A. MY friend, the last question ^* has suggested another; which, as it is acknowledged by all to be far from unimpor­tant, and, in the apprehensions of many, by no means improper to be attentively consider­ed by this people at the present day; the can­dor of this truly venerable, this learned and polite assembly will excuse us in attempting, in a few words, to examine, Whether the slave­ry, to which Africans are in this province, by the permission of law, subjected, be agreable to [Page 4]the law of nature? And since, fully persua­ded of the truth of those principles, in which is founded the idea of natural equality, to the exclusion of a right in one individual of the human species to exercise any degree of autho­rity over another without his consent, I am o­bliged to appear in favor of the negative of the proposition; and since, if I rightly remem­ber, I have sometimes heard you express a very different sentiment, if you are disposed to join in the proposal, I will first attend to what may be offered on your part in support of it. And shall therefore only observe, that the strange­ly inconsistent conduct of mankind, respecting this matter, furnishes us with reflections upon the present state of human nature by no means the most agreable. To me, I confess, it is matter of painful astonishment, that in this enlightened age and land, where the princi­ples of natural and civil Liberty, and conse­quently the natural rights of mankind are so generally understood, the case of these unhappy Africans should gain no more attention;— that those, who are so readily disposed to urge the principles of natural equality in defence of their own Liberties, should, with so little reluctance, continue to exert a power, by the [Page 5]operation of which they are so flagrantly con­tradicted. For what less can be said of that exercise of power, whereby such multitudes of our fellow-men, descendants, my friend from the same common parent with you and me, and between whom and us nature has made no distinction, save what arises from the stronger influence of the sun in the climate whence they originated, are held to groan un­der the insupportable burden of the most ab­ject slavery, without one chearing beam to re­fresh their desponding souls; and upon whose dreary path not even the feeblest ray of hope is permitted to dawn, and whose only prospect of deliverance is—in death. If indeed the law protects their lives, (which is all that can be said even here, and more—shame to man­kind! —more than can be said in some of our sister colonies ^¶) the only favor these unhap­py [Page 6]people receive, from such protection, is a continuation of their misery; the preservati­on of a life, every moment of which is worse than non-existence. A favor this, no doubt, that in a very special manner demands ac­knowledgement!

B. Though conscious, my friend, of my inability, the most advantageously to represent the arguments in favor of this proposition, es­pecially when circumscribed within the nar­row limits the present occasion will allow; yet clearly convinced of the propriety of attentive­ly considering this question, especially at a pe­riod when persons of every denomination are so justly affected with a sense of Liberty, I readily comply; rather hoping that if any present, are in doubt respecting this matter, they will take occasion from hence, so fully to examine it, as to procure satisfaction to them­selves, than expecting what shall be now of­fered on my part will have so desirable an ef­fect.

[Page 7] I am well aware of the difficulty of his task who attempts to defend a proposition of this nature. An heart replete with benevolence and compassion will hardly admit reasoning that involves principles seemingly incompati­ble with the happiness of any. Suffer me therefore to entreat you, that every tender sen­timent, that even the feelings of humanity may be suspended, while we calmly attend to the voice of reason, which is the voice of na­ture's alwise and benevolent Author.

That Liberty to all is sweet I freely own; but still 'tis what, in a state of society at least, all cannot equally enjoy, and what even in a free government can be enjoyed in the most perfect sense by none. Such is the nature of society, that it requires various degrees of au­thority and subordination; and while the uni­versal rule of right, the happiness of the whole, allows greater degrees of Liberty to some, the same immutable law suffers it to be enjoyed only in less degrees by others. And though my friend, I can most cordially join with you in the benevolent wish, that it were possible that these Africans, who I am free with you to call my brethren, and to whom, it is confessed, the [Page 8]principles of our civil constitution allow but a small degree of liberty, might enjoy it equal­ly with us; yet 'till I am convinced it might comport with the rule above mentioned, to al­low them more I am in duty bound to appear an advocate for those principles.

Let it therefore be remembered, that the question to be considered is, "Whether the slavery, to which Africans are in this Pro­vince, by the permission of law, subjected, be agre­able to the law of nature?"

It is, I presume, scarcely necessary to observe to you, that by the law of nature is intended that law which is the measure of all our moral actions, and by which their fitness and proprie­ty, and consequently their justice or injustice, are to be determined. In other words, that law to which whatever action is in it's nature fit and proper, just and right, is agreable, and to which every action of an opposite nature is disagreable. This, then being intended by the law of nature, whether the justice of Af­rican slavery, if found agreable to this law, is defensible, will be needless to inquire. But it will be said, through this definition of the [Page 9]law of nature be admitted, we are still to be informed what those actions are, that are agre­able to this law, and consequently right. I answer, whatever action in it's nature, con­comitant circumstances being considered; tends to happiness on the whole, is agreable to this law, and every action of a contrary tendency is hereunto disagreable. And hence it will follow, that whatever practical princi­ple of society, (which is to be considered as the action of the community) hath this ten­dency, is to be reputed just, and approved and adopted, and those of a contrary tendency consequently disapproved.

To demonstrate this, it will be necessary only to observe, that as nothing in nature can possibly be of the least consequence but hap­piness or misery, so the difference in the ten­dency of the practical principles of any socie­ty to the production of these, is the only thing that can possibly render some eligible, fit and proper, rather than others; and was it not for this distinction, it must forever remain a mat­ter of perfect indifference, what practical prin­ciples were in any society adopted. But with­out [Page 10]stopping more fully to demonstrate the truth of this principle, it having been recog­nised as well by the generality of ethic writers, as by the wisdom of all good governments, I shall proceed to enquire, how far it will ope­rate to the determination of the present questi­on.

And in the first place, I shall enquire into the agreement of the law of nature with the idea of slavery in general, in opposition to that principle of natural equality, which is so zeal­ously contended for by the advocates for u­niversal Liberty.

By slavery in general I mean the involunta­ry subordination of the will of one to that of another; whereby, independent of all com­pact, the actions of the former are in all things to be directed by the will of the latter. Now if slavery in general, according to this defini­tion, be agreable to the law of nature, the principle of natural equality must fall, and in order to determine the question in dispute, it will be necessary only to apply the general principle to the case of the African subordina­tion, whereby it will be casy to discern if there [Page 11]is any thing in the nature of their particular case not agreable hereto.

I am therefore now to shew, that slavery, as above defined, is not repugnant to the law of nature, and therefore that the principle of natural equality cannot be true.

That right of authority is to be found in some being involving subordination in others, independent of all voluntary contract on the part of the subordinate, is, as far as I know, universally acknowledged. Such is the right of the Governor of the universe to govern and direct the conduct of all finite existences, and such is the right of parents to govern and di­rect the conduct of their children. Now if it be found, that there is the same foundation for authority and subordination among dif­ferent individuals of the human species, be­tween whom no such relations as those above-mentioned do subsist, as there is for authority and subordination in those cases where it is ac­knowledged to be just, it will follow, that de­grees of rightful authority in some, involving degrees of subordination in others, must be admitted among them likewise. In other [Page 12]words, if the reason and foundation of the abso­lute authority of the Governor of the universe over the creation, and the limited authority of parents over their children, be found to o­perate with equal strength in favor of a right of some individuals among mankind to exer­cise any degrees of authority over others, the exercise of such authority must be acknowledg­ed just, i. e. agreable to the law of nature. And now to determine this question, it is ne­cessary to inquire, in what the right of autho­rity, in the cases abovementioned, is founded: And here the answer is obvious, in the greatest good of the whole. For since the Governor of the universe is possessed of power, wisdom, and goodness in perfection of degree, it is im­possible but that the greatest happiness to the creation should be the result of his exercise of the most absolute sovereignty. And though this right of absolute authority in the Creator over his creatures be inseparable from the rela­tion between Creator and creature, yet it is not founded simply in that relation, that is, in the idea of derived existence; but in the natural imperfection and dependance of the creature, and the natural perfection of the Creator, and the reason of the necessarily absolute subjecti­on of the creature does not consist merely in [Page 13]his having received existence, but in his having received it from such a Being; a Being by the perfection of his nature qualified for the most perfect government, and under whose adminis­tration it is impossible but that the before-mentioned immutable law of nature, the great­est happiness of the whole, should operate to effect. Agreable to this is the foundation of the natural authority of parents over their chil­dren; it by no means consisting in the notion of derived existence; but in the different quali­fications of parents and children to execute this immutable law: For while parents so far excel their children in wisdom, and from na­tural affection are disposed to promote their happiness, it will follow, that more happiness will result to both, from the exercise of au­thority in parents, and subordination in chil­dren, than from the exercise of equal Liberty in each. And that this authority of parents over their children is derived from this source, and not from the natural relation subsisting between them, considered merely as parents and offspring, is moreover evident beyond all contradiction from this consideration, that whenever the parent is by any means disqua­lified, in the respects before mentioned, to di­rect the conduct of his child, the subordinati­on of the child ceases.

[Page 14] If this, which I think none will deny, be a just representation of the foundation in na­ture of authority and subordination; in order to justify involuntary slavery in general, in op­position to the notion of natural equality, it is necessary only to inquire, whether among dif­ferent individuals, between whom there is no such natural relation as that of parent and off­spring, there be not the same reason, ground, and foundation in nature for the exercise of authority in some, necessarily involving su­bordination in others, which there is in cases where such relation actually subsists. And concerning this, no one surely can remain a moment undetermined, who reflects with the least degree of attention, upon the vast ine­quality observable between different individuals of the human species, in point of qualification for the proper direction of conduct. Now whether this inequality be considered as arising from difference in natural capacity, difference in the means of improvement, or in dispositi­on properly to employ such means; in a word, whether it arises from nature or education, or any other supposeable quarter, it matters not, while this is in fact the case, while some are actually found so far to excel others both in respect of wisdom and benevolence, both in [Page 15]the knowledge of the principles of propriety, and a disposition to practice such principles, that the general end, happiness, would be bet­ter promoted by the exercise of authority in the former, though necessarily involving su­bordination in the latter, than by the enjoy­ment of equal Liberty in each, the exercise of such authority must be right, and never the less so, though the individuals by such an oeconomy subordinated, do not consent. It is fit that children should be subjected to the au­thority of their parents, whether they consent to such subjection or not; this is put beyond all possibility of doubt by the express declara­tion of wisdom which cannot err; not to men­tion the consent of all ages in their approbati­on of the principles of those civil societies which have warranted the exercise of such au­thority. Every law is applicable to all cases within the same reason; and since it cannot be denied that the reason of authority and subor­dination between parents and children, equal­ly applies to the support of a distinction of the same kind among others not so related, it fol­lows inevitably, that a distinction in the latter case is equally justifiable with one in the for­mer; they are both supported by the same prin­ciple of natural law, and therefore must stand or fall together.

[Page 16] I have introduced these observations upon the foundation of the authority of the Gover­nor of the universe over the creation, and of parents over their children, for the sake of ex­ample, rather than as necessary to support the general idea of inequality: I say as necessary, for while there is so manifestly great an ine­quality in the capacities and dispositions of mankind to direct their own as well as the conduct of others, to its only proper end, I think it demonstrable, that the principle of ab­solute equality could not be supported, even though we had no argument from fact by which it might be illustrated. And in truth, I think, before the principle of absolute equa­lity can be maintained, it must be made to ap­pear, that all mankind, in point of capacity and disposition to conduct properly, are equal.

It now remains only to apply these general principles to the particular case of Africans in this country, and see what degree of authority the people here are thereby warranted to ex­ercise over them; and if it shall appear in fact, that they are not reduced by the law of this land to a degree of subordination beyond what the law of nature abovementioned, the [Page 17]happiness of both, requires, it will follow un­deniably, that the law by which they are thus subjected is just.

A. Before you proceed to the application you mention, permit me to make an observa­tion, that perhaps may render such applicati­on unnecessary. I think you have by no means supported the idea of slavery in general; but that your argument in favour of natural inequality, though ingeniously enough con­ducted, is manifestly inconclusive, and that the contrary, notwithstanding all you have alledg­ed, may still be true. For though I acknow­ledge, that in every society the practical prin­ciple that in it's operation tends to the great­est happiness of the whole is right, i. e. agre­able to the law of nature, and that the abso­lute authority of the Governor of the universe, and the limited authority of parents over their children is founded in the reason you alledge; and also admit, among different individuals, all those different degrees of qualification for the proper direction of conduct for which you contend; yet that the natural right of inde­pendence is hence excluded, and the princi­ple of natural equality consequently over­thrown [Page 18]is by no means acknowledged. The reason is obvious, that the principle for which you contend is in the nature of things utter­ly impracticable; your conclusion therefore, from premises implying a false hypothesis, cannot be admitted.

The exercise of authority, only in cases where such exercise is productive of happiness, is undoubtedly right: But such is the consti­tution of things with regard to man, such his nature, state, and condition, as renders it ab­solutely impossible that a principle, warranting the exercise of authority in any particular case, independent of the consent of the subordinate, should be correspondent to this end. And for this good reason, that it is impossible for human wisdom to distinguish the cases where the ex­ercise of such authority would be proper, from those where it would not be so; and could this be effected, it would still be utterly impossible for any practical principle of society, for any human law to make the distinction. The same law which would warrant the exercise of authority in one case, must of necessity war­rant it in another; unless it could be suppo­sed, that some infallible judge could be pre­sent [Page 19]at all times, and in all places, and direct the operation of law in every particular case. And were even this possible, it might still be doubted whether the principle of natural equa­lity would be overthrown. Such are the weak­nesses and imperfections, the passions and pre­judices of the best of men, and so deeply are all impressed with a sense of Liberty and in­dependence, that it may well be questioned, whether a law, warranting authority in those cases only where it would be most proper, were such law possible, would operate more to the general happiness, than a law establish­ing the principle of natural equality: For tho' in that case, many would conduct less foolish­ly than they now do; yet the idea of servi­tude, and dependence upon the will of ano­ther, would be a perpetual, and not unfruit­ful source of misery. But whatever might be the effect of such a constitution, since that is confessedly impossible, it is evident beyond all contradiction, that the principle of natural e­quality is infinitely better adapted to the gene­ral end, happiness, than any other practical principle that can possibly be established. Hence I think it is manifest, notwithstanding the plausible appearance of your reasoning in theory, since it will not endure the true touch­stone [Page 20]of practice, that slavery, which many to their cost know to be a practical thing, is far from being supported thereby.

Your notion of the ground and foundation of natural authority, in the examples you have adduced, is undoubtedly just, and consent in those cases, is by no means necessary to subor­dination, but, unfortunately for your conclu­sion, the cases are far from being applicable to the point in hand: For as in one case, per­fection of wisdom and goodness excludes the possibility of error, and renders the most per­fect subjection necessarily best; so the princi­ple of affection implanted by the Author of nature in the breast of the parent, inspiring such a tender concern for the welfare of his off­spring, and so strongly operative to the pro­duction of kind offices towards him, together with the natural inability of the child, through weakness or inexperience, to be his own di­rector, may well warrant a general rule of li­mited subordination in the other. And when you have shewn me the man, or number of men, capable of infallibly directing the con­duct of others, the exercise of authority in them, shall not want my approbation. And [Page 21]when you shall point out to me any classes of men, between whom there is such a compara­tive difference in point of ability for the pro­per direction of conduct, as between parents and children, and the same disposition in the superior towards the inferior, that the Author of nature has implanted in the hearts of pa­rents towards their children, I will readily ac­knowledge the exercise of a like degree of au­thority justifiable by the law of nature.

But I am much at a loss to conceive how your reasoning in favor of slavery in general, were it ever so fully conclusive, could possibly justify us in thus forcibly subjugating the Af­ricans, between whom and us nature seems to have made no such difference as that, upon which you suppose the notion of natural ine­quality to be founded: For I suppose you will hardly imagine the darkness of a man's skin incapacitates him for the direction of his con­duct, and authorises his neighbours, who may have the good fortune of a complexion a shade or two lighter, to exercise authority o­ver him. And if the important difference does not lay here, it seems not very easy to determine where it does; unless perchance, it be in the quality of their hair; and if the [Page 22]principle of subordination lies here, I would advise every person, whose hair is inclined to deviate from a right line, to be upon his guard. If indeed any should alledge, that they are distinguished by the flatness of their noses, I can't but think this circumstance a­gainst them, for if a man is to be led and go­verned by the nose, it may well be question­ed, whether a nose of a different figure would not be better adapted to the purpose.

B. My friend, I am no enemy to hu­mour, but I think it rarely serves to illustrate a logical conclusion. I confess my argument, as you have represented it, appears ridiculous enough; but if you had deferred your reply till I had made an application of the principle to the point in hand, perhaps it had saved you this needless expence of wit. I have not pre­tended, as a consequence from my principles, that every degree of superiority in point of dis­cretion would warrant to any individual of a community a right to exercise authority over his neighbour: I have only contended, that the notion of equality, in the strict sense, had no foundation in nature; but as happiness is the only end of action, so superiority in wisdom, [Page 23]goodness, &c. is in the nature of things a proper foundation of authority. And as na­ture has made differences among creatures in these respects; so it is fit and proper, and a­greable to nature's law, that different degrees of authority in point of direction of conduct should be exercised by them; and that in some cases, even among the human species, this difference is so important, as to render the exercise of authority justifiable, even without the consent of the governed: For this I have produced an example from fact, in the case of parents and children. All this you have im­plicitly allowed. I now go on to say, as a consequence from the same acknowledged principle, that whenever such a connection of things takes place, that any number of men cannot, consistently with the good of the whole, have a residence in any community but in a state of involuntary subordination, and that their residence in such community notwithstanding such subordination, be in fact best for the whole, such subordination, though involuntary, is no violation of the law of nature; but on the contrary to all in­tents and purposes correspondent thereto. This is a true conclusion from premises incon­testible, [Page 24]principles universally acknowledged, and which you yourself have but now admit­ted. Subordination in this case comes fully within the reason of the subordination of chil­dren, rests on precisely the same foundation, and is therefore justifiable on precisely the same principles. For whether the necessity of such subordination arises from natural inca­pacity, or from any other quarter, it matters not, if this is in fact the case; if the interest of the whole does require it; let the causes or reasons of such requirement be what they may, such subordination is equally justifiable as in any other case whatever; not only in the case of children, but even in the case of consent; for the obligation to submission arising from consent, is founded in the general obligation to fulfil contracts; which obligation is ulti­mately founded in the good of society.

Now fully within this predicament lies, as I conceive, the particular case of Africans in this country. That it is only in a state of limited subordination (I say limited, for it is to be remembered, that the authority of those to whom they are subordinate, is restricted by the superior authority of law, to which we are all subordinate, and which provides that [Page 25]they, as well as others, shall be treated accord­ing to the general principles of humanity) that these people can consistently enjoy a resi­dence among us is, I suppose, acknowledged by all. And whether it is not better for them to reside here, notwithstanding such subordi­nation, even regard being had to their interest only, than in their native country, no one can doubt, at least no one, who has a tolerably adequate conception of their misery, and wretchedness there. Figure to yourself my friend, you are not unacquainted with Afri­can history, figure to yourself the delightful situation of a natural inhabitant of Africa. View him necessarily destitute of every mean of improvement in social virtue, of every ad­vantage for the cultivation of those principles of humanity, in which alone consists the dig­nity of the rational nature, and from which only source springs all that pleasure, that hap­piness of life, by which the human species is distinguished from the other parts of the ani­mal creation. Consider his situation as a can­didate for an eternal existence; view him as necessarily ignorant of every principle of that religion, through the happy influence of which alone the degenerate race of Adam can rati­onally form the most distant expectation of fu­ture [Page 26]felicity. View him moreover in a state of the most abject slavery, a slavery of the worst kind, a slavery of all others most de­structive of human happiness,—an entire sub­jection to the tyrannizing power of lust and passion,—wholly devoted to the governing in­fluence of those irregular propensities, which are the genuine offspring of depraved nature, when unassisted by philosophy or religion. Behold him actually clothed in all that brutal stupidity, that savage barbarity which natural­ly springs from such a source. Add to this, his condition of perpetual insecurity, arising from the state of hostility and war that forever rages in those inhospitable climes; and con­sider the treatment he is to expect, whom the fortune of war has subjected to the power of his enraged foe, whose natural cruelty is per­petually sharpened, and whose desire of re­venge is continually cherished, by a sense of his own danger. Reflect, I say, a moment upon the condition of a creature in human shape, (for in such a state of degradation one can hardly call him a man) the misery, the wretch­edness of whose situation is by these expressi­ons but faintly represented; and compare it with the condition of a slave in this country; and then see if you can hesitate one moment [Page 27]which of the two is most eligible. If perad­venture a doubt should arise, if you will please to enquire, whether you would rather choose one, for whose prosperity you was tenderly concerned, should be educated in Africa, with all the immunities of a native African, or in this country, though in that state of subordi­nation, to which Africans are here subjected, I will venture to warrant you of every such doubt a speedy resolution.

Here then I rest the argument, for upon this point the present question must infallibly determine. Notwithstanding all the uneasi­ness attending subordination, and all the mi­series to which an African is exposed in his removal from his native country; while his condition here is so much more eligible than his condition there, his removal is to be es­teemed a favor: And the constitution of our government, whereby such removal is counte­nanced and encouraged, is by no means to be esteemed reprehensible. It is in vain to al­ledge here the want of consent on his part. It is evident from the reasoning above, that con­sent, in order to subjection, is necessary in those cases only where the end of authority, the greatest possible good, cannot be promoted [Page 28]without it: But who I beseech you, ever thought the consent of a child, an ideot, or a madman necessary to his subordination? Every whit as immaterial is the consent of these miserable Africans, whose real character seems to be a compound of the three last mentioned. What can avail his consent, who through ig­norance of the means necessary to promote his happiness, is rendered altogether incapable of choosing for himself? And as the consent of such a being could by no means involve subordination in a case where it would be otherwise improper, so the want of it can be no bar in a case where it would not. In all such cases it is undoubtedly the duty of those, whom providence has favored with the means of improvement in understanding, and the wisdom resulting from such improvement, to make use of their discretion in directing the conduct of those who want it.

I am sensible that I have already dwelt too long upon this argument; you will however in this connexion, permit me to add, that were involuntary subjection, in all cases, contrary to the law of nature, it is impossible to suppose, that the Governor of the universe, whose wis­dom is infinite, and whose will is eternally [Page 29]and immutably coincident with, and when re­vealed to us, the measure of, this law, should ever have expressly tolerated it in any parti­cular instance. I mention this in the present connexion, the rather because I suppose the authority, the Israelites, when under a govern­ment absolutely theocratical, were permitted to exercise over strangers, was founded in the same reason with the authority, for which I con­tend, viz: that it was better for them to reside among a people, where they might have some opportunity for improvement in knowledge and virtue, though in a state of subordination, than to remain amongst the barbarous and i­dolatrous nations, whence they originated.

Were it necessary or expedient, it would be easy to shew, by comparison, in a great variety of instances not mentioned, the superiority of a slave in this country, in point of condition, to a natural inhabitant of Africa. And though it be too true, that these unhappy creatures are, in many particular cases, cruelly treated, yet, while their importation is to them a redemption from a condition on the whole so much more miserable, we must, as I said before, justify the government in tolera­ting such importation; and with regard to [Page 30]the particular instances of abuse, we can only say caveant qui sunt conscii.

I have omitted the right, sometimes pre­tended to be derived from purchase, because I look upon the argument to be trifling. For though right of authority, if it be well found­ed, be possibly, in some cases, transferable, yet it is well known, that all the authority any one of these miserable creatures can pretend to over another, is founded merely in the for­tune of a brutal, savage war, conducted with­out the lest regard, on either side, to any principles of equity, justice, or national honor; and for the right of authority so founded I have no disposition to contend. But I think there is much more in their argument who contend that, by the purchase of these vic­tims, their lives are preserved, which would otherwise undoubtedly be sacrificed to the cruelty of the captors. For though I am sen­sible, that to this is commonly replied, that the custom of purchasing captives is a perpe­tual source of war; yet if we consider that a people, so inhumanly savage as to dispose of their nearest relations for baubles, can never want matter of discord; and that, was it not for the advantages in this way made of them, [Page 31]the captives would generally perish, we shall have no reason to doubt whether the custom of purchasing may in this way be considered as a favor.

On the whole, since it is evident beyond all controversy, that the removal of the Africans, from the state of brutality, wretchedness, and misery, in which they are at home to deeply involved, to this land of light, humanity, and christian knowledge, is to them so great a bles­sing; however faulty any individuals may have been in point of unnecessary cruelty, practised in this business; yet, whether the general state of subordination here, which is a necessary consequence of their removal, be a­greable to the law of nature, can by no means longer remain a question.

A. Notwithstanding all you have so ingeni­ously alledged in support of this question, I am still obliged to confess myself one of those in whom your reasoning has failed to produce conviction: And must be excused in saying that the justice of slavery generally understood, is still, for aught I am able to discern, far from being supported.—It is true the Israelites [Page 32]when under a theocratical government were permitted, under certain circumstances, to ex­ercise authority over strangers resident among them. And this is adduced as an argument, infallibly conclusive in favor of slavery. But is it certain that this conclusion is not drawn a little too hastily?

The Governor of the universe has, in a cer­tain instance, expressly tolerated slavery, No­thing was ever by him tolerated but what was agreeable to the law of nature. Therefore,—Slavery is lawful. The man must have a very extraordinary talent who can de­duce this conclusion from such premises.— It is readily granted, that thus much may be justly inferred from them, viz. that such a particular connexion of things once took place, as rendered slavery, under the express permission of the Governor of the universe, lawful. But will it follow from hence, that slavery is ever lawful without such permission? As well may we infer a right, by the law of nature, to put any who are unable to resist our power, under harrows and axes of iron, and in a word, make the particular precept in any case, given the Israe­lites, a measure, whereby to explain those general laws of nature, which are to regulate the con­duct [Page 33]of all mankind. It is undoubtedly true, that every express declaration of the Governor of the universe is agreeable to, and justly ex­planatory of, the law of nature, as far as such declaration extends: And the conduct of any particular person, or people, which is agree­able to such declaration is most certainly right; but it can never be certainly inferred from hence, that a like conduct in others, not hav­ing the same warrant, is agreeable to this law: For the imperfection of human wisdom ren­ders it forever uncertain, whether the cases are in all respects similar; and consequently, it can never be certainly determined, that the same conduct will, in both cases, have the same natural tendency to happiness; and hence the same conduct, that in the former case was right, may in the latter, be wrong. But could even this be ascertained, there would still re­main an insuperable difficulty in determining the actions of one people to be right, merely from an express toleration of the same, or like ac­tions in another: And this arises solely from the want of such toleration. If it be objected, that an action, in it's nature unfit, could not be tolerated; it may be answered, that the same action, when so expressly authorised, may be fit and proper, and in it's nature right, [Page 34]which without such toleration, would not be so; and for this plain reason, that the same action, when by rightful authority permitted, may have on the whole a tendency to happi­ness, which without such permission, would have an opposite tendency.

If this reasoning be just (the validity of which, I am happily too well acquainted with your knowledge of the principles of argumen­tation, to doubt whether you will dispute) how far the lawfulness of the practice of slave­ry among the Israelites, when expressly tolera­ted by the Governor of the universe, will justi­fy a people in a like practice, to whom no such toleration has ever been granted, is by no means difficult to discern. And before the principle of natural equality can be over­thrown, the tendency of slavery to the good of mankind, must, by arguments drawn from the nature and constitution of things, be made evidently to appear.

I have no disposition to contend for the support of principles not founded in sufficient reason; was I convinced, that the principle of natural equality, universally understood, was [Page 35]not founded in the general good of mankind, notwithstanding the consent of philosophers in all ages, I would readily give it up. And was I persuaded, that the practice of enslaving Africans, as tolerated in this province, was consonant to this end. I should no longer doubt of it's propriety: But unhappily for my apprehension this is far from being the case.

Was it possible to consider this case as standing alone, independent of it's connexions with practices of a like kind in other places, and the more extensive influence it may conse­quently have upon the happiness of mankind, it is at least doubtful if it would then be right. I am ready to allow, that was it certain that their condition here is happier on the whole, than in their own country, your premises, in this independent view of the matter, would well warrant your conclusion; but even this I ap­prehend is far from being true. You have re­presented the misery and wretchedness of these people in their native land, in a light indeed disagreeable enough: But I am still disposed from my apprehension of the dignity of the rational nature, at least to hope that your co­louring is a little too strong; and that not­withstanding [Page 36]the unhappy state of degradation into which they are confessedly sunk, they are still some degrees above brutes. It is ac­knowledged that they are extremely unacquaint­ed with the politer arts, and almost wholly ig­norant of every thing belonging to science, and consequently strangers to all the pleasures of a scholar and a philosopher; they are also confessedly destitute of an acquaintance with the principles of urbanity and consequently want, in a great measure, the happiness re­sulting from a well regulated civil society; their condition is allowedly not greatly dif­ferent from a state of nature; though it is to be remembered, that if modern writers of the best reputation are to be credited, their man­ners, in most parts of that extensive country, are far less savage and barbarous; their con­veniences and enjoyments much more numer­ous, and in a word their manner of life much more agreable than has been heretofore represented.^¶ [Page 37]And indeed it is not to be wondered that those who have been disposed to make a gain by this iniquitous practice of enslaving their fellow men, should be careful, for their jus­tification, to represent them as nearly upon a level with the brute creation as possible; not to mention the ridiculous attempts that have, in this view, been made to prove them actual­ly [Page 38]of another species. But granting their con­dition to be, as in fact it is, comparatively low; that their sources of happiness, when compar­ed with those which the members of a well-ordered civil society enjoy, are few; yet it is not to be forgotten, that their appetites and desires are in some good measure proportional. [Page 39] Nemo desiderat quae ignorat. The benevolent author of our being has accommodated our natural desires in a great measure to the natu­ral means of gratification. And he who at­tentively considers the anxious and perplex­ing cares; the fatiguing and often fruitless la­bors; the cravings of unnatural appetites; [Page 40]the frequently disappointed views and expec­tations; and, in a word, the various and al­most innumerable new sources of infelicity naturally, and many of them inseparably con­nected with what is commonly called a state of civilization, will perhaps perceive that the difference, in point of real happiness, between the scholar, the courtier, and the simple child of nature, is far from infinite. But allowing it to be very considerable, allowing that the privileges and advantages of a free member, of a free society, where useful sciences and the liberal arts are patronized and flourish, and where all those principles that beautify and adorn the rational nature are cultivated, are comparatively very great: What, I be­seech you has all this to do with the pre­sent question? What advantage is all the learning of this country to those ignorant wretches, who are now practising their ludi­crous gambols on yonder common, except indeed that it generally procures them one day in the year, a dispensation from the seve­rity of their servitude—What is all our boast­ed acquaintance with science and the politer arts to these miserable creatures, who, by their situation, have little more concern in these [Page 41]matters than their brethren in the middle re­gions of Africa; and which knowledge, could the obtain it, must serve only to increase their misery? What a blessing, for example, would a knowledge of the principles of civil Liberty be to a person perpetually doomed to a state of the most abject slavery?—In their native country, though their condition be indeed contemptible enough, they have the blessing of Liberty to sweeten every pleasure, and give a relish to every enjoyment: But here, though their condition were in other respects much more favourable than it is, while conscious of perpetual and absolute dependance upon the will of others, this reflection, so opposite to the strong sense of Liberty implanted in the heart of every son of Adam, must necessarily mar the happiness of every gratification, effectually chill the sense of pleasure, and stop every natural source of felicity. A keen ex­cruciating sense of liberty forever lost must still predominate, till, the spirit broken by the fatigue of incessant distress, they sink into a state of lifeless insensibility. And then for sooth we are presently disposed to tax them with natural stupidity; and make the very thing that our unnatural treatment has occasion­ed the ground of our justification.—It is well known, that stupidity is by no means the na­tural [Page 42]characteristic of these people; ^§ and when we consider the nature of their conditi­on in this country, how miserably dejected, depressed and despised, instead of marking their want of apprehension, we ought rather to ad­mire that there are any the least appearances of sensibility remaining in them.

But it is alledged, ‘that at home they are in a perpetual state of war, and that by the purchase of captives many lives are preserv­ed, that would otherwise be devoted to de­struction.’ Surprizing indeed; that here, as in the former case, the very evil that this practice has occasioned should be alledged in excuse of it! One must have a favourable o­pinion indeed of that cause which needs the support of such arguments!—These people are naturally peaceable, and less inclined to acts of hostility than the generality of man­kind; ^‡ the nature of their climate disposing [Page 43]rather to the softer pleasures, than the fiercer passions. This though long smothered is now a truth well known; and 'tis astonishing that the patience with which they endure the cru­ellest servitude, should not, long e're this time have rectified this mistake. But I may not enlarge here; the absurdity of this argument is too glaring to justify a serious confutation.

It is also alledged, that ‘in their own country they are unnecessarily ignorant of the princi­ples of our holy religion.’ This indeed, generally understood, is confessedly a melan­choly truth. The advantages they enjoy from revelation are not to be mentioned. Those feeble rays of nature's light which the fatal apostacy of our original parents has hap­pily left unextinguished in their posterity, are [Page 44]their almost only guide: And the insuffici­ency of these, for the purposes of moral direc­tion, is confessedly but too evident from the ignorance of those, who are unhappily favor­ed with no other directors. But admitting this to be the case, that the advantages enjoy­ed by this people, of a religious nature, are ex­tremely small; before an argument can be hence derived in favor of their removal to this country, it must be shewn that the advan­ges they here enjoy are greater. But if we examine the religious advantages of slaves in this country, I fear we shall find, to the dis­honor of our profession, that they are not greatly superior to those of their brethren in Africa, at least the excess will fall far short of of an equivalent for the excess of their misery.

It is true, that in most parts of New-Eng­land, slaves are sometimes permitted to attend public worship, but how much is to be expect­ed from this, without the addition of private instruction, which heaven knows is but spar­ingly afforded them, their acquaintance in ge­neral with the principles of christianity abun­dantly demonstrates. And if we consider their opportunities of instruction, in connexion with fixed prejudices against a religion, whose professors they naturally consider as avowedly [Page 45]violating one of the plainest laws of nature; and add to this, the strong temptations they are under, from the nature of their condition, to every species of iniquity, we shall hardly expect to find in them more of the spirit of true practical religion, than is to be found in those who never heard of the gospel. And whether this is not in fact generally the case, is by no means a question to those who are ac­quainted with them. But admitting the pos­sibility that some individuals, may be benefit­ed in this way; shall this be alledged as an equivalent for all the miseries to which these people are, by this practice, inevitably subjec­ted, for the sure and certain destruction to which such multitudes are hereby devoted? As well may the design of propagating chris­tian knowledge, be alledged in excuse of the shocking cruelties practised on the miserable Americans, by their merciless destroyers, the Spaniards and Portuguese. Thus we see this formidable argument turns out upon ex­amination, not less deficient than those afore­mentioned; and this practice of enslaving our fellow men, though considered in this inde­pendent view, notwithstanding all that can be alledged, must be acknowledged altogether unjustifiable.

[Page 46] But we must not stop here: Upon your own principles, we must consider this practice in all its connexions; we must not only regard the evils of slavery in this country, but must take in also the miseries and calamities that are by this means brought upon any of the human race. Before this practice can be justified, it must appear to be productive of general hap­piness; it must correspond with the general good of the whole. Now if we consider the practice of slavery in this country, in it's ten­dency to countenance and encourage the same thing, as it is practised in the southern colonies, and West-Indies, it will appear much more glaringly iniquitous and unjust. Several hundred thousands of those unhappy creatures, are, by the best information, annually exported from the various parts of Africa to America, a great proportion of whom, thro' the shock­ing, the unparalleled sufferings of transporta­tion, miserably perish on the voyage, and as to those who unhappily survive, to enter upon that state of perpetual servitude, to which they are destined, it is well known, that they are treated with less humanity, more merciless severity, and savage barbarity, than reason would warrant us to exercise towards the [Page 47]meanest of the brute creation. ^‖ It would wring drops of blood from an heart of ada­mant to relate the cruel sufferings of these un­happy people, in those countries, who, at the same time, have less advantages for christian knowledge, than the natives of California, or the inhabitants of the antarctic circle. ^¶ But [Page 48]I forbear—The person that can imagine the practice of slavery in this country, consi­dered in all it's consequences, connexions and tendencies, productive of the happiness of mankind, must, I think, allow, that the direct way to encrease their happiness is by every possible means to encrease their misery.

B. As you have not now disputed the truth of the principle, but joined with me in resting the argument upon a matter of fact, I shall no farther pursue the dispute, but leave that point to be determined by the judgment of others.