THERE has been lately published in the English and Dutch Gazettes, a resolution of Congress, of March last, tending to forbid all intercourse between the inhabitants of America and Great Britain, or on any account or i [...] any circumstan [...]es whatever; and it is credibly re­ported that all British goods, however the pro­perty of them may have been acqui [...]d (capture excepted) are declared to be contraband and liable to be confiscated, and that an American in Europe, or the West-Indies, who purchases goods of British growth or manufacture, will on his importation of them, into America, be ex­posed to have his property seized, and to be [...] or at least censured▪ Several gentlem [...]n [...] from America, have informed me, that such [...] ­solutions and laws, were proposed before they left the conti [...]ent; and the men [...]ce thrown ou [...] by Messrs. Adams, Dana, and Searle, against any who should purchase British goods for the American market, leaves me in no kind of doubt, that such violent and [...]considera [...]e mea­sures have been actually adopted by Congre [...]s, and by some, if not by all the Assemblies.— I know not what good effects are expecte [...] in America from such resolutions, in Europe, they [Page 2]are esteemed impolitic, and useless at best for any good purpose, but what is to me the most alarming, is that those resolutions were taken in consequence of representations made by the French Minister at Philadelphia; and are we, in all the pride of independant sovereignty, become greater slaves, even than the subjects of France? Is the Congress, and are our Assemblies become so dependant on this Court, as to be dictated to even by it's Minister? The merchants of France go freely to London, purchase goods, and though they are obliged at all times, whether in peace or war, to introduce them privately into the kingdom, or pay a heavy tax, yet when once in­troduced they sell them openly as English goods; they now advertise them as such, and you can scarce go through a street in Paris, without seeing many stores, over the doors of which, English Goods just imported, are advertised for sa [...]e; Congress have within three years past, acted so often in direct contradiction to their own re­solves and declarations, that it is no way sur­prising that they have lost the confidence of the public, on this side the water at least they have entirely lost it; the King gave a large sum of money about the time of Mr. Laurens's arrival, for the use of the army, but the Court had so little confidence in Congress, that the money was made payable to General Washington's or­ders only, nor could they be induced, by the earnest solicitations of Doctor Franklin, to give [Page 3]Congress any controul over it; this shews either that they have no confidence in Congress, or that they mean to take General Washington and his army in effect into their pay, and make them subservient to their purposes; Mr. Laurens ob­tained liberty to lay out a part of the money in cloathing and necessary articles for the army; the Ministers probably considered it more for the interest of France, and better for the army, to have such part of the money as must go in pur­chase of clothing, &c. laid out in France, than sent in specie to America; but what followed? Mr. Laurens sent his agent to Holland and laid out one million and a half of livres, nearly, in British manufactures.—Thus whilst Mr. Adams was declaiming in Holland against England, and protesting against all use of its manufactures, and threatening every American that should pur­chase them, with being advertised as the enemy of his country, the Agents of Congress were publicly (and therefore I presume with his knowledge) purchasing those proscribed manu­factures for public use; can the annals of the world exhibit more striking instances of incon­sistency? This public preference given to the manufactures of England, by laying out the money granted by France in the purchase of them, has irritated the Minister, [...]d given ge­neral disgust; our affairs here will [...] feel the consequences, nor do I believe that we shall have any credit at all, nor that our bills will be paid [Page 4]in two months from this time.—Mr. Laurens was not to blame in this affair, so far as I know any thing of it, he acted prudently, and for the interest of his constituents; he did what you and every honest merchant would have done, in his place he had money to lay out for the public, and he sought the best market for the goods, most suitable, and such as were to be had on the best terms; besides there was a strong ship in Holland bound for America, in which they could be transported at little risque.—But what can be said of Congress for passing resolves, which they must know will not be obeyed, and which as soon as published, they themselves de­stroy, by acting in direct contradiction to them? What I have hinted about our bills keep to your­self, or use it only to check any of our friends who may be disposed to venture too deep in them. You may be assured that no loan has been ob­tained either in Spain or Holland; that there is not the least probability of any; that the resig­nation of Mr. Neckar has been a sensible shock to public credit in France; and that great em­barrassments are apprehended in a few months on account of money; that too many begin to consider every livre granted to America, as so much lest, and that Doctor Franklin is now under acceptances for nearly three millions of livres more than he has funds to answer for.— Th [...]e facts are sufficient for your direction— The Doctor may possibly obtain fresh grants—I [Page 5]doubt it—I know he has been refused, and I am told in rather harsh terms.—Congress drew bil [...]s on Mr. President Laurens, as being in Holland, many months before he sailed from America; they drew on Mr. Jay long before his arrival in Spain; these bills have been honoured and you in America have been taught to believe that it was from money received in Spain und Holland—no such thing—those bills have been uniformly sent to Doctor Franklin for payment, even the salaries of Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, and their suites, have been drawn for on Doctor Franklin, who has paid them out of the monies received here. The Agents of private States sent over here on one mad Quixotical scheme or other, have been furnished with money for their expences, out of the sums granted for the sup­port of our army; our Ambassadors and Agents have for some time past cost us at least twenty thousand pounds sterling per annum, the relief of prisoners, and other contingencies, more than as much more, all this has been taken from the money afforded us by France for our army, Congress though repeatedly advised by Doctor Franklin not to draw on him, have continued to draw without bounds, and generally without ad­vice; by their conduct one would suspect that they imagined that the Treasury of France was at their disposal, and that they had a right to draw what money they pleased from it.—The Ministers here see no end to this [Page 6]proceeding if permitted to run on, and if the Agents and Ministers of Congress are permitted to contract debts, and draw on them for the payment, and if Congress are at liberty to draw un [...]imitedly on Dr. Franklin, and they obliged to answer ultimately their drafts, it is reasonable therefore to expect, that France under its actual circumstances, will hold its hand, and that you will soon find the bills of Congress protested for non-acceptance, or non-payment; nothing pre­vents it at this moment, but the fear of a violent revolution with us—Is it to be supposed that France will be content for any time to defray the expence of the various Quixotical embassies Congress are sending to different Courts?— That she will continue to advance money to be laid out under her eyes, in the manufactures of her enemies, to the contempt of those of her own; and to her real impoverishment? You who believe this have faith indeed, but it is a question with me if it is such as will remove mountains. I know and confess t [...]e difficult situation of Con­gress—And I know also, (what I am sure they will not confess) that they have brought them­selves into it by their cabals, their ignorance, and their mismanagement; but their present em­barrassments afford them no excuse for their in­volving themselves in still greater—If you ask me what they can do? I answer at once, let them do what for a long time past they have left un­done, let them act an honest and consistent part, [Page 7]let them acknowledge their inability, let them in a word, lay their case fairly as it is before their Ally, let them weigh fairly the probable chances for their succeeding to establish Inde­pendent Sovereignty, and if they find the proba­bility against it, let them honestly confess it, and put an end to the calamities of our country, by a peace on honorable terms; perhaps to talk of peace on other conditions than Great-Britain's asking for it on bended knees, is toryism with you, if so, I cannot help it. I have for some time since, had the fate, though I shall never have the fame of Cassandra; I have predicted misfortunes and disappointments—Nobody has believed my predictions, yet they have hitherto been uniformly verified by events; "I could still prophecy but the cold hand of despair is on me" and I will only add my wishes for your pros­perity, and be assured of my sincere respect and attachment.

THE dangerous crisis to which our affairs are rapidly advancing affects me greatly—I can speak of nothing el [...]e with attention when in company, it excludes every thing else from my thoughts when alone, we have been deceived, and that principally by ourselves, we have de­ceived others uninten [...]ly I charitably believe. The British nation has [...]allen into errors equally great; would to God this great tragedy of errors, could have a happy catastrophe! It is in vain to blame our public managers, but it is wis [...] in us to examine our present si [...]uation and to weigh the probability of future consequences. Experience has shewn us that France is either unable or unwil­ling to assist us effectually, so as to drive the British force out of our country; judging from appearances, here I might conclude, tha [...] France is unwilling, as appearances warrant such a con­clusion, but when the conduct of men, or of a nation is capable of two constructions, I would willingly adopt the most favourab [...]—I know the inability of the nation to assist us effectually, and they say, they are not unwilling I ought to believe them, though I know it is certainly in­consistent with their interest, and with the safe­ty of their foreign possessions to remove the war from our continent. But to which ever of these causes we impute the continuance of the war, in our country, the consequences will be found [Page 9]equally pernicious to us. Great-Britain is de­termined in no circumstances to admit the inde­pendency of America, and so long as both parties remain inflexible, we shall continue to weaken, exhaust and ruin each other, and who will eventually be the gainers? It is, I think time ***** for us to enquire how our account will stand on a close. Let the contest close, when or in what manner it may—Will independent sovereignty, in the hands of a democracy, be a government under which our persons and proper­ties will be better secured than they were before this unhappy contest began?—Will our com­merce flourish more under independency, than it did whilst we were connected with Great Britain? This I know is generally believed, it is even relied on, as a principal source from which we shall reimburse our present expences.—The sub­ject however merits an examination.—If the restraints formerly laid on our trade were overbalanced by the protection and encourage­ment given to it. If in a state of independence, that protection and encouragement must ne­cessarily be withdrawn, and our commerce with Great-Britain and its possessions, become subject to all the duties and prohibitions laid on the commerce of other aliens and strangers. If ou [...] commerce with France and other foreign nations must be subject to the conditions and restraint which they shall see sit to impose, as must be th [...] case, it deserves enquiry whether we in our com­merce [Page 10]shall become gainers or not. I have exa­mined the question as thoroughly as I am ca­pable, and am convinced we must be losers. We complained of England for including America in the Navigation Act, and other acts of trade, but if the naval force of that nation rose in conse­quence of those acts, into a power sufficient to protect the trade of the whole empire; if the trade of America was protected thereby, could it be unreasonable that the trade of America should submit to those acts and regulations which were the source of its protection and security? We complained that acts of parliament prohibited us from carrying certain articles of our produce to foreign markets, and thereby gave England a monopoly advantageous to her and injurious to us; but it must at the same time be acknow­ledged that British subjects were generally re­strained from purchasing and importing the same articles from other countries; so that if England made a monopoly of certain articles of our pro­duce, she gave us in return a monopoly of her market, and the liberty of re-exporting our goods if a better market afforded elsewhere; in this, the advantage ay evidently with us; a great part of the articles thus monopolized by Eng­land, were such as could have been, and were formerly supplied by foreigners at as low or lower rates than we could afford them. But the system of Great-Britain being as you know to promote the commerce of her own empire in every part [Page 11]of it, not only restraints and duties were laid on foreign importations, but bounties given to en­courage the growth and importation of many of our productions, which otherwise would not have found their way to Europe; another complaint was, that we were prohibited the taking from fo­reigners, articles, which we wanted though not the growth or fabric of England; but it is well known that those articles concerning which so much has been said, formed but a very inconsiderable part of our commerce.— Every one who has had an opportunity of com­paring the manufactures of one nation in Eu­rope with another, of observing the different modes and principles of transacting business, will at once give England and her merchants the preference. All the more solid, substantial and useful articles are made better, and afforded cheaper there, than any where else, certain linens from Russia and Silesia excepted—and even those as well as the less important foreign articles, came to us, considering the drawbacks in England on exportation, nearly, if not quite as cheap, as we could have imported them di­rectly. But it has been also objected that fo­reigners were not admitted to bring their pro­duce and merchandize into our ports, and trade with us; of all the complaints made by us on the subject of comme [...]ce, this appears to me the most absurd and gr [...]ndless. The exclusion of foreigners from being the carriers for England [Page 12]is the corner stone in which its commerce and maritime power arose, and the principal cause of the increase of our commerce and navigation, and if ever we should be independent and at peace and should neglect to pass acts to exclude fo­reigners from being our carriers, we shall never be either a maritime or commercial nation.— The Parliament [...]ary regulations, and restrictions on our commerce were a principal cause of the unhappy contest between the two countries, and we were impatient under them because we were apprehensive, that they were part of a system to enslave us entirely, and thus thinking it was na­tural that we should exaggerate their hardships, and in all our deliberation on the subject, turn our attention to the restraints laid on trade, with­out considering the encouragement and protecti­on given to it; I do not mean to call in ques­tion the views or designs of any one at that period. I believe that others as well as myself, had at that time but partially examined the subject, and in truth we know that too many of our leading pa­triots had little or no knowledge of commerce, its interests and dependencies.—I confess that on a more extensive view, and impartial exami­nation of the subject, I think it evident that the restrictions which were laid on our commerce previous to the present dispute were over-ba­lanced by the protection, and various encou­ragements afforded to it by Great-Britain, but supposing that at the close of the war America [Page 13]remain independent, what must be the future situation of our commerce? Will independency at the restoration of peace, give commerce such a spring, procure for it such new sources and encouragements as are necessary, not only to revive it from the ruined state in which it now is, but to raise it still higher than it has been at any former period? Or will independency prove prejudicial to the commerce of America? This is a serious question, and the importance of it must apologize for the length of my letter. I know that I am writing to the first commercial character in America, but I also know your candor and love of truth, and therefore I ven­ture to communicate to you my thoughts on the subject, which if just you will approve, if erro­neous you will correct. America left at liberty will, I am persuaded, take at the least, three­fourths of all the European articles she wants from Great-Britain. The superiority of the British manufactures, their conformity to our taste and habits; the generosity and strict punctu­ality of her merchants, and above all the credit which they can give, and which no other nation can, or will give, must secure to that nation, as great a share of our trade as I have mentioned. But how are we to pay for those purchases? Whilst we were part of the empire, Great-Britain gave a preference to our iron, naval stores, pot ash, flax seed, timber, &c. &c. and encouraged the importation of them by bounties, [Page 14]and by laying heavy duties on the same articles from foreign nations. This will no longer be the case; we have no reason to expect to be even amongst the most favoured foreign nations in the British ports. We have imagined that Great-Britain would not support its commerce, and manufactures, without our productions and with­out our markets for a consumption of theirs; this has been asserted, in harangues and publi­cations many thousands of times within seven years past, I confess, that I once believed it— but observation and experience have convinced me, that we have been greatly mist [...]ken.—Of all the articles furnished by us to Great-Britain, I know but two, tobacco and [...]ce, which can­not be obtained as good and as cheap from other countries. The consumption of rice in Great-Britain, is very inconsiderable; and that of to­bacco, does not exceed twenty thousand hogs­heads annually, on an average.—Other coun­tries indeed can produce both these articles at as low a price as America can, but the preference given to them from America by Great-Britain, has formerly prevented their being cultivated to any extent.—It is well known that the Island of Cuba, the Coast of Brazil, and many other countries produce tobacco of a quality superior to ours.—That the Ukraine is capable of supply­ing all Europe with that article: its cultivation it is true is not yet carried to perfection there, but as it is, Russia at this time exports large [Page 15]quantities of tobacco to France, and to other nations.—The same may be said of many other countries respecting rice. Indigo is produced in the Southern parts of America, and in the Islands, every way superior to ours.—The pro­ductions of Russia, Denmark and Sweden, &c. are the same with ours, and in exchange for them, those kingdoms take the same kind of merchandize from England as we formerly took; at best therefore we shall meet with rivals in the British markets on our arrival with our produce, and rivals in the purchases we wish to make there—But we are supposed to be Independent, and can therefore go where we please, but we cannot find purchasers where we please, and the nations among whom we find them may lay what impositions they please on our sales—The North­ern powers in Europe cannot become purchasers for they have the same articles to sell—France wants but a very small part of our productions; it wants neither our iron, pot-ash, flax seed, fish, oil, or in short, scarcely any thing except about 24000 hogsheads of our tobacco, annually—Our timber and naval stores; and for the two latter articles, we shall find the same rivals in the ports of France as in England; and in regard to the first, the most important article of all, the cul­tivation of it advances so rapidly in Flanders, and in the Ukraine, that those countries will soon rival us in the quality of their tobacco, and from the cheapness of labour, be able at [Page 16]all times to undersell us in France, and in all the Northern ports of Europe—We have no pro­mise of a preference in the markets of France— nor the least ground to expect it—Spain and Por­tugal it is true, may want our flour and our fish if, contrary to all appearance, we should have any, but they will want little or nothing else, and our trade, be it whatever it may, to the Southern parts of Europe, and into the Medi­teranean, must at all times be exposed to the Cor­sairs of Barbary—Those piratical states, who pay little or no respect to the flags of the first maritime nations in Europe, further than they are paid for it, will hardly pay any to the flag of a nation, they have scarcely so much as heard of, and of which, if they come to know any thing, they will know that they can in no case have any thing to hope or fear from—We have pro­tested against the African trade, but if we relax or rescind our resolutions on that subject, without a marine to protect our commerce there, and without either forts or factories on the coast, we can have no share of it—We cannot flatter ourselves that we shall be able to reduce either Nova-Scotia, Newfoundland, Canada, or the Flo­ridas; and if Great-Britain be obliged at the close of the war to submit to the loss of thirteen colonies, it is natural to supposs she will exert herself to make the most of those which are left her—We neither have nor wish for possessions in the West-Indies—We formerly had a great and [Page 17]increasing trade there, but how much of it shall we retain as an in [...]ependent nation? If any part of the globe be de [...]endent on us for our produce it must be the W [...]st-Indies—Five years ago we rated our importance so high as to believe that from a suspension of trade with us, all the manu­facturing towns in England would rise, or at least, clamor loudly in our favour, thro' the want of employment; that Ireland would be ruined only for the want of our flax-seed, and that the British West-Indies must perish by fa­mine from the want of our productions—But the experience of six years ought certainly to correct such erroneous ideas of our own importance, or we must have been incorrigible even by expe­rience itself—Not one manufacturing town in Great-Britain has complained for want of em­ploy; Ireland has been supplied with flax-seed at as cheap, or cheaper rate than formerly, and has found sufficient markets for her linens—The West-Indies may have suffered but little dimi­nution. These facts ought to convince us that the world is not so dependent on us, as we have imagined, and by pursuing our enquiries we shall find that we are as much, or more depend­ent on our neighbours than they are on us—I am not writing to one who declaims against lux­ury, without any conception of its effects, nor to one of those who talk a great deal about com­merce, and of its benefits, or of its disservices [...]o a country, without having the least idea of its [Page 18]nature, or of the extent of its influence and power: I therefore may, without reasoning on the subject, venture to say that the pro [...] ­tions of the West-Indies are essentially necessary to us, and that we can do no better without their suga [...], coffee, cocoa. cotton, &c. &c. than [...]y without our flour, beef, lumber, &c. &c. For­merly as British subjects, we had the right of supplying the British Islands with whatever they wanted, and taking in exchange whatever they had to dispose of—We paid no more d [...]ies [...] our other fellow subjects paid, either upon im­portation or exportation—We had a right of carrying to the French, Dutch, and other foreign possessions in the West-Indies, all our produc­tions, tobacco excepted, and of receiving in [...] ­change from them, whatever they could [...]ord, rum and a few other articles excepted—The ar­ticles we received from them were indeed subject to a certain duty on importation into America. But how was it then and how is it now with the French, Dutch, and other foreigners, as to our commerce with their West-India possessions: It is true we were admitted into their ports, but our flour was a prohibited article, and only admitted openly in times of scarcity. Many principal ar­ticles of our produce were in the same predica­ment: France, by prohibiting our flour into her Islands, shews that she was in no fear of their starving without supplies from us. But what articles of their produce were we permitted to [Page 19]purchase and export openly is exchange? Molas­ses, or the wretched liquor which they distilled from it, only; all others, such as coffee, cotton, sugar, indigo, &c. we brought away as by stealth, and by the purchased connivance of their officers—Has France bound herself by treaty to give us more freedom of trade with her Island [...] than formerly? By no means—We are to be treated as the most favoured nation is treated; and the subjects of the most favoured nation were never better treated than the manner I have de­scribed—This favorite article of my country­men, mol [...]sses, the only one of any importance, which we were at liberty to import from the French Islands, was taken care of by Con­gress in their first proposals to France for a treaty. I saw the importance of it at that time, and flattered myself we had secured it, without any real sacrifice on our part, but Congress afterwards thought differently, and gave it up. We have not therefore, at this day, any security even for this single article—Every thing rests on the gene­ral and [...]ague terms of recipr [...]cally, and of being treated in the same way, and in the same manner, as any, even the most favoured nation shall be treated. But it may be said that the necess [...]ry in which the Islands must be for our produce, will at all times bring them to our terms, or at least to just and reasonable ones. Let us examine the subject at­tentively—The French islands can be under no necessity of taking from us flour, or salted pre­visions [Page 20]of any kind; on the contrary, it is the policy of France, to prohibit them from doing it, if so disposed; for by supplying her islands with flour of her own growth and manu [...]acture, and with all kinds of salted provisions purchased in Europe with her brandies, wines, &c. she en­courages the agriculture and commerce of her subjects in Europe, which is a prime object with every wise nation; as to fresh provisions, her windward islands only can ever be in w [...]nt of them, and at most the demand is inconsider­able collectively, and the business of supplying never was in the best of times a profitable branch of commerce; Great-Britain in possession of Ca­nada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas can from those colonies supply her islands with every thing they want, at as low or lower rate than we can; wheat, flour, pork, beef, horses, &c. have for many years since, and before the war, been cheaper in Canada than with us, and West-India goods of every kind have been dearer; Great-Britain therefore naturally must and will shut her ports against us as a foreign independent nation; her islands will want nothing from us which they cannot be supplied with from her own colonies in the continent, and those islands produce nothing which is not wanted either in Great-Britain or in those colonies; good policy must therefore lead her totally to exclude us from all trade with them. Our commerce in this most important branch of it must therefore be confined [Page 21]to the supplying the French, Dutch, and other foreign islands and settlements, with such articles as they will consent to t [...]ke from us, and re­ceiving in return molasses (openly so long as they shall think proper to afford it to us free of duty) and such other productions as they may be pleased to connive at our smuggling.—Thus in Europe, we shall be either excluded from our ancient and certain markets, or a [...] least rivalled in them, and we shall have no certainty of new ones, nor any security against heavy duties and impositions in such, as we may be able to ob­tain.—New channels have been opened for sup­plying Great-Britain with the commodities we formerly furnished to that nation, and for con­suming the manufactures we formerly took from her. It was the interest and policy of Great-Britain to promote our commerce and fisheries, whilst we were part of the empire; accordingly she encouraged our ship building by the purchase of our ships, or by giving them freights; but being independent, the reverse will become both her interest and policy towards us; her ports will be entirely shut against us in the West-Indies, for the reasons already given, and our commerce in that important branch confined, as I have shewn, to the furnishing the French, Dutch, and other foreign settlements, with such articles as they shall consent to receive, and under such con­ditions as they shall see fit to impose, and in re­turn they will give us molasses, if they please, [Page 22]free of duty. But their sugar, coffee, cotton, &c. will ever remain prohibited articles so long as those nations are interested to make a mono­poly of these articles in Europe, both on account of commerce and revenue, and it is impossible they can be interested to do otherwise; when France was in possession of Canada, Louisbourg, &c. the government did not permit those colo­nies to receive sugar, coffee, or any of the pro­ductions of those islands direct from them, but obliged those colonies to take them from France, charged with double freights, duties, &c. and can we expect that France will do for us what she ever refused to do for her own subjects? That she will grant us privileges which she never granted to any other nation? Can we expect that Great-Britain, resentful on account of her losses, and desirous of encouraging the colonies which may remain to her in America, and which will be able to supply her islands with every thing, can we expect that she will permit us to trade with those islands on any terms? It is re­pugnant to common sense to suppose it. Con­gress, you may remember spent some months in debate about the fisheries, they acted the parts of the hunters who quarrelled about the bear­skin—for England in the mean time drove our Allies, as well as us, entirely out of them; nor can France regain any interest in the fisheries, but by the sacrifice of some advantage which she has, or may hereafter gain. But how are we to [Page 23]come in for any share in them? It will be to no purpose to plead that our local situation gives us a natural right to participate, and that we en­joyed that right from our first settlement, &c.— We enjoyed it is true, that right with many others, as subjects and part of the British empire, but we have separated from it and appealed to the sword; the sword has decided against us on that subject, and shall we at the peace have any thing to give or restore to Great-Britain, equal to the purchase of what that nation is almost as jealous of as Spain is of her mines? Will France after having regained a share in the fisheries for herself, go still further to obtain an interest in them for us? Look-into the treaty between us, and you will find that France and we acted a little like the hunters I have referred to, in our division of Newfoundland and the fisheries; but it was made on condition of a conquest of them by either or both of us; that failing, France is under no obligation to guaranty any part of them to us; and what puts the matter out of all question is, that it is not for their interest that America have any share in the fisheries. —Deprived of these, and of almost all the West-India trade, wholly excluded from that of Africa, as well as from the benefit of selling our iron, pot-ash, flax-seed, timber, naval stores, indigo, &c. advantageously in Great-Britain and Ireland, with few or no markets opened for those commodities, what resources [Page 24]will be left for our commerce? No nation is Europe will give a suitable price for our indigo, Ireland is supplied with flax seed and lumber from the North, at a lower rate than we can afford to sell them a [...]; Sweden and Russia can at all times undersell us, in the articles of iron, timber, ships, naval stores of every kind pot-ash, &c. The bounti [...]s on tar, turpentine, &c. being taken off, we cannot send those articles to Eu­rope, without an insupportable loss, and we cannot expect that any nation (like England) will give us bounties on those articles. In taking a view of the West India commerce, I have said nothing in particular of the Spanish, Portu­guese, or Danish settlements in America. I think you will agree with me, that as the two former have ever been, and most probably will remain shut against all strangers, nothing can be ex­pected from thence, and that as to the latter, they are too inconsiderable to merit particular attention even were they not nearly in the same predicament, with those of France and Holland, which you know them in truth to be.

These external difficulties, appear to me to be of themselves insurmountable, but they are not all we shall have to encounter, if we should, contrary to all probability, continue indepen­dent—Without a marine force, our commerce will be every where exposed to imposition and insult, and we shall not probably be able to sup­port a marine—In truth neither our friends, nor [Page 25]our foes, can wish to see us a maritime power, but there will arise at the peace, and in a state of independency, other embarrassments and bur­dens on our commerce. Our national debt, considering our ability will be immense, and we shall not easily agree in apportioning of it, to the several states. This, and a multitude of other causes for dispute, are so certain, and so likely to be productive, that it will be miracu­lous, if we can avoid a civil war with each othe [...], as soon as we shall be f [...]ed from foreign ene­mies. Heavy taxes must at least be laid to pay even the interest of our public debts in the ex­hausted state in which the pe [...]ce will find us. We cannot think of lessening the principal until the continent shall have had some time to recover itself. But the interest of our public debt and the expences of government in each state will (though they must prove heavy) not be the whole of our burthens. The civil [...] Congress including the expences of their foreign ministers, consuls, &c. will exceed all our former expences, public and private, under our ancient govern­ment. Commerce therefore will necessarily be­come the subject of heavy taxes, because the landholders who are naturally jeal [...]s of com­merce, and not the merchants will [...]redeminate in making our laws, and imposing our ta [...]es, a large share of the taxes must however fall on the landholder, which will oblige him to raise the price of his productions, and this with the [Page 26]taxes on trade, will encrease it to such a height, that we shall find no market in which we shall not be undersold by foreigners. You, who are perfectly acquainted with the disposition of those who form the Congress and the Assemblies of the several states, know that it is very far from being favourable to commerce; their views are so contracted, that they never have seen that agriculture and commerce mutually depend on, and support each other. The resolutions of Con­gress in almost every instance, demonstrate their ignorance of the principles and effects of com­merce; the non-exportation agreement (for which I must blame myself as well as others) was a fatal measure; it laid the ax to the root of our commerce, and our agriculture fell with it; that resolution shews what extravagant ideas we then had of our importance, we flattered ourselves that by shutting our ports, we should distress Great-Britain and Ireland, and starve the West-Indies, so far as to effect our purposes, but the operation of that resolve well nigh starved our army, and the poorer people, and brought distress to the doors of every order; un­happily but too many of our leaders are still buoyed up with the same wild and groundless ideas, and when I hear men, reputed as the wisest and most enlightened of American patri­ots, advance that commerce is rather injurious, than beneficial and that it would be better to have foreigners who want our produce, to come [Page 27]and purchase it, than for us to carry it to them. That the whole attention of America as an in­dependent nation, should be turned to agricul­ture, and the manufacturing of articles of the first necessity. When I hear such doctrines ad­vanced, and by men whom America has been taught to look up to revere, and reviewing at the same time the other circumstances which I have touched on, I become doubtful, whether our commerce would not suffer as greatly from internal checks and embarrassments, as from ex­ternal ones—but, my dear Friend, we are very far from the peaceable establishment of indepen­dency, so far, that I candidly tell you, that I think there is not any probability of its ever taking place, at least in our day. The nations of Europe, France excepted, are all of them against it, and none more so than Spain, France becomes every day more indifferent to it, but so long as we can be made their instruments for humbling Great Britain, Spain will temporize, and France will appear to be in earnest on the subject; we are certainly the cheapest in­struments they can find to employ full one half of the forces of Great-Britain; forces, which if left at liberty to fall on their foreign possessions, would soon reduce them to the state they were in 1762. But how dearly do we pay for the services we are performing.

The Powers of Europe, hitherto neuter, appear at this time far from being indifferent to the fate [Page 28]of Great-Britain, should any of them take part with her, the war will assume a different appear­ance, and our sa [...]e will [...]ecom from that mo­me [...]t determined I think there is a probability of such an event t [...]king place soon, but my wish and prayer is for peace, and th [...]re-establishment of America in her [...]iginal rights. The present moment is unquestionably th [...] most important America has ever seen, we a [...]e now of more w [...]ght in the general scale than we can possibly expect to be hereafter, should th [...] Po [...] cr [...]f Eu­rop once agree, on the term of p [...]c [...], our as­sent will hardly be asked, and we should [...]d it necessary to acquies [...]e in the terms imposed on us.—The present opportunity ought therefore to be improved; England it is true, has a formi­dable league at this time against her, but we find in ancient as well as modern times, that nations less able to resist, have been successful, against leagues still more formidable; I do not indeed recollect any one league, that ever came off victorious, over the single power leagued against. The cause is in the nature of men, and nations; it must therefore still exist in a certain degree, and I know not why it should not even in its full force. You will call this a political letter, against which we have often protested, I intended it only as a commercial one, but I could not examine the future probable state of our commerce under independency, without [...], I have [...]ed you so effectu­ally [Page 29]by this time, that I will take my leave with­out ceremony; it is now to beg that you will make my most respectful compliments to Mrs. Morris, and to assure you that I am ever with the most sincere esteem and attachment,

THE appointment of an Ambassador to the Empress of Russia, has led me to make some serious reflections on the idea which Con­gress entertain of their own importance in the commercial and political world; they appear to be persuaded that every nation in Europe, Eng­land excepted, are interested to have us inde­pendent, and though they have been told the contrary by every Power they have applied to ex­cept France, yet the flattering delusion conti­nues, and a Minister Extraordinary has been sent to Russia. The fact is, that there is not one Power in Europe, except France, interested in having us independent, and by much the greater part are interested against us; the Em­peror of Germany, and King of Prussia, not [Page 30]being commercial Powers, can be very little affected either way; Holland, and all the Nor­thern Powers, a [...] naturally interested against us; their productions and ours, are the same in every article, indigo and ri [...]e only excepted; Russia raises tobacco for its own consumption, and begins to export large quantitie, to its neighbours; the two great sources of he Dutch wealth, are their fisheries and their freights for othe [...] nations, in both these America must soon interfere with them; the Ne [...] Englanders began to rival them in th [...]se branch [...]s of busines before the war; if we l [...]k [...]outhward, Portugal owes its existence [...] an independent [...] to Eng­land; were [...]ngland once so [...] as to re­ceive the law from France and Spain, Portugal would instantly become annex [...]d to the latter; the wealth [...]f Spain lies in its Islands in the West Indies, and in its provinces on the continent; can Spain wish to see a mighty independent em­pire of confederate Republics, established in the neighbourhood of all its treasures? It is to the lest degree absurd to suppose that Court can be so blind to the consequences which must soon re­sult from such an event; whilst we continue de­pendent on Great Britain, and under its con­troul, Spain will have nothing to dread so long as it continues to be on good terms with the Court of London, and the European connections and alliances of Spain, will serve to prevent that Court from wantonly breaking with Spain; but [Page 31]North-America freed from all European con­troul, will be at liberty to break with Spain at any time, without disturbing the peace of Eu­rope, or interesting any of its powers in the quarrel; the family connection between the Courts of France and Spain, and the desire of revenge for her former losses, have led Spain into a war, but it is evident that the Court of Spain, will not on any considerations make the war a common cause with us.—America out of the question, Great Britain is greatly superior to France and Spain united; this France and Spain are sensible of, and therefore give us good words and encourage us on, that England may be weakened by our expence; France has acted openly it is true, but the assistance afforded us from time to time has been calculated, not to drive the British forces from the continent, but to keep us from accommodating, and to employ their enemy with us. Spain has given us a trisling aid in money, but in the most secret manner, more like a bribe than a subsidy. The other Southern Powers, are not in any respect interested in our dependence or independence, but are perfectly indifferent as to either, nor if they should interest themselves would it be of the least consequence. But you may say, France having valuable possessions in the West-Indies, ought on the general principle which I have ad­vanced, to fear the consequences of our inde­pendence.—Not at all.—The possessions of [Page 32]France from their being islands, can have nothing to apprehend from the independent sovereignty of the United States.— France will at all times have a fleet sufficient to protect them, and it can never be our interest to have any other concern with them than in the way of commerce—but our position with re­spect to Spain is different—Nothing but a river will separate us, and the contrariety of our dis­positions, manners, and habits are such, that it is impossible, if left to ourselves, that we should live for any time in peace with each other.— Congress to induce Spain to declare and to act openly, have offered to cede the two Floridas— It is really no great act of generosity to offer what is not our's, but suppose Spain accepts and gets possession of them we shall thereby become still nearer our neighbours, and quarrel so much the sooner—Spain is not however, or appears not to be contented with this offer, in­sinuates that Louisiana ought to be thrown into the scale—on condition of her guaranting our independence. It is but too probable, that Con­gress will not even refuse this, if they are per­suaded that their independent sovereignty can­not be established on easier terms But no man of sense and knowledge in these affairs, can ima­gine that Spain is scrious in this demand, or that, that court means any thing else, by it than to gain time—Spain cannot be ignorant that from the day in which we become peaceably established in Independent Sovereignty, she must [Page 33]look forward to the loss of all her southern pro­vinces as an event certain, and not very distant; and she must know, that though she obtain Louisiania, yet the Allegany, or western moun­tains, will be as insufficient a barrier between us, as the river Missisippi—I must tell you, that our Independence is spoke of in a very different style here, from what it was three years since, it is not viewed here in the light in which Congress speak of it, when they say it is as fixt as fate (or if they mean any thing) as certain as those eter­nallaws of nature which Omnipotence itself can­not alter; on the contrary, it is considered by every sensible man here, as not only doubtfull, but the probability greatly against us: The con­sequences of American Independence are also estimated very disterent from what they were for­merly in France—Experience has shewn, that our attachment to the English manners, customs, and to their manufactures, is such, that if Inde­pendent and at liberty to trade where we please, England will have the preference; almost every American who arrives in France is impatient to get over to England, and the severe laws you are passing on that subject, may prevent their ever returning to America, during the war at least; but it will not prevent their going over—The laws ordering confiscation, &c. demonstrate more fully than any direct language is capable of, the predilection of Americans for England. France, though at war with England, permits her subjects to go to London openly and when [Page 34]they please, they taking out passports, and not a week passes but some of the citizens of Paris go over to London, and there are now more than four times the English goods consumed in this city, than there were before the war; the better sort of people here, both at court and in the city, are now become mad, as I may say, after every thing that is English, and even the ribbons worn by the ladies at court, are, in a great part, from English loems.

I have been told that Mons. Luzern remon­strated to Congress against our trading with Eng­land, or purchasing and importing its manufac­tures, and that those laws have passed in compli­ance with his remonstrances and requests; I am unwilling to believe it, for if true, we are be­come, and that voluntarily, greater slaves to France than its own subjects are. On whatever ground the laws have been passed, I venture to predict that not any one good effect will be pro­duced by them, but the contrary—A little time will shew what success Mr. Dana meets with at Russia, but if he meets with any at all, I am greatly mistaken—I know of no Power in Eu­rope, Portugal only excepted, that is naturally and necessarily more in the English interest than Russia—I hear that your spirits were greatly raised on hearing of the declaration of England against Holland; I expected it would be the case, though every thing considered there is not the least ground for encouragement from that event, but the contrary—It is now more than [Page 35]four months since England commenced hosti­lities, yet the Dutch have made no reprisals, nor are they prepared to make any at this time. Nearly one half of the Republic are violently against a war with England on any considerations whatever—The views of England in declaring were to exclude Holland from the armed neutra­lity, to dissolve at once a confederacy, which at best, could not have lasted any time, and to de­prive France and Spain of their naval supplies, furnished by the Dutch, and the French Islands of provisions, by the same channels—The pur­pose has been effected—Russia offers to mediate, but refuses to take part with Holland; Denmark has in effect long since deserted the confedera­tion, and the armed neutrality, on which I never built any hopes, is come to nothing.

Before the arrival of Mr. Laurens, jun. France gave Dr. Franklin six millions of livres for the current year, it has since added four more, and as it is said has engaged to be our security for 10 millions of livres in Holland, if to be borrowed at four per cent. You will be told therefore of 20 millions, and may possibly receive that sum, but will that do more than prolong the war another year? Without a fleet superior to that of England, nothing can be done to any purpose, as to finishing the war. I wish I could give you a more favourable ac­count of affairs here, and such as you wish to receive and credit, but I cannot do it consistent with truth, and though you are certainly misin­formed [Page 36]as to the face of affairs in Europe by men who are either ignorant of them, and who are resolved at all hazards to write what they know you wish to believe, yet this will not jus­tify my doing the same. In a word, my friend, nothing short of peace can save our country from ruin and slavery, and whatever you may think in America, I am convinced that the terms offered by Great-Britain afforded a good room to open a treaty on, and ought not to be re­jected. This will not perhaps be a popular doc­trine at present, but it must be sooner or later— for me, I have freely opened my mind to you, and though you may differ in sentiment you will not, I trust, condemn the motive for my having done it. I have long since had my accounts ready for settlement, and have been waiting here for six months past, on heavy expence, un­able to get them audited, Mr. Johnson, nomi­nated by Congress, as auditor, refused from the first to act, and Congress have not named any other, thus I am kept out of my money in a cruel and most unprecedented manner, but I will not add on the subject at this time. My com­pliments to all friends, and be assured that I am with much respect and friendship

I HAVE not had the pleasure of any letters from you since my leaving America, so that though I have written several, am uncertain of any of them coming to your hand, you doubtless must be as desirous to know the true state of af­fairs on this side the water, as I am to know how things really are on yours,—the few letters I have received have been too short, and written with too much caution to give me the infor­mation I wish for, and the Americans who arrive run into such extremes that I know not what to depend on. But a few weeks before the news of the defeat of Gen. Gates in Carolina, we were told by Mr. Searle, who arrived directly from Philadelphia, that the British were shut up, and in a manner besieged in Charlestown, that General Washington's army consisted of more than 20,000 men, &c. others gave an account very different: In short, nothing can be more con­tradictory than the accounts given by the diffe­rent persons, who arrive in France, of the state of affairs in America. I wish you could find time and a safe opportunity to send me the truth, and the whole truth; I assure you it would be of service, and tend to prevent the mischiefs which flow from false and exaggerated accounts transmitted from America, and which are repaid with interest in the account sent back to you of the state of affairs in Europe. The writers and [Page 38]relaters of false accounts on both sides the water, have done us infinite mischief. The war itself was occasioned at first more by them than by any other, or perhaps every other cause taken to­gether, and the continuance of it has been equally owing to them; and in the beginning of the contest, the friends of the British ministry in America assured them, that America would not persevere in its opposition, and our agents and correspondents in London encouraged us, by as­suring us that the majority of the nation was in our favour, that government would not go to extremities, that Parliament would, and must recede, for that the nation was unable to make war, and to support it for any time; thus false representations on both sides laid the foundation for the scenes which succeeded, and in which we are still involved, and a continuation of the same kind of wrong and groundless information has kept up the action of this great tragedy of errors. You have found so many of the accounts transmitted you from Europe to have been groundless, and so many of the flattering encouragements and promises made you, disap­pear and vanish into air their original composition, that I presume you would now bear to hear the truth at large, if I dared to send it you, and though it is hardly safe for me to do it, I dare not send you any thing else—Great-Britain is neither ex­hausted nor dispirited as you have been taught to believe, the Parliament appear more unani­mous [Page 39]and resolved in the prosecution of the war, than at any former period, and the warmest op­posers of the Minister's unite with him in refu­sing to accede to the Independence of America. The British fleet is evidently superior at sea to that of our ally, and the former are preparing to augment it by more than thirty new ships of the line, and near forty frigates, actually on the stocks—The late subscription to the new loan, shews that money is not wanted though the na­tional debt is become immense; this is their fituation—The state of our friends has been as greatly misrepresented in America, as that of our enemies—I will not enter into particulars but I think you cannot rely on either men or ships from hence, untill very late in this season if at all—Mons. de Grasse has sailed with about twenty sail of the line for the West-Indies, from whence, it is said, he is ordered to America, but as Admiral Rodney has a fleet nearly equal in force, in the Islands, I see no prospect of any thing decisive should such a manoeuvre be made, and should it take place, the French fleet cannot be with you before August, or later, and in these seas the maritime force of contend­ing powers appear too nearly balanced to expect any thing of importance from them this Sum­mer—I am fully of opinion however, that Eng­land enters on this campaign with greater advan­tage, than it has began any one since France joined in the war, and if they succeed in bring­ing [Page 40]the Emperor of Germany to interpose in their favour, I think the balance will be decidedly on their side. This will be known in a very short time, possibly before I send on this letter— Our first object of the war was the repeal of those acts of Parliament which were injurious to our rights and privileges; before this repeal was obtained we were forced to declare Indepen­dency, and solicit an alliance with France, the hereditary enemy of England—By a fortunate turn of our affairs, France was brought into an alliance with us, and to guarranty our Indepen­dence, just at this time the Parliament of Eng­land repealed the obnoxious acts; this changed entirely the object of the war on our part as well as on that of England; it was no longer for the redress of grievances, but for sovereignty that we fought; at the time in which France came into a treaty of alliance with us, their object was to sepa­rate America forever from England, and thereby to weaken effectually, a power which for centuries past, had given them more uneasiness and stood more in their way than any other power in Europe, from appearances they judged that by a sudden declaration and vigorous exertions the point would be gained, in a very short time, and at little expence, either of men or money; that England would be brought to consent to the in­dependence of America, after which every thing else would follow of course, and in its proper time, but the first stroke failed, the favourable [Page 41]moment was lost, and all the preparations which had been made for improving it, served only to shew England the danger it had been in, and to rouse the spirit of the nation to make the most vigorous exertions. From this period the ob­ject of the war became almost as much changed with France, as it had before been changed in America; at first, it was by a sudden stroke to force England to acknowledge our independence and separation from their empire, which being done, peace must have followed, and time will have soon effected the rest; but this failing, the original object was changed, or rather it was thought best to obtain it, by taking a different line of conduct. England was loaded with debt, and was violently agitated by parties, the oppo­sition to Ministers in Parliament and out, was formidable, and it appeared more so than it really was, from the English freedom of speech in Parliament, and of publications out of it; America was not perfectly unanimous in any of its measures, except [...]n the support generally of their independency, in this they appeared suf­ficiently unanimous, to prevent any fear of them falling off or accommodating. Therefore what could not be gained in one way, was to be at­tempted in another; the [...]eakening of England was the primary and constant object, but the means for doing this were changed; it was as I have already said [...] to be don [...] by our being immediately established independency, and the [Page 42]consequences which time would naturally pro­duce, would effect every thing desired; but this failing through the same ostensible object, that of our independence has been held up to view, yet measures so very different have been pursued, that their first object, so far as it respects us, has become entirely changed, and the plan now is so far as we can judge by appearances, to weaken England by spinning out the war, and of em­ploying of us against them; and after England is reduced by th [...] means, our independence may possibly be established.—I need not point out to a ma [...] of your superior penetration the fatal mis­chiefs, with which such a system is pregnant.— Whilst England is at war with France and Spain united, we are left with more than one half of its land forces, and a considerable part of its marine on us; we may struggle hard and behave manfully, but must be continually losing ground and strength, whilst (France) our Ally with Spain, may possibly hold a balance to the rest, without any material injury to themselves, tho' the fact is they have not done even this hitherto. But supposing that England in conse­quence of such a system, should in two or three years be reduced to receive the law from France and Spain, in what situation must America by that time be? And to what Power can we look for relief, if France or Spain, or both, should offer to dictate the laws to us? Though this may not be the case, yet nothing is more evident than [Page 43]that he present object of France and Spain, is to employ, and waste the forces of Britain at the expence of America; evident as this must be to every one who impartially reviews the past, and compares it with the present, we are unwilling to see or believe it, and are prevented from the examination by fair promises, generous pro­fessions, and just so much and no more assist­ance as will serve to keep us from sinking at once, or flying off to the other side — In the mean time you must observe that Spain has from the first refused to know any thing of us, thereby holding it in its power to declare for or against us, or to insist on any conditions [...]atever, as interest may dictate, whilst Ame­rica is bound by a secret article of the treaty of Paris of Feb. 6, 1778, to make a similar one with Spain whenever required, ye [...] though this article was obtained from the American com­missioners at the signing of the treaty at Paris, and though Spain has been now for two years engaged in the war, yet that Court still refuses to acknowledge us, or to receive our ambassa­dor, though the Presi [...]ent of Congress—I will not enter further on the important, and to me painful subject—I have already said enough to a man of your penetration and judgment, and have no need to go into a particular and minute discussion, I will therefore finish my letter on more private matters; you must recollect the many and long conversations we have had, on [Page 44]the subject of a settlement on the Mississippi, near the Illinois, or on some other part of hat fertile western country, when I left America I intended to have made some attempt a least, to interest some gentlemen in Europe i [...] the scheme, but the unfavourable appearance of American affairs, and the uncertainty how the war may terminate, have prevented me from saying any thing on the subject.—I have not however lost sight of it, and if you continue in the same sentiments as form [...]rly, it will be well to turn your though [...]s that way. — I can see no pro­spect of our being so happy, or of doing some­thing to repair the injuries, we have done our­selves and families in point of fortune any where as by such an establishment.—If we return to our dependence on Great-Britain, it will not probably be with unanimity and parties, animo­sities and bickerings between the different Go­vernments, and even between individuals, will probably exist longer than we shall, and render the remainder of our lives disagreeable:—On the other ha [...]d, if ou [...] independence is establish­ed, the jarring interests of the different States, will be such, and so many grounds for disputes are already laid, that we shall be happy even to escape for any time the going into a civil war among ourselves, by retiring west, a [...]d which we may [...]d, let the event of the war turn either way, we may escape those disagreeable scenes, which await our country, and enjoy more satisfaction, as we [...] find our account much better, in set­tling [Page 45]a new colony, than in mixing in the feuds and factions of old ones; if indeed the re­port is true, that Congres have offered to cede Louisi [...]nia, and the navigation of [...]e Mississippi exclusively to Spain, I confess I know not how this can be done, if th [...]y accept of it, and Ame­rica becomes ind [...]pendent in such cruel terms, but I can hardly conceive it possible that such an idea could have entered the head, of the weakest and maddest of our politicians.—I cannot expect that you can have leisure to send me any digested plan, on this subject, but I pray you not to be sparing of gener [...]l hints, of the grounds and principles on which you would wish to have one formed, and when you write send duplicates, that some one may reach me, address your letter under cover, to Dr. Franklin, who will know where to forward them.—I have nearly finished a third sheet, and have not the courage to enter on a fourth, though in writing to you, I enjoy in some degree the pleasure of conversing with you, of which you know I am not easily tired;—but I shall write again in a few days, and in the mean time wishing you all which one friend can wish or desire for another, I am most sincerely,

THE famous Abbe Raynall has published a new edition of his Histoire Philosophique & Politique. The Parliament of Paris have con­demned the book to be torn and burnt, his per­son to be seized, and his estate confiscated. The Abbe, however, had timely notice, and has fled. The Book is at present both scarce and dear, or I would send it to you. The liberties which the Abbe has taken with the Christian Religion, and with the political manoeuvres of France, have caused his persecution. I am of opinion that the latter has been the principal, for it is well known that no country in Europe abounds more in Deists and Deistical writers than this— As you must be anxious to know the sentiments of this celebrated and eloquent writer with res­pect to the American revolution, I have made a few extract, and would gladly oblige you with more if I had time, but having only borrowed the books, I must return them as soon as read, speaking of our revolution he says. ¹ ‘De [Page 47]toures les causes energiques que produiserent tant des revolutions, sur la Globe, aucune n'existoit dans le Nord de l'Amerique, ni la religion, ni les lois n'y avoient etè outragiés, les sang des Martyrs, ou des citoyens, n'y avoit pas ruissetè sur des echauffauds, on n'y avoit pas insulté aux meurs, les manieres, les usages, aucun des objects cher au peuples, n'y avoient eté livrès au ridicule, le pouvoir arbitraire n'y avoit arraché aucun habitant du seine de sa famille, ou de ses amis, pour les hainer dans les horreurs du'n cachet, l'or­dre publique n'y avoit pas eté invertí, les principes d'administration, n'y avoient pas changé & les maximes du government [...]y etoient toujours restées le meme. Tout se re­duissoit, [Page 48]a scavoir, si la metropole avoit, ou n'av [...]it pas le droit de mettre directment ou indirectment un leger impot sur les colonies, car les gri [...]fs accumulées dans le manifeste n'eurent de valeur, car par ce premier grief, cette question presque metaphysique, n'etoit guerre propre, a soulever une multitude, ou du moins a l'intereser fortment a une que­relle, pour laquelle, elle voyoit ses terres privées des bras destinés a les seconder, ses maissons ravagées, ses campagnes couvertes de cadavres, de ses proches, ou teints de son propre sang.’ On the Tender Act, he says, ² ‘Est ce que a corps (Congress) ignoroit qu'on ne commande pas plus aux esprits, qu'aux sentiments? est ce qu'il ne sentoit pas, que dans le crise presente, tout citoyen raisonable craindroit decommetre sa fortune? est ce qu'il ne s'appercevoit pas qu'a l'origine d'une republique, il sa permettoit, des actes d'un despotisme inconnu dans les règions meme faconnèes a la servitude!’ On our alliance with France, and the transactions of that time, [Page 49]he says, ³ ‘On rapproche aux conseils du [Page 50]Louis seize, d'avoir blessé la Majesté de l [...] premier puissance de Globe, en désavouant a la face de l [...]univers des secours, qu'on ne cesseit de donnor, clandestinement aux Ame­ricaines, on leur rapproche-d'avoir par une intrígue des Ministres, our par l'ascendant de quelque Agens obs [...]ures, engagée l'etat dans un guerre déssess [...]reux tandis qu'ill fal­loit s'occupe [...] a remonter les ress [...]rts du g [...] ­vernment, à gu [...]rir les longues plaies d'un regne dont toute le derniere moitié avoit eté vile and soible, partagée entre les dépreda­tions, & la honte, entre la bassasse du vice & les convulsions du despotisme. On leur rapproche d'avoir provoqué les combats par une politique insiduese, de s'etre enveloppés [Page 51]dans des discours, indignes de la France, d'avoir, employe, avec Angleterre, le lan­gage d'un audace timide qui semble demen­tir les projets qu'on a fermée, les sentimens qu'on a dans sa coeur, langage qui [...] p [...]u [...] ­quà viler celui qu [...] s'en sert, sans p [...]uvoir tromper celui a qui on l'addresse, & qui déshonore, sans que ce dishoneur mème puise etre utile, ni au ministre, [...] a l'etat, pour­quoi demande t'on encore, pourquoi des hommes, qui ont e [...]tre les mains, tout la puissance de l'et [...], & qui pour etre obëis, n'ont quà commander, se sont ils laisses pre­venir, sur toutes les mers pa [...] un enemi, dont la constitution entraíne des lenteurs ne­cessaires? Pourquoi s'etre mis par un traité inconsideré dans les fers du Congress qu'on auroit tenu lui meme dans la dependance par des subsides abondans & [...]gles. L'Europe qui a les yeux fixés sur nous, voit un grand dessein & nul [...]e demarches concertier, voit dans nos Arseneaux, & sur nos ports preparatifs im­mense, & nulle execution, voit des flottes menacantes, & cet appareil rendu presque inutile, l'audace & la valeur, dans les parti­culiers, la molesse, & l'irresolutíon dans les chefs, rout ce qui annonce d'un coté la force, & la pouvoir important d'un grand peuple, tout ce qui annonce de l'autre, la foiblesse & la lenteur qui tiennent au charactére & aux vuës, c'est par cette contradiction frappante [Page 52]entre nos projets & nos demarches, entre nos movens, & l'esprit qui les empl [...]ië, que le genie Angl [...]is, un moment eto [...]né, a repris sa viguer & jusqu'a present [...]'est une probléme a sa resaudre pour l'Europe▪ si en nous declarant pour l'Amerique nons n'avons pas nous méme re­levé les force de l'Angleterre.’—Speaking of the motives of France in the treaty with us, he says, ⁴ ‘E [...]fin la philosophie, dont le premier sen [...]im [...]nt est [...] desir de voi tous les govern­ments justes, & tout les peuples, heureux, en portant un coup d'oeil sur cette alliance d'une monarchie, avec un people qui défend sa liberté, en cherche le motif, elle voit trop, q [...]e la bonbeur de l'humanité n'y a point de part, e [...]e [...]ense que, s [...] l' [...]mour de la justice, eut [...]ec [...]dé la cour de Versailles, elle auroit a retté dans le premier article de sa conven­tion ave [...] l'Amerique que tous les peuples opprimés avoint le droit de s'elever contre leurs oppresseurs.’ Speaking of the refusal on the [Page 53]part of Great-Britain, to accept of the mediation of Spain, on terms which would at least have tacitly acknowledged our independence in fact, though not in right, he says, ⁵ ‘Si don [...] on me demandoit quel, est le nom, qu'on donnera dans quelques anneés a la fermeté que les Anglois ont montré, dans ce moment, je re­pondroi [...] que je l'ignore; quant a celui qu'elle merite, je le sais; je sais que les annales du monde ne nous offrent que rarement, l'aguste & majesteux spectacle d'une nation qui aime mieux renoncer a sa dureé qu'a sa gloire.’ With re­spect to the continuation of the confederacy against England he queries, ⁶ ‘Est il possible [Page 54]qu'une union etroite, puisse longtems subsister entre des confedereés d'un caractere aussi opposé que le François, emporté, dedaig­neux & leger; l'Espagnol, lent, hautain, jaloux & froid: l'Amerique qui tient secrete­ment ses regard tournés vers sa mere patrie, & qui se rejouiroit des devastres de ses allies, s'ils etoient compatibles avec son indepen­dance? Ces nations, soit qu'elles agissent en [Page 55]concert, soit qu'elles s'agissent separament tarderont elles à s'ente accuser, a se plaindre, & a se brouillon? L'Histo [...]e nous apprend encore, que peu de ligues, se sont partagies les depouilles, de la nation entre la quelle elles se sont formies Athenes, victorieuse de la Perse, Rome sauveé d'Anibal: dans les tems modernes, Venise echappeé a la fameux ligue de Cambrai, & de nos jours mëme, la Prusse, qui par la genie d'un homme a sou­tenir tête a l'Europe, ont droit de suspendre notre jugement sur l'issue de la guerre pre­sente. Enfin si l'on considere l'esprit de la nation Françoise opposé a celui de la nation qu'elle combat, on verra que l'ardeur du François, est peutetre egalement prompte á s'allumer & à s'eteindre; qu'il espere tout lors qu'il commence qu'il desespire de tout des qu'il est arrèté par un obstacle, que par son caractere il a besoin de l'enthusiasme des succêss, pour obtenir des succêss nouveaux; que l'Anglois au contraire, même presump­tueux d'abord, malgré sa hardiésse naturelle, sait, quand il le feut, battre avec courage, s'eléver avec le danger & s'affermir par la disgrace; semblable a ce chene robuste auquel Horace compare l [...]s Romains, qui frappé par la häche & mutilé par le fer, renoit sous les coups, qu'on le porte, & tire une vigeur nouvelle, de ses blessures méme.’ He then considers the part which other European Powers [Page 56]take, and says, ⁷ ‘C'est peutêtre beaucoup que les nations ne l'oient pas encore traversié dans ses projets contre l'Angleterre. Le re­sentiment que les injustices, & les hauteurs, de cette Isle superbe, ont inspiré par tout, doit etre la cause, de cette inaction mais la haine l'ai, lorsque l'interest montre, il est possible que l'Europe juge contraire, a sa suretè, l'afroible ferment de la Grande Bre­tagne dans l'ancien & le nouvelle hemisphére, & qu'aprés a voir joui des humiliations & des dangers, de cette puissance orguelleuse & tyrannique elle prunne ensin les armes pour la defendre.’ He enquires what will be the true interest of France and Spain with respect to America, if victorious, and gives it as his opi­nion that it will be their best policy to have us divided, not between them, but between our­selves and England; but I am tired with giving you extracts, the above are sufficient for a sample of the sentiments of this eloquent and popular [Page 57]Author. He is perhaps the most popular writer of the day in France, and his exile will most probably encrease his popularity here and indeed in all Europe. As you understand French, I have preferred the sending you the Author's own words to any translation of mine, and have already made this letter too long to add any thing more than my compliments to Mrs. Thompson, and sincere wishes for your mutual happiness.— I am with most sincere respect and attachment,

I EXPECT by the time you receive this, you will hear me announced from letters, written by certain Americans on this side the water, as an enemy to my country; though I do not ima­gine you will credit such reports, yet I am per­suaded you interest yourself so much in what con­cerns me, that you will be glad to know what gave rise to them.—Too many of the Ameri­cans who arrive in France, bring with them all [Page 58]that spirit and rage, and of party by which they were actuated at home, they think, or pretend to think, that the only way to serve America, and at the same time to make their Court here, is to represent the situation of our affairs totally different from what it really is. In August last I arrived here; Mr. Searle soon after me, that gentleman asserted that the British were shut up in Charlestown, so that he said ‘not a soldier dared to venture out far enough to shoot a bird.’ That General Washington's army consisted of more than 20,000 effective men well supplied, that so far from wanting recruits, men pressed for to enlist, that America was in no way anxious for peace, but on the contrary wished the war might be continued until England should be humbled, if not ruined, ‘until (said he) that old Lion's claws shall be out, and his teeth all drawn.’ When any one doubted of these and such like extravagant assertions, he was sure to be answered with a most important air, ‘You must pardon me Sir, but I do know, for I am a Member of Congress, the only one that ever was in Europe in that quality, and I think I must know better than any other, having been Chairman of most of their Com­mittees.’—Those who from their personal knowledge were able to bring facts as well as circumstances directly in contradiction to his assertions, were sure to be represented as Tories, unfriendly, or as enemies to America, though [Page 59]events too notorious to be concealed, and the re­presentations of Congress of the State of America fally contradicted his assertions, yet all si [...]nified nothing; the man who ventured to question the policy or rectitude of any measure of Congress, who would not agree that America was able alone to support the war, that Great Bri­tain was exhausted, and become as weak as she was wicked, that commerce had done us the most essential mischief; that mer­chants, that is American merchants, who he de­clared to be in general, mere pitifull speculators and undeserving of the name of merchants, had by their trade, done u [...] such injury that it would have been well for America had they long since been exti [...]pated—That the goods sent out by France had been worse for us, than if in their room, forty thousand Russians had been sent to fight against us—The man who would not assent to these and such like mad assertions, but ven­tured to contradict them, was sure to be noted down as unfriendly at least, if not an enemy to his country, and thus I was entered on his black list—You will hardly believe it possible that any man without being perfectly mad, could be ca­pable of talking in such a manner, yet many, as well as myself, can assure you that this was the common stile of his conversation; that he often went beyond any thing I have told you of, and what will equally surprize you is, that there were at Paris, Americans who joined him and [Page 60]acted as his echo; you well know that I am so in­capable of acting a tame, equivocal part, that I do not always act even a cautious one; I did every thing in my power to discountenance this mad rant; this drew on me the ill will of seve­ral of my countrymen, whose good opinions I wished to have in preference, tho' too indifferent as to either, to step aside from the line of truth and candor to ga [...]n the latter or to avoid the former—I have said here (what is acknowledged even by Frenchmen, and ought by this time to be known in America) that Great-Britain is not an exhausted, contemptible kingdom, but on the contrary, that they possess a greater share of energy and vigor, and are capable of making greater exertions than any nation in the world besides—Was it criminal to say what all Europe acknowledges with surprize and admiration to be the case?—Was, or is it high treason, to call in question the perfect wisdom and rectitude of any of the measures of Congress?—or to with­hold one's ass [...]nt to assertions, declaring that Congress never were at any period, so respectable both at home and abroad, as at this time, that they never possessed the confidence of the people at large, in so perfect a degree, as at present; and that America had never been at any time more unanimous or in better circumstances? By Mr. Searle, and some others, it has been deemed criminal next to high treason, not to go those lengths; indeed one would imagine that he carried [Page 61]it still higher, for speaking one day at table (a French gentleman who understood English, being present) on American affairs, and the Americans then in Europe, he exclaimed, that he wished to God every American in France might be instantly hanged, and that he would be content to suffer among them, could that be effected, since by that means a better set would be introduced.

I should not trouble you with these expres­sions, which you can consider in no other light, than the ravings of madness, were it not that this gentleman, has been seconded and support­ed in this stile, by some Americans here, though I know of no one of them who has gone by any means so far; what idea must foreigners have of us, and of our councils, when they hear a man who boasts on all occasions of being a mem­ber of Congress, and to have had a prin [...]ipal share in all our public measures, talk at such a rate? you can easily conceive and without my proceeding to reci [...]e instances of nearly the same nature, which I could easily do, sufficient to fill a large volume, whence has arisen one of the principal causes, of our national character and credi [...]'s having sunk so very low within these three years past.

Though this letter, and others I have lately written contain my opinion of our affairs, and of the state as well as of the views of the Powers in Europe, with which we have any concern, yet I have on no occasion ventured to make it pub­lic [Page 62]in Europe, but have most cautiously avoided giving of it, even in private conversation. I consider the people of America, to be [...]ill too violently agitated, to listen to any thing which appears to contradict their favouri [...]e wish; they have been taught to believe, that their happi­ness and that of their posterity, is inseparably connected with independency, or rather with their own Sovereignty. The generous and noble enthusiasm, which first inspired them, to oppose acts and claims, injurious to our rights and pri­vileges has been kept up after the claims and acts have ceased to exist, and its force turned to the support of independent sovereignty, a claim never heard of on our part, until since the year 1775. Yet I cannot in justice to myself and friends conceal from them my sentiments on the important subject, nor the dangers which to me appear at the door. It is the interest of each of the contending parties to make peace as soon as possible, and nothing at this time prevents, but our claim of independent Sovereignty, which France by treaty is bound to support. If we consent with an accommodation with England, the great obstacle will be removed, if we do not, it is probable that the war will become more ge­neral, and it is not difficult to foresee where we shall land, and in what condition in the general storm; have we not by sending ambassadors to almost every Court in Europe, h [...]d an opportu­nity of trying the disposition of the several courts [Page 63]towards us? Not one of them except Dr. Frank­lin has been received, the others after an enor­mous and foolish expence, have returned or are still waiting with their credentials in their hands, at some Minister's door, undistinguished among the crowd of suppliants.—Our submit­ting to this, continuing to solicit under such mortif [...]ing treatment, and our appointing an ambassador to Russia, after having been refused audience, almost every where else in Europe, but ill agrees with the character of independent so­vereignty. The spirit and manlike boldness, with which we asserted our rights, and ventured singly to oppose Great-Britain in the defence of them, drew the attention of all Europe, and raised our character high, and the very name of an American became respectable, but the turn which our affairs have taken since the year 1778, owing to the management of them by men in­texicated with the ideas of sovereignty, and the flattering prospect of becoming ambassadors, en­voys, &c. thus reversed the scene, and con­vinced the world at large, how unequal our gentlemen in Congress, are to the task of So­vereigns, and of great statesmen.—Emoluments have had their weight with these men, the Secre­taryship to an embassy, has not been thought below their acceptance, especially as a salary of 1000l. sterling, per annum, was attached to it.

The salaries to the different boards, though by no means extravagant, have been tempting [Page 64]objects to many, and the civil list of Congress, which has been as rapidly encreasing, as that of France has been diminishing, under the hands of its present minister of finances, held out hopes at least to all. It is no way surprizing that men in possession, or in expectation of so­vereignty, or its emoluments, should labour in­cessantly to persuade America that its peace, li­berty and safety cannot be secure but under an independent democratical government, the men of this character form a numerous body, and they "labour faithfully in their v [...]cations." It is to no purpose that the experience of all ages and nati [...]ns of the world contradict the doctrine which they advance, but few read the history of past ages, and still fewer reflect on what they have read, and on what the present time offers to their most serious consideration; if we were contending only for momentary peace, safety and liberty, or only for the enjoyment of them for the present age, with the offers made us, we must be more than madmen to continue the con­test, but the professed object and the only one that can in any degree justify a prosecution of the war, is the security of those blessings to the latest posterity; will an independent democrati­cal government secure them better than any other? In the examination of the question, some regard ought to be paid to what has passed in the world, and we ought to inquire if any country ever was, for any time, even for one century at [Page 65]peace, free and happy under a democracy? for myself I confess, I have never heard, or read of such a country either antient or modern; all the antient republics were aristocratical is a greater or less degree, the modern ones are the same, and the moment that the democracy in any state breaks down or subjected the aristocra­cy, every thing has ever gone to confusion— peace, liberty and safety have all been lost in the distractions of democracy, which in a very short time has prepared the way to absolute monar­chy—but possibly America has produced a race of men more simple, virtuous, and pa­triotic, than any part of the world has hitherto been blessed with: If we are sure of this we have some grounds for making the experiment, if what has failed in every other instance; but if in fact we find ourselves agitated, and led by the same passions, as the rest of mankind have ever been, we ought to pause and weigh seriously whether in future, we shall be blessed for having sixed the peace, liberty, and safety of America on a sure basis, or on the contrary, be execrated for having destroyed the very basis and foundation of good order and government, and entail [...]d on posterity all the miseries, which anarchy o [...] des­potism can inflict. It will perhaps be said, that the nations which have been so convulsed and distracted by Democracy, were previously cor­rupted, it may be true, but did any nation ever retain that degree of disinterestedness and of rigid [Page 66]patriotic virtue necessary to support good order and government under a Democracy, after they became rich and powerful? further where is the nation that ever preserved it even in poverty, under a Democracy? I confess I recollect no one. The Spartans by banishing wealth and luxury, and holding comm [...]ce the parent of both in ab­horrence, pr [...]served their form of government (liberty they never had any idea of) for many ages, but their government was as far or farther removed from Democracy, than it was from ab­solute Mo [...]archy.—The Romans began under a system of government partly Royal, and partly Aristocratical; the latter destroyed the former, and to support itself mixed some portion of the Democratic with the Aristocratic, to gain over the people, to assist them in the perpetual exclu­sion of Royalty. The Democratic power was at first very confined and limited, and the Aristo­cratic remained for several centuries almost ab­solute, but in every struggle between the two, the Democratic gained more or less the advan­tage over the Aristocratic, until after the most violent and bloody contest, the former came off victorious, and the Roman empire became in effect, in absolute Democracy, which soon pre­pared them to receive an absolute master.—Caesar with the advantage of victories and personal abi­lities unparalleled even in the Roman histories, could not have succeeded had not the Republic been previously thrown into confusion, and all [Page 67]principle and subordination destroyed by a Demo­cracy, at the head of which he for some time placed himself to facilitate his becoming their sole Sovereign, Lord and Emperor: But there is no necessity for travelling far, or searching in­to antient history; nor should I have mentioned the above instances but by the great stress laid by certain declaimers, in American assemblies, on [...] Spartan and Roman government, and their virtues—whilst it is evident they either kn [...]w nothing of them more than their names, or wilfully misrepresent fects.—We have had some small experience ourselves, of democratical government; and we cannot, from what we have seen and experienced, but be a [...]le to form a judgement what the consequences will be when it comes to operate in full vigor and without re­straint.

Absolute democracy and absolute monarchy are nearly connected with each other, and even wise and tried patriots, have, in all ages, sub­mitted to the latter, to escape from the distrac­tions of the former; perhaps the situation of our country, upon every account, is such, that it will not bear a strict comparison with any other, I believe it to be the case; at the same time I am of opinion that this is against us, un­der the proposed government of a democracy.

At this time we are of some wright in the ge­neral scale, and may by improving it be able, though not to dictate the law absolutely, yet to [Page 68]obtain such terms of peace, as may come up to every reasonable wish.—But are we sure of ob­taining the same, when the great contending Powers tired of the war, come to settle their dif­ferences by a peace, shall we then find ourselves in a situation to dictate, or to be dictated to? We have ranged ourselves on the side of France and Spain, against England, but shall we in a treaty of peace, be considered and respected as their equal, or shall we be regarded in the settle­ment of their accounts as an article to be used in discount, by either as the balance may fall? This is a serious enquiry, and France has al­ready put it in our power to answer the question. When Spain offered to mediate between France and England, the latter accepted the mediation, on condition that France withdrew their rescript of March 1778, which declared America inde­pendent—to this France replied, that England could not with propriety demand of them a con­cession at the beginning of a war, the events of which were uncertain, which they could only be brought to grant at the close of an unfortu­nate war. This reply of France says plainly, that if the war should be unfortunate on their part, our independence may be given up, and shews in what point of light we are considered. —The events of the war have not hitherto been fortunate, on the part of France and Spain, nor have they been greatly unfortunate though the balance (were the accounts now to be settled) [Page 69]is against them.—Future events are uncertain, but should France or Spain unfortunately loose considerably, we and our independence remain as a pledge, by a restoration of which their losses will be made up; if on the other hand, Eng­land proves unfortunate, the acknowledgement of our independence, may serve them in the same stead, if the latter proves the case, as it possibly may, after two or three years more of war; what by that time will be our situation? Our country ravaged, and exhausted, our com­merce destroyed, an immense internal and fo­reign debt contracted, the interest only of which will be a greater tax, than we ever had any idea of before this war, to which will be added, the support of civil government, as expensive, or more so than formerly, and the expences of new establishments, internal and external, such as Courts of Admiralty, &c. Boards of Trade, of Marine, of Treasury, &c. &c. of Ambassadors, Envoys, Consuls, &c. which alone will amount to more than all our former public expences, be­sides we must have a marine force at least, or we cannot expect to have our flag respected—nor our commerce secure from imposition—shall we find ourselves equal to all this? Will the inha­bitants of America, taught to believe, that they fought to exonerate themselves from taxes, be contented under ten times the tax they ever paid, and to have the same entailed on their posterity?—In this state of weakness, debt, [Page 70]and discontent, is it possible that we most lie at the mercy of the victorious, or most fortunate power which eve [...] it be, at the peace? If England dictates the terms of peace, we must he unconditionally at their mercy, if France does it, we shall be equally so [...], in this moment we may escape the danger of lying at the mercy of either. France will not be able to dictate the la [...] to England, without having previously so effectually reduced that power, as to render it unable to [...] in our behalf, should any, even the most [...], be dic­tated to us. If this is a just state of the case, and it appears to me such, we may possibly enjoy [...] nominal independent sovereignty, but in [...] and reality [...] dependent, and that uncon­ditionally on France, on the other hand should the war prove unfortunate on the part of France, France m [...] agreeable to their public declara­tion withdraw its rescri [...], which declared [...] independent, and leave us to unconditional sub­mission to England; we are thus pushed on by the continuance of the war towards the streights of Scylla and Ch [...]ryb [...]is, but thank God we have not yet arrived there, and if there is any pru­dence of skill with those who are at the helm of our public ship, we may land [...] and honour­ably on so [...] ground. I have given you, and that freely, my sentiments on our public situation. Though treated with a degree of injustice and ingratitude which has scarce a parallet in history [Page 71]by a faction of my countrymen; my country and its interests still lie nearest my heart. I have met with many English, Scotch, and Irish fa­milies, in the course of my acquaintance in this country, who following the dictates of con­science, and what they thought to be their duty, took part with the Stuart family, and who in consequence had been proscribed, and driven from their country under the loss of title, for­tune, &c. I was at first surprized to find that these people, though many of them had been born in France, and inheriting as one might suppos [...], the severest resentments against Eng­land, still valued themselves on the country from which they and their [...] had been expelled, with the unmost [...] and disgrace, and in a word, in [...] the var­nish and paint that had been laid on in the course of a century in France, [...] original can­vass was still visible in their sentiments and ac­tions. Since I have been in exile [...]self my sur­prize has ceased. I find it is not difficult to change climate and country, but that it [...] im­possible for any one, that is not either less or more than m [...], to conquer those early arta [...]h­ments and predilections which every citizen of a free government has for his country and its in­terests—my saying one word on the affairs of America is one proof of this, but my letters being filled with scarce any thing else, shews that whatever resolutions I have taken to the [Page 72]contrary, I can neither think nor write without touching, and even dwelling on the subject, in fact, it is the only one, which lies down with me at night and rises with me in the morning, it accompanies me in every circle whether gay or serious, and often makes me blind and deaf to every thing else. I am sometimes attacked by prudence, which asks me what I have to do, under my circumstances with the politicks of any country, or particularly of one more than an other. She tells me if I have time to listen, which I seldom have, that of all men, I ought not to meddle, that being fairly on shore, though after suffering a shipwreck, I have nothing left but to collect what I can of my fortune out of the wreck, and make the best of it. Though judgment pronounces fully in favour of this opi­nion, still I cannot remain indifferent to what affects a country which I must for ever call mine. I take up my pen almost every day to write to some friend or other in America, I determine not to let any thing political fall from it, yet be­fore I have finished one page I find myself in the full force of a current which I cannot escape or resist, but I will be carried on no further by it is this letter. I promised myself with being able to do something in the commercial way. I have been disappointed from various causes, I hoped to have finished my accounts soon, and received the considerable balance due me from Congress; but though my accounts with vouchers to support [Page 73]my demands have been ready more than four months, I can find no auditor. Congress have been informed near a year since that their audi­tor could not serve, yet they have not appointed any other, tho' they knew I was waiting at my own expence to adjust my account. The cruelty and injustice of this proceeding is too visible to require my enlarging on it, I am discouraged in writing to men, who consider themselves omni­potent, and who have among their other attri­butes, taken that of doing injustice when they please, and justify all by the tyrant's plea, neces­sity; out of a balance of more than 300,000 li­vres, I have not been able to obtain one shilling, by a prevailing junto in Congress, I have been represented in America as a defaulter grown rich at the public expence, this was done to prejudice my countrymen against me, and to cover or jus­tify their horrid ingratitude, and at the same time to force me on a dangerous and expensive voyage, to obtain justice here, where they had previously taken such arrangements, as to counteract me in pursuit of my right; it is true they appointed an auditor, but laid him under such restrictions, that they must have known at the time, that no man of spirit would accept the office, and on a refusal, they have neglected the naming any other; does this shew them acting like my credi­tors in earnest for the settlement, or like shuffling evasive debtors, who push it off, by every means in their power, to have some plausible excuse for [Page 74]the non-payment of their debts? the world will determine without hesitation, and I am resolved the cause shall be soon laid before them. I des­pair of s [...]eing of any change for the better, I have long, tho' impatiently waited for it, to the al­most total ruin of my fortune and prospects in life, and can any one blame me if I lay before the world the history of that injustice and ingra­titude under which I have suffered? and of those vile intrigues and detestable cabals which have occasioned the most complicated misery and di­stress to my country; I am confident no disin­terested or impartial man will censure me for doing myself justice, and for disabusing the pub­lic with respect to certain characters and pro­ceedings, at the same time that I have ample materials in my hands for doing this, I take no pleasure in the idea, I have put it off as long as possible, but I cannot forbear much longer, I hope this letter will come safe to your hands, if so, communicate the contents to such of your and my friends as you judge proper, but let no extracts or copies be made of it. I have already exhausted your patience, I will therefore add only, that I am,

A Gentleman lately here from America, assured me, that it was considered by our country­men as political heresy or treason to entertain a doubt that France would under any circumstances whatever, give up our independency by with­drawing from its alliance with us.—This way of thinking, reflects honour on m [...] countrymen, as it must proceed from their resolution to sup­port inviolably and at all events, their own en­gagements; but too much confidence proves fa­tal to nations oftener than too little, and it is not unseasonable for them to review, what has so frequently happened in Europe under circum­stances similar to the present, and reflect on those instructive lessons which the history of the last two centuries lays before us. What nation in Europe has not during that period broken their most solemn treaties, and deserted their allies, as often as state necessity or public interest and safety dictated the measure? I declare I know of none; England (and untill lately we joined them in it) has always been very free in censuring the cou [...]t and people of France as the most per­fidious of any in Europe; France has retorted the charge, though to her honour she has ge­nerally done it i [...] a more decent language; but shall we not be found equally in the wrong, if at this time, we think, speak and act, in the opposite extreme from that in which we acted [Page 76]formerly. On an impartial review of the past, and examination of the present, I confess, I think we shall, and if we eventually become the dupes, and are sacrificed by our unsuspicious confidence, the political world will judge, at least, that we were rather too young and unex­perienced for the great affairs we engaged in. The style of Congress appeared to me, I con­fess, a little too strong and presumptuous, when in September 1779, they declared that the inde­pendence of America was as fixed as fate; this was in a religious view, bidding defiance to Omnipotence, and placing our independence on a basis which no civil government or human system ever yet could boast of. Since my return to Europe, I have had leisure to take a calm and unprejudiced view of our situation, and however confident you may be in America, I can but have the most distressing apprehensions for our future peace, liberty and safety; not that I have more reason to distrust the good faith of France than that of any other nation, under similar cir­cumstances, but I have every reason to doubt of the favourable issue of the war, and if it should be unsavourable, France has already declared to the world the part it will take with regard to our independence. I will explain myself—when Spain offered to mediate, England insisted on France's withdrawing the rescript of the 13th March 1778, (which acknowledged our inde­pendence as preliminary to any treaty) France [Page 77]replied that it was unreasonable in England to require that at the beginning of a war, (the events of which were unce [...]tain) which could only be complied with at the close of an unsuc­cessful war. This reply needs no comment. The war, though not greatly unsuccessful hi­therto, on the part of France, has been very far from being successful; France is at this time a great loser on the whole, but whilst the high style of England embroils that nation with other Powers, and so long as we find employ for near one half its forces, France will continue the war, and encourage us by temporary and partial sup­plies, and the most liberal promises—but a storm is gathering on the continent of Europe, and how soon it will burst, God, who views the hearts of all men (the Emperor's not execpted) only knows, but the moment it begins, we must bid adi [...]u to every hope of aid from Europe: The storm which we have been for six years tossed by, does not abate, and if we have any skilful pilots on board, they must see Sevlla on one side, and Charybdis on the other, and that unless we make a safe port immediately, we must be ship­wreck'd on the one or the other, and increase the list of those unhappy people, who in every age, have been sacrificed under the appearance of friendship and assistance, to ambiti [...]n and in­terest. With our country ravag [...]d and exhausted without any effectual aid, or perhaps any at all from our Asly, what have we a right to expect [Page 78]in the end (if we continue to reject with con­tempt and insult every offer of peace) but uncon­ditional submission? Will France in no case, do at this time, what they have repeatedly done heretofore? I mean not to cast the least reflection by referring to any particular instance, what I have already said of nations in general, will clear me of having such intention—But we ought to recall to our minds, how often the peo­ple of Scotland, since the beginning of this cen­tury, have been encouraged to rise in claim of their supposed rights, and of those of the House of Stuart; stores, troops, ships and money have been sent to their aid, the consequences are two well known to need repeating—At the close of a war, not very unsuccessful on the part of rance, they were given up, and their Prince, Charles Edward, though he, as well as his ancestors, had received as solemn promises from France, to be re-established on the throne of England, as we can pretend to have for in­dependency, was ordered to quit the kingdom, and on refusal was publicly sei [...]d [...]on, and bound like a common felon, in the streets of Paris, and forcibly carried off; the interest of the [...]tion was the plea which justified the measure, and may not the same again have equal [...] At least our sit [...]ation calls for serious rest [...].—We may at this time obtain all and more th [...]n we first claim­ed, and improving the p [...]esent moment, I will v [...]nture to say, more than we [...] ever expect [Page 79]under any other probable, or almost possible cir­cumstances. But there is a treaty, and our pub­lic and national honor and character are pledged. But if France, to whom it is pledged, trifles with us, if unable or unwilling to assist us effec­tually, or if to serve its own views, it leaves us to wear out the force of its hereditary enemy by our destruction, are we holden to support our ho­nour pledged in treaty, at such an expence? The universal maxim of all nations, Salus Populi, su­prema lex, will in such case have no weight with us, by persevering we may possibly, though not probably, effect with others, the ruin of Great-Britain; but if we and our country must be in­volved and crushed by the fall of that paternal edifice, in which we once took shelter, and in the beauty and grandeur of which, we once placed our greatest pride and security, shall we act the parts of patriots or madmen? I know not how you will relish these reflections, but I cannot forbear making them, so long as I can neither forget my country, or cease to be anxious for its peace, liberty and happiness. I wrote you a few days since on private affairs, by the way of L'Orient, I will therefore close this by assuring you, that nothing personal, though I have suf­fered more injustice, than almost any man of my time, has had the least influence on my mind, as to our general interests. I have done much towards promoting a separation from Great-Britain and for independency—I acted from a [Page 80]sincere belief that it would soon, and certainly be effected, and that it would tend to our hap­piness and peace; I now see no prospect of it's being obtained, and am fully convinced that the irreparable mischiefs we have already suffered and must suffer, with the temper and disposition of my countrymen, are such, that independency must prove a curse rather than a blessing to us— From this persuasion I have written freely to many of my friends—Few men, not natives of France, have juster, or more favorable ideas of the nation, than I have, and shall ever enter­tain, nor shall I ever be wanting in personal gratitude for the many civilities and favors I have received from men, in place and out; but these ought, and have not any influence on my mind when the true interests of my country are in ques­tion—I know, personally, but one of the mini­sters, I esteem and respect him as much as any man can do; but if I dared to intrude so far as to hint my opinion to him, it should be not to pursue the war another moment on account of our independence, nor to hazard any thing for an object, which will never prove of that ad­vantage to France, in its commercial interests, which I once thought it would, if indeed it can prove of any at all—But I have tired you with the length of this letter, I will therefore close with assuring you I am, with sincere esteem and unalterable friendship, Dear Sir,

P. S. When I query whether the indepen­dency of America will prove of so great advan­tage to France, as was once imagined, I con­fine myself to advantages merely of a commer­cial nature, to be derived from us in that state. If France by our assistance succeed so far, as to ruin the commerce and marine of Great Britain, and if we in the course of effecting this, become reduced to be in effect dependant on France, there can be no question but that we shall be of advantage to France, but such a supposition de­stroys every idea of real independency.

My compliments to Mrs. Wilson.

PRESUMING that you still continue in Con­gress, and that the friendship which has so long subsisted between us, remains unimpaired, I have determined to write you a long and con­fidential letter, on subjects intimately connected to the well being of our country. Some of the sentiments I am about to communicate, may perhaps appear inconsistent with my former con­duct and professions, and therefore it is incum­bent on me to explain the causes which have in any degree changed my political opinions. I need not particularly recur to the origin of the [Page 82]present controversy with Great Britain; what I professed and did at that period, was professed with sincerity, and done with the best intentions, but had I then foreseen one half of the calamities that have followed the measures of that time, in­stead of approving, I should have most strenuously opposed them; for it must be confessed, that we were actuated rather by the apprehension of fu­ture grievances, than by the actual pressure of any which we really felt; and most certainly I should not have thought it either wise or justi­fiable to run into the horrors of civil war, with­out more urgent necessity, and a much greater load of oppression. But unfortunately, we in America were deceived by those flattering ac­counts transmitted to us from England, as much as the British government was deceived by oppo­site accounts sent from America. We were fully pers [...]aded that a majority of the people of Great Britain, approved our claims, and that a short suspension of commerce with that kingdom would obtain us all we desired; under this delusion we went forward until hostilities suddenly began: Those who have most studied human nature, and the history of mankind, will best conceive the effects and changes which followed: Inflamed and afterwards exasperated by the provocations and ravages of war, our minds became gradually alienated from that people whose ancestors were ours, and to whom we had always been connected by the strongest ties, that can bind or unite so­cieties [Page 83]of men. We indignantly slighted that union which had been esteemed our greatest glory and happiness, and under whose benign influence we had increased and prospered beyond example. With this change in our sentiments, we heard of the British government having engaged foreign troops to be employed against us, and we na­turally determined to follow the example and seek foreign aid from those most likely to afford it; for this purpose, and with this commission I came to Europe, and the Declaration of Inde­pendency soon followed; a declaration which though absent I approved of, because I thought Independency attainable with but little more dif­ficulty or bloodshed, and that our countrymen were wise and virtuous enough to use it rightly and make it a blessing.—I had besides other rea­sons—I thought an independent government was allotted to us by nature, and that the esta­blishment of it could not be long prevented, after the change which had taken place in our sentiments respecting it: That, to depart from the claim we had made to it, would at that time and in that state of things, be like hastily [...]inning over a wound corrupted within, and would only convert to waste all the blood which had been spilt in the contest, and entail on our children, if not on ourselves, the necessity of shortly beginning and supporting another.— Actuated therefore by a desire to spare the peo­ple of England, as well as of America, from a [Page 84]renewal of such calamities, I heartily concurred in negociating and signing the treaties with France, and afterwards returned to America, in the hopes of seeing our country soon restored to the blessings of peace, commerce, and good go­vernment: I need not tell you that the hope proved abortive, nor need I explain to you how much I was disappointed and dissatisfied by the changes which had taken place in America, and which were every day increasing. You will re­collect the conversations that passed between us on this subject; I found indeed the hills, the mountains, and rivers of America, situated as formerly, but almost every thing which had d [...] ­stinguished and done honour to the inhabitants appeared to have changed The dangers of suddenly releasing a people from the restraints of regular government, which were visibly expe­rienced.—Noisy and d [...]signing individuals had risen from the lowest order, and displaced the best and most respectable members of society.— The new governments were almost every where feeble, and ill administred; anarchy and licen­tious violence frequently prevailed, and even in Congress itself, reason, patriotism, and justice, were but too often vanquished by faction, cabal, and views of private interest. But what appeared a more alarming evil, was the depravity of morals which had taken place among our coun­trymen, and been encouraged if not produced by the revolution; and particularly by the laws [Page 85]for making the depreciated and depreciating pa­per currency a legal tender, instead of its no­minal amount in gold and silver; laws which not only afforded temptations, but in effect offered rewards to dishonesty, by enabling those already in debt to liberate themselves for a twentieth or thirtieth part in value of the real debt, and encouraging all who could ob­tain credit, or property from others, to with­hold payment in the certain expectation of being able at a future period legally to exonerate them­seves almost for nothing; laws by which more injustice seems to have been occasioned, than what was ever committed under any other go­vernment, and among the same number of peo­ple, in so short a space of time. I do not mean however to censure our countrymen with seve­rity, I am persuaded that probity and good mo­ra [...] were no where more generally prevalent than in North-America, before the late revolution, and that any other people would have been at least as much changed by the same causes, and in the same circumstances. I could not avoid however, regretting, that a similar change had taken place, and lamenting the miserable pro­spects which were present on every side.—Agri­culture declining; the progress of arts and sciences suspended; the education of the rising generation (the hopes of our country) neglected; thousands of industrious youth forced from the plough, and other useful homely occupations, [Page 86]and prematurely destroyed by the diseases, wants and sufferings of a military life, whilst the sur­vivors by exchanging their plain morals and ho­nest industry, for the habits of idleness and vice, appeared more likely to burthen than to bene­fit their country hereafter, and above all the numerous causes and sources of future dissentions between the disterent States, left very little room for agreeable expectations or ideas. Distressed at the prospect of these, and a thousand other evils, of which there appeared neither a reme­dy, nor an end, you will not wonder that I quitted a scene so unpleasant, and came again to this country, where I have had time and op­portunity to reflect dispassiona [...]ely, on the gene­ral state of things, and the probable consequences so far at least as the interests of our country are concerned; and from these reflections, combined with all the facts and informations, that I have been able to obtain, I have deduced two propo­sitions, of the truth of which I am fully con­vinced, however extraordinary they may appear in America:—The first of these is, that there is no probability of our being able finally to establish our independency; and the second, that if it were established, it would prove rather a curse than a blessing to us.—As I am per­suaded, that you will at least read with attention and candour, what I write on subjects so inte­resting; I will enter into a particular considera­tion of each of these propositions, and begin with [Page 87]the first which concerns the probability of our being able finally to establish the independency which we have assumed and declared.—Expe­rience has I presume by this time, so far cor­rected the vain opinions we formerly entertained of our strength and resources, than ever the most insane of all our mad politicians will hardly pre­tend, that we can alone resist the force of Great-Britain. —The final establishment of our inde­pendency must therefore greatly depend on the assistance, which other nations may be able and willing to afford us, and I think it very evident, that we have most egregiously flattered and de­ceived ourselves on this subject. There is indeed a generous propensity in human nature which in­clines mankind to favour those who struggle against superior force, in defence of their free­dom and just rights, and this propensity led many ind [...]viduals in different parts of Europe, (who considered us engaged in such a struggle,) to bestow on us their unavailing good wishes and applauses.—But it is impossible that the motives of our revolt should have been really approved by the government of any kingdom or state of Europe, because there is not one among them, whose subjects and colonies were so free as those of Great Britain; and it would have been ma­nifestly absurd, in any government, to vindicate our claim to privileges, which at the same time it denied to its own subjects; and besides insur­rections are naturally viewed with jealousy, and [Page 88]dislike, by all regular long established govern­ments as of dangerous example to their own sub­jects.—It happened indeed that Great-Britain, by her vast acquisitions of wealth and power, had become the object of envy and dread to cer­tain European nations, who without expecting or intending, that we should ever become inde­pendent, were pleased at our revolt, and re­joiced to see that kingdom weakening itself by a destructive civil war, and least we should be too soon subdued, and the mischiefs of our revolt too soon terminated, a little scanty assistance was from time to time secretly given to us, until this alliance was publicly announced, and France engaged in the war against Great-Britain, it might have been naturally expected that every other Power in Europe inclined to favour our independency would have openly acknowledged it, after the example of France. Great-Britain was then universally believed to be so weakened and discouraged, that no nation could have been restrained through the fear of incurring her re­sentment; and therefore it is difficult to conceive why any one really withing for our indepen­dency, should have witheld from it the sanc­tion of an open avowal or acknowledgement, which would necessarily have tended to finish the work and secure our future gratitude and friendship—But though more than three years have passed since the French alliance was announced, no other nation has manifested [Page 89]the least intention to follow the example, or the least favourable inclination towards us, but several have, on the contrary, most un­equivocally discovered, that their wishes and views are repugnant to our pretensions. The government of Portugal very early proscribed all intercourse with us, in terms of extreme vigor, if not hostility; and this very proscription re­mains unrepealed—That of Denmark has de­nied our independency, and even forced out of our hands (as out of the hands of pirates) se­veral prizes which our ships of war had taken from Great-Britain, and sent into the ports of Norway—The Emperor is notoriously an enemy to our independency—he retains an hereditary attachment to Great-Britain, as well as jealousy to the House of Bourbon; and views with im­patience, on every side, the territories of his ancestors possessed by his neighbours—he is in the full vigor of his life, master of the best dis­ciplined, most numerous and formidable army in Europe, and certainly is not without ambi­tious, enterprizing views; so that should the war continue, we have every thing to fear from his influence and interference, which certainly will be against those nations who possess the countries he wishes to regain, and not against Great-Britain who witholds nothing from him, and from whom he has nothing to claim—He has indeed already prepared the way to interfere by offering to mediate between the belligerent [Page 90]powers, and you need not be told that an unsuc­cessful mediator almost always takes part in the quarrel—The Dutch, though at war with Eng­land, publicly disavow our independency, and so far from connecting their cause with ours, that they notoriously would have made a separate peace with Great-Britain, had not the British Government refused to treat separately with the States-General; a refusal that manifest [...] how little the British Ministry feels itself embarrassed by these new enemies. Whatever you in Ame­rica may imagine, the true interests of the Dutch are by no means favorable to our independency; they have no manufactures of any consequence for our use, and as merchants, fishermen and car­riers, we should certainly become their most dan­gerous rivals and competitors: Respecting Russia and Sweden, they certainly cannot ex­pect to gain by our independency, excepting in­digo and rice we have nothing for their use:— Russia exports tobacco, and their other pro­ductions are all similar to ours, and we should naturally interfere with them in every market. The governments of these countries have never manifested the least disposition to favour our in­dependency; I think, at most we can only flat­ter ourselves that they will remain idle spectators. Congress appear indeed to have formed very plea­sing hopes from the Northern treaty of n [...]utrality, and have consequently appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary to the Empress of Russia, who i [...] [Page 91]now on his way to Petersburg, where he will doubtless find that humiliating reception, which their other Ministers have met at every other court but that of France. It seems however, that no experience will cure them of the folly of thus meanly exposing themselves to new insults. Respecting the conduct and views of Spain, I think they are of a nature that deserves our most serious consideration, I ha [...] almost said detesta­tion—You know that a secret article was an­nexed to the treaty of alliance with France, by which his Most Christian Majesty stipulated, and the American Commissioner engaged, that the Spanish government should be entitled to accede to the treaties made with France, or to make other similar treaties with us, and we were ful [...]y persuaded that government would, in a reason­able time, accede to, or make such treatie [...], otherwise we most certainly should not have thought ourselves just [...]f [...]ble in thus binding our constituents indefinitely, and leaving the Spanish government absolutely free respecting the time. Above three years have now elapsed since this engagement was made on our parts, and near two years since Spain has b [...]en a [...] open war with Great-Britain, no more time, and no better opportunity can therefore he desire [...] by the Spanish court for treating with us, and yet there has not been the least appearance of a desire to do it, or of an intention ever to own us as an independent people; though being at war with [Page 92]Great-Britain, no obstacle or restraint can pos­sibly [...] from the fear of offending the British government. It is universally understood, that his Catholic Majesty after the peace of 1763, always retained a strong desire of revenging and repairing his losses by the preceeding war—The controversy between Great-Britain and her co­lonies promised a favourable opportunity of do­ing this, and therefore he early began to equip a powerfull fleet and make ready to avail himself of future occasions and events—The treaties which France suddenly made with us, were most certainly and avowedly contrary to the views of the Spanish Minister, and there is not the smallest reason to believe that any change, favorable to us, has since taken place in the policy and de­signs of the Spanish court; but there are the strongest reasons to justify a contrary conclusion. That court professedly came into the war from motives absolutely foreign to our independency, and has since prosecuted it solely with the view of recovering Gibraltar and the Floridas—Espe­cial care has been taken that not a single Spanish ship or vessel of war (though many frequently pass by our ports) should ever stop in any one of them, least that court should incur the reproach of having assisted or favored a people, whom it neither acknowledges, nor apparently ever in­tends to consider in any character but that of rebellious subjects of the British Crown. Our operations and designs must indeed necessarily [Page 93]have great influence on the progress and issue of the war, and therefore the ministry of Spain were naturally solicitous for information about them, [...] obtain it a Spanish gentleman was sent to reside among us; but though Congress had at different times, appointed no less than three mi­nisters to the Spanish court, this gentleman was never permitted to assume any public character, and therefore his residence among us was a con­tinual insult, an indirect denial of our indepen­dency, so long as he lived, and his death pro­duced a remarkable instance of condescension and inconsistency, not to say hypocrisy, in Con­gress, who, to liberate the soul of the deceased from Purgatory, very devoutly attended one of the most superstitious rights of a religion, which that body but a little time before, in addressing the people of England, had described as ‘having dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, mur­der and rebellion through every part of the world.’ But this and all other endeavors to conciliate the good will of Spain appear to have failed—Near two years have passed since Con­gress appointed their president, a gentleman of distinguished merit and talents, as Minister Ple­nipotentiary to the Catholic King, and he has not only been unsuccessfull in the business of his mission, but is now humbly waiting at Madrid without any probability of obtaining the smallest acknowledgement or notice of his public cha­racter.—Supposing the government of Spain to [Page 94]be most unalterably determined that we shall finally be the dupes and facrifices of this war, it might still have been expected, that as we a [...]e fighting against the same enemies, it would have assisted us with some of the means to fight, but in this, as in other things, we have been disappointed, not only from what Congress expected from the "everflowing treasures of Spain," but of what policy ought to have en­gaged that court to afford us. The little pal­try sums that have been obtained (less than a mercantile house in moderate credit might have supplied) have been dealt out with such niggardly reluctance, that it manifests the most beggarly meanness and insensibility to accept, and much more to sollicit them so long and im­portunately. Nothing is more evident to me than that Spain looks on our independency with jealousy and aversion, as being a most danger­ous example to her vast American e [...]ories, and of the most dangerous tendency in respect to her future dominion over them. Indeed she cannot desire that so remarkable a revolt from the greatest power of Europe, should by its success­ful issue afford encouragement to her distant pro­vinces to make similar attempts, nor can she wish that a new maritime empire should rise up so contiguously to her treasures and American possessions, which at all times have been the ob­jects of her peculiar care and jealousy. An em­pire too far removed from Europe to be restrained [Page 95]by the power of Spain, and too near the sources of that power not to excite the utmost fear and apprehension. So long as the Spanish govern­ment continues at war with England, so long it will naturally wish us to be the instruments of injuring and distressing that nation. But when the war ends, that government will undoubt­edly wish to see us, not only reduced again to the dominion of Great-Britain, but at the same time weakened and chastised, so that instead of affording encouragement to its colonies by a successful revolt, we may serve as an example to deter them from attempting to become inde­pendent. I think it therefore evident, that France, the only nation that has acknowledged our independency, is also the only one inclined to support it. How long that nation, contrary, to the views of Spain, and the rest of Europe will think it wise or necessary to continue the war for our support, are questions that merit our most serious consideration.

The only advantages which France can have expected from our independency, are a diminu­tion of the trade and power of England, and an increase of her own commerce by a participation in ours, there advantages doubtless were ex­pected from the treaties with America, a few measures of government ever gave more univer­sal satisfaction, that was manifested by the French nation when those treaties were an­nounced, but since my return here I have seen [Page 96]that satisfaction generally abated and succeeded by disappointment, so that in truth but little benefit is now expected from our independency, at least by the most discerning part of this na­tion. The merchants complain of losses on al­most every adventure to our country, through the depreciation of the paper currency, the breach of public faith, and other causes unfavourable to us. They complain of a general predilection towards English manufactures, which in spite of the war, and the laws of the several states, are imported through Holland, St. Eustatius, &c. and every where purchased by our countrymen in preserence to those of France, or any other nation. Most of the French gentlemen that have served in our army or travelled in our country, complain of a similar predelection in favour of Englishmen, and manners, and a simi­lar ave, sion from those of France. They per­ceive a general dislike of them among the peo­ple, and alledge, that French Officers who sight and bleed, in our cause, receive fewer at­tentions and civilities from our countrymen, than are bestowed on British officers of inferior rank when taken prisoners. In short, that our man­ners, habits, propensities and prejudices, are all English, as well as our language, and that nei­ther regard for our allies, the authority of our laws, nor yet the animosities which the war ne­cessarily produces, can engage us, even during its continuance, to suspend the use of British [Page 97]manufactures, or lay aside our former regard for individuals of that nation; and it is there­fore naturally concluded that when peace shall be restored, whether we remain independant or not, the greatest part, if not the whole of our commerce will certainly return again to its for­mer British channels, and that our former at­tachment to that nation, will again revive, so as to leave little or no benefit to this country from our independence. Those of our countrymen who visit France, afford cause for similar conclu­sions, retaining the same appearances, manners, language, prejudices, affections and aversions, they are confounded with, and mistaken for En­glishmen by all but those to whom they are per­sonally known, and as their peculiarities but ill accord or assimilate with those of our new al­lies, they feel like strangers or exiles from their country, and generally hasten through this king­dom to Ostend, Amsterdam, &c. from whence, in spite of Dr. Franklin's earnest dissuasions, and even the menaces of Mess. Adams, Dana, Searle, &c. the greatest part of them secretly venture over to England, and when arrived there (tho' in constant danger of being imprisoned) they al­most believe themselves at home; such is the power of old habits, and early prejudices. You will not therefore wonder that a discerning, jea­lous nation, like this, begins to think with Ho­race, Naturam expellas, &c. and to perceive that nothing will finally detach us and our com­merce [Page 98]from Great Britain, and that ever if our independency was established, we should soon be again united to that country by confedera­tion, and the closest alliance, and to contribute as much if not more, than ever to it's trade and power. This, the most sensible part of the French nation believe, and with this belief it [...]h impossible they should think it wise and expedient, to persist obstinately in wasting the force and treasures of France, and endangering her pos­sessione, from an object unlikely to be obtained, and which if obtained would afford no solid ad­vantage.—You will not therefore be surprized, that the war, though begun with general ap­plause, has now become unpopular, as well as our cause in this country, a great part of the nation ardently wish for peace, and as our inde­pendency, and engagement of France to sup­port it, are the only obstacles, it is not likely the nation will long look with patience on that which notoriously opposes its desires, and even its felicity, and therefore it cannot be reasonably expected, that France will long persevere in the war on our account. A man must be little ac­quainted with history, who can imagine, that because the French government has acknow­ledged our independency, and entered into trea­ties with us, that it will therefore never desert us: The same government had much oftner ac­knowledged and asserted the right of the Stuart family to the [...] of England, and had much [Page 99]oftner promised to maintain that right, yet those promises were never fulfilled; multitudes who trusted to them were deceived and sacrificed; even the Pretender himself, notwithstanding the most formal acknowledgements and frequent promises was not only abandoned, but to gra­tify the British government, was exiled, seized, and ignominiously transported out of France. I have many reasons individually to be satisfied with the French Ministry, and therefore I would not mention transactions of this nature, even to you, were they not so generally notorious. It may however appear invidious, and it certainly is unnecessary to recollect such facts, or apply them to the present question, because the French government has itself with unusual candor, pub­licly explained its opinion of the extent and force of its engagements to us, when they say in re­ply to the demand of England, that France would withdraw its rescript of the 13th March, 1778, as a preliminary to the mediation of Spain: That it was not reasonable to expect of them, to do that at the beginning of a war, (the events of which were uncertain) which could only be done at the close of an unsuccessful war.

France, therefore, holds herself at liberty to desert our alliance and independency at the end of an unsuccessful war, and as the present is not pretended to be a successful war, the inference is plain, and the time to apply it may be near; so long indeed as we are able to support a great [Page 100]part of the war, and France escapes any consider­able disaster, this government may not be in haste to abandon us, because we may be thought the cheapest and fittest instrument for weakening our parent country: But our resources, credit, and ability to bear any considerable share in the war, will be soon totally annihilated, and when this happers, I am fully convinced, that France will no longer suffer her treaties to deprive her of peace: let us however suppose that France should obstinately persist in the war, and even that Spain, contrary to her system and views, should do the same in order to establish our indepen­dency, still it does not appear probable, that this object would be finally obtained. The navy of France has for some time been in the most formidable state to which it can be carried. That of Spain had nearly attained this point of per­fection before she entered into the war; and yet while both were in this state, no advantages were gained over England. What then can we expect hereafter, when the navy of both count [...]i [...]s must daily decline? In France, every seaman being at the disposal of government, the g [...]eat­est number of ships of war, can possi [...]ly be manned, may be ma [...]ned immediat [...]ly, by with­drawing the seamen from every other service.— At the beginning of the prese [...]t war, France attempted to do this in some degree, but total­ly abandoning the fisheries, the best n [...]sery of seamen, and diminishiug every commercial [Page 101]branch of her navigation.—It was, in­deed, intended to encourages the equipment of privateers, whereby a considerable num­ber of seamen might have been continually so [...]ming, but the dreadful mortality which took place in the fleet under M. d'Orvilliers, in 1779, frust [...]ted this intention. Privateers were then deprived of their crews, and since that time, it is only by particular permission and favour that seamen could be obtained to equip her priva­teers or merchant vess [...]s; no nursery of sermen therefore remains, and yet a very great supply is wanted from time to time in the French navy, through the practice of crowding an un [...]sual number on board their ships of war, whereby a greater pr [...]portion [...] [...]ed in action, and perish by contageous us dis [...]s. Spain is equ [...]ly destitute of resources to supply the waste of her seamen, and the e [...]o [...]e the maritime power of both na­tions must hereafter [...]y d [...]line, and that of France would be almost annihilated, if a con­ti [...]ental war should supervene.—On the other hand the B [...]itish navy is becoming every day more formidable; forty additional ships from 50 to 100 guns, besides a mu [...]h greater number of frigates, are now on the sto [...]ks, and when ready may be all manned, because the British govern­ment under its greatest embarrassments has pre­served every reso [...]rce and nursery for seamen un­tou hed; the fisheries, consting trade, and other branches of navigation have been all maintained, [Page 102]and an incredible number of privateers conti­nually employed, the crew, of which may all be transferred into ships of war, whenever it be­comes necessary; so that the marine of Great-Britain, by increasing on one hand, whilst that of France and Spain diminish on the other, will soon become greatly superior to both, and when this happens, you need not, I think, be told the consequences. You will doubtless hear in Ame­rica, as usual, that Great-Britain i [...] exhausted, divided, and disc [...]u aged, but such accounts are as fallacious now as they were f [...]rmerly. This might be demonstrated by many facts, but I think it will not appear doubtful, when you recollect the immense sum that was subscribed in England for the service of the present year, and that the British Court, far from fearing new enemies, not only attacked the Dutch, but has since refused the mediation of Russia, in making a separate peace with that republic. It has long been fashionable in America to rail at the British go­vernment, as being not only wicked but weak and incapable. These imputations are however certainly repugnant to facts, for it must be con­fessed that none of the belligerent powers has displayed so much vigor and ability as Great-Britain, in prosecuting the war; and though we may incline to shut our eyes against the truth, a great part even of the French nation is just and generous enough to acknowledge, and admire the superior fortitude and intelligence with which [Page 103]the British government has hitherto repelled and frustrated the efforts of enemies so much more numercus. Indeed there never was a period in which the resources, bravery, and real greatness of the British nation were more eminently dis­played, than at this time. But having discarded the remembrance of former friendships that ‘pride in the glerious atchievements of our common ancestors,’ and that ‘affection for the heirs of their virtues’ which Congress itself but a few years since boasted of; we may be unwilling to admit this truth,—it will not however cease to be truth.—The sun will shine whether we open or shut our eyes; thinking ourselves alone almost able to resist Great-Britain we very confidently inferred that the force of France joined to ours, would become irresistible, but we found ourselves mistaken. When Spain joined in the war, we formed similar expectations, and they likewise proved fallacious; the same hopes will doubtless be entertained in America, from the addition of Holland, and they will, I am persuaded, prove equali [...] delusive. The British Ministers certainly think they have more to gain than to lose by the Dutch war, and hitherto events have confirmed that opinion; but should it hereafter prove erro­neous, they will be able at any time to make a separate peace with that Republic, so that at best we can have no dependence on any foreign assistance, but that of France and Spain, and the latter being no way committed on our side, may [Page 104]at any time make a separate peace as well as Holland; indeed I have already shewn it to be pro [...]ble not only that Spain, but that France also will soon relinquish the contest; should both however persivere, we cannot expect a success­ful issue; [...]e have seen that the [...]ited forces of both, during two years, in which they were the most formida [...]le, have proved unavailing, even when our credit and re [...]ources were inex [...]au [...]ed. H [...]w then can we expect success hereafter, when the forces of France and Spain are declining, and our own faith and credit irretrievably ruined; our paper money, the most important of all our resources, for ever destroyed; several of the southern States already conquered, many of our countrymen disaffected, and many more wearied and discouraged by the long continuance and hopeless appearance of the war; accompa­nied with a multitude of difficulties which I need not mention to you, but which utterly preclude the least probability of our being able finally to continue an independent people. If this be evi­dent, as I flatter myself it is, we are next to en­quire whether the establishment of an indepen­dent government, were it practicable, would not be injurious rather than beneficial to us. But a few years have elapsed since you, and I believe every other American, were firmly convinced that the peace, freedom, and happiness of Ame­rica, could in no way be promoted so well and secured, as by a dependence on the British [Page 105]Crown; we were then sensible of the "inesti­mable advantages of a free English constitution of government." We publicly ascribed our amazing increase and prosperity to its "protection and en­couraging influence," and declared that "we should ever esteem an union with the people of Eng­land to be our greatest glory, and our greatest hap­piness." Had the British Government at that period threntened to withdraw its protection from us, and abandon us to that very independency, for which we are now suffering and facrificing so much, we should have been universally alarmed, and have considered ourselves as menaced with the severest punishment. Recollect the unani­mous opinion of that time, and compare it with what has since been taught and believed on this subject in America, and then let me ask you, whether this change of opinion be the work of reason and experience, or of exasperation and madness? And whether the sober, unanimous conviction, under which we and our fa [...]ers had happily lived, and which our experience h [...]d in­variably confirmed, is not more likely to be well founded than any sentiments which the rage and animosity of civil war have produced, and which have never been brought to any fair dis­passionate examination or trial? Should I ask the advocates of independency what benefits they ex­pect, which we did not, and might not again enjoy without it; I should probably be told, freedom of legislation and of commerce; it seems [Page 106]however to me, that on both these subjects we are deceiving ourselves. There are few, if any benefits, which we have not their attendant dis­advantages. There may be too little as well as too much restraint in the making of laws, and the former excess is full as mischievous and liable to abuse as the latter: In those which were called Royal governments, the exercise of the King's prerogative may have sometimes pre­vented wholesome laws, but on the other hand, it has also prevented the people from injurious ones, and if we were to review the legislative acts of the several states since the revolution, we should find that the facility in making laws, has produced a multitude of bastly and injudicious, not to say pernicious ones; and that the num­ber of these has been greatest in the States, where the fewest restrain [...] attend acts of legisla­tion respecting the freedom of commerce; I think we have formed mistaken ideas of it's benefits, and that we have not sufficiently considered, in how fewer instances we have really suffered any considerable disadvantage, by being restrained in our trade with foreign nations, and how very little we shall gain by an exemption from those restraints.

Among all the nations in Europe, there is cer­tainly none, where commerce is so reputable, or where it is carried on by men of so much for­tune, probity, and honour as in Great Britain, and consequently there is no where an American [Page 107]merchant could obtain the same credit, or be served with the same fidelity as in England; and certainly the British manufactures exceed those of any other country, i [...] goodness and cheapness, excepting only a few articles, the greatest part of which, by means of drawbacks on exportation, may be obtained from England almost as cheap as from the countries where they are made: and on the other hand, if we were restrained from carrying some of our own pro­ductions to foreign countries, the people of England were in most cases restrained from buy­ing the like productions of foreigners; so that we had all the advantages of a monopoly, and in general a much better price than we could have obtained any where else, besides large boun­ties on our iron, naval stores, and other articles, should we be deprived of these advantages, and bounties, precluded from the privileges of Bri­tish subjects, and made liable to the alien's duty; A trade with foreign nations on such terms, as they might chuse to grant us, would I think prove an unusual compensation, and we should be soon desirous of returning again to our former restraints, accompanied with our former privi­leges: this is however but a partial view of the subject; absolute freedom of legislation and commerce, or in other words independency, can never be maintained without fleets, armies, mi­nisters of state, am assadors, boards of war, of admiralty, of treasury, and many other ex­pensive [Page 108]establishments of a severeign indepen­dent government. We have heretofore enjoyed, and may again enjoy the benefits of all these esta­blishments, as well as the protection of the Bri­tish fleets and armies, without any other contri­bution or burthen, than what resulted from a few unimportant restraints on our trade, and certainly an exemption from those restraints, can never afford any advantages equivalent to the taxes which the people of America must neces­sarily bear to support independency, should it be established, not to mention what must be paid to discharge the enormous public debt al­ready incurred, and which remains to be incur­red by a prosecution of the war; and should we after all succeed, it will only be to set up and become subjects of a state, which as being the youngest republic, must take the lowest rank among the nations of the earth, instead of con­tinuing as we were, members of "an Empire, which (to use the words of Congress) has been the envy and admiration of ages." These, how­ever, are but a few of the evils to be expected from our independency. You, my friend, know so much of history, and of mankind in general, as well as of our countrymen in particular, that a little reflection must convince you, that the Democratic Governments lately formed in Ame­rica are far from being suited to the people there. I need not remind you of the tumultuous disor­der, ingratitude, violence, and injustice, which [Page 109]in all ages and parts of the world have attended this species of government, I can only say, that if it can be advantageous to any societies of men, it is only to those which are small and uncor­rupted by luxury or vice.—Our own colony of Connecticut has I believe experienced the best effects which a Democratical government is ca­pable of producing, but these effects have re­sulted wholly from the rigid morals, frugality, and industry of the people: And we must not forget that in the adjoining colony of Rhode-Island, the very same Government was attended with much anarchy, faction, licentious disorder, and injustice. And if we consider the late pro­gress of luxury, immorality and vice, and the decline of public virtue among our countrymen, there will appear but soo much reason to fear that the Democratical Governments established in the united states will produce the same dread­ful effects, which the history of the world, in­forms us they have invariably produced in every large society or government where they have been established. But the intestine disorders, that may arise within each particular state among its own inhabitants, are not the only mischiefs to be expected, greater evils, if possible, are to be apprehended from the contentions of different states with each other, considering the various manners, prejudices, and prepos [...]essions of the people of the several states, and their discor­dant opinions, claims and pretensions, it seems [Page 110]impossible that our confederation can long sub­sist, or that we can long remain at peace with each other, when relieved from the present war with Great-Britain—Hitherto the different states have voted supplies according to the allot­ments and requisitions of Congress, but there is not a single state, which has not protested against these allotments as being unequal, and claimed future retribution. To allot the portions of public expence to each of the several states with exact justice, will always be a difficult task, on account of their continually varying circum­stances, but when these allotments are made as justly as possible, it is not probable they will ever be satisfactory to all, so that from hence a fruitful source of future discord will arise.— Virginia claims to itself almost all the valuable uncultivated lands, adjoining to the united states, and is rapidly selling them; other states protest against the injustice of this claim; Virginia and Pennsylvania have already been nearly engaged in hostilities on account of their boundaries; and hostilities were sometime ago actually begun between Pennsylvania and Connecticut on the same account, and are now only suspended by the more urgent necessity of resisting the arms of Great-Britain.—There are similar disputes between New-York, Massachusetts-Bay, and New-Hampshire, which though now dormant, would immediately revive, should peace and in­dependency be established in America. I had [Page 111]almost forgot the inhabitants of several inferior districts, who assume a right of separating from the colonies or states, to which they have hither­to belonged, in the same manner as those colo­nies have separated from Great-Britain, and of being admitted into the confederation as dis­tinct independent states.—One of these states in particular (that of Vermont) is secretly abetted, by some of the New-England states against New-York, and though Congress has undertaken the decision, it dares not decide against the claim and pretentions of the people. In short, the sources of internal commotion and civil war between the several states are so nu­merous and plentiful that it does not seem possi­ble for peace and union long to subsist among them, or that evils even greater than those we have suffered, since the declaration of Indepen­dency should be avoided after the establishment of it: The protecting, mediating and restraining influence or power of some other nation is indis­pensably necessary to our well being, and cer­tainly there is no other nation on earth so well suited to this purpose by religion, manners, language, government, &c. or on which we can so honourably and advantageously depend as Great-Britain.

If then there be no probability of finally es­tablishing the Independency we have declared, and of the establishment of it be more likely to prove pernicious than beneficial to us, what ob­stacle [Page 112]or objection is there to prevent our re­nouncing the beneficial claim and reconciling ourselves again to the parent country? Of all the various objections that have been made on this subject at different times and by different people, there are but two which deserve the smallest notice. The first of these is, that the solemn acts and declarations of the King and Parliament of Great Britain, are not to be re­lied upon; That when we shall have laid down our arms, former pretentions may be revived and new acts of Parliament made to subject our rights, &c. If there be any force in this objec­tion it will operate even more strongly against negociating for peace than for reconciliation; a treaty of peace would be an act of the crown only, and might be more easily evaded than a solemn compact, in which the Parliament as well as the King would be a party. Those therefore who from apprehensions of this nature, refuse treating for reconciliation, should not think of treating for peace, they should resolve to prose­cute the war with unrelenting fury; to reprobate the folly of Congress in sending Mr. Adams to negociate with Great-Britain, they should forget how often that nation has interposed to save the civil and religious liberties of other countries a­gainst the ambitious views of France and Spain, and regardless of the danger of f [...]lling under the power of these our new friends, they should re­solve never to sheath the sword until the British [Page 113]nation is exterminated; in this and only in this way they will act consistently and reconcile their actions to that distrust which they profess to en­tertain of the national faith of Great-Britain— Wise, impartial men, will however think, that objections of this nature come with very little propriety from the people of America, who, as an independent people, are too young, and even already have shewn too little regard for their own national faith, to have a right to dis­trust that of others; and especially of a nation so long distinguished by a faithful adherence to its engagements, and which, even at this mo­ment, enjoys the confidence of Europe more than any other, as is manifested by the readi­ness with which the people of all countries, even of France itself, still lend and confide their mo­ney to the British government, notwithstanding its embar [...]asments. But what renders this ob­jection more contemptible is, that it proceeds from those very men who were most active in evading and violating the most solemn engage­ments, and the most sacred obligations of justice respecting the redemption and value of the Con­gress bills of credit. The last objection against a reconciliation with Great-Britain is, that it would be rep [...]g [...]ant to our engagements with France, and consequently dishonorable and un­gratefull in us. No man can be more jealous of the honor of America, or more zealous in its support than I was, so long as even the semblance [Page 114]of it promoted our public measures; but my jealousy and zeal were naturally extinguished when Congress on the 18th of March, 1780, committed that very act, which, but six months before, they had unanimously and publicly re­probated as "excerable deed," an ‘unpardonable sin,’ and which, by their own judgment and sentence would justly ‘render us a reproach and a bye-word among the nations of the Earth,’ and make us "appear like a common prostitute among chaste and respectable matrons, &c"— Such being our situation, such our crime and punishment, according to the decision and sen­tence of our own representative. I do not con­ceive that any deviation from our engagements with France, can add to our national dishonor, nor can I indeed discover any way to escape this dis­honor and infamy, but by deserting that indepen­dency which we have so disgracefully perverted, and blending ourselves again with the British nation, but I would not even for so desirable a purpose commend an unjustifiable departure from our treaties with France. It has already been demonstrated, that the French government considers itself, as at liberty, to desert us at the end of an un [...]uccessful war, and consequently we must be entitled to the same liberty, and to the same interpretation of our engagements.— Should we continue independent, our treaties with France ought to be most sacredly fulfilled, but we never could have intended by those trea­ties, [Page 115]to bind ourselves eternally to fight for in­dependeney, even when the attainment of it be­comes evidently impossible, and when through our own incapacity, it is more likely to prove injurious than beneficial to us, such an engage­ment, had we even been insane enough to make would be nu [...], because it would be contrary to the first laws and duties of nature. Politicians do not generally feel or expect much from sen­timents of national gratitude, yet I am far from wishing that my countrymen should become un­grateful. I have been as you well know most ready to magnify our obligation to the French, as well from my personal regard to that nation, as from a persuasion, that the appearance of gra­titude on our side would produce beneficial ef­fects. I was willing even to err by an excess of grateful sentiments towards our new ally, so long as that excess appeared harmless, but when a claim on our gratitude is set up, and opposed to the peace and happiness of millions, it becomes proper at least to enquire if it is well sounded? In what, let me ask are we obliged to France? She scarcely knew a single individual of our country, and therefore could not have been ac­tuated by any motive of regard for us, at the time when she began to afford us secret assis­tance. It is with reluctance that I enter on the discussion of this question, even privately with you, but it is as easy, as it is expedient to ascer­tain the views of the French government and its [Page 116]conduct towards us; envious as well as appre­hensive of the rapid increase of the British wealth and power, a r [...]inous contest between different parts of the British empire, wa [...] natu­rally viewed with particular s [...]sfection and to prolong this centest, with all its destructive con­sequences, it was thought politic to assist the weakest side, which was ours, enmity towards the British nation, and not a regard for us was the prevailing motive. In similar circumstances as much assistance would have been given to any other people under heaven, and there can be no cause for gratitude for any aid given in such cir­cumstances, and with such views. The first an of the French government evidently was to assist us just so far as might be absolutely necessary to prevent an accommodation, and to give this as­sistance with so much secrecy as to avoid any rupture with Great Britain. On this plan suc­cours were first permitted to be dealt out to us, by private individuals, and only on condition of future payment, but afterwards we were thought to be such cheap and effectual instruments of mis­chief to the British nation, that more direct and gratuitous aids were afforded us; these were however soon discovered, and frequently com­plained of by the British government, and as often denied by that of France. The whole of the year 1777 passed in a succession of complaints from Lord [...] t [...]rmont on one side, and of solemn denials accompanied with the most friendly pro­testations [Page 117]and assurances from the French mi­nister on the other. Each complaint produced a temporary suspension of our succours, and a new contrivance for secretly conveying them to Ame­rica, and eluding the vigilance of the British mi­nister. While the French cou [...]t was thus violat­ing its [...]ng [...]gements and promises to Great-Bri­tain, it does not appear to have ever expected, or desired, that we should become independent, but on the contrary to have always had in view and contemplation, the time whe [...] we were to b [...] subdued, and lest at the mercy of Great-Bri­t [...]in, and when it would be nighly dangerous for us o [...] possess any evidence of the assitance we had received, or of the fa [...]acy of those amicable assurances and protestations which had been so often repeated to the British Ambassader, and accordingly all inter ourse between the French minister and us, passed by me [...]ns and channels s [...]ed to the views I have just described. No written proof of the least importance was ever left in our hands, even Mr. Gerard's letters appointing occasional interviews with us, were always without any signature, and though five hundred thousand livres were quarterly paid to our Banker, from the Royal Treasury, not the smallest evidence of the source from whence that subsidy came, was permitted to remain in our power. So much precaution did nor pass unnoticed by us at that period. I saw clearly, and with concern, that it was dic­tated [Page 118]by a persuasion that we should be finally subdued by the arms of Great-Britain, and an intention finally to desert and disown having ever had any connection with us: Towards the end of the summer 1777, this court seems to have thought the time near for so abandoning and disavowing us. The capture of Ticonde­roga, and the progress of General Burgovne's army on one side, with the victory at the Bran­dywine, and the taking of Philadelphia on the other, convinced the French Ministers, that the period of our resistance would soon come, and made them solicitous to remove every impression which the assistance previously given to us might have been made on the British Government. Amicable protestations and assurances were there­fore renewed, with unusual servour, and least words alone should be insufficient, they proceed­ed to important and effectual acts of complai­sance American armed vessels were every where arrested and detained in the French ports, and afterwards only permitted to sail, under en­gagements to return home without committing any act of hostilit in the Puropean Seas. Two v [...]uable Jamaica ships, taken by American pri­vateers, and brought to Nan [...]z, were wrested from the captors, and restored to their former British owners. Injunctions of a nature not to be disobeyed were sent to all the ports affording us any supply of military stores. &c. and to grati­fy Lord Stormont, the Captain of the ship Am­phitrite [Page 119]was thrown into prison, for having car­ried such st [...]res to America, though with the privity and approbation of this Court. The principal actor in this affair was under the great­est apprehensions and alarm for his own sa [...]ety, when a messenger arrived with the news of Ge­neral Burgoyne's army having surrendered to that of General Gates. The [...]ews allayed his fears, and stopped those proceenings, by which the French government had already manifested it's intentions to disown and abandon us. The impression which th [...]s news made in England, and the intention ann [...]uncea in Parliament, of soon offering the most liberal terms to America, produced a sudden change in the conduct and policy of this Court respecting us. It was per­ceived, or at least believed, that nothing short of an open declaration in our favour, would pre­tract the quarrel, or prevent our reconciliation with Great Britain; and it was apprehended, that when reconciled, both countries might turn their force against France,—England from re­sentment for what had been done, and America for what had been refused for our support. The French Ministry then appeared, for the first time, to think seriously of promoting a final se­paration between us and our parent country, being convinced, from the strength which we had manifested, in singly resisting the power of Great Britain, and the general discouragement which notoriously prevailed in that nation, that [Page 120]such a separation might be effected with but little difficulty, and no danger to France.

The proposals of Congress, therefore, which had been lest twelve months unnoticed, were suddenly accepted, and the treaties speedily con­cluded, and afterwards hastily announced to the world, in order to frustrate the pacific endea­vours of the British Government, and engage us to reject it's liberal offers, for promoting a re­conciliation. Having been personally engaged in concluding and signing the treaties with France and personally favoured and obliged to it's Government, and being also persuaded as I then was, that those treaties would prove infi­nitely beneficial to our country, I very naturally approved of their ratification, and of the rejec­tion of all terms offered by the British Commissi­oners. Situated as I then was, and thinking as I then did, it was impossible for me to act other­wise; but yet I shall for ever regret, that a ma­jority of our countrymen were not wise enough to know, and pursue their own interests, and to accept of offers, which contained every thing conducive to their future peace and prosperity, and which, had the, been accepted, would have saved us and our parent country innumerable calamities, and have preserved thousands of use­ful rives, with oceans of kindred blood, which have been since offered up as a sacrifice to our idol, Independency.—Unhappily that time and opportunity were irrecoverably lost, and all re­grets [Page 121]must necessarily prove unavailing. It now only remains with us to employ all our thoughts and faculties in repairing the mischiefs that are past, and stopping their future progress.

In examining the motives and views of the French ministry there appears no reason to believe that the change in its system and policy towards us, and the treaties thereby produced, were the effect of a regard for our country, any more than the preceding resolution to disown and abandon us, had been—In every variation of conduct, this Ministry, like true politicians, pursued what they considered as the interests of their country, regardless of ours; and though I have no desire to censure them for acting from such motives I cannot admit that any just title to our gratitude can be from thence derived.—If we proceed to review what has passed since the treaties were announced, we shall doubtless find abundant reason to form the same conclusion.—By your station in Congress you must have necessarily known the extent and nature of the succours afforded to us by this government since the war, and I cannot believe, after mature consideration, that they have been such as to lay our country under any great load of obligation.—I do not mean, like Mr. J. Adams, to assert, that ‘France has broken, or at least not fulfilled the terms of her alliance with us,’ though, between ourselves, I cannot but think there is some foun­dation for such an assertion, by the letter as well [Page 122]as the spirit of the treaty; the first article of which says, ‘If war should break out between France and Great-Britain during the conti­nuance of the present war between the Uni­ted States and England, his Majesty and the United States shall make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good of­fices, their councils and their forces, according to the exigence of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies.’

It is to be remembered, that before France en­tered into the war, we had alone supported a very unequal contest with Great-Britain for near three years, and had thereby incurred an enor­mous debt, and nearly exhausted all our credit and resources; it might therefore have been ex­pected from the terms of our engagement, that instead of continuing to bear an unequal share of the burthen, our own proportion would have been lightened by our Ally, in consideration of what we had previously done and suffered alone; but has this been in any degree the case? Is it even true that France has since, in proportion to her superior wealth and numbers, borne a just share of the war? No enemy has ravaged or even landed within this kingdom; no new tax has been levied to support the war; almost every thing expended is the fruit of oeconomy, and has been employed in building and sustain­ing a formidable navy, and particular care has been used to expose it as little as possible, in or­der [Page 123]that it may remain entire at the end of the war. The same principle which has furnished the means, appears likewise to direct the opera­tions of the war on this side, whilst England and America have been wasting their strength and resources against each other; very strong and early representations were as you know made, and from time to time repeated, to this govern­ment, respecting the disorder of our finances, and the absolute impossibility of supporting the war, unless our ally would either lend, or assist us in borrowing considerable sums of money; but these representations produced no effect, altho' France has from the beginning always been able to borrow with so much facility, that there could have been no difficulty in affording us sufficient pecuniary aid, if the inclination to do it had not been wanting. It is not until since the alarming revolt of the Pennsylvania and Jersey troops, that this government could ever be brought to promise a single shilling towards paying the army in America, and the sum now granted is placed under the direction of General Washing­ton, in a way that manifests a total want of con­fidence in Congress, and renders the General in effect independent of the body by whom he is commissioned, and who will not dare either to dismiss, or even to disoblige him; because with­out his concurrence, the army cannot obtain a single shilling. You can best decide whether Congress has deserved this distrust, not to say [Page 124]insult; but if that body has deserved this, it cer­tainly does not merit the confidence of America; and in either case, the preference shewn to Ge­neral Washington seems likely to produce dan­gerous jealousies to say no more; the esteem which I have long entertained for him precludes every suspicion that he will adopt, or be­come the instrument of any improper design. But this reference will doubtless be considered and represented in America, as indicating an in­tention in this government to attach General Washington, to the interests of France, and to support him against all opposition, and it is easy to conceive the animofities likely to result from such apprehensions.

Respecting the sea and land forces sent at dif­ferent times to America, they doubtless were never suited nor intended to drive the British forces out of the United States, probably this government thinks that so great a part of the British forces can no where be employed and wasted so advantageously for France, as in fight­ing against the people of America, where they can do no harm to the French nation, and where we are under the necessity of opposing them, but were the British fleets and armies transferred from the continent to the West-India islands, it would depend on our inclination, whether we followed them or not, and in either case but especially in the latter, the French and Spanish possessions would be in imminent danger. These [Page 125]reasons sufficiently explain, why in truth, the French Government never did nor will make any effectual efforts to drive the English from New-York, &c. Respecting the fleet and ar­my sent last year to Rhode-Island, under the command of Mons. de Ternay, and Mons. de Rochambeau, you who were in Congress, need not be told the purpose for which they were professed to be sent, and probably by this time, you will be convinced that the great additional force which was promised, and of which the first sent was represented only as the van guard, was really never intended to follow, and that the true, though secret object in view, was not so much to act offensively against the British forces, as to secure and hold Rhode-Island, in the same manner as Queen Elizabeth held cau­tionary towns belonging to the Dutch. This Government has for a confiderable time been apprehensive that Great-Britain might soon re­gain the southern States by conquest, or their own defection, but it was also expected that the people of New-England, by more vigorous and persevering efforts would still maintain the con­test, even if all the other States should be again reduced to their former dependence, on the Crown of Great-Britain. The herbour of Rhode Island is commodiously situated in the center of New England, and was therefore thought a de­sireable possession by the French Ministry, and a fleet and army were accordingly sent to fortify [Page 126]themselves, and remain there, ready to favour and encourage those among us, who should ap­pear more attached to the French interest, and disposed to go the most desperate lengths against reconciliation with Great-Britain, and at the same time ready to overawe and restrain those of a contrary disposition. Indeed any one who con­siders how long the French fleet and army have remained in their station at Rhode-Island, with­out having ever received any order to engage in the smallest offensive enterprize, and that no attempt has been made to send even the small­est part of the reinforcements promised, must conclude that this fleet and army were not sent to America for our sakes, so much as to gain an advantageous strong hold in our country, and a controling influence over the people there, in order to prevent our reconciliation with Great-Britain, until we shall both have so far weaken­ed and ruined each other, that France with a formidable navy carefully preserved, will at the close of the war have nothing to fear, whatever becomes of us, or of our independency. Many other facts might be adduced, but they cannot be necessary to support this general represen­tation of the policy and views of France to­wards us, and to invalidate every cliam which may be made from thence, on our gra [...]itude, if it be then true that there is no validity, in either of these objections, nor any probability of finally establishing our independency, and if the esta­blishment [Page 127]of it would more likely prove preju­dicial than beneficial to us, it is high time to re­flect on our situation, and instantly terminate the destructive contest in which we are engaged. Dr. Franklin's sentiments on the separation of America from Great-Britain, even after the declaration of independency, are very plainly, as well as forcibly expressed, in his letter to Lord Howe, ‘Long (says this venerable patriot) did I endeavour with unfeigned and unwearied zeal, to preserve from breaking that fine and noble China Case—the British Empire, for I knew, that being once broken, the separate parts could not retain their share of the strength and value that existed in the whole; and that a perfect re-union of those parts could scarce ever be hoped for.’ I know of nothing that has occurred since the date of that letter, to induce Doctor Franklin to change his private sentiments on this subject, it is true that at that time, a re-union, though devoutly to have been wished for, could scarce be hoped or expected, so long as every original cause of the separation still existed, and were so many obstacles in the way of the wished for re-union; but those hav­ing been since removed, and America having fatarly experienced, ‘that separate, it does not retain even it's share of that strength and value which existed in the whole.’ On the Doctor's own principles, a re-union ought to be hoped for, and endeavoured after with unfeigned and [Page 128] [...]wearied zeal by him, and by every friend to America. If our own future prosperity requires that we be again united to Great-Britain, and if through inability to resist, we must eventu­ally return to that nation, it is both parricide and suicide to employ and waste our strength and blood for the destruction of a country, which is shortly to become our's, and to which we must hereafter resort for protection and support, against those to whom we are now attached, and whose ba [...]tles we are fighting. But besides the f [...]lly and wickedness, we ought to reflect on the danger of such conduct, for if we cannot finally withstand Great Britain, nothing can be more hazardous than to prevoke her resentment, by [...]n obstinate and desperate resistance—If the United States persist in rejecting all evertures for a reconciliation, and be finally conquered, after mis [...]hievously protracting the evils of civil war, as long as possible, what favour and indulgence can they reasonably expect? These considerations are of the utmost importance to our future well­being, and wretched will our condition doubt­less become, should they be much longer disre­garded.

The causes which first occasioned the civil war, have long ceased to exist, the acts com­plained of have been repealed, all right of tax­ing us, solemnly renounced by the British Parli­ament, and offers made to us at different times, more than equivalent to all that was originally [Page 129]demanded by our delegates in Congress. We therefore no longer contend for our rights, but for Sovereign Dominion, for a new o [...]ject, to which we had originally no claim, and which even after the commencement of hostilities we most solemnly professed to hold in aversion and abhorrence. This is the idol, which in the days of peace, and under the empire of reason we be­hold with sentiments of detestation, but which in the rags and phrenz [...] of civil war, we have set up and worshipped. This is the false divi­nity, whose votaries we have become, and on whose altars we daily offer up the dearest of all sacrifices. The peace and presperity of our country, and the blood of our nearest relations and friends. To labour in curing this madness, and in exciting forgiveness, peace, and brotherly love among the contending parts of the British empire, would certainly be a most laudable and meriterious employment, and never did any con­test afford so many reasons for charity and mutual forgiveness as the present. "To err is human." but in case of error, be it on either side, is pe­culiarly entitled to indulgence from the other; the cause of this dispute having been so intri­cate, and the question of right so doubtful, that the wisest and best men would not avoid think­ing differently about them. Those therefore, who unrelentingly cherish vindictive resentments on this subject, and deny forgiveness to each other, will have very little reason to ask, or ex­pect [Page 130]it of Heaven—Let us then exert our utmost efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation, if we accelerate these blessings, if we contribute to receive "transcendent relation" that formerly subsisted between us and our parent country, we shall deserve the applauses of present and future generations, and in every event we shall at least secure the approbation of our own consciences. I pretend not to know exactly the terms on which a reconciliation might now be effected, every overture from Great-Britain having been treated with insult, and considered by u [...] as a proof of her weakness and our own strength, no encou­ragement has been left to further offers; on her part, enough however has already been offered to afford a basis for safe and honorable negocia­tion; and I am fully persuaded that every thing which we ought to desire, every thiug consistent with our own and the general good of the Em­pire, may be finally obtained if we do not ne­glect the present opportunity and wait till con­quest supersedes all negociation. It never can be the interest of Great-Britain to deny our rea­sonable demands, because it can never be benefi­cial to her to govern a people so remote, and so rapidly encreasing, by force; and on our parts, we should recall amd regulate our demands by those sentiments which Congress professed even after the commencement of hostilities. ‘Our breasts, said they, retain too tender a regard for the kingdom from which we derive our [Page 131]origin, to renew such a reconcili [...]tion as might, in any manner, be inconsistent with her dignity or her welfare; these, related as we are to her, honour and duty, as well as in­clination, induce us to support and advance’ Every thing which we can ask consistently with these sentiments, will not, I am confident, be denied to us. Respecting the first measures to­wards a negociation with the British Govern­ment, they must, I think, begin among the people at large, in the same manner as the first steps towards the present contest originated—If the people in general be made sensible of the mischiefs and dangers attending the present pur­suit of independency, they will naturally assemble as formerly, in town meetings, &c. and by suita­ble resolutions will procure instructions from their several assemblies to their delegates in Congress, for promoting a negotiation and reconciliation with the parent country; and if it should appear that a majority of the states is not inclined to [...]e­gocia [...]e, in that case they never can be in doubt about suitable ways and means to treat scpa­rately.

If these facts and observations appear to you well founded, I beg you will employ them in such way as may be best suited to promote the salutary purposes of this letter. I do not how­ever wish that any part of it should at this time be ascribed to me, unless there may be more ne­cessity for it than I can at present conceive of; [Page 132]I shall however acquiesce in every thing you may think expedient in this respect, as I am confident, that though our countrymen may not be yet prepared for the [...] truths, the time can­not be distant in which they will be universally admitted, and when recovering from our present delirium, we shall reflect with anguish of mind on the blessings we have lost, and the miseties we have suffered by ou [...] pursuit of in dependency. When that period arrives, we shall equally re­gret, and wonder at our infatuation in desiring to separate from a people to whom we were con­nected by all the ties of consanguinity, mutual affection, and interest; by similarity of religion, laws, manners, and language; and generally by every thing fitted to bind mankind to each other; a people justly celebrated above all others for civil and religious liberty, for public and private virtues, for philosophy, science and arts, and generally for all that exalts and adorns human nature; and we shall no less regre [...] and wonder that in thu [...] breaking the ‘bonds of law, loyalty, faith and blood;’ in thus discarding all remembrance of former benefits, all ‘pride in the glorious atchievements of our common an­cestors, and all affection for the heirs of the [...] virtues,’ and separating from an empire, which (by our own confession) ‘has been the envy and admiration of ages,’ we should at the same time [...]ni [...]e ourselves to, and render our­selves virtually dependen [...] [...]n, a nation and go­vernment, [Page 133]which we and our fathe [...]s have con­sidered as hereditary inimical to us, to our reli­gion, and to every species of freedom. As I have devoted this letter solely to reflections on the public affairs of our country, and have al­ready made it so long, I will not add to it by saying any thing more, than that I am with the most sincere respect and friendship,

Mr Silas Deane's Letter to Major Ben­jamin Tallmadge, at Gen. Washing­ton's Head-Quarters.

YOUR letter of September last did not come to hand until a few d [...]s since, its de [...]ntion is to me p [...]ctly [...] countable—You ask me what I think [...] aff [...] and [...]hat [...]ll be the issue of [...]nem—Thinking in the manner I do, silence on the subject would be prudence, at least [Page 134]in me; but it would not be acting the friendly and open part towards you—In a word, I think that our affairs were never at any period in a worse situation than at present, and that the issue of the war if continued much longer, will be in the ruin and slavery of our country. You may be assured that England is determined, o [...] no consideration, nor in any circumstances what­ever, to admit of our independency; that nation is neither exhausted nor dispirited, its energy, re­sources, and national character never appeared in a greater and more striking point of view than at this time; you are not to suppose that all the powers of Europe have deserted Great-Bri­tain, and become indifferent to the fate of a na­tion which at different periods have relieved and defended most of them, when in the most im­minent danger themselves; nor have you any ground to conclude, as too many rashly do, that because no power in Europe has as yet declared for England, that therefore they all (at least se­cretly) wish us success. There is no nation at this day in Europe, except England, in which the subjects are in reality anything more than the properts of government, for except that arbi­trary and tyrannical nation of Great-Britain, they are no where entitled to any share in the legisla­tion. The government of Holland, about which you have heard s [...] much and know so little, is included in the above description, being an ab­solute aristocracy, the members of which are not [Page 135]chosen by the people, but by those who compose the aristocracy; that government is in its nature as despotic as any in Europe, but fortunately for its subjects, the genius of commerce protects them from the baneful effects of despotism; they think they are free, they have not experienced the contrary, and until lately have been happy, but is it not surprising that we should imagine, that monarchs who hold their own subjects in chains, should, from motives of disinterested ge­nerosity and the love of liberty, assist a people in their revolt from a government infinitely milder than their own? A people whose first and favor­ite position is, that all men are by nature equal. Reflect cooly for a moment if the sounding epi­thets of great, good, generous, disinterested ally, protector of the liberties of mankind, &c. will protect you, and then answer me: Few nations ever engaged in war but from motives of ambi­tion, interest or revenge; the latter is notori­ously the sole motive in Spain for the present; her interest in incompatable with our indepen­dency, in every point in which it can be viewed. Spain is sensible of this, and therefore will not acknowledge us—Can it be believed that an ar­bitrary, despotic and jealous monarchy can wish to see a mighty empire of confederated republics, whose religion, genius, and form of government are directly the reverse to, and naturally at war with theirs, established in the neighbourhood of all its treasures? at the doors of its unarmed and [Page 136]enervated colouies? But Holland is also at war with England! rather say that England is at war with Holland, for the latter has not, as yet, made a single reprisal; but if the States of Hol­land enter seriously into the war, they will not do it on our account, nor will they take any part in our affairs; they have told Mr. Adams so, in plain but modest terms, repeatedly—They are not so much interested against our independency as Spain; but they are far from being interested to have it established, every other power to the North are interested in a greater or less degree against us, the natural produce of their country being the same as ours. As to those to the South they must naturally be indifferent to our fate, except Portugal, which is essentially affected by what affects England, and is of course as great an enemy to our independency as England can be; but the Southern powers, Spain excepted, are of very little importance in the present subject. If I were to hazard a conjecture it would be, that the Emperor of Germany & Empress of Russia will ultimately take part with England, and de­cide the contest, and that the terms of peace will finally be dictated by them. If we conti­nue to reject all overtures, until such an event arrives, unconditional submission will be our fate; but if those and all the other Powers in Europe, remain peaceable spectators of the war, it does not follow that Great-Britain must fall, her naval power and resources are equal to those [Page 137]of all her enemies, and the war being solely maritime, the event must be uncertain, Great-Britain is undoubtedly able to support the war for several years to come, and she is at all events resolved to hazard every thing sooner than yield to our independency; but suppose the war con­tinued for two years longer, and suppose at that period, the resources and maritime power of Great-Britain exhausted and broken, her credit lost, and general bankruptcy and despair through­out her dominions, and finding no friend to in­terfere, that she is obliged to receive the law from her enemies.—This may afford a triumph for us for a moment, before our resentments have time to cool, but when we have laid down our arms and become cool enough to look round, and examine our situation, we shall find that we have purchased this triumph at the price of the peace, safety and liberty of our country, we shall by that time find our country exhausted and ravaged, an immense national debt on us, and the expences of our civil government, and pub­lic departments, so greatly increased, that the burthen of the whole will be unsupportable.— The war has already cost us more than thirty millions sterling, if justice were to be done to every one, and though by the breach of public faith, and the highest act of national injustice and despotism ever known, it is liquidated at much less, yet two years continuance of the war, will leave us near that sum in debt, the new [Page 138]established government will cost us, ten times more than the old ever did; we now expend near 20,000l. sterling annually, on foreign em­bassies and agencies, at the peace these establish­ments must be enlarged, as well as the expence; Congress must be supported in a certain dignity, Boards of Treasury, of Marine, of Commerce, &c. must be established with salaries, sufficient to induce men of abilities to serve; Consuls in the different foreign ports must be appointed, a ma­rine force must be kept up to a certain degree, or our flag will not be respected, nor our com­merce protected in any part of the world.—In short, from the best calculations I can make, the expences of our public government will greatly exteed 100,000l. sterling annually, independent of the expences of the government of each par­ticular State, which will necessarily be increated, and if j [...]stice be done our officers and soldiers, in their half pay, the expences of our new pub­lic government only, will be at least 300,000l. sterling annually. The proportion of the public debt to Conn [...]cticut, supposing that State to share one equal thirteenth of the whole, will exceed two millions sterling, that state is the best able to pay taxes, of any in the confederation, will it be able to pay the interest only of such a sum, and its proportion of the public current expences, in addition to those of their private government? You know it is impossible.—Will the States when peace leaves local prejudices, [Page 139]ancient jealoufies, and every other seed of con­tention at liberty to spring up and operate, will they agree in the partition of their public debts and expences, in the share of vacant lands, of emoluments, and o [...]c [...]s? In short, will they a­gree in any thing, will the honest Farmers in Connecticut be contented to find, that after they have suffered so much, in a war, professedly undertaken to free them from taxes, and impo­sitions, that their lands have become mortgaged nearly to their value? Will not discontent pre­vail universally in the States, between each other, and amo [...]g the individuals of each, and will the Democratic system we have adopted, have suf­ficient energy to govern so extensive a conti­nent, uneasy and convulsed in every part? Will it be able to prevent universal Anarchy, the na­tural child of Democracy in every age and nation, of the world? If ever a state was calculated for Democracy, it must have been Connecticut; an equality of fortune, the influence of religious sentiments, sober, virtuous and frugal manners, with the small extent of territory, were all in our favour; and we and our ancestors were happy under an apparent Democracy—I say apparent, for we always beheld and acknowledged a su­preme power at a distance, and complied with its requisitions, but the case will be materially different in future, if independency is established at the peace, b [...]sides are our manners the same as formerly? Have they been changed for the [Page 140]better or worse? If civil feuds and anarchy pre­ [...]ail, [...]e shall lie at the mercy of any power that may be disposed to interfere, it is next to impossible but that they will not prevail, and I leave you to reflect on the consequences, but if France and Spain succeed with our assistance in ruining Great Britain, if they dictate the law to us also? They certainly will, it is not in the nature of a despotic victorious Power to do otherwise; and if they dictate the feverest con­ditions, to whom have we to apply?— No power on earth will be left to take our part, no one whom either affection or interest will in­duce to interfere, that great nation from whom we have so often boasted of our descent, that nation which has so often unlocked its treasures and spill'd its best blood, in the defence of the rights and liberties of other nations, tho' strang­ers to her, will not be able to reach a helping hand to her descendants in distress; she may afford us her unavailing pity, or offer feeb'e en­treaties on our behalf, but we have no reason to expect either, I view our situation as with Sylla on the one hand and Charybdis on the other, and our pilots drunk with the intoxicating ideas of independent sovereignty, madly pushing us into that vortex, in which our peace liberty and safety will be swallowed up and lost for ever, if you ask me what is to be done, I say make peace immediately on the best terms you can, the pre­sent moment is a favourable our, we are now of [Page 141]more weight in the scale, than we can possibly be in a general treaty, at the close of the war, we may then find ourselves light as the dust of the balance, at best but a meer article to be set off to either fide, on a general settlement of ac­count; Mr. Sebor will write to you by this con­veyance, and I leave him to inform you of Si­monet's villainy and imposture in the bill which he sold you, as well as of other private matters, for I am heartily tired, and my spirits are too low to attempt a more chearful subject at pre­sent, wishing you success and happiness, I am with sincere esteem and friendship,