IF I was equal to the task of form­ing a plan for the government of a colony, I should be flattered with your request, and very happy to com­ply with it; because as the divine sci­ence of politicks is the science of so­cial happiness, and the blessings of so­ciety depend entirely on the constitu­tions of government, which are gene­rally institutions that last for many generations, there can be no employ­ment more agreeable to a benevolent mind, than a research after the best.

[Page 4]POPE flattered tyrants too much when he said

Nothing can be more fallacious than this: But poets read history to collect flowers not fruits—they attend to fan­ciful images, not the effects of social institutions. Nothing is more certain from the history of nations, and the nature of man, than that some forms of government are better fitted for being well administered than others.

WE ought to consider, what is the end of government, before we deter­mine which is the best form.—Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree, that the happiness of society is the end of government, as all Divines [Page 5] and moral Philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow, that the form of govern­ment, which communicates ease, com­fort, security, or in one word happi­ness to the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best.

ALL sober enquirers after truth, an­cient and modern, Pagan and Christ­ian, have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroaster, Socra­tes, Mahomet, not to mention autho­rities really sacred, have agreed in this.

IF there is a form of government then, whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to [Page 6] promote the general happiness than any other form?

FEAR is the foundation of most go­vernments; but is so sordid and brutal a passion, and renders men, in whose breasts it predominates, so stupid, and miserable, that Americans will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it.

HONOUR is truly sacred, but holds a lower rank in the scale of moral ex­cellence than virtue.—Indeed the for­mer is but a part of the latter, and consequently has not equal pretensions to support a frame of government pro­ductive of human happiness.

THE foundation of every government is some principle or passion in the minds [Page 7] of the people.—The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature then, have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of government.

A MAN must be indifferent to the sneers of modern Englishmen, to men­tion in their company, the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoad­ley.—No small fortitude is necessary to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years past, has frequently reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any candid mind, that there is no good government but what is Republican. That the only valuable [Page 8] part of the British Constitution is so; because the very definition of a Repub­lic, is "an Empire of Laws, and not of Men." That, as a Republic is the best of governments, so that particular arrangement of the powers of society, or in other words that form of govern­ment, which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of Republics.

OF Republics, there is an inex­haustible variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations.

As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made? In a large society, inhabiting an exten­sive country, it is impossible that the whole should assemble, to make laws: [Page 9] The first necessary step then, is, to depute power from the many, to a few of the most wise and good.—But by what rules shall you choose your Re­presentatives? Agree upon the number and qualifications of persons, who shall have the benefit of choosing, or annex this privilege to the inhabitants of a certain extent of ground.

THE principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assem­bly. It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the in­terest of this Assembly to do strict jus­tice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words [Page 10] equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it.—Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be better made in times of greater tranquility than the present, and they will spring up of themselves naturally, when all the powers of government come to be in the hands of the peoples friends. At present it will be safest to proceed in all established modes to which the people have been familiarised by habit.

A REPRESENTATION of the people in one Assembly being obtained, a question arises whether all the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be left in this body? [Page 11] I think a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whose government is in one Assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follow.

1. A SINGLE Assembly is liable to all the vices, follics and frailties of an in­dividual.—Subject to fits of humour, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and conse­quently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments: And all these errors ought to be corrected and defects sup­plied by some controuling power.

2. A SINGLE Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burthens which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents.

[Page 12]3. A SINGLE Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the long Parlia­ment, but more remarkably of Hol­land, whose Assembly first voted them­selves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a course of years, that all vacancies happening by death, or otherwise, should be filled by them­selves, without any application to con­stituents at all.

4. A REPRESENTATIVE Assembly, altho' extremely well qualified, and ab­solutely necessary as a branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise the ex­ecutive power, for want of two essen­tial properties, secrecy and dispatch.

5. A REPRESENTATIVE Assembly is still less qualified for the judicial [Page 13] power; because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws.

6. BECAUSE a single Assembly, pos­sessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitra­rily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favour.

BUT shall the whole power of legis­lation rest in one Assembly? Most of the foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to be more complex—to which we may add, that if the legislative power is wholly in one Assembly, and the exe­cutive in another, or in a single person, these two powers will oppose and ener­vate upon each other, until the contest shall end in war, and the whole power, [Page 14] legislative and executive, be usurped by the strongest.

THE judicial power, in such case, could not mediate, or hold the balance between the two contending powers, because the legislative would undermine it.—And this shews the necessity too, of giving the executive power a nega­tive upon the legislative, otherwise this will be continually encroaching upon that.

To avoid these dangers let a distant Assembly be constituted, as a mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature, that which represents the people and that which is vested with the executive power.

LET the Representative Assembly then elect by ballot, from among them­selves [Page 15] or their constituents, or both, a distinct Assembly, which for the sake of perspicuity we will call a Council. It may consist of any number you please, say twenty or thirty, and should have a free and independent exercise of its judgment, and consequently a negative voice in the legislature.

THESE two bodies thus constituted, and made integral parts of the legisla­ture, let them unite, and by joint bal­lot choose a Governor, who, after be­ing stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives, should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be made also an integral part of the legislature. This I know is liable to objections, and if you please you may make him only [Page 16] President of the Council, as in Con­necticut: But as the Governor is to be invested with the executive power, with consent of Council, I think he ought to have a negative upon the le­gislative. If he is annually elective, as he ought to be, he will always have so much reverence and affection for the People, their Representatives and Councillors, that although you give him an independent exercise of his judgment, he will seldom use it in opposition to the two Houses, except in cases the public utility of which would be conspicuous, and some such cases would happen.

IN the present exigency of Ameri­can affairs, when, by an act of Parli­ament we are put out of the royal [Page 17] protection, and consequently discharged from our allegiance; and it has be­come necessary to assume government for our immediate security, the Gover­nor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, Attorney­General, should be chosen by joint ballot, of both Houses. And these and all other elections, especially of Re­presentatives and Councillors, should be annual, there not being in the whole circle of the sciences, a maxim more infallible than this, "Where annual elections end, there slavery begins."

THESE great men, in this respect, should be, once a year

This will teach them the great politi­cal virtues of humility, patience, and [Page 18] moderation, without which every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey.

THIS mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very well for the present, but if, by experiment, it should be found inconvenient, the le­gislature may at its leisure devise other methods of creating them, by elections of the people at large, as in Connecti­cut, or it may enlarge the term for which they shall be chosen to seven years, or three years, or for life, or make any other alterations which the society shall find productive of its ease, its safety, its freedom, or in one word, its happiness.

A ROTATION of all offices, as well as of Representatives and Councillors, [Page 19] has many advocates, and is contended for with many plausible arguments. It would be attended no doubt with ma­ny advantages, and if the society has a sufficient number of suitable characters to supply the great number of vacan­cies which would be made by such a rotation, I can see no objection to it, These persons may be allowed to serve for three years, and then be excluded three years, or for any longer or short­er term.

ANY seven or nine of the legislative Council may be made a Quorum, for doing business as a Privy Council, to advise the Governor in the exercise of the executive branch of power, and in all acts of state.

THE Governor should have the com­mand of the militia, and of all your [Page 20] armies. The power of pardons should be with the Governor and Council.

JUDGES, Justices and all other offi­cers, civil and military, should be no­minated and appointed by the Gover­nor, with the advice and consent of Council, unless you choose to have a government more popular; if you do, all officers, civil and military, may be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses, or in order to preserve the independ­ence and importance of each House, by ballot of one House, concurred by the other. Sheriffs should be chosen by the freeholders of counties—so should Registers of Deeds and Clerks of Coun­ties.

ALL officers should have commissi­ons, under the hand of the Governor and seal of the Colony.

[Page 21]THE dignity and stability of govern­ment in all its branches, the morals of the people and every blessing of socie­ty, depends so much upon an upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be dis­tinct from both the legislative and ex­ecutive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that. The Judges therefore should always be men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great pa­tience, calmness, coolness and atten­tion. Their minds should not be dis­tracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or body of men. To these ends they should hold estates for life in their offices, or in other words their com­missions [Page 22] should be during good beha­viour, and their salaries ascertained and established by law. For misbehaviour the grand inquest of the Colony, the House of Representatives, should im­peach them before the Governor and Council, where they should have time and opportunity to make their defence, but if convicted should be removed from their offices, and subjected to such other punishment as shall be thought proper.

A MILITIA LAW requiring all men, or with very few exceptions, besides cases of conscience, to be provided with arms and ammunition, to be trained at certain seasons, and requiring coun­ties, towns, or other small districts to be provided with public stocks of am­munition [Page 23] and entrenching utensils, and with some settled plans for transporting provisions after the militia, when marched to defend their country against sudden invasions, and requiring certain districts to be provided with field pieces, companies of matrosses, and perhaps some regiments of light horse, is al­ways a wise institution, and in the present circumstances of our country indispensible.

LAWS for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so extremely wise and use­ful, that to a humane and generous mind, no expence for this purpose would be thought extravagant.

THE very mention of sumptuary laws will excite a smile. Whether [Page 24] our countrymen have wisdom and vir­tue enough to submit to them I know not. But the happiness of the people might be greatly promoted by them, and a revenue saved sufficient to carry on this war forever. Frugality is a great revenue, besides curing us of vanities, levities and fopperies which are real antidotes to all great, manly and warlike virtues.

BUT must not all commissions run in the name of a King? No. Why may they not as well run thus, "The Colony of (left blank) to A. B. greeting, and be tested by the Governor?

WHY may not writs, instead of run­ning in the name of a King, run thus, "The Colony of (left blank) to the She­riff," &c. and be tested by the Chief Justice.

[Page 25]WHY may not indictments conclude, "against the peace of the Colony of (left blank) and the dignity of the same?"

A CONSTITUTION, founded on these principles, introduces knowledge among the People, and inspires them with a conscious dignity, becoming Freemen. A general emulation takes place, which causes good humour, sociability, good manners, and good morals to be general. That elevation of sentiment, inspired by such a go­vernment, makes the common people brave and enterprizing. That ambi­tion which is inspired by it makes them sober, industrious and frugal. You will find among them some elegance, perhaps, but more solidity; a little pleasure, but a great deal of business— [Page 26] some politeness, but more civility. If you compare such a country with the regions of domination, whether Mo­narchical or Aristocratical, you will fancy yourself in Arcadia or Elisium.

IF the Colonies should assume go­vernments separately, they should be left entirely to their own choice of the forms, and if a Continental Constitu­tion should be formed, it should be a Congress, containing a fair and ade­quate Representation of the Colonies, and its authority should sacredly be confined to these cases, viz. war, trade, disputes between Colony and Colony, the Post-Office, and the unappropria­ted lands of the Crown, as they used to be called.

[Page 27]THESE Colonies, under such forms of government, and in such a union, would be unconquerable by all the Monarchies of Europe.

YOU and I, my dear Friend, have been sent into life, at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to have lived.—How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children.—When! Before the present epocha, had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and hap­piest government that human wisdom can contrive? I hope you will avail yourself and your country of that ex­tensive [Page 28] learning and indefatigable in­dustry which you possess, to assist her in the formations of the happiest go­vernments, and the best character of a great People.—For myself, I must beg you to keep my name out of sight, for this feeble attempt, if it should be known to be mine, would oblige me to apply to myself those lines of the immortal John Milton, in one of his sonnets,