THE C—tee having gone through the examination of the facts contained in the North-American papers, and the diſcuſſion of the opinions and reſolutions formed and originated in another place, and ſent to us for our concurrence, have taken up theſe reſolutions with an addreſs that accompanies them, as the only proper meaſures for P—t to adopt on this important occaſion, at this very dangerous and perilous criſis. 'Tis not more ſtrange that this ſhould be thought any remedy at all for this dangerous diſeaſe, than that it ſhould be taken up as the only remedy—however, ſuch as it is, this is the only matter propoſed for our deliberation, and therefore the only matter into the conſideration of which I ſhall enter. As this appears to me in two different lights, I ſhall beg to view it under two different conſiderations.—In the firſt view I conſider the H—ſe as acting in its juriſdiction of grand inqueſt of the nation, as having made an inquiſition formed into reſolutions, and as having, by their addreſs, made a preſentment of the crimes and miſdemeanors found in the ſaid reſolutions. In the ſecond place I ſhall conſider this meaſure, now taken by Miniſtry, as a political meaſure, under the particular caſe laid before us for the inforcing of revenue laws. When, Sir, I conſider this h—ſe as acting in its juriſdiction of grand inqueſt of the nation, I muſt beg leave to mark, to every individual who hears me, the eſſential difference that there is between coming to an opinion upon a political meaſure, and the giving a judgment which becomes their verdict. In the firſt caſe. I do not wonder that gentlemen ſhould defer their opinions to the opinions of perſons, who, from their ſituation and employment, muſt be better informed of the neceſſity, the propriety, and effect of any political meaſure, as they alone can be fully informed of the circumſtances which call for it—of the means, connected with collateral events, which are really practicable—and as they are more eſpecially reſponſible for the conſequences of ſuch meaſures which they propoſe or undertake—I ſay, Sir, it is natural, for various reaſons, that there ſhould always be a majority of gentlemen who are diſpoſed to make this deference of their opinions; but, Sir, when they do conſider that they are ſitting in judgment, and are to give their verdict, there is not a ſingle individual who hears me, that can think it conſiſtent, either with his honour or his conſcience, to make that deference of his judgment, when that judgment is to form the verdict: I therefore, Sir, call upon and appeal to the conſcience of every m—r of this h—ſe to examine, with the ſame preciſion and juſtice, the facts ſtated in theſe reſolutions, before they give their judgment on them as crimes, as they would do if they were members of a grand jury: and it is in this view that I beg to ſubmit my opinion upon the reſolves now offered to the h—ſe. Upon the whole, I do venture to pronounce, that however illegal and unconſtitutional we may ſuppoſe the proceedings of the h—ſe of repreſentatives of the Maſſachuſets Bay to have been; yet, Sir, theſe reſolutions, if they charge them not only with crimes and miſdemeanors that they have not committed, but with thoſe which they have carefully and cautiouſly avoided to commit, there would be in our proceedings a ſpirit and temper hardly to be reconciled to juſtice. If there be any thing in theſe reſolves, now propoſed to you, charging the council and civil magiſtrates of that province with having neglected to execute and perform thoſe duties, which, as a truſt, they are by their charter required to do, and if thoſe charges ſhould lead to any thing that is to affect that charter—while thoſe charges are neither rightly underſtood, nor ſufficiently grounded—ſurely we ought not precipitately to come into theſe reſolutions, without having thoroughly examined the caſe and circumſtances under which theſe people were to act, and alſo the ſteps and conduct which they, to the beſt of their judgment, thought proper to take, in order to reſtore and keep peace. However illegal and unconſtitutional the proceedings of the town-meeting of Boſton may have been—whatever tendencies they may be ſuppoſed to have had—however dangerous the meeting of convention may be ſuppoſed to have been, and whatever intention may be imputed to it—we ſurely ſhould not haſtily, and without ſufficient examination of the ſtate of the evidence, charge them with the uſurpation of the powers of government, and with intentions of ſetting up a new and unconſtitutional authority independent of the crown of Great-Britain. It is therefore, Sir, for this purpoſe I muſt intreat the indulgence and patience of the h—ſe to permit me to examine theſe ſeveral charges by the nature of the evidence upon which they are founded.

When I conſider the charge which is made in the firſt and ſecond reſolutions againſt the proceedings of the houſe of r— in January and February 1768, I do, Sir, acknowledge that there are many things which I would not dare to juſtify in this h—. I do acknowledge, Sir, that wherever they call into queſtion the power and authority of the King, Lords & Commons in parliament aſſembled, to make laws and ſtatutes of ſufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of Am— ſubjects of the crown of Great Britain in all caſes whatſoever—Whether this be done by reſolutions, or by writing of letters, they are unwarrantable and dangerous, are illegal and and unconſtitutional proceedings, and derogatory of the right of the crown and parrliament of Great Britain. But when there is any particular fact charged in aggravation of theſe proceedings▪ when the h— of r— is charged with intent to create unlawful combinations againſt the laws and ſtatutes of Great Britain, upon the fact that they came to a reſolution, by letters, to deſire the other houſes of aſſembly on the continent, to join with them in this denial of the authority of parliament—that fact ought to be very carefully ſtated, and very ſurely founded in the evidence that is given of it.—Now, let me ſtate how this fact does actually ſtand, and then compare it as it is ſtated in the ſecond reſolution. The h— of r—, in January 1768, in a dabate upon the expediency of writing to the aſſemblies of the other colonies on the continent, with reſpect to the importance of their joining with them, &c, put a queſtion upon their propoſition of writing letters, deſiring thoſe aſſemblies to join with them—which paſſed in the negative—and was ſo negatived for this very reaſon, becauſe containing that very propoſition of joining, the h— thought exceptions might be taken to it, as having a tendency to the forming combinations, and might be conſidered at home as the appointing another congreſs. Beſides what I know from my own informations of this matter, I am founded in ſaying that this was the very reaſon why this motion received its negative, becauſe Governor Bernard, in his letter of the 30th of January 1768, gives this very account of it. But although, Sir, the houſe of r—s thought that that this mode of proceeding, to deſire the other aſſemblies to join with them, was neither prudent nor juſtifiable, yet they did not think that there could be any exception taken to their acquainting the other houſes of r—s on the continent with the meaſures they had taken with regard to the difficulties ariſing from the acts of parliament for levying duties and taxes on the American colonies. The firſt queſtion received its negative, becauſe it was liable to the very imputation you now charge them with; and the ſecond cautiouſly avoids every ſtep, and even expreſſion, that might be liable to ſuch imputations, and yet you do charge them therewith. You charge them firſt with unlawful combinations, and ſupport that charge by evidence of a fact which never did exiſt, by reciting the exceptionable words of a motion which received its negative becauſe it had thoſe exceptionable words in it: and notwithſtanding the gentlemen who firſt brought forward this charge have condeſcended to amend the error, as to date, yet I perceive they think ſtill that the reſolve that gave occaſion to the circular letter ſtill ſtands in the affirmative upon the Journals of the houſe for January. They are led into this error by their ignorance of the proceedings of that houſe, when it proceeds to reconſider a negative, ſo as to leave the original ſubject at large—yet they might have been ſet right (firſt) by Governor Bernard's letter of the 30th of January, which acquaints the Secretary of State that the whole of this buſineſs ſtood negatived in the month of January: and (next) by the Speaker's letter, which tells the ſame Miniſter, that the reſolution which gave birth to the circular letter took place on the 4th of February: but I ſee it is determined that we muſt cenſure a reſolve which never exiſted. Now, Sir, however you may be founded in the other parts of the charge brought forward in the two firſt reſolutions—can any man give his judgment upon inqueſt that this charge is founded.

In conſidering the charges brought againſt the council and civil magiſtrates in the third and fourth reſolutions—I beg leave, firſt, to examine the nature and circumſtances of the riots and tumults ſaid to have continued for ſome time in the town of Boſton. Whatever may have been the general diſcontents of the people of that town at the revenue laws—whatever may have been their general diſguſt againſt the commiſſioners of the revenue—whatever may have been their murmurings—whatever their complaints, either in ſpeaking or writing—whatever may have been the illegal conduct of ſome audacious ſmugglers, in open defiance of law and civil authority—I find, in the evidence, but two tranſactions that can be conſtrued into riot and tumult. The firſt was on the 18th of March; the ſecond on the 10th of June; that on the 18th of March, was nothing more than a mere proceſſion of a poſt-chariot or two, and ſome ſingle horſe chaiſes, with a mob of boys, and idle people at their heels, by way of ovation or triumph over the ſtamp-act, on the anniverſary of its repeal. There was, Sir, a proceſſion of the very ſame nature in London upon the anniverſary of the failure of the exciſe bill; and yet, Sir, the civil magiſtrates of the city of London never had any ſuch ſevere charge brought againſt them for not putting a ſtop thereto. On the contrary, that great miniſter Sir Robert Walpole ſaid, he ſhould be aſhamed not to diſtinguiſh oppoſition to the laws from oppoſition to the miniſter, and ſhould think himſelf a very bad man to confound what was harmleſs in the one caſe with what was dangerous and criminal in the other. As to the riot on the 10th of June, it was undoubtedly not only illegal, but of a dangerous nature—yet, Sir, it was ſudden, unpremeditated, and temporary.—It began and ended within a few hours, on the ſame evening—The effect was over before any preventive meaſures could have been taken to ſuppreſs it; nor was any civil magiſtrate applied to at the time; nor has any violence, riot or tumult happened ſince. The council (which is all that their authority could do) took the occaſion to expreſs their abhorrence of all ſuch riots and tumults, and to adviſe the governor to direct the attorney-general to proſecute the offenders; and notwithſtanding government has been informed, on this particular occaſion, that nothing but the exertion of military power could prevent an open revolt of the town of Boſton, which might probably ſpread throughout the provinces: yet, Sir, it is plain by the letter of Governor Bernard to the commiſſioners of the revenue, written by the unanimous deſire of the council, that ſo far from expecting, at that time, any further violences, there was no ground to expect any violences at all.—Which unanimous opinion of the governor and council hath been juſtified by the event; becauſe no ſuch riots or violences have ſince happened; ſo that the whole of theſe riots and tumults, ſaid to have continued for ſome time, are reduced to the ſudden unpremeditated riſing of a mob for two or three hours.—Upon this ſtate of the facts—is there any ground to bring forward a charge of cenſure againſt the town in general, or upon the council or civil magiſtracy of that province, which can lead to any thing that may affect their charter! If the reſolution leads to that—it is not founded—if it does not—it is irritating & provoking, & means nothing.

I take no notice of the fifth reſolution, as it contains only the approbation of a meaſure taken by Miniſtry here, the good or bad effect of which is yet in the womb of time, and may prove a monſtrous unnatural birth.

On the ſixth reſolution, I muſt own that I have no grounds on which to juſtify or defend the town meetings of Boſton on the 14th of June, & 12th of September—for their imprudencies have taken the ground from under my feet; yet knowing that the generality of the people there met, are and ever have been a faithful, valuable and loyal people, I will ſtill hope that there was nothing ſo miſchievous in their intentions as the aſpect of them was bad and ſuſpicious. I will ſtill hope that independency never was in their heads—I am ſure ſedition and rebellion never was in their hearts, however they may have been deluded and miſled into actions which they did not underſtand, and have not ſeen the conſequences of.

The ſeventh and eighth reſolutions do indeed contain very heavy and very criminal charges upon the town meeting of Boſton, and on the meeting of convention. They are not indeed charged with treaſon and miſpriſion of treaſon in the direct and technical terms thereof; but when we are told that all thoſe terms are cautiouſly avoided, and yet hear it ſaid, at the ſame time, that it is impoſſible to ſay how far, upon the examination of the acts and deeds committed (all conſpiring to uſurpations of the powers of government, and the ſitting up of new and unconſtitutional authority independent of the crown of Great Britain) how far they may amount to treaſon or miſpriſion of treaſon—I own, Sir, I am ſtill more afraid of thoſe words than if the charge had been direct and technical, as I do not ſee what (by implication or conſtruction) they may not lead to; and therefore, Sir, if there be any treaſon, or miſpriſion of treaſon, it would have been fairer to have charged them with it directly, in the technical terms thereof, than to leave any future judge, or future jury, to tranſlate our words into technical terms hereafter. But let us examine how the facts do actually ſtand: if the ſelectmen of Boſton had iſſued precepts for the electing of deputies to meet in convention, as a general aſſembly of the repreſentatives of the province, they would undoubtedly have uſurped the powers of government, & not only manifeſted a deſign to ſet up, but would have actually ſet up, a new and unconſtitutional authority, independent of the crown of Great Britain; and the convention meeting at that predicament, would have been a direct treaſonable meeting. The iſſuing a precept cannot be done but under the authority of the King's writ, which paſſes under the great ſeal of the province: the forms of ſuch precept, and ſuch writ, are preſcribed and directed by a law of the province; nor can any other letter or matter iſſued in any other form be, by any implication or conſtruction whatſoever, deemed a precept. On the contrary, that the ſelect men of one town ſhould write letters to the ſelect men of other towns, deſiring them to appoint committees to meet and convene upon matters of common concern, hath been the common law and invariable practice of that country, from their firſt eſtabliſhment, and is in one particular inſtance directed & required to be done by a ſtatute of the province—But as the candor of the gentlemen induces them to recede from this charge, and to alter the words iſſuing a precept, to thoſe of writing a letter, I ſhall ſay no more on that head.

Deputies are ſuch as are elected or deputed to ſerve for and repreſent the freeholders of the province in general aſſembly, appointed under the great ſeal to be held or convened. Theſe deputies muſt be freeholders, and elected or deputed by freeholders—muſt be elected by direction of a precept under the King's writ.—If therefore the town-meetings had elected ſuch deputies it would have been a treaſonable uſurpation of the powers of government: but the fact is, that the town meeting choſe one or more perſons each, as a committee, which they are authoriſed by the practice and law of their province to do. The perſons choſen for theſe committees need not be freeholders, nor are they choſen by freeholders, but by any inhabitant qualified to meet in town meeting. The election, therefore, of ſuch is not ſetting up a new and unconſtitutional authority—is no uſurpation of the powers of government. And although the word convening, or convention, from the uſe of it in this country in the year 1688, and by the ſtrange and unaccountable application of it in the town meeting referring to that period as a precedent, may convey to us here an idea of a moſt dangerous and unwarrantable aſſembly, and the more dangerous and unwarrantable, if any caſe was ſuppoſed that could give ground for ſuch aſſembly: yet in that country the word convene is a mere concurrent word to the word meeting. By an act of the 4th of William and Mary, for regulating townſhips, it is ſaid, the freeholders ſhall annually meet and convene. By the 5th and 6th of George the ſecond, touching precinct meetings, it is ſaid, "the freeholders and inhabitants ſo convened."—And by the 1ſt of Anne, commiſſioners of ſewers are impowered to meet and convene.— So that ſo far as the word goes, meeting and convening, or meeting in convention, means no more than a common and uſual act But, Sir, as it did meet and convene, in ſo queſtionable a form, I hope I may be permitted to conſider the deſign in meeting—the conduct of this convention when met—and the effect of its meeting. Whatever may have been contained in the letter from the ſelect men of the town of Boſton, yet that was neither the foundation nor the warrant for their convening.

Seeing the violent agitation and ſtate of inflammability in which the people of the maritime parts of the province eſpecially were heated to a degree of madneſs, the town meetings choſe committees, and the committees met and convened, in order to prevent any miſchief and ill conſequences that might have ariſen from that dangerous ſtate of the people's minds. They met to promote, to the utmoſt of their abilities, peace and good order amongſt the people, and due ſubmiſſion to government. They met to reſtrain them from going into any illegal or unconſtitutional practices, and to turn their ſpirit into the right and conſtitutional channel of hoping and waiting for redreſs of ſuch grievances as they thought they were under, by petitions preferred to his Majeſty, and by relying on the juſtice of the nation: and their conduct, Sir, was agreeable to this deſign; for the moment that they met, before they had advice of the arrival of the men of war, and of the troops, They diſclaimed all pretence to any authoritative or governmental acts, and did actually diſclaim all pretences of uſurping any of the rights of ſovereignty, or even of arrogating to themſelves any authority whatſoever. They gave their free and ſincere advice, not in an authoritative, but merely friendly manner—adviſing and perſuading the people of the province to avoid all tumults and diſorders—ſtating to them the dreadful conſequences of ſuch—and converting the channel of their conduct into that of reliance upon government, in expectation of the effect that the petition ſent home ſome time before by their repreſentatives would have, and undertaking themſelves as committees met and convened to repeat that meaſure of petitioning; the drawing up of which petitions, one to the Governor, another to the King, and the writing a letter to Mr. De Berdt (whom they conſidered as a ſort of agent for the province) was all that they actually did.

The authority which theſe gentlemen had with the people, and the prudent and temperate ſteps which they took, does to me appear the rather to have been the cauſe that no diſturbances have happened in the province ſince the arrival of the troops, than any other reaſon that can be given, however ſpecious, and however calculated for our belief; and to this meeting or convention I impute this good effect.

This, Sir, being to the beſt of my judgment the actual ſtate, and the real facts of this caſe—if I conſider my giving my opinion upon the reſolutions before us as a verdict upon an inqueſt, however I may believe and be of opinion, there may have been a conduct in many things very blameable—in many more imprudent;—yet, upon the whole of the charge brought in theſe reſolutions, I muſt, as far as my judgment goes, think it is no true bill: and, if this be my opinion of the reſolutions, I muſt neceſſarily, if I conſider the addreſs (as I do) as a preſentment upon this inqueſt, give my opinion againſt that alſo: but I am not only againſt it as a preſentment upon a charge which I think no true bill, but as it goes to the adviſing the crown to a proceeding directly contrary to that law, and to thoſe rights which I think the people of the province of Maſſachuſets Bay are intitled to—as it goes to the adviſing the crown to a proceeding which, conſiſtent with its own acts, it cannot go into, and which I think none of his Majeſty's council will ever adviſe him to enter into;—at leaſt, ſuch advice would put his Majeſty under ſuch difficulty, as no one man would wiſh to put another.—And what I am going to ſay is the foundation of this opinion, which I wiſh and call upon the crown lawyers to attend to and conſider.—The crown, in the 8th of William the Third, gave its conſent to an act of the province of Maſſachuſets Bay, for regulating trials for high treaſon within that province, according to an act of parliament of the 7th of William. I know that no provincial act whatever, even with the conſent of the crown added to it, can alter or ſuperſede any act of parliament—I know, and will allow, that this act does not ſuperſede or repeal the thirty-fifth of Harry the Eighth—but ſo far forth as the iſſuing this ſpecial commiſſion for trying treaſons here in England under that act, be a meaſure which the King may or may not take—I do ſay, that the crown having given its conſent that the people of the province of Maſſachuſets Bay ſhall be tryed within that province, according to the ſeventh of William, ſo far as that will or pleaſure can be bound by that conſent ſo given, never will or can, conſiſtent with the acts of the crown, iſſue ſuch commiſſion to bring any delinquent out of the province, and to try him here upon the act of Harry the Eighth.

I ſuggeſted this before in the form of doubt, in hopes it might have drawn forth ſome anſwer. I do now pronounce peremptorily and poſitively that the crown neitheir will or can iſſue ſuch commiſſion, and I call upon the crown lawyers to anſwer this, if they have anſwer to give. The people have thought themſelves aggrieved in having the caſes of their property determined in the court of Admiralty, without the benefit of juries—perhaps that complaint may not be founded entirely in law; but if they think ſo, and if this procedure by which they may, without the preſentment of an inqueſt of twelve lawful men, be taken into cuſtody, and in that cuſtody ſent over hither to be put upon their trial for their lives, ſhould ſtrike their hearts upon this old ſore, how deeply muſt it wound them, and to what a dangerous ſtate of deſperation may it not drive their minds. If they conſider that they may be preſented by their Governor, a ſingle man, and in conſequence of that preſentment taken into cuſtody, and ſent priſoners 3000 miles to be put upon their trial, which of itſelf, ſhould they be acquitted, is a puniſhment of the ſevereſt and moſt cruel nature: if they conſider that they are thus deprived of the common liberty which we enjoy, of not being preſented and put upon trial but by the inqueſt of twelve lawful men of our country—to what predicament muſt they think themſelves reduced—I own I dread the conſequence if the Americans ſhould feel that they are in that predicament, but I am comforted becauſe I am ſure they never will feel it, as I am convinced that ſuch commiſſion never will nor can be iſſued, that ſuch proceedings never will be, nor can be, carried into execution.

I will therefore next conſider this meaſure connected with the military manoeuvres in America—as a political meaſure planned and deſigned to enforce the execution of the revenue laws in that country.—To be able to judge of the effect of ſuch meaſure, it will be neceſſary to ſtate the caſe to which it is applied.

On one hand you have your declaratory law,—your revenue laws as the exertion of the declared right—you have your commiſſioners to execute theſe laws—and the military to enforce this execution.—On the other hand, the Americans do univerſally, invariably and unalterably declare, that they ought not to ſubmit to any internal taxes impoſed upon them by any legiſlature wherein they have not repreſentatives of their own election.—On this principle they oppoſe ſuch taxes by their Petitions and Remonſtrances only, as yet, but there is ſomething threatning in the bad temper and ill blood which ſeems to be forced up—ſo that the iſſue is well nigh brought to force.—The people of that country and the king's troops are, as it were, ſet in array againſt each other.—The ſword indeed is not drawn—but the hand is upon it.— The word for action is not indeed yet given, but miſchief is on tip-toe; and the ſlighteſt circumſtance would in a moment throw every thing into confuſion and bloodſhed. And if ſome mode of policy does not interpoſe to remove this exertion of military power—the union between Great Britain and North America is broken for ever—unleſs (what is worſe) both are united in one common ruin.

Where the whole ſpirit and bent of a people, who have the powers of government within themſelves, is fixed and determined againſt a tax—experience and common ſenſe will convince you, that no civil power, no civil coercion, will ever aſſeſs or collect it.

It will be found alſo in the trial, fact; that no military force can do this—it never did, ſo long as the forms only of government remained: it cannot aſſeſs or collect: it may raiſe a contribution by military execution—but that is not government, it is war.

Here, Sir! I muſt beg to mark the diſtinction between the application of military force in this caſe, and the application of it in the uſual caſes which ariſe in Great Britain.

Military force is never applied, but when called for by the civil magiſtrate—never acts, but in aid of the civil magiſtrate—and under the orders and command of the civil magiſtrate: but if they are ſent to Boſton—the civil magiſtrate the mean while proteſting that they are not wanted—if they are ſent, not in aid of the civil magiſtrate, but as it were to force him to act: are not put under his orders, but take poſſeſſion of his juriſdiction, and take the command—that is not government, it is war.

If the people are indeed in rebellion—it is a neceſſary war: but if they neither make, nor intend, any oppoſition by force or arms—if they have continued, and do continue, to pay the duties—what is there for the troops to do? however the people may ſubmit, in theſe points, in fact—the troops will never convert them to the opinion of the right.

And here I cannot withold an obſervation which a friend of mine in that country makes on this occaſion: If you mean to govern the country by the aid of military force, you have not ſent a ſufficient number of troops— if you do not mean this, you have already ſent too many. But— thank God, reſiſtance by force and arms is not the reſiſtance which you have to guard againſt. The people of America are husbandmen and merchants; who have lived by their dependence upon, and under the protection of Great Britain—are unaccuſtomed to arms—are not trained up in a military ſpirit—do not (to uſe an expreſſion of their own) feel hold to reſiſt by arms: yet, if you attempt to force taxes againſt the ſpirit of the people there, you will find, when perhaps it is too late, that they are of a ſpirit which will reſiſt all force—which will grow ſtronger by being forced— will prove ſuperior to all force—and ever has been unconquerable: they are of a ſpirit to abide, nay, to court, perſecution: and if amongſt other propoſitions which they have taken up they ſhould once take it into their heads that they are under a ſtate of perſecution; that ſpirit of enthuſiaſm which is of their temper, and of their very nature, will ariſe; and every miſchievous conſequence, in every extreme, will accompany it.

This ſpirit is not dead in them; it is only dormant; the utmoſt care and ſkill of thoſe who lead them, either in civil or religious matters, is employed to reſtrain and keep it down. If this ſpirit ſhould once take fire—and believe me, Sir, it is in ſuch a ſtate of inflammability that the ſmalleſt ſpark would give it fire—it will break out into a flame, which no reaſon, no prudence, no force can reſtrain: thoſe who yet retain ſome lead, and have kept matters from running to extremities, to whom the people ſtill liſten—will either loſe that lead, or will take the lead of this ſpirit when it ſhall be once gone forth—and if the miniſters (whom we here call the clergy) once fall in with this ſpirit; if the people once call upon them, they muſt take the lead—and if they do, the people (to uſe their own phraſe) will be led by Moſes and Aaron, by the civil and religious, under a bond of unity that no factions will divide, no force can break.

The ſpirit of their religion—or if you pleaſe ſo to call it of fanaticiſm —will, like Moſes' ſerpent, devour every other paſſion and affection: their love for the mother country, changing its nature, will turn to the bittereſt hate: their affectation of our modes and faſhions, (the preſent ſource of great part of our commerce) will become an abomination in their ſight.

That ſpirit which led their anceſtors to break off from every thing which is near and dear to the human heart—from every connection which friendſhip, relation, blood could give—which led them to quit every comfort that a ſettled and civilized country (their own native country) could afford; and to encourage every difficulty and diſtreſs, which a wild wilderneſs of ſavages could oppoſe to them, to ſtruggle even for their exiſtence;—that ſpirit, equally ſtrong and equally inflamed, has but a ſlight and trifling ſacrifice to make at this time—they have not to quit their native country, but to defend it—they have not to forſake their friends and relations, but to unite with and to ſtand by them, in one common union. The only ſacrifice they have to make is that of a few follies and a few luxuries.—It is not neceſſity that is the ground of their commerce with you; it is merely the affectation of our modes and cuſtoms—the love for home, as they call England, that makes them like every thing which comes from thence; but paſſion may be conquered by paſſion, and they will abominate as ſincerely as they now love you; and if they do, they have within themſelves every thing which is neceſſary to the food, raiment, or the dwelling of mankind, and have no need of your commerce.

But that gentlemen may not think this to be mere harangue—I will come to particulars. They have a great ſurpluſage of hides and leather— hides are even part of their exports. They have peltry—they have wool, linen and cotton. They work up all theſe, and have home-made and home-ſpun, ſufficient for their cloathing. They have fiſh, game, beef, mutton and every other article at about one third of the price which we pay here—they have iron and copper which they caſt and work up in every form that is neceſſary. The only difficulty which they have at firſt to labour againſt, will be the manufacture of hardware. But when I tell the H— that they do already make all the implements of husbandry better than thoſe which come to them from England—and that the husbandmen buy ſuch, in preference to thoſe made in England—they will ſee how large a ſtride they have taken towards the eſtabliſhment of this branch of buſineſs: and (overloaded, from various reaſons, as every branch of our manufactures is with manufacturers) if a ſtop be put to them but for one year,—the tide is upon the turn; the manufacturers with the turn of that tide will go over in ſhoals to America—as they once came over hither from the Netherlands. If it be not the humour of the h— to bear to be told this now, they will remember it hereafter.

In one word. If this ſpirit of fanaticiſm ſhould once ariſe upon the idea of perſecution—thoſe people whom Great Britain hath to this hour drawn as it were with a thread—and whom it has governed, as you have been ingeniouſly told, with a little paper and packthread—you will not for the future be able to govern it with a rod of iron: and every benefit which this country has derived from that country, will be ſtopped at every ſource.

If it be not the humour of the h— to believe this at preſent—I only beg they will remember it has been ſaid, and that they are forewarned of it.

If this then be the ſtate of this buſineſs, and theſe the conſequences of proceeding by exertion of force inſtead of meaſures of policy—and if after all, force will not and cannot produce the effect aimed at—but will produce ſuch directly contrary and pernicious effects: if after alienating the people of the colonies—after diſſolving the union that is between us—after breaking all communication of commerce between us; it ſhall be found impoſſible to tax a people who have the powers of government within themſelves, unleſs by and with their own conſent, either in the grant, or by their acquieſcing in the grant with their conſent to aſſeſs and collect ſuch tax—if this be the caſe—there remains no other alternative, but to adopt ſome mode of policy, that will carry that conſent along with the power of government.

But why do I endeavour, under the diſcouragement which gentlemen give to any reaſoning, any conſideration of this matter; why ſhould I endeavour to obtrude my poor reaſoning ſo ill received? Why ſhould I talk of adopting modes of policy when the ſhorter way—of the queſtion and deciſion, the ſhort way of force, ſeems already adopted? Nevertheleſs, even under this diſcouragement, if gentlemen attend, I will mark out that mode of policy by which every evil may be avoided, and all again be reſtored to peace, to union and government. This mode lies in the nature of the buſineſs, in the actual ſtate of things—it is the moſt eaſy to be underſtood— the moſt eaſy to be executed—nay, the only one that is practicable.

What I would wiſh to ſuggeſt to the conſideration of the h—, and what I know would ſucceed—is this plain and ſimple advice—that you ſhould not ſtir up, but wave, all queſtions which become mere articles of faith—that you ſhould make no innovotions in practice, nor ſuffer any encroachments to be made on government—that you ſhould take the ground that you now actually ſtand upon—and that government ſhould act upon that ground, as it hath done invariably for 160 years paſt, from the firſt eſtabliſhment of the colonies.

This would heal that union between the mother country and her colonies, which hath been vitiated;—would reſtore that communication of commerce which otherwiſe will be cut off—would revive again the ſpirit of obedience—and re-eſtabliſh the power of government.

Truth lies in a very narrow compaſs. I ſhall not therefore take up much time in explaining to the h— this plain and practical propoſition. I ſee the h— is impatient to decide; but it is for that very reaſon, ſeeing the danger of the deciſion, that I labour to obtrude and even force, againſt their inclinations, my poor opinion to their conſideration—I do not attempt or pretend to amuſe and entertain them. I cannot expect their attention, it is from the importance of the ſubject that I beſeech their patience.

From the firſt eſtabliſhment of the colonies, till within three or four years paſt, the people there have enjoyed and exerciſed the power of taxing themſelves internally— of giving and granting their own money,

Firſt, For the ſupport of government within the limits and precincts of their reſpective juriſdictions.

Secondly, For the aid of the mother country whenſoever called upon or required for that ſpecial purpoſe.

In which the mother country never interfered.—On the other hand, the mother country has uninterruptedly and invariably laid and impoſed upon them external taxes by port duties—which the people never have oppoſed—never conſidered as a grievance—nay, never objected to, or petitioned againſt.

Government gave to theſe people no occaſion of diſputes, by laying internal taxes; and hath always found reaſon to be ſatisfied with the liberality and chearfulneſs of their free grants and aids.

The people, on the other hand, never objected to external taxes —to impoſts, ſubſidies and duties. They know that the expreſs conditions of their ſettlements and eſtabliſhments were, that they ſhould pay theſe—and therefore they never have had any diſputes with government on this head—but have always found reaſon to be ſatisfied in the moderation with which government hath exerciſed this power.

Within four or five years paſt, it was thought adviſeable to lay internal taxes on the people of the colonies. The queſtions which this meaſure and the repeal of it, raiſed and brought into diſcuſſion—and the manner in which this queſtion was moſt unaccountably agitated; by arguing from precedents of external taxes to the juſtice and propriety of internal taxes; by ſaying, that there was no difference— has taught the colonies, to retort the reverſe of the propoſition, by arguing from internal to external. In this argument they have adopted your own propoſition— and by your help have reaſoned themſelves into an oppoſition to all external taxes which they had hitherto ſubmitted to for a century and half. Hence we receive at this day complaints of grievances, calls for redreſs, petitions and remonſtrances againſt theſe taxes—and hence, all the miſchiefs of this day's perplexity.

But, Sir! all this is a mere outwork; advanced on your ground—it is not their real defence, on ground which they hope to maintain—it is mere argument ad hominem; it is fighting you with your own weapons. Neither their own principles, nor the conſtitution of their eſtabliſhments, give ground for this reaſoning—nor do their own arguments lead them to theſe concluſions. They neither are nor can be in earneſt in making theſe claims, otherwiſe than having ſomething to negotiate with, and to give up.

If therefore you will act in the government of the colonies as you have done for 160 years paſt; and will take the ground that this buſineſs does actually now ſtand upon—and will ſuffer it to be known and underſtood that you do really adopt this mode of adminiſtration, all may be quiet, and would be quiet, as ſoon as a ſhip could arrive with the news of it in North America.

The ground that this buſineſs doth actually ſtand upon is this—you have now no internal taxes upon which queſtions may be raiſed or diſputes ariſe with the Americans.—You have no conceſſions to make—no repeals as to internal taxes— The external taxes which are laid upon the colonies, are no other as to the matter of them, than ſuch as the colonies have ever ſince their firſt eſtabliſhment ſubmitted to and paid: and you have pledged yourſelves, that if in the mode of theſe taxes there be any thing which is injurious to the ſpirit of commerce—any thing which is matter of real grievance—you will be ready to relieve and to amend: there is not at preſent any intention of extending the exerciſe of our power to the laying internal taxes; nor will any future miniſtry (be they compoſed of whomſoever they may) over venture to lay internal taxes.

But as there are thoſe who ſay that there is no ſuch diſtinction—as alſo others who do not ſee how this diſtinction can ariſe—I will, if the impatience of gentlemen to come to a deciſion without diſcuſſion, without a debate, will permit me, mark ſuch diſtinction: after which, I will eſtabliſh the plain, ſimple advice which I preſume to give on thoſe reaſonings which I advance, as to the policy, the wiſdom, the experience, the juſtice, the neceſſity of the meaſure.

1. The conditions of the grants and charters under which theſe people did firſt quit this country and ſettle in America; and on which their corporations and powers of government are eſtabliſhed—do expreſly ſtipulate for the payment of ſubſidies, duties, and impoſts, almoſt without variation, in the ſame words, throughout every grant and charter. I need not now repeat or recite theſe clauſes—they are apparent, and open to the inſpection of every one.

On the other hand, every charter does expreſly or intentionally make a diſtiction between theſe and ſuch taxes as they are permitted and impowered to lay on their own eſtates, real and perſonal, within the precincts and limits of their territories; and on ſuch tranſactions as ſhall paſs within their own juriſdiction.

The charter of Virginia, after having directly fixed the right of payment of the ſubſidies, impoſts and duties, from the company to the crown; and having made a grant of the ſame to the company for 21 years—has theſe words: That they ſhall be free of all ſubſidies and cuſtoms in Virginia for 21 years, and from all taxes and impoſitions for over. —Making not only an expreſs diſtinction in the matter but in the right—and in conſequence of this diſtinction, the incorporating charters of government gave them power to tax themſelves.

The charter of Maryland, in all the grants therein made, makes an expreſs ſaving of impoſts, duties and cuſtoms to the king and his heirs for ever, which the people of that province by the expreſs condition of their charter are bound to pay—yet the ſame charter, likewiſe making the diſtinction both in matter and right, between internal and external taxation—We our heirs and ſucceſſors ſhall at no time ſet and make, or cauſe to ſet, any impoſition, cuſtom, or other taxation, rate or contribution whatſoever, in and upon the dwellers and inhabitants of the aforeſaid province, for their lands, goods, tenements or chattels WITHIN THE SAID PROVINCE. —And in conſequence of this, the legiſlature of the province has power granted to impoſe and aſſeſs taxes within the precincts and juriſdictions of its territories.

In the ſame manner (for it would be tireſome to cite all particulars) and almoſt in the ſame words, all the charters of incorporation and government—which are to be diſtinguiſhed from the original grants of the lands and territories—make the ſame diſtinction—ſtipulating expreſly for the payment of all impoſts, ſubſidies and duties, according to the law of merchants.—But as to the lands, tenements and hereditaments within the precincts and juriſdictions—leaving thoſe at large, as objects of the taxation of the ſeveral legiſlatures which are reſpectively thereby eſtabliſhed; with powers to ordain and eſtabliſh all manner of laws, impoſe and aſſeſs, and to levy money on the lands and hereditaments within the bounds of their grants.

2. And as this was both intentionally & expreſly the liberties & franchiſes granted to theſe colonies at their firſt ſettlement; and ſo underſtood; as far as the crown could or might grant Virginia charter..—So the exerciſe and adminiſtration of government towards theſe people hath been for a century and half invariably conducted on this plan— always impoſing or requiring external or port duties—never, till of late years, calling forth the power of parliament to exert its abſolate power in laying duties and taxes on the dwellers and inhabitants of thoſe colonies for their lands, heriditaments or tranſactions within the precincts and juriſdictions of their ſeveral territories.

3. The colonies having been uſed to this diſtinction by the courſe and practice of government, have in their reaſoning marked an eſſential difference in the nature of the thing.

Whatever tax or duty is impoſed upon external property imported into their country—is indeed annexed to the property, but not upon them either in their rights or perſons; untill they chooſe, by purchaſing that property with the tax annexed to it, to annex that tax alſo to themſelves: but this is an act of their own conſent.

Whatever tax is impoſed on any property immediately and intimately united with their perſons or rights, muſt be paid without any interpoſition of their own will, unleſs they quit that property, or forego that right.

The firſt is external; and annexed or not, at their own will—the ſecond is internal, and abſolutely annexed to what is inſeperable from them.

Seeing this eſſential difference in the nature of the thing, eſtabliſhed by invariable preſcription from their firſt eſtabliſhment as a government—they reaſon (and juſtly too) from this diſtinction and this preſcription, That whatever right of taxing themſelves within the precincts and limits of their own juriſdictions they may enjoy by the principles of the Britiſh government and their own conſtitution; or whatever rights they may have been permitted to exerciſe by preſcription and practice— ſuch right or rights are confined to their own limits. Howſoever they may reaſon right or wrong as to internal taxes, their arguments go not beyond low water mark —whatever paſſes the great ocean to or from without, either is originally, or commences to be, ſeparate and diſtinct from their internal rights and property: whoever acts and trades beyond the limits of their precincts, acts and trades under the expreſs conditions of the maritime laws, both of regulation and revenue.

If therefore there be any difference in this diſtinction—in the nature, circumſtances and effect of taxes, internal and external—if there be any diſtinction in the caſe whether the conſent of the ſubject goes or does not go along with a payment made under a tax—ſo far as theſe diſtinctions do go, ſo far is there a diſtinction in the right; reſpecting the extent to which the rights of ſuch people may be admitted.

4. But the principles on which the Houſe of Commons grounds its peculiar right to originate all grants, and to frame all money bills, gives the colonies reaſonable expectation, that, whatever be the right of the king, lords and commons, aſſembled in parliament to make laws which ſhall be binding on the colonies in all caſes whatever—the Houſe of Commons will never in act and deed originate any grants from the lands or money within the limits and precincts of the colonies, until it ſhall be clear beyond all doubt that the members of that houſe do in act and deed repreſent the counties, cities and boroughs in America, as they do the counties, cities, and boroughs of Great-Britain, for whom they give and grant—or that according to the principles maintained by the Houſe of Commons, they do give and grant for the counties, cities and boroughs whom they do in act and deed repreſent.

I ſay, Sir! no miniſtry will ever venture—the preſent do not deſire or mean— to propoſe ſuch taxes to the Houſe of Commons: and that houſe never will, conſiſtent with thoſe principles by which it maintains this right of originating grants, excluſive of the lords—I ſay, never will, adopt and originate any ſuch tax.

What then remains—but that as you are in fact, and by good fortune, reſtored again to the ſafe old ground on which this matter hath always ſtood—but that you reſume again the ſpirit of your old policy. I am founded when I ſay that this would reſtore again peace, order and government.—I have letters in my pocket from ſome of the principal, ſome of the leading men in that country—who ſay we do not call upon Great Britain to give up her rights and claims— 〈…〉 deſire to be returned back, and ſet again upon our old ſafe ground, which we underſtood, and that in the exerciſe of your power you would return to your old policy.

Let the matter of right reſt upon the declaratory law, and ſay no more about it. It may be underſtood (as it is in the ſame words as that reſpecting Ireland) that it ſhall ſtand in the ſame line of adminiſtration—I ſay it may be ſo underſtood, and will be better underſtood by being never explained.

Do nothing which may bring into diſcuſſion queſtions of right, which muſt become mere articles of faith—Go into no innovations in practice, and ſuffer no encroachments on government—Extend not the power which you have of impoſing taxes, to the laying internal taxes on the colonies—Continue to exerciſe the power, which you have always exerciſed, of laying ſubſidies, impoſts, and duties—but exerciſe this, as you have always hitherto done, with prudence and moderation, and directed by the ſpirit of commercial wiſdom.

This ſpirit and mode of government would cement again that union which is ſhattered, if it is not quite broken—would reſtore again that ſpirit of obedience, which the loſs of authority on the one hand, and the loſs of affection on the other, hath incorrupted— would re-eſtabliſh the authority as well as force of civil government, which has almoſt loſt its force by loſing its authority.—EXERT THE SPIRIT OF POLICY that you may not ruin the colonies and yourſelves BY EXERTING FORCE.