IN the conſtitution of England, the three principal forms of government, monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy, are blended together in certain proportions; but each of theſe orders, in the exerciſe of the legiſlative authority, hath its peculiar department, from which the others are excluded. In this diviſion, the granting of ſupplies. or laying taxes, is deemed to be the province of the houſe of commons, as the repreſentative of the people......All ſupplies are ſuppoſed to ſlow from their gift; and the other orders are permitted only to aſſent, or reject generally, not to propoſe any modification, amendment, or partia • alteration of it.

This obſervation being conſidered, it will undeniably appear, that in framing the late Stamp Act, the commons acted in the character o • repreſentative of the colonies. They aſſumed it as the principle of tha • meaſure, and the propriety of it muſt therefore ſtand, or fall, as th • principle is true, or falſe: For the preamble ſets forth, that the com • mons of Great-Britain had reſolved to give and grant the ſeveral rat • and duties impoſed by the act; but what right had the commons 〈◊〉 Great-Britain to be thus munificent at the expence of the commons America?........To give property not belonging to the giver, and wit • out the conſent of the owner, is ſuch evident and flagrant injuſtice, ordinary caſes, that few are hardy enough to avow it; and therefo •• when it really happens, the fact is diſguiſed and varniſhed over by 〈◊〉 m • ſt plauſible pretences the ingenuity of the giver can ſuggeſt...... 〈◊〉 it is alledged that there is a virtual, or implied repreſentation of the co ••• nies ſpringing out of the conſtitution of the Britiſh government: 〈◊〉 it muſt be confeſſed on all hands, that, as the repreſentation is 〈◊〉 actual, it is virtual, or it doth not exiſt at all; for no third kind of preſentation can be imagined. The colonies claim the privilege, 〈◊〉 is common to all Britiſh ſubjects, of being taxed only with their 〈◊〉 conſent given by their repreſentatives, and all the advocates for Stamp Act admit this claim. Whether, therefore, upon the 〈◊〉 matter, the impoſition of the Stamp Duties is a proper exerciſe of conſtitutional authority, or not, depends upon the ſingle queſtion, Whether the commons of Great Britain are virtually the repreſentatives of the commons of America, or not.

The advocates for the Stamp Act admit, in expreſs terms, that the colonies do not chooſe members of parliament, but they aſſert that the colonies are virtually repreſented in the ſame manner with the non-electors reſident in Great Britain,

How have they proved this poſition? Where have they defined, or preciſely explained what they mean by the expreſſion, virtual repreſentation? As it is the very hinge upon which the rectitude of the taxation turns, ſomething more ſatisfactory than mere aſſertion, more ſolid than a form of expreſſion, is neceſſary: for how can it be ſeriouſly expected, that men, who think themſelves injuriouſly affected in their properties and privileges, will be convinced and reconciled by a fanciful phraſe, the meaning of which can't be preciſely aſcertained by thoſe who uſe it, or properly applied to the purpoſe for which it hath been advanced?

They argue, that the right of election being annexed to certain ſpecies of property, to franchiſes, and inhabitancy in ſome particular places, a very ſmall part of the land, the property, and the people of England are comprehended in thoſe deſcriptions. All landed property, not freehold, and all monied property, are excluded. The merchants of London, the proprietors of the public funds, the inhabitants of Leeds, Halifax, Birmingham, and Mancheſter, and that great corporation of the Eaſt-India company, none of them chooſe their repreſentatives, and yet are they all repreſented in parliament, and the colonies being exactly in their ſituation, are repreſented in the ſame manner.

Now, this argument, which is all that their invention hath been • ble to ſupply, is totally defective; for, it conſiſts of facts not true, and • concluſions inadmiſſible.

It is ſo far from being true, that all the perſons enumerated under • e character of non-electors, are in that predicament, that it is indu • tably certain there is no ſpecies of property, landed, or monied, • hich is not poſſeſſed by very many of the Britiſh electors.

I ſhall undertake to diſprove the ſuppoſed ſimilarity of ſituation, • ence the ſame kind of repreſentation is deduced, of the inhabitants 〈◊〉 the colonies, and of the Britiſh non-electors; and, if I ſucceed, 〈◊〉 notion of a virtual repreſentation of the colonies muſt fail, which, truth, is a mere cob web, ſpread to catch the unwary, and intangle 〈◊〉 weak. I wou • d be underſtood: I am upon a queſtion of propriety, not of power; and, though ſome may be inclined to think it is to little purpoſe to diſcuſs the one, when the other is irreſiſtible, yet are they different conſiderations; and, at the ſame time that I invalidate the claim upon which it is founded, I may very conſiſtently recommend a ſubmiſſion to the law, whilſt it endures. I ſhall ſay nothing of the uſe I intend by the diſcuſſion; for if it ſhould not be perceived by the ſequel, there is no uſe in it, and, if it ſhould appear then, it need not be premiſed.

Leſſees for years, copyholders, proprietors of the public fund • ▪ inhabitants of Birmingham, Leeds, Halifax, and Mancheſter, merchants of the city of London, or members of the corporation of the Eaſt-India company, are, as ſuch, under no perſonal incapacity to be electors; for they may acquire the right of election, and there are actually not only a conſiderable number of electors in each of the claſſes of leſſees for years, &c. but in many of them, if not all, even members of parliament. The intereſts therefore of the non-electors, the electors, and the repreſentatives, are individually the ſame; to ſay nothing of the connection among neighbours, friends, and relations. The ſecurity of the non-electors againſt oppreſſion, is, that their oppreſſion will fall alſo upon the electors and the repreſentatives. The one can't be injured, and the other indemnified.

Further, if the non-electors ſhould not be taxed by the Britiſh parliament, they would not be taxed at all; and it would be iniquitous as well as a ſoleciſm, in the political ſyſtem, that they ſhould partake of all the benefits reſulting from the impoſition, and application of taxes, and derive an immunity from the circumſtance of not being qualified to vote. Under this conſtitution then, a double or virtual repreſentation may be reaſonably ſuppoſed. The electors, who are inſeparably connected in their intereſts with the non-electors, may be juſtly deemed to be the repreſentatives of the non-electors, at the ſame time they exerciſe their perſonal privilege in the right of election; and the members choſen, therefore, the repreſentatives of both. This is the only rational explanation of the expreſſion, virtual repreſentation. None has been advanced by the aſſertors of it, and their meaning can only be inferred from the inſtances, by which they endeavour to elucidate it, and no other meaning can be ſtated, to which the inſtances apply.

It is an eſſential principle of the Engliſh conſtitution, that the ſubject ſhall not be taxed without his conſent, which hath not been introduced by any particular law, but neceſſarily reſults from the nature of that mixed government; for, without it, the order of democracy could not exiſt.

See Tre • t. Peerage. Parliaments were not formerly ſo regular in point of form as they now are. Even the number or knights for each ſhire were not aſcertained. The firſt writs now ex • ant for their choice, are 22d Edward I. by which, two, as at th • s day, were directed to be choſen for each county; but the king not being ſatisfied with that number, other writs were iſſued for chooſing two more. This diſcretionary power being thought inconvenient, was afterwards reſtrained by the ſtatutes of Richard II, Henry IV, and ſubſequent acts.

In earlier times there was more ſimplicity in the rules of government, and men were more ſolicitous about the eſſentials, than the forms of it. When the conſent of thoſe who were to perform, or pay any thing extrafeudal, was fairly applied for and obtained, the manner was little regarded; but, as the people had reaſon to be jealous of deſigns to impoſe contributions upon them without their conſent, it was thought expedient to have formalities regulated, and fixed, to prevent this injury to their rights, not to deſtroy a principle, without which, they could not be ſaid to have any rights at all.

Before the introduction of thoſe formalities, which were framed with a view to reſtrain the excu • ſions of power, and to ſecure the privileges of the ſubject, as the mode of proceeding was more ſimple, ſo perhaps this foundation of conſent was more viſible than it is at preſent, wherefore it may be of uſe to adduce ſome inſtances, which directly point out this neceſſary and eſſential principle of Britiſh liberty.

The lords and commons have ſeparately given aids and ſubſidies to the crown. In 13th Edward III, the lords granted the tenth of all the corn, &c. growing upon their demeſnes, the commons then granting nothing, nor concerning themſelves with what the lords thought fit to grant out of their own eſtates. At other times, the knights of ſhires, ſeparating from the reſt of the commons, and joining with the lord • , have granted a ſubſidy, and the repreſentatives of cities and boroughs have likewiſe granted ſubſidies to the crown ſeparately, as appears by a writ in 24th Edward I, which runs in theſe words, Rex, &c. cum comites, barones, milites nobis, &c. fecerunt undecimam de omnibus bonis ſuis mobilibus, et cives et burgenſes, &c. ſep • imam de omnibus bonis ſuis mobilibus, &c. nobis curialiter conceſſerint, &c. The earls, barons, and knights, having given unto us in parliament, the eleventh part, and the citizens and burgeſſes the ſeventh part of their goods and chattels, &c. When an affair happened, which affected only ſome individuals, and called for an aid to the crown, it was common for thoſe individuals alone to be ſummoned; to which purpoſe ſeveral writs are extant. In 35th Edward III, there is a writ (which Dugdale ha • printed in his collection of writs of ſummons to parliament) directed to the earl of Northampton, which, after reciting the confuſion the affairs of Ireland were in, and that he, and ſome other Engliſh lords had poſſeſſions in that kingdom, and were therefore more particularly obliged to the defence of it, follows in theſe words: Volumus vobiſcum, et cum aliis de eodem regno (Angliae ſcilicet) terras in dicta terra habentibus colloquium habere, &c. We will confer with you, and others of the ſame kingdom (viz. England) poſſeſſed of lands in the ſaid country.

But, that the reader may perceive how ſtrictly the principle, of no perſon's being taxed without their conſent, hath been regarded, it is proper to take notice, that, upon the ſame occaſion, writs were likewiſe directed even to women, who were proprietors of land in Ireland, to ſend their deputies to conſult, and conſent to what ſhould be judged neceſſary to be done on the occaſion▪ e. g. Rex, &c. marioe, &c. ſalutem, &c. vobis, &c. mandamus quod aliquem, vel aliquos de quibus confidati • apud Weſtmon. mit • atis ad loquendum nobiſcum ſuper dictis negotiis, et ad faciendum et conſentiendum nomine veſtro, ſuper hoc quod ibidem ordinari contigerit. We command you to ſend to Weſtminſter, ſome perſon or perſons, whom you may confide in, to confer with us, on the aboveſaid affair, and to do and aſſent, in your name, to whatever ſhall be there decreed.

A reflection naturally ariſes from the inſtances cited:—When, on a particular occaſion, ſome individuals only were to be taxed, and not the whole community, their conſent only was called for, and in the laſt inſtance it appears, that they, who upon an occaſion of a general tax, would have been bound by the conſent of their virtual repreſentatives (for in that caſe they would have had no actual repreſentatives) were in an affair calling for a particular aid from them, ſeparate from the reſt of the community, required to ſend their particular deputies: But how different would be the principle of a ſtatute, impoſing duties without their conſent who are to pay them, upon the authority of their Gift, who ſhould undertake to give, what doth not belong to them.

That great king, Edward I, inſerted in his writs of ſummons, as a firſt principle of law, that quod omnes tangat ab omnibus app • obetur, what concerns all, muſt be approved by all, which by no torture can be made to ſignify that their approbation or conſent only is to be requi • ed in the impoſition of a tax, who a • e to pay no part of it.

The ſituation of the non electors in England—their capacity to become electors—their inſeparable connection with thoſe who are electors, and their repreſentatives—their ſecurity againſt oppreſſion reſulting from this connection, and the neceſſity of imagining a double or virtual repreſentation, to avoid iniquity and abſurdity, have been explained—the inhabitants of the colonies are, as ſuch, incapable of being electors, the privilege of election being exerciſeable only in perſon, and therefore if every inhabitant of America had the requiſite freehold, not one could vote, but upon the ſuppoſition of his ceaſing to be an inhabitant of America, and becoming a reſident of Great-Britain, a ſuppoſition which would be impertinent, becauſe it ſhifts the queſtion—ſhould the colonies not be taxed by Parliamentary impoſitions, their reſpective legiſlatures have a regular, adequate, and conſtitutional authority to tax them, and therefore there would not neceſſarily be an iniquitous and abſurd exemption, from their not being repreſented by the houſe of commons.

There is not that intimate and inſeparable relation between the electors of Great-Britain, and the Inhabitants of the colonies, which muſt inevitably involve both in the ſame taxation; on the contrary, not a ſingle actual elector in England, might be immediately affected by a taxation in America, impoſed by a ſtatute which would have a general operation and effect, upon the properties of the inhabitants of the colonies. The latter might be oppreſſed in a thouſand ſhapes, without any Sympathy, or exciting any alarm in the former, Moreover, even acts, oppreſſive and injurious to the colonies in an extreme degree, might become popular in England, from the promiſe or expectation, that the very meaſures which depreſſed the colonies, would give eaſe to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain. It is indeed true, that the intereſts of England and the colonies are allied, and an injury to the colonies produced into all it's conſequences, will eventually affect the mother country; yet theſe conſequences being generally remote, are not at once foreſeen; they do not immediately alarm the fears, and engage the paſſions of the Engliſh electors; the connection between a freeholder of Great-Britain, and a Britiſh American being deducible only thro' a train of reaſoning, which few will take the trouble, or can have opportunity, if they have capacity▪ to inveſtigate; wherefore the relation between the Britiſh Americans, and the Engliſh electors, is a knot too infirm to be relied on as a competent ſecurity, eſpecially againſt the force of a preſent, counteracting expectation of relief.

If it would have been a juſt concluſion, that the colonies being exactly in the ſame ſituation with the non-electors of England, are therefore repreſented in the ſame manner; it ought to be allowed, that the reaſoning is ſolid, which, after having evinced a total diſſimilarity of ſituation, infers, that their repreſentation is different.

If the commons of Great-Britain have no right by the conſtitution, to GIVE AND GRANT property not belonging to themſelves or others, without their conſent actually or virtually given; If the claim of the colonies not to be taxed without their conſent, ſignified by their repreſentatives, is well founded; if it appears that the colonies are not actually repreſented by the commons of Great-Britain, and that the notion of a double or virtual repreſentation, doth not with any propriety apply to the people of America; then the principle of the ſtamp act, muſt be given up as indefenſible on the point of repreſentation, and the validity of it reſted upon the power which they who framed it, have to carry it into execution.

Should the parliament deviſe a tax, to be paid only by thoſe of the people in Great-Britain, who are neither members of either houſe of parliament, nor their electors; ſuch an act would be unjuſt and partial, ſaith the author of the claim of the colonies, &c. who yet allows that the Non-electors would have a ſecurity againſt the weight of ſuch a tax, ſhould it be impoſed, which the colonies have not; viz. that the members of parliament and the electors, muſt be relatively affected by it; but the induſtrious North-American, and the opulent Weſt-Indian may have their properties taxed, and no individual in Great-Britain participate with them in the burthen: On the contrary, the members of parliament would make their court to their conſtituents muſt effectually, by multiplying Taxes upon the ſubjects of the colonies.

Is it not amazing that the above author, with theſe ſentiments, ſhould undertake the defence of the ſtamp duties, which, by his own conceſſion, appears to be more unjuſt, and more partial than the tax he ſuppoſes, and upon which he beſtows, very properly, the epithets of unjuſt and partial. —Diluit helleborum, certo compeſcere puncto Neſcius examen. He infuſes a dangerous drug, without ſkill to know the proper point between its good and ill effects.

But it has been objected, that if the inhabitants of America, becauſe repreſented in their reſpective aſſemblies, are therefore exempted from a parliamentary tax, then the citizens of London, who are repreſented in their common council, may plead the ſame immunity. If it were not for the authority upon which this objection is urged, it might be ſafely paſſed over without a particular anſwer; but ſince it hath been introduced with an appearance of reliance, and the opinion which it retails, is ſaid to have been delivered with great gravity, and pronounced with deciſive confidence, I would not be ſo wanting in reſpect to an eminent character, as to neglect the ceremony of a direct refutation.

But I muſt obſerve, that when the opinion of a lawyer is taken in a matter of private concern, in which he is under no bias to deceive, a conciſe declaration of it may generally ſuffice; he who applies for it being generally obliged to depend upon his council's character of integrity and knowledge; not only becauſe the expence of a methodical and minute diſcuſſion would be too bu • thenſome, but becauſe the force of legal reaſoning is not generally underſtood. But in a queſtion of public concernment, the opinion of no court lawyer, however reſpectable for his • candour and abilities, ought to weigh more than the reaſons adduced in ſupport of it. They ought to be explained, they may be examined. Conſidering his temptations, credit ought to be cautiouſly and diffidently given, to his aſſertion of what is his opinion.—Conſidering the conſequence of a deciſion, not to one man only, but to millions that exiſt and myriads that may exiſt, and • he exceeding fallibility of legal knowledge, nothing ſhort of clear conviction, after the fulleſt explication of the reaſons of the opinion, and the moſt accurate and intenſe conſideration of their validity, can juſtify an acquieſcence under it.

On the preſent occaſion, ſo immenſely important, nullius addictus jurare in verba magiſtri; unuſed to ſwear on any maſter's word; I ſhall pin my faith upon the dictum of no lawyer in the univerſe; and when his ipſe dixit is authoritatively urged, I ſhall be 〈◊〉 no pains to repreſs my ſuſpicions that his reaſons are concealed, becauſe, if fairly produced and held up to the light, many flaws in them would be diſcovered by a careful examiner. I have lived long enough to remember many opinions of court lawyers upon American affairs; they have been all ſtrongly marked with the ſame character; they have been generally very ſententious, and the ſame obſervation may be applied to them all. They have all declared that to be legal, which the miniſter for the time being has deemed to be expedient. The opinion given by a general of the law, in the late war, on the queſtion, whether ſoldiers might be quartered on private houſes in America, muſt be pretty generally remembered.

The very learned gentlemen has, it ſeems, declared that, upon mature deliberation, he has formed his opinion, that the colonies are in their nature, no more than common corporations; and that the inhabitants of a colony are no more entitled to an exemption from parliamentary taxations, becauſe repreſented in an American aſſembly, than the citizens of London.

This opinion may be inconteſtably juſt in the judgment of that accompliſhed politician, and elegant writer, who chooſes to diſtinguiſh himſelf by the titles of late G...rn..r of the J- • ſ-ys, of the M • ſſ-ch ſ-ts B—, and of S—th C • r-l-a; and who does not chooſe to be diſtinguiſh'd by the title of late Maitre d' Hotel of the late Sir D—v—s O-b—e; or that exactly fitting, and characteriſtical See the Hiſt. of TOM BRAZEN. appellation conferred on him, by an incenſed culprit in an American court of ſtar-chamber, an appellation rather adapted to ſignify thoſe powers, which are uſeful in intrigue, and that lead to promotion, than expreſſive of reſpect and dignity; but having conſidered the ſubject in the beſt manner my very ſlender and limited capacity will allow, neither doth the opinion of the one, nor the approbation of it by the other, influence my judgment.

Let a great man declare a ſimilitude, and he will ſoon find a Polonius to acknowledge, that, "yonder cloud is, by the maſs, like a camel indeed" ......or, black like an ouzle," ....or, very like a whale."

The objection having been ſtated, the anſwer is obvious and clear.

The colonies have a complete and adequate legiſlative authority, and are not only repreſented in their aſſemblies, but in no other manner. The power of making bye-laws veſted in the common council is inadequate and incomplete, being bounded by a few particular ſubjects; and the common council are actually repreſented too, by having a choice of members to ſerve in parliament. How then can the reaſon of the exemption from internal parliamentary taxations, claimed by the colonies, apply to the citizens of London?

The power deſcribed in the provincial charters, is to make laws, and in the exerciſe of that power, the colonies are bounded by no other limitations than what reſult from their ſubordination to, and dependence upon Great Britain. The term bye laws is as novel, and improper, when applied to the aſſemblies, as the expreſſion, acts of aſſembly, would be, if applied to the parliament of Great Britain; and it is as abſurd and inſenſible, to call a colony a common corporation, becauſe not an independent kingdom, and the powers of each to make laws and bye-laws, are limited, tho' not comparable in their extent, and the variety of their obj • ct • , as it would be to call lake Erie, a Duck-puddle, becauſe not the atlantic ocean.

Should the analogy between the colonies and corporations be even admitted for a moment, in order to ſee what would be the conſequence of the poſtulatum, it would only amount to this, The colonies are veſted with as complete authority to all intents and purpoſes to tax themſelves, as any Engliſh corporation is to make a bye-law, in any imaginable inſtance for any local purpoſe whatever, and the parliament doth not make laws for corporations upon ſubjects, in every reſpect proper for bye-laws.

But I don't reſt the matter upon this, or any other circumſtance, however conſiderable, to prove the impropriety of a taxation by the Britiſh parliament. I rely upon the fact, that not one inhabitant in any colony is, or can be actually or virtually repreſented by the Britiſh houſe of commons, and therefore, that the Stamp duties are ſeverely impoſed.

But it has been alledged, that if the right to give and grant the property of the colonies by an internal taxation is denied by the houſe of commons, the ſubordination and dependence of the colonies, and the ſuperintendence of the Britiſh parliament can't be conſiſtently eſtabliſh'd.....That any ſuppoſed line of diſtinction between the two caſes, is but a whimſical imagination, a chimerical ſpeculation againſt fact and experience. ......Now, under favour, I conceive there is more confidence, than ſolidity in this aſſertion; and it may be ſatisfactorily and eaſily proved, that the ſubordination and dependence of the colonies may be preſerved, and the ſupreme authority of the mother country be firmly ſupported, and yet the principle of repreſentation, and the right of the Britiſh houſe of commons flowing from it, to give and grant the property of the commons of America, be denied.

The colonies are dependent upon Great Britain, and the ſupreme authority veſted in the king, lords, and commons, may juſtly be exerciſed to ſecure, or preſerve their dependence, whenever neceſſary for that purpoſe. This authority reſults from, and is implied in the idea of the relation ſubſiſting between England and her colonies; for, conſidering the nature of human affections, the inferior is not to be truſted with providing regulations to prevent his riſing to an equality with his ſuperior. But, though the right of the ſuperior to uſe the proper means for preſerving the ſubordination of his inferior is admitted, yet it does not neceſſarily follow, that he has a right to ſeize the property of his inferior when he pleaſes, or to command him in every thing; ſince, in the degrees of it, there may very well exiſt a dependence and inferiority, without abſolute vaſſalage and ſlavery. In what the ſuperior may rightfully controul, or compel, and in what the inferior ought to be at liberty to act without controul or compulſion, depends upon the nature of the dependence, and the degree of the ſubordination; and, theſe being aſcertained, the meaſure of obedience, and ſubmiſſion, and the extent of the authority and ſuperintendence will be ſettled. When powers, compatible with the relation between the ſuperior and inferior, have, by expreſs compact, been granted to, and accepted by, the latter, and have been, after that compact, repeatedly recognized by the former— When they may be exerciſed effectually upon every occaſion without any injury to that relation, the authority of the ſuperior can't properly interpoſe; for, by the powers veſted in the inferior, is the ſuperior limited.

By their conſtitutions of government, the colonies are empowered to impoſe internal taxes. This power is compatible with their dependence, and hath been expreſsly recognized by Britiſh miniſters and the Britiſh parliament, upon many occaſions; and it may be exerciſed effectually without ſtriking at, or impeaching, in any reſpect, the ſuperintendence of the Britiſh parliament. May not then the line be diſtinctly and juſtly drawn between ſuch acts as are neceſſary, or proper, for preſerving or ſecuring the dependence of the colonies, and ſuch as are not neceſſary or proper for that very important purpoſe?

When the powers were conferred upon the colonies, they were conferred too as privileges and immunities, and accepted as ſuch; or, to ſpeak more properly, the privileges belonging neceſſarily to them as Britiſh ſubjects, were ſolemnly declared and confirmed by their charters, and they who ſettled in America under the encouragement and faith of theſe charters, underſtood, not only that They might, but that it was their right to exerciſe thoſe powers without controul, or prevention. In ſome of the charters the diſtinction is expreſſed, and the ſtrongeſt declarations made, and the moſt ſolemn aſſurances given, that the • ettlers ſhould not have their property taxed without their own conſent by their repreſentatives; though their legiſlative authority is limited at the ſame time, by the ſubordination implied in their relation, and They are therefore reſtrained for making acts of aſſembly repugnan • to the laws of England; and, had the diſtinction not been expreſſed, the powers given would have implied it, for, if the parliament may in any caſe interpoſe, when the authority of the colonies is adequate to the occaſion, and not limited by their ſubordina • ion to the mother country, it may in every caſe, which would make another appellation more proper to deſcribe their condition, than the name by which their inhabitants have been uſually called, and have gloried in.

Becauſe the parliament may, when the relation between Great Britain and her colonies calls for an exertion of her ſuperintendence, bind the colonies by ſtatute, therefore a parliamentary interpoſition in every other inſtance, is juſtifiable, is an inference that may be denied.

On ſome emergencies, the king, by the conſtitution, hath an abſolute power to provide for the ſafety of the ſtate; to take care, like a Roman dictator, ne quid detrimenti capiat reſpublica, [That the common wealth may not ſuffer.] and this power, is not ſpecifically annexed to the monarchy by any expreſs law; it neceſſarily reſults from the end and nature of government; but who would infer from this, that the king, in every inſtance, or upon every occaſion, can, upon the principles of the conſtitution, exerciſe this ſupreme power.

The Britiſh miniſters have, in the moſt effectual terms, at different periods, from the reign of Charles II, to that of the preſent king, recognized this diſtinction in their requiſitions, tranſmitted to the colonies to raiſe and levy men and money, by acts of aſſembly; and recently, in the courſe of the laſt war, they were ſo far from thinking that it was proper for the Britiſh houſe of commons to give and grant the property of the colonies to ſupport the military operations in America, upon which not only the immediate protection of that part of the Britiſh dominions, but the moſt important intereſts, perhaps the ultimate preſervation of Great Britain from deſtruction, eſſentially depended; I say, on this great occaſion of the moſt important, and national concernment, the Britiſh miniſters were ſo far from calling upon the houſe of commons, in their peculiar department, to give and grant property, belonging neither to themſelves, nor their conſtituents, that they directly applied to the colonies to tax themſelves, in virtue of the authority and privilege conferred by their charters, and promiſed to recommend it to the Britiſh Parliament to reimburſe the expence they ſhould incur in providing for the general ſervice.......They made good their promiſe; and if all the money raiſed in the colonies, by acts of aſſembly, in purſuance of the requiſitions of the Britiſh miniſters, hath not been repaid by parliament, a very conſiderable part of it hath.

Could they, who made the requiſitions I have mentioned, or the aſſemblies that complied with them, intend, or imagine the faith of the Engliſh government was to be preſerved by a retribution, at one time, of the money diſburſed at the inſtance, and upon the credit of the Britiſh miniſtry, enforced and ſupported by • oyal aſſurances, and by taking it back again at another time? is this method of keeping the faith of government to be ranked among the improvements which have been made beyond the idea of former adminiſtrations, conducted by miniſters ignorant of the importance of the colonies, or who impotently neglected their concerns, or were diverted by mean purſuits, from attending to them? Is it abſolutely certain, that there never can, at any future period, ariſe a criſis, in which the exertion of the colonies may be neceſſary; or, if there ſhould, that it will bring with it an oblivion of all former indirection?—But this is a ſubject fitter for ſilent meditation, than public diſcuſſion.

There was a time when meaſures of prevention might have been taken by the colonies.—There may be a Time when redreſs may be obtained........Till then, prudence, as well as duty, requires ſubmiſſion.

It is preſumed that it was a notable ſervice done by New-England, when the militia of that colony reduced Cape-Breton, ſince it enabled the Britiſh miniſters to make a peace leſs diſadvantageous and inglorious than they otherwiſe muſt have been conſtrained to ſubmit to, in the humble ſtate to which they were then reduced.—That the general exertion of the colonies in North-America, during the laſt war, not only faciliated, but was indiſpenſably requiſite to the ſucceſs of thoſe operations by which ſo many glorious conqueſts were atchieved, and that thoſe conqueſts have put it in the power of the preſent illuſtrious miniſters to make a peace upon terms of ſo much glory and adv • ntage, as to afford an inexhauſtible ſubject during their adminiſtration, and the triumph of toryiſm, at leaſt, for their ingenious panegyriſts to celebrate.

An American, without juſtly incurring the imputation of ingratitude, may doubt, whether ſome other motive, beſides pure generoſity, did not prompt the Britiſh Nation to engage in the defence of the colonies. He may be induced to think that the meaſures taken for the protection of the plantations, were not only connected with the intereſts, but even neceſſary to the defence of Great-Britain herſelf, becauſe he may have reaſon to imagine that Great-Britain, could not long ſubſiſt as an independent kingdom after the loſs of her colonies.—He may, without arrogance, be inclined to claim ſome merit from the exertion of colonies, ſince it enabled Great Britain ultimately to defend herſelf; I mean that kind of merit which ariſes from benefits done to others, by the operation of meaſures taken for our own ſakes......a merit moſt illuſtriouſly diſplayed in the generoſity of Great Britain, when, with their co-operation, ſhe protected the colonies to preſerve herſelf.

When an houſe is in flames, and the next neighbour is extremely active, and exerts his endeavours to extinguiſh the fire, which, if not conquered, would catch, and conſume his own dwelling, I don' ſay, that if the owner of the houſe which had been in flames, ſhould, after the fire ſubdued, complaiſantly thank his neighbour generally for his ſervices, he would be abſurdly ceremonious; but, if the aſſiſtant ſhould afterwards boaſt of his great generoſity, and claim a right to the furniture of the houſe which he had aſſiſted in ſaving, upon the merit of his zeal and activity, he would deſerve to be put in mind of the motive of his ſervice.

If the advantages gained by the late moſt glorious and ſucceſsful war have been ſecured by an adequate peace......if the ſucceſſes that attended the military operations of the Britiſh arms, were the effect of the conjunct efforts of the Britiſh Nation and her Colonies, rouſed by the ſpirit, excited by the virtue, animated by the vigour, and conducted by the wiſdom of the ableſt miniſter that ever ſerved his country, has there been no compenſation received for the charges of the war? are the colonies entitled to no credit for it?

When the deſign is to oppreſs the colonies with taxes, or calumniate the late patriotic miniſter, the expences of the war, and the enormity of the national debt are proclaimed: When the preſent all accompliſhed adminiſtration is to be celebrated, then is the immenſe value of the new acquiſitions diſplayed in the brighteſt colours, acquiſitions vaſt in extent, richly productive of the valuable commodities belonging to their ſeveral climates. The poſſeſſion of thoſe in North-America, enſures the ſafety of the other colonies there, inſomuch that our only dangerous neighbours, the French, do not think the pittance left worth retaining, having, by the ceſſion of Louiſiana to the Spaniards, avowedly given up for ever thoſe great objects, for which alone they began the war.....The ceded iſlands are almoſt of equal advantage, for protecting our own, and annoying the ſettlements of the French and Spaniards, if they ſhould be again our enemies. Part of Nova Scotia, ſince the removal of the neutral French, hath been already ſettled by 10,000 inhabitants, within the compaſs of ſix or ſeven years, a province lately conſidered as no more than a proper ſituation for a fortreſs, whoſe •• rriſon it could not ſubſist: Even Cape-Breton, that barren appendage to the province of Nova Scotia, is known now to contain treaſures ſo worthy of attention, as to be reſerved to the crown. The mines there are not veins; they are mountains of coal; vaſt clifts of nothing elſe, ſtand open, and acceſſible; no boring neceſſary to find it; no pit neceſſary to come at it; no fire engines requiſite for carrying on the works. This iſland, and all the neighbouring ſhores in the gulph of St. Laurence, have another fund of wealth in their fiſheries. Canada is already a very flouriſhing colony, inhabited by 90,000 people, and their demand on Great Britain for a ſupply of manufactures, muſt be immediately conſiderable. The peltry will be another great branch of commerce. Weſt-Florida is ſurpriſingly fertile, and luxuriantly productive in its natural ſtate, of every thing, and not only promiſing, but actually producing wines and ſilk, and indigo, &c. &c.

Is no part of this deſcription the ebullition of an exuberant fancy, and ſhall we not caſt one glance of retroſpection towards the man, who, when his country was deſpiſed, and inſulted, and ſunk into the moſt abject condition of deſpondence, by inſpi • ing her ſons with that invincible vigour of patriotiſm, with which himſelf was animated, not only diſpelled her fears, ſecured her ſafety, and retrieved her honour, but humbled her enemies, and tore from them the reſources of their ſtrength, and the ſupports of their inſolence?

Are the acquiſitions of the war retained by the peace, ſo ineſtimably valuable, and ought not the colonies to have ſome conſideration that were inſtrumental in the ſucceſſes whence thoſe acquiſitions flowed, and ſtrained every nerve in the general ſervice, to that degree of exertion, that without it, all the power of Great-Britain, all the amazing abilities of her miniſter, and all the diſcipline, and unparallelled bravery of her national troops and ſeamen, could not have availed beyond meer defence, if happily ſo far? if the war was expenſive beyond all former example, ſo were the ſucceſſes of it beneficial. If the expences attending the military operations in America, are juſtly to be charged to the ſole defence of the colonies, and no part of it to the ſecurity of Great-Britain, or to the views of extending her dominions by conqueſt, if all the ſucceſſes of the war have been atchieved by the national arms of Great Britain ALONE, without any aſſiſtance, or co • operation of the plantations, ſtill ought not the claim againſt the colonies in equity, to be mitigated upon reflection of the advantages deri •• d from them, and of their contribution to the national revenue for •• ong courſe of years, during which, their protection put the Britiſh nation to very little, if any particular expence?

If moreover, Great Britain hath an equitable claim to the contribution of the colonies, it ought to be proportioned to their circumſtances, and they might, ſurely, be indulged with diſcharging it in the moſt eaſy, and ſatisfactory manner to themſelves. If ways and means convenient, and conciliating would produce their contribution, as well as oppreſſive and diſguſting exactions, it is neither conſiſtent with humanity or policy, to purſue the latter.....A power may even exiſt without an actual exerciſe of it, and it indicates as little good ſenſe as good nature to exerciſe it, only that the ſubjects of it may feel the rod that rules them. Moderation may be obſerved, and equity maintained, at the ſame time that ſuperiority is aſſerted, and authority vindicated, whatever the apprehenſions of puſillanimity, or the inſolence of uſurpation may ſuggeſt.

What is the annual ſum expected from the colonies—what proportion from each—how far do their abilities extend? Theſe matters have been, without doubt, preciſely aſcertained, or eaſily may be, at a time when the real, the ſubſtantial, the commercial intereſts of Great Britain, are preferred to every other conſideration, and it is ſo well known, that the trade whence it's greateſt wealth is derived, and upon which it's maritime power is principally founded, depends upon a wiſe and proper uſe of the colonies, which implies, at leaſt, ſuch an underſtanding of their circumſtances, as muſt render it extremely eaſy, to form a reaſonable eſtimate of their comparative wealth, and the extent of their abilities. The proportion of each colony, being ſo eaſily aſcertainable at this period of uncommon knowledge of their affairs, why has the courſe obſerved by former miniſters, when ſupplies have been expected from America, been neglected by the preſent? Why was there not the uſual requiſition communicated to the provincial aſſemblies, inſtead of exacting an uncertain and unequal ſum from each colony, by a law abruptly paſſed, without any previous default of thoſe who are affected by it?—I ſhall not call it a law repugnant to their genius, cancelling their charters, infringing the moſt valuable rights and privileges of Britiſh ſubjects, derogatory from the faith and honour of government, unjuſt and cruel in its principles, rigorous and oppreſſive in the means provided for its execution, and as pernicious in its conſequences to the mother country, as injurious to the colonies in its immediate operation; but I may call it a rigorous and ſevere law. It is in vain to attempt a palliation of this uſeleſs ſeverity, (uſeleſs I mean to the purpoſe of raiſing a revenue) by fallaciouſly •• etending that, as all the colonies were to be taxed, and the authority of each is limited, the interpoſition of the parliament became neceſſary, ſince nothing can be leſs diſputable, than that each colony hath a competent authority to raiſe it's proportion, and conſequently nothing is more evident, than that all the colonies might raiſe the whole. It is aſſerted in the pamphlet entitled, the claim of the colonies, &c. that Maryland availing herſelf of the protection of Virginia and Pennſylvania, contributed nothing to the common defence. This writer from a view of ſome map of North-America, imagined, it ſhould ſeem, that Virginia and Pennſylvania were ſettled ſo as to encompaſs Maryland; but the truth is, that the frontiers of Maryland were as much expoſed, as thoſe of the next colonies, and the fact is moreover falſe, for I have been well informed that Maryland contributed near 50,000 l. and incurred beſides a conſiderable expence, which is now a debt upon the public journal of that colony, by putting her militia into actual ſervice, and that an unhappy diſpute, attended with a very heavy provincial charge, on ſome topic of privilege, was the real cauſe, why the grants of Maryland were not more liberal. After all▪ there have been inſtances, I ſpeak not of more modern times, in which the parſimony of the parliament hath been complained of, and the notion of privilege carried to a great length by the houſe of commons; but theſe have not been thought ſolid reaſons for ſtripping their conſti • uents of their rights. The aſſertion that the colonies would have paid no regard to any requiſitions, is raſh and unauthorized, and had the event actually happened, the trouble and loſs of time to the miniſters in making the experiment, would not have been conſiderable or detrimental to the nation, and after its failure, an act of parliament might ſtill have been made to compel the contribution, if the power which hath been exerciſed is defenſible upon the principles of the Britiſh conſtitution.

A meaſure ſo extreme, could hardly be at once purſued, becauſe the miniſters did not know what to demand, who have made ſo many regulations in regard to the colonies, founded upon knowledge, formed with judgment, and executed with vigour. Had the requiſitions been communicated, I make no doubt but they would have been entertained with reſpect, and productive of all the effects that could reaſonably have been expected from them. A petty American aſſembly would not, in anſwer to ſuch requiſitions, have impertinently recommended the reduction of exorbitant ſalaries, the abatement of extravagant, and the abolition of illegal perquiſites, the extinction of uſeleſs places, or the diſbanding of undeſerving, or ill deſerving penſioners, as a more proper and beneficial method of relieving the public burthens, than a new and heavy impoſition upon uſeful and induſtrious ſubjects.

Have great things been promiſed for the eaſe of the people of England, and hath a meaſure been fallen upon, that, by putting the accompliſhment of them at a diſtance, and keeping expectation alive, it may contribute to the prolongation of a power, which, in the interim, will find ſufficient opportunities to gratify the views of miniſterial avarice or ambition?

If a ſum had been liquidated, and a preciſe demand made, it might perhaps have been ſhewn, if proportioned to the circumſtances of the colonies, to be of no real conſequence to the nation; and, if above their circumſtances, that it would, with the oppreſſion of the plantations, prove ruinous to the Britiſh manufactures; but, whilſt matters are thus vague, and indeterminate, any attempt to ſhew that the ſtamp duties will be inadequate to the promiſed relief, diſtreſs the colonies, and conſequently beggar the Britiſh manufacturers, may be obviated by ſaying, that the act is in the nature of an experiment; if inadequate, other methods may be ſuperadded; if inconvenient, it may be repealed, as ſoon as diſcovered; and hints may be thrown out at the ſame time, to cheriſh the hopes of the nation, that there are the beſt grounds to expect It is aſſerted by the author of the claim of the colonies, &c, that the merchants trading to the ſeveral colonies gave in an eſtimate of the debt due to them from the colonies, amounting to 4,000,000 l. It would have been a real public ſervice if he had pointed out how this debt is to be paid under the oppreſſion of new and heavy impoſitions, or what will be the proper remedy if there ſhould be a ſtoppage in the payment of 4,000,000 l, a ſtagnation of commerce, and want of employment to the Britiſh manufacturers. the meaſure will be productive of all that can be deſired or wiſhed.

The frugal Republicans of North-America, (if the Britiſh inhabitants there are to be diſtinguiſhed by a nick-name, becauſe it implies that they are enemies to the government of England, and ought therefore to be regarded with a jealous eye) may be allowed, without derogating from the vaſt and prodigious knowledge of a miniſter, to be acquainted with their own internal circumſtances better than a ſtranger, who muſt depend upon information: and that too, moſt frequently, of men not the moſt eminent for their candour, diſtinguiſhed by their ſagacity, or reſpectable for their integrity. Had requiſitions been made, and the ſum demanded been equitable, and proportioned to their circumſtances, they could have fallen upon ways and means leſs oppreſſive than the ſtamp duties. They have frequently taxed themſelves: They have tried various methods of taxation: They know, by experience, the eaſieſt and leaſt expenſive. The meaning, or conſtruction of their levy-act is ſettled: They can be carried into execution, not only at a ſmall expence, without exhauſting a conſiderable part of their produce by the multiplication of officers, and their ſupport; but without heavy pains and grievous penalties, without oppreſſion of the innocent, giving countenance to vexation, and encouragement to profligate informers, without the eſtabliſhment of arbitrary and diſtant courts of It was formerly held to be a grievous oppreſſion, that, inſtead of having juſtice at home, the Engliſh ſubject was drawn to Rome by APPEALS, but an American is to be drawn from home, in the FIRST INSTANCE, as well as by appeals. admiralty.

The national debt is heavy, and it is a popular ſcheme to draw from colonies a contribution towards the relief of the mother-country. The manner of effecting it is not carefully attended to, or nicely regarded by thoſe who expect to receive the benefit. The end is ſo ardently deſired, that, whether the means might not be more moderate, is not ſcrupulouſly examined by men, who think themſelves in no danger of injury or oppreſſion from their ſeverity. It is affirmed to thoſe who cannot detect the falacy of the aſſertion, that millions have been expended ſolely in the defence of America. They believe it, and thence are eaſily perſuaded that the claim of a contribution from the colonies is juſt and equitable, and that any meaſure neceſſary to ſecure it, is right and laudable. It is repreſented, that unleſs the colonies are ſtripped of the trial by jury, and courts of admiralty are eſtabliſhed, in which judges from England, ſtrangers, without connection or intereſt in America, removeable at pleaſure, and ſupported by liberal ſalaries, are to preſide; unleſs informers are encouraged and favoured, and the accuſed moſt rigorouſly dealt by, that the tax will be eluded......and theſe ſeverities are excuſed on account of their ſuppoſed neceſſity. The colonies are deſcribed to be a numerous, flouriſhing, and opulent people: It is alledged that they contribute to the national expence, by taxes there only the pitiful ſum of 1900 l. per year, for the collection of which, an eſtabliſhment of officers, attended with the expence of 7600 l. per annum, is neceſſary. Upon theſe premiſes, the uneaſineſs of the colonies, at being forced to bring more into the common ſtock, appears to be unreaſonable, if not rebellious; and they ſeem rather to deſerve reprehenſion and correction, than favour and indulgence.

The ſucceſſes of the war were obtained as well by the vigorous efforts of the Colonies, as the exertion of Great-Britain......The faith of Great-Britain hath been engaged in the moſt ſolemn manner, to repay the colonies the monies levied by internal taxations for the ſupport of the war. Is it conſiſtent with that faith to tax them towards ſinking the debt in part incurred by that re-payment? The immenſe acceſſion of territory, and value of the acquiſitions obtained by the peace, is the conſequence of the ſucceſſes of the war.....The charge of the war is leſſened by the advantages reſulting from the peace. The colonies, for a long courſe of time, have largely contributed to the public revenue, and put Great-Britain to little or no expence for their protection. If it were equitable to draw from them a further contribution, it does not therefore follow, that it is proper to force it from them, by the harſh and rigorous methods eſtabliſhed by the ſtamp act; an act unequal and diſproportioned to their circumſtances whom it affects; exempting opulence, cruſhing indigence; and tearing from a numerous, loyal, and uſeful people, the privileges they had, in their opinion, earned and merited, and juſtly held moſt dear. If they are really in debt, the payment of it hath not been refuſed, it hath not been demanded. If one ſubject, grown giddy with ſudden elevation, ſhould, at any future period, raſhly declare, that the colonies ſhould be taxed, at all events, in the moſt rigorous manner; and that millions of induſtrious and uſeful ſubjects ſhould be grievouſly oppreſſed, rather than himſelf depart from his character of perti • acity and wilfulneſs, check the impulſe of a tyrannical diſpoſition, or forego the gratification of his vanity, in a wanton diſplay of power; ſubmiſſion would be an admirable virtue indeed, if not the effect of impotence.

That the contribution ariſing from the ſtamp duties is diſproportioned to their circumſtances from whom it is exacted, is manifeſt; for they will produce in each colony, a greater or leſs ſum, not in proportion to its wealth, but to the multiplicity of juridical forms, the quantity of vacant land, the frequency of transferring landed property, the extent of paper negociations, the ſcarcity of money, and the number of debtors. A larger ſum will be exacted from a tobacco colony tha • from Jamaica; and it will not only be higher in one of the pooreſt colonies, and the leaſt able to bear it, than in the richeſt; but the principal part of the revenue will be drawn from the pooreſt individuals in the pooreſt colonies, from mortgagors, obligors, and defendants. If this be true, does the act deſerve the encomium of being a mode of taxation the eaſieſt, and the moſt equal, a duty upon property ſpread lightly over a great variety of ſubjects, and heavy upon none?

The commons of Great-Britain, moreover, in their capacity of repreſentative, not only give and grant the property of the colonies; but in my conſtruction of the ſtamp-act, (however every reader may examine and judge for himſelf,) give and grant alſo to certain officers of the crown, a power to tax them higher ſtill; for theſe officers will not, I preſume, be called virtual repreſentatives too; and what they think fit to • evy, by an ingenious extent of the fiction, will not be conſidered as levied with the conſent of the colonies....The inſtances, I believe, are rare, in which the repreſentatives of the people of England have delegated to officers of the crown, the power of taxing their conſtituents, nor hath any diſtinction yet been advanced to prove, that in their capacity of virtual repreſentatives of the colonies, the houſe of commons not having the ſame confidence repoſed in them, ought to proceed upon peculiar rules. There was a ſtatute of Henry VIII, by which, I think, the king's proclamations, with the conſent of the privy council, were to operate as laws; and another ſtatute of Richard II, that the power of the two houſes ſhould be veſted in twelve lords; but theſe acts bear no reſemblance to the ſtamp-act.

The ſtamping inſtruments are to be retained in England. Vellum, parchment, and paper, are to be ſent to America, ready ſtamped........ The firſt commiſſioner of the treaſury, or the commiſſioners, or any three or more of them, are, by the act, impowered to ſet any price upon the vellum, parchment and paper, and the payment of that price is ſecured and enforced by the ſame pains and penalties that the ſtamp-duties are.

If the ſubſtitution of an arbitrary civil law court, in the place of the legal judicatories, and that deſerved favourite, the common-law-trial by jury, would not juſtify the aſſertion, that the ſtamp-act hath ſtripped the colonies of the guards and ſecurities provided by the conſtitution againſt oppreſſion in the execution of laws, I would much leſs preſume to ſay, the veſting in the commiſſioners of the treaſury a power to tax the colonies, will amply juſtify the aſſertion, that the ſtamp-act hath not left them even the ſhadow of a privilege. It is indeed ſomething difficult to imagine how the order of democracy, which is as much a part of the conſtitution, as monarchy or ariſtocracy, can exiſt when the people are excluded from a ſhare in the executing, and a ſhare in the making of laws; but that is not the preſent caſe; and, though I may not be able to anſwer a ſpecious objection, formed upon general principles, I am not obliged to adopt it, 'till I am convinced of its ſolidity.

A little examination will find how unfair and deceptive the repreſentation is, that the colonies in North-America, two millions of Britiſh ſubjects, an opulent, thriving and commercial people, contribute to the national expence, no more than 7 or 800 l. per annum by taxes raiſed there; for though it ſhould be acknowledged, (which I neither acknowledge nor deny, becauſe I do not know, no • have an opportunity of coming at the fact) that the impoſitions upon the inhabitants of the colonies do not raiſe there, a greater ſum than hath been ſtated, it doth not follow that the inhabitants of the colonies are indulged at the expence of Great-Britain, and that the needieſt Britiſh cottager, who out of his ſcanty pittance hardly earned, pays the high duties of cuſtoms and exciſe in the price of his conſumptions, has reaſon to complain, if immenſe ſums are raiſed upon the inhabitants of the colonies elſewhere.

By ſuch artifices and ſophiſtry, i • ignorance miſled, credulity deceived, and prejudices excited. Thus oppreſſion gains the credit of equity, cruelty paſſes for moderation, and tyranny for juſtice, and the man who deſerves........reproach, is celebrated by adulation▪ and applauded by deluſion for his wiſdom and patriotic virtues.

The truth is, that a vaſt revenue ariſes to the Britiſh nation from taxes paid by the colonies in Great-Britain, and even the moſt ignorant Britiſh cottager, not impoſed upon by infamous miſrepreſentation, muſt perceive, that it is of no conſequence to his eaſe and relief, whether the duties raiſed upon America are paid there, and thence afterwards remitted to Great-Britain, or paid at firſt upon the produce of the colonies in Great-Britain.

In the article of tobacco, for inſtance, the planter pays a tax upon that produce of his land and labour conſumed in Great-Britain, more than ſix times the clear ſum received by him for it, beſides the expences of freight, commiſſion and other charges, and double freight, commiſſion and charges upon the tobacco re-exported, by which the Britiſh merchants, mariners and other Britiſh ſubjects, are ſupported —a tax, at leaſt, equal to what is paid by any farmer of Great-Britain, poſſeſſed of the ſame degree of property; and moreover the planter muſt contribute to the ſupport of the expenſive internal government of the colony, in which he See the appendix▪ reſides.

Is it objected, that the duties charged upon tobacco, fall ultimately upon the conſumers of this commodity in the conſequential price ſet upon it? Be it ſo, and let the principle be eſtabliſhed that all taxes upon a commodity, are paid by the conſumers of it, and the conſeſequence of this principle be fairly drawn, and equally applied.

The Britiſh conſumers therefore, ultimately pay the high duties laid upon tobacco, in proportion to the quantity of that commodity which they conſume....The colonies therefore, in proportion to their conſumption of Britiſh Manufactures, pay alſo the high duties of cuſtoms and exciſe, with which the manufacturers are charged in the conſequential pri •• ſet upon their conſumptions....In their paſſage moreover, from the Britiſh manufacturers to the American importers, the commodities go thro' a great many hands, by which their coſts are enhanced; the factors, the carriers, the ſhop-keepers, the merchants, the brokers, the porters, the watermen, the mariners, and others, have their reſpective profits, from which they derive their ſubſiſtance, and the ſupport of their families, and are enabled to pay the high duties of cuſtoms and exciſe, in the price of their See the Appendix. conſumptions.

The policy of the la • e regulations of the colonies is of the ſame character with their juſtice and lenity. The produce of their lands, the earnings of their induſtry, and the gains of their commerce center in Great Britain, ſupport the ar • cifiers, the manufactories, and navigation of the nation, and with them the Britiſh land holders too.

Great Britain had ALL before, and therefore can have no more from the colonies; but the miniſter, in the purſuit of a well digeſted, conſiſtent, wiſe and ſalutary plan of colonization and government, a plan founded upon the principles of policy, commerce and finances, chuſes to demoliſh at one blow, all their privileges as they have underſtood them, that he may raiſe in America, a part of what was before paid in Great-Britain. But if the execution of it, inſtead of improving the advantages already poſſeſſed, confirming the bleſſings already enjoyed, and promoting the public welfare, ſhould happen to diſtreſs the trade, reduce the navigation, impoveriſh the manufacturers, and diminiſh the value of the lands in Great-Britain; ſhould it drive the Britiſh mechanics and manufacturers to America, by depriving them of their beſt cuſtomers at home, and force the colonies upon manufactures, they are diſabled from purchaſing, other topics of eulogy muſt be diſcovered by his ingenious encomiaſts, than his wiſdom or his political atchievements. Upon ſuch an event, an American will have very little reaſon to exclaim O! me infelicem, qui nunc demum intellego Ut illa mihi profuerint quae deſpexe • a • , Et illa, quae laudâram, quantum luctûs habuerint▪ O! unhappy I, who now at length am ſenſible How the things I had deſpiſed were of advantage to me, And how much mourning they cauſed, which I had ſo much approved▪

The right of exemption from all taxes without their conſent, the colonies claim as Britiſh ſubjects. They derive this right from the common law, which their charters have declared and confirmed, and they conceive that when ſtripped of this right, whether by prerogative or by any other power, they are at the ſame time deprived of every privilege diſtinguiſhing free-men from ſlaves.

On the other hand, they acknowledge themſelves to be ſubordinate to the mother country, and that the authority veſted in the ſupreme council of the nation, may be juſtly exerciſed to ſupport and preſerve that ſubordination.

Great and juſt encomiums have been beſtow'd upon the conſtitution of England, and their repreſentative is deſervedly the favourite of the inhabitants in Britain. But it is not becauſe the ſupreme council is called parliament, that they boaſt of their conſtitution of government; for there is no particular magical influence from the combination of the letters which form the word; it is becauſe they have a ſhare in that council, that they appoint the members who conſtitute one branch of it, whoſe duty and intereſt it is to conſult their benefit, and to aſſert their rights, and who are veſted with an authority, to prevent any meaſures taking effect dangerous to their liberties, or injurious to their properties.

But the inhabitants in the colonies have no ſhare in this great council. None of the members of it are▪ or can be of their appointment, or in any reſpect dependant upon 〈◊〉 . There is no immediate connection▪ on the contrary, there may be an oppoſition of intereſt; how puerile then is the declamation, what will become of the colonies birthright, and the glorious ſecurities which their forefathers handed down to them, if the authority of the Britiſh parliament to impoſe taxes upon them ſhould be given up? To deny the authority of the Britiſh legiſlature, is to ſurrender all claim to a ſhare in its councils, and if this were the tenor of their charters, a grant more inſidious or replete with miſchief, could not be imagined, a forfeiture of their rights would be couched under the appearance of privilege, &c.

We claim an exemption from all parliamentary impoſitions, that we may enjoy thoſe ſecurities of our rights and properties, which we are entitled to by the conſtitution. For thoſe ſecurities are derived to the ſubject from the principle that he is not be taxed without his own conſent, and an inhabitant in America can give his conſent in no other manner than in aſſembly. It is in the councils that exiſt there, and there only, that he hath a ſhare, and whilſt he enjoys it, his rights and privileges are as well ſecured as any elector's in England, who hath a ſhare in the national councils there; for the words parliament and aſſembly are in this reſpect, only different terms to expreſs the ſame thing.

But it is argued, that if the common law of England, is to be brought, as juſtifying a claim of exemption in any ſubject of Great Britain from a parliamentary tax, it will plead againſt a tax impoſed by a provincial aſſembly; for as all the colony aſſemblies derive their authority from the meer grant of the crown only, it might be urged that any tax impoſed by them, is impoſed by authority of the prerogative of the crown, and not by full conſent of parliament. That if this right in the crown, is acknowledged to exempt the ſubject from the juriſdiction of parliament in the caſe of taxation, its power to diſpenſe with acts of parliament, or to deprive the ſame ſubject of the benefit of the common law, can't be denied.

One would be inclined to ſuſpect that it is ſuppoſed, ſomething elſe than reaſon, may on this occaſion conduce to perſuaſion.

The Engliſh ſubjects, who left their native country to ſettle in the wilderneſs of America, had the privileges of other Engliſhmen. They knew their value, and were deſirous of having them perpetuated to their poſterity. They were aware that, as their conſent whilſt they ſhould reſide in America, could neither be aſked nor regularly given in the national legiſlature, and that if they were to be bound by laws without reſtriction, affecting the property they ſhould earn by the utmoſt hazard and fatigue, they would loſe every other privilege which they had enjoyed in their native country, and become meer tenants at will, dependant upon the moderation of their lords and maſters, without any other ſecurity....that as their ſettlement was to be made under the protection of the Engliſh government, they knew, that in conſequence of their relation to the mother-country, they and their poſterity would be ſubordinate to the ſupreme national council, and expected that obedience and protection would be conſidered as reciprocal duties.

Conſidering themſelves, and being conſidered in this light, they entered into a compact with the crown, the baſis of which was, that their privileges as Engliſh ſubjects, ſhould be effectually ſecured to themſelves, and tranſmitted to their poſterity. As for this purpoſe, preciſe declarations and proviſions formed upon the principles, and according to the ſpirit of the Engliſh conſtitution were neceſſary; CHARTERS were accordingly framed and conferred by the crown, and accepted by the ſettlers, by which all the doubts and inconveniencies which might have ariſen from the application of general principles to a new ſubject, were prevented.

By theſe charters, founded upon the unalienable rights of the ſubject, and upon the moſt ſacred compact, the colonies claim a right of exemption from taxes not impoſed with their conſent.—They claim it upon the principles of the conſtitution, as once Engliſh, and now Britiſh ſubjects, upon principles on which their compact with the crown was originally founded.

The origin of other governments is covered by the veil of antiquity, and is differently traced by the fancies of different men; but, of the colonies, the evidence of it is as clear and unequivocal as of any other fact.

By theſe declaratory charters the inhabitants of the colonies claim an exemption from all taxes not impoſed by their own conſent, and to infer from their objection to a taxation, to which their conſent is not, nor can be given, that they are ſetting up a right in the crown to diſpenſe with acts of parliament, and to deprive the Britiſh ſubjects in America of the benefits of the common law, is ſo extremely abſurd, that I ſhould be at a loſs to account for the appearance of ſo ſtrange an argument, were I not apprized of the unworthy arts employed by the enemies of the colonies to excite ſtrong prejudices againſt them in the minds of their brethren at home, and what groſs incongruities prejudiced men are wont to adopt.

Tho' I am perſuaded that this reaſoning hath already been ſufficiently refuted, and that no ſenſible and diſpaſſionate man can perceive any force in it, yet I can't help remarking, that it is grounded upon a principle, which, if it were poſſible for the examiner to eſtabliſh it, would entitle him to the applauſe of the inhabitants in Great Britain, as little as to the thanks of the colonies.

From what ſource do the peers of England derive their dignity, and the ſhare they have in the Britiſh legiſlature? are there no places in England that derive their power of chuſing members of parliament from royal charters? will this writer argue, that the crown may, by prerogative, tax the inhabitants of Great-Britain, becauſe the peers of England, and ſome repreſentatives of the people, exerciſe a legiſlative authority under royal patents and charters? it muſt be admitted that all the members of the houſe of commons are freely choſen by the people, and are not afterwards ſubject to any influence of the crown or the miniſtry: And are not the members of the lower houſes of aſſembly as freely choſen alſo by the people; and, in fact, as independent, as the members of the houſe of commons? if the truth were confeſſed, the objection would not be, that the colonies are too dependent upon the crown, or that their claim of exemption from all taxes, not impoſed by their own conſent, is founded upon a principle leading to ſlavery. At one time, the North-Americans are called republicans; at another, the aſſertors of deſpotiſm. What a ſtrange animal muſt a North American appear to be from theſe repreſentations to the generality of Engliſh readers, who have never had an opportunity to admire, that he may be neither black, nor tawny, may ſpeak the Engliſh language, and, in other reſpects, ſeem, for all the world, like one of them!

"The common-law, the great charter, the bill of rights," are ſo far from declaring, with one voice, that the inhabitants of the colonies ſhall be taxed by no other authority than that of the Britiſh parliament, that they prove the contrary; for the principle of the common law is, that no part of their property ſhall be drawn from Britiſh ſubjects, without their conſent, given by thoſe whom they depute to repreſent them; and this principle is enforced by the declaration of the GREAT CHARTER, and the bill of rights, neither the one nor the other, introducing any new privilege. In Great-Britain, the conſent of the people is given by the houſe of commons; and, as money had been levied there for the uſe of the crown by pretence of prerogative, without their conſent, it was properly declared at the revolution, in ſupport of the conſtitution, and in vindication of the people's rights, that the levying of money, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, i. e. without their conſent who are to pay it, is illegal, which declaration was moſt ſuitable to the occaſion, and effectually eſtabliſhes the very principle contended for by the colonies.

The word parliament, having been made uſe of, the letter of the declaration is adhered to, and the conſequence drawn, that no Britiſh ſubject can be legally taxed, but by the authority of the Britiſh parliament, againſt the ſpirit and principle of the declaration, which was aimed only to check and reſtrain the prerogative, and to eſtabliſh the neceſſity of obtaining the conſent of thoſe on whom taxes were to be levied. Is not this a new kind of logic, to infer from declarations and claims, founded upon the neceſſary and eſſential principle of a free government, that the people ought not to be taxed without their conſent, that therefore the colonies ought to be taxed by an authority, in which their conſent is not, nor can be concerned; or, in other words, to draw an inference from a declaration or claim of privilege, ſubverſive of the very principle upon which the privilege is founded? How aukwardly are the principles of the revolution applied by ſome men! What aſtoniſhment would the promoters of that glorious meaſure, thoſe patrons and friends of liberty, did they now tread the ſtage of this world, expreſs, that a word, by which they meant to aſſert the privileges of the ſubject, and reſtrain deſpotic power, ſhould be relied upon to demoliſh the very principle by which themſelves were anima • ted, and after all their pains and hazards to eſtabliſh the generous ſentiments of liberty, that thoſe who feel and enjoy the bleſſings of their ſucceſsful ſtruggles, ſhould not be able to raiſe a thought beyond the ideas affixed to ſyſtematic terms.

It was declared alſo by the bill of rights, that the elections of members of parliament ought to be free, and the common law laid down the ſame rule before, which is as applicable to the election of the repreſentatives of the colonies, as of the commons of Great-Britain. But with the help of the examiner's logic, it might be proved from the letter of the bill of rights, that the elections only of members of parliament ought to be free; for the freedom expreſſed in the bill of rights, is as much attached to elections of members of parliament, as the authority to grant money is to the Britiſh parliament, and if the declaration in the one caſe implies a negative, there is the like implication in the other. If, moreover, the common law, the great charter, and the bill of rights, do really, as the examiner aſſerts, with one voice declare, that the inhabitants of the colonies ought to be taxed only by the Britiſh parliament, it is not conſiſtent with that character of vigilance, and jealouſy of their power, commonly aſcribed to the Britiſh parliament, that, from their firſt regular ſettlement to the reign of George III, the American aſſemblies ſhould not only have been ſuffered, without any animadverſion, without one reſolve, or even a ſingle motion to reſtrain them, to encroach upon the juriſdiction and authority of the Britiſh parliament; but that the parliament ſhould never before the late ſtamp-act, in one inſtance, have impoſed an internal tax upon the colonies for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue, and that, even when acts of aſſembly paſſed in conſequence of miniſterial inforced by royal requiſitions have been laid before them, they ſhould be ſo far from objecting to their validity, as actually to recognize the authority of the provincial legiſlatures, and upon that foundation ſuperſtruct their own reſolves and acts.

But tho' it hath been admitted, that the ſtamp-act is the firſt ſtatute that hath impoſed an internal tax upon the colonies for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue, yet the advocates for that law contend, that there are many inſtances of the parliament's exerciſing a ſupreme legiſlative authority over the colonies, and actually impoſing internal taxes upon their properties—that the duties upon any exports or imports are internal taxes—that an impoſt on a foreign commodity is as much an internal tax, as a duty upon any production of the plantations,......that no diſtinction can be ſupported between one kind of tax and another, an authority to impoſe the one extending to the other.

If theſe things are really as repreſented by the advocates for the ſtamp act, why did I have preſumed to mention this fact upon the authority of private intelligence, as well as of the news papers, and other publications; and tho' the chancellor of the exchequer is not named, yet the fact ſeems in general to be referred to in the poſtſcript to the excellent letter concerning libels, warrants, ſeizure of papers, and ſecurity of the peace, &c. in the following words: Otherwiſe (i. e. if it were not right for the parliament to reſolve general warrants to be illegal) let me aſk how that momentous reſolution touching an Engliſh parliament's right of taxing the colonies could be juſtified? it was an independent ſubſtantive reſolution, followed by nothing, (i. e. that ſeſſion) and yet was a reſolution not only of extreme magnitude, but of the moſt general and higheſt legal nature, involving in it a deciſion of the firſt and moſt fundamental principles of liberty, property, and government, and well worthy alſo, as to the temporary policy of it, the moſt ſerious of all conſideration. This was reſolved too, if I am informed right, at the cloſe of the night, and the riſing of the houſe; ſo that every body muſt have taken it as a clear thing, that they could at any time come to a reſolution upon any general point of law, whenever they ſhould ſee it expedient ſo to do, ſed verbum ſapienti ſat eſt; but a word is enough to the wiſe. the chancellor of the exchequer make it a queſtion for the conſideration of the houſe of commons, whether the parliament could impoſe an internal tax in the colonies or not, for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue?

It appears to me, that there is a clear and neceſſary diſtinction between an act impoſing a tax for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue, and thoſe acts which have been made for the regulation of trade, and have produced ſome revenue in conſequence of their effect and operation as regulations of trade.

The colonies claim the privileges of Britiſh ſubjects......it has been proved to be inconſiſtent with thoſe privileges, to tax them without their own conſent, and it hath been demonſtrated that a tax impoſed by parliament, is a tax without their conſent.

The ſubordination of the colonies, and the authority of the parliament to preſerve it, have been fully acknowledged. Not only the welfare, but perhaps the exiſtence of the mother country, as an independent kingdom, may depend upon her trade and navigation, and theſe ſo far upon her intercourſe with the colonies, that, if this ſhould be neglected, there would ſoon be an end to that commerce, whence her greateſt wealth is derived, and upon which her maritime power is principally founded. From theſe conſiderations, the right of the Britiſh parliament to regulate the trade of the colonies, may be juſtly deduced; a denial of it would contradict the admiſſion of the ſubordination, and of the authority to preſerve it, reſulting from the nature of the relation between the mother country and her colonies. It is a common, and frequently the moſt proper method to regulate trade by duties on imports and exports. The authority of the mother country to regulate the trade of the colonies, being unqueſtionable, what regulations are the moſt proper, are to be of courſe ſubmitted to the determination of the parliament; and, if an incidental revenue, ſhould be produced by ſuch regulations; theſe are not therefore unwarrantable.

A right to impoſe an internal tax on the colonies, without their conſent for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue, is denied, a right to regulate their trade without their conſent is admitted. The impoſition of a duty, may, in ſome inſtances, be the proper regulation. If the claims of the mother country and the colonies ſhould ſeem on ſuch an occaſion to interfere, and the point of right to be doubtful, (which I take to be otherwiſe) it is eaſy to gueſs that the determination will be on the ſide of power, and that the inferior will be conſtrained to ſubmit In the reign of our great deliverer, when the Engliſh and the Dutch were at war with France ▪ they joined in preventing the northern powers from carrying on a trade with the enemy. M. Gro • ing having formed a deſign, to prove the right of the northern powers to a • ree trade and navigation, communicated his plan to, and deſi • ed the opinion of baron Puffendorf upon it, who obſ • rved that as the queſtion had not been ſettl • d upon clear and undeniable princip • es, and there was a mixture of fact and right, the confederates might contend th • t they have a right to diſtreſs the enemy, and as the means to • ttain that purpoſe, to reſtrain the trade of the northern powers, an argugument that with ſuperior force would be concluſive..

The writer on the regulations lately made with reſpect to the colonies, who is ſaid to have been well informed, aſſerts a fact, which indiſputably proves, that the impoſitions mentioned, were only regulations of trade, and can, with no kind of propriety, be conſidered in any other light. The fact he aſſerts, is, that the whole remittance from all the taxes in the colonies, at an average of thirty years, has not amounted to 1900 l. a year, and in that ſum, 7 or 800 l. per annum only, have been remitted from North-America; and that the eſtabliſhment of officers, neceſſary to collect that revenue, amounts to 7600 l. per annum.

It would be ridiculous indeed to ſuppoſe, that the parliament would raiſe a revenue by taxes in the colonies to defray part of the national expence, the collection of which taxes would increaſe that expence to a ſum more than three times the amount of the revenue; but, the impoſitions being conſidered in their true light, as regulations of trade, the expence ariſing from an eſtabliſhment neceſſary to carry them into execution, is ſo far from being ridiculous, that it may be wiſely incurred.

The author of the claim of the colonies, &c. gives (as hath been obſerved) the epithets of unjuſt and partial, to a tax which ſhould be impoſed upon the non-electors, only in Britain, and in that very inſtance, proves, that a tax upon the non-electors in the colonies, is more unjuſt and partial, and yet undertakes to defend the juſtice of it; and the writer on the regulations of the colonies declares, that it is in vain to call the acts he has cited as precedents, by the name of mere regulations, notwithſtanding he hath irrefragably proved, that they are ridiculous, if conſidered in any other light. See the regulation of the colonies, &c. A grave anſwer to a little p • rt pamphlet, called the objections to the taxation▪ &c. would be too • udic • ous. When the author of it talks of order • to be obſerved under pains and penalties, he • ſes the awful ſtyle of a L—d of T— but it was too conſtrained for him to ſupport, and he therefore very naturally relapſed into the character of a jack-pudding. He had very little reaſ • n to apprehend that Lo • k, Sidney, or Selden, would be called upon to pull off his—cap. page 105—57, and the claim of the colonies, &c. page 28, 29, 30.)

Though I conceive that the diſtinction which hath been ſuggeſted▪ is ſufficiently evident, and that the argument from precedents hath been refuted, yet, as there have been two or three inſtances particularly enforced and relied upon, I muſt beg the reader's patience whilſt I examine them ſeparately, without undertaking the taſk to remove every incongruity to be found in the writings of the enemies of America on this occaſion; for it would require an Hercules to cleanſe the ſtable.

The 5th Geo. II, it is alledged, abrogates ſo much of the common law as relates to deſcents of freeholds in America, takes from the ſon the right of inheritance in the lands the crown had granted to the father, and his heirs in abſolute fee, makes them aſſets, and applies them to the payment of debts and accounts contracted by the father without the participation of the ſon; it ſets aſide the ſort of evidence required by the common law, and eſtabliſhed by every court of juſtice in America, in proof of a debt, and enjoins the admiſſion of an ex parte affidavit. The power of parliament having been exerciſed to take away the lands of the people in America, the moſt ſacred part of any man's property, and diſpoſing of them for the uſe of private perſons inhabitants of Great-Britain, who can queſtion, ſays the examiner, the parliament's right to take away a ſmall part of the products of thoſe lands, and apply it to the public ſervice?

It is very obſervable, that in applying this ſtatute, a language is made uſe of, which gives the idea of violence; and it muſt be confeſſed, that great aggravation of features, and ſtrong colouring, were neceſſary to make it in any d • gree reſemble the impoſitions of the ſtamp act.

It would be uſeleſs, as well as tedious, to point out every miſrepreſentation in this application, ſince that will be effectually done, by briefly ſhewing the effect of the 5th Geo. II, and ſuggeſting the occaſion of making that ſtatute.

Lands, negroes, &c. in the plantations, are made aſſets for the ſatisfaction of all debts owing to his majeſty, or any of his ſubjects, in like manner as real eſtates are, by the law of England liable to the ſatisfaction of debts due by ſpecialty.

If the creditor reſides in Great-Britain, the affidavits of his witneſſes taken there, are to be allowed as evidence, and to have the ſame force their teſtimony would have, if given, vivâ voce, in open court.

The evidence mentioned in the ſtatute, prevailed in moſt, if not all the colonies, before the ſtatute, and lands were alſo liable to the ſatisfaction of all debts in moſt inſtances, by the method practiſed alſo in the court of chancery in England, of marſhalling aſſets. In ſome of the colonies, without this circuity, lands were immediately liable to ſimple contract debts.

Independent of the ſtatute, when the creditor obtains a judgment againſt his debtor, all his lands, &c. over which he has a diſpoſing power, are liable, and, ſince the ſtatute, only ſuch lands, &c. are aſſets, as the debtor had a power to diſpoſe of. It appears then, that all the effects of the ſtatute on this head, is to ſubject real eſtates to the payment of debts after the death of the debtor, (for the moſt part the caſe before the ſtatute) which might have been made ſubject before his death.

In many of the colonies, the provincial creditors of deceaſed debtors, were preferred to the Britiſh, in the ſame degree, by acts of aſſembly which carried the appearance of partiality; tho' in fact, the effect of the laws of England gave riſe to them; for, upon bankruptcies in Great-Britain, the ſteps required by the ſtatutes to entitle creditors to a ſatisfaction, effectually exclude colony creditors in moſt caſes, and their diſtance, when their debtors die in Great-Britain, where colony creditors have not ſtanding agents as the merchants have in the plantations, and there happens a deficiency of aſſets, ſhuts them out likewiſe from all chance of ſatisfaction in the uſual ſcramble among creditors for the debtor's eſtate on ſuch events.

In ſome of the colonies they changed, by acts of aſſembly, certain ſpecies of perſonal property, e. g. negroes, into the nature of real eſtates, by making them deſcendible; and, by this alteration of the common law, and confuſion of the former diſtinction of property, very conſiderably diminiſhed the perſonal fund liable to all debts.

As theſe circumſtances were repreſented and believed to be great diſcouragements to the trade of the mother country, after repeated requiſitions to provide a remedy in the colonies, in which the grievance was moſt ſenſibly felt, had been diſregarded, the ſtatute was finally made.

This was, without doubt, a ſubject upon which the ſuperintendence of the mother-country might be juſtly exerciſed; it being relative to her trade and navigation, upon which her wealth and her power depend, and the preſervation of her ſuperiority, and the ſubordination of the colonies, are ſecured, and therefore is comprehended in the diſtinction.

After citing, and applying this ſtatute, the examiner takes occaſion to inſult a gentleman of a moſt amiable and reſpectable character, becauſe he preſumed it ſeems, to queſtion the univerſality of parliamentary power, and appears to be ſo totally occupied in the buſineſs of defamation, as not to be aware of his running into the moſt egregious inconſiſtencies. If the examiner is a lawyer, he has betrayed the moſt ſhameful ignorance; if an agent, the moſt infamous unfaithfulneſs. Had the American Chief Juſtice acted in England, as too many of his countrymen have done—had he paid his court to power, by mean compliances, and endeavoured to recommend himſelf, by inventing accuſations againſt the colonies, by repreſenting the inhabitants in them, as a refractory, diſloyal, and rebellious people, and by propoſing ſchemes for their depreſſion—had he not firmly maintained his character of honour and probity, we ſhould not have ſeen this impeachment of his underſtanding; but he left the taſk of proſtitution to the man of ſordid views, Ille ſuperbos aditus regum, Duraſ que fores, expers ſomni Colat— Let ſuch a one, without taking ſleep, Attend • he proud levees, and haughty gates Of kings—

"Had the colonies," ſays the examiner, agreed to the impoſition of the ſtamp-duties, a precedent would have been eſtabliſhed for their being conſulted, before any impoſition upon them by parliament would hereafter take place. He intimates that they were adviſed by ſome of their agents to take this courſe: If ſuch advice hath been given, it was weak or inſidious, and the agents, who recommended the meaſure, ought to be removed for their incapacity or their treachery.

How would the precedent have been eſtabliſhed, or, if it had, what would have been the advantage? This conduct would have admitted, that the colonies might be taxed at any time, and in any manner, without their conſent; and conſequently, would at once have been an effectual ſurrender of all their privileges as Britiſh ſubjects.

If precedents were to be regarded, when a tax in America, for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue is required, they are not wanting. Upon ſuch occaſions, the courſe hath always, and uniformly been, 'till the impoſition of the ſtamp duties, to tranſmit requiſitions to the colonies; and, if the inſtance cited by the examiner, is, in any degree pertinent, he has ſhewn in his appendix, that the method of requiſition was in that purſued; for, the lords of trade, in their report, expreſly mention the refuſal of the colonies to comply with the requiſitions tranſmitted to them, to remove the grievance complained of.

The clauſe in the mutiny act during the late war is alſo relied upon, but with how much propriety, few words will evince.

The acts of aſſembly of each colony, could have no obligatory force beyond the limits of each; but the ſervice of the colony troops, was not confined within the ſame colony in which they were raiſed; it is therefore evident that the provincial legiſlatures, had not an authority adequate to the great object of the military operations in America, which was not merely the defence of the plantations, by meaſures executed within their boundaries, but the enemy was attacked in his own country, and for this purpoſe the Britiſh and American troops acted conjunctly. On this occaſion it was not only convenient, that the troops employed in the ſame ſervice, ſhould be ſubject to the ſame diſcipline, but it was indiſpenſably neceſſary that this diſcipline ſhould be eſtabliſhed by act of parliament, the authority of the provincial legiſlatures being deemed incompetent. And it is to be remarked, moreover, that the provincial troops were raiſed and paid by the colonies, and that it was in the power of their aſſemblies, a power exerciſed by ſome of them, to diſband or reduce them when they pleaſed, and therefore their ſupporting and keeping them up, was an effectual conſent to the act of parliament; but as hath been ſhewn, an internal tax may be as compleatly and adequately laid in every colony, by the authority of the reſpective aſſemblies, as by the Britiſh parliament, and therefore there is not the ſame neceſſity for the interpoſition of the mother-country in this, as in the other inſtance, and the colonies with reference to the ſtamp-act, are not called upon to do any act expreſſive of their aſſent to it, nor is it in their power to hinder its taking effect in the fulleſt exent.

The act for the eſtabliſhment of a poſt-office in the colonies (9 Anne, • . 10,) comes the neareſt to the ſubject of any regulation that hath been mentioned; but yet it is materially diſtinguiſhable from the ſtamp-act. For the ſame reaſon that an act of parliament was neceſſary to ſecure the diſcipline of the provincial troops, acting in conjunction with the Britiſh forces during the late war, the authority of parliament might be proper for the general eſtabliſhment of a regular poſt-office, for as the laws of each colony are in their operation confined within the limits of each, prohibitory and compulſive clauſes to inforce a general obſervance, without which the eſtabliſhment would fail, might be eluded. If a man ſhould maliciouſly give a wound in one colony, and the wounded perſon die in another, the offender could not be convicted of murder, becauſe the whole fact conſtituting that crime, would not be cognizable in the colony where the wound was given, or the death happened; and the ſame principle is applicable to every other inferior offence, and intimates in what manner prohibitory clauſes might be evaded. This matter therefore of the poſt-office, may be referred to the general ſuperintending authority of the mother country, the power of the provincial legiſlatures being too ſtinted to reach it. In this view, and upon the conſideration of the general convenience and accommodation ariſing from the eſtabliſhment, the people of America, have not complained of it, but if this inſtance were more pertinent than it is, it would only prove what hath been too often proved before.......when men do not ſuſpect any deſigns to invade their rights, and ſubdolous ſteps taken to that end, are productive of immediate convenience without pointing out their deſtructive tendency, they are frequently involved in ruin before they are aware of danger, or that the conduct flowing from the negligence of innocent intentions, may afford a handle to men of different diſpoſitions, for the commiſſion of oppreſſion......of the truth of theſe obſervations the hiſtories of all people who have once been bleſſed with freedom, and have loſt it, exhibit abundant examples.

When inſtances are urged as an authoritative reaſon for adopting a new meaſure, they are proved to be more important from this uſe of them, and ought therefore to be reviewed with accuracy, and canvaſſed with ſtrictneſs. What is propoſed ought to be incorporated with what hath been done, and the reſult of both ſtated and conſidered as a ſubſtantive original queſtion, and if the meaſure propoſed is incompatible with the conſtitutional rights of the ſubject, it is ſo far from being a rational argument, that conſiſtency requires an adoption of the propoſed meaſure, that, on the contrary, it ſuggeſts the ſtrongeſt motive for aboliſhing the precedent; when therefore an inſtance of deviation from the conſtitution is preſſed as a reaſon for the eſtabliſhment of a meaſure ſtriking at the very root of all liberty; though the argument is inconcluſive, it ought to be uſeful.

Wherefore if a ſufficient anſwer were not given to the argument drawn from precedents, by ſhewing that none of the inſtances adduced are applicable, I ſhould have very little difficulty in denying the juſtice of the principle, on which it is founded. What hath been done, if wrongful, confers no right to repeat it. To juſtify oppreſſion and outrage, by inſtances of their commiſſion, is a kind of argument which never can produce conviction, though it may their acquieſcence, whom the terror of greater evils may reſtrain from reſiſting, and thus the deſpotiſm of the eaſt may be ſupported, and the natural rights of mankind be trampled under feet. The queſtion of right, therefore, doth not depend upon precedents, but on the principles of the conſtitution, and hath been put upon its proper point already diſcuſſed, whether the colonies are repreſented or not, in parliament.

As the name of Hambden occurred to the examiner in his deſign of caſting an oblique reflection upon the colonies, it is ſurpriſing he did not recollect, that very numerous precedents have been applied in the defence of an arbitrary and oppreſſive proceeding, deſtructive of the eſſential principle of Engliſh liberty. But though meer acts of power prove no right, yet the real opinion entertained of it, may be inferred from forbearance; for mankind are generally ſo fond of power, that they are oftener tempted to exerciſe it beyond the limits of juſtice, than induced to ſet bounds to it from the pure conſideration of the rectitude of forbearance. Wherefore if I had denied the principle of this kind of reaſoning, without ſhewing the defects of the artificial painted precedents which have been produced, I might ſtill very conſiſtently urge, that, the repeated and uniform requiſitions of the Engliſh miniſters, as often as occaſions for the ſingle purpoſe of revenue have happened, tranſmitted to the colonies to tax themſelves by provincial acts, and the acts of parliament regulating the trade of the plantations, as well as of Ireland, without one inſtance, before the ſtamp act, of a tax impoſed by parliament upon either, for the unmixed purpoſe of revenue prove, that the impoſition of a tax upon them without their conſent, hath conſtantly been held to be inconſiſtent with their conſtitutional rights and privileges. I have joined Ireland with the colonies, and preſume it will hardly be contended that Ireland, over which the courts of juſtice in England have a ſuperintendant power, is not, at leaſt, as ſubject to Great-Britain as the colonies are.

A moſt extraordinary reaſon hath been given, why the method of requiſition would have been improper, viz. that the ſums raiſed muſt be paid into the exchequer, and if levied by the provincial aſſemblies, the parliament would have no right to enquire into the expenditure of them. This is ſo extremely futile, that it would be almoſt abſurd to beſtow a ſerious refutation upon it.

Why muſt the ſums raiſed be paid into the exchequer? If the intention is to apply them in the colonies to any internal purpoſe, why muſt they be remitted to Great-Britain? if armies are to be kept up in America, to defend the colonies againſt themſelves, (for it can hardly be imagined that troops are neceſſary for their protection againſt any foreign enemy) or are to be employed in the national ſervice of cropping the ears, and ſlitting the noſtrils of the civil magiſtrates, as marks of diſtinction See the narrative of the outrages committed by the ſoldiery, on Mr. juſtice Walker in Canada. , why muſt the money be paid into the exchequer? or, if it ſhould be paid into the exchequer, in order to be applied towards ſinking the national debt, why might not the parliament enquire into the application of it? does the examiner, in his idea of the parliament, figure to himſelf a monſter with an hand that can reach to the utmoſt verge of the Britiſh dominions, and clutch and cruſh millions of ſubjects at a gripe; but, when the object is near, apt to be rendered by ſome magical influence, ſo ſhort, and ſo • eeble, as not to be able to reach the exchequer, or to ſqueeze the chancellor of it?

We are aſſured that there never can be any irregular attempts of the prerogative upon our rights, whilſt we are bleſſed with a prince of the glorious line of Brunſwick upon the throne of Great-Britain. I have all the confidence in the excellent diſpoſitions of our preſent moſt gracious ſovereign that an Engliſhman ought to have, but I cannot penetrate into futurity; and, as the examiner hath not yet eſtabliſhed the character of a prophet, I muſt conſider this aſſertion rather as a curious ſpecimen of lip-loyalty, I will not call it extravagant adulation, than as a ſober recommendation, to ſurrender all thoſe guards and ſecurities of liberty, which the conſtitution of a free government hath provided; but, if the Britiſh Americans ſhould ever be reduced to the unhappy neceſſity of giving up their natural rights, and their civil privileges, I believe they would as ſoon make the ſurrender to a prince of the line of Brunſwick, as to any other mortal, or number of mortals, in the univerſe.

We have ſeen too a piece in ſome of our late news-papers, all bedawbed with the lace of compliment.....there is no end to human ambition▪ it is perpetually reſtleſs, and puſhing forward. If a little P—ct—r A late notable ſpeech puts me in mind of the ingenuity of the female diſ • utant, who uſed to ſilence debate, by crying out, God bleſs the king, and what have you to ſay to that? is raiſed to the title of excellency, and the rank of a kind of viceroy, there is ſtill a ſummit beyond the eminence to which he hath been elevated, that he is ſollicitous to gain.

It hath been truly ſaid, that it will be no eaſy taſk to perſuade the Americans to forſake the culture of their lands, to leave the ways their fathers trod, and in which themſelves were trained, to drop a buſineſs they al •• ady underſtand, in which they have had long experience, and by which their families have thriven, to change all their habits of thinking, and their manner of life, in order to apply to arts which they do not know, or know but imperfectly, and that where eſtates may be eaſily raiſed by mere tillage, the temptations to manufacture are wanting, and men, who can depend upon their induſtry alone, will not have recourſe to arts for ſubſiſtence. But that which perſuaſion might not effect, and to which peculiar cirſtances might be adverſe, neceſſity, and an alteration of thoſe circumſtances, may accompliſh. When the alternative is propoſed, and the one part of it aſſures ſucceſs, and a comfortable ſupport by a moderate application of induſtry, familiarized by uſe, and rendered eaſy by practice; and the other affording only an experiment of precarious iſſue, calling for an application unexperienced and dreaded, attended with perplexity, and productive of irkſome anxiety, the generality of mankind would not heſitate in chooſing the former. But, though it would gain the preference of choice, yet, if the alternative is taken away, and choice yields to neceſſity, the enterprizing will form projects, the judicious improve, the induſtrious execute them. Succeſs, in one inſtance, will animate the timid to make trial of the means which have ſucceeded under the direction of others, ſtimulate the phlegmatic, and rouſe the indolent—ſhould the neceſſity after a little time, ceaſe, new habits may become as ſtrong as the old, and the alternative would therefore be altered, the choice be an act of deliberation, rather than of blind impulſe; old prejudices would be greatly abated, if not extinguiſhed, new attachments, perhaps, be formed. From this change, different conſequences may be conjectured or foretold, and perhaps the moſt confident might be diſappointed by the event. It is not ſo difficult for men to ſtrike into new employments and methods of life, when impelled by the urgency of diſtreſs, nor ſo eaſy to call them back to their old manner of life, and divert them from new purſuits experienced to be profitable, and productive of the beſt ſecurity againſt oppreſſion, as ſome ſeem to apprehend.

It is not contended that the colonies ought to be indulged in a general liberty of exporting and importing every thing in what manner they pleaſe, but, ſince they are hindered from making all the advantages they might do, and what advantages might they not make, if under no checks? they have a good plea againſt all rigour and ſeverity, not abſolutely neceſſary. That Britiſh manufactures come dearer, and not ſo good in quality to America, as formerly, is a very general complaint, and what effect it may have, ſhould they ſtill grow dearer and worſe in quality, or the colonies be rendered leſs able to conſume them, is a conſideration which concerns Great-Britain, at leaſt as much as the colonies. An increaſe of price, and falling in the goodneſs of quality, is the uſual effect of monopolies; there is no danger of foreigners taking advantage of this circumſtance in America, whatever they may do in other countries, but the induſtry it may give riſe to in America, when other circumſtances concur, is not difficult to be foreſeen.

It muſt be acknowledged, that the balance of trade between Great-Britain and her colonies, is conſiderably againſt the latter, and that no gold or ſilver mines have yet been diſcovered in the old American ſettlements, or among the treaſures of the new acquiſitions. How then is this balance to be diſcharged? The former trade of the colonies, which enabled them to keep up their credit with Great-Britain, by applying the balance they had gained againſt foreigners, is now ſo fettered with difficulties, as to be almoſt prohibited. In order therefore to reduce the balance againſt them upon the trade between the colonies and Great Britain, this trade muſt be contracted, ſo as to bring the ſcales to an equilibrium, or a debt will be incurred that can't be paid off, which will diſtreſs the creditor as well as the debtor, by the inſolvency of the latter. The income alſo of the colonies, which was before inveſted in their trade, will be diminiſhed in proportion to the produce of the ſtamp-act, and therefore the amount of that produce muſt be drawn out, which will create a further reduction of the trade.

I confeſs that I am one of thoſe who do not perceive the policy in laying difficulties and obſtructions upon 〈◊〉 gainful trade of the colonies with foreigners, or that it even makes any real difference to the Engliſh nation, whether the merchants who carry it on with commodities Great-Britain will not purchaſe▪ reſide in Philadelphia, New-York or Boſton, London, Briſtol, or Liverpool, when the balance gained by the American merchant in the purſuit of that trade centers in Great-Britain, and is applied to the diſcharge of a debt contracted by the conſumption of Britiſh manufactures in the colonies, and in this to the ſupport of the national expence.

If in conſequence of the obſtructions, or regulations as they are called, of their commerce, and the impoſition of taxes upon their properties, the colonies ſhould only be driven to obſerve the ſtricteſt maxims of frugality, the conſequence would rather be diſagreeable than hurtful—ſhould they be forced to uſe new methods of induſtry, and to have recourſe to arts for a ſupply of neceſſaries, the difficulty in ſucceeding would prove leſs than the apprehenſion of miſcarrying, and the benefit greater than the hope of it. There are few people of the higheſt, and even of the middle rank, but would upon a ſtrict ſcrutiny into their ordinary diſburſements, diſcover ſome articles that would admit of defalcation.

A prudent man, conſtrained to abridge his outgoings, will conſider what articles of expence may be retrenched or given up without diſtreſs or diſcomfort, and if, after this ſaving, he ſtill finds that his expences exceed his income, he will then conſider of what articles he can provide a ſupply by the application of domeſtic induſtry, or whether ſome tolerable ſubſtitute may not be fallen upon to anſwer the purpoſe of what he can neither buy, nor hath ſkill or ability to fabricate. He will reflect that the expedient which is at firſt but an indifferent ſhift, uſe and experience will improve into convenience, that practice will confer knowledge and ſkill, and theſe facility and ſatisfaction, and tho' the progreſs ſhould be ſlow and gradual, habit will grow with it, and produce reconcilement and content.

What are called in North America, luxuries, ought for the moſt part to be ranked among the comforts and decencies of life, but theſe will not be relinquiſhed, if a ſupply of neceſſaries may be provided by domeſtic induſtry.......for food, thank GOD, they do not, and for raiment they need not, depend upon Great-Britain.

Any thin covering in the ſummer to preſerve dece • cy, and ſubſtantial cloathing in the winter to repel the cold, are ſufficient for domeſtic ſervants and labourers, and theſe may be provided without any remora to the buſineſs of tillage, for there are many intervals in which it is ſuſpended. There are times too, when the employment is ſo ſlight as to be rather a moderate exerciſe, than a laborious taſk, when the work that is done might be performed by hal • the number of labourers without exceſſive exertion, or exhauſting fatigue. There are beſides in moſt families thoſe, whom the feebleneſs of immature years, or their ſex, at particular periods▪ or the decripitude of old age, diſcharge from the duties of tillage. Leather, and wool, and cotton, and flax, are at hand: How eaſy then is the neceſſary cloathing provided for thoſe whoſe ſtation does not require any attention or regard to faſhion, or elegance; ſo eaſy that many have already gone into this manufacture without any other impulſe, than the ſpirit of induſtry, which can't bear inaction, tho' the ſavings on this head have afterwards been neglected. In this very conſiderable branch ſo little difficulty is there, that a beginning is half the work. The path is beaten, there is no danger of loſing the way, there are directors to guide every ſtep. But why ſhould they ſtop at the point of cloathing labourers, why not proceed, when vigour and ſtrength will increaſe with the progreſſion, to cloath the planters? When the firſt ſtage is arrived at, the ſpirits will be recruited, and the ſecond ſhould be undertaken with alacrity, ſince it may be performed with eaſe. In this too, the experiment hath been made and hath ſucceeded▪ Let the manufacture of America be the ſymbol of dignity, the badge of virtue, and it will ſoon break the ſetters of diſtreſs. A garment of linſey-wolſey, when made the diſtinction of real pa ••• tiſm, is more honou •• ble and attractive of reſpect and veneration, than all the pageantry, and the robes, and the plumes, and the diadem of an emperor without it. Let the emulation be not in the richneſs and variety of foreign productions, but in the improvement and perfection of our own—Let it be demonſtrated that the ſubjects of the Britiſh empire in Europe and America are the ſame, that the hardſhips of the latter will ever recoil upon the Upon a ſurmiſe that a certain noble • — • , wa • the author of ſome hardſhips inflicted upon the colonies, a reproachful and miſchievous diſtinction hath been made by ſome people, between the natives of S—t—d, and of E—g—d and America, which every judicious friend of the colonies muſt wiſh to ſee aboliſhed and an Union rather eſtabliſhed than diviſions promoted. Every man who has his all, and the welfare of his poſterity at ſtake, upon the proſperity of America, as he hath an intereſt in common with the natives of it, ought to be conſidered as an American—It is an effectual way to make men adverſaries, to call and treat them as ſuch—Beſides, laying aſide this conſideration, the diſtinction is extremely unjuſt; for tho' there 〈◊〉 too much reaſon to believe that ſome natives of America, and of E —g—d, who have reſided in the colonies, have been inſtrumental in bringing upon us the ſeverities we deplore, yet hath it never been even ſurmiſed, I ſpeak it to their honour, that any native of S—t—d reſiding, or that ever did reſide in America, had in any degree a hand in them. It is much to be feared, if the breach which a too eager proſecution of the little views of party hath made among the inhabitants of a colony heretofore the moſt diſtinguiſhed for prudence and unanimity, ſhould not be cloſed, in conſideration of the general calamity, that America as well as Denmark, will furniſh an inſtance of the exceſſive temerity of political an • moſity. former.

In theory it is ſuppoſed that each is equally important to the other, that all partake of the adverſity and depreſſion of any. The theory is juſt, and time will certainly eſtabliſh it; but if another principle ſhould be ever hereafter adopted in practice, and a violation deliberate, cruel, ungrateful, and attended with every circumſtance of provocation, be offered to our fundamental rights, why ſhould we leave it to the ſlow advances of time (which may be the great hope and reliance, probably, of the authors of the injury, whoſe view it may be to accompliſh their ſelfiſh purpoſes in the interval) to prove what might be demonſtrated immediately—Inſtead of moping, and puling, and whining to excite compaſſion; in ſuch a ſituation we ought with ſpirit, and vigour, and alacrity, to bid defiance to tyranny, by expoſing it's impotence, by making it as contemptible, as it would be deteſtable. By a vigorous application to manufactures, the conſequence of oppreſſion in the colonies to the inhabitants of Great-Britain, would ſtrike home, and immediately. None would miſtake it. Craft and ſubtilty would not be able to impoſe on the moſt ignorant and credulous; for if any ſhould be ſo weak of ſight as not to ſee, they would not be ſo callous as not to feel it.—Such conduct would be the moſt dutiful and beneficial to the mother-country. It would point out the diſtemper whe • the remedy might be eaſy, and a cure at once effected by a ſimple alteration of regimen.

Of this meaſure ſhould there be apprehenſions, and miniſterial orators and panegyriſts endeavour to obviate them by obſerving, that, it would always be eaſy to reinſtate things where they were, and that by eaſing the colonies of their burthens, and giving encouragement to their produce; the eſtabliſhment of any manufacture in America might be prevented. We ſhould mark well this reaſoning, and avail ourſelves of the inſtruction given by our enemies, which would point out to us the remedy, and the more ſpeedy the application of it the better, and that would depend upon ourſelves.

Beſides the urgency of ſuch an occaſion (ſhould it happen) there would be another powerful inducement to this ſimple, natural, eaſy method.......the good or bad ſucceſs of one attempt to oppreſs, generally produces or prevents future impoſitions. In common life a tameneſs in bearing a deprivation of part of a man's property, encourages • apacity to ſeize the reſt.

Any oppreſſion of the colonies, would intimate an opinion of them I am perſuaded they do not deſerve, and their ſecurity as well as honour ought to engage them to confute. When contempt is mixed with injuſtice, and inſult with violence, which is the caſe when an injury is done to him who hath the means of redreſs in his power; if the injured hath one inflammable grain of honour in his breaſt, his reſentment will invigorate his purſuit of reparation, and animate his efforts to obtain an effectual ſecurity againſt a repetition of the outrage.

If the caſe ſuppoſed ſhould really happen, the reſentment I ſhould recommend would be a legal, orderly, and prudent reſentment, to be expreſſed in a zealous and vigorous The ingenious Mr. Hume, obſerves in his hiſtory of James I▪ that the Engliſh fine cloth was in ſo little credit even at home, that the king was obliged to ſeek expedients by which he might engage the people of faſhion to wear it, and the manufacture of fine linen was totally unknown in the kingdom—what an encouragement to induſtry! This very pene • rating gentleman also recommends a mild government, as a proper meaſure for preſerving the dominion of England over her colonies. induſtry, in an immediate uſe and unabating application of the advantages we derive from our ſituation......a reſen • ment which could not fail to produce effects as beneficial to the mother country as to the colonies, and which a regard to her welfare as well as our own, ought to inſpire us with on ſuch an occaſion.

The general aſſemblies would not, I ſuppoſe, have it in their power to encourage by laws, the proſecution of this beneficial, this neceſſary meaſure; but they might promote it almoſt as effectually by their example. I have in my younger days ſeen fine ſights, and been captivated by their dazzling pomp and glittering ſplendor; but the ſight of our repreſenta • ives, all adorned in compleat dreſſes of their own leather, and flax, and wool, manufactured by the art and induſtry of the inhabitants of Virginia, would excite, not the gaze of admiration, the flutter of an agitated imagination, or the momentary amuſement of a tranſient ſcene, but a calm, ſolid, heart felt delight. Such a ſight would give me more pleaſure than the moſt ſplendid and magni •• cent ſpectacle the moſt exquiſite taſte ever painted, the richeſt fancy ever imagined, realized to the view....as much more pleaſure as a good mind would receive from the contemplation of virtue, than of elegance; of the ſpirit of patriotiſm, than the oſtentation of opulence.

Not only, "as a friend to the colonies," but as an inhabitant having my all at ſtake upon their welfare See the regulations, &c. page 111. I deſire an exemption from taxes impoſed without my conſent, and I have reflected longer than "a moment upon the conſequences:" I value it as one of the deareſt privileges I enjoy: I acknowledge dependance on Great-Britain, but I can perceive a degree of it without ſlavery, and I diſown all other. I do not expect that the • ntereſts of the colonies will be conſidered by ſome men, but in ſubſerviency to other regards. The effects of luxury, and venality, and oppreſſion, poſterity may perhaps experience, and SUFFICIENT FOR THE DAY WILL BE THE EVIL THEREOF.

BY the 12th Charles II▪ the colonies are reſtrained from ſending the products enumerated in the act to any foreign ports......By the 15th of the ſame king, they are prohibited from importing commodities of the growth or manufacture of Europe, except from Great-Britain, ſaving a few articles mentioned in this act.

A law, which reſtrains one part of the ſociety, from exporting its products to the moſt profitable market, in favour of another; or obliges it to import the manufactures of one country that are dear, inſtead of thoſe of another that are cheap, is effectually a tax. For if the profitable exportation, and the importation of the cheaper commodities were permitted, a tax equal ſuch gain in the former caſe, and to the ſaving in the latter, would leave that part of the ſociety, in the ſame ſtate and cond ••• on, as if under the prohibition and reſtriction above mentioned. As for inſtance in the caſe of importation.......Suppoſe a country which I will diſtinguiſh by the name of A, can purchaſe commodities of the ſame kind, and equal goodneſs, 20 per cent cheaper of B, than ſhe can of C;..........Then it is clear, if A is prohibited from taking theſe commodities of B, and obliged to purchaſe them of C, that A is juſt in the ſame ſtate and condition, as if ſhe were allowed to purchaſe the commodities of B, on paying thereon a duty of 20 per cent to C........This inſtance, mutatis mutandis, is equally applicable to the caſe of exportation. Hence it appears, that the country favoured by the prohibition and reſtriction, gains as much thereby, as it would do, if the proportionate tax were paid to it, upon taking off the prohibition and reſtriction; or, in other words, the profit which the one is hindered from making, in conſequence of the prohibition and reſtriction, is made by the other, in whoſe favour they have been introduced.

It hath been obſerved by a well-received writer on the ſubject of trade, that a prohibition acknowledges the commodities it is laid on, to be good and cheap, otherwiſe it were needleſs, and a prohibition on the goods of any one nation, gives a monopoly to other nations, that raiſe the like. ...Again.... a prohibition againſt any one nation, makes other nations, having the like commodities, take the advantage and raiſe their price, and is therefore a tax. 〈…〉

If a prohibition, extending to one nation only in favour of many, 〈…〉 , and is therefore a tax; a pro • ibition extending to 〈…〉 in favour of one, is indub •• ably • o.

From Virginia and Maryland are exported, communibus annis, 90,000 h • g • heads of • ob • cco to Great Britain, of which it is ſuppoſed 60,0 • 0 are • hence re-exported. But theſe colonies not being permited to ſend their tobacco immediately to foreign markets diſtributively, in proportion to their demands, the re-exported tobacco pays double freight, double inſurance, commiſſion and other ſhipping charges.— The whole quantity is, moreover, of courſe much depreciated, for going all to Great-Britain, the home-market is overdone, by which circumſtance, the quantity required for home-conſumption is without doubt purchaſed cheaper than it would be, if no more than that were imported into Great-Britain, and of this glut foreigners, and purchaſers on ſpeculation alſo, avail themſelves. Beſides, a great deal of the tobacco getting home late, the rigorous ſeaſon hinders its being re-ſhipped for ſome months, during which, it is dead on hand, and moreover gives advantage to buyers.......a loſs to the planter, which would be avoided, if the tobacco could be immediately ſent to its proper market.

The above quoted author hath computed the duties, exciſes, &c. on leather, at 50 per cent; and the artificial value of a bale of Engliſh cloth ariſing from taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws, at 51 per cent, by which, he means that every hundred pounds worth of that ſpecies of manufacture, includes in tha • ſum 51 l. of taxes. His computation is, without doubt, too low now, taxes having been increaſed very conſiderably ſince the time, in which he wrote.

But leſt the eſtimate ſhould be objected to on account of its including 20 per cent for monopolies, &c. I will ſtate the artificial value ariſing from taxes only to be 33l. 6s. 8d. which will hardly be objected to, for being too high.

The colonies, it is ſuppoſed, take annually, manufactures from Great-Britain, to the amount of £. 2,000,000 Therefore they pay an ANNUAL TAX of £. 666,666 13 4 To which muſt be added freight, inſurance, commiſſion and ſhipping charges, amounting at leaſt to 10 per cent, the half of which, as it might be ſaved by back-freight, &c. were the colonies permitted to import directly the manufactures of foreign countries, is computed at 100,000 00 0 What may be the amount from the reſtrictions, on all the enumerated commodities (except tobacco) exported from all the colonie • , with ſubſidies retained and duties laid, upon the moſt moderate computation, may, I ſuppoſe be be ſtated at 150,000 00 0   £.916,666 13 4

Part of the commodities ſent from Great-Britain to the colonies, is firſt imported into Great-Britain from foreign countries; but the eſtimate is not exceptionable on that account, for the general calculation on the advanced price of Britiſh manufactures, is extremely low. —Several of the foreign commodities receive their perfection in Britain....All of them are enhanced by the articles of double freight, inſurance, ſhipping, charges, the merchant importer's commiſſion, the Engliſh tradeſman's profit, the merchant expo • ter's commiſſion, and ſubſidies retained. If the colonies were not reſtrained from directly importing foreign commodities, they would it is preſumed, pay leſs for them, even by 50 per cent, than they do at preſent.

It hath been already obſerved, that there are ſhipped from Virginia and Maryland, annually, at an average about 90,000 hogſheads of tobacco, 60 000 of which, or upwards, are re exported from Great-Britain, to foreign markets; but they pay to Great-Britain, for the reaſons above explained, 3l. per hogſhead, i. e. the ſum of 3l. upon each hogſhead might be ſaved if the tobacco might be immediately and diſtributively ſent to the reſpective markets, in proportion to their demands; and an equal ſum is paid alſo to Great • Britain, upon the ſame rule of computation, i. e. that theſe colonies pa • what they might ſave if not reſtrained. For tho' the Engliſh manufacturer • ets the tobacco he wants, without the double freight, &c. ye • 〈…〉 a • vantage of the glut, and an opportunity of buying it as cheap, 〈…〉 ſold in Gerat Britain for the foreign markets, before the 〈…〉 double freight, &c. are incurred, and therefore the planter 〈…〉 more for his toba • co ſold for hom • , than that which is ſold • or foreign conſumption, and conſequently pays as much for it. For there is great reaſon to imagine, that if theſe colonies were at liberty to ſend their tobacco immediately where they pleaſed, the market in England would be as profitable as thoſe of France, Holland, &c.....But when the tobacco, under the preſent regulation, is purchaſed for re-exportation, the purchaſer undoubtedly conſiders the expence he is to be at, before it gets to the foreign market, as part of the price of the commodity, and therefore lowers his price to the merchant in proportion.

The above ſum of 3l. for each hogſhead, makes £. 270,000 00 0 The amount of the ſundry impoſitions and reſtrictions before mentioned brought forward, 916,666 13 4 Total amount of taxes to Great-Britain 1,186,666 13 4 Beſides the above amount of taxes paid to the mother-country, the colonies in North-America ſupport their own civil eſtabliſhments, and pay quit-rents to the crown and proprietaries, to the amount (ſuppoſing 600,000 taxables, at the moderate rate of 15s each) of 450,000 00 0 Total amount of taxes paid to our mother-country, and the ſupport of our civil eſtabliſhment, annually, 1,636,666 13 4 Suppoſing the clear annual rents of the lands in North-America, (unreſtrained by acts of parliament) would amount to £. 2,500,000

It appears then, that the whole tax is upwards of 65 per cent; and if, therefore, the artificial value of one hundred pounds worth of Britiſh manufacture, (cloth for inſtance) is, according to the above computation, 33l. 6 s. 8 d. there was, before the ſtamp-act, a tax paid by the North-Americans, near double of that which is paid by the inhabitants of England. If the above ſum of 33 l. 6 s. 8 d. is too low, and ought to be increaſed, then the tax on North-America, on the article of manufactures imported from Britain, muſt alſo be increaſed.

It ſhould ſeem that the maxim of every tax upon labour falling ultimately upon the conſumer of its product, cannot be ſtrictly applied to the product of the North-American colonies. For, as they are obliged to ſend their commodities to ſome port in the Britiſh dominions, or (where indulgence is granted to ſend ſome of them to other places) deprived in great meaſure of the benefit of returns, they are by theſe means ſubjected to dead freight; and moreover, being confined in their conſumption to a particular manufacture, and the commodities they export, being chiefly raw materials, they have not the means generally in the power of other people, by raiſing the price of labour, to throw their burthens upon others; but are, for the moſt part, obliged, both in their exports and imports, to ſubmit to an arbitrary determination of their value.

The ſanguine genius of one of the Anti-American writers, brings to my mind the fable of the boy and the hen that laid golden eggs. He is not content to wait for the increaſe of the public revenue, by that gradual proceſs and circulation of property, which an attention to the commercial intereſts of the nation hath eſtabliſhed, but is a • • nce for tearing away the embryo, which, in due time might be matured into fullneſs of ſize and vigour; without ever reflecting, that when the hen is deſtroyed by his violence, there will be no more GOLDEN EGGS.......The following paſſage juſtifies this obſervation........

If we have from the colonies their ALL already, we only have it (ſays he) by trade, and not by taxes; and ſurely it is not the ſame thing, whether the wealth be brought into the public coffers by taxes, or coming in by trade, flows into the pockets of individuals, and, by augmenting his influence with his wealth, enables the merchant to plunge us into new wars and new debts for his advantage The objections to the taxations, &c. conſidered..

The man who thinks the gains of the merchant are dangerous, and that the welfare of the manufacturers, the landholders, &c. doth not depend upon the trade and navigation of Great-Britain, is very conſiſtently an advocate for a meaſure which hath a direct tendency to check them; but whether this opinion, and very conſiſtent conduct, might not be more ſerviceable in ſome other employment than in that of a L— of T—, is ſubmitted to their conſideration, who are the judges of merit, and the diſpenſers of its rewards.

For a reaſon, which the above opinion ſuggeſts, I ſhall ſubjoin an eſtimate of the duties upon tobacco conſumed in Great Britain, and of the profit to the planter on that tobacco.......The intelligent reader will not apprehend it to be my meaning, that the planter pays out of his pocket all the duties laid on tobacco, or be at a loſs to infer, that the eſtimate has been made with no other view, than to obviate the principle others by their writings ſeem to adopt.

The old ſubſidy is one penny per pound, 25 per cent deducted.

All the other duties are ſeven pence, and one third per pound, 15 per cent deducted.

An hogſhead of tobacco, at an average, contains 952lb.

The whole duties therefore, £. 27 14 0 The amount of the whole duties on 30,000 hogſheads, is £. 831,000 00 0

The full clear proceeds of an hogſhead of tobacco, reckoning 952lb. in each hogſhead, has not, on an average for ſome years paſt, exceeded 4l. See before, p. 52. The attentive reader will obſerve▪ that the net proceeds of a hogſhead of tobacco, at an average, are 4l. and the taxes 3l..... together 7l.—Quere, how much per cent does the tax amount to, which takes from the two wretched tobacco colonies, 3l. out of every 7l.? And how deplorable muſt their circumſtances appear, when their vaſt debt to the mother country, and the annual burthen of their civil eſtabliſhments are added to the eſtimate? In theſe two colonies there are upwards of 180,000 taxables. wherefore, on 30,000 hogſheads, the planters get 120,000l. How much of the above ſum of 831,000l. is net to the revenue, I ſhall not undertake to ſay; but I preſume it may be ſafely aſſerted, that no part of this, or any other public money, is touched by any Americans, whether they have great po • ers of ſpeech or not; tho' any gentleman who might be affected by it, is not to be blamed for his apprehenſion, that a ſudden importation of a certain commodity, might hurt the home market.

The ſum of the taxes, paid in North-America, will appear enormous to thoſe, who, having been told that theſe colonies pay only 7 or 800 l. per annum, in conſequence of taxes laid there, might be led, in their dependence upon miniſterial candor, to believe, that they paid no more elſewhere;......but to others, who are better acquainted with the ſubject, the computation will appear too low.—From theſe obſervations it may be inferred what vaſt wealth, in taxes only, the mother country has, in the courſe of a hundred years, drawn from her colonies; and how profoundly well-informed the writer is, who, with equal pertinency and modeſty, pronounces, that it is now high time for England to draw ſome little profit from her colonies, after the vaſt treaſure ſhe has expended on their ſettlement.

I confeſs that the above computations are conjectural, but I believe • hey are probable. I mean that thoſe, who are beſt acquanited with the ſubject, will think the charge upon North-America is not exaggerated, and which I think very naturally accounts for the eno • mous debt ſhe at preſent labours under to the mother-country.

Dr. Davenant obſerves, that, if ever any thing great or good be done for the Engliſh colonies, induſtry muſt have its due recompence, and that cannot he without encouragement to it, which, perhaps is only to be brought about by confirming their liberties, and eſtabliſhing good diſcipline among them; that, as they ſee they are a free people, in point of government, ſo they may, by diſcipline, be kept free of the miſchiefs that follow vice and idleneſs. And, as great care ſhould be taken in this reſpect, ſo without doubt, it is adviſeable, that no little emulation of private intereſts of neighbour governors, nor that the petitions of hungry courtiers at home, ſhould prevail to diſcourage thoſe particular colonies, who, in a few years, have raiſed themſelves by their own charge, prudence and induſtry, to th • wealth and greatneſs they are now arrived at, without any expence to the crown; upon which account, any innovations, or breach of their original charters, (beſides that it ſeems a breach of the public faith) may, peradventure, not tend to the king's profit. Excellent obſervation! but how little it hath been regarded, the prſeent deeply-afflicting diſtreſs of the inhabitants of North-America demonſtrates;—a diſtreſs ſufficient to drive men into diſpair, who are not animated by the hope, that—DEUS DABIT HIS QUOQUE FINEM. God ſhall alſo put an End to theſe.