BEFORE we can undertake to determine the proper use and improvement of the principles of Natural Religion, we must know what Natural Religion is, and what those principles are, which we are to use and improve.

It was justly observed by one ^* who hath gone before me on this subject, that "the belief of God's existence is most essentially fundamental to all religion."—If we could suppose an intel­ligent creature to do every thing that we call right, and to forbear what we call evil; yet, if he did not act from a sense of the Being and Perfections of God, we should not pronounce this religion, whatever else we might call it.

It is the opinion of many great and good men, that there is an essential and immutable difference between moral good and evil; and [Page vi]that this difference arises from the very nature of things, so as to be entirely independent on the will of God. I shall not determine whether these sentiments are true or false but allowing that they are true, and that some superior minds are influenced by this abstract and unalterable fitness of things to act agreable to it, without any other consideration; we may call them wise and virtuous; but if there is no regard to a Deity, they cannot be denominated religious, because a respect to a Deity is necessarily im­plied in the very notion of Religion—If there is no God, there is, there can be no Religion— The sacred writings lay this down as a funda­mental principle, "He that cometh to God must believe that He is"—This is the foundation of all Religion both Natural and Revealed.

THE first thing therefore in discoursing on Natural Religion is to establish this great, this fundamental, this essential truth—That there is a God.

ALLOWING the Being and Perfections of God, we are next to prove that there is such a thing as Religion.

IN the last place we shall show in what re­spects this Religion may be called Natural or the Religion of Nature.

[Page vii] THE first thing before us is, to prove the Being of a God, or that there is a Deity of in­finite perfection—I shall not take up much of your time upon this head, as I am not able to offer any arguments, but such as will easily occur to your minds without any help of mine.

"The high priori road" is, I fear, too intricate for men of common understanding, either when they attempt to find it out themselves, or to tra­vel in it when discovered by others—These ex­alted reasonings become men of such prodigious reach of thought as the late Dr. Clark, but even with the help of this clear and consum­mate Reasoner, the most are rather puzzled and confounded, than enlightned and established by such abstract speculations—"The argument a posteriori", says that very great man, "is indeed by far the most generally useful argument, most easy to be understood, and in some degree suited to all capacities".

THAT every Effect must have some cause is as plain and undeniable a truth as any axiom in Euclid. That the whole sensible universe is an Effect, we have all the evidence that the nature of the thing will admit. If it is not the effect of some cause, it must exist from Eternity: Now, says Dr. Clark, "whatever exists from Eternity and [Page viii]without any external cause, is self-existent: What­ever is self-existent, must exist necessarily, by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing itself. It follows evidently, that unless the material world exists necessarily, by an absolute necessity in its own nature, so as that it must be an express contradiction to suppose it not to exist; it cannot be independent, and of itself eternal. Now that the materi­al world doth not exist thus necessarily, is ve­ry evident. For absolute necessity of existing, and a possibility of not existing, being contradic­tory ideas; it is manifest the material world can­not exist necessarily, if without a contradiction we can conceive it either not to be, or to be in any respect, otherwise than it now is. Than which, nothing is more easy. Every thing in it, both the whole and every one of its parts, their situ­ation and motion, the form and also the matter, are the most arbitrary and dependent things, and farthest removed from necessity, that can pos­sibly be imagined". We rationally conclude therefore that the universe is the effect of some powerful cause.

THE structure and constitution of the world, the accurate adjustment of its various parts, and the uses and ends to which they are mutually adapted, prove this cause to be intelligent, wise and good.

[Page ix] THE two first of these attributes, I conclude, will readily be allowed. Possibly some may dispute, whether the Goodness of God can be justly argued from the state of things in this world, where there is such a mixture of sorrow, distress and misery. But there is certainly a large share of good com­municated, enough to preponderate the evil there is in the universe, so far as it is known to us, and even if we leave out all consideration of a future state. The most enjoy a great degree of comfort, and would enjoy much more, were it not for their own irregular passions, and the faults and follies which are the consequence of them. As bad as things are, there are very few, who are reduced to such a state of extreme misery, as to be willing to exchange it for a state of non-existence, if this were in their pow­er. Who then can reasonably dispute the good­ness of God? especially when we consider, that so great and wise a Being as God is, hath with­out doubt a large and extensive plan; and possibly, at the winding up of the drama, those things which are at present dark, may have a quite contrary aspect.

IT would not be difficult to prove the other moral perfections of the Deity, by arguments fetched from those we have mentioned; or per­haps, though we are obliged to think and speak [Page x]of them as distinct attributes in God, there is but one principle of action in him; all may be reduced to boundless intelligence or wisdom; or, as Mr. Wollaston calls it, "Divine Reason, which, as it exerts itself upon this or that occasion, is by us variously denominated" Justice, Mercy, Truth, or whatever else goes to constitute moral perfection, or perfect moral conduct. An infi­nitely pure Being must always propose to himself the best end in acting, and must know what are the best means to accomplish that end; He can have no temptation to act contrary to what his wisdom dictates; He cannot be under any undue influence, either from prejudice within, or deceit without; and if this allwise Being is also infinite in power, He must be an object of the highest confidence, or the greatest fear; according as we have reason to think, He is our friend or our enemy; engaged to promote our happiness, or determined to make us miserable.

To say that God has exerted his power or his wisdom, ad ultimum posse, so that He can proceed no farther, is to say a great deal too much: But we may with reason assert, that he has discovered infinite wisdom and infinite pow­er; or in other words, that none but a Being possessed of these perfections in the highest possi­ble [Page xi]degree could have created this stupendous universe. ^*

THAT we do not discern more wisdom, pow­er and goodness in the works of God, is not owing to any defect in them, but in us. The more we study and know of them, the more do we see of these perfections in their production. This is true not only of men whose capacities are weak, and who have but small advantages to search out the works of God, it is equally true of men of the most sublime genius, who have the best opportunities to look into nature and to inquire after truth. The effect of their in­quiries is, a deeper sense of their own igno­rance, and a more exalted thought of the Divine Excellence. This would be the case, if we should contemplate the works of God through numberless ages, even to eternity. The reason we do not discern Infinite Perfection in the works of God, is, because we cannot comprehend In­finity. [Page xii]The Apostle speaking of the heathen says, ^* "The invisible things of God from," or ever since, "the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead, so that they are without excuse". His eternal power and godhead are understood by the things that are made, so far as they are understood; men are capable of understanding, of forming right conceptions of the nature and perfections of God from the things which He has made, if they duly consider and attend to them. But though we might form right conceptions of Him by an attentive consideration of his works, yet this great and glorious being can never be comprehended by a finite mind.

THE evidence of the Being and Perfections of God from his works, is not only conclusive, but clear and level to the meanest capacity. It strikes the mind with conviction, almost as soon as it is proposed. The rudest barbarian, is no sooner put upon thinking and reflecting, than he feels the absurdity of supposing, that he himself and evey thing around him, were produced by chance, that is by nothing, a mere non-entity, that they were effects without a cause. He assents to the existence of some powerful and [Page xiii]designing mind, who made and preserveth all things; and the more he looks into himself, contemplates the curious workmanship of his bo­dy, the nature of the human soul, and the sur­prizing union which subsists between these two very different substances, so much the more sa­tisfied he is that the conclusion is just. While he looks abroad and surveys the universe, wonders of wisdom and power multiply upon him, and his faith continually gathers strength. Evident marks of these Divine Perfections are to be seen in the adjustment of those vast heavenly bodies, which present themselves to the wondring sight. With what exact order, harmony and beauty do they perform their several revolutions, and dis­charge their appointed functions! Or if we only traverse the globe on which we dwell, and ob­serve, how it is variegated with hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas, which all have their particu­lar use; the tribes of different animals with which it is stocked; the surprizing variety of trees, plants, and vegetables with which every part abounds, new scenes perpetually opening to the enquiring mind, it is impossible to doubt, the couclusion is irresistible, that there is One, and only One, great and adequate cause of all, and that this cause is God. There needs only common sense and understanding to make this deduction—But there is this peculiar advantage [Page xiv]attending this argument, that the more closely we examine the constitution of the universe, and the greater discoveries we make of the works and laws of nature, the reasoning from them grows stronger and approaches nearer to demon­stration—A sure evidence that it is founded in truth.

THE Being and Perfections of God being once established, it is not hard to prove that there is such a thing as Religion—when I say there is such a thing as Religion, I intend, that there are duties incumbent on man towards the Deity, which God hath a right to require of us, and which we are under obligations to perform. I observed in the beginning of the discourse, that the very notion of Religion implies a regard to God: If we should allow that moral good and evil do not depend on the will of God, yet there is nothing of religion in the best action, unless we have respect to God in doing it, unless we do it because it is conformable to his will. God is a Being of infinite excellency, the foun­tain of understanding and wisdom; all creatures, received their being from Him, and depend con­stantly upon Him; they derive from his goodness all the benefits of which they partake, and it is He only that can supply their wants, or satisfy their desires. On these accounts He has an ab­solute [Page xv]right of government, and it is the duty of the whole intelligent world to obey, serve and honor Him.

GOD, having given us our respective capaci­ties, and placed us in such particular circumstan­ces and relations, has hereby intimated to us, that it is his will we should act agreably to them. A wise and good Being would not have confer­red these capacities, and constituted these relati­ons, without some wise and good design; and what design could He have, but to point out to them that method of conduct, which would be proper for them, and agreable to Him? And what makes it quite evident, that this was his design, is, that while we act agreably to the circumstan­ces in which He hath placed us, we promote our own felicity, whereas a contrary conduct tends to bring misery on our selves, and to in­troduce disorder into the world. This therefore is the constitution of nature, or rather of the God of nature, from whence arises fitness and obligation.

IT is fit and right that we should act in con­formity to the will of an all perfect Being, whose will is rectitude itself, and who requires nothing of us, but what tends to make us like himself, who is the standard of excellence. And to act other­wise is wrong.

[Page xvi] IF it be asked; what is it that makes this con­formity a duty? may we not as well enquire why two and two make four? why one quan­tity is greater than another? The understanding determines both. If men are sceptical in these points, arguments will not cure them. A long series of reasoning will not make it clearer, af­ter all, the mind is no more satisfied, and we are obliged often to return to the point from whence we first set out. Right in this case is a kind of simple perception. Reason and consci­ence dictate that God is to be obeyed—We feel their authority. To renounce it is to offer vio­lence to our understanding—"Right implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is right, is to see a reason for doing it. Now, this per­ception, this acknowledged rectitude in the ac­tion, is the very essence of obligation; that which commands the approbation and choice, and binds the conscience of every rational be­ing". A creature to whom his Creator has grant­ed the powers of reason and reflection, if he doth not improve these powers, or act agreably to the dictates of reason, doth not act as the being he is; he rebels against his Sovereign and Lord, and doth what he can, to defeat the design of Hea­ven in bringing him into existence.

THERE are a variety of ways in which God may make known his will to us; whatever way He [Page xvii]chooses, the obligation is the same, it is our du­ty to act in conformity to it. He who made us and conferred so many benefits upon us, hath an unlimited right to our homage and obedi­ence; as it is quite certain, that a Being of such absolute rectitude can never require any thing, which is not agreable to his own perfect nature, or in other words, which is not right and fit.

IT cannot be indifferent to this All-perfect Mind, whether his creatures act agreably to his will or not. "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness". The same rectitude, which in­fluences his will and directs his requirements from his creatures, necessarily causes Him to be pleased when they do right, and displeased when they do wrong. And being possessed of uncon­trolable power, it is reasonable to conclude, that He will evidence his approbation and dislike, by rewarding those who do his will, and punish­ing those who do it not. This is what we call his moral government, which is his rendering to men according to their actions, whether they be good or evil. Something of this we see in this life, in the tendency which moral piety hath to produce happiness; and in the evils which are often consequent on our acting contrary to the nature and will of God. 'Tis true, in the pre­sent state, this distinction is not uniformly and [Page xviii]constantly maintained, according to men's moral or religious conduct. There is frequently a pro­miscuous dispensation of things, without any ap­parent regard to the merit or demerit of charac­ters. Virtue and goodness fail of their proper ge­nuine effect; while vice and wickedness not only escape the punishment, which the general nature and disposition of things would lead us to ex­pect, but seem to triumph and prosper. From this view of things, it is a just and unavoidable conclusion, that there will be a future state, when the perfection of God's moral government will be displayed; all the present inequalities will be set to rights; and He will appear to be holy, wise and good, beyond all dispute and contra­diction.

THE whole of this reasoning is founded on the supposition that man acts freely; and upon any other supposition, it is idle to talk of moral go­vernment, of rewards and punishments, or in­deed of religion or virtue. "That", says Mr. Wollaston, "which hath not the opportunity or liberty of chusing for itself, and acting accord­ingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a necessity incumbent ab extra. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only an in­strument in the hand of something which impo­ses the necessity; and cannot properly be said [Page xix]to act, but to be acted. The act must be the act of an agent, therefore not of his instrument. A Being under the above-mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a machine; to which no language or philosophy ever ascrib­ed morals". ^* The scheme of necessity in the actions of an intelligent being, or that all our volitions, determinations and actions proceed from God, as infrustrable effects from their proper cause, hath hitherto been embraced by a very few, except insidels, and those of the most ma­lignant class, who have very consistently given up the doctrine of future punishment. In this they [Page xx]discover that they have more just and honorary thoughts of God, than those Christians, who first make God the author of sin, and then represent him as inflicting eternal punishment on men for it; for that which is originally, and in strict construc­tion his own act. Mr. Howe calls it, "a black conception of God, that He should be supposed irresistibly to determine the will of man to the hatred of his own most blessed self, and then to exact the severest punishments for the offence done. "We should rather chuse", says he, "to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, or what not besides, disputed or even torn away from us, than ever suffer ourselves to be disputed in to a belief, that the holy and good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing".

IT is a conclusive argument against such a fatal necessity as some men plead for, that it is contrary to the perceptions of the human mind,—we have a consciousness of liberty, we perceive no external influence, we have a moral sense, we pass a judgment on our own actions, approve or disapprove our selves and others. It shows the difficulty, to which a very sensible writer ^* of the present day is reduced, who al­lows this inward perception, that we are necessi­tated [Page xxi]to think ourselves and others free; and yet denies the reality of liberty. God has, according to him implanted a delusive sense in us, our feel­ing is deceitful, the God of truth doth continu­ally by a positive influence deceive and delude us. What strange notions have some men of that glorious Being, all whose ways are truth, and who is righteous altogether! Is it not better to set limits to our enquiries, and to suppose there may be a mistake in some curious speculations, than to entertain sentiments so dishonorable to God, and so intirely subversive of all moral go­vernment? I admire the modesty, as well as goodness of heart, discovered by the great Mr. Locke, in one of his Letters to Mr. Molineux, "I freely own" says he, "the weakness of my un­derstanding, that though it be unquestionable, that there is Omnipotence and Omniscience in God our Maker, and I cannot have a clearer per­ception of any thing, than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to, and therefore I have long since left off the consideration of the question". ^*

IF some of our modern reasoners, who have not a tenth part of his understanding, had a little more of his humility, the world would be free [Page xxii]from those angry disputes about fate and free-will, liberty and necessity, which puzzle the heads, but seldom mend the hearts, of those who engage in them.

I have said—There is a God—That there is Reli­gion—I am now to consider in what sense this Religion is called Natural. And it is thus denomi­nated, not because men discover it in the sole exercise of their natural faculties and powers; but because it hath its foundation in the Perfections of God, and in that constitution of nature which he has established, or which arises from the mutual relation between God and His creature Man. God having made us the beings we are, intelli­gent rational creatures, and having fixed our par­ticular situation, there arise certain fitnesses and obligations, which constitute the law of our na­ture. This is the law of Him who is the author of our being; to act agreable to that, is therefore to obey God, which constitutes it Religion. And to obey a law, which results, not from the positive will of God, but from the nature He hath given to man, is to him natural religion. This religion is immutably the same, the law of our nature can never cease to oblige, nor can it ever be right to act in contradiction to it. "The nature of God is unchangeable, the original relations wherein we stand in to Him are also unchangeable, and the [Page xxiii]duties thence resulting are still owing to Him, and ever will be. Man must ever be bound to own his glorious perfections, to pay Him venera­tion love and praise, on account of them, and to endeavor after a resemblance to Him in his moral excellencies". Having received our being from God, and entirely depending upon Him, we are bound to own Him as Maker, Preserver; Lord and Ruler; to make the utmost returns of gratitude and love; to pray to Him for what we want, to praise Him for what we enjoy; to commit ourselves and our affairs to his dis­posal; to be resigned to his will, submit to His government, and yield obedience to his com­mands, whenever, and however, He is pleased to signify his mind to us. These duties arise from the necessary relations between a Creator and a creature; between a being who is conti­nually conferring benefits, and one who is as constantly receiving them.

THE Religion of Nature, doth not depend on the conceptions we may form of God, or the apprehensions we have of our duty to Him. Men may have very false and unworthy notions of a Deity, they may make many mistakes in religi­on, or about the duties which God requires of them. But the mistakes they make do not alter he nature of things. God is the same, whe­ther [Page xxiv]we conceive aright of Him or not: Reli­gion is the same, whether we form just notions of it or not: The obligations we are under to obey God are the same, whether we obey Him or not.

THE Christian Religion is contained in the book we call the Bible; it remains the same whether men attend to it or not, whether they under­stand it or not, whether they act agreably to it or not. The Bible is the standard; the rule to which Christians are to appeal, in all differ­ences of opinion and practice. In like manner, the religion of nature is written in the book of nature, in the works of God; man may read there the being and perfections of God. "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the fir­mament sheweth his handy work; day unto day uttereth speech; and night unto night sheweth knowlege; there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard". The truths which the heavens declare are always the same, the religion they teach doth not alter and change according to our apprehensions and prejudices; it is quite independent of our notions and per­ceptions; and remains steady and permanent, whether we attend to it or not. Indeed, every thing in religion, which approves itself to the unprejudiced reason of man, is undoubtedly a part [Page xxv]of natural religion; but there is such a thing as truth and duty, whether they are discovered to us or not, whether our reason is exercised about them or not. This religion, which is taught by the natural order and constitution of things, all men are ca­pable in some degree of knowing, of embrac­ing and practicing. "The Gentiles which have not the law, are a law unto themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another". ^* What the apostle Paul evident­ly intends, is, that all intelligent creatures are subjects of law; that reason implies duty; that man hath a capacity to distinguish between good and evil; and is conscious that he is bound to practice the one, and to avoid the other. "What is intended," says the pious Mr. Hallyburton, "may be reduced to these two assertions, viz. That men are born with such faculties, which cannot, after they are capable of exercising them, but admit the obligation and binding force of some, at least, of the laws of nature, when they are fairly offered to their thoughts. And that man is so stated, that he cannot miss occasions of thinking of, or coming to the knowledge of those laws of nature. The Gentiles, all of them, do [Page xxvi]by nature those things, that is, the material part of those duties, which the law of nature enjoins; which shews the work of the law, or some part of it, at least, to be written in their hearts, since they do some things it enjoins: I do not think that this writing of the law imports innate ideas, or innate actual knowledge; neither the apostle's scope nor words oblige us to this". nor doth it imply, that the will of God in it's full extent is immediately clear and evident to men.

ONE would imagine by the exalted terms in which some men speak of the light of nature, that the whole system of moral truth arose spon­taneously in the mind of man, without any help at all; that he had need only to open his eyes, in order to have a right discernment of the perfections of God, and a compleat view of all the duty we owe him.

IT is doubtful, whether the original progenitors of the human race, however perfect in their kind they are represented, had such an intire acquaint­ance with moral truth, as to need no instruction from their Maker. It is hardly probable, that they had such exalted powers, and such a com­prehensive view of divine truth, as some have ascribed to them. There is no accounting for their so easy defection from their original state, if we suppose this to be the case. Perhaps we [Page xxvii]shall carry our thoughts of human nature, in it's first constitution, as high as the scripture warrants; if we suppose, that the understanding and other powers were adjusted to the law, under which man was placed. He had the same passions and appetites that men have now; but being free from all moral blemishes and defects, he was able to restrain and govern them, and to make them conducive to the enjoyment of greater good. His reason was sufficient, with the helps he might ex­pect from his Creator, to direct his moral con­duct, and to raise him to that exalted happiness, which his rank in the scale of beings qualified him for. But he was to come to the perfection of his nature by degrees; and had he stood the trial appointed by his Maker, he would have constant­ly improved, in the knowlege of God and of the divine law; and have made continual approaches to that glorious Being, who is the standard of perfection.

MAN is evidently at present in a state of degra­dation, we see only the ruins of an excellent and noble creature. If we had no help from revela­tion, it would be a rational deduction from the state in which we find ourselves, that human nature is not in all respects the same it once was; that mankind are in a fallen, as they certainly are in a weak and depraved state. Man is still an intelli­gent [Page xxviii]creature, he is capable of thinking and re­flecting, of judging of truth and falshood, of distinguishing between right and wrong; but the candle of the Lord gives but a dim and feeble light. Man, through inattention and corruption, or some other cause, if left to himself, would certainly attain to very little knowlege of God or his duty. Reason is blinded by a thousand passions, and we often act in direct contradiction to it. Yea, so great is the darkness which has overspread the human mind, that we some­times "call evil good, and good evil".

THOSE men, who talk in such high strains of the light of nature, and who affirm with so much confidence, that all, "even the most ignorant and illiterate of the human race, have naturally and necessarily a clear and intimate perception of the whole of religion and their duty", ^* forget that they were once children, and by what gradual steps they arrived to the degree of knowlege, to which they have attained, and of which they are so rea­dy to boast. The most acute Philosopher at his first entrance into life, had scarce any ideas or consciousness at all. He who afterwards makes the most distinguished figure among the great and wise men of the earth, is, when born, as much an infant in knowlege and understanding, as in [Page xxix]stature and in speech. He knows not the use of the various parts of his body, is incapable of con­sidering the objects around him, or of providing for his own necessities; much less is he capable of contemplating the works of God, of forming any conceptions of his Being and Perfections. Most of the knowlege he gets is by the help of others, and from the tuition and instruction he receives in society. Many truths, which are com­municated by others, and which we see to be quite agreable to reason, we might never have thought of, if we had been left wholly to our selves, and had received no assistance or instruction from abroad. We necessarily assent to mathematical truths, when we see them demonstrated; and yet we have not any innate knowledge of them, they do not arise spontaneously in our minds, and only a very few have any acquaintance at all with them.

THE great truths of Religion are founded in the reason and nature of things. Man hath na­tural powers capable of seeing and approving these truths; by a diligent use and improvement of these powers, he may make great proficiency in knowlege, not only of the things of nature, but of the things of God and Religion. The powers of human nature have never been carried to their highest pitch: It is very possible it may arrive to [Page xxx]higher degrees of perfection, than any meer man hath ever attained to. But whatever men's natural powers are, or whatever they are capable of attain­ing to, if they do not exercise these powers, and have no assistance from those about them, their knowlege will be confined within a very narrow compass. We may be ignorant of self-evident truths, if we do not attend to them; much more may we be ignorant of the truths of Natural Re­ligion, if we do not exercise our minds about them. If we are of our selves capable of disco­vering these truths in their full extent, a point not so clear as some think it, they must be discover­ed, not by intuition, but by close application and a course of reasoning. Men are bound, by dili­gent study and enquiry, to endeavor to know what God requires of them, and to practice the whole of their duty. They ought also to improve all those assistances and helps which are afforded them. A neglect, which proceeds from voluntary ignorance, is as really a crime, as if we had known our Lord's will and did it not.

BUT whatever powers man is possessed of, and how agreable soever the truths of religion are to pure and unprejudiced reason, it is impossible to determine, how much or how little acquaintance man would have had with moral truths, by his own natural light, without instruction. Certainly [Page xxxi]many of the heathen lost some which we esteem among the first principles of Religion. "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things". ^*

IT is by no means fair to conclude, that man would, by the meer strength of reason, have in­vestigated all that we can now prove to be ratio­nal. Nor doth it follow, because we are capable of finding out a truth, that therefore we should cer­tainly have found it out. The corruptions of the human heart often, where they have the ascendant, make them indolent with respect to the improve­ment of their minds; at least, they might have kept us from searching out such truths as would be disagreable and unpleasant to us; or if we had, by the exercise of our reasoning powers, dis­covered something of the nature of moral virtue, if we were brought to see the difference between right and wrong; it is likely they would have been meer speculations. Reason alone could scarce have set moral truths before us, in so strong and amiable a light, as to have captivated our souls with its charms, overcome our corruptions, and brought us to a universal conformity to the nature and will of God. Mere conjectural discoveries, or surmises built on subtle speculations, are not [Page xxxii]firm enough to establish such a persuasion of truth as would influence the mind to universal and con­stant holiness, in opposition to its own corrupti­ons, and the enticements and temptations of an evil world. It must be a full satisfying and abiding conviction of the truth, that hath such powerful effects; a conviction too clear to be produced by unassisted reason however impro­ved.

BUT if we suppose, that we might, by the ex­ercise of reason, arrive at the clearest view of the moral beauty there is in right action, or the fit­ness there is in the practice of virtue, yet I much question, whether according to the present consti­tution of our natures, any abstract ideas of the fitness or unfitness of things would produce a right moral conduct. A sense of moral beauty, or of the excellency of holiness, is of great use to a good mind; but it never was designed to be our only principle of action, in this state of trial. I own our natures would be more excellent, if a love of goodness were alone a sufficient incitement to do right; it is likely this is the case with some of the creatures above us; and possibly our na­tures may rise to this. We are capable now of discerning the intrinsic fitness of things, and of being moved by it; this capacity may gradually increase, till it swallow up all other motives. The more we see of God, and converse with him, the more we [Page xxxiii]shall become like Him in his holiness and his happiness. At present, our nature is very much constituted of appetites and passions, which move us to action. So it was at first, "The woman saw", says the sacred Historian, speaking of Eve, "that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes". The motives to obe­dience, which God saw fit to propose to Adam, were addressed to his hopes and fears. "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die". The threatning implied a promise, that if he did not eat, he should live—and certainly we do not need such arguments less in our present state, than man did in a state of innocence.

IF man was so constituted in his primaeval state, as to be influenced by his hopes and fears, we are not to suppose he will be governed by higher motives now; at least not by higher mo­tives only. But if we take man without a parti­cular revelation from God, what is there to excite his hopes?—Let us allow, that by the strength of his own powers, and without any communi­cations from above, he hath conceived just no­tions of God and of his law; for if his notions are not just, all inferences from them are but idle imaginations; but if his notions are just, the least reflection will convince him, that he hath in many instances transgressed the law of his na­ture, [Page xxxiv]which is the law of God; that he hath ex­posed himself to the just displeasure of a Being, whose arm none can resist. And what reason hath he to think God will pass by his offence and receive him into favor?

IF from the promiscuous dispensation of things in the present state, he infers that there will be a future state of retribution, wherein a difference will be made according to men's moral conduct, yet reason alone could not make it certain, that God would reward any obedience which man now yields; as he yields none, that is not mingled with a great deal of imperfection and sin. All are sinners, all may therefore expect to be treat­ed as sinners; they who have sinned more than others, may justly expect greater punishment. But how any can upon the principles of reason be certain of a reward, because they have not been so bad as some others, I cannot see. The light of nature cannot assure us, that God will forgive a sinner upon his repentance; of conse­quence he hath no encouragement to repent; and if he hath no encouragement to repent, there is no reason to suppose he will repent. It is more likely, that, if he reflects on his state, he will sink under a sense of his guilt, and an appre­hension of punishment. Such would probably be the case, if men had just sentiments of God [Page xxxv]and his law, without any intimation from Him, that He would pardon their transgressions and re­store them to favor.

You will say perhaps, that the Heathen have had some persuasion of a future state of rewards and punishments; but I fear, if the light of na­ture will afford no better evidence of future re­wards than the Heathen have had, moral virtue or religion will receive but little assistance from it. Alas! what dark and confused notions have they entertained! how gross and sensual their representations of future happiness! such as we evidently see to be unworthy of God, and no way calculated to convey rest to the mind of man. Their good men after this life, remember their griefs, and are afflicted with the enmities they contracted here; their exercises and enjoyments are suited to a bodily state, rather than to a state of pure spirits.

If here and there an eminent Philosopher had more rational conceptions of these things, yet no one acquainted with the history of the world, even of the politer nations, will pretend, that this was the case with the body of the people. Even their wisest Philosophers had rather a suspi­cion, than a full persuasion of a future state; and "yet stedfastness seems of absolute necessity in [Page xxxvi]this case, since a respect to the recompence of the reward must be always prevalent, in order to influence to a steady pursuit". Agreably you seldom find their best and wisest men fetching any consolation from the state of rest which remaineth for good men; their exhortations to virtue are not enforced by this; if they believed the doc­trine of future rewards themselves, yet they did not think it worth while to persuade others into a belief of it. For want of this argument, how fri­gid and jejune are all their exhortations to virtue! Even the discourses of a Seneca or a Cicero have not a tendency to warm our hearts, like the una­dorned addresses of a plain unlettered Christian, who is acquainted with the sacred scriptures, and the powerful motives of the Gospel. How much better notions of morality hath a common Christi­an, who at all attends to the precepts of the Gos­pel, or even a modern Deist, who is acquainted with the Bible, than the wisest sages of antiqui­ty! How much clearer his views of a future state! The Gospel makes that certain, which, without it, is but a dark conjecture.

BESIDES, the revelation with which God hath favored us, teaches how He can be just and yet justify the sinner; it opens the mysteries of redeem­ing love and grace; it contains the most graci­ous declarations of God's readiness to pardon the [Page xxxvii]penitent believer; it offers the most gracious assistance, and promises the most glorious rewards. By the help of this, we know many truths, which unassisted reason never would have taught us; and we understand the truths of natural religion, much better than we could have understood them without this help. By means of revelation, we are capable of making a much better use of reason, than we could have made without it.

THERE is nothing in Christianity that is contra­ry to reason. God never did, He never can, au­thorize a religion opposite to it, because this would be to contradict himself. The Gospel is not designed to abrogate the Religion of Nature, it always supposes an eternal rule of righteousness, from which man had deviated, and by which he was condemned. Man had rebelled against his Maker and Lord; had renounced his dependence on God, and set himself up in opposition to Him; in all which he acted contrary to the Religion of Nature. The design of the Gospel was to re­duce him to a right state, to bring him to live on God, to submit to his authority, to resign to his will, and to rely upon him for every good thing.

UNDER this dispensation God appears in a new character, in a new relation, as the God and Fa­ther [Page xxxviii]of our Lord Jesus Christ, as a God pardoning iniquity transgression and sin. This was a cha­racter in which the Deity could not appear, till man had sinned, it was a discovery of something in his nature, which neither Men nor Angels had before any conception of. From this new cha­racter, or new relation, arise new obligations, and new duties; duties which there could be no place for, while man was in a state of innocence, but which are perfectly adapted to his state as a sinner. This is by no means contrary to the Reli­gion of Nature. It is perfectly agreable to it, that we should conform to every new discovery which God makes of himself, and attend to every new intimation of his will.

To give credit to a divine testimony; to sub­mit to a messenger sent by God; to accept of pardon in his way, which is most wise and good, and approves itself to the reason of man, all this is perfectly agreable to every principle of Natural Religion. Nothing is more contrary to truth, than to represent faith and repentance as positive duties, they are founded in reason, they are the result of that relation in which we stand to God and Jesus Christ, and are exactly suited to our pre­sent apostate state.

THE Religion of Nature then, is the same it [Page xxxix]ever was, and "Christianity is this very Religion, with some wise and merciful additions, accommo­dated to the state of mankind as sinners". The Gospel adopts the whole law of nature, it ex­plains it, enjoins conformity to it, adds new obli­gations to obedience; and at the same time pro­vides and offers the kindest helps, to the perfor­mance of what it requires.

SOME may possibly object, that I am discours­ing of Revealed Religion, when my business was to treat of that which is Natural. But how is it possible to give you any tolerable view of Natural Religion, without recurring to Revelation? "Who is there, says Mr. Locke, that ever did or un­dertook to give the law of nature to us all in­tire, as a law, no more, nor no less, than what is contained in, and had the obligation of, that law? who ever made out all the parts of it, put them together, and shewed the world their obli­gations? where was there any such Code, that mankind might have recourse to, as their unerring rule, before our Savior's time". ^*

BESIDES, what is "the proper use and im­provement of Natural Religion", the subject ex­pressly appointed for this Lecture by the pious Founder, but to lead you to that which is Reveal­ed? [Page xl]To what purpose should we discourse of the obligations of Natural Law, if we could not lead you to the merciful discoveries of the Gospel? this would be to throw discouragements in your way. He that reasons justly upon the principles of Natural Religion, and goes no further, I will not say, must despair, but must have many doubts and suspicions of ever obtaining the divine favor. In this respect "the law is our school-master to bring us to Christ". The doctrine of the atonement and of justification by the merits and righteousness of Christ, not only sees the divine character in the clearest light; but gives the great­est encouragement to repentance and obedience. "If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquity, O Lord, who shall stand? but there is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared." ^*

FURTHER, If Natural Religion is no more than has been found out by the natural powers of man, if we are not to include any thing that hath come to us by revelation, who is able to draw the line, and to shew exactly which truths have been discovered by reason, or the mere light of nature, and which have come to us by revelation? It is probable at least, that God first instructed men in the principles of religion, or taught them the law by which they were to be governed; [Page xli]and that their descendants, in all parts of the world, have received by tradition and education, some degree of that light and knowlege, which was communicated to their progenitors from the Deity himself. And if this was the case, and no one can determine it was not, then we must say, that there is no natural religion at all, or that its be­ing revealed doth not make it cease to be natural. If a law is founded in nature; and God, instead of leaving us to find it out by study and applica­tion, is pleased kindly to make it known to us by revelation, will that make it cease to be a law of nature? if we may call that natural religion, which we receive by instruction from our parents and others; why may we not call that natural reli­gion, which we are taught by our Heavenly Fa­ther? ^*

HOWEVER Christianity comes to us; or how­ever supernatural the way in which it was origi­nally communicated; it so far coincides with the Religion of Nature, that it is founded in the per­fections of God, and is perfectly consonant to the reason of man.

[Page xlii] I KNOW it is said, that "were we not capable of distinguishing good from evil, or knowing from the consideration of the invariable perfecti­ons of God, what the divine goodness could command or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion from the many false ones". ^† But this reasoning is founded upon a mistake, it supposes that when men have once corrupted religion, they are left intirely without remedy. The capacity of thinking and reasoning, with which God hath distinguished man, how­ever it hath been neglected or perverted, will, whenever he is led to make a proper use of it, enable him to distinguish between true and false religion. There is no necessity of such a previous comprehensive knowlege of God, or of good and evil. It is not of so great importance, whether men have antecedently reasoned justly or not, or indeed whether they have reasoned at all. If they are awakened to attend to a religion proposed to them, and to examine it with impartiality and care, they are capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of perceiving whether this religi­on is worthy of God. A revelation from God may set many truths and duties before them, which [Page xliii]were before unknown, and yet when presented to their minds, may appear perfectly agreable to their reason and understanding; otherwise when men have once formed wrong notions of religion, it is impossible they should correct their errors, and reason becomes for ever unprofitable.

BUT what shall we say of the Heathen, who have no written revelation? By what rule will they be judged? and what will be their state after this life? such inquiries are too bold and presumptuous, "secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are re­vealed belong unto us and to our children". It is certain the most ignorant have some rule, however they came by it, and they will be judged by the rule which they have, and not by that which they have not. It is evident that the Hea­then have some notion of expiation and forgive­ness, as well as some knowlege of God, and of the distinction between virtue and vice; both are imperfect, and it may be said of them, that "they hold the truth in unrighteousness", and with such a mixture of ignorance and uncertainty, as that it can afford but little rest to their minds. But we may assure ourselves that the Judge of all the earth will do right; and that He will so order things, that none of mankind will have any rea­son [Page xliv]to complain. If the Heathen have no hope of the salvation, which the Gospel promises; nei­ther are they exposed to that damnation, which it threatens to those who despise and reject it. In­stead of puzzling our selves with such curious inquiries, let us fear lest this should be our "con­demnation, that light is come into the world, but we have loved darkness rather than light, because our deeds have been evil".

WE, in this favored land, are lift up to Heaven, with respect to our spiritual privileges; we have many and great advantages to know our Master's will; we have the scriptures which are able to make us wise unto salvation; we have singular helps to understand them; we have line upon line, and precept upon precept. As to means nothing is wanting. We ought often to think of that most equitable rule, by which our Savior assures us the Great God will conduct himself. ^* "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required".

You, my Young Friends, who are so happy, as to have your education in this Seat of Learning, have a most valuable price put into your hands, an op­portunity [Page xlv]not only to furnish your minds with human literature, but to acquire spiritual and divine knowlege—All will be insufficient, unless "God, who caused the light to shine out of darkness, shine in your hearts to give the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ". We take pleasure in your literary accomplish­ment, these things are well worthy your atten­tion and diligent application. But while you as­pire after an acquaintance with the various bran­ches of learning, we shew unto you a more ex­cellent way. "This is life eternal, that ye know God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent". "Wis­dom is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom, and with all thy getting, get understanding. Ex­alt her and she shall promote thee; she shall bring thee to honor, when thou dost embrace her".