SECTION I. Mr Hume's favourite argument is founded on a false hypothesis.

IT is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any re­ligious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believ'd on the testimony of others. "A miracle," says he, ‘supported by any human testimony, is [Page 6]more properly a subject of derision than of argu­ment ^*."Again, in the conclusion of his essay, Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony, for any kind of miracle, can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof ^†.’ Here he concludes against all miracles. "Any kind of miracle" are his express words. He seems however immediately sensible, that in asserting this, he hath gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning. ‘We may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any system of religion.’ In the note on this passage, he has these words. ‘I beg the limitation here made, may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be prov'd, so as to be the foun­dation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind, of to admit of proof from human testimo­ny.’

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs; but will directly lead to this general conclusion: ‘That it is impossible for God Almigh­ty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence that it can be reasonably believed in after-ages, or even in the same age, by any person who hath [Page 7]not been an eye-witness of the miracles, by which it is supported.’

Now, by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topics have been employ'd for the purpose by this subtle dispu­tant. Among these there is one principal argument which he is at great pains to set off to the best ad­vantage. Here indeed he claims a particular con­cern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, 'tis not my business to con­trovert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay be­fore the reader, the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

'Experience,' says he, ‘is our only guide in rea­soning concerning matters of fact ^*. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; an uniform experience amounts to a proof ^†. Proba­bility always supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to o­verbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportion'd to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experi­ments, and deduct the l [...]sser number from the greater, in order to know [...] he exact force of the supe­rior evidence ^‡. Our belief or assurance of any fact [Page 8]from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses ^*. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two op­posite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another de­gree of assurance, against the fact which they en­deavour to establish; from which contradiction, there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority ^†. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if besides the testimony consider'd apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof a­gainst proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in propor­tion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a viola­tion of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from ex­perience can possibly be imagined ^‡. And if so, 'tis an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never [Page 9]be render'd credible, even in the lowest degree.’ This, in my apprehension, is the sum of the argument on which my ingenious opponent rests the strength of his cause.

IN answer to this I propose first to prove, that the whole is built upon a false hypothesis. That the evi­dence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony hath a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced. For this purpose let it be remark'd, that the earliest assent, whch is given to testimony by children, and which is previous to all experience, is in fact the most unlimited, that by a gra­dual experience of manknd, it is gradually contracted, and reduced to narrower bounds. To say, therefore, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experi­ence, is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly youth, which is unexperienced, is credulous; age, on the contrary, is distrustful. Exactly the reverse would be the case were this author's doctrine just.

Perhaps it will be said. If experience is allowed to be the only measure of a logical or reasonable faith in testimony, the question, Whether the influence of testi­mony on belief, be original or deriv [...]d? if 'tis not mere­ly verbal, is at least of no importance in the present controversy. But I maintain it is of the greatest im­portance. The difference between us is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may [Page 10]appear. According to his philosophy, the presump­tion is against the testimony or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presump­tion in its favour, till properly supported by experi­ence. According to the explication given, there is the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till properly refuted by experience.

If it be objected by the author, that such a faith in testimony as is prior to experience, must be unrea­sonable and unphilosophical, because unaccountable; I should reply, that there are, and must be, in hu­man nature, some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which therefore 'tis vain to attempt a rational account. I should desire the objector to give a reasonable account of his faith in this principle, that similar causes al­ways produce similar effects; or in this, that the course of nature will be the same to-morrow, that it was ye­sterday, and is to day: principles, which he himself acknowledges, are neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises; and which nevertheless we are under a necessity of presupposing, in all our rea­sonings from experience ^*. I should desire him to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest in­formations of his memory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt, or to explain. Indeed me­mory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Certain it is that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by experience. Yet should any person hence infer, that memory derives all its evidence from experi­ence, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. For, [Page 11]on the contrary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but the general maxims or conclusions, we have form'd, from the comparison of particular facts remember'd. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience. When there­fore we say that memory, which gives birth to expe­rience, may nevertheless in some instances be correct­ed by experience, no more is imply'd, but that the in­ferences form'd from the most lively and perspicuous reports of memory, sometimes serve to rectify the mis­takes which arise from such reports of this faculty, as are most languid and confus'd. Thus memory, in these instances, may be said to correct itself. The case is often much the same with experience and testimo­ny, as will appear more clearly in the second section, where I shall consider the ambiguity of the word ex­perience, as us'd by this author.

BUT how, says Mr Hume, is testimony then to be refuted? Principally in one or other of these two ways: first, and most directly, by contradictory te­stimony; that is, when an equal or greater number of witnesses, equally or more credible, attest the con­trary: secondly, by such evidence either of the inca­pacity or baseness of the witnesses, as is sufficient to discredit them. What, rejoins my antagonist, can­not then testimony be confuted by the extraordinary nature of the fact attested? Has this consideration no weight at all? That this consideration hath no weight at all, 'twas never my intention to main­tain; that by itself it can very rarely, if ever, amount to a refutation against ample and unexceptiona­ble [Page 12]testimony, I hope to make extremely plain. Who hath ever denied, that the uncommonness of an e­vent related, is a presumption against its reality; and that chiefly on account of the tendency, which, expe­rience teacheth us, and this author hath observed, some people have to sacrifice truth to the love of wonder ^*? The question only is, How far does this presumption extend? In the extent which Mr Hume hath as­sign'd it, he hath greatly exceeded the limits of nature, and consequently of all just reasoning.

In his opinion, ‘When the fact attested is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind, by the force which remains ^†.’ There is a metaphy­sical, I had almost said, a magical balance and arith­metic, for the weighing and subtracting of evidence, to which he frequently recurs, and with which he seems to fancy he can perform wonders. I wish he had been a little more explicit in teaching us how these rare inventions must be us'd. When a writer of genius and elocution expresses himself in general terms, he will find it an easy matter, to give a plausible appear­ance to things the most unintelligible in nature. Such sometimes is this author's way of writing. In the instance before us he is particularly happy in his choice of metaphors. They are such as are na­turally adapted to prepossess a reader in his favour. What candid person can think of suspecting the im­partiality of an inquirer, who is for weighing in the scales of reason, all the arguments on either side? [Page 13]Who can suspect his exactness who determines every thing by a numerical computation? Hence it is, that to a superficial view his reasoning appears scarce in­ferior to demonstration; but, when narrowly canvass­ed, 'tis impracticable to find an application, of which, in a consistency with good sense, it is capable.

In confirmation of the remark just now made, let us try how his manner of arguing on this point can be applied to a particular instance. For this purpose I make the following suppsition. I have lived for some years near a ferry. It consists with my know­ledge that the passage-boat has a thousand times cross­ed the river, and as many times returned safe. An unknown man, whom I have just now met, tells me in a serious manner, that it is lost; and affirms, that he himself standing on the bank, was a spectator of the scene; that he saw the passengers carried down the stream, and the boat overwhelmed. No person, who is influenced in his judgment of things, not by philosophical subtilties, but by common sense, a much surer guide, will hesitate to declare, that in such a testimony I have probable evidence of the fact asserted. But if leaving common sense, I shall recur to metaphysics, and submit to be tutored in my way of judging by the essayist, he will remind me, ‘that there is here a contest of two opposite experi­ences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains.’ I am warned, that ‘the very same principle of experience, which gives me a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of the witness gives me also, in this case, another degree of assurance, against [Page 14]the fact, which he endeavours to establish, from which contradiction there arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief and authority ^*.’— Well, I would know the truth, if possible; and that I may conclude fairly and philosophically, how must I balance these opposite experiences, as you are pleased to term them? Must I set the thousand, or rather the two thousand instances of the one side, against the single instance of the other? In that case, 'tis easy to see, I have nineteen hundred and ninety-nine degrees of evidence that my information is false. Or, is it necessary, in order to make it credible, that the single instance have two thousand times as much evidence, as any of the opposite instances, supposing them equal among themselves; or supposing them unequal, as much as all the two thousand put together, that there may be at least an equilibrium? This is impossible. I had for some of those instances, the evidence of sense, which hardly any testimony can equal, much less exceed. Once more, must the evidence I have of the veracity of the witness, be a full equivalent to the two thousand instances, which oppose the fact attested? By the supposition, I have no positive evidence for or against his veracity, he being a person whom I never saw before. Yet if none of these be the balancing, which the essay-writer means, I despair of being able to discover his mean­ing.

Is then so weak a proof from testimony incapable of being refuted? I am far from thinking so; tho' even so weak a proof could not be overturned by such a contrary experience. How then may it be [Page 15]overturned? First, by contradictory testimony. Go­ing homewards I meet another person, whom I know as little as I did the former; finding that he comes from the ferry, I ask him cencerning the truth of the report. He affirms that the whole is a fiction; that he saw the boat, and all in it, come safe to land. This would do more to turn the scale, than fifty thousand such contrary instances, as were sup­posed. Yet this would not remove suspicion. In­deed, if we were to consider the matter abstractly, one would think, that all suspicion would be removed, that the two opposite testimonies would destroy each other, and leave the mind entirely under the influence of its former experience, in the same state as if nei­ther testimony had been given. But this is by no means consonant to fact. When once testimonies are introduced, former experience is generally of no account in the reckoning; it is but like the dust of the balance, which hath not any sensible effect upon the scales. The mind hangs in suspence between the two contrary declarations, and considers it as one to one, or equal improbability, that the report is true, or that it is false. Afterwards a third, and a fourth, and a fifth, confirm the declaration of the second. I am then quite at ease. Is this the only effectual way of confuting false testimony? No. I suppose again, that instead of meeting with any person who can inform me concerning the fact, I get from some, who are acquainted with the witness information concerning his character. They tell me, he is notorious for lying; and that his lies are commonly forged, not with a view to interest, but merely to gratify a malicious pleasure, which the takes in alarm­ing [Page 16]strangers. This, tho' not so direct a refutation as the former, will be sufficient to discredit his report. In the former, where there is testimony contradicting testimony, the author's metaphor of a balance may be used with propriety. The things weighed are homo­geneal: and when contradictory evidences are pre­sented to the mind, tending to prove positions which cannot be both true, the mind must decide on the comparative strength of the opposite evidences, before it yield to either.

But is this the case in the supposition first made? By no means. The two thousand instances formerly known, and the single instance attested, as they re­late to different facts, tho' of a contrary nature, are not contradictory. There is no inconsistency in be­lieving both. There is no inconsistency in receiving the last on weaker evidence, (if it be sufficient evidence) not only than all the former together, but even than any of them singly. Will it be said, that tho' the former instances are not themselves contradictory to to the fact recently attested, they lead to a conclu­sion that is contradictory? I answer, 'Tis true, that the experienced frequency of the conjunction of any two events, leads the mind to infer a similar con­junction in time to come. But let it at the same time be remarked, that no man considers this inference, as having equal evidence with any one of those past events, on which it is founded, and for the belief of which we have had sufficient testimony. Before then the method recommended by this author can turn to any account, it will be necessary for him to compute and determine with precision, how many hundreds, [Page 17]how many thousands, I might say how many myri­ads of instances, will confer such evidence on the conclusion founded on them, as will prove an equi­poize for the testimony of one ocular witness, a man of probity, in a case of which he is allowed to be a competent judge.

There is in arithmetic a rule called REDUCTION, by which numbers of different denominations are brought to the same denomination. If this ingeni­ous author shall invent a rule in logic, analogous to this, for reducing different classes of evidence to the same class, he will bless the world with a most im­portant discovery. Then indeed he will have the honour to establish an everlasting peace in the repu­blic of letters; then we shall have the happiness to see controversy of every kind, theological, historical, philosophical, receive its mortal wound: for though, in every question, we could not even then determine with certainty, on which side the truth lay, we could always determine (and that is the utmost the nature of the thing admits) with as much accuracy as geometry and algebra can afford, on which side the probability lay, and in what degree. But till this metaphysical reduction is discovered, 'twill beimpossible where the evidences are of different orders, to ascer­tain by subtraction the superior evidence. We could not but esteem him a novice in arithmetic, who be­ing asked, whether seven pounds or eleven pence make the greater sum, and what is the difference? should, by attending solely to the numbers, and over­looking the value, conclude that eleven pence were the greater, and that it exceeded the other by four. [Page 18]Must we not be equal novices in reasoning, if we follow the same absurd method? Must we not fall into as great blunders? Of as little significancy do we find the balance. Is the value of things hetero­geneal to be determined merely by weight? Shall sil­ver be weighed against lead, or copper agaist iron? If in exchange for a piece of gold, I were offered some counters of baser metal, is it not obvious, that till I know the comparative value of the metals, in vain shall I attempt to find what is equivalent, by the assistance either of scales or arithmetic?

'TIS an excellent observation, and much to the purpose, which the late learned and pious bishop of Durham, in his admirable performance on the analo­gy of religion to the course of nature, hath made on this subject. "There is a very strong presumption," says he, ‘against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of them, which yet is overcome by almost a­ny proof. There is a presumption of millions to one against the story of Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts, so and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. The like may be said of a single com­mon fact ^*.’ What then, I may subjoin, shall be said of an uncommon fact? And that an uncom­mon fact may be proved by testimony, hath not yet been made a question. But in order to illustrate the observation above cited, suppose, first, one at random mentions, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a [Page 19]part of the heavens, a comet will appear; the con­clusion from experience would not be as millions, but as infinite to one, that the proposition is false. In­stead of this, suppose you have the testimony of but one ocular witness, a man of integrity, and skilled in astronomy, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part of the heavens, a comet did appear; you will not hesitate one moment to give him credit. Yet all the presumption that was against the truth of the first supposition, tho' almost as strong evidence as experience can afford, was also against the truth of the second, before it was thus attested.

It is necessary to urge further, in support of this doctrine, that as the water in the canal cannot be made to rise higher than the fountain whence it flows; so it is impossible, that the evidence of testimony, if it proceeded from experience, should ever exceed that of experience, which is its source? Yet that it greatly exceeds this evidence, appears not only from what hath been observed already, but still more, from what I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel. One may safely affirm, that no conceivable conclusion from experience, can possess stronger evidence, than that which ascertains us of the regular succession and duration of day and night. The reason is, the instances on which this experience is founded, are both with­out number and without exception. Yet even this conclusion, the author admits, as we shall see in the third section, may, in a particular instance, not only be surmounted, but even annihilated by testimony.

Lastly, let it be observed, that the immediate con­clusion from experience is always general, and runs thus: 'This is the ordinary course of nature.' [Page 20] ‘Such an event may reasonably be expected, where all the circumstances are entirely similar.’ But when we descend to particulars, the conclusion becomes wea­ker, being more indirect. For though all the known circumstances be similar, all the actual circum­stances may not be similar: nor is it possible in any case to be assured (our knowledge of things being at best but superficial,) that all the actual circum­stances are known to us. On the contrary, the direct conclusion from testimony is always particular, and runs thus; ‘This is the fact in such an individual instance.’ The remark now made will serve both to throw light on some of the preceding observations and to indicate the proper sphere of each species of evi­dence. Experience of the past is the only rule where­by we can judge concerning the future: And as when the son is below the horizon, we must do the best we can by light of the moon, or even of the stars; so in all cases where we have no testimony, we are under a necessi­ty of recurring to experience, and of balancing or numbering contrary observations ^*. But the evidence [Page 21]resulting hence, even in the clearest cases, is ac­knowledged to be so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction built merely on the former, may be overturned by the slightest proof exhibited by the latter. Accordingly the future hath in all ages and nations, been deno­minated the province of conjecture and uncertain­ty.

FROM what hath been said, the attentive reader will easily discover, that the author's argument against miracles, hath not the least affinity to the argument used by Dr Tillotson against transubstantiation, with which Mr Hume hath introduced his subject. Let us hear the argument, as it is related in the Essay, from the writings of the Archbishop. ‘'Tis acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the au­thority either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely on the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our [Page 22]Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth of the Christian religion, is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and 'tis evident, it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one be so certain of the truth of their testimony, as of the immediate objects of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real pre­sence ever so clearely revealed in scripture, 'twere directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, tho' both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. ^*’ That the evidence of testimony is less than the evidence of sense, is undeniable. Sense is the source of that evidence, which is first transferred to the memory of the individual, as to a general reservoir, and thence transmitted to others by the channel of testimony. That the original evidence can never gain any thing, but must lose, by the transmission, is be­yond dispute. What hath been rightly perceived, may be misremembered; what is rightly remembered may, thro' incapacity, or thro' ill intention, be mis­reported; and what is rightly reported may be mis­understood. In any of these four ways therefore, [Page 23]either by defect of memory, of elocution, or of veracity in the relater, or by misapprehension in the hearer, there is a chance, that the truth received by the information of the senses, may be misrepresented or mistaken; now every such chance occasions a real diminution of the evidence. That the sacramental elements are bread and wine, not flesh and blood, our sight and touch, and taste, and smell concur in testify­ing. If these senses are not to be credited, the apostles themselves could not have evidence of the mission of their master. For the greatest external evidence they had, or could have, of his mission, was that which their senses gave them, of the reality of his miracles. But whatever strength there is in this argument with regard to the apostles, the argument with regard to us, who, for those miracles, have only the evidence, not of our own senses, but of their testimony, is incompa­rably stronger. In their case, it is sense contradicting sense; in ours it is sense contradicting testimony. But what relation has this to the author's argument? None at all. Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it hath been already evinced, that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the gene­ral conclusion from experience can afford us.— Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.

[Page 24] THUS I have shown, as I proposed, that the au­thor's reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis. — It supposeth testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false.—It supposeth by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evi­dently shows that they have not.—It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidences, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which 'tis impossible, by any ex­plication, to render of real use.

SECTION II. Mr Hume charged with some fallacies in his way of managing the argument.

IN the essay there is frequent mention of the word experience, and much use made of it. 'Tis strange that the author hath not favoured us with the definition of a term of so much moment to his argu­ment. This defect I shall endeavour to supply; and the rather, as the word appears to be equivocal, and to be used by the essayist in two very different senses. The first and most proper signification of the word, which, for distinction's sake, I shall call personal experience, is that given in the preced|'ing section. 'It is,' as was observed, ‘founded in memory, and consists solely of the general maxims [Page 25]or conclusions, that each individual hath formed, from the comparison of the particular facts he hath remembered.’ In the other signification, in which the word is sometimes taken, and which I shall distinguish by the term derived, it may be thus de­fined. ‘It is founded in testimony, and consists not only of all the experiences of others, which have thro' that channel been communicated to us, but of all the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts at­tested.’

In proposing his argument, the author would sure­ly be understood to mean only personal experience; otherwise, his making testimony derive its light from an experience which derives its light from testimony, would be introducing what logicians term a circle in causes. It would exhibit the same things alternately, as causes and effects of each other. Yet nothing can be more limited, than the sense which is conveyed under the term experience, in the first acceptation. The merest clown or peasant derives incomparably more knowledge from testimony, and the commu­nicated experience of others, than in the longest life he could have amassed out of the treasure of his own memory. Nay, to such a scanty portion the savage himself is not confined. If that therefore must be the rule, the only rule, by which every testimony is ultimately to be judged, our belief in matters of fact must have very narrow bounds. No testimony ought to have any weight with us, that doth not relate an event, similar at least to some one observation, which [Page 26]we ourselves have had access to make. For exam­ple, that there are such people on the earth as ne­groes, could not, on that hypothesis, be rendered cre­dible to one who had never seen a negro, not even by the most numerous and the most unexceptionable attestations. Against the admission of such testimony, however strong, the whole force of the author's ar­gument evidently operates. But that innumerable absurdities would flow from this principle, I might easily evince, did I not think the task superfluous.

The author himself is aware of the consequences; and therefore, in whatever sense he uses the term experience in proposing his argument; in prosecuting it, he with great dexterity shifts the sense, and ere the reader is apprised, insinuates another. ‘'Tis a miracle,’ says he, ‘that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must therefore be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appella­tion ^*.’ Here the phrase, an uniform experience against an event, in the latter clause, is implicitly de­fined in the former, not what has never been observed BY US, but (mark his words) what has never been observed IN ANY AGE OR COUNTRY.— Now, what has been observed, and what has not been observed, in all ages and countries, pray how can you, Sir, or I, or any man, come to the knowledge of? Only I suppose by testimony, oral or written. The personal experience of every indi­vidual is limited to but a part of one age, and com­monly [Page 27]to a narrow spot of one country. If there be any other way of being made acquainted with facts, 'tis to me, I own, an impenetrable secret; I have no apprehension of it. If there be not any, what shall we make of that cardinal point, on which his argument turns? 'Tis in plain language, ‘Testimo­ny is not intitled to the least degree of faith, but as far as it is supported by such an extensive expe­rience, as if we had not had a previous and inde­pendent faith in testimony, we could never have acquired.’

How natural is the transition from one sophism to another! You will soon be convinced of this, if you attend but a little to the strain of the argument. "A miracle," says he, ‘is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable expe­rience hath established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire, as any argument from ex­perience can possibly be imagined ^*.’ Again, ‘As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the na­ture of the fact, against the existence of any mi­racle ^†.’ I must once more ask the author what is the precise meaning of the words firm, unalterable, uniform? An experience that admits no exception, is surely the only experience, which can with propri­ety be termed uniform, firm, unalterable. Now since, as was remarked above, the far greater part of this experience, which compriseth every age and every country, must be derived to us from testimony; that the experience may be firm, uniform, unalterable [Page 28]there must be no contrary testimony whatever. Yet by the author's own hypothesis, the miracles he would thus confute, are supported by testimony At the same time to give strength to his argument, he is under a necessity of supposing, that there is no ex­ception from the testimonies against them. Thus he falls into that paralogism, which is called begging the question. What he gives with one hand, he takes with the other. He admits, in opening his design, what in his argument he implicitly denies.

But that this, if possible, may be still more mani­fest, let us attend a little to some expressions, which one would imagine he had inadvertently dropt. "So long," says he, ‘as the world endures, I pre­sume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all profane history ^*.’ Why does he presume so? A man so much attached to experi­ence, can hardly be suspected to have any other rea­son than, because such accounts have hitherto been found in all the histories, profane as well as sacred, of times past. But we need not recur to an inference to obtain this acknowledgment. It is often to be met with in the essay. In one place we learn, that the witnesses for miracles are an infinite number ^†; in another, that all religious records of whatever kind abound with them ^‡. I leave it therefore to the author to explain, with what consistency he can assert, that the laws of nature are established by an uniform experience, (which experience is chiefly the result of testimony) and at the same time allow, that almost all human histories are full of the relations of [Page 29]miracles and prodigies, which are violations of those laws. Here is, by his own confession, testimony against testimony, and very ample on both sides. How then can one side claim a firm, uniform, and unalterable support from testimony?

It will be in vain to object, that the testimony in support of the laws of nature, greatly exceeds the testimony for the violations of these laws; and that, if we are to be determined by the greater number of observations, we shall reject all miracles whatever. I ask, Why are the testimonies much more nume­rous in the one case than in the other? The answer is obvious: Natural occurrences are much more fre­quent than such as are preternatural. But are all the accounts we have of the pestilence to be rejected as incredible, because, in this country, we hear not so often of that disease, as of the fever? Or, because the number of natural births is infinitely greater than that of monsters, shall the evidence of the former be regarded as a confutation of all that can be advanced in proof of the latter? Such an objector needs to be reminded of what was proved in the foregoing secti­on; that the opposite testimonies relate to different facts, and are therefore not contradictory; that the conclusion founded on them, possesseth not the evi­dence of the facts on which it is founded, but only such a presumptive evidence, as may be surmounted by the slightest positive proof. A general conclusion from experience is in comparison but presumptive and indirect; sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence.

[Page 30] I SHALL remark one other fallacy in this author's reasoning, before I conclude this section. ‘The In­dian prince,’ says he, ‘who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, rea­soned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, which arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it ^*.’ Here a distinction is artfully suggested, between what is contrary to experience, and what is not con­formable to it. The one he allows may be proved by testimony, but not the other. A distinction, for which the author seems to have so great use, it will not be improper to examine.

If my reader happen to be but little acquainted with Mr Hume's writings, or even with the piece here examined, I must intreat him, ere he proceed any farther, to give the essay an attentive perusal; and to take notice particularly, whether in one single passage, he can find any other sense given to the terms contrary to experience, but that which has not been experienced. Without this aid, I should not be surprised, that I found it difficult to convince the judicious, that a man of so much acuteness, one so much a philosopher as this author, should, with such formality, make a distinction, which not only the essay, but the whole tenour of his philosophical writings, shows evidently to have no meaning. Is [Page 31]that which is contrary to experience a synonymous phrase for that which implies a contradiction? If this were the case, there would be no need to recur to experience for a refutation; it would refute itself. But 'tis equitable that the author himself be heard, who ought to be the best interpreter of his own words. "When the fact attested," says he, ‘is such a one, as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences ^*.’ In this pass­age, not the being never experienced, but even the be­ing seldom experienced constitutes an opposite experience. I can conceive no way but one, that the author can evade the force of this quotation; and that is, by obtruding on us, some new distinction between an opposite and a contrary experience. In order to pre­clude such an attempt, I shall once more recur to his own authority. ‘'Tis no miracle that a man in seeming good health, should die of a sudden.’ Why? ‘Because such a kind of death, tho' more unusual than any other, hath yet been frequently observed to happen. But 'tis a miracle that a dead man should come to life,’ Why? Not because of any inconsistency in the thing. That a body should be this hour inanimate, and the next animated, is no more inconsistent, than the reverse that it should be this hour animated, and the next inanimate; though the one be common, and not the other. But the author himself answers the question: ‘Because that has never been observed in any age or country ^†.’ All the contrariety then that there is in miracles to experience, doth, by his own concessi­on, [Page 32]consist solely in this, that they have never been observed; that is, they are not conformable to expe­rience, To his experience personal or derived, he must certainly mean; to what he has had access to learn of different ages and countries. To speak beyond the knowledge he hath attained, would be ridiculous. It would be first supposing a miracle, and then inferring a contrary experience, instead of concluding from experience, that the fact is miraculous.

Now, I insist, that as far as regards the author's argument, a fact perfectly unusual, or not conformable to our experience, such a fact as, for aught we have had access to learn, was never observed in any age or country, is as incapable of proof from testimony, as miracles are; that, if this writer would argue consistently, he could never, on his own principles, reject the one and admit the other. Both ought to be rejected or neither. I would not, by this be thought to signify, that there is no difference between a miracle and an extraordinary event: I know that the former implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not implied in the latter. All that I intend to a sert is, that the anthor's argument equally affects them both. Why doth such interposal appear to him incredible? Not from any incongruity he discerns in the thing itself. He doth not pretend it. But 'tis not conformable to his experience. "A miracle," "says he," is a transgression of the law of nature ^*," But how are the laws of nature known to us? By experience. What is the criterion, whereby we must [Page 33]judge, whether the laws of nature are transgressed? Solely the conformity or disconformity of events to our experience. This writer surely will not pretend, that we can have any knowledge a priori, either of the law, or of the violation.

Let us then examine by his own principles, whe­ther the King of Siam, of whom the story he alludes to, is related by Locke ^†, could have sufficient evidence from testimony, of a fact so contrary to his experience as the freezing of water. He could just say as much of this event, as the author can say of a dead man's being restored to life. ‘Such a thing was never ob­served, as far as I could learn, in any age or country.’ If the things themselves too are imparti­ally considered and independently of the notions ac­quired by us in these northern climates, we should account the first at least as extraordinary as the second. That so pliant a body as water should become hard like pavement, so as to bear up an elephant on its sur­face, is as unlikely in itself, as that a body inanimate to-day should be animated to-morrow. Nay, to the Indian monarch, I must think, that the first would appear more a miracle, more contrary to experience than the second. If he had been acquainted with ice or frozen water, and afterwards seen it become fluid; but had never seen nor learned, that after it was melted, it became hard again, the relation must have appeared marvellous, as the process from fluidity to hardness never had been experienced, tho' the reverse often had. But I believe nobody will que­stion, [Page 34]that on this supposition it would not have ap­peared quite so strange, as it did. Yet this supposition makes the instance more parallel to the restoring of the dead to life. The process from animate to inanimate we are all acquainted with; and what is such a resto­ration, but the reversing of this process? So little reason had the author to insinuate, that the one was only not conformable, the other contrary to experience. If there be a difference in this respect, the first to one alike unacquainted with both, must appear the more contrary of the two.

Does it alter the matter, that he calls the former ‘a fact which arose from a state of nature, with which the Indian was unacquainted?’ Was not such a st [...] quite unconformable, or (which in the author's language I have shown to be the same) contra­ry to his experience? Is then a state of nature which is contrary to experience, more credible than a single fact contrary to experience? I want the solution of one difficulty: The author, in order to satisfy me, presents me with a thousand others. Is this suitable to the method he proposes in another place, of admit­ting always the less miracle and rejecting the greater ^*? Is it not, on the contrary, admitting without any difficulty the greater miracle, and thereby removing the difficulty, which he otherwise would have had in admitting the less? Does he for­get, that to exhibit a state of nature entirely differ­ent from what we experience at present, is one of those enormous prodigies, which, in his account, render the Pentateuch unworthy of credit ^†? "No [Page 35]Indian," says he in the note, ‘'tis evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him, and 'tis impossible for him to tell a priori, what will result from it.’ This is precisely, as if, in reply to the author's objection from experience against the raising of a dead man (suppose Lazarus) to life, I should retort: ‘Neither you, Sir, nor any who live in this century can have experience, that a dead man could not be restored to life at the command of one divinely commissioned to give a revelation to men. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to you, and 'tis impossible for you to tell a priori what will result from it. This therefore is not contrary to the course of nature, in cases where all the cir­cumstances are the same. As you never saw one vested with such a commission, you are as unexperienced, as ignorant of this point, as the inhabitants of Sumatra are of the frosts in Muscovy; you cannot therefore reasonably, any more than they, be positive as to the consequences.’ Should he rejoin, as doubtless he would, ‘This is not taking away the difficulty; but, like the ele­phant and the tortoise, in the account given by some barbarians of the manner in which the earth is supported, it only shifts the difficulty a step further back. My objection still recurs. That any man should be endowed with such power is contrary to experience, and therefore incredible:’ Should he, I say, rejoin in this manner, I could only add. ‘Pray Sir, revise your own words lately quoted, and con­sider [Page 36]impartially whether they be not as glaringly exposed to the like reply.’ For my part, I can only perceive one difference that is material between the two cases. You frankly confess, that with re­gard to the freezing of water, besides the absolute want of experience, there would be from analogy a presump­tion against it, which ought to weigh with a rational Indian. I think, on the contrary, in the case sup­posed by me of one commissioned by Heaven, there is at least no presumption against the exertion of such a miraculous power. There is rather a presumption in its favour.

Does the author then say, that no testimony could give the King of Siam sufficient evidence of the effects of cold on water? No. By implication he says the contrary: "It required very strong testi­mony." Will he say, that those most astonishing effects of electricity lately discovered, so entirely unanalogous to every thing before experienced, will he say, that such facts no reasonable man could have sufficient evidence from testimony to believe? No. We may presume, he will not, from his decision in the former case; and if he should, the common sense of mankind would reclaim against his extravagance. Yet 'tis obvious to every considerate reader, that his argument concludes equally against those truly mar­vellous, as against miraculous events; both being alike unconformable, or alike contrary to former ex­perience ^*.

[Page 37] THUS I think I have shown, that the author is chargeable with some fallacies, in his way of mana­ging [Page 38]the argument; that he all along avails himself of an ambiguity in the word experience; —that his reasoning includes a petitio principii in the bosom of it;— and that, in supporting his argument, he must have recourse to distinctions, where, even him­self being judge, there is no difference.

SECTION III. Mr Hume himself gives up his favourite argument.

'MR Hume himself,' methinks I hear my reader repeating with astonishment, ‘gives up his favourite argument! To prove this point is indeed a very bold attempt.’ Yet that this attempt is not altogether so arduous, as at first hearing, he will possibly imagine, I hope, if favoured a while with his attention, fully to convince him. If to acknowledge, after all, that there may be miracles, which admit of proof from human testimony; if to acknowledge, that such miracles ought to be received, not as probable only, but as absolutely certain; or, in other words, that the proof from human testimony may be such as that all the contrary uniform experience, should not only be overbalanced, but, to use the author's expression, should be annihilated; if such acknowledgments as these, are subversive of his own principles; if by making them, he abandons his darling argument; this strange part the essayist evidently acts.

"I own," these are his words, ‘there may pos­sibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit a proof from [Page 39]human testimony, tho' perhaps’ (in this he is modest enough, he avers nothing; perhaps) ‘it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.’ To this declaration he subjoins the following suppsition: ‘Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the 1st of January 1700, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event, is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: 'tis evident, that our present philo­sophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the caus­es, whence it might be derived ^*.’

Could one imagine, that the person who had made the above acknowledgment, a person too who is justly allowed by all who are acquainted with his writings, to possess uncommon penetration and philosophical abilities, that this were the same individual, who had so short while before affirmed, that "a miracle," or a violation of the usual course of nature, ‘supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument ^†;’ who had insisted, that ‘it is not requisite, in order to reject the fact, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood; that such an evidence carries falsehood on the very face of it ^‡;’ that ‘we need but oppose even to [Page 40]acloud of witnesses, the absolute impossibility, or,’ which is all one, ‘miraculous nature of the events, which they relate; that this in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation ^*;’ and who finally to put an end to all altercation on the subject had pronounced this oracle. ‘NO TESTIMONY FOR ANY KIND OF MIRACLE CAN EVER POSSIBLY AMOUNT TO A PROBABI­LITY, MUCH LESS TO A PROOF ^†.’ Was there ever a more glaring contradiction!

YET for the event supposed by the essayist, the testimony, in his judgment, would amount to a probability; nay to more than a probability, to a proof; let not the reader be astonished, or if he cannot fail to be astonished, let him not be incredulous, when I add, to more than a proof, more than a full, entire and direct proof; for even this I hope to make evi­dent from the author's principles and reasoning. "And even supposing," says he, that is, granting for argument's sake, ‘that the testimony for a miracle amounted to a proof, 'twould be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish ^‡.’ Here is then, by his own reasoning, proof against proof, from which there could result no belief or opinion, unless the one is conceived to be in some degree supe­rior to the other. "Of which proofs," says he, ‘the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminuti­on [Page 41]of its force in proportion to that of its antago­nist. ^*’ Before the author could believe such a mi­racle as he supposes, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony is stronger than the proof against it from experience. That we may form an accurate judgment of the strength he here ascribes to testimony, let us consider what, by his own account, is the strength of the opposite proof from experience. ‘A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable expe­rience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possi­bly be imagined ^†.’ Again, ‘As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle ^‡.’ The proof then which the essayist admits from testimony, is, by his own estimate, not only superior to a direct and full proof; but even superior to as entire a proof, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Whence, I pray, doth testimony acquire such ama­zing evidence? 'Testimony,' says the author, ‘hath no evidence, but what it derives from experi­ence. These differ from each other only as the species from the genus.’ Put then for testimony, the word experience, which in this case is equivalent, and the conclusion will run thus: Here is a proof from experience, which is superior to as entire a proof from experience as can possible be imagined. This [Page 42]deduction from the author's words, the reader will percieve, is strictly logical. What the meaning of it is, I leave Mr Hume to explain.

What hath been above deduced, how much soever it be accounted, is not all that is implied in the con­cession made by the author. He further says, that the miraculous fact so attested, ought not only to be re­ceived, but to be received for certain. Is it not enough, Sir, that you have shown that your most full, most direct, most perfect argument may be over­come; will nothing satisfy you now but its destruc­tion? One would imagine, that you had conjured up this demon, by whose irresistible arm you proposed to give a mortal blow to religion, and render scepticism triumphant, (that you had conjured him up, I say) for no other purpose, but to show with what facility you could lay him. To be serious, does not this au­thor remember, that he had oftener than once laid it down as a maxim, That when there is proof against proof, we must incline to the superior, still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the sorce of its antagonist ^*? But when a fact is received for certain, there can be no sensible diminution of assurance, such diminution always implying some doubt and uncertainty. Consequently the general proof from experience, tho' as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined, is not only surmounted, but is really in comparison as nothing, or, in Mr Hume's phrase, undergoes annihilation, when balanced with the particular proof from testi­mony. Great indeed, it must be acknowledged, is [Page 43]the force of truth. This conclusion, on the principles I have been endeavouring to establish, has nothing in it, but what is conceivable and just; but on the prin­ciples of the essay, which deduce all the force of testi­mony from experience, serves only to confound the understanding, and to involve the subject in midnight darkness.

'TIS therefore manifest, that either this author's principles condemn his own method of judging, with regard to miraculous facts; or that his method of judging subverts his principles, and is a tacit desertion of them. Thus that impregnable fortress, the asylum of infidelity, which he so lately gloried in ha­ving erected, is in a moment abandoned by him, as a place untenable.

SECTION IV. There is no peculiar presumption against such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of re­ligion.

IS it then so, that the decisive argument, the essayist flattered himself he had discovered ^*, which with the wise and learned, was to prove an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and would consequently be useful, as long as the world endures; is it so, that this boasted argument hath in fact little or no influence on the discoverer himself! But this author may well be excused. He cannot be [Page 44]always the metaphysician. He cannot soar incessant­ly in the clouds. Such constant elevation suits not the lot of humanity. He must sometimes, whether he will or not, descend to a level with other people, and fall into the humble track of common sense. One thing however he is resolved on: If he cannot by metaphysic spells silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition; he will at any rate, though for this purpose he should borrow aid from what he hath no liking to, trite and popular topics; he will at any rate free himself from their impertinent solicitations.

There are accordingly two principles in human nature, by which he accounts for all the relations, that have ever been in the world, concerning mi [...] ­cles. These principles are, the passion for the mar­vellous, and the religious affection ^*; against either of which singly, the philosopher, he says, ought ever to be on his guard; but incomparably more so, when both happen to be in strict confederacy together. ‘For if the spirit of r [...]ligion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. ^†’ Notwithstanding this strong affirmation, there is reason to suspect that the author is not in his heart, so great an enemy to the love of wonder, as he affects to appear. No man can make a greater concession in favour of the won­derful, than he hath done in the passage quoted in the preceding section. No man was ever fonder of para­dox, and, in theoretical subjects, of every notion that is remote from sentiments universally received. [Page 45]This love of paradox, he owns himself, that both his enemies and his friends reproach him with ^*. There must surely be some foundation for so universal a censure. If therefore, in respect of the passion for the marvellous, he differ from other people, the dif­ference ariseth from a particular delicacy in this gentleman, which makes him nauseate even to wonder with the crowd. He is of that singular turn that where every body is struck with astonishment, he can see nothing wondrous in the least; at the same time he discovers prodigies, where no soul but himself ever dreamt that there were any.

We may therefore rest assured of it, that the author might be conciliated to the love of wonder, provided the spirit of religion be kept at a distance, against which he hath unluckily contracted a mortal antipathy, against which he has resolved to wage eternal war. When he but touches this subject, he loseth at once his philosophic composure, and speaks with an acrimony unusual to him on other occasions. Some thing of this kind appears from the citations already made. But if these should not satisfy, I shall produce one or two more, which certainly will. There is a second supposition the author makes of a miraculous event, in a certain manner circumstanced and attested, which he declares, and I think with particular pro­priety, that he would ‘not have the least inclination to believe ^†.’ At his want of inclination the reader will not be surprised, when he learns, that this sup­posed miracle is concerning a resurrection; an event [Page 46]which bears too strong a resemblance both to the doctrine and to the miracles of holy writ, not to alarm a modern Pyrrhonist. To the above declara­tion he subjoins, ‘But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination.’ Again, a little after, ‘As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious mi­racles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact,’ (a point which the author is positive, tho' he neither produceth facts nor arguments to support it) ‘this must diminish very much the au­thority of the former testimony, and’ (pray observe his words) ‘make us form a GENERAL RESOLUTION, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered.’

Never did the passion of an inflamed orator, or the intemperate zeal of a religionist, carry him further against his adversary, than this man of speculation is carried by his prejudice against religion. Demagogues and bigots have often warned the people against list­ening to the arguments of an envied and therefore de­tested rival, lest by his sophistry they should be sedu­ced into the most fatal errors. The same part this author, a philosopher, a sceptic, a dispassionate inquirer after truth, as surely he chuseth to be accounted, now acts in favour of infidelity. He thinks it not safe to give religion even a hearing. [Page 47]Nay so strange a turn have matters taken of late with the managers of this controversy, that it is now the FREETHINKER who preaches implicit faith; 'tis the INFIDEL, who warns us of the danger of con­sulting reason. Beware, says he, I admonish you, of inquiring into the strength of the plea, or of bringing it to the deceitful test of reason; for ‘those who will be so SILLY as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded ^*.’ That religion is concerned in the matter, is reckoned by these sages sufficient evidence of imposture. The proofs she offers in her own defence, we are told by these candid judges, ought to be rejected, and rejected without examination. The old way of scrutiny and argument must now be laid aside, having been at length discovered to be but a bungling, a tedious, and a dangerous way at best. What then shall we sub­stitute in its place? The essayist hath a most admi­rable expedient. A shorter and surer method he re­commends to us, the expeditious way of resolution. 'Form,' says he, ‘a GENERAL RESOLUTION, never to lend any attention to testimonies or facts urgedby reli­gion, with whatever specious pretext they may be covered.’

I had almost congratulated Mr Hume, and our enlightened age, on this happy invention, before I reflected, that tho' the application might be new, the expedient itself, of resolving to be deaf to argument, was very ancient, having been often with great suc­cess employed against atheists and heretics, and warm­ly recommended by Bellarmine and Scotus, and most [Page 48]others of that bright fraternity the schoolmen: Per­sons, I acknowledge, to whom one could not, per­haps in any other instance, find a resemblance in my ingenious opponent.

I'm afraid that after such a declaration, I must not presume to consider myself as arguing with the au­thor, who hath, in so peremptory a manner, resolved to attend to nothing that can be said in opposition to his theory. 'What judgment he has,' to use his own expression, ‘he has renounced by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects ^*,’ If how­ever it should prove the fate of these papers, the for­bidding title of them notwithstanding, to be at any time honoured with the perusal of some infidel, not indeed so rivetted in unbelief as the essayist, I would earnestly intreat such reader, in the solemn style of Mr Hume, ‘To lay his hand upon his heart, and after serious consideration declare ^*,’ If any of the patrons of religion had acted this part, and warned people not to try by argument the metaphysical sub­tleties of the adversaries, affirming, that ‘they who were MAD enough to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the reasoning, were almost sure to be confounded; that the only prudent method was, to form a GENERAL RESO­LUTION, never to lend any attention to what was advanced on the opposite side, however specious;’ whether this conduct would not have afforded great matter of triumph to those gentlemen the deists; whether it would not have been construed by them, and even justly, into a tacit conviction of the weak­ness of our cause, which we were afraid of exposing [Page 49]in the light, and bringing to a fair trial. But we scorn to take shelter in obscurity, and meanly to de­cline the combat; confident as we are, that REASON is our ally and our friend, and glad to find that the e­nemy at length so violently suspects her.

As to the first method, by which the author ac­counts for the fabulous relations of monsters and pro­digies, 'tis freely acknowledged, that the Creator hath implanted in human nature, as a spur to the improve­ment of the understanding, a principle of curiosity, which makes the mind feel a particular pleasure in every new acquisition of knowledge. 'Tis acknow­ledged also, that as every principle in our nature is liable to abuse, so this principle will often give the mind a bias to the marvellous, for the more marvel­lous any thing is, that is, the more unlike to all that hath formerly been known, the more new it is; and this bias, in many instances, may induce belief on insufficient evidence.

But the presumption that hence ariseth against the marvellous is not stronger in the case of miracles (as will appear from an attentive perusal of the second section) than in the case of every fact that is perfectly extraordinary. Yet how easily this obstacle may be overcome by testimony, might be illustrated, if ne­cessary, in almost every branch of science, in physio­logy, in geography, in history. On the contrary, what an immense impediment would this presumpti­on prove to the progress of philosophy and letters, had it in reality one fiftieth-part of the strength which the author seems to attribute to it. I shall not tire my reader or myself by recurring to the philosophic [Page 50]wonders in electricity, chymistry, magnetism, which, all the world sees, may be fully proved to us by te­stimony, before we make the experiments our­selves.

BUT there is, it seems, additional to this, a pecu­liar presumpti [...] against religious miracles. ‘The wise,’ as the author hath observed with reason, ‘lend a very academic faith to every report, which favours the passion of the reporter, whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural incli­nations and propensities ^*.’ Now, as no object whatever operates more powerfully on the fancy than religion does, or works up the passions to a higher fervour; so, in matters relating to this subject, if in any subject, we have reason to suspect that the understanding will prove a dupe to the passions. On this point therefore we ought to be peculiarly cauti­ous, that we be not hasty of belief. In this senti­ment we all agree.

But there is one circumstance, which he hath o­verlooked, and which is nevertheless of the greatest consequence in the debate. It is this, that the pre­judice resulting from the religious affection, may just as readily obstruct, as promote our faith in a reli­gious miracle. What things in nature are more con­trary, than one religion is to another religion? They are just as contrary as light and darkness, truth and error. The affections, with which they are contem­plated by the same person, are just as opposite, as [Page 51]desire and aversion, love and hatred. The same re­ligious zeal which gives the mind of a Christian, a propensity to the belief of a miracle in support of Christianity, will inspire him with an aversion from the belief of a miracle in support of Mahometism. The same principle, which will make him acquiesce in evidence less than sufficient in the one case, will make him require evidence more than sufficient in the other.

Before then the remark of the author can be of any use in directing our judgment, as to the evidence of miracles attested, we must consider whether the original tenets of the witnesses would naturally have blassed their m [...]nds in favour of the miracles, or in opposition to them. If the former was the case, the testimony is so much the less to be regarded; if the latter, so much the more. Will it satisfy on this head to acquaint us, that the prejudices of the wit­nesses must have favoured the miracles, since they were zealous promoters of the doctrine, in support of which those miracles are said to have been per­formed? To answer thus would be to misunderstand the point. The question is, Was this doctrine the faith of the witnesses, before they saw, or fancied they saw the miracles? If it was, I agree with him. Great, very great allowance must be made for the prejudices of education, for principles, early perhaps, carefully, and deeply roote [...] in their minds, and for the religious affection founded in these principles; which allowance must always derogate from the weight of their testimony. But if the faith of the witnesses stood originally in opposition to the doctrine [Page 52]attested by the miracles; if the only account that can be given of their conversion, is the conviction which the miracles produced in them; it must be a preposterous way of arguing, to derive their convic­tion from a religious zeal, which would at first ob­stinately withstand, and for some time hinder such conviction. On the contrary, that the evidence ari­sing from miracles performed in proof of a doctrine disbelieved, and consequently hated before, did in fact surmount that obstacle, and conquer all the op­position arising thence, is a very strong presumption in favour of that evidence: just as strong a presump­tion in its favour, as it would have been against it, had all their former zeal, and principles, and preju­dices, co-operated with the evidence, whatever it was, in gaining an entire assent.

Hence there is the greatest disparity in this respect, a disparity which deserves to be particularly attended to, betwixt the evidence of miracles performed in proof of a religion to be established, and in contradic­tion to opinions generally received; and the evidence of miracles performed in support of a religion already established, and in confirmation of opinions generally received. Hence also the greatest disparity betwixt the miracles recorded by the evangelists, and those related by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian.

THERE is then no peculiar presumption against re­ligious miracles merely as such; if in certain cir­cumstances there is a presumption against them; the presumption ariseth solely from the circumstances, insomuch that, in the opposite circumstances, it is as strongly in their favour.

SECTION V. There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

IN this section I propose to consider the reverse of the question treated in the former. In the former I proved that there is no peculiar presumption against religious miracles; I now inquire whether there be any in their favour. The question is important, and intimately connected with the subject.

THE boldest infidel will not deny, that the immortality of the soul, a future and eternal state, and the connection of our happiness or misery in that state, with our present good or bad conduct, not to mention the doctrines concerning the divine unity and perfec­tions, are tenets which carry no absurdity in them. They may be true for aught he knows. He dis­believes them, not because they are incredible in themselves, but because he hath not evidence of their truth. He pretends not to disprove them, nor does he think the task incumbent on him. He only pleads, that before he can yield them his assent, they must be proved.

Now, as whatever is possible, may be supposed, let us suppose that the dogmas above mentioned are all infallible truths; and let the unbeliever say, whether he can conceive an object worthier of the Divine in­terposal, than to reveal these truths to mankind? and [Page 54]to enforce them in such a manner, as may give them a suitable influence on the heart and life. Of all the inhabitants of the earth, man is incomparably the noblest. Whatever therefore regards the interest of the human species, is a grander concern, than what regards either the inanimate or the brute creation. If man was made, as is doubtless not impossible, for an after state of immorality; whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely superior to that which concerns merely the transient en­joyments of the present life. How sublime then is the object which religion, and religion only, exhi­bits as the ground of supernatural interpositions! This object is no other than the interest of man, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world which bears in his soul the image of his Maker; not the interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity: an object at least in one respect adequate to the ma­jesty of God.

Does this appear to the essayist too much like ar­guing a priori, of which I know he hath a detestation? It is just such an argument, as, presupposing the most rational principles of Deism, results from those max­ims concerning intelligent causes, and their operations, which are founded in general experience, and which uniformly lead us to expect, that the end will be pro­portionate to the means. The Pagans of Rome had notions of their divinities infinitely inferior to the opi­nions concerning God, which in Christian countries are maintained even by those, who, for distinction's [Page 55]sake, are called DEISTS. Yet such of the former as had any justness of taste, were offended with those po­ets, who, exhibited the celestials on slight occasions, and for trivial purposes, interfering in the affairs of men. Why? Because such an exhibition shocked all the principles of probability. It had not that veri­similitude which is absolutely necessary to render fic­tion agreeable. Accordingly it is a precept, with re­lation to the machinery of the drama, given by one who was both a critic and a poet, That a god must never be introduced, unless to accomplish some important design which could not be otherwise effectuated ^*. The foun­dation of this rule, which is that of my argument, is therefore one of those indisputable principles, which are found every where, among the earliest results of experience.

THUS it appears, that from the dignity of the end, there ariseth a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles, as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

SECTION VI. Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr Hume's favourite maxims.

THERE is a method truly curious, suggested by the author, for extricating the mind, should the evidence from testimony be so great, that its false­hood [Page 56]might, as he terms it, be accounted miraculous. In this puzzling case, when a man is so beset with miracles, that he is under a necessity of admitting one, he must always take care it be the smallest; for it is an axiom in this writers DIALECTIC, That the probability of the fact is in the inverse ratio of the quantity of miracle there is in it. "I weigh," says he, ‘the one miracle against the other, and according to the supe­riority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle ^*.’

Now, of this method, which will no doubt be thought by many to be very ingenious, and which appears to the essayist both very momentous and very perspicuous, I own, I am not able to discover either the reasonableness or the use.

First, I cannot see the reasonableness. 'A miracle,' to adopt his own definition, ‘implies the transgres­sion,’ or rather the suspension, ‘of some law of na­ture; and that either by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent ^†.’ Now, as I should think, from the principles laid down in the preceding section, that it would be for no trifling purpose, that the laws of nature would be suspended, and either the Deity or an invisible agent would interpose; 'tis on the same principles, natural to imagine, that the means, or miracle performed, should bear a proportion in respect of dignity and greatness, to the end proposed. Were I therefore under such a necessity as is supposed by Mr Hume, of ad­mitting [Page 57]the truth of a miracle, I acknowledge, that of two contradictory miracles, where all other circum­stances are equal, I should think it reasonable to be­lieve the greater. I shall borrow an illustration from the author himself. "A miracle," he says, ‘may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle; the raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose is as real a miracle, tho' not so sensible with regard to us ^*.’ Surely if any miracle may be called little, the last mentioned is intitled to that denomination, not only because it is an undiscoverable and insensible miracle, but because the quantum of miraculous force requisite, is, by the hypothesis, ever so little, or the least conceivable. Yet if it were certain, that God, angel, or spirit, were, for one of those purposes, to interpose in sus­pending the laws of nature; I believe most men would join with me in thinking, that it would be ra­ther for the raising of a house or ship than for the rai­sing of a feather.

But though the maxim laid down by the author were just, I cannot discover in what instance, or by what application, it can be rendered of any utility. Why? Because we have no rule, whereby we can judge of the greatness of miracles. I allow, that in such a singular instance, as that above quoted from the essay, we may judge safely enough. But that can be of no practical use. In almost every case that [Page 58]will occur, I may warrantably aver, that it will be impossible for the acutest intellect to decide, which of the two is the greater miracle. As to the author, I cannot find that he has favoured us with any light in so important and so critical a question. Have we not then some reason to dread, that the task will not be less difficult to furnish us with a measure, by which we can determine the magnitude of miracles; than to provide us with a balance, by which we can ascertain the comparative weight of testimonies and experiences?

If leaving the speculations of the essayist, we shall, in order to be assisted on this subject, recur to his ex­ample and decisions: let us consider the miracle which was recited in the third section, and which he declares, would, on the evidence of such testimony as he supposes, not only be probable, but certain. For my part, 'tis not in my power to conceive a great­ter miracle than that is. The whole universe is af­fected by it; the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars. The most invariable laws of nature with which we are acquainted, even those which regulate the mo­tions of the heavenly bodies, and dispense darkness and light to worlds, are violated. I appeal to the author himself, whether it could be called a great­er, or even so great a miracle, that all the writers at that time, or even all mankind, had been seized with a new species of epidemical delirium, which had given rise to this strange illusion. But in this the au­thor is remarkably unfortunate, that the principles by which he in fact regulates his judgment and belief, [Page 59]are often the reverse of those which he endeavours to establish in his theory.

SHALL I hazard a conjecture? It is, that the word miracle, as thus used by the author, is used in a vague and improper sense, as a synonymous term for improbable; and that believing the less, and reject­ing the greater miracle, denote simply believing what is least, and rejecting what is most improbable; o [...] still more explicitly believing what we think most worthy of belief, and rejecting what we think least worthy. I am aware, on a second perusal of the author's words, that my talent in guessing may be justly questioned. He hath in effect told us himself what he means. "When any one," says he, ‘tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion ^*.’ At first indeed one is ready to exclaim, What a strange revolution is here! The belief of miracles then, even by Mr Hume's account, is absolutely inevitable. Miracles them­selves too, so far from being impossible, or even extraordinary, are the commonest things in nature; [Page 60]so common, that when any miraculous fact is attested to us, we are equally under a necessity of believing a miracle, whether we believe the fact, or deny it. The whole difference between the essayist and us, is at length reduced to this single point, Whether greater or smaller miracles are intitled to the prefer­ence. This mystery however vanishes on a nearer inspection. The style, we find, is figurative, and the author is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an unusual application of a familiar term. What is called the weighing of probabilities in one sentence, is the weighing of miracles in the next. If it were asked, For what reason did not Mr Hume express his sentiment in ordinary and proper words? I could only answer, I know no reason but one, and that is, To give the appearance of novelty and depth to one of those very harmless propositions, which by philosophers are called identical, and which, to say the truth, need some disguise, to make them pass upon the world with tolerable decency.

What then shall be said of the conclusion which he gives as the sum and quintessence of the first part of the essay? The best thing for aught I know, that can be said, is, that it contains a most certain truth, tho' at the same time the least significant, that ever perhaps was ushered into the world with so much solemnity. In order, therefore, to make plainer English of his plain consequence, let us only change the word miraculous, as applyed to the falsehood of human testimony, into improbable, which in this passage is entirely equivalent, and observe the effect produced [Page 61]by this elucidation. ‘The plain consequence is, and 'tis a GENERAL MAXIM, worthy of our at­tention, That NO TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A MIRACLE; UNLESS THE TESTIMONY BE OF SUCH A KIND, THAT ITS FALSEHOOD WOULD BE MORE IMPROBABLE, THAN THE FACT WHICH IT ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH ^*.’ If the reader thinks himself instructed by this discovery, I should be loth to envy him the pleasure he may derive from it.

SECTION I. There is no presumption, arising from human nature, against the miracles said to have been wrought in proof of Christianity.

FROM what hath been evinced in the fourth and fifth sections of the former part, with regard to religion in general, two corollaries are clearly deducible in fa­vour of Christianity. One is, That the presumption arising from the dignity of the end, to say the least of it, can in no religion be pleaded with greater advan­tage, than in the Christian. The other is, That the presumption arising from the religious affection, in­stead of weakening, corroborates the evidence of the gospel. The faith of Jesus was promulgated, and gained ground, not with the assistance, but in de­fiance, of all the religious zeal and prejudices of the times.

[Page 63] IN order to invalidate the second corollary, it will possibly be urged, that proselytes to a new religion, may be gained at first; either by address and elo­quence, or by the appearances of uncommon sanctity, and rapturous fervours of devotion; that if once people have commenced proselytes, the transition to enthusiasm is almost unavoidable; and that enthu­siasm will fully account for the utmost pitch both of credulity and falseness.

Admitting that a few converts might be made by the aforesaid arts, it is subversive of all the laws of probability, to imagine, that the strongest prepos­sessions, fortified with that vehement abhorence which contradiction in religions principles rarely sails to excite, should be so easily vanquished in multi­tudes. Besides, the very pretext of supporting the doctrine by miracles, if a false pretext, would of ne­cessity do unspeakable hurt to the cause. The pre­tence of miracles will quickly attract the attention of all to whom the new doctrine is published. The influence which address and eloquence, appearances of sanctity and fervours of devotion, would otherwise have had, however great, will be superseded by the consideration of what is infinitely more striking and decisive. The miracles will therefore first be can­vassed, and canvassed with a temper of mind the most unfavourable to conviction. 'Tis not solely on the testimony of the evangelists that Christians be­lieve the gospel, tho' that testimony appears in all respects such as merits the highest regard; but it is on the success of the gospel; it is on the testimony, as we may justy [...] of the numberless proselytes [Page 64]that were made to a religon, opposing all the religi­ous professions then in the world, and appealing, for the satisfaction of every body, to the visible and miraculous interposition of Heaven in its favour. The witnesses considered in this light, and in this light they ought to be considered, will be found more than 'a sufficient number:' and tho' perhaps there were few of them, what the author would deno­minate 'men of education and learning;' yet, which is more essential, they were generally men of good sense, and knowledge enough to secure them against all delusion, as to those plain facts for which they gave their testimony; men who, (in the common acceptation of the words) neither did, nor could derive to themselves either interest or honour by their attestations, but did thereby, on the contrary, evi­dently abandon all hopes of both.

It deserves also to be remembered, that there is here no contradictory testimony, notwithstanding that both the founder of our religion, and his adhe­rents, were from the first surrounded by inveterate enemies, who never ‘esteemed the matter too in­considerable to deserve their attention or regard;’ and who, as they could not want the means, gave evident proofs that they wanted not the inclination to detect the fraud, if there had been any fraud to be detected. They were jealous of their own reputa­tion and authority, and foresaw but too clearly, that the success of Jesus would give a fatal blow to both. As to the testimonies themselves, we may permit the author to try them by his own rules ^*. [Page 65]There is here no opposition of testimony; there is no apparent ground of suspicion from the character of the witnesses; there is no interest which they could have in imposing on the world; there is not a small number of witnesses, they are innumerable. Do the historians of our Lord deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation? Do they fall into the op­posite extreme of using too violent asseverations? So far from both, that the most amazing instances of divine power, and the most interesting events, are related without any censure or reflection of the wri­ters on persons, parties, actions, or opinions; with such an unparallelled and unaffected simplicity, as demonstrates, that they were neither themselves ani­mated by passion like enthusiasts, nor had any design of working on the passions of their readers. The greatest miracles are recorded, with as little appear­ance either of doubt or wonder in the writer, and with as little suspicion of the reader's incredulity, as the most ordinary incidents: A manner as unlike that of impostors as of enthusiasts; a manner in which those writers are altogether singular; and I will add a manner which can on no supposion be tolerably ac­counted for, but that of the truth, and not of the truth only, but of the notoriety, of the events which they re­lated. They spoke like people, who had themselves been long familiarized to such acts of omnipotence and grace. They spoke like people, who knew that ma­ny of the most marvellous actions they related, had been so publicly performed, and in the presence of multitudes alive at the time of their writing, as to be uncontrovertible, and as in fact not to have been con­verted, [Page 66]even by their bitterest foes. They could bold­ly appeal on this head to their enemies. A man, say they, spaking of their master ^*, approved of God among you, by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as YE YOURSELVES ALSO KNOW The objections of Christ's persecutors a­gainst his doctrine, those objections also which regard the nature of his miracles, are, together with his an­swers, faithfully recorded by the sacred historians; 'tis strange, if the occasion had been given, that we have not the remotest hint of any objections against the reality of his miracles, and a confutation of those ob­jections.

BUT passing the manner in which the first proselytes may be gained to a new religion, and supposing some actually gained, no matter how to the faith of Jesus; can it be easily accounted for, that, even with the help of those early converts, this religion should have been propagated in the world, on the false pretence of miracles? Nothing more easily, says the author. Those original propagators of the gospel have been deceived themselves; for ‘a religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality ^†.’

Were this admitted, it would not in the present case, remove the difficulty. He must not only himself imagine he sees what has no reality, he must make every body present, those who are no en­thusiasts, nor even friends, nay he must make enemies also imagine they see the same thing which he ima­gines [Page 67]he sees; for the miracles of Jesus were ac­acknowledged by those who persecuted him.

That an enthusiast is very liable to be imposed on, in whatever favours the particular species of enthu­siasm, with which he is affected, none, who knows any thing of the human heart, will deny. But still this frailty hath its limits. For my own part, I cannot find examples of any, even among enthu­siasts, (unless to the conviction of every body they were distracted) who did not see and hear in the same manner as other people. Many of this tribe have mistaken the reveries of a heated imagination, for the communications of the Divine Spirit, who never, in one single instance, mistook the operations of their external senses. Without marking this difference, we should make no distinction between the enthusiastic character and the frantic, which are in themselves evidently distinct. How shall we then account from enthusiasm, for the testimony given by the apostles, concerning the resurrection of their master, and his ascension into heaven, not to mention innumerable other facts? In these it was impossible that any, who in the use of their reason were but one remove from Bedlamites, should have been deceived. Yet, in the present case, the unbeliever must even say more than this, and, accumulating absurdity upon absurdity, must affirm, that the apostles were deceived as to the resurrection and ascension of their master, notwith­standing that they themselves had concerted the plan of stealing his body, and concealing it.

BUT this is not the only resource of the infidel. If he is driven from this strong hold, he can take refuge [Page 68]in another. Admit the apostles were not deceived themselves, they may nevertheless have been, thro' mere devotion and benevolence, incited to deceive the rest of mankind. The religionist, rejoins the author, ‘may know his narration to be false, and yet per­severe in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause ^*.’

Our religion, to use its own nervous language, teacheth us ^†, that we ought not to lie, or speak wickedly, not even for God; that we ought not to accept his person in judgment, or talk, or act deceitfully for him. But so very little, it must be owned, has this sentiment been attended to, even in the Christian world, that one would almost think, it contained a strain of virtue too sublime for the apprehension of the multitude. 'Tis therefore a fact not to be ques­tioned, that little pious frauds, as they are absurdly, not to say impiously, called, have been often prac­tised by ignorant zealots in support of a cause, which they firmly believed to be both true and holy. But in all such cases the truth and holiness of the cause are wholly independent of those artifices. A person may be persuaded of the former, who is too clear-sighted to be deceived by the latter: for even a full conviction of the truth of the cause is not, in the least, inconsistent with either the consciousness, or the detection of the frauds used in support of it. In the Romish church, for example, there are many zealous and orthodox believers, who are nevertheless incapable of being imposed on by the lying wonders, which some of their clergy have exhibited. The cir­cumstances [Page 69]of the apostles were widely different from the circumstances, either of those believers, or of their clergy. Some of the miraculous events which the apostles attested, were not only the evidences, but the distinguishing doctrines of the religion which they taught. There is therefore in their case an absolute inconsistency betwix a conviction of the truth of the cause, and the consciousness of the frauds used in support of it. Those frauds themselves, if I may so express my self, constituted the very essence of the cause. What were the tenets, by which they were distinguished, in their religious system, particularly from the Pharisees, who owned not only the unity and perfections of the Godhead, the existence of an­gels and demons, but the general resurrection, and future state of rewards and punishments? Were not these their peculiar tenets, That ‘Jesus, whom the Jews and Romans joined in crucifying without the gates of Jerusalem, had suffered that ignominious death, to make atonement for the sins of men ^*? that, in testimony of this, and of the divine acceptance, God hath raised him from the dead? that he had exalted him to his own right hand, to be a prince and a saviour, to give repentance to the peo­ple, and the remission of their sins ^†? that he is now our advocate with the father ^‡? that he will descend from heaven at the last day, to judge the world in righteousness ^§, and to receive his faithful disciples into heaven, to be forever with himself ^‖?’ These fundamental articles of their system, they [Page 70]must have known, deserved no better appellation than a string of lies, if we suppose them liars in the testi­mony they gave of the resurrection and ascen­sion of their master. If, agreeably to the Jewish hypothesis, they had, in a most wonderful and daring manner, stole by night the corpse from the se­pulchre, that on the false report of his resurrection, they might found the stupendous fabrick they had pro­jected among themselves, how was it possible they should conceive the cause to be either true or holy? They must have known, that in those cardinal points, on which all depends, they were false witnesses con­cerning God, wilful corrupters of the religion of their country, and public, though indeed disinterested in­cendiaries, whithersoever they went. They could not therefore enjoy even that poor solace, ‘that the end will sanctify the means:’ a solace with which the monk or anchoret silences the remostrances of his conscience, when in defence of a religion which he re­gards as certain, he, by some pitiful juggler-trick, imposeth on the credulity of the rabble. On the contrary, the whole scheme of the apostles must have been, and not only must have been, but must have ap­peared to themselves, a most audacious freedom with their Maker, a villainous imposition on the world, and I will add, a most foolish and ridiculous project of heaping ruin and disgrace upon themselves, with­out the prospect of any compensation in the present life, or reversion in the future.

ONCE more, can we account for so extraordinary a phenomenon, by attributing it to that most power­ful [Page 71]of all motives, as the author thinks it ^*, ‘an ambition to attain so sublime a character, as that of a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven?’

Not to mention, that such a towering ambition was but ill adapted to the mean rank, poor education, and habitual circumstances, of such men as the Apo­stles mostly had been; a desire of that kind, what­ever wonders it may effectuate when supported by enthusiasm, and faith, and zeal, must soon have been crushed by the outward, and to human appearance insurmountable difficulties and distresses they had to encounter; when quite unsupported from within by either faith, or hope, or the testimony of a good conscience; rather, I should have said, when they themselves were haunted from within by a consci­ousness of the blackest guilt, impiety, and baseness. Strange indeed it must be owned without a parrallel that in such a cause, and in such circumstances, not only one, but all, should have the resolution to per­severe to the last, in spite of infamy and torture; and that no one among so many confederates; should be induced to betray the dreadful secret.

THUS it appears, that no address in the FOUNDER of our religion, that no enthusiastic credulity, no pious frauds, no ambitious views in the FIRST CONVERTS, will account for its propagation on the plea of mira­cles, if false; and that consequently there is no pre­sumption arising from human nature against the mira­cles said to have been wrought in proof of Christiani­ty.

SECTION. II. There is no presumption arising from the history of man­kind, against the miracles said to have been wrought in proof of Christianity.

IN the foregoing section, I reasoned only from the knowledge that experience affords us of human na­ture, and of the motives by which men are influenced in their conduct. I come now to the examination of facts, that I may know whether the history of man­kind will invalidate or corroborate my reasonings.

THE essayist is confident, that all the evidence resulting hence is on his side. Nay so unquestionable a truth does this appear to him, that he never attempts to prove it: he always presupposeth it, as a point universally acknowledged. 'Men in all ages,' we learn from a passage already quoted, ‘have been much imposed on, by ridiculous stories of miracles ascribed to new systems of religion ^*.’ Again he asserts, that ‘the violations of truth are more com­mon in the testimony concerning miracles, than in that concerning any other religious matter of fact ^†.’ These assertions, however, tho' used for the same purpose, the attentive reader will ob­serve, are far from conveying the same sense, or be­ing of equal weight in the argument. The difference hath been marked in the fourth section of the first part of this tract. The oracular predictions among the ancient Pagans, and the pretended wonders per­formed [Page 73]by capuchins and friars, by itinerant or stati­onary teachers among the Roman Catholics, the au­thor will doubtless reckon among religious miracles; but he can with no propriety denominate them, mi­racles ascribed to a new system of religion ^†. Now, 'tis with those of the class last mentioned, and with those only, that I am concerned; for 'tis only to them that the miracles wrought in proof of christianity bear any analogy.

I shall then examine impartially this bold assertion, That ‘men in all ages have been much imposed on, [Page 74]by ridiculous stories of miracles ascribed to new sys­tems of religion.’ For my part, I am fully satisfied, that there is not the shadow of truth in it: and I am utterly at a loss to conceive what could induce an author so well versed in the annals both of ancient and mo­dern times as Mr Hume, in such a positive manner to advance it. I believe it will require no elaborate dis­quisition to evince, that these two, JUDAISM and CHRISTANITY, are of all that have subsisted, or now subsist in the world, the only religions, which claim to have been attended in their first publication with the evidence of miracles. It deserves also to be remarked, that it is more in conformity to common language, and incidental distinctions which have arisen, than to strict propriety, that I call Judaism and Christanity, two religions. 'Tis true, the Jewish creed, in the days of our Saviour, having been corrupted by rabbinical tra­ditions, stood in many respects, and at this day stands in direct opposition to the Gospel. But it is not in this acceptation that I use the word Judaism. Such a creed, I am sensible, we can no more denominate the doctrine of the Old Testament, than we can denominate the creed of Pope Pius the doctrine of the New. And truly the fate which both institutions, that of Moses, and that of Christ, have met with among men, hath been in many respects extremely similar. But when, on the contrary, we consider the religion of the Jews, not as the system of faith and practice, which presently obtains, or heretofore hath obtained among that people; but solely as the religion that is revealed in the law and the prophets, we must acknow­ledge, that in this institution are contained the rudi­ments [Page 75]of the gospel. The same great plan carried on by the Divine Providence, for the recovery and final happiness of mankind, is the subject of both dispen­sations. They are by consequence closely connected. In the former we are acquainted with the occasion and rise, in the latter more sully with the progress and com­pletion of this benign scheme. 'Tis for this reason that the scriptures of the Old Testament, which alone contain the authentic religion of the SYNAGOGUE, have ever been acknowledged in the CHURCH, an es­sential part of the gospel-revelation. The apostles and evangelists in every part of their writings, presuppose the truth of the Mosaic economy, and often found both their doctrine and arguments upon it. 'Tis therefore, I affirm, only in proof of this one series of revelations, that the aid of miracles hath with success been pretended to.

CAN the PAGAN religion, can, I should rather say, any of the numberless religions (for they are totally distinct) known by the common name of Pagan, produce any claim of this kind that will me­rit our attention? If the author knows of any, I wish he had mentioned it; for in all antiquity, as far as my acquaintance with it reacheth, I can recollect no such claim. However, that I may not, on the one hand, appear to pass the matter too slightly; or, on the other, lose myself, as Mr Hume expresses it, in too wide a field; I shall briefly consider, whether the ancient religions of Greece or Rome (which of all the species of heathenish superstition are on many ac­counts the most remarkable) can present a claim of this nature. Will it be said, that that monstrous [Page 76]heap of fables we find in ancient bards, relating to the genealogy, productions, amours, and atchievements, of the gods, are the miracles on which Greek and Roman Paganism claims to be founded?

If one should talk in this manner, I must remind him, first, that these are by no means exhibited as EVIDENCES, but as the THEOLOGY itself; the poets always using the same affirmative style concerning what passed in heaven, in hell, and in the ocean, where men could not be spectators, as concerning what passed upon the earth: secondly, that all those mythological tales are confessedly recorded many cen­turies after they are supposed to have happened; no voucher, no testimony, nothing that can deserve the name of evidence having been produced, or even al­ledged, in proof of them; thirdly, that the intention of the writers seems to be solely the amusement, not the conviction of their readers; that accordingly no writer scruples to model the mythology to his par­ticular taste, or rather caprice; but considering this as a province subject to the laws of Parnassus, all agree in arrogating here the immemorial privilege of poets, to say and feign, unquestioned, what they please; and fourthly, that at least several of their narrations are al­legorical, and as plainly intended to convey some physical or moral instruction, as any of the apologues of Aesop. But to have said even thus much in refuta­tion of so absurd a plea, will perhaps to many readers appear superfluous.

LEAVING therefore the endless absurdities and in­coherent fictions of idolaters, I shall inquire, in the next place, whether the MAHOMETAN worship [Page 77](which in its speculative principles appears more rati­onal) pretends to have been built on the evidence of miracles.

Mahomet, the founder of this profession, openly and frequently, as all the world knows, disclaimed such evidence. He frankly owned that he had no commission nor power to work miracles, being sent of God to the people only as a preacher. Not in­deed but that there are things mentioned in the revela­tion he pretended to give them, which, if true, would have been miraculous; such are the nocturnal visits of the angel Gabriel, (not unlike those secret inter­views, which Numa, the institutor of the Roman rites, affirmed that he had with the goddess Egeria) his getting from time to time parcels of the uncreated book transmitted to him from heaven, and his most a­mazing night-journey. But these miracles could be no evidences of his mission. Why? Because no per­son was witness to them. On the contrary, it was because his adherents had previously and implicitly believed his apostleship, that they admitted things so incredible, on his bare declaration. There is indeed one miracle, and but one, which he urgeth against the infidels, as the main support of his cause; a mi­racle, for which even we, in this distant region and period, have not only the evidence of testimony, but, if we please to use it, all the evidence which the contemporaries and countrymen of this military a­postle ever enjoyed. The miracle I mean is the ma­nifest divinity, or supernatural excellence, of the scriptures which he gave them; a miracle, concern­ing [Page 78]which I shall only say, that as it falls not under the cognisance of the senses, but of a much more fal­lible tribunal, taste in composition, and critical dis­cernment, so a principle of less efficacy than enthu­siasm, even the slightest partiality, may make a man, in this particular, imagine he perceives what hath no reality. Certain it is, that notwithstanding the many defiances which the prophet gave his enemies sometimes to produce ten chapters, sometimes one, that could bear to be compared with an equal portion of the perspi­picuous book ^*, they seem not in the least to have been convinced, that there was any thing miraculous in the matter. Nay this sublime performance, so highly venerated by every Mussulman, they were not afraid to blaspheme as contemptible, calling it, ‘A confused heap of dreams,’ and the silly fables of "ancient times ^†."

[Page 79] Passing therefore this equivocal miracle, if I may call it so, which I imagine was of very little use in [Page 80] making proselytes, whatever use it might have had, in confirming and tutoring these already made; it may [Page 81]be worth while to enquire, what were the reasons, that an engine of such amazing influence was never employed by one who assumed a character so eminent, as the chief of God's apostles, and the seal of the prophets? Was it the want of address to manage an impositi­on of this nature? None who knows the history of this extraordinary personage, will suspect that he [Page 82]wanted either the genius to contrive, or the reso­lution and dexterity to execute, any practicable ex­pedient for promoting his grand design; which was no less than that extensive despotism, both religious and political, he at length acquired. Was it that he had too much honesty to concert and carry on so gross an artifice? Those who belive him to have been an impostor in pretending a divine mission, will hardly suspect him of such delicacy in the methods he would take to accomplish his aim. But in fact there is no colour of reason for such a suggestion. There was no prodigy, no miraculous interposition, which he hesitated to give out, however extravagant when he saw it would contribute to his ends. Pro­digies of which they had no other evidence but his own allegation, he knew his adversaries might deny, but could not disprove. His scruples therefore, we may well conclude, proceeded not from probity, but from pru­dence; and were solely against such miracles, as must be subjected to the scrutiny of other people's senses. Was it that miracle-working had before that time become so stale a device, that instead of gaining him the admiration of his countrymen, it would have ex­posed him to their laughter and contempt? The most cursory perusal of the Alcoran, will, to every man of sense, afford an unanswerable confutation of this hypothesis. ^* Lastly, was it that he lived in an en­lightened [Page 83]age, and amongst a civilized and learned people, who were too quick-sighted to be deceived by tricks, which among barbarians might have pro­duced the most astonishing effects? Quite the reverse. He lived in a barbarous age, and amongst an illiterate people, with whom, if with any, he had reason to be­lieve the grossest deceit would have proved successful.

What pity was it, that Mahomet had not a coun­sellor so deeply versed in human nature as the essayist, [Page 84]who could have assured him, that there needed but effrontery and enterprise; that with these auxiliaries he had reason to hope the most impudent pretences would be crowned with success? The too timid prophet would doubtless have remonstrated against this spirited counsel, insisting, that it was one thing to satisfy friends, and another thing to silence or con­vert enemies; that it was one thing to impose on mens intellects, and another thing to deceive their sen­ses: that tho' an attempt of the last kind should suc­ceed with some, yet if the fraud were detected by any, and he might expect that his adversaries would exert themselves in order to detect it, the whole my­stery of craft would be divulged, his friends would become suspicious, and the spectators of such pre­tended miracles would become daily more prying and critical; that the consequences would infallibly prove fatal to the whole design; and that therefore such a cheat was on no account whatever to be risked. To this methinks I hear the other replying with some earnestness, ‘Make but the trial, and you will cer­tainly find, that what judgment, nay and what senses your auditors have, they will renounce by principle in those sublime and mysterious subjects; they will imagine they see and hear what has no reality, nay whatever you shall desire that they should see and hear. Their credulity (forgive a freedom which my zeal inspires) will increase your impudence, and your impudence will overpower their credulity. The smallest spark may here kin­dle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricu­larum [Page 85]swallow greedily, without examination, what­ever soothes superstition and promotes wonder.’ Whether the judicious reader will reckon that the prophet or his counsellor would have had the better in this debate, I shall not take upon me to decide. One perhaps (if I might be indulged in a conjecture) whose notions are founded in metaphysical refine­ments, or whose resolutions are influenced by ora­torical declamation, will incline to the opinion of the latter. One whose sentiments are the result of a practical knowledge of mankind, will probably sub­cribe to the judgment of the former, and will allow, that in this instance the CAPTAIN-GENERAL and PROPHET of Islamism acted the more prudent part.

Shall we then say, that it was a more obscure thea­tre on which JESUS CHRIST appeared? Were his spectators more ignorant, or less adverse? The con­trary of both is manifest. It may indeed be affirmed with truth, that the religion of the wild Arabs was more repugnant to the doctrine of Mahomet, than the religious dogmas of the Jews were to those of Jesus. But we shall err egregiously, if we conclude thence, that to this repugnancy the repugnancy of disposition in the professors of these religions must be proportionate. 'Tis a fine observation of the most piercing and comprehensive genius, which hath ap­peared in this age. That ‘tho' men have a very strong tendency to idolatry, they are nevertheless but little attached to idolatrous religions; that tho' they have no great tendency to spiritual ideas, they are nevertheless strongly attached to religions which [Page 86]enjoin the adoration of a spiritual being ^*.’ Hence an attachment in JEWS, CHRISTIANS, and MAHO­METANS to their respective religions, which was never displayed by POLYTHEISTS of any denomination. But its spirituality was not the only cause of adherence which the Jews had to their religion. Every physi­cal, every moral motive concurred in that people to rivet their attachment, and make them oppose with violence, whatever bore the face of innovation. Their religion and polity were so blended as scarce to be distinguishable: this engaged their patriotism. They were selected of God preferably to other na­tions: this inflamed their pride ^†. They were all under one spiritual head, the highpriest, and had their solemn f [...]stivals celebrated in one temple: this strengthened their union. The ceremonies of their public worship were magnificent: this flattered their senses. These ceremonies also were numerous, and occupied a great part of their time: this, to all the other grounds of attachment, superadded the force of habit. On the contrary, the s [...]mplicity of the gospel, as well as the spirit of humility, and moderation, and charity, and universality, (if I may be allowed that term) which it breathed, could not fail to alarm a people of such a cast, and awaken, as in fact it did, the most furious opposition. Accordingly, Christia­nity had fifty times more success amongst idolaters, than it had among the Jews. I am therefore war­ranted to a [...]ert, that if the miracles of our Lord and [Page 87]his apostles had been an imposture, there could not on the face of the earth, have been chosen for ex­hibiting them, a more unfavourable theatre than Judea. On the other hand, had it been any where practicable, by a display of false wonders, to make converts to a new religion, no where could a project of this nature have been conducted with greater pro­bability of success than in Arabia. So much for the contrast there is betwixt the Christian MESSIAH and the ORPHAN CHARGE of Abu Taleb. So plain it is, that the mosque yields entirely the plea of miracles to the synagogue and the church.

BUT from HEATHENS and MAH [...]METANS, let us turn our eyes to the CHRISTIAN world. The only object here, which merits our attention, as coming under the denomination of miracles ascribed to a new system, and as what may be thought to rival in crebibility the miracles of the gospel, are those said to have been performed in the primitive church, after the times of the apostles, and after the finishing of the sacred canon. These will probably be ascrib­ed to a new system, since Christianity, for some cen­turies, was not (as the phrase is) established, or (to speak more properly) corrupted by human authority; and since even after such establishment, there re­mained long in the empire a considerable mixture of idolaters. We have the greater reason here to consider this topic, as it hath of late been the subject of very warm dispute, and as the cause of Christianity itself (which I conceive is totally distinct) seems to have been strangely confounded with it. From the manner in which the argument hath been conducted, [Page 88]who is there that would not conclude that both must stand or fall together? Nothing however can be more groundless, nothing more injurious to the religion of Jesus, than such a conclusion.

The learned writer who hath given rise to this controversy, not only acknowledges, that the falsity of the miracles mentioned by the fathers, is no evi­dence of the falsity of the miracles recorded in scrip­ture, but that there is even a presumption in favour of these, arising from those forgeries, which he pre­tends to have detected ^*. The justness of the re­mark contained in this acknowledgment, will appear more clearly from the following observations.

Let it be observed, first, that supposing numbers of people are ascertained of the truth of some mira­cles, whether their conviction arise from sense or from testimony, it will surely be admitted as a conse­quence, that in all such persons, the presumption against miracles from uncommonness must be great­ly diminished, in several perhaps totally extinguish­ed.

Let it be observed, secondly, that if true miracles have been employed successfully in support of cer­tain religious tenets, this success will naturally sug­gest to those, who are zealous of propagating fa­vourite opinions in religion, to recur to the plea of miracles, as the most effectual expedient for accom­plishing their end. This they will be encouraged to do on a double account: first, they know, that peo­ple from recent experience, are made to expect such [Page 89]a confirmation; secondly, they know, that in con­sequence of this experience, the incredibility, which is the principal obstruction to such an undertaking, is in a manner removed: and there is, on the con­trary, as in such circumstances there certainly would be, a promptness in the generality to receive them.

Add to these, that if we consult the history of mankind, or even our own experience, we shall be convinced, that hardly hath one wonderful event actually happened in any country, even where there have not been such visible temptations to forgery, which hath not given rise to false rumours of other events similar, but still more wonderful. Hardly hath any person or people atchieved some exploits truly extraordinary, to whom common report hath not quickly attributed many others, as extraordinary at least, if not impossible. As fame may, in this respect, be compared to a multiplying glass, reasona­ble people almost always conclude in the same way concerning both; we know that there is not a real object corresponding to every appearance exhibited, at the same time we know that there must be some objects to give rise to the appearances.

I should therefore only beg of our adversaries, that, for argument's sake, they will suppose that the miracles related in the New Testament were really performed; and then, that they will candidly tell us, what, according to their notions of human nature, would, in all likelihood, have been the consequences. They must be very partial to a darling hypothesis, or little acquainted with the world, who will hesitate to own, that, on this supposition, 'tis not barely proba­ble, [Page 90]but certain, that f [...] a few endowed with the miraculous power, there would soon have arisen numbers of pretenders; that from some miracles well attested, occasion would have been taken to propagate innumerable false reports. If so, with what colour of justice can the detection of many spurious reports among the primitive Christians be considered as a presumption against those miracles, the reality of which is the most plausible; nay the only plausible account that can be given of the origin of such reports? The presumption is too evidently on the opposite side to need illustration.

'Tis not my intention here to patronize either side of the question which the Doctor's Free inquiry hath occasioned. All that concerns my argument is, bare­ly to evince, and this I imagine hath been evinced, that, granting the Doctor's plea to be well founded, there is no presumption arising hence, which tends in the lowest degree to discredit the miracles record­ed in holy writ; nay, that there is a contrary presumption. In further confirmation of this truth, let me ask, Were there ever, in any region of the globe, any similar pretensions to miraculous powers, before that memorable era, the publication of the gospel? Let me ask again, Since those pretensions ceased, hath it ever been in the power of the most daring enthusiast, to revive them any where in favour of a new system? Authentic miracles will, for a time, give a currency to counterfeits; but as the former be­come less frequent, the latter become more suspect­ed, till at length they are treated with general con­tempt, and disappear. The danger then is, lest [Page 91]men, ever prone to extremes, become as extrava­gently incredulous, as formerly they were credulous. Laziness, the true source of both, always inclines us to admit or reject in the gross, without entering on the irk some task of considering things in detail. In the first instance, knowing some such events to be true, they admit all without examination; in the se­cond, knowing some to be false, they reject all with­out examination. A procedure this, which, how­ever excusable in the unthinking herd, is altogether unworthy a philosopher.

But it may be thought, that the claim to miracles in the early ages of the church, continued too long to be supported solely on the credit of those perform­ed by our Lord and his apostles. In order to ac­count for this, it ought to be attended to, that in the course of some centuries, the situation of affairs, with regard to religion, was really inverted. Educa­tion, and even superstition, and bigotry, and popula­rity, which the miracles of Christ and his apostles had to encounter; came gradually to be on the side of those wonders, said to have been performed in af­ter times. If they were potent enemies, and such as we have reason to believe nothing but the force of truth could vanquish; they were also potent allies, and may well be supposed able to give a temporary triumph to falsehood, especially when it had few or no enemies to combat. But in discoursing on the prodigies said to have been performed in primitive times, I have been insensibly carried from the point, to which I proposed in this section to confine myself. From inquiring into miracles ascribed to new sy­stems [Page 92]I have proceeded to those pleaded in confir­mation of systems previously established and generally received.

LEAVING so remote a period, I propose, lastly, to inquire, whether, since that time, any heresiarch whatever, any founder of a new sect, or publisher of a new system, hath pretended to miraculous pow­ers. If the essayist had known of any such pretender, he surely would have mentioned him. But as he hath not afforded us any light on this subject, I shall just recall to the remembrance of my reader, those persons who, either as innovators or reformers, have made some figure in the church. They were the persons from whom, if from any, a plea of this kind might naturally have been expected; especially at a time when Europe was either plunged in barbarism, or but beginning to emerge out of it,

Was ever then this high prerogative, the power of working miracles, claimed or exercised by the founders of the sects of the Waldenses and Albigen­ses? Did Wickliff in England pretend to it? Did Huss or Jerom in Bohemia? To come nearer mo­cern times, Did Luther in Germany, Zuinglius in Switzerland, Calvin in France, or any other of the reformers, advance this plea? Do such of them as are authors, mention in their writings any miracles they performed, or appeal to them as the evidences of their doctrine? Do contemporary historians al­ledge, that they challenged the saith of their auditors, in consequence of such supernatural powers? I ad­mit, if they did, that their miracles might be ascri­bed to a new system. For tho' they pretended only [Page 93]to re-establish the Christian institution, in its native purity, expunging those pernicious interpolations, which a false philosophy had foisted into the doctrinal part, and Pagan superstition into the moral and the ritual; yet as the religion they inculcated, greatly differed from the faith and worship of the times, it might, in this respect, be denominated a new sy­stem; and would be encountered by all the violence and prejudice, which novelties in religion never fail to excite. Not that the want of real miracles was a presumption against the truth of their doctrine. The God of nature, who is the God of Christians, does nothing in vain. No new revelation was pretended to; consequently there was no occasion for such supernatural support. They appealed to the revelati­on formerly bestowed, and by all parties acknow­ledged, as to the proper rule in this controversy: they appealed to the reason of mankind as the judge; and the reason of mankind was a competent judge of the conformity of their doctrine to this unerring rule.

But how, upon the author's principles, shall we account for this moderation in the reformers? Were they, in his judgment, calm inquirers into truth? Were they dispassionate reasoners in defence of it? Far otherwise. He tells us, ‘They may safely be pronounced to have been universally inflamed with the highest enthusiasm ^*.’ And doubtless we cannot expect from this hand a more amiable picture of their disciples. May not we then, in our turn, safely pronounce, this writer himself being judge, that for a man to imagine he sees what hath no rea­lity, to impose in this manner not only on his own [Page 94]understanding, but even on his external senses, is a pitch of delusion higher than the highest enthusiasm can produce, and is to be imputed only to downright frenzy ^*?

[Page 95] Since the world began, there hath not appeared a more general propension to the wildest fanaticism, a greater degree of credulity in every claim that was made to the illapses of the Holy Spirit, or more tho­rough contempt of all established modes of worship, than appeared in this island about the middle of the last century. 'Tis astonishing, that when the minds of men were intoxicated with enthusiasm; when e­very new pretender to divine illuminations was quick­ly surrounded by a crowd of followers, and his most incoherent effusions greedily swallowed as the dictates of the Holy Ghost; that in such a Babel of sectaries, none are to be found, who advanced a claim to the power of working miracles; a claim which, in the author's opinion, tho' false, is easily supported, and wonderfully successful, especially among enthusiasts. Yet to Mr Hume himself, who hath written the history of that period, and who will not be accused of neglecting to mark the extravagancies effected by enthusiasm, I appeal whether this remark be just.

Will it be alledged as an exception that one or two frantic people among the Quakers, not the leaders of the party, did actually pretend to such a power? Let it be remembered, that this conduct had no other consequences, but to bring upon the pretenders such a general contempt, as in that fanatical and gloomy age, the most unintelligible jargon or glaring nonsense would never have been able to produce.

Will it be urged by the essayist, that even in the be­ginning of the present century, this plea was revived in Britain by the French prophets, a set of poor visiona­ries, who, by the barbarity with which they had been treated in their own country, had been wrought up [Page 96]to madness, before they took refuge in this? I must beg leave to remind him, that it is manifest, from the history of those delirious and unhappy creatures, that by no part of their conduct did they so effectually open the eyes of mankind naturally credulous, discredit their own inspirations, and ruin their cause, as by this, not less foolish than presumptuous pretence. Accor­dingly they are perhaps the only sect, which hath sprung up so lately, made so great a bustle for a while, and which is nevertheless at this day totally extinct. It deserves also to be remarked concerning this people, that though they were mad enough to imagine that they could restore a dead man to life; nay tho' they proceeded so far, as to determine and announce be­forehand the day and the hour of his resurrection; yet none of them were so distracted, as to imagine, that they had seen him rise; not one of them afterwards pretended, that their prediction had been fulfilled. Thus even a frenzy, which had quite disordered their intellects, could not in this instance overpower their senses.

UPON the whole, therefore, till some contrary ex­ample is produced, I may warrantably conclude,— that the religion of the BIBLE is the only religion ex­tant, which claims to have been recommended by the evidence of miracles;—that though in different ages and countries, numberless enthusiasts have arisen, ex­tremely few have dared to advance this plea;—that wherever any have had the boldness to recur to it, it hath proved the bane, and not the support, of their cause. Thus it hath been evinced, as was proposed, that there is no presumption arising from the history [Page 97]of the world, which can in the least invalidate the ar­gument from miracles, in defence of Christianity.

SECTION III. No miracles recorded by historians of other religions are subversive of the evidence arising from the miracles wrought in proof of Christianity, or can be considered as contrary testimony.

‘WHY is a miracle regarded as evidence of a religious doctrine?’ Or, ‘What connection is there between an act of power admitted to be supernatural, and the truth of a proposition pro­nounced by the person who exerts that power?’ These are questions, which some of our infidels have exulted in as unanswerable: and they are questions, which 'tis proper to examine a little; not so much for their own sake, as because a satisfactory answer to them may throw light on the subject of this sec­tion.

A man, I suppose, of an unblemished character, advanceth doctrines in religion, unknown before, but not in themselves apparently impious or absurd. We interrogate him about the manner wherein he attained the knowledge of those doctrines. He affirms, That by no process of reasoning, nor in any other natural way, did he discover them; but that they were re­vealed to him by the Spirit of God. It must be own­ed, there is a very strong presumption against the truth of what he says; and 'tis of consequence to inquire, whence that presumption ariseth. It is not primarily from any doubt of the man's integrity. If the fact he [Page 98]related, were of an ordinary nature, the reputation he has hitherto maintained would secure him from being suspected of an intended deceit. It is not from any absurdity or immoral tendency we perceive in the doctrine itself. It ariseth principally, if not solely from these two circumstances, the extreme uncommon­ness of such a revelation, and the great facility with which people of strong fancy, may in this particular impose upon themselves. The man, I supposed, ac­quaints us further, that God, when he communicated to him the truths he publishes, communicated also the power of working miracles; such as, of giving sight to the blind, and hearing to the deaf, of raising the dead, and making whole the maimed. 'Tis evident, that we have precisely the same presumption against his be­ing endued with such a power, as against his having obtained such a revelation. Two things are asserted: there is one presumption, and but one, against them; and it equally effects them both. Whatever proves either assertion, removes the only presumption which hinders our belief of the other. The man, I suppose, lastly, performs the miracles before us, which he said he was commissioned to perform. We can no longer doubt of a supernatural communication. We have now all the evidence which the integrity of the per­son could give us, as to an ordinary event attested by him, that the doctrine he delivers as from God, is from God, and therefore true.

Nay, we have more evidence than for any common fact, vouched by a person of undoubted probity. As God is both almighty and all-wise, if he hath bestow­ed on any so uncommon a privilege, 'tis highly pro­bable, that it is bestowed for promoting some end un­commonly [Page 99]important. And what more important end than to reveal to men that which may be condu­cive to their present and eternal happiness? It may be said, That, at most, it can only prove the inter­posal of some power superior to human: the being who interposeth is perhaps a bad being, and intends to deceive us. This it may be allowed, is possible; but the other is probable. For, first, From the light of nature, we have no positive evidence of the exist­ence of such intermediate beings, good or bad. Their existence is therefore only possible. Of the existence and perfections of God, we have the highest moral assurance. Secondly, If there were such beings, that raising the dead, and giving sight to the blind, should come within the verge of their power, is also but pos­sible; that they are within the sphere of omnipotence is certain. Thirdly, Whatever seems to imply a sus­pension of any of the established laws of nature, we may presume, with great appearance of reason, pro­ceeds from the author of nature, either immediately, or, which amounts, to the same thing mediately: that is, by the intervention of some agent impowered by him. To all these there will also accrue presumptions, not only, as was hinted already, from the character of the preacher, but from the apparent tendency of the doc­trine, and from the effect it produceth on those who receive it. And now the connection between the mi­racle and the doctrine is obvious. The miracle re­moves the improbability of a supernatural communi­cation of which it is in fact an irrefragable evidence. This improbability, which was the only obstacle, be­ing removed, the doctrine hath, at least, all the evidence [Page 100]of a common fact, attested by a man of known virtue and good sense.

In order to illustrate this further, I shall recur to the instance I have already had occasion to consider, of the Dutchman and the King of Siam. I shall sup­pose, that, besides the account given by the former of the freezing of water in Holland, he had informed the prince of the astonishing effects produced by gun­powder, with which the latter had been entirely unac­quainted. Both accounts appear to him alike incredi­ble, or, if you please, absolutely impossible. Some time afterwards, the Dutchman gets imported into the kingdom a sufficient quantity of gunpowder, with the necessary artillery. He informs the monarch of this acquisition; who having permitted him to make experiments on some of his cattle and buildings, per­cieves, with inexpressible amazement, that all the European had told him, of the celerity and violence with which this destructive powder operates, is strict­ly conformable to truth. I ask any considerate per­son, Would not this be enough to restore the stranger to the Indian's good opinion, which, I suppose, his former experienced honesty had entitled him to? Would it not remove the incredibility of the account he had given of the freezing of water in northern coun­tries? Yet, if abstractly considered, what connec­tion is there between the effects of gunpowder and the effects of cold? But the presumption arising from miracles, in favour of the doctrine published by the performer, as divinely inspired, must be incompa­rably stronger; since, from what hath been said, it appears to have several peculiar circumstances, which [Page 101]add weight to it. 'Tis evident, then, that miracles are a proper proof, and perhaps the only proper proof, of a revelation from Heaven. But 'tis also evident, that miracles may be wrought for other purposes, and may not be intended as proofs of any doctrine what­soever.

THUS much being premised, I shall examine ano­ther very curious argument of the essayist: ‘There is no testimony,’ says he, ‘for any prodigy, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnes­ses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of the testimony, but even the testimony destroys itself ^*.’ In order to illustrate this strange posi­tion, he observes, that, ‘in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Tur­key, of Siam, and of China, should all of them be established on any solid foundation. Every mira­cle therefore pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions, (and all of them abound in miracles) as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed, so it has the same force, tho' more indirectly, to over­throw every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other.’ Never did an author [Page 102]more artfully avail himself of indefinite expressions. With what admirable sleght does he vary his phra­ses, so as to make the inadvertent reader look upon them as synonymous, when in fact their significati­ons are totally distinct? Thus what, by a most ex­traordinary idiom, is called at first, ‘miracles wrought in a religion,’ we are next to regard, as 'miracles attributed to a particular system,' and last­ly, as ‘miracles, the direct scope of which is to establish that system.’ Every body, I will venture to say, in beginning to read the sentence, if he forms any notion of what the author means by a 'miracle wrought in a religion,' understands it barely as a ‘miracle wrought among those who profess a particular religion,’ the words appearing to be used in the same latitude, as when we call the tra­ditional tales current among the Jews, tho' they should have no relation to religion, Jewish tales; and those in like manner Mahometan or Pagan tales, which are current among Mahometans or Pagans. Such a miracle, the reader, ere he is aware, is brought to consider as a miracle attributed to a par­ticular system; nay further, as a ‘miracle, the direct scope of which is to establish that system.’ Yet nothing can be conceived more different than the meaning of these expressions, which are here jum­bled together as equivalent.

'Tis plain, that all the miracles of which there is any record, come under the first denomination. They are all supposed to have been wrought before men, or among men; and wherever there are men, there is religion of some kind or other. Per­haps [Page 103]too all may, in a very improper sense, be attri­buted to a religious system. They all imply an in­terruption of the ordinary course of nature. Such an interruption, wherever it is observed, will be ascribed to the agency of those divinities that are a­dored by the observers, and so may be said to be attributed by them to their own system. But where are the miracles (those of holy writ excepted) of which you can say with propriety, it is their direct scope to establish a particular system? Must we not then be strangely blinded by the charms of a few am­biguous terms, if we are made to confound things so widely different? Yet this confusion is the very basis, on which the author founds his reasoning, and rears this tremendous doctrine; That ‘a mira­cle of Mahomet, or any of his successors,’ and, by parity of reason, a miracle of Christ, or any of his apostles, ‘is refuted (as if it had been mentioned, and had in express terms, been contradicted) by the testimony of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Taci­tus, and of all the authors, Chinese, Grecian, and Roman Catholic, who have related any mira­cles in their particular religions.’ Here all the miracles, that have been related by men of different religions, are blended, as coming under the common denomination of miracles, the direct scope of which was to establish those particular religious systems; an insinuation, in which there is not even the shadow of truth.

That the reader may be satisfied on this point, I must beg his attention to the following observations concerning the miracles of profane history. First, Many facts are related as miraculous, where we may [Page 104]admit the fact, without acknowledging the miracle. Instances of this kind we have in relations concern­ing comets, eclipses, meteors, earthquakes, and suchlike. Secondly, The miracles may be admitted as genuine, and the manner in which historians ac­count for them, rejected as absurd. The one is a matter of testimony, the other of conjecture. In this a man is influenced by education, by prejudices, by received opinions. In every country, as was ob­served already, men will recur to the theology of the place, for the solution of every phenomenon sup­posed miraculous. But, that it was the scope of the miracle to support the theology, is one thing; and that fanciful men thought they discovered in the theo­logy the causes of the miracle, is another. The in­habitants of Lystra accounted, from the principles of their own religion, for the miracle performed in their city by Paul and Barnabas ^*. Was it therefore the scope of that miracle to support the Lycaonian religion? Thirdly, Many miracles are recorded, as produced directly by Heaven without the ministra­tion of men: by what construction are these disco­vered to be proofs of a particular system? Yet these also, wherever they happen, will be accounted for by the natives of the country, from the princi­ples of their own superstition. Had any of the Pa­gan citizens escaped the ruin in which Sodom was miraculously involved, they would doubtless have sought for the cause of this destruction in the establish­ed mode of polytheism, and would probably have imputed it to the vengeance of some of their deities, incurred by the neglect of some frivolous ceremony. [Page 105]Would it therefore have been the scope of the miracle to confirm this nonsense? Fourthly, Even miracles said to have been performed by a man, are no eviden­ces of the truth of that man's opinions; such, I mean, as he pretends not to have received by revela­tion, but by the excercise of reason, by education, or by information from other men; no more than a man's being endowed with bodily strenth greater than ordinary, would prove him to be superior to others in his mental saculties. I conclude with de­claring, that if instances shall be produced, of mira­cles wrought by men of probity, in proof of doctrines which they affirm to have been revealed to them from Heaven, and which are repugnant to the doctrine of the Bible, then I shall think it equitable to admit, that religious miracles contradict one another. Then will reasonable people be reduced to the dilemma, either of disproving the allegations on one side, or of acknowledging that miracles can be no evidence of revelation. No attempt however hath as yet been made by any writer to produce an instance of this kind.

'But will nothing less satisfy?' replies the author. ‘Will not the predictions of augurs and oracles, and the intimations said to have been given by the gods or saints in dreams and visions, of things not other­wise knowable by those to whom they were thus intimated; will not these, and suchlike prodigies, serve in some degree as evidence?’ As evidence of what? Shall we say of any religious principles con­veyed at the same time by revelation? No, 'tis not even pretended, that there were any such principles [Page 106]so conveyed: but as evidence of principles which had been long before entertained, and which were originally imbibed from education, and from education only. That the evidence here, supposing the truth of the facts, is at best but very indirect, and by no means on the same footing with that of the miracles re­corded in the gospel, might be easily evinced, if there were occasion. But there is in reality no occasion, since there is no such evidence of the facts as can justly intitle them to our notice. Let it be remembered, that, in the fourth section of the first part, it was shown, that there is the greatest dis­parity, in respect of evidence, betwixt miracles per­formed in proof of a religion to be established, and in contradiction to opinions generally received; and mi­racles performed, on the contrary, in support of a religion already established, and in confirmation of opi­nions generally received; that, in the former case, there is the strongest persumption for the miracles, in the latter against them. Let it also be remem­bered, that in the preceding section it was shown, that the religion of the Bible is the only religion ex­tant, which claims to have been ushered into the world by miracles; that this prerogative neither the Pagan religion, the Mahometan, nor the Roman-Catholic, can, with any appearance of reason, ar­rogate; and that, by consequence, there is one of the strongest presumptions possible for the miracles of the gospel, which is not only wanting in the miracles of other religions, but which is contrasted by the strongest presumption possible against these miracles. And tho' this presumption should not, in all cases, [Page 107]be accounted absolutely insuperable, we must at least say, it gives an immense superiority to the proofs of Christianity. 'Twere an endless and a fruitless task to canvass particularly the evidence of all the pre­tended miracles either of Paganism or Popery, (for on this head Mahometism is much more modest) but as the author hath selected some, which he considers as the best attested, of both religions, these shall be examined severally in the two subsequent sections. From this examination a tolerable judgment may be formed concerning the pretensions of these two spe­cies of superstition.

But from what hath been said, it is evident, that the contrariety which the author pretends to have dis­covered in the miracles said to have been wrought, as he expresseth it, in different religions, vanishes entirely on a close inspection. He is even sensible of this himself; and, as is customary with orators, the more inconclusive his reasons are, so much the more positive are his assertions. "This argument," says he, "may appear over subtile and refined;" indeed so subtile and refined, that it is invisible altoge­ther; ‘but— is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues di­stant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.’ After the particle but, with which this clause begins, the reader naturally expects such an explication of the argument, as will convince him, that tho' subtile and refined, it hath [Page 108] solidity and strength. Instead of this, he hath only the author's word warranting it to be good to all in­tents: "But is not in reality different," &c. The a­nalogy between his example and his argument seems to be but very distant; I shall therefore, without any comment, leave it with the reader as I find it.

THUS it appears, that, for aught the author hath as yet proved, no miracles recorded by historians of other religions are subversive of the evidence arising from the miracles wrought in proof of Christianity, or can justly be considered as contrary testimony.

SECTION IV. Examination of the PAGAN miracles mentioned by Mr Hume.

SHOULD one read attentively the Essay on Miracles, and consider it solely as a philosophical disquisition on an abstract question, like most of the other pieces in the same collection; he could not fail to wonder, what had induced the author so suddenly to change sides in the debate, and, by doing so, to contradict himself in terms the most express. Does he not, in the latter part of that performance, as warmly con­tend for the reality of some miracles, as he had plead­ed in the former part, for the impossibility of all? 'Tis true, he generally concludes concerning those, that they are 'gross and palpable falsehoods.' But this serves only to render his conduct the more mysterious, as that conclusion is always preceded by an attempt to evince, that we have the greatest reason to receive them as 'certain and infallible truths.' Nay, so en­tirely [Page 109]doth his zeal make him forget even his most po­sitive assertions, (and what inconsistencies may not be dreaded from an excess of zeal!) that he shows mi­nutely we have those very evidences for the miracles he is pleased to patronize, which, he had strenuous­ly argued, were not to be found in support of any miracles whatever.

"There is not to be found," he affirms ^*, ‘in all history, a miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, educa­tion, and learning, as to secure us against all delu­sion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose, in case of being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoid­able.’ We need only turn over a few pages of the Essay, and we shall find the author taking great pains to convince us, that all these circumstances concurred in support of certain miracles, which, not­withstanding his general resolution, he has thought fit to honour with a very particular attention.

He has not indeed told us how many witnesses, in his way of reckoning, will constitute 'a sufficient number;' but for some miracles which he relates, he gives us clouds of witnesses, one cloud succeeding another: for the Molinists, who tried to discredit them, ‘soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, one hundred and twenty [Page 110]in number ^*.’ As to the character of the wit­nesses, ‘most of them were persons of credit and substance in Paris ^†;’ again, those miracles ‘were attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, be­fore judges of unquestioned integrity ^‡;’ and, ‘they were proved by witnesses, before the official­ty or bishop's court of Paris, under the eyes of Cardinal Noailles, whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his ene­mies ^§;’ again, ‘the secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or curès of Paris, give tes­timony to these impostures, than whom no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and man­ners ^‖.’ Once more, one principal witness, ‘Mon­sieur de Montgeron, was counsellor or judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and cha­racter ^*;’ another ‘no less a man than the Duc de Chatillon, a Duke and Peer of France, of the highest rank and family ^*.’ 'Tis strange, if credit, and substance, and distinction, and capacity, are not sufficient securities to us, that the witnesses were not 'themselves deluded;' 'tis strange, if uncontested inte­grity, and eminent strictness of life and manners, can­not remove 'all suspicion of any design in them to de­ceive others;' 'tis strange, if one who was counsellor of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and cha­racter, and if another was a Duke and Peer of France, of the highest rank and family, had not ‘a great deal [Page 111]to lose, in case of being detected in any falsehood:’ nay, and if all those witnesses of credit and distinction, "had not also a great deal to lose;' ‘since the Jesu­its, a learned body, supported by the civil magis­trate, were determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought ^*;’ and since ‘Monsieur Herault, the lieutenant de police, of whose great reputation, all who have been in France about that time, have heard; and whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence, have been much talked of; since this magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was invested with full powers on purpose to suppress these miracles, and and frequently seized and examined the witnesses and subjects of them; though he could never reach any thing satisfactory against them ^†.’ As to the only remaining circumstance, ‘their being performed in a public manner, and in a celebrated part of the world,’ this concurred also. They were perform­ed, we are told, ‘in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world ^‡;’ be­sides ‘twenty-two rectors or curès of Paris, with in­finite earnestness, pressed the Archbishop, an ene­my to the Jansenists, to examine those miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and indisputably certain ^§.’

Thus the essayist hath laid us under the disagreeable necessity of inferring, that he is either very rash in his [Page 112]general assertions, or useth very great amplification in his particular narrations. Perhaps in both infer­ences, we shall find, upon inquiry, that there is some truth. In his History of Great Britain, he gives us notice ^*, that he addressed himself ‘to a more distant posterity, than will ever be reached by any local temporary theology.’ Why did he not likewise, in writing the Essays, entertain this grand idea? It would have been of use to him. It would have pre­vented his falling into those inconsistencies, which his too great attention and antipathy to what he calls a localtemporary theology, only could occasion; and which, when that theology, according to his hypothesis, shall be extinct, and when all our religious controver­sies shall be forgotten, must appear unaccountable and ridiculous. People will not then have the means of discovering, what is so obvious to us his contempo­raries, that he only assumes the appearance of an ad­vocate for some miracles, which are disbelieved by the generality of Protestants, his countrymen, in order, by the comparison, to vilify the miracles of sacred writ, which are acknowledged by them.

BUT to descend to particulars, I shall begin with considering those miracles, for which the author is indebted to the ancient Pagans. First, in order to convince us, how easy a matter it is for cunning and impudence to impose by false miracles on the credulity of barbarians, he introduces the story of Alexander of [Page 113]Pontus ^†. The justness of the account he gives of this impostor from Lucian, I shall not dispute. But that it may appear, how little the Christian religion is affected by this relation, notwithstanding some insi­nuations he hath intermixt with it, I shall make the following remarks.

It is of importance to know, what was the pro­fession of this once so famous, tho' now forgotten Paphlagonian. Was he a publisher of strange gods? No ^*. Was he the founder of a new system in religi­on? No. What was he then? He was no other than a professed fortune-teller. What were the arts by which he carried on this gainful trade? The es­sayist justly remarks, that ‘it was a wise policy in him to lay the first scene of his impostures in a coun­try, where the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow the grossest delusion.’ For, ‘had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learn­ing, had immediately spread thro' the whole Roman empire their sense of the matter; which, being [Page 114]supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind.’ I shall beg leave to remark another instance of good policy in him. He attemped not to gain the veneration of the multi­tude by opposing, but by adopting their religious prejudices. His whole plan of deceit was founded in the established superstition. The author himself will acknowledge, it would have been extreme folly in him to have acted otherwise: and all the world, I believe, will agree in thinking, that, in that case, he could not have had the smallest probability of success. What were the miracles he wrought? I know of none, unless we will dignify with that name, some feats of legerdemain, performed mostly by can­dle light; which, in many parts of Europe, we may daily see equalled, nay far exceeded, by those of mo­dern juglers. Add to these some oracles he pronoun­ced, concerning which, if we may form a judgment from the account and specimen given us by Lucian, we should conclude, that, like other Heathen ora­cles, they were generally unintelligible, equivocal, or false. Before whom did he exhibit his wonders? Before none, if he could help it, that were not tho­rough believers in the popular system. His noctur­nal mysteries were always introduced with an A­VAUNT to Atheists, Christians, and Epicurians: and indeed it was dangerous for any such to be present at them. Mr Hume says, that, ‘from his igno­rant Paphlagonians, he was enabled to proceed to the inlisting of votaries among the Grecian philo­sophers.’ On what authority he advances this, I have not been able to discover. He adds, ‘and [Page 115]men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome.’ Lucian mentions one man of rank, Ru­tilianus, among the votaries of the prophet; an ho­nest man he calls him, but at the same time the weakest, the most superstitions that ever lived. As to the military expedition, which one would imagine from Mr Hume's expression, the Emperor had re­solved on, in consequence of the encouragement which the delusive prophecies of this impostor gave him, we find, on the contrary, it was undertaken, before those prophecies were uttered. But further, Did Alexan­der risk any thing in assuming the character of the interpreter of ESCULAPIUS? Did he lose, or did he suffer any thing in defence of it? Quite the reverse. He enriched himself by this most ingenious occupa­toin. I shall say nothing of the picture which Luci­an gives of his morals, of the many artifices which he used, or of the atrocious crimes which he perpe­trated. It must be owned, that the principal scope for calumny and detraction is what concerns the pri­vate life and moral character. Lucian was an ene­my, and, by his own account, had received the high­est provocation. But I avoid every thing, on this topic, that can admit a question.

Where, I would gladly know, lies the resem­blance between this impostor and the first publishers of the gospel? Every one, on the most superficial re­view, may discover, that, in all the material circum­stances, they are perfect contrasts. There appears not therefore to be great danger in the poignant re­mark with which the author concludes this relation: ‘Tho' much to be wished, it does not always hap­pen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian rea­dy [Page 116]to expose and detect his impostures.’ Lest the full import of this emphatical clause should not be apprehended, the author hath been still more ex­plicit in the note: ‘It may here perhaps be ob­jected, that I proceed rashly, and form my no­tions of Alexander, merely from the account gi­ven of him by Lucian, a professed enemy. It were indeed to be wished, that some of the accounts published by his followers and accomplices had re­mained. The opposition and contrast betwixt the character and conduct of the same man, as drawn by a friend or an enemy, is as strong, even in common life, much more in these religious mat­ters, as that betwixt any two men in the world, betwixt Alexander and St Paul for instance.’ Who can forbear to lament the uncommon distress of an author, obliged every moment to recur to unavail­ing wishes? Mr Hume, however, in this calamitous situation, solaceth himself, as well as he can, by supposing what he cannot assert. He supposeth what would have been the case, if his wishes could have been gratified; and artfully insinuates, in this manner to his readers; that if we had the character and conduct of the apostle, delineated by as able an enemy as Lucian, we should find the portrait as ugly as that of Alexander.

Let us then for once suppose, what the author so ardently wishes, that such an enemy had undertaken the history of Paul of Tarsus. I can easily conceive what a different representation we should, in that case, have had, of the mental endowments and mo­ral disposition, as well as of the inducements and views of this Christian missionary. I can conceive [Page 117]also, that both his actions and discourses might have been strangely disfigured. But if the biographer had maintained any regard, I say not, to truth, but to probability; there are some things, we may be ab­solutely certain, he would never have advanced. He would not surely have said of Paul, that he was by pro [...]sion a cunning man, or conjurer; one who, for a little money, either told people their fortunes, or taught them how to recover stolen goods. He would not, I suppose, have pretended, that where­ever the apostle went, he flattered the superstition of the populace, in order to gain them, and founded all his pretensions on the popular system. He would not have alledged, that Paul inriched himself, or that he could ever have the prospect of inriching himself, by his vocation; nay, or that he risked nothing, or suffered nothing, by it. He could not have said con­cerning him, that he declined the audience or scrutiny of men, whose opinions in religion differed from those on which his mission was founded. He durst not have imputed to him the wise policy of laying the scene of his impostures, only where ignorance, bar­barism, and stupidity prevailed: as it is unquestiona­ble, that our apostle traversed great part, not only of Asia Minor, but of Macedonia, and Achaia; fixed his residence eighteen months at Corinth, a city not less celebrated for the polite arts, than for its popu­lousness and riches; preached publicly at Athens before the Stoics and the Epicureans, and even be­fore the Areopagus, the most venerable judicature in Greece; not afraid of what the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning, might spread through [Page 118]the whole Roman empire, concerning him and his doctrine; nay, and lastly preached at Rome itself, the mistress and metropolis of the world.

The reader will observe, that, in this comparison, I have shunned every thing that is of a private, and therefore of a dubious nature. The whole is found­ed on such actions and events as were notorious; which 'tis not in the power of contemporary histo­rians to falsisy; such with regard to Alexander, as a votary could not have dissembled; such with regard to Paul, as an enemy durst not have denied. We are truly indebted to the essayist, who intending to exhibit a rival to the apostle, hath produced a character which, we find on making the comparison, serves only for a foil. Truth never shines with grea­ter lustre, than when confronted with falsehood. The evidence of our religion, how strong soever, appears not so irresistibly, considered by itself, as when by comparison we perceive, that none of those artifices and circumstances attended its propagation, which the whole course of experience shows to be necessary to render imposture successful.

THE next topic on which the ingenious author hath bestowed some flourishes, is the miracle ‘which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot, in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the emperor, for these miraculous and extraordinary cures ^*.’ The story he introduces with informing us, that it is [Page 119] ‘one of the best attested miracles in all profane history.’ If so, it will the better serve for a sam­ple of what may be expected from that quarter. "Every circumstance," he tells us, ‘seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large, with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous super­stition.’ For my part, were I concerned to en­force the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition, I should not wish the story were in bet­ter hands than in the author's. He is by no means deficient in eloquence; and if sometimes there appear a deficiency in argument, that is not imputable to him, but to the subject, which cannot furnish him with any better: and tho' I do not suspect him to be in the least concerned to re-establish Paganism, yet 'tis well known, that hatred to his adversary may as strongly animate an advocate to exert himself, as affection to his client.

But to proceed to the story: First, the author pleads ‘the gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, thro' the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar way with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordina­ry airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and De­metrius.’ To this character, the justness of which I intend not to controvert, I shall beg leave to add, what is equally indubitable, and much to the purpose, that no emperor showed a stronger inclination to cor­roborate his title by a sanction of the gods, than the prince of whom he is speaking. This, doubtless, [Page 120]he thought the more necessary in his case, as he was of an obscure family, and nowise related to any of his predecessors. How fond he was of p [...]ading visi­ons, and presages, and auguries, in his favour, all the world knows ^*.

The author adds, ‘The historian, a contempo­rary writer, noted for can [...] and veracity, and withal the greatest and mo [...] penetrating genius per­haps of all antiquity, and so [...]ree from any tenden­cy to superstition and cred [...]y, that he even lies under the contrary imputation of atheism and pro­saneness.’ This would say a great deal, if the cha­racter of the historian were of any moment in the question. Doth Tacitus pretend that he was him­self a witness of the miracle? No. Doth he men­tion it as a thing which he believes? No. In ei­ther case I a knowledge, that the reputation of the relater for candour and penetration, must have added weight to the relation, whether considered as his tes­timony, or barely as his opinion. But is it fair to plead the veracity of the writer in proof of every po­pular rumour mentioned by him? His veracity is only concerned to satisfy us, that it was actually report­ed, as he r [...]es; or that the attempt was made, and the miracle pretended; a point which, I presume, nobody would have disputed, altho' the authority had been less than that of Tacitus. Indeed the historian doth not say di [...]ectly, whether he believes the miracle or not; but by his manner of telling it, he plainly in­sinuates, that he thought it ridiculous. In introdu­cing [Page 121]it, he intimates the utility of such reports to the Emperor's cause. "By which," says he, ‘the fa­vour of heaven, and the appointment of the gods, might be urged in support of his title ^*.’ When he names the god Serapis, as warning the blind man to recur to Vespasian, he adds, in evident contempt and derision of his godship, ‘Who is adored above all others by the Egyptians, a people addicted to super­stition ^†.’ Again he speaks of the emperor, as in­duced to hope for success, by the persuasive tongues of flatterers ^‡. A serious believer of the miracle would hardly have used such a style in relating it. But to what purpose did he then relate it? The answer is easy. Nothing could be more characteristic of the Emperor, or could better show the arts he had recourse to, and the hold which flattery had of him; nothing could be more characteristic of the Alexandrians, the people amongst whom the miracle is said to have been wrought.

"The persons," says the essayist, ‘from whose testimony he related the miracle, of established cha­racter for judgement and veracity, [...]s we may well suppose; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their verdict, after the Flavian family were despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any re­ward as the price of a lie.’ Persons of established character for judgment and veracity! Who told Mr Hume so? 'Twas not Tacitus. He only denomi­nates [Page 122]them in general ^*: "They who were present," and "a crowd of bystanders." The author, consci­ous that he advances this without even the shadow of authority, hath subjoined, in order to palliate the matter, as we may well suppose. An admirable expe­dient for supplying a weak plea, with those conve­nient circumstances that can give it strength! When facts fail, which is not seldom the case, we need b [...] apply to supposition, whose help is always near. But if this be allowed to take the place of argument, I see no reason why I may not avail myself of the privilege of supposing, as well as the author. The witnesses then, I will suppose, were mostly an igno­rant rabble: but I wrong my cause; I have a better foundation than supposal, having Tacitus himself, and all antiquity on my side, when I add deeply im­mersed in superstition, particularly attached to the wor­ship of Serapis, and keenly engaged in support of Vespasian, ALEXANDRIA having been the first city of note that publicly declared for him. Was it then matter of surprise, that a story, which at once soothed the superstition of the populace, and savoured their po­litical schemes, should gain ground among them? Can we justly wonder, that the wiser few, who were not deceived should convive at, or even contribute to promote a deceit, which was highly useful to the cause wherein themselves were imbarked, and at the same time highly grateful to the many? Lastly, can we be surprised that any, who, so seven and twenty years, had, from motives of interest, and ambition, and po­pularity, propagated a falschood, should not afterwards be willing to expose themselves as liars?

[Page 123] The author finishes the story thus: ‘To which if we add the public nature of the facts related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.’ As to the nature of the facts, we are told by Ta­citus, that when Vespasian consulted the physicians, whether such maladies were curable by human art, they declared ^*, that ‘in the one the power of sight was not extinct, but would return, were the ob­stacles removed; that in the other, the joints had suffered some dislocation, which by a salutary pres­sure might be redressed.’ From this account we are naturally led to conclude, that the disorders were not so conspicuous, but that either they might have been feigned, where they were not; or that cures might have been pretended, where none were per­formed. I think it is even a further presumption of the truth of this conclusion, that Suetonius, the only other Roman historian who mentions the miracle, (I know not how he hath been overlooked by Mr Hume) differs from Tacitus, in the account he gives of the lameness. The one represents it as being in the hand, the other, as in the leg ^†.

There are other circumstances regarding this story on which I might make some remarks; but shall for­bear, [Page 124]as it is impossible to enter into a minute dis­cussion of particulars, that appear but trivial, when considered severally, without growing tiresome to the bulk of readers. I shall therefore only subjoin these simple questions. First, What emperor or other potentate was flattered in his dignity and pretensions by the miracles of our Lord? What eminent per­sonage found himself interested to support, by his au­thority and influence, the credit of these miracles? Again, What popular superstition or general and rooted prejudices were they calculated to confirm! These two circumstances, were there no other, make the greatest odds imaginable betwixt the miracles of VESPASIAN and those of JESUS CHRIST.

So much for the PAGAN miracles mentioned by the author.

SECTION V. Examination of the POPISH miracles mentioned by Mr Hume.

THE author soon descends from ancient to mo­dern times, and leaving Paganism, recurs to Po­pery, a much more fruitful source of lying wonders.

THE first of this kind he takes notice of ^*, is a Spanish miracle recorded in the memoirs of Cardi­nal de Retz. The story, he says, is very memorable, and may well deserve our consideration. ‘When [Page 125]that intriguing politician fled into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed thro' Sara­gossa the capital of Arragon; where he was shown in the cathedral church, a man, who had served twenty years as a door keeper of the church, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid their devotions at that cathedral.— He had been for so long a time wanting a leg; but recovered that limb, by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and, when the cardinal examined it, he found it to be a true natural leg, like the other.’ Would not any person imagine, from the last words of the sentence, that the cardinal had ordered the man to put off his shoes and stockings, that, by touch as well as by sight, he might be satisfied, there was no artifice used, but that both his legs consisted of genuine flesh and bone? Yet the truth is, his Emi­nency did not think it worth while to examine any one circumstance of this wonderful narration, but contented himself with reporting it precisely as it had been told him. His words literally translated are, ‘In that church they showed me a man, whose bu­siness it was to light the lamps, of which they have a prodigious number, telling me, that he had been seen seven years at the gate, with one leg on­ly. I saw him there with two ^*.’ Not one word of trial or examination, or even so much as a single question asked on the subject; not a syllable of his [Page 126]finding the leg to be either true or false, natural or artificial, like the other or unlike. I have a better opinion both of the candour and of the good sense of Mr Hume, than to imagine, he would have design­edly misrepresented this story, in order to render it fitter for his purpose. I believe the source of this er­ror hath been solely the trusting to his memory in the relation which he gave, and not taking the trou­ble to consult the passage in the memoirs. This conjecture appears the more probable, as he hath made some other alterations, which are nowise con­ducive to his design; such as, that the man had been seen in the church twenty years wanting a leg, and that he was a door-keeper; whereas the memoir-writer says only seven years, and that he was one who light­ed the lamps ^*.

"This miracle was vouched," says the author, ‘by all the canons of the church; and the whole com­pany in town were appealed to, for a confirmati­on of the fact, whom the Cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle.’ 'Tis true, that the company in town were appealed to, by those ecclesiastics; but 'tis also true, that De Retz, by his own account, [Page 127]seems not to have asked any man a question on the subject. He acknowledges indeed, that an anniver­sary festival, instituted in commemoration of the mi­racle, was celebrated by a vast concourse of people of all ranks.

"Here," continues the essayist, ‘the relater was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character, as well as of great genius.’ But of what weight, in this affair, is either the genius or the incredulity of the relater, since, by Mr Hume's confession, he had no faith in the relation? Strange indeed is the use which the essayist makes of this circumstance!

"What adds mightily," says he, ‘to the force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, that the cardinal himself, who re­lates the story, seems not to give any credit to it.’ It doth not in the least surprise me, that the car­dinal gives no credit to this relation; but I am be­yond measure surprised, that Mr Hume should repre­sent this circumstance as adding mightily to the force of the evidence. Is then a story which is reported by a man of genius, the more credible that he doth not believe it? Or, Is it the more incredible that he doth be­lieve it? What would the author have said, if the cardinal had told us, that he gave credit to the re­lation? Might he not, in that case, have very per­tinently pleaded the great genius, and penetration, and incredulity of the relater, as adding mightily to the force of the evidence? On that hypothesis, he surely might, for pretty obvious reasons. Uncom­mon penetration qualifies a man for detecting fraud; [Page 128]and it requires evidence greater than ordinary to sur­mount incredulity. The belief therefore of such a person as the cardinal, who had not only the means of discovering [...]n imposture, as he was contemporary and on the spot, but the ability to discover it, as he was a man of genius, and not over-credulous; his belief, I say, would evidently have been no small presumption of the truth of the miracle. How his disbelief can be in like manner a presumption of its truth, is to me incomprehensible. Ay but, rejoins the author, ‘as he seems not to give any credit to it, he cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud.’ Very well. I am satisfied that a man's TESTIMONY is the more to be regarded, that he is above being suspected of concurring in any fraud, call it holy or unholy. But I want to know why, on the very same account, his OPINION is the less to be regarded? For my part, I find no difficul­ty in believing every article of the narration for which the cardinal gives his testimony: notwithstanding this, I may be of the same opinion with him; that the account given by the dean and canons, which is their testimony, not his, was all a fiction. But it is not with the cardinal's testimony we are here con­cerned: about that there is no dispute. It is with his opinion. Are then a man's sentiments about a matter of fact, I must insist on it, the less worthy of regard, either because he is a man of genius, and not at all credulous, or because he cannot be suspect­ed of any concurrence in a holy fraud? Are they the more improbable on these accounts? The essayist, when he reflects, will be the last man in the world, [Page 129]would assist in establishing a maxim so unfavora­ble, not only to candour, but even to genius and scepticism: and indeed there are few, if any, that would be greater sufferers by it than himself.

But leaving this, as one of the unfathomable depths of the essay, I proceed to the other circum­stances. "The miracle," says the author, ‘of so singular a nature, as could scarce admit of a counter­feit.’ He did well at least to use the word scarce; for if every visitant was as little desirous of prying into the secret, as the cardinal, nothing could be more easily counterfeited: ‘And the witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, specta­tors of the fact, to which they gave their testimo­ny.’ By the very numerous witnesses, I suppose he means the whole company in town, who were ap­pealed to. They were all, in a manner, spectators of the fact. What precise abatement the author intended we should make, from the sense of the word spectators, on account of the qualifying phrase, in a manner, I shall not presume to determine; but shall observe, from the memoirs, that it was not so much as pretended by the canons, that any of the citizons had seen the miracle performed; 'twas only pretended, that they had seen the man formerly at the gate of the church, wanting a leg. Nor is it alledged, that any of them was at more pains in ex­amining the matter, either before or after the recove­ry of the leg, than the cardinal was. They were therefore properly no spectators of the fact. The phrase, in a manner, ought, I imagine, to have been placed in the end of the sentence, which would have [Page 130]run thus: ‘to which they, in a manner, give their testimony:’ for no direct testimony was either asked of them, or given by them; their belief is inferred from their devotion.

I have been the more particular in my remarks on the circumstances of this story, not because there was need of these remarks: for, tho' to the essayist the relation appeared very memorable, to me, and, I believe, to most people, it appears very trifling; but that the reader might have this further specimen of the author's talents in embellithing, To the above­mentioned, and all other such idle tales, this short and simple answer will, by every man of sense, be thought sufficient. The country where the miracle is said to have been wrought, is SPAIN; the people who propagated the faith of it, were THE CLERGY. What comparison, in point of credibility, can be made be­tween miracles, which, with no visible support but their own evidence, had at once to encounter, and did in fact overcome the abhorrence of the priest, and the tyranny of the magistrate, the insolence of the learned, and the bigotry of the superstitious: what comparison, I say, can be made between such, and any prodigies said to have been performed in a coun­try, where all the powers of the nation, secular and ecclesiastical, the literature of the schools, such as it is, and the prejudices of the people, conspire in establishing their credit; a country sunk in the most obdurate superstition that ever disgraced human na­ture ^*, a country where the awe of the inquisition [Page 131]is so great, that no person, whatever be his sentiments, dares mutter a syllable against any opinion that hath obtained the patronage of their spiritual guides? But that I may not be accused of prepossession, or suspected of exaggerating. I shall only give the sentiments of two eminent foreigners (who were not Protestants, and may therefore be supposed the more impartial) concern­ing that nation, and the influence which the holy tri­bunal has both on their character and manners. Vol­tarire ^*, speaking of the inquisition as established in Spain, says, ‘Their form of proceeding is an infal­lible way to destroy whomsoever the inquisitors please. The prisoners are not confronted with [Page 132]the informers; and there is no informer who is not listened to. A public criminal, an in famous person, a child, a prostitute, are creditable accu­sers. Even the son may depose against his father; the wife against her husband. In fine, the priso­ner is compelled to inform against himself, to di­vine, and to confess, the crime laid to his charge; of which often he is ignorant. This procedure, unheard of till the institution of this court, makes the whole kingdom tremble. Suspicion reigns in every breast. Friendship and openness are at an end. The brother dreads his brother, the father his son. Hence taciturnity is become the charac­teristic of a nation endued with all the vivacity natural to the inhabitants of a warm and fruitful climate. To this tribunal we must likewise im­pute that profound ignorance of sound philosophy, in which Spain lies buried, whilst Germany, England, France, and [...]even Italy, have discover­ed so many truths, and enlarged the sphere of our knowledge. Never is human nature so debased, as when ignorance is armed with power.’— "'Tis necessary," says Montesquieu ^*, in the humble remonstrance to the inquisitors of Spain and Portugal, ‘that we advertise you of one thing; 'tis, that if any person, in future times, shall dare assert, that in the age wherein we live, the Europeans were civilized, YOU will be quoted to prove that they were barbarians, and the idea people will form of you, will be such as will dishonour your age, and bring hatred on all your contemporaries.’

[Page 133] I COME now to consider the miracles said to have been performed in the church-yard of Saint Medard, at the tomb of Abbe Paris. On these the author hath expatiated with great parade, exulting, that he hath found in them, as he imagines, what, in respect of of number, and nature, and evidence, may carrie the miracles of holy writ. Yet should we adn it them to be true, how they can be considered as proofs of any doctrine, or how they can affect the evidence of the miracles recorded in scripture, 'twill not per­haps be easy to discover. But setting that question a­side, I propose to examine their evidence; and that, not by entering into a particular inquiry concerning each separate fact mentioned in Montgeron's collec­tion, as such an inquiry would appear, to every ju­dicious reader, both tedious and impertinent; but by making a few general observations, founded in unque­stionable fact, and mostly supported even by the authority of Montgeron, that doughty champion of the Jansenist saint ^*.

First, Let it be remarked, that it was often ob­jected by the enemies of the saint, and scarce con­tradicted, never confuted, by his friends, that the prostrations at his sepulcher produced more diseases, than they cured. The ingenious author lately quoted, in the account he gives of the affairs of the church in the ninth century, taking occasion incidentally to mention the miracles of the Able, speaks of this cir­cumstance, [Page 134]as a thing universally known, and un­undeniable ^*. "I should not take notice," says he, ‘of an epidemical folly with which the people of Dijon were seized in 844, occasioned by one Saint Benignus, who threw those into convulsions who prayed on his tomb; I should not, I say, mention this popular superstition, had it not been furiously revived in our days, in parallel cir­cumstances. It seems, as if the same follies were destined to make their appearance, from time to time, on the theatre of the world: but good sense is also the same at all times; and nothing so ju­dicious hath been said, concerning the modern mi­racles wrought on the tomb of I know not what deacon at Paris, as what a bishop of Lyons said, concerning those of Dijon. A strange saint indeed, that maims those who pay their devoirs to him. I should think, miracles ought to be performed for the curing, and not for the inflicting of maladies.’

The second observation is, That the instances of persons cured are extremely few, compared with the multitudes of people in distress, who night and day attended the sepulchre, imploring in vain the inter­cession of the saint. The crowds of sick and infirm, who flocked to the tomb for relief, were, by all ac­counts, innumerable: whereas all the cures which the zealous and indefatigable Montgeron could pro­cure vouchers of, amounted only to NINE ^†. The [Page 135]author therefore must be understood, as speaking with great latitude, when he says, ‘There surely never was so great a number of miracles ascribed to one per­son, as those which were lately said to have been wrought in France, upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded ^*.’ If thousands of diseased persons had applied for medicine to some ig­norant quack, in the assurance of his extraordinary abilities; would it be matter of surprise to a rea­sonable man, that, of so many, eight or nine should be sound, whose distempers had taken a favourable turn, whilst they were using his specifics, and had there by given countenance to the delusion? I think it would be matter of surprise that there were so few.

I shall observe, thirdly, That imposture was actually detected, and proved in several instances. That the reader may be satisfied of this, I must intreat him to have recourse to the Archishop of Sens' Pastoral in­structions; a book which Mr Hume could not, with propriety, take any notice of, having positively assert that ‘the enemies to those opinions, in whose fa­vour the miracles were said to have been wrought, were never able distinctly to refute or detect them ^†.’ This prelate, on the contrary, hath not only given a distinct refutation of some of these pre­tended [Page 136]miracles, but hath clearly detected the deceit and little artifices by which their credit was support­ed. I intend not to descend to particulars, and shall therefore only refer the reader to the book itself, and beg that he will peruse what relates to the cases of Jacques Laurent Menedricuz, Jean Nivet, Sieur le Doulx, Laleu, Anne Coulon, the widow de Lorme, as well as Mademoiselle le Franc, of whom the essayist hath made mention in a note. In this perusal, the reader will observe the shameful prevarications of some Jansenist witnesses, for whom Mr Hume would fain apologize, by telling us pleasantly, they were tamperd with. ^*. I shall only add on this head, that the detection of fraud in some instances, justly brings suspicion on all the other instances. A man whom I know to have lied to me, on several occa­sions, I shall suspect, on every occasion, where I have not access to discover, whether what he affirms be true or false. It is in the same way we judge of the spirit and conduct of parties, as of individuals.

I observe, fourthly, That all the cures recorded by Montgeron, as duly attested, were such as might have been effected by natural means. There are two kinds of miracles, to which Mr Hume hath alluded in a note, tho' he does not directly make the distinc­tion. One is, when the event, considered by itself, is evidently preternatural. Of this kind are, raising the dead, walking on water, making whole the mai­med; for by no natural causes can these effects be produced. The other kind is, when the event, con­sidered by itself, is natural, that is, may be produced by natural causes, but is denominated miraculous, [Page 137]on account of the manner. That a sick person should be restored to health, is not, when considered singly, preternatural; but that health should be res­tored by the command of a man, undoubtedly is. Let us hear the author on this point: ‘Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be deno­minated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contra­ry to these laws. Thus, if a person claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no mi­racle, and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature, than that the voice or command of a man, should have such an influence ^*.’ From what hath been said, it appears, that these two kinds of miracles must differ considerably in respect of evidence, since the latter naturally gives room for a suspicion, which is ab­solutely excluded from the former. In the former, when the fact or event is proved, the miracle is un­questionable. In the latter, the fact may be proved and yet the miracle may be justly questioned. It [Page 138]therefore merits our attention, that all the miracles recorded in Montgeron's collection, were of the second kind. One of the most considerable of those cures, was that of Don Alphonso de Palacios, who had lost one eye, and was distressed with an inflam­mation in the other. The inflamed eye was cured, but the lost eye was not restored. Had there been a reproduction of the member which had perished, a sufficient proof of the fact, would have been a suf­ficient proof of the miracle. But as the case was o­therwise, the fact vouched may be admitted, without admitting any miracle. The cures said to have been per­formed on those patients who were afflicted with para­lytic or dropsical disorders, or that performed on Louisa Coirin, who had a tumour on her breast, will not appear to be intitled to a rank in the first class. As little can the cure of Peter Gautier claim that honour. One of his eyes had been pricked with an awl; in consequence of which the aqueous humour dropped out, and he became blind of that eye. His sight was restored, whilst he paid his addresses to the Abbé. But that a puncture in the cornea of the eye will often heal of itself, and that the aqueous hu­mour, after it hath been quite lost, will be recruited, and consequently, that the faculty of vision will, in such a case, be recovered, is what every oculist can assure us of. The loss of the watery humour, is the constant effect of a very common operation in surgery, couching the cataract. Hence we may learn, how we ought to understand these words of the author ‘The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of [Page 139]as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre ^*.’ As therefore the alledged miracles were all of the second class, 'tis only from the attendant circumstances we can judge, whether the facts, tho' acknowledged, were miraculous or not.

In order to enlighten us on this point, I observe, fifthly, That none of the cures were instantaneous. We have not indeed the same hold of the deceased Abbé, as of a living prophet, who pretends to work miracles. Those who attend the latter, can know exactly, to whom he grants the benefit of his mi­raculous aid. They can judge also, whether the sup­plicant's recovery be coincident, with the prophet's volition or command. In the former case, we have not access to judge of either; and consequently, there is much greater scope for fancy and credulity to operate. No voice was ever said to have proceeded from the tomb of the blessed deacon, as his votaries styled him. They obtained no audible answer to their prayers. There are however some circum­stances, by which a probable conjecture may be made concerning the efficiency of the saint in the cures ascribed to him. One is, if the cure instan­taneously followed the first devotions at the tomb. Supernatural cures differ, in this particular, as much as in any other, from those which are effected by natural means, that they are not gradually, but in­stantly, perfected. Now of which kind were the cures of St Medard? From the accounts that are given, 'tis evident, that they were gradual. That some of them were sudden, is alledged; but that any [Page 140]of them were instantaneous, or immediately followed the first application, is not even pretended. All the worshippers at the tomb, persisted for days, several of them for weeks, and some for months successively, daily imploring the intercession of the Abbé, before they received relief from their complaints; and the relief which was received, is, in most cases, ac­knowledged to have been gradual.

I observe, sixthly, That most of the devotees either had been using medicines before, and continued to use them, during their applications to the saint; or, that their distempers had abated, before they deter­mined to solicit his help. That the Spanish youth had been using, all the while a medicine prescribed by an eminent oculist, was proved by the depositions of witnesses; that Gautier had begun to recover his sight, before he had recourse to the sepulchre, was attested, not only by his uncle, but even by himself, when, as the Archbishop of Sens informs us, he signed a recantation of what he had formerly ad­vanced. With regard to the rest, it appears at least probable, from the circumstances of the proof, that they were using the prescriptions of the physicians, whom they had consulted before applying to the dea­con, and who were afterwards required to give their testimony, concerning the nature and malignancy of the different diseases.

The seventh observation is, That some of the cures attested were incomplete. Th [...] was manifestly the case of the Spaniard, who [...] only from the most inconsiderable part [...] complaint. Even the cure of Mademoisell [...] [...], which was as [Page 141]great a subject of exultation to the partisans of the Abbé as any other, was not complete. Not only was she confined to her bed, for many days, after the de­crease of her dropsy; but the still remained incapable of moving two of her singers. Silva, physician to the Duke of Orleans, attested this; adding expressly, that he could not look on her as being cured.

The eighth and last observation I shall make on this subject is, That the relief granted some of them was but temporary. This was clearly proved to be the case of the Spanish gentleman. That soon after his return home, he relapsed into his former malady, the prelate I have often quoted, hath, by the certi­ficates and letters which he procured from Madrid, put beyond controversy. Among these, there are let­ters from a Spanish grandee, Don Francis Xavier, and from the patient's uncle, besides a certificate signed by himself.

After the above observations, I believe, there will be no occasion for saying much on this subject. The author has, in a note, artfully enough pointed out his aim, that it might not be overlooked by the careless reader ^*. "There is another book," says he, ‘in three volumes, (called Recueil des miracles de l' Abbe Paris,) giving an account of many of these miracles, and accompanied with prefatory dis­courses, which are very well wrote ^†.’ He adds, [Page 142] ‘There runs however, thro' the whole of these a a ridiculous comparison betwixt the miracles of our [Page 143]Saviour and those of the Abbé; wherein 'tis asserted, that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former ^†.’ At first reading, one is apt, with [Page 144]surprise, to imagine, that the author is going to make some atonement for the tenets of the essay, by [Page 145]turning advocate for the miracles of Jesus Christ; and by [...]howing, that these are not affected by his doctrine. But on this point we are not long held in suspense. He subjoins, ‘As, if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of [Page 146]God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspi­red writers.’ An ingenious piece of raillery with­out question. Is it possible, in a politer man­ner, or in more obliging terms, to tell the Christian world, They are fools; and that all who are silly enough to believe the miracles recorded in scripture, are not intitled to be argued with as men? How? They are so absurd as to believe the scriptures to be the word of God, on the evidence of the miracles wrought by our Lord and his apostles; and that these miracles were wrought, they could not believe on any testimony, less than that of God, reporting them in the scriptures: and thus, by making inspiration and miracles reciprocally foundations to each other, they, in effect, admit both without any foundation at all. After this handsome compliment to the friends of holy writ, he thinks himself at liberty to be very ex­plicit on the comparative evidence of the miracles of the Abbè, and those of Jesus: ‘If these writers in­deed were to be considered merely as human testi­mony, the French author is very moderate in his comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason, pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other, in evidence and authority.’ Was ever so rough an assault, preceded by so smooth, but so insidious a preamble? Is it then still the fate of Jesus to be betrayed with a kiss? But notwithstand­ing this author's declaration, no Christian will have reason to dread the issue of the comparison. Mr Hume hath not entered on particulars, neither shall I enter on them. I should not incline to tire my rea­der with repetitions, which, in a minute inquiry, [Page 147]would be inevitable. I shall therefore only desire him, if he think it needful, to peruse a second time the eight foregoing observations. Let him try the miracles of our Lord by this touch stone; and I persuade myself, he will be satisfied, that there is no appearance of reason to pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other, or even equal them, in evidence and authority.

The author triumphs not a little in the observati­on, that the reports of the prodigies performed by the deacon, were violently opposed by the civil ma­gistrate, and by the Jesuits, the most learned society in the kingdom. He could see the importance of this circumstance in the the case of Abbè Paris, tho' not in the case of Jesus Christ. But that the differ­ence of the cases as well as their resemblance, may better appear; it ought likewise to be observed, that Jansenism, tho' not the ruling faction, was at that time the popular faction; that this popularity was not the effect of the miracles of the Abbè, but ante­cedent to those miracles; that, on the contrary, the Jesuits were extremely unpopular; and that many, who had no more faith in the miracles of Saint Medard than Mr Hume hath, were well pleased to connive at a delusion, which at once plagued and mortified a body of men, that were become almost universally odious.

I shall only add, that nothing could more effec­tually expose the folly of those pretensions, than the expedient by which they were made to cease: In consequence of an order from the King, the sepulchre was inclosed with a wall, and the votaries were de­barred [Page 148]barred from approaching the tomb. The author says, in relation to this ^*, ‘No Jansenist was ever em­barrassed to account for the cessation of the mira­cles, when the churchyard was shut up by the Kings edict.’ Certain it is, that ‘God is master of his own graces and works.’ But it is equally certain, that neither reason nor the gospel leads us to think, that any human expedient will prove success­ful, which is calculated to frustrate the decrees of Heaven. Both, on the contrary, teach us, that men never more directly promote the designs of their Maker than when they intend directly to oppose them. It was not thus, that either Pharisees or Sadducees, Jews or Gentiles, succeded in their opposition to the mira­cles of Jesus and his apostles. The opinion of Gamaliel ^† was undoubtedly judicious: If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye CANNOT overthrow it; beware therefore, lest ye be found fighting even against God. To conclude; Did the Jansenist cause derive any advantage from those preten­ded miracles? None at all. It even suffered by them. It is justly remarked by Voltaire ^‡, that ‘the tomb of the deacon Paris, proved in effect, in the minds of all people of sense, the tomb of Janse­nism:’ How unlike in all respects the miracles recorded by the Evangelists!

THUS I have briefly inquired into the nature and evidence, first of the Pagan, and next of the P [...]pish miracles, mentioned by Mr Hume; and have, I hope, sufficiently evinced, that the miracles of the New [Page 149]Testament can suffer nothing by the comparison; that, on the contrary, as, in painting, the shades serve to heighten the glow of the colours; and, in mu­sic, the discords to set off the sweetness of the har­mony; so the value of these genuine miracles is en­hanced by the contrast of those paltry counterseits.

SECTION VI. Abstracting from the evidence for particular facts, we have irrefragable evidence, that there have been miracles in former times; or such events as, when compared with the present constitution of the world, would by Mr Hume be denominated miraculous.

I READILY concur with Mr Hume in maintain­ing, that when, merely by the force of REASON, we attempt to investigate the origin of worlds ^*, we get beyond our sphere, and must infallibly bewilder ourselves in hypothesis and conjecture. REASON in­deed (which vainly boasts her all-sufficiency) hath sometimes pretended to carry men to this amazing height. But there is ground to suspect, that, in such instances, the ascent of reason, as the author elegant­ly expresseth it ^†, hath been aided by the wings of imagination. If we will not be indebted to REVE­LATION, for our knowledge of this article, we must, for aught I can percieve, be satisfied to live in igno­rance. There is, however, one question distinct from the former, tho' akin to it, which, even from the principles of reason, we may with great probabi­lity [Page 150]determine. The question I mean is, Whether the world had an origin or not?

That there hath been an infinite, eternal, and in­dependent series of finite, successive, and dependent beings, such as men, and consequently that the world had no beginning, appears, from the bare considerati­on of the thing, extremely incredible, if not altoge­ther absurd. The abstract argument used on this head, might appear too metaphysical and refined: I shall not therefore introduce it; but shall recur to to­pics which are more familiar, and which, tho' they do not demonstrate, that it is absolutely impossible that the world hath existed from eternity, clearly evince that is highly improbable, or rather, certainly false. These topics I shall only mention, as they are pret­ty obvious, and have been often urged with great en­ergy by the learned, both ancient and modern. Such are, the late invention of letters, and of all the scien­ces and arts by which human life is civilized; the known origin of most nations, states and kingdoms; and the first peopling of many countries. 'Tis in our power at present to trace the history of every people, backwards to times of the greatest barbarity and ig­norance. Europe, tho' not the largest of the four parts into which the earth is divided, is, on many ac­counts, the most considerable. But what a different face doth Europe wear at present, from what it wore three thousand years ago? How immense the odds in knowledge, in arts, in policy, in every thing? How easy is the intercourse, and how extensive the acquaintance, which men can now enjoy with all, even the remotest regions of the globe, compared with [Page 151]what was, or could have been enjoyed, in that time of darkness and simplicity? A man differs not more from a child, than the human race now differs from the human race then. Three thousand years ago, appear indeed to mark a very distant epoch; and yet it is but as yesterday, compared with eternity. This, when duly weighed, every thinking person will ac­knowledge to be as strong moral evidence, as the subject can admit, (and that I imagine is very strong) that the world had a beginning.

I shall make a supposition, which will perhaps ap­pear whimsical, but which will tend to elucidate the argument I am enforcing. In antediluvian times, when the longevity of man was such as to include some centuries, I shall suppose, that a few boys had been imported to a desart island, and there left toge­ther, just old enough to make shift to sustain them­selves, as those in the golden age are fabled to have done, on acorns, and other spontaneous productions of the soil. I shall suppose, that they had lived there for some hundreds of years, had remembered nothing of their coming into the island, nor of any other person whatsoever; and that thus they had never had access to know, or hear, of either birth or death. I shall suppose them to enter into a serious disquisition con­cerning their own duration, the question having been started, Whether they had existed from eternity, or had once begun to be? They recur to memory, but memory can furnish them nothing certain or de­c [...]sive. If it must be allowed that it contains no trace of beginning of existence, it must also be allowed, that it reaches not beyond a few centuries at most. [Page 152]They observe besides, concerning this faculty, that the further back it goes, it becomes the more indis­tinct, terminating at last in confusion and darkness. Some things however they distinctly recollect, and are assured of. They remember, they were once of much lower stature, and of smaller size; they had less bo­dily strength; and all their mental faculties were wea­ker. They know, that, in the powers both of bo­dy and of mind, they have advanced, by impercept­ible degrees, to the pitch they are now arrived at. These considerations, especially when fortified by some analogous observations they might have made on the growth of herbs and trees, would have shown the probability to be entirely on the side of those who asserted, that their existence had a beginning: And tho', on account of the narrow sphere of their knowledge and experience, the argument could not have appeared to them in all its strength, we, from our long acquain­tance with nature, even abstracting from our know­ledge of man in particular, must be satisfied, that it would have been strictly analogical and just. Exactly si­milar, the very same, I should rather say, is the argument I have been urging for the origination of the species. Make but a few alterations in phraseology: for me­mory, substitute history and tradition; for hundreds of years, say thousands; for the powers of body and mind, put the arts and sciences; and, with these, and per­haps one or two more such variations, you will find the argument as applicable in the one case, as in the other. Now, if it be granted, that the human spe­cies must have had a beginning, it will hardly be que­stioned, that every other animal species, or even that the universe, must have had a beginning.

[Page 153] BUT in order to prove the proposition laid down in the title of this section, 'tis not necessary to sup­pose, that the world had a beginning. Admit it had not, and observe the consequence. Thus much must be admitted also, that not barely for a long continued, but for an ETERNAL, succession of generations, mankind were in a state little superior to the beasts; that of a sudden, there came a most astonishing change upon the species; that they exerted talents and capacities, of which there appeared not the smallest vestige, during the eternity preceding; that they acquired such knowledge as procured them a kind of empire, not only over the vegetable and a­nimal worlds, but even, in some respect, over the elements, and all the unwieldy powers of matter; that, in consequence of this, they were quickly raised, much more above the state they had been formerly and eternally in, than such their former and eternal state was above that of the brute creation. If such a revolution in nature, such a thorough, general, and sudden change as this, would not be denominated miraculous, 'tis not in my power to conceive what would. I could not esteem it a greater miracle, hardly so great, that any species of beasts, which have hitherto been doomed to tread the earth, should now get wings, and float about in the air.

Nor will this plea be subverted by that trite ob­jection, That mankind may have been as much en­lightened, perhaps myriads of years ago, as they are at present; but that by some universal calamity, such as deluge or conflagration, which, after the rotation of many centuries, the earth possibly becomes liable [Page 154]to, all traces of crudition and of science, all traces both of the elegant and of the useful arts, may have been effaced, and the human race, springing from a few who had escaped the common ruin, may have emerged anew, out of barbarity and ignorance. This hypothesis doth but substitute one miracle in the place of another. Such general disorder is en­tirely unconformable to our experience of the course of nature. Accordingly the destruction of the world by a deluge, the author hath numbered among those prodigies, or miracles, which render the Pentate [...]ch perfectly incredible.

IF, on the contrary, we admit, that the world had a beginning, (and will not every thinking person acknowledge, that this position is much more pro­bable than the contrary?) the production of the world must be ascribed either to chance, or to in­telligence.

Shall we derive all things, spiritual and corporeal, from a principle so insignificant as blind chance? Shall we say, with Epicurus, that the fortuitous course of rambling atoms hath reared this beautiful and stupendous fabric? In that case, perhaps, we should give an account of the origin of things, which, most people will think, could not properly be styled miraculous. But is it, because the formation of a grand and regular system in this way, is conformable to the experienced order of nature? Quite the re­verse. Nothing can be more repugnant to universal experience, than that the least organic body, not to mention the glorious frame of nature, should be pro­duced [Page 155]by such a casual jumble. It has therefore, in the highest degree possible, that particular quality of miracles, from which, according to the author's the­ory, their incredibility results, and may doubtless, in this loose acceptation of the word, be termed mira­culous. But should we affirm, that, to account thus for the origin of the universe, is to account for it by miracle; we should be thought, I'm afraid, to speak both weakly and improperly. There is something here, if I may so express myself, which is far beyond the miraculous; something, for which I know not whether any language can afford a proper appellation, unless it be the general appellations of absurdity and nonsense.

Shall we then at last recur to the common doctrine, that the world was produced by an intelligent cause? On this supposition also, tho' incomparably the most rational, it is evident, that in the creation, formation, or first production of things, call it by what name you please, a power must have been exerted, which, in respect of the present course of nature, may be styled miraculous. I intend not to dispute about a word, nor to inquire, whether that term can, in strict propriety, be used of any exertions before the esta­blishment of the laws of nature. I use the word in the same latitude, in which the author commonly useth it in his reasoning, for every event that is not conformable to that course of nature with which we are acquainted by experience.

WHETHER, therefore, the world had, or had not, a beginning; whether, on the first supposition, the [Page 156]production of things be ascribed to chance, or to de­sign; whether, on the second, in order to solve the numberless objections that arise, we do, or do not, recur to universal catastrophes; there is no possibility of accounting for the phenomena that presently come under our notice, without having at last recourse to MIRACLES; that is, to events altogether uncon­sormable, or, if you will, contrary to the present course of nature known to us by experience. I cannot conceive an hypothesis, which is not reducible to one or other of those above-mentioned. Whoever imagines, that another might be framed, which is not comprehended in any of those, and which hath not as yet been devised by any system-builder; let him make the experiment, and I will venture to prognosticate, that he will still find himself clogged with the same difficulty. The conclusion therefore above deduced, may be justly deemed, till the con­trary is shown, to be not only the result of one, but alike of every hypothesis, of which the subject is sus­ceptible.

THUS it hath been evinced, as was proposed, that abstracting from the evidence for particular facts, we have irrefragable evidence, that there have been, that there must have been, miracles in former times, or such events, as when, compared with the present constitution of the world, would by Mr Hume be de­nominated miraculous.

SECTION VII. Revisal of Mr Hume's examination of the Pentateuch.

ALLOWING to the conclusion deduced in the foregoing section its proper weight, I shall also take into consideration the Pentateuch, or five books of Moses; or rather, I shall endeavour impartially to revise the examination which those books have already undergone by the essayist ^*. It is, in this case, of the greatest importance to know, whether the evidence on both sides hath been fairly stated.

"HERE then we are first to consider a book," which is acknowledged, on all hands, to be the most ancient record in the world, "presented to us," we admit, "by a barbarous and ignorant people ^†," at the same time exhibiting a system of Theism, or natural religion, which is both rational and sublime; with which nothing that was ever compiled or pro­duced, on this subject, in the most enlightened ages, by the most learned and polished nations, who were unacquainted with that book, will bear to be compa­red.

Mr Hume himself must allow, that this remark [Page 258]deserves attention, since his reasoning in another per­formance, which he calls, The natural history of reli­gion, would lead us to expect the contrary. He there maintains, that Polytheism and Idolatry are, and must be, the religion of rude and barbarous, and consequently of ancient ages; that the true prin­ciples of Theism, or the belief of one almighty and wise Being, the creator, the preserver, and the ruler of heaven and earth, results from the greatest improve­ments of the understanding in philosophy and science. To suppose the contrary, says he, is supposing, that ‘while men were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth; but fell into error, as soon as they acquired learning and politeness ^*.’ This reasoning is just, where-ever religion is to be con­sidered as the result of human reflections. What account then will the author give of this wonderful exception? That the reverse is here the case, it is impossible for him to dissemble. The people he himself calls ignorant and barbarous; yet they are not idolaters or polytheists. At the time when the book, which he examines, was composed, he seems to think, they even exceeded themselves in barbarity; yet the sentiments of these barbarians on the subject of religion, the sentiments which that very book presents to us, may well put to silence the wisdom of the politest nations on earth. Need I re­mind Mr Hume of his express declaration, that if a [...]aveller were transported into any unknown region, and found the inhabitants ‘ignorant and barbarous, he might before hand declare them idolaters, and [Page 159]there is scarce a POSSIBILITY of his being mista­ken ^†?’ I know no satisfactory account that can be given of this exception, on the principles of the essayist. Nevertheless, nothing is more easy, than to give a satisfactory account of it, on the Christian principles. This account is that which is given by the book itself. It is, that the religious tenets of that nation were not the result of their reasonings, but proceeded from divine revelation. The contrast we discern betwixt the ISRAELITES, and the ancient GREEKS and ROMANS, is remarkable. The GRFEKS and ROMANS, on all the subjects of human erudition, on all the liberal and the useful arts, rea­soned like men; on the subject of religion, they prated like children. The ISRAELITES, on the contrary, in all the sciences and arts, were children; but, in their notions of religion, they were men; in the doctrines, for example, of the unity, the eternity, the omnipotence, the omniscience, the omnipresence, the wisdom, and the goodness of God; in their opinions concerning providence, and creation, the preservation and government of the world; opinions so exalted and comprehensive, as, even by the au­thor's acknowledgment, could never enter into the thoughts of barbarians.

But to proceed in the revisal: We have here a book, says the essayist, "wrote in all probability long after the facts it relates." That this book was written long after some of the facts it relates, is not in­deed denied: that it was written long after all, or even most of those facts, I see no reason to believe. If [Page 160]Mr Hume meant to signify, by the expression quo­ted, that this was in all probability the case, why did he not produce the grounds on which the probability is founded? Shall a bold assertion pass for argument? or can it be expected, that any one should consider reasons, which are only in general supposed, but not specified?

He adds, ‘corroborated by no concurring testimo­ny;’ as little, say I, invalidated by any contradict­ing testimony; and both, for this plain reason, be­cause there is no human composition, that can be compared with this, in respect of antiquity. But tho' this book is not corroborated by the concurrent testimony of any coeval histories, because, if there ever were such histories, they are not now extant; it is not therefore destitute of all collateral evidence. The following examples of this kind of evidence de­serve some notice. The division of time into weeks, which hath obtained in many countries, for instance among the Egyptians, Chinese, Indians, and nor­thern barbarians; nations whereof some had little or no intercourse with others, and were not even known by name to the Hebrews ^*: the tradition which in [Page 161]several places prevailed concerning the primeval chaos from which the world arose, the production of all living creatures out of water and earth, by the efficiency of a supreme mind ^*, the formation of [Page 162]man last of all, in the image of God, and his being vested with dominion over the other animals, the [Page 163]primitive state of innocence and happiness: the sub­sequent degeneracy of mankind: their destruction by a flood: and the preservation of one family in a vessel. Nay, which is still stronger, I might plead the vesti­ges of some such catastrophe as the deluge, which the shells and other marine bodies, that are daily dug out of the bowels of the earth, in places remote from the sea, do clearly exhibit to us: I might urge the traces, which still remain in ancient histories, of the migration of people and of science from Asia (which hath not improperly been styled the cradle of the arts) into many parts both of Africa and Europe: I might plead the coincidence of those migrations, and of the origin of states and kingdoms, with the time of the dispersion of the posterity of Noah.

But to return: The author subjoins, ‘resem­bling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin.’ 'Tis unluckily the fate of ho­ly writ with this author that both its resemblance, [Page 164]and its want of resemblance, to the accounts of other authors, are alike presumptions against it. He hath not indeed told us, wherein it resembles fabulous ac­counts: and, for my part, tho' the charge were just I should imagine, little or nothing to the disadvantage of the Pentateuch, could be deduced from it. It is u­niversally agreed among the learned, that even the most absurd fables of idolaters, derive their origin from facts, which having been, in barbarous ages, transmitted only by oral tradition, have come at length to be grossly corrupted and disfigured. 'Tis nevertheless probable, that such fictions would still retain some stricking features of those truths, from which they sprung. And if the books of Moses re­semble, in any thing, the fabulous accounts of other nations, it would not perhaps be difficult to prove, that they resemble only whatever is least fabulous in these accounts. That this will be found to be the case, we may reasonably presume, even from what hath been observed already; and if so, the resem­blance, so far from being an argument against those books, is evidently an argument in their favour. In order to remove any doubt that may remain on this head, it ought to be attended to, that, in a num­ber of concurrent testimonies, (where there could have been no previous concert) there is a probability in­dependent of that which results from our faith in the witnesses: nay, should the witnesses be of such a cha­racter as to merit no faith at all. This probability ariseth from the concurrence itself. That such a con­currence should spring from chance, is as one to infinite, in other words, morally impossible: if therefore con­cert be excluded, there remains no other cause but the reality of the fact.

[Page 165] 'Tis true, that ‘upon reading this book, we find it ful of prodigies and miracles:’ but 'tis also true, that many of those miracles are such, as the subject it treats of, must unavoidably make us expect. For a proof of this position, I need but refer the reader to the principles established in the preceding section. No book in the world do we find written in a more simple style; no where does there appear in it, the least affectation of ornament; yet nowhere else is the Almighty represented, as either acting or speak­ing in a manner so becoming the eternal ruler of the world. Compare the account of the CREATION which is given by Moses, with the ravings of San­choniatho the Phenician philosopher, which he had dignified with the title of COSMOGONY: or compare it with the childish extravagancies of the Greek and Latin poets, so justly likened by the author to a sick man's dreams ^*; and then say, whether any person of candour and discernment will not be disposed to ex­claim in the word, of the prophet, What is the CHAFF to the WHEAT ^†! The account is what we should call in reference to experience, miraculous. But was it possible it should be otherwise? I believe the greatest infidel will not deny, that it is at least as plausible an opinion that the world had a be­gining, as that it had not. If it had, can it be imagined by any man in his senses, that that particu­lar quality should be an objection to the narrative, which he previously knows it must have? Must not the first production of things, the original formation of animals and vegetables, require exertions of pow­er, [Page 166]which, in preservation and propagation, can never be exemplified?

It will perhaps be objected, That if the miracles continued no longer, and extended no further, than the necessity of creation required, this reasoning would be just; but that in fact they both continued much longer, and extended much further. The answer is obvious: it is impossible for us to judge, how far the necessity of the case required. Immediately af­ter the creation, things must have been in a state ve­ry different from that which they are in at present. How long that state might continue, we have not the means of discovering: but as, in human in­fancy, 'tis necessary that the feeble creature should, for some time, be carried in the nurse's arms, and afterwards, by the help of leading strings, be kept from falling, before he acquire, strength to walk; 'tis not unlikely, that in the infancy of the world, such interpositions should be more frequent and requisite, till nature attainining a certain maturity, those laws and that constitution should be established, which we now experience. It will greatly strengthen this conclusion, to reflect, that in every species of natural productions, with which we are acquainted, we invariably observe a similar feebleness in the indivi­duals on their first appearance, and a similar gradation towards a state of greater perfection and stability. Be­sides, if we acknowledge the necessity of the exerti­on of a power, which only in reference to our expe­rience is called miraculous, the question, as is well observed by the judicious prelate formerly quoted ^*, ‘whether this power stopped immediately, after it [Page 167]had made man, or went on and exerted itself farther, is a question of the same kind, as whether an or­dinary power exerted itself in such a particular de­gree and manner, or not.’ It cannot therefore, if we think reasonably on this subject, greatly astonish us, that such a book should give ‘an account of a state of the world, and of human nature, entirely different from the present; of our fall from that state; of the age of man extended to near a thousand years; and of the destruction of the world by a de­luge.’

Finally, if, in such a book, mingled with the ex­cellencies I have remarked, there should appear some difficulties, some things for which we are not able to account; for instance, ‘the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of Heaven; and their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable;’ is there any thing more extraordinary here, than, in a composition of this nature, we might have previously expected to find? We must be immoderately conceited of our own un­derstandings, if we imagine otherwise. Those fa­vourites of Heaven, it must be likewise owned, are the countrymen of the writer; but of such a writer, as of all historians or annalists, ancient or modern, shows the least disposition to flatter his countrymen. Where, I pray, do we find him, either celebrating their virtues, or palliating their vices; either extolling their genius, or magnifying their exploits? Add to all these, that, in every thing which is not expressly ascribed to the interposal of Heaven, the relation is in itself plausible, the incidents are natural, the cha­racters [Page 168]and manners such as are admirably adapted to those early ages of the world. In these particulars, there is no affectation of the marvellous; there are no ‘descriptions of sea and land monsters; no relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and un­couth manners ^*.’

WHEN all these things are seriously attended to, I persuade myself, that no unprejudiced person will think, that the Pentateuch bears falsehood on the face of it, and deserves to be rejected without ex­amination. On the contrary, every unprejudiced person will find (I say not, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, then all the miracles it relates; this is a language which I do not understand, and which only serves to darken a plain question; but I say, he will find) very many and very strong in­dications of authenticity and truth; and will con­clude, that all the evidences, both intrinsic and ex­trinsic, by which it is supported, ought to be im­partially canvassed. Abundant evidences there are of both kinds; some hints of them have been given in this section; but to consider them fully, falls not within the limits of my present purpose.