CHAP. I. In which the fundamental principles of Dr. CHAUNCY's sys­tem concerning future punishment are pointed out and compared with each other.

CHAP. II. Whether the damned deserve any other punishment, than that which is conducive to their personal good.

ON the supposition, that future punishment is a mere discipline necessary and happily conducive to the re­pentance and good of the damned; it may be asked, whether such discipline be all which they deserve, and which can consistently with strict justice be inflicted; or whether they do indeed deserve a greater degree or du­ration of punishment, than that which is sufficient to lead them to repentance, and that additional punishment be by grace remitted to them. Let us consider both these hy­potheses.

THE first is, that the wicked deserve, according to strict justice, no more punishment, than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and to prepare them for happiness.— That this is not a mere hypothesis made by an opponent of Dr. C. but is a doctrine implied at least, if not express­ly asserted in his book, may appear by the following quo­tations. ^* Is it not far more reasonable to suppose, that ‘the miseries of the other world are a proper discipline in order to accomplish this end’ [the recovery of sinners] [Page 24] "than that they should be final and vindictive only?" If a final and vindictive punishment be entirely just, what has reason to object to the infliction of it, in some instances at least?—^* ‘The consideration of hell as a purging fire, is that only which can make the matter sit easy on one's mind.’ But if hell, though not merely a purging fire, be justly deserved, why does not the thought of it sit easy on one's mind? So that it is manifestly implied in this reasoning of Dr. C. that no other punishment of the wick­ed can be reconciled with justice, than that which is adapted to their personal good.

THE same is implicitly asserted by other writers on the same side of the question concerning future punishment. Bishop Newton, in his Dissertation on the final state of man­kind, ^† says, ‘It is just and wise and good, and even mer­ciful, to correct a sinner as long as he deserves correct­ion; to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his faults.’ Therefore all the punishment of the sinner, which is just, and which he deserves, is correction, or to be scourged out of his faults. The Chevalier Ramsay tells us, that ‘Justice is that perfection in GOD, by which he endevaours to make all intelligences just^‡.’ ‘Vindictive justice, is that attribute in GOD, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it be totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated‖.’ Therefore if GOD inflict any punishment with any other design, than to make the subject of that punishment just, and to extirpate vice from him, he violates even vindictive justice. M. Pet­itpierre in a tract lately published in England, and highly applauded by some, declares, that ‘repentance appeases divine anger, and disarms its justice; because it ac­complishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of avenging ju­stice; which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which when that state is reversed, by conversion and holiness, will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delight­ful manifestations of mercy and forgiveness.’** ‘The honour of the divine law is sufficiently guard­ed by the punishment of the sinner as long as he re­mains impenitent, and by the faithful and obedient adherence of the penitent offender. Divine justice is [Page 25] always satisfied when it attains its end; and this end is always attained, whenever the sinner is brought to repentance.’ ^** So that it is evident, that all these writers implicitly held the proposition now under consi­deration, which is, that the wicked deserve according to strict justice, no more punishment than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and prepare them for happiness. This is not only a real tenet of those writers, but is most essential and important to their system; for if the con­trary can be established, consequences will follow, which will greatly embarrass, if not entirely overthrow that sy­stem. I therefore beg the patience of the reader, while I particularly examine that tenet: Concerning it the fol­lowing observations may be made,

1. IT implies that the punishment which is necessary to lead the wicked to repentance is the curse of the divine law. Without doubt that punishment which amounts to the utmost, which strict justice admits, includes the pe­nalty or curse of the divine law. The latter does not exceed the former; because the divine law is founded in perfect justice, and whatever is inconsistent with justice, is equally inconsistent with the divine law. If therefore the sinner deserve, according to strict justice, precisely so much punishment as is necessary to lead him to re­pentance and no more, then this is the true and utmost curse of the divine law.—Yet such a punishment as this, is really [...] whole no evil, and therefore no curse even to the subject; because by the supposition it is necessary to lead him to repentance, and prepare him for the everlasting joys and glory of heaven.

Dr. C. has given us his idea of a curse, in his Five Dissertations,^* in the following words, "A testimony of the divine displeasure against man's offence": "A testimony of the vengeance of GOD, which is a judgment on his part and a real evil on man's part." In the same book,^‡ he states his idea of a blessing to a man, to be, "That which is greatly to his advantage." But the pains of hell, if they be absolutely necessary, and most happily conducive to the repentance and endless happiness of the damned, are no real evil on their part, nor any judgment or testi­mony of vengeance on GOD's part: and therefore are no curse at all; but are according to the Doctor's own definition [Page 26] a real blessing, and a real testimony of the benevolence of GOD to the damned. Surely a medicine of disagreeable taste, but absolutely necessary to preserve the life, or re­store the health of a man, and administered with consummate judgment, is no evil or curse to the man to whom it is administered; but is a desirable good, or a blessing to him; and the administration of it, is a full proof of the benevo­lence of the physician to his patient. A proof equally de­monstrative of the divine benevolence to the damned, is the whole of their punishment in hell, if it be designed merely to lead them to repentance and to prepare them for happiness: and this fruit of the divine benevolence can, according to Dr. C's own definition of a curse, be no curse.

IT is granted by Dr. C. and in general by other ad­vocates for universal salvation, that the torments of hell are not only wisely adapted, but that they are abso­lutely necessary to lead the damned to repentance; that no more gentle means would so well answer the pro­posed end; that therefore the divine goodness and wis­dom have chosen and applied those torments, as the means of good to the damned. But certainly that which is on the whole necessary for a person's own good, is to him, on the whole, no real evil, and therefore no curse; but a good, a blessing; a wise man would choose it for himself, as it is, in its connection, really and properly eligible or desirable. If the torments of hell taken in connection with repentance and endless happiness be a curse, then repentance and endless happiness taken in connection with the torments of hell, are a curse too. If some bitter pill, considered as connected with life, be a curse; than life connected with that pill, is a curse too. That and that only is a curse to a person, which taken in its proper connections and dependences, renders him more miserable, than he would be without it. On the con­trary, that is a blessing to a person, which taken in its proper connections and dependences, renders him more happy than he would be without it. It is just as great a blessing and just as great a privilege, as happiness itself. And with what propriety this can be called a curse, I appeal to every man acquainted with propriety of lan­guage to determine. To call this a curse is to confound [Page 27] a curse and a blessing.—This being the true idea of a curse and a blessing, it immediately follows on the sup­position now under consideration, that the torments of hell are no curse, but a blessing to those on whom they are inflicted; because the very supposition is, that they are necessary to secure and promote their happiness and are inflicted for this end only.

THE absurdity then, to which on the whole we are reduced is, that those means, which are the best that infinite wisdom itself could devise and apply, for the salvation of those who die in impenitence, are the curse of the divine law; and that the greatest evil which God can consistently with justice inflict on the greatest and most obdurate enemy of himself, of his Son our glo­rious Saviour, of his law, of his grace, and of mankind, is, to put him under the best possible advantages to se­cure and promote his highest everlasting happiness: Which is no more nor less than to say, That the great­est curse which God can consistently with his perfections inflict on the sinner dying in impenitence, is to bestow on him the greatest blessing, which it is in the power of omnipotence and infinite bounty to bestow on him, in his present temper of mind; that the divine law has no curse at all annexed to it; and that the penalty of the law is an inestimable blessing, the blessing of repen­tance, or of that discipline, which is absolutely necessary, and most wisely adapted to lead to repentance, and to prepare for the greatest happiness.

IF on this view of the matter, it should be said, that the punishment of hell is not the greatest blessing which God can bestow on the sinner who dies in impenitence; that it would be a greater blessing, to grant him repen­tance by immediate efficacious grace, and then receive him to heavenly happiness;—Concerning this I observe, that it gives up the only ground, on which the supposi­tion now under consideration rests, and on which alone it can be supported. The supposition is, that the punishment of hell is inflicted with the sole view of leading the suff­erers to repentance, and of promoting their good. But if their good might be as effectually secured and promot­ed by other means, as is now asserted, then the torments of hell are not inflicted to promote the good of the sufferers. [Page 28] So far as their good is concerned, those torments are needless, nay they are a wanton exercise of cruelty. But as cruelty cannot be ascribed to the only wise God, he must, if this objection be valid, inflict the torments of hell, for some other end, than the final happiness of those who are sent to that world of misery.

BESIDE; Dr. C. and other opposers of endless punish­ment, are no friends to the doctrine of efficacious grace. According to their system, efficacious grace destroys all liberty and moral agency, and reduces men to mere ma­chines. Therefore in their view, to be led to repentance by efficacious grace, is not a greater blessing, than to be led to repentance by the torments of hell; because it is not a greater blessing to be a watch or a windmill than to be a rational moral agent. Nay, according to their sys­tem, there is no possibility of leading by efficacious grace any man to a repentence which is of a holy or of a moral nature: because according to their system, a necessary holiness is no holiness, and a necessary repentance is no more of a moral nature, than the working of a machine.

2. IF all who are saved, be delivered from wrath on account of the merit of Christ in any sense, then that punishment, which leads to repentance, is not the curse of the law, or is not all the punishment which justice admits. They who suffer the curse of the law, satisfy the law, and therefore stand in no need of the merit of Christ to satisfy the law or to deliver them from the curse of it. They can no longer consistently with justice be holden under that curse. To hold such persons still under the curse of the law, unless they can obtain an interest in the merit of Christ, can never be reconciled with the moral perfection of God. Yet this is the very fact, if that punishment which leads to repentance be the curse of the law and at the same time, as Dr. C. abundantly holds, salvation in the deliverance from wrath, as well as in the bestowment of positive happiness, be granted to no man, but on account of the merit of Christ.

3. ON this hypothesis, our Lord Jesus Christ will not save all men, nor will all men be saved, whether by Christ, or without him.—Deliverance from the curse of the law is essential to salvation. But if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to [Page 29] repentance; and if, as the advocates for universal salva­tion hold, a great part of mankind will suffer this punish­ment; it follows, that a great part of mankind will not be saved. For to be saved, and yet to suffer the curse of the law, is a direct contradiction. To suffer the curse of the law is to be damned, and is all the damnation to which any sinner is exposed, and to which justice, the most strict and rigorous justice, can doom him. If then any man have suffered this damnation, from what is he or can he be saved? Certainly from nothing, because he is exposed to nothing: unless we say, that by the just law of the God of perfect justice, he is exposed to unjust pun­ishment.

IF to this argument it be objected, that though all men are not saved from the curse of the law, whether by Christ, or without him; yet all are finally admitted to happiness; those who repent in this life, are admitted to happiness through the merits of Christ; those who die impenitent, are admitted to the same, in consequence of enduring in their own persons, the curse of the law: and that this is all which is intended by the salvation of all men:—with respect to this I observe.

(1) THIS is no proper salvation, which in its primary meaning signifies a deliverance from evil. But accord­ing to the case now stated, some men are not deliv­ered from any evil, to which they ever were exposed; but suffer it all. Therefore they are not saved.

(2) That this objection entirely sets aside, with re­gard to a great part of mankind, salvation in the way of forgiveness of sin, and the free grace of God in the pardon of the sinner, which is contrary to the whole gospel.

But to proceed; as Christ, on the present hypothesis, doth not in fact save all men; so it would be no favour to them, for him to attempt the salvation of all those who die impenitent. An attempt to deliver them from the curse of the law, would be an attempt to deprive them of the most necessary, wise, desirable and merciful means of grace, on which their eternal happiness de­pends: an attempt not to deliver them from any thing which on the whole is an evil, a disadvantage even to themselves; but to deprive them of that on which their [Page 30] supreme interest depends; of that which is in fact the greatest good, which they, in their present temper can enjoy, and the greatest blessing which at present God can possibly bestow on them.—Now to deprive them of this, is certainly no favour, nor any fruit of grace, mer­cy or goodness to them personally. Even to take them to heaven, before they have passed through this discip­line would by no means be so great a favour to them, as to cause them to pass through this discipline; as it would be to take them to heaven before they were prepared for it, or could enjoy happiness in it.

FURTHER; if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then Christ came not to deliver from the curse of the law, all who are to be finally happy, but to inflict that curse on a part of them. Christ is exalted to be a prince and a Savi­our to give repentance and forgiveness of sins. It is a part of his office, to bring men to repentance, by all wise and proper means. Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, suppose, that hell torments are the means, and most wise, proper and necessary means too, by which Christ will execute the work of giving re­pentance to all the damned. Therefore his work as a saviour, so far as respects them, is, on Dr. C's plan, not to deliver them from the curse of the law, but to in­flict that curse on them. But who is not struck with the contrariety of this idea, to the constant, uniform declara­tions of scripture, that Christ came to redeem us from the curse of the law, to save us from wrath, to deliver us from the wrath to come, &c.

WILL it be said in opposition to the last observation, that those who die in impenitence, are not saved in any sense by or through Christ, whether by his atonement, or by him as God's prime minister, in the fulness of times bringing all to repentance; and that therefore Christ is not come to inflict the curse of the law on any who shall be finally happy? Then let it never more be pleaded, that Christ is the saviour of all men; that he gave himself a ransom for all; that he tasted death for every man; that the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many, (meaning all men) that by the righteousness of one the [Page 31] free gift shall come upon all men to justification of life; that Christ must reign, till he shall have put all enemies under his feet, in genuine repentance; that peace be­ing made by the blood of the cross, it pleased the father by Christ to reconcile all things to himself. For if Christ shall not finally have saved all men by his merit, nor shall have led them to repentance in the execution of the scheme of providence; in what sense can the salvation of all men be ascribed to Christ? In what conceivable sense can he be called the Saviour of all men?—Therefore if any adopt the idea of the objection just stated, let them never more plead in favour of the salvation of all men, any of those passages of scripture referred to above, nor any passage, which relates to salvation by Christ.

BESIDE; if the damned be led to repentance by the torments of hell, by whom are those torments inflicted? Not by Christ it seems, because that would imply, that Christ came not to deliver all who shall be finally happy, from the curse of the law; but to inflict that curse on a part of them. By whom then will those torments, those most excellent means of grace, be administered? Is not Christ the judge of all men? The father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the son. We must all stand at his judgment seat and receive according to that which we shall have done in the body whether good or evil: and he will say; Depart, ye cursed, into ever­lasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.

4. IF the penalty of the law consist in that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then all the damned, if brought to repentance at all, are delivered out of hell, not on the footing of grace and mercy, or of fa­vour and goodness; but on the footing of the strictest justice; not on the footing of the gospel, but of the rigour of law.—By the present hypothesis, the damned all suffer that punishment, which is necessary to lead them to repentance, and therein suffer the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the utmost rigour of law and justice denounces or can inflict. If the Deity himself were to proceed in punishing, one step beyond this line, he would exceed the bounds of justice, would rise in opposition to his own perfections, would deny himself; in short, would no longer be God. Therefore as soon as a sinner [Page 32] in hell is brought to repentance, he must be immediately released. Nor is he under obligation to plead for grace or favour; he may demand rele [...] on the footing of per­sonal justice. He is under no necessity to have recourse to the gospel, he may insist on his personal right, on the foot­ing of the law. He hath satisfied the law; he hath satis­fied the justice of God; it hath taken its course on him; he hath nothing more to fear from it; and he must be delivered from further punishment or else he is injured, he is oppressed.

NAY; to plead for mercy or favour in order to his deli­verance, is not merely needless; it is out of character, it is degrading himself who stands right with respect to the law, to the place of one who is obnoxious to still further punishment. It implies that he is ignorant of his own character and relation to the Deity and his law. Equally out of character would he act, if on his deliverance, he should render praise or thanks, either to God the father, or to his son Jesus Christ. Surely a man condemned by a civil judge, to receive forty stripes save one, after he has recived them, is under no obligation to render praise or thanks for his release, either to the judge or to the ex­ecutive officer.

BUT how are these things reconcileable with the scrip­tures? Surely these consequences fairly deducible from the hypothesis under consideration, are entirely inconsist­ent with the gospel; and the hypothesis itself cannot con­sistently be embraced by any believer in the New Testa­ment.

PARTICULARLY: This hypothesis precludes all possi­bility of forgiveness of the damned, even, on the supposi­tion that they are finally to be admitted to heavenly hap­piness.—Forgivness implies, that the sinner forgiven is not punished in his own person, according to law and justice. But on the hypothesis under consideration in this chapter, all the damned, are in their own persons punished according to law and justice, in that they suffer that punishment, which is necessary to lead them to re­pentance. Who would think of telling a man, who has in his own person, received the corporal punishment, to which he had been condemned, that the crime for which he received that punishment, is freely forgiven him! [Page 33] This would be adding insult to the rigour of justice.— But according to the scriptures, it seems there is no sal­vation on the footing of the law, or without forgivness. Therefore either it must be made to appear, that the scriptures do admit the idea, that some men will be receiv­ed to heaven on the footing of law, and without forgiv­ness of sins; or the hypothesis, that the punishment, which is sufficient to lead to repentance, is the curse of the law, must be renounced.

5. ALL men who are by any means brought to repent­ance, whether by the torment of hell or any other cause, are on the footing of justice entitled to perfect subsequent impunity. By the supposition, the sole just end of all the punishment inflicted by the Deity, is the repentance of the sinner. But this end is already obtained in all who are the subjects of repentance. Therefore to punish them is to inflict pain or misery for no just end whatever. But that the Deity should inflict misery for no just end, is for him to commit injustice and wanton cruelty, which is im­possible. What then is become of the curse or penalty of the divine law? The apostle declares, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This seems to import, that eve­ry transgressor is exposed to a curse. But he who transgresses in ever so many instances, and then whether sooner or later repents, whether his repentance be ef­fected by mercies, or by judgments, or by any other cause, is exposed to no curse, no punishment whatever; nor can without injustice be made the subject of any. On this scheme, if there be any curse in the law, it must, be re­pentance itself. By the curse of the law, is doubtless meant the ill consequence, to which the sinner is by law and justice subjected, on account of his transgression.— BUT according to the scheme now before us, repent­tance, whensoever and by what cause soever it may exist in a sinner, is all the ill consequence (if it may be so call­ed) to which he is by law and justice subjected on account of any sin or sins. This therefore with respect to him is the whole curse of the law, and can this be true? "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." But hath Christ redeemed us from repent­ance? and did he effect that redemption, by becoming him­self a penitent?

[Page 34]6. ON the hypothesis, that no man can be justly pun­ished for any other end, than his own personal good; no man commits any sin or moral evil, by any damage which he does, or can do, to any being beside himself; and the whole evil of sin consists in this, that by it a man does more or less damage to himself; but he never does, nor can possibly commit sin, by dishonouring or doing damage to any other being created or divine, only so far as, in the same action, he does damage to himself personally consi­dered—If God never do nor can justly punish a sinner, for any other end, than to lead him to repentance and to promote his good; and if all just punishment be a mere discipline necessary and wholesome to the recipient; then punishment inflicted for any other end is unjust. It is unjust to punish a sinner on account of any contempt of the Deity, any opposition to his designs, to his cause or kingdom in the world, or on account of any abuses of any man or men, excepting so far as he damages himself at the same time. If it be just to punish a sinner for any of those sins, further, or in any other respect, than as he damages himself; it is just to punish him for other end or ends, than his own personal good; which is contrary to the supposition.—But if it be unjust to punish for actions in any other respect than as in those actions a man damages himself or his own interest; it must be because there is no moral evil in those actions, on any other account, or in any other view of them, than that by them he does a da­mage to himself, and the whole evil of sin must consist in this, that it is disadvantageous to the sinner's own inter­est or happiness. The end of all punishment is the remo­val or prevention of evil: and the evil to be removed or prevented by punishment, and which is the only ground of punishment, is the only evil of sin. But the hypothesis which we are opposing throughout this chapter is, that the only just ends of punishment, are the repentance and good of the sinner himself; that is, the removal or pre­vention of personal evil to the sinner, is the only just end of punishing him. Of course this personal evil to the sin­ner, is the only just ground of punishing him, and is the whole evil of sin.

NOW if this be the whole evil of sin, and it deserve punishment on no other account than this; no wonder [Page 35] there is such opposition made to the doctrine of endless punishment. For truly, if the nature and evil of sin be such, as hath been just now stated, not only the endless punishment of it is unjust, but any punishment of however short duration is unjust; because sin carries its own full punishment in itself. All that punishment which it de­serves, is either contained in sin at the time it is commit­ted, or it follows afterward, as a natural and necessary consequence, without any pain inflicted by the Deity; and to inflict any the least pain on the sinner, as a punishment of his sin, is manifestly unjust and absurd.—If a child, in consequence of thrusting its finger into a candle, should suffer great pain, surely it would not, beside that pain, deserve chastisement: because all the evil of its impru­dence consists in bringing on itself that pain, and that pain itself is the full punishment of the imprudence. Therefore to inflict any further punishment must be unjust and cruel.—To apply this; all the moral evil of which the sinner is guilty, consists in bringing pain or loss on himself, and to punish him for this, is as absurd, as to punish the child just supposed; or to punish a man because he will walk with pebbles in his shoes, will whip him­self, or will bring on himself the pain of hunger, by go­ing without his ordinary meal.

7. ON this hypothesis, he that repenteth, shall be saved, from what? from that wise, wholesome and neces­sary discipline, which cannot be justly inflicted, after he becomes a penitent; or in other words, he shall be saved from a punishment which is entirely unjust.—Therefore the promises of salvation to those who repent, amount to nothing more than assurances; that GOD will not abuse, injure or rob them of their personal rights. But do we want so many "exceeding great and precious promises," to assure us of this? Or are these promises so exceeding great and precious, as it seems they were in the judgment of an apostle? Have we not abundant evidence of the same truth, from the moral rectitude of the Deity, without the aid of even a single promise?

8. IF the sinner deserve no more punishment, than is necessary to lead to repentance, then he experiences much [Page 36] more of the grace and mercy of GOD, while he is in hell, than he does while he is on earth, or than he does in his deliverance from hell. In hell he enjoys those means of grace which are far better and more wisely and effectu­ally calculated to secure his everlasting happiness, than those means which he enjoys on earth. In hell he receives real and demonstrative tokens of the divine grace and mer­cy in that discipline which is so necessary and so happily conducive to his everlasting happiness. But in deliverance from hell on his repentance, he receives no favour; his de­liverance is a mere act of justice which cannot be denied him.

9. ON the same hypothesis, the curse of the law, and the greatest, most necessary and most desirable mean of grace with respect to the impenitent, are one and the same thing. This is so plain, that not a word need be said to elucidate it. Therefore if Christ were to save any man from the curse of the law, he would deprive him of the best mean of grace, which he does or can enjoy; and this salvation itself, so far from a blessing to the sinner, would be an infinitely greater curse, then the curse of the law; because it would deprive him of a necessary and most ex­cellent mean of grace, the punishment which is necessary to lead him to repentance. Nor would the gift of Christ himself, his incarnation, sufferings, death, atonement, or any thing which he hath done, or can possibly do, to save us from the curse of the law, be any favour or bles­sing to the person to be saved, but utterly the reverse. It is evidently no blessing to any man personally, but the reverse, that any measures should be taken to deprive him of the best and most necessary mean of grace, without which he would not be prepared for heaven and could not be admitted to it.

10. THE doctrine, that the sinner deserves no more punishment, than is necessary to lead to repentance, con­futes itself in this respect; that while it holds forth, that no punishment can justly be inflicted on the sinner, but that which is merely disciplinary, at the same time it supposes, that such a punishment is in fact inflicted on all the damned, as is to the highest degree vindictive. What is a proper [Page 37] vindictive punishment, but that which satisfies the demands of law and justice? But that such a punishment is inflicted on all the damned, is supposed by all who espouse the principle, which I am now opposing. Therefore in that very doctrine, in which they mean to oppose all vindictive punishment, they in the fullest sense hold it, by holding that such punishment as is conducive to the good of the sufferer, is all which justice admits.

IF they should say, that the punishment of the damned is not merely vindictive; but at the same time disciplinary too, and therefore just: though if it were merely vindic­tive, it would be unjust: I answer, the present question entirely respects punishment which is merely disciplinary. Therefore to allow, that the punishment of the damned is partly vindictive, is to give up this question, and to sub­stitute another.—Beside; if a vindictive punishment be unjust, how can it become just by being connected with a punishment, which is just? To correct a child, to gratify a malicious temper, is doubtless unjust. Now, if a man correct his child from two motives, partly from malice, and partly from a view to the good of the child; the jus­tice of his conduct, so far as he is influenced by the latter motive, can never render his conduct just, so far as it pro­ceeds from the former.

A vindictive punishment is that which is inflicted with a design to support the authority of a broken law, and of a dispised government: And if the punishment be just, it is at the same time according to the conduct or demerit of the transgressor. This is demanded by every law; and if the law be just, it is justly demanded: Or in other words, such a punishment of the transgression of a just law, as is sufficient to support the authority of that law, is a just pu­nishment. At the same time it is a punishment as truly, and to as high a degree vindictive, as justice will admit. Now if that punishment which is necessary to lead the sin­ner to repentance, be sufficient thus to support the autho­rity and dignity of the divine law and government, and be inflicted for this end; it is to the highest degree vin­dictive, and designedly vindictive. If it be not sufficient to answer those ends, it is not the whole punishment, [Page 38] which the divine law and justice demand: For as I have before observed, every just and wise law demands that punishment which is necessary to its own support or exist­ence, and justice and wisdom enforce this demand.

Therefore let the advocates for universal salvation make their choice. If they shall choose to hold agreeably to the present supposition, that such punishment as is necessary to lead to repentance, is all that can justly be inflicted on the sinner, and that therefore it is sufficient to support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government; they stand convicted of holding, that the punishment of the damned is by no means merely disciplinary, but to the highest degree vindictive. If on the other hand, they choose to hold, that the punishment which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, is not adequate to the pur­poses before mentioned; then they must renounce the principle, which we have been so long considering, and allow the divine law does denounce a further punishment, than that which is necessary to lead the sinner to repen­tance, and is a mere discipline. Because the divine law being perfectly just, does justly, and must necessarily ad­mit of that punishment, which is sufficient to its own sup­port or existence.—Thus on either supposition, they must renounce a very favourite tenet.

11. WITH what propriety can we talk of satisfying the law by repentance, or by that punishment, which is neces­sary to lead to repentance; when the law says not a word expressly concerning repentance, either in consequence of punishment, or without it? By the law is the knowledge of sin; but by it we know nothing of any good, to be obtained by repentance, whether in the way of favour, or in the way of justice. The doctrine of any advantage to be obtained by repentance, is a doctrine of the gospel only, not of the law. Yet if it be unjust to punish a sin­ner with any other view, than to lead him to repentance, this doctrine would undoubtedly be found in the law. The voice of the law is, not cursed is every one that trans­gresseth, and doth not repent: But cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.

[Page 39]12. From the principle, that sin deserves no other pun­ishment, than that which is subservient to the good of the sinner, it will follow, that what we call sin, is no moral evil.

IT seems to be a dictate of reason and the common sense of mankind, that moral evil should be followed, or de­serves to be followed, with natural evil or with pain and shame: and that this natural evil be a real evil to the sin­ner, an evil to him on the whole. But that evil, which is necessary and subservient to a man's personal good, is to him no real evil; but on the whole is, even to him per­sonally, a good, a blessing, and not a curse. Now it is not a dictate of reason and common sense, that moral evil deserves a blessing. That which deserves a blessing and no curse, is no moral evil. Therefore if sin deserve no other punishment than that which is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, it is no moral evil.

IF it be said to be no dictate of common sense, that mo­ral evil should be followed with natural evil: it may be answered, that surely it is not a dictate of common sense, that it be followed, with natural good. This would imply, that it deserves a reward.—Nor is it a dictate of common sense, that it be followed with neither natural good nor natural evil. This would imply, that it is worthy of neither praise nor blame, reward nor punishment; and therefore is neither a mo­ral good nor a moral evil. Both which conclusions are absurd. Therefore it remains, that it is a dictate of rea­son and common sense, that moral evil be followed with natural evil.—Or if it be further urged, that it is a dictate of common sense, that moral evil considering the infinite goodness and mercy of God, should be followed with no natural evil; it is to be observed, that this is giving up the ground of justice, and going on that of goodness and mercy, which is entirely foreign to the subject of this chapter. The inquiry of this chapter is what sin deserves on the footing of justice, not what it will actually suffer on the footing the divine infinite goodness and mercy. This latter inquiry shall be carefully attended to in its place, chapter VIII.

[Page 40]AGAIN; Moral evil is in itself, or in its own nature, odious and the proper object of disapprobation and abhor­rence. By its own nature I mean its tendency to evil, the dishonour of the Deity and the misery or diminution of the happiness of the created system. Therefore it is not injurious to the person who perpetrates moral evil, to disapprove, hate and abhor it in itself, aside from all con­sideration of the consequences of such disapprobation, whether such consequences be to the perpetrator personal­ly good or bad. Hence it follows, that it is not injuri­ous to the perpetrator of moral evil, to manifest disappro­bation of his conduct, so far as morally evil, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not. And if sin be a moral evil, it is not injurious to the sinner, both to disapprove, and to manifest disapprobation of sin, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not.—But this directly contradicts the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is sub­servient to the good of the sinner. For what is punish­ment, but a manifestation of disapprobation, which a per­son vested with authority has, of the conduct of a sub­ject? And if it be not injurious to the sinner, to disap­prove his sin, and to manifest that disapprobation, whe­ther it subserve his good or not; then his sin, or he on account of his sin, deserves both disapprobation, and the manifestation of disapprobation, though that manifesta­tion be not subservient to his personal good: which is the same thing as to say, that the sinner deserves punishment, whether that punishment subserve his own good or not. On the other hand, if it be not just to manifest disappro­bation of sin, it is not just to disapprove sin. If it be not just to disapprove or to hate sin, aside from the considera­tion, that the disapprobation is conducive to the personal good of the sinner; then sin is not in itself, or in its own nature and tendency, hateful or odious, but becomes odi­ous then only, when the hatred of it conduces to the per­sonal good of the sinner. But if sin be not in itself odi­ous, it is not a moral evil; which was the thing to be proved.

THERE seems to be no way to avoid this consequence [Page 41] but by holding, that moral evil is not in itself odious and abominable, but that it becomes odious then only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the personal good of the perpetrator: which is the same as to hold, that moral e­vil, as such, is not at all odious, but is odious in this par­ticular case only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the good of the perpetrator: but in all other cases, it is a matter of indifferency at least, if not an object of cordial complacency; and therefore in all other cases is no mo­ral evil.

ON the supposition which I am now opposing, when a man sins and immediately repents, he deserves no punish­ment, because the end of all punishment is already ob­tained by his repentance, and a tendency of punishment to the repentance of the sinner, which is the only circum­stance, on the present hypothesis which can justify his punishment, cannot now be pretended, as a reason for his punishment. Therefore any punishment after repen­tance, must be undeserved and unjust. But if sin be a moral evil or a crime, it is in its own nature displeasing to GOD, and he may justly both be displeased at it, and manifest his displeasure; that is, he may punish it, whe­ther the sinner repent or not, Repentance though it is a renunciation of sin in future, makes no alteration in the nature of the sin which is past; nor is it any satisfaction for that sin. If it were, it would be either the curse of the law, or such a meritorius act of virtue, as to balance the demerit of sin: Neither of which will be pretended. But if the only reason why it is, or can be just for GOD to shew displeasure at sin, be, that the sinner may thereby be led to repentance; then sin itself, or the proper nature of sin, is not a just reason, why God should either be dis­pleased, or show displeasure at it. Impenitence or the repetition of sin or the continuance of the sinner in it, is on this supposition, the only just reason or ground of ei­ther displeasure, or of any manifestation of displeasure at sin. Therefore sin in general, or sin as such, deserves no displeasure or manifestation of displeasure; but sin in some particular case only, as when it is persisted in or re­peated. If we should hold, that sins committed in the day time, do not deserve punishment; but that those which are committed in the night, do deserve punishment, I [Page 42] think it would be manifest to every man, that we denied, that sin as such, and by the general nature common to all sins, deserves punishment; and that we confined the desert of punishment to something which is merely accidental, and not at all essential to sin. And is it not manifest, that the desert of punishment is as really not extended to the general nature of sin, but is confined to something merely accidental, when it is asserted, that sin deserves no punish­ment, unless it be followed with impenitence? or unless it be persisted in? or, which is the same thing, that no pun­ishment is just, except that which is designed to lead the sinner to repentance?

IF sin do not by its general nature deserve punishment, it does not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displeasure; because all manifestation of divine dis­pleasure at sin, is punishment.—Again, if sin do not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displea­sure, it does not by its general nature deserve displeasure it­self: and if so, it is not by its general nature a moral evil.

IT appears then, that on the hypothesis now under consideration, sin deserves neither punishment nor hatred, and is no moral evil, unless it be followed with impeni­tence; or unless it be persisted in, for at least some time. The first act of sin is no moral evil. But if the first act be not a moral evil, why is the second, the third, or any subsequent act? Impenitence is nothing but a repe­tition or perseverance in acts the same or similar to that of which we do not repent. But if the first act, abstract­ed from the subsequent, be not a moral evil, what reason can be assigned, why the subsequent should be a moral evil? Thus the principle, that sin deserves punishment so far only, as the punishment of it tends to the repentance and good of the sinner, implies, that there is no moral evil in the universe, either in the first sin, or in any which follow; none even in impenitence itself.—On the other hand, if sin in all instances be a moral evil, it is justly to be abhorred by the Deity, whether repentance succeed or not: and if it may justly be abhorred by the Deity, he may justly manifest his abhorrence of it, whe­ther repentance succeed or not. But to allow this, is to give up the principle, that sin deserves no other punish­ment, than that which is subservient to the repentance and good of the sinner.

[Page 43]PUNISHMENT is a proper manifestation of displeasure, made by a person in authority, at some crime or moral e­vil. If sin, though repented of, be still a moral evil, and the just object of the divine displeasure; why is it not just, that this displeasure should be manifested? But the manifestation of the divine displeasure at moral evil, is punishment.—If on the other hand, it be an injurious treatment of a sinner, that the Deity should, after repent­ance, manifest his displeasure at him, on account of his sin; then doubtless it is injurious in the Deity to be dis­pleased with him on account of his sin, of which he has repented. Again; if it be injurious in the Deity to be dis­pleased with a man on account of his sin, after he has de­sisted from it in repentance, why is it not injurious to be displeased with him, on account of his past sin, though he is still persisting in sin? If one act of murder be not the proper object of the abhorrence of all holy intelligences, creator and creatures why are two or one hundred acts of murder proper objects of abhorrence. Add nought to itself as often as you please, you can never make it something.—So that by this principle we seem to be ne­cessarily led to this conclusion, that no man on account of any sin whatever, whether repented of or not, can con­sistently with justice be made the object of divine abhor­rence or displeasure, and consequently that sin in no in­stance whatever is a moral evil.

ON the principle which I am now opposing, whenever a man commits any sin, for instance murder, neither God, nor man hath any right to manifest displeasure at his con­duct, or even to be displeased with it, till two things are fully known; first whether the murderer do or do not repent; secondly, whether displeasure in this case, or the manifestation of displeasure, will conduce to the happiness of the murderer. If he do repent, no intelligent being hath a right, on the footing of justice, to be displeased; nor even if he be impenitent, unless it be known for a cer­tainty, that the displeasure of the person, who is inquir­ing whether he have a right to be displeased or not, will conduce to the repentance and good of the murderer. To say otherwise; to say that we have a right in justice to be displeased with the conduct of a murderer, though he does repent, or though such displeasure does not con­duce [Page 44] to his repentance and happiness, is to give up the principle in question. For if we may justly be displeased with his conduct, though he is penitent, or though our displeasure does not conduce to his personal happiness; we may justly manifest our displeasure. But manifesta­tion of displeasure, especially by a ruler, at the miscon­duct of a subject, is punishment.

ONCE more; on the supposition that we have no right to be displeased with murder, unless our displeasure con­duce to the good of the murderer; if there be any moral evil or turpitude in murder, it consists not in the murder itself, or in the malicious action of murder; but wholly in this circumstance attending it, that displeasure at it, conduces to the personal good of the murderer.

PERHAPS it may be objected to the reasoning in the last argument, that if it prove any thing, it proves too much, and therefore really proves nothing; that if sin, or any crime, do in all cases, and on account of its own [...] and turpitude, deserve disapprobation and punish­ment, it will follow, that it deserves the same, even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice; that after such punishment the nature of the crime is the same which it was before; that the crime therefore is still the proper object of disapprobation, and of the mani­festation of disapprobation; and on the ground of the pre­ceding reasoning, deserves an additional punishment, af­ter it has been once punished according to strict distributive justice; which is absurd.

TO this it may be answered, that a crime considered in connection with its just and full punishment, is not that crime considered, in itself, or in its own nature mere­ly. Water mingled with wine, and thus become a com­pound substance, is no longer mere water. The prece­ding reasoning supposes, that a crime in its own nature and tendency deserves disapprobation and the manifesta­tion of disapprobation. But a crime taken with the full punishment of it which is according to strict distributive justice, and considered in this complex view, or that crime and the just punishment of it considered as one complex object, is not that crime considered in itself and in its own nature merely. Therefore although the crime considered in itself deserves punishment, yet considered [Page 45] in the complex view just stated, it deserves not additional punishment.—And whereas it is implied in the object­ion now under consideration, that a crime even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation, and therefore that disapprobation may justly be manifested even by the magi­strate, or the crime may be punished; it is to be observed, that the whole force of this reasoning depends on the mean­ing of the expression, a crime even after it has been punish­ed according to strict distributive justice, is still the just ob­ject of disapprobation. If the meaning of that expression be, that the crime considered in its own nature and ten­dency, and as abstracted from the punishment or any thing done to prevent the ill effect of the crime, is a pro­per object of disapprobation, and is an event most ardent­ly to be deprecated, or it is most ardently to be wished, that it might never have come into existence, and in this sense, it is the just object of disapprobation and of the manifestation of disapprobation: this is undoubtedly true, and no ill consequence to the preceding reasoning will follow. But if the meaning of that expression be, that a crime considered in connection with its just punish­ment and the good effects of that punishment, as one com­plex object, is a proper object of disapprobation, so that it is proper to wish, that this complex object had not come into existence; it is not true that in this sense a crime af­ter it has been punished according to strict distributive jus­ice, is still the just object of disapprobation. There have doubtless been many instances of crimes in civil society, which taken with the just punishments inflicted on them, have been on the whole the occasion of great good to so­ciety, have established government and preserved the peace of society longer and more effectually, than would have been the case, had no such crimes been committed. Therefore the existence of those crimes taken with the punishments, as one complex object, is no proper object of disapprobation or deprecation, but of acquiescence and joy: because in this connection they tend not to impair, but establish and promote the general good. In this sense any crime or any sin, after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is not the just object of disap­probation, and therefore not of the manifestation of dis­approbation [Page 46] or of punishment.—So that the foregoing reasoning will not prove that a sin or crime, once pun­ished according to strict distributive justice, deserves an additional punishment.

The essence of moral evil is, that it tends to impair the good and happiness of the universe: in that the odi­ousness of sin or of moral evil consists. And a punishment in the distributive sense just, is that punishment inflicted on the person of the sinner, which effectually pre­vents any ill consequence to the good of the universe, of the sin or crime punished. Now therefore sin taken with the just punishment of it, no more tends to impair the good of the universe, than poison taken with an ef­fectual antidote, tends to destroy the life of him who takes it.

Objection. 1. IF sin taken with its just punishment, do not tend to impair the good of the universe, and if the essence of moral evil consist in its tendency to impair the good of the universe, it seems that sin taken with its just punishment is no sin at all. Answer: It is indeed not mere sin. It is no more sin, than poison taken with its antidote, is poison. That poison which is mixed with the antidote, if it were separated from the antidote, would produce the same effects, is of the same tendency, and consequently of the same nature, as before the mixture. Yet the compound made by the mixture, produces no such effects, is of no such tendency, and consequently is of a very different na­ture. So any sin which is punished according to strict ju­stice, abstracted from the punishment, is of the same ten­dency and nature, of which it was before the punishment. Yet that sin taken with its full and just punishment, as one complex object, is of a very different tendency and nature, and will be followed with no such effects as would have followed from it, had it not been punished. In this sense, sin taken with its full and just punishment is indeed no sin at all.

Objection. 2. If the sinner do not deserve punishment, when the ill consequences of his sin are prevented by his personal punishment; why does he deserve punishment, when the ill consequences are prevented by the sufferings of his substitute?—Answer. Desert and ill desert are ac­cording to the character of the person himself, and not ac­cording to that of his representative or substitute. Now satisfaction for a crime by personal suffering is as really a [Page 47] part of the criminal's personal character, as the crime itself. But satisfaction by the suffering of another, is [...] part of the personal character of the criminal.

IF then on the whole, it be an established point, that on the supposition that no other punishment can be justly in­flicted on the sinner, than that which is necessary for his repentance and happiness, sin is no moral evil; this will be attended with many other consequences equally, or if possible, still more absurd:

1. THAT sin deserves no punishment at all. Surely no­thing but moral evil deserves punishment.

2. THAT neither sin itself, nor we as sinners are the ob­jects of the divine disapprobation.

3, THAT neither ought we to disapprove it, whether in ourselves or others.

4. THAT repentance is no duty of any man; yea, it is positively wrong. Shall we repent of an innocent action?

5. THAT the calamities which God brings on men in this life, are not reconcileable with justice. That these cala­mities in general are punishments or demonstrations of God's displeasure at the sins of mankind, is manifest from the scriptures. This is especially manifest concerning the most extraordinary and unusual calamities which in scrip­ture are mentioned to have befallen communities or indi­viduals; as the flood of Noah, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the destruction of Jerusalem and the Tem­ple by the Chaldeans, and afterwards by the Romans, the death of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Uzzah, &c. &c. But all these punishments were unjust, if sin be no moral evil.

6. THAT there is no foundation in any human actions or characters, for praise or blame, reward or punishment. If sin be no moral evil, it is not blameable; and if sin or vice do not deserve blame or punishment, virtue which is the opposite, does not deserve praise or reward: and all moral distinctions are groundless, as in a moral view there is no difference between virtue and vice, sin and holiness. Therefore there is no moral government in the universe, nor any foundation for it.

I NOW appeal to the reader, with regard to the propri­ety of the preceding remarks, and whether the absurdities before mentioned, be not indeed implied in the hypothesis, [Page 48] that the sinner can, consistently with justice, be made to suffer no other punishment, than that which is disciplinary or conducive to the good of the sufferer, by leading him to repentance and preparing him for happiness. If those absurdities justly follow, not the least doubt can remain, but that the principle from which they follow, is absurd and false.

CHAP. III. Whether the damned will in fact suffer any other punishment, than that which is conducive to their personal good.

IN the last chapter the subject of inquiry was, whether the damned sinner deserve, according to strict justice and the law of God, any other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead to repentance and prepare for happiness. But though it should be granted, that he does indeed deserve a further or greater punishment, than that which is sufficient for the ends just mentioned; yet it may be pleaded, that in fact he never will suffer any other pun­ishment; that in hell the damned are punished with the sole design of leading them to repentance; that when this design shall have been accomplished, whatever further punishment they may deserve, will be graciously remitted, and they immediately received to celestial felicity. Whe­ther this be indeed the truth, is the subject of our present inquiry.—With regard to this subject, I have to propose the following considerations.

1. If the damned do indeed deserve more punishment, than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance; then they may, consistently with justice, be made in fact to suf­fer more. That they may consistently with justice be made to suffer according to their demerits, is a self-evident pro­position. To punish them so far, is not at all inconsistent with the justice of God, therefore the objection drawn from the justice of God against vindictive punishment as opposed to mere discipline, must be wholly relinquished. A merely disciplinary punishment is one which is suited and designed to lead the sinner to repentance only. A vindic­tive punishment is one which is designed to be a testimony of the displeasure of God at the conduct of the sinner, and [Page 49] by that testimony, to support the authority of the divine law, subserve the general good, and thus satisfy justice: and it must be no more than adequate to the demerit of the sinner. I do not find that Dr. C. has in his whole book, given us a definition of a vindictive punishment, as he ought most certainly to have done. According to Che­valier Ramsay's definition of divine vindictive justice, vin­dictive punishment is, ‘That dispensation of God, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it is totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated.’ ⁶⁰ What then is a disciplinary punishment? This definition perfectly confounds disciplinary and vindictive punishment.

IF it be just to punish a sinner according to his demerit; as it certainly is by the very terms; and if such a punish­ment be greater than is sufficient to lead him to repentance merely; as is now supposed: then all objections drawn from the justice of God, against a vindictive punishment, and all arguments from the same topic, in favour of a pun­ishment merely disciplinary, are perfectly groundless and futile. The sinner lies at mercy; and if he be released on his repentance, it is an act of grace, and not of justice.

2. IF the damned do deserve more punishment than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance, they will in fact suffer more. As it is just, so justice will be executed. That they will be punished according to their demerits, is capable of clear proof, both by the authority of scripture, and by that of Dr. C.

(1) By the authority of scripture.—This assures us, that God will ‘render to every man according to his deeds to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tri­bulation and anguish upon every soul that doth evil,’ Rom. II. 6, &c. ‘For the work of a man, shall he ren­der unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways,’ Job, XXXIV. 2. ‘Thou renderest to every man according to his work,’ Psal. LXII. 12. ‘I the lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings,’ Jer. XVII. 10. See also chap. XXXII. 19. ‘For the son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works,’ Matt. [Page 50] XVI. 27. ‘For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whe­ther it be good or bad,’ 2 Cor. V. 10. ‘Behold I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be,’ Rev. XXII. 12. ‘Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him: lest at any time the adver­sary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing,’ Mat. V. 25, 26. In the parallel text in Luke, it is thus ex­pressed, ‘I tell thee, thou shalt not depart thence till thou hast paid the very last mite.’ James. II. 13, ‘He shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy.’ Rev. XIV. 10, ‘The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation? and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever.’

These texts, it is presumed, sufficiently shew, that we have the authority of scripture to prove, that in the future world, the wicked will be punished accoding to their de­merits, and that no mercy will be shewn them.

(2) The same truth is evidently holden by Dr. C.— He asserts, ^*that ‘there will be no salvation for those in the next state, who habitually indulge to lust in this; but they must be unavoidably miserable, notwithstand­ing the infinite benevolence of the Deity, and to a great degree, God only knows how long, in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices.’ ^‡That ‘some of them’ [the damned] ‘shall be tormented for ages of ages, the rest variously, as to time, in proportion to their deserts:’ That they will suffer ‘^†positive tor­ments in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes:’ That ‘^**there will be a difference in the pun­ishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds:’ That "^†† if they" [the blasphmers of the Holy Ghost are ‘[Page 51]not saved till after they have passed through these tor­ments’ [of hell] ‘they have never been forgiven.— The divine law has taken its course; nor has any inter­vening pardon prevented the full execution of the threat­ened penalty.’ Some observations have been already ^‡‡ made on these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, to show, that on Dr. C's plan they equally prove, that all the damned are saved without forgiveness; that the divine law has its course on them all; that they all suffer the full threatened penalty, and of course they suffer all that punishment which they deserve.

THE other quotations set this matter in a light equally clear. If the wicked shall be punished in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices; in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; according to the na­ture and number of their evil deeds; in proportion to their deserts; they will most certainly receive the full punish­ment due to them according to their demerits, and nothing will be remitted to them.

THUS it appears both by the authority of scripture and also by that of Dr. C. that the damned will actually suffer all that punishment, which they deserve. And as it is now supposed to be proved in the preceding chapter, that the damned deserve a further punishment than that which is conducive to their repentance and personal good; of course it follows, that they will in fact suffer such further punish­ment.

OBJECTION.—The argument from the scriptural de­clarations, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works &c, to prove, that they will suffer all which they justly deserve, is not conclusive; because the same expressions are used concerning the righteous, setting forth, that they shall be rewarded according to their works &c. Yet it is granted on all hands, that their reward is not merely such as they deserve, or is not strictly according to justice.

ANSWER. The reward of the righteous is indeed not merely such as they deserve, but infinitely exceeds their deserts. It is therefore at least equal to their deserts; or it falls not short of them. If this be allowed concerning the punishment of the wicked, it is sufficient for every purpose of the preceding argument. If the wicked suffer a punishment at least equal to their demerits; then no part of the punishment deserved by them, is remitted to them. [Page 52] Beside; the declarations of scripture are, that the wicked shall pay the uttermost farthing, the very last mite; that they shall have judgment without mercy, wrath with­out mixture, &c. which are as strong and determinate expressions, to represent that they will be punished to the full extent of justice, as can be conceived.

3. ALTHOUGH Dr. C. is so great an enemy to vindict­ive punishment; yet he himself, holds that men do even in this life suffer such punishment. ‘But do those testi­monies of his vengeance lose their nature as judgments on his part, and real evils on their's, because they may be an occasion of that repentance, which shall issue in their salvation? When God threatened the Jewish nation, in case they would not do his commandments, with famine, the pestilence, the sword, and a dispersion into all parts of the earth; did he threaten them with a benefit? And when those threatenings were for their sins carried into execution, did he inflict a blessing on them? When he threatened in particular, that if they where disobedient, they should be cursed in the field, Deut. XXVIII. 16, did he hereby intend, that the field should be cursed; but that he meant thereby a real benefit to them?’ ^*If vindictive punishment be in­flicted even in this life, much more may we conclude that it is inflicted in hell, the proper place of retribution to the wicked.

4. IF the punishment of hell be a mere discipline hap­pily conducive to the good of the sufferers, there is no forgiveness in the preservation of a man from it. It is no forgiveness for a parent to give his child a li­cence to tarry from school; or for a physician to allow his patient to desist from the cold bath, which he had pre­scribed. Or if a parent, to inure his child to hunger and cold, have kept him for some time on a scanty diet, and have clothed him but thinly; it is no act of forgiveness, to allow the child in future a full diet, or warm cloth­ing. Forgiveness is to remit a deserved penalty, or to ex­empt from penal evil; not to deprive of a benefit, or of any thing which is absolutely necessary to our happiness, and which is therefore on the whole no real evil, but a real good. If therefore there be nothing more penal or vindictive in the punishment of hell, than in the cold [Page 53] bath, or in the scanty diet and thin clothing just men­tioned; there is no more of forgiveness in exemption from the former, than in exemption from the latter.— Thus the scheme of disciplinary punishment in hell leads to a conclusion utterly inconsistent with the whole tenor of scripture, and of the writings of Dr. C.

5. ALL those texts which speak of the divine vengeance, fury, wrath, indignation, fiery indignation, &c. hold forth some other punishment, than that which is merely disciplinary. The texts to which I refer are such as these; Deut. XXXII. 41, ‘If I whet my glittering sword and mine hand take hold on judgment; I will render ven­geance to mine enemies, and will reward them that hate me.’ Rom. III. 5, 6, ‘Is God unrighteous, who taketh vengeance?’ —"God forbid." Chap. XII. 19, "Vengeance is mine: I will repay saith the Lord." Luke. XXI. 22, "These be the days of vengeance." 2 Thes. I. 8, ‘In flaming fire taking vengeance of them, that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.’ —Jude. 7, ‘Suffering the vengeance of eternal fire.’ —Job. XX. 23, ‘When he is about to fill his belly, God shall cast the fury of his wrath upon him.’ —Isai. LI. 17, ‘Awake, awake, stand up O Jerusalem, which hast drunk at the hand of the Lord, the cup of his fury; thou hast drunken the dregs of the cup of trembling, and wrung them out.’ —Chap. LIX. 18, ‘According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay fury to his adversa­ries, recompence to his enemies’ &c. Instances of the denunciation of wrath against the wicked, are noted in the margin.^*—Rom. II. 8, 9, "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doth evil." Heb. X. 27, ‘A certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.’ See also Psal. L. 22. Heb. XII. 29, Luke. XII. 46.—Rev. XIV. 10. "Shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation." Therefore in the punish­ment of the wicked there will be no mixture of mercy or forgiveness.

IT is of no importance, that in some of the texts now quot­ed, a reference is not had to the punishments of the future [Page 54] world, but to those of this life. If God can consistently with his perfections inflict a partial vengeance, why not the whole of that which is justly due? If he can and does inflict vengeance in this life, why not in the future too, provided, as is now granted, it be just?

THAT the passages now quoted, do indeed speak of a punishment more than merely disciplinary, is manifest by the very terms of the passages themselves. To say that vengeance, wrath, fury, indignation, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture, mean a mere wholesome, fatherly disci­pline, designed for the good only of the subjects, is to say that the inspired writers were grossly ignorant of the proper and common use of language; and particularly that they were wholly ignorant of that important dis­tinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment, on which Dr. C. and other writers of his class so much insist. If vengeance mean fatherly discipline, what is pro­per vengeance? If it be proper to call fatherly chastise­ment, vengeance, wrath, fury, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture; by what name is it proper to call a punishment really vindictive?

6. THE same may be argued from various other passag­es of scripture, some of which I shall now cite. 1 Cor. XVI. 22. ‘If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha.’ It is absurd to suppose, that this curse means a discipline designed for the good on­ly of the patients. Such a discipline is so far from a curse, that it is a very great blessing.—Deut. XXVII. 26, compared with Gal. III. 10, ‘Cursed be he that confirm­eth not all the words of this law, to do them.’ Deut. XXIX. 19. ‘And it come to pass, when he heareth the words of this curse, that he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagi­nation of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst. The Lord will not spare him, but the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book, shall lie upon him, and the Lord will blot out his name from under heaven. And the Lord shall separate him unto evil, out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant, that are written in this book of the law.’ —This text seems to be in several respects inconsistent with the idea, that [Page 55] the future punishment of the sinner it merely disciplinary. IT declares, that "the Lord will not spare him." But to inflict that punishment only, which is far less than the sinner deserves, and which is not at all vindictive, but wholly conducive to his good, is very greatly to spare him. It is further said, that the ‘anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against him:’ which is not an ex­pression properly and naturally representing the discipline, which proceeds from parental affection seeking the good on­ly of the child. The same may be observed of this ex­pression, ‘The Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven.’ It is added, ‘All the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him’ — ‘And the Lord shall separate him unto evil—according to all the curses of the covenant, which are written in this book of the law.’ These last expressions seem to be very determinate. Curs­es are not blessings: but that discipline which is subservient to the good of the subject is a blessing. The curses here mentioned are all the curses written in this book of Moses, or the book of the LAW. Therefore some men will suffer the curse of the law, even the whole curse of the law, or all the curses mentioned in the law; which, by what has come up to our view in the last chapter, appears to be more than a discipline promoting the good of the subject.

AGAIN; Deut. XI. 26—29, ‘Behold I set before you this day a blessing and a curse. A blessing, if ye will obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a curse, if ye will not obey the commandments of the Lord your God.’ — Prov. III. 33, ‘The curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked; but he blesseth the habitation of the just.’ —Job XXIV. 18, ‘Their portion is cursed in the earth.’ —Psal. XXXVII. 22, ‘They that be cursed of him, shall be cut off.’ —Psal. CXIX. 21, "Thou hast rebuked the proud, that are accursed."— Jer. XI. 3, ‘Cursed be the man that obeyeth not the words of this covenant.,’ Ibid. chap. XVII. 5, ‘Cursed, be the man, that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm.’ Mal. I. 14, "Cursed be the deceiver," &c Chap. III. 9, "Ye are cursed with a curse." 2 Pet. II. 14, "Cursed children."

BY all these texts it appears, that some men do or shall [Page 56] suffer the curse of God. Whether all these texts refer to a curse to be inflicted after death, does not for reasons al­ready given materially affect the present argument. A curse is undoubtedly a punishment which does not promote the good of the subject▪ otherwise a curse and a blessing are perfectly confounded.

IF it shall still be insisted, that the curse so often men­tioned, means that punishment only, which is conducive to the good of the subject: it may be answered, then there would be no impropriety in calling the present af­flictions of the real disciples of Christ, by the name of a curse. Why then are they not so called in scripture? Why are not the real children of God, even the most vir­tuous and pious of them, said to be cursed by God, &c.? And why are not the curses of the wicked, as well as the afflictions of the righteous, said to work together for their good, and to work out for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? Dr. C. loves to illustrate the punishment of hell by the discipline inflicted by fathers on earth▪ with a sole view to the good of their children. But would it be proper to call the necessary, wise and wholesome discipline of earthly parents, by the name of a curse? or is it ever so called, either by God or man?— Equally absurd is it, to call the punishment of hell by that name, if it be designed for the good only of the pa­tients.

I beseech the reader to consider what a contrast there is between the texts, which have now been quoted, and those in which a punishment really disciplinary is mention­ed and described. In the former the punishment is called by the names of vengeance, fury, wrath, smoaking wrath, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture, a curse, an ana­thema, all the curses of the law, &c. Whereas the real discipline of God's children is called a chastisement; ‘If ye be without chastisement, then are ye bastards and not sons:’ a correction ▪ ‘I will correct thee in mea­sure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished.’ This correction is said to be mingled with pity. ‘Like as a father pitieth his children; so the Lord pitieth them that fear him.’ ‘I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes, nevertheless, my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him.’ But where [Page 57] in all the scriptures is the punishment of the future state represented to be designed for the good of the subjects? Where is it in scripture called a fatherly chastisement, cor­rection or discipline, or by any other appellation of the like import? What right then have we to consider it as a mere chastisement? Is not this an idea formed in the fond ima­gination of those who would fain support a favourite sys­tem?

7. IF future punishment be merely disciplinary, the discipline will produce its proper effect on some, sooner than on others. Some who shall in this life have contract­ed a less degree of depravity and hardness of heart, will be more easily and speedily brought to repentance, than others. This on the hypothesis now made, is both agree­able to the dictates of reason, and is the very doctrine ex­pressly and abundantly taught by Dr. C. But how is this to be reconciled with the account of scripture? That in­forms us, that all those on the left hand of the judge are to be sentenced to everlasting fire, and shall go away into everlasting punishment. The sentence denounced on all is in the same terms, and not the least intimation is given, that some of them shall be punished longer than others; much less that only some shall be punished for ages of ages; others released, in a much shorter time. Dr. C. and other writers of his class suppose, that in hell the wicked are put under those means of grace, which are vastly more advantageous, powerful and conducive to the effect of re­pentance, than those means which are enjoyed in this life. But the same writers will allow, that in many instances, even the means which are enjoyed in this life are followed with the desired effect of repentance, and this within so short a term as threescore years and ten. Therefore we may reasonably conclude that within the like term, many more will be brought to repentance by the vastly more powerful means to be used with the damned: and so on through every successive period of seventy years. I think then an answer to two questions may justly be demanded of any one in Dr. C's scheme.

(1) WITH what truth or propriety can a sentence of everlasting punishment be pronounced on the whole body of sinners, when some of them shall repent and be saved very soon; others in large numbers, in every succeeding [Page 58] age, and even every year? As well might a sentence of exclusion from pardon and the favour of God during this life, be pronounced against the whole of every generation of mankind, because some men do indeed continue in that state during this life. Nay, with much greater truth and propriety might this latter sentence be pronounced, than the former; because it is granted by Dr. C. and others, that the greater part of men live and die in impe­nitence and alienation from God. Whereas, allowing that the punishment of the wicked is a mere discipline, we may presume, that very few indeed of the whole number of the damned, will remain in torment, for that duration, which according to the ideas of our opponents, is intended by everlasting and for ever and ever, and which is the longest punishment to be inflicted on any of the human race. This is a punishment reserved for a very few, the most depraved, hardened, abandoned sinners, perhaps one in a thousand or ten thousand. The rest less hardened and more easily wrought on by the powerful means of grace used with the damned, will be brought to repentance by a punishment of shorter continuance.

I know Dr. C. says, that though all the damned shall not, yet as some of them shall, suffer that punishment, which in his sense, is everlasting and forever and ever, therefore everlasting punishment may be truly asserted of them collectively. But the same reason would justify a sentence excluding the whole human race from pardon and the divine savour, during the whole of the present life. God might with the same truth and propriety have said to Adam and all his posterity, even after the revelation of the covenant of grace, I doom you, in righteous judgment, to live and die the objects of my wrath. This latter sen­tence would, for the reason before assigned, have been not only equally, but much more conformed to truth and fact, than that which shall be pronounced on the wicked at the end of the world; if they shall be delivered out of hell from time to time in every age and perhaps every year. Yet it is presumed, no man will plead for the truth and propriety of the sentence just supposed.

(2) THE other question to which an answer may be ex­pected, is, how has it come to pass, that no intimation of a difference in the duration of the punishment of the [Page 59] wicked, is hinted in any part of the scriptures? The dif­ference between a punishment of a few years, and one which is to last for ages of ages, or for such a duration, as may with propriety be called an eternity, is very great, and we should think, well worthy to be noticed in the scriptures. To say, that it is noticed in those texts, which inform us, that the wicked shall be punished accor­ding to their works, &c. is to beg a point in dispute: be­cause those who believe endless punishment, believe that the works of all sinners deserve an endless punishment; and though they will suffer different punishments accor­ding to their different demerits; yet the difference will not consist in duration, but in degree: as the righteous will be rewarded differently according to their works; yet the reward of every individual of the righteous will be of endless duration.

8. IF future punishment be designed as a mere discipline, to lead sinners to repentance, it is inflicted without any necessity, and therefore must be a wanton exercise of cru­elty.—The repentance of sinners may be easily obtained without those dreadful torments endured for ages of ages. Doubtless that same wisdom and power which leads a goodly number of mankind to repentance in this life, without the help of the torments of hell, might by the like or superior means, produce the like effect on all. The gospel might have been preached to all the heathens, and all those means of grace, which have been successful on some men, might have been used with all. And who will venture to say, that those means and that grace, which effected the repentance of Saul the persecutor, of the thief on the cross, of Mary Magdalene, and of the old, idolatrous Manasseh who had filled Jerusalem with inno­cent blood; could not have effected the repentance of any, or at least some of those who have been, or shall be, sent into the future state of punishment? How does it appear, that those means and that grace which were sufficient for the conversion of those noted sinners before mentioned, would not, had they been applied, have been sufficient for the conversion of thousands of others, who in fact have not been converted? And how does it appear, but that similar though more powerful grace and means, which are doubtless within the reach of divine power and know­ledge, [Page 60] would have been sufficient for the repentance and conversion of all mankind? If so, the repentance of sin­ners might have been accomplished, at a cheaper rate, and in a way more demonstrative of the divine goodness, than by the awful means of hell-torments. Those tor­ments therefore are inflicted without any real necessity, unless they be inflicted for some other end, than the re­pentance of the damned.

I AM aware, it will be objected, that if God should bring men to repentance by efficacious grace or means, it would be inconsistent with their moral agency, would destroy their liberty, and reduce them to mere machines. But were Paul, Mary Magdalene &c. brought to repentance in such a way as to destroy their liberty? It will not be pretended. Neither can it be pretended, that the same means and grace would have destroyed the liberty of others. This being granted, it necessarily follows, that if repentance be the only end, hell-torments are arbitra­rily inflicted on all those, who might have been, or may in future be brought to repentance by those means, and that grace, by which Paul or any other man hath been brought to repentance in this life.—I ask, does God in this life, apply all those means and all that grace, to all men, to lead them to repentance, which are consistent with their moral agency? And if he apply to any man, more powerful means, or more efficacious grace, than he does apply to him, would he destroy all his liberty and re­duce him to a mere machine? If so, then how are the more powerful means of hell-torments consistent with mo­ral agency or liberty? They, it is said, are more power­ful and efficacious means of grace, than any employed in this life: and if in this life the utmost is done to lead sin­ners to repentance, which is consistent with moral agency; hell-torments must entirely destroy moral agency and re­duce poor damned souls to mere machines; and of course they will be no more capable of repentance or salvation, than clocks and watches.

If on the other hand it be said, that the utmost which is consistent with moral agency, is not done in this life, to lead men, to repentance; it will follow, that God chooses to inflict hell-torments, not merely as a necessary mean to lead sinners to repentance; to grant which, is to give up [Page 61] the whole idea, that they are merely disciplinary.

Those whom I am now opposing, hold, that God can­not, consistently with their moral agency, bring all men to repentance in this life. How then can he, consistently with their moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell? If those means which would be effectual in this life, would be inconsistent with moral agency, why are not hell-torments equally inconsistent with moral agency, since it is allowed that they will be effectual? Or if those means which are barely effectual in hell, be not inconsistent with moral agency, I wish to have a reason assigned, why those means which would be barely effectual in this life, would be any more inconsistent with moral agency.

Dr. C. and others hold, that to say, that God cannot consistently with moral agency, or in a moral way, bring men to repentance in hell, is to limit his power and wis­dom. But to say, that God cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring men to repentance in this life, as really implies a limitation of the divine power and wis­dom, as to say, that he cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell. How is it any more reconcileable with those divine perfections, that he cannot reduce a sinner to repentance, in threescore years and ten, than that he cannot produce the same effect, throughout eternity? To say, that there is not time in this life, for the sinner to obtain a thorough conviction of the necessity of repentance, affords no relief to the difficul­ty. For though it should be granted, that there is not time for the sinner to obtain this conviction by experience, which however there seems to be no necessity of grant­ing; yet cannot God exhibit the truth in such a manner, as to produce that conviction? And let a reason be given, why that conviction produced by a clear divine exhibition of truth and a sense of happiness and misery, set in such a light, as to lead to repentance, is more inconsistent with moral agency, than the same conviction obtained by experience, or by the torments of hell.

If hell-torments be necessary to lead sinners to repent­ance, because they are more painful, than the afflictions or other means used with men in this life; why are not greater afflictions sent on men in this life? It is manifest, that most men might suffer much greater afflictions, than [Page 62] they really do suffer. And if greater pain be all that is wanting to lead them to repentance, it seems that to in­flict that, would be the greatest instance of goodness, and might supersede the necessity of hell-torments.

IT is granted by Dr. C. and others, that hell-torments will certainly lead to repentance all who suffer them. At the same time he objects to the idea of leading sinners to repentance by the efficacious grace of God, that it destroys moral agency. But if there be a certain established, un. failing connection between hell-torments continued for a proper time, and repentance; those torments as effec­tually overthrow moral agency, as efficacious grace. All that need be intended in this instance, by efficacious grace, is such an exhibition or view of the truth and of motives, as will certainly be attended with repentance. But such an exhibition of the truth as this, is supposed by Dr. C. to be made in hell. And why this exhibition made in hell is more consistent with moral agency, than an exhibition which is no more effectual, powerful or overbearing, made in this life, I wish to be informed.

PERHAPS it will be further pleaded, that though it be feasible to lead sinners to repentance in this life; yet it is not wise and best. But why is it not as wise and good, to persuade sinners to repent, without the use of hell-tor­ments, as by those torments? If indeed it be fact, that God does not inflict endless but disciplinary misery on sin­ners, we may thence conclude, that it is wisely so ordered. But this is not to be taken for granted; it ought to be proved before an inference is draw from it. It is the great question of this dispute.

9. THAT future punishment is not merely disciplinary, appears from the various declarations of scripture, that those who die impenitent, are lost, are cast away, perish, suf­fer perdition, are destroyed, suffer everlasting destruction, &c. as in these texts; John XVII. 12. ‘None of them is lost, save the son of perdition.’ —Luke IX. 25. ‘What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself or be cast away.’ —Matt. XIII. 48. ‘Ga­thered the good into vessels, but cast the bad ( [...] the dead, rotten fish) away.’ 2 Peter II. 13. ‘They shall utterly perish in their own corruption.’ —Heb. X. 39. ‘We are not of them that draw back unto perdition; [Page 63] but of them that believe unto the saving of the soul.’ — 2 Peter, III. 7. ‘But the heavens and the earth which are now, are reserved unto fire, against the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men.’ —Matt. X. 28. ‘Fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.’ —2 Thess. I. 9. ‘Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power.’ —But what truth or propriety is there in these expressions, if future pu­nishment be a mere discipline? The damned in hell are no more cast away, lost, destroyed; they no more perish, or suffer perdition, than any of God's elect are cast away, &c. while they are in this world. Hell is no more a place of destruction, than this world. The wicked in hell are no more vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, than the saints are in this world. The damned are under discipline; so are even the most virtuous and holy, while in this life. Yet they are not lost, cast away, rejected as reprobate sil­ver, or destroyed by God; but are kept as the apple of his eye. And as the means of grace, under which the damned are placed, are far more adapted certainly to secure and pomote their greatest good, than any means which we enjoy in this state; to consider and to speak of them as lost, cast away, destroyed, &c. because they are under those means, is to the highest degree absurd. They are just as much further removed from a state, which can justly be called destruction, perdition, &c. than they were, while in this world, as the means of grace which they en­joy in hell are more powerful and effectual to prepare them for happiness, than those means which they enjoyed in this world.

SUPPOSE a man seized with some dangerous disease, and a variety of means is used for his recovery, but in vain. Suppose it appears, that if no more effectual means be employed, he will never be recovered. Suppose further, that at length an entirely different course is taken with him, a course which is not only far more likely than the former to be successful; but concerning which there is ab­solute certainty, that it will be successful: I ask, can the man now under the operation of these most excellent and infallible means, with any truth be said to be lost, to be cast away, to be destroyed, &c? Or if those terms must [Page 64] be applied to one or other of those situations, in which we have supposed him to be at different times; to which of them are they applied with the least truth and reason? This example may illustrate the subject now under con­sideration.

10. IF it be consistent with the divine perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of advancing his own good, as is implied in the very idea of disciplinary pu­nishment; why is it not equally consistent with the same perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of promoting the good of the system; provided that misery do not exceed the demerit of the subject?—I presume no believer in endless punishment, will plead for any degree or duration of punishment, which is not subservient to the glory of the Deity implying the greatest good of the uni­verse. Therefore, all such punishment, as is not subser­vient to that end, is foreign to the present question. Fur­ther, it is now supposed to be proved, that other pu­nishment than that which is adapted to prepare the sin­ner for happiness, is justly deserved by the sinner. Now since this it allowed or proved, why is it not consistent with every attribute of the Deity, to inflict that other pu­nishment, provided only it be subservient to the good of the system?

IT is holden by our opponents, that the punishment of a sinner may lead him to repentance. So it may lead other sinners to repentance; or it may restrain them from sin, and in a variety of ways may equally subserve the good of those who are not the subjects of the punishment, as it may the good of him who is the subject of it. And that the good of other persons may be of equal worth and import­ance, nay, of far greater worth to the system, than the good of the transgressor himself, cannot be denied. Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this arti­cle, if the personal good of the sinner be a sufficient reason why he should be punished according to justice; why is not the good of others, or the good of the system, a suf­ficient reason for the same proceeding? And is it not evident, not only that such a punishment is consistent with the perfections of God; but that those perfections, good­ness itself not excepted, require it? In this case, to in­flict a punishment merely conducive to the good of the [Page 65] person punished, would be no fruit of goodness, but of a contrary principle; and the doctrine of merely discipli­nary punishment, if it mean a punishment conducive in­deed to the good of the subject, but destructive to the good of the system, is so far from being built on the di­vine goodness, as some boast; that it is built on a very different foundation. I am aware, that it is holden by the advocates for universal salvation, that the good of the system cannot be promoted by the endless misery of any individual, but requires the final happiness of every one. Merely to assert this however, as some do very confidently, is perfect impertinence. Let them prove it, and they will do something to the purpose.

11. IF none of the damned will be punished for any other end than their own good, and yet they all deserve to be punished more than is subservient to their own good; then some of them deserve to be punished for a longer term, than that which in scripture, according to Dr. C's sense of it, is said to be forever and ever. The punishment, which in the language of scripture, is said to be everlasting, for­ever and ever, &c. will actually be suffered by some of the damned, as is agreed on all hands. But if none of the damned will suffer any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good, then the punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever, is con­ducive to their personal good. They therefore deserve a punishment of greater duration than that which in scrip­ture is said to be forever and ever: and of course that more durable punishment is the curse of the divine law, and is threatened in the law. But where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is any punishment threatened, or even hinted at, of greater duration than that which shall last forever and ever?—So that this scheme of disciplinary punishment necessarily brings us to this absurdity, that the true and real curse of the divine law, is not contained in the law; and that the punishment justly deserved by the sinner, is no where revealed or even hinted at, in all the scripture. Yet the scripture assures us, that some sinners will be in fact punished according to their demerits, so as to pay the uttermost farthing, and to receive judgment without mercy. And no man pretends that any sinner will suffer more than that punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever. The consequence is, that [Page 66] that punishment which is forever and ever, is the whole that the sinner deserves, and therefore is by no means a mere discipline.

12. OUR Lord informs us, Matt. X. 33; That whoso­ever shall deny him before men, shall be denied by him be­fore his Father. But on the hypothesis now under consi­deration, this means only, that Christ will deny him till he repents. In Luke XIII. 25, &c. we read, that when once the master of the house shall have risen and shut the door, some will begin to stand without and to knock, say­ing, Lord, Lord, open to us, and will urge several ar­guments in favour of their admission: to whom the mas­ter will answer, I know you not, whence you are; de­part from me, all ye workers of iniquity. But on the present hypothesis, Christ will deny them in no other sense than he denies every real penitent and believer, during the present life. He will deny the wicked after the general judgment no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined; after that, he will know them, will own them, and receive them to eternal and blissful communion with himself. The same is observable of all his most sin­cere disciples in this life. While here, they are under discipline, though not so merciful and gracious a discipline as that with which the damned are favoured. However, during the continuance of the discipline of this life, Christ denies and refuses to confer on any of his disciples, an en­tire exemption from pain, distress, or affliction; and sub­jects them equally with the rest of the world, to these ca­lamities: so that in this respect all things come alike to all. He does indeed give them assurance of rest and glory after this life. As full assurance of rest and glory after the ex­piration of the term of their discipline, is, on the present hypothesis, given to all the damned. Also in the prospect of this rest and glory, and in the certain knowledge that they are the objects of his favour, he affords his disciples much relief and comfort under their present trials. The same sources of relief and comfort are afforded to all the damned. So that Christ denies the damned in no other sense, than that in which he denies his most sincere fol­lowers, during this life.

THE same observations for substance may be made con­cerning the application of the damned for admission into heaven, after the general judgment, and the answer and [Page 67] treatment which they shall receive on that occasion. The door shall be shut against them no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life.—The master of the house will answer, I know you not, (i. e.) I do not as yet own you as my friends and disciples, because you have not yet been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life.—He will tell them, ‘Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity.’ But this means no more, than that they must not be admitted but hea­ven, till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined▪ The same is true of all real christians in this life.

13. ON the hypothesis now under consideration, what damnation do those in hell suffer, more than real chris­tians suffer in this life? They are kept in a state of most merciful and gracious discipline, till they are prepared, and then they are taken to heaven. The same is true of every real christian in this life. This difference however is worthy of notice, that the discipline of hell is far more advantageous than that of this life, because more effectual, and likely to fit the subject for heaven more speedily and thoroughly; otherwise it would never have been applied. It is also a more merciful and gracious exhibiton of the di­vine goodness. Doubtless that mean of grace, which is most happily and effectually conducive to the speedy re­pentance and preparation of the sinner for heaven, is to him the most merciful and gracious exhibition and demon­stration of the divine goodness.

IT is true, the discipline of hell is attended with more pain than that of this life. So the discipline of this life, with respect to some individuals, is attended with more pain, than it is with respect to others. Yet it doth not hence follow, that some christians suffer damnation in this life: nor will it be pretended, that either the scriptures or common sense would justify the calling of those greater pains of some chistians in this life, by the name of damna­tion, in any other sense, than the less pains or afflictions of other christians, may be called by the same name.

ON the whole then, when the scripture says, ‘He that believeth, and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned:’ The whole meaning is, he that believeth, shall be admitted to heaven immediately after death: but he that believeth not, shall not immedi­ately [Page 68] be admitted, merely because he is not yet prepared for it by repentance; but he shall be put under a discipline abso­lutely necessary for his own good, and the most wise, effectual, merciful and gracious, that divine wisdom and goodness can devise; and as soon as this discipline shall have prepared him for heaven, he shall be admitted without further delay. When the scriptures say, he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him; the meaning is, he shall not see life till he is brought to repentance by the merciful discipline just now mentioned; and not the wrath of God abideth on him; because he shall be made the subject of nothing wrathful or vindictive; but the mercy, or most merciful and benevolent discipline of God abideth on him.

14. IF the only end of future punishment be the repen­tance of the sinner, and if the means used with sinners in hell be so much more powerful and happily adapted to the end, than those used in this life; it is unaccountable, that while so many are led to repentance by the compara­tively weak means used with men in this life, and within so short a period as seventy years, the far more powerful means applied in hell, should not be productive of the same effect, in a single instance, within so long a period as a thousand years. That none are to be delivered out of hell, within a thousand years after the general judg­ment, is explicitly taught by Dr. C. His words are,^* "This period" (a thousand years) ‘must run out, be­fore the wicked dead could any of them live as kings and priests with Christ.’

WE all doubtless believe, that many sinners die impe­nitent, who are not the subjects of depravity and hardness of heart vastly greater, than are in some, who are brought to repentance in this life. Now put the case of the class of sinners, who are the subjects of a depravity and hardness of heart, the very next in degree to that of the most depraved of those who are brought to repent­ance in this life. Is it reasonable to believe, that these cannot be brought to repentance, even by the most pow­erful means of grace enjoyed in hell, within a less time than a thousand years? If it be not reasonable to believe this, then it is not reasonable to believe Dr. C's scheme of disciplinary punishment.

[Page 69]15. THE last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. This death is understood by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, to mean the second death. Then the second death is doubtless an enemy. But if it consist in a necessary discipline, the most wise and wholesome, the most conducive to the good of the recipients, and to the divine glory, which the wisdom of God can devise; surely it is no enemy either to God or the recipients; but is a perfect friend to both. With what truth then could the apostle call it an enemy?

16. THE scripture, so far from declaring those who suf­fer chastisement and disciplinary pains, accursed, merely on that account, expressly declares them blessed. Psal. XCIV. 12; ‘Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, O Lord, and teachest him out of thy law; that thou mayest give him rest from the days of adversity.’ But where are the damned ever said to be blessed? They are constantly declared to be accursed.—Heb. XII. 5—9, ‘Ye have forgotten the exhortation, which speaketh to you, as unto children, my son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebu­buked of him. For whom the Lord loveth, he chas­teneth, and scourgeth every son whom he re­ceiveth. If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons. For what son is he, whom the Father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastise­ment, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards and not sons.’ —This passage evidently considers those who suffer chastisement from the hand of God, as his children, his sons. If therefore the damned suffer a mere chastisement, they are not accursed, but are the blessed sons or children of God. But are they ever so called in scripture?—Beside; this passage evidently suppo­ses, that some men do not suffer fatherly chastisement, of which all the sons or children of God are partakers: and expressly declares, that such as do not suffer it are bastards and not sons: which seems not to agree with the idea, that all the damned, will by fatherly chastisement be brought to final salvation. If no other punishment be inflicted by God, than fatherly chastisement, then there [Page 70] are no bastards in the universe. Yet it is evidently sup­posed in this text, that there are bastards.

HEB. X. 28, ‘He that despised Moses law died without mercy—of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the son of God?’ &c. But if all who die impenitent, be sent to a state of discipline most excellently adapted to their good and salvation, no man dies without mercy. This dis­cipline itself is the greatest mercy which can, in their state of mind, be bestowed upon them. With respect to the same subject, it is said, Heb. II. 2; ‘That every trans­gression and disobedience, received a just recompence of reward.’ —A just recompence, is a punishment ade­quate to the demands of justice; and this, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, cannot be a mere merciful discipline.

17. IF the punishment of hell be a mere wholesome discipline, then what the apostle says of the discipline of christians in this life, may be said with equal truth and propriety of the punishment of the damned: thus, We glory in damnation; knowing that damnation worketh repentance, and repentance salvation.

18. IF no other than a disciplinary punishment be con­sistent with the divine goodness; surely the requirement of an atonement in order to pardon, is unaccountable. The doctrine of atonement, and of the necessity of it to par­don and salvation, is abundantly holden by Dr. C. He says,^* ‘Jesus Christ is the person upon whose account hap­piness is attainable by the human race.’ He speaks^‡ of the "sacrifice of himself," which Christ ‘offered up to God to put away sin.’ ‘The obedience of Christ to death, is the ground or reason upon which it hath pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the race of Adam.’ ^† "By thus submitting to die. he" (Jesus) ‘made atonement, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to.’ ^§— ‘Christ was sent into the world to make way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy towards the sinful sons of men.’ ^‖ ‘The only begotten Son of God both did and suffered every thing that was necessary, in [Page 71] order to a righteousness on account of which God might, in consistency with the honour of his perfections, and the authority of his law, make the grant of life. Accord­ingly this meritorious righteousness is that for the sake of which, upon the account of which, this blessing is con­ferred.’ ^‖‖ According to Dr. C. then, Christ hath not only made atonement by his obedience and death, but that atonement was necessary to the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy to the sinner; and without that atonement, saving mercy could not have been exercised toward the sinner, in a consistency with wisdom, justice and holiness, or the honour of the divine perfections, or the authority of the divine law and government. The constitution therefore by which salvation can be obtained in no other way, than in consequence and on account of his obedience and death, is not only consistent with wis­dom, holiness, justice, yea, all the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government: but it was required by them all.

BUT the sufferings and death of Christ, or his atone­ment, is no discipline of the sinner. They are as foreign from it as the vindictive punishment of the sinner himself. The atonement, as Dr. C. hath explained it, makes way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy toward the sinner. It was therefore designed to satisfy the divine wisdom, justice and holiness. It was designed to make the grant of life to the sinner consistent with the honour of the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and go­vernment. And if our Lord Jesus Christ might, in the behalf of the sinner, be made to suffer in order to satisfy divine justice; why may not the sinner himself be made to suffer for the same end?

IF Christ have, on the behalf of sinners, suffered for the end of supporting the authority of the divine law and government; what reason can be assigned, why it should be inconsistent with any attribute of the Deity, that sinners themselves should be made to suffer for the same end? But this would be a proper vindictive punishment. Therefore Dr. C. is entirely inconsistent with himself, in allowing the atonement of Christ, in the terms before quoted; and yet denying the reasonableness of a vindictive punishment, or its consistency with the divine perfections.

[Page 72]19. WE are assured, ‘that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose;’ Rom. VIII. 28. But this implies, that all things do not work for good, to them who love not God. Yet all things do work for their good, if they suffer no other than a disciplinary punishment. Con­cerning those who are Christ's, it is said, that ‘all things are their's; whether Paul or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are their's;’ 1 Cor. III. 21, 22. But on the supposition, that all punishment is disciplinary, it is equally true concerning all mankind, that all things present and to come are their's. Yet this is not said, but the contrary is implied in that it is said of those only who are Christ's or are Christians, that all things are their's.

20. I ARGUE from those words of the wise man, Eccl. IX. 10; ‘Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest.’ If future punishment be discilplinary, the damned are in a state of probation, and may and will so exercise their rational powers, as shall finally issue in their salvation. But can this be reconciled with the words of Solomon, that in the future state, there is no work to be done, no device to be invented, no knowledge or wisdom to be exercised by us, to the accomplishment of what we now leave undone? This is manifestly the argument, by which he presses on us the present diligent discharge of our duty; and this argument would be utterly inconclusive, if there were another state, in which what our hand now findeth to do, might be done.

OF similar import is John IX. 4; ‘I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world.’ That our Lord, by the day, means this life, is manifest by the last words of the quotation. But if in the future state no man can work, the future state is not a state of proba­tion.

TO these I may add, Gen. VI. 3; ‘My spirit shall not always strive with man—yet his days shall be an hundred an twenty years.’ As if it had been said, my spirit shall not always strive with man; yet he shall strive [Page 73] with him an hundred and twenty years, and no longer; for so long only shall his days be continued. But how is this consistent with the idea, that God will be striving with man, for ages of ages after his days shall have been elapsed?

Objection 1. IF to some part of the foregoing reasoning it be objected, that it supposes future punishment to be merely disciplinary, and designed to subserve no other end, than the repentance of the sinner: whereas it is granted, that God may and will inflict vindictive punishment, but not a punishment merely vindictive; that he may take ven­geance of the sinner, provided at the same time he aim at the good of the sinner: To this I answer—

1. THAT in this objection it is granted, that God may and will inflict on the damned a punishment properly vin­dictive, a punishment over and above that which is con­ducive to the personal good of the sinner. But this is to grant all which is pleaded for in this chapter, and all which at present is attempted to be proved.

2. IF the meaning of this objection be, that God may inflict vengeance, provided he do it with a sole view to the good of the sinner, it confutes itself; it seems to grant something, but in reality it grants nothing. It seems to admit a proper vindictive punishment, but really admits no punishment besides that which is merely disciplinary. For to talk of inflicting vengeance with a sole view to the good of the subject, can mean nothing more, than to inflict pain with a sole view to the good of the subject; and this is nothing more than a punishment merely disciplinary: if God show displeasure with a sole view to the good of the sinner, this is mere discipline.

3. IF the meaning of this objection be, that God may consistently with his perfections, inflict a proper vindictive punishment, provided at the same time that he is aiming at a proper vindication of his broken law and despised go­vernment, he aim at the good of the sinner also; I an­swer, if it be right and consistent with the perfections of God, to vindicate his law and government, there is no ne­cessity of bringing in the aid of another motive or design, to make it right or consistent with his perfections. If on the other hand, it be not in itself right to vindicate his law and government, no other affections, views or actions, [Page 74] however right and benevolent, co-existing with the sup­posed vindication, can atone for it, or make it right.

TO illustrate this by an example:—A parent has a dis­obedient child; and it is become necessary both for the good of the child, and for the support of the parent's au­thority in his family in general, and over his child in par­ticular, that he be properly punished. Accordingly from both these motives, the good of the child and the support of his own authority, the parent inflicts the proper punish­ment. This according to the objection now before us, is right. But according to the same objection, if the child be desperate and there be no prospect of effecting his good by punishment, it is not consistent with the character of a good parent to inflict the same punishment, from the mo­tives of supporting his own government and the good of the family only. If this action done from these motives only, be a wrong action, it is still wrong, so far as it pro­ceeds from the same motives, however it may arise in part from the motive of the child's good. To render this still plainer, let us suppose, that a parent inflicts pain on his child merely to afford amusement to his neighbours, as the Romans were wont to exhibit fights of gladiators. It will be agreed on all hands, that this action is abomina­ble. Again, suppose the same pain be inflicted partly from the motive of amusing his neighbours, and partly from a regard to the child's good. I presume all will allow, that so far as the action proceeds from the former motive, it is still abominable, and is not sanctified by the co-exist­ent motive of the child's good.

ON the whole, we arrive at this conclusion; that if it be consistent with the divine perfections, that God should inflict punishment from the two motives of vindicating his own law and government and benefiting the sinner; it is equally consistent with the divine perfections to inflict pun­ishment from the former motive only. All the vindictive punishment pleaded for, is that which is deserved by the sinner and is necessary to support the divine law and mo­ral government in proper dignity, and thus to promote the general good: and this surely is opposed to no attribute of God, whether justice or goodness.

Objection 2. TO the argument drawn from the des­truction threatened to the wicked, it may be objected, that this destruction means, that they shall be destroyed as sin­ners [Page 75] only, or shall be brought to repentance and a renun­ciation of sin. To this it may be answered, that in this sense every one who in this life repents and believes, is destroyed, and suffers destruction. Yet this is never said in scripture. This sense of the word destruction makes the punishment of hell, and the awful curse of the divine law, to consist in repentance, which is no punishment or curse, but an inestimable blessing. Besides, that repent­ance, on which the sinner is forgiven if it can be called a destruction at all, is not an everlasting destruction, but an emotion of heart, which is begun and finished in a ve­ry short time. Or if by this everlasting destruction be understood the habitual and persevering repentance of the true convert; then the glorified saints in heaven, are constantly suffering that destruction which will be everlast­ing, and which is the curse of the divine law.

BEFORE this subject is dismissed, proper notice ought to be taken of some arguments urged in favour of the sen­timent, that the punishment of hell is merely discip­plinary.

1. IT is urged,⁷⁶ that the various afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients: therefore pro­bably the same end is designed by the sufferings of hell. —To this it may be answered, It is by no means granted, that all the afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients. It does not appear, that men in general, who are visited with the loss of children, wives, or other dear friends; or with the loss of eye­sight, of some other sense, or of a limb; or with distress­ing pains or incurable diseases; are thereby rendered more happy in this life. If men may be allowed to judge by their own experience, they will in most cases decide the question in the negative. Nor does the deci­sion in many cases appear ill founded to those, who have opportunity to observe persons under those afflictions. To say that men are no proper judges, whether they themselves be, in this life, made more happy or not, by the afflictions which they suffer, is to say, that they are no judges of their own happiness or misery. This being once established, we may assert, that hell-torments though endless promote the happiness of the patients: because being no judges of their own happiness or misery [Page 76] they may be extremely happy, at the very time they judge themselves to be perfectly miserable.

IN any ease in which calamity proves fatal, it is absurd to pretend, that it promotes, in this life, the happiness of the patient, unless calamity itself be happiness. No man has opportunity in this life to derive any good from the pains of death. Therefore at least these pains are not designed for the subject's good during his present life.

HERE it may be proper to mention several remarkable in­stances of grievous calamity recorded in scripture: As the instance of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Pharaoh, Saul, the house of Eli, Nadab and Abihu, Hiel, &c. It is presumed, Dr. C, himself would not pretend, that these calamities were intended for "the profit of the sufferers themselves" in this life. What right then had he to argue, as in the following passage?⁷⁷ ‘The pro­per tendency and final cause of evils in the present state, are to do us good. This is the voice of reason confir­med by experience, and scripture concurs herewith.’ He then quotes Psal. LXXXIX. 31—34; and proceeds, ‘If evil, punishment or misery in the present life is mer­cifully intended for the good of the patients themselves why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as the father of mercies, and God of pity, confined to this world only?’ The force of all this depends en­tirely on the supposition, that in all instances of suffering in this life, the end is the sufferer's good during this life.

BUT this supposition, we see by what has been said al­ready, is by no means true. The superstructure there­fore built on this foundation falls entirely to the ground. We all grant, that in some instances afflictions are in­tended for the good of the sufferers. A proof of this, which needed no proof▪ Dr. C. has produced out of the eighty-ninth psalm. On this foundation extended in his own imagination to comprehend all instances of affliction, he built an argument in which he triumphed.—Now since there are those several instances of calamity before mentioned, which Dr. C. would not pretend were design­ed for the sufferer's good in this life; I might as well sup­pose that no other instances of calamity are designed for the sufferers good in this life; and then adopt Dr. C's [Page 77] strain of ardent declamation, in manner following: If evil punishment or misery in the present life, be not intended for the good of the patients themselves, but to support the authority of the divine law, and thus subserve the ge­neral good; why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as a God of perfect purity and strict justice, limited to this world only? Why should it not be supposed, that the infinitely holy God has the same hatred of sin in the other world which he has in this? and that he has in the next state the same intention which he has in this, to vin­dicate, by punishments, his law and government.

THE truth is, that as some of the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life and others are as manifestly not intended for his good in this life; nothing certain can be hence concluded concerning the end of the misery of the damned. Nay: if it were cer­tain, that all the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life or that they are not intended for his good in this life; yet it could not be certainly thence concluded, that the miseries of the damned are intended for the good of the patients, nor that they are not in­tended for the good of the patients. But this point must be determined by other evidence, the evidence of reve­lation.

IF it should be said, that though some of the sufferings of this life do not, in this life, produce good to the pa­tients; yet they will produce good to them in the future life; it will be sufficient to reply, that this wants proof; that it is a main point in the present dispute; and that it should be taken for granted, is not to be suffered.

2. IT is also urged by our author, ‘That the whole course of nature, and even the revelations of scripture constantly speak of God, as the universal father, as well as governor of men—What now is the temper and conduct of fathers on earth towards their offspring? They readily do them good and chastise them for their profit; but they do not punish their children, having no view to their advantage.’ — ‘And shall we say that of our father in heaven, which we cannot sup­pose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?’ He abounds in pathetic discourse of the same strain, which is much more suited to work on the imaginations and passions of mankind, than on [Page 78] their reason. The foundation of all this discourse is, that fa­thers on earth, acting in character, never punish and never can punish their children, but with a design to promote their personal good. But would Dr. C. himself adven­ture to lay down this position, and to abide by it? Did never a wise and good father find it necessary, to punish, and even to cast out of his family, a desperate child, to prevent his ruining the rest of the children? Was there never, or can there possibly never be, an instance of this? If such an instance ever has, or ever may occur, the ap­pearance of argument in the forecited passage, vanishes at once. Not only do fathers find it necessary to punish des­perate children, without any prospect of their personal good; but very frequently do kings, governors and chief magistrates find this necessary with regard to their subjects. Now in the scripture, God much oftener illustrates his character, by that of a king, a prince, a sovereign lord, than by that of a father. And askings, &c. often find it necessary to inflict capital and other punishments, without any view to the personal good of the sufferers; we may hence deduce an argument, that God also will punish many of his rebellious subjects, without any view to their per­sonal good; but to support his moral government, to be an example of terror to others, and thus to secure the general good: and this argument would be at least as strong as that of Dr. C. just cited.

3. IT may be pleaded, that though calamities in this life do not always issue in the sufferers good; yet God may compensate them in the future state, for the loss or suffering, of which they are the subjects in this life. Thus our author, ‘It is possible that the evils which a­ny suffer in this, may be made up to them in another state.’ ^*—It is granted, that God is able to com­pensate his creatures for the evils of this life; but that he in fact will do it in all cases, is to be proved.—Be­sides; the very idea of compensation is inconsistent with the idea of disciplinary punishment and that all the evils of both this life and the future are necessary and are in­tended for the good of those who suffer them. For if this idea be just, what foundation is there for compensa­tion? Will a father compensate a child for the pain of that discipline which is absolutely necessary for his good [Page 79] and most wisely adapted to it? No man would ever think of it. Compensation supposes, that the evil for which compensation is made, has been inflicted from other mo­tives, than a regard to the good of the sufferer. And if evil may in one instance be inflicted from other motives than a regard to the good of the sufferer; it may in any other instance in which justice and wisdom admit of it; and if in this state, in the future too.—If the evils of life be intended for the good only of the subjects, we may as well talk of compensating a man for the pain of draw­ing a tooth which is a perpetual torment to him; or for the disagreeable taste of the dose which cures him of the colic; as to talk of compensating him for the calami­ties of life. The saints will indeed be rewarded for their pa­tience under these calamities; and this part of their ho­liness is doubtless as amiable, and is as properly as any part of their holiness the object of the complacency of the Deity, and of those rewards which are the fruits of that complacency. But those rewards are not to be considered as compensations of losses or of damages. The very idea of compensation implies, that that for which compensation is made, is on the whole an evil to the person compensa­ted. But the very idea that present evils are necessary and conducive to the good of the subjects, implies, that on the whole they are no evils to the subjects.

IT is now submitted to the reader, whether the doctrine, that the damned will in fact suffer no other punishment, than that which is subservient to their personal good, be not in many respects most glaringly inconsistent with the scriptures; and whether it be not equally irreconcileable with their general tenor as with many particular passages; and also with many parts of Dr. C's book.

CHAP. IV. Containing an examination of Dr. C's arguments to prove endless punishment inconsistent with justice.

THAT the endless punishment of the damned is incon­sistent with justice, is positively and abundantly as­serted by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal sal­vation. Whether the arguments which the Doctor offers to prove the injustice of endless punishment, be conclusive, is the subject of our inquiry in this chapter.

BEFORE we proceed to this inquiry, it seems necessary, to explain the meaning of the proposition—That the end­less punishment of the damned is consistent with justice.

I DO not find that Dr. C. hath any where given us a de­finition of his idea of justice, or of a just punishment, which is certainly a great omission. The Chevalier Ramsay gives the following definition of the divine justice: "Justice is that perfection of God, by which he endeavours continual­ly to make all intelligences just.^*" But with the same rea­son he might have defined the divine mercy to be, not that perfection in God, by which he is himself inclined to the exercise of mercy to the miserable; but that by which he endeavours to make all intelligences merciful: and the di­vine love to be, not that perfection in God, by which he loves his creatures, but that by which he endeavours to make other intelligences exercise love. By this definition of justice a human judge, who wrongs every man, whose cause is brought before him, and yet endeavours to make other men just, is a just judge.

THE word justice is used in three different senses. Some­times it means commutative justice, sometimes distributive, and sometimes general or public justice. Commutative jus­tice respects property only, and the equal exchange and re­stitution of it. Distributive justice is the equal distribution of rewards and punishments, and it respects the personal rights and demerit of the person rewarded or punished. General or public justice respects what are called the rights of a community, whether a city, state, empire, or the uni­verse. This kind of justice requires the public good; and [Page 81] whenever that I violated or neglected the public is injured. This last use of the word justice, though very frequent, yet is an improper use of it; because to practise justice in this sense, is no other than to act from public spirit, or from love to the community, and with respect to the universe, it is the very same with general benevolence.

NOW when we inquire, whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with justice, no man will sup­pose that the word justice means commutative justice; be­cause the inquiry has no respect to property. Nor is the word to be understood to mean general or public justice. It is indeed an important inquiry, whether the endless punishment of a man dying in impenitence, be consistent with the general interest of the universe; but this is not the subject to be considered in this chapter. The question to be considered in this and in one or two succeding chap­ters, is, whether to inflict an endless punishment on a man dy­ing in impenitence, be an act of distributive justice, or be a treat­ment of him by his judge, correspondent and no more than correspondent or proportioned to his demerit, to his crimes, or to his moral conduct and personal character. This is a question entirely different from the following; Whether the infliction of an endless punishment on a sin­ner dying in impenitence, be subservient to the good of the universe? A punishment or calamity inflicted on a person may be subservient to the public good of a community, yet not be deserved by him on account of his personal crimes. It was for the good of the Roman republic, that Regulus should return to certain death at Carthage; yet he did not deserve that death; it was not correspondent to his moral character. On the other hand, many a villain has by his attrocious crimes deserved death; yet by reason of his power, his connections, or the peculiar circumstances of the state, it could not, consistently with the public good be inflicted on him. So that in a variety of instances public justice or the public good is promoted by private or distributive injustice; and distributive justice would be productive of public injury or damage. And in some cases the public good may be promoted by a proceed­ing, which, though not in the distributive sense unjust, yet is not according to distributive justice. An innocent person may choose to be made the subject of sufferings, in the stead of a criminal. Therefore though the suffer­ings [Page 82] which he chooses to endure, be inflicted on him, no injustice is done him. For will it be p [...]ended, that this proceeding is according to strict distributive justice, which requires the criminal to be punished and not his substitute. Yet it may promote the good of the community, or secure it from great detriment by a relaxation of its laws and go­vernment; as in the well known instance of Zaleucus, who put out one of his own eyes, to support the authority of the law against adultery, which his own son had vio­lated.

ON the whole, when we inquire whether the endless punishment of the damned be consistent with justice, the word justice means distributive justice. This, as has been already observed, respects the personal merit or demerit of the man rewarded or punished. A man suffers distri­butive injustice when he is not treated as favourably as is correspondent to his personal conduct or character. On the other hand, he has justice done him, when he is treat­ed in a manner correspondent to his personal conduct or character. A just punishment then is that which is pro­portioned or correspondent to the crime punished. But it may be further inquired, when is a punishment propor­tioned to the crime punished? To this the answer seems to be, when by the pain or natural evil of the punishment, it exhibits a just idea of the moral evil or ruinous tendency of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all intel­ligent beings from the commission of the crime.

FURTHER to elucidate this matter, let it be observed, that any crime, by relaxing the laws and by weakening the government, is a damage to the community; and de­serves just so much punishment, as, by restoring the pro­per tone of the laws, and proper strength to the govern­ment, will repair that damage. The chief evil of any crime, on account of which it principally deserves punish­ment, consists in the relaxation of the laws and govern­ment of the community in which the crime is committed. For example, the chief evil of theft is not that a certain person is clandestinely deprived of his property. His pro­perty may be restored and he may in this respect suffer no damage. Still the thief deserves punishment. If a man be defamed, the chief evil is not that the person defamed is injured by the loss of his reputation. His reputation may, by a full confession of the defamer or by other means, [Page 83] be restored. Still the defamer may deserve punishment. If a man be murdered, the chief evil is not that the man is deprived of his life, and his friends and the community are deprived of the benefit of his aid. His life may have been a burden to himself, to his friends and to the com­munity; or he may by divine power be raised from the dead. Still, in either case, the murderer would deserve punishment.

THE true reason, why all those criminals would, in all those cases, deserve punishment, is, that by their respec­tive crimes they would weaken the laws and government of the community, thereby would break in upon the pub­lic peace, good order, safety and happiness; instead of these would introduce confusion and ruin; and thus would do a very great damage to the community.—Therefore, they would respectively deserve just so much punishment, as by restoring the tone of the laws and government, would re-establish the peace, good order, safety and hap­piness of the community, and thus would repair the da­mage done to the community by their crimes.—A punish­ment adequate to this end exhibits by the natural evil of it, a just idea of the moral evil of the crime, and a pro­per motive to restrain all from the commission of it: it is therefore duly proportioned to the crime, is correspon­dent to the conduct of the criminal, and is perfectly just.

THE passages in which Dr. C. declares positively, that the endless punishment of the wicked would be unjust, are very numerous; but his arguments to prove that it would be unjust, are, so far as I can find, very few. As this is a capital point in the present controversy, it was to be ex­pected, that he would go into a formal consideration of it, and give us his reasons methodically and distinctly. In­stead of this, in all the various parts of his book in which he declaims most vehemently on the subject, there are very few in which I find an attempt to argue. These are as follows:— ‘An eternity of misery swallows up all proportion: or though there should be some difference in the degree of pain, it is such a difference, I fear, as will be scarce thought worthy of being brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it.’ ^*— ‘The smallness of the difference between those in this world, to whom the character of [Page 84] wicked belongs in the lowest sense, and those to whom the character of good is applicable in the like sense, renders it incredible, that such an amazingly great dif­ference should be made between them in the future. The difference between them, according to the com­mon opinion, will be doubly infinite.—For the re­ward and punishment being both eternal, they must at last become infinite in magnitude. How to reconcile this with the absolutely accurate impartiality of God, is, I confess, beyond me.’ ^*— ‘It does not appear to me, that it would be honourable to the infinitely righ­teous and benevolent governor of the world, to make wicked men everlastingly miserable. For in what point of light soever we take a view of sin, it is certainly in its nature a finite evil. It is the fault of a finite crea­ture, and the effect of finite principles, passions and ap­petites. To say therefore, that the sinner is doomed to infinite misery, for the finite faults of a finite life, looks like a reflection on the infinite justice, as well as good­ness of God. I know it has been often urged, that sin is an infinite evil, because committed against an in­finite object; for which reason an infinite punishment is no more than its due desert. But this metaphysical nicety proves a great deal too much, if it proves any­thing at all. For according to this way of arguing, all sinners must suffer the utmost in degree, as well as in duration; otherwise they will not suffer so much as they might do, and as they ought to do: which is plainly inconsistent with that difference the scripture often declares there shall be in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the na­ture and number of their evil deeds.’ ^†

THESE, I think, are the passages in which Dr. C. offers his most plausible and strong, if not his only, arguments, to prove, that endless punishment is not consistent with jus­tice; and the arguments here offered are these three on­ly—That endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinners and smallest saints, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is therefore incredible, and not reconcileable with the justice and impartiality of God.—That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the latter is [Page 85] finite, the former infinite.—That endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is in­finite in degree too, and therefore that the punishment of all the damned is equal.

I. THAT endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is there­fore incredible, and not reconcileable with the justice and impartiality of God. On this I observe,

1. That there is an infinite difference between the treat­ment of two persons, one of whom is sent to endless misery, the other not, is readily granted. But that the one, who is sent to such a punishment, is treated unjustly, is not granted; and to assert, that he is treated unjustly, is to beg and not to prove the thing in question.

2. That of the two persons now supposed, one should be treated according to his demerits, and the other by the "boundless goodness of God," should be exempted from that punishment, to which, by his demerit, he is justly lia­ble, is nothing incredible or unjust. Surely the gracious exemption of one man from that punishment, which he de­serves, renders not the punishment of another unjust, which would otherwise be just.

3. As there is no injustice in the case now stated, so nei­ther is there any partiality in it. There is no partiality in the conduct of the Supreme Magistrate, who condemns one criminal according to his demerit, and pardons another criminal equally guilty. But partiality is then practised, when of two real and known criminals, one is condemned by the judge; the other cleared, on the pretence, that he is innocent. So that this whole argument from the incre­dibly different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, whose characters are so nearly on a level, so far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on ac­count of the endless punishment of the sinner, is a mere begging of the question. It takes for granted, that the sinner does not deserve an endless punishment. So far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on ac­count of the infinite reward or happiness bestowed on the saint, it supposes, that God in his infinite goodness, cannot bestow an infinite good on a creature, who in his own per­son is entirely unworthy of it. It also supposes, that if e­ver [Page 86] God pardon any sinner, he must pardon all, whose de­merits are no more than that of the man pardoned; other­wise he is partial: and for the same reason, that if ever he condemn any sinner, he must condemn all those, whose characters are equally sinful with that of the man con­demned. But it is presumed, that these sentiments will be avowed by no man.

II. THE next argument is. That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the former is infinite, the latter finite.—As this is a matter of great im­portance in the present dispute, it requires our particular attention.—How then does Dr. C. make it appear, that sin is a finite evil? By these several considerations, that it is the fault of a finite creature,—during a finite life,— and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites; the sum of which is, that it is impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit an infinite crime; or which is the same thing, a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment.—As to this let it be observed,

1. THAT if it be impossible for a creature, in a finite du­ration, to commit a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment, it is as really against what Dr. C. holds, as a­gainst the opposite system. He says,^* ‘If the next is a state of punishment intended to satisfy the justice of God, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved:’ that is, if in the next state a punishment be inflicted, which satisfies justice, all men will not be saved. But a punishment, which satisfies justice is a perfectly just punishment. It is therefore just, that some men should finally not be saved; or it is just, that on account of their sins, they be without end excluded from salvation. And what is the endless ex­clusion of a sinner from salvation on account of his sins, but an endless punishment inflicted for the fault of a finite crea­ture, committed in a finite life, and the effect of finite prin­ciples, passions and appetites?—This passage of Dr. C. is a plain and full concession both of the justice of endless, pu­nishment, and of the infinite evil of sin.

THAT sin is an infinite evil, or an evil deserving an end­less punishment, is implied in all those passages also, in which Dr. C. asserts, that the salvation of all men, and e­ven of the damned, after they have suffered all which they ever are to suffer, is the fruit of boundless and inexhaustible [Page 87] goodness, infinite indulgence and love, &c. In his argument that the punishment of the damned is disciplinary, he says,^* ‘That God must in the other world, as well as this, be disposed to make it evident, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness.’ It is plain by the connecti­on, that the Doctor means, that the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a punishment, which is condu­cive to their good, is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness.

But that the goodness of that act of deliverance is not greater than the evil or punishment from which it delivers, will be conceded by all. There is goodness in delivering a man from the tooth-ache; but no man will pretend, that this is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. To de­liver from the misery of a thousand years torment in hell, is an act of far greater goodness. But this is not an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. Nor is any act of de­liverance worthy of these epithets, unless it deliver from an evil, which is boundless and inexhaustible. Doubtless the act of God in delivering a sinner from the punishment of hell is called an act of boundless and inexhaustible good­ness with respect to the greatness of the benefit conferred by that deliverance, and not with respect to the inherent and essential goodness of God. If the latter be Doctor C's meaning, what he says is no illustration of the divine goodness in delivering a sinner from the pains of hell: he might have said the same concerning the deliverance of a­ny person guilty or innocent, from the tooth-ache, or from the prick of a pin. He says, that God in the other world, as well as this, must be disposed to make it evident, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. But if the deliverance of a sinner from the pains of hell be not a boundless benefit, it does not make it evident, that God is a being of boundless goodness. If it be a boundless be­nefit, the evil delivered from is boundless. If therefore the deliverance of the damned from the torments of hell, be an act and a proof of boundless and inexhaustible goodness, as the Doctor holds, the evil from which they are deliver­ed, and to which they are exposed by the divine law, is boundless and inexhaustible. But they are not by the di­vine law exposed to a greater punishment than they justly deserve: therefore they justly deserve a boundless [...] inex­haustible punishment: of consequence sin, by which they [Page 88] deserve this punishment, is a boundless and inexhaustible or an infinite evil.

AGAIN, Dr. C. in the words of Mr. Whiston, says,^* "Many, or all of them," [the damned] ‘may possibly be re­covered and saved at last, by the infinite indulgence and love of their creator.’ The same observations, which were made in the preceding paragraph, are applicable here. It cannot be the meaning of Dr. C. that the recovery of the damned is in no other sense a fruit or proof of the in­finite indulgence and love of their Creator, than the reco­very of a person in this life from the smallest disease, or ca­lamity; or the deliverance of even an innocent being from some slight evil. A less degree of indulgence and love, than that which is infinite, would be sufficient for these re­coveries, or deliverances. And if nothing short of infinite indulgence and love can recover the damned, then their recovery is a proof of infinite love. Now what can be a proof of infinite love, but the bestowment of an infinite be­nefit? And no benefit consisting in recovery from evil is infinite, unless the evil, from which the recovery is made, be infinite. But if the evil from which the damned are supposed to be recovered, be infinite, sin, by which they are exposed to that evil, must itself be an infinite evil.

IF here it should be objected, that the damned are not indeed delivered from wrath, by boundless goodness and in­finite love; but that boundless goodness and infinite love are exercised in their admission to the positive happiness of heaven only: I entreat the reader to observe, that in the former of the two passages last quoted, Dr. C. is speaking of God's making evident his boundless and inexhaustible goodness, by pitying sinners, and punishing them in order to their benefit, or by the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a disciplinary punishment. In the other, he is speaking in the words of Mr. Whiston, concerning the recovery of the damned.—But for a more full answer I beg leave to refer the reader to page 13, where this same objection has been stated and considered.

THAT sin is an infinite evil, is implied in what Dr. C. holds concerning annihilation; he says, ‘If the fore­going scheme should be found to have no truth in it— the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence both in soul and body, [Page 89] so that they shall be no more in the creation of God.’ By this it appears that the Doctor held, that endless an­nihilation would be no unjust punishment of sin. But end­less annihilation is an endless or infinite punishment. It is an endless loss of not only all the good which the man at present enjoys; but of all that good which he would have enjoyed throughout eternity, in the state of bliss to which he would have been admitted, if he had never sinned. This in an endless duration would amount to an infinite quantity of good. Annihilation therefore is an infinite punishment both as it is endless, and as the quantity of good lost is infinite: and Dr. C. in allowing that endless annihilation would be no more than a just punishment of sin, allows, that sin deserves an infinite punishment, or that it is an infinite evil, though it is the fault of a finite creature, in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. If therefore it be a difficulty hard to be solved, that a finite creature, in a finite life, should commit an infinite evil, meaning a crime which may be justly punished with an endless punishment; it is a diffi­culty that equally concerned Dr. C. as myself; and it was absurd for him to object that to others, which lay equally in his own way.

IT may be objected to these observations, that endless annihilation is not an infinite punishment, because it may be inflicted on even an innocent person. God having once communicated existence is under no obligation to perpetu­ate it; but for wise ends may without injury suffer even the most holy of his creatures, after the enjoyment of existence and of good for a season, to drop into their original nothing. To this it may be answered; that this objection equally proves, that annihilation is no punishment at all, as that it is not an infinite punishment. When an innocent creature is suffered in sovereign wisdom to drop into non-existence, this is not only not an infinite punishment, but is no punishment at all. A punishment is some evil brought on a person, in testimony that his conduct is disapproved by the author of that evil. This is not the case in the annihilation of the innocent person now supposed. Therefore it equally fol­lows from the possible annihilation of an innocent creature, that the annihilation of the wicked would be no punish­ment at all, as that it would not be an infinite punishment. Annihilation is an infinite loss, and in that sense, an in­finite [Page 90] evil, to an innocent person, as well as to one ever so guilty. But as it is not inflicted on the [...], in testi­mony of disapprobation, it is not a punishment. On the other hand, if it be inflicted at all on the wicked, it is in­flicted in express testimony of the divine abhorrence of their conduct, and therefore is a punishment: and any pu­nishment, which is an infinite evil, is an infinite punish­ment.

TO illustrate this, let the following example be taken. A parent having begun the most liberal and advantageous education of his son, may for wise reasons, entirely drop, without any injustice to his son, the course of education, which he had begun, and may suffer him to grow up in comparative ignorance. This would not only not be a very great punishment of his son, but no punishment at all. Whereas, if he should treat his son in the same manner, from the motive of testifying his displeasure at some tri­fling levity or childish inadvertence, it would be both a real and a very great punishment: and though it would consist in a loss or privation, yet it would be a much greater punish­ment than the infliction of a very considerable positive pain. In like manner, though annihilation may be inflicted in such a manner, as to be no punishment; yet when it is inflicted with the declared design of exhibiting the divine displea­sure at sin; it is a far greater punishment, than a very great and long temporary misery.—That annihilation is an e­vil, no man will deny, who allows that existence and hap­piness are good. And if it be an evil, it is an evil equal to the good lost by it, taking into view the continuance of that loss; and as this is infinite, final annihilation is an in­finite evil: and whenever it is inflicted in testimony of dis­approbation of the conduct of the sinner, it is an infinite punishment.

DOUBTLESS Dr. C. was of the opinion, that annihilation may be a punishment, as it was his belief, that if his scheme of universal salvation be not true, the wicked are to be annihilated. He would doubtless have allowed, that annihilation will not be brought on them in testimony of the divine approbation of their conduct. Nor can it be supposed to be the fruit of perfect indifference in the divine mind, with respect to their conduct. It must therefore be a testimony of divine disapprobation, which constitutes it a [Page 91] punishment. And as it is an infinite evil, of course it is an infinite punishment▪ ^*

PERHAPS it may be further said, in opposition to what has been now advanced, that the meaning of those who as­sert, that sin does not deserve an infinite punishment, is not, that sin does not deserve an endless privation, or negative punishment; but that it does not deserve an endless positive punishment, consisting in positive pains or torments.—If the objection be thus explained, it comes to this merely, that sin does indeed deserve an endless punishment, and so is truly and properly an infinite evil, in the sense in which any of us hold it to be an infinite evil: but it is not such an infinite evil, as to deserve so great an endless punish­ment, as endless positive pain and torment. But this stat­ing of the objection entirely shifts the ground of the dispute: granting, that an endless punishment is justly deserved by sin, it denies, that so great a degree of punishment, as end­less positive misery, is deserved by it. Endless annihilation is equally and as truly an endless punishment, as endless tor­ment. Nor is there any ground of objection to the one more than to the other, on account of any difference in du­ration, or that in which alone the infinity consists. But the ground of objection to endless misery, rather than to end­less annihilation, is, that it is a greater, more dreadful, and more intolerable punishment; or a greater punishment in degree.

BESIDES, not every degree of endless pain is a greater e­vil or punishment, than endless annihilation. No man will pretend, that any slight pain continued to eternity, is so great an evil, as endless annihilation and the endless loss of all enjoyment and existence.

ON the whole, as the state of the argument before us, is now wholly shifted; as it is granted by the objector, that sin deserves an infinite or endless punishment, but not so great an endless punishment, as is implied in some degrees of endless pain; every thing for which we contend, as to the duration of future punishment, is granted. It is not [Page 92] pretended by the advocates for endless punishment, that sin deserves an infinite degree of endless punishment. Nor do they pretend to determine the degree of punishment, which it deserves. It becomes all to leave that to God, who alone is able to determine it. The advocates for tem­porary punishment will not pretend to determine the de­gree of temporary punishment, which sin deserves. The degree of future punishment is not the subject of the pre­sent dispute. I might now therefore fairly dismiss the fur­ther discussion of the infinite evil of sin, as on account of the concessions already mentioned, wholly impertinent to the present dispute. But wishing to relieve what difficul­ties, and to throw what light on the subject, I can, I pro­ceed to observe,

PERHAPS it may be yet further pleaded, that the oppo­sers of the infinite evil of sin mean, that sin does not de­serve such an endless positive misery, as is worse than non-existence.—As to this, besides that it makes the subject of the dispute to be wholly the degree of punishment, and not the duration of it; it may be remarked, that it is grant­ed in this plea, that it would be just, if all the wicked, who die in impenitence, were annihilated. Annihilation there­fore is the punishment deserved by the least sinner, who dies in impenitence; and those, whose guilt is more aggra­vated, deserve a greater punishment; and as some are incon­ceivably greater sinners than the least, they deserve an in­conceivably greater punishment than annihilation. Again, as the least sinner deserves annihilation, so he deserves that degree of positive pain, or that mixture of pain and plea­sure, which is equally undesirable, or equally dreadful as non-existence. Therefore those, who are inconceivably greater sinners than the least, deserve that degree of posi­tive endless pain, which is inconceivably worse and more to be dreaded, than non-existence, or than that mixture of pain and pleasure, which is equally to be dreaded as non-existence. Therefore from principles conceded by Dr. C. it clearly follows, not only that all sinners deserve an endless punishment, but that all sinners, except those of the very lowest class, deserve that degree of endless misery, which is worse than non-existence; and which is not only an infinite evil, but an evil doubly infinite, as the loss is infinite, and the positive misery exceeding all the good enjoyed, be­ing endless, is infinite too.

[Page 93]2. THE argument of Dr. C. now under consideration, "If it prove any thing, proves a great deal too much," as it supposes, that any crime can justly be punished for no longer time, than was consumed in the perpetration of the crime.—That this is implied in the argument, will appear, if we consider, that if it be once allowed, that a crime may be punished for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of it, the whole argument, that a creature can­not, in a finite life, commit such sin, as shall deserve an end­less punishment, must be given up. If a man may in one day commit a crime, which deserves a punishment to be continued for a year, who will say, that he may not in one day commit a crime, which shall deserve a punishment to be continued for two years, for ten years, or during his life? Therefore in determining the duration of the punishment, no regard at all is had to the time taken up in the perpe­tration of the crime. And if no regard be had to this, there is no absurdity in supposing, that the crimes of a fi­nite life may deserve an endless punishment. To say, that there is an absurdity in it, supposes, that in adjusting the punishment, a regard is always to be had to the time taken up in the perpetration of the crime; which is contrary to known fact, as well as to the deduction just now made. Nay, it implies, as I before observed, that no just punish­ment can be continued for a longer time, than was consu­med in the perpetration of the crime.—The mere dura­tion of punishment is of no importance or consideration, un­less the whole punishment be excessive. Therefore perpetual imprisonment is inflicted for crimes, which are perpetrated in a very short time.

BY the same argument, by which Dr. C. undertakes to prove, that sin does not deserve an endless punishment, any man may undertake to prove, that it does not deserve a punishment to continue for ages of ages. The Doctor's argument is, that sin deserves no more than a temporary punishment, because it is committed in a finite duration. With the same strength of argument it may be said: Sin deserves not a punishment of ages of ages, but a punishment of no longer duration, than seventy years, because it is com­mitted in the space of seventy years.—It is manifest, that when a punishment of ages of ages is inflicted on the sinner, no regard is had to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin. And if it be just to inflict a punishment in one case, [Page 94] without regard to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin, why not in another? If because sin is the fault of a fi­nite life, it does not deserve an infinite punishment; then because it is the fault of a life of less duration, than that of ages of ages, it does not deserve a punishment which is to continue for ages of ages.—Or how will Dr. C. prove, that sin, the fault of a life, which is to continue only seventy years, deserves a punishment, which is to continue for ages of ages? I presume he will not pretend to prove it by any proportion between the duration of seventy years and that of ages of ages; but merely by revelation. From the same source of evidence, we undertake to prove both the reality and justice of endless punishment. And it is as ineffectual to object to our proof of endless punishment, the dispropor­tion between an infinite and a finite duration, as it is to ob­ject to his proof of a punishment of ages of ages, the dis­proportion between the duration of ages of ages, and that of seventy years. I grant that the disproportion between infinite and finite duration, is greater, than that between ages of ages and seventy years. But, when the time consu­med in the commission of a crime is not at all regarded, let the disproportion be what it may, nothing can be thence concluded.

IF it be still pretended, that a regard to the time consu­med in the commission of sin is had, in determining the du­ration of its punishment [...] ask what regard is had to it? If the duration of the punishment may at all exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin, how much may the for­mer exceed the latter? To say there is an infinite dispro­portion between a si [...] life, and an endless eternity, affords no satisfaction. So there is a very great disproportion be­tween a life of seventy years, and ages of ages. And if on the principles of Dr. C. an endless punishment be more un­just than that of ages of ages, is not the latter on the same principles really unjust? If not, then a punishment, the du­ration of which is greatly disproportionate to the time con­sumed in the commission of the crime, is still just: and who will undertake to fix the degrees of disproportion between the duration of the punishment, and the time consumed in the commission of the crime, which are consistent, and which are inconsistent with justice? And let a reason be given, why it is not as really unjust to inflict a punishment, the du­ration of which is greatly disproportionate to the time spent in the commission of the crime, as to inflict a punishment, [Page 95] the duration of which bears no proportion to the time spent in the commission of the crime. Why would not the same argument from the disproportion of the dura­tion of the punishment, to the time spent in committing the sin, prove, that Adam was unjustly punished, in that he was condemned to eat bread in the sweat of his face, all the days of his life, for the sin of eating the forbidden fruit, which was doubtless finished in a very short time? Also, that David was unjustly punished, in that the sword never depart­ed from his house, because of his sin in the matter of Uriah?

IF a finite creature, in a finite time, cannot commit an in­finite evil, or one which deserves an endless punishment, it will follow, that even our Lord Jesus Christ himself, if he be a real creature, though the first born of every creature,^* cannot, if he were disposed, commit an infinite evil. Yet as he created and upholds all things by the word of his pow­er, he doubtless has power to annihilate all things. Now I ask, whether if Christ should annihilate the whole crea­ted system, himself only excepted, it would be a finite or an infinite evil? If the answer should be, that it would be a finite evil, I would ask again, whether it would not be as great an evil to the universe, as the endless misery of one sinner, provided he deserves that misery.—I make this this proviso, because we do not plead for endless punish­ment on any other supposition, than that it is just: And if it should be said, that the endless punishment of a sinner is an infinite evil, because it is unjustly inflicted, this would be a begging of the question: it would also follow, that on the supposition of the justice of the endless punishment of the sinner, it is not an infinite evil, and therefore there is no foundation for the objection now under consideration, that sin a finite moral evil is punished with an infinite natural e­vil or punishment.—Beside, that the endless annihilation of the created system would be an infinite evil in the very same sense, in which the endless punishment of the damned is an infinite evil, is evident from this consideration, that the punishment of the damned is not pretended to be infi­nite in any other respect, th [...] in duration. In the very same respect the endless annihilation of which we speak, is infinite.

[Page 96]IF the answer to the question just proposed, should be, that the annihilation of the created system would be an in­finite evil; the consequence is, that an infinite evil may be caused or committed by a finite creature, in a finite time.

POSSIBLY it may be further objected, that if our Lord Jesus Christ be a mere creature, he had no power in him­self to create the universe; but created it by a divine pow­er communicated for that purpose: and that if he should annihilate it, he must do it by the same communicated pow­er. Therefore Christ himself has it not in his power, to effect an infinite evil.—But we are to observe, that if Christ was a proper intelligent moral agent in creation, that work is his work, and properly to be ascribed to him, as properly as any actions of men are to be ascribed to them. It is allowed on all hands, that all men have re­ceived all their powers of action from their creator; yet no man will dispute, whether these actions be the proper actions of men, or whether the effects produced by these actions be imputable to them, as their proper causes. Therefore with at least as great truth and propriety is Christ, even on the supposition that he is a mere creature, the proper cause of all his works, whether of creation or annihilation, as men in general are the causes of their works. He cannot possibly be more dependent for his powers, than we are for ours. Nor is it of any importance to the sub­ject now under consideration, whether Christ had original­ly the power of creation and annihilation, or whether it was communicated to him afterwards. A power given by God at one time, is as really given by him, as if it were gi­ven at another time.

IN the argument against the infinite evil of sin, that a fi­nite creature cannot commit an infinite evil, in a finite time; the finitude of the time is either essential to the va­lidity of the argument, or it is not. If it be essential, it implies, as was before observed, that no crime can deserve to be punished for a longer time, than was consumed in the commission of the crime. If the finitude of the time be not essential to the argument, but the meaning be, that a finite creature cannot at all commit an infinite evil, because he is a finite creature, it will follow, that if the whole system of intelligent creatures were to revolt from God, and to con­tinue in their revolt to an absolute eternity, it would be but a finite evil.

[Page 97]OBJECTION: The time never can come, at which the system of creatures shall have continued to an absolute eter­nity, in their revolt from God. Though therefore we suppose that the whole created system should revolt, it is absurd to suppose, that they shall have continued in their revolt to an absolute eternity: and therefore it is impos­sible, that the whole created system should have com­mitted an infinite evil.—ANSWER. For the same reason it is impossible, that a creature should have been punished to an absolute eternity. The longest punishment to which any suppose the wicked are doomed, is in no other sense infinite, than that in which the revolt which has been sup­posed, may be infinite. If then the wicked be not doomed to an infinite or endless punishment; sin is not, on any scheme, punished with an infinite punishment; and then the whole objection of punishing a finite evil, with an in­finite punishment, falls to the ground.

BUT this whole argument, founded on the finitude of the life and of the capacity of the sinner, was virtually given up by Dr. C. in that he believed, that endless an­nihilation would be a just punishment of sin: though the duration of the punishment in this case, would infinitely exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin.

III. WE come at length to consider the third argument of Dr. C. against the justice of endless punishment, which is, that endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is infinite or to the utmost in degree, as well as duration, and therefore that the pu­nishment of all the damned is equal, which is both absurd and contrary to scripture. This I take to be the argu­ment intended in the latter part of the last quotation made in the beginning of this chapter.—On this it is observable, that though a sinner, on account of the infinite evil of sin as committed against a God of infinite glory, deserve and shall suffer an endless punishment; it by no means follows, that he deserves or will suffer that punishment which is infinite in degree too, or which is to the utmost degree in which any sinner is punished. All that follows from the infinite evil of sin is, that it deserves an infinite punish­ment; and an endless punishment is an infinite punish­ment, though it be not to the utmost in degree. There­fore, when Dr. C. says, ‘According to this way of ar­guing, [Page 98] all sinners must suffer to the utmost in degree, as well as duration, otherwise, they will not suffer so much as they ought to do;’ he merely asserts what he ought to have proved. Therefore he fails in his attempt to fasten on the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, the ab­surdity that the punishment of all the damned will be equal. He might as well have argued, that because all saints shall receive an infinite or an endless reward; the reward of every one will be to the utmost in degree, and the reward of all will be equal.

OR if the meaning of this argument be, that the wick­ed will all be punished equally, not because they will suf­fer an endless punishment, but because they all sin against the same infinitely glorious object, and therefore their sins are all equal: the answer is, that the consequence by no means follows from the premises. Though it be true, that the wicked all sin against the same God, and on that ac­count all deserve endless punishment? yet it no more fol­lows thence, that they all deserve the same punishment in degree, than if a number of subjects should rebel against the same excellent Prince, it would follow, that they are equally guilty, and all deserve an equal punishment.

THE expression, infinite evil of sin, seems to be very of­fensive to some gentlemen. They seem to conceive that it means as great an evil or crime, as it is possible for a man to commit, the moral turpitude of which can in no respect be increased.—This idea of the infinite evil of sin is very different from that which is entertained by those who hold, that sin is an infinite evil. All they mean is, that sin is in such a sense an infinite evil, that it may be justly followed by an endless punishment. It no more follows hence, that the moral turpitude of any particular sin can not be increased, than that the endless punishment of it cannot be increased; or than that the endless happiness of the saints in heaven cannot be increased. Indeed, neither the happiness of heaven, nor the misery of hell can be increased in duration: nor can the turpitude of sin be so increased, as to deserve a greater duration of punishment, than that which is endless. But as both the happiness of heaven and the misery of hell, though endless, may be in­creased in degree; so may the turpitude of sin be so in­creased, as to deserve a greater degree of punishment.

[Page 99]WHEN it is said, that if the evil of sin be infinite, it is as great as possible, and so all sins are equal; it seems to be implied, that all infinites are equal in all respects, than which nothing is more false. An infinite line, an infinite superficies, and an infinite solid, are all infinites, and they are all equal in one respect or dimension, that of length. But a line though truly infinite in length, is not in the di­mension of breadth equal to an infinite superficies. Nor is a superficies, though truly infinite in the two dimensions of length and breadth, equal in depth to an infinite solid.— To apply this, sin may be infinitely aggravated with re­spect to the object against whom it is committed, and in that respect it may be incapable of an increase of aggrava­tion. Still it may not be infinite with respect to the de­gree of opposition, or virulence and malignity to the object, against whom it is committed.

BY the infinite evil of sin therefore is meant, that sin tru­ly deserves an endless punishment, as it is committed against an infinitely glorious object, against God himself, his autho­rity, his law, his government; and as it enervates the laws, violates the peace and safety of his kingdom, introduces con­fusion and ruin, and would actually ruin entirely that king­dom, and the happiness of all who belong to it, were not measures taken by God to prevent its natural effect. In this respect it is infinitely evil, and in this respect, in which it is infinitely evil, the evil of it cannot be increased, because the object against which it is committed, cannot be greater, more important, or more excellent; and in this respect all sins are equal. But by the infinite evil of sin, is not meant an evil, which deserves an infinite degree of punishment; or an act of opposition to God and his king­dom, which is infinitely virulent or malicious. In this re­spect the evil of sin may be increased, and in this respect all sins are by no means equal.—The evil of any one sin is not so great, but that on the whole it may be increased, as the happiness of heaven is not so great, but that on the whole that may be increased.

THOUGH the turpitude of sin is infinite with respect to the object opposed, yet it is not infinite as to the degree of opposition. If a subject rebel against the most excellent sovereign on earth, his crime is, in respect to the object, as great as he can commit in rebellion against a temporal prince; because by supposition he cannot be the subject of [Page 100] a better temporal prince, and therefore he cannot rebel a­gainst a better. Yet this rebellion may be more aggrava­ted by greater degrees of opposition, abuse or insult to this same excellent prince.

WHAT has been now said concerning the infinite evil of sin, has been in the way of explanation, and in answer to Dr. C's objections. The positive proof, that sin is an infi­nite evil, has been so largely and ably given by others, that the reader will allow me to refer him to them.^*

THUS I have particularly attended to the arguments brought by Dr. C. to prove, that the endless punishment of the wicked would not be just.—I shall now proceed to a more general consideration of the justice of endless punishment consisting in misery, and to some arguments in proof of it. The first argument to which I wish to direct the attention of the reader, is, that if endless punishment be the curse of the divine law, or the punishment threaten­ed in the divine law, as the wages of sin, or as the proper punishment of sinners; undoubtedly it is just. It is impos­sible, that a God of perfect and infinite justice should threat­en an unjust punishment.—I am indeed aware, that it is not a conceded point, that endless misery is threatened in the divine law: I therefore purpose to attempt the proof of it.—The curse of the divine law is either endless an­nihilation, or it is that misery which the wicked in fact suf­fer in hell, or it is some temporary misery of greater dura­tion than that which is actually suffered in hell, or it is end­less misery. These several hypotheses shall come under con­sideration in the following chapters.

BUT before I proceed, it may be proper to explain in what sense I use the word law, in this inquiry concerning the curse of the divine law.—By the divine law, I mean not merely any positive, revealed law, as that given to Adam concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil: but what Dr. C. calls "the moral law of God," and ‘the law of works, as requiring perfect, actual, indefect­able obedience.’ The Doctor allows, that "he" [Adam] ‘was, without all doubt, under strict indispensable obli­gations to obey every command of God, wherein it [Page 101] should be made known to him—and must have rendered himself obnoxious to the righteous resentments of his God and king, had he expressed any disregard to any of them.’ ^* This he speaks concerning the moral law, as may be seen by the context. And doubtless as Adam was obligated to obey "every command" of the moral law, and in case of disobedience, was ‘obnoxious to the righ­teous resentments of God,’ the same is true of every other man. The righteous resentment of God for dis­obedience to this law, is that very curse of the law, from which Christ hath redeemed his people, and which is the proper object of our present inquiry. By law taken in this sense, Dr. C. abundantly holds, that no man can be justi­fied. ‘By law, the apostle sometimes means law in ge­neral, both the law written in men's hearts, and in the books of revelation—sometimes—the Mosaic law in special. But whether he understand by it natural or revealed law, or law including both; works done in conformity to it, when mentioned with reference to justification, he always sets aside as totally insufficient for the procurement of it.’ ^† Here the Doctor tells us in what sense he uses the word law, which is the same in which I use it, in the present inquiry: and as he asserts in this context, and in very many other passages, that no man, "Jew or Gentile," can be justified on the foot of law taken in the sense just explained; of course all men are condemned by the law, and the punishment to which the law condemns all, is the curse of the law; or the curse of the law is that punishment to which the moral law con­demns every man who transgresses it.

CHAP. V. Is Annihilation the Punishment of the damned?

DOCTOR C's first object was, to prove that all men will be finally happy. — If he should fail in this, his last resort was annihilation. ‘If the foregoing scheme,’ says he,^* ‘should be sound to have no truth in it, and the wicked are sent to hell, as so many in­curables, the second death ought to be considered, as that which will put an end to their existence, both in soul and body, so as that they shall be no more in the creation of God.’ Having made the supposition, that the next is the final state of men, he says,^† ‘It is most peremptorily affirmed, that they’ (the wicked) ‘shall reap corruption, perish, be destroyed, and die a second time; which fixes the sense of the word everlasting, when joined with the misery they shall be doomed to undergo, limiting its meaning to an age, or period of duration only.’ Corruption, perdition, destruction, and the second death do not limit the meaning of the word everlasting, unless it be on the supposition, that those words themselves mean annihilation. Sometimes by those words Dr. C. seems to have meant a transition from one future state of existence to another; at other times he expressly declares that they mean misery, torment. Now if those words applied to the wicked mean a transition from the next state of existence to another, they by no means certainly limit their misery. This transition may be from one state of misery to another state of misery; as Dr. C. supposed that they might pass through several future states of misery, before they should arrive at happiness. Nay, from the words used in this sense, no inference can be drawn, that they will ever arrive at a state of happiness: because a transition from one state of misery to another state of misery, is as truly a transition, as a transition from a state of misery to a state of happiness.—But if those words mean misery or torment, they certainly do not limit the future misery of the wicked; as will more fully ap­pear presently.

[Page 103]I DO not find any proof offered by Dr. C. that the wicked will be annihilated, unless he consider the very meaning of the words destruction, death, &c. as a proof. But this proof, if it be one, was absolutely given up by himself, as he held, that those words signify not annihila­tion, but misery; as in the following passages; ‘Ever­lasting punishment, everlasting fire, everlasting destruc­tion: so the words are rendered in our English bibles; but we are very obviously led to understand by them MISERY, that must be suffered for a certain period.’ ^* ‘If men continue the servants of sin, the wages they shall receive before the gift through Christ is conferred on them, will be the second death: whereas if they be­come the servants of God, this gift through Christ will issue in their eternal life, without their passing through the second death.’ ^† That by the second death he here meant not annihilation, but the misery of hell, is manifest, as it is to be followed with the gift of God through Christ, which is eternal life. ‘The going away into everlasting punishment, the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, mean the same thing in the sacred dialect, with the se­cond death.’ ^‡ ‘They may be saved without first going through the torments of hell, or as the scripture expresses it, without being hurt of the second death.’ ^‖ How strange then is it, that Dr. C. should urge the literal and original meaning of the words death, destruction, &c. as an argument for annihilation, when he himself supposed that they mean not annihilation, but obviously mean misery! and that he should suppose, that they limit the sense of the word everlasting, when it is joined to the misery of the damned! As well might he have said, that the word mi­sery limits the sense of the word everlasting, when it is joined to the misery of the damned!

Perhaps some admirers of Dr. C. may attempt to re­concile this inconsistence, by saying, he held that the words death, destruction, &c. mean and prove annihilation, on the sole supposition, that the next state is final: that on any other supposition he held that they mean misery.— But this would be a vain attempt. For if those words do or may mean misery, they are no proof of annihilation, whether the next state be final or not. They are no more [Page 104] a proof of it, than [...] words misery and torment; be­cause by his own concessions, they are at least capable of meaning misery or torment. Therefore though Dr. C's scheme of universal happiness should fail, we should from the application of the words death, destruction, &c. to the wicked, be under no necessity of supposing that they will be annihilated; everlasting destruction may mean ever­lasting misery.

THE truth appears to be, that Dr. C. was led to adopt, as [...] last resort, the idea of the annihilation of the wicked, not by the obvious meaning and use of the words death and destruction in scripture; since he allows they ob­viously mean misery or torment; but by the preconcep­tion, that it is a certain truth, that the endless misery of any of mankind can never exist. To this preconceived opinion the scripture must some way or other be accom­modated.

BUT let us proceed to some considerations to confirm the proposition, that annihilation is not the curse or punish­ment denounced against sin in the divine law.

THE doctrine, that annihilation is the curse of the di­vine law, may be holden in two different senses, both which I conceive to be entirely opposite to the truth.— It is the sentiment of many, that annihilation is the punish­ment of sin threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die impenitent.—Again; it is the sentiment of some, that though annihilation will not be inflicted on any; yet it is the curse which was originally in the law de­nounced against sin; but that Christ hath absolutely re­deemed all from it; and therefore none will suffer it.

I. IT is the sentiment of many, and was the sentiment of Dr. C. provided his scheme of universal happiness do not hold; that annihilation is the punishment threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die im­penitent.—Concerning which it is to be remarked;

1. That on this hypothesis, all Dr. C's arguments both from scripture and reason, to prove the salvation of all men, entirely fall to the ground; and it is nothing incon­sistent with either the justice or goodness of God, that a great part of mankind should be forever cast off, and suf­fer an endless punishment; and not only a great part, but the greater part of the whole; as he acknowledges, that [Page 105] but few are saved immediately from this life.^* Nor is it at all inconsistent with the design of Christ's undertaking, nor with his honour as the Saviour of mankind, that the greater part of the whole race should not be saved.^† All that argument therefore of Dr. C. with his declamation on the supposed absurdity, that Christ should undertake to defeat the devil and destroy his works, and yet really be so far baffled by him,^‡ as still to fail of the salvation of the greater part of mankind, comes entirely to nothing.— Nor must it be any more urged as an argument in this dis­pute, that God is willing that all men should be saved, and not willing that any should perish; or that Christ died for all men, &c. &c. At least these propositions must be re­ceived with the same limitations and distinctions, with which the despised orthodox, systematic divines have re­ceived them. At the same time, all those texts which speak of the restitution of all things; of God's tender mercies over all his works; of the free gift coming upon all men to justification of life; of the creature delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God; of the destruction of the last ene­my, death: of all things gathered together in Christ; of all things reconciled to God by Christ; of every creature saying, blessing and honour, &c, to him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb, &c, &c, must be given up, or understood with the like limitations, as are put upon them, by the believers in endless misery.—At the same time, all Dr. C's laboured criticism on [...], and [...], &c, must be acknowledged to be ground­less: and all that he hath said against vindictive punish­ment, and in favour of mere discipline, is nothing to the purpose.

II. THE scriptural representations of the punishment of the wicked are inconsistent with the idea that it consists in annihilation. According to the scriptures the wicked depart into everlasting fire.—The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever.—They shall weep and [Page 106] wail and gnash [...] teeth.—They have no rest day nor night.—The [...] in hell lifted up his eyes, being in torment.—The damned shall dwell with ever lasting burnings. —When the master of the house shall have risen up and shut the door, they shall stand without, crying Lord, Lord, open to us: to whom the master shall say, I know you not▪ depart from me.—After they themselves shall have been thrust out, they shall see Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God.—The rich man in hell saw Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his bosom.— The saved shall go forth and look on the carcases of trans­gressors, and they shall be an abhorring to all flesh.—The beast and false prophet, and by parity of reason, all men dying in wickedness, shall be cast into a lake of fire and shall be tormented forever and ever; [...] in the plural number, determining, that they, the devil, the beast and the false prophet, shall be tormented for ever and ever.—The wicked shall be tormented with fire and brim­stone, in the presence of the angels, and in the presence of the lamb.

BUT how can those who are annihilated, be said to be cast into fire, into a lake of fire and brimstone, and to be tormented there; to have no rest; to weep, and wail and gnash their teeth; to dwell with everlasting burnings?— As well might these things be said of them before they were created.—How can they be said to plead for admission into heaven, and to reason on the subject with the master of the celestial mansions? How can they see Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God? How can they seeing Abraham and Lazarus in that state, enter into dis­course with the former?—Rev. XIV. 11. The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night. But those who are annihilated, so far as they have any thing, have continual rest day and night.

THE different degrees of the punishment of the wicked in hell prove, that their punishment does not consist in an­nihilation. Matt. V. 22, ‘Whosoever shall be angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment: whosoever shall say to his brother, raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire.’ —The [Page 107] servant who knows not his master's will, and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. but the servant who knows his master's will, and com­mits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with many stripes.—It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon and for Sodom, than for Chorazin, Bethsaida and Capernaum. —The wicked shall receive according to their works, ac­cording to the fruit of their doings, and according to that which they shall have done in the body. The scribes and Pharisees were to receive the greater damnation, Matt. XXIII. 14.—But if annihilation be the punishment of the wicked, there is no difference between the punishment of the least sinner and the greatest, who die impenitent: which is both absurd in itself and absolutely contradictory to the scriptural account.

IF it should be pleaded in answer to this argument, that though all the wicked shall suffer annihilation; yet the punishment of all will not be the same; as the more ag­gravated sinners will be made the subjects of misery for a while, and then be annihilated: it may be replied, that this supposes the curse of the law to consist in two things, temporary misery and annihilation. But where have we any hint in the scripture, that the curse of the law, as suf­fered in the future world, is such a heterogeneous com­pound as this?—After all, it seems, that annihilation is but a small part of that curse; for that alone will be inflicted on the least sinner only, and on account of the least sin; and all that punishment which shall be inflicted on any person, above that which is due to the least sin; is to consist in torment. Why then might not the constitution have been, that the small additional part of the curse, which is to consist in annihila­tion, should likewise be inflicted in torment? This was very feasible. He who suffers the punishment of ninety nine sins in torment, might by a small addition, in degree or dura­tion to his torment, have suffered the punishment of an hundred sins. Add to the torment of every sinner dying impenitent, a degree or duration of misery, equal to that which is deserved by one sin, and that the least, and there would have been no need that any of them be annihilated, but having suffered the whole curse of the law, they would on the foot of strict justice be entitled to exemption from further punishment. And who having by misery satisfied [Page 108] for all the various and most aggravated sins of his life, would not choose to satisfy, in the same way, for the least of all his sins, rather than to be struck out of existence, and to lose inconceivable and endless enjoyment? As therefore this supposed constitution would be so apparently unnecessary and unwise, it cannot be expected to obtain credit, unless it be most clearly revealed in scripture, which is not pretend­ed concerning it.—Besides, this hypothesis places so small a part of the punishment of sinners in annihilation, that it cannot with any propriety be said, that the curse of the law consists in annihilation.

SHOULD it be further objected, that though all the wick­ed be annihilated, yet their punishment may be of different degrees, as the losses they shall respectively suffer, will be different according to their various degrees of enjoyment or capacities for enjoyment: it may be answered, that the wicked are to be punished according to their several crimes. A man guilty of murder, will, if his other crimes be the same, be punished more than the thief, who steals the va­lue of five shillings. Yet the enjoyment of the latter and his capacity for enjoyment, may be far greater than those of the former. By annihilation therefore he would suffer a far greater loss.—Not all those who know their mas­ter's will, and yet commit things worthy of stripes, possess greater enjoyments or capacities for enjoyment, than those who know not their master's will.

3. THE punishment of the fallen angels does not consist in annihilation: and the damned suffer the same kind of punishment with them. That the fallen angels are as yet annihilated, I presume, will be pretended by no believer in divine revelation, and that they are not to be annihila­ted, will be evident, if we consider, that in expectation of that full punishment, to which they are liable, they asked our Lord, whether he were come to torment them before the time. It was torment then, not annihilation, which they expected. The present state of the fallen angels is a state of torment to a certain degree. They "believe and tremble:" "They are reserved in chains under darkness, to the judgment of the great day," Jude, 6: "They are cast down to hell," 2 Peter, II, 4: "The devil that de­ceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and [they] shall be tormented day and night, forever and ever," Rev. XX, 10. This text proves,

[Page 109](1) That the devil is now, before the general judgment, in a state of torment, in the lake of fire and brimstone.^* And it appears from the question, which he put to our Lord, to which reference was just now had, that he anxi­ously dreads the removal, which he is to suffer, from this his present state, to that in which he is to be after the ge­neral judgment, and to which he and his angels, are re­served in chains. But can we suppose, that he would anxi­ously dread a deliverance by annihilation, out of the lake of torment by fire and brimstone? This would imply, that endless annihilation is more to be dreaded, than the endless torment which is the subject of this controversy. If so, Dr. C. ought to have dropped all objections to the justice of endless torments, since he allowed that the annihilation of the wicked would be just. And if that be just, then al­so endless continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone, which is the utmost punishment that any man holds concer­ning the wicked, and which is now supposed to be a less punishment than annihilation, is just.—But if it be grant­ed, that annihilation is not so great a punishment as end­less continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone; it is as absurd to suppose, that the devils should dread or tremble at the prospect of annihilation, as that a man tormented with the gout or stone, should dread or tremble at an as­surance, that he should ere long be delivered from his tor­tures, and in their stead should suffer the prick of a pin.

(2) THAT text directly proves, that the devil is to be for­ever tormented, and not annihilated. "And they," [the nominative to be supplied] "shall be tormented forever and ever."—To say that this means, that the devil will be first tormented for ages of ages, and then be annihilated, leads into the absurdities before noticed.

BUT to this state of torment, in which the fallen angels are, and are to be, the wicked shall be sent. "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are." And as the devil is not to be annihilated, but punished with torments, so are the wicked.

[Page 110]4. ROM. IX, 22, affords an argument pertinent to the present subject. The words are, "What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to de­struction." One end it seems of permitting sinners to pro­ceed to such lengths in sin, is to make known the divine power in their destruction. But annihilation is no exertion of power, it is a mere suspension of power.—The words imply further, that the longer God endures with the wick­ed, the greater will be the manifestation of both his wrath and power in their destruction. But as annihilation is the same to every person annihilated, it exhibits no greater manifestation of power towards one than towards another. And if it were a manifestation of power, there would be no greater manifestation of power in the annihilation of one, than of another. It is presumed, that no unbiassed judge will say, that the meaning is, that God endures, with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath, to display his wrath and power in their annihilation; as the very same display of both would be made, without any long-suffer­ing.

THE only consideration urged from scripture in support of the sentiment, which I am opposing, is the application of the words, death, destruction, perish, corruption, &c. to the punishment of the wicked.—This however came with a very ill grace from Dr. C. who understood, and was ne­cessitated by his scheme of universal salvation, to understand, those words to mean misery, as I have already shown.— With regard to others, who make not this concession, let them, if they believe in revelation, (and with such only I dispute) reconcile the scriptures with themselves, and un­derstand such like passages as those I have quoted above, representing the punishment of the damned, to consist in misery, in any consistence with the threatening of death, destruction, &c, otherwise than by allowing that those words do mean positive misery. But to allow this, is to give up the scheme of annihilation; or at least this argu­ment for it.

BESIDES, the scriptures themselves explain their own meaning in the use of the words death, destruction, &c. The second death is expressly said to consist in being cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and in having a part in that lake; which is not a description of annihilation, nor [Page 111] can be reconciled with it. Rev. XX, 14. Ch. XXI, 8.— Mat. XXIV, 51, "And shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with hypocrites, there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." To divide a man into two parts, as determinately expresses annihilation, as the words death, perdition, &c. This however the scripture supposes to be consistent with a state of misery, expressed by wailing and gnashing of teeth. Gen. V, 24. "Enoch walked with God, and was not, for God took him." In this instance, though the scripture says, Enoch was not, which more di­rectly expresses annihilation, than death, destruction, &c, yet it explains itself to mean not annihilation; indeed no man pretends that the righteous are annihilated.—When the scriptures say, that men are dead in trespasses and sins, no man understands the expression to mean annihilation. The same may be said of the apostle's words in 1 Tim. V, 6. "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth."

THEREFORE, since the scriptures do often use the word death, &c. to signify something entirely different from a ces­sation of life or of existence; and since we cannot make the scriptures consistent with themselves, unless we under­stand the same words in the same latitude, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, we are necessitated to un­derstand them in that latitude.

II. As I observed, there is another sense in which an­nihilation may be holden, and was holden by Dr. C. which is this; that though annihilation will not actually be inflicted on any man, yet it is the curse which was ori­ginally in the divine law denounced against sin; but that Christ hath absolutely redeemed all men from that curse, so that no man is now liable to it. ‘By Christ—they were absolutely and unconditionly put into salvable cir­cumstances—Upon this foundation and this only, they are become capable of a future immortality.’ ^* ‘God might upon the first offence he’ [Adam] ‘committed, have immediately turned him out of existence, as he threat­ened he would; the effect whereof would have been the total loss of all his principles bodily and mental, and of all his obligations.’ ^† ‘The same grace through Christ, which continued Adam in being after the lapse,’ &c. ^‡ ‘It will further enhance our idea of the greatness of God's grace’ [through Christ] ‘in restoring that [Page 112] possibility of existence which had been forfeited by Adam's lapse,’ &c.^‖ ‘Death—would have put a period to all possibility of perception or exertion in any shape for­ever, had it not been for the interposition of grace through Christ.’ ^** ‘The term death when used with refer­ence to the posterity of Adam, considered simply as such, cannot contain more in its meaning, than is in­cluded in it, when used with reference to Adam him­self.’ ^††

ON this hypothesis, the punishment actually suffered by the damned is no part of the curse of the divine law, but merely a necessary and wholesome discipline designed for the good of the patients. But this scheme of annihilation can, no more than the former, be reconciled with the scripture, which says the wicked shall receive according to their works, shall pay the uttermost farthing, shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, &c. Nor indeed can it be reconciled with Dr. C's book, which says, The wicked will be punished according to their de­serts, according to their sins, according to the nature and number of their crimes and evil deeds: and so that the law will have its course, and the threatened penalty will be executed on some of them at least. These expressions certainly declare, that they will suffer the full curse of the divine law. Otherwise the curse of the law is a greater punishment than that which is according to the deserts of the wicked, and greater too than the full penalty threat­ened in the law; which is absurd and contradictory.

HERE I might repeat the various arguments urged in the third chapter, to prove that the punishment of the damned is not a mere salutary discipline. But to avoid re­petition, I beg leave to refer the reader to the considera­tions there suggested: and to proceed to other considera­tions, which may further show, that the future punish­ment of the wicked is not disciplinary, and that Christ hath not so redeemed all men from annihilation, that no man is now liable to it, if indeed that be the curse of the law.

1. IF annihilation be the curse of the divine law, and the torments of hell be a mere salutary discipline; then there is no forgiveness in exempting a sinner from those torments. To forgive a sinner is to exempt or release him from the curse of the law; not to excuse him from a [Page 113] salutary mean of grace. If a physician excuse his patient from an emetic or from the cold bath, no man will pre­tend, that he exercises forgiving grace.

2. I WISH the reader to attend to Gal. III. 10; ‘For as many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse: for it is written cursed is every one that con­tinueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.’ This proves that all men are not abso­lutely delivered from the curse of the law, whether that curse consist in annihilation, or misery temporary or endless: because some men are evidently supposed in this text, to be exposed to that curse. ‘As many as are of the works of the law,’ as doubtless many of the Jews of that day were, are expressly said to be "under the curse." They therefore were not absolutely and unconditionally de­livered from that curse. But if the curse of the law be an­nihilation, and all men be unconditionally delivered by Christ from that curse, how can any man be under it?

IF it should be said, that this text is nothing to the pur­pose, because the curse here mentioned is the curse, not of the moral, but of the ceremonial law; it may be answered, If this text, with the context say nothing of redemption from the curse of the moral law, how is it known, that Christ, according to the hypothesis now under considerati­on, hath delivered all men unconditionally from annihila­tion, which is supposed to be the curse of the moral law? It is the 13th verse, which assures us, that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." If this mean the ceremonial law, it seems, we have no assurance that Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the moral law, be that annihilation or what it may; but all that Christ hath done or suffered notwithstanding, we are as liable to that curse, as we were before Christ undertook for us.

BESIDES, the curse of the law here mentioned, is the ve­ry curse mentioned in Deut. XXVII, 26, from which it is quoted. But that was not the curse of the ceremonial law, but of the moral, as every precept enumerated in that context, and to which this curse is annexed, is pure­ly moral.—Or if this curse be that to which any man is liable, who transgresses any precept, written in the book of the law; it will certainly include the curse of the moral law. For whether the book mentioned, be the book of Deuteronomy, or the whole Pentateuch, it con­tained [Page 114] the whole moral law. Therefore the curse here mentioned includes the curse of the moral law. And in­deed with respect to us under the gospel, the text must mean the moral law only, because, as the ceremonial law is now repealed, it is no longer in existence, and therefore is no longer contained in the book of the law.—Further, if the redemption of Christ was a redemption from the curse of the ceremonial law only; then it had no respect at all to us Gentiles, who never were under the ceremonial law; nor are we in any respect redeemed by Christ.

IT is also to be observed, that this curse is opposed by the apostle, throughout the context, to the blessing of Abra­ham, as is manifest by inspection. But the blessing of A­braham did not consist in freedom from the ceremonial law. If it consisted in that, the Gentiles originally possessed the blessing of Abraham, since they were as perfectly free from the ceremonial law, as Abraham himself. Whereas the coming of the blessing of Abraham on the Gentiles is spo­ken of as a new and adventitious blessing, not as one origi­nally possessed by them; see v. 8 and 14. The blessing of Abraham is not only not said to consist in bare freedom from the ceremonial law, but it is positively said to consist in justi­fication by faith; v. 6—10. v. 14 and 29.

THIS passage throws light on the present question in a­nother point of view. As the curse of the law is set in di­rect opposition to the blessing of Abraham, all who are not entitled to the blessing of Abraham, are of course under the curse, and are not unconditionally rescued from it by Jesus Christ.—If it should be said, that the blessing of Abraham is common to all mankind, all being justified and exempted from the curse of the law, as he was; let it be observed, that Abraham obtained this blessing in conse­quence of faith only: and will it be pretended, that all men are now the subjects of the faith of Abraham? The apostle constantly speaks of this blessing as suspended on the condition of faith: v. 7, "They which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham." V. 8, "The scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith." V. 9, "They which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham." V. 14, "That the bles­sing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Je­sus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the spirit through faith." V. 29, "If ye be Christ's, then [Page 115] are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Now if faith in Christ be necessary to the inheritance of the blessing of Abraham, and all who are not entitled to that blessing, be liable to the curse of the law; then it cannot be true, that all mankind are unconditionally freed by Christ from the curse of the law, whether that curse be annihilation or any thing else.

3. ON the hypothesis now under consideration, what are pardon and justification? They are every where in scripture represented to be conditional, suspended on the conditions of repentance and faith; and the same is abun­dantly holden by Dr. C. however inconsistently with his other tenet concerning the unconditional exemption of all men from the curse of the law. The language of scrip­ture is, He that believeth shall be saved; but he that be­lieveth not, shall be damned. He that believeth not is con­demned already—the wrath of God abideth on him, &c, &c. How can those be condemned, and how can the wrath of God abide on those, who are unconditionally delivered from the curse of the law? Pardon is generally supposed to con­sist in an acquittance from the curse of the law: but if all men, penitent and impenitent, believing and unbelieving, be acquitted and delivered from that curse, where is the propriety or truth of limiting pardon to the penitent and believing, and of declaring, that all the rest of men are con­demned? To what are they condemned? Not to suffer the curse of the law: From this they are by supposition unconditionally delivered. By what are they condemned? Not by the law: this would imply, that they are under the curse of it.

IF to this it be said, that the impenitent are condemned to suffer the curse of the law, in this sense only, that the law declares the punishment to which, according to strict justice, they are liable; but not that punishment to which they are now liable, since the redemption of Christ:—To this it may be answered, In this sense the penitent and be­lieving are equally condemned, as the impenitent and un­believing; nay, the whole body of the saints in heaven. Nor would there be any truth in saying, in this sense, "He that believeth on Christ, is not condemned."

4. THAT single text, Gal V. 2, seems to confute the hypothesis now in question. The words are, ‘If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.’ Whereas [Page 116] according to the hypothesis now in question, whether the Galatians were circumcised or not; whether they depended on their circumcision and other conformity to ceremonial institutions or not: still Christ did profit them; still by him was unconditionally secured to them the infinite pro­fit of escape from the curse of the law, and of an endless life of happiness and glory in heaven.—

THIS argument is equally conclusive, whether it be sup­posed that Christ has unconditionally rescued all men from annihilation or any other punishment. If salvation be se­cured to all men by Christ, then he does profit them, how­ever they be circumcised or depend on their circum­cision.

BESIDE the two lights in which the doctrine of annihi­lation hath been stated above, there is another in which some seem to hold that doctrine; it is this, That if after God shall have used all proper means for the repentance and salvation of the wicked, they shall still remain impeni­tent, he will annihilate them from despair of ever bring­ing them to good.—Concerning this sentiment it may be inquired, what then is the curse of the law? Is it an­nihilation? If so, then I refer to the arguments already urged in this chapter against that idea; viz. That on that supposition endless punishment is just: That the scripture abundantly represents the punishment of the damned to consist in misery: That the punishment of all who suffer the curse of the law will be equal: That the curse of the law is the same punishment which the devils suffer, which is not annihilation: That the punishment which the finally impenitent shall suffer, will be such, that in it God will display both his wrath and power, and greater degrees of wrath and power in the case of those, with respect to whom he exercises the greatest long-suffering: which can­not be true, if the curse of the law be annihilation, as that is not an exertion of power at all. or a display of greater wrath and power in the case of one sinner than of another. If it be said, that the curse of the law is that discipline which the wicked shall suffer, before they be annihilated, I refer to what has been said, chap. II and III.—If it be granted that the curse of the law is endless misery; either it must be allowed, that endless misery will be suffered by some men; or that though endless misery be the curse of the law, Christ hath redeemed and will save all men from [Page 117] it, by admitting some to endless happiness, and by inflict­ing on others endless annihilation. With respect to this last sentiment, I beg leave to refer to the considerations al­ready hinted in this chapter: and that the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the wicked justly de­serve, whether it consist in endless misery or any thing else, will actually be inflicted, hath been attempted to be proved in chap. III.

ON the whole; it is left with the candid and judicious to determine, whether annihilation be the curse of the law: and whether that as the curse of the law can be re­conciled with the scriptures, on either of the foremen­tioned hypotheses.—1. That all who die in impenitence, will be annihilated, as the proper and adequate punish­ment of their sins in this life.—2. That annihilation was originally the curse of the law; but that Christ hath res­cued all from it.—If it shall be found that annihilation in any view of it, is not the curse of the law; it will re­main, that that curse consists either in that punishment which sinners actually suffer in hell; or in some temporary misery greater than that which they actually suffer in hell; or in endless misery. In which of these it does consist, shall be farther inquired in the next chapter.

CHAP. VI. The Justice of endless Punishment consisting in Misery.

ACCORDING to what was proposed in the close of the last chapter, I am to inquire in the first place, Whe­ther the curse of the law, or the punishment which in the divine law is threatened against transgressors, consist in that punishment which the wicked will actually suffer in hell.— That this cannot be the curse of the law, on the supposition that all men are to be saved, appears at first blush from this consideration, that some men will actually suffer that punishment: and if that punishment be the curse of the law, some men will be damned and not saved. For salva­tion consists in deliverance from tho curse of the law. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law:" and all who are saved, are saved by the redemption of [Page 118] Christ, which is a redemption from the curse of the law. But since all men are not saved from that punishment which a great part actually suffer in hell; it is absurd to say, that that punishment is the curse of the law from which Christ hath redeemed and will save all men.

I MEAN not now to enter into any dispute concerning the nature of Christ's redemption. It is sufficient for my present purpose to take for granted no more, than is grant­ed by all christians, that all who are saved, are saved some how by and through Christ. This is abundantly asserted in the various works of Dr. C. But neither has he pretended nor will any other advocate for universal salvation pre­tend, that the punishment which is actually to be suffered by a great part of mankind in hell, is the curse of the law from which Christ is to save all men: because by the very terms a great part of mankind are actually to suffer it.

BESIDE; if that be the curse of the law; it is all the punishment to which the sinner is justly liable. He having suffered that, cannot consistently with justice be made to suffer any further punishment; and if after that he be ex­empted from further punishment, he is exempted from it, not in the way of grace, forgiveness or pardon; but en­tirely on the footing of justice and of his own personal right. It is to be noticed however, that the gospel is ig­norant of any salvation of sinners, except in the way of grace and forgiveness.

IF the punishment actually to be suffered in hell be the curse of the law, then the damned in their deliverance out of hell, and exemption from further punishment, experi­ence no salvation at all. They are delivered from nothing to which they are or ever were exposed. We might as well say, that the most innocent citizen in the state is saved from the gallows, when he hath neither committed any crime, nor is accused of any.—The very idea of salvation is deliverance from the curse of the law. But if the pains of hell for ages of ages be the curse of the law, they who suffer those pains, are not saved; they are damned to the highest possible degree consistent with law and justice; which is all the damnation for which any man can argue.

ON the whole, I conclude, that the idea, that the curse of the law consists in the punishment, which the damned are actually to suffer in hell, is totally irreconcileable with the salvation of all men.

[Page 119]IN the next place we are to inquire, whether the curse of the law consist in some temporary punishment, which is of greater duration than that which is supposed to belong to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. If the curse of the law be a temporary punishment of great­er duration than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned; that more lasting temporary punishment is doubt­less threatened in the law. Doubtless the curse of the law is the curse threatened in law: the very terms imply this. Now, where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is threat­ened any punishment of greater duration, than that which in the sacred dialect is said to be everlasting, forever, forever and ever, &c? But all these expressions are on all hands allowed to be applied in scripture to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. Unless therefore some longer punishment can be found threatened in scripture, than that which is said to be forever and ever, &c, it cannot be pretended, that the curse of the law is a temporary pu­nishment of greater duration, than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned. But no punishment of great­er duration, whether temporary or endless, than that which the damned are constantly declared to suffer, can be pointed out from any part of scripture. Therefore the curse of the law is not a temporary punishment of greater duration, than that which is to be suffered by the damn­ed.

NOW, if this train of reasoning be just, if the curse of the divine law be neither annihilation, nor (on the suppo­sition of the salvation of all men) that misery which the damned are actually to suffer; nor a temporary misery of greater duration; the consequence is inevitable, that it is endless misery. No other hypothesis seems to be conceiva­ble. The law certainly threatens some punishment. This punishment must consist either in annihilation, or in some­thing else. If it consist in something else, that something must be either temporary or endless misery. If it be tem­porary misery, it must be either a misery of shorter dura­tion than that which is to be suffered by the damned; or that very misery which is to be suffered by the damned; or a temporary misery of longer duration. That the curse of the law is a misery of shorter duration than that which is to be suffered by the damned, no man will pretend; as this would imply that the damned will suffer a greater pu­nishment [Page 120] than was ever threatened, and than is just. And that the curse of the law is neither the very misery to be suffered by the damned, nor a temporary misery of longer duration, I have endeavoured to prove, and submit the proof to the candid and judicious. If the proof shall be found to be good, we are driven to the conclusion, that the curse of the divine law is endless misery.

IF then it be an established point, that endless misery is the curse of the divine law; the inference is immediate and necessary, that the endless misery of the sinner is a just punishment of his sin. It is impossible that a God of inviolable and infinite justice should threaten in his law an unjust punishment. A law containing such a threatening, is an unjust law; and an unjust law can never be enacted by a legislator of perfect justice.—It is in vain to say, that God will never execute the law. To make an unjust law, is as really irreconcileable with justice, as to execute it. What should we think of a human prince who should enact a law, that whoever should walk across his neighbour's ground without his consent, should die on the gallows. I pre­sume no man would pretend, that the forbearance of the prince to execute the law, would save his character from abhorrence and contempt.

AGAIN; If all men shall be saved, they will be saved from something, from some punishment. That punish­ment must be either temporary or endless. If it be tem­porary, it must be either that punishment, which is to be endured by the damned, or a longer temporary punish­ment. But for reasons already given, it can be neither of these. Therefore it must be an endless punishment. But if all men be saved from an endless punishment, they were exposed to an endless punishment, and exposed to it by a divine constitution, and therefore an endless punishment is just; otherwise it could not have been appointed by God.

IF all men shall be saved, they are redeemed by Christ, and they are redeemed by him from some punishment. That punishment is either temporary or endless. If it be temporary, it is either the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer, or a longer temporary punishment. But for reasons already given it is neither of these. There­fore, it is an endless punishment. Therefore they were exposed to an endless punishment, and that punishment is just. Surely no Christian will pretend, that our Lord Je­sus [Page 121] Christ came to redeem and save us from a punishment to which we never were exposed, and which the very jus­tice of God would never permit him to inflict.

IF endless punishment be unjust, it seems that Christ came to save mankind from an unjust punishment; a pu­nishment, to which they were not justly liable, and which could not be inflicted on them consistently with justice. But what an idea does this give us of God? It implies, that he had made an unjust law, denouncing an unjust pe­nalty; that having made this law, he was determined to execute it, till Christ came and prevented him.

IF all men shall be saved, and shall be saved in the way of grace, favour, pardon or forgiveness; then it would be just, that they should not be saved. If their deliverance im­ply grace and forgiveness, then it would be just, that they should not be delivered, and that they should suffer that punishment from which they are delivered. But for rea­sons already given, if all men shall be saved, they shall be saved from an endless punishment. And to be saved from an endless punishment not on the footing of justice, but by mere grace and forgiveness, implies, that the infliction of endless punishment would be just. Surely to liberate a person from an unjust punishment, is no act of forgiveness.

ALL the ascriptions of praise, and all hymns of thanks­giving sung by the saved on account of their salvation, prove, that it would have been just, that they should not be saved. If God in delivering all men from endless pu­nishment, be worthy of praise and thanksgiving, it would have been just, if he had not delivered them from it. A mere act of justice, which the object of it may demand on the footing of his personal right, does not infer, an obli­gation to any great praise or thanksgiving. No man con­ceives himself bound very much to praise another for gi­ving him his due, or for not injuring him, or for not pu­nishing him, when he deserves no punishment. But the only punishment, from which God delivers all men, on the supposition, that all are to be saved, is an endless punish­ment, as was shewn before. Therefore, unless endless pu­nishment be just, there is no foundation for praise and thanksgiving for the salvation of all men.

IF endless punishment be unjust, then God was bound in justice to save all men from it, and could no more fail of granting this salvation, than he could deny himself: and [Page 122] he was bound in justice to do whatever was necessary to that salvation, and if that salvation could not be dispensed, but in consequence of the incarnation and death of Christ; then unless God had given his son to become incarnate and to die, he would have committed injustice. So that on this plan, the very gift of Christ, of the gospel, and of all the means of grace, are mere acts of justice, and not of grace or favour: and the revelation of the gospel or of the salvation of all men is no gracious communication, but a communication made entirely on the foundation of justice. For surely it is but an act of justice to tell mankind, if there be any need of telling them, that God will not injure them, and so preserve them from the tormenting fear of injury from the hand of God. To have kept them with­out the necessary means of knowing this, would have sa­voured of cruelty.—Yet according to the scriptures the forementioned divine acts and communications are no acts of justice, but of free and infinite grace.

IF endless punishment be unjust, it is hard to imagine of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind. Dr. C. speaking of his own scheme of universal salvation, says, ‘Nor is there any scheme that so illustriously sets forth the powerful efficacy and ex­tensive advantage of the mediation of Jesus Christ. If mankind universally are the objects of his concern, if he died for them all, if he ascended up to heaven for them all, if he is there acting on their behalf, and managing all things in the kingdom of grace, with a view to their salvation, and will not give up his ministry in this king­dom, till he has actually accomplished this great design, and instated the whole human kind in eternal glory, what more noble idea can we form of his undertaking for us?’ &c. ^* What is "the powerful efficacy and ex­tensive advantage of the mediation of Christ," with regard to those, who suffer for ages of ages, as Dr. C. allows some men do? Is "the powerful efficacy and extensive advan­tage of Christ's mediation" "illustriously set forth" in de­livering them from an unjust punishment? is the idea, that Christ came to save them from a punishment, which they do not deserve, "the most noble idea we can form of his undertaking?" Those who are saved by Christ, without suffering the torments of hell, do indeed derive some ad­vantage [Page 123] from the mediation of Christ. But this is no great­er advantage than is derived from Christ, according to the scheme of those, who believe in endless punishment. They hold, that all who are preserved from hell, are preserved from it by Christ. But what advantage do those men de­rive from Christ's mediation, who pass through the torments of hell, and are not saved, till they have been punished for ages of ages? To say that they are rescued by Christ from endless misery, is either to give up the present question, and to allow that endless misery is just: or it is to give up the moral rectitude of the divine character, and to hold, that God has threatened, and was about to inflict, an un­just punishment.—To say, that the advantage, which they derive from Christ, is that they are rescued from a temporary punishment, which is longer than forever and ever, is to say, that for which there is no foundation, as no such punishment is threatened or mentioned in scripture. So that in any case, if endless punishment be unjust, it is im­possible to imagine, of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind.

THE hope of the gospel implies that endless punishment is just. On the plan of universal salvation, all men are en­couraged to hope that they shall be delivered from some punishment. Dr. C. applies Rom. VIII. 20, to all men, and supposes that they are all subjected to vanity in hope of "deliverance from the bondage of corruption," and from "the final consequences" of it.^* That is, all men have a ground to hope, that they shall be at last delivered from sin and its punishment. This punishment as we have seen, can be no other than an endless punishment. But that God encourages us to hope, that we may escape endless punish­ment, as clearly implies that endless punishment is just, as his encouraging us to hope, that he will never leave us nor forsake us in this life, implies that it would be just, if he should leave us. If endless punishment be not just, then God encourages us to hope, that he will not injure us, will not rob us of our rights or tyrannize over us! The very idea of hope in this case, implies some danger that God will injure us; however that there is a possibility, and therefore a foundation to hope, that he will not injure us.

IF endless punishment be unjust, we are as sure, that it will never be inflicted, as we are of the justice of God, or [Page 124] as we are, that the judge of all the earth will do right. But are we ever encouraged in scripture barely to hope, that the judge of all the earth will do right?—What if a subject who has always entirely conformed to the laws of his prince and is conscious of his own innocence, and also knows that his prince is fully informed of it, should say, that he hopes his prince will not order him to be executed as a felon? This would certainly imply great diffidence in the justice of his prince, and would be a high reflection on his character. Much more is it a reflection on the cha­racter of God, to express a bare hope, that under his go­vernment, no man will be punished with an unjust punishment.

THE promises of the gospel appear to be a further proof of the justice of endless punishment. They are promises of deliverance from some punishment. If there be any pro­mises of the salvation of all men, they are not promises that all shall wholly escape the punishment of hell. Dr. C. and others grant, that some men will suffer that pu­nishment. Nor are they promises of escape from a longer temporary punishment, than that of hell, as there is no mention in all the scripture of such a punishment. There­fore they are promises of deliverance from endless punish­ment. Therefore endless punishment is just: otherwise the promises that God will save from it, would be absurd. The very idea, that God promises to save from endless punishment, implies that he has a right to inflict it. Do we ever find God promising in scripture, that he will not injure or tyrannize over his creatures? And are the ‘ex­ceeding great and precious promises,’ which the apos­tle Peter mentions, merely assurances that we shall not be treated by God unjustly? There would be nothing at all precious in such promises; because they would give us no greater security from such injury, than we should have without them. If the bare justice of God do not secure us from injury at his hands, neither will his veracity.— What should we think of a prince of good reputation for justice, if he make proclamation, that he would not pu­nish any of his subjects ten times as much as they deserve; and should call this an exceeding great and precious pro­mise? Whatever we might before have thought of him and of his government, we should doubtless then think that his subjects were not perfectly secure in their rights.

[Page 125]DR. C. allows that it is our duty to pray for the sal­vation of all men. This appears especially in his comment on 1 Tim. II, 4, &c.^* But this proves the justice of end­less punishment. If we are to pray for the salvation of all men, we are to pray that they may be delivered from the curse of the law; which, as we have seen already, is an endless punishment. Now, to pray that God would save men from endless punishment certainly implies an acknow­ledgement of just exposure to such punishment. Other­wise there would be as much propriety, that the angels a­round the throne of God, should pray, that they, perfectly guiltless as they are, may not be punished with the tor­ments of hell. What if an entirely innocent and most du­tiful subject of some earthly prince, and one who is by all acknowledged to be such, should prefer a petition to his prince, that he would not order the petitioner to the stake or the gallows?

HITHERTO the justice of endless punishment has been considered on the ground of what I suppose to be the truth, that it is deserved by every sinner, on account of the sins which he hath committed in this lite only.—There is ano­ther ground, on which it may be supported, and which is equally inconsistent with that capital argument in favor of the salvation of all men, that endless punishment is not re­concileable with justice.—Though it were not just, to in­flict an endless punishment for the sins committed in this life only, which I by no means allow; yet there would be no injustice in suffering the sinner to go on in sin, and to punish him continually and without end as he sins.

THAT it was no injustice in God, to leave man at first to fall into sin, will doubtless be granted by all, because it is an evident fact. Now if God may without injury permit a creature to fall into sin to day, and punish him for it, why may he not do the same tomorrow, and so on through eve­ry day or period of his existence. And if it be just to leave a sinner to endless sin, it is doubtless just to inflict on him endless punishment for that endless sin. Therefore the endless sin and punishment of a creature is no more incon­sistent with divine justice, than the existence of sin and pu­nishment in any instance, and for ever so short a duration. If it be not consistent with justice, that a sinner be left by God to endless impenitence; then the leading of a sinner [Page 126] to repentance is an act of mere justice, the payment of a debt, and not an act of grace, which is utterly irreconcile­able with the scriptures.—If it be not consistent with jus­tice to leave a sinner to final impenitence, then God is bound in justice, some time or other to lead every sinner to repentance. But when is this time? How long may God, without injury, permit the sinner to continue impe­nitent? If he may for one day, why not for two? for four? for eight, &c. to eternity?—Though the damned should, by their sufferings, fully satisfy for all their past sins; yet God would be no more obliged in justice, to lead them to repentance, or to preserve them from sin in future, than he was obliged to preserve them from sin at the time they first fell into it: and consequently he would not be ob­liged in justice to release them from punishment. I take it to be abundantly conceded by Dr. C. that the damned may justly be punished till they repent. Therefore if they ne­ver repent they may justly be punished without end

NOW, that our advocate for universal salvation, may es­tablish his favorite proposition, that endless punishment is not reconcileable with divine justice; he must show, that it is not consistent with divine justice, to leave a sinner to proceed without end in his own chosen course of sin, and to punish him daily for his daily sins. Till he shall have done this, it will be in vain for him to plead, that those who die in impenitence, will all finally be saved, because endless punishment is not reconcileable with the justice of God.

IF after all, any man will insist, that endless punish­ment is not reconcileable with divine justice? he ought fairly to answer the preceding reasoning, and to show that the curse of the divine law from which Christ hath re­deemed us, is either annihilation, or that misery which the damned are actually to suffer; or a longer temporary misery. He ought to show further, that Christ came to deliver all men from some other punishment, than that which is endless; or that it is reconcileable with the cha­racter of God to refuse to release man from an unjust pu­nishment, without the mediation of his son: that deliver­ance from unjust punishment is an act of free grace, pardon, or forgiveness: that deliverance from an unjust pu­nishment is a proper ground of extatic and everlasting praise and thanksgiving to God. That the very mission of [Page 127] Christ, the institution of the gospel and of any means ne­cessary to the deliverance of sinners from endless punish­ment, can be considered as gracious gifts and institutions, on any other supposition than that endless punishment is just. He ought also to show, of what advantage the me­diation of Christ is to those who suffer in hell for ages of ages; and how the hope and the promises of the gospel, and how praying for the salvation of all men, can be re­conciled with the idea, that endless punishment is unjust, and finally, that it is unjust, that God should leave a sinner to perpetual sin, and to punish him perpetually for that sin.

It seems to be but an act of justice to Dr. C. to repeat here, what I noticed before, that he himself, whether con­sistently or not, does acknowledge the justice of endless pu­nishment: as in these words: ‘If the next state is a state of punishment, not intended for the cure of the pa­tients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of God, and give warning to others, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved.’ ^† This is a plain declaration, that a state, in which all salvation, and all possibility of salvation, are excluded, no more than satisfies justice, or is no more than just.—The same is confessed in those many passages of this and the other works of Dr. C. wherein he has po­sitively asserted, that man cannot be "justified on the foot of mere law," of "rigid law" &c.^* He would not deny, that the law of God is just, perfectly just. If therefore we cannot be justified on the foot of the divine law, we must on that foot be finally condemned, and consequently must be finally condemned on the foot of justice. There­fore the final or endless condemnation of the wicked is en­tirely just. The just law of God himself condemns them: and if that law, "mere law," "rigid law," be executed, they must be condemned to an endless punishment, and can­not possibly be justified or saved. So long therefore as the divine law is just, so long, according to the concession of Dr. C. the endless condemnation and misery of the wicked are just.—There seems to be no way to avoid this conse­quence, but by holding that the curse of the law, and the punishment which "satisfies justice," are annihilation, with respect to which sentiment, I must refer the reader back to Chap. V. But how inconsistent it is, to hold, that endless punishment, whether consisting in annihilation, or [Page 128] misery, is no more than satisfactory to justice; and at the same time to hold, that the wicked in temporary pains in hell, suffer according to their deserts, and endure the whole penalty of the law, cannot escape the notice of any atten­tive reader.—Or will it be said, that the Doctor held a commutation of punishment? that endless annihilation is commuted for temporary misery? If so, then temporary mi­sery is the curse of the divine law now inflicted in commu­tation for endless annihilation; and our author was entire­ly mistaken in a doctrine abundantly taught in all his wri­tings, that, "by law," "mere law," "rigid law," no man can be justified or saved.

AS a corollary from the whole of the preceding reason­ing concerning the justice of endless punishment, may I not safely assert, what was most grievous to Dr. C. and is so to all other advocates for universal salvation; that SIN IS AN INFINITE EVIl? If every sinner do, on account of sin, deserve an endless punishment, sin is an infinite evil: that is all that is meant by the infinite evil of sin.—There­fore if any man deny the infinite evil of sin, let him prove, that it does not deserve an endless punishment, and let him answer the preceding reasoning to evince the justice of end­less punishment.^*

PERHAPS some may object, that supposing sin do deserve an endless punishment, when it is not repented of; yet how can it deserve so great a punishment, when it is renounced in real repentance.—But if repentance make atonement for sin; if it satisfy the broken law of God; if it repair the damage done to society by sin; or if it so far atone, that the good of the universe, comprehending the glory of the deity, though it before required, that sin should be punish­ed with endless punishment, now requires that it be punish­ed with a temporary punishment only: then as repentance is a satisfaction made by the sinner himself, and makes a part of his personal character, sin repented of, does indeed not deserve endless punishment, otherwise it does. And if repentance do make the satisfaction for sin which has been [Page 129] described, then the satisfaction or atonement of Christ is in vain, since repentance would have answered the purpose without the death and atonement of Christ. There was no need that sinners be redeemed by Christ, or as Dr. C. says, that he should be "the person upon whose account," and that ‘his obedience and death should be the ground or reason upon which happiness should be attainable by any of the race of Adam.’ They might have redeem­ed themselves, and by repentance have made a full satis­faction or atonement for their own sins, and thus might have been saved on their own account,, and on the ground or reason of their repentance.—But if on the other hand it be granted, that repentance does not make atonement or satisfaction for sin, and it be just to punish a sinner without end, provided he do not repent; it is just to inflict the same punishment, though he do repent.

THIS chapter shall be closed with a remark on a passage before quoted from Dr. C.^* in which he says, that the dif­ference in the degree of the pain of the damned will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration, is annexed to it.— If the different degrees of the misery of the damned be un­worthy of notice, and do not sufficiently distinguish them ac­cording to their several degrees of demerit; then the dif­ferent degrees in the happiness of the saints in heaven do not sufficiently distinguish them, according to their charac­ters. Therefore on the same principle we ought to deny the endless duration of the happiness of heaven, as well as of the misery of hell; and to say, that the difference in the degree of happiness of the blessed in heaven, will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it; that if the happiness of heaven be of endless duration, the hap­piness of all the inhabitants of that world will be equal, which is inconsistent with the declarations of scripture, that all shall be rewarded according to their works; and that therefore the doctrine of the endless happiness of heaven is not true.—But the falsity of this conclusion is evident to all: and equally false is the conclusion from the like pre­mises, that the punishment of the damned is not endless.

CHAP. VII. Containing another view of the question concerning the Justice of endless Punishment.

IN the preceding chapter, the question concerning the jus­tice of endless punishment was considered in the light in which it is stated by Dr. C. There is another view of the same question, which is not indeed exhibited in his book, but is much talked of by some who in general embrace his scheme. It is this: Whatever the general good requires, is just: Whatever is not subservient to the general good, is unjust. Now as the endless punishment of the wicked is, in their opinion, not subservient but hurtful to the general good, it is, say they, unjust. The question thus stated seems to be nothing more than a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word justice. It reduces all justice to the third sense of justice as explained above,^* and perfectly confounds justice with goodness as it respects the general system. Therefore the question which comes up to view, according to the sense of justice now proposed, is the very same with this, Whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with the general good of the universe, or with divine goodness; which shall be considered at large in the next chapter, and needs not be anticipated here. However it may be proper to point out the impropriety and absurd consequences of this use of the word justice.

IT was doubtless subservient to the general good, that our Lord Jesus Christ was crucified by wicked hands, and therefore in the sense of justice now under consideration, his crucifixion was just; they who perpetrated it, perform­ed an act of justice. Yet will any man pretend, that our blessed Lord was not injuriously treated by his wicked crucifiers? If they committed no injury to our Lord, wherein did the wickedness of this action consist?—The truth is, the cru­cifixion of Christ was no injury to the universe, but an in­estimable benefit: yet it was the highest injury that could be done him personally.

EVERY instance of murder is doubtless made by the over­ruling hand of divine providence, subservient to the ge­neral good and the divine glory. But does a man murder­ed [Page 131] suffer no injury? The same may be said of all the assaults, thefts, robberies, murders and other crimes that have ever been committed. Though they will in the con­summation of all things be overruled to subserve the general good, so that the universe will finally suffer no injury by them; yet very great personal injury may be done by them to those who have been robbed, murdered, &c. These ob­servations may show the necessity of distinguishing between the private rights of individuals, and the rights of the uni­verse, and between private, personal injustice, and injustice to the universe. If all the crimes in the world, because they will be finally rendered by the divine hand subser­vient to the good of the universe, be in every sense [...]n­tirely just, and the omission of them would be unjust; where shall any injustice be found? No injustice is, ever was, or can possibly be committed by any being in this, or any other world. No injustice can be committed, till some thing shall be done, which God shall not finally render sub­servient to his own glory and the good of the intellectual system.

ACCORDING to the principle now under consideration, it would not be just, that any man should escape any cala­mity, which he does in fact suffer. It was not just that Paul should escape stoning at Lystra, or that John should not be banished to the isle of Patmos: and whenever it is subser­vient to the public good, that any criminal, a murderer for instance, should be pardoned, or should be suffered to pass with impunity; it is not just to punish him; he does not deserve punishment: Cain did not deserve death for the murder of his brother, nor did Joab, during the life of David, deserve death for the two murders of Abner and Amasa, both better men than himself. And if he did not deserve death, what did he deserve? It appears by the history and by the event, that it was not subservient to the general good, that he should, during the life of David, be punished at all. Therefore on the present supposition, he deserved, during that period, no punishment at all for those murders. If so, then during the same period, at least, there was no sin, no moral evil in those murders: for sin or moral evil always deserves hatred and punish­ment.—But afterwards in the reign of Solomon, the general good required Joab to be punished with death. At that time therefore he deserved death for those murders; [Page 132] and those same actions which for several years after they were perpetrated, had no moral evil in them, grew, by mere length of time, or change of the circumstances of the state, to be very great moral evils.—See then to what consequences the principle now under consideration will lead us! It must therefore be renounced as false, or as a great perversion of language.

WHEN I assert the justice of the endless punishment of the wicked, I mean that it is just in the same sense, in which it was just, that Cain or Joab should be executed as murderers: i. e. it is correspondent to their personal con­duct and characters. If those with whom I am now dis­puting, allow that the endless punishment of the wicked is just in this sense, they allow all for which I at present con­tend. If they deny, that it is just in this sense, they give up their favorite principle, and dispute against the justice of endless punishment, not merely because it would be in­consistent with the general good, but for the same reasons as those for which Dr. C. disputed against it: and they place the question on the same footing, on which it has been so largely considered in the preceding chapters. The execution of Cain as a murderer would have been corres­pondent to his personal conduct, and therefore would have been just. If the endless punishment of the wicked be de­nied to be just in this sense, it is denied to be just, not mere­ly because it would not be subservient to the good of the universe; but because it would not be a punishment corres­pondent to their personal conduct; instead of this, it would exceed the demerit of that conduct, and therefore would rob them of their personal rights.

CHAP. VIII. In which it is inquired, whether endless punishment be consi­stent with the divine goodness.

THAT this inquiry is very important, every one must be sensible, who is in the least acquainted with this controversy. No topic is so much insisted on by the advo­cates for universal salvation; on no subject do they throw out such abundant and fervent declamation; no argument [Page 133] is urged with such an air of triumph. This is their strong hold, in which they feel themselves perfectly secure, and from which they imagine such effectual sallies may be made, as will drive out of the field all believers in endless punish­ment. Therefore this part of our subject requires parti­cular and close attention.

I PROPOSE to begin with stating the question,—then to proceed to some general observations concerning the di­vine goodness and some concessions made by Dr. C.— then to consider Dr. C's arguments from the divine good­ness;—and in the last place, to mention some considerations to show, that the endless punishment of some of mankind, is not inconsistent with the divine goodness.

I. IT is a matter of great importance, that the question now to be considered be clearly stated. The question is, Whether it be consistent with the divine goodness, that any of mankind be doomed to endless punishment consisting in misery. This question is not now to be considered with any reference to the atonement of Christ; or the argu­ment in favour of universal salvation, drawn from the di­vine goodness, does not depend at all on the atonement. To argue that goodness requires the salvation of all men now since Christ has made a sufficient atonement, implies that without the atonement no such argument could be urged. To argue from the atonement is not to argue from goodness merely, but from fact, from the gospel, from particular texts or from the general nature of the gospel. The argument is this; Christ hath made atonement for all, therefore all will be saved. But that this argument may carry conviction, it must first be made evident that the atonement did respect all mankind; also that it is the intention of God, to apply the virtue of that sufficient atonement, to the actual salvation of all. But these things can be proved from the declarations of scripture only. Now all Dr. C's arguments from scripture shall be consi­dered in their place; but this is not their place.

THE question, Whether it be consistent with divine goodness, that any of mankind be punished without end, means, either, Whether it be consistent with the greatest possible exertion or display of goodness in the Deity; or Whether it be consistent with goodness in general, so that God is in general a good Being, and not cruel and malicious, though he do inflict endless punishment on some men.— [Page 134] It is not an article of my faith, that in all the works of creation and providence taken together, God displays in­deed goodness in general, but not the greatest possible goodness. This distinction is made, to accommodate the discourse, if possible, to the meaning of Dr. C. As he denies that God has adopted the best possible plan of the universe, it seems, that he must have distinguished in his own mind, between the goodness actually exerted and dis­played by the Deity in the present system, and the great­est possible display of goodness.

IF the former of these be intended by Dr. C. and others, all their strong and frightful declamations on this subject, come to this only, that endless punishment is not the great­est possible display of the divine goodness; or that the sy­stem of the universe, if endless punishment make a part of it, is not the wisest and best possible. — But this is no more than is holden by Dr. C. and it is presu­med by other advocates in general for universal salvation. Dr. C. abundantly holds, as we shall see presently, that the present system of the universe, according to his own view of it, without endless punishment, is not the wisest and best possible. It is therefore perfect absurdity in him, to object, on this ground, to endless punishment.

BUT it is manifest, by the vehement and pathetic excla­mations of Dr. C. on this subject, that he aimed at some­thing more than this. It is manifest that he supposed and meant to represent, that if the doctrine of endless punish­ment be true, God is not a good, a benevolent being, but a cruel, malicious one. He says,^* that the doctrine of end­less punishment ‘gives occasion for very unworthy re­flections on the Deity:’ That in view of that doctrine ‘^† an horror of darkness remains, that is sadly distressing to many a considerate heart.’ He quotes^‡ with ap­probation those words from Mr. Whiston: ‘If the com­mon doctrine were certainly true, the justice of God must inevitably be given up, and much more his mercy.— This doctrine supposes him,’ [God] ‘to delight in cruel­ty,’ So that the question agitated by Dr. C. is really, Whether, if God inflict endless punishment on any sinner, it be not an act of cruelty and injustice, as all cruelty is in­justice.—But this is the very question, which has been so largely considered in several preceding chapters, and needs not to be reconsidered here. So that Dr. C's argu­ments [Page 135] from goodness are mere arguments from justice; and if endless punishment be reconcileable with divine jus­tice, it is equally reconcileable with divine goodness, in the sense in which he argue from divine goodness.

If after all it be insisted on, that Dr. C. meant to con­sider the question, or that the question ought to be consi­dered, in the first sense stated above, viz. Whether endless punishment be consistent with the most perfect display of goodness; although if the negative of this question were granted, Dr. C. could not consistently thence draw an ar­gument in favor of universal salvation; yet it may be pro­per to consider this state of the question, and perhaps suf­ficient observations upon it will occur in the sequel of this chapter.

II. I AM to make some general observations concerning the divine goodness, and take notice of some concessions made by Dr. C.

The goodness of God is that glorious attribute, by which he is disposed to communicate happiness to his creatures. This divine attribute is distinguished from the divine justice in this manner: the divine justice promotes the happiness of the universal system, implying the divine glory, by treat­ing a person strictly according to his own character: the divine goodness promotes the same important object, by treating a person more favorably than is according to his own character or conduct: So that both justice and good­ness may and always do, as far as they are exercised, sub­serve the happiness of the universal system, including the glory of the Deity, or the glory of the Deity, including the happiness of the universal system. As the glory of God, and the greatest happiness of the system of the universe, and even of the created system, mutually imply each other; whenever I mention either of them, I wish to be under­stood to include in my meaning the other also. The de­clarative or the exhibited glory of God, is a most perfect and most happy created system; and a most perfect and most happy created system is the exhibited glory of God; or it is the exhibition, the manifestation of that glory; as a picture is an exhibition of the man.

THAT infinite goodness is in God, and is essential to his nature, is granted on all hands: God is LOVE. This at­tribute seeks the happiness of creatures, the happiness of the created system in general, and of every individual [Page 136] creature in particular, so far as the happiness of that indi­vidual is not inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with happiness on the whole. But if in any case, the happiness of an individual be inconsistent with the happi­ness of the system, or with the happiness of other indivi­duals, so that by bestowing happiness on the first supposed individual, the quantity of happiness on the whole shall be diminished; in this case, goodness, the divine goodness, which is perfect and infinite, will not consent to bestow happiness on that individual. Indeed to bestow happiness in such a case would be no instance of goodness, but of the want of goodness. It would argue a disposition not to in­crease happiness, but to diminish and destroy it.

THEREFORE that Dr. C. might prove, that the endless punishment of any sinner is inconsistent with the goodness of God, he should have shown, that the sum total of hap­piness enjoyed in the intellectual system will be greater if all be saved, than it will be if any suffer an endless punish­ment. To show that God by his infinite goodness will be excited to seek and to secure the greatest happiness of the system, determines nothing. This is no more than is grant­ed by the believers in endless punishment. It is imperti­nent therefore to spend time on this. But the great ques­tion is, Does the greatest happiness of the system require the final happiness of every sinner? If Dr. C, have not shown that it does, his argument from divine goodness is entirely inconclusive.

INSTEAD of showing, that the divine goodness or the greatest happiness of the general system, requires the final happiness of every individual; Dr. C. has abundantly shown the contrary. In his book on the Benevolence of the Deity, ^* he expresses himself thus; ‘It would be injuri­ous to the Deity to complain of him for want of goodness merely because the manifestation of it to our particular system, considered singly and apart from the rest, is not so great as we may imagine it could be.—No more happiness is required for our system, even from infinitely perfect benevolence, than is proper for a part of some great whole.—We ought not to consider the displays of divine benevolence, as they affect individual beings only, but as they relate to the particular system of which they are parts.—The divine benevolence is to be esti­mated from its amount to this whole, and not its consti­tuent [Page 137] parts separately considered.—The only fair way of judging of the divine benevolence with respect to our world, is to consider it not as displayed to separate individuals, but to the whole system, and to these as its constituent parts.’ — ‘^† No more good is to be ex­pected from the Deity with respect to any species of be­ings, or any individuals in these species, than is reason­ably consistent with the good of the whole of which they are parts.’ — ‘^‡ It is true, that destruction of life will follow, if some animals are food to others. But it may be true also, that there would not have been so much life, and consequently happiness, in the creation, had it not been for this expedient.’ — ‘^‖ As we are only one of the numerous orders which constitute a ge­neral system, this quite alters the case, making those capacities only an evidence of wise and reasonable bene­volence, which are fitted for a particular part sustaining such a place in the constitution of this whole.’ — ‘^* I proceed to show wherein the unhappiness that is con­nected in nature, or by positive infliction of the Deity, with the misuse of moral powers, is subservient to the general good of the rational creation, which is hereby more effectually promoted, than it would have been, if free agents might have acted wrong with impunity.’ — "^‖‖ For if they" [future punishments] ‘are considered— under the notion of a needful moral mean intended to promote, upon the whole, more good in the intelligent cre­ation, than might otherwise be reasonably expected; they are so far from being the effect of ill will, that they really spring from benevolence and are a part of it.’

BY these quotations it appears with sufficient clearness, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that there are defects, miseries and punishments of individual creatures, which are consis­tent with the good of the system, and are therefore consis­tent with the divine goodness: and that the divine good­ness does not seek the happiness of any individual any fur­ther, than the happiness of that individual is subservient to the happiness of the system, or to the increase of happiness on the whole. Therefore Dr. C. supposes the miseries of men in this life, and even the punishments of the future world, are not inconsistent with the divine goodness, be­cause they are subservient to the good of the system.— [Page 138] Now the advocates for endless punishment believe the same concerning the endless punishment of those who die impe­nitent: and for him to suppose without proof, that this pu­nishment is not consistent with the greatest good and hap­piness of the system, is but begging the question.

WHAT is the absurdity of supposing, that the endless pu­nishment of some sinners may be subservient to the good of the system? Why may not the general good be promoted, as well by endless misery, as by the miseries of this life? And why may we not be allowed to account for endless misery in the same way, that Dr. C. accounts for the mi­series of this life, or for the temporary misery which he al­lows to be in hell? It is now supposed to have been proved, that endless punishment is just. If then the general good may be promoted by the tortures of the stone endured for a year, by a man who deserves them, why may not the ge­neral good be promoted by the same tortures, continued without end, provided the man deserves such a continuance of them? If we were to judge a priori, we should probably decide against misery in either case. But fact shows that temporary miseries are consistent with the goodness of God, or with the general good: and why may not endless mise­ry be so too, provided it be just?

IF it be asserted, that the endless punishment of a sinner who deserves such punishment, is so great an evil, that it cannot be compensated by any good, which can arise from it to the system; I wish to have a reason given for this as­sertion. It is granted that the good accruing to the system overbalances the temporary miseries of sinners both here and hereafter. And is the endless misery of an individu­al, though justly deserved, so great an evil, that it cannot be overbalanced by any endless good, which may thence accrue to the system? Endless misery is doubtless an infi­nite evil: so is the endless good thence arising, an infinite good.

NOR does it appear, but that all the good ends, which are answered by the temporary punishment of the damned, may be continued to be answered by their continual and endless punishment, if it be just. God may continue to display his justice, his holiness, his hatred of sin, his love of righteousness, and of the general good, by opposing and punishing those who are obstinately set in the practice of sin, and in the opposition of righteousness, and of the ge­neral [Page 139] good. In the same way he may establish his autho­rity, manifest the evil of sin, restrain others from it, and by a contrast of the circumstances of the saved and damned, increase the gratitude and happiness of the former, as well as increase their happiness by the view of the divine holi­ness, and regard to the general good, manifested in the pu­nishment of the obstinate enemies of holiness and of the gene­ral good; and by a view of divine grace in their own sal­vation, and the salvation of all who shall be saved. These are the principal public ends to be answered by temporary vindictive punishment, on supposition that future punish­ment is temporary; and if any other good end to the universe shall be answered by it, in the opinion of those who believe it, let it be mentioned, that by a thorough enquiry we may see whether the same good end may not be answered by continual and endless punishment.

ANOTHER question concerning the divine goodness pro­per to be considered here, is, whether it secure and make certain the final happiness of every man; or whether it be satisfied with this, that opportunity and means are afford­ed to every man to obtain happiness, if he will seize the opportunity and use the means.—Concerning this also, Dr. C. hath sufficiently expressed his sentiments; as in * the following passages; ‘^* We must not judge of the be­nevolence of the Deity merely from the actual good we see produced, but should likewise take into consideration the tendency of those general laws conformably to which it is produced. Because the tendency of those laws may be obstructed, and less good actually take place, than they were naturally fitted to produce. In which case, it is no argument of want of goodness in the Deity, that no more good was communicated; though it may be of folly in the creatures.’ — ‘^† It is impossible we should judge fairly of the Creator's bene­volence, from a view only of our world, under its pre­sent actual enjoyments. But if we would form right sentiments of it, we must consider the tendency of the divine scheme of operation, and what the state of the world would have been, if the rational and moral beings in it had acted up to the laws of their nature and given them full scope for the production of good.’ — ‘^‡ All the good suitable for such a system as this, is apparently [Page 140] the tendency of nature and the divine administration, and it actually prevails so far as this tendency is not per­verted by creatures tbemselves,—for which he [God] is not answerable.’ The Doctor expresses himself to the same purport in many other passages of the same book.

IT is manifest, that in these passages, Dr. C. esteems it a sufficient vindication of the divine goodness, that God hath established good laws, hath benevolently constituted the nature of things and hath given opportunity to men to secure to themselves the enjoyment of good: and that the divine goodness does not imply that every individual crea­ture shall actually enjoy complete good or happiness. If these things be true, then no argument from the divine goodness can prove, that every individual of mankind will be finally happy: the divine goodness though complete and infinite does not secure actual happiness to every indi­vidual: it secures the opportunity and means only of hap­piness: or it secures such a divine scheme as has a tendency to the happiness of all, and would actually prevail to the communication of happiness to all, if it were not perverted by creatures themselves, for which perversion God is not answerable.

NOW that such a divine scheme as this is actually adopt­ed, is undoubted truth, and may be granted by every ad­vocate for endless punishment. Therefore on the same ground on which Dr. C. vindicates the goodness of God, from the objections which arise from present calamities, and from future temporary punishment; may the same goodness be vindicated from the objections which are raised from endless punishment. In the former case it is pleaded, that God is infinitely good, though creatures suffer cala­mities here and deserved punishment hereafter, because he has given them opportunity to obtain happiness, and has adopted a scheme of operation which has a tendency to good. Just so God is infinitely good, though some men suffer deserved endless punishment; because he has given mankind opportunity to obtain eternal life and salvation, and has adopted a scheme of providence and of grace, which will actually prevail to the final salvation of all, if it be not neglected or perverted by men themselves; for which neglect or perversion God is not answerable.

IT is also conceded by Dr. C.^* that ‘none of the sons of Adam, by the mere exercise of their natural powers, [Page 141] ever yet attained to a perfect knowledge of this rule’ [the rule of man's duty, and of God's conduct in rewarding and punishing.] ‘Most certainly they are unable, after all their reasonings, to say, what punishment as to kind, or de­gree, or duration, would be their due, in case of sin.’ This is plainly to give up all arguments against endless pu­nishment, drawn from the goodness of God, or from any o­ther divine perfection. For if ‘most certainly after all our reasonings’ from the divine perfections as well as from other topics of reason, we be ‘unable to say what pu­nishment, as to kind, or degree, or duration, is due in case of sin;’ then "most certainly we are unable to say," but that an endless punishment, and that consisting in mise­ry too, is due, and is necessary to secure and promote the good of the system. Therefore to have been consistent, Dr. C. ought never to have pretended, that endless mise­ry is not reconcileable with divine goodness.

DR. C. further grants, that it may be necessary, that the penalty of the divine law be inflicted, and that the inflicti­on of it may be honorable to God, and useful to creatures: yea, he grants, that the full penalty of the law will actual­ly be inflicted on some men. ‘^* Perhaps the reasons of government might make it fit and proper, and therefore morally necessary, that the threatening which God has denounced, should be executed. Would the wisdom of the supreme legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty it was not reasonable and just he should inflict? And might not the infliction of it, when incurred, be of service, signal service, to the honor of the divine autho­rity, and to secure the obedience of the creature in all after times?’ —If it be ‘fit and proper, and morally necessary;’ if it be ‘of signal service to the honor of the divine authority, and to secure the obedience of creatures,’ to inflict the penalty of the divine law; doubtless the infliction of it is not only consistent with the general good, but subservient to it, and therefore perfectly consistent with the divine goodness. It is not "reasona­ble," that God should inflict the penalty of his law, unless the infliction be consistent with the general good, and so with the divine goodness. Therefore the question propo­sed in the last quotation may with equal truth and force be proposed a little differently, thus, Would the wisdom of [Page 142] the supreme legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty, which it was not consistent with the general good of the universe, or with the goodness of his own nature, that he should in any one instance inflict?—Thus it ap­pears to be fully granted, that divine goodness does not op­pose the infliction of the penalty of the divine law, but re­quires it.—Nay, as hath been hinted above, Dr. C. ex­pressly asserts, that the penalty of the law will be inflicted on some men; that on those who pass through the tor­ments of hell, the divine law will take its course, and the threatened penalty will be fully executed.^*—Now what the penalty of the divine law is, we have before endeavour­ed to show. Therefore if our reasoning on that head be just, it follows from that reasoning and from Dr. C's concessions in the preceding quotations taken together, that endless pu­nishment is not only reconcileable with divine goodness, but is absolutely required by it. Would divine goodness both denounce and actually inflict a penalty, which that goodness did not require, and which was not even reconcile­able with it?

DR. C. informs us,^† that ‘Christ was sent into the world, and the great design he was sent upon was to make way for the WISE, just and holy excrcise of mercy— towards the sinful sons of men.’ It seems then, that if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, there would have been no way for the exercise of mercy towards men, in a consistency not with justice and holiness only, but with wisdom? and if not with wisdom, not with the general good: for wisdom always dictates that which is for the ge­neral good. And if it would not have been consistent with the general good, to exercise mercy towards sinners, without the mediation of Christ, neither would it have been consistent with the divine goodness, for that and that only which is subservient to the general good, is an object to the divine goodness. In this sentiment Dr. C. was very full, as we have already seen.—Therefore without the mediation of Christ, divine goodness required, that all man­kind be left in a state of despair under the curse of the law. And if it have been shewn, that this curse is endless misery, it follows, that divine goodness, required that all mankind, if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, should suffer endless misery.

[Page 143]III. As was proposed, we now proceed to consider Dr. C's arguments from the goodness of God, to prove the salvation of all men.—If some of the following quotati­ons be found to be rather positive assertions than argu­ments; I hope the fault will not be imputed to me, provi­ded I quote those passages which contain as strong argu­ments from this topic, as any in his book.

‘^* IT is high time, that some generally received doc­trines should be renounced, and others embraced in their room that are more honourable to the Father of Mer­cies, and comfortable to the creatures whom his hands have formed. I doubt not it has been a perplexing dif­ficulty to most persons (I am sure it has been such to me) how to reconcile the doctrine which dooms so great a number of the human race to eternal flames, with the essential, absolutely perfect goodness of the Deity.— And perhaps they contain ideas utterly irreconcileable with each other. To be sure, their consistency has ne­ver yet been so clearly pointed out, but that a horrour of darkness still remains that is sadly distressing to many a considerate tender heart.’ —In this passage it is im­plied, that the doctrine of endless misery is not honourable to the Father of Mercies. But what is the proof of this? If there be any, it consists in these several particulars— That this doctrine is uncomfortable to the creatures of God—That it has been a perplexing difficulty to some, Dr. C. thinks to most, and "is sure it has been such to HIM," to reconcile that doctrine with the goodness of God—That perhaps they are irreconcileable—That to be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horrour of darkness remains.

IF these be arguments, they require an answer.—The first is, that the doctrine of endless misery is uncomfort­able, or rather not so comfortable to God's creatures, as some other doctrines: therefore it is not honourable to the Father of Mercies.—But would Dr. C. dare to say, that every doctrine is dishonourable to God, which is not equally comfortable to sinful creatures, as some other doc­trines? and that no doctrine is consistent with the divine goodness, but those which are in the highest degree com­fortable to such creatures? What then will follow con­cerning his doctrine of "torment for ages of ages?"— [Page 144] Or would any man choose that the comparison be dropped and that the argument be expressed thus:—The doctrine of endless misery is uncomfortable to creatures, therefore it is dishonourable to God? This still confutes the doctrine of torment for ages of ages. Beside, if the meaning be, that it is uncomfortable to all creatures, it is a mistake.— To those who believe it to be a just and glorious expression of the divine hatred of sin, and a necessary mean of vin­dicating the justice of God, of supporting the dignity of his government and of promoting the general good; it is so far from being uncomfortable, that it is necessary to their comfort; and they rejoice in it for the same reasons, that they rejoice in the advancement of the general good. They rejoice in it on the same principles of benevolence and pie­ty, that Dr. C. rejoiced in the prospect, that the divine law would have its course, and the full threatened penalty be executed on some of mankind.

THE next particular of the above quotation is, that the doctrine of endless misery has been perplexing to some, or to most men, and to be sure to Dr. C.—Doubtless this is true of many other doctrines, which however have been believed both by Dr. C. and by other Christians: such as the perfect rectitude, goodness and impartiality of all the dispensations of divine providence: the consistence be­tween the existence of sin in the world and the infinite wisdom, power, holiness and goodness of God: the final subserviency of all events to the divine glory and the ge­neral good of the system, &c. Therefore, if the argu­ment prove any thing, it proves too much.

THE third particular is, Perhaps endless misery is not reconcileable with the goodness of the Deity.—Answer, Perhaps it is reconcileable with that divine attribute.

THE last particular is, To be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horrour of darkness remains with respect to the subject.—Answer, In the opinion of many other men, they have often been so reconciled, that there was no reason, why a horrour of darkness in view of the subject should remain in the mind of any man. They experience no more horrour of dark­ness in the idea, that God inflicts that endless punishment which is perfectly just, is absolutely necessary to satisfy di­vine justice, and vindicate the despised authority, govern­ment and grace of God, and is subservient to the glory of [Page 145] God and the general good; than in the idea of most other doctrines of the gospel.

BUT let us proceed to another passage of Dr. C.— ‘^*Multitudes are taken off before they have had opportu­nity to make themselves hardened abandoned sinners: and so far as we are able to judge, had they been con­tinued in life, they might have been formed to a virtu­ous temper of mind, by a suitable mixture of correction, instruction, and the like. And can it be supposed with respect to such, that an infinitely benevolent God, with­out any other trial, in order to effect their reformation, will consign them over to endless and irreversible tor­ment? Would this be to conduct himself like a father on earth? Let the heart of a father speak on this occa­sion. Nay, it does not appear, that any sinners are so incorrigible in wickedness, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite power: And if the infinitely wise God can, in any wise methods, recover them, even in any other state of trial, may we not argue from his infinite benevolence, that he will?’

THE first branch of this argument is, that some die be­fore they become incorrigible; therefore the fatherly good­ness of God will give them another trial.—But did Dr. C. know when sinners become incorrigible, and when not? Does any man know how long a person must live in sin, to arrive at that state? If not, what right has any man to say, that any sinners die, before God as perfectly knows them to be incorrigible, as if they had lived in sin ever so long?—Beside, were sinners to live in sin ever so long, still this objection might be made; and Dr. C. has in fact made it, not only with regard to those who die premature­ly, but with regard to all sinners. He says, "It does not appear, that any sinners are so incorrigible, as to be be­yond recovery by still further methods." That is, if it do not appear, that sinners are in this world beyond recovery by still further methods to be used for their recovery, we are to believe from God's infinite benevolence, that those further methods will be used for their recovery. But should a sinner go through the torments of hell, and of ten other succeeding states of trial, it is to be presumed, that Dr. C. would not say, but that possibly he might be reco­vered by some further methods within the power of God [Page 146] to use, if indeed God should Yee cause to use those further methods. The ground of this argument is, that goodness requires, that God use means for the recovery of sinners, as long as it is in the power of God to use any further means to that end. But this as much needs to be proved as any one proposition advanced by Dr. C.

THE next branch of this argument is, that it would not be acting like a father on earth, if God were to consign sinners to endless torment.—And is it acting like a father on earth, to doom men to the second death, the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, and there torment them for ages of ages? Let the heart of a father on earth speak and declare whether it would be agreeable to him, to inflict on his children these extreme and long continued tortures? or even many of the temporal calamities which God inflicts on mankind; such as poverty, shame, a feeble sickly habit, extreme pain and distress, loss of reason, and death attended with the most afflicting circumstances? Would a father on earth choose to plunge his children in the ocean, and leave them to the mercy of the waves? Would he set his house on fire, while they were buried in soft slumbers, and consume them in the flames?—Such declamatory applications to the passions are a two-edged sword which will wound Dr. C's scheme, as certainly as that of his opponents. But this controversy is not to be settled by an application to the passions.

THE last part of the above quotation destroys the whole. It is this; It does not appear that any sinners are so incor­rigible, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite wisdom. If God have revealed that no sinners shall be recovered after this life, it is doubt­less a wise constitution that this life is the only state of pro­bation. Therefore it is not within the reach of infinite wisdom, to use any further means after this life for the re­covery of those who are incorrigible here. So that this whole paragraph is a mere begging of the question: it takes for granted, that this life is not the only state of pro­bation, or that the endless punishment of all who die im­penitent is not a doctrine of divine revelation.

DR. C. elsewhere^* argues universal salvation from this, that God speaks of himself, ‘as the universal Father of Men;’ and says, ‘fathers on earth chastise their [Page 147] children for their profit, but do not punish them, ha­ving no view to their advantage.’ —But does a father on earth never punish an incorrigible child, when it is ne­cessary for the good of the rest of the family? If he did not, but suffered him to ruin his whole family, or even one of his other children; would be act the part, or deserve the name, of a father? ‘And shall we say that of our Father in Heaven (who instead of being evil, as all earthly fathers are more or less, is infinitely good) which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?’ —The truth is, this and all arguments of the kind take for grant­ed what is by no means granted, that the salvation of all men, is subservient to the good, not of the persons saved only, but of the universal system.

IN various passages ^* Dr. C. has much to say of our natu­ral notions of God's goodness; particularly, that the natural notions we entertain of the ‘goodness and mercy of God, rise up in opposition to the doctrine of never ending tor­ments.’ I grant that our natural notions of those di­vine attributes rise up in opposition to endless torments, on the supposition that they are unjust and inconsistent with the general good. But on the supposition that they are both just and subservient to the general good, our natural no­tions rise up in favour of them. So that this and such like arguments all depend on taking for granted what is no more granted than the main question.

NEARLY allied to the argument from the divine good­ness, is that by which Dr. C. attempts to prove universal salvation from the end of God in creation. ‘^‡As the first cause of all things is infinitely benevolent, 'tis not easy to conceive that he should bring mankind into existence unless he intended to make them finally happy.’ ‘^† If the only good God knew—that some free agents would make themselves unhappy, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of his wisdom to prevent it, why did he create them? To give them existence knowing at the same time that they would render themselves finally miser­able—is scarce reconcileable with supremely and abso­solutely perfect benevolence.’ —This argument, as the preceding, entirely depends on the supposition that the final happiness of every individual is necessary to the great­est happiness of the system. Doubtless God is absolutely [Page 148] and perfectly benevolent: but such benevolence seeks the greatest happiness of the system, not of any individual, unless the happiness of that individual be consistent with the greatest happiness of the system. This is the plain dictate not of reason only, but of scripture, and is abun­dantly conceded by Dr. C. as appears by the quotations already made. There is no difficulty therefore in con­ceiving, that however the first cause of all things is infi­nitely benevolent, he should bring mankind into existence, though he never intended to make them all finally happy. He might in perfect consistence with infinite benevolence, bring them into existence, intending that some of them should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and thereby contribute to the greatest hap­piness of the system. And if such a punishment be sub­servient to the greatest happiness of the system, infinite be­nevolence not only admits of it, but requires it; nor would God be infinitely benevolent, if he should save all men. Therefore this grand argument, on which Dr. C. and other writers in favour of universal salvation, build so much, is a mere begging of the question. Let them show that the greatest good of the system requires the final hap­piness of every individual, and they will indeed have gone far toward the establishment of their scheme. But until they shall have done this, their argument from this topic is utterly inconclusive. It is no more inconsistent with the goodness of God, that he should create men with a fore­sight and an intention, that they should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and which is subser­vient to the general good; than that he should create them with a foresight and intention, that they should subserve the same important end, by suffering the torment of ages of ages, or the pains of the stone or the colic; provided these temporary pains are not subservient to their personal good. And to say that temporary pains cannot consistently with the divine goodness be inflicted on the sinner, unless they be subservient to the personal good of the patient, is to contradict the plain dictates of reason, of scripture, and of Dr. C. himself. But this subject has been largely con­sidered in Chap. III.

THESE, I think, are Dr. C's principal arguments from the divine goodness, to prove universal salvation: I pre­sume, that in his whole book there are none more forcible [Page 149] than these. His arguments of this kind generally, if not universally, depend on taking for granted, what is as much in dispute as any point in the whole controversy, that end­less punishment is not consistent with the greatest good of the universal system, or the greatest general good. If it be true, that any man will be punished without end, no doubt it is so ordered, because infinite wisdom and good­ness saw it to be necessary to the general good. If it be not true, it is equally certain, that infinite wisdom and good­ness saw endless punishment to be inconsistent with the ge­neral good. But which of these is the truth, is the main question.

IV. THAT endless punishment is consistent with the di­vine goodness, not only is implied in various sentiments and tenets of Dr. C, but appears to be a real and demon­strable truth. To evince this, I shall now, as was propo­sed, mention several considerations.

1. ALL arguments against endless punishment, drawn from the divine mercy, grace or goodness, imply a conces­sion, that endless punishment is just. Were it not just, there would be no occasion to call in the aid of goodness. Stern, unrelenting justice would afford relief. Nor is there the least goodness, as distinguished from justice, exercised by a judge, in delivering a man from an unjust punishment, attempted to be brought upon him by a false accuser. If therefore the salvation of sinners, and of every sinner, be an act of goodness, mercy or grace, as Dr. C. abundantly declares; then endless punishment is just. And if it be just, it appears by Chap. III, that it will be inflicted, and inflicted by God too. Therefore it is consistent with di­vine goodness.

It is hoped it has been made manifest in Chap. II and III, that the end of future punishment is not the personal good of the patients, but to satisfy justice, and support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government; as both Dr. C. and the scriptures abundantly hold, that the wicked will be punished to the utmost extent of their demerit. Now if the end of future punishment, whether temporary or endless, be to satisfy justice, and to support government; then the general good is promoted by the satisfaction of justice: otherwise God would not inflict such punishment. And if the proof in Chap. VI, that endless punishment is just, be valid, then justice is not satisfied [Page 150] by any punishment short of endless. But by Chap. II and III it appears, that all that punishment, which the wicked deserve, will actually be inflicted upon them by God. Therefore endless punishment is perfectly consis­stent with divine goodness.

2. If the divine law may be in any one instance execu­ted consistently with divine goodness, endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness. But the divine law may, in some instances, be executed consistent­ly with divine goodness.—I have before endea­voured to show, that the penalty of the law is end­less punishment. If this be true, then when the law is ex­ecuted, endless punishment is inflicted. And who will dare to say, that God has made a law, which he cannot in any one instance execute consistently with his own perfec­tions: And that if he should execute it in any instance, his goodness and mercy must be inevitably given up? Nay, he delights in cruelty? If the law cannot be executed without cruelty, it is a cruel unjust law: and to make a cruel and unjust law, is as irreconcileable with the moral rectitude of God, as to execute that law. If the infliction of endless punishment be cruel, the threatening of it also is cruel. But this runs into the former question, whether endless pu­nishment be just.

IF it be said, though the law is just, and the execution of it would not be cruel; yet it cannot be executed consis­tently with the divine goodness, because the divine good­ness seeks the greatest possible good of the system: But the greatest possible good of the system requires the final hap­piness of all:—As to this I observe,

(1) THAT it is giving up the argument from divine goodness in the light, in which Dr. C. has stated it. It appears by the quotations already made, that he held end­less punishment to be so inconsistent with divine goodness, that if that punishment be inflicted, it will prove God to be destitute of goodness, and to delight in cruelty.

(2) THAT the question as now stated comes to no more than this, Whether endless punishment be consistent with the greatest possible display of divine goodness: For a sys­tem, in which there is the greatest possible good, and the greatest possible display of the divine goodness, are one and the same thing. But if it were granted, that endless pu­nishment is, in this sense, inconsistent with the divine good­ness, [Page 151] it would by no means follow, on Dr. C's principles, that all men will be saved. Because it is an established principle with him, that divine goodness is not and cannot be displayed, to the highest possible degree, or so but that there is room for higher displays and further communica­tions of it. ‘^* Neither is it to be supposed, because God is infinitely benevolent, that he has in fact made an in­finite manifestation of his goodness.—Infinity in bene­volence knows no bounds, but there is still room for more and higher displays of it.—This perfection is strictly speaking, inexhaustible, not capable of being dis­played to a ne plus.’ Therefore, it would be absurd for Dr. C. or any one, who agrees with him in the senti­ment expressed in the last quotation, to state the argument from divine goodness, in the light in which it is exhibited in the objection now under consideration. This stating of the argument runs entirely into the question, whether the present system of the universe be the best possible; which Dr. C. has sufficiently answered in the negative, in the pas­sage last quoted, and in many other passages of his writings. If it be true, that divine goodness does not adopt and pro­secute the best possible plan of the universe in general: what reason have we to think, that it will adopt and pro­secute the best possible plan with regard to any part of the divine system; for instance the future state of those who die in impenitence?

(3) ON the supposition, that God does adopt and prose­cute the best possible plan, both with regard to the universe in general, and in every particular dispensation of his pro­vidence; still we shall never be able to determine a priori, that the final salvation of all men is, in the sense now un­der consideration, most subservient to the general good. It must be determined either by the event itself, or by revela­tion: and whether revelation do assure us of the salvation of all men, is not the subject of inquiry in this chapter, but shall be particularly considered in its place.

3. IF divine goodness without respect to the atonement of Christ, which is foreign from the subject of this chapter, require the salvation of all men; it either requires that they be saved, whether they repent or not; or it requires, that they be saved on the condition of their repentance only. If it require that they be saved, whether they repent or [Page 152] not, it follows, that they have done no damage to the uni­verse, or have committed no sin. For the very idea of sin is a damage to the universe, a dishonor to God, and an in­jury to the creature. Now whenever a damage is done to the universe, the good of the universe, or which in the present argument comes to the same thing, the divine good­ness requires reparation. But if the good of the universe require, that the sinner be saved without even repentance, the good of the universe requires no reparation, and if it require no reparation, it has not been impaired, or there has been no damage done to the good of the universe: and if no damage have been done to the universe, no sin has been committed. No wonder then, that the divine goodness requires the salvation of those who have com­mitted no sin or no moral evil.

IF on the other hand it be allowed, that by sin damage is done to the universe, and yet it be holden, that divine goodness requires the salvation of all men, on the con­dition of their repentance only; it will follow, that re­pentance alone makes it consistent with the general good, that the sinner be saved. Repentance then repairs the damage done to the universe by sin; and so makes sa­tisfaction or atonement for sin.—The very essence of atonement is something done to repair the damage done by sin to the universe, so that the sinner can be exempted from punishment, without any disadvantage to the universe. And as repentance is a personal act of the sinner, he does on this supposition make atonement for his own sin by his personal virtue. Therefore, if after this he be saved from wrath, he is but treated according to his personal character, or according to strict justice; not ac­cording to goodness or grace. So that while Dr. C. pro­fesses and supposes himself to be arguing from the divine goodness, the salvation of all men from the wrath to come; his arguments are really drawn from the justice of God only. They imply either that the sinner who is by divine good­ness to be saved from the wrath to come, is no sinner, de­serves no punishment, and therefore is incapable of being saved from wrath, as he is exposed to none; or that though he be a sinner, he has in his own person, made full satisfaction for his sin, and therefore merits salvation from wrath, and is incapable of it by an act of grace or good­ness.

[Page 153]4. TO argue the salvation of all men from the goodness of God, without regard to the atonement of Christ; and yet to allow that endless punishment is just, is a direct con­tradiction.—If it be allowed or proved, that endless punishment is just, it follows of course that it is consistent with the general good, and which is the same thing, with the divine goodness, and is even required by divine good­ness, on the supposition on which we now proceed, that no atonement is made for sin. The very idea of a just punishment of any crime is a punishment which in view of the crime only, is requisite to repair the damage done to the system by that crime. Any further punishment than this is unjust, and any punishment short of this, falls short of the demand of justice. At the same time that this is demanded by justice, it is demanded by the general good too: because by the definition of a just punishment, it is necessary to the general good; necessary to secure it, or to repair the damage done to it, by the crime punished. So that a just punishment of any crime is not only consistent with the general good, but is absolutely required by it, provided other measures equivalent to this punishment be not taken to repair the damage done by sin, or, which is the same, provided an atonement be not made. And if the endless punishment of sin be just; it is of course, on the provi­so just made, perfectly consistent with the general good of the universe, and absolutely required by it, and equally requi­red by the goodness of God. And to say that though it be just, it is not reconcileable with the divine goodness, is the same as to say, that though it be just, it is not recon­cileable with justice.

OBJECTION: Divine goodness does not admit of the endless punishment of the apostle Paul; yet his endless punishment would be just.—Answer: Divine goodness, or the general good of the universe, considering the sins or the personal character of Paul by itself, does both ad­mit and require his endless punishment. But considering the atonement of Christ, which, as I have repeatedly ob­served, comes not into consideration in the present argu­ment, it does not indeed admit of it.

I BEG leave to ask the advocates for universal salvation, whether if Christ had not made atonement, it would have been consistent with the general good of the universe, that sinners be punished without end. If they answer in the affirmative, then endless punishment is in itself recon­cileable [Page 154] not with justice only, but with goodness too, as goodness always acquiesces in that which is consistent with the general good. For if only in consequence of the atone­ment, endless punishment be inconsistent with the divine goodness, it becomes inconsistent with it, not on account of any thing in the endless punishment of sin, or in the di­vine goodness simply; but wholly on account of some­thing external to them both: and therefore that external something being left out of the account, there is no incon­sistency between the endless punishment of sin and the di­vine goodness in themselves considered. But that they are in themselves inconsistent is implied in Dr. C's argument from divine goodness; and that they are not in themselves inconsistent is all for which I am now pleading.

IF the answer to the question just proposed be, that it would not be consistent with the general good, that a sin­ner be punished without end, even if Christ had not made atonement; it follows, that such punishment is not just; as the very definition of a just punishment is, one which in view of the sinner's personal character only is necessary to the general good.—Or if this be not a proper defini­tion of a just punishment, let a better be given. Any pu­nishment is just, or is deserved, for no other reason, than that the criminal viewed in himself owes it to the public, or the general good requires it.

5. IF divine goodness require, that every sinner be, on on his mere repentance, exempted from punishment, it will follow, that sin is no moral evil.—If divine goodness require that every sinner be, on his mere repentance, ex­empted from punishment, the general good of the universe requires the same. If the general good do require it, then either the sinner hath in that action of which he re­pents, done nothing by which the general good hath been impaired; or that impairment is repaired by his repent­ance. For if he have impaired the general good, and not afterward repaired it, then by the very terms it re­quires reparation. And this which the general good in these cases requires of the sinner for the reparation of the general good, is his punishment, and not his exemption from pu­nishment. But if the sinner have done nothing which re­quires that reparation be made to the general good, then he hath committed nothing which hath impaired the gene­ral good: or, which is the same, he hath committed no [Page 155] moral evil. For moral evil is a voluntary act impairing the general good consisting in the glory of God and the hap­piness of the created system.—Or if it be said, that the repentance of the sinner repairs the general good, and prevents the ill effects of his sin; I answer, repentance is no punishment, nor any reparation of damage to the uni­verse by a past action. It is a mere cessation from sin and a sorrow for it. A man who has committed murder, makes by repentance no reparation for the damage which is there­by done to society or to the universe. So that if ever any damage were done to the universe by sin, and if therefore the public good required that reparation be made by the punishment of the sinner, it still requires the same, and therefore does not require his exemption from punishment. Beside; the false and absurd consequences^* necessarily following from the principle that the penitent deserves no punishment, which is the same with this, that the general good does not require that the penitent, viewed in his own character merely, be punished; plainly point out the falsity and absurdity of the principle itself. Particularly this consequence, that on that supposition the penitent never is nor can be forgiven, as he makes by his repentance full satisfaction in his own person, and thus answers the de­mand of justice or of the general good.—But if it be true, that repentance does not repair the damage done by sin to the universe; and if as is now asserted, the general good do require that the penitent sinner, without regard to the atonement of Christ, be exempted from punishment; it required the same before he repented; consequently his sin never did impair the good of the universe, and there­fore is no moral evil.

OBJECTION 1. The fourth argument seems to imply, that sin consists in damage actually done to the universe: whereas there are many sins, in which no real damage is actually done. As if a man stab another with a design to murder him, and open an abscess, whereby the man is be­nefited instead of murdered; and in all acts of malice, which are not executed, no damage is actually done.

ANSW. Taking the word damage in a large sense, to mean, not merely loss of property, as it is sometimes taken, but misery, calamity or natural evil; it may be granted, that sin does consist in voluntarily doing damage to the uni­verse. It is a misery, a calamity, or a natural evil to any [Page 156] man, to be the object of the malice of any other person, though his malice be never executed. It exposes him to the execution of that malice: it renders him unsafe: and to be unsafe is a calamity; especially to be the object of the malice of another to such a degree, that the malicious man attempts the life of the object of his malice. In this case the man who is the object of malice is very unsafe in­deed.—And if but one person be in a calamitous situati­on, so far at least the public good is impaired, or the uni­verse is damaged. Besides, if that one act impairing the public good, be left unpunished, and no proper restraint by the punishment of the act, be laid upon the man himself and upon others, the flood-gate is opened to innumerable more acts of the same, or a like kind. This surely is a further calamity to the universe. So that every sinful vo­lition, though it fail of its object in the attempt, or though it be not attempted to be executed in overt act, is a real calamity or damage to the universe.

OBJECT. 2. The preceding reasoning must needs be fal­lacious, as it implies, that goodness or grace is never exer­cised in any case, wherein punishment is deserved; that whatever is admitted by justice, is required by goodness; and that if sin be a moral evil and deserve punishment, it cannot consistently with the general good be forgiven.

ANSW. This is not true. The reasoning above does not imply, but that there may be, consistently with the ge­neral good, the forgiveness of some sinners. Nor does it imply, but that the general good may require the for­giveness of some sinners; as undoubtedly it does require the forgiveness of all who repent and believe in Christ, and so become interested in him according to the Gospel. Nor does this reasoning imply, but that some sinners may obtain forgiveness on some other account than the merits of Christ: though I believe it may be clearly shown from scrip­ture, that forgiveness can be obtained on no other account. But this reasoning does assert, that if all penitents as such, or merely because they are penitents, or on account of their own repentance and reformation, be required by divine goodness to be exempted from punishment; then sin de­serves no punishment and is no moral evil.

6. THE voice of reason is, that divine goodness, or a regard to the general good requires, that sin be punished according to its demerit, in some instances at least: other­wise [Page 157] God would not appear to be what he really is, an ene­my to sin, and greatly displeased with it.—It is certain­ly consistent with divine goodness, that sin exists in the world, otherwise it would never have existed. Now since sin is in the world, if God were never to punish it, it would seem, that he is no enemy to it. Or if he punish it in a far less degree than it deserves, still it would seem, that his displeasure at it is far less than it is and ought to be. Nor can mere words or verbal declarations of the Deity sufficiently exhibit his opposition to sin, so long as he uni­formly treats the righteous and the wicked in the same manner. His character in view of intelligent creatures will appear to be what it is holden forth to be in his actions, rather than what he in mere words declares it to be. But will any man say, that it is conducive to the good order and happiness of the intellectual system, that God should ap­pear to be no enemy, but rather a friend to sin?

OBJECTION. God would still appear to be an enemy to sin, though he were not to punish it: because he takes the most effectual measures, to extirpate it by leading sinners to repentance.—Answ. The extirpation of sin shows no other hatred of it, than a physician shows to a disease, which he takes the most effectual measures to abolish, by the re­storation of health. But these measures of the physician do not show, that he views his patient as blameable. Sick­ness is no moral evil, and all the pains of the physician to remove sickness, are no testimony of his abhorrence of mo­ral evil. But sin is a moral evil, and it is subservient to the general good, that the great governor of the universe should testify his abhorrence of it, as a moral evil, or as justly blameable. To this end he must do something fur­ther than is done by the physician, who heals his patient: he must either in the person of the sinner, or in his substi­tute, punish sin, and that according to its demerit; other­wise he will not show himself displeased at it as a moral e­vil.

HATRED of sin is as essential to the Deity as love of ho­liness; and it is as honorable to him and as necessary to the general good, that he express the former as the latter. Indeed the latter is no further expressed, than the former is expressed: and so far as the former is doubtful, the latter is doubtful too. The question then comes to this, whether it be consistent with the general good, that God should in [Page 158] actions, as well as words, express his abhorrence of sin as blameable, or as a moral evil; and express this abhorrence to a just degree. If this be consistent with the general good, it is also consistent with the general good, that sin be punished according to its demerit: and if it deserve an end­less punishment, it is consistent with the general good and with divine goodness, that such a punishment be inflicted.

7. THAT endless punishment is inconsistent with divine goodness, and that all men are saved by free grace, is a di­rect contradiction. To be saved is to be delivered from the curse of the law, which we have before endeavoured to show to be an endless punishment. But to be saved from this by free grace, implies, that the person so saved, deserves endless punishment, and that such punishment is with respect to him just. But whatever punishment is just with respect to any man, provided no atonement be made by a substitute, is necessary to the public good; and unless it be necessary to the public good, it is unjust. If it be necessary to the public good, the public good requires it: and if the public good require it, divine goodness requires it. Therefore to apply this reasoning to the endless pu­nishment of the sinner:—The salvation of the sinner con­sists in deliverance from the curse of the law: the curse of the law is endless punishment; and to be delivered from this by free grace, implies, that the endless punishment of the sinner is just. If the endless punishment of the sinner be just, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the pub­lic good requires his endless punishment, and the divine goodness of course requires it. So that if the sinner can be saved by free grace only, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the endless punishment of the sinner is not at all inconsistent with divine goodness; and to say that it is inconsistent with the divine goodness, and yet to say that all men are saved by free grace, and can be saved in no other way, implies, as I said, a direct contradiction. It implies, that endless punishment is just, as the deliverance from it is the fruit of grace only: it also implies, that it is not just, as the public good or the divine goodness does not require it, but is inconsistent with it.

CHAP. IX. In which is considered Dr. Chauncy's argument from Rom. V, 12, &c.

HAVING in the preceding chapters considered Dr. C's arguments from reason and from the divine per­fections, I proceed now to consider those which are drawn from particular passages of scripture. The first of those passages which demands our attention is Rom. V, 12, &c. ‘Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men; for that all have sinned. For until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed, when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned, after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one, many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation; but the free gift is of many offences unto justification. For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came up­on all men to condemnation: even so by the righteous­ness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justifica­tion of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous. Moreover, the law entered that grace might abound: but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: That as sin hath reigned un­to death, even so might grace reign through righte­ousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ, our Lord.’

THE Doctor's argument from this passage depends wholly on the supposition, that the apostle considers "Adam and Christ as the respective opposite sources of death and life to mankind universally:" Or that Christ is the source [Page 160] of life and eternal salvation to all men without exception, as Adam was the source of death to all men without ex­ception. The Doctor's reasons to support this proposition are,—(1) That in the 15th verse it is said, ‘If through the offence of one many be dead, much more hath the grace of God abounded unto many:’ and as by many in the former part of this verse is meant all men, there­fore he concludes that the same word is used in the same extensive sense, in the latter part of the verse: "the antithesis," he says, "will otherwise be lost."— (2) The word many, [...], means all men, because the article is prefixed to it, [...].—(3) That in the 18th verse it is expressly asserted, ‘As by the offence of one, the judgment came upon all men, [...], to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men, [...], unto justification of life.’ Whence the Doctor concludes, that the words all men in both parts of the comparison, are used in the same extent.—(4) That the advantage by Christ exceeds, abounds beyond, the disadvantage by Adam; but this, unless all men be saved, would be so far from the truth, that the former would ‘sink below the latter.’ —Let us attend to these distinctly.

1. THE word many in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses, means all men: therefore it means the same in the latter part of those verses: ‘the antithesis will otherwise be lost.^*’ Now how does the truth of this proposition appear? It must certainly be supported by pro­per proof, to obtain credit. But in the very many instan­ces in which the Doctor is pleased to repeat this proposi­tion, in his long commentary on Rom. V, 12, &c. I do not find one reason offered to prove it, beside that quoted above, "The antithesis will otherwise be lost.^*" This therefore is now to be considered.—In the rebellion in Great Bri­tain, 1745, large numbers of men were engaged in the rebellion, and were led away by the Pretender. After the Pretender was defeated, large numbers, by the influ­ence of some particular person, we will suppose, return­ed to their allegiance, and took the proper oaths to the King: yet not all who were drawn into the rebellion by the Pretender. Now would there be any improprie­ty in saying in this case, As by the Pretender many had [Page 161] been drawn into the rebellion, so by that other person ma­ny were brought back to their allegiance? The former ma­ny is allowed to be more extensive, than the latter; yet there is a manifest antithesis in the proposition; an anti­thesis as manifest as there would have been, if the men who returned to their allegiance, had been just as numerous as those who engaged in the rebellion, and had been the same individuals. Equally manifest it is, that though the many, who died in Adam, be more numerous than the many who are the subjects of saving grace by Christ: yet there is a proper antithesis in this proposition,— ‘If through the of­fence of one, many be dead; much more the grace of God by Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.’

2. THE word many, [...], means all men, because the arti­cle is joined with it, [...], the many. ^*—If this be evident at all, it must be evident either from the general use of the adjective [...], when connected with the article, or from the circumstances of the particular case in which it is used in this passage, Rom. V. 15 and 19. If the validity of the argument now under consideration, be evident from the ge­neral use of [...] in the plural with the article; then gene­rally when used by good authors, and especially by the au­thors of the New Testament, it means a strict universality. Let us therefore attend to particular instances.—Acts XXVI, 24. "Much learning doth make thee mad;" [...]. But no man will say, that this expression means all learning. The use of the article however is ve­ry proper, and the expression means the much learning of which the apostle was possessed.—2 Cor. II, 17; ‘For we are not as many, [...], which corrupt the word of God.’ If [...] here mean all men, the apostle in direct contradiction to himself in this very expression, means that he himself, and all the other apostles, as well the rest of mankind, did corrupt the word of God.—Rev. XVII, 1; ‘I will show unto thee the judgment of the great whore, that sitteth upon many waters,’ [...]. All waters, or all people cannot be meant, because by far the greater part of the nations of the world never were under the influence of the great whore.—The only other instances in the whole New Testament, in which [...] in the plural is used with the article, are Mat. XXIV, 12. Rom. XII, 5. Ch. XV, 22. 1 Cor. X, 17 and 33, [Page 162] which the reader may examine for himself, and it is pre­sumed, he will find, that in no one of them is a strict uni­versality clearly intended. If this be so, it is by no means evident from the general use of [...] in the plural with the article, that [...], many, in Rom. V, 15 and 19, means all men.

NOR is this more evident from the circumstances of the particular case, in which many, [...], is used in Rom. V. 15. Let it be translated as Dr. C. chooses to translate it, thus: If through the offence of one, the many be dead, much more the grace of God, by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many. Nothing appears from the expression, but that the meaning of the apostle may be, what it has generally been understood to be, that the many who were connected with Adam, and whose life or death depended on his standing or falling, became dead through his offence: and the many who are connected with Christ, and with a particular design to save whom, He died, shall be made the subjects of the abounding grace of God in their most glorious salvation.—I say, nothing appears, either from the general use of [...], or from the particular use of it in this case, but that this and this only is the real sense of it, in this instance. And for Dr. C. to wish his readers, before he has given them a reason, to give up this sense in favor of his own, is for him to come to them in the humble character of a suppliant, and not in the dignified character of a cogent reasoner.

3. IN the 18th verse, it is expressly asserted, As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men, [...], to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men, [...], to justification of life: whence Dr, C. concludes, that the words all men, in both parts of the comparison are used in the same extent; and says, ‘It can be no other than a flat contradiction to the express words of the apostle to say, that in the latter part of this comparison not all men are meant, but believers only; that is, a few of them.’ ^* It is indeed a flat contradiction to Dr. C's sense of the apostle's words; but that it is a contradiction to the true sense of those words, does not appear. If it should be further granted to be a contradiction to the most literal sense of those words taken by themselves, it would not thence follow, that it is a contradiction to the true [Page 163] and real sense of the words. The real sense of words in all authors, is in thousands of instances to be known, not from the words themselves merely, but from their connection and other circumstances.

THE Dr. rightly asserts, that the words all men in verse 18th, mean the same with the many in verse 15th. And as it has been shown, that there is no evidence given by the Doctor, that the many, to whom grace abounds through Christ, mean all men; so all men in the 18th verse mean­ing, by his own consent, the same with the many in verse 15th, must, until we have evidence to the contrary, be un­derstood with the same restriction. To carry on the com­parison, and maintain the antithesis, there is no more ne­cessity of understanding the words all men, when applied to the saved by Christ in the 18th verse, to mean the whole human race; than there is of understanding in that extent, the many in the latter part of verse 15th.

BESIDE; the meaning of those words is abundantly restricted by the context: as verse 17th, ‘For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign by one, Jesus Christ.’ The 18th verse is an inference drawn from the 17th, and is in­troduced by [...], therefore. But the 18th verse would be no just inference at all from the 17th, unless the words all men in the latter part of the 18th verse be equally re­stricted as the words they which receive abundance of grace, in the 17th verse. Let us make trial of understanding those phrases in a sense differently extensive, thus; For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more true believers in this life, who are the subjects of the peculiar and abundant grace of God, shall reign in eternal life by one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men universally to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men universally unto justification of life, whether in this world they believe or not. The whole force of this reasoning is more briefly expressed thus; Those who be­lieve in this life, shall reign in life eternal: therefore also all men, whether they believe in this life or not, shall in like manner reign in life eternal. But who does not see, that this consequence by no means follows from the pre­mises?

[Page 164]ALTHOUGH Dr. C. supposes "this therefore" [in verse 18th,] "is the same which began the 12th verse:"— yet he allows, ‘it will make no essential difference in the apostle's reasoning, if we should suppose, that the 18th and 19th verses introduced by [...], are a conclu­sion from the three foregoing verses:’ ^* And it is evident by the Doctor's own discourse, that he himself was full in the opinion, that the 18th and 19th verses, are a conclusion from the three preceding verses, though he was of the opinion that those three verses, are an ‘INTER­POSED parenthesis.’ Let the reader notice the follow­ing passage; ‘The view of the apostle in interposing these verses’ [the 15th, 16th, and 17th,] ‘was that he might argue from the gift in this abounding sense, when he came to prosecute the comparison between Adam and Christ—And if the gift through Christ might be supposed to abound beyond the lapse, in the 15th, 16th, and 17th verses, why not in the 18th and 19th?’ ^†

INDEED the Doctor himself allows, that the all men in the latter part of the 18th verse, is no more extensive, than they which receive abundance of grace in the 17th verse. But he supposes that the latter expression is equally extend­ed with the former, and that the former extends to all mankind. I say, he supposes this: but his opponents in this controversy suppose the contrary; and how does it ap­pear, but that their supposition is as good as his? If the Doctor wished that we should give the preference to his supposition, he ought to have given us some reason.

THE Doctor with the help of a "learned friend" has given us a long dissertation on the 17th verse, and on the Greek verb [...], with a design to prove, that [...], they who receive, mean not those who receive the grace of God actively, voluntarily and with a heart to im­prove it; but those who are the "objects of this grace," "or the persons upon whom it is bestowed." But this is altogether immaterial in the present dispute. By the a­bundance of grace Dr. C. understands the abounding advan­tage by Christ, terminating in a reign in life.—Now it will be granted on all hands, that they on whom this grace is bestowed, will be saved. Indeed the very expression, reigning in life, implies salvation. Those therefore on whom this grace is bestowed, will as certainly and as con­fessedly [Page 165] be saved, as those who cheerfully receive and im­prove the grace of God. All the question is, and a very important one it is, whether this abounding grace termina­ting in a reign in life, be bestowed on all men. That it is preached or offered to all men, is granted. But that it is so communicated to all, as to secure their reign in life, is a different idea, and is the main subject of this contro­versy.

SO that all the labours of Dr. C. and his ‘ingenious friend,’ to settle the meaning of receive, [...], con­tribute nothing to establish this point, That all men in the latter part of verse 18th, mean the whole human race. So long as the Doctor grants, that the words all men, verse 18th, are not more extensive than they which receive a­bundance of grace, verse 17th; and so long as he has not proved, that they which receive abundance of grace, so as to reign in eternal life, mean the whole human race; so long nothing is done to prove universal salvation, from the use of the words all men, verse 18th. To say, that they which receive abundance of grace mean all mankind, because that expression is equally extensive as the words all men in the 18th verse, is a mere begging of the question. It is in the first place to suppose and not to prove, that the words all men mean all mankind; and then by them to prove, that also they which receive abundance of grace, mean all mankind.

THE universal term all men, verse 18th, is by the for­mer part of the chapter limited to those who are justified by faith, who have peace with God, and who joy in God, through Christ, as having received reconciliation. Dr. C's opinion was, that the 18th verse is but the full expres­sion of the sentence left imperfect in the 12th verse, and that the therefore in the beginning of the 18th verse ‘is the same which began the 12th verse.^*’ The 18th verse then is an immediate conclusion from the verses pre­ceding the 12th, especially from the 11th. Now the be­lievers in endless punishment hold, that in all that part of the chapter, from the beginning to the 12th verse, the a­postle had been speaking of the privileges of believers on­ly, and not those privileges which belong to all mankind. And to infer from those privileges which are peculiar to believers, that all mankind will be saved, is to infer a con­sequence, [Page 166] which is by no means contained in the premises: and such reasoning ought never to be imputed to any man of Paul's sound judgment, much less to him, an inspired a­postle.

TO illustrate this matter, permit me to descend to par­ticulars. Verse 1st, believers are said to be justified by faith and to have peace with God: verse 2d, to have access by faith into the grace of the gospel and to rejoice (or glory) in the hope of the glory of God: verse 3d, to glory in tri­bulations: verse 5th, to have the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost: verse 8th, it is said that God commendeth his love towards believers, in that Christ died for them: verse 9th, that believers are justified by Christ's blood, and saved from wrath through him: verse 10th, that believers are reconciled to God by the death of Christ and saved by his life: verse 11th, that believers glory in God through Christ, by whom they have received the atonement or reconciliation.—Now what is the con­sequence really following from these premises, ascribing to believers these peculiar and exclusive privileges? Is it that by the righteousness of Christ the free gift unto jus­tification of life, is come upon all mankind, believers and unbelievers? By no means: any man, without the aid of inspiration, would be ashamed to draw such a consequence from such premises. The only just consequence of these premises, is that which has been generally taken to be the meaning of the 18th verse; viz That as by the of­fence of one, Adam, judgment to condemnation came upon all mankind who were his seed; even so by the righteousness of one, Jesus Christ, the free gift unto jus­tification of life, came upon all his seed, who are believers only, and who are the only persons of whom the apostle had been speaking in the premises.—May I not now adopt the same bold language which Dr. C. often uses concerning his comments on scripture, that no other sense than this, can be put on this 18th verse without making the apostle argue inconclusively?

I KNOW very well that the Doctor understood differ­ently the whole passage from the beginning of this chap­ter to the 12th verse. But as his whole argument from Rom. V. 12. to the end, in the present view of it, de­pends on his different construction of verse 1—12; it is not sufficient to say, that the Doctor understood that passage [Page 167] differently, or that it is capable of a different construction. It must be shown that it is not capable of the construction which is given above; and that the Doctor's construction must be the true one. Let us therefore attend to his con­struction and his reasons in support of it.

THE construction is, that the last verse of the preceding chapter, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, verses, and the latter part of the 11th verse of this chapter, are spoken of all mankind. The reasons which he assigns for such an understanding of those verses, are

(1.) THAT in the 6th verse Christ is said to die for the ungodly. ^* But if we should assert, that by the ungodly here are meant those only, who afterward and during this life become godly or believers, though Christ died for them while ungodly or considering them as ungodly, the Doctor has given no confutation of such a construction. Therefore he had no right to expect, that it would be reject­ed by any one who should choose to adopt it.—Or if we allow, that Christ did die for all men in this sense, that he died to introduce a dispensation of grace which should offer salvation to all, and invite all to it, and to use Dr. C's own expression, to put all into salvable circumstances; nothing will hence fellow favourable to the actual salvation of all men, or to the Doctor's argument from Rom. V. 12, &c. It will not follow, that all will accept the invitations to salvation and act upon them. Still the we and us, which occur so often from the 1st to the 12th verse, and parti­cularly in verse 6th, may mean believers only.

(2.) ‘IT is a gross mistake to think, that the apostle in this 9th verse is speaking of that justification he had in the 1st verse connected with faith; and for this decisive reason, because—as salvation from wrath is one thing essentially included in that justification which is the result of true faith; it would be ridiculous to argue, much more being justified, meaning hereby this justification, we shall be saved from wrath.’ ^†—But did Dr. C. entertain the opinion, that justification and salvation are one and the same? Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness: he was then justified: but he did not then receive complete salvation. Believers being in this life justified by faith, have peace with God, according to the 1st verse of this chapter, as Dr. C. allows. [Page 168] Yet they are not in this life saved from wrath in the sense they will be, at the day of judgment. Therefore, how­ever Dr. C. asserts it, it does not appear to be ridiculous to argue, that believers being in this life justified by faith in the blood of Christ, shall at the day of judgment, much more be saved from wrath through him. Is it ridiculous to argue, that Abraham being justified by faith here, will much more be saved from wrath hereafter?

(3) ‘THE particle [...], now, connected with the justi­fication here treated of, is emphatical, making it clear, that the apostle is not to be understood of justification at the great day; but of justification that had at that time been completed.^*’ —No body pretends, that the a­postle means a justification at the great day. It is allowed on all hands, that he means a justification, which had at that present time been completed. But what follows hence? Did Dr. C. imagine, that believers are not in a proper sense completely justified in this life? And that the justification of Abraham, Rahab, &c. was in no proper sense completed before their death, or before the great day? Concerning the former, it is expressly said, that he believ­ed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness—that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness, &c, and concerning the latter, was not Rahab the harlot justified, &c? Nor is it material to the present purpose, whether this justification of Rahab mean a justification by God, or a manifestative justification, proving, that she was justified in in the sight of God; because the latter, equally as the for­mer, implies that she was then justified in the sight of God.

THAT believers are in this life justified in a peculiar sense, is further taught in 1 Cor. VI, 11, ‘And such were some of you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God.’ —I presume it will be grant­ed, that pardon or forgiveness is an essential part of justifi­cation, and that when a man is forgiven by God, he is jus­tified by God. But that believers are forgiven in this life, is evident from the following texts, Mat. IX, 2, "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee." See also, Mark, II, 5, and Luke V, 20,—Col. II, 13. ‘And you being dead in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath [Page 169] he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all trespasses.’ 1 John II. 12, ‘I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you, for his name's sake.’

But why need I produce proofs of what Dr. C. grants, though it seems in his comment on the 9th verse, he had forgotten it? In his comment on the 1st verse, &c, he speaks of ‘the justified by faith, as glorying in hope of the glory of God—and in their sufferings— because they knew that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope.’ The Doctor, as the apostle did before him, evidently considers these things as taking place in this life. Indeed the con­trary cannot be pretended without the grossest absurdity. He also considers these views and affections as peculiar to the justified by faith. Therefore some men are completely justified by faith in this life: at least so completely, as to render the 9th verse properly applicable to them. There­fore his argument from [...], now, that the justification spo­ken of in the 9th verse, is not peculiar to believers, proves nothing.

BESIDE, Dr. C. could not, without the most glaring absurdity and inconsistency, understand this 9th verse of all mankind: because the persons here referred to, shall be saved from wrath. But according to the Doctor some men will not be saved from wrath, they will suffer all that wrath to which they are liable on the footing of strict jus­tice: they will suffer according to their sins, according to their crimes, and their deserts, and so that the whole threatened penalty will be executed on them.

(4) DOCTOR C. argues, that because it is said in verse 10th, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God; by the we here, we must understand, not believers only, but all mankind: or because, as the Doctor paraphrases the words, while they were enemies, they were reconciled; therefore this reconciliation cannot mean the cordial re­conciliation of true believers.^* The force of this argu­ment wholly depends on this supposition, that the persons here intended, were reconciled, and yet after the recon­ciliation was effected, they still remained enemies. But what necessity of this gloss of the text? Why may it not mean this merely, that when the persons here intended [Page 170] were going on in their enmity, they were arrested by the grace of God, reclaimed from their enmity, and reconciled to God? There appears to be nothing absurd or unusual in this expression understood in this sense. If it should be said, When a subject was waging war against his sovereign, and was in actual battle with the troops of his sovereign, he was reconciled to him; the expression would not natu­rally imply, and no man would understand it to mean, that notwithstanding the reconciliation, he still continued a fix­ed and malicious enemy to his sovereign No man would understand the expression in any other sense than this, that in the midst of the war and battle, he was struck with con­viction of his wickedness, and became cordially reconciled to his sovereign.

IF the Doctor depended on the original words [...], to make out that the reconciliation here in­tended took place, while the persons spoken of remained enemies; he might as conclusively have argued, that the person mentioned in Joh. IX, 25, ( [...]) had his sight restored to him, while he remained perfectly blind; and that Saul went to Damascus, with the expectation of bringing certain persons to Jerusalem, who at the same time should still remain at Damascus, ( [...]) Act. XXII, 5.

AT length we come to the Doctor's exposition of the 11th verse, to which his criticism, on all the preceding ver­ses refers. He tells us, The meaning plainly and briefly is, ‘We believers glory in God of our interest, and relation to him, as our covenant God, through Jesus Christ, by whom we were so changed in our state, while ene­mies—in common with the rest of mankind, as to be ca­pable of—final justification upon the foot of faith.’ On this it may be remarked, That if by ‘interest in and covenant relation to God,’ Dr. C. meant any thing different from that state of reconciliation, which is obtain­ed by Christ, and which is mentioned in the latter part of this verse, it does not appear, that the text gives him any warrant to insert that interest, &c. in his comment, as a ground of rejoicing or glorying. I appeal to the reader, whether the most natural sense of the text be not this, We believers glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, as having by Christ received reconciliation; or for this reason, that of God's rich grace through Christ, we have [Page 171] obtained reconciliation with God. Otherwise, why is the circumstance of our receiving the reconciliation by Christ mentioned in this connection with our glorying in God? Beside, to glory in God as our covenant God, and to glory in him on account of our reconciliation with him, is one and the same thing.

THE glorying of which the apostle speaks, is through Christ; and this implies, that it is on account of some be­nefit or blessing received through Christ: and what this blessing is, which the apostle had in view, and which he considered as the ground of glorying to believers, he im­mediately explains in these words, by whom we have re­ceived the reconciliation, that reconciliation of which he had been speaking in the 10th verse.—But if the recon­ciliation, which the apostle makes, the great ground of re­joicing or glorying to believers, be, as Dr. C. holds, com­mon to believers and unbelievers? then the great ground of glorying to believers is not any blessing peculiar to be­lievers; but something common to all mankind; and therefore unbelievers have just the same reason to glory in that blessing as believers; which is no more credible than the doctrine of universal salvation, and wants as much proof as that doctrine; and therefore cannot be admitted as any evidence of the truth of that doctrine.

I BEG the reader's patience, while I make a few other remarks on Dr. C's construction of the passage from Rom. IV. 25, to Chap. V. 12; and I wish the reader to keep before him the passage itself, while he follows me in these remarks.

THIS whole passage is expressed in the first person, and is manifestly one continued discourse. Yet Dr. C. was of the opinion, that in this short passage of only twelve ver­ses, the persons, or the we, us and our, which occur in al­most every sentence, are shifted no less than four times. In the last verse of Chap. IV, it was his opinion, that all men are intended: that from the first to the sixth verse of Chapter V, only believers are intended: that from the 6th to the 11th verse all men are intended: that in the former part of the 11th verse believers only are intended: that in the latter part of the 11th verse all men are again inten­ded. I beg leave to set down this whole passage, accor­ding to the Doctor's explanation, together with the text itself:—Thus

HOW strange, that in a continued discourse all in the first person plural, the we and us should be changed back­ward and forward four times! What torturing of the scripture is here! At this rate, what discourse in the world will be intelligible? How will it be possible for any man, and especially for the common people, for whom as well as for the learned, the scriptures were written, to un­derstand them?

BUT this is not all. By this various reference of the pronouns we and us, the reasoning of the apostle is render­ed utterly inconclusive, in almost every step of it. Thus the first verse of the fifth Chapter is manifestly brought in by the apostle, as a consequence drawn from the last verse of the preceding Chapter. But from the consideration, that Christ died and rose to put all men into a capacity of ob­taining justification at the great day, it by no means fol­lows, that believers are now justified by faith, and have peace with God. Verse 9th, if it be ever so true, that all men are put into a possibility of salvation, it by no means follows, that all men will be actually saved. It no more [Page 174] follows, than from the opportunity given all men, of ob­taining salvation immediately after this life, it follows, that all will actually be saved immediately after this life: Or than from the opportunity of entering the land of Ca­naan, given all that generation, which came out of Egypt, it followed, that all that generation would in fact enter that land: Or than from the opportunity given any man to be­come rich or honorable, it follows, that he will in fact be­come rich or honorable. The same observation is equally applicable to the 10th verse. What was before observed concerning the 11th verse, understood in Dr. C's sense, needs not to be repeated.

BUT what is of chief importance is, that according to the Doctor's construction, there is no argumentative con­nection between the 11th and the 12th, or which is the same thing, between the 11th and the 18th verses. If the Doctor's sense of the 11th and 18th verses be true, the latter is no just consequence from the former. The Doc­tor's sense of the 11th verse is, that all men through Christ have received a possibility of final salvation; and his sense of the 18th verse is, that all men will actually be saved. But if it be ever so true, that all men have received a pos­sibility or opportunity of final salvation, it does not fol­low, that all will actually be saved. Yet as the 12th or 18th verse, (the intermediate verses being a parenthesis) is a deduction from the 11th, the last of the propositions just expressed, should justly follow from the other; other­wise the apostle argues inconclusively. And as the Doc­tor's gloss of these two verses makes the apostle reason in­conclusively, we may be sure, that he has not given the true sense of them.—But according to the common un­derstanding of these verses, the reasoning is clear and cer­tain. For if believers have obtained through Christ a cor­dial reconciliation and peace with God, then certainly those same believers will, in the same way, obtain eternal life and salvation.

THAT the 12th, and therefore the 18th verse, is an in­ference from the 11th, is, I think, manifest from a careful perusal of the passage, and it is at least implicitly granted by Dr. C. He expressly says, that the therefore in the be­ginning of the 18th verse, ‘is the same which began the 12th verse. The protasis or first part of the compari­son was there entered upon, but left unfinished. 'Tis [Page 175] here resumed, I say, therefore, as by the offence of one man’ &c. ^* And his paraphrase of the 18th verse is in these words: ‘I say, therefore, (to resume now and pur­sue the comparison I began in the 12th verse) as it was by the lapse of the one man, Adam,’ &c.^† The Doc­tor also quotes Dr. Doddridge's assertion, that ‘the 12th verse is an inference from the 11th,’ and does not con­tradict that assertion, though he labours through a num­ber of pages, to affix a different sense from that of Dr. Doddridge, to the 11th verse, that thus he may evade the construction of the 18th verse, which Dr. Doddridge had given, and establish his own. But all this was needless, if indeed the 12th and 18th verses are not an inference from the 11th.—Nor is there any inconsistence in the opinion, that the 18th verse may be at the same time an in­ference from the 11th and from the 15th, 16th and 17th verses. True and sufficient premises or reasons of the pro­position of the 18th verse, may be contained in the 11th verse. Those reasons maybe explained, and even others added in the 15th, 16th and 17th verses, which fall into a parenthesis; and the 18th verse may contain an inference justly deducible from either, or from both.

I AM indeed sensible, that Dr. C. in his paraphrase of the 12th verse, does not consider it as an inference from the 11th; but the 11th as deducible by way of inference from the 12th, in this manner: Because sin and death came upon all men by Adam, therefore all men have obtained a possibility of salvation by Christ. His words are, ‘For this cause or reason, we have received reconciliation by Jesus Christ, namely, because as sin entered into the world by the one man, Adam,^‡’ &c. But this is as surprising as any part of Dr. C's truly surprising exposition of this chapter. In the first place, it is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any thing, but pure imagination. In the second place, to apply this paraphrase to the 18th verse, which is but the full expression of the 12th, it will stand thus: For this cause or reason all men have received a possibility of salvation, namely, that as by the offence of one, judg­ment came upon all men to condemnation, even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to ac­tual salvation. Or more briefly thus: The reason, why [Page 176] all men have obtained a possibility of salvation, is, that sal­vation is actually come upon all men: Or to place the sen­tence in its proper arrangement, Salvation is actually come upon all men; therefore all men have received a possibili­ty of salvation.—On this reasoning I need make no re­mark.—It is not however probable, that the Doctor was sensible, that his paraphrase of the 12th verse, appli­ed to the 18th, would come to this. Nor is the reason just expressed, that which the Doctor believed to be the true one, why we have received the reconciliation. But that which in the Doctor's opinion was the true rea­son, he expressly declares to be, ‘That it was in such a way, viz. by the offence of one, that judgment came upon all men to condemnation.^*’ —Who is answer­able for this inconsistency, I need not inform the read­er.

BEFORE I dismiss this part of Dr. C's book, I cannot but observe, that he speaks of a double justification,^† the one meaning absolution at the great day; the other mean­ing the advantageous state, or the possibility of the salva­tion of all mankind through Christ. It seems then that the Doctor had forgotten, that he had but a few pages be­fore made out a threefold justification: THe first kind con­sisting in the introduction to a capacity or possibility of sal­vation through Christ: The second in the justification of believers, who have peace with God while in this life; such was the justification of Abraham: The third in absolution at the great day.—But when any thing is abundantly multiplied, no wonder if the author himself of that multi­plication forgets the number of units contained in his own product.

DR. C. says,^‡ It can be no other than a flat contradic­tion to the express words of the Apostle himself, to say that in the latter part of the comparison in the 18th verse, the words all men are not used in the same extensive sense, as in the former part of that verse. This is indeed a strong, positive assertion, but where is the reason to sup­port it? Beside; he thought it no flat contradiction to the express words of the Apostle, to say that we in the former part of the 11th verse, is not used in the same extensive sense as in the latter part of that verse: nor any flat contradiction to the words of our Saviour, to say, that the word everlasting is not used in the same extensive sense in [Page 177] the former part, as in the latter part of Matt. XXV. 46, ‘These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into everlasting life.’

BUT it is time we should proceed to the other argument of Dr. C. to prove that universal salvation is taught in Rom. V. 12, &c. viz.

4. THE advantage by Christ exceeds, abounds beyond, the disadvantage by Adam. But unless all men be saved, the former "sinks below" the latter.^*—It is granted, that the advantage by Christ, to those who obtain salvation by Christ, exceeds, and abounds beyond, the disadvantage by Adam. But the question is, whether this saving ad­vantage extend to all those, to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended. That it does extend to all the same sub­jects to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended, is hol­den by Dr. C. But how does he prove it? By no other arguments than those which we have already particularly considered; and whether they be conclusive, is submitted to the reader,—Dr. C. did not imagine, that the advan­tage by Christ was more extensive, or extended to a great­er number of persons, than the disadvantage by Adam. He believed, that they both extended to all mankind.— Therefore, the super-abounding, the excess, or surplusage of the advantage by Christ, does not consist in the extent of it, but in something else, and that something else may exist, though the extent as to the number of persons be the same, or even less than the extent of the disadvantage by Adam.

IF the glory of God, and the happiness of the created system, be more advanced by the salvation of a part of the human race, and by the rejection of the rest, than they would have been, if Adam had never fallen; then surely the advantage by Christ on the general scale, does not "sink below" the disadvantage by Adam: and to assert, that the divine glory and the happiness of the created sy­stem would be most advanced by the salvation of all men, is to beg material points in question.—But if Dr. C. mean, that if all be not saved by Christ, then the ad­vantage by Christ to those who shall be finally miserable, "sinks below" the disadvantage by Adam to the same persons; I grant it, and apprehend no disadvantage to my cause by the concession. For it is granting no more than [Page 178] is implied in the very proposition, which I endeavour to defend, that all men will not be saved.

I HAVE now finished my remarks on Dr. C's argument from Rom. V, 12, &c.—If the reader think I have been prolix in these remarks, I hope he will remember how pro­lix the Doctor was in his argument from this passage; and I presume he will not think it unreasonable to take up nineteen pages in answering sixty-nine.

IT is now left to the reader to judge, whether it be cer­tain, that because the word many in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses means all men, it means the same in the latter part of those verses:—Whether it be certain, that the word many means all men, because the article is joined with it, [...], the many:—Whether because the words all men in the former part of the 18th verse, mean all mankind, they certainly mean the same in the latter part of that verse:—Whether because the advan­tage by Christ exceeds the disadvantage by Adam, it cer­tainly follow, that the advantage to every individual man, will exceed the disadvantage to that man.

CHAP. X. In which is considered Dr. C's Argument from Romans VIII. 19—24.

THE text is, ‘For the earnest expectation of the crea­ture waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole crea­tion groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan with­in ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the re­demption of our body.’ —The words of chief import­ance are those of the 21st verse; ‘The creature itself al­so shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God:’ which [Page 179] are supposed by Dr. C. to hold forth the salvation of all men. But the main question here is, what is the meaning of the word creature. Dr. C. supposes it means the hu­man race. Others suppose it means the whole of the cre­ation which was made for the sake of men, and is subjected to their use.—Beside the word creature, the following words and expressions, ‘manifestation of the sons of God’ —"vanity"—"willingly"— ‘bondage of cor­ruption’ —are all understood differently by Dr. C. and by those who believe in endless punishment. Let us there­fore attend to them respectively.

I. THE meaning of the word [...], creature or creation, is to be sought. It may not be impertinent to inform the reader who is unacquainted with the original, that the word translated creature in the 19th, 20th and 21st verses, is the very same which in the 22d verse is translated crea­tion; and doubtless whatever be the meaning of it, it ought to have been translated uniformly throughout this passage.—Dr. C. was of opinion that it means all man­kind or the rational creation of this world. His reasons for this opinion are, that ‘earnest expectation, groaning, travailing together in pain, are more naturally and obvi­ously applicable to the rational, than the inanimate’ [and brutal] "creation"— ‘that [...], the whole cre­ation, is never used (one disputed text only excepted, Col. I. 15.) to signify more than the whole moral cre­ation, or all mankind’ —that ‘it would be highly incongruous, to give this style’ [the whole creation] ‘to the inferior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent’ part, mankind.

1. ‘EARNEST expectation, groaning, travailing together in pain, are more naturally applicable to the rational, than the inanimate’ [and brutal] "creation."^*—If this prove any thing, it will prove too much: it will prove, that when in Psal. CXIV, it is said ‘The sea saw it and fled; Jordan was driven back; the mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs;’ the meaning is, that men saw it and fled; that men were driven back; that men skipped like rams and like lambs▪ it will prove, that Jer. XLVII. 6, ‘O thou sword of the Lord, how long will it be ere thou be quiet? put up thyself into thy scabbard, rest and be still;’ means that men should [Page 180] put up themselves into a scabbard, and there rest and be still. It will prove that Hos. XIII. 14, ‘I will ransom them from the power of the grave: I will redeem them from death. O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction;’ means that God will be the plagues and destruction of men: and when once it is esta­blished, that death and the grave mean men, as men are to be ransomed from the grave and redeemed from death, it will follow that men are to be ransomed from themselves and redeemed from themselves.—But there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from this mode of con­struing the scriptures.

THE truth is, that the figure of speech, whereby inani­mate things are represented as living, sensible and rational persons, and are addressed as such, is very common in scripture. Beside the instances already mentioned, I beg leave to refer to the following: Deut. XXXII. 1. ‘Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; hear, O earth, the words of my mouth.’ Psal. LXV. 12, 13. ‘The little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures—the val­leys—shout for joy: they also sing.’ Isai. LV. 12. ‘The mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands.’ Hab. II. 11. ‘For the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it.’ Psal. LXXXIX, 12. ‘Tabor and Her­mon shall rejoice in thy name.’ Psal. XCVII, 1. ‘The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice; let the multitude of the isles be glad thereof.’ Isai. XXIV, 4. ‘The earth mourneth and fadeth away, the world monrneth, languisheth and fadeth away.’ See also Psal. XCVIII, 8. Isai. XVI, 8. XXXV, 1, 2. XLIX, 13. Lev. XVIII, 28, &c, &c.

NOW rejoicing, shouting for joy, singing, breaking forth into singing, clapping of hands, crying out, answer­ing, mourning, languishing, &c, are certainly in these passages applied to inanimate creatures. But they are ap­plicable to such creatures, not more naturally and obvious­ly, than earnest expectation, groaning and travailing in pain.

THOUGH the Doctor thinks these expressions not proper­ly applicable to any other creatures than mankind; yet he himself applies them to mankind in no other sense, than [Page 181] that in which they are applicable to the brutal creation. The sense in which he supposes all mankind long and wait for the manifestation of the sons of God, is, that they ‘groan under the afflictions of this world, sensible of its imperfections, and consequently desire something bet­ter.’ Now the calamities of the world fall not on the rational part of it only, but on all the animal, sensitive parts, and consequently they, as well as mankind, ‘de­sire something better.’ From these calamities and mi­series the animal parts of the world will be delivered, at the manifestation of the sons of God.

FURTHER, the inanimate parts of the world, once per­sonified, as they are in innumerable instances throughout the scriptures, may as properly have the particular person­al affections, actions and sufferings, of expectation, waiting, groaning, travailing, &c. ascribed to them, as any other personal affections, actions or sufferings.

IF any should think it impossible for brutes and inanimate matter to enjoy the liberty of the children of God, and therefore that it is absurd to represent, that they shall be delivered into that liberty: let it be observed, that though this would be absurd, while they are represented to be still brutes and inanimate matter; yet as soon as they are represented to be intelligent beings, the absurdity ceases. There is in this case no more absurdity in representing them, as brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God after the resurrection, than in representing, that they rejoice in the manifestation of the divine perfections and in the prevalence of true religion in this world; as is done in the passages before quoted.

OBJECTION. Though there would be no absurdity in figuratively representing brutes and inanimate creatures, in this world, as rejoicing in the manifestations of divine power, wisdom and goodness, yet there is an absurdity in the representation, that they shall be brought into the li­berty of the children of God, after the end of the world; because then they will be annihilated; and to represent that after they shall be annihilated, they still enjoy glori­ous liberty, is a gross inconsistency. This is the objection in its full strength.—Let us attend to it.

IT is not agreed by all writers, that the liberty of the children of God mentioned in the 21st verse, means that liberty and blessedness which they shall enjoy after the re­surrection [Page 182] and general judgment; some are of the opinion, that it means that liberty which they shall enjoy on earth in the latter days, when Christ shall reign on earth for a thousand years.^* If this be the true sense of the apostle, the objection vanishes at once, as the brutal and inanimate creation will then be in as real existence, as they are now.

NOR is it agreed among writers, that this world will, after the general judgment be annihilated. It is the opi­nion of many, and of great authority too, that after a purification by fire, it will be restored to a far more glori­ous state, than that in which it is at present, and will for­ever be the place of the residence of holy and happy be­ings.—If this be true, the objection again vanishes.

FINALLY, if it be the real truth, that the brutal and material creation will be annihilated, after the general judgment, yet there is no absurdity in representing, that it shall be brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Wherein does the liberty of the children of God consist? Doubtless in a great measure in deliverance from sin, and from the influence of it in themselves and others. So the brutal and material creation, even if it be annihi­lated, shall be delivered from the power, abuse and abomi­nable perversion of wicked men, to which it had been long subjected, and under which it had long groaned. There­fore this creation introduced as a rational person, may, without impropriety be represented as earnestly wishing for that deliverance. And as the deliverance from sin in themselves and from the effects of sin in others, is at least a great part of the liberty which the children of God shall obtain after the general judgment; so the aforesaid deli­verance of the creation may not improperly be called a deliverance into the liberty of the children of God, into a similar liberty, a like freedom from the tyranny, abuses and perversions of wicked men. Or the sense may be a deliverance in, at, or on occasion of, the glorious liberty of the children of God. The preposition us, is capable of this sense, and then the construction of this passage will be, That the creation itself will be delivered from the bondage of corruption, at the time, or on occasion, of the glorious liberty or deliverance of the children of God.

2. DOCTOR C. further pleads, ‘That [...], the [Page 183] whole creation, is never used (one disputed text only ex­cepted, Col. I. 15) to signify more than the whole mo­ral creation, or all mankind.’ ^*—This is a matter of im­portance, and requires particular attention.—The phrase [...] is used four times only in all the New Testa­ment, beside the instance which is now under consideration. The places are, Mark XVI. 15; ‘Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature.’ Col. I. 15; "The first born of every creature." V. 23; ‘The gospel which ye have heard, which is preached to every creature, which is under heaven.’ 1 Pet. II. 13; ‘Sub­mit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake.’

AS to Mark XVI. 15, it is granted, that in that text every creature means human creature.—Though Dr. C. says, that Col. I. 15, is disputed; yet he pretends not, that every creature here means mankind merely: nor does it appear, that the text is in this respect disputed. It is indeed disputed, whether [...], every creature, or rather, all the creation, refer to the new creation, i. e. the church, or to the old creation, which was made at the beginning of the world. It is also disputed, whether Christ be so the first born of all the creation, as to be a creature himself; or whether he be the first born in this sense only, that he is the heir, the head and Lord of all the creation. [...], in our version rendered first-born, is by some ren­dered first creator or producer, which gives a still differ­ent sense to the passage. But it does not appear, that it has ever been contended, that [...] ‘signifies no more than all mankind.’ For in whatever sense Christ is the first-born of all the creation, he is the first-born not only of the human race, but of all the creation absolute­ly. If it be said, that Christ is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the first creature which was made; this implies, that he was made not before all men only, but be­fore all creatures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he was begotten from eternity, and so begotten before all the creation; still he was in this sense begotten not before all men only, but before all crea­tures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the heir, the head, the Lord of all; still in this sense he is the first-born not of mankind only, but of all creatures.—What right then had Dr. C. to [Page 184] suggest, that it is disputed, whether [...] in this text ‘signify more than the whole moral creation of this world, or all mankind?’

THE next passage, in which [...] occurs, is Col. I. 23; ‘The gospel, which was preached to every crea­ture under heaven.’ The Doctor, who was well ac­quainted with the original, doubtless recollected, or at least, he ought to have examined, and then he would have seen, that in the original it is, ‘ [...], in all the creation under heaven,’ or in all the world. Surely the Doctor did not imagine, that the gospel was preached within every man.

The other passage is 1 Pet. II. 13, ‘Submit your­selves to every ordinance of men;’ [...], every human creature. The question is whether these words signify all mankind: and the very proposing of the question, I presume, suggests the answer. Will any man say, that every Christian is required, either by reason or revelation, to submit to every individual of the human race, whether man, woman or child; and whether the Christian be a lord or a tenant, a king or a subject?— Besides; allowing that the phrase as it stands, means the hu­man race; the addition of [...] to [...] shows that [...] without [...], would not signify the human race; otherwise why is it added? If the words in our language, every creature, mean always every human creature, it would be needless in any case to insert the adjective human; and the very insertion of it would imply, that the writer or speaker was of the opinion, that the bare words every crea­ture, were not certainly limited to human creatures, but would most obviously be taken in a greater extent.— This text therefore is so far from a proof, that ‘ [...], every creature, is never used in all the New Testament (except in one disputed text) to signify more than all mankind;’ that it is a clear proof, ‘that it does naturally signify more than all mankind,’ and to make it signify no more, must be limited by [...], human.

AFTER all, the very drift of the apostle shows, that in 1 Pet. II. 13, he was so far from meaning all mankind by the expression [...], that he meant either not one of the human race, or at most but very few; that he meant either human laws and [Page 185] constitutions, or human magistrates, the king as supreme, governors who are sent by him, &c.

NOW let the reader judge, whether [...] be never used in all the New Testament to signify more or less than all mankind; and whether of the four instances, in which it occurs, beside this of Rom. VIII, it do not in every one signify either more or less than all mankind; excepting Mark XVI, 15. And it is equally against Dr. C's argu­ment from Rom. VIII, whether it be used in other places to signify more, or to signify less than all mankind. If it signify more in other places, it may signify more in Rom. VIII. If it signify less in other places, it may signify less in Rom. VIII: and when the apostle says, ‘the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestati­on of the sons of God,’ he may mean that only believers and true Christians, or the true church in all ages, as dis­tinguished from the Apostle, and first converts, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, are thus waiting, &c.

IT is further to be observed, that [...], creature or creation, without [...], is in the whole New Testament u­sed ten times, beside the use of it in Rom. VIII; in no one of which does it mean mankind. The places in which it is used are all noted in the margin, that the reader may examine them for his own satisfaction.^*

IN the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, [...] occurs but three times: 2 Chron. XIV. 15, where it is translated cattle: Ezra VIII. 21; where it is translated substance: and Psal. CIV. 24, where it is translated riches. —In the Apocrypha it is used nine times; and not once to signify all mankind and not more or less.^†

BUT it is time we attend to Dr. C's other reason for un­derstanding the creature to mean all mankind; or at least to include all mankind, if it mean any thing more. The reason is,

3. That ‘it would be highly incongruous, to give this style’ [the whole creation] ‘to the inferior or less va­luable [Page 186] part, wholly leaving out the most excellent’ part, mankind.^‡—But is there more propriety in calling a small part, though it be the most excellent part, the whole creation; than in calling by far the greater part the whole creation, though it be not so excellent? The learned men in any nation, are, in some respects, the most excellent part of the nation. But would it be more proper to call them, to the exclusion of all the unlearned the whole nation, than to call all the unlearned, to the exclusion of the few learned, the whole nation? The few truly vir­tuous and holy persons who love God supremely and their neighbour as themselves, and who find the strait gate, are undoubtedly the most excellent part of any nation. But would it be more proper to call them alone the whole nation, than to call the rest alone, the whole nation? Those of the apostolic age, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, were, without doubt the most excellent of that ge­neration. But would it therefore be more proper to call them as distinguished from the rest of men, that whole ge­neration; than to call the rest of men as distinguished from them, that whole generation?—Beside; propriety or congruity of language depends wholly on use. If the words creature, creation and whole creation be frequently in scripture used without any reference to mankind; then there is no incongruity in the same use of the same words, in this eighth chapter of Romans: and that this is the use, I appeal to the texts before quoted, which are all the texts in which the words here translated crea­ture, and the whole creation, are to be found in all the scriptures.

II. WE are to inquire into the meaning of the expres­sion, "manifestation of the sons of God."—These words, ‘The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God;’ are thus paraphrased by Dr. C. ‘The creature, the rational creature, man­kind in general, waits for the time when it shall be re­vealed, that they are the sons of God.’ ^‖ He here takes it for granted, that the word creature means man­kind. Whether this be a supposition justly founded, is now submitted to the reader who has perused what has been offered on this subject.

[Page 187]BUT even on the supposition that the creature does mean mankind, how strange it is that the waiting of this crea­ture for the manifestation of the sons of God, should mean that this creature is waiting to be itself manifested to be the sons of God! Would it not be strange arguing, to say, that because the Jews waited for the manifestation of the Messiah, therefore they waited to have it manifested, that they were the Messiah! or that because Simeon wait­ed for the manifestation of the consolation of Israel; there­fore he waited to have it made apparent, that he was the consolation of Israel! Yet either of these expressions as naturally imports the sense which I have now given, as the expression, the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God, imports, that the "creature" or race of creatures. is waiting to have it ‘revealed that they are the sons of God.’

III. THE meaning of the word "vanity" next requires our attention.—By this word Dr. C. understands ‘mortali­ty and all other unavoidable unhappiness and imperfection of this present weak, frail, mortal state.’ ^* Again, "mankind were subjected to vanity or mortality."^‖ ‘God subjected mankind to vanity, i. e. the infelicities of this life.’ ^† According to Dr. C. then, the vanity here spoken of is a natural evil. But it may at least be made a question, whether he be not mistaken, and whether it be not a moral evil. The same word, [...], is used twice more in the New Testament; Eph. IV. 17; ‘That ye henceforth walk, not as other gentiles walk in the va­nity of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God,’ and 2 Pet. II. 18, ‘For when they speak great swelling words of vanity.’ In these two, the only instances of its use in the New Testament, beside the text under consideration, it manifestly means not a natural but a moral evil, either positive wickedness or at least a sinful deficiency. Is not this a ground of presumption at least, that also in Rom. VIII. 20, it means a moral evil?

IN the same sense [...] the adjective from which [...] is derived, is used Jam. I. 26, ‘This man's religion is vain:’ and 1 Pet. I. 18; ‘Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things—from your vain conversation.’ [...] is also used in the same sense, Rom. I. 21; ‘Be­came [Page 188] vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened.’ Vain and vanity in none of these in­stances signify "mortality" or "infelicity;" but either positive sin or sinful deficiency.

BESIDES; the very nature of the case shows, that vani­ty in this instance was not used by the apostle, in Dr. C's sense. According to his sense of vanity, the apostle under the influence of the Holy Ghost, advances this proposition; The human race was made subject to ‘mortality, una­voidable unhappiness and imperfection,’ not willingly. But who ever supposed that the human race was made sub­ject to these things willingly? or that any man, or any in­telligent being, ever chose to be subject to mortality and unhappiness? This is a proposition too insignificant to be advanced by so sensible and grave a writer as Paul, and under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost too.—The Doc­tor seems to have been aware of this objection to his con­struction of vanity, and therefore supposes the word willing­ly means, not what is naturally understood by it, a volun­tary consent of the heart; but that it means, ‘through some fault,’ "by a criminal choice." Therefore

IV. WE are to inquire into the meaning of the word willingly.—Is it not at first blush a little extraordinary, that willingness must certainly mean a fault, a criminal choice? Suppose an historian should say, that Hugh Peters and others who were executed at the restoration of Charles the second, were executed not willingly; must we under­stand him to mean, that they were not executed in conse­quence of any fault of their own?—The original word [...] is used once more only in all the New Testament, I Cor. IX. 17, "If I do this thing" (i. e. preach the gospel) ‘willingly, [...], I have a reward: but if against my will, [...], a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.’ According to Dr. C's construction of wil­lingly in Rom. VIII, the meaning of the apostle is, If I preach the gospel "through some fault of my own," or "by my own criminal choice," I have a reward; but if I do it without any fault or criminal choice of my own, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.

[...] derived from [...], and of the same signification, is in the New Testament used in Philem. 14, only; ‘That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but willingly:’ which I presume even Dr. C. would not expound thus; [Page 189] That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but through some fault of thine own.—The adverb, [...], is used twice in the New Testament, Heb. X. 26; ‘If we sin willfully, after we have received the knowledge of the truth:’ and 1 Pet. V. 2, ‘Taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint but willingly.’ To the first of these the Doctor in a quotation from Taylor, refers, as an authority, to confirm his sense of willingly in Rom. VIII. But surely both he and Taylor made this reference with little consideration; for according to them the sense of the verse in Hebrews is this; If after we have received the knowledge of the truth, we sin ‘through our own fault,’ or "by our own criminal choice." Did Dr. C. or Dr. T. indeed believe, that we ever sin without any fault of our own, or without our own criminal choice? —It is plain, that the meaning of Heb. X. 26, is what is well expressed in the translation; If we sin wilfully, not through some inattention, but pertinaciously, after we know the truth, know our duty and the proper motives to it; there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin.

THUS the construction, which Dr. C. gives of willingly, as meaning, "through our own fault," or ‘by our own criminal choice,’ appears to be wholly unsupported by any authority; to be a mere invention to help over the dif­ficulty of the supposition, that the inspired apostle should advance so trifling a proposition as this; that mankind do not choose misery: and also appears to be attended with many absurdities.

THE error of that construction further appears from this, that if what comes upon us not through our own fault, be properly expressed by saying, that we are subjected to it, not willingly; then what does come upon us through our own fault, may be properly expressed, by saying, it comes upon us willingly. At this rate the inhabitants of the old world were drowned willingly: Sodom and Gomorrah were burnt up willingly: Pharaoh was first plagued, and then destroyed in the Red Sea willingly: Korah, Dathan and Abiram were swallowed up in the earth willingly: Those whom Dr. C supposes to be punished in hell for ages of ages, are punished willingly.

NEITHER is it true, in Dr. C's sense, that mankind are made subject to vanity, not willingly: i. e. ‘Not through any fault of theirs;’ ‘not by their own criminal [Page 190] choice.’ —By vanity he understands "mortality," "and the infelicities of this vain mortal life," There­fore according to him, men are not made subject to morta­lity, and the infelicities of this life, through any fault of their own. And if so, then death and the various infeli­cities of life are not any evidence, that the subjects of death and those infelicities are themselves sinners, or the objects of God's displeasure. But this is contrary to the whole current of scriptural representations; particularly to Ps. XC. 3, &c. ‘Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men.—Thou carriest them away, as with a flood; they are as a sleep. In the morning they are like grass, which groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For they are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath they are troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy countenance. For our days are passed away in thy wrath: we spend our days as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine anger, according to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts to wisdom.’ ‘How plain and full is this testimony, that the general morta­lity of mankind is an evidence of God's anger for the sin of those, who are the subjects of such a dispensati­on?’ ^*

BUT if mortality and the calamities of life be an evi­dence of God's anger at the sin of those, who suffer death and those calamities; then it is not true, that men in ge­neral are subjected to death and those calamities, without any fault of their own; but the truth is, that they are subjected to them on account of their own sin, as this is the very cause of the divine anger, of which calamity and death are the effects and tokens.

[Page 191]If it should be objected, that to be made subject to va­nity, in this passage, does not mean, to be made actually to suffer death and infelicity, or does not include the inflicti­on of death and infelicity; but implies mortality only, or that constitution whereby men are made mortal or liable to death and infelicity: this objection grants, that death and infelicity are actually inflicted on men on account of their own fault or sin; but holds, that the sentence of mor­tality and liableness to infelicity took place in consequence of Adam's sin only. So that according to this, the sense of the apostle will be, That the human race was put un­der a sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own; yet this sentence was never to be executed, but on ac­count of their own fault. And the consideration that man­kind are put under the sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own, is a ground of hope, that they will be delivered from that sentence of mortality. But as the ac­tual infliction of death is on account of their own fault, there is no such ground of hope, that they will be deliver­ed from death and infelicity themselves.—A mighty pri­vilege this (were it possible) to be delivered from the sen­tence of death, and from mortality, but not from death it­self! To be delivered from liableness to infelicity, but not from infelicity itself!

I AM not insensible of the absurdity and impossibility of such a supposition. But who is answerable for this ab­surdity? Doubtless the objector himself, who is of the o­pinion, that to be made subject to vanity, is to be under the sentence of death, and to be made liable to infelicity, but not to suffer death or infelicity.

The idea, that to be made subject to vanity, [...], means not the state of subjection to vanity, but the act by which the creature was subjected: and that [...] means, as Dr. C. says,^* by or through him, who subjected it; implies this further absurdity, that the act, by which the creature was made subject to vanity, was by him who subjected it; or that act was really the act of him whose act it was; that he who subjected the creature to va­nity, really did subject it to vanity.—But who will dare to impute such identical propositions to the inspired apostle?

V. WE at length come to consider Dr. C's sense of the phrase bondage of corruption.—This according to him is [Page 192] synonymous with vanity: Therefore the same observations for substance, which were made concerning his sense of va­nity, are applicable to his sense of the bondage of corruption. But a few things in particular are worthy of remark. Dr. C. says, that in consequence of the subjection of man ‘to a frail, mortal, corruptible condition—he is upon the foot of mere law, and without the supposition of grace or gospel, in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations.^*’ It seems then, that since all christiani­zed nations are under not mere law, but grace and gospel, they are not in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations, and doubtless for the same reason, are not in bondage to any principle of depravity. But is this indeed so, that men under mere law are so depraved, as to be in bondage to animal appetites; but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, in the mere external dispensation of it, they are no longer the subjects of any depravity? It seems then, that the natural depravity of men depends on their mere external circumstances; that while they are without the gospel their hearts are in bondage to animal appetites: but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, however they disregard it, they are free from that bon­dage. But all those nations, to whom Christianity is pub­lished, are under the gospel; therefore they are already free from bondage to animal appetites; and it is absurd for them to hope, that they shall be delivered from this part of the bondage of corruption.

BESIDE; Dr. C. says, that ‘both these senses of bondage’ [i. e. bondage to death and bondage to ani­mal apetites] ‘are certainly included in that vanity the creature is subjected to.’ ^† Then by the creature Dr. C. must mean, not the whole moral creation, or all man­kind including those nations and individuals to whom the gospel is made known: because they are not under mere law, and therefore according to him are not subjected to that part of vanity which consists in bondage to animal ap­petites. Yet he abundantly holds, that all men are sub­jected to vanity, which certainly includes, according to him, bondage to animal appetites.

ACCORDING to Dr. C. vanity includes bondage to bo­dily or animal appetites. Yet mankind are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own. But [Page 193] is it not a fault or crime in any man, to be governed by his bodily appetites, or to be in bondage to them? With what truth or consistency then could he hold, that men are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own, and that therefore their subjection to vanity is a ground of hope of deliverance from it; when the very state of subjection to vanity is a very great fault or crime? Can a fault or crime be a ground of hope of impunity, or of the divine favour?

BUT perhaps it may be pleaded, that though the state of subjection, or the being subject to vanity, implies a fault; yet the act of subjecting, or the act by which man­kind were subjected, to vanity, is not through, or on ac­count of any previous fault of mankind in general; and this is the ground of hope that they shall be delivered. If this be the meaning of Dr. C. it comes to this. That because mankind are, in consequence of Adam's sin, not their own personal sin, subjected by God to frailty, mor­tality, bodily appetites and sin; therefore they do not de­serve to be left without hope of deliverance: the divine perfections do not admit of it: it would not be just: at least it would be a hard case. Otherwise where is the ground of hope of deliverance? No promise is pleaded as the ground of this hope. The only pretended ground of hope in this argument is, that mankind were subjected to vanity, not through any fault of their own: as in the following passage; ‘For if mankind were subjected to a state of suffering, not through any wilful disobedience which they themselves had been personally guilty of, it is congruous to reason to think, that they should be sub­jected to it not finally—but with room for hope that they should be delivered from it: and was it not for this hope, it cannot be supposed—it would be a reflection on the—benevolence of the Deity to suppose, that they would have been subjected to it.’ ^* But if this subjection to vanity by God be perfectly just, what right have we to expect, that God will deliver all men from the conse­quences of it? Have we a right, without a divine pro­mise to expect, [...] God will suffer none of the sinful race of men, to bear the consequences of a just and wise con­stitution? And would it be a reflection on the Deity, not to expect this?

[Page 194]SO that this whole argument of Dr. C. implies that God in subjecting mankind, on account of Adam's sin, "to a state of suffering," made an unjust constitution. Yet Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, that this is a real constitution of God.

AT the same time, it is implied in all this, that if man­kind had been thus subjected to vanity, in consequence of their own personal sin; they might justly have been left with­out hope. Thus it is really granted by Dr. C. after all his labour to prove the contrary, that the personal sins of men, deserve a hopeless state of suffering. And the whole question in the present view of it, comes to this, Whether the personal actual sins of mankind, under the present di­vine constitution, be real sins, and deserve the punishment justly due to sin: or whether these sins be not excusable, because they are the established consequence of Adam's transgression, and not the consequence of their own volun­tary act. Or in other words, whether the moral evil of any action consist in the nature of the action itself, or in its cause or antecedents. Of this question I should be very willing to enter into the discussion, were it necessary: but as it has been so particularly considered by another author, I beg leave to refer to him.^* I beg the reader's patience however, while I make only one or two brief observa­tions.

IF the present actions of mankind be excusable, because they are the consequence of Adam's transgression and not of their own previous sinful actions or volitions, in the first instance; it will follow that there is no sin or moral evil in the world, nor ever has been. All the present ac­tions of men, if they be excusable, are no moral evil. The same is true of all the actions of men ever since the fall of Adam. And even Adam's transgression itself is no moral evil; for this did not take place in consequence of any previous criminal choice or action; because by suppo­sition, that transgression was the first sin committed by man. Whatever transgression he first committed, is the very transgression of which we are speaking: and it is absurd to talk of a sin previous to the first sin.

CONCERNING Dr. C's idea, that mankind are subjected to mortality, infirmity, and the influence of bodily appe­tites, [Page 195] on account of Adam's sin only, without any regard to their personal sins; and that this subjection was the cause and occasion of all the actual transgressions and tem­poral calamities of the posterity of Adam; it may be ob­served;

1. THAT for reasons already given,^* it appears not to be true, that mortality and the calamities of life are brought on men on account of Adam's sin merely, without regard to the personal demerit of those who suffer them.

2. THAT the human race was indeed, in the sentence of God on Adam, subjected to infirmity and mortality: but it was no more subjected to these, than it was to de­pravity and sin. At least to assert the contrary would be to beg an important point in dispute: and to be sure, Dr. C. could not with any consistency assert the contrary. He holds throughout this, and all his other works, that the human race is subjected to infirmity on account of Adam's sin, and the Doctor's idea of this infirmity amounts to a proper moral depravity of nature. All that is meant, or that needs to be meant, by the moral depravity natural to mankind, in this fallen state, so far as that depravity is dis­tinct from actual sin, is something in our nature, which uni­versally leads to actual sin. Whether this something ex­ist primarily in the body and bodily appetites, or primarily in the soul, is perfectly immaterial, so long as it is an un­failing source of actual sin, as Dr. C. manifestly considers it.^† In his Five Dissertations he is very explicit and abun­dant in this matter. His words are, ‘In consequence of the operation of appetites and inclinations seated in our mortal bodies, we certainly shall, without the interpo­sition of grace—do that—the doing of which will deno­minate us the captives of sin and the servants of corrup­tion.’ ^‡ "He" [the apostle] ‘ascribes it to the flesh, by means of the overbearing influence of its propensi­ties in this our present mortal state, that—we do that which our minds disapprove;’ ^‖ and in many other pas­sages to the same effect.—So that Dr. C. really, though it seems undesignedly, held, that moral depravity of nature comes upon all mankind, on account of Adam's sin: and his favourite construction of Rom. V. 12; ‘And so death passed upon all men, for that’ (or as he will have it, whereupon, in consequence of which) "all have sinned;" [Page 196] comes to this only; that on account of Adam's sin, a di­vine sentence was denounced on the whole human race, dooming it to a state of moral depravity; in consequence of which moral depravity all men commit actual sin. What then has the Doctor gained by the construction of this passage, which he has laboured so hardly in this and his other works to establish; and in which he claims to be an original; and which perhaps is the only particular in his whole book, with respect to which he has a right to set up this claim? It is also curious to see a gentleman of Dr. C's abilities, both opposing and defending with all his might, the native moral depravity of human nature!

REASONS have been already given, why willingly ought to be understood not to mean through the fault of a person; but in its original proper sense, with the consent of a person. If those reasons be sufficient, there is a further difficulty in Dr. C's construction of this passage, especially of the 20th verse. According to his construction of [...], crea­ture, the apostle declares, that mankind are subject to their bodily appetites, and so to sin, not willingly, not with their own consent. But is it possible, that men should be sub­ject to bodily appetites, and should commit actual, person­al sin, without their own consent?—If, to evade this observation, it be said, that they are however by the act of God, without any previous consent of their own, subject­ed to frailty, mortality, bodily appetites, and so to sin; this would be mere trifling. Who ever imagined, that God first waited for the consent of mankind, and having obtained their consent, established the constitution, by which they became mortal, frail, subject to the influence of their bodily appetites and so to sin?

AFTER all, Dr. C's exposition of this paragraph in Rom. VIII, is by no means, even on his own principles, a proof of universal salvation. His translation of those most im­portant words in the 20th and 21st verses, is this, ‘The creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly; but by the judicial sentence of him, who subjected it, in conse­quence of a previous hope, that even this very creature should be delivered from its slavery of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.’ So that the utmost, which this passage teaches, according to his own account, is, that mankind may now hope, that they shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the [Page 197] glorious liberty of the children of God. But what if there be a foundation to hope that this will be the case? Does it thence follow, that this hope will certainly be fulfilled? In consequence of the death of Christ and the proclamation of the gospel, there is a door of hope set open to all men. But does it hence follow, that all men will certainly enter in at this door, and secure the blessings for which there is a foundation to hope? D. C. would doubtless grant, that there is a door of hope opened to mankind in general, that they may be saved immediately after death. Yet he would not pretend, that this hope is realized. God delivered the Israelites out of Egypt in such a manner, as gave hope that even that generation would enter the promised land. Yet this hope was not fulfilled.—Therefore, though it should be granted, that God hath subjected mankind to vanity in hope, that they shall be delivered from it, into the glorious liberty of the children of God, it would by no means follow, that all men will be saved: and Dr. C. is entirely mistaken, when he says, ‘Mankind universal­ly is expressly made, in the 21st verse, the subject of this glorious immortality.’ ^* No such thing is expressly said, and in these words he contradicts his own paraphrase of that verse, in which he pretends no more, than that there is a foundation for hope, that mankind shall attain to a glorious immortality.

IN the preceding remarks on Dr. C's construction of this passage, the sense, which I suppose to be the true one, hath been sufficiently expressed. Yet it may be proper here briefly to repeat it.—The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creation is subject to that use to which it is applied by sinful men, which, as to the end of its existence, the divine glory, is in its own natural tendency, vain and unprofitable, and in many respects positively sinful; I say, to this it is subject not voluntarily, but on account of him, for the sake of his glory, ( [...] governing the accusative) or for the accomplishment of the mysterious, but wise and glorious purposes of him, who subjected the same in hope, that this same creation shall be delivered from this unpro­fitable and sinful use, which may justly be considered as a state of bondage to it, into a liberty, in several important respects, similar to that of the children of God; or at [Page 198] least shall be delivered at the time, when the children of God shall be admitted to the enjoyment of their most glori­ous liberty. For we know, that the whole creation groan­eth and travaileth in pain together until now, by reason of that vile abuse and perversion, which is made of it by sin­ful men, and through desire of that deliverance just menti­oned, and in due time to be granted it.

BESIDE the observations on particular parts of Dr. C's construction of Rom. VIII. some more general remarks occur.—One is, that his construction implies, that the divine law is unjust, and cannot be executed consistently with justice. He says,^* that man on the foot of mere law, without grace, is in bondage to bodily appetites: there­fore on the foot of mere law, without grace, there is no hope for him. And he speaks^† of the case of mankind as remediless, without the grace manifested in Jesus Christ. Yet in the same page he says, ‘It is the thought, that mankind were subjected to suffering, not remedilessly, but with an intention of mercy,’ and ‘it is this thought only, that can reconcile the unavoidable sufferings of the race of men, as occasioned by the lapse of Adam, with the perfections of God.’ So that God made a law, which could not be executed, consistently with his perfections, and he was obligated in justice to shew mercy through Christ, to mankind. By mere law men were re­mediless, and if they had been suffered to remain in that remediless state, as they would have remained in it with­out Christ and the gospel, such a dispensation could not have been reconciled with the perfections of God. There­fore the divine law cannot be reconciled with justice, or with the perfections of God.

ACCORDING to Dr. C. vanity included in it bondage to bodily appetites, as well as bondage to death.^‡ There­fore, as God could not consistently with his perfections, subject mankind to vanity, without an intention of mercy;^‖ and as it would be a reflection on the Deity, to suppose, that he has subjected mankind to vanity, without hope of deliverance:^‖‖ therefore on these principles, God could not consistently with his perfections and character, avoid giving mankind a ground of hope of deliverance from sin, or he could not withhold the grace of the gospel: but he was obliged in justice to his own character, to deliver men [Page 199] from both sin and the sufferings of this life, and it may be presumed, that Dr. C. would have consented to add, and from the sufferings of hell too. Where then is the grace of the gospel, and of the gift of Christ? In the gift of Christ, in the institution of the gospel, and in every thing pertaining to it, so far as was necessary to our deliverance from sin and punishment, God has done no more than was necessary to save his own character from reflections and re­proach.

IT may be further remarked, that Dr. C.^* argues, that because men are subjected to a state of suffering, not through their own personal disobedience; ‘it is congru­ous to reason to think, that they should be subjected to it, not finally.’ But why does he say, "not finally"? He might with the same strength of argument have said, not at all. The calamities of this life, with temporal death, are inflicted on mankind, either as a punishment, or as sovereign and wise dispensations of Providence. If they be inflicted as a punishment, without any sin, by which the subjects deserve them, they are as real an injury as endless misery would be, if it were inflicted as a punishment, in like manner without any sin, by which it should be de­served. And if God do indeed injure his creatures in a less degree, he is an injurious being: and what security have we concerning such a being, that he will not injure them in the highest possible degree?—So that if God be a just being, as it is agreed on all hands, that he is, it is equal­ly "congruous to reason to think," that he would not subject his creatures to a temporary state of suffering, as a punishment, without any sin, by which they deserved it, as that he would not subject them to a state of final suffer­ing.

IF it be said, that death and the calamities of life are not a punishment of mankind, but mere sovereign, wise dis­pensations of providence; this supposition opens a door for endless misery. For how do we know, that the same so­vereign wisdom, which is now supposed to inflict tempo­ral evils on mankind, may not also see fit to inflict on them endless evils?

ACCORDING to Dr. C. men are by a divine constitution subjected to vanity including mortality, infelicity and bond­age to bodily appetites. But why was this constitution [Page 200] made? Was it made for the greater happiness of every individual, or of the system, or of both? Which ever of these answers be given, it will follow, that evil, both na­tural and moral is subservient to good; and is introduced, if not in the first instance of Adam's transgression, yet in every other instance, by the positive design and constitu­tion of God. Evil therefore both natural and moral, makes a part of the scheme of God, takes place by his constitution, and is subject to his controul? What then becomes of the scheme of self-determining power, for which Dr. C. is so zealous an advocate? And here how justly may many passages in Dr. C's writings be retorted? Particularly the following; ‘If men's volitions and their consequent effects, are the result of invariable ne­cessity in virtue of some exterior causes so inviolably connected, as that they will and must come to pass, the author of this connection, which according to this plan is God, is the only efficient and real author of whatever has been, or shall hereafter be brought into event; not excluding any of the most complicated vil­lanies that have been, or may be perpetrated by any of the sons of Adam. Is this a scheme of thoughts fit to be embraced by intelligent creatures?’ ^*

BESIDE, if this constitution were made for the greater happiness of every individual, then every individual is more happy than he would have been, if he had not been sub­jected to vanity; and then there is no such thing as punish­ment in the subjection to vanity, or in any of its conse­quences; nor any foundation, with a view to the private interest of any man, to regret any of the evils of this life, or of that which is to come.

IT does not however appear to be fact, that every in­dividual is in this life rendered more happy, by the evils which he suffers here: and to say that he will be render­ed by them more happy on the whole hereafter, neither ap­pears to be fact, nor to be capable of proof. How will a­ny man prove, that the Sodomites will on the whole be more happy, than Enoch and Elijah, who never tasted death?

IF all men be subjected to vanity, to promote not their personal good, but the good of the system, and the good of individuals be given up to this end; why may we not [Page 201] in the same way account for endless punishment?—If it be not consistent with the divine perfections to subject men to suffering, unless it issue in their personal good; then it is not consistent with the divine perfections to punish at all, either in this world, or the future.

CHAP. XI. Containing remarks on Dr. C's arguments from Col. I. 19, 20. Eph. I. 10. and 1 Tim. II. 4.

THE first of those texts is: ‘For it pleased the Fa­ther, that in him all fullness should dwell. And having made peace by the blood of the cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself: by him, I say, whe­ther they be things in earth, or things in heaven.’ —Dr. C's sense of this passage is this: ‘^*It pleased the Father—by Jesus Christ—to change back all things to himself—to change the state of this lower world, of the men and of the things, whether they be on earth, or in the aerial heaven, that encompasses it.’ It was his opinion, that to reconcile all these things, is to rechange their state, or bring them back to that state they were ori­ginally in.^† With reference to mankind, he says,^‡ ‘By Christ their state was changed back, they were absolute­ly brought back to the condition they would have been in, had it not been for the lapse; what I mean is, that they were absolutely and unconditionally put into salva­ble circumstances.’ —But what follows from all this; One would think Dr. C. had forgotten himself. Suppo­sing all this were granted, would it follow, that all men will be saved? That because they are in salvable circum­stances, therefore their actual salvation will be effected? No, no more than from the original state of Adam, it followed that he would never fall. He was indued with a power to stand: he was in such circumstances, that he might have continued in his original innocence. Yet he fell. So, though it be granted, that all men are by Christ put into salvable circumstances, yet through their obstinate impeni­tence and unbelief they may fail of this great salvation.— [Page 202] Doubtless Dr. C. believed, that by Christ the state of man­kind is so changed, that they are all salvable, or may be saved, immediately after the end of this world. But this notwithstanding, he believed also, that a great part of mankind would die impenitent, and that none of them would be saved within a thousand years of the end of this world, and some of them not till after ages of ages.

BUT in aid of his argument from this passage, the Doctor brings in again, Rom. V. 10. ‘For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his son; much more being reconciled, we shall be saved, by his life.’ I have formerly remarked on the Doctor's use of this passage; and need not repeat those remarks. It may be observed, however, that the manner of his ap­plying this passage to strengthen his argument from Col. I. 20, really implies, that this last text taken by itself, con­tains no argument at all, and therefore ought never to have been introduced as a proof. Whatever force there is in it, to prove universal salvation, depends entirely, ac­cording to Dr. C's stating of the matter, on Rom. V. 10, which has been considered already.—So that if his sense of Col. I. 20, be true, it does nothing towards proving the salvation of all men.

I DO not however mean to suggest, that Dr. C's sense is, in my opinion, the true one. It is impossible, that all things should be brought back, in all respects, to their ori­ginal state. All mankind cannot now live in the garden of Eden. It cannot be again fact, that all the knowledge of God possessed by men, should be such as is derived from either the works of creation and providence, or from im­mediate intercourse of God and angels with men. Nor can it be ever again true, that God is propitious to men immediately, without a mediator. In these, and perhaps many other respects, mankind cannot be changed back to their original state. But if once the advocates for univer­sal salvation admit of limitations, and say, that all things will however be brought to their original state in many re­spects, the believers in endless punishment too must be al­lowed to apply their limitations; and they will allow, that as the original state was a state of order, regularity and due subordination, wherein every person and thing were in their proper places; so in this sense all things will final­ly [Page 203] be brought back to their original state, and order will be again restored to the universe.

NOR does the verb [...] signify in general to change any thing back to its former state. For instance, if two men had been long and habitual enemies to each other; and if having for a while become friends, they should re­turn to their former enmity; I believe no critic in the Greek language would think this return to their enmity, would be properly expressed by [...], reconcile. When the Jews were brought home from the Babylonish captivity, they were changed back to their former state. But is this change ever expressed by [...], reconcile?

THIS verb is never used in the New Testament, but to signify a change, whereby those who were at enmity, be­come friends. This observation is true of all those words of the same derivation, on which Dr, C. criticises so a­bundantly from page 128, to 142. It is therefore not ap­plicable to all the things on this earth, and in the aerial hea­ven, unless it be by the figure prosopopoeia. By that figure indeed every thing animate and inanimate may be said to be alienated from man, in consequence of his sin; and to be reconciled to him in consequence of the blood of the cross, and of the return of man to God through Christ. But if this were the idea of Dr. C. he should have given up his objection to the sense of Rom. VIII. 19, &c, gi­ven by the believers in endless punishment; and at the same time he would have virtually given up his own sense of that passage.

IT is strange, that Dr. C. as well as the translators of the bible, should render the words [...] in Col. I. 20, unto himself. In the preceding verse we have [...]; in the 20th verse we have [...], and again, [...]. Now it seems very odd, that in this multiplied use of [...] in its various cases, one instance only should be selected from the rest, and rendered himself, meaning the Father, and in all the other instances it should be referred to Christ. No person without prepossession, construing this passage, would render it in that manner. It is altogether unnatural to suppose, but that [...] refers to the same per­son in all these instances, and ought to be rendered accord­ingly.

IT is further to be observed concerning [...] and [...], that in all instances in which they occur in [Page 204] the New Testament, in the Septuagint and in the Apo­crypha, the person to whom the subject of the proposition is said to be reconciled, is never once expressed in the ac­cusative case governed by the preposition [...]; but is always expressed in the dative case. Hence it may be inferred that [...] in Col. I. 20, does not mean the person to whom all things in heaven and earth are reconciled: but that it means, that all things in heaven and earth are re­conciled to each other, into him: i. e. so as to be brought into Christ, to be united under him as their head, and be interested in the common advantages and blessings of his glorious kingdom.

TO be in Christ is a common phrase of the New Testa­ment to express subjection to Christ, and an interest in the blessings of his kingdom; and to be reconciled into Christ, may mean to become united to him by faith, to become subject to him in obedience, and to be interested in all the blessings of his kingdom.^*

BY sin angels and men, Jews and Gentiles, became alienated from each other; and men in general, by the pre­dominancy of self-love, became virtually enemies to each other. Now it pleased the Father to reconcile by Jesus Christ, angels and men, Jews and Gentiles to each other, and to diffuse by his grace a spirit of benevolence among them, whereby they should love their neighbour as them­selves. And as to the universal term all things, we cannot take it in its literal and utmost extent, unless by the figure before mentioned, which Dr. C. cannot admit, without giving up what he most earnestly contends for, in his com­ment on Rom. VIII. 19, &c. But if we once admit a limitation of that universal term, every one must be al­lowed to propose his own limitation, and some doubtless will insist, that it extends to angels and to believers only from among men: as it is said, that all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, were batized by John: all men counted John that he was a prophet: all men came to Christ, John III. 26.

BUT if we should allow, that all things in heaven and earth include all mankind; still even in this extent it is [Page 205] true, that it pleased the Father to reconcile all things; but in such a sense, as not to imply the salvation of all men. This is true in the same sense, in which God hath no plea­sure in the death of the wicked, Ezek. XXXIII. 11; or in the death of him that dieth, Chap. XVIII. 32; in the same sense in which God was unwilling to give up Eph­raim, Hos. XI. 8; and in the same sense in which Christ was unwilling to give up the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and would have gathered them together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; though they would not.— The destruction of the sinner is not in itself agreeable to God; as the punishment of a child is not in itself agreeable to a good parent. Yet as a good parent may, to secure the general good of his family, punish a disobedient child; so God, to secure the general good of his kingdom, may punish a rebellious creature. As the good parent who, to prevent that punishment to which his disobedient and apostate child must, going on in his disobedience, be sub­jected, uses all proper means to reclaim him; may be said to be pleased with the idea of his impunity; so the Deity who uses all proper means to reclaim all mankind, and to reconcile them to one another, may be said to be well plea­sed with the idea of this reconciliation, or to choose to re­concile all men to one another, and to bring them into Christ. In itself it is the object of his choice and com­placency.—In this sense it pleased the Father to recon­cile all things: it was what pleased him.

ON the whole it appears, that if Dr. C's sense of this passage be the true one, it affords no proof at all of uni­versal salvation;—That his construction of it is far less favourable to that doctrine, than that which seems to be holden forth by our translation;—That if this last con­struction be adopted, still it would be no real proof of uni­versal salvation, for two reasons; (1) That the universal term must be limited, and therefore may be so limited as to comprehend angels and believers only of all nations. (2) That even if the universal term be extended to all mankind, still the text is capable of a construction both rational and an­alogous to other passages of scripture, which yet does by no means imply universal salvation. And the sequel of the apos­le's discourse favours this last construction, implying, that it pleased the father, or was in itself pleasing to the father, to reconcile all men, on the terms of the gospel, and not absolute­ly, [Page 206] as Dr. C. supposes. The sequel is, ‘And you that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled—to present you holy and unblamable and unreprovable in his sight: if ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the gospel.’ —Will a­ny man pretend, but that this implies, that if they did not continue in the faith, they would not be presented unblam­able in the sight of God?—But this is far from the doc­trine which teaches, that all mankind, whether believers or unbelievers, whether they continue in the faith or not, shall be saved.

BEFORE I quit this part of the Doctor's book, I shall add one remark more. In his comment on this, Col. I. 20, and on Rom, V. 10, he takes great pains to make out a dou­ble reconciliation to be taught by the apostle Paul. ‘The one, he says, means that change of state all men are absolutely brought into by the death of Christ; and is opposed to the condemnation through the lapse of the one man Adam. The other is that change of state, which is connected with an actual meetness for, and pre­sent interest in, eternal life.^*’ But these two reconci­liations are really but one; for the definition which the Doctor himself gives of the latter, perfectly agrees with the former. He abundantly holds, that ‘that change of state, into which all men are brought by the death of Christ,’ ‘is connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life;’ and his whole scheme implies this: otherwise there is no certainty, that all men will be saved, in consequence of the death of Christ. The Doctor himself, in the very next sentence to that just quoted, allows, that the former reconciliation is connected in the scheme of God, with the latter, and will finally issue in it. Now, if his first kind of reconciliation be connected with that kind, which is connected with ac­tual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life: then that first kind of reconciliation is itself connected with ac­tual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life. If Jacob be connected with Isaac, and Isaac be connected with Abraham, then Jacob too is connected with Abraham.

[Page 207]LET us now attend to the Doctor's argument from Eph. I. 10: ‘That in the dispensation of the fullness of times, he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him.’ —On this text the Doctor says, ‘By means of the lapse, and what has been consequent there­upon, all things in heaven and on earth, were got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and the good plea­sure of God to reduce them from their present separa­ted, disorderly state, into one duly-subjected and well subordinated whole, may very fitly be signified by the phrase, [...], to gather together in one all things. And this I take to be the thing in­tended here.’ ^* But what is this to the purpose of the salvation of all men? It is granted on all hands, that by the lapse, all things relating to men, got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and that it is the good plea­sure of God to reduce them from their present separated, disorderly state▪ into one duly-subjected, well subordinated whole, under Christ as their head; and that this is the thing intended by the apostle in this passage. But if the Doctor supposed, that this implied the repentance and sal­vation of all men, it was but a mere supposition without proof.

SUPPOSE a rebellion be excited in the kingdom of a most wise and good prince, and this rebellion extend far and wide, so as to throw the whole kingdom into confusion. At length the king's son, at the head of his armies, sub­dues the rebels, pardons the generality, sentences the leaders, some to the gallows, others to perpetual imprison­ment: and thus restores peace, tranquility, good order and government. Is not a well subjected and duly subor­dinated state of things in that kingdom now restored and established, although those rebels who are confined in pri­son, still retain their rebellious tempers, and are not in a state of happiness?

NOR does Dr. C. pretend to point out how a well subor­dinated state of things proves the salvation of all men; unless it be in the following and other passages not more conclusive: ‘If God created all men—by Jesus Christ, we may easily collect hence, how he comes to be their common Father—and if they are his children, how fit, proper and reasonable it is, that they should be fellow [Page 208] heirs to, and joint partakers in, that happy state, which he has proposed shall take place,’ &c.^* It seems then that Eph. I. 10, proves that all men will be saved, not by any thing contained in the text itself, but because all men are the creatures of God. The argument is this: All men are the creatures of God, therefore that well sub­jected and duly subordinated state of things, which is to be effected by Jesus Christ, implies the salvation of all men. It seems then that that well subjected and duly subordinated state of things, does not of itself imply the final salvation of all men, and therefore this text is introduced with no force of argument. Dr. C. might have argued just as forcibly thus, All men are the creatures of God, therefore all men will be saved. But as to this argument it is en­tirely different from Eph. I. 10, and hath been already considered.

WE are, in the last place, to attend to Dr. C's argu­ment from 1 Tim. II. 4; ‘Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth.’ — The questions concerning the meaning of this text, are, as Dr. C. justly observes, two; (1) Who are meant by all men; whether all men individually, or generically. (2) Is there a certain connection between God's willing, that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation.

1. WHO are meant by all men, whether all men indi­vidually, or generically.—Dr. C. gives two reasons, why this expression should be understood of all men individu­ally.

(1) ‘That God's willingness that all men should be saved, is brought in as an argument to enforce the du­ty of praying for all men,’ ^† mentioned in the first and second verses. The Doctor takes for granted, that it is our duty to pray for all men individually; and then con­cludes, that all men individually are those, whom God wills should be saved. But it is by no means true, that we are to pray for all men without exception. The a­postle John expressly mentions a sin unto death, and for those who commit that sin we are not to pray; 1 John V. 16, 17. Our blessed Saviour not only did not in fact pray for the world, but openly and in the most solemn manner avowed the omission; John XVII. 9. And the prophet Jeremiah was forbidden by God, to pray for the [Page 209] Jews, for their good; Jer. XIV. 11. So that when the apostle in the first verse of the context now under consi­deration, exhorts to pray for all men, we must of necessity, as we would not set the scripture at variance with itself, understand him to mean not all individuals without excep­tion.

BESIDE, if it were our duty to pray for all individuals, it may not have been the design of the apostle in this pas­sage to inculcate this duty. The Jewish converts to chris­tianity were full of prejudices against the Gentiles, and a­bove all, against the Gentile kings, and those, under whose authority they were; and who, in their opinion, had no right to exercise authority over their nation. Therefore with the utmost propriety does the apostle give the exhor­tation contained in the first and second verses of this con­text, though he meant no more, than that Christians should pray for the Gentiles of every nation, as well as for the Jews, and especially for kings and rulers among the Gentiles.

(2) THE other reason given by Dr. C. why all men should be understood of all men individually, is the reason given, why God desires the salvation of all men, viz. that there is one God, and one mediator between God and men. "This," he says, "is a reason, which extends to all men" individually, "without limitation." Very true; and it is a reason, which extends to all men generically too: and therefore is a very good reason, why we should pray for the salvation of men of all nations; nor is there any thing in this reason, which proves, that the apostle meant, that all men individually would be saved.

AS to Dr. C's reasoning in the following passage;^* ‘God is as truly the God of one man, as of another; and there is therefore the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the salvation of every man, as of any man;’ it is by no means allowed to be conclusive. It depends on this postulate, which is a begging of the question: That God cannot give existence and other com­mon benefits to a man, and not save him. I might with the same force argue thus; God is as truly the God of one man, as of another; therefore there is the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the temporal prospe­rity of every man, as of some men. It is no more grant­ed, [Page 210] and therefore ought no more to be asserted, without proof, that salvation is connected with this circumstance, that God is a God to every man, in the sense in which it is granted, that he is a God to every man, than that tempo­ral prosperity is connected with that circumstance.

FURTHER, that all men individually are intended, Dr. C. argues from this, that the apostle says, ‘There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus.’ The Doctor says, that the man Jesus mediates between God and men universally. If by the mediation of Jesus, the Doctor meant such a mediation as will certainly issue in the salvation of all men; this again is a mere humble beg­ging of the question. But if he meant a mediation of the following description, that Christ hath made atonement suf­ficient for all men; is now offering the virtue of that a­tonement to all men; and is using a variety of means to persuade all men to accept and trust in that atonement, and to return to God, seeking his favor and eternal life, for the sake of Christ alone; it follows not at all from such a me­diation of Christ, that all individuals will be saved. It no more follows, than from the facts, that God led the Isra­elites out of Egypt by the hand of a mediator; that he gave them opportunity to enter the land of promise; and that that mediator was the mediator of that whole gene­ration individually; it followed, that that whole generation individually, would certainly enter the land of promise.

DR. C. says,^* ‘No good reason can be assigned, why the man, Christ Jesus, should mediate between God and some men only, to the exclusion of others.’ Can a good reason be assigned, why Christ leads to repentance in this life, some men only, to the exclusion or dereliction of o­thers? When such a reason shall be assigned, doubtless we shall be supplied with a reason, why Christ should effectual­ly and savingly mediate in behalf of some men only.

2. THE other question concerning the meaning of this text, which also Dr. C. notices,^† is, Whether there be a certain connection between God's willing in the sense of this text, that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation.—Dr. C. grants that men as free agents have power to oppose those means which God uses with them for their salvation; and yet holds that God has a power to [Page 211] counteract, in a moral way, this opposition of men.^* Of this and other remarkable things in Dr. C. on the subject of free agency, particular notice will be taken hereafter. —In the mean time it may be observed, that it appears from various passages of scripture, that God is frequently said to will things which do not in fact come into existence, or with respect to which his will is not efficacious: as in the following passages: Matt. XXIII. 37. ‘O Jerusa­lem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often would I, [...], have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and ye would not!’ Hos. XI, 8; ‘How shall I give thee up Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Ze­boim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together.’ Deut. V. 28, 29; ‘They have well said all that they have spoken. O that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me and keep my commandments always!’ Chap. XXXII. 28, 29; ‘For they are a nation void of counsel, neither is their any understanding in them. O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would con­sider their latter end!’ Psal. LXXXI. 13; ‘O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walk­ed in my ways!’ Isai. XLVIII. 18; ‘O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! Then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea.’ Luke XII. 47; ‘And that servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, nei­ther did according to his will,’ &c. Matt. XXI. 31; ‘Whether of them twain did the will of his Father? They say unto him, the first.’

NOW what right had Dr. C. to suppose, that the will of God in 1 Tim. II. 4, is not used in the same sense as in the passages just quoted? And if it be used in the same sense, there is no more absurdity in supposing that the will of God should be resisted in the one case, than in the other: no more absurdity in the supposition, that God should will the salvation of all men, and yet all should not be saved: than that he should will to gather together the inhabitants of [Page 212] Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and yet th [...] they should not be thus gathered.

BESIDE the texts quoted above, I may further refer to Ezek. XVIII. 32; ‘I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God.’ Yet his death did, by the words of this text, take place in fact. So that here is a most plain instance of an event which takes place con­trary, in some sense, to the pleasure or will of God.— Dr. C's reasoning is this; Whatever God wills, will come to pass. God wills the salvation of all men; there­fore this will come to pass. To apply this reasoning to the text last quoted, it will stand thus; Whatever God wills, comes to pass. But God wills the continued life of him that dieth; therefore it comes to pass, that he who dieth, does not die.

THE truth is, God wills the salvation of all men, in the same sense that he wills the immediate repentance and sanctification of all men; or as he wills them to be as per­fect, in this life, as their heavenly Father is perfect. He now commands all men every where to repent, to believe the gospel and to comply with the necessary conditions of sal­vation: and complying with those conditions, they shall be saved immediately after the present state.—So that God's willing that all men should be saved, no more proves that all men will be saved, than his willing that all men should immediately repent, proves, that all will immediately re­pent; or than his willing that all men should be perfect in this world, and comply with his law as perfectly as the angels do in heaven, proves that these things will actually take place in this world.

IT is presumed, that Dr. C. would not have denied, that it is the will of God in some sense, and that a proper sense too, that all men be brought to repentance in this state, and that they be saved immediately after this state. Yet God does not efficaciously will either of these things. —Was it not in a proper sense the will of God, that our first parents should retain their original innocence, and not by their apostacy deluge the world in sin and misery? I presume this will not be denied. It was his will, if it was his command. But if it was the will of God, that Adam should stand and not fall; the will of God in this case was not efficacious. And if it was not efficacious to prevent the entrance of sin into the world, how can we know, that [Page 213] it will be efficacious to extirpate it out of the world, or from among the human race? If God was not in any pro­per sense willing that sin and misery should enter and pre­dominate in the world; then it seems, that infinite power and wisdom were in this instance baffled. And if these divine perfections have been baffled once, they may be baffled a second time, and notwithstanding all their at­tempts, sin and misery may continue without end, in some of the human race. If on the other hand, although God commanded and in a proper sense willed, that man should stand: still in another sense he consented, or willed, that he should fall: in the same sense God may consent, that some men shall be the subjects of sin and misery to an end­less duration.

DR. C. ‘readily owns, that men, as free agents, have the power of resisting and opposing those means, which God from his desire of their salvation, may see fit to use with them.’ ^* "Yet it appears" to him ‘a gross re­flection on that being, who is infinitely perfect, to sup­pose him unable finally to counteract, and in a moral way too, the weakness, solly and obstinacy of such poor inferior creatures, as men are.^†’ How these two pro­positions, which in the Doctor's book occur within a page, can be reconciled with each other; how man can have a power to resist all the means which God uses to effect his salvation, and at the same time God can have a power to counteract, in a moral way, this obstinate resistance of man, must certainly be set down among the things hard to be understood in Dr. C.

BUT perhaps the word finally in the second quotation is emphatical, and Dr. C's meaning is, that though the pow­er of resisting in man cannot consistently with free agency be counteracted even by God, at once, or in a short time; yet it may be counteracted in a very long time. This how­ever will not agree with Dr. C's own language. He says,^‡ ‘The power in men of resisting the means, which God from desire of their salvation sees fit to use with them, ought not to be overruled, nor indeed can be in consis­tence with moral agency.’ Now to counteract or over­rule in a long time this power of resisting, is as really to overrule it, as to overrule it in a short time. But accord­ing to Dr. C. it cannot be overruled in consistency with [Page 214] moral agency. It seems then, that if the damned shall be finally brought to repentance by God counteracting their obstinacy, they are stripped of their moral agency.

OR if it be pleaded, that this counteracting is not an effectual overruling; but such an influence of means and motives, as is consistent with moral agency: still this gives no satisfaction. Is it such a counteracting, as will certain­ly and "insallibly" be followed by the repentance and sal­vation of the sinner? This is holden by Dr. C.^§ If this be so, what moral power of still resisting has the sinner at the time of his repentance? And if he have at that time no moral power of further resistance, then this power is overruled effectually, and of course, according to Dr. C's scheme, the sinner is deprived of his moral agency.

IF on the other hand it be said, that the counteracting be not such as will certainly and "infallibly" be followed by the repentance of the sinner; then there is no certainty that the sinner will ever under the most powerful means which God shall use with him, be brought to repentance and be saved. Thus the certainty of universal salvation at once comes to nothing. There is no certainty, no ground of assurance, that all will be saved; and all the truth is, that God will use means with sinners hereafter, as he does in this state, to prepare them for salvation; but as in this state, so in the future, sinners may, or may not, comply with those means.

TO Dr. C. ‘it appeared a gross reflection on that be­ing who is infinitely perfect, to suppose him unable fi­nally to counteract, and in a moral way too, the obsti­nacy of men.’ ^* But is it no reflection on God, to suppose him not to have been able in a moral way, to prevent the entrance of sin into the world? Is it no reflection on him to suppose, that he is not able in a moral way to counteract the obstinacy of men in this life? Is it no reflection to suppose, that he is not able, by the powerful means used in hell, to counteract it, in a single instance, for the space of a thousand years?^† How long must God be unable to counteract human obstinacy, before the imputation of such inability becomes a reflection on him? How long may he consistently with his perfections be unable to counteract that obstinacy? and what duration of that inability may be imputed to him, without a reflection on him, and what [Page 215] duration of it cannot be imputed to him without a reflec­tion? If it be no reflection on God, to say, that he is unable to counteract that obstinacy within a thousand years; is it a reflection to say, that he is unable to counteract it in two thousand, in ten thousand, or in an hundred thousand years? If not, why does it become a reflection to say, that he is unable finally to counteract it?—Let any be­liever in Dr. C's scheme answer these questions.

DOCTOR C's reasoning in the following passage, is worthy of notice; ^‡ ‘If God desires the salvation of all, and Christ died that this desire of God might be complied with, is it credible that a small portion of men only should be saved in event?’ —This rea­soning may be retorted thus: If God desires that all men be saved immediately after this life, and Christ died that this desire might be complied with; is it credible, that a small portion of men only should be then saved?

THE advocates for universal salvation, one and all, bring in the text now under consideration, ‘Who will have all men to be saved,’ as a proof of their doctrine. Therefore I wish to ask them, from what they believe all men are, according to these words, to be saved? From an endless punishment? Then they were by a divine con­stitution exposed to an endless punishment; then an endless punishment is just; then sin deserves an endless punish­ment; then sin is an infinite evil; which to them is an in­finitely horrible doctrine. But let them, if they can, avoid it, once allowing that all men are to be saved from an endless punishment. Or are all men, according to these words, to be saved from a temporary punishment? What temporary punishment? Not that which is to continue for ages of ages: some will suffer that. Not from a longer temporary pu­nishment; because none such is threatened; and sinners are not exposed to a punishment greater than that which is threatened in the divine law.—On the whole, accord­ing to universalism, these words mean, that all men shall be saved indeed, but shall be saved from—NOTHING.

CHAP. XII. Doctor C's arguments from Psal. VIII. 5, 6. Heb. II. 6—9. Phil. II. 9, 10, 11. 1 Cor. XV. 24—29. and Rev. V. 13; considered.

HIS argument from Psal. VIII. 5, 6, and Heb. II. 6—9, is built on those words, ‘Thou hast put all things under his feet.’ He was of the opinion, that those words mean, by the universality of the terms, that even sin itself shall be subjected to Christ; and that sin can­not be subjected to Christ in any other way, than by the de­struction of it.^* But this is to suppose what is by no means granted, and ought not to have been asserted without proof. An enemy may be overpowered, taken, imprison­ed, and put entirely under the power, or under the feet of the conqueror; and yet not be put to death or annihila­ted. When it is said Christ's enemies shall be made his footstool, Psal. CX. 1, Heb. X. 13; No one will pretend, that this means either a cordial submission to Christ, or an­nihilation. When the captains of Israel put their feet on the necks of the Canaanitish kings, Josh. X. 24, as this was no token of cordial submission or reconciliation; so it is certain, that those kings were not then annihilated. The same idea is naturally suggested by that expression, Put under his feet. Not any of these phrases is allowed to be used in scripture, to express either a cordial submis­sion, or annihilation. Sin is such an enemy, as never can in its nature be reduced to a cordial submission to Christ. Nor needs it to be annihilated, to answer the expression of being put under the feet of Christ: Nor indeed does that expression naturally suggest the idea of annihilation; but na­turally, if not necessarily implies the contrary. An enemy may be under the feet of his conqueror before he is anni­hilated, but after he is annihilated, he is neither under his feet, nor in any other place. To be under the feet there­fore implies existence: and sin may properly be said to be put under the feet of Christ, when it is so restrained and exemplarily punished, that on the whole no dishonour is done by it to Christ, or to the Deity; no evil results from [Page 217] it to the universe, or to any of Christ's real followers: but on the other hand it is made, contrary to its own ten­dency, the instrument of promoting the glory of God and of the Saviour, and of increasing the happiness of his uni­versal kingdom, and of all his true subjects.

DR. C. makes a distinction between God's government of power and his moral government: by which it is sup­posed, that he meant to show, that sin cannot be brought into subjection to Christ, but by the willing submission of the sinner. ‘^*Men by sinning oppose the government of God; not his government of power; for this ever was, and ever will, and ever must be, submitted to; but his moral government which he exercises over intel­ligent and free agents. Here is room for opposition. Men may resist that will of God, which requires their obedience,’ &c. It may be presumed, that the pas­sage now quoted was entirely out of the Doctor's mind, when he wrote the following; ‘'Tis readily acknowledg­ed, the glory of Christ's power, as head of the govern­ment of God, will be illustriously displayed, if by force only he finally subdues obstinate sinners.’ By this it ap­pears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that men do oppose the power of Christ, and the power Christ as the head of the government of God too; and that his power may be il­lustriously displayed, if it be employed to subdue by force their obstinate opposition. But to say, that power and force are employed to subdue obstinate opposition, and yet that this opposition is no opposition to that power and force, is as absurd, as to say, that a prince exerts his power and force to subdue the opposition of an army of rebels, and yet that those rebels do not at all oppose his power; or it is as absurd as to say, that opposition can be subdued where there is no opposition.

IT is by no means clear what Dr. C. meant by God's government of power, as opposed to his moral government. Can there be any government without power? It is plain by the last quotation, that Dr. C. did not imagine, that God's moral government is without either power or force, and that both power and force may be employed to sub­due sinners, who as sinners are subjects of God's moral go­vernment only.—But let the Doctor have meant by this distinction what he will, it is by no means true, that sin­ners [Page 218] are always so far restrained and subjected by God's moral government, that in the present state of things, and if all things were to remain as they now are, no dishonour would be done to God, no injury to his kingdom, to his chosen people, or to the intellectual system. There is room therefore for sin and sinners, in this sense, to be sub­jected and restrained by the government of God. When ‘the wrath of men shall praise God, and the remainder of wrath shall be restrained,’ then will sinners be brought to that subjection to Christ, of which I am speak­ing. But Dr. C. would not pretend, that in this sense, sinners ever have been, ever will be, and ever must be subject to God.—In one word, to be subjected to Christ is to be made either actively or passively subservient to his purposes and to his glory.

WHEN the enemies of a prince are overcome, and in chains and prisons are restrained from interrupting the peace and happiness of his faithful subjects; then they are put under his feet and are subjected to him, and all their "rule, authority and power, are put down or abolished." So when all the enemies of Christ, all "obstinate sinners" shall be, to use Dr. C's own words, ‘by force finally sub­dued,’ shut up in prison, bound with chains, and pre­vented from doing the least mischief to the disciples and kingdom of Christ; then those enemies will be put under the feet of Christ; then ‘an end will be put to the do­minion of sin;’ then the works of the devil will be de­stroyed; then the serpents head will be bruised, and the devil's kingdom will be overthrown, as really and effectu­ally, as the power of a rebel can be overthrown by an en­tire conquest of him and his adherents, by his perpetual imprisonment and other proper punishment according to the laws of the kingdom, though he and some of his parti­zans be permitted to live, and though they retain a rebel­lious spirit.—The verb [...] in Rom. VIII. 20, sig­nifies, as Dr. C. holds, an involuntary subjection. It may therefore mean the same in Heb. II. 8, and 1 Cor. XV. 27, &c,

DOCTOR C. insists on the words in 1 John, III. 8, ‘For this purpose was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.’ By the works of the devil, he understands all sin: by destroying he un­derstands an entire abolition. On the other hand, by de­stroying [Page 219] the works of the devil, some understand a perfect defeat of every attempt in opposition to the peace, happi­ness and glory of God's kingdom: ‘The devil will be most effectually subdued, his works will be destroyed and his head bruised in the highest sense and degree, when he shall be perfectly defeated and disappointed in all his designs, and every thing he has attempted against Christ and his interest, shall be turned against himself, to answer those ends which he constantly sought to defeat by all his attempts; and Christ shall be more honoured, and his kingdom more happy and glorious forever, than it could have been, if Satan had never opposed him, or seduced and destroyed any of mankind.’ ^*—As the text now under consideration is capable of the sense just given; until it shall be proved, that the Doctor's is the true sense, it proves nothing to his purpose.

DOCTOR C. grants,^† That by destruction the scrip­tures mean the misery and punishment of sinners. There­fore sinners are in the sense and language of scripture de­stroyed, when they are sent to the place of restraint, im­prisonment and misery prepared for them. And as sinners will be destroyed without annihilation, so may sin and the works of the devil.

THAT God has always power to subdue or to subject to himself his enemies, is one thing: actually to subject them, by restraining them from doing any damage to his king­dom or his subjects, is another. In the present state, the enemies of Christ tempt his subjects, obstruct his cause, and do many things, which if they were to remain as they now are, would be an everlasting dishonour to Christ. But they shall be made his footstool, they shall no more do any of those things.

WHEN Christ puts his enemies under his feet, he treads them down in his anger and tramples them in his fury, a­greeably to Isai. LXIII. 3. But this surely is not to bring them to a cordial reconciliation.

THEREFORE, as Psal. VIII. 5, 6; Heb. II. 6—9, are fairly capable of a construction entirely different from that on which Dr. C's whole argument from them depends; they prove nothing to his purpose: especially as they are not naturally capable of his construction.

[Page 220]WE are now to attend to Phil. II. 9, 10, 11; ‘Where­fore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.’ —The question concerning this text is the same as that concerning the text last under consideration; What are we to understand by that subjection, to which Christ in consequence of his exaltation, was to reduce mankind? Is it a free and vo­luntary subjection in all men? Or in some men a subjec­tion to which they shall be reduced by the power and au­thority of Christ, in opposition to their own inclinations? Dr. C. asserts that the former is the most plain and na­tural sense, and that the latter is evidently too low and re­strained an interpretation. But positive assertions prove nothing.

AS to the Doctor's reasons to prove that the subjection in question is a free and voluntary one, they are as fol­lows; That Christ is now endeavouring to reduce man­kind to a voluntary subjection to himself^*—That though Christ do not in this state, prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him, yet he may prevail on them in the next state.^†—That if Christ was exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, &c. he will fail of his end unless all men be reduced to a voluntary sub­jection^‡—That the genuflection in this Phil. II, 10, evi­dently means a voluntary act^‖—That a compelled sub­jection is a poor, low kind of subjection in comparison with that which is voluntary; therefore the reward of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply an universal voluntary subjection of mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection.^‖‖

1. Christ is now endeavouring to bring all men to a vo­luntary subjection to himself; and these endeavours will sooner or later be successful: therefore Phil. II. 9, &c. means a voluntary subjection.—Answer: Christ is now in no other sense endeavouring to bring all to a voluntary subjection, than in the days of his incarnation he endea­voured to gather the inhabitants of Jerusalem together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings: or tha [...] [...] [Page 221] always has endeavoured to prevent the death of him that dieth. But as those endeavours have not been efficacious; so his endeavours to bring all men to a voluntary subjec­tion, may not be. Therefore this argument proves no­thing.

2. Though Christ do not in this state prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him; yet he may pre­vail on them in the next state: therefore in the next state all will in fact be brought to a voluntary subjection: there­fore Phil. II. 9, &c. means voluntary subjection.—An­swer: It does not follow from the power of Christ to re­duce all men to a voluntary subjection, that he will in fact, reduce them to that subjection.

3. If Christ were exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, &c. he will fail of the end of his ex­altation, unless all be reduced to a voluntary subjection. —Answer: The consequence by no means follows from the antecedent. For though it be allowed that Christ was exalted for the end, that every knee should bow to him; yet it is not allowed that this bowing of the knee is a vo­luntary subjection. So that Christ may obtain the whole end of his exaltation, without effecting a voluntary subjec­tion of all men. This argument takes for granted, that the bowing of the knee mentioned in Phil. II. 10, is a voluntary submission.

4. The genuflection in Phil. II. 10, evidently means a voluntary act.—Answer: It does not evidently mean a voluntary act.—A mere contradiction is a sufficient answer to a mere assertion.

5. A compelled subjection is a poor, low kind of sub­jection in comparison with that which is voluntary. There­fore the reward of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply a voluntary subjection of all mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection. Therefore it does imply a volun­tary subjection; therefore a voluntary subjection is intend­ed in Phil. II. 10.

ANSWER: We are very improper persons to determine a priori what is the proper reward of Christ, or what re­ward is the greatest, and most honourable to Christ. Some may imagine it would be most honourable to Christ, to re­duce all men to a voluntary submission in this life; as in that case they would be saved from all future punishment; [Page 222] and thus might the grace, power and wisdom of Christ in their opinion be more glorified. Hence they might ar­gue just as forcibly as Dr. C. does in the other case, That undoubtedly Christ will in this life reduce all men to a vo­luntary subjection to himself. On the same principle it might also have been proved, before the fact shewed the contrary, that all men would be reduced to a voluntary sub­jection to Christ, in a very short time, long before the time of their ordinary departure out of life. On the same principle too it might have been proved, that God would never permit sin and misery to enter the world.—Thus it appears, that Dr. C's argument, if it prove any thing, proves too much, therefore proves nothing.

THE Doctor was not insensible, that the same words are quoted by the Apostle Paul, and applied to the general judgment; at which time Dr. C. does not pretend, that all men will be voluntarily subject to Christ.^* See Rom. XIV. 10, 11, 12. ‘For we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God.’ Therefore we have clear evidence, that these words do sometimes mean that subjection which is not voluntary. And that in Phil. II. 10, they mean a voluntary subjection and that only, we must have good evidence, before we are obliged to be­lieve it. The utmost evidence which Dr. C. gives us, re­specting that matter, I have exhibited above; and con­cerning the sufficiency of it, the reader will judge.

DOCTOR C. acknowledges,^† that the words are perti­nently applied by the Apostle, to that subjection which shall take place as to all, at the general judgment: but says that his thus applying them is no argument that they mean no­thing more. To which it may be answered, that it is an argument that they mean nothing more in Phil. II. 10, unless good reason can be given to show, that in this pas­sage they do mean more: and whether the reasons which Dr. C. gives, be good and satisfactory, is submitted as before.

WE come at length to the consideration of that passage of scripture, which Dr. C. ‘considers as decisive of itself, were there no other text in the Bible of the like im­port.’ [Page 223] It is 1 Cor. XV. 24—29; ‘Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest, that he is ex­cepted which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the son also himself be subject unto him, that put all things un­der him, that God may be all in all.’

THE Doctor prefaces his criticism on this text, with some observations on the previous context, which demand our first attention.—He quotes the 21st and 22d verses; ‘For since by man came death, by man came also the re­surrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive:’ and adds, ‘It is with me beyond all controversy evident, that the apos­tle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal re­surrection, not of the resurrection of the righteous on­ly, but of the whole race of Adam.—The same all who suffer death through Adam, shall through Christ be made alive. The comparison between the damage by Adam and the advantage by Christ, lies in this very thing.^*’ Here we have the Doctor's opinion, and his reason for it. His opinion is, that in the 22d verse the a­postle is speaking of all mankind: his reason for this opi­nion is, that otherwise there would be no proper compari­son of Adam and Christ. But the truth of this observati­on is by no means conceded. The reader may have seen my ideas of this case in the remarks made above, on Rom. V. 12, &c.—If an army under one general be all killed or taken, and afterwards the surviving part of the same army, now liberated, and under the command of another general, return every one in safety from a dangerous bat­tle; it may be justly said, As under the former general all the army was killed or taken, so under the latter ge­neral all the army returned from the battle in safety. There would in this case be a true and proper comparison. Yet the very same all would not be intended in both parts of the comparison. Dr. C's reason therefore is not sufficient [Page 224] to support his construction. There is a proper comparison of Adam and Christ, if the apostle say, and intended to say, As in Adam all his seed die, even so in Christ all his seed shall be made alive.

IT is indeed a truth granted on all hands, that all man­kind will be raised at the last day; but it does not hence follow, that the apostle in this verse is speaking of such an universal resurrection.

BESIDE, if it should be granted, that the 22d verse re­fers to the resurrection of all men, it would not follow, that all will be saved. For Dr. C. grants, that had the apostle ‘no where else opened his mind more fully and particularly upon this matter, the utmost we could have argued from his words, would have been, that as all men die in Adam, so in Christ they should all be deli­vered from this death, by a resurrection to life.^†’ How then does this text prove universal salvation? And especially how is this verse, or even the whole passage ‘of itself decisive?’ Although Dr. C. in page 197, declares his opinion, that this passage is ‘decisive of itself, was there no other text in all the Bible of the like import;’ yet he himself in page 207, gives it up as decisive, in the following words; ‘This parenthesis, comprehended with­in the 24th and 29th verses, was purposely interposed to bring us to a pause—and give us opportunity— to reflect upon—the truths—here revealed; pur­suing them in their just tendency, necessary connection and final result: In the doing of which, we should vir­tually continue the discourse, and finish it with re­spect to the wicked, as the apostle had done—with respect to the righteous.’ Thus it appears by the au­thority of Dr. C. that this portion of scripture does not contain any thing plain, or positive concerning the salva­tion of those who die in wickedness; but to investigate that which to him was so important and favourite a doctrine, we must virtually continue and finish the discourse our­selves. How then is this passage decisive of itself? Unless we virtually continue and finish the discourse ourselves with respect to the wicked, as the apostle had done with respect to the righteous, we shall never, even in Dr. C's opinion come to the same conclusion concerning the wicked, to which the apostle came concerning the righteous, that they shall be saved.

[Page 225]THE chief thing, which Dr. C. endeavours by this pas­sage to prove, with a final view to the establishment of u­niversal salvation, is, that the mediatory scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ; but a great deal will then remain to be done before the plan of God, for the accomplishment of which the mediatory kingdom is entrusted to the son, shall be completed.^* By the "fi­nishing," "the completing," &c, of "the mediatory scheme," the mediatorial kingdom, &c, Dr. C. must have meant the finishing of the work of salvation, or of delivering sinners from sin and misery: otherwise he meant nothing to the purpose of proving the salvation of all men. What if the mediatorial kingdom be not finished at Christ's second coming? Yet if after that period, Christ will never more deliver any of mankind from sin and from wrath; those who shall at that time remain in sin, and under the wrath of God, will never be saved.

THAT in the sense now explained, the mediatorial scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ, is in­deed a point in dispute, and the Doctor's proofs of this point are to be candidly weighed. They are these two—(1) This passage of scripture teaches, that an uni­versal subjection to Christ is to be effected before the finish­ing of the mediatory scheme; but this universal subjection to Christ is not effected at the second coming of Christ.— (2) The reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in the kingdom of Christ, and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for some time at least. —I think these two are all the reasons which Dr. C. has given to support the proposition in question. He has in­deed divided his long and complicated discourse on the text now before us, into five heads: but for what reason is not manifest.

I. IT was the opinion of Dr. C. that 1 Cor. XV. 24-29, teaches us, that an universal subjection to Christ is to be effected before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, which is not effected at Christ's second coming.—By sub­jection to Christ Dr. C. meant with respect to intelligent creatures, a cordial, willing subjection. By subjection to Christ, with respect to sin and death the first and second, he seems to have meant abolition. But though it is agreed [Page 226] on all hands, that there will be an universal subjection to Christ effected, before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme; yet it is not agreed that this subjection, with re­ference to all intelligent creatures, will be a willing sub­jection or submission. Concerning this particular, some ob­servations have been made in the former part of this chap­ter. That the text now under consideration does teach a willing subjection, must be shown, or the text will not ap­pear to be to the purpose.—Now to show, that all intel­ligent creatures will be cordially subjected to Christ, and will be saved, the Doctor insists, that both sin and the se­cond death will be destroyed.

1. THAT sin will be destroyed. With reference to those words, "he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet"—"All things shall be subdued unto him"—The Doc­tor asks, "Is sin an enemy?"—Supposing it is an enemy, what follows? Not what the Doctor asserts, "Then it will be destroyed," meaning abolished, extirpated by uni­versal obedience and virtue. For the apostle does not say, that all enemies shall be destroyed, abolished, extirpated or annihilated: but that all enemies shall be subdued and put under Christ's feet. So that the true and only consequence from the supposition, that sin is an enemy, is, that it shall be subdued, restrained and put under Christ's feet; which may be done in a sense true, proper, and as Dr. C. grants,^* glorious to Christ, without the abolition of it.

INDEED the apostle says, that ‘the last enemy, death, shall be destroyed;’ which by no means implies, that all other enemies shall be destroyed. It may mean, what our translators evidently understood by it, that the last in­stance which we shall have of the destruction of any enemy, will be in the destruction of death.—The words literal­ly, and according to the order of the original, are thus trans­lated; the last enemy is destroyed death; and they may mean, and may very properly be rendered thus, Death is destroyed the last enemy. Now suppose an historian, in the account of a battle, should say, The general was killed the last enemy: must we necessarily understand him to mean, that all the enemies of the whole army were kil­led, and the general was killed after all the rest? Might not his words be justly taken in this sense, that the general was the last enemy who fell, and many others might escape?

[Page 227]OR death may by the apostle be called the last enemy proverbially and with respect to this life only; as it is now sometimes called the last debt due to nature. Since the expression, ‘the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death,’ is capable of this sense; and since it does not appear, that it implies, that all other enemies will be de­stroyed: therefore it is no proof of universal salvation; as both sin and misery may still be allowed to be enemies, and yet may be in existence, after the destruction of death.

BUT it may be asserted in a true and proper sense, that sin, in the damned, is not an enemy. It does no damage to Christ, to his kingdom, or to the peace and happiness of his subjects. It is to be sure, an enemy in no other sense, than the damned themselves are enemies: and if from that expression, ‘the last enemy that is destroyed, abolished, [...], is death,’ it follow, that all Christ's enemies will be abolished or annihilated; it will also follow, that all the damned will be annihilated. So that if this ar­gument prove any thing, it proves too much; so much that it entirely overthrows universal salvation.

BUT sin in the damned, and the damned themselves, instead of doing any damage to Christ or his subjects, will be the means of increasing the glory of the former and the happiness of the latter, to eternity.

IT is observable, that the verb [...] is never in all the New Testament, applied to express the destruction of all wicked men, of the enemies of God in general, or of all sin. Therefore as neither sin itself, nor all the enemies of God, are said [...], to be abolished, we have no right, even on the supposition that sin is an enemy in eve­ry sense, to say that it will be abolished, or extirpated from the universe.—The peculiar phraseology of the passage now under consideration, is worthy of particular notice. In the 24th verse it is said, that Christ will ‘abolish, [...], all rule and all authority and power.’ But he is said to put all his enemies under his feet, [...], verse 25th, and to put all things under his feet, [...], verse 27th. Although there­fore all the rule, and all the authority and power of Christ's enemies shall be abolished, and the apostle is careful to in­form us of that; yet he is equally careful to inform us, that his enemies themselves shall be only subjected to him, [Page 228] and put under his feet; as it seems, designedly shifting the phraseology and avoiding the application of the verb [...] to them. What right then have we to apply it to them? Is not the application of words to persons or things, to which the apostle designedly did not apply them, a gross perversion of scripture?

DOCTOR C's argument that sin will be destroyed, de­pends wholly on this general proposition, That all Christ's enemies will be destroyed. Now the word destroyed in this case, doubtless means either abolition, or restraint and punishment. If it mean abolition, extirpation, annihilation; then as was before observed, all the enemies of Christ will be annihilated, and the doctrine of universal salvation falls to the ground at once. If it mean restraint, punishment, preventing from doing mischief, &c, then sin may be said to be destroyed, and yet have an endless existence in the uni­verse.

IF then these words, ‘The last enemy death shall be destroyed,’ do certainly imply, that all Christ's ene­mies shall be destroyed? and if it be also certain, that sin in the damned is, in every proper sense, an enemy, those words are equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as with the opposite. They either imply an universal annihi­lation of all Christ's enemies; and so are equally inconsist­ent with universal salvation, as with endless torment; or they are not at all inconsistent with it, and therefore are no argument against it. If they imply an universal anni­hilation of the enemies of Christ, as they are equally a­gainst Dr. C's scheme, as against the opposite; it equal­ly concerns him, as his opponents, to provide an answer to them, and it is absurd in him to object them to the doc­trine of his opponents.

THE sum of what has been said on this head of the de­struction of sin is (1) That it does not appear, that sin in the damned is properly an enemy to Christ and his king­dom; as it does no harm to that kingdom. (2) If it be determined that sin in the damned is an enemy to Christ, it will not follow, that it will be destroyed, meaning by de­struction annihilation or abolition; because it is no where said, that all Christ's enemies will be destroyed, [...]. —Or even if this were asserted concerning all Christ's enemies, and the verb [...] were applied to them all, it would not certainly determine, that they will all be an­nihilated, [Page 229] as that verb is capable of another sense, and is doubtless used in another sense, Heb. II. 14; ‘That through death he might destroy, [...], him that had the power of death, that is the devil.’ Dr. C. did not believe, that the devil will be annihilated. Therefore if that verb were applied to all Christ's enemies, and sin in the damned were allowed to be an enemy to Christ; still it might mean something else beside annihilation: nay, it must necessarily mean something else, or it would equally disprove univer­sal salvation, as endless misery.

IN Dr. C's discourse on this subject, it is implied, that when a sinner is brought to repentance and cordial recon­ciliation to Christ, he is destroyed. His words are,^* ‘Christ shall continue vested with regal power, till he has brought all enemies into subjection to him—Christ will continue head of the kingdom of God—till he has actually subdued all enemies—Is sin an enemy?— then it shall be destroyed—for Christ must destroy all enemies.’ By these several expressions it appears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that all Christ's enemies will be subjected to him, that they all will be subdued under him, and that they will all be destroyed by him. Now it is a­bundantly evident, that by subjection, subduing, &c, when applied to those, who die in impenitence, Dr. C. meant a cordial reconciliation to Christ: and he by no means held, that these enemies thus reconciled, will be destroyed by annihilation. It follows therefore, that as all Christ's enemies are to be destroyed, to be destroyed, and to be re­conciled to Christ in true repentance, are, according to Dr. C. one and the same thing. Therefore, when Paul was converted, he was destroyed; and as he will eternally be the subject of repentance, he will suffer an eternal destruc­tion. The punishment of God's enemies is, that they shall be destroyed; they shall be punished with everlasting de­struction. But what punishment are everlasting repentance and complacency in God? they are among the greatest blessings which Deity himself can confer on a creature. Endless destruction and endless salvation are throughout the scriptures opposed to each other. But according to Dr. C's scheme, they perfectly harmonize and mutually imply each other.—Now whether this scheme harmo­nize with the scriptures is submitted to the reader.

[Page 230]WHETHER this scheme harmonize with the scriptures or not,, it does not harmonize with other parts of Dr. C's book. He says,^** that by the destruction of the wicked, mentioned in 2 Thes. I. 9, and in various other texts, ‘we are very obviously led to understand misery.’ Surely convrersion from sin to holiness, and especially the everlast­ing holiness of the saints in heaven, is not misery.

DR. C. holds, that all enemies will be subdued and sub­jected to Christ, and that sin will be subjected to him, when it is abolished or annihilated. But if sin be subject­ed to Christ, when it is annihilated, then the sinner would be subjected to Christ were he annihilated. But this kind of subjection is no more a cordial subjection, than that which is effected by mere power, and which consists in re­straint and punishment.—Beside, according to Dr. C. there are two ways of subjecting to Christ intended in this passage; one is by cordial reconciliation, the other is by annihilation. This then will keep in countenance the op­ponents of Dr. C. who believe, that there are two ways of subjecting to Christ; one by cordial reconciliation, which respects the elect only; the other by restraint and punish­ment, which respects the reprobate.

ON the whole, whether this passage be sufficient to prove an universal abolition of sin, is now left to the judg­ment of the reader.

2. DOCTOR C. was of the opinion, that 1 Cor. XV. 24—29, teaches, that before the finishing of the media­torial scheme, the second death will be destroyed.—He says,^* ‘The second death may with as much propriety be called an enemy, as the first death.—Let any sense be assigned, in which the first death can be properly spoken of as an enemy, and it will at once be easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy, and much more so.’ — ‘Is^† death, the second death, an enemy? Then this ene­my shall be destroyed; for Christ must destroy all ene­mies.’ This is the Doctor's argument; in answer to which two observations may be made—That the se­cond death is not an enemy, in the sense which the Doc­tor's argument implies—That if it were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be destroy­ed, i. e. abolished.

[Page 231]THE reader hath seen the observations made above, con­cerning sin as an enemy and concerning the destruction of sin: similar observations may be made concerning the se­cond death.

(1) THE second death is not an enemy in the sense which Dr. C's argument implies and requires.—If the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to those who are the subjects of it, as it destroys their happiness and prevents their admission to a glorious immortality; this is granted. But it is not granted, that therefore it will be destroyed: and for the Doctor to take it for grant­ed, that therefore it will be destroyed, is the same thing as to take for granted that all mankind will finally be admit­ted to a glorious immortality, which is the grand subject of the present controversy.—But if the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to Christ, as it prevents the brightest display of his glory, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; in this sense it is denied to be an enemy.—This is a sense in which the first death is an enemy, and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says, it does not seem ‘easy to make it ap­pear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy.’ The first death, while it continues, prevents the brightest display of the glory of Christ, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest hap­piness of his subjects: if it should continue, it would be inconsistent with the promises of Christ, with the complete salvation of the elect, and would defeat the gospel. Now to make it appear, that in this sense the second death is an enemy, it may be presumed, is not a more easy talk, than to prove the salvation of all men.—The second death is no more an enemy to Christ, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects, than the execution of some most attro­cious and ungrateful rebels, whose lives cannot be spared consistently with the glory of their king, the prosperity of his kingdom, or the happiness of his faithful subjects; is an enemy to the king, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects.

DOCTOR C. further urges, that ‘the second death is the last enemy, and the only one that is so.’ ^* If it be no enemy, it is neither the last nor the first enemy. Therefore, "it seems" not ‘reasonable, when the apos­tle [Page 232] says, the last enemy which is death, shall be destroyed, to understand him to mean by death, the second death.’ The first death is in the sense before given, the last enemy; the last who prevents the complete display of Christ's glo­ry, the last who prevents the perfection of his kingdom, the last who has power to hurt the saints. After the de­struction of this death, they immediately receive the adop­tion of sons. Although the devils and those who have been persecutors in this world, will still be in existence af­ter the destruction of the first death, they will no more have it in their power to dishonour Christ, or to interrupt the happiness of his subjects, than if they were annihilated.

(2) IF the second death were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be destroyed, meaning abo­lished. All the enemies of God or of Christ, are no where said to be abolished [...], meaning annihilation. To be subdued, subjected, put under feet, is by no means the same as to be annihilated. If therefore the second death be ever so truly and properly an enemy, the utmost that would thence follow, is, that it would be so restrained and subjected to Christ, as to be prevented from doing mischief, and to be made an instrument of promoting the glory of God, and the happiness of his kingdom. In this sense it may be granted, that the second death will be destroyed; yet the salvation of all men would no more be implied in the concession, than it is implied in the destruction of the devil, mentioned, Heb. II. 14, that he will be annihila­ted. Nor can we hold, that all Christ's enemies will be destroyed in the sense now opposed, without holding the annihilation of the wicked, and giving up universal sal­vation.

DR. C. endeavours to make out, that if death, the last enemy, do mean temporal death, still the destruction of this death implies universal salvation. ‘Simple restoration to life, says he,^* is not the thing the scripture means by death destroyed. To be sure the apostle Paul had quite another notion of it.—What is the idea he leads us to entertain of it? Plainly not a bare return to life, but such an one as is connected with a glorious immor­tality.’ That in this chapter the apostle speaks of such a return to life, as is connected with a glorious immortality, is granted; because in this chapter he is speaking of the [Page 233] resurrection of the saints only. The Doctor indeed tells us, that it was with him ‘beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal resurrection.’ To others however it is be­yond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here of the resurrection of the righteous only. Even the Doctor acknowledges, that after the 28th verse the apos­tle ‘confines his discourse to the righteous, without say­ing any thing of the wicked.^†’ Now this affords some ground of presumption at least, that in the former part of the chapter too, he confines his discourse to the resurrec­tion of the righteous. Nor has Dr. C. given any reason, beside that which has been already examined, viz. That the comparison between the damage by Adam, and the ad­vantage by Christ, lies in this very thing, that the same all men are meant in both parts of that expression, ‘as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.’ So that Dr. C's argument,^‡ that from the resurrection of all mankind, it follows, that all will be saved, depends on principles, which are neither granted nor proved, and therefore is utterly inconclusive.

HE further says, ^* ‘This second death, strictly and pro­perly speaking, is THE LAST ENEMY, and THE ONLY ONE, that is so.’ Then surely there will not be a third, a fourth death, &c, &c, for ages of ages. Yet this is taught in other parts of his book; as in the following passage, ^** ‘They may all—be doomed—to a state of mi­sery, which shall last for an age: In which state some —may be wrought upon to submit themselves to God —Others may die in this state stupid—And those who thus died in their obstinacy may again—be put into a place of suffering for another age; in which some may be reduced—and others stand it out still. These others may. in yet another form of existence, be sent into a place of discipline for another age; and so on, till there has been torment for ages of ages.’ Here the Doctor distinctly mentions three future states of suffering, and supposes there may be others continued in succession for ages of ages, which are so many distinct deaths, as really as the first state of suffering after this life, is the se­cond death, with respect to temporal death. What right then had the doctor to say, and with what consistency could [Page 234] he say, that the second death is the last enemy, and the on­ly one that is so?

II. THE other argument of Dr. C. is, that the reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestow­ed on them in the kingdom of Christ; and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have en­joyed that reward for some time at least; and therefore will not be at an end, at the second coming of Christ, or immediately after the general judgment."^*—This argu­ment wholly depends on the supposition, that at the time at which the work of salvation shall be completed by Christ he will entirely abdicate all government of superintenden­cy over those who shall be saved by him. If otherwise; if he shall still retain a superintendency over those who shall be saved by him; if he shall still be their immediate head or ruler, and the source of their happiness; though he shall not be the supreme ruler of the universe, nor even of the redeemed; but in this respect he shall resign the kingdom to the Father: he may be said yet to have a king­dom, and to sit on his throne; and to reign, &c. Before the resignation of the mediatorial kingdom, the govern­ment of all things is in the hands of Christ, being delega­ted by the Father to this government. Or as Dr. C. ex­presses it, ‘he will be head over all; he will govern all; he will be all unto all.’ ^† Christ during that period acts as the supreme head of the universe. But when he shall have resigned the mediatorial kingdom, the Father will act as supreme head. Still Christ may, under the Father, be the head and governor of his redeemed and saved peo­ple. The Father will be supreme ruler, and Christ with his Church united to him, and dependent on him, will re­ceive the benefits of his government. This does not im­ply, but that Christ himself, in subordination to the Fa­ther, will have a government over his saints.

NOR does it imply, but that the son as one with the Fa­ther, as being in the Father, and the Father in him, shall reign after the resignation of the delegated sovereignty o­ver all things. It may be presumed, that no man will say, that the Father does not reign now while the administra­tion of universal government is in the hands of the Son. If he did not now reign, there would be no propriety in speaking as the scripture often does, ‘of him that sitteth [Page 235] on the throne, and the Lamb;’ nor any propriety in the promise, Joh. XV. 16; ‘That whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may give it you;’ nor in those words of James, Chap. I. 17; ‘Every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ But I need not add texts, to prove this.—For the same reason therefore that the Father now reigns in and with the Son; so after the resignation of the general delegated administration, the Son will still reign in and with the Father. Now the go­vernment is conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Son: then it will be conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Father. Yet as now the Father reigns in and with the Son; so then will the Son reign in and with the Father. Christ now reigns with supreme sovereignty by delegation from the Father. Af­ter the resignation of this sovereignty, he will still reign over the saints by delegation from the Father, but with dominion, which shall be subordinate to that of the Father. He will also at the same time reign in and with the Father, in the exercise of a dominion, which shall not be delegated, but which is essential to him as a divine person, and one with the Father; as the Father, by virtue of his divinity, now necessarily reigns in and with the Son.—So that al­though Christ shall immediately after the general judg­ment, resign the supreme delegated sovereignty, which he now possesses; still he will reign in these two respects, by a delegated subordinate authority over his saints; and by an undelegated, essential authority, which by virtue of his divinity, he possesses necessarily with the Father.

BUT whether the true idea of Christ's delivering up the kingdom to the Father, concerning which Divines have repeatedly differed, have been now precisely exhibited or not; still the scriptures necessitate us to believe, that in some sense Christ will reign to an absolute eternity. Heb. I. 8; ‘Unto the Son, he saith, Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever.’ Rev. XXII. 5; "They" [the saints] "shall reign forever and ever." 1 Pet. V. 4; ‘When the chief shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory that fadeth not away.’ 1 Cor. IX. 25; "We do it to obtain an incorruptible crown." Heb. XII. 28; ‘We receiving a kingdom that cannot be [Page 236] moved.’ Both these last texts are quoted by Dr. C.^* to prove that the righteous shall live and be happy without end: and they equally prove that they shall reign without end.—But the saints are to sit down with Christ on his throne and reign with him: and it is absurd to imagine, that they are to reign after the cessation of his reign; that they are to wear crowns which are incorruptible and fade not away; but that his crown is corruptible and fadeth away. Beside; the king­dom which the apostles and primitive christians received, ac­cording to Heb. XII. 28, was not the kingdom of the Father, as distinguished from that of the Son, but was the kingdom of the Son, which he himself had then lately set up. This kingdom is said to be incapable of being shaken or dissolved; and therefore is endless, as Dr. C. himself believed: other­wise it was absurd for him to quote that text to prove, that the righteous will live and be happy without end.—Dan. VII. 14. "HIS" [the Son of man's] ‘dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.’ Isai. IX. 7: ‘Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end.’ Luke I. 33; ‘He shall reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end.’ —More determinate language could not be used, to express the endless continuance of Christ's kingdom.

IT is therefore granted, that the kingdom of Christ will continue, after the general judgment, and even without end. Yet it does not thence follow, that he will not at that time have finished the mediatorial work, or rather the work of saving sinners. I make this distinction, because though Christ will at the general judgment, have finished the work of saving sinners from wrath; yet he will with­out end be the mediator between the Father and the saints, and will be the medium of all divine communications to them, whether of knowledge, of happiness or of honour. It by no means follows from the circumstance, that Christ will, after the general judgment, retain a kingly power and dominion, that he will exert that power in delivering sinners from sin and misery.

THE whole of Dr. C's discourse on this subject implies, that the kingdom of the Father, in which he shall be all in all, will not begin immediately after the general judgment. But how can this be reconciled with Matt. XIII. 40—44; ‘[Page 237]As therefore the tares are gathered and burnt in the fire; so shall it be in the end of this world. The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do ini­quity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. Then, [...], at that very time, shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their FATHER.’ This single text proves that the kingdom becomes the Father's immediately after the end of this world, and therefore entirely overthrows all Dr. C's labour to prove, that the kingdom does not become the Father's till ages of ages after the end of this world; and equally overthrows his great labour to fix a construction on 1 Cor. XV. 24, consistent with his scheme.

BESIDE; the Doctor's construction of the last passage mentioned seems to be absurd in itself. For he ‘connects the end,’ as to the time of it, ‘with Christ's delivery of the kingdom to the Father.’ ^† And by the end he in the same page explains himself to mean the ‘shutting up of the scene of providence with respect to the sons of Adam:’ which is and can be no other than the end of Christ's mediatorial kingdom. According to Dr. C. therefore, the apostle, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, gravely tells us, that the end of Christ's kingdom will be, when he shall deliver up his kingdom to the Fa­ther: or the end of it shall be at the very time, at which the end of it shall be! But what is this, but the most childish tautology! Who ever imagined, that Christ would still retain his kingdom, after he should have delivered it up? Surely that scheme must be in distress indeed, which requires such construction as this to be put on the sacred scripture!

DOCTOR C. says, ‘The reward promised, under the administration of Christ's kingdom, in this present state, in order to persuade men to become his good and faith­ful subjects, is not the final happiness God intends to bestow upon them; but the happiness of that state which intervenes between the resurrection and God's being all in all.’ ^‡ But all the promises of the Bible are gi­ven in this present state; therefore there are no promises in all the Bible of final happiness. How then does Dr. [Page 238] C. know that all men, or even any man will be finally happy? This is at once giving up his favourite doctrine, to establish which he wrote his whole book.

DOCTOR C. calls out,^* ‘What a poor, low, lean idea the common explanation of this text gives us of the final effects of Christ's reign—in comparison with that, the above interpretation lets us into!’ Such excla­mations occur in almost every argument of his book. I observe therefore concerning them once for all, that they seem better suited to work on the passions and imagination, than on the reason; that at least they are attempts to de­termine what is most for the general good and the glory of the Deity, not from revelation or from fact; but a priori, by our own imagination concerning what is best and most eligible. Now that we are in this way utterly incapable of determining what is most eligible, and most for the divine glory, in a thousand instances; every man of reflection must grant.

I HAVE now finished my remarks on Dr. C's "decisive" argument from 1 Cor. XV. 24, &c. Whether it be in­deed "decisive;" whether it be "unanswerably stong,"^‡ is submitted to the reader.

WE are next to consider the Doctor's argument from Rev. V. 13; ‘And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I, saying, Blessing and honour, and glory and power be unto him, that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for­ever and ever.’ —The main question concerning these words is, whether they ‘look forward to a completion of the scheme of God,’ and assert a fact which is not to take place, till that scheme shall be completed. This is Dr. C's idea: he says, they ‘they evidently look for­ward to the completion of that scheme;’ he says it merely; he gives no reason to prove it. The context gives no suggestions of such an idea. It may be presumed, that Dr. C. himself did not imagine, that the song of the four beasts and four and twenty elders, contained in verse 9th, &c. looked forward to the completion of the scheme of God. It was evidently sung on occasion of the Lamb's taking the book sealed with seven seals, and before any of these seals were opened. Nor is there the least hint, but that what is described in the 13th verse, took place [Page 239] on the same occasion: but the narration naturally implies that it did then take place. The 14th verse confirms the construction now given. ‘And the four beasts said, Amen. And the four and twenty elders fell down and worshipped him that liveth forever and ever.’ These words are evidently a part of the song mentioned in the 9th verse, as it was sung by the same four beasts and four and twenty elders. Whereas according to Dr. C's construction of the 13th verse, they are either a song which is to be sung after the completion of the scheme of God; or though they are a part of the song mentioned in the 9th verse, the apostle's account of that song is inter­rupted by inserting in the midst of it, a song to be sung by all mankind, after the completion of the scheme of God. —To assert therefore, that the fact of the 13th verse did not take place on the occasion of the lamb's taking the book; but is to take place ages of ages after the end of this world; and to support this assertion by no proof or rea­son, is to act an unreasonable part: especially considering the context and the difficulties attending that construction.

THESE words appear to contain a figurative representa­tion of all creatures joining in joy and praise to the Father and the lamb on occasion of Christ's taking and being about to open the seals of the book sealed with the seven seals; the book of providence toward the church. That such re­presentations are common in scripture, we have already seen, while we were considering Rom. VIII, 19, &c. Therefore no argument in favor of universal salvation is afforded by this passage.

DR. C. mentions several other texts as favouring his scheme; but says himself, that he does not ‘depend on them as proofs,’ or as "conclusive in themselves." We need not therefore spend time to remark upon them. The reader of himself will easily conceive from the answers given to those on which he does depend as conclusive, what answers would be given to the rest.

TOWARD the close of that part of his book, which con­tains the direct evidence of universal salvation, Dr. C. comes down wonderfully, seems to relent, and to be sca­red at the result of his own reasoning. He owns, that af­ter all, he may be mistaken; that concerning the state which he supposes will succeed the next state, neither the prophets, Jesus Christ, nor the apostles, have spoken in [Page 240] plain and explicit language, leaving no room for doubt.^* How these mild concessions are reconcileable with his many previous declarations, that his arguments are at least in his opinion, "evident," "decisive," "unanswerably strong;" that it is "positively affirmed" (in Rom. VIII. 19, &c.) "that they—shall be instated in immortal glory;" that "it is absolutely declared in this passage of scripture," (Rom. V. 12, &c,) "that they" (mankind universally) "shall be made righteous," &c, &c. remains to be point­ed out.

CHAP. XIII. In which Dr. C's scheme is considered, with a reference to his ideas of human liberty and moral agency.

IT is an essential part of the system of Dr. C. and of the generality of the advocates for universal salvation, that all fixed certainty of any actions of men, whether exter­nal or internal, is inconsistent with liberty and moral agen­cy in those actions.—That this is really a tenet of the Doctor may appear from the following quotations.

HE says,^* ‘Such exertions of the Deity, as shall be certainly effectual to restrain them’ [free agents] ‘from perverting their faculties, look like a moral impossibility, or a method of conducting towards free agents, which is unfit, in the reason of things, as not being suited to the nature of such kind of beings.’ He considers it as^† "inconsistent with the powers bestowed" on free agents, if ‘by any extrinsic power, their faculties are unavoidably put into exercise in one certain way only.’ He asks, ‘If motives should in all cases be set in such a strong and powerful light, as that no wrong choice could be made— how could such a method of operation consist with the proper powers of free agents? It does not appear to the human mind, a thing fit, that they’ [free agents] ‘should be thus irresistibly guided by any extrinsic pow­er, though it were even divine.’ And much more to the same effect is to be found in various parts of [Page 241] our author's writings. Indeed it is indisputably his scheme of liberty and moral agency, that if any power or cause extrinsic to the will itself, should either certainly and ef­fectually restrain free agents from perverting their facul­ties to sin and vice; or certainly and effectually influence them to exercise their faculties in repentance and virtue, or in any one way; it would be entirely inconsistent with liberty and moral agency.

THAT Doctor C. also held, that the future repen­tance and salvation of all men, is certain, and that this certainty is caused and established by a cause extrinsic to the will of all men, is evident in the following passages out of many,^* ‘God—really meant—an engagement, that mankind universally should, in due time—resemble Abra­ham in his moral temper—which is the same thing with their being blessed in Christ, or being reduced BY HIM under moral subjection to the government of God.’ ^† "They" (all men) ‘will be wrought upon sooner or la­ter in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents, to become righteous persons.’ ^‡ ‘It is abso­lutely declared in this passage of scripture, that they shall be made righteous,’ — ‘Unless they are thus made righteous’ &c.— ‘God—has absolutely and unconditionally determined—that all men, the whole race of lapsed Adam shall finally reign in life, and be prepared for that state, by being formed into righteous persons.’ ^‖ ‘It is the purpose of God—that mankind universally—shall cer­tainly and finally be saved.’ He speaks^§ of some per­sons as "infallibly selected for salvation."—In these passages it is manifest, that Dr. C. held, not only an abso­lute infallible certainty of the salvation of some, yea of all men; but that this certainty is established by God, and is the effect of his determination, and also, that all men will finally be brought to repentance, to ‘the moral tem­per of Abraham,’ ‘to a moral subjection to the go­vernment of God:’ and that they shall be ‘made righteous,’ and "formed into righteous persons:" all which expressions imply a cause extrinsic to the will of man, which cause effectually and certainly operates to lead him to repentance, or to an ‘exercise in one certain way only.’ How these things can be reconciled with [Page 242] the Doctor's avowed principles of liberty and moral agen­cy, is hard to be conceived.

NOR was it through inattention, that the Doctor held an extrinsic cause certainly operating on the minds of men. It is a doctrine essential and important in his scheme, that all the damned will be finally and certainly brought to re­pentance, and brought to repentance by the torments of hell too. Are not those torments a cause extrinsic to the human will? If that cause be certainly effectual to lead the damned to repentance, what, on the Doctor's plan, becomes of their moral agency? If that cause be not certainly ef­fectual to lead them all to repentance; it is not certain that all men will be saved—So that on the plan of the Doc­tor's book, either his grand doctrine of the final certain salvation of all men, by a disciplinary punishment, must be given up, or it must be supposed, that all who are in that way saved, are divested of their moral agency and are re­duced to mere machines.

INDEED if the salvation of all men be certain, and it be certain that all men will repent; it is by some cause or other made certain. That which is now a certain futurity, was a certain futurity from the beginning; yea from eter­nity. As it is now a certain futurity, that Christ will come to judgment, so it was certain from the beginning. There­fore if it be now a certain futurity, that all men will re­pent and be saved, it was a certain futurity from the be­ginning; and that certainty was established by some cause: and that cause must have been extrinsic to the wills of men; because both the certainty and the cause of it ex­isted before the existence of men or their wills.—So that if it be a real and certain truth, that all men will be saved, to prove which, Dr. C. wrote his whole book, it is equal­ly certain on his plan, that all men are divested of their moral agency.

SHOULD it be still pleaded, that this certainty of the sal­vation of all men, is not effected by any cause extrinsic to the wills of those, who are to be saved, but by their wills themselves; the absurdity of this supposition must be gla­ring to every man on the slightest reflection. A great part of those who are to be saved, are not as yet in existence: and it will not be pretended that their wills can have pro­duced an effect, or established a certainty, before they exist. And doubtless Dr. C. and other universalists would [Page 243] allow, that the salvation of those who are in existence, was as certain before their existence, as the salvation of those is, who are in future to come into existence. But that certainty could not, for the reason already mentioned, be the effect of any exertion of their own wills.

BESIDE; if it were not for this absurdity, a certainty established by the will of man with respect to the will it­self, as effectually binds that will, and is equally inconsist­ent with its liberty, as if that certainty were established by any other cause. Suppose the will of any man shall establish in itself a certain and unfailing bias to any particu­lar action or series of actions; it cannot be pretended that this fixed bias already established, is any more consistent with liberty and moral agency, in the man in whom the bias exists, than if it had been established by any other cause. If a man were to cut off his own leg, though he might be more blamable for the act of cutting it off, than he would be for the same act performed by another; yet the effect, as to his subsequent inability to walk, would be the very same.

THEREFORE whatever be the cause of the certainty and fixed futurity of the repentance and salvation of all men; the doctrine of the certain salvation of all men, is on Dr. C's plan of liberty, wholly inconsistent with human liber­ty, and implies that all men are, and ever have been, mere machines.

IN vain does Dr. C. endeavour to relieve this difficulty, by observing in various passages, as in one of the quota­tions above, That this repentance is brought about ‘in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents.’ For he has told us that such exertions of the Deity, as shall be certainly effectual to restrain free agents from per­verting their faculties, and such an influence of any ex­trinsic power, motives or whatever, as shall▪ unavoidably put their faculties into exercise in one way only, are not adjusted to moral agents; but are inconsistent with their proper powers. Therefore, according to the Doctor, it is not in the power of the Deity himself, certainly and in­fallibly to lead all men, in a moral way, to repentance. It is a direct contradiction. And though he observes,^* That that being who is infinitely perfect will be able, in a moral way, finally to counteract human obstinacy; he is utterly [Page 244] mistaken, if there be any truth in his idea of liberty. If God were to overcome human obstinacy, an extrinsic cause would effectually and certainly incline the human faculties to an exercise in one way; winch the Doctor says is incon­sistent with moral agency.

THE Doctor tells us,^† that to ‘represent hell to the view of sinners in such a striking light, as that they should be irresistibly stopped in their wicked pursuits, would not comport with their free agency.’ Yet he supposes, that to be in hell, and to feel its torments so strikingly as to be certainly and infallibly stopped in wicked pursuits, and thus to be brought to repentance, is to be brought to re­pentance in a moral way, entirely comporting with free agency.

UPON Dr. C's plan of liberty, there not only is not, and cannot be, any certainty, that all men will be saved; but there is not, and cannot be, any certainty that any one man will be saved. The Divine Being himself cannot make it certain, without destroying moral agency. Not any of the promises of the gospel give us assurance of the salvation of any man: nor is it in the power of God to give a promise of salvation which shall insure the event, so long as men remain moral agents. Therefore it was to no purpose that Dr. C. quoted so many promises and scrip­tural declarations to prove the salvation of all men.

ON the same hypothesis concerning liberty, even though all men were delivered from hell and admitted to heaven, there would be no certainty that they would continue there. They would be constantly liable to sin anew, and bring on themselves a second damnation. To deny this, would be, to allow that their faculties might consistently with moral agency, be certainly and fixedly inclined to "exercise themselves in one way only."

THAT the inhabitants of heaven are liable to sin and damnation, is actually allowed by honest Bishop Newton. ‘This life is indeed a state of trial,^‡ but not a trial to fix our fate forever, without any possibility of changing for better or for worse, in the world to come. For if the righteous can be but righteous, and the wicked can be but wicked, and cannot act otherwise; there is an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action. [Page 245] Their virtue ceases to be virtue, and their sin is no longer sin.’ — ‘The scripture ^*assures us, that in the next life men will be made (Luke XX. 36.) equal unto the angels; but angels, we know, have apostatized and and fallen; and why may not men, even when made equal unto the angels?—If righteousness ^† should degenerate and become wickedness; or if wickedness should amend and become righteousness; the tables would then be turned, and with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too.’ How then is it certain that all men will be finally holy and happy? It neither is, nor can possibly be certain; be­cause certainty in this case would imply that ‘the righteous can be but righteous;’ and so ‘there would be an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action.’

WHAT then becomes of the boasted evidence of the final salvation of all men? There is no certain evidence of it. There is not, nor can be, on this scheme of liber­ty, any certain evidence but that all men will finally apos­tatize, and of course be doomed to misery correspondent to their wickedness.

IT is true, the Bishop abundantly contradicts this senti­ment concerning liberty, and holds that the damned must repent, and cannot but repent, as in the following passa­ges; ‘It is impossible for any creature to live in eternal torments—If nothing else yet his own sensations and feelings must bring him one time or other, to an ac­knowledgement of his sin and of his duty.’ ^‡— ‘The fire must in time purge away and consume the dross and leave only the gold behind. No creature can be so totally depraved and abandoned, as to hold out under the most exquisite tortures, obstinate and obdurate to all eternity. —In short, if they have any sense or feeling, any rea­son or understanding, any choice or free-will, they must one time or other, sooner or later, be brought to repent­ance.’ ^‖ ‘Tortures upon tortures, tortures without end, no creatures of the least sense or feeling can sup­port; but must all be brought to submission at last: and they had much better make a virtue of necessity’ ^§— Virtue then is consistent with necessity. How is this [Page 246] idea consistent with what has been before quoted from this same author? But inconsistence and self contradiction re­lieve no difficulty.

FROM the same hypothesis it follows that God himself does not and cannot possibly govern mankind with certain­ty; that there is no foundation to pray for any event which depends on the volitions of our own minds, or those of other men; that there is no ground for confidence in the divine providence; and that it is impossible that any future free actions of men, or any events depending on those actions, should be certainly foretold, or even fore­known by God himself; because what is absolutely un­certain, cannot be certainly known, and what is certainly known is certainly fixed and determined. But it is not consistent with my design to enlarge on the endless absurd­ities of this scheme of human liberty, absurdities from which, though long since pointed out to belong to that scheme, the ablest advocates for it, have not been able, and it is presumed never will be able, to clear it.

CHAP. XIV. A reply to Dr. C's answers to the arguments in favour of endless punishment, drawn from those texts, which declare the punishment of the damned to be everlasting, forever, forever and ever, and the fire of hell to be unquenchable,

DOCTOR C. says,^* that the misery of the damned is said to be eternal or everlasting, in five texts only in all the New Testament. Whatever was intended by this ambiguous proposition, the fact doubtless is, that many of his readers have been grossly deceived by it, as they have been led to believe, that the doctrine of endless punishment is apparently taught, in no more than five texts in all the New Testament; or that no more than five texts can be produced, the words of which seem to import an endless punishment. Whereas, all that Dr. C. or any man can pretend is, that the punishment of the damned is in five [Page 247] texts only, in the New Testament, asserted to be eternal, by the use of the adjective [...], commonly translated eternal or everlasting. It cannot be pretended, but that the texts in which the punishment of the damned is in some manner or other declared to be eternal, and in words as determinate, as the adjective, [...], eternal, far exceed the number five. The five texts now referred to, do not comprise any of those, in which the damned are said to be punished forever, forever and ever; to be punished by a worm that dieth not, and a fire that is not quenched; to be confined by an impassable gulf; to be shut out from the kingdom of heaven; not to see life, &c. &c. &c.

NOW what follows from this circumstance, that the pu­nishment of the damned is in five texts only, in the New-Testament, declared to be eternal, by the application of the Greek adjective, [...]? It may still be declared to be eternal, by other words equally determinate, in above five hundred texts.

OR if there were no other texts, expressing in other words, endless punishment; are not five divine assevera­tions of any truth, sufficient to bind our faith? If five be not sufficient for this end, neither are five thousand.

BESIDES; all that Dr C. says on this head, may be justly retorted: and if his observations in page 259, 260, be of any force to show, that the doctrine of endless pu­nishment is not caught in the scriptures; just as forcibly may it be proved, that the damned will not be punished for an age. Supposing, as Dr. C. does, that the words [...], &c. do not mean an endless duration, but the duration of an age; I might say, ‘The misery of the wicked is said to be for an age, in only five texts, in all in all the New Testament: Upon which I cannot help making a pause to express my surprize to find the sacred writers so very sparing in the use of this word age, as referring to future torments. It is used but three times by Matthew; but once by Mark; but once by Paul; and not once by the other writers of the New Testa­ment. All which is very extraordinary, if it be a doc­trine of Christianity, that the wicked are to be punished for an age.—And the omissions of the sacred writers upon this head, are a strong presumptive argument, that they know nothing of this doctrine, which has been so vehemently pleaded for in these latter days,’ by Dr. [Page 248] C. and some others. Therefore, whenever it shall be proved, that notwithstanding the rare use of the word age, with a reference to the punishment of the wicked, that punishment will really last for an age; it is presumed, that it can be proved from the same topics, that it will last with­out end.—If a word, signifying an age, applied five times to future punishment, prove that punishment to con­tinue for an age; why will not a word signifying an end­less duration, applied five times to that punishment, prove it to be without end? Nothing therefore can be concluded from the number of times, [...], eternal, is applied to future punishment. The whole question, in this state of it, depends on the proper meaning of the word; not at all on the frequency of its use.

DR. C. says,^* ‘That [...] and [...] may signify a limited duration;’ and that ‘from this remark it fol­lows, that the preceding evidence in favour of univer­sal salvation, remains strong and valid.’ It is acknow­ledged, that if those words may signify, and all things con­sidered, do as probably signify, a limited, as an unlimited duration, when applied to the punishment of the wicked; nothing either for or against endless punishment, can be concluded from the use of those words. It is also, on the same suppositions, acknowledged, that by that application of those words, the evidence which Dr. C. has exhibited in favour of the salvation of all men, is not at all impaired. But it is not granted, that those words, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, do as probably signify a limited as unlimited duration. Nor is it granted that Dr. C's evidence of universal salvation is valid. Though we should grant that it remains unimpaired by the words [...] and [...], eternity and eternal; yet it may be utterly invalidated by other considerations: and that this is in fact the case, I have endeavoured already, and shall further en­deavour to show; how successfully, is submitted to the reader.

THE Doctor manifestly argues, on this head from pos­sibility to probability, and even to fact. He says,^† ‘If [...] may signify a period of time only, there is not a shadow of an interference between its connection with the punishment of wicked men, and their being finally saved:’ i. e. If it may possibly signify a period of time [Page 249] only, it is absolutely certain, that when it is applied to fu­ture punishment, it does signify a period of time only. The inconclusiveness of such argumentation must be mani­fest to every reader. In the same manner it is easy to prove, ‘that there is not the shadow of an interference between the connection of [...], eternal,’ with the life and happiness of the righteous, and their final damna­tion.

THE Doctor^* says, ‘These words, [...] and [...] are evidently more loose and general in their meaning, than the English words eternity, everlasting—If it were not so, how comes it to pass, that [...] and [...] will not always bear being translated eternity, everlasting?’ By the same argument it may be proved, that the words eternity and everlasting in our language, are more loose and gene­ral in their meaning, than the Greek [...] and [...]. We frequently say, such a man is an everlasting talker, or he talks eternally; he is eternally slandering and quarrelling with his neighbours. But according to Dr. C's sense of the Greek words [...] and [...], the English phrases just mentioned cannot be properly translated, by the use of those Greek words. The Doctor says, they properly mean the duration of an age. But when it is said, a man talks eternally, the meaning is not, that he talks for an age.—The truth is, there are idioms in all languages, which will not bear a literal translation into any other language.—The circumstance that [...], will not always bear to be rendered eternity and eternal, no more proves, that they do not properly signify the same with our words eternity and eternal, than the circumstance that they will not always bear to be rendered an age, and during an age, proves that they do not properly signify the duration of an age. It is said, Rom. XVI. 26. ‘Ac­cording to the commandment of the everlasting God, [...];’ but no man would render this, according to the commandment of the God who lives for an age.

THE Doctor thinks that ‘before eternal times is an impro­priety in English,’ and hence infers, that [...] Tit. I. 2, means a limited duration. It is presumed, that the Doctor would not have objected to the propriety of expressing a proper eternity, by saying, From eternity, from everlasting, from eternal ages. Yet in reality there [Page 250] is as great an impropriety in these expressions, as in that which the Doctor pronounces an impropriety. Understood strictly and literally they imply, that there is a point at which eternity began, and from eternity is from that point. The very use of the preposition from implies this. It im­plies, that the computation is made from something, at which eternity began. This something must strictly be some time, or some point in endless duration. So that from eternity taken strictly, is as real and as great an im­propriety as before eternity or before eternal times. The same is observable of to eternity. Yet from eternity and to eternity, are in fact used among us to express an abso­lute eternity: and how does it appear absurd, that the apostle should express the same idea by a phrase, in which no greater impropriety is naturally implied, and which may as well, and in the same way, as the phrases from eternity and to eternity, be made properly to signify an absolute e­ternity? The impropriety supposed to be in the expres­sion, Before eternal times, is, that it implies a beginning to eternity. The same is implied in the expression from eternity: and in the phrase to eternity it is implied that there is an end to eternity. But I mean not to insist on this: I do but just mention it, to show, that Dr. C's most fa­vourite proof, that [...] means a temporary duration, is not demonstrative.

THE Doctor further observes,^* ‘The particles [...] and [...], are sometimes added in the Septuagint, to the word [...]. Whereas, should we add the English words answerable to those Greek particles, to the term eter­nity, it would make evident nonsense.’ The Doctor was mistaken: we do say forevermore, forever and ever, forever and for aye. Yet no man will hence infer, that in our language the words forever do not properly mean an endless duration, or that forever and ever implies an ad­dition to eternity.

DOCTOR C. insists,^† that ‘ [...] and [...] signify no­nothing more than an age, dispensation, period of conti­nuanee, either longer or shorter;’ That ‘it is cer­tain, this is the sense in which they are commonly, if not always used in the sacred pages;’ That this is ‘the frequent and almost perpetual use of the words— in the sacred writings.’ It is by no means granted, [Page 251] nor has the Doctor made it evident, that this is almost the perpetual use of those words, especially in the New Testament. [...] reckoning the reduplications of it, as [...], to be but single instances of its use, oc­curs in the New Testament in one hundred and four in­stances; in thirty-two of which, it means a temporary du­ration.^* In seven, it may be taken in either the tempo­rary or endless sense.^† In sixty-five, including six instan­ces in which it is applied to future punishment, it plainly signifies an endless duration.^‡ How then could Dr. C. say, that it is commonly if not always used in the sacred pages, to signify an age or dispensation only? and that this is almost the perpetual use of it?

BUT if [...] used absolutely did generally signify a mere temporary duration; it would not thence follow, that it has the same restricted signification, when governed by the preposition [...]. It is never applied to future punish­ment, [Page 252] but in this construction. In the whole New Testa­ment, it is used in this construction, sixty-one times, in six of which it is applied to future punishment.^* That in all the remaining fifty-five it is used in the endless sense, I appeal to the reader. If in those fifty-five instances it be used in the endless sense; this surely is a ground of strong presumption, that in the six instances, in which it is ap­plied to future punishment, it is used in the same sense.

THE adjective [...] is still more unfavourable to Dr. C's system, than the substantive [...]. It is found in seventy-one places in the whole New Testament; sixty-six, be­side the five in which Dr. C. allows it is applied to future punishment.^† In every one of the sixty-six instances, ex­cept two, 2 Tim. I. 9; and Tit. I. 2; it may, to say the least, be understood in the endless sense. If beside the two instances just mentioned, Rom. XVI. 25. Philem. 15. Heb. VI. 2; and Jude 7, should be pleaded, which I think are all that any universalist will pretend do contain a [Page 253] limited sense; it may be observed concerning Rom. XVI. 25, that [...] may, with at least as great truth and propriety, be rendered ‘mystery kept secret during the eternal or unlimited past ages, or from eternity,’ as, ‘mystery kept secret since the world began.’ —The literal construction of Philem. 15, 16, is, ‘That thou mightest receive him eternal, no longer as a servant, but above a servant, a brother;’ or more briefly thus; ‘That thou mightest receive him as an eternal brother.’ That Onesimus was, in the endless sense, become an eternal brother to Philemon, and that as such he ought to be received by Philemon, cannot be disputed, provided they both were, as the apostle sup­posed them to be, real Christians.—The final judgment intended in Heb. VI. 2, may with the same propriety be called an endless judgment, because it refers to an endless duration to follow; as it may be called the judgment of an age or dispensation, because it refers to an age or dis­pensation which shall then have been past.—As to the fire suffered by the Sodomites, if the text mean the fire of hell, then Jude 7, is to be added to the five texts, in which it is acknowledged [...] refers to future punish­ment. If it mean the fire in which they and their city were consumed in this world, it can be called eternal, or [...], with respect to the effect only: and to say that this effect is to last for a limited time only, is the same as to say, that the Sodomites are finally to be saved; which is to beg the grand question.

AS to 2 Tim. I. 9, and Tit. I. 2, without insisting on what has been observed in page 249, 250, if it should be granted, that in these two instances [...] is used in a li­mited sense, I conceive no injury would result to the doc­trine for which I plead. It will not be disputed that the words eternal and everlasting in our language, are some­times used in a limited sense: and perhaps no book written in the English language, especially written by so many dif­ferent authors, and at such distant times, as the New Tes­tament, can be found, in which the word eternal is used seventy times, and not twice at least in the limited sense.

AS the proper meaning of the word [...] is so much insisted on by Dr. C. and as he triumphs in the idea, that it is almost perpetually, by the sacred writers, used in the limited sense, I must beg the patience of the reader, [Page 254] while I descend to the consideration of the particular texts, in which it occurs. In forty-four of the forementioned sixty-six texts, [...] is applied to the future life of the righteous, and therefore is used in the endless sense. If this be not allowed, it will follow, that there is no pro­mise, no security of an endless life to the righteous, or to any of mankind, and of course universal salvation must be given up; as shall be more particularly shown presently. In Luke XVI. 9, it is applied to the celestial habitations of the righteous: in 2 Cor. IV. 17, to the future glory of the righteous: in 2 Cor. V. 1, to their house in hea­ven: in 2 Thess. II. 16, to their consolation: in 2 Tim. II. 10, to their future glory: in Heb. V. 9. to their sal­vation: in Heb. IX. 15, to their future inheritance. That in these seven instances it is used in the endless sense, will doubtless be granted, by all those who allow this to be the sense of it in the preceding forty-four. In Feb. IX. 12, it is applied to the redemption of Christ: in Heb. XIII. 20, to the covenant of grace: in Rev. XIV. 6, to the gospel. That in these three instances, it is used in the endless sense, it is presumed, there can be no dispute among Christians. The sense is still more determinate, when it is applied to the Deity or his perfections, as it is to God himself, in Rom. XVI. 9: to the divine power, in 2 Tim. VI, 16: to the divine glory, in 1 Pet. V. 10: to the Holy Ghost, in Heb. IX. 14—In 2 Cor. IV. 18, it is applied to things unseen, as opposed to things seen: and to suppose, that in this instance it means the duration of an age or dispensation only, would destroy all opposition between things seen and things unseen; because many of the former continue for an nge or dispensation, as well as the latter. The bare writing of this passage, so as to ex­press a limited duration, sufficiently confutes that sense: thus, ‘The things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are unseen, continue for an age or dis­pensation.’ —In 2 Pet. I. 11, [...], is applied to the kingdom of Christ. I am aware, that the believers in Dr. C's book, will hold, that in this instance, it is used in the limited sense, because according to that book, the kingdom of Christ is of mere temporary continuance. To assert this however is a mere begging of a question in dis­pute. That this kingdom is not of mere temporary con­tinuance, [Page 255] some reasons have been urged to show.^* How forceable those reasons are, is submitted to the reader.— Now these texts, together with 2 Tim. I. 9. Tit. I. 2. Rom. XVI. 25. Philem. 15. Heb. VI. 2, and Jude 7, which were before considered, make up the whole sixty-six.

FOR the truth of this account of the use of [...] in the New Testament, I appeal to all who are acquainted with the Greek testament, or are capable of examining it. And if [...] be used seventy one times in the whole; sixty-six times beside those instances, in which it is allowed to be applied to future punishment: and if in all those six­ty-six instances, except two, it certainly mean, or at least may fairly and most naturally be understood to mean, an endless duration; if in all, except six, it must necessarily be understood in the endless sense; what are we hence na­turally, and may I not say, necessarily, led to conclude, concerning those instances, in which it is applied to the punishment of the wicked? Doubtless that in those instan­ces too it is used in the endless sense.

BUT what are we to think of Dr. C's saying, that this word is, in the sacred pages, most frequently and almost perpetually, used in the limited sense? With all his parade of Greek learning, and of a thorough acquaintance with the Greek testament, was he in reality so little acquainted with it, as to fall into such an egregious mistake? If it should be here pleaded in defence of Dr. C. that he suposed [...] to be used in the limited sense, in all those instances in which it is applied to the future life of the righteous; and that on this supposition, it is almost perpetually used in the limited sense: it may be observed, that Dr. C. did indeed suppose this; and he might as well have supposed, that the same word applied to future punish­ment is used in the limited sense. This latter supposition would have been no more a begging of the question than the former. But of this more presently.

DR. C.^† thinks ‘it is evident from the very texts that are brought to prove the strict eternity of hell-tor­ments, that they contain no such doctrine.’ This pro­position is supported by the following considerations—That in two texts the word everlasting is applied to the fire of hell, not to the punishment or misery of the wicked— That fire in its own nature tends to an end, and will by [Page 256] the laws of nature necessarily in time come to an end— That fire powerfully tends to bring on a dissolution of those bodies that are cast into it.

1. THAT the word everlasting is applied, in two texts, to the fire, not to the punishment, of hell; hence the Doc­tor infers, in words which he quotes with approbation from Nichol Scot, that though ‘the fire be without end, it will not follow, that every individual subject, which is cast into it, must be so too.’ ^* Did the Doctor then believe, that some of the subjects of hell-fire will not exist without end, but will be annihilated? This is to give up the salvation of all men.—Besides; that the fire of hell will be kept up without end, and therefore eternal ages after all the subjects shall be either annihilated or de­livered out of it, is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any evidence from scripture or reason. As well might the Doctor have said, The saints will indeed be received to everlasting habitations; the habitations will be strictly with­out end; but the saints will, after a while, be all either annihilated or sent to hell.—What if the word everlasting be in two instances applied to the fire of hell? In other in­stances it is applied to the punishment, to the destruction, to the smoke of the torment, and to the torment itself of the damned, Rev. XX. 10, "And" [they] ‘shall be tormented, day and night, forever and ever.’ And if, when applied to the fire, it prove that to be without end, doubtless when applied to the punishment, to the destruction, to the torment, it e­qually proves them to be without end.

2. THAT ‘fire as such naturally tends to an end, and will, in time,’ by the laws of nature, ‘actually come to an end.’ ^†—This, like many other of Dr. C's argu­ments, if it prove any thing, proves too much, and there­fore really proves nothing. It depends on this very false principle▪ that whatever, according to the laws of nature, established in this world, would, without an immediate di­vine interposition, come to an end, will certainly come to an end in the future world. Now according to this prin­ciple, all the bodies of both sinners and saints, in the fu­ture world, as well as this, will be dissolved. Nay, as their souls too are constantly upholden in existence by the agency of God, and would in their own nature immedi­ately cease to exist, were it not for that continued agency; [Page 257] it follows, according to the principle now under conside­ration, that all the souls of both sinners and saints will ac­tually come to an end, in the future world. But as this consequence will be rejected, and as it will be granted, that the souls of all men will, by the agency of God, be upholden without end; so the same agency will be suffici­ent, to continue the fire of hell without end; and that whether it be material fire or not. If it be not material fire, it does not, in its own nature, more tend to an end, than the souls of men, or the faculties of those souls. If it be material fire, still it may, as was just now observed, be perpetuated to an absolute eternity.

IF this argument from the tendency of fire to an end, be of any force, it will overthrow Dr. C's scheme, equal­ly as the contrary. For it is equally the tendency of all the fire, of which we have any experience, to come to an end, in a short time, as to come to an end at all. No fire in this world will, without new supplies of fuel, last for ages of ages, or even for one age. But with a proper supply of fuel, any fire may be kept up without end. If therefore we are to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, because the fire of which we have know­ledge, will without a new and constant supply of fuel, come to an end; we are also to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, before the expiration of one age. —Indeed God can make the fire of hell last for an age: and he can with equal ease make it last without end. Nay, he can make our common fire last without end. The same power which shall make our bodies immortal, can make our common fire strictly eternal. To this end the nature of that fire needs no greater alteration, than the nature of our bodies needs, to render them immortal.

THE Doctor informs^* us, that he ‘sees not but an age, dispensation or period, for the continuance of this fire, will very well answer the full import of the word [...], everlasting; especially, if we suppose this age to last till the fire has accomplished the end, for which it was enkindled.’ —But it is not allowed by the oppo­nents of the Doctor, that the fire will ever have accom­plished the end, for which it was enkindled: and to argue on that supposition, is to take for granted, what is as much in dispute, as any subject of this whole controversy.—He [Page 258] adds, The words concerning Sodom and Gomorrah, ‘They are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire,’ ‘import no more than this, that this fire lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven, in the destruction of those cities, for a standing exam­ple of the divine vengeance ^† to after ages.’ And the fire of hell is ‘doubtless called everlasting for the like reason.’ According to this then, the word everlasting, &c, applied to future punishment, gives no evidence, that that punishment is to last longer, than the time, during which the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were in consu­ming, or longer than one day: and the flood of Noah, as it lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven in the destruction of the old world, for a standing public ex­ample of the divine vengeance to after ages, was an eter­nal flood: The deaths of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Zimri and Cosbi, &c, &c, were for the same reasons eternal deaths.—But how is this sense of everlasting consistent with that for which Dr. C. abundant­ly contends, that it signifies the duration of an age? And if "the fire of hell be doubtless called everlasting," in the former sense, how does it appear, that it ever is, or that it can consistently be, called everlasting in the latter sense?

3. ‘Fire powerfully tends to bring on a solution of continuity, in those bodies, that are cast into it;’ there­fore the punishment of hell is not endless.^** So fire tends to bring on a dissolution of the human body in a very short time, in one hour, or in a much shorter time: therefore the punishment of hell will not last for ages of ages, or for one age, or even for one day. This argument is just as conclusive, as that now quoted from Dr. C. He who can make an human body endure the fire of hell for an age, can make it endure the same fire, for an endless succession of ages. Therefore though fire does powerfully tend to bring on a dissolution of those bodies, which are cast into it, it by no means thence follows, either that such dissolution will be effected in the wicked; or that their torment will ever come to an end.

[Page 259]The Doctor proceeds^‡ to argue, that future punish­ment will not be endless, because ‘the wicked are not said to live always in torment without dying; or that their bodies shall be immortal, or incorruptible, or indissolu­ble: but that they shall reap corruption, be destroyed, perish, undergo death.’ On this passage it may be re­marked,

1. THAT by dying, corruption, destruction, perishing, the second death, he evidently means something different from torment; as he sets those terms in opposition to torment or misery. Yet he tells us in the very same page, that ‘the second death, which wicked men shall pass through, and their being cast into the lake of fire, mean—one and the same thing.’ In other parts of his book, he declares, that everlasting destruction evidently means mise­ry, ^‖—that ‘the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, means the same thing, in the sacred dialect, with the second death,’ ^§—that the scripture expresses going through the torments ‘of hell, by being hurt of the second death.’ ^*

2. IF by death, destruction, &c, Dr. C. mean any thing different from the torment of the damned, it seems he must mean, either annihilation, or a dissolution of the connection of the souls and bodies of the damned, and their transition from the state, in which they are to be im­mediately after this life, to the next succeeding state. If he mean the former, it is indeed opposed to their endless misery, and equally opposed to their final salvation. If he mean a transition of the damned to some other state, this is no proof against endless misery; because the Doctor himself supposes, that the damned, or some of them at least, will pass through several succeeding states of misery. And let them pass through ever so many succeeding states, there is no evidence arising from this bare transition, that they will ever be saved. So that let the Doctor mean, in this case, what he will, by death, destruction, &c, those words are either not at all opposed to the endless misery of the wicked, or they are equally opposed to their endless hap­piness. Whether they do mean annihilation or not, has been already considered in Chap. V. The truth undoubt­edly is, what Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, though [Page 260] in writing this passage, he seems to have forgotten it; that the death, destruction, corruption, second death of the damned, is their misery or torment, the smoke of which shall ascend forever and ever, and in which in Rev. XX. 10, they are expressly said to be tormented forever and ever.

3. IF the express words ‘The wicked shall always live in torment, without dying,’ be not written in scripture, yet it is there written, that ‘they shall go into everlasting punishment;’ that ‘the smoke of their torment shall ascend forever and ever,’ ‘that they shall be tormented forever and ever,’ &c. In Rev. XX. 10, it is said, ‘The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false pro­phet are, and they shall be tormented day and night for­ever and ever;’ [...], in the plural number. Now so long as a person is tormented, he lives in torment without dying: and to be tormented forever and ever, is to live always in torment without dying. What right then had Dr. C. to say, that the wicked are not said to live al­ways in torment without dying? And if the very words just quoted from Dr. C. had been inserted in the sacred volume, they might have been explained away as easily as the ex­pressions just now quoted from scripture, and as the many o­ther declarations of endless torment which are there to be found. It might have been said, The wicked, while such, shall indeed always live in torment; but no sooner shall they re­pent and become righteous, than they shall be delivered from their torment, into endless bliss. The righteous are no more in the very words said to be immortal in happiness, than the wicked are said to be immortal in misery; and shall we therefore deny, that they are to be immortal in happiness? If it had been said, that the wicked shall be incorruptible or indissoluble in misery, it might have been pleaded, with as much plausibility, as attends many of Dr. C's pleas, that this meant, that while they are in misery, they are incorruptible, &c, not that they shall without end remain in misery.

THE Doctor tells us,^* that ‘the texts which join [...], everlasting, with the misery of the wicked, are ve­ry few in comparison with those, which join with it a dissolution, destruction, or death.’ That this observa­tion [Page 261] may be at all to the purpose, it ought to be shown— 1. That destruction, death, &c, as applied in scripture to the damned, are inconsistent with their endless misery, and are not at the same time, equally inconsistent with their final salvation.—2. That whenever there is a seem­ing inconsistency between several passages of scripture, and to relieve the difficulty, we are necessitated to understand some of them in a figurative sense; we are to determine, that the truth is according to the literal tenor of the grea­ter number, and that the minority, as in popular assemblies, is always to give way to the majority, and complaisantly submit to a figurative construction.

A VIEW has now been taken of Dr. C's arguments to prove, that [...] eternity and [...], eternal, do not in the sacred writings properly mean an endless duration. Con­cerning the validity of those arguments, it is the province of the reader to judge.

WE are next to attend to the Doctor's answer to the argument drawn from the circumstance, that the same word in scripture is used to express the duration of the misery of the wicked, as is used to express the duration of the hap­piness of the righteous, and that in the same text; as Mat. XXV. 46; "These shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."

THE Doctor's first answer to this argument is, that the state next succeeding the present, is not final, either with respect to the wicked or the righteous: and therefore the word eternal, even when applied to the life of the righteous, means not an endless duration.^* For this hypothesis he gives no new reasons, but refers us to what he had said be­fore, which we have already considered,^† and the sum of which is, that Christ's kingdom is not to continue without end, but is at last to be delivered up to the Father; that the reward promised in scripture to the righteous is to be bestowed upon them in this kingdom of Christ; that that reward therefore cannot be without end.—In opposi­tion to this, it has been shown, that the scriptures abun­dantly assure us, that the kingdom of Christ is to be without end; and that whatever is said in scripture concerning Christ's resignation of the kingdom to the Father, must be understood in a consistency with the endless duration of Christ's kingdom: and an attempt was made, to show in what sense of resigning the kingdom, a consistency can be preserved.

[Page 262]FURTHER; the idea now advanced by Dr. C. cannot be admitted, in a consistency either with the scriptures, nor with Dr. C. himself.

1. Not with the scriptures. For if Mat. XXV. 46, and the many other texts, which promise eternal life to the righteous, do not promise them an endless life and hap­piness, there is no promise of such happiness to the righ­teous in all the scripture: and with at least as much plau­sibility, as the Doctor evades the force of Mat. XXV. 46; may the force of any text be evaded, which can be brought to prove the endless life of the righteous. Let us consider those, which the Doctor supposes determine the future life and happiness of the righteous to be endless.^* Luke XX. 36; "Neither can they die any more." This may be eva­ded two ways; it may be said to mean no more, than that they shall not die during the continuance of Christ's king­dom; and the original happily favours this construction. [...]. Neither can they die as yet; their death will be deferred till the end of Christ's kingdom.— It may also be evaded thus, If they cannot die any more they may live in misery.—1 Cor. IX. 25; ‘But we an incorruptible crown.’ True, the crown may be incor­ruptible indeed! but the possessor may be very corrupti­ble: as Dr. C. supposes the fire of hell may be endless, though the wicked shall all be delivered out of it in time. —And when the bodies of the saints are said to be rai­sed incorruptible, to put on incorruption, immortality, &c, this may mean indeed, that they shall exist and live, but not that they shall be happy without end.— ‘We receiv­ing a kingdom, which cannot be moved,’ Heb. XII. 28; the kingdom may indeed be immovable; yet a great part of the subjects may be removed.—1 Pet. I. 4; ‘He hath begotten us—to an inheritance incorruptible, un­defiled, and that fadeth not away.’ All this may be true concerning the inheritance, yet all the heirs from a­mong men, of that inheritance, may be removed from the possession of it, and in that sense, may fade away.—Rev. II. 11; ‘He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the se­cond death.’ He may however be hurt of the third, fourth or fifth death.—Chap. XXI. 4; ‘God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death.’ Here also I avail myself of the original: [Page 263] it may be literally rendered, ‘The death shall not be as yet.’ —1 Thess. IV. 17; ‘So shall we be ever with the Lord.’ The word ever, [...], properly signifies not endlessly, but constantly, continually, uninterruptedly. In this sense it is manifestly used in every other instance in the New Testament. Nor is it in any instance, beside this 1 Thess. IV. 17, applied at all to the future state. There­fore 1 Thess. IV. 17, means no more, than that the saints, while they are in heaven, shall be uninterruptedly with Christ; as John XII. 8, means, that while we are in the world, we uninterruptedly have the poor with us.

THUS by admitting Dr. C's sense of Mat. XXV. [...]6, we erase from the scriptures every promise of endless life and happiness to the righteous, and overthrow the gospel.— Indeed Dr. C. expressly holds, that there is no promise in the gospel of endless happiness to any man; how consis­tently with himself, the reader will judge. ^§ ‘The re­ward promised, under the administration of Christ's king­dom, in the present state, in order to persuade men to become his good and faithful subjects, is not the final happiness God intends to bestow upon them; but the happiness of that state, which intervenes between the resurrection and God's being all in all.’ Yet^† he quotes the texts remarked on in the last paragraph, and says they determine, that the happiness of the righteous is to be end­less: and were not those texts supposed by Dr. C. to be promises, given under the administration of Christ's king­dom, in this present state, in order to persuade men to be­come his good and faithful subjects?

2. NOR is Dr. C's construction of Matt. XXV. 46, any more consistent with his own scheme, than it is with the Bible. His whole scheme supposes, that all men will be finally happy: and he believed that the doctrine of final happiness is taught in scripture. He professes to ground his whole book immediately on scripture. But if there be no promise in scripture, of endless happiness, as is implied in his construction of Matt. XXV. 46; and as he expressly holds, in page 222; his whole scheme falls to the ground.

THAT Dr. C. does in other parts of his book, hold that there are promises of endless happiness, does not relieve the matter. To be inconsistent and to contradict one's self, clears up no difficulty. Who is answerable for that incon­sistence, [Page 264] I need not inform the reader. It is manifest, the Doctor was driven into this inconsistence, by the pressure of the argument from Matt. XXV. 46, That the punish­ment of the wicked is of the same duration with the hap­piness of the righteous, because in the very same sentence it is said, The wicked shall go away into everlasting pu­nishment, and the righteous into everlasting life.

IF there be no promise in scripture, of final happiness, then all those texts from which the Doctor argues univer­sal salvation, are altogether impertinent, and prove no­thing to the purpose for which they are brought. A pro­mise is an assurance of the bestowment of some future good. If therefore, Rom. V. 12, &c, Chap. VIII. 19, &c, 1 Cor. XV. 24, &c, &c, be no promises of endless happiness, they afford no assurance nor evidence, that all will be finally saved.

IN the same manner in which Dr. C. restricts Matt. XXV. 46, to a limited duration, may every text from which he argues universal salvation, be restricted. If the life promised in the last quoted text, be a limited life; a life to be enjoyed before the kingdom is delivered up to the Father; what reason can be given why, in Rom. V. 18, "The free gift came upon all men to justification of life," the life promised is not the same, and of the same limited duration?—If life for a limited duration only be pro­mised in Matt. XXV. 46; then the destruction of death for a limited duration only, is of course all that is promised in the same text. And if the destruction of death for a li­mited duration only be all that is promised in Matt. XXV. 46; how does it appear, that a destruction of death for any more than a limited duration, is promised in 1 Cor. XV. 26, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death?" —And how strange is it, that Dr. C. should from Rom. VIII. 21, ‘The creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God,’ argue the certain salvation of all men, when he himself holds, that the glorious liberty promised the children of God, does not mean final salva­tion.

THE Doctor's second answer to the argument from Matt. XXV. 46, is founded on the supposition, that the next is the final state with respect to both the righteous and the^* [Page 265] wicked.^‖—If the next state of the wicked be final, the Doctor abundantly declares, that all men will not be saved.^§— ‘If the next state is a state of pu­nishment not intended for the cure of the patients them­selves,—it is impossible all men should be finally saved.’ ^* ‘If—the wicked are sent to hell as so many absolute incu­rables, the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence, both in soul and body.’ Thus this second answer of Dr. C, whol­ly depends on the supposition, that the wicked are to be annihilated; and to evade the argument from Mat. XXV. 46, to prove endless punishment, he is necessitated to adopt the scheme of annihilation, and thus to give up his whole system of universal salvation.

THE Doctor gives us three reasons to show, that even on the supposition, that the next is the final state, it will not follow, from the endless happiness of the righteous, that the wicked will suffer endless misery. The first reason is, That the word everlasting, [...], when applied to the righteous, is mostly joined with the word life: whereas this word, when applied to the wicked, is never connected with their life, but always with the fire, or with their damnation, punishment or destruction. ^†—Now this observation is wholly impertinent, on any other supposition, than that the wicked are to be annihilated: for Dr. C. himself makes this observation, supposing that the next state of the wick­ed will be final. And if it be final, the wicked must be without end in that state, which is allowed by all to be a state of misery; or they must not exist at all.—Thus still the Doctor is obliged to give up his favourite scheme of the salvation of all men.

HIS second reason is, that it perfectly falls in with our natural notions of the infinite benevolence of the Deity, that he should reward the righteous with endless life; but not that he should punish the wicked with endless misery.^‡ But our notions of the benevolence of the Deity, are to be conformed to divine revelation; and only when they are conformed to that standard, are they right. And to sup­pose, that the endless misery of those, who live and die in wickedness, is not agreeable to scriptural representations of the benevolence of the Deity, is a mere begging of the [Page 266] question.—This subject has already been largely consi­dered in Chap. VIII.

THE Doctor's last reason is, ‘That we are naturally and obviously led to interpret [...], everlasting, when joined with the happiness of the righteous, in the endless sense, from other texts which determine this to be its meaning.’ —"This" adds the Doctor, ‘I call a decisive answer to this branch of the objection, upon supposition, that the next is the final state of man.’ ^* Now all those his determinate texts have been already con­sidered in page 262, and in view of the observa­tions there made, the reader will judge, whether those texts do any more decisively, than the word [...], ever­lasting, prove the future happiness of the righteous, to be without end.

TO confirm his construction of Matt. XXV. 46, Dr. C. mentions two texts in which he supposes the word [...], everlasting, is in the same sentence used both in the limit­ed and endless sense. One is Rom. XVI. 25, 26; ‘Ac­cording to the mystery which was kept secret [ [...]] since the world began—but is now made ma­nifest—according to the commandment [ [...]] of the everlasting God.’ Concerning this text it was before observed, that [...] is perfectly ca­pable of the endless sense. The mystery was kept secret from all eternity, or during the eternal ages which prece­ded creation; or through the eternity a parte ante, as some call it. So that this text answers not the Doctor's pur­pose.—The other text produced by the Doctor, is Tit. I. 2, ‘In hope [ [...]] of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promised [ [...]] before the world began.’ On this text, it has been observed,^† that there is no absolute certainty, that it means a limited duration. But supposing that this indeed is an instance to the Doctor's purpose: when it shall be made as evident from the very nature of the case, or from any other source of evidence, that the wicked cannot be punished without end, as it is, that God could not give a promise before eternity; doubtless we shall all give up the Doctrine of endless punishment.

AT length we come to the Doctor's criticism on the ex­pression forever and ever.—He seems to suppose, that [Page 267] expression in scripture does not refer to the future punish­ment of all the wicked, but only of ‘the worshippers of the beast,’ and to a certain "rabble rout of men," as he calls them. Be this as it may, it equally overthrows the Doctor's scheme, as if it ever so confessedly referred to the punishment of all the wicked.—But on the sup­position, that forever and ever refers to the punishment of the wicked in common, the Doctor thinks that that ‘phrase is obviously capable of being understood of a limited du­ration.’ ^* His reasons are, That [...] in the singular number almost perpetually signifies an age, or a limited duration,^§—That though this word in the plural is to be met with in several places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration,^†—In like man­ner the plural of [...] is most commonly, if not always, used, in the New Testament, to point out a limited dura­tion;^‡ That [...] is applied in Rev. XI. 15, to the kingdom of Christ, and therefore must mean a li­mited duration;^‖—That [...], and [...] are always in the Septuagint, to be understood in the limited sense.^‖‖

1. A [...] in the singular number almost perpetually signi­fies a limited duration.—Answer: It is by no means granted, that [...] in the singular almost perpetually signifies a limited duration; especially when governed by the pre­position [...]. In p. 250, &c, the use of [...], in the New Testament, was traced, both in the singular and plural, and it was found, that it is much more frequently used in the endless, than in the limited sense. If the use of the singular number only be traced, in even this number it is still most frequently used in the endless sense, as the learn­ed reader may see, by examining the texts, in which it is used in the Greek Testament, all which have been already noted. Dr. C's assertion therefore, that it almost per­petually signifies a limited duration, is a mere assertion, and stands for nothing until it shall be proved: and to make a mere assertion a ground of an important consequence, is not warrantable by the laws of reasoning and philosophy.

BUT if the assertion were ever so true, the consequence, which Dr. C. thence draws, would by no means follow.— If [...] in the singular did almost perpetually signify a limi­ted duration, it would not follow, that [...] too [Page 268] signifies a limited duration. Language is not made meta­physically by philosophers, but by the vulgar, without me­taphysical reasoning: and the meaning of particular phra­ses is wholly determined by use, not by metaphysical rea­soning on the natural force of the words. If therefore use have determined [...] to mean generally or universally an endless duration, this is enough to settle the present question, let [...] mean in the singular what it may.

OR if we must reason metaphysically on this subject, it may be asserted, that [...] is no absurd or unintelligible mode of expressing an endless du­ration. If [...] signify an age, and the phrases just menti­oned be rendered, the age of the ages and the ages of the a­ges, the strictest philosophy will justify those phrases, as applied to eternity. We have no idea of eternity, but as an endless succession of ages. Therefore, that age, those ages, or that duration, which comprehends all those succes­sive ages, is a proper eternity. The Doctor undertakes to reason metaphysically on this subject,^† and observes, that ‘a duration for eternities of eternities, is a ve­ry uncouth mode of expression.’ —But it is not more uncouth, than the expression of An eternity added to an eternity, or an eternity and an eternity. Yet this is the strict analysis of forever and ever, an expression rendered abundantly proper by use.

ONE thing more ought to be observed, that [...], whe­ther in the singular or plural, governed by the preposition [...], invariably in the New Testament, signifies an endless duration. But in the phrase in question, [...] it is governed by that preposition.

2. THAT though [...], the plural, is met with in se­veral places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration.^*—Ans. 1. It does not appear, that [...] in the Septuagint always signifies a limited durati­on; nor is it used in this sense in all the instances, which Dr. C. produces to prove, that it always means a limited duration: as Psal. CXLV. 13. ‘Thy kingdom is an e­verlasting kingdom: [...].’ Dan. II. 44; ‘In the days of these kings, the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom—and it shall stand forever, [...].’ Though the Doctor endeavours to prove, [Page 269] that in these texts a limited duration must be intended, be­cause in 1 Cor. XV. 28, Christ is represented as delivering up his kingdom to the Father; yet it is at least as clearly proved by Luke I. 33, "Of his kingdom there is no end," and the other texts before quoted,^‡ that the texts now in question are to be taken in the endless sense.—Besides, how does it appear, that Psal. CXLV. 13, refers to the kingdom of Christ, as distinguished from the kingdom of the Father? And the kingdom of the Father Dr. C. al­lows, is without end.

THERE are other texts, in which [...] seems beyond dispute to be used in the endless sense; as Psal. LXXVII. 7. ‘Will the Lord cast off forever, [...]? and will he be favourable no more?’ The latter expression explains the former to mean an endless duration. The next verses further confirm this idea.—Dan. IV. 34; ‘I praised and honoured him, that liveth forever, [...].’ Chap. VI. 26; ‘For he is the living God, and stedfast forever, [...].’ If [...] be not in these instances used in the endless sense, it is in vain to search for instances, in which it is used in that sense; and it may be presumed, that it is incapable of any applicati­on, by which it shall appear to be used in that sense.

ANS. 2. But if it were ever so true, that [...] is never used in the Septuagint, but in a limited sense; it by no means thence follows, that [...] is in general, or at all, in the New Testament, used in a limited sense.

3. In like manner the plural of [...], is commonly, if not always, used in the New Testament to point out a li­mited duration.^* The answers to this argument are the very same, with those given to the preceding.—(1) The plural of [...], in the New Testament, even when it is not redoubled, is not commonly, much less always, used to point out a limited duration; but is generally used to point out an endless duration, as the reader may see by the texts in which it occurs, all which are noted in the mar­gin.^† Dr. C. quotes Luke I. 33, ‘He shall reign over [Page 270] the house of Jacob forever,’ as an instance, that [...] means a limited duration. But if he had quoted the whole verse, the latter part would have effectually confuted his sense of the former part. The words are, ‘and of his kingdom there shall be no end.’ —(2) If [...] by it­self did commonly point out a limited duration, it would not follow, that the same limited sense belongs to [...].

4. [...] is applied to the king­dom of Christ, in Rev. XI. 15; and therefore must mean a limited duration.^†—Answer: The application of that phrase to the kingdom of Christ, is no proof at all, that it is ever used in the limited sense: because it appears by Luke I. 33, Dan. VII. 14, Isai. IX. 7, and more large­ly by what was said, page 235, &c, that Christ's kingdom is without end.

5. The phrases [...], and [...] are always in the Septuagint, to be under­stood in the limited sense.^‡

Answer 1. IT is by no means a conceded point, that those phrases in the Septuagint are always to be understood in a limited sense. The contrary appears even from the in­stances quoted by Dr. C. to prove that they are used in the limited sense; as Psal. CXIX. 44, ‘So shall I keep thy law continually forever and ever.’ Psal. CXLV. 2, "I will praise thy name forever and ever." To sup­pose, that these texts contain no more, than a professed in­tention of the psalmist, to obey and to praise God, as long as he should live in this world, is as arbitrary a sup­position, as to suppose, that when the scriptures speak of God as living forever and ever, they mean no more, than that God will live as long as men live in this world.

Answer 2. BUT if those phrases in the Septuagint did ever so certainly mean a limited duration, it would not fol­low, that also the very different phrase [...] in the New Testament, means a limited duration. The truth is, this last phrase is not to be found in the Septua­gint, though it frequently occurs in the New Testament. [Page 271] Be it so therefore, that those phrases in the Septuagint, mean a limited duration; is it not very singular argumen­tation, thence to infer, that a very different phrase found in the New Testament, means a limited duration too? This is just as if Dr. C. had argued, that because the word lion in the Septuagint means a four-footed beast, therefore the word man in the New Testament means a four-footed beast too.

THE Doctor^‖ holds, that ‘it is of no significancy, that this phrase is sometimes applied to God:’ because, if from this application merely, we argue the absolute e­ternity of God; we may argue the absolute eternity of the land of Canaan, and of the successive generations of men, from the application to them, of the same or an equivalent phrase.—But the same phrase is never applied, either to the land of Canaan, or to the successive generations of men: and whatever other phrase is applied to them, is by that very application proved not to be equivalent: Because we have no other possible way to know, that any phrase is equi­valent, than by its application to those subjects alone, which are of equal duration with those, to which alone the phrase in question is applied.—The Doctor proceeds; ‘Reason assures us, that the duration of God will have no end’ —for this cause, ‘not from the force of this phrase, we interpret it when applied to God, as mean­ing a duration without end.’ But is not the eternity of God revealed in scripture, as well as known by reason? If so, where and in what words is it expressed? Let any more determinate expression of it be pointed out in the scriptures. If the divine eternity be clearly revealed in scripture, and this phrase be as determinately expressive of it, as any in the bible, doubtless it determines the future punishment of the wicked also, to be without end, because it is repeatedly applied to that.

FINALLY, the Doctor observes,^* ‘That it is as certain, that the phrase [...], ought to be con­strued for ages of ages, as that the wicked in the re­surrection state, will not be incorruptible, but shall die a second time.’ That the wicked shall reap corruption, and shall suffer the second death, is not in the least incon­sistent with their endless misery, unless corruption and the second death mean either annihilation or final happiness. If [Page 272] they mean the same with the destruction of the wicked, they mean misery, as Doctor C. himself allows; ^† and no man will say, that the declarations of scripture, that the wicked shall reap misery, or suffer misery, are a proof, that that misery is not endless. Or if corruption and the second death mean a transition from the resurrection state, to the next succeeding state, if any such there be, still that succeed­ing state, or the final state of the wicked, may be a state of misery. But if corruption and the second death mean annihilation, they overthrow the salvation of all men. Is it not therefore surprizing, that Dr. C. should over and over again, insist on an argument, as fully demonstrative of his scheme, which argument either wholly overthrows his scheme, or is utterly impertinent to the subject?

ON the whole, it is left with the reader to determine, whether the reasons offered by Dr. C. prove, that [...] means a limited duration.— That the reader may judge concerning the true force of that expression, every place, in which it is used by the in­spired writers, is noted in the margin.^§

NEXT occurs Dr. C's answer to the argument from Mark IX. 43; ‘The fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.’ —The Doctor's answer consists of these particulars— That the fire of hell may never be quenched; yet the wicked may not live in it endlessly^‡—That in hell, or while the wicked are in the next state of existence, their worm indeed shall not die, and their fire shall not be quench­ed; but their torment shall be continued during their ex­istence in that state.^‖—As to the first observation, That the fire of hell may never be quenched, though the wick­ed shall be delivered out of it in time, by either salvation or annihilation; it has been observed to be a mere wild conjecture, and probably would never have been thought of, had not the scheme been in distress, and must be re­lieved [Page 273] by some means of other. Other remarks have been made on this conjecture, to which I refer the reader. —Nor does the latter observation, especially as connect­ed with the former, appear to be more rational or perti­nent. According to these two observations, the sense of Mark IX. 43, 44, is merely this; It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into the fire which never shall be quenched, though thou mayest soon be delivered out of it; and in which while thou con­tinuest, thy torments will not cease. But where is the evidence of the truth of this proposition? How does it ap­pear to be better for a man to cut off his right hand, and be forever after maimed, than to go into a fire which is in­deed endless, and in which while he continues, he will be uneasy, and even feel torment; though he may not con­tinue in it two minutes or two seconds? Who would not choose to suffer even a very painful torment, for a few se­conds, or minutes, rather than to lose an hand or an eye? Thus the sense which Dr. C. puts on Mark IX. 43, &c. utterly frustrates the manifest design of our Lord, which was in that passage to exhibit a most powerful motive to the greatest self-denial. But according to the Doctor's construction, the passage contains no powerful motive to self-denial, or any thing else.

Besides; is it not flat and insipid, to tell a man, that he shall go into a fire which never shall be quenched, though he may be immediately taken out again?—Yet this is the sense which Dr. C. puts on those words of our Saviour! But how is it to the purpose? or how does it concern any man, if he be not in the fire of hell, that that fire shall never be quenched?—Suppose a man is to be burnt at the stake. It would be a matter of indifference to him, whether the fire, in which he should be put to death, be continued burning for five hundred years, after his death, or be extinguished immediately: and to tell him by way of threatening, that that fire shall be kept up five hundred years after his death; or to threaten a criminal who is a­bout to be executed on the gallows, that the gallows on which he shall die, shall stand a thousand years after his execution; would be perfect impertinence.

DOCTOR C. seems to insist much on this, That in Mark IX. 43, &c, a reference is had to the punishment of those whose bodies were either burnt in the valley of Hin­nom, [Page 274] or permitted to lie upon the ground, to be fed upon by worms. But it does not thence follow, as Dr. C. sup­poses, that as the fire of the valley of Hinnom went out, when the bodies were consumed, and the worm died, when the bodies were eaten up; so the fire and worm of hell shall cease. The sense may be, that as those bodies in the valley Hinnom, were consumed by fire and worms, which after a while ceased; so the wicked in hell shall be tormented by fire and worms, which shall not cease.— Indeed this is expressly asserted: and as Mr. Hopkins just­ly observes. ‘It cannot be granted, that our Saviour, by those words,’ ‘Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched,’ means a worm that dieth, ‘and a fire that is quenched very soon. For this would be to suppose, he means directly contrary to what he says.’ ^*

THE Doctor argues against endless punishment from the smallness of the number of those who are saved in the next state.^† That "only a few of mankind" should be saved finally, and "the greater part eternally perish" he thinks not reconcileable with the great mercy of the Christian dispensation; or with the glad tidings of great joy, and the divine good will celebrated at the birth of our Savi­our. This argument is built on the supposition, that it would not be dishonorary to Christ, that a minority of mankind be lost. But this would be equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as that a majority be lost. This argument, as it grants that some will not be saved, gives up the grand question, and disputes concerning the number only, which is to be saved. But this is no subject of dispute in this controversy.

IS it then no instance of great and glorious mercy, to in­stitute a scheme, by which salvation may be offered to eve­ry creature; By which whosoever will, may take the wa­ter of life freely, and no man shall perish, but in conse­quence of his own voluntary rejection of that institution? Is not the certain information of this institution indeed glad tidings of great joy to all people? Is not the institution a clear proof of the abundant good will of God to men, even though sinners, through their voluntary opposition, obtain no good by it? It certainly is, if we may believe Dr. C. for it is a maxim with him, ‘that we must not judge of [Page 275] the divine goodness, by the actual good, which we see produced, but must take into view the tenden­cy of the divine administration,’ &c, see the quotati­ons made page 139.

THE Doctor says, ‘It is incredible, that God should con­stitute his Son the Saviour of men, and the bulk of them be finally damned.’ ^* But why is it incredible? Is it not an undertaking worthy of Christ, in a way most hono­rary to God, to open a door of mercy and salvation to all mankind, though by the wicked and ungrateful rejection of Christ by the majority, a minority only will actually be saved? If it be not credible, that God should constitute his son the saviour of men, and "the bulk" of them be final­ly damned, is it credible, that Christ should be constituted the saviour, and a bare majority of mankind be saved? If not, how large must the majority be?

AS to the observation, ‘That it is a gross reflection on the saviour, whose proper business it is, to destroy the works of the devil, and rescue mankind out of his hands; to suppose, that the devil should finally get the better of Christ, by effecting the everlasting damnation of the greater part of men;’ ^† there are some particulars in it, which want explanation. First; what is meant by de­stroying the works of the devil? If this mean to abolish all sin, and all the misery consequent on sin to any of the hu­man race; it is not granted, that this is the proper business of our Saviour, nor is this the proper meaning of the ori­ginal in 1 Joh. III. 8, the text to which Dr. C. refers. The verb is [...], dissolve, take to pieces, and thus prevent the ill effect of the works of the devil. But if destroying the works of the devil mean, to defeat and to prevent the ill consequences of those works, so that no final damage shall thence arise to the interest of God's kingdom, or of the universe; it is granted, that this is the proper business of Christ. But it is not granted, but that this maybe ef­fected, without the salvation of all men.—Again, what is meant by "the devil's getting the better of Christ?" This doubtless means, that he defeats Christ more or less, as to some object of his mediatorial undertaking. But Dr. C. has no more made it appear, that the final salvation of only a part, and a small part of the human race, implies [Page 276] such a defeat; or that it was not the original intention of Christ to save a small part only; than he has made it ap­pear, that it was the intention of Christ to save all men.

Dr. C. seems not to have reflected, while he was urging this argument, that it equally militates against his own last resort, annihilation. For if an ‘end be put to the exist­ence, both in soul and body,’ of all who die impeni­tent, as the Doctor allows will be the case, if universal salvation be not true;^§ then on his principles, the devil will not be vanquished by Christ; the works of the devil will not be destroyed, but ‘he will get the better of Christ, by effecting the everlasting destruction of the greater part of those whom Christ came from heaven to save.’ ^* —So that when this objection shall be answered, so far as it lies against Dr. C's last resort, doubtless an answer will be supplied to those who believe in endless misery.

After all, it is not an article of my faith, that only a small part of the human race will be finally saved. But my faith in this particular is not built on abstract reason­ings from the divine goodness and the mission of Christ. That divine goodness which suffered all the apostate angels to perish finally, might have suffered all, or a greater part of the apostate race of men, to perish in like manner. My faith is built on several representations and prophecies of scripture, particularly concerning the millennium, and the general and long prevalence of virtue and piety in that pe­riod. Therefore in this view, the foundation of the objec­tion from the smallness of the number saved, is taken a­way.

CHAP. XV. In which are considered Dr: C's answers to the arguments drawn from what is said concerning Judas, Mark XIV. 21;—from the unpardonable sin;—and from the tenden­cy of the doctrine of universal salvation to licentiousness.

THE Doctor answers to the argument from Mark XIV. 21, ‘Wo to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. Good were it for that man, if he had never been born;’ That perhaps it may be a pro­verbial expression, not literally true;^*—That if the li­teral sense were the most reasonable, considering this text by itself; yet considering the many passages brought by Dr. C. which declare the final salvation of all men, we must not understand this passage in the literal sense, as in that case we shall set the scripture at variance with itself;^† —That the real meaning of this passage may be propheti­cal, as if our Lord had said, ‘The man who shall betray me shall practically declare, that in his apprehension, it were good had he not been brought into being.’ ^‡— As to the first of these answers, it is a mere unsupported conjecture, and therefore is to be set down for nothing.— As to the second, it is not allowed that the Doctor has produced any one passage of scripture which declares the final salvation of all men: but this in view of what has been said on the passages produced by the Doctor, is sub­mitted to the reader.—As the Doctor contends that this passage cannot be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself; so it is contend­ed by the advocates for endless punishment, that it can be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself in the least degree; and that the ge­neral tenor of the scripture points out the literal sense to be the true sense.—As to Dr. C's third answer, it is, in the first place, a mere unsupported conjecture: second­ly, it may be noticed, that it is manifest, that the text [Page 278] pronounces the proper wo or curse, which should fall on the man who should betray our Lord. ‘The Son of Man indeed goeth, as it is written of him; but wo to that man, by whom the Son of Man is betrayed: good were it for that man, if he had never been born.’ — But according to Dr. C. all the curse which this text de­nounces, is such a weariness of life and impatience of ex­istence, as has sometimes befallen even true saints; as in the instance of Job. And is it credible that this was the proper and full curse of betraying the Lord of life and glory? Or that if this be but a very small part of the curse of that abominable wickedness, our Lord would have mentioned it in such a manner, as naturally to communicate the idea, that it is the proper and full curse of it?

AFTER all the ingenuity of Dr. C. and other univer­salists, in torturing this passage to a meaning consistent with their scheme; it remains a plain, direct, and positive testi­mony against it.

NEXT follows Dr. C's▪ answer to the argument from what is said concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, Matt. XII. 32; ‘Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.’ Mark III. 29; ‘He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath ne­ver forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damna­tion.’ Luke XII. 10, ‘Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven.’

THE Doctor's first answer to this argument is taken from Grotius—he tells us that Grotius ‘looks upon the words as an Hebraism intended to signify, not so much the par­donableness of some sins, and the unpardonableness of others; as the greater difficulty of obtaining pardon for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, than for any other blasphemy.’ It is wholy immaterial whether the words were intended to signify not so much the unpardonableness of some sins. If they were intended to signify at all the unpardonableness of some sins, that is sufficient for the pre­sent purpose. So that both Dr. C. and his favourite author Grotius, virtually concede all that is demanded in this in­stance.

CONCERNING this construction of Grotius, which is but a mere conjecture, brought in to help over an argument [Page 279] which crouds hardly on Dr. C's scheme; the Doctor says, ‘Whoever goes about to prove, that there is no truth in it, will perhaps find, that he has undertaken a very hard task.’ The same may be said of any man, who should undertake to prove, that there are not a dozen pri­mary planets belonging to the solar system; or who should undertake to disprove any one of a thousand other conjec­tures.

AFTER all, the Doctor does not depend much on this construction of Grotius, and proceeds to give us his own sense of the passages above quoted; which is, That it is indeed true, that ‘the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is absolutely unpardonable;’ ^* that the divine law shall take its course on those who are guilty of that blasphemy, and no intervening pardon will prevent the full execution of the threatened penalty on them; and forgiveness strict­ly and literally speaking will not be granted to them;^† yet that they will be finally saved, and admitted to heaven, after they shall have suffered the full penalty threatened in the law.—On this idea of Dr. C. some remarks have been already made in Chapter I. Nor can it escape the notice of the attentive reader, that it implies, that some men are saved, not only without forgiveness; without the exercise of divine grace, in the scriptural sense of grace; without any aid from the merit or atonement of Christ; and therefore not ‘on the account, on the ground, or for the reason of Christ's obedience and death;’ ^‡ but wholly on the footing of the law. But the idea that any of mankind are to be saved without forgiveness, is wholly foreign from the scriptures, nor can it be pointed out to be contained in any part of scripture. Every chapter of the gospel is inconsistent with it; to refer to parti­cular texts would be endless and needless.—And what divine grace is there exercised in the salvation of one, who has by suffering the whole threatened penalty of the law, made full satisfaction for his own sins?— There is manifestly no more grace in saving such a man, than there is in saving one who has ne­ver sinned. Nor is he who has suffered the full penalty of the law, saved on account of the death or obedience of Christ. On the account of Christ's obedience or death he is released from no punishment: and to suppose, that God [Page 280] has not goodness enough, without an atonement, to take a creature to heaven, who in the eye of the law is per­fectly innocent, is a supposition utterly inconsistent with the divine goodness.—Lastly, he who is saved in conse­quence of suffering the whole penalty threatened in the law, is saved on the foot of law. Yet it is utterly and a­bundantly denied by Dr. C. to be possible, that any sinner should be saved on the foot of law.

IN view of these observations, the reader will judge, whether Dr. C's construction of the passages, which speak of the sin against the Holy Ghost, be admissible: and whether those passages and the argument deduced from them, do not remain in full force against universal salvation.

WE come at length to Dr. C's answer to the last argu­ment of those in the opposite scheme which he considers, which is drawn from the tendency of Dr. C's system to li­centiousness and vice.

ON this the Doctor observes; ‘To disprove the final salvation of all men, it must be plainly shown, that this doctrine does naturally and directly tend to encourage men in vitious practice.^*’ In this it is implicitly grant­ed, that if the doctrine of universal salvation do indeed na­turally and directly tend to encourage men to persist in vi­tious practice, it is not true. On this we may join issue with him. That that doctrine does comparatively encou­rage men to persist in vice, will appear perhaps from the following considerations.—It will not be denied that if there were no punishment threatened to the wicked, it would naturally and directly encourage them to persist in vice. This is granted by Dr. C.— ‘Had we attempted^† to introduce mankind universally into a state of happi­ness, upon their leaving this world, whatever their mo­ral conduct had been in it, the argument,’ that Dr. C's scheme tends to licentiousness, ‘would then have held strong.’ But if the argument holds strong, provided there be no future punishment, it holds proportionably, if that punishment be very small and far less than is deserved by the wicked; and especially if at the same time that pu­nishment be suited to their personal good. Now that the future punishment of the wicked is, on Dr. C's scheme, very small, compared with what it is on the opposite scheme, is manifest at first sight; it is infinitely less. And that it [Page 281] is far less, nay infinitely less than the wicked deserve, is manifest by what Doctor C. as well as his oponents, al­lows, that all who are saved, are saved by unbounded grace. Therefore, if the damned be finally saved, as they are saved by unbounded grace, they are punished infinitely less than they deserve. Also, that according to Dr. C's scheme, the wicked are to be punished with a disciplinary punishment suited to the good of the subjects, is manifest from his whole book.—Now that this punishment of the wicked does comparatively encourage vice, may be illus­trated by an example. It is generally agreed that murder deserves death. But suppose a law should be made, by which no murderer should be punished with death, or with any other punishment to be continued longer, than till he should repent. Would not such a law as this, compared with the law as it now stands, naturally and directly tend to encourage murder? I need not make the applica­tion.

DOCTOR C. seems to think that his doctrine of future punishment even more powerfully restrains from sin, than the doctrine of endless punishment, because his doctrine is more credible to men in general. But are we to inquire what is most likely or most easy to be believed by men in general, to determine what is most likely to restrain from sin or to be the real truth of God? Then certainly the doctrines of the divine character and mission of Christ, of his miracles, resurrection, ascension, &c, &c, in short the doctrines of christianity in general, are not so likely to re­strain men from sin as the doctrines of mere natural reli­gion. Or if it be said that those doctrines are capable of such proof, as will satisfy and convince all candid inquirers; the same is said of the doctrine of endless punishment.

I HAVE now finished my reply to Dr. C's answers to the arguments in favour of endless punishment; and having before considered his arguments in favour of his own scheme; I shall proceed to some arguments in confirmation of the doctrine of endless punishment.

CHAP. XVI. In which some direct arguments are proposed, to prove the endless punishment of the wicked.

I AM sensible that my book is already protracted to a considerable length. Therefore to relieve the patience of the reader, I shall endeavour to crowd this part into as narrow a compass as possible. Indeed if the answers already given to the objections to endless punishment, be sufficient, the less needs be said in way of direct proof.

THE various texts always brought in discourses on this subject, come now with full force; in proof of this doctrine. As Matt. XVIII. 8; ‘It is better for thee to enter in­to life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire.’ Chap. XXV. 41; ‘Then shall he say unto them on the left hand, de­part from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.’ Verse 46th; ‘These shall go away into everlasthing punishment.’ 2 Thess. I. 9; ‘Who shall be punished with everlasting destruc­tion from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power.’ 2 Pet. II. 17; ‘To whom the mist of darkness is reserved forever.’ Jude 13: ‘To whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever.’ Rev. XIV. 10, 11; ‘And he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb: And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever.’ Chap. XIX. 3; ‘And again they said, Alleluia: and her smoke rose up forever and ever.’ Chap. XX. 10; ‘And the devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and [they] shall be tormented day and night, for­ever and ever.’

THE evations of these texts have been particularly con­sidered, and it is hoped, sufficiently answered.

[Page 283]THE Greek words used in these texts are, [...] and [...]. From an inspection of every text in which these words and phrases are used in the New Testament, it has been found, with regard to the first, that quite contrary to Dr. C's account, it ‘is almost perpetually,’ i. e. in the proportion of 66 to 2, used in the endless sense; setting aside the places in which it is applied to the punishment of the wicked. With regard to the other two phrases, it has been found, that they are without exception used in the endless sense. Nor does the Greek language furnish any word more determinately expressive of endless duration: and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says to the contrary, it appears that they do as properly and determinately express an endless duration, as the English words eternal and eternity. If therefore these words be explained away to mean a mere temporary dura­tion, it is impossible that any words be used, which would not suffer the same treatment from the same hands.

THE texts concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost still remain a clear proof of endless punishment. They are Matt. XII. 31, 32; ‘The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall not be forgiven unto men—Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world neither in the world to come.’ Mark III. 29: ‘He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness; but is in danger of eternal damnation.’ Luke XII. 10; Unto him that ‘blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be for­given.’

SO long as the gospel rejects every idea of the salva­tion of men without forgiveness, so long will these texts confute the salvation of all men.

TO these I may add the following texts; 1 John V. 16; ‘If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life, for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death. I do not say that he shall pray for it.’ So that we are not to pray for those who sin unto death. Why not? evi­dently because their salvation is impossible. If their sal­vation be possible, I presume no sufficient reason can be gi­ven, why we should not pray for it. If it should be said that we are not to pray that the salvation of such should be immediately accomplished, but that it may be accomplish­ed [Page 284] in due time: the answer is at hand, that we are not at liberty to pray that any man may be saved out of due time; and in this sense we are prohibited to pray for the salvation of any man.

Heb. VI. 4—6; ‘For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come; if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance.’ Since it is impossible to renew such to repentance, it is according to Dr. C. as well as the scipture, impossible that they be saved. Of like import is Chapter X. 26, 27; ‘For if we sin wil­fully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery in­dignation, which shall devour the adversaries.’ If there remain no more or no longer a sacrifice for sins; then neither will the man whose character is here described, be able by his own sufferings to make a sacrifice of satisfaction for his sins, nor will the sacrifice of Christ be longer of any avail to him. And if the judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries, remain for him; he must suffer them without a possibility of escape, either by the sacrifice of Christ or in consequence of his own suffer­ings.

THE wo denounced by Christ on Judas also seems to re­main a demonstrative proof of endless punishment. Matt. XXVI. 24, and Mark XIV. 21; ‘Wo to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed: good were it for that man if he had never been born.’ Let Judas suffer a temporary misery of ever so great duration, it must be in­finitely less than an endless duration of happiness. So that if Judas were finally to enjoy endless happiness, he would be an infinite gainer by his existence, let the duration of his previous misery be what it might. It was therefore on the supposition of his final salvation, not only good, but infinitely good, that he had been born: which is a direct contradiction to the declaration of our Saviour.

IN connection with this passage, I shall introduce the following; Luke VI. 24; ‘Wo unto you that are rich: for ye have received your consolation.’ On the suppo­sition of the salvation of all men, the rich do by no means [Page 285] receive in this life their consolation; but they are to re­ceive infinitely the greatest consolation in the future life.— Psalm XVII. 14; ‘From men of the world, who have their portion in this life;’ Plainly implying that they are to have no portion in the future life. Luke XVI. 25; ‘Son, remember that thou in thy life time receivedst thy good things,’ If all shall be saved, the rich and the men of the world in no other sense have their portion in this life, than the rest of men.—They have some good things in this world, but infinitely the greatest part of their happiness is to be enjoyed in the world to come, and what they enjoy here, is nothing in comparison with what they are to enjoy hereafter. More than this, cannot be said of any man.

MARK IX. 43—49; ‘If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee, to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into hell, into the fire that ne­ver shall be quenched: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet, to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God, with one eye, than having two eyes, to be cast into hell-fire: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.’ Mat. III. 12; ‘Whose fan is in his hand, and he shall thoroughly purge his floor; and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.’

John III. 36. ‘He that believeth on the Son, hath e­verlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.’ If all are to be saved, then all will see life and enjoy it. Should it be said, that the meaning of this text is barely, that he that believeth not, shall not see life, while he remains an unbeliever; it may be observed, that this sense of the text will admit the idea, that unbelievers may all become believers, at death, or at some future time in life; as it holds forth no more, than that a man while an unbeliever, shall not be admitted to life; and says nothing but that all unbelievers may become believers in this life, or at death; and therefore may attain to life and salvation in heaven, [Page 286] just as soon as those, who are now believers. But can any man bring himself to believe, that this text was not de­signed to teach us, but that unbelievers will attain to the life and salvation of heaven as soon as believers? If that be the true sense, this text teaches us no more concerning un­believers, than is true concerning all saints in this state of imperfection. It may on this supposition be said, with e­qual truth, and in the same sense, that no imperfect saint shall see life, as that no unbeliever shall see life. It is plain, that this text was meant to exhibit some privilege on the believer above the unbeliever. But if the con­struction, now under consideration, be the true one, and u­niversal salvation be true, what is that privilege? The be­liever has the promise of an endless life; so has the unbe­liever in common with all mankind. The believer cannot perhaps be admitted to the inheritance of that promise, within less than ten or twenty years. Within the same time the unbeliever may be admitted to the same inheri­tance, whether he be admitted to it at death, or in con­sequence of some discipline in hell, by which he is led to repentance and faith. The believer has the present com­fort of anticipating his future happiness; there is on the plan of universal salvation, abundant foundation for the same anticipation to the unbeliever. It is true, the unbe­liever is not yet prepared for the possession of heavenly hap­piness: neither is the believer during his present imper­fection.

LUKE XVI. 26; ‘And besides all this, between us and you, there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence.’ Mat. VI. 15; ‘If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.’ Chap. XXIII. 34, 35; ‘And his Lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due un­to him. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.’ Heb. VI. 8; ‘That which beareth thorns and briers, is rejected, and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned.’ —How is the end of any man to be burned, if all shall finally be saved? Luke XIV. 24; ‘For I say unto you, that none of those men who were bidden, shall taste of my supper.’ Chap. XIII. [Page 287] 25, 26, 27; ‘When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open un­to us, and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not, whence you are—I tell you, I know you not, whence you are, depart from me, all ye workers of ini­quity.’ —Rev. XXII. 11, 12; ‘He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righte­ous still: and he that is holy, let him be holy still. And behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give to every man according as his work shall be.’ — These last words, with verse 10th, determine this text to refer to the general judgment.—The words of the tenth verse are, ‘Seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand.’ But a period ages of ages after the general judgment cannot be said to come quickly, and to be at hand.

IF to these texts it should be said, that they mean no more, than that they cannot as yet be saved, though they will be saved in proper time; I answer, (1) That there is no appearance in the texts themselves, of such a sense; (2) That if that were the true sense, they would mean no more, than might be said, mutatis mutandis, of all real saints, who are not about to die immediately; (3) That that sense would imply, either that the future punishment of the wicked is a mere wholesome discipline, or that those who die impenitent do not deserve endless punishment. If they pass the great gulf as soon as they repent, their pu­nishment is a mere wholesome discipline: but that it is not a mere wholesome discipline, I have endeavoured to show in Chap. II. and III. If they suffer the full punishment, which they deserve, and then come out, they are saved without forgiveness, and they never deserved an endless punishment, the contrary to which I have endeavoured to prove in Chap. VI. To those chapters I beg leave to refer the reader, for what might be said here in further answer to this objection.—If because the damned cannot pass the great gulf at present, it be said, There is a great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass thence to heaven, then because a saint is not about to die at present, it might with propriety be said, there is a great gulf fixed between him and hea­ven, so that he cannot pass it.—If those scriptural ex­pressions, [Page 288] "Let him be unjust still,"— ‘Great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass,’ —"Depart, I know you not," "Shall not taste of my supper,"—&c, mean no more, than that they shall remain unjust &c, for the present: why may not the following expressions— ‘Shall not come into condemnation,’ —"Are justified from all things,"— ‘Is passed from death unto life’ —&c, mean no more, than that the saints shall not come into condemnation for the pre­sent, or for some time to come?—Are for the present justified from all things? Is for the present passed from death unto life?

REV. III. 5; ‘He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment; and I will not blot out his name out of the book of life; but I will confess his name before my Father, and before his angels.’ Does not this text plainly hold forth, that the names of all who do not overcome, shall be blotted out of the book of life; and that Christ will not confess their names before the Father, and before his angels? Chap. XIII, 8; ‘And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him, whose names are written in the book of life of the Lamb, slain from the foundation of the world.’ Chap. XXI. 27; ‘And there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie; but they which are written in the Lamb's book of life.’ Psal. LXIX. 27, 28; ‘Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not come into thy righteous­ness. Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous.’ Now will any be sa­ved, whose names are not written in the Lamb's book of life? In the quotation from Rev. XXI. 27, it is expressly asserted, that no one who defileth, worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, shall enter the heavenly city; but they on­ly who are written in the Lamb's book of life. There­fore not only will not all men be saved, as some will be excluded the heavenly city; but some men have not their names written in the Lamb's book of life, and this is a fur­ther evidence, that all will not be saved.

IT is said, that ‘sinners shall not stand in the congrega­tion of the righteous,’ (Psal. 1. 5,) and the represen­tation in the parables of our Lord, is, that after the ge­neral judgment, the tares and chaff shall be no more mixed with the wheat; nor the good with the bad fish. Nor [Page 289] is there any intimation that the tares or the chaff will be­come wheat, or the bad putrid fish become good; but the contrary is plainly implied in the parables themselves. Be­sides, the judgment is said to be eternal, [...],^* doubtless with respect to the endless and unchangeable consequences. But if the judgment be strictly eternal with respect to its consequences, the punishment of the damned will be with­out end.

THE parables before mentioned further prove endless punishment, as they represent, that the bad fish are cast away; that the tares and chaff are burnt up. How is this consistent with their final salvation and happiness?

ALL those texts which declare, that those who die im­penitent shall perish, shall be cast away, shall be rejected, be destroyed be lost, &c, disprove universal salvation; as 1 Cor. I. 18; ‘The preaching of the cross is to them that perish, foolishness; but unto us who are saved, it is the power of God.’ 2 Pet. II. 12; ‘These shall utterly perish in their own corruption.’ Luke IX. 25; ‘For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lost himself, or be cast away.’ Heb. VI. 8; "That which beareth thorns and briers is rejected." 2 Cor. IV. 3; ‘If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost.’ 2 Thess. I. 8; ‘Who shall be punish­ed with everlasting destruction.’ Mat. XXI. 44; ‘On whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder;’ &c. &c. Now with what truth or propriety can those be said to perish, be cast away, be rejected, destroyed, lost; who are all finally saved? Perdition, destruction, &c, are ever in scripture set in opposition to salvation, and are repre­sented to be inconsistent with it. But where is the oppo­sition, if those who perish, be saved too?

ACTS III. 21; ‘Whom the heaven must receive un­til the times of the restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began.’ This text which has been often quoted as a proof of universal salvation, is, I conceive, a clear proof of the contrary. The heaven will receive and retain our Lord Jesus Christ, until the time shall come [Page 290] when all those things shall be restored, which God, by the mouths of all his prophets, hath declared, [...], shall be restored, which things doubtless comprehend all things which ever shall be restored. But our Lord Jesus Christ will not be retained in heaven longer than till the general judgment. After that time therefore, nothing will be restored. But it is granted on all hands, that after that time the wicked will be in misery. Therefore they shall never be recovered from that misery.

2 Pet. III. 9; ‘The Lord is not slack concerning his promise (as some men count slackness) but is long suf­fering to us ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance,’ also hath been quoted to prove universal salvation. It is however im­pertinent to that purpose, but upon the supposition that the word perish means endless perdition. Not even any universalist will say, that God is unwilling that those who die in impenitence should perish for a while, until they are brought to repentance, or until they shall have suffered the just punishment of their sins. But if perish in this passage mean endless perdition, it doubtless means the same in all those texts in which the wicked are positively said to perish, as 1. Cor. I. 18, ‘For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness.’

LUKE XX. 35; ‘But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage.’ — Some then will not obtain that world, and therefore will not be saved. John XVII. 9; ‘I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for they are thine.’ But are any to be saved, for whom our Lord does not make intercession? Heb. XII. 15; ‘Looking diligently lest any man fail of the grace of God.’ Some then will fail of that grace.

PROV. I. 26—29; ‘I also will laugh at your at your calamity and mock when your fear cometh: when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind: when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not an­swer; they shall seek me early but they shall not find me.’ If God shall never answer their calls, and they shall never find God; they will never be saved.—Psalm CXII. 10; "The desire of the wicked shall perish."— [Page 291] Job VIII. 13, 14; ‘The hypocrite's hope shall pe­rish: whose hope shall be cut off, and whose trust shall be a spider's web.’ —Prov. X. 28; ‘The expec­tation of the wicked shall perish.’ Chap. XI. 7; ‘When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish, and the hope of unjust men perisheth.’ Chap. XXIX. 1; ‘He that being often reproved hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without remedy.’ If all men are to be saved, the hope and expectation of the wicked are not cut off, do not perish, in any other sense than that in which the hope and expectation of the righteous pe­rish and are cut off. The wicked may expect to obtain hap­piness before they are sufficiently disciplined, or before a certain period. So may the righteous expect to make their transition to heaven before it will come. This expectation of both will be cut off. But the expectation which the wicked have of final happiness, will never according to Dr. C's system, be cut off. Nor, according to the same system, can it be true, that the wicked shall be destroyed without remedy.—Prov. XIV. 32; ‘the wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death.’ But according to the universal system, the wicked hath in his death as real and well founded a hope as the hope of the righteous. Job XI. 20, "Their hope shall be as the giving up of the ghost." Chap. XXVII. 8; ‘For what is the hope of the hypo­crite, though he hath gained, when God taketh away his soul?’ Phil. III. 19; ‘Whose end is destruc­tion.’ But if all men be finally saved, the end of no man is destruction. Heb. VI. 8; ‘Whose end is to be burn­ed.’ —2 Cor. XI. 15; ‘Whose end is according to their works.’ This is said of the ministers of satan, whose works are certainly evil. Their end therefore being according to their works must be evil too. How then can they be FINALLY saved? If it should be said, that these texts do not mean the last end of the wicked; this would be a mere assertion. As well might we say that Rom. VI. 22; ‘Ye have your fruit unto holiness and the end everlast­ing life,’ means not the last end of the righteous.

THE scripture represents, that at the end of this world, all things are brought to an end. 1 Pet. IV. 7; "But the end of all things is at hand," [...]. Surely this can­not mean that the end of all things will take place after [Page 292] ages of ages to succeed the end of this world. A period so distant is never in scripture said to be at hand; nor could this with propriety, be said of such a period.— Matt. XXIV. 14; ‘This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness to all nations: and then, [...], shall the end come.’ —But when all things shall have come to their end, they will be in a fixed, unalterable state, and after that, there can be no passing from hell to heaven. Nor can there be any such passing after Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to the Fa­ther. To this Dr. C. agrees. But I have already gi­ven my reasons for believing that Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the Father, at the end of this world; and for believing that 1 Cor. XV. 24, must be understood in this sense, and that according to Dr. C's explanation of that text, it cannot be reconciled with Matt. XIII. 40—44, and other passages of scripture.

2 COR. VI. 2; ‘Behold now is the accepted time; be­hold, now is the day of salvation.’ Heb. III. 7; ‘To day, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.’ But if the greater part of mankind shall be saved out of hell, and the means of repentance in hell be far more con­ducive to the end, than the best means used in this world, it should have been said, In the future state is the accept­ed time, and in hell will be the day of salvation.

2 COR. IV. 18; ‘The things which are seen, are tem­poral; but the things which are not seen, are eternal.’ If all the unseen things of the future state be eternal, the punishment of the damned is eternal. And eternal, [...], must in this instance mean endless: otherwise all oppositi­on with regard to duration, between things seen, and things unseen, is lost; and things unseen are as truly tem­poral, as things seen. At most, on Dr. C's principle of construing scripture; the apostle's proposition comes to this merely: The things which are seen, are temporal, but the things which are unseen are to continue for an age. But this is true of many present seen things.

THE promises of the gospel in general afford an argu­ment in favour of endless punishment.—Rev. II. 11; ‘He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death.’ I presume all will grant, that this promise im­plies, that all who do not overcome, shall be hurt of the second death. Therefore, by parity of reason, when it is [Page 293] promised in the same chapter, ‘To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God;’ it implies, that those who do not overcome, shall never eat of that tree, ‘To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone,’ &c, im­plies, that he who does not overcome, shall never eat of the hidden manna, shall never receive the white stone, &c. ‘Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out,’ implies, that he who does not overcome, shall not be a pillar in the temple of God. ‘To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me in my throne,’ implies, that he who does not overcome, shall never sit in Christ's throne. These I give as a specimen only of the promises, and of the argument which they afford.

FINALLY, if all shall be saved, why have not Christ, and those who wrote by the inspiration of his spirit, been explicit in the matter? Why have they used so many ex­pressions, which in the literal sense assert the contrary doc­trine? and which apparently obscure the truth, and blind the eyes of the readers of the New Testament? Especial­ly, if, as Dr. C. holds, universal salvation be so glorious to God, the main subject of the gospel, and so necessary to vindicate the divine character? Surely this of all doctrines ought to have been indisputably revealed, and not one hint given to the contrary.

BESIDES these arguments drawn directly from texts of scripture; I shall mention one drawn from the general na­ture of the gospel, or from the particular doctrines of the gospel, acknowledged by both parties in this controversy.

THOSE who die impenitent, deserve an endless punish­ment. The proof of this hath been attempted, Chap. VI. It is briefly this: If endless punishment be not the penal­ty threatened in the law, and justly deserved by the sin­ner, no account can possibly be given of the penalty of the law. It cannot be the temporary punishment actually suf­fered by the damned; because then the damned would be finally saved without forgiveness. It cannot be a tempo­rary punishment of less duration, than that which is suffer­ed by the damned; because on that supposition the damned are punished more than they deserve. It cannot be a tem­porary punishment of longer duration, than that which the scriptures abundantly declare the damned shall suffer; be­cause [Page 294] no such punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture. It must therefore be an endless pu­nishment.—This endless punishment threatened in the law, is not annihilation, but endless misery; because if it were annihilation, none of the damned, on supposition, that they are all finally saved, will be punished with the curse of the law, or which is the same, with the punishment which they justly deserve. But both the scripture and Dr. C. abundantly hold, that the damned will be punished as much as they deserve, as hath been shewn Chap. III. But for the full proof, that the punishment of hell is not annihilation, I must refer the reader to Chap. V. If the endless punishment threatened in the law, and deserved by the wicked, be not annihilation, it must be endless misery. But whatever punishment the wicked justly deserve, they will in fact suffer; they will have to pay the uttermost farthing; they will suffer judgment without mercy. There­fore, they will suffer not only an endless punishment, but an endless misery, or torment.

THE same argument is a little differently stated thus; Dr. C. allows, that if the punishment of the damned be in­tended to satisfy justice, it is impossible all men should be saved.^* He also holds abundantly, that it is impossible, that any sinner should be justified or saved "on the foot of law." He equally holds this with regard to the moral law, "the law written in men's hearts," "the natural law," and the law is promulged in the gospel by Jesus "Christ and his apostles," as with regard to the "Mo­saic law." ^† He also holds, that ‘the law of God is a perfect rule of righteousness.’ Now if it be impossi­ble that any sinner be justified by the moral law, then eve­ry sinner is, and must be condemned by it, and from that condemnation he can never be acquitted by the law. If it be impossible that any sinner be saved by that law, then on the footing of that law, every sinner must be excluded from salvation.

BUT this law is "a perfect rule of righteousness." Therefore perfect righteousness, or strict distributive jus­tice, will never admit of the salvation of any sinner; but every sinner justly deserves to be endlessly excluded from salvation.—Again, a punishment which satisfies justice, is one which is perfectly just and deserved by the sinner. [Page 295] Therefore, if the sinner be punished according to his de­sert, he can never be saved.—But both the scriptures and Dr. C. hold, that the damned will be punished according to their deserts; therefore they will never be saved.