HOW long a constitution, under which we enjoy equal rights, may endure, it is not for short-sighted mortals to predict. In the annals of the world there are few instances, where a direct attack has been made by any part of the citizens of a free state, against the liberty of the rest. It has ever been the practice of those, who meditated its destruction, to avert suspicion from themselves, by warning the people of danger from others. Thus it is that a people are sometimes precipi­tated into that state of anarchy and confusion, which is most favourable to insidious designs.

Although the frequent prostitution of professions renders it almost disgraceful to use them, I must assure you, that from the moment I began seriously to reflect, your happiness has been dear to my heart. At the hazard of my peace and for­tune, without the least hope of reward, and with the certain prospect of provoking the malice of weak and wicked minds, I have for many years devoted my attention to the public con­cerns. On this head however I should have maintained a becoming silence, had not certain ungenerous remarks been thrown out in a place where it was impossible for me, in a pro­per manner, to expose them. Besides these there is a recent publication, in which my real name has been used with an unwarrantable freedom; but this I consider as the effusion of habitual insolence, not meriting a more particular notice. A sufficient answer may be collected from the following remarks.

When a disagreement takes place between the two branches of the legislature, on a question involving with it other ques­tions of still greater moment, every freeman in the communi­ty is concerned in its decision. The freedom of the press has been indirectly attacked by men who should guard it with the [Page 4] fondest care. It has been repeatedly asserted, that the officers of government have exerted their influence, acquired through public money, in opposing the wishes of the people, and that therefore they have merited punishment from the representatives of the people. An assertion repeatedly made is generally the result of reflection. The purpose of this is to wound the feel­ings of some, restrain others by their fears, and bind the rest by their interests. The spirit of a genuine republican must revolt at the idea. What? Shall he, who in some respects, is constituted the guardian of your rights, be himself debarred the common right of speaking his opinions? Does his situation separate his interests from those of the people, or render him less capable than the most illiterate demagogue of deciding on questions of policy?

Thus far is premised to remove unreasonable prejudice. The author has been charged with adhering to the senate, courting their favour, and reposing a faith in their decisions. The truth is, on the maturest deliberation, he thinks them justifiable in rejecting the bill for an emission of paper, and it is partly his intention to adduce some arguments in their vindication.

When a man coolly and deliberately acts against his interest, there is a presumption, that he conceives himself in the right. It cannot escape your penetration, that if a servant of the peo­ple were capable of sacrificing on the altar of ambition his opinion, his conscience and his duty, he would, with every appearance of the most fervent zeal, espouse the cause of those who might most effectually requite his endeavours.

The senate having rejected the proposed plan of an emission upon loan, the house of delegates declines all overtures of a conference, and determines to close the session without making any provision for the necessary supplies. In an address to the people they state the disagreement, and urge many arguments in support of their own system. They tell them an appeal is made by both branches of the legislature, that the opinion of the people only can decide, and that both branches will be equally bound by instructions. The senate makes no direct address; but as they conceive their fellow-citizens entitled to know the principles of their conduct, the messages respecting the money bill are published by their direction. In one of these is a declaration, that they make no appeal; and they sug­gest the inconveniencies which they apprehend may flow from the precedent. The house of delegates adjourns to the 20th of March, and the senate to the 20th of April.

[Page 5]This brief narrative suggests a variety of points, a thorough discussion whereof is absolutely necessary, before you can pru­dently take any step on this peculiar great occasion.

In the first place it is proper to decide, whether an appeal is made by both branches, and your instructions requested by each. Whatever might possibly be implied from the senate's first message, their subsequent express declaration, published at the same time, must render void that implication. This construction is conformable to a known maxim of law and com­mon sense—Expressum facit cessare tacitum; that is, accord­ing to a liberal translation, positive words set aside that which without them would be implied. I conceive, that nothing can be fairly construed into an appeal to the people, except an ad­dress soliciting their instructions in the most plain unequivocal terms.

But it is insisted by a crowd of writers, that although the senate make no direct application, if the people shall think proper to instruct, the senate is constitutionally bound to obey.

This second point must be determined on a view of the constitution and the declaration of rights. To me this point also is abundantly clear, from the single consideration, that the constitution creates two distinct branches only; and that nei­ther that nor the declaration any where intimates, that the people at large are immediately a part of the legislature. Had the respectable framers intended, that whenever a bill proposed by one is rejected by the other, the people may afterwards di­rect it to be passed into a law, they would have said so in plain positive terms; but then they would have rendered of no avail the institution of the two branches. The senate would have been calculated for little more than to produce delays, and to afford occasions for inflaming the passions, and disturbing the public quiet. There would not have been two distinct regu­lar branches to decide, but two distinct branches to propose. A bill proposed by either would be a law, not being dissented to by the other, or, in case of a dissent, the people would con­stitute a third or a single branch occasionally. No business would be settled in the appointed legislature, unless the two branches agreed. Had the framers entertained such ideas, they would unquestionably have prescribed the manner of collecting the peoples decision.

I believe there never existed a government, in which, not­withstanding every freeman had a suffrage in framing laws, the question was decided by a majority of single voices. In the purest democracies, the people have voted by classes, tribes or [Page 6] companies, into which they were distributed, agreeably to some rational principle. I pretend to no great historical re­searches. I conceive that many ages have elapsed since any civilized nation, state, or even single independent city, has placed the power of legislation in the people at large; and I think, that no virtuous citizen, who is acquainted with the history of ancient democracies, would wish this power amongst us to reside constantly in the people. In abstract theory, such a legislation appears consonant to their natural rights; but the shocking inconveniencies attendant on the mode, have long since occasioned mankind to renounce it. It was calcu­lated only for small cities in their beginnings; and he that wishes for it in a state of equal extent and population to ours, must either be a political madman, or, under the convenient cloak of public good, he veils the most dark and traitorous intent.

Let us examine the true import of the fourth article of the declaration of rights; for on that article, if on any, is founded the doctrine that both branches of the legislature are bound to obey the instructions of the people, and that by so doing, they act agreeably to the constitution. The article speaks so plain a language it will be difficult for any exposition to render it more intelligible:

‘That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and as such accountable for their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty mani­festly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffec­tual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or establish a new government; the doctrine of non-resist­ance against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, sla­vish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.’

If the period has actually arrived, when it is necessary for the people to interpose, they should act in a way very different from that of commanding the senate's assent to a bill, which, on the maturest deliberation, they have unanimously rejected. Such an interference of the people might only prevent, for a season, that, which without many subsequent interferences, would be likely to take place; and the danger threatened from the corruption of their trustees would probably continually in­crease. The truth is, that from the obvious meaning of the fourth article, and upon every sound principle of government, the interference of the people is a resumption of all delegated powers; the whole frame is ipso facto dissolved; and it becomes [Page 7] their business either to reform its errors and abuses, and to de­clare it again in force, or to adopt an entire new system. If experience hath evinced two distinct legislative branches to be inconvenient, they will probably abolish that which is not of their immediate appointment. But to say, that the senate shall still subsist, and enjoy their powers and privileges uninterrupted, and that notwithstanding they shall be obliged to give their assent, which, after a full interchange of sentiment with the delegates, they have unanimously declined, seems uttering ma­nifest contradictions to be saying, that a thing is so, and is not so, in the same sentence.

This fourth article was unnecessary, as indeed are many others. It affords a striking lesson to legislators never to use sentences or words without necessity or meaning. It was ne­ver surely foreseen, that an article asserting only a natural right, could by any possibility be construed into a positive institution. I have on many occasions lamented, that the convention in composing a declaration did not content themselves with re­cognising generally the law, and laying down certain maxims of government for the conduct of future legislatures. Instead of that they have thrown together natural rights, principles of government, and particular provisions of the common law. Had this and the first article been omitted, there would have been no sentence or word in the whole declaration or the form of government, countenancing the doctrine in question; and yet the rights of the people would have been precisely as they are. With respect to the fifth article, which speaks of the people's right to participate in the legislature, that article is manifestly opposed to the doctrine; because it explains the right into a right of immediate representation, and frequent elections.

When the happiness of the people, the true end of all soci­ety and government, cannot be preserved on account of some original fault in the constitution, or when the trustees betray their sacred charge, and the people are roused by a sense of in­juries no longer to be borne, the indelible rights of nature authorise them to enforce that redress to which all constitution­al means are incom [...]nt. This is the principle of the Eng­lish revolution in 1008. This is the principle of the revo­lution in America, which every good man still flatters himself will be deemed the most important era in the history of the world. It would be slavish to imagine, that without the first and fourth articles, or even with one directly repugnant, the people might not annul a compact intended for their good, [Page 8] when experience evinces the framers of that compact to have been mistaken; or that a mode of government which suited its framers, might not be changed by their posterity.

But whether a right be inherent in the people, and whether this be a proper occasion for using it, are two distinct questions. Has ten years experience demonstrated the senate to be either a dangerous or useless body? Has the rejection of the paper system perverted the ends of its appointment, or exposed your liberties to danger? The warmest advocates for the measure surely will not maintain the affirmative of these questions to be a self-evident position. Let them remember, that the attempt to introduce this very scheme miscarried two years successively, and yet the people murmured not. In the third year the house of delegates were induced to adopt it. The senate unani­mously dissented. The people still made no complaints. In­deed, had the conduct of the senate excited their displeasure, it might have been easily manifested in the late election. In this election the gentlemen most distinguished for opposition to paper, were honoured with almost every suffrage. It will be strange indeed, if you can now be persuaded, that the new senate has perverted the ends of government by declining an expedient rejected by the old, and by two successive houses of delegates.

The mode of appointing your senate is esteemed by wise men the most admirable institution in all the United States▪ and I make no doubt, that in Europe it has done honour to American genius. The senate of Maryland has been conti­nually acquiring the esteem and confidence of the people, whilst other senates have fallen in repute. The difference arises from the different modes of election. It is not a man's popularity in a single county or district, it is his general good character, and his real dignity and importance, that confer on him this honour. The suffrage of the electors is a tribute paid to worth. The arts of intrigue, and even the magic powers of eloquence, should these be essayed, will probably be found unavailing.

In spite of these circumstances attempts are made to excite your suspicions of the senate. You are told, that in this select body prevails a baneful aristocratic spirit. Enemy as I am to arbitrary sway of every kind, I was at first startled at the sug­gestion. But as this was a weighty charge, I thought some proof should be required superior to the bare assertion of any man. An aristocracy is properly when the sovereign power of a state resides in a permanent body of men distinct from the peo­ple. At present the senate is not that permanent body; be­cause [Page 9] it is appointed once in five years, and the supreme power resides not in it to so great an extent as in the house of dele­gates. Neither of them alone can pass a law. If an aristocracy be the government of a few, uncontroled and unchecked by any other power, an aristocratic spirit must mean a disposition to bring about such a government. In what instance has even a single senator evinced an inclination to confine the powers of legislation to the senate, or to change that branch into a per­manent hereditary body. I now ask, whether the address of your delegates be not an attempt to have their own proposition passed into a law, without the consent of the senate. I be­seech you to reflect soberly, whether this conduct of the dele­gates does not tend indirectly to confer on them alone the power of making laws.

I am thoroughly, and upon the best grounds, persuaded, that no man in the senate conceives himself at liberty to disregard the wants, wishes, or sentiments of the people. He is per­fectly apprized, that the institution was not intended to cloathe individuals with honour merely for their own gratification; but, like every other part of the constitution, to consult the general good. There may be a variety of instances where this general good is promoted by gratifying the inclination of the people. But is there a man so lost to common sense as not to foresee, that if the people shall take upon themselves to decide nice questions of policy by a majority of voices, they may frequently be wrought upon to choose things which will injure them the most. I repeat that their will, provided they persist long enough to pursue effectual measures, must stand for a law. But on what ground can a man who breathes the true spirit of patriotism, persuade them to exercise their will on the pre­sent occasion? Can he seriously believe them better qualified than the senate to decide on the expediency of an emission? It is not sufficient to say, they best know their own wants; be­cause that is only a begging of the question, which is, whe­ther an emission would supply those wants. Behold the glar­ing monstrous absurdity. The people do not immediately choose the senate. They appoint their most intelligent men to choose for them; and their electors make the most diligent inquiry into every corner of the state. Well, the senate, after all, is ignorant of the true interests of the state; and the ge­neral body of the people, from which they were selected, is to supply their wants, and enlighten their understandings.

If any man says the senate are interested, or otherwise cor­rupt, let us have an opportunity to decide on his testimony; for [Page 10] confident assertions, and noisy declamation, will, I trust, at last, stand for nought.

It may be said the comparison is not proper between the people and the senate; that the people are called to decide be­tween their immediate representatives and the senate, on a question, the right decision of which is essential to your hap­piness; and that, until this decision, all operations of the legis­lature will be suspended. In the same way might any other rejected bill be brought before the people. It is indeed natu­ral for every projector to esteem his own system of the last im­portance. In a contest between the two branches, to be de­termined in the proposed manner, is it at all probable, that the question will come fairly before the people? The number of delegates exceeds that of the senate in a ratio of five for one. This circumstance could not fail to operate, if even the arts of popularity were laid aside, the inhabitants of each county assembled, the merits fairly discussed, and instructions signed only at that, or a subsequent meeting of the same kind. The delegates being far more intimately connected with their con­stituents, it must be a plain question indeed, which the people will decide in favour of the senate. Would to Heaven my countrymen could see the business in a true light. Their re­presentatives appeal to them for instructions—So far I should have no objection, if their representatives were themselves un­determined. But these instructions are to govern the senate, and at the same time to be dictated by the delegates. In this kind of service the ^* people are not volunteers, and they feel not enough to stimulate them to a voluntary exertion. Can the interposition of the people thus obtained, be termed an interference, dictated by a sense of wrongs, a defence of na­tural rights, and a promotion of the true ends of government? Can a man wish the free unbiassed sentiments of the people to prevail, when he exerts every nerve to obtain their decision before each side of the question can be fairly examined? A draught of instructions is circulated before the close of the session. Its preamble asserts the appeal of the senate, and the people are pressed to subscribe before they can possibly examine the allegation, or hear the senate's reasons.

Is this such a mode as naturally suggested itself to men anxi­ous in the pursuit of truth? Were these instructions in other respects constitutional, they would be void on one certain [Page 11] ground. Had the senate, being at a loss how to decide, really appealed to the people, instructions would be strictly proper; but the personal influence of any member or either branch, would even in that case have been extremely improper.

Were I an advocate for the principle, I should be puzzled respecting the true manner of communicating the sense of the people. Are instructions to be signed only at public meet­ings? Is there to be one meeting only? Is that meeting to take place at each county court-house, or in each hundred? Is one general form to be pursued? Or may each man choose his own form? By whom are the several papers to be collected in each county or district? With whom shall they all be lodged? What shall be deemed a sufficient authentication? On a sug­gestion of forgery, how shall the fact be ascertained, or the crime punished? A thousand such questions may be asked, and the ingenuity of many gentlemen might be sufficient to pre­scribe suitable provisions. But as to these questions no answer is found in the constitution, the conclusion is obvious, that its framers had no idea of the thing, consistent with the regu­lar administration of the government by them devised. I re­peat, that whenever the great body of the people shall declare their will (in whatever way it be done) this declaration, agree­ably to the fourth article of the declaration, and the unaliena­ble rights of nature, ought to be law; but then the whole frame of the government is either dissolved or suspended. I mean not, that any act of violence committed by only a part, and obstructing the exercise of a constitutional authority, would amount to this dissolution or suspension. I mean such an in­terference as is mentioned in that article. I contend that, ac­cording to the plain import of the words, the authors had not in contemplation an interference, without a total dissolution or a suspension, until it could be reformed, and again declared in force.

Had the constitution made express provision, and prescribed the manner in which instructions should be given, so as to bind both branches of the legislature, the people ought never­theless to be extremely sparing in the exercise. Were the cor­rupt motives of the senate apparent; if by their conduct your liberties were manifestly endangered; if proving false to their trust, they sacrificed the pubic good to their own private views—it would be proper to teach them their duty, and at the same time to address them in the terms of a severe repri­mand. And further, as the people are to exercise the right, the people only should determine on the occasion. I repeat [Page 12] again and again, that with or without a constitutional provisi­on, the people ought unquestionably to interfere on occasions like these. The difference between me and my adversaries is, whether an interference will not abolish or suspend the consti­tutional legislature; and whether this be a proper season for an interference. The doctrines imputed to me by scribblers, I detest as much as I do all insolence, domineering, sedition, ma­lice and calumny.

I should imagine any prudent, cautious, disinterested citi­zen, who has a valuable stake in the community, whose wel­fare is intimately connected with the public prosperity, who wishes no change in a government under which none hold superior rights, who would hazard all, and could gain nothing by a new revolution—I should imagine that such a man, let his opinion respecting an emission be what it may, will be in­duced by no solicitation to subscribe. The point was simply, whether bills of credit should be emitted on loan. The house of delegates was divided. A member whose reputation is not limited to these states, who, sometime ago, possessed your al­most unbounded confidence, and to whom nothing had since been imputed, this gentleman, with about two fifths of the house, was stedfastly opposed to the plan. The senate were unanimous. But what again is the senate? It is a select body of men of enlarged minds, and unblemished characters, hav­ing no interest whatever distinct from yours, bearing with you a full proportion of burthens, and out of the senate-house at their own homes, to all intents and purposes, composing a part of the people. If these fifteen men can harbour a design of erecting an arbitrary power on the ruins of the constitution, of enjoying their dignities for life, and bequeathing them to their issue, they have conceived ideas of which I did not think the brain of man susceptible. Suppose the last convention had conferred the whole legislative authority on the senate, ap­pointed fifteen men senators for life, and rendered the office hereditary. Is it possible such an odious establishment could have subsisted even unto this day. No senator under the pre­sent form can meditate an extension of his authority, and no rational being, on a moment's reflection, can retain his suspi­cions, unless jealousy of your trustees be like the jealousy of love, excited without cause, and subsisting on idle fancies. If a senator were really capable of such designs, he would become a much fitter object of derision, than of any well grounded apprehension. Happy will it be for you, my countrymen, if that constitution which perhaps owes its existence, and has [Page 13] done honour to men, who no longer view it with a parent's eye, shall withstand this powerful attack. Oh! listen to a man who defies the tongue of envy and detraction to fix one improper motive for this address, who has long been a faithful guardian to that constitution, and feels for it more than a fa­ther's love. Be assured, if it must receive a deadly wound, the fatal blow will be dealt by yourselves, or your immediate representatives. Far from me be the wish of narrowing the powers of the popular branch of the legislature. The defect of human policy, arising from human nature, is such, that in instituting the frame of a government, it is impossible to guard against dangers on one side, without being exposed on another. Were every thing submitted to my discretion, I de­clare solemnly I would not abridge the established power of your delegates. my only wish and aim is to protect that sacred palladium of your rights, which you have sworn to defend, against all open and secret combinations. Permit not either branch, by any method, to exercise the office of both. The very use and intent of one is to check any unadvised hasty pro­ceedings, or intemperate sallies of the other more numerous assembly. Think not, that a prediliction for the former has blinded my understanding. I further declare, that if it were left to me to abolish one or the other, I would by all means preserve the house of delegates. There is nothing more hate­ful to my soul than the idea of a proud, worthless, tyrannical order of nobility, like the senate of Venice. But, although this government may hereafter possibly degenerate into an ar­bitrary one, there is no reason to dread, that it will become an aristocracy erected by the senate.

If it be the meaning of the fourth article, that the peo­ple shall act as an umpire, wherefore is it, that in every in­stance of a dissent the bill is not laid before them? To this may be said, they are called upon only with respect to bills of the last importance. The constitution however creates no distinction. The constitution contains no provision in any case.

An idea has been started, that both branches are to be con­sidered as agents of the people, and the constitution a letter of instructions; that as it was impossible for the principal to foresee the necessity of an emission at this time, he may now give additional instructions. There is a disposition in mankind to be imposed on by similitudes. They captivate the imagina­tion, and are much better received than solid argument. Be­hold another similitude.—

[Page 14]There are fifty persons, the far greater part having no know­ledge or experience in trade, who agree to join st [...], and commence merchants. In a little time they find it extremely inconvenient for so large a company to transact their own af­fairs. They enter into articles to be binding until at two se­veral meetings of the company a majority shall vote for dissolv­ing the partnership. By the principal clause in the indenture, the business for a limited time is committed to the manage­ment of only two, without any proviso, that if these two should differ respecting a proposition made by either, the matter shall be referred to the company. One of them, a fine, bold, [...] the ordinary profits of a slow [...], and [...] only in capital strokes, proposes [...] a considerable part of the stock in a venture to [...] object is to import rice for supplying the want of Indian corn, the apprehension of a short crop having suggested the thought. The other merchant, a cautious, calculating man, considers it as a mere chimera. The first thereupon calls a meeting of the company, produces his calculations, displays his brilliant prospects, and actually brings over a ma­jority. His associate continues fixed. His judgment is not convinced, and he adheres to his opinion. Should the law authorise the majority, notwithstanding their agreement, to displace their agents, and should they take the management into their own hands, they are again in the situation which induced them to choose managers. Again they perceive the necessity of appointing; and it is not improbable, that they will trust the whole concern to him who has impressed an high opinion of his talents.

The meaning of this allegory is to guard you against sophis­try.

Let us trace the consequences of the doctrine, that, not­withstanding the express provisions of the constitution, the people, without violating or suspending, may control a dele­gated power. If it be good with regard to the legislature, it must likewise be good with respect to the executive and judiciary.

A citizen levies constructive war against the state. He is thereon indicted in the general court, arraigned, takes his trial, and is found guilty by the unanimous suffrage of twelve men, the petit jury. This man is a favourite of the people. His friends make strenuous exertions, and a great majority of the people are induced to sign a declaration of their will, and an order, that he be discharged. There is no doubt the prisoner will escape punishment, provided the people shall enforce their [Page 15] mandate. But will any man pretend, that, it authorises the judge legally and constitutionally to pronounce the discharge? And yet the court may be considered the agent of the people, deriving authority like every other department of government, immediately or ultimately from the people.

Suppose now the address to succeed, and in ten countries a greater number to have signed the instructions for an emission, than have either signed against it, or declined signing at all ^*. The senate taking the constitution for their guide, and finding it no where expressed, that in any case they shall be bound to pass laws against their own opinion, still viewing the system as injurious to our affairs, esteeming it their inviolable duty to preserve the constitution unimpaired, and thinking too, that the free unbiassed opinion has not been obtained, will most probably continue firm in rejecting the bill. The house of delegates will then most probably decline for a season all further intercourse. The people then, or a part of them in behalf of the rest, mistaking the firmness of virtue for an obstinate con­tempt of their rights, will perhaps repair to the capital, and in thunder pronounce their will. If then the senate, still holding themselves bound by superior obligations, and manifesting a zeal for their country's permanent happiness, shall disdain to assent to that which their judgments disapprove, and thereby establish a precedent, leaving to their successors little more than a name, and shall either instantly adjourn, or relinquish their seats, this posture of affairs will, in all human probability, be construed a dissolution of government. Immediately may en­sue scenes, the bare contemplation of which must touch the stuotest heart, not interested to produce them. But passing over these scenes of discord, riot, violence, and perhaps blood­shed, let us calmly consider what best can posssibly happen. On a resignation of the senate, provided such a measure would not be construed void on the principle of duresse, there can be no senate under the present form until the year 1791. In such a case the house of delegates may do one of two things. They may proceed, on the pretext of necessity, to exercise alone the powers of legislation, or they may address their constituents [Page 16] to elect a convention. The latter being more safe and decent, will probably be adopted. Alas, my beloved countrymen, we shall be fortunate indeed, if the convention will recognise the present constitution, reforming only a few errors and abuses, and rendering it from this convulsion more stable than before, or if a new constitution from its ashes shall arise superior to the present! The members of a convention will be composed principally of the present delegates, irritated and inflamed as they are against the senate.

You will be told, that this is an attempt, by alarming your fears, to intimidate you from doing that which is right. To him who attentively, and with a proper frame of mind, consi­ders the conduct and address of your delegates, the messages of the senate and the aforegoing remarks, the condition of our affairs will appear critical and alarming. If I know my own heart, although I were thoroughly convinced, that bills of cre­dit would produce the promised effects, I would stedfastly set my face against this mode of effecting the plan. Nothing short of a conviction, that on the scheme depended your safety and happiness, would reconcile me to the idea. At the same time were I certain that the people, left to themselves, would feel the want of an emission, and without it could not be con­tent, I would renounce my opinion, and reprobate the man who could hold out against the free voice of the people, his masters.

When I consider, that independent of impelling the people, like a blind machine, to break down the fixed barriers of the constitution, the scheme for an emission is pregnant with a thousand ills, I regret the poor extent of my powers. I wish for immediate inspiration. When indeed alone, and in my study, I contemplate on all these things, my whole frame be­comes agitated and convulsed. I feel as it were the resistless impulse of an invisible agent.

I PROCEED now to offer some remarks on the nature of the plan.—After the messages of the senate, and another re­cent publication, it is perhaps unnecessary to advance any thing further on bills of credit. There are however some things which either escaped that honourable body, and the ingenious Commentator on that great and good man Mr. Necker, or did not strike them so forcibly as they do me. The conduct of the advocates for an emission, in the first instance, affords a pre­sumption [Page 17] that the paper will depreciate. Not a man who sub­scribes instructions, at the same time obliges himself to receive it as specie. If he did, I would then remind him of the red money, founded on real public property to an amount far supe­rior to the sum emitted, on private subscriptions to four times that amount, on a considerable tax payable in the bills, on the solemn association of a great part of the people, and on their authority exercised in the appointment of committees. It came out too at a time when the extreme scarcity of a medium was universally acknowledged. It is supposed, that the critical pe­riod of that emission constitutes a material difference between the red money and the emission now proposed. With respect to the doubtful issue of the war, you well remember, that red mo­ney funds, every particle of your property, your liberty, and perhaps your lives, depended on the same event. The red mo­ney was, besides, the only immediate resource left to this state for feeding the army.

The history of this money might convince you, that the sea­son for bills of credit is past. There was a time, when, in all respects, they were equal to cash. But we ought rather to be surprised at the circumstance, than from it to expect they will be so again.

Consider, I beseech you, the true nature of bills of credit. They are promissory notes, for sums of money payable at a distant day. What then shall give them value equal to so ma­ny sums of ready money? A kind of popular illusion, an opini­on universally, or very generally, prevailing, that they will answer all the purposes of specie, will give them this value as effectually as if there were a sum of money deposited in places convenient to every person for exchanging on demand. Under such an opinion, no man would hesitate to take them from another.

This opinion, having existed before the war, was unfortu­nately lost by the continental bills. Every attempt to restore it has miscarried. I will not say, that no man possesses a faith in bills of credit; but I remark, that a very great part of the people do not. There exists not then this popular illusion, or opinion. It is indeed extraordinary to contend that it does, when so many reprobate the very name of paper money.

Opinion is the support of almost every species of legal au­thority. When the people in a county believe, that the sheriff has power to do every act enjoined, this belief confers the power in reality. When they want this belief, he is no more than a common man. In like manner, bills of credit not be­ing [Page 18] from their nature ready cash, if the people do not think them so, there is nothing which can make them so.

The loudest clamours for an emission afford no proof of the opinion's existence. That clamour may be raised, because men conceive that an emission would diminish the tax; be­cause debtors may entertain the idea either of discharging their debts with facility, or of staying the importunity of their cre­ditors; because the more paper is scattered abroad, the better chance have public debtors of every kind; because there are abundant subjects of speculation, which render it profitable to borrow paper at par, and exchange it at discount; because thoughtless improvident men are ever prone to prefer present ease to the greatest distant good.

The sticklers for paper appeal to the recent experience of sister states. A person from Philadelphia has lately assured the inhabitants of this city, that in Philadelphia he generally agrees to take half cash, half paper, and contrives pretty well to get rid of the paper. The stipulation of half and half de­monstrates a difference, which indeed the house of delegates discovered to be ten per cent. I flatter myself I shall explain why it maintains so high a value, without answering the pur­pose of its emission.

In Pennsylvania the sum emitted is moderate. It is receiv­able by the public in so many ways, that there is a continual demand, and numerous competitors. It changes from its ori­ginal nature of promissory notes, becomes an article of mer­chandise, and its value depends on principles similar to those of merchandise in general. Attend to every circumstance. It is the doctrine of some men who pretend to reason on princi­ple, that if there he a demand, or several demands, exceeding the amount of an emission, the value of the paper must be equal to that of specie, and a dollar of the one will be no bet­ter than a dollar of the other. Here is plain proof to the con­trary, and unerring principle might have convinced them without the experiment.

So long as paper will not answer every purpose of specie, so long will a silver dollar be worth more than a paper dollar, redeemable at a distant day. In Pennsylvania, paper can pay all taxes and duties. A man owes taxes, and has nothing but specie; there is no inducement for him to exchange it, unless for so doing he be allowed a premium. As, however, there are numbers in the same situation, he cannot make his own terms. Hence it is, that he is obliged to give £.90 in coin for £.100 in paper. At this price have the demands fixed [Page 19] the paper. There is a general demand, calling for a greater sum than is in the hands of the people; and, besides this, there are several other demands. Superadded to this consideration, almost the whole of each demand centers in Philadelphia, and very little of the paper finds its way out of the city. Advert now to the main reason assigned for issuing paper.—It is to increase, throughout the state, the circulating medium. No man in Philadelphia pretends to assert, that the circulating me­dium is at all increased by the emission of the bills of credit, or promissory notes. The paper only constitutes an additional article of merchandise, which indeed is sometimes bartered for other commodities. Shopkeepers advertise, they will take paper as specie for their commodities. This they may well do, for the sake of a more rapid sale, and from having imperceptibly raised their prices. They know the amount of the emission, of the ta [...]s, and of the duties; and the demand created by the uses, cannot fail to enable them to dispose of their paper at a discount, for which their amends a [...] [...]ple.

Now for the operation and effect.—The people can pay any given tax with greater facility; but then this tax being so much the less productive, there is a necessity for supplying the defect by additional taxes. The people in [...] therefore are not benefited by the facility, and those obliged to pay spe­cie, are more burthened than the rest. The benefit is con­fined to a class, for whose benefit the government was under no obligation to devise systems and plans.

I have that skill in paper (and I pretend to no more than is possessed by a thousand others) that, let we know the amount, funds, period of redemption, uses and demands, and, from sure principles, I can calculate pretty nearly the value at which it will be at different stages. If the sum, not very large, be redeemable within ten years, without having created uses and demands, I then calculate the value of a [...] of hand, paya­ble at the end of ten years, without interest. Suppose the use of money for one year to be worth twelve per cent. and no doubts entertained of the redemption, £.100 will be then worth about £.45.

If there be any immediate uses, the value then depends on them. The period of redemption, and the funds, are out of the question. They become strictly an article of merchandise. Are matters on such a footing, that the holders of the paper shall seek purchasers, or those wanting paper shall seek sellers? On this question much depends. In Philadelphia the holders advertise, and the uses immediately bring them purchasers.

[Page 20]Let us examine the plan of our delegates.—£.250,000 to be emitted on loan, and, as I apprehend, £ 100,000 to be laid out in purchases of one kind or another.

I take it as a settled point, I reason not with the man who denies it, that, in this state at least, opinion does not place paper on a footing with specie. The values at which the emissions of 1780 have been held since the peace are notori­ous, and yet many times the amount are receivable by the treasurer as specie. The value of the projected paper must depend on the funds, and a confidence that it will be redeemed, or on immediate uses. I have fully explained the first princi­ple. There remains something to be said on the second. It is not sufficient that a demand call for the whole of an article— the demand must be general. If one person only wants the article, and the quantity he wants exceeds the whole quantity in the state, which is in the hands of one hundred persons, it is evident that he has them at his mercy. If only one person has an article, wanted by one hundred, the quantity, provided it be not very great, is not of much moment. He has them at his mercy, until they are fully supplied, and then his com­modity becomes a drug. But if there be many buyers and many sellers, and the former have more than is wanted by the latter, it is a drug in the beginning.

For the proposed paper of Maryland there is proposed only one general demand, and that is to be created by taxes of the present year. Suppose their amount £.150,000, (which by the bye is much greater than can or ought to be laid) this de­mand will not place the holders of paper in the eligible situa­tion of being sought by the purchasers. The demand owing to duties is small, and confined to the men best acquainted with the mystery of buying and selling. Arrears of taxes in­deed, amount pretty high; but a great part is due from col­lectors, and the residue is by no means apportioned amongst the people. It is chiefly due by men of large unproductive estates. With respect to arrearages, if paper be equal to spe­cie, they will remain due after an emission, except only from those who shall borrow. These, from the nature of the plan, must be few. In short, the arrears will constitute only a par­ticular demand, and this will be very small, until a depreciation shall ensue.

Upon the whole, therefore, I do not say, that I apprehend a very considerable appreciation. I assert positively, that the pa­per, in the course of six months after an emission, would depre­ciate more than thirty-three and one third per cent. and, were [Page 21] my [...] depending on the truth of my prediction, I should feel no more concern than if it depended on the old Chesapeake's keeping to its channel.

It was reported during the session, that the paper at New-York was even by brokers exchanged at two and a half. That brokers could make an advantage demonstrates, that suspicions were entertained, or, in a place abounding with cash, there could be no necessity for applying to them. I have heard the following account of that emission: That parties having run high, there was a kind of compromise. In consideration of the emission's not exceeding a certain sum, the enemies of the scheme agreed to give it support; and attempts to depreciate it were deemed infamous. The premium to brokers was deemed allowable, as a reasonable satisfaction for their trouble. I again go back to the history of red money. For a short season that also was even here said to pass as specie; that is, in the few payments and purchases made with it in the begin­ning, there was no actual discount. But, so soon as without infamy a man might distinguish, you may remember how ra­pid the depreciation. Attend to that emission on another ac­count.—It was made receivable at par for all taxes. Wheat and tobacco was also receivable, the former at seven and six­pence, when the actual value was about five shillings. This measure soon fixed the value of red money at two for one, when, according to the aforesaid principle of the paper advo­cates, a dollar of it ought to have been worth five shillings. If men will not listen to experience, nor determine upon plain evident principles, it is an error to call them rational animals. With respect however to the emission of New-York, the ex­periment is not complete. We know not its exact circum­stances. Too little time has elapsed, to have the value ascer­tained as at Philadelphia, on certain solid grounds. I am well assured, that at the last place the idea of bills of credit serving for a circulating medium, or answering any valuable purposes, is relinquished by its warmest friends. And thus, before our emission could take place, will it be also at New-York. Why do they not speak of the Rhode-Island and the Carolina paper?

I shall make no apology for the liberty I shall take with the delegates address. We well know, that the measures of pub­lic bodies are not the result of every individual's wisdom, unit­ing in one mind. On genuine republican principles, the ad­dress presents an invitation to a general discussion; and this is no time to respect persons, or even bodies. Should they view it in a different light, and resent this, or a similar attempt, I [Page 22] would say, it is that body which acts in the true spirit of a corrupt aristocracy.

In their address there are principles either misapplied, or ex­plained so as to contradict self-evident positions. Say they, ‘in every state there ought to be as much circulating money as will represent all the property bought and sold for cash; and the current money of every country ought always to be in proportion to its trade, industry, consumption, alienation and taxes.’ Do they mean by "represent" purchase? And do they mean the property and labour actually sold at the same instant, or in the course of a year? Do they mean, that if the property and labour sold annually in the state, be worth 1,000,000 of money, that there ought to be that million in the state? If they mean the last, they are certainly mista­ken; because the same sum, in the course of a year, may per­form a great variety of offices.

Were the state of Maryland separated from, and inaccessible to, the rest of the world,^* 1,000lb. of gold, and 20,000lb. of silver, would represent the property and labour bought and sold, and bear a proportion to the enumerated articles, as fully as if these quantities were trebled, so as to produce nearly that quantity of money which the delegates think necessary to the state, connected with, and accessible as it is, to the inhabitants of other countries. If in the supposed separation, the presence of 1,000lb. of gold, and 20,000lb. of silver, would cause a bushel of wheat to be sold for two shillings and six-pence, or about 6 dwt. of silver, the augmentation of them to thrice the quan­tity would, in the end, occasion a bushel of wheat to be sold for seven shillings and six-pence, or about 18dwt. of silver, provided there were no change in the quantity or demand. So that the quantity of specie would not be material.

But as Maryland is connected with, and accessible to, the inhabitants of other countries, there will, without the intro­duction of paper, be always as much money as will do the offices mentioned in the address. The influx and reflux of specie depends on as sure principles as the flowing and ebbing of the sea.

In every independent country, not having mines, or receiv­ing tribute, the quantity of money depends on the balance of trade. If her export of merchandise exceed her import, the balance is brought in coin. And this will be done until the [Page 23] quantity of cash, by degrees, raising the prices of her com­modities, it no longer suits her merchants to send these com­modities to other countries for the purpose of importing for them other commodities. They then remit coin. The sur­plus commodities now lying on hand, and the quantity of cash being lessened by these remittances, they again fall to that price which will enable merchants to export them on better terms than specie. Again the hard metals flow into the country; and again their reflux is infallibly brought about.^*

On this principle, when coin is sent out because the prices of commodities will not allow an export, notwithstanding they abound as much as usual, the quantity in other countries not being increased, and the demand there continuing as it was, there is a presumption that the state has more than its proper share of specie. But if all the surplus commodities be exported, and they are insufficient to pay for the merchandise brought in their stead, the balance must be remitted in coin, or remain a debt to a foreign country. The latter was precisely our case before the war. We imported from Great-Britain more than our to­bacco, and sometimes wheat, and the little foreign trade allow­ed us, would pay for. Hence arose the "old distressing" debt to British subjects. The commerce of this country was ma­naged principally by their factors. These did not make ample remittances. For a great part of their goods they took bonds; and without the revolution, the result must have been the vest­ing a great part of our real property in British merchants.

The situation of America during her vassallage, and indeed of most dependent colonies, is different from that of indepen­dent [Page 24] nations. This country was, in a manner, inaccessible to all but one people. The principle, that in every country there will be as much circulating cash as will represent the labour and property sold, &c. is meant only for an independent coun­try. Not having perused all the books on this subject, I am not certain that some of my ideas are not entirely new. They ought not surely, on that account, to be deemed less just; and I hope, that my labours will throw a ray of light on a subject hereto­fore deemed obscure and impenetrable.

Wherefore bills of credit, bearing no interest, and redeem­able at a far distant period, should, in America alone, have been on a footing with solid coin, has never yet been suffici­ently explained.

Under the circumstances of America before the war, the prices of her commodities were much higher than might have been expected from the quantity of her circulating cash. These prices were adjusted on the principle of affording a reasonable profit to the merchant who purchased the surplus for exporta­tion. The fact was, there was a kind of barter between America and her parent country, so far as that surplus extend­ed; and a credit was given for the balance. These colonies, having no mines, and their trade nearly confined to Great-Britain, it was impracticable to obtain the quantity of cash required by their domestic concerns, which would bear the due proportion to the property and labour to be bought and sold, and afford means of improving new plantations. Prices were re­gulated to a great degree by our intercourse with Great-Bri­tain. Here then was the true necessity of falling on some ex­pedient "for melting down solid property." We could nor in­stitute banks for want of coin. If they had been instituted, the coin would have been drawn out by factors to make remit­tances, and the banks would have broken almost as soon as in­stituted. Under these circumstances, with the addition that speculation on government securities had never yet been thought of, bills of credit, after a few bungling essays, succeeded to a charm. Specie not being wanted for exportation, the factors having regulated their operations on a different plan, and do­mestic purposes constituting almost the entire use for a circu­lating medium, the opinion of the people was easily obtained; and as no suspicions of the public faith had been created by in­fractions of public engagements, there was a mutual tacit consent that the paper of each colony should be received by its neighbours.

[Page 25]We are now, from the signal interposition of Heaven, a free independent people. We are on a footing with other nations, and specie will find its level amongst us as with them. With­out going into the idle disquisition of the exact proportion of circulating cash, so as to preserve any given prices of the pro­perty and labour bought and sold, I do confidently pronounce, that without impolitic forcing measures during peace, we shall find a ^* sufficient quantity for trade, consumption, alienation and taxes. A bank on a solid rational foundation, has its uses as well as inconveniencies. But as the question is not con­cerning a bank, I proceed not on that fruitful, perplexing, en­tertaining subject.

If there be a man incapable of perceiving the difference be­tween a time when opinion was in favour of bills, and times of a general distrust; between times of vassallage, with a severe restriction of our trade, and a period when we have taken our just station, and our commerce courted by the world; between the infancy and ripe age ^† of a country—if he cannot make these plain distinctions, I could almost say, that a false pride, a defect of understanding, the dictates of interest, or an over­bearing private influence, has induced him obstinately to maintain opinions condemned by a vast majority of the best characters ^‡ in the union.

The address states the amount of specie before the war at about £.200,000, and that if even this sum be now circu­lating amongst us, fifteen millions of property can pay only £.200,000. To the man who considers the efficacy of a brisk circulation, and the energy of a faithful administration of jus­tice, this statement appears extraordinary indeed. In France one third of their ninety millions sterling of cash, is paid an­nually for taxes and duties; but the amount of sums paid from one to another, in the course of a year, amongst twenty-odd [Page 26] millions of souls, is not to be reckoned. When £.200,000 are paid for debts to-day, what prevents it from being paid for other debts to-morrow? It is not annihilated by the first pay­ment. It is not like a soldier's ration, which, if it does its office to-day, is for ever gone, and another ration must be provided for to-morrow. Let justice take its course, or fall upon some rational expedient for satisfying both creditor and debtor. Let us on every occasion respect the public faith, and, without pursuing any other extraordinary measures, you would find, that in the course of one year £.100,000 might pay debts to the amount of more than a million.

The paper is, it seems, devised as a medium of taxes, and government is to furnish you with something, wherewithal to pay itself. There is a novelty in the idea of a creditor's en­abling the debtor by a new loan to pay his debt, and of a right medium of taxes distinct from a medium of commerce or exchange. It may be prudent for a creditor sometimes to venture a little further, in order that by aiding his debtor to execute a well laid scheme, he may secure his whole debt. There is nothing like this promised by the bill, and the reverse would most probably take place. "But the people, at present unable to pay scarcely anything, will be put into a condition to pay a tax of thirty shillings in the hundred pounds." No such thing. It is clear, that the paper would not be lent from the treasury to one man in a hundred. Of the first £.100,000, 11,000 is destined to Baltimore county. No person can take less than £.50, and suppose none to take more. The fifties in 11,000 are only 220, and in that county there cannot be fewer than 4400 men chargeable with the tax. On these sup­positions then, only one man in twenty can borrow from the public. Suppose no person to borrow less than £.500, and only one in 200 can be a borrower. I think in the present state of credit, few will borrow for the sake of administering to the necessities of their neighbours. From all this, the plan appears inadequate to the purpose of furnishing the people with the means of discharging the tax.

But it is said, the medium being supplied, the people may pro­cure it with their produce. Should the paper be really cash, the difficulty of procuring that, and of procuring specie, will be equal. An idea has been propagated, that specie has, all at once, vanished from the land. That is impossible; because there has been very little export of cash since the very late period, when a man could procure a reasonable quantity for anything he had to sell. Take notice that I admit, only for [Page 27] the sake of argument, that merchantable commodities or pro­visions brought to any market in the state, do not command specie at this moment. I admit freely, that the artificial scar­city of cash, has lately and suddenly increased. The expec­tation, or the probability, or even the mere possibility, of an emission, has determined most men not to part with a single shilling of cash which they can consistently preserve. Each expects to receive no more, and therefore, if he can avoid it, he will pay none. Let the paper system be fairly abandoned. Let the legislature inspire a confidence, that contracts shall be enforced, and the true medium which improvident laws have confined to private coffers, and perhaps reburied in the earth, will again circulate, and do its office.

I have been always surprised, when men of intelligence have inferred the actual scarcity of coin from the low prices of ne­groes, stock, &c. taken in execution. The demand for these things is much less than it was before the war; and as the quantity at market has increased, it has followed from the in­variable principles of demand, that the prices are greatly dimi­nished. The abundant articles of a gainful speculation have absorbed all the spare cash; and lessened the demand for those things in which savings of money were formerly invested. To them too is owing that high premium for the use of money, which, after all, has been much oftener talked of than really given.

The spirit of speculation, however, has occasioned another conclusion equally false. From the avidity with which a small class of men has purchased up public securities, is inferred a confidence in government. It is pleasant to infer this from a man's purchasing at four, six, and eight for one, when it is evident that he purchases with a view of disposing of them in a short time to advantage. His reliance on the public faith would indeed be effectually proved, if he purchased at par, or hoarded them as solid coin.

The most plausible argument for an emission, is the oppor­tunity offered, if we had cash, of sinking our share of the con­tinental domestic debt with far less than the sum due to credi­tors. ‘Final settlements may be procured at six or eight for one. Should they not be obtained with bills of credit, these bills will nevertheless procure flour and tobacco. And as specie is not in the state, these articles are to be sent out, and the state becomes a merchant.’ Let us examine freely this whole process.

How long will it be before the paper can be struck and is­sued? How long after that before it can be returned by way of [Page 28] taxes? How much time will be consumed in procuring tobac­co (I will not ask the price) shipping it, and bringing back coin in its stead? Do you suppose that the state will trade to advantage? In whom shall it confide? The other states being competitors, is it not probable the price of securities will be advanced before this process can furnish the cash? I put these queries to evince the superiority of the plan mentioned by the senate. To the plan, however, of an emission to be exchanged immediately for securities at a reasonable rate, it has been deemed sufficient to object the benefit which would accrue to ADVENTURERS. But it would seem, that the delegates plan would not be less favourable to adventurers. They are ad­venturers chiefly from whom securities can now be obtained. The address says, that the proposed paper can depreciate only a trifle, and intimates, that the senate's would depreciate to a great degree. Surely, the more valuable the paper, exchanged for securities at a given rate, the more benefit will be derived to adventurers. I will not be understood to advocate the scheme hinted at by the senate. I disdain all species of deception. I reprobate all kinds of paper; and, if I can suggest a more eli­gible mode of obtaining facilities, this last argument in its fa­vour must fall to the ground.

The address compliments you on your "solid property," and asserts the difficulty of discharging the tax to be owing more to the want of a medium, than to your embarrassed circum­stances.

We may account much better for the default in collections, than from the inability of the people. Does the middling and most valuable class of citizens complain of the tax? Are they incapable of paying? Are they in arrears? If they are, is the fault imputable to them? Suppose an industrious planter pos­sessed of 300 acres of tolerable land, 4 or 5 working hands, and stock, &c. in proportion. This property is perhaps assessed to £.700. Suppose the produce he raises for sale to bring only £.140. A tax of 20s in the £.100 requires £.7, the twen­tieth part of his income. The calculation is easy and plain. Consider now the case of the poor, in whose favour we have heard such moving declamation. To men of very minute ca­pitals it makes scarcely a palpable difference, whether taxes be high or low, receivable in paper, or in coin only. But now turn to men of overgrown property, with their thousands of acres, and hundreds of slaves. On these taxation is heavy; because their annual incomes, in proportion, are small. But who is there that pities a man for owing £.100, when the [Page 29] debt arises merely from his possessing perhaps 15,000? After all this mighty bustle then for the poor, the clamour is, in truth, raised for the rich. These are the men who have set the pernicious example of with-holding the tax. These are the men who declaim against heavy impositions, the want of a medium, and the necessity of postponing collections. It is their pernici­ous influence, which even without their intending it, may have prevented men both able and well-inclined from paying their public dues, and prevented money, after being paid, from coming to the treasury.

That you may not suppose I affect superior wisdom on all "political and constitutional questions," I acknowledge that the original hint of the plan I mean to propose was borrowed from a member of the legislature. And that the whole of my reasoning may be more candidly received, I further acknow­ledge, that most of my ideas are borrowed—not indeed prin­cipally from books. These too often contain the wild dreams of visionary projectors, or of men attached to a fine spun theo­ry. I would be ashamed to quote any writer beyond the At­lantic on a subject relative to bills of credit; because those wri­ters can reason only on speculation; and because, in America, we have experience to give every observing man more real knowledge than could possibly have been possessed by such a man as Sir James Stewart. Not that I despise his book. It is a repository of much useful knowledge; and where he con­fines himself to facts or principles established by experience, his work is extremely valuable. I take particular notice of this la­borious writer, because his volumes have been produced on account of his authority. Neither he nor Aristides, nor any other man, should have any influence to which his reasons ad­duced do not entitle him.

It is well known, that in Europe almost any sums may be borrowed on ample security. The interest is from two and an half to five per cent. Neither congress, nor any individual state, could perhaps borrow even £.1,000 upon any terms, on the faith of government generally pledged. But suppose the paper scheme entirely discarded, and an act of assembly im­posing a tax of 6/3 in the £.100 for ten years, for the sole and express purpose of procuring a loan, and authority given to pro­per persons to negotiate it in Europe, the principal payable one tenth annually, and an interest in the mean time, not exceed­ing eight per cent. Such a scheme has been tried by no state in the union. I have no doubt that this high interest, and this abundant security, would tempt monied men in Europe to ad­vance, [Page 30] and that, by this expedient, we might procure cash far more speedily than under the paper system.

In Europe money is frequently invested in public funds, for the sake of security, and for establishing a sure annual income, without trouble or diminution of the capital. Some of the persons who thus lay out their money, have no thought, at the time, of ever receiving back the principal; but they have it in their power at any time to receive it by selling out. Such is one great advantage that a well ordered government enjoys by having inspired a confidence in the public. It is not pro­bable at this period, that men could be found willing to lend us on any reasonable terms, without a stipulation of receiving the principal at a fixed time. I therefore propose to borrow two hundred thousand pounds for ten years. A tax of six shillings and three-pence in the £.100, on 11,000,000 of property, gives the gross sum of £.34,375. Suppose it to produce, in ten years, only enough to discharge the equivalent of a tenth of the principal annually, with the interest accruing, until the whole be paid, and the expence of the negotiation. On this plan we borrow immediately £.200,000; and that sum laid out in continental securities would purchase, at five for one, to the amount of £.1,000,000, which is considerably more than our balance of the continental domestic debt, at present bearing interest. It is incumbent on me to explain how the contract is to be made.

Should we agree to pay actually a tenth of the principal an­nually, and the whole interest due at the end of the year, our payments would be made in the following manner: In the first year we should have to pay £.20,000 of the principal, with the interest on the whole, which at eight per cent. would be £.16,000.—Total 36,000. In the second year £.20,000 more of the principal, and the interest on the remaining £.180,000, which would be £.14,400—Total £.34,400 Let us state every payment.—

But as the plan would not raise enough for the first years, I would propose, that the gross sum of £.28,800, being a tenth of the amount, be paid at the end of every year, and then for [Page 31] £.200,000 immediately advanced, the lender would, in ten years, receive £.288,000. And besides, the annual payments might be immediately placed out by him at interest in Europe. He would in such case have to receive an interest for nine years on the first payment, eight years on the second, seven on the third, and so on to the ninth. Now calculate his whole gains, supposing his annual receipts placed on simple interest, at four per cent.

Should we calculate on compound interest, the difference would not be so great, although still very considerable. I have made the above calculation to evince, that my scheme would probably succeed. The stipulation with the lender ought to be, that he should sustain no loss from tardy payments.

I beseech cool dispassionate men to compare the several plans. The proposer of the last, sears not the imputation of sinister views. It is proposed in sincerity, and relied on by the author. It were easy to demonstrate how deeply some men may be interested in an emission. I forbear from respect. I detest personality. The attempt to injure my reputation excites no resentment. I pity the slave to malignant passions. Were the attack even such as to endanger my good name, recrimination would at best be a paltry mode of defence.

[Page 32]The operations under the loan would be this: It would entitle us to draw bills, which being sold in Philadelphia, would bring specie to the state; and the agents or com­missioners of the loan might make their annual payments by tobacco.

Were the hint adopted, I might suggest other things in the draught of the bill. It might perhaps please the lenders to have a power of appointing their own collectors, whose re­ceipts, produced by the people to our collectors, might be al­lowed and charged to their principal. Amendments might occur; but I am satisfied the outline deserves well the atten­tion of the legislature. It is a scheme to deliver this state of an annual burthen of £.60,000, at the expence of a 6/3 tax, for only ten years, and this without producing dissensions among the people, or violating public faith.

To men of selfish contracted minds, who measure not on the large scale of general good, the profit to be gained by an emission on loan, may be very alluring. The translator of Mr. Necker on bank-notes, has demonstrated, that the gain never could be made. Suppose it should; the burthen of contribut­ing so much to the public revenue must fall heavily somewhere. It would to all intents and purposes be a tax, and a very un­equal one. If an equal moderate tax cannot be paid, it will re­quire something more than sound to prove, that an unequal one, without loss or deduction, will come into the treasury. The fact is, that public debtors already constitute a numerous and powerful body; and it cannot be good policy to augment it. These debtors have either had value from the public, or escaped burthens borne by the rest. Their debts are just, and ought to be paid. By increasing their number, is there no cause to apprehend a pernicious combination? Should the thought here­after suggest itself, that the best step for a public debtor is to procure a seat in the great public councils, you will run the hazard either of having your burthens greatly increased, or of a public bankruptcy, the ruin of your creditors, con­vulsions in the state, and ultimately the destruction of your freedom.

I proceed to a more invidious dangerous task. Do thou sacred love of truth assist and bear me up! It is by plain sim­ple calculation to demonstrate the mistakes in the delegates ad­dress. It has mistated your resources, and exaggerated your embarrassments. Its errors are amazing, and the following instances shall establish my charge

[Page 33]

How can this debt arise, except from a wrong balance of trade? Examine their estimate.

But from their own shewing, our exports have considerably exceeded the imports. They have committed an error of £.100,000 in the value of 700,000 bushels of wheat, at six shillings and eight-pence the bushel.

They allow nothing for skins, flax-seed, bar and pig-iron, and smaller articles. The annual amount of these articles cannot be short of £.25,000 0 0.

They allow nothing for the export of cash. If none has been sent out, there can be no scarcity. If some has been sent out, it ought to be charged in the account. Behold their di­lemma! But suppose, as they do, a great and dreadful scarci­ty; it cannot be occasioned by an annual export of less than £.50,000 0 0 currency.

[Page 34]Cast up the four sums which we have thus gained.

With which I am willing to reward any noted calculator who will condescend to assist me.

Thus taking their data, correcting their figures, and adding things, which cannot be well denied, I demonstrate that we owe not one farthing to Great-Britain, except what we must have elsewhere gained, and except a sum, the value of which we have on hand. But the case is not so. Their data I re­ject, and I will correct other mistakes. The imports since the peace, have greatly exceeded £.600,000 currency; al­though [Page 35] no proof is presented, that the balance has been against the state. It is most probable, that imports and exports, upon an average, have been nearly equal. The following I con­ceive pretty nearly (for I choose to be under the mark) a true average state of our exports since the end of the war, which will continue for a few years to come, after which it cannot fail to increase:

The idea of private oeconomy and frugality extricating us from all embarrassments, has been ridiculed. It has been tri­umphantly said, that a free government cannot prevent men from spending their money, or living as they please. It is true, that government cannot limit the number of dishes at a man's table, the quantity of madeira, to be consumed in a year, or the kind and number of his carriages. But when men, having by a thoughtless profusion incurred heavy debts, are obliged to retrench, and begin seriously to reform, the legislature may certainly forbear to furnish them with the means of continuing their extravagance, enhancing their debt, and only postponing their evil day. Would not, I pray you, an emission operate in this way for the borrowers? Would it not again hurry men into their wild ill concerted schemes? But government can go further than a mere forbearance. It can encourage home ma­nufactures. It can either prohibit certain importations, or lay such a duty as would answer three good ends, an increase of its revenue, a diminution of imports, and a discouragement of luxury. The force of prejudice, and the magic of declama­tion, must be great indeed, to prevent men from seeing these glaring truths!

Suppose our imports from every part to be only £.800,000, and our exports to every part to be equal. Suppose too our embarrassed circumstances, aided by the prudence of our legis­lature, to lessen the importation of merchandise a fortieth part, This gives us an annual balance of £.20,000. The diminu­tion [Page 36] of a twentieth gives us £.40,000, and of a tenth £.80,000. The whole balance would be brought in solid coin, provided we did not remit commodities to pay old debts. But from our situation these debts must be slowly paid, and it is proper to adopt some fair mode of composition, or installment ^*. I will suppose wise measures to be pursued, so as to lessen our imports a twentieth. This might produce in our favour a balance of £.10,000 in coin, and 30,000 to be applied in discharge of those debts. In a few years, if we have not now coin enough, we shall have abundance, our debts ^† will be discharged, and we cannot be otherwise than a free and happy people. Those schemes, which promise all at once, without any thing on your part, will be ever fallacious. Consider a little further the result of an emission on loan. We shall proceed in our luxuries, and provided credit be obtained, our imports from abroad will be augmented, or (which will have a more pernicious effect) we shall get merchandise from a neighbouring state. Of conse­quence there will be a constant drain of our hard cash. At the period assigned for redeeming the paper, we shall find money far more rare, and the people labouring under a debt far hea­vier than that which is said already to bear them down. In the name of common sense and common justice, for the sake of your neighbours, yourselves, your posterity, your country, reflect on all these things, and bestow on this scheme, the sure instru­ment of your destruction, such decisive marks of disapprobation, as shall for ever deter its advocates, demonstrate your good sense, retrieve the national character, and make rapid advances to that grand consummation of policy—the RESTORA­TION of PUBLIC and PRIVATE FAITH.

I must note a few other remarkable passages in the address. It informs you of no other amount of debts, for confiscated property, than the sum of £.275,600 3 11. By the audi­tor's account, the whole sum due for principal and interest, ex­clusive of the interest on unbonded debts, is £.411,919 12 1½.

[Page 37]

The emission would afford the strong body of public debtors such an accession of influence, as, if they pleased, might pro­duce a combination not to be withstood. £.250,000 divided into five hundreds, might possibly give 500 new debtors. Di­vided into fifties, 5000. But old debtors would be the prin­cipal borrowers. Suppose then an addition of only 250 debt­ors, and these to be men of some enterprize and influence. How contemptible the suspicions suggested against the senate, compared to the well grounded apprehensions, which these might excite!

The address says nothing of the two and a half impost, as a productive fund in ease of the assessment. I am most credibly informed, that the product of this tax, in 1786, appeared to the house to be £.33,093 9 8. This ought undoubtedly to have lessened their estimate of an assessed rate, about 6/8 in the £.100.

I come now to the account of the continental debts.^* On the first of January, 1783, the foreign debt, according to the published estimate of congress, was 7,885,085 dollars. It has not since been increased, except by arrears of interest, and some loans, which have been applied to pay off the old interest, and maintain ministers and agents. Suppose it to be now raised to 10,000,000 dollars, bearing an interest of five per cent. Our tenth of that sum is only 1,000,000, equal to £.375,000, the interest of which is only £.18,750: So that the address has erred in stating the interest of the foreign debt to be 1,723,626 dollars; because that is an interest at five per cent. on the enormous sum of 34, 472,520 dollars. Congress however is under an obligation to pay a part of the principal of the foreign debt at this time. Hence it is, that for the year 1786, they have called on the states for a sum, not to be paid every year. And hence it is, most probably, that the address has so materially mistated the annual interest of the foreign debt. There is indeed a great difficulty in compre­hending the exact state of continental affairs. Since the year 1783, there has been no statement from congress that has [Page 38] been, at the same time, full, explicit, intelligible and clear. It is no wonder that new requisitions, balances of the old, in­terest now due, interests annually arising, a million of figures, and references to statements not at hand, should perplex an ordinary brain, and produce mistakes. But a common man, without a full comprehension of the subject, would not have undertaken to publish for the information of others. From the whole body of the delegates, in an appeal to their constitu­ents, nothing but accuracy and precision ought to be expected; and a considerable time actually elapsed before I ever thought of questioning their statements and calculations. That I was wrong in taking any thing upon trust, I hope already appears.

I will now present you a more complete general view of your affairs, than any you have yet seen. My groundwork for the state of the continental debt, is the estimate of 1783, which I am well assured is the groundwork that has ever since served congress itself.

The continental debt arises in a great measure from a non­compliance with their requisitions. Suppose the whole debt to be 50,000,000 of dollars, and that although a state has not complied fully with these requisitions, it has complied in as great a proportion as the rest. Now these fifty millions are apportioned. Surely a state cannot owe its quota of the debt, and its balance of requisitions at the same time. Congress, however, being disappointed in one year, in the next year makes a new requisition, and calls for the balance of some former demand, in order to prevent the accumulation of her principal debt, and to comply with her positive engagements. Could congress think proper, and could all its creditors agree, to convert the whole debt into a principal, bearing interest, and would the states obey their just requisitions in providing permanent funds, the burthen would every year be equal, their affairs simplified, and errors not likely to be made. But of this hereafter.

The foreign debt paying interest, I have before stated in 1783 to be 7,885,085 dollars.

The interest of which, partly at four, and the rest at five per cent. is 369,038 dollars. Our tenth ^* thereof (discard­ing petty fractions, as I shall continue to do) is 36,903— equal to £.13,838 12 6.

[Page 39]But suppose, as I have already done, the whole foreign debt 10,000,000 dollars, and our quota of the interest, being the interest 1,000,000, at five per cent. is £.18,750 0 0.

The domestic debt, paying interest, is 27,115,290 dollars. The interest of this at six per cent. is 1,626,917. Our tenth of this is 162,691, equal to [...]161,009 0 0.

We have now to reckon arrears of interest, and the gross sum not yet paying interest. The interest of the foreign debt being already supposed to be consolidated with the principal, and to make it 10,000,000 dollars, there is nothing to be set down for foreign arrears.

I take it for a settled unavoidable point, that as congress can­not pay the arrears, or the commutation, these two articles must at last be consolidated with the principal now bearing in­terest. Should congress be unable to reconcile foreign credi­tors to this measure, she may, notwithstanding, so soon as she is invested with the five per cent. impost, by borrowing on that fund, exchange her creditors. And thus, when her pow­ers are enlarged, and her credit established, like that of other sovereign powers, a property in the American funds will be transferrable like the stocks in England, without, however, [Page 40] that fluctuation in their value. This is "a consummation de­voutly to be wished." Until this happy period shall arrive, the confederacy is little better than a rope of sand, to be parted by the first rude blast. God grant that a dissolution of the uni­on be not the secret wish of too many in these states.

And this I aver to be within a trifle more or less, the whole which we should have annually to contribute for interest, sup­posing the whole continental foreign and domestic debt conso­lidated into a principal, bearing interest.

[Page 41]But as the foreign debt of 10,000,000 dollars, pays only five per cent. and the difference between the rate of five and six per cent. makes a difference on our 1,000,000, of 10,000 dollars, equal to £.3.750. The latter calculation being a lumping one, is reduced below the former more particular one.

Of which surely every friend to his country will be happy in feeling a thorough conviction.

Let me now inform you of the burthens to which you are in duty bound to submit.

To raise this last sum, suppose a recourse to the old mode of assessment. Seven shillings and six-pence in the £.100 on 11 millions of property, gives £.41,250 gross, which surely might produce more than £.37,000 net. The two rates of 6/3 and 7/6, with the 2/6 imposed by the consolidating act, make 16/3. And this, upon the plainest calculation, is the whole burthen necessary to be borne along with the 2½ per cent. for your whole continental and domestic debt, and the liberal support of government. To this add 3/9 for county charges, which you are sensible ought to be less than at present. And your whole burthen is just twenty shillings annually for every £.100. From this 2/6 are to be shortly deducted, and [Page 42] 6/3 more are to cease at the end of ten years, and then the rate will be only 11/3.

But suppose my scheme for a loan rejected, you have then to provide for an annual interest of £.60,000, until we can sink the principal. In that case twelve shillings, instead of the 6/3, would be required. And then your whole contribution (exclusive of the 2½ duty) to congress, the state and the county, would be 25/9 until the deduction of the 2/6, which would reduce it to 23/3. But inasmuch as property is undervalued in assessments, perhaps the real value of £.100 would contri­bute only fifteen shillings.

Suppose my scheme adopted, the five per cent. impost set­tled on congress, and our 2½ per cent. of course done away, there would at the end of ten years, be an annual balance due by congress of £.9,179 15 0, as appears by the following state:

Which I conceive would be sufficient for our contribution to the expences of congress civil establishment, considering that congress has the back lands still to dispose of.

There would then remain only the charges of our own in­ternal government, and the county expences, for which an imposition of 8/9 in the £.100, would be more than enough.

I have said nothing of the residue of our quota of the con­tinental money. To this may be opposed the paper purchased by the intendant, and part of the tax arrearages.

It is now time to close my remarks. On the bill for the relief of debtors, and on certain repealing bills, I say nothing at present. The fertility of my subjects has already drawn me too far.

I have never addressed you, except on occasions of impor­tance, and I have hitherto had the pleasing reward of your approbation. On this occasion above all others, I deserve it. You will at least acquit me of "an officious dabbling in poli­tics." I know, that when men are rooted in opinion, they are disposed to condemn all who oppose them, and the foundest [...] to irritate and inflame. With an appeal to the great Searcher of thoughts, I again protest, that my [Page 43] heart is exempt from hatred and malice. It gives me pain to be obliged to speak in a manner displeasing to any one, and particularly to those whom I still regard, and who lately ho­noured me with their esteem. I beseech all who have attempt­ed to injure me, to forgive my not being hurt. They may rest assured, that one of the first wishes of my soul, is to live in amity with all.—Let that be the principle of all! May the sufferings of their country awaken a true zeal, and uniting in her cause, they will bid fair at last to coalesce in brotherly love.