CHAP. I. Of the Mind in general, its Objects and Operations.

§ 1. IT is my Design in the following Essay, to trace out,The Design. in as short a Compass as I can, the se­veral Steps of the Mind of Man, from the first Impressions of Sense, through the seve­ral Improvements it gradually makes, till it ar­rives to that Perfection and Enjoyment of itself, which is the great End of its Being.—In order to which, it will first be expedient to define what we mean by the Human Mind, and to give some Account of its various Objects, Powers and Ope­rations, and the Principles and Rules by which they are to be conducted in attaining to the Know­ledge [Page 2] of Truth, which is the Business of that Science which is called LOGIC, or The Art of Thinking or Reasoning; the Foundation of which is the Philosophia prima, which is also called Me­taphysics and Ontology, or the Doctrine of the ge­neral Notion of Being, with its various Properties and Affections, and those applied in general both to Body and Spirit. And as Truth and Good are nearly allied, being in effect but the same Thing under different Considerations; this will pave the Way towards the Attainment of that supreme Good, in the Choice and Enjoyment of which consists our highest Happiness; the particular Consideration of which is the Business of Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, which is the Art of pursuing our highest Happiness by the universal Practice of Virtue.

§ 2. THE Word Mind or Spirit, in general, signifies any intelligent active Being; The Defini­tion of Mind. which Notion we take from what we are conscious of in ourselves, who know that we have within us a Prin­ciple of conscious Perception, Intelligence, Acti­vity and Self-exertion; or rather, that each of us is a conscious, perceptive, intelligent, active and Self-exerting Being: And by Reasoning and Ana­logy from ourselves we apply it to all other Minds or Intelligences besides, or superior to us; and (removing all Limitations and Imperfections) we apply it even to that Great Supreme Intelligence, who is the universal Parent of all created Spirits, and (as far as our Words and Conceptions can go) may be defined, an infinite Mind or Spirit, or a Being infinitely intelligent and active. But by the Human Mind, we mean that Principle of Sense, Intelligence and free Activity, which we feel with­in [Page 3] ourselves, or rather feel ourselves to be, furnished with those Objects and Powers, and under those Confinements and Limitations, under which it hath pleased our great Creator to place us in this present State.

§ 3. WE are, at present, Spirits or Minds connected with gross, tangible Bodies, Of the Uni­on of Body and Mind. in such a Manner, that as our Bodies, can perceive and act nothing but by our Minds, so, on the other Hand, our Minds perceive and act by Means of our bo­dily Organs. Such is the present Law of our Nature, which I conceive to be no other than a meer arbitrary Constitution or Establishment of Him that hath made us to be what we are.—And accordingly I apprehend that the Union between our Souls and Bodies, during our present State, consists in nothing else but this Law of our Na­ture, which is the Will and perpetual Fiat of that infinite Parent Mind, who made, and holds our Souls in Life, and in whom we live, and move, and have our Being, viz. That our Bodies should be thus acted by our Minds, and that our Minds should thus perceive and act by the Organs of our Bodies, and under such Limitations as in fact we find ourselves to be attended with.

§ 4. THE immediate Object of these our Per­ceptions and Actions we call Ideas; as this Word has been commonly de­fined and used by the Moderns,Definition of Idea, Notion, &c. with whom it signifies any immediate Ob­ject of the Mind in Thinking, whe­ther sensible or intellectual, and so is, in Effect, synonymous with the Word Thought, which com­prehends both.—Plato, indeed, by the Word Idea, understood the original Exemplar of Things, [Page 4] whether sensible or intellectual, in the eternal Mind, conformable to which all Things exist; or the abstract Essences of Things, as being Origi­nals or Archetypes in that infinite Intellect, of which our Ideas or Conceptions are a Kind of Copies.—But perhaps, for the more distinct un­derstanding ourselves upon this Subject, it may be best to confine the Word Idea to the immedi­ate Objects of Sense and Imagination, which was the original Meaning of it; and to use the Word Notion or Conception, to signify the Objects of Consciousness and pure Intellect, tho' both of them may be expressed by the general Term Thought; for these are so entirely, and toto Coelo different and distinct one from the other, that it may be apt to breed Confusion in our Thoughts and Language, to use the same Word promiscu­ously for them both; tho' we are indeed general­ly obliged to substitute sensible Images and the Words annexed to them, to represent Things purely intellectual; such, for Instance, are the Words, Spirit, Reflect, Conceive, Discourse, and the like.

§ 5. OUR Minds may be said to be created meer Tabulae rasae; i. e. They have no Notices of any Objects of any Kind properly created in them,The Origi­nal of our Ideas. or concre­ated with them: Yet I apprehend, that in all the Notices they have of any Kind of Objects, they have an immediate Dependance upon the Deity, as really as they depend upon Him for their Existence; i. e. They are no more Authors to themselves of the Objects of their Perceptions, or the Light by which they perceive them, than of the Power of Perceiving itself; but that they perceive them by a perpetual Inter­course [Page 5] with that great Parent Mind, to whose incessant Agency they are entirely passive, both in all the Perceptions of Sense, and in all that in­tellectual Light by which they perceive the Ob­jects of the pure Intellect.—Notwithstanding which, it is plain from Experience, that in Con­sequence of these Perceptions they are entirely at Liberty to act, or not to act, and all their Actions flow from a Principle of Self-exertion.—But in order the better to understand these Things, I must more particularly define these Terms.— And, as all the Notices we have in our Minds derive to them originally from (or rather by Means of) these two Fountains, Sense and Con­sciousness, it is necessary to begin with them.

§ 6. BY Sense, we mean, those Perceptions we have of Objects ab extra, Of the Sen­ses; or by Means of the several Organs of our Bodies.—Thus, by Feeling or Touch, we perceive an endless Variety of tangible Ob­jects, Resistance, Extension, Figure, Motion, Hard, Soft, Heat, Cold, &c. By Sight we perceive Light and Colours, with all their endlesly various Modifications, Red, Blue, Green, &c.—By Hear­ing, we perceive Sounds:—By Tasting, Sapors:— By Smelling, Odours, &c.—These are called Sim­ple Ideas.—And of these, sorted out into a vast Variety of fixed Combinations, or Compound Ideas, distinct from each other, and in which they are always found to co-exist, consists every Sort and individual Body in Nature, such as we call Man, Horse, Tree, Stone, Apple, Cherry, &c.—And of all these various distinct Combinations or Com­pounds, connected together in such a Manner as to constitute one most beautiful, useful and har­monious Whole, consists what we call Universal Nature, or the intire sensible or natural World.

[Page 6]§ 7. IN the Perception of these Ideas or Objects of Sense,In which we are pas­sive. we find our Minds are meerly passive, it not being in our Power (supposing our Organs rightly disposed and situated) whether we will see Light and Colours, hear Sounds, &c. We are not Causes to ourselves of these Perceptions, nor can they be produced in our Minds without a Cause; or (which is the same Thing) by any imagined unintelligent, inert, or unactive Cause (which indeed is a Contradiction in Terms) from whence it is Demonstration that they must derive to us from an Almighty, intelligent active Cause, exhibiting them to us, impressing our Minds with them, or producing them in us; and consequent­ly (as I intimated) it must be by a perpetual In­tercourse of our Minds with the DEITY, the great Author of our Beings, or by His perpetual Influence or Activity upon them, that they are possessed of all these Objects of Sense, and the Light by which we perceive them.

§ 8. THESE Ideas or Objects of Sense are commonly supposed to be Pictures or Representations of Things without us,Ideas of Sense not Pictures, but the real Things. and indeed external to any Mind, e­ven that of the Deity himself, and the Truth or Reality of them is con­ceived to consist in their being exact Pictures of Things or Objects without us, which are supposed to be the real Things.—But as it is impossible for us to know what is without our Minds, and consequently, what those supposed Originals are, and whether these Ideas of ours are just Resemblances of them or not; I am afraid this Notion of them will lead us into an inextrica­ble Scepticism. I am therefore apt to think that [Page 7] these Ideas, or immediate Objects of Sense, are the real Things, at least all that we are concern­ed with, I mean, of the sensible Kind; and that the Reality of them consists in their Stability and Consistence, or their being, in a stable Manner, exhibited to our Minds, or produced in them, and in a steady Connection with each other, con­formable to certain fixed Laws of Nature, which the great Father of Spirits hath established to Himself, according to which He constantly ope­rates and affects our Minds, and from which He will not vary, unless upon extraordinary Oc­casions, as in the Case of Miracles.

§ 9. THUS, for Instance, there is a fixed sta­ble Connection between Things tangible and Things visible, Instanced in Things visible and tangible. or the immediate Objects of Touch and Sight, depend­ing, as I conceive, immediately upon the permanent, most wise and Al­mighty Will and Fiat of the great Creator and Preserver of the World. By which, neither can it be meant, that visible Objects are Pictures of tangible Objects (which yet is all the Sense that can be made of our Ideas of Sense being Images of real Things without us) for they are entirely different and distinct Things; as different as the sound Triangle, and the Figure signified by it; so different, that a Man born blind, and made to see, could have no more Notion that a visible Globe hath any Connection with a tangible Globe, by meer Sight, without being taught, than a French­man that should come into England, and hear the Word Man, could imagine, without being taught, that it signified the same Thing with the Word Homme, in his Language.—All that can be meant by it, therefore, is, That, as tangible Things are [Page 8] the Things immediately capable of producing (or rather, being attended with) sensible Pleasure or Pain in us, according to the present Laws of our Nature, on Account of which they are conceived of as being properly the real Things; so the im­mediate Objects of Sight or visible Things, are al­ways, by the same stable Law of our Nature, connected with them, as Signs of them, and ever correspondent and proportioned to them; Visible Extension, Figure, Motion, &c. with those of the tangible Kind, which go by the same Names; and so in the Compounds or Combinations of them; the visible Man, Horse, Tree, Stone, &c. with those of the tangible Kind, signified by the same Names.^*

§ 10. NOT that it is to be doubted but that there are Archetypes of these sensible I­deas existing,Of Arche­types. external to our Minds; but then they must exist in some other Mind, and be Ideas also as well as ours; because an Idea can resemble nothing but an Idea; and an Idea ever implies in the very Nature of it, Re­lation to a Mind perceiving it, or in which it ex­ists. But then those Archetypes or Originals, and the Manner of their Existence in that eternal Mind, must be intirely different from that of their Exi­stence in our Minds; as different, as the Manner of His Existence is from that of ours: In Him they must exist, as in original Intellect; in us, only by Way of Sense and Imagination; and in Him, as Originals; in us, only as faint Copies; such as he thinks fit to communicate to us, ac­cording to such Laws and Limitations as he hath established, and such as are sufficient to all the [Page 9] Purposes relating to our Well-being, in which on­ly we are concerned. Our Ideas, therefore, can no otherwise be said to be Images or Copies of the Archetypes in the eternal Mind, than as our Souls are said to be Images of Him, or as we are said to be made after his Image. ^*

§ 11. THUS much for Sense.—By Conscious­ness is meant,Of Consci­ousness, Imaginati­on and Me­mory. our Perception of Ob­ject ab intra, or from reflecting or turning the Eye of our Mind inward, and observing what passeth within it­self; whereby we know that we per­ceive all those sensible Objects and their Connections, and all the Pleasures and Pains attending them, and all the Powers or Faculties of our Minds employed about them. Thus I am conscious that I perceive Light and Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, and tangible Qualities, with all the various Combinations of them; and that of these, some give me, or rather are attended with Pain or Uneasiness, others with Pleasure or Ease, and the comfortable Enjoyment of myself. I find, moreover, that when I have had any Per­ception or Impression of Sense, I retain a faint Image of it in my Mind afterwards, or have a Kind of internal Sense or Remembrance of it; as having seen the Sun, a Flower, a Horse, or a Man, I retain the Image of their Figure, Shape, Colour, &c. afterwards. Thus I have now a faint Idea of the Sun at Midnight, and of a Rose in Winter: I know how such a Tree, such a Horse, or such a Man looks, tho' I have neither of them before my Eyes. This Power of the Mind is cal­led Imagination and Memory, which implies a Con­sciousness of the original Impression (tho' indeed [Page 10] the Word Memory may imply the Recollection of intellectual as well as sensible Objects, but chiefly those by Means of these, which is also called Reminiscence) and these Ideas of the Imagination may be truly said to be Images or Pictures of the Ideas or immediate Objects of Sense. We are moreover conscious of a Power whereby we can, not only imagine Things as being what they real­ly are in Nature, but can also join such Parts and Properties of Things together, as never co-existed in Nature, but are meer Creatures of our Minds, or Chimeras; as the Head of a Man with the Body of an Horse, &c. which must also be referred to the Imagination, but as influ­enced by the Will.

§ 12. BUT besides these Powers of Sense and Imagination, Of the pure Intellect, and its Acts. we are conscious of what is called the pure Intellect, or the Pow­er of conceiving of abstracted or spi­ritual Objects, and the Relations be­tween our several Ideas and Concepti­ons, and the various Dispositions, Exertions and Actions of our Minds, and the complex Notions resulting from all these; of all which we cannot be properly said to have Ideas, they being in­tirely of a different Kind from the Objects of Sense and Imagination, on which Account I would rather call them Notions or Conceptions. And they are either simple, such as Perception, Consciousness, Volition, Affection, Action, &c. or complex, as Spirit, Soul, God, Cause, Effect, Proportion, Ju­stice, Charity, &c. And of all these, and what relates to them, consists the intire spiritual or moral World. But in order the better to understand or conceive of these, it is necessary more particu­larly to pursue and explain these intellectual and [Page 11] active Powers, whereof we are conscious within ourselves; such as, 1. The simple Apprehension of Objects, and their several Relations, Conecti­ons and Dependencies, arising from our compar­ing our Ideas and Conceptions one with another. 2. Judging of true or false, according as Things appear to agree or disagree, to be connected or not connected one with another; and 3. Reasoning or inferring one Thing from another, and methodiz­ing them according to their Connections and Or­der: All which are the Subject of Logics. To which succeed, 1. Affecting or Disaffecting them according as they appear good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable to us, i. e. attended with Plea­sure or Uneasiness. 2. Willing or Nilling, Chusing or Refusing according as we affect or disaffect them. 3. Liberty of Acting, or forbearing to act in Consequence of the Judgment and Choice we have made of them: All which are the Sub­ject of Ethics. It is necessary to define all these Terms, and give some Account of these several Acts and Exertions of our Minds (which, as well as those of Sense, Consciousness, Imagination and Memory above-mentioned, are only so many Modifications of them) in order to what is next to follow.

§ 13. BUT before I proceed, I would, in or­der thereunto, first observe, That no sooner does any Object strike the Sen­ses,Of intellec­tual Light or intuitive Evidence. or is received in our Imagination, or apprehended by our Understand­ing, but we are immediately conscious of a Kind of intellectual Light within us (if I may so call it) whereby we not only know that we perceive the Object, but directly apply ourselves to the Consideration of it, both in itself, its Pro­perties [Page 12] and Powers, and as it stands related to all other Things. And we find that as we are ena­bled by this intellectual Light to perceive these Objects and their various Relations, in like Man­ner as by sensible Light we are enabled to per­ceive the Objects of Sense and their various Si­tuations;^* so our Minds are as passive to this in­tellectual Light, as they are to sensible Light, and can no more withstand the Evidence of it, than they can withstand the Evidence of Sense. Thus I am under the same Necessity to assent to this, That I am or have a Being, and that I perceive and freely exert myself, as I am of assenting to this, That I see Colours or hear Sounds. I am as perfectly sure that 2+2=4, or that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, as that I feel Heat or Cold, or that I see the Sun when I look full on it in the Meridian in a clear Day; i. e. I am intuitively certain of both.—This intellectual Light I con­ceive of as it were a Medium of Knowledge, as sensible Light is of Sight:—In both there is the Power of perceiving, and the Object per­ceived; and this is the Medium by which I am enabled to know it.—And this Light is one, and common to all intelligent Beings, and enlighteneth alike, every Man that cometh into the World, a Chinese, or Japonese, as well as an European or American, and an Angel as well as a Man: By which they all at once see the same Thing to be true or right in all Places at the same Time, and alike invariably in all Times, past, present, and to come.

§ 14. NOW if it be asked, Whence does this Light derive, whereby all created Minds at once perceive, as by a common Standard, the same [Page 13] Things alike to be true and right?—I answer, I have no other Way to conceive how I come to be affected with this intui­tive intellectual Light,Whence it is derived. whereof I am conscious, than by deriving it from the universal Presence and Action of the DEITY, or a per­petual Communication with the great Father of Lights, ^* or rather his eternal Word and Spirit.— For I know I am not the Author of it to myself, being passive and not active with regard to it, tho' I am active in Consequence of it.—There­fore, tho' I cannot explain the Manner how I am impressed with it (as neither can I that of Sense) I do humbly conceive that God does as truly and immediately enlighten my Mind inter­nally to know these intellectual Objects, as he does by the Light of the Sun (his sensible Repre­sentative) enable me to perceive sensible Objects. So that those Expressions are indeed no less Phi­losophical than Devout, that GOD is Light, and in his Light we see Light.—And this intuitive Knowledge, as far as it goes, must be the first Principles, from which the Mind takes its Rise, and upon which it proceeds in all its subsequent Improvements in Reasoning, and discovering both Truth in Speculation, and Right in Action; so that this intellectual Light must be primarily and carefully attended to, if we would avoid and be secure from either Error or Vice.—Nor must this Manner of Thinking be suspected to savour of Enthusiasm, it being the settled Course or Law of Nature, according to which the great Parent Mind enlighteneth us; and that in Things, in [Page 14] their own Nature capable of clear Evidence; whereas Enthusiasm implies an imaginary, as Re­velation is a real and well-attested adventitious Light, above and beyond the settled Law or Course of Nature, discovering Truths not other­wise knowable, and giving Directions, or enjoin­ing Rules of Action in Things arbitrary, or Mat­ters of meer Institution.—And from this intuitive intellectual Light it is (as I conceive) that we de­rive what we call Taste and Judgment, and, with respect to Morals, what some call the moral Sense or the Conscience, which are only a Sort of quick intuitive Sense or Apprehension of the Decent and Amiable, of Beauty and Deformity, of True and False, and of Right and Wrong, or Duty and Sin: And it is the chief Business of Culture, Art and Instruction, to awaken and turn our Attention to it, and assist us in making Deducti­ons from it.

CHAP. II. Of the Mind fimply apprehending, and of its Objects more particularly.

§ 1. LET us therefore proceed to define the several Acts and Objects of the pure In­tellect thus enlightened: And first, Of the simple Apprehension of Objects or Beings, Of simple Apprehen­sion and its Objects. and the various Conceptions arising to our View from the Consideration of their Natures and Affections, and their seve­ral Relations, Connections and De­pendencies, such as Cause and Effect, Essence and Existence, Things necessary and contingent, Finite [Page 15] and Infinite, Possible and Impossible, Perfect and Imperfect, Truth and Good, Beauty and Harmony, Substances and Accidents, Subjects and Adjuncts, Time and Place, Whole and Parts, Unity and Multiplicity, Number and Order, Identity and Di­versity, Things Agreeing and Opposite, Equal and Unequal, Like and Unlike, Denomination and De­finition, Individuals and Abstraction, Kinds and Sorts, Bodies and Spirits; and lastly, of Metaphor and Analogy from Things sensible to Things spi­ritual, and from Things human to Things di­vine.—Of all which I shall treat in the Order as they are here enumerated.

§ 2. AS soon as the Mind is possessed of any Variety of Objects,Of Being in general. being assisted with that inward intellectual Light above­mentioned, deriving, and, as it were, perpetually beaming forth from the great Foun­tain of all Light, both sensible and intellectual, it immediately falls to contemplating its Ideas and Conceptions, and comparing them one with another.—And here, the first Thing it is en­lightened to know or be conscious of, is, its own Existence from the Existence of its Perceptions and Exertions and their Objects, which it conceives of as real Beings or Things, whence it gets the No­tion of Being in general.—But even this first Ob­ject of its Knowledge it is made to know from that first Principle of intellectual Light, flowing from the Parent Mind, That Perception and Ac­tion, and being perceived or acted upon, implies Ex­istence, of which Principle it has an inward intuitive Sense and Certainty. Hence it immediately infers, I perceive and act, therefore I am: I perceive such an Object, therefore it is, &c. Not that its Exi­stence depends on my Mind, but on that Mind [Page 16] by whom I am enabled to perceive it. And as per­ceiving and acting, and being perceived and acted upon, implies Existence or Being, so it is a Contra­diction for the same Thing to be and not to be at the same Time, for that would be to perceive and not perceive, to act and not to act, and to be per­ceived and not perceived, and acted upon and not acted upon, at one and the same Time: And from these Definitions arise that first great Di­stinction of Being into Spirit and Body, whereof the Existence of the first consists in perceiving and acting, and that of the other in being passive­ly perceived and acted.—And here, to perceive or to act is called the Power, and what is per­ceived or acted upon, is called the Object.—So that by Being, is meant, what really IS or exists, in Opposition to what is merely fictitious or ima­ginary; a Creature of our own Minds, and not of him that made and enables us to perceive and act.

§ 3. NOW of every Thing that IS, it must be said,Of the first Being and eternal Truth. either, That it always was, or, that it began to be.—If it always was, or never derived from the Pow­er of any other Being, it must be in­dependent of every other Being what­soever, and consequently must exist absolutely by the intrinsic Necessity of its own Nature, or be a necessarily existent Being, and all other Beings must depend on its Will and Power, otherwise they could never have been, or continue to be; and Itself, being derived from no other Being, and dependent on none, it must be out of the Power of any other Being to limit or controul it, and consequently it must be infinite and eter­nal; i. e. must have all Reality, Perfection and [Page 17] Fulness of Being, without any regard to Time or Place: For that must be infinite, that has, and can have no possible Bounds or Limitations; and that must be eternal, that is, and always was, and will be, and can't but be; and such a Being must be All in All; all Reality and Excellency.—Nor can there be more than One such Being, who is Being itself, because it is a manifest Contradiction that two or more Beings should, each have in it, or consist of, all possible Reality and Perfection. He must therefore be a perfect Unity, the ΤΟ Ε''Ν, and the ΤΟ 'ΩΝ, and the [...], as the Ancients called Him, which is the true Import of the ori­ginal sacred Names JAH and JEHOVAH. And He is also called Truth and Good:—Truth itself, as He is all Reality; and Good itself, as He is all Perfection and Excellency.—And He is Truth as He is infinitely intelligible, and Good as He is infinitely eligible, containing within and of Himself, all that can contribute to render Himself happy, as well as all other perceptive, conscious, active Beings, dependent on Him.—In this necessarily existent and eternal Being or Mind must originally exist all those necessary and eternal Truths with which our Minds are furnished, ei­ther by Intuition or Demonstration; such as these, That Perception and Action imply Existence:—That what begins to be, must have a Cause:—That the Whole is equal to all its Parts:—That all the Rays of a Circle are equal:—That what is right or wrong in another towards me, must be equally right or wrong in me towards him, &c.—We know that these and the like eternal Truths do not de­pend on our Minds, or the actual Existence of Things, but must have an eternal and necessary Existence, antecedent to our Knowledge of them, [Page 18] and independent of it, or of any particular Exi­stence.—And as we can have no Notion of Truth without a Mind perceiving it, their necessary and eternal Existence must infer the necessary Existence of an eternal Mind; and consequently, it must be in that eternal Mind that we behold them, or rather by our Communication with Him that we are enlightened with the Knowledge of them.— In Him they must exist as one archetypal and eternal Light of Truth; but as they are from Him reflected on the various Objects in our finite Minds, they appear various and manifold, as sen­sible Light is one in the Sun, tho' it becomes va­rious Colours and other sensible Qualities in diffe­rent Objects.

§ 4. ON the contrary, Whatever Being be­gan to be, Of Causes & Effects. must have had a Cause, and depend on some other Being for its Existence.—By the Word Cause, we mean, that Being by whose Design and Activity, Force or Exertion, another Being exists: And that Being which exists by the Design, Force, Action, or Exertion of another, is called an Ef­fect; what is called an Effect therefore must be supposed not to have existed, and consequently to have had a Beginning of Existence, or at least a dependent Existence, and must therefore have had a Cause, by the Force or Activity of which it came into Existence, and without which it would not have been.—And this must be the Case of every Thing that is, till you come to a first Cause, i. e. to a Being that never had a Be­ginning, or any dependent Existence, but exists by the absolute Necessity of its own Nature, having an original perfect Fulness of Being in and of itself, without depending on any other Being, and deals out Being and Perfection to all [Page 19] other Beings, in various Measures and Degrees as pleaseth him.—And such a Being there must be, otherwise nothing could ever have been, unless you suppose a Thing to be its own Cause, i. e. To act before it is, which is impossible; or unless you suppose an infinite Succession of Causes and Effects, which in effect would be an infinite Ef­fect without any Cause at all: ^* But an Effect without a Cause, is a Contradiction in Terms; for, by the Definition, to every Thing that is pro­duced, there must be a correspondent Power ade­quate to the Production of it, or an active Force, sufficient to produce it.—And here, the Thing existing is said to be a Thing in Act; and as the Force producing adequate to the Effect, is called the Power, so the Effect not yet produced, is said to be in Power, or in fieri, and the Being which exerts that Power, we call an Agent and Active, and that on or in which the Force termi­nates, we call a Patient and Passive.

§ 5. THERE are indeed many Things that occur to our Senses and Thoughts,Of real and apparent Causes. that appear at first Sight to be Agents or Causes, which, strictly speaking, are not so, as we find upon a more exact Scrutiny, though they are vulgarly so cal­led. Thus we say, The Sun moves, rises and sets, when yet upon a more thorough Enquiry we find, it is not the Action of the Sun, but these Appear­ances are occasioned by the Motion of the Earth, and that they are only meer passive Appearances in our Minds. So we say, the Fire burns; the Sun warms, enlivens, ripens the Fruits, &c. and we call the Parent the Cause of his Offspring; where­as, upon a more strict Enquiry, we find that he is by no Means the adequate Cause; and that the [Page 20] Sun, and (what we call) other natural Causes, are in themselves but meer passive inert Beings, con­nected one with another, according to the esta­blished Laws of Nature; so that being Things meerly passive and inert, they cannot, properly speaking, be the Causes of the Effects vulgarly ascribed to them; they must therefore be called only Signs, Occasions, Means, or Instruments, and we must look for some other Being in whom re­sides, and by whom must be exerted, that ade­quate Power or Force by which the Effect is tru­ly produced, which therefore is the true and real Cause; and the other can only be called the appa­rent Causes, having no real Efficiency or Activity in the Production of the Effect.

§ 6. MOREOVER we find from what we ex­perience in ourselves,Of necessa­ry and vo­luntary Causes. that we breathe and our Blood circulates without any Design or Activity of ours; and the Course of Nature without us, goes on whether we will or not, and even tho' we should exert our utmost Force to with­stand it. These, with regard to us, may be called necessary Effects, as not depending on our Will and Power; tho' with regard to the true Author of Nature, they are free and voluntary Effects.—On the other Hand, we walk, speak, write, &c. from a Principle of conscious designed Self-exertion, and voluntary Activity; these there­fore are called free or voluntary Effects with re­gard to us, which we produce or not, as we please; in doing which we are voluntary Causes. Hence we learn to make the Distinction between necessary and voluntary, or free Causes and Effects. So that by voluntary Effects, we mean, such as are produced by a free voluntary Cause acting [Page 21] from a Principle of conscious Design and Self-exertion, exciting a Force of its own, or from within itself, which it chuseth to exert, and might do otherwise; and this is properly called a Cause, an efficient Cause or Agent. And as to those natu­ral Effects abovementioned, of which the appa­rent is not the real Cause, having neither Design nor Force in itself (as the Water in turning a Mill) but is rather acted than acts; however necessary they are with regard to us, yet from the most wise Design and Contrivance manifestly appearing in the Effects themselves, we evidently discern that the Being who is their true and adequate Cause, must be furnished with Wisdom and Power equal or sufficient for the Production of them, and must act from a Principle of free Self-exertion, and with a Design or View at some certain End proposed to himself in acting, and therefore be a free intelligent and voluntary Cause, for nothing can give what it hath not.

§ 7. WHENCE it appears, that only intelligent active Beings or Spirits,Of final Causes. can be truly efficient Causes, which alone are pro­perly called Causes, and that when we speak of natural Causes, it is only in Accommo­dation to vulgar Apprehensions, since they are meerly passive, and act, or rather are acted, with­out any Design or Exertion of their own.—And as to what are commonly called final Causes, they are only the Views or Motives, determining the Design or Purpose of the efficient Cause, but have properly no Causality or Activity in themselves. We are conscious, when we produce any Effect, that we act with some End, View, or Design, which determineth us, or rather, properly speak­ing, upon the View of which we determine our­selves, [Page 22] to act so rather than otherwise, and to chuse and make use of such and such Means, ra­ther than others, as being most fit and useful in order to accomplish our End; and therefore we say, He that wills the End, must will the Means conducing to the Attainment of it; the Effect to be produced being the ultimate End, and the Means the subordinate Ends which we have in View. — And herein consists the proper Notion of Wis­dom, viz. In the right Judgment and Choice of Ends and Means; the best Ends and the fittest Means; and in a vigorous Activity in the Appli­cation of the Means in order to attain the End.— Thus it is in human Affairs; and from what we observe in the Course of Nature, in which there is an evident Subordination of Ends and Means, we unavoidably infer that there must be something analogous to this in the Author of it, not because He needs Means for Himself, but that He may make the Series or Course of Na­ture the more intelligible and instructive to us.— Hence the best Part of the Study of Nature must consist in the Discovery, as far as we are able, of what are called final Causes; i. e. of the plain Signatures of Design and Contrivance, and the Dependance and Connection of Ends and Means.

§ 8. IN artificial Effects, or those produced by Man,Of Matter and Form. as in Building, &c. by reason of our Impotence we need Matter to work upon, and a Form or Model to work by, according to which the Effect, being framed or formed out of the pre-existent Mate­rials, is said to consist of Matter and Form, which have also been reckoned among the Causes, and they may each be called Causa fine quâ non, as the Schoolmen used to speak; but they cannot [Page 23] be properly called Causes, as having no Force or Design in producing the Effect; we may, how­ever, from hence, by Analogy, in speaking of o­ther Things, advantageously make use of what is called, the Ratio Materialis, and Formalis of Things in Nature, and even of Things purely intellectual.—And because we need Matter and Form in producing artificial Effects, we are apt to think, or at least to speak as tho' we thought, this the Method of the Almighty in producing na­tural Effects, but this is owing to our Weakness, whereby we are apt to measure Him by ourselves. Indeed he may be said to have a Form, Idea, or Archetype in his infinite, all-comprehending Mind, conformable to which he acts; but this can mean no more than that all Things which he produceth are always present with Him, and perfectly known to Him, with all their Relations and Connections, antecedent to their Production, and that He pro­duceth them conformable to His own Know­ledge, Design and Contrivance, being the Plan which he hath formed.—And that Existence of Things in the divine eternal Mind (if it may be so called) as being perfectly known to Him, an­tecedent to their Production, is called their Arche­typal State; and their Existence in Rerum Natu­ra, as being actually produced by His Will and Power, and thereby perceived and known to us, is called their Ectypal State.

§ 9. TO this Head therefore belongs the Di­stinction between the Essence of Things,Of Essence, and Exi­stence. and their Existence.—By their Essence, we mean those constituent Princi­ples, Properties and Powers in them, which are necessary to their Nature, as being what they are, whether considered only as con­ceived [Page 24] in the Mind of an intelligent Being, or existing in Rerum Natura. Thus the Essence of Gold consists in its Colour, Weight, Fixedness, Ductility, Solubility in Aqua Regia, or whatever Properties are always found to co-exist in that Sort of Body which we call Gold, and no other: So the Essence of a Rose consists in such a parti­cular Figure, Odour, &c.—of a Man, in an intelligent active Power, joined with an animal Body, of such a particular Shape, and Configu­ration of Parts:—of a Triangle, in three Sides, joining at three Angles:—of Justice, in rendering to every one his Due, &c.—In short, whatsoever goes to the Definition of a Thing, so as to give it a clear and necessary Discrimination from all other Things, we call the Essence of it, whether in fact it exist or not. Thus we have as clear an Idea of a Rose in Winter, as in June, when it is before our Eyes, and under our Noses; and as fixed and stable a Notion of a Triangle, Circle, Justice, or Charity, even upon Supposition that the Figures and Actions which go by those Names, do not exist in Nature or Fact, as if they did. Whereas by Existence, we generally mean a Thing's being actually in Fact and Na­ture, as well as in Idea or Conception, as a Rose in June, the Sun in the Firmament, a Man ac­tually doing a just or kind Thing, &c.—Hence Existence always implieth Essence, tho' Essence doth not necessarily imply Existence, except in that of the necessarily existent Being, in whom Necessity of Existence is implied in His very Essence, and accordingly His original Name JEHOVAH, given by Himself, does literally signify, The Es­sence existing, as Mr. Hutchinson shews in Mos. Sina Princip. Ch. 2.

[Page 25]§ 10. IN Pursuance of this Distinction be­tween the Essence and Existence of Things,Of Princi­ples. which is necessary in order the better to conceive of them, it is here also needful to explain what we mean by the Word Principle, which originally signifies the Beginning of a Thing, or that from whence any Thing takes its Beginning, Origin, or Derivation; and in this Sense it is nearly allied to the Word Cause. Thus God may be said to be the Prin­ciple or Origin of all Things.—And as the essen­tial Constituents whereof any Thing consists, have been ranked among the Causes, they are also called the Principles of which it consists, and into which it may, at least in Conception, be resolved; as Man of Soul and Body, Bodies of the four Ele­ments, a Triangle of its three Sides and Angles, &c.—And as the Properties and Powers of Things have been supposed to flow from their Essence; hence That in any Thing which is sup­posed to be the Foundation or Original from whence its Properties, Powers or Actions derive, is called the Principle of them; as Equality with two Right Angles from the Nature of a Tri­angle; Perception and Self-exertion from the Na­ture of the Soul, &c. And lastly, as the Know­ledge of Things consists in understanding the Foundation of their Existence, the Causes from whence they are derived, the Essentials whereof they consist, and the Origin of their Properties and Powers; hence the Propositions expressive of this Knowledge, are called the Principles of any Science.

§ 11. UNDER this Head of Causes and Effects, Of Things necessary & contingent. it is necessary more par­ticularly to explain the Distinction of Beings into Things necessary and con­tingent. [Page 26] —By Things contingent, we mean, such as depend on the free Exertion of the Wills and Powers of intelligent active Beings, and which therefore might not have been, had they so plea­sed, and consequently their Existence is precari­ous and dependent.—Thus, That I sit here, and whether I shall sit here an Hour longer, or not, is contingent, as depending on the Freedom of my own Will to do so, or not, as I please: Whe­ther the Sun will rise To-morrow, is contingent, as depending on the free Exertion of the Will of the Deity, who may, if he pleaseth, this Mo­ment put an End to the whole Course of Nature. And thus the Existence of the whole Creation is contingent and precarious, as deriving from, and dependent on, the meer Will and Power of GOD, who if He pleased, might not have commanded Things into Being, and may cease to Will their Continuance when He pleaseth. Whereas by Things necessary, we mean such as can't but be, which must be understood either with regard to our Power, or that of the Deity. Thus, with re­gard to our Power, it can't but be that Things are as they are, and as He hath made them, and that the Course of Nature proceeds as it does, and as He hath ordered it, which therefore, tho' not so in itself, to us is necessary and Fate. But that only is absolutely necessary in itself, the Non-existence of which would imply an Absurdity and Contradiction; and nothing else is thus absolute­ly necessary besides the Deity Himself, the ne­cessarily existent Being, without whom nothing could ever have existed; and eternal Truths which are founded in the Perfection of his Na­ture, independent of any other Mind whatsoever; as, that the Whole is bigger than either of its Parts: That all the Rays of every Circle are equal: [Page 27] That we ought to do as we would be done by.— These, and the like, being absolutely and unal­terably necessary, antecedent to the Will, and in­dependent of the Power of the Deity Himself, as well as His own Existence and Perfections, must unavoidably be Emanations of that necessa­rily existent Being.

§ 12. TO this Head also belongs the Di­stinction of Beings into Finite and In­finite. Of Things finite and infinite. That is said to be Finite, which hath certain Limits or Bounds to its Existence or Powers, as are all de­terminate Lines, and the Surfaces and Figures of Bodies, or the Powers of created Minds; in short, all Kinds of Effects or Productions, which are limited to such a Degree or Measure of Be­ing, as their Cause is pleased to bestow: For the Will and Power of the Cause that gives them Being, limits them to such a Measure of Being, Extent and Power, as he thinks fit to impart; which, in many Instances, may be said to be In­definite, as extending vastly beyond our Compre­hension. But that Being only is Infinite which comprehends all that truly is, without any Bounds or Limits, and whose Knowledge and Power ex­tends to all that is, or is possible. Hence, ^* tho' the Word Infinite, in grammatical Construction is a negative Term, used in Accommodation to our weak Capacities, yet what it expresseth is truly positive, as implying all that absolutely is; and the Word Finite, is truly the Negative, as implying but a limited Part of that which truly is; the Infinite being the absolute independent Being, or Being by way of Eminency, and with­out the Power of any other; Being to limit or [Page 28] controul it; and the Finite, intirely dependent on the Will and Power of another to be and conti­nue what it is, and so exists only conditionally.

§ 13. TO this Head of Causes and Effects, belongs also the Distinction of Things possible and impossible. Of Things possible and impossible. We say a Thing is possible, when there is a Power suf­ficient to produce it, and impossible, when there is no Power adequate to the Produc­tion of it:—Of which some Things are impossi­ble in their own Nature, as implying a Contra­diction in themselves, as that there should be a Mountain without Declivity, or a Triangle consist­ing only of two Sides, which are impossible to GOD himself, not for want of Power in Him, but because they imply a Repugnancy in them­selves, or a Contradiction to some necessary and eternal Truth, which GOD himself cannot alter. And of Things possible in their own Nature; some are possible to an unlimited Power, which yet are impossible to a Power that is limited: A Man can build a House, tho' he cannot create a World. And of limited Powers there is an end­less Variety, so that what is possible to one may be impossible to another: Here therefore the Maxim is, That what is Fact is possible, but, it does not therefore follow, that if it be possible it is Fact.

§ 14. AND lastly: To this Head of Causes and Effects doth also belong the Di­stinction of Things perfect and imper­fect: Of Things perfect and imperfect. An Effect is said to be perfect, when it is finished according to the Plan or Design of it, and fitted to answer the End proposed, from whence we arise to the ge­neral Notion of Perfection. And we say, a Be­ing [Page 29] or Thing is perfect, when it hath all the Parts, Properties or Powers, that a Thing of that Na­ture ought to have in order to constitute it in that Kind of Being, and to render it capable of an­swering the End of its being: As a Man is said to be perfect, that has all the Parts and Powers that a Man, as such, ought to have, so as to an­swer the general End of his Being; i. e. some good Degree of Happiness:—He is then said to be perfect in his Kind, tho' some of the same Kind may have their Properties and Powers in a greater Degree of Perfection than others, and so be perfecter in Degree, tho' not in Kind, and con­sequently capable of answering some nobler Ends, with regard both to themselves and others, as enjoying or communicating certain higher De­grees of Happiness. On the other Hand, we say a Thing is imperfect, when it is destitute of certain Parts or Properties that a Thing of that Kind ought to have; as a Man with but one Hand, or one Eye, or an Ideot, &c. who consequently cannot so well be useful to others, or enjoy himself. But if any Creature hath all the Parts and Pro­perties that a Creature of that Kind ought to have, tho' it is said to be perfect in its Kind, yet it is said to be but comparatively perfect with re­spect to other Kinds of Beings of greater Per­fection and Excellency, as being made for higher Ends; i. e. to enjoy or communicate greater Degrees of Happiness; but what Degrees of Being or Perfection any Thing has, it receives from the free Will and Pleasure of its Cause. And that Being only is said to be absolutely per­fect, who hath an entire absolute Fulness of Be­ing, Perfection and Excellency, and consequent­ly enjoys the highest Happiness, having in and of [Page 30] Himself all Being, all that truly is, and there­fore an All-sufficiency, even every Thing that can contribute to render both Himself and all his Creatures compleatly happy.

§ 15. TO this Head of Perfection therefore belong the Notions of Truth and Good. Of Truth and Good. A Thing is said to be true with respect to the original Archetype, Plan or Design of it, or so much of Being or Perfection as it was designed to partake of, and Good with respect to the End of it, which it was designed to answer: So that its Truth consisteth in its Conformity to its Plan or Archetype, which is its Standard; and its Goodness is its Fitness to answer its End. And as the Plan is formed with a View at the End to be answered, they are in effect only the same Thing under diverse Consi­derations; and a Thing is True, considered as intelligible, and Good as eligible. Thus a House is said to be True, as it answers its Archetype or Model, as conceiv'd or understood in the Mind of the Architect; and Good, as it is fitted to an­swer the End he designed in it, viz. the Conve­nience and Pleasure of its Inhabitant, on which it is delightful or eligible. So the Truth of each Creature, and of the whole World, consists in its Conformity to its original Design, Archetype or Standard, conceived in the infinite Mind of the great divine Architect, and as such, intelligible to Him, and in some Measure to any other Mind; and its Goodness consists in its Fitness to answer His Ends in giving it Being, and particulary the Happiness of His rational Creatures, on account of which, it is pleasing and eligible to Him, or any other intelligent Being, that feels or discerns that Fitness. Hence Goodness being in effect the [Page 31] same with Perfection, must have the same Di­stinctions of Kind and Degree, Comparative and Absolute as above. And the infinite Mind of the Deity is the Standard of all Things that exist, He is the Truth itself absolutely and by way of Emi­nence, comprehending in Himself all that is and can be; all Reality and Perfection, considered as intelligible and variously imitable in and by his Creatures: And as He is the Pattern and Author of all Fitness and Proportion to any End, and the Fountain of all that is pleasant and beatifying, or the Original of all that is Good in the whole Creation, He is Goodness itself, and therefore in­finitely eligible, and to be chosen and loved above all Things. Thus we are led from the Type to the Archetype; from all the Emanations of Truth and Good in the Creature, variously portioned out as pleased Him, to that Being who is the great Principle and Original of all; the Truth itself, even all Truth; and Good itself, the chief Good, the ΤΟ 'ΑΓΑΘΟ'Ν; infinite Truth, and infi­nite Good, all that can beatify both Intellect, Will and Affection.

§ 16. TO this Head of Perfection or Excel­lency we may also refer the Considera­tion of Beauty and Harmony, Of Beauty and Har­mony. which have a manifest Relation to some End which any Thing is designed for. By Beauty, we vulgarly mean, such an Assemblage of visible Ideas as pleases and charms the Eye; and by Harmony, such an Assemblage of Sounds as pleases and charms the Ear. But, more strictly speaking, it is the Mind or Intellect that is charmed on these Occasions, by Means of the Objects of Sight and Hearing. What is it then that is Beauty and Harmony to the interior intel­lectual [Page 32] Sense of the Mind? And if it be duly considered, it will be always found that it is Fit­ness and Proportion, either real or apparent, in relation to some End or Use, in those Objects that please and charm us. Thus in Beauty; an Assemblage of various Ideas, all fitted and pro­portioned to each other, and, in the Whole, to one uniform Design and End, subservient to the Advantage and Pleasure of an intelligent Mind, or of a social System of intelligent Beings; this is what pleases and charms under the Notion of Beauty, as might be exemplified in the Beauty of a Person, an Animal, or a Building, &c. And from sensible Things it is figuratively and by Ana­logy transferred to Affections, Actions and Behavi­our; the Beauty whereof consisteth in their uniform Fitness and Tendency to the Order, Peace and Happiness of each individual Mind, and, in the Whole, of any social System: So as to Harmo­ny; it is an Assemblage of various Sounds, all fitted and proportioned to each other, and in the whole Composition, to an uniform Design and End, expressive of what may please and delight the Mind: And from Music it is transferred to signify Things fitted and proportioned to each other, and to the whole System, and thence pleasing and delightful, whether it be in the na­tural or moral World. Hence we speak of the Harmony and Order of all Nature, and of the Harmony and Order of Society. So that both in Beauty and Harmony, the Fitness and Propor­tion of Things, Affections and Actions to each other, and in the Whole, to the Pleasure, Peace and Happiness of intelligent Beings, is always understood. And from thence we arise to the Apprehension of the first original Beauty, the ΤΟ [Page 33] ΚΑΛΟΝ, the Pattern and Source of all Fitness and Proportion in the absolute Perfection of the divine Intellect and Conduct, and the Harmony of the divine Attributes and Operations, and all the Happiness, both divine, human and angeli­cal, resulting therefrom.

§17. NEXT to the Consideration of a Being or Thing as existing from its Causes,Of Substan­ces and Ac­cidents, Subjects & Adjuncts. we consider it as a Substance with re­gard to its Accidents, and a Subject with respect to its Adjuncts. The primary Notion we have of Substance is taken from Body, as being some­thing that is hard or solid, and resists the Touch, as Gold, Wood, &c. and observing a Number of other Ideas or sensible Qualities always attending it, or connected with it, we call them its Acci­dents, as long, broad, thick, square, round, red, blue, yellow, &c. Of these, we observe some es­sential to all Bodies, as Length, Breadth, Thick­ness; others we observe to be various in different Bodies, as square, round, white, black, &c. Those Qualities that are essential to any Thing, we call Properties; and the others are more properly called Accidents, Modes or Modifications. Now that so [...] extended, figured Thing, which resists the Touch, being the first Idea or Combination of Ideas, to which we give the Name Substance, we are apt to consider that as the Foundation or Substratum to the rest, and the other Qualities as subsisting in it, or depending on it, tho', strictly speaking, they are rather only co-existent and connected with it by the Law of Nature, which is the meer Fiat of the Almighty. This is our original and proper Notion of Substance in Bodies, and from thence we analogically apply it to [Page 34] Minds or Spirits, tho' they are Beings of an in­tirely different Kind, and have nothing common to them but meer Being or Existence, so that great Care must be taken that we do not imagine any Thing like a solid Substratum in Spirits as such. But if we must apply the Word Substance indifferently to both, it may be defined to mean any distinct Being considered as consisting of its essential Properties. Thus a Body we call a Sub­stance, as consisting of solid Length, Breadth and Thickness, or solid Extension, which are its essen­tial Properties, without which it cannot be con­ceived as being what it is: So we call a Spirit or Mind, a Substance, as being a Power or Princi­ple of conscious Perception and Activity, which are Properties essential to it as being what it is. Thus we may say, a Tree, a Horse, a Man, an Angel, &c. (and by Analogy, even the Deity Himself) are Substances. And those Qualities that are not essential to it, may, as I said, be called its Modes or Accidents; as in a Man, to be tall or short, white or black, fat or lean, learned or ignorant, virtuous or vicious, &c. which have also, some­times, been called Adjuncts: But this Term is more properly applied to external App [...]ges or Circumstances, as Clothes, Riches, &c. with re­spect to which the Being is called a Subject; and any of them, whether Properties, Modes or Ad­juncts, in speaking of it, are called Attributes; and a succinct lively Enumeration of any or all of these, in any Subject, discriminating it from any other Thing, is called a Description of it.

Of Time and Place, Space and Duration.§ 18. EVERY Body or sensible Thing that is, must necessarily have some Time and Place, in which it ex­ists, which are reckoned among its principal Modes; and by its Time, is [Page 35] usually meant, that Portion of Duration; and by its Place is meant, that Portion of Space, in which it exists. But then by Space, we must mean the whole Extent of sensible Things, the Place of each par­ticular Thing, being that Part of the whole Ex­tent which it occupies, in its proper Situation re­lative to the rest: And by Duration, must be meant, the whole Continuance of the Existence of the entire sensible World, measured out by the Revolutions of the Sun; and the Time of any particular sensible Thing, means, its continuing to exist during so many Parts, or such a Number of his Revolutions. But Time, considered as a Conception in the Mind, is nothing else but the Succession of its Ideas, of which the Succession of some principal Ones, as the Revolution of Years, Days, &c. being settled and stable ac­cording to the established Course of Nature, are considered as Standards or Measures to the rest. Such are Time and Place, Space and Duration, literally with regard to the sensible World, to which they properly belong, and they are only figuratively, and by Analogy, ascribed to Spirits or intelligent active Beings, concerning which the Term Ubi, where, and when, by some have been preferred. For, as their Existence is intirely of another Kind from that of Bodies, so must their Space and Duration be: As their Existence con­sists in conscious, active Intelligence, so their Space must mean only the Extent or Reach of their intelligent active Powers, and their Duration only their Continuance to exert those Powers: But, strictly speaking, they are so far from exist­ing in Space and Time, that, on the other Hand, Space and Time do truly exist in them. And accordingly the infinite eternal Mind is so far [Page 36] from existing in infinite Space and Duration that He comprehendeth all Space and Duration, and every Thing that is, within His boundless Intellect, and is present to all Times and Places, not after the Manner of being co-extended with them, but as an infinitely active, all-comprehending In­tellect, to whom all Things, all Times and Pla­ces, are at once present, without Succession or Li­mitation; i. e. they are at once known to His in­finite Mind, and subjected to, and dependent upon, His unlimited Will and Power.

§ 19. NEXT to the Consideration of a Being or Thing,Of Whole and Parts. as Substance with regard to its Accidents, and a Subject with re­gard to its Adjuncts, we consider it as a Whole with regard to the Parts whereof it consists: As a Man consists of Soul and Body; and his Body, of his Head, Trunk and Limbs, each of which may be yet further sub-divided. On the other Hand, we call that a Part, which is considered as being not an entire Thing of itself, but as it goes, in Conjunction with other Parts, to the Constitution of a Whole or entire Being, as a Leg or an Arm, with respect to the Human Bo­dy: Such is any individual Thing with respect to the Parts whereof it consists, which therefore may be called an Individual Whole, as not being divi­sible into more of the same Kind, or Quantity, and the Parts of which are not of themselves intire Beings. But besides this, there is, what is called an aggregate Whole, the Parts of which, are each a distinct intire Being, tho' it has a Relation to other distinct Beings, with which it is connected as Parts of another Whole; and the Parts are ei­ther of the same, or of different Kinds: Such, of the first Sort, is an Army, consisting of the many [Page 37] distinct individual Men whereof it is constituted, each of which, is an intire Being of himself, and all of the same Kind.—And such, of the other Sort, is the whole World with regard to all the various distinct Beings whereof it consists, but those of different Kinds, as Bodies, Spirits, Men, Beasts, Trees, Stones, &c. So that the same Thing may be a Whole with regard to the Parts whereof it consists, and a Part, as it goes to the Constitution of another Whole: And the Max­im here is, that The Whole is greater than either of its Parts, and equal to them all taken together, which is the Foundation of all mathematical De­monstrations. This Notion of Whole and Parts, is originally taken from Bodies, and is properly and literally to be understood of them and their Dimensions, but may analogically and improper­ly be applied also to Spirits; in which Sense we may say, The Soul is a Whole, and the Under­standing, Will, Affections and Exertions of it may be considered as Parts of it, they bearing the like Analogy to the Soul, as the Members and Or­gans do to the Body.

§ 20. UNDER this Head of Whole and Parts, we may consider the Notions of Unity and Multiplicity, Number and Order. Of Unity and Multi­plicity, Number and Order. A Whole or intire Being, considered as being simple or indivisible into more of the same Kind or Quantity, we call a Unit or One intire individual Being, as one Shilling, one Tree, one Ox, one Man, one Angel: Thence it is applied also to an aggregate Whole, as one Army, one World. And the Parts of which any Whole is compounded or consists, are said to be manifold. And by how much the less of Composition there is in any Being, by so [Page 38] much the perfecter it is, as being so much the more One: Hence Spirit being compounded on­ly of Power and Act, is more perfect than Body, which is compounded of many Parts and Di­mensions. And as Power and Act in the Deity intirely coincide, He is the most perfect Being, as being the most simple and intirely One, and therefore is called pure Act, without any Va­riety or Multiplicity; a most perfect Unit, con­sisting of all Reality and Perfection. Now from the Multiplicity of Individuals with regard to an aggregate Whole, and of Parts with Regard to each individual Whole, we have the Conception of Number, the Parts being numerous or consist­ing of a Number of Units, as many Members in the same Body, many Men, many Beasts, many Trees, &c. to which in Computation, we give the Denominations of One, Two, Three, Four, &c. And these Parts we consider as subsisting in some Order, according to their several Relations and Situations, with regard to each other, and to the Whole: Of which we say, one is prior, the other posterior to the other, either in Nature, Time, Place, Dignity or Knowledge, as a Father to his Son, &c. And this Order of Things which we express by the Terms, first, second, third, fourth, &c. we find to be founded in some Establishment which we observe to be made in the Course of Nature, which therefore, in all our Divisions and Sub-divisions, Conceptions and Reasonings, we should make our Standard, and endeavour to follow it as exactly as ever we can.

§ 21. MOREOVER, to this Head of Unity and Multiplicity,Of Identity and Diver­sity. belong the Notions of Identity and Diversity. A Thing is said to be one and the same, when it appears to have all the essential indi­viduating [Page 39] Properties at one Time that it had at another, tho' it may differ in some Things acci­dental or circumstantial, as a Man at 5 and at 50: But if Things differ in any Thing essential, we say, they are Diverse, being not the same, but the one a different and distinct Being from the other; as an Apple and an Oyster. But Iden­tity is of very different Consideration in Bodies and in Spirits, as they are Beings of an entirely different Kind. In Bodies, we call that one and the same, which, however it may differ in some Things not essential to it, yet in Things peculiar to it, it affects our Senses in the same Manner at one Time as at another, or consists of the same sensible Qualities, Figure, Colour, &c. essential to it; as a Mountain now, and twenty Years ago: And those are diverse or distinct Bodies one from another, that consist of different sensible Quali­ties essential to each, as Gold and Lead; or that in Bodies is the same or different, which appears to consist of the same or different individuating sensible Qualities. But as by a Spirit, which is also called a Person, we mean a distinct, conscious, intelligent Agent, so his Identity consists in being conscious of a Series of Perceptions and Actions that he knows to be his own and not another's, by which therefore he knows he is the same Per­son now with himself twenty or fifty Years ago, which continued Consciousness is his distinct in­dividuating Property. Whereas Peter is not the same with Paul, but another Person, each having distinct individuating Properties, the one being conscious of a different and distinct Series of Per­ceptions and Actions from the other: And ano­ther appears to me the same with himself at dif­ferent Times, or to be a different Person, ac­cording [Page 40] as from his Words and Actions, he ap­pears to be conscious or not conscious of the same Perceptions and Actions. This is the usual and common Sense of the Word Person, which, however, is sometimes used to signify not a di­stinct Being, but a distinct Capacity: In which Sense the same Intelligence may sustain diverse Persons, by acting in so many different Characters or Capacities. I need say nothing here of the Sense of this Word, as used in Divinis.

§ 22. FURTHERMORE, some Things are said to agree, Of Things agreeing or opposite. others to differ, and be op­posite to each other: And those Things that agree in a third Thing, are said to agree between themselves; and the Idea or Conception of the one, in some respect, in­cludes or implies the Ideas or Conception of the the other, and vice versâ. Thus Things are said to agree in their Causes, Effects, Properties, Sub­jects, Adjuncts, Time, Place, Quantity, Quali­ty, &c. As two Sons have one common Parent, two Men are contemporary, or are Countrymen, or have the same Occupation, &c. But Things are said to disagree or differ in relation to these Things, as two Men to be of different Countries or Occupations, &c. And to be opposite, when they are contrary the one to the other, and the Idea or Notion of the one excludes that of the other, as Light and Darkness, Heat and Cold, Extension and Thought, True and False, Right and Wrong, &c. and any Thing and its Privation or Negation, as Sight and Blindness, &c.

Of Things equal or un­equal.§ 23. IN the next Place, we say, Things are equal, when they have the same Quantity, whether discreet or continued; i. e. Number or Magnitude, [Page 41] as 2+2=4 and any two Right Angles are equal to each other, having the same, or an equal Number of Parts or Degrees. On the contrary, we say Things are Unequal, when one is Greater, and the other Less, as 3 is more than 2, a Right Angle is greater than an Acute, and less than an Obtuse, &c. And here the Mathematicians have several Maxims which are the Foundations of their Demonstrations; as, Equals added to Equals, make the Whole equal; and Equals taken from E­quals, leave the Remainder equal: So of Unequals, &c. And from Bodies and their Dimensions, this is by Analogy transferred to Spirits or Minds, which are compared in their Powers and Facul­ties, as Bodies, &c. in their Quantities: Thus we say, one Man or Angel has an equal, greater or less Degree of Understanding, Force or Acti­vity, than another, and those of the Deity are infinite, and beyond all Comparison. To this Head belong the Arguments, a majore ad minus affirmando, and a minore ad majus negando; as, if one Man can lift such a Weight, much more two; and if two cannot lift it, much less one.

§ 24. AND lastly, we say, Things are like one another, when the one resembleth the other in some Quality,Of Things like and unlike. Power or Fa­culty; and of all other Analogies, those between the natural and moral World are the most pleasant and useful; GOD having designed the one as an Emblem of the other, whereby we may be best instructed from our Senses in what most concerns us: As Know­ledge is like Light, or Benevolence like Attraction; i. e. Knowledge is to the Mind, what Light is to the Eye, in the Discovery of Truth. In like Manner, Benevolence is to Society what Attraction [Page 42] is to Nature, as the one preserves Order and Harmony in the natural World; so the other preserves Peace and Happiness in the moral World. This is what is called Analogy or Pro­portion; and is either continued or disjunct.—Con­tinued when the first Term is to the second, as the second is to the third, as, The Parent is to the Child, as the Child is to the Grandchild. Disjunct, when the first is to the second, as the third to the fourth; as, Virtue is to the Soul, as Health is to the Body, in regard to Ease and Tranquility.— To this Head belong the Mathematicians Doc­trine of Proportions, or the Similitude of Ratio's, as, 2∶4∷4∶8. and 2∶4∷16∶12.—Here likewise belong moral Proportions, or the Fitness of Affections and Actions to Characters with re­gard to Happiness. Hence that reciprocal Pro­portion expressing the grand Foundation Principle of Morals, That such Affections and Actions as are right or wrong in another towards me, as tend­ing to promote my Happiness or Misery in the Whole, must for the same Reason be right or wrong in me towards him, supposing an, Ex­change of Characters.—Thus of Similitude. On the other Hand, we say, Things are Unlike, when they have different Qualities and Powers; as John is not like Thomas, the one being a good Genius, the other a Dunce.

§ 25. WHATEVER Being or Thing, or what­ever Power,Of Deno­mination & Definition. Effect, Property, Ad­junct or Part, Quantity or Quality of any Thing be the Object of our Con­sideration; in order the better to think of it by ourselves, and especially in order to converse with one another about it, it is ne­cessary to give it a Name, or annex some Sound [Page 43] or other Sign, agreed upon to be steadily signi­ficative of it, whether it be an Object of the Sense and Imagination, or of the pure Intellect and Reason; and that Sound or Sign so esta­blished, becomes a Kind of Vehicle to the Idea or Conception, whether Simple, Compound or Complex. Thus we give the Names White, Black, Red, &c. to the Colours so called, Hard, Soft, Hot, Cold, &c. to the tangible Qualities so called; and Consciousness, Perception, Self-exertion, &c. to the simple Conceptions so called.—Thus to instance in the Compounds; we give the Name Gold to a certain yellow Metal that is the heavi­est and most ductile of all others, and the Name Cherry to the Fruit of such a Tree, and of such a particular Figure, Consistence and Taste; and so the Name Justice, to an Action of an intelligent Agent, designing to render to every one what he apprehends to be his Due, &c. This is called Denomination, or giving Names to Things: And the great Rule to be observed in this Affair, is, That we constantly annex such an Idea or Con­ception or such a precise Collection or Combina­tion of either sensible Ideas or intellectual No­tions, to such a Name or Word, and always use it in the same Sense. And the true Notion of a Definition, whether in Things sensible or intellectual, consists in explaining what are the precise Ideas or Conceptions, which are combined and annexed to such a Name. Thus the Word Gold means a yellow fusible Body, of the greatest Weight and Ductility of any other, and soluble in Aqua Regia. So the Word Spirit, means a conscious, intelligent, active, self-exerting Being. Thus we define compound Ideas, or complex Conceptions; but as for those that are simple, [Page 44] they cannot be defined otherwise than by some synonymous Term, because they can be known only by Experience.

§ 26. ANY one intire Being that cannot be divided into more of the same Kind,Of Abstrac­tion, and of Indivi­duals, Sorts and Kinds. we call an Individual, whether it be a Body, or a Spirit, and in order the better to think and speak of it, we give it a proper Name, as, to this Man the Name of John, to that, Pe­ter; to this Horse, the Name Bucephalus, to that Dog, the Name Argus, &c. And if there be no Occasion for a proper Name, we say this Tree, that Stone, that Piece of Gold, &c. And observing that there are a great Number of In­dividuals that agree in certain essential Properties that discriminate them from all other Things, we call all the Beings of that Sort, a Species, and a­gree upon a common Name that shall indifferent­ly stand for every Individual of that Sort: This is what is meant by Abstraction. Thus observing all the Individuals of Men to agree in a certain Figure, Shape and Structure, and in certain Pow­ers of Reason, Speech and Activity, we call the whole Species by the general Name, Man, in which we do, in effect, substitute some indivi­dual Idea to represent the whole Species, and an­nex to it a general Name common to all the In­dividuals. And comparing this Sett of Beings, which we call Mankind, with another Sett which we call Beasts, we find there are some Proper­ties in which they all agree, as Life, Sense and spontaneous Motion, &c. to these we give a more general Name or Genus, that shall stand for them all, as the Word Animal. And ascending higher, we observe that each Tribe of Animals [Page 45] agree with another Sett of Beings called Plants, in vegetable Life, and so constitute a yet more general Name to stand for them all, as the Word Animate. And finding all these agree still with a vastly greater Number of other Things, Elements, Stones, Metals, &c. in the three Dimen­sions, Length, Breadth and Thickness, we agree on the yet more general Name Body to compre­hend them all. And lastly, Spirits are yet ano­ther Sett of Beings, intirely and toto Coelo diffe­rent from Bodies of any Sort, whose Essence con­sists in conscious Perception and Activity, and have nothing common with them but bare Exi­stence; so that we comprehend them all, both Bodies and Spirits, both Things perceiving, and Things perceived, Things active, and Things passive, under the most general Name Being, or Thing; i. e. what is, or exists. This is the high­est Genus of all, which, with the subordinate Genera or Kinds, have been considered as another Kind of Whole, called Totum Genericum (to di­stinguish it from the other Whole, explained above, § 19. which is properly so called, but for Di­stinction-sake is also termed Totum Integrale) and its Parts are called Species (the Parts of the other being called its Members.)—And the Division of the Genus into its Species may more fitly be cal­led Distribution, and that of the Integrum into its Members, Partition. Thus in the Instance before us, we distribute Beings into Bodies and Spirits; Bodies into Inanimate and Animate; Animate into Plants and Animals; and Animals into Men and Beasts. And lastly, these lowest Species can be distributed only into the several Individuals: But the Individuals, tho' they cannot be distributed into Sorts, they may be distinguished by their [Page 46] Causes, Effects, Subjects or Adjuncts, &c. as, by their Families, Places, or Countries, by their Colours, Sects or Occupations, and other accidental Circumstances.

§ 27. IT is of great Importance, in order to think clearly and justly,Particu­larly of Bo­dies and Spirits. to take Care that we have as exact a Notion as possible of all those Properties in eve­ry Kind of Being, that do essentially distinguish one from another, that we may make our Definitions and Divisions just, and avoid as far as possible, that Perplexity of Thought and Expression which ariseth from con­founding one Thing with another. But this is more especially necessary in that first great Divi­sion of Beings into Bodies and Spirits; because we take our first Rise to Knowledge from sensi­ble Things or Bodies, and by that Means are so prepossessed with a Notion of their Reality and Importance, that it is with much Difficulty that we rise to the Notion of Spirits and what relates to them; or, when we do, to have any strong Apprehension of their Reality and Importance, or to conceive of them but under corporeal Ima­ges. We should therefore labour much in the Business of Reflexion, and Abstraction from sen­sible to intellectual Things, and disengage our­selves from Sense and Imagination as much as possible; and consider, that tho' our Notion of Spirits is intirely of a different Nature and Ori­ginal, from that of Bodies, it is neither less real and substantial, nor indeed less clear and certain. These we have from Sense and Imagination, and those from Consciousness and Reasoning; but as these are Faculties of as much Reality and Cer­tainty, as those (nay more) we are not less cer­tain [Page 47] of the Existence of Spirits than of Bodies, nor have we a less clear Notion of the one than the other. I am as intuitively certain of my own Existence by Consciousness, as of the Existence of Bodies by Sense, and am as demonstratively sure of the Existence of other Spirits, and espe­cially of the eternal Parent Mind, as I am of any Thing imaginable, whatsoever: Nay (as I said) upon due Consideration, it will appear that the Evidence and Reality here hath much the Advantage. And I do as clearly and perfectly know what I mean, when I say I or myself, as when I say my Body; and have as clear a Notion of the Meaning or Conceptions annexed to the Words, Sense, Imagination, Consciousness, Under­standing, Reason, Pleasure, Aversion, Activity, Self-exertion, &c. as of the Meaning or Ideas annexed to the Words, Extension, Figure, Soli­dity, Motion, Colour, Sound, Heat, Cold, Sweet, Bitter, &c. I as perfectly know the one as the other. So that I must consider Spirits, as being as much real and intelligible Beings as Bodies, tho' of entirely a different Kind; and indeed as much more real, as they are a more perfect Kind of Be­ings; as Perception and Action are Things of great­er Reality and Perfection, than being perceived and acted; Activity than Passivity: And they must be of as much more Importance, as one's Self and the Enjoyment of one's Self is of more Im­portance to us, than any outward sensible Ob­jects.

§ 28. INDEED there is a Difficulty in being duly disengaged from Things sensible, Of Signs, Metaphor & Analogy. in order the better to conceive of Things intelligible, spiritual and divine, and we are obliged to make use of [Page 48] those as a Means and Step to these, using sensi­ble Signs, Metaphors and Analogies, to represent and shadow forth those more noble, abstract Ob­jects of Intellect, Reason and Faith: For (to use the Words of the great Author of the Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. § 16.) ‘As the Mind is better acquainted with some Sort of Objects which are earlier suggested to it, strike it more sensibly, or are more easily comprehended than others, it is naturally led to substitute these Objects for such as are more subtil, fleeting or difficult to conceive. Nothing, I say, is more natural than to make the Things we know, a Step to those we do not know; and to represent and explain Things less familiar, by others that are more so. Now it is certain we imagine before we reflect, and we perceive by Sense before we imagine, and of all our Senses, the Sight is the most clear, distinct, various, agreeable and comprehensive. Hence it is natural to assist the Intellect by Imagina­tion, the Imagination by Sense, and the other Senses by Sight. Hence Figures, Metaphors and Types. We illustrate spiritual Things by corporeal; we substitute Sounds for Thoughts, and written Letters for Sounds; Emblems, Symbols and Hieroglyphics, for Things too obscure to strike, and too various or too fleet­ing to be retained: We substitute Things ima­ginable for Things intelligible; sensible Things for imaginable; smaller Things for those too great to comprehend easily, and greater Things for such as are too small to be discerned di­stinctly; present Things for absent; perma­nent for perishing; and visible for invisible. Hence the Use of Diagrams: Hence Right [Page 49] Lines are substituted for Time, Velocity and other Things of very different Natures. Hence we speak of Spirits in a figurative Stile, ex­pressing the Operations of the Mind by Allu­sions and Terms borrowed from sensible Things, such as, apprehend, conceive, reflect, discourse, and the like. And hence those Al­legories which illustrate Things intellectual by Visions exhibited to the Fancy.’—Hence also it is that we conceive and speak of God Almigh­ty by Analogy from the greatest Perfections in ourselves, such as Knowledge, Wisdom, Power, Justice, Goodness, &c. which we substitute to re­present his infinite Perfections, removing all Li­mitation and Imperfection.—And hence it is that in the Revelation which God hath made of him­self, and his Dispensations towards Mankind, he cloaths himself with human Parts and Passions, in order to render himself in some Measure intelligi­ble to us, and moreover, teacheth us, what (to all practical Purposes, which are chiefly aimed at) it concerneth us to know of him and his Deal­ings with us, by Things and Relations familiar among our selves, such as, the Sun, Light and Life, Father, Son and Spirit, Mediator, Redeemer, Priest, Propitiation, King, Kingdom, &c. All which gracious Accommodations to our low Capacities, we must always so understand and explain as to imply nothing contradictious or unworthy of his infinite Excellency, implied in either his natural or moral Perfections.—Thus much of the Mind's simple Apprehension of its Objects, and their Rela­tions, arising from our comparing them one with another, and the Manner of our conceiving and expressing them.

CHAP. III. Of the Mind judging, affirming, denying, assenting, &c.

§ 1. I PROCEED now in the second Place to the Consideration of that Act of the Mind, which is called Judgment, i. e. which af­firms or denies one Thing of another,Of Judg­ments and Propositi­ons. and judges of True and False.—Ac­cordingly I observe further: That no sooner hath the Mind compared its Ideas or Conceptions one with ano­ther, but, perceiving, or apprehending that it perceives their Connections and Repugnances, or the Agreement or Disagreement between them, it passeth some Judgment affirming or denying the one of the other, according as it apprehends the one is or is not included or implied in the o­ther or connected with it. Thus observing the Ideas we call Roundness or Brightness agree with, or are included in the Idea to which we give the Name Sun, we affirm the Sun is Round or Bright.—And finding the Idea we call a Square is not comprehended in that of the Sun, we deny that the Sun is Square.—So with Regard to intel­lectual Notions; we affirm Virtue is preferable to Gold, and deny that Riches are of so much Worth as Learning; where Excellency beyond that of Gold is included in the Notion of Virtue, and an Ex­cellency equal to that of Learning is not included in that of Riches.—These Judgments of the Mind expressed in Words, we call Propositions: And the Idea or Conception of which we affirm or de­ny [Page 51] any Thing, is called the Subject of the Proposi­tion; and that which is affirmed or denied of, it is called the Attribute or Predicate, and what joins them is the Verb; and what separates them is the negative Particle; as, the Sun is the Center, or, is not the Center of the World.

§ 2. IN all Propositions the Subject is either a General or an Individual Idea or Con­ception.Of Pro­positions universal, particular and singu­lar.—If the Subject be a general Term, then it is either a universal or particular Proposition.—It is a univer­sal Proposition when the Attribute or Predicate is understood to be affirmed or denied of all the Individuals contain­ed under the Subject; as, Man is a rational Crea­ture, Man is not immortal; and is generally expres­sed by some Term of Universality, all or none.— All is a universal Affirmative, as, all Men are mor­tal; and it is denied by denying the Term of Universality; as, not all Men are mortal; or by a particular Negative, as, some Men are not mor­tal.—None is a universal Negative, as, no Vice is to be indulged; which is denied by a particular Affirmative, as, some Vice is to be indulged.—On the other Hand, a Proposition is particular, when the Predicate is understood to be affirmed or denied of only some of the Individuals con­tained under the Subject; as, some Men are wise, some Men are not rich: And a particular Affirma­tive is denied by a universal Negative; as, no Men are wise; and a particular Negative is denied by a universal Affirmative; as, all Men are rich. —But if the Subject be an Individual, the Pro­position is called singular, as John is wise, or is not rich, which are denied, the One, by saying, he is not wise; the other by affirming he is rich.

[Page 52]§ 3. ANOTHER Division of Propositions is in­to such as are simple and such as are compound. Of Propo­sitions sim­ple and compound.—If a Proposition expres­seth but one Judgment of the Mind, and cannot be properly resolved into more Propositions, or the full Sense of it may be expressed in one Proposition in which there is but one Attribute predicated on but one Subject, it is called a simple Proposition; as, God is good: And these are either absolute, when the Predicate is expressive of something essential to the Subject, or directly predicated of it, and no Condition is either expressed or understood, as, The Sun is bright; or conditional, when there is some Condition annexed to the Subject, upon the Supposition of which, the Predicate is affirmed or denied of it; as, If God be good, he cannot delight in the Misery of his Creatures. These condition­al Propositions have, by some, been reckoned among the Compounds; but ought not, by the Definition above given, tho' they have that Ap­pearance; they being reducible to one Proposi­tion, as in this Example; it is only as much as to say, God being good cannot delight in Misery.— On the contrary, a compound Proposition is expres­sive of several Judgments of the Mind, and may be resolved into two or more Propositions, there being two or more Subjects, or two or more Pre­dicates, connected by Conjunctions; as, The Sun is bright and round; Both Wisdom and Riches are desirable.—And these compound Propositions are either Copulatives or Disjunctives, according as the Parts are connected by copulative or dis­junctive Conjunctions; as, Both Peter and Paul were Apostles and Martyrs.—The World exists either of itself, or from a most wise and powerful Cause.

[Page 53]§ 4. BUT the most important Distinction of Propositions is, into such as are True or False.—If we join or separate,Of Pro­positions True and False. i. e. af­firm or deny Things as being what they really are, the Proposition is True; as, Gold is heavier than Silver, or Silver is not so ductile as Gold.—But if we affirm or deny Things otherwise than they really are, the Pro­position is False; as, Money is better than Virtue, or Learning is not so good as Riches.—And here it may be remarked, that the proper original Notion of Truth (as was above observed, Chap. II. § 15.) is, that it consists in the Agreement of any Thing with its Standard.—GOD's infinite Intellect, comprehending all that is, is the original Stand­ard. He himself is said to be infinite Truth, or the Truth itself, as being infinitely intelligible and perfectly known to his own infinite Intellect, and conformable to it in all that he is and does; and all Things that exist, are what they are originally in his eternal archetypal Idea, or as they are known to him, whether they be Things necessary or contingent.—And the Truth of Things creat­ed consists in their Conformity to their Arche­type, as they actually exist in Nature and Fact, partaking of so much Truth and Reality as the great Author of them thought fit to assign them. This is, what is called, Metaphysical Truth, as above explained.—And now, this Existence of Things as they really are, whether in the eternal Mind, if they are Things necessary, or in the Na­ture and Fact, if they are Things contingent, must be the Standard to our Minds, and our Know­ledge or Judgment of them is then Truth, when we conceive and affirm of them as being what they really are.—This is called Logical or Mental Truth. [Page 54] —And, lastly, our Thoughts and Judgments of Things must be the Standard to our Words and Expressions concerning them; which are then Truth, when they agree with the real Sense and Apprehension of our Minds.—This is called Verbal Truth; and when we design nothing but to speak as we think, it is called Moral Truth.— Since therefore Truth is inflexible, and Things are what they are whatever we think of them, and no Imagination or Opinion of ours can, in the least, alter them; it concerns us above all Things to think and speak of them, as well as to affect and act with regard to them, exactly as being what they really are.

§ 5. AS all Things are in their own Nature either necessary or contingent (as was shewn above,Of Pro­positions necessary and con­tingent. Chap. II. § 11.) so are the Propositions expressive of them.— Here therefore it is needful to explain this Distinction of Propositions.—Ac­cordingly, those Propositions we call ne­cessary, which assert Things or Relations which are in their own Nature necessary, immutable and eternal, and which (as was above explained) being founded in the infinite Perfection of the divine Nature, are independent on the divine Will, and therefore cannot be altered by the Power of God himself, because it would involve some Absurdity or Contradiction; as, Some Be­ing must have always existed;—no Being can begin to be without a Cause;—Triangles of the same Base and Height are equal;—Benefits deserve Gratitude, &c.—And those necessary Propositions, whose Evidence is intuitive, are called Axioms or Maxims. These Truths, with all their necessary Consequen­ces, are, as it were, so many Rays of that divine [Page 55] intellectual Light above asserted (Chap. I. § 13. 4. and Chap. II. § 3.) which incessantly flow from the great Fountain of Light, and shine a­like into all created Minds.—Of this Kind are a Multitude of metaphysical, mathematical and mo­ral Truths, which, it is evident, must be of a di­vine Original, since, like the Deity, they are eve­ry where present to all Minds, immutable and eternal, and cannot derive from any created Light, or the actual Existence of the Creatures, which is evidently precarious and contingent, tho' they are subservient to lead us up to those Truths that are necessary and eternal.—On the other Hand, those Propositions are contingent, which assert Things and Relations that are con­tingent, as depending on the Wills and Powers of free Agents, and consequently might not have been had they so pleased, and the non-existence of them implies no Absurdity, as, The Sun shines;— John runs.—And of this Kind are all physical Truths which relate to created Natures, and which depend on the free arbitrary Will of the Deity, and Matters of meer Institution; and all political and historical Truths, which depend on the free Exertion of human Wills.

§ 6. NOW the Truth or Falshood of some Propositions is self evident, which we are said to know by Intuition; Of Pro­positions self evi­dent and demon­strable. either by Sense, as when I actually perceive Light, Colours, &c. or by Consciousness and pure Intellect; as, when I say, I know that I am, and that nothing can produce itself, and that the Whole is e­qual to all its Parts, &c.—The Reason of this intuitive Evidence is, that the Attribute appears at first Sight to be included in the Subject, or con­nected [Page 56] with it.—But if the Connexion between the Subject and Attribute doth not appear at first Sight, the Terms being duly explained, we must make use of a third Idea or Notion called a Reason or Argument, which may serve as a com­mon Measure or Standard whereby to judge of the Connexion between them; which, if it evi­dently appears to agree with each of the Terms of the Proposition, it demonstrates their Agree­ment between themselves, and if with but one of them, it demonstrates their Disagreement; as, since I know I began to be, and nothing can begin to be without a Cause, this demonstratively proves that I must have had a Cause of my Existence.— And as Knowledge implies a clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement between the Subject and Predicate, we are said in both these Cases to have Knowledge, Certainty and Evidence: In the former, to have intuitive Certainty, or Knowledge by Intuition; and in the latter to have demonstrative Certainty, or Knowledge by Demon­stration; and the Certainty of Demonstration is always ultimately resolved into the Certainty of Intuition.—And in all Cases, the Criterion or Test of Evidence and Certainty, is, that it is not in our Power to with-hold our Assent or Acquies­cence.—This is called Science, which Term is however, by some, restrained to those Truths which are necessary and immutable.

§ 7. On the other Hand, we find it, many Times,Of Propo­sitions doubtful and proba­ble. in our Power, and even that, in some Cases, we are obliged to with­hold our Assent for want of perfect Evidence, or a high Probability, there being some good Reasons to doubt.— Now if the Reasons against the Truth [Page 57] of any Proposition rather preponderate when du­ly compared with the Reasons for it, it is called doubtful.—On the contrary, if the Reasons for it manifestly appear to prevail over those against it, it is said to be probable: Thus we say, it is doubtful, whether the Comets are inhabited, because they seem to be in an irregular chaotic State: But it is probable that the Planets are inhabited, be­cause they appear to be vast Globes in a settled re­gular Condition, analogous to our Earth, and no other good End can be assigned them. Yet it is only probable, because we do not know enough of them to be perfectly sure that no other good End can be answered by them, and it is possible to be otherwise.—And of these Doubts and Pro­babilities there are endlessly various Degrees, ac­cording to the various Numbers and Weight of the Reasons for or against them; and they also variously appear more or less probable or doubtful to different Persons, according as they have more or less Capacity or Opportunity to examine them, and according as they give their Attention more or less to the Consideration of them. And when any Proposition is supported with all the Reasons it is, in the Nature of it, capable of, and there remains no sufficient Reason to doubt of the Truth of it, we are then said to have a moral Cer­tainty, and our Assent to it is called a Persuasion, which implies a settled Acquiescence of the Mind in the Truth of it.

§ 8.Of Opi­nion and Faith, and Rules of Assent. If the Reasons for the Proba­bility or moral Certainty of any Propo­sition are taken from the Nature of the Things considered in themselves, our Assent to it is called Opinion; as when I say, I am of Opinion that the Pla­nets [Page 58] are inhabited, from the Reasons that are ta­ken from the Nature of them, so far as we can come to the Knowledge of it; which Term also is, by some, used to signify our Assent to all con­tingent Propositions, however so certain.—But if the Reasons of our Assent are taken only or chief­ly from the Testimony of others (as suppose we were told by credible Persons that came from the Planets, that they are inhabited) it is called Faith, which will be stronger or weaker accord­ing to the Credibility of the Thing in itself, and the Number and Credibility of the Persons at­testing it;—who, if they be Men, one or more, it is called Human Faith; such as that whereby I believe there is such a Place as Constantinople, and that there were such Men as Alexander and Julius Caesar, &c. And when any Fact of our Times is asserted by the concurrent Testimony of all Men, or any ancient Fact is attested by the uni­versal Suffrage of all Antiquity, uninterruptedly handed down to us from Age to Age, we have the highest moral Certainty, which scarce leaves Room for possible Doubt.—But if any Proposi­tion be attested by God himself, our Assent, or Acquiescence in the Truth of it, is called divine Faith, such as that whereby I believe there will be a Resurrection, and a future Judgment, &c.— And this Faith must intirely exclude all Doubt, if we are morally sure that the Proposition comes from God, and that we rightly understand it, be­cause we are demonstratively certain, that he can neither deceive nor be deceived, so that Faith is at the Bottom grounded upon Reason.—And in all Cases, if the Subject be not capable of clear Evi­dence, we must be content with such Proof as the Nature of it will admit of; having also a due [Page 59] Regard to the Importance of it; and always be determined by the greatest Probability; and if that cannot be had, and we are obliged to act, we must be determined by the greatest Safety and Advantage.

CHAP. IV. Of the Mind reasoning and methodizing its Thoughts.—

§ 1. NOW, Thirdly, that Act of the Mind which seeks Reasons or Arguments to prove the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition,Of Reason in general. and makes use of them to that Purpose is called Reason.—In order to the right Exercise of which, it is neces­sary,—First, That we carefully consider the Words of the Proposition to be proved or inquir­ed into, which is now called the Question, and all the Words and Terms we make use of in our Argumentations upon it; and mark well what Ideas or Conceptions we annex to them, and al­ways use the same Word in the same Sense, that we may industriously avoid all Ambiguity.— And, Secondly, That we consider exactly the Ideas or Notions themselves signified by them, as much as possible, divested of the Words, and re­count and consider the Parts and Properties whereof they consist, that we may see how far our intuitive Knowledge goes, i. e. what Attri­butes do, at first Sight, appear to be included in the Subject, or related to it, and what kind of Relation they bear; that, by this Means, care­fully sifting and canvassing the Matter, and sepa­rating [Page 60] what is clear from what is doubtful, we may first be sure where the Doubt lies, and wherein the Merits of the Cause do really consist.

§ 2. THESE Things being first duly observed, the right Exercise of Reason proper­ly consists,Of the right Ex­ercise of Reason.—First, In taking a care­ful Survey of all the Relations which the Subject or Pr [...]icate of the Que­stion, or disputed Proposition, bear to any other Ideas or Notions, and thereby searching out and discovering some third Idea or Concepti­on related to one or other, or both of them, which is called the Reason or Argument, and, as I said, may be considered as a common Measure by which to judge of the Relation between them; the Foundation of which is that grand Maxim above mentioned (Chap. II. § 22.) That those Things which agree or differ in a Third, must agree or dif­fer between themselves; this is called Sagacity.— To which Purpose it is necessary that we endea­vour to consider the Whole of Things, and as far as we can, make ourselves Masters of our Sub­ject; and in many Cases it may be of good Use to have Recourse to the several Topicks above ex­plained in the second Chapter, Causes, Effects, &c.—And as all our Reasoning takes its Rise from self-evident Propositions, we must see to it, that the Connexion between them and those we would prove, be made as clear and evident as possible before we proceed to a Conclusion. And, Secondly, When we have found an Argument, and duly considered its Relation to the Terms of the Question, the Act of Reason consists in inferring, from the Agreement or Disagreement of the Sub­ject and Attribute of the Question with this inter­mediate Idea or Conception, their Agreement or [Page 61] Repugnancy between themselves: This is called Illation.—Thus, suppose the Question were, Whether Virtue be more valuable than Riches?—I first consider the Nature of Virtue and Riches in all their Properties and Relations; I compare them with each other, and particularly with regard to our Happiness, which alone can render any Thing more or less valuable to us; and then, from that general self-evident Proposition, That, what most contributes to our Happiness is most valuable, I in­fer, That, since Virtue conduceth vastly more to our Happiness than Riches, it must upon that Ac­count, be vastly more valuable.

§ 3. THE Method of Reasoning in the Schools is called Syllogism, Of the Nature of Syllogism. which consists in comparing the intermediate Idea or Ar­gument, First, With the Predicate of the Question, which is called the Ma­jor Term, as being generally the most extensive; for which Reason the first Proposition is called the Major; Secondly, With the Subject of it, which is called the Minor Term, and therefore this se­cond Proposition is called the Minor, and these two are called the Premises: And then, Thirdly, In making the Conclusion according as it is found to agree or disagree with both, or either of them. If it is found to agree with both, it is affirmative; if with but one, it is negative.—As, suppose the Question were, Whether Justice ought always to be practised?—The Argument shall be the Advan­tageousness of it.—Then the Major Proposition will be, What is advantageous in the whole is al­ways to be practised: The Minor, That Justice is ever advantageous in the whole:—Then the Conclusion will be, That Justice is always to be practised.—Or, what is mischievous to Society ought not to be practised; Lying is mischievous to So­ciety; [Page 62] —therefore Lying ought not to be practised. —The Ground of which Method of Reasoning is this Maxim: That whatever can truly be uni­versally affirmed or denied of any Subject, may truly be affirmed or denied of all or any of the Particu­lars or Individuals comprehended under that Sub­ject.—And if either of the Premises be yet doubt­ful, being denied, it must be proved after the same Manner as before, till we arrive at two Premises, neither of which can reasonably admit of any Doubt.

§ 4. SYLLOGISMS of this Kind are called the Categorick Forms, as being expressed absolutely,Of the three Fi­gures of Categorick Syllogisms. and always consist of only simple Propositions.—In which the most usual and useful are those, where­in the intermediate Idea or Argument precedes, as being the Subject in the Major Proposition, which is always universal, and follows, being the Predicate in the Minor, which is always affirmative: and this is called the first Figure: As, An infinitely wise and good Being cannot delight in the Misery of his Creatures:— God is an infinitely wise and good Being;—there­fore, God cannot delight in the Misery of his Crea­tures. But in some Cases it may be most conve­nient to make the middle Term the Predicate of both the Premises, one of which is always nega­tive, and the Major universal; this is called the second Figure, as All Virtue is amiable; Avarice is not amiable; therefore, Avarice is not a Virtue. And lastly, sometimes it may be most conveni­ent to make the middle Term the Subject of both the Premises; which is called the third Figure; in which the Minor must be affirmative, and the Conclusion is always particular; as, Solomon did [Page 63] not always act wisely: But Solomon was a wise Man; therefore, some wise Man doth not always act wisely, or, which is the same, All wise Men do not always act wisely. Much is here said by Logici­ans of the Modes of Syllogisms under each of these Figures, which is rather Matter of Curiosity than Use; but if any one desires to gratify his Curiosity, he may see a most complete and ac­curate Account of them in the Port-Royal Art of Thinking.

§ 5. BUT the same Arguments may be dis­posed more familiarly in what is called the Hypothetick Form, Of the Hypothe­tick Syllo­gism. the Major of which is a conditional Proposition, as in the former Example: If virtue is, in the whole, more conducive to our Hap­piness than Riches, it is more valuable: But it is in the whole more conducive to our Happiness: Therefore it is more valuable. So in a later In­stance: If Lying be mischievous to Society, it ought not to be practised: But it is mischievous, &c. therefore ought not to be practised. Here the ma­jor Proposition consists of two Parts, which are called the Antecedent and the Consequent, and the Argument proceeds from the affirming or Position of the Antecedent to the Position of the Consequent. But there is another Form of it which proceeds from taking away of the Conse­quent to taking away of the Antecedent, as, If I had said such a Thing, I should have thought of it; But I never thought of it, therefore I never said it.

§ 6.Of the Disjunc­tive Syl­logism. THERE is likewise another Form of Syllogism which is called the Disjunctive Form, in which the Parts must be Opposites, so that the Position of the first must infer the taking away of [Page 64] the other, or of all the rest, if there be more than two; or the taking away of the latter, or all the rest, if more than two, must infer the Po­sition of the former; as, Every Man serves ei­ther God or Mammon: Peter serves God, there­fore he cannot serve Mammon: or, Judas serves Mammon, therefore cannot be a Servant of God. And to give an Instance where there are more than two, Every Action is either good, bad or indiffe­rent; but to relieve a poor Man is a good Action; therefore it is neither bad nor indifferent; or, it is neither bad nor indifferent; therefore it is a good Action.

§ 7. These are the chief Forms of Reasoning to which all others, that are of any Consequence,Of irregu­lar Syllo­gisms. may be reduced. It may not however be amiss to say something of those which are called irregular Syl­logisms. Of which, some are redundant, as con­sisting of more than three Propositions, of which Number only regular Syllogisms consist: In which Case, a Reason is added to support either the Major or Minor, or both, before we proceed to the Conclusion. Others are deficient, as when the Major is left out or suppressed in the Mind, be­ing understood, tho' not expressed; as, Virtue conduces more to our Happiness than Riches, there­fore it is more excellent; such are called Enthymems. But the most noted of these irregular Syllogisms are the Dilemma and the Sorites. In a Dilemma, the major Proposition is a Conditional, whose Con­sequent contains all the several Suppositions upon which the Antecedent can take Place, which be­ing removed in the Minor, it is apparent the An­tecedent must also be taken away; as, If God did not create the World, it must either have been [Page 65] self-existent, or have derived from meer Chance; but it could neither be self-existent nor derive from Chance; therefore it must have been created by God. Sorites is a Method of arguing in a Series of Proposi­tions, so connected together, that the Predicate of the first becomes the Subject of the second, and so on, till we come to a Conclusion, in which the Predicate of the last Proposition appears from those intermediate Propositions to be connected with the Subject of the first. For an Example of the Sorites, we may set down the following Way of Reasoning, to prove the natural Immor­tality of the Soul.

1. The Soul is a conscious, intelligent, active, self-exerting Being.

2. A conscious, intelligent, active, self-exert­ing Being, as such, is intirely of an opposite and different Nature and Kind from that of Bodies, and therefore can have nothing common with them but bare Existence.

3. A Being that, as such, is intirely of a different Nature from Bodies, and hath nothing besides Existence common with them, can have no corporeal Properties and Affections, such as solid Extension, Continuity of Parts, and Divisi­bility or Discerpibility.

4. A Being that, having no corporeal Pro­perties, and so does not consist of solid extended Parts, divisible or discerpible, cannot be naturally liable to a Dissolution.

5. What is not, in the Nature of it, liable to a Dissolution, must be naturally immortal. Ergo,

6. The Soul is naturally immortal. And here these intermediate Propositions may be re­duced to so many categorick Syllogisms, begin­ning with the last, and ending with the first.

[Page 66]§ 8. THOUGH the Rules given above, if du­ly attended to,Of So­phisms. would effectually pre­vent all sophistical Reasoning; yet it may not be amiss to add a few Words concerning what are called Sophisms or false Rea­sonings; among which, the chief are, 1. That which is called Ignoratio Elenchi, which is, when the Dispute proceeds upon a Mistake, occasioned by not attending to the true Meaning or State of the Question. 2. Petitio principii, which is, when in pretending to argue, the Thing is ta­ken for granted which was to be proved; this we call Begging the Question. 3. Fallacia qua­tuor terminorum, which is, when the intermediate Term bears a different Sense in the Minor, from the Sense in which it was used in the Major. 4. Non Causa pro Causa, which is, when that is, by Mistake, taken for a Cause, which was not the Cause; as, when a Person receives his Health consequent to the using such a Medicine, and a­scribes it to that, when perhaps it might really be owing to a Medicine which he had used before. And 5thly, the last I shall mention, is that which ariseth from what is called the Association of Ideas, where because such Ideas are connected meerly by Custom, we are apt to conceit they are connected in Nature, as Terrors with Dark­ness. On which Account it is of great Import­ance in Education, to take Care that no Ideas be­come associated by Habit or Custom but those that are connected in Nature; and on the other Hand, that those Ideas that are really connected in Nature be associated by Habit or Custom, that a Sense of their Connection may operate with the greater Force in the Conduct of Life. And thus much for Syllogism.

[Page 67]§ 9. THE last Thing in Logick, is that Course of Reasoning which is called Method, Of Me­thod. which is only a regular Pro­ceeding in connecting a large Series of Reasonings or Instructions on any Subject, and therefore truly belongs to this Part of Logick which treats of Reasoning. For in delineating a whole Science, or treating on any large Subject, it is necessary to pursue it thro' a long Chain of Reasoning, or a whole Series of Propositions mu­tually related; in which it is of great Import­ance, both for the clearer understanding it, and the better remembering it, that we carefully ob­serve the Order that Nature itself points out to us; so as to begin with what is plain and simple, and thence to proceed gradually to what is more compounded and obscure; so ordering and rang­ing Things through the whole Process, that what goes before may continually reflect Light upon what is to follow, and pave the Way to it; and taking the utmost Care to preserve Evidence, or at least the highest possible Degree of Probability in every Step, till we arrive at the highest Truth and Good, or the Conclusion we aim at.—In order to which, the best Thing we can do, is to observe diligently the Manner in which the best Writers proceed, in treating on any Subject they propose to handle, and particularly, the Mathe­maticians, and Moralists.—Now, I say, such a Series of Reasonings we call Method; which, if it begin with Effects, and ariseth to the Discove­ry of Causes, or with particular Facts, Parts or Properties, and ariseth gradually to the Whole, and to general Principles, and Conclusions, it is called the Analytical Method.—But if it begin with Causes already discovered, and descend to [Page 68] Effects, or with general Principles, and descend, by the Application of them, to the Illustration or Proof of Particulars or Facts, it is called the Synthetical Method.—The first is used in searching and discovering Truth; the second chiefly in teaching it in the most compendious Manner, when it is discovered.

§ 10. BUT in order to succeed well in the right Use of our Reason,Of the dis­interested Love of Truth. be the Form or Method what it will, whether in Thinking or Reasoning by ourselves, or in a joint Searching after Truth, in our Conversation with others, which should be our only View in what is called Dis­putation, it is of the greatest Importance that we observe some such Rules as these; 1. That we habitually consider the Knowledge of Truth, as being the highest Perfection and Happiness of our Minds, which therefore should be our grand Pursuit, separate from every other Consideration. 2. That accordingly we possess ourselves of an ardent and disinterested Love of Truth, for its own intrinsic Excellency; and of the utmost Aversion to all Falshood and Deceit, or being any ways misled or imposed upon by false Co­lours, and delusive Appearances. 3. That in order to this, we honestly endeavour as much as possible to divest ourselves of all sinister Views and Prejudices, in favour of any vulgar Opini­ons, pre-conceived Schemes, or worldly Interests, and guard ourselves against every untoward Ap­petite or Passion, that may darken or byass our Minds, and so keep them as calm as possible, and open and ready to the Impressions of the naked Truth. 4. In order the better to come at Truth, we must endeavour to consider, with the utmost [Page 69] Attention, the Things themselves, with all their various Relations and Connections, divested of the Delusions and Ambiguities of Words, which are many times apt to mislead us. 5. And lastly, we must enlarge our Views as much as possible, so as to take the Whole of Things into our Conside­ration, without which we cannot make any tolera­ble Judgment of what relates to Particulars. If we would faithfully observe these and the like Rules for the Conduct of our Understandings, and at the same time, be, above all Things, concerned to do our Duty, and to know the Truth, with this honest View, to be governed by it in Heart and Life, with all Humility, and without Par­tiality or Hypocrisy, we should not be in Danger of being misled into any great or dangerous Mistakes, but should attain to know the Truth, and the Truth would make us free.—And thus much for the several Objects and Operations of the Understanding, which are the Subject of Logicks.

CHAP. V. Of the Mind affecting, willing and acting.

§ 1. HAVING thus given some Account of the Subject of Logicks, Of the Passions in general. which relate to the Conduct of the In­tellect, in its various Exertions, I now go on to give a short Sketch of the Subject of Ethics, which relate to the Conduct of our Affections and Behaviour; of which no more is here intended, than what is just necessary, in order to the Business of the next Chapter.—Here there­fore, [Page 70] according to what was observed above (Chap. I. § 12.) we are to treat, 1. Of our af­fecting or disaffecting Things, according as they appear good or bad. 2. Of our chusing or re­fusing, willing, or nilling them, according as we affect or disaffect them. And, 3. Of our freely acting, or forbearing to act, according to the Judg­ment and Choice we have made. First then, we are to consider the Affections or Passions, of which we are conscious, and which next occur to be ob­served in the Frame of our rational Nature, the Doctrine or Explication of which is called Pa­thology; for no sooner doth any Object come under the Mind's Consideration, but it appears agreeable or disagreeable, according as it is, by the established Law of our Nature, attended with Pleasure or Pain, or, at least, with some Degree of Satisfaction or Uneasiness, or the Apprehen­sion of it.—Now, by the Passions, we mean in general, such Affections or Disaffections, Inclina­tions or Aversions, as we experience in ourselves, upon feeling or expecting that Pleasure or Unea­siness with which any Object is attended.—And such is the Law of Union between our Souls and Bodies, that upon our being affected or disaffect­ed towards any-Object, we are sensible of cer­tain Commotions and Perturbations in our Blood and Spirits, corresponding and in Proportion to those pleasing or displeasing Apprehensions.

§ 2. NOW the leading Passion, and which seems in some Degree to be at the Bottom in all our Passions,Of the Pas­sions more particular­ly. is what we call Admiration or Wonder, which, in a high Degree, is called Astonish­ment, and is that Sentiment which we feel on the Perception of any Thing that is new, [Page 71] or great, or what we are unaccustomed to, or from which we have strong Apprehensions of Pleasure or Uneasiness.—And more particularly, when we are delighted in any Thing, as being at­tended with Pleasure, we are said to love it; and if we actually possess the Pleasure, it is attended with Joy.—If the Object of our Affection be a Person, our Love may be called Esteem; and if the Person be in Misery, it is called Pity or Com­passion: And if the Object be absent or future, it hath the Name of Desire or Hope.—On the other Hand, when we are disaffected towards any Object, apprehending it to be attended with Pain or Uneasiness, we are said to hate it; and the ac­tual Sufferance of that Pain or Uneasiness is cal­led Grief; and Shame, if it arise from the Con­sciousness of our own Misconduct; and if the Object be a mean and despicable Character, the Passion is called Contempt; and if the Evil be future and impending, it is Terror, or Fear.— If the Object from which we feel or apprehend Pleasure, be procured, or occur to us by Means of any Person or free Agent, designing Good to us, we call our Sentiment on that Occasion, Be­nevolence, Complacence and Gratitude, attended with a Desire to reward it; and with Joy at any Good, or Grief at any Ill that occurs to our Friend or Benefactor: And this Temper, if it arise to a settled Habit of mutual Good-will and good Offices, we call Friendship. But, on the other Hand, if the Object from whence we feel or apprehend Pain or Uneasiness be procured or occur to us by Means of any free Agent, de­signing any Evil or Mischief to us, we call our Sentiment on that Occasion, Malevolence, Anger, or Resentment, which is apt to be attended with a [Page 72] Desire to revenge it; and with Joy at any Evil that befals our Enemy, or Grief at any Good that may occur to him, which is called Envy. And if this Temper groweth to a settled Habit of Ill-will towards the supposed injurious Person, it acquireth the Name of Malice.

§ 3. THESE Passions are natural to us, and, as such,Of the End and Use of them. must be considered as Part of the Frame of our Natures, and consequently as being implanted in us by the Author of our Nature, for answering very wise and good Ends, relating to our Happiness; and therefore are so far from being evil in themselves, that they have the Na­ture of Good, as well as all our other Faculties, and so, like the rest, become morally Good or Evil, according to the good or ill Use we make of them. Now as God hath so framed us, that our Happiness should depend on a vigorous Ac­tivity in the Use of the Powers and Faculties he hath given us, his Design in planting these Pas­sions in us, was, that they might be, as it were, Spurs and Incentives in us, to put us upon such a vigorous Activity, in avoiding those Things that are mischievous either to ourselves or others, and pursuing those Things in which our Happi­ness or that of others consists. For the Passions are, as it were, the Wings of the Soul, by which it is carried on with Vehemence and Impetuosity in its several Pursuits; and, as it were, its Springs, by which it is animated and invigorated in all its Exertions. Thus Love, Desire and Hope, vigo­rously animate and spur us on to the Pursuit of those Things that we love, desire and hope for, as being connected with our Well-being and Happiness; and Hatred, Abhorrence and Fear, [Page 73] engage us with the utmost Vehemence to fly from, and guard against, those Things that we abhor and dread, as tending to our Misery. And as Benevolence, Compassion and Gratitude, in­spire us with a Delight in all those good Offices in which both our personal and social Happiness consists; so Malevolence, Aversion and Anger, are useful to inspire us with Indignation and Zeal, in opposing all those impious and injurious Practices that tend to the Mischief and Misery of Society in general, as well as each particular Person.

§ 4. SO that the Passions are designed to be, and are, in their Nature,Of the due Govern­ment of them. capable of being subservient to a Multitude of excellent Purposes; and all that is ne­cessary to render them so, is, that there be a right Judgment made, what Objects we ought to affect or disaffect, as being really connected with our Happiness or Misery, either personal or social; and that they be duly ballanced one with another, and rightly governed and moderated in Proportion to the real Value and Importance of their respective Objects. And for this Purpose were we furnished with the Pow­ers of Reason and Conscience, that they might preside oyer our Passions, and make a right Judgment of their several Objects, and thence prescribe Laws to them, and restrain them from all Exorbitancies and Irregularities; that we might know what we ought to love or hate, to hope for or fear, to be pleased or displeased with, and in what Proportion, and not to suffer them to ex­ceed the real Value and Importance of Things with regard to our true Happiness. Since, there­fore, the great Author of our Nature aims at our Happiness, and hath given us our Passions [Page 74] to be subservient to it, and furnished us with Reason, to govern and regulate them in such a Manner as to render them useful to that End, it must be his Will and Law, and the Law of our Nature, that we should duly exercise our Reason in the right Government of them, so as not to suffer them to hurry us on into such Actions as our Reason and Conscience disallow, as being contrary to the eternal Laws of Justice and Be­nevolence: And one of the chief Concerns in Culture and Education is, to discipline and mo­derate the Passions, and to inure them to a ready Submission to the Dictates of Reason and Con­science.

§ 5. AND lastly, in consequence of any Ob­ject's appearing agreeable or disagree­able to our Minds,Of Will, Activity and Liber­ty. as tending to our Pleasure or Uneasiness, and being ac­cordingly affected or disaffected, the last Things I mentioned, of which we are conscious in ourselves, and which I shall here briefly take together, are the Powers of chusing the one, and refusing the other, and our Wills to act, or not to act, with a Power of free Activity, whereby we are able spontaneously to ex­ert ourselves for obtaining the one, and avoiding the other. Now, as our true Happiness consists in being secure from all Pain or Uneasiness, which is called natural Evil, and in being possessed of such Pleasures and Satisfactions as are suitable to our Nature in the Whole of it, which are called na­tural Good; so our highest natural Perfection con­sists in being capable of rightly judging and chu­sing for ourselves, and of a free and vigorous Activity, conformable to our best Judgment and Choice, for avoiding the one, and attaining the [Page 75] other. And as our Reason was plainly given us, to enable us to make a right Judgment what we ought to chuse and avoid, and to do and forbear, in order to our true Happiness, in the Whole of our Nature and Duration; and our Will consists in freely resolving and determining ourselves to the one or the other, as they shall appear to our Judgment; so our highest moral Perfection con­sists in actually making a right Judgment, what we ought to affect or disaffect, and to do and forbear; and in freely and habitually exerting our­selves in chusing and doing the one, and rejecting and forbearing the other, conformable thereunto. I say freely; for Freedom or Liberty consisteth in having a Power to act, or not to act, as we please, and consequently to suspend judging or acting, till we have taken Opportunity to make as deli­berate and exact a Judgment as ever we can, what is best for us in the Whole, to do or for­bear; as Necessity, on the other Hand, consider­ed as opposed to Liberty, implieth, that it is out of our Power to suspend acting, or to do other­wise than we do, in which Case there can be nei­ther Praise nor Blame.

§ 6. I SAY our highest moral Perfection con­sists in freely doing what we know tends to make us intirely happy in the Whole of our Nature and Duration:Of the right go­verning our Activity & our highest moral Per­fection. But then it must be considered, that, as GOD is our chief Good, our great Creator, Preserver and Governor, on whom we do intirely depend for our Being, and for all our Happiness, and all our Hopes; and as he wills our Happiness, as his End in giving and continuing our Beings, and consequently every Thing as a Means, that [Page 76] is conducive to it; so it must be supposed to be implied in our highest moral Perfection, that we be intirely devoted to Him, and do every Thing conducive to our Happiness, in Relation to Him, ourselves, and one another, in a designed Con­formity to Him as our great Original and Pat­tern, and in Compliance with his Will, and from a Sense of Duty to Him as our supreme moral Governor. And consequently, that, as by Rea­son of our great Ignorance and Weakness, we stand in much Need of his Instruction and As­sistance, in order to judge what is truly condu­cive to our Happiness, and to put it in Practice; it must imply a most grateful and ready Sub­mission to his Instructions and Injunctions, and Dependance upon his Aids and Assistances to ren­der all our Endeavours successful, in the Pursuit of our true and everlasting Happiness. But the more particular Prosecution of these Subjects will be the Business of Ethics or Moral Philoso­phy, especially as it is improved by Christianity.

CHAP. VI. Of the Progress of the Mind, from its first Notices, towards its utmost Perfection.

§ 1. MEAN time, I would, in Pursu­ance of my first Design, make a few Observations,Of the Mind's Progress, from its first No­tices. agreeable to the Sketch here laid down, on the gradual Pro­gress of the human Mind, from the first Notices of Sense and Intellect, to its highest Perfection and Happiness. And as to its first Notices, they are doubtless those of Sense, but directly [Page 77] joined with a Consciousness of its Perceptions.— Warmth and Hunger, and probably some Pains, are, perhaps, all the Sensations it hath before its Birth; and when it comes into the Light of this World, it is directly impressed with the Sense of Light and Colours, as well as Sounds, Tastes, Odours, and frequent uneasy and painful Sensa­tions, &c. all which still more and more awaken its Consciousness; and every fresh Notice of Sense and Consciousness, still goes on to excite its Ad­miration, and engage its Attention. And being a perfect Stranger to every Thing about it, it hath every Thing to learn; to which it diligently applies itself, as its Consciousness more and more awakens, upon the Repetition, every Moment, of fresh Impressions of Sense; till, by Degrees, having a great Number of Feelings, Tastes, Odours, Sounds, and visible Objects, frequently repeating their several Impressions, its conscious Memory still enlarging, it begins, by Means of the intellectual Light, with which it finds its Consciousness attended, gradually to collect and recollect the several Relations and Connections it observes to obtain among its various Ideas: And at length, when it is in Ease, it discovereth a won­derful Curiosity and Delight in observing these Connections, as well as being impressed with new Ideas.

§ 2. IT hath been made very evident both by Reasoning and Experiment,Of its Learning, Connexions and Lan­guages. ^* "That the Objects of Sight and Touch are in­tirely different and distinct Things; that there is no necessary Connection be­tween them; that Things visible are only arbitrary Signs of Things tangible; [Page 78] that the one hath the Nature of a Language with Regard to the other, and that the Connec­tion between them is to be learned only by Expe­rience, as that between Words and the Things signified by them:" And particularly, that as all visible Objects or Ideas are only in the Mind; so a Man born blind, and made to see, which must also be the Case of Infants, can have at first no Notion of Distance, nor of any Connec­tion between Things visible and tangible, and con­sequently, that both Distance and that Connec­tion must be learn'd by long Trial and Experi­ence. It must, therefore, be a Matter of great Exercise of Thought in an infant Mind to learn this Connection, and particularly, to learn the Notion of the various Distances and Situations of Things tangible, by its Observations on the various Degrees of Strength or Weakness, of Vividness or Faintness of the Light reflected from them, in the Things visible constantly connected with them. And, at the same time that it hath these Things to learn, which must be a laborious Work, as being the same Thing with learning a Language, it is also learning the Names of Things, and the Connection and Use of Words, which is another Language. And, as if all these were not Task enough, it hath all this While, to be learning how to use its Limbs; its Hands in handling, its Tongue, and other Organs of Speech, in making and imitating Sounds, and its whole Body in all its Exertions, and particularly, at length, the Poize of its Center of Gravity, and the Use of its Feet in walking.

§ 3. ALL these Things require a great deal of earnest Application, and the Exercise of much Thought and Experience: So that it seems evi­dent [Page 79] that those little Creatures, from the Begin­ning, do consider, reflect and think a prodigious deal more than we are commonly apt to imagine;Of the Ca­pacity of Children, and the Re­gard due to them. and I do not see how we can avoid admitting that the Soul's Capacity is as great from the first Moment as ever it is. For it is plain, from what hath been said, that they learn two distinct Languages within the two first Years of their Life to a good Degree of Perfection; I mean the Connection between tangi­ble and visible Objects, and between both of them and Words, and besides this, a considera­ble Degree of Dexterity in the Use of their Limbs, which is, doubtless, a great deal more than they ever learn in so much Time afterwards. And consequently the Reason why there appear so many little, low, weak and childish Things in them, which we are apt to despise and think them beneath our Notice, is not for want of good Sense and Capacity, but meerly for want of Ex­perience and Opportunity for intellectual Im­provements. Hence also it appears, that we ought to think little Children to be Persons of much more Importance than we usually appre­hend them to be; and how indulgent we should be to their inquisitive Curiosity as being Strangers; with how much Candour, Patience and Care, we ought to bear with them and instruct them; with how much Decency, Honour and Integrity, we ought to treat them; and how careful it concerns us to be, not to say or do any Thing to them, or before them, that savours of Falshood or Deceit, or that is in any Kind indecent or vitious. Pueris maxima debetur Reverentia, is a good trite old Saying.

[Page 80]§ 4. FOR it is to be observed, in the next Place,Of their Knowledge of Persons, Relations and Duties. that while Children are acquir­ing a general Knowledge of the sensible World about them, they are at the same time learning the Knowledge of the Persons with whom they converse; their Dependence on them, and the Re­lations they stand in to them; and a Notion of meum and tuum, and thence a very quick Sense of Justice and Injury, as well as of good Usage, Be­nevolence and Gratitude; all which appear obvi­ous to them from Consciousness and Reflection, and Attention to that inward, intuitive, intellectu­al Light, which as I have observed (Chap. I. § 13. 14.) perpetually shines in upon their little Minds, from the DEITY, the Father of Lights, and the Father of their Spirits. Hence they soon apprehend the Relations of Causes and Effects, of Whole and Parts, of Things equal, greater or less, of Things like and unlike, of the same and Things different and contrary, of general Names and Notions, and Analogies from Things sensible to Things spiritual and moral, of Actions necessary and voluntary, and of Things done with Design and by Accident, &c. And by Reflection and Observation they judge of others by them­selves: So that in three or four Years, they do, with a litttle Teaching, begin to have a Notion of Persons, as being an intirely different and distinct Sort of Beings from meer Objects of Sense. They soon know that a Stone in falling, the Wa­ter in running, the Wind in blowing, and the Fire in burning, &c. knows not what it does, and neither acts voluntarily, nor with Design: Where­as a Man or a Boy, they apprehend, if he does what is either pleasing or displeasing, beneficial [Page 81] or injurious to them, he knows what he does, and designs to do it, and might, if he would, do otherwise. From whence, as I said, they have a quick Sense of good or ill Usage, and consequently, of Right and Wrong, and of Gra­titude or Resentment, according as they take themselves to be well, or ill treated.

§ 5. HENCE, with regard to what they do themselves, they, by Reflection,Of their Notions of Praise and Blame, Shame and Guilt, &c. soon acquire the Notions of Free-Agency, and of Praise or Blame, according as they are conscious of their doing well or ill; i. e. according as they are sensi­ble they act a fit and a reasonable Part on the one Hand, or an unreasonable and injurious Part on the other. Thence they soon learn to have a Sense of Shame and Guilt upon their Consciousness of having done amiss, and of Satisfaction and Self-applause, when they think they have done well. And hence they quickly learn the Notions of Law, Conscience, Sin and Duty, especially if they have had the Rules explained, and been duly chastized or ap­plauded when they have done ill or well, by those on whom they know they have a Dependance, and to whom they find themselves accountable; and to whom to account, as being both their Be­nefactors and Governors, they are conscious it is fit and reasonable, as they know they stand in much Need of their Help and Conduct in order to their own Well-being. All these Things are obvious in Children of four, five and six Years old, and manifestly derive from that intellectual Light, of which I have often been speaking: And the great Concern of Culture, and a right Education, is to awaken their Attention to this [Page 82] inward intuitive Sense of True and False, Good and Bad, Right and Wrong; and to fix their Attachment to the one, and their Aversion to the other, by steadily affecting them with Applause or Blame, Pleasure or Pain, Joy or Grief, according as they affect or do the one or the other.

§ 6. AND as the Intellect and Reason of Children thus manifestly appears to dawn and improve,How they should be treated, & taught the Notion of the Deity, and their Duty to him. it ought to be continually encouraged and assisted by those that are about them, and especi­ally those that have the Conduct of them. As they are got into a World wherein every Thing is new and strange to them, and for want of Knowledge and Experience, they are liable to many Mistakes in their Ap­prehensions, and to make a thousand Blunders in their Actions and Conduct; and yet in their original Simplicity and Well-meaning, are ordi­narily very inquisitive, and willing to be taught and conducted; it is mightily incumbent on those to whose Care they are by Providence commit­ted, whether Parents, Nurses, Guardians, Ma­sters or Tutors, to consider them, with great Candor, as Strangers that need to be conducted and assisted; to be ready to answer their little Questions, and to teach them to reason by can­didly reasoning with them; and to apply them­selves with great Tenderness, Patience and As­siduity, to guide and instruct them. And as they grow capable of considering the Connections of Causes and Effects, &c. they should open their Minds, and turn their Attention to the Survey of all Nature, and lead them to observe the Contrivance, Beauty and Usefulness of every [Page 83] Thing before their Eyes, and especially those Things they find most necessary, useful and plea­sing to themselves, and on which their own Sub­sistance and Comfort more immediately depend; and thence conduct them to the Apprehension, and some just Conceptions, of the true Cause of every Thing in all Nature, who is truly their Father and Author, and upholdeth their Souls in Life, and replenisheth them with his Loving Kind­ness and tender Mercies; and who is the great common Father and Lord of all Things, both in Heaven and Earth: And from these Appre­hensions, it will be easy to teach them to deduce their Duty and Obligations to Him, of Love, Gratitude, Trust, Resignation and Obedience, and to be as like Him as ever they are able, pure as He is pure, righteous as He is righteous, and kind and merciful as He is; and to praise Him daily for every Thing they enjoy, and pray to Him for whatsoever they want, and to live un­der an habitual Sense of their Dependance upon Him, and Obligations to His infinite Goodness: To which Purposes, let them not only be taught to live in the daily Exercise of Devotion by them­selves, but also steadily attend on the publick Worship, both in the Family, and at the Church, where the Sight and Example of others, will mightily contribute to awaken and keep alive in their Minds a Sense of these Things, which will be apt strongly to influence the Conduct of their whole Lives.

§ 7.Of moral & political Connections and Duties. AND as they begin to grow ac­quainted with the Family and Neigh­bourhood, and their Connections with these and those that are about them, and to see how their own Comfort [Page 84] and Well-being depends on the Esteem, Love and good Offices of others, and that these de­pend on their own good Conduct, and good Of­fices towards them; they should have it incul­cated upon them, that as they would be secure from all Injuries, and the ill Treatment of others, so they must avoid every Thing that is injurious and abusive towards them; and as they would expect the Benevolence and good Offices of others, they must be full of Good-will, and ready to every good Office towards them; and conse­quently, delight in every honest, faithful, kind and obliging Thing, whereby they may recom­mend themselves to the Confidence, Esteem and Good-will of all Mankind with whom they have to do. And as they go on to enlarge their Ac­quaintance with the World about them, and to have a Notion of their Connections with the Town in which they live, and the Government and Kingdom to which they belong, and, in ge­neral, with the whole Species; they should be led on to a Sense of Order and publick Virtue, and the Love of their Country, and finally of the whole human Kind, and to look for their own Weal in that of the whole Community, and even of the whole moral System, and to a Con­duct corresponding thereunto.

§ 8. AND, as from their early Acquaintance with the Objects of their Appetites, Of mode­rating their Appetites & Passions. from whence they derive a very ex­quisite Pleasure, they contract a vio­lent Attachment to them, and an Impatience of whatever may interrupt or controul their Gratification; and as this Im­petuosity is, in many Instances, utterly incon­sistent with their Duty and true Interest, both [Page 85] with regard to God and Man, and a strong Temptation to the Violation of it; they should, from the Beginning, be taught and inured to the Practice of Self-denial, and the Moderation and Restraint of their Appetites and Passions, and, as far as they are capable, be shewn the Reason­ableness and Necessity of their so doing, in order to their own truest Interest. In order to which, the widely different Natures and Interests of Soul and Body, and of Time and Eternity, should be explained to them, with the Evidences of a future State; and consequently, of how much Importance it is to them to be, in a good Mea­sure, disengaged from the Body and Time, so short and uncertain; and to cultivate the Soul, and improve it in Knowledge and Virtue, of which they can never be dispossessed, not even by Death itself, they being Treasures which they can carry with them into another State, and that will last for ever. And as our real Well-being de­pends on Order, and as this depends on Law and Rule, of the Fitness of which, they are not yet competent Judges; tho' they are to be led to reason and judge for themselves, as fast as their Capacity will admit of it; in the mean time, they should be taught and inured to Humility, and Obedience to Government, and even to an implicit Obedience, till they are able to judge for themselves, and be kept, as much as possible, from all bad Company, which will be extremely apt to mislead them.

§ 9. AND as it is to be supposed, that Chil­dren have all along,Of Read­ing and Writing. from their first Capacity for it, been taught to read and write, it concerns those who have the Conduct of them, to put them [Page 86] upon the Practice of Reading and Writing, parti­cularly with a View at enlarging and improving their Minds, by directing them to read the most in­structive and engaging Things in History, Poetry, and Morality, and especially the most instructive and useful Things in the Holy Scriptures; at the same time awakening their Attention to them, and a right Understanding of them: To which Purpose, putting them upon writing out the most striking Passages would be very conducive; as by this Means their Attention would be the more en­gaged, and they would have a little Treasure of their own of the wisest and most useful Things, and would put the greater Value upon them, under the Notion of their being a Treasure of their own. And, by the Way, Care should be taken, as far as can consist with good Govern­ment, to contrive to put and keep them always in a good Humour, which will make every Thing take the better Effect.

§ 10. BY this Time they may begin to be led to a Sense of the Charms of Mu­sick,Of Mu­sick, Num­bers, Fi­gures, Globes, &c. and the Mysteries of Numbers and geometrical Figures, and the Reasonings and Operations relating to them, as far as their Capacities will admit, which are of the greatest Use, as they tend to ripen their Minds, by inuring them to strong Application, and a close Way of thinking. But Care should be taken that these Exercises do not consist of meer Abstractions, and barren and useless Speculations, but be turn­ed as much as possible to Facts, and Things practical and useful in Life. And by the Time they are ten or twelve Years old, they may be taught from Maps, a general Notion of the [Page 87] Earth, the Situation of the several Countries and Kingdoms upon it, and considerable of the Hi­story of the several Nations inhabiting it; and at the same time, from Schemes and Globes, con­siderable Notion of the Heavens, and the Sy­stem of the World in general, as well as this Globe of the Earth in particular: All which, would vastly tend to enlarge their Minds, and give them a great and generous Way of Thinking.

§ 11. AND now if they are designed for a publick Education,Of Gram­mar, Lan­guages, Oratory, History, Poetry, &c. they are to be taught the Principles of Grammar and Language, in which they should, in­deed, begin to be initiated by six or seven Years old; and the Connection between their own and other Lan­guages, should be carefully explained, by instructing them in an English, La­tin and French Grammar, at the same time: So that by Twelve or Fourteen, they may become pretty well versed in the Construction of Speech, both Latin and French, as well as English; and in Two or Three more, of Greek and Hebrew, that they may be able to read the holy Scriptures in those venerable and noble Languages of An­tiquity, in which they were at first written, and other excellent Pieces of Oratory, History, Poetry, and Morality, which were the greatest Works of Genius, and have stood the Test of Time, and been handed down to us thro' the several Ages of Mankind: All which are of great Use to refine and polish the Mind, and give it a no­ble Taste for the sublimest Beauties, as well as the justest Sentiments, and the finest Maxims of true Wisdom; which, therefore should be care­fully pointed out, and illustrated to them, relat­ing [Page 88] both to Things human and divine: Particu­larly some good Rhetoric and Poetry, with the Mythology of the Ancients, should now be ex­plained, and they should begin to be well versed in the History of the World, both sacred and prophane, and with it, the Knowledge both of the Times and Places of the several Facts, from Geography and Chronology, both ancient and mo­dern. I would have them carried as far as may be in these Things by the Time they arrive at the Age of Sixteen or Eighteen.

§ 12. AND now it will be time for them to have their Minds closely turned in­ward upon themselves,Of Meta­physicks, Logick and Criticism. to take an ex­act View of their intellectual Powers, and the Objects of them, by the Stu­dies of Metaphysicks and Logicks, in which they are taught the great Principles of first Self-evident Truth, and how to make Deduc­tions from them; a thorough Knowledge of the Operations and Procedure of the Mind, and a just Notion of right Reasoning, and of ranging and methodizing their Thoughts, from the seve­ral Relations and Connections of Things. And upon this should at the same time be built a more critical Knowledge of Language, and its Procedure from literal, to just figurative Ex­pressions of the Sense of the Mind; and from the true Art of Reasoning, which addresseth the Understanding, to the right Art of Persuading, in Address to the Passions; which should be taught in such a Manner, as to be so far from clouding, dazzling and misguiding the Under­standing, as to be rather subservient to it, by giv­ing it a clearer Apprehension of its Objects, and more strongly engaging its Attention to the [Page 89] Truth, and Right of the Case, as well as a Love to it, and Delight in it. To which Pur­pose, the various Stiles in just Writing, cor­responding to the various Subjects and Purposes, should be critically understood, and every Thing in Thinking and Speaking be reduced to the Standard of Truth and Nature, without any So­phistry, Disguise or false Colouring.

§ 13. AND then, from the Doctrine of just Reasoning and exact Speaking,Of Mathe­maticks, & the fine Arts. it will be proper, in the next Place, to lead the Mind on to the sublime Mathema­ticks (the first and easiest Things of this Kind, being supposed to be alrea­dy known.) And here there opens a spacious Field of Certainty and Demonstration, highly raising and improving the Mind in a vast Scene of eternal Truths, in the Doctrine of Numbers and Magnitudes, and their various Proportions; and that wonderful Engine of Mathematical Rea­soning Algebra, by the Help of which, the Mind works itself into the Discovery and Understanding of the sublimest Truths, and traverseth the whole visible Creation of God, in which all Things are found to be done conformable to those sublime Principles. And as the Mind is supposed to have been already conversant in Eloquence, Poetry and Musick, so it should now be led into a Taste of the other fine Arts, Painting, Sculpture and Ar­chitecture, which do in some Measure depend on the Knowledge of mathematical Proportions.

§ 14. I COULD wish the Minds of Children, as I observed above,Of Physicks and Astro­nomy. were early initi­ated in the Study of Nature, by being led into the easiest and most delight­ful Things in Natural History, and a [Page 90] general Survey of the mighty Works of God, both in Heaven and Earth; to which, as they further ripen, their Attention should be now more strongly turned by a Variety of Experiments. And when they are furnished with a considerable Apparatus in the Skill of mathematical Reason­ing, they should next be taught to apply it in Physicks, or the Study of Nature, the Laws of Motion, Gravitation, Elasticity, Light, Colours, Sounds and other sensible Qualities; and from thence proceed to the Knowledge of every Thing that can be discovered in the Elements, Earth, Water, Air and Fire, and in all the various Tribes of Creatures in this terraqueous Globe, both Mineral, Vegetable and Animal; in all which they must be led to take Notice of the wonder­ful Art, Connections, Design and Contrivances that manifestly appear in them all, and of every Thing that is useful for the Comfort and Ele­gance of Life, while we continue in this present State. And in consequence of these Things, they should be further led on to observe and under­stand the Connection of this Globe itself, and all the Creatures in it, with the Sun, the Fountain of all Light and Life to the whole System of the Planets and Comets belonging to him, and de­pending on him, and the prodigious Host of Stars analogous to him, on whom the like Sy­stems may be supposed to depend, which are the Subjects of Astronomy. And here, the Contem­plation of that World of Things extremely lit­tle beneath us, as well as Things vastly great, distant and remote from us, alike beyond the Ken of the naked Eye, and discovered only by the Help of Optic Glasses, equally demand their Attention, prodigiously enlarge their Imaginations [Page 91] and Understandings, and, at the same time, lead them to the most grand and august Apprehen­sions of the DEITY, and of his most exten­sive Benevolence to all his whole Family, in Hea­ven and Earth. And from a Sense of the Beau­ty, Harmony, Order and Usefulness appearing in the whole System of Nature, they are led to a Sense of the like Beauty, Harmony and Order, which ought to obtain in the moral System, and the Hap­piness resulting from it, which now should be the Subject of their most intense Study, accord­ing to that excellent Saying of Tully; Homo or­tus est ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum.

§ 15. FOR as the Mind, from the first Dawn­ing of Intellect and Reason, hath been supposed, from the Contemplation of it­self,Of Theo­logy and Morals. and the sensible World surrounding it, and the Instruction of those about it, to be convinced of the Existence of the DEITY, the Author of all Things, and gradually attain­ing just Notions of Him who is the great Fa­ther of Spirits; so now it must be led on further, in Moral Philosophy, Theology, Ethics, &c. to the Contemplation of Him, and that World of Spirits derived from Him, dependent on Him, and subjected to his supreme Dominion and Go­vernment, in which he seeks to lead them gra­dually on thro' a Course of Discipline, to their highest Perfection and Happiness in their Know­ledge of Him, Conformity to Him, and Enjoy­ment of Him, their sovereign Good, as the great End of their Existence, and all his Dispensations towards them. Here then opens another vast Scene of necessary and eternal Truths. In order to which, the first Study is to gain a right Know­ledge of ourselves, our own intellectual and ac­tive [Page 92] Powers, our various Affections and Exer­tions, by Conciousness and Reflection; and thence to form a Notion, not only of other created Spi­rits, but especially of GOD the great Parent Spirit, by substituting the greatest both natural and moral Perfections we find in ourselves where­with to conceive of Him and his Dispensa­tions towards us, removing from them all Limi­tation and Imperfection. And by the intellectual Light wherewith he perpetually irradiateth our Minds, we not only see his absolute Independance and necessary Existence, but also our own intire Dependance on Him, and our Relation and Obli­gations to Him; from whence evidently resulteth the Fitness, Decency and Duty of all those Affec­tions, and that Behaviour which we manifestly owe to Him, and are comprehended under the general Names of Piety and Adoration. And by the same Light attending our looking inward on ourselves, and considering our own Nature, and our Relations and Connections one with another, we, in like Manner, evidently discern what Affections and Behaviour are fit, decent and due from us to ourselves, and to each other, implied in the Terms Moderation, Probity and Benevolence; and also that Happiness and Self-enjoyment which result­eth from being conscious of our affecting and be­having accordingly, as well as the Remorse and Misery arising from our affecting and acting other­wise. Thus our Perception of eternal Truth, and Love of Order, in Conformity to it, leadeth the Mind to its Union with the eternal God, and the Happiness of his everlasting Kingdom, in the Conduct and Government of the World, which consisteth in the universal Order, Harmony and [Page 93] Happiness of all intelligent active Beings that are qualified for it.

§ 16. BUT as we are by the Condition of our Natures or Circumstances,Of Oecono­my and Po­liticks. especi­ally the human Species, cantoned out into various particular Societies, it is necessary, in order to our Perfection, that we be trained up to act a good Part, under the Discipline of these Societies in our Progress towards it. The first is that of the Family to which we belong. This leads us to the Study of OEconomy, which provideth for the Weal of these first Rudiments of Society founded in Na­ture, in which we are to be carried thro' the first Stage of Life, and fitted to act a good Part in making a further Progress towards our Perfection, under the Discipline of the civil Community to which we belong, which is founded in Compact, either explicit or tacit, being a voluntary Com­bination of a great Number of Individuals to promote their Welfare in the common Good of the whole Community; in which, each one is to seek his own Weal and Happiness, both tempo­ral and spiritual. Hence ariseth Polity, or the Art of good Government, both Civil and Ecclesiasti­cal; which consisteth in the Communities agree­ing on certain Rules and Laws founded in the common Interest, and enforced by proper Sanc­tions, in Conformity to which, every Individual is to resign to the publick or prevailing Sense (at least as far as his Duty to God will permit) as being the safest and most rational Method he can take, in order to secure his own best Interest and Happiness. To which, therefore, it will much conduce, that every one be trained up in this Spirit of Resignation to the publick Sense, as far as possible, and in an ardent Love of the pub­lick [Page 94] Good of his Country and publick Order; in an exact Knowledge of it, and the Laws founded in it, joined with a faithful Conformity to them. And lastly, in an earnest Zeal and Ac­tivity in whatever may tend to promote the pub­lick Interest; being constantly taught the Glory of publick Virtue and Usefulness, and deserving well of Mankind.

§ 17. BUT as we are attended with innu­merable Impressions of Sense,Of the In­tent and Usefulness of Revela­tion, in im­proving & advancing us to our highest Perfection. and So­licitations of Imagination and Appe­tite, continually diverting our Atten­tion and Affections from these Re­flections, and the inward Light at­tending them, and strongly tempting us to the Violation of Order and Law, both moral and political: It must be observed, lastly, that God hath from the Beginning, in great Compassion to Mankind, instructed us more perfect­ly in the Knowledge of these most important Things by Revelation, wherein He hath used a Variety of Means to engage our Attention to them, and to reclaim us to Order, and restore us to his Favour, upon our Deviation from them, in order to our true Happiness. And to these Purposes, He hath condescended to accommo­date himself to the low Capacities of the general Rate of Mankind, by using various Types and Emblems, and a most beautiful and instructive Language taken from what is familiar among us, wherewith to represent and shadow forth his Per­fections and Dispensations, which are vastly above our Comprehension; the Nature and Intent of which Language should be critically considered, and well understood; and the beautiful Analogies [Page 95] drawn from Things sensible and imaginable, to Things intelligible, spiritual and moral. Parti­cularly, in the Dispensation of his Grace, for our Recovery from the Power and Guilt of Sin, to his Image and Favour, by the Mediation, of his Son, and the Influence of his Spirit. It is not his Design to teach us precise Philosophical No­tions and Verities, as Matters of meer Specula­tion, but rather chiefly by as exact Conceptions as we are at present capable of, borrowed from Things common and familiar to us, to promote in us pure and holy Affections, and all Manner of virtuous Dispositions and Practices; to wean and disengage us from fleeting and sensible Things, and low animal Pursuits and Gratifica­cations, which we are shortly to leave; and to awaken and engage our Attention to spiritual, eternal and immutable Things, the Objects of Rea­son and Faith; that we may not look at the Things that are seen, which are temporal, but may look through them to the Things that are not seen, which are eternal; and that we may learn to love and delight in Him, who is all in all, our chief and sovereign Good, and to advance ourselves to as near a Resemblance to Him as our Natures will admit of; that by our Conformity to Him, and the Imitation of Him, we may, through the great Mediator, his blessed Son, and by the Help of his holy Spirit, be entirely secure of his Fa­vour, and for ever happy in Him, ourselves and one another. Here then we arrive at our perfect Consummation and Bliss; our highest Perfection and Happiness, both intellectual and moral, in the clearest Knowledge of Him and ourselves, that our Minds can admit of, and the intire Uni­on of our Wills, Affections and Behaviour to [Page 96] his Will, and the Purity and Holiness of his Nature, and the blessed Designs of his Kingdom. So that it is by this holy Discipline of Christianity that we are daily to inure ourselves to a due Disen­gagedness from this uncertain sensible Scene, and to improve ourselves in the Knowledge and Love of Things unchangeable and eternal, and in the Exercise of Devotion towards GOD, and the Imitation of Him, till we are qualified to quit this our present Station, and enter upon that eter­nal Life of Contemplation and Devotion, and of universal Purity, Probity and Benevolence, which is to be our highest Perfection and ever­lasting Happiness in the future State of our Ex­istence.