AS you live at a diſtance from the ſeat of news, and may know nothing of the Ohio-Defeat but from hearſay-reports, which, having paſſed thro' a variety of hands before they have reached you, muſt be very uncertain, and mixed with a great deal that is not true, I have been at the pains, for your gratification, to put together, from the beſt accounts, the whole of what may be depended on for fact, in relation to this intereſting affair to all the Britiſh American Governments: And if I ſhould hereupon add a few thoughts, tending to point out to you wherein this defeat, however inglorious in itſelf, is yet naturally and powerfully adapted to ſerve theſe Colonies in the end, it may give ſome relief to your anxious mind, and diſpoſe you to wait, with a becoming ſubmiſſion, the iſſue of thoſe military operations which are but juſt begun.

The firſt news of this defeat was bro't us in a letter from Col. Innes, dated July 11th, in theſe words, I have this moment received the melancholly news of the defeat of our troops, the General killed and numbers of our officers, our whole artillery taken. In ſhort, the account I have received is ſo very bad, that, as pleaſe God, I intend to make a ſtand here. It's highly neceſſary to raiſe the militia every where to defend the Frontiers. It at once appeared to every one, from the general air and ſtrain of this letter, that the aged Colonel was under the influence of a ſtrong panic when he wrote it, for which reaſon we were diſpoſed to hope, that matters were not ſo bad as he had ſuggeſted; and by after contradictory accounts we were encouraged in this hope, till the ſecond of this inſtant, when, upon the arrival of the weſtern poſt, it was put beyond all doubt, by a variety of letters, that the Ohio-reincounter was, on our ſide, every way as diſadvantageous as we were at firſt led to conceive it to be.

By comparing the accounts we have hitherto received, it appears, that the General proceeded from the little meadows with about 1300 men, moſtly Britiſh, beſides the neceſſary artillery, ammunition, and proviſions, leaving the main body of the convoy under the care of Col. Dunbar, with orders to join him as ſoon as poſſible; that on the 9th of July the Monongahela was paſſed firſt by 300 men▪ then by 200, then by the General himſelf, with the column of artillery, baggage, and main body of the army, about one o'clock; that immediately upon this a quick and heavy fire was heard from the front; that the detachments of the 2 and 300 men gave way, and fell back in great conſternation upon the main body, who were haſtening to ſuſtain them; that this ſtruck the men with ſuch a panic, and bro't on ſuch confuſion as could not, by any expedients, be afterwards remedied; and that in conſequence of this, notwithſtanding the courage and reſolution of the officers, the enemy obtained a compleat victory, killing and wounding a great many,At the loweſt computation, between 6 and 700 ſoldiers, officers and private men, were killed, or wounded, beſides pioneers, waggoners, ſervants, &c. and obliging the reſt to quit the ground, leaving behind them the artillery, ammunition, proviſions, and whole baggage.

The number of the enemy remains ſtill ſomewhat uncertain. One of the officers writes, "it was impoſſible by the diſpoſition of the French and Indians to judge of their number." Another is pretty certain, "that they did not exceed above 3 or 400." A Gentleman from Philadelphia of good intelligence ſays, "by the beſt accounts there were about 400 Indians and 80 French." I am inclined to think, they were not much more numerous; for if they had, they would probably have cut off the whole army, as they had ſo great an advantage againſt them, and fired, not in the European way, but by taking aim, in which method of firing the Canadians, as well as Indians, are very dextrious.

But whether their number was great, or ſmall, they made ſad havock of our men. Perhaps, all circumſtances conſidered, hiſtory will ſcarce furniſh an inſtance of ſuch a dreadful carnage. To be ſure, the like was never before ſeen in North-America: Nor could it have happened, humanly ſpeaking, without great miſconduct, either in the officers, or ſoldiers, or both. Some are pleaſed to lay the blame on the ſoldiers; ſpeaking of them as cowards, and as leaving their officers to fall a ſacrifice to the enemy. Others ſeem to think, the chief commander was rather principally faulty in not uſing due caution, and a prudent forecaſt, to guard the men againſt the ſurprize which involv'd them in deſtruction.

It does not come within my preſent deſign to enter upon an enquiry into the blameable ſource of this miſchief; tho' you will unavoidably perceive my opinion about it, by reading what I have to offer with reſpect to the tendency of it finally to ſerve the intereſt of even all the Britiſh American Colonies.

I readily own, this defeat, in many reſpects, is a terrible evil. Great diſhonour has been reflected on the Britiſh arms;—the Indians will be more ſtrongly attached to the French than ever;—the French are inſpir'd with greater courage and reſolution, while, at the ſame time, their ſtrength is very much increaſed by the artillery, ammunition, and ſtores, bro't by us, within 7 miles of their fort, at an immenſe expence of labour and money: Beſides all which, our ſouthern colonies are thrown into perplexity and confuſion, and lie doubly expoſed to the depredations of the ſavages of the wilderneſs.—But theſe things notwithſtanding, it may be beſt, in the end, we have met with this loſs. Shameful and miſchievous as it is, it may be one of the grand links in that chain of cauſes, by which Heaven may intend to chaſtiſe the French, curb their inſolence, drive them out of the encroachments they have made on us, and reduce them to a neceſſity of keeping within their own boundaries without diſturbing us in the poſſeſſion of ours. Theſe, I would hope, are the beneficial conſequences aimed at by providence: Nor, as I imagine, could any thing have happened more naturally and ſtrongly adapted to bring into effect ſuch happy events.

'Tis too evident to be diſputed, that the ſouthern Colonies needed ſomething EXTRAORDINARY to rouſe them out of that deep ſecurity I very juſtly ſpeak of them as in deep ſecurity; for tho' it was the greateſt part of a year from the time of Col. Waſhington's defeat to the arrival of General Braddock in Virginia, yet they had not raiſed ſo many as one 1000 men to join the troops from England; which we, in theſe parts, can attribute to nothing but their being, to an high degree, careleſs and ſecure: Eſpecially when we conſider, that this is not one fifth part of the men that have been raiſed in the Maſſachuſetts-Province only, in a much leſs time, tho' they were not under the like neceſſity. they were unhappily ſunk into. Had they had a juſt ſenſe of their danger from the French, who were ſettling and fortifying on their back-lands; had they in time wiſely concerted, and vigorouſly executed, meaſures for driving them off, they might eaſily have done it, and at a comparatively ſmall expence. It was unaccountable inattention to their own ſafety that bro't them into thoſe circumſtances, which gave riſe to the embarkation of troops from home, and a greater national charge following thereupon than has ever been expended upon the northern Colonies, from their firſt ſettlement to this day. And the deſtruction of theſe troops, in ſo ſtriking a way, accompanied with ſuch loſs and diſappointment, is eminently fitted to alarm their fears, awaken in them a ſenſe of danger, and conſtrain them to ſpeed and vigour, in proſecuting methods, both for guarding themſelves, and annoying the French. And ſhould it operate to the production of theſe good effects, as it naturally tends to do, the damage in the end, would be more than counter-ballanced. For there are more than 40 Engliſhmen in the ſouthern ſettlements to one Frenchman; and where the diſproportion is ſo great, they muſt be capable, under a common bleſſing, of putting it out of the power of the French to do them any harm, Pennſylvania only contains more inhabitants than the Province of the Maſſachuſetts. And it would be ſtrange, if that province, with Maryland, Virginia, and the two Carolinas, were not vaſtly more than a match for the comparatively few French, who are ſuch bad neighbours to them. Had we, in New-England, no ſettlements and fortreſſes behind us ſuperior to thoſe on the back of them, we ſhould eſteem ourſelves quite ſafe, not thinking we had any thing to fear from the French, tho' we had no aſſiſtance from Great-Britain. unleſs they are madly reſolved to continue careleſs and inactive; which can't well be ſuppoſed after the late occurrence, ſo powerfully ſuited to excite in them a becoming concern for the ſecurity of their liberties and propertiesOne would have tho't it could not be ſuppoſed, but that the ſouthern colonies, by what has happened among them, ſhould have been excited to an immediate care for their own ſafety; but we hear, to our very great ſurpriſe, that Maryland and Virginia have done nothing as yet; that Philadelphia is in a wrangle about the method of ſupplying money; and that New-York have revoked their vote to raiſe 400 men, tho' they had forwarded this vote to the Maſſachuſetts-Government: Upon which I would only ſay, they are in a more profound ſleep than I imagin'd; but I doubt not, they will be tho'-roughly rouſed, when they find, that the people in their out-ſettlements are killed, or captivated, or obliged to retire into the heart of their country for ſafety, as will ſoon be the caſe, and the ſooner for their preſent careleſsneſs, and to their far greater coſt.

Our ſouthern brethren, it muſt be acknowledged, have not been uſed to military expeditions. The ſooner therefore they are put upon them the better. For their being uſed to them will, I believe, be found the ONLY STABLE FOUNDATION upon which, under the ſmiles of Heaven, and the well conducted aſſiſtance of Great-Britain, they may expect to hold their poſſeſſions without moleſtation from the French. And providence may be opening the way for THIS STABLE FOUNDATION by the preſent evil event, the rather adapted to this purpoſe, becauſe ſo extraordinary in its circumſtances. The ſteps by which it leads hereto are eaſily diſcernable, tho' they may be tho't tedious and burdenſome. They will, by means of this diſaſter, be more liable than they ever were before to the incurſions of the Natives, ſet on and ſtrengthened by the perfidious French; this will put them under, what I may call, an happy neceſſity of raiſing conſiderable numbers of men to protect their Frontiers, and ſcour the Woods; this will inure their men to hardſhips, and inſenſibly teach them the art of war, as it ought to be carried on in a wilderneſs-land: and, in conſequence of theſe things, they will ſoon have within themſelves a power ſufficient for their own defence, and capable of being employed offenſively too, as there may be occaſion.

This is the way in which the northern colonies have had numbers of men, from generation to generation, trained up for war, and inſpired with martial courage diſpoſing them, with all readineſs, to go forth againſt the enemy, whether French, or Indian, or both, as they have been called thereto. And were the ſouthern colonies, in the ſame way, form'd for military exploits, it would be an eaſy thing, with comparatively little help from home, wiſely conducted, to drive the French, not only out of their encroachments, but out of theſe parts of the earth. And perhaps this may be the view of providence; and the Ohio-defeat may be one of the grand ſteps leading to it, by alarming the Engliſh colonies, the ſouthern ones in ſpecial, and putting them upon the acquirement and exerciſe of martial ſkill and valor, even from neceſſity.

This defeat has an obvious tendency alſo to anſwer another very good purpoſe, it may be, the moſt important of any in order to ſucceſs in our attempts againſt the French; and this is, the effecting an alteration in ſome material articles, as they reſpect the military power that may be employed to this end.

It has been tho't neceſſary, that the chief Command ſhould be lodged in a Britiſh Officer of known courage, and experience in the art of war as practiſed in Europe. This gave riſe to the appearance of General Braddock in Virginia, as Head of all his Majeſty's forces in North-America. And to this, I believe, it may principally be attributed, that we met with ſuch ill ſucceſs on the banks of the Monongahela. Not that I queſtion the perſonal valor of this Gentleman, or his military ſkill in the regular way: But he had no Idea of the manner of fighting in uſe here, and therefore wholly neglected the only effectual expedients to guard againſt the fatal conſequences that aroſe from it. It does not indeed look very likely, that a ſtranger to the country, and one altogether unacquainted with its warlike methods, which are known to be quite different from what they are in Europe, ſhould be the beſt qualified perſon to have the chief hand in planing, and executing, the hoſtile ſchemes neceſſary for our protection and ſecurity, The preſent melancholly event is, all circumſtances conſidered, ſurprizingly calculated to give inſtruction and warning upon this head: Nor, after ſuch dear bought experience, is it probable we ſhall again have our firſt military officer from home. Or ſhould this be ſtill tho't neceſſary, we may reaſonably hope, he will be ſo reſtrained as not to have it in his Power to act, but with the advice of ſome thoroughly experienced American actually preſent with him. Had General Braddock been thus reſtrained, tis morally certain, he would not have been ſo ſhamefully ſurprized and beat. It does not appear, that he wanted good advice; and ſome are of opinion, that if he had hearkened to it, not holding thoſe in too great contempt, who, tho' inferior to him in regular military ſkill, were yet better acquainted with the methods proper to be uſed with ſuch an enemy as he had to engage with, he might have been alive at this day, and in circumſtances to have forced Du Queſne out of the hands of the French.

The American provincial troops, the New-England ones in particular, who have expoſed themſelves to hardſhips and hazards for their King and Country, and by their bravery done eminent ſervice for both, may have been too much neglected, I mean in thoſe appointments which are the proper reward of military merit. The Regiments upon the eſtabliſhment ordered to be raiſed this year, in theſe colonies, were ſo ſupply'd with Britiſh officers, that room was left for only here and there one of an American deſcent; and perhaps room would not have been left even for theſe few, had it not been a neceſſary expedient in order to the filling up of the regiments. Nor is this the firſt time, that as brave men as any in the world have been treated with like neglect. Tis well known, New-England gave peace to Europe, not many years ago, by the valor of their men in reducing Cape-Breton; and yet, theſe very men were ſtrangely overlook'd in the appointment of officers for the two Regiments that were raiſed, even from among themſelves, for the ſecuring that important acquiſition; that is to ſay, New-England men did all the ſervice, both in taking and keeping this ſtrong fortreſs, and one and another from Great-Britain were put into moſt of the poſts of honor and profit, to the excluſion of thoſe who had merited them, and were, without any reflection; as well capable of filling them. A different conduct ſeems neceſſary; if any thing is ever intended to be done to good purpoſe againſt the French, in theſe parts of the world. And the late horrid ſlaughter of Britiſh officers, as well as private ſoldiers, may have a tendency to bring it about. It is certainly adapted to ſuch a purpoſe. For it is now made manifeſt, and in a way that can't fail, one would think, of convincing even all England, that neither Britiſh officers, nor private ſoldiers, without American aſſiſtance, can be depended on for ſucceſs againſt American enemies.

Had General Braddock been oppoſed by French Regulars only, he would probably have met with little interruption in his progreſs; but, as he had to do with the Canadians and Indians, who fought in a way he was an intire ſtranger to, he ſoon fell a prey into their hands: Nor would numbers have ſerved him; they would only have given occaſion for a more horrible ſlaughter of men. The plain truth is, Regular troops, in this Wilderneſs-country, are juſt the ſame that irregular ones would be in Flanders. American irregulars would eaſily be confounded by regular troops in the open fields of Europe; and regular troops would be as eaſily reduced to the like confuſion by American irregulars in the woods here.

I would not be underſtood to mean by what I here ſay, as tho' we did not need regular troops, or could not make uſe of them to good purpoſe. For, as France has ſent over a conſiderable number of their regulars, it is highly proper there ſhould be regulars to oppoſe them; and, in laying ſeige to their fortifications, regulars are the fitteſt to be employed: But, as there is no way of marching to the French fortreſſes, or to their regulars, either in, or out of them, but thro' the American woods and thickets, the beſt regular troops that could be ſent us would, without all doubt, be attacked in their march; and ſhould this be the caſe, they would probably be ſoon deſtroyed, or obliged to retreat with loſs, not being ſkilled in the only method of fighting that would be of any real ſervice to them. General Braddock's defeat is a practical inſtance that muſt forever ſilence all diſpute upon this head.

And what is more naturally and obviouſly deducible herefrom than this, that American irregulars, in an American war, are full as neceſſary as Britiſh regulars. And if American irregulars are thus neceſſary, it muſt be evident, at firſt ſight, that it will argue the want of policy, if that is done which has a direct tendency to cool their zeal, and damp their ſpirits; and this moſt certainly will be done, if they are obliged to ſee regiments raiſed, upon the Britiſh Eſtabliſhment, even among themſelves, with ſo many officers appointed from home, as almoſt wholly to exclude them from being ſharers in any thing that is either honorable, or profitable. If one of the good effects following upon the Ohio-defeat, ſo inglorious to the Britiſh arms, as well as hurtful to their intereſt, is not a greater care to diſtinguiſh American merit, it will not be becauſe it is not, in all reſpects, fitted to point out the political Wiſdom of ſuch a conduct: Nor, unleſs ſuch a conduct ſhould be conſequent thereupon, can it reaſonably be expected, that any military attempts will be carried on here with that reſolution, vigor, and ſpirit, which are neceſſary.

I may pertinently add to what has been hitherto ſaid, it is poſſible ſome of the rules and articles for the further governing his Majeſty's forces, given out the laſt year, extending to America, and the troops ſerving here by commiſſion only from the Governors of the ſeveral provinces, would not have run exactly in their preſent form, if the importance of theſe troops, in an American war, had been ſo thoroughly conſidered then, as it probably will be now. Perhaps, upon this ſuppoſition, it would not have been thought abſolutely neceſſary to be ſo explicit in ſaying, "that the general or field-officers of the provincial troops ſhall have no rank with the general and field-officers who ſerve by commiſſion from us;" or, that "the captain and other inferior officers of the Britiſh forces ſhall, in all duties, take poſt of the provincial officers of the like rank, though their commiſſions ſhould be of elder date." Such a diſtinction, ſo formally made between Britiſh and Provincial officers, however juſt in it ſelf, may, in preſent circumſtances, be of great diſſervice, and certainly will, ſhould it unhappily prove an occaſion of jealouſy, diſaffection, and contempt, in theſe officers towards each other.

The ſubjection alſo of the Provincial troops to Courts-martial, "in like manner with the officers and ſoldiers of the Britiſh troops, when acting in conjunction with them," may probably tend to render the enliſtment of ſoldiers a much greater difficulty, than if they were left to be try'd conformably to the laws of the provinces to which they belong. For it is to be conſidered, nine in ten of the men, who muſt compoſe our Provincial troops, in any important expedition, if to be depended on, are ſuch as go upon principle, from loyalty to their King, love to their country, and a juſt concern for the welfare of their families, and the ſecurity of their liberties and eſtates; and theſe are the men that would be moſt ſtartled at the thought of being ſubjected to Martial-law, as practiſed at home: nor would they eaſily be perſuaded to come under ſuch ſubjection.

The unhappy event that has lately taken place in America is well fitted to convey to the Mother-Country juſt Ideas of what is proper to be done here: and it will accordingly, as we may reaſonably truſt, be productive of thoſe determinations, which ſhall, in the beſt manner, tend to ſupport the honour of the Provincial, as well as Britiſh troops, and give them all the weight and encouragement that can be deſired.

You are ſatisfied, I believe, by this time, that the Ohio-defeat is naturally adapted to ſerve the American Engliſh Colonies in the end, however grievous it may be for the preſent: Though I ſhould not do juſtice to New-England in general, and the Maſſachuſetts-Province in particular, if I did not ſuggeſt my fears, leaſt, by means of this diſappointment, they would be ſubjected to one very great hardſhip, unleſs his Majeſty, in his paternal wiſdom and goodneſs, ſhould do that which will, in a good meaſure, prevent its being ſo. To explain my ſelf here.

New-England in general, and the Maſſachuſetts-Province in ſpecial, are the chief, I may ſay the only, ſources that may be rely'd on for a ſupply of effective men to carry into execution any future deſigns againſt the French. There are no men in the American Colonies ſo well qualified, or ſpirited, as theſe to engage in war-like enterprizes: And this is ſo well known, that the other Colonies, as well as Great-Britain, have their expectations mainly from us. The danger therefore is, leſt our men ſhould be call'd into military ſervice beyond our ability, as well as proportion. This indeed is the caſe at preſent. The Maſſachuſetts-Government only has more men employ'd in the ſeveral expeditions now on foot, than all the other Colonies put together. One full eighth part of our people (the flower of them too) are in active ſervice at this day, and a greater number of them in our own pay than when we undertook the reduction of Louisbourg. Such, in truth, is the ſpirit reigning in the Province, that every third man, I believe, would be in readineſs, upon very ſhort warning, to engage in an enterprize I could name, if put upon it, and duly encouraged in it. It is therefore obvious, at firſt ſight, that, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, we ſhall be ſingularly liable to have our men taken off from their labour in their reſpective callings, the effect whereof will be the riſe of all the neceſſaries of life; an incapacity to pay thoſe taxes, which are already tribled upon us; and, what is ſtill worſe, the ſtopping our growth for twenty or thirty years, by the loſs of our young men, either by death, or their going where they will be expoſed to fewer hardſhips, and leſs charge.

It is in the power of his Majeſty to prevent, in a great meaſure, theſe inconveniences, I don't mean by not calling upon us for our men; [this, conſidering the preſent temper and character of the Southern Colonies, may be neceſſary] but by employing them at the charge of the crown; at the ſame time, making us the ſpecial object of his paternal regards, in proportion to our greater zeal and activity in the defence of our Sovereign's rights againſt the French-Encroachments.

It does not ſeem equitable, that this Province, becauſe more loyal and active than the other Provinces, ſhould be drain'd of its men, and burdened with a weight of charge beyond what we are able to bear. We may, I think, reaſonably expect all proper care will be taken to guard againſt this: Nor otherwiſe will it be long in our power to be of any ſervice, either to his Majeſty, or the other Colonies under his dominion. We ſhall ſink under the burden that is laid upon us, and unavoidably fall into ruin.

I cannot help obſerving here, though this Province has been the Grand Barrier to all the American Colonies for more than an hundred years, and has, in that time, expended immenſe ſums of money, in the wars it has carried on with the French, and Indians, for the common good, as well as its own; yet it has never received the leaſt help, in reſpect either of men, or money, from any of the ſouthern Governments: Nor has the Mother-Country, in all that time, made them a donation of ſo much as one thouſand pounds, ſo far as I remember, to aſſiſt them in their own proper defence: Which we take the more hardly, as we have been publickly told, that no leſs a ſum than ten thouſand pounds ſterl. was given the laſt year to Virginia, (and without their aſking for it) to encourage them in their attempts againſt the French at Ohio; while yet, this is the firſt time they have been called to any difficulty of this ſort, or put to any charge worth mentioning. Were we, in this Province, to meet with proportionable encouragement from home, we ſhould not think much of any thing we might be called to for the common benefit of the American Britiſh Colonies.

I believe, Sir, you think it high time I ſhould come to a cloſe of this letter; but I muſt beg your patience, though I may already have treſpaſſed upon it, while I mention to you what our New-England forces have done this ſummer for the ſervice of his Majeſty, and turning the ſcale in favour of the Engliſh, notwithſtanding our loſs at Ohio.

Let me then congratulate you upon the reduction of all the French forts One of theſe Forts was much ſtronger in its make than Du Queſne, and defended with more and heavier Cannon; and our troops, while bombarding it, and at work in preparing to cannonade it, were attacked, from the woods, by perhaps as great a number of Indians as ſurprized and defeated our army at the ſouthward. And what was the effect? Our New-England men, inſtead of being affrighten'd by the Indian's yelling, and ſtanding as marks to be ſhot at, while they could do them little or no hurt, took them in their own way, bravely followed them into the woods, and ſoon oblig'd them to retreat, without ever attempting again to give them the leaſt diſturbance. at Nova-Scotia, and St. John's River. In ſome complimental addreſſes to the Governor of Hallifax, NEW-ENGLAND was kept ſo intirely out of view, that a ſtranger would have gueſſed, that Britiſh Troops only had merited the honour of this exploit: Whereas the plain truth is, it was done by two regiments (of a thouſand each) ſent from New-England, with the aſſiſtance of only two or three hundred of his Majeſty's regular troops. This could not well have been diſguiſed, even in a compliment, if a New-England officer had had the chief command, as we were univerſally led to expect. How the matter came to be otherwiſe ordered, I preſume not to ſay: But thus much is certain, the honour of New-England was not thereby advanced, nor the moſt likely ſtep taken to promote his Majeſty's ſervice in future enliſtments. I have no view in what I now ſay to ſuggeſt the leaſt reflection on Col. Monckton; for, by all accounts, he is every way equal to the place he holds, and has behaved excellently well in it: But it muſt be tho't reaſonable, that New-England ſhould have had the honour of a Chief-Commander from among her own ſons; eſpecially as it is known here, that they enliſted upon this ſuppoſition, and would have been perſuaded upon no other.

I need not obſerve to you the importance of theſe acquiſitions in Nova-Scotia. They are alone a full counter-balance to our loſs at the ſouthward; and you will eaſily be diſpoſed to think ſo, when I have told you that the Neutral-French, as they are called, are, by this means, intirely ſubjected to our Command. And accordingly tranſport-veſſels, (they having refuſed to ſwear allegiance to his majeſty George our gracious Sovereign) have been taken up, and ſailed from hence, to carry them out of that part of America, and to place them in others where they may be leſs dangerous and troubleſome. I ſuppoſe, by this time, Nova-Scotia is emptied of its French-inhabitants, and thereby ſecured to the Britiſh crown more effectually than ever. How galling muſt this be to France! What a vaſt diſappointment! when ſhe doubtleſs expected the reverſe of all this, as ſhe had ſent over ſo great a number of troops, and with a deſign to accompliſh that on her ſide, which we have done on our's.

We thankfully aſcribe it, under the ſmiles of providence, to the ſeaſonable arrival of Admiral Boſcawen, with ſo powerful a naval force, that the Gallic Scheme, ſo far as it related to Nova-Scotia, has been intirely defeated. And ſuch has been the vigilant and prudent conduct of this brave Commander, and ſuch the diſtreſſes ariſing herefrom to a certain place, that it might, perhaps, ſhould permiſſion be granted, be ſoon put into Engliſh hands, to the intire Ruin of the French intereſt in America.

I don't think I ſhall be too haſty, if I congratulate you alſo on the virtual or conſtructive conqueſt even of Du Queſne itſelf on the Ohio, in what Major General Shirley, our Governor, has already done to cut off the communication between Canada, and that fort. I own, I was not without pain, when I knew his excellency was going in perſon upon the Niagara-expedition, and with no more than about 2500 men, as it might reaſonably be expected the French would be alarmed at an attempt to take from them the grand Key to all the Lakes, and whole Country extending to the Miſſiſippi; and my fears were heightened upon the advantage, General Braddock's defeat would give them, the more powerfully to oppoſe him. But, by the wiſe and timely care of his Excellency, the Engliſh Oſwego-fort, upon the Margin of the ſouth-eaſt part of lake Ontario, was ſo enlarged and ſtrengthened as to diſcourage a thouſand French and Indians from making an attack upon it, tho' they were collected together, near the fort, for this purpoſe:—Beſides which, He has for ſome time had, thro' the laborious diligence of a number of New-England carpenters, well guarded and defended while at their work, three well arm'd veſſels cruizing in the lake; and by this time 2 more are built, and join'd with them; which make a very formidable ſquadron for a ſmall ſea, as Ontario may be called, tho' detached from the Ocean between 2 and 300 miles at the neareſt diſtance. And, by means of this ſquadron, he has it in his power to prevent an attempt againſt Oſwego by canonading or bombarding, without which it will be an eaſy thing to hold it againſt any number of French and Indians that can be bro't to take it. And by this ſquadron alſo he has rendered it impracticable (as may be ſeen by only looking on a map of this part of America) for the Canadians to convey artillery, ammunition, or any other ſtores, for the defence of their encroachments on the back of our ſouthern Colonies. Fort Du Queſne muſt, for this reaſon, ſoon fall into our hands, and without much trouble, beſides what may be called for in watching the lake.

Had General Braddock made it his firſt buſineſs to ſecure the command of lake Ontario, which he might eaſily have done ſoon enough to have ſtopt the force that was ſent from Canada to Du Queſne, that fort muſt have been ſurrendered to him upon demand; and had he gone this way to it, greater part of that vaſt ſum might have been ſaved to the nation, which was expended in making a waggon road, thro' the woods and mountains, the way he went. Why he went this way I preſume not to enquire; much leſs would I ſay, that he was above thinking, any plan of operation could be better than his own.

It is impoſſible to determine at this diſtance, whether his Excellency General Shirley will directly endeavour the reduction of Niagara-Fort. He is wiſe, and cautious; and will, I believe, do nothing upon this head, under preſent circumſtances, unleſs there is the utmoſt probability of ſucceſs. It would not give me any concern, if he ſhould make no immediate attempt upon this fort. For as he has now got the command of Lake Ontario, the grand point is gained. The key of communication is in Engliſh hands; and if a good uſe is made of it, the conſequence muſt be the intire deſtruction of the French intereſt on the back-parts of our ſouthern Colonies, in a little time, and with little pains.

As to our Crown-Point expedition; its effect is ſtill altogether in the womb of providence; though it might have been determined long ago, and in our favour, humanly ſpeaking, had not a delay been render'd unavoidable, by the obligation which was laid upon Governor Shirley to go to Maryland [a curious ſpecimen, among other things we have ſeen, of the ſignal advantage of the lately propoſed Union of the Provinces] to ſettle with General Braddock the plan of action for the ſummer. This affair has now been ſo long in hand, and ſo much opportunity hereby given the Canadians to employ even their whole power to oppoſe us, that I am not, I freely own, without fear what may be the conſequence. The troops from France, not intercepted by Admiral Boſcowen, may, before this time, be poſted in the moſt advantageous ſituation for the defence of that place: And ſhould this be the caſe, our New-England men may be called to difficult ſervice. If they don't ſucceed, it will not be for want of courage and reſolution. Superior force may poſſibly oblige them to return without accompliſhing what they went for; but I rather hope ſoon to hear, that they are in poſſeſſion of Fort-Frederick.

I have nothing further to add at preſent, but that I am, without a compliment,