A FOURTH ESSAY, &c.
THE system of taxation equal to the public expenditures, adopted and recommended by Congress, is grounded on the most solid and demonstrable principles, and, if there is no error or defect in the execution of it, cannot fail of producing the two great ends expected from it, viz. Supplying the expences of the States, and reducing our currency to a fixed and permanent value. These two effects will be produced by the natural operation of this system, without any force or extraneous helps. Yet 'tis to be noted here with care and concern, that when these great and steady principles come to operate on the present distracted state of our currency and finances, very sad and perhaps fatal effects will be produced, and infinite injustice done, even by this forcible remedy, though the most salutary and only effectual one, if some care is not taken to direct its force and limit its first effects. The appreciation of our currency is among the first of these ill consequences which I fear, and would guard against. The evils of this I have considered in my second Essay; but as what I there urged either has not been understood or regarded, I think it necessary here to resume the subject, which certainly merits the highest attention of every American.
The value of money is what it is now worth to the possessor. The present exchange of continental money is to hard money at the rate of about forty to one, though it is very fluctuating; at this exchange of forty to one, which is very near the truth, and for which I appeal to the merchants and goldsmiths books, I say, at this exchange, our debt of continental money, i. e. all the continental money in circulation, is worth five millions of dollars in hard money. For the reader need not be told that that value is found by dividing the whole sum of our currency, viz. two hundred millions of dollars, by the exchange, viz. forty, which will make a quotient of five millions of dollars of hard money. If this exchange is reduced, say to twenty for one, it will increase this public debt to ten millions of hard dollars. Therefore it follows, that every appreciation of the money increases the public debt, and to an amazing degree, by leaps, though almost imperceptible, yet certain, and to an amount almost beyond belief. For if the exchange should fall to ten for one, the debt would rise to twenty millions; an exchange of five to one would raise the debt to forty millions of hard dollars, and so on till the debt would rise to two hundred millions of hard dollars, and all this without the least benefit to the [Page 4] public, but in every view to its detriment. For, over and above the vast increase of taxes necessary to pay this increased debt, many other evils still worse than the tax would follow, to which I must beg the reader's most serious attention: for however out of sight and distant it may appear, the mischief is infinite, and must be fatal, if not prevented.
1st. This appreciation will raise the value of the money in the chests of the possessors, in proportion as it increases the public debt. This will raise the great money-holders into nabobs, so rich there will be no living with them. They have already, it is generally thought, much more than their share. Men of overgrown riches, especially of sudden acquirement, are dangerous to any community. They are not generally people of the best refinement of manners or wisest discretion, and therefore their influence in the community, which will ever be (caeteris paribus) in proportion to their wealth, will be dangerous; but were they all the best of men, such amazing and sudden acquisitions of wealth would be enough to spoil them. We find, by long and various experience, that human nature cannot bear, without corruption, such sudden leaps into the heights of greatness, prosperity, wealth and influence.
2d. This same cause will induce all men to hoard their money, when they find it grows better and better daily in their chests. Money will soon become so scarce, as not to be obtained without great difficulty, and this will increase the value or appreciation of it; for the value of money will ever be in proportion to its scarcity and demand. Thus every stage of this mischief will tend to increase the evil, and lead on to further stages of the same calamity and distress. This is obvious to every one.
3d. This same cause will ruin our trade and manufactures; for the rise of money in the desk will be more profitable than any trade or branch of manufacture. This will ruin all industry; for the rich will not go into business, and the poor will not find employers, and this will produce scarcity of all goods, both home produced and imported, and of course general distress and want must follow.
4th. This same appreciation will increase the public debt, and consequently will increase the taxes by which it must be paid, and that in proportion to the value or amount of the appreciation. The appreciation of money is like an account in a merchant's book; there must be a debtor and creditor to it. It is not possible that one shilling should be gained by one person in this way, which is not lost by somebody. If you make the money more valuable in my pocket, it will cost the public more to redeem it; and therefore, if it was to be appreciated up to its original value, every man's tax must be multiplied by the present exchange, i. e. made about forty times bigger than it need be to redeem all the money at the present value; and therefore it is probable those who think the present taxes are not more than the fortieth part of what they should be, will be zealous promoters of the scheme of appreciation.
[Page 5]5th. This same thing will increase every private debt. For nothing is plainer than this, viz. if the money is more valuable at the time of payment than it was at the time of contract, the debt is thereby increased, i. e. it will take more hard money or more wheat to pay the debt than would have paid it at the time of contract. This brings on the inevitable ruin of many poor people, who cannot avoid being more or less in debt for rent or some other necessary thing. It is hard enough for them to pay their debts at their just value; but when the sum comes to be increased, perhaps doubled or trebled in a few months, the payment becomes either extremely difficult or impossible. This might at first please the rich pretty well, but they would find their mistake, for they would be obliged soon to accept a notice of bankruptcy instead of payment from their debtors.
6th. The great cry for appreciation is, that those who have suffered by depreciation ought to have the benefit of a compensation by the appreciation of the currency; but this is nugatory, and will prove in the end a perfect deception. For not one tenth part, perhaps not an hundredth part of the money, when it shall appreciate, will be found in the hands of those who have suffered by the depreciation. It will be no adequate remedy to any of them, but will be an increase of distress and injury to far the greatest part of them. Those persons who have suffered by the depreciation, but by the chance of the times have been able to make it up some other way, so as to be able to hoard up sufficient sums of money to take advantage of the appreciation, those, I say, are not the great objects of my concern; but the helpless widow, the fatherless infant, and a thousand others who have been obliged, through the deficiency of their interest, to spend on the principal, till it is all or mostly gone, those, I say, are the great objects of pity; their cries for justice and compensation ought to be heard; the appreciation does them no good, for they have not cash on which it can operate; for nobody can take any benefit of the appreciation, but such as have more cash on hand than all their taxes will amount to; but the aforesaid widows, &c. are by the appreciation plunged into an increased distress and injury; for if they have an acre of land, or a horse or cow left, they must be loaded with a vast increase of taxes, in order to appreciate the money which they have lost, and which now lies hoarded in the coffers of their rich neighbours, who have gotten it from them. From this view of the matter, it appears that many people may imagine that they shall receive an advantage from the appreciation, and therefore cry loudly for it, who will, in the end, be greatly hurt by it. It seems they ask they know not what, like the mother of Zebede's children, who, in the ardency of maternal affection, petitioned our Saviour that her two sons might sit, the one on his right hand, and the other on his left, not considering that the purport of her petition was, that one of her sons might be saved and the other damned.
7th. The appreciation of the continental bills will continue through the whole course of it all the mischiefs of a fluctuating currency. This [Page 6] destroys or varies the standard or common measure of value of all things bought or sold; renders all money contracts and debts uncertain; corrupts the equity and alters the force of our laws, by varying the fines, forfeitures, and fees limitted by them; and in short, throws both the private man in his dealings, and the judge on the bench, into such perplexity and confusion, that neither can have due knowledge of right, even when they may be disposed to do it, whilst the wicked have the greatest latitude in which they may practice shocking wrongs, and that in the face of the sun, and with impunity. This suspends the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice, corrupts the morals of the people, and in the end produces every evil work. Surely this picture is dreary.
8th. From all these mischiefs no one benefit can arise to the public. Every advantage of the appreciation goes to the rich men who have got the money hoarded, and to them alone. Why then all this more than Herculian labour of appreciating the money? why all these risks and public dangers? why all this multiplied burden and distress on our people? The uses of the currency are to every purpose as great to the public if fixed at the present value, at 2d. or 3d. the dollar, as at any other value that can be named.
9th. The appreciation of the currency will destroy the equity of the taxation itself, according to the known and received principles of it, viz. that all estates ought to be taxed in proportion to their value, in such manner that every man's estate, after the tax is paid, shall bear the same proportion to his neighbour's as before, i. e. so that no man should be enriched or impoverished by the tax more than his neighbour. But if the money is appreciated, the tax will have a very different effect, as will be obvious at first sight, only by viewing its operation in one very familiar instance, viz. Suppose two brothers have each a plantation of equal value, say worth one thousand pounds hard money each, and one of them sells his plantation for one thousand pounds hard money, and changes that money into forty thousand pounds continental money, and the tax comes on; and we will further suppose they are both taxed according to the value of their estates, i. e. equally, and that the tax necessary to appreciate the money be twenty per cent. on the whole value; it appears then plain that the tax of the one, who keeps his plantation, will be two hundred pounds hard money, and the tax of the other, who has forty thousand pounds continental money, will be eight thousand pounds of that money; consequently, the first will have a clear estate left of eight hundred pounds hard money value, but the other will have an estate worth thirty-two thousand pounds hard money, for by the supposition all the money he has left will be appreciated up to its original value, i. e. to the value of hard money, and will be worth forty times as much as his brother's estate. But if all these arguments do not convince, I have one more, which I think must do for the hardiest opponent; it is this—
10th. The scheme of appreciation will destroy itself; it is in its nature impracticable, and its own operation will work its destruction. For the [Page 7] appreciation of the currency will increase the taxes and public burdens to such an enormous and insupportable amount, that the people neither can, or will, or ought to bear them. When they come to be told that all their taxes are not at all for the benefit of the public, but are for no other purpose than to increase the value of the money hoarded by their rich neighbours (and they certainly will find this out) they will join in one general cry against the oppression, with one voice damn the taxes, and swear they will not pay them. Then the mighty bubble will sink into nothing, and with it will go all our revenue, public faith, defence, honour and political existence. Very many things more might be added on this fertile subject; but if what I have said in my second essay on this subject, and what I have repeated and added here, is not sufficient for conviction, it is vain and useless in my opinion to add more, and shall only here beg my readers patience and attention a moment to an affair of my own.
I do here, as an individual▪ enter my protest most solemnly against this most fatal, useless and chimerical scheme of appreciating the currency, and am determined to leave a copy of my Essays with my children, that my posterity may know that in 1780 there was, at least, one citizen of Philadelphia who was not totally distracted, and that they may have the honour and consolation of being descended from a man, who was able to keep in his senses in times of the greatest infatuation. But all this notwithstanding, and although appearances are strong against me, I will still hope that there yet is a judicious majority on my side, who are thoroughly sick of all visionary projects, and wish to adopt the substantial and sure remedies which still remain in our power. With such as these I will most chearfully join in company, and sit down with them with great pleasure, and unite in farther consultation on the important subject, begging this favour at the same time of the rest, who do not like our employment, that they would not come into the room to interrupt us; and this they cannot think a hardship, as they certainly can lose nothing by it, for I really have not one word more to say to them.
If it is granted that the currency ought not to be appreciated up to its original value, I cannot see a shadow of reason [...] it should be appreciated at all, and not be fixed at its present value. The truth is always better than any thing near it, although ever so near. Every shilling that it may be appreciated is added to the public debt, for which the public receives not the least advantage, but all the profit goes to the great hoarders of our currency; for those who have no more on hand than just the amount of their whole tax get nothing by it. There remains then but two things to be considered: 1st. What the present exchange is; and 2dly. How to fix it to that exchange or value.
First As to the first of these there is a difficulty, principally arising from this, viz. that the exchange is not the same in all the States, but different in the different States, and this difference is not fixed in the different States, but sometimes varies in the several parts of the same State. But it is here to be observed, that the exchange of the several parts of the State differs very little from that which prevails in [Page 8] the great capitals nearest to them, and what little variation there is, most generally appears to lie in this, viz. that the exchange rises first in the great capitals, and the out towns, of less trade, follow pretty quickly after them; so that the exchange of each State may be pretty safely taken from that of its capital, or the great capital to which it is most contiguous. The rule by which I find the true exchange at any given time is, to take the exchange which prevailed at the given time in each State, and add them all together and divide the sum by thirteen, and the quotient will be the mean exchange or value of the currency. For instance, by the best advice I can collect, the exchange last Christmas, or December 25, 1779, was, in the four New-England States, New-York, North and South Carolina and Georgia, i. e. in eight States, at thirty-five for one, and in New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia, i. e. in five States, at forty for one, their sums will stand thus,—
8 into 35 is | 280 |
And 5 into 40 is | 200 |
Sum, 480 |
which sum divided by thirteen gives a quotient of 36 12/13 or 37 nearly, which I suppose to be the true mean exchange or averaged value of the currency, through all the thirteen States, at that time. The present exchange in this city is forty-five to one, and the exchange was rising both to the eastward and southward when the last advices came away, so that I suppose the present mean exchange may safely and truly be fixed at forty for one, but our future advices will soon determine this beyond all doubt. This is throwing aside all theory and speculation, and grounding my computation entirely on fact, and is a method which I expect will be allowed to be fair, true and unexceptionable; and at this value I propose that the currency should be fixed at present, and be finally redeemed at the same. Both these I conceive very just and practicable. I do not think there is any justice in taxing the public to appreciate any man's money in his chest beyond the present value. This would be burdening the public, merely for the benefit of a few individuals of monied men; for I before observed that no person could take benefit of such an appreciation, but such as have more money on hand than all their taxes for redeeming the whole currency will amount to; and those few among us who have such a surplus of money are the men who have the least occasion of assistance from the public, and in general have the least right to expect or even to wish it. For a further consideration of this I refer back to all the reasons I have given against an appreciation. On the other hand, it will be readily granted that every principle of justice requires that any further depreciation of our currency should, if possible, be prevented. The practicability of both these, i. e. of fixing the currency, deserves our most serious consideration; and here, notwithstanding the unnaccountable and seemingly capricious fluctuation of the exchange, both in progressive and retrograde motion (for we have frequently seen both) yet I say, this notwithstanding, I do contend there are great natural [Page 9] principles, which, if properly applied, will confine this slippery subject, fix it to a point, and prevent such fluctuation as will greatly prejudice its use.—To prevent an APPRECIATION,
1st. As the currency has no real fixed value in itself, it is necessary that it should be connected, tied or fastened firmly to something that is fixed, which may hold it steady, as an anchor does a ship, which keeps its place by that connection, let the wind or tide set either way. Such a fixed medium is hard money, the value of which cannot vary much from its value in Europe, and therefore its permanency may be safely depended on. To this end I propose, 1st. That an order of Congress be passed, that hard money shall be received for taxes and all other payments into the Continental Treasury, at the present value or fixed exchange; say forty for one. For as the demand for taxes will be very great and universal, if the present system of taxation be carried into effectual execution, as it doubtless will be, it will not be possible for any man to get a better exchange than is received in the public treasury. 2d. I propose that a resolution pass to redeem the whole currency finally at the present value; say forty for one. This will effectually take away all inducement to raise the value of it beyond the exchange which can finally be obtained for it, when it shall be redeemed. I do apprehend that my reasons before assigned against the appreciation will prove the justice, good policy and necessity of these resolutions, to which I therefore refer. 3d. I propose that all public estimates, quotas, payments, &c. be made in hard money, or continental equal to it at the current exchange, and also that all judgments of courts, fees, salaries, &c. should be made up in the same manner, that so no public community or private person should receive either injury or benefit from any future fluctuation of the currency, either up or down, if such should happen, any farther than his cash on hand might be affected by it. This would not only be an effectual remedy of the crying injustice, both public and private, which has too long prevailed among us, but will also take away the principal inducement and temptation to attempt any fluctuation of the currency. And 4th. I propose, for the more effectual operation of this remedy, that all the tender acts, all laws against dealing in hard money, and every other of that nature which now subsists in any of the States, may be repealed. I think that a late writer, under the signature of Adolphus, has treated this subject with great judgment and propriety; and as those acts were mostly made on the recommendation of Congress, I apprehend a recommendation of that honourable body to the several States for such repeal might be necessary.—It appears to me that these propositions will most effectually prevent any future appreciation of our currency: But it may be said here, we are sufficiently out of danger of that, the present labour is to stop the depreciation. But I do not know all this. I have many reasons to fear an appreciation, which would be a very ruinous calamity if it should happen, and I think we may do well to use precautions against a possible evil; and I have at least the common argument of quacks in favour of my propositions, that they are innocent, they can do no hurt, and they [Page 10] may do good. If the event to which they are designed to be applied should happen, they will be of the utmost use and benefit; if that event should not happen, their operation will be prevented, and no bad effects can proceed from them, I am as sensible as any man of the urgent necessity of preventing a farther depreciation, and therefore recur to such great natural principles as I think will most effectually and assuredly remedy the mischief; and here I hope it will not be taken amiss, if I repeat some things I have heretofore advanced; for great truths, and weighty principles of decisive importance, ought often to be repeated, that they may be better kept in mind. I proceed then, to prevent DEPRECIATION,
2d. To observe, that one great cause of depreciation is the increase of the quantity of our currency, and therefore the quantity must by no means be increased. For it is not possible to prevent the operation of such increase on the depreciation. It matters not in what shape such an increase may appear, whether of continental bills, certificates, bills on Europe, or bills of particular States. If the quantity in circulation is increased, it is not in the [...] of the thing possible to prevent the effect of depreciation, which must and will [...] from that increase. Therefore, 3d. the incomes must be made equal to the expenditures. This will give the currency a quick circulation, sufficient for every purpose, without any increase of its quantity, will raise that demand for it, which is essential to its nature and use, and from its natural operation will prevent any possibility of depreciation, if the confidence of the public in its final redemption can be made intire and free of doubt. And this brings me to the consideration of another great principle▪ on which the credit of all bills must depend, viz. 4th. [...] final redemption of the bills must be made certain, and the [...] exchange at which they shall be finally paid or redeemed must be certainly known. If there is any doubt of either of these in the minds of the people, that doubt will lessen the value of the bills; for a certainty will always be better than an uncertainty, i. e. the credit of the States must stand so firmly connected with their real substance, that there can be no doubt but the one will be supported by the other. The life and use of money lies in a quick and ready circulation; yet, although this circulation should be ever so brisk, if it passes from hand to hand, like Robin's alive, in constant danger of dying in the last hand, it must, notwithstanding all its signs of life and vigour, depreciate fast; and I conceive a general confidence or doubt of this kind has operated more on our currency than people are generally aware of. In the gloomy aspect of our affairs in the winter of 1778, when the British army had possession of Philadelphia, the exchange rose to six, seven and eight for one. In the summer and fall of the same year, when we begun to feel the great effects of General Gates's success, the English sued for peace and their army left Philadelphia, our alliance with France was formed, with a prospect of the accession of Spain, and a powerful French fleet was on our coast, the exchange fell to four for one, and kept down for many months together; but when our sanguine expectations began to abate, new difficulties [Page 11] arose, and the multiplied emissions had swelled the quantity of our currency to an enormous amount, beyond any probability or even possibility of payment at fall value, there ensued a great abatement of the general confidence, and mighty doubts arose whether it would ever be redeemed at all, or, if it was, at what value; and these doubts increased with the increase of the quantity, and some other causes, till the exchange rose up to the enormous height which now exists. The principal causes of these doubts, and consequently of the depreciation, I take it, have been the uncertainty of the fate of the war, or support of our Independence, and the increasing enormous sum of our currency. I conceive all doubts arising from the first of these causes are pretty well done away. I think it is so far from remaining a doubt whether we shall support our Independence, that I do not apprehend it is in our power to give it up▪ if we were willing, and to fall back into the dominion of Great-Britain. I am of opinion that France and Spain, and perhaps some other powers, must be conquered, before the trade or government of America can be permitted to be monopolized and controuled by Great Britain. The vast extent of our country, the fertility of our soil, salubrity of our climates, with other natural advantages, together with the rapid increase of our people, agriculture and arts, make us an object of vast importance, expectation and attention with every trading country of Europe, and they will not easily give up the share of profit which they expect to derive from us. If we continue to increase as we have done in time past, that is, to double every twenty-five years, the thirteen States will contain more people, at the end of the next century, than France, Spain and Great-Britain together all contain at present. All Europe gaze with attention on our rising greatness, and it is a pity that America, like some careless beauty, should be the only person in the company insensible of her charms. It is time for us to know our own importance, and not throw ourselves away in a needless despondency As to the doubts arising from the great quantity of our currency, and the consequent uncertainty of its redemption, I conceive they will be effectually removed by the foregoing propositions. The present debt of continental money ceases to appear enormous; it does not exceed five millions of hard dollars, which is less than two dollars per head on the inhabitants; a light burden! a trifle! not adequate to the abilities of the poorest town in the thirteen States. The only remaining doubt is, whether the states will in fact pay this sum, small as it is. This doubt appears to me ridiculous; for were we to suppose there was not a grain of honour or honesty left in the thirteen States, on which we could depend for the payment of their debts, yet they have suffered so much by the depreciation of their currency, that they will, from a principle of self preservation, remedy the mischief, and prevent it in future. A burnt child dreads the fire, and certainly we have not lost all the feelings of human nature, however callous we may be to the inducements of moral principles. But my confidence, even in the morality of the States, is not shaken, it is entire. It is my opinion our people are able and willing to do all that is necessary to [Page 12] be done in the present crisis. Nothing more is or can be necessary, than to put the matter in a proper train of operation. Let the people see the expenditures made with prudence and oeconomy; that the demand of public money is grounded on public necessity only; let them see men acting in the offices, through which the public monies are to pass, in whom they can have confidence; let them see a system of finance formed which shall appear both practicable and sufficient, and put under such direction as shall afford a good probability of prudent management and effectual execution; let these things be done (and I do not take them to be mountains impracticable) and I conceive our public faith will be effectually restored, and rise to such a degree of respectability, that no branch of the revenue will dare to defraud the treasury, or withhold the supplies necessary to the public safety; nor, on the other hand, will our public faith prove a ruinous and infamous trap to those who have trusted their fortunes to its security. I do not pretend these are light matters and without difficulty. The forming a system of finance is an arduous work, fully equal to the abilities of a person of the strongest intellects, steady attention, and aptitude to the subject. It must be the work of ONE MIND, capable of the necessary attention to all the parts, and able so to comprehend and arrange the whole, as to form a system both practicable and sufficient. I do not think any aggregate body of men on earth able to do this. I am of opinion that we might as well expect that a General Assembly, a Parliament, a Diet of an Empire, or a Congress, could describe and demonstrate the properties of the sphere, compute the force of falling bodies, define the laws of hydrostaticks, or make an almanack, as well as form a system of finance. The power of superintendence and legal sanction is theirs, but the calculation and execution of the system is not, in my humble opinion, compatible to the senatorial body. The British Parliament, some years ago, abolished the Julian stile and adopted the Gregorian, and gave it legal sanction, to the great satisfaction and benefit of the kindom, but I never heard any man suppose that that Parliament was ever capable of calculating or demonstrating either of the stiles: yet I do not apprehend that it is any reflection on the dignity, abilities or competency of that Parliament to suppose, that, if no body could have calculated stiles better than they could, we might have done without any till this time, and computed the advance of the spring by the budding of the white-oak trees, as the Indians do. The consequence from all this is, in my opinion, that if a senatorial body want stiles, systems of finance, or any things else which require peculiar abilities, such as by common probability cannot be presumed to exist in such a body, they can only manifest their wisdom and employ their authority in appointing men of proper abilities to make them; then the Senate can examine and correct them, and add their sanction and authority, put the execution of them under a proper direction, and keep the superintendance only in themselves. I think it may easily appear, that the nature of the subject limits the powers of a Senate to this line of conduct. But were it not so, good policy would prescribe this method; for the ground of finance is every step of it most [Page 13] dangerous ground. Errors are at first imperceptible and easily made, but soon shoot up into capital importance, and often assume a most hideous and ghastly appearance; all which is apt to throw disgrace and censure, and sometimes contempt, on the authors. That which proceeded from ignorance may be attributed to bad design. In any view, mistakes and disappointments prove the ignorance or imperfection of the managers, and there will always be some degree of contempt due to persons who undertake things which they know not how to perform. Bodies of supreme dignity ought never to incur censures or aspersions of this sort. The public always suffers, when the wisdom or integrity of their supreme power is called at all into question. They ought therefore, in all good policy, to appoint proper persons to do all business of this sort, were it only that they might have a scapegoat to bear away from themselves the censure, disgrace and contempt, which any errors might occasion, when they came to be discovered; for it is very observable, that when any error or misconduct happens in any great department of the State, the blame always falls on the officer under whose direction it was made. No part of the censure ever falls on the supreme power, unless it is that of making a corrupt or injudicious appointment of the officer, or taking the management of the matter out of his hands by too particular instructions.
On the whole matter, our country abounds with men and every sort of supplies we need (military stores and cloathing excepted, which are easily attainable from abroad.) Our public councils and measures are very little obstructed by disputes or parties in opposition. The great thing wanted is, to put our finances into such a train, order or system, as will revive the public credit, bring our currency into such an established value and demand, as is necessary to its nature and use, and enable the public to call into use such services and supplies as are necessary to the public safety. That the abilities requisite to form and execute such a system are not to be found or expected in any senatorial body, i. e. by common probability it cannot be presumed, that the component members of such a body should be possessed of the rare and peculiar abilities requisite for this great purpose. It remains then a matter of the highest and most urgent necessity, that a suitable person for the great office of Financier-General, or Superintendant of Finance, should be looked up and appointed as soon as may be, whose sole business should be to inspect and controul our whole revenue and expenditures, and keep them in balance with each other. I imagine this high office will not be very greedily sought or eagerly accepted by any person capable of it. It will require the most unwearied, unremitted application, the most intense and fixed attention to a subject of a most intricate nature and great extent; the heart-felt interests, the loss or gain, the injury or benefit of millions, will stand closely connected with his conclusions and management, and of course his errors, if he makes any (as from the intricacy and vast extent of the subject he undoubtedly must) his errors, I say, will incur the severe resentment, and raise the merciless cry of the inconsiderate and ill-natured, which make a considerable part of the world; [Page 14] and after all, if he conducts with success, he will get little praise; for every thing in his way will go smoothly on in a regular train, which will soon grow familiar, and of course unnoticed, and not one in a thousand will know to whom they are indebted for their tranquility. Besides, I do not know that the present confusions of our revenue are capable of being speedily reduced to order by any address of wisdom, skill and diligence, and should he fail, the weighty burden will crush him in an instant, and he may fall, like Phaëton, ridiculous and unpitied, for undertaking a work for which, perhaps, any degree of human wisdom or ability may prove insufficient. Be this as it may, much will depend on the choice of this officer. Should an insufficient man be appointed, his defects or mismanagement will not only be severely felt while he is in office, but most probably his successor may find a more difficult task to correct his errors, than to have taken up the matter new, and set out right at first.
But to return to the main point; the great question seems now to be, whether, in any practicable train or method, it would be possible to raise money among ourselves equal to the necessary expenditures, i. e. whether the people could pay such a large sum. To this I answer, the best method of judging of the mighty wealth and abilities of the States is, by reflecting on what they have paid in times past. The expences of the war for five years past have been about eleven millions of hard dollars per annum, besides the loans, as will easily appear by computing the value of the bills emitted each year; and this has been all paid, except five millions, and that in the worst, most distressing and oppressive method that could be devised, viz. by the depreciation of the currency. The payments of the last year, 1779, which were actually made, were about double the said sum, for on the last day of the year 1778, the whole currency was about one hundred and thirty-three millions, of which at least one hundred and twelve millions of dollars were in circulation, and the exchange was six to one; consequently one hundred and twelve millions, divided by six, gives in hard money the amount of our debt of continental money, viz. eighteen millions and seven hundred thousand dollars, to which add the expenditures of the year 1779, viz. about one hundred and sixty-five millions of dollars. To find the value of this we must divide it by the mean exchange of the year, which I conceive may be found by multiplying the exchange at the end of the year 1778, viz. six for one, by the exchange at the end of the year 1779, viz. forty, which makes a product of two hundred and forty, the square root of which, viz. 15,5 nearly, is the mean exchange, and the sum of expenditures of 1779, viz. one hundred and sixty five millions, divided by said mean exchange, viz. 15,5, gives for quotient nearly 10⅔ millions of hard dollars, which added to the amount of the debt at the end of the year 1778, viz. 18,700,000, makes somewhat more than twenty-nine millions; out of which subtract the debt now remaining, viz. five millions, there remains twenty-four millions of hard dollars, which have been [Page 15] actually paid by the thirteen States in the year 1779. The question is then reduced to this, viz. Whether it is not only possible, but much easier to pay eleven millions of hard dollars in some equitable mode, which distributes the burden on all in due proportion to their abilities, than it was last year to pay more than double that sum in the most unequal and oppressive way imaginable. I know it will require strong exertions, but we began the war with this expectation and resolution, and I do not think our people will shrink or give back under the burden when it comes. Besides, it does not appear to me possible to increase our circulating cash in any way, without further depreciating it, which at once destroys its use, and the very end we should have in view by increasing it. Loans will do this; for every loan makes a new certificate or bill of some sort, and all these will flow into circulation as soon as they gain that established value which they ought to have, and which they must have before we can borrow without a loss or discount. I think it manifestly reasonable, that all loan-office certificates should be redeemed at the exchange which existed at their dates, and that there should be a rate of exchange from the first depreciation down to the present time made, to ascertain the exchange at the time when each bill was dated, and a sure interest, in proportion to the value of the principal, should be secured to the possessor, until the certificate shall be paid. If this was done, we might borrow, perhaps, without a discount or loss, and keep our debt at home, which would be much better than drawing bills on Europe at a loss of fifty per cent. and contracting a hard money debt abroad. But this is digression. To return to my subject, I do not really see but that general and heavy taxes are most absolutely necessary to give demand to our currency, animate the industry of our people, and banish idleness, speculation, and a thousand visionary projects, which prevail to an alarming degree, and which must vanish into nothing soon, and therefore the sooner the better. Taxes will increase the circulation of our currency, which will increase its use quite up to the full amount necessary to all our needs, nor can I see any other way in which we can carry on the war, without incurring such an enormous debt at the end of it, as will mix even the joys of established liberty with bitterness, and even endanger that very liberty itself for which we have so strenuously contended, and for which the debt itself was contracted. The writer of three letters on appreciation has advised us to set the presses a going again, and in the plenitude of calculation made out that the depreciation or exchange, at the end of the year 1780, would in that case be about sixty-eight to one; but had he founded his calculation on fact (on the supposition that the depreciation would be no greater this year than it was last, which is not true) he would have found the depreciation or exchange, at the end of the year 1780, at least two hundred and sixty-six to one, and probably it would be more than double, perhaps the treble of that exchange, if it should contine to pass at all thro' the year, which is far from a certainty. This method then will not do. From all which it appears pretty plain we have but two things before us, viz. to raise as much money [Page 16] as will be sufficient to pay our expenditures as we go; or, if we can not do this, to reduce our expenditures to the sum which we can pay. For to talk of keeping up a greater expence than we can pay any how, is absurd and ridiculous to a very contemptible degree. To borrow abroad is ruinous, and nothing is plainer than that we cannot hold it out long in this way; and what is worse, our enemies must know this, and thereby be encouraged to continue the war against us. To borrow at home destroys the very end and use of the loan as it goes. The great purpose cannot be served in this way. What we can raise among ourselves is all that we can pay, and we cannot attempt expenditures beyond this without bankruptcy. A peace cannot be expected till the end of the great contest between three of the greatest powers of Europe, which may involve more powers in the dispute. It is a matter of such high point of honour, pride and interest with them all, especially Great-Britain, that they will strain the last nerve for superiority before they will yield an ace, and the war may last many years; the consequence of all this is, that we must take up the matter as we can hold out. A man who has a long race before him is mad, if he exhausts all his strength in the first mile. A certain degree of exertion we are capable of, beyond which we cannot go; within this we must keep and confine ourselves. This degree ought to be calculated with great judgment, and used with great oeconomy, and with the most effect it will bear, but it cannot be exceeded without the mighty and tremendous danger of final ruin. These are my best thoughts, the subject is too vast, too unexplored for my comprehension. This is my fourth address to the public on this weighty theme. I am obliged for the favourable reception of the other three, hope the same candor will be extended to this. My thoughts are free, the nature and incidents of the subject dictate my argument. Great natural principles will always make their own way in the end, and if they are ever rejected, it is because they are not rightly apprehended, and any departure from them will be checked and reformed by dear experience. My close attention to this great and intricate subject has taught me that it baffles all speculative theory and calculation. The only safe basis of every principle of reasoning on it must be fact or experiment. Here I drop my pen, ready to stand corrected by the better thoughts and more useful discoveries of any superior genius.
Philadelphia, February 10, 1780.