AUGUST 25th.

THE President, Members and Judge Advocate being sworn, the Judge Advocate prosecuting in the name of the United States of America, the Court proceed to the trial of Major General St. Clair, who ap­pears before the Court, and the following charges, contained in a Report of a Committee of Congress ap­pointed to examine the evidence collected, and to state charges against the General Officers who were in the Northern Department when Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated, are exhibited against him.

First. With neglect of duty, under the 5th article of the 18th section of the Rules and Articles of War.

Second. With cowardice, with treachery, with incapacity as a General, respectively; under the 5th arti­cle of the 18th section of the Rules and Articles of War.

Third. With treachery, under the 5th article of the 18th section of the Rules and Articles of War.

Fourth. With inattention to the progress of the enemy, with treachery, with incapacity as a General, respectively; under the 5th article of the 18th section of the Rules and Articles of War.

Fifth. With shamefully abandoning the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in his charge; under the 12th article of the 13th section of the Rules and Articles of War.

Major General ST. CLAIR pleads NOT GUILTY.

The Judge Advocate states the matters upon which the charges against the General are founded, as follow:

Gentlemen,

IT is necessary (previous to my producing the requisite evidence on this trial) that I should inform you of the matters, upon which the charges against Major General St. Clair are founded. They are certain remarks, made by a committee of the Hon. the Continental Congress, appointed to examine the evidence collected, and to state charges against the general officers who were in the northern department when Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated.

Before I mention these remarks, I would inform you that Major General St. Clair, on or about the 13th day of June, 1777, took upon him the command of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and that these places were evacuated to the enemy by his orders on the 6th day of July following.

The first remark is: That on the 13th day of June General St. Clair was possessed of an information from two prisoners taken in Canada, that the British forces, amounting to about 10,000 men, were proceeding as fast as possible against him, and that he might expect their arrival in three weeks at farthest. That as on the 18th of June four of the enemy's vessels were lying on the hither side of Split Rock, and on the 24th seven of them were at Crown-Point, and others four or five miles lower down, their forces then encamped on both sides of Gilleland's Creek, and he was informed by his scouts that they were very numerous; so from these circumstances it appears General St. Clair had substantial reason to confide in what the prisoners had told him [Page 4] relative to the intentions and strength of the enemy; and that he ought at this time to have taken his final resolution, either to stand an attack, or to retreat with his stores, the preservation of which was a principal object in the determination of a council of war on the 20th of June. Therefore it appears that General St. Clair's neglecting to form his decisive opinion at this time, or at a later day, so as to allow him a sufficient opportunity to retreat with his troops, sick, ammunition, cannon, provisions and cloathing, and to deprive the enemy of shelter at Ticonderoga, was a neglect of duty.

Second. That General St. Clair, on the 24th of June, was informed by his scouts the enemy were very numerous and yet, nevertheless, on the next day he wrote to Congress, that he was not able to discover whether the enemy were in force or not.

Third. That if General St. Clair found small scouts could not acquire a knowledge whether the enemy were in force or not, it was his duty in due time to have sent out reconnoitering parties, in such force as might have assured him whether or not the enemy were in strength, this being a most important point, as upon this he was to regulate his motions; and therefore his failure in sending out such parties in due time was a neglect of duty.

Fourth. That as Jesse Leavenworth swears General St. Clair did not annoy the enemy in their advance against, and investiture of, the posts under his care, although the troops were healthy, courageous, and [...] of action, it appears the General did not to the utmost of his power oppose the operations of the enemy; and therefore that he is liable to the charge of neglect of duty, of cowardice, or of treachery, or of incapacity as a General.

Fifth. That as it was determined in a council of war on the twentieth of June, approved by General Schuyler, the commanding officer in the department, that the repairing the old and adding new works on Mount Independence ought to claim immediate attention; and Jesse Leavenworth swears not a stroke was struck for those purposes; and by the orderly book it appears the fatigue party was decreased in number, and continued so at a time when it should have been abundantly increased; so on these points the General is liable to be charged with a neglect of duty, amounting to a breach of orders, and with treachery.

Sixth. That as on the 25th of May, the Deputy Commissary rated that 1400 barrels of flour would, at an allowance of one pound each man per diem, serve 4000 men 66 days, and that 661 barrels of beef would serve the same number of men 75 days; and supposing that, from the twentieth of June to the fourth of July inclusive, there were in Ticonderoga and Mount Independence 4739 men, and there does not appear to have been at any time between these periods a greater number; so estimating the consumption of 4739 men, from the twentieth of June to the fourth of July inclusive, upon the 2015 barrels of flour, 195 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork, on the twentieth of June returned by Deputy Commissary Yancey as then actually remaining on hand, there did on the fourth of July remain, or ought, if provisions had been regularly and properly issued, to be then remaining 1625 barrels of flour, 3 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork; a magazine of provisions sufficient to afford to the army on the fifth of July, amounting, by the arrival of the militia of the Grants, to 5639 men of all ranks, fall allowance of provision in flour for 52 days, and in beef and pork for 32 days, exclusive of the considerable number of fat cattle that arrived at Ticonderoga on the fifth of July, the teams of oxen necessarily attending the post, and other stores specified in the Commissary's return on the twentieth of June, and even supposing, as may not reasonably be done, that no supply of flour had arrived after that day. And as this calculation has been liberally made, upon the quantity of provisions actually in Ticonderoga on the twentieth of June, for the expenditure of which General St. Clair, as commander at the post, ought to be held responsible; therefore it clearly appears Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were not abandoned upon the just principle of a want of provisions.

Seventh. That as General St. Clair informed the Hon. Mr. Jay, that at the time of holding the council of war on the 5th of July he knew it to be impossible to defend the posts with his numbers, it is natural to conclude he was decided upon this point as early as the 29th of June, the day that he sent his son and pri­vate effects from Ticonderoga to Fort-George, as a place of safety: That being decided upon this point, it was his duty then to have taken as effectual measures for the preservation of the public property, at least equally with his own, claiming his earliest attention: That on the 30th of June, the enemy being ad­vancing against him so near as the Three-mile-point, it is incredible that he did not then know that they were in force: That it was his duty, at that point of time, to have finally determined either to abide the operations of the enemy, or to retire: That if the last resolution was taken, and, from his sending off his son and baggage the day before, there is the strongest presumption that this resolution was then fully taken, it was his duty then to have proceeded to send off the public stores, to destroy the works, and to evacuate the posts without losing a moment of time: And that by deferring to take any measures to retire till the last moment when he could possibly retreat even with his effective troops, a moment when the sick, ammu­nition, cannon, provision and cloathing of the army must be abandoned and lost, besides the lives of many men in effecting a retreat from before an enemy immediately upon him, General St. Clair appears charge­able with inattention to the progress of the enemy, with treachery, or with incapacity as a General, and with shamefully abandoning the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in his charge. Nor can the proving, as General St. Clair wishes to do, that the works of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were too extensive, and that the troops were very badly armed, if such things can be proved, fail of placing General St. Clair in a more reprehensible point of view, as the weakness of his defence being more obvious, his retreat should have been the earlier determined upon.

The charge of neglect of duty is founded on the first, third, fourth and fifth remarks respectively.— Cowardice, treachery, incapacity as a General, respectively, are founded upon the fourth remark.— Treachery, founded upon the fifth remark.—Inattention to the progress of the enemy, treachery, inca­pacity as a General, respectively, founded upon the seventh remark.—Shamefully abandoning the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in his charge, founded upon the seventh remark.

Major General St. Clair requests that the Resolution of Congress of the 5th of February last, appointing two Counsellors learned in the law to assist and co-operate with the Judge Advocate in the trial of the General [Page 5] Officers who were in the Northern Department when Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated, may be read; which, being read, is as follows:

Major General St. Clair requests the Judge Advocate to inform him what steps have been taken respecting these gentlemens attendance:—The Judge Advocate produces a copy of a letter written by him to his Ex­cellency General Washington, and the General's answer, which are as follow:

The letters being read, Major General St. Clair addresses the Court as follows:

THE resolution that has just been read is of so singular a nature, that I cannot pass it by without some observations.

The treatment I have received renders it necessary for me to submit to any regulation that may have been prescribed, as an objection on my part would probably be construed into the fear of a thorough investigation, and consequently an evidence of guilt. I shall therefore make no objection to the learned gentlemen, should they attend, assisting and co-operating with the Judge Advocate in my trial: But, as I conceive this to be introducing a very great change in the mode of proceeding before Courts Martial, I cannot consent that Congress have any power to make that change.

Courts Martial were constituted by the first article of the 14th section of the rules and articles for the go­vernment of the troops, and the mode of proceeding in them by the third article of the same section. These articles every officer is obliged to subscribe, whereby they become a compact betwixt the army and the people, and cannot be altered but by common consent; and a resolve of Congress has no more operation upon them than an edict of the Grand Turk. But a power to alter the ordinary course of proceeding for a par­ticular case is big with consequences of the most dangerous nature, and might be made an instrument of the most grievous oppression. I do therefore, on behalf of the army, solemnly protest against my having sub­mitted to this innovation ever hereafter being drawn into precedent.

Major General St. Clair admits he took the command of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on or about the 13th day of June, 1777, and that these posts were evacuated by his orders the 6th day of July following.

The Judge Advocate produces copies of letters from Major General St. Clair to Major General Schuyler, dated June 13th, June 18th, and June 24th, 1777; also a copy of a letter from Major General St. Clair to Congress, dated June 25th, 1777; a copy of a letter from General St. Clair to Major General Schuyler, dated June 30th, 1777; the proceedings of a Council of Officers held at Ticonderoga the 20th of June, 1777; a state of the guards and fatigue party, June 15th, 1777, from a copy of General St. Clair's orderly book; also an order from the said orderly book respecting the guards and fatigue party, June 23d, 1777: which, being read, are as follow:

The Judge Advocate produces a copy of a return of provisions, &c. at Ticonderoga the 25th of May, 1777, which the Court adjudge improper evidence, on account of its being prior to the time Major General St. Clair took the command of the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount independence.

The Judge Advocate produces a copy of a return of provisions and stores remaining on hand at Ticonde­roga and Mount Independence, June 20th, 1777; a general return of the troops at Ticonderoga, June 14th, 1777; a general return of the troops at Ticonderoga, June 28th, 1777; and the proceedings of a Council of General Officers held at Ticonderoga, July 5th, 1777; which, being read, are as follow:

Mr. Avery, Deputy Commissary General in the Northern Department, being sworn,

Q. What Quantity of provision was at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence the 13th of June, 1777?

A. I cannot particularly ascertain the quantity of provision, as I had no particular return at that time, but to the best of my recollection General St. Clair wrote me the 15th or 16th of June, that there was seven weeks provision on hand at Ticonderoga, Mount Independence and its dependencies.

General St. Clair's question. What was the general purport of my letter to you?

A. The general purport was informing me that there was such a quantity of provision there. That you thought it too small a quantity; and if I did not forward on more, you would leave me to judge what the consequence would be to myself.

General St. Clair's question. Did you receive a letter from General Schuyler about the same time, and upon the same subject?

A. Yes.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the purport?

A. Much the same as your's was; complaining of the quantity of provision at that post being too small, and urging an immediate supply.

Mr. Yancey, who superintended the Issuing Commissary's Department at Ticonderoga and Mount Inde­pendence, being sworn,

Q. Were any supplies of provision received at Ticonderoga or Mount Independence between the 20th of June and 6th of July, 1777?

A. I left Ticonderoga the 21st of June in order to purchase cattle. I purchased myself twenty-one cattle, and sent forward to Ticonderoga twenty of them. The other I sent forward, with thirty oxen and steers delivered me by Mr. Avery's order, all to Ticonderoga. There were a few cattle also sent on in company with these for the hospital. I do not know their number. The first was sent on the 26th of June; the place from where they were sent was called Paulett. The next was the 27th of June, place called Manchester.

Q. Do you know whether these cattle arrived at Ticonderoga or Mount Independence?

A. Not from my own knowledge. I understood that one, two or three of the cattle were made use of by Colonel Warner, who took them under his care to drive them into Ticonderoga, and I understood that they arrived there, but only from information.

Q. Court. What quantity of provision was issued the 20th of June as a ration?

A. I do not, at present, exactly know what quantity was issued as a ration at that time. The artificers received one ration and a half.

Q. Court. What quantity of provision was daily issued by the General's orders, and to the general hospital?

A. I do not know. The general hospital was sometimes supplied by my magazine, but not steadily. The general officers and their families, and several of the field and some other officers, drew what they pleased on account.

General St. Clair's question. Where could the general hospital have been supplied with provision, unless it was from your magazine?

A. I do not know from any place with respect to fresh provision, unless they sent out and purchased it. The salt provision and flour could be got from me only.

General St. Clair's question. Was there any country in the neighbourhood from which they could have been supplied?

A. None nearer than the Hampshire Grants.

General St. Clair's question. When you made the return of the 20th of June, did you count the barrels of provision yourself, or did you make up your return from the returns made to you?

A. I did not count the barrels of provision. I made the return from the entries of my peoples receipts and deliveries.

Q. Court. When did the book of accounts commence from which you made your return?

A. I believe the first of December▪ 1776.

General St. Clair's question. Had there not been, from time to time, a considerable quantity of provision condemned at this post?

A. I sent some packers to Ticonderoga in March, 1777, to repack the provision. They returned to me I think in April, and I saw when I got up to Ticonderoga an account of damaged provision amongst my papers, amounting to about twenty-eight barrels of beef or pork, but I am pretty confident the twenty-eight barrels of beef or pork were not included in the general return of the 20th of June, but I cannot undertake to say there was no damaged provision amongst the quantity mentioned in the return of the 20th of June.

General St. Clair's question. Did you know, when you were sent to purchase fresh provision, of any magazine of salt provision in the vicinity of Ticonderoga, from which you could have supplied that garrison?

A. I knew of salt provision having been carried forward from Bennington and William's-Town to St. Coack, but I do not know the quantity.

General St. Clair's question to Mr. Avery. Did you order salt provision from St. Coack or Stillwater to Albany?

[Page 13]A. I ordered a small quantity from Stillwater, the magazine at Albany being empty of salt provision at the time. It was some time in the month of June, as near as I can recollect.

Question to Mr. Avery. How long did the magazine at Albany remain empty, and did any supply of provision arrive between that time and the 6th of July?

A. There was some provision arrived at Albany, but what quantity I cannot tell, but not much more than was sufficient for the supply of the troops that were there.

General St. Clair's question to Mr. Avery. Did you write to General Schuyler, that you were deceived by your Purchasing Commissaries?

A. I do not remember that I did; but I do not know but I might have wrote to General Schuyler that they had not collected the quantity that I expected.

The Court adjourned till to-morrow, nine o'clock.

AUGUST 26th.

The Court met according to adjournment.

The Judge Advocate produces several extracts from a copy of General St. Clair's orderly book, which, being read, are as follow:

Mr. Leavenworth, being sworn, says: I arrived at Ticonderoga the 9th of March, and tarried there until the retreat. About three weeks before the retreat, as near as I can remember, it was reported that the enemy were at Split Rock, and I heard guns some days that were said to be their evening and morning guns. I also heard General St. Clair give out he thought that the enemy were between six and seven thousand strong. On the 26th of June I made report to General St. Clair of the tallow in my possession, the quantity being great. He said he would give directions about it, and said also that the Commissary ought to have taken care of it, and had it worked up. General St. Clair took occasion to mention that the Commissary had not only ne­glected his duty in that instance, but also had neglected it in not sending on the supplies of provision. I did not hear any thing more about it, and on Wednesday before the retreat I went to General St. Clair re­specting it, who said it was the Commissary's business, and he ought to have taken care of it, and blamed him again on account of provision, and said there were but a few days provision. I told him I thought there was more. All the provision had been removed from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence, and on Thursday or Friday I went to Mount Independence to satisfy myself respecting the quantity of provision there, and I think there were full three thousand barrels of beef, pork and flour there, from the appearance of them. I did not count them. This was a larger quantity than appeared to be there on the twenty-sixth of June. On Wednesday before the retreat I was at Head-Quarters, and observed it was entirely stripped of the baggage, and in consequence of it I put my baggage in a boat, and sent it to Mount Independence. Having received no orders about the tallow, I desired some gentlemen to speak to the General about it, and on Saturday morning the enemy made their appearance on Mount Defiance, when, talking to some gentlemen respecting the tallow, one of them said I had done enough to exculpate myself respecting it, and gave me to understand that we were to retreat that evening, and told me not to let it be known by words or actions, and told me not to regulate my conduct by it so that it might be known. It was General Poor who told me of it. On Saturday evening, at gun firing, I went into my boat with my people, and went to the south-west point of Mount Independence, and I continued in my boat and on the point of Mount Independence all night. Be­tween eleven and twelve o'clock at night, one Serjeant Bond came down, who told me that he came down to see what boats were there. That between twelve and one o'clock, a party of men came down to the Scotch­man's, and took the boats up to the Crane, as they said, to load with provision, and at day light began to re­turn, and I went off with my boat in company with the first boats. The cannon began to be removed (when General Schuyler was present) from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence, and continued to be removed after General Schuyler's departure, as were quantities of artillery stores.

[Page 14]Q. Did any quantity of provision arrive at Ticonderoga or Mount Independence from the 20th of June to the time of the evacuation, either from Fort George or Skeensborough!

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Did any number of cattle arrive at Ticonderoga or Mount Independence between the 20th of June and the time of the evacuation?

A. I saw cattle that Colonel Warner said he brought in with him. I thought I saw (from the idea I now have) about forty head.

Q. Were any parties sent out to annoy the enemy, by order from General St. Clair, in their advance against, and investiture of, the posts under his ca [...]e, to your knowledge?

A. The enemy came to Three Mile Point, and I have seen parties go out of about twenty men in a party. I know of none sent out to oppose the enemy's progress.

Q. Court. What kind of ground was it between Three Mile-Point and Ticonderoga?

A. I have not been over the whole of the ground, but over part of it; there are some cleared fields next to the Lake, and woods back. This is all the description I can give of the ground.

Q. Were the troops under General St. Clair healthy, courageous, and desirous of improving every advan­tage against the enemy?

A. Yes.

Q. Court. What reason had you to think the troops were healthy, courageous, and desirous of improving every advantage against the enemy?

A. In the first place, with regard to their being healthy, I had occasion to be at the hospital several times after the enemy came near to us, and I did not see many sick there, and it was generally reported that the army was healthy. After I was apprehensive that we were to retreat, I took pains to enquire of a number of officers of my acquaintance, indirectly, whether the troops were courageous, and determined to fight, should the enemy come on, and they all answered in the affirmative.

Q. Court. Was it your opinion, and the opinion of the officers you indirectly asked whether the troops were courageous and determined to fight, that the place was defensible?

A. I did not ask any of the officers whether the place was defensible. It was my own opinion that the place was not defensible in the circumstances it then was.

Q. Court. What do you mean by the circumstances it was then in?

A. In the first place, the lines were very extensive, so that there were not men enough on the ground to man them: Another circumstance was, the enemy had got possession of the heights about us: Another was, the heavy cannon, artillery stores, and all the provision, were removed from Ticonderoga to Mount Inde­pendence; and the reason why Mount Independence could not be defended was, that there were not works thrown up suitable to cover the men. Great part of the provision that was carried over to the Mount was, at the time of the retreat, at the foot of the Crane. The distance from the place the provision lay, to the top of the Mount, was about two hundred feet.

Q. Was any thing done at Mount Independence between the 20th of June and the 6th of July, 1777, to­wards repairing the old works there, and adding new works?

A. I was not at the south end of Mount Independence, but I heard there were some small works flung up there. The north end of Mount Independence appeared to me as usual on the Thursday or Friday preceding the evacuation. I saw no new fortifications on it, nor any additional works. I know there were no new for­tifications where I expected there would have been some built.

Q. Did General St. Clair send his son and baggage to Fort George, as a place of safety, before his evacu­ation of the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence?

A. I don't know that he did of my own knowledge.

Q. Were the sick, the public stores of ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing left behind, when the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated?

A. Some of the sick were carried off, which I saw. I know nothing respecting the other particulars.

Q. What time was it you heard General St. Clair give out that the enemy were between 6 and 7000 strong?

A. It was said by General St. Clair while the enemy lay at Split Rock. I believe about a fortnight before the evacuation.

Q. Court. Would the provision be (lying at the foot of the Crane) under the enemy's fire, after Ticon­deroga should be in their hands?

A. They were within cannon shot of Ticonderoga, and the enemy must have commanded the Lake.

General St. Clair's question. Were there not parties constantly at work, getting up the provision from the bottom to the top of the Mount?

A. There was a party at work when I went to see what provision was there, and I suppose there was a party constantly at work. It was reported so.

General St. Clair's question. At what time of the day was it on Saturday that General Poor gave you the information of the evacuation being likely to take place?

A. It was in the morning before breakfast. I don't know the time of the day. I took it General Poor was going to Head-Quarters.

General St. Clair's question. What quantity of tallow had you in your possession?

A. One hundred and fifty-four barrels. If I remember right, there were 34▪ 345 lbs.

General St. Clair's question. Had you ever made any report of the tallow to me before the 26th of June?

A. No.

General St. Clair's question. You have mentioned several times that I gave out that the enemy were between 6 and 7000 strong. I should be glad to know whether it was to you I told it, or how you came to be acquainted with it?

A. I don't recollect the circumstances but at one time; that was on the day it was said the scout returned from Split Rock. I was at Head-Quarters, and I heard you observe to several officers who were there, that the enemy were between 6 and 7000 strong.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the company who were there?

A. I can't recollect any person particular, but I think General Patterson was there.

[Page 15]General St. Clair's question. Did you ever hear me say that the enemy were lying at Split Rock, to the amount of any number of troops?

A. You did not say that the enemy lay at Split Rock, but that they consisted of about the number before­mentioned.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know of any [...] between any of the parties from Ticonderoga and the enemy?

A. I heard of some people being killed and scalped between the breast-work and Ticonderoga landing, and I think there was a scalp brought in by some of Whitcomb's people.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know of any larger parties than twenty men being sent out?

A. I don't recollect any.

General St. Clair's question. You have mentioned Head-Quarters being stripped of baggage. I should be glad to know what kind of baggage you observed had been removed from thence?

A. I don't recollect particular things.

General St. Clair's question. What kind of baggage▪ had you ever observed there?

A. I had observed utensils, such as drinking glasses, one chair, a table and a vallefe; but all the utensils I saw in the room at this time was one bowl, except a table and stools.

General St. Clair's question. Did you ever see any thing removed from Head-Quarters?

A. I cannot say absolutely that I did.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether there were parties employed in forming an abbitis about Mount Independence, at any time between the 20th of June and the evacuation?

A. I do not.

General St. Clair's question. Did you ever see parties of axe-men sent over there?

A. I saw parties of axe-men go off the parade often, but I did not know where they went, nor did I ask them to my knowledge.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether the parties of axe-men you saw go off the parade were employed on the Ticonderoga side?

A. I do not.

General St. Clair's question to Mr. Yancey. Did you ever report to me that there was an ounce of tallow at Ticonderoga, or did it appear in any return of your's?

A. I don't believe that I ever told you any thing about it, or made any return to you of it.

The Court adjourn to the house of Capt. Rathburn, in King-Street, until Friday next, at nine o'clock.

AUGUST 28th.

The Court met at Captain Rathburn's, in King's-street, according to adjournment.

Major General St. Clair admits that he wrote a letter to the Hon. John Jay, dated July 25th, 1777, in which there was a sentiment, in substance, that if the General Officers had been against the evacuation of the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, it would have taken place, as he knew it would be impossible to defend the posts with his numbers.

Lieutenant Colonel Hale being sworn,

Q. Were you at Ticonderoga or Mount Independence when the evacuation of those posts took place?

A. I was on Mount Independence.

Q. Did you command a regiment?

A. I was Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Leonard's regiment of Massachusetts militia.

Q. Was the time of service of this regiment nearly expired when the evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence took place?

A. It was nearly expired, as they viewed it, and I think within two or three days from the time of the evacuation.

Q. What do you mean by the terms, as they viewed it?

A. I mean the men viewed their time of service to have commenced from the time they were raised, and the time they drew pay from. They, I understood, founded this belief from the order of the Brigadier, which was that they were raised for two months service; which, when I shewed General St. Clair, he said it was dif­ferent from the order of the Court. The order of the Court was, that they should serve two months from the time of their being on the ground, to the best of my remembrance.

Q. Did you inform General St. Clair that the men viewed their time of service to be nearly expired, and when it took place were determined to go home?

A. After I had heard something said among the people that they viewed their time of service as nearly out, and it was talked among them if they staid they should get no pay, I spoke to them that the enemy were near, and that was the only time, if they came to do any thing, that it was to be done. I also spoke to some of the officers, with regard to the time of service being nearly out, and told them I would inform the General of the circumstances. After this, on Saturday preceding the evacuation, I waited on General St. Clair, to let him know what the regiment thought respecting these matters, and invited Lieut. Colonel May, the Colonel of the other Massachusetts regiment, to go with me. We went, and I informed General St. Clair of the circumstances I have related, and told him their uneasiness with respect to drawing their money on the ground; who told me, that if they made up their rolls their money was ready for them. Lieutenant Colonel May and myself shewed the General the Brigadier's order, and the General said it was different from the order of the Court. The men also made an excuse that they had not been invited to stay. When we informed General St. Clair of the circumstances, he said the men must not go away by any means if they were disposed to go, and told me to write a certificate of the matter, and said perhaps I shall give them a small bounty, and said your certificate will justify me for so doing. The General said he would let the matter rest till morning and think on it, and would send word to me in the morning what proposals to make to the regiment. I went and told the officers of it that night, who appeared to be well satisfied. It was near night when we parted from the General.

[Page 16]General St. Clair's question. Do you not recollect your mentioning to me, or Lieutenant Colonel May, that the men considered their time nearly out, and were determined to go home when it was out, and suggested to me that probably a small bounty might induce them to stay?

A. I do not recollect it.

General St. Clair's question. What do you conceive the men understood by their saying that they were not invited to stay?

A. Upon some of the men saying that their times were nearly out, I told them they must stay longer if there was an occasion for it. They said they had not been invited to stay, and supposed, if they staid, they should get no pay for it. I considered it only as an excuse of theirs, that they should not get pay if they staid after their time was out.

Q. Court. Had you ever before the Saturday informed General St. Clair of the mens opinion of the short time they had to stay?

A. I had not.

Q. Court. What was your inducement for going to the General that day?

A. Upon hearing what I have before related amongst the men, that they considered their time of service as nearly out, and that some of them talked of going home, and to remove all uneasiness about it.

Q. Court. What Reasons have you to suppose the men would have staid, had General St. Clair given them an invitation?

A. The conversation I had with them induced me to think so.

General St. Clair's question. Were you at Castle-Town the day after the evacuation?

A. I was.

General St. Clair's question. Did not both your's and Colonel May's regiment determine to leave the army that day?

A. Not that I know of.

General St. Clair's question. Were you present when I had the two militia regiments drawn up, and spoke to them on that subject?

A. No; but I knew that you were speaking to one of the regiments. I was at a distance, and saw a parade of men, and you amongst them. The regiments were intermixed, and some of my men likely were there.

Q. Court. Did you know at the time what General St. Clair said to them?

A. I was unwell at a distance at the time, and did not know, but I understood afterwards, but don't know from whom, that he was saying something to them about keeping with the army.

Q. Court. When did the regiments leave the army?

A. I believe it was the fourth day at Manchester.

Q. Court. Did the regiments go off by order?

A. We were marching rather in disorder, when General St. Clair asked me whether I commanded that regiment? I told him I did, part of them; and he said, By God, I wish you would embody them, and march them home.

General St. Clair's question. Did I not, in the course of the march, frequently complain of the disorder of the two regiments, and reprove them for it?

A. Not in my hearing?

General St. Clair's question. Were they not disorderly on the march?

A. They did not keep rank and file.

General St. Clair's question. Do you remember of Colonel May's having reported to me that the men were willing to stay, but the officers were not?

A. I do not.

General St. Clair's question. Did your regiment keep their station that was assigned them in the line of march?

A. I know of no station that was assigned them but one day: Whether they kept it that day or not I don't remember.

General St. Clair's question. Did not your regiment break the line of march, and were you not halted by General Poor just after leaving the picketted fort, who said he would turn out a party of men, and order them to fire upon them?

A. I do not remember it.

Q. Was the regiment Colonel May belonged to in the same situation with respect to the opinion of the men, that their time of service was nearly expired, as your's was?

A. Much the same.

Q. When Colonel May went with you to General St. Clair, did he inform him that his men viewed their time of service nearly expired, and were determined to go as soon as it was expired?

A. We related what I have before mentioned.

The Court adjourn till to morrow, nine o'clock.

AUGUST 29th.

The Court met according to adjournment.

Major General St. Clair produces part of a resolution of Congress, dated April 29th, 1777, which, being read, is as follows:

[Page 17]Major General St. Clair desires Major General Gates, and several other gentlemen, may be sworn.

Major General Gates being sworn, says, Some time in April, in the year 1777, I made a requisition from Congress for the defence of the Northern Department, and estimated the troops necessary for that service as follows: Two Major Generals; six Brigadiers; one battalion of artillery, 600; twenty-five battalions of infantry, 12,500; two companies of rangers, 100; staff, batteau-men, &c. 400; total 13,600. At that time I did not expect General Burgoyne would have landed between 10 and 11,000 men. If I had, I should have required more men for the defence of that department.

General St. Clair's question. During the time I had the honour of serving under you, did you ever discover in me cowardice, treachery, or incapacity as a general officer?

A. From my long acquaintance with you as an officer, and particularly your usefulness to me as a Brigadier General in the campaign of 1776, it excites my astonishment that there should be such charges as cowardice, treachery, or incapacity, exhibited against you. From any knowledge of you, both as an officer and a gentleman, I have the highest opinion of your courage, honour, capacity and fidelity.

Q. What proportion of these troops ought to be at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence?

A. At Fort Schuyler, 500. The intermediate posts between Albany and Fort Schuyler inclusive, 500. The posts between Albany and Fort George inclusive, 600. At Fort Ann and Skeensborough, 300. The remainder at Ticonderoga and its dependencies. Besides these, I expected aid from the Militia of the country, having unlimited powers from Congress for that purpose.

Q. Court. What number of men would you have thought necessary, had you been fully possessed of the force of General Burgoyne?

A. Three to two.

Dr. Brown being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Were the sick removed from the hospital at the time of the evacuation?

A. All except four, whom it was unsafe to remove, as there was a chance of their recovery by remaining, and if they were removed, it was my opinion they would not have survived to have reached Skeensborough.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of the medicines and hospital stores removed?

A. A day or two days before the communication was cut off with Fort George, all were removed, except what was wanted for an immediate supply, which were all saved.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of what was left at Ticonderoga sent off?

A. There was; but I cannot say what proportion was saved. There was an officer and fifty men given us, and boats sufficient, and had they done their duty, it is my opinion we could have saved all the medicines and stores.

Q. Court. How long before the evacuation took place were the sick sent off?

A. There were a number of sick sent off some days before the evacuation took place; about the time the enemy appeared at Three Mile Point: The rest, except the four, were removed at the time of the evacuation.

Q. Court. Do you know whether there was a magazine of flour appropriated for the use of the hospital, separate from the general magazine?

A. I believe there was none.

Q. Did any provision arrive for the hospital, particularly, some days before the evacuation?

A. There were some sheep, beeves and milch cows. I do not recollect the number.

Q. In what situation was the army at the time of the evacuation, with respect to health?

A. There were very few in the hospital, not above 100; a great proportion of them wounded. There were a number in the regiments not fit for duty, on account of the measles, and the consequences of that disorder, which had prevailed much; but not proper objects for the general hospital.

Dr. Townshend being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Were the sick removed from the hospital at the time of the evacuation?

A. All that could be removed with any degree of safety to themselves.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of the medicines and hospital stores removed?

A. A day or two before, to the best of my remembrance, the communication with Fort George was closed, there was a large proportion carried over to the store there, and only what was judged sufficient was left for those that remained on the ground.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of what was left at Ticonderoga sent off?

A. Yes. Early in the evening, about dark, preceding the evacuation, we had a number of men sent to carry the stores down to the landing on the south side of Mount Independence. They worked very industriously the first of the evening, and packed nearly the whole, and the chief of them was carried to the landing, myself assisting; but the men, when they found the place was to be evacuated, deserted us. We got the greater part into the boats, and went off to Skeensborough in the morning.

Q. Court. How long before the evacuation took place were the sick sent off?

A. About the time the medicines were sent off to Fort George. The sick, that were not likely to recover in a few days, that could be sent off without injuring them by transportation, were sent to the hospital at Fort George.

Q. Court. Do you know whether there was a magazine of flour appropriated for the use of the hospital, separate from the general magazine?

A. There was not.

Q. In what situation was the army at the time of the evacuation, with respect to health?

A. The army was healthy, except with respect to the measles, which had prevailed very generally through the camp. They had recovered of the measles at the time of the evacuation, but they had left many of them languid with coughs.

Q. What situation was the army in a few days previous to the evacuation, with respect to health?

A. Much in the same situation as they were at the time of the evacuation, except a number more had the measles then than had at the time of the evacuation. I examined a number of regiments a little before the evacuation particularly, and there were in general between thirty and forty unfit for duty, but not fit objects for the general hospital.

[Page 18] Question to Dr. Brown. What situation was the army in a few days previous to the evacuation, with respect to health?

A. I believe they were not quite so healthy as at the time of the evacuation, and not so many fit for duty, as they were recovering daily from the measles and its effects. I examined the regiments myself a few days before the evacuation, and the prescriptions of the surgeons, and found but very few but had from twenty to thirty unfit for duty. Some had more.

General St. Clair's question to Dr. Brown. Were not the hospital surgeons frequently required to inspect into the state of the sick in each regiment, and was it not done with a view that I might not be imposed on by the regimental returns?

A. They were desired to do it frequently, and I have some idea of some conversation passing between Dr. Potts and myself about the intention of doing it, but I do not recollect the particulars of it.

General St. Clair's question to Dr. Townshend. The same as the last to Dr. Brown.

A. We were directed to do it frequently, and there was scarcely a day passed but some of the regiments were examined by some of the surgeons of the general hospital.

Colonel Hay, who acted as Deputy Quarter-Master General for the army at Ticonderoga and Mount Inde­pendence, being sworn, says: On Saturday, about three o'clock in the afternoon, the day preceding the evacuation, I was sent for by General St. Clair, who informed me that a Council of General Officers had been held, and they had determined to evacuate the garrison next morning. I then took the liberty of asking the General if he had received orders from General Schuyler? He told me he had not. To which I took the liberty of saying I was extremely sorry for it. The General said he knew very well what I meant, and he had seriously considered the consequences of the step he was taking. If he remained there, he would save his character and lose the army; if he went off, he would save the army and lose his character; the last of which he was determined to sacrifice to the cause in which he was engaged. The General then desired me to prepare every thing for the removal of as many of the stores as possible. I then told the General, that as the wind blowed hard from the north-east, and the batteaus were lying at the south end of Mount Independence, it would be impossible to get them round to remove the greatest part of the stores. The General said it must at all events be attempted; for if the enemy knew of our design to evacuate the place, they would certainly cut off our retreat; but, on further consideration, said he would take the opinion of the General Officers, and let me know the result. In the mean time, that I was to prepare every thing possible for carrying off the stores, which I did as far as the wind, which rose much higher, would permit. I saw the General afterwards at sunset, who told me that Generals Poor and Patterson were of opinion the evacuation ought not to be retarded. What few boats were near Ticonderoga side were then given to the artillery men, and the most valuable stores on that side carried down to the wharff on that side. About nine the General sent for me again, and having asked what I had done, desired me to go as soon as possible to Mount Independence, order as many boats as could be brought from the south side of the Mount to bring off the provisions that were lying near the Crane, leaving a proper proportion for the medicines, ammunition, and other most valuable stores, which were to be carried down to the south side. About, I think, one o'clock, I saw the General again on Mount Independence, who begged that we would make all the dispatch possible, and carry off all that we could in boats by day light. I then went down to where the provision laid, and got a very considerable number of boats loaded, which at break of day were taken round to the south end of the Mount by the General's order. When I got there I found the soldiers in the utmost confusion, and could not by threats or promises prevail on them to unload from the waggon, and embark on board the boats the most valuable part of the General's baggage. Nearly about sun-rise the General himself came up, and begged, if possible, I would save his papers, and pay no attention to the rest of his baggage I spoke to Colonel Long, who, I understood afterwards had received orders from the General, was to command by water, and went off himself after the army that had marched some short time before. Some days before the evacua­tion, being at Head Quarters after dinner, there were three field officers there (I think Colonels, but am not certain) who had lately arrived with a strong reinforcement of militia. Being asked by the General what time they could possibly stay? they replied, it would be impossible to detain them but a very few days, as they had not a second shirt to their backs, having first turned out with no other view than driving a party of the enemy from Otter-Creek. I went off by water.

General St. Clair produces a return made to him by Colonel Hay, which Colonel Hay acknowledges was made by him to General St. Clair, and which Colonel Hay thinks must have been made by him about the 21st of June, 1777; which, being read, is as follows:

[Page 19]

UDREY HAY, D. Q. M. G.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether the men, returned by you as constant fatigue-men, were not included in the daily details for fatigue?

A. I am certain they were not included in the daily details for fatigue, being appropriated entirely to my department, and under my direction.

Q. Do you know whether the greater part of the provision and stores were got off from the garrison?

A. The greater part of the provision, I am certain, was not. I cannot answer with respect to the stores, as when we arrived at Skeensborough I had no time to examine them.

Q. Do you know the number of the body of the militia that arrived some days before the evacuation?

A. I do not know the number.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know of more than one body of militia arriving?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Court. Was there a sufficient number of boats at the post to carry off all the provision?

A. There was not a sufficient number to have carried off the provision and the other stores.

Q. Do you know how many ox-teams were employed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence at the time of the evacuation.

A. I cannot tell, having lost all my returns; but the number was not large, as in that wilderness there was not grass to maintain them.

General St. Clair's question. In what condition were the ox-teams that were employed at these posts?

A. The oxen were in poor working order, but might probably have brought the provision from the landing, had they no other garrison duty to do.

Q. Court. Do you know of any parties having been sent out by General St. Clair to discover the enemy's numbers, or to annoy them in their progress against the garrison?

A. To discover their numbers, I know of parties having been frequently sent out, and the General com­plained they were in such dread of the savages, he could not get proper intelligence from them. I know of none sent out to annoy the enemy in their progress, but the regular pickets that were sent out.

Q. How large were these parties that were sent out to discover the enemy's numbers?

A. I cannot answer with any exactness.

[Page 20]Q. Court. Do you know whether the troops were courageous, and had a desire to improve every advantage against the enemy?

A. Their own words, and the facts which arose when they were sent out, were so very different, that it was difficult to judge, as they were generally beat back again.

The Court adjourn till to-morrow, nine o'clock.

The Court adjourn, by his Excellency's desire, until Thursday next, at nine o'clock.

The Court adjourn, by his Excellency's desire, until Monday, nine o'clock, to meet in camp.

SEPTEMBER 7th.

The Court met in Camp according to adjournment.

Colonel Koseiuszko being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect what the strength of the fatigue parties was, that were employed on Mount Independence on or about the 23d day of June, 1777?

A. About five or six hundred men were employed on the batteries at Mount Independence as fatigue men, after General Schuyler had been at Ticonderoga, and had given directions to put new works on Mount Inde­pendence. There was also a party employed in front of the works, in a thick wood, cutting abbatis; I do not recollect the number. I remember that General Fermoy's brigade was employed in the wood cutting abbatis. General Fermoy himself was there two or three days. Besides these, I always sent a fatigue party to cut the abbatis.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether there was a fatigue party likewise employed at the time on the Ticonderoga side?

A. I know there was a fatigue party employed on the breast-work.

General St. Clair's question. Did you not, by my orders, make some additions to the works on the Ticonderoga side?

A. Yes; between the west end of the French lines and the Lake. It was not quite finished at the time of the evacuation.

General St. Clair's question. Supposing Ticonderoga to have been abandoned, and the enemy to have been in possession of it, would it have been possible to have maintained the works on the point of Mount Independence, that were made for the command of the Lake and the defence of the bridge?

A. No; as the ground overlooked them about fifty feet.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect where the place from which we got our water was, on Mount Independence side, and the situation of it?

A. On the west side of Mount Independence, on the low ground, near the Lake.

General St. Clair's question. Could we easily get at the water?

A. No; It was very steep, and I think about one half a mile distant from the fort.

General St. Clair's question. Supposing the enemy had passed some of their vessels into South-Bay, would it not have been wholly in their power to have cut us off from the water?

A. The spring would have been exposed to the fire of the enemy.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the distance from the Lake to East-Creek, beyond the south end of Mount Independence?

A. About one half a mile or three quarters.

General St. Clair's Question. Would it not have been in the enemy's power to have annoyed, from the vessels from South-Bay, any troops that might have been marching across the Isthmus to the relief of Mount Independence?

A. It would have been in the enemy's power to have done it on account of the passage being narrow, a thick wood, and the possession of the Lake.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect whether any works were begun to improve the redoubt on the high ground, on the point of Mount Independence?

A. Yes; by your order I marked out the lines, and prepared the fascines; which was after General Schuyler left Ticonderoga.

General St. Clair's question. In what condition was the fort upon Mount Independence?

A. It was a picketted fort, only for small arms. Picketted all round, some good and some bad.

General St. Clair's question. How many men could the fort contain with convenience for the defence of it?

A. About 1000 men.

General St. Clair's question. What batteries had the enemy erected against Ticonderoga at the time, or before the evacuation took place?

A. One battery was erected against the Jersey redoubt on the opposite side of the Lake, about half a mile distant, and on higher ground. They had made some works where they had an encampment against the French lines, about half a mile or three quarters distant. The enemy had also taken possession of Mount Hope, a retrenched camp, which had been occupied by us the campaign before, by which the communication with Lake George was cut off. They had taken possession of the mill, burnt the block-house, and passed on the other side of the creek, where they took possession of a hill which commanded all Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and had begun a firing on the sloop that was stationed for the defence of the passage from Lake George. They had also begun some works on a point on the east side of the Lake, opposite to the bridge.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect Colonel May's having told me, after I had spoke to the militia at Castle-Town, that the men would stay, but the officers would not?

A. I do not recollect Colonel May's having told you of it, but I met some of the militia on the retreat, and having expressed my surprize at their not staying to fight for their country, they answered, they were willing to stay, but their officers would not.

Q. Court. Could the enemy's vessels lie in South-Bay, in a situation to command the spring, and not be exposed to our batteries on Mount Independence?

A. There was high ground, and batteries could have been placed there to prevent them.

Q. Court. Could the enemy's ships lie in South-Bay, in a situation most to annoy a reinforcement going to Mount Independence, without being exposed to the fire of our batteries from Mount Independence?

A. They could.

[Page 21]Q. Court. Was there any other spring on Mount Independence, out of the enemy's fire, that the garrison could have been supplied with water from?

A. No other lasting one.

Q. Court. What kind of ground was it on the height on Mount Independence. Whether stony, diffi­cult of raising a parapet on. or of sinking a ditch?

A. Very stony and rocky ground, and would require a great deal of labour to put on the works. A ditch could not be sunk to any proper depth without blowing the rocks.

Brigadier General Wilkinson being sworn,

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect what means were taken by me to gain intelligence of the approach of the enemy, and their numbers?

A. By scouts and detachments, both by land and by water.

General St. Clair's Question. Were not there scouts and detachments sent out frequently?

A. There was an established daily scout, as well as I recollect, besides many that were sent out occasionally.

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect the distance from Ticonderoga to Gilliland's Creek?

A. I cannot ascertain the distance.

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect the nature of the ground between Ticonderoga and Gil­liland's Creek?

A. I can judge of it only from observation as I passed up and down the Lake. On the west side it is a mountainous craggy country, the mountains in many places jutting in full upon the Lake. On the east side a flat low country covered with wood.

General St. Clair's Question. Could large detachments of troops, had our garrison been in a situation to have afforded them, march through that country on the west side of the Lake?

A. Not without great difficulty and probable loss, on either side of the Lake.

General St. Clair's Question. Was there not, notwithstanding the difficulty of the country, frequently small parties sent out towards Gilliland's Creek, to discover the approach and strength of the enemy, and were there not parties sent out on the east side of the Lake with the same view?

A. There were.

General St. Clair's Question. If large detachments had been sent out at such a distance that they could not have been supported with the whole force of the garrison, could they have retarded the progress of the enemy, or must they not have fallen into their hands?

A. They might have given a momentary check, but must inevitably have been out off.

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect my sending out serjeant Heath, with a party, previous to any account we had of the embarkation of the enemy on the Lake, with orders to proceed to Point au-Fer, or whenever he should find the enemy, endeavour to make a prisoner, and bring me an account of them?

A. I do not recollect the officer's name, but I recollect a scout was sent out for that purpose.

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect the account he brought?

A. I recollect, that he informed that he discovered the enemy somewhere about Gilliland's Creek, en­camped, and that he conceived them to be in force.

General St. Clair's Question. Do you recollect in what part of the country he was when he made the discovery?

A. I think he was on the east shore, opposite to Gilliland's Creek. I do not recollect the distance.

General St. Clair's question. Did you hear of any other debarkation of the enemy than at Gilliland's Creek, from the time of their embarkation at Point-au-Fer to their landing at or near the Three Mile Point?

A. We were informed of their approach to Crown Point, and of their being encamped there. I don't recollect any other particular debarkation until their arrival at or near Three Mile Point.

General St. Clair's question. Had we not information of numerous parties of the savages being in the country, on the west side of the Lake?

A. We had, and found them so very numerous that our parties could scarce ever get in view of the enemy, though many attempts were made to discover their situation.

General St. Clair's question. Were there actions several times between our parties and the savages?

A. There were, and I remember our parties on those occasions were routed.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the strength of the fatigue parties that were detailed on or after the 20th of June?

A. I cannot particularly ascertain the number. I remember that the fatigue parties and guards generally amounted to about one fourth of the number of effectives fit for duty in the garrison, and some times one third.

General St. Clair's question. Besides the number of men for fatigue that was detailed, was there not a constant fatigue party with the Quarter Master General, and a regiment of militia also employed in constant fatigue?

A. The Quarter-Master General had a constant fatigue party, besides the number that was furnished him by the details. There were besides, 100 men employed on daily duty from two regiments of militia.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect my having ordered the fatigue on Mount Independence to be done by a brigade at a time, under the command of a Brigadier; and was not this number also exclusive of the detail for fatigue?

A. I recollect there was, and they were exclusive of the detail for fatigue, except the proportion from the brigade ordered on duty.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the diminishing the camp guards, and was it not done on account of the severity of duty, by having so many men on fatigue?

A. I recollect it, and it was done upon that principle.

General St. Clair's question. As you lived with me, you must be acquainted with the baggage I had. I wish you would mention it.

A. You had a portmanteau, and a chest which contained your baggage; also some kitchen furniture.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of my baggage sent off from Ticonderoga previous to the evacuation?

A. No.

[Page 22]General St. Clair's question. What age was my son, who left Ticonderoga?

A. He was a mere child; about ten or twelve years of age.

General St. Clair's question. Was any part of my baggage sent off with him when he was sent to Fort George?

A. No part of it.

General St. Clair's question. Could any of my baggage have been removed without your being acquainted with it?

A. I don't think it possibly could.

Q. Court. Was any part of the furniture belonging to Head-Quarters removed to any other place previous to the evacuation?

A. None.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect what orders were given to the troops on the evacuation being determined upon?

A. I do not, as I was then employed in fixing an occasional picket, but I believe the orders were given to the Brigadiers.

General St. Clair's question. Was there a strong picket advanced of the French lines, and the other pickets reinforced, so as to form a chain of centinels the night of the evacuation?

A. I don't know it of my own knowledge, as I was ordered to Mount Independence to give orders about loading the battea [...]; but, from every information I received, I am induced to think there was.

General St. Clair's question. Was not the order for the march of the troops, the striking their tents, and loading their baggage, delivered by you to some of the regiments on Mount Independence?

A. The order for striking their tents and loading their baggage was delivered by me, and dispersed to all the regiments about twelve o'clock at night.

General St. Clair's question. How was the retreat conducted?

A. The troops pushed out of Mount Independence without order or regularity, in a great deal of confusion. I remember that, after you had got them stretched, you rode from the rear to the front, in order to halt and throw them into some form, but your orders were directly disobeyed, and the militia would not halt, but pushed on, and drew after them many of the continental troops. When we arrived at Hubbarton, the army halted, and was refreshed as well as our circumstances would admit. After waiting a length of time, two or three hours, for the rear guard and stragglers, you moved on with the main body, leaving the command with Colonel Warner, with orders to follow as soon as the whole came up.

General St. Clair's question. Were not many of the continental regiments got into good order soon after they left Mount Independence, and did not the rear guard come off in very good order?

A. There were several regiments got into tolerable good order by your halting them, and other attempts, and the rear guard under Colonel Francis came off in very good order.

Q. How large was the daily scout that was sent out to gain intelligence of the enemy's approach and strength?

A. From fifteen to twenty-five. It was a subaltern's light command.

Q. Do you know the strength of those that were sent out occasionally for that purpose?

A. Their numbers varied. I remember one which amounted to 100.

Q. Do you recollect the time this scout, consisting of 100, was sent out?

A. I do not recollect the day, but the occasion was the enemy had made a couple of prisoners, and fell in with a returning scout of ours which they routed; in consequence of which this party was detached to come up with them if possible.

Q. Do you recollect where the enemy lay at the time?

A. I cannot recollect particularly, but believe at Gilliland's Creek.

Q. After the enemy had landed at Three Mile Point, were any parties sent out to annoy them in their approach towards the garrison?

A. There were.

Q. How large were these parties?

A. There were two small parties sent out. I believe they might have been about 60 men. They were routed and pursued by the Indians.

Q. Were any orders given for the destruction of the barracks at the time of the evacuation of the garrisons of Mount Independence and Ticonderoga, or before?

A. Not to my knowledge. The reason General St. Clair assigned for not setting them on fire was, it would have betrayed our movement to the enemy.

Q. Court. Do you suppose it would have had that operation?

A. It most certainly would.

Q. Was the number of men returned on command in your return of the 28th of June, on command in the garrison, or where?

A. There were many of them on command in the garrison. I do not recollect the number. Some were on command at Fort Schuyler; some at Albany, and on the communication to Ticonderoga; at Skeensborough, Fort-Ann, Lake-George landing, and at the block-house at the saw-mill.

General St. Clair's question. During my command at Ticonderoga, or at the time of the evacuation, did you perceive any instances of cowardice in me?

A. No; but I have upon every occasion observed a direct contrary conduct.

General St. Clair's question. Were you with me at Princeton and Trenton, and did you observe any instance of cowardice in me there?

A. I was. I observed no instance of cowardice in you, but, on the contrary, upon every occasion of danger, you manifested the utmost coolness and intrepidity.

General St. Clair's question. At the affair of Princeton do you recollect your riding up to me, and inform­ing me that our troops had given way in the centre; and do you recollect what passed between me and you upon that occasion?

[Page 23]A. I recollect your begging me to take no notice of it, left it should communicate a pannic to the troops we were with.

General St. Clair's question. At the time the picket was attacked at Ticonderoga, which occasioned some firing from the lines, and at every other time when there was firing, did I not transport myself to the place with the utmost expedition?

A. You did; and your positive injunctions to the officers and exhortations to the soldiery were, to reserve their fire until the enemy came within a very certain shot.

General St. Clair's question. Were there any other pickets placed by you besides those mentioned in the orderly book?

A. There was an additional picket of 50 men posted on the left of the French lines, without them, every night, which came off in the morning; and a similar picket, subject to the same orders, was posted on the point to the right of the Jersey redoubt.

Q. Court. During the time you were with General St. Clair at Ticonderoga, did you observe any conduct of his that induced you to think him treacherous to the United States?

A. No; but he did, upon every occasion, manifest the most enthusiastic zeal for the good of the cause of the United States.

Q. Court. Do you know the particular period when General St. Clair had compleat information of the number and designs of the enemy?

A. The first information of their number and design which he received, that could be relied on was, I think, two days before the evacuation. This intelligence was by stratagem obtained from a prisoner.

The Court adjourn till ten o'clock to-morrow.

SEPTEMBER 8th.

The Court met according to adjournment.

The judge Advocate produces copies of letters from Major General St. Clair to Major General Schuyler, dated July 1st, July 2d, and July 3d, 1777; also a letter from Major General St. Clair to the Hon. John Hancock, dated July 14, 1777; which, being read, are as follow:

Lieutenant Colonel Varrick being sworn,

Q. Did you muster the troops at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence in the month of June, 1777?

A. Yes; except Colonel Long's regiment, which was mustered before I arrived there.

Q. In what condition was the continental troops with respect to arms?

A. Some of them very indifferent. The three New-Hampshire regiments, Colonel Scammel's, Colonel Cilley's and Colonel Hale's, had pretty good French arms, and chiefly bayonets. I believe a majority of the other regiments had not bayonets. The militia regiments had arms, but very indifferent, but no bayonets.

Q. Had the corps of artillery or artificers any arms?

A. None.

Q. Were the lines and redoubts at Ticonderoga furnished with spears?

A. They were furnished with some spears and sharp pointed poles, but whether there were sufficient or not for them I cannot tell.

Q. Did General St. Clair inform you on or about the 26th or 27th of June, 1777, of the quantity of provision he had in the garrison?

A. I think he mentioned to me he had about thirty-six days of the meat kind. Flour, I do not know what quantity he had.

General St. Clair's question. Were there not a great many boys amongst the troops?

A. There was a number of boys, old men and negroes. I dismissed at the muster 50, as positively unfit for any kind of service, and would have dismissed more, had you not desired me to be very tender, as you had so few troops in garrison.

General St. Clair's question. Did not my son pass the Lake from Ticonderoga with you?

A. Yes; he passed the Lake at my request. I urged the matter to you.

General St. Clair's question. Did any part of my baggage go over when he went with you?

A. None. Some of your son's clothes were left behind.

Major Hull being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. How was the retreat in General from Mount Independence conducted?

A. The general plan of the retreat, I think, was very well, though there was some part of the troops that behaved disorderly.

General St. Clair's question. During the time of my command at Ticonderoga, did you ever observe any kind of cowardice, treachery, or inattention to the progress of the enemy in me?

A. Not the least appearance of either.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the circumstance of my ordering a strong picket out the night of the evacuation under Colonel Francis, and that it was directed to be of picked men?

A. Yes.

Q. Court. What was the general plan of the retreat?

A. General Poor's brigade was ordered in front, the militia next, General Patterson's brigade next, General Fermoy's brigade after him, and the rear guard, consisting about 450 men, under the command of Colonel Francis. Over the first part of the ground we marched in file, owing to the nature of the country; where the ground would admit of it we marched in platoons. General Poor's brigade, as far as I was capable of seeing, when they first marched off from Mount Independence, marched off in good order.

Q. Court. How were the invalids disposed of at the time of the evacuation?

A. Those who were not able to march were sent by water. The others marched with their respective regiments.

General St. Clair's question. What quantity of provision was ordered for the troops to take with them before they left the garrison?

A. I think eight days; principally pork and flour, and some hard bread.

Brigadier General Poor being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Do you know what means were taken to discover the approach and strength of the enemy?

A. By continually sending scouts by land on both sides of the Lake, and by water.

General St. Clair's question. Did you ever hear of any landing the enemy made but at Gilliland's Creek, until they came to Crown-Point?

A. No.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect my sending out serjeant Heath, with a party, to make discoveries?

A. No; but I recollect your sending out Lieutenant Lifer, who returned with two prisoners. I remember your sending out a person with orders to proceed to Point-au-Fer, or wherever the enemy were, who brought intelligence that the enemy were on the well side of the Lake at Gilliland's Creek.

[Page 26]General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the general strength of the parties that were sent out?

A. Sometimes a Subaltern's command, sometimes a Captain's command, Captain Whitcomb being out frequently; sometimes by twos and threes, merely as spies.

General St. Clair's question. Would the sending of larger parties have answered a better purpose than of sending the parties that were sent, and could larger parties have been sent without great danger of losing them?

A. For the sake of gaining intelligence of the approach of the enemy, or to ascertain their numbers, could have been much better attained by small parties than by large ones, as any considerable number of men marching in that woody country, where the ground is covered with moss, might easily be discovered, and of consequence would be exposed to have been cut off by the enemy.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect whether the working parties were increased on or after the 20th of June?

A. If I remember right, the detail was taken off, and we were ordered to work by brigades, to turn out in the brigade every officer and man who were off duty and able to work, to throw up lines on Mount Independence, and also to fell the trees on the sides and at the bottom of the hill. Near twenty acres of trees were felled.

General St. Clair's question. Was there any wood on Mount Independence, to have supplied the garrison in case of a siege, or was there a magazine of wood laid in?

A. There was no magazine of wood laid in. There was some scattering logs upon the top of the hill, and so much upon the sides, that I believe we should not have been put to any difficulty in getting wood, in case we had been besieged.

General St. Clair's question. How long do you suppose the wood that was on the Mount would have fur­nished firing for the garrison we had?

A. At that season of the year it might have lasted us a fortnight.

General St. Clair's question. Could we have spared men from the works that we were engaged in, to have laid in a further supply of wood, or had we a number of draught cattle sufficient to have brought it from any distance?

A. At that time we had not half men enough to man our works. I never understood we had many teams, but I do not recollect the number. What few teams we had were employed in transporting the stores from Lake George Landing to Lake Champlain.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect, after the enemy landed at Three Mile Point, and before they broke ground, my ordering the men to lie a night or two on their arms?

A. I do.

General St. Clair's question. Did you not understand the reason of that order was, that tho' I did not think the enemy were in force, yet I thought they might attempt to carry us by a coup-de-main?

A. I don't recollect it.

General St. Clair's question. Was our force in any degree adequate to the defence of the places?

A. No; I think that the places could not have been maintained unless with at least 10,000 good troops, and we ought to have had possession of two hills without the French lines, as also the one on the other side of the Lake, known by the name of Mount Defiance.

Major General St. Clair produces a paper, and asks General Poor whether the matter therein contained was the order of march and distribution of batteaus, that was agreed upon at the Council on the 5th of July?— The paper is as follows:

A. I very well remember the orders, and I think it to be the paper.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect a picket to be advanced, consisting of the number of men, and under the officers mentioned in the paper?

A. I well remember it. I was desired by you, when this picket was paraded, to post them with the other picket, which I think was 150 men, as near the enemy as I could without bringing on an action, and to give them particular orders in the morning, when I was to call them in, that they were to compose the rear guard, which I did.

General St. Clair's question. Did you not understand that the reason of ordering out that picket was, to prevent any surprise happening to us while the men were employed in carrying the stores and baggage to the landing place?

A. Yes; and likewise to form a chain of centinels from water to water, to prevent any of our men de­serting to them, and giving them any information.

General St Clair's question. Do you recollect the burning of General Fermoy's house?

A. Yes; before I called in the pickets on Ticonderoga side I saw that house in flames, which laid the hill that his brigade was on open to the view of the enemy, as I could see every movement they were making, striking their tents and loading and carrying off their baggage, which induced me to order in the pickets one half an hour sooner than I should otherwise have done, as the principal part of the troops on Ticonderoga side had crossed the bridge, in order to embark their baggage on board the boats, the wind being so high the boats could not be brought over.

General St. Clair's question. Were not orders given not to set fire to any of the buildings?

A. Yes: You gave me particular orders, as soon as I had posted the pickets, to communicate your orders with respect to the evacuation of the place to the commanding officers of regiments in my brigade, and desired, [Page 27] as soon as the baggage was packed up, that every light, both from fire and from candle, might be put out, previous to striking the tents and putting the baggage on board the boats. I understood the reason was, to prevent the enemy from making any discovery of our intentions; and had not the wind been so very high, which obstructed the moving of the boats, we should have been able to have left the place by two o'clock, as was determined on.

General St. Clair's question. Was not the confusion of marching off the troops from Mount Independence occasioned by that house of General Fermoy's having been set on fire?

A. I believe that was the principal occasion of it.

General St. Clair's question. How far did the troops march before that confusion was, in a great measure, remedied?

A. I marched in front. I frequently fell back to the rear of my brigade, to examine into their situation, and before we had marched many miles I got them nearly all together; I can say nothing with respect to the others; and the first halt we made the brigades were all formed in order, and marched so during the whole retreat, excepting Colonel Leonard's and Colonel Wells's, two militia regiments, who behaved with the greatest disorder.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect of one or both of these regiments having broke the line of march?

A. The day after the evacuation, when we arrived at Otter Creek, we were alarmed by a report that the enemy were just in our rear. I, being in front, was ordered to cross the bridge, and draw the men up upon the most advantageous ground I could find. I posted the regiment that Lieut. Colonel Hale commanded at a ford; he left it, and went off. In the evening, on our march, about a mile and a half from that place, I came up where Colonel Hale was with his regiment. The regiment had four oxen killed and skinned. I asked him how he came there without leave? he said he came to get some provision, to prevent his men from starv­ing. I ordered him to cut up his meat, to be ready to fall into the line of march, which he might be in a few minutes; if not, we should march but about a mile and a half, and make a halt. I moved on, and in about ten minutes found his regiment running by my brigade, and he nearly at the head of them. He, with about forty of his men, passed the brigade. I rode forward, and halted him till part of one regiment of my bri­gade had passed him; he came up again, and insisted on passing, as he would not be left in the rear. I turned out about forty men, and ordered them to fire upon them, unless they would remain on the ground till the line of march came up, where they were to fall in, which halted them. Both regiments frequently broke the line of march.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect, whether the troops, at the time of the evacuation, were ordered to take five days provision with them?

A. They were ordered to take several days provision with them, which was judged sufficient to have carried them to the North River, had we pursued the route we expected to take.

General St. Clair's question. During my command at Ticonderoga, did you discover any thing that had the appearance of cowardice in me, or induced you to think me treacherous, or inattentive to the progress of the enemy?

A. I was once with you where you were in danger, and sundry times when we have expected an immediate attack, and never discovered the least discomposure of mind, but you always appeared with the greatest bra­very and steadiness, becoming the character of an officer. From your close application to your duty by day, before the enemy made their appearance at Ticonderoga, and your constant application both by day and night, after they came there, gave me every reason to imagine you left nothing undone that was in your power to contribute to the strength of the garrison; therefore I had not the least reason to induce me to think you either treacherous or neglectful of your duty, I remember your observing to me, if I evacuate the place, my character will be ruined; if I remain here, the army will be lost; but I am determined to evacuate it, altho' it will give such an alarm that has not happened in the country since the war commenced.

General St. Clair's question. At what time did this conversation happen. Was it previous to the resolution that was entered into by the Council of War, or posterior to it?

A. It was after it. You gave your reasons for it, and said that it was to throw this body of troops between the country and Burgoyne, that the militia might have a body to collect to; which, if this body was cut off, they would have none, and of course Burgoyne would pursue his operations without any obstacle, or words to that effect.

General St. Clair's question. Were you with me at Trenton or Princeton, and what was my conduct at those places with respect to courage?

A. I was with you at both places. We were not brought to close action at either place, but you behaved with the greatest spirit, and with as much coolness as at any other time.

Q. Court. At what time did General St. Clair receive the first compleat intelligence of the strength and designs of the enemy?

A. I don't recollect any that was obtained before the prisoner was taken; he was the first person that gave us intelligence who commanded the enemy's army, of their strength and designs, and that not until the next day after he was taken.

Q. Court. Was there any other intelligence received, between the time of the prisoners being taken and the time of the evacuation?

A. There was a report in camp, that some of the inhabitants said they were clearing a road through the wood to get into our rear. The Jagers also mentioned that they were clearing a road.

Q. Court. Do you know whether it was a prevailing opinion, that nothing serious would be attempted against Ticonderoga that campaign, and whether it was not expected that the enemy's troops would have been sent round from Quebec to the southern army?

A. A little before General St. Clair arrived at Ticonderoga the enemy made a movement up the Lake, with a number of boats and one or two vessels, tarried a few days, and returned. I acquainted General Gates of it, and further acquainted him that I was informed they were making preparations at St. John's to proceed with their whole army. He wrote me, that he had the strongest assurances from Congress that the King's [Page 28] troops were all ordered round to New-York, leaving only a sufficient number to garrison their forts, and desirest me to be getting every thing in readiness, that if the enemy went out of one door, we must enter the other. He farther mentioned in his letter, that we might daily expect alarms, as they commanded the Lake, and might come up with their shipping, and that the intelligence he had by a spy that came from Canada corrobo­rated the sentiment of Congress.

Q. Court. What orders had the commanding officer of the rear guard, and did he obey the orders he received?

A. He was ordered upon his coming in to sweep every thing off the ground upon Ticonderoga side, to bring every man and beast, which I understood he effected, and then to fall in the rear of General Fermoy's brigade, as a rear guard to the army.

Q. Court. What orders did the officer of the rear guard receive at Hubbarton?

A. The first halt that was proposed to be made was at Lacey's camp, which was the first cleared land we came to after we left Mount Independence. When I got within about a mile of the place, I met an inhabitant, who informed me there was a large number of the enemy and Indians at Hubbarton, which was two miles farther, which induced me to continue the march until I arrived at Burnam's, in Hubbarton, where it was said the enemy were. Upon our arrival we were told that about 500 of the enemy had been there, and had gone to Castle-Town. There I marked out the ground for each brigade, posted officers to fall in with his brigade and regiment as they came up. We had then made a march of about twenty miles, which had fatigued many of our feeble men; so that the officer commanding of the rear guard thought proper to halt at the place first proposed, Lacey's camp, two miles in our rear. General St. Clair sent several times to order the rear guard up; the last messenger came and said they were on their way up. As we tarried there about three or four hours, General St. Clair said he would march to Castle-Town with his army, and would leave Colonel Hale's and Warner's regiments to cover his retreat, with orders for them to move on moderately. Some time in the evening I heard the General express a good deal of uneasiness and concern that Colonel Francis did not come up with the rear. Towards morning he sent one of his Aids up to order them down immediately; and, if I mistake not, sent a second time. They did not join the army, but remained until they were attacked by the enemy the next morning.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether the rear guard had orders to move on to Castle-Town that night?

A. I cannot say positively that they had, but I understood they had.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect my having sent orders to Colonel Pellows and Colonel Halcott's militia regiments, who were halted two miles from Hubbarton, to march up and support them upon being attacked?

A. Yes.

General St. Clair's question. Was that order obeyed?

A. It was not. The regiments came directly to us at Castle-Town.

Major General St. Clair produces a map of Ticonderoga, Mount Independence and the adjacent country, with references, which Colonel Koseiuszko, on his oath, says is a true one, to the best of his knowledge and judgment, except as to the distances, it not having been made from actual survey, but taken from view.

The Court adjourn till to-morrow, ten o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 9th.

ALL the members not attending, the members present, being a majority of the Court, adjourn till to­morrow, at ten o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 10th.

The same as yesterday.

SEPTEMBER 11th.

The same as yesterday.

SEPTEMBER 12th.

THE Court met according to adjournment.

Captain Woolcott being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the orders that were given to Colonel Warner at Hubbarton?

A. I was in front when we arrived at Hubbarton, laid down, and got a sleep. When I waked, I found the party were nearly all gone. I asked Captain Smith where they were gone to, who said to Castle-Town; and having asked him whether we were to march, he said it was General St. Clair's orders, delivered by General Patterson, that we were to march to Castle-Town. I went into the house where Col. Warner, Col. Francis and Col. Hale were, and having asked Col. Warner whether he determined to march any farther, he said he did not that night; tho' there were orders to march to Castle-Town, he did not intend to go on any farther, because the men were much fatigued.

Q. Court. What time did the rear guard arrive at Hubbarton?

A. I believe it was about three or four o'clock in the afternoon.

Q. Court. What time did they leave it the next morning?

A. They commenced their march about eight o'clock, but before the whole got in motion they were at­tacked by the enemy.

Q. Was Colonel Warner the commanding officer of the rear guard at the time?

A. He was.

Colonel Baldwin, being sworn, says, On the 5th of July, 1777, about nine o'clock in the evening, Gene­ral St. Clair sent for me, and told me that he had determined to abandon the place that night; he would have me with the artificers, get all the intrenching tools, and the carpenters and smiths tools on board of batteaus that were assigned me for that purpose, and be ready by two o'clock in the morning to leave the place. I left him and went to my men, got every thing on board belonging to my department agreeable to order, on Ti­conderoga [Page 29] side, by twelve o'clock. I then went to the stone redoubt, and asked Captain Winslow if he wanted any assistance? He told me that every thing was out of the magazine and on board the boats, there was nothing left but his tents, that were to be carried. I then went to Head-Quarters, and was informed that General St. Clair was gone over to the Mount. I rode over, and met him near the fort, told him what I had done, and asked him if he had any further orders? He said that the people were all asleep on this side, wished that I would go and wake General Fermoy. I went, called him up, and returned. General St. Clair then desired I would go, and see to get the stores away from the magazine that was not then open. I soon got a large party of men, went to the magazine, and rolled the barrels from it to the landing (I believe about 100 large barrels of powder.) I then went to the landing, where I found the men in great confusion, contend­ing about boats. The wind was high, and it was bad loading them; the men very cross, and hard to be prevailed with to do their duty. About sun-rise the army was past and the boats put off. There remained only a few barrels of powder and rum, with a small matter of baggage on shore, and there were only two batteaus that lay at a little distance. I promised Captain Nicholls, that if he could get these boats with his carpenters, and carry off what remained at the landing, I would give him a barrel of the rum when he got to Skeensborough; he immediately brought them in, got all on board (except about eight old tents that were not worth carrying, and a howitzer that we run into the Lake and left, with some carriages for cannon and General St. Clair's waggon) just as the enemy came into the works on the hill and fired upon us. The boats pushed off, and I rode away with Captain Buckland. We saw none of our people (except General St. Clair's waggoner with his horses; Captain Buckland rode one of them, and we brought off the other) until we came to the last house; there we found four soldiers partly drunk. We made them run until we soon came up with others that were too heavy loaded, and who had stopped to throw away a part. We endeavoured to bring all up with us, until we came to Colonel Francis, which was about two miles, as near as I can guess. He had then fell some small distance in the rear, by reason of people stopping to lighten their packs. I marched some time with him, but he found the front marched too fast for him. He desired I would ride forward to the General, and desire him to make a small halt till he could come up, which was done. We marched to Hubbarton, where the front halted two or three hours. We were informed that a large body of the enemy was just gone from the place where we halted as the front came up, and were gone towards Castle-Town. After the army had refreshed themselves the General ordered Colonel Warner, with some others, to wait until Colonel Francis came up with the rear guard, and then march on with them; and then General St. Clair marched with the army to Castle-Town, and took twenty-six prisoners on the way—there halted for that night, the men very much fatigued. On the morning of the seventh the rear, with Colonel Warner and Colonel Francis, was attacked at Hubbarton; we heard the guns. General St. Clair immediately sent one of his Aids to order Colonel Bellows, with two militia regiments (that lay two miles on the road towards the rear) to re­inforce Colonel Francis, and cover his retreat if it was necessary; but those regiments soon came down to us, and I heard the Aid say that he could not by any means prevail with the men to obey the order, and Colonel Bellows did all in his power to get the men to go with him to meet the enemy. The General this morning heard our boats were cut off at Skeensborough, which caused him to alter his route, and go by the way of Rutland.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect whether the working parties at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were increased or decreased on or about the 23d day of June, 1777?

A. They were considerably increased. There were several works that were not finished that were ordered to be done, besides a number of new ones laid out that the men were ordered to work upon, and we continued at these works both at Mount Independence and Ticonderoga until the day we came away, besides a consider­able reinforcement to the party at work upon the bridge. As the troops increased the working parties increased, we having almost every man upon the ground on duty of one kind or another. There was a regiment of militia constantly on duty in the woods, under my direction, providing timber for the bridge, that was not included in the details. I had about 100 men, besides the militia on duty with me there, that were not included in the details. I had about 30 out of the militia also making shingles, and a party making brick, not included in the details.

General St. Clair's question. Was the boom that was laid below the bridge in the Lake fixed in such a manner, that it would have been able to have resisted the shock of a vessel?

A. The anchors were chiefly lost from it, the cables having been broken by the ice. I rather think it would not have stopped their heavy vessels, though it might their smaller ones.

General St. Clair's question. Did you receive directions for building a general hospital at Ticonderoga, and were you not employed on that work?

A. I did, from General Schuyler. I was at work on it about the 23d of June, and the greater part of the fatigue-men were then taken from that work to be put on other works. Some of the artificers were taken off, though the greater part of them continued at work on it.

General St. Clair's question. What distance is the last house you have mentioned from Mount Independence?

A. I believe not more than a quarter of a mile from the landing upon the south side of the Mount.

Captain Winslow being sworn.

General St. Clair's question. What part of the artillery, and at what post, did you command at Ticon­deroga?

A. I commanded in a stone redoubt, where there were thirteen pieces of artillery.

General St. Clair's question. Were the artillery and stores that were in that redoubt removed at the time of the evacuation.?

A. The stores were all removed, and six of the pieces of artillery. I loaded the cannon in a flat bottomed boat that was given me to load them in, and was ordered, I think by General Poor, afterwards to take them out to put the baggage in. There were also 40 barrels of powder there, which, with the stores, I loaded myself in the boats to go to Skeensborough, after I had got those articles down. I was then ordered by General St. Clair, as I was coming up from the boats, to spike up the remainder of the cannon, to go to the old fort to assist in removing the stores from thence.

General St. Clair's question. Were the stores generally removed from the old fort?

[Page 30]A. Every thing of any consequence was. They were all carried down to the boats at least, if they were not put on board.

General St. Clair's question. Were the cannon all spiked that were left?

A. I spiked all that I had the care of, and some more that were at the shore that were brought from the French lines, that could not be embarked.

General St. Clair's question. Were you Paymaster to the troops at Ticonderoga?

A. I was.

General St. Clair's question. Was the military chest saved?

A. It was. I sent it away the morning of the evacuation, about three o'clock, with four of my men. You ordered me to send it away sooner, but I could not get a boat to do it.

Q. Did the stores that were sent from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the time of the evacuation, fall into the hands of the enemy afterwards?

A. They did, after they arrived at Skeensborough; though there might have been some boats that fell into their hands before they got up to Skeensborough.

Q. To Colonel Hay. Did the stores that were sent from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the time of the evacuation, fall into the hands of the enemy afterwards?

A. They did at Skeensborough, after an engagement between the enemy's vessels and ours.

General St. Clair's question to Col. Hay. Was not a great part of them destroyed by fire by our people?

A. One of the vessels was blown up.

General St. Clair's question to Col. Hay. Do you recollect the number of batteaus that were at Ticonderoga, fit for service?

A. Not positively, but I imagine they were about 70

General St. Clair's question to Col. Hay. Was the boom below the bridge so secured, that it could resist the shock of a vessel?

A. It was secured with several anchors and cables. It would have stopped a vessel's way, so far as to have exposed her to the fire from on both sides, and made it difficult for her to get back again; but if a vessel came against it with a full wind, I never thought it would have resisted her.

General St. Clair's question to Col. Hay. Was the wind fair the night of the evacuation for vessels to come up against it?

A. It was, and blowed very hard.

General St. Clair's question to Col. Hay. If the enemy had attempted it that night, was it not probable they would have broke through every obstruction?

A. I am of opinion they would have carried away our boom and broke our floating bridge, but must probably, by that means, have been thrown athwart some of the caffoons, and thereby exposed to the fire of our batteries on both sides, until the cannon were removed or spiked up.

Lieutenant Colonel Stevens being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Did you command the artillery at Ticonderoga at the time of the evacuation?

A. I did.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect what orders were given to you at the time of the evacuation?

A. About seven o'clock in the evening of the 5th of July was the first of my hearing of the intended evacuation. You waited on me at my quarters (as I was unwell) and informed me that the retreat was to take place that night. On the information, I told you I had reason to curse the day I ever put my feet into the country, there being so much retreating. Yoy said that you had the greatest reason to curse the day, and intimated that more blame would fall on you than on me for losing the artillery. You then advised with me what artillery to bring off, and was anxious for bringing the whole off, and offered me what assistance I wanted. I told you it was impossible to bring the whole off, on account of the deficiency of boats; and 500 men were turned out to my assistance. You had agreed to move all the pieces except the eighteen pounders, and those above them, which I got to the landing, but the scarcity of boats was the occasion of my leaving some of them there. I did make out to get a number of them to Skeensborough, but they were lost there. I should have got the whole there, had not the boats been taken up by General Poor for the men's baggage, into which the pieces were to go. The boats with the ammunition and powder had reached almost to Skeensborough before the enemy came up with them. One of them we set fire to, with fifteen tons of powder, which blew up; the rest fell into the hands of the enemy.

General St. Clair's question. Were not orders given to spike up all the cannon tha could not be removed?

A. There were.

General St. Clair's question. Was that done?

A. It was. You advised with me about knocking the trunnions off, but being fearful it would make too much noise and alarm the enemy, as they were so near, it was omitted.

General St. Clair's question. Was there any artillery ordered to be fired that night, to amuse the enemy?

A. There were two eighteen pounders in the Jersey battery fired every seven minutes at their shipping, and at a battery that the enemy were raising opposite to the Jersey battery, which continued till near sun-rise the next morning, to amuse them.

General St. Clair's question. At the time the enemy moved up with their gun boats, as if they meant to attack the Jersey battery, do you recollect what passed at the time between you and me?

A. You seemed to be angry at me for firing without your positive orders, and said you would rather give fifty pounds than I should have fired.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect my explaining to you the reason of my saying so?

A. I do not recollect your explaining to me the reason. You expressed in your discourse to me, that you wished they would come nearer, that we might have a fairer chance to sink them; and I judged that it was on account of your thinking they were not near enough.

General St. Clair's question. Did you receive any orders for dismounting and moving the cannon at Ti­conderoga?

A. I did about the latter end of June, or beginning of July, from General Schuyler, and moved all the [Page 31] cannon above a twelve pounder, except the two eighteen pounders which were left at the Jersey battery, to Mount Independence, and laid them on skids, with their vents down, which induced the soldiers to think that a retreat was intended from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence. I moved also the ammunition by your orders, except about one hundred rounds, to Mount Independence.

General St. Clair's question. Was all the fixed ammunition removed at the time of the evacuation?

A. I have the greatest reason to think that all was brought off.

General St. Clair's question. Was there any annoyance given by the artillery to the enemy in their ap­proaches to the place?

A. They were fired upon from the French lines, and from every quarter where they made their appear­ance, by heavy artillery, from the first of their approach to the evacuation.

Mr. Boyer being sworn, General St. Clair's question. In what station did you act at Ticonderoga?

A. As an Assistant Commissary of Provision.

General St. Clair's question. When I called on you on the 5th of July for a return of provision, what quantity did you report to me to be on hand?

A. I imagine there were two thousand barrels of flour, and eight hundred barrels of beef and pork, the greater part was pork, and it was about that quantity I reported to you there was.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect what quantity of provision was issued as a ration at Ti­conderoga?

A. I think, but am not positive, there was issued for a ration, one pound of bread, one pound of beef, or three quarters of a pound of pork in lieu of beef. That was all they daily drew. The other parts of a ration I do not remember.

General St. Clair's question. Was there any allowance made to the men for the small articles you could not furnish them with?

A. They had briefs given them for them.

General St. Clair's question. How long were you Assistant Commissary at that place?

A. About six weeks.

General St. Clair's question. Had you received any directions from any of the principals in the depart­ment, what quantity of provision to issue as a daily ration?

A. I do not remember that I had.

General St. Clair's question. Did you not issue the same ration that had been issued before you came into office?

A. I issued the same quantity that had been issued before I came into the office.

The Court adjourned till to-morrow, ten o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 13th.

THE Court met according to adjournment.

Major General St. Clair produces a certificate, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Hale and Lieutenant Colonel May, which Lieutenant Colonel Hale acknowledges to have been written by him, and signed by him and Lieutenant Colonel May; which, being read, is as follows:

Major General St. Clair produces returns of the state of the arms and accoutrements in Colonel Francis's regiment, Colonel Scammell's regiment, Colonel Warner's regiment, Colonel Hale's regiment, and Colonel Marshall's regiment; and return of the state of the arms in Colonel Samuel Brewer's regiment, and Colonel Cilley's regiment; also a return of the arms wanted in the artillery; a certificate from Major Hull; and co­pies of two letters from him (General St. Clair) to General Schuyler, dated Ticonderoga, June 25th, and June 26th, 1777; which, being read, are as follow:

N. B. One Company on command at Fort Ann, which is not inserted in the above Return.

EBENEZER FRANCIS, Colonel.

[Page 32]

Ticonderoga, June 18, 1777. ALEX. SCAMMELL, Colonel.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777. SETH WARNER, Colonel.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777. WILLIAM ELLIOT, Adjutant.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777. THOMAS WEEKS, Adjutant.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777. SAMUEL BREWER, Colonel. TIM. WHITING, Quarter-Master.

Ticonderoga, June 17, 1777. C. STARK. Adjutant.

Major General Schuyler being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. What troops had you estimated for the defence of the garrisons of Ticonde­roga and Mount Independence?

A. Ten thousand continental troops. I do not know that I mentioned in my letter to General Washington and to Congress that they should be continental troops, but I intended them to have been continental troops.

General St. Clair's question. Did you think the posts tenable with the force I had?

In answer to this question, General Schuyler produces an extract from a copy of a letter to Congress, dated the 8th of June. 1777, which he says was sent by express to Congress, and was received by them about the 13th of June, but he did not receive any answer to the letter till late in July. The extract is as follows:

General Schuyler says further, in answer to the question, that when he mentioned in the letter to Congress that between two and three thousand men were sufficient to have maintained Mount Independence, he con­ceived the [...]ort, about which orders had been given the beginning of February to Colonel Baldwin, was far advanced; that the obstruction in the Lake was compleated; that there were carriages provided for the can­non; that the lines were compleated, and not by one half so extensive as he found them.

General St. Clair's question. Did you ever give me any orders for evacuating these garrisons?

A. No. The reason why I did not give you any orders for evacuating these garrisons was, because I had wrote this letter to Congress, and they did not give me any orders about it; and as the continent conceived them of great importance, and very strong, I did not think myself at liberty to give any orders for an evacuation of them.

General St. Clair's question. Was the defective state in which you found the works at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence owing to any negligence in me, or disregard to the orders I received from you?

A. It could not be owing to any negligence in you, or disregard to the orders you received from me, as you had arrived there but a few days before; not was it owing to the negligence of any officer who had com­manded there in the winter or spring before; nor to the commanding officer of the artiliery or the engineer. I conceive it to be owing to a want of men and a want of materials.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know of any steps taken by the eastern states to reinforce these posts, after their investiture?

A. Immediately on my return from Ticonderoga, I wrote to the eastern states to hasten on the remainder of the continental troops. Some troops came up in consequence of my application, but did not reach Albany till some time after the evacuation of Ticonderoga. Upon receiving the first letter from you after I returned from Ticonderoga, I applied to the eastern states, and to this, for reinforcements of militia. The militia from the Massachusetts arrived at Fort-Edward, I believe, between the 4th and 7th of July. A few from Connecticut did not join us until towards the latter end of July. Those from this state got up much about the same time that the Massachusetts did. The Massachusetts militia were up as soon at Fort-Edward, and those from this state, as I could reasonably expect them to be. Connecticut, as I was informed by Governor Trumbull, had a call for the militia from General Washington, to go to the Highland, or Peeks-Kill. That was the reason that their militia did not join us sooner.

General St. Clair's question. Did the force you had collected, supposing the garrisons to have held out, put you in a situation to have raised the siege?

A. I believe that, with all the troops you brought with you, with the reinforcement with General Nixon, and including all the militia, I had not at Fort-Edward, about the 20th of July, more than five thousand men. If the garrison had remained, I should have had no more than three thousand militia, before I was joined by General Nixon, to have marched to its relief, which number I conceive very inadequate to have raised the siege. General Nixon, I believe, arrived about the 12th or 13th of July; but if I had had a force which I might think was sufficient, yet I should not have been able to have raised the siege for want of pro­vision, there being scarcely any provision of the meat kind in the department; flour was plenty. Nor was there any stock of provision of the meat kind laid in, not even a sufficiency of salted meat to have fur­nished the scouts with. We had not lead in the department sufficient for an army any thing like to have raised the siege with. At Fort-Edward, on the 7th of July, we were obliged to strip the men that were there of every cartridge they had, to send them to Fort-Ann, and were left without any lead for some days, excepting a mere trifle I got from Albany, a very small quantity brought up by the militia, and by stripping the windows.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know the usual weight of a barrel of beef or pork in that country?

A. Barrels of beef or pork should weigh, when they are well packed, about 200 weight; but I have fre­quently complained that the barrels of beef or pork of the Commissary's were not in well packed as they ought to be, owing to their making use of soldiers and others, whom I supposed did not understand the busi­ness so well, so that the barrels were but slighty packed. I have seen some that I suppose a quarter of meat might have been put in more, others that the deficiency was less. I should imagine, if the rest of the barrels were the same as those I inspected into, they would not have averaged more than 170 pounds each.

General St. Clair's question. Did I not, when it was determined in the Council of Officers that was held the 20th of June, 1777, respecting the holding Mount Independence and evacuating Ticonderoga, express my opinion that it would be impossible to hold that post, when the other side of the Lake should be abandoned?

A. I remember perfectly well you did.

[Page 35]Colonel Scammell being sworn,

General St. Clair's question. Do you know any instance of cowardice, treachery, or inattention to the progress of the enemy, that I was guilty of during my command at Ticonderoga?

A. I do not.

Major General St. Clair admits, that in the number of men returned on command the 28th of June, there were about 457 on command in the garrison.

The Court adjourn till to-morrow, ten o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 14th.

THE Court met according to adjournment.

Major Dunn, Aid de Camp to General St. Clair, being sworn, says:

I arrived at Ticonderoga about the 18th of June, 1777. A day or two after my arrival I went round the lines on Ticonderoga, and found them much in the same situation as they were in November, 1776, except­ing the redoubts on the low ground, which were evacuated, and a chain of new ones erected on the height between the old sort and the right of the French lines. These were nearly compleated. In some cannon were mounted, and a party of fatigue at work on the rest. On Mount Independence I found a party of about 100 men, under the direction of Colonel Koseiuszko, erecting three redoubts in the rear of the Mount, and forming an abbatis, the old one having taken fire some time before, and was chiefly destroyed. One other party of about 150 men, under Colonel Baldwin, sinking a number of piers in the passage between the two posts. One other fatigue party, employed daily in bringing stores and provision from Lake George Land­ing. Besides these, Colonel Hay, the Quarter-Master General, had a party of Negroes, taken from the different regiments, as a constant fatigue, independent of the daily detail. There were two regiments of militia cutting logs for the piers then sinking, these were likewise independent of the daily detail, and exempt from all other garrison duty. All these parties of fatigue were continued as above, with very little alteration, till the evacuation took place. Being the only Aid de Camp belonging to General St Clair's family, most of the orders delivered were through me, and therefore I had the greatest opportunities of seeing all parties that were sent out; and after my arrival, I do not remember a day that parties were not sent out on the east or west, and frequently on both sides of the Lake Champlain, to reconnoitre the Lake and woods. Those parties consisted from 15 to 50 men. I do not recollect exactly the time the enemy first made their appearance on the Lake, but remember perfectly, after their appearing with their fleet at Split-Rock, that no party could be perswaded (because of the savages) to approach near enough to discover any thing of consequence. They frequently fell in with the enemy's parties, but were always obliged to retire. In this state we remained till the enemy landed on Three Mile Point, I think on the 30th of June; and on this occasion I heard the Ge­neral complain that his garrison was not in force to risque a party large enough to do them any damage. This occasioned the parties being reduced; sometimes not more than one officer, and two or three men, was thought the most eligible mode to discover the movements of the enemy. A look-out boat was also stationed between the enemy's fleet and the Jersey redoubt, to apprize the garrison of any movement in the fleet. On the enemy's landing at the point, the General ordered all the provision and stores at Lake George Landing immediately removed into the lines; the batteaus and boats to be in readiness to move to Fort George on the shortest notice. The enemy, advancing towards the lines, on the first or second day of July took possession of the heights between the landing and the old French lines. The boats were ordered to move to Fort George, and the troops posted at the landing and saw-mills ordered into the garrison, which was effected without any loss. The communication between the garrison and Lake George was now effectually cut off, the enemy being in possession of the heights in our front. Their light parties made frequent attacks on our picket, which consisted of fifty men, posted some distance in front of the lines. On those occasions, and every other alarm that came to my knowledge (and I believe none escaped me) the Ge­neral always appeared at the lines, going from right to left encouraging the troops, putting them in mind of the cause they were engaged in, telling them to keep themselves cool, and not to throw away their fire if the enemy should approach; that he wished for nothing more than a serious attack, and did not doubt but we should repulse them if they did attack. Such was the General's personal attention to the posts, and the movements of the enemy, after they landed at Three Mile Point, that I do not believe he slept one hour in four and twenty, on an average, till the evacuation took place. As to the quantity of provision I can say but little; but I recollect, soon after my arrival. General Schuyler's expressing great surprize that no magazines were formed at Albany, or any other place nearer than that, for the supply of the garrison. He sent Mr. Yancey immediately to the country, and pressed him in the strongest terms to spare no pains in ob­taining provision for the post; that if the enemy should come on, we should be reduced by famine; adding, at the same time, that the neglect of the Commissaries had been such, that he believed it would be serving the public to hang at least one of the department.—The following are the particulars I recollect respecting the retreat. About eight o'clock in the evening, July 5. I saw the ammunition and cannon removing on board the vessels and to Mount Independence. I was at this time ignorant of the retreat. About nine o'clock the same evening General St. Clair sent me with orders to General Fermoy, that he should direct all the stores, ammunition, cannon, baggage, &c. to be taken to the foot of the hill on the east side of the Mount, where they were to be put on board batteaus for Skeensborough. I returned, after delivering the order, to Ticon­deroga, and was sent by the General with orders to the Officer in the Jersey redoubt, to continue firing his cannon every half hour towards the battery the enemy were erecting opposite to the redoubt till further orders. About twelve o'clock the same evening I was again sent to Mount Independence. I found General Fermoy near his house, with his own baggage. I went to the landing, where I found Colonel Hay directing the loading the boats, with between three and four hundred men carrying down the stores, &c. but, for want of proper orders and attention from General Fermoy, every thing appeared in the greatest confusion. About this time they began to strike their tents on Mount Independence, all of which, I believe, were put on board the boats. At two o'clock General St. Clair left Ticonderoga, all the stores, ammunition, artillery and camp equipage from that side being removed, except the heavy cannon, which, from our small number of men and want of draught cattle, could not then be removed. All the tents and hospital stores, most of the am­munition [Page 36] and light cannon, were also removed from Mount Independence. Some provision, I cannot say what quantity, and most of the heavy cannon, were left; all the batteaus and boats were however loaded. About three o'clock in the morning the troops were put in motion for the evacuation, but General Fermoy having set fire to his house (contrary to positive orders) which lighted the whole Mount, and gave the enemy an opportunity of seeing every movement we made, it damped the spirits of our own troops; the militia re­giments pushed out of the Mount in disorder, and were followed by a number of continental troops; the guards from Ticonderoga had also to pass the light, and rushed forward in confusion. The General at this time rode to the front, and obliged them to halt, and formed a line of march in rank and file, the roughness of the country and badness of the road permitting no other. Having effected this, he returned to the rear, which still remained at the foot of the Mount. It was near four in the morning when the rear began to march. Colonel Francis, who commanded the rear guard, followed immediately after, and the line continued in good order till we arrived at Hubbarton, where the whole were halted to refresh. The halt was near two hours. Most of the stragglers and rear guard having joined us, the army was again put in motion. The rear guard here was given to Colonel Warner, with orders to halt about one and a half mile short of the main body, which would remain that night at Castle-Town, about six miles from Hubbarton, and to march in the morning by four, and join the main body. In the morning the General paraded the army, and waited near two hours for the rear guard. About seven o'clock a firing began on Warner's party, and on enquiry found he had halted at Hubbarton. The General expressed his surprize that his orders were disobeyed. He dispatched myself and Major Livingston to order two militia regiments, that had halted between the main body and Warner, to reinforce him (these regiments were commanded by Colonel Bellows) and if the enemy should appear in much superior force, that Warner should retreat to Rutland, where the main body would be to cover him. Those regiments of militia refused to go up, tho' positively commanded, and afterwards intreated, by Colonel Bellows. This delay occasioned Warner's retreat to Rutland, where the main body received him. The militia regiments returned, and although myself on horseback, and three miles from the main body, they arrived there with me. I rode express.

Q. Court. Besides the parties you have mentioned on fatigue, do you recollect whether there was a brigade ordered for fatigue on Mount Independence about the 23d of June?

A. I do recollect there was a brigade ordered for fatigue on Mount Independence about that time, which was exclusive of the parties for fatigue I have mentioned.

Q. Do you know the time General St. Clair received information of the strength and designs of the enemy?

A. I do not know the time.

Q. Did General St. Clair remove any of his baggage from Ticonderoga at any time previous to the evacuation?

A. No part of it. His son went off, I believe, about a week before, but did not even carry all his own baggage with him. About the time General St. Clair's son went away, General Fermoy's baggage was removed from Head-Quarters to Mount Independence, he having lived with the General until that time.

Q. What distance is Split-Rock from Ticonderoga?

A. About thirty-seven miles.

Q. What distance is Gilliland's Creek from Ticonderoga?

A. About forty-two miles.

Lieutenant Colonel Livingston, Aid de Camp to General Schuyler, being sworn, says:

About the middle of June, 1777, General St. Clair (agreeable to orders from General Schuyler) took upon himself the command of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. A few days after I went to Ticonderoga, in company with General Schuyler. After being there a few days. General Schuyler found it necessary for the service to return to Albany, and the command in that department continued in General, St. Clair, with whom I had the honour of serving during the siege and on the retreat. Previous to the enemy's appear­ance before Ticonderoga, every method was made use of to gain intelligence of their movements and intentions. For this purpose scouting parties, properly officered, were kept out on the east and west sides of Lake Cham­plain. These parties were generally selected from a corps of rangers, who had been accustomed to services of this kind. The General did not confine his attention to the article of intelligence alone. No measures were neglected to strengthen the works on both sides of the Lake. Fatigue parties were daily employed in this duty, and the direction of them generally committed to Colonel Koseiuszko, an active officer, who acted as an assistant engineer in the northern department. The obstructions of the navigation at Lake Champlain was also attended to. Besides a very slight boom, which had been thrown across the Lake during the command of General Gates, large cassoons were sunk between Mount Independence and Ticonderoga, altho' this ar­duous work was not compleated when the evacuation took place. On the 26th of June, or thereabouts, our scouts observed an encampment of the enemy at Crown-Point, fifteen miles from Ticonderoga. From this time it became exceedingly difficult to procure any intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, as the woods between us and Crown-Point were so infested with savages as to render it exceedingly hazardous to send small parties that way, and the force of the garrison was too weak to justify the detaching a large number. Not many days after, I think it was on the last of June, the enemy's gun-boats appeared off Three Mile Point. The same day there was a skirmish between a scout from the garrison and the enemy. Our party were worsted, and obliged to retire with a little loss. A considerable body of the enemy then took possession of Mount-Hope. This height commanded the road between Ticonderoga and the North Landing of Lake George. It had been fortified by us the preceding year, but was dismantled long before General St. Clair's arrival in that quarter. The old block-house at the north end of Lake George was still in our hands. A subaltern's guard was left in it, to protect the public stores which were lying at that landing. The enemy did not suffer this officer to remain long in peaceable possession; they attacked him with small arms, and were repulsed. The General, aware of the dangerous situation of the block-house, and that the small garrison there must soon be overpowered by numbers, or be obliged to submit on the appearance of artillery, judged it necessary to order them within the lines. This was effected just in time, and without loss. The Communication between Ticonderoga and Lake George, by the main road, was now entirely cut off, which rendered it impracticable to bring the stores from the Lake within the fort. There was now [Page 37] great danger of their falling into the enemy's hands. To prevent a loss of this kind, the General ordered the stores to be immediately put on board the batteaus, and carried back to Fort George, on the south side of the Lake. This service was executed without loss, and no further communication possible between Ticon­deroga and the country by the way of Lake George. The enemy continued to make their approaches on the Ticonderoga side of the Lake. It was impossible, from the weakness of the garrison, and the great extent of works we had to defend, to give them much interruption in their approaches. But the movement of the enemy, which gave the greatest alarm to the garrison, was the very rapid progress they made in clearing a road, and getting artillery on Sugar Hill or Mount Defiance. This proceeding was the more surprising, as it had been in agitation during the command of General Gates (in the fall of 1776, after our misfortune on Lake Champlain, when an attack on Ticonderoga was daily apprehended) to occupy that height with artil­lery, but was judged to be impracticable. This hill had such an entire command of Ticonderoga, that the enemy might have counted our very numbers, and enfiladed every part of our works. After possesing them­selves of this commanding height, it would have required but a few hours more to invest us on all sides. This might have been effected by only occupying the ground on the east side of Lake Champlain below Mount Independence, where the pass from the Lake to East Creek is very narrow. Had this taken place, our com­munication with the country had been at an end, no further supplies of provision or men could have reached us, nor would a retreat, in case of necessity, then been practicable. But before this was effected, it was de­termined in a Council of War to retire from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. This resolution was entered into on the evening of the 5th of July, and very early in the morning of the 6th the troops left the ground. Measures for the evacuation were concerted with the greatest secrecy, to keep the enemy ignorant of our designs. The centinels within the works were ordered to challenge no person that night. This order I carried myself to the guards on Ticonderoga, though I was ignorant of the reason of such an order. The guns at the French lines were spiked; but, to amuse the enemy, the Jersey battery kept up a regular fire during the night. The General also sent me to the old French redoubt, which commanded the bridge between Ticonderoga and the Mount, to order the officer commanding the artillery there not to spike the guns in that redoubt until further orders, as this redoubt might have been of service in covering our troops on their passage across the bridge; but I found that through some mistake those guns had already been spiked. What stores it was possible to remove in the course of one night, or rather in the space of a few hours, were put on board the vessels and batteaus in Lake Champlain, and sent for Skeensborough under Colonel Long, with the invalids and sick of the hospital. Many barrels of powder, in particular, I remember were taken from the magazine, and put on board the vessels, though they afterwards fell into the enemy's hands, or were blown up. The remainder of the army, under General St. Clair himself, retired by land. The rear guard was under the command of Colonel Francis. The army the first day reached Castle-Town, about thirty miles from Mount Independence. We made a halt of between one and two hours at Hubbarton, twenty odd miles from the same place. Before our leaving that town, the General ordered the rear guard to halt a mile or two short of Castle-Town, where he intended to stay with the army that night. The General had no reason to doubt but these orders would have been attended to, and therefore was not a little surprised to find early the next morning that the rear guard was still at Hubbarton, which is six miles distant from Castle-Town. At this distance from the army, they were attacked by General Frazer's corps. The rear guard was increased by many who at first did not belong to it. This was owing to the excessive bad roads and very heavy march­ing, which prevented many, who were more feeble than others, from keeping pace with their regiments. These were picked up by the rear guard, agreeable to orders. At the time of the engagement, I imagine it could not amount to less than 1000 men. The moment the firing was heard at Castle-Town, the General determined to support the rear guard at Hubbarton. The troops at Castle-Town were already under arms, and ready to march when the firing was first heard. They were then ordered to keep their ground, and Major Dunn and myself were dispatched with orders from the General to Colonel Bellows, who lay with his and another militia regiment between Castle-Town and Hubbarton. Our orders were to direct Colonel Bellows to march with those two regiments immediately to the assistance of Colonel Francis, and to assure Colonel Bel­lows at the same time that they should be farther supported, if necessary. In riding towards Hubbarton we were met by these regiments which were marching with speed towards Castle-Town. We delivered our orders, but could not prevail upon either regiment to reinforce the rear guard; though, in justice to Colonel Bellows, it must be said, he was in the rear of the regiment, and warmly persuaded them to go to the field of action. an unaccountable panic had seized his men, and no commands or intreaties had any effect on them. Finding it impossible to turn these regiments to this necessary piece of service, we rode on towards the seene of action, to find how matters were situated there, and report to the General; but we had not proceeded far before we were met by Capt. Chadwick, with about 30 men. Capt. Chadwick had just left the field, and informed us that the action was at an end, that our men were dispersed, that the communication between us and Hubbarton was cut on, so that we should run the greatest risque of being made prisoners if we proceeded any further that way, and that the enemy were in possession of the field of battle, in great force. The firing (which had heen very smart) having ceased, countenanced this intelligence, and we returned to Castle-Town and ap­prized the General of it. General St. Clair now thought it unnecessary to send any further reinforcement to Hubbarton, and prepared to pursue his march. But here I must not forget to mention the conduct of the General towards two eastern regiments of militia, commanded, I believe, by Hale and Learned. These regiments had shewed much discentent on the march the preceding day, and began now to be very cla­morous to be dismissed. The General, apprized of this spirit of discontent in these regiments, ordered them to be paraded at Castle-Town, on the morning of the action at Hubbarton, and addressed them in person. He spoke on this occasion in so forcible and pathetic a manner, that the regiments, ashamed of their con­duct, consented to remain with the army as long as there was any prospect of immediate danger from the enemy; but the plundering disposition they discovered on the march, and their other disorderly behaviour, obliged the General a day or two afterwards to dismiss them from the army with disgrace. The army after this continued their route through several towns, east of Castle-Town, without any further interruption from the enemy, to Hudson's River. I am very well perswaded that it was General St. Clair's intention at first to have marched by Skeensborough to Fort Edward; but an officer of one of our gallies on the Lake arrived [Page 38] at Castle-Town before we left it, and informed the General that the enemy were pursuing in force that way, who would reach Skeensborough before he could possibly get there, and that some vessels had already fallen into their power. This determined the General to change his intended route, and take the road he after­wards did. Before we reached Hudson's River, General St. Clair dispatched me to inform General Schuyler of the situation of his army. So far as I had an opportunity of observing General St. Clair's conduct, it reflects high honour on him. Previous to, during the siege, and on the retreat, he gave proofs of his atten­tion, activity and courage. The garrison were always under arms at their proper posts before sun-rise, and frequently before day-break. The General was always out on these occasions himself, and was an example of vigilance to the soldiery. I do not remember, tho' I lived in the same quarters with him the greater part of the time during the siege, that he ever undressed himself at night. All night, indeed, he would scarcely ever permit himself to sleep. If he did, it was not above an hour or two, tho' the gentlemen about him would frequently observe that he would certainly injure his health unless he indulged himself with more sleep. In case of alarms, which were very frequent, he always appeared at the lines, encouraging the soldiery by his presence and exhortations. On the retreat, he preserved as much order in the army as was possible thro' such bad roads, and so rough a country.

Q. Do you know the time General St. Clair received information of the strength and designs of the enemy?

A. I do not.

Major General St. Clair, having concluded the testimony in his behalf, desires the Court to give him time to make his defence.

The Court, taking into consideration the General's desire, do give him till the 21st instant for that purpose.

The Court adjourn till the 21st instant.

Major General Lincoln's Quarters, near Quarter-Hill, September 28th.

THE Court were to have met, by order of his Excellency General Washington, at this place. Not a sufficient number of members attending, the members present, being a majority of the Court, adjourn till to-morrow, nine o'clock.

Major General Lincoln's Quarters, near Quaker-Hill, September 29th.

THE Court met.

Major General St. Clair produces a letter from him to Major General Schuyler, dated the 10th of June, 1777; and extracts from a letter to General Schuyler from him, dated June 28, 1777; which are as follow:

Major General St. Clair, being requested to make his defence, says as follows:

HOWEVER disagreeable it may be to appear before a Court, a prisoner, and in the light of a cri­minal, I am happy that my conduct, which has been so much censured at large, is at last to be enquired into by a proper judicatory, and that, after so long a delay, and so injurious a discrimination, public justice will be done upon a full, an impartial, and dispassionate examination, and that it will be passed upon by men equal to the task of investigating the truth, however artfully concealed, and determining upon the intrinsic merit of military actions, stripped of the glare that is sometimes thrown upon them by success, or the false lights in which they are often placed by consequences. If I am guilty of all, or any of the charges against me, I wish not to escape punishment; but, conscious of no crime, I hope by your sentence, upon a candid comparison of the testimony, to have those stains wiped from my character, with which it has been suffered to remain too long blotted, and to be restored with honour to the arms of my friends and of my country. I say a proper judicatory, in contra-distinction to that before which the matter has been so long hung up, and which, from the proceedings, seems to have considered itself as analogous to a grand-jury, and has strictly followed the ill example of grand juries in latter times; I mean their calling for, or admitting, such evidence only as might serve to criminate, not considering how much the bare accusation affects the reputation, or, where the person has any sensibility, how deeply it cuts into the soul.

The instances of discrimination are so many, it is painful to mention them. But has it not taken place in the cases of General Sullivan. General Wayne, General Maxwell, General Putnam, and others? They have all been accused of misconduct, but General Schuyler and myself only have been forced to languish, in torpid inactivity, under the weight of the accusation.

The charges against me are of a very general and criminal nature, and have been stated by a Committee of Congress, upon the evidence collected by another Committee, appointed for the purpose of collecting evidence against the General Officers, who were in the northern department when Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated. Sir, all this formal interference of Congress, or Committees of Congress, gives the matter an air of vast importance, and impresses on the public an idea of great criminality. It will, therefore, be necessary for me, whilst I defend myself against the charges directly, to take some notice of the reasonings of the Committee, and to shew in some instances their fallacy, in others their futility. For which reason I beg leave to read the report.

THE Committee, appointed to examine the evidence collected, and state charges, against the General Officers, who were in the northern department when Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were evacuated, Report.

That, having examined the papers to them committed, relative to the subject in question, they find

That, on or about the 13th day of June, 1777, Major General St. Clair took upon him the command at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and that those posts were, by his orders, evacuated to the enemy on the 6th day of July following.

That, by Deputy Commissary Avery's return of provision at Ticonderoga on the 25th of May, 1777, there were at that post 1400 barrels of flour, and 661 barrels of beef; which he stated as sufficient provision in flour for 4000 men during 66 days, and in beef for 75 days.

That, by Deputy Commissary Yancey's return of provision remaining on hand at Ticonderoga the 20th of June, 1777, there were 2015 barrels of flour, 195 barrels of beef, 784 barrels of pork, and 48 barrels of hard bread, besides pease, Indian meal, sugar, coffee, chocolate, molasses, wine, rum, salt, candles and hog's-lard.

That, on or about the 5th of July, 1777, as appears by Jesse Leavenworth's affidavit, a considerable num­ber of fat cattle arrived at Ticonderoga.

That, by the general return of the troops on the 14th of June, 1777, present at Ticonderoga and on com­mand, and which we suppose to be in the environs, there were

[Page 40]That, by the general returns of troops on the 28th of June, 1777, present at Ticonderoga and on com­mand, and which we suppose to be in the environs, there were

That General St. Clair informed the Council of War held on the 5th of July, 1777, that 900 militia had joined him. That Jesse Leavenworth swears they were of the Grants; and General St. Clair, in his letter to Congress, July 14, says they joined on the 5th. That the whole force in Ticonderoga, on the 5th of July, 1777, was 5639 men and officers, of which a number, not exceeding 639, could be considered as sick.

That, on the 13th of June, 1777, General St. Clair wrote to General Schuyler, the commanding officer in the department, that two men from Canada, taken prisoners, informed him that the British army in Ca­nada were assembling, to the amount of about 10,000 men, as fast as possible, to cross the Lake, and attack Ticonderoga; and that he might depend upon it their fleet would appear in a fortnight at farthest.

That, on the 18th of June, General St. Clair wrote to General Schuyler, that four of the enemy's vessels were lying within a mile of the hither side of Split-Rock; that on the day before the enemy's Indians had taken two prisoners, who had strolled from his camp unarmed; and that he thought the enemy's main army was not far off.

That, on the 14th of June, General St. Clair wrote to General Schuyler, that the evening before he had received information, from a scouting party, the enemy were encamped on both sides of Gilliland's Creek, and that they were very numerous.

That, on the 25th of June, General St. Clair wrote to Congress, that he was not able to discover whether the enemy were in force or not; that seven of their vessels arrived at Crown-Point the preceding evening; and that others of their fleet were four or five miles lower down.

That, on the 30th of June, General St. Clair wrote to General Schuyler, that the enemy having advanced to the Three Mile Point, the alarm was given; that his people were in the best disposition possible; and that he had no doubt of giving a good account of the enemy, should they think proper to attack him.

That it does not appear the enemy did attack General St. Clair; yet, nevertheless, on the 5th of July he called a Council of War, and desired their opinion, whether he should wait the attack at the Ticonderoga lines, or whether the whole of the troops should be drawn over to Mount Independence, the more effectually to provide for the defence of that post. Whereupon the Council were unanimously of opinion, that it was impossible, with their force (then stated by General St. Clair to be 2089 rank and file, besides the corps of artillery, 900 militia, and 124 artificers unarmed) to defend Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and that the troops, cannon and stores should be removed that night, if possible, to Mount Independence. That the General also put another question, whether, after a retreat to Mount Independence, they should be in a situa­tion defend that post? or, in case it could not be defended, whether a retreat into the country would be practicable? Upon these points, the Council unanimously concluded that a retreat ought to be undertaken as soon as possible, and that they should be very fortunate if it could be effected. And in pursuance of this determination Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were abandoned between two and three o'clock in the morning of the 6th of July, 1777, General St. Clair having, as appears by Jesse Leavenworth's affidavit, eight days before sent his son and baggage from Ticonderoga to Fort George.

That General St. Clair, in his letter to the Hon. John Jay, Esq dated July 25, 1777. writing of the evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, says, That had the opinion of the Council been con­trary to what it was, it (meaning the evacuation) would nevertheless have taken place, as he knew it to be impossible to defend the posts with their numbers.

That the sick at Ticonderoga, and the public stores of ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing, were [...] behind, or lost upon the precipitate retreat of the 6th of July.

That on the 20th of June, 1777. a Council of War was held at Ticonderoga, Generals Schuyler and St. Clair being present, wherein it was determined, that Ticonderoga and Mount Independence ought to be main­tained as long as possible, consistent with the safety of the troops and stores; that, if either of those posts must be evacuated, the former should be evacuated; that the fortifications and lines on Mount Independence were very deficient; and that repairing the old and adding new works ought to claim immediate attention.

That, by Jesse Leavenworth's affidavit, it appears there was not a stroke struck to fortify Mount Independ­ence; that no parties were sent to annoy the enemy, though the troops were healthy, courageous, and desirous to improve every advantage against them.

That, by the determination of the Council of War on the 5th of July, it appears the enemy had then nothing more to do to compleat their investiture of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, than to occupy the neck of land, a space of three quarters of a mile between the Lake and the East Creek, and to possess themselves of the Narrow, between them and Skeensborough.

[Page 41]That, by General St. Clair's orderly book, it appears, that on the 15th of June [...] were issued for the following guards:

A picket guard, of 1 Captain, 3 Subalterns, 3 Serjeants, 3 Corporals, and 50 Privates, posted to the right of the French lines.

For fatigue, 3 Captains, 10 Subalterns, 10 Serjeants, 5 Drums and Fifes, 326 Rank and File. The whole to continue till farther orders. Total privates for guards, 178; for fatigue, 326.

That, on the 23d of June, the abovementioned guards were reduced from 178 to 95 men; the fatigue party from 326 to 250 men; and 78 privates, under proper officers, were ordered for the detail of guards at Mount Independence; all to continue till further orders.

That the 26th of June was the first day the troops were drawn up at their alarm-posts, ordered to discharge their loaded pieces, and to clean them; and it was but on this day that a signal was given in orders, in case of an attack at the French lines, or at Mount Independence.

That, on the 29th of June, it was ordered that a scout, consisting of a subaltern, a serjeant, and twenty privates, should be sent out every morning, one hour before gun-fire; the fatigue party being then increased to 310 privates, the other guards continuing as before, 173 privates, without any addition till the evacu­ation of the posts.

Upon which state of evidence, your Committee, in order to ground their charges against Major General St. Clair, beg leave to remark;

First. That, on the 13th of June, General St. Clair was possessed of an information, from two prisoners taken in Canada, that the British forces, amounting to about 10,000 men, were proceeding as fast as possible against him, and that he might expect their arrival in three weeks at farthest. That as, on the 18th of June, four of the enemy's vessels were lying on the hither side of Split-Rock, and on the 24th seven of them were at Crown Point, and others four or five miles lower down, their forces then encamped on both sides of Gilli­land's Creek, and he was informed by his scouts that they were very numerous; so from these circumstances it appears General St. Clair had substantial reason to confide in what the prisoners had told him relative to the intentions and strength of the enemy, and that he ought at this time to have taken his final resolution, either to stand an attack, or to retreat with his stores, the preservation of which was a principal object in the determi­nations of the Council of War on the 20th of June. Therefore it appears that General St. Clair's neglecting to form his decisive opinion at this time, or at a later day, so as to allow him a sufficient opportunity to retreat with his troops, sick, ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing, [...] deprive the enemy of shelter at Ticonderoga, was a neglect of duty.

Second. That General St. Clair, on the 24th of June, was informed by his scouts the enemy were very numerous, and yet, nevertheless, on the next day he wrote to Congress, that he was not able to discover whether the enemy were in force or not.

Third. That it General St. Clair found small scouts could not acquire a knowledge whether the enemy were in force or not, it was his duty in due time to have sent out reconnoitring parties, in such force as might have assured him whether or not the enemy were in strength, this being a most important point, as upon this he was to regulate his motions; and therefore his failure in sending out such parties in due time was a neglect, of duty.

Fourth. That as Jesse Leavenworth swears General St. Clair did not annoy the enemy in their advance against, and investiture of, the posts under his care, although the troops were healthy, courageous, and desi­rous of action, it appears the General did not to the utmost of his power oppose the operations of the enemy; and therefore that he is liable to the charge of neglect of duty, of cowardice, or of treachery, or of incapacity as a General.

Fifth. That as it was determined in the Council of War on the 20th of June, approved by General Schuyler, the commanding officer in the department, that the repairing the old and adding new works on Mount Independence ought to claim immediate attention; and Jesse Leavenworth swears not a stroke was struck for those purposes; and by the orderly book it appears the fatigue party was decreased in number, and so continued at a time when it should have been abundantly increased; so on these points the General is liable to be charged with a neglect of duty, amounting to a breach of orders, and with treachery.

Sixth. That as on the 25th of May, the Deputy Commissary rated that 1400 barrels of flour would, at an allowance of one pound each man per diem, serve 4000 men 66 days, and that 661 barrels of beef would serve the same number of men 75 days; and supposing that, from the twentieth of June to the fourth of July inclusive, there were in Ticonderoga and Mount Independence 4739 men, and there does not appear to have been at any time between those periods a greater number; so, estimating the consumption of 4739 men, from the twentieth of June to the fourth of July inclusive, upon the 2015 barrels of flour, 195 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork, on the twentieth of June returned by Deputy Commissary Yancey as then actually remaining on hand, there did on the fourth of July remain, or ought, if provisions had been regularly and properly issued, to be then remaining 1625 barrels of flour, 3 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork; a magazine of provisions sufficient to afford to the army on the 5th of July, amounting, by the arrival of the militia of the Grants, to 5639 men of all ranks, full allowance of provision in flour for 52 days, and in beef and pork for 32 days, exclusive of the considerable number of fat cattle that arrived at Ticonderoga on the fifth of July, the teams of oxen necessarily attending the post, and other stores specified in the Commissary's return on the twentieth of June, and even supposing, as may not reasonably be done, that no supply of flour had arrived after that day. And as this calculation has been liberally made, upon the quantity of provision [Page 42] actually in Ticondero on the twentieth of June, for the expenditure of which General St. Clair, at com­mander at the post, ought to be held responsible; therefore it clearly appears Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were not abandoned upon a just principle of a want of provision.

Seventh. That as General St. Clair informed the Hon. Mr. Jay, that at the time of holding the Council of War on the 5th of July, he knew it to be impossible to defend the posts with his numbers, it is natural to conclude he was decided upon this point at early at the 29th of June, the day that he sent his son and pri­vate effects from Ticonderoga to Fort-George, as a place of safety: That being decided upon this point, it was his duty then to have taken at effectual measures for the preservation of the public property, at least equally with his own, claiming his earliest attention: That on the 30th of June, the enemy being ad­vanced against him so near as the Three Mile Point, it is incredible that he did not then know that they were in force: That it was his duty, at that point of time, to have finally determined either to abide the operations of the enemy, or to retire: That if the last resolution was taken, and, from his sending off his son and baggage the day before, there is the strongest presumption that this resolution was then fully taken, it was his duty then to have proceeded to send off the public stores, to destroy the works, and to evacuate the posts without losing a moment of time: And that by deferring to take any measures to retire till the last moment when he could possibly retreat oven with his effective troops, a moment when the sick, ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing of the army must be abandoned and lost, besides the lives of many men in effecting a retreat from before an enemy immediately upon him, General St. Clair appears chargeable with inattention to the progress of the enemy, with treachery, or with incapacity as a General, and with shamefully abandoning the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in his charge. Nor can the proving, as General St. Clair wishes to do, that the works of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were too extensive, and that the troops were very badly armed, if such things can be proved, fail of placing General St. Clair in a more reprehensible point of view, at the weakness of his defence being more obvious, his retreat should have been earlier de­termined upon and made.

Your Committee, having thus stated the points principally resulting from the evidence collected against General St. Clair, recommend that a general court-martial be ordered to fit for the trial of Major General St. Clair, for the loss of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, with the public stores; and that he be charged

First. With Neglect of Duty; under the 5th article of the 18th section of the rules and articles of war— and that the charge be founded upon the first, third, fourth and fifth Remarks, respectively.

Second. With Cowardice, with Treachery, with Incapacity as a General, respectively; under the 5th article of the 18th section of the rules and articles of war—and that the charge be founded upon the fourth remark.

Third. With Treachery; under the 5th article of the 18th section of the rules and articles of war— and that the charge be founded upon the fifth remark.

Fourth. With inattention to the Progress of the enemy, with Treachery, with Incapacity as a General, respec­tively; under the 5th article of the 18th section of the rules and articles of war—and that the charge be founded upon the seventh remark.

Fifth. With shamefully abandoning the Posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in his charge; under the 12th article of the 13th section of the rules and articles of war—and that the charge be founded upon the seventh remark.

Finally, upon the case of Major General St. Clair, your Committee recommend that authenticated copies of the returns, letters, and determinations of courts-martial, referred to, be transmitted to the Judge-Advocate-General; that Elisha Avery, James Yancey, Richard Varrick, Jesse Leavenworth, and the Colonels com­manding the two battalions of Massachusetts militia, whose time of service was nearly expired at the evacuation of Ticonderoga, be summoned to give evidence at the trial of Major General St. Clair; and that he be fur­nished with a copy of the remarks and charges against him.

The first observation that naturally offers is, that the charges which have been exhibited to this Court have all been founded upon the ex parte affidavit of a Mr. Leavenworth, which (in most instances) he has contra­dicted in open Court, and consequently is entitled to no degree of credit, and upon my own letters to Congress and to General Schuyler, the Officer who commanded in chief in the northern department. It is singular, however, that charges of so high a nature against an officer of my rank should be attempted to be supported (for supported I trust they are not) by no other living witness than Mr. Leavenworth, a private man! a fol­lower of the army! in some of the lowest and vilest occupations! who, if he had had capacity to judge, could not possibly have had proper information; that not an officer, of any rank whatsoever, has been called upon; and yet, had treachery, had neglect of duty, been committed,—had I been inattentive to the progress of the enemy,—had the posts in my charge been shamefully abandoned,—or had I been guilty of cowardice,—they could not have escaped their notice altogether; nay, it was by them only they could probably hate been dis­covered. But this by the bye. Previous to any remarks upon, or application of, the testimony, I beg leave to inform the Court, that, before I left Philadelphia to take upon me the command of Ticonderoga, Congress had received information, which they credited, that the principal part of the enemy's troops in Canada were ordered round by St. Lawrence to join General Howe; that no serious attempt would be made upon Ticon­deroga; at most, it would be a diversion only. This was communicated to me by Mr. Hancock, then Pre­sident, and I have his authority to mention it to this Court. This circumstance will serve as a key to many of my letters, and will account for my doubts about some intelligence I received after my arrival at Ticonde­roga. And it appears from General Poor's testimony, that General Gates had likewise, from them, received the same account.

The first charge is neglect of duty, founded upon the first, third, fourth and fifth remarks, respectively.

The first remark is, "that on the 13th of June I was possessed of an information, from two prisoners taken in Canada, that the British forces, amounting to about 10,000 men, were proceeding as fast as possible against me, and that I might expect their arrival in three weeks at farthest; that as, on the 18th of June, four of the enemy's vessels were lying on the hither side of Split Rock, and, on the 24th, seven of them were at Crown-Point, and others four or five miles lower down, their forces then encamped on both sides Gilliland's Creek, [Page 43] and that I was informed by my scouts they were very numerous; so, from these circumstances, it appears I had substantial reason to confide in what the prisoners had told me relative to the [...] and strength of the enemy, and that I ought at this time to have taken my final resolution either to stand an attack, or to retreat with my stores, the preservation of which was a principal object in the determinations of the Council of War on the 20th; therefore it appears, that neglecting to form my decisive opinion at this time, or at a later day, so as to allow myself a sufficient opportunity to retreat with my troops, sick, ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing, and to deprive the enemy of shelter at Ticonderoga, was a neglect of duty."

It is true, that on the 13th of June I was possessed of an information, from two prisoners, that the British army amounted to about 10,000 men, and that they were making every preparation to cross the Lake, to attack my posts; but it is also true, that I considered these persons as spies; that their information was con­tradicted by two Frenchmen, who had been sent into Canada by General Gates, for the express purpose of gaining intelligence of the enemy's designs; that the information of these Frenchmen arrived at the same time, and was transmitted by the same conveyance to General Schuyler; as appears from my letter to him of June 13th.

The information, Sir, of prisoners is generally doubtful; but that of persons considered as spies must al­ways be suspected. I would therefore have been justifiable in not giving them credit, if I had not received contradictory intelligence. But when the Court consider the opinion of Congress above-mentioned, and that the persons actually were spies (the letter from Mr. Livius to General Sullivan, that has been published by the General, having been found upon one of them) and that their intelligence was contradicted by persons of credit, they will think the conclusion I drew the natural and proper one—that they were sent to deceive us, and were unworthy of belief. They will think that the enemy's advancing their vessels to Crown-Point and Split Rock, and forming an encampment at Gilliland's Creek, as they did on the 18th and 24th of June (that place being at a distance, out of the reach of our parties, but not out of the way of observation) thereby to induce the division of our troops, to reinforce the places on which they had no design, and to lessen the op­position where their army was to act effectually, was the very thing they ought to have done; and we all know the appearance of a great encampment can be made with very few troops. And this sentiment at cofor­tified by the position of their camp, which was a sandy beach upon the shore of the Lake, where the creek falls into it, forty-two or three miles distant from Ticonderoga, as has been proven by General Wilkinson, Major Dunn, and others, with a rough, broken, woody country betwixt them.

But it seems I ought then, or at a later day, to have taken my decisive resolution to retreat, saving to my­self a sufficient opportunity to bring off my troops, and every thing that was at the posts, and to deprive the enemy of shelter at Ticonderoga, and that the not doing so was a neglect of duty.

I suspect, Sir, the Committee, who formed these charges, had no idea of the nature of a subordinate com­mand. They would otherwise have known, that I had no power to form or execute any such resolution, and that my justification for evacuating the posts at all must depend upon the necessity of the case. I did what my duty required me. I gave the earliest notice to the Commanding Officer of the department, and stood ready to execute his commands. But I am perswaded that, had it been in my power to have taken my final resolu­tion then, and upon the intelligence I had received I had abandoned the posts, altho' every thing had been saved which has since been lost, the charges of treachery and cowardice would have been rung much louder, and pressed home more strongly, and with more virulence, if possible, than in the present case. I should have heard, that no decisive operation should be founded on the vague report of prisoners or deserters, often ignorant, almost always ill informed; but that to abandon a post on the information of persons I suspected to be, and actually were, the enemy's spies, or from the view of an encampment upwards of forty miles off, and that only seen across a lake six or eight miles broad, could proceed from no other than one of those sources, or from perfect stupidity; and this Court, from whom I expect a very different decision, would have joined in that opinion, and condemned me to the punishment I had justly merited. But, besides all this, if the Council of War was to guide, it was out of my power to take any such measure; for the resolution of the Council is, that both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence are to be held as long as they can be, con­sistent with the safety of the troops and stores. When the safety of the troops and stores became doubtful, Ticonderoga, not Mount Independence, was to be evacuated.

The second article upon which the charge of neglect of duty is founded is, "That if I found small scouts could not acquire a knowledge whether the enemy were in force or not, it was my duty, in due time, to have sent out reconnoitring parties, in such force as might have assured me whether or not the enemy were in strength, and that this was not done."

Had not the Committee been totally ignorant of the nature of the country in which these parties were to act—had they given any attention to the returns of my army, which were before them, or credit to my letters to General Schuyler, of which they had the perusal, this article would never have made its appearance. Had it ever occurred to them that the enemy proceeded by water, and that the only debarkation we hear of was at Gilliland's Creek, forty miles and upwards from Ticonderoga, and that they proceeded from thence by water again, we should not have heard this story of reconnoitering parties, of which, I am morally cer­tain they themselves had no determinate idea. My whole army would not have formed one party such as they seem to think ought to have been sent out frequently. I have proven that small parties were sent out, not only frequently but constantly; and altho' they were but small parties, they were as strong as the state of my garrison, and the works in hand, would allow. It is true, indeed, I obtained by them no certain intelli­gence of the enemy's force until they landed at Three Mile Point, nor was it possible before; they possessed neither the gifts of divination, nor walking upon the water; but they could give me information if any part of the enemy's army were advancing by land, and this was all I could expect from them, except that, in that case, they might have brought off some prisoners.

The returns prove the strength of my army—the orderly book the daily guards—and I have proven, by General Poor, Colonel Baldwin, Colonel Koseiuszko, General Wilkinson, and almost every witness, the nu­merous fatigue parties and pickets. I leave it to the Court to judge if larger parties could have been spared to make discoveries. But supposing, for argument sake, that my army would have afforded stronger reconnoitring parties, I contend that, until the enemy were landed, they would have been useless, and afterwards highly im­proper; [Page 44] and that the sending such would have argued great want of Judgment. It would have been sending two or three hundred men (and that number would perhaps have been thought a pretty good recon­noitring party) to certain destruction. They could not have marched thro' thick woods and rank herbage without being discovered, if the enemy's parties were the least vigilant. If they were attacked at a distance, as they could not be supported, they must inevitably have fallen into the enemy's hands; if attacked within supporting distance, they must still have fallen, or a general action been brought on; for they could no otherwise have been supported, but by marching out to sustain them, and then all the expence and time that had been laid out on the fortifications were thrown away. A General, entrusted with the defence of a post, who reduces himself to the necessity of fighting the enemy to support his detachments, or who, by making large detachments and losing them, puts it out of his own power to maintain his post, certainly discovers very little knowledge, and would justly be the object of censure at least, if not of punishment. Had such detachments been made from my army, one or other of these consequences must have followed; they must have been when▪ or I must have risked an action to bring them off: But I had not a force sufficient for the defence of my posts, much less to cope with the enemy in the field, therefore no such detachments, as should lay me under the necessity of attempting it, or be of any great moment if a misfortune happened to them, were made. But further, as very small parties, three men for example, can approach an enemy without much danger of being discovered, which large parties cannot, and that these small parties, from that cir­cumstance, have a better chance to make prisoners, to take off a centinel for example, to which they are fully adequate, and that the intelligence to be obtained from reconnoitring parties must depend, in a great measure, upon the prisoners they make, it follows that small parties are the most proper, and fully answer every purpose of gaining intelligence that can be derived from the larger, without being subject to the same dangers. It likewise follows, that there was no neglect of duty in this instance, but, on the contrary, that the most proper methods for obtaining certain intelligence of the motions and force of the enemy were taken and pursued.

The charge of neglect of duty is further grounded upon the affidavit of Mr. Leavenworth, who, the [...], swears that the enemy were not annoyed by me in their advance against, and investiture of, the posts under my care, though the troops were healthy, courageous, and desirous of action, and therefore I am liable to the charges of neglect of duty, of cowardice, or of treachery, or of incapacity as a General. The Committee seem to be in doubt on which of the four to six, it is one or t'other, but, to make sure of the matter, and swell the black list, they have directed that I be prosecuted upon each. It has been proven by Dr. Brown and Dr. Townshend, the hospital surgeons, that the troops were not healthy, and their testimony will have weight. The Court will please to observe the contradiction betwixt what the Committee say Mr. Leavenworth swore, and what he actually swears before this Court; here he swears that he has seen parties go out of about twenty men, and that he once heard of a scalp being brought in; there he swore that they were not annoyed at all; perhaps he thought killing and scalping the savages employed by the enemy no annoy­ance! But it is needless to dwell upon this man's testimony, as, from his station, he could not know much, and, from his observation, he actually knows very little.

It is in proof to the Court, by a number of witnesses, that parties were constantly out, and that they frequently were engaged with the enemy; and, by Colonel Stevens, that every annoyance was given to the enemy by the artillery, from every quarter, from the first of their appearance until the evacuation. But if the Committee meant that no large detachments were sent to annoy the enemy, it is granted; and the reasons that have been already given for not sending out large reconnoitring parties apply so directly, it would be trespassing on the patience of the Court to repeat them.

The last ground for the charge of neglect of duty is, "that, notwithstanding it had been determined in a Council of War on the 20th of June, that the repairing the old works, and adding new ones on Mount Independence ought to claim immediate attention, Mr. Leavenworth swears not a stroke was struck for these purposes." Here Mr. Leavenworth gives the Committee the slip again; for he swears before the Court, not that there was not a stroke struck for these purposes, but that he has heard there were many strokes struck; he has heard of what he calls some small works flung up on the south end of Mount Independence; and it ap­pears by the map, and explanation by Colonel Koseiuszko, these were lines and three redoubts, for 1500 men at least. But, forsooth, there were none erected where he expected, and he did not think the works suitable to cover the men. He acknowledges he has seen parties of axe-men sent from the parade. He could not suppose they were sent to strike no strokes; and it is scarce conceivable that a person, who on other occasions, as much out of his way, was so very inquisitive, should not have had the curiosity to ask some one what those men were going to do with their axes, if his occupation as a suttler had not given him an opportunity to know it.

These palpable contradictions betwixt the evidence this man has given to the Committee, and what he has declared to the Court, will, I hope, put a stop to all ex parte enquiries for the future; in which case, I shall the less regret the injuries I have myself sustained from them. But the Committee go on, and say, in further support of the charge, "that from the orderly book it appears the fatigue party was decreased, and continued so at a time when it ought to have been abundantly increased." It is true the parties furnished by the daily details were decreased; but I have proven, by a cloud of witnesses, that circumstance notwithstand­ing, that the fatigue parties were abundantly increased, and continued so; nay, that almost my whole army were constantly employed in repairing the old and constituting new works; and that, so far from being guilty of a neglect of duty, amounting to a breach of orders, in that respect, I did every thing in my power to put the posts in a proper posture of defence.

The second charge is cowardice, treachery, and incapacity as a General, directed to be tried upon the 5th article of the 18th section of the Rules and Articles of War, and founded on the fourth remark of the Committee.

By Mr. Leavenworth's testimony again are these horrid accusations to be supported; not in a direct man­ner, but by inference and deduction from that part of it, which the Committee in the above remark say he gave them▪ viz. "that the enemy were not annoyed in the advance to, and investiture of, the posts;" but which he, in part, has contradicted here, as I observed before, and which, by Colonel Stevens, General [Page 45] Wilkinson, Colonel Livingston, Major Dunn, and others, I have proven to be false. The inferences of consequence are false likewise, and of course the charges groundless. But I believe it is the first instance where charges of a capital nature have been brought against an officer by deduction, without a shadow of proof to support them; and cowardice and treachery are capital crimes, although the Committee have directed them to be tried by an Article of War to which no capital crime whatever can be referred, having been expresly provided for crimes not capital. I wave, however, any advantage that might be taken of this. My reputa­tion, or my safety, shall never depend upon the blunders of any sett of men who may think proper to accuse me; but, when proof is wanting, candour will never attribute actions to the worst cause from which they could possibly flow; good-nature will ever ascribe them to the best. Hitherto, however, I have experienced very little of either. But my birth, Sir, my education, my connections, both in this country and in Britain, my station in life, my children (if to these had not been added the habitudes of early life) as they were the best pledges, so they should have secured me from the imputation of those most shameful vices, from which the meanest of the people are generally free. But my reputation rests not on that bottom. I am happy in the general good opinion of the army, which is never bestowed upon cowards, nor has all the calumny that I have been loaded with shaken me a single friend. The Court have the fullest evidence, that on every occa­sion I have given demonstrations of an active, as well as passive, courage; my conduct in that respect has been uniform on all occasions; and this is confirmed by the concurring testimony of many of the principal officers of the army, with some of whom I have been, personally, in almost every action that has happened during the war. From thence they must conclude, that, whatever might have been the motives for my evacuating Ticonderoga, it could not have been owing to cowardice, and chat the charge is false, malicious and scandalous.

Treachery, Sir, is a crime it is impossible to prove, positively, not to have been committed. It is there­fore necessary, in order to fix it, that some actual commission should be proven; but as this has not been attempted, it is enough alone to overthrow the charge. But I beg leave to inform the Court, that when Congress appointed me to the command of a regiment, I considered it as the call of my country, that could admit of no refusal. I reflected that some knowledge acquired by study, and the service of the whole last war (during which I was in almost every siege and every action of consequence) put me in a situation to be of some use to our army in its infant state. My country, I thought, had a right to my services, and to every advantage that could be derived from my experience. I therefore, without hesitation, resigned an honourable and profitable employment I then held under the crown, to qualify myself for that offered to me by Congress, notwithstanding it was not of one half the yearly value. I quitted die sweets of a retirement I was fond of, the pleasures of domestic life, and the care of the education, and provision for a rising family, (both of which claimed my closest attention) for the toils, the hardships, and the extraordinary expences of war. Had this the appearance of treachery? And yet, for these, I have met with the ungracious return of those cruel accusations, though, surely, they were not the natural returns to such a conduct. What farther promotion Congress were pleased to confer upon me was totally unsolicited. I received it with gratitude, determined that my actions should be the best proof of the sense I had of the honour they had done me; nor have I been therein disappointed. My country now reaps the solid advantages of my conduct, whilst I am loaded with obloquy and abuse. I forgive it, however, but I can never forget that the channels of justice have been shut against me, and that for thirteen long, long months, I have been hung up to be stung by the envenomed tongue of malice, and pointed at by the finger of folly. But the sentence of this Court will, I trust, place me once more in that honourable point of view, from which I have not deserved to be removed, having been careful to observe that maxim of Horace, Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.

How incapacity came to be a crime, unless in those who made the appointments (for I must repeat it, no office I have ever held, or now hold, under Congress, was ever solicited by me) or by what Article of War it is triable, I own I do not know. But this charge, with the others, has been made upon a supposition that I did not do every thing in my power to oppose the operations of the enemy in their advance against, and in­vestiture of, the posts in my charge; but it is in full proof to the Court that every thing was done, which pru­dence dictated, and circumstances would allow. It follows, that this is equally groundless with the others.

The third charge is treachery again, under the same Article of War, to which, at I observed before, it can­not be referred, and grounded upon the fifth remark of the Committee, which is, "that as it had been deter­mined in a Council of War on the 20th of June, that the repairing the old and adding new works on Mount Independence claimed immediate attention, and Jesse Leavenworth swears not a stroke was struck for these purposes; and by the orderly book it appears the fatigue party was decreased in number, and so continued, at a time when it should have been abundantly increased, I am liable to be charged with treachery." I have already so fully refuted these matters in the charge for neglect, of duty, which is founded on the same allega­tions, that I think it unnecessary to take up the time of the Court with a repetition of the same arguments. But as it may, perhaps, appear odd, that the number of men actually employed on these duties differs so widely from the orderly book, I will here, once for all, account for it. I never approved of putting all orders into the book. Accidents frequently happen to the copies; deserters carry them off to the enemy, who thereby become perfectly acquainted with every thing you are doing; to prevent which, as our works were so very incompleat, a great many of my orders were verbal. Yet I dare say, had the Committee attended to it, they would have found in the orderly book frequent orders for whole brigades (besides the daily details) to parade at certain hours, and take their orders from their respective Brigadiers; and had they called upon any officer of the army, they would have been informed these brigades were sent upon fatigue, repairing the old and constructing new works, which has been proven to the Court in the fullest manner.

The fourth charge is, inattention to the progress of the enemy, treachery, and incapacity as a General again, founded on the seventh remark of the Committee; which is, "that as General St. Clair informed the Honourable Mr. Jay, that, at the time of holding the Council of War on the 5th of July, he knew it to be impossible to defend the posts with his numbers, it is natural to conclude he was decided upon this point as early as the 29th of June, the day that he sent his son and private effects from Ticonderoga to Fort George, as a place of safety. That, being decided upon this point, it was his duty then to have taken as effectual measures for the preservation of the public property, at least equally with his own, claiming his earliest atten­tion. [Page 46] That on the 30th of June, the enemy being advanced to Three Mile Point, it is incredible that he did not then know they were in force. That it was his duty, at that point of time, to have finally determined to abide the operations of the enemy, or to retire. That if the last resolution was taken, and, from the sending off his son and baggage the day before, there is the strongest presumption that this resolution was then fully taken, it was his duty then to have proceeded to have sent off the public stores, to destroy the works, and to evacuate the posts without losing a moment of time; and that by deferring to retire till the last moment when he could possibly retreat even with his effective troops, a moment when the sick, ammunition, cannon, provision and cloathing of the army must be lost, besides the lives of many men in effecting a retreat from before an enemy immediately upon him, he appears to be chargeable with inattention to the progress of the enemy, with treachery, or with incapacity as a General." They appear to be again uncertain upon which charge to fix; but, to make sure work of it, direct, as in the former case, that I be prosecuted for each, and upon the beforementioned Article of War, which certainly cannot be applied to treachery. Bnt let us exa­mine what all this amounts to. The Committee say that because I wrote to Mr. Jay, that on the 5th of July I knew it to be impossible to defend the posts with my numbers, it is natural to conclude that I knew it to be impossible to defend them with my numbers so early as the 29th of June; for that they must mean (if they mean any thing) by being "decided upon this point." But this is by no means the natural conclusion; the natural and candid conclusion is, that circumstances might have changed betwixt these periods, and matters have come to my knowledge on or before the 5th of July, of which I was ignorant on the 29th of June, and which would fully justify a change of measures. But the reason they conclude in that manner is, that on that day I sent my son and private effects to Fort George, as a place of safety; and this, I find by a former part of their report, is also the information of Mr. Leavenworth upon oath. Now it happens that, although I sent my son on that day to Fort George, I sent no part of my baggage there then, or at any other time; and this very respectable witness, Mr. Leavenworth himself, swears that I did not, to his knowledge. The account he has given of Head-Quarters being stripped, as he calls it, is so absurd, that was there no other testimony to disprove it, it would destroy itself. But his testimony before the Court contradicts, in almost every in­stance, that the Committee say he has given to them. My son was a boy betwixt eleven and twelve years of age, who, on the information I have mentioned to have received from the President of Congress, that there was no probability of an active campaign▪ I had taken with me, that I might superintend his education. He remained with me at Ticonderoga until matters wore a gloomy aspect, and was then sent to Fort George, on his way to Albany, where he was put to school. In case of an attack, he would naturally have distressed me, and divided my attention; and this is the dreadful affair of sending my son, that has been so often repeat­ed, and upon which so many base ungenerous comments have been made. I have proven beyond the possibi­lity of a doubt, that I never sent away six-pence worth of my private effects, and that I took the most effectual measures for the preservation of the public property, great part of which was brought off, whilst my own was left a prey to the enemy. But it seems it is incredible that the enemy should be at the Three Mile Point, where some of their vessels arrived on the 30th of June, and that I should not then know whether they were in force or not. The Committee have again forgot that the enemy were water-borne, and that at this time they had not debarked. Had that occurred to them, they would not have thought the matter so very incredible. I believe they would have thought it very probable. But they seem to have viewed one side of the picture only. I have proven to the Court, that from the number of savages, who kept my parties at a distance from the shores of the Lake, it was impossible to obtain any satisfactory account of the enemy's numbers until they were landed, which they began to be on the 30th of June, and with so much caution, as appears by my letter of that date to Gen. Schuyler, that I had very good reason to conclude they were not in force, and to exult in that consideration too, hoping for an opportunity not only to have served my country, but in some measure to have filled the expectations I knew the public had formed from me. The resolution to retire was therefore not "then fully taken." But what idea of military movements must these gentlemen have? who conclude that an enemy at three miles distance is not immediately upon you, or who imagine that works may be destroyed, and stores, ammunition and cannon, &c. removed, under the eye of a superior and collected force. Sir, had a retreat been attempted upon the enemy's landing at Three Mile Point, and the steps pursued which the Com­mittee have enumerated above, it is impossible, in the nature of things, but the army must have been cut off, or fallen prisoners into their hands. But, by our putting a good face upon the matter, and shewing a determination to hold both posts, they were induced to divide their force, in order to invest us and reduce us by the more slow, but certain, method of regular approach; not that this method was necessary to them, for they might most certainly have carried us by assault at any time: But assaults are frequently very bloody things! and on that circumstance I chiefly depended for rendering my small garrison serviceable to their country. I was in hopes the enemy would assault us, and some accounts that I had, that they were short of provisions, gave me some reason to expect it. I depended upon my troops—I was perswaded they were brave, and I believe they too had confidence in me. Every order and every advice I gave them pointed directly to that object— and I still believe that, had they attempted it, we should have given so good an account of them, that the conquest of Ticonderoga would have terminated the operations of that campaign—but conquered it would have been, after all our exertions. Every letter I have wrote holds up the same idea, and I always speak of an attack as contra-distinguished from a siege; and the character of the General I was opposed to gave me reason to expect something by assault or surprize. I mentioned to Congress, so early as the 25th of June, the great deficiencies in troops and provision, and the probability of my being obliged from these circum­stances to evacuate. The moment I was informed, with any tolerable degree of certainty, of their numbers, which I was not until the 3d of July from a prisoner and some deserters (their information was confirmed by a spy I sent into their camp the 3d and returned the 5th) and saw that they meant a regular siege, I was certain the defending the posts effectually was impossible. The moment, however, which I chose for the re­treat, as it was the only one was ever in my power to chuse, so it was almost the only one after the enemy's landing at Three Mile Point in which the retreat could have been effected. I have fully proven that the sick were not left behind nor lost, that great part of the cannon, all the ammunition, the baggage and tents of the army, the hospital stores and part of the provision, were removed from Ticonderoga—as much as could at once have been removed at any prior time. Every boat was loaded. I think I have proven it to have been ne­cessary [Page 47] and well conducted, and that the confusion, occasioned principally by the burning of General Fermoy's house, and his not circulating the orders to his brigade in proper time, was soon remedied.—I beg the Court to reflect one moment upon what was to be done, and now short the time to do it in!—for, though the evacuation was resolved on about three o'clock in the afternoon, we could not begin to carry it into execution until night came on, the enemy being in possession of a high hill on the opposite side of the Lake, from whence they could see our every movement,—that it was the season when the nights are at the very shortest, and that it was moreover moon-light,—and that the necessity of keeping the matter a secret, until the very mo­ment of evacuation, prevented any preparatory steps being taken to expedite the business, and they will be of the opinion that more was never done, caeteris paribus, in equal time; and if, in the different embarkations, some irregularities did happen, when every circumstance is taken in—the suddenness of the thing—the dis­position every man would naturally have to save perhaps his little all—the confusion the night alone is apt to occasion—the distance every thing had to be carried, and their variety, the candid mind will be more apt to wonder that any order could be preserved, than that some irregularities supervened. On this occasion it would be great injustice not to acknowledge, that the officers were in general diligent and attentive, and the men silent and obedient to a wonder; the continental troops I mean; for the militia, Bellows's and Robe­son's regiments excepted, held a very different conduct. Colonel Bellows exerted himself greatly in removing the cannon from the lines and embarking them, which he effected, notwithstanding some difficulties that, I have since heard, were thrown in his way by an officer of the artillery. I was in a very particular manner obliged to General Poor, Colonel Long, Colonel Hay, and Colonel Stevens, to whose pains and assiduity it was chiefly owing that so much of the public property was taken off. It is true, however, the greatest part of it fell afterwards into the enemy's hands at Skeensborough, but not from any fault of mine. That was the only place to which they could have been removed; and had not my march been delayed, as has been shewn, by Colonel Warner's unfortunately taking upon himself to judge of and disobey his orders, I should have arrived at Skeensborough time enough to have protected the stores, and probably to have cut off that party of the enemy which pursued them. I agree perfectly with the Committee, that the posts, as the proper number of men for their defence were not sent to them, should have been evacuated earlier. But I did my duty. I apprized both Congress and General Schuyler of my situation, and the probable consequences; and from one or other of them, if it was thought proper to evacuate the posts, my orders were to come▪ From these circumstances, it appears that I have not been guilty of treachery or incapacity. But it is truly surpriz­ing that gentlemen, who had the perusal of my letters to General Schuyler, should have alledged inattention to the progress of the enemy, as in every one of them, viz. those of the 13th, 18th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 28th and 30th of June, and 1st, 2d and 3d of July, I make particular mention of their progress, and the steps taken to obtain a knowledge of it.

The fifth and last charge is, "Shamefully abandoning the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in my charge," and this is directed to be founded upon the seventh remark, which has just been under con­sideration. The punishment of this crime, Sir, is death, without alternative. No presumptive evidence, therefore, can be admitted, no construction can be allowed, to fix it; but the fact must be proven in the clearest and most positive manner. But in the remark of the Committee referred to, I do not find a single circumstance that relates to it, except a loose assertion, for which I am bold to say they had no warrant either from reason or evidence. It is this: "Nor can the proving, as General St. Clair wishes to do, that the works of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were too extensive, and that the troops were very badly armed, if such things can be proved, fail of placing General St. Clair in a more reprehensible point of view; as, the weakness of his defence being more obvious, his retreat should have been earlier determined upon and made." I have proven by General Gates, General Schuyler, General Poor, and Colonels Baldwin and Koseiuszko, the engineers, and a number of other witnesses, that the works were much too extensive for my numbers; by General Gates, that the numbers were not one fourth of what he demanded, and Congress had voted, at a time he did not expect the enemy would have come on with 10 or 11,000 men, and not much more than a fifth of what he would have demanded in that case, exclusive of the militia, which he had powers to call for, in any number he thought proper; by General Schuyler and General Poor, that they would at least have demanded 10,000 good troops; by Major Hull's certificate, and the returns of arms from the offi­cers commanding regiments, that many of the men were very badly armed. And, with the Committee's good leave, although the weakness of my defence was certainly from these circumstances the more obvious, yet, as proper notice thereof was in due time given both to Congress and General Schuyler, neither of whom gave any directions about the matter, and I had no power of myself to order the evacuation until the last extremity, I cannot thereby be placed in a point of view reprehensible in any degree whatsoever. As the proof here fails entirely, the charge must fail with it. But, Sir, the posts were not shamefully abandoned. The retreat was undertaken upon the justest principles, and, I hope the Court will bear with me when I say, upon the most honourable and ingenuous motives; the measures to effect it were taken with judgment; the orders were pertinent and clear; and the whole, notwithstanding some cross accidents, which it was not pos­sible to foresee, was conducted with a degree of art, that reflects some credit upon both the General and the troops. I need not tell this honourable Court that a retreat, with an inferior army, from before a superior one, is perhaps the mo [...] delicate and dangerous undertaking in the whole circle of military operations, and that it never will be effected without prudence, fortitude and secrecy. I hope I have satisfied the Court, that I could not order the evacuation until the last moment, when I saw no alternative betwixt that and the certain loss of the army. I think I have proven that that moment was arrived, as one day more would probably have compleated the investment of the posts, and then it would have been impossible. I have proven that my motive was not to avoid the enemy, but to save the army, and by removing them to a place where rein­forcements could reach them, to make them serve as the basis of a force sufficient to cover the country, and check the progress of the enemy; and this I did with the certainty of a loss of reputation, a price few people are willing to [...] for the prosperity of their country! I indeed expected it would be a temporary loss of reputation only, nor will it be more, though it has already been of much longer duration than I looked for; and I fear the [...] long delaying to afford me an opportunity to vindicate my character, is not very likely to induce others who may happen in like circumstances to make a similar sacrifice. My letter to Congress. [Page 48] of the 14th of July, proves, that I foresaw the events that would probably happen, and which must have had some effect upon my determinations.

Indeed, from the knowledge I had of the country through which General Burgoyne had to advance,—the difficulties I knew he would be put to [...]o subsist his army,—and the contempt he would naturally have for an enemy, whose retreat I concluded he would ascribe to fear, I made no doubt but he would soon be so far en­gaged, as that it would be difficult for him either to advance or retreat. The event justified my conjecture, but attended with consequences beyond my most sanguine expectations. A fatal blow given to the power and insolence of Great-Britain, a whole army prisoners, and the reputation of the arms of America high in every civilized part of the world! But what would have been the consequences had not that step been taken, and my army had been cut to pieces or made prisoners? Disgrace would have been brought upon our arms and our counsels,—fear and dismay would have seized upon the inhabitants, from the false opinion that had been formed of the strength of these posts,—wringing grief and moping melancholy would have filled the now chearful habitations of those whose dearest connections were in that army,—and a lawless host of russians, set loose from every social tie, would have roam'd at liberty through the defenceless country, whilst bands of sa­vages would have carried havoc, devastation and terror before them! Great part of the state of New-York must have submitted to the conqueror, and in it he would have found the means to enable him to prosecute his success. He would have been able effectually to have co-operated with General Howe, and would proba­bly have soon been in the same country with him—that country, where our illustrious General, with an infe­rior force, made so glorious a stand, but who must have been obliged to retire if both armies came upon him at once, or he might have been forced, perhaps, to a general and decisive action in unfavourable circum­stances, whereby the hopes, the now well-founded hopes of America, of liberty, peace and safety, might have been cut off for ever. Every consideration serves to prove the propriety of the retreat, that I could not undertake it sooner, and that had it been delayed longer it had been delayed too long. But it may justly be matter of wonder why Congress, who, so early as the twenty-ninth of April, declared their opinion, as appears by the resolve of that date, which has been read, that unless certain measures were pursued by the eastern states for compleating and forwarding without delay the troops ordered for that service, the important posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence must inevitably be lost, and who must have known from the returns, if it can be supposed they knew through no other channel, that no such, measures had been pursued, nor even any taken to replace the corps of militia whose times of service had expired, and had left the posts, it may be justly matter of wonder, I say, that they should not have ordered the evacuation, in proper time to have saved every article of public property. It has been proved that my numbers were greatly inadequate to the defence of the posts. But I must acknowledge a mistake I made with respect to these numbers. At the Council of War held on the 5th of July, I stated them at 2089 rank and file, fit for duty; to which should have been added 457 of those returned on command, and who were within the garrison, which brings them up to 2546. I took the account from the general return, and did not recollect that the regiments had a custom of returning men on particular duties in camp as on command, nor was this noted at the foot of die general return. It was a mistake, but not such a one as would have made any alter­ation, had it not happened. It has been proven by General Schuyler, that, had the garrison held out, he could not have raised the siege, as he had not been able to collect a sufficient force, and that, if a sufficient force had been collected, the siege could not have been raised for want of ball. But, had the posts been eva­cuated sooner, I am perswaded there would have no little been said about the vast numbers of militia that would have come to my assistance, had the posts been held longer; and these reports would have been be­lieved, and added no little to the opprobrium under which I should have lain. I am, however, of the same opinion with my late worthy friend Mr. Livingston, then a Member of Congress, who used to say—that, had I left Ticonderoga one week sooner, I should certainly have been hanged, and probably without the ceremony of a court-martial. But, Sir, if it is shameful for an inferior army to retreat before a superior one, we must begin and unlearn what we have been spending years in reading to acquire; and history, instead of being a faithful guide to the unexperienced, has been hanging out false lights for many centuries, to mislead the unwary traveller. According to this doctrine, some of the most famous actions of antiquity, and which we have been taught to consider as master-pieces of skill, were shameful retreats, and founded in cowardice, treachery or incapacity. The famous retreat of Brafidas, with his Lacedemonians—the retreat of the Con­sul Attilius Colatinus, amongst the Romans—Marshal Banier, amongst the Sweedes—Marshal Belleisle, amongst the French—and, to add to the catalogue one of our times, that of his Excellency General Wash­ington from New-York—were all shamefully abandoning posts. But impartial posterity, as it formed a better judgment of those, so will it also do of that; and whilst the candid historian dwells with rapture upon the many shining events that have been produced by that distinguished Chief, he will point to that retreat, as the beginning of a system that has ensured the Liberties of [...]

I have now got through the main body of the charges, but there are still some light parties of Commis­saries and others, intended to act, I suppose, as irregulars, with whom there must be some skirmishing; for though their testimony has not the least connection with any of the charges, it has taken up the time of the Court, and makes a considerable figure in the proceedings. The provision returns I suppose are meant, in­directly, to strengthen the charges or to create a suspicion of carelessness or waste in that article.

I have admitted Mr. Yancey's return of the 20th of June, which states that there was on hand at Ticon­deroga and its dependencies at that time 2015 barrels of flour, 195 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork; on which the Committee, having taken an estimate of Mr. Avery's (which states that 1400 barrels of [Page 49] flour, and 661 barrels of beef, would afford sufficient provision in flour for 4000 men for 66 days, and in beef for 75) for a foundation conclude, that there did on the 4th of July remain, or ought to be, if provisions had been properly and regularly issued, then remaining, 1625 barrels of flour, 3 barrels of beef, and 784 barrels of pork; which, they say, was a magazine sufficient to afford full allowance of provision to 5659 men of all ranks for 52 days in flour, and 32 days in beef and pork.

But Mr. Avery's statement is egregiously wrong; 1400 barrels of flour, averaging them at 200 lbs. and 651 barrels of beef, averaging them at 212 lbs. supposing the ration to be a pound of each, will afford 4000 rations of flour for 70 days, and of beef for 35 days only. But in 4000 men there will be 322 officers (I have taken the proportionate number of officers to the troops at Ticonderoga as the foundation) who, on an average, are entitled to draw three rations, and consequently for 4000 men, who have that proportion of officers, 4644 rations must be issued daily, which the stock above-mentioned would afford no longer than 60 days of flour, and 30 days of meat.

But the ration at Ticonderoga was a pound and a half of flour, and a pound of flesh (beef or pork) the addition having been made in lieu of vegetables and other articles, to which the soldier was entitled, but which the Commissary could not furnish. This Mr. Avery must have been acquainted with, and should have taken into the account; and this reduces the magazine to 40 days flour instead of 66, and 30 days meat in­stead of 75. As these are matters in which there is not the least intricacy, depending upon the most simple calculation, the Committee should certainly have satisfied themselves Mr. Avery's estimate was right, before they adopted it as a principle: As the principle is false, all the superstructure they have raised upon it falls to the ground. But the quantity is still over-rated; for it is certain, that in the division and distribution of provision they suffer considerable waste.—I believe an allowance of five per cent. is made to the Commissaries on that account, therefore five per cent. is to be deducted from the whole quantity, viz.

4644, the number of rations issued daily, the quotient is 37 days flour, and 28 days meat nearly. In this manner Mr. Avery's estimate ought to have been made, and it was imposing upon the public, and the officers who commanded at these posts, to make it otherwise.

But the Committee go on, and in their sixth remark, still taking Mr. Avery's estimate for a ground-work, say that, supposing the number of men to have averaged 4739 from the 20th of June to the 4th of July, there ought to have remained of the quantity returned as on hand by Mr. Yancey on the 20th of June, provision at full allowance, for men of all ranks, for 52 days in flour, and 32 in beef and pork, when the garrison was increased to 5639. Let us see what light a little arithmetic will throw upon this matter.

These sums, as appears by the operation, divided by 5639, the supposed number of men, leaves flour for 49 days nearly, and meat for 24 days nearly; so that the calculation is all wrong here likewise; but let us examine what it ought to be.

and the above quantities of flour and beef, divided by 7000 for the beef, and 10,500 for the flour (one half must be added for the half-pound) leaves of flour for twenty-nine days, and of beef for nineteen nearly; an ample provision for a siege! Neither is this calculation made upon a liberal plan, with respect to Ticonderoga, but a very narrow one, indeed a very narrow one any where, as neither the hospital, the sailors, the batteau-men, or any followers of the army are taken into the account; nor any notice taken of the inhabitants who [Page 50] had been driven from their houses, and were necessarily furnished with provisions at that post, to enable them to reach the inhabited parts of the country; neither is there any notice taken of the real weight of the barrels, which, from the manner of packing them, fall greatly short, both flour and meat, of what I have calculated upon. I have proved by General Schuyler that the barrels of meat are generally about 170 pounds, which would reduce that article to about ten days provision. I have never pretended, for all this, that the want of provision obliged me to evacuate the posts, but the low state of the magazines, and the little prospect which it has been proven I had of an effectual supply, prevented me from calling in the militia: The Court will judge if it would not have been madness to have done it in these circumstances, and they will please to recol­lect that it is in proof, that although some provision was forwarded from Fort George after the 20th of June, the greatest part of it was sent back, the enemy having cut off the communication betwixt Ticonderoga and the landing previous to its arrival. I grant that an officer commanding at a post is in some measure responsi­ble for the expenditure of the provision; and I am bold to say, that during my command, as far as it depend­ed upon me, provision was issued with great [...]conomy.

Mr. Avery says that he did not know what quantity of provision was on hand at Ticonderoga on the 13th of June, the time I took the command there, but that on the 15th or 16th of June I wrote to him that there was provision at the posts for seven weeks. From his manner of mentioning this, one would imagine I had wrote merely for his information, and all was well; but the fact is, and he has owned it, though with apparent reluctance, that the design of my letter to him was, to complain of the small quantity of provision, and press a further supply in a decent, at the same time the strongest manner, by putting him in mind of the ill con­sequences to himself that might attend a failure. This letter he never thought proper to answer, or give me the least satisfaction whether I might expect supplies or not. It has been proven that the magazine at Albany was empty, and part of the provision that had been forwarded to Still Water, on its way to Ticonderoga, was carried back for the supply of that post. Upon my way from Albany to Ticonderoga I found the ma­gazine at Fort Edward in the same case, and the provision that had been forwarded from thence to Fort George bringing back to supply the troops at that post; as appears by my letter to General Schuyler of the 10th of June, from Fort George. Mr. Yancey indeed says, he had heard of salt provision having been sent from Bennington to St. Coak, but is ignorant of the quantity, but does not pretend to say there was any magazine from which the posts at Ticonderoga could have been supplied. That very provision sent from Still Water to Albany was part of that which came from Bennington; but why should I multiply words, Mr. Avery acknowledges he was deceived by the people he had employed to purchase provision, "they did not collect the quantity he expected." It is true, some cattle arrived at Ticonderoga the day before the evacuation, I believe about forty,—they arrived too late to be of any use in the garrison, but they were of great use on the retreat.

I have said the ration at Ticonderoga was a pound and a half of bread and a pound of beef or pork, but I am not able to prove it. The march of a part of the army has deprived me of several witnesses I intended to have examined. I know it, however, to have been the case. The Commissaries whose business it was to be perfectly acquainted with what was issued as a ration, know nothing about the matter, neither Principal nor Deputy. Mr. Avery knows nothing about it, for he was at Albany; Mr. Yancey knows nothing about it, for he was purchasing cattle; and Mr. Boyer, the Issuing Commissary on the ground, is not certain what it was: He says, he believes it to have been a pound of bread and a pound of beef, or three-quarters of a pound of pork. He acknowledges the men did not receive the other component parts of a ration. They got briefs for them. He likewise acknowledges, that during the time he was at the post the same quantity of bread and meat war issued as a ration, that had been customary before and at the time he came into office. Now it is certain that a pound of bread and a pound of beef, or three-quarters of a pound of pork, is not a sufficient allowance for a soldier, especially when, as was the case at Ticonderoga, he is kept constantly to hard labour; his brief he cannot eat; and it is also certain that the Commissaries did not furnish them with vegetables and the other small articles; it is therefore probable that the quantity of bread and meat was in­creased. But in June, 1776, in Canada, General Sullivan ordered that, where milk could not be procured, the troops should have a pound and a half of beef or eighteen ounces of pork per diem, besides molasses, rice, Indian meal and pease; and this continued to be the allowance in meat until some time after General Gates took the command, who altered it from a pound and a half of beef, or eighteen ounces of pork, to a pound of either, and added half a pound to the quantity of bread; and this alteration was induced, chiefly, by the prevalence of bilious complaints, which it was expected lessening the quantity of animal and increasing the quantity of vegetable food would help to abate: That continued to be the ration at these posts until the evacuation, some temporary alterations excepted, when the troops were supplied with vegetables. And this reasoning is confirmed by General Wayne's orderly book, by which it appears, that on the 30th of December he reduced the quantity of flour to one pound and a quarter, and of meat to one pound, vegetables being then issued by the Commissary, agreeable to the resolve of Congress of the 28th of December, 1776; and, doubtless, when these were expended, the ration returned to its former standard.

The attention of the Court has been a good deal taken up with a quantity of tallow that was in the posses­sion of Mr. Leavenworth. He says, I think, that he informed me of it on the 26th of June, and it may be that he did so; but as I knew Leavenworth to be a private person, and as I had no official account of any tallow, I concluded it was altogether a private affair, some money-making job betwixt him and the Commis­sary. Reflecting, however, on the quantity, which was surprizingly great, 34,345 pounds, and finding it was public property, I determined to have sent it to Fort George by the first opportunity; but before any op­portunity offered, that communication was cut off. Mr. Yancey acknowledges he had never made any return of this tallow, tho' it must have been great part of a year on hand. If he had, I should not have suffered it to remain there; tho' it might perhaps have been worked up at that place more to his profit, had he been allowed to employ soldiers, which seems to have been his expectation. As he never did make any return of it, and the only account I ever had was from a private person, a very short time before the communication with Fort George was stopped, the loss of it is justly chargeable to his negligence, and he ought to be re­sponsible for it.

The second remark of the Committee is a misrepresentation of my letter to General Schuyler of the 24th of June. They say I was on that day informed by my scouts that the enemy were very numerous, and on the next wrote to Congress that I was not able to discover whether the enemy were in force or not. Let the letter speak for itself. "Serjeant Heath, who I sent down the Lake to make discoveries, returned last night, and informs me that, from a place near the mouth of Otter-Creek, he descried an encampment of the enemy on both sides of Gilliland's Creek; that, from the appearance and the extent, he thinks it must contain a great body of men; and that a great many smokes arose at a distance back, which he supposes was from the en­campments of the Indians;" and again, "that one of the inhabitants, in whom he could place confidence, informed him the Indians were very numerous;" and in another place, "that another inhabitant informed him, that some of the enemy's troops had said their whole army was there," that is, at Gilliland's Creek. Now, Sir, is there any thing in all this like positive intelligence that the enemy were very numerous? No, Sir, there is not. The encampment was seen from a very considerable distance, across the Lake, and the serjeant thinks that, from the appearance of it, it might contain a great body of men. An inhabitant, indeed, told him the Indians were very numerous. Four or five hundred, Sir, is a large body of Indians, and what the inhabitants any where would call very numerous, but ten times that number is not a great body of troops; and for aught I knew, and had reason to believe, the whole of their army left in Canada did not amount to that number. There was therefore no inconsistency in my writing to Congress on the 25th of June, that I was not able to discover whether the enemy were in force or not, notwithstanding the information I received by my scouts on the 24th. But, in the same letter, I gave General Schuyler my reasons for not believing that there was a great body of men in that encampment (of which the Committee do not think proper to take any notice) viz. that it was improbable the enemy would waste their time at such a distance from the object against which they were to act, in a country that afforded them nothing (the inhabitants had all left that side of the Lake the year before) and they had been there four or five days; and I thought the ground, on which Heath described the encampment to be, incapable of containing a great number of men. There­fore it was more probable that it was a party only sent to amuse, and to give confidence to the savages. Had I given Congress other information than I did on the 25th of June, it had been a falshood.

I have now got through the whole of this matter, and it clearly appears there is not the smallest foun­dation for all, or any of the charges against me.—On the contrary, it has been proven beyond the possibility of a doubt, that I did every thing which my duty required, and that circumstances would allow. I have therefore good reason to expect the decision of this Court in my favour. Yet I still shall have it to regret, that the accusations have spread far and wide, and been greedily swallowed for truth, whilst few, comparatively very few, will ever hear of the honourable acquittal.

If in the course of this business I have appeared with confidence, I hope I have not with arrogance; and though I have examined the report of the Committee of Congress with freedom, I have not forgot to do it with decency. No man can have a higher sense than I have of the respect in which Congress ought to be held; but a dignified conduct can alone secure respect to any man, or body of men. That conduct this Congress will, no doubt, ever preserve. But should some future Congress depart from the great business of watching over the affair of a whole continent, to hunt down an individual—should factions arise amongst them, and local interests take place of the general interest—should their time be wasted in frivolous and end­less disputes, where the object is a mere boyish desire of victory, whilst the public service stands still, and its honest servants tired out with tedious and expensive waiting—and should they create offices with great salaries, where those who hold them may rob the public at their pleasure, without a possibility of detection, and cabal amongst themselves for the disposal of them—and should they pass resolves, ridiculous in them­selves and impossible to be carried into execution—then will Congress sink into contempt, nor will all the importance they may endeavour to assume, nor the fastidious pomp they may display, support them, and then will the misfortunes of America begin.

The Court adjourn without day.