, the game becomes more easy. In all operations upon the legislature, whether for the par­ticular emolument of the bank, the fiscal corps in general, or any other purpose, in which the views of the party are interested, the prospect of success is greatly improved. And in all inquiries relative to the conduct of the officer, in the management of the public monies, these members of Congress, bank directors, and the bank itself, give him their firm and uniform support. In their eyes his conduct will ap­pear immaculate, angelic, and partaking perhaps of something still more divine^*.

If we take an impartial review of the measures of the government, from its adoption to the present time, we shall find its practice has corresponded, in every respect, with this theory. The demon­stration strikes us in every page of the law, that a faction of monarchic speculators, seized upon its legislative functions in the commencement, and have directed all its operations since. We shall find, [Page 12] that to the views of this faction, an apt instrument has been obtained in the Secretary of the Treasury, and to whose emolument and advancement, all his measures have been made subservient. If the pub­lic debt has been accumulated by every possible con­trivance, buoyed up by means of the sinking fund, made in a great measure perpetual, and formed in­to a powerful monied machine, dependent on the fiscal administration, to this combination it is due. If by means of this sudden elevation of fortune, a dangerous inequality of rank has been created a­mong the citizens of these States, thereby laying the foundation for the subversion of the government itself, by undermining its true principles, to this combination it is due. If those sound and genuine principles of responsibility, which belong to repre­sentative government, and constitute its bulwark, and preserve its harmony, have been annulled or weakened; if a practicable means of influence, whereby the members of the legislature may be de­bauched from the duty they owe their constituents, has been formed; if, by implication and construc­tion, the obvious sense of the constitution has been perverted, and its powers enlarged, so as to pave the way for the conversion of the government from a limited into an unlimited one, to this combina­tion they are due. The catalogue of enormities is a lengthy one, but its truth is well known to those who have marked the course of public proceedings, or examined the acts.

A more thorough developement of these measures with their pernicious tendency, may perhaps be pre­sented in a future essay; the object of the present one is more particularly to demonstrate, that by vir­tue of this combination, all regard for their consti­tuents has been abandoned by the parties to it, and that the public can neither count upon the indepen­dence [Page 13] or integrity of the legislature, or the responsi­bility of the other departments, whilst it lasts.

That the Secretary of the Treasury has been faith­ful to this corps, and performed his part of the co­venant, is well known. Every report from his de­partment furnishes the proof. Through him propo­sitions for assumption, after assumption, with all the properties of the debt, for the establishment of the bank, and for loans from the bank, for the latitude of construction contended for in the powers of the government, &c. have been ushered into Congress. By them firm support has been given to these propo­sitions. But it remained for an experiment still more interesting to the parties, and alarming to the com­munity, to try the strength of this combination, and evince its turpitude; the particulars of which I will now detail.

In the course of these transactions and for the term of four years, the real state of the public finances was never searched into by the legislature. It was however manifest to the more observant, that the affairs of that department had gradually assumed a complexity and obscurity, which rendered them al­most impenetrable. To every succeeding session re­ports had been made that there was a surplus of re­venue, and yet reasons were urged for an increase of the public burdens, and with which the legislature had complied. Foreign loans were likewise an­nounced, but no intimation given, how far the fo­reign debt had been discharged, or in fact how these loans had been applied. In this situation, early in the late session, a well known partizan and member of the fiscal corps^*, introduced a bill into the house of representatives, for applying a sum said to be on hand, to the amount of two millions of dollars, in discharge of the debt due the bank, on account of the shares taken by the United States. It seemed [Page 14] strange how there could be lying idle such a sum, and in the course of discussion only it appeared, that it consisted of the foreign loans, which had been drawn into this country by the Secretary of the Trea­sury.

It became immediately an object worthy enquiry, why this money had been drawn here. If it was idle, the demonstration must be deemed satisfactory, there had been no occasion for it: Of course that the domestic resources had been amply adequate to their objects, and in particular those of the sinking fund, to which alone any foreign money was appli­cable.

The subject assumed a still more extraordinary as­pect from the consideration that a proposition was then depending, and forming a part of the appro­priation bill for the current year, for a loan from the bank of 800.000 dollars. The motive to mea­sures in themselves so opposite and contradictory, the one founded on the idea of a large surplus lying idle, and the other of a poverty in the treasury, was inexplicable. Nor could it be accounted for upon any rational principle, why the bank should allow a payment to extinguish a loan at 6 per cent. one tenth of which only it was bound to receive, and make one immediately after at five. It could not be pre­sumed that the individual adventurers in the institu­tion, would sacrifice their interests to the public; it is well known that such sacrifices are seldom made, nor ought they indeed to be expected. It was natu­ral to infer that inducements of a different kind led to this arrangement between the bank directors and the Secretary of the Treasury, and which no public documents exhibited.

The draft however of the money from Holland, especially if not called for by indispensable and legal obligations, was an interesting fact, and which re­quired [Page 15] explanation. Had our engagements been ful­ly and punctually fulfilled to France? and if they had, would they not have accepted and thank­ed us for the service, of a reimbursement of all we owed them? The parallel in their present situation, with our own when the money was advanced, called upon us for the offer; and America must feel mor­tified and humbled if it was not made, at least so far as we had it in our power to comply with it. In eve­ry view an explanation became necessary, and as so much had been already confessed, in the course of discussion, a proposition for it could not now be re­sisted, with even the appearance of decency. An or­der accordingly issued to that effect from the house of representatives upon the motion of Mr. Giles some time in December last^*.

To this order the Secretary reported on the 3d of January following that 18.678.000 florins, equal to 7.471.200 dollars, had been borrowed. That of this sum 4.029.217 dollars had been paid to France, a­bout 3.000.000 dols. drawn into America, 2.304.369 of which by bills upon our bankers, and between 6 and 700.000 dollars by a diversion of that amount to the payment of the interest of the foreign debt, and that the residue of the sum borrowed (except a­bout 160.000 dollars still on hand) had been, or were to be applied to different purposes abroad^†.

[Page 16] But the question still remained to be answered, Why had this money been drawn here? where was it, if on hand, or how disbursed? The report threw no light on these important points, but rather increased the obscurity with which it had been inveloped. There was therefore an obvious impropriety in proceeding further upon either of the bills, which were depend­ing at this time, one before each house, until the real state of the public finances should be thoroughly understood. To vote the foreign money improperly drawn here to the bank, thereby preventing its possi­ble application to any object for which it was origi­nally intended, or to complicate our affairs further by another loan from that institution, were by no means desireable objects, at least with those who had commenced the inquiry. Correspondent efforts were therefore made in each house to dispel the clouds which covered these transactions, and orders were accordingly issued from each, for more correct in­formation in every necessary particular^*.

[Page 17] To these orders the Secretary reported, not a plain statement of the public finances, but a free criticism [Page 18] upon the conduct of one of the members of the House of Representatives, highly disrespectful to the House, and a series of elaborate essays illustrative principally of the policy of our institutions, relative to which no information had been required, and of which certainly no panegyric from him was necessa­ry. They contained likewise a vindication of his conduct in certain particulars, relative to which no charge had been brought forward. These reports too were protracted, and detailed, in such manner, as to occupy the whole of the session, except a few days before its close.

It is scarcely necessary in this stage, and after the subject has been, so fully and ably, discussed before the public, to mention the nature, extent, and ob­jects of those funds which the Secretary had to dis­burse, with the extent of his authority over them. A brief statement may, however, make it more ex­plicit, [Page 19] and intelligible. The following then is the outline: Upon the domestic revenues consisting of impost, tonnage, and excise, the current expences of the government, with the interest upon the fo­reign and domestic debt, were solely chargeable. Two foreign loans were authorized by law, the first of 12,000,000 of dollars of the 4th of August 1790, and the second of 2,000,000 of the 12th ensuing of the same month, destined for different purposes, and established on different funds. The first was deem­ed commensurate with the whole foreign debt, and was suggested as well from the necessity of providing for the instalments as they became due, and which it was concluded could not otherwise be satisfied, as by the consideration that as the debt itself was con­tracted in the course of the late war, under very in­auspicious circumstances, and whilst the fate of those strenuous and manly exertions, then making for our independence, was uncertain, it were possible in the present more prosperous state of our affairs, to ob­tain a remodification of it to advantage. The second was intended in aid of the sum of 1,374,656 dollars, being the surplus of revenue at the end of 1790, ap­propriated for the sinking fund; and for this latter purpose only, if required, could any foreign money be drawn here. The power over these loans, was given in every respect, exclusively to the President. In regard to them, the Secretary acted by his in­struction, and under his authority, only.

In the discharge of the ordinary duties of the Secretary of the Treasury, and which I never con­sidered as being very difficult or important, other­wise than as the care and application of great sums of public money make it so, the course appears to me to be both simple and obvious. If the revenue should at any time prove inadequate, the deficiency could not be attributed to him, nor the executive, [Page 20] unless indeed fallacious statements had been given as the ground for additional charges, assumptions, increase of the military establishment, and the like. In such event it became his duty to state the fact simply and correctly to the legislature, that they might in time supply such additional funds, as should be necessary; and if the domestic resources of the sinking fund were exhausted, to state the fact to the President, that he might determine whe­ther he would avail himself of a foreign loan.

In the foreign transaction, and which was com­mitted to the President, two considerations were to be principally regarded—the first, not to borrow at all, unless, in relation to the object for which the money was designed, it might be done with advan­tage—and the second, so to arrange the business, that the money borrowed should, immediately af­ter it was received, be paid over to those for whom it was procured, otherwise we would be subjected to the payment of double interest. For this latter purpose, an accurate arrangement became necessary with France, and the money lenders in Holland, that the amount necessary to be borrowed, might be ascertained with precision.

It appeared, however, by these reports that he had violated the instructions of the President, in the first instance, by borrowing upon the two million loan, though expressly confined by them to the other, and for the purpose of foreign debt only, precluding all idea of drawing any part of the monies borrowed into this country^*.—

That he had violated the law by blending the two loans together, whereby a door was opened for a free use of the whole amount of the foreign money in domestic expenditures, except so much as should be paid to France, under this single restraint, that [Page 21] upon the final adjustment of the accounts of his ad­ministration, two millions only should be credited to the sinking fund, in case they were used^*.—

That by virtue of this arrangement, and upon the pretence of the sinking fund, or, to use his own words, by way of instrumentality to it, although in fact, by his own shewing, not a single farthing stands thus accounted for, (the domestic resources having been adequate, except occasionally and un­der particular pressures, and which it is to be pre­sumed any of the banks would have accommodated) he had drawn into this country directly and indi­rectly, as above mentioned, about 3,000,000 of dollars, of the foreign money, near 1,000,000 more than was authorised for the sinking fund, in the ut­most extent^†.—

That he had exposed the United States to consi­derable loss, arising from the loss of interest for the time these monies have been thus afloat, and which must have produced, from the period the drafts were furnished the bank, a correspondent benefit to those institutions^‡.—

That he had borrowed money from the bank when there was no occasion for such loans, except upon the idea that there ought to be, beyond the pressure of current demands, to guard against the contingencies of war, and other fanciful dangers, at [Page 22] least five or six hundred thousand dollars always on hand^*.—

That he had occasioned a violation of our faith with France, in not paying the money borrowed in the amount, and at the times stipulated.—

And lastly, that the whole of these transactions had been carried on without the knowledge of the legislature or the President.

That all these facts are literally and strictly true, will appear by his own reports, and to which I have referred, except that respecting the failure in our payments to France, and this I have taken from a view of the debt in possession of every one, in any degree conversant with public affairs. We owed to that nation up to the end of 1792, 5, 498, 697 dollars; the actual payments amounted to 4, 473, 480 dollars only, leaving due on the 1st of January last, the sum of 1, 025, 216 dollars^†.

These charges are of a high and serious import; and which require the severest reprehension. Nor has any satisfactory explanation been given, to jus­tify even the motive, in any one respect. Who shall violate the law, and trample under foot the boun­dary [Page 23] of appropriations, especially in the extent and manner herein shewn? Shall the President himself? Does an invading enemy approach your coast and threaten the public safety? And if in case of extra­ordinary emergencies, he had authorised it, would he not have announced it to the legislature at their next meeting? Those who are acquainted with the respect always entertained and shewn, to the consti­tution and the laws, by the present chief magistrate, in every station he has filled, will give the answer. But not only to violate the law, but likewise the President's instructions, pointing out the mode of its execution, and on the day they were given, to with­draw the money from France, in derogation of our national faith, and at a time she most required our aid, with the other circumstances of misconduct al­ledged, are not to be palliated whilst they are ac­knowledged to exist.

When none are furnished, the mind naturally ranges at large, to seek for motives to account for a conduct so subversive of all legal and other obliga­tions of public duty. The character of the man, and his known political principles, must lay the foun­dation for conjecture, if indeed, when the facts are apparent, there can exist any doubt of the motive. Would this money have aided the republican cause in France, and contributed to enable that gallant and generous people, to repel the invasion under the Duke of Brunswick? 'Tis well known that the pulse of the whole party beat in unison with him, as he advanced towards Paris, and that with him they were covered with shame and mortification as he retreated^*. Or was it intended solely to aid the [Page 24] bank here, and those speculators his political asso­ciates, pressed it is true by difficulties, and which were sufficient to excite his sympathy! Was it one or both of these objects which influenced his mea­sures, for both were answered? Let facts speak to an impartial and discerning public!

The very respectable and independent member, who had been most active in pressing this enquiry, considered it his duty to make known his sentiments of these transactions. Although the last of the long series of reports furnished, was not presented more than four or five days before the close of the session, yet he deemed it incumbent on him, and consistent with that candour which has always marked his cha­racter, to shew in that stage, the extent of his objec­tions to this gentleman's official conduct. With this view he laid on the table, and subject to the disposi­tion of the house, several resolutions specifying these objections. It was to be inferred, that on account of the short time intervening before the adjournment, and of course, the impossibility of examining, and thoroughly comprehending, all the various docu­ments relating to the subject, and of giving it that full and free discussion its importance required, it was his wish the consideration should be postponed to the next session. Upon this point, however, he appeared to be indifferent, because he well knew the subject was now before another tribunal, who would do justice to it. But the conduct of the house which I deem important in the scale of these observations, shall now be noticed.

The fiscal corps appeared to consider themselves more critically circumstanced than this member. They were obviously struck with consternation. To [Page 25] get rid of it altogether, they could not hope. To postpone it to the next session, was what of all things they dreaded. It was before the public, who were interested in the result, and who would force a trial at one time or other. They therefore laid hold of it with avidity, and a strong hand. If we now de­cide upon it, perhaps it may be deemed satisfactory, and with us who are his friends, no danger need be apprehended. They sat day and night upon the resolutions, until they got through them; and al­though they complained there was not sufficient time for the investigation, yet they hurried the decision, in half the time remaining. The free latitude of discussion, practised upon other occasions was refus­ed; the smallest departure was censured; and when­ever, in particular, an approach was made toward the bank, the whole party tumultuously crying to order, and, with the directors at their head, rose in arms to defend it.

The character of the vote itself, which constituted this majority, is easily given, by every person ac­quainted with that of the House, or with public transactions in general. Of the thirty five, twenty one were stock-holders, or dealers in the funds, and three of these latter bank directors, and whose degree of zeal was obviously in the ratio above sta­ted, as their relative profits; the bank directors, being considerably more active and zealous than the other members of the corps. That the fact, of this number being bank directors, is true, can it is be believed, be satisfactorily shewn. The public books however must contain the evidence, unless entered in fictitious names, and by them let it be tested^* [Page 26] For the motive of their vote, sufficient cause has alrea­dy been assigned. But for that of the other mem­bers, candour furnishes an apology. The short space of time allowed for the discussion, to those who had not previously examined the subject, rendered it im­possible for them to understand it: and in that situa­tion it became their duty to vote on the favourable side. Besides, this was an affirmative proposition of censure; had one of approbation been proposed to sanctify these proceedings, it would have been resisted by those thus circumstanced, with equal force, [Page 27] and most probably have turned the majority, in like degree, the other way.

I have given a summary of the above proceedings, to evince the solidity of these observations, and to demonstrate that a combination has been formed of a powerful faction, in two departments of the go­vernment, and upon principles dangerous to the rights and interests of the community. That being founded on the basis of private interest, embracing a very extensive circle of society, and which must ac­quire additional strength, in proportion as the pub­lic debt shall be accumulated, its activity and force are the more to be dreaded. That its progress in undermining the great pillars of the government, by the establishment of an institution, in express violation of its powers, and capable, as an engine of corruption, of sapping the foundation of public virtue, and polluting all its measures, has been al­ready great. And that the consequences to be just­ly apprehended, unless a speedy and efficacious re­medy shall be applied, are really of the most alarm­ing kind. In contemplation of the pernicious ten­dency of these measures, with the astonishing success which had attended them, and their probable future extent, there was a period not far back, when I con­sidered the cause of liberty itself in danger, and trembled for the public safety. I feared that the glo­rious fruits of the revolution, had been thrown a­way, by the blind confidence and temerity, of a ge­nerous and unsuspicious people. But I trust that our day of trial has passed, and that we may yet be se­cure. To the manly efforts and disinterested patriot­ism, of those who maintained the conflict, against such a combination of interests, and checked its ra­pid career, much praise is due. America is sensible of their services, and will remember their virtues. Thanks, illustrious patriots, your country greets you [Page 28] well, and will enrol your names upon the immortal records of fame!

By marking the extent of the evil, the cure is in a great measure designated. With the legislature should the correction commence, for ‘whilst that branch preserves its independence and integrity, we are safe.’ Let us cast from it then, whatever impurities, tend to impair these qualities, or lessen its responsibility to the people. Let the public creditors stand apart, not as a class of men to be branded with reproach and infamy, but as constituting an interest, which, without due restraint, may endanger the ge­neral welfare; and if admissible at all into that branch, let them be inhibited under the severest penalties, from a profanation of its functions afterwards, by any traffic in the public funds. Let the law establish­ing the bank, as a violation of the principles of the constitution, be declared null and void, or at least let the establishment be repudiated from its present im­pure connection with the government. Let the whole system of the treasury department undergo a thorough reform, and the most effectual guards be provided against those liberties and abuses, which have been charged, upon its present administration. Let it be completely subjected to the supreme head of the ex­ecutive, against which it seems to have revolted, and let its communication with the legislature be put on a footing, more consistent with the constitu­tion, and the dignity and independence of the re­presentatives of the people. Renovations of this kind, will not violate public credit, but establish it in the public confidence; will not impair the en­ergy of the constitution, but restore it to its pristine health, and proper functions; will not stain our na­tional character, but exhibit it, in its legitimate fea­tures, of a dignified simplicity, and genuine repub­licanism.