IT has been a generally received opinion, that in the moment of the explosion of cannon, there is a tremulous motion in the metal; that such tre­mulous motion would violently jar, or somehow dangerously affect a person who should then touch the piece; and that it was therefore dangerous for a person to be in contact with the piece when it was fired. It has also been generally thought, that a person could not bear to recoil on the car­riage with the piece. Hence it is, that in every construction of gun carriages, and in every mode of firing a piece of cannon, which have hitherto been invented, the person who fires it, stands at a distance from it. These apprehensions, how­ever, are ill founded, except in cases where the Gun is improperly made, or injudiciously ma­naged.

I have clearly proved, that a man can safe­ly, and without inconvenience, bear to be in con­tact with the piece in the moment of explosion; [Page 6] that he can safely and easily bear the velocity and other supposed dangerous circumstances of the re­coil; and that, if a suitable mechanism is em­ployed for the purpose, he can point and fire a piece of cannon in any direction, with nearly as much ease and expedition as he does a musket. The establishing these principles, opens a new field in artillery. By a judicious application of them, cannon may be so mounted, either for sea or land service, that they may be worked with greater facility, and fired with greater certainty of hitting the object, than can be done in the com­mon way. The carriage or construction that is exhibited, was chiefly intended to demonstrate these particulars; not as a model for actual ser­vice: And is such, as a variety of embarassing circumstances led me, or rather obliged me to a­dopt. I beg that gentlemen will keep this dis­tinction in mind, and not draw erroneous infer­ences from this rude performance, against the ad­vantages which may be derived from a proper application of the principles themselves.

In the above mentioned construction, the stock­ing of the gun is done merely for the purpose of fixing the transverse piece of iron, which acts as trunnions, in its proper place. But this end may be better answered by fixing artificial trunnions to a piece already made, or by placing the trun­nions properly in casting a gun; either of which, besides rendering the stocking of the gun unne­cessary, would considerably lessen the height at which the gun stands, facilitate its motion, and make the work much stronger. The stocking and fixing the gun in the present way, is attend­ed with many inconveniences and disadvantages. Among others, it increases the quantity of work­manship and the expence; renders the construc­tion [Page 7] weaker and much heavier; and will not ad­mit of the same facility of motion as if the gun was supported by real trunnions properly placed. For, as in a considerable elevation or depression of the piece, the centre of gravity falls before or behind the centre of motion, there is necessarily a great weight to overcome in making those move­ments, which would not happen in the other case. The rest of the work is also adapted to the occasion, and is executed without regard to the proportion which should obtain between the several parts, or between them and the gun itself. I beg therefore, once more, that it may be remembered, that the whole construction, taken together, is not offered as a model, either for land or sea service; but is chiefly intended to demonstrate the principles a­bove mentioned.

Rough and rude however as the present con­struction is, if it were only reduced in length and weight, which it will well admit of, it could be used without any very great inconvenience, and with great advantage, in the sea service, or in land batteries against ships. The principal incon­venience on ship-board would be, that it will take up more room than the common carriage; but in return for this, the gun could be worked with fewer men, with greater expedition, and be fired with greater certainty of hitting the adverse ship, or any capital part of her which one would wish to strike. Laying aside all the other parts of the construction, were a gun, with trunnions pro­perly placed, to be mounted in a swivel fixed in a common carriage or one similar to it, in the same manner as is done in the present construction, the gunner to point, fire, and recoil, as in that—there is no doubt but a vessel armed with a set of guns mounted in that way, would be more pow­erful [Page 8] than if the same guns were mounted altoge­ther in the common way. This simple improve­ment will admit of great freedom and facility of motion, in point of elevation, depression, and la­teral direction; and procure the party the advan­tage of firing with much greater certainty of hit­ting the object than in the usual way: in other respects, it will have many of the disadvantages attending the common carriage.

A cannon mounted in the common way, may not improperly be considered, so far as relates to its being fired at a moving object, as a fixed body. You must wait till the object comes in­to your line of fire, before you can fire at it. If that moment be lost, you fire in vain. You can­not, as the sportsman on shore does, follow your object with the piece, till you get a fair opportuni­ty to fire at it. This is the case in firing from land batteries against a ship under sail. The un­certainty of hitting the object in this mode of firing, is evident from repeated experience. You yourselves remember the very little injury which the British ships sustained in passing and repassing our range of batteries on Yellow Hook, Powles Hook, Governor's Island, and the forts and bat­teries from thence to Fort Washington inclusive­ly. The French fleet under Count d'Estaing, passing the British batteries on Rhode-Island with­out receiving any material injury, is another con­clusive instance of that uncertainty. But if this is the case where cannon are fired from firm ground, at an object moving in smooth water, how much greater must the chance be of missing the object in sea fights, where the piece is fired from a body which is in motion itself, at another body which is also in motion; where both are not only in progressive motion, but each is constantly, tho' [Page 9] gradually, changing its level, and also the ele­vation and depression of its guns, from the rising or falling of the waves. If the side of the ship rises or sinks but only an inch, the direction of the gun changes with it: and it is well known, that an alteration of only one inch at the muzzle, will make the shot go very wide of the object at a mile's, or even half a mile's distance. These circumstances however generally obtain, in a greater or less degree, between ships at sea, and must of course often frustrate the intended effect of the shot. Considering these circumstances, it is not surprising that engagements at sea have continued a long while, and that many hundred shot have been fired on each side, with inconsiderable damage to either; though it is plain, from some instances of very close engagements, that were a few discharges from these tremendous machines to hit a vessel, they would create great havoc and destruction. Thus in most of the battles fought between fleets in the late war, some of which were said to be severe, there were seldom more than 20 men killed on board a ship whose com­pliment consisted of 5 or 600: a striking proof of the great uncertainty there is of hitting so large an object as a ship of the line, in the common way of mounting and firing cannon.—Experience, as well as reason, shews that in that mode of firing, the dismasting, or otherwise crip­pling a ship, is the effect of chance, not of judg­ment.

Since then the hitting from a battery on shore, a ship sailing in smooth water, within 2 miles dis­tance, is so very uncertain, it follows, that if a mode could be discovered of firing with greater certainty of hitting the object, that a battery fur­nished with guns fitted in that manner, would, in [Page 10] point of real force and execution, be to one with guns mounted in the common way, as the certain­ty of hitting in one case is to the uncertainty of hitting in the other, according to the number of guns in each battery. Suppose, for instance, that from the range of batteries before mentioned, 100 shot were fired at the British ships, and that one in 25, which is much more than is common­ly imagined, hit the vessel: Suppose also, all o­ther circumstances being alike, that there were only 20 shot fired from the other battery, and that only four of them took effect; it follows, that a battery of 20 such guns is as good as one of 100 in the common way. This reasoning will hold good, whatever may be the exact proportion of the cer­tainty of hitting in one way, to the uncertainty of hitting in the other. At present, let us confine ourselves to generals: We have not sufficient data or grounds to ascertain matters with precisi­on. But as the uncertainty of hitting moving ob­jects, at long shot, is still greater at sea, from the causes already mentioned, than in the case just stated of firing from batteries on shore, it is evi­dent that a vessel armed in the improved manner, would have still greater advantages, at long shot, over one armed in the common way. We just now observed, that there have been smart engage­ments at sea, as they were called, in which there was great firing on both sides, and yet but little damage done. A great many shot therefore must have been spent in vain. Consider, a moment, the proportion of the balls which missed, to those which hit. State it as low as you can, it will yet be prodigiously great. It has been computed, that at sea, at from half a mile's to a mile's distance, not above one shot in forty takes effect; Some say not above one in fifty; others have made [Page 11] the proportion still greater; and all very just­ly ascribe it to the causes before mentioned. Firing against an object at sea, in the com­mon way, is pretty much upon the same princi­ples, and just as wisely contrived, as if a sports­man, in order to shoot a duck on the river when the water was a little rough, was to get into a small canoe or wherry whose sides were so low as to be but a little above the level of the water, lay his fowling piece horizontally over the side, fas­ten it immovably there, order the man at the pad­dle or oars to work the boat so as to bring the gun to bear on the bird, then place himself aside of the piece, and fire it in that position, with a match, when he thought he had a good opportunity of hitting the bird. At a very moderate distance, how often would he miss, to once that he would hit the object?

Let us now reason from small things to great. We are sensible, if the sportsman were to loosen his gun, to move it as he pleases, and fire it when he pleases, that he would seldom miss the object. If we can loosen the cannon, move it with facili­ty and expedition in any direction, and fire it when we please, may we not hope, considering the comparative magnitude of the object to the cannon, to do it with similar success? It is up­wards of 20 years ago, that in a voyage to Eu­rope, the circumstances attending the firing a cannon loaded with ball at another vessel, sug­gested these reflections to me, and made the mat­ter an object of subsequent attention.

But to return to the subject; it has been com­puted, I say, that at long shot, at sea, but one ball in forty takes place; that is, in other words, that a cannon mounted in the common way, hits once in forty times. It is reasonable to think [Page 12] that one fixed on the present principles will miss much seldomer. But let us suppose that it will hit but four times in forty: then the advantage of the one gun over the other will be as four to one, that is, that ten guns fixed on the new prin­ciples are equal, at long shot, to forty guns mounted in the common way.

Plain and clear as this reasoning is, when we apply the conclusion to naval war, it holds out such great and unexpected advantages, that we are struck with surprize, and immediately ima­gine we have reasoned on false principles.

If, as we have just now been led to believe, 10 guns in this way, are equal, at long shot, to 40 in the old way, then a ship of 10 guns, in this way, is equal to one of 40, of the same weight of metal, in the other; and one of 20 to one of 80. This calculation, however, is not strictly accu­rate; but it is sufficiently so to illustrate the ad­vantage of the proposed mode over the common one. Let us abate 1-4, and rate the advantage at three to one—then a ship of 30 guns will be equal to one of 90. It is obvious, that the larger ship will be a better mark in all respects, as to hull and rigging, to the smaller ship, than the smaller ship will be to her. It is also obvious, that the larger vessel will much better bear the effect of the shot, than the smaller will do. This last circumstance is of no great consequence in our plan, and I only mention it to shew that it has not been overlooked in considering the subject.

The new frigates of 40 guns, carry 28 eigh­teen pounders on the main deck; the rest are quarterdeck and forecastle guns. A vessel of the same dimensions, and without quarterdeck and forecastle guns, which are of little or no use on the plan I shall mention, will carry 28 twenty­four [Page 13] pounders. If that plan is kept in view in building the vessel, she may be so formed and finished abaft, as to fight, with ease, 4 stern cha­ses occasionally.

According to the calculation just now, of three to one, a ship of 28 twenty-four pounders, mounted in the proposed way, is equal to one of 84 guns of the same weight of metal mounted in the common way. It is not worth while to at­tend to the difference which the different weight of metal that a ship of that rate carries, would make in this calculation. It is also supposed, that the ships are at long shot, broadside to broadside, and firing at each other in that position: That no step is taken, or manoeuvre made, to give the small vessel an opportunity of availing herself of her ca­pacity of firing with greater certainty on the ene­my; and at the same time of lessening the chance of her being hit by the enemy.

But let us reverse the matter. Let us suppose that prudence and skill are added to the advan­tage of firing with greater certainty. Let the smaller vessel be provided to fire 4 stern chases. Let her, on falling in with a ship of the line, feign to run away, and endeavour to steer such a course in her pretended flight, that the enemy can bring only his bow chases to bear upon her. This is bringing the guns in action nearer to an e­quality in point of number, while the smaller vessel possesses the advantage of firing with great­er certainty. It is moreover very probable, that a ship of the line would be deceived by the seeming inferiority of the smaller vessel, and not fire her bow chases, lest it might retard her own sailing: by which means she might be cripled in her rig­ging by the lesser vessel, and the latter receive no damage at all.

[Page 14] To illustrate still further the superiority of a vessel carrying guns mounted in the proposed way, over the other, I must point out another advantage arising from that mode of mounting cannon.

It is impossible, with guns mounted in the com­mon way, either on batteries on shore, or on board a ship, to fire several pieces of cannon, or even two, in the same instant of time, against a moving ob­ject that is less than the space between the embra­sures of a land battery, or between the ports of a ship, for instance, against the mast of a ship un­der sail. For it being impossible to move a can­non, mounted in the common way, at will, as we do a musket, by what rule can we previously point two guns, which are to be fired in the same moment, so that the balls will meet in a distant invisible point or angle to which the mast may possibly come? On the other hand, a platoon of any number of muskets may be progressively leveling at any moving object, and at a signal or word of command, be fired in the same instant against it. In like manner, seve­ral pieces of cannon, mounted on the proposed principles, may be levelled and fired at a mast or other moving object, in the same moment; and consequently with a greater probability of carry­ing it away, than if each were to be fired sepa­rately at it. The principal ropes in a ship come near each other about the upper part of the masts where the lower yards are slung. A platoon of 4 twenty-four pounders fired at that spot, is likely to do considerable injury. Such a platoon fre­quently repeated, could scarcely fail of maiming that part of the mast, or otherwise cripling the ship, so as to retard, if not stop her way. It is at least very probable, that before she could come near enough to fire with certainty into the other vessel, she would meet with some such disaster. [Page 15] As soon as that happens, her fate may be said to be decided; the blow may be easily and spee­dily followed up, till she is unable to work any way without great difficulty. The lesser vessel may then safely take her station off her bow, her quarter, or her stern, and with little risk or in­jury to herself, complete the victory. Besides, there are places in the hull of a ship, where a blow or shot is more destructive, and more difficultly to be come at and repaired, than in others: And com­manding our guns as we do, it is in our power to strike such places.

All that we have hitherto said upon this sub­ject, is founded on the superior certainty of hit­ting the object with guns fixed in the proposed way, to that of hitting with guns mounted in the common way. But an addition may be made to the proposed improvement, which, in all cases whatever, will render a vessel of 28 twenty-four pounders superior to a ship of the first rate armed in the common way; and perhaps to any force in the common way, that can be brought against her.

If improvements in the military art, which in­crease the destruction of fighting men, tend, as has been thought, to lessen the calamities of war by putting a speedy end to it; and upon that principle to save rather than destroy men, the i­deas I am going to suggest, will be an advantage rather than an evil to mankind. It is evident that improvements of the kind are only useful to those who first employ them; and as long as they are kept secret. It is also evident, if such improve­ments are very considerable; if they will give one party a great advantage over the other, and are made a prudent use of, that they may decide the event of a war before an enemy can acquire a com­petent knowledge of them.

[Page 16] The destruction of men and ships, has long been attempted by combustibles and fire.—Powder-flasks, stinck-pots, fire balls, &c. were contrived to effect the former, but are only of use in boarding or very close fighting. Fire arrows and red hot bullets have been employed for the latter. Fire arrows were found ineffectu­al: And the difficulty and danger attending the preparing and loading red hot shot at sea, seem to have had greater weight than any other cause in occasioning their being laid aside. Few people who frequent the sea, and have a competent know­ledge of the aranagement of things in a ship, un­derstand the construction of furnaces; and few who understand the latter, know any thing of the former. The loading a piece of cannon, mount­ed in the common way, with red hot ball, is dif­ficult and dangerous. The wad used on those occasions, is troublesome and hazardous. As soon as the ball is in, the gun must be fired, lest the ball should fire the powder. There are me­thods, however, to lessen the difficulty and dan­ger. A gun mounted in the proposed way, can be more easily loaded with red hot shot, than one in the common way: And as to the necessity of im­mediately firing the gun, lest the red hot ball should fire the powder, it can very easily be avoid­ed. There is a method of preparing wads for loading with red hot balls, which so effectually guards against that inconvenience, that we may, if we please, let the ball remain in the gun till it is cold. Besides these improvements, shells and carcasses may be very advantageously used at sea: they can be fired from cannon, though not to so great a distance as red hot shot.

If a vessel, such as I have stated before, were to be armed with 28 twenty-four pounders mount­ed [Page 17] in the proposed way; and to be furnished with in apparatus for firing red hot ball, shells and carcasses, what would she have to fear from any force whatever, in the common way of sighting at sea, that could be brought against her?—Though a ship of the line should escape being crippled in her rigging by the manoeuvres before mentioned, and should approach her; is it not probable that a few broadsides of such materials would soon decide her fate, and make her expire in an awful blaze or tremendous blast?

Let us apply what has been said to our situ­ation in the late war. To equip a few vessels of that force, and in that manner, would have been no difficult task, if the measures that it was in our power to take, had been taken. The vessels could have been built and equipped with ease.—I knew how to make cannon of any size. I had been at the pains in Europe to make myself mas­ter of that art, and some other things in the me­chanical way appertaining to the military and na­val business, in order to be of more extensive uti­lity in this country. To arm the vessels in the proposed manner, I depended on no one's know­ledge or information. I could direct, and, with common artificers, accomplish the whole. If the cannon, for the sake of concealing the design, were cast of the common form, I could, with a few workmen, and an apparatus that is not diffi­cult to be prepared, have fixed artificial trun­nions to them on board a hulk in the river, which should have a proper guard on board, and no communication with the shore, but in a way that would prevent any information being given of what was doing on board. The swivels for the guns could be made on board. So much of the carpenters work as would not lead to a discovery, [Page 18] could be done on shore, the rest could be com­pleted on board. When the ships were ready, and the crew on board, the guns and what belong­ed to them might be taken in. The workmen, who should be previously selected with that view, should also be carried on board, the apparatus in the hulk destroyed, the furnace for heating the shot be erected, and the vessel then sail on her destined errand, taking the pilot with her. As cannon mounted in the proposed way, require but half the hands to work them that are necessary in the common way; and as no hands would be wanted to man prizes, a much less crew would be sufficient than would be otherwise necessary. The ships might therefore be victualled for a lon­ger time, and be under no necessity on that ac­count of going into port for many months.

Admitting, that a few vessels so equipped and armed were at sea; that proper care had been taken to exercise and accustom the people to work and fight the guns before they attempted to seek the enemy; that they were ordered to sink or burn whatever fell in their way: a horrid task in­deed! which nothing but necessity could justify, or prompt men to execute, what effect would such unexpected, and to the enemy long unknown destruction, have had on their military operations by sea and land? What effect would it have had in preventing the distresses and disgraces we suffered in our own military operations, in our finances and in our trade? What effect would it have had in distressing the enemy, and bringing the war to a speedy conclusion?

By what strange fatality is it, that a mind which had been long and successfully employed in cultivating the arts of peace; and particularly a science devoted to relieve the distresses of hu­man [Page 19] nature, should become the author of ways and means to increase destruction and desolation among mankind! There is no doubt, had the plan above mentioned been executed, but it would have proved fatal to numbers of the British sea­men. There is another measure, from which, were it to have been conducted with the greatest humanity, we should have derived great advan­tage; and the enemy have suffered great injury. But were the same measures to have been carried to the extreme of military severity, it would have made people of all ranks in that infatuated nation, feel the horrors of war in their own coun­try; and awakened them to a sense of the deso­lution which their troops were wantonly commit­ting in this. Painful as such measures are to the feelings of humanity, they became necessary evils in our situation. In war, there should be no tri­flling; and in a war, such as we have concluded, the fate of a few thousands of adversaries should not be put in competition with the liberty, safe­ty, and happiness of a whole people, or perhaps with the existence of liberty itself. You, my countrymen, were solemnly declared Rebels; un­conditional submission, that is, in other words, a surrender at discretion, of liberty, life, and pro­perty, were demanded of you; and in case of refusal, you were doomed to the pains and penal­ties denounced by law against persons of that de­scription. In England, I felt for you; I felt for that country too. I laboured to reconcile mat­ters as long as there was the least prospect of ef­fecting it: and I flatter myself, it will be found, that in the measures I took for that purpose, I consulted the dignity of Britain, the honor of my country, and the interest and happiness of both people. Independently of these considera­tions, [Page 20] it appeared to me, that the great cause of li­berty was at stake; that it depended on the issue of the controversy, whether that invaluable blessing should be preserved and extended among mankind; or universal despotism be established on its ruins.

Harbours which are of easy approach from the sea, and have deep water in them, are ge­nerally fortified against ships of war.—Har­bours which have shallow water, and those of difficult approach on account of bars, sands and shoals, are not fortified at all, or but slightly; because no ships of force can get into the former, or chuse to risk getting into the latter. These circumstances are deemed a suffi­cient security against an enemy. This idea has long prevailed; and is a remarkable instance of our being sometimes so much governed by long received, but nevertheless ill-founded opinions, as not to see what observation, and plain unbias­sed reason, clearly point out. Because ships of war, which require deep water, cannot get into such harbours, does it follow that an enemy can­not enter them, approach the cities on their shores, destroy the shipping, and lay the cities under contribution or in ruins, by means of ves­sels of considerable force, But so constructed as to draw but little water? Look over the charts of the sea ports in England, Scotland and Ireland, and you will find many such harbours in them. Is it not a little extraordinary that none of their European neighbours ever thought of visiting them in the way, and for the purposes just men­tioned? Is it not a little extraordinary; that the British themselves, who are so expert in naval matters, who by threatening accessible cities with their ships, have compelled the sovereigns of them to a neutrality, should not have thought of employing [Page 21] some such measures against Amsterdam and Rot­terdm, and thereby prevented or put an end to the Dutch war?

Such enterprises might easily have been exe­cuted by us on the principles laid down. I have observed that shells and carcasses may be fired from cannon as well, though not to so great a dis­tance, as we do shot. With a couple of vessels of the force before mentioned, but drawing little water; and a smaller one armed in the common way, for the sake of treating with the enemy on shore, without risking a discovery of the nature of our armament and force, we might have struck several very capital strokes. Many vessels might have been destroyed or ransomed in the har­bours, and considerable contributions levied on the towns.

The preceding observations will explain to the gentlemen who were in Congress some years ago, why I then took so much pains to call the atten­tion of that honorable body to naval affairs.

To judge rightly of things, it is some times necessary to place them in different points of view. In the present case, we may perhaps form a truer estimate of the ideas that have been held out, if we were to consider how it would have affected ourselves and our allies, had they been employed against the common cause in only an instance or two.

While I was in England in 1782, a fleet was preparing, and did sail under Lord Howe to re­lieve Gibralter. The combined squadron of France and Spain were stationed to receive him. The British fleet consisted of about 45 sail of the line: the combined squadron of about 60 sail of the line. Such, to my knowledge, are the con­veniences that can be had for the purpose in [Page 22] England, that there would have been no difficul­ty to arm, in less than three weeks, half a dozen ships of 74 guns in the way proposed. Consi­dering the great superiority of a ship armed in that way, over one armed in the common way, it is very easy to conceive what the consequence would have been to the combined squadron, had such a formidable force, a force the more dangerous because unknown and unsuspected, been under the direction of a man of Lord Howe's abilities. Whether the British would have made use of red hot shot, shells, or car­casses, on such an important and decisive occa­sion, let every man judge for himself; but I believe no man will doubt, but if six sail of the line had been allowed to play that game with cannon fixed on the proposed principles, the de­struction of the greater part of the combined squadron would have been inevitable.

Amsterdam and Rotterdam carry on almost all the foreign trade of the United Provinces. Their harbours are shallow and unfortified: nor is there a fortification that need be dreaded in any part of the approach to them. They depend, like some of their neighbours, on their sands and shoals for protection. At the above period, the Dutch fleet of 12 sail lay in the Texel. In Eng­land, large vessels may readily be had, that with some alteration would draw no more water than we have mentioned. I submit it, whether two sail of the line and four such smaller vessels, all armed in the way we have proposed, and allowed to use red hot shot, shells, and carcasses, could not have destroyed the Dutch fleet: Whether the smaller vessels could not have got up to Amster­dam and Rotterdam, two to each place, have com­pelled the Dutch to give up the alliance and make [Page 23] peace, or else have laid those cities in ashes, de­stroyed the shipping in the harbours, and thereby have disabled the United Provinces from carry­ing on the war to any effect.