Paris papers; or Mr. Silas Deane's late intercepted letters, to his brothers, and other intimate friends, in America. To which are annexed for comparison, the Congressional declaration of indepedendency in July 1776, and that now inculating [sic] among the revolted provinces, with the never-to-be-forgotten orders of the rebel general in August 1776, for preventing a pacification.

Paris papers; or Mr. Silas Deane's late intercepted letters, to his brothers, and other intimate friends, in America. To which are annexed for comparison, the Congressional declaration of indepedendency in July 1776, and that now inculating [sic] among the revolted provinces, with the never-to-be-forgotten orders of the rebel general in August 1776, for preventing a pacification.

Table of contents

Title page

INTRODUCTION.

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Mr Silas Deane's Letter to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, at Gen. Washington's Head-Quarters.

The following is one of the Papers intercepted with Mr. Silas Dean's letters; and from the matter and style, seems to be a composition of his, tho' none of his letters expressly refers to it as an inclosure. It was probably put under a cover to some one or other of his particular friends, which is missing. The AMERICAN ACCOUNT CURRENT, with its Vouchers.

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Paris Papers; OR Mr. SILAS DEANE'S late intercepted LETTERS, TO His BROTHERS, and other intimate FRIENDS, in AMERICA.

To which are annexed for Comparison, the Congressional Declaration of Independency in July 1776, and that, now inculating among the revolted Provinces, with the never-to-beforgotten Orders of the Rebel General in August 1776, for preventing a Pacification.

NEW-YORK: RE-PRINTED BY JAMES RIVINGTON.

INTRODUCTION.

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THE Public will expect no apology for the present collection of these letters; for it is decisive of their utility, that though the Rebels began, they have found it expedient to discontinue, the re-publication of them in their Gazettes.

They made it a question at first, whether Deane was the real author of them? and yet what is that to the arguments, if they are sound and substantial? But this point is now settled— Not one of the persone to whom they are directed, has ventured to deny his receipt of the duplicate; and their presses are pouring out abuses upon their quondam Ambassador, as freely as of late against General Arnold, whom [Page]they had before applauded as the most active and valiant of their Heaven born Commanders .

[Page] This is natural, and it will be the [...]e of all their leaders, the moment they disapprove of the aims of the Junto, who are, or conceive themselves to be, interested in the dismemberment of the empire. Those execrations however, would be turned into applause, if the desperadoes who compose it, saw a prospect under the restoration of the British government, for what they have sought to obtain by subverting it—the non payment of their debts, a way of subsisting without re-assuming their former abject occupations, and the retention of their present possessions, free from contribution to the losses they have brought upon the rest of their countrymen.

The Editor has no intention to defend Mr. Deane, who will doubtless find it easier to deal with the clemen [...] of his injured Sovereign, and the [...] rality of a brave and gener us nation; than to pacify his own cons [...]rence, or atone for the complicated misery he has [Page]been instrumental in pulling down upon his countrymen.

This collection of his epistles, is to aid him in the designs of his penitence for repairing if possible the mischief he has done. Happy for America, if they are conducive to the opening the eyes of others, before their wicked seducers shall have compleated their vassalage to a crafty and arbitrary Monarchy! That they are not already in this gulph of perdition, is under God to be ascribed, to the efforts of Great-Britain, in favour of her numerous friends in this country.

Be it the consolation of the suffering Loyalists, that no arts of their oppressors for concealing their numbers, to lessen their consequence, can at this day succeed.

Neither their songs nor their addresses, their illuminations, riots, shews nor thanksgivings, with all the variety of essays and compositions, puffs, scandals and gasconades, in prose and metre, [Page]under which the Rebel presses have groaned ever since the French victory in the Chesapeak, avail but to shew the impotence of a party, vainly hoping to impress Europe with an idea of their strength, and their own countrymen with a contempt of the power themselves dread, as the avenger of their crimes.

It is a proof that though the domineering, they are the minor party, that they forbid the liberty of the press, and in the case of their own Ambassador's letters, dare not appeal to the understandings of the multitude; and it adds to the evidence, that such unceasing pains are taken, to express a joy and confidence, felt least by those who most promote the shew and appearance.

With the help of a few lying letters, those Gazettes may perhaps influence the councils of Versailles, and furnish matter for factious oratory in England; certainly they cannot mislead those [Page]who form their estimate of the real temper of America, from the clear demonstration afforded by the neglect of a great m [...]ority of the people to attend the elections for officers in the usurpation; too well is it known for the success of those arts of the usurpers, that Congress in all periods of this struggle, from the moment of the first discovery of the pernicious and perfidious design to divide the empire, have [...]uniformly d [...]clin [...]d the general voice, ar [...]ently as it has been desired by the people, and advantageous as [...] must have been to the tyrants, to have obtained their co [...] currence or approbation.—It is und [...]bitably true, that

The collective body were not consulted

On the declaration of independency, even in-the tumultuous days of July 1776; nor

On the confederation concerted at Little York, on the Susquehanna, in November 1777; nor

On the British-peace-overtures, in preference[Page]of the French offers, in 1778; nor

On the propose [...] for negociating a [...] [...]ent of differences, as ten [...]re [...] by the fr [...]endly d [...]claration of December 1780.

You confess, therefore, usurpe [...] [...] your aversion [...] the experiment of a fair [...], on the question for or against [...] re-union, that you boast of a concord which has no existence, you confirm it by your edicts, taxations and merciless cruelties; in which you take away life by courts-martial, and violate the very frames and constitutions yourserves imposed; and it will ever remain (without any other proof) an inconrestible truth, that the majority of the continent [...] your measures, till you consent to [...] general appea [...] throughout all the towns, villages and districts within the reputed bounds of the revol [...].

To [...] futile policy of [...], and lying laws, implying [...] to raise millions you do not [...] and the increase of a [Page] [...] which by creating a depend [...] [...] upon France, lessens your own [...] hope, of perpetuating the domination you exercis [...]er your miserable [...] e [...]austed countrymen. Say, ye [...], politicians of a pageant Con [...] [...] ye not already neg [...]ected by [...] partizans? and the powers [...], substantially shifted into the hands of a triumvirate, composed of the French [...], your own General, and Finan [...]. [...] ye are w [...] [...]er ye obey: and pray from whom do the rebel army few as they are, now receive their rewards!

There is a perhaps that you may so magnisy yourselves by your fals [...] 's, as to cheat France [...] one of a [...] quiring the dominio [...] [...] at first meant [...] ment, for red [...] [...] Britain, and [...] her amb [...] [...] [...]ations. Ad [...]it [...] persuaded to say a firmer hol [...] [...] [Page]Chesapeak, by a reinforcement of the troops, with which she has already turned your countrymen out of their possessions, and admit her able to retain them against Great-Britain; is she not from that moment, in a condition to set your authority at defiance? Tremble then at the probable consequences of a partition of the Continent to give peace to Europe; an event which will leave you nothing in that district which shall happily be restored to it's ancient reunion, and little to hope for in that, which shall unfortunately fall under a haughty and Popish oppressor. Is it for this you have waded through the blood of your own countrymen? And what prospect of an escape from this mighty ruin, but in the blessing of God upon the future progress of the British arms; and that by listening to the counsels of Mr. Deade, you like him, may be subjects of that clemency you have so often despised. Wretched America! when Great-Britain instead of a war of [Page]correction to bring you to your senses, shall forget your descent, and proceed to press you down by the weight of affliction and general desolation.

On either of these contingencies, the pertinacious authors or supporters of the rebellion, may rue their agency in the measures so pernicious to themselves and their countrymen. The day of doom cannot be afar off, Pax quaeritur Bello, and let those two individuals dread it most, who by a preheminence in guilt, ventured to write and publish the general orders to the rebel army in August 1776; which by falsely denying, contrary to all virtuous and honourable policy, the message of peace, then in their hands, prevented the instantaneous restoration of the common tranquility; and for the hope to themselves of the precedency of Pennsylvania, and rank in the French army, have sent thousands of a cheated, insulted and credulous host to the shades.

Notes

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The following is copied from a Philadelphia Newspaper entitled the FREEMAN's JOURNAL. 23d January, 17 [...]2.

"Last week divers of the lengthy epistles of [...], Silas Deane, vaniously directed, which had not p [...]ssed through the hands of the enemy, were delivered unsea [...]ed to the Pr [...]sident of Congress. They contai [...] arguments, opinions and advice, exactly of the cast of those which predominate in the letters which were lat [...]ly inserted as his in this paper, to soms of which there are express references, in these last arrived. Those who had the opportunity of coming at the truth, were already convinced that our publications were genuine; but the incident above meationed, removes all doubt on this subject. Indeed the most increavious must now admit the baseness of this quondam Commi [...]er of the nasted sla [...]es at the Cour [...] of Versailles. Whether the [...]aitor had taken the money of George the Third, as early as the nes [...]rious attack on congress of December, 1778▪ the cause of so much discord and distraction in our public councils during the year 1779; or whether his prostitution is to be seemed coeval only with the visit which Mr. Walpole, agent for the English owners of lands in the Grenad [...]s, was last summer admitted to make at Paris, time only can determine. By the last accoun [...] he was at Ostend preparing [...], without doubt, for London.

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DEAR SIR,

Paris, 14th June. 1781.

THERE has been lately published in the English and Dutch Gazettes, a resolution of Congress, of March last, tending to forbid all intercourse between the inhabitants of America and Great Britain, or on any account or i [...] any circumstan [...]es whatever; and it is credibly reported that all British goods, however the property of them may have been acqui [...]d (capture excepted) are declared to be contraband and liable to be confiscated, and that an American in Europe, or the West-Indies, who purchases goods of British growth or manufacture, will on his importation of them, into America, be exposed to have his property seized, and to be [...] or at least censured▪ Several gentlem [...]n [...] from America, have informed me, that such [...] solutions and laws, were proposed before they left the conti [...]ent; and the men [...]ce thrown ou [...] by Messrs. Adams, Dana, and Searle, against any who should purchase British goods for the American market, leaves me in no kind of doubt, that such violent and [...]considera [...]e measures have been actually adopted by Congre [...]s, and by some, if not by all the Assemblies.— I know not what good effects are expecte [...] in America from such resolutions, in Europe, they [Page]are esteemed impolitic, and useless at best for any good purpose, but what is to me the most alarming, is that those resolutions were taken in consequence of representations made by the French Minister at Philadelphia; and are we, in all the pride of independant sovereignty, become greater slaves, even than the subjects of France? Is the Congress, and are our Assemblies become so dependant on this Court, as to be dictated to even by it's Minister? The merchants of France go freely to London, purchase goods, and though they are obliged at all times, whether in peace or war, to introduce them privately into the kingdom, or pay a heavy tax, yet when once introduced they sell them openly as English goods; they now advertise them as such, and you can scarce go through a street in Paris, without seeing many stores, over the doors of which, English Goods just imported, are advertised for sa [...]e; Congress have within three years past, acted so often in direct contradiction to their own resolves and declarations, that it is no way surprising that they have lost the confidence of the public, on this side the water at least they have entirely lost it; the King gave a large sum of money about the time of Mr. Laurens's arrival, for the use of the army, but the Court had so little confidence in Congress, that the money was made payable to General Washington's orders only, nor could they be induced, by the earnest solicitations of Doctor Franklin, to give [Page]Congress any controul over it; this shews either that they have no confidence in Congress, or that they mean to take General Washington and his army in effect into their pay, and make them subservient to their purposes; Mr. Laurens obtained liberty to lay out a part of the money in cloathing and necessary articles for the army; the Ministers probably considered it more for the interest of France, and better for the army, to have such part of the money as must go in purchase of clothing, &c. laid out in France, than sent in specie to America; but what followed? Mr. Laurens sent his agent to Holland and laid out one million and a half of livres, nearly, in British manufactures.—Thus whilst Mr. Adams was declaiming in Holland against England, and protesting against all use of its manufactures, and threatening every American that should purchase them, with being advertised as the enemy of his country, the Agents of Congress were publicly (and therefore I presume with his knowledge) purchasing those proscribed manufactures for public use; can the annals of the world exhibit more striking instances of inconsistency? This public preference given to the manufactures of England, by laying out the money granted by France in the purchase of them, has irritated the Minister, [...]d given general disgust; our affairs here will [...] feel the consequences, nor do I believe that we shall have any credit at all, nor that our bills will be paid [Page]in two months from this time.—Mr. Laurens was not to blame in this affair, so far as I know any thing of it, he acted prudently, and for the interest of his constituents; he did what you and every honest merchant would have done, in his place he had money to lay out for the public, and he sought the best market for the goods, most suitable, and such as were to be had on the best terms; besides there was a strong ship in Holland bound for America, in which they could be transported at little risque.—But what can be said of Congress for passing resolves, which they must know will not be obeyed, and which as soon as published, they themselves destroy, by acting in direct contradiction to them? What I have hinted about our bills keep to yourself, or use it only to check any of our friends who may be disposed to venture too deep in them. You may be assured that no loan has been obtained either in Spain or Holland; that there is not the least probability of any; that the resignation of Mr. Neckar has been a sensible shock to public credit in France; and that great embarrassments are apprehended in a few months on account of money; that too many begin to consider every livre granted to America, as so much lest, and that Doctor Franklin is now under acceptances for nearly three millions of livres more than he has funds to answer for.— Th [...]e facts are sufficient for your direction— The Doctor may possibly obtain fresh grants—I [Page]doubt it—I know he has been refused, and I am told in rather harsh terms.—Congress drew bil [...]s on Mr. President Laurens, as being in Holland, many months before he sailed from America; they drew on Mr. Jay long before his arrival in Spain; these bills have been honoured and you in America have been taught to believe that it was from money received in Spain und Holland—no such thing—those bills have been uniformly sent to Doctor Franklin for payment, even the salaries of Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, and their suites, have been drawn for on Doctor Franklin, who has paid them out of the monies received here. The Agents of private States sent over here on one mad Quixotical scheme or other, have been furnished with money for their expences, out of the sums granted for the support of our army; our Ambassadors and Agents have for some time past cost us at least twenty thousand pounds sterling per annum, the relief of prisoners, and other contingencies, more than as much more, all this has been taken from the money afforded us by France for our army, Congress though repeatedly advised by Doctor Franklin not to draw on him, have continued to draw without bounds, and generally without advice; by their conduct one would suspect that they imagined that the Treasury of France was at their disposal, and that they had a right to draw what money they pleased from it.—The Ministers here see no end to this [Page]proceeding if permitted to run on, and if the Agents and Ministers of Congress are permitted to contract debts, and draw on them for the payment, and if Congress are at liberty to draw un [...]imitedly on Dr. Franklin, and they obliged to answer ultimately their drafts, it is reasonable therefore to expect, that France under its actual circumstances, will hold its hand, and that you will soon find the bills of Congress protested for non-acceptance, or non-payment; nothing prevents it at this moment, but the fear of a violent revolution with us—Is it to be supposed that France will be content for any time to defray the expence of the various Quixotical embassies Congress are sending to different Courts?— That she will continue to advance money to be laid out under her eyes, in the manufactures of her enemies, to the contempt of those of her own; and to her real impoverishment? You who believe this have faith indeed, but it is a question with me if it is such as will remove mountains. I know and confess t [...]e difficult situation of Congress—And I know also, (what I am sure they will not confess) that they have brought themselves into it by their cabals, their ignorance, and their mismanagement; but their present embarrassments afford them no excuse for their involving themselves in still greater—If you ask me what they can do? I answer at once, let them do what for a long time past they have left undone, let them act an honest and consistent part, [Page]let them acknowledge their inability, let them in a word, lay their case fairly as it is before their Ally, let them weigh fairly the probable chances for their succeeding to establish Independent Sovereignty, and if they find the probability against it, let them honestly confess it, and put an end to the calamities of our country, by a peace on honorable terms; perhaps to talk of peace on other conditions than Great-Britain's asking for it on bended knees, is toryism with you, if so, I cannot help it. I have for some time since, had the fate, though I shall never have the fame of Cassandra; I have predicted misfortunes and disappointments—Nobody has believed my predictions, yet they have hitherto been uniformly verified by events; "I could still prophecy but the cold hand of despair is on me" and I will only add my wishes for your prosperity, and be assured of my sincere respect and attachment.

I am, Dear Sir, Your most obedient, And very humble Servant, (Signed) SILAS DEANE.

To Col. Wm. Duer, to the care of Robt. Morris, Esq Philadelphia.

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Paris, 10th June, 1781.

Dear Sir,

THE dangerous crisis to which our affairs are rapidly advancing affects me greatly—I can speak of nothing el [...]e with attention when in company, it excludes every thing else from my thoughts when alone, we have been deceived, and that principally by ourselves, we have deceived others uninten [...]ly I charitably believe. The British nation has [...]allen into errors equally great; would to God this great tragedy of errors, could have a happy catastrophe! It is in vain to blame our public managers, but it is wis [...] in us to examine our present si [...]uation and to weigh the probability of future consequences. Experience has shewn us that France is either unable or unwilling to assist us effectually, so as to drive the British force out of our country; judging from appearances, here I might conclude, tha [...] France is unwilling, as appearances warrant such a conclusion, but when the conduct of men, or of a nation is capable of two constructions, I would willingly adopt the most favourab [...]—I know the inability of the nation to assist us effectually, and they say, they are not unwilling I ought to believe them, though I know it is certainly inconsistent with their interest, and with the safety of their foreign possessions to remove the war from our continent. But to which ever of these causes we impute the continuance of the war, in our country, the consequences will be found [Page]equally pernicious to us. Great-Britain is determined in no circumstances to admit the independency of America, and so long as both parties remain inflexible, we shall continue to weaken, exhaust and ruin each other, and who will eventually be the gainers? It is, I think time ***** for us to enquire how our account will stand on a close. Let the contest close, when or in what manner it may—Will independent sovereignty, in the hands of a democracy, be a government under which our persons and properties will be better secured than they were before this unhappy contest began?—Will our commerce flourish more under independency, than it did whilst we were connected with Great Britain? This I know is generally believed, it is even relied on, as a principal source from which we shall reimburse our present expences.—The subject however merits an examination.—If the restraints formerly laid on our trade were overbalanced by the protection and encouragement given to it. If in a state of independence, that protection and encouragement must necessarily be withdrawn, and our commerce with Great-Britain and its possessions, become subject to all the duties and prohibitions laid on the commerce of other aliens and strangers. If ou [...] commerce with France and other foreign nations must be subject to the conditions and restraint which they shall see sit to impose, as must be th [...] case, it deserves enquiry whether we in our commerce [Page]shall become gainers or not. I have examined the question as thoroughly as I am capable, and am convinced we must be losers. We complained of England for including America in the Navigation Act, and other acts of trade, but if the naval force of that nation rose in consequence of those acts, into a power sufficient to protect the trade of the whole empire; if the trade of America was protected thereby, could it be unreasonable that the trade of America should submit to those acts and regulations which were the source of its protection and security? We complained that acts of parliament prohibited us from carrying certain articles of our produce to foreign markets, and thereby gave England a monopoly advantageous to her and injurious to us; but it must at the same time be acknowledged that British subjects were generally restrained from purchasing and importing the same articles from other countries; so that if England made a monopoly of certain articles of our produce, she gave us in return a monopoly of her market, and the liberty of re-exporting our goods if a better market afforded elsewhere; in this, the advantage ay evidently with us; a great part of the articles thus monopolized by England, were such as could have been, and were formerly supplied by foreigners at as low or lower rates than we could afford them. But the system of Great-Britain being as you know to promote the commerce of her own empire in every part [Page]of it, not only restraints and duties were laid on foreign importations, but bounties given to encourage the growth and importation of many of our productions, which otherwise would not have found their way to Europe; another complaint was, that we were prohibited the taking from foreigners, articles, which we wanted though not the growth or fabric of England; but it is well known that those articles concerning which so much has been said, formed but a very inconsiderable part of our commerce.— Every one who has had an opportunity of comparing the manufactures of one nation in Europe with another, of observing the different modes and principles of transacting business, will at once give England and her merchants the preference. All the more solid, substantial and useful articles are made better, and afforded cheaper there, than any where else, certain linens from Russia and Silesia excepted—and even those as well as the less important foreign articles, came to us, considering the drawbacks in England on exportation, nearly, if not quite as cheap, as we could have imported them directly. But it has been also objected that foreigners were not admitted to bring their produce and merchandize into our ports, and trade with us; of all the complaints made by us on the subject of comme [...]ce, this appears to me the most absurd and gr [...]ndless. The exclusion of foreigners from being the carriers for England [Page]is the corner stone in which its commerce and maritime power arose, and the principal cause of the increase of our commerce and navigation, and if ever we should be independent and at peace and should neglect to pass acts to exclude foreigners from being our carriers, we shall never be either a maritime or commercial nation.— The Parliament [...]ary regulations, and restrictions on our commerce were a principal cause of the unhappy contest between the two countries, and we were impatient under them because we were apprehensive, that they were part of a system to enslave us entirely, and thus thinking it was natural that we should exaggerate their hardships, and in all our deliberation on the subject, turn our attention to the restraints laid on trade, without considering the encouragement and protection given to it; I do not mean to call in question the views or designs of any one at that period. I believe that others as well as myself, had at that time but partially examined the subject, and in truth we know that too many of our leading patriots had little or no knowledge of commerce, its interests and dependencies.—I confess that on a more extensive view, and impartial examination of the subject, I think it evident that the restrictions which were laid on our commerce previous to the present dispute were over-balanced by the protection, and various encouragements afforded to it by Great-Britain, but supposing that at the close of the war America [Page]remain independent, what must be the future situation of our commerce? Will independency at the restoration of peace, give commerce such a spring, procure for it such new sources and encouragements as are necessary, not only to revive it from the ruined state in which it now is, but to raise it still higher than it has been at any former period? Or will independency prove prejudicial to the commerce of America? This is a serious question, and the importance of it must apologize for the length of my letter. I know that I am writing to the first commercial character in America, but I also know your candor and love of truth, and therefore I venture to communicate to you my thoughts on the subject, which if just you will approve, if erroneous you will correct. America left at liberty will, I am persuaded, take at the least, threefourths of all the European articles she wants from Great-Britain. The superiority of the British manufactures, their conformity to our taste and habits; the generosity and strict punctuality of her merchants, and above all the credit which they can give, and which no other nation can, or will give, must secure to that nation, as great a share of our trade as I have mentioned. But how are we to pay for those purchases? Whilst we were part of the empire, Great-Britain gave a preference to our iron, naval stores, pot ash, flax seed, timber, &c. &c. and encouraged the importation of them by bounties, [Page]and by laying heavy duties on the same articles from foreign nations. This will no longer be the case; we have no reason to expect to be even amongst the most favoured foreign nations in the British ports. We have imagined that Great-Britain would not support its commerce, and manufactures, without our productions and without our markets for a consumption of theirs; this has been asserted, in harangues and publications many thousands of times within seven years past, I confess, that I once believed it— but observation and experience have convinced me, that we have been greatly mist [...]ken.—Of all the articles furnished by us to Great-Britain, I know but two, tobacco and [...]ce, which cannot be obtained as good and as cheap from other countries. The consumption of rice in Great-Britain, is very inconsiderable; and that of tobacco, does not exceed twenty thousand hogsheads annually, on an average.—Other countries indeed can produce both these articles at as low a price as America can, but the preference given to them from America by Great-Britain, has formerly prevented their being cultivated to any extent.—It is well known that the Island of Cuba, the Coast of Brazil, and many other countries produce tobacco of a quality superior to ours.—That the Ukraine is capable of supplying all Europe with that article: its cultivation it is true is not yet carried to perfection there, but as it is, Russia at this time exports large [Page]quantities of tobacco to France, and to other nations.—The same may be said of many other countries respecting rice. Indigo is produced in the Southern parts of America, and in the Islands, every way superior to ours.—The productions of Russia, Denmark and Sweden, &c. are the same with ours, and in exchange for them, those kingdoms take the same kind of merchandize from England as we formerly took; at best therefore we shall meet with rivals in the British markets on our arrival with our produce, and rivals in the purchases we wish to make there—But we are supposed to be Independent, and can therefore go where we please, but we cannot find purchasers where we please, and the nations among whom we find them may lay what impositions they please on our sales—The Northern powers in Europe cannot become purchasers for they have the same articles to sell—France wants but a very small part of our productions; it wants neither our iron, pot-ash, flax seed, fish, oil, or in short, scarcely any thing except about 24000 hogsheads of our tobacco, annually—Our timber and naval stores; and for the two latter articles, we shall find the same rivals in the ports of France as in England; and in regard to the first, the most important article of all, the cultivation of it advances so rapidly in Flanders, and in the Ukraine, that those countries will soon rival us in the quality of their tobacco, and from the cheapness of labour, be able at [Page]all times to undersell us in France, and in all the Northern ports of Europe—We have no promise of a preference in the markets of France— nor the least ground to expect it—Spain and Portugal it is true, may want our flour and our fish if, contrary to all appearance, we should have any, but they will want little or nothing else, and our trade, be it whatever it may, to the Southern parts of Europe, and into the Mediteranean, must at all times be exposed to the Corsairs of Barbary—Those piratical states, who pay little or no respect to the flags of the first maritime nations in Europe, further than they are paid for it, will hardly pay any to the flag of a nation, they have scarcely so much as heard of, and of which, if they come to know any thing, they will know that they can in no case have any thing to hope or fear from—We have protested against the African trade, but if we relax or rescind our resolutions on that subject, without a marine to protect our commerce there, and without either forts or factories on the coast, we can have no share of it—We cannot flatter ourselves that we shall be able to reduce either Nova-Scotia, Newfoundland, Canada, or the Floridas; and if Great-Britain be obliged at the close of the war to submit to the loss of thirteen colonies, it is natural to supposs she will exert herself to make the most of those which are left her—We neither have nor wish for possessions in the West-Indies—We formerly had a great and [Page]increasing trade there, but how much of it shall we retain as an in [...]ependent nation? If any part of the globe be de [...]endent on us for our produce it must be the W [...]st-Indies—Five years ago we rated our importance so high as to believe that from a suspension of trade with us, all the manufacturing towns in England would rise, or at least, clamor loudly in our favour, thro' the want of employment; that Ireland would be ruined only for the want of our flax-seed, and that the British West-Indies must perish by famine from the want of our productions—But the experience of six years ought certainly to correct such erroneous ideas of our own importance, or we must have been incorrigible even by experience itself—Not one manufacturing town in Great-Britain has complained for want of employ; Ireland has been supplied with flax-seed at as cheap, or cheaper rate than formerly, and has found sufficient markets for her linens—The West-Indies may have suffered but little diminution. These facts ought to convince us that the world is not so dependent on us, as we have imagined, and by pursuing our enquiries we shall find that we are as much, or more dependent on our neighbours than they are on us—I am not writing to one who declaims against luxury, without any conception of its effects, nor to one of those who talk a great deal about commerce, and of its benefits, or of its disservices [...]o a country, without having the least idea of its [Page]nature, or of the extent of its influence and power: I therefore may, without reasoning on the subject, venture to say that the pro [...] tions of the West-Indies are essentially necessary to us, and that we can do no better without their suga [...], coffee, cocoa. cotton, &c. &c. than [...]y without our flour, beef, lumber, &c. &c. Formerly as British subjects, we had the right of supplying the British Islands with whatever they wanted, and taking in exchange whatever they had to dispose of—We paid no more d [...]ies [...] our other fellow subjects paid, either upon importation or exportation—We had a right of carrying to the French, Dutch, and other foreign possessions in the West-Indies, all our productions, tobacco excepted, and of receiving in [...] change from them, whatever they could [...]ord, rum and a few other articles excepted—The articles we received from them were indeed subject to a certain duty on importation into America. But how was it then and how is it now with the French, Dutch, and other foreigners, as to our commerce with their West-India possessions: It is true we were admitted into their ports, but our flour was a prohibited article, and only admitted openly in times of scarcity. Many principal articles of our produce were in the same predicament: France, by prohibiting our flour into her Islands, shews that she was in no fear of their starving without supplies from us. But what articles of their produce were we permitted to [Page]purchase and export openly is exchange? Molasses, or the wretched liquor which they distilled from it, only; all others, such as coffee, cotton, sugar, indigo, &c. we brought away as by stealth, and by the purchased connivance of their officers—Has France bound herself by treaty to give us more freedom of trade with her Island [...] than formerly? By no means—We are to be treated as the most favoured nation is treated; and the subjects of the most favoured nation were never better treated than the manner I have described—This favorite article of my countrymen, mol [...]sses, the only one of any importance, which we were at liberty to import from the French Islands, was taken care of by Congress in their first proposals to France for a treaty. I saw the importance of it at that time, and flattered myself we had secured it, without any real sacrifice on our part, but Congress afterwards thought differently, and gave it up. We have not therefore, at this day, any security even for this single article—Every thing rests on the general and [...]ague terms of recipr [...]cally, and of being treated in the same way, and in the same manner, as any, even the most favoured nation shall be treated. But it may be said that the necess [...]ry in which the Islands must be for our produce, will at all times bring them to our terms, or at least to just and reasonable ones. Let us examine the subject attentively—The French islands can be under no necessity of taking from us flour, or salted previsions [Page]of any kind; on the contrary, it is the policy of France, to prohibit them from doing it, if so disposed; for by supplying her islands with flour of her own growth and manu [...]acture, and with all kinds of salted provisions purchased in Europe with her brandies, wines, &c. she encourages the agriculture and commerce of her subjects in Europe, which is a prime object with every wise nation; as to fresh provisions, her windward islands only can ever be in w [...]nt of them, and at most the demand is inconsiderable collectively, and the business of supplying never was in the best of times a profitable branch of commerce; Great-Britain in possession of Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas can from those colonies supply her islands with every thing they want, at as low or lower rate than we can; wheat, flour, pork, beef, horses, &c. have for many years since, and before the war, been cheaper in Canada than with us, and West-India goods of every kind have been dearer; Great-Britain therefore naturally must and will shut her ports against us as a foreign independent nation; her islands will want nothing from us which they cannot be supplied with from her own colonies in the continent, and those islands produce nothing which is not wanted either in Great-Britain or in those colonies; good policy must therefore lead her totally to exclude us from all trade with them. Our commerce in this most important branch of it must therefore be confined [Page]to the supplying the French, Dutch, and other foreign islands and settlements, with such articles as they will consent to t [...]ke from us, and receiving in return molasses (openly so long as they shall think proper to afford it to us free of duty) and such other productions as they may be pleased to connive at our smuggling.—Thus in Europe, we shall be either excluded from our ancient and certain markets, or a [...] least rivalled in them, and we shall have no certainty of new ones, nor any security against heavy duties and impositions in such, as we may be able to obtain.—New channels have been opened for supplying Great-Britain with the commodities we formerly furnished to that nation, and for consuming the manufactures we formerly took from her. It was the interest and policy of Great-Britain to promote our commerce and fisheries, whilst we were part of the empire; accordingly she encouraged our ship building by the purchase of our ships, or by giving them freights; but being independent, the reverse will become both her interest and policy towards us; her ports will be entirely shut against us in the West-Indies, for the reasons already given, and our commerce in that important branch confined, as I have shewn, to the furnishing the French, Dutch, and other foreign settlements, with such articles as they shall consent to receive, and under such conditions as they shall see fit to impose, and in return they will give us molasses, if they please, [Page]free of duty. But their sugar, coffee, cotton, &c. will ever remain prohibited articles so long as those nations are interested to make a monopoly of these articles in Europe, both on account of commerce and revenue, and it is impossible they can be interested to do otherwise; when France was in possession of Canada, Louisbourg, &c. the government did not permit those colonies to receive sugar, coffee, or any of the productions of those islands direct from them, but obliged those colonies to take them from France, charged with double freights, duties, &c. and can we expect that France will do for us what she ever refused to do for her own subjects? That she will grant us privileges which she never granted to any other nation? Can we expect that Great-Britain, resentful on account of her losses, and desirous of encouraging the colonies which may remain to her in America, and which will be able to supply her islands with every thing, can we expect that she will permit us to trade with those islands on any terms? It is repugnant to common sense to suppose it. Congress, you may remember spent some months in debate about the fisheries, they acted the parts of the hunters who quarrelled about the bearskin—for England in the mean time drove our Allies, as well as us, entirely out of them; nor can France regain any interest in the fisheries, but by the sacrifice of some advantage which she has, or may hereafter gain. But how are we to [Page]come in for any share in them? It will be to no purpose to plead that our local situation gives us a natural right to participate, and that we enjoyed that right from our first settlement, &c.— We enjoyed it is true, that right with many others, as subjects and part of the British empire, but we have separated from it and appealed to the sword; the sword has decided against us on that subject, and shall we at the peace have any thing to give or restore to Great-Britain, equal to the purchase of what that nation is almost as jealous of as Spain is of her mines? Will France after having regained a share in the fisheries for herself, go still further to obtain an interest in them for us? Look-into the treaty between us, and you will find that France and we acted a little like the hunters I have referred to, in our division of Newfoundland and the fisheries; but it was made on condition of a conquest of them by either or both of us; that failing, France is under no obligation to guaranty any part of them to us; and what puts the matter out of all question is, that it is not for their interest that America have any share in the fisheries. —Deprived of these, and of almost all the West-India trade, wholly excluded from that of Africa, as well as from the benefit of selling our iron, pot-ash, flax-seed, timber, naval stores, indigo, &c. advantageously in Great-Britain and Ireland, with few or no markets opened for those commodities, what resources [Page]will be left for our commerce? No nation is Europe will give a suitable price for our indigo, Ireland is supplied with flax seed and lumber from the North, at a lower rate than we can afford to sell them a [...]; Sweden and Russia can at all times undersell us, in the articles of iron, timber, ships, naval stores of every kind pot-ash, &c. The bounti [...]s on tar, turpentine, &c. being taken off, we cannot send those articles to Europe, without an insupportable loss, and we cannot expect that any nation (like England) will give us bounties on those articles. In taking a view of the West India commerce, I have said nothing in particular of the Spanish, Portuguese, or Danish settlements in America. I think you will agree with me, that as the two former have ever been, and most probably will remain shut against all strangers, nothing can be expected from thence, and that as to the latter, they are too inconsiderable to merit particular attention even were they not nearly in the same predicament, with those of France and Holland, which you know them in truth to be.

These external difficulties, appear to me to be of themselves insurmountable, but they are not all we shall have to encounter, if we should, contrary to all probability, continue independent—Without a marine force, our commerce will be every where exposed to imposition and insult, and we shall not probably be able to support a marine—In truth neither our friends, nor [Page]our foes, can wish to see us a maritime power, but there will arise at the peace, and in a state of independency, other embarrassments and burdens on our commerce. Our national debt, considering our ability will be immense, and we shall not easily agree in apportioning of it, to the several states. This, and a multitude of other causes for dispute, are so certain, and so likely to be productive, that it will be miraculous, if we can avoid a civil war with each othe [...], as soon as we shall be f [...]ed from foreign enemies. Heavy taxes must at least be laid to pay even the interest of our public debts in the exhausted state in which the pe [...]ce will find us. We cannot think of lessening the principal until the continent shall have had some time to recover itself. But the interest of our public debt and the expences of government in each state will (though they must prove heavy) not be the whole of our burthens. The civil [...] Congress including the expences of their foreign ministers, consuls, &c. will exceed all our former expences, public and private, under our ancient government. Commerce therefore will necessarily become the subject of heavy taxes, because the landholders who are naturally jeal [...]s of commerce, and not the merchants will [...]redeminate in making our laws, and imposing our ta [...]es, a large share of the taxes must however fall on the landholder, which will oblige him to raise the price of his productions, and this with the [Page]taxes on trade, will encrease it to such a height, that we shall find no market in which we shall not be undersold by foreigners. You, who are perfectly acquainted with the disposition of those who form the Congress and the Assemblies of the several states, know that it is very far from being favourable to commerce; their views are so contracted, that they never have seen that agriculture and commerce mutually depend on, and support each other. The resolutions of Congress in almost every instance, demonstrate their ignorance of the principles and effects of commerce; the non-exportation agreement (for which I must blame myself as well as others) was a fatal measure; it laid the ax to the root of our commerce, and our agriculture fell with it; that resolution shews what extravagant ideas we then had of our importance, we flattered ourselves that by shutting our ports, we should distress Great-Britain and Ireland, and starve the West-Indies, so far as to effect our purposes, but the operation of that resolve well nigh starved our army, and the poorer people, and brought distress to the doors of every order; unhappily but too many of our leaders are still buoyed up with the same wild and groundless ideas, and when I hear men, reputed as the wisest and most enlightened of American patriots, advance that commerce is rather injurious, than beneficial and that it would be better to have foreigners who want our produce, to come [Page]and purchase it, than for us to carry it to them. That the whole attention of America as an independent nation, should be turned to agriculture, and the manufacturing of articles of the first necessity. When I hear such doctrines advanced, and by men whom America has been taught to look up to revere, and reviewing at the same time the other circumstances which I have touched on, I become doubtful, whether our commerce would not suffer as greatly from internal checks and embarrassments, as from external ones—but, my dear Friend, we are very far from the peaceable establishment of independency, so far, that I candidly tell you, that I think there is not any probability of its ever taking place, at least in our day. The nations of Europe, France excepted, are all of them against it, and none more so than Spain, France becomes every day more indifferent to it, but so long as we can be made their instruments for humbling Great Britain, Spain will temporize, and France will appear to be in earnest on the subject; we are certainly the cheapest instruments they can find to employ full one half of the forces of Great-Britain; forces, which if left at liberty to fall on their foreign possessions, would soon reduce them to the state they were in 1762. But how dearly do we pay for the services we are performing.

The Powers of Europe, hitherto neuter, appear at this time far from being indifferent to the fate [Page]of Great-Britain, should any of them take part with her, the war will assume a different appearance, and our sa [...]e will [...]ecom from that mome [...]t determined I think there is a probability of such an event t [...]king place soon, but my wish and prayer is for peace, and th [...]re-establishment of America in her [...]iginal rights. The present moment is unquestionably th [...] most important America has ever seen, we a [...]e now of more w [...]ght in the general scale than we can possibly expect to be hereafter, should th [...] Po [...] cr [...]f Europ once agree, on the term of p [...]c [...], our assent will hardly be asked, and we should [...]d it necessary to acquies [...]e in the terms imposed on us.—The present opportunity ought therefore to be improved; England it is true, has a formidable league at this time against her, but we find in ancient as well as modern times, that nations less able to resist, have been successful, against leagues still more formidable; I do not indeed recollect any one league, that ever came off victorious, over the single power leagued against. The cause is in the nature of men, and nations; it must therefore still exist in a certain degree, and I know not why it should not even in its full force. You will call this a political letter, against which we have often protested, I intended it only as a commercial one, but I could not examine the future probable state of our commerce under independency, without [...], I have [...]ed you so effectually [Page]by this time, that I will take my leave without ceremony; it is now to beg that you will make my most respectful compliments to Mrs. Morris, and to assure you that I am ever with the most sincere esteem and attachment,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient, and very humble servant, S DEANE.

Hon. Robert Morris, Esq Philadelphia.

§

Paris, 13th June, 1781.

Dear Sir,

THE appointment of an Ambassador to the Empress of Russia, has led me to make some serious reflections on the idea which Congress entertain of their own importance in the commercial and political world; they appear to be persuaded that every nation in Europe, England excepted, are interested to have us independent, and though they have been told the contrary by every Power they have applied to except France, yet the flattering delusion continues, and a Minister Extraordinary has been sent to Russia. The fact is, that there is not one Power in Europe, except France, interested in having us independent, and by much the greater part are interested against us; the Emperor of Germany, and King of Prussia, not [Page]being commercial Powers, can be very little affected either way; Holland, and all the Northern Powers, a [...] naturally interested against us; their productions and ours, are the same in every article, indigo and ri [...]e only excepted; Russia raises tobacco for its own consumption, and begins to export large quantitie, to its neighbours; the two great sources of he Dutch wealth, are their fisheries and their freights for othe [...] nations, in both these America must soon interfere with them; the Ne [...] Englanders began to rival them in th [...]se branch [...]s of busines before the war; if we l [...]k [...]outhward, Portugal owes its existence [...] an independent [...] to England; were [...]ngland once so [...] as to receive the law from France and Spain, Portugal would instantly become annex [...]d to the latter; the wealth [...]f Spain lies in its Islands in the West Indies, and in its provinces on the continent; can Spain wish to see a mighty independent empire of confederate Republics, established in the neighbourhood of all its treasures? It is to the lest degree absurd to suppose that Court can be so blind to the consequences which must soon result from such an event; whilst we continue dependent on Great Britain, and under its controul, Spain will have nothing to dread so long as it continues to be on good terms with the Court of London, and the European connections and alliances of Spain, will serve to prevent that Court from wantonly breaking with Spain; but [Page]North-America freed from all European controul, will be at liberty to break with Spain at any time, without disturbing the peace of Europe, or interesting any of its powers in the quarrel; the family connection between the Courts of France and Spain, and the desire of revenge for her former losses, have led Spain into a war, but it is evident that the Court of Spain, will not on any considerations make the war a common cause with us.—America out of the question, Great Britain is greatly superior to France and Spain united; this France and Spain are sensible of, and therefore give us good words and encourage us on, that England may be weakened by our expence; France has acted openly it is true, but the assistance afforded us from time to time has been calculated, not to drive the British forces from the continent, but to keep us from accommodating, and to employ their enemy with us. Spain has given us a trisling aid in money, but in the most secret manner, more like a bribe than a subsidy. The other Southern Powers, are not in any respect interested in our dependence or independence, but are perfectly indifferent as to either, nor if they should interest themselves would it be of the least consequence. But you may say, France having valuable possessions in the West-Indies, ought on the general principle which I have advanced, to fear the consequences of our independence.—Not at all.—The possessions of [Page]France from their being islands, can have nothing to apprehend from the independent sovereignty of the United States.— France will at all times have a fleet sufficient to protect them, and it can never be our interest to have any other concern with them than in the way of commerce—but our position with respect to Spain is different—Nothing but a river will separate us, and the contrariety of our dispositions, manners, and habits are such, that it is impossible, if left to ourselves, that we should live for any time in peace with each other.— Congress to induce Spain to declare and to act openly, have offered to cede the two Floridas— It is really no great act of generosity to offer what is not our's, but suppose Spain accepts and gets possession of them we shall thereby become still nearer our neighbours, and quarrel so much the sooner—Spain is not however, or appears not to be contented with this offer, insinuates that Louisiana ought to be thrown into the scale—on condition of her guaranting our independence. It is but too probable, that Congress will not even refuse this, if they are persuaded that their independent sovereignty cannot be established on easier terms But no man of sense and knowledge in these affairs, can imagine that Spain is scrious in this demand, or that, that court means any thing else, by it than to gain time—Spain cannot be ignorant that from the day in which we become peaceably established in Independent Sovereignty, she must [Page]look forward to the loss of all her southern provinces as an event certain, and not very distant; and she must know, that though she obtain Louisiania, yet the Allegany, or western mountains, will be as insufficient a barrier between us, as the river Missisippi—I must tell you, that our Independence is spoke of in a very different style here, from what it was three years since, it is not viewed here in the light in which Congress speak of it, when they say it is as fixt as fate (or if they mean any thing) as certain as those eternallaws of nature which Omnipotence itself cannot alter; on the contrary, it is considered by every sensible man here, as not only doubtfull, but the probability greatly against us: The consequences of American Independence are also estimated very disterent from what they were formerly in France—Experience has shewn, that our attachment to the English manners, customs, and to their manufactures, is such, that if Independent and at liberty to trade where we please, England will have the preference; almost every American who arrives in France is impatient to get over to England, and the severe laws you are passing on that subject, may prevent their ever returning to America, during the war at least; but it will not prevent their going over—The laws ordering confiscation, &c. demonstrate more fully than any direct language is capable of, the predilection of Americans for England. France, though at war with England, permits her subjects to go to London openly and when [Page]they please, they taking out passports, and not a week passes but some of the citizens of Paris go over to London, and there are now more than four times the English goods consumed in this city, than there were before the war; the better sort of people here, both at court and in the city, are now become mad, as I may say, after every thing that is English, and even the ribbons worn by the ladies at court, are, in a great part, from English loems.

I have been told that Mons. Luzern remonstrated to Congress against our trading with England, or purchasing and importing its manufactures, and that those laws have passed in compliance with his remonstrances and requests; I am unwilling to believe it, for if true, we are become, and that voluntarily, greater slaves to France than its own subjects are. On whatever ground the laws have been passed, I venture to predict that not any one good effect will be produced by them, but the contrary—A little time will shew what success Mr. Dana meets with at Russia, but if he meets with any at all, I am greatly mistaken—I know of no Power in Europe, Portugal only excepted, that is naturally and necessarily more in the English interest than Russia—I hear that your spirits were greatly raised on hearing of the declaration of England against Holland; I expected it would be the case, though every thing considered there is not the least ground for encouragement from that event, but the contrary—It is now more than [Page]four months since England commenced hostilities, yet the Dutch have made no reprisals, nor are they prepared to make any at this time. Nearly one half of the Republic are violently against a war with England on any considerations whatever—The views of England in declaring were to exclude Holland from the armed neutrality, to dissolve at once a confederacy, which at best, could not have lasted any time, and to deprive France and Spain of their naval supplies, furnished by the Dutch, and the French Islands of provisions, by the same channels—The purpose has been effected—Russia offers to mediate, but refuses to take part with Holland; Denmark has in effect long since deserted the confederation, and the armed neutrality, on which I never built any hopes, is come to nothing.

Before the arrival of Mr. Laurens, jun. France gave Dr. Franklin six millions of livres for the current year, it has since added four more, and as it is said has engaged to be our security for 10 millions of livres in Holland, if to be borrowed at four per cent. You will be told therefore of 20 millions, and may possibly receive that sum, but will that do more than prolong the war another year? Without a fleet superior to that of England, nothing can be done to any purpose, as to finishing the war. I wish I could give you a more favourable account of affairs here, and such as you wish to receive and credit, but I cannot do it consistent with truth, and though you are certainly misinformed [Page]as to the face of affairs in Europe by men who are either ignorant of them, and who are resolved at all hazards to write what they know you wish to believe, yet this will not justify my doing the same. In a word, my friend, nothing short of peace can save our country from ruin and slavery, and whatever you may think in America, I am convinced that the terms offered by Great-Britain afforded a good room to open a treaty on, and ought not to be rejected. This will not perhaps be a popular doctrine at present, but it must be sooner or later— for me, I have freely opened my mind to you, and though you may differ in sentiment you will not, I trust, condemn the motive for my having done it. I have long since had my accounts ready for settlement, and have been waiting here for six months past, on heavy expence, unable to get them audited, Mr. Johnson, nominated by Congress, as auditor, refused from the first to act, and Congress have not named any other, thus I am kept out of my money in a cruel and most unprecedented manner, but I will not add on the subject at this time. My compliments to all friends, and be assured that I am with much respect and friendship

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient, And very humble Servant, SILAS DEANE.

To Jeremiah Wadsworth, Hartford, Connecticut.

§

[Page]

Paris, 14th May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE not had the pleasure of any letters from you since my leaving America, so that though I have written several, am uncertain of any of them coming to your hand, you doubtless must be as desirous to know the true state of affairs on this side the water, as I am to know how things really are on yours,—the few letters I have received have been too short, and written with too much caution to give me the information I wish for, and the Americans who arrive run into such extremes that I know not what to depend on. But a few weeks before the news of the defeat of Gen. Gates in Carolina, we were told by Mr. Searle, who arrived directly from Philadelphia, that the British were shut up, and in a manner besieged in Charlestown, that General Washington's army consisted of more than 20,000 men, &c. others gave an account very different: In short, nothing can be more contradictory than the accounts given by the different persons, who arrive in France, of the state of affairs in America. I wish you could find time and a safe opportunity to send me the truth, and the whole truth; I assure you it would be of service, and tend to prevent the mischiefs which flow from false and exaggerated accounts transmitted from America, and which are repaid with interest in the account sent back to you of the state of affairs in Europe. The writers and [Page]relaters of false accounts on both sides the water, have done us infinite mischief. The war itself was occasioned at first more by them than by any other, or perhaps every other cause taken together, and the continuance of it has been equally owing to them; and in the beginning of the contest, the friends of the British ministry in America assured them, that America would not persevere in its opposition, and our agents and correspondents in London encouraged us, by assuring us that the majority of the nation was in our favour, that government would not go to extremities, that Parliament would, and must recede, for that the nation was unable to make war, and to support it for any time; thus false representations on both sides laid the foundation for the scenes which succeeded, and in which we are still involved, and a continuation of the same kind of wrong and groundless information has kept up the action of this great tragedy of errors. You have found so many of the accounts transmitted you from Europe to have been groundless, and so many of the flattering encouragements and promises made you, disappear and vanish into air their original composition, that I presume you would now bear to hear the truth at large, if I dared to send it you, and though it is hardly safe for me to do it, I dare not send you any thing else—Great-Britain is neither exhausted nor dispirited as you have been taught to believe, the Parliament appear more unanimous [Page]and resolved in the prosecution of the war, than at any former period, and the warmest opposers of the Minister's unite with him in refusing to accede to the Independence of America. The British fleet is evidently superior at sea to that of our ally, and the former are preparing to augment it by more than thirty new ships of the line, and near forty frigates, actually on the stocks—The late subscription to the new loan, shews that money is not wanted though the national debt is become immense; this is their fituation—The state of our friends has been as greatly misrepresented in America, as that of our enemies—I will not enter into particulars but I think you cannot rely on either men or ships from hence, untill very late in this season if at all—Mons. de Grasse has sailed with about twenty sail of the line for the West-Indies, from whence, it is said, he is ordered to America, but as Admiral Rodney has a fleet nearly equal in force, in the Islands, I see no prospect of any thing decisive should such a manoeuvre be made, and should it take place, the French fleet cannot be with you before August, or later, and in these seas the maritime force of contending powers appear too nearly balanced to expect any thing of importance from them this Summer—I am fully of opinion however, that England enters on this campaign with greater advantage, than it has began any one since France joined in the war, and if they succeed in bringing [Page]the Emperor of Germany to interpose in their favour, I think the balance will be decidedly on their side. This will be known in a very short time, possibly before I send on this letter— Our first object of the war was the repeal of those acts of Parliament which were injurious to our rights and privileges; before this repeal was obtained we were forced to declare Independency, and solicit an alliance with France, the hereditary enemy of England—By a fortunate turn of our affairs, France was brought into an alliance with us, and to guarranty our Independence, just at this time the Parliament of England repealed the obnoxious acts; this changed entirely the object of the war on our part as well as on that of England; it was no longer for the redress of grievances, but for sovereignty that we fought; at the time in which France came into a treaty of alliance with us, their object was to separate America forever from England, and thereby to weaken effectually, a power which for centuries past, had given them more uneasiness and stood more in their way than any other power in Europe, from appearances they judged that by a sudden declaration and vigorous exertions the point would be gained, in a very short time, and at little expence, either of men or money; that England would be brought to consent to the independence of America, after which every thing else would follow of course, and in its proper time, but the first stroke failed, the favourable [Page]moment was lost, and all the preparations which had been made for improving it, served only to shew England the danger it had been in, and to rouse the spirit of the nation to make the most vigorous exertions. From this period the object of the war became almost as much changed with France, as it had before been changed in America; at first, it was by a sudden stroke to force England to acknowledge our independence and separation from their empire, which being done, peace must have followed, and time will have soon effected the rest; but this failing, the original object was changed, or rather it was thought best to obtain it, by taking a different line of conduct. England was loaded with debt, and was violently agitated by parties, the opposition to Ministers in Parliament and out, was formidable, and it appeared more so than it really was, from the English freedom of speech in Parliament, and of publications out of it; America was not perfectly unanimous in any of its measures, except [...]n the support generally of their independency, in this they appeared sufficiently unanimous, to prevent any fear of them falling off or accommodating. Therefore what could not be gained in one way, was to be attempted in another; the [...]eakening of England was the primary and constant object, but the means for doing this were changed; it was as I have already said [...] to be don [...] by our being immediately established independency, and the [Page]consequences which time would naturally produce, would effect every thing desired; but this failing through the same ostensible object, that of our independence has been held up to view, yet measures so very different have been pursued, that their first object, so far as it respects us, has become entirely changed, and the plan now is so far as we can judge by appearances, to weaken England by spinning out the war, and of employing of us against them; and after England is reduced by th [...] means, our independence may possibly be established.—I need not point out to a ma [...] of your superior penetration the fatal mischiefs, with which such a system is pregnant.— Whilst England is at war with France and Spain united, we are left with more than one half of its land forces, and a considerable part of its marine on us; we may struggle hard and behave manfully, but must be continually losing ground and strength, whilst (France) our Ally with Spain, may possibly hold a balance to the rest, without any material injury to themselves, tho' the fact is they have not done even this hitherto. But supposing that England in consequence of such a system, should in two or three years be reduced to receive the law from France and Spain, in what situation must America by that time be? And to what Power can we look for relief, if France or Spain, or both, should offer to dictate the laws to us? Though this may not be the case, yet nothing is more evident than [Page]that he present object of France and Spain, is to employ, and waste the forces of Britain at the expence of America; evident as this must be to every one who impartially reviews the past, and compares it with the present, we are unwilling to see or believe it, and are prevented from the examination by fair promises, generous professions, and just so much and no more assistance as will serve to keep us from sinking at once, or flying off to the other side — In the mean time you must observe that Spain has from the first refused to know any thing of us, thereby holding it in its power to declare for or against us, or to insist on any conditions [...]atever, as interest may dictate, whilst America is bound by a secret article of the treaty of Paris of Feb. 6, 1778, to make a similar one with Spain whenever required, ye [...] though this article was obtained from the American commissioners at the signing of the treaty at Paris, and though Spain has been now for two years engaged in the war, yet that Court still refuses to acknowledge us, or to receive our ambassador, though the Presi [...]ent of Congress—I will not enter further on the important, and to me painful subject—I have already said enough to a man of your penetration and judgment, and have no need to go into a particular and minute discussion, I will therefore finish my letter on more private matters; you must recollect the many and long conversations we have had, on [Page]the subject of a settlement on the Mississippi, near the Illinois, or on some other part of hat fertile western country, when I left America I intended to have made some attempt a least, to interest some gentlemen in Europe i [...] the scheme, but the unfavourable appearance of American affairs, and the uncertainty how the war may terminate, have prevented me from saying any thing on the subject.—I have not however lost sight of it, and if you continue in the same sentiments as form [...]rly, it will be well to turn your though [...]s that way. — I can see no prospect of our being so happy, or of doing something to repair the injuries, we have done ourselves and families in point of fortune any where as by such an establishment.—If we return to our dependence on Great-Britain, it will not probably be with unanimity and parties, animosities and bickerings between the different Governments, and even between individuals, will probably exist longer than we shall, and render the remainder of our lives disagreeable:—On the other ha [...]d, if ou [...] independence is established, the jarring interests of the different States, will be such, and so many grounds for disputes are already laid, that we shall be happy even to escape for any time the going into a civil war among ourselves, by retiring west, a [...]d which we may [...]d, let the event of the war turn either way, we may escape those disagreeable scenes, which await our country, and enjoy more satisfaction, as we [...] find our account much better, in settling [Page]a new colony, than in mixing in the feuds and factions of old ones; if indeed the report is true, that Congres have offered to cede Louisi [...]nia, and the navigation of [...]e Mississippi exclusively to Spain, I confess I know not how this can be done, if th [...]y accept of it, and America becomes ind [...]pendent in such cruel terms, but I can hardly conceive it possible that such an idea could have entered the head, of the weakest and maddest of our politicians.—I cannot expect that you can have leisure to send me any digested plan, on this subject, but I pray you not to be sparing of gener [...]l hints, of the grounds and principles on which you would wish to have one formed, and when you write send duplicates, that some one may reach me, address your letter under cover, to Dr. Franklin, who will know where to forward them.—I have nearly finished a third sheet, and have not the courage to enter on a fourth, though in writing to you, I enjoy in some degree the pleasure of conversing with you, of which you know I am not easily tired;—but I shall write again in a few days, and in the mean time wishing you all which one friend can wish or desire for another, I am most sincerely,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient, and very humble servant, SILAS DEANE.

Samuel H. Parsons, Esq Brigadier General in the Service of the United States, America.

§

[Page]

Dear Sir,

Paris, June 1, 1781.

THE famous Abbe Raynall has published a new edition of his Histoire Philosophique & Politique. The Parliament of Paris have condemned the book to be torn and burnt, his person to be seized, and his estate confiscated. The Abbe, however, had timely notice, and has fled. The Book is at present both scarce and dear, or I would send it to you. The liberties which the Abbe has taken with the Christian Religion, and with the political manoeuvres of France, have caused his persecution. I am of opinion that the latter has been the principal, for it is well known that no country in Europe abounds more in Deists and Deistical writers than this— As you must be anxious to know the sentiments of this celebrated and eloquent writer with respect to the American revolution, I have made a few extract, and would gladly oblige you with more if I had time, but having only borrowed the books, I must return them as soon as read, speaking of our revolution he says. ¹ ‘De [Page]toures les causes energiques que produiserent tant des revolutions, sur la Globe, aucune n'existoit dans le Nord de l'Amerique, ni la religion, ni les lois n'y avoient etè outragiés, les sang des Martyrs, ou des citoyens, n'y avoit pas ruissetè sur des echauffauds, on n'y avoit pas insulté aux meurs, les manieres, les usages, aucun des objects cher au peuples, n'y avoient eté livrès au ridicule, le pouvoir arbitraire n'y avoit arraché aucun habitant du seine de sa famille, ou de ses amis, pour les hainer dans les horreurs du'n cachet, l'ordre publique n'y avoit pas eté invertí, les principes d'administration, n'y avoient pas changé & les maximes du government [...]y etoient toujours restées le meme. Tout se reduissoit, [Page]a scavoir, si la metropole avoit, ou n'av [...]it pas le droit de mettre directment ou indirectment un leger impot sur les colonies, car les gri [...]fs accumulées dans le manifeste n'eurent de valeur, car par ce premier grief, cette question presque metaphysique, n'etoit guerre propre, a soulever une multitude, ou du moins a l'intereser fortment a une querelle, pour laquelle, elle voyoit ses terres privées des bras destinés a les seconder, ses maissons ravagées, ses campagnes couvertes de cadavres, de ses proches, ou teints de son propre sang.’ On the Tender Act, he says, ² ‘Est ce que a corps (Congress) ignoroit qu'on ne commande pas plus aux esprits, qu'aux sentiments? est ce qu'il ne sentoit pas, que dans le crise presente, tout citoyen raisonable craindroit decommetre sa fortune? est ce qu'il ne s'appercevoit pas qu'a l'origine d'une republique, il sa permettoit, des actes d'un despotisme inconnu dans les règions meme faconnèes a la servitude!’ On our alliance with France, and the transactions of that time, [Page]he says, ³ ‘On rapproche aux conseils du [Page]Louis seize, d'avoir blessé la Majesté de l [...] premier puissance de Globe, en désavouant a la face de l [...]univers des secours, qu'on ne cesseit de donnor, clandestinement aux Americaines, on leur rapproche-d'avoir par une intrígue des Ministres, our par l'ascendant de quelque Agens obs [...]ures, engagée l'etat dans un guerre déssess [...]reux tandis qu'ill falloit s'occupe [...] a remonter les ress [...]rts du g [...] vernment, à gu [...]rir les longues plaies d'un regne dont toute le derniere moitié avoit eté vile and soible, partagée entre les dépredations, & la honte, entre la bassasse du vice & les convulsions du despotisme. On leur rapproche d'avoir provoqué les combats par une politique insiduese, de s'etre enveloppés [Page]dans des discours, indignes de la France, d'avoir, employe, avec Angleterre, le langage d'un audace timide qui semble dementir les projets qu'on a fermée, les sentimens qu'on a dans sa coeur, langage qui [...] p [...]u [...] quà viler celui qu [...] s'en sert, sans p [...]uvoir tromper celui a qui on l'addresse, & qui déshonore, sans que ce dishoneur mème puise etre utile, ni au ministre, [...] a l'etat, pourquoi demande t'on encore, pourquoi des hommes, qui ont e [...]tre les mains, tout la puissance de l'et [...], & qui pour etre obëis, n'ont quà commander, se sont ils laisses prevenir, sur toutes les mers pa [...] un enemi, dont la constitution entraíne des lenteurs necessaires? Pourquoi s'etre mis par un traité inconsideré dans les fers du Congress qu'on auroit tenu lui meme dans la dependance par des subsides abondans & [...]gles. L'Europe qui a les yeux fixés sur nous, voit un grand dessein & nul [...]e demarches concertier, voit dans nos Arseneaux, & sur nos ports preparatifs immense, & nulle execution, voit des flottes menacantes, & cet appareil rendu presque inutile, l'audace & la valeur, dans les particuliers, la molesse, & l'irresolutíon dans les chefs, rout ce qui annonce d'un coté la force, & la pouvoir important d'un grand peuple, tout ce qui annonce de l'autre, la foiblesse & la lenteur qui tiennent au charactére & aux vuës, c'est par cette contradiction frappante [Page]entre nos projets & nos demarches, entre nos movens, & l'esprit qui les empl [...]ië, que le genie Angl [...]is, un moment eto [...]né, a repris sa viguer & jusqu'a present [...]'est une probléme a sa resaudre pour l'Europe▪ si en nous declarant pour l'Amerique nons n'avons pas nous méme relevé les force de l'Angleterre.’—Speaking of the motives of France in the treaty with us, he says, ⁴ ‘E [...]fin la philosophie, dont le premier sen [...]im [...]nt est [...] desir de voi tous les governments justes, & tout les peuples, heureux, en portant un coup d'oeil sur cette alliance d'une monarchie, avec un people qui défend sa liberté, en cherche le motif, elle voit trop, q [...]e la bonbeur de l'humanité n'y a point de part, e [...]e [...]ense que, s [...] l' [...]mour de la justice, eut [...]ec [...]dé la cour de Versailles, elle auroit a retté dans le premier article de sa convention ave [...] l'Amerique que tous les peuples opprimés avoint le droit de s'elever contre leurs oppresseurs.’ Speaking of the refusal on the [Page]part of Great-Britain, to accept of the mediation of Spain, on terms which would at least have tacitly acknowledged our independence in fact, though not in right, he says, ⁵ ‘Si don [...] on me demandoit quel, est le nom, qu'on donnera dans quelques anneés a la fermeté que les Anglois ont montré, dans ce moment, je repondroi [...] que je l'ignore; quant a celui qu'elle merite, je le sais; je sais que les annales du monde ne nous offrent que rarement, l'aguste & majesteux spectacle d'une nation qui aime mieux renoncer a sa dureé qu'a sa gloire.’ With respect to the continuation of the confederacy against England he queries, ⁶ ‘Est il possible [Page]qu'une union etroite, puisse longtems subsister entre des confedereés d'un caractere aussi opposé que le François, emporté, dedaigneux & leger; l'Espagnol, lent, hautain, jaloux & froid: l'Amerique qui tient secretement ses regard tournés vers sa mere patrie, & qui se rejouiroit des devastres de ses allies, s'ils etoient compatibles avec son independance? Ces nations, soit qu'elles agissent en [Page]concert, soit qu'elles s'agissent separament tarderont elles à s'ente accuser, a se plaindre, & a se brouillon? L'Histo [...]e nous apprend encore, que peu de ligues, se sont partagies les depouilles, de la nation entre la quelle elles se sont formies Athenes, victorieuse de la Perse, Rome sauveé d'Anibal: dans les tems modernes, Venise echappeé a la fameux ligue de Cambrai, & de nos jours mëme, la Prusse, qui par la genie d'un homme a soutenir tête a l'Europe, ont droit de suspendre notre jugement sur l'issue de la guerre presente. Enfin si l'on considere l'esprit de la nation Françoise opposé a celui de la nation qu'elle combat, on verra que l'ardeur du François, est peutetre egalement prompte á s'allumer & à s'eteindre; qu'il espere tout lors qu'il commence qu'il desespire de tout des qu'il est arrèté par un obstacle, que par son caractere il a besoin de l'enthusiasme des succêss, pour obtenir des succêss nouveaux; que l'Anglois au contraire, même presumptueux d'abord, malgré sa hardiésse naturelle, sait, quand il le feut, battre avec courage, s'eléver avec le danger & s'affermir par la disgrace; semblable a ce chene robuste auquel Horace compare l [...]s Romains, qui frappé par la häche & mutilé par le fer, renoit sous les coups, qu'on le porte, & tire une vigeur nouvelle, de ses blessures méme.’ He then considers the part which other European Powers [Page]take, and says, ⁷ ‘C'est peutêtre beaucoup que les nations ne l'oient pas encore traversié dans ses projets contre l'Angleterre. Le resentiment que les injustices, & les hauteurs, de cette Isle superbe, ont inspiré par tout, doit etre la cause, de cette inaction mais la haine l'ai, lorsque l'interest montre, il est possible que l'Europe juge contraire, a sa suretè, l'afroible ferment de la Grande Bretagne dans l'ancien & le nouvelle hemisphére, & qu'aprés a voir joui des humiliations & des dangers, de cette puissance orguelleuse & tyrannique elle prunne ensin les armes pour la defendre.’ He enquires what will be the true interest of France and Spain with respect to America, if victorious, and gives it as his opinion that it will be their best policy to have us divided, not between them, but between ourselves and England; but I am tired with giving you extracts, the above are sufficient for a sample of the sentiments of this eloquent and popular [Page]Author. He is perhaps the most popular writer of the day in France, and his exile will most probably encrease his popularity here and indeed in all Europe. As you understand French, I have preferred the sending you the Author's own words to any translation of mine, and have already made this letter too long to add any thing more than my compliments to Mrs. Thompson, and sincere wishes for your mutual happiness.— I am with most sincere respect and attachment,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient, And very humble Servant, SILAS DEANE.

To Charles Thompson, Esq Secretary to the Congress.

§

Paris, May 16th, 1781.

My dear Brother,

I EXPECT by the time you receive this, you will hear me announced from letters, written by certain Americans on this side the water, as an enemy to my country; though I do not imagine you will credit such reports, yet I am persuaded you interest yourself so much in what concerns me, that you will be glad to know what gave rise to them.—Too many of the Americans who arrive in France, bring with them all [Page]that spirit and rage, and of party by which they were actuated at home, they think, or pretend to think, that the only way to serve America, and at the same time to make their Court here, is to represent the situation of our affairs totally different from what it really is. In August last I arrived here; Mr. Searle soon after me, that gentleman asserted that the British were shut up in Charlestown, so that he said ‘not a soldier dared to venture out far enough to shoot a bird.’ That General Washington's army consisted of more than 20,000 effective men well supplied, that so far from wanting recruits, men pressed for to enlist, that America was in no way anxious for peace, but on the contrary wished the war might be continued until England should be humbled, if not ruined, ‘until (said he) that old Lion's claws shall be out, and his teeth all drawn.’ When any one doubted of these and such like extravagant assertions, he was sure to be answered with a most important air, ‘You must pardon me Sir, but I do know, for I am a Member of Congress, the only one that ever was in Europe in that quality, and I think I must know better than any other, having been Chairman of most of their Committees.’—Those who from their personal knowledge were able to bring facts as well as circumstances directly in contradiction to his assertions, were sure to be represented as Tories, unfriendly, or as enemies to America, though [Page]events too notorious to be concealed, and the representations of Congress of the State of America fally contradicted his assertions, yet all si [...]nified nothing; the man who ventured to question the policy or rectitude of any measure of Congress, who would not agree that America was able alone to support the war, that Great Britain was exhausted, and become as weak as she was wicked, that commerce had done us the most essential mischief; that merchants, that is American merchants, who he declared to be in general, mere pitifull speculators and undeserving of the name of merchants, had by their trade, done u [...] such injury that it would have been well for America had they long since been exti [...]pated—That the goods sent out by France had been worse for us, than if in their room, forty thousand Russians had been sent to fight against us—The man who would not assent to these and such like mad assertions, but ventured to contradict them, was sure to be noted down as unfriendly at least, if not an enemy to his country, and thus I was entered on his black list—You will hardly believe it possible that any man without being perfectly mad, could be capable of talking in such a manner, yet many, as well as myself, can assure you that this was the common stile of his conversation; that he often went beyond any thing I have told you of, and what will equally surprize you is, that there were at Paris, Americans who joined him and [Page]acted as his echo; you well know that I am so incapable of acting a tame, equivocal part, that I do not always act even a cautious one; I did every thing in my power to discountenance this mad rant; this drew on me the ill will of several of my countrymen, whose good opinions I wished to have in preference, tho' too indifferent as to either, to step aside from the line of truth and candor to ga [...]n the latter or to avoid the former—I have said here (what is acknowledged even by Frenchmen, and ought by this time to be known in America) that Great-Britain is not an exhausted, contemptible kingdom, but on the contrary, that they possess a greater share of energy and vigor, and are capable of making greater exertions than any nation in the world besides—Was it criminal to say what all Europe acknowledges with surprize and admiration to be the case?—Was, or is it high treason, to call in question the perfect wisdom and rectitude of any of the measures of Congress?—or to withhold one's ass [...]nt to assertions, declaring that Congress never were at any period, so respectable both at home and abroad, as at this time, that they never possessed the confidence of the people at large, in so perfect a degree, as at present; and that America had never been at any time more unanimous or in better circumstances? By Mr. Searle, and some others, it has been deemed criminal next to high treason, not to go those lengths; indeed one would imagine that he carried [Page]it still higher, for speaking one day at table (a French gentleman who understood English, being present) on American affairs, and the Americans then in Europe, he exclaimed, that he wished to God every American in France might be instantly hanged, and that he would be content to suffer among them, could that be effected, since by that means a better set would be introduced.

I should not trouble you with these expressions, which you can consider in no other light, than the ravings of madness, were it not that this gentleman, has been seconded and supported in this stile, by some Americans here, though I know of no one of them who has gone by any means so far; what idea must foreigners have of us, and of our councils, when they hear a man who boasts on all occasions of being a member of Congress, and to have had a prin [...]ipal share in all our public measures, talk at such a rate? you can easily conceive and without my proceeding to reci [...]e instances of nearly the same nature, which I could easily do, sufficient to fill a large volume, whence has arisen one of the principal causes, of our national character and credi [...]'s having sunk so very low within these three years past.

Though this letter, and others I have lately written contain my opinion of our affairs, and of the state as well as of the views of the Powers in Europe, with which we have any concern, yet I have on no occasion ventured to make it public [Page]in Europe, but have most cautiously avoided giving of it, even in private conversation. I consider the people of America, to be [...]ill too violently agitated, to listen to any thing which appears to contradict their favouri [...]e wish; they have been taught to believe, that their happiness and that of their posterity, is inseparably connected with independency, or rather with their own Sovereignty. The generous and noble enthusiasm, which first inspired them, to oppose acts and claims, injurious to our rights and privileges has been kept up after the claims and acts have ceased to exist, and its force turned to the support of independent sovereignty, a claim never heard of on our part, until since the year 1775. Yet I cannot in justice to myself and friends conceal from them my sentiments on the important subject, nor the dangers which to me appear at the door. It is the interest of each of the contending parties to make peace as soon as possible, and nothing at this time prevents, but our claim of independent Sovereignty, which France by treaty is bound to support. If we consent with an accommodation with England, the great obstacle will be removed, if we do not, it is probable that the war will become more general, and it is not difficult to foresee where we shall land, and in what condition in the general storm; have we not by sending ambassadors to almost every Court in Europe, h [...]d an opportunity of trying the disposition of the several courts [Page]towards us? Not one of them except Dr. Franklin has been received, the others after an enormous and foolish expence, have returned or are still waiting with their credentials in their hands, at some Minister's door, undistinguished among the crowd of suppliants.—Our submitting to this, continuing to solicit under such mortif [...]ing treatment, and our appointing an ambassador to Russia, after having been refused audience, almost every where else in Europe, but ill agrees with the character of independent sovereignty. The spirit and manlike boldness, with which we asserted our rights, and ventured singly to oppose Great-Britain in the defence of them, drew the attention of all Europe, and raised our character high, and the very name of an American became respectable, but the turn which our affairs have taken since the year 1778, owing to the management of them by men intexicated with the ideas of sovereignty, and the flattering prospect of becoming ambassadors, envoys, &c. thus reversed the scene, and convinced the world at large, how unequal our gentlemen in Congress, are to the task of Sovereigns, and of great statesmen.—Emoluments have had their weight with these men, the Secretaryship to an embassy, has not been thought below their acceptance, especially as a salary of 1000l. sterling, per annum, was attached to it.

The salaries to the different boards, though by no means extravagant, have been tempting [Page]objects to many, and the civil list of Congress, which has been as rapidly encreasing, as that of France has been diminishing, under the hands of its present minister of finances, held out hopes at least to all. It is no way surprizing that men in possession, or in expectation of sovereignty, or its emoluments, should labour incessantly to persuade America that its peace, liberty and safety cannot be secure but under an independent democratical government, the men of this character form a numerous body, and they "labour faithfully in their v [...]cations." It is to no purpose that the experience of all ages and nati [...]ns of the world contradict the doctrine which they advance, but few read the history of past ages, and still fewer reflect on what they have read, and on what the present time offers to their most serious consideration; if we were contending only for momentary peace, safety and liberty, or only for the enjoyment of them for the present age, with the offers made us, we must be more than madmen to continue the contest, but the professed object and the only one that can in any degree justify a prosecution of the war, is the security of those blessings to the latest posterity; will an independent democratical government secure them better than any other? In the examination of the question, some regard ought to be paid to what has passed in the world, and we ought to inquire if any country ever was, for any time, even for one century at [Page]peace, free and happy under a democracy? for myself I confess, I have never heard, or read of such a country either antient or modern; all the antient republics were aristocratical is a greater or less degree, the modern ones are the same, and the moment that the democracy in any state breaks down or subjected the aristocracy, every thing has ever gone to confusion— peace, liberty and safety have all been lost in the distractions of democracy, which in a very short time has prepared the way to absolute monarchy—but possibly America has produced a race of men more simple, virtuous, and patriotic, than any part of the world has hitherto been blessed with: If we are sure of this we have some grounds for making the experiment, if what has failed in every other instance; but if in fact we find ourselves agitated, and led by the same passions, as the rest of mankind have ever been, we ought to pause and weigh seriously whether in future, we shall be blessed for having sixed the peace, liberty, and safety of America on a sure basis, or on the contrary, be execrated for having destroyed the very basis and foundation of good order and government, and entail [...]d on posterity all the miseries, which anarchy o [...] despotism can inflict. It will perhaps be said, that the nations which have been so convulsed and distracted by Democracy, were previously corrupted, it may be true, but did any nation ever retain that degree of disinterestedness and of rigid [Page]patriotic virtue necessary to support good order and government under a Democracy, after they became rich and powerful? further where is the nation that ever preserved it even in poverty, under a Democracy? I confess I recollect no one. The Spartans by banishing wealth and luxury, and holding comm [...]ce the parent of both in abhorrence, pr [...]served their form of government (liberty they never had any idea of) for many ages, but their government was as far or farther removed from Democracy, than it was from absolute Mo [...]archy.—The Romans began under a system of government partly Royal, and partly Aristocratical; the latter destroyed the former, and to support itself mixed some portion of the Democratic with the Aristocratic, to gain over the people, to assist them in the perpetual exclusion of Royalty. The Democratic power was at first very confined and limited, and the Aristocratic remained for several centuries almost absolute, but in every struggle between the two, the Democratic gained more or less the advantage over the Aristocratic, until after the most violent and bloody contest, the former came off victorious, and the Roman empire became in effect, in absolute Democracy, which soon prepared them to receive an absolute master.—Caesar with the advantage of victories and personal abilities unparalleled even in the Roman histories, could not have succeeded had not the Republic been previously thrown into confusion, and all [Page]principle and subordination destroyed by a Democracy, at the head of which he for some time placed himself to facilitate his becoming their sole Sovereign, Lord and Emperor: But there is no necessity for travelling far, or searching into antient history; nor should I have mentioned the above instances but by the great stress laid by certain declaimers, in American assemblies, on [...] Spartan and Roman government, and their virtues—whilst it is evident they either kn [...]w nothing of them more than their names, or wilfully misrepresent fects.—We have had some small experience ourselves, of democratical government; and we cannot, from what we have seen and experienced, but be a [...]le to form a judgement what the consequences will be when it comes to operate in full vigor and without restraint.

Absolute democracy and absolute monarchy are nearly connected with each other, and even wise and tried patriots, have, in all ages, submitted to the latter, to escape from the distractions of the former; perhaps the situation of our country, upon every account, is such, that it will not bear a strict comparison with any other, I believe it to be the case; at the same time I am of opinion that this is against us, under the proposed government of a democracy.

At this time we are of some wright in the general scale, and may by improving it be able, though not to dictate the law absolutely, yet to [Page]obtain such terms of peace, as may come up to every reasonable wish.—But are we sure of obtaining the same, when the great contending Powers tired of the war, come to settle their differences by a peace, shall we then find ourselves in a situation to dictate, or to be dictated to? We have ranged ourselves on the side of France and Spain, against England, but shall we in a treaty of peace, be considered and respected as their equal, or shall we be regarded in the settlement of their accounts as an article to be used in discount, by either as the balance may fall? This is a serious enquiry, and France has already put it in our power to answer the question. When Spain offered to mediate between France and England, the latter accepted the mediation, on condition that France withdrew their rescript of March 1778, which declared America independent—to this France replied, that England could not with propriety demand of them a concession at the beginning of a war, the events of which were uncertain, which they could only be brought to grant at the close of an unfortunate war. This reply of France says plainly, that if the war should be unfortunate on their part, our independence may be given up, and shews in what point of light we are considered. —The events of the war have not hitherto been fortunate, on the part of France and Spain, nor have they been greatly unfortunate though the balance (were the accounts now to be settled) [Page]is against them.—Future events are uncertain, but should France or Spain unfortunately loose considerably, we and our independence remain as a pledge, by a restoration of which their losses will be made up; if on the other hand, England proves unfortunate, the acknowledgement of our independence, may serve them in the same stead, if the latter proves the case, as it possibly may, after two or three years more of war; what by that time will be our situation? Our country ravaged, and exhausted, our commerce destroyed, an immense internal and foreign debt contracted, the interest only of which will be a greater tax, than we ever had any idea of before this war, to which will be added, the support of civil government, as expensive, or more so than formerly, and the expences of new establishments, internal and external, such as Courts of Admiralty, &c. Boards of Trade, of Marine, of Treasury, &c. &c. of Ambassadors, Envoys, Consuls, &c. which alone will amount to more than all our former public expences, besides we must have a marine force at least, or we cannot expect to have our flag respected—nor our commerce secure from imposition—shall we find ourselves equal to all this? Will the inhabitants of America, taught to believe, that they fought to exonerate themselves from taxes, be contented under ten times the tax they ever paid, and to have the same entailed on their posterity?—In this state of weakness, debt, [Page]and discontent, is it possible that we most lie at the mercy of the victorious, or most fortunate power which eve [...] it be, at the peace? If England dictates the terms of peace, we must he unconditionally at their mercy, if France does it, we shall be equally so [...], in this moment we may escape the danger of lying at the mercy of either. France will not be able to dictate the la [...] to England, without having previously so effectually reduced that power, as to render it unable to [...] in our behalf, should any, even the most [...], be dictated to us. If this is a just state of the case, and it appears to me such, we may possibly enjoy [...] nominal independent sovereignty, but in [...] and reality [...] dependent, and that unconditionally on France, on the other hand should the war prove unfortunate on the part of France, France m [...] agreeable to their public declaration withdraw its rescri [...], which declared [...] independent, and leave us to unconditional submission to England; we are thus pushed on by the continuance of the war towards the streights of Scylla and Ch [...]ryb [...]is, but thank God we have not yet arrived there, and if there is any prudence of skill with those who are at the helm of our public ship, we may land [...] and honourably on so [...] ground. I have given you, and that freely, my sentiments on our public situation. Though treated with a degree of injustice and ingratitude which has scarce a parallet in history [Page]by a faction of my countrymen; my country and its interests still lie nearest my heart. I have met with many English, Scotch, and Irish families, in the course of my acquaintance in this country, who following the dictates of conscience, and what they thought to be their duty, took part with the Stuart family, and who in consequence had been proscribed, and driven from their country under the loss of title, fortune, &c. I was at first surprized to find that these people, though many of them had been born in France, and inheriting as one might suppos [...], the severest resentments against England, still valued themselves on the country from which they and their [...] had been expelled, with the unmost [...] and disgrace, and in a word, in [...] the varnish and paint that had been laid on in the course of a century in France, [...] original canvass was still visible in their sentiments and actions. Since I have been in exile [...]self my surprize has ceased. I find it is not difficult to change climate and country, but that it [...] impossible for any one, that is not either less or more than m [...], to conquer those early arta [...]hments and predilections which every citizen of a free government has for his country and its interests—my saying one word on the affairs of America is one proof of this, but my letters being filled with scarce any thing else, shews that whatever resolutions I have taken to the [Page]contrary, I can neither think nor write without touching, and even dwelling on the subject, in fact, it is the only one, which lies down with me at night and rises with me in the morning, it accompanies me in every circle whether gay or serious, and often makes me blind and deaf to every thing else. I am sometimes attacked by prudence, which asks me what I have to do, under my circumstances with the politicks of any country, or particularly of one more than an other. She tells me if I have time to listen, which I seldom have, that of all men, I ought not to meddle, that being fairly on shore, though after suffering a shipwreck, I have nothing left but to collect what I can of my fortune out of the wreck, and make the best of it. Though judgment pronounces fully in favour of this opinion, still I cannot remain indifferent to what affects a country which I must for ever call mine. I take up my pen almost every day to write to some friend or other in America, I determine not to let any thing political fall from it, yet before I have finished one page I find myself in the full force of a current which I cannot escape or resist, but I will be carried on no further by it is this letter. I promised myself with being able to do something in the commercial way. I have been disappointed from various causes, I hoped to have finished my accounts soon, and received the considerable balance due me from Congress; but though my accounts with vouchers to support [Page]my demands have been ready more than four months, I can find no auditor. Congress have been informed near a year since that their auditor could not serve, yet they have not appointed any other, tho' they knew I was waiting at my own expence to adjust my account. The cruelty and injustice of this proceeding is too visible to require my enlarging on it, I am discouraged in writing to men, who consider themselves omnipotent, and who have among their other attributes, taken that of doing injustice when they please, and justify all by the tyrant's plea, necessity; out of a balance of more than 300,000 livres, I have not been able to obtain one shilling, by a prevailing junto in Congress, I have been represented in America as a defaulter grown rich at the public expence, this was done to prejudice my countrymen against me, and to cover or justify their horrid ingratitude, and at the same time to force me on a dangerous and expensive voyage, to obtain justice here, where they had previously taken such arrangements, as to counteract me in pursuit of my right; it is true they appointed an auditor, but laid him under such restrictions, that they must have known at the time, that no man of spirit would accept the office, and on a refusal, they have neglected the naming any other; does this shew them acting like my creditors in earnest for the settlement, or like shuffling evasive debtors, who push it off, by every means in their power, to have some plausible excuse for [Page]the non-payment of their debts? the world will determine without hesitation, and I am resolved the cause shall be soon laid before them. I despair of s [...]eing of any change for the better, I have long, tho' impatiently waited for it, to the almost total ruin of my fortune and prospects in life, and can any one blame me if I lay before the world the history of that injustice and ingratitude under which I have suffered? and of those vile intrigues and detestable cabals which have occasioned the most complicated misery and distress to my country; I am confident no disinterested or impartial man will censure me for doing myself justice, and for disabusing the public with respect to certain characters and proceedings, at the same time that I have ample materials in my hands for doing this, I take no pleasure in the idea, I have put it off as long as possible, but I cannot forbear much longer, I hope this letter will come safe to your hands, if so, communicate the contents to such of your and my friends as you judge proper, but let no extracts or copies be made of it. I have already exhausted your patience, I will therefore add only, that I am,

My dear Brother,

Most affectionately your's, SILAS DEANE.

Simeon Deane, Esq Merchant, Williamsburgh, Virginia.

§

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Paris, May 10th, 1781.

Dear Sir,

A Gentleman lately here from America, assured me, that it was considered by our countrymen as political heresy or treason to entertain a doubt that France would under any circumstances whatever, give up our independency by withdrawing from its alliance with us.—This way of thinking, reflects honour on m [...] countrymen, as it must proceed from their resolution to support inviolably and at all events, their own engagements; but too much confidence proves fatal to nations oftener than too little, and it is not unseasonable for them to review, what has so frequently happened in Europe under circumstances similar to the present, and reflect on those instructive lessons which the history of the last two centuries lays before us. What nation in Europe has not during that period broken their most solemn treaties, and deserted their allies, as often as state necessity or public interest and safety dictated the measure? I declare I know of none; England (and untill lately we joined them in it) has always been very free in censuring the cou [...]t and people of France as the most perfidious of any in Europe; France has retorted the charge, though to her honour she has generally done it i [...] a more decent language; but shall we not be found equally in the wrong, if at this time, we think, speak and act, in the opposite extreme from that in which we acted [Page]formerly. On an impartial review of the past, and examination of the present, I confess, I think we shall, and if we eventually become the dupes, and are sacrificed by our unsuspicious confidence, the political world will judge, at least, that we were rather too young and unexperienced for the great affairs we engaged in. The style of Congress appeared to me, I confess, a little too strong and presumptuous, when in September 1779, they declared that the independence of America was as fixed as fate; this was in a religious view, bidding defiance to Omnipotence, and placing our independence on a basis which no civil government or human system ever yet could boast of. Since my return to Europe, I have had leisure to take a calm and unprejudiced view of our situation, and however confident you may be in America, I can but have the most distressing apprehensions for our future peace, liberty and safety; not that I have more reason to distrust the good faith of France than that of any other nation, under similar circumstances, but I have every reason to doubt of the favourable issue of the war, and if it should be unsavourable, France has already declared to the world the part it will take with regard to our independence. I will explain myself—when Spain offered to mediate, England insisted on France's withdrawing the rescript of the 13th March 1778, (which acknowledged our independence as preliminary to any treaty) France [Page]replied that it was unreasonable in England to require that at the beginning of a war, (the events of which were unce [...]tain) which could only be complied with at the close of an unsuccessful war. This reply needs no comment. The war, though not greatly unsuccessful hitherto, on the part of France, has been very far from being successful; France is at this time a great loser on the whole, but whilst the high style of England embroils that nation with other Powers, and so long as we find employ for near one half its forces, France will continue the war, and encourage us by temporary and partial supplies, and the most liberal promises—but a storm is gathering on the continent of Europe, and how soon it will burst, God, who views the hearts of all men (the Emperor's not execpted) only knows, but the moment it begins, we must bid adi [...]u to every hope of aid from Europe: The storm which we have been for six years tossed by, does not abate, and if we have any skilful pilots on board, they must see Sevlla on one side, and Charybdis on the other, and that unless we make a safe port immediately, we must be shipwreck'd on the one or the other, and increase the list of those unhappy people, who in every age, have been sacrificed under the appearance of friendship and assistance, to ambiti [...]n and interest. With our country ravag [...]d and exhausted without any effectual aid, or perhaps any at all from our Asly, what have we a right to expect [Page]in the end (if we continue to reject with contempt and insult every offer of peace) but unconditional submission? Will France in no case, do at this time, what they have repeatedly done heretofore? I mean not to cast the least reflection by referring to any particular instance, what I have already said of nations in general, will clear me of having such intention—But we ought to recall to our minds, how often the people of Scotland, since the beginning of this century, have been encouraged to rise in claim of their supposed rights, and of those of the House of Stuart; stores, troops, ships and money have been sent to their aid, the consequences are two well known to need repeating—At the close of a war, not very unsuccessful on the part of rance, they were given up, and their Prince, Charles Edward, though he, as well as his ancestors, had received as solemn promises from France, to be re-established on the throne of England, as we can pretend to have for independency, was ordered to quit the kingdom, and on refusal was publicly sei [...]d [...]on, and bound like a common felon, in the streets of Paris, and forcibly carried off; the interest of the [...]tion was the plea which justified the measure, and may not the same again have equal [...] At least our sit [...]ation calls for serious rest [...].—We may at this time obtain all and more th [...]n we first claimed, and improving the p [...]esent moment, I will v [...]nture to say, more than we [...] ever expect [Page]under any other probable, or almost possible circumstances. But there is a treaty, and our public and national honor and character are pledged. But if France, to whom it is pledged, trifles with us, if unable or unwilling to assist us effectually, or if to serve its own views, it leaves us to wear out the force of its hereditary enemy by our destruction, are we holden to support our honour pledged in treaty, at such an expence? The universal maxim of all nations, Salus Populi, suprema lex, will in such case have no weight with us, by persevering we may possibly, though not probably, effect with others, the ruin of Great-Britain; but if we and our country must be involved and crushed by the fall of that paternal edifice, in which we once took shelter, and in the beauty and grandeur of which, we once placed our greatest pride and security, shall we act the parts of patriots or madmen? I know not how you will relish these reflections, but I cannot forbear making them, so long as I can neither forget my country, or cease to be anxious for its peace, liberty and happiness. I wrote you a few days since on private affairs, by the way of L'Orient, I will therefore close this by assuring you, that nothing personal, though I have suffered more injustice, than almost any man of my time, has had the least influence on my mind, as to our general interests. I have done much towards promoting a separation from Great-Britain and for independency—I acted from a [Page]sincere belief that it would soon, and certainly be effected, and that it would tend to our happiness and peace; I now see no prospect of it's being obtained, and am fully convinced that the irreparable mischiefs we have already suffered and must suffer, with the temper and disposition of my countrymen, are such, that independency must prove a curse rather than a blessing to us— From this persuasion I have written freely to many of my friends—Few men, not natives of France, have juster, or more favorable ideas of the nation, than I have, and shall ever entertain, nor shall I ever be wanting in personal gratitude for the many civilities and favors I have received from men, in place and out; but these ought, and have not any influence on my mind when the true interests of my country are in question—I know, personally, but one of the ministers, I esteem and respect him as much as any man can do; but if I dared to intrude so far as to hint my opinion to him, it should be not to pursue the war another moment on account of our independence, nor to hazard any thing for an object, which will never prove of that advantage to France, in its commercial interests, which I once thought it would, if indeed it can prove of any at all—But I have tired you with the length of this letter, I will therefore close with assuring you I am, with sincere esteem and unalterable friendship, Dear Sir,

Your most obedient And very humble Servant, (Signed) SILAS DEANE.

[Page]

P. S. When I query whether the independency of America will prove of so great advantage to France, as was once imagined, I confine myself to advantages merely of a commercial nature, to be derived from us in that state. If France by our assistance succeed so far, as to ruin the commerce and marine of Great Britain, and if we in the course of effecting this, become reduced to be in effect dependant on France, there can be no question but that we shall be of advantage to France, but such a supposition destroys every idea of real independency.

My compliments to Mrs. Wilson.

To the Honourable James Wilson, Esq at Philadelphia.

§

Paris, 20th May, 1761.

DEAR SIR,

PRESUMING that you still continue in Congress, and that the friendship which has so long subsisted between us, remains unimpaired, I have determined to write you a long and confidential letter, on subjects intimately connected to the well being of our country. Some of the sentiments I am about to communicate, may perhaps appear inconsistent with my former conduct and professions, and therefore it is incumbent on me to explain the causes which have in any degree changed my political opinions. I need not particularly recur to the origin of the [Page]present controversy with Great Britain; what I professed and did at that period, was professed with sincerity, and done with the best intentions, but had I then foreseen one half of the calamities that have followed the measures of that time, instead of approving, I should have most strenuously opposed them; for it must be confessed, that we were actuated rather by the apprehension of future grievances, than by the actual pressure of any which we really felt; and most certainly I should not have thought it either wise or justifiable to run into the horrors of civil war, without more urgent necessity, and a much greater load of oppression. But unfortunately, we in America were deceived by those flattering accounts transmitted to us from England, as much as the British government was deceived by opposite accounts sent from America. We were fully pers [...]aded that a majority of the people of Great Britain, approved our claims, and that a short suspension of commerce with that kingdom would obtain us all we desired; under this delusion we went forward until hostilities suddenly began: Those who have most studied human nature, and the history of mankind, will best conceive the effects and changes which followed: Inflamed and afterwards exasperated by the provocations and ravages of war, our minds became gradually alienated from that people whose ancestors were ours, and to whom we had always been connected by the strongest ties, that can bind or unite societies [Page]of men. We indignantly slighted that union which had been esteemed our greatest glory and happiness, and under whose benign influence we had increased and prospered beyond example. With this change in our sentiments, we heard of the British government having engaged foreign troops to be employed against us, and we naturally determined to follow the example and seek foreign aid from those most likely to afford it; for this purpose, and with this commission I came to Europe, and the Declaration of Independency soon followed; a declaration which though absent I approved of, because I thought Independency attainable with but little more difficulty or bloodshed, and that our countrymen were wise and virtuous enough to use it rightly and make it a blessing.—I had besides other reasons—I thought an independent government was allotted to us by nature, and that the establishment of it could not be long prevented, after the change which had taken place in our sentiments respecting it: That, to depart from the claim we had made to it, would at that time and in that state of things, be like hastily [...]inning over a wound corrupted within, and would only convert to waste all the blood which had been spilt in the contest, and entail on our children, if not on ourselves, the necessity of shortly beginning and supporting another.— Actuated therefore by a desire to spare the people of England, as well as of America, from a [Page]renewal of such calamities, I heartily concurred in negociating and signing the treaties with France, and afterwards returned to America, in the hopes of seeing our country soon restored to the blessings of peace, commerce, and good government: I need not tell you that the hope proved abortive, nor need I explain to you how much I was disappointed and dissatisfied by the changes which had taken place in America, and which were every day increasing. You will recollect the conversations that passed between us on this subject; I found indeed the hills, the mountains, and rivers of America, situated as formerly, but almost every thing which had d [...] stinguished and done honour to the inhabitants appeared to have changed The dangers of suddenly releasing a people from the restraints of regular government, which were visibly experienced.—Noisy and d [...]signing individuals had risen from the lowest order, and displaced the best and most respectable members of society.— The new governments were almost every where feeble, and ill administred; anarchy and licentious violence frequently prevailed, and even in Congress itself, reason, patriotism, and justice, were but too often vanquished by faction, cabal, and views of private interest. But what appeared a more alarming evil, was the depravity of morals which had taken place among our countrymen, and been encouraged if not produced by the revolution; and particularly by the laws [Page]for making the depreciated and depreciating paper currency a legal tender, instead of its nominal amount in gold and silver; laws which not only afforded temptations, but in effect offered rewards to dishonesty, by enabling those already in debt to liberate themselves for a twentieth or thirtieth part in value of the real debt, and encouraging all who could obtain credit, or property from others, to withhold payment in the certain expectation of being able at a future period legally to exonerate themseves almost for nothing; laws by which more injustice seems to have been occasioned, than what was ever committed under any other government, and among the same number of people, in so short a space of time. I do not mean however to censure our countrymen with severity, I am persuaded that probity and good mora [...] were no where more generally prevalent than in North-America, before the late revolution, and that any other people would have been at least as much changed by the same causes, and in the same circumstances. I could not avoid however, regretting, that a similar change had taken place, and lamenting the miserable prospects which were present on every side.—Agriculture declining; the progress of arts and sciences suspended; the education of the rising generation (the hopes of our country) neglected; thousands of industrious youth forced from the plough, and other useful homely occupations, [Page]and prematurely destroyed by the diseases, wants and sufferings of a military life, whilst the survivors by exchanging their plain morals and honest industry, for the habits of idleness and vice, appeared more likely to burthen than to benefit their country hereafter, and above all the numerous causes and sources of future dissentions between the disterent States, left very little room for agreeable expectations or ideas. Distressed at the prospect of these, and a thousand other evils, of which there appeared neither a remedy, nor an end, you will not wonder that I quitted a scene so unpleasant, and came again to this country, where I have had time and opportunity to reflect dispassiona [...]ely, on the general state of things, and the probable consequences so far at least as the interests of our country are concerned; and from these reflections, combined with all the facts and informations, that I have been able to obtain, I have deduced two propositions, of the truth of which I am fully convinced, however extraordinary they may appear in America:—The first of these is, that there is no probability of our being able finally to establish our independency; and the second, that if it were established, it would prove rather a curse than a blessing to us.—As I am persuaded, that you will at least read with attention and candour, what I write on subjects so interesting; I will enter into a particular consideration of each of these propositions, and begin with [Page]the first which concerns the probability of our being able finally to establish the independency which we have assumed and declared.—Experience has I presume by this time, so far corrected the vain opinions we formerly entertained of our strength and resources, than ever the most insane of all our mad politicians will hardly pretend, that we can alone resist the force of Great-Britain. —The final establishment of our independency must therefore greatly depend on the assistance, which other nations may be able and willing to afford us, and I think it very evident, that we have most egregiously flattered and deceived ourselves on this subject. There is indeed a generous propensity in human nature which inclines mankind to favour those who struggle against superior force, in defence of their freedom and just rights, and this propensity led many ind [...]viduals in different parts of Europe, (who considered us engaged in such a struggle,) to bestow on us their unavailing good wishes and applauses.—But it is impossible that the motives of our revolt should have been really approved by the government of any kingdom or state of Europe, because there is not one among them, whose subjects and colonies were so free as those of Great Britain; and it would have been manifestly absurd, in any government, to vindicate our claim to privileges, which at the same time it denied to its own subjects; and besides insurrections are naturally viewed with jealousy, and [Page]dislike, by all regular long established governments as of dangerous example to their own subjects.—It happened indeed that Great-Britain, by her vast acquisitions of wealth and power, had become the object of envy and dread to certain European nations, who without expecting or intending, that we should ever become independent, were pleased at our revolt, and rejoiced to see that kingdom weakening itself by a destructive civil war, and least we should be too soon subdued, and the mischiefs of our revolt too soon terminated, a little scanty assistance was from time to time secretly given to us, until this alliance was publicly announced, and France engaged in the war against Great-Britain, it might have been naturally expected that every other Power in Europe inclined to favour our independency would have openly acknowledged it, after the example of France. Great-Britain was then universally believed to be so weakened and discouraged, that no nation could have been restrained through the fear of incurring her resentment; and therefore it is difficult to conceive why any one really withing for our independency, should have witheld from it the sanction of an open avowal or acknowledgement, which would necessarily have tended to finish the work and secure our future gratitude and friendship—But though more than three years have passed since the French alliance was announced, no other nation has manifested [Page]the least intention to follow the example, or the least favourable inclination towards us, but several have, on the contrary, most unequivocally discovered, that their wishes and views are repugnant to our pretensions. The government of Portugal very early proscribed all intercourse with us, in terms of extreme vigor, if not hostility; and this very proscription remains unrepealed—That of Denmark has denied our independency, and even forced out of our hands (as out of the hands of pirates) several prizes which our ships of war had taken from Great-Britain, and sent into the ports of Norway—The Emperor is notoriously an enemy to our independency—he retains an hereditary attachment to Great-Britain, as well as jealousy to the House of Bourbon; and views with impatience, on every side, the territories of his ancestors possessed by his neighbours—he is in the full vigor of his life, master of the best disciplined, most numerous and formidable army in Europe, and certainly is not without ambitious, enterprizing views; so that should the war continue, we have every thing to fear from his influence and interference, which certainly will be against those nations who possess the countries he wishes to regain, and not against Great-Britain who witholds nothing from him, and from whom he has nothing to claim—He has indeed already prepared the way to interfere by offering to mediate between the belligerent [Page]powers, and you need not be told that an unsuccessful mediator almost always takes part in the quarrel—The Dutch, though at war with England, publicly disavow our independency, and so far from connecting their cause with ours, that they notoriously would have made a separate peace with Great-Britain, had not the British Government refused to treat separately with the States-General; a refusal that manifest [...] how little the British Ministry feels itself embarrassed by these new enemies. Whatever you in America may imagine, the true interests of the Dutch are by no means favorable to our independency; they have no manufactures of any consequence for our use, and as merchants, fishermen and carriers, we should certainly become their most dangerous rivals and competitors: Respecting Russia and Sweden, they certainly cannot expect to gain by our independency, excepting indigo and rice we have nothing for their use:— Russia exports tobacco, and their other productions are all similar to ours, and we should naturally interfere with them in every market. The governments of these countries have never manifested the least disposition to favour our independency; I think, at most we can only flatter ourselves that they will remain idle spectators. Congress appear indeed to have formed very pleasing hopes from the Northern treaty of n [...]utrality, and have consequently appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary to the Empress of Russia, who i [...] [Page]now on his way to Petersburg, where he will doubtless find that humiliating reception, which their other Ministers have met at every other court but that of France. It seems however, that no experience will cure them of the folly of thus meanly exposing themselves to new insults. Respecting the conduct and views of Spain, I think they are of a nature that deserves our most serious consideration, I ha [...] almost said detestation—You know that a secret article was annexed to the treaty of alliance with France, by which his Most Christian Majesty stipulated, and the American Commissioner engaged, that the Spanish government should be entitled to accede to the treaties made with France, or to make other similar treaties with us, and we were ful [...]y persuaded that government would, in a reasonable time, accede to, or make such treatie [...], otherwise we most certainly should not have thought ourselves just [...]f [...]ble in thus binding our constituents indefinitely, and leaving the Spanish government absolutely free respecting the time. Above three years have now elapsed since this engagement was made on our parts, and near two years since Spain has b [...]en a [...] open war with Great-Britain, no more time, and no better opportunity can therefore he desire [...] by the Spanish court for treating with us, and yet there has not been the least appearance of a desire to do it, or of an intention ever to own us as an independent people; though being at war with [Page]Great-Britain, no obstacle or restraint can possibly [...] from the fear of offending the British government. It is universally understood, that his Catholic Majesty after the peace of 1763, always retained a strong desire of revenging and repairing his losses by the preceeding war—The controversy between Great-Britain and her colonies promised a favourable opportunity of doing this, and therefore he early began to equip a powerfull fleet and make ready to avail himself of future occasions and events—The treaties which France suddenly made with us, were most certainly and avowedly contrary to the views of the Spanish Minister, and there is not the smallest reason to believe that any change, favorable to us, has since taken place in the policy and designs of the Spanish court; but there are the strongest reasons to justify a contrary conclusion. That court professedly came into the war from motives absolutely foreign to our independency, and has since prosecuted it solely with the view of recovering Gibraltar and the Floridas—Especial care has been taken that not a single Spanish ship or vessel of war (though many frequently pass by our ports) should ever stop in any one of them, least that court should incur the reproach of having assisted or favored a people, whom it neither acknowledges, nor apparently ever intends to consider in any character but that of rebellious subjects of the British Crown. Our operations and designs must indeed necessarily [Page]have great influence on the progress and issue of the war, and therefore the ministry of Spain were naturally solicitous for information about them, [...] obtain it a Spanish gentleman was sent to reside among us; but though Congress had at different times, appointed no less than three ministers to the Spanish court, this gentleman was never permitted to assume any public character, and therefore his residence among us was a continual insult, an indirect denial of our independency, so long as he lived, and his death produced a remarkable instance of condescension and inconsistency, not to say hypocrisy, in Congress, who, to liberate the soul of the deceased from Purgatory, very devoutly attended one of the most superstitious rights of a religion, which that body but a little time before, in addressing the people of England, had described as ‘having dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder and rebellion through every part of the world.’ But this and all other endeavors to conciliate the good will of Spain appear to have failed—Near two years have passed since Congress appointed their president, a gentleman of distinguished merit and talents, as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Catholic King, and he has not only been unsuccessfull in the business of his mission, but is now humbly waiting at Madrid without any probability of obtaining the smallest acknowledgement or notice of his public character.—Supposing the government of Spain to [Page]be most unalterably determined that we shall finally be the dupes and facrifices of this war, it might still have been expected, that as we a [...]e fighting against the same enemies, it would have assisted us with some of the means to fight, but in this, as in other things, we have been disappointed, not only from what Congress expected from the "everflowing treasures of Spain," but of what policy ought to have engaged that court to afford us. The little paltry sums that have been obtained (less than a mercantile house in moderate credit might have supplied) have been dealt out with such niggardly reluctance, that it manifests the most beggarly meanness and insensibility to accept, and much more to sollicit them so long and importunately. Nothing is more evident to me than that Spain looks on our independency with jealousy and aversion, as being a most dangerous example to her vast American e [...]ories, and of the most dangerous tendency in respect to her future dominion over them. Indeed she cannot desire that so remarkable a revolt from the greatest power of Europe, should by its successful issue afford encouragement to her distant provinces to make similar attempts, nor can she wish that a new maritime empire should rise up so contiguously to her treasures and American possessions, which at all times have been the objects of her peculiar care and jealousy. An empire too far removed from Europe to be restrained [Page]by the power of Spain, and too near the sources of that power not to excite the utmost fear and apprehension. So long as the Spanish government continues at war with England, so long it will naturally wish us to be the instruments of injuring and distressing that nation. But when the war ends, that government will undoubtedly wish to see us, not only reduced again to the dominion of Great-Britain, but at the same time weakened and chastised, so that instead of affording encouragement to its colonies by a successful revolt, we may serve as an example to deter them from attempting to become independent. I think it therefore evident, that France, the only nation that has acknowledged our independency, is also the only one inclined to support it. How long that nation, contrary, to the views of Spain, and the rest of Europe will think it wise or necessary to continue the war for our support, are questions that merit our most serious consideration.

The only advantages which France can have expected from our independency, are a diminution of the trade and power of England, and an increase of her own commerce by a participation in ours, there advantages doubtless were expected from the treaties with America, a few measures of government ever gave more universal satisfaction, that was manifested by the French nation when those treaties were announced, but since my return here I have seen [Page]that satisfaction generally abated and succeeded by disappointment, so that in truth but little benefit is now expected from our independency, at least by the most discerning part of this nation. The merchants complain of losses on almost every adventure to our country, through the depreciation of the paper currency, the breach of public faith, and other causes unfavourable to us. They complain of a general predilection towards English manufactures, which in spite of the war, and the laws of the several states, are imported through Holland, St. Eustatius, &c. and every where purchased by our countrymen in preserence to those of France, or any other nation. Most of the French gentlemen that have served in our army or travelled in our country, complain of a similar predelection in favour of Englishmen, and manners, and a similar ave, sion from those of France. They perceive a general dislike of them among the people, and alledge, that French Officers who sight and bleed, in our cause, receive fewer attentions and civilities from our countrymen, than are bestowed on British officers of inferior rank when taken prisoners. In short, that our manners, habits, propensities and prejudices, are all English, as well as our language, and that neither regard for our allies, the authority of our laws, nor yet the animosities which the war necessarily produces, can engage us, even during its continuance, to suspend the use of British [Page]manufactures, or lay aside our former regard for individuals of that nation; and it is therefore naturally concluded that when peace shall be restored, whether we remain independant or not, the greatest part, if not the whole of our commerce will certainly return again to its former British channels, and that our former attachment to that nation, will again revive, so as to leave little or no benefit to this country from our independence. Those of our countrymen who visit France, afford cause for similar conclusions, retaining the same appearances, manners, language, prejudices, affections and aversions, they are confounded with, and mistaken for Englishmen by all but those to whom they are personally known, and as their peculiarities but ill accord or assimilate with those of our new allies, they feel like strangers or exiles from their country, and generally hasten through this kingdom to Ostend, Amsterdam, &c. from whence, in spite of Dr. Franklin's earnest dissuasions, and even the menaces of Mess. Adams, Dana, Searle, &c. the greatest part of them secretly venture over to England, and when arrived there (tho' in constant danger of being imprisoned) they almost believe themselves at home; such is the power of old habits, and early prejudices. You will not therefore wonder that a discerning, jealous nation, like this, begins to think with Horace, Naturam expellas, &c. and to perceive that nothing will finally detach us and our commerce [Page]from Great Britain, and that ever if our independency was established, we should soon be again united to that country by confederation, and the closest alliance, and to contribute as much if not more, than ever to it's trade and power. This, the most sensible part of the French nation believe, and with this belief it [...]h impossible they should think it wise and expedient, to persist obstinately in wasting the force and treasures of France, and endangering her possessione, from an object unlikely to be obtained, and which if obtained would afford no solid advantage.—You will not therefore be surprized, that the war, though begun with general applause, has now become unpopular, as well as our cause in this country, a great part of the nation ardently wish for peace, and as our independency, and engagement of France to support it, are the only obstacles, it is not likely the nation will long look with patience on that which notoriously opposes its desires, and even its felicity, and therefore it cannot be reasonably expected, that France will long persevere in the war on our account. A man must be little acquainted with history, who can imagine, that because the French government has acknowledged our independency, and entered into treaties with us, that it will therefore never desert us: The same government had much oftner acknowledged and asserted the right of the Stuart family to the [...] of England, and had much [Page]oftner promised to maintain that right, yet those promises were never fulfilled; multitudes who trusted to them were deceived and sacrificed; even the Pretender himself, notwithstanding the most formal acknowledgements and frequent promises was not only abandoned, but to gratify the British government, was exiled, seized, and ignominiously transported out of France. I have many reasons individually to be satisfied with the French Ministry, and therefore I would not mention transactions of this nature, even to you, were they not so generally notorious. It may however appear invidious, and it certainly is unnecessary to recollect such facts, or apply them to the present question, because the French government has itself with unusual candor, publicly explained its opinion of the extent and force of its engagements to us, when they say in reply to the demand of England, that France would withdraw its rescript of the 13th March, 1778, as a preliminary to the mediation of Spain: That it was not reasonable to expect of them, to do that at the beginning of a war, (the events of which were uncertain) which could only be done at the close of an unsuccessful war.

France, therefore, holds herself at liberty to desert our alliance and independency at the end of an unsuccessful war, and as the present is not pretended to be a successful war, the inference is plain, and the time to apply it may be near; so long indeed as we are able to support a great [Page]part of the war, and France escapes any considerable disaster, this government may not be in haste to abandon us, because we may be thought the cheapest and fittest instrument for weakening our parent country: But our resources, credit, and ability to bear any considerable share in the war, will be soon totally annihilated, and when this happers, I am fully convinced, that France will no longer suffer her treaties to deprive her of peace: let us however suppose that France should obstinately persist in the war, and even that Spain, contrary to her system and views, should do the same in order to establish our independency, still it does not appear probable, that this object would be finally obtained. The navy of France has for some time been in the most formidable state to which it can be carried. That of Spain had nearly attained this point of perfection before she entered into the war; and yet while both were in this state, no advantages were gained over England. What then can we expect hereafter, when the navy of both count [...]i [...]s must daily decline? In France, every seaman being at the disposal of government, the g [...]eatest number of ships of war, can possi [...]ly be manned, may be ma [...]ned immediat [...]ly, by withdrawing the seamen from every other service.— At the beginning of the prese [...]t war, France attempted to do this in some degree, but totally abandoning the fisheries, the best n [...]sery of seamen, and diminishiug every commercial [Page]branch of her navigation.—It was, indeed, intended to encourages the equipment of privateers, whereby a considerable number of seamen might have been continually so [...]ming, but the dreadful mortality which took place in the fleet under M. d'Orvilliers, in 1779, frust [...]ted this intention. Privateers were then deprived of their crews, and since that time, it is only by particular permission and favour that seamen could be obtained to equip her privateers or merchant vess [...]s; no nursery of sermen therefore remains, and yet a very great supply is wanted from time to time in the French navy, through the practice of crowding an un [...]sual number on board their ships of war, whereby a greater pr [...]portion [...] [...]ed in action, and perish by contageous us dis [...]s. Spain is equ [...]ly destitute of resources to supply the waste of her seamen, and the e [...]o [...]e the maritime power of both nations must hereafter [...]y d [...]line, and that of France would be almost annihilated, if a conti [...]ental war should supervene.—On the other hand the B [...]itish navy is becoming every day more formidable; forty additional ships from 50 to 100 guns, besides a mu [...]h greater number of frigates, are now on the sto [...]ks, and when ready may be all manned, because the British government under its greatest embarrassments has preserved every reso [...]rce and nursery for seamen untou hed; the fisheries, consting trade, and other branches of navigation have been all maintained, [Page]and an incredible number of privateers continually employed, the crew, of which may all be transferred into ships of war, whenever it becomes necessary; so that the marine of Great-Britain, by increasing on one hand, whilst that of France and Spain diminish on the other, will soon become greatly superior to both, and when this happens, you need not, I think, be told the consequences. You will doubtless hear in America, as usual, that Great-Britain i [...] exhausted, divided, and disc [...]u aged, but such accounts are as fallacious now as they were f [...]rmerly. This might be demonstrated by many facts, but I think it will not appear doubtful, when you recollect the immense sum that was subscribed in England for the service of the present year, and that the British Court, far from fearing new enemies, not only attacked the Dutch, but has since refused the mediation of Russia, in making a separate peace with that republic. It has long been fashionable in America to rail at the British government, as being not only wicked but weak and incapable. These imputations are however certainly repugnant to facts, for it must be confessed that none of the belligerent powers has displayed so much vigor and ability as Great-Britain, in prosecuting the war; and though we may incline to shut our eyes against the truth, a great part even of the French nation is just and generous enough to acknowledge, and admire the superior fortitude and intelligence with which [Page]the British government has hitherto repelled and frustrated the efforts of enemies so much more numercus. Indeed there never was a period in which the resources, bravery, and real greatness of the British nation were more eminently displayed, than at this time. But having discarded the remembrance of former friendships that ‘pride in the glerious atchievements of our common ancestors,’ and that ‘affection for the heirs of their virtues’ which Congress itself but a few years since boasted of; we may be unwilling to admit this truth,—it will not however cease to be truth.—The sun will shine whether we open or shut our eyes; thinking ourselves alone almost able to resist Great-Britain we very confidently inferred that the force of France joined to ours, would become irresistible, but we found ourselves mistaken. When Spain joined in the war, we formed similar expectations, and they likewise proved fallacious; the same hopes will doubtless be entertained in America, from the addition of Holland, and they will, I am persuaded, prove equali [...] delusive. The British Ministers certainly think they have more to gain than to lose by the Dutch war, and hitherto events have confirmed that opinion; but should it hereafter prove erroneous, they will be able at any time to make a separate peace with that Republic, so that at best we can have no dependence on any foreign assistance, but that of France and Spain, and the latter being no way committed on our side, may [Page]at any time make a separate peace as well as Holland; indeed I have already shewn it to be pro [...]ble not only that Spain, but that France also will soon relinquish the contest; should both however persivere, we cannot expect a successful issue; [...]e have seen that the [...]ited forces of both, during two years, in which they were the most formida [...]le, have proved unavailing, even when our credit and re [...]ources were inex [...]au [...]ed. H [...]w then can we expect success hereafter, when the forces of France and Spain are declining, and our own faith and credit irretrievably ruined; our paper money, the most important of all our resources, for ever destroyed; several of the southern States already conquered, many of our countrymen disaffected, and many more wearied and discouraged by the long continuance and hopeless appearance of the war; accompanied with a multitude of difficulties which I need not mention to you, but which utterly preclude the least probability of our being able finally to continue an independent people. If this be evident, as I flatter myself it is, we are next to enquire whether the establishment of an independent government, were it practicable, would not be injurious rather than beneficial to us. But a few years have elapsed since you, and I believe every other American, were firmly convinced that the peace, freedom, and happiness of America, could in no way be promoted so well and secured, as by a dependence on the British [Page]Crown; we were then sensible of the "inestimable advantages of a free English constitution of government." We publicly ascribed our amazing increase and prosperity to its "protection and encouraging influence," and declared that "we should ever esteem an union with the people of England to be our greatest glory, and our greatest happiness." Had the British Government at that period threntened to withdraw its protection from us, and abandon us to that very independency, for which we are now suffering and facrificing so much, we should have been universally alarmed, and have considered ourselves as menaced with the severest punishment. Recollect the unanimous opinion of that time, and compare it with what has since been taught and believed on this subject in America, and then let me ask you, whether this change of opinion be the work of reason and experience, or of exasperation and madness? And whether the sober, unanimous conviction, under which we and our fa [...]ers had happily lived, and which our experience h [...]d invariably confirmed, is not more likely to be well founded than any sentiments which the rage and animosity of civil war have produced, and which have never been brought to any fair dispassionate examination or trial? Should I ask the advocates of independency what benefits they expect, which we did not, and might not again enjoy without it; I should probably be told, freedom of legislation and of commerce; it seems [Page]however to me, that on both these subjects we are deceiving ourselves. There are few, if any benefits, which we have not their attendant disadvantages. There may be too little as well as too much restraint in the making of laws, and the former excess is full as mischievous and liable to abuse as the latter: In those which were called Royal governments, the exercise of the King's prerogative may have sometimes prevented wholesome laws, but on the other hand, it has also prevented the people from injurious ones, and if we were to review the legislative acts of the several states since the revolution, we should find that the facility in making laws, has produced a multitude of bastly and injudicious, not to say pernicious ones; and that the number of these has been greatest in the States, where the fewest restrain [...] attend acts of legislation respecting the freedom of commerce; I think we have formed mistaken ideas of it's benefits, and that we have not sufficiently considered, in how fewer instances we have really suffered any considerable disadvantage, by being restrained in our trade with foreign nations, and how very little we shall gain by an exemption from those restraints.

Among all the nations in Europe, there is certainly none, where commerce is so reputable, or where it is carried on by men of so much fortune, probity, and honour as in Great Britain, and consequently there is no where an American [Page]merchant could obtain the same credit, or be served with the same fidelity as in England; and certainly the British manufactures exceed those of any other country, i [...] goodness and cheapness, excepting only a few articles, the greatest part of which, by means of drawbacks on exportation, may be obtained from England almost as cheap as from the countries where they are made: and on the other hand, if we were restrained from carrying some of our own productions to foreign countries, the people of England were in most cases restrained from buying the like productions of foreigners; so that we had all the advantages of a monopoly, and in general a much better price than we could have obtained any where else, besides large bounties on our iron, naval stores, and other articles, should we be deprived of these advantages, and bounties, precluded from the privileges of British subjects, and made liable to the alien's duty; A trade with foreign nations on such terms, as they might chuse to grant us, would I think prove an unusual compensation, and we should be soon desirous of returning again to our former restraints, accompanied with our former privileges: this is however but a partial view of the subject; absolute freedom of legislation and commerce, or in other words independency, can never be maintained without fleets, armies, ministers of state, am assadors, boards of war, of admiralty, of treasury, and many other expensive [Page]establishments of a severeign independent government. We have heretofore enjoyed, and may again enjoy the benefits of all these establishments, as well as the protection of the British fleets and armies, without any other contribution or burthen, than what resulted from a few unimportant restraints on our trade, and certainly an exemption from those restraints, can never afford any advantages equivalent to the taxes which the people of America must necessarily bear to support independency, should it be established, not to mention what must be paid to discharge the enormous public debt already incurred, and which remains to be incurred by a prosecution of the war; and should we after all succeed, it will only be to set up and become subjects of a state, which as being the youngest republic, must take the lowest rank among the nations of the earth, instead of continuing as we were, members of "an Empire, which (to use the words of Congress) has been the envy and admiration of ages." These, however, are but a few of the evils to be expected from our independency. You, my friend, know so much of history, and of mankind in general, as well as of our countrymen in particular, that a little reflection must convince you, that the Democratic Governments lately formed in America are far from being suited to the people there. I need not remind you of the tumultuous disorder, ingratitude, violence, and injustice, which [Page]in all ages and parts of the world have attended this species of government, I can only say, that if it can be advantageous to any societies of men, it is only to those which are small and uncorrupted by luxury or vice.—Our own colony of Connecticut has I believe experienced the best effects which a Democratical government is capable of producing, but these effects have resulted wholly from the rigid morals, frugality, and industry of the people: And we must not forget that in the adjoining colony of Rhode-Island, the very same Government was attended with much anarchy, faction, licentious disorder, and injustice. And if we consider the late progress of luxury, immorality and vice, and the decline of public virtue among our countrymen, there will appear but soo much reason to fear that the Democratical Governments established in the united states will produce the same dreadful effects, which the history of the world, informs us they have invariably produced in every large society or government where they have been established. But the intestine disorders, that may arise within each particular state among its own inhabitants, are not the only mischiefs to be expected, greater evils, if possible, are to be apprehended from the contentions of different states with each other, considering the various manners, prejudices, and prepos [...]essions of the people of the several states, and their discordant opinions, claims and pretensions, it seems [Page]impossible that our confederation can long subsist, or that we can long remain at peace with each other, when relieved from the present war with Great-Britain—Hitherto the different states have voted supplies according to the allotments and requisitions of Congress, but there is not a single state, which has not protested against these allotments as being unequal, and claimed future retribution. To allot the portions of public expence to each of the several states with exact justice, will always be a difficult task, on account of their continually varying circumstances, but when these allotments are made as justly as possible, it is not probable they will ever be satisfactory to all, so that from hence a fruitful source of future discord will arise.— Virginia claims to itself almost all the valuable uncultivated lands, adjoining to the united states, and is rapidly selling them; other states protest against the injustice of this claim; Virginia and Pennsylvania have already been nearly engaged in hostilities on account of their boundaries; and hostilities were sometime ago actually begun between Pennsylvania and Connecticut on the same account, and are now only suspended by the more urgent necessity of resisting the arms of Great-Britain.—There are similar disputes between New-York, Massachusetts-Bay, and New-Hampshire, which though now dormant, would immediately revive, should peace and independency be established in America. I had [Page]almost forgot the inhabitants of several inferior districts, who assume a right of separating from the colonies or states, to which they have hitherto belonged, in the same manner as those colonies have separated from Great-Britain, and of being admitted into the confederation as distinct independent states.—One of these states in particular (that of Vermont) is secretly abetted, by some of the New-England states against New-York, and though Congress has undertaken the decision, it dares not decide against the claim and pretentions of the people. In short, the sources of internal commotion and civil war between the several states are so numerous and plentiful that it does not seem possible for peace and union long to subsist among them, or that evils even greater than those we have suffered, since the declaration of Independency should be avoided after the establishment of it: The protecting, mediating and restraining influence or power of some other nation is indispensably necessary to our well being, and certainly there is no other nation on earth so well suited to this purpose by religion, manners, language, government, &c. or on which we can so honourably and advantageously depend as Great-Britain.

If then there be no probability of finally establishing the Independency we have declared, and of the establishment of it be more likely to prove pernicious than beneficial to us, what obstacle [Page]or objection is there to prevent our renouncing the beneficial claim and reconciling ourselves again to the parent country? Of all the various objections that have been made on this subject at different times and by different people, there are but two which deserve the smallest notice. The first of these is, that the solemn acts and declarations of the King and Parliament of Great Britain, are not to be relied upon; That when we shall have laid down our arms, former pretentions may be revived and new acts of Parliament made to subject our rights, &c. If there be any force in this objection it will operate even more strongly against negociating for peace than for reconciliation; a treaty of peace would be an act of the crown only, and might be more easily evaded than a solemn compact, in which the Parliament as well as the King would be a party. Those therefore who from apprehensions of this nature, refuse treating for reconciliation, should not think of treating for peace, they should resolve to prosecute the war with unrelenting fury; to reprobate the folly of Congress in sending Mr. Adams to negociate with Great-Britain, they should forget how often that nation has interposed to save the civil and religious liberties of other countries against the ambitious views of France and Spain, and regardless of the danger of f [...]lling under the power of these our new friends, they should resolve never to sheath the sword until the British [Page]nation is exterminated; in this and only in this way they will act consistently and reconcile their actions to that distrust which they profess to entertain of the national faith of Great-Britain— Wise, impartial men, will however think, that objections of this nature come with very little propriety from the people of America, who, as an independent people, are too young, and even already have shewn too little regard for their own national faith, to have a right to distrust that of others; and especially of a nation so long distinguished by a faithful adherence to its engagements, and which, even at this moment, enjoys the confidence of Europe more than any other, as is manifested by the readiness with which the people of all countries, even of France itself, still lend and confide their money to the British government, notwithstanding its embar [...]asments. But what renders this objection more contemptible is, that it proceeds from those very men who were most active in evading and violating the most solemn engagements, and the most sacred obligations of justice respecting the redemption and value of the Congress bills of credit. The last objection against a reconciliation with Great-Britain is, that it would be rep [...]g [...]ant to our engagements with France, and consequently dishonorable and ungratefull in us. No man can be more jealous of the honor of America, or more zealous in its support than I was, so long as even the semblance [Page]of it promoted our public measures; but my jealousy and zeal were naturally extinguished when Congress on the 18th of March, 1780, committed that very act, which, but six months before, they had unanimously and publicly reprobated as "excerable deed," an ‘unpardonable sin,’ and which, by their own judgment and sentence would justly ‘render us a reproach and a bye-word among the nations of the Earth,’ and make us "appear like a common prostitute among chaste and respectable matrons, &c"— Such being our situation, such our crime and punishment, according to the decision and sentence of our own representative. I do not conceive that any deviation from our engagements with France, can add to our national dishonor, nor can I indeed discover any way to escape this dishonor and infamy, but by deserting that independency which we have so disgracefully perverted, and blending ourselves again with the British nation, but I would not even for so desirable a purpose commend an unjustifiable departure from our treaties with France. It has already been demonstrated, that the French government considers itself, as at liberty, to desert us at the end of an un [...]uccessful war, and consequently we must be entitled to the same liberty, and to the same interpretation of our engagements.— Should we continue independent, our treaties with France ought to be most sacredly fulfilled, but we never could have intended by those treaties, [Page]to bind ourselves eternally to fight for independeney, even when the attainment of it becomes evidently impossible, and when through our own incapacity, it is more likely to prove injurious than beneficial to us, such an engagement, had we even been insane enough to make would be nu [...], because it would be contrary to the first laws and duties of nature. Politicians do not generally feel or expect much from sentiments of national gratitude, yet I am far from wishing that my countrymen should become ungrateful. I have been as you well know most ready to magnify our obligation to the French, as well from my personal regard to that nation, as from a persuasion, that the appearance of gratitude on our side would produce beneficial effects. I was willing even to err by an excess of grateful sentiments towards our new ally, so long as that excess appeared harmless, but when a claim on our gratitude is set up, and opposed to the peace and happiness of millions, it becomes proper at least to enquire if it is well sounded? In what, let me ask are we obliged to France? She scarcely knew a single individual of our country, and therefore could not have been actuated by any motive of regard for us, at the time when she began to afford us secret assistance. It is with reluctance that I enter on the discussion of this question, even privately with you, but it is as easy, as it is expedient to ascertain the views of the French government and its [Page]conduct towards us; envious as well as apprehensive of the rapid increase of the British wealth and power, a r [...]inous contest between different parts of the British empire, wa [...] naturally viewed with particular s [...]sfection and to prolong this centest, with all its destructive consequences, it was thought politic to assist the weakest side, which was ours, enmity towards the British nation, and not a regard for us was the prevailing motive. In similar circumstances as much assistance would have been given to any other people under heaven, and there can be no cause for gratitude for any aid given in such circumstances, and with such views. The first an of the French government evidently was to assist us just so far as might be absolutely necessary to prevent an accommodation, and to give this assistance with so much secrecy as to avoid any rupture with Great Britain. On this plan succours were first permitted to be dealt out to us, by private individuals, and only on condition of future payment, but afterwards we were thought to be such cheap and effectual instruments of mischief to the British nation, that more direct and gratuitous aids were afforded us; these were however soon discovered, and frequently complained of by the British government, and as often denied by that of France. The whole of the year 1777 passed in a succession of complaints from Lord [...] t [...]rmont on one side, and of solemn denials accompanied with the most friendly protestations [Page]and assurances from the French minister on the other. Each complaint produced a temporary suspension of our succours, and a new contrivance for secretly conveying them to America, and eluding the vigilance of the British minister. While the French cou [...]t was thus violating its [...]ng [...]gements and promises to Great-Britain, it does not appear to have ever expected, or desired, that we should become independent, but on the contrary to have always had in view and contemplation, the time whe [...] we were to b [...] subdued, and lest at the mercy of Great-Brit [...]in, and when it would be nighly dangerous for us o [...] possess any evidence of the assitance we had received, or of the fa [...]acy of those amicable assurances and protestations which had been so often repeated to the British Ambassader, and accordingly all inter ourse between the French minister and us, passed by me [...]ns and channels s [...]ed to the views I have just described. No written proof of the least importance was ever left in our hands, even Mr. Gerard's letters appointing occasional interviews with us, were always without any signature, and though five hundred thousand livres were quarterly paid to our Banker, from the Royal Treasury, not the smallest evidence of the source from whence that subsidy came, was permitted to remain in our power. So much precaution did nor pass unnoticed by us at that period. I saw clearly, and with concern, that it was dictated [Page]by a persuasion that we should be finally subdued by the arms of Great-Britain, and an intention finally to desert and disown having ever had any connection with us: Towards the end of the summer 1777, this court seems to have thought the time near for so abandoning and disavowing us. The capture of Ticonderoga, and the progress of General Burgovne's army on one side, with the victory at the Brandywine, and the taking of Philadelphia on the other, convinced the French Ministers, that the period of our resistance would soon come, and made them solicitous to remove every impression which the assistance previously given to us might have been made on the British Government. Amicable protestations and assurances were therefore renewed, with unusual servour, and least words alone should be insufficient, they proceeded to important and effectual acts of complaisance American armed vessels were every where arrested and detained in the French ports, and afterwards only permitted to sail, under engagements to return home without committing any act of hostilit in the Puropean Seas. Two v [...]uable Jamaica ships, taken by American privateers, and brought to Nan [...]z, were wrested from the captors, and restored to their former British owners. Injunctions of a nature not to be disobeyed were sent to all the ports affording us any supply of military stores. &c. and to gratify Lord Stormont, the Captain of the ship Amphitrite [Page]was thrown into prison, for having carried such st [...]res to America, though with the privity and approbation of this Court. The principal actor in this affair was under the greatest apprehensions and alarm for his own sa [...]ety, when a messenger arrived with the news of General Burgoyne's army having surrendered to that of General Gates. The [...]ews allayed his fears, and stopped those proceenings, by which the French government had already manifested it's intentions to disown and abandon us. The impression which th [...]s news made in England, and the intention ann [...]uncea in Parliament, of soon offering the most liberal terms to America, produced a sudden change in the conduct and policy of this Court respecting us. It was perceived, or at least believed, that nothing short of an open declaration in our favour, would pretract the quarrel, or prevent our reconciliation with Great Britain; and it was apprehended, that when reconciled, both countries might turn their force against France,—England from resentment for what had been done, and America for what had been refused for our support. The French Ministry then appeared, for the first time, to think seriously of promoting a final separation between us and our parent country, being convinced, from the strength which we had manifested, in singly resisting the power of Great Britain, and the general discouragement which notoriously prevailed in that nation, that [Page]such a separation might be effected with but little difficulty, and no danger to France.

The proposals of Congress, therefore, which had been lest twelve months unnoticed, were suddenly accepted, and the treaties speedily concluded, and afterwards hastily announced to the world, in order to frustrate the pacific endeavours of the British Government, and engage us to reject it's liberal offers, for promoting a reconciliation. Having been personally engaged in concluding and signing the treaties with France and personally favoured and obliged to it's Government, and being also persuaded as I then was, that those treaties would prove infinitely beneficial to our country, I very naturally approved of their ratification, and of the rejection of all terms offered by the British Commissioners. Situated as I then was, and thinking as I then did, it was impossible for me to act otherwise; but yet I shall for ever regret, that a majority of our countrymen were not wise enough to know, and pursue their own interests, and to accept of offers, which contained every thing conducive to their future peace and prosperity, and which, had the, been accepted, would have saved us and our parent country innumerable calamities, and have preserved thousands of useful rives, with oceans of kindred blood, which have been since offered up as a sacrifice to our idol, Independency.—Unhappily that time and opportunity were irrecoverably lost, and all regrets [Page]must necessarily prove unavailing. It now only remains with us to employ all our thoughts and faculties in repairing the mischiefs that are past, and stopping their future progress.

In examining the motives and views of the French ministry there appears no reason to believe that the change in its system and policy towards us, and the treaties thereby produced, were the effect of a regard for our country, any more than the preceding resolution to disown and abandon us, had been—In every variation of conduct, this Ministry, like true politicians, pursued what they considered as the interests of their country, regardless of ours; and though I have no desire to censure them for acting from such motives I cannot admit that any just title to our gratitude can be from thence derived.—If we proceed to review what has passed since the treaties were announced, we shall doubtless find abundant reason to form the same conclusion.—By your station in Congress you must have necessarily known the extent and nature of the succours afforded to us by this government since the war, and I cannot believe, after mature consideration, that they have been such as to lay our country under any great load of obligation.—I do not mean, like Mr. J. Adams, to assert, that ‘France has broken, or at least not fulfilled the terms of her alliance with us,’ though, between ourselves, I cannot but think there is some foundation for such an assertion, by the letter as well [Page]as the spirit of the treaty; the first article of which says, ‘If war should break out between France and Great-Britain during the continuance of the present war between the United States and England, his Majesty and the United States shall make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils and their forces, according to the exigence of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies.’

It is to be remembered, that before France entered into the war, we had alone supported a very unequal contest with Great-Britain for near three years, and had thereby incurred an enormous debt, and nearly exhausted all our credit and resources; it might therefore have been expected from the terms of our engagement, that instead of continuing to bear an unequal share of the burthen, our own proportion would have been lightened by our Ally, in consideration of what we had previously done and suffered alone; but has this been in any degree the case? Is it even true that France has since, in proportion to her superior wealth and numbers, borne a just share of the war? No enemy has ravaged or even landed within this kingdom; no new tax has been levied to support the war; almost every thing expended is the fruit of oeconomy, and has been employed in building and sustaining a formidable navy, and particular care has been used to expose it as little as possible, in order [Page]that it may remain entire at the end of the war. The same principle which has furnished the means, appears likewise to direct the operations of the war on this side, whilst England and America have been wasting their strength and resources against each other; very strong and early representations were as you know made, and from time to time repeated, to this government, respecting the disorder of our finances, and the absolute impossibility of supporting the war, unless our ally would either lend, or assist us in borrowing considerable sums of money; but these representations produced no effect, altho' France has from the beginning always been able to borrow with so much facility, that there could have been no difficulty in affording us sufficient pecuniary aid, if the inclination to do it had not been wanting. It is not until since the alarming revolt of the Pennsylvania and Jersey troops, that this government could ever be brought to promise a single shilling towards paying the army in America, and the sum now granted is placed under the direction of General Washington, in a way that manifests a total want of confidence in Congress, and renders the General in effect independent of the body by whom he is commissioned, and who will not dare either to dismiss, or even to disoblige him; because without his concurrence, the army cannot obtain a single shilling. You can best decide whether Congress has deserved this distrust, not to say [Page]insult; but if that body has deserved this, it certainly does not merit the confidence of America; and in either case, the preference shewn to General Washington seems likely to produce dangerous jealousies to say no more; the esteem which I have long entertained for him precludes every suspicion that he will adopt, or become the instrument of any improper design. But this reference will doubtless be considered and represented in America, as indicating an intention in this government to attach General Washington, to the interests of France, and to support him against all opposition, and it is easy to conceive the animofities likely to result from such apprehensions.

Respecting the sea and land forces sent at different times to America, they doubtless were never suited nor intended to drive the British forces out of the United States, probably this government thinks that so great a part of the British forces can no where be employed and wasted so advantageously for France, as in fighting against the people of America, where they can do no harm to the French nation, and where we are under the necessity of opposing them, but were the British fleets and armies transferred from the continent to the West-India islands, it would depend on our inclination, whether we followed them or not, and in either case but especially in the latter, the French and Spanish possessions would be in imminent danger. These [Page]reasons sufficiently explain, why in truth, the French Government never did nor will make any effectual efforts to drive the English from New-York, &c. Respecting the fleet and army sent last year to Rhode-Island, under the command of Mons. de Ternay, and Mons. de Rochambeau, you who were in Congress, need not be told the purpose for which they were professed to be sent, and probably by this time, you will be convinced that the great additional force which was promised, and of which the first sent was represented only as the van guard, was really never intended to follow, and that the true, though secret object in view, was not so much to act offensively against the British forces, as to secure and hold Rhode-Island, in the same manner as Queen Elizabeth held cautionary towns belonging to the Dutch. This Government has for a confiderable time been apprehensive that Great-Britain might soon regain the southern States by conquest, or their own defection, but it was also expected that the people of New-England, by more vigorous and persevering efforts would still maintain the contest, even if all the other States should be again reduced to their former dependence, on the Crown of Great-Britain. The herbour of Rhode Island is commodiously situated in the center of New England, and was therefore thought a desireable possession by the French Ministry, and a fleet and army were accordingly sent to fortify [Page]themselves, and remain there, ready to favour and encourage those among us, who should appear more attached to the French interest, and disposed to go the most desperate lengths against reconciliation with Great-Britain, and at the same time ready to overawe and restrain those of a contrary disposition. Indeed any one who considers how long the French fleet and army have remained in their station at Rhode-Island, without having ever received any order to engage in the smallest offensive enterprize, and that no attempt has been made to send even the smallest part of the reinforcements promised, must conclude that this fleet and army were not sent to America for our sakes, so much as to gain an advantageous strong hold in our country, and a controling influence over the people there, in order to prevent our reconciliation with Great-Britain, until we shall both have so far weakened and ruined each other, that France with a formidable navy carefully preserved, will at the close of the war have nothing to fear, whatever becomes of us, or of our independency. Many other facts might be adduced, but they cannot be necessary to support this general representation of the policy and views of France towards us, and to invalidate every cliam which may be made from thence, on our gra [...]itude, if it be then true that there is no validity, in either of these objections, nor any probability of finally establishing our independency, and if the establishment [Page]of it would more likely prove prejudicial than beneficial to us, it is high time to reflect on our situation, and instantly terminate the destructive contest in which we are engaged. Dr. Franklin's sentiments on the separation of America from Great-Britain, even after the declaration of independency, are very plainly, as well as forcibly expressed, in his letter to Lord Howe, ‘Long (says this venerable patriot) did I endeavour with unfeigned and unwearied zeal, to preserve from breaking that fine and noble China Case—the British Empire, for I knew, that being once broken, the separate parts could not retain their share of the strength and value that existed in the whole; and that a perfect re-union of those parts could scarce ever be hoped for.’ I know of nothing that has occurred since the date of that letter, to induce Doctor Franklin to change his private sentiments on this subject, it is true that at that time, a re-union, though devoutly to have been wished for, could scarce be hoped or expected, so long as every original cause of the separation still existed, and were so many obstacles in the way of the wished for re-union; but those having been since removed, and America having fatarly experienced, ‘that separate, it does not retain even it's share of that strength and value which existed in the whole.’ On the Doctor's own principles, a re-union ought to be hoped for, and endeavoured after with unfeigned and [Page] [...]wearied zeal by him, and by every friend to America. If our own future prosperity requires that we be again united to Great-Britain, and if through inability to resist, we must eventually return to that nation, it is both parricide and suicide to employ and waste our strength and blood for the destruction of a country, which is shortly to become our's, and to which we must hereafter resort for protection and support, against those to whom we are now attached, and whose ba [...]tles we are fighting. But besides the f [...]lly and wickedness, we ought to reflect on the danger of such conduct, for if we cannot finally withstand Great Britain, nothing can be more hazardous than to prevoke her resentment, by [...]n obstinate and desperate resistance—If the United States persist in rejecting all evertures for a reconciliation, and be finally conquered, after mis [...]hievously protracting the evils of civil war, as long as possible, what favour and indulgence can they reasonably expect? These considerations are of the utmost importance to our future wellbeing, and wretched will our condition doubtless become, should they be much longer disregarded.

The causes which first occasioned the civil war, have long ceased to exist, the acts complained of have been repealed, all right of taxing us, solemnly renounced by the British Parliament, and offers made to us at different times, more than equivalent to all that was originally [Page]demanded by our delegates in Congress. We therefore no longer contend for our rights, but for Sovereign Dominion, for a new o [...]ject, to which we had originally no claim, and which even after the commencement of hostilities we most solemnly professed to hold in aversion and abhorrence. This is the idol, which in the days of peace, and under the empire of reason we behold with sentiments of detestation, but which in the rags and phrenz [...] of civil war, we have set up and worshipped. This is the false divinity, whose votaries we have become, and on whose altars we daily offer up the dearest of all sacrifices. The peace and presperity of our country, and the blood of our nearest relations and friends. To labour in curing this madness, and in exciting forgiveness, peace, and brotherly love among the contending parts of the British empire, would certainly be a most laudable and meriterious employment, and never did any contest afford so many reasons for charity and mutual forgiveness as the present. "To err is human." but in case of error, be it on either side, is peculiarly entitled to indulgence from the other; the cause of this dispute having been so intricate, and the question of right so doubtful, that the wisest and best men would not avoid thinking differently about them. Those therefore, who unrelentingly cherish vindictive resentments on this subject, and deny forgiveness to each other, will have very little reason to ask, or expect [Page]it of Heaven—Let us then exert our utmost efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation, if we accelerate these blessings, if we contribute to receive "transcendent relation" that formerly subsisted between us and our parent country, we shall deserve the applauses of present and future generations, and in every event we shall at least secure the approbation of our own consciences. I pretend not to know exactly the terms on which a reconciliation might now be effected, every overture from Great-Britain having been treated with insult, and considered by u [...] as a proof of her weakness and our own strength, no encouragement has been left to further offers; on her part, enough however has already been offered to afford a basis for safe and honorable negociation; and I am fully persuaded that every thing which we ought to desire, every thiug consistent with our own and the general good of the Empire, may be finally obtained if we do not neglect the present opportunity and wait till conquest supersedes all negociation. It never can be the interest of Great-Britain to deny our reasonable demands, because it can never be beneficial to her to govern a people so remote, and so rapidly encreasing, by force; and on our parts, we should recall amd regulate our demands by those sentiments which Congress professed even after the commencement of hostilities. ‘Our breasts, said they, retain too tender a regard for the kingdom from which we derive our [Page]origin, to renew such a reconcili [...]tion as might, in any manner, be inconsistent with her dignity or her welfare; these, related as we are to her, honour and duty, as well as inclination, induce us to support and advance’ Every thing which we can ask consistently with these sentiments, will not, I am confident, be denied to us. Respecting the first measures towards a negociation with the British Government, they must, I think, begin among the people at large, in the same manner as the first steps towards the present contest originated—If the people in general be made sensible of the mischiefs and dangers attending the present pursuit of independency, they will naturally assemble as formerly, in town meetings, &c. and by suitable resolutions will procure instructions from their several assemblies to their delegates in Congress, for promoting a negotiation and reconciliation with the parent country; and if it should appear that a majority of the states is not inclined to [...]egocia [...]e, in that case they never can be in doubt about suitable ways and means to treat scparately.

If these facts and observations appear to you well founded, I beg you will employ them in such way as may be best suited to promote the salutary purposes of this letter. I do not however wish that any part of it should at this time be ascribed to me, unless there may be more necessity for it than I can at present conceive of; [Page]I shall however acquiesce in every thing you may think expedient in this respect, as I am confident, that though our countrymen may not be yet prepared for the [...] truths, the time cannot be distant in which they will be universally admitted, and when recovering from our present delirium, we shall reflect with anguish of mind on the blessings we have lost, and the miseties we have suffered by ou [...] pursuit of in dependency. When that period arrives, we shall equally regret, and wonder at our infatuation in desiring to separate from a people to whom we were connected by all the ties of consanguinity, mutual affection, and interest; by similarity of religion, laws, manners, and language; and generally by every thing fitted to bind mankind to each other; a people justly celebrated above all others for civil and religious liberty, for public and private virtues, for philosophy, science and arts, and generally for all that exalts and adorns human nature; and we shall no less regre [...] and wonder that in thu [...] breaking the ‘bonds of law, loyalty, faith and blood;’ in thus discarding all remembrance of former benefits, all ‘pride in the glorious atchievements of our common ancestors, and all affection for the heirs of the [...] virtues,’ and separating from an empire, which (by our own confession) ‘has been the envy and admiration of ages,’ we should at the same time [...]ni [...]e ourselves to, and render ourselves virtually dependen [...] [...]n, a nation and government, [Page]which we and our fathe [...]s have considered as hereditary inimical to us, to our religion, and to every species of freedom. As I have devoted this letter solely to reflections on the public affairs of our country, and have already made it so long, I will not add to it by saying any thing more, than that I am with the most sincere respect and friendship,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient And very humble servant, (Signed) SILAS DEANE.

To the Honourable Jesse Root, Esq Member of Congress, Philadelphia.

Mr Silas Deane's Letter to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, at Gen. Washington's Head-Quarters.

Paris, 20th May, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

YOUR letter of September last did not come to hand until a few d [...]s since, its de [...]ntion is to me p [...]ctly [...] countable—You ask me what I think [...] aff [...] and [...]hat [...]ll be the issue of [...]nem—Thinking in the manner I do, silence on the subject would be prudence, at least [Page]in me; but it would not be acting the friendly and open part towards you—In a word, I think that our affairs were never at any period in a worse situation than at present, and that the issue of the war if continued much longer, will be in the ruin and slavery of our country. You may be assured that England is determined, o [...] no consideration, nor in any circumstances whatever, to admit of our independency; that nation is neither exhausted nor dispirited, its energy, resources, and national character never appeared in a greater and more striking point of view than at this time; you are not to suppose that all the powers of Europe have deserted Great-Britain, and become indifferent to the fate of a nation which at different periods have relieved and defended most of them, when in the most imminent danger themselves; nor have you any ground to conclude, as too many rashly do, that because no power in Europe has as yet declared for England, that therefore they all (at least secretly) wish us success. There is no nation at this day in Europe, except England, in which the subjects are in reality anything more than the properts of government, for except that arbitrary and tyrannical nation of Great-Britain, they are no where entitled to any share in the legislation. The government of Holland, about which you have heard s [...] much and know so little, is included in the above description, being an absolute aristocracy, the members of which are not [Page]chosen by the people, but by those who compose the aristocracy; that government is in its nature as despotic as any in Europe, but fortunately for its subjects, the genius of commerce protects them from the baneful effects of despotism; they think they are free, they have not experienced the contrary, and until lately have been happy, but is it not surprising that we should imagine, that monarchs who hold their own subjects in chains, should, from motives of disinterested generosity and the love of liberty, assist a people in their revolt from a government infinitely milder than their own? A people whose first and favorite position is, that all men are by nature equal. Reflect cooly for a moment if the sounding epithets of great, good, generous, disinterested ally, protector of the liberties of mankind, &c. will protect you, and then answer me: Few nations ever engaged in war but from motives of ambition, interest or revenge; the latter is notoriously the sole motive in Spain for the present; her interest in incompatable with our independency, in every point in which it can be viewed. Spain is sensible of this, and therefore will not acknowledge us—Can it be believed that an arbitrary, despotic and jealous monarchy can wish to see a mighty empire of confederated republics, whose religion, genius, and form of government are directly the reverse to, and naturally at war with theirs, established in the neighbourhood of all its treasures? at the doors of its unarmed and [Page]enervated colouies? But Holland is also at war with England! rather say that England is at war with Holland, for the latter has not, as yet, made a single reprisal; but if the States of Holland enter seriously into the war, they will not do it on our account, nor will they take any part in our affairs; they have told Mr. Adams so, in plain but modest terms, repeatedly—They are not so much interested against our independency as Spain; but they are far from being interested to have it established, every other power to the North are interested in a greater or less degree against us, the natural produce of their country being the same as ours. As to those to the South they must naturally be indifferent to our fate, except Portugal, which is essentially affected by what affects England, and is of course as great an enemy to our independency as England can be; but the Southern powers, Spain excepted, are of very little importance in the present subject. If I were to hazard a conjecture it would be, that the Emperor of Germany & Empress of Russia will ultimately take part with England, and decide the contest, and that the terms of peace will finally be dictated by them. If we continue to reject all overtures, until such an event arrives, unconditional submission will be our fate; but if those and all the other Powers in Europe, remain peaceable spectators of the war, it does not follow that Great-Britain must fall, her naval power and resources are equal to those [Page]of all her enemies, and the war being solely maritime, the event must be uncertain, Great-Britain is undoubtedly able to support the war for several years to come, and she is at all events resolved to hazard every thing sooner than yield to our independency; but suppose the war continued for two years longer, and suppose at that period, the resources and maritime power of Great-Britain exhausted and broken, her credit lost, and general bankruptcy and despair throughout her dominions, and finding no friend to interfere, that she is obliged to receive the law from her enemies.—This may afford a triumph for us for a moment, before our resentments have time to cool, but when we have laid down our arms and become cool enough to look round, and examine our situation, we shall find that we have purchased this triumph at the price of the peace, safety and liberty of our country, we shall by that time find our country exhausted and ravaged, an immense national debt on us, and the expences of our civil government, and public departments, so greatly increased, that the burthen of the whole will be unsupportable.— The war has already cost us more than thirty millions sterling, if justice were to be done to every one, and though by the breach of public faith, and the highest act of national injustice and despotism ever known, it is liquidated at much less, yet two years continuance of the war, will leave us near that sum in debt, the new [Page]established government will cost us, ten times more than the old ever did; we now expend near 20,000l. sterling annually, on foreign embassies and agencies, at the peace these establishments must be enlarged, as well as the expence; Congress must be supported in a certain dignity, Boards of Treasury, of Marine, of Commerce, &c. must be established with salaries, sufficient to induce men of abilities to serve; Consuls in the different foreign ports must be appointed, a marine force must be kept up to a certain degree, or our flag will not be respected, nor our commerce protected in any part of the world.—In short, from the best calculations I can make, the expences of our public government will greatly exteed 100,000l. sterling annually, independent of the expences of the government of each particular State, which will necessarily be increated, and if j [...]stice be done our officers and soldiers, in their half pay, the expences of our new public government only, will be at least 300,000l. sterling annually. The proportion of the public debt to Conn [...]cticut, supposing that State to share one equal thirteenth of the whole, will exceed two millions sterling, that state is the best able to pay taxes, of any in the confederation, will it be able to pay the interest only of such a sum, and its proportion of the public current expences, in addition to those of their private government? You know it is impossible.—Will the States when peace leaves local prejudices, [Page]ancient jealoufies, and every other seed of contention at liberty to spring up and operate, will they agree in the partition of their public debts and expences, in the share of vacant lands, of emoluments, and o [...]c [...]s? In short, will they agree in any thing, will the honest Farmers in Connecticut be contented to find, that after they have suffered so much, in a war, professedly undertaken to free them from taxes, and impositions, that their lands have become mortgaged nearly to their value? Will not discontent prevail universally in the States, between each other, and amo [...]g the individuals of each, and will the Democratic system we have adopted, have sufficient energy to govern so extensive a continent, uneasy and convulsed in every part? Will it be able to prevent universal Anarchy, the natural child of Democracy in every age and nation, of the world? If ever a state was calculated for Democracy, it must have been Connecticut; an equality of fortune, the influence of religious sentiments, sober, virtuous and frugal manners, with the small extent of territory, were all in our favour; and we and our ancestors were happy under an apparent Democracy—I say apparent, for we always beheld and acknowledged a supreme power at a distance, and complied with its requisitions, but the case will be materially different in future, if independency is established at the peace, b [...]sides are our manners the same as formerly? Have they been changed for the [Page]better or worse? If civil feuds and anarchy pre [...]ail, [...]e shall lie at the mercy of any power that may be disposed to interfere, it is next to impossible but that they will not prevail, and I leave you to reflect on the consequences, but if France and Spain succeed with our assistance in ruining Great Britain, if they dictate the law to us also? They certainly will, it is not in the nature of a despotic victorious Power to do otherwise; and if they dictate the feverest conditions, to whom have we to apply?— No power on earth will be left to take our part, no one whom either affection or interest will induce to interfere, that great nation from whom we have so often boasted of our descent, that nation which has so often unlocked its treasures and spill'd its best blood, in the defence of the rights and liberties of other nations, tho' strangers to her, will not be able to reach a helping hand to her descendants in distress; she may afford us her unavailing pity, or offer feeb'e entreaties on our behalf, but we have no reason to expect either, I view our situation as with Sylla on the one hand and Charybdis on the other, and our pilots drunk with the intoxicating ideas of independent sovereignty, madly pushing us into that vortex, in which our peace liberty and safety will be swallowed up and lost for ever, if you ask me what is to be done, I say make peace immediately on the best terms you can, the present moment is a favourable our, we are now of [Page]more weight in the scale, than we can possibly be in a general treaty, at the close of the war, we may then find ourselves light as the dust of the balance, at best but a meer article to be set off to either fide, on a general settlement of account; Mr. Sebor will write to you by this conveyance, and I leave him to inform you of Simonet's villainy and imposture in the bill which he sold you, as well as of other private matters, for I am heartily tired, and my spirits are too low to attempt a more chearful subject at present, wishing you success and happiness, I am with sincere esteem and friendship,

My Dear Sir,

Your most obedient, And very humble Servant, S. DEANE.

Major Benj. Tallmadge, at Gen. Washington's Head-Quarters.

Notes

1.

(1). Of all the energetical causes effecting so m [...]y revolutions in the world, not one of them have existed in North-America. Neither religion nor the laws were outraged. Martyrs or citizens had not been massed out of [...]heir blood upon the scaffold. No i [...]sult had been committed against morality, manners, or customs, nor any thing dear to a people. Not a man had been snatched from the bosom of his family or friend to perish in the horrors of a dungeon. Public order was not inverted. The principles of administration, remained unaltered, and the maxims of government continued what they ever had been. The whole amounted only to this, whether the parent country, had, or had not a right, directly or indirectly, to put a trifling duty on the colonies? For the grievances accumulated in the declaration of independency, amount to nothing, because the first grievance—a question nearly metaphysical, was not sufficient to justify a general commotion, and much less an insurrection, for which a country is to behold herself deprived of the hands that should have been her support, her harvests ravaged, and her fields covered with the carcases of her relations, or stained with her own blood.

2.

(2). Were they (the Congress) ignorant that the understanding is no more to be controled than opinions? Did they not perceive that in the present crifia every reasonable citizen was fearful of exposing his estate? were they not apprized that i [...] the birth of a republic they permitted deeds of despotism, unknown to countries already moulded into slavery!

3.

(3). 'Tis the reproach of the Councils of Lewis the XVIth, that they have tarnished the Majesty of the first power upon the glope, by disavowing in the face of the uriverse, the succours clandestinely given to the Americans. It is a reproach that the intrigues of Minister [...], or the ascendancy of certain obscure agents, have engaged the nation in a destructive war, when the springs of government should have been strengthened to heal the wound of a reign, the last half of which had been contemptible and weak, divided between plunder and disgrace, the meaness of vice, and the convulsions of arbitrary power. It is a reproach to have provoked to arms by an insidious policy, and to become entangled in speeches unworthy of France to utter to England, the language of a cowardly bravado, giving the lie to projects already formed, and the real set time [...]ts of the hearts language, debasing him that uses it, without deceiving those to whom it is spoken, and which expeses to a disgrace, profitable neither to the minister nor the ration. Why ask then the reason that men who have in their hands all the power of the nation, and who to be obeyed have only to speak the word [...] comma [...]d, suffered themselves to be sur [...]r [...]zed in every sea by an enemy whose constitution ne [...]essarity compels them to be slo [...]? Why suffer themselves by an into siderate treaty to be entangled in the net of a Congress, that should have been herd in a state of dependance, for their large and regular [...] sid [...]es?—Europe, that has her eyes fixed upon us, [...] a grand design, and not a [...]ell-judged step to accomplish it; sees in out arsenals, and in [...]u [...]po [...]ts, immense preparations but no execution; sees menacing fleets and little or nothing effected, courage and bravery in individuals; in the chiefs effeminacy and irresolution—here every thing that bespeaks the strength and commanding power of a great people, and there the weakness and tardiness, natural to the character and aims of the most inconsiderable. It is by this striking contradiction between our projects and our conduct, between our means and the head that directs them, that the genius of Great-Britain stunned for a moment, recovered its vigor, and to this hour, 'tis a problem for Europe to selve, whether in declaring for America, we have not ourselves increased the strength of England.

4.

(4) In fine, philoso hy, whose first sensation is a detu [...] [...] all governmen [...] j [...]st [...]nd all nation [...] happy; in glaneing a eye [...] [...]nce of a monarchy w [...]h? people d [...]serding their liberty, looks for the [...]. T [...]o well she perceive that the se [...]city of ma kind is no part of [...]. She think [...] th [...] love of justice had any infl [...]ence upon th [...] Cou [...]t of Ver [...]is [...]le [...]t would hav [...] [...]de a part of the first article, that every oppreifed people had [...] to rise againsh their oppressors.

5.

(5) If I am asked for names to be given some years hence, to the firmness the English are now demonstrating; the answer will be, I don't know—As to what they merit, I do know—I know that the a [...]n [...] of the world rarely shew a nation chusing rather to rencunce her exislence than her glory.

6.

(6) Is it possible that a strict union can long subsist between confederates of such opposite characters as [...]he hot, disd [...]inful, and inconstant Frenchman; the slow, haughty, jealous, and cold Spaniard; and the American, who retai [...]s a lasting regard to his Mother Cou [...]try, rejoicing in the misfortunes of his allies, as far as it is compatible with his independence—Can those people, whether acting in concert or separately, avoid mutual accusations, complaints and quarrels? Besides, history informs us, that few leagues have divided the spoils of the nation against which they were aimed—Athens was victorious over the Persians—Rome delivered from Han [...]ba [...], and in modern times, Venice escaped the fam [...]s league of Cambray; and now in our day. Prussia by the genius of only one man, made a head in Europe, and this should induce us to suspend our judgment it upon the issue of the presen [...] war—In a word, it w [...] consider the spiritof the French nation, which is so oppofite to that against which they are contending, w [...] shall see that the French a [...]dor is perhape, as ready to infl [...]me as to extinguish itself; that it hopes every thing at the beginning, and that it des [...]ai [...] of all things when checked by an [...]b [...]ac [...]e; and that, as belonging to its character, it wants the eathusiasm of success to acquire new successes—That the English, on the contrary, less presumpt [...]ous at the on [...]et, notwithstanding their natural pride, know how, at a proper time, to fight with courage, ise with danger, and harden themselves against he disgrace of adversity, like the stout oak, to which H [...]ace compares the R [...]mans, which smitten by the [...], and hacked by the steel, grows under the strokes, and draws fresh vigor even from its wounds.

7.

(7). It is odd that the nations have not yet crossed the projects meditated against Great-Britain. A general resentment for the injustice and arrogance of this proud island, must be the cause of this inactivity; but hatred subsides when interest appears 'Tis possible for Europe to judge against her own safety for the depression of the power of Great-Britain, in the old and new hemisphere, and that after rejoicing in the humiliations an [...] dangers of this proud and tyrannical power, they take up arms to desend her.

The following is one of the Papers intercepted with Mr. Silas Dean's letters; and from the matter and style, seems to be a composition of his, tho' none of his letters expressly refers to it as an inclosure. It was probably put under a cover to some one or other of his particular friends, which is missing.
The AMERICAN ACCOUNT CURRENT, with its Vouchers.

[Page]

THE war between America and Great-Britain, was enter [...] [...] on account of certain acts of Parliament, injurous to the rights and privileges of the former; unhappily to [...] count [...]es, the [...] misre [...]resentations of de [...]ning man on hot: [...] prevail [...]d so far as to have the most unfavourable construction put, by each p [...]ty, on every word or [...] of the other, and [...] the [...] the [...] extre [...]ity, an appeal to the sword.—America [...] [...] (single and u [...]supp [...]ted) to contend with Great-Britain, applied to France the [...]reditary [...] the latter, for assistance [...] was formed, and the refusal of Great-Britain to rece [...]e from its claimt, or to rep [...]al the [...] complained of, [...] [Page]the measure taken by America, in the opinion of great part of Europe.

Great-Britain from conviction, that the acts c [...]mplained of were wrong, has receded from the claims which occasioned the first une [...]iness, and now invites America to return, and be reconciled.

America says, that it is too late, that she has put herself under other pretection, and made choice of a new friend, which she will not on any consideration desert.

In this situation, and after six years contest, it is not unseasonable to enquire, what have been the gains or losses of America, to this time, and to state facts, from which a judgement may be formed, with moral certainty, what her future loss or gain will be.—I propose, in the first place, to state the acco [...] of the loss and gain of America, in the present war to this time, and to cite facts to justify the charge [...], or credits entered on each fide;—and in the second place, to state all the facts, necessary to enable us, to judge with moral certainty of the final issue of the adventure, and to calculate if the balance be now found in favour of America, whether it is equal to the risque: she has already run, and the probability of increasing or lesing such balance by continuing of the adventure:—On the other hand, if it fall against her, what probable chance or prospect she has of retrieving her loss, or of increasing it by going on, being simply a merchant, I know of no other method equally plain and certain, to come at the true state of America, at this time, or for calculating, with any degree of certainty, as to the future; as my couatrymen, even the most illi [...]erate understands something of accounts, and my great and sole object being to state in the most simple and plain manner possible, [Page]the real situation of America. I shall make use of such mercantile terms only, as are universa [...]y understood, by which if the account shall have one article wrongly charged in it, or if any thing be given for a fact, which is not such, I shall be open to im [...] conviction.

[...] to [...]ting of the account it is necessary to examine what the state of America was at, and for some time before the commencement of the war, by which it will be seen at once on comparing it, with the present, on which side the balance lies.

In 1775, the number of inhabitants amounted to about three millions, settled on a sea coast of near 1500 miles in extent, with an immense continent behind them, fettile and uninhabited, except by a few wandering savages; and being all employed (a very few [...] in the innocent and healthful business of cultivating the earth, this, stock of inhabitants, independent of importations increased at the rate of doubling or cent per cent. every twenty years; their [...] exportations, which consisted in all kinds of provisions, in lumber, tobacco, indigo, and other produce of the country, amounted to nearly three millions and an half ste [...]ing.

The demand for this produce, encouraged and paid for the clearing up, and improving the lands, and gave such a spring of agriculture and navigation, that those most useful arts were carried to great persection, and were rapidly improving.

This annual exportation, of three millions and an half, was not a clear profit in favour of America, for the greatest part of it, and at times the whole, was returned in foreign commodities, part of which might have been dispensed with, but at the same time it must be acknowledged, that if [...] the tasie for [Page]foreign superfluities and luxuries, excited the Americans to clear up, improve and cultivate their country, as the only means by which they could obtain them; this produced a substantial and pe [...]manent addition to the stock, or capital wealth of the country—And if it be granted, that the real wealth of any country, is to be estimated from the number of inhabitants living comfortably within it, and the quantity of its produce of the most necessary articles, [...] clear that America, tho' it had not the practed, had the most it creasing capital of any country in the world—It has already been observed that the increase of population in America, was at the rate of cent per cent every twenty years; and if their exports are examined, they will be found to have increased in still greater proportion from 1675 to 1775. This observation be carried further, and it would be easy to shew, that every useful art and science had, during the same period, kept pace with the population and cultivation of the country in America— But it is sufficient for the present adjustment of our general account, to shew that the capital, or stock of America, in 1775, without mentioning less [...] a ticles, consisted in a fertile country of immense extent; three millions of free industrious inhabitants, living in independent ease on their forms and plantations, which supplied them with all the first necessaries of life, and a surplus of near three millions and an half sterling, for commerce with other countries—That this commerce employed upwards of 1500 ships and ve [...]l [...]ls of different sizes, and a proportionable number of seamen—That much the greater part of these ships were built and owned in the country—That the American commerce and fisheries, were fruitful nurseries for good seamen, which useful order of men [Page]were increasing, in a greater proportion, than even the inhabitants at large; these are some of the capital articles of our real stock in 1775, and every thing considered, they were such as no other country could boast of. But it may be said with justice, that neither the number of inhabitants, extent and fertility of the terr [...]tory, or the productions and commerce of a country, can be counted on as forming a solid and permanent stock, unless the civil and political constitution under which the inhabitants live, be such, as will secure to them the property and free use of those advantages which the nature and situation of their country gives them—The rapid increase of population and property in America, for more than a century past, is a convincing proof that the civil constitution was such as secured the liberty and property of its inhabitants.

But the claims of the British Parliament to the right of making laws binding on America in all cases whatever, and to tax its inhabitants at pleasure, with other acts, of theirs since 1763, subjected both the liberties and property of America to the will of Parliament—America was alarmed at such dangerous claims, and apprehensive of the consequences, remonstrated and protested against those acts and claims, and resolved to oppose them to the utmost. It was, as Congress in the most express and solemn manner declared, not for the "gaining any new rights," but to secure those which by charters, compacts and the British constitution, they, as British subjects, were intitled to; that America contended—In the course of the two first years of the war, matters were carried so far, that Congress judging that the Parliament was determined in no case to recede, but to pursue and enforce those claims [Page]and acts to the utmost, resolved to separate America from the British Empire, and declared it independent and sovereign—The people of America confirmed this resolution of Congress, to maintain their rights and priviledges, not as being part of the British Empire but separate and independent—It is near five years since this resolution was taken.

I have briefly shewn what the stock or capital of America, was previous, and by what means it became in danger, In the next place I will endeavour to state with impartiality, what our losses and gains have hitherto been; but it must previously be observed, that those claims and acts of Parliament, which brought both our liberty and property into danger, and which gave the only original cause for the dispute, having since been given up and repealed, independent sovereignty remains the only object for which America is now adventuring, for since every personal right and priviledge may be secured and enjoyed, though America continues part of the British empire, there can be no other, America then, has credit for stock in hand in 1775. The thirteen provinces or states, of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, &c.

For three millions of inhabitants, the annual increase of which stock was 150,000 people.

For three millions and an half of annual produce, over what was consumed by the inhabitants, which encreasing annually in the same ratio, with the encrease of population added to the capital 175,000l. sterling yearly.

For the navigation, fisheries and commerce, which America then had on hand, amounting to an immense value, and increasing at the above rate.

[Page] For the peace, good order and moral principles of its inhabitants as inestimable, as they were unparallel'd in almost any other country.

These articles put to the credit of the account, let us examine the debit, or what deduction is to be made on the score of expences, and disbursements, at and before that period. The support of civil government, supposing it to have cost each province 8000l. sterling annually (which is estimating it high) amounted to 104,000l. sterling,

The duties paid by the commerce, taken at its highest gross produce, to be between 30 and 40,000l. annually.

In this account the balance appears at once to be immensely in favour of America, and justiries the Americans in opposing with the utmost firmness and perseverance, every claim or act of parliament, which tended to diminish, or deprive them of it. But those claims being now out of the question, and America offered the peaceable enjoyment of this capital with all its encreasing advantages, secured and guaranteed under the British empire, it is evident that in proceeding to state the account of our expences and losses, previous to this, stand as so many charges, incurred in defending and securing our original capital stock, that effected, every thing further must be charged against independent sovereignty.

This account is most unquestionably the most important that America, or perhaps any other country, ever had to consider and to state fairly, without prejudice or partiality, and I trust my honest and brave countrymen, will view it in this right, that they will estimate without exaggerating, or diminishing, what their losses and expences have actually been, since the present object of independent sovereignty, has been [Page]the only one in question, what the situation of our country has been ever since it has been claimed and exercised, what our circumstances now are, what they were previous to this contest or to 1763, and from comparing the present, with the past, form a true judgment on the whole to direct their future conduct. In the beginning of 1778 an offer was made to America to be placed in the situation it was in, at, and previous to the year 1763, to have all the grievances complained of by Congress in 1774 and 1775 redressed, to have the acts which they remonstrated against, and which were then declared to be the [...]ole cause of the war, revealed, and several advantages granted to America, which the inhabitants had n [...], previous to 1763, either claimed or enjoyed, had these offers been accepted of, the account would then have been closed (as I have already shewn) in our favour. But independent sovereignty was by Congress made an essential prelimenary, a sine qua non, of any negociation at all. In July 1776, the above terms had not been offered to us, and a persuasion that England would not recede so far, as to offer them was the principal ground on which that resolution was taken. All the declarations of Congress and of the different American assemblies prove the truth of this fact; the declaration of independence itself acknowledges it, and the arguments made use of in support of the measure were all drawn from that presumption only, Foreign aid was sollicited, this could neither he asked or granted consistently with the laws of nations, and the saith of treaties, whilst we a knowledged ourselves to be the subjects of Great-Britain, therefore being resolved to deserd our rights, the foreign aid sollicited, became indispensably necessary, and the establishment of civil government in the several provinces [Page]equally so, to prevent general anarchy and confusion. On this ground, and on this only, Congress were forced into a measure, which they had before reprobated in all their public declarations.— In their petition and address to the King, and people of England, in 1774, and 1775, they solemnly called God to witness, that they had no view of a separation, and that they regarded such an event as the greatest of evils, which could befall both countries. I dare appeal to the warmest supporter of the Declaration of July, 1776, to say, if the same offers had been made on the part of England, as were made in 1778, any such resolution would have passed in C [...] gress, or in any one of the American assemblies. Our Declaration of Independence could [...]t give a new cause of complaint, or our part, against England, though by our challenging a new right unheard of by our ancestors, and expressly disclaimed by all the pre [...]ing resolutions of Congress, we enlarged the subject of contest. But In epe [...]dence being considered, as the only ground on which our rights and liberties could be established and secured, under the circumstances America then was, the measure on this principle was consistent and right but otherways wrong, and contradictory to our repeated and most solemn declarations.—From the moment, therefore, in which we were offered a redress of the grievances we had complained of, and to have the rights reclaimed, to be confirmed, and that in the very way in which our petitions to the Crown of England had pointed out, no other subject of dispute could remain, but the new claim of independent sovereignty, and to this only all our subsequent losses and expences are to be charged.—And as we were in 1778 offered assistance, to reimburse the expences of the [Page]war, our pervious expences, by the refusal of that offer, may with justice be charged to the same account.

I have stile the claim of Independence a new and unheard of claim; the following expressions of Congress will justify me;—In the unanimous petition of that body to the King, in 1774, they say, ‘We ask but for peace, liberty, and safety, we wished not for a diminution of the prerogative, nor do we sollicit for the grant of any new right in our favour, your royal authority over us, and our connection with Great-Britain we shall always carefully and jealously support and maintain.’ Again, they say, addressing the King, ‘That your Majesty as the loving Father of your while People, connected by the same b [...]ndo [...] law loyalty, faith and Slood, though dwelling in different countries &c.’ In the address of Congress in July 1775, to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, they say, and ‘declare before God, and the world, that they have not raised armies with ambitious designs of separating from Great Britain, and establishing independent States, and that they, sight not for glory or conquest.’ In their Petition to the King of the same da [...]e, they say: Attached to ‘your Majesty's person, family and government, with all devotion that principle or affection can inspire, connected with Great Britain by the strongest tees that can unite societies. &c.’ These, and and similar declarations of Congress, shew that the claim of a right to Independence, was not only unheard of in July, 1775, but that every pretension to it was disclaimed and reprobated by Congress, in terms of the warmest indignation.

I will not presume to enimate the value of independent sovereignty to America, if our right and liberties, [Page]our peace and safety, cannot be secured in any other way, it exceeds all calculation, but i [...] these can be as well secured by accepting the offers made us, its value becomes [...]t bed but idea, and imaginary, and if in pursuing this object we exhaust and ruin our country, lay the grounds for civil seuds among ourselves, and become [...]ality mere dependent on France, than we ever were on England; [...] such cas [...], every expected good will fail, and we shall realize evils, greater than we can at this time conceive of.

I am very far from condemning the resolution of the 4 [...]h July, 1776▪ But though under certain circumstances, a measure may be wise and good, yet under others, it may be the height of folly and madness, to persevere in supporting of it.

A review of what we have expended and lost, and a ca [...] did examination of facts and probabilities, will enable us to form our judg [...]ment.

I have already sh [...]wn that our capital stock a [...] and previous to 1775, consisted in 3 000 000 of inhabitants the neat yearly profit or increase of which was 150 000. In an annual exportation of three million a [...]d an half [...] of p [...]o [...]iuce which w [...]s increasing in the same proportion. In an ex [...]sive and growing ravigation, co [...]merce, and fishery; in thirteen Colonies or States, ex [...]n [...]ing near 15 0 miles on the sea c [...]act, with an immense and fe [...] country behind them, r [...]ady to find employ, and to afford an honest and pl [...]tiful subsistence to their increasing numbers, and above all, in the peaceful industrious, and moral principles and dispositions of the people at large.

It is allowed by all, that the principle sou [...]ce of the wealth of every country, consists in the number [...]f its inhabitants living at their ease, or above want, by [Page]honest industry; if then America made previous to the war, an actual acquisition of 150,000 inhabitants of this description, six years would have added 900,000 to their stock, and so far as their increase has fell short of that, in consequence of the war, so far a loss has been suffered which is justly chargeable to the war, or rather to the object of it.—If in fact the number of inhabitants has not increated at all since 1775, the loss is immense; I will not pretend to say they have not increased at all, but appearances strongly countenance such an opinion, and demonstrate that the increase, if any, has been inconsiderable.

The number of houses, in a country where the materials for building are found in plenty, and cost little more than the charge of collecting them together, will ever be in proportion to the number of inhabitants; but there are not at this time more houses in America, than there were in 1775, whereas by the above calculation, they would, had we been at peace, have increased near one third. In the Autumn 1774, upwards of five hundred houses were contracted for to be built in Philadelphia the next year. Other Towns were in proportion to that City. The increase of houses in country Towns and Villages was such, that the articles of nails, window glass, and other necessary materials for building, formed a very capital part of our imports; I will not pursue the subject, these observations being sufficient to justify the presumption, that the number of inhabitants has not increased to any considerable amount since the war. It is indeed impossible to ascertain this with certainty, as no exact numbering was ever made; the aggregate of three millions was a presumed one, from the general estimate made by the Delegates from [Page]different parts of the continent. But the number of houses not having increased, [...]or house rent advanced, convinces me that there has been but little, or no increase since the war. The annual importation of inhabitants, amounted to near 20,000 one year with another; the stopping of this source of population, our loss of men by the war, the continual emigrations from us to Europe and the West-Indies, and the before unexperienced obstacles and difficulties, in the way of establishing and supporting families, appear to me sufficient to have prevented any increase of our numbers. To this immense loss of inhabitants, we may justly add those, who by a military life, or otherwise, in consequence of the war have acquired such dissipated habits, that they cannot be expected to return to their old industrious and lab [...] rious employments.

This great and capital loss, has been attended with another naturally and necessarily connected with it, and with the loss of commerce, viz. the decline of agriculture, and reduction of our exports. It is to no purpose to urge our former exports were repaid by imports of articles not essentially necessary, and in part by those of mere luxuries, since admitting that part of our importations were mere luxuries, and but few of them articles of the first necessity, yet if the taste of the inhabitants for them, induced them to clear up and cultivate the country, it produced a real and permanent addition to the capital stock of American wealth, since every acre of wild land cleared up, added just so much to the natural stock as it would sell for in its improved state. I will not presume to say, that all our importations were wisely made, or that many of the articles were such as we had better have been without, for admitting of this, [Page]nothing can be urged from it against the above genera [...]p inc [...]le.

The ploügh and the s [...]il mutually aid and encourage each other, and it is the policy of every wise na [...]ion, to keep both for ever in view, and to improve and cultivate each, as the most natural and certain support of the other.

Before commerce flourished in England, agriculture was in as low a state in that Island as in any kingdom of Europe, and their commerce and agriculture have in every flage, advanced together and kept pace with each other, until both have arrived at the highest perfection ever known or heard of in the world—But there is no necessity for locking abroad for insta [...]ces; agriculture and commerce have rose and flourished and they have declined and languished together under our eyes in America.

In 1772 Philadelphia exported 3,43,384 barrels of flour, and 7,06,185 bushe's of wheat, and 361 square rigged vessels, and 391 floops and schooners were cleared out from that port.

In 1773, there were 265,967 barrels of flour, and 1,82 391 bushels of wheat, and 48 183 barrels or tierces of bread exported, and 426 square rigged vessels, and 370 sloops and schoon [...] were cleared,

The amount of the whole of the exports of every kind, from that city, was as follows:

In 1772, | £. 6,31 534 | 14 | 10 | 1-2 sterling,
1773, | 7,84 254 | 4 | 2 |  | ditto.
1774, | 7,20,135 | 13 | 7 | 3 4 | ditto.

If it be considered that the exports from New-York were nearly equal to those of Philadelphia, and that Virginia and Maryland exported in to bacco alone, to nearly as great an amount as the whole exportation from Philadelphia, it must be allowed that the whole [Page]exports of America are not rated too high at £. 3▪500,000 sterling, annually. If from 1775 to this time, our exports have not exceeded £. 500,000 per a [...]num, (and they have fell much below that sum) there must have been an annual loss of three millions, and in six years of eighteen millions in our commerce.

But how has it been with our agriculture, and has it not failed in some degree in the same proportion?

The ports of America were shut, and commerce almost en [...]irely suspended in 17 [...]5; I have shewn that antee [...]dent to that period, Philadelphia alone exported in flour, wheat and bread, equal to 400,000 barrels of flour; if the exportation of the same from New-York, Maryland and Virginia, are taken into the calculation, it will not be ex [...]avagant to suppose that America exported at that period, one million barrels of flour annually: But what was the situation of America, as to this article, in 1778, 1779 and 1780? Every one who knows that the victualling Commissary could not in Pennsylvania and all the Northern States, procure bread in those years for General Washington's army, which scarce ever amounted to ten thousand men, but was obliged to send to Virginia, and even to North Carolina, for flour, can resolve the question and must acknowledge that our agriculture sell [...] our commerce.

The history of our nation affords a stronger proof of the mutual dependance of agriculture and commerce on each other. The losses of population, agriculture and commerce have not been the only ones; the actual expences of the war, have been considerable though they are indeed trifles, if compared with the others, yet in settling the account they merit attention.

[Page] In May 1775, Congress began to emit paper, on the credit and faith of America, this paper obtained a credit at first, equal to silver or gold, and so long as this paper retained this credit, Congress received of individuals for public use, its full nominal value, in their produce, merchandize, or service.

By the quantity of paper sent out by Congress to market, and by having no fund established, for i [...]s redemption, it depreciated. But the question is not at this time, at what rate Congress have offered to redeem their paper, but what real value they have received for it in exchange. A bankrupt who pays two and an half per cent, or 6d. in the pound, to his creditors, never argues from that, that he has received no more, what real value has Congress received in exchange for two hundred millions of dollars of their paper, and the large loans they have had? Congress by their resolutions of the 18 h of March 1780, offered to call in all their paper bills at the rate of 40 for one, but they forced no one to accept of their offer. Whether the holders of their paper will finally receive no more, is out of the question. By their resolutions of the 28 h of Ju [...]e following Congress gave a certain rule, by which the above question may be determined, for it is not to be presumed, that in the table which they than published, they rated depreciation either higher or lower than the reality, and having received the same value, for a bill emitted, as for the bill at the same time borrow [...]d depreciated in their hands, the rule for fixing the value of their several loans, must apply with equal justice to their emissions, they do not allow of any depreciation until Sept. 1, 1777, previous to which they had passed in exchange for the produce of the country, the payment of the army, &c. 36 610,000 [Page]Dollars, or 8,237,000l. st [...]ling, and consequently must have receiv [...]d i [...]s value, the am unt of loans to that time was 7,545,196 dollars, which b [...]ing also with u [...]deprecia [...]ion make an addition of £. 1,697,699 2 [...]. od [...]ter [...]ing,

From Sept 1777 to Sept. 26, 1778, Congressissued and [...]assed 45,50,000 Dollars, i [...] paper, the value of which from the table of rates fix [...]d on by Congress is as follows, viz.

| Dollars.
1,000,000 Nov. 7, 1777, | value 8 [...]2 880
1,000,000 Dec. 3, | 750 000
1,000,000 Jan. 8, 1778 | 671,000
2,000,000 22, | 1,285 320
2,000,000 Feb. 16, | 1,180,524
2,000,000 Mar. 5, | 1,122,444
1,000,000 April 4, | 490,444
5,000,000 11, | 2,376,110
500,000 18, | 230,277
5,000,000 May 22, | 1,976,110
5,000,000 June 20, | 1 375,0 [...]0
5,000,000 July 3 [...], | 1,244,440
5,000,000 Sept. 5, | 1,224.444
10,000,000, 26, | 2 222 222
45,500,000 equal to | 16,941,215

real value, or £. 3,811,773:7:6 Sterling.

From September 26, 1778, to September 1779, Congress struck off, [...] passed 55,000,54, [Page]dollars of the following dates and value, viz.

Nov. 4, 1778, | 10,000,000 | value 1,807,777
Dec. 14, | 10,000,000 | 1,476,666
Feb. 3, 1779, | 5,000,160 | 570,182
19, | 5,000 160 | 525,017
April 1, | 5 000,160 | 452,766
May 5, | 10,000,000 | 812,000
June 3, | 10,000,0000 | 740,000

55,000,540 equal to 6,384,408 or £. 1,436,491 16 S [...]e [...]ling.

But Congress declare 13th September 1770, that they had issued, and had then in circulation to the amount of 159,948,880 Dol.

The sums above calculated amounted to but 137,110,480 do.

Which leaves a difference of 22,838,400

But Congress in January 1779, or [...]ered a large sum of their bills to b [...] called in, by [...]an, or by exchanging for new bills, and some time after [...]ck off 50 0 0 395 dollars, to redeem by exch [...]ng [...] for the emissions of 20 h M [...]y 1777, and of April 11, 1778; in [...]he lists of C [...]g [...]s emissions of paper, certified at Philadelphia, 13th July, 1779 by Robert Troup, Secr [...]tary of the Treasur [...] Office, and from which the above was takes, I find only ten millions of these emissions set down, there remains therefore forty million [...] be added to the debt, viz. twenty millions of May 1777, and twenty millions [Page]of April 1778; the difference between this amount of forty millions, and the above balance of 22 838,400 must run from the amount of those emissions which were paid into the Loan Office, the first sum having been passed before depreciation commenced, was in value equal to £. 4,500,000 sterling, and the latter of April 1778, to 9,504,000 dollars, or £. 2,138,400 sterling.

On the 13th September 1779, Congress declare that the amount of their loans from March 1, 1778, to that time, amount to 26 188,909 dollars, but do not give the dates at which they were made, I will therefore take the whole at a medium of six months back of that date, (as at that time large sums were lent on account of the emissions called in) and the value will be, dollars or £. sterling. Congress compute their foreign debt at four million of dollars, or £. 900 000 sterling; the above [...]um, though f [...]r below the amount of the public expences of Congress at that time, are sufficient to shew that they then amounted to upwards of twenty millions sterliog, independent of the private expences of each State for its own particular dif [...]nce.

Congress on th [...] 13th September 1779, resolved to c [...]vtinue their emi [...]ions to 2 [...]0 millions and no farther, in consequence of which they soon after gave cut the balance.

I have not presumed to hope that I could af [...]ertain the amount of the public expences with precision; Congress confess that this is even beyond their power; but it is sufficient to shew from unquestionable facts, that in September 1779, it greatly exceeded twenty millions sterling. It is still more difficult to state [...]he amount of the expence of private State [...]; b [...]t as in the above stating, I have kept below the real amount, [Page]so I presume if the private expences of all the particular S [...]a [...]s, be [...]stimated [...] one fourth of that [...] the public, it will not exceed the rea [...]ity; and if the large sum [...] drawn for l [...]st yea and now dra [...]ing f [...], on Europe, and the increased and i [...]creasing expence of every kind [...] consid [...]e [...], the actu [...] am [...]unt of the charge of the war, [...] 1781 ca [...]not be estimated at less tha [...] forty million [...]. Nor can it be presumed, [...] antages it has necessa [...]ily [...], could have cost less in six years; but it is [...], at Congress having fixed the [...] their bill [...] at forty for o [...], [...] the have given out and passed two hundred millions, ye [...] the [...] o [...]e but five; [...] that account, and for their loans according to the rates they hav [...] fixed them [...]t, and calcu [...]a [...]ing in this manner, some [...]ssert, that the war has not cost us more tha [...] 7 [...] 8 millions herling, but such persons go on principles [...] fa [...]e and ab [...].— If Congress had reduce [...] their paper and Loan Office certificates to the one hundredth part of their n [...]m [...]al value, it would have argued nothing against their having actually received, and the people at large having paid, the full value of what the several emissions and loans, were worth, at the time of their being made, and Congress have received just as much for every paper dollar, from this press, as for the one at the same time borrowed, nothing either in justice, or equity, can be urged against the same rule of calculation for both.—But Congress have not reduced their circulating paper, to 40 for one, they have offered by their resolution of March, 1780, to barrow and receive it at that, but they force no one to accept their offer; on the contrary every one of their promises and resolutions, to redeem the whole in 18 years, at [Page]the nominal value, remain unrepealed and in full force, and every one is at liberty to hold his money in hand, or to part with it as he shall prefer.—It is true that if it be held back, and the nominal sum exacted, even eighteen years hence, great injustice will be done the public who instea of paying less tha [...] the real expence of the war, will in such case pay much more, but neither will o [...]n affect the assertion, that this part of the actual expence of the war, amounts to the value of the several emissions of the bills, at the time of their being made and of the loa [...]s wh [...] borrowed, and the general calculation I have made, sufficiently pr [...]ve that those with the foreign debt, a [...]d the debts of particular States, amount to the sum, I have stated our six years expences at. If indeed the arrcarag [...], of the officers and soldiers of our army, who on this subject have been treated differently from almost any other order of me [...], be taken into conside [...]tson, as I think they most certainly must, and ought to be, and the expences of inlistment, [...]es, of sub [...]itute money, paid by individuals, I am well persuaded, t [...]t 40 millions sterling, will fall much below the actual expences of the war, this year's included.

It has been a fav [...]urite argument in America, that the paper money depreciating in the ha [...]ds of the pub [...]e a large op [...]ated as a tax on the people, and therefore whatever value, was [...]inally received for it, the present debt of America, is [...]o more in justice or equity, than the present value of the money.— I shall not at present [...] this sperious [...], I am not stating what we actually owe [...]e [...]qu [...]ing what we intend sinal [...] to pay, bu [...] what o [...]r expences real [...]y [...]ave [...] how they have, or may be cancelied; but I cannot pass it over, without observing [Page]that the justice of this argument, rests solely on the supposition, that every American from time to time became possessed of his proportion of those bills, as they were emitted or borrowed and passed, and that he continued [...]o hold just so much as the amount of his tax for their redemption: Had this been the cause, neither depreciation nor appreciation could have affected him, but just the contrary has happened and his imaginary payment of the public debt, has occasioned a loss, of what is of more consequence than 40 millions sterling. The loss of our national character, of our faith and honor, and the perversion of every idea, or principle of moral and civil justice.

The tender act as it is called, passed in all the States on the urgent recommendation of Congress, obliged creditors, salary men, widows and orphans, to receive the paper, in every stage of its depreciation at its nominal value, for old debts, for salaries, legacies, and dowers, contracted for, or bequeathed in specie.—By this law, this pretended payment sell on creditors, salary men, and most heavily on widows and orphans, the latter of which, though in every country, they claim the first protection of the Magistrate, and of every man who pretends to the lesst portion of honesty or humanity, have been oppressed and sacrificed, beyond any thing ever heard, or read of, among civilized nations.—I will mention two or three instances out of the many which have come to my knowledge; a captain of a merchant ship had by his industry and oeconomy, become master of a comfortable little interest, the greatest part of which he vested in the purchase of a house not far from Philadelphia, in 1775, he sold it for one thousand pounds payable in December 1779, with [Page]interest, at the day of payment his creditor tendered him Congress paper, to the nominal amount of his bond, and offered him that, or eight half Johanneses in full. The debtor had the law on his fide, and the honest creditor, took the eight half Johanneses, in preference to the thousand pounds in paper.

The widow of a reputable merchant, who in 1774, left her at his death, with a jointure of six hundred pounds per a [...]num, expressly to enable her to keep his infant children under her immediate care, during their education, was in 1779 forced to accept of the nominal sum in paper, not equal in value to twenty pounds of the principal.

In 1779. I knew a judgement given in one of the supreme Cou [...]s in America, ordering an heir to receive of hi [...] guard an in lien of 1500l. sterling, which his ance [...]to [...] left him, the nominal sum in paper, which on the day this iniquitous, but legal judgement was rendered, was not equal to 6 per cent. on one years interest of thi [...] capital.

Thus regislative assemblies, in compliance with recommendations from Congress, passed laws, which established and protected the most cruel injustice.— Every man of extensive aquaintance in America, must have met with many instances similar to the above in the cou [...]se of the 4 last years. I have cited only three out of the m [...]ny thousands on record in America, and in ci [...]ing them, I have had no view in casting any reproach on Congress, and the assemblies, in passing [...]uch laws had no other object in view but the establishment of the rights and siberties of America. This great object [...]d every other from the view of men, zealous in the cause of liberty, but unexpe [...]ienced in, [...]nd unequ [...] to the great affairs before them, and in thi [...] zeal they undesignedly laid the axe [Page]to the root of all morality and justice, and ruined more widows and orphans, than the sword of the greatest conqueror ever made such—This measure forced honest guardians and trust [...]es to vi [...]iate their trusts, and to ruin their wards—The guardian who in pursuance of the will of his deceased friend had put out the fortune of orphans at interest, for their benefit, was obliged to receive of the debtors, paper, of less than one twentieth of the value—what could he d [...] the law oblig [...]d him to receive it, and neither justice nor equity required him to became a sufferer, had he been able to have taken the loss on himself. The loss was in most instances too great for him to attempt it. The debtors excused themselves by sa [...]ing that those with whom they had contracted forced it on them. In a word the mischief became general, and the [...]atal effect which dep [...]eci [...]tion and the Tender Law, had on the moral principles of the people at large, will be long fe [...] in America—and can men boast of having ex [...]ne [...]ated the public of debts, justly contracted by [...]uch a sa [...]ifice? by the ruin of the widow and the orphar, of or di [...]s and s [...]ary men, who had from their confidence in the justice of their country, rested their whole fortune and future support and prespects in [...], on the known and established laws of the land.

Those who can boast or avail themselves of such advantages, must hold public as well as private justice in very low account, and it is to no purpose to attempt to reason with men, who can view the distress of the widow and the fatherless, and the ruin of honest men, and the destruction of the principles of common justice, with indifference.

Instances of injustice and distress, flowing from this source, have unhappily been so frequent, that [Page]too many have became hardened and insensible to them, and [...]o their f [...]tal consequences. The body of the people, surprized, to find injustice sealed by public authority, on the tribunal from whence, they had ever look'd for the most just and equitable decre [...]s, have been told that public necessity required it, and justified the change: thus the plea of public necessity, has been made use of to destroy the eternal and sacred principles of justice and morality, ‘And with necessity the tyrant's plea excused these cursed deeds.’—Milton.

The loss of the principles of justice, equity and good faith, exceeds all possible calculation, and if any thing can augment it, it is the additional loss of a good and vir [...]uous education to the rising generation. This having been in great part lost in America for six years past, threatens the perpetuation of the evil to future generations—we have still other losses to place on the debit side of our account, though loss considerable and alarming th [...]n the last, yet they are very serious ones.

Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and a part of Vi [...]ginia are ruined, and we [...]ke no use of th [...] whole sea coast south of Che [...]e peak Bay.

Our enemies have possessed themselves of the city of New York, of a great part of that state, and of the whole [...]f the province of Main, which forms a part of the state of Massachusetts Bay, and our ally h [...]s permission to take [...] of the harbour and island of Newport under pretence of assisting us but in reality as a pledge for our fidelity to our alliance, and for the payment of the sums lent to us.

If all terms of accommodation and peace with Great Britain are rejected, what have we to put on the opposite or credit side of the account? The [...]urity [Page]of our liberty and property? with grief we must acknowledge, that neither were ever less secure than at present—Our independence? at this time but a [...] states, enjoy a nominal independence, to support which they have rendered themselves more dependant on France, than ever they we [...]e on England To cou [...]t on independance as a preseat reality, is therefore absurd, we have, [...] is true, a treaty with France, in which France declares that we are actually in possession and enjo [...]e [...] of independence, and that it shall at all hazards be [...] to us, but is it not with equal solemnity declared, some millions of times every day, i [...] the same country, that a wafer of an inch diameter, and two lines in thickness, contains the flesh, bones, &c. of a complete human body, and that half a gill of bad wine, contain [...] the whole of its blood?

On the Debtor side of the account I have shewn that we had a right to charge as loss,

More than half a million of inhabitants,

The loss of our fisher [...]es, trade and commerce.

The decline of agriculture, by which our exports have in six yeart suffered eighteen millions sterling.

The actual expence of 40 millions sterling 1781 included.

The loss of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carol [...], with all the coast from Cape Henry southward.

The loss of a part of Virginia.

The loss of the city of New-York, and a great part of that state.

The loss of the province of Main, part of Massachusetts State.

The mortgage of Rhode-Island and Newport to France.

[Page] And, what exceeds all other losses, we have suffered a depravity of manners and principles to prevail under the the [...]ter and support of regislative authority, and by the loss of th [...] education of the rising generation, and the ground so [...]erpetuating this depravity.

Our articles in credit against this i [...]mensue am [...]at of debt, or loss, are, in a word, an alliance with France, the hereditary enemy of our once fond and indulgent parent friend.

The p [...]ssession of a [...]minal independence by a part of the [...]a [...]es, and the hopes of regaining b [...] the a [...]d of our [...]lly the ter [...]itory we have lost, and of finally enjoying independent save e [...]gnty over the whore.

A few [...]questionable sects will enable us to judge what probability there is, that thes [...] hopes will be realized. In the mean time, every one must judge, w [...] the, if reatized, he [...]ain wi [...] balance the loss.

From the [...] in which France took part in the war, [...] offers of England have been such as to leave [...]ing [...] independent sovereignty for us to contend for.

France wishes to improve every occasion for the weak [...]ing and humbling of England, and so far as the [...] of America from its dommion will effect [...], [...] independence is an object with France, bu [...] no further; and is America c [...]n be [...] use of, to ruin the made and [...] of England, and in d [...] ing this, t [...] [...] and [...], and [...] every [...] quite [...], the [...]bject [...] to France, [...] nothing is, or [...] in Europe, [...] We [...]t-Indies and South America, [...] North [...] America from the [...] [Page]into a large, populons, and mighty empire of confede [...]ated republica, wholly detached from, and independent of any European control.

Spain, whose aid we have in vain solicited for four years, is directly and greatly interested against such an event. A desire of revenge on England for past inju [...]ies, and the connection between the two Crowns of France and Spain, have been the only motives which engaged Spain in the war. But these motives have not so far blinded the Court of Spain, to their true interest, as to induce them to take any one step tending to the acknowledgment of our independence.

After two years war with England, S [...]ain refus [...]s to receive our Ambassador; we have, at a great expence of money, and to the sacrifice of our national character, sent Ambassadors to Italy, to Vien [...]a, to Madrid, to Berlin, and to Holland, and have been affronted by a refusal of audience every where,—and how the new embassy to Ruffia will s [...]cceed, time will soon discover.

France, af [...]e two years ineffectual solicitations, was induced from the apprehension, that on the surrender of General Burgoyne's army, England would recommodate matters in America, and turn its force on them, suddenly changed their [...]ile of conduct towards us, and made a treaty with us.

To any one acquainted with the history of what passed between the Court of France and the Commissioners of Congress, from the first application made, until the arrival of the news of the affair of Saratoga, nothing can appear more ridiculous, than the pomp [...]u [...] declarations of disinterested friendship and royal generosity, on the part of France, except it be our eternally echoing them back in [...] the [Page]epithet of our great, good, generous, disinterested ally, the great protector of the liberties of mankind, &c.

The prospects then of the establishment of our independence rest, on the advantages which America and France, have, or may gain over England in the course of the war, and on the promises of France, but is it to be expected that France will continue the war for ever, or to the sacrificing of all i [...]s foreign possessions to fulfil this promise? A peace must be made, and the account sooner or later settled between the to [...]tending parties, suppose it to be entered on at this time.

The baian [...]e lies heavily against us on every account, we have lost much, and gained nothing, but is the balance so much in favour of ourally, that a discount may be expected from us? quite the contrary, France is at this time greatly the loser both in point of commerce and territory. In the West I dies. S [...]. Vincent's and Dominica, balance St. Lucia, and the Islands of Grenada and Tobago, remain in favor of France; but the loss of their fisheries more than balances this, to which is to be added, the whole of their East In [...]ia possessions and commerce. France cannot, at this time, regain the point started from, and has this year less prospect of [...]aining any thing than it has had in an [...] one year since the war commented. The neval force of France, as well as that of Spain, has reached its zenith, and cannot rise higher this war, but on the contrary must decline through the want of seamen; on the contrary, the naval force of England is rapidly augmenting, and their naral resources, especially that capital one of seamen, remain unex [...]austed.

The war being fimply maritime from these facts, the probabilities of future success, are easily calculated. [Page]I have in the above account set down the harbour and island of Newport, as mortgaged to France, I do not pretend it is so by any f [...]rm [...]erntract, but many circumstances sh [...]w, that it in reality is so, and for the sole purpose of kee [...]ing America seady to her alliance with France, and to oblige us to conti [...]ue the war.—Mons. de Ro [...]h [...]mbe [...] took possession and fortified it, under the pretence [...]hat the fleet and army, under his command, were only the vanguard of a much greater [...] it, on its way, a [...]d to b [...]d [...]ily expected, [...] armament ever was sen [...]at that time, nor intended.

Did Monsieur Ro [...]h [...]mberu, when h [...] made that d [...]cla [...]tion (i [...] the name of his mast [...]r) to the [...]ssen [...] bly of Rh [...]de [...]s [...]a [...]d, speak as he was ordered, or did he knowingly impose on and deceive that body, and [...] America?

The common language of France, of those most at [...] is, ‘The [...] are two parties i [...] America one for an accommodation and peace with England, the other or the support of the alliance [...] France and a continuance of the war, it is therefore necessary, that France sho [...] have a force in Ameri [...] sufficient to support the latter party.’

‘The Southern S [...]are will unqe [...] [...] under the British power and government, [...] the Nord [...], the New England State, may b [...] having a France force, kep [...] in the center of them, be held in the inte [...]ers o [...] France’

In fact, my countrym [...], the French were sent to Rhode Island, n [...]t so m [...]ch to be employed against the British, as to [...] the possession of that port and Island, and to oblige us to [...] the war; and the pardal empo [...]ary suppliea se [...]t us from time [Page]to time, are neither calculated nor designed, to fore: the British to abandon America, but to keep us from fi [...]king entirely, and to encourage us to find employ on [...]our contiment for a British army, which otherways must reduce their islands in one s [...]son, or in two campaigns at most.

So many facts point to this as the only object France has in view, th [...] nothing but the most generous and unsuspi [...]ious confidence on our part, can make us bend to it.

When Chariest own was befieged, France and Spain had in the West-Indies, a supe [...]ier fleet, which in ten or filt [...]en days at most, could have relieved it, they were applied to, but made no movement or di [...]e [...]sion whatever. The [...] of [...] ditheartened the wh [...]e [...] at that time M [...] [...], and by his deciaration and [...] re-animated the people, but his p [...]mises [...] spirits of the country again sell, and Ge [...]era: Washington's army were on the point of disb [...]nding.—In this situation, France has stepped in, and given or leat ten millions of livres, and guarranted a loan for us in Holland, for [...]s much more, if we can borrow money at four p [...]r [...]cent. this is set down as twenty millions in hand; we are sure of one half of it only, but if we obtain the whole, it [...] at best only encourage us on through another loosing campaign, for it can d [...] nothing towards driving the British fl [...]ts from our ports, or their troops from our continent.

It is said that Monsie [...], de Grasse, is to go to our assistance with his fleet, after touching at the West-Indies; but can any one who knows that the British fleet in the Islands, will be there too, build any thing of solid use to America, on such a promised [...] noeuvre. [Page]I say another loofing campaign, (God grant my prediction may prove a false one [...] but when it is known that a confiderable fleet and army are to fail from England, in four or five weeks, for some part of our continent, and that Monsiour de Grasse, cannot be expected these before next September, it will be agreed, that I have grounds for making it. I have now with as much brevity [...]s the subject will admit of, slated our situation; I have not knowingly exaggerated in any instance, nor misrepresented any fact; and I submit it to the judgment of the impartial and confiderate patriots in America, what meaures ought to be taken?

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Information about this book

Title statement

Paris papers; or Mr. Silas Deane's late intercepted letters, to his brothers, and other intimate friends, in America. To which are annexed for comparison, the Congressional declaration of indepedendency in July 1776, and that now inculating [sic] among the revolted provinces, with the never-to-be-forgotten orders of the rebel general in August 1776, for preventing a pacification.

Deane, Silas, 1737-1789.

Publication

Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, MI :

Date

2011-05.

ID [DLPS]

N13851

ID [TCP]

N13851

ID [STC]

Evans 17509

ID [NOTIS]

APY0517

ID [IMAGE-SET]

17509

ID [EVANS-CITATION]

99027572

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Series

Early American Imprints, 1639-1800 ; no. 17509.

Notes

(Evans-TCP ; no. N13851)

Transcribed from: (Readex Archive of Americana ; Early American Imprints, series I ; image set 17509)

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Source

— Paris papers; or Mr. Silas Deane's late intercepted letters, to his brothers, and other intimate friends, in America. To which are annexed for comparison, the Congressional declaration of indepedendency in July 1776, and that now inculating [sic] among the revolted provinces, with the never-to-be-forgotten orders of the rebel general in August 1776, for preventing a pacification., Deane, Silas, 1737-1789., United States. Declaration of Independence..

Extent

xii, 141, [1], xxxii, [1], 11, 11, 12-24 p. ; 16 cm. (8vo)

Re-printed by James Rivington.,. New-York: :: [1782]. (Reprinted from Rivington's Royal gazette, Oct. 24-Dec. 12, 1783.) ("A declaration of independence published by the Congress at Philadelphia in 1776. With a counter-declaration published at New-York in 1781."--[1], 11, 11 p., with separate title page. Opposite pages bear duplicate numbering.)

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