CHAP. I. Government by Laws and Sanctions, why necessary.

IF there be, in any region of the universe, an order of moral agents living in society, whose reason is strong, whose passions and inclinations are mo­derate, and whose dispositions are turned to virtue, to such an order of happy beings, legislation, adminis­tration, and police, with the endlessly various and complicated apparatus of politics, must be in a great measure superfluous. Did reason govern mankind, there would be little occasion for any other govern­ment, either monarchical, aristocratical, democra­tical, or mixed. But man, whom we dignify with the honourable title of Rational, being much more frequently influenced, in his proceedings, by suppos­ed interest, by passion, by sensual appetite, by ca­price, by any thing, by nothing, than by reason; it [Page 2] has, in all civilized ages and countries, been found proper to frame laws and statutes fortified by sanctions, and to establish orders of men invested with authority to execute those laws, and inflict the deserved punish­ments upon the violators of them. By such means only has it been found possible to preserve the general peace and tranquility. But, such is the perverse dis­position of man, the most unruly of all animals, that this most useful institution has been generally de­bauched into an engine of oppression and tyranny over those, whom it was expresly and solely establish­ed to defend. And to such a degree has this evil prevailed, that in almost every age and country, the government has been the principal grievance of the people, as appears too dreadfully manifest, from the bloody and deformed page of history. For what is general history, but a view of the abuses of power committed by those, who have got it into their hands, to the subjugation, and destruction of the human species, to the ruin of the general peace and happi­ness, and turning the Almighty's fair and good world into a butchery of its inhabitants, for the gratification of the unbounded ambition of a few, who, in over­throwing the felicity of their fellow-creatures, have confounded their own?

That government only can be pronounced consistent with the design of all government, which allows to the governed the liberty of doing what, consistently with the general good, they may desire to do, and which only forbids their doing the contrary. Liberty does not exclude restraint; it only excludes unrea­sonable restraint. To determine precisely how far personal liberty is compatible with the general good, and of the propriety of social conduct in all cases, is a matter of great extent, and demands the united wisdom [Page 3] of a whole people. And the consent of the whole people, as far as it can be obtained, is indispensably necessary to every law, by which the whole people are to be bound; else the whole people are enslaved to the one, or the few, who frame the laws for them.

Were a colony to emigrate from their native land, and settle in a new country, on what would they pro­pose to bestow their chief attention? On securing the happiness of the whole? or on the aggrandizement of the governor? If the latter, all mankind would pro­nounce those colonists void of common sense. But in every absolute monarchy, the aggrandizement of the governor is the supreme object; and the happiness of the people is to yield to it. Were only a handful of friends to form themselves into one of those little societies we call clubs; what would be their object? The advantage of the company, or the power of the chair-man?

Very shrewd was Rumbald's saying in Charles II's. time, viz. ‘He did not imagine, the Almighty in­tended, that the greatest part of mankind should come into the world with saddles on their backs, and bridles in their mouths, and a few ready booted and spurred to ride the rest to death^a.’

CHAP. II. The People the Fountain of Authority, the Object of Government, and last Resource.

ALL lawful authority, legislative, and executive, originates from the people. Power in the people is like light in the sun, native, original, inherent, [Page 4] and unlimited by any thing human. In governors, it may be compared to the reflected light of the moon; for it is only borrowed, delegated, and limited by the intention of the people, whose it is, and to whom governors are to consider themselves as responsible, while the people are answerable only to God; them­selves being the losers, if they pursue a false scheme of politics. Of which more hereafter.

As the people are the fountain of power, so are they the object of government, in such manner, that where the people are safe, the ends of government are an­swered, and where the people are sufferers by their governors, those governors have failed of the main design of their institution, and it is of no importance what other ends they may have answered.

As the people are the fountain of power, and object of government, so are they the last resource, when governors betray their trust. And happy is that peo­ple, who have originally so principled their constitu­tion, that they themselves can without violence to it, lay hold of its power, wield it as they please, and turn it, when necessary, against those to whom it was entrusted, and who have exerted it to the prejudice of its original proprietors. Of all which more co­piously hereafter.

Legem majestatis reduxerat, &c. says Tacitus. The antient lex majestatis among the Romans was intended against those who injured the state; and the majesty, in defence of which it was made, was the majesty of the people. But Tiberius perverted that salutary law into a protection for tyrants. So our court-sycophants cry out, on every remonstrance against misgovern­ [...] ‘Treason! The king is betrayed; the nation [...],’ while nobody but themselves has the least [...] of hurting the king, nor of ruining any thing, [...] which, if let alone, will ruin the nation.

CHAP. III. Of Government by Representation.

GOVERNMENT naturally divides itself into legi­slative and executive. No degree of wisdom is more than sufficient for the former. For the latter, nothing but well regulated force is wanted. To compose a system of wise and good laws is the ut­most effort of human sagacity. To carry on the affairs of a nation, in a long-beaten track, requires only common sense and common diligence.

The most natural and simple idea of government is that of the people's assembling together in their own persons, for consulting, debating, enacting laws, and forming regulations, according to which all are to conduct themselves, and by which the general liberty, property and safety are provided for. Accordingly this is the plan of government among the Indians in America, and other simple and uncultivated people; and is described by Caesar, Tacitus, &c. as having been that of the antient Gauls, and Germans.

But such a scheme of government is thought only compatible with a small dominion. In great and po­pulous countries, it being supposed impossible to as­semble together, in a deliberative capacity, the whole body of the people, or even all the men of property, so as to avoid confusion, and to obtain the uncon­strained opinion of a majority, it is thought necessary to have recourse to an adequate and freely elected representation.

It may be said, ‘Why might not (in Britain for instance) the inhabitants of single counties meet to­gether to deliberate on those subjects, which are now debated in parliament, and afterwards communicate [Page 6] the result of their consultation to a grand national assembly?’ The answer is, This would still be go­vernment by representation; because the national assembly must be the elected representatives of the people. Of all which more hereafter.

In planning a government by representation, the people ought to provide against their own annihilation. They ought to establish a regular and constitutional method of acting by and from themselves, without, or even in opposition to their representatives, if necessary. Our ancestors therefore were provident; but not provident enough. They set up parliaments, as a curb on kings and ministers; but they neglected to re­serve to themselves a regular and constitutional method of exerting their power in curbing parliaments, when necessary. Of which I shall have occasion to treat more fully in the sequel.

CHAP. IV. Advantages of parliamentary Government, which have recommended it to many nations.

THERE is no advantage within the reach of a particular people, that may not be obtained by parliamentary goverment in as effectual a manner, as if every inhabitant of the country were to deliberate and vote in person. But this supposes par­liament free from all indirect influence, and to have no interest separate from the general good of the commonwealth.

In a country, like Britain, where a parliament is constitutionally the last resort, and where there lies no regular appeal to the people, the perversion of parlia­ment from its original intention may prove utter ruin, [Page 7] as leaving no constitutional means of redress, and compelling the people to take into their own hands the dangerous work of vindicating their liberties by force; which, in the concusion of jarring parties, may produce anarchy and end in tyranny. Of which more hereafter.

Nothing can be imagined more august than a nu­merous set of wise, free, and honest men sitting in consultation upon the means for securing the happiness of a whole people. Such was that most venerable antient assembly of the Amphictyons, which was the general tribunal of Greece for judging and deciding all controversies among the several states. So great was the respect in which the decisions of that council were held, that their sentences were seldom, or never, disputed, and that grievous wars were often termina­ted by their arbitration. The several states of Greece, in number about twelve, sent each to this grand court one, two, or three delegates, according to their respective importance ^a.

The Panaetolium of the antient Aetolians seems to have been an assembly very much upon the plan of our house of commons. This convention met annually, or oftner, if necessity required. Representatives were sent to this assembly from all quarters, with instruc­tions, from which they were not to deviate. In this Panaetolium resided the whole majesty of the state. In it laws were made and repealed, alliances formed and renounced, peace and war declared, magistrates ap­pointed, particularly the chief commander, for every year, &c ^b.

The antient Achaia was a confederacy of states, like our modern Holland or Swisserland ^c. Each of those [Page 8] little states had its possessions, territories, and boun­daries; each had its senate, or assembly, its magistrates and judges; and every state sent deputies to the gene­ral convention, and had equal weight in all determi­nations ^a. And most of the neighbouring states, which, moved by fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate themselves.

The government of the antient commonwealths of Italy, before the Roman was formed, was much upon a free or parliamentary plan.

The Israelitish government was of the free, or par­liamentary kind. The people's demanding a change of the form of their government into monarchical, was directly opposite to their constitution, and to the divine intention. Which, by the bye, shews the absurdity of the doctrine of regal government's being of divine original. Of which more elsewhere.

The republic of Lycia was a confederacy of towns, which they ranged into three classes according to their respective importance. To the cities of the first rank they allowed three votes each in the general council; to those of the second two, and to those of the third one. ‘For reason taught them, that they, who have the most at stake, ought to have the greatest weight in all consultations concerning the common good ^b.’

Sparta, as modelled by the good and wise Lycurgus, was a republican, or parliamentary government, though of a mixed kind; for there were kings, a senate elected by the people, and an assembly of the people, the consent of which last was necessary to the establishment of a law, says Plutarch ^c. Nor [Page 9] Nor was this mixture an objection against the Spar­tan government's being of the free, or parliamentary kind. The Theban, the Dutch, the English, and other free, or parliamentary governments have all been of the mixed sort, having admitted kings, or stadtholders, or other chiefs. There has indeed hardly ever been known a pure commonwealth; though many an unmixed monarchy, or tyranny. The Eng­lish republic, which was demolished by the villainous Cromwel, was one of the most unmixed, that ever was known. It was a true government by repre­sentation; of which more hereafter. In the mean while, now I am mentioning republican govern­ment, I take this opportunity of entering an express caveat against all accusations of a desire to establish republican principles. I do not think a friend to this nation is obliged to promote a change in the consti­tution. The present form of government by king, lords, and commons, if it could be restored to its true spirit and efficiency, might be made to yield all the liberty, and all the happiness, of which a great and good people are capable in this world. There­fore I do not think it worth while to hazard any con­siderable commotion for the sake merely of changing the constitution from limited monarchy to republi­can government, though I hardly know the risque it would not be worth while to run for the sake of changing our government from corrupt to incorrupt. But to return.

Athens, as reformed by Solon, was a free, or parli­amentary state, consisting of a senate of 400 elect­ed by the people, besides the court of Areopagus. The poorest of the people had a right of speaking [Page 10] and voting in the assembly of the people, or, if you please, house of commons. The people indeed pos­sessed, by this means, a degree of power above the reach of such as the vulgar were in those antient un­improved ages, before the art of printing had made knowledge universal as in our times. The errors in the Athenian state were in the first concoction. Had Solon been concerned in the original framing of it, that state would have been longer-lived. He con­fessed, that all he could do was, To give the Athe­nians the best laws their degeneracy could bear ^a.

‘Athens consisted, says Harrington ^b, of the senate of the bean proposing, of the church or assembly of the people resolving, and too often debating, which was the ruin of it; as also of the senate of the Areo­pagites, the 9 archons, with divers other magistrates, executing. Lacedaemon consisted of the senate pro­posing, of the church or congregation of the people resolving only, and never debating, which was the long life of it; and of the two kings, the court of the ephori, with diverse other magistrates, executing. Carthage consisted of the senate proposing, and some­times resolving; of the people resolving, and some­times debating too; for which fault she was repre­hended by Aristotle, and she had her suffetes, and her hundred men, with other magistrates, executing. Rome consisted of the senate proposing, the concio or people resolving, and too oftent debating, which caused her storms; as also of the consuls, censors, aediles, tribunes, praetors, quaestors, and other magi­strates, executing. Venice consists of the senate or [Page 11] pregati proposing, and sometimes resolving too; of the great council, or assembly of the people, in whom the result is constitutively, as also of the doge, the signory, the censors, the dieci, the qua­zancies, and other magistrates, executing. The proceeding of the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a like nature, though after a more obscure manner: for the soverainties, whether cantons, provinces, or cities, which are the people, send their deputies commissioned and instructed by themselves (wherein they reserve the result in their own power) to the provincial or general conven­tion or senate, when the deputies debate, but have no other power of result than what was conferred upon them by the people, or is farther conferred by the same upon farther occasion. And for the execu­tive part they have magistrates or judges in every can­ton, province, or city, besides those which are more public and relate to the league, as for adjusting con­troversies between one canton, province, or city, and another; or the like between such persons as are not of the same canton, province, or city.’

Thebes, in Boeotia, antiently a monarchy, was af­terwards changed to a republic, and was a free or parliamentary government in the times of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, who raised it to great eminence a­mong the states of those times, and at whose demise it sunk again into its former obscurity ^a.

Carthage was undoubtedly a free, or parliamen­tary state, without a king; though I do not know, that we have a particular account of its constitution [Page] from any antient author, Greek, or Latin; for of the country itself we have not so much as the name of a writer. We read of their having a senate, and of a fatal division among the people by the Hannonian fac­tion, which ruined Hannibal's schemes, and prevented his making a total conquest of Rome after the battle of Cannae ^a.

The Roman government down to Iulius Caesar was parliamentary. Their senate may be compared to our house of peers, as the senators sat for life, and in their own right. And though the Romans had nothing of representation comparable to our house of com­mons, supposing our house of commons incorrupt and independent; yet representation, or giving the people their weight in government, was what they intended by their tribunes of the people, and by di­viding the people into curiae, comitia, tribes, &c. The Roman republic was but half-formed, and the formed part was the least valuable. We read often of the tribunes sending the consuls to prison; and, we find the senate depriving the tribunes of their office ^b. This shews the Roman republic to have been miserably ill-balanced, when the senate was sometimes above the tribunes, and the tribunes sometimes above the consuls. Romulus had originally divided the people into three tribes, and each of these into ten curiae. He chose one senator himself, and ordered each of the tribes, and curiae to chuse three, which amounted to 100 in all. None but patricians could be senators. Thus 99 of the 100 senators owed their seats to the people. When the 100 Sabines were added, they were all patri­cians, [Page 13] and all chosen by the people. When Tarquinius Priscus, to ingratiate himself with the people at his accession, chose 100 senators out of their body; he enobled them first▪ The number of the senators pro­bably continued to be about 300 till the time of Sylla, 530 years from Tarquinius Priscus. Sylla probably increased the number (by bringing in men for his pur­pose, to above 400. But these additional senators were still chosen by the people. Caesar, to strenthen his party, increased the senate to 900, introducing all sorts of men, as new-made citizens, half barbarous Gauls, soldiers, and sons of freed-men. It would be a ridiculous to think of the people's having any hand in this transaction. For in Caesar's time the army ruled all. And lastly the triumvirs increased the senate to above 1000. In the imperial times it is of no consequence what the number of the senate was; because all power was then engrossed by the emperors, and the senate was an empty name; that mighty senate, of which Cineas Pyrrhus's embassador, said, it seemed to him an assembly of kings; that senate, which was for ages the scourge of tyrants, was then become a mere ergastulum of slaves, the drudges, the flatterers, and supporters of tyrants.

After Coriolianus's time, A. U. C. 263, the plebei­ans became eligible, without being ennobled, into the senate. And those magistrates, who were called curule, had the privilege, during a certain time, of giving their votes in the senate, though they were not senators.

The Roman senators voted either by a general Aye or No, sitting in their places, or by separately declar­ing each his sententia, as the censors called their names; or by dividing, those for the question going to one side [Page 14] of the house, and those against it to the other, which they called, ire pedibus in sententiam tuam, &c. and those senators, who only divided, without giving their reasons, were called senatoris pedarii ^a.

The Roman republic was indeed never finished. For the caprice of the multitude was left to operate at random. So that every popular demagogue had it in his power to spirit up the multitude to whatever pitch of madness might suit his ambitious, or interested views. Nor was the general sense of the Roman people known by the fluctuating violence of the mob of the capital, who were often deceived, and often influenced, by largesses of corn, or by shews of gladiators; but who had more weight in the government, than the consuls, senate, and all the citizens of Italy and the other Ro­man dominions. The error consisted in the want of a regular subdivision, and representation of the people. The body of the people of property ought to have in their own hands the government of themselves. But the multitude in one great and debauched city ought not to be considered as the body of the people. The tribunitial power was too great. The appeals to the people at large, and their voting at large, [...] what first opened a door for the contests of Sylla and Marini, and of Caesar and Pompey, which overset liberty.

The great error in the Roman republic was, That the people, or plebeians were not represented, but voted in a collective body; which occasioned conti­nual tumult and confusion. They assembled in innu­merable multitudes, and forced their tribunes upon [Page 15] whatever their licentious fancy dictated. They had no reading; consequently were very ignorant; and often chose the worst measure, when the senators, if left to themselves, would have chosen much better for them.

The Gauls to Pharamond's time, who died A. D. 428, managed all affairs in the assembly of the peo­ple, where they set up and dethroned their kings at their pleasure.

The power of the French kings was antiently re­strained within very narrow limits. Liberty was the same in France, as in all the Gothic states. The power was in the assembly of the states. The frequent calling of general assemblies was thought inconvenient. Therefore they had standing committees, which gave [...] to the parliaments of France. The parliament of Paris first attended the king, then was fixed to Paris, for convenience. They formerly judged the Peers and great men of the kingdom, over whom the king had no power, because they were to be tried by their peers. All the great officers of state took their oaths in par­liament; not bound personally to the king, but in his political capacity. Laws had no force, unless they regestered them. The efficiency of all those checks is now lost. No assembly of the states now heard of. Parliaments are only the shadow of what they were. Their tyrant has the liberties of the subject entirely at his mercy; imprisons whom he pleases; sets up what judges he pleases, to try whom he pleases, and con­vict them of what crime he pleases. The great officers take the oaths to him, and are responsible to him, and not at all, as formerly, to the people.

This is the work of Richeliu ^a.

[Page 16]Advices from France, Ian. 1773, signify, that the princes of the blood have yielded to the court, and that the parliaments of France will be abolished to the very name: the thing has long been lost. This abo­lition has accordingly taken place since.

The three estates of France, in their times of free­dom, were, 1. The clergy (they will always be upper­most.) 2. The nobility. 3. The deputies of the provinces.

According to the original system of the Franks, every free subject was intituled to some share in go­vernment, either in person, or by representation ^a.

Frequent conventions of the states of Denmark, when that country was free, were a fundamental ar­ticle of the Danish constitution. They consulted con­cerning matters of government, laws, peace and [...] taxes, and promotions to offices ^b

The Swedish government has always been upon a parliamentary, or free plan. In that country, till the revolution in 1772, four estates made the laws, viz. 1000 noblesse, 100 ecclesiastics (just 100 too many) 150 citizens, and about 250 peasants ^c. They had no nobility before A. D. 1560. Voltair observes, that Charles XI. was the first absolute prince in Sweden, and Charles XII. his grandson, the last.

‘In Sweden, the supreme power is vested, not in the king, but the senate, which is no other than a committee of twelve chosen out of the estates, or parliament of the kingdom, to controul the king in all actions, which they dislike ^d.’

[Page 17] ‘The Bolognese, A. D. 1200, had lively ideas of the Roman republic. They had consuls, whose powers were like those of Rome; and many inferior magistrates, whom they seldom suffered to continue in power above a year ^a.’ In a time of public dan­ger they continued them several years, if they thought them wise and faithful ^b.

Marseilles, like Holland, was a free republic planted by a set of brave people flying from slavery ^c.

Grotius ^d celebrates the Dutch, for that, like the antient Romans, they have always been against kingly government. That in the times of Caesar, the com­mands of the people had as much power over the prin­cipes, or elected chiefs, as theirs over the people, Non minus in ipsos juris, &c. ^e. Grotius quotes Tacitus ^f, who observes, that all the Germans were for liberty, and that by liberty the Romans meant republican government, is evident from Tacitus's expre [...]ion, Urbem Romam a principio, &c. Rome was originally under kingly government. Liberty' (in opposition to monarchy) ‘and the consular power were esta­blished by Brutus;’ and from Lucan ^g, Liber­tas ultra Tanaim, &c. Liberty' (after the decisive battle) ‘fled beyond the Don and the Rhine; and what is now possessed by the German and Scythian, so often obtained at the expence of our blood, is denied to us.’

The Spanish cortes were much the same as our par­liaments, composed of prelates, masters of the military [Page 18] orders, nobles, and representatives sent from the cities, and towns (no mention of counties). No act could pass unless they were unanimous as our juries. And the acts must be confirmed by the king. They were assembled by summons from the king and privy coun­cil, and dissolved by order of the president of the council. But a committee of eight sat still. They have been rarely called since 1647. Their last sitting was in 1713. They were laid aside by Charles V. because they would grant no money, and because he found he could raise money without them. The Visigoths governed in Spain about 350 years, termi­nating about A. D. 700. During that period, Spain was very respectable. Her government was free; her church more pure than others, from popish super­stition, rejecting the pope's supremacy. Her mo­narchs, elective and limited, as in almost all the Gothic states, commanded the army, called general councils, proposed the subjects to be considered, gave their sanction to laws, gave out edicts merely execu­tive, coined money, gave employments, conferred honours; but all under correction of the general council, who could set aside any of the king's acts ^a. All the northern nations had such a mixed form of government, in which no money could be raised, nor laws made, or repealed, but with their consent. Spain is now under absolute government, occasioned by the timidity of the Castilians, who finally gave up the cause of liberty on a defeat in war, between them and Charles V. which lasted only two years (the Dutch fought for liberty 70 years). Charles told the cortes, he wanted them to grant him supplies first, and then he [Page 19] would pass their bills. The wretched Castilians gave up the point, and voted their tyrant, whom they ought to have destroyed, almost half a million sterling. Such is the inertia of mankind ^a.

The cortes of Portugal have long since sold to the crown their part in the legislature. Their govern­ment, which was once free and parliamentary, is now unmixed despotism, and their cortes like the parlia­ments of France ^b. The ceremony of giving Don Alonzo I. of Portugal the kingdom, by the public approbation of the people, A. D. 1140, exhibited a glorious spirit in both king and people ^c.

The Helvetic confederacy is the most considerable republican or parliamentary government, after the Venetian ^d. The Swiss cantons are not, properly speaking, a republic, but an union of several repub­lics. But they have a common assembly, in which all matters interesting to the whole community are de­bated; whatever is there determined by the majority, binds the whole; they all agree in making peace, and declaring war; and the laws and customs, which pre­vail throughout the Swiss cantons, are (excepting the difference in religion between the protestant and popish provinces) nearly the same ^e. There are, in­deed, some differences both in constitution and admi­nistration. But so are there differences between the three kingdoms, and the numerous colonies, which compose the British dominion; nay there are differences between the customs in the several counties of Eng­land. All this shews, contrary to a common preju­dice, [Page 20] that the largest dominions, as well as the smallest, may be administred in the republican form with as much success as in the monarchical. The Roman republic took in a much greater extent of dominion than many modern kingdoms put together; and was, with all its imperfections, as well admini­stered, to say the least, as most monarchies have been. But this is matter of speculation merely.

The diet of Poland is constitutionally composed of king, senate, bishops, and deputies of the landholders of every palatinate. Every owner of three acres of land has a vote for a member. And the majority carries every point. But in the general diet, unani­mity is necessary. Every palatinate (without regard to the towns in it) sends three members. The indi­gent gentry are always directed by some person of superior fortune, influence, or ability. The diet of Poland consists of an upper and lower house. The upper house contains the senate, the superior clergy, and the great officers; the lower the representatives of the palatinates ^a. An edict by king Iagellon, who reigned in the 16th century, found contrary to his coronation oath, was hewn in pieces before his face by the Polish [...]abres ^b. The Polish nobility will not give up the privilege of electing their kings, though they always elect the hereditary successor ^c. By this they impress their Kings with the idea of obligation to their subjects; and at the same time, the heir to the crown is properly educated.

[Page 21]When liberty began to dawn (says Voltaire) ^a about A. D. 1300, the states general of France, the parlia­ment of England, the states of Arragon and Hungary, and the diets of the German empire were all nearly on the same foot, as to the privileges and consequence of the third estate. [We have seen some difference arise since the above period. Let Britain take care, lest she come into the condition, into which those states are fallen.]

France (says the same author) ^b was once governed as England is now. The kings assembled the states. In the year 1355, they made their king Iohn sign a charter much like the Magna Charta of England.

There was scarce an absolute prince in Europe, about the 13th century. But the nobles were tyrants, and the feudal tenures universal ^c In short, to use the words of the great Alg. Sidney ^d, In Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Scotland, England, and generally all the nations, that have lived under the gothic polity, this supreme power has been in their general assemblies under the name of diets, cortes, senates, parlia­ments, &c.

CHAP. I. Parliaments irregular and deficient, 1, By Establish­ment. 2, By Abuse. By Establishment they are an inadequate Representation of the People, and their Period is too long. By Abuse they are corrupt.

PARLIAMENTS in England have been of very fluctuating importance in different ages. It was long before they got to what might be called a bearing▪ And even now, there is in them infinitely more wrong than right, as will too mani­festly appear by what follows.

Parliaments are irregular and deficient, 1, by esta­blishment; and 2, by abuse. When I distinguish between the irregularities and deficiencies in our par­liaments by establishment, and by abuse, I mean by the former such irregularities and deficiencies▪ as are known and avowed, as their too great length, their being an inadequate representation, &c. By the lat­ter, I mean those which have insensibly crept in, and prevail through connivance, as corruption at elections, and in the house, &c.

It is justly remarked by Mr. Hume, That whatever, in government, is publicly allowed at any particular [Page 23] period, may be said to be constitutional at that period, especially (it may be added) if it has been regu­larly and openly introduced and established by appro­bation of the majority of those, who have the power of establishing [...] ▪

The lengthening of parliaments from annual to triennial, and from triennial to septennial, is undoubt­edly an abuse (of which more hereafter) but being avowedly effected at first, and allowed since, this abuse becomes constitutional.

But the buying of boroughs, and of votes in the house of commons, was never fairly established, nor openly avowed as a regular proceeding, and is there­fore a mere abuse, and not a constitutional error.

Almost all political establishments have been the creatur [...]s of chance rather than of wisdom. There are few instances of a people forming for themselves a constitution from the foundation. Therefore it is impossible to say what would be the effect of a perfect commonwealth; there being no example of such a phaenomenon. The common course of those matters has been, that either a people have emigrated from an old established government, and have wrought into their new system of politics the errors and deficiencies, which had crept into the old; or a few wise and good men have undertaken to repair and patch up a crazy constitution; and then, like Solon, they found them­selves obliged to be content with as good a consti­tion as the people would bear, instead of such an one as a wise legislator could frame. And in establishing this constitution, they have been obliged to yield to the violence of party, and the blindness of prejudice, and to suffer various particulars to be established con­trary to their own better judgment. So that the [Page 24] machine of government being pushed one way by one party, and the contrary by another, is at last pushed into a bog, or set on the edge of a precipice, and left out of the perpendicular, like the hanging tower of Pisa, to be propped and shored up by posterity. This is in part the case of our own constitution, especi­ally with respect to the commons house of parliament. If there be in a ship at sea ten leaks, to stop nine of them will not put the crew in a state of safety; though they must perhaps be stopped one after another, they must all be stopped, else the consequence is obvious;

There are several frightful leaks in the great vessel of the British state, which, if they be not all stopped, must sink it.

The grievances requiring redress, which respect parliament, are chiefly these: 1. By establishment they are in no respect a representation of the property of the people. 2. Their period is, likewise by esta­blishment, of an enormous length. 3. They are, by abuse, corrupt, or fallen under an undue influence both as to the election of members, and their voting in the house.

CHAP. II. Inadequate Representation, its Disadvantages.

WHEN our ancestors first proposed govern­ment by representation, it is certain, they intended adequate representation; for no other deserves the name, or answers the end.

[Page 25] ‘Every Englishman (says Sir Thomas Smith ^a) is intended to be present in parliament, either in person, or by procuration and attorney, of what preeminence, state, dignity, or quality soever he be, from the prince to the lowest person of England. And the consent of the parliament is taken to be every man's consent.’

‘In a free state (says judge Blackstone ^b) every man, who is supposed a free agent' (that is, not through poverty, absolutely dependent on the will of another) ought to be, in some measure, his own governor, and therefore a branch, at least, of the legislative power ought to reside in the whole body of the people.’

It is evident, that inadequate representation in par­liament is utterly inconsistent with the idea of free government. For a people governed contrary to their inclination, or by persons, to whom they have given no commission for that purpose, are, in the properest sense of the phrase, an enslaved people, if ever there was an enslaved people.

‘Il est essentiel de fixer, &c. It is necessary’ (says the excellent Montesquieu ^c) ‘to fix the number of citi­zens who are to vote; otherwise it is uncertain whether the people, or only a part of the people, have given their sense.’ (We know full well, that it is but a very small part of the people of England whose votes fill the house of representatives, and that the votes of both electors and members are most barefacedly influenced.) ‘At Sparta, the sense of the people was collected from a suffrage of 10,000. At Rome, this [Page 26] was neglected; which was one great cause of its ruin.’

To compare great things with small, could the East India company be said to be established on a proper foot, if 100 proprietors, whose stock amount­ed in all to 5,000l. had the power of chusing the court of directors against the votes of 5000 proprietors, whose stock was worth 5,000,000l, and if the court of directors, when chosen, possessed absolute power without a peal, and thought them­selves responsible to no set of men upon earth? Or if a friendly society consisting of 100 members found that the whole power of the society was en­grossed by 3 members; and that the others could obtain nothing they wanted, or in the manner they wished to have it; could this society be, with any shadow of propriety, called free? That parliamen­tary representation on its present foot, is as incon­sistent with liberty, will appear but too clearly in the sequel.

That a part of the people, a small part of the peo­ple, and the most needy and dependent part of the people, should engross the power of electing legisla­tors, and deprive the majority, and the independent part of the people of their right, which is, to chuse legislators for themselves and the minority and depen­dent part of the people, is the grossest injustice that can be imagined.

Every government, to have a reasonable expec­tation of permanency, ought to be founded in truth, iustice, and the reason of things. Our admirable con­stitution, the envy of Europe, is founded in injustice. Eight hundred individuals rule all, themselves accoun­table to none. Of these about 300 are born rulers, [Page 27] whether qualified or not. Of the others, a great many are said to be elected by a handful of beggars instead of the number and property, who have the right to be the electors. And of these pretended electors, the greatest part are obliged to chuse the person nominated by some lord, or by the minister. Instead of the power's returning annually into the hands of the people, or, to speak properly of the boroughs, the lengthening of parliament to septen­nial, has deprived them of six parts in seven of their power; and if the power returned annually, as it ought, all the people would still have reason to com­plain, but the handful, who vote the members into the house.

In consequence of the inadequate state of represen­tation, the sense of the people may be grosly mis­apprehended, or misrepresented, and it may turn out to be of very little consequence, that members were willing to obey the instructions of their constiuents; because that would not be obeying the general sense of the people. For the people are not their consti­tuents. The people of England are the innumerable multitude which fills, like one continued city, a great part of Middlesex, Kent and Surry; the countless inhabitants of the vast ridings of Yorkshire, the mul­titudes, who swarm in the cities and great towns of Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Ely, and others; some of which places have no repre­sentatives at all, and the rest are unequally repre­sented. These places comprehend the greatest part of the people. Whereas the instructions would be sent from the hungry boroughs of Cornwal, Devon­shire, &c. In short, the sense of the constituents would be, at best, only the sense of a few thou­sands; whereas it ought to be that of several hun­dreds [Page 28] of thousands, as will be very clearly made out by and by.

‘Neither in Scotland nor England (says Rapin ^a) are are resolutions of parliament to be always considered as the sense of the nation. It is a defect of the constitution of both houses, that the members of parliament receive no instructions from their electors. The moment they are met, they become masters and sovereigns of those by whom they are chosen, and palm upon the nation their own decisions for those of the public, though they are often contrary to the sentiments and interests of the people they represent. Instances are so frequent, that I need not stay to prove what I advance.’ ‘It must not be imagined (says he ^b) that then,’ (in the times of Henry VIII.) ‘any more than at this day, whatever the parliament did was agreeable to the general opinion of the nation. The representative was chosen as at present, without any instruction con­cerning the points to be debated in parliament, nay without the people's knowing any thing of them. Thus the house of commons had, as I may say, an unlimited power to determine by a majority of votes, with the concurrence of the lords and assent of the king, what they deemed proper for the welfare of the kingdom.’ [In our times (the present always ex­cepted) what they deem proper for the welfare of the junto.] ‘There was no necessity therefore, in order to obtain what the court desired, of having the con­sent of the people, but only the majority of voices in both houses. Hence it is easy to conceive, that the court used all imaginable means to cause such mem­bers to be elected, as were in their sentiments. [Page 29] This is now, and ever will be practised, till some cure is found for this inconvenience. I call it an in­convenience, because it happens sometimes that the parliament passes acts contrary to the general opinion of the nation.’

Under a whig ministry (says the same author ^a) we see a whig parliament chosen, under a tory ministry a tory parliament. ‘It has frequently happened, that the resolutions of the lower house have been directly con­trary to the sentiments of the people, whom they represented. So it is not the people, or commons of England that share the legislative power with the king and peers; but the representatives, who enjoy a pri­vilege, which belongs only to the people in gene­ral, to whom however they are not accountable for their conduct. All they can suffer, if they have acted in parliament contrary to the sense of their county, or borough, is not to be elected again ^b.’

Parliament under Henry VIII. confirmed the de­molition of the papal power over England, and the dissolution of the religious houses; under Edward VI. demolished popery; under Mary, set it up again; under Elizabeth, overthrew it a second time. So we have seen parliament stamp the Americans, then un­stamp them, and then tax them in a new manner. Parliament has not, in these sudden doings and un­doings, followed the sense of the people. The un­steady people are not so unsteady as this comes to. In former times, parliament was too much overawed by the authority of kings: in latter times, too much swayed by ministerial influence; and all this in con­sequence of its being in no respect a just and accoun­table representative of the people.

[Page 30] ‘In former ages’ (says Mr. Cornwal ^a, in the house, A. D. 1685.) ‘the complexion of this house might have been depended on as a true representa­tion of the inclinations of the people; but by what­ever magic art it has been brought about, the case is now directly contrary. The complexion of this assembly is always the same with that of our mini­sters. We adopt all their measures. We applaud every step of their conduct. We are angry with those they happen to be angry with. We enquire when they set us on; and we stop when they say, You have gone far enough. Sir, we have had for many years past a course of most excellent ministers, or this house has by some magic art been rendered blind to their failings. I say some magic art, for if by any art we have been rendered remiss in our duty, it must have been by some art of the Devil permitted by God Almighty for the punishment of our sins; and if so, I hope he will dispell the enchantment, before we have blindly run ourselves into irrecovera­ble perdition.’

The nation in general disapproved of the proceed­ings of the tory commons, A. D. 1701, and the justices of peace, grand jury, freeholders, &c. of Kent presented a petition, lamenting the divisions in the kingdom, and the reflexions cast upon the king (by the commons) recommending union, attention to the sense of the people, supplies, &c. The house votes it scandalous, insolent, seditious, tending to destroy the constitution of parliament, and to subvert the established government of these realms. They ordered the gentlemen, who presented it, to be taken [Page 31] into custody. One escaped. It was apprehended that force would be used to rescue the others. The house orders them to the gatehouse, and addresses the king to issue his proclamation for apprehending Colepepper again, and for putting out of the commission of the peace and lieutenancy such of the petitioners as were in them. Then the legion letter was sent to the speaker, which begun thus, ‘Gentlemen, it were to be wished you were men of that temper, and pos­sessed of so much honour, as to bear with the truth, though it be against you, especially from us, who have so much right to tell it to you: But since even petitions to you from your masters (for such are the people who chuse you (are so haughtily received as with the committing the authors to ille­gal custody; you must give us leave to give you this fair notice of your misbehaviour. If you think fit to rectify your errors, you will do well, and possibly may hear no more of us; but if not, assure yourselves the nation will not long hide their resent­ments. And though there are no stated proceed­ings to bring you to your duty, yet the great law of reason says, and all nations allow, that whatever power is above law, is burdensome and tyrannical, and may be reduced by extra-judicial methods. You are not above the people's resentment; they that made you members may reduce you to the same rank from whence they chose you, and may give you a taste of their abused kindness in terms you may not be pleased with, &c. ^a’

The imprisoning of the Kentish petitioners was afterwards condemned in parliament. Yet the com­mons [Page 32] condemned the petition itself, and resolved, that to assert, that the house of commons is not the only representative of the commons of England, or that the commons have no power of commitment▪ but over their own members, or to reflect on the proceedings of the house, or of any member in the house, are high violations of the privileges of the house of com­mons ^a. All this is the heigth of despotism, and is indeed inconsistent with itself.

Queen Anne, in her answer to the parliament's address, A. D. 1714, says, She esteems the address and approbation of the peace of Utrecht, the undoubted voice of her people· But the lords in their first address to George I. say, ‘It was by no means to be imputed to the nation in general.’ And the commons in less than a year afterwards, said, ‘As that dishonour cannot in justice be imputed to the whole nation, &c.’ All this shews that a parliament may have one interest, and the nation another. This could not be, if par­liaments were really what it is pretended they are ^b.

‘The treaty of Utrecht’ (says the duke of Argyle ^c, in the house of peers, A. D. 1739) ‘was approved of by a majority in both houses of parliament. I remem­ber, I then disapproved of it, and gave my senti­ments very freely in this house against it; and I remember the reward I met with for so doing. That very treaty was in a following parliament, so highly disapproved of, that some of those who had the chief hand in making it, were punished by parliament; and others had perhaps been more severely punished if they had not fled from justice. This my lords, may perhaps be the fate of the convention in some [Page 33] future parliament, though the father of it seems now extremely fond of his child: for I cannot but look upon his majesty's speech and the address now pro­posed as a second approbation of that convention. I must think them designed as a new triumph over those that opposed it, which can give no great joy to the nation, whatever it may do to the father of the convention; and therefore I wish that in order to make his country rejoice as well as himself, he would hereafter take as much care to triumph over those that oppose it.’

When the bill for searching houses in quest of sailors was before the commons, A. D. 1739, it was found to be very unpopular, and the people of Gloces­tershire petitioned against it in a very high style, ‘That it would, as the petitioners apprehend, impose hardships upon the people too heavy to be borne, and excite discontents in the minds of his majesty's sub­jects; would subvert all the rights and privileges of a Briton, and overturn Magna Charta itself, the basis on which they are built; and by these means destroy that very liberty, for the preservation of which the present royal family was established upon the throne of Great Britain; for which reasons such a law could never be obeyed, or much blood would be shed in consequence of it.’ The house took [...]ch offence at this petition, that they voted, 196 to 144, it should not lie upon their table ^a.

Hear Mr. Pitt on this subject, A. D. 1741. ‘The misfortune is, that gentlemen who are in office, seldom converse with any but such as are in office, and such men, let them think what they will, [Page 34] always applaud the conduct of their superiors; con­sequently, gentlemen who are in the administration, or in any office under it, can rarely know what is the voice of the people. The voice of this house was formerly, I shall grant, and always ought to be the voice of the people. If new parliaments were more frequent, and few placemen and no pensioners admitted, it would be so still; but if long parliaments be continued, and a corrupt influence should pre­vail, not only at elections, but in this house, the voice of the house will generally be very different, nay often directly contrary to the voice of the people^a.’ So that gentlemen thought 30 years ago, and to the same purpose, a few years since, on the stamp-act, he charged the house of commons with an unli­mited compliance with the demands of the ministry.

In the case of Ashby and White, the resolutions of the commons were directly contrary to the sense of the people. The people's universal opinion was, that the commons took too much upon them; and that any person may, and ought to appeal to the courts of justice and the law of the land, when he thinks him­self deprived of his right as an elector; the resolu­tions of a house of commons being unsteady and vague, while the law of the land is notorious and per­manent. Of which more hereafter.

We have, in our own times, seen a most remark­able instance of disagreement between the sense of the people, and that of parliament. We have seen par­liament repeatedly expel Mr. Wilkes. And we have seen the people so highly offended at this proceeding, [Page 35] that 60,000 of them have petitioned the king to dissolve this parliament. In consequence of which numerous petitions, it was to be expected, that some notice would be taken in the king's, that is the minister's speech, next ensuing. Instead of which (so low, is the people's im­portance sunk, and so little regard shewn to their opi­nion) the laughter of all Europe was excited by a few frivolous paragraphs about a pretended sickness among the horned cattle, of which no body had heard any thing before as then existing in England, nor has any one since. It was moved in the house of commons, that, in their address, in answer to the above profound speech, the house should declare their intention of enquiring into the causes of the present discontents. Several of the courtly members gravely denied that there was any discontent in the kingdom, though they knew that 60,000 had subscribed petitions for a dissolution of parliament. They might have argued more plausibly, that there was no parliament then existing. For it will appear presently, that a tenth part of the above number sends in the majority of the house. And if the voluntary petition of 60,000 deserves no regard, surely the bought votes of 5000 ought to go for nothing. Others of the opposers of the motion said, The affair did not come regularly before them; as if they had declared, that the house of commons, the grand inquest of the nation, the representatives of the people of England, are not obliged to enquire into a matter of such consequence in the opinion of the people, that 60,000 of them had thought it necessary to complain to the sovereign; or as if they so wholly disregarded the opinion of ten times the number of the electors of the majority of their house, concerning their own conduct, that they did not think it worth while to enquire what [Page 36] had so grievously offended so great a number of their constituents, as to provoke them to the unusual mea­sure of petitioning the king for their dissolution. Others of the courtly gentlemen, in imitation of Walpole, said, the petitioners were base-born. But surely they could not be more base-born, than the beggars, who send in the majority of the house of commons.

The ministerial party, however, carried it against the motion ^a.

CHAP. III. What would be adequate Parliamentary Representation.

FIVE millions, according to the estimate of my incomparable friend Dr. Price, and our best modern calculators, is nearest to the true num­ber of the people of England. The males between 6 and 56 in 5 millions are 1,250,000, or a fourth part of the whole. As youth at 16 are of an age too im­mature to be capable of voting, so are many on the contrary capable of voting beyond the age of 56; and one may be supposed to make up for the other. It is commonly insisted on, that persons in servitude to others, and those who receive alms, ought not to be admitted to vote for members of parliament, because it is supposed, that their votes will be influenced by those, on whom they depend.

But the objection from influence would fall to the ground, if the state were on a right foot, and parlia­ment [Page 37] free from court-influence. Supposing half the constitution in disorder, it is not easy to determine what would be best for the other half. My purpose is, to point out all the defects. And if the people will correct all I shall point out, I will then answer, that all shall go well; but not if they amend by halves.—To return,—

Every man has what may be called property, and unalienable property. Every man has a life, a per­sonal liberty, a character, a right to his earnings, a right to a religious profession and worship according to his conscience, &c. and many men, who are in a state of dependence upon others, and who receive charity, have wives and children, in whom they have a right. Thus the poor are in danger of being in­jured by the government in a variety of ways. But, according to the commonly received doctrine, that servants, and those who receive alms, have no right to vote for members of parliament, an immense mul­titude of the people are utterly deprived of all power in determining who shall be the protectors of their lives, their personal liberty, their little property (which though singly considered is of small value, yet is upon the whole a very great object) and the chastity of their wives and daughters, &c. What is particularly hard upon the poor in this case is, that though they have no sha [...]e in determining who shall be the lawgivers of their country, they have a very heavy share in raising the taxes which support government. The taxes on malt, beer, leather, soap, candles, and other articles, which are paid chiefly by the poor, who are allowed no votes for members of parliament, amount to as much as a heavy land-tax. The landed interest would com­plain grievously, if they had no power of electing re­presentatives. And it is an established maxim in free [Page 38] states, that whoever contributes to the expences of go­vernment ought to be satisfied concerning the applica­tion of the money contributed by them; consequently ought to have a share in electing those, who have the power of applying their money. Nor has the receiv­ing of alms been always held a sufficient reason for refusing the privilege of voting, as appears by the following; ‘Resolved, A. D. 1690, That the free men of the port of Sandwich, inhabiting within the said borough, (although they receive alms) have a right to vote in electing barons to serve in parliament.’ ^a Query, Whether there be not other instances of per­sons receiving alms, having a right to vote for mem­bers.

But, giving up the point, concerning the right of the poor to vote for members of parliament, the pre­sent state of parliamentary representation will still ap­pear to be inadequate beyond all proportion. Of the 1,250,000, the whole number of males in England, we may well suppose that at least one third, or about 416,000 are housekeepers, and independent on alms Divide this number by 513, the number of members for England, the quotient is 799 and a fraction, the round number is 800, which shews, that no member of parliament ought to carry his election against a compe­titor by fewer than 401 votes, that being a majority of 800, who have the right of voting, exclusive of the poor and dependent. If we allow them the privilege of chusing representatives, which I see no argument against, the number will be much greater, viz. about 1200, a majority of which is 601.

[Page 39]Mr. Postlethwayte reckons 639,000 taxable persons in England, excluding Wales ^a. And every person, who pays tax, ought to have a vote. Calculators did formerly reckon above 6,000,000 of souls in England and Wales. And Dr. Price shews, that there is great reason to apprehend (with much concern I write it) that ‘we have lost a fourth part of our people.’ Supposing Postlethwayte's number of taxable persons in England and Wales together to be 630,000; divid­ing this number by 513 shews, that no member ought to be voted into the house by fewer than the majority of 1200; for 1200 have a right, and 601 ought to be the smallest number of votes actually given to him who gains his election against a competitor. Or if we calculate by counties, the present state of representation will appear enormously absurd. The most adequate plan for forming an assembly of repre­sentatives, would be, for every county, including the cities, boroughs, cinque ports, or universities it hap­pens to contain, to send in a proportion of the 513 answering to its contribution to the public expence. Were that the plan, we should, in the same manner, see no member sent into the house by fewer than seve­ral hundreds of voters. Of which hereafter.

CHAP. IV. View of the present State of Parliamentary Represen­tation.

LET the reader judge for himself of the monstrous irregularity of parliamentary representation, from the following view of it by the learned [Page 40] and indefatigably laborious Brown Willis, Esq in his NOTIT. PARLIAM.

In the following extract, I have stated the majority as the only electors in each place; which they really are, the votes of the minority being inefficient. I have given to Wallingford, for instance, 76, the majo­rity of 150 electors, which latter is the whole number of voters in that borough; so that no member for Wallingford can be elected by more than 76 efficient votes; and he, who has 76 votes, is as effectually elected as if he had the whole 150. And I have com­puted the number of votes, which elect the majority of the house, as the majority is the same, to all intents and purposes of legislation, with the whole 558, nem. con.

The right of election at Grampound is in the corpora­tion of nine men, and burgesses made by them, which burgesses, therefore, are not to be accounted as free elec­tors, being made for the purpose of the election. This is the case in other places, which I have not noted.

[Page 41]

The lord of this borough appoints a mayor and twelve burgesses, who chuse the members.

Here likewise the corporation of 13 make the bur­gesses as they please. Therefore the corporation only are to be reckoned the electors.

[Page 43]

The freeholders are the electors, who cannot be above 40, as there are but 100 houses in the town.

Yet there are 600 houses in the town.

Willis says, there are not above 20 houses, and that the members are elected by the burgh-holders.

[Page 44]

‘Here is but one house,’ says Willis, A. D. 1750. I have been told that now there is no house. I was therefore going to charge the two Old Sarum sena­tors to nobody. But as Willis says, the lord of the borough appoints a bailiff and six burgesses, to whom he give his conge d'elire. I have called them his re­presentatives. And surely he, and the lord of the bo­rough of Newton, in the isle of Wight, ought to be contented with the representation they have in parlia­ment.

I state Bewdley at 8, the majority of 14, as the other 20 are appointed by the 14.

This town and Boroughbridge are both in one pa­rish, the only single parish in England that sends 4 members.

[Page 45]

The corporation consists of 36, who make what burgesses they please. They being probably at the command of the corporation, are hardly to be ac­counted free electors. Let us, however add 36 to the corporation, which will make the majority of electors 72.

The members are elected by the corporation only, which are a mayor and two bailiffs.

From this extract we see, that 254 members are actu­ally elected by 5723 votes; now the most numerous meeting of the commons ever known, was on occasion of the debate about Walpole, A. D. 1741. There were then 502 in the house. Therefore 254 comes very near a majority of the house, or the whole acting and efficient number. And the greatest part of these illus­trious, [Page 46] 5723, who have the power of constituting lawgivers over the property of the nation, are them­selves persons of no property.

In North Britain the number of souls is about 1,5000,000. The males between 16 and 56 are 300,000. Allowing one third part to be their ow [...] masters, and to be above receiving charity, no Scotch member ought to be elected by fewer than a majority of 2000 votes. But there are many instances of mem­bers elected in North Britain by almost as small a number as in England. The truth of the matter is, that in North Britain, though the country be nothing as to riches, compared with England, yet there are fewer beggars. Almost all are housekeepers, though a great number of those houses are wretched hovels. So that almost all adult males ought to be voters in North Britain.

Lord Talbot ^a, in his speech in the house of peers, A. D. 1739, supposes, that 50,000 elect the majo­rity of the house. And he justly exclaims against that number, as utterly disproportionate, which it undoubt­edly is, if the due number be 416,000 or 639,000. What would his lordship have said, had he known that little more than a tenth part of his 50,000 send in the majority of our law-makers?

Taking the whole representative for South and North Britain, the members for counties are only 131 of the 558, of which 131,42 are for Scotland and Wales. ^b. The members, therefore, for the boroughs and cinque ports, which ought not to be one in ten, compared with those for the counties, are 382, above four times as many. So that for one member, who [Page 47] may be supposed to come fairly into the house, four (if we except a few for the great cities) are sent by the poorest of the people, directed by court-influence.

We have seen above, p. 38, that, dividing the right of voting as it ought to be, no member should be elected by fewer than the majority of 800 votes. But we find, that not one member of all these 254 is elected by a number so high as 300; and a multi­tude by a number below 20.

If we take the places, where a majority of the elec­tors comes below 20, it is shameful what a propor­tion of the 513 is sent into the house by a handful, and that handful mostly people in low circumstances, and therefore obnoxious to bribery, or under the power of their superiors.

[Page 48]

Here we see 56 members (about a ninth part of the whole for England) are sent into the house of com­mons by 364 votes, which number ought not to send in one member. For no member ought to be elected by fewer than the majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Dr. Price, in order to give 410,000 voters their due and equally distributed share of legislative power, without which equal distribution the majority of the men of property are enslaved to the handful of beggars, who, by electing the majority of the house of commons, have so great an overbalance of power over them, as to be able to carry every point in direct opposition to their opinion, and to their interest.

Here we see (monstrum horrendum, ingens!) two persons, the lord of the pitiful town of Newton, in the isle of Wight, and him of Old Sarum, Wiltshire, where there is not a house, send in as many members as the inestimable wealth of the city of London, in which the livery, who are the legal electors, are 8,000; and the persons, who ought to have votes [Page 49] are probably 20,000, and upwards. Here to indi­viduals have equal weight in the state with 30,000!

The following counties, A. D. 1693 to 1697 on an average, paid annually as follows, each respec­tively so many parts in 513 of the land-tax and sub­sidy; and sent members as follows ^a.

According to this estimate, Middlesex, with its towns, contributes of land-tax and subsidy together 265 parts of 513. Therefore Middlesex ought to be represented by 265 members. And Cornwal contri­butes of land-tax and subsidy together 13 parts of 513. Therefore Cornwal ought to send 13 members.

Men of large property ought likewise to have more votes, than those, who have less to secure. Property ought in all states to have its proportional weight and consequence.

In the East India act of 1773, which was heavily complained of for its injustice, there is yet one very equitable regulation, and worthy of imitation, viz. That every proprietor of 3000l. stock shall have two votes; of 6000l. 3; and of 10,000l. 4 votes at elec­tions of directors ^b.

The British government, therefore, taking it ac­cording to its avowed state, is neither absolute mo­narchy nor limited monarchy, nor aristocracy, nor democracy, nor a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy [Page 50] and democracy; but may be called a ptochocracy (the reader will pardon a new word) or government of beggars. For a few beggarly boroughs do avow­edly elect the most important part of the government, the part which commands the purse. It is true this is only the ostensible state of things. The British government is really a juntocracy (I doubt the reader will now think I presume upon his good nature) or government by a minister and his crew. For the court directs the [...]eggars whom to chuse.

Is this the universally admired and universally envied British constitution?

How much more proper would a petition have been, from the friends of liberty to the king, to set himself at the head of a plan for restoring indepen­dency to parliament, than petitioning him to dis­solve that which was then sitting. What point could have been gained by that measure? It is a handful of beggars, bribed, or awed, by the court, or the grandees, that sends the majority of the members into the house. Would not they have sent back the same men? Did they dare to send any others? If it be said, that the dissolution of the parliament then sitting would have redressed all grievances, it must follow, that a new parliament would; but how many new parliaments have we seen since the revolution? Yet we have now standing armies, septennial parliaments, rotten boroughs, placemen in the house, excises, &c.

Though I have not the least idea of wishing so great a change in the constitution, as would exclude king and lords from parliament; yet I may, I think, be allowed just to mention, that the great power by our constitution vested in a small number of indivi­duals, which will always make an inequality, and an unbalancing, ought to make us the more desirous [Page 51] of reducing, if possible, one of our three estates at least, to somewhat a little nearer to adequate, than it is at present. But of this more hereafter.

Representation in the house of commons is inade­quate in other respects besides those already mentioned.

In antient times, when parliaments were first esta­blished, there was no property, but that of land. Therefore all powers, and all honours, were heaped on the landed men. The consequence was, that the landed interest was too well represented, to the detri­ment (in our times) of the mercantile and monied. This is an occasion of various evils. For many of our country-gentlemen are but bad judges of the im­portance of the mercantile interest, and do not wisely consult it in their bills and acts. Of this kind are the game-act, the dog-act, and taxes on every necessary of life, which give our rivals in trade a great advan­tage over us. And ministers, to curry favour with the house of commons, are tempted to burden com­merce with taxes for the sake of easing the landed interest. See the art of Walpole ^a to this purpose, by proposing to ease the land of one shilling in the pound, and laying a duty on salt for three years, to make up the deficiency. It was objected to this proposal, That the salt-duty was always reckoned a grievous burden upon the manufacturing poor, and was therefore taken off; and that it was a strange paradox, that the landed gentlemen were poorer than the poor, and therefore in more need of relief from a heavy tax.

It is the overbalance of the power in the hands of the landed men, that has produced the bounty on exporta­tion of corn (of which more fully hereafter) which increases the manufacturer's expence of living, and [Page 52] discourages the exportation of our manufactures. This is, in the end, hurtful to the landed interest. But short-sighted and selfish men do not see it in that light; nor will seem to understand, that the land-tax, while nominally three shillings in the pound, is not really nine-pence. The time was, when land in England might have been purchased for a 50th part of its present value. What has given it the 49 parts additional worth? Can any one imagine, the diffe­rence is owing to any thing, but our trade and manu­factures?

A. D. 1373, a parliament being called, it was ex­pressly mentioned in the writ, that from every burgh there should be sent two burgesses, ‘the most discreet and sufficient, who had the greatest skill in ship­ping and merchandizing ^a.’

There was a clause in the election-bill in king William's time for rendering merchants eligible into parliament, making oath, that they were worth 5000 l. ^b

‘When the young nobility and gentry (says Dave­nant) employ their time and thoughts carefully to in­spect and consider the kingdom's foreign traffic, they will evidently see how much their landed interest de­pends upon it; they will find that as trade brought land from 12 to 25, the general rental from 6 to 14 millions, and the kingdom's capital from 72 to 252 millions, reckoning lands, tenements, hereditaments, and personal estates, 18 years purchase at a medium; so it may bring land from 25 to 50 years purchase, and lands, tenements, hereditaments, &c. from 18 to 26 years purchase, the general rental from 14 millions to 28 millions, and the kingdom's capital from 252 [Page 53] to above 1000 millions, if by industry and prudent management it can be rendered more extensive. But the mutual dependance between land and trade, we hope, has been sufficiently made out in the series of these discourses ^a.’

It was owing to a want of merchants in the house, that the bill for restraining paper-credit in America was brought in. And it was no small disgrace to the house, that there were petitions against it presented from most of the agents for the colonies, as an impru­dent and hurtful scheme. Postlethwayte, in his DICT. OF COMM. and BRIT. TRUE SYST. has made many remarks on the advantage of merchants in the house of commons; to whom I must refer the reader.

Is not an aristocracy a government in the hands of a few, or of one class, or one interest, excluding the body of the people of property from their due weight in government? Is not our house of peers wholly, and our house of commons chiefly filled with men, whose property is land? Is not therefore the government of this mercantile and manufacturing country in the hands of the landed interest to the exclusion of the mercantile and manufactural? Does not then the go­vernment of this country tend too much to aristocracy?

The eldest sons of Scotch peers are declared incapa­ble of sitting in the house of commons ^b. But the sons of English peers may sit, so that ten individuals out of one family may be legislators. Is not this too aristocratical?

It is said, property in land is more capable of being proved, than in merchandize, manufactures, or stocks. But this is frivolous; for any man, though possessed [Page 54] of an ostensible land-estate, may be in debt to more than the value of his estate; and where is then his qualification?

The interest of merchants is so much the interest of the nation, that there can hardly be too many mer­chants in parliament. The London members almost always vote on the side of liberty. It is objected, that each merchant will probably vote in parliament for what is most for the advantage of his own parti­cular branch. True. Therefore let a considerable number of merchants always have seats in the house, and then all different interests will be consulted. It has likewise been argued, that merchants are bad members, because they are liable to be influenced in favour of the court by government contracts. But here again comes in my observation concerning par­tial reformations. Correct all the other abuses, and court-influence will become impossible. Then will appear the advantage of merchants in the house of commons. Of all which more hereafter.

As to the monied interest, if the public debts are not to be paid, or some substantial security found for them, it would be very proper, that the monied interest (as such) should have representation in par­liament. Else what security have we, that a profli­gate court will not shut up the exchequer, as Charles II. did, and obtain, by corrupt means, the sanction of parliament for the measure? It is indeed alledged, that the mercantile, manufactural, and monied inte­rests are represented by the members for the cities, and boroughs. But this is nothing to the purpose. Because the qualification required is always to be in land.

CHAP. V. How parliamentary representation came to be thus inadequate.

REpresentation in the commons house of parlia­ment came to be thus out of all proportion inadequate, in much the same manner as cities come to be built in defience of all plan or regu­larity by every land-proprietor's humouring his own caprice in building upon his own ground. Our kings and our queens gave and took away the privilege of sending members, as pleased their fancy without all regard to justice, or proportion.

Mr. Carte ^a alledges, that the lawyers, in the puritan times, in order to strengthen their own party, searched old records, and found, that many towns of the king's demesne had been summoned once or twice by Edward I. to send representatives; and on this founded a pretence, that these were in all times parliament-towns. ‘Thus (says he) the puri­tans got the ascendency in the house; and thus was an unreasonable disproportion in the representation of the kingdom introduced to the infinite prejudice of the constitution.’

Mr. Carte shews, that the mode of representation established in antient times was tolerably adequate; but ‘that the case is now vastly altered. There is no longer any just or reasonable proportion in the representation. For, whilst all the landed interest is represented by 92 members, and the trading or mo­nied [Page 56] interest ^a by about 100 deputies of cities and great towns, there are above 300 representatives of small, inconsiderable, and many of these beggarly boroughs, who by a majority of 3 to 2, are able to dispose of the property of all the landed and opulent men in the kingdom in despite of their unanimous dissent. These have long been considered as the rot­ten part of our constiution, and being venal as well as poor, they have been the chief source of the cor­ruption complained of in modern parliaments.’

‘Foreigners, who know and reflect on this inequa­lity in our representation, which they cannot recon­cile to common sense, stand amazed at hearing us brag of the excellency of our constitution, while it labours under so fundamental a defect, and are apt to doubt, whether the sense of parliament is really the sense of the nation,’ &c.

According to Borlase, author of the NATURAL HIS­TORY OF CORNWAL, only 5 boroughs of that county sent 10 members, and the county 2, 23 Edw. I. and Lestwithiel sent 2 more, 33 Edw. I. Thus it remained, excepting one change, to 6 Edw. VI. when 7 other boroughs were allowed to send 2 members each. 1 Mary, another was added, and 4 and 5 of the same reign, another. 1 Eliz. another; 5 of the same reign, 2 others; 13 of the same queen, 2 others; and 27, another; in all 21 boroughs, ^b [Page 57] which, with the county, make up 44 members. The cause of this partiality for Cornwall, he thinks, was that dutchy's being in the crown, and yielding a greater royal revenue, than any other county, all which was very convenient for our kings and queens, as the places were poor, and consequently dependent. So that pro­bably the very design of giving this privilege to these paltry boroughs was, to obtain for the court an undue influence in parliament. And ought they then to be allowed a privilege, unjust in itself and given with un­just views? Towns came to be burghs (that is, pri­vileged within themselves, and freed from certain taxes and tallages) by charters of lords or kings ^a. It was originally left to the sheriff of each county to name the burghs, which should send members ^b. The oldest returns extant of knights, citizens, and bur­gesses, are 26 Edward I. viz. 2 knights for Wilt­shire, 2 citizens for New Sarum, 2 burgesses for Dounton, 2 for Devizes, 2 for Chippenham, 2 for Malmesbury ^c. But afterwards, 12 Edw. III. there were returned only 2 knights for the county, 2 citizens for Sarum, 2 for Wilton, 2 for Dounton, and 2 for Merleberg, [Marlborough ^d.] Brady men­tions many instances of places discontinuing to send members, and then beginning again, and discontinu­ing again, for 100 to 300 years, &c. And, which is extraordinary, the returning officer would often return, ‘Nulla est alia, &c. There are no more cities, nor burghs in my bailywick,’ though more cities and burghs in the same bailywick, or county, had formerly sent members ^e. He meant, ‘There is no other city [Page 58] or burgh, fit to send members;’ for the sheriff, at his pleasure, often spared the decayed burghs the ex­pen [...]e of sending members, though there was a law, 5 Rich. II. c. 4. for punishing sheriffs, who failed in this respect. The sheriffs, in their returns, still extant, often mention, that there are no other places in the county, now able to send members ^a. There is no instance (says Brady ^b) of any burgh's complaining of its not being represented. But there are instances of their petitioning to be excused sending members.

Mr. Willis thinks, there were before Edw. VI. about 130 cities and boroughs, in all, that returned members to parliament ^c, and that the original num­ber was not considerably increased till the time of Henry VIII. but continued from the middle of Ed­ward III. much the same, (not 30 new boroughs being created between Edw. I. and Edw. VI.) excepting that some boroughs intermitted sending for some time as [...]0, 100, to 400 years, and afterwards begun again. In several parliaments, as 18 Edw. III. &c. the re­cords say, ‘In hoc parl. &c. In this parliament there were no brie [...]s [or writs] sent to any city or burgh, but to the counties only ^d.’ There were likewise councils, or parliaments, in which were only mem­bers from trading towns, and no knights of shires^e. There were 17 places made burghs, with privilege of sending members, by Henry VI ^f. The cinque ports are now 8; though the very name shews, that they were originally but 5 ^g. Prynne says Wales sent 48 members, temp. Edward II. But Henry VIII. [Page 59] summoned only 12 knights and 12 burgesses^a. Some trading places sent representatives, upon occasional summonses to councils for regulating trade. Mr. Willis likewise gives a list of burghs, which formerly returned members, and ‘which if restored (says he^b) would constitute a parliament near half as numerous, as the representative of burghs was before Edward VI.’ The county-palatine of Chester, and city of the same, sent no members before Edward VI. ^c. Nor Durham county-palatine and city besor 25 Car. II. ^d The small boroughs, to which the privilege of send­ing members had been granted for the support of mi­nisterial influence, and corruption, were deprived of their right of election,' A. D. 1654, under the usur­pation of Cromwell ^e. In former times, the king's learned council, the civilians, masters in chancery, were summoned to attend parliament, but without voices, as now the judges; and the bishops were to bring with them ‘their dean and chapter, their arch­deacon, and all the clergy, [totumque clerum] of their diocese, by their representatives [procuratores] to agree [ad consentiendum] to the things which shall be ordained ^f.’ This last [ad consentiendum] seems to imply, that all these holy men had suffrage in par­liament. But lord Coke expressly affirms the con­trary, and indeed it is not probable that they had, though they were in those times held in high venera­tion. There were 33 abbots summoned to parliament 4 Edward III. and in the parliament writs 6 Ed­ward III.23 others, besides 4 priors, and the master of the order of Semplingham, who were not usually in [Page 60] parliament. [I have forgot, in copying this out, to set down from whence I took it.] ‘Four knights for every county, and two men for every city, burgh, and market-town, were summonded to parliament,’ A. D. 1283. temp. Edward I. ^a Near the end of Edward I. writs were issued out for all the counties, excepting Cheshire and Durham ^b. A. D. 1446, 24 Henry VI. there were 74 knights in parliament from 37 counties; one of which is Wigorn, and several counties are left out. There were 200 burgesses; so that the whole house of commons consisted of 274 members, now 513, for England. [I have forgot, in extracting this paragraph, to mark from whence I took it.] According to Blackstone ^c, there were only 300 members in the commons house of parliament in the time of Henry VI. ^d Therefore the number of the house commons is almost doubled in about 300 years by our kings and queens giving privileges of election to new places.

There was in the time of Henry V. a debate about the surrender of corporations. Baeda (Qu.) and Newbury surrendered their corporations to the king. It was questioned, Whether a corporation can sur­render its charter, which is robbing posterity. And the commons called upon those towns to send mem­bers, notwithstanding the surrender. The house however excused their sending members on their pleading inability, and ‘they sent none since ^d.’ An act passed 1690, to declare the right and freedom of election for the cinque-ports. Before this bill the wardens of the cinque-ports claimed a right of nomi­nating [Page 61] to each cinque-port one person to serve as baron or member of parliament ^a.

In Henry VIIIth's first parliament there were 148 counties and boroughs, which sent members; and the whole number of the commons was 298. Dur­ham and Chester were not in th [...] list. The 6 boroughs of Cornwal, and the county, probably sent only 14 members, where now they send 44. No members then for Westminster. Wiltshire, with its cities and boroughs, sent 34. Henry gave, or restored, privi­lege of sending members to 14 counties, chiefly Welch, and to 17 towns in England and Wales, and to Calais in France; in all 32 counties and boroughs, which sent to parliament 38 members. Edward VI. gave privilege to 22 boroughs (no counties) and they sent 44 members. Queen Mary, to 14 boroughs, which sent 25 members. Elizabeth to 31 boroughs, which sent 62 members. Iames I. to 14 boroughs, which sent 27 members. [I have forgot to mark whence I took this paragraph.] February 15, 1640, The commons ordered that Cockermouth should be re­stored to its former privilege of sending members ^b. November 26, That the towns of Ashperton and Honiton should likewise send members ^c. Oakhamp­ton had no members since 7 Edward II. It was re­stored at the beginning of this parliament. We [...]bly had sent no members since Edward I. It was restored 1640. Milborn-port sent none since 35 Edward I. 'till required in 1640. The commons, in the same year, ordered that Malton, Allerton, and Seaford should be restored to their former privileges.

Under Iames II. the power of electing members of parliament was in many places transferred from the [Page 62] inhabitants in general to the magistrates; because they were likely to be more within the reach of bribery ^a.

The borough of Stockbridge, A. D. 1689, for bribery, narrowly escaped being disfranchised, and incapacitated for ever for sending members, and in­stead of its 2 members, an addition was proposed to be made of 2 more knights of the shire for the county of Southampton ^b.

CHAP. VI. Evil of the Boroughs having so disproportionate a Share in Parliamentary Representation.

MEMBERS of parliament have the properties, liberties, and lives of the nation in their hands, and hold themselves accountable to no man, or set of men, for the laws they make. Ought the trustees of so great a charge to be men capable of giving or re­ceiving base bribes? Members of parliament ought to be men of good natural parts, education, and character, sound reasoners, graceful speakers, knowing in the three interests, viz. the landed, the commercial, and the monied, in general history, law, and politics, and in the history, laws, and politics of Britain, learned in human nature, and masters of the spirit and dispo­sition of the inhabitants of the three kingdoms, and of the colonies. Is it to be conceived, that the inha­bitants of a set of miserable Cornish boroughs are judges of such high accomplishments as these? Were election of members of parliament upon its proper foot, every [Page 63] county, including its cities and towns, would elect a set of gentlemen to be its representatives. This would concentre the wisdom of the whole county, and not leave it, as at present, in the power of a dozen silly fellows to set up a lawmaker, capable or inca­pable, over their country.

Here I must hint to the reader, that, though I have stated the accomplishments of a member pretty high, I am sensible, that lower, with integrity, will suffice, or at least would, if parliament were upon the proper foot as to independency. But the lamentable part of the case is at present, that by far the greatest part of our electors are wholly incapable of distinguishing, and must be supposed often to chuse the worst qualified of the candidates, and reject the best.

We often see, before a general election, many flam­ing harangues addressed to the people, shewing them the importance of chusing proper persons for so mo­mentous a trust. I have wondered in myself how any man of sense could waste his paper and ink so fruitlessly as in giving people advice, which no man, who knows human nature, can expect them to take. The plain English of those harangues is as follows. Illustrious beggars of the Cornish boroughs!

Your country expects of you at the approaching election, what every considerate person must conclude to be wholly out of your reach, viz. That you will wisely and honestly consider the importance of the trust reposed in you, of sending into the legislative assembly of the nation so great a proportion of the members. It is expected, that you are well qualified, without having ever had the means for being qualified to judge of the fitness of candidates; that you, who have neither knowledge of books, nor of the world, [Page 64] should judge unerringly of the capacities and dispo­sitions of persons, who offer themselves as candidates for your favour. It is likewise expected, illustrious beggars, that you, whose circumstances are, in the most miserable degree, dependent, should be, in your principles and dispositions, independent patriots. As we require a qualification in members of parliament, of several hundreds a year, that they may be above temptation, [...]o we expect of you, who are in conti­nual want, that you defy temptation. Do not, pa­triotic electors, regard the threats of your landlords, when they tell you, they will turn you out of your dwelling. Remember what you ne [...]er learned in Horace, ‘Dulce et decorum est pro patriâ mori.’ It requires no fortitude above whatever gross unprin­cipled fellow is master of, to die in a ditch for your country, with her wives and children about you.

‘Legislation (says Blackstone ^a) is the greatest act of superiority, that can be exercised by one being over another.’ How few then can be supposed qualified for such a momentous trust! But we put this trust in the hands of any man, however worthless, or inca­pable, who is able and willing to lay out a few thou­sands in the purchase of a borough.

Iames I. before a general election, directs, ‘that there be not chosen any persons banqueroutes, or outlawed; but men of known good behaviour, and sufficient livelihood,—nothing being more absurd in any commonwealth, than to permit those to have free voices for law-making, who, by their own acts, are exempted from the laws protection ^b.’ [Page 65] None were to be eligible to parliament in Cromwel's time, but persons of known integrity, fearing God and of good conversation; no common scoffer or re­viler of Religion; none who denies the scripture to be the word of God; no common profaner of the Lord's day; no professed swearer or curser; no drunkard, haunter of taverns, ale-houses, or brothels, nor that shall hereafter drink healths, or be guilty of adultery, fornication, extortion, bribery, perju [...]y, forgery, &c ^a. Here was such an exclusion-bill, as, if it had been put in force in our times, would have left St. Stephen's Chapel miserably depopulated. But how should the house be filled with proper members by improper electors? The lords rejected, A. D. 1702, after a se­cond reading, a bill to provide, that no person be cho­sen a member of the commons, who has not a suffi­cient real estate. A great many lords protested against the rejection of so good a bill; because the design of it was, to prevent foreigners, and men of no property, from having the power of taxing the property of Eng­lishmen ^b. But men of no property have now the pow­er of taxing the property of Englishmen. For the mem­bers for the boroughs are four times as numerous as those for the counties.

There was much debating in the house of com­mons, A. D. 1770, upon a bill for settling what of­fences should be punished by incapacitation to sit in the house. If what judge Blackstone affirms, as above, be unquestionably true, it is a matter of supreme consequence, that only men of unquestionable charac­ters be legislators. For my part, I should think a law [Page 66] for incapacitating every man of an ambiguous cha­racter, highly proper and necessary. We know how exact in that respect the antient heathens were. And it were a shame, that the professors of the purest of all religions should be more lax in principle then they. But how is it to be expected, that any particular re­garding elections should be properly managed by such weak and influenced men as those, who send in the majority of the house?

‘Kings may make lords, and corporations, which cor­porations may send their burgesses to parliament,’ says N. Bacon ^a. The annotator observes, on this, ‘Tho' the King can make corporations, yet he cannot give them a right to be represented in parliament with­out the commons assent.’ I believe Henry VIII. and his termagant daughter did not ask the consent of the house of commons, when they gave to so many places the power of sending members to parliament. And if not, according to this author, those places have no legal right to send members. The miserable village of Bossiney was made a free borough neither by king nor queen, but by Richard earl of Corn­wal, brother to Henry III. It sent members for the first time under Edward VI. ^b Surely we have no occasion to be encumbered by this paltry place, and its venal members. If a king's brother, if even a sheriff of the county, ^c, can give privilege of sending members, surely a king can take away that mock privilege. Or if kings, and brothers of kings can give privilege to paltry boroughs in one age, then [Page 67] kings and their brothers can, in another more enlight­ened age, give privilege to respectable counties and great cities, to send up that number of representatives, which is found to be adequate to their respective contributions to the public expence. Our good king George I [...]I. (whom God preserve!) has as good a right, at least in foro conscientiae, to give London 100 additional members, to give Bristol 20 additional, 20 to the county of York, &c. as our Maries, our Elizabeths, and our Henries, had to give a set of rot­ten boroughs the privilege of sending three times their adequate number. If a king has power in the 15th or 16th century, to do wrong, surely a king has power in the 18th to redress that wrong.

Suppose, for the experiment's sake, the cities of London and Westminster, and county of Middlesex, should join in a decent petition to the legislature, requesting, that the excessive number of members, which represents the county of Cornwal, may be transferred to the service of the inestimable opulent metropolitan cities and county, and their miserably inadequate representation to the inconsiderable county of Cornwall; or, in other words, that London and Westminster, and Middlesex may, for the future, be re­presented by 44 members (not half the adequate num­ber) and Cornwal by 10. Suppose Cornwal to peti­tion, that nothing may be changed. Here would be two counter petitions before the legislature; one, of the most respectable property, that sends repre­sentatives to parliament, requesting what they have an undoubted title to; the other of a comparatively inconsiderable property, insisting to keep what un­doubtedly they have no right to, have obtained in a surreptitious manner, and have kept a great deal too [Page 68] long. Would the legislature listen to the latter, and reject the former?

Iames I. forbids sending members ‘from such ruinous places, as have not sufficient resyantes [inha­bitants] to make such choice ^a.’

Were the privilege of election taken from the bo­roughs, there would be less occasion for a place-bill. For large bodies of the independent people would not elect, or re-elect place-men.

‘Most of the great counties and chief cities chose men who were zealous for the king and government, A. D. 1701, but the rotten parts of our constitution, as an eminent author styles the small boroughs, were in many places wrought on to chuse bad men ^b.’

‘Before bribery, or meat, drink, insinuation, and artifice prompted to the mean and poor sorts of burges­ses a right, which antiently they never dreamed of, there were no contests between them and the commu­nities or commonalties, that is, the governing part of cities and burghs, about the election of citizens and burgesses to represent them in parliament, seeing, when they received wages, it was a burden to those, who chose and sent them. And it is not easily to be imagined, that poor and ordinary men would con­tend for a burthen, or a trouble.—There was then no striving for votes, or making parties to be elected ^c.’ No invention could have been thought of more fa­vourable to court-influence in parliament, than giv­ing so great importance to the beggarly boroughs. They are the creatures of the court. That is, they receive their privilege from kings; and the burgage [Page 69] tenures in them generally belong to men of fortune, who have power to oblige the inhabitants of these burgage-houses to elect whom they please. And the court having great funds at its disposal, ambitious and avaritious men are thereby drawn to the court-side in promoting the election of courtly men. But above all, the easiness of bribing a small handful of voters, who have the privilege of sending two members, is ruinous to the independency of the house of commons.

In the year 1742, there came before the lords a bill for quieting corporations, occasioned by an appeal to them from the violence used by Walpole, in order to compel the election of some of his creatures for Wey­mouth. That arch-corrupter had endeavoured to in­timidate the corporation by threatening their charter. A minister cannot by any such means influence a county, or a great city. ‘Many of our boroughs (says my lord Chesterfield in speaking on that subject) are now so much the creatures of the crown, that they are generally called court-boroughs, and very properly they are called so. For our ministers for the time being have always the nomination of their re­presentatives, and make such an arbitrary use of it, that they often order them to chuse gentlemen, whom they never saw, nor heard of, perhaps, till they saw their names on the minister's order for chusing them. These orders they always punctually obey, and would, I suppose, obey them, were the person named in them the minister's footman, then actually wearing his livery. For they have, we know, chosen men, who have but very lately thrown the livery off from their backs; but never can throw it off from their minds ^a.’

[Page 70] March 18, 1742, a bill for regulating elections for cities, and boroughs, was put off for a month ^a. The author of FACTION DETECTED BY FACTS, thus ac­counts for the loss of this popular bill: ‘The true rea­son why this bill was not passed was one, which equally affected all parties, and which will everlastingly pre­vent an effectual bill of this kind; and this arises from the various rights of election, which are so numerous, that they distract and confound the dif­ferent interests of gentlemen, which, to speak fairly on all sides, induces them, by one plausible pre­tence or other, for their private regard, to oppose or to propose, so many different clauses, that such bills become at last impracticable and unpalatable to all.—The burgage-tenures too, which gentlemen will neither part with, nor can tell how to regulate, are another invincible obstruction; and the powers and the penalties create farther difficulties, which no human wisdom has yet been able to surmount.’ The plain English of all this is, that a majority of the members of both houses were, thirty years ago (not in our golden days) so sordidly selfish in their dis­positions, that rather than lose a trifling privilege or profit, they would suffer their country to sink in a quick-sand of corruption. It is to be hoped, that this shocking account of the state of patriotism thirty years ago, was not true. But however the truth may have been, it is particularly remarkable, that an author, who wrote on purpose to shew, that the clamour of the people was groundless, should incautiously confess, that the majority of the legislature was so execrably [Page 71] corrupt, that there was great and weighty ground for clamour.

Lord North and Grey was against the union, be­cause Scotland was to have twice the number of re­presentatives, and to pay only half the tax paid by Wales, though Wales was as poor, and much less in extent. Lord Hallifax answered, that Cornwal did not pay above one fifth of what Glocestershire did, and sent five times as many members ^a.

A state or commonwealth, says Milton ^b ‘is a so­ciety sufficient of itself in all things conducible to well-being and commodious life.’ Will this defini­tion answer to Britain as parliaments now are? when all depends on a set of men authorised by a very small minority both as to numbers and property?

It is a common maxim in politics, that in every state there must be some where an absolute and irresisti­ble power over the people. But this is to be rightly understood, or it will lead to mistakes. In a monar­chy, as France, the whole power is in the king against all other voice. This is proper tyranny. At Venice it is in the nobles exclusively. This is proper aristocracy, or oligarchy. In Holland (excepting some errors and deviations) the whole power is in the states, that is, or should be, the people; but it does not descend low enough, and leaves the bourgeoisie considerably enslaved. In England the whole power is in king, lords, and commons. Therefore in monar­chies the people, the chief object, have no share of power. In oligarchies the people have as little. In republics the people have a share of power. But in our mixed government the people are swallowed up in king, lords, and commons. To say, therefore, that [Page 72] there must be in every country an absolute power somewhere over the people, and in which they are to have no share, is making the people mere beasts of burden, instead of what they are, viz. the original of power, the object of government, and last resource. Our courtly people, therefore, to quiet our minds on this subject, tell us, we have a very great share in governing ourselves, as we elect our law-makers. We have seen, what this amounts to. And if any Eng­lishman is satisfied with the view I have given of parliamentary representation, I can only say, he is thankful for small mercies.

There will be occasion to exhibit much more on this subject in the following chapters on Corruption, &c.

CHAP. VII. Inadequate Representation universally complained of. Proposals by various Persons for redressing this Irregularity.

THE monstrous inequality of parliamentary repre­sentation has not escaped unobserved. And there have been attempts made to reform it.

‘To what gross absurdities, (says Mr. Locke ^a) the following of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheep-cot, or more inhabitants than a shepherd, are to be found, send as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches.’ He afterwards shews (contrary [Page 73] to the common objection, That this deviation must not be corrected, because such correction would pro­duce a violation of the constitution) that restoring adequate representation, would be precisely what is wanted toward establishing the constitution on its true and original principles. ‘This irregularity of repre­sentation strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess, needs a remedy, though most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society antecedent to all positive laws in it, and, depending wholly upon the people, no inferior power can alter it; and therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted, having, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act, as long as that government stands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy.’

Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than the fashion of representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true proportion, the number of members in all places, that have a right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the people, however incorporated, can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance it affords to the public; it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to have restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders, which the succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced. For it being the interest, as well as the intention of the people, to have a fair and equal representative, whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, and establisher of [Page 74] the government, and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community. Prerogative being nothing but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such cases, which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people, and establishing the gover [...]ent on its true foundation, is, and always will be, true and just prerogative. The power of erecting new cor­porations, and therewith new representatives, carries with it a supposition, that, in time, the measures of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to be represented, which before had none, and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and become too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. It is not a change from the present state, which perhaps corruption, or decay, has intro­duced, that makes an inroad upon government; but its tendency to injure and oppress the people, and to set up one part, or party, with a distinction from, and unequal subjection to the rest. ‘Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and people in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, justify itself, and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undoubtedly equal measures, suitable to the original frame of the govern­ment, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever permitted or caused them to do it ^a.’

Mr. Locke hints, in this passage, the propriety of our kings applying their prerogative to the restoring [Page 75] of a more adequate representation. Nor is there any thing unreasonable in the proposal; since it is noto­rious, that a great part of the monstrous disproportion of representation in parliament, is owing to the caprice of our crowned heads in opening the house of com­mons to numbers, who had no original right to enter it. And if, in order to restore the balance, we were to disfranchise 50 or 60 of the beggarly boroughs, we should do nothing unprecedented. For Willis ^a gives an account of above 60 ‘disused or obsolete boroughs and towns, which were antiently summoned to send members to parliament,’ viz. Donestable, Newbury, Ely, &c. Where are now the members for those places? They would have made, he says ^b, ‘a parlia­ment near half as numerous as the representative of the burghs was before Edward VI.’ If our former kings and queens filled and emptied the house of com­mons at their pleasure, why should not our modern crowned heads have power to set right what they set wrong, either by diminishing (with consent of par­liament) the exorbitant number of borough members, or increasing the representation of the counties, add­ing members to London, Westminster, and Southwark, to Bristol, to Liverpool, &c. or by some means, or other, take legislation out of the hands of the beg­gars, and put it into those of men of property.

‘It is plausibly urged,’ says a speaker in the house of commons^c, ‘that the voice of the nation is only to be heard in this assembly [the house of commons]; but plausibility is one thing, and truth another. This assembly does not constitute a real representa­tive [Page 76] of the kingdom. The metropolis, for instance, which contains at least a 6th part of the people, sends to parliament only 8 members, and many of the principle trading towns send none.’

‘A great inconvenience springs from the constitu­tion of the boroughs,’ (says a writer in the time of K. William ^a) ‘which elect not by virtue of their wealth, dignity, or number of inhabitants, but by the borough-houses, in which they live;’ these only (which perhaps are the most inconsiderable part of the borough) having in them the electing power exclusive of the rest. This qualification makes such houses sell better to a purchaser, than any others in the town; and it is customary for gentlemen, who are desirous of a seat in parliament, to lay out their money in such bargains, and though it costs them dear, yet, if it be possible, they will be land-lords of a sufficient number of these borough-houses (in the purchase whereof some friend's name is mostly made use of in trust) that thereby they may command an election either for themselves, or their assigns, at pleasure. And what is this less than buying of votes with money? ‘This is what is called the rotten part of the constitution. It cannot continue the century. If it does not drop, it must be amputated,’ said lord Cha­tham, in his speech on the stamp-act.

Cromwel's plan of a parliament ^b was briefly as fol­lows: The period triennial; the whole number of members to be 400 for England and Wales; 30 for Scotland. and 30 for Ireland. The number of mem­bers [Page 77] for some of the most remarkable places was as follows; Cornwal 12, Devonshire 20, York 22, Essex 16, Kent 18, Middlesez 6; London 6, Bristol 2. He also intended members for several places, which now send none, as Manchester, &c. Every reader will observe, that this scheme was far from being an adequate representation, though much pre­ferable to the present. Of the 400 English members, 270 were county-members; which gave the counties the advantage they ought to have over the boroughs; whereas in our times the borough members out-num­ber those for the counties 4 times over. Every per­son worth 200l. real or personal was to have right of voting; whereas in our times, hardly any, but beg­gars, have weight in appointing the representative. Fairfax in his scheme for settling the nation, proposes adequate representation by counties ^a. Lord Chatham has proposed, that a third member be added to the representation for each county. This would be of service; but would not redress the evil. For represen­tation would be still out of proportion, as the borough members would still out-number those for the counties. Lord Molesworth is for transferring the members for the mean boroughs to the great places. Mr. Hume proposes ^b, as an improvement of the British constitution, the restoration of the plan of the republican parliament, and allowing no person to vote, who did not possess a property [he does not confine it to land] of 200l. value. Mr. Carte pro­poses, for equalling representation, to give all persons possessed of property within the hundred, in which is a small borough (which now of itself sends two mem­bers) [Page 78] a right of voting equally with the men of the borough; and to make the steward, or judge of the hundred court a joint returning officer with the pre­sent borough-officer. This would render bribery more difficult, than it is, but would not make parlia­mentary representation adequate.

On this subject the author of the DISSERT. UPON PARTIES ^a, reasons as follows: `At the settling of the revolution, those persons, who had exclaimed so loudly against placemen and pensioners in the reign of Charles II. and who complained at that instant so bitterly of the undue influence that had been employed in small boroughs, chiefly to promote the elections of the parliament which sat in the reign of Iames II. ought to have been attentive, one would think, to take the glorious opportunity, that was furnished them by a new settlement of the crown, and of the constitution, to secure the independency of parlia­ments effectually for the future. Machiavel observes, and makes it the title of one of his discourses, That a free government, in order to maintain itself free, hath need every day of some new provisions in favour of liberty. The truth of this observation, and the reasons that support [...]t, are obvious. But as every day may not furnish opportunities of making some of these new and necessary provisions, no day, that does furnish the opportunity, ought to be neglected. The Romans had been so liberal in bestowing the right of citizens on strangers, that the power of their elections began to fall into such hands as the consti­tution had not intended to trust with them. Quin­tus [Page 79] Fabius saw the growing evil; and being censor, he took the opportunity; confined all these new el [...] ­tors into four tribes, put it out of their power to turn the elections, as they had done whilst their numbers were divided among all the tribes; freed his country from this danger; restored the constitution accord­ing to the true intent and meaning of it; and ob­tained, by universal suffrage, the title of Maximus. If a spirit like this had prevailed among us at the time we speak of, something like this would have been done; and surely something like it ought to have been done, for the revolution was in many instances, and it ought to have been so in all, one of those renovations of our constitution which we have often mentioned. If it had been such with respect to the electing of members to serve in par­liament, these elections might have been drawn back to the antient principle, on which they had been established; and the rule of property, which was followed antiently, and was perverted by innumerable changes which length of time produced, might have been restored, by which the communities, to whom the right of electing was trusted, as well as the qua­lifications of the electors and the elected, might have been settled in propor [...]on to the then present state of things. Such a remedy might have wrought a radical cure of the evil which threatens our consti­tution; whereas it is much to be apprehended, even from experience, that all others are merely palli­ative.

Brady ^a mentions resolutions of the house of com­mons, That in all places, where there is neither char­ter, [Page 80] nor immemorial custom, to the contrary, every [...]useholder has a right to vote for members. In some instances, prescription for confining the right of election to the bailiffs and capital burgesses, excluding house­holders in general, have been disallowed by the house^a. But the resolutions of the house on this, as on many other points, are often inconsistent. Brady (who shews great fear lest the people should have any li­berty, or power) thinks the commons founded this resolution so favourable to the people, on a mistake as to the sense of the phrase, communitas civitatum et burgorum; which meant, he thinks, the governing part of cities and burghs, not the housholders in gene­ral. But surely it is more for the advantage of liber­ty, that election be in many, than few, hands; as it is harder to bribe many than a few.

We see what light this grievance of inadequate parliamentary representation has been viewed in by the best politicians. If therefore judge Blackstone did, at the time he wrote the 172d page of the first vol. of his COMMENTARIES, recollect the miserable state of repre­sentation in our times, it is inconceivable how he could bring himself to write as he has done. ‘Only such are entirely excluded, from voting for members, says he, as can have no will o [...] their own’ [meaning poor and dependent people without property]. ‘There is hardly a free agent to be found, but what is entituled to a vote in some place or other in the kingdom.’ Did the learned judge consider, what he himself has observed, that the borough-members are four times as numerous, as the county-members; that [Page 81] a few thousands of electors send in the majority of the house; that in many places a handful of beggars sends in as many members as the great and rich county of York, or city of Bristol? Did the learned judge con­sider these shocking absurdities, and monstrous dis­proportions, or did he consider the alarming influence the court has in parliament, when he wrote what follows, viz. ‘If any alteration might be wished, or suggested in the present frame of parliaments, it should be in favour of a more complete represen­tation of the people.’ What! are we to be put off with a cold If, in a case where our country lies bleed­ing to death? ‘If any alteration might be wished’ —Let us go on then, and say, If the deliverance of ourselves and our posterity from destruction might be wished; if any alteration of what must bring us to ruin might be wished—any alteration from a mockery rather than the reality of representation—any alteration from 300 placemen and pensioners sitting in the house of commons—any [...]ration from a corrupt court's commanding the ma [...]rity of the elections into the house, and of the votes, when in it—any alteration from the parliament's becoming a mere outwork of the court—If it is, at last to be doubted, whether the saving of our country is to be wished, what must become of us? Had a hackneyed court-hireling written in this manner, it had been no matter of wonder. But if the most intelligent men in the nation are to endeavour to persuade the peo­ple that there is hardly room for a wish; that there is scarce any thing capable of alteration for the better, (the judges four volumes are a continued panegyric) at the very time when there is hardly any thing in [Page 82] the condition, it ought to be in, at the time when we have upon us every symptom of a declining state, when we are sinking in a bottomless gulf of debt and corruption, the spirit of the constitution gone, the foundations of public security shaken, and the whole fabric ready to come down in ruins upon our heads—if they who ought to be the watchmen of the public weal are thus to damp all proposals for redress of grievances—Quo res summa loco? In what condition is this once free and virtuous kingdom likely soon to be?

CHAP. I. Parliaments were originally annual.

‘WHERE annual election ends, slavery begins,’ says the author of HISTOR. ESS. ON THE BRIT. CONST. A maxim of equal solidi­ty in politics with that of my late amiable friend Dr. Foster in divinity, viz. ‘Where mystery begins, reli­gion ends.’ Long parliaments are incompatible with liberty. To give a set of men power for a long pe­riod of time, is giving them the hint, that they may make themselves despots, if they please. Kings and grandees are tyrants only because they know they have their power during life. But of the danger of inveterate power I shall have occasion to treat more fully hereafter.

Parliaments, according to Postlethwayte ^a, were ori­ginally annual; and antiently all the people voted at elections, till Henry VI. enacted, that only freehol­ders [Page 84] residing in the country, and who had an income of 40s. a year, should vote. ‘That parliaments were formerly chosen fresh and fresh, is evident; since there be writs extant for new elections for 80 years successively;’ says the learned writer of a piece entitled, LIMITATIONS FOR THE SUCCESSOR, &c. ^a

In the Saxon times it cannot well be supposed, that parliaments could be longer than annual, were it only for one reason, viz. That the members of their wittena gemots, or parliaments, were mayors, or officers, who held their offices only one year, at the end of which they were obliged to divest themselves of all power, and to assemble the people for new election. It was agreed, that a parliament should be held twice every year at London, and this continued from king Alfred's time to that of Edward II. as ap­pears by Horn's MIRR. OF JUST. chap. 1. sect. 2. ^b' A. D. 1378, a parliament was called, because, a­mong other reasons, it was constitutional, that par­liaments should be held annually ^c. The commons, A. D. 1940, regret, they had not made parliaments annual, instead of triennial. By two statutes, they say, they found parliaments once a year still in force^d. When the triennial bill was established, in the time of Charles I. after an intermission of 12 years, the king, in the genuine spirit of a Stuart, made a merit of his agreeing to the bill. The commons would not allow it; but insisted, that there were then in force two statutes for annual elections. ‘The bill for triennial parliaments, says Milton ^e, was but the third part of one good step towards that which [Page 85] in times past was our annual right.’ Milton ^a says this triennial bill of which Charles made a great merit, was much less than two statutes yet in force of Ed­ward III. Nay, in a book, entitled, THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM, the MIRROR OF JUSTICES is quoted, that parliaments by the old laws, ought to be held twice a year. If so, we are deprived of 13 parts in 14 of our antient privilege.

Sir William Wyndham, in the debate on the repeal of the septennial act, A. D. 1734, gives the true acoount of this matter. ‘At the time of the revolu­tion, says he, nay at the present time, at all times, the word parliament in the common way of speaking comprehends all the sessions from one election to another. That this is the common meaning of the word, I appeal to every gentleman in this house; and for this reason those patriots, who drew up our CLAIM OF RIGHTS, could not imagine that it was necessary to put in the word new; they could not so much as dream that the two words, frequent parliaments, would afterwards be interpreted to mean frequent sessions of parliament, but the lawyers, who are accustomed to confound the sense of the plainest words, immediately found out that a session of par­liament was a parliament; meant only frequent ses­sions. This quirk the lawyers found out immedi­ately after the revolution; this quirk the courtiers at that time caught hold of; and this set the people anew upon the vindication of their rights, which they obtained by the triennial bill. By that bill the right of the people to frequent new parliaments was [Page 86] established in such clear terms, as not to be misun­derstood, and God forgive them who consented to the giving it up. ^a’

The answer given by the king (that is, the mini­ster) to the remonstrances requesting the dissolution of a supposed corrupt parliament, A. D. 1770, was, That the remonstrances were disrespectful to his ma­jesty, injurious to parliament, and irreconcileable with the principles of the constitution.' It were to be wished, that the public had been better satisfied of the justness of this answer. Does not the very idea of petitioning imply acknowledgment of superi­ority in the person addressed to? Were not the remon­strances addressed to the king by his titles of sove­reignty? Was not an appeal to the sovereign from a supposed corrupt ministry and parliament doing honour, nay, was it not doing the highest honour in the power of the remonstrants, to the throne, and to the person of the king, as supposing, that from him alone there was hope of redress? Again, what injury to parliaments in general was done by requesting the dissolution of a particular parliament? If the members had acted uprightly, it was to be expected, that their constitu­ents (if free) would immediately re-elect them, which instead of disgrace, would have reflected the highest honour upon them. If indeed it had been confessed, that many members, from a consciousness of their corrupt practices, had reason to fear the loss of their seats, the case was otherwise: but this was too shame­ful to confess. Or if it had been said, that a majority of the electors, being dependent on their members, or obnoxious to bribery, would of course have re-chosen the same men, at worst the dissolution of the [Page 87] parliament would have been nugatory. But it would have shewed the people, that the king was willing to listen to the request of 60,000 of his subjects. Lastly, as to the remonstrances being irreconcilable with the principles of the constitution; it is strange that there should be any thing unconstitutional in requesting the king to do what the constitution gives him a power to do at any time; what William III. did in compliance with a petition from one county; what George II. did without solicitation, and without blame, when he dissolved one of his parliaments at the end of the 6th session, with the view, according to some, of pre­venting the irregularities of a long electioneering time. It is strange that there should be any thing unconsti­tutional in the king's dissolving a parliament at the request of 6 times the number and 60 times the pro­perty that made them a parliament. It is strange, that there should be any thing unconstitutional in dis­solving a parliament which had sat several years, when we know, that the length of parliaments is one of our greatest grievances, and that our kings could not any way more effectually shew themselves to be the friends of the constitution, than by regularly dissolving every parliament at the end of the first session.

CHAP. II. Brief History of the lengthening and shortening of Parliament.

PARLIAMENTS seldom sat, in former times, many months. ‘In one year there were sometimes 2, sometimes 3 parliaments, says Sir Simon Dewes on [Page 88] the poll-tax before the lords in 1641 ^a. The longest parliament ever yet held,’ viz. almost a whole year, under Hen. IV. was three times prorogued, which was then an innovation ^b. An act was made 4 Edw. III. cap. 14. for holding parliaments yearly, or oftener, if necessary. Again by 36 Edw. III. cap. 10^c. `They knew not, in those days, the fashion of prorogations. Therefore parliaments then were annual. The un­thinking people of Charles II's. time were contented if there was no interruption of parliaments, longer than for three years. Henry VIths reign was the first in which prorogations began to be made for any time, and they were but very little used till Hen. VIIIths time. The usual way formerly was to call a parliament at least once a year, and as soon as the business was done, to dissolve them ^d. Henry VIII. first lengthened parliament beyond three years, as the most effectual means for rendering the members obedient to his will. Annual parliaments were re­stored by Philip and Mary, after an intermission of two years ^e.

Charles, A. D. 1640, makes a mighty merit of giving his assent to the bill for triennial parliaments, before any subsidy granted to him ^f. Great joy, and both houses waited on the king with thanks ^g. This salutary law was repealed 16 Car. II. therefore is not in the STATUTES AT LARGE. The purport of it is to restore the laws by which parliaments ought [Page 89] to be held annually. It enacts, that if the chancellor does not issue out writs, any 12 peers shall in the king's name; failing them, the sheriffs, mayors, bailiffs, &c. shall cause elections to be made; they neglecting, the electors shall proceed as if writs had been regularly issued. It had been happy if the peo­ple had been constituted with authority to make laws, when the legislature did not their duty. The pream­ble to the repeal of this salutary law, puts it upon the derogation it is from the king's prerogative. As if the salus populi were not of infinitely more consequence than the king's prerogative, whose only value is its usefulness to the people.

The army demanded, A.D. 1647, that parliaments should be triennial, and the dissolution of them not in the king's power. A representative according to the contributions respectively paid to the public by coun­ties; and that improper members be expelled ^a. The army at this time seem to have been the most reasonable set of men in the nation. Before Charles Ist's time the members of the house of commons never dreamed of their having power to continue themselves in office one hour beyond the time limited by their constituents.

The author of HISTOR. ESSAYS ON THE ENGL. CONSTIT. is too severe against the long parliament which opposed Charles I. They certainly meant honestly, having no byass to draw them from the public interest, though they sat too long, fearing, perhaps, that their successors might not be as faithful as them­selves. It was much more clearly disinterested than the protracting of parliament from triennial to septen­nial for the pretended fear of a jacobite parliament. He says it was madness in the people to rejoice upon [Page 90] the king's consenting, for 600,000 l. raised for him, not to dissolve parliament without their own consent. This was the first protraction of the period of parlia­ment, and taught ill-designing ministers to imitate it. It is an evil of kingly government, that through fear of tyranny, well meaning people have often consented to what was unconstitutional. So in the alteration from triennial to septennial, jacobitism, or an attachment to a race of kings, was the cause of the irregularity.

The triennial bill was repealed, A. D. 1664. and instead of it a law to prevent parliaments having vaca­tions of more than three years ^a. One would think all memory of Iames I. and Charles I. was miraculously obliterated out of the minds of the people of England. It was but 15 years before that Charles I. was beheaded; and the people (or the parliament at least) were for trusting their all again to kings. The long, or pen­sioned parliament meets 1661, agreeable to the court, and says Rapin, ‘without doubt by the influence of the court.’ Great part were high church men and royalists. Pensioning begun afterwards, tho' at the beginning of this parliament they shewed a great par­tiality for the king ^b. The commons threw out a bill for shortening parliaments. The lords send down another: Rejected likewise, A. D. 1693 ^c. Parlia­ments were made triennial by 6 William III. cap. 2. ^d In that reign they were often dissolved at the end of the first session. 2 George I. they were made septen­nial. The pretence was, the danger of a Jacobite house of commons: The real reason, that they, who were in power, chose to continue in power. The [Page 91] triennial bill receives the royal assent, A. D. 1694 ^a. And the historian observes, that if our good king had not done it that day (queen Mary just taken ill of the small-pox, of which she died) it is probable he never would have given it the royal assent. So indifferent are even our best kings about bills tending to the en­largement of the people's liberty. At the same time, it must be owned, William had some reason to dread a change of parliaments. The abbe Reynel tells us ^b, that when this triennial bill was under consideration, queen Mary desired lord Bellamont, her treasurer, to oppose it. He refused. He was desired only to be neutral. He proved, on the contrary, very active in promoting the bill. The queen dismissed him from his post. He retired to privacy and frugality. The queen, overcome by his obstinate virtue, offered him a pension. He declined it, saying, He had no right to a reward, as he did no service. It is wonderful, that George I. should so easily obtain the repeal of so favourite an act. A strong clause was added by the lords to the bill of rights, excluding effectually all popish successors to the throne. Passed easily by the commons, which looks as if the tory and popish par­ties had not been so strong in the house and kingdom as those who brought in the septennial bill pretended. This was A. D. 1689, and septennial parliaments were established A. D. 1716 ^c. It is hardly to be ima­gined that there should be more danger from Jaco­bitism in 1716 than in 1689, the very year after Iames's abdication. All this shews how flimzy the pretences are for what is big with so much evil. So Iulius [Page 92] Caesar was appointed, by the senate and people of Rome, dictator for 6 months. He made himself perpetual dictator. All the world condemns this tyrannical pro­ceeding. The house of commons, 2 George I. was elected, as usual, for three years. They elected them­selves for four years more, without leave of their con­stituents, given, or even asked! O! but the danger of a Jacobite parliament, if a new election was brought on! True. And in the same manner Caesar, in his civil war, tells us, he feared Pompey's tyranny; if he himself resigned the dictatorial power. Some authors tell us, the septennial act was made on purpose to save an odius ministry, who dreaded a new and in­corrupt parliament. Thirty lords (even lords!) pro­tested against the septennial act. And Mr. Snell told the house of commons, they might as well make them­selves perpetual at once, as continue themselves one month beyond the time, for which they were elected.

It was a singular modesty in the lords to origi­nate in their house an act relating to the commons. Therefore lord Guernsey moved the commons, to throw it out of the house, without reading it. It was answerd, That the triennial act had originated in the house of peers. [But if they were allowed to make a salutary proposal concerning what they had nothing to do with, it does not follow, that they are to be suffered to go out of their way to do mischief ^a.] Carried 276 to 156 for a second reading, the Tuesday after. Petitions were sent from many towns against it. And when this self-prolonged parliament (which, says the author of the USE and ABUSE OF PARLIA­MENT ^b, ‘went farther in impoverishing and enslav­ing [Page 93] their fellow-subjects, than all their predecessors from the restoration,)’ came at last to be dissolved, the cities of London and Westminster, with bells, bon­fires, illuminations, and every other demonstration of joy, celebrated its demise, as a deliverance from their worst enemies.

The motion for repealing the septennial act, A. D. 1742, was opposed by Pultney and Sandys. (I sup­pose the patriots were afraid a new parliament might not be so staunch against Sir Robert.) Rejected, 204 against 184. The proposal was made by Sir Iohn Barnard, which gives me a better opinion of him, than of Pultney and Sandys ^a.

A. D. 1744, a motion was made for annual par­liaments ^b. Passed in the negative 145 to 113. Therefore 113 thought it right. Let not then the proposal of annual parliaments be thought romantic.

A motion was made, A. D. 1747, for leave to bring in a bill for shortening the term and duration of future parliaments: ‘a measure truly patriotic, a­gainst which no substantial argument could be pro­duced, although the motion was rejected by the ma­jority, on the pretence that whilst the nation was en­gaged in such a dangerous and expensive war, it would be improper to think of introducing such an alteration in the form of government^c.’ This was setting common sense upon its head. The danger of the times is the very best reason for making salutary al [...]rations, and abolishing dangerous abuses.

Parliament was dissolved at the end of the 6th ses­sion, 1747, for a whimsical reason, according to some, [Page 94] viz. because the Dutch were in doubt, whether Britain would persevere in her schemes, which were favour­able to them, if the same parliament continued to sit. I should have thought the danger of a change of coun­sels was in case of a change of parliament ^a. Some said, as above observed, it was done to shorten the time, and lessen the mischiefs of electioneering. The king in his speech pretends that he dissolved the par­liament to shew his intire confidence in the affections of his people, and that he did not depend merely on a particular set of men in the house of commons ^b.

Thus it appears that parliaments were originally renewed every year, and that a parliament and a session were the same thing. That they held on in this way with little variation, to the times of Henry VIII. That annual parliaments were restored under Philip and Mary. That they were made triennial, A. D. 1640. That in the time of the troubles under Charles I. they were very irregular, and protracted to an enormous length; the house of peers abolished, and the rump, or remainder of the commons, kicked out by Crom­wel. That under Charles II. A. D. 1664, the trien­nial bill was repealed, and the period of parliaments left to the arbitrary pleasure of the prince. That his long, or pensioned parliament met, A. D. 1661, and sat above 18 years. That the period of parliament was reduced back to triennial 6 William III. A. D. 1694 ^c. And that, A. D. 1716, 2 George I. they were protracted to septennial, at which period they have continued ever since, in spite of innumerable remonstrances against a grievance so universally con­fessed, and so notoriously mischievous. Of which more fully elsewhere.

CHAP. III. Example of several Nations, who have shewn a fear of inveterate Power.

SOME few nations have shewn some small degree of apprehension from power continued in the same hands, knowing, that there can be no liberty, unless they, who make the laws, be well assured that they shall come, by and by, to be subject to their own laws.

Aristotle ^a mentions, as the chief cause of the sub­version of free states, their deviating from the princi­ples, on which they were originally constituted. He tells us, the Thurians had a salutary law, by which the same person could not be twice praetor without an intermission of five years. They suffered this law to be abrogated. Their state, from that fatal time, declined to its ruin ^b

The Athenians finding that their kings, trusting to the perpetuity of their power, began to stretch prero­gative, abolished the regal office, and set up archons, who were ro reign 10 years, and then to be subjects. But the people finding even this period [which is not much beyond that of our parliaments] too long, changed their plan of government, and appointed 9 archons, to reign one year^c: The Athenian epistates, the chief of the prytanes, was in office only one day, and never more than once ^d The 10 cosmi, or supreme magistrates of the Cretans, were annual ^e. [Page 96] All the magistrates of the Aetolians were annual ^a. The king and people of Epirus, during the age of their liberty, were accustomed to meet once in the year, the king to renew his coronation oath, and the people their allegiance ^b. The Carthaginian suffetes, or chief magistrates, held their power only one year ^c. Livy tells us, that the Carthaginians found two years too long a period for their praetors to have power. They therefore made that office annual. The Corin­thian prytanes were annual magistrates ^d.

Three brothers having enjoyed the consulship seven years successivly, a regulation was made, that neither consul nor tribune should be in office above one year ^e. In England, a great family com­mands the elections of members for one or several boroughs, from generation to generation. The Ro­mans never chose a dictator, but in extreme danger, and when expeditious measures alone could save the state, and only for six months. They appointed seve­ral times a dictator to drive an expiatory nail into the wall of Iupiter's temple. But he held his office only one day. The wise Romans would trust power no longer than was necessary. The authors of the ANT. UNIV. HIST. give the following account of the office of dictator among the Romans; ‘This supreme officer was called dictator, either because he was dictus, that is named by the consul, or from his dictating and commanding what should be done. No one could be created dictator till he had been consul. The time assigned for the duration of the office was the space of six months. As to the perpetual dicta­torships [Page 97] of Sylla and Iulius Caesar, they were notorious usurpations, and violations of the laws of their coun­try. The dictator was not allowed to march out of Italy, lest he should take advantage of the distance of the place to attempt something against the com­mon liberty. He was always to march on foot, except in case of a tedious and sudden expedition, and then he formally asked leave of the people to ride. In all other things his power was absolute and uncon­trouled. He might proclaim war, levy forces, lead them out, disband them, &c. without consulting the senate. He could punish as he pleased; and from his judgment lay no appeal. To make his authori­ty more aweful, he had always twenty-four fasces with axes carried before him, if we believe Plutarch, and Polybius. Livy ascribes the first rise of this cus­tom to Sylla. The authority of all other magistrates ceased, or was subordinate to him. He had the naming of the general of the horse, who was wholly at his command. When his authority expired, he was not obliged▪ to give an account of any thing he had done during his administration.’ [And we know accordingly what tyrants the dictators proved.] ‘In short, the dictatorship was a kind of absolute monar­chy, though not durable, and was looked upon as the only refuge of the commonwealth in time of danger, till Sylla and Caesar converting it into a tyran­ny, rendered the name of dictator odious, insomuch that, upon the fall of the latter, a decree passed in the senate, forbidding the use of that dignity upon any account whatsoever for the future.’

The greater the power is, says Livy, the shorter ought to be the time of holding it. Nothing is more advantageous for a state, says Seneca, than that great power be short. When the Carthaginian judges were [Page 98] found to have made a bad use of their power, which was for life, Hannibal obtained a regulation, reducing it to annual.

The Romans, in their best times, jealous of those who assumed power, had almost condemned Marcius to death for assuming the title of propraetor given him by the army, but without authority of the senate, though he had just then gained a glorious victory in Spain ^a.

Cicero in his book, DE LEGIB. says, the follow­ing was an express law among the Romans, ‘Eundem magistratum, &c. Let no man bear the same office in the republic twice without an interval of 10 years between.’ It is true the people often broke through this wise regulation, and suffered power to be too often, and to continue too long, in the same person, or family, as in the case of Rutil. Censorius created censor twice together, and of Fabius's son made con­sul, after that authority had been often conferred on the father, so that he himself declared against the peo­ple's partiality for his family. ‘The last Roman decemviri, though chosen by their country but for a year, prolonged their term by their own act, and retained the power they had usurped, till the people forced it out of their hands, and punished them severely for their usurpation. Their memory stands branded in history with all the infamy it deserves; while the names of Valerius and Horatius, under whose conduct the people recovered their right of electing annual magistrates, are celebrated by their historians with all the praises that gratitude can yield, or merit claim, monuments more lasting than brass or marble ^b.’

[Page 99] Quinctius foresaw the bad consequences of suffering power to continue long in the same hands. There­fore he refused to be continued in the consulship be­yond his year. In consequence of too long a conti­nuance of power in the same hands, Sylla and Marius attached to themselves the army in such a manner as grievously disturbed, and Caesar as ruined Rome.

Agustus, at the point of death, gave his will to his collegue in the consulship. And some supposed, he intended to restore the republican government. But recovering he went on as before, like presump­tuous sinners, who escaping from illness, soon forget their sick-bed repentance ^a.

Observe the consequence of a contrary conduct. The Romans in their degenerate times became fearless of the loss of liberty. Though Sylla foretold, that Iulius would be found to have many M [...]riuses within him; though Caesar openly bribed for the office of pontifex maximus, or chief priest, or, if you please, pope of Rome; though he defended Cataline the con­spirator and his crew, (with whom he was accused of being an accomplice) till a band of equestrians drew their swords upon him, and had almost killed him; though he was accused of a conspiracy with Crassus, P. Sulla, and Autronius, to murder those senators, who opposed their ambitious views, and to seize the consulship for Crassus, and the command of the horse for himself; though he was accused of another plot with Piso; though he behaved so ill in his praetorship, that the senators thought it necessary to take his office from him; though he refused to abdicate in obedience to the decr [...]e of the fathers, till he saw, that he would be driven from the bench by force; though he treated [Page 100] Bibulus, his collegue in the consulship, with such rudeness that he forced that meek spirited man to re­tire, after which he reigned alone as absolutely as any tyrant, imprisoning the best men of Rome, as Cato, and others, whenever they opposed his tyranny; though Iulius, I say, thus gave innumerable proofs of that lawless ambition, which afterwards overthrew the liberties of his country, yet the too credulous people advanced this apparently dangerous citizen to the highest honours, and, giving him the province of Gaul for five years, and the command of the army, with their own hands put into his the sword with which he stabbed liberty to the heart. Even after the consul Marcellus faithfully warned the senate, that it was hazarding all that was valuable, to continue him in his command; and that it was absolutely necessary for the public safety, that the formidable army should be disbanded; there were still Romans (degenerate Ro­mans!) treacherous enough, and slavish enough, to support the man who, they knew, or ought to have known, was laying measures for subduing their coun­try ^a.

The people of Taprobane, supposed to be Ceylon in India, chose for their king a person who had no children, and if he happened to have children after­wards, they deposed him, lest the crown should be­come hereditary, and power become inveterate in one family ^b. The officer, who had in his custody the seals, and keys of the citadel and treasury, held his place but one day.

The antient brave and free Arragonians, justly fearing the encroachment of kingly power, appointed a magistrate called, in modern times, the justizia of [Page 101] Arragon, who was to come between the king and the people, and to whom the subjects might appeal, when injured by the king. This magistrate was to be the ablest lawyer in the country. And a king, who op­posed his explanation of the sense of the law, was to be looked upon as a lawless tyrant. But about A. D. 1467, the justizia himself was found to have abused his power. The Arragonians therefore found it ne­cessary to put his decisions under the examination of 17 men chosen out of the four orders of the king­dom ^a. It may, I believe, be safely affirmed, that all the free states of antiquity, in their free times, made a point of giving no longer than annual autho­rity to their magistrates.

‘At Venice, A. D. 1298, an act passed in the great council, which till then was annually chosen by the people, That all those of which it was that year com­posed, or who had been members of it for the four last years, should, upon their obtaining twelve voices in the council of forty, be themselves, and their pos­terity for ever after, members of it; and that all the other citizens should be for ever excluded from the administration of public-affairs. From this time the people of Venice, like all others under the same cir­cumstances, have found how dangerous it is to be useless, and that to have no share in the government is to be a prey to those who have ^b.’

The Florentines, offended at the long continuance of power in the Medici family, insisted that it was necessary ‘to restore the constitution to its first prin­ciples, by restoring the magistrates to their regular functions in the government ^c.’

[Page 102]No president could be chosen at Florence in less than three years from his last service ^a. By this means posts of honour were attainable by most of the citi­zens, and no man or party could become inveterate in power, and responsibility was still in view.

The Florentines ordered, about the beginning of the 16th century, that the office of gonfalonier or chief magistrate should from that time be annual, and that the council should be enlarged by the ad­dition of all who had gone through the great offices of state, either at home or abroad; the number be­fore was but 18 ^b. Power should be widely diffused, and continually shifting from hand to hand.

Cardinal Richelieu, in his TESTAM. POLIT. con­demns the custom in France, of appointing the gover­nors of provinces for life ^c.

At Venice the doge, not being an absolute sovereign, has not power to take off, or put on his ducal crown when he pleases. The consiglieri, or counsellors of Venice, are chosen for 8 months. The capi di qua­ranta, or heads of the courts of 40 judges, are cho­sen by the senate for two months. The savii del con­siglio, or sages of the council, serve 3 months; the savii di terra firma, or sages of the continent, 6 months. Five savii agli ordini, or sages of order, are likewise chosen by ballot in the senate for 6 months each ^d.

The khalif Omar would not nominate his son for his successor, nor even suffer him to have a vote for the successor. It was enough, he said, for one fami­ly to have one in the important office of khalif^e.

[Page 103]A doge of Lucca cannot be re-elected in less than 7 years. The senators are elected every two months. The great council of 130 nobles and 10 burghers hold their places 2 years. Their police is very atten­tive to the suppression of luxury. ^a

‘There is,’ says my honoured friend Mr. Boswel, ‘in the government of Corsica a gradual progression of power flowing from the people, which they can dis­pose of, and resume at their pleasure at the end of every year; so that no magistrate, or servant of the public, of whatever degree, will venture, for so short a time, to encroach upon his constituents, know­ing, that he must soon give an account of his admini­stration, and if he should augment the authority of his office, he knows, he is only wreathing a yoke for his own neck, as he is immediately to return to the situation of an ordinary subject. ^b’

When the throne of Poland becomes vacant, the primate archbishop of Gnesna, obtains a greater power than the king had; but this gives no jealousy, because he has no time, before a king be chosen, to make himself formidable ^c. The Parmesans used to change their podesta twice a year ^d The directors of the Dutch East-India company are obliged every third year, to give an account to the states general of their whole proceedings ^e.

A noble stand was made by the citizens of Dublin ^f, for obtaining a limitation of the period of their par­liaments. [Page 104] They have accordingly, viz. A. D. 1768, obtained a restriction of them to eight years. Some of the candidates they obliged to swear, that they would vote for this abridgment, before they elected them.

CHAP. IV. Example of the English in some Instances, shews an Apprehension of danger from inveterate Power.

EVEN the English, who are described by a hu­morous author, as a people of great faith and little wit, that is, fore thought, have occasi­onally shewn some little fear of the mischief to be ex­pected from power inveterating in the same hands.

‘For the general government of the country, the antient Saxons [our ancestors] ordained 12 noblemen chosen from among others for their worthiness and sufficiency. These in the time of peace, rode their several circuits, to see justice, and good customs ob­served, and they often of course, at appointed times, met altogether to consult and give order in publick affairs; but ever in time of war one of these twelve was chosen to be king, and to remain so long only as the war lasted; and that being ended, his name and dignity of king also ceased, and he became as before; and this custom continued among them until the time of their wars with the emperor Charles the Great. At which time, Wittekind, one of these twelve, a nobleman of Angria in Westphalia, bore over the rest the name and authority of king; and he being after­ward, by means of the said emperor, converted to the [Page 105] faith of Christ, had by him his mutable title of king turned into the enduring title and honour of duke, and the eleven others were in a like manner by the said emperor advanced to the honourable titles of earls and lords, with establishment for the conti­nual remaining of these titles, and dignities unto them, and their heirs: of whose descents are since issued, the greatest princes in Germany ^a.’

The 24 barons, who were to redress grievances in the time of Henry III. proved 24 tyrants; the conse­quence of trusting power in the hands of a few. Ac­cordingly the knights of the shires were obliged to curb the tyranny of the reforming barons.

Enacted 1 Henry V. that no sheriff be again sheriff in less than three years ^b. By 1 Henry V. cap. 4. ‘sheriffs bailiffs shall not be in the same office in three years after ^c.’ By 28 Edward III. ‘no sheriff shall continue in his office above one year ^d.’ And by 1 Rich. II. ‘none that hath been sheriff, shall be so again within three years ^e.’ Enacted, A. D. 1444, that ‘to prevent oppression and exactions, no man shall be sheriff or under-sheriff of a county, above one year at most, on pain of forfeiting 200 l.’ ^f

Our ancestors were cautious of allowing power to remain too long even in the hands of searchers, gaugers, aulnegers [public measurers of manufactures,] custo­mers [custom-house-officers] &c. ^g ‘A searcher, gau­ger, &c. shall have no assured estate in his office.’

In the commission for the admiralty and navy, it was provided, that no chairman continue in office above a [Page 106] fortnight together, and all commanders to take their turns ^a.

Even the king-killing parliament were sensible of the evil of too long parliaments. ‘To prevent the many inconveniencies apparently arising from the long continuance of the same persons in supreme authority, resolved, That this present parliament dissolve upon, or before the last day of April, 1649.’ And their self-denying ordinance shews that the general opinion of those times was for a place-bill. And the same of adequate representation ^b.

CHAP. V. Sense of Mankind on inveterate Power; or Arguments for short Parliaments.

I Will throw together in this chapter some of the best arguments for short parliaments, that have occured to me in the course of my reading. I hope the reader will excuse any deficiencies he may find in the arrangement of them.

To take the character of man from history, he is a creature capable of any thing the most infer­nally cruel and horrid, when actuated by interest, or what is more powerful than interest, passion, and not in immediate fear of punishment from his fellow-creatures; for damnation lies out of sight. Who would trust such a mischievous monkey with super­fluous power?

The love of power is natural; it is insatiable; it is whetted, not cloyed, by possession. All men possessed [Page 107] of power may be expected to endeavour to prolong it beyond the due time, and to encrease it beyond the due bounds; neither of which can be attempted with­out danger to liberty. Therefore government (by such frail and imperfect creatures as men) is impossible without continual danger to liberty ^a. Yet we find that men in all ages and nations have shewn an asto­nishing credulity in their faithless fellow-creatures; they have hoped against hope; they have believed a­gainst the sight of their own eyes.

Were any foreigner of good understanding to be asked, what he thought would, be the consequence of our commons being elected by so small a number of the people, and of their sitting for seven years, he would answer, that without a reformation of these irregula­rities, the British government must unavoidably run into an aristocracy, or tyranny of a few, the most odius of all forms of government. Yet the good people of England sleep very sound; and foreigners ad­mire and envy our form of government. The truth is, that neither foreigners nor English consider much besides the theory of our constitution. They admire what it ought to be, and would be, if we had the true spirit of it, while they have reason to execrate it as it is in our times, and to look forward with horror on what it is like to end in.

‘We know by infinite examples and experience, says the excellent Gordon, that men possessed of power rather than part with it, will do any thing, even the worst and the blackest, to keep it; and scarce ever any man upon earth went out of it as long as he could carry every thing his own way in [Page 108] it; and only when he could not, he resigned; I doubt that there is not one exception in the world to this rule; and that Dioclesian, Charles the Vth, and even Sy [...]la, laid down their power out of pique and discontent, and from opposition and disappoint­ment; this seems certain, that the good of the world or of their people, was not one of their motives either for continuing in power, or for quitting it. It is the nature of power to be ever incroaching, and converting every extraordinary power, granted at particular times, and upon particular occasions, into an ordinary power to be used at all times, and when there is no occasion; nor does it ever part willingly with any advantage. From this spirit it is, that oc­casional commissions have grown sometimes perpe­tual; that three years have been improved into seven, and one into twenty; and that when the people have done with their magistrates, their magistrates will not have done with the people^a.’

It is justly observed by judge Blackstone, that the greatest superiority any man can obtain over another, is to make laws, by which he shall be bound. And surely the greater the power, the greater danger of its becoming inveterate in the same hands.

A wise people will not suffer combinations of great families. The monopally of power is the most dan­gerous of all monopolies. An Athenian was banished by the ostracism, if 6000 citizens all of at least 60 years of age agreed, that it was necessary. Nor was it inflicted or suffered as a punishment, but was un­derstood as a wise precaution, for the good of the whole, against the exorbitant popularity, and dan­gerous power of a few.

[Page 109]No body is willing to part with power, and all are for increasing what they have. The prince of Orange (afterwards king William III.) shews great anxiety about Iames IId's being limited. ‘It was, he said, of bad example, and subjects might think of limit­ing protestant kings, if they begun with popish.^a.’

The following, to the end of this paragraph, is chiefly abridged from REASONS FOR ANNUAL PARLIAMENTS. ‘For the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently.’ Words of the act for declaring the rights of the subject at the beginning of the revolution. Frequent parlia­ments must mean frequent elections; for frequent meet­ings of parliament without new elections would be an evil, rather than an advantage. Alfred ^b ordered, ‘that parliament should meet twice a year or oftener.’ There are statutes three times in the reign of Ed­ward III. ‘that parliament should be held once a year or oftener.’ To the same purpose, in the time of Rich. II. Prorogations of parliament were then unknown. They began under Henry VI. Little used till Hen. VIII. Will. III. was blamed for so many officers in parliament. The king has power to chuse his officers and servants; but the servants and representatives of the people ought not to be the king's servants: who can serve too masters? If votes are purchased by places, and members are more than reimbursed their own shares of the public taxes, they become interested to load the people, in order to fill their own pockets. Accordingly let it be considered what a load might now be taken off from the people by annihilating useless places and corrupt pensions. [Page 110] A man may at one time be fit for being a represen­tative, who is not so at another. He may go into the house in independent circum [...]tances. In three years, extravagance learned at London may beggar him. Were parliaments annual▪ the chance of this would be as 1 to 7. By a few mens m [...]opolizing legislative power, 6 times the number 5 [...]8, or 3,34 [...] are in every parliament excluded from practically learning parlia­mentary knowledge, and understanding th [...] [...]nterests of their country, besides their being exclu [...]e [...] [...] what they have an equal natural right to, with the 558, who were chosen, i. e. who bought their seats.

Short parliaments would give the people an oppor­tunity of knowing more of the state of things both at home and abroad, than long ones. 558 gentlemen do not know so much as seven times that number, or three times that number. Long parliaments are par­ticularly favourable to corruption. A virtu [...]us man could not be debauched in a year's [...] in St. Ste­phen's chapel. Nemo repente fuit [...]urpisimus.

Length of parliaments destroys all responsibility, makes our delegates our masters, and erects them into an august assembly, whom we must not approach but in the humble guise of petition. Short parliaments would be clear of suspicion, and nothing would more promote confidence between king and people than free­dom from suspicion of court influence. If our kings are indifferent about the people's confidence, we are in the case of the people of France, whom the king can plunder at will. Can the people be fre [...] from suspicion, when they see some hundreds of placemen in the house? They must be a nation of ideots, if they were. [Page 111] With what honest views can the court desire long parliaments? Parliamentary slavery is flower, but surer than quo warrantos, and the other oppressive acts of tyranny, which alarm the people and defeat them­selves. So Cha. II had almost ruined all by his long pensioned parliament, whose very length qualified it for pensi [...]ning. All wise nations, and all good princes have approved of frequent meetings with their parliaments and di [...]ts. Our Edwards and Henries often put a stop to the course of their victories to meet parliament. The Spaniards were peculiarly cautious about the frequency of their state meetings. Their Sanchos, Henries, Ferdinands, and Charles's were very careful of this. Under Charles, who was particularly exact in this respect, the Spanish monarchy was most flourishing. His son Philip pursued a contrary plan of encroachment on the people, and first eclipsed the glory of the monarchy. In France, under Clovis, Pepin, Charlemagne, Capet, and his successors for ages, the meetings of the states were cherished. Lewis XI. and most of his successors have promoted the contrary scheme of government, without the people. The consequences have been continual insurrections, tu­mults, and leagues. The subjects have often returned with interest on the heads of their ambitious princes, the damages they have suffered at their hands, which has reduced the kingdom to extreme distress. The struggles of the parliament of Paris, and people of France, during the minority of this present king, to recover their lost liberties, shew the precarious state of despotic monarchs. When Germany was exposed to unspeakable miseries from the Hungarians, Sclavo­nians, Vandals and Danes, the remedy was establish­ing frequent and annual diets by the golden bull, under Charles IV, wherein the imperial cities and Hanse [Page 112] towns took care to send new deputies to every new diet, lest they should be bribed by the imperial mini­sters. Holland, and Switzerland, though improve­able in many points, are very careful on this head, and by the frequency of the assemblies of their states, have been secure.

Harrington labours to shew, that all well-con­ducted states have avoided the error of suffering power to continue too long in the same hands And he quotes Machiavel, who ascribes the ruin of the Roman commonwealth, to the want of an agrarian law, and the damage, which accrued from the prolongation of power in the same hands ^a.

Dr. South gave out his text, ‘The word of the Devil, which I would recommend to your serious attention at this time, is written in the IId chapter of Iob, and the 4th verse, "All that a man hath will he give for his life,"’ &c. The jacobites moved, A. D. 1693, for a place-bill, and short parliaments. And there were men, who, in the apostle Paul's time, preached Christ from contention. But truth is truth, if the Devil had spoke it, and christianity is a good religion, though some have preached it from conten­tion. So a place-bill, and short parliaments are salu­tary measures, though the jacobites proposed them from party-views. The former was passed by the commons, but rejected by the lords; the latter passed both houses, but was denied the royal assent. The lords threw out the bill for incapacitating placemen from sitting in the house, because it would seem too great a restraint on the people's liberty of choice. But this is a frivolous objection. For as the law stands now, the people are restrained from chusing [Page 113] persons unqualified as to fortune, and those who hold certain places; and all the evil is, that the people are not more restrained in their choice of improper persons.

‘Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments, bind not,’ says Blackstone ^a. Therefore short parliaments are desirable. It is impos­sible, in many cases, to foresee what the effect and operation of an act of parliament will prove. And if a bad law must continue in force seven years (the same parliament will not perhaps like to repeal its own law) the subjects may be heavy sufferers.

The length of parliaments dejects the spirits of the few patriots who are still left. At the sitting down of a new parliament they lose all hope of redress, for many years. And the depression of their courage is the triumph of the court, and gives them opportu­nity for rivetting the chain.

If our parliaments were annual, it might be as well, that our ministries, and the rest of the execu­tive, were more permanent. For an honest parlia­ment (and an annual parliament, with exclusion by rotation, could have no interest to be other than honest) would oblige the executive to act according to justice, and the public interest, which would secure the pub­lic safety. The reducing our parliaments to indepen­dency on the court, would confound the enemies of this country. For it would shew the world, that the court had no indirect designs. And no nation can hope to injure Britain, if her government is true to her.

Walpole, A. D. 1735, when the house was moved about shortening parliaments said, It would be dan­gerous; for that it would make the government demo­cratical by giving factious men too much game to [Page 114] play. This was truly Walpolian, that is jesuitical, reasoning. In whose hands ought the power to be? In those of a corrupt court? will it be safer there than in the hands of the original proprietors, I mean the people? Is the court likely to consult the people's interest with more diligence and fidelity than the peo­ple themselves? The court may be rich, though the nation be ruined. But if the nation be ruined, what is to become of the people?

The unembarrassed modesty of a thorough-paced courtier sticks at nothing. Pelham formally sets him­self ^a to prove (in opposition to the sense of all that ever thought, spoke, or wrote upon government) that ‘it is an advantage of our constitution, that a person, may be in a station of power his whole life, because the attachment of the people to their king and royal family, will always prevent any bad effects from his ambition, and the controul of a master, or sovereign,’ [however ill-disposed, or however mis-led, the sove­reign may be] ‘as well as of two houses of parlia­ment,’ [however corrupt the parliament may be] will always prevent his being guilty of very enor­mous practices, or will, at all times, even when he is in the zenith of his power, be able to discover and punish them, if he should.' But wise founders of states have generally thought prevention preferable to punishment; and have, therefore, made regulations for preventing the continuance of power too long in the same hands. And in spite of their utmost precau­tion, wicked ministers have often escaped.

It is observed, that the members are particularly careful of their conduct toward the end of a parlia­ment, with a view to their being re-elected. Does [Page 115] not this shew the advantage of short parliaments, and the frequent return of power into the hands of the people? If it be said, upon the plan of exclusion by rotation, and an effectual place-bill, gentlemen would not want to be re-elected, and therefore the shorten­ing of parliaments would not make them at all the more careful of their conduct; this is confessing all that is wanted, viz. That, if parliaments were upon a right foot, there would be no byass upon the minds of the members, to draw them away from their coun­try's interest; which they would naturally pursue, because their own is involved in it.

The place-bill has been repeatedly passed by the commons in consideration of an approaching general election, which shews plainly the advantage of short parliaments ^a.

A motion was made, A. D. 1713, to address the queen that she would desire the duke of Lorrain to remove the pretender out of his dominions. Sir Wil­liam Whitlocke observed, that there was such an address presented to Cromwel about the removing of Charles Stuart out of France, who was afterwards restored to the throne. Being near the end of a parliament, and the members fearing for their election, it was resolved nem. con ^b. This shews the advantage of short parlia­ments. For the jacobite interest was at that time thought to be strong in the house.

In the Devonshire instructions, A. D. 1741, which were admired for their conciseness and sense, is the following, ‘restore triennial parliaments, the best security for British liberty ^c.’

[Page 116] ‘In governments, where the legislature is one lasting assembly, there is danger, that the mem­bers of such assembly think they have an interest dis­tinct from that of the community ^a.’ In England, while parliaments are septennial, it may happen, that many hundreds of individuals may be legislators the greatest part of their lives. Accordingly it was found, in the year 1766, that 64 members had served in a parliaments, 31 in 5, 16 in 6, 3 in 7, 2 in 8, 1 in 9, and 1 in 10. ^b

Many writers lay great stress upon I know not what imaginary danger from unbalancing the power of the three estates. For my part, I own I am so dull, that I can see but one danger respecting the interior of the kingdom, viz. The danger of the people's being enslaved by the servants of the crown. Suppose the power of king and lords diminished to what degree the reader pleases; if the people of property in general were free and happy, could the king and lords be unhappy? Would the king and the lords have just reason to complain, if they were happy? Does any friend to his fellow-creatures wish the king and lords to possess power for any other purpose, than the gene­ral happiness? Can we not imagine a state, in which the people might be very happy, in which king and lords possessed much less power than they do in this country? Can we not imagine a very happy state, in which there was neither king nor lords? What is the necessity of a check on the power of the commons by king and lords? Is there any fear, that the com­mons be too free to consult the general good? Must [Page 117] the representatives of the people be checked and clog­ged in promoting the interest of their constituents? If there be not some necessity for this (which to me seems as rational as to say, there ought to be a check to prevent individuals from being too healthy, or too virtuous) I cannot see the solidity of that reasoning, which lays so much stress on the necessity of a balance, or equality of power among the three estates, or indeed (speculatively, or theoretically speaking) of a necessity of any more estates than one, viz. An ade­quate representation of the people, unchecked and uninfluenced by any thing, but the common interest; and that they appoint responsible men for the execu­tion of the laws made by them with the general ap­probation. Yet some writers of no small note effect to regret the supposed weakness of the crown and house of lords, when set against the commons, because the latter commands the purse. ‘The king's legislative power, ‘says my esteemed friend Mr. Hume, is no check to that of the commons.’ And why, I pray you, should it be a check? Again, Though the king has a negative in the passing of laws, yet this, in fact, is esteemed o [...] so little moment, that whateve [...] is voted by the two houses is sure ^a to be passed into a law, and the royal assent is little better than a mere form.’ What would this gentleman have? Ought a king, a single individual, or a handful of lords, to have the power of stopping the business of the whole British empire according to their caprice, or their interested views, whose interest may often be imagined (by themselves at least) to lie very wide of the general weal? I can see very clearly the use of a check upon the power of [Page 118] a king or lords; but I own I have no conception of the advantage of a check upon the power of the people, or their incorrupt and unbyassed represen­tatives. The same eminent writer seems to think a certain competent degree of court-influence, by offices, necessary. For my part, I look upon every degree, great or small, of ministerial power in parliament as a deadly poison in the vitals of the constitution, which must bring on its destruction.

The opposers of annual parliaments say, Every thing will be fluctuating under them, and no nation will treat with you; no war can be prosecuted with success. &c. Have they then forgot, that the trea­ties of Bretigny and Troyes were concluded, and the victories of Crecy and Agincourt gained, under the aus­pices of annual parliaments? On the contrary, ‘it is thought by many (says the author of PREF. TO FRAGM. POLIB. ^a) that the septennial act, A. D. 1716, was the severest stab, the liberties of the people of England ever received.’

A standing parliament, or the same parliament long continued, changes the very nature of our con­stitution in the fundamental article, on which the preservation of our whole liberty depends ^b.' The security of our liberty does not consist only in frequent sessions of parliament, but in frequent new parlia­ments ^c.

‘The antient custom (says Davenant ^d) in the mixed governments formed in these northern coun­tries (which will be the best model for them to fol­low) was, That national assemblies should be fre­quently called, and sent home as soon as the nation's business was dispatched. The wisdom of old times [Page 119] did never think it convenient that one and the same assembly should sit many years brooding of faction. For it is in these continued sessions, where the skill is learnt of guiding, and being guided, where the youth is depraved, and old sinners hardened, where those parties are formed that give the cunning speak­ers so much weight and value, and where they can bring their subtlety and eloquence to market. And in former reigns, the departing from a principle so essential in its constitution, had like to have changed the whole face of the English government; for leeches and other blood-sucking worms are ingen­dered in standing pools; flowing waters do not cor­rupt or breed so many insects. The keeping a na­tional assembly long sitting debauches the gentry of a kingdom, and opens a way to offices of trust, not known among their ancestors; but when such assem­blies are called together to consult upon the difficul­ties of state, and are dissolved as soon as the public business is dispatched, the measures of the false poli­ticians become presently quite altered. They, who design to rise, must mount by other steps than for­merly. Intriguing, heading▪ parties, running into factions, and sudden changing of sides will avail the busy men but little. A year or two is not sufficient to mould and fashion an assembly to their designs; every new sessions young gentlemen are sent up whom it is not so easy to corrupt; they can fix nothing where there is a perpetual flux and reflux of matter; it is like building on a quick sand. When such as intend to advance themselves in the world see all this, and that these assemblies are no more the field in which they can exercise their wicked arts with any advan­tage, they naturally fall into other methods, and are [Page 120] honest of course, when it is no longer their interest to be otherwise. In such a constitution there is no need to silence troublesome and perplexing rhetoric with some good office, nor to buy off and reconcile at any rate, men of turbulent and ambitious spirits; and when it is not needful to hire people to save their own country, how much cheaper and more easy is govern­ment rendered to princes, who then have a free choice among their subjects to call whom they please into the service of the state? whereas otherwise their favours are confined to one narrow sphere; and as thereby their goodness is made more extensive, so the stations requiring abilities and experience must be better filled, when a court has not the necessity upon it to find out places for men rather than men that are fit for the places. In countries where this post, so essential to liberty, is thus preserved from corrup­tion, all matters relating either to war or peace, pub­lic revenues, or trade, will go on prosperously; and a national assembly so constituted will always produce wholesome laws, right administration, and a perpe­tual race of honest and able ministers.’

Charles II. governed, by his long or pensioned-parliament in much the same arbitrary manner as William the Bastard did without a parliament. For, ‘as the people had in both cases lost the exercise of their annual power of election, with that they had lost the remedy for all their grievances. And under this mode of things may be observed all the marks of tyranny that can be found under the despotic go­vernment of one man. The laws were no longer any protection to the innocent. Judgment and jus­tice were directed by court-policy; severity and [Page 121] cruelty took the place of mercy and moderation; slitting of noses, cutting of ears, whipping, pillory­ing, branding, fining, imprisoning, hanging, and beheading, were the constant lot of those who had virtue enough to speak, write or act in defence of constitutional liberty. And so far was the house of commons from relieving the people under this dread­ful distress, that they contributed all in their power to prevent even their cries and prayers from either approaching the throne or themselves. They passed a law, by which no man durst ask his neighbour to join him in a petition for relief to the king or either house of parliament. It was a melancholy conside­ration to see the people refused the benefit of prayers and tears for relief against their own infamous de­puties ^a.’

‘Nothing could make it safe (says the author of DISSERT. ON PARTIES ^b) nor therefore reasonable, to repose in any set of men whatsoever so great a trust as the collective body delegates on the repre­sentative in this kingdom, except the shortness of the term for which this trust is delegated. There­fore every prolongation of this term is in its degree unsafe for the people; it weakens their security, and endangers liberty by the very powers given for its preservation. Such prolongations expose the nation, in the possible case of having a corrupt parliament, to lose the great advantage which our constitution hath provided of curing the evil before it grows con­firmed and desperate, by the gentle method of chusing a new representative, and reduces the people by con­sequence to have no other alternative than that of [Page 122] submitting or resisting, though submitting will be a [...] grievous, and resistance much more difficult, when the legislature betrays its trust, than when the king alone abuses his power.—These reflections, are sufficient to prove these propositions; and these propositions set before us in a very strong light, the necessity of using our utmost efforts that the true design of our constitution my be pursued as closely as possible by the re-establishment of annual, or at least triennial parliaments.’

The author of a piece intituled A Discourse between a Yeomen of Kent, and a Knight of a Shire upon the Prorogation of the Parliament to May 2, 1693 ^a, writes as follows.

The king had rejected the bill ‘for securing the foundations of the civil government, by such a con­stant succession of new-chosen parliaments, that their deputies, by their long continuance in that trust▪ may not be in danger to be corrupted by offices o [...] private interest.’ The speakers in the dialogue remark, that the mischiefs of Charles IId's and Iames IId's reign were occasioned, in great measure, by their refusing to call successive parliaments, and by continuing the same parliament for many years, to form them to a compliance with their designs of despotic power. They observe, ‘That from king William's so­lemn and repeated assurances that he would put a stop to the arbitrary power exercised over the people, and parliament, and from his request to parliament, that they would make such an effectual provision for their fundamental laws and liberties, that they might never hereafter be in danger to be again invaded; there was [Page 123] reason to expect, that the antient, legal course of annually-chosen parliaments would have been im­mediately restored, and the strongest fence made for that constitution, that the wisdom of the kingdom could have invented.’ But the promoters of the revolution lost the opportunity.

Politicians have laid down for a maxim, That if kings were republican in their measures of administra­tion, subjects would be royalists in their obedience. Our kings have it in their own absolute power to do the nation a prodigious service. The king can dis­solve every parliament at the end of the first session; which would make parliaments annual. But this would be applying prerogative to the advantage of the people; whereas kings generally think it is in­tended for their advantage, and to keep the people down. Yet even the army (not generally friendly to liberty) proposed, A. D. 1647, biennial parliaments^a; that the counties should elect members ‘according to the respective rates they bore in the common charges and burdens of the kingdom, and that the election of burgesses for poor declined or inconside [...]able towns be taken off ^b.’ And general Fairfax, in his pro­posals for peace in Charles Ist's time, makes the reduc­tion of the period of parliament to two years, an essen­tial article ^c.

‘If it should ever happen, says the author of PREF. TO FRAGM. POLYB. ^d that the representatives, en­couraged by long independence on the people, should instead of reforming grievances, increase their num­ber, and become themselves the greatest grievance; [Page 124] the people will, in that case, have no legal remedy, which is in itself contrary to the nature of govern­ment; it being ridiculous to imagine that the same law, which provides a remedy for every private wrong, should provide none for these of the public, or that the whole body of the people, for whose sake the law itself was instituted, should ever find them­selves in such circumstances, as to lose the benefit of it. Yet this must happen if it be received as a standing maxim of law and justice, that their repre­sentatives when once chosen for any number of years, have, notwithstanding the grossest misbehaviour, still a right to sit out their term, and what is worse to extend it as far as the affairs of the nation, or their own, may seem to require. If this be adm [...]ed, then no term can by law be prescribed to their sitting; because they have still a power by law of extending that term, and consequently of perpetuating them­selves. This, however improbable, must, upon a supposition of the legality of the first extension of the original term, be allowed to be equally legal. From hence it appears how dangerous it is to remove the corner stones of government; and that whenever they have been removed through necessity, the first op­portunity ought to be laid hold of to restore them to their former situation.’

Lord Digby, in his speech, A. D. 1640, says, The safety of the state consists in frequent parlia­ments. They are the unum necessarium. The long intermission of parliaments has always produced bad effects.' He observes, that the oppressions of ship-money, and the rest in Charles Ist's time, were worse than all the grievances from Magna Charta down, and that the intermission of parliaments was the pri­mary [Page 125] cause of the ministry's daring to oppress the sub­ject. [He had no idea of a bribed parliament's second­ing the views of a villainous court.] A parliament, he says, is the only security against a bad ministry. [But what security against a bad parliament?] For a ministry will always aim at an enlargement of power, and a parliament only can curb them. ‘No state can wisely be confident of a minister's being good longer than the rod is held over him ^a.’ He men­tions Nov as once a great patriot and promoter of the petition of right; afterwards, when made attorney general, the very inventor of ship-money. He calls Wentworth also a shameful apostate. He is for trien­nial parliaments. There were no places nor money to bribe with then. But even triennial parliaments now would be too long.

‘Had we had frequent parliaments, says Sir W. Drake, A. D. 1641, we should have given a timely stop to mischiefs, and never have suffered them to break in upon us with such an inundation of distem­pers, that without prevention, may yet swallow us up ^b.’

The act, A. D. 1641, for securing parliament against dissolution by the king, without its own con­sent, was dangerous, as it left parliament at liberty to sit as long as they pleased. But it was thought safe, because there was then no considerable number of places, pensions, or contracts, and the people had therefore an unreserved confidence in parliament. It set, however, a very bad example for corrupt times. The people thought it a glorious victory over the tyrant, the only object of their fear; little apprehend­ing, that ever a time would come, when they should [Page 126] have reason to dread an excessive power in parliament [...] ▪ Yet they ought to have known, that it is never [...] that power be so far out of the people's reach, th [...] they cannot resume it, whenever they see it abused▪ either by kings, or parliaments. And they ought to have remembered, that (such is the disposition of the human mind) to give independent power to any set of men whatever, is giving them the watch-word to erect themselves into tyrants. The proceedings of that very parliament exhibited a striking proof of the justness of this remark, and the independency on their constituents, still arrogated by many of our members of parliament, confirms it. Were our parliaments annual, we should see our members as ready to ac­knowledge their responsibility to their constituents, [...] now our overseers of the poor are to submit their ac­counts to the examination of the parish.

The triennial bill under king William III. was received, says Burnet ^a, with great joy; many fan­cying, that all their other laws and liberties were now the more secure, since this was passed into a law. Time must tell what effects it will produc [...] whether it will put an end to the great corruption, with which elections were formerly managed, and to all those other practices, which accompany them. Men, who intended to sell their own votes within doors, spared no cost, to buy the votes of others in elections. But now it was hoped, we should see a golden age, wherein the characters men were in, and the reputation they had, would be the prevail­ing considerations in elections. And by this means it was hoped, that our constitution, in particular [Page 127] that part of it, which related to the house of com­mons, would again recover its strength and repu­tation, which were now very much sunk. ‘For cor­ruption was so generally spread, that it was believed, every thing was carried by that method.’

To these observations of the good bishop, I will add, That it is at no time easy to say what effect a partial reformation of abuses will produce. And the mere reducing of parliaments to triennial is surely a very partial correction. It is only stopping one leak in ten. For supposing parliaments were triennial, so long as a few thousands (instead of many hundred thousands) have the power of sending in a majority of the house, it will be in the power of the treasury to influence elections. And, so long as there is no penalty for sitting in the house of commons, and, at the same time, enjoying a place, or pension, so long there will be danger lost the votes of the members be influenced by a corrupt court. And so long as the same individuals may be returned again and again, without necessity of exclusion by rotation, so long it will be worth the ministry's while to influence them, and worth their while to bribe their electors. But, if parliaments were annual, with exclusion by rota­tion; if the power of electing were equally distri­buted, as it ought to be, among men of property, so that no one member could be elected by fewer than a majority of 800 votes; and if no member could hold a place, or pension, while he sat in the house of commons, under a severe penalty—if all these restorations of the constitution were brought about, I will engage, that court-influence in parliament shall be impossible; and then we shall see the golden days mentioned by the bishop.

[Page 128]Concerning triennial parliaments it was argued, A. D. 1693, That long parliaments might prove dangerous either to king or people; to the former by their obtaining great influence among the people, and retrenching too much the power of the crown. But this I think frivolous, because history has no example of a crown, whose power was too much retrenched. And besides it is most likely that a short parliament will retrench prerogative. That long parliaments may be likely to prove dangerous to the people, is extremely natural. For power becoming inveterate in the hands of any set of men is always dangerous. When a court knows, that the same set of men are likely to be in parliament for seven, fourteen, or twenty one years, it becomes worth while to practise upon them; and a wicked court may influence a corrupt parliament to give up, says Burnet ^a, all the money and all the liberties of England, when they are to have a large share of the money, and are to be made instru­ments of tyranny.' ‘Frequent parliaments would like­wise, says the same author, put an end to the great expence, candidates put themselves to in elections, and would oblige the members to behave themselves so well, both with relation to the public, and in their private deportment, as to recommend them to their electors at the three years end; whereas, when a parliament is to fit many years, the members covered with privileges, are apt to take great liber­ties, to forget, that they represent others, and to take care only of themselves.’ Burnet mentions some objectio [...]s then made to frequent elections, as, ‘That they would make the freeholders proud, and inso­lent, when they knew, that application must be [Page 129] made to them at the end of three years. This would establish a faction in every body of men, who had a right to election; and whereas now an election puts men to a great charge all at once, then the charge must be perpetual all the three years, in lay­ing in for a new election, when it was known, how soon it would come round.’ But surely we cannot do much, if we cannot get over such frivolous objec­tions as these. As to the pride and insolence, which the power of frequent elections would produce in the freeholders, it is nothing to the purpose. We are not to deprive the freeholders of what is otherwise their just right, because their possessing of it may make them proud. On that principle, they must not have their estates, at least none must have considerable estates. And, above all, we must have no bishops, peers, or kings. And as to faction's being likely to be increased by shortening parliaments, it is more likely to confound faction. The very support of faction is power continued long in the same hands. And as to the increase of expence to members in con­sequence of short parliaments, it is an objection set upon its head. For, if parliaments were annual, with exclusion of two thirds for three years by rotation, there would be at once an end put to packing, brib­ing, canvassing, electioneering, placing, and pension­ing of parliament-men; because the parliament, never consisting wholly of the same men for two years together, it would not be worth while for the court to get their iniquitous schemes carried in parliament, only to remain for one year, and be overthrown the next; and whenever a seat in the house came to be no longer a matter of emolument, the contest would be (as now with respect to parish-officers in England, [Page 130] and seats in the assemblies in America) how to avoid being elected.

The people's right of annually electing deputies to represent them in parliament was, at the time of the triennial act, as much a part of their birthright, as the freedom of their persons. They had enjoyed it longer than Magna Charta, without violation, till the times of Charles I. It was therefore no more in the power of any single king and parliament to deprive the people of this right, than of Magna Charta. And the people have now a right, at any time, to resume their original power, and to elect only for one year, declaring, that they will not yield obedience to one act made in a second year of the same parliament.

The only plausible pretence for septennial parlia­ments, viz. the danger of a jacobite parliament's being chosen, never was solid; because, on that principle, parliaments should have been still longer than septen­nial, that is, there should have been no new parlia­ment called, while there was a considerable body of jacobites in the nation. But if the pretence for sep­tennial parliaments had been ever so plausible, at the time of that fatal innovation, in the name of common sense, what has that to do with our times?

It was proposed to address for frequent new parlia­ments, A. D. 1675, in the house of peers. It was urged that parliaments both before and long after the conquest, were held 3 times a year, viz. at Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas, 8 days, each time ^a. This continued with some variations till Edward III. Then parlia­ments were appointed to be annual, or oftener, if need be, ‘and prorogations were not then, nor till late [Page 131] times, unknown ^a.’ It was unreasonable, that the same man should engross legislative power, and exclude so many others equally entitiled. Change of hands was useful to keep those intrusted to their duty. A member may be chosen when in good circumstances. He may ruin himself with gaming, &c. Then he becomes obnoxious to bribery. Then he taxes the people, to enable the court to bribe him, and the rest of the venal crew. At any rate a place-man is not as free as he who has nothing from the court. Hono­res mutant mores. ‘The commons are now become judges of their own privileges, condemning and imprisoning their fellow subjects’ [their constituents, their masters] ‘at pleasure, and without oath; they are judges of all elections, by which means very often they, and not the people, chuse their fellow members. This is owing to the length of parlia­ments. Long parliaments give time for settling cabals and schemes of corruption. The nation was therefore much obliged to the long pensioned parlia­ment for not enslaving it. How easily this may be done in future ages, under such princes and long par­liaments, may easily be conjectured ^b. Lately there have been given 1500l. 2000l. and 7000l. to be elected. There is a scurvy proverb, That men, who buy dear, cannot live by selling cheap.’ The address was however carried in the negative. Several lords protested, and the king came to prorogue the house before all the lords who intended to join in the pro­test, were come to the house ^c.

‘It cannot be unknown to king William,’ (says the judicious author of REASONS FOR ANNUAL PAR­LIAMENTS [Page 132] ^a) ‘how much he has been libelled, because so many of his officers were in the house.—’ ‘I am desirous that it should be made apparent, for the future, in every parliament, that there is no likelihood of its being debauched, and that will be made apparent by establishing annual parliaments ^b.’ He then goes on to shew, that, as members are de­legated by electors, to supply their places, and do their business for them, they ought not to be con­tinued longer than a year; because circumstances may so change in a year, that a member who was fit for the business in agitation, when he was chosen, may be found very ill qualified for judging of what comes before parliament, the following sessions; yet the electors have no opportunity of changing h [...]m for a more proper deputy. Again he shews, that the con­tinuing the same members for several years is over­throwing the people's privilege of delegation, and giving their delegates a power of becoming their masters, and the creatures of the court, from which, and not the people, they receive their commissions upon every new prorogation. If short parliaments be the most effectual means for preventing bribery, short parliaments are eminently desireable; for bribery is more dangerous than quo warrantos. He then goes on ^c to shew, that frequent new parliaments were the custom under our Henries and Edwards. That the best kings of Spain, and of France, and the best German emperors were most desirous of frequent meetings with their people in their general cortes, parliaments, and diets.

[Page 133]When the septennial bill was proposed, A. D. 1716, it was pretended, that the people were very generally disaffected, though the rebellion was quel­led; and that the hopes of the jacobites were founded on a new parliament. It was proposed first, to sus­pend the triennial act for once, which would have continued the parliament three years longer. It was questioned whether the septennial bill should be set on foot in the house of lords or commons. It was thought best it should be started in the lords house, where the triennial originated; that the odium might not fall upon the commons so as to hinder their elections. Triennial elections (they said) keep up party divisions, raise animosities in families, occasion ruinous expences, &c. The only pretence for lengthening parliaments, was the jacobitism of the people, which was owing to the mad cry of The church in danger, set up by the bigotted priesthood. ‘Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.’ Could they not see that the contest about elections was owing to the posts and places? Why did they not abolish them, as in Holland? The whigs made a point of carrying the bill, and every opposer of it was to be set down for a tory. The triennial act, when passed, was looked upon by the people as their great security. Why therefore did the people's deputies dare to mention the repeal of it? It had made king William supremely popular. The septennial bill was taking the election fro [...] the people, and electing themselves for four years. Parliaments ought not to be altered from what was the known intention of the electors, wi [...]hout new authority obtained from the electors. But that they did not ask; well knowing they should not obtain it. The expence of frequent [Page 134] elections was no argument, because these expences are voluntary. Frequent elections, it was said, pro­duced corruption, [the contrary is the truth, their consciences told them] and corruption produced the parliament which approved the peace of Utrecht. [If corruption does mischief, the business is to remove the materials of corruption. The cause abolished, the effects will cease of course.] Lord Trevor said, the shortest parliaments were the best, and that annual was the constitutional period. That parliaments were longest in the worst times, and when the revolution came in, which brought liberty, with it came short parliaments. It was very necessary, he said, to make regulations for preventing parliaments making en­croachments on the constitution, as well as for re­straining ministerial encroachments. If the people were disaffected and discontented, whether would the lengthening of parliaments conciliate, or widen the breach? There is no representative of the people but a house, of their own making. Every election, supposing representation adequate, and places out of the way, throws the government again into the hands of the people, where it must always be safe. It is absurd to alledge, that foreign states could not trust us, if our parliaments were shortened. What more permanent than the French court? But who trusts the French court? Let property govern, and all will be safe, and universal confidence will follow. A long parlia­ment made Charles II. indifferent about the affec­tions of his people. The lengthening of parliaments tended to produce faction in foreign states, when they saw how easily the British constitution might be broke into. It was therefore observed in the house of peers, that to publish the prevalency of a popish faction in Britain, and to tell foreigners, that the people were [Page 135] not to be trusted with themselves, was confounding all confidence of foreign states in this nation. Articles in the lords protest against committing, were, ‘That frequent new parliaments are required by the consti­tution of this kingom, and the practice of many ages evidences this to be the constitution. That long par­liaments naturally increase corruption. The longer the time, the more worth a corrupt minister's while to bribe, and the more worth a candidate's to get in­to the house.’ Thirty lords protested against com­mitting the bill, and afterwards 24 against passing it. Petitions were presented to the commons against it from Hastings, Marlborough, Cambridge, and Abing­don. ^a

In the same debate in the house of peers, the duke of Devonshire, in favour of the bill, laboured to set forth the inconveniencies attending triennial parlia­ments, that they served to produce feuds, animosi­ties, party-divisions, expensive elections,' with the other trite stuff commonly urged on that side of the question. On the contrary, lord Abingdon said, the people looked upon the triennial act, as the great security of their rights and liberties; that if the bill passed the commons, it would be looked upon by those they represented, as a breach of trust. The duke of Kingstone denied the last part of this assertion, and urged that the business of the legislature was to rectify old laws, as well as to make new ones. Lord Paulet said, he did not think it for the king's service, and interest; but before they went any farther, they ought to know the sentiments of the people. His lordship urged that the bill shewed a distrust of the affections of the people, without which no king could be safe or happy; that king William had gained the [Page 136] hearts of his people by the triennial act; and it would look somewhat strange, that the most popular of our laws should be repealed in a year after the protestant succession took place.

The earl of Peterborough said, He wished he could give his vote for the bill; but that he could not be for a remedy that might cause a greater evil; and that if this present parliament continued beyond the time for which they were chosen, he knew not how to express the manner of their existence, (unless begging leave of the venerable bench, turning to the bishops) he had recourse to the distinction used in the Athanasian creed, for they would neither be made nor created, but proceeding.

The earl of Nottingham was against the bill, because he thought it would rather exasperate, than quiet the minds of the people; and that though he could not assign the true cause of the people's dissatisfaction▪ yet there must have been some secret cause for it: That he hoped people's discontent was not so great, as had been represented; that this bill seemed to imply that the affections of the people were confined to so small a number as the present house of commons; that whatever reasons may be given for continuing this parliament for four years longer, would be at least as strong, (and by the conduct of the ministry might be made much stronger) for continuing it still longer, and even for perpetuating it; which would be an ab­solute subversion of the third estate of the realm. He then hinted at the danger of enlarging the prerogative, and instanced in the precedent of Henry VIII. who persuaded his parliament to give him the abbey-lands under pretence that they would bear part of his expences, which would ease them of taxes, and im­prove [Page 137] trade; but that soon after he demanded, and obtained, great subsidies, and made use of those lands to enslave the people.

The duke of Argyle said, that designs had been laid to bring in the pretender, long before the king's happy accession to the throne; and that if the conspi­rators had improved the ferment, at the election of the last parliament, it w [...]s probable their wicked schemes for setting aside the protestant succession had taken place.

The bishop of London said, he was confounded between danger and inconveniences on one side, and destruction on the other. After a debate of five hours the question being put, it was carried in the affirmative, 24 lords protesting against passing the bill, ‘Because fre­quent parliaments were the fundamental constitution of the kingdom▪ Because the house of commons ought to be chosen by the people; and when continued for a longer time, than they were chosen for, they were then chosen by the parliament, and not by the people. They conceived that the bill, so far from prevent­ing corruption, would rather increase it; for the longer a parliament was to last, the more valuable, to corruptors, would be the purchase. And that all the reasons that had been given for long parliaments, might be given for making them perpetual, which would be an absolute subversion of the third estate ^a.’

In the same debate in the house of commons the court-members said, the septennial bill would strengthen the hands of the king; settle and maintain the protestant succession; encourage our allies to depend upon us, that what shall hereafter be stipulated shall be performed; [Page 138] would break our parties and divisions, and lay a solid foundation for future happiness. And since the pre­sent parliament have exerted themselves for the public good, why should they not continue longer together, that they may finish what is so happily begun?

The opposition denied ‘that the people were dis­affected, said the parliament, that had done so great things, were but little more than a year old, and that nobody could imagine that discontents (if there were any) would last the remainder of their term, under so wise, so unerring, so pacific an admini­stration as they then enjoyed. Was the frame of our constitution to be altered, before our allies would favour us with their friendship? That was an argu­ment very improper to be urged in a British parlia­ment. It was acknowledging, that the king dares not trust the people in a new choice. It is a dis­honour to this house; for it supposes that another house of commons would act differently from the present, which is to confess, that this house does not truly represent the people. The trust, they said, was triennial; and if it was continued longer, from that instant they ceased to be the trustees of the people, from that instant they acted by an assumed power and erected a new constitution; and though it is a received maxim, That the supreme legislature cannot be bound, yet it must be under­stood that it was restrained from subverting the foundations on which itself stood. And now after above an hundred millions given by the people, in order to preserve their old form of government, a bill is sent from the lords, which if it passes, must expose us again to the greatest of dangers, which is that of a long parliament. In the pensioned parliament, [Page 139] the means of temptation in the minister's hands were not so great as they now are; the civil list nigh double to what it then was; and the depen­dence on the crown greatly enlarged by reason of the increase of officers for managing the public funds. What influence these may have upon an exhausted nation, under the terror which 40,000 regular troops carry with them, is easily foreseen. Can the lords think us so ungrateful, as to join in the destruction of the power that raised us; and why cannot we con­tent ourselves with proceeding in the common me­thods, which the usage of many ages justifies?’

It was resolved however, 284 against 162, that the bill be committed.

What follows is taken from Hutcheson's speeches on the same occasion ^a. ‘If we should give our con­sent to the passing of the bill before us into a law, we should be guilty of a most notorious breach of the trust reposed in us, by those who sent us hither, and should make a very dangerous step towards the undermining of that constitution, which our ances­tors have been so careful to preserve, and thought no expence either of blood or treasure too much for that purpose, and under which we do yet enjoy those privileges and advantages, which no other nation in the world can at this day boast of. It must be agreed, that before the reign of Henry VIII. there was no single instance of a prorogation of parliament. That parliaments had only one session, and those ge­nerally very short ones, none of which ever lasted a year. That to prevent the mischief of long inter­vals of parliament, it was enacted, in the 4th of [Page 140] Edward III. that parliaments should be holden an­nually; and this was confirmed by subsequent acts of parliament. And therefore I may venture to affirm, that by the antient constitution, parliaments were to be holden frequently, and to be of the continuance only of one session, and that there was no right or power in the crown to prorogue the same. I wish gentlemen would as generally concur that the other part which I have mentioned, and I think have made appear to have been our antient constitution, is as absolutely necessary to the preservation of our li­berties, I mean parliaments of one session, not only frequent parliaments, but frequent new parliaments. The thing indeed appears very evident to me, so evident that in my opinion our liberties would not be more, nay not so precarious under an absolute mo­narch, as with a house of commons who had a right to sit either for many years together, or without any limitation of time. For 'tis certain that a prince, who had stood only on the bottom of his own abso­lute authority, supported by a few ministers, and some troops, would still think himself pr [...]tty much upon his good behaviour towards the united body of his people; and would probably be cautious of ex­erting his power in such a manner as to give a just provocation to a general revolt, and setting up another in his stead; but a prince, with a parliament at his devotion, would be infinitely more terrible, and with much greater security might give a loose to every ex­travagancy of power; for when the representatives of the people, who are chosen by them to be the guar­dians of their liberties, can be prevailed on, for little advantages to themselves, to betray their trust, and [Page 141] come into all the measures of a designing ministry; 'tis then, indeed, that the liberties of a people are in the most imminent danger; and surely there is great reason to apprehend that a house of commons might soon become very obsequious to a minister, if they were to sit for a long period, or without limi­tation, and that there were in view no near day of a new election, when the conduct of gentlemen in this place would be inquired into in their respective countries. I remember very well, what an outcry was rais [...]d against the last parliament, on suspicion only that a repeal of the triennial act was intended; and the arguments against it without doors, were then the very same with those which are now urged a­gainst it within: what an inconsistency must it then appear to see those very gentlemen, who were then the most zealous opposers of such an attempt, be­come now the most violent advocates for it! And will it not also in some measure affect their integrity, publicly to own that the arguments they pretended to be then influenced by, had not the least weight with them; and that the thing in itself was very desirable when there should be a good ministry and parliament in being, and pernicious only in the then situation of affairs? It was not certainly from this consideration that the late ministry and parliament were diverted from the attempt: they doubtless had a very good opinion of themselves, and were confirmed therein by the voice of a great majority of the people; and which, by a most strange and unaccountable witch­craft, still continues in their favour; if I may depend upon what several who have argued for the bill seem to have agreed to ^a.’

[Page 142]An attempt was made in the year 1734, for shorten­ing parliaments. On which occasion Mr. Plummer spoke as follows.

‘I wish we would take an example from the crown in one thing. We may observe, that the crown never gives a place or employment for life, or for a long term of years, except such as cannot be other­wise disposed of, and the reason is plain: were these places given for life, the grantee would then be out of the power of the crown, and consequently would not have such a dependance on it, as those persons must have who enjoy their places during pleasure only.—In this the crown acts wisely, and I wish we would follow the example: when I say we, I speak of the gentlemen present, not as members of this house, but as a part of the people of Great Bri­tain: it would certainly be the height of wisdom in the people to keep those they trust and employ in their service as much in their power as possible. If those, the people chuse to represent them in this house, were to continue in that station only during the pleasure of the people, the representatives would, I believe, have a proper regard for the interests of the people, and would never think of throwing off all dependance upon them ^a.’

‘As bribery and corruption, says Mr. Wynne, in the same debate, is a natural consequence of long parliaments, as it must always increase in proportion as the term for the parliament's continuance is pro­longed, I am persuaded that all those who are against bribery and corruption will join with me in voting for the restitution of triennial parliaments. It is [Page 143] not the expence of an election that country gentle­men are to be afraid of; the most extravagant enter­tainments, that a stranger in the country could give, would have but little weight, if to these he did not add downright bribery; and even then bribes must be so high as to overballance the natural interest of the country gentlemen, as well as the honesty of the greatest part of the electors: as these bribes cannot be made so high for a triennial parliament, as they may for a septennial, they cannot be so prevalent among the electors; and therefore a gentleman, who de­pends upon nothing but his natural interest, will always have a better chance for representing his country in a triennial parliament than he can have in one which is to continue for seven years; for which reason I cannot but think that any gentleman who has a mind that his posterity shall depend for their seats in parliament upon the natural interest they may have in their respective countries, and not upon the frowns or the favours of the ministers for the time being, must necessarily be for our returning to our former constitution in this respect. This, Sir, is in my opinion absolutely necessary; and it must be done soon, otherwise country gentlemen, tired out with contending against those who purchase their elections, perhaps with the very money which the country gentlemen are obliged to pay out of their estates in public duties and taxes, will at last have nothing to do but to sit down and bemoan the fate of their country: but the complaints will then be to very little purpose: for the doors of that place where the groans of the people ought to be heard, will then be shut against them: we may depend on it, that those who obtain their seats in this house by [Page 144] ministerial influence, will, while here, be directed in all their proceedings by the same sort of influence, and by none other ^a.’

‘Ever since we have had septennial parliaments, our elections have been generally attended with distractions and confusions; but I cannot allow, that this would be the case if they were annual, or even triennial: and I would gladly ask gentlemen, if before that time it was ever known that the solicitations and conten­tions about elections began two years before the chus­ing of a new parliament, which is known to be the case at present over the whole kingdom, and which always must necessarily be the case; it being natural for men to contend with more vigour and heat for a post either of honour or profit, that is to be en­joyed for seven years, than for one that is to be held but for one, or for three. Then, Sir, as to the bribery and corruption at elections, I am sure it has very much increased since the septennial law took place. It is a natural consequence of lengthening the time of a parliament's continuance; a conse­quence so natural, that I am surprized to find it so much mistaken as it seems to be by some gentle­men who have spoken upon the other side of the question. It is certain, Sir, that bribery will never be made use of at any election, but by a man who has not a sufficient natural interest in the place where he declares himself a candidate; and by such we may expect it will always be made use of, as far as it can be done with safety, if the candidate has but the least hopes of succeeding by such dishonourable means. Where there happens a competition, every elector has a natural byass to vote for one man rather [Page 145] than another. And every elector will vote accord­ing to his natural byass, if he is not bought off. Whoever endeavours to buy him off, must certainly come up to his price; and this price will be higher or lower according to the elector's honour and circum­stances, and the natural byass he has for the other can­didate. A great many men may be perhaps bought off with 100 or 1000 guineas, who if half that sum were offered would spurn it away with an honest dis­dain. I hope, Sir, there are a great many electors in this kingdom, whose honour upon such occa­sions, is above the power of any such corrupt temp­tations: but that there are likewise a great many who may be bought, is a fact which I believe no gentleman in this house will dispute; and in this view let us examine the difference between triennial and septennial parliaments. Give me leave then to suppose two gentlemen set up in opposition to each other for representing one of our little boroughs in parliament; one of them a country gentleman of a great natural interest in the place; the other a citi­zen of London, or a placeman not near equal to him in interest; but depending entirely upon the money he is able to lay out. Suppose the citizen or place­man comes to a calculation, and finds that it will cost him at least 3000l. to buy the country gentle­man out of his interest in that borough; if the par­liament were to continue but for three years, he would very probably resolve not to be at such an expence, and so would refrain from being guilty of the crime of corrupting his countrymen; but when the parliament is to continue for seven years, he may as probably resolve to be at that charge. Thus by corruption he may get a seat in this house, and it [Page 146] is to be feared that he, who comes in by corruption, will not walk out with clean hands. Gentlemen are very much mistaken if they imagine that the price of an elector depends upon the duration of a parliament, or that a man who sells his vote for 100 guineas at an election for a septennial parliament, would sell his vote for the half of that sum, if the parliament to be chosen were to continue only for three years. No, Sir, there are very few of this sort of electors who think of futurity; the present offer is the temptation, and the only temptation which can be of any weight with them. Besides, they can­not depend upon having the like offer made them at the next election; and 50 guineas ready money with an. uncertain hope of having 50 more three years hence, is not surely, so great a price, as 100 guineas ready down. The natural interest of the country gentleman, and the honour of the electors, are what the dealers in corruption have to contend with; and against these a small price cannot be so prevalent as one a little higher. Some may perhaps be corrupted by a small price; but certainly the higher it is, the greater will the numbers be that are tempted to yield to it; and as a man may give a higher price at the election for a septennial parliament than he can do at one for an annual or triennial, therefore the greater the numbers will be of those who yield to his temp­tation, the more he may depend upon corruption; and the more it is to be depended on, the more general and the more frequent will it certainly be. From hence it appears evident, that the increase of bribery and corruption is as natural a consequence of septennial parliaments, as any one thing can be con­ceived to be the consequence of another. There is no way, Sir, of effectually preventing corruption, [Page 147] but by putting it out of the power of any man to corrupt: there is no corrupting any man but by com­ing up to his price; therefore the only way of put­ting it out of the power of any man to corrupt, is to put it out of the power of any man to come up to the price of any number of electors; and this can only be done by making our elections frequent: the more frequent, the better. It is certain, a gentle­man, who enjoys a good pension for seven years, is more able to give a high price, than if he had en­joyed that pension but for one year or even for three; and he will more willingly give a high price, when he is thereby to purchase the continuance of the pen­sion for seven, than for one, or for three. This, Sir, is so evident, that I am astonished to hear it contro­verted within these walls. If our parliaments were annual, it would be impossible for place-men or pen­sioners to save as much yearly as would be sufficient to bribe country gentlemen out of their interest, and the electors out of their honesty, which I am afraid is a practice now too frequent in many parts of this kingdom. How can it otherwise be imagined, the people would chuse persons they never saw, persons they perhaps never heard of, in opposition to gentle­men who live in the neighbourhood; gentlemen who give them daily employment, by buying in their shops and markets all the manufactures and provisions they have use for in their families, and gentlemen whose ancestors have perhaps often represented that very place in parliament with great honour and uni­versal approbation?’

Sir William Wyndham, in the same debate, shews the evil of long parliaments in one view as follows. ‘Let us suppose a gentleman at the head of the ad­ministration, whose only safety depends upon cor­rupting [Page 148] the members of this house.’ This may now be only a supposition, but it is certainly such a one as may happen; and if ever it should, let us see whether such a minister might not promise himself more suc­cess in a septennial than he could in a triennial par­liament. It is an old maxim, That every man has his price, if you can but come up to it. This I hope does not hold true of every man; but I am afraid it too generally holds true; and that of a great many it may hold true, is what I believe was never doubted of; though I don't know but it may now be denied: however let us suppose this distressed minister applying to one of those men who has a price, and is a member of this house. In order to engage this member to vote as he shall direct him, he offers him a pension of 1000l. a year: if it be but a triennial parliament, will not the member immediately con­sider thus within himself, if I accept of this pension, and vote according to direction, I shall lose my cha­racter in the country; I shall lose my seat in parlia­ment the next election, and my pension will then of course be at an end; so that by turning rogue I shall get but 3000l. This is not worth my while. And so the minister must either offer him perhaps the double of that sum, or otherwise he will probably determine against being corrupted. But if the parliament were septennial, the same man might perhaps say within himself, I am now in for seven years. By accepting of this pension I shall have at least 7000l. This will set me above contempt; and If I am turned out at next election, I do not value it. I'll take the money in the mean time. Is it not very natural to suppose all this, Sir? And does not this evidently shew that a wicked minister cannot corrupt a triennial parliament [Page 149] with the same money as he may a septennial? Again, suppose this minister applies to a gentleman who has purchased, and thereby made himself member for a borough at the rate of perhaps 1500l. besides travel­ing charges and other little expences: suppose the minister offers him a pension of 500l. a year to en­gage his vote; will not he naturally consider if it be a triennial parliament, that if he cannot get a higher pension, he will lose money by being a mem­ber; and surely if he be a right burgess, he will resolve not to sell at all, rather than sell his com­modity for less than it cost him; and if he finds he cannot sell at all, he will probably give over stand­ing a candidate again upon such a footing; by which not only he but many others will be induced to give over dealing in corrupting the electors at the next election. But if it be a septennial parliament, will he not then probably accept of the 500l. pension, if he be one of those men that has a price? Will he not conclude, that for 1500l. ^a he may always secure his election, and every parliament will put near 2000l. in his pocket, besides reimbursing him all his charges.

After viewing the present question in this light, is it possible, Sir, not to conclude that septennial par­liaments, as well as the elections for them, must al­ways be much more liable to be influenced by cor­ruption, than triennial, or the elections for them, &c.' Afterwards he goes on as follows:

Suppose, Sir, that the generality of the electors in England have virtue enough to withstand a temp­tation of 5 guineas each, but not enough to resist [Page 150] the force of 10 guineas, one with another: is it not then much more probable that the gentlemen who deal in corruption may be able to raise as much money once every seven years as will be sufficient to give 10 guineas each one with another to the generality of the electors, than that they will be able to raise such a sum once in every three years. And is it not from thence certain, that the virtue of the people in general is in greater danger of being destroyed by septennial than by triennial parliaments? To sup­pose, Sir, that every man's vote at an election is like a commodity, which must be sold at the market­price, is really to suppose that no man has any vir­tue at all: for I will aver, that when once a man resolves to sell his vote at any rate, he has then no virtue left; which I hope is not the case of many of our electors; and therefore the only thing we are to apprehend is lest so high a price should be offered as may tempt thousands to sell who had never be­fore any thoughts of carrying such a commodity to market. This, Sir, is the fatal event we are to dread, and is much more to be dreaded from septen­nial than from triennial parliaments. If we have therefore any desire to preserve the virtue of our people; if we have any desire to preserve our consti­tution; if we have any desire to preserve our liber­ties, our properties, and every thing that can be dear to a free people, we ought to restore the trien­nial law; and if that be found too insignificant▪ we ought to abolish prorogations, and return to annual elections.—Afterwards he adds what follows;

‘The crown, either by ill management or by pro­digality and profuseness to its favourites, has spent or granted away all its estates, and the public ex­pence [Page 151] is so much enlarged, that the crown must have annual supplies, and is therefore under a necessity of having the parliament meet every year; but as new elections are always dangerous, as well as trouble­some to the ministers of state, they are for having them as seldom as possible; so that the complaint is not now for want of frequent meetings or sessions of parliament, but against having the same parlia­ment continued too long. This is the grievance now complained of; this is what the people want redressed; it is what they have a right to have re­dressed. The members of parliament may for one year be looked on as the real and true representa­tives of the people; but when a minister has seven years to practise upon them, and to feel their pulses, they may be induced to forget whose representatives they are; they may throw of all dependance upon their electors, and may become dependants upon the crown, or rather upon the minister for the time being ^a.’

Sir I. St. Aubyn observed, in the same debate, that parliaments were generally annual, but never longer than triennial, till Hen. VIII. (an obstinate tyrant, who broke through all the laws of God and man, when they stood in the way of his ambition, avarice, or lust) introduced long parliaments, as proper means for enslaving the nation. Sir Iohn gives an account much too favourable of Ch. Ist's character, and of his hatred to parliaments. Ch. II. would have laid parliaments aside; but could not. Therefore he con­trived to debauch them. And his long pensioned-parliament will be infamous through all ages. ‘It [Page 152] was the model,’ says Sir Iohn, from which, I believe, some later parliaments have been exactly copied.' At the revolution, the people claimed their antient right. The triennial law was then estalished. The septennial law was intended only as a preservative against a temporary inconvenience. The inconveni­ence being removed, the remedy, which was itself an evil, and a violation of the constitution, ought to be removed, and the constitution restored. Long par­liaments become independent on the people, and de­pendent on the court. If the members are to deny all power in the people to instruct them, and are to sit seven years together voting as they please, in spite of the people, how are they a representative of the people? And if they may sit seven years, though the people have commissioned them only for three, why may they not make themselves perpetual, like the lords, and set the people aside? The power of the crown is always increasing. Therefore members ought to come frequently into the power of their con­stituents, that they may be kept under the constant awe of acting contrary to their interest. Dangerous attempts on liberty have been prevented by the ap­proach of a general election. Which shews the ad­vantage of short parliaments, which would occasion general elections to be always near. Long parlia­ments are an unjust exclusion of a great number of gentlemen of property, who ought to have their turn in serving their country. Frequent new parliaments would be great advantage to our kings. Were par­liaments annual, a king might, in the course of 28 years, have the advice of 28 gentlemen, where now he has only that of four. Short parliaments have always been less corrupt than long ones; because a minister [Page 153] must have time to lay his plans of operation, and erect his batteries against the virtue of the members, and men are not immediately debauched. Besides, the shorter parliaments are, the less it is worth a minister's while to bribe the members, for votes in the house; because the shorter time his iniquitous schemes can stand securely if he gains them. And this must of course lessen the expences, the animosities, and the corrupt proceedin [...]s of elections. Long parliaments first introduced bribery because they we [...]e worth pur­chasing at any rate; country gentlemen who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to serve, are unable to oppose corrup­tion, especially if at any time the public treasure shall be unfaithfully squandered away to corrupt their boroughs. ‘Country gentlemen, indeed, may make some weak efforts; but as they generally prove un­successful, and the time of a fresh [...]truggle is at so great a distance, they at last grow faint in the dispute, give up their country for lost, and retire in despair. Despair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper disposition for slavery. Ministers of state un­derstand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections. They know that the spirit o [...] liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by constant action; that it is impossible to en­slave the nation, while it is perpetually upon its guard. Let country gentlemen then, by having frequent op­portunities of exerting themselves, be k [...]pt warm and active in their contention for the public good. This will raise that zeal and indignation which will at last get the better of these undue influences, by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the several boroughs, have been able to supplant country g [...]ntle­men [Page 154] of great character and fortune who live in their neighbourhood. I do not say this upon idle specula­tion only. I live in a country where 'tis too well known, and I will appeal to many gentlemen in the house, to more out of it) and who for this very reason are out of it) for the truth of my assertion. It is a sore which has been long eating into the most vital parts of our constitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minister should ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs, if he should keep a register of them in his closet, and by sending down his treasury man­dates should procure a spurious representation of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the most con­tradictory measures of his administration, and even to vote every crude undigested dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power should become the sole object of their attention, and they should be guilty of the most violent breach of parlia­mentary trust, by giving the king a discretionary li­berty of taxing the people without restraint or con­troul; the last fatal compliment they can pay to the crown;—if this should ever be the unhappy circum­stance of this nation, the people indeed may complain to the crown, but the doors of that place where their complaints should be heard, will be for ever shut against them ^a.’

In the same debate, Sir I. Hinde Cotton observed, that the worst of our laws have been made by septen­nial parliaments; as the septennial act itself; the law of treason, by which a supposed traitor might be tried in any part of the country at the greatest distance from [Page 155] his friends and acquaintance; the riot-act; the S. S. act; the plague-act; the excise scheme) which indeed proved abortive); to which add the smuggling-act, the gin-act; the marriage-act; the stamp-act, &c. &c. &c.

‘Long parliaments’ (says Mr. Bromley, in the same debate) ‘have in former reigns proved the unhappy cause of great calamities to this nation, and have been at all times declared an innovation upon our consti­tution. The people looked upon the septennial bill as a dangerous infringement upon their liberties, not­withstanding the pretence alledged in the preamble to the act, which seemed at that time to carry some weight with it.—That in former times proroga­tions were unknown, and that as soon as the business of a parliament was over, it was dissolved, and a new one called the next year.—That the bill of rights declares, that frequent and new parliaments tend very much to the happy union and good agreement between king and people.—That the septennial act in its preamble complains of the expence and trouble of triennial parliaments, and therefore, very ab­surdly, instead of proposing what would have pro­duced a cure, viz. the reduction of parliaments to annual, proposes to aggravate the evil by lengthening their period.—That the multiplicity of places held by members, is a principal cause of contests and expences about elections.—That long parliaments are as demonstrably to the people's disadvantage, as it is demonstrably advantageous to have an annuity for 7 years, rather than for one ^a.’

It has been observed by some defenders of long par­liaments, that even the long pensioned parliament under Ch. II. became more faithful to the interest of [Page 156] the people, and more intractable to the court, at last, than at first. Sir I. Barnard gives a very satisfactory answer to this in the same debate ^a. ‘As to the long parliament in king Charles's time, though they did not toward the end shew the same servile com­pliance that they had done many years before, yet it is plain that the crown thought that parliament fitter for the purposes of the court, at that time, than they could expect any new parliament chosen by the people to be; otherwise, as the king had it in his power, he would have certainly dissolved them much sooner: and if that long parliament really deserved the name usually given to it, we must con­clude that their non-compliance at last was not owing to their virtue, or a want of inclination to receive, but to a want of power in the crown to give. The people were not then accustomed to bear such heavy burdens as they do at present, the reve­nues of the crown were not so large, nor the posts and places, at the disposal of the crown, so nume­rous; there was not such a formidable standing army, to support the parliament, in case they had gone on in the same servile method. And as the complaints of the people grew loud and clamorous, as there was little to be got and a great deal to be apprehended, by the continuance of a servile compliance with the courts measures, it is very probable that these were the true reasons of that parliament's becoming at last so restive. If the nation was now in the same state it was at that time, I should not be half so much afraid of septennial parliaments as I think I have now good reason to be.’

Sir I. Barnard gives a very good answer to the trite and disingenous objection against short parliaments, [Page 157] which our courtiers are always playing off upon us. ‘The animosities, disputes, and divisions about elec­tions, says he, have been set in the most dreadful light, and have been represented as so great an incon­venience, that we ought to run the risk of having our constitution overturned rather than submit to it. But, Sir, can it be imagined that there would be the same contention for a seat in parliament which was to continue but for one year, or even for three, that there is for one which is to continue for seven? The example of the city of London plainly shews us the contrary. As the common council-men and a great many other officers in the city are chosen annually, I have had occasion to be often present at the [...]e annual elections, and never could find, that they were attended with any great heats and animo­sit [...]es, or with any inconvenience; for after the elec­tion is over, the contending parties go home and live in the same friendship they did before. And I am convinced the case would be the very same, if annual elections for members of this house were restored. The same man might perhaps be conti­tinued and rechosen every year for many years toge­ther, probably without any dispute or opposition; but his bein [...] liable every year to be turned out, would be a continual check upon his behaviour, and would make him study the interests of the peo­ple, instead of pursuing only some private and selfish views of his own. Even as elections stand at present, the [...]e would be no such contentions, nor any such heats and animosities as we hear of if they were entirely le [...]t to gentlemen who have a natural interest in the place: in such case, if a candidate found him­self defeated by fair means only, and merely by the superior interest of his antagonist, it would not raise [Page 158] his indignation; it would occasion no heats or ani­mosities; he would wait with patience for a new opportunity, and in the mean time would endeavour to recommend himself to his country by acts of hos­pitality and benevolence. It is ministers of state intermeddling in elections; it is election-brokers and such dealers in corruption, that occasion [...] the heats and animosities we have: for when a gentleman of a great natural interest in a place sees his electors obliged by power, or bribed by money, to vote against him, perhaps in favour of an utter stranger; it cannot but raise his indignation; it may indeed be expected to raise his utmost fury and revenge. It is certain, Sir, that if the peo­ple were entirely left to themselves, they would without much contention always chuse those gentle­men, who, by having large properties of their own, might be reasonably supposed to be such as would take the best care of the properties of their fellow subjects: but if the people should ever begin to see their representatives making their seats in parliament places of profit, and bartering their votes and their behaviour in parliament for posts, places, and pen­sions; the people will soon follow the example of their representatives, and will insist upon sharing with them in the profits. Thus, by degrees, the minds of the people will be debauched; they will be brought to think, that the selling their votes at elections is no crime; the representatives, who buy their seats, must sell their votes; and at last all regard for the public good will be generally laid aside by all sorts of men. The only effectual method, Sir, of preventing this fatal effect is to restore annual elections; for then it would be impossible [Page 159] even for the treasury itself, if ever the public money should come to be so misapplied, to issue yearly sums of money sufficient to get the better of the natural interest, which country-gentlemen always have in the places where they and their families have perhaps for many generations resided. The con­sequence of which wil be, that none but country gentlemen, and those who have a natural interest in the place, will ever appear as candidates. And thus neither the morals of the people will be de­bauched, nor their properties plundered, nor their liberties destroyed, by those election-brokers and ministerial agents, or their candidates, who never can be employed or set up but for such base pur­poses. As for our credit abroad, which it is pre­tended septennial parliaments very much contribute to, I think it is evident that it has been sinking ever since the septennial law took place; which con­firms what was justly observed by an honourable gentleman, That the credit of the nation among foreigners does not depend upon the length or shortness of our parliaments, but upon that corres­pondence and confidence which ought always to be kept up between the king and his people. I will not say, that this decay of our credit abroad has been altogether owing to the septennial law, but I dare say, if our parliaments had not been septennial, they would probably before now have enquired into the conduct of those who have been the causes of this decay; and whatever reasons the decay of our credit among foreigners may have been owing to, it is now come to so low an ebb, that we really seem to have almost none to lose. And as I think nothing can so effectually restore our credit abroad as the restor­ing [Page 160] our constitution at home, I shall therefore give my vote for the question ^a.’

The sense of the city of London on long parliaments; is manifest from the following instruction to their members, A. D. 1741.

‘When we reflect on the danger of entrusting power too long in the same hands; when we con­sider how often in former times the liberty of this country has been sacrificed and sold by long conti­nued parliaments; and that a frequent recourse to their constituents, the people, is a certain and ne­cessary check to bad measures and worse intentions; we require you to prosecute in the most vigorous manner a repeal of the septennial act, and to restore the salutary form of triennial parliaments, as the principal means of securing the rights, and support­ing the dignity of a free nation ^b.’

In the debate on the motion for annual parliaments, A. D. 1744 Mr. Thomas Carew argued as follows;

‘Sir, the members of this house are the great and general inquest of the nation. We are to take notice of, and to take proper methods for redressing all the grievances that occur, whether they be such as relate to the kingdom in general, or such as relate to the particular counties, cities, or boroughs we represent. Now as grievances are almost an­nually occurring, and as some grievances are the more difficult to be removed, the longer they con­tinue; therefore it is necessary we should visit our constituents at least once a year, to know their senti­ments, and to examine, upon the spot, the grie­vances they complain of. But this is not to be expected, unless you make the elections annual; for [Page 161] we find by experience that after gentlemen are once chosen for a long term of years, they fix their abode in this city, and seldom revisit their constituents, till it becomes necessary for them to go down to sollicit their votes at a new election. Nay, since the establishment of septennial parliaments, we have often had gentlemen in this house▪ who never saw the borough that sent them hither, nor knew any thing of its constitution or interest; perhaps could not recollect its name, till they looked into the printed lists of parliament for their own name, and there found they represented such a borough. An­other part of our business, Sir, is to represent to our sovereign the sentiments of our constituents with regard to the measures he is advised by his ministers to pursue, as well as the persons he employs in the executive part of government. If we ever think of doing this faithfully and sincerely, we must visit our constituents at least once a year, because every year produces some new measure, and every year some new persons are introduced into public business. This I say is another part of our duty, and when it is faithfully and sincerely performed, it is of great advantage to the prince upon the throne, because it prevents his being led on in a track of unpopular measures, till both he and his ministers are over­whelmed in the torrent of popular resentment, which often happens in arbitrary countries, where the prince is tumbled headlong from his throne, before he knows any thing of his having pursued unpopu­lar or wrong measures; whereas, had he had timely information, he might have restored himself to the love and affection of his subjects, by making a just sacrifice of his wicked counsellors to the resentment of his oppressed people. As the prince can have no [Page 162] interest, seperate from his people; his interest, if he rightly considers, must lead him to gain the love and esteem of his people, and to avoid every thing that may give them discontent, It is therefore his interest to have always a house of commons, that knows, and will faithfully and speedily represent to him the complaints and grievances of his people. But this is directly opposite to the interest of his ministers. In all countries, and in this as much as any other, ministers have an interest separate from that of the people. They are for enriching them­selves, their families, tools and sycophants, at the expence of the people; and it is their business to keep all the avenues to the throne shut up against the complaints of the people, lest the prince should, as every wise one will, sacrifice them to his own security. Ministers must therefore be for having always a house of commons, that either does not know, or will not faithfully represent to their sove­reign, the complaints and grievances of the people; and as we are much more affected with what we see than with what we hear of, it is the business of a minister to prevent the members of this house, if possible, from ever seeing their constituents; because the less we are affected with, the more easily we may be prevailed on to conceal from our sovereign, or even to misrepresent to him the complaints of the people. Thus, Sir, it is apparently the interest of the king, it is apparently the interest of the country, to have short parliaments and frequent general elec­tions; but it is apparently the interest of ministers, especially wicked ministers, to have parliaments as long and general elections as seldom as possible ^a.’

[Page 163]It was argued by Mr. Carew, in the same debate, that it would be very imprudent for a private person to give a power of attorney for a long time, when he might for a short; that it is equally imprudent for the people to give parliament a power of attorney for 7 years, when they may restrict it to three, or to one ^a.

Mr. Sydenham, in the same debate, shews, that long parliaments produce and increase corruption of manners in the people. That the virtues of both pa­triotic and military courage are overlooked and unre­warded by a corrupt ministry, and parliamentary in­terest, and usefulness in carrying on their dirty schemes, only taken notice of at court; [so that the way to our modern temple of honour is through the temple of corruption.] That the old English hospi­tality is destroyed by gentlemen's taking up their re­sidence at London, where they are in the way of hang­ing upon the minister, and waiting at the catch for places as they fall. That their country seats are thus left desolate, and the land is become a desart. That long parliaments, and consequent corruption, strike at the very root of moral honesty. For what is soliciting for a vote, but gravely proposing to a man to declare himself a rascal? And what is a man without probity, or a woman without chastity? Whoever has forfeited his or her character in these cardinal articles, we na­turally suppose capable of every species of vice. That electioneering destroys all frugality and industry in the people, and makes them neglect their lawful employments to go a madding; which would not be, if parliaments were shortened, because it would not [Page 164] be worth while to make a contest about an election, &c.

Lord Hillsborough, in the debate on the regency-bill, A. D, 1751, in which it was proposed, that the parliament which should be sitting at the demise of Geo. II. should sit three years after the accession of his present majesty, spoke, on that clause, as followe [...] ‘It is a measure at no time eligible; in the present time it may be dangerous. It has been advanced▪ that parliaments have a power and right to prolong their duration, and that the salus popuili frequently requires it. But I do absolutely deny that a par­liament has any legal power, or right, to prolong the time limited by law without the consent of the electors, or people, who sent them to parliament, and whose representatives they are; and I do say, and do insist upon it, that whenever parliaments do take upon themselves to prolong the time of their duration, such prolongation is an infringement of the liberty of the electors in a most essential part, and tends to destroy that freedom which they were chosen to defend. For liberty never was, nor ever will be, preserved, unless those who have the powers of the people delegated to them be frequently re­moved. It was by the frequent rotation and change of magistracy in all countries of the world, that free­dom and independency hath been preserved.—It is upon this principle we find the people of England at all times crying out for frequent parliaments. And I am sure if ever frequent parliaments were necessary, they are essentially so in the present times ^a.’

In the year 1759, it was moved, that leave be given to bring in a bill for shortening the term and [Page 165] duration of parliament ^a, The motion was rejected, because it was a time of war. A frivolous reason. All times are proper for doing what is proper. If a nation is at peace, establish that peace, by redressing grievances. If the times are troublesome, nothing will contribute more to quiet them, than correcting abuses. ‘It must be granted)’ says a member of the commons on that occasion) ‘that bribery and corrup­tion in elections must always be the necessary con­sequences of long parliaments, and that if bribery and corruption in elections be not put an end to, they will put an end to our constitution, and esta­blish in this nation the very worst sort of government that was ever in any country established. For gentlemen will soon find out, if they have not found it out already, that it can signify nothing to stand candidates for members of parliament in opposition to the ministers for the time being; because, tho' a few of them by their popularity, their hospitality, and their great expence at the time of the elections, may get themselves chosen, yet the ministers, by bribery and corruption, will always procure a ma­jority of their friends to be elected, or at least returned, for the next ensuing parliament, so that no man, who sets up upon a truly patriotic scheme, can thereby propose to do his country any real service. And when this comes to be the general opinion, no man, who is governed singly by a sincere love for his country, will ever think of standing a candidate at any election. On the contrary, such men will always avoid being chosen, that they may not expose themselves to the resentment of the court, without [Page 166] being thereby able to serve their country. Contested elections may sometimes happen; but it will never be about who shall serve, but about who shall sell, their country. Consequently it is evident, that bribery and corruption at elections must at last bring on bribery and corruption in the house. Can we expect that a corrupt parliament will ever refuse to grant the crown what number of standing forces, or what public revenue, the ministers for the time being may please to insist on? Thus we shall at last be brought under that very form of government which was established at Rome under their first emperors, that is to say, an absolute monarchy supported by a cor­rupt parliament and a mercenary army; and the history of the Roman empire, from its first establish­ment to its utter extinction, must convince us, that it is the very worst form of government that ever was invented; for from thence we may learn that such monarchs as the Roman emperors may sacrifice the public interest to their private passions more openly, and may commit more whimsical cru­elties under the form of law, than any arbitrary monarch dare venture upon; and that such a par­liament will always be more factious under a good prince than under a wicked and tyrannical one; because the former will disdain to sacrifice the pub­lic service solely to parliamentary merit, or to squan­der the public money in bribing the electors or the members, both which the latter will always do with­out measure or reserve. Such a form of government must necessarily be the most oppressive upon the poor, the most inconsistent with trade and com­merce, and of the most pernicious consequence to the religion, morals, and courage of the people. [Page 167] I say first, that such a form of government must be the most oppressive upon the poor, because taxes must be imposed for the support of the government and as the rich must have always a great influence in parliament, they will in the methods of taxa­tion take as much care as they can of themselves. Therefore they will chuse to supply the public reve­nue by taxes upon the necessaries and conveniences of life, because to every such tax a poor man, who lives comfortably by his labour, pays as much as the richest man in the kingdom. And such taxes the ministers of the crown will always be most fond of, because of the multitude of officers that must be employed in the collection. In the next place I say that such a form of government must be the most inconsistent with trade and commerce, which must be evident from what I have just mentioned; for taxes upon the necessaries and conveniences of life must raise the price of labour. This must raise the price of every sort of manufacture; and this must diminish, if not totally prevent, their sale at any foreign market. And, lastly, I say that such a form of government must be of the most pernicious con­sequence to the religion, morals, and courage of the people. For as to the religion and morals of the people, it is evident the more profligate the people generally are as to every principle of religion, mo­rality, or politics; bribery and corruption will, both in parliament and at elections, have the greater and the more certain effect. In such a form of government therefore the governing powers will take every method they can contrive for subduing and rooting out of the human mind every passion, every affection, but the desire of sensual pleasure and its [Page 168] constant attendant, a boundless love of money. In all assemblies the members will harangue and vote not for the sake of gaining esteem or of serving their country; but for the sake of raising their price; in the church the clergy will study and preach, not for the sake of religion, but of getting better bene­fices. At the bar, the lawyers will plead not for the sake of justice, but of increasing the number or the value of their fees; and in the wars, either by land or sea, the soldiers will fight not for the sake of glory or the honour of their country, but of plunder or prizes. Thus the love of money will become the sole governing principle among the peo­ple; and whilst the government can, by taxes or otherwise, get money enough to answer this popular passion of its own creating, it will continue abso­lute and undisturbed; but the moment it ceases to be able to do so, faction will ensue in their assem­blies, and mutiny in their fleets and armies. Then as to the courage of the people, in such a form of government, it is certain that the governing powers will take every possible method to render the people in general cowardly, undisciplined and unarmed; because the more they are so, the more easily they may be overawed by a mercenary stand­ing army, the more impossible it will be for any great and antient family to defend themselves by an insurrection of the people in their favour against the most unjust and cruel oppression. Even as to those of the standing army, courage, as well as every other sort of virtuous merit, will be ne­glected, or at least not duly rewarded; because all public rewards will, and indeed must, be applied by the governing powers towards gaining and secur­ing [Page 169] those who are rich enough to be assisting to the government in bribing and corrupting the people at elections, and base enough to vote constantly in parliament as directed by the ministers for the time being.’

April 26, 1771, Mr. Sawbridge made a motion for leave to bring in a bill to shorten the duration of par­liaments. He shewed, that this branch of the con­stitution had been established by our Saxon ancestors, at which time they had only been annual; that they were set aside 140 years by the Normans; that on their revival they had continued of short duration (mostly annual) till the reign of Hen. VIII. whose tyranny was never complete till established by that long par­liament; that the next long parliament was that commonly so called of 1641. The pensionary par­liament in the reign of Cha. II. was productive of the worst consequences to the constitution; to remedy which the triennial bill was passed, forbidding parli­ament to sit more than three years. This was over­turned by that breach into the constitution in the reign of Geo. I. the passing of the septennial bill. Though perhaps the particular necessities of the times might render such an act at that day useful, (a rebellion just crushed, and a pretender to the throne, making it improper to call the people together at that time) yet that necessity was now at an end, none of those dan­gers now hanging over us. That the length of par­liaments gave up that power which the constituents ought to have over their representatives, viz of fre­quent examination into their conduct, and rejection of them if they thought them unworthy. That long parliaments gave an opportuni [...]y to an intimacy between the ministers and the members, always dan­gerous and destructive to the constitution; that in [Page 170] shortening the duration of parliaments he should in­cline to annual, as subject to fewer objections, in his opinion, than triennial, but that must be the subject of future debates. Mess. Townsend, Dempster, Tur­ner, Barre, &c. supported this measure: they fre­quently called on administration to shew any reasons why a bill should not be brought in. But to the amazement of most members, not one word was uttered by them; the most contemptuous silence was observed. On this great national question the short appeal was to the numbers at the command of the minister, and the only declared reasons were 105 to 54^a.

Mr. Sawbridge, A. D. 1773, moved the house of commons again for shortening parliament. He ob­served, that in the Saxon times, for above 500 years, the period of parliaments was short, to the great ad­vantage of the constitution; that from the Norman invasion to Hen. III. parliaments were either discon­tinued, or had lost their former efficiency; that after a struggle of half a century, this valuable acquisition was recovered, and the constitution brought back to its first principles; that from thence to Hen. VIII. parliaments were frequent, and their happy conse­quence notorious; that during the reign of that arch tyrant, they were for the first time lengthened, on which the corruption of our representatives, and the bloody acts of that monster of cruelty are the best comment; that from his demise to the rump par­liament, we were happily freed from the bane of English liberty, to which suceeded the long pension-parliament of Ch. II. which is too well known to need any comment; that after the revolution many [Page 171] brave independent men endeavoured to put it out of the power of bad princes, or corrupt ministers, to undermine the constitution, while the forms of it remained, and at length prevailed so far as to obtain the triennial bill; but all those advantages were a­gain lost, A. D. 1716, by the septennial bill. That he thought it was better the revolution had never hap­pened, than that septennial parliaments should be fixed upon us. He expected his motion to be oppos­ed by the enthusiastic sticklers for old customs, and by all ministerial men, &c. The treasury bench, as before, sat speechless. The question was put. Car­ried against the motion 133 to 45 ^a.

Mr. Oliver, in support of Mr. Sawbridge's motion, observed, among other particulars, That the king, ac­cording to the original constitution, has the executive power wholly in his own hands; but that parliament of late years has encroached upon the king's prerogative. That parliament, instead of itself governing, is ap­pointed to be a check upon government, ‘to watch over the king and the courts of justice, to guard the rights and privileges of the people, and in their name, and by their direction, to grant occasional national supplies for national purposes.—’ ‘That long parliaments tend naturally to make the members forget and neglect the very ends of their institution, and to consider themselves, not as mere delegates and attornies of the people, but as persons chosen to be the absolute governors of the country.’ He ob­served, that ‘parliament, which was appointed to watch over administration, is become itself the admi­nistration; and that for the faithful shepherds dogs [Page 172] of former times, we have now, by an unnatural co­pulation, a breed of wolves to guard the flock.’ He reasons, he says, ‘not by inference and probable con­clusions; but from experience.’ He then mentions a motion lately made, for inquiry into the conduct of the courts of justice; which motion was rejected; and a late demand of half a million for the civil list, which was immediately granted, without any inquiry into the causes of a deficiency, or into the application of such prodigious sums. ‘Whenever a supply is moved for, (says he) however enormous the sum, it is readily granted; for the administration, who receive the money, sit upon these benches. Whenever an ef­fectual inquiry into the application of money is moved for, it is as readily refused; for the administration, who apply it, sit upon these benches. The proceed­dings of the courts of justice, and the application of of public money were formerly the great objects of parliamentary inquiry. Now parliament is only a check upon hackney-coachmen, &c.’ ^a

A. D. 1773, the livery of London came to a resolu­tion, which they ordered to be published, ‘That they will vote for no candidate at an election of member for the city, till he has signed a solemn engagement to promote, by every means in his power, either in or out of the house, a perpetual act for shortening the duration of parliaments ^b.’

At a numerous meeting of freeholders of Middle­sex, at Mile-End, A. D. 1773, ‘Resolved, That it is the opinion of the freeholders of the county of Middlesex, that a return to the antient mode of [Page 173] representation in short parliaments, and a bill for the exclusion of placemen and pensioners from the house of commons, is the most likely method of obtaining a redress of the various grievances under which the subjects of this kingdom labour ^a.’

A noisy declaimer in the house of commons, on what is called the patriotic side, published a thing a few years ago, intituled, if I forget not, Considerations on the causes of the present Discontents; in which he fairly declared, he did not think shortening parlia­ments, or excluding placemen would answer. He said the grievances were only remedied by I know not what public men, who were to be responsible. But most people thought this a very gross confession, that he did not mean the public advantage; but that he wanted to be one of the public responsible men ^b.

CHAP. VI. Of Exclusion by Rotation.

THE shortening of parliaments alone, without exclusion by rotation, would prove only a pal­liation, not a radical cure. It would, if I may so suddenly change the metophor, be stopping some, but not all the leaks. Suppose parliaments re­duced to annual, might not a court candidate bribe his electors with a seventh part of what he now gives for his borough? And might not the minister bribe [Page 174] the corrupt member's vote in the house with a seventh part of what he now gives? I do not ferget what is observed on this by Sir W. Wyndham, in his speech above quoted, p. 148. viz. ‘That a seventh part of a sum would make so poor a figure, that it would hardly prove a temptation. That though an elector might think it worth while to be damned for 20 or 21 guineas, he might grudge to hazard his soul for the scurvy price of three, as he might die before next election; and that a member, who might be expected to sell himself to the devil and the minister for a pen­sion of 700l. a year, would despise a single hundred.’ Allowing all this its due weight, it is still true' that a member chosen annually for seven years toge­ther, has at the end of the seven years sat as long in the house as if he had been chosen for seven years at once; and how far rogues might have an understand­ing between themselves, so as to elude this salutary regulation, an honest man cannot guess. It is a com­mon electioneering trick in our times, for the can­didate to lend the electors small sums upon their notes of hand; those notes understood to be void if the elec­tor votes right. Might not the same game be played between the elector and the candidate, and between the member and the minister, if the period of parliament were reduced to annual? This could certainly not be, if it were certain, that the very next session two thirds of the members must be excluded by rotation; because whatever was by the corrupt set voted, might be un­voted the very next session, and then—Omnis labor ef­fusus; the money would be all thrown away; the pros­pect of which would effectually prevent the minister's hazarding it. Besides, it would be impossible to find a sufficient number of places. As the period of parlia­ment [Page 175] is at present, if the minister can, by all his cor­rupt arts, aided by the hopes and fears of members, influence 255 of the house of commons, he is secure for seven years. But if two thirds of the house were to be changed every year, he must find means for at­taching to his party seven times that number, or 1785, in every seven years, which would considerably clog the progress of court-influence in parliament. I men­tion two thirds of the house, and not the whole, be­cause it is pretended by the court-party, that it is ne­cessary to keep in the house some of the great officers of [...] state, and that a whole house of unexperienced members would be at a loss about the forms, &c.. As the shamefull injustice done by long parliaments to gentlemen, who have a right to be in authority some part of their lives, is a strong argument against their continuance; so it is to be remembered, that without exclusion by rotation, the mere shortening of parlia­ments even to annual would not redress this grievance. If the majority of the house be not changed every other year, the same men may be re-elected for 20 years to­gether; and if a place bill should be passed, tricks may be played by riding or splitting of places, unless a ro­tation bill is like wise passed. The city of London, or county of York, cannot be bribed, but their mem­bers may. Therefore there is no security without exclusion by rotation. But with that regulation and the others, bribery might easily be rendered impracti­cable.

Harrington proposes, that every domestic officer, ma­gistrate, representative, &c. be excluded from his place of power and trust for a term equal to that of his em­ployment ^a, and that a third part of the house of com­mons [Page 176] be chosen annually; and a third part, viz. those who have sat full three years, give place to the newly elected. Such a rotation would give all persons of consequence their turns in the government ^a.

CHAP. VII. Of electing by Ballot.

THE electing of members by ballot would like­wise be a check on court influence in parlia­ment. There ought to be no voting vivâ voce, where balloting would better prevent influ­ence, caballing, animosity, or resentment. Therefore all elections for members of parliament ought, as things are now, to be by ballot. Courts of directors, members of the commons in their house, and all those, who are liable to be called to account for their transactions (which peers, electors, jurymen, &c. are not) ought to vote with an audible voice.

But let it be observed here, that making parliamen­tary representation adequate would supersede the neces­sity of balloting at elections. For court influence, and whatever could byass electors, would be then utterly cut up by the roots, when many thousands of votes were necessary to send in the members for any one county, comprehending its towns. To set about bribing 401 electors in order to gain one member, or 202, 104 electors to secure a majority in the house, a minister must be lord of the mines of Potosi.

[Page 177]It is thought by some authors, that the Athenians chose their 9 archons by ballot for 160 years ^a. Their senate of 400, and the prytanes were chosen by lot ^b.

Balloting was used in some cases at Rome. And when, through the prevalence of corruption, that free manner of voting went into desuetude, it was restored by the lex Papiria and the lex Gabinia.

The Roman senate did not vote by ballot; but the people did. Salust (if he be the author of the FRAGM. TO CAESAR) and Cicero, in CORNEL. express their wish, that balloting were used in the senate.

Elections of magistrates being troublesome, causing heats, and dissensions among the people of Florence, it was agreed that the electors, who consisted of the president and members of the college [should have been all people of property] should write on tickets, and inclose in a chest, the names of such citizens, as they thought fit to be in the magistracy; and that when the day of election came, a set of those names should be taken out, after shaking the chest, and the names first drawn should be the magistrates elect, and to continue three years and a half ^c. This me­thod was kept up at Florence, while the republican government continued. Aretin disapproves it, but we know not why.

At Venice all elections are made by ballot, and all voting in the great council, the college, the senate, and all the courts of judicature is done by ballot, without any mistake, or any sort of confusion, or dis­turbance, [Page 178] which prevents bribery, faction, animo­sities, and all bad consequences ^a.

A motion made in the house of commons, A. D. 1707, that all election questions be decided by ballot­ing, was rejected. To be heard and determined at the bar of the house ^b.

It was again proposed, A. D. 1708, that questions concerning elections should (if either competitor de­sired) be decided by ballot. Carried in the negative. I suppose they thought balloting dangerous, when there were so many jacobites ^c.

A bill for electing the Scotch peers by ballot was moved in the house of peers, A. D. 1734. Mis­carried. Many lords protested, because balloting is the freest manner of electing, and the most likely to defeat ministerial influence, which was to be feared in a matter of such consequence.

The method of voting by ballot, say they, ap­pears to us infinitely preferable on many accounts; for as it is well known, there are several alliances among that body of nobility, many of the peers may be put under great difficulties, their alliances draw­ing them one way, and their opinion and inclina­tion another way. It is also possible, that by pen­sions from the crown, or by civil or military pre­ferments, some of them may lie under obligations to a court, and be reduced to the hard necessity (under the power of an arbitrary minister) either of losing their employments, or of voting against their nearest relations, and their own opinion also. ‘We appre­hend that no election can be called perfectly free, where any number of the electors are under any [Page 179] influence whatsoever, by which they may be biassed in the freedom of their choice ^a.’

Judge Blackstone is against voting by ballot in the house of commons. ‘because the conduct of every member is subject to the future censure of his con­stituents, and therefore should be openly submitted to their inspection ^b.’ Upon what principle is it then, that the house, from time to time, orders the galleries to be cleared? Is it that their constituents may not see, nor know, nor consequently be able to censure their conduct in the house? Of which more fully in the sequel.

Harrington is for balloting on all occasions ^c.

Balloting is used in many cases, as in the elections in the India-house, the Royal society, &c. but it is not practised where, above all, it ought (while things continue on their present foot) to be used, viz. in the election of members of parliament.

‘It is customary in the borough of Limmington in Hampshire, to elect by ballot’ [the manner of which the writer there describes.] ‘This method I know to be of great advantage where it is made use of. It prevents animosity and distaste, and very much assists that freedom, which ought to be in elections. No man, in this way, need fear the disobliging of his landlord, customer, or benefactor ^d.’

CHAP. I. Members of Parliament no longer hold themselves res­ponsible to the People.

FROM the inadequate state of representation in parliament, and the enormous length of their period, have arisen several most fatal conse­quences. The first I shall mention is, That mem­bers, being generally elected by handfuls of persons, possessed of little property, and less knowledge of the in­terest of their country, and impowered as law-makers for seven years, have given up all thought of being accountable to any set of men upon earth for their proceedings in parliament. And it must be allowed, that on the present ludicrous foot on which repre­sentation stands, it would be disgracing a gentleman beyond sufferance, to call him to the bar of a set of poor unlettered Cornish burghers, and to expect him to an­swer the silly questions they would put to him concern­ing his conduct in the house, of which they cannot be supposed competent judges, any more than they are of the qualifications of a legislator, which shews the ab­surdity of their having the power of making legislators, not for themselves only, but for the nation in general. Were parliamentary representation upon its proper foot, no member would be sent into the house by a [Page 181] puny burgh; but all would be county-members, and every member would have, to his admission as a law-maker, the sanction of the majority of the inhabitants of a county, comprehending the cities and towns in it. From such a respectable body as this, it would be an honour to gentlemen to receive instructions; and to be responsible to them, would not be beneath the dignity of any person whatever.

It is notorious, that the right of constituents to in­struct their members, and the consequent duty of members to obey instructions, is in our times ques­tioned by many, and by many given up. Yet it is certain, first, that no harm could come from the mem­bers of parliament being obliged to wait for instruc­tions from their constituents, supposing the consti­tuents what they ought to be, because legislation is, the least of any thing, a matter of haste; and the exe­cutive is not in the parliament.

There seems to be a palpable inconsistency in the courtly doctrine, That the people are wholly unqua­lified for judging of political matters, and that there­fore their sense in petitions, remonstrances, and in­structions, is not to be regarded. If so, why is the choice of members of parliament left to the people? Why should not the ministry nominate them at once? If the people are incapable of judging of politics, they are incapable of judging of the qualifications of members. But to set this absurdity in its full light, it is to be observed, that the courtiers, at the same time they argue for the incapacity of the people in general, insist that the election of legislators is best trusted to the most incapable part of the people. Simi­lar to which ingenious reasoning is their plea, when they tell us, ‘The people are in fault, why do they [Page 182] let themselves be bribed by the court?’ So every town-rake cries out against the frailty of women (himself the cause of the failure of female virtue.) And because the people are liable to be corrupted, our courtiers insist, that the election of law-makers is best in the hands of that part of the people who are most liable to be corrupted. Into such absurdities do men plunge themselves, when they undertake the defence of what their understandings and consciences revolt against!

In the remarkable answer of lord Percival, member for Westminster, to instructions sent him by his con­stituents ^a, we have that gentleman's notion of the duty of representatives in respect of instructions. And he speaks the sense of too many.

‘Gentlemen, you are welcome upon all occasions, and I look upon this application as a fresh instance of your friendship—As I never concealed my prin­ciples from you, so I will never depart from them. The only motives that direct my conduct are the pre­servation of the constitution of my country, the security of the present royal family upon the throne, and the common liberty of Europe.—These views I shall always think inseparable.—In the prosecu­tion of them, my judgment sometimes may, my heart shall never fail me.—I remember on my part, that to your independent voice, I owe my seat in parliament:—on yours, you will not forget that I ought to be independent there.’ [True, my good lord, you ought to be independent on a court; but not on 10,000 people of property who sent you to parlia­ment on purpose to do their business.] When I differ from your sentiments, I shall do it with great reluc­tance, [Page 183] and then only when I am convinced, that your true interest must extort it from me.' [Of which true interest your lordship, of your great modesty, holds yourself a better judge than the many thousands who employ you as their agent. How would your good lordship take such language from your steward? ‘In such a case the crime is equal to flatter popularity,’ ‘[to do your constituents busi­ness, as they chuse, is to flatter popularity,]’ or to court power. It becomes me to respect both; but it is my duty to follow neither beyond those limits, which the circumstances of time, prudence, neces­sity, and the public safety can alone determine.‘So the French king, or the grand Turk, might be ex­pected to silence the petitions of their subjects, by telling them, that the prince is the only judge of the circumstances, of time, prudence, and necessity.’

Some argue, that members of parliament are not obliged to obey instructions of their constituents, be­cause the constituents do not hear the debates, and there­fore cannot be supposed judges of the matter to be voted. But the lords may send votes by proxy, tho' they do not hear the debates. The very truth is, that the members have no opportunity of being at all better judges of most matters to be voted i [...] parliament than men of understanding and reading, w [...]o never sat in the house. So that the hearing of the debates gives no such mighty advantage to the members above the con­stituents. Besides, there is nothing to hinder a mem­ber's informing his constituents of the reasons (occur­ring in the course of the debate) why he intends to vote so, or so. If they allow them, all is well. If he votes contrary to their direction, tho [...]h he means their real interest, he only shews himself a wrong-headed agent, who will act according to his own opi­nion [Page 184] in spite of his masters; and ought, besides being immediately turned out of his office, to be answer­able for all damages.

The excellent Davenant, 'tis true, lays no great stress on responsibility in members of parliament. But this is only because in his times they had few examples of parliaments so corrupted as to come to have an interest different from that of their constituents. But in our degenerate times, when we know, that parliaments may be effectually drawn away from consulting the interest of their representatives, it is strange that judge Blackstone (who writes what I have quoted from him above, p. 179) should write as follows:

A member of parliament ‘is not bound, like a de­puty in the United Provinces, to consult with, or take the advice of his constituents upon any particu­lar point, unless he himself thinks it proper, or pru­dent so to do ^a.’

Suppose then a majority of the house of commmons, corrupted by a villainous court, should propose to lay an exorbitant tax upon the people. Suppose the majority of the constituents, and people of England, should instruct the majority of the members against this tax, could the act establishing this tax, passed in direct opposition to the mind of the people of Eng­land, (which judge Blackstone's doctrine allows) be said to be, in any sense, constitutional, or par­liamentary, or in any degree more tolerable to a free people, than if the king in council had pretended to impose the tax? If the votes of the electors be the whole and sole foundation of the authority, the members have to sit, and to make laws, can it be con­ceived, that the electors gave this authority on purpose to plunder themselves?

[Page 185]If the members of the house of commons are not obliged to regard the instructions of their constitu­ents; the people of this country chuse a set of des­pots every seven years, and are as perfect slaves as the Turks, excepting the few months of a general election. And it is the trumping up of this doctrine, that gave Voltaire the hint to write, that the English are only free once in seven years, and then they have not the sense to make the proper use of their freedom. Pudet haec approbria, &c. That a Frenchman should have it in his power to turn English liberty thus to ridi­cule, is mortifying enough; but that an English judge should support his contempt of our liberty, is still more humiliating.

But how could the spirit of liberty be expected to breathe in the works of a gentleman, who speaking of the just vengeance, which a frantic tyrant, the destroyer of liberty, and butcher of his subjects, brought upon himself, uses such expression as— ‘the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I. ^a’ And again^b, the fatal catastrophe of that pious and unfortunate prince;' and who apologizes for his rapacious pro­ceedings, by telling us, he gave up the right to ton­nage and poundage (after keeping it for fifteen years, in spite of the continual remonstrances of parliament) when he found he could keep it no longer; which the judge calls ‘giving the nation ample sati [...]faction ^c.’ Let the reader peruse the incomparable Mrs. Macaulay's history of his horrid reign, or indeed any, even that of his professed apologist Clarendon, and determine whether exempting him from the guilt of tyranny, it is possible to fix it on any prince that ever disgraced [Page 186] a throne, or filled a kingdom with confusion and bloodshed. As a friend to human nature, I cannot help declaring my opinion, that had he been guilty of no crime besides his offering the Scotch army a bribe of four counties, and the plunder of London, to invade Eng­land ^a, or had he been guilty of no instance of tyranny besides his fighting and slaughtering his subjects about his over-strained prerogative—had he had as many heads as the Lernean hydra, he ought to have lost them all. Nor can I, in reading judge Blackstone's Com­mentaries, help lamenting, that a writer, whose ad­mirable work will be read as long as England, its laws, and language remain, should be so sparingly tinctured with the true and generous principles of liberty, on the support and prevalency of which, the glory of the British empire depends.

CHAP. II. The Denial of Responsibility is a novel Doctrine.

THE doctrine so much preached of late, by our speech-makers and courtly writers, that mem­bers of parliament are not obliged to regard the instructions of their constituents, is a mere inno­vation. In former times their receiving wages suppo­sed an obligation to do the business of those who paid them, and that they were to do it in the manner their employers chose it should be done. And their constant language in the house is, ‘We dare not grant any more subsidies. Who sent us hither? Whose busi­ness are we doing? How shall we answer this to the [Page 187] people? What will the people of England say to this? &c.’ ^a

The very nature of the house of commons is changed,' (says the duke of Buckingham in the house of peers, A. D. 1677.) ‘They do not now think they are an assembly of men, that are to return to their own homes, and become private men again (as by the laws of the land and constitution of parliaments, they ought to be) but look upon themselves as a standing senate, as men picked out to be legislators for the rest of their lives ^b.’

Our ancestors shewed themselves to be constituents, by finding, imprisoning, and incapacitating their members, when they acted contrary to their inten­tion. Absentees were fined 20l. a large sum in those days ^c. Our members are our masters, and insist on a dictatorial independency on us for 7 years, and to give no account of their conduct at the 7 years end, nor have we any power over them, but that of not re-electing them to a new parliament, if they have betrayed us in the last. Nay, the majority of the members command their own election, and fit in par­liament, as the peers, for life. And yet we are a free people. Well may the neighbouring nations admire so mysterious a system.

The abbè Reynel ^d thinks, the antient custom of the king's giving out, in the summonses to parlia­ment, the business, for which it was to meet, was very useful, because the constituents could then instruct their members how to vote; whereas now, says he, ‘the people are obliged to give their representatives an unlimited power, which they use as they think [Page 188] proper.’ The knights hesitated about granting Edw III. supplies, till they had the consent of their constituents ^a. The barons agreed. There is no mention of the burgesses. They desired, that there might be a new parliament summoned, which might come prepared with authority from their constituents. The commons did not presume to grant Edw. III. any tax, till they consulted their constituents ^b. The commons, in the time of Rich. II. being desired to grant a subsidy, soon after Tyler's insurrection, an­swered, that by reason of the ‘evil heats and rancour of the people throughout the whole realm, they neither durst, nor would grant any manner of tal­lage^c.’ Here the sense of the responsibility to the people operated properly. Elsynge ^d says, ‘When the commons gave their answer touching the subsidy demanded for the wars, they desired leave to return into the country to confer with their neighbours, promis­ing their endeavours for the same at next parliament.’

‘Some of our principal law-books tell us, that in antient times, this house has often refused to agree to propositions made by the court for this reason only, That they could not, till they went home, and con­sulted with their constituents.’ The words of Mr. Plummer's speech on the motion for repealing the sep­tennial act, A. D. 1734^e.

‘We shall have little thanks for our labour, when we go home,’ said Wentworth, in the debate in parliament about a saving clause in the petition of right^f. In those days, the members considered what thanke they were likly to have from their constituents. [Page 189] In ours, they consider what thanks they are likely to have from the treasury.

It was enacted 1 Hen. V. at the petition of the commons, that none, but residents in the places they represented, should be chosen knights, citizens or bur­gesses ^a. They had not then invented the refinements of our times, that the members are representatives for the whole kingdom, and from the moment of their election, are alike independent on their particular constituents, and on the whole body of electors through the kingdom.

H. B. (supposed Boscawen) in his speech on rejec­tion of the exclusion bill, says, ‘That those who sent us here, may see, we have done what we can, let us make such votes as may be serviceable to our country. ^b.’

‘I have heard,’ (says Sir R. Clayton in the debate on the exclusion-bill, A. D. 1681.) ‘that it has been an antient usage, that members have consulted their cities, boroughs, and counties in any thing of weight, as well as giving money, before they resolved it. The practice was good, and I wish it was continued. We can discharge ou [...] [...]rust no better than in observ­ing the direction of those who sent us hither. What the people chuse is right, because they chuse it. He himself had been instructed by the city of London to promote the exclusion-bill. So said lord Russel ^c.’

Our constituents,' says Sir Edw. Deering ^d, A. D. 1641.) sent us hither as their trustees to make and unmake laws. They did not send us to rule them by arbitrary, disputable, and revocable ordinances' (meaning ordinances of the commons.)

[Page 190]The style of former times was, ‘The commons desired certain lords to confer with them about their charge ^a,’ In those days the commons thought they had a charge, for which they were answerable.

Our constant practice (since A. D. 1681.) of print­ing the votes of the house of commons, is an acknow­ledgment of the importance of the people, and the propriety of giving them satisfaction. The occasion of first publishing the votes was the exclusion bill ^b.

The commons in the time of Ch. I. directed the judges to inform the people in all the counties they should come into in their circuits, that they (the com­mons) had abolished, or regulated all the oppressive courts, &c. This shews, that the commons of those times thought themselves responsible. ^c

Lord Digby, member for Dorset, and Sir I. Cole­pepper, from Kent, inform the house, A. D. 1640, that they had in charge seven articles of grievances, to which they add some remarks of their own ^d. Do our members make conscience of carrying to the house the complaints of their constituents?

The following phrases in Cromwel's summonses to sheriffs for parliament electi [...]s, shew, that respon­sibility was in those days thought the duty of mem­bers.—So that the said knights severally may have full and sufficient power for themselves, and the people of that county, to do and consent unto those things which then and there by common consent of the said parliament shall be ordered,' &c. ^e

By the strain of the Romanstrance ^f of the Commons of England to the house of commons, in the republican [Page 191] times, we see how this matter appeared to our ances­tors of last century.

‘We must desire you to call to your remembrance, that we are still the body of the commons of England, you but the representatives; that we have not so dele­gated the power to you, as to make you the gover­nors of us and our estates. You are in truth but our procurators to speak for us in the great council. That of right we ought to have access to those, whom we have thus chosen, and to the house, as there shall be cause to impart our desires to you, and you ought not to refuse us. That by involving our votes in yours, we had no purpose to make you perpetual dectators.’

Members of parliament, says the excellent Sydney ^a, do not act by a power derived from kings, but from those who chuse them. And those who give power, do not give an unreserved power. Members of par­liament are therefore accountable to their constituents. It is true, the constituents do not call them to an account, otherwise than by not electing them again, if they have disapproved of their conduct. [This proves in fact a very inadequate punishment, because the right of election comes so seldom into the hands of the people, and because (in all, but the present incor­rupt times) by far the greatest part of the members have been imposed upon their constituents by power or by bribery.] ‘Many members, he says afterwards ^b, in all ages, and sometimes the whole body of the commons, have refused to vote, till they consulted those who sent them. The houses have been often adjourned, to give them time to do this; and if this were done more frequently, or if towns, cities, and counties, had on some occasions, given instructions [Page 192] to their deputies, matters would probably have gone better in parliament than they have often done.’

That stern old patriot, in his XLIVth sect. ^a over­throws the doctrine of absolute power delegated to the members of the house of commons by their constitu­ents. He considers members of parliament as the servants of the public. ‘I take, says he, what ser­vant I please, and when I have taken him, I must, according to this doctrine, suffer him to do what he pleases. But from whence should this necessity arise? Why may I not take one to be my groom, another to be my cook, and keep them both to the offices, for which I [...]ook them? And if I am free, in my private capacity, to regulate my particular affairs according to my own discretion, and to allot to each servant [...] proper work, why have not I, with my associ [...] the freemen of England, the like liberty of directing and limiting the powers of the servants we employ in our public affairs?’

Milton and Locke bring very substantial arguments for calling even kings, with all their sacred majesty, their jure divino, and their impeccability (kings can do no wrong) to account, if they govern in any man­ner inconsistent with the good of the people. How much more lords, or commons, who have never even challenged to themselves any divine atributes? Iames I. owned himself to be the great servant of the state.

‘Who, says Locke, shall be judge, whether his trustee, or his deputy’ [are not members of the house of commons trustees and deputies in the strictest sense of the word?] ‘acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he, who deputes him, [Page 193] and must, by having deputed him, have still power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this be reason in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in cases of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned!’

The qualifications of a member of parliament, according to the author of an excellent tract pub­lished in the beginning of this century, intituled, REASONS FOR ANNUAL PARLIAMENTS, are sense, courage, and integrity. By sense, he means chiefly knowledge of the interests of England (though classi­cal learning and fluency in haranguing are in our times essentially necessary) commerce, manufactures, liberty, securities and violations of the people, and redress; resources for war and peace, and connections with other states, balance of power, &c. Courage against the encroachments of a court, against solici­tations, places, preferments, threats, cabals, &c. Integrity not merely to the whigs, or to the minority, but to the nation. No man ought to be chosen, that will not receive instruction. There are no counties and few towns that do not understand the interest of their country enough to give general instructions. ‘You have a right to instruct your members. It was the custom formerly to instruct all the members, and the nature of deputation shews that the cus­tom was well grounded ^a.’ N. B. This was written 1702, when the people were not so knowing, and consequently not so well qualified for instructing, as now. He insists, that parliament be instructed to pro­mote a militia, and to encourage the use of firelocks among the populace, to increase the navy, and reduce our wars to naval wholly.

[Page 194] ‘I have met, says queen Anne, with so many ex­pressions of joy and satisfaction in all the counties through which I have had occasion to pass, that I cannot but look upon them, as true measures of the duty and affection of all my subjects ^a.’ Queen Anne thought the sense of the people might be collected otherwise than from parliament. The commons an­swered, ‘It is great condescension in your majesty to take notice in so public a manner of the expressions of joy and satisfaction,’ &c. ^b Thus we spoil our kings and queens. It was not the least condescension. It is the duty of every sovereign to pay the most pro­found the most sacred attention to the sense of the peo­ple, for whose benefit alone he is endowed with power.

The collectors of the debates of the commons hold it to be scarce a disputable point, ‘Whether the repre­sentatives of a people are accountable to their con­stituents, or whether it ought to be deemed an offence to lay the proceedings of our representatives before those whom they represent ^c.’

‘I hope, your indulgence to an old servant will pardon this omission;’ says Mr. Cooke, member for Middlesex, in his address to the electors, March 26, 1768. What sort of a servant must he be, who is not responsible to his master?

‘If parliament’ (says Sir I. Barnard in the debate on the convention, A. D. 1739.) ‘should begin to refuse giving satisfaction to the people, the people will begin to refuse putting any confidence in par­liaments; and if this should ever come to be the case, the [parliaments] not only may, but they ought to be laid aside. I do not know that the cha­racter [Page 195] of parliament ever received a deeper stab than it did at the seeming approbation of the convention in last sessions of parliament; and if we should in this so far screen the contrivers of that convention as to refuse to let the people know whether they were to blame or not; I say, if we should do this now, that the chief argument advanced last year in favour of that convention appears to have been without foun­dation, it will, I fear; be a mortal blow ^a.’

We find in our histories nothing more frequent than instructions from constituent bodies to their representatives in parliament, which shews, that the people (whose opinion, indeed in modern times, is little regarded by their governors, whereas it ought to be followed implicitly) think they have a right to instruct, and that their representatives ought to regard their instructions.

The city of London sent instructions to her mem­bers, 33 Ch. II. requiring them to insist on the pas­sing of the exclusion-bill. And Sir Rob. Clayton gave it as one reason in his speech on that occasion, That his duty to his electors obliged him to vote for the bill ^b.

‘In many places, it was given, as an instruction to members [at the election in 1681] to stick to the exclusion ^c.’ And see the judicious instructions by the borough of Southwark, A. D. 1701, on the treachery of the French king ^d. Many places instructed their members, A. D. 1714, particularly London. ‘We desire and expect that you will enquire by whose counsel, &c. the separate peace was made ^e.’

[Page 196]See the very judicious instructions given by the citizens of London to their members, A. D. 1741, against standing armies; extension of excise laws; sep­tennial parliaments; placemen in the house of com­mons; recommending strict enquiry into the expen­diture of public monies; cautioning against a disho­nourable peace with Spain, &c. The preamble runs as follows; ‘We the citizens of London who have cheerfully elected you to serve us in parliament, and thereby committed to your trust the safety, liberty, property, and privileges of ourselves and posterity, think it our duty, as it is our undoubted right, to acquaint you with what we desire and expect from you in discharge of the great trust we repose in you, and what we take to be your duty as our representa­tives,’ &c. ^a

There were sent up instructions from all parts, in the same year, for an effectual place and pension-bill, and for short parliaments, and against a standing army, and all needless expences, by which taxes were in­creased ^b.

In the year 1742, the lord mayor and corporation of London instructed their members ^c (on occasion of a disappointment [...]om some pretended patriots) requir­ing their faithful attention to the prosecution of what­ever migh [...] give hopes of redress. These instructions were followed by others to the same purpose from We [...]minster, Bristol, Edinburgh, York, Worcester, and other places.

The city of London instructed their representatives, A. D. 1769, to endeavour to prevent all attempts to [Page 197] the disadvantage of trial by jury; to watch over the observance of the Habeas Corpus act; the application of the public money to bribery or electioneering; to oppose the dangerous doctrine of constructive treasons, the garbling of petitions, and turning them into accu­sations; the use of military force on pretence of keep­ing the peace; to oppose the indiscriminate demands of ministers on pretence of paying civil list debts; to promote an effectual place-bill; to propose laws for preventing the influence of peers in elections, and for subjecting the candidate, as well as the elector, to the bribery oath; and to endeavour to obtain short parli­ments and election by ballot, &c. ^a

‘The instructions of your constituents’ (says a sensible writer ^b) ‘you should always be ready to obey. But you have inverted the maxim of the Gospel, and made the servants greater than their masters. You, who are only deputies and factors, have usurped a power not only superior to your creators, but destructive of the very rights, by which they exist as freemen, and by which you yourselves exist as representatives. In the gulph of your privilege you have swallowed up the birthright of the people, who are ultimately paramount to all the three branches of the legislature.’ [Of as much more consequence, he might have said, (allowing for dif­ference in property) as 12 millions are more in num­ber than 800 individuals.] ‘Had you been as tenacious of your duty, as of your interest, you would have first provided for the safety of the people's rights, and then entered upon a discussion of your own pri­vilege.’

[Page 198]Mr. Beckford, late lord mayor of London, seems to have had a proper notion of instructions, viz. That they are to be followed implicitly, after the member has respectfully given his constituents his opinion of them. ‘Far be it from me, says he, to oppose my judgment to that of 6000 of my fellow-citizen^a.’

‘I ever thought myself happy’ (says Sir Ellis Cun­liffe, in his letter to the mayor of Liverpool) ‘in obeying all the commands of my constituents, whether of a public or private nature;’ [desiring, on account of illness, to be excused serving any longer in parlia­ment^b.]

‘I cannot think it consistent with the honour and dignity of this house,’ (says Mr. Plumer in the debate on the Spanish war, A. D. 1738.) ‘to give people with­out doors any shadow of reason for suspecting, that the resolutions of this house are dictated by our ministers of state; for, in all our resolutions, we ought to speak our own sense, the sense of those we represent, the sense of the nation, and not the sense of ministers ^c.’

When king William, A. D. 1694, refused the royal assent to the famous bill for free and impartial proceed­ings in parliament, the commons remonstrated, and the committee proposed, among other particulars, to address the following to his majesty: ‘We beg, Sir, you will be pleased to consider us as ANSWERABLE TO THOSE WE REPRESENT. And it is from your goodness we must expect arguments to soften to them in some measure the necessary hardships they are forced to undergo in this present conjuncture ^d.’

CHAP. III. Arguments for Responsibility of Members to the People.

IN the debate upon the motion for repealing the septennial act, A. D. 1734, Sir W. Wyndham opposed Sir W. Young, who had endeavoured to depriciate the necessity of responsibility.

‘The gentleman [meaning Sir William] said, that we were to have no dependence upon our constituents; he went further; he said it was a dangerous depen­dance; nay, he went further still, and said it was more dangerous than a dependance on the crown. This my worthy friend took notice of, and, with his usual modesty, called it a new doctrine. It is, Sir, not only a new doctrine, but is the most mon­strous, the most slavish doctrine was ever heard; and such a doctrine as I hope no man will ever dare to support within these walls. I am persuaded, Sir, the learned gentleman did not mean what the words he happened to make use of may seem to import; for though the people of a county, city, or borough, may be misled, and may be induced to give instruc­tions which are contrary to the true interest of their country, yet I hope he will allow, that in times past the crown has been oftener misled; and conse­quently we must conclude that it is more apt to be misled in time to come than we can suppose the peo­ple to be ^a.’

Though it should be affirmed, that a member of par­liament is not responsible to his own constituents, yet it would be strange to assert, that all the members may neglect the remonstrance of all the constituents in [Page 200] England to the same purpose. In that case, the mem­bers could not be said to be representatives of the peo­ple of England, but must be considered as a set of ab­solute despots, acting for their own private interest. But this is inconsistent with the very idea of election, or of delegated power. And if one member is not re­sponsible, neither is another. If one is responsible, all are. If revolution-principles are justifiable, that is, if the people may take the power out of the hands of a king, or government, when they abuse it, it follows, that the king and government are in all cases responsi­ble to the people, and that a majority of the people can at any time change the government. This is not de­nying the danger and trouble of revolutions, nor the difficulty of determining what is the sense of the ma­jority of the people. But if members of parliament are not obliged to regard instructions from their con­stituents, what is to become of a poor town, or coun­try-place, unable to bear a tax no way grievous to other wealthier places? The house receives no pe­titions upon money-bills; because every place either sends a member or members of its own, or is repre­sented by the county-members. But, if the house is neither to be informed by petition nor by instruction, how is it to be informed? This leaves an open door for the most cruel oppression.

Lord Coke says, ‘It is the custom of parliament when any new device is moved for in parliament on the king's behalf for his aid, or the like,’ [as a little demand of half a million to pay civil-list debts ‘that the commons may answer, They dare not agree to it without conference with their countries.’ He gives an instance of this 9 Edw. III. which is applied by Mr. Pulteney in the debate on the excise-scheme, A. D. 1733. And Mr. Pulteney adds, that the ab­horrence shewn by the people against that scheme, was a sufficient reason for rejecting it.

[Page 201]So far from questioning the responsibility of mem­bers, I should think it reasonable and proper to demand an oath of the members at their taking their seats, be­sides the usual oaths; I mean an oath of fidelity to their constituents, by which they should declare before God and men, that they come into the house by the free and uninfluenced choice of a true majority of those, who by law have the right of choice; and that they will, in all their speeches and votes, faithfully and zealously pursue their country's good, in spite of all temptation to the contrary. The most incorrupt parliament ought not to refuse giving their constituents all the security in their power. An honest man does not refuse to give his bond. The most virtuous are the most de­sirous of avoiding suspicion, and the most anxious a­bout standing in a clear light before the world.

No single man, or set of men, ought to be trusted with power without account to the people, the origi­nal proprietors of power. ‘There is not upon earth’ (says the excellent Gordon) ‘a nation, which having had unaccountable magistrates, has not felt them to be crying and consuming mischiefs. In truth, where they are most limited, it has been often as much as a whole people could do to restrain them to their trust, and to keep them from violence; and such fre­quently has been their propensity to be lawless, that nothing but a violent death could cure them of their violence. This evil has its root in human nature; men will never think they have enough, whilst they can take more; nor be content with a part, when they can seize the whole ^a.’

The history of mankind for two or three thousand years backwards (which is as far backwards as history goes) is a sermon upon this text, Nothing more dan­gerous [Page 202] than power without responsibility. But the species resembles an individual. As the father's expe­rience does not make the son wiser, so neither does the history of the sufferings of former generations teach the succeeding to secure themselves against the mis­chiefs of unaccountable power.

‘When we elect persons to represent us in parlia­ment (says a judicious writer ^a) we must not be sup­posed to depart from the smallest right which we have deposited with them. We make a lodgment, not a gift; we entrust, but part with nothing. And, were it possible, that they should attempt to destroy that constitution which we had appointed them to maintain, they can no more be held in the rank of representatives than a factor, turned pirate, can con­tinue to be called the factor of those merchants whose goods he had plundered, and whose confidence he had betrayed. The men, whom we thus depute to parliament, are not the bare likeness or reflexion of us their constituents; they actually contain our powers and privileges, and are, as it were, the very persons of the people they represent. We are the parliament in them; we speak and act by them. We have, therefore, a right to know what they are saying and doing. And should they contradict our sense, or swerve from our interests, we have a right to remon­strate, inform, and direct them. By which means, we become the regulators of our own conduct, and the institutors of our own laws, and nothing material can be done but by our authority and consent.’

The tyranny of the East India governors ^b, who, on account of the distance of their situation from the seat of government, think themselves in a manner out of [Page 203] its reach; shews how dangerous it is to trust power without responsibility.

A few years ago, the wise justices of Westminster gave for one night a discretionary power to the con­stables to apprehend and secure all street-walking women. What was the consequence? Those impe­rious brutes took up a number of industrious washer-women going to their business before day-light, cram­med them into a place of confinement like the black hole at Calcutta, in which one, or more, were fairly suffocated, and found dead next morning.

See a British house of commons plundering the peo­ple of above half a million to pay court-debts, A. D. 1773, at the same time examining with great severity into the plunderings committed in Asia by the East India company's servants; the accusars and the ac­cused alike guilty, because alike secure, as they ima­gined, from question. Thus the poet of nature repre­sents lady Macbeth encouraging her husband to murder his sovereign under his own roof, by the considera­tion, that there was no body who dared to call them to account.

In other countries, we find a connexion held be­tween representation and responsibility.

The tribunes of the people, in the times of the commonwealth of Rome, had no will of their own. They were the mere speaking-trumpet of the people. And had the people been regularly formed into dis­tricts, in such manner as to prevent the corrupt popu­lace of that great city from carrying every point by mobbing, all would have been well.

The deputies from the Swiss cantons to the gene­ral diet, receive instructions from their constituents, and think themselves obliged to conform to them ^a.

[Page 204]The Procuradores, or members for Castile, in the corte held at Madrid, in the beginning of Charles V. excused themselves from granting the supplies he de­sired, because they had received no orders from their constituents; and afterwards receiving express orders not to do it, they gave Charles a flat denial.

The same was the custom in France, before that country was enslaved. The general assemblies being laid aside, the same custom is still [latter end of the 17th century] used in the lesser assemblies of the states in Languedo [...] and Bretagne. The same is observed by the deputies of the cities of Germany to the diets ^a.

The deputies or members of the parliament of Paris, when all France was like to be ruined by the confu­sions in the minority of Lewis XIV. were afraid to sign a compromise for restoring the public quiet, lest their constituents should not approve of the terms ^b. Our deputies are not afraid to approve the measures of the court, though they know them to be the exe­cration of their constituents.

Before the people of Ireland obtained a limitation of the time of their parliaments, they instructed their members, and many places went so far as to demand of them, before election, an oath, that they would vote for the measure ^c.

The deputies sent by each of the United Provinces to the States General are responsible only to the respec­tive provinces which send them, and not to the States General ^d. In England our members do not hold [Page 205] themselves responsible to their constituents, but to the house, and the house to the prime minister. Thus the people, who ought to be all, are nothing. The saga­cious Dutch have guarded against the danger of lodging too irresponsible a power in the hands of their supreme assembly, or giving their deputies leave to sell them. The States General cannot, without the unanimous consent of all the provinces (who are too numerous to be bribed) make peace, nor war, nor raise troops, nor make laws affecting the whole republic. Nor can they repeal an antient statute or regulation, nor elect a stadholder, otherwise than at the risque of their heads, which they accordingly hazarded for the public good, A. D. 1668, when, to check the growing power of Lewis XIV. at the in­stance of Sir W. Temple, they signed the triple alliance, and elected the prince of Orange stadtholder, through fear of danger from slow counsels ^a.

The people of New England keep up the right of instructing their members ^b.

CHAP. IV. Unwarrantable Privileges assumed by the House of Commons, in consequence of inadequate Representa­tion, and too long Parliaments.

IN consequence of the inadequate state of parlia­mentary representation, the house of commons has assumed such a superiority over its constitu­ents (and indeed, the burgesses of the meaner boroughs, who, as has been seen, have the credit of electing the [Page 206] majority of the house, are a set of very contemptible people, scarce capable of electing, or of instructing) that, despising the thought of being answerable to them, they arrogate certain privileges never granted by the people, and assume the power of protecting, excluding, expelling their own members, of deciding their own causes, prosecuting, arresting, imprisoning, reprimanding, and fining their employers at their ar­bitrary pleasure, and according to I know not what lex et consuetuo [...] parliamenti, which tramples on Mag­na Charta, and the Bill of Rights.

Sir William Iones indeed argues strongly, that the law of parliament is the law of the land. But in the prosecution of Clarendon ^a it being uncertain at first, which way they should proceed, precedents were searched, and Sir Thomas Littleton reported, that the committee had found ‘various proceedings in different parliaments.’ What is then the consuetudo parlia­menti?

Privilege and pre-emminence of every kind is invi­dious, and odious to the people. Whoever wanted to excite the Roman people against the senate, never failed to mention the law forbidding marriage between the patricians and plebeians. Even where privilege is bestowed in consequence of merit, it is but aukwardly brooked. ‘Why must Aristides be honoured with the title of The Just, more than others?’ said the Athenian, and voted his banishment on that ac­count ^b.

All privilege is a nuisance, whose extent is unknown; because the subject is thereby in danger of falling into undesigned offence. But it has always been made a point to [Page 207] keep the extent of parliamentary privilege, preroga­tive royal, ministerial power, &c. profound secrets. These are the arcana imperii, in English, tricks of state. But does the concealment of what may be dangerus to the people, shew, in government, a paternal ten­derness for the people? And is that government any thing better than a tyranny, which shews a want of paternal tenderness for the people? The truth is, our ministers chuse to secure a small convenience to them­selves (the convenience of keeping the people in fear of them) tho' at the risque of great loss to the subjects.

I would wish (says Iames I. in his speech, March, 1609 ^a) that the law were written in our vulgar tongue.—Every subject ought to understand the law, [and, among other laws, the parliament law] ‘under which he lives—that the excuse of ignorance may be taken away from those, who do not conform them­selves to them.’

‘In contending for the privilege of parliament, says a writer on general warrants ^b, I desire to be under­stood to mean, not that insolent abuse of privilege, which has made its name odious, and its existence intolerable; by which members of parliament have usurped a power of making themselves judges in their own cause, and avengers of their own quarrels; by which the course of law and justice has been obstruct­ed, just debts with-held from many an unhappy cre­ditor, and property detained from its true inheritor. I beg leave to mark out a distinction between the privilege and the prerogative of parliament, defining the one to be the exercise of a tyrannous and oppressive jurisdiction over the rest of the subjects; the other to [Page 208] consist in that protection which secures the representa­tives of the people from the power of the crown. On keeping this privilege sacred and inviolate depends the freedom of parliament, and of consequence the being of our constitution.’

The only use of parliamentary privilege from arrest, is to prevent a tyrant, or a corrupt court, from im­prisoning, on pretence of debt, or distressing, such members as opposed their measures. But this might have been sufficiently provided against, without car­rying privilege to such an unreasonable length, that there should be no time of the year, when a member, and his dependents, should be obliged to pay their debts.

It is well observed by an eminent lawyer in his speech in parliament ^a, That the privileges of the members of the house of commons might be said to be those of the people, if the members of the house of commons had no interest different from that of the people, which he affirms, is the very contrary of the truth.

Mark, how sublime the style of the following.

‘Resolved (by the commons, A. D. 1699) That to assert, that the house of commons have no power of commitment, but of their own members, tends to the subversion of the constitution of the house of com­mons.’

We will allow the house of commons to have much higher powers. But let them be powers fit for a house of commons to have. Every puny justice has power of commitment. Again,

‘Resolved, That to print or publish any books, or libels, reflecting upon the proceedings of the house [Page 209] of commons, or of any member thereof, for, or relating to his service therein, is a high violation of the rights and privileges of the house of com­mons.’

This resolution puts an end to all enquiry into the behaviour of our trustees, and makes it impossible for us to call them to account, or to know, whether it will be safe to re-elect them or not. There is somewhat particularly gross and mean-spirited in stopping en­quiry. It always suggests the idea of somewhat, which will not bear enquiring into. ‘I care not, says the honest old philosopher, if there were a window in my breast, that any body might look in and see what is passing in my thoughts.’ Felony, breach of the peace, and treason, deprive a member of his privilege ^a. And the commons lately gave up privilege in case of seditious libels. Thus we see them magnifying privi­lege against the people, and lowering it in servile com­plaisance to the court; directly contrary to what the spirit of liberty would dictate.

Sir Charles Sedley observes, in his speech, A. D. 1699 that when complaint was made, that great part of the revenue remained unaccounted for, in the hands of the receivers, a member answered, It could not be helped; for that those receivers were members, and stood upon their privilege ^b. Nor is it to be wondered that they should; since every 100,000 l. of the pub­lick money kept back, yields 4000 l. a year interest; and a great officer of the state, whose department lies among the finances, may keep in his own hands many such sums for many years. But this is pocketing what [Page 210] belongs to the public, and is as honest as it would be to steal sixpence a-piece out of 100,000 pockets.

There seems to be a small inconsistency between the qualification act and the privilege of members against arrest for debt. The former says, No man shall be member for a county, if he has not 600 l. a year clear, nor for a city or borough, unless he has 300 l. But the privilege supposes, that a member may be unable to pay his debts; and, in that case, provides against his being arrested, to the great inconvenience and loss of those, who have trusted members. Now, if it be improper that a needy man be a member of the house of commons, why must this needy man be pri­vileged against arrests? Why should not the bailiffs have him, and another be elected in his room? If it be said, the arrest may be litigious; it may be the contrivance of a villainous minister, to put a friend to liberty out of the way on a critical occasion; the answer is short. Let the house of commons bail the arrested member, if they understand this to be the case; if not, let him be given up to his creditors. This would equally secure the member against ministe­rial tricks, and the creditor against abuse of privilege. It is criminal in any man to contract debts, which it is improbable he should ever be able to pay. It is cri­minal to protect such a debtor. Which doctrine, by the way, condemns all our too daring merchants, bankers, &c. who take whatever credit they can have in consequence of the too easy credulity of mankind, and extend their adventures, by which only them­selves can be gainers, at the peril of hundreds, who may be undone by them. But a member of parlia­ment, a legislator, ought not to be supposed capable of ever coming into such circumstances, as to be liable to arrest for a just debt; or if he does, he ought to be [Page 211] left to the same law with other bankrupts. Where then is the honest use of this parliamentary screen? For it is to be observed, that privilege screens a mem­ber 40 days before and 40 days after the sitting of the house, against arrest for the most just debt, and for all sorts of offences, that do not come up to felony, breach of the peace, treason, or seditious libels.

A. D. 1541, the commons begun privileging from arrest for debt by writ from the speaker. In former times, it was done by writ from the chancellor ^a.

It is plain, that all the privileges assumed by mem­bers of parliament are not necessary for the pubilc ser­vice, whatever they may be for their pride; for they have often been dispensed with. An act was made, A. D. 1641, for laying down the privileges of parlia­ment for a session, because the citizens complained that they lost money by them ^b.

The freemen and citizens of London, in their peti­tition to parliament, A. D. 1646, complain of many members, who stand upon privilege, and refuse to pay their debts ^c.

An order was made, A. D. 1647, that no persons under authority of parliament, but the members, shall have protection or immunity by reason of privilege, nor any member be free from action or prosecution, but obliged to answer. Only their persons not liable to arrest ^d

In the year 1647, the commons ordered, that from Ianuary 20th of that year, none but members should, during that session, have protection by privilege of the house, in any suit; and that the estates of members be [Page 212] liable for debt, &c. And the same year, the [...] gave up those lords, who by reason of their offences, had not liberty to sit in parliament, to be prosecuted by suits of law, and likewise their attendents, as if there were no parliament ^a.

Privilege of members, as to person and estate, was taken off, A. D. 1649 ^b.

The lord mayor, aldermen, and commons, A. D. 1646, complained to parliament, that many were sufferers by protection of privilege; they complained of jealousies fomented between parliament and city, and their mayor suspended; desire that the debts due by parliament to the city may be put in course of pay­ment ^c. The Lords answer with great acknowledge­ments of the important services of the city, which they promise never to forget; and to do every thing in their power for redressing the complaints of the citizens, and particularly of the lord mayor, of whom they speak very highly. Commons give it a very cold reception. Ludlow, in his MEMOIRS, calls the petition an insolent address, and the commons' answer, a declaration that they would preserve their authority and not be dictated to.

A standing order of the house was published, A. D. 1739, against members giving protections ^d.

The commons, A. D. 1678, put a stop to all pro­tections granted by members to any but menial ser­vants actually in service. A great grievance by abuse of privilege ^e.

A good act was made, A. D. 1701, for explaining parliamentary privilege, which was a great nuisance, [Page 213] obstructing the course of justice, and preventing the demand of just debts from year to year; for the ses­sions of parliament being prorog [...]ed from period to period, the whole year round was a time of privilege. So natural is it to overstretch power in our own favour. Dodderidge traces privilege for the servants of members back to 8 He [...]. VI.^a

A D. 1707, Asgill, a member, was in debt. His cre­ditors petitioned the house, that he may not be defend­ed by privilege from paying a just debt. It happened that Asgill had written a silly pamphlet about the pos­sibility of going to heaven without dying. The house took the opportunity of this pamphlet to expel him, on the statute of blasphemy, I suppose, without either violating privilege▪ or screening a bad man from pay­ing his just debts ^b. Why should not all privileges both of lords and commons, be put on this footing, that no member of either house be liable to arrest, but with consent of the house, and the house always to consent, unless when the cause is litigious or unjust?

When it was moved, that letters of members go fr [...]e during the sitting of the house, Sir Heneage Finch said it was a beggarly proposal. The lords left out the provision, and the commons agreed ^c.

A. D 1690, Mr. Montague was charged in execu­tion for 507 [...] l. He was at the same time elected member. The house of commons was puzzled, whether he could be received. But they found prece­dents in the preceeding parliament, and that lord Coke, INST. 3. affirms, that all persons are eligible, except aliens, minors, and persons attainted of treason or [Page 214] felony ^a. It is, however to be remembered, that noblemen, clergymen, women, lunatics, commissio­ners of customs, and several other placemen, are not eligible; and that [...] member for a county must have a qulification of 600 l. a year, and for a city or borough 300 l. a year. But the Scotch, and univer­sities are exempted from qualifications.

Sir Thomas Shirley, a member, was imprisoned for debt in the time of Iam. I. The serjeant at arms was sent to the Fleet by the house to demand him. The warden refuses: The commons send for the warden, and commit him to the Tower. A dispute arose, whether the house's imprisoning the warden, could indemnify him, in case of his prisoner's escap­ing, during his absence. Some proposed to send, and break open the prison, and bring away Sir Thomas by force. [A whimsical application, surely, of legisla­tive power.] The speaker overruled this motion; telling the house, that it would be actionable. Af­ter much debating, they sent for the warden again, and put him into the dungeon called Little ease. The warden offers to release Sir Thomas if two members will be security for the debt. The house refuses. At last they privately desire the king to order the warden, on his allegiance, to release Sir Thomas ^b.

Mr. Ferrers, member for Plymouth, was arrested for debt, A. D. 1542, going to parliament, and carried to the Counter. The serjeant of the commons was sent to the Counter to fetch him. The people at the counter resisted the serjeant, who complained to [Page 215] the sheriffs. They took part with their officers. The serjeant returned to the house, and informed them. The commons resent highly. They rose, and went to the house of lords, to whom they related the affair. The lords and judges declared the contempt very atrocious, and referred the punishment to the commons, who returned to their house, and sent their serjeant to the sheriffs with his mace, without a writ, though the chancellor offered them one. In the mean while the sheriffs resolved to change their scheme, and deliver up Mr. Ferrers to the serjeant. The commons ordered the sheriffs to attend them, with the clerks and officers of the Counter. They likewise ordered their serjeant to take into custody White, the person who had arrested him. The sheriffs and White were sent to the Tower, the clerk of the Counter to a place, in the same prison, called Little ease, and the officer, who arrested Mr. Ferrers, and four others, to New­gate, who were not set at liberty, till the lord mayor petitioned for them ^a. Was this contest suitable to the dignity of the house of commons? A battle between the gaolers of the Counter, and the repre­sentatives (such they ought to be) of the greatest peo­ple in Europe!

It is notorious, that from time immemorial, the house of commons has assumed to itself a power of trying, condemning, and punishing, in cases, where itself is the offended party, and often in a very arbi­trary manner, and without due regard to the standing laws of the land. An assembly of representatives elected in an adequate manner, and holding their power a competent time, and upon the foundation of responsibility to constituents, would not have fallen into this error.

[Page 216]The MIRROR OF JUSTICE says, ‘Parliaments were ordered to hear and determine all com­plaints of wrongful acts done by the king, queen, or their children, and some others, against whom common right cannot be had elsewhere ^a.’ There­fore offending sub [...]ects are to be tried at law, and not by parliament. It is not by a power of apprehending and imprisoning, that the dignity of parliament is to be kept up, any more than the credit of religion by fire and faggot. On the contrary, these violences necessarily bring both into contempt, because they suppose, that they are not sufficient for their own sup­port without these unnatural helps. Let your religion be rational, and your parliament incorrupt, and they will defy abuse. Who ever heard of the vene­rable court of Areopagus, or the more venerable one of the Amphictyons, sending out their serjeant at arms to apprehend the writers of pamphlets against them?

It seems strange, that a part of the legislature should shew so little respect for the laws, as to set up its own unknown and hasty resolutions as a better rule of con­duct for judges, &c. than the known solemn acts of the whole parliament. Yet we often see them doing so. Sir Francis Pemberton, judge of the court of kings' bench, had over-ruled a plea of an order of the house of commons, A. D. 1689, for arresting certain persons, and defended his proceeding; for that it was accord­ing to law ^b. Resolved, That the judgments given by Pemberton, Iones, &c. are illegal, and a violation of the rights of parliament, and that a bill be brought in to reverse those judgments. Another case of the same kind relating to a judgment of the court of king's bench on information against Williams, speaker of the [Page 217] house of commons, for matters done by order of the house, was resolved illegal, and against the freedom of parliament, and that a bill be brought in to reverse it^a. Pembe [...]n and Iones were examined again, and put in custody of the serjeant at arms ^b. Judge Berkley was taken off of his bench in Westminster-Hall, A.D. 1640, by the usher of the black rod, to the great terror of his brethren ^c. In those days the house of commons was venerable, as being known to act according to the general sense of the people. Therefore the people did not grudge them any degree of power. In corrupt times, when the people see their pretended represen­tatives acting constantly in obedience to a designing court; they wish their power retrenched, though the retrenching of the power of the house of commons is not the proper means for redressing the evil; but cut­ting off the communication between it and the court; of which more in the sequel.

The following instances shew what power has been formerly allowed our parliaments, when the people had a confidence in them. A. D. 1680, Scroggs was impeached of [...]eason. Gre [...]t question was made, whether he could be accused of treason, or of high crimes and mi [...]demeaners only. It was argued, that parliament may punish as treason any crime tending to the destruction of the nation, though not declared to be treason by 25 Edw. III. Tresilian and his accom­plices were condemned in parliament for crimes not before declared felony, by any promulgated law. Empsom and Dudley the same. Finch and Berkley were condemned by parliament of treason for the same crimes as those charged on Scroggs, &c. The judges [Page 218] in Richard II.'s time were condemned for giving ex­trajudicial opinions. A knight of Cheshire was con­demned for conspiring the death of the king's uncle. An earl of Northumberland for giving liveri [...] to so many that they were thought a little army. None of these were declared felony by any previous statute ^a.

The commons, however, made a bad use of the people's confidence, and began to use their power in a tyrannical and oppressive manner. Accordingly the judicious writer of a piece, entituled, The Subjects Right of Petitioning ^b (which was written on occasion of the commons imprisioning the Kentish petitioners, A. D. 1701) observes, that great numbers of other subjects ‘had been imprisoned by them the same session, to the horror and amazement of all those, who knew the rights and liberties of the people of England;’ and therefore could not but be concerned to see them so miserably infringed; and that it was necessary, in order to prevent such acts of power for the future, to shew, that they were mere acts of power, and manifest encroachments on the rights and liberties of the people. He shews, that the common law was formerly so tender of the subject's liberty, that it suf­fered none to be imprisoned, but for violence and breach of the peace. The lords brought in the custom of imprisoning 35 Hen. III. by the STAT. MARL [...]R. for obliging bailiffs, or collectors of rents, to make up their accounts. Afterwards, 23 Edw. III. it was enacted, that debtors should be compelled by impris­onment to pay their debts. But if a debtor died in prison, the debt was paid. And by 1 Edw. II. no one was to be punished for breaking prison, ‘foras­much [Page 219] as one is warranted to do it by the law of nature,’ says the MIRROR. By Magna Charta, ‘no free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, but by judg­ment of his peers, or the law of the land; which is explained by 25 Edw. III. to be a security against imprisonment by petition or suggestion to the king or his council, or in any other way than due course of law [no mention of a vote of the House of Commons.] It is certain, says that writer, that men, imprisoned by the commons, underwent no judgment of their peers, were not committed by any legal process, or by any law, that we know in this land ^a.’ He insists, that the commons have no right to imprison any, but their own members, and that only when absolutely necessary. The members know this power of the house, and voluntarily expose themselves to it, by going into the house; which other subjects do not; but claim the privilege given them by Magna Charta. He owns, likewise, that there may be some pretence for imprisoning persons not members, when guilty of breach of privilege, or contempt. [In which I think he makes too large a concession. I see not the justice, nor even the common decency of any set of men whatever (I am of opinion the two houses of parliament are but men) punishing any offence against themselves. There is no possible case, in which a jury may not decide.] Confinement by the commons alone, he observes, is an encroachment on the legislature, which consists of king, lords, and commons ^b. The commons sending the subjects to prison, even though guilty, is assuming the office of the executive, which [Page 220] belongs to the king, the commons being of the legisl­lative only. A power in the commons of imprisoning is a mockery, he thinks, of the people's liberty; be­cause a free people ought to be liable to no punish­ment, but in consequence of some known standing law. Judges, and justices of the peace have a power of imprisoning in consequence of their being impowered by the king to execute the laws, which the commons are not. The commons have no need of a power to punish, because they may apply to the executive whenever a known law is violated. [Even the sove­raine cannot punish an offence against himself. The offender is tried, and condemned by indifferent per­sons, viz. judges and juries.] The house of com­mons has no power to decide concerning property; how then, he says, can it take away personal liberty, which is more valuable? He says, the power of im­prisoning was but just then assumed by the commons, and could not plead custom, or prescription. Too great a power in the house of commons, he says, may produce great mischief many ways; particularly by disgusting the people against parliamentary govern­ment, and driving them to such a proceeding as that of the Danes, who, to be free from the tyranny of their lords, made themselves slaves to their king. When there is reason, he says, to suspect a great pre­valency of bribery and corruption in the house of commons, it is time for the people to see to the re­trenching of their power; [the cutting off of court influence, he should have said] for that a corrupt house of commons may be expected to make them­selves formidable to the people, in order to be of con­sequence to the court, and to deserve the more liberal pay ^a.

[Page 221]No set of men empowered only to make laws, can, without an express commission from the people, alter the constitution, because it is only upon the principles of the constitution, that they had their power entrusted to them; and the principles of the constitution will never bear them out in overthrowing the constitution. The people, whose original and inherent power esta­blished the constitution, may change the constitution, or empower a set of men to change it.

Writers on the side of this assumed boundless par­liamentary privilege, by accustoming themselves to think of the house of commons as the representative of the people, fall into the mistake, that whatever is right for the one is right for the other likewise, and that whatever the people's power reaches to, is like­wise within the reach of the assembly of representa­tives. And this is, generally speaking, true. But there is a distinction to be made. The people have certain incommunicable powers, which their represen­tatives can upon no occasion challenge to themselves. The people alone can elect representatives. The whole body of representatives have not in themselves the power to take into, to exclude, or to expel from their house one single member, otherwise than ac­cording to notorious and stated laws made by the whole legislative power, and assented to by the people. This may be explained by comparing it with the king's power of commissioning embassadors for foreign courts; which power is incommunicably inherent in him, in such manner, that all the embassadors em­ployed by the king cannot by any power of their own send an embassador to, or dismiss, or expel one from the most inconsiderable court. Yet every embassador, when furnished with his credentials, has the power [Page 222] of representing the king his master's person at the court to which he is sent, in all those matters and things which enter into the function of an embassador. Again, the people alone have the power of determin­ing for how long a period they will continue their re­presentatives in office. The assembly of representa­tives have not power to continue their own authority one day beyond the time, for which they were elected. If they have, they may, at any time, erect themselves into peers, and insist on keeping their seats for life. Again, an assembly of representatives have no power to assume to themselves any unprecedented privilege; but the people have power to confer on their represen­tatives what privileges they please, to limit them as they please, and even to new-model the whole go­vernment.

In the case of a court of directors, established by a trading company, it is universally understood, that the directors, when once established by the proprietors, have power to do whatever the proprietors could do for the common advantage of the company, this power being still left to the explication and limitation of the proprietors. But, when a director dies, or resigns, the court of directors cannot put another in his place. This is the incommunicable privilege of the proprie­tors. Nor can the directors lengthen, beyond the in­tention of their constituents, the time for which they were appointed. Nor can they assume to themselves any one power or privilege, different from those given them by the proprietors. Nor can they refuse a duly elected director, nor take in one of their own chusing, nor expel one chosen by the proprietors, otherwise than according to the laws of the company, and the powers orginally reposed in them. Nor can they alter any thing fundamental in the constitution of the com­pany; [Page 223] but the proprietors can; so far as to the total dissolution of the incorporate body. Therefore, when Mr. Prynne was threatened by Sir H. Van [...] and Sir A. Haselrig, to be voted out of the house of com­mons, A. D. 1659, he answ [...]red, ‘He knew of no one in the house who had a right to vote him out, being equally entrusted with themselves for the whole nation, and those he represented ^a.’

As to the power assumed by the house, of sending for persons, papers, and records, and of reprimanding fining, imprisoning offenders, it has long been que­stioned, and never rightly established. Burnet writes of it as follows; ‘The commons could not receive an information upon oath, nor proceed against those who refused ^b. Their right of imprisoning any be­sides their own members, was inquired into, and it was found to be built on no law, nor practice, older than queen Elizabeth. Several people therefore, when sent for in custody of the serjeant at arms, refused to attend ^c.’

When the commons, in the th [...]rd parliament under Ch. II. imprisoned, too arbitrarily, many of the abhor­rers, or court party, the clamour turned against them, and one Stowel stood on the defensive against the ser­jeant, when he came to apprehend him, saying, The commons had no law for imprisoning. He got the bet­ter. And the commons, to save their authority, drop­ped the matter, and granted Stowel a month to recover from an indisposition, which he had not ^d.

It is manifestly an irregularity for the house of com­mons, which is only a third part of the legislature, to take [Page 224] to itself singly the executive power. ‘The house of commons has no more power to administer an oath than to cut [...] a head,’ says Charles I ^a The power of the house (as being no court of judicature (to examine wit­nesses, was questione [...] by the lords, A. D. 1732. Though the commons had always claimed that power, yet it was a point still in dispute between the two houses. It was argued, that the commons had dele­gated that power to their committees. That mem­bers, who were justices of the peace, could administer the oath to the witnesses, for which their was pre­cedent. That that house was a court of record, and as such they certainly had a power to administer an oath, in any affair that came properly before them. But being unwilling to have any dispute with the lords, the debate was dropped ^b. There is no statute law, by which a constitutional power is given to the house of commons to order a paper to be burnt, and the sheriffs to attend and see it done. That they have assumed this power from time immemorial, is un­doubted ^c.

It was resolved by the commons, A. D. 1689, ‘that bailing by the court of king's bench, persons committed by this house, is a crime, for which the advisers may justly be excepted out of the indemnifica­tion ^d.’ The king's bench goes on, however, the same year, bailing by Habeas Corpus, persons obnoxious to the commons. The commons order the governor of the Tower to bring before them in custody of their serjeant at arms, Sir Thomas Ienner and others, tho' [Page 225] bailed before the warrant could reach them. Not giving satisfaction, on their examination before the house, a committee is appointed to prepare a charge against them. The governor of the Tower is ordered to bring before the commons several lords, and others. The commons prepare impeachments against them. They order several others into custody ^a. At the same time that the commons consulted safety, they punished cruelty. They ordered Richardson, keeper of New­gate, to be prosecuted for cruelty to his prisoners ^b.

In the affair of the printers in 1770, it was argued in the house of commons, that the power of summon­ing persons before them, and punishing for refusal, is necessary for preserving the purity of elections; because, if every returning officer may proceed as he pleases, and laugh at the house of commons, there must be an end of all due election and return. But we know that many matters relating to elections are now allowed to be cognizable in the courts of law. Why should not all? Why should the house of commons concern themselves with any thing, but their great obj [...]cts, viz. legislation, raising supplies, and enquiring into the conduct of ministers? One thing we all know, relating to this affair, viz. That if the commons would go on with their own business, and leave the decision of elections, and breaches of their own privileges, to the inferior courts, magnanimously de­clining to be judges in their own cause, and having nothing to do with any man, till he comes to take his seat, and has satisfied the house, that either his election was never questioned, or if questioned, was legally decided, as any other difference between man [Page 226] and man; it is, I say, notorious, that if this was the lexet consuetudo parliamenti, there would be no opportu­nity for the reflections now so commonly cast upon our house of commons, as deciding elections too much in favour of the court-candidate, and as taking upon themselves the inconsistent offices of plaintiffs, judges, and juries.

Judge Blackstone, in his account of the unknown and unlimited power and privileges of parliament ^a, seems to forget, that the safety of the people limits all free governments. It is true that the people of Eng­land, not being accustomed, till lately, to apprehend danger from any quarter, but the throne (tyranny hav­ing been an old trick among kings from Nimrod's time down) have all along encouraged and supported their parliaments in extending their power, as the only sure bulwark against regal encroachments. But latter ages have taught us the necessity of looking out for security against parliamentary encroachments. And, the me­thod is not by lessening the power of parliament, but by lessening the power of the court over the parliament. For a parliament is not (as a king) naturally hostile to liberty. If ever a parliament comes to oppose, or in­jure the people, it must be in consequence of an unna­tural influence acting in it. Therefore our modern male-contents seem to be in a wrong pursuit. To re­trench the power of their representatives, would be lessen­ing their own power. To break through the corrupt in­fluence of the court over their representatives, would be making them truly their representatives. Take away court-influence, and the 558 will of course pursue the interest of their country, as any other set of gentle­men [Page 227] men would do, because their own will be involved in it, when they have no places or pensions to indemnify them. At the same time it cannot be denied, that for a house of commons, though ever so incorrupt and uninfluenced by the court, to be ever grasping at new privileges, and assuming new powers, descending from the dignity of representatives of the majesty of the people of Britain, taking upon themselves the office of the justices, prosecuting, imprisoning, and fining, a set of printers and booksellers, depriving the subjects of his trial by jury, and employing their time in hunt­ing out small offenders, while they should be battling the gigantic enemies of liberty and virtue, and plan­ning measures for making unborn millions happy; it cannot be denied, I say, that such proceedings as these are infinitely beneath the attention of a house of commons, though it should be granted, that the power of the house of commons, being the power of the peo­ple, ought not to be limited. All thing are lawful for them; but all things are not expedient. The truth of the matter is, That if our houses of commons had kept to their proper sphere, we should never have seen any libels against them, nor any occasion for prosecut­ing, imprisoning, and fining; or if there had, the courts of king's bench and common pleas were open.

The following passages from the Magazines shew how these assumptions of the house of commons ap­pear to the people.

‘It is not more known, than lamented, what an authority the house of commons has claimed over the liberty of the subject; and how numerous the instances are in our history, where, without the spe­cification of any crime, or the execution of any war­rant, they have voted a freeman of England into [Page 228] prison, and kept him closely confined for weeks, nay months, to the irreparable injury, perhaps, of him and his family. To aggravate the cruelty of the pro­cedure, they have even voted every body who offered to procure him the least justice, an enemy to his country; and deemed it to the last degree unpar­donable, that he should have recourse to those very laws, for satisfaction, which they themselves had esta­blished for his redress. The privilege thus claimed by the house of commons is no less repugnant to the laws of this kingdom, than it is opposite to reason and nature: if then we are desirous of restraining the servants of the crown from the exercise of an arbitrary authority, whence comes it that we have never en­deavoured to restrain our own immediate servants from the exercise of a tyranny practised a thousand times more frequen [...]ly, and infinitely more replete with slavery and destruction ^a? Perhaps it may be said, There is no likelihood that the house of commons will resign any part of their privileges. What is this, but saying, that the august assembly in question, will not adopt a measure highly beneficial to the freedom and happiness of their country? What is it, but say­ing, that they are fond of a power to treat those very people as the most abject set of slaves, whose liberties they have solemnly sworn to defend? And what is it but a positive implication, that they are the greatest of all enemies to that very national welfare, which they profess so tenderly to cherish and befriend ^b?’

Suppose a man had personally offended the majority of the individuals, who happen to compose a jury, [Page 229] that is to try him. Would not every body acknow­ledge, it would be great severity to refuse him the usual liberty of objecting to his jury? But suppose twe [...]ve men to commence a prosecution against one; and that those very individuals are immediately, in the very rage of their resentment, inclosed to pass a verdict, and determine of a punishment for an offence against themselves. Would this have the smallest semblance of justice? On the contrary, is it not the very design of law, to take out of the hands of the off [...]nded, the trial and punishment of the offenders, and put it into those of indifferent persons? But, when either house of parliament, or a court of justice punishes for breach of privilege, or contempt of court, the persons offended are the judges, and inflict the pu­nishment.

If it be objected, that it is beneath the dignity of the august house of commons to submit their com­plaints against those who have been guilty of breach of their privileges, to the decision of a court of law (which the sovereign himself must do) let it be re­membered, that, according to the present monstrous state of representation, a gentleman of 5000l. a year, by sitting in the house of commons, in consequence of the votes of 10 beggars, acknowledges a superiority in those 10 men; for he could not have sate, if they had not empowered him. If now he should submit to those 10 constituents his part of a dispute between the house of commons and an author, or printer, or be­tween the house, and a member who has affronted them by accusing them of corruption, I should be glad to know, whether he would do a meaner thing than he has already done in submitting to those 10 worthies, whether he shall sit in the house or not.

[Page 230]It is the natural disposition of man, to overstretch whatever power he gets into his hands. It is the same incroaching disposition, that puts kings upon decision by arms, rather than by arbitration, which puts lords upon rejecting the most salutary bills, which puts them and commons upon punishing sup­posed offences against themselves, and which puts inferior courts upon punishing what they call con­tempt. And it is easy to find somewhat plausible to say in support of an unjust claim. But after all is said, it will still be true, that a king's chusing the brutal decision of arms, rather than the rational one of arbitration by neutral powers, that a house of lords or commons, taking into their own hands the punish­ment of supposed offences against themselves, instead of referring them to indifferent persons, and a court of law or justice punishing whatever it pleases to call contempt against itself, instead of leaving the matter to a jury of the supposed offender's peers, without which every punishment is irregular;—there is no doubt, I say, that all such proceedings as these are inconsistent, not only with justice and liberty, but with civilization and police, and are the very evils complained of under tyrannical governments, and a­mong savages, not yet regulated by government.

‘The legislative authority which has power to abrogate all laws now in being, cannot be tyed to any rules of human prescription, but there are eternal rules of equity and justice, right reason, and con­science, and these are unalterable, and never to be swerved from.’ Words of Sir Godfrey Copley, con­cerning the house of commons trying Sir Iohn Fen­wick for treason in an unprecedented way.

[Page 231]Lord Coke ^a, and many other writers, make a great matter of the houses of parliament being the sole judges of whatever concerns their own houses respectively, because they are the supreme court, and no other court can intermeddle with their affairs. And it is, by the same able writer, and others, taken for granted, that every court is to be sole judge of its own privileges, and of offences committed against itself.

There is no doubt concerning the supremacy of parliament, and that therefore no inferior court can, of its own authority, claim the decision of d [...]ffe­rences between the houses, or between one house and a supposed offender, or offenders against that house. But there is certainly a power in either house to refer to the decision of others any matter, wherein the house is itself a party. And it will then become lawful for those, to whom the reference is made, to decide.

It does not appear to me, that there is any thing humiliating in submitting to the decision, or arbitra­tion, of a set of men, whether in or out of parliament, or that it necessarily implies acknowledging a superi­ority in those men. In a dispute between the king and a merchant, neither one nor the other thinks himself degraded by having the cause tried by the court of King's Bench, and the point determined by a jury. The cause must be tried in that court first, and cannot come before the lords, but by appeal. And even when it is finally determined by the lords, is the sove­reign degraded by submitting to the decision of his inferiors? The lords are as much his inferiors after, as before. What could be nobler, than to see a man [Page 232] of high rank and large fortune decline to pronounce in a dispute between himself and one of his domestics, and leaving the matter to arbitration of his other domestics?

Supposing the house of commons elected in an ade­quate manner, that is, every member by about 400 men of property, I say that in submitting to their arbitration, a member would submit to his undoubted superiors in every respect. If every member submits, the house submits to their constituents. And surely it could be no degradation for them to submit a point of honour or ceremony, a matter of no national conse­quence, to their political creators, from whom they derive their very existence as a house.

Supposing it granted, that there is a difficulty either way, viz. Whether parliament takes into its own hands the punishment of offences against itself, or leaves it to arbitration by others, will any man pre­tend, that the difficulties are equal on both sides? Nay, will not any man acknowledge that in declining to be judges in their own cause, there is magnani­mity; as on the contrary (in all private disputes at least) there is much selfishness and arrogance in claim­ing to decide our own quarrels.

It is usually said, there are customs of parliament and other courts, which themselves only understand. Are then the customs of parliament and other courts only to be explained by algebra, fluxions, or the higher geometry? Or are they matters of plain common sense? If they be not, the most innocent and uprightly-inten­tioned subject may fall into the great and dangerous guilt of offending against those inexplicable customs and privileges, and may find himself suddenly in the same condition with the unfortunate sailor dashed on unseen breakers in an open sea, swallowed up and lost.

[Page 233] A. D. 1704, the lords, in their judicial capacity, determined, that a person's right to vote for a member might be tried at law, and that the commons have nothing to do with that point, and that, by their vote to the contrary, they had struck at the liberties of the people, the law of England, and the judicial power of the house of lords ^a. This was taking the protection of corrupt returning officers out of the hands of the house of commons. Even lord Coke, who magnifies the power of parliament as much as any writer whatever, observes, that parliaments may do wrong, of which he gives several instances. He quotes one ‘mischievous act with a flattering pre­amble ^b,’ by pretext of which, Empson and Dudley committed innumerable oppressions upon the subjects, and the act was accordingly repealed the first parlia­ment after the death of Hen. VII. in whose time it was made. ‘A good caveat, says he, to parliament, to leave all causes to be measured by the golden and [...] metwand of the law, and not by the uncer­tain and crooked cord of discretion.’

The popish party blamed parliament for taking into custody some of the abhorrers. They said it was a matter which had no relation to privilege of parli­ament, signifying, that if it had, there had been no harm ^c. We now question the [...]ctrine of a power in the commons of imprisoning for [...]ny thing, but what stops proceedings of the house, and is done in the house. Instances were brought by Sir William Iones, of commitments of persons not members for faults not breaches of privilege, as for exercising patents con­demned [Page 234] by the commons, and for faults in preaching and catechising. ‘There would be no end, says he, of giving instances of such commitments which may be observed in almost every parliament.’ This how­ever was all wrong, as superseding law ^a. Parlia­ments were listened to, and thanked for detecting wicked favourites by Edw. I. Hen. II. IV. V. and Elizabeth. The contrary by Hen. III. and VI. and Edw. II. and Rich. II. This was the proper business of parliament, the other of the courts of law.

The power of the house of commons to send even their own members (much more other subjects) to prison without tryal by jury, is to the last degree dangerous. For a house of commons may become, through court-influence, so generally corrupt, that they may see it proper to send every honest member to the tower, the moment he opens his mouth against their traiterous measures, and in favour of his coun­try. This could not be, if every person, whether member or not, offending, or supposed to offend, against the orders of the house, were to be tried, before he could be committed, by a jury of those, who are in every respect equal to the members, I mean the people, the constituents of the members.

There is an act 1 Iam. I. cap. 16. entitled, ‘An act for new execution against any who shall be here­after delivered out of prison, by privilege of parlia­ment, and for discharge of them, out of whose cus­tody such prisoners shall be delivered ^b.’ This shews, that privilege was not originally intended for oppression of the subject. But judge Hales collects many instances of privilege allowed to members and [Page 235] the servants of members upon very frivolous pretences, and to the great loss of their just creditors ^a. By 4 Edw. III.^b it was enacted, that ‘though the lords and peers of the realm in presence of the king had taken upon them to give judgment in cases of trea­son and felony of such as were no peers of the realm, hereafter no peer shall be driven to give judgment on any other than their peers according to law ^c.’ Why did not the commons come to the same reso­lution? See ^d many instances of punishments inflicted upon persons not members, for pretended breach of privilege, which would have come much more decent­ly from the court of King's Bench, even though justly inflicted, which was not always the case.

Judge Hales says, both lords and commons inde­pendently have power of judicature ^e. Yet he says an ordinance, or resolution of one house, ‘bindeth not in succession ^f,’ unless it afterwards receive the sanction of the other branch, or branches of the legislature.

A. D. 1584, Dr. Parry, for speaking freely in the house against a bill, was committed to the serjeant, brought to the bar, and obliged on his knees to con­fess his fault, and ask pardon, &c. ^g But by 4 Hen. VIII. cap. 8. it is enacted, ‘That all suits, fines, pu­nishments, corrections, &c. to be put or had upon any member, for speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matters concerning parliament to be com­menced, or treated of, be utterly void, and of none effect.’ This act is declaratory of the antient law and custom of parliament ^h.

CHAP. V. Parliamentary Privileges and Prosecutions have been too generally frivolous and unjust.

TO prove that parliamentary privileges and pro­secutions are grievances, I will add here a few, out of a great many instances I had col­lected in the course of my reading, of parliamentary prosecutions, very much unworthy the dignity of parliament, which will shew, that it is not easy for men going out of their proper sphere to act suitably, nor to exclude passion and prejudice from their decisions in their own cause.

In fact, the liberty and property of free-born Eng­lishmen are things of too sacred a nature to lie open to invasion, from the sudden resolutions of any set of men whatever. And yet greater depredations have not been committed, than those which the liberty and property of Englishmen have suffered, at the hands of kings and ministers, who have been artful enough to prevail with parliaments (naturally friendly to li­berty) to become the instruments of their tyranny.

Some members of parliament, in the time of Philip and Mary, A. D. 1555, made a secession. Some were indicted and fined; others traversed; but the point was not decided, when the queen died.

Mr. Taylor, barrister at law, a member, was brought on his knees in the house, A. D. 1631, for saying, that the parliament had committed murder with the sword of justice, in the case of Strafford. He was ex­pelled the house, and voted incapable of ever sitting more. He was committed to the Tower during plea­sure [Page 237] of the house; and afterwards carried to Windsor to make his recantation ^a.

In the time of Iam. I. the year not mentioned, a member, for seeming to reflect on another member, as puritanical and factious, was called to the bar, and on his knees discharged the service of the house, with an intimation, that his sentence was very merciful, because they might have imprisoned him besides ^b.

The commons, afraid of Lilburn's party and the levellers, made them close prisoners in the Tower; but this severe order was countermanded afterwards ^c. His printed papers were ordered to be burnt by the hangman; the sheriff to protect him: the gentleman usher of the house to search for papers of the same kind, and bring them before the house ^d.

‘There have been no cases harder than those, in which king, lords, and commons have concurred; as that of Cromwel, earl of Essex, who was attainted, and not suffered to come from the Tower to be heard ^e.’

Hen. Marten, esq. was disabled, A. D. 1643, and committed to the Tower by the house of commons, for reflecting on the king and royal family, but after­wards restored, and the sentence erased from the Jour­nals. Several were disabled for having been in the kings's quarters ^f. One suspended for writing a book against the Trinity. Recants, and is restored; but afterwards disabled for the same offence ^g. Coningsby expelled for being a monopolist ^h. Commons exclude [Page 238] all those members who voted for treating with the king; it is plain they thought they had power of exclusion and incapacitation. However, the people seemed pleased, for there came multitudes of addresses from all quarters approving of their proceedings ^a.

Cranfield was fined 500 l. each to four members whom he had slandered ^b.

Lord Saville was committed to the Tower, for re­fusing to name the person who had written a letter to him, which parliament had thought treacherous ^c.

‘An order, A. D. 1647, for several members of the house to take some of the deputies of the serjeant at arms, and to break open doors, and seize trunks and papers of one captain Vernon, was much opposed by some members, as altogether illegal ^d.’

Doctor Cary was brought to the bar of the house of peers, A. D. 1677, and examined concerning a MS. carried by him to the press, on the illegality of the prorogation; because he would not answer certain interrogatories, he was fined 1000 l. and kept in prison till he paid the money ^e. Aaron Smith be­ing accused of seditious words to the same purpose, and absconding, the house addressed for a proclama­tion to apprehend him, which the king granted ac­cordingly ^f.

Even the punishments inflicted by the house of peers, though undoubtedly a court, will not be sub­mitted to without discontent, when ordered in this arbitrary manner.

[Page 239]Sir I. Maynard, A. D. 1647, treats the house of lords with contempt. Is fined 5000l. and sent to the Tower ^a. Wanted to be tried by a jury. Nor will the subjects, while a spark of liberty remains, be re­conciled to any other form of trial.

The commons took too much upon them, A. D. 1681, when they passed the vote, that the laws against recusants ought to be only put in execution against papist, and not against protestant dissenters. Their design was right, so far as they meant to favour prote­stant dissenters; but no single branch of the legislature has power to dispense with laws made by the united authority of all the three. They are to be regularly repealed by the same authority which made them ^b

When the bill to prevent double returns passed, A. D. 1695, some lords protested, because the com­mons took too much upon them, when they pretended to settle the course of elections and returns by their vote, excluding the other house, which was making themselves, contrary to the constitution and sense of the public in all ages, a court of judicature ^c.

Iohn Biddle, a school-master, was examined, A. D. 1654, for an Arian book. The book was burnt by the hands of the hangman. He was committed to the Gate-house, without pen, ink, or paper. Seems to have been a man of no depth. He was confined afterwards in Newgate, and then banished to the isle of Scilly ^d.

Parliament, A. D. 1650, takes up the office of criminal judges, and sentences several persons to the pillory for forgery ^e.

[Page 240] A. D. 1680, one Sherridan, in custody of the serjeant at arms by order of the house, had moved for his habeas corpus. Refused by judge Raymond, because committed by order of the house, though moved in behalf of Raymond. Sir William Iones is against bail­ing in case of commitment by the commons. Says the house of commons is a court of itself, and part of the highest court in the nation, superior to those in Westminster hall, and the laws made in it, are to bind the inferior courts, but cannot be understood to bind them­selves. That it is dangerous to hinder the power of parliament (in those days the house of commons was the people). A commitment by the house is a judg­ment, and was never allowed to be bailable. I [...] per­sons committed by the house on any account may be bailed, they may be bailed even though committed for breach of privilege, and then the house is disarmed of its necessary power. Thinks it improper to make any resolution, or give any answer to the motion in behalf of Raymond; but to leave the judges at their peril to bail persons committed by the house ^a.

‘The highest court is to govern according to the laws, as well as the lowest ^b.’ The words of the duke of Buckingham, 1668, 20 Car. II. speaking of the house of peers, directed to the commons in a conference on the affair of Skinner. He goes on, ‘I suppose none will make a question, but that every man and every cause is to be tried by Magna Charta, i. e. by his peers, or according to the law of the land.’ As if he had meant, that parliamentary trials are not accord­ing to Magna Charta and the law of the land.

‘The good old rules of the law are the best secu­rity; and let not men have so much cause to fear, [Page 241] that the settlements they make of their estates shall be too easily unsettled, when they are dead, by the power of parliament ^a.’

‘Our judges and ministers of justice, neither can nor ought, in reverence to the votes of either or both houses, to break the oath they have taken, for the due and impartial execution of our laws, which by experience have been found to be the best support both of the protestant interest and of the peace of the kingdom.’ Charles IId's words in his proclamation, A. D. 1681, and apology for dissolving his parliament, premisses very just, though ill applied ^b.

In the case of lord Banbury, the chief justice Holt disregardeed a vote of the house of peers; and in that of Ashby and White, the courts of law took no notice of a vote of the house of commons ^c.

The Lord chief justice Holt was ‘very learned in the law, and had on great occasions shewed an in­trepid zeal in asserting its authority.’ For he ven­tured on the indignation of both houses of parliament by turns, when he thought the law was with him ^d.

Imprisonment by mere order of council was, in the time of Charles I. found to be illegal, and contrary to Magna Charta, and is likewise inconsistent with six statutes in favour of liberty made since ^e. By the same rule, imprisonment as a punishment, inflic [...] by any order whatever, without trial per pares, is illegal. This was the very tyranny of the star-chamber and high commission-courts.

[Page 242]There was an order for a reward of 50 l. &c. A. D. 1677, for apprehending Andrew Marvel for publish­ing against the government ^a.

Shaftesbury, after many months confinement in the Tower, had recourse to the court of king's bench. Obtains no redress. Obliged to ask pardon of the house in terms dictated for him. Released after 13 months confinemement ^b.

Several people were taken into custody for speaking disrespectfully of the house, A. D. 1697 ^c.

Charles Caesar, Esq was committed to the Tower, for saying, ‘the queen did nothing without a certain lord, who in the late reign was known to keep a constant correspondence with the court of St. Ger­mains ^d.’

Articles against Sir Edward Dering, A. D. 1642, were, That he had encouraged a petition derogatory from the authority of parliament; in which petition it was requested, that no member should be expelled with­out shewing cause; that the subjects should not be bound by any order of either house singly, particularly that no order concerning the militia from the commons only should be binding. All this they declared wicked and seditious; and his having said, the delivery of the peti­tion should be by 40,000 people, and his using means to raise [...] insurrection for that purpose ^e. Declared a breach of privilege of parliament. He flies from justice. Summoned to answer before the parliament. Some of the men of Kent come to the parliament with their pe­tition, though before burnt by the hangman. Some of them were committed, the rest dismissed ^f.

[Page 243]Candles called for, A. D. 1641, opposed by the majority. The serjeant by mistake brings them in. Widdrington and Herbert, members, take them away without orders of the house: great disturbance ensues. They are called to the bar. Are ordered to kneel. They refuse; and are sent to the Tower ^a.

It was debated, A. D. 1696, whether the mace should lie on the table, as usual, while Sir I. Fenwick was under examination before the commons, and whether the sheriffs of London could have him in custody before the house. It was determined, that the mace should be held by the serjeant at arms at the bar by Sir Iohn. He got his trial put off on false pretences, for which the commons meant to have him attainted, convicted, and executed, as a traitor for eluding jus­tice; upon the same principle as people are outlawed, who fly from trial, or bankrupts are made felons, who do not appear to be examined, or culprits are pressed to death, who will not plead either guilty, or not guilty. ‘A bill of attainder, a member said on that occasion, is an extraordinary thing, and never used, but upon extraordinary occasions—Parliament may declare that to be a crime, which was deemed no crime before it was committed, and surely they may determine what they will admit as evidence of a crime.’ Another said, ‘It is lodged with the legislature to judge of those crimes, which are shel­tered from the law; and he thought never any attain­der was brought in upon a juster occasion than this ^b.’ It was alledged, that attainders are suspicious ways of proceeding, and dangerous in corrupt times. They who spoke for the bill, represented the parliament as possessed of a dictatorial power to take care, ne quid [Page 244] detrimenti capiat respublica, and to convict dangerous men upon such evidence, as to them might seem sa­tisfactory, though not the formal evidence, required by law, and which inferior courts are obliged to fol­low. If all this be true, there is, surely, the utmost necessity for an incorrupt, for an unsuspected parlia­ment. Attainders, it was said by others, were only to be had recourse to, against those, who were not forth-coming: but Sir Iohn was in the house. The whole was a party-affair between the whigs and the tories, and the former were desirous of mortifying the latter. Several lords protested against his attainder, because bills of attainder against persons in prison, and who are therefore to be tried by law, are of dan­gerous consequence to the subjects and constitution; because the evidence of grand jury-men and petty jury-men, not given before the peers, was admitted, though they disagreed in their test; because informa­tion in writing was received, which prevents the wit­ness being cross examined; because Fenwick was cast by one witness only, and him a doubtful one; and because Fenwick was not considerable enough to be proceeded against in so extraordinary and irregular a manner, justifiable only in cases of great danger. Fenwick, however, was beheaded on Tower-hill, denying to the last, all concern in the assassination plot, though he owned himself a jacobite ^a.

Manley, a member of the cmmons, was sent to the Tower, A. D. 1696, for saying, ‘It is not the first time there has been reason to repent mens making their court to the government at the hazard of the people's liberties ^b.’

[Page 245] Buckley, printer, ordered into custody of the ser­jeant for printing Memorial of the States-general, re­flecting on the proceedings of the house, 1712 ^a. ‘Resolved, That the great liberty of the press is very prejudicial, &c. That all printing presses be re­gistered with the names and places of residence of the owners, and that the authors, printers, and publishers names be put to every publication.’ This, however, did not pass into a law; but instead of it, a heavy duty on news-papers and pamphlets, was afterwards proposed ^b.

Complaint made to the house, A. D. 1712, of a preface to some sermons of Dr. Houdley, bishop of St. Asaph ^c. Ordered to be burnt by the hangman ^d. The worst thing in the preface is, the good bishop's expressing his apprehensions, and those of all the wise and good of those times, concerning the danger in which the nation was involved from a jacobite ministry.

When the tory parliament of A. D. 1701, impri­soned the Kentish petitioners, many ‘thought it to be the greatest outrage upon the people's liberties, alledging, it was their undoubted right to petition; that it were better to be under the oppression of one, than of many. What avails (said they) the Habeas Corpus act. It looked (they said) as if the nation was betrayed, and Englishmen bought and sold ^e.’

Certain letters of Mr. Chivers, a member, were complained of, A. D. 1699, in the house of com­mons, as reflecting on, and misrepresenting several members. The house was so irritated, that it was carried 119 to 83, that he attend the house, (though indisposed) and not obeying, it was moved, that he [Page 246] be brought by the serjeant at arms. This, however, was over-ruled. But they resolved, That publishing the names of members, reflecting upon them, and misrepresenting their proceedings in parliament, is a breach of privilege, and destructive of the freedam of parliament ^a.

Here follow several instances of punishments and censures inflicted by the commons on irregular pro­ceedings in elections. Dr. Harris, for preaching a­bout elections, was called before the house of com­mons, and on his knees ordered to confess his fault, and in the quarter-sessions, and in his own pulpit be­fore sermon. Ingrey, under-sheriff of Cambridge, for refusing the poll, was committed to the serjeant at arms, and was ordered to confess his fault there, and at the quarter-sessions. The mayor of Arundel for putting the town to great charges, not giving due and general warning, and for packing elections, was sent for by warrant, and ordered to pay the charges. Sir William Wrey, and others, deputy lieu­tenants of Cornwal, for assuming to themselves a power to make whom they pleased members, and defaming certain candidates; sending for train bands to be at the election, and menacing the court, under pretence of the king's pleasure, were committed to the Tower, to acknowledge their offence at the bar, and at the assize in Cornwal ^b. Yet seizing and search­ing the papers of members of parliament was resolv­ed to be breach of privilege, A. D. 1641 ^c.

Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Steele, was expelled the house, A. D. 1713, for reflections on the jacobite [Page 247] ministry in his Englishman and Crisis ^a. All the wisest and best men in the house defended Steele. But he was expelled, because he had insinuated (what no body then alive doubted) that the protestant suc­cession was in danger from the ministry. This pro­secution, however, hurt the ministers greatly, and occasioned a great deal of searching ^b. But ministers have great power in bringing vengeance on their ene­mies. And parliaments have been too busy in hu­mouring the views of ministers. Mazarine boasted (says cardinal de Retz) that if he had but two lines of any man's writing, he could cut off his head ^c. But to return to the proceedings against Steele: He owned he wrote what he was charged with, and with the same chearfulness as he had abjured the pretender. Blamed for the Crisis containing several paragraphs tending to sedition, and reflecting on the queen and government. Not allowed to defend what he had written paragraph by paragraph, but generally. No­thing could be done more arbitrary in the court of in­quisition. Defends himself with great address. Foley, instead of answering paragraph by paragraph, Steele's defence, contented himself with saying it was plain to every body that the writings complained of were seditious, scandalous, and every thing bad. Walpole defends him, and shews that there was great reason to be alarmed ^d.

There never was perhaps an instance of so trifling an affair producing such weighty consequences, as that of Sacheverel, A. D. 1709. One would have imagined, that twenty silly bigots might have preached twenty capucinades each, and this great kingdom have [Page 248] remained in the same condition, as if they had never climbed their tubs. It was the fatal and ill-advised measure of solemnly impeaching the insignificant cushion-thumper (contrary to the better advice of the the [...] attorney general Eyre, who was for burning his sermon, and imprisoning him, and even that would have been doing him too much honour) that produced the mischief, and set all England in a flame. For the good-natured people always pity the person, who is punished, however atrocious his guilt.

A wise government will always consider maturely, which of two measures, is likely to produce the greatest good, and the least harm. But surely this thought never once entered the heads of the then ministry. For, it was manifest, on one hand, that Sacheverel's sermon was too mean a performance to produce, of itself, any effect. And what probable advantage could be expected from prosecuting, and raising to importance, the author of a production, which did not deserve the attention of any person whatever, much less of government ^a?

Whitehead's poem, Manners, was complained of by lord Delawar ^b, and unanimously voted a libel, &c. A. D. 17 [...]9. The author absconded; but Do [...] ­sley appeared. Moved, that he be taken into custody of black rod. Lord Carteret pleads for him, in con­sideration of his surrendering, and because the author was known. Other lords spoke bitterly against both author and publisher. The chancellor (Hardwicke) explains the liberty of the press. He says, it meant originally the liberty of printing, instead of transcrib­ing. Says, there are severe statutes, unrepealed, against publishing defamatory libels in writing, before [Page 249] printing was discovered. Lord Talbot answered, that then the right way was, That any lord who thought himself injured, should prosecute Whitehead, before a court of justice. ‘Let not, says he, such a charge lie against us, that we were judges, jury, and parties in the same cause ^a.’ Dodsley was, however, taken into custody of black rod.

A paper entitled, Constitutional Queries, was sent, A. D. 1751, to most persons of rank ^b. and left upon the tables of most coffee-houses, insinuating designs a­gainst Frederic prince of Wales, and the protestant succession. It was censured by both houses, as mali­cious, false, &c. and the king was requested to give orders for prosecuting the author, &c. But no author was ever found out.

In the hon. Alex. Murray's tryal, the same year, (who had been ordered by the commons to come to the bar of their house to receive upon his knees, his sentence of imprisonment in Newgate for breach of privilege, &c. Mr. Murray not thinking his crime worthy of a chance of catching the gaol-distemper, and losing his life about a matter of privilege, had prudently kept out of the way) in the debate on this affair, I say, it was observed, that the commons, in such cases, assumed a privilege, which the king has not, (viz. of punishing a subject without legal trial) excepting in the peculiar case of suspending the Ha­beas Corpus act, when there is an actual rebellion in the country. There was a pamphlet published, giv­ing a full account of his case. It was read in the house of commons, and the usual black epithets of malicious, seditious, scandalous, &c. heaped upon it. [Page 250] A noble duke, who happened to be present, was so ashamed of the picture drawn of him in the pamphlet, that he made his escape out of the house. The commons addressed the king to prosecute the author, printer, &c. ‘But an independent English jury brought in a verdict, Not guilty ^a.’

Mr. Wilkes's prosecution does not properly belong to this chapter, having been carried on by the secreta­ries of state. Of his repeated expulsion by the house of commons, inspite of his re-election by a great majo­rity of the freeholders of Middlesex, see the sequel. I will only observe here, that in the year 1773, of 352 members, all but 50 were for reversing the determi­nation of the Middlesex election by a bill to regulate the rights of election ^b.

The mention of Mr. Wilkes's expulsion and re-election, calls up that of Mr. Adams, a member of the assembly of Barbadoes, who, A. D. 1762, was prosecuted, fined, and imprisoned for resisting the sheriff in the execution of his duty. The assembly expelled him. He was re-elected—re-expelled. His electors insisted, that they, and not the assembly were the judges of the fitness of persons to represent them; and there was no law, by which Mr. Adams was dis­qualified for a representative merely for his having resisted the sheriff, though there was for punishing him otherwise, which punishment accordingly he had suffered. Mr. Adams was then formally disqualified by act of governor, council, and assembly. He ap­pealed to the king. His disqualification was reversed, with a declaration, that it was arbitrary, and contrary to the spirit of the British constitution ^c. But this by [Page 251] the way. To return: In the case of the printers, who published the debates of the house of commons, A. D. 1771, and were proceeded against by that house, it did not appear, that they had any legal authority for apprehending, or committing; for, though they obtained a royal proclamation against the offenders, they could not, or, however, did not oblige them to appear before them. On the contrary, the lord mayor and aldermen of London protected the printers, and obliged the person, who apprehended them, to find securities to answer for his offence. And the printers continued to publish the debates. One of the alder­men wrote to the secretary of state an account of his proceeding. And the accused printer sent the speaker the opinion of council upon the house's proceeding and the royal proclamation, viz. That both were illegal, unconstitutional, and void. On that occa­sion, authorities were brought from history and law in justification of what was done by the lord mayor and aldermen in opposition to the house of commons as follows.

Burnet, in his HISTORY of his OWN TIMES, re­lates, That the commons sent their serjeant to bring before them many of the abhorrers; which brought their authority for punishing any others besides their own members, into question, because they cannot re­ceive an information upon oath, nor proceed against those, who refuse to appear before them. Many re­fused to obey their summons; it being found, that the practice was no older than the days of queen Elizabeth. Again, the oath of every alderman obliges him to keep up the franchises of the city; one of which, granted by Edw. III. in parliament is, That [...]o summons, attachment, or execution be made in [Page 252] the liberty of the city, by any king's officers [conse­quently, I suppose, much less by the officers of the lower house of parliament] but only by ministers [officers] of the city.' The charter of Edw. IV. gives to the corporation of London, the whole and ex­clusive ‘execution of all warrants, with the return of the same, by such their minister, or deputy, whom they shall thereunto use.’ And by 2 Will. and Mary the corporation of London is confirmed in all its pri­vileges and franchises; of which it is not, on any pretence whatever, to be deprived, &c. ^a.

Why does not the house of commons let the peo­ple know their privileges? Why are not those privileges established by law? When they think themselves offended, why do they not prosecute the offender in a legal and constitutional way, which would stop all reflection upon them? The king's causes are tried in the courts of justice by judge and jury, who are indif­ferent persons. Why is any individual, or any assem­bly of men whatever to be judge, jury, and executioners in their own cause?

The lord mayor and alderman Oliver were after­wards committed to the Tower by the house of com­mons, who refused to hear their defence by council. Alderman Wilkes was ordered to attend the house, but he sent the speaker a direct refusal, because he was not summoned as a member, to answer in his place.

This whole proceeding of the house of commons, was condemned by many both within and without doors. And it may be affirmed, that the people of England will never, while a spark of the fire of liberty remains, be reconciled to an assumed power in repre­sentatives [Page 253] to imprison their constituents without tryal by jury.

It has been said, ‘How are the commons to obtain the informations necessary for making laws, or en­quiring into the conduct of ministers, if they cannot oblige persons to attend?’ The answer is, They cer­tainly cannot, and therefore ought to have a power of compelling attendance as the courts have. But this has nothing to do with their assuming a power of imprisoning those who do attend, or would if their attendance was required for any other purpose than that of punishing them. In fact, no inconvenience could arise, but, on the contrary, great advantage, from every court's giving up what the king must give up, viz. The claim of judging and punishing pre­tended contempts, or other offences, against them­selves. It is a whimsical part of our political oecono­my, that, if any person, or body of the subjects offends the house of commons, they take the matter into their own hands, and punish with fine and impri­sonment. But if a minister has offended against the people, the commons can only impeach him before the upper house. The commons themselves punish offences against themselves; which one would rather suppose they would refer to others; and they refer to others the punishment of offenders against the people, whose guardians they are, which one would rather suppose they would keep in their own hands. The truth is, the proper function of the house of com­mons is twofold, viz. Inquisitorial, and legislative; but they are ever running into the executive, which is no part of their office.

It was argued, in defence of the lord mayor, on the same occasion, That the courts of law have power [Page 254] to enquire into the acts of the highest authority. ‘If the king himself exercises any act of power not con­formable to law, the courts will remedy it.’ Lord chief justice Holt, on another occasion of the same kind, insisted, ‘That if what the house of commons called a contempt, was not really such, the person committed must be discharged by the court of king's bench or common pleas;’ and in this opinion he was supported by the lords. The same celebrated judge held, that the vote of the house of commons forbid­ding any one to seek a legal remedy against their or­ders, was illegal, and he accordingly discharged the persons committed for contempt of that order ^a.

Hakewel ^b brings many instances of persons punished for serving members with subpoenas, writs, &c. while the house was sitting. Prosecutions against members were commonly stopped by letters issued from the house. Members were by privilege exempted from serving as jurymen. He brings also a multitude of instances of members servants, &c. being set at liberty from arrests ^c. A. D. 1640, the time of privilege was 16 days exclusive before parliament, and 15 days inclusive after ^d.

Privilege of parliament extended not only to the per­sons of members, but to their cattle and other goods ^e.

Mr. Arthur Hall, A. D. 1580, was committed to custody of the serjeant, for publishing conferences of the house; and afterwards to the Tower for 6 months, [Page 255] expelled the house, and fined 500 l. ^a He refused to retract, and was for ever disabled to sit in parliament.

I am afraid of tiring the reader by enumerating instances of such parliamentary prosecutions, as may be said to be frivolous, or arbitrary. A well consti­tuted and upright parliament will have but little occa­sion to prosecute for disrespectful speeches; for no body will speak disrespectfully of an assembly of men, who shew themselves solely and sincerely attached to the public good. Or if any persons should be so rash and malignant, the general hatred o [...] contempt, which they will certainly draw down upon their own heads, will supersede all use of prosecution by the offended per­sons. Or if prosecutions be necessary, [...]et prosecution be commenced (as when offence or injury are committed against the king) in the courts of law; and let the accused be tried according to the known laws of his country, and be acquitted or condemned by the verdict of a jury. All other modes of trial are violations of the consti­tution.

The collection made by Petyt, in his MISCEL. PARL. of parliamentary prosecutions on account of disrespectful speeches, makes our ancestors appear mean-spirited. Iohn such-a-one wished that the devil would take the parliament. Thomas-such another said, the parliament was carrying on works of darkness. A third said, he was not afraid of the pillory. What then? Was it not infinitely beneath the magnanimity of a supreme legislature to take notice of such trifles? This recals to my memory an old presentment by an inquest; ‘We sayen, that Iohn Stevens is a man, we cannot tell what to make of him; and he hath books, we do not understand them.’

CHAP. VI. Of excluding the People from the house of Commons, and punishing those who publish the Speeches made there.

ANOTHER consequence of the inadequate state of parliamentary representation, and of too long parliaments, is a dangerous power assumed by the commons, of clearing their house, and excluding their constituents from the satisfaction of knowing how their deputies behave themselves, and whether they consult the public interest, or play the game into the hands of the ministry. Upon the same principle they found the practice of punishing all per­sons, who publish any speeches made in their house.

As to the house of lords, supposing it once granted, that it is wise to allow any set of men a power of con­sulting for themselves, without regard to the public, and putting a negative upon the most salutary national proposals, if thought by them likely to entrench upon their particular privileges (a point, the proof of which I should be sorry to have imposed on me) supposing, I say, a house of lords upon the foot of the British, it follows, that they have a right to exclude all, but peers, from their deleberations; because they are do­ing their own business, and not the public; they are acting for themselves, and are principals, and not deputies.

But surely the faithful representatives of the people, cannot dread the people's knowledge of their proceed­ings in the house. An aristocracy of persons, whose interest may be different from that of the people, a court of inquisition, or a Venetian council of Ten, [Page 257] might be expected to shut themselves from the sight of the people, but not a house of representatives assem­bled, by the people's order, to do the people's business. How are the people to know which of their delegates are faithful, and ought to be trusted again, or which otherwise, if they are to be excluded the house?

Even in the house of peers, this custom has been blamed.

‘It is not, my lords, said the earl of Chesterfield on this subject, A. D. 1740, by excluding all sorts of strangers that you are to preserve the antient dignity of this assembly: it is by excluding all manner of quibbling, impertinence, deceit, weakness, and cor­ruption. These, I hope, are strangers here: I hope your lordships will take care never to admit any one of them within these walls; but by excluding other strangers, when you have nothing of a secret nature under consideration you will only raise a jealousy of the dignity of your proceedings; and if this jea­lousy should become general, without doors, you will in vain seek for respect among the people ^a.’

There were many strangers in the gallery of the house of peers, on occasion of the enquiry into lord Peterborough's conduct in Spain, A. D. 1711. A motion was made to clear the gallery. But the duke of Buckingham opposed it, and they were suffered to stay ^b.

The commons, A. D. 1714, having cleared their house of all strangers, not excepting peers, it was moved in the house of peers, that the house be cleared of all strangers, not excepting members of the house of com­mons. The duke of Argyle opposed the shutting of the house of peers, and said, it was for the honour of [Page 258] that august assembly, to shew that they were better bred than the commons ^a.

Hakewel says ^b, the commons finding persons in their house who had no right to be there, have obliged them to take an oath, that they would keep secret what they had heard.

‘Of right the door of the parliament ought not to be shut, but to be kept by porters, or king's serjeants at arms, to prevent tumults at the door, by which the parliament might be hindered ^c.’

It was common in former times for the members themselves to publish their speeches made in the house. Accordingly there are extant to this day, many of them in pamphlets of those times, and in Rushworth's, Nals [...]n's, and other collections. In our times it is punishable to publish any of their doings, though they do not themselves publish them, and the very gal­lery is cleared, that we may not know which of our deputies is faithful to us, nor which betrays us.

The order of the house of commons against printing the speeches was made, A. D. 1641 ^d, in times which our courtly men will hardly allow to be of good authority. The order itself is not justifiable upon any principles of liberty, or of representation, unless the debates were regularly published by the members. For published they ought undoubtedly to be; if delegates ought to be responsible to their constituents. My lord mayor, therefore, and Mr. alderman Oliver were severely dealt with in being sent to the Tower, A. D. [Page 259] 1771, for defending the printers in doing only what ought to have been done by the members.

Sir Edward Dering's speeches were published by himself, A. D. 1641.

‘Resolved, That they are against the privilege of the house, and shall be burnt by the hangman in West­minster, Cheapside, and Smithfield; himself disabled during the parliament, and to be imprisoned in the Tower, during the pleasure of the house.’ He was released, however, in a few days ^a.

A. D. 1720, the proprietors of the redeemable funds being discontented, petitioned to be heard by council against a bill then before the house. They went in considerable numbers to the lobby, to wait the event. The justices were ordered to clear the passages. They read the riot-act. On which occasion, some of the petitioners said, It seemed to them a strange proceed­ing, to treat a set of peaceable subjects, people of pro­perty, who attended the house to complain of griev­ances, as a riotous mob; and that the commons first picked their pockets, and then sent them to jail for com­plaining.

Whatever has been advanced in support of printing the Votes and Journals, is equally strong against clear­ing the house. The house of commons is the people's house, where the people's deputies meet to do the people's business. For the people's deputies, therefore, to shut the people out of their own house, is a rebellion of the servants against their masters. That the members of parliament are, according to the constitution, ser­vants, is manifest from the notorious fact of their constantly receiving wages for many centuries together, which members, accordingly, forfeited by absence, [Page 260] neglect, &c. ‘Who sent us hither?’ (says Sir F. Winnington, in the debate upon this subject, A. D. 1681.) ‘The privy-council is constituted by the king; but the house of commons by the choice of the people. I think it not natural, nor rational, that the people who sent us hither, should not be informed of our actions. ^a’ Suppose the directors of the East-India company were to shut out the proprietors from their house, and then dispose of their property at their pleasure, defying all responsibility, how would this be taken by the proprietors? The excluding the people from the house of commons, and punishing the pub­lishers of their speeches, is precisely the same in­croachment on the people's rights; only so much the more atrocious in consideration of there being no re­gular appeal from parliament, whereas there is from the directors of a trading company.

Sir Iohn Hartop moved, A. D. 1681, that the votes might continue to be printed ^b. A motion for printing the votes, A. D. 1688, passed in the nega­tive ^c. The votes of the commons were ordered to be printed, A. D. 1690 ^d. The gallery and speaker's chamber were cleared of strangers, on occasion of the prosecution of Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard Steele, A. D. 1713 ^e. Resolutions were made, A. D. 1742, to print the journals of the house of commons, which begin with Edw. VI. ^f, to the number of 30 volumes, 1000 copies; which is done accordingly; I know not whether begun at that time, or afterwards. For A.D. 1752, ‘the house came to a resolution to print their Journals, which had hitherto been in manuscript. ^g’

[Page 261]There was a long debate about printing the pro­ceedings and debates of the house, A. D. 1738, in which it was observed, that it is a hardship for mem­bers to have their sentiments misrepresented and falsi­fied in News-papers and Magazines, &c. But Mr. Pulteny said, ‘Parliaments, when they do any thing amiss, will be talked of with the same freedom as any other set of men whatever. This parliament, I hope, will never deserve it; but, if it did, I should be very sorry, that any resolutions were entered into, in order to prevent its being represented in the present, or the next age, in its proper colours. Whatever the other house may do, I hope, we shall never stretch our privilege so far, as to cramp the freedom of writing on public affairs ^a.’

There was a pamphlet at this time ascribed to Wal­pole, which contained a history of queen Anne's tory parliament. This publication Walpole defended, be­cause that parliament deserved to be disgraced. But who shall decide which parliament deserves to be dis­graced, and which to be honoured. The sure way, in all events, is, to admit as many strangers as the galle­ries will conveniently hold; that the members order genuine copies of their speechs to be published; of which authenticity the hearers in the galleries will be able to judge; and then no spurious, or unauthenticat­ed publications of speeches will be received by the people; because they will certainly chuse to read those whose authenticity is established by a cloud of witnesses.

CHAP. VII. Of Absentees from the House, and Members neglecting Parliamentary Business.

ANOTHER evil arising from the miserably in­adequate state of representation and consequent contempt, which members acquire for their constituents, is, their taking the liberty of absenting themselves for frivolous or no reasons, and of attend­ing very carelessly to the business of the nation, when they come to the house. Did a gentleman recollect, that at his election he received an aweful charge from an august meeting of 5000 of his countrymen, and gave a solemn promise sealed with the religion of an oath to be diligent and faithful in discharging the mo­mentous trust then committed to him, and did he know, that those who employed him, would censure him publicly, if they found, that he did any body's business in parliament but theirs; he would tremble at the thought of trifling with so sacred a function. But when a youth just come from Oxford, remembers, that he was elected (as it is called) by a few drunken idiots in a paltry borough, and carried round the town in an old oaken chair, and that he has his place as he has his estate, or that he gave every voter five guineas; it is no wonder, that he considers the whole as a very paltry farce, which he may attend to, or neglect, as he pleases.

It is supposed that members of parliament have often done the business of a corrupt court by seasonably playing truant. Those gentlemen shew themselves not abandoned to all sense of shame. When the pub­lic has been betrayed by a villainous vote for an aug­mentation [Page 263] of the army, or an extension of the excise laws, they did not vote worng, they cry; they were not there. But why were they not there, to vote right, and endeavour to make others vote right? Why were they not upon duty, taking care of their country? Ah! if a man loves his young and beauti­ful wife, and regards his honour, he will not leave her in the hands of a known rake; or if he loves his money, he will not leave his strong box open to a thievish servant ^a. No more will a gentleman, who loves his country, leave her in the hands of unknown persons, who may betray her. Do gentlemen consi­sider of what consequence a few votes may be?

The oath in favour of passive obedience and non-resistence was rejected by only three votes. The bill, A. D. 1692, for totally disqualifying placemen for sitting in the house of commons (the best bill, surely, as to its object, that ever was brought into the house) was rejected by only two votes. The famous amend­ment by the lords to the bill of Ian. 27. 1702, by which amendment it was made high treason to attempt to set aside the protestant succession in the house of Hanover in case of queen Anne's leaving no posterity, was carried by only one vote, 118 to 117 ^b. I have been told, that a member of that parliament, who was infirm and gouty, but proved faithful to his country in attending at the hazard of his life, often mentioned his own proceeding on that occasion with pleasure, and particularly on his death-bed.

The ruinous act in favour of the French trade, A. D. 1713, was thrown out by only nine votes, viz. 194▪ against 185 ^c. Only 9 true Englishmen in the house!

[Page 264]In the end of queen Anne's reign, a place bill was lost in the house of peers for want of one vote, while one of the lords, who had too proxies in his pocket, was buying a penknife.

The act A. D. 1728. by which a fine of 500l. is enacted for asking, or receiving, by himself, or ano­ther, money, or other reward, by way of gift, loan, or device, &c. for voting, or declining to vote at elections of members of parliament, was carried by only two votes, viz. 91 to 89.

The motion A. D. 1741, for enquiring into the conduct of affairs in Walpole's 20 years reign, was carried in the negative by two votes, 244 to 242.

‘How often, while the merits of a contested election have been trying within these walls, have the benches been almost empty? But the moment the question approached, how have we seen the members eagarly croud to their seats, and then confidently pronounce upon a subject, on which they had not heard a syl­lable, but in private from the parties ^a.’ To such a mockery have been reduced the most important of all earthly things, I mean parliaments. After turning them in this manner, to a farce, after laying aside all that was useful to the people in them, what step are we most likely to take next, but to lay parliaments them­selves aside?

Our ancestors were sensible of the evil of absenting, and therefore they made laws for punishing delinquent members by mulct ^b. So among the Romans, absen­tees from the senate, without sufficient cause shewn, were fineable, and obliged to give security for pay­ment [Page 265] ^a. By 7 Edw. I. stat. 1. ‘To all parliaments and treatises’ [treaties, or meetings for public busi­ness] ‘every man shall come without force of arms^b.’ See the 5th stat. Rich. II. cap. 4. ‘That every one, to whom it appertaineth, shall, upon summons, come to the parliament ^c.’ By 7 Hen. VIII. cap. 16. ‘No knights of shires, nor burgesses shall depart before the end of parliament ^d.’ [N. B. We should say, before the end of the session. But in those times every session was a parliament.] The penalty was loss of wages. A call of the house, A D. 1641, with severe penalties for absentees. Orders and reso­lutions for putting the kingdom in a state of defence^e. A call of both houses, A. D. 1647, 240 commoners were absent ^f. A fine of 20l. set on those whose excuse was not allowed by the house. ‘Resolved, A. D. 1709, that such members as absent themselves with­out leave, be reputed desert [...]rs of their trust, and neg­lectors of the duty they owe to the house and to their country ^g.’

Thus we see, inadequate representation, and long parliaments produce in our members of parliament a contempt for the people; neglect of instructions, and refusal of responsibility; put families upon setting up for legislators from generation to generation, so that ten persons in one family may be members at the same time, and it has been found, that individuals have sate 30, 40, and 50 years in the house. Inadequate representation is one cause, why the members cannot be supposed even to know the sense of the people, as [Page 266] they are not chosen by the generality of the people; but by a handful. Inadequate representation deprives the greatest part of the people, both in number and property, of their weight in legislation, and gives it up, as a monopoly, into the hands of a few. It is the ori­ginal cause of the commons assuming exorbitant pri­vileges to the disadvantage of the people; of their prosecuting and imprisoning their constituents; of con­cealing from the people, their creators, the transactions of their house; of their absenting themselves and neg­lecting the business of the nation, &c.

CHAP. I. Of the Origin, Funds, and Materials of Corruption.

TWO weaknesses in human nature have produced bribery, corruption, and many other wicked arts; I mean, the love of power, and the love of money. In antient times men in superior sta­tions were drawn into many of their bad practices by the former. The latter is our disease, and a lousy disease (I ask the reader's pardon) it is. For if there be a vice incompatible with any degree of magnani­mity, greediness of money is that vice.

It is difficult to exclude corruption. Where there is any thing worth striving about, such creatures as men commonly are, will use indirect means for at­taining it.

Undue influence in elections for offices prevailed at Rome so early as the 458th year from the building of the city ^a. Which occasioned the making a law to prohibit canvassing for votes.

But the difficulty of excluding corruption is no rea­son for giving over all endeavours to abolish it; any [Page 268] more than the difficulty of living a virtuous life amidst the various temptations, to which our frail nature is exposed, is a reason for our giving over all endeavours to regulate our conduct by the strict laws of morality. On the contrary, we must resolve to live a life of vir­tue, however difficult it may be, or we are undone as individuals; and we must root corruption out of the state, or we are undone as a nation.

Aristotle ^a observes, That men in low circumstances d [...]d not, in his time, aspire after places of power and trust, because they were unprofitable, and they could not afford to neglect their own private affairs, to at­tend on the public; and that men of fortune only could properly fi [...]l those employments, because they were under no temptation to plunder their country. In our times, who have no idea of serving the public for nought, we see all men, rich and indigent, striving who shall obtain the greatest share of the public offices, because they are all lucrative, and those whose fortunes are the largest, find them still too small for their extravagance, which produces the continual scramb [...]e we see.

The Polish noblesse consider their votes, for king, in the same manner as the inhabitants of our rotten boroughs do theirs for members of parliament, that [...], as part of their fortune. But the wickedness of our electioneering is tenfold beyond that of the Poles. For it is no great matter who is king of Poland; because he has no power to do mischief; whereas our parlia­ment has a power so transcendent, says judge Blackstone, that it is impossible to fix its limits. Therefore, to vote for a candidate, who gives a bribe, is selling our country to a man, who has proved himself a knave, [Page 269] and giving him power to do infinite mischief, for which he is not responsible or punishable.

Bad ministers, in our times, thrust themselves into power chiefly with a design o [...] filling their pockets, and advancing their families and friends. And it is much to be lamented, that there is such ample oppor­tunity for them to gratify their exorbitant desires. It is universally allowed, that a British ministry has the disposal of several millions annually of the public mo­ney. And the reader may judge what opportunity there must be for them to chip off fragments and cor­ners from such prodigious masses, without the pub­lic's being ever acquainted with facts in so particular a manner as to convict a minister, or his tools, of the plunder they have committed.

As parliament is the natural check upon the wicked measures of kings and courts, parliaments must be managed to obtain their connivance at the proceedings of kings and courts. Therefore in former times the court not being possessed of the necessary funds, wheedled, or bullied them; now they make use of (what they think the surer means, viz.) bribing and buying them. And our ministers, since the revolu­lution, have carried this liberal art so far, as to study no other system of politics, or government, than find­ing out proper men for their purpose, and filling the house of commons with them; and the whole differ­ence between one ministry and another, is that one junto has a better knack at managing parliaments than another.

The chief materials, by which a minister keeps up an ascendency in parliament, are, 1. The prodigious sums of public money, of which he has the disposal. 2. The innumerable places in the customs, excise, salt-duty, &c. and in the navy, army and church, [Page 270] the greatest part of which are at the disposal of the minister.

Latter times have thrown into the ministerial scale a weight unknown to former ages; I mean the na­tional debt. The anixety of the public creditors, the proprietors of the funds, about public credit, is a powerful cause of their shewing a reluctance against all proposals for salutary alterations, or restorations. But their reasonings on this subject are not sounder than it would be for the inhabitant of a crazy building to oppose all repairs, and to insist, that the best way for preventing his mansion from coming in ruins upon his head, is to let it fall. Of which more fully hereafter.

The revenue of the civil list, which is nominally 800,000l. per annum, but, by means of a demand from time to time of half a million to pay off its pre­tended deficiencies or debts, is really near a million (in the last reign it often exceeded a million) must throw a prodigious power into the hands of those who have the disposal of it.

A million per annum would maintain 200 dukes, at 5000l. a year each, or 250 earls at 4000 a year each, or 1000 gentlemen at 1000l. a year each. It would support arts, manufactures, and commerce to the in­conceivable advantage of the public, &c.

But the civil list revenue is not reckoned above one third part of what a minister has in his disposal. It is not therefore to be wondered, that a minister has great influence in parliament. If one considers into how many purses, of 100 guineas each, the prodigi­ous sum of three millions may be divided, at first glance one would conclude, that a minister could give such a purse to every man upon the island.

The royal prerogative has been greatly curtailed since 3 Car. I. the date of the petition of right. [Page 271] Star-chamber, and high commission court abolished, with martial law, and the prince's power of levying taxes without parliament; disuse of the forest laws; abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and pre­emption; the establishment of the habeas corpus act; the act for frequent parliaments; the assertion of the liberties of the people by the bill of rights, and act of settlement; the exclusion of certain dependents on the crown from seats in parliament; the independency of the judges; the restraining of the king's pardon from being pleaded to parliamentary impeachments; the dependency of the crown on parliament, by its being stripped of its antient properties, &c.—these, and other entrenchments on the regal power and pre­rogative would seem sufficient to clip the wings of kings and ministers, and to secure the state against the innumerable evils of corruption. But what avail these seeming enlargements of our liberties, if we con­sider (as even judge Blackstone ^a himself, no unreason­able complainer, observes) that though the appearance of court-power is taken away, the reality remains, and is perhaps greater than under Iam. I. only it shews itself now in the milder and less startling shape of influence, instead of that odious and formidable one, of prerogative;—an influence, however, to con­siderate minds not the less dreaded on account of its apparent gentleness. Let it be considered, that our monarch's revenues being settled for life, a rapacious and corrupt court (for what do men generally pro­pose by going into court, but filling their pockets? has the disposing of the greatest part of a million a year, civil list revenue. Let it be considered, what a multitude of officers created by, and removeable at [Page 272] the pleasure of the court, are employed in raising 10 millions a year in taxes, customs, excises; commis­sioners, and innumerable officers in every port of the kingdom, nay at every creek into which a smug­gling boat can be thrust; commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; postmasters, and their servants in every town, and upon every public road; commissioners of stamps, and distributors; officers of the salt-duty; surveyors of houses and windows; receivers of land-tax; mana­gers of lotteries; commissioners of hackney-coaches; besides frequent accidental opportunities of conferring favours, as by preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittance of public money, &c. which attaches those most, whose attachment is the most desireable to the court, I mean, the opulent, and leading part of the people; to which add the prodigious influence the court gains by having the power of officering an army of above forty thousand men; to say nothing of the formidable force of such a body of disciplined men against a flock of sheep, I mean the helpless people. This dreadful army, the court-sycophants pretend is kept up only from year to year: but it is universally looked upon as on a footing equally certain with the army in France. Accordingly gentlemen bring up their sons as regularly to the army, as to the church. These forty thousand men are paid by the court, raised by the court, officered by the court, commanded by the court. Add to all this, that the court must have innumerable ways of misapplying the public money to the purposes of gaining undue influence, which even the most faithful and upright parliament could not detect. And what then must be the case, if we sup­pose parliament itself (the only constitutional check on a corrupt court) a sharer in the plunder of the people, [Page 273] and therefor; interested to conceal, or connive at the ravages made by a profligate court.

‘As we have annually increased our funds and our taxes, we have annually increased the power of the crown, and these funds and taxes being established and laid for perpetuity, or for terms equivalent to perpetuity in the sense here intended, this increase of power must not only continue, but still increase, as long as this system of oeconomy subsists. How this increase of power arises from the increase of funds and taxes, and the influence of the crown grows in proportion to the burthen on the people, heavier; hath been explained so much in the debates on a late detestable occasion’ [Walpole's excise scheme] that the less needs to be said on the subject here. If we consider in the increase of taxes, first, the increase of officers, by which a vast number of new dependants on the crown are erected in every part of the kingdom, (dependants as numerous, and cer­tainly more prevalent, than all the tenants and wards of the crown were antiently) and, secondly, the power given to the treasury and other inferior officers, on account of these taxes, which are at least as great and as grievous in this free government of ours, as any that are exercised in the most arbi­trary government on the same occasions; if we con­sider this alone, we shall find reason sufficient to conclude that, although the power of prerogative was more open and more noisy in its operations, yet the power thus acquired is more real and may prove more dangerous, for this very reason, because it is more covered and more silent. That men began to see, very soon after the revolution, the danger aris­ing from hence to our constitution, as I said above, is most certain. No less than seven acts were made [Page 274] in king William's reign to prevent undue influence on elections; and one of the acts, as I remember, for I have it not before me, is grounded on this fact, that the officers of the excise had frequently, by threats and promises, prevailed on electors, and abso­lutely debarred them of the freedom of voting. What hath been done, or attempted, since that time, in the same views, and what hath been done, or at­tempted, both in the reign of king Will. and since, to prevent an undue influence on the elected, as well as on the electors, I need not recapitulate. They are matters of fresh date, and enough known. ‘Upon the whole, this change in the state and pro­perty of the public revenue hath made a change in our constitution not yet, perhaps, attended to suf­ficiently; but such an one, however, as deserves our utmost attention, since it gives a power un­known in former times to one of the three estates, and since public liberty is not guarded against the dangers that may arise from this power, as it was, and now is more than ever, against the dangers which arise from the powers formerly possessed or claimed by the crown ^a.’

‘That the business of most kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this; it imports the lower rank of men only, and the people (whose cries seldom reach the prince, till it is too late, and till all is past remedy) that matters should be frugally ordered, because taxes must arise from their swe [...]t and labour. But the great ones, who heretofore have had the prince's ear and favour, or who hoped to have him in their possession, were swayed by another sort of interest; they like profusion, as hav­ing [Page 275] had a prospect to be gainers by it, they can easi­ly set their account even with the state; a small charge upon their land is mo [...]e than balanced by a great place, or a large pension ^a.’

See the lord keeper North's account of abuses in the conduct and disposal of the public money in the time of king Ch. II ^b. Those who, in our times, are the conductors of the same kind of dirty work, may compare the modern ingenious ways and means with those of their worthy predecessors.

Among other pretended want of money in the treasury, in order to have a pretence for giving an exorbitant price for necessaries. Lending the crown at 8 per Cent. money which was raised at 5 and 6. Paying with the public money, pretending it to be private, and taking interest. Depreciating the pub­lic debts and funds, buying them of the holders at half their worth, and afterwards by interest getting them paid in full. Pretending to give up all power in recommending to places for a consideration, and then insisting on recommending still, and so getting both ways. Rolling over losses upon the crown, or public, while the gain was to sink into private poc­kets. A father stopping a large sum in his own hand, which was to have been paid the public creditors. Before he can be brought to account, he dies. The money sinks into the pocket of his heir. He obtains a pardon of all his father's debts. Gross frauds in office found out. Then new offices and salaries set up as checks. The new prove as great knaves as the old, and form a scheme of collusion and mutual under­standing. But the public pays for all, and the power of the court is strengthened. An old placeman begs [Page 276] leave to sell. Pockets the money, and by and by, through interest, gets a new place gratis. Extrava­gant men squander their own money in their public employments of embassadors, governors, &c. and charge the public with more than they have really spent, while what they really spent was 10 times more than necessary. The business of old offices transferred to new: but the profits of the old still kept up, though become sinecures. An old servant of the public retires upon a pension. He who suc­ceeds him, by interest, gets it continued to him. Another gets an addition to his salary, and then sells his place for a great deal more than it cost him, and so an additional load is laid on the public: for the addition must be continued, because the place was bought. An annual sum is granted by the public for a public use, as keeping up a harbour, or the like. A private man, by interest, gets a grant of the jobb; the public concern is neglected, and the public poc­ket picked. Crown lands perpetually begged and given away to strengthen the court interest. The crown constantly kept in debt, and parliament soli­cited to pay those debts occasioned merely by the voracity of the court. Commanders of fleets order a superfluous quantity of stores. By collusion between them and the store-masters, this superfluous quantity is sold again to the king, and the money sunk in their pockets. Sometimes the store-masters gave receipts fore more than was received into the king's stores, and the money was divided among the plunderers. The king's works done by the day, whereas it would have been cheaper by the great. Money pretended to be coined gratis. Lists of large sums newly coined pro­duced. But the contrivance was to make the pieces unequal, and then the too heavy pieces were carried [Page 277] back to the mint, and the profit sunk in private pockets, &c.

Secret service is a huge cloke thrown over an im­mense scene of corruption; and under this cloke we must not peep. Our court-men tell us, there must be large sums expended in this way, and those, sums cannot be accounted for; because the services done for them must never be known. But we find, that the commons, A. D 1708, addressed queen Anne for accounts of pensions paid for secret service to mem­bers of parliament, or to any persons in trust for them; and that ‘the queen ordered said account to be laid before the house ^a.’

Contracts are a great fund of ministerial influence. It is well known, that our ministry do not accept the most reasonable offer; but the offer which is made by those, who have the greatest parliamentary interest; and that in war time, every man, who furnishes for the government, is enriched; in France the contrary; which shews, that we manage our public money much worse than the French ministry do theirs. In the late war it is notorious, that several of our purveyors and commissa­ries got estates sufficient to set them up for earls and dukes. But as Burnet ^b says, ‘the regard, that is shewn to members of parliament among us, causes that few abuses can be inquired into, or discovered.’

As to lotteries if ‘a minister has it in his power to give the subscription of 4 or 500 lottery tickets every year to single members, he has an annual means of bribing the house without danger of detec­tion ^c.’ It was alledged in the house of commons [Page 278] by Mr. Seymour, that in the lottery of 1769, 20,000 tickets had been disposed of to members of parliament, which sold for near 2l. premium each ^a. This was a scramble of 40,000l among the members at one dash. We need not wonder, that lotteries are a favourite species of ways and means. Mr. Seymour, A. D. 1771, moved, that the names of the subscri­bers to the then present lottery should be laid before the house.

In a committee on the lottery bill, Mr Cornwal moved for leave to bring in a bill to prevent any member's having more than 20 tickets, in his own name; and that those, who had subscribed for more, should refund into the exchequer the sums so gained by them ^b. He observed, that 200 annual tickets put 400l. a year into the pocket of a member, which is better than 800l. a year by a place; because it did not expose him to the expence of being re-elected, nor to expence, or duty, attending the place [for some places are not sinecures].

CHAP. II. Of Corruption in Elections.

OUR courtly gentlemen labour to persuade us, that parliamentary corruption has never been that formidable evil our patriots have repre­sented it. Facts are stubborn. They will speak; and they will not always speak as our sleek courtiers would wish them. If they will speak, let them speak. Magna veritas, et praevalebit.

[Page 279]Ministerial artifice, for corrupting parliaments, has been applied in too ways, 1 To over-ruling elections, and 2. To byassing the votes of members in the house.

To shew the good people of Britain how their great and weighty concerns are managed, I will give a brief acco [...]nt of some remarkable controverted elections, and facts relating to that subject, which have occurred to me in the course of my reading, with reflections.

‘The duty of a member of parliament’ (says the brave Lucas of Ireland) ‘is infinitely the most impor­tant that can devolve upon a subject ^a.’ Mr. Locke ^b ranks it among those breaches of trust in the exe­cutive magistrate, which amount to a dissolution of government, ‘if he employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives, or openly to pre-engage the electors, and prescribe what manner of persons shall be chosen.’ To regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it, but to cut up the govern­ment by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security.

'Some call the attendance in parliament a burden, says Sir Thomas Littleton ^c. ‘If it be a burden, it is such a burden as some men spend a great part of their estates for, as if it was a privilege.’

In modern times, every body is rushing into the house of commons. In former days, it was a pri­vilege to be exempted from the burden of being elected, or contributing to the wages of members ^d, Does not this fact alone demonstrate, that those [Page 280] who strive to get into the house, intend the filling of their pockets merely? It was as much, and more, an honour to be in parliament in former times, than in ours; but it was not so lucrative. Does any man buy without a view of selling? And how are the buyers of seats in parliament to re-imburse them­selves; but out of the plunder of a wretched and almost bankrupt nation? ‘D—n you and your in­structions too,’ (said a worthy member in answer to his constituents recommending to his attention the public interest) ‘I have bought you, and I will sell you by G—.’

Candidates for seats in the house of commons pretend that they lay out their thousands in electioneering, in order to obtain—not a place or a pension—but honour, and an opportunity of serving their country. But do they seriously expect any man to believe this, who sees them trampling upon honour and honesty, bribing, gambling, rooking? Is that honour worthy of the name, which is got by the most dishonourable means? Is it serving our count [...]y to debauch our country? When those men get into the assembly of legislators, what do they for their country? What grievances have been redressed by the innumerable multitude of mem­bers of parliament, who have, since the revolution, obtained seats in the house by unwarrantable means? What greater grievance can be imagined than the con­tinuance of this ruinous practice? I say nothing of damnation, as a consequence of debauching a whole people, and promoting the inter [...]st of the enemy of mankind in the world; though I might say, that our bribing candidates ought, upon every prudential prin­ciple, to be absolutely certain that no such consequence can follow; and that either there is no future state, or that men are not accountable for their actions, and [Page 281] that their moral characters are (as Epicurus and Lucretius teach) entirely indifferent to the Supreme Governor of the universe. But of this more hereafter.

Iames I. at his accession proposed, that undue elections and returns should be punished by fine. For gross and wilful neglect, the place to forfeit its liber­ties to the crown; and every person sitting contrary to law, to be fined and imprisoned ^a. He directs the electors what sort of members to chuse, and threatens them with loss of their privileges in case of disobedi­ence. Never done before ^b. He advises the electo [...]s of the counties for the new parliament, A. D. 1620, to chuse only such gentlemen as are guides and lights of their own countries; men, who led honest a [...]d exemplary lives; no b [...]krupts, or discontented per­sons, who want to fish in troubled waters. The bad effect of chusing unfit persons, he says, is visible, as bankrupt and needy men will desire long parliaments for their own protection ^c.

In the directions to the electors of the times of Charles I. there are some very good advices, and useful for all times, as to chuse ‘men of parts, courage, and expression, professors of religion, exact in all duties, holy towards God, and just towards all men, free from covetousness, oppression, and partiality▪ not dependent: for such cannot be theirs [...]arther than another will permit. To chuse such as have estates in their counties, not such as are to get estates by their country's ruin; such as have been oppose [...]s of illegal taxes, not those who have recived the public [Page 282] money, and given no account; to judge of candi­dates by their lives and practices, &c. ^a’

However the Walpole family has acted, Mr. Horace Walpole writes well on this subject, as follows: ‘I hear, that dissatisfaction and dissentions have arisen among you, and that a warm contest is expected, and I dread to see in the incorrupted town of Lynne what has spread too fatally in other places, and what I fear will end in the ruin of this constitution and country,’ &c. And afterwards, ‘My votes have neither been dictated by favour nor influence, but by the principles on which the revolution was founded—the principles to which the town of Lynne has ever adhered, and by which my father commenced and closed his venerable life ^b.’

The Irish parliament has lately, A. D. 1768, made some good resolutions, such as, That the election-oath ought to be administred to the candidate, not the elector; and that there ought to be no guzzling at elections.

Judge Blackstone very justly regrets the ignorance of the common law, which appears in many members of parliament. Men are prepared for all other employ­ments by being previously qualified; but a country fox-hunter thrusts himself into the house of commons in puris naturalibus. He knows, that, generally speak­ing, there will be nothing required of him, but to take care, that he do not (like Sir Francis Wronghead in the play) cry No, when he should have cried Aye.

‘Let it ever be remembred, and seriously con­sidered, that every county, or borough, when they [Page 283] chuse their members, put into their hands no less than the keys of all their treasure; and not all their treasure only, but the property of every man in the British empire; out of which they can take what they will, and when they will, and as such are a very desirable partnership for a king ^a.’

A humourous writer in one of the news-papers pro­posed, at the commencement of the last general election, that as it is vain to think of excluding bribery, it might be a considerable improvement, if we were to lay aside, at every general election, all canvassing, eating, drinking, kissing voters wives and daughters, quarrelling and idleness, and that the people should go on with their business as usual, till the very day came. That an act should be made abolishing all the laws in being against corruption at elections, and that from and after such a day, it should be lawful for the con­testing candidates to go to the place of election with purses of guineas in their hands and fairly purchase the voters, openly bidding against each other as at an auction.

We have an election-oath, by which every elector if called upon, is obliged to swear, that he has re­ceived nothing for his vote. But the intention of it (though it were likely to be atherwise useful) is most commonly defeated by the candidates agreeing to wave the ceremony. Who can give a reason why every member is not at his first entrance into the house obli­ged, at the hazard of the punishment of perjury, [...]o swear, that he has taken no illegal steps to gain his e­lection, and at the end of every session, that he has not been influenced by the court or ministry in any one vote he has given?

[Page 284]In the year 1754, Sir I. Barnard moved the house of commons for a repeal of the law, which obliges electors to take the bribery-oath. Experience proves, he said, the inutility of the oath, for preventing bri­bery, and shews, that it only opens a door for perjury. The motion was over-ruled ^a.

It is supposed, that many prime ministers, lords, and others, desirous of having influence in the house of commons, have, to evade the act 9 Anne, furnish­ed candidates with mock qualifications to be returned after their election. And those wretches have so­lemnly sworn, upon the strength of a bit of paper to be given up next day, that they were possessed of estates of 600l. a year for life, clear of all incum­brance, while they were many hundreds, perhaps thousands of pounds, worse than nothing, and only hoped to repair their ruined fortunes by prostituting their votes to a villainous minister.

We find, the mystery of iniquity began early to work. Edw. III. crowned, A. D. 1327, endeavour­ed to pack the parliament, that he might obtain the larger supplies. He puts the sheriffs and other place-men upon influencing elections. The knights of the shires insist, that this abuse be redressed ^b.

Sheriffs were tampered with to make false returns of members, under Rich. II. ^c. The commons begun to be of consequence. And the king's having few places, pensions, contracts, lotteries, military offices, &c. to bestow, they had no byass to draw them aside [Page 285] from their country's interest, and therefore [...]ere trou­blesome to the court.

Rich. II. changed all the sheriffs in the kingdom to have a parliament to his mind, and the mayors and magistrates in cities and boroughs ^a. Such is the fatal power of kings! It is erroneously remarked by historians, that this was the first instance of the court's tampering with elections, and proved Richard's ruin. It could not have been done by direct bribery in those times, when there were few places, &c. And the grants of forfeited estates, crown lands, purses of money, &c. would go but a short way. ‘It is impossible’ (says Rapin ^b) ‘that a free spirited nation should see their liberties in the hands of a set of men, whom themselves have not freely chosen, without desiring to be freed from such an oppression.’

The court proposed to call a parliament, A. D. 1387, the election whereof should be so managed, that the members should be all at the king's [Rich. II.] direction.' But, in those days they had not the means of electioneering. Accordingly little or nothing was done ^c.

Rich. II. and all our tyrants (I wish I could say only tyrants) since, have broke into the freedom of election, and of voting. If this does not shew the importance of an independent parliament, nothing will.

A sheriff was fined and imprisoned, A. D. 1401, for a false return of a member for Rutland ^d.

Hen. VIII. was freed from the debt of a loan, with­out payment made, by a bill in parliament, which bill is said, by Hall, to have been obtained by corrupt [Page 286] means. [...]nd it is affirmed, that art was used in making elections for parliament, in order to obtain a confirmation of Henry's divorce.

A speaker of the commons, whose name is not mentioned ^a, takes notice of a certain duke's having endeavoured to influence an election, before the time of Phil. and Mary, and of a counsellor at law in their time, who had made an attempt of the same kind; but was disappointed. He wishes all the electors of his time (A. D. 1571.) were as staunch.

In the worst times, parliamentary corruption has prevailed the most. ‘All sorts of artifices, frauds, and violences were used in queen Mary's reign, for making parliaments.’ All the magistrates in cities and counties were changed from protestant to popish. False returns made, and allowed by a popish parlia­ment ^b. Queen Mary expresly ordered the sheriffs to return papists ^c.

Tho. Long, returned member for Westbury, Wilts, A. D. 1571, was so weak a man, that the house, wondering, how he came to be elected, questioned him upon it; and found, that he had been guilty of the foul fact; having bribed the mayor of the town, and one Watts, with no less a sum than 4l. The house ordered Mess. mayor and Watts to be sent for in custody, and to return the wages of iniquity, like honest men; and fined the corporation 20l. but we hear no more of the matter afterwards ^d.