An examination of the Constitution for the United States of America, submitted to the people by the general convention, at Philadelphia, the 17th. day of September, 1787, and since adopted and ratified by the conventions of eleven states, chosen for the purpose of considering it, being all that have yet decided on the subject. / By an American citizen. ; To which is added, a speech of the Honorable James Wilson, Esquire, on the same subject.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, &c.

NUMBER I. On the Foederal Government, and firſt on the ſafety of the people, from the reſtraints impoſed on the Preſident.

IT is impoſſible for an honeſt and feeling mind, of any nation or country whatever, to be inſenſible to the preſent circumſtances of America. Were I an Eaſt Indian, or a Turk, I ſhould conſider this ſingular ſituation of a part of my fellow creatures as the moſt curious and intereſting. Intimately connected with 〈◊〉 country, as a citizen of the union, I confeſs it entirely engroſſes my mind and feelings.

To take a proper view of the ground on which we ſtand, it may be neceſſary to recollect the manner in which the United States were originally ſettled and eſtabliſhed. Want of charity in the religious ſyſtems of Europe, and of juſtice in their political governments, were the principal moving cauſes, which drove the emigrants of various countries to the American continent. The Congregationaliſts, Quakers, Preſbyterians and other Britiſh diſſenters, the Catholics of England and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans, Calviniſts, and Moravians, with ſeveral other ſocieties, eſtabliſhed themſelves in the different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that liberality in eccleſiaſtical affairs, which has been obſervable ſince the late revolution. Religious liberty naturally promotes correſponding diſpoſitions in matters of government. The conſtitution of England, as it ſtood on paper, was one of the freeſt, at that time, in the world, and the American colonies conſidered themſelves as entitled to the fulleſt enjoyment of it. Thus, when the ill-judged diſcuſſions of late times in England brought into queſtion the rights of this country, as it ſtood connected with the Britiſh crown, we were found more ſtrongly impreſſed with their importance, and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the wiſeſt and moſt learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic. When the greateſt names in parliament inſiſted on the power of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all caſes whatſoever, America, ſeeing that it was only another form of tyranny, inſiſted upon the immutable truth, that taxation and repreſentation are inſeparable; and, while a deſire of harmony and other conſiderations induced her into an acquieſcence in the commercial regulations of Great-Britain, it was done from the declared neceſſity of the caſe, and with a cautious, full, and abſolute ſaving of our voluntarily-ſuſpended rights. The parliament was perſevering, and America continued firm, till hoſtilities and open war commenced, and finally the late revolution cloſed the conteſt for-ever.

It is evident, from this ſhort detail, and the reflections which ariſe from it, that the quarrel between the United States and the parliament of Great-Britain did not ariſe ſo much from objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as from a difference concerning certain important rights, reſulting from the eſſential principles of liberty, which their conſtitution actually preſerved to all the ſubjects reſiding within the realm. It was not aſſerted by America, that the people of the iſland of Great-Britain were ſlaves, but that we, though poſſeſſed abſolutely of the ſame rights, were not admitted to enjoy an equal degree of freedom.

When the declaration of independence compleated the ſeparation between the two countries, new governments were neceſſarily eſtabliſhed. Many circumſtances led to the adoption of the republican form, among which was the predilection of the people. In deviſing the frames of government, it may have been difficult to avoid extremes oppoſite to the vices of that we had juſt rejected; nevertheleſs, many of the ſtate conſtitutions we have choſen are truly excellent. Our misfortunes have been, that in the firſt inſtance we adopted no national government at all; but were kept together by common danger only; and that in the confuſions of a civil war, we framed a foederal conſtitution, now univerſally admitted to be inadequate to the preſervation of liberty, property, and the union. The queſtion is not, then, how far our ſtate conſtitutions are good, or otherwiſe—the object of our wiſhes is, to amend and ſupply the evident and allowed errors and defects of the foederal government. Let us conſider a while, that which is now propoſed to us—let us compare it with the ſo much boaſted Britiſh form of government, and ſee how much more it favours the people, and how completely it ſecures their rights, remembering, at the ſame time, that we did not diſſolve our connection with that country ſo much on account of its conſtitution, as the perverſion and mal-adminiſtration of it.

In the firſt place, let us look at the nature and powers of the head of that country, and thoſe of the oſtenſible head of ours.

The Britiſh king is the great biſhop or ſupreme head of an eſtabliſhed church, with an immenſe patronage annexed. In this capacity he commands a number of votes in the houſe of lords, by creating biſhops, who, beſides their great incomes, have votes in that aſſembly, and are judges in the laſt reſort. Theſe prelates have alſo many honorable and lucrative places to beſtow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dignities, powers, and patronage, give a great luſtre and an enormous influence to the crown.

In America, our preſident will not only be without theſe influencing advantages, but they will be in the poſſeſſion of the people at large, to ſtrengthen their hands in the event of a conteſt with him. All religious funds, honors and powers, are in the gift of numberleſs unconnected, diſunited and contending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality univerſally prevails. In ſhort, danger from eccleſiaſtical tyranny, that long ſtanding and ſtill remaining curſe of the people —that ſacrilegious engine of royal power in ſome countries—can be feared by no man in the United States. In Britain, their king is for life—in America, our Preſident will always 〈◊〉 one of the people at the end of four years. In that country, the king is hereditary, and may be an ideot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be removed, for "he can do no wrong." This is a favorite maxim of their conſtitution. In America, as the Preſident is to be one of the people at the end of his ſhort term, ſo will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was originally one of the people; and that he is created by their breath. Further, he cannot be an ideot, probably not a knave or tyrant, for thoſe whom nature makes ſo diſcover it before the age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It appears, we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but have rather pre-ſuppoſed he may and ſometimes will do wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable and complete removal.

In England the king has a power to create members of the upper houſe, who are judges in the higheſt court, as well as legiſlators. Our Preſident not only cannot make members of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people, through their repreſentatives: and a member of Aſſembly may and will be as certainly diſmiſſed at the end of his year, for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder or miſconduct.

The king of England has complete legiſlative power, while our Preſident can only uſe it when the other ſervants of the people are divided. But in all great caſes affecting the national intereſts or ſafety, his modified and reſtrained power muſt give way to the ſenſe of two-thirds of the legiſlature. In fact it amounts to no more, than a ſerious duty impoſed upon him to requeſt both houſes to re-conſider any matter on which he entertains doubts or feels apprehenſions; and hers the people have a ſtrong hold upon him from his ſole and perſonal reſponſibility.

The Preſident of the upper-houſe (or the chancellor) in England, is appointed by their king, while our Vice-Preſident, who is choſen by the people, through the electors and the Senate, is not at all dependant on the Preſident, but may exerciſe equal powers on ſome occaſions. In all royal governments, an helpleſs infant or an inexperienced youth may wear the crown. Our Preſident muſt be matured by the experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five muſt be fully underſtood. Wiſdom, virtue and active qualities of mind and body can alone make him the firſt ſervant of a free and enlightened people.

Our Preſident will fall very much ſhort indeed of any prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but the abſolute allowance of the people, paſſing through the hands of their other ſervants from year to year, as it becomes neceſſary. There will be no burdens on the nation, to provide for his heir, or other branches of his family. It is probable, from the ſtate of property in America, and other circumſtances, that many citizens will exceed him in ſhow and expence,—thoſe dazzling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no authority to make a treaty, without two thirds of the ſenate, nor can he appoint ambaſſadors or other great officers without their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of perſonal obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of congreſs at any time; he can create no nobility or titles of honour, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His perſon is not ſo much protected as that of a member of the houſe of repreſentatives; for he may be proceeded againſt like any other man in the ordinary courſe of law. He appoints no officer of the ſeparate ſtates. He will have no influence from placemen in the legiſlature, nor can he prorogue or diſſolve it. He will have no power over the treaſures of the ſtate; and, laſtly, as he is created through the electors, by the people at large, he muſt ever look up to the ſupport of his creators. From ſuch a ſervant, with powers ſo limited and tranſitory, there can be no danger, eſpecially when we conſider the ſolid foundations on which our national liberties are immoveably fixed, by the other proviſions of this excellent conſtitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he poſſeſſes, is a delegated part of their majeſty and their political omnipotence, tranſiently veſted in him by the people themſelves, for their own happineſs.

NUMBER II. On the ſafety of the people, from the reſtraints impoſed upon the Senate.

WE have ſeen that the late honorable convention, in deſignating the nature of the chief executive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers—As our preſident bears no reſemblance to a king, ſo we ſhall ſee the ſenate have no ſimilitude to nobles.

Firſt, then, not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wiſdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by theſe qualities alone they are to obtain their offices; and they will have none of the peculiar follies and vices of thoſe men, who poſſeſs power merely becauſe their fathers held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with equal proſpects) among and on a footing with the other ſons of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at various periods, filled the ſeats of congreſs, we ſhall find this expectation perfectly reaſonable. Many young men of genius, and many characters of more matured abilities, without fortunes, have been honored with that truſt. Wealth has had but few repreſentatives there, and thoſe have been generally poſſeſſed of reſpectable perſonal qualifications. There have alſo been many inſtances of perſons not eminently endowed with mental qualities, who have been ſent thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private—As the ſenators are ſtill to be elected by the legiſlatures of the ſtates, there can be no doubt of equal ſafety and propriety in their future appointment, eſpecially as no further pecuniary qualification is required by the conſtitution.

They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in making proviſion for themſelves, either by creating new places, or encreaſing the emoluments of old ones. As their ſons are not to ſucceed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increaſe or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people, of which thoſe ſons will be a part. They poſſeſs a much ſmaller ſhare of the judicial power than the upper houſe in Britain, for they are not, as there, the higheſt court in civil affairs. Impeachments alone are the caſes cognizable before them, and in what other place could matters of that nature be ſo properly and ſafely determined? The judges of the foederal courts will owe their appointments to the preſident and ſenate, therefore may not feel ſo perfectly free from favour, affection and influence, as the upper houſe who receive their power from the people, through their ſtate repreſentatives, and are immediately reſponſible to thoſe aſſemblies, and finally to the nation at large—Thus we ſee, when a daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public juſtice, the people, who alone can impeach him by their immediate repreſentatives, will cauſe him to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occaſion, but by two-thirds of a ſelect body, choſen a long time before, for various purpoſes, by the collected wiſdom of of their ſtate legiſlatures. From a pretence or affectation of extraordinary purity and excellence of character, their word of honour is the ſanction, under which theſe high courts, in other countries, have given their ſentence—But with us, like the other judges of the union, like the reſt of the people, of which they are never to forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath.

No ambitious, undeſerving or inexperienced youth can acquire a ſeat in this houſe by means of the moſt enormous wealth, or moſt powerful connections, till thirty years have ripened his abilities, and fully diſcovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference ſurely than mere property.

The ſenate, though more independent of the people, as to the free exerciſe of their judgment and abilities, than the houſe of repreſentatives, by the longer term of their office, muſt be older and more experienced men, and are veſted with leſs effective power; for the public treaſures, the ſinews of the ſtate, cannot be called forth by their original motion. They may indeed reſtrain the profuſion or errors of the houſe of repreſentatives, but they cannot take any of the neceſſary meaſures to raiſe a national revenue.

The people, through the electors, preſcribe them ſuch a preſident as ſhall be beſt qualified to controul them.

They can only, by conviction on impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the puniſhment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminiſhes the importance of their judicial powers. They are detached, as much as poſſible, from local prejudices in favour of their reſpective ſtates, by having a ſeparate and independent vote, for the ſenſible and conſcientious uſe of which every member will find his perſon, honor and character ſeriouſly bound—He cannot ſhelter himſelf, under a vote in behalf of his ſlate, among his immediate colleagues. As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily governed by the majority of the deputation—He will be obliged, by wholeſome proviſions, to attend his public duty, and thus in great national queſtions muſt give a vote, of the honeſty of which he will find it is neceſſary to convince his conſtituents.

The ſenate muſt always receive the exceptions of the preſident againſt any of their legiſlatve acts, which, without ſerious deliberation and ſufficient reaſons, they will ſeldom diſregard. They will alſo feel a conſiderable check from the conſtitutional powers of the ſtate legiſlatures, whoſe rights they will not be diſpoſed to infringe, ſince they are the bodies to which they owe their exiſtence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the people:

And laſtly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the Houſe of Repreſentatives—a body ſo truly popular and pure in its election, ſo intimately connected, by its intereſts and feelings, with the people at large, ſo guarded againſt corruption and influence—ſo much, from its nature, above all apprehenſions, that it muſt ever be able to maintain the high ground aſſigned to it by the foederal conſtitution.

NUMBER III. On the ſafety of the people, from the nature of the Houſe of Repreſentatives.

IN purſuing the conſideration of the new foederal conſtitution, it remains now to examine the nature and powers of the Houſe of repreſentatives—the immediate delegates of the people.

Each member of this truly popular aſſembly will be choſen by about ſix thouſand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an unjuſt ſhare in their determinations—no old Sarum will ſend thither a repreſentative by the voice of a ſingle elector. This is the caſe with that Britiſh Borough. As we ſhall have no royal miniſters to purchaſe votes, ſo we ſhall have no votes for ſale; for the ſuffrages of ſix thouſand enlightened and independent freemen are above all price. When the increaſing population of the country ſhall render the body too large at the rate of one member for every thirty thouſand perſons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty thouſand, which will render the electors ſtill more incorruptible. For this regulation is only deſigned to prevent a ſmaller number than thirty thouſand from having a repreſentative. Thus we ſee a proviſion follows, that no ſtate ſhall have leſs than one member, for if a new and greater number than thirty thouſand ſhould hereafter be fixed on, which ſhould exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any ſtate, ſuch ſtate, without this wholeſome proviſion, would loſe its voice in the Houſe of Repreſentatives—a circumſtance which the conſtitution renders impoſſible.

The people of England, whoſe Houſe of commons is filled with military and civil officers and penſioners, ſay their liberties would be perfectly ſecured by triennial Parliaments. With us, no placeman can ſit among the repreſentatives of the people, and two years are the conſtitutional term of their exiſtence. Here, again, leſt wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwarineſs of the people ſhould place in this important truſt an undeſerving, unqualified, or inexperienced youth, the wiſdom of the Convention has propoſed an abſolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own intereſt, but he cannot, for a few years more, be intruſted with the affairs of the nation. He muſt be an inhabitant of the ſtate that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their particular circumſtances—The houſe of Repreſentatives is not, as the ſenate, to have a Preſident choſen for them from without their body, but are to elect their Speaker from their own number—They will alſo appoint all their other officers. In great ſtate caſes, they will be the grand inqueſt of the nation, for they poſſeſs the ſole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and diſſolutions of a perverſe or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at leaſt once in every year, and to ſit on adjournments to be agreed on between themſelves and the other ſervants of the people. Should they differ in opinion, the Preſident, who is a temporary fellow-ſervant, and not their hereditary maſter, has a mediatorial power to adjuſt it for them, but cannot prevent th •• conſtitutional meeting within the year. They can 〈◊〉 the attendance of their members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of each repreſentative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the houſe, that ſo the people may be acquainted with the conduct of thoſe in whom they repoſe ſo important a truſt. As was obſerved of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themſelves, nor increaſe, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from needleſs additions to the public expences, on ſuch ſordid and mercenary principles—They are not to be reſtrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the independent repreſentatives of freemen, for there is to be a perfect liberty of ſpeech. Without their conſent, no monies can be obtained, no armies raiſed, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union, and they will have a negative upon every legiſlative act of the other houſe.—So far, in ſhort, as the ſphere of foederal juriſdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the people, and, in contentions with the other branch, ſo far as they ſhall be right, they muſt ever finally prevail.

Such, my Countrymen, are ſome of the cautionary proviſions of the frame of government your faithful convention have ſubmitted to your conſideration— ſuch the foundations of peace, liberty and ſafety, which have been laid by their unwearied labours—They have guarded you againſt all ſervants but thoſe "whom choice and common good ordain," againſt all maſters, "ſave preſerving Heaven."

NUMBER IV. The ſecurity for national ſafety and happineſs, reſulting from other parts of the foederal Government.

IN conſidering the reſpective powers of the Preſident, the Senate and the Houſe of Repreſentatives, under the foederal conſtitution, we have ſeen a part of the wholeſome precautions, which are contained in the new ſyſtem. Let us examine what further ſecurities for the ſafety and happineſs of the people are contained in the general ſtipulations and proviſions.

The United States guarantee to every ſtate in the union a ſeparate republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, who ſhall make an alteration in the form of government of any ſtate, whereby the powers thereof ſhall be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will ſtand guilty of high treaſon; or ſhould a foreign power ſeduce or over-awe the people of any ſtate, ſo as to cauſe them to veſt in the families of any ambitous citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that ſuch inveſtment of powers would be void in itſelf, and every perſon attempting to execute them would alſo be guilty of treaſon.

No religions teſt is ever to be required of any officer or ſervant of the United States. The people may employ any wiſe and good citizen in the execution of the various duties of the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no proteſtant can hold a public truſt. In England every Preſbyterian, and other perſon not of their eſtabliſhed church, is incapable of holding an office. No ſuch impious deprivation of the rights of men can take place under the new foederal conſtitution. The convention has the honour of propoſing the firſt public act, by which any nation has ever diveſted itſelf of a power, every exerciſe of which is a treſpaſs on the Majeſty of Heaven.

No qualification in monied or landed property is required by the propoſed plan; nor does it admit any preference from the prepoſterous diſtinctions of birth and rank. The office of the Preſident, a Senator, and a Repreſentative, and every other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wiſe, informed and upright man, be his property what it may, can exerciſe the truſts and powers of the ſtate, provided he poſſeſſes the moral, religious and political virtues which are neceſſary to ſecure the confidence of his fellow citizens.

The importation of ſlaves from 〈◊〉 foreign country is, by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally inconſiſtent with the diſpoſitions and the duties of the people of America. A ſolid foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro ſlavery, in which many good men of all parties in Pennſylvania, and throughout the union, have already concurred. The temporary reſervation of any particular matter muſt ever be deemed an admiſſion that it ſhould be done away. This appears to have been well underſtood. In addition to the arguments drawn from liberty, juſtice and religion, opinions againſt this practice, founded in ſound policy, have no doubt been urged. Regard was neceſſarily paid to the peculiar ſituation of our ſouthern fellow-citizens; but they, on the other hand, have not been inſenſible of the delicate ſituation of our national character on this ſubject.

The people will remain, under the propoſed conſtitution, the fountain of power and public honour. The Preſident, the Senate, and the Houſe of Repreſentatives, will be the channels through which the ſtream will flow—but it will flow from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious, civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will come from them through the hands of their ſervants. And this, as obſerved before, will be guaranteed to them under the ſtate conſtitutions which they reſpectively approve; for they cannot be royal forms, cannot be ariſtocratical, but muſt be republican.

The people of thoſe ſtates which have faithfully diſcharged their duty to the union will be no longer ſubjected alone to the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will call forth the juſt proportion of their ſiſter ſtates, and our national character will again be as unſtained, as it was once exalted. Elevation to independence, with the loſs of our good name, is only to be conſpicuous in diſgrace. The liberties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty of an individual in the ſame ſituation. Their virtue is more precarious. The unfortunate citizen muſt yield to the operation of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too eaſy annihilates the ſacred obligations of gratitude and honor, and becomes execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable ſituation, which muſt be our miſerable condition, if the defects of the old confederation remain without amendment. The propoſed conſtitution will cure the evil, and reſtore us to our rank among mankind.

Laws, made after the commiſſion of the fact, have been a dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of the moſt virtuous and ſhining characters in the world have been put to death, by laws formed to render them puniſhable, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and to which patriotiſm impelled them. Theſe have been called ex poſt facto laws, and are exploded by the new ſyſtem. If a time of public contention ſhall hereafter arrive, the firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they can puſh their noble oppoſition, on the foundation of the laws. Should their country's cauſe impel them further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and uſing thoſe arms which Providence has put into their hands, will make a ſolemn appeal to "the power above."

The deſtruction of the ancient republics was occaſioned in every inſtance by their being ignorant of a great political poſition, which was left for America to diſcover and eſtabliſh. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome aſſerting, that taxation and repreſentation were inſeparable. The Roman citizens, proud of their own liberty, impoſed, in the freeſt times of the commonwealth, the moſt grievous burdens on their wretched provinces. At other times we find thouſands of their citizens, though reſiding within the walls of Rome, deprived of legiſlative repreſentatives. When America aſſerted the novel truth, Great Britain, though boaſting herſelf as alone free among the modern nations, denied it by her legiſlature, and endeavoured to refute it by her arms—the reaſoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of all nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will conſider this poſition as the only rock on which they can found the temple of liberty, that taxation and repreſentation are inſeparable. Our new conſtitution carries it into execution on the moſt enlarged and liberal ſcale, for a Repreſentative will be choſen by ſix thouſand of his fellow-citizens, a Senator by half a ſovereign ſtate, a Preſident by a whole nation.

The old foederal conſtitution contained many of the ſame things, which from error or diſingenuouſneſs are urged againſt the new one. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does either notice the liberty of the preſs, becauſe they are already provided for by the ſtate conſtitutions; and relating only to perſonal rights, they could not be mentioned in a contract among ſovereign ſtates.

Both the old and new foederal conſtitutions, and indeed the conſtitution of Pennſylvania, admit of courts in which no uſe is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of admiralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the ſtate of Pennſylvania, as alſo the court of appeals under the old confederation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be in the expreſs words of the Pennſylvania conſtitution, "as heretofore,"—almoſt always uſed, though ſometimes omitted. Trials for lands lying in any ſtate between perſons reſiding in ſuch ſtate, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, treſpaſſes, aſſumptions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any ſtate, will be held in the ſtate courts by juries, as now. In theſe caſes the foederal courts cannot interfere. Trials between a ſtate and its own Citizens, and between Citizens of the ſame ſtate, involving queſtions concerning ſtate laws that infringe this conſtitution, may be carried by appeal, it is preſumed, into a foederal court. But when a diſpute ariſes between the citizens of any ſtate about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had between the citizens of any ſtate and thoſe of another, or the government of another, the private citizen will not be obliged to go into a court conſtituted by the ſtate, with which, or with the citizens of which, his diſpute is. He can appeal to a diſintereſted foederal court. This is ſurely a great advantage, and promiſes a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial by jury is not excluded in theſe foederal courts. In all criminal caſes, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at ſtake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeachment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined, impriſoned or puniſhed, but only may be diſqualified from doing public miſchief by loſing his office, and his capacity to bold another. If the nature of his offence, beſides its danger to his country, ſhould be criminal in itſelf—ſhould involve a charge of fraud, murder or treaſon—he may be tried for ſuch crime, but cannot be convicted 〈◊〉 a jury. In trials about property in the foederal courts, which can only be as above ſtated, there is nothing in the new conſtitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt it will be the mode in every caſe, wherein it is practicable. This will be adjuſted by law, and it could not be done otherwiſe. In ſhort, the ſphere of juriſdiction for the foederal courts is limited, and that ſphere only is ſubject to the regulations of our foederal government. The known principles of juſtice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it can be uſed, the inſtructions of the ſtate legiſlatures, the inſtructions of the people at large, the operation of the foederal regulations on the property of a preſident, a ſenator, a repreſentative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will certainly render thoſe regulations as favorable as poſſible to property; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the hands of the juries. Under the preſent conſtitution of all the ſtates, a public officer may be condemned to impriſonment or death on impeachment, without a jury; but the new foederal conſtitution protects the accuſed, till he ſhall be convicted, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the indiſpenſible judges of all crimes.

The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exerciſe in our affairs was foreſeen, and a wholeſome proviſion has been made againſt it; for no perſon holding an office under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign honors, powers or emoluments.

The apprehenſions of the people have been excited, perhaps by perſons with good intentions, about the powers of the new government to raiſe an army. Let us conſider this point with moderation and candor. As enemies will ſometimes inſult us, invade our country and capture our property, it is clear a power in our government to oppoſe, reſtrain or deſtroy them, is neceſſary to our honor, ſafety and exiſtence. The military ſhould, however, be regarded with a watchful eye; for it is a profeſſion that is liable to dangerous perverſion. But the powers veſted in the foederal government do not go the length which has been ſaid. A ſtanding army is not granted or intended, for there can be no proviſion for its continuing three years, much leſs for its permanent eſtabliſhment. Two years are the utmoſt time for which the money can be given. It will be under all the reſtrictions which wiſdom and jealouſy can ſuggeſt, and the original grant of the ſupplies muſt be made by the Houſe of repreſentatives, the immediate delegates of the people. The Senate and Preſident, who alſo derive their power from the people, appoint the officers; and the heads of the departments, who muſt ſubmit their accounts to the whole legiſlature, are to pay and provide them, as ſhall be directed by the laws that ſhall contain the conditions of the grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many troops quite unneceſſary. They will form a powerful check upon the regular troops, and will generally be ſufficient to over-awe them—for our detached ſituation will ſeldom give occaſion to raiſe an army, though a few ſcattered companies may often be neceſſary. But whenever, even on the moſt obvious reaſons, an army ſhall be raiſed, the ſeveral ſtates will be called, by the nature of things, to attend to the condition of the militia. Republican jealouſy, the guardian Angel of theſe ſtates, will watch the motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the ſoldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however between the troops of ſuch commonwealths as ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles, and thoſe of a regal government, where ambition and oppreſſion are the profeſſion of the king. In the firſt caſe, a military officer is the occaſional ſervant of the people, employed for their defence; in the ſecond, he is the ever ready inſtrument to execute the ſchemes of conqueſt or oppreſſion, with which the mind of his royal maſter may be diſturbed.

Obſervations have been made on the power given to the foederal Government in regard to the elections of Repreſentatives and Senators. The regulations of theſe elections are, by the firſt part of the clauſe, to be preſcribed by the ſtate legiſlatures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always execute the duty. But in caſe the union or the public ſafety ſhould be endangered by an omiſſion of this duty, as in the caſe of Rhode-Iſland, then the legiſlature of the United States can name for the people a convenient time, and do other matters neceſſary to enſure the free exerciſe of their right of election. The exception, in regard to the places of chuſing Senators, was made from due reſpect to the ſovereignty of the ſtate legiſlatures, who are to elect the Senators, and whoſe place of meeting ought not to be preſcribed to them by any authority, except indeed, as we always muſt, by the authority of the people. This power given to the foederal legiſlature is no more than what is poſſeſſed by the governments of all the ſtates. The conſtitution of Pennſylvania permits two-thirds of ſuch cities and counties, as ſhall elect repreſentatives, to exerciſe all the powers of the General Aſſembly, "as fully and amply as if the whole were preſent," ſhould any part of the ſtate neglect or refuſe to perform their duty in this particular. In ſhort, it is a power neceſſary to preſerve the ſocial compact of each ſtate and the confederation of the United States.

Beſides the ſecurities for the liberties of the people ariſing out of the foederal government, they are guarded by their ſtate conſtitutions, and by the nature of things in the ſeparate ſtates. The Governor or Preſident in each commonwealth, the Councils, Senates, Aſſemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Officers of all churches, ſtate and county Treaſurers, Prothonotaries, Regiſters, Preſidents and other officers of Univerſities, Colleges and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burgeſſes of towns, Commiſſioners of counties, County Lieutenants, and many other officers of power and influence, will ſtill be choſen within each ſtate, without any poſſible interference of the foederal Government. The ſeparate ſtates will alſo chooſe all the members of the legiſlative and executive branches of the United States. The people at large in each ſtate will chooſe their foederal repreſentatives, and, unleſs ordered otherwiſe by the ſtate legiſlatures, may chooſe the electors of the Preſident and Vice-Preſident of the Union. And laſtly, the legiſlature of the ſtate will have the election of the Senate, as they have heretofore had of the Members of Congreſs. Let us then, with a candor worthy of the ſubject, aſk ourſelves, whether it can be feared, that a majority of the Repreſentatives, each of whom will be choſen by ſix thouſand enlightened freemen, can betray their country?—Whether a majority of the Senate, each of whom will be choſen by the legiſlature of a free, ſovereign and independent ſtate, without any ſtipulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible diſtinctions of birth or rank, and who will be cloſely obſerved by the ſtate legiſlatures, can deſtroy our liberties, controuled as they are too by the houſe of repreſentatives? or whether a temporary, limited, executive officer, watched by the foederal Repreſentatives, by the Senate, by the ſtate legiſlatures, by his perſonal enemies among the people of his own ſtate, by the jealouſy of the people of rival ſtates, and by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom.There is one grand operation of the new foederal conſtitution, favorable to general liberty, which I do not remember to have heard from any of its friends. It is well known, that in moſt of the ſtates the members of their Houſes of Repreſentatives are choſen in equal numbers from each county, and in the eaſtern ſtates, in equal numbers from each town, without any regard to the number of taxable inhabitants, or the number of ſouls. Hence it is very frequent for a county, with ten thouſand ſouls, to ſend only the ſame number of members to the ſtate houſe of repreſentatives, as a county with two thouſand ſouls, by which each perſon in the leaſt populous county has five times as great a voice in electing repreſentatives, as his fellow citizen of the moſt populous county. This is clearly a departure from the principles of equal liberty, and ought to be altered in the ſeveral ſtates. I ſpeak the more plainly becauſe our ſtate conſtitution is free from that fault in the formation of our houſe of Aſſembly. Now the new conſtitution expreſsly declares, that the foederal Repreſentatives ſhall be in the proportion of one to every thirty thouſand, which accords with reaſon and the true principles of liberty. This houſe, therefore, ſo far as national matters go, will remedy the evil ſpoken of in the ſeveral ſtates, and is one more great ſtep towards the perfection of equal liberty and genuine republicaniſm in America. It muſt ſtrongly recommend the foederal conſtitution to the ſerious reflecting patriot, even though he may formerly have had doubts, and it will ſuggeſt to the ſeveral ſtates the propriety of reconſidering that point in their reſpective conſtitutions. Pennſylvania, though right in the principles on which her legiſlative elections are and will be held, is leſs ſafe from the exiſtence of this fault in the adjoining ſiſter ſtates of Virginia, Maryland, Jerſey, Delaware and New-York, and in others more remote.

Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to cloſe theſe obſervations by remarking, that there is no ſpirit of arrogance in the new foederal conſtitution. It addreſſes you with becoming modeſty, admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give it a trial; and when experience has taught its miſtakes, the people, whom it preſerves abſolutely all powerful, can reform and amend them. That I may be perfectly underſtood, I will acknowledge its acceptance by all the ſtates, without delay, is the ſecond wiſh of my heart. This firſt is, that our country may be virtuous and free.

AN AMERICAN CITIZEN.

SUBSTANCE OF AN ADDRESS TO A MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF PHILADELPHIA: DELIVERED, OCTOBER SIXTH, MDCCLXXXVII, BY THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON, ESQUIRE, ONE OF THE DELEGATES FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE LATE CONTINENTAL CONVENTION. Mr. CHAIRMAN and FELLOW CITIZENS,

HAVING received the honour of an appointment to repreſent you in the late convention, it is, perhaps, my duty to comply with the requeſt of many gentlemen, whoſe characters and judgments I ſincerely reſpect, and who have urged that this would be a proper occaſion to lay before you any information, which will ſerve to elucidate and explain the principles and arrangements of the conſtitution that has been ſubmitted to the conſideration of the United States. I confeſs that I am unprepared for ſo extenſive and ſo important a diſquiſition: but the inſidious attempts, which are clandeſtinely and induſtriouſly made to pervert and deſtroy the new plan, induce me the more readily to engage in its defence: and the impreſſions of four months conſtant attendance to the ſubject, have not been ſo eaſily effaced, as to leave me without an anſwer to the objections which have been raiſed.

It will be proper, however, before I enter into the refutation of the charges that are alledged, to mark the leading diſcrimination between the ſtate conſtitutions, and the conſtitution of the United States. When the people eſtabliſhed the powers of legiſlation under their ſeparate governments, they inveſted their repreſentatives with every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms reſerve: and therefore upon every queſtion, reſpecting the juriſdiction of the houſe of aſſembly, if the frame of government is ſilent, the juriſdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating foederal powers, another criterion was neceſſarily introduced: and the congreſſional authority is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the poſitive grant, expreſſed in the inſtrument of union. Hence, it is evident, that in the former caſe, every thing which is not reſerved, is given: but in the latter, the reverſe of the propoſition prevails, and every thing which is not given, is reſerved. This diſtinction being recognized, will furniſh an anſwer to thoſe who think the omiſſion of a bill of rights, a defect in the propoſed conſtitution: for it would have been ſuperfluous and abſurd, to have ſtipulated with a foederal body of our own creation, that we ſhould enjoy thoſe privileges, of which we are not diveſted either by the intention or the act that has brought that body into exiſtence. For inſtance, the liberty of the preſs, which has been a copious ſubject of declamation and oppoſition: what controul can proceed from the foederal government, to ſhackle or deſtroy that ſacred palladium of national freedom? If, indeed, a power ſimilar to that which has been granted for the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate literary publications, it would have been as neceſſary to ſtipulate that the liberty of the preſs ſhould be preſerved inviolate, as that the impoſt ſhould be general in its operation. With reſpect, likewiſe, to the particular diſtrict of ten miles, which is to be the ſeat of government, it will undoubtedly be proper to obſerve this ſalutary precaution, as there the legiſlative power will be veſted in the preſident, ſenate, and houſe of repreſentatives of the United States. But this could not be an object with the convention: for it muſt naturally depend upon a future compact; to which the citizens immediately intereſted, will, and ought to be parties: and there is no reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſo popular a privilege will in that caſe be neglected. In truth, then, the propoſed ſyſtem poſſeſſes no influence whatever upon the preſs; and it would have been merely nugatory, to have introduced a formal declaration upon the ſubject: nay, that very declaration might have been conſtrued to imply that ſome degree of power was given, ſince we undertook to define its extent.

Another objection that has been fabricated againſt the new conſtitution, is expreſſed in this diſingenuous form—"the trial by jury is aboliſhed in civil caſes." I muſt be excuſed, my fellow citizens, if, upon this point, I take advantage of my profeſſional experience, to detect the futility of the aſſertion. Let it be remembered, then, that the buſineſs of the foederal convention was not local, but general—not limited to the views and eſtabliſhments of a ſingle ſtate, but co-extenſive with the continent, and comprehending the views and eſtabliſhments of thirteen independant ſovereignties. When, therefore, this ſubject was in diſcuſſion, we were involved in difficulties, which preſſed on all ſides, and no precedent could be diſcovered to direct our courſe. The caſes open to a jury, differed in the different ſtates: it was therefore impracticable, on that ground, to have made a general rule. The want of uniformity would have rendered any reference to the practice of the ſtates idle and uſeleſs: and it could not, with any propriety, be ſaid, that "the trial by jury ſhall be as heretofore:" ſince there has never exiſted any foederal ſyſtem of juriſprudence, to which the declaration could relate. Beſides, it is not in all caſes that the trial by jury is adopted in civil queſtions: for cauſes depending in courts of admiralty, ſuch as relate to maritime captures, and ſuch as are agitated in the courts of equity, do not require the intervention of that tribunal. How, then, was the line of diſcrimination to be drawn? The convention found the taſk too difficult for them: and they left the buſineſs as it ſtands—in the fulleſt confidence, that no danger could poſſibly enſue, ſince the proceedings of the ſupreme court are to be regulated by the congreſs, which is a faithful repreſentation of the people: and the oppreſſion of government is effectually barred, by declaring that in all criminal caſes, the trial by jury ſhall be preſerved.

This conſtitution, it has been further urged, is of a pernicious tendency, becauſe it tolerates a ſtanding army in the time of peace. This has always been a popular topic of declamation: and yet I do not know a nation in the world, which has not found it neceſſary and uſeful to maintain the appearance of ſtrength in a ſeaſon of the moſt profound tranquility. Nor is it a novelty with us; for under the preſent articles of confederation, congreſs certainly poſſeſſes this reprobated power: and the exerciſe of it is proved at this moment by the cantonments along the banks of the Ohio. But what would be our national ſituation, where it otherwiſe? Every principle of policy muſt be ſubverted, and the government muſt declare war before they are prepared to carry it on. Whatever may be the provocation, however important the object in view, and however neceſſary diſpatch and ſecrecy may be, ſtill the declaration muſt precede the preparation, and the enemy will be informed of your intention, not only before you are equipped for an attack, but even before you are fortified for a defence. The conſequence is too obvious to require any further delineation; and no man, who regards the dignity and ſafety of his country, can deny the neceſſity of a military force, under the controul, and with the reſtrictions which the new conſtitution provides.

Perhaps there never was a charge made with leſs reaſon, than that which predicts the inſtitution of a baneful ariſtocracy in the foederal ſenate. This body branches into two characters, the one legiſlative, and the other executive. In its legiſlative character, it can effect no purpoſe without the co-operation of the houſe of repreſentatives: and in its executive character, it can accompliſh no object, without the concurrence of the preſident. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the ſenate can of itſelf perform: and ſuch dependence neceſſarily precludes every idea of influence and ſuperiority. But I will confeſs, that in the organization of this body, a compromiſe between contending intereſts is diſcernible: and when we reflect how various are the laws, commerce, habits, population, and extent of the confederated ſtates, this evidence of mutual conceſſion and accommodation ought rather to command a generous applauſe, than to excite jealouſy and reproach. For my part, my admiration can only be equalled by my aſtoniſhment, in beholding ſo perfect a ſyſtem formed from ſuch heterogeneous materials.

The next accuſation I ſhall conſider, is that which repreſents the foederal conſtitution as not only calculated, but deſignedly framed, to reduce the ſtate governments to mere corporations, and eventually to annihilate them. Thoſe who have employed the term corporation, upon this occaſion, are not perhaps aware of its extent. In common parlance, indeed, it is generally applied to petty aſſociations for the eaſe and conveniency of a few individuals; but in its enlarged ſenſe, it will comprehend the government of Pennſylvania, the exiſting union of the ſtates, and even this projected ſyſtem is nothing more than a formal act of incorporation. But upon what pretence can it be alledged that it was deſigned to annihilate the ſtate governments? For, I will undertake to prove that upon their exiſtence depends the exiſtence of the foederal plan. For this purpoſe, permit me to call your attention to the manner in which the preſident, ſenate, and houſe of repreſentatives, are propoſed to be appointed. The preſident is to be choſen by electors, nominated in ſuch manner as the legiſlature of each ſtate may direct; ſo that if there is no legiſlature, there can be no ſenate. The houſe of repreſentatives is to be compoſed of members choſen every ſecond year by the people of the ſeveral ſtates, and the electors in each ſtate ſhall have the qualifications requiſite to electors of the moſt numerous branch of the ſtate legiſlature—unleſs, therefore, there is a ſtate legiſlature, that qualification cannot be aſcertained, and the popular branch of the foederal conſtitution muſt likewiſe be extinct. From this view, then, it is evidently abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the annihilation of the ſeparate governments will reſult from their union; or, that, having that intention, the authors of the new ſyſtem would have bound their connection with ſuch indiſſoluble ties. Let me here advert to an arrangement highly advantageous; for you will perceive, without prejudice to the powers of the legiſlature in the election of ſenators, the people at large will acquire an additional privilege in returning members to the houſe of repreſentatives—whereas, by the preſent confederation, it is the legiſlature alone that appoints the delegates to congreſs.

The power of direct taxation has likewiſe been treated as an improper delegation to the foederal government; but when we conſider it as the duty of that body to provide for the national ſafety, to ſupport the dignity of the union, and to diſcharge the debts contracted upon the collective faith of the ſtates, for their common benefit, it muſt be acknowledged that thoſe, upon whom ſuch important obligations are impoſed, ought, in juſtice and in policy, to poſſeſs every means requiſite for a faithful performance of their truſt. But why ſhould we be alarmed with viſionary evils? I will venture to predict, that the great revenue of the United States muſt, and always will, be raiſed by impoſt; for, being at once leſs obnoxious, and more productive, the intereſt of the government will be beſt promoted by the accommodation of the people. Still, however, the object of direct taxation ſhould be within reach in all caſes of emergency; and there is no more reaſon to apprehend oppreſſion in the mode of collecting a revenue from this reſource, than in the form of an impoſt, which, by univerſal aſſent, is leſt to the authority of the foederal government. In either caſe, the force of civil conſtitutions will be adequate to the purpoſe; and the dread of military violence, which has been aſſiduouſly diſſeminated, muſt eventually prove the mere effuſion of a wild imagination, or a factious ſpirit. But the ſalutary conſequences that muſt flow from thus enabling the government to relieve and ſupport the credit of the union, will afford another anſwer to the objections upon this ground. The ſtate of Pennſylvania, particularly, which has encumbered itſelf with the aſſumption of a great proportion of the public debt, will derive conſiderable relief and advantage; for, as it was the imbecility of the preſent confederation, which gave riſe to the funding law, that law muſt naturally expire, when a complete and energetic foederal ſyſtem ſhall be ſubſtituted—the ſtate will then be diſcharged from an extraordinary burden, and the national creditor will find it to be his intereſt to return to his original ſecurity.

After all, my fellow-citizens, it is neither extraordinary nor unexpected, that the conſtitution offered to your conſideration, ſhould meet with oppoſition. It is the nature of man to purſue his own intereſt, in preference to the public good; and I do not mean to make any perſonal reflection, when I add, that it is the intereſt of a very numerous, powerful, and reſpectable body, to counteract and deſtroy the excellent work produced by the late convention. All the officers of government, and all the appointments for the adminiſtration of juſtice and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred from the individual to the aggregate ſovereignty of the ſtates, will neceſſarily turn the ſtream of influence and emolument into a new channel. Every perſon, therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy a place of profit under the preſent eſtabliſhment, will object to the propoſed innovation? not, in truth, becauſe it is injurious to the liberties of his country, but becauſe it effects his ſchemes of wealth and conſequence. I will confeſs, indeed, that I am not a blind admirer of this plan of government, and that there are ſome parts of it, which, if my wiſh had prevailed, would certainly have been altered. But, when I reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every man (and the obſervation applies likewiſe to every ſtate) has an equal pretenſion to aſſert his own, I am ſatisfied that any thing nearer to perfection could not have been accompliſhed. If there are errors, it ſhould be remembered, that the ſeeds of reformation are ſown in the work itſelf, and the concurrence of two thirds of the congreſs may at any time introduce alterations and amendments. Regarding it, then, in every point of view, with a candid and diſintereſted mind, I am bold to aſſert, that it is the BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS EVER BEEN OFFERED TO THE WORLD.The candid Reader will ſuppoſe Mr. WILSON here means, that it is the beſt form of foederal government, which has ever been offered to the world—and it is ſurely true that the foederal conſtitution, conſidered in due connexion with the ſtate conſtitutions, is the beſt form of government that has ever been communicated to mankind.

FINIS.