YOU will be ſurpriſed at an Addreſs made to you jointly in this Manner; but as I have not the Honour to be much acquainted with either of you, though I eſteem you both, (at leaſt while you remain connected) I hope you will forgive me for troubling you, in this public Way; and the rather, as I think the Matters I ſhall write upon, to be of very great Importance; and as you will diſcover by what I am going to ſuggeſt to you, that I am a true Friend to Old England, and a ſincere Lover of my Country.

I have long thought that our Miniſters of State may be much aſſiſted, in their Deliberations, by Perſons who have not the Honour of ſitting at the Council Board. 〈◊〉 wiſeſt Meaſures have often been pointed out, in the Courſe of parliamentary 〈◊〉 ; and Members of either Houſe, perhaps thoſe l • aſt conſ •••• d by Government, have frequently been earlieſt in ſuggeſting ſuch Plans of public Policy, as Government itſelf has been glad to adopt. The Ex • inction of factious Oppoſition, the Un • nimity of every Party, and the Acquieſcence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is propoſed by his Majeſty's Servants, while it hath produced infinite Advantages to the Public, hath deprived thoſe who direct the Cabinet, of all ſuch Parliamentary Inſtruction, as their Predeceſſors in Power uſed to receive. You, my Lord, of late, ſcarcely hear any Speech in the Houſe of Lords, but that of a Lawyer on a Scotch Appeal; and the hereditary Council of the Nation rarely aſſemble for higher Purpoſes than to alter Settlements and deliberate on Bills of Divorce. And you, Sir, in the other Houſe, where ſo many ſkilful Champions uſed formerly to engage and ſtruggle for Victory, remain ſingle in the Field of Battle; and your Speaker takes the Chair only to vote Millions and levy Thouſands, without the leaſt Debate or Oppoſition.

The Channel of Parliamentary Inſtruction being thus ſtopt, no other but that of the Preſs is left open, for thoſe Heads of Advice to which it may be worth your While to attend. For this Reaſon it is, that I have thought of addreſſing you in this Manner. Who I am, it matters not. Let it ſuffice, that, unpe • ſioned and unemployed, I can vie, 〈◊〉 Zeal for the Public, with thoſe who taſte the Sw • ets of exorbitant Salaries, and unfathomed Perquiſites. Whether my Knowledge be equal to my Zeal; whether my Acquaintance with the World, and Experience in Buſineſs, have enabled me to offer any Thing that may be 〈◊〉 real Utility, muſt be determined by you, and by the Public. This I am certain of, that my Intention is honeſt; and while I pleaſe myſelf, I ſhall endeavour, at the ſame Time, not to offend either of you. Some Productions, in which you have, of late, been jointly taken Notice of, proceeded from a fa • tious Diſpoſition, which I am unacquainted with, and deteſt. For, far from wiſhing to diſunite and ſeparate your Intereſts, I am fully perſuaded that without your perfect Harmony and Union, the great Events which have happened under your Adminiſtration, will not have thoſe permanent good Conſequences ſo much to be wiſhed for: And it is only from your joint Concurrence, that we can hope for any of thoſe prudent, ſpirited and national Meaſures concerning which I propoſe to offer you a few Hints, in this Addreſs.

Conſidering the preſent diſtreſſed Condition of France, fallen from its alarming Power, and Greatneſs, into the loweſt State of Diſtreſs and Impotence; unfortunate in its military Operations in every Quarter of the Globe▪ beaten all Europe over by Sea and Land; its Fleets ſailing, only to be deſtroyed; its Armies marching, only to run away; without Trade; no Credit; ſtopping Payments, proteſting Bills, and to all Intents and Purpoſes a Bankrupt Nation; their King, the Princes of the Blood, the Nobility, and the Clergy carrying in all their Plate to be coined, for the preſent extreme Exigency of their Affairs; diſappointed and baff • ed in all their Schemes on the Continent, and taught to think no more of Invaſions, by the Deſtruction of the only Fleet they had left;—I ſay, conſidering all theſe Circumſtances, which I have not exaggerated, in the leaſt, it is not unnatural to imagine, that a Period will ſoon be put to the Troubles of Europe. France, 〈…〉 on the War, muſt ſoon be reduced to the Neceſſity of ſuing for Peace.

We have had Bloodſhed enough. God forgive thoſe who have occaſioned this terrible Deſtruction of the human Species, and ſpread Miſery, and Devaſtation, for ſo long a Time, in almoſt every Corner of the Globe. The great Succeſs with which the Arms of Britain have been bleſſed, puts it in our Power to give Peace to Europe: and it is to the Honour of his Majeſty and thoſe who direct his Councils, that the Diſtreſſes of our Enemies have only enabled him to give the World a Proof of his Moderation; and to ſhew that his Inclination to make Peace, keeps Pace with the Inability of France to prolong the War.

As his Majeſty entered into this War, not from Views of Ambition, ſo he does not Wiſh to continue it, from Motives of Reſentment. The Deſire of his Majeſty's Heart is, to ſee a Stop put to the Effuſion of Chriſtian Blood.

What was declared in the above Paragraph of his Majeſty's Speech from the Throne, to our own Parliament, at the Opening of this Seſſion, has ſince that, been notified in Form to our Enemy. The Readineſs of England, and Pruſſia, to enter into a Treaty, and to give Peace to Chriſtendom, which Prince Lewis of Wolfenbuttle hath been authorized to communicate to the French Miniſter at the Hague, will, no Doubt, open the Door for a Negotiation, in a Manner the moſt likely to be embraced by the Court of Verſailles; whoſe Diſgraces and Diſtreſſes, (too great to be diſſembled, and too extenſive to be remedied) will diſpoſe them to liſten with Attention to every Propoſal of Accommodation, made to them by an Enemy whoſe Sword was unſheathed only to puniſh Perfidy; and whoſe Succeſſes, as appears from their 〈…〉 firſt Advances towards a Treaty, have not infatuated them to prefer unneceſſary and ruinous Conqueſt, to a reaſonable and ſolid Peace.

It is, therefore, to be hoped, and to be believed, that Peace is not at a great Diſtance; and upon this Suppoſition I ſhall beg Leave to offer a few Conſiderations to you, as to the Perſons on whom the Fate of this Country depends; Conſiderations which are equally important as they are ſeaſonable; and an Attention to which, before you enter upon any Negotiation, may, perhaps, aſſiſt you (if I may be allowed to ſuppoſe you ſtand in Need of any Aſſiſtance) in directing this Negotiation to ſuch an Iſſue, as may be equally honourable to yourſelves, and uſeful to the Public.

In this Situation of Affairs, one of the firſt Matters relative to the future Negotiation, which, no doubt, muſt occur to you, will be the Choice of thoſe Perſons who are to be truſted with the great Concerns of this Nation as Plenipotentiaries. As much will depend upon this Point, I ſhall beg Leave to begin with giving you my Thoughts upon it, and the other Topics on which I propoſe to trouble you will naturally ariſe from each other without obſerving any other Order, or Connection, beſides that in which they ſhall preſent themſelves to a Mind intent upon its Subject.

With regard then to the Choice of Plenipotentiaries, I cannot but lament the Difficulties you have to encounter, before you will be able to find ſuch as the Public will have Reaſon to thank you for.—I am not totally unknowing in the Characters and Capacities of many among the great. But when I caſt my Eyes around me, I own that I am ſurprized, greatly ſur ••• zed, but ſtill more grieved, to find ſo few among us, •• pable of conducting the arduous Taſk 〈…〉 Peace. Whether this hath ariſen from Neglect in the Education of our Men of Quality; or whether the Qualifications which fit them for Stateſmen, have been neglected, in Compariſon of ſuch as fit them for Arthur's or Newmarket; or whether it be owing to the State Policy ſo ſyſtematically adopted, of late Years, of giving Places, not to Perſons who can beſt execute the Buſineſs—but to thoſe who can beſt do a Job; whatever be the Cauſe, the Fact is certain; and it is Matter of Amazement that there ſhould be ſo few in this Iſland, who have given any Proofs that they are capable of conducting with Ability, much leſs with Dexterity, this important Buſineſs of a Negotiation with France. Men who are verſed in Treaties, knowing the Intereſts, Pretenſions, and Connexions of the ſeveral Princes of Europe; ſkilled in the Principles of public Law, and capable of applying them on every particular Occaſion; acquainted with the Commerce, the Colonies, the Manufactures of their own Country; Maſters of all the Inſtances of Infraction of former Treaties, which occaſioned the War we are now engaged in: In a Word, Men whoſe Rank and Conſequence amongſt ourſelves, may command Reſpect, and procure them Authority, amongſt our Enemies; and who, to every other Qualification, already enumerated, can boaſt of an Integrity not to be corrupted, and a Steadineſs in ſupporting the Intereſts of their Country, which no Difficulties can diſcourage, and no Temptations can ſhake:— Such are the Men, whom you muſt endeavour to employ, in the approaching Negotiation, and ſuch, I hope, ye will be able to find; though, I own, I am puzzled to gueſs on whom the Choice will fall, none being, as yet, • ointed out by the public Voice, nor, perhaps 〈…〉 upon by yourſelves. Times have been, 〈…〉 have expected, to ſee One named to ſuch an important Office, meerly becauſe he was a Favourite, or a Favourite's Favourite; becauſe he was connected with this Miniſter, or was a Relation of that great Man. But if we have too frequently trifled with our national Concerns, by truſting them in ſuch Hands, I need not ſay that there are Circumſtances at preſent which give us reaſonable Ground for hoping that the ſame Sagacity, and Deſire to ſerve the Public which hath found out, and employed the propereſt Perſons to conduct the Operations of the War, will be exerted to find out the propereſt Perſons (few as there are to be found) to conduct the Deliberations of the Treaty.

Very deplorable indeed muſt be the Inabilities of the Perſons we ſhall employ, if their Negotiations for Peace be conducted ſo awkwardly as to rob us of the Advantages we have gained by the War. If we may judge from late Events, France ſeems as little to abound with Wiſdom in the Cabinet, as it doth with Courage and Conduct in the Field. And if the Negotiations at Utrecht, in which almoſt all the Advantages of War equally ſucceſsful with the preſent, were given up, be urged as an Inſtance of the ſuperior Dexterity of French Politics, it ought to be remembered that this was more owing to our own Diviſions, than to their Sagacity, and the Inabilities of our Plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, tho' we had no great Reaſon, God knows, to brag of them. What, therefore, may we not expect from a Negotiation to be begun in very different Circumſtances; when there exiſts no Faction whoſe Intereſt it may be to perplex and defeat it; and when that national Unanimity to which we, in a great 〈…〉 owe the Succeſs of the War, will ſtill 〈…〉 it's bleſſed Effects, till it make 〈…〉 and honourable Peace?—However, favourable as theſe Circumſtances are, the Choice of ſuch Plenipotentiaries as may be likely to conduct the Negotiation, with Dignity, Dexterity and Integrity, becomes a Conſideration which the Public will expect ſhould be weighed with the utmoſt Attention. And, if ſuch Perſons cannot be found amongſt us (which I hope may not be the Caſe) there is a very deſirable Alternative ſtill in your Power. Fix the Scene of Negotiation, where, indeed, for the Honour of our Country, I could wiſh to ſee it fixed. Name no other Plenipotentiaries to conduct the Peace but thoſe Miniſters who directed the War: And a Treaty of London, in ſuch Hands, will make ample Amends for our wretched Management at Utrecht.

But let Peace be ever ſo well made; let Miniſters plan Treaties with the greateſt Sagacity, and Plenipotentiaries negotiate the Articles with the utmoſt Skill and Dexterity, yet we know from Hiſtory and Obſervation, that they never can be perpetual, and, moſt commonly, are not laſting. Princes, too frequently, ſeem to own no other Rule of Action, than preſent Convenience; and the Law of Nations is ſeldom appealed to, but to ſanctify Injuſtice, and ſave Appearances. Nor are the poſitive Compacts ſolemnly agreed upon between Nation and Nation, better obſerved. For how ſeldom do we ſee a Treaty religiouſly adhered to, by the Parties whoſe Intereſt it is to break it, and who think they are in ſuch Circumſtances as to be able to break it with Impunity?—If ſuch Infidelity be too common amongſt Princes in general, Experience, long Experience teaches us, that the Nation with whom we are ſoon to treat, excel us, at leaſt, in this Part of Policy. For no Cord • are ſtrong enough to bind them.

Gallic Faith is become proverbial, and the Neighbours of France can reproach her with innumerable Inſtances of a moſt profligate Diſregard to the moſt ſolemn Treaties. And the Reaſon ſeems to be obvious, without ſuppoſing that Nation more perfidious than others. The Power, the Populouſneſs, the Extent, the Strength of the French Monarchy, free them from thoſe Apprehenſions which bind the weaker Side to be faithful to it's Engagements; and depending upon the Inability of their Neighbours, conſidered ſingly, to procure to themſelves Juſtice, this, too frequently, has tempted them to the moſt ſhameful and barefaced Inſtances of national Breach of Faith.

It well becomes us, therefore, at this Juncture, when the Diſtreſſes of the French, we may hope, will oblige them to conſent to Terms of Peace, unfavourable to the Intereſt, and diſgraceful to the Glory of their Monarch, to take every Method in our Power to ſecure the Obſervance of thoſe Conceſſions they may make; and to inſiſt upon their giving us ſuch Proofs of their Sincerity, before any Negotiation be entered upon, as may give us ſome Aſſurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.

What Proof of their Sincerity, I would recommend it to you to demand, what Conceſſions it will be neceſſary to inſiſt upon, I ſhall beg Leave to mention; after having firſt ſatisfied you by a Detail of ſome Particulars, that ſuch Demands as I would propoſe cannot be looked upon as the Inſolence of a Conqueror, but as the wiſe Foreſight of a People whom dear-bought Experience hath taught the proper Way of doing itſelf Juſtice.

It may not, therefore, be unneceſſary to place before your Eyes, 〈…〉 the moſt remarkable Inſtances of French 〈…〉 •• ich have give Riſe to all the Troubles of Europe for above theſe hundred Years.

The Peace of Weſtph • lia 1643., while it ſecured the Liberties and Religion of Germany, alſo laid the Foundation of that Power which hath made France, ever ſince, the Terror of Europe. By this Treaty Article 73, & ſeq., the Upper and the Lower Alſace, a Country of great Extent, and of infinite Conſequence in Point of Situation, was ceded to France. In this Country there were Ten Imperial Cities, whoſe Privileges and Liberties were in the moſt ſolemn Manner ſecured by the ſame Treaty, which expreſsly ſays, Article 88. Le Roi de France ne s'arroger • 〈◊〉 les villes de la Prefecture, que le ſimple Droit de Protectio • 〈…〉 appartenoit à la Maiſon d'Au • r • che. that they ſhall preſerve their Freedom, and that the King of France ſhall not aſſume over them, any Thing more than the bare Right of Protection. How was this Article obſerved? The ten Imperial Cities have been humbled to receive the French Yoke, equally with the Reſt of Alſace, and remain now, laſting Monuments, what others may expect from Power unreſtrained by Juſtice.

The Treaty ‖ of the Pyrenees ſtill enlarged the Boundaries of France, eſpecially on the Side of Flanders; and the Spaniards thought themſelves ſafe from farther Loſſes, by the Marriage of their Infanta to Louis the XIV. who, upon that Occaſion, jointly with her, made a formal Renunciation of all her Rights, to ſucceed to any Part of the Spaniſh Poſſeſſions. And yet, with unparalleled Inſolence, ſeven Years had ſcarcely elapſed before Flanders was again attacked, on Pretence of thoſe very Rights which had been ſo lately renounced, and which even tho' they had not been renounced, muſt have appeared chimerical, unleſs a Siſter can have a Right to ſucceed in Preference to her Brother.

The Peace of Nimeguen 1679. reſtored the Tranquility of Europe, which the Invaſion of Holland by the French had diſturbed. But ſcarcely was the Peace ſigned before it was ſhamefully violated. The Decrees of the Chambers of Re-union, by which Lewis the XIV. ſeized ſo many Territories, to which he had not the leaſt Right; the Surpriſal of Straſburg, and the Blockade of Luxemburgh, ſhewed ſuch a Wantonneſs of Perfidy, as no Hiſtory of the moſt barbarous and unpoliſhed Savages could well exceed; and juſtly drew upon the common Oppreſſor, the joint Vengeance of offended Europe.

Who is ignorant of the Story of the Partition Treaty? Solemnly entered into to preſerve that Tranquility which the Treaty of Reſwick had juſt reſtored to Europe, it was no ſooner made than it was ſhamefully abandoned by the Court of France; and for ſuch Reaſons as will, upon every Occaſion, juſtify every Injuſtice. The Letter of the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they muſt own; —but the Spirit of it was what ought to be attended to. And by ſuch a Comment, worthier of a pitiful Sophiſter, than of a moſt Chriſtian King, his Grandſon was aſſiſted in placing himſelf on the Throne of Spain.

The Politics of Lewis the XV. have been faithfully copied from thoſe of his Great-Grandfather; and the Behaviour of France, upon the Death of Charles the VI. is a freſh Proof, of how little Uſe are the moſt ſolemn Treaties, with a Power that knows no Ties but thoſe of Intereſt.—The Treaty of Vienna had but two or three Years before In 1738., annexed to the Crown 〈◊〉 , the Dutchy of Lorrain; a Ceſſion which was purchaſed, and purchaſed cheaply, by the Guarantee of the Treaty of 〈…〉 A • ticle 10. Pr • g • atic Sanction. By this Stipulation▪ France was under the moſt ſolemn Engagements to ſupport the Queen of Hungary in the Poſſeſſion of all her Father's Dominions. But how was the Engagement fulfilled? 〈◊〉 will ſcarcely believe ſuch bare-faced Perfi • y 〈◊〉 poſſible, as our Times ſaw was actually avo • ed upon that Occaſion. Germany was inſtantly, covered with the Armies of France, to aſ •• ſt the Elector of Bavaria, in an Attempt to overturn the Pragmatic Sanction ſo lately guaranteed by France and to dethorne that Princeſs whom the French were bound by a Treaty, ſworn to in the Name of the Holy Trinity, to protect and defend from all her Enemies.

I have brought down this Sketch of French Faith to the preſent Times; imperfect indeed; but, as far as it goes, ſtrictly conformable to Hiſtorical Truth.—What Confidence, then, can France expect any of its Neighbours will put in her, after ſo many and ſuch flagrant Inſtances of national Perjury, as ſhe appears to be guilty of?—The Catalogue of her Infidelities will ſtill be increaſed; and the little Reaſon that our Iſland, in particular, has to truſt Her, will ſtill be more apparent, by reminding you of ſome of the many Proofs, which Great Britain itſelf can appeal to, of French Ingenuity in Treaty-breaking.—I ſhall go no higher than the Peace of Utrecht, becauſe the Inſtances in which it hath been violated by France, have produced the preſent War; and becauſe the Enumeration of them will lead me, naturally, to thoſe Hints which I mean to throw out, as neceſſary to be attended to, in our future Negotiations; and which, if neglected, will loſe to 〈◊〉 Nation all the Fruits of thoſe Succeſſes, to gain which, we have ſtrained every Nerve, and loaded ourſelves with a Burthen under which it is a Miracle that we have not already ſunk.

The War which was cloſed by the Peace of Utrecht had been undertaken with Views confined, altogether, to the Continent of Europe, and carried on, though at an immenſe Expence, more to gain Conqueſts for our Allies, than for ourſelves. However, in the Treaty of Peace, ſome Advantages and Conceſſions were ſtipulated in Favour of the Crown of Great Britain, and its commercial Intereſts.

By the 12th Article, All Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient Limits, and with all its Dependencies, is ceded to the Crown of Great Britain.

And by the 15th Article, The Subjects of France Inhabitants of Canada, and elſewhere, ſhall not diſturb or moleſt, in any Manner whatever, the Five Indian Nations which are ſubject to Great • Britain, nor its other American Allies.

Let us now ſee how theſe Articles have been obſerved. The French ſeem to have had two Capital Views in all their American Schemes, ever ſince they have thought Trade and Commerce an Object worthy of their Attention. The firſt was to extend themſelves from Canada, Southwards, through the Lakes along the Back of our Colonies; by which Means they might anſwer a double Purpoſe, of cutting off our Communication with the Indian Nations, and of opening a Communication for themſelves, between the Rivers St. Lawrence and Miſſiſippi, and thus to join, as it were, their Colonies of Canada and Louiſiana. The other Part of their Plan, equally important, and more immediately fatal to our Intereſts in North America, was to gain a Communication with the Ocean; the only Acceſs they now have to Canada, through the River St. Lawrence, being ſhut up half the Year.

Full of this favorite Project of American Empire, ſoon after the Treaty of Utrecht, they began to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in direct Violation of the ſolemn Conceſſions they had ſo lately made.

As long ago as 1720, they ſeized and fortified the moſt important Paſs in America, at Niagara; in that very Country of the Five Indian Nations, from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht had excluded them. The infinite Conſequence of Niagara made them leſs ſcrupulous, no Doubt, about Treaties. For by Means of this Uſurpation they, in a Manner, became Maſters of the Lakes, and could, at Leiſure extend themſelves to the Ohio, and carry their Chain of Forts and Settlements down to the Miſſiſippi.

The Plan of Uſurpation on the Back of our Colonies went on gradually and ſucceſsfully from Year to Year; the Indians owned by the Peace of Utrecht to be our Subjects, were debauched from our Intereſt, and ſpirited up to maſſacre, and ſcalp the Engliſh; and in 1731, the Inſolence of the French grew to ſuch an Heighth, that they erected their Fort at Crown-Point, in a Country indiſputably ours; whether conſidered as in the Center of the five Nations, or as actually within the Limits of New-York. And whoever caſts his Eye upon the Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will ſee how greatly the Poſſeſſion of it facilitated the Completion of the great Object of opening a Communication with the Ocean; and how much it expoſed our moſt valuable Colonies to Indian Maſſacres and French Invaſions.

If it ſhould be aſked, what was our Miniſtry in England employed about, during ſuch Inſtances of French Perfidy—the Anſwer muſt be, (tho' I wiſh I could draw a Veil over this Period) that our Affairs were then conducted by a Miniſter who was awake, indeed, to every Scheme of Corruption; eager to buy a Borough, or to bribe a Member; but ſlow to every Meaſure of national Importance and Utility. His firſt, his only Object, was to preſerve himſelf in Power; and as, in Proſecution of ſuch intereſted and mercenary Views, he had actually engaged this Nation in an Alliance with France, in Europe, (to pull down the exorbitant Power of our old and natural Ally) it was no Wonder that he heard unmoved, and ſuffered with Impunity, the French Uſurpations in North-America.

Let us next trace the French Infidelity with Regard to Nova Scotia or Acadia. Tho' that Province had been yielded to us at Utrecht, we had taken very few Steps to ſettle it effectually, till 1749, after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. And then the French Court gave us a Specimen of Chicane worthy indeed, of thoſe whom no Treaty ever bound, in Oppoſition to their Convenience. They began to ſpeak out, and to tell us, nay to inſiſt upon it ſeriouſly in Memorials, that the Country ceded to us under the Name of Nova Scotia, comprehended only the Peninſula, and did not extend beyond the Iſthmus. Whereas the Charters of King James I. to Sir William Alexander; and Sir William's own Map, as old as the Charter, demonſtrate that the ancient Limits of the Country ſo named included a vaſt Tract of Land, beyond the Peninſula, reaching along the Coaſt till it joined New England; and extending up the Country till it was bounded by the South Side of the River St. Lawrence. Of ſuch an Extent of Country they had formed a Plan to rob us; hoping, no Doubt, to find the ſame Supineneſs in the Britiſh Adminiſtration which had overlooked their former E • croachments. With this View they deſired that Commiſſaries might meet to ſettle the Limits, promiſing not to act in America, till thoſe Commiſſaries ſhould agree, or the Conferences break up. But how was this Promiſe obſerved? While the Commiſſaries trifled away their Time at Paris, the Uſurpations went on in America; Incurſions were frequently made into the Peninſula of Acadia, the Poſſeſſion or which they did not pretend to diſpute with us; Forts were built by them in ſeveral Places, and particularly a moſt important One to command the Iſthmus; thus decid • ng by the Sword, in Time of full Peace, that Controverſy which they themſelves had agreed ſhould be amicably adjuſted by their Commiſſaries; and furniſhing a laſting Warning to us, that a Treaty which leaves Points of Conſequence to be determined by any After-Conferences, only ſerves to light up another War.

While the French Uſurpations went on ſo inſolently in Nova Scotia; the Plan was carrying on with equal Perfidy on the Banks of the Ohio; a Country, the Inhabitants of which had been in Alliance with the Engliſh above an hundred Years ago; an Alliance frequently renewed; to which alſo we had a Claim as being a Conqueſt of the Five Nations, and from which, therefore, the French were excluded by the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht above recited. But what avail Treaties when Intereſt comes in Competition? The Poſſeſſion of the Ohio was abſolutely neceſſary, that the great Plan of connecting Canada with Louiſiana might ſucceed: And, therefore, they began their Hoſtilities againſt us, in that Country very ſoon after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; inſulted our Traders, plundered and made them Priſoners; erected Fortreſſes, and eſtabliſhed Settlements; and our Governor of Virginia having ſent Waſhington, in 17 • 3, to complain of •• eſe Hoſtilities, he returned with an Anſwer from the French commanding Officer on the Ohio, which only ſhewed how much in earneſt they were to maintain themſelves in their new Uſurpations.

From this Period we may look upon the War as begun. Our Governors in North-America had Orders from England, to oppoſe the French Encroachments by Force of Arms; and, in 17 • 4, Waſhington was ſent again to the Ohio, with ſome Troops; but being defeated, by the ſuperior Numbers of the Enemy, who had juſt before taken the Engliſh Fort, they made themſelves Maſters of this important Country.

No Doubt the French Miniſters flattered themſelves that England, inattentive to the Intereſts of its Colonies for ſo many Years before, and who, ſo lately, had ſubmitted to a Diſadvantageous Peace, would not have the Spirit to oppoſe Force to Force, and do itſelf Juſtice by other Weapons than the Complaints of Lord Al •• marle, and the Memorials of Mr. Mildmay. But the Hour of Vengeance was, at laſt, come; the Intereſts of the Kingdom were attended to by thoſe in Power; the infinite Importance of our American Colonies was underſtood, and a Reſolution taken to have Recourſe to Arms. And thus England, which, for half a Century, had been waſting its Millions, and laviſhing its Blood, to obtain a Barrier in Flanders, which thoſe for whom we conquered it could not defend, or rather did not think it worth while to keep; began the preſent War, a War truly NATIONAL.

If there be Merit in this ſpirited Conduct of the Britiſh Adminiſtration, from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to the breaking out of the preſent War, tell your Enemies, My Lord, that you, and a near Relation 〈◊〉 yours (whoſe Memory Though this great Miniſter died in 1754, and the preſent War was not declared in Form till 175 • , he certainly has a Claim to ſhare in the Merit of the ſpirited Conduct here ſpoken of. Our American Concerns were properly attended to, in his Time; our Colony of Nova Scotia liberally ſupported, and its ancient Limits aſſerted; the Complaints of our Colonies, in general, againſt the French Encroachments were not ſufied or neglected, but Orders were ſent from England to repel Force by Force; in Conſequence of which Orders, Waſhington's unfortunate Expedition to the Ohio in 1754, was undertaken. I leave this Note to the Conſideration of thoſe minute Critics, who thought they had detected an Anachroniſm here. Perhaps I cannot ſo well juſtify my having omitted (though it was not by Deſign) to give a Share of Commendation to the great and learned Lord (who retired from the higheſt Station in the Law, after having filled it with ſo remarkable Abilities and Integrity) whoſe Behaviour, upon this Occaſion, deſerved as well of his Country, as it had done many Years before, when his Spirit, in contributing, jointly with the two Relations here meant, to call forth national Vengeance, procured him, from the Wags of thoſe Days, the military Title of C—l Y—ke. will always be reſpected) had then the chief Direction of public Buſineſs. And you, Sir, will pardon me for paying this Compliment to thoſe who began the War with Spirit; while I, at the ſame Time, declare it as my Opinion that your coming into Power after it was begun, has contributed to its being carried on with a Succeſs equally glorious and important to the Nation.

But before I make the Application of the above Deduction concerning For the Particulars of the French Encroachments in America, which I have only given a Sketch of, ſee the Memori • ls of our Commiſſaries, Dr. Mitchell's Conteſt in Ameri • a; the Doctor's and Mr, Evans's Maps, and many other Treatiſes. our American Complaints (which I ſhall, by and bye, make Uſe of, when I come to ſpeak to the Terms which it will be neceſſary to inſiſt upon at the approaching Treaty) it will be proper to mention another moſt important Inſtance of French Perfidy in Europe.

Dunkirk, by its Situation, almoſt oppoſite the Mouth of the Thames, had done amazing Miſchief to the Trade of England, during King William's and Queen Ann • 's Wars. The Demolition of Dunkirk ▪ therefore, very naturally became a favourite Object of the Nation; the Parliament, in 1708, addreſſed her Majeſty to make no Peace without this Condition M • r •• 2d. 1 •• 8. The Lords having ſent down an Add • eſs to the C • mm •• s • or their Concurrence, relating to certain Conditions to be inſiſted upon▪ • the • ine 〈…〉 . of a Treaty with Fran •• , Mr. Secretary B • yl • repreſented. That the Britiſh Nation having been at a 〈◊〉 E • pence of Blood and Treaſure, for the Proſecution of this neceſſary War, it was but juſt they ſhould reap ſome Benefit by the Peace: And the Town of Dunkirk being a Neſt of Pyrates, that infeſted the Ocean, and did infinite Miſchief to Trade, He, therefore, moved that the demoliſhing of its Fortifications and Harbours be inſiſted upon, in the enſuing Treaty of Peace, and inſerted in the Addreſs, which was unanimou • ly appro • ed of. and carried back to the Lords. See 〈…〉 of Parliament, Vol. vii. p. 122., and though after a War ſo ſucceſsful, much more might have been obtained for England than really was, this Point was carefully inſiſted upon, and the Ninth Article of the Peace of Utrecht obtained.

By this Article, the French King engages to demoliſh all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk; to rui • the Harbour; to break the Dykes and 〈◊〉 .— The Works towards the Se • to be deſtroyed in Two Months, and th • ſ • to the Land in Three Months after; all this to be done at his own Exp •• ce; 〈◊〉 the Fortifications, Harbou • , Dykes, and 〈◊〉 , n • ver after to • e reſtored. Could Words be • eviſed in all the Extent of Language to ſtipulate, in a ſtronger Manner, the effectual and ſpeedy D • molition of this Pl • ce? And yet all Eur • pe ſaw w • th Amazement, and England beheld with Indignation, the Peace of Utrecht violated, with Regard to this important Condition, almoſt as ſoon as it was ſigned.

By the Article above-recited we ſee that Dunkirk was to be demoliſhed within five Months after the ſigning the Peace; and yet, near a Year after, I find Mr. Walpole, in our Houſe of Commons, inſiſting that the Peace had already been broken with Regard to Dunkirk; Since inſtead of ruining the Harbour, the French were then actually repairing the 〈◊〉 , and working on a new Canal C • andler's Debates, Vol. 8. P. 69.. And though the pacific Inclinations of the Miniſtry in 1713, when Mr. Walp • l • puſhed this Affair, overruled the Inquiry, the Facts on which it would have proceeded were certain.

The ſpirited Remonſtrances of Lord Stair at Paris, on the Acceſſion of George I. concerning this Infraction of the Peace, were the laſt Inſtances of Humiliation which Lewis XIV. ſaw himſelf expoſed to; and, perhaps, he would have found himſelf obliged to do us that Juſtice, by Neceſſity, which the Regent, who ſoon after came into Power, willingly agreed to from Views of private Intereſt. Tho' the Peace of Utrecht had obliged the Spaniſh Branch of the Bourbon Family to renounce their Right of Succeſſion to the Crown of France, the Duke of Orleans, who, by this Regulation, ſaw only an Infant's Life between him and the Throne, knew well, that tho' the Renunciation had been ſolemnly ſworn to, the Doctrine of its Invalidity, of its being an Act, void, ab initio, had been publickly avowed. T • r • y, as appears by his See the Report of the ſecret Committe • , P. 13. The following Extract from a Letter of Mo • ſr. Ter • y to Mr. St. John is remarkable. The Renunciation deſired would be null and invalid by the fundamental Laws of France; according to which Laws the moſt near Prince to the Crown is, of Neceſſity, the Heir thereto.—This Law is looked upon, as the Work of him who hath eſtabliſhed all Monarchies, and we are perſuaded in France that God only can aboliſh it. No Renunci • tion therefore can deſtroy it; and if the King of Spain ſhould renounce it for the Sake of Peace, and in Obedien • e to the King his Grand •• ther, they would deceive themſelves that received it as a ſufficient Expedient to prevent the Miſchief we propoſe to avoid, Correſpondence with Lord Bolingbroke, very frankly made no Scruple of telling the Engliſh before-hand, that this Expedient, which had been deviſed to prevent the Union of France and Spain under one Monarch, would be of little Force, as being inconſiſtent with the fundamental Laws of France; by this Declaration giving us a very remarkable Inſtance of the Weakneſs, or of the Wickedneſs of our then Miniſters, who could build the Peace of Europe on ſo ſandy a Foundation, and accept of Terms which France itſelf was honeſt enough to own were not to be kept.

However, the Regent was reſolved to ſupport his Claim to the Crown of France, in Excluſion to the Spaniſh Branch; and, as the Support and Aſſiſtance of England was neceſſary for this Purpoſe, it is not to be wondered at that he ſhould court the Friendſhip of a Nation from whom he had ſo much to expect; and therefore, he was wiſe enough to do us Juſtice, by carrying into Execution, in ſome Degree, the Article relating to Dunkirk.

The perſonal Intereſt of the Regent was the only Reaſon for this Compliance: But ſucceeding Adminiſtrations in France not being influenced by the ſame private Views to adhere to Treaties ſolemnly ratified, Dunkirk began gradually to riſe from its Ruins; its Port again received Ships; its Trade flouriſhed; England ſaw itſelf deprived of this favourite Advantage gained at Utrecht; and ſuch was the Aſcendency of French Councils over thoſe of this Iſland, at the Period I ſpeak of, that we were actually engaged in Alliances with France, while that Nation was thus openly inſulting us, and inſulting us, without Obſtruction, in ſo eſſential an Article. We all remember what paſſed in Parliament in 1733, relating to the Point now before us.—Such was the tame Acquieſcence of the Britiſh Adminiſtration, that Dunkirk, by this Time, ſtood upon our Cuſtom-Houſe Books as a Port▪ from whence great Imports were made; and when an Inquiry concerning this was propoſed in the Houſe of Commons by a great Parliament Man Sir W. Wyndham. ſince dead, the then Miniſter hung his Head, in the Houſe, for Shame. And who could have believed it poſſible, that the ſame Perſon who had been ſo ready to promote a Parliamentary Inquiry into this Violation of the Peace in 1713, ſhould obſtruct ſuch an Inquiry, when he himſelf was in Power, though the Reaſons for it had become much ſtronger? Who could ſee Him, without Indignation, ſ • ut his Eyes to the Re-eſtabliſhment of Dunkirk, and obſtruct the propoſed Inquiry, by getting from Cardinal Fleury (who then governed France, and, I bluſh to ſay it, England too) a deluſive, miniſterial Letter, promiſing what he knew would not be performed;—and obtained, perhaps, only becauſe the Cardinal was aſſured, that the Breach of the Promiſe would not be reſented.

While England remained ſo averſe to do itſelf Juſtice, no Wonder that France improved the Opportunity. At the Time when that Miniſter was obliged to retire from Power, the Re-eſtabliſhment of Dunkirk was compleated. For, in a little more than a Year after The Memorial is dated July 1, 1742., we find a Memorial preſented by Lord Stair to the Dutch, complaining of this Violation of the Peace of Utrecht, and urging it as a Reaſon for their joining us againſt France. And as it was for the Honour of the new Adminiſtration, that they began with Meaſures ſo ſpirited and national, it is equally remarkable, that the ſame Perſon, who had threatened Lewis XIV. in his own Palace, for his Slowneſs in demoliſhing Dunkirk, lived to be again employed by his Country at the Diſtance of near thirty Years, when the Reſtoration of Dunkirk became an Object of national Reſentment.

The two Nations had not, as yet, begun the late War, when we ſaw, in One Inſtance, both a Proof that Dunkirk was again a Port, and a Port which may be made Uſe of, to endanger the Safety of Britain. At the Time I now ſpeak of I • 1743-4., we beheld the Harbour of Dunkirk crowded with Tranſports to embark Count Saxe and the Pretender to invade us. And, if that Invaſion had then taken Effect, from that very Port which was to be no Port (happily the Winds were contrary to the Fleet from Breſt) the infinite Miſchief which this Nation may ſuffer from its Re-eſtabliſhment, would have been fatally experienced.

Though we have no great Reaſon to brag of the Treaty made at the Concluſion of the laſt War (which I am aſhamed to call a Peace, as it ſettled nothing that was before in Doubt between the two Nations) the Peace of Utrecht concerning Dunkirk, was, nevertheleſs in its moſt eſſential Part, reſtored to its full Force. I ſay, in its moſt Eſſential Part; becauſe, though the 17th Article of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle left Dunkirk in the State it then was, with Regard to its Fortifications to the Land; the ſame Article revived our Right, to the Demolition of its Port, by ſtipulating That ancient Treaties are to be obſerved in regard to the Port, and the Works on the Sea Side.

Little or nothing was done between the Concluſion of the Peace, and the breaking out of the preſent War, towards carrying into Execution this freſh Promiſe. On the contrary, the enlarging of the Fortifications of Dunkirk, is mentioned in his Majeſty's Declaration of War, three Years ago, as one of the freſh Heads of Injury offered to England. And whoever reflects upon the Tranſactions, ſince that Period, will ſee that Dunkirk is reſtored to its original Importance. Its Privateers have done infinite Miſchief to our Trade; a Squadron of his Majeſty's Navy, in vain blocked up its Harbour lately, to prevent the ſailing of Thurot's Fleet: and, it is well known, that the long threatened Invaſion of theſe Kindoms, which France, in Deſpair, certainly meditated, would have been attempted from this Place, if the Deſtruction of their Ships of War by Hawke, had not taught them the Abſurdity of invading us in their much celebrated flat bottom Boats, which, we may well ſuppoſe, will hardly be tried, when their Fleets, really formidable, have been deſtroyed in the Attempt.

The above Enumeration of French Infidelities, in general, and in particular their Behaviour to England with regard to Dunkirk, and with regard to North-America, ſo naturally points out the Expediency and Neceſſity of the Hints I ſhall now offer, that, in propoſing them, I may well hope not to have them ridiculed as the Reveries of a chimerical St. Pierre, but rather attended to, as the ſober Dictates of Prudence, and of a Zeal not altogether devoid of Knowledge.

Firſt, Then, my Lord and Sir, before you enter upon any New Treaty, or liſten to any plauſible Propoſals whatever, inſiſt that Juſtice may be done this Nation, with regard to former Treaties. Shew France the ſtrong, the ſolemn Engagement ſhe entered into at Utrecht to demoliſh Dunkirk; put her in Mind of the amazing Perfidy with which ſhe, from Time to Time, eluded the Performance of that Engagement; and demand immediate Juſtice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the enſuing Negotiation.

Be not deceived any longer in this Matter. The French will, no doubt, aſſure you that the Demolition of Dunkirk ſhall be an Article in the New Treaty. But let them know, you are not to be ſo impoſed upon. They wlll, to be ſure, when this becomes a new Article, reckon it a new Conceſſion on their Side, and expect ſomething in return for it,—perhaps Guadaloupe, or ſome ſuch Trifle, as they will call it. But tell them with the Firmneſs of wiſe Conquerors, that the Demolition of Dunkirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties made long ago, and violated; and that it ſhall not be ſo much as mentioned in the inſuing Negotiation, but complied with before that Negotiation ſhall commence.

Or, admitting that no Conceſſion ſhould be required by France in the New Treaty, in Conſideration of a new Article to demoliſh Dunkirk, place to them, in the ſtrongeſt Light, the unanſwerable Reaſons we have againſt putting any Confidence in them, that ſuch an Article would be better executed, than that in the Treaty of Utrecht has been.

If they refuſe doing us this immediate Juſtice, previous to the Peace; aſk them how they can expect that we ſhould have any Reliance on their Sincerity to fulfil the New Engagements they may enter into, when they afford us ſo ſtrong, ſo glaring an Inſtance of Infidelity, in an Article of ſuch Conſequence, made ſo many Years ago? Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuſes this, at the very Time he is treating, affords you ſuch manifeſt Proof, that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot truſt to the Execution of any Promiſe ever ſo ſolemnly made?

Perhaps France may think it a Diſgrace to them, to comply with any Thing previous to the Beginning of a Negotiation. Tell them, that acting honourably, and doing what Juſtice requires, can never be diſgraceful. But if it be a Diſgrace, tell them, with the Spirit of honeſt Men, that we owe it them, for the greater Diſgrace they put, not long ago, upon us, by requiring us to ſend two Peers of this Realm to remain in France as Hoſtages, till we ſurrendered Louiſbourg; an Indignity which I cannot call to Mind without Pain, and which, I always thought, was ſubmitted to without Neceſſity.

It is now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of our Nation; and as Dunkirk was put into our Poſſeſſion before the Treaty of Utrecht, as a Pledge of the French Sincerity, and to continue in our Poſſeſſion, till the Demolition ſhould be completed; let ſome ſuch Expedient be now agreed upon; with this Difference only, that inſtead of five Months after the Peace, the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at Utrecht, let no Peace be ſigned, at preſent, till this Right acquired to us by former Treaties, and of which we have been ſo perfidiouſly robbed, be actually carried into full Execution.

However, if any inſuperable Difficulties ſhould attend the doing ourſelves Juſtice, on this Head, before the Peace; if, for Inſtance, which perhaps may be the Caſe, it ſhould be found that it cannot be complied with, unleſs we conſent to a Ceſſation of Arms, during the Time of Negotiation; rather than give France that Opportunity of recovering from its Diſtreſſes, and of being protected from the Superiority of our Arms, before we have, finally, obliged them to accept of our own Terms of Peace (which was one Cauſe of the Ruin of our Negotiation at Utrecht) I would wave inſiſting upon the Demolition of Dunkirk, before the Treaty, and think it ſufficient to demand Hoſtages from them, as a Security that it ſhall be faithfully complied with, within a limited Time after the Treaty ſhall be concluded. The Pariſians had two Engliſh Milords to ſtare at, upon the laſt Peace; and I do not ſee why the Curioſity of our Londoners ſhould not be gratified, in the ſame Way; and Two Ducs and Pairs of France be ſent as Hoſtages to England, till Dunkirk ceaſe to be a Port.

I know well, that Political Opinions, concerning the Importance of any particular Object, are as frequently dictated by Whim and Faſhion, as built on ſolid Reaſon and Experience. Perhaps, ſome may think, that this is the Caſe, with Regard to the Neceſſity of demoliſhing Dunkirk. But, tho' it may not at preſent be ſo favourite an Obj • ct of National Politics, as it was in the Queen's Time; this has not b •• n owing to any real Ch • ng • of Circumſtances; but to another Cauſe, to the 〈◊〉 Diſputes betw •• n the two Nations, which have been the great Object of the preſent War, and ſcarcely permitted us, hitherto, to 〈◊〉 , in what other Inſtances, the 〈◊〉 of France muſt be checked at the i • ſ • ing Peace.—But as th ••• ef •• able Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard to Dunkirk; and it will be equally neceſſary for the Honour and for the Intereſt of this Nation to make no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfaction on this Head. It will be neceſſary for the Honour of the Nation to inſiſt upon this, if it were only to ſhew to Europe in general, and to France in particular —That we have too much Spirit not to reſent Injuries; and too much Wiſdom not to take Care, when we have it happily in our Power, to prevent them for the future.—But the Demolition of Dunkirk, is alſo neceſſary, if we would take Care of the Intereſt of the Nation. Such hath been our Succeſs, in deſtroying the Navy of France; and ſo unable doth that Kindom now appear, to carry on its ambitious Projects by Land, and to vie at the ſame Time, with England, for Dominion on the Sea; that we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, there is an End of Breſt and Toulon Squadrons, to face our Fleets; and a future War with England, will leave the French no other Way of diſtreſſing us by Sea, than to lie in watch for our Merchant Ships, with numberleſs Privateers. In ſuch a piratical War, Dunkirk, if its Harbour be not now deſtroyed, will, too late, be found to be of infinite Conſequence; and we ſhall fatally experience it again, what it was in the Queen's Time, and in the Language of her Parliament, a N •• t of Pyrac •• , inf • ſsing the Ocean, and doing infini •• Miſ • hief to Trad • See above, P. 18..

For theſe Reaſons, therefore, I am ſo 〈◊〉 -faſhioned to as expect that our Plenipotentiaries will have this Point properly ſtated to them in their Inſtructions, and that Del • nda eſt Cart • age, Demoliſ • Dunkirk, will be a Preliminary Article in the enſuing Negotiation.

The War having begun, principally, with a View to do ourſelves Ju • tice in North America, the Regulation of Matters, on that Continent, ought to be, and no Doubt, will be, the capital Article relating to England, in the coming Treaty. It will be neceſſary, therefore, to give you my Sentiments, on this Head; and while I do it, with all becoming Diffidence, I ſhall, at the ſame Time, ſupport what I may offer, with Reaſons appearing ſo ſtrong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to your farther Conſideration, though it ſhould fail of producing Conviction.

Now it is with the greateſ • Pleaſure, I would obſerve, that with Regard to North America, we have nothing to aſk, at the Peace, which we have not already made ourſelves Maſters of, during the War. We have been bleſſed by Heaven, with a Succeſs, in that Part of the World, ſcarcely to be paralleled in Hiſtory. The Raſhneſs of Br • dd • ck, the Inex • erience of Shirley, the Inactivity of Londoun, and the Ill-ſucceſs of Aber • romb •• , ſeem only to have been ſo many neceſſary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our Troops; and that ſteady Perſeverance in our Miniſters, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Uſurpations, but Lo • i • bourg is an Engliſh Harbour; Q • ebec, the Capital of Canada, is already in our Poſſeſſion; and the Reſt of that Country will fall of Courſe. It is a Proſpect ſtill more agreeable; that by deſtroying the Naval Force of France our North American Conqueſts cannot be retaken; and the Principle I would now lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is, not to give up any of them. And I ſhall now endeavour to prove to you, that ſuch a Demand may be inſiſted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accuſing us of Inſolence towards them▪ and cannot be omitted without giving the Nation juſt Reaſon to complain, that we have conſented to a treacher • us and d • luſive Peace.

It cannot, ſurely, ever enter the Imagination of a Britiſh Adminiſtration, to make Peace, without, at leaſt, keeping in our Poſſeſſion, all thoſe Places, where the French had ſettled themſelves, in Violation of former Treaties, and from which we have, fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we ſhall, at the Peace, be left in Poſſ • ſſion not only of the Peninſula of Acadia, but of all Nova Scotia, according to its old Limits; the Bay of Fundi, and the River St. John.—The important Conqueſts of Crown Point ▪ and Niagara, will not be relinquiſhed; and Fort du Queſite, and the Country near the Ohio, will remain Ours.—They are already Ours; the French know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not expect that we ſhall give them up at the Peace.

But though Care ſhould be taken to keep all thoſe Places juſt mentioned; ſomething more muſt be done, or our American Colonies will tell you, you have done Nothing. In a Word, you muſt keep Canada, otherways you lay the Foundation of another War.

The Neceſſity of this may be placed in ſo ſtriking a View, as to ſilence the French Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all Europe, of the Juſtice of our Demand.

Aſk the French, what Security they can give you, if we reſtore Canada to them, however reſtrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence? If the Treaty of Utrecht could not keep them from Encroachments, what Reaſon can we have to ſuppoſe the future Treaty will be better obſerved? If the French are left at Montreal, and the three Rivers, can we be certain they will not again croſs the Champlain Lake, and attack Crown-Point? If the North Side of the River St. Lawrence be ſtill theirs, what is to inſure us againſt an Expedition to Niagara? Can we flatter ourſelves, that a People, who in full Peace, erected thoſe two Fortreſſes, in direct Violation of their Faith plighted at Utrecht, will be reſtrained by any future Treaty, from attempting, alſo in full Peace, to recover them? After having ſeen the French carrying on a regular Plan of Uſurpation, in North America, for theſe Forty Years paſt, ſhall we be ſo weak as to believe that they will now lay it aſide? No, depend upon it, if the French think it worth their while to aſk back that Part of North America, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, of Elbowing all our Colonies round about, and of reſuming the ſame ambitious Views of Enlargment which the moſt ſacred Ties of former Treaties could not reſtrain.

The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of Canada. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Acceſs to it; and a Trade ſcarcely defraying the Expence of the Colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the Plan of extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the Engliſh; and of opening its Communication with Louiſiana and with the Ocean, had not made them perſevere.—Canada itſelf is not worth their aſking; and if they do deſire to have it reſtored to them, it can only be with a View to repeat the ſame Injuries and Infidelities, to puniſh which, we engaged in the preſent War. Unleſs, therefore, we be reſolved, with our Eyes open, to expoſe ourſelves to a Repetition of former Encroachments; unleſs we would chooſe to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops, in America, in full Peace, at an immenſe Expence; we can never conſent to leave the French any Footing in Canada. If we do not exclude them, abſolutely and entirely from that Country; we ſhall ſoon find we have done Nothing. Let the Treaty be drawn ever ſo accurately; let the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies be deſcribed ever ſo preciſely, and regulated ever ſo much, in our Favour; what has happened already, ought to teach us what we may expect again; the future Treaty will be obſerved no better than the former have been; Uſurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus ſhall we have thrown away all our Succeſſes; ſo many Millions will have been expended to no Purpoſe; and the Blood of ſo many Thouſands of our brave Countrymen ſpilt, only to remind us, that though we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to improve, perhaps, the only Opportunity we ſhall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of France to violate its Faith.

I take it for granted that, in the future Negotiation, the Iſland of Cape Breton will follow the Fate of Quebec: I ſhall only obſerve with Regard to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification of Louiſbourg be of infinite Service to France; it can be of little or no Uſe to England, if Canada be left to us. It is of Conſequence to France, as a Retreat to their Ships fiſhing on the neighbouring Banks of Newfoundland; and as a Security to the Entrance of the Gulph of St. Laurence. But the Poſſeſſion of Newfoundland itſelf, makes Louiſbourg of no Utility to the Engliſh, in the former Reſpect; and Halifax, where we have a good Harbour, anſwers very nearly the latter Purpoſe. Upon this View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that, the Neceſſity of garriſoning Louiſbourg having ended with the Conqueſt of Quebec, its Fate will be determined, without troubling the French Plenipotentiaries? Without waiting for a Congreſs, let Orders be forthwith ſent to demoliſh it, ſo as not to leave one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications; to remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better Country; and to leave the Iſland, a bare and barren Rock; the State it was in, before the Peace of Utrecht gave Leave to France to fortify it. If the Right given to the French by the 13th Article of the ſame Peace, to fiſh in ſome Parts of thoſe Seas ſhould be continued (and I could wiſh to ſee it continued, as the Refuſal of it would be rather unreaſonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungarriſoned be left open to them; and a few Men of War kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent Louiſbourg's being again made a Place of Strength.

If you adopt this Meaſure, I ſhould be inclined to think, France will ſee that you know your true Intereſts; and that you are reſolved ſteadily to purſue them. And if they ſhould make any Remonſtrances againſt it, tell them they may follow our Example, and demoliſh, if they pleaſe, the Fortifications of Mahon; which we ſee them poſſeſs with as great Indifference as we remember the Circumſtances of its Loſs, with Shame: Which, as being of no Uſe to them they will not deſire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us, at an Expence, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we ſhall not be very ſanguine about recovering. Or rather tell them, that in demoliſhing Louiſbourg, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themſelves, when their Troops were employed in diſmantling the Frontier Towns in Fland • rs, at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at Aix la Chapelle were conſenting to give them up.

The Plan which I have had the Honour of ſketching out to you, beſides being ſo reaſonable in itſelf, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expreſſed by his Majeſty in his Speech, of not having entered into the War with Views of Ambition. The Poſſeſſion of Canada, is no View of Ambition; it is the only Security the French can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conqueſts, of great Importance, our Management of which will give us ſufficient Means of ſhewing our Moderation. And though I ſhall not preſume to give any Opinion about the future Diſpoſal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that "the Poſſeſſion of Guadaloupe," an additional Sugar Iſland, when we have ſo many of our own, ought not to be inſiſted upon ſo ſtrenuouſly as to make it a neceſſary Condition of the Peace. And though "Senegal and Goree," are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own African Settlements have hitherto ſupplied us with Slaves, ſufficient for our American Purpoſes: And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Conſequence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen to guard our African Conqueſts. The People of England, therefore, will not, I believe, blame the giving them back, for a valuable Conſideration,—provided Canada be left to us.

To conſider this Affair in its proper Light, it will be neceſſary to reflect on the infinite Conſequence of North America to this Country. Our Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabitants, who are moſtly ſupplied with the Manufactures of Great Britain; our Trade to them, by employing innumerable Ships, is one great Source of our maritime Strength; by ſupporting our Sugar Iſlands with their Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the Weſt Indies; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco, and Fiſh, to all the Markets of Europe; they produce Indigo, and Iron; and the whole Navy of England may be equipped, with the Products of Engliſh America. And if, notwithſtanding our having loſt ſeveral Branches of Commerce, we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we have ſtill more Commerce than ever; a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vaſt Increaſe of our Shiping; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade to our own American Colonies; a Trade which the Succeſſes of this War, will render, every Day, more and more advantageous? If this Matter, then, be conſidered, in the above Light, by thoſe whom I now addreſs, they will make our North American Conqueſts, the ſine qua non of the Peace, as being the only Method of guarding our invaluable Poſſeſſions there, from Uſurpations and Encroachments; and they will look upon every other Conqueſt, we have made, or may make, in other Parts of the World, as Inſtruments put into our Hands by Providence, to enable us to ſettle Affairs on the Continent of Europe, as advantageouſly to our Allies, as our Gratitude could wiſh, and as their Fidelity doth deſerve.

Here, then, let me change the Scene, and having ſettled our Affairs in Canada (would to God they were ſo ſettled at the Peace!) permit me to finiſh my Plan of Negotiation, by giving my Sentiments on the Part we ought to act, to obtain a proper Settlement of Affairs in Germany.

If a great Number of Allies can make themſelves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quarrelling amongſt themſelves, when they begin their Negotiations for Peace. Like an Oppoſition, in our Parliament carried on againſt an overgrown Miniſter, all Sorts of Parties and Connections, all Sorts of diſagreeing and contradictory Intereſts, join againſt him, at firſt, as a common Enemy; and tolerable Unanimity is preſerved amongſt them, ſo long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War continues in Suſpence. But when once they have driven him to the Wall, and think themſelves ſure of Victory; the Jealouſies and Suſpicions, which, while the Conteſt depended, had been ſtifled, break out; every one who ſhared in the Fatigue, expects to ſhare in the Spoils; ſeparate Intereſts counteract each other; ſeparate Negotiations are ſet on Foot; till at laſt, by untimely and mercenary Diviſions, they loſe the Fruits of their Victory, and the Object of the common Reſentment is able to make Terms for himſelf The true Hiſtory of the Tranſaction here alluded to, may, poſſibly ſome Time or other, appear; though, as yet, we are perſuaded, the World knows very little of it.. • his was exactly the Caſe in the Conteſt between Lewis XIV. and the Princes of Europe united againſt him, before the Peace of Utrecht; and the unhappy Diviſions of the Allies (Diviſions too likely to have ſprung up, even tho' there had not been a Party in England, who to gratify their private Reſentments, blew up the Coals of Diſſention) gave the French the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of Peace, than they could well have hoped after ſo unſucceſsful a War.

I have mentioned this with a View to obſerve, that the Circumſtances of the preſent War on the Continent are very different; no ſuch unfortunate Diſunion ſeems poſſible to happen to us though it may happen amongſt the Confederates who are engaged on the ſame Side with France, againſt Hanover and the King of Pruſſia.

It may be collected from more than one Hint dropt in the Courſe of this Letter, that I am no Friend to Continental Meaſures in general; eſpecially ſuch continental Meaſures as engaged us during the three laſt Wars, as Principals; when we ſeemed eager to ruin ourſelves, in Support of that Auſtrian Family whom we now find, with unparalleled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in cloſe Alliance with France.— But the Continental Meaſures now adopted by England were neceſſary, both with Regard to▪ Our Honour and our Intereſt. Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quarrel entirely Engliſh; and tho' Care was taken, by the Act of Settlement, that England ſhould not be involved in Wars on Account of Hanover; yet Gratitude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generoſity, bound us, not to allow the innocent Electorate to be ruined for England's American Quarrel with France. In Regard to our Intereſt, no Engliſh Miniſter, however inflexible, in his Attachment to his native Country, could have deviſed the Means of making the beſt Uſe of our American Conqueſts, if the French could have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was with a View to prevent this, to oppoſe the French in their Projects in Germany, the Succeſs of which would have been ſo detrimental to England, that we honeſtly and wiſely have formed and have maintained the Army now commanded by Prince Ferdinand; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of Pruſſia.

But tho' this was a Meaſure of Prudence, it was ſcarcely poſſible for the wiſeſt Stateſmen to foreſee all thoſe great Conſequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the French have made in Germany, and the Reſiſtance they have there met with by the Care of the Britiſh Adminiſtration; have contributed more than perhaps we could expect, to our Succeſs in America, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering Hanover, France ſaw herſelf obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Weſtphalia and on the Rhine; vaſt Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty; the ravenous Ruſſians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unleſs allured by Subſidies; and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be ſtopt, with the Louis D'ors of France. Involved in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from ſtrengthening themſelves at Sea, where England had moſt Reaſon to dread their becoming ſtrong.

The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the German War, are indeed now ſo ſo well underſtood, that we have ſeen the greateſt Enemies of this Meaſure acknowledge their Miſtake.

They now confeſs that if we had not reſiſted France, in her Projects of German Conqueſts, her beſt Troops had not been deſtroyed; her own Coaſts would have been better protected; ſhe would have been able to pay more Attention to her American Concerns; England might have been threatened, ſo ſeriouſly, with Invaſions, as to be afraid of parting with thoſe numerous Armies which have conquered at ſuch a Diſtance from Home. In a Word, that univerſal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Diſtreſſes of France, and gives England greater Reaſon of Exultation, than any Event of the War, might have been prevented. It is entirely owing to the German Part of the War that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches; that ſhe is found to be a ſinking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already ſunk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy of another Monteſquieu, to aſſign the Cauſes of the Riſe and Fall of the French Monarchy; and to point out thoſe ſilent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made ſo rapid a Progreſs, that France, in 1712, after upwards of twenty Years, almoſt conſtant War, maintained againſt all Europe, was ſtill more reſpectable, and leſs exhauſted than ſhe now appears to be, when the ſingle Arm of Great Britain is lifted up againſt her, and the War has laſted no more than three or four Years.

If this then be the State of the War, in Germany; if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour or Intereſt; and if the infinite Advantages it hath already produced, be ſtated by me fairly—the Inference I would draw, and which, I believe, the whole Nation will alſo draw, is, that we ſhould continue to exert thoſe Endeavours which hitherto have been ſo effectual, in defeating the Deſigns of France to get Poſſeſſion of Hanover.

His Majeſty, as Elector of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition: His Country has been attacked only becauſe it belonged to the King of Great Britain: and nothing more is required of us, but to be true to ourſelves, by neglecting no Step that may prevent Hanover from falling again into the Hands of France, after having been ſo miraculouſly reſcued from the Contributions of the rapacious Richli • u, and ſaved from the Military Deſert of Belleiſ • e.—I need not ſay any Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithſtanding it's great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the Weſer to the Rhine. I ſhall only obſerve, that the next Campaign (if another Campaign ſhould preceed the Peace) will, in all Probability, loſe us none of the Advantages we have gained, on that Side; if our Army, ſtill headed by Prince Ferdinand, who has already gained ſo many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by ſending to it ſome Thouſands more of our national Troops; who now, ſince the Conqueſt of Canada, and the Defeat of the long threatened Invaſion, have no other Scene of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory in Germany.

It would be a very pleaſing Proſpect, if we could ſpeak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Succeſs, concerning the future Operations of the King of Pruſſia. However, when we reflect on the amazing Difficulties he has had to ſtruggle with; attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, each of whom, ſingly, one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength; bearing up, at the ſame Time, againſt the formidable Power of the Houſe of Auſtria; the brutal Ferocity of the Ruſſians; the Attacks of the Swedes; the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the additional Weight of the French Arms upon him; when, I ſay, we reflect on the uncommon Difficulties this magnanimous Prince has to reſiſt, we muſt rather expreſs our Wonder, and our Satisfaction that his Situation is ſtill ſo reſpectable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worſe. The ſevereſt Checks he has me • with during this War, have only ſerved to ſhew how calm he poſſeſſes himſelf under Diſtreſs, and how ably he can extricate himſelf. The Hour of Adverſity has called forth all his Abilities, and if he has failed ſome Times, from too great an Eagerneſs to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Ant • us, gained freſh Strength from every Overthrow.

And, upon this Principle, I flatter myſelf, his Pruſſian Majeſty will ſtill be able to ſecure to himſelf the greater Part, if not the whole of Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much ſhatte • 〈◊〉 with its Loſſes and Fatigues, before the Opening of another Campaign. It is to be hoped alſo, that beſides the amazing Reſources He has ſtill left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connection with England, affords him; the Power of the Confederacy againſt him may be broken, by diſuniting the Confederates. Hiſtory ſatisfies us how ſeldom a Confederacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a ſingle Power attacked. I have give one Inſtance of this already, when I ſpoke of the Grand Alliance againſt Lewis XIV. and the League of Cambray againſt the Venetians, in the 16th Century, is an Inſtance ſtill more remarkable.

But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wiſhes, our Endeavours, this ſhould fail; if his Pruſſian Majeſty, like a Lion caught in the Toils (after a Reſiſtance already made, which will hand him down to Poſterity as the greateſt of Men) ſhould at laſt be unable to defend himſelf; let him not deſpair while he is in Alliance with Britain: For I would inculcate a Doctrine, which I think will not be unpopular amongſt my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be oppoſed by our Miniſters, That whatever Conqueſts we have made, and whatever Conqueſts we may ſtill make, upon the French, except North America, which muſt be kept all our own; ſhould be looked upon as given back to France for a moſt important Conſideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Pruſſia from any unforeſeen Diſtreſſes.

Perhaps my Notions on this Subject may ſeem to border on Enthuſiaſm; but, however, I cannot but be perſuaded, that Things are come to that Paſs in Germany, that the Ruin of the King of Pruſſia will be ſoon followed by the Ruin of the Proteſtant Religion in the Empire. The blind Zeal of the bigotted Auſtrian Family will have no Check, if the Head and Protector of the German Proteſtants be deſtroyed; and the War begun only to wreſt Sileſia from him, will, in the End, be found to be a War that will overturn the Liberties and Religion of Germany. If, therefore, the noble Perſeverance of the King of Pruſſia deſerves the Eſteem of a generous People; if his Fidelity to his Engagements, which has contributed to ſave Hanover and to ruin France, can demand our Gratitude; if the Danger of the only Proteſtant Sovereign in Germany, able to preſerve the Privileges of his Religion from being trampled under Foot, can call forth the warm Support of this Proteſtant Nation; may I not hope, may I not be confident, that our Miniſters will dictate, and our People approve, of Terms of Peace in his Favour, though they ſhould be purchaſed by relinquiſhing ſome of our Conqueſts; while the Poſſeſſion of Canada will be ſo reaſonable a Bound to the Demands we may make for ourſelves?

I have ſtated this Point upon a Suppoſition that the Event of the War may turn out to the Diſadvantage of the King of Pruſſia. But if the Fortune, the Capacity, the Perſeverance of that Great Prince ſhould enable him (as I think we may ſtill hope) to extricate himſelf from the Dangers that ſurround him—it may be aſked, What is to be done with the Conqueſts which, beſides Canada, we ſhall be in Poſſeſſion of when we treat of a Peace? — My Propoſal is honeſt, and, perhaps, will not be treated as chimerical: Employ them to recover, out of the Hands of France, thoſe Towns of Flanders, gained for the Auſtrian Family by the Valour, and at the Expence of England; and which have been ſo perfidiouſly ſacrificed. A Britiſh Adminiſtration muſt tremble at the Proſpect of ſeeing Newport and Oſtend become French Property, and, therefore, ſhould uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace; though thoſe Endeavours may ſerve the Court of Vienna, whoſe Ingratitude to Bri • ain never will be forgotten; though, at the ſame Time, I muſt own we ſhall draw no ſmall Advantage from it. We ſhall learn, for the future, to prefer our own Intereſt to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent, to the immediate Exigencies of our own Country, and never to aſſiſt a new Ally, without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what Return we have had!

I have, now, nearly executed my principal Deſign, in the preſent Addreſs; which was to give my Thoughts on the important Buſineſs of the approaching Treaty. And if it be conducted with as much Ability, as the War has been carried on with Spirit and Succeſs, there is great Room for flattering ourſelves, that the Voice of the Publick demands no Advantages or Ceſſions in Favour of England, which the Miniſters of England are not reſolved to inſiſt upon.

But amidſt the ſignal Succeſſes of our Arms, which give us ſo reaſonable an Expectation of an honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country to the higheſt Pinnacle of Glory and Reputation abroad—I wiſh it could be ſaid that our Conſtitution was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and almoſt loſt, at Home.—I ſhall beg Leave to take this Occaſion of touching this equally melancholy and important Subject; with a View, not to blame, but to lament; not to bring any railing Accuſation againſt thoſe who are now in Power, but to exhort and to excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to add to the Services they have done their Country, in ſaving it from the open Attacks of France, the ſtill more important Service of ſaving our Conſtitution, which ſome unhappy Circumſtances of our preſent Situation have already greatly changed, and ſeem to threaten with entire Deſtruction;—Nay, I may ſay, would have actually deſtroyed, if it were not for the good Heart of our gracious Sovereign, who ſcorns to take Advantage.

Conſiderably above an hundred Millions of Debt, the Sum we muſt be obliged to ſit down with, at the End of the preſent War, is the Burthen which, however immenſe, Experience has taught us, contrary to all Theory, we ſhall be able to bear without Bankruptcy. As our Expences have increaſed, we have found, contrary to the Predictions of gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them have increaſed alſo.—But tho' our Debts be not too great for the Riches of our Country, they are much too great for the Independency of its Conſtitution. For, when I conſider the infinite Dependence upon the Crown, created by Means of Them, throughout the Kingdom, amongſt all Degrees of Men; when I reflect on the many Thouſands of Placemen, of every Denomination, who are employed in the Collection of the vaſt Variety of Taxes now levied on the Public; and take a Review of a far greater Number of Servants of the Crown, both Civil and Military, for whoſe Support ſo conſiderable a Share of the public Revenue is ſet apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be tempted to aſſiſt in extending the Influence of the Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty; when I conſider our vaſt Load of Taxes, in this Point of View, I cannot help obſerving the amazing Revolution in our Government which this ſingle Article has brought about; nor enough lament the unhappy Circumſtances of Affairs, and the Neceſſities of the War which have forced us to an annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and which will almoſt be incredible to Poſterity. I believe I can venture to ſay upon Memory, that the Expences of the War, for all King William's Reign, about 13 Years, were not, at a Medium, above 3 Millions and a half a Year; and Queen Anne's, tho' the laſt Years were exorbitant, were little more than 5 Millions. What they are now I ſigh to think on. Twelve or fourteen Millions are demanded without Reſerve; and, what is ſtill more, voted without Oppoſition. Nay, of ſo little▪ Conſequence it is now thought, by our Repreſentatives, to deliberate on the weighty Buſineſs of raiſing Money on the Subject, that ſcarcely can Forty of them be got together, to hear the Eſtimates for at leaſt One hundred and fourſcore Thouſand Men, for ſo many have we now in our Pay; and to borrow Eight Millions, the Sum of which our Expences exceed our Income.

Theſe are alarming Conſiderations; but another Object, no leſs threatning the Ruin of our Conſtitution, alſo preſents itſelf.

I am old enough to remember what Uneaſineſs and Jealouſies diſturbed the Minds of all true Patriots, with regard to ſtanding Armies, and military Eſtabliſhments. Principles of Liberty in general, and, in particular, Whig Principles▪ excited this Uneaſineſs, and produced thoſe Jealouſies, which from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source of Parliamentary Debate. It was no longer ago than the late King's Time, that the veſting Courts Martial, in Time of Peace, with the Power of puniſhing Mutiny and Deſertion with Death, was carried in the Houſe of Commons by a ſmall MajorityIn 1717-18 the Numbers on the Diviſion were 247 to 229.. Nay, that a Court Martial, however limited in its Juriſdiction, was inconſiſtent with the Liberties of a free People, in Time of Peace, was the Doctrine of Whigs in thoſe Days; it was the Doctrine, in particular, of Sir Robert Walpole then in Oppoſition; whoſe remarkable Expreſſion, in this great Debate, That they who gave the Power of Blood, gave Blood, never can be forgotten. And though afterwards when he became to be a Miniſter, he was better reconciled to ſtanding Armies and Mutiny Bills, in Time of Peace, ſeventeen Thouſand Men, was all the Army he durſt aſk; yet even that Demand produced an annual Debate; and the annual Reaſon, on which he founded the Neceſſity of his Demand—being the Danger from the Pretender and the Jacobites; was the ſtrongeſt Proof, that even in Sir R. Walpole's Opinion, the Reduction in the Army ſhould take Place, when this Danger from Diſaffection ſhould ceaſe. But how are Things changed?—I own indeed that amidſt the Dangers of this War, and the Threats of an Invaſion, the vaſt Army now on our Eſtabliſhment; is neceſſary: But what I lament is to ſee the Sentiments of the Nation ſo amazingly reconciled to the Proſpect of having a far more numerous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in former Times thought, could be allowed without endangering the Conſtitution. Nay, ſo unaccountably fond are we become of the military Plan, that the Erection of Barracks, which, twenty Years ago, would have ruined any Miniſter who ſhould have ventured to propoſe it, may be propoſed ſafely by our Miniſters now a-Days, and, upon Trial, be • ound to be a favourite Meaſure with our Patriots, and with the Public in general.

But what I lament as the greateſt Misfortune that can threaten the public Liberty, is to ſee the Eagerneſs with which our Nobility, born to be the Guardians of the Conſtitution againſt Prerogative, ſollicit the Badge of military Subjection, not meerly to ſerve their Country, in Times of Danger, which would be commendable, but in Expectation to be continued Soldiers, when Tranquility ſhall be reſtored, and to be under military Command, during Life. When I ſee this ſtrange, but melancholy Infatuation, ſo prevalent, I almoſt deſpair of the Conſtitution. If it ſhould go on in Proportion as it has of late, I fear the Time will, at laſt, come, when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded as unfaſhionable. Unleſs another Spirit poſſeſs our Nobility; unleſs they lay aſide their Military Trappings; and think that they can ſerve their Country more effectually as Senators than as Soldiers, what can we expect but to ſee, the Syſtem of military Subordination extending itſelf throughout the Kingdom, univerſal Dependence upon Government influencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit, nay, the very Form of the Conſtitution deſtroyed? We have generally beaten the French, and always been fooliſh enough to follow their Faſhions; I was in Hopes we ſhould never have taken the Faſhion of French Government; but from our numerous Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I am afraid we are running into it as faſt as we can. And, unleſs ſomething can be done, to bring back our Conſtitution to its firſt Principles, we ſhall find that we have triumphed, only to make ourſelves as wretched as our Enemy; that our Conqueſts are but a poor Compenſation for the Loſs of our Liberties; in a Word, that, like Wolfe, falling in the Arms of Victory, we are moſt gloriouſly—undone!

But though I have drawn ſo melancholy a Picture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the Loſs of our Liberties, it is with no other Deſign, than to exhort thoſe who are placed at the Helm, to ſet about the Repairs of our ſhattered Veſſel, as ſoon as ſhe can be brought ſafe into Harbour. After the Peace is once ſettled, it ought to be the great Object of our Miniſters, to deviſe every Expedient, and to adapt every Plan, that may extricate this unhappy Conſtitution from the Dangers I have deſcribed. Conſidering the low Ebb of France, we have ſome Reaſon to hope that when Peace is once reſtored, upon ſolid Terms, it will not ſoon be interrupted. Much, therefore, may be done during thoſe Years of Tranquility; if our Miniſters be diligent and faithful in this great Work of reviving the Conſtitution. The ſacred and inviolable Application of the Sinking Fund, which the Increaſe of our Trade, and other Circumſtances, have ſo greatly augmented, and muſt ſtill augment, will operate gradually, and effectually. Univerſal and unvariable Oeconomy, muſt be introduced into every Branch of Government; the Revenues of the Kingdom may be vaſtly increaſed by adopting Schemes that will prevent Frauds, and leſſen the Expence of Collection; innumerable unneceſſary Places may be aboliſhed, and exorbitant Perquiſites, in thoſe we leave, may be reſtrained; Attention muſt be had to the Morals and Principles of the Nation, and the Revival of Virtue and of Religion will go Hand in Hand, with the Revival of Liberty. But no Object will deſerve more Attention, than our Military Encroachments on Conſtitutional Independence. When this War ſhall be over, there will be leſs Reaſon, than ever, for numerous Armies. The Kingdom now happily being united, and Diſaffection to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear no Rebellions among ourſelves; and Invaſions from France are leſs likely than ever. Beſides, by the Care and Perſeverance of ſome Patriots, we have acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained up to be uſeful, and conſequently, we may without any Danger to the Public, reduce the Number of our Guards and Garriſons, ſo low, as to deſtroy great Part of the huge Fabrick of Military Influence and Dependence. But whatever you do, if you mean to reſtore the Conſtitution, you muſt ſecure the Dignity and Independence of Parliament. After paſſing ſuch Laws as may ſtill be neceſſary to preſerve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence of every Sort; to puniſh Bribery both in the Electors and in the Elected; ſomething, perhaps, may ſtill be done by Way of Place-bill, to leſſen Miniſterial Influence over Parliaments, without having Recourſe to an Oliverian Self-denying Ordinance; or to ſo total an Excluſion of Placemen, as was eſtabliſhed, in the original Act of Settlement.

And an Houſe of Commons thus choſen, and thus made independent, now that 〈◊〉 is rooted out, can never be formidable but to thoſe who have Reaſon to tremble. Such an Houſe of Commons, will co-operate with the Adminiſtration in every Plan of publick Utility, and at the ſame Time inquire carefully into the Abuſes of Government; Supplies will be voted; but only in Proportion to the real Income and Abilities of the Nation; and we may expect to ſee, what we have not ſeen above theſe forty Years, a Parliamentary Commiſſion of Accounts erected to inquire into the Diſburſement of near Two Hundred Millions. And unleſs we ſee this ſoon, I ſhall look upon our Conſtitution, as loſt, for ever.

Theſe, and many ſuch Regulations, as theſe, may, under an honeſt and virtuous Adminiſtration, be adopted when once Peace is reſtored: And the Proſpect of ſeeing them adopted, and ſteadily purſued, keeps me from deſpairing altogether of the Commonwealth.

To you, therefore, whoſe Power, moſt likely, will not terminate with the War; and whom I have preſumed to addreſs with Regard to the Terms that ſhould be demanded, to ſecure us from a perfidious Foe; To you, My Lord, and Sir, let me earneſtly recommend, the ſtill more important Care, of ſaving us, from ourſelves; and as you have with an Unanimity, that doth you both great Honour, directed our Councils, ſo as to humble France, let me intreat you to preſerve your Union, till it re-invigorate the almoſt loſt Powers of the Britiſh Conſtitution.

If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty, to your Country; if you would live great, and die lamented; if you would ſhine in Hiſtory, with our Clarendons and Southhamptons; let not this Opportunity, perhaps, this laſt Opportunity of ſaving Britiſh Liberty, and Independence, be thrown away. You, My Lord, whoſe Rank, whoſe extenſive Influence, and perſonal Authority, have given you the Pre-eminence, in public Affairs, as it were by Preſcription; much will depend upon you, in the carrying on this important Work. But when I direct my Addreſs to you, Sir, you muſt be conſcious that beſides the general Expectations we have from you, as a Lover of your Country, we have your own repeated Promiſes and Declarations, to make us flatter ourſelves that you will not ſtop ſhort, in your Schemes of national Reformation. Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but liſted, from your earlieſt Years, under the Banner of Patriotiſm; called into Power, by popular Approbation, and ſtill uniting, the uncommon Characters of Miniſter and Patriot; Favourite of the Publick, and Servant of the Crown; be not offended, Sir, if I remind you, not to diſappoint that Confidence the Public places in your future Endeavours to prop the ſinking Conſtitution. Nor let it ever fall from your Memory, that the Nation expects from your Virtue, your Oeconomy, your Plans for Liberty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your bold Councils, and vigorous Efforts, in carrying on the preſent War.

Perhaps I grow too warm, on a favourite Subject; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot take Effect, till the War be cloſed, let me turn your Attention again, for a little While longer, to the Object immediately before our Eyes—the inſuing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard to theſe, though I ſuppoſe, they will begin before the Winter be over, I think there is ſome Reaſon for being of Opinion that we muſt have another Campaign, before they can be finally cloſed. France is too low, to think ſeriouſly of a Peace, without making ſome deſperate Effort. She never would have expoſed her Weakneſs to all Europe, by ſo ſhameful and ſo • umbling a Bankruptcy; She never would have ruined her public Credit, and melted her Plate, the laſt Reſource, when every other has been exhauſted, only to receive Terms from England. No, ſhe knows ſhe is undone, for ever, if ſhe gets no Footing in Hanover; and, therefore, we may expect to ſee another Attempt made for that Purpoſe. But, if we are not wanting to ourſelves, another Attempt, will end, as unfortunately for her, as the former have done; and her Ruin only be more confirmed. In the mean While, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will meet at a Congreſs; but the Events of the Field, muſt regulate the Deliberations of the Cabinet. We, no Doubt, ſhall be firm in our Demands, whatever they are; and the French will endeavour to gain Time, to know whether there is any Likelihood of obliging us to offer them better. In this Situation, then, France muſt hear with Terror, that without breaking our national Faith, without injuring private Property, without giving exorbitant Premiums, we have already provided immenſely for the Supplies of another Year (and Supplies for Years may ſtill be had) to meet them;—not in America; there they are no more;—not on the Ocean— the Deſtruction of their Fleets leaves that Empire free to us—but once more, on the Plains of another Minden, again to feel and to confeſs the Superiority of Britiſh Valour.

I have only a Particular or two, to add, before I conclude. And I cannot help congratulating the Public, on the Wiſdom of our Manner of Opening the Negotiation for Peace. I mean to obſerve, that our Miniſters have happily got rid of a ſet of very uſeleſs, or very pernicious Gentlemen called Mediators, by applying directly to the Enemy himſelf. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the Figure of the Pope's Nuncio, and the Ambaſſador of 〈◊〉 , a • ting the F • rce of Mediation at Munſter, for ſeveral Years, while the War went on, till its Eve •• s regulated the Terms of Peace. The Mediation of Inſignificant Powers is therefore abſurd; and the Danger of calling in a powerful Mediator, who may threaten to declare againſt you, if you do not ſubmit to his partial Deciſions, is too obvious to be inſiſted upon. You have done wiſely, therefore, to keep the Negotiation in your own Hands; the Nation, from this Inſtance, has a full Confidence that her Intereſts are ſkilfully conducted; and, therefore, I ſhall only add, another Particular, which however ſubordinate, will, no Doubt, be attended to by you; though ſome late Negotiators of ours, with France, neglected it.

The French, by taking the Lead in Europe of late, have, of Courſe, been able to introduce their Language in all public Negotiations; ſo that, perhaps, the French is the only Tongue, by the Channel of which Plenipotentiaries and Miniſters of different Countries, can converſe. But when the Negotiation is to be put into Writing, to be drawn up in that Form which is to be binding upon all the Parties, and ſigned jointly by the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the Intereſt of the State, ought to allow us, to accept of the Original Treaty in the Native Tongue of our Enemies. The Honour of the Nation forbids this; as it would be a Confeſſion of Superiority, to which Britain, at no Time, much leſs after ſo glorious a War, ſhould ſubmit; eſpecially as we cannot ſubmit to it, without giving the Enemy a real Advantage, and laying the Foundation for future Cavils.—Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letters, boaſts, that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the French Stile, he had been able to outwit Don Louis de Haro, in the Conferences at the Pyren • es. And a much later Inſtance, in which we ourſelves were partly concerned, ſhould confirm us, in our Refuſal to treat with the French in their own Language.—I mean the famous Capitulation of the Dutch Garriſon of Tournay in 1745; which, though only reſtrained from acting, for a limited Time in any of the Barrier Towns I have not the original Capitulation before me, but I remember pretty exactly on what the Cavil turned. The Troops were not to act, I think, for two Years, in any of the Places le plus reculées de la Barriere. The Dutch, no Doubt, underſtood, de la Barriere to be the Genitive Ca • e, but the French ſaid they meant it in the A • lative. , as the Dutch believed, when they accepted of the Capitulation, was ſoon after interpreted by France, as tying them up from acting in any Part of the World; and might have been fatal to this Country, if the Rebellion in Scotland, to aſſiſt in quelling which the Dutch lent us thoſe very Troops, had been ſo ſucceſsful, as to oblige us, to put our foreign Allies to the Teſt.

We have no great Reaſon, no more than other Nations, to truſt Gallic Faith, as appears from the many Inſtances of their unp • lliated Perfidy which I have collected above. Let us not, therefore, be ſo weak as to give them Room for obtruding upon us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in which they plight their Faith. They are too ready to break it when the Terms are ever ſo clear; and, therefore, let us take Care not to give them that Advantage which ſuperior Skill in their own Language, naturally confers, and which upon ſome future Occaſion, they may improve to our Detriment. Let the original and authentic Copy of the Treaty, therefore, be in a dead Language, the Phraſes of which cannot vary, and whoſe Meaning is equally underſtood by both Parties. We had once a very learned Plenipotentiary in Queen Elizabeth's Time, who, in a Negotiation with Spain, when it came to be debated in what Language the Treaty ſhould be made, ludicrouſly enough propoſed to the Spaniard, who was giving himſelf Airs of Superiority, to treat in the Language of his Maſter's Kingdom of Jeruſalem. But, leaving the Hebrew for our Divines, I would only have our Negotiators treat in Latin: Which ſeemed, as it were by Preſcription, to have a Right to be the Language of the Public Law of Europe; till ſome late▪ Inſtances have ſhewn that the French was beginning to be ſubſtituted in its Room; by the Lazineſs or Neglect of thoſe who treated. As we are ſanguine in our Hopes of a much better Peace than we had at Utrecht, with Regard to the Terms, let it not be worſe than that at Utrecht, which preſerved the Old Cuſtom of ſettling the Negotiation in Latin. We then had a Biſhop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but without having Recourſe to the very learned Bench, or chooſing a Plenipotentiary from Cambridge (I hope in a little Time one may join the other Univerſity without giving Offence) the Negotiators at the enſuing Peace, may be accommodated with Latin enough for the Purpoſe I mention, at a very moderate Expence—If their Secretary or Chaplain cannot aſſiſt them.

But when I begin to be ludicrous on ſo ſerious a Subject, it is Time to have done: And my Addreſs has already ſwelled to ſuch a Size as ſurprizes myſelf, as much, as I fear it will tire the Reader. However, the vaſt Variety of Facts and Particulars which naturally offered themſelves to me, and which could not be omitted without hurting the Connection, and weakning my Argument, will, perhaps, procure Indulgence for ſo long a Pamphlet: And, for the ſame Reaſon, I flatter myſelf, that if I ſhould happen to have been miſtaken in any Thing I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have miſquoted a Treaty, ſome Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to truſt much to my Memory, for Want of a proper Opportunity of conſulting many of thoſe Books, which furniſh the Materials I have made uſe of. However, I believe a candid Reader will find no capital, at leaſt, no wilful, Miſtake.

I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my Notions on the important Subject of the Peace, are a regular Plan or Syſtem for the Adminiſtration to proceed upon. I throw them out, only as looſe Hints for my Superiors, to improve as they may think proper. Should there be any Weight in all, or any of them, you, My Lord and Sir, will be able to work them into Utility for this Kingdom. If they are not worth your Notice; as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to be known, I can neither looſe nor gain Reputation by them. All I can ſay, if they are neglected, is, Operam et Oleam perdidi.