CHAP. I. Of Mr. Edwards's notion of the essence or root of true virtue.

MR. EDWARDS in his first chapter gives us his idea of the essence and root of all true virtue. By virtue he tolls us he means true holiness or grace. This he calls the true, moral beauty of all moral beings. He says ‘True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in general. ^*’ By being in general, he tells us he means ‘intelligent beings in general, not inanimate be­ings that have no perception or will.—True virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular beings because of their virtue or beauty; nor in gratitude, because they love us,’ (therefore not in love to God as a being of infinite moral excellence, and love) ‘but a propensity and union of heart to being, simply considered, exciting absolute benevolence to being in general.—I would express what appears to me to be the truth on this subject, in the following particulars.’

‘The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered: And if being simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object.’

‘The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart, is benevolent being.—A secondary ground of pure be­nevolence, is virtuous benevolence itself, in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevo­lence, sees another being possess'd of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having ex­istence—as [Page 4]it were out of gratitude to him for his love of general existence.’

‘Several things noted—concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love. First, That loving a being on this ground’ (as God for instance) ‘necessarily arises from pure benevolence to being in general, and comes to the same thing.’

‘2. This which has been mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true, mo­ral, or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and the various qualities and exercises of mind, which proceed from it; and the external actions which proceed from these. And in these things consists all true virtue.’

‘3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these principles and acts, so 'tis primarily on this account, they are beautiful, viz. that they imply consent and union, with being in general. This is the primary and most essential beauty of every thing that can justly be called by the name virtue, or is any moral excellency.’

‘4. This spiritual beauty, that is but a secondary ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the primary ground of a truly virtuous complacence. ^‡’

Let us stop here a little, and make a few reflections on the doctrine before us.—The primary object of vir­tuous regard in pure benevolence, which true virtue or holiness does radically and most essentially consist, is being, simply considered, or regarded only as having perception and will, or intelligent being in general, abstractly consi­dered. This primary object of virtuous regard, consi­dered as such, has no personal, or moral, or relative cha­racters. It has but two attributes, perception and will. It is neither wise nor foolish, neither morally good nor evil, neither self-existent nor created and dependent, nei­ther God nor a creature. It has no relation to the be­nevolent mind. It is mental being in general, simply con­sidered, as such. The virtuous mind viewing of it as such, [Page 5]unclothed with any other characters, personal or rela­tive, wishes away in the dark, that it may enjoy all the perfection, honor and happiness it is capable of, be it what it will. ‘All true virtue consists most essentially in this general benevolence; yea, it consists wholly in this, and in those mental affections and actions which arise out of it.’ Does it so indeed? Is this the root, out of which love to God, and all particular moral beings springs? Are all particular virtues branches which spring from this root? May all these be resolved into this pure or simple benevolence to being simply consi­dered, as their first principle? It must be so, according to the doctrine before us. How different is this from that divine philosophy taught us from heaven!

According to this fundamental principle of Mr. Ed­wards's scheme, God is not the primary object of virtuous regard, nor is love to him the root of virtuous affecti­ons. For God, and being simply considered, are ex­ceeding divers from each other. Our author indeed sometimes says, they are the same, in effect, and that be­nevolence to the one is, in effect, the same as love to the other. But in this he is totally inconsistent with him­self, and confounds his own fundamental doctrine. Of the love of complacence which arises out of benevolence to being, simply considered, God may be the primary and chief object, consistently with this scheme; but of the love of virtuous benevolence he is, and can be but a secondary object. Benevolence to God, a particular being, is but a secondary virtue, or particular great branch of benevolence to being, simply considered. For ‘true virtue primarily consists not in love to any particular beings as virtuous’ (so not to God) ‘but in a propensity and union of heart to being, simply consi­dered, exciting absolute benevolence to being in ge­neral.’

According to this doctrine, there ought to have been three great commands. The first, greatest, and most fundamental of all should have been this, viz. ‘Thou [Page 6]shalt love being in general, simply considered as having perception and will: for simple benevolence to this is the root and mother of all particular virtues; and all moral excellence and spiritual beauty primarily and most essentially consists in it.'—Secondly, 'Subordi­nate to this, and as the first great branch of this root, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart. And thirdly, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.’ But on the two last ‘hang all the law and the pro­phets.’ The first is wholly overlooked. A strange oversight, if all true virtue, or holiness and grace, pri­marily, radically, and most essentially consists in it!

Some gentlemen, perhaps, unwilling to give up Mr. Edwards's doctrine, will say, 'These two commands im­ply, the first, as containing the whole of mental being.' This is no answer to the objection. According to this notion of the root, or first principle of true virtue, love to God, as well as to our neighbour, is the offspring of this general, indeterminate benevolence. And if it is fit to command or require the daughter affection, much more the mother love. And besides, Jesus Christ says, to love the Lord our God, is the first and greatest com­mand in the law. He has given no intimation of his knowing any thing of this hidden root, and spring of all virtue. And the holy prophets and apostles knew no­thing of it.

CHAP. II. How supreme love to God results from absolute be­nevolence to being, simply considered, and is in ef­fect the same thing.

MR. Edwards begins his second chapter thus, ‘From what has been said, 'tis evident, that true vir­tue must chiefly consist in love to God.—This ap­pears whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love.’

1st. ‘It was observed that the first objective ground [Page 7]of that love wherein true virtue consists, is being simp­ly considered; and as a necessary consequence of this, that being who has the most of being, has proportion­ably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence,’ being known as such. ‘But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest being. So that all other beings—is as nothing in comparison of him.’ According to our author, ‘True virtue pri­marily and most essentially consists in pure benevo­lence to being in general: Yea it wholly consists in this and those affections and actions that arise out of it.’ If so, virtue must chiefly consist in love to being in general. And this general benevolence must, in the order of nature, at least, be conceived of, as antecedent to any truly virtuous regard to any particular being whatever: for such are regarded with benevolence, pri­marily, as having a share in general being.

Upon Mr. Edwards's principles the absolutely great Being, must have an incomparably greater share of the primary benevolence to being, simply considered, than all other particular beings. Compared with them he has chief and supreme benevolent regard: but not so, com­pared with the primary object of virtuous love, viz. Be­ing in general. That must be the chief object; for the great Being does not exhaust all being, so as to reduce all others to non-existence, or no degree of being. He infinitely outweighs all other beings, as put into the scale against him. But if his infinite degree of being is put into one scale, and the same be put into the opposite scale, and together with that the degrees of existence of all other beings, 'tis obvious this great Being's weight in the opposite scales will balance itself, and the whole weight of the other beings will remain clear, and turn the scale. This scale has in it the whole of the primary object of virtuous love, the other not; and the virtuous attraction, or tendency of primary benevolence to being simply considered, is in proportion to the quantity of being.—How do false metaphisicks entangle and mislead [Page 8]the greatest and best men, when they wander in them! It is as dengerous a thing to attempt to be wise over­much, as to be overmuch righteous.

But let us attend to the second thing mentioned by our author, as an evidence that true virtue does, upon his first principle, consist chiefly in love to God. ‘If we consider the secondary ground of love, viz. Beauty or moral excellency, the same thing will appear.’ viz. That virtue chiefly consists in the love of God: ‘for God is infinitely the most beautiful and excellent being, as well as the greatest. Therefore he that has true vir­tue consisting’ (primarily, radically and most essential­ly) 'in benevolence to being in general, and' (seconda­rily) ‘in complacence in virtue, and benevolence to virtuous being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. ^‖’ Our author says, as quoted above, ‘a secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence it self, in its object.—And loving a being on this ground, necessari­ly arises from pure benevolence to being in general & comes to the same thing.’ From these principles it ne­cessarily follows, that love to God, both of benevolence and complacence, considered as having infinitely the highest benevolence to being simply considered, is but a secondary and daughter virtue. The mother virtue is de­monstrably no other than pure benevolence to being simply considered. God, as most benevolent to being in general, is the first object of virtue's secondary love: Being simply considered, has the first and supreme re­gard. For it can't be that the daughter love, should usurp the place and honor of the mother, or that the stream should be prefered before, and be greater than the fountain.

Indeed God is, upon these principles, the chief and supreme object of virtuous complacence. But such com­placence is itself the offspring of benevolence to being simply considered, and may be resolved into it. ‘He [Page 9]that is governed by love to being in general, must of necessity have complacence in him, who he sees has the same benevolence, and the greater degree of bene­volence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him, for his love to general existence, that his own heart is unit­ed to, and so looks on its interest as its own.’ ^‡

Can these things be right? Is true, religious love to God such as Mr. Edwards here represents it? Does the virtuous or holy mind first entertain a benevolent af­fection for being in general, abstractly considered, simp­ly as intelligent, and in the next step direct this benevo­lence chiefly to God, considering him as having the greatest share of mental being? and thus viewing him as most benevolent and beneficent to being simply con­sidered, does the benevolent mind rise in greater bene­volence to him, and settle in complacence in him, on this account, from a sort of gratitude to him, as thus be­friending the grand object of his primary love? Does not this represent being simply considered as the supreme object of virtuous regard, and make it an idol, and vir­tue itself idolatrous? Does it not in effect represent love to God, as the result of our own virtuous love to simple being, virtue's idol, rather than of his virtuous attracti­on, and quickening love to us while we were sinners? Do we receive any such ideas from inspired teachers in holy scripture?—These views are too shocking. Mr. Edwards could not admit them in open light, tho' his doctrine leads to them; but often turns off his eye, & relieves both himself and his reader, by giving a truer view of love to God. I wish he had been uniform in this: But he is very inconsistent with himself. I believe it is not possible for so great and good a man as he was, building on so false a foundation, to be self-consistent throughout.—He says, ‘All true virtue▪ must radically, and essentially consist in a supreme love to God, both of [Page 10] benevolence and complacence.’ ^† And yet he lays it down as his fundamental principle, ‘that true virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in ge­neral; the first object of a virtuous benevolence, or of virtuous love is being simply considered.’ Being in ge­neral, or simply considered is not God: It has none of the peculiar, distinguishing characters of the Godhead. 'Tis impossible that virtue should primarily, radically & most essentially consist both in love to God, and to being simply considered, unless it may thus consist in love to two very different objects, God, and a mere abstract idea, a creature of the mind. Our worthy author also says, ‘Being in general—is by right the great, supreme, rul­ing and absolutely sovereign object of our regard.’ (p. 30.) This is not God. He is one only, and distin­guished from all other beings in the universe, who are almost infinite in number and weight. But he soon comes about right again, and says, ‘A truly virtuous mind is under the sovereign dominion of love to God.’ (p. 133)—‘It may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the [Page 11] first and the last; or which, with regard to their ex­ercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love to him, and have not respect to God as their supreme end.’ (p. 134)

This is most true. And yet it is said, ‘true virtue primarily consists not in love to any particular beings, because of their virtue,—but in propensity and union of heart, to being simply considered.’

Let us carefully gather up the scattered wheat, and let the wind drive the chaff away.

Mr. Edwards presents us with three grand objects of virtue's primary and most essential regard, viz. Being in general, considered simply, as intelligent, uncloathed with any personal, moral or relative characters; the uni­versal system of intelligent beings, and God the author of being, and head of the system; and says, these are in effect one: and primary and chief regard to being in general, simply considered, to the universal system of beings, and to God the Being of beings, and head of the system, is represented as, in effect, the same thing. But each of these objects has peculiar characters, which give ground for distinguishing ideas: Our author does often distinguish them from each other, and they ought never to be confounded. There can't be three first and supreme objects of virtuous love.

There is indeed a strange confusion and inconsistence in this great man's ideas and reasonings upon this sub­ject. And it must necessarily be so whenever men at­tempt to blend true and false principles together. There­fore it is said in the law, ‘Thou shalt not wear a gar­ment of divers sorts. Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds; lest the fruit of thy seed which thou hast sown, and the fruit of thine vineyard be defiled.’ ^*

Suffer me just to mention one thing more. Our au­thor says, ‘The virtue of the divine Mind, must consist [Page 12] primarily in love to himself.—There is no need of mul­tiplying words to prove that it must be thus on a sup­position that virtue, in its most essential nature, consist in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards being in general; and so flowing out to particular beings in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty’ (benevolence to being simply considered) 'which they are possessed of.' ^‡ He also says elsewhere, ‘God's own holiness must pri­marily consist in love to himself.’ ^* According to this notion all other divine virtues, or moral excellencies of the Divine Mind, such as love of justice, equity or moral proportion, faithfulness, &c. are only secondary virtues, which arise out of pure benevolence to being simply con­sidered, and derive all their virtuousness or moral excel­lence and beauty from their subordination and subservi­ency to it; as will more fully appear in the next chap­ter. But it is doubtless more natural and just to con­sider all moral virtues or perfections in the Divine Be­ing as equally original and primary, and virtuous and beautiful, in themselves simply considered. All these moral attributes of the divine Mind, seen by the divine eye, together with those that are called natural, God is worthily the primary and chief object of his own virtuous or holy love. He is not virtuous and holy because he loves himself, but he loves himself because he is holy.

CHAP. III. Concerning Mr. Edwards's notions of the primary and secondary beauty of moral things.

MR. Edwards, in his third chapter, says many things concerning what he calls the primary and secondary beauty of moral beings and actions, which are very ex­traordinary, and I think, very injurous and destructive to true virtue.—I must make some extracts that the rea­der may be under advantage to judge of the justness of the remarks.

[Page 13] 'Tho' that which has been spoken of,' viz. benevo­lence to being simply considered, &c. ‘alone is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents,—and alone is the moral amiableness of beings that have under­standing and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are: Yet there are other quali­ties, sensations, propensities and affections of mind, & principles of action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue; which are intirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind. (p. 134.)’

‘The propensity of minds to mental existence may be called the highest and first, or primary beauty, being the proper and peculiar beauty of moral beings.—Yet there is another, inferior, secondary beauty, which is not peculiar to spiritual beings, but is found even in in­animate things; which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things in form, manner, quantity, and visible end and design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, syme­try, proportion, harmony, &c. such is the mutual a­greement of the sides of a square—of the colours, fi­gures, dimensions and distances of the different spots on a chess-board—of the figures of a piece of chints, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of a human countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the vari­ous notes of a melodious tune.’

‘This secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity & proportion, not only takes place in material things, but in things immaterial.—This is evident in fact in num­berless instances.—’

‘There is a beauty in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agreement of different things that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and mea­sure: And therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion, which is observ­able [Page 14]in those material things which are esteemed beau­tiful;’ (with that of a chess-board for instance.)

‘Things are in natural regularity and mutual agree­ment, when he whose heart opposes the universal sys­tem should have, (has) the hearts of the system or— of the head of the system against him, and that in con­sequence he should (does) receive evil in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart.— So there is a like agreement in nature and measure when he that loves has the proper returns of love:— as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude.’

‘Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agree­ment of one thing to another; some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature and direct relation one to another.’ (Or, to speak more properly and intelligi­bly; from the various characters, relations and con­nections of moral beings, there arises a natural and moral fitness, suitableness and equity in some dispositions, af­fections and actions of one towards another, and a like unfitness, unsuitableness, and inequitableness in others. But this, tho' the clearest and justest manner of express­ing the matter, does not so well agree with the favorite scheme of reducing all moral fitnesses of relative virtues into the order of secondary beauties, and of representing their beauty as altogether of the same sort with that of a beautiful face, and so as having nothing of the nature of true virtue in them simply as such; and therefore this is carefully avoided, and such a manner of expression is chosen, as is more applicable to the beautiful harmony of parts in material things. But to return, our author adds) ‘so it is in relative duties: duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of hus­bands and wives; of rulers and subjects; of friend­ship and good neighbourhood; and all duties that we owe to God as our creator, preserver and bountiful be­nefactor; [Page 15]and all duties whatsoever, considered as re­quired by God, and as branches of our duty to him; and also considered as what are to be performed with re­gard to Christ, as acts of obedience to his precepts, & as testimonies of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have and hope for from him.’ There is a manifest justice and moral fitness in all these relative duties, and a high degree of secondary beauty, like that of a piece of flowered chints, but nothing vir­tuous in them merely as loved and practised from a view and regard to their relative fitness and great equitable­ness; but only as they flow from simple benevolence to being, simply considered, or as unclothed either with mo­ral or relative character. Could you have thought it? Can you believe it?—Our worthy author proceeds thus.

‘It is this secondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. Wal­laston seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He evidently has respect to the justice there is in the virtues and duties of one being to­wards another; which consists in one being's expressing such affections and using such a conduct towards ano­ther, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them: which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and oc­casion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it,’ (yet there is nothing of the nature of true virtue in all this.)

‘But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things’ (or in the moral fitness and equitableness of the dispositions and actions of moral beings towards each other) ‘viz. the union of heart to being in general, which appears in those virtues; and which, those virtues when true, are the various expressions of. Benevolence to be­ing [Page 16]in general, or to being simply considered, is intirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the midst of variety;’ (or from an equitable behaviour to God and man, from a regard to their personal and relative characters) ‘and is a superior kind of beauty.’ ^‡

Enough, I presume, has been quoted on this head to give the reader a clear idea of this great man's notions concerning what he calls the only true moral beauty, of moral beings, in which he places the essence of true vir­tue; and what he calls the inferior, secondary beauty, in which, he says, virtue does not consist, any more than in a harmonious tune.—Let us now examine them a little. But their falshood and absurdity are so open and glaring, that it is difficult to say any thing to render it more striking. However we may view this doctrine in various lights, and observe some of its consequences.

1. If this doctrine is true, God's revealed law, which is professedly the guide to true virtue, the rule and stand­ard of it, no where commands, recommends, or once mentions that in which all true virtue primarily and most essentially consists; but only injoins and recommends it in regard to its secondary beauty.

If I mistake not, Mr. Edwards does implicitly ac­knowledge this in what has been transcribed above.— Now certainly, that the law and standard of true virtue should take no notice of that in which it does most es­sentially consist, is a more wonderful mystery than any of those that belong to revealed religion.

2. If this doctrine is true, it may be suspected, that the holy and inspired men of old, prophets and apostles, never knew or practised true virtue. Whenever they re­commend those works or actions which are virtuous, they do it by representing their secondary beauty, in which virtue does not consist, any more than in the beauty of a square.—When they praise and honor the virtues of God, and Jesus Christ, in their rapturous de­votions, they dwell upon their relative aspects, and in­ferior [Page 17]beauty, consisting in mental proportion and har­mony, and are profoundly silent about their primary, & only true moral beauty. They don't 'go to the bottom of things,' and lay open their root and first spring. Proba­bly they knew nothing of it. Thus David praises God, saying, ‘The Lord rewarded me according as I did a­right—With the pure and upright thou wilt shew thy self pure and upright: With the froward, thou wilt shew thyself froward.’ He is here praising God for the proportion and agreement of his works with their objects and occasions, which is not the thing in which their virtuousness consists.—Indeed he says, God's tender mercies are over all the works of his hands; and the Apostle says, he is the father of the whole family of hea­ven and earth: Which perhaps may be thought by some, to refer to the first principle of all true virtue, viz. Pure benevolence to being simply considered. But it is observ­able that they put more into the character of these ob­jects of God's paternal care, and tender mercies, than be­longs to being simply considered, or as only having per­ception and will. They are thus regarded, as being the works of his hands, and members of his family. They are therefore, relatively considered, objects of God's benevo­lent, paternal regard: And in this view of them there is a natural suitableness, and a kind of justice in their be­ing so regarded. This is an inferior kind of beauty, not virtuous in itself, but only as this paternal, tender care for his own creatures, arises out of pure benevolence to being, simply considered. Is it indeed so?

Moreover, the angels of God, and the whole church in heaven, appear to take as little notice of the primary and only true moral beauty, as the prophets and apos­tles have done. In their songs of praise to God and the Lamb, they dwell upon the secondary beauty of their vir­tuous works, and are in raptures in their contemplations of it. ‘Thou art righteous, O Lord,—because thou hast judged thus: for they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou hast given them blood to [Page 18]drink, for they are worthy. ^‡’ It is the beauty of God's judgment, as righteous or just, ‘consisting in the a­greement, and harmonious proportion of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner and measure,’ that is here praised; but this is ‘the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion which is observable in those material things which are esteemed beautiful.’ Why did not the an­gel of the waters, on this great occasion, take notice of that first spring, benevolence to simple being, which in­fluenced this judgment, and sanctified the righteousness of it, and raised it into virtue, and gave it the lustre of the primary and only true moral beauty? Doubtless he tho't its virtuousness and true beauty consisted in its righteousness. 'Tis also observable that the wisest and holiest men in the church, thro' all ages, have expressed themselves in their writings, and books of devotion, as supposing the secondary beauty of virtuous affections and actions was their true beauty. That it is not so, but only an inferior kind of beauty, like that of bodies, is a new discovery, reserved for our age and country. But it is more probable that one truly great and good man should have unhappily reasoned himself into speculative error, than that the whole church in heaven and earth should, till now, have overlooked the primary and only true mo­ral beauty and excellence of moral beings.

3. Let it also be observed that there is no such object of God's attention and regard, as being simply considered. God is his own first object. He sees himself as he is, as possessed of an absolute fullness of being, enriched and adorned with all possible mental perfections. As such he is the primary object of his first and chief love, both of benevolence and complacence. How ridiculous would it be to represent him, as first viewing himself, as posses­sed of infinite degrees of being, simply considered, and in this view exercising primary, pure benevolence to him­self; and then reflecting on himself as thus virtuously [Page 19]benevolent, making himself, as such, the secondary ob­ject of greater benevolence, and the first object of his own complacence? Yet so it must be, upon this scheme.

All other mental being, whether future or actually existing, is seen by God, as shared in various proportions among a great number of distinct beings, and these are all regarded as his creatures and property, made for certain valuable ends. As such they are objects of his paternal benevolence and care, in various degrees, wisely and e­quitably proportioned to the various importance of their respective being, and destined use and end.

What now is become of being simply considered, the grand, primary object of virtuous love? It is vanished as a shadow, or a night vision.

4. Let us next consider the destructive influence of this notion of virtue, upon virtue itself. All relative duties which we owe to God, to Jesus Christ, and our fellow servants, in all our various relations to them, and connections with them, partake of the nature of justice: they are equitable, fit and right in their own nature: they have a natural agreement and harmonious propor­tionableness to the nature and characters of their respec­tive objects, as compared with our own, and to the re­lations and connections between the agent and the ob­jects of these duties. All this you see and approve, & the dispositions and exercises of your mind or heart to­wards all the objects of these relative duties, are natural, harmoniously proportionable to them, and in concord with them, equitably suited to them. Your heart then is very beautiful, but not at all virtuous, if these harmo­nious and equitable dispositions and exercises of your mind do not arise from pure benevolence to being, simp­ly considered, ‘which is the true and moral beauty of beings that have understanding.’ So then the beauty of your mind as adorned with all these relative, equita­ble and harmonious dispositions only, is of the same sort with that of bodies. Your heart is as b [...]tiful as a square or a cube, and no more virtuous than they. ‘'Tis [Page 20]true that benevolence to being in general, when a per­son hath it, will naturally incline him to justice or pro­portion in the exercise of it to particular beings.’— But then, as Mr. Edwards adds. ‘It appears that just affections and acts have a beauty in them distinct from, and superior to the uniformity and equality there is in them;—and that is the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to being in general. ^*’

Mr. Edwards sums up the matter thus, ‘From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears that, that disposition or sense of the mind which consists in a determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is intirely a different thing from a truly vir­tuous taste. For it has been shewn that this kind of beauty is intirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue. And therefore it will follow that a taste for this kind of beauty, is intirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm that a disposition to ap­prove the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtu­ous disposition of mind?’ ^§ No man, I presume, ever will. But if some one should, he would not talk more absurdly than this great and worthy gentleman does, when he reduces moral harmony, and just proportion to a beauty or excellence of the 'very same sort' with that of music or a square.

If this good man had attended to one obvious distinc­tion he might have saved himself from falling into this grand absurdity, viz. The difference there is, in the na­ture of the things, between the mind's seeing and ap­proving the harmonious proportion and justness of vir­tuous dispositions and exercises of heart, towards God & our neighbour, and having such dispositions and exer­cises himself. A man may see and approve the beauty and excellence of virtue, in some degree, and yet his heart not be in this beautifully harmonious and equitable [Page 21]temper and state. Nothing is more common, and no­thing more to be lamented, than this monstrous inconsist­ence between the moral sense or taste of the mind, and the ruling dispositions and exercises of the heart of man.

Mr. Edwards concludes this chapter with this obser­vation, which closes the proof of his doctrine, ‘Not only reason, but experience plainly shews, that men's approbation of this sort of beauty’ (the secondary beauty of moral beings and actions) ‘does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connection with virtue. For otherwise men's delight in the beauty of squares, cubes, and regular polygons, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous and holy men.’ ^† Wonderful! Here an appeal is made to experience, and the argument is built on this supposition, that moral proportion and harmony is a beauty of the same kind with that of ma­terial things. It is not possible to conceive any thing more absurd. I desire any one to take a human mind, adorned with all right, relative affections and exercises to Jesus Christ, harmoniously agreable, and beautifully pro­portioned to his characters and relations to us, (only ex­cluding benevolence to being simply considered, and let the faith of him be their spring) and carefully compare it with a square, a cube, and a beautiful piece of em­broidery, and try if he can discover any such likeness in their beauties as to lead him to pronounce them 'beau­ties of the very same sort' or order. He will as soon dis­cover the actions of a spirit to be of the same kind with the action or motions of a clock.

The truth is, this marvellous scheme has changed the natural, moral beauty and glory of true virtue, into an image made like to the beauty of an equilateral tri­angle or a chess-board.

Mr. Edwards, speaking of what he calls the only true moral beauty, or the first principle of true virtue, says, ‘It is impossible that any one should truly relish this beauty, [Page 22]consisting in general benevolence’ (to being in general, simply considered) ‘who has not that temper himself. ^‡ After benevolence to being in general exists, the pro­portion which is observed in objects,’ (or, as it is ex­pressed a few lines above ‘the degree of being, and the degree of benevolence to being, that particular beings have) may be the cause of the proportion of benevo­lence to those objects: But no proportion, is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of being, &c. is the consequence of the existence of benevolence, and not the ground of it. Even as a ten­dency of bodies one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the conse­quence of the being of such a thing as attraction, and not attraction the effect of proportion. ^†’

[Page 23] This great man would have done well to have reflect­ed here, that the moral and virtuous attraction, or bene­volent propensity of minds to minds, is first and chiefly in God, the father of spirits, (and is, in him a paternal affection) and is communicated to his offspring, created spirits, in consequence of, and by the means of his giving them to feel in themselves his attracting love and virtue, and paternal benevolence and propensity of heart towards [Page 24]them; by a realizing belief of which, their hearts are put in motion towards him, and attract, or tend to him, first and chiefly, as their center and end: and secondarily, draw their brother minds, by benevolent wishes that they would unite with them in their love and tendency to God, their common father and center. All true virtue, and virtu­ous love begins thus. That infinite proportion of spiri­tual excellence and love which is in God, as perceived and realized by created minds, and felt, as extended to them, is the true cause, ground, and source of the first ex­istence of such a thing in them as a truly virtuous ten­dency or propensity of heart; which first and chiefly di­rects itself to him, and in subordination to him, to bro­ther minds.

To represent benevolence to being simply considered, uncharactered, and unrelated, as the essence and root of all true virtue, out of which love to God and our neigh­bour arises, and as pre-existing there, in the order of na­ture, is not metaphysical, but imaginary and arbitrary, un­worthy of a moral philosopher, and wholly contrary to that true divinity which is taught us from heaven. ^*

[Page 25] The reader will be well pleased to see this confirmed by the author of the dissertation on the nature of true virtue; observe then the following passage. ‘It may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last; or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source, in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.’ (p. 134.) Consequently, pure benevo­lence to being simply considered, is so far from being the root and essence of all true virtue, that it has 'nothing of the nature of true virtue in it.

CHAP. IV. Of Mr. Edwards's notions concerning natural conscience, and the moral sense.

I Pass over Mr. Edwards's fourth chapter, in which he treats of self-love, as little to my purpose: But in the fifth, wherein he treats of natural conscience, and [Page 26]the moral sense, there are some things that draw at­tention. He says, ‘Natural conscience consists in these two things, viz.’

‘1.|In—that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind, to be easy or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. ^‡’ This gives no idea at all of the nature and true character of conscience. That determines us to be easy or uneasy in reflecting on our own moral con­duct, as we judge it to be consistent or inconsistent with the law of God, and so to deserve approbation or blame from him. If our tho'ts look no further than to self­consistence as the ground of self-satisfaction, conscience has no more concern in the matter, than it has in the easi­ness, or uneasiness a man feels in himself, in reflecting on a scheme of business as a self-consistent, or inconsistent scheme.

‘2.|The other thing which belongs to the approbati­on or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert; consisting in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury, and re­sentment and punishment; or between loving and be­ing loved, between shewing kindness and being reward­ed, &c.—Approbation and disapprobation of consci­ence, in the sense now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice, to every thing whatsoever, that is mo­rally good or evil, in a mind—that will take things in general into its consideration, and is free from specula­tive error.—And thus we may see in what respects this natural conscience extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to being in general, and supreme love to God. For altho' it sees not, or rather, does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i. e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to being in general, simply considered, or [Page 27]loves it not for being in general's sake, (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that) yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it (of virtue) from that uniformity, equality and justice there is in it, and the demerit there is seen in the con­trary.—Men by natural conscience may see the jus­tice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that made us, and being willingly so;— and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God for his goodness,—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him, who ex­ercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we re­ceive all well-being.—Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disap­prove and condemn the want of it; and yet without see­ing the true beauty of it. ^†’ (That is, without being able to see or taste that in which its essence and distinguish­ing nature wholly consists.) And yet he presently adds, I think, very inconsistently, ‘If men's consciences were fully enlightened—as they will be at the day of judg­ment, they would approve nothing but true virtue; no­thing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it.’ ^‡ And yet this same natural conscience does not see, and can't taste this true virtue, consisting in general benevolence, 'nothing but benevolence itself can do that.' He also says, natural ‘conscience approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that falls short of it.’ ^* But the secondary beauty falls short of it. Thus natural conscience does, and does not, can, and can't taste or ap­prove the true beauty of virtue; which general benevo­lence, or a truly virtuous heart alone can do: and at the day of judgment natural conscience will be so improved as to see the true beauty of virtue, consisting in general benevolence, and wholly approve it; which nothing but virtuous benevolence can do. Will not the wicked then [Page 28]become virtuous according to this doctrine? Error is fated to run crooked. The greatest men can't govern and keep it strait. It is our wisdom to have nothing to do with it. Since so great a man as Mr. Edwards could not alter its crooked nature, but was drawn, by its wiley turnings, into numberless inconsistencies, 'tis in vain for others to attempt to manage so involv'd a creature.

But let us attend our author. He says, ‘That moral sense, which is natural to mankind—is the same with this natural conscience—The sense of moral good & evil, and the disposition to approve virtue, and disap­prove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the writings of many of late.—Some of the arguments made use of by these writers do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love.’ Or, as it is expressed a few lines low­er, ‘There is a moral taste or sense of moral good and evil natural to all, which don't properly arise from self­love. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be refer'd to that which I have ob­served to be primary in the approbation of natural conscience, viz. A sense of desert, and approbation of that natural agreement there is in manner and measure, in justice.—This moral sense of equality and natural agreement (in moral things) extends to all moral good and evil.—Thus natural conscience, if the understand­ing be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding, stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joyns its voice with it in every article. [p. 163.] This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be ex­ercised at liberty, and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere, approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; tho' not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. (p. 188.)’

Let us now make a few observations on these things, and some proper reflections on the whole.

[Page 29] 1. Mr. Edwards acknowledges, as we have seen, that there is, in natural conscience, a moral taste or sense of moral good and evil, or of virtue and vice determining the mind to approve the one and condemn the other; that this sense concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it; supposing the understanding duly informed, &c. This is true in itself, and as much as any moral philosopher can in reason demand; but is not true, on his scheme, but is utterly inconsistent with his notions of the essence of virtue and moral beauty or ex­cellence: Which, according to him, essentially consists in pure benevolence to being, simply considered; which natural conscience don't, and can't see, and the moral taste can't relish: that the inferior beauty of moral things, in which their virtuousness does not at all consist, and 'which is of the 'same sort' with the beauty of inani­mate things is the only object of this faculty called con­science and moral sense. If so, this natural sense or taste is not at all of the moral kind any more than a natural taste for music or painting. Mr. Edwards says, 'natu­ral conscience—will approve of true virtue without see­ing the true beauty of it.' Approve of that which you have no idea of, no relish for. Is not this a contradicti­on? 'Tis the same thing, upon his scheme, as to say that a man who sees and approves the beautiful countenance and dress of an angel, in so doing approves of his vir­tue, when at the same time he has no conception or re­lish of it.

2. Mr. Edwards says, 'Benevolence alone can taste the sweetness, or discern the beauty of true virtue, consisting in benevolence to being simply considered. The na­tural conscience and moral sense can't discern and relish this true moral beauty. How should it? This moral fa­culty was given us, and is fitted in its nature for the pur­pose of discerning and approving the moral fitness, pro­portion and equity there is in the relative duties we owe to God and our neighbour.—But we have no such re­lation to being simply considered, and that has no such [Page 30]characters as to infer a natural or moral fitness or equity in our performing any duty to it. Natural conscience is wholly ignorant of it, and as uninterested in it, as in a dream, or in the phantoms in Milton's limbo of vanity. Our author implicitly owns that there is no natural justice and proportion in this kind of benevolence. His distinction between the primary and secondary beauty is grounded on this supposition.—If we suppose there is a natural jus­tice, proportion, or harmonious agreement between this simple benevolence and its object, or any suitableness therein to the characters and relations of being simply considered, and that the benevolent mind, has a regard hereto, in exercising this benevolence, we reduce this pri­mary and essential moral beauty into a secondary, and so the very essence of virtue will vanish and be lost.

3. Mr. Edwards acknowledges, as we have seen, that there is, in natural conscience a sense of desert, and that it is connected with the moral taste and approbation of the proportion and justice there is in all those relative duties we owe to God and our neighbour; and he allows that this connection which natural conscience makes, is just, and agreeable to the true nature of things. And yet he lays that the true virtuousness of these actions or duties does not consist in any such natural proportion, fitness or justice, but in something of a higher and very different nature, even in this that they flow from, and are the expressions of benevolence to being simply consi­dered.—This worthy gentleman is totally inconsistent with himself in these things.—

Moral desert is necessarily connected with, and has a natural and direct relation to, that quality in moral acti­ons wherein their virtuousness or viciousness consists, and to nothing else. To suppose the contrary is the high­est possible absurdity.

If then natural conscience points out the moral ground of desert, of approbation or blame truly, Mr. Edwards's notions of the nature and essence of virtue are essentially wrong. But if his notions are right, natural conscience [Page 31]has no perception or sense of that quality in moral acti­ons wherein their virtuousness essentially consists, but, as a wrong headed thing, places it in that wherein it does not at all consist, and so connects the sense of desert wrong, and contrary to the true nature of things. He who form'd the natural conscience or moral sense, such as it is, is then the author of this false connection of desert, and has given us a guide to virtue, which, from the very constitution of its nature, unavoidably deceives us. In­deed it leads us, as our author says, to judge all those moral actions virtuous which are really so, and none but such; supposing it is duly enlightened. But then it leads us to place their virtuousness in their secondary beau­ty, and does not perceive and can't relish that quality in which their virtuousness does most essentially and wholly consist; (as Mr. Edwards conceeds.) And herein it naturally and necessarily deceives us, and leads us to ap­prove our actions as virtuous and acceptable, while there is no more true virtuousness in them than in singing a harmonious tune. Has God given to mankind such a blundering, blind leader, as the natural guide of life, think you?

4. Let us observe wherein Mr. Edwards places the es­sential difference between the moral sense or taste, and a truly spiritual sense, or virtuous taste. He allows, as we have seen, that they both approve and condemn the same things, i. e. all morally good and evil actions; but says they do this upon different grounds, and with different kinds of approbation. The moral taste relishes virtuous actions, only on account of their secondary beauty; the truly virtuous sense approves them, chiefly on account of their primary beauty, consisting in benevolence to being simply considered. I must desire the readers attention to two short quotations more; which complete the evi­dence that this is Mr. Edwards's notion of the difference between the moral, and virtuous taste. He says, ‘Appro­bation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a [Page 32]truly virtuous approbation, because,—when the con­science is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and actually as to the object approved, tho' not as to the ground and reason of ap­proving. ^*’ Are the primary and secondary beauty the same object? ‘God has established—that this principle of natural conscience, which, tho' it implies no such thing as benevolence to being in general, nor any de­light in such a principle, simply considered, and so im­plys no truly spiritual sense, or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are ap­proved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.’ ^§ — There is doubtless a real and essential diffe­rence between that moral taste or sense, which is natural to man, and universal, in some degree of it, and a truly virtuous taste or holy sense, which is peculiar to virtuous men. But it can't consist in what this great man here places it in.

This is a subject of so great, practical importance, that we may properly employ a few tho'ts upon it.—Mr. Edwards's reasoning supposes that if the true virtuous­ness of morally good actions consisted in those qualities, of moral proportion, harmony and justice, on account of which natural conscience, or the moral sense approves and relishes them, this approbation would be virtuous; and so natural or vicious men would be virtuous men. But in this he is greatly mistaken.

By the moral discernment and taste, natural to man, we are constituted moral agents. By the exercise of this moral faculty the things that are morally good or virtu­ous are seen to be so, as such are approved, the obligati­on we are under to choose and practise them, in prefer­ence to every thing that stands in opposition to them, is felt, in some degree. If we do so, we are self-approved; but if we suffer vicious lusts, and worldly interests to prevail, in opposition to this sense of the mind, we are condemned by ourselves. All this shews that man is designed for virtue in his creation, and that his happiness [Page 33]is connected with his being virtuous, but does not render him so. To render a man truly virtuous or holy, his heart must agree with his enlightned conscience, or moral sense; or in other words his will must choose, with pre­fering love, and a determined resolution to practise, what is approved and recommended by the moral sense; and this, not in some particular branches of virtue only, but in its whole extent, giving up every contrary lust to be mortified, and all inconsistent interests, as loss for its sake, or which is the same thing, for God's sake and his king­dom's. This sense, choice and attachment of the heart to God, or to virtue and its interests, is that wherein a truly virtuous taste or spiritual sense consists, as distin­guished from the natural, moral sense of the mind. They are really two distinct things, tho' in perfect harmony. In virtuous minds they both agree in one; but in vici­ous minds the prevailing relish of the heart, or tendency and choice of the will, is in opposition to the moral sense, in partial favour to particular lusts, and their interests. In this case the heart is perverse, the man is froward and willful, condemned of himself in that which he allows. Herein confists the exceeding sinfulness of sin. ^*

There is no cure for this evil disease of the heart, but by the grace and truths of the gospel, as strongly im­pressed upon the mind by the spirit of Jesus Christ. If the perverseness and obstinacy of wicked minds prevails to that degree, under the enlightening influences and strivings of the spirit of truth and grace, as to provoke the Lord to withdraw his gracious influences, and give them wholly up to their own hearts lusts, their perverse­ness becomes absolutely incureable, and they go into per­dition. 'Tis in vain to expect a miraculous exertion of properly creating power, to form their hearts anew, or regenerate them, without light or the word of gospel truth, after the moral power of the gospel, and spirit of Jesus Christ, has failed of doing it, thro' their perverse resistance of the Holy Ghost, and unconquerable enmity [Page 34]to the truth he teaches. Yet this is what some gentle­men do; who teach it for doctrine that men are always regenerated in this manner, and can be in no other; that their enmity and preverse resistance to the holy Spirit uni­versally increases in proportion as he enlightens their minds, and strives with them by the gospel truth. This doctrine is directly contrary to the doctrine of the gospel, and to experience, and of very hurtful tendency and in­fluence.

5. From Mr. Edwards's doctrines it does necessarily follow that men are under no natural obligation to be virtuous at all according to his notion of virtue, and can't equitably be required to be so. They may indeed be re­quired to practise all relative duties to particular beings, from a regard to their secondary beauty, or relative fitness; for God has made them capable of discerning and tast­ing this, by endowing them with moral sense. But there is nothing virtuous in all this, ‘considered simply, and by itself.’ Benevolence to being, simply considered, and ‘for being in general's sake, and delight in this principle simply considered, is that in which all true virtue prima­rily consists, out of which all truly virtuous exercises of mind to particular beings arise.’ But natural consci­ence and the moral sense, can't taste and approve this kind of virtue any more than the white of an egg; and natural reason, and common sense say there is no worth in it, nor any use or occasion for it in the moral world. Nothing but this preternatural principle itself can taste the sweetness of this primary beauty, or perceive any moral excellence in this sort of virtue. Doubtless this is true; for it lies far beyond the sphere of natural consci­ence, and the moral taste. It is no object to them, con­sequently man is, by the constitution of his nature, as incapable of seeing, or tasting this primary beauty of mo­ral things, as beasts are of relishing their secondary beauty. He is no more made for the one, than they are for the other, and is no more obliged to relish the one than they are to relish the other; and can't equitably be required [Page 35]to do so, til a new faculty, or taste is given him, adapted to this object, by a new creating act of power; (which is what Mr. Edwards's disciples, at the bottom, intend by what they call regeneration, if I understand their writ­ings.) Yet Mr. Edwards's scheme, inconsistently e­nough with itself, says, he is so obliged, at the same time that it confesses he has, in his nature, no faculty, sense or taste, in the exercise of which it is possible for him ever to reach this beauty, however perfectly the understand­ing is inlightened, and freed from blinding, stupifying prejudices. Mr. Hopkins says, nothing that simple in­tellect is capable of, can give the idea of any thing pro­perly moral. ^§ By moral, I presume he intends what Mr. Edwards calls the primary and only true moral beauty. And yet the intellect is the leading faculty, which con­stitutes us moral and accountable agents.

The teachers of these doctrines endeavour to defend them against the above objection, by saying, men's ina­bility to relish the true beauty of virtue, or what they call, after Mr. Edwards, the true moral excellency, is of the moral kind, the fault of the will, and so does not ex­cuse: that if they had a will, a right disposition and heart to this, it would then be no more impossible than any thing else.—This is no more than saying, if they had this new kind of relish, which is falsely called a truly spiritu­al sense, or virtuous taste, they would have it, and if they had it, they might easily exercise it. But what is this to the purpose, when at the same time they confess there is no natural faculty in human nature, by any pos­sible application of truth to which, this taste can be rais­ed up in the heart? On these principles, we might, with as much reason, and as good a grace say, the inability a blind man is under to see and relish the beauty of light, is of the moral kind, and solemnly impute it to him as sin. ^‡

[Page 36] You might as reasonably preach to your horse, as St. Francis did to the fishes, and exhort him to see and ad­mire the secondary beauty of moral things, as, on these principles, exhort natural men to see and relish their pri­mary beauty. Suppose you should, and because he is so blind and stupid that your exhortation makes no im­pression, and after all your endeavours he has no idea of [Page 37]this beauty, any more than his saddle, your wrath rises against the poor beast, and you smite him with your staff. Now suppose upon this, his mouth is opened, as the mouth of Balaam's ass was, rebuking the madness of the prophet, and he should in like manner rebuke yours, say­ing, 'The thing you require of me is wholly above me, my Maker has given me no moral taste at all.' Would you answer him that his impotence is only of the moral kind; if he had such a taste, and would will to do it, he might easily taste the sweetness of this beauty? If you should, supposing his inspiration to continue, he would re­ply, this is the very thing I am naturally incapable of. You seem, sir, not to know what you say. You must now be reduced to silence. The application is easy, and just. The horse wants but one thing to enable him to taste the secondary beauty, viz. Moral sense: and man wants one to enable him to discern the primary beauty, viz. A spiritual sense: And this is conceeded to be as unat­tainable by him, as the other is by the horse, unless it is given by a miraculous, creating power.

This scheme of doctrines, tends to destroy true virtue and real religion. It represents virtue as an unnatural thing, places it on a false and indefensible foundation, and pours contempt upon it, by representing its true bea­ty, and moral excellencies as of the 'very same sort with the beauty of material things.' If it is once believed that these are doctrines of the bible, christianity will be re­jected with great scorn; but they are not to be found there. Yet, somehow, this scheme has obtained too much credit in the country. While christian divines propagate these notions, infidels triumph.—The great veneration for Mr. Edwards, will doubtless, in part, ac­count for the great spread of his unhappy mistakes. As the sear of man brings a snare, so does too great vene­ration. This has been the sin and snare of these late times. It began to work powerfully about thirty years ago, in the almost idolatrous esteem and veneration for a young clergyman from abroad. But let us venerate [Page 38]the one true Master in heaven, and receive his words as oracles. They are truly so.

Many persons, no doubt, will be surprized to find so great and worthy a man as Mr. Edwards was, forming so wrong a scheme of thoughts.—They may be told, & have seen, he was inconsistent with himself, and some­times acknowledges the truth. In some passages he speaks excellently. But his great unhappiness was, he endea­voured to blend a set of imaginary notions with the truth; but he could not make them mix and cleave together. Hence the reigning inconsistency. 'Tis only the false part that has been exposed and censured. This ought to be so, for truth and virtue's sake.—Altho' Being simp­ly considered, is set up as an idol of the imagination, yet we firmly believe, his heart never honored it with chief, nor with any love, but statedly worshiped the living God only, as the first and supreme object of virtuous love and regard.—But an unhappy scheme of imaginations, part­ly prevailed over his judgment, and the truer taste of his heart, when he was writing his dissertation upon virtue.

I am not obliged to account for this.—However, I suppose this arose partly from some distress his reasoning powers were thrown into by some reasonings and objecti­ons he had met with. Perhaps he did not see any other way to reconcile the admission of a moral sense or taste, in natural men, in such a latitude as he see himself oblig­ed to admit it, with their being wholly destitute of, and dead to all true virtue, and enemies to it, in heart, but by removing virtue away, quite out of the view of the mo­ral faculty, and placing its essence in what the moral taste has no sense of, or relish for; and reducing those moral qualities, which it confessedly has an approving and pleased taste of, into the low rank and order of ma­terial beauties. Some things which he has droped, here and there, I think, render it probable that this was the case. He says,' (p. 179.) ‘Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous appro­bation, because—it agrees with the latter as the ob­ject [Page 39]approved.’—But he need not to have changed the nature of virtue, to have secured this tree of life from the rude approach of the wicked. The law of sin in their members, which wars against the law of the mind, does too effectually restrain them from being truly virtu­ous, without the necessity of removing virtue out of the view of the law of the mind, and setting up being simply considered, as virtue's first and grand object.

It was manifestly such a kind of distress, arising from another quarter, that induced this great man, in the lat­ter part of his answer to Dr. Taylor, after he had over­thrown his scheme, to admit, by way of answer to some of the Doctor's objections against the Calvinistic doctrine, the extravagantly absurd notions of Adam and all his seed being one complex, moral person, or moral whole, and of personal identity being a purely arbitrary thing, not at all founded in a phisical oneness, or sameness of being; whereby he has really given up the orthodox doctrine of a proper imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, as a public or family sin, as being the sin of their family head; and exposed the doctrine of original sin, instead of defending it; and has betrayed the very foundation of God's moral government, and changed it into the absurdest thing that can be imagined; so far as a doctrinal misrepresentation of things can do it.

Perhaps from some such cause Mr. Edwards was de­termined to adopt that scheme of tho'ts concerning mo­ral liberty and necessity, as distinguished from natural, which is opened in his treatise concerning the will. But be the cause what it will, he has certainly erred greatly in all these things, and very dangerously for his follow­ers, as is evident from the nature and tendency of his no­tions, and from the destructive scheme of doctrines they are building upon them; which can't be reduced to prac­tice without confounding the churches, and true religi­on with them.—The grand view manifestly was to give a new support to Calvinism, and overthrow Arminian­ism. These new notions concerning virtue, original sin, [Page 40]and moral liberty and necessity, do indeed overthrow Ar­minianism, and genuine Calvinism too, and together with them, the moral government of God, and confound & change the nature of virtue and vice; so far as any spe­culative doctrines can produce such effects. This wor­thy good man did not see this fatal tendency of these speculations: If he had, he would have renounced them with abhorrence.

Great men, when they err in any great matters, err like themselves. They are great in their falls; how much greater when they stand firm, and erect, on sacred ground.

This great, good mind, now sees the whole truth in a perfect, & most consistent light, and, no doubt, rejoices in it, with all the children of light, and has obtained ple­nary pardon of all the unhappy mistakes which he was subject to, in the state of mortality, where the vail is not wholly taken away; and a most gracious acceptance with the Father of lights, thro' the kind mediation of our great High-Priest. And we have, all of us, more and greater errors, in this imperfect state, than we are aware of, or can ever hope to have pardoned to us, but thro' our Lord's merciful intercession for us.—Let us not be high-minded, but fear, and look well to our goings: Be honest, unbiased, and impartial as possible, in our reasonings and religious inquiries; bear with each others weaknesses, speak the truth in love, honor the great and good, but be careful that our veneration of them prove not a snare to us, but always keep our ears open to our true Master, and sure guide: and the rest he will set in order, when he comes. Amen.

CHAP. V. Of the essential nature of true virtue.

MOral virtue (or holiness) in the most comprehen­sive sense of the words, includes all that is mo­rally good and right in moral beings, and, as such, wor­thy of approbation, praise and reward.

Virtue is a complex thing: It does not primarily con­fist in one single disposition, tendency, or affection of the [Page 41]mind, all other virtuous affections arising our of that as their root; but includes various affections equally ori­ginal and essential to virtue, and others that are seconda­ry. These are all perfectly harmonious. Their resule is honor and happiness.

Virtue has its seat in the mind: not in the understand­ing only, nor in the will only. Both must conqur in the exercises that are truly virtuous. The mind, as intelli­gent, sees the things that are virtuous, and approves them as morally right and worthy to be chosen, in preference to every thing inconsistent therewith. But altho' the mind sees and approves the things that are virtuous and excellent, yet if this mental approbation is not followed and crowned by a free and determined choice of them, by the heart, but any inconsistent affections prevail, and determine the mind to act contrary to its own moral sense of what is right, the mind is not virtuous but vi­cious. This is the character of all willful sinners, or wicked men.—On the other hand, the virtuous tendency or propensity of the heart does not consist in any blind instinct, either natural or supernatural; but the mind in all its virtuous propensities and exercises acts with under­standing, under the sweet influence of light. But let us observe more particularly.

1st. As God is the first and greatest Being, from whom all others derive their being and their all, virtue or holi­ness, is in him as its source and original. He is essenti­ally, absolutely and independently virtuous and holy. He has in himself all possible mental powers and persee­tions; his understanding and power are infinite. All his works are known to him from the beginning. He forefees all future beings and things with equal clearness, as if they stood in present existence before his eye. He thus lees all his creatures, in all their various ranks and orders, and infinitely various capacities and characters, natural and moral, and views them in all their relations to himself, and in their relations to, and connections with each other; and sees what dispositions, actions and con­duct, [Page 42]in himself to them all, and in them severally to­wards him, and to one another, are answerable and equi­tably adapted to his character and to theirs, and to all the various relations between him and them, and among themselves, and the happy tendency and result of such a universally equitable and right conduct, and the wrong­ness and evil nature and miserable consequences of the contrary.—And as God sees all these things in a perfect light, so he fully and absolutely approves the equitable, and good, and abhors the contrary; and ever determines his own actions and treatment of his creatures, agreably to this moral sense of his own mind; and he wills and commands that his rational creatures should govern themselves by a regard to what is equitable, and morally fit and right, in their whole moral conduct. Those that do so, he approves; those that act in a contrary manner, he blames; and will bless the one and punish the other, unless they repent and amend.—As his moral discern­ment and taste, or mental approbation of moral good, can't be corrupted or imposed on, so 'tis impossible that his heart or will should be perverted and drawn into the least inconsistence with his sense of what is fit and right; for he can have no motive to be thus inconsistent with himself, and do what his own mind, as intelligent and moral, does necessarily, absolutely and uniformly disap­prove and condemn as evil and hateful, in its nature, tendency and consequences. ‘God is light, and in him is no darkness at all, a God of truth, without iniquity, just and right is he.—God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man.’

If God is thus perfectly wise and holy, and equitable, or virtuous, it hence follows, that it is the 'good pleasure of his will' to give his family of rational creatures as great a measure of happiness as can be communicated by the exercise of a paternal government over them, perfectly wise, and perfectly virtuous or holy, and no more.—In­deed more can't be communicated. An attempt to give more, would defeat its own design, and, in the issue, de­stroy [Page 43]the happiness of his children, instead of increasing it.—Goodness in God is the goodness of a mind ab­solutely virtuous and perfectly intelligent. It is then a most virtuous propensity to do what becomes the holy Father of Spirits to do, in forming his offspring to an established virtuousness of character, in conformity to himself; and it further implies a will to render such hap­py, and a pleasure in making, and seeing them so: But it can't will to make the vicious happy: This is abhor­rent to virtuous goodness or love.—If any are fallen from virtue, virtuous goodness will dispose the Father of Spi­rits to use proper methods to recover them to virtue, & so, in consequence, to happiness, if the circumstances of their case are such, as to render it wise and fit to extend such kind care to them. But if not, their case is despe­rate, and they are cast away, as no longer objects of vir­tuous goodness and care. This is the condition of apos­tate angels; the former, that of mankind as fallen in Adam.

2. Let us next consider the nature of true virtue as it is in subordinate intelligent beings, the offspring of God. In general, it consists in right and equitable dispositions and actions towards God and our fellow servants. And those are right and equitable which are answerable to, and harmoniously agree with their respective characters, actions, and relations to us, and to one another.

Our Lord sums up the whole under two general heads, viz. Supreme love to God, and equitable love to our neighbour. As virtue in all orders of intelligent crea­tures is essentially the same, this is a just summary of it, in regard to them all. Let us then consider virtue, both as it respects God and our neighbour.

1st. As it respects God, it summarily consists in our loving him with all our heart, i. e. with supreme, ruling, pious affection and regard. In this true virtue primarily, radically, and most essentially consists. This supreme love to God is doubtless to be understood in a comprehensive sense, as including that complex affection and pious re­gard [Page 44]to him which is answerable to his whole revealed character, and several relations to us. God, considered in himself, and in his relations to us, is most worthy of our highest fear and love, trust and confidence, of our whole service and indire obedience, and to be regarded, sought, and delighted in as the chief good and last end of all things. These are essential parts of godliness, or virtuousness of heart towards God, and are to be under­stood as comprehended in this first and great command, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,' &c:

These right and pious dispositions and exercises of the mind towards God, are the result of a true knowledge, and realizing sense of God in the mind, as clothed with his true characters and relations to us; which is given by God himself, by the ministry of Jesus Christ, and thro' the influence of the Holy Ghost. Some writers indeed assert, that there must first be wro't, by the miraculous creating power of the spirit, a moral change; (as they describe it, it is a phisical change) or that a new heart, or virtuous taste, and spiritual sense must be created, be­fore any possible inlightening of the mind in the know­ledge of God can have any influence in exciting and Brawing forth any right affections and exercises of the heart towards him. This they seem to consider as a sort of substratum and support to all the acts and exercises of virtue▪ But they ought to have reflected, that God him­self, is the source and support of virtue in us; which is the re-action of our minds towards him, answering to his action and influence on them, by the light and moral power of his glory and love; or their attraction and ac­tive tendency towards him, in consequence of their be­ing brought under the attractive influence of his blessed character and gracious love to us in Jesus Christ. Our Lord uses a similar manner of expression when he speaks of his Father's drawing men, and their coming to him in consequence thereof; which drawing he makes to con­fist in God's so teaching them as that they hear and learn of him. Again he says, ‘If I be lifted up from [Page 45]the earth, I will draw all men unto me.’ 'Tis by the doctrine of his cross that the attracting glory and love of God and Jesus Christ are most clearly manifested: And all who behold and realize this glory of the Lord, are drawn by its influence and come to him, and are changed.

To talk of a moral change in the mind, forming the heart in a virtuous temper, as preceeding this attraction of God upon the mind, and as necessary to render that effectual, is the same absurdity in divinity or moral phi­losophy as it would be in natural, to assert that a body naturally cold, must first change its nature, and become of a hot nature, like the sun, before it can be warmed by the action of the sun's rays upon it, however near the sun may approach towards it.

Moreover, let it be observed that God, considered by the mind in his relative characters, and absolute perfecti­ons, or as exercising his perfections in all his relations & works to his creatures, is the complete object of pious regard; which regard is answerable to the characters & various relations in which he is seen by the believing mind: And in this answerableness, and harmonious a­greement of the affections and actions of the mind to his characters, relations and works, their virtuousness, or moral excellence and acceptableness essentially consists. This is the view which is given us of this matter thro'­out the inspired writings.—It is very surprising to hear great and good men represent all relative duties which we owe to God, and Jesus Christ, considered as perform­ed from a regard to their relative characters and works, and to the equitableness and suitableness of such returns, as beauties of an inferior kind, and as having nothing of true virtuousness and moral excellence in them, 'consi­sidered simply, and by themselves' but only as they arise out of, and are the various exercises of pure benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, as intelligent.—Such misrepresentations and the doctrines built upon them, extremely disgust inlightened and virtuous men, and per­plex [Page 46]the simple, and confound their understanding, and involve practical religion (the plainest thing in the world, adapted to the capacities of the vulgar) in a cloud, and give it so mysterious an appearance, that they are tempt­ed to suspect there is nothing real in it, or if there is, that it is so far removed out of their view, that 'tis in vain to trouble themselves about it. How sorely is vir­tue wounded in the house of its friends!

2dly. Virtue, as it respects our neighbour, summarily consists in loving him as ourselves. Which implies that there is a love of ourselves, which is virtuous, and ap­proved by God: otherwise our loving our neighbour as ourselves could not be a virtuous love.—This virtuous love of our neighbour is explained by our Lord as im­plying such an equitable affection or disposition of mind towards him, as engages us to do to him all things whatso­ever we would, that he should do to us, or could in rea­son and equity expect him to do, if we were in his cir­cumstances and he in ours.

This virtuous and equitable regard to ourselves and to our neighbour, is the result of a true knowledge or faith of God, as graciously revealed to us, and a truly pi­ous and filial regard to him, viewed in his true character, and relations to ourselves and to our neighbour. Or in other words, this equitable love is the offspring of piety to God.—Without a true knowledge of God, and our relations to him, we can't truly know ourselves, or our neighbour; and in consequence can't know what man­ner and measure of love and regard to him, and to our­selves is equitable, and agreeable to the righteous will of God: And without a true, pious, governing love and regard to God, our love and respect to ourselves and our neighbour, will necessarily be ungoverned, and in a great measure irregular, and in many of its exercises, in ma­ny respects, inequitable, or unrighteous; and therefore vicious and blameworthy, so far as inequitable.

The truly virtuous mind views himself, and his neigh­bour, as God's creatures, subjects of his government, & [Page 47]objects of his good-will, and paternal care; who seeks their true good, virtue and happiness; and reflects that it is the good pleasure of his will that he, and every one do so too, in humble dependence on him, the great Fa­ther of Love, and fountain of good.—In this view, conformably to God's will, he bears a true, friendly, e­quitable regard to himself, and his neighbour, and en­deavours, according to his ability, to promote his own, and his neighbour's good, subordinate to God, and to advance himself, and his fellow servants in virtue, pre­parative to true happiness; with humble prayer to the Great Father of the whole family in heaven and earth, to bless both them and himself, for his own goodness sake, in Jesus Christ.—This spirit of equitable, friendly regard, will dispose the virtuous mind to behave to every one in a manner suitable to their various characters, of­fices, and relations, agreably, and in obedience to God's righteous law; which is written in the heart of the tru­ly virtuous.

The love of our neighbour, yea, of any individual, as springing out of these principles of faith and pious re­gard to God, is, in effect, universal love. For these prin­ciples will extend this spirit of equitable, friendly regard to the whole family of God, to all his creatures, who are objects of his kind care and paternal good-will, when the mind is so opened and enlarged, as to take in­to its view, his whole family as being such, and objects of his benevolent regard.—In this way it is that virtuous love or benevolence becomes general, and extends to all: not from its beginning in pure benevolence to being simply considered, and so from this root, branching out in benevolent regard to particular beings, to God and his intelligent creatures, as sharers in being, the first be­loved; Which is an unnatural and unchristian notion, and has no countenance from scripture, reason or expe­rience, but is condemned by them all. How far the idea of virtue given in this chapter is approved and sug­gested by inspired teachers, the reader must judge for himself.

CHAP. VI. Of that defective sort of virtue which is observable in many men, who are not truly religious, but, upon the whole, are of a vicious character.

'TIS undeniably true in fact, that natural conscience and the moral sense, have a very considerable in­fluence in many men, who are not truly religious, in re­straining them from many sins, and engaging them to practise many duties: Their hearts, in many instances, concur, in some degree, with the moral sense of their minds. A sense of equity, of moral honour, of gratitude, a spirit of benevolence, compassion, &c. and some, kind of regard to God, influence them to do many worthy deeds, worthy in some respects, and in many lesser instances to deny and controul particular evil dispositions, for their sakes, when yet they will deny and counteract all these for some other lusts, and under greater temptations, and have no effectually governing regard to God, and to virtue, its interests and reward.

Writers are divided in their sentiments concerning actions of this kind. Some are disposed to allow them to be virtuous in some degree. Others say there is no­thing in them that does at all partake of the nature of true virtue. This is Mr. Edwards's sentiment. Some others go farther, and say, they are perfect sins, and, as some express themselves, abominable good works. Mr. Hopkins says, 'all the exercises of the hearts of the un­regenerate; (even the best of them, under the highest in­fluences of common grace, and strivings of the Holy Spirit) 'are in direct opposition to God, his spirit and law.' ^* I believe this subject, which is often handled in a very confused manner, may be set in a just and clear light. Whether it is so represented here, the reader will judge, when he has run thro' this chapter.

A distinction ought to be made between the denomi­nating character of the agent, and that of particular ac­tions which he does. These do not always agree. Both [Page 49]virtuous and vicious men are generally imperfect in their respective characters in this life; and some are so in a very great degree, especially in the morning of their mo­ral life, and are in a great degree inconsistent with them­selves, in their dispositions and conduct. Some parti­cular actions, in both, are governed by, and denominated from the weaker principles and springs of action, in them, and are inconsistent with, and belie their true, prevailing, denominating characters: If we judge of their respective characters by them, we shall judge wrong. Truly vir­tuous or good men, sometimes (alass! too frequently) do particular actions which are morally evil, wholly evil: the virtuous principles and tempers which habitually rule in them, have no degree of influence in producing them, but are quiescent, or over-ruled by contrary prin­ciples or passions. In these things they act wholly out of character, considered as virtuous; and yet they act from an inward spring in themselves. Thus, for exam­ple, Peter was a believing and good man, but his deny­ing his Lord was a very evil thing, had not the least tincture of faith or virtue in it, but sprang wholly out of sinful fear and criminal cowardice, which at that time suppres­sed the actings of his faith, and virtuous love to his Mas­ter. If this had been his habitually ruling principle, he would not have been a good or virtuous man, any more than those jewish rulers who believed that Jesus was the Christ, but did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue, because they loved the praise of men, more than the praise of God. So, on the other hand, men of a vicious character do some particular ac­tions which do not spring from any vicious principles or affections in their hearts, and have no positive viciousness in them.

I do not mean to insinuate that they spring from any truly virtuous principles of heart. They have no such principles of action in their hearts.—But there are certain middle principles or springs of action wro't into the mind of man, by our gracious Creator, which, tho' they [Page 50]are not virtuous, and do not necessarily imply a princi­ple of virtue in the heart, yet are friendly to virtue, and espouse its cause within us, suppose the mind duely in­structed: Such are reason, natural conscience, the moral sense or taste, &c. These have some degree of influence, in many natural men. In some single actions they rule. Thus, for instance, men, whose hearts are far from be­ing in an habitual, and universally equitable disposition towards God and their neighbour, are many times deter­mined to do particular equitable actions to others from a regard to the equity of the case, as their truespring; and, for equity's sake, deny themselves in little things.— What is positive in such actions is not sinful or vicious; it is contrary to no law of God, but required in the law. But there is an essential defect in the agent, which ren­ders him not well accepted: Yet he is not blamed, stric­ly speaking, for what he does, but for what is wanting to render his work perfect, or truly virtuous. What I intend will, perhaps, be best illustrated in this manner. God commands his people to deal equitably, every man with his neighbour, from a regard to what is just, and out of a supreme respect and duty to him, their righte­ous Father and Judge, who loves righteousness, and hates iniquity. Now A. in dealing with B. his neigh­bour, sees what is right between them, and, from a re­gard to the equity of the case, deals justly with him, when at the same time he sees how he might make an unrighteous gain by him, undiscovered: But in all this he has no true and obedient regard to God as his righte­ous Governor and Judge. (There are many such cases in real life.) The action he does is a right action, in re­spect to what is positive in it, commanded by God, and the motive on which he acts is a right motive, one of the motives God wills him to be influenced by. There is therefore nothing evil in the action, positively consider­ed, nor in the motive upon which it is done: but the man is blame-worthy in that he is not influenced by a religious regard to God, as well as by a regard to the e­quity [Page 51]of the case, in respect to his neighbour. In this re­gard his action is essentially deficient, and weighed in a true balance is found light, and can't be accepted as an in­stance of true, divine virtue.

To render actions truly virtuous, they must be sancti­fied by a spirit of religious regard to God, mingling it self in with them. This is the true salt which seasons, and fits them to be offered to God as an acceptable sac­rifice, by Jesus Christ.—If actions of the kind above spe­cified, unseasoned with salt, are at all considered as vir­tues, it must be in an improper sense. If any are dispo­sed to consider them as branches of virtue, they should represent them as dead branches which have no vital union with the true root of the tree, viz. a spirit of religious regard to God. As such they will soon wither away, if not grafted upon the true stock; like the faith of the stony ground hearers, who have no root in themselves.— Yet, on the other hand, men act very unadvisedly in re­viling this kind of deficient actions, as having nothing in their nature but what is sin, and an abomination to God. There is something in them which is right, as we have seen, and required by God. This is approved, not abhorred and thrown back as dung in the faces of the doers of them: ^‡ Yet the agent is faulted for that which is want­ing in his work to render it truly holy, and accepted, as having all the essential characters of truly good fruit.— This kind of actions which are not positively vicious, nor yet truly virtuous, may fitly be resembled to what is called historical faith; which implies assent to the truth of the gospel facts, founded on the proper evidence (which saving faith also has) but the heart does not em­brace the truths believed with governing love; and [Page 52]therefore the faith is not saving. For 'with the heart man believeth unto righteousness.' Yet the assent of the mind is not sinful. 'Thou believest there is one God. Thou dost well' says the apostle James. But lest men should rest here, he adds, 'Devils also believe and trem­ble.'

Actions materially good, may be distinguished into three kinds; the first are formally good, and truly virtu­ous and holy, acceptable and rewardable, upon the gos­pel plan of grace.—The second kind are such as have been mentioned above. Of this sort the commendable behaviour of the young man in the gospel was, whom our gracious Lord looked upon with love; but added, one thing thou lackest yet. May all his ministers learn of him.—The third sort are such materially good actions as spring from vicious motives and lusts of the heart. Such were the public prayers, fastings and alms of the Pha­risees. These are positively vicious: the outward work is rendered unclean, profane and abominable by the vi­cious principle of the heart from which it proceeds.

When all the reformations and best moral actions of natural men, under the influence of an awakened and in­lightened conscience, and the highest improvements of common grace, are represented as altogether vicious, and in direct opposition to the spirit and law of God, and a­bominable to him, like the Pharisees prayers and alms, they are set in a very false light, and a stumbling block is cast before the lame and the blind. A thing which their appointed guides ought not to do.