PROCEEDINGS OF A GENERAL COURT MARTIAL, &c.
Major General Baron STEUBEN, PRESIDENT.
- Brigadier General KNOX,
- Colonel MOYLAN,
- Colonel HUMPTON,
- Colonel LAMB,
- Colonel STEWART,
- Major CLARKSON,
- Major BURNET,
- Major MUIRMAN,
- Major BAUMAN,
- Major MOORE,
- Major M‘PHERSON,
- Major GALVAN.
Captain WALKER, acting as JUDGE ADVOCATE.
THE President, Members and Judge Advocate being sworn, the Judge Advocate produced the papers No. 1 and 2, which, together with the General Orders for assembling the Court, were read as follows:
(No. 1.) STATE OF GEORGIA. IN ASSEMBLY, January 17, 1780.
THE Committee appointed to take into consideration the situation of the State since the 29th day of December, 1778, report, That the capital and troops in this State were sacrificed on the said 29th of December, which was the first cause of the distresses and consequences which ensued.
Your Committee are of opinion, that the Delegates of this State should be directed to promote a trial of Major General Howe, who commanded on that day. They find that the good people of this State were further discouraged, by the said Major General Howe crossing the Savanna river next day with the troops that escaped from Savanna, and ordering those at Sunbury and Augusta to do the same, leaving this State at the mercy of the enemy without any continental troops, instead of retreating to the back country and gathering the inhabitants. The country, thus abandoned, became an easy prey to the British troops, they marching up and taking post at Augusta, and sending detachments to every part of the State.
(No. 2.) BY THE UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, September 5, 1781.
THE Report of the Committee, to whom were referred the instructions from the Assembly of the State of Georgia to the Delegates of that State, and their motion thereon, relative to Major General Robert Howe, was taken into consideration; and thereupon
Ordered, That the extract from the Minutes of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, respecting the conduct of Major General Howe in his command of the troops in the said State in December 1778, be transmitted to the Commander in Chief, and that he be directed to cause as enquiry to be made into the matters therein alledged, in such manner as he shall judge proper, as soon as circumstances will admit.
GENERAL ORDERS.
A GENERAL Court-Martial will assemble at ten o'clock to-morrow morning, at the City Tavern, for the trial of Major General Howe on the following charges, exhibited against him by the Delegates of the State of Georgia in Congress, by order of the General Assembly of the said State.
1st. For sacrificing by his conduct the capital of the State of Georgia, and the troops of that State, on the 29th day of December, 1778, which was the first cause of the distresses and consequences which ensued.
2dly. For crossing the Savanna river the day succeeding the 29th December, 1778, with the troops that escaped from Savanna, and ordering those at Sunbury and Augusta to do the same, leaving the State at the mercy of the enemy without any continental troops, instead of retreating to the back country and gathering the inhabitants; whereby the good people of the State were further discouraged, and the country, thus abandoned, became an easy prey to the British troops, they marching up and taking post at Augusta, and sending detachments to every part of the State.
Major General HOWE appears before the Court, and the above charges being read to him, he pleads
To the first charge—NOT GUILTY.
To the second charge—he acknowledges that he crossed the Savanna river after he retreated, as soon as circumstances would admit, and that he ordered the garrison at Sunbury to evacuate that post, and join him wherever he might be; but does not recollect that he ordered the evacuation of Augusta.
The evidence in support of the charges not attending, the Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
DECEMBER 8th.
The Court being met according to adjournment, the Judge Advocate informs the Court, that two material witnesses in support of the charges are General Elbert and Colonel Walton; that the former is in Maryland, and he is informed was some time since summoned by the Board of War; that, however, he is not arrived, and that Colonel Walton refuses to attend, for reasons alledged in his letter annexed, No. 3. Whereupon the Court ordered the letter No. 4, annexed hereto, to be written to the Delegates of the State of Georgia; and then the Court adjourned till Monday morning, ten o'clock.
(No. 3.)
I HAVE had the favor of your summons to attend a Court-Martial, appointed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to sit on the conduct of Major General Howe, on the complaint of the State of Georgia. It is not unknown to Major General Howe, or to the Delegates of the State, that I declined to give evidence upon this subject whilst the prosecution was in the form of an enquiry, and depositions taking in the War-Office by order of Congress, until measures should be taken for obtaining the testimony of Major General Elbert, who commanded the Georgia brigade of continental troops on the 29th day of December, 1778, the corps which suffered the most by capture on that occasion: And the sacrifice or loss of the troops being the principal object of the prosecution, I should suppose that the trial would be partial without his evidence; or, at least, that implied censure might be recorded against his conduct in the minutes of the Court, which might injure a most valuable citizen and soldier of the State. Indeed, I should think myself accessary in the wrong which might take place, did I not plead that the trial might be fait and full, taking in his essential evidence. For these reasons, Sir, it is that I have hitherto and do now declined to attend the Court; but when it shall be decided to take General Elbert's testimony before the proceedings are close, then shall I chearfully depose what I know in this case. I beg that you would please to make my respects to the Court, and acquaint the members with the reasons assigned for my conduct.
P. S. I have understood that General Elbert, who is in Maryland, was sent for by the late Commissioners of the War-Office; but I do not know it as a fact.
(No. 4.)
THE Court-Martial ordered by his Excellency the Commander in Chief for the trial of Major General Howe, upon certain charges exhibited against him by the Delegates of the State of Georgia, having met and summoned the evidences whose names were given in, are acquainted that only Colonel Walton can be found, and that he declines to give his evidence, for the reasons contained in his letter which is inclosed; that General Elbert and Colonel Marbury are in Maryland, and tho' summoned some time since to attend, as the Court are informed, are not yet arrived.—The Court therefore request, Gentlemen, to know whether you are content the trial should proceed upon such evidence as can now be obtained, or whether you expect the trial to be postponed to a distant day, when the deficient evidence may be procured. I am, Gentlemen,
DECEMBER 10th.
The Court met according to adjournment, and the Judge Advocate read to them a letter from the Delegates of the State of Georgia (No. 5) in answer to their's of Saturday; Whereupon the Court determined to proceed to the examination of such evidences as could be procured, and in the mean time measures should be taken to procure the absent evidences.
(No. 5.)
WE do ourselves the pleasure to reply to your letter of yesterday, and are sorry to understand that the operative powers of the Court are impeded for want of evidence in the case of Major General Howe, on the part of the State of Georgia. We are not informed by the Board of War with the time or conveyance of the summonses sent to General Elbert and Colonel Marbury; and it will appear pretty evident to you, that we have no coercive powers to compel evidence to attend. Under a train of circumstances peculiar in themselves, we cannot presume to dictate to the Court; but if difficulties exist, the propriety of a reference to Congress will readily occur. We annex the names of such persons as have occurred to us since the delivery of those to the Board of War, whose evidence we wish to have taken on the trial, in addition to the former. We are, Sir,
The Court adjourned till Friday morning, ten o'clock.
DECEMBER 14th.
The Court met according to adjournment.
Major Lucas was sworn.
Q. by the Court. Were you in the army in Georgia under the orders of General Howe the latter end of 1778, when the enemy invaded that State?
A. I was.
[Page 5]Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As a Captain in the Georgia Line.
Q. Do you know what steps were taken by General Howe to prevent the enemy's landing in that State?
A. I visited the post at Girardeau's landing, where Captain Smith was posted with about 75 men; my situation in the army prevented me from seeing the different posts.
Q. Where did the enemy land?
A. At Girardeau's landing.
Q. Do you know the opposition that was made to their landing?
A. No; I heard a firing, but was not present.
Q Where was the main body of the army when the enemy landed, and at what distance was it from the place of landing?
A. At Fair-Lawn, better than a mile from the place of landing.
Q. Do you know what force they landed?
A. No; I understood, when I was prisoner, that they landed 2500 men at that place.
Q. Did they land at any other place?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Where were you posted that day?
A. With my regiment in the Georgia brigade, on the left of the line.
Q. After the enemy had landed, did the line move down to oppose them, or did they wait the enemy's attack?
A. They waited the enemy's attack.
Q. Did the enemy attack them in their position at Fair-Lawn, and what resistance was made?
A. We were posted in a position of defence against the enemy, the South-Carolina brigade on the right, the Georgia brigade on the left, the artillery in the centre, and a party of militia, under the command of Colonel Walton, on the right of the whole, to oppose the enemy at a pass, I think a mile from the main body, where the enemy's infantry did attack them; but a small resistance being made by them, enabled the enemy's infantry to attack our right flanks immediately after, at which time the main body moved on, firing a few shot from their artillery, which did some small damage in the Georgia brigade; about that time we had orders to retreat, agreeable to the disposition given the night before, which was by a defile called Springhill to M'Gilvray's gate, an advantageous piece of ground.
Q. Was the retreat conducted agreeably to the disposition?
A. No; the brigade I belonged to moved off in column, and were afterwards ordered by the commanding officer to form by files, and some time afterwards they broke, and the principal part went into Savanna. Two parties were taken out of the brigade, by order of General Howe, as we were moving in column, to act as infantry on the flanks; the piece of artillery ordered to cover the rear of that brigade quitted its station, and left the brigade shortly after the retreat began.
Q. By whose orders did the party go into town?
A. I cannot tell.
Q. Was the commanding officer with them?
A. I cannot say; I being in the front of the brigade moved on; the troops being formed in files, they extended to a great length. Some time after the troops were formed in files, Colonel Elbert left us, as I understood afterwards, to look for a pass over M'Gilvray's creek. I arrived at the mouth of the creek with about eighty of the front of the column; for want of orders I staid some time there, when a superior officer hoisted the flag, and surrendered the party.
Q. Who was the officer that surrendered the party?
A. Major John Habersham.
Q. What number did your brigade consist of?
A. I can't certainly tell, I believe upwards of 300.
Q. Were only the eighty men you mention, who arrived with you at the creek, included in the surrender of Major Habersham?
A. The greater part of those who went into town had by that time arrived at the creek, and were included in the surrender.
Q. To what number of troops did Major Habersham surrender?
A. The greatest part of the enemy's army had by that time arrived.
Q. Did you see Colonel Elbert, after he left you to look for the pass?
A. No.
Q. As you were the head of the brigade, what occasioned the brigade to leave the line of march, pointed out in the disposition:
A. Colonel Elbert was at the head of the brigade, when they left the route pointed out in orders.
Q. Did you, from the time you took up the line of march, until the time you left the route laid down in the disposition, see General Howe, or either of his Aids, with Colonel Elbert?
A. No.
Q. When your brigade left the route, was the front of it at its proper distance in the general column?
A. The brigade had halted to form by files; this had occasioned the brigade to fall about 3 or 400 yards in the rear of the artillery.
Q. Had General Elbert been absent from the column from the time you took up the line of march, till you left the route laid down in the disposition?
A. No.
Q. Was the march by files a part of the general disposition given out?
A. No.
Q. What time did the firing commence at the landing?
A. About sun-rise.
[Page 6]Q. by General Howe. Where was the Georgia brigade ordered to break into files?
A. Nigh the burying-ground.
Q. Were there some roads which led into Savanna not far from the burying-ground?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see me at that place?
A. No; I saw you a little time before pass the brigade.
Q. Did you hear me speak to the officers and men as I passed the brigade?
A. I do not recollect it.
Q. Were the men in good order when I passed them?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear me, in general terms, commend the order the troops were in?
A. I think I did.
Q. Do you know of any troops employed to break up the ground in front of the line?
A. Detachments were sent out the night before the action for that and other purposes.
Q. What part of the town did the troops break into?
A. About the centre.
Q. Was the part of the swamp, where the enemy crossed to attack the militia on the right, commonly known to be passable?
A. I had always understood it was impassable.
Q. by the Court. What time did the firing commence on the right with the militia, under Colonel Walton?
A. I can't exactly tell; about two o'clock.
Q. What measures were taken to prevent the enemy's advance from the landing, and what opposition was made?
A. Several detachments went from the line after the enemy had landed; I do not know for what purpose.
Q. by General Howe. Are you acquainted with the situation of Girardeau's plantation?
A. I have been there frequently, but am not perfectly acquainted with its situation.
Q. Is there a large extent of rice-fields before it, and are those fields perfectly level?
A. There is an extensive plain of rice-fields before it.
Q. How wide do you think it is from Girardeau's house to the landing-place?
A. I can't really say; I should suppose about three quarters or a mile.
Q. Are there any causeways through that rice-field?
A. There are a great number of banks passable.
Q. Were you ever in the rice-field?
A. Yes.
Q. What nature of ground is the field in general?
A. Wet at times, but passable for infantry.
Q. When the retreat was ordered, what was the order of march directed?
A. In one column.
Q. Did they move off in that order?
A. Yes.
Q. by Court. Was the road through which the column marched practicable for a larger front than a file?
A. Yes; large enough for any platoon.
Q by General Howe. Did the troops keep in good order while they remained in column?
A. They were in perfect good order whilst in column.
Q. When you arrived at the creek, did you attempt to pass it?
A. No.
Q. Do you know of any action between our troops and the enemy at Springhill defile?
A. I was not there; I heard a firing, which I supposed to be there.
Q. Where were you then?
A. Near M'Gilvray's creek.
The Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
DECEMBER 15th.
The Court met according to adjournment.
Nicholas White produced to the Court a general order, appointing him to act as Judge Advocate, vice Captain Walker, whose indisposition obliged him to retire, after which he was sworn.
Major Lucas's testimony continued.
Q. by General Howe. Why did you not pass the creek?
A. For want of orders.
Q. Did you hear from the enemy, when a prisoner, by what means they discovered the pass on my right?
A. I heard, when among them, it reported, that a Negroe had discovered to the commanding officer the defile by which they passed the swamp.
Q. by Court. Whether, from your knowledge of the rice-fields near Mr. Girardeau's house, was it easy to overflow them with water?
A. I cannot tell.
Q. by General Howe. Could you have crossed the creek with your party, had you been ordered to do it?
A. I could have crossed myself by swimming, and such of my party as could swim, with the loss of our arms and accoutrements. On my arrival at the creek I met with Captain Day, of the Georgia line, who was then taking off his boots on purpose to cross the creek; I asked him if he had seen the commanding officer; he said he had not, but that I was his commanding officer, and would act as I thought proper; on which he put on his boots and joined me.
[Page 7]Q. Was it before, or upon the retreat, that the damage was done to the Georgia brigade by the enemy's artillery?
A. Upon the retreat.
The Court adjourned to Thursday morning, ten o'clock.
Mr. John Wereat being under a necessity of leaving the city of Philadelphia, the Judge Advocate, on behalf of the prosecution, and Major General Howe in his own right, and by direction of the General Court-Martial, agreed to take his deposition before one of the Justices of the Peace for the city of Philadelphia. The Judge Advocate having asked Mr. Wereat the different questions proposed by the Delegates of the State of Georgia, and he answering them in the negative, being a private citizen, the Judge Advocate did not think it necessary to ask Mr. Wereat any further questions on behalf of the prosecution. Then the following questions were put by General Howe:
Q. Do you recollect that the inhabitants of the town were advised by me to remove their effects, for fear of accident?
A. I believe it was hinted to the inhabitants to provide against the worst by removing their effects; that many did remove part of their property, and more would have done so, could they have procured boats and carriages for that purpose.
Q. Do you know the morass below Tatnall's gate, in front of the position of the troops on the 29th of December, and the ground on the other side of it?
A. I am well acquainted with the road leading from Savanna by Tatnall's to the place where the enemy landed. Some distance below Tatnall's gate there is a causeway through a morass, or very boggy swamp, which I believe is not passable for a footman above the causeway, and but with difficulty below it.
Q. Are you acquainted with that part of the swamp where the enemy passed on my right, and if you are, please to describe it?
A. I knew nothing of the swamp by which the enemy passed at that time, but have been through it frequently since. It was not wide, but a thicket, and boggy. The French, at the siege of Savanna, made it passable, by laying poles across it.
Q. What are the landing places above and below my position at Fair-Lawn, and is there any approach by Haner's mill, and if there is, where does it come into the town?
A. There were a variety of landing-places, both above and below the place of the enemy's landing at Girardeau's; namely, Costin's Bluff, Half-moon Bluff, Mulbryne's and Thunderbolt, below, the former called three, and the latter five miles from Savanna by land, and may be something more. Above, and by way of the Back river, there are Rae's and M'Gilvray's landings, the former five, and the latter two miles by land from Savanna, and five intermediate landing-places between them. All these landings, both above and below, are on high land, with roads leading from them towards Savanna. There is a road that goes round near Haner's mill, and comes in by the barracks. It was a very good one in September and October 1779.
Q. What is the extent of the rice-field between Girardeau's house and the river; are there any causeways leading through it to the high land, beside that leading directly to the house, and was the rice-field itself passable for infantry or not?
A. The distance from Girardeau's house on the high land to the river I believe to be about half a mile, perhaps a little more. I believe there were other banks, beside the main one, that led directly from the landing to the house. The field was extensive, and the effects of the north-westerly winds, that prevailed for several days before the approach of the enemy, kept the tides low, and I believe made the rice-field passable for infantry any where but across creeks.
Q. Could the rice-field, about the 29th December, have been easily overflown, and would or would not the sluices, if they had been overflown, been under the command of the cannon of the enemy's shipping?
A. This question is answered in part by the preceding answer. The westerly winds always make low tides, and there is no other way of flowing the fields, had the dams and sluices been in good order, which I have reason to believe was not the case; but if they were, the enemy had the absolute command of them by their vessel.
Q. Did the Governor of Georgia contest the command with me until after my taking position near Tatnall's house?
A. The Governor (Houston) of Georgia did contend for the command, and relinquished it (as I understood and believed) after the enemy appeared in the river, and only a day or two before they landed.
Q. Were the troops halted at Treutlan's plantation, the bridges between that and Savanna preserved, and were any parties sent down the country for that purpose?
A. I well remember the halt at Treutlan's about 36 miles above Savanna, either two or three nights, and one night at a plantation about a mile distant from Treutlan's, to the best of my recollection. The bridges were not taken up, and I remember to have heard General Howe say, that he would not put it out of the power of the inhabitants to remove; and from what he said, I believe the security of the inhabitants and their property was the reason that the bridges were not destroyed, and I know that much property and some of the inhabitants were secured by this precaution. I also remember that a party of horse was sent to Ebenezer-bridge, as I understood, to guard that pass, and give notice of the approach of the enemy.
JOHN WEREAT.
[L. S.] BEFORE me, the subscriber, one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Philadelphia, personally appeared John Wereat, the deponent, who being duly sworn on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, did depose and say, in the presence of Major General Howe and Nicholas White, Esquire, Judge Advocate, that the several answers to the questions of Major General Howe, as contained in the within deposition, were just and true, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
[Page 8]Mr. John Gibbons being under the necessity of leaving the city, the Court were of opinion that his evidence and examination should be taken before one of the Justices of the Peace for the city, in the presence of Major General Howe and the Judge Advocate, to which Gen. Howe and the Judge Advocate consented.
Q. by the Judge Advocate. Were you in the army in Georgia under the orders of General Howe the latter end of 1778, when the enemy invaded that State?
A. I was in the militia.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As a private on horse-back, for the purpose of reconnoitering.
Q. Do you know what steps were taken by General Howe to prevent the enemy's landing in that State?
A. No.
Q. Where did the enemy land?
A. At Girardeau's landing, commonly called Brewton's plantations.
Q. Do you know the opposition that was made to their landing?
A. No; I heard there was a party of men there that fired upon them, and killed two or three of them.
Q. Where was the main body of the army when the enemy landed, and what distance was it from the place of landing?
A. At a plantation called Fair-Lawn, about a mile from Savanna, and about a mile and a quarter from the place of landing by the main road, and about three quarters of a mile upon a strait line across the fields.
Q. Do you know what force they landed?
A. I was told they landed from 2500 to 3000 men.
Q. Did they land at any other place?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Where were you posted that day?
A. In the fore part of the day, as I was on horse-back, I was ordered out to reconnoitre, and at the time of action I was with the militia, on the right of the continentals about three quarters of a mile.
Q. How many probable places of landing were there in the vicinity of the town?
A. I cannot say exactly; but from information, there were several, both above and below, where they might have landed.
Q. Were there any steps taken to watch the motions of the enemy at those places?
A. I was one of a party of mounted militia that was sent down to a place called the Oyster-house, upon Augustine creek, to watch the motions of the enemy, where we remained one night.
Q. After it was known that the enemy had landed, what measures were taken to ascertain their numbers, and to oppose them?
A. I don't know what measures were taken to ascertain their numbers; but as I was returning from the Oyster-house, I met Colonel M'Intosh, with a party of men, posted about half a mile from where the enemy landed, and about three quarters of a mile from the main army.
Q. Was the place where the enemy landed known in time, and was it defensible?
A. I don't know whether it was known in time or not, and can't say whether it was defensible or not, having never been on the ground.
Q. Do you know what force was stationed there, and the resistance made?
A. No.
Q. Was the position of the army the best possible to have been taken for the defence of the town?
A. I cannot say, not being acquainted with military affairs.
Q. Were the passes leading indirectly to the town secured?
A. I don't know.
Q. In what manner did the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. They came through a swamp opposite to where the militia was posted, and on their discovering the militia they immediately formed, to the number of about 300, and rushed on, and there was little or no resistance made by the militia when they broke and dispersed.
Q. How many of our troops were taken, and in what manner?
A. I was informed there were 300 prisoners taken, and the reason of it was, they had gone below the pass at Spring-hill, and could not cross M'Gilvray's creek.
Q. How many cannon and what stores were lost?
A. I cannot say.
Q. When did the army cross Savanna river, and in what manner?
A. I don't know.
Q. Were the troops at Augusta and Sunbury ordered to leave the State, and by whose orders?
A. On the night of the 29th of December I met an officer of the rank of Captain, I think his name was Moseby, who informed me that he was going with orders to the commanding officer at Sunbury to evacuate that post, by order of General Howe.
Q. by General Howe. Were you with the militia posted on the right, to oppose the passage of the enemy through the swamp on the 29th of December?
A. I was.
Q. Do you know Colonel Walton?
A. Yes; I know him.
Q. Did you see him at the post where the enemy crossed the swamp, or any where in the field in the course of that day?
A. I do not recollect that I did, except in the fore part of the day, before the militia took post at the swamp.
Q. When the militia broke, had the enemy fired on them?
A. I believe not.
Q. In what manner did they quit the field?
A. In a very disorderly and irregular manner, and with the greatest expedition
[Page 9]Q. Do you know of any orders given by Colonel Walton before or at the advance of the enemy?
A. I do not.
Q. Were there any parties sent from Treutlan's plantation to guard the bridges between that and Savanna?
A. I believe there was a party sent to guard one bridge between Ebenezer and Treutlan's plantation.
JOHN GIBBONS.
[L. S.] BEFORE me, the subscriber, one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Philadelphia, personally appeared John Gibbons, the deponent within named, who being duly sworn on the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God, did depose and say, in the presence of Major General Howe and Nicholas White, Judge Advocate, that the several answers to the questions of the Judge Advocate in behalf of the prosecution, and Major General Howe, as contained in the within deposition, were just and true, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
JANUARY 4th, 1782.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Colonel Nicola, Majors Olney and Rochefontaine sworn in as Members, vice Colonels Humpton, Moylan and Major Burnet, whose duty obliges them to leave this city.
Colonel George Walton sworn.
Q. by the Court. Were you in the American army in Georgia, at the time the British troops under the command of Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity did you act, and under whose command did you conceive yourself to be?
A. As a senior Colonel of the militia of the State, I was under the immediate command of the Governor until the 24th of December, 1778, on which day the Governor, by public orders, relinquished the command to Major General Howe, and ordered the militia to receive and obey his orders; which as Colonel Commandant of the militia I did, altho' the Governor issued orders to the militia afterwards.
Q. Do you know how long, previous to the invasion of Georgia, General Howe received intelligence of the designs of the enemy, and what steps were taken by him in consequence?
A. Some time about the middle of November, or a few days later, in the year 1778, part of the British troops from East Florida arrived at Sunbury by way of Colonel's island, while another penetrated the State by land. They evidently expected to have co-operated with a northern force, which not having arrived, they soon retreated. About the same time, or a few days after, a transport vessel put into Tybee, which had been separated from a fleet convoying troops of the enemy from New-York, under the conduct of Colonel Campbell; but this vessel also finding that fleet not arrived, again put to sea, not, however, until she had [...] a man to desert to us. This man gave a particular and circumstantial account of the fleet and troops coming from New-York, and was generally believed. As a proof, it was made the foundation of an act of the Governor and Council, appointing Dr. Hall and myself to go to General Lincolt, who was arrived or expected at Charlestown, in order to communicate this intelligence, as well as the general condition of the State. General Howe being in South-Carolina, and advices of this having been transmitted to that State, I take it for granted that he had the information as early as others; but when, or by whom he received it, is impossible for me to tell, and what steps were taken by him in consequence. I cannot ascertain precisely the day on which General Howe arrived at Savanna. It did not appear that he was expected, as it was understood, by the arrival of the Georgia delegates from Congress, that he had been recalled from his command in that department, and Major General Lincoln appointed to it. He, however, did come, reassumed the command, and gave assurances that he would defend the town, and that there was little danger. The Carolina troop; which came some time after united with the troops of Georgia, and an encampment formed in a line, leading from near Tatnall's house towards the fort at the Trustees gardens. And here the army lay until the afternoon of the 29th December, when the enemy made their attack. During this time, General Howe went several times to reconnoitre Girardeau's hill, Caustin's Bluff, and the banks of Augustine creek, lower down. I was with him more than once, and generally understood that it was his opinion that the enemy would land at Caustin's Bluff, on account of the landing being good, and approachable by water two ways.
A large wood, which lies between that and the town, I understood was to have been cut down to obstruct the enemy's progress by that route; but it was never done.
On the 28th December, in the afternoon, the enemy's vessels sailed up the Savanna river, considerably above the entrance of Augustine creek, which looked as if the landing was intended to be higher up; and in the evening, some time before sun-set, the Vigilante with heavy metal, and some other vessels, cast anchor opposite Girardeau's causeway, which operated as a general demonstration of their intention to land there. As the sun was setting. I accompanied General Howe and the principal officers of the army down to the Bluff opposite. Upon that occasion I understood that it was judged that the enemy would land there, and that works were to be thrown up in the night, and the causeway defended, but it was not done. The only force sent there, I understood, was a few men in the nature of a picquet. After we returned from the Bluff, I went to the militia which were at the fort, and presently afterwards received orders from one of General Howe's family (Major Grimkie I believe) to keep the militia upon the ground where they were until morning, and then to move them and take post to the left of the Georgia brigade, commanded by General Elbert; but in the morning I received orders (but whether from the same Aid or not I do not recollect) to remove back in the common and wait further orders, for that the balls from the enemy's vessels fell frequently on Elbert's left, and the militia would be exposed. As the morning of the 29th opened, the enemy were seen to move from their vessels in boats, and to land at the lower end of the causeway; and yet no alteration, that I know of or believe, took place in the arrangement and position of the American army. [Page 10] The enemy marched along a narrow causeway, upwards of half a mile in length, with a deep ditch on either side, and in fight of the army, without any other opposition than what was made by the small corps or picquet I have mentioned. They ascended a steep bluff, and took possession of the highest grounds about Savanna, and there deliberately formed their army. Being ignorant of what was really intended to be done, and tired with the suspense in which I had so long remained, some time in the afternoon I took Colonels Brisbane and Martin, who had engaged to act with me that day, down upon the bluff on the left of the army, with a view to observe the motions of the enemy, who began to make some tittle parade on the rice-fields, as though an attempt was designed upon our left by way of the fort. I instantly formed the conjecture that it was a deception, and that they would attempt our right by the way of the pass to Milledge's old field, and I immediately determined to order the militia that way, and mentioned it to them, and said that I would then go to General Howe, let him know what I had done, and my fears of the designs of the enemy. I presently found the General at the right of the army, and immediately asked him if he was not afraid that the light troops of the enemy would get round upon our right? he told me that he was not, for that he had fortified the only pass below Tatnall's house. I asked him where that work was? and he pointed to the place. I told him that the enemy would not attempt to cross the swamp there; that there was a very easy dry pass lower down, and more convenient for the enemy. He said I was surely mistaken, and desired me to go and look at the work he had caused to be thrown up. I rode down, examined it, and returned to the General, repeating what I had first said; and seeing that he had confidence that this work had been thrown up at the proper place, the more certainly to convince him, I made use of the following expressions, or words to the like purpose: ‘General, in order that you may be convinced that what I say to you is true, I assert to you, upon my honor, that before the war I have frequently crossed the pass I mean in a chair, with young ladies, picking jessamines.’ This had the desired effect; he appeared convinced, asked me where my regiment was; I told him I had moved it to the right; he thanked and desired me to go and reconnoitre the pass I had mentioned. I instantly went off, and as I entered the swamp along that pass, I perceived the British light infantry hopping over the little difficulties with great agility. I was perceived, but not fired at. Foreseeing that the enemy would be soon round, I rode full speed with the intelligence to the ground where the militia horse were posted, and sent it to General Howe (but by whom I do not recollect, I believe there were several that rode off with it) and followed immediately after myself, and reported to the General himself, that the enemy were in force on our right. I was ordered to the militia, in the front of which, at about 70 or 80 yards, the enemy formed the line of two deep, in numbers, as appeared then and since, about 350. Once or twice a field piece had already been discharged at the enemy, and some execution done, when Colonel Marbury rode up and told me, that General Howe ordered me to attack the light infantry immediately. I told him the field-piece was already directed against them, and, pointing to the smallness of my numbers, which was then under 100 men, and at the time in some little confusion, added, I beg you to give my compliments to the General, and assure him that I will do every thing in my power; but I do most earnestly entreat that he will either wheel one of the brigade's round, or only succour me with a single company of continental troops, to countenance the militia. He went off, and presently after the enemy in my front opened their line, and commenced a heavy fire of musketry upon my small corps, which obliged it to retire, and which it did in safety, save those killed or maimed upon the field. Having a thigh broke in the action, I took the resolution of endeavouring to get into town, and crossed the General in his retreat, the whole army having been removed from their field position without waiting the attack of Colonel Campbell, except artillery, or turning the right, and attacking the light infantry under Sir James Baird.
The Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 5th.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Colonel Walton's testimony continued.
Q. Do you know what force the enemy landed?
A. From all the information which had been received, it appeared that the 71st British regiment and Delancey's brigade of American recruits were part of the enemy's army, by which it was concluded by every body that they were in force. From the fort where the militia were in the dawn of the morning of the 29th, the enemy's light infantry were plainly seen to land at the lower end of the causeway, and to march up and take post at the Bluff, where the small number of troops or picquet was posted. I have already mentioned what their numbers were. I did not perceive that any more troops were landed until they gained that post, and then the debarkation continued until the invading army was compleated, which appeared to be about two o'clock in the afternoon, to the best of my recollection. I do not know their numbers, but believe them to have been 2000 at least. I understood, that before they advanced the enemy had been reconnoitered by Major Moore, and that he reported to the General that there were upwards of 3000 men.
Q. What was the composition and number of the army under General Howe?
A. The army under the command of Major General Howe was composed of a brigade of continental troops from South-Carolina, the Georgia brigade, and the militia under my command. The number of either of the brigades I do not know, and by consequence neither their amount when combined; but I believe the whole together were less than 1000 men, including Colonel Roberts's artillery, which I forgot to mention.
Q. In what manner did the main body of the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. I have already mentioned, that I had formed the conjecture some time in the afternoon of that day, that the enemy intended to endeavour to gain our right by Milledge's pass; and of course I expected that the main body would approach our line by the road leading from Savanna to the Governor's gate, as a brigade of ours was posted on either side of that road, while the artillery was placed in its centre. When the light infantry had gained the pass on the right, and had received a fire from the field piece with me, [Page 11] it appeared that the enemy's artillery, taking this for the signal, was advanced, and began to play at long shot upon our line, which I understood was done by our artillery at the same time. No doubt the infantry was also advancing, but not being present, I could not see them. I always understood, however, and believe that the retreat was ordered and in execution before they came within fighting distance.
Q. When, and in what manner did the army retreat?
A. That part of the army with me retreated towards the Spring-hill and Sheftall's tan-yard; but being unable to proceed with them, I turned off towards town. I understood they retreated by those routes. About midway from the south-west corner of the town and the Spring-hill, being faint, I was taken from my horse. After recovering, which was almost immediately, I perceived scattered troops and citizens out of the town running and riding in great disorder towards that hill. The musket-bullets then began to reach the place where I lay, but seemed to be spent. Before I was taken down, one of General Howe's Aids (Captain Turner) passed me, going towards the hill; and presently after the General himself. Major Grimkie and some others came up. I then learned that the day was wholly unfortunate. Having found myself better, and the light infantry which had driven the militia from their ground having pushed in towards the town, with an evident view to cut off the rear of our army, I desired the General to leave me, and was put again upon my horse, and proceeded as fast as possible to Mr. Watts's, in Yamacraw. Just as I got there, I saw a number of the Georgia troops running along the street towards Nunez's creek in the like confusion. I did then suppose that some mode of crossing it had been established, as it was a work of scarce an hour, by throwing over it a piece of scantling; but I understood soon afterwards that many of them were captured upon its banks, it not having been then, or indeed at any other time fordable.
WE are sorry to understand, that the indisposition of General Elbert is like to prevent his attendance as an evidence on the trial of Major General Howe. Should that be the case, we are hopeful the Court will direct his deposition to be taken, before the close of the trial, upon the interrogatories that were given in by us to the Board of War, in behalf of the State of Georgia. We are, Sir,
- EDWARD TELFAIR,
- W. JONES.
I HAD the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, and beg leave to acquaint you, that the opinion of the Court is, that the proposition therein contained is inadmissable, it being contrary to the usage and custom in like cases; and that they have taken every step in their power to obtain the evidence of General Elbert, but find, by a certificate received from the Doctors attending him, that he is not in a condition to travel. I am, Gentlemen, with great respect,
The Court adjourned till Tuesday morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 8th.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment. Major Dexter sworn as a Member, in the room of Major Moore, whose indisposition obliged him to retire.
Colonel Walton's testimony continued.
Q. What wat the loss in men, cannon and stores, and by what means were they lost?
A. I do not know particularly the loss in either. I have seen a return made by each of the Brigades, the amount of both was somewhere about 300, tho' I do not exactly recollect; they were chiefly lost by capture. The army were kept with an apparent view of fighting the enemy; but the enemy having got in the rear of the right of the line before any attack was made in front, the continental line was ordered to retreat. Before it was effected, the enemy on our right defeated the militia under my command, and part of them pushed in upon their flank. I afterwards saw the rear broken and retreating towards Nunez's, as I have before mentioned. I believe that most of the cannon in the town and in the field were lost; how many were saved I cannot tell, being a prisoner. The one with the militia was abandoned upon being overpowered by the enemy. With regard to those in the town, as well as the stores in general, they appeared to me to have been lost by the jealousies and a supineness which characterize and tincture the transactions of that time. Mutual applications, complaints and reproaches, between the Governor of the State and the General, took place of real exertion, and the cannon and stores were not removed; in consequence fell into the enemy's hands.
Q. When did the army cross Savanna river, and in what manner?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know of any orders given to the troops at Augusta and Sunbury to leave the State?
A. No; I do not positively.
Q. What were the number of militia belonging to the State of Georgia?
A. In the year 1773, Government ordered a return of the men to be made from the age of 16 to 60, as I recollect, and by that return it appears that there were two thousand five or six hundred men, the precise number I do not recollect. Since that return was made, there was a considerable augmentation of inhabitants to the westward, but I do not believe they made up for the number of fugitive tories that sought protection from the enemy from the lower country. So that I suppose that at that day the number of fighting men might be nearly equal with that returned in 1773, or not so much.
Q. When the invasion of Georgia took place, what proportion of militia was requested by General Howe of the executive authority?
A. I do not know.
[Page 12]Q. Do you know the numbers actually in the field at that time?
A. The prospect of losing the town and the neighbouring country, I believe, prevented many from joining the army, they being employed in removing their families and property from the more southern parts, except about Sunbury, as well as in the neighbourhood of Savanna; and whether those from the westward had been called for in tim I do not know, but there were a very small proportion in service upon that occasion. What number were in arms with the corps at Sunbury I do not know. I had under my command at Savanna, including infantry, artillery and the company of horse, which I did not include in my former estimation, something above 100 men; the precise number I cannot ascertain. I believe another cause why the militia was backward upon that occasion was, the disputes already suggested between the Governor and General.
Q. Was the army provided with tools to erect the works proposed at Girardeau's Bluff?
A. I do not know.
Q. You mention your party being in confusion at the time you were ordered to attack the British light infantry. What was the occasion of that confusion?
A. The superior numbers of the enemy who were drawn up in front.
Q. Do you know of any previous dispositions made by General Howe in case of retreat?
A. I do not, I never received any orders to retreat.
Q. Did you see the General's orders issued previous to the affair of the 29th?
A. I did not; the only general order I saw was that putting the militia in general orders [...] continental command, to the best of my recollection.
Q. How far is Milledge's pass from the post then occupied by the main body of General Howe's army?
A. I have already said that the head of the second branch was about a mile distant from town, and from thence about half a mile to the pass; so that the pass being about a mile and an half from town, in the circuit of the path, and the position of General Howe's main body being below the town, the circuit would be continued about one quarter of a mile farther; therefore, to the best of my judgment, the distance was about one mile and three quarters.
Q. What was the general face of the country over which the enemy passed to make their attack?
A. In the front of the American line lay a bed or row of springs, which formed to the lest a gut extending to the river, whilst those which lay more to the right make a marsh in the opposite direction. Immediately below Tatnall's fence, it assumes the appearance of a swamp (by which I mean low, watry and miry ground, largely wooded and thickly underbrushed.) At the commencement of this swamp, that is a little below Tatnall's fence, was the small work which the General had caused to be thrown up on his right, and which, by his desire, I examined. To the right of that work, about half a mile, to the best of my judgment, though I never traversed it in a direct line, is the pass across the swamp to Milledge's old field. The dull way or path which leads from town to this pass begins its course about opposite the burying-ground, and continues in a southern direction until it gains the head of a second marshy branch, about one mile distant from town, to the best of my judgment. It then turns down that branch in a north-east direction to the pass, in distance about half a mile, to the best of my judgment. From the other, or eastern side, to the Governor's gate, is about three quarters of a mile, or not quite so much, at which place the path used to enter the great road; but latterly, and before that day, most of the old fields, and all the ground lying between that and the gate, had been enclosed and under cultivation. At this crossing-place, the waters appear to me to have forced themselves into a single bed, and to form a kind of running branch of creek, over which there appears to have been once a wooden bridge; but since my remembrance, there were only two or three sleepers or logs across. On my way from reporting to the General, and before I got quite up to my command, Colonel William M'Intosh, who commanded the horse that day, cried out that the enemy were crossing the branch, which I that moment perceived. It was the branch nearest to town, and the place they crossed some little distance below the path-way, say about 100 or 150 yards. I take it, they stept over upon roots and high tufts, which are common in the marshy branches of that country. Upon their crossing this branch, I neither went or sent to the General, because, from the intelligence I had already given, it was an event he must have expected, and that it would have been presently announced by firing.
Q Did you ever mention to General Howe Milledge's pass previous to the day of action?
A. I do not remember to have mentioned it to him until the time I have already mentioned. The first object was to guard against the enemy's landing, which occupied my mind; and after they had landed at Girardeau's, I was not with the General until the time I have mentioned, as I recollect. When I went down, in the anxiety I have heretofore related, the first enquiry was respecting that pass.
Q. What were the reasons that prevented your seeing the general orders on the day of attack?
A. I know of no particular reason; the militia had but lately been put under continental command, and I was not in the practice of going for orders, nor were they sent to me.
Q. Whether the shores above Nunez's creek were equally practicable for the enemy to land as those below?
A. The shores or bluffs above Nunez's creek are not so steep and abrupt as the hill at Girardeau's; but the navigation to them is much more difficult. Musgrove's or Nunez's creek was more difficult to cross by an enemy, than the obstruction below the town.
The Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 9th.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Colonel Walton's testimony continued.
Q. Was the town of Savanna fortified in any degree?
A. The town itself was not fortified. At the north-east point of the Trustees gardens, a fort had been some considerable time before erected, and some pieces of 18 pound cannon and others of less size planted in it, for the evident defence of the town. I do not recollect any other works, except those slightly thrown up in the field upon that occasion.
[Page 13]Q. When General Howe gave assurance of defending the town, did you understand from him upon what principles he meant to defend it?
A. I do not know the principles upon which the defence of the town was undertaken, in any military point of view. I heard General Howe say, in presence of a number of the inhabitants of the town, on the 23th or 26th preceding the attack, I forget which, that the enemy's army was composed of raw boys from the Highlands and of Delancey's green-coats, who would not fight, and that he did not care if they were double the number.
Q. by General Howe. Do you know at what time the Governor of Georgia informed me that the militia was under my command?
A. The orders by which the militia were put under continental command were dated the 24th December, and the next day, to the best of my recollection, the militia were put in general orders; hence I conclude that the General must have been informed the evening of the 24th.
Q. Did any body of militia join you, besides those of your own regiment?
A. About 20 men, a few more or less, I cannot recollect, came down from the neighbourhood of Ebenezer; but whether they were with me on the day of attack or not I forget. Some gentlemen from the country were volunteers.
Q. Did you proceed with Dr. Hall to South-Carolina, agreeable to the resolution of the Governor and Council.
A. I did not. Dr. Hall was not at first ready, and when he was, I desired him to proceed; that having much better horses, I could go much faster: The evening preceding the day I was to have set out, an express arrived from Skidaway, announcing the arrival of a fleet upon the coast. I then deemed it improper to leave my regiment.
Q. When General Provost first penetrated the State of Georgia with troops, did I repair to that State?
A. I have already mentioned that General Howe was in South-Carolina, and expected to go to the northward. When the troops from East-Florida first came into the State, neither the General nor General Elbert was in the State. He came, as I now recollect, soon after the retreat of the enemy from pursuing our troops to Ogechee hill.
Q. Was I with the troops at the south side of Ogechee river, when you were there with the militia?
A. Yes.
Q. When you and your party returned, did you not leave me at that place?
A. I remember that the militia under my command did duty upon the hill at Ogechee with the continental troops under the command of Major General Howe, and I believe when they returned the army was left upon that ground.
Q. After the report supposed to be from a deserter, was a body of Carolina militia, under the command of Colonel Bull, marched to Savanna?
A. I remember that Colonel Bull came over into Georgia with a body of South-Carolina militia; but I do not recollect the particular time, or upon whose application they came over.
Q. Were a detachment of Carolina continental infantry and artillery marched into Georgia, subsequent to a report of an intended invasion, and previous to the invasion?
A. With regard to the first, I do not know when any continental artillery or infantry were marched into Georgia, subsequent to the report of an invasion; previous to the attack both infantry and artillery arrived. There might have been a detachment there sooner.
Q. Did any considerable time elapse after a report made by the deserter, without any further intelligence of an invasion?
A. I cannot ascertain the precise time.
Q. Was any other information received by the State of an invasion, besides that of the deserter?
A. At this distance of time I do not recollect what particular informations were received. The invasion was generally expected.
Q. Did the Governor and Council receive information from any person of the transport vessel, except from the deserter already mentioned?
A. I do not know the nature of the information received by the Governor and Council, nor from whom, not having been a member.
Q. Were not the apprehensions of an invasion in a great measure subsiding?
A. Not that I know or believe.
Q. Were the Carolina militia, after remaining some few days at the barracks, dismissed?
A. I was chiefly out of town about that time, and do not know whether or by whom they were dismissed. They went soon away.
Q. Were any regiments of militia of the State of Georgia, subsequent to the report of an invasion, called forth by the State, and kept embodied?
A. I don't recollect that I knew what Government did about that time as to ordering the militia to be embodied, but there was none in actual service, except parts of my regiment occasionally.
Q. As you were in the Assembly, did you see any official letters of mine to the Legislature of the State, pointing out the weakness of it, and pressing upon them the necessity of fortifying it?
A. I have seen several letters of the General to the Legislature of that State, without being able to advert to their particular objects; I believe one was advising fortifications.
Q. After General Prevost retreated, previous to the arrival of Colonel Campbell, have you any knowledge of my applying to the Governor for hands, tools, and other materials for fortifying the State?
A. I do not recollect to have had any particular knowledge of particular applications, but I verily believe that applications were made.
Q. Do you know whether the Negroe you met acted as a guide to the enemy?
A. I looked upon him to be in the service of the enemy.
Q. Were there not various landing-places above the town of Savanna, which were accessible by the back river?
[Page 14]A. I have already said, or meant to say, there were.
Q. Did any part of the horse remain with the militia on the right that day?
A. When the enemy crossed the branch and formed, I asked for the horse, and was told by Colonel M'Intosh that they had all been sent different ways by the General. I had none at that time as I saw or recollect, except Colonel M'Intosh and Mr. O'Brian.
JANUARY 10th.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Major Benjamin Porter sworn.
Q. Were you in the army in Georgia, at the time the British troops under the command of Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As a Major in the Georgia line previous to the invasion, and on the 29th of December acted as a volunteer Aid with General Howe, having resigned my commission in the line five or six weeks before.
Q. What steps were taken by General Howe to prevent the enemy landing?
A. The troops were drawn up on a piece of ground called Fair-Lawn, nearly as some gentlemen have represented who were examined before me, and some guards posted between Fair-Lawn and Girardeau's landing, and I believe one at the landing, as I heard a firing which appeared to be at that place.
Q. Where did the enemy land?
A. At Girardeau's landing.
Q. Do you know what force the enemy landed?
A. I do not.
Q. What was the composition and number of the army under General Howe?
A. The number I do not certainly know, but I believe they were about 600, exclusive of the militia; they consisted of the Georgia and South-Carolina troops.
Q. In what manner did the main body of the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. The enemy first approached in front of our troops, but very little resistance was made, as the troops retreated immediately after it was known the enemy were gaining our right.
Q. When, and in what manner did the army retreat?
A. The army retreated immediately after I reported to General Howe that the enemy were gaining our right, and in column, the South-Carolina in front, the artillery in the centre, and the Georgia in the rear.
Q. What was the loss in men, cannon and stores, and by what means were they lost?
A. I don't know.
Q. When, where and in what manner did the army cross Savanna river?
A. The army crossed Savanna river at the Sisters a few days after the 29th in boats.
Q. Do you know of any orders given to the troops at Augusta and Sunbury to leave the State?
A. I do not.
Q. Was there any confusion in the retreat?
A. Not the least confusion among the continental troops as long as I staid with them, having left them near the burying-ground, at 3 or 400 yards from where the retreat commenced, and went into Savanna to dispatch my servant with my baggage, whom I ordered to hold himself in readiness.
Q. by General Howe. What was the first duty you were sent upon, after being an extra Aid to me?
A. To reconnoitre the enemy and the ground between Fair-Lawn and Girardeau's landing.
Q. What guards were between the troops at Fair-Lawn and the enemy?
A. There was one on the road leading to Girardeau's house, another in a wood still nearer to it, and I heard of and believe there was another at the landing before mentioned, as I heard a firing which appeared to be at that place.
Q. What was the distance from the position at Fair-Lawn to the place where the enemy landed?
A. About a mile and a half.
Q. What is the distance between Girardeau's house and the landing place, and what is the nature of the ground?
A. I suppose it may be about 500 yards from the landing place to Girardeau's house; there was a causeway leading directly from the landing to the house; there were several ditches also leading thro' a rice-field different ways; the dirt thrown out of them made banks which appeared dry enough to walk on; so appeared the field to be generally, tho' I was not on the field.
Q. Did the enemy's shipping command the landing-place?
A. Yes; I think effectually.
Q. Are you acquainted with the morass in front of our position at Fair-Lawn, what is the nature of it, and of the ground on each side of it?
A. I think I am acquainted with the nature of the ground, as I crossed the creek in front of our troops that were drawn up near the morass, which appeared to me deep, and impracticable for troops to cross in order. After the bridge was taken up, I found difficulty in getting my horse over, tho' planks were laid down for that purpose. The morass on each side of the creek, especially on the side of Fair-Lawn, appeared very boggy, and I think impassable for troops.
Q. Could the morass directly in our front be seen by persons approaching it until they came near it?
A. I think not, as the morass was wide, the descent sudden, and at a distance appeared like a plain.
Q. Did you, from any conversation that passed between us, or from any other circumstance, understand whether or not I was acquainted with the pass of which the enemy availed themselves?
A. I thought you were acquainted with the ground from your sending me several times to visit it, and from your seeming apprehensive of danger, should the enemy pass that way. I don't know certainly to this minute where the enemy did pass.
[Page 15]Q. Did I or did I not express to you my apprehension of the enemy passing on my right, and desired you and Major Deheyser alternately to watch them closely?
A. I don't recollect any particular conversation on that subject, but well remember you sent Major Deheyser and myself to examine the ground, which we did, and reported to you.
Q. Was there any horse posted that way?
A. Yes; there was a party of volunteer horse posted in a wood, near the swamp on our right.
Q. Did any parties patrole on our right?
A. Yes; I saw some horsemen riding through the wood between where the party of horse was and the swamp.
Q. When I was informed that the enemy was gaining my right, what steps were taken?
A. I remember to have informed General Howe the enemy had passed the swamp on our right, when he ordered a retreat, and sent me to take off a picquet which was posted on our right, and direct the officer to take the nearest route on the flanks of our army to Spring-hill defile.
Q. Were the orders for retreat given previous to any firing, or afterwards?
A. Previous to any firing, except from Colonel Roberts's artillery, at a party of the enemy directly in front, as well as I recollect.
Q. Did you see me in the retreat, and what were your observations?
A. I saw you on the flanks of the army, and you appeared to be attentive to the troops.
Q. Where did you join me after you had been sent with orders to the picquet on the right?
A. I joined you on the plain near the burying-ground, and as well as I recollect there was a road that led into Savanna.
Q. In what order were the troops at that time?
A. They were marching in column, and appeared to be in very good order.
Q. By what way did you make your retreat from the town of Savanna?
A. After being detained some time enquiring for my servant, I retreated over M'Gilvray's creek, some distance below the Spring-hill defile.
Q. Was it passable for troops, or otherwise?
A. It was by no means passable for troops in order, though they might have escaped that way, as I got over with some difficulty.
Q. Was there any heavy firing on the troops, when you left them to go into Savanna?
A. Not that I recollect.
Q. Why did you not retreat by the Spring-hill defile?
A. I made an attempt to go that way, but hearing a smart fire, which appeared to be at that place, I was induced to belive the enemy had taken possession, and that I was too late.
Q. Did the country in the vicinity of Savanna abound with waggons and teams?
A. I believe not.
Q. Do you know of any militia arriving at Savanna from South-Carolina?
A. Yes; a party commanded by Colonel Bull.
Q by General Howe. Did you see me riding to the right of the army, previous to the action of 29th December?
A. Yes; I saw you once or twice in the course of the day through a wood on the right of the army, and on the same side of the swamp with it.
Lieutenant Glascock sworn.
Q. Were you in the army in Georgia, at the time the British troops under the command of Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As Lieutenant in the first regiment in the Georgia brigade.
Q. Do you know what steps were taken by General Howe to prevent the enemy landing in that State?
A. I only know of one detachment sent to oppose the landing of the enemy, which was from the Georgia brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Moseby.
Q. Do you know what force they landed?
A. I believe about 3000 men.
Q. In what manner did the main body of the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. They advanced by the road leading through the centre of the continentals; the only opposition that was made, that I know of, was the firing of a few cannon, and a small flush that was thrown up in that road that they advanced, in which were two field-pieces.
Q. When, and in what manner did the army retreat?
A. The South Carolina brigade in front, and part of the artillery in the centre, the Georgia brigade in the rear of the whole, except a field-piece commanded by Captain Defoe.
Q. Was there any confusion in the retreat, and to what was it owing?
A. There was, and it appeared to me that the confusion was occasioned by the enemy's cannon being directed at the column, and the firing of small arms on our left flank.
Q. Did the Georgia troops during the retreat separate from the column?
A. They did.
Q. Do you know by what cause, and by whose orders?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you know the nature, extent and consequence of the confusion you mentioned?
A. The Georgia brigade, which I had a view of, were entirely confused, and the consequence was the most part of them were captured.
Q. Were the dispositions, in case of a retreat, mentioned in general orders previous to the action?
A. Yes they were, and we were to retreat, if dispersed, to the road where the fork leads to M'Gilvray's house, as well as I recollect.
[Page 16]Q. Was this rendezvous pointed out for the whole, or only part of the army?
A. For the whole of the army.
Q. Were not the troops ordered to retreat in column?
A. They were.
Q. Did they continue in good order while the column was preserved?
A. They did.
Q. Was there any change made in the formation, and if there was, what was it?
A. The arrangement of the Georgia brigade from platoons to files was a change made by order of General Elbert.
Q. What was the order observed after that part of the column was reduced?
A. Somewhat confused.
Q. Was there any halt made by the Georgia brigade after they broke into files?
A. The rear platoons, of course, were obliged to wait for those advanced in front.
Q. Did it occasion any space between the two brigades?
A. None.
Q. Did the troops go into town?
A. They did.
Q. At what place did they go into town?
A. Near the centre.
Q. Did they receive any orders to that purpose that you know of?
A. None.
Q. Was any detachment made from your brigade to reinforce the guard at Girardeau's landing on the 28th December?
A. Only Lieutenant Moseby's detachment, which I have already mentioned.
Q. by the Court. Do you know the reason of the column's being changed from platoons to files, or did you hear General Elbert give any reason for that manoeuvre?
A. It appeared to me that the arrangement of the Georgia brigade was changed from the enemy's cannon being directed at the column, and a shot striking near the centre, and immediately an alteration took place, but I do not recollect of ever hearing General Elbert give it as a reason.
Q. by General Howe. What number of shot were fired previous to the alteration?
A. Four or five.
Q. by the Court. Did you see General Howe with the Georgia brigade, after that change of disposition was made?
A. Not that I recollect.
Q. At what distance from the rear of the column do you suppose the artillery of the enemy was?
A. Six or seven hundred yards.
The Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 11th.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Lieutenant Edward Lloyd being sworn informs the Court, that on the 29th December, 1778, just as the enemy were approaching, he was requested by the Major of the regiment of militia to which he belonged to act as Serjeant-Major, and to get the men in order, but previous to that day he acted as a private, and that he knew nothing with respect to the general disposition of the army. The Court are of opinion that the capacity in which Lieutenant Lloyd acted on 29th December, would not admit of his knowing any matters respecting the charges exhibited against General Howe, and therefore thought it unnecessary to ask him any further questions on the subject.
Mordecai Shefftal sworn.
Q. Were you in the army in Georgia, at the time that the British troops under the command of Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was, and acted as Deputy Commissary General of Issues to the continental troops that were there, and Commissary General of Purchases and Issues to the militia.
Q. What quantity of provisions had you on hand on or about the 29th of December, 1778?
A. About 560 barrels of flour, 150 barrels of beef, 11 barrels of pork, a few barrels of bread, 12 hogsheads of rum, 2 hogsheads of brandy, and a small quantity of candles.
Q. Had you, on or about the 29th of December, made a return or report to General Howe of the quantity of provisions on hand?
A. On the 25th of December I reported to General Howe that I had a quantity of provisions on hand.
Q. Did you, on or previous to the 29th of December, receive any orders from General Howe to remove these provisions?
A. On the 25th I applied to General Howe, to know whether I should remove the provisions. He said he thought there was no danger. I told him, I thought there was. He then told me, if I thought proper, I might remove them. I then told him I could put some of them on board a vessel on freight. He then gave me an order for a Corporal and four privates, to impress Negroes to remove them from the store to the vessel. I set about it, and removed 78 barrels of flour.
Q. What became of the flour you removed?
A. It sat off from the wharff to go up the river, but what became of it afterwards I know not.
Q. Did you see any general orders respecting the removal of provisions from Savanna, on or before the 29th of December?
A. I never saw any.
Q. Had the provisions you have mentioned been removed so as to be out of the reach of the enemy, and the landing of the enemy so retarded as to require a longer stay of the army near Savanna, had you any means in that case to supply the army?
[Page 17]A. The Commissary of Purchases supplied me with fresh provisions for the use of the army, and what quantity he had by him I cannot tell.
Q. Could teams and waggons be procured in a short time from the inhabitants, for the removal of the stores to any island distant?
A. I do not think there could.
Q. Supposing the stores to have been removed by water, could they have been deposited in places inaccessible to the vessels and boats of the enemy?
A. They could have been secured for some time.
Q. From what authority did you hold your appointment as Commissary to the continental troops?
A. From General Elbert, then Colonel Commandant of the troops belonging to that State.
Q. When you applied to General Howe on the 25th of December, did you inform him that there was a sufficient quantity of vessels for the removal of provisions?
A. I told General Howe that there was a number of vessels at the wharff, if I had authority to impress them.
Q. by General Howe. Was the flour and beef, set forth in your testimony, all continental property?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you roll down to the landing any more than you have mentioned?
A. Yes; on Monday, the 28th, there were 240 barrels of flour rolled down.
Q. Were not the most of the crafts about town used by the inhabitants to remove their effects?
A. I cannot tell.
Q. Do you know of any orders given to the Quarter-master to procure boats and vessels to remove the provisions?
A. No; I know of none.
Q. When you received orders to impress the Negroes, were you limited to any number?
A. I don't recollect that I was.
Q. Was the vessel you did obtain loaded?
A. No; because she could not have gone up the river if she was loaded.
Q. by the Court. By whose orders were the 240 barrels of flour (mentioned in your answer to General Howe's question) removed?
A. By General Howe's order, and by a fatigue-party sent by him for that purpose.
Q. Were they transported by water?
A. They were not; they were left on the wharff, as the Spaniard who was to have taken them on board shipped his fast and ran up the river on the appearance of the vessels of the enemy.
The Court adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 12th.
The Court met according to adjournment.
Captain John Budd sworn.
Q. Were you in the army when Colonel Campbell invaded Georgia?
A. Yes.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As a Lieutenant in Colonel Roberts's regiment of artillery.
Q. Do you know what steps were taken by General Howe to prevent the enemy landing?
A. As there is such a length of time elapsed, I do not recollect any particular circumstance relative to the dispositions of the army.
Q. What was your post in the column in the retreat?
A. Immediately in front of the Georgia brigade.
Q. What was your post in the line in the time of action?
A. On the right of the continentals.
Q. Do you recollect at what period of the retreat the Georgia brigade quitted the line of march?
A. I do not recollect at what particular period, but the first I observed of their being gone was when we wanted them to support the field-piece when we arrived on the hill, where one of our horses and driver were shot, which was the means of our losing the piece.
Q. How far were you advanced in front of the Georgia brigade when the army took up their line of march on the retreat?
A. About twenty or thirty paces.
Q. How far distant from the town was the hill you speak of?
A. About half a mile to the northward.
Q. How far was the rear of the South-Carolina brigade advanced in your front at the time you halted?
A. There were three field-pieces and two ammunition-waggons between the infantry and the field-piece with which I was, and we were as close as we could be to the ammunition-waggon when we halted, and the front of the artillery close to the rear of the South-Carolina brigade.
Q. Was your piece particularly attached to the Georgia brigade?
A. I do not know that it was.
Q. Were there any more field-pieces, beside the one you mention, lost in the action of that day?
A. Not belonging to the continental troops.
Q. Did you fire your field-piece in the line, before the retreat commenced?
A. Yes; we did fire four or five times with round shot, at the distance of 150 paces.
Q. Had you any grape or case shot?
A. We had a great quantity of grape, but no case.
Q. by General Howe. Did you see me in the course of the retreat, and where?
[Page 18]A. Yes; I saw you speaking to Colonel Roberts immediately on the right of the field-piece with which I was, about mid-way between Spring-hill defile and Fair-Lawn, when Colonel Roberts told us that it was the orders for us to go on as quick as possibly we could.
Mr. Coshman Pollock sworn.
Q. Were you in the army in Georgia, at the time the British troops under Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was in the militia.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. As a private.
The Court were of the same opinion with respect to Mr. Pollock, as to Mr. Lloyd.
Major General Elbert sworn.
Q. Were you in the American army when Colonel Campbell invaded Georgia, and in what capacity?
A. I was, and in the capacity of Colonel Commandant of the Georgia brigade.
Q. Do you know how long previous to the invasion of Georgia General Howe received intelligence of the designs of the enemy, and what steps were taken by him in consequence?
A. I don't know that General Howe had any previous information of the designs of the enemy to invade the State of Georgia. Some time about the beginning of November 1778, being in Charles-Town on business of the public, where General Howe then was, accounts were received that Colonel Provost, with a considerable force from East-Florida, had invaded that State. I immediately received the General's orders to return to Georgia, where, I think the second day after my arrival, I was joined by him, who informed me that he had ordered some continental troops from the State of South-Carolina to our assistance, and that some militia of that State were assembling for the like purpose; the latter, after being some days in Georgia, returned. Colonel Provost having retreated before their arrival, part of the continentals ordered from South-Carolina were brought into Georgia, and the remainder posted at Purysburgh. Nearly about the time of Colonel Provost's invasion, a vessel arrived at Tybee, and after remaining a day or two sailed again. From this vessel we had a deserter, who informed that she was a transport with British troops on board, and one of a considerable fleet that had sailed from New-York to invade the State. Some time the latter end of December, a fleet appeared upon the coast, and a few days after arrived at Tybee; upon which General Howe drew all the troops of the State and those of South-Carolina before-mentioned to Savanna, except a garrison left in the sort at Sunbury, and Colonel Marbury's regiment posted at Augusta. On the 28th December, the enemy's fleet proceeded up the river Savanna, the van of which anchored nearly opposite Girardeau's, where, from some of their movements, it was judged they would attempt to land their troops. In the evening of that day I was at the above place with General Howe and several other officers, reconnoitering the enemy. The General, on leaving the place, requested that I would remain and post a picquet he had ordered there, and desired that I would order the officer commanding the picquet to cause the dam leading from the river to the hill to be cut across. When the picquet arrived, I posted them in the manner that I thought would best answer the purpose for which they were sent, and gave the officer the orders I had in charge from the General. I then marked out the ground where I judged it necessary to throw up some works, and told the officer I would go to the General and try to have his party, which consisted of only thirty men, considerably reinforced, and at the same time obtain an order to have some entrenching tools sent down. I waited upon the General, and informed him that I had every reason to believe that the enemy intended to land at Girardeau's, and recommended to him to have the picquet there considerably reinforced, and requested that he would immediately order some entrenching tools to the place, as the party was entirely without. I am not certain, but I believe I recommended at the same time to the General to send a field-piece or two to the same place. His reply was, that he would consider of it, and requested that I would call on him in an hour or two. On my return to the General, at about ten or eleven o'clock at night, I understood him that the entrenching tools were sent. With respect to the reinforcement, he told me that he could not spare more than 20 men, which he requested that I would go down with. I did so, and on my arrival was surprized to find that no tools were at the place. It being then too late to obtain them, so as to be of any service, I told Captain Smith, who commanded the picquet, that at day-light I did not doubt but he would see the enemy landed, and recommended that he would reserve his fire until they got within 50 or 60 yards, then to commence a cool, deliberate fire, and retreat up until he was either supported or forced from his ground. As I judged it happened, but the party were soon forced from the hill, when the enemy gained footing a little after day-light, and were the most of that day, the 29th, in full view, landing their troops and artillery, without the least interruption from us.
Q. Do you know what force the enemy landed?
A. The force with which the enemy invaded the State amounted to full 3000 men. I believe they had about 2000 landed when they advanced towards us.
Q. What was the composition and number of the army under General Howe?
A. Between 5 and 600 continental troops, and a detachment of artillery with four or five field-pieces, and about 100 militia.
Q. In what manner did the main body of the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. The enemy advanced in two columns, their right along a path leading through Sir James Wright's plantation, halting in full view of us at a place called Gay's, their left down the main road leading from Girardeau's to Savanna; while we were amused by the first column in front, the latter filed by their left, along a bye-path leading through the back of Milledge's old field, and across a swamp upon our right to an open pine barren at the back of the new barracks, where they were met by the militia under Colonel Walton, who, after a smart skirmish, were forced from their ground. I know of no other resistance, except by the picquet at Girardeau's, and the firing of a few field-pieces in the front of our line that was made to the enemy.
Q. When, and in what manner did the army retreat?
[Page 19]A. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, the army was ordered to retire in the following order; the South-Carolina troops to retreat first to the Spring-hill, and there form and cover the retreat of the artilletry and Georgia troops, the latter to form somewhere about M'Gilvray's path, and there remain, until joined by the former. Our army was formed across the road leading from Savanna to Girardeau's, near half a mile below the town, under a hill of easy ascent in an open field, with a ravine in front, Tatnall's buildings better than 100 yards on our right, and Governor Wright's barn about the same distance on our left, with a traverse across the road in our centre with two field-pieces, and a field-piece advanced in front of each wing; on our right was a swamp, some distance up which, at the back of Tatnall's buildings, a path led from Milledge's to town; on this path a work was thrown up, in which was posted a detachment of continental soldiers, and to the right of this, up the same swamp, I understood the militia were to have been posted. Our left was in some degree covered by a battery at some distance wide of its rear, which commanded part of a low rice-field not very accessible. As soon as the enemy, who were in our front, observed the Carolina troops go off the field and our artillery limbered, they moved briskly forward, and commenced a sharp cannonade on the Georgia brigade, which was formed in a close column by sections by the left, with the left in front. As soon as the artillery moved off the field, I faced the column to the right about, and retired in that order. As we crossed the road, the enemy's artillery made some impression on the column, notwithstanding which it preserved perfect good order. Just as we gained the summit of the hill, a heavy fire of musquetry commenced towards our left, when I perceived our artillery go off on a full gallop. I moved as quick as I possibly could without getting into disorder. About 100 yards before I got to the southeast extremity of the town, a body of the enemy, advanced to the east of the new barracks, commenced a heavy fire of musquetry on our left flank; at the same time observing the Carolina brigade beyond the southwest extremity of the town, in some disorder, pushing for the Spring-hill, and a body of the enemy near that place keeping up a smart fire on them, I judged it too late for me to attempt that defile, as the enemy must be in full possession of it before I could possibly reach it. In this situation, with the enemy in front, flank and rear, I formed the design of attempting to force my way up the Ogechee road, where I observed the enemy's line to be the weakest, and with this view ordered my light infantry to advance and attack the enemy on my flanks, to draw their fire while I reduced the column, and to divert their attention from my main design. Immediately after the order to the light infantry, as we advanced, I ordered an open column, as soon as I saw that there was a proper distance between the sections, which happened just as we were behind the burying-ground. I lost no more time than was necessary for the following words of command: Halt: Sections, to the left face: By files to the right wheel: March. Before I got the rear well clear of the burying-ground, the line broke about the centre, and the whole, except three or four sections, fell up one of the streets. Observing the few that followed me, I led them through where a square of buildings had but late been burnt down, and halted before the Court-house door, which being a brick building, I had thought of throwing myself into it, but previous to taking this step, I determined to consult Colonel Harris, the next officer in command to myself. I called him to me, and asked if he could recommend any place through which I could effect a retreat? he answered that we might get over Musgrove's creek. I observed to him that it was a full tide, and that the creek could not be passable. He replied that there was a log, which he had been fifty times over. I replied, lead me to it, it is a happy circumstance, we will save our men; and called out, Follow me, soldiers, and I will conduct you to a safe retreat. I heard the words, Follow the commandant, frequently repeated; and lest they might not know what I intended, I kept waving my sword over my head, and moved slowly on at the head of the few that yet preserved their order, and sent Colonel Harris back to the rear with orders to push them on, and desired that he would join me in time before I got to the creek. This he did, but when we got there he could not find the log, owing I suppose to the high tide. As the only alternative, I then ordered the soldiers to swim the creek; a few obeyed my command, others alledged that they could not swim. The enemy, who had got possession of the Spring-hill defile, moved down and kept a smart fire on us, and, rather than be taken prisoner, I saved myself by swimming, as did Colonel Harris. Major Grimkie, one of the General's Aids, swam a little above where I did.
Q. What was the loss in men, cannon and stores, and by what means were they lost?
A. The manner in which the Georgia troops were lost I have already answered; respecting those of South-Carolina I can't say. I believe the number of continental troops lost that day exceeded 200. One field-piece was taken from the militia, another from the continental artillery, owing, as I was informed, to the driver being killed. Five other long brass field-pieces not properly mounted, that were removed out of town, with a quantity of ammunition, in consequence of our misfortune fell into the enemy's hands. Several iron pieces, with a quantity of stores that it was impossible to move after the enemy made their appearance, were likewise lost.
Q. When did the army cross Savanna river, and in what manner?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know of any orders given to the troops at Augusta and Sunbury to leave the State?
A. The General informed me of the orders he had sent to the garrison of Sunbury. I don't recollect what they exactly were, but they were such as I approved of at the time, and only lament they were not obeyed. With respect to the orders given to the troops at Augusta I can't say.
Q. What was the number of militia belonging to the State of Georgia?
A. I believe the whole militia of the State of Georgia amounted to about 3000 men.
Q. When the invasion of Georgia took place, what proportion of militia was requested by General Howe of the executive authority?
A. About the time of the invasion General Howe was frequently with the Governor, and at that time I am certain the General informed me of every material matter that passed between them; but at this time I don't recollect any particulars of consequence, tho' to the best of my belief he represented to the Governor, that as many militia as could be collected would be necessary.
Q. Do you know the numbers actually in the field at that time?
A. No.
[Page 20]Q. Do you know of any previous dispositions made by General Howe, in case of a retreat?
A. The general orders before-mentioned, that were issued respecting the mode of retreating, if necessary, may be deemed a previous disposition. I know of no other.
Q. Were the militia of the State of Georgia in general armed, and in what manner?
A. The militia of the State of Georgia were in general but indifferently armed. Those belonging to the town of Savanna I judged to be very well armed.
Q. What is the general face of the country in the vicinity of Savanna?
A. The town of Savanna stands on a high sandy ridge, which terminates in a bluff near a mile in extent on the river. This ridge runs backward, upwards of two miles, nearly the same width, and is a remarkable level open pine-barren. On each side of the ridge a creek empties into the river, which occasions two swamps, both of which, rather farther back than the tows, are cultivated, the uncultivated parts are very thickly wooded; that to the south-east of the town is passable in many places; the other, to the south-west of the town, is scarcely passable but where the road runs through it. On the opposite side of the swamp, below the town, is Girardeau's place, a bluff 40 or 50 feet high, and ridge nearly similar to that on which the town stands, with this difference, that the ridge terminates nearly three quarters of a mile from the river, and leaves a remarkably level swamp, overflowed by every spring-tide.
Q. Were the army in possession of a proportion of entrenching tools to erect works?
A. I don't believe that the army had a proper supply of entrenching tools, but I am certain that a sufficient quantity could have been obtained to throw up works that would have been of service.
Q. What were the applications made at different times by General Howe to the legislative and executive authority of the State for means of defending it?
A. With respect to any further applications I don't recollect.
Q. by the Court. Do you know what reasons operated to prevent the enemy's being opposed in landing their troops?
A. No.
Q. Had the enemy any vessels of force to cover the landing of their troops?
A. Yes, and from the dispositions of those vessels, I judged they intended landing at that place.
Q. by General Howe. Were or were not the legislative and executive bodies of the State of Georgia, at different times, frequently applied to by me, both personally and by letter, to fortify the country at particular places, beside other measures strongly recommended by me for the general defence of the State?
A. Yes, I believe they were.
Q. Did you ever see any letters of mine to that State for that purpose?
A. Some considerable time before the invasion, I recollect seeing a letter from you, very fully on that subject, laid before the Assembly, which gave offence; in consequence, as I apprehended, of your attempting to dictate to them.
Colonel Marbury sworn.
Q. Were you in the army in Georgia, when the enemy under Colonel Campbell invaded that State?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity did you act?
A. I had the command of a regiment, but it was not present. The day previous to the 29th of December I arrived at Savanna, and acted as Aid to General Howe on the latter part of the day the enemy landed.
Q. Do you know how long previous to the invasion of Georgia General Howe received intelligence of the designs of the enemy, and what steps were taken by him in consequence?
A. I do not know when General Howe received the intelligence, and as I was out of town, do not know what steps were taken previous to the evening of the 28th December, 1778, when I joined the General about sun-set at Girardeau's. He was then, in company with several gentlemen of the army, reconnoitering the ground, and spoke of it's being very defensible.
Q. Do you know what force the enemy landed?
A. It was generally said, and I believe they landed at least 2000 men.
Q. What was the composition and number of the army under General Howe?
A. About 500 continentals, with a detachment of Colonel Roberts's artillery, four or five field pieces, and about 100 militia.
Q. In what manner did the main body of the enemy approach, and what resistance was made?
A. They advanced in two columns, one by the path leading thro' Sir James Wright's plantations, the other on the main road leading to Savanna. They appeared in full view at Gay's gate, from a little below which place a detachment filed off, and thro' a thick swamp gained our right and charged Colonel Walton, who, with about 80 militia and a field-piece, was posted back of the new barracks, and from the enemy's great superiority of numbers was obliged to leave the ground, and retreat precipitately after a short engagement. I don't know of any other resistance made, except a few shot from the artillery in front of our army, before a retreat was made, and a fire from Captain Smith, who commanded the party at Girardeau's, on the enemy, as they advanced to take possession of Girardeau's hill.
Q. When, and in what manner did the army retreat?
A. I was not on the ground when the retreat was ordered; but I think about or a little after three o'clock, as I was going with a requisition from Colonel Walton to the General for troops to support him, I met General Howe, at the head of the Carolineans, retreating, about half way between Tatnall's and the town. They were then in good order.
Q. What was the loss in men, cannon and stores, and by what means were they lost?
A. I do not know the loss of either, nor can I account by what means.
Q. When did the army cross Savanna river, and in what manner?
A. On the night of the 30th General Howe reached Treutlan's, which is about 45 miles above Savanna, and sent out to secure the boats, and began to cross the baggage on the morning following at the Two Sisters.
[Page 21]Q. Do you know of any orders given to the troops at Augusta and Sunbury to leave the State?
A. After we had retreated to Cherokee hill, about eight miles from Savanna, the General sent Captain Wood with orders to the officer commanding the troops at Sunbury to evacuate the fort, to retreat and join the General. On the next day, or day after, Major Deheyser was sent to Augusta, with orders for the troops stationed there to cross the river, and join the continental army wherever they might be.
Q. What were the number of militia belonging to the State of Georgia?
A. I think there was about two thousand five hundred men.
Q. When the invasion of Georgia took place, what proportion of militia was requested by General Howe of the executive authority?
A. I do not know.
Q. Do you know the number actually in the field at that time?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know of any previous dispositions made by General Howe, in case of a retreat?
A. I do not.
Q. How far is Milledge's pass from the post then occupied by the main body of General Howe's army?
A. I think it is about half a mile.
Q. Were the militia of Georgia in general armed, and in what manner?
A. They were badly armed.
Q. What is the general face of the country in the vicinity of Savanna?
A. I am not well enough acquainted with the place to describe it.
Q. Were the army in possession of a proportion of entrenching tools to erect works?
A. I do not know.
Q. What were the applications made at different times by General Howe to the legislative and executive authority of the State for means of defending it?
A. I have heard mention made of frequent applications, but cannot attempt to say what they were.
Q. by General Howe. What were the orders given you by me on that day, and other circumstances that passed between us?
A. On the evening of the 28th December 1778, after returning from Girardeau's with General Howe, he requested that I would collect three or four gentlemen, and patrole the country that night between the sea and Savanna, to observe if any of the enemy had landed below, or if any of the country people appeared to be going to the British vessels. I did so, and returned just about day-break, and soon after a firing commenced by Captain Smith at Girardeau's, who was soon forced from his post, and it occupied by the British. A little after I returned to town, and about twelve o'clock rode to head-quarters at Tatnall's house, in company with Colonel Huger and General Elbert. They informed me that the General had called a council, wherein it was determined to remain on the ground where they were and receive the enemy. Those gentlemen informed General Howe that they had just returned from reconnoitering the ground on our right, that the swamp was passable, and they did not like their situation. The General said he was not well pleased with it, or words to that purpose, and requested those gentlemen to take the opinions of the officers who had composed the council. Some little time after this, the General requested me to take a view of the ground, and immediately return to him; I did so, and gave information similar to what he had before received. I asked the General if he thought it would be amiss to send a company to the place where it was thought the enemy would cross the swamp, about a quarter of a mile higher up, where there was a small breast-work, occupied by Captain Keith of South-Carolina, with a company of regular troops, I think about 30 or 40. He said it was a lucky thought, and requested me to take the command. Having no other at that time, my regiment being in Augusta, I accepted it chearfully. The General desired me to ride up and look out a convenient place, and he would order up the men. He sent Major Grimkie, his Aid, directly after me, who informed me that the militia under Colonel Walton were to occupy the ground I spoke of, and that he should not send up any regulars. I then returned to the General, told him that I did not wish to remain as an idle spectator, and would be glad he would employ me. He told me to remain with him, and if the enemy advanced I might be of service. A little after the enemy appeared in view, and the General requested me to go up and remain on the right between, and have an eye on the breast-work and the militia. I went up, and about three o'clock (I think) the enemy appeared, and shortly after formed on an eminence that the militia had left a little before, and which Colonel Walton attempted to regain, but was too late. The militia appeared in confusion, and could not be reduced to order. A field-piece was fired once or twice in front of the militia, and though the Colonel prevailed on them to advance and gave them three cheers, they were still in confusion. I asked him if it would not be necessary to get a support of regulars. He requested me to ride to General Howe, to inform him of his situation, that he would maintain the ground as long as possible, but was afraid he could not do it long without support, and requested the General to send a detachment to his assistance. On my way to head-quarters I passed near to the small work occupied by Captain Keith, who called and informed me that General Howe had retreated, and asked what he had best do. I pointed out his route, and advised him to make the best of his way, and then came up to General Howe, about half way between Tatnall's and town, at the head of the Carolina troops, who were in good order. I let him know Colonel Walton's request. He ordered me back to him immediately with orders to retreat; but when I returned behind the barracks, I found the British on the ground, and the militia flying towards the Spring-hill, about 200 yards before me. I did not see Colonel Walton again, and never got up with the whole of the militia till they had got over the defile that we had to pass. There in vain I endeavoured to rally them, and on my return met General Howe about the Spring-hill (the troops were then in great confusion) who immediately requested me to try again to rally the militia, and was the second time as unsuccessful as the first. By the time I returned, the artillery and troops had reached the Red-House, called M'Gilvray's, near the upper end of the defile, where they halted; and after a short time the General sent me to Colonel White, who had command of the galleys and other vessels laying above Race-Hall, to inform him of our retreat and to order him to move up the river with the vessels, and when at any advantageous [Page 22] place to come to, in order to prevent any vessels running up the river and landing men to cut off our retreat; but at the same time not to remain in any place so long, as to endanger the vessels under his command.
Q. Where was the militia posted when you first saw them after you were sent to the right?
A. On a small eminence near a branch, at some distance from the barracks.
Q. Where were they when you went to them the second time?
A. Between that eminence and the barracks.
Q. Was it a part of the Carolina brigade you saw when you returned from endeavouring to rally the militia, or the main body?
A. Only a part.
Q. What time were you with me before I sent you to the gallies?
A. I do not believe it was more than a quarter of an hour.
Lieutenant Colonel Ternant was sworn.
Q. Were you in the army at the invasion of Georgia by Colonel Campbell?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity did you then act?
A. As Inspector to the army.
Q. At the commencement of the invasion, what steps were taken by Major General Howe to prevent the enemy landing?
A. From the 24th of December, when the British fleet first entered the Savanna river, to the 29th, when the action took place, the General, with Governor Houston and several officers of the army, visited the several places where it was most probable the enemy would land. I was present at those reconnoitering excursions. The landing at Girardeau's was generally looked upon as the most likely to be chosen by the enemy, which occasioned discussion about the means most effectual to prevent them, and in general to counteract their operations. It was generally thought necessary, and as I understood agreed on between the Governor and General, to erect a battery on the banks of the river, so as to prevent the approach of the shipping to the causeway, and consequently the enemy's landing and taking post on the bluff. The fort on Savanna was also to be repaired and enclosed. The high banks raised along the river, from Savanna-bluff to Girardeau's causeway, for the purpose of watering and draining the rice-fields, were to be broken so as to overflow those fields at high water, and render the whole extent of them, from Girardeau's causeway to the causeway in front of the troops on Fair-Lawn, as impassable as possible, and these fields without that prevention were then thought passable for infantry by files, tho' not without difficulty. Some other field works were likewise to be made in the vicinity of the place, extended as a position for the troops, which then might amount to about 650 regulars and about 100 militia. The means necessary to make these field preparations being entirely in the hands of the executive of Georgia, such as Negroes, tools of all kinds, horses and gears for the transportation of artillery, applications were made by the General to procure them. They were promised several times in my presence by Governor Houston, but never furnished, any further than by sending three Negroes the 26th in the morning with two tools, and these went away in the evening of the same day and never appeared again. I heard the General many times express his complaints about it, and repeatedly sent his Aids, but to no purpose. The chief command was even disputed him, which occasioned confusion and delay in every measure; and how soon the dispute ended by the Governor giving up the command to the General I can't tell. On the 28th, fix of the enemy's vessels having come up and anchored opposite to Girardeau's bluff, the erecting of any battery on the banks of the river became impracticable; upon which a picquet of 50 men was posted at the house on the bluff, with an intention, as I heard the General express, to watch the motions of the enemy at that place, and oppose them so far as to be reinforced in time, whenever it should be ascertained that they really intended to land there. On the 29th, early in the morning, a firing was heard at that place, in consequence of the enemy's landing; upon which the General ordered me there, but before I reached half way, I found that and another picquet retreating. I had collected the whole together, when the General joined us, and ordered me to take command of them, and remain on the spot where we were till further orders. I omitted to observe that a mounted militia man was left with the commanding officer of the picquet, to give the earliest intelligence of the enemy's apparent movements, but who never to my knowledge reported to the General, tho' he was sent in time for that purpose, as I heard the commanding officer of the picquet say.
Q. At what distance from the main body of the army was the place the enemy landed?
A. Between a mile and a mile and an half.
Q. What force did they land at that time?
A. I understood, after the action, they landed upwards of 2000 men at that place.
Q. How many probable places of landing were there in the vicinity of the town?
A. There were several places above and below the town, whose names have partly escaped my memory, but which rendered every position that could be taken with an inferior force in the vicinity of the town, for the purpose of defending it, exceedingly precarious.
Q. Were any steps taken to watch the motions of the enemy at those places?
A. Parties of militia were posted at each of those places below the town, and a picquet of 50 continental troops at Girardeau's, as the most probable place of landing. The two gallies were so posted as to watch any movement the enemy could make by the back river, for the purpose of landing above the town.
Q. Did the enemy land at any other place than Girardeau's bluff?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. After it was known that the enemy landed, what measures were taken to ascertain their numbers and to oppose them?
A. I cannot speak to the first part of that question, further than that I heard the General several times complain he could get no information to be depended on, either about their force or designs. About three hours after the enemy had landed, I received orders to return to the army with the advanced picquets, who [Page 23] immediately joined their respective corps. Two hours before the action a council of war was called of the field officers of the army, and from the uncertainty of the information procured by the General of the number and design of the enemy, and to gain as much time as possible for the removal of public and private property from the town, it was unanimously agreed that the army ought to remain on the spot where they were then posted at Fair-Lawn until the views of the enemy could be known, and their superiority so ascertained as to urge and justify a retreat. In consequence of that determination, the following disposition was made and issued in general orders:
GENERAL ORDERS and DISPOSITION of the TROOPS.
THE Carolina troops are to be told off into 16 platoons of eight files each, with the remaining files formed on their right as light infantry; the whole to be commanded by Colonel Huger. The Georgia troops to be formed into eight platoons of ten files each, with the remaining files on their left as light infantry; the whole to be commanded by General Elbert. The officers to take post as usual by seniority in their respective lines. Those who do not command platoons to fall in the rear of them as bringers-up, the better to preserve order and regularity through the line. Both corps to be formed in columns; those of Carolina by platoons on their right, and the others likewise by platoons on their left, and to remain in that formation, with the light infantry at the head of each column, until further orders. The artillery to remain in its present position, and to be in the utmost readiness to move or act as occasion may require. The General requests and expects that both officers and men will distinguish themselves by their firmness and perseverance, and by an exact observance of orders. Should they be compelled to retreat, it is to be in the following order. The troops will move off in columns in the order set forth. The light infantry of Carolina to form the advance guard, to march rapidly by the shortest route to the Spring-hill defile, which they will possess on both sides and endeavour to maintain. The artillery, all but one field-piece, will follow the Carolina brigade, and Colonel Roberts, when he arrives at the defile, will post his pieces so as best to cover the retreat of the Georgia brigade; Colonel Huger, his men so as most effectually to answer the same purpose, and to secure the artillery. The Georgia troops will follow their light infantry with a field-piece, forming the rear of the line, and as soon as they reach the defile this colomn, with the whole of the artillery, will pass and form on the other side of it, in such manner as the commanding officer shall think best to prevent insults from the enemy, and to secure the retreat of the troops from the head of the defile. Should a root take place, the troops are to re-assemble beyond the defile at M'Gilvray's road. Further orders are to be applied for, or will be given, as circumstances shall require.
I was then sent again to reconnoitre the passes through the swamp on our right, and was accompanied by two militia-men whose names I do not recollect. The principal gap was defended by a strong picquet, whose numbers I have forgot, and a redan which occupied the whole space of the passage. The other pass was that mentioned to exist about a quarter of a mile further; I immediately went to visit it; we attempted three times to go through the swamp at that place, and upon my guides pronouncing it impracticable we returned to the troops on Fair-Lawn. The General then ordered me to join a body of militia intended as a further security to his right flank, and to post them in such a manner as best to answer that object. I found them drawn up in one rank to the number of ninety-three, with a field-piece, nearly opposite to the pass last mentioned. They being a too great distance from the swamp, it was thought best to advance them closer to it; but before the necessary movements could be performed with that irregular body, the enemy's light infantry came out of the swamp, filing off to the right and left, so as to come on the flanks of the militia, who from that moment would not be prevailed on to make the smallest alteration in their actual position. As soon as I saw the enemy from the swamp, I ordered a mounted militia-man to go and acquaint the General with it. Mean while the field-piece was directed to fire on the thickest of the enemy, and the militia encouraged to keep their ground, until the enemy by approaching higher would be fired upon and skirmished with, so as to cover as far as in their power the retreat of the troops on Fair-Lawn. As soon as the enemy, who had performed this angular evolution out of the reach of musquetry, had arrived to both wings of the militia, they marched briskly, or rather rushed with great shouts. The militia, probably struck with the superiority of the enemy, who amounted to about 700 men, broke without firing, and fled towards the Spring-hill causeway; a few only fired their musquets in retiring. Upon this the enemy poured in a heavy fire, and as soon as the field-piece was spiked up I attempted to join the continental troops, whom I met about a hundred yards to the westward of the barracks, retreating in tolerable good order, except those of Georgia under General Elbert, who, contrary to the disposition, had quitted the line of march and gone into the town. I marched with the troops to the defile. Two houses that stood on each side of it were occupied for a few minutes, and when all hopes of the Georgia troops arriving were over, and the enemy pressing upon us, the troops with the artillery, except one field-piece, got over the causeway, and made a halt of a few minutes on the other side of it.
Q. by General Howe. Were the reports of the invasion given by the deserter, said to come from the transport, previous to the retreat of the troops that invaded Georgia from St. Augustine, or afterwards?
A. They reached us at Sunbury, after the retreat of those troops to Frederica.
Q. Had you any conversation with Colonel Walton at the post on our right, or any where on our right, in the course of that day?
A. I had not.
Q. Where did you join me on the retreat?
A. At the place where I met the troops.
Q. Did I remain at the Spring-hill defile with General Huger till the troops had passed it?
A. I saw you there.
The Court, after having gone through the evidences both for and against General Howe, adjourned to Monday morning, ten o'clock.
JANUARY 21st.
The Court met agreeable to adjournment.
Major General Howe proceeds in his defence as follows:
Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court,
CONSCIOUS as I am that I have to the utmost of my abilities endeavoured to serve my country—that from principle I entered into the present contest with the earliest, resolved not to retire but with the latest, or at least not until my life or American grievances had a period—that my zeal in the common cause was equal to any, and that my ardor to promote it could be exceeded by none—I little dreamed that I should at this day, or indeed on any other, have stood arraigned at a military tribunal for imputed crimes, which malice would strive to magnify and fix upon me, and by which my reputation might, for a time at least, be held in suspence, even by the good. How painfully this must affect me, let military sensibility determine: For in a profession so chaste as that of arms, where honor is so feelingly alive that it must smart and agonize at the least shadow of aspersion, expression can give no proper colourings to my anxieties; indeed it yields me none, but what, compared to my feelings, would be poor and contemptible. Happily for me, however, I am arraigned before a Court where Justice, with its delicate auxiliary Honor, sit as Judges; a Court where, of all others, had I been guilty, I should be most appalled at appearing, but by which, conscious of my innocence, I most rejoice to be tried. Tho' it would not perhaps be very difficult to shew that Georgia, as a State, had very little to do in this prosecution, yet, desirous to be justified by facts alone, and fearing no search, or research, tho' malevolence directs the probe, I shall admit, for the present at least, that having been misunderstood by or misrepresented to the State of Georgia, they have thought proper to bring me where now you see me. The charges against me are heavy—let us see how they have been supported; and though Colonel Walton is not the first, yet, as he is the arch evidence upon this occasion, I shall begin with him, and the more especially, as he so very comprehensively in his testimony alludes to every charge brought against me, that remarking upon his evidence will, in a great measure, do away the necessity of descanting upon the rest. He tells you that the British troops from East Florida penetrated Georgia two ways; that they evidently expected co-operating troops from the northward, which not arriving, they returned. That troops did enter the State in the manner he says is true; but by what spirit of divination it was made evident to him that they expected co-operation, and retired for the want of it, I am at a loss to determine. If circumstances at that time made it evident, those circumstances should have been declared; or if subsequent events evinced it, every principle of common justice, could they have influence upon the Colonel, ought to have impelled him to relate them, that no undue deductions might be drawn from what he said in injury to a man by his means on trial for his reputation. It is not however from this instance alone that I am warranted to say that he is seldom explicit, but where he thinks what he says will condemn me; end throws in so dubious light every thing of a contrary tendency, that he appears to hope unfavourable inferences may be drawn from it. Certain it is, that until the arrival of the deserter he speaks of, which was after the East Florida troops had retreated, the ultimate end of their views appeared and was believed to be no more than an intention to ravage and lay waste as much of the State of Georgia as they could, to plunder the inhabitants and drive off the stock,—the latter of much more importance to St. Augustine than people, unacquainted with its situation and the precariousness of its supplies, would be apt to imagine. I confess that after-events demonstrated plainly that co-operation was then expected, but as nothing previous existed to induce the idea, the Colonel should have expressed himself in such a manner as to have left no possibility of implication that there did; and this I doubt not he would have done, had justice been all that he aimed at. I however set at defiance the utmost stretch of his malice, either within these walls or without them. He tells you further, that this account given by the man of the transport was so much credited, that Doctor Hall and himself were sent by the Governor and Council to Charlestown to commune with General Lincoln (then either arrived or expected) upon the general situation of the State, and to give him the intelligence brought by the deserter; that I was in South-Carolina when these advices were transmitted, and he takes it for granted I had them as early as others, but when or by whom he knows not, or what measures were taken in consequence; that the time I arrived at Savanna he cannot precisely ascertain, but that it appeared I was not expected, as the Delegates lately arrived from Congress had reported I was recalled from the department, and General Lincoln was ordered on to supercede me. Come, however, he says I did, reassumed the command, gave assurances that I would defend the town, and that there was little danger. What the Colonel means by the greatest part of this I am at a loss to determine. I think I may be pretty certain that he does not mean to serve me by it, and yet I cannot see how it can operate to injure me. It appears, in short, altogether insignificant as to any relative tendency until the latter end of it, when the cloven foot appears in the insinuation that I gave improper encouragement to the inhabitants to stay in town, that I was not expected, and that the command was assumed; that is, I suppose, though he does not speak out, that having been recalled I had no business there. If this be his meaning, I am amazed that a senior Colonel of a State and Commandant of militia had not, in the course of service, or by the dictates of common sense, been taught, that though another General had been appointed to the department. I could not with military propriety leave it until his arrival, and that therefore I could not reassume what had not been laid aside. I am authorized to say that in a part of this stuff, intended by the Colonel for testimony, he has absolutely deviated from facts. I had, upon the first information of General Provost's incursion into Georgia, posted to that State, and took the command of the troops on the south side of Ogechee, where the Colonel was, and remained in Georgia till after the 29th of December. This he could not but remember, and upon cross-examination has confessed, any more than I can forget that he left me and took off his party in that advanced situation, though I was very weak in numbers, while the enemy were still in the State, and by all accounts no further off than between Newport river and the Altamaha. The Colonel amuses the Court with an account of the reconnoitering parties we [Page 25] were upon, in one of which he observed a large wood which was to have been cut down, but he says it was never done, and in his manner of expressing it seems to imply some neglect in me. Had the cutting down of this wood been necessary, which was far from being the case, Mr. Walton cannot but know of the repeated applications made by me to his Governor for tools, hands and many other matters, for purposes of much greater consequence, and that no assistance was yielded me; how then this wood was to have been cut down, or how he could expect it to be done, I cannot imagine, unless he had lately been reading Tasso, and, as he has talents for romance, might think that, like one of Tasso's heroes, I could fell forests with one stroke of my [...] In the Colonel's account of matters, relative to the operations of the 29th, he strives to criminate me in [...] things, which, had I been guilty of them, would have at worst amounted to nothing but errors in judgment. Among other things, he talks of a work at Girardeau's that was necessary to be erected, but it was never done; of a long narrow causeway of more than half a mile's length where the enemy advanced, and yet no steps were taken, and so on. But as I can obviate all he wishes to fix upon me by speaking generally to the charges, and by a reference to better testimony, I shall wave for the present a particular comment upon his evidence (though I may now and then refer to it) after observing that he has the most excellent knack of interweaving accusation and comment with what he would have you think a relation of facts, of any man that ever existed. Unluckily for himself, however, his manner of comment defeats the end he aims at; he sets out upon bad [...] from which, bad as they are, he draws worse conclusions; and so he appears to have the venom of the viper, without its tooth. From the stations the enemy's vessels took, some [...] appeared of an intention to land at Girardeau's; but this Court need not be told (though it may be information to Mr. Walton) that it is customary in war to look one way and act another, and this I [...] suspected the enemy intended. Various were the landing places in Georgia, those above the town were of easy access to the enemy by water, some of them miles in my rear, and very near the road by which, if we [...], we were compelled to retreat, the road and river for many miles running parallel to each other; and though I had taken every measure in my power, by stationing the galleys at particular places, and by guard- [...] from them, to watch the communications closely, yet, well aware upon what slender threads the face of military movements depend, and that the least neglect of duty or most trifling accident might defeat the best planned system of precaution, and be productive of events of unutterable fatality, those landingplaces [...] upon me as circumstances of awful consideration even where we lay; and how much more obnoxious [...] me they might have been, had I thrown myself down on Girardeau's, and the enemy had doubled me by water, I leave to any man of military abilities to determine. Whether it has been a benefit or disadvantage to me to differ in opinion with some as to the situation at Girardeau's, I shall not undertake to [...]; but this I know, that notwithstanding I might from military policy hold out the idea that the enemy would land there, and that it was very desensible, I really never thought so. Many circumstances [...] in favour of their landing above the town, and it ever operated upon me as a matter of surprize that they did not attempt it. The least movement that way would have necessitated me to retreat above them, by which means the town must have been left open to them, or, had I remained in or about it, captivity would inevitably have been the consequence. The situation at Girardeau's appeared to me to have many vices, which may not perhaps have struck others. I had examined it with the utmost strictness, both alone and in company. I had walked over all its causeways, and through many parts of its rice-fields, and found, to my [...] and surprize, that not only the causeways, but the fields themselves, would admit of the approach of troops to the high land, as appears to the Court by testimony not to be controverted. The enemy therefore would not have been comported to attack us merely by the approach leading directly to the house, but might, had I fixed myself there, have doubled either flank, or embraced both. Any manoeuvre like this would have made our retiring necessary, and perhaps we should have been obliged to do it under fire, and by that means have reassumed our main position at Fair-Lawn, in that confusion incident to young troops retreating before an enemy; besides this, the bridge and roads between Girardeau's and Fair-Lawn could not have been [...] up effectually while we were in front of them, and it might have been difficult to have done it with the enemy hanging heavily on our rear, and to leave them unimpaired might have been attended with obvious and great inconveniencies. These reasons and many others appeared to me to militate strongly either against [...], my whole force at that place, or posting heavy detachments there, even if my numbers would have admitted of it, which unfortunately was far from being the case. In short, as the enemy could absolutely command a landing where they pleased, as this place was less beneficial to them or injurious to us than [...] any other, as it left a morass in my front, with other advantages of situation, where it was probable [...] could have been opposed with most effect, and left me between the town and them, I had my doubts then, and I declare they exist now, whether I should not have acted with more military propriety, had I withdrawn every shew of opposition at Girardeau's, and spread it out as a table to invite them to land there. These were some of the reasons which governed my conduct upon that day. They will, I flatter myself, have weight with the Court, and, if they do not convince Colonel Walton, will at least invalidate his testimony. Upon examining this ground with Colonel Roberts, commanding officer of artillery, a gentleman as distinct in character as in sentiment from the man last mentioned, a man of abilities in his profession, of honor, integrity and benevolence of heart, in whom were united the gentleman and the soldier, who, knowing the value of reputation in himself, would have revolted at the idea of wounding it in another, who would have disdained to prostitute official influence to the vile purposes of private pique and personal prejudices, and who, if he must resent, would have resented by manly ways; this officer, who has since nobly fallen in the cause of his country, from whose fall the service has received a deep wound, and of whose loss I never think but the sigh of anxiety expands my bosom, upon my asking his opinion whether it was eligible to take measures for a capital opposition at Girardeau's, expressed himself in the strongest terms against it; and though I had reserved my own opinion at the time I requested his, he gave reasons very similar to those I have uttered, and added, that he thought a smart guard, not so formidable as to make the enemy advert to other landingplaces, or to dishearten them from attempting the approach by the causeway to the house, and yet capable of giving them a handsome check, was all he thought necessary to be done. The guard at Girardeau's, under Captain Smith, had been increased to about 70 [...], a work was to have been thrown up in the night, and [Page 26] the causeway cut through within fire of the hill. Colonel Ternant has told you it could not be done for want of tools, as after all my efforts, and the efforts of the Quarter-master, none were obtained until it was too late. Near this post evidence demonstrates two guards were placed, and there certainly were others, though no proof has been had of it. Those guards were intended by me to answer a duplicate end; that of guarding the approaches to the main body at Fair Lawn, and to support Captain Smith, as occasion should make it requisite. I believe it will be thought that as there was a variety of other places to attend to, which required men, that so small a main body as I had could not well spare, more than what those detachments amounted to for any particular purpose. Two persons, who were well mounted, active, and thought trust-worthy, were ordered to attend Captain Smith, and he was directed to send instant information of the first preparations of the enemy to land. One of these men was accordingly dispatched by the Captain at least an hour before the firing began, but he trusted the message to a third person, and went to give notice of the enemy's motions to a relation of his four or five miles off and below the post; so that neither the guards in advance or I had the least intimation of the enemy's motions until the action commenced, and consequently Captain Smith missed of the support intended him, and, after behaving with great gallantry, made good his retreat. From hence I think it appears (that though I did not place my whole reliance upon the enemy's landing at Girardeau's, and approaching by the main causeway, or throw so large a guard within view of them as some may think that I ought to have done) that I took measures to support the guard, in order to a more obstinate resistance; and as the troops were kept constantly upon their arms, I should have had time, had the intelligence intended me by Captain Smith reached me when it ought, to have supported him with the whole of the troops, had the enemy, by confining themselves to the causeway, made the measure warrantable. It must be evident to the Court from testimony, that as the field before the house was near [...] quarters of a mile long, and that the shipping commanded the end of the causeway, that it was therefore impossible [...] oppose them there, and after they had gained the high land, it would have been the heighth of madness with troops so inferior in number, to have attempted to meet them on the plain; for without some advantage of situation, the consequence must be obvious. It was therefore thought best by me, and by many, not to waste the men by fruitless efforts, but to withdraw the guards, and let them join their several corps at the main position. At this place, in front, the situation was exceedingly defensible; so much so, that had the enemy attacked us there, I think there was every probability that the events of that day had been determined in our favour. I had reasons, which appeared to me strong, to induce the belief that they would have attacked us in that manner. The road which led to us was wide, and though it had been broken up, so as not to be passable immediately under the command of a field-piece, yet it was done in such a manner that it did not appear to those in approach till almost arrived at it. The morass in front, and the ground on each side of it, was so formed, that at a very little distance the whole appeared level; and as the passes on my right had no roads to them, at least none that had been used for a considerable time, there was a great chance that they might not advert to them. The enemy's own accounts shew that my hope of their not finding the passes and [...] atacking me in front were well founded; for they say, in their official accounts, that this would have been the case, had not a Negroe deserted to them and become their informer and guide. These reasons, joined with the consideration that even the shew of resistance on our part might occasion hesitation and delay on their's (and half a day or even an hour was precious, as the public and private property was removing) induced me to remain where I was. Colonel Walton has asserted that I, by my own confession, appeared ignorant of the passes on my right. It is not common, I believe, for a man to deviate from truth, where it must in consequence and obviously make against himself; and surely I must have deviated from truth had I said so, for your records teem with evidence that I was acquainted with the passes. They were sources of constant anxiety to me, they were in fact the disease of my position; I [...] not cure them, nor could I guard them effectually—the next eligible thing was to watch them closely, and who, after hearing the evidence adduced, can accuse me of not having done so. Patroles of horse were ordered to be continually going, stationary videts were appointed, several private confidential characters, who acted as volunteers upon this occasion, besides two extra Aids-de-Camp, military characters, active, vigilant and well mounted, appear in evidence to have been employed for this purpose, besides various other measures that were pursued. Do not all these precautions demonstrate that I was painfully sensible how tender our situation was upon the right? What though I might not have known the exact spot where jessamines were to be plucked, or nosegays had been made, I was well informed of the general weakness of that part on my flank, and though I hoped the enemy might not attempt it, yet I took every method to be informed of it if they did; after which I never meant to remain on the ground a moment, as my conduct as well as the testimony given in evinces. The pass the enemy availed themselves of was so remote on my right, that I thought I should have had time to retreat without loss, should they endeavour to pass it. Careful as I was, I have my doubts that the information was not so early as I might have expected. In saying this, I do not mean to reflect upon any of those individuals who undertook to look out that way. They were respectable characters, with every ability and desire to serve the cause; but it is possible for accident sometimes to occasion an enemy to elude the greatest vigilance, and if a moment was lost, I am convinced it must have arisen from accident alone. A party was detailed for this pass, and Colonel Marbury was to have commanded it. I have it much to sorrow for, that any innovation took place. That respectable, spirited officer would not have posted his party near the barracks, and far in the rear of the troops, but would have stationed them where they ought to have been, directly on the spot they were intended to guard; by which means, if all other vigilance had failed, the action between him and the enemy would have announced their approach many minute sooner than the firing that did happen gave it me. But if it was criminal in me not to know this pass, what shall be said of him who undertook to guard it for me, and yet took post remote from it. Colonel Walton declares to the Court, that Colonel Marbury delivered him an order from me to attack the British light-infantry, and relates, not indeed that he obeyed the order, but theatrically describes his situation and the enemy's. I do not recollect, and think I may assert that no such order was ever sent him. If it was, can that memory, which appears to be such a faithful register of trifles, not be impressed with the name of the person who brought the order; and stranger still it is that the Colonel should believe, or at least assert, that Colonel Marbury was the person [Page 27] who delivered it. But the deep groves and flowery bowers the Colonel had strayed into, in company with fair damsels, had awakened in his imagination a spirit of Chivalry, and, like Knight-Errants of old romance, becomes his province, and his relations are as extraordinary as any thing in Amadis of Gaul, Parismus and Parismenus, the Fairy Tales, or any other books of that sort. The similarity however breaks in this, that those fables have morals, while morals in the Colonel's fables are left out. Colonel Walton, in that part of his evidence which relates to the detaching of so many of the militia-horse, by the turn of his expression, and some volunteer explosions of fancy which have not been made a record of, but which through the whole of his testimony he has been too apt to let off, appears to blame me for those detachments. They were however disposed of to the best of all uses our situation would admit of, that of watching the various approaches which called for attention, and which our numbers could not guard. The Colonel one would think is a little unlucky; for where he wishes to condemn he contributes to acquit, and where he means to commend he censures—his friendship by this means becomes more dangerous than his enmity. I am in another place accused, in the Colonel's testimony, of retreating without sending him notice of it. Notice, however, was assuredly sent him, and was repeated by Colonel Marbury. It was not, I dare say, received, because probably the Colonel's retreat began first, or so early after me that the messenger might not have been arrived. Colonel Marbury mentions that one of the continental picquets had received no orders when he saw it. This picquet had been put under the orders of Colonel Walton, and I believe he sent directions to it to retire; but, abstracted from this, Major Porter was dispatched to call off the picquets, and has told you that he did do it. As I had reasons for wishing the picquets to remain on the ground a short time after the troops moved off, Major Porter might not have got to them when Colonel Marbury saw them, who, having been desired to have an eye on the picquets, acted with his usual propriety in ordering that picquet off. The disposition for the day is before the Court, and must speak for itself. I flatter myself it makes provision for every probable contingence, and that it will bear the inspection of any military eye. From that it appears that I ordered the army to retreat in column, as it shortened the line of march, and threw the men more in the countenance of their officers; that they were to proceed by the shortest route to the Spring-hill defile; so that I could not have the least idea of their going into town. That this order of march and the route laid down was not or could not be pursued was a misfortune to me indeed, but ought not to be imputed to me as a fault. My friend General Elbert has justified me as to never having given any order for it, and justified himself by a recital of the accidents which compelled him to deviate from the disposition. That deserving officer and myself have lived in a course of friendship for a length of time, and in situations critical and intricate have seldom upon military matters differed in opinion. His assistance and advice have laid me under obligations to him, and his spirit and abilities have served his country. Having omitted something relative to the situation at Girardeau's, I beg a moment's indulgence of the Court to revert to it. As most rice-fields in that country can at times be laid under water, it may appear strange to some, upon a superficial view, that Girardeau's fields were not put in that state. I had this once in object, and examined the flood-gates, but found most of them so out of repair that they would not keep in the tides; and if they could, as those vents are situated by and empty themselves into the river, they would have been under the enemy's command. Had those objections however been out of the question, the winds which had prevailed for several days made, as was usual to those winds, such low tides, that until the afternoon of the 29th the lands could not have been overflowed. Mr. Wereat's evidence proves this fact. I have confessed that I ordered the garrison at Sunbury to evacuate the fort, and I will add that I was so anxious to have it done, that my first order was written with a pencil, on horseback, in the field, and on the retreat. Fearful that this order might miscarry, and still anxious for the fate of the garrison, upon a halt we made about eight miles from town, I, in another letter more explicit in its content, repeated the order for evacuation, and directed, that if the stores could not be removed they should be destroyed, and the cannca spiked. This letter, and another to the same purpose not an hour afterwards, were dispatched by officers. Some, if not all, were received, but the Major who commanded there delayed obeying the order until he heard from me again, in consequence of which he and his party fell into the enemy's hands a few days afterwards. How this order, had it been wrong in itself, since it was not obeyed, could contribute to sacrifice the capital and the State, let those who framed the charge explain. I think it appears plain that nothing very erroneous in my conduct has happened, when, notwithstanding a strong desire to have me censured, charges so futile and ill-grounded are exhibited against me. It would have been horrid in me to have suffered a [...] to have remained in a work too extensive for five times the number of men, ill-constructed, unfinished, without casemates, and without the least probability of relieving it. Had I done so, and been arraigned for that, I should have stood in this presence with very different sensations than now I do; nor would I so justly have incurred the censure of my own heart to please the executive authority of the whole world, though every individual which composed it had been a Colonel Commandant of Militia. Major Lane, who commanded the fort, had recently been in it second in command, when an attack upon it by the enemy had been gallantly repulsed. The Magistrates and citizens of the town, hoping to defend it again, solicited, implored, and beset him to remain in it. Combined with these, he was in the bloom of youth, in the hey-day of blood and spirits— [...] an enthusiastic ardour for fame, which it is better for an officer sometimes to be misled by than never to feel, and which, tho' it may now and then induce excess, it is at word but the excess of a good quality. All these prevailed upon him to delay an execution of his orders, and he had his punishment in his fault. The crossing of Savanna river very early after the retreat I have also confessed. Some of the reasons that operated upon me must be my defence; half of them, I pledge myself, will be a sufficient justification. The gallies and vessels with private and public stores had been ordered to Purysburgh, and had arrived; the river at that place was so narrow that they must have been lost, had they been attempted even by infantry alone. Besides this, all Carolina, as yet uninjured, was open to the enemy, and no inroad by land more eligible to them than Purysburgh; the battalions in that State were reduced by the expiration of enlistments to a small number; the bulk of its militia lie remote from the sea, and are not to be collected upon a sudden emergency so speedily as is to be wished; the whole country between Purysburgh and Charles-Town lay exposed to the ravages of the enemy, and was much nearer to them than Augusta; indeed, had they lost no time in Georgia, [Page 28] but by a rapid movement had made Charles-Town their object, I think, in the then situation of affairs, their prospects of carrying it were very probable. These circumstances, and some others, combined to make me press my arrival at Purysburgh, after three or four days stay at the Two Sisters, during which time it appears I was not negligent of the inhabitants. Before I had crossed the river myself, tho' most of the troops were over, General Lincoln arrived on the other side, and sent for me. Had it been proper to proceed to Augusta, we were as near to it from thence as from the side I had left, and the General no doubt would have adopted the measure; but matters so plainly pointed out to him the necessity of hastening to Purysburgh, that the troops were ordered to march by dawn of day, and we had but just got to that place when advanced parties of the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the ferry, which demonstrated the rectitude of the measure of arriving there as soon as possible. These reasons, if they justify at all, will have force as to calling down the few troops that were at Augusta; and these General Lincoln, whose prudence is not to be doubted, would likewise have remanded, had it been requisite. Colonel Walton told the Court in some part of his evidence, that I gave assurances to the inhabitants that I would defend the town. By this it would appear, if you take it singly, as he no doubt would have you to do, that I had pledged myself to the people at all events to defend them, lulling them thereby into a state of absolute security, and by that means inducing them to remain with their effects. Upon further examination, however, these assurances, even by his own account of them, amount to no more than my speaking of the composition of the enemy's troops, in a way which might inspirit those who heard me to exert themselves in defence. It was not surely my province to dispirit a people whose assistance I wanted, both for their sakes and my own; but certain it is I mentioned to many of the inhabitants the removal of their goods as a cautionary step for fear of accident, and this I think may appear from Mr. Wereat's evidence. I recommended it more than once to the Governor, whose duty it was to advise the inhabitants upon this head, and I am conscious I have nothing to accuse myself of upon this occasion. This also I should have mentioned sooner, and I beg the excuse of the Court for not having done so; but in such a farrago of evidence as the Colonel's, where facts are so few, and so wrapped up in beliefs, suppositions and opinions, no wonder if one or two of them should escape being unfolded. Mr. Sheftall, the Deputy Commissary General of Issues, has been brought by the prosecutors to prove upon me, as I suppose, a neglect of the public stores. I have ever had a favourable opinion of Mr. Sheftall as an honest man, and from the testimony of such I knew I had nothing to fear; his evidence therefore is in my favour. Many measures however were pursued, that Mr. Sheftall might have had no knowledge of. It was in the Deputy Quarter Master General's department to provide vessels and carriages for the removal of stores. Colonel Wily, who filled this office, was a man of rank, character and activity. He was directed to, and I am sure did pursue every method to obtain them, both by himself and a very active Deputy, Doctor Wadden; but their efforts were in vain. The vessels at that time at Savanna were either the property of private individuals, or in their employment. On board of these, as it is natural to suppose, the inhabitants were crouding their effects, and these vessels by civil means could not be obtained. I might indeed, by dint of bayonet, have tumbled out of the vessels both the people and their effects; but humanity, honor and conscience militated against it. I have warred to preserve civil rights, and pride myself in the thought that I have never violated them. But had I been so dead to every sense of feeling, should I not have been liable to the actions of each of those I had injured, and who would, who ought to have indemnified me? A vessel, as appears, was at last procured, capable of receiving the stores, and a party was then furnished (and it would have been useless to have done it before) to move the stores to the wharff; but the master of the vessel, alarmed a long while sooner than he need to have been, ran away with the vessel and left the stores behind. It appears in evidence, that upon the invasion of Georgia from East Florida I gave it, as soon as possible, my personal aid; that I ordered on a body of continental troops, which soon followed; that militia likewise upon that occasion were to come in from Carolina. Before these were collected, the troops from East Florida had retired; but upon the intelligence given by the deserter from the transport of an intended invasion under Colonel Campbell, they were not countermanded, but arrived in Savanna. They came about the middle of December, and were after some time dismissed, I know not why, by the Governor of Georgia. It has also been given in evidence, that I requested of the Governor of Georgia all the militia he could collect. It appears also to the Court, as I flatter myself, that every circumstance which had a claim to my attention received it, and particularly that on the retreat I paid every possible attention to the men. Some distance on the retreat I halted until the whole were past me, and a better organized column I have seldom seen even upon parade. Just at this time, I had intelligence that a party of British were seen coming down the Ogechee road, a good way beyond the barracks. Upon this I galloped to where General Huger was, and observing that this body of the enemy, though at a considerable distance, seemed hastening to possess the Spring-hill defile, I desired General Huger to proceed there, see in what manner Major Wise, who had been sent there with a party and ordered to defend the pass to the last man, had posted them, and, if he thought more men requisite, to reinforce the party with the advanced guard of the line, or take off as many platoons from the head of the column as he should think proper. Directly after this I was returning to the rear, but when I came to the artillery found the troops that I left in [...] rear of it missing. Upon this I sent orders to the troops in front to hasten their march for the defile, and directed Colonel Roberts to press on the artillery, as I was anxious for its fate, as its rear was now in air. When I came to the defile, I found General Huger had posted the party to my entire satisfaction, and that gallant officer offering to head it, I accepted his offer, and told him I would remain with him. We staid some time there under a pretty smart fire, hoping that the troops missing, or some part of them, might arrive; but being informed by some person who came out of the town, that he saw them going towards Yamacraw, and as the Carolina brigade with the artillery had entirely passed the defile, and was some distance on their retreat, all object for remaining there ceased, and we retired to the other end of the pass, where again we made some stand, after which we halted no more until we reached Cherokee-hill. What more could be expected of me I am at a loss to know. The reputation of a man is in great danger of suffering, at least for a time, when prosecutions are commenced against him under the auspices of a State. Mankind at large will be apt to suppose that he might be faulty, when the majority of a community appear [Page 29] to think him so, and perhaps the conclusion is commonly just. If characters in general are in this way vulnerable, military characters in particular are much more obnoxious to the wound. There exists in republican governments a jealousy, perhaps laudable, of men of the sword. The glare of the character excites the envy of the vulgar, and as the gallantry of the profession seems to elevate those who adopt it above the common level, men feel a malignant happiness in pulling them down. If this be a fault, it is a fault in human nature, which, though it may bear hard upon individuals, is not perhaps without its social benefits. It may soften that haughtiness, but too apt to infect the minds of military men, and make them correct that despotism of temper, which a long habit of being implicitly obeyed is but too apt to induce, fix in their remembrance the relation they bear and the duty they owe to civil society, and establish in them a courtesy of conduct to their fellow-citizens (which might otherwise forsake them) when they reflect that even their favorite mistress, Fame, is enjoyed upon the precarious tenure of retaining the good-will of the people. The right in States, however, to censure and arraign is a prerogative of a delicate nature, the dignity of which consists in a very sparing and very judicious use of it—and hard is the fate of that man, against whom a State sets itself.—Whether he be right or wrong—it is not but upon the most palpable certainty of his deserving it, that they ought to do it. Hard, however, as it is, it is the duty of every man to submit. It is a tax he owes to the public, which, though he pays with anxiety, he should pay without murmuring. This is more particularly incumbent upon military men, who, upon every occasion, should demonstrate to community that they have not sunk the idea of a citizen in that of a soldier. Actuated by sentiments like these, I now pay my tribute to the State of Georgia, in full confidence that the events of this trial will prove to them, that I faithfully whilst with them, to the utmost of my abilities, strove to fill the measure of my duty both to them and the common cause, and that where malice and misrepresentation have prevailed upon them to censure me most, I least of all have deserved it at their hands. I was very early in this contest impressed with a sense of the great importance of the State of Georgia to the common weal. It was this conviction of their worth, joined to the true respect and good-will I bore them, that made me so often press upon them the absolute necessity of taking measures to place themselves in a state of defence. It was this which made me point out to them, in the strongest expressions I was master of, that, affailable as they were at a variety of places, they were at none prepared for defence; that while other States were exerting themselves to be in the best possible state of security, they remained so unprepared, that they seemed to invite an attack; that, destitute as they were of arms, ammunition, military stores and implements of all kinds, they ought without loss of time to exert themselves to obtain them; that their internal resources not being very great, and the assistance from other States too remote upon sudden emergency to be had in time, that they ought therefore to put themselves, by works, in a situation to maintain their country until collateral aids could be called in, and that all idea of expence should be lost in the importance of the object. This I reiterated upon them, as their records will shew, and have it much to lament that I reiterated in vain. Colonel Walton could have told you this, for he was of the body to which I spoke it, and candour should have exacted of him at least to have told it to the administration, which, after his liberation from captivity, he had the ingenuity to create; but it was not popular to inform them of the fatal apathy which pervaded the former Legislatures, in which he himself had no inconsiderable share. The State of Georgia laboured under peculiar disadvantages. The climate was thought much more unfavourable to exotic constitutions than it really was. The government had originally been military, consequently not congenial to liberty. A number of men of liberal sentiments were therefore discouraged from resorting there, and though it contained at [...] many characters equal in every particular to any in other States, yet, comparatively to thick [...] settled countries, they were but a few. A number of these had been appointed to places of honorary or pecuniary emolument under the crown, and most of them, as has been common in other States, withdrew themselves when the contest waxed warm. From the select few that remained, their civil and military officers were appointed, who, by a fatal clause in the constitution of the State, were rendered inelegible to any share in their Legislature. By this means, not so great a choice of characters as was to be wished remained, and many floated into notice who had otherwise remained out of view. A number of these, however innocent, were totally unconversant in public affairs, and so were liable to be fashioned by the crafty and designing. Thus a Gwinnet, a Truitland, a Houston and a Walton became their Governors; thus design and self-interest became the ruling principle of administration; and thus I became an object of persecution. The thunder however, as I understand, slept until Mr. Walton awakened it. For tho' a government had been set up some months before he came out, yet not one word of complaint, I believe, had officially been heard of against me. This government, it is true, had not been constitutionally established; because so many of the Representatives of the State had evacuated it, that the numbers set forth by the constitution as adequate to the choice of a President and Council could not be collected. Those, however, who remained, alarmed by the enormities which for want of government were daily committed with impunity, thought themselves warranted by necessity to deviate from common rules, and therefore met and elected public officers. The persons chosen were men of real patriotism; and feeling a reluctance to assume powers not constitutionally vested in them, they forebore proceeding to executive operations until most, if not all, of the people of the State had sanctified their nomination, by requesting to be governed by them. Some time alter this, Mr. Walton returns from captivity, and though this government was progressing fast to its periodical dissolution, even that short time was too long for a man of his strong aspirations after power to wait. A few members of Assembly, much less than the number which set up the other Governor, were therefore by some means got together, and Mr. Walton is elected Governor, and other public officers nominated. Thus two administrations actually existed at one moment in the same State, a phoenomenon in the world of civil policy almost as much to be wondered at, as if two Suns appeared at the same time in one firmament in the natural world. During this government, if so it may be called, of Mr. Walton's, and which a verv respectable [Page 30] grand jury presented as an usurpation, * the letter to Congress mentioning the operations of the 29th of December with disapprobation took its rise; and though my name is not mentioned in it, yet the events of that day are spoken of in such terms, that they appear to be intended as the foundation for subsequent process. This letter had the name of Mr. Glascock, Speaker of the House of Assembly, affixed to it; but Mr. Glascock has written to Congress absolutely disavowing it, and bestowing upon it the epithet of a vile forgery. Mr. Walton's government, like Sancho's of old, running rapidly to dissolution, another, at the time fixed by the constitution, takes its rise; and though Mr. Walton was no longer Governor, he still continued a member of its Legislature, and I became arraigned for the charges before you. I have not the least [...] of blame to cast on the Assembly at large. In the light I was shewn to them, their treatment of me has been proper. They were labouring under the pressure of distress, were made sore by the calamities of war. It was natural for them to enquire into the origin of their misfortunes. It would not have been popular or safe to let them recollect, that some of the very men they had invested with authority had been leading men in all the measures of the State precedent to its misfortunes; that they had been dead to every sense of danger, or criminally negligent of every means of averting it, and this notwithstanding the most animated and pointed applications to them to fall upon measures to place their country in a state of defence, and for want of which it at last fell a melancholy sacrifice. To prevent this recollection, it became necessary to divert their attention to another object, and who so convenient as him who had been the military commander of the department? He was a thousand miles absent from the scene of accusation, and consequently could not defend himself. He had no connexions of consanguinity or affinity to take his part, was an alien to the State, and most of the friends he had obtained in it in course of acquaintance were absent as well as himself. He therefore was proper game to run at, and it was determined to hunt him down. Personal prejudices in one of the leaders stimulated also to this measure, so that selfish policy and inveteracy united in the chace. Hence has persecution been let loose upon me, and every method tried to ruin my fame. The embers of time have been raked up, to see if no spark of error was to be found, that the breath of malevolence might puff it into flame. After three long years have passed by, I am called to trial for actions, when the motives of many of them might have been forgotten by myself. In short, every measure has been pursued to immolate my reputation upon the altar of malice; but I trust, I know it has been tried in vain. Had I, in so early a period of the war, committed any military error in judgment, my zeal in the common cause, and my unabating efforts to promote it, would have induced any man, to whose bosom the least ray of candour could find its way, to cast a veil over the mistake. To the service of my country, I glory in having devoted myself. Six years have clapsed, and, a few weeks excepted, I have never asked or accepted one moment's recess from service; for to service I have sacrificed all other considerations, however interesting, endearing or heart-felt they might have been. Should illiberal minds censure me for being too much of an egotist in saying this, let them be taught that there are occasions which warrant a man's speaking of himself, and that my enemies have involved me in this predicament. The length of time that has passed since the transactions happened for which I am under trial, though a great, is not the most capital disadvantage I sustain. Accident has deprived me of many of my official papers; and many, not thinking they would have been useful to me, have been destroyed by myself. I feel the want of them most severely on this day. They would have essentially elucidated many parts of my conduct through the course of a command, in various circumstances intricate, critical, perplexing and vexatious. But above all, I lament the absence of a Secretary and an Aid de Camp, who, having lived with me long in uninterrupted intimacy and confidence, were acquainted with the minutiae and aggregate of my conduct; had been with me often in Georgia, and resided there with me for months at a time; copied all my orders and official letters; knew with what earnestness I strove, and what sacrifices I made to avoid any contest with the executive of that State; and that such was my regard for civil rights, that I never did by military exertion, what with safety to service could be done by the authority of a constable. This indeed may not be so immediately necessary to my defence against the matter with which I am charged; but, trained as I have been in republican principles, the reverence I bear to civil authority, to which it is my pride and pleasure to be subordinate, makes every appearance of contest with it a matter wounding to my happiness, and I should have been glad, since contest did happen, to have shewn that I could not avoid it. The evidence now, Mr. President, and my defence are gone through: the result is with you and the Court. I have to thank you, and through you the Court also, for your attention to me during a trial, made longer than it need to have been by a number of untoward accidents. I flatter myself, that very little of the delay that has happened can be imputed to me. A day or two excepted, when I was truly too indisposed to attend you, I can accuse myself of none. On the part of the Court. I am glad to bear testimony of the happy blend of candour and strictness, with which through the whole of this trial evidences have been examined, and in which the dignity of a Court Military so much consists. I wait, Sir, with impatience for your sentence. To military sensibility in my situation, a moment is an eternity. My [Page 31] honor is in your hands; it is a sacred deposit, but I know, I feel it will be returned to me unimpaired; and I long to have restored to me that sword, which I have always worn with honor, and shall never, I flatter myself, lay aside with disgrace.
THE Court, after maturely considering the charges, evidences and defence, find General Howe not guilty of the first charge.—They find that General Howe crossed the Savanna river, and ordered the evacuation of Sunbury and Augusta, but are of opinion that those measures were necessary and military; and therefore do acquit him of both charges with the HIGHEST HONOR.
STEUBEN, Major General, President.
The Court adjourn without day.
UNITED STATES in CONGRESS assembled, January 24, 1782.
A LETTER of the 23d from General Washington was read, accompanied with the proceedings of a General Court-Martial upon Major General Howe. The said proceedings being read,
Resolved, That the sentence of the General Court-Martial, acquitting Major General R. Howe, with the highest honor, of the charges exhibited against him, be and hereby is approved and confirmed.