THE constitution, which I enclosed to the general assembly in a late official letter, appears without [Page 31] my signature. This circumstance, although trivial in its own nature, has been re [...]dered rather important to my­self at least, by being misunderstood by some, and mis­represented by o [...]hers.—As I disdain to conceal the rea [...]ons for witholding my subscription, I have always been, still am, and ever shall be, ready to proclaim them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, by whom I was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now to address them: aff [...]cting no indifference to pub­lic opinion, but resolved not to court it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own judgment.

As this explanation with involve a summary, but ge­neral review of our federal situation, you will p [...]rdon me, I trust, although I should transgress the usual bounds of a letter.

Before my departure for the convention, I believed, that the confederation was not so emin [...]ntly defective, as it had been supposed. But after I had entered into a free com­munication with those who were best informed of the con­dition and interest of each state; after I had compared the intelligence derived from them, with the properties which ought to characterise the government of our union, I became persuaded, that the confederation was distitute of every energy, which a constitution of the United States ought to possess.

For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it should be a shield against foreign host [...]lity, and a firm re­sort against domestic commotion; that it should cherish trade, and promote the prosperity of the states under its care.

But these are not among the attributes of our present union. Severe experience under the pressure of war— a ruinous weakness manifested since the return of peace; and the contemplation of those dangers, which darken the fu­ture prospect, have condemned the hope of grandeur and of safety under the auspices of the confederation.

In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its ef­fects is but short; the final ratification having been de­layed until the beginning of the year 1781. But however short, this period is distinguished by melancholy testimonies of its inability to maintain in harmony, the social inter­course of the states, to defend Congress against encroach­ments [Page 32] on their rights, and to obtain, by requisitions, sup­plies to the federal treasury, or recruits to the federal ar­mies. I shall not attempt an enumeration of the particu­lar instances; but leave to your own remembrance and the records of Congress, the support of the assertions.

In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed; and yet each of them has produced fatal examples of delin­quency, and sometimes of pointed opposition to federal du­ties. To the various remonstrances of Congress, I ap­peal, for a gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the in­juries which our faith, honor, and happiness, have sustain­ed by the failure of the states.

But these evils are past; and some may be led by an honest zeal to conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes sir, they will be repeated as long as the confederation ex­ists, and will bring with them other mischiefs, springing from the same source, which cannot be yet foreseen in their full array of terror.

If we examine the constitution and laws of the several states, it is immediately discovered that the law of nations is unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect public dignity and public justice. The letter however of the confederation does not permit Congress to remedy these defects, and such an authority, although evidently deducible from its spirit, cannot, without violation of the second article, be assumed. Is it not a political phoenome­non, that the head of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check offences against this law; and sentenced to witness in un­avaling anguish the infraction of their engagements to fo­reign sovereigns?

And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakness. After a war shall be inevitable, the requisitions of Congress for quotas of men or money, will again prove unproductive, and fallacious. Two causes will always conspire to this baneful consequence.

1. No▪ government can be stable, which hangs on hu­man inclination alone, unbiassed by the coercion; and 2, from the very connection between states bound to proportion­ate contributions, jealousies and suspicions naturally arise, which at least chill the ardour, if they do not excite the murmurs of the whole. I do not forget indeed, that by [Page 33] one sudden impulse our part of the American continent has been thrown into a military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations of Congress. But ought we to argue from a contest, thus signalized by the magnitude of its stake, that as often as a flame shall be hereafter kindled, the same enthusiasm will fill our legions, or renew them, as they may be filled by losses?

If not, where shall we find protection? Impressions, like those, which prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular forces, will deprive the American republic of the services of militia. But let us suppose, that they are attainable, and acknowledge, as I always shall, that they are the natural support of a free government. When it is remembered, that in their absence agricul­ture must languish; that they are not habituated to mi­litary exposures and the rigour of military discipline, and that the necessity of holding in readiness successive detachments, carries the expence far beyond that of en­listments—this resource ought to be adopted with caution.

As strongly too am I persuaded, that the requisitions for money will not be more cordially received. For besides the distrust, which would prevail with respect to them also; besides the opinion, entertained by each state of its own liberality and unsatisfied demands against the United States, there is another consideration, not less worthy of attention. The first rule for determin­ing each quota the value of all lands granted or sur­veyed, and of the buildings and improvements thereon. It is no longer doubted, that an equitable, uniform mode of estimating that value, is impracticable; and there­fore twelve states have substituted the number of inha­bitants under certain limitations, as the standard acc [...]d­ing to which money is to be furnished. But under the subsisting articles of the union, the assent of the thir­teenth state is necessary, and has not yet been given. This does of itself lessen the hope of procuring a reven [...]e for federal uses; and the miscarriage of the impost al­most rivets our despondency.

Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some consolation, if when rebellion shall threaten any state, [Page 34] an ultimate asylum could be found under the wing of Congress. But it is at least equivocal whether they can intrude forces into a state, rent asunder by civil discord, even with the purest solicitude for our federal welfare, and on the most urgent entreaties of the state itself. Nay the very allowance of this power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money and of men.

To these defects of congressional power, the history of man has subjoined others, not less alarming. I earnestly pray, that the recollection of common suffer­ings, which terminated in common glory, may check the sallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendship between the states. But I cannot presume, that we are superior to those unsocial passions, which under like circumstances have infested more ancient nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the conflicts for commercial advantages, in the discontents which the neighbourhood of territory has been seen to engender in other quarters of the globe, and in the efforts of fac­tion and intrigue—thirteen distinct communities under no effective superintending controul (as the United States confessedly now are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.

In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general prosperity to decline under a system thus un­nerved. No sooner is the merchant prepared for fo­reign ports, with the treasures which this new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to him, that they are shut against American shipping, or opened under oppressive regulations. He urges Con­gress to a counter-policy, and is answered only by a condolance on the general misfortune. He is immedi­ately struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American flag will be disgraced. For who can con­ceive, that thirteen legislatures, viewing commerce un­der different regulations, and fancying themselves dis­charged from every obligation to concede the smallest of their commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be wrought into a concert of action and [Page 35] defiance of every prejudice? Nor is this all: Let the great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and illustrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few those are, which will be absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending within their boundaries the choicest blessings of climate, soil, and navigable waters; then let the most sanguine patriot banish if he can, the mortifying belief, that all these must sleep, until they shall be roused by the vigour of a national govern­ment.

I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by mi­nute details; because they are evidently fortified by truth, and the consciousness of the United States of America. I shall, therefore, no longer deplore the un­fitness of the confederation to secure our peace; but procced, with a truly unaffected distrust of my own opinions, to examine what order of powers the govern­ment of the United States ought to enjoy? How they ought to be defended against encroachments? Whe­ther they can be interwoven in the confederation, with­out an alteration of its very essence, or must be lodged in new hands? Shewing at the same time the convul­sions, which seem to await us, from a dissolution of the union or partial confederacies.

To mark the kind and degree of authority, which ought to be confided to the government of the United States, is no more than to reverse the description which I have already given, of the defects of the confede­ration.

From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and [...]t these will be slow indeed, if depen­dent on supplication alone. For what better name do requisitions deserve, which may be evaded or opposed without the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indispensable ingredient, it ought not to be direct­ed against a state, as a state; it being impossible to at­tempt it except by blockading the trade of the delin­quent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent schemes were eligible, in other respects, both of them might perhaps be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest; would be tardy in their complete ef­fect, [Page 36] as the expence of the land and naval equipments must be first reimbursed; and might drive the proscrib­ed state into the desperate resolve of inviting foreign al­liances. Against each of them lie separate unconquer­able objections. A blockade is not equally applicable to all the states, they being differently circumstanced in commerce and in ports; nay, an excommunication form the privilege of the union would be vain, because every regulation or prohibition may be easily eluded under the rights of American citizenship, or of foreign nations. But how shall we speak of the intrusion of troops? Shall we arm citizens against citizens, and habituate them to shed kindred blood? Shall we risque the inflicting of wounds which will generate a rancour never to be sub­dued? Would there be no room to fear, that an army accustomed to fight, for the establishment of authority, would salute an Emperor of their own? Let us not bring these things into jeopardy. Let us rather sub­stitute the same process by which individuals are com­pelled to contribute to the government of their own states. Instead of making requisitions to the legislatures it would appear more proper, that taxes should be im­posed by the federal head, under due modifications and guards; that the collectors should demand from the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the collection of ordinary taxes.

It follows too, that, as the general government will be responsible to foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any offensive measure, or enforce any public right. Perhaps among the topics on which they may be ag­grieved or complain, the commercial intercourse, and the manner in which contracts are discharged, may con­stitute the principal articles of clamour.

It follows too, that the general government ought to be the supreme arbiter, for adjusting every contention among the states. In all their connections, therefore, with each other, and particularly in commerce, which will probably create the greatest discord, it ought to hold the reins.

It follows too, that the general government ought to protect each state against domestic as well as external violence.

[Page 37]And lastly, it follows, that through the general go­vernment alone, can we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled by our resources and situation.

Should the people of America surrender these powers, they can be paramount to the constitutions and ordi­nary acts of legislation, only by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I venture to believe, that if the confederation had been solemnly questioned in opposition to our constitution, or even to one of our laws, posterior to it, it must have given way. For never did it obtain a higher ratification, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form.

This will be one security against encroachment. But another not less effectual is, to exclude the individual states from any agency in the national government, as far as it may be safe, and their interposition may not be absolutely necessary.

But now, Sir, permit me to declare, that in my hum­ble judgment, the powers by which alone the blessings of a general government can be accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the confederation, without a change in its very essence, or, in other words, that the confedera­tion must be thrown aside. This is almost demonstra­ble, from the inefficacy of requisitions, and from the ne­cessity of converting them into acts of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for additional powers. But to whom shall we commit these acts of authority, these additional powers? To Congress? When I formerly lamented the defects in the jurisdiction of Congress, I had no view to indicate any other opinion, than that the federal head ought not to be so circumscribed. For free as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body, and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally free to make known my aversion to repose such a trust in a tribunal so constituted. My objections are not the visions of theory, but the result of my own obser­vations in America, and of the experience of others abroad. 1. The legislative and executive are concentred in the same persons. This, where real power exists, must even­tuate in tyranny. 2. The representation of the states bears no proportion to their importance. This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of the majority to [Page 38] that of the minority. 3. The mode of election, and the liability [...]f being recalled, may too often render the de­legates rather partizans of their own states than repre­sentatives of the Union. 4. Cabal and intrigue must consequently gain an ascendency in a course of years. 5. A single house of legislation, will sometimes be pre­cipitate, perhaps passionate. 6. As long as seven states are required for the smallest, and nine for the greatest votes, may not so [...]eign influence at some future day in­sinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active exertion? 7. To crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge of possibility, that so numerous an assembly should acquire that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour, which ar [...] the test of excellence in the executive department.

My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the new powers must be deposited in a new body, grow­ing out of a consolidation of the union, as far as the circumstances of the states will allow. Perhaps, how­ever, some may mediate its dissolution, and others, par­tial confederacies.

The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcileable with a very early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union, we must be undone. For, before the voice of war was heard, the pulse of the then colonies was tried, and sound to beat in unison. The unremit­ted labour of our enemies was to divide, and the policy of every Congress, to bind us together. But in no ex­ample was this truth more clearly displayed, than in the prudence with which independence was unfolded to the sight, and in the forbearance to declare it, until America almost unanimously called for it. After we had thus launched into troubles, never before explored, and in the hour of heavy distress, the remembrance of our social strength, not only forbade despair, but drew from Congress the most illustrious repetition of their settled purpose to despise all terms, short of indepen­dence.

Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been, while we acted in fraternal concord. But let us discard the illusion, that by this success, and this glory, the crest of danger has irrecoverably fallen. Our go­vernments are yet too youthful to have acquired sta­bility [Page 39] from habit. Our very quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among the upright and intel­ligent, few can read without emotion the future [...]ate of the states, if severed from each other. Then shall we learn the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall we hear of partitions of our country. If a prince, in­flamed by the lust of conquest, should use one state as the instrument of enslaving others—if every state is to be wearied by perpetual alarms, and compelled to main­tain large military establishments—if all questions are to be decided by an appeal to arms, where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by negociation—in a word, if all the direful misfortunes which haunt the peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land, for what have we to contend? why have we exhausted our wealth? why have we [...]ely betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal cause?

But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my mind, I entertain no less horror at the thought of partial confederacies. I have not the least ground for supposing, that an overture of this kind would be listened to by a single state, and the presumption is, that the politics of the greater part of the states, flow [...]rom the warmest attachment to an union of the whole. If, however, a lesser confederacy could be obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen, well to weigh the probable consequences, before they attempt to form it.

On such an event, the strength of the union would be divided in two, or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased since the war as to be divisible—and yet re­main sufficient for our happiness?

The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia could expect to form, would comprehend the three southern states, and her nearnest [...] neigh­bour. But they, like ourselves, are dimin [...] in their real force, by the mixture of an unhappy species of po­pulation.

Again may I ask, whether the oppul [...]nce of the United States has been augmented since the wa [...]? This is answered in the negative, by a load of debt, and the declension of trade.

[Page 40]At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of war, and soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the forest, and an army spring from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted, impoverished, in its com­merce, and destitute of men, could, for some years at least, provide an ample defence for itself.

Let it not be forgotten, that nations, which can enforce their rights, have large claims against the United States, and that the creditor may insist on payment from any of them. Which of them would probably be the victim? The most productive, and the most exposed. When vexest by re­prisals or war, the southern states will sue for alliance on this continent or beyond sea. If for the former, the ne­cessity of an union of the whole is decided; if for the lat­ter, America will, I fear, re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, exhibited among most of those nations, which have, too late, repented the folly of relying on auxilia­ries.

Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for power. The ancient friendship between the citizens of America, being thus cut off, bitterness and hostility will succeed in its place; in order to prepare against surround­ing danger, we shall be compelled to vest some where or other power approaching near to military government.

The annals of the world have abounded so much with instances of a divided people being a prey to foreign in­fluence, that I shall not restrain my apprehensions of it, should our union be torn asunder. The opportunity of in­sinuating it, will be multiplied in proportion to the parts into which we may be broken.

In short, Sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my imagination the miseries which will harrass the United States, if torn from each other, and which will not end until they are superseded by fresh mischiefs under the yoke of a tyrant.

I come, therefore, to the last, and perhaps only refuge in our difficulties, a consolidation of the union, as far as cir­cumstances will permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the constitution was framed by the federal convention. A quorum of eleven states, and the only member from a twelfth have subscribed it; Mr Mason of Virginia, Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts, and myself having refused to sub­scribe.

[Page 41] Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction of those who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty com­manded me thus to act. It commanded me, Sir for believe me, that no event of my life ever occupied more of my reflection. To subscribe, seemed to offer no inconsiderable gratification, since it would have presented me to the world as a fellow-labourer with the learned and zealous statesmen of Ame­rica.

But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I was about to differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom is to the honor of the country which he has saved, embossomed in their affections, and can receive no praise from the highest desire of language; the other two of whom have been long e [...]o [...]led among the wisest and best lovers of the commonwealth; and the unshaken and intimate friendship of all of whom I have ever prized, and still do prize, [...]s among the happiest of all acquisitions. I was no str [...]nger to the reigning partiality for the members who composed the convention, and had not the smallest doubt, that from this cause, and from the ardor for a reform of government, the first applauses at least would be loud and profuse. I suspected, too, that there was something in the human breast which for a time would be apt to construe a temper [...]teress in politics, into an enmity to the union. Nay, I [...] foresaw, that in the dissentions of parti [...]s a middle line would probably be interpreted into a want of ent [...]rpri [...] and decision. But these considerations, how seducing s [...]ver, were feeble opponents to the suggestions of my conscience. I was sent to exercise my judgment, and to exercise it was my fixed determination; being instructed by even an im­perfect acquaintance with mankind, that self-approbation is the only true reward which a political career can be­stow, and that popularity would have been but another name for perfidy, if to secure it, I had given up the freedom of thinking for myself.

It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have ascertained before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my fellow citizens, considered relatively to a govern­ment, so substantially differing from the confederation as that which is now submitted. But this was, for many obvious reasons, impossible; and I was thereby deprived of what I thought the necessary guides.

[Page 42] I saw, however, that the confederation was tottering from its own weakness, and that the sitting of the conven­tion was a signal of its total insufficiency. I was therefore ready to assent to a scheme of government, which was pro­posed, and which went beyond the limits of the confedera­tion, believing, that without being too extensive it would h [...]ve preserved our tranquility, until that temper and that genius should be collected.

But when the plan which is now before the general assembly, was on its passage through the convention, I moved, that the state conventions should be at liber­ty to amend, and that a second general convention should be holden, to discuss the amendments, which should be suggested by them. This motion was in some measure justified by the manner in which the confederation was forwarded originally, by congress to the state legisla­tures, in many of which amendments were proposed, and those amendments were afterwards examined in Congress. Such a motion was doubly expedient here as the delegation of so much more power was sought for. But it was negatived. I then expressed my un­willingness to sign. My reasons were the following:

1. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the constitution, that it is to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, for their assent and ratification. The meaning of these terms is allowed universally to be, that the convention must either adopt the constitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole, and is positively forbidden to amend. If therefore, I had signed, I should have felt myself bound to be silent as to amendments, and to endeavor to sup­port the constitution without the correction of a letter. With this consequence before my eyes, and with a de­termination to attempt an amendment, I was taught, by a regard for consistency, not to sign.

2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citizen of America, let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a full opportunity to propose, through his re­presentatives, any amendment which, in his apprehen­sion, tends to the public welfare. By signing, I should have contradicted this sentiment.

3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the [Page 43] people on its side. But if at a future day it should be burthensome after having been adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate that it was in some measure forced upon them, by being confined to the single al­ternative of taking or rejecting it altogether, under my impressions, and with my opinions, I should not be able to justify myself had I signed.

4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that this great subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes by the criticism of the world, and that no man can assure himself how a constitution will work for a course of years, until at least he shall have heard the observations of the people at large. I also fear more from inaccuracies in a co [...]stitution, than from gross er­rors in any other composition; because our dearest in­terests are to be regulated by it; and power, if loosely given, especially where it will be interpreted with great latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had I signed with these ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against the information which I ardently desired.

5. I was afraid, that if the constitution was to be submitted to the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by them, they would not only reject it, but bid a lasting farwel to the union. This formidable event I wished to avert, by keeping myself free to propose amendmen [...]s, and thus, if possible, to remove the obsta­cles to an effectual government. But it will be asked, whether all these arguments were not well weighed in convention. They were, Sir, with great candor. Nay, when I called to mind the respectability of those, with whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these principles. On other occasions, I should chearfully have yielded to a majority; on this, the sate of thousands, yet unborn, enjoined me not to yield until I was con­vinced.

Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in the constitution for its amendment, may not be a suffici­ent security against its imperfections, without now arrest­ing it in its progress? My answers are, 1. That it is better to amend, while we have the constitution in our power, while the passions of designing men are not yet enlifted, and while a bare majority of the states may [Page 44] amend, than to wait for the uncertain assent of three fourths of the states. 2. That a bad feature in go­vernment, becomes more and more fixed every day. 3. That frequent changes [...]f a constitution, even if practicable, ought not to be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And 4 That in the present case, it may be questionable, whether, after the particular advan­tages of its operation shall be discerned, three fourths of the states can be induced to amend.

I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which shall be suitable to the views of all. Many ex­pedients have occured to me, but none of them appear less exceptionable than this; that if our convention should chuse to amend, another federal convention be recommended: that in that federal convention the a­mendments proposed by this or any other state be discuss­ed; and it incorporated in the constitution or rejected, or if a proper number of the other states should be un­willing to accede to a second convention, the constitu­tion be again laid before the same state conventions, which shall again assemble on the summons of the exe­cutives, and it shall be either wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a further power of amendment. I count such a delay as nothing, in comparison with so grand an object; especially too as the privilege of amending must terminate after the use of it once.

I should now conclude this letter, which is already too long, were it not incumbent on me, from having con­tended for amendments, to set forth the particulars, which I conceive to require correction. I undertake this with reluctance: because it is remote from my inten­tions to catch the prejudices or prepossessions of any man. But as I mean only to manifest that I have not been actuated by caprice, and now to explain every ob­jection at full length would be an immense labour, I shall content myself with enumerating certain heads, in which the constitution is most repugnant to my wishes.

The two first points are the equality of suffrage in the senate, and the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the legislature, with no other check than the revision of the president. I conjecture that neither of these things can be corrected; and particularly the [Page 45] former, without which we must have risen perhaps in disorder.

But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other just­ly obnoxious cause, Virginia will be seconded by a majority of the states. I hope that she will be seconded, 1. In causing all ambiguities of expression to be pre­cisely explained. 2. In rendering the president ineligi­ble after a given number of years. 3. In taking from him the power of nominating to the judiciary officers, or of filling up vacancies which there may happen dur­ing the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 4. In taking from him the power of pardoning for treason at least before conviction. 5. In drawing a line be­tween the powers of Congress and individual states; and in defining the former, so as to leave no clashing of jurisdictions nor dangerous disputes; and to prevent the one from being swallowed up by the other, under cover of general words, and implication. 6. In abridg­ing the power of the senate to make treaties supreme laws of the land. 8. In incapacitating the Congress to determine their own salaries. And 9. In limiting and defining the judicial power.

The proper remedy must be consigned to the wisdom of the convention; and the final step which Virginia shall pursue, if her overtures shall be discarded, must also rest with them.

You will excuse me, Sir, for having been thus tedi­ous. My feelings and duty demanded this exposition; for through no other channel could I rescue my omission to sign from misrepresentation, and no more effectual way could I exhibit to the general assembly an unre­served history of my conduct.

PERMIT one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the constitution of this commonwealth, and beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government submitted to your considera­tion, b [...]fore you surrender these great and valuable pri­vileges up for ever. Your present frame of government secures to you a right to hold yourselves, houses, pa­pers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants granted without oaths or affirmati­ons first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses, or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further provides, "in controversies respecting property, and in suits be­tween man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." It also provides and declares, that the people have a right of FREEDOM OF SPEECH and of WRITING and PUBLISHING their senti­ments, therefore the FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED." The con­stitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as yet you have the right of freedom of speech and of publishing your sentiments. How long these rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons, and your property, are to be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine, whether the trial by jury is to continue as your birth-right, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to declare.

Without presuming upon my own judgment, I can­not think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my [Page 47] private opinion and call upon others for theirs; and if I use my p [...] the boldness of a freeman, it is because I know tha [...] [...] [...]ty of the press yet remains unviolated and juries you [...] [...]udge [...].

The late convention have submitted to your consider­ation a plan of a new federal government. The subject is highly interesting to your future welfare. Whether it be calculated to promote the great ends of civil socie­ty, viz. the happiness and prosperity of the communi­ty; it behoves you well to consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of that frenzy of enthusiasm, that has actuated the citizens of Pennsylvania, in their approbation of the proposed plan, before it was possible that it could be the result of a rational investigation in­to its principles: it ought to be dispassionately and de­liberately examined, and its own intrinsic merit, the only criterion of your patronage. If ever free and unbiassed discussion was proper or necessary, it is on such an occa­sion. All the blessings of liberty and the dearest privi­leges of freemen, are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct. Those who are competent to the task of developing the principles of governmnnt, ought to be encouraged to come forward, and thereby the better enable the people to make a proper judgment; for the science of government is so abstrute, that few are able to judge for themselves, without such assistance the people are too apt to yield an implicit assent to the opi­nions of those characters, whose abilities are held in the highest esteem, and to those in whose integrity and pa­triotism they can confide; not considering that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents, a­bilities, and superior acquirements; and that the men of the greatest purity of intention may be made instruments of despotism in the hands of the artful and designing. If it were not for the stability and attachment which time and habit gives to forms of government, it would be in the power of the enlightened and aspiring few, if they should combine, at any time to destroy the best establishments, and even make the people the instruments of their own subjugation.

The late revolution having effaced in a great measure all former habits, and the present institutions are so re­cent, [Page 48] that there exists not that great reluctance to inno­vation, so remarkable in old communities, which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot forsee the full operation of material changes on civil polity; it is the genius of the common law to resist innovation.

The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow crea­tures, have availed themselves, very successfully, of this favourable disposition; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments, have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government; all the distresses and difficulties they experi­ence, preceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government; and in the other event, immediate ruin an annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all dis­trust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concur­rence of the two men in whom America has the highest confi­dence, and now triumphantly exult in the completion of their long meditated schemes of power and aggrandise­ment. I would be very far from insinuating, that the two illustrious personages alluded to, have not the welfare of their country at heart; but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one has been imposed on in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness and inde­cision attendant on old age, has been practised on in the other.

I am fearful that the principles of government incul­cated in Mr. Adams's treatise, and enforced in the nume­rous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well designing members of the late convention. But it will appear in the sequel, that the construction of the proposed plan of government is infinitely more extrava­gant.

I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the sutility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams's fine qua non of a good govern­ment is three balancing powers, whose repelling qualities [Page 49] are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby pro­mote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts, that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectu­al method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of government that ever existed, as far as histo­ry affords materials, has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he indeed says, that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue? not a day, for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom, and industry of mankind, that the scale would presently prepon­derate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly ex­tended. The state of society in England is much more fa­vourable to such a scheme of government than that of Ame­rica. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction of interests, in the three orders of government, they exist but in name; the only operative and efficient check, upon the conduct of administration, is the sense of the people at large.

Suppose a government could be formed and support­ed on such principles, would it answer the great pur­poses of civil society? if the administrators of every go­vernment are actuated by views of private interests and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests

[Page 50]Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole, we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds those intrusted with power, in the greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for freemen. A republican or free go­vernment, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is equally divided; in such a government the people are the sovereign, and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, mo­narchy, or despotism will rise on its ruin. The high­est responsibility is to be attained, in a simple struction of government; for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on.— If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct: some will impute it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power in one body of men (separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and ne­cessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays im­posed on its proceedings, you will create the most per­fect responsibility, for then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the authors, and will ap­ply the remedy with certainty and effect, discardin [...] them at the next election. This tie of responsibility w [...] obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legis­lature, and will the best secure the rights of the pe [...]le.

Having premised thus much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of government; and I trust shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the essential requisites of a free go­vernment; that it is neither founded on those ballancing restraining powers, recommended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British constitution, or possessed of [Page 51] that responsibility to its constituents, which in my opi­nion, is the only effectual security for the liberties and happiness of the people; but on the contrary, that it is a [...] daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocra­cy among freem [...]n, that the world has ever witnessed.

I [...] previously consider the extent of the powers intended [...] be ve [...]ted in Congress, before I examine the construction of the general government.

It will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government, and that all others are subordinate to i [...]. The celebrated Montes­quieu [...] it a [...] a maxim, that legislation neces­sarily follow, the power of taxation. By section 8, of the first [...] of the proposed plan of government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Now what can be more comprehensive than these words; not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive powers of a confederation, and a standing army in time of peace, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the absolute controul over the commerce of the United States, and all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, &c. they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation: what­ever taxes, duties, and excises that they may deem re­quisite for the general welfare▪ may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officer [...] of Con­gress, distributed through every district in America, and the collection would be enforced by the standing army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Con­gress may construe every purpose for which the state le­gislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every object of revenue.

The judicial power, by 1st section of article 3d, shall extend to all cases, in law, and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their au­thority, and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty [Page 52] and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies be­tween two or more states, between a state, and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or sub­jects.

The judicial power to be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

The objects of jurisdiction recited above, are so nu­merous, and the shades of distinction between civil causes are oftentimes so slight, that it is more than probable that the state judicatories would be wholly superceded; for in contests about jurisdiction, the federal court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail. Every person acquainted with the history of the courts in England, knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at differ­ent periods, extended the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution, and con­trary to their very nature, courts of a criminal juris­diction obtaining cognizance in civil causes.

To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and judicatories out of all doubt, the 6th article ordains, that "this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand­ing."

By these sections, the all-prevailing power of taxati­on, and such extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the general government, as must in their operation, necessarily absorb the state legislatures and judicatories; and that such was in the contemplation of the framers of it, will appear from the provision made for such event, in another part of it, but that fearful of alarming the people by so great an innova­tion, they have suffered the forms of the separate go­vernments [Page 53] to remain, as a blind. By section 4th of the 1st art. "the times, places, and manner of holding elec­tions for senators and representatives, shall be prescrib­ed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Con­gress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regu­lations, except as to the place of choosing senators."— The plain construction of which is, that when the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary opera­tion of this government, the Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and sen­ators.

If the foregoing be a just comment—if the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it be­comes you to consider whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so extended a territory; and whether it would be practicable, con­sistent with freedom? It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be govern­ed on democratical principles, on any other plan, than a confederation of a number of small republics, possess­ing all the powers of internal government, but united in the management of their foreign and general con­cerns.

It would not be difficult to prove, that any thing short of despotism, could not bind so great a country under one government; and that whatever plan you might, at the first setting out, establish, it would issue in a despotism.

If one general government could be instituted, and maintained on principles of freedom, it would not be so competent to attend to the various local concerns and wants of every particular district; as well as the pecu­liar governments, who are near the scene, and possessed of superior means of information: besides, if the busi­ness of the whole union is to be managed by one govern­ment, there would not be time. Do we not already see, that the inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniencies and disadvantages they are subjected to, on this account, and that, to en­joy the comforts of local government, they are separat­ing into smaller divisions.

Having taken a review of the powers, I shall now ex­amine [Page 54] the construction of the proposed general govern­ment.

Art. 1, sect. 1. "All legislative powers herein grant­ed, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representa­tives." By an other section, the president (the principal executive officer) has a conditional controul over their proceedings.

Sect. 2. "The house of representatives shall be com­posed of members chosen every second year, by the people of the several states. The number of represen­tatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabi­tants.

The senate, the other constituent branch of the legis­lature, is formed by the legislature of each state, appoint­ing two senators, for the term of six years.

The executive power, by Art. 2, sect. 1, is to be vest­ed in a president of the United States of America, elect­ed for four years: section 2, gives him "power, by and with the consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con­sent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other pub­lic ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose ap­pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law, &c. And by another section he has the absolute power of granting reprieves and pardons for treason, and all other high crimes and misdemeanors, except in cases of impeachment.

The foregoing is the outlines of the plan.

Thus we see the house of representatives are, on the part of the people, to balance the senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well born, &c. The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000) appears to be too few, either to commu­nicate the requisite information, of the wants, local cir­cumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence in the exer­cise of such great powers; the term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained; [Page 55] for as Congress have the controul over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most inconvenient.

The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of go­vernment, is constituted on the most unequal principles. The smallest state in the union has equal weight with the great states of Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsyl­vania. The senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the executive; none of the principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and consent. The term and mode of its ap­pointment, will lead to permanency; the members are chosen for six years, the mode is under the controul of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by rotation, they may be continued for life, which from their extensive means of influence, would follow of course. The presi­dent, who would be a mere pageant of state, unless he coincides with the views of the senate, would either be­come the head of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion; besides, their influence being the most pre­dominant, could the best secure his re-election to of­fice.

And from his power of granting pardons, he might skreen from punishment the most treasonable attempts on the liberties of the people, when instigated by the senate.

From this investigation into the organization of this government, it appears, that it is devoid of all responsi­bility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that so far from being a regular balanced govern­ment, it would be, in practice, a permanent ARISTO­CRACY.

The framers of it, actuated by the true spirit of such a government, which ever abominates and suppresses all free enquiry, and discussion, have made no provision for the li­berty of the press, that grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants; but observed a total silence on that head. It is the opinion of some great writers, that if the liberty of the press, by an institution of religion, or otherwise, could be rendered sacred even in Turkey, that despotism would fly before it. And it is worthy of remark, that there is no declaration of personal rights, premised in [Page 56] most free constitutions; and that the trial by jury in civil cases is taken away; for what other construction can be put on the following, viz. Art. 3. sect. 2. "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases above mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact!" It would be a no­velty in jurisprudence, as well as evidently improper to al­low an appeal from the verdict of a jury, on the matter of fact; therefore it implies and allows of a dismission of the jury in civil cases, and especially when it is consider­ed, that jury trial in criminal cases is expressly stipulated for, but not in civil cases.

But our situation is represented to be so critically dread­ful, that, however reprehensible and exceptionable the pro­posed plan of government may be, there is no alternative between the adoption of it and absolute ruin. My fellow citizens, things are not at that crisis, it is the argument of tyrants; the present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on that quarter, and as to domestic dissen­tions, we have not so much to fear from them, as to preci­pitate us into this form of government, without it is a safe and a proper one. For remember, of all possible evils, that of despotism is the worst and the most to be dread­ed.

Besides, it cannot be supposed, that the first essay on so difficult a subject, is so well digested as it ought to be; if the proposed plan, after a mature deliberation, should meet the approbation of the respective states, the matter will end; but if it should be found to be fraught with dangers and inconveniences, a future general Convention being in possession of the objections, will be the better enabled to plan a suitable government.

AS long as the liberty of the press continues unvio­late, and the people have the right of expressing and publishing their sentiments upon every public me [...] sure, it is next to impossible to enslave a free nation▪ The state of society must be very corrupt and base indeed, when the people, in possession of such a monitor as the press, can be induced to exchange the heaven-born bles­sings of liberty, for the galling chains of despotism. Men of an aspiring and tyrannical disposition, sensible of this truth, have ever been inimical to the press, and have considered the shackling of it, as the first step to­wards the accomplishment of their hateful domination, and the entire suppression of all liberty of public dis­cussion, as necessary to its support. For even a stand­ing army, that grand engine of oppression, if it were as numerous as the abilities of any nation could maintain, would not be equal to the purposes of despotism over an enlightened people.

The abolition of that grand palladium of freedom, the liberty of the press, in the proposed plan of govern­ment, and the conduct of its authors, and patrons, is a striking exemplification of these observations. The rea­son assigned for the omission of a bill of rights, securing the liberty of the press, and other invaluable personal rights, is an insult on the understanding of the people.

The injunction of secrecy imposed on the members of the late Convention during their deliberation, was obviously dictated by the genius of aristocracy; it was deemed im­politic to unfold the principles of the intended government to the people, as this would have frustrated the object in view.

The projectors of the new plan, supposed that an ex par­te discussion of the subject, was more likely to obtain unani­mity in the Convention; which would give it such a sanction [Page 58] in the public opinion, as to banish all distrust, and lead the people into an implicit adoption of it without examination.

The greatest minds are forcibly impressed by the immedi­ate circumstances with which they are connected; the par­ticular sphere men move in, the prevailing sentiments of those they converse with, have an insensible and irresistible influence on the wisest and best of mankind, so that when we consider the abilities, talents, ingenuity, and consum­mate address of a number of the members of the late con­vention, whose principles are despotic, can we be surprised that men of the best intentions have been misled in the dif­ficult science of government? It is derogating from the character of the illustrious and highly revered WASH­INGTON, to suppose him fallible on a subject that must be in a great measure novel to him? As a patriotic hero, he stands unequalled in the annals of time.

The new plan was accordingly ushered to the public with such a splendor of names, as inspired the most un­limited confidence; the people were disposed to receive upon trust, without any examination on their part, what would have proved either a blessing or a curse to them and their posterity. What astonishing infatuation! to stake their happiness on the wisdom and integrity of any set of men! In matters of infi [...]tel smaller concern, the dictates of prudence are not disregarded! The cele­brated Montesquieu, in his Spirit of Laws, says, that "slavery is ever preceded by sleep." And again, in his account of the rise and fall of the Roman empire, page 97, "That it may be advanced as a general rule, that in a free state, whenever a perfect claim is visi­ble, the spirit of liberty no longer subsists." And Mr. Dickenson, in his Farmer's Letters, No. XI, lays it down as a maxim, that "A perpetual jealousy respecting liberty is absolutely requisite in all free states."

‘Happy are the men, and happy the people, who grow wise by the misfortunes of others. Earnestly, my dear countrymen, do I beseech the author of all good gifts, that you may grow wise in this manner, and I beg leave to recommend to you in general, as the best method of obtaining this wisdom, diligently to study the histories of other countries. You will there find all the arts that can possibly be practised by cunning rulers or false patri­ots [Page 59] among yourselves, so fully delineated, that changing names, the account would serve for your own times.’

A few citizens in Philadelphia (too few, for the ho­nor of human nature) who had the wisdom to think consideration ought to precede approbation, and the for­titude to avow that they would take time to judge for themselves on so momentous an occasion, were stigma­tized as enemies to their country; a [...] monsters, whose existence ought not to be suffered, and the destruction of them and their houses recommended as meritorious. The authors of the new plan, conscious that it would not stand the test of enlightened patriotism, tyrannical­ly endeavoured to preclude all investigation. If their views were laudable—if they were honest—the contrary would have been their conduct, they would have in­vited the freest discussion. Whatever specious reasons may be assigned for secrecy during the framing of the plan, no good one can exist, for leading the people blindfold into the implicit adoption of it. Such an at­tempt does not a [...]gur the public good. It carries on the face of it an intention to juggle the people out of their liberties.

The virtuous and spirited exertions of a few patriots, have, at length, roused the people from their fatal infa­tuation, to a due sense of the importance of the mea­sure before them. The glare and fascination of names is rapidly abating, and the subject begins to be canvassed on its own merits; and so serious and general has been the impression of the objections urged against the new plan, on the minds of the people, that its advocates, finding mere declamation and scurrility will no longer avail, are reluctantly driven to defend it on the ground of argument. Mr. Wilson, one of the deputies of this state in the late convention, has found it necessary to come forward. From so able a lawyer, and so profound a politician, what might not be expected, if this new act of convention be the heavenly dispensation which some represent it. Its divinity would certainly be illustrated by one of the principal instruments of the Revelation; for this gentleman has that transcendent merit! But if on the other hand, this able advocate has failed to vin­dicate it from the objections of its adversaries, must we [Page 60] not consider it as the production of frail and interested men.

Mr. Wilson has recourse to the most slimsey sophistry in his attempt to refute the charge that the new plan of general government will supercede and render powerless the state governments. His quibble upon the term cor­poration, as sometimes equivalent to communities which posse [...] sovereignty, is unworthy of him. The same comparison in the case of the British parliament assum­ing to tax the colonies, is made in the Xth of the Far­mer's Letters, and was not misunderstood in 1768 by any. He says, that the existence of the proposed federal plan depends on the existence of the state governments, as the senators are to be appointed by the several legisla­tures, who are also to nominate the electors who choose the president of the United States; and that hence all fears of the several states being melted down into one empire, are groundless and imaginary. But who is so dull as not to comprehend, that the semblance and forms of an ancient establishment, may rem [...]in, after the reality is gone. Augustus, by the aid of a great army, assumed despotic power, and notwithstanding this, we find even under Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero, princes who dis­graced human nature by [...]heir excesses, the shadows of the ancient constitution held up to amuse the people. The senate sat as formerly; consuls, tribunes, of the peo­ple, censors and other officers, were annually chosen as before, and the forms of republican government con­tinued. Yet all this was in appearance only. Every senatus consultum was dictated by him or his ministers, and every Roman found himself constrained to submit in all things to the despot.

Mr. Wilson asks, What controul can proceed from the federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred pal­ladium of national freedom, the liberty of the press?" What? cannot Congress, when possessed of the immense authority, proposed to be devolved, restrain the printers, and put them under regulation. Recollect that the omnipotence of the federal legislature over the state esta­blishments is recognized by a special article, viz. "that this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, [Page 61] or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." After such a declaration, what secu­rity does the constitutions of the several states afford for the liberty of the press, and other invaluable personal rights, not provided for by the new plan? Does not this sweep­ing clause subject every thing to the controul of Congress?

In the plan of confederation of 1778, now existing, it was thought proper by article the 2d, to declare, that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and inde­pendence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." Positive grant was not then thought sufficiently descriptive and restrain­ing upon Congress, and the omission of such a declara­tion now, when such great devolutions of power are proposed, manifests the design of reducing the several states to shadows. But Mr. Wilson tells you that every right and power not specially granted to Congress is considered as withheld. How does this appear? Is this principle established by the proper authority? Has the convention made such a stipulation? By no means. Quite the reverse; the laws of Congress are to be "the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding," and consequently, would be paramount to all state au­thorities. The lust of power is so universal, that a spe­culative unascertained rule of construction would be a poor security for the liberties of the people.

Such a body as the intended Congress, unless parti­cularly inhibited and restrained, must grasp at omnipo­tence, and before long swallow up the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers of the several states.

In addition to the respectable authorities quoted in my first number, to shew that the right of taxation in­cludes all the powers of government, I beg leave to ad­duce the Farmer's Letters, see particularly letter 9th, in which Mr. Dickenson has clearly proved, that if the British parliament assumed the power of taxing the co­lonies, internally, as well as externally, and it should be [Page 62] submitted to, the several colony legislatures would soon become contemptible, and before long fall into disuse. Nothing, says he, would be left for them to do, higher than to frame bye-laws for empounding of cattle, or the yoking of hogs.

By the proposed plan, there are divers cases of judi­cial authority to be given to the courts of the United States, besides the two mentioned by Mr. Wilson. In maritime causes about property, jury trial has not been usual; but in suits in equity, with all due deference to Mr. Wilson's professional abilities (which he calls to his aid) jury trial, as to facts, is in full exercise. Will this ju­risperitus say, that if the question in equity should be, did John Doe make a will, that the chancellor of England would decide upon it? He well knows, that in this case, there being no mode of jury trial before the chancellor, the question would be referred to the court of king's bench for discussion according to the common law, and when the judge in equity should receive the verdict, the fact so established, could never be re-examined or controverted. Maritime causes, and those appertaining to a court of equity, are, however, but two of the many and exten­sive subjects of federal cognizance mentioned in the plan. This jurisdiction will embrace all suits arising under the laws of impost, excise, and other revenue of the United States. In England, if goods be seized, if a ship be prosecuted for non-compliance with, or breach of the laws of the customs, or those for regulating trade, in the court of exchequer, the claimant is secured of the transcendant privilege of Englishmen, trial by a jury of his peers. Why not in the United States of America? This jurisdiction also goes to all cases under the laws of the United States, that is to say, under all statutes and ordinances of Congress. How far this may extend, it is easy to foresee; for upon the decay of the state pow­ers of legislation, in consequence of the loss of the purse strings, it will be found necessary for the federal legisla­ture to make laws upon every subject of legislation.— Hence the state courts of justice, like the barony and hundred courts of England, will be eclipsed, and gra­dually fall into disuse.

The jurisdiction of the federal court goes, likewise, to [Page 63] the laws to be created by treaties made by the president and senate (a species of legislation) with other nations; 'to all cases affecting foreign ministers and consuls; to controversies wherein the United States shall be a party; to controversies between citizens of different states," as when an inhabitant of New-York has a demand on an inhabitant of New-Jersey. This last is a very invidious jurisdiction, implying an improper distrust of the impar­tiality and justice of the tribunals of the states. It will include all legal debates between foreigners in Britain or elsewhere, and the people of this country. A rea­son hath been assigned for it, viz. "That large tracts of land, in neighbouring states, are claimed under royal or other grants, disputed by the states where the lands lie, so that justice cannot be expected from the state tribu­nals." Suppose it were proper indeed to provide for such case, why include all cases, and for all time to come? Demands as to lands for 21 years would have satisfied this. A London merchant shall come to Ame­rica, and sue for his supposed debt, and the citizen of this country shall be deprived of jury trial, and subjected to an appeal (though nothing but the fact is disputed) to a court 500 or 1000 miles from home; when if this American has a claim upon an inhabitant of England, his adversary is secured of the privilege of jury trial. This jurisdiction goes also to controversies between any state and its citizens, which though probably not intend­ed, may hereafter be set up as a ground to divest the states, severally, of the trial of criminals; inasmuch as every charge of felony and misdemeanour, is a contro­versy between a state and the citizens of the same: that is to say, the state is plaintiff, and the party accused is defendant in the prosecution. In all debts about juris­prudence, as was observed before, the paramount courts of Congress will decide, and the judges of the state, be­ing sub graviore lege, under the paramount law, must acquiesce.

Mr. Wilson says, that it would have been impractica­ble to have made a general rule for jury trial in the civil cases assigned to the federal judiciary, because of the want of uniformity in the mode of jury trial as practised by the several states. This objection proves [Page 64] too much, and therefore amounts to nothing. If it precludes the mode of common law in civil cases, it certainly does in criminal. Yet in these we are told, "the oppression of government is effectually barred, by declaring, that in all criminal cases trial by jury shall be preserved." Astonishing, that provision could not be made for a jury in civil controversies, of 12 men, whose verdict should be unanimous, to be taken from the vicinage; a precaution which is omitted as to trial of crimes, which may be any where in the state within which they have been committed. So that an inhabi­tant of Kentucky may be tried for treason at Richmond.

The abolition of jury trial in civil cases, is the more considerable, as at length the courts of Congress will supersede the state courts, when such mode of trial will fall into disuse among the people of the United States.

The northern nations of the European continent, have all lost this invaluable privilege: Sweden, the last of them, by the artifices of the aristocratic senate, which depressed the king, and reduced the house of commons to insignificance. But the nation, a few years ago, pre­ferring the absolute authority of a monarch to the vexa­tious domination of the well-born few, an end was sud­denly put to their power

"The policy of this right of juries (says judge Black-stone) to decide upon fact, is founded on this: that if the power of judging were entirely trusted with the ma­gistrates, or any select body of men named by the exe­cutive authority, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, would have a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is not to be expected, that the few should be attentive to the rights of the many. This, therefore, preserves in the hands of the people, that share which they ought to have in the ad­ministration of justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy citizens."

The attempt of governor Colden, of New-York, be­fore the revolution, to re-examine the facts, and to re-consider the damages, in the case of Forsey against Cun­ningham, produced, about the year 1764, a flame of pa­triotic and successful opposition, that will not be easily forgotten

[Page 65]To manage the various and extensive judicial autho­rity, proposed to be vested in Congress, there will be one or more inferior courts immediately requisite in each state; and laws and regulations must be forthwith pro­vided to direct the judges; here is a wide door for in­convenience to enter. Contracts made under the acts of the states respectively, will come before courts acting under new laws and new modes of proceeding, not thought of when they were entered into. An inhabi­tant of Pennsylvania, residing at Pittsburgh, finds the goods of his debtor, who resides in Virginia, within the reach of his attachment; but no writ can be had to authorise the marshal, sheriff, or other officer of Con­gress to seize the property about to be removed, nearer than 200 miles: suppose that at Carlisle, for instance, such a writ may be had, mean while the object escapes. Or if an inferior court, whose judges have ample sala­ries, be established in every county, would not the ex­pence be enormous? Every reader can extend in his imagination, the instances of difficulty which would pro­ceed from this needless interference with the judicial rights of the separate states, and which, as much as any other circumstance in the new plan, implies that the dissolution of their forms of government is de­signed.

Mr. Wilson skips very lightly over the danger appre­hended from the standing army allowed by the new plan. This grand machine of power and oppression may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the public liberties, especially as the funds to support the troops may be granted for two years, whereas in Britain, the grants ever since the revolution in 1688, have been from year to year. A standing army with regular pro­vision of pay and contingencies, would afford a strong temptation to some ambitious man to step up into the throne, and to seize absolute power. The keeping on foot a hired military force in time of peace, ought not to be gone into, unless two thirds of the members of the federal legislature agree to the necessity of the measure, and adjust the numbers employed. Surely Mr. Wilson is not serious when he adduces the instance of the troops now stationed on the Ohio as a proof of the propriety [Page 66] of a standing army. They are a mere occasional ar­mament for the purpose of restraining divers hostile tribes of savages. It is contended, that under the pre­sent confederation, Congress possess the power of rais­ing armies at pleasure; but the opportunity which the states severally have of withholding the supplies neces­sary to keep these armies on foot, is a sufficient check on the present Congress.

Mr. Wilson asserts, that never was charge made with less reason, than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal senate. In my first number, I stated, that this body would be a very un­equal representation of the several states, that the mem­bers being appointed for the long term of six years, and there being no exclusion by rotation, they might be continued for life, which would follow of course from their extensive means of influence, and that possessing a considerable share in the executive as well as legislative, it would become a paramount aristocracy, and swallow up the other orders in the government.

That these fears are not imaginary, a knowledge of the history of other nations, where the powers of go­vernment have been injudiciously placed, will fully de­monstrate. Mr. Wilson says, "the senate branches into two characters; the one legislative and the other execu­tive. In its legislative character it can effect no purpose without the co-operation of the house of representatives, and in its executive character it can accomplish no ob­ject without the concurrence of the president. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the senate can of itself perform, and such dependence necessarily precludes every idea of influence and superiority." This I con­fess is very specious, but experience demonstrates, that checks in government, unless accompanied with ade­quate power, and independently placed, prove merely no­minal, and will be inoperative. Is it probable, that the president of the United States, limited as he is in power, and dependent on the will of the senate, in appointments to office, will either have the firmness or inclination to exercise his prerogative of a conditional controul upon the proceedings of that body, however injurious they may be to the public welfare: it will be his interest to [Page 67] coincide with the views of the senate, and thus become the head of the aristocratic junto. The king of England is a constituent part of the legislature, but although an hereditary monarch, in possession of the whole executive power, including the unrestrained appointment to of­fices, and an immense revenue, enjoys but in name the prerogative of a negative upon the parliament. Even the king of England, circumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a century past. The check of the house of representatives upon the senate will likewise be rendered nugatory for want of due weight in the democratic branch, and from their constitution, they may become so independent of the people as to be indifferent of its interests: nay, as Congress would have the controul over the mode and place of their election, by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected at one place, and that too the most incon­venient, the ruling power may govern the choice, and thus the house of representatives may be composed of the creatures of the senate. Still the semblance of checks, may remain, but without operation.

This mixture of the legislative and executive more­over highly tends to corruption. The chief improve­ment in government, in modern times, has been the complete separation of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative in different hands from those which hold the executive; and again severing the judi­cial part from the ordinary administrative. "When the legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty."

Mr. Wilson confesses himself nor satisfied with the or­ganization of the federal senate, and apologizes for it, by alledging a sort of compromise. It is well known that some members of convention, apprized of the mis­chiefs of such a compound of authority, proposed to as­sign the supreme executive powers to the president and a small council, made personally responsible for every appointment to office, or other act by having their opin­ions recorded; and that without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the president should not be capable of taking any step. Such a check [Page 68] upon the chief magistrate would admirably secure the power of pardoning, now proposed to be exercised by the president alone, from abuse. For as it is placed, he may shelter the traitors whom he himself, or his co­adjutors in the senate, have excited to plot against the liberties of the nation.

The delegation of the power of taxation to Congress as far as duties on imported commodities, has not been objected to. But to extend this to excises, and every species to internal taxation, would necessarily require so many ordinances of Congress, affecting the body of the people, as would perpetually interfere with the state laws and personal concerns of the people. This alone would directly tend to annihilate the particular govern­ments; for the people, fatigued with the operations of two masters, would be apt to rid themselves of the weak­er. But we are cautioned against being alarmed with imaginary evils, for Mr. Wilson has predicted that the great revenue of the United States, will be raised by im­post. Is there any ground for this? Will the imposts supply the sums necessary to pay the interest and prin­cipal of the foreign loan, to defray the great additional expence of the new constitution; for the policy of the new government will lead it to institute numerous and lucrative civil offices, to extend its influenee and pro­vide for the swarms of expectants, the people having in fact no controul upon their disbursements, and to af­ford pay and support the supposed standing army, that darling and long wished for object of the well born of A­merica; and which, if we may judge from the principles of the intended government, will be no trifling estab­lishment, for cantonments of troops in every district of America, will be necessary to compel the submission of the people to the arbitrary dictates of the ruling pow­ers? I say will the impost be adequate? By no means. To answer these there must be excises and other indi­rect duties imposed, and as land taxes will operate too unequally to be agreeable to the wealthy aristrocracy in the senate who will be possessed of the government, poll taxes will be substituted as provided for in the new plan for the doctrine then will be, that slaves ought to pay for wearing their heads.

[Page 69]As the taxes necessary for these purposes, will drain your pockets of every penny, what is to become of that virtuous and meritorious class of citizens the public creditors. However well disposed the people of the United States may be to do them justice, it would not be in their power: and, after waiting year after year, without prospect of the payment of the interest or prin­cipal of the debt, they will be constrained to sacrifice their certificates in the purchase of waste lands in the distant wilds of the western territory.

From the foregoing illustration of the powers to be de­volved to Congress, it is evident that the general go­vernment would necessarily annihilate the particular governments, and that the security of the personal rights of the people by the state constitutions is superceded and destroyed; hence results the necessity of such security being provided for by a bill of rights to be inserted in the new plan of federal government. What excuse can be then made for the omission of this grand palladium, this barrier between liberty and oppression. For univer­sal experience demonstrates the necessity of the most ex­press declarations and restrictions, to protect the rights and liberties of mankind, from the silent, powerful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern.

The new plan, it is true, does propose to secure the people of the benefit of personal liberty by the habeas corpus; and trial by jury for all crimes, except in cases of impeachme [...] but there is no declaration, that all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship almighty God, according to the dictates of their own conscience and understanding; and that no man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to, or against his own free will and consent; and that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship; that the trial by jury in civil causes as criminal prosecutions shall be held sacred; that the requiring of excessive bail, imposing of excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments be forbidden; that [Page 70] monopolies in trade or arts, other than to authors of books or inventors of useful arts, for a reasonable time, ought not to be suffered; that the right of the people to assemble peaceably for the purpose of consult­ing about public matters, and petitioning or remon­strating to the federal legislature ought not to be pre­vented; that the liberty of the press be holden sacred; that the people have a right to hold themselves, their hou­ses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seized; and that therefore warrants, without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be command­ed or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right and ought not to be grant­ed; and that standing armies in time of peace are dan­gerous to liberty, and ought not to be permitted but when absolutely necessary; all which is omitted to be done in the proposed government.

But Mr. Wilson says, the new plan does not arrogate perfection, for it provides a mode of alteration and cor­rection, if found necessary. This is one among the nu­merous deceptions attempted on this occasion. True there is a mode prescribed for this purpose. But it is barely possible that amendments may be made. The fascination of power must first cease, the nature of man­kind undergo a revolution, that is not to be expected on this side of eternity. For to effect this (Art. 9.) it is provided, that if two thirds of both houses of the federal legislature shall propose them; or when two thirds of the several states, by their legislatures, shall apply for them the federal assembly shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which when ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures, or conventions, as Congress shal see best, shall controul and alter the proposed confederation. Does history abound with examples of a volun­tary relinquishment of power, however injurious to the community? No; it would require a general and suc­cessful rising of the people to effect any thing of this nature.—This provision therefore is more sound.

The opposition of the new plan (says Mr. Wison) pro­ceeds from interested men, viz. the officers of the state [Page 71] governments. He had before denied that the proposed tranfer of powers to Congress would annihilate the state governments. But he here lays aside the masque and avows the fact. For, the truth of the charge against them must entirely rest on such consequence of the new plan. For if the state establishments are to remain un­impaired, why should officers, peculiarly connected with them, be interested to oppose the adoption of the new plan. Except the collector of the impost, judge of the admiralty and the collector of excise (none of whom have been reckoned of the opposition) they would other­wise have nothing to apprehend. But the charge is un­worthy, and may with propriety be retorted on the ex­pectations of office and emolument under the intended government.

The opposition is not so partial and interested as Mr. Wilson asserts. It consists of a respectable yeomanry throughout the union, of characters far removed above the reach of his unsupported assertions. It comprises many worthy members of the late convention, and a majority of the present Congress, for a motion made in that honorable body, for their approbation and recommendation of the new plan, was, after two days animated discussion, pru­dently withdrawn by its advocates, and a simple trans­mission^* of the plan to the several states could only be ob­tained; [Page 72] yet this has been palmed upon the people as the approbation of Congress; and to strengthen the deception, the bells of the city of Philadelphia, were rung for a whole day.

Are Mr. W—n, and many of his coadjutors in the late C—n, the disinterested patriots they would have us believe? Is their conduct any recommendation of their plan of government? View them the foremost and loudest on the floor of Congress, in our assembly, at town meetings in sounding its eulogiums: view them preventing investi­gation and discussion, and in the most despotic manner en­deavouring to compel its adoption by the people, with such precipitancy as to preclude the possibility of a due consi­deration, and then say, whether the motives of these men can be pure.

My fellow citizens, such false detestable patriots in every nation, have led their blind confiding country, shouting their applauses, into the jaws of despotism and ruin.— May the wisdom and virtue of the people of America, save them from the usual fate of nations.

THE formation of a good government, is the great­est effort of human wisdom, actuated by disinter­ested [Page 73] patriotism; but such is the cursed nature of am­bition, so prevalent in the minds of men, that it would sacrifice every thing to its selfish gratification; hence the fairest opportunities of advancing the happiness of humanity, are so far from being properly improved, that they are too often covered with the votaries of power and domination, into the means of obtaining their nefarious ends. It will be the misfortune of Ame­rica to add to the number of examples of this kind, if the proposed plan of government should be adopted; but I trust, short as the time allowed you for considera­tion is, you will be so fully convinced of the truth of this, as to escape the impending danger; it is only ne­cessary to strip the monster of its assumed garb, and to exhibit it in its native colours, to excite the universal ab­horrence and rejection of every virtuous and patriotic mind.

For the sake of my dear country, for the honour of human nature, I hope, and am persuaded, the good sense of the people will enable them to rise superior to the most formidable conspiracy against the liberties of a free and enlightened nation, that the world has ever witnessed. How glorious would be the triumph! How it would immortalize the present generation in th [...] an­nals of freedom.

The establishment of a government, is a subject of such momentous and lasting concern, that it should not be gone into without the clearest conviction of its pro­priety; which can only be the result of the fullest dis­cussion, the most thorough investigation and dispassionate consideration of its nature, principles, and construction. You are now called upon to make this decision, which involves in it, not only your fate, but that of your pos­terity for ages to come. Your determination will either ensure the possession of those blessings, which render life desirable, or entail those evils which make existence a curse: that such are consequences of a wise or impro­per organization of government, the history of man­kind abundantly testifies. If you viewed the magnitude of the object in its true light, you would join with me in sentiment, that the new government ought not to be implicitly admitted. Consider then, duly, before you [Page 74] leap, for after the Rubicon is once passed, there will be no retreat.

If you were even well assured, that the utmost purity of intention predominated in the production of the proposed government, such is the imperfection of hu­man wisdom and knowledge, that it would not be wise in you to adopt it with precipitation in toto, for all former experience must teach you the propriety of a re­vision on such occasions, to correct the errors, and sup­ply the deficiencies that may appear necessary. In every government, whose object is the public welfare, the laws are subjected to repeated revisions, in some by different orders in the government, in others by an ap­peal to the judgments of the people, and deliberative forms of procedure. A knowledge of this, as well as of other states, will shew, that if every instance where a law has been passed without the usual precautions, it has been productive of great inconvenience and evils, and frequently has not answered the end in view, a sup­plement becoming necessary to supply its deficiencies.

What then are we to think of the motives and de­signs of those men who are urging the implicit and im­mediate adoption of the proposed government? Are they fearful, that if you exercise your good sense and discernment, you will discover the masqued aristocracy that they are attempting to smuggle upon you, under the suspicious garb of republicanism? When we find that the principal agents in this business, are the very men who fabricated the form of government, it cer­tainly ought to be conclusive evidence of their ins;idious design to deprive us of our liberties. The circumstances attending this matter, are such as should in a peculiar manner excite your suspicion; it might not be useless to take a review of some of them.

In many o [...] the states, particularly in this and the northern states, there are aristocratic juntos of the well-born few, who had been zealously endeavouring since the establishment of their constitutions, to humble that offensive upstart, equal liberty; but all their efforts were unavailing, the ill-bred churl obstinately kept his assumed station.

However, that which could not be accomplished in [Page 75] the several states, is now attempting through the medi­um of the future Congress. Experience having shewn great defects in the present confederatian, particularly in the regulating of commerce and maritime affairs, it became the universal wish of America to grant further powers, so as to make the federal government adequate to the ends of its institution. The anxiety on this head was greatly increased, from the impoverishment and distress occasioned by the extensive importations of fo­reign merchandize and luxuries, and consequent drain of specie since the peace: thus the people were in the disposition of a drowning man, eager to catch at any thing that promised relief, however delusory. Such an opportunity for the acquisition of undue power, has never been viewed with indifference by the ambitious and designing in any age or nation, and it has accord­ingly been too successfully improved by such men among us. The deputies from this state (with the exception of two) and most of those from the other states in the union were unfortunately of this complexion, and many of them of such superior endowments, that in an ex parte discussion of the subject, by specious glosses, they have gained the concurrence of some well-disposed men in whom their country have great confidence, which has given great sanction to their scheme of power.

A comparison of the authority under which the con­vention acted, and their form of government, will shew that they have despised their delegated power, and as­sumed sovereignty; that they have entirely annihilated the old confederation, and the particular governments of the several states, and instead thereof have established one general government that is to pervade the union; constituted on the most unequal principle [...], destitute of accountability to its constituents, and as despotic in its nature as the Venetian aristocracy; a government that will give full scope to the magnificent designs of the well-born; a government where tyranny may glu [...] its vengeance on the low-born, unchecked by an odious bill of rights, as has been fully illustrated in my two pre­ceeding numbers; and yet as a blind upon the under­standing of the people, they have continued the forms of the particular governments, and termed the whose a [Page 76] confederation of the United States, pursuant to the sen­timents of that profound, but corrupt politician Machia­vel, who advises any one who would change the con­stitution of a state, to keep as much as possible to the old forms; for then the people, seeing the same officers, the same formalities, courts of justice, and other out­ward appearances, are insensible of the alteration, and believe themselves in possession of their old government. Thus Caesar, when he seized the Roman liberties, caused himself to be chosen dictator (which was an an­cient office) continued the senate, the consuls, the tri­bunes, the censors, and all other offices and forms of the commonwealth; and yet changed Rome from the most free, to the most tyrannical government in the world.

The convention, after vesting all the great and effici­ent powers of sovereignty in the general government, insidiously declared, by section 4th of article 4th, "that the United States shall guarantee to every state in this union, a republican form of government;" but of what avail will be the form without the reality of freedom?

The late convention, in the majesty of its assumed omnipotence, have not even condescended to submit the plan of the new government to the consideration of the people, the true source of authority, but have called upon them by their several conventions, "to assent to, and ratify"^* in toto, what they have been pleased to de­cree; just as the grand monarque of France requires the parliament of Paris to register his edicts without re­vision or alteration, which is necessary previous to their execution.

The authors and advocates of the new plan, con­scious that its establishment can only be obtained from the ignorance of the people of its true nature, and their unbounded confidence in some of the men concurring, have hurried on its adoption with a precipitation that betrays their design; before many had seen the new plan, and before they had time to examine it, they, by [Page 77] their ready minions, attended by some well-disposed, but mistaken persons, obtained the subscriptions of the people to papers, expressing their approbation of, and wish to have it established; thus precluding them from any consideration, but lest the people should discover the juggle, the elections of the state conventions are urged on at very early days; the proposition of elect­ing the convention of this state in nine days after the date of the resolution, for all the counties east of Bed­ford, and supported by three or four of the deputies of the convention, and who were also members of the then assembly, is one of the most extravagant instances of this kind; and even this was prevented by the se­cession of nineteen virtuous and enlightened members.^‡ [Page 78] In order to put the matter beyond all recall, they have proceeded a step farther, they have made the deputies nominated for the state convention, of this city, and elsewhere, pledge their sacred honour, previous to their election, that they would implicitly adopt the proposed government, in toto; thus, short as the period is, before the final fi [...]t is to be given, consideration is rendered nugatory, and conviction of its danger or impropriety unavoidable. A good cause does not stand in need of such means; it scorns all indirect advantages and bor­rowed help, and trusts alone to its own native merit and intrinsic strength: the lion is never known to make use of cunning, nor can a good cause suffer by a free and thorough examination. It is knavery that seeks dis­guise. Actors do not care that any one should look into the tiring room, nor jugglers or sharpers into their hands or boxes.

Every exertion has been made to suppress discussion by shackling the press; but as this could not be effect­ed in this state, the people are warned not to listen to the adversaries of the proposed plan, lest they should impose upon them, and thereby prevent the adoption of this blessed government. What figure would a law­yer make in a court of justice, if he should desire the judges not to hear the counsel of the other side, lest they should perplex the cause and mislead the court? Would not every by-stander take it for granted, that he was conscious of the weakness of his client's cause, and that it could not otherwise be defended, than by not be­ing understood.

All who are friends to liberty are friends to reason, the champion of liberty; and none are foes to liberty but those who have truth and reason for their foes. He who has dark purposes to serve, must use dark means; light would discover him, and reason expose him: he must endeavour to shut out both, and make them look frightful by giving them ill names.

Liberty only flourishes where reason and knowledge are encouraged; and wherever the latter are stifled, the former is extinguished. In Turkey printing is forbid, enquiry is dangerous, and free speaking is capital; be­cause they are all inconsistent with the nature of the go­vernment. [Page 79] Hence it is that the Turks are all stupidly ignorant, and are all slaves.

I shall now proceed in the consideration of the con­struction of the proposed plan of government —By sect. 4th of art. 1st, of the proposed government, it is decla­red, "that the times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be pre­scribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such re­gulations, except as to the place of chusing senators." Will not this section put it in the power of the future Congress to abolish the suffrage by ballot, so indispen­sible in a free government.—Montesquieu, in his Spi­rit of laws, vol. 1, page 12, says, "that in a democra­cy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by the suffrages of the people, which are their will; now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself. The laws, therefore, which establish the right of suffrage, are fun­damental to this government. In fact it is as impor­tant to regulate in a republic, in what manner, by whom, and concerning what suffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince, and after what manner he ought to govern. This valuable privilege of voting by ballot, ought not to rest on the discretion of the government, but be irrevocably esta­blished in the constitution.

Will not the above quoted sect. also, authorise the future Congress to lengthen the term for which the se­nators and representatives are to be elected, from 6 and 2 years respectively, to any period, even for life? as the parliament of England voted themselves from triennial to septennial; and as the long parliament under Charles the 1st became perpetual?

Sect. 8th, of art. 1st, vests Congress with power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for the organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia ac­cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress."— [Page 80] This s [...]ct. will subject the citizens of these states to the most arbitrary military discipline; even death may be inflicted on the disobedient; in the character of militia, you may be dragged from your families and homes to any part of the continent, and for any length of time, at the discretion of the future Congress; and as mili­tia, you may be made the unwilling instruments of oppression under the direction of government; there is no exemption upon account of conscientious scru­ples of bearing arms: no equivalent to be received in lieu of personal services. The militia of Pennsyl­vania may be marched to Georgia or New-Hamp­shire, however incompatible with their interests or consciences; in short, they may be made as mere ma­chines as Prussian soldiers.

Sect. the 9th begins thus—"The migration or impor­tation of such persons, as any of the states, now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808, but a duty or tax may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person." And by the 5th art. this restraint is not to be removed by any future convention. We are told, that the objects of this article are slaves, and that it is insert­ed to secure to the southern states the right of introducing negroes for twenty-one years to come, against the declar­ed sense of the other states to put an end to an odious traf­fic in the human species; which is especially scandalous and inconsistent in a people, who have asserted their own liberty by the sword, and which dangerously enfeebles the districts, wherein the labourers are bondmen. The words are dark and ambiguous; such as no plain man of com­mon sense would have used, are evidently chosen to conceal from Europe, that in this e [...]ghtened country, the practice of slavery has its advocates among men in the highest sta­tions. When it is recollected that no poll tax can be im­posed on five negroes above what three whites shall be charged: when it is considered, that the impost on the con­sumption of the Carolina field negroes, must be trifling, and the excise, nothing, it is plain that the proportion of contributions, which can be expected from the southern states under the new constitution, will be very unequal; and yet they are to be allowed▪ to enfeeble themselves by [Page 81] the further importation of negroes till the year 1808. Ha [...] not the concurrence of the five southern states in the con­vention, to the new system, been purchased too dearly by the rest, who have undertaken to make good their defici­encies of revenue, occasioned by their wilful incapacity, without an equivalent?

The general acquiescence of one description of citizens in the proposed government, surprise me much, if so, many of the Quakers have become indifferent to the sacred rights of conscience, so amply secured by the constitution of this commonwealth; if they are satisfied, to rest this in­estimable privilege on the discretion of the future govern­ment, yet, in a political light, they are not acting wisely; in the state of Pennsylvania, they form so considerable a por [...]ion of the community, as must ensure them great weight in the government; but in the scale of general empire, they will be lost in the balance.

I intended in this number to have shewn from the na­ture of things, from the opinions of the greatest writers, and from the peculiar circumstances of the United States, the impracticability of establishing and maintaining one government on the principles of freedom, in so extensive a territory; to have shewn, if practicable, the inadequacy of such government, to provide for its many and various concerns; and also to have shewn, that a confederation of small republics, possessing all the powers of internal go­vernment, and united in the management of their general and foreign concerns, is the only system of government by which so extensive a country can be governed, consistent with freedom: But a writer under the signature of Bru­tus, in the New-York paper, which has been republished by Messrs. Dunlap and Claypoole, has done this in so mas­terly a manner, that it would be superfluous in me to add any thing on the subject.

My fellow citizens, as a lover of my country, as the friend to mankind, whilst it is yet safe to write, and whilst it is yet in your power to avoid it, I warn you of the im­pending danger. To this remote quarter of the world has liberty fled. Other countries, now subject to slavery, were once as free as we yet are; therefore, for your own [Page 82] sakes, for the sake of your posterity, as well as for that of the oppressed of all nations, cherish this remaining asy­lum of liberty.

THAT the present confederation is inadequate to the objects of the union, seems to be universally allowed. The only question is, what additional powers are wanting to give due energy to the federal govern­ment? We should, however, be careful in forming our opinions on this subject, not to impute the temporary and extraordinary difficulties that have hitherto impeded the execution of the confederation, to defects in the system itself. Taxation is, in every government, a very delicate and difficult subject; hence it has been the policy of all wise statesmen, as far as circumstances permitted, to lead the people by small beginnings, and almost imper­ceptible degrees; into the habits of taxation; where the contrary conduct has been pursued, it has ever fail­ed of full success, not unfrequently proving the ruin of the projectors. The imposing of a burdensome tax at once on a people, without the usual gradations, is the severest test that any government can be put to; des­potism it self has often prov [...]d unequal to the attempt. Under this conviction, let us take a review of our situa­tion before and since the revolution. Fr [...]m the first settlement of this country, until the commencement of the late war, the taxes were so light and trivial as to be scarcely felt by the people; when we engaged in the expensive contest with Great Britain, the Congress, sen­sible of the difficulty of levying the monies necessary to its support, by direct taxation, had recourse to an anti­cipation [Page 83] of the public resources, by emitting hills of credit, and thus postponed the necessity of taxation for several years; this means was pursued to a most ruin­ous length: but about the year 1780 or 1781, it was wholly exhausted; commerce had been suspended for near six years; the husbandman, for want of a market, limited his crops to his own subsistence; the frequent calls of the militia, and long continuance in actual ser­vice, the devastations of the enemy, the subsistence of our own armies, the evils of the depreciation of the paper money, which fell chiefly upon the patriotic and virtu­ous part of the community, had all concurred to pro­duce great distress throughout America. In this situa­tion of affairs, we still had the same powerful enemy to contend with, who had even more numerous and better appointed armies in the field, than at any former time. Our allies were applied to in this exigence, but the pecuniary assistance that we could procure from them, was soon exhausted; the only resource now re­maining, was to obtain by direct taxation, the monies necessary for our defence; the history of mankind does not furnish a similar instance of an attempt to levy such enormous taxes at once, of a people so wholly unpre­pared and u [...]inured to them—the lamp of sacred liber­ty must indeed have burned with unsullied lustre, every sordid principle of the mind must have been then extinct, when the people not only submitted to the grievous im­positions, but chearfully exerted themselves to comply with the calls of their country; their abilities, however, were not equal to furnish the necessary sums—indeed the requisition of the year 1782, amounted to the whole income of their farms and other property, in­cluding the means of their subsistence; perhaps the strained exertions of two years, would not have sufficed to the discharge of this requisition; to whom then, can we impute the difficulties of the people to a due compliance with the requisitions of Congress to a de­fect in the confederation, for any government, however energetic, in similar circumstances, would have experi­enced the same fate. If we review the proceedings of the states, we shall find that they gave every sanction and authority to the requisitions of Congress, that their [Page 84] laws could confer; that they attempted to collect the sums called for, in the same manner as is proposed to be done in future by the general government, instead of the state legislatures.

It is a maxim, that a government ought to be cau­tious not to govern over much, for when the cord of power is drawn too tight, it generally proves its destruc­tion; the impracticability of complying with the requi­sitions of Congress has lessened the sense of obligation and duty in the people, and thus weakened the ties of the union; the opinion of power in a free government is much more efficacious than the exercise of it; it re­quires the maturity of time and repeated practice to give it due energy and certainty to the operations of government, especially to such as affect the purses of the people.

The thirteen Swiss Cantons confederated by more ge­neral and weaker ties than these United States are by the present articles of confederation, have not experi­enced the necessity of strengthening their union by vest­ing their general diet with further or greater powers; this national body has only the management of their foreign concerns, and in case of a war can onl [...] call by requisition on the several Cantons for the necessary sup­plies, who are sovereign and independent in every in­ternal and local exercise of government; and yet this rope of sand, as our confederation has been termed, which is so similar to that, has held together for ages without any apparent chain.

I am persuaded, that a due consideration will evince, that the present inefficacy of the requisitions of Congress is not owing to a defect in the confederation, but the peculiar circumstances of the times.

The wheels of the general government having been thus clogged, and the arrearages of taxes still accumu­lating, it may be asked what prospect is there of the go­vernment resuming its proper tone, unless more com­pulsory powers are granted? To this it may be answer­ed, that the produce of imposts on commerce which all agree to vest in Congress, together with the immense tracts of land at their disposal, will rapidly lessen and eventually discharge the present incumbrances; when [Page 85] this takes place, the mode by requisition will be found perfectly adequate to the extraordinary exigencies of the union. Congress have lately sold land to the amount of eight millions of dollars, which is a considerable portion of the whole debt.

It is to be lamented that the interested and designing have availed themselves so successfully of the present crisis, and under the specious pretence of having disco­vered a panacea for all the ills of the people, they are about establishing a system of government that will prove more destructive to them, than the wooden horse filled with soldiers did in ancient times to the city of Troy; this horse was introduced by their hostile enemy the Grecians, by a prostitution of the sacred rites of their religion; in like manner, my fellow citizens, are aspir­ing despots among yourselves, prostituting the name of a Washington to cloak their designs upon your liberties.

I would ask how is the proposed government to show, or down those treasures upon every class of citizens as is so industriously inculcated and so fondly believed?— Is it by the addition of numerous and expensive esta­blishments? Is it by doubling our judiciaries, instituting federal courts in every county of every state? Is it by a superb presidential court? Is it by a large standing ar­my? In short, is it by putting it in the power of the future government to levy money at pleasure, and plac­ing this government so independent of the people as to enable the administration to gratify every corrupt passi­on of the mind, to riot on your spoils, without check or controul?

A transfer to Congress of the power of imposing im­posts on commerce, and the unlimited regulation of trade, I believe is all that is wanting to render Ameri­ca as prosperous as it is in the power of any form of government to render her; this properly understood would meet the views of all the honest and well mean­ing.

What gave birth to the Continental Convention?— Was it not the situation of our commerce, which lay at the mercy of every foreign power, who from motives of interest or enmity could restrict and controul it, without risqueing a retaliation on the part of America, as Con­gress [Page 86] was impotent on this subject? Such indeed was the case with respect to Britain, whose hostile regulations gave such a stab to our navigation as to threaten its an­nihilation, it became the interest of the American mer­chant to give a preference to foreign bottoms; hence the distress of our seamen, ship-wrights, and every me­chanic art dependent on navigation.

By these regulations too we were limited in markets for our produce, our vessels were excluded from their West-India islands, many of our staple commodities were denied entrance in Britain; hence the husb [...]ndmen were distressed by the demand for their crops being les­sened, and their prices reduced. This is the source to which may be traced every evil we experience, that can be relieved by a more energetic government. Recollect the language of complaint for years past, compare the recommendations of Congress founded on such com­plaints, pointing out the remedy; examine the reasons assigned by the different states for appointing delegates to the late convention, view the powers vested in that body; they all harmonize in one sentiment, that the due regulation of trade and navigation was the anxious wish of every class of citizens, was the great object of calling the convention.

This object being provided for by the proposed consti­tution, the people overlook, and are not sensible of the needless sacrifice they are making for it. Of what avail will be a prosperous state of commerce, when the pro­duce of it will be at the absolute disposal of an arbitra­ry and unchecked government, who may levy at plea­sure the most oppressive taxes; who may destroy every principle of freedom; who may even destroy the privi­lege of complaining.

If you are in doubt about the nature and principles of the proposed government, view the conduct of its authors and patrons, that affords the best explanation, the most striking comment.

The evil genius of darkness presided at its birth, it came forth under the veil of mystery, its true features being carefully concealed, and every deceptive art has been and is practising to have this spurious brat receiv­ed as the genuine offspring of heaven-born liberty. So [Page 87] fearful are its patrons that you should discern the impo­sition that they have hurried on its adoption with the greatest precipitation; they have endeavoured also to preclude all investigation, they have endeavoured to in­timidate all opposition; by such means as the [...]e have they surreptitiously procured a convention in this st [...]te, favourable to their views; and here again investigation and discussion are abridged, the final question is moved before the subject has been under consideration! An appeal to the people is precluded even in the last res [...]rt, lest their eyes should be opened; the convent [...]on have denied the minority the privilege of entering, the reasons of their dissent on its journals. Thus despotism is alrea­dy triumphant, and the genius of liberty is on the e [...]e of her exit, is about bidding an eternal adieu to this once happy people.

After so recent a triumph over British despots, after such torrents of blood and treasure have been spent, af­ter involving ourselves in the distresses of an arduous war, and incurring such a debt, for the express purpose of asserting the rights of humanity, it is truly astonish­ing that a set of men among ourselves should have the effrontery to attempt the destruction of our liberties.— But in this enlightened age to hope to dupe the people by the arts they are practising, is still more extraordina­ry. How do the advocates of the proposed government combat the objections urged against it? Not even by an attempt to disprove them, for that would the more fully confirm their truth, but by a species of reasoning that is very congenial to that contempt of the understandings of the people that they so eminently possess, and which policy cannot even prevent frequent ebullitions of; they seem to think that the oratory and fascination of great names and mere sound will suffice to ensure success;— that the people may be diverted from a consideration of the merits of the plan, by bold assertions and mere de­clamation. Some of their writers for instance, paint the distresses of every class of citizens with all the glow­ing language of eloquence, as if this was a demonstrati­on of the excellence, or even of the safety of the new plan, which notwithstanding the reality of this distress, may be a system of tyranny and oppression; other wri­ters [Page 88] tell you of the great men who composed the late convention, and give you a pompous display of their virtues, instead of a justification of the plan of govern­ment; and others again urge the tyrants plea, they en­deavour to make it a case of necessity, now is the criti­cal moment; they represent the adoption of this go­vernment as our only alternative, as the last opportuni­ty we shall have of peaceably establishing a government; they assert it to be the best system that can be formed, and that if we reject it we will have a worse one or none at all; nay, that if we presume to propo [...] [...]lterations we shall get into a labyrinth of difficulti [...] [...]om which we cannot be extricated, as no two state [...]ll agree in amendments, that therefore it would involve us in irre­concilable discord. But they all sedulously avoid the fair field of argument, a rational investigation into the organization of the proposed government. I hope the good sense of the people will detect the fallacy of such conduct, will discover the base juggle, and with becom­ing resolution resent the imposition.

That the powers of Congress ought to be strengthen­ed all allow, but is this a conclusive proof of the neces­sity to adopt the proposed plan; is it a proof that be­cause the late convention in the first essay upon so arduous and difficult a subject, harmonized in their ideas, that a future convention will not, or that after a full investi­gation and mature consideration of the objections, they will not plan a better government, and one more agree­able to the sentiments of America; or is it any proof that they can never again agree in any plan? The late convention must indeed have been inspired, as some of its advocates have asserted, to admit the truth of these positions, or even to admit the possibility of the propos­ed government being such a one as America ought to adopt; for this body went upon original ground foreign from their intentions or powers, they must there­fore have been wholly uninformed of the sentiments of their constituents in respect to this form of government, as it was not in their contemplation when the conven­tion was appointed to erect a new government, but to strengthen the old one. Indeed they seem to have been determined to monopolize the exclusive merit of the dis­covery, [Page 89] or rather, as if darkness was essential to its suc­cess, they precluded all communication with the peo­ple, by closing their doors; thus the well disposed members, unassisted by public information and opinion, were induced, by those arts that are now practising on the people, to give their sanction to this system of des­potism.

Is there any reason to presume that a new Conven­tion will not agree upon a better plan of government? Quite the contrar [...], for perhaps there never was such a coincidence of sentiment on any occ [...]sion as on the pre­sent; the opponents to the proposed plan, at the same time in every part of the continent, harmonized in the same objections; such an uniformity of opposition is without example, and affords the strongest demonstra­tions of its solidity. Their objections too are not local, are not confined to the interests of any one particular state to the prejudice of the rest, but with a philan­thropy and liberality that reflects lustre on humanity, that dignifies the character of America, they embrace the interests and happiness of the whole union; they do not even condescend to minute blemishes, but shew that the main pillars of the fabric are bad▪ that the essen­tial principles of liberty and safety are not to be found in it, that despotism will be the necessary and inevitable consequence of its establishment.

MR. WILSON, in a speech delivered in our con­vention on Saturday the 24th instant, has con­ceded, nay forceably proved, that one consolidated go­vernment will not answer for so extensive a territory as the United States includes, that slavery would be the [Page 90] necessary fate of the people under such a government [...], his words are so remarkable, that I cannot forbear re­citing them; they are as follows, viz. "The extent of country for which the new constitution was required, produced another difficulty in the business of the federal convention. It is the opinion of some celebrated wri­ters, that to a small territory, the democratical, to a middling territory, as Montesquien has termed it, the monarchical, and, to an extensive territory, the despotic form of government is the best adapted. Regarding, then, the wide and almost unbounded jurisdiction of the States, at first view the hand of despotism seemed ne­cessary to controul, connect, and protect it; and hence the chief embarrassment arose. For, we knew, that al­though our constituents would chearfu [...]ly submit to the legislative restraints of a free government, they would spurn at every attempt to shackle them with despotic power." See page five of the printed speech. And again in page seven, he says, "Is it probable, that the dissolution of the state governments, and the establish­ment of one consolidated empire, would be eligible in its nature, and satisfactory to the people in its admini­stration? I think not, as I have given reasons to shew, that so extensive a territory could not be governed, connected, and preserved, but by the supremacy of des­potic power. All the exertions of the most potent em­perors of Rome, were not capable of keeping that em­pire together, which, in extent, was far inferior to the dominion of America."

This great point having been now confirmed by the concession of Mr Wilson, though indeed it was self evident before, and the writers against the proposed plan of government, having proved to demonstration, that the powers proposed to be vested in Congress, will necessarily annihilate and absorb the legislatures and judiciaries, and produce from their wreck one consoli­dated government, the question is determined. Every man therefore who has the welfare of his country at heart, every man who values his own liberty and hap­piness, in short, every description of persons, except those aspiring despots who hope to benefit by the misery and vassalage of their countrymen, must now concur in [Page 91] rejecting the proposed system of government, must now unite in branding its authors with the stigma of eternal infamy. The anniversary of this great escape from the fangs of despotism, ought to be celebrated as long as liberty shall continue to be dear to the citizens of Ame­rica.

I will repeat some of my principal arguments, and add some further remarks, on the subject of consoli­dation.

The legislative is the highest delegated power in go­vernment; all other are subordinate to it. The cele­brated Montesquie [...] [...]tablishes it as a maxim, that legis­lation necessarily follows the power of taxation. By the 8th [...]ection of article the first of the proposed go­vernm [...]t, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." Now, what can be more comprehensive than these words? Every species of taxation, whether external or internal, are included. Whatever taxes, duties, [...]d excises, that the Congress may deem necessary to the general welfare, may be im­posed on the citizens of these states and levied by their officers. The Congress are to be the absolute judges of the propriety of such taxes, in short they may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, they may seize up­on every source of taxation, and thus make it impractica­ble for the states to have the smallest revenue; and if a state s [...]ld presume to impose a tax or excise, that would interfere with the federal tax or excise, Congress may soon terminate the contention, by repealing the state law, by virtue of the following section; "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other pow­ers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof." Indeed every law of the states may be controuled by this pow­er. The legislative power granted by these sections, is so unlimited in its nature, may be so comprehensive and boundless in its exercise, that this alone would be amply sufficient to carry the co [...]p d [...] grace to the state go­vernments, [Page 92] to swallow them up in the grand vortex of general empire. But the legislative has an able auxilia­ry in the judicial department, for a reference to my second number will shew, that this may be made greatly instrumental in effecting a consolidation; as the federal judiciary would absorb all others. Lest the foregoing powers should not suffice to consolidate the United States into one empire, the convention, as if determined to prevent the possibility of a doubt, as if to prevent all clashing by the opposition of state powers, as if to pre­clude all struggle for state importance, as if to level all obstacles to the supremacy of universal sway, which in so extensive a territory would be an iron handed des­potism, have ordained by article the 6th, "That this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not­withstanding."

The words, "pursuant to the constitution," will be no restriction to the authority of Congress; for the fore­going sections give them unlimited legislation; their un­bounded power of taxation does alone include all others, as whoever has the purse strings will have full dominion. But the convention has superadded another power, by which the Congress may stamp with the sanc­tion of the constitution every possible law; it is contain­ed in the following clause: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Whatever law Congress may deem necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers vested in them, may be enacted; and by virtue of this clause, they may con­troul and abrogate any and every of the laws of the state governments, on the allegation that they inter­fere with the execution of any of their powers; and yet these laws will "be made in pursuance of the consti­tution," and of course will "be the supreme law of the [Page 93] land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state, to the contrary notwithstanding.

There is no reservation made in the whole of this plan in favour of the rights of the separate states. In the present plan of confederation made in the year 1778, it was thought necessary by article the 2d to declare, that each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde­pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the Unit­ed States in Congress assembled. Positive grant was not thought sufficiently descriptive and restrictive upon Con­gress, and the omission of such a declaration now, when such great devolutions of power are proposed, manifests the design of consolidating the states.

What restriction does Mr. Wilson pretend there is in the new constitution to the supremacy of despotic sway over the United States? What barrier does he assign for the security of the state governments? Why truly a mere cobweb of a limit! By interposing the shield of what will become mere form, to check the reality of pow­er. He says, that the existence of the state governments are essential to the organization of Congress, that the former is made the necessary basis of the latter, for the federal senators and president are to be appointed by the state legislatures; and that hence all fears of a consoli­dation are groundless and imaginary. It must be con­fessed, as reason and argument would have been foreign to the defence of the proposed plan of government, Mr. Wilson has displayed much ingenuity on this occasion; he has involved the subject in all the mazes of sophistry, and by subtil distinctions he has established principles and positions, that exist only in his own fertile imagina­tion. It is a solecism in politics for two co-ordinate so­vereignties to exist together; you must separate the sphere of their jurisdiction, or after running the race of dominion for some time, one would necessarily triumph over the other; but in the mean time the subjects of it would be harrassed with double impositions to support the contention; however, the strife between Congress and the states could not be of long continuance, for the former has a decisive superiority in the outset, and has [Page 94] moreover the power by the very constitution itself to terminate it when expedient.

As this necessary connexion, as it has been termed, between the state governments and the general govern­ment, has been made a point of great magnitude by the advocates of the new plan, as it is the only obstacle alledged by them against a consolidation, it ought to be well considered. It is declared by the proposed plan, that the federal senators, and the electors who choose the president of the United States, shall be appointed by the state legislatures for the long period of six and four years respectively; how will this connexion prevent the state legislatures being divested of every important, eve­ry efficient power? may not they, will not they dwindle into mere boards of appointment, as has ever happened in other nations to public bodies, who in similar circum­stances have been so weak as to part with the essentials of power? does not history abound with such instances? And this may be the mighty amount of this inseparable connexion which is so much dwelt upon as the security of the state governments. Yet even this shadow of a limit against consolidation may be annihilated by the imperial fiat, without any violation of even the forms of the constitution; section 4th of article 1st has made a provision for this, when the people are sufficiently fa­tigued with the useless expence of maintaining the forms of departed power and security, and when they shall pray to be relieved from the imposition. This section cannot be too often repeated, as it gives such a latitude to the designing, as it revokes every other part of the constitution that may be tolerable, and as it may enable the administration under it to complete the system of despotism: It is in the following words, viz. "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for sena­tors and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may by law at any time make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators." The only appa­rant restriction in this clause is, as to the place of ap­pointing senators, but even this may be rendered of no avail; for as the Congress have the controul over the time of appointment of both senators and representatives, [Page 95] they may, under the pretence of an apprehension of in­vasion, upon the pretence of the turbulence of what they may stile a faction, and indeed pretences are never wanting to the designing, they may postpone the time of the election of the senators and the representatives from period to period to perpetuity: Thus they may, and if they may they certainly will, from the lust of do­minion so inherent in the mind of man, relieve the peo­ple from the trouble of attending elections by conde­scending to create themselves. Has not Mr. Wilson a­vowed it in fact? Has he not said in the convention that it was necessary that Congress should possess this power, as the means of its own preservation; otherwise says he, an invasion, a civil war, a faction, or a secession of a minority of the assembly, might prevent the representa­tion of a state in Congress.

The advocates of the proposed government must be hard driven, when they represent, that because the le­gislatures of this and the other states have exceeded the due bounds of power, notwithstanding every guard pro­vided by their constitutions; that because the lust of ar­bitrary sway is so powerful as sometimes to get the bet­ter of every obstacle, that therefore we should give full scope to it, for that all restriction would be useless and nugatory. And further, when they tell you that a good administration will atone for all the defects in the go­vernment, which, say they, you must necessarily have; for how can it be otherwise, your rulers are to be taken from among yourselves. My fellow citizens, these as­piring despots must indeed have a great contempt for your understandings, when they hope to gull you out of your liberties by such reasoning; for what is the pri­mary object of government, but to check and controul the ambitious and designing: How then can moderation and virtue be expected from men who will be in possessi­on of absolute sway, who will have the United States at their disposal? They would be more than men who could resist such temptation! Their being taken from among the people would be no security, tyrants are of native growth in all countries; the greatest bashaw in Turkey has been one of the people, as Mr. Wilson tells [Page 96] you the president general will be. What consolation would this be, when you shall be suffering under his oppression.

INCREDIBLE transition! The people who, seven years ago, deemed every earthly good, every other considerati­on as worthless when placed in competition with liberty, that heaven-born blessing, that zest of all others; the peo­ple who, actuated by this noble ardor of patriotism, rose superior to every weakness of humanity, and shone with such dazzling lustre amidst the greatest difficulties; who, emulous of eclipsing each other in the glorious assertion of the dignity of human nature, courted every danger, and were ever ready when necessary, to lay down their lives at the altar of liberty: I say, the people who exhibited a spectacle that commanded the admiration, and drew the plaudits of the most distant nations, are now reversing the picture; are now lost to every noble principle, are about to sacrifice that inestimable jewel liberty to the genius of despotism. A golden phantom held out to them by the crafty and aspiring despots among themselves, is alluring them into the sangs of arbitrary power; and so great is their infatuation, that it seems as if nothing short of the reality of misery, necessarily attendant on slavery, will rouse them from their false confidence, or convince them of the direful deception; but then, alas I it will be too late, the chains of despotism will be fast rivetted, and all escape pre­cluded.

For years past the harpies of power have been industri­ously inculcating the idea, that all our difficulties proceed from the impotency of Congress, and have at length suc­ceeded [Page 97] to give to this senti [...]ent almost universal currency and belief: The devastations, losses and burthens, occasion­ed by the late war, the excessive importations of foreign merchandize and luxuries, which have drained the country of its specie and involved it in debt, are all overlooked, and the inadequacy of the powers of the present confedera­tion is erroneously supposed to be the only cause of our dif­ficulties; hence persons of every description are revelling in the anticipation of the [...]alcyon days consequent on the establishment of the new constitution. What grose decep­tion and fatal delusion! Although very considerable benefit might be derived from strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable them to regulate commerce, and counteract the adverse restrictious of other nations, which would meet with the concurrence of all persons; yet this benefit is ac­companied in the new constitution with the scourge of des­potic power, that will render the citizens of America te­nants at will of every species of property, of every enjoy­ment, and make them mere drudges of government. The gilded bait conceals corrosive [...] that will eat up their whole substance.

Since the late able discussion, all are now sensible of great defects in the new constitution, are sensible that pow­er is thereby granted without limitation or restriction;— yet such is the impatience of the people to reap the golden harvest of regulated commerce, that they will not take time to secure their liberty and happiness, nor even to secure the benefit of the expected wealth; but are weakly trusting their every concern to the discretionary disposal of their fu­ture rulers; are content to risk every abuse of power, be­cause they are promised a good administration, because mo­deration and self-denial are the characteristic features of men in possession of absolute sway. What egregious folly What superlative [...]gnorance of the nature of power does such conduct discover!

History exhibits this melancholy truth, that slavery has been the lot of nearly the whole of mankind in all ages, and that the very small portion who have enjoyed the blessings of liberty, have soon been reduced to the common level of slavery and misery. The cause of this general vassalage may be traced to a principle of human nature, which is more powerful and operative than all the others combined; [Page 98] it is that lust of dominion that is inherent in every mind, in a greater or less degree; this is so universal and ever active a passion as to influence all our ancestors; the dif­ferent situation and qualifications of men only modifies and varies the complexion and operation of it.

For this darling pre-eminence and superiority, the merchant, already possessed of a competency, adven­tures his all in the pursuit of greater wealth; it is for this, that men of all descriptions, after having amassed fortunes, still persevere in the toils of labour; in short, this is the great principle of exertion in the votaries of riches, learning, and same.

In a savage state, pre-eminence is the result of bodily strength and intrepidity, which compels submission from all such as have the misfortune to be less able; there­fore the great end of civil government is, to protect the weak from the oppression of the powerful, to put every man upon the level of equal liberty; but here again the same lust of dominion by different means frustrates al­most always this salutary intention. In a polished state of society, wealth, talents, address and intrigue are the qualities that attain superiority in the great sphere of government.

The most striking illustration of the prevalence of this lust of dominion is, that the most strenuous assertors of liberty in all ages, after successfully triumphing over tyranny, have themselves become tyrants, when the un­suspicious confidence of an admiring people have en­trusted them with unchecked power: Rare are the in­stances of self-denial, or consistency of conduct in the votaries of liberty, when they have become possessed of the reins of authority; it has been the peculiar felicity of this country, that her great deliverer did not prove a Cromwell, nor a Monk.

Compare the declarations of the most zealous assert­ors of religious liberty, whilst under the lash of persecu­tion, with their conduct when in power; you will find that even the benevolence and humility inculcated in the gospels, prove no restraint upon this love of domi­nation. The mutual contentions of the several sects of religion in England some ages since, are sufficient evi­dence of this truth.

[Page 99]The annals of mankind demonstrate the precarious tenure of privileges and property dependent upon the will and pleasure of rulers; these illustrate the fatal danger of relying upon the moderation and self-denial of men exposed to the temptations that the congress un­der the new constitution will be. The lust of power or dominion is of that nature, as seeks to overcome every obstacle, and does not remit its exertions, whilst any ob­ject of conquest remains, nothing short of the plenitude of dominion, will satisfy this cursed demon: Therefore liberty is only to be preserved by a due responsibility in the government, and by the const [...]nt attention of the people; whenever that responsibility has been lessened, or this attention remitted, in the same degree has arbi­trary sway prevailed.

The celebrated Montesquieu has warned mankind of the danger of an implicit reliance on rulers; he says, that "a perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, is abso­lutely requisite in all free states," and again, "that slavery is ever preceeded by sleep."

I shall conclude this number with an extract from a speech delivered by lord George Digby, afterwards earl of Bristol, in the English parliament, on the triennial bill in the year 1641. viz. "It hath been a maxim a­mong the wisest legislators that whoever means to settle good laws must proceed in them, with a sinister opinion of all mankind; and whosoever is not wicked, it is for want only of the opportunity. It is that opportunity of being ill, Mr. speaker, that we must take away, if ever we mean to be happ [...], which can never be done, but by the frequency of parliaments.

"No state can wisely be confident of any public mi­nister's continuing good longer than the rod is held over him.

"Let me appeal to all those that were present in this house at the agitation of the petition of rights: and let them tell themselves truly of whose promotion to the management of public affairs do they think the genera­lity would, at that time, have had better hopes, than of Mr. Noy, and sir Thomas Wentworth; both having been at that time and in that business, as I have heard, most keen and active patriots, and the latter of them, to [Page 100] the eternal aggravation of his infamous treachery to the commonwealth be it spoken, the first mover, and insist­er, to have this clause added to the petition of rights, viz.

"That for the comfort and safety of his subjects, his majesty would be pleased to declare his will and plea­sure, that all his ministers should serve him according to the laws and statutes of the realm.

"And yet, Mr. speaker, to whom now can all the inundations upon our liberties, under pretence of law, and the late ship-wreck at once of all our property, be attributed more than to Noy, and all those other mis­chiefs whereby this monarchy hath been brought almost to the brink of destruction, so much to any as to that grand apostate to the commonwealth, the new lieute­nant of Ireland, sir Thomas Wentworth? Let every man but consider these men as once they were."

British Liberties, page 184 and 185.

THE admiring world lately beheld the sun of liber­ty risen to meridian splendor in this western he­misphere, whose cheering rays began to dispel the gloom of even transatlantic despotism; the patriotic mind, en­raptured with the glowing scene, fondly anticipated an universal and eternal day to the orb of freedom; but the horrison is already darkened, and the glooms of sla­very threaten to fix their empire. How transitory are the blessings of this life! Scarcely have four years elaps­ed since these United States, rescuced from the domi­nation of foreign despots, by the unexampled heroism [Page 101] and perseverance of its citizens, at such great expence of blood and treasure, when they are about to fall a prey to the machinations of a profligate junto at home, who, seizing the favourable moment, when the tempo­rary and extraordinary difficulties of the people have thrown them off their guard, and lulled that jealousy of power so essential to the preservation of freedom, have been too successful in the sacrilegious attempt; however I am confident that this formidable conspiracy will end in the confusion and infamy of its authors; that, if ne­cessary, the avenging sword of an abused people will humble these aspiring despots to the dust, and that their fate, like that of Charles the First of England, will de­ter such attempts in future, and prove the confirmation of the liberties of America until time shall be no more.

One would imagine, by the insolent conduct of those harpies of power, they had already triumphed over the liberties of the people; that the chains were rivetted, and tyranny established. They tell us all farther oppo­sition will be in vain, as this state has passed the Rubi­con. Do they imagine the freemen of Pennsylvania will be thus trepanned out of their liberties; that they will submit without a struggle? They must indeed be inebriated with the lust of dominion, to indulge such chimerical ideas. Will the act of one sixth of the peo­ple, and this too, founded on deception and surprise, bind the community. Is it thus that the altar of liberty so recently crimsoned with the blood of our worthies, is it to be prostrated, and despotism reared on its ruins? Certainly not. The solemn mummery that has been acting in the name of the people of Pennsylvania, will be treated with the deserved contempt, it has served, indeed, to expose the principles of the men concerned, and to draw a line of discrimination between the real and affected patriots.

Impressed with an high opinion of the understanding and spirit of my fellow citizens, I have in no stage of this business entertained a doubt of its eventual defeat; the momentary delusion, arising from an unreserved confidence placed in some of the characters whose names sanctioned this scheme of power, did not discourage me: I foresaw that this blind admiration would discover it, native deformity.

[Page 102]Already the enlightened pen of patriotism, aided by an able public discussion, has dispelled the mist of de­ception, and the great body of the people are awaken­ed to a due sense of their danger, and are determined to assert their liberty, if necessary, by the sword, but this mean need not to be recurred to, for who are their enemies? A junto, composed of the lordly and high minded gentry, of the profligate and the needy office hunters, of men, principally, who, in the late war, skulked from the common danger. Would such cha­racters dare to face the majesty of a free people? No: All the conflict would be between the offended justice and generosity of the people, whether these sacrilegious invaders of their dearest rights should suffer the merit­ed punishment, or escape with an infamous contempt.

However, as additional powers are necessary to Con­gress, the people will no doubt see the expediency of calling a convention for this purpose as soon as may be, by applying to their representatives in assembly, at their next session, to appoint a suitable day for the election of such convention.

UNDER the benign influence of liberty, this coun­try, so recently a rugged wilderness, and the abode of savages and wild beasts, has attained to a degree of improvement and greatness, in less than two ages, of which history furnishes no parallel; it is here that hu­man nature may be viewed in all its glory, man assumes the station designed him by the creation, a happy equa­lity and independency pervades the community; it is here the human mind, untrammelled by the restraints [Page 103] of arbitrary power, expands every faculty: as the field to fame and riches is open to all, it stimulates universal exertion and exhibits a lively picture of emulation, in­dustry and happiness. The unfortunate and oppressed of all nations fly to this grand asylum, where liberty is ever protected, and industry crowned with success.

But as it is by comparison only, that men estimate the value of any good, they are not sensible of the worth of these blessings they enjoy until they are deprived of them; hence, from ignorance of the horrors of slavery, nations that have been in possession of that rarest of bles­sings, liberty, have so easily parted with it: When groaning under the yoke of tyranny, what perils would they not encounter, what consideration would they not give to regain the inestimable jewel they had lost; but the jealousy of despotism guards every avenue to free­dom, and confirms its empire at the expence of the de­voted people, whose property is made instrumental to their misery; for the rapacious hand of power seizes up­on every thing, despair presently succeeds, and every noble faculty of the mind being depressed, and all mo­tive to industry and exertion being removed, the people are adapted to the nature of the government, and drag out a listless existence.

If ever America should be enslaved, it will be from this cause, that they are not sensible of their peculiar felicity, that they are not aware of the value of the hea­venly boon committed to their care and protection; and if the present conspiracy fails, as I have no doubt will be the case, it will be the triumph of reason and philo­sophy, as these united states have never felt the iron hand of power, or experienced the wretchedness of sla­very.

The conspirators against our liberties have presumed too much on the maxim, that nations do not take the alarm, until they feel oppression. The enlightened ci­tizens of America have, on two memorable occasions, convinced the tyrants of Europe, that they are endued with the faculty of foresight, that they will sedulously guard against the first introduction of tyranny, however speciously glossed over, or whatever appearance it may assume: It was not the mere amount of the duty on [Page 104] stamps, or tea, that America opposed; they were con­sidered as signals of approaching despotism, as prece­dents whereon the superstructure of arbitrary sway was to be reared.

Notwithstanding such illustrious evidence of the good sense and spirit of the people of these united states, and contrary to all former experience of mankind, which demonstrates, that it is only by gradual and impercepti­ble degrees that nations have hitherto been enslaved, ex­cept in case of conquest by the sword; the authors of the present conspiracy are attempting to seize upon absolute power at one grasp; impatient of dominion, they have adopted a decisive line of conduct, which if successful would obliterate every trace of liberty. I congratulate my fellow citizens, that the infatuated confidence of their enemies has so blinded their ambition, that their defeat must be certain and easy; if imitating the refined policy of successful despots, they had attacked the cita­del of liberty by sap, and gradually undermined its out­works, they would have stood a fairer chance of effect­ing their design; but in this enlightened age thus rash­ly to attempt to carry the fortress by storm, is folly in­deed. They have even exposed some of their batteries prematurely, and thereby unfolded every latent view; for the unlimited power of taxation would alone have been amply sufficient for every purpose; by a proper application of this, the will and pleasure of the rulers would of course have become the supreme law of the land; therefore there was no use in pourtraying the ulti­mate object, by superadding the form to the reality of supremacy in the following clauses, viz. that which im­powers the new congress to make all laws that, may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of their powers by virtue of which every possible law will be constitutional, as they are to be the sole judges of the propriety of such laws; that which ordains that their acts shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the laws or constitution of any state to the contrary not­withstanding; that which gives congress the absolute controul over the time and mode of its appointment and election, whereby, independent of any other means; they may establish hereditary despotism; that which autho­rises [Page 105] them to keep on foot at all times a standing army; and that which subjects the militia to absolute command. And to accelerate the subjugation of the people, trial by jury in civil cases, and the liberty of the press are abo­lished.

So flagrant, so audacious a conspiracy against the li­berties of a free people, is without precedent; mankind in the darkest ages, have never been so insulted—even then tyrants found it necessary to pay some respect to the habits and feelings of the people; and nothing but the name of a Washington could have occasioned a moment's hesitation about the nature of the new plan, or saved its authors from the execration and vengeance of the people, which eventually will prove an aggrava­tion of their treason, for America will resent the impo­sition practised upon the unsuspicious zeal of her illustri­ous deliverer, and vindicate her character from the as­persions of these enemies of her happiness and fame.

The advocates of this plan have artfully attempted to veil over the true nature and principles of it, with the names of those respectable characters that by con­summate cunning and address they have prevailed upon to sign it, and what ought to convince the people of the deception and excite their apprehensions, is, that with every advantage which education, the science of government, and of law, the knowledge of history, and superior talents and endowments furnish the authors and advocates of this plan, they have, from its publication, exerted all their power and influence to prevent all dis­cussion of the subject, and when this could not be pre­vented, they have constantly avoided the ground of ar­gument, and recurred to declamation, sophistry, and personal abuse, but principally relied upon the magic of names. Would this have been their conduct, if their cause had been a good one? No: they would have in­vited vestigation, and convinced the understandings of the people.

But such policy indicates great ignorance of the good sense and spirit of the people; for if the sanction of every convention throughout the union was obtained by the means these men are practising, yet their triumph would be momentary, the favorite object would still [Page 106] elude their grasp, for a government founded on fraud and deception could not be maintained without an army sufficiently powerful to compel submission, which the well-born of America could not speedily accomplish. However, the complexion of several of the more consi­derable states does not promise even this point of suc­cess. The Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, New-York, and New-Hampshire, have, by their wisdom in taking a longer time to deliberate, in all probability saved them­selves from the disgrace of becoming the dupes of this gilded bait, as experience will evince, that it need only be properly examined to be execrated and repulsed.

The merchant, immersed in schemes of wealth, sel­dom extends his view beyond the immediate obje [...] of gain; he blindly pursues his seeming interest, and sees not the latent mischief; therefore it is, that he is the last to take the alarm, when public liberty is threatened. This may account for the infatuation of some of our merchants, who, elated with the imaginary prospect of an improved commerce under the new government, overlook all danger; they do not consider that com­merce is the handmaid of liberty, a plant of free growth that withers under the hand of despotism, that every concern of individuals will be sacrificed to the gratifica­tion of men in power, who will institute injurious mo­nopolies, and shackle commerce with every device of avarice; and that property of every species will be held at the will and pleasure of rulers.

If the nature of the case did not give birth to these well founded apprehensions, the principles and characters of the authors and advocates of the measure ought. View the monopolizing spirit of the principal of them See him converting a Bank instituted for the common benefit, to his own and creatures emolument, and by the aid thereof controuling the credit of the state, and directing the measures of government. View the vassal­age of our merchants, the thraldom of the city of Phi­ladelphia, and the extinction of that spirit of indepen­dency in most of its citizens, so essential to freedom. View this Colossus attempting the grasp to commerce of America, and meeting with a sudden repulse; in the midst of his immense career receiving a shock that [Page 107] threatens his very existence. View the desperate fortunes of many of his coadjutors and dependents, particularly the bankrupt situation of the principal instrument under the great man in promoting the new government, whose superlative arrogance, ambition, and rapacity, would need the spoils of thousands to gratify. View his tower­ing aspect, he would have no bounds of compassion for the oppressed, he would overlook all their sufferings. Recollect the strenuous and unremitted exertions of these men, for years past, to destroy our admirable constitu­tion, whose object is, to secure equal liberty and ad­vantages to all, and the great obstacle in the way of their ambitious schemes, and then answer, Whether these apprehensions are chimerical; whether such characters will be less ambitious, less avaricious, more moderate, when the privileges, property, and every concern of the people of the United States shall be at their mercy, when they shall be in possession of absolute sway.

YOU have the peculiar felicity of living under the most perfect system of local government in the world; prize then this invaluable ble [...]ng as it deserves; suffer it not to be wrested from you, and the scourge of despotic power substituted in its place, under the spe­cious pretence of vesting the general government of the United States with necessary power; that this would be the inevitable consequence of the establishment of the new constitution, the least consideration of its nature and tendency is su [...]cient to convince every unprejudiced [Page 108] mind. If you were sufficiently impressed with your pre­sent favored situation, I should have no doubt of a pro­per decision of the question in discussion.

The highest illustration of the excellence of the con­stitution of this commonwealth, is, that from its first establishment, the ambitious and profligate have been united in a constant conspiracy to destroy it; so sensi­ble are they that it is their great enemy, that it is the great palladium of equal liberty, and the property of the people from the rapacious hand of power: the annals of mankind do not furnish a more glorious instance of the triumph of patriotism over the lust of ambition, aided by most of the wealth of the state. The few general­ly prevail over the many by uniformity of council, un­remitted and persevering exertion, and superior inform­ation and address; but in Pennsylvania, the reverse has happened; here the well-born have been baffled in all their efforts to prostrate the altar of liberty for the pur­pose of substit [...]ting their own insolent sway, that would degrade the freemen of this state into servile dependence upon the lordly and great: however, it is not the nature of ambition to be discouraged; it is ever ready to im­prove the first opportunity to rear its baneful head, and with irritated fury to wreak its vengeance on the vota­ries of liberty.

The present conspiracy is a continental exertion of the well-born of America to obtain that darling domi­nation, which they have not been able to accomplish in their respective states. Of what complexion were the deputies of this state in the general convention? Six out of eight were the inveterate enemies of our inestimable constitution, and the principles of that faction that for ten years past have kept the people in continual alarm for their liberties. Who are the advocates of the new constitution in this state? They consist of the same facti­on, with the addition of a few deluded well-meaning men, but whose number is daily lessening.

The conspirators have come [...]rward at a most favor­able conjuncture, when the state of public affairs has lulled all jealousy o [...] power: emboldened by the sanction of the augu [...]l name of a Washington that they have prosti­tuted their purpose, they have presumed to overleap the [Page 109] usual gradations to absolute power, and have attempted to seize at once upon the supremacy of dominion. The new instrument of government does indeed make a sal­lacious parade of some remaining privileges, and insults the understandings of the people with the semblance of liberty in some of its artful and deceptive clauses, which form but a flimsy veil over the reality of tyranny, so weakly endeavoured to be concealed from the eye of freedom. For, of what avail are the few inadequate stipulations in favor of the rights of the people, when they may be effectually counteracted and destroyed by virtue of other clauses; when these enable the rulers to renounce all dependence on their constituents, and ren­der the latter tenants at will of every concern? The new constitution is in fact a carte blanche, a surrender at discretion to the will and pleasure of our rulers; as this has been demonstrated to be the case, by the inves­tigation and discussion that have taken place, I trust the same good sense and spirit which have hitherto enabled the people to triumph over the wiles of ambition, will be again exerted for their salvation. The accounts from various parts of the country correspond with my warm­est hopes, and justify my early predictions of the eventual defeat of this scheme of power and office making.

The genius of liberty has sounded the alarm, and the dormant spirit of her votaries is reviving with enthusi­astic ardor; the like unanimity which formerly distin­guished them in their conflict with foreign despots, pro­mise to crown their virtuous opposition on the present occasion, with signal success. The structure of despo­tism that has been reared in this state, upon deception and surprise, will vanish like the baseless fabric of a dream, and leave not a trace behind.

The perasites and tools of power in Northampton county ought to take warning from the fate of the Car­lisle junto, lest like them, they experience the resentment of an injured people. I would advise them not to repeat the imposition of a set of fallacious resolutions as the sense of that county, when in fact, it was the act of a despicable few, with Alexander Patterson at their head, whose atchievements at Wyoming, as the meaner instru­ment of unfeeling avarice, have rendered ins [...]nously no­torious; [Page 110] but yet, like the election of a Mr. Sedgwick for the little town of Stockbridge, which has been adduced as evidence of the unanimity of the western counties of Massachusetts state in favour of the new constitution, when the fact is far otherwise, this act of a few individu­als will be founded forth over the continent as a testi­mony of the zealous attachment of the county of North­ampton to the new constitution. By such wretched and momentary deceptions do these harpies of power endea­vour to give the complexion of strength to their cause. To prevent the detection of such impositions, to prevent the reflection of the rays of light from state to state, which producing general illumination, would dissipate the mist of deception, and thereby prove fatal to the new constitution, all intercourse between the patriots of A­merica is as far as possible cut off; whilst on the other hand, the conspirators have the most exact information, a common concert is every where evident, they move in unison. There is so much mystery in the conduct of these men, such systematic de [...]ption, and fraud, cha­racterises all their measures, such extraordinary solici­tude shewn by them to precipitate and surprise the peo­ple into a blind and implicit adoption of this government that it ought to excite the most alarming apprehensions in the minds of all those who think their privileges, pro­perty and welfare, worth securing.

It is a fact that can be established, that during almost the whole of the time that the late convention of this state were assembled, the news-papers published in New-York, by Mr. Greenleaf, which contain the essays writ­ten there against the new government, such as the pa­triotic ones of Brutus, Cincinnatus, Cato, &c. sent as usual by the printer of that place, to the printers of this city, miscarried in their conveyance, which prevented the re-publication in this state, of many of these pieces, and since that period great irregularity prevails; and I stand informed, that the printers in New-York complain that the free and independent newspapers of this city do not come to hand; whilst on the contrary, we find the devoted vehicles of despoti [...]m pass uninterrupted. I would ask what is the meaning of the new arrangement at the post-office, which abridges the circulation of news-papers [Page 111] at this momentous crisis, when our every concern is dependent upon a proper decision of the subject in dis­cussion. No trivial excuse will be admitted; the Centi­nel will, as from the first approach of despotism, warn his countrymen of the insidious and base stratagems that are practising to hoodwink them out of their liberties.

The more I consider the manoeuvres that are practising, the more am I alarmed—foreseeing that the juggle can­not long be concealed, and that the spirit of the people will not brook the imposition, they have guarded, as they suppose, against any danger arising from the oppo­sition of the people, and rendered their struggles for li­berty impotent and ridiculous. What otherwise is the meaning of disarming the militia, for the purpose, as it is said, of repairing their musquets at such a particular period? Does not the timeing of the measure determine the intention. I was ever jealous of the select militia, consisting of infantry and troops of horse, instituted in this city, and in some of the counties, without the fanc­tion of law, and officered principally by the devoted in­struments of the well born, although the illustrious pa­triotism of one of them, has not corresponded with the intention of appointing him. Are not these corps pro­vided to suppress the first efforts of freedom, and to check the spirit of the people until a regular and suffici­ently powerful military force shall be embodied to rivet the chains of slavery on a deluded nation. What con­firms these apprehensions, is the declaration of a certain major, an active instrument in this business, and the echo of the principal conspirators, who has said, he should dee [...] the cutting off of five thousand men, as a small sa­crifice, a cheap purchase, for the establishment of the new constitution.