An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe. Published (here) for the information of the inhabitants of New-England.

An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe. Published (here) for the information of the inhabitants of New-England.

Table of contents

Title page

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE REASONS OF THE Conduct of Great Britain, &c.

[Page]

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE REASONS OF THE Conduct of Great Britain, &c.

THE whole Face of Affairs in Europe is, within the space of the last Year, so much altered, that it is almost impossible for the most unconcerned Spectator to prevent his Thoughts from running out into Questions and Suppositions about it. Curiosity it self, the lowest Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its Way into such a Scene: And will expect, or invent, some Account of so surprizing a Change; from a Calm hardly paralleled by any past Prosperity, to a sudden Gathering of Clouds; which, if not soon dissipated, must burst, and discharge themselves some where or other.

But when Self-Interest is joined to this natural Curiosity, and it becomes a personal and [Page] National Concern, to know the main Causes and Springs of such Events, as All are interested in; there seems then to be a Right, strictly so called, to demand and receive all the Satisfaction the Nature of such Affairs can permit to be given. In a free Nation especially, where no Resolutions can be effectual without the Consent and support of the Community, every Man, who can think at all, will think it an injurious Treatment, if, at a proper Time, and in a proper Manner, some Light be not held forth to him; and some satisfactory Solution given of such Appearances, as must otherwise very much perplex and disturb him. And one Thing Governours themselves are sure to find, That unless they shew such a Regard to Those who justly think they have a Claim to it, this Evil will come to pass, that Mankind (always disposed enough towards Dissatisfaction, either through a sort of natural Ill-will to Those above them, or through a Weariness under the Continuance of the same Administration, or through an affected Popularity, or real Patriotism not sufficiently instructed) will take that Side of the Prospect to dwell upon, which will af [...]d them most Matter for Satyr at Home; and lay all the Load upon the Conduct of Those, in whose Time of Power such a Crisis of Political Affairs appears in the World.

All this was never more true, than in this Nation, and at this Time. Every Briton who, either by his Treasure or his Blood, by his Vote or his Interest, by his Person or his Representative, has in Time past bor'n any part [Page]in procuring the common Peace, and establishing the several Interests of Europe: Every such Member of the British Nation, who, by this Time flatter'd himself with Hopes of enjoying the Result of all our Toil, and Taxes, and Blood, in an Universal Peace, and an extended undisturbed Commerce, has a Right to ask,— How comes this Face of Things to be again overclouded?—All Europe once more in Agitation— Three Fleets from Britain fitted out at a Great Expence, and with the utmost Expedition sent to several parts of the World:—And, what is most unaccountable, the Emperor and Spain, Powers that could hardly be kept within the Bounds of common Decency, towards one another, by all the Address of two powerful Mediators in a publick Treaty, abandoning that Mediation; and, in the middle of it, privately running into one another's Arms, and uniting, in Designs destructive to the Commerce and Rights of other Nations, with all the Marks of Cordial Affection, and a Resolute Friendship.

Is not This, the King of Spain—of that Country, which has always felt the Want of the Friendship of Britain, more than of That of all other Nations besides; to such a Degree, that it has passed into a Proverb throughout the Kingdom, Paz con Inglatérra, con todos otros la Guerra: Peace with England, and War with all the World besides? — of that Country, which reaps more Advantage from the Trade with England, than from that of all its other Neighbours put together?—And, Is not this [Page]the same King, whose Engagements to the Interests and Possessions of Britain in his Country, are as solemn and strong, as the most express Treaties can make them?—The same, who just before the Opening the Congress at Cambray, owned and ratified them all, by acceding in Form to the Quadruple Alliance; and accepting, by That, the Mediation of Britain and France?

And above all, if we turn our Eyes to the Emperor; Is not This the Prince, whom we once bore upon our Shoulders, out of the Reach of all his Enemies, and supported by our Strength, in the Time of his own greatest Weakness?— The Prince, whom our Zeal, and our Fleets, and our Treasure, laboured to six upon the Throne of Spain, at a Time when Difficulties and Dangers surrounded the whole Imperial House at Vienna?—And now, Vested, as we always wished Him to be, with the High and August Dignity He enjoys; Is not this the Emperor, who may justly be said to owe the Preservation even of all his Hereditary Countries, and of his Imperial Crown it self, (if we may have liberty to say so,) to that hazardous and unequalled March of the Confederate Army into Germany, and to the happy Consequences of it? To that Victory, in which the British, Dutch, Hanoverian, Prussian, and Hessian Troops bore so great a part; and, in a particular Manner, to that British General, who projected and conducted the Whole?— And the same Emperor, who, as He was throughout the last War, the chief Object of the Love and good Wishes of this Nation, so, at the End of it, was established [Page]in the Possession of Flanders; and owes Ostend it self to those victorious Arms, which had before supported his Person, and preserved the Empire for him? And all this long Scene of Service and Toil, entred into and prosecuted by us, We must own, against the repeatad Remonstrances of many, that We were hastening apace to make Him a Power too great and too formidable; and that we should find in Him at last, the Enemy we then dreaded only in another.

It is natural for every Briton to look back, and to ask these and the like Questions. And the next Thought which succeeds, is almost as natural; That it is hardly to be supposed, that these Powers should take such Steps, without something to justify them. We can hardly imagine it possible, That, without some real and high Provocation, the Emperor could throw any the least Indignity upon the Crown of Great Britain; or act any injurious or even hard Part towards a Nation who had sacrificed so much Treasure and so much Blood to his Service. And therefore we are apt enough to conclude, (and have Reason to do so, till we find it otherwise) That some great Mismanagement on the Part of Britain; some unjustifiable Partiality towards Others; some Breach of Faith; some Outrage or other in Politicks, has been committed against his Imperial Majesty: Or, that some unpardonable Behaviour on our Part, with Regard to his just Interests, must have been the Occasion of a Conduct that so far exceeds the Common Maxims [Page]of Princes and States towards one another.

And indeed, I shall be very free to own, If this be the Case; if either solemn Treaties, or any Engagements, with the Court of Vienna, have been broke through; if either Affronts, or even Neglects, inconsistent with the Duty of a faithful Ally, have been Part of the Conduct of the present Court of Great Britain towards his Imperial Majesty; former Appearances ought not be spoken of; all past Obligations ought to be as nothing in the present Account: The Emperor has a Right to guard and strengthen himself by Treaties contrary to his former Treaties, and to act the Part He judges best for his own Honour and Security: And we of this Nation have no Right to tax Him, either with Ingratitude unprovoked, or with Breach of Faith without the Appearance of a Justification; but ought to turn all our Zeal against Those, whose Counsels, and whose Behaviour, upon this Supposition, have made such a Conduct on his part, wise, just and necessary. And the same must be acknowledged with Regard to Spain also; if any such Excuse can justly be alledged on that Side.

We will now, therefore, enquire What has been the Behaviour of the King and Nation of Great Britain, since his present Majesty came to the Throne, towards the Emperor particularly: And, as we pass, towards Spain also. And I will put the Account of this into two Periods. The first shall be, from his Majesty's Accession to the Crown, to the Opening the Congress at Cambray: The Second, from the Opening of [Page]that Congress to the Signing of the Treaty of Peace at Vienna between the Emperor and Spain.

At the Time when his Majesty came to the Throne of Great Britain, several Points of great Importance remain'd to be adjusted, before the Peace of Europe could be esteem'd as a Thing fix'd upon any lasting and solid Foundation; in particular, some Things very uneasy to the Emperor, and others very much desired by Spain. In consideration of this, his Majesty, after other previous Treaties and Conventions, enter'd directly upon these necessary Points, which were fix'd in the Treaty of London, July 22. 1718. entirely to the Enperor's Satisfaction: who was himself a Party in that Treaty, and confirm'd with his own Hand what his Ministers had before sign'd in his Name. His Italian Dominions, always dear to him, He justly thought not very secure, without the Possession of Sicily; upon which the Preservation of Naples very much depends. This great and important Point, the King of Great Britain fix'd, as a main Article of this Treaty: and engaged, in Concert with France, that, Sardinia being deliver'd up to the Emperor by Spain, the King of Sicily should accept of that Island in lieu of Sicily, which He should yield to the Emperor.

On the Part of Spain, a Favourite Point was likewise settled. Don Carlos, Son to the present Queen, was establish'd in the Succession of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia: And This consented to, by the Emperor, who alone was capable of disturbing it; and effectually guaranteed by the Powers of Britain and France. I [Page]will at present name no other Particulars, but these two principal ones. Some other Points, Circumstances, and Incidents, in order to perfect the Peace between the Emperor and Spain, remain'd to be settled in a Congress, under the Mediation of Britain and France: And this Mediation made a Part and an express Article of this Treaty of London, to which the Emperor long ago, and Spain afterwards, set their Hands, and gave their solemn Consent. The former of the two Articles now mentioned, viz. That relating to Sicily, did not long subsist in Words only; but was soon actually put in Execution; and the Emperor put in Possession of that Kingdom.

Hitherto, Nothing but Friendship appears: And perhaps Friendship to Excess. What the Emperor exceedingly desired, is granted to Him: And nothing granted to Others, but what the Emperor himself had previously consented to, as a reasonable and fitting Equivalent. Neither had the King of Spain any Reason to complain, when the Succession of Don Carlos in Italy was put in so sure a Way of taking place at the Time appointed. So far indeed, was He from it; That, before the Opening of the Congress, He himself acceded to the Treaty of London, and consented to all the Allotments made in it.

The Congress was at length open'd at Cambray, Jan. 26. N. S. 1723-4. in order to settle all remaining Uncertainties, under the Care of the two mediating Powers, Britain and France. This will be a Second Period; from this Opening at [Page] Cambray, to the opening of another Scene at Vienna. And through the whole Management of this Congress, the Part the Mediators acted, was so impartial, so equitable, so agreeable to the Treaty of London, which was the Basis of this Congress; that the most solemn Appeal may be made to Both the contesting Powers, Whether any one Step was taken, which could give any the least just Ground of Complaint. No Appeal is, indeed, necessary. The Imperial Court would loudly have complain'd of any Conduct; if there had been any towards that Court which could have deserv'd it. But there never was any Complaint of that Sort from thence: Nor indeed could there have been any made, without discovering at the same Time that there was nothing to complain of, but the too great Equity and Justice observ'd by the Mediators between the two contending Powers; and their resolute Adherence to all Treaties; and particularly to that of London, to which this Court itself had consented. Nor did Spain make the least Complaint against the Behaviour of the mediating Powers, through the whole Progress of the Mediation; but what arose from the constant Justice of the Mediators, in keeping within the Bounds of their Duty and Honour, and their not giving into any new and exorbitant Demands of that Court.

Thus, therefore, stands the Case. Whilst a Mediation was happily going on, under the Sanction of a solemn Treaty, appointing this Mediation; and this Appointment sign'd, and consented to, by these contending Crowns; without [Page]any apparent Dissatisfaction, or even the least Pretence for it, a private Treaty is enter'd into, carried on, and finish'd at Vienna; in plain Contradiction to that Article relating to the Mediation, by which They had solemnly obliged themselves to settle the Points in Difference, under the Eye and Influence of Great Britain and France: And the whole conducted with the highest Disrespect to the mediating Powers, and without the least seeming Desire of keeping the common Measures of Decency with them. Considering, therefore, only the Manner and Circumstances attending this Transaction between the Emperor and Spain, at Vienna; as it was a Violation of an express Article of a former Treaty sign'd by Themselves, and an high and unprovoked Indignity offered to the Mediators; these were alone enough to justify the Mediators, in any publick act of due Resentment of such Usage.

But so far were They from shewing any such Resentment; so far from making this open Affront, the Occasion of an open Rupture; that, when the Signing of this Treaty was first, in Form, notified to the two Courts of Britain and France; and it was declared to be no other than a Defensive one, with Regard only to the mutual Satisfaction of the Emperor and Spain; and not contradictory, but perfectly agreeable, to the Treaty of London: So far were They from improving such Usage into a publick Quarrel, that both at Home, and by their Ministers every where Abroad, They express'd a great Pleasure that the Two Powers, whom the Mediators at Cambray could not bring even to [Page]Terms of common Civility towards one another, had found the happy Means, without the Ceremony and Assistance of any Mediator, to get over Difficulties that had been declared almost insuperable; and to link themselves in the Bands of Friendship, upon Terms, not inconsistent (as it was affirm'd) with the Repose of Europe. This was the great End of the Congress itself: And, if this End were answer'd; the Mediating Powers were not sollicitous about the Means used in compassing it; but could pass over the great Disregard shewn towards Themselves, in Consideration of the solid and common Good obtain'd by this Agreement.

But in how decent a Manner soever, the Courts of Britain and France treated this Affair: Those of the Emperor and Spain saw very well that such a Step could not but be very shocking to the Mediators; and stood in need of the best Apology They could make. And very luckily (as They or their Agents thought) for Themselves, the Behaviour of the Court of France, in sending back the Infanta to Spain; joined with his Britannick Majesty's not accepting the sole Mediation at Cambray; furnished them with One as good as they could have wish'd. And therefore, the Imperial Ministers at Cambray, at London, and at Paris, were very ready at first to put it all upon this; and to declare that, the Reason of this extraordinary Step was, that the Court of France having affronted his Catholick Majesty in so high and so unpardonable a Manner, that Spain could not in Honour any longer act with the Most Christian King, as a Mediator; [Page]and the King of Great Britain having declined to act as sole Mediator, when it was propos'd to Him to do so by the Crown of Spain: This broke off all Hopes of any Effect from the Congress at Cambray; and left his Catholick Majesty nothing to do, but to fly to Vienna; and, out of a due Resentment of so great an Injury, and the Necessity of his Affairs, to throw himself entirely upon the Honour and Equity of that Court: And, more particularly, that his Imperial Majesty, upon Ripperda's first Applications, shewed a great Unwillingness to move the Negociations out of their Course at Cambray; but at last prevailed upon himself, out of Love to the Publick Tranquility, to consent to the carrying them on at Vienna, after he found it more and more plain, that the Resentment of Spain against France, and his Britannick Majesty's Refusal of the Sole Mediation, made it impossible to proceed at Cambray.

Such was the Language of the Imperialists, upon the first Notification of the Vienna Treaty, when they thought it needful to make an Apology for it. And tho' it cannot be affirmed that the Court of Spain did itself expresly offer this, as the first moving Reason of that Piece of Conduct; yet (accorning to the best Accounts from Spain) upon the first publick News of the Vienna Treaty at Madrid, the Discourses of many were taught to run that Way, and to dwell upon that same popular Topick. And without Doubt it was thought a very cunning Part, thus to attribute such a Conduct to sudden Rage and Passion; that this might [Page]afford some Colour for a Treaty in Appearance so detrimental to Spain, and a little palliate the low Terms accepted by that Crown; and by this means, as they flattered themselves, remove all Suspicion of any pernicious and unjustifiable Secret behind the Curtain, till the due Time came for revealing it.

But as Facts and Dates are stubborn Things, not to be shaken by the Sound of Words and plausible Speeches; this itself proved the most unlucky Pretence possible: and only opened a Door to the best-grounded Suspicions, that something very bad, too bad to be owned, was at the Bottom of such a Behaviour.

The Courts of Great Britain and France were not so idle Spectators of the Affairs of Europe, but that they had long before this the most evident Proofs in their Possession, that this Account of that Transaction was impossible to be true. The Resolution of the Court of France, relating to the Infanta, did not come (no, not in Suspicion) to Madrid, till March 8. N. S. 1724-5. Ripperda, who conducted the new Treaty, had been sent to Vienna above three Month before that: and even his full Powers for making this clandestine Treaty were sign'd Novem. 22. 1724. And soon after the Treaty of Peace was sign'd in form at Vienna, the publick Language at the Court of Madrid, was, That they had looked upon the Peace with the Emperor, as a Thing sure ever since the preceding March 29. on which Day a Courier was known to come from Vienna to Madrid, with the Nows of all the principal Articles being adjusted, i. e. twenty one Days only, from the Day [Page]of the first News at Madrid, of the King of France's Resolution of annulling his Marriage with the Infanta.

This is so evident a kind of Demonstration, that Persons of the lowest Understanding cannot but conclude from it, how absurd it is, to make this Resolution of the Court of France, the first Step towards an excuse for what was resolved on, and set on foot, with full Powers signed for the Purpose, above three Months before it. For who is there, that cannot immediately see, That a proceeding authorized, November 22. could not be owing to an Affront which was not heard of, till March 8. following? And that a Treaty thoroughly adjusted, in its main Articles, at Vienna, so early in March, as to be known at Madrid, the Twenty ninth of that Month, could not be so much as facilitated, or modelled by what was not known at Madrid till the Eighth of the same March: And which therefore, could not in so few Days be sent to Vienna, to operate there; and the News of that Operation be return'd to Madrid?

But, if possible, it was still more unaccountable to draw an Excuse from his Britannick Majesty's not taking upon himself the sole Mediation at Cambray: which it was well known he could not have done without an open Affront to France; and a manifest Violation of the Quadruple Alliance; besides other Inconveniencies. For it was not till March 9. 1724-5. that the Court of Spain moved this.—The Motion was then to be transmitted to London; and the Answer to it, to be sent back to Madrid. This Answer did not arrive [Page]till about April 24. following: and therefore I need not say, could not have the least Part in a Treaty set on Foot above four Months before, and sign'd in Form April 30. 1725. at Vienna, i. e. about a Week after his Majesty's declining the sole Mediation was known at Madrid; and when it was impossible to be known at Vienna. These therefore, were Pretences entirely foreign from the true Reasons of that Conduct. The Treaty of Vienna was authoritatively begun, and going forward, long before the Provocation from France could possibly palliate that clandestine and dishonourable Proceeding. And it must have been brought to perfect Maturity, before the Motion was so much as made to his Majesty to take on him the sole Mediation; because it was even sign'd in Form before the Intelligence of the King's Resolution against the sole Mediation could, with any Certainty, arrive at Vienna. And from such an Apology at the first Appearance of the new Alliance, the Courts of Britain and France had a Right to be jealous; and to suspect some Secrets of a very pernicious Nature still behind.

But we have not yet done with this first Scene. It is proper to observe, that during this whole Proceeding, and for the Space of above three Months after the News of sending back the Infanta was come from France to Madrid, the Expressions of Friendship towards the British Court, ran as high as possible at the Court of Spain, viz. to this Purpose: ‘That his Catholick Majesty was resolv'd to seperate himself for ever from France, and place his entire Friendship[Page]and Confidence solely in the King of GreatBritain: — That to this End he now desired to enter into the most strict Engagements for the rendering that Friendship perpetual. — That it was hoped, his Majesty would suffer the Negotiations at Cambray to go on under his Mediation only, INTO WHOSE HANDS HE WAS DESIROUS TO PUT ALL HIS INTERESTS,&c.’ whilst all this Time Ripperda was acting with full Powers at Vienna, in contradiction not only to this Mediation, and the Measures by which it must have been conducted, had his Majesty accepted it; but, as we shall soon see, to all subsisting Engagements, and in Violation of the Laws of Friendship and Amity between Nations. Nay, whenever that Negotiation of Ripperda's at Vienna happened to be touch'd upon, as a Piece of common Talk only, the Language of the Court of Spain was, ‘That he was an enterprising Man, and loved to make a Noise in the World:’ insinuating by this, that That Court had no Part in what Ripperda was doing at Vienna.

When his Majesty's Reasons for not taking upon himself the sole Mediation were represented at Madrid, the Force of them was acknowledged by that Court: and at the same Time a great Willingness was expressed to accept even of a Reparation from France, for the Indignity offer'd to Spain, so it might come thro' the Hands of the King of Great Britain, and the Pleasure that Court would have, upon such a Reparation, ‘in the Prosecution of the Negotiations at Cambray IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY [Page]WERE BEGUN; His Majesty being a common Friend to both Parties, and One of whose Affection Spain had so often, and particularly upon this last Occasion, received the most essential Proofs.’ I hardly need to observe, that at this very Time Things were so ripe at Vienna, that the Treaty of Peace was sign'd in Form, April 30. about seven or eight Days after this Language of Friendship at the Court of Madrid; and after these earnest Desires expressed, of the Continuation of the Negotiations at Cambray in the Manner in which they were begun

But this Way of Speaking did not cease yet: For after May 21. on which Day a Courier arrived at Madrid, with the News that the Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and Spain, was sign'd on April 30. After this publick Intelligence of a Treaty sign'd at Vienna, the Language of the Court of Spain was full of Excuses for not having communicated the Steps of this Negotiation at Vienna to his Britannick Majesty; and full of the usual Professions of ‘a particular Regard for his Friendship, and a sincere Desire of cultivating the strictest Union with him;’ together with all Assurances, ‘That nothing had been stipulated in this Treaty, in any wise prejudicial to the King, or to the Interests of his Subjects, or in the least contrary to any of the Engagements enter'd into with him, either separately or jointly with France; and Expressions of a deep Sense of the great Obligation that Court had to his Majesty for the Proofs he had so often given of his Friendship and regard for the Interest of Spain; always accompanied with [Page]the Hope, that what had happened would in no wise lessen his Majesty's Friendship, which this Court entirely depended upon, and desired to cultivate by all the Ways possible.’

There were indeed Tokens and Symptoms of Evil continually, during this whole Scene of Civility, shewing themselves; fully sufficient to guard against all Trust in any such Professions, either of the Court of Madrid, or that of Vienna: and these, succeeded by worse and worse Appearances; and at last, by such certain Proofs as can leave no doubt of a Secret Treaty of the most dangerous Consequence between the two new Allies. And I will now mention some, in the Order of their Time.

1. On May 1. O. S. 1725. the Emperor's Minister at London notified in Form to the Court of Great Britain, the Signing of a Treaty of Peace at Vienna between his Master and the King of Spain: and communicated a Copy of that Treaty at the same Time. After Assurances that this Treaty was made upon the Foot of the Quadruple Alliance, with strict Regard to all former Engagements, and the like; He expressed his Imperial Majesty's Hope, that his Britannick Majesty would accede to this Treaty; and by virtue of that Accession be Cuarantee to the Succession to the Territories of the Emperor, as settled in his Family by a late Constitution: and before he concluded, said, ‘That, after the signing of the Vienna Treaty, Ripperda acquainted the Emperor that there remain'd still some Things to regulate between the King his Master, and the King of Great Britain; and that the King of [Page] Spain requested the Emperor to make use of his Mediation, for the settling them: That the Emperor had answer'd, that if these Affairs had any Relation to the Treaty of London, or arose in consequence of that Treaty; and if it should prove agreeable to his Britannick Majesty, he would employ his Mediation; but otherwise, He would not concern himself with them.’

To all this it was answer'd, ‘That, as for the Signing of the Treaty at Vienna, it was no News here; his Majesty having Iready by a Courier received Advice of it: That, with Regard to the Guaranty mentioned, his Majesty could not consent to burthen himself with new Obligations, by being Guarantee of the Succession lately established by the Emperor; but was resolved to leave his Hands at Liberty, in order to have it in his Power to regard, and assist, his true Friends upon all Occasions that may arise; and that, as for what he had related as represented by Ripperda to his Imperial Majesty, this Court knew of nothing Britain had to settle with Spain, but some Points of Commerce, for which there could be no need of a Mediator.’

And certainly, no one can think but that it was wisely and happily judged, to refuse a Guaranty, which might have been attended with so fatal Consequences. For, as the Emperor's Children are now Females only; and the Influence of that Succession upon Europe must depend upon the Marriages of these Females; and as no one then knew, to what Princes [Page]they might be hereafter married: It was wise in his Majesty not to oblige himself to support a Succession which might possibly, by some future Marriages, become formidable to the rest of Europe; and fatal in the End to Britain it self. And as it was wise, so it is already proved to be happy, that such an Engagement was refused: For (as it will by and by appear) the Succession is already in Prospect formidable; the Archdutchesses are destin'd to the Infants of Spain, and such a Power arising from this Conjunction, as in all humane Probability may make the rest of Europe tremble.

Nor can the Argument taken from the Emperor's Guaranty of the Succession here, in his Majesty's Family, (which has been since urged,) be of any Force in this Case. For, in the first Treaty between his Majesty and the Emperor, this Prince absolutely refused to be Guarantee to our Succession; and never would hear of it, 'till by the Quadruple Alliance his Majesty had obtained for Him the great Advantage of the Possession of Sicily. As therefore, his Imperial Majesty refus'd the Guaranty of the Succession here, in his Majesty's Royal Family, in one Treaty, tho' a Treaty entered into and prosecuted with perfect Amity on both Sides; and as He would not afterwards come into it, but upon a very signal and beneficial Acquisition to himself first settled: This cannot be judged a good Argument for his Majesty, to accede to a Treaty enter'd into and finish'd, not only without his Privity; not only without any Regard to his Friendship, or any one Mark [Page]of Respect towards him; but in open Disrespect to him, as Mediator at a Congress then subsisting; and, under these very different Circumstances, to become a Guarantee of a Succession, of the Consequences of which, to his own Kingdoms, and the rest of Europe, no Judgment could be made, till the Marriages of the two Archdutchesses should come to be settled and known. But, to return to our present Subject.

This Proposal of the King's being a Guarantee for the new establish'd Succession in Germany, [to which the Emperor could not in Reason expect a Compliance] consider'd alone, gave Ground for a Suspicion, that some latent Matter for Quarrel was now treasuring up. And this Suspicion justly increased, upon the Offer of the Emperor's Mediation, coming at the same Time with this Treaty itself. For this Offer supposed Differences between Britain and Spain: And as these must be Differences without any real Ground, (every material Thing being settled by Treaties between those two Nations,) this look'd like a Design to blow up a Fire where there was none; and to presume an Uneasiness between Spain and Britain, which might be improved hereafter into an open Rupture.

It is impossible, as we pass, not to observe how very artful the Manner of this first Proposition must now appear, since Things have opened more to the Eyes of the World. The Offer, we see, is made for accomodating Differences, withont naming, or hinting at, any particular one. There would be no doubt but that the Offer was really made with Relation to [Page] Gibraltar. The Emperor's Minister was not to name this: But some time after, the Court of Madrid openly ovowed, that the Mediation of the Emperor which Spain had accepted, was a Mediation for the Restitution of Gibraltar: Nay, and some time after that, the Emperor himself, (as we shall soon see) orders his Resident here, to shew the Words in which he had obliged himself to this Mediation for Gibraltar. Again, this Offer is made, merely as arising from a Discourse of Ripperda's; without the least Hint of any Obligation upon the Emperor to make it, or to prosecute it. And afterwards, this Offer of Mediation appears, by Order of the Imperial Court, as an express Article of a Treaty between Him and Spain. But, what is still more, his Imperial Majesty by his Minister represents his Answer to Ripperda to have been, that he would not concern himself in any Affair that did not arise in consequence of the Treaty of London, not even so far as to use his Mediation: and afterwards (as it will presently appear) by his Resident here, produces the Article itself, by which he had engaged himself to use his good Offices, that is, his Mediation, for the Restitution of Gibraltar; of that Place, the Possession of which was known to be ascertained to the Crown of Great Britain by that very Treaty of London, confirming the Treaty of Utrecht; and about which therefore, it was as well known, that there could be no just Ground for a Difference.

All this sufficiently confirms, in Event, the Justice of that Suspicion of some Secret Agreements between the Emperer and Spain, which [Page]the Offer of this Mediation immediately raised in the Court of Great Britain: And this, before the Treaty of Peace now delivered could be read and considered. But,

2. When the Treaty itself was read and examined; and such Friendship was seen to be established between such Powers, upon such Terms; the Consideration of this might justly raise yet stronger Suspicions. For thus the Case appeared. Nothing was found in this Treaty of Peace, of Importance, or, so much as in Appearance, Honourable to Spain: Nothing of the Order of the Golden Fleece, which had been so much insisted on at the Congress: Nothing of the Titles to be used by these Two Powers, but what might easily have been settled there, much more to the Honour of Spain. And, if we come to Points of much more Importance; the Neutral Garrison [...] which, by the Quadruple Alliance, were to be the great Bulwarks of the Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany; and every Thing the Mediators had propos'd for his Security, and that of the Duke of Parma, were all lost to Spain by this Proceeding: Whilst the Emperor gains every Thing, and particularly the Guaranty of his own Succession by Spain, which the Imperial Ambassadors had sollicited in vain at the Congress.

To see, therefore, Two Powers, full of such a Rancour against one another as had resisted the Influence of a powerful Mediation for several Years, now in so short a Space of Time running into one another's Embraces, with so much Eagerness and Precipitations:—To find (upon comparing [Page]this new Treaty with former Pretensions,) the Crown of Spain, at Cambray, so exceedingly uneasy with the good Terms it was sure of obtaining by the Congress there; at Vienna, so readily submitting to much worse: —at Cambray, not to be satisfied with the Emperor's Faith, even with the Guaranty of Britain and France together; at Vienna, entirely depending upon the Faith of the same Emperor, without any Guaranty present or to come: — What could be collected from such an Appearance, even upon the first Reading, but that this Treaty of Peace now communicated at London, was not the sole Treaty made at Vienna; but that there must be a secret one still behind, too unjustifiable to be yet revealed? And of this more Suspicions followed thick upon one another. For,

3. Soon after the Treaty of Peace was signed at Vienna, which was April 30. 1725. Ripperda's Insolences towards his Majesty, and even Threatnings began; and from that Time continued, till it was thought more politick to be more silent. Of these, the Advices from Vienna were now perpetually full. Such, for Instance, as these that follow, were his common Discourses.

‘If King George supports France, we know very well how to place the Pretender upon the Throne. — Alberoni was a Great Man, but committed many Blunders: One great one was, That he sent the Spanish Fleet to Sicily, instead of Sending it to England, to dethrone the King; which might easily then have been done: and this once done, the Way had been made plain for every Thing else.—King George had best consider[Page]how to come to Terms with us; for we have it in our Power to push the Pretender's Interest with Efficacy.’ And in all his Discourses of this Sort, he always took it for granted, that the Court of Vienna would never make the least Hesitation to enter into all the Measures of Spain.

His Conversations of this peculiar Melignancy towards his Britannick Majesty, were without Number, and without Measure. And so far was he from seeming to desire, they might be kept secret, that one of his Speeches to his Company was this: I know all that I say, is told again. I am very glad of it. I say what I say, on Purpose that it may be told. Nor did he speak with much greater Respect of his Majesty's Allies. Particularly, upon the Mention of the Treaty of Hanover, between the Kings of Great Britain, France and Prussia, he said aloud, Yes, yes, We shall teach these little Gentlemen (Petits Messieurs) to make Treaties. And I will add here that, about this same Time, a very considerable Man in the Court of Vienna, was not much behind Ripperda himself in his Regards towards his Majesty; when, in a Conversation, upon a Person's expressing his Doubt about his Britannick Majesty's undertaking to be Guarantee of the Austrian Succession, he answered with a great deal of Emotion. Then let him look to himself; for we are well inform'd they begin to be weary of him in England.

We may well think these and many more Insults and Threatnings, from Persons of such Figure at that Time, sufficient to create new Suspicions, [Page]as well as to strengthen Those already created. Such Usage, and such Freedom of Language, could not arise out of nothing; but must be the Effect of some Agreements and Resolutions, not yet appearing to the World.

4. These Suspicions were greatly confirm'd by the Accounts from Vienna of Ripperda's Expressions of another sort, immediately after the signing the Treaty of Peace: Expressions, I mean, dropt sometimes, as it were accidentally, upon several very important Points. He did not scruple, in proper Places, and upon proper Occasions, to declare in Conversation, that Spain was engaged to support the Ostend Company; and when that led the Discourse to Gibraltar, he said, We know Gibraltar to be impragnable; but by the Measures we have now taken here, we assure Our selves we shall oblige England to give it up. At the same Time, he spake of the Marriage of Don Carlos with the eldest Archdutchess, as a Thing agreed upon; and added, the Prince of Asturias, for whom this Match was first designed, is consumptive, and can't live. And surely, such Expressions must amount to the strongest Suspicions of a Treaty, as yet Secret, of which these Three important Points must make a Part. This is the least we can say of such Discourse, coming from a Principal Agent in this New Alliance; though at this Time only in the way of accidental Conversation.

5. These Suspicions grew stonger, upon the Appearance of the Treaty of Commerce: which, tho' signed at Vienna on the Day after the Treaty of Peace, yet, was not communicated to the [Page]Court of Great Britain by the Emperor's Order: nor any Notification to this Hour, made, of such a Treaty, either before or since the Signing it. The King's Minister at Vienna procured a Copy of it, as soon as it was printed there, and transmitted it to London. When this came to be read; and when it appeared in the plainest Light, that, by the Express Words of it, such Alterations were made in the Commerce of Europe, at must begin in the Ruine of our East and West-India Trade, and end in that of all the other valuable Branches of our Commerce: What could the Court of Great Britain conclude from such a Treaty, but that even This, bad as it is, is not all; that there must be something yet unknown to put in the Balance, on the Side of Spain, for all these unparalleled Advantages given, against the express Words of former Treaties, to the Emperor and his Subjects; and that They, who were capable of entering into such Articles as these, which now appear'd, could not hope to succeed in them, without other Articles, and another Treaty, still kept in Darkness, till the proper Time of producing it should come?

6. About the End of July, or the Beginning of August, the D— of Wh—n arrived at Vienna. The Court of London was not ignorant of his real Errand: nor of the Sum of Money he received, in his Journey, towards his Expences, from the Pretender's Friends. And tho' he disguis'd his Design a little, when he first appear'd at Vienna; and pretended to his Majesty's Friends there, that his View was only to [Page]travel for a few Years, till the Memory of his Extravagancies at home might be a little effac'd, and his private Affairs in better order: yet, he quickly acted another Part in all his Conversation and Conduct. He soon grew intimate with Ripperda, with whom he had frequent Conferences, and from whom he was known to receive Money. He was admitted to the Conversation of the principal Persons of the Court of Vienna. And during his whole Stay, both He and Graham, the Pretender's Agent at Vienna, had a very particular Intimacy with the Russian Minister at that Court. At first the Project was, that He was to return to England, and do great Exploits there. But when he himself began not to think England a very safe Place for one who had laid himself open; the Design of his Return thither was laid aside; and another Plan was then concerted, of sending him to Rome to the Pretender, and from thence to Spain. And before he parted from Vienna, his intimate and Fellow Labourer Graham, had long Conferences with a Person of great Importance at that Court: as he had afterwards several others. This Conduct of Wh—n at Vienna, and of so many considerable Persons whilst he was there, still increased the Opinion, that the new Alliance could not be so innocent a Thing as the publick Treaty of Peace.

7. The smooth Language at Madrid was by this Time gradually abated, and at length quite changed. At the End of June 1725. the Court of Spain openly avowed the Acceptance of the Emperor's Mediation for the Restitution of Gibraltar; [Page]but at the same Time made the usual Professions of Friendship for the King of Great Britain, and hoped that this Acceptance of that Mediation, would not offend him. Nor did this Court make any Scruple frankly now to own that the Affair of Gibraltar had been from the Beginning a principal Point, concerted between the Emperor and Spain. In Consequence of this, about the Middle of July following, M. Grimaldo, by order of his Catholick Majesty, wrote a Letter to his Britannick Majesty's Minister at Madrid; the Conclusion of which was very Peremptory: ‘That the Continuance of the Alliance and Commerce of Great Britain with Spain, depended upon his Majesty's restoring Gibraltar forthwith.’ And the Language of this Court, from this Time, was of an insulting Strain, with Regard even to the King himself, who was then at Hanover; and in Words, not very civil, to this Effect, ‘Let him make haste home, and call his Parliament, and propose the Restitution immediately.’ This Alteration in the Language of the Court of Madrid; this demanding Gibraltar in so peremptory a Manner, which Britain possesses by Treaties sign'd by this King of Spain himself, gave another just Ground of Suspicion of a Secret Offensive Treaty, of a very pernicious Nature.

8. What confirm'd all these Suspicions very much, was, the Reception of Ripperda at Madrid; of the Man who had been the Maker of the Vienna Treaties, and who had used his Majesty in so insolent and outragious a Manner. For, as before his coming thither, no Satisfaction [Page]was ever given at Madrid, upon Complaint made of these Affronts and Threatnings: so, after it, all Honours, Profits, and Trusts, were heap'd upon him, in a Degree hardly ever known.

And it was but reasonable to conclude from hence, That, as the Court of Spain had verified one Part of his Publick Discourses at Vi [...] na, by demanding Gibraltar; so the aggrandizing and honouring him in so extravagant a Manner, without so much as the least Disavowal of his Behaviour, at Vienna, towards the King of Great Britain, was a sort of Declaration, in Effect, that his whole Conduct, of which this was so remarkable a Part, was not only not displeasing at Madrid; but perfectly agreeable to the main Design, and Tendency of the new Alliance, begun, conducted, and finish'd by this very Man at Vienna. And indeed, daring as Ripperda was, yet, it is hardly conceivable that he would have dared to have treated his Britannick Majesty, in that insolent Manner; had he not known it to be agreeable to the Tenor of the New Alliance; and been well assured he should be supported in it.

There were all Suspicions, or something stronger than Suspicions, built upon Appearances that could have no Interpretation put upon them; and could have no Meaning, nor Consistency in them; unless upon the Supposition of another Treaty between the Emperor and Spain, besides that made publick to the World. But we can still carry this Matter from Suspicion to Certainty; For,

[Page] 9. As there are Times and Seasons, when the Discovery of Secrets may be thought to be of such singular Use, as to countervail all the Inconveniencies of doing it: so it happened in this Case. Ripperda, now His Catholick Majesty's Prime Minister at Madrid, thought it of the highest Importance to use all Means to prevent the Accession of the Dutch to the Treaty of Hanover. And when he saw that other Methods failed of this Effect upon the Dutch Ambassador there; he had recourse to those which he thought would terrify the States, in their present Situation, from all Thoughts of doing it. At the beginning therefore of February, 1725-6. With the utmost Seriousness and Positiveness, he assured both the British and Dutch Minister at that Court, that there was a secret offensive Treaty between Spain and the Emperor, in which They had obliged themselves mutually to support one another in their several Demands: And of this Treaty he told them three particular Articles. I. That the Emperor was to assist Spain, in the obtaining Gibraltar. II. That Spain was to support the Emperor in his new Establishment of the Ostend Company. III. And the Third was an Article, to settle the Quotas of Money on one Side, and Soldiers on the other, for the Purposes of this secret Treaty. This was to Influence the Dutch to judge that it would be in vain to endeavour to alter or unsettle that Ostend Trade, which was so resolved upon, and so grounded.

M. de Ripperda might have added another secret Engagement, into which the Courts of Vienna and Madrid had entered; viz. to undertake [Page]the placing the Pretender on the Throne of Great Britain, and to begin with that Enterprize, before they proceeded to the Execution of their further Projects for involving all Europe in War and Confusion. Of this Engagement the Court of Great Britain received such certain Intelligence from several Quarters; that it is no more to be doubted, than These Particulars of the secret Offensive Alliance, avowed and declared by M. de Ripperda.

M. de Ripperda's profess'd Discovery of a secret Treaty, was soon farther confirmed by what followed. An Account of this frank and open Discovery was immediately sent to the Court of Great Britain. And, at the opening of the last Session of Parliament, A Noble Person in an high Station, agreeably to that Regard he owed to his Country, and to the Satisfaction due to that August Assembly, of which He was a Member, publickly declared it, in the House of Lords, as an undoubted Truth, and what Ripperda had own'd, That there was a secret Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, which contained Articles in it destructive of the Rights of Britain, both with Regard to its Possessions and its Commerce abroad. This positive and undisguised Declaration in Parliament, made a great Noise without Doors. And, upon the Signification of this, to the Court of Vienna, The Imperial Resident here was ordered to give Satisfaction to the British Court, upon this Subject. Accordingly, he came to some of His Majesty's Ministers, and read out of a Paper the Words which he said were the Contents [Page]of the Article which His Master had enter'd into, relating to Gibraltar: The which implied, that his Master had engaged to use his Good Offices for the Restitution of Gibraltar. And this was ordered to be produced, as a full and satisfactory Proof that there was no such Thing as a secret Offensive Alliance between the two New Allies. One would think indeed, that no such Effect could possibly have been intended by this Proceeding, or expected from it. For, as upon this Occasion, it might have been naturally and justly expected, as a Thing absolutely necessary to the Vindication of the Court of Vienna, that the Imperial Resident here, should have been order'd to have shewn likewise what followed immediately this Article; and indeed the Treaty it self, of which it was a part: And as neither of these was ordered or suffered to be done; the Whole of this taken together, will prove the Truth of that very imputation, which the Court of Vienna designed by this Step to vindicate itself from, as from something unjustifiable and dishonourable.

If from Vienna, we go back once again to Madrid, we shall find still more Evidences of a secret Treaty. For just about the same time that Ripperda spake so openly to the two Ambassadors, the King of Spain himself wrote a Letter to the States General for the same Purpose of keeping them from acceeding to the Treaty of Hanover: which was read in the Assembly of the States of Holland. Feb. 8. N. S. 1725-6. In this He acquaints Them, That ‘He [Page]stands obliged to assist his Imperial Majesty, in case of a War, or Insult — which He will perform — making it a common Cause — holding for Enemies Those who shall be Enemies of his Imperial Majesty.’ All which, as denounced to the States, who had no uneasiness with the Emperor, but on account of the Ostend Company, must regard only That; and can have no Meaning but this, that, if the Dutch should act, merely in their own Defence, and in support of their own Rights, against that Company; His Catholick Majesty had entered into an Engagement to assist the Emperor, and support the Ostend Company by Force, if needful: as it was explained by that King's Minister himself at the Hague, in a Declaration made by Him, ‘That His Catholick Majesty would look upon whatever should be undertaken against the Ostend Company, as done against himself.’ This is an open owning of a Treaty, besides That already Publick; and of an Engagement in it to support the Ostend Company by Force.

To proceed; When about two Months after the first Declaration made by Ripperda, it was represented at Madrid how much the Court of Great Britain was surprized at this open Discovery, made to the Two Ambassadors, of a secret Offensive Treaty: No other Reply could be obtained, but, in general Words, That the Court of Spain still desired the Friendship of Great Britain; and that the Engagements enter'd into at Vienna, would not hinder this. Nor could any thing that was urged, move that Court, either to own this secret Treaty; or at all [Page]to deny it. Very soon after this, the two Ambassadors thought it proper to have a Conference with Ripperda; in which He began a little to shuffle, and to interpret away what he had said of an Offensive Treaty, by endeavouring to persuade them, That it was little more than a Defensive One. But being press'd by Both, who agreed in what He had before told them; and required peremptorily to answer, whether he had not declared to Them expresly that there was a secret Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, He answered, That he had told them so; and added, that all he had told them was true. And how indeed could he possibly deny it, since there was not a Foreigner of any Distinction at Madrid, who had not heard him, without Reserve, declare the same about this secret Offensive Alliance? And whom can we believe in such a Case; if not a Prime Minister so often affirming a matter of Fact to so many; whilst neither the King his Master, nor any of His other Ministers at that time denied it; or at all look'd as if they had any Thoughts then of denying it?

And once more, when an Application was made at Madrid, from the British Court, with Relation particularly to the Part which Spain appeared now to take in the Affair of the Ostend Trade; at first nothing was avowed, but an Obligation to use Good Offices for accomodating that Affair. But, when a Proposal was offer'd, which the Court of Spain acknowledg'd to be a very reasonable one; and when upon this it was urg'd, That, since This Proposal was thought a reasonable One; if the Imperial Court should refuse to [Page]listen to it; This could be a just Reason why Spain should not support the Emperor any farther in what Spain it self judg'd to be unreasonable; It was answered, ‘This could not be allowed: For Spain must stand by its Engagements with the Emperor.’ This was a plain Acknowledgment of farther Engagements, and of another Sort, than those of a Friendly Accommodation; and by just Consequence, of a secret Offensive Treaty. For such Engagements must be enter'd into by Treaty; and this Treaty must be distinct from That already published, which does not contain them; and it must be an Offensive Treaty, because it is in support of an Invasion made upon the Rights of others; and in opposition to Those who act only in defense of those Rights founded upon the most solemn Treaties.

After all this, it is too late for the Court of Spain to sink the Credit of this Discovery made by Ripperda to the two Ambassadors; or to think of destroying the Credibility of what this Court it self has given Testimony to. All the Circumstances of this Affair, as I have related them, make it too plain to be now evaded: And all who know any thing of Publick Affairs, will look upon what I have now produced, as a positive and convincing Evidence of what before was only a strong Suspicion.

This therefore, we are too sure of; That the now publick Treaty of Peace, made at Vienna, was it self enter'd into without the least Provocation from the Mediators; in contradiction to an Express Article of the Quadruple Alliance, appointing this Mediation alone for the adjusting [Page]remaining Differences; cover'd all the time at Madrid with the smoothest Language, and the pretended earnest Desire of proceeding still at Cambray; and made up of Articles so dishonourable to Spain, that nothing can account for them, but the Supposition of another, and this an Offensive Treaty, yet private: That this is not only Supposition upon Conjecture; but is proved to. Us, by Arguments too strong to be denied; the repeated Affirmation of Him who was made Prime Minister of Spain after he had made this Treaty; the Acknowledgments in Effect of the Two Courts themselves of Vienna and Madrid, with regard to Gibraltar, and the Ostend Trade; and the Order from Vienna for producing at London an Article of a Treaty, in such Words and in such a manner, as makes it impossible to doubt of the Reality of it.

We will now see what Light we can get into the Nature of This so certain Offensive Alliance; and the other Treaties between the Emperor and Spain: and in what manner We Our selves are likely to be affected by Them; with regard to, the great and only Security of all our other good Things, the present Protestant Royal Family; with regard to the Possessions of Great Britain in Spain; with regard to the settled Rights and Privileges of the Nation in Trade and Commerce; and indeed, in consequence of these, with regard to our being, or not being at all, a Nation worth existing. If after this, we extend our View farther, We shall see what is likely to be the Fate of Europe; and what will become [Page]of the Ballance of Power, if the main Designs projected in this late Alliance at Vienna, should be permitted to take effect. This Enquiry is the only way to our making a true Judgment of the Steps taken by Britain, and the Powers in Alliance with it. And when we have done this, — Let them that are Blind, be blind still.

I. The first Enquiry which will offer it self, upon this Occasion, to the Mind of every True Briton, will arise from the Interest We all have, in the preservation of our present Protestant Establishment; and our concern to find out how This is already, or will probably be, affected by this New Alliance.

I know very well how easy and how common it is, to laugh at the Name of the Pretender, whenever it is mentioned upon such Occasions; as a Political Bugbear, or Scare-crow,; a mere Word of Alarm; or a Puppet to be play'd by Statesmen at their pleasure, ond whenever their Designs require it. But it would be very unfortunate for Great Britain, and end in the total Ruine of Us and our Posterity; if Those who are at the Helm, should suffer themselves, at the Pleasure of such as wish them no good, to be laugh'd out of that Care and Wakefulness which their King and their Country require of them. There is not a Day, nor an Hour, in which the necessity of Attention to this great Point, does not appear: Nor is there, I fear, any Crisis of Affairs in Europe possible, at this time, without This bearing a great part in it. And therefore, when a Breach with a Protestant King of Great Britain, who loves his Subjects too honestly to give up their greatest [Page]Concerns to the Demands of any Power upon Earth, is thought convenient and useful; no one can help concluding, from the known Principles of the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, that the Moment They resolved upon entring into an Alliance so injurious to his Britannick Majesty, and so destructive to the Interists of Britain: The same Moment another Resolution must also be taken: The Resolution of giving his Majesty all the uneasiness they could, even in his highest Rights; and either forcing Him by this Means to Their Terms; or prepairing the way for a King of Britain after their own Hearts, from whom they may expect all Submission and Compliance. But this is only a probable Argument. Let us come now to Facts.

I have already mentioned some Preliminaries; the Journey of Wh—n to Vienna, and his Conduct and Intrigues and Encouragements there; as well as Ripperda's threatning King George with the Pretender, before he left Vienna. But afterwards the Appearances of a settled Design against His Majesty and His Royal Family, soon began to thicken apace; and the Intelligences about it to be very positive, from all the Friends of Great Britain, at almost every Court of Europe.

In the first place, according to what had been before concerted at Vienna, the D— of Wh—n, with Letters Recommendatory from young Ripperda, went for Rome, directly to the Spanish Minister residing there. By this Minister, he was introduced to the Pretender. In the Pretender's House, he was kept close shut up for Six Days; to hide, if possible, his being there: And, after [Page]very close Conference, was posted away to Madrid, where old Ripperda, his great and intimate Friend, was now in high Credit and Honour.

Thither he came with Credentials from the Pretender; and, as a publick Mark of Confidence in him, adorn'd with a Garter, and a new Title; and was very kindly entertain'd at Madrid, with these open Distinctions of Treason and Perjury upon him. And tho' it was often said, and promised and sworn to, by Ripperda, that this New Agent should be sent away in twenty four Hours time; and as strongly sworn to, that he never admitted him, nor ever would, into his Company; yet he still remain'd at Madrid, without any Mark of displeasure, and was known to be frequently with Rpperda himself in close Conference. His intimacy with Count Konigsec, the Imperial Minister at Madrid, and the freedom of his Visits to him, were very remarkable, at a Time when he profess'd himself to come into Spain on no other Errand but the Pretender's Service; and this, without reserve to the English themselves at Madrid, who were in the Friendship, and even in the Service of the Crown of Britain. This made it certain, that the Business of these frequent Meetings with Persons of Character, both in the Spanish and Imperial Service, could be no other, than that which brought him to Madrid. At the same Time the late Duke of Ormond was admitted to frequent Audiences at Court: In which no one could think that the Interests of his Master were forgot. On the contrary, Now it was that several Projects for the Execution of what was the sole End of Wh—n's Journey to Madrid, [Page]were laid before the Court of Spain, to be weighed and considered in their several Probabilities.

What can the greatest Well-wisher to this New Alliance say, in Apology for this Conduct of the Court of Spain; as well these Audiences given now to the late Duke of Ormond, as the Reception of the D— of Wh—n was favour'd with, at a Time when he came directly commission'd by the Pretender, and never attempted to hide the full intent of his Journey? What can any one say, who will but read the sixth Article of the Peace of Utretcht? in which the Catholick King doth promise, as well in his own Name, as in that of his Heirs and Successors, that they will not at any time disturb or molest the Queen, her Heirs and Successors of the Protestant Line, being in the Possession of the Crown of Great Britain, and the Dominions, subject thereunto; neither will the aforesaid Catholick King, or any of his Successors, give at any time any Aid, Succour, Favour or Counsel, directly or indirectly, to any Person or Persons, who on any Cause or Pretence should hereafter endeavour to oppose the said Succession by open War, or by any Conspiracies against such Prince and Princes, possessing the Throne of Great Britain, by virtue of the Acts of Parliaments made there. And since his present Majesty came to the Throne, in Article 5. of the Quadruple Alliance, (to which Quadruple Alliance the present King of Spain acceded, before the opening of the Congress at Cambray) his Catholick Majesty (as the Emperor had done before) binds himself, his Heirs and Successors, to maintain and guaranty the Succession in the Kingdom of Great Britain, as established in [Page]the House of his Britannick Majesty now reigning; as likewise to defend all the Dominions and Provinces possessed by his Majesty; and not to give and grant any Protection or Refuge, to the Pretender (there described) or his Descendents, nor any Succour, Counsel, or Assistance whatsoever, directly or indirectly. And to observe the same, [i. e. not to give Reception, Succour, &c.] with regard to those who may be order'd or Commission'd by the said Person [the Pretender] to disturb the Government of his Britannick Majesty, or the Tranquility of his Kingdoms, &c. Let but the late and present Conduct of the Court of Spain, be compar'd with these express Stipulations; and every Reader may be left to make his own Inferences from such a Comparison. To return,

The Evil I was speaking of, was not to rest in Words and Schemes; nor were the Projects I have mentioned, only proposed in Theory. Preparations were actually made in Spain, to put the determin'd Purpose in Execution: Of which Preparations I will enumerate certain Particulars that could not be concealed.

In February 1725-6, a Resolution was taken to send a Body of Troops consisting of 12000 Men, to the Coasts of Galicia and Biscay. There were at that Time at Cadiz several Spanish Ships that were plainly designed for an Imbarkation: Two of them were of 70 Guns, one of 64, one of 56, one of 26, and one of 24; and all victuall'd for a hundred Days. And at Cadiz it now was, that 4800 Arms were known to have been bought, and destin'd to the Pretender's Service. His Majesty's Minister at Madrid, did indeed, upon the [Page]Discovery made to him of the Place where they lay in Pawn for a certain Sum, take effectual Care, by first laying down that Sum, and afterwards paying their whole Price, to keep them out of the Hands of the first Purchasers, who earnestly sollicited to have them, and frequently offer'd the Money which had been lent on them. For he knew from undoubted Intelligence, the Purpose They were intended for. Besides these Ships at Cadiz, there were likewise then in Spain, three Russian Men of War, one of 64 Guns, and the other two of about 40 Guns each, equipp'd some time before from Petersbourg, which came to Cadiz in the beginning of Winter 1725, to carry on the Pretence of Merchandize; but in December went from thence to St. Andero, and lay there the three following Months.

As to these three Ships, the Court of Great Britain, some time after they sailed from Petersbourg, made a full Discovery, by Letters from the Pretender's Agent there, and others concerned in this Transaction, which fell into their Hands; that they had been fitted out at the Expence of the Pretender's Friends, with the Privity of the Court of Petersbourg, and sent to Spain, to be employed in an Expedition for the Pretender's Service; and that five more had been contracted for, and were design'd to follow. And accordingly, at the Time of their passing the Sound, so very particular a Joy was express'd at Stockholm, by a certain Party there, that it could not but be remark'd by the Friends of Great Britain, at that place. And in their Passage, when they lay in the North of Scotland, and afterwards were driven [Page]by Stress of Weather into Ireland; his Majesty's Officers belonging to the Customs, who, according to their Duty went on Board, found all the Symptoms of Enmity to his Majesty; all possible Tokens of a warlike Design; and all the Fears of a Discovery that could shew themselves. And after these Ships were safe in Spain, it was given out by one of the greatest Men in the Court of Russia, and written by another great Man, from his Mouth, to Stockholm, in order to influence the Swedes, ‘That the Alliance of Britain and France would be of the less Moment; since the Imperial Court, and the Pretender's Measures in Spain, would now find those two Powers full Employment.’ And it was likewise after the safe arrival of these Russian Ships at St. Andero, and during their stay there, that the Motions and Projects of the Pretender's Friends grew more and more vigorous in Spain Not only the late Duke of Ormond admitted to frequent Audiences at this Juncture, but one Connock, the Pretender's constant Minister at Madrid, hardly ever out of Ripperda's House; and one Pomphilly, lately come from England, offering Money to all the Broken Officers he could meet with at Madrid; (as several of them freely affirm'd, and particularly a Swiss Protestant, One of those to whom the Offer was made) and this professedly upon a Design then on foot in favour of the Pretender.

From the mention of these particular Preparations, I pass on to shew what Use was intended to be made of the whole. So early as in February 1725-6, 12000 Men (as has been said above) were design'd to be sent to the Coasts of [Page] Galicia and Biscay, the first Project of the Court of Madrid being to make an Attempt on his Majesty's Dominions from those Parts. But as such a Body of Troops could not at that Juncture march thither, without giving an Alarm; the Pretence for it, made use of by the Court of Spain, was, that they had certain Intelligence of a Resolution taken by the Court of Great Britain to land a Number of Troops in that part of the Country; who were to burn and destroy all before them, and even the Shipping in all the Harbours. Under the Cover of this pretended Intelligence, which no one in England could possibly give, and which no one at Madrid could really believe, the March of these Forces was ordered. But his Majesty's Minister at Madrid, representing to the Duke of Ripperda (who was then Prime Minister, and in the highest Degree of Trust and Confidence with the King his Master) that such Intelligence could have no Foundation; and even that such a Design from England was impossible; Ripperda promised the March of those Troops should be forborn, till a Declaration from the British Court, to the Purpose of what Mr. Stanhope had said, could be obtained. But the true Reason of delaying this March, was, that some of the Pretender's Friends had represented to the Court of Spain, that the sending of 12000 Men to Galicia and Biscay, without any Colour of Necessity for them, in a Country where there never used to be above two or three Battallions, would give such an Alarm to England, as would inevitably put us upon our Guard; and therefore it would be more eligible to order that [Page]Body of Troops to Navarre, on a very natural Pretext of securing that Frontier against France; but when there, they would be so near Gupiuscoa, that they might be ready to imbark on a very short Notice, in Transports to be provided at a Port of that Province; and be convoyed from thence by a Number of Men of War, of which those three Muscovite Ships were to be part. They proposed at the same time, that some few Ships should be sent with Arms from Cadiz directly to Scotland; and a Body of 6000 Men kept ready by the Emperor at Ostend.

But the Court of Spain, being soon after perfectly informed, that such vigorous Resolutions were taken, and such Preparations and Dispositions made, by Great Britain, that it was in vain for them to hope for any Success at that Time from such an Attempt; they suspended for the present the putting this Design in Execution; the rather, finding themselves obliged to send part of their Ships from Cadiz and St. Andero to the WestIndies: And the Muscovite Ships returned home.

Thus in Fact stood the Case, in favour of the Pretender, at the Court of Madrid, before the vigorous Measures of Great Britain alter'd it. And, who that considers the whole of this, will be moved by any the strongest Verbal Asseverations of that Court, against such Facts; when it is remember'd, That this whole Scene of the New Alliance, which is acknowledged to be framed against our Trade, and our Right to Gibraltar, was begun and carried on to perfection, under the Colour of the highest Regards to his Majesty; and accompanied all along with the strongest and most pathetick Assurances of Friendship?

[Page] Especially, if we add here, what ought to allarm the British Court, and was sufficient it self to justify all their earliest Precautions and Preparations; viz. That soon after the publishing the Vienna Treaties of Peace and Commerce, They had positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from more than one Person; and such as could be entirely depended on; That one express Article of this Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender; and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for him in England, before opening the War in any other parts. And by as undoubted Intelligence it was added, That the Pretender, in return, had since obliged himself to restore Gibraltar and Port Mahon to the Crown of Spain; to be Guarantee of the Emperor's Ostend-Trade; and lay open the Commerce, with our Plantations abroad, to their Ships, with the fame Privileges as the English themselves enjoy. And for this Article, enter'd into by the Emperor with the King of Spain, for the Service of the Pretender, there is as certain Evidence, as of the Being of a secret Treaty: Of which I cannot think it possible to doubt, after what has been, and will be, said upon the Articles of Gibraltar and the Ostend-Trade.

This brings our Thoughts to the Court of Vienna; For This Article touches the Imperial Court, equal with That of Spain; and proves the Pretender's Cause, to be the Concern of the Former, as truly as of the Latter; and to be made so by an express Stipulation in a Treaty. And this alone is Evidence enough of the worst Dispositions towards a King, and a Nation, which have not deserved [Page]such a Return from Vienna. For, This single Point being certain, it will be of small Importance to alledge the Conduct of this Court in not giving such publick Tokens of this Disposition, in Fact, as the Other has done: Which will only shew a cautious Prudence in the Execution, but not at all any Innocence, or Ignorance, of such Designs. The Article alone demonstrates the Design; and that is sufficient.

But indeed, if, after this, We consider the most publick Parts of the late Conduct of the Imperial Court towards this Nation, we cannot conclude less than this, That there is little Thought or Desire there, of keeping any. Terms with us, in any respect: I mean, that part of Conduct which regards our Trade, not only by Consequence, but directly and immediately. At Ostend, and in the Netherlands, the present and future fatal Effects of the New Establishment are too visible: At the same Ostend, which was conquered and preserved by our Arms, and those of the Dutch. In Sicily, rescued from the Spaniard by our Fleet, as well as secured to the Emperor, by the good Offices of our King in the Treaty of London: In the same Sicily, the Kindness was soon returned by a prohibition of all our woollen Manufactures; and this prohibition not yet removed, but only suspended for a while, upon the strongest Representations and the plainest Evidence, that this proceeding was against the Faith of Treaties, which made the British Privileges there, exactly the same, as in all other Dominions of Spain, to which it once belonged: Those same Treaties, under which the Duke of Savoy, at the Peace of Utrecht, took possession of this Kingdom [Page]of Sicily; and under which the present Emperor took it after him. And lately, in the Austrian Dominions in Germany, preserved from Ruine by the Arms and Money of Us and our Allies, most Species of our Manufactures are prohibited. So that in every Inch of Ground his Imperial Majesty is possessed of; even in those Countries gained by our Assistance, and where he is as closely bound by particular Treaties, as the most solemn and repeated Engagements can bind him: In all, He has acted the same part towards Us, in one of our tenderest Concerns. And if the Imperial Court be resolved to go on in these Paths; This alone must determine them to espouse the Pretender's Interest: As They are fully assured of His present Majesty's firm Resolution never tamely to give up the Rights and Privileges of this Nation, in so essential a Point as that of Trade.

But I have done: And I am sure, have said enough upon this first Point, to put it beyond all Doubt, that this New Alliance at Vienna contains in it, and will certainly bring after it, if not vigourously opposed, the most unspeakable Evil to Great Britain; by engaging, and attempting, to subvert our present happy Establishment.

II. I will now say a Word or two about the Possessions of Great Britain within the Spanish Dominions; and how They must be affected by this new Alliance. These are Gibraltar, and Port Mahon; won by our Arms in lawful War; ascertained to us as our Property, by all the Parties concerned in that War; and secured to us by all the Solemnity of Alliances, and Treaties, and particularly by this present King of Spain himself, [Page]in two express Articles of the Treaty of Peace sign'd at Utrecht, 1713. For, of the great Importance especially of One of them, (I mean Gibraltar) I would not be thought to speak as any the least Motive to a just and brave People to value and preserve it, were not the Possession of it founded upon the strictest Right, and the most undeniable Maxims of Political and National Justice. But when that Importance, to which Spain gives Testimony by the eagerness discovered to wrest it out of our Hands, is added to the Right of Possession; No one among us, who is a true Lover of his Country, can be easy under the prospect of an Alliance, which opened it self to Great Britain, with the Civil Complement from Spain of demanding Gibraltar immediately, as the Condition of the Continuance of a Friendship, which cannot be violated without the Breach of all Faith and Trust in Treaties; and with the Emperor's Obligation, to use His kind Help to bring Britain to a Compliance with that Demand. I have already spoken of this Demand, and this Obligation, as certain Evidences of a secret Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Spain. I now speak of this mutual Engagement between these two Powers, for the Recovery of Gibraltar, as one of the unjust and pernicious Conditions of their new Alliance. And, after I have before so plainly proved, That this Engagement makes one main part of it; not only from Ripperda's repeated Affirmation both at Vienna and at Madrid; but from the perumptory Language used at Madrid after this Alliance at Vienna; and from the Testimony from Vienna added to This, that there was an [Page]express Article containing the Emperor's Stipulation upon this Head; and this Testimony given at London, by Order of the Imperial Court, in a very remarkable manner. After the Proof of this Fact, I need say no more than that, if the Designs of this Alliance be not vigorously opposed, and effectually broke, the first unwelcome Evil to Great Britain must be, To see a place of the utmost Importance to us, if we will trust the Confession both of Friends and Enemies, wrested from us by Force, (if it be possible) unless we will basely yield it up to the importunity of Those who ask it; and a place, which is our Honour, and our Strength abroad; a great Defence and Advantage to our extended Navigation; and a Convenience to our Ships of all sorts, not to be equalled by any other Place, that can be offer'd by that Crown, which would deprive us of it.

III. But indeed this Place, could it be preserved to us by all our Strength and Prudence, would be of no Importance to us hereafter; if the other Schemes of This new Alliance stand good. It will be a small Comfort to Great Britain, and little better than a Ridicule, to have in possession so great a Convenience to Shipping and Trade, as Gibraltar is; if we are to be stripped of that Trade it self, and to be reduced to the Condition of having little or no Occasion for any Shipping at all. And yet, This I think must be the Case with us, if the Projects of this new Union are suffered quietly to succeed. For our Trade it self, that Ornament and support of Great Britain, must by Degrees be so affected, in almost every Branch of it, that it connot but [Page]naturally lessen, Flag, and Dye, just in Proportion as this new Alliance gains Strength and flourishes. There can be little Hope, if this Conjunction proceeds much farther, of obtaining any Redress for the many injuries in Commerce, already received; or of preventing many more, from the Side of Spain: and much less, if possible, of keeping the Designs at Ostend from having Effect; which, taken with all their extended ill consequences towards almost all the Branches of our Trade, are enough to awaken all Britons, who have been used to esteem their Commerce, as their darling Good: — a Good, to the support and increase of which, all their Treaties and Alliances have for many Years past solely tended; and in Comparison of which they have despised, and left to Others the Acquisition of Tracts of Land, and Territories to enlarge Dominion and Power. Hitherto, We have always shewed our selves sensible that Trade was our proper Life; and the Encouragement of this, upon an honourable Bottom, the proper Nourishment of that Life. Every Instance of Conduct in any Power at Home, which has but seem'd to shake it a little, or to touch it, at a Distance, in an unkindly Manner, has been found to be so resented, as to disunite the greatest Friends; and at once to unite those of different Views amongst us, in a vigorous Opposition to it. And every Step, in order to defend and promote it, has been received with universal Applause; and reconciled and enlarg'd the Affections of Men to such Benefactors. And with regard to Foreign Nations; every hurt, any [Page]of them do to our Commerce; every Breach into the Fences and Privileges with which that is guarded and enrich'd; every Shadow of a Tendency this way, has aways been view'd here, as the higest of all Injuries to this Nation, and the natural Subject for the genuine and just Resentment of every true Briton. And if we are not dead to all this Sense; if we still retain the proper Life and Vigor of Britons; that is, of a Nation adorn'd and supported by the most extended Commerce that can be boasted of by any People: What can we think of an Alliance between two powerful Princes, form'd, against the plain Stipulations of Treaties, in order to deprive us of our Glory, our Riches, our Strength, which depend all upon our Trade; and afterwards, to desend and preserve Themselves in their Acquisitions of our Rights?

These are not Words without a Meaning; nor Fears merely of Imagination set on Work by present Resentment: But real, Substantial, and undeniable. For, if the Union of these two Powers proceeds upon the present Foot; and be not thoroughly broken in its terrible Parts; let any one say, what hope can remain of any Bounds to be set to the Injuries our Trade has selt, and must feel? Will those Depredations and Hostilities, committed in the West-Indies by the Spaniards, under pretence of their Right to guard against Clandestine Trade; Those Violences, by which the whole Commerce of Jamaica has been well nigh destroyed, and the Trade of that Island reduced to a miserable Condition, be now redress'd? Or, will the Remonstrances of these Grievances, [Page]which have had no Effect before the Treaties of Vienna; now, after such Treaties are made, meet with any better Reception at Madrid; and procure Us a more favourable Answer? Will any Complaints, or Representations, in support of the acknowledg'd Rights of the South-Sea-Company, obtain now so much as a Hearing at the Court of Spain; when the Strength of such an Alliance is added to the former Disinclination towards any Redress; and is suffered by the other Powers of Europe to exert itself? Or, will They, who have been hitherto unmoved by Right and Justice, at length voluntarily listen to their Voices? Or, will the Court of Vienna, which has stood out, before this Alliance, against all Sollicitations, relinquish the Pretensions at Ostend, and act agreeably to former Treaties in the Affair of Commerce; now after the Riches of Spain are to come in, to the Aid of former Resolutions?

So far from this, that it is an express Article, stipulated in this New Alliance, that, as the Emperor is to assist Spain in the regaining of Gibraltar; so is Spain obliged to support the Emperor in his Ostend Company, and his Commerce.

This Article, relating to the Ostend Company, as part of a Secret Offensive Alliance, (as I have before shewn) was more than once not only acknowledg'd, but boasted of, to the British and Dutch Ministers at Madrid, by Ripperda, when he was prime Minister in Spain. But we have not only this Evidence. For, as in the Affair of Gibraltar, the Emperor himself, by producing an Article of a Treaty, gave Testimony to his having enter'd into Engagements relating to that [Page]Place; so, his Catholick Majesty has not scrupled to give his own Testimony, that, by this New Alliance, He has entered into Engagements to support the Emperor in his Establishment of the Ostend Company; not only by the Language of his Court at Madrid; but by what he wrote himself, and ordered his Minister at the Hague, to denounce, by way of Threatning, to the States General, upon this Subject. of which I have given an Account before. And besides all this, it is enough to look upon the Publick Treaty of Commerce sign'd at Vienna, May 1st, 1725. to be satisfied, that such Privileges in Commerce are granted, by Spain, to the Emperor's Subjects, as are contrary to many former Treaties, and to the most manifest Rights of other Nations founded upon those Treaties.

I shall not enter minutely into all the Particulars which are of Importance, upon this Head. The Subject has been so plainly stated, and even exhausted, before the World aleady, that there can be no need of any Thing farther, than to refer those who have not yet look'd into the Depth of this Affair, to the several Memorials of the States General, and of those commission'd by Them, upon this Occasion; particularly those which were printed here, in the Daily Courants of Dec. 16. 1725. Jan. 19. 25. Feb. 5. 8. 12, and 14. 1725-6. in which all the Pretences of their Enemies are compleatly and plainly answered; and the Matter placed in the most evident Light. I will only just state the Dates and Intent of the Treaties, relating to the Commerce most immediacely affected by the new Ostend Company; and [Page]add a Word or two about the farther Consequences of it.

So long ago as the Year 1609, the King of Spain, by the Truce then made with the United Provinces, granted them their first Privileges of Trade in the East-Indies; by which the Dutch East-India Company has been from that time in Possession of their Commerce in those Parts. But these Privileges wanted Confirmation: and this they fully obtain'd from the Crown of Spain, after long and mature deliberation, at the Treaty of Munster in the Year 1648. by which, the Crown of Spain not only granted the Hollanders these Privileges; but engag'd itself, to maintain and protect them, in the Enjoyment of these Privileges. In this Treaty the Bounds were set to the several Pretensions of the Dutch and Castillans in the East-Indies; and the Limits of their distinct Navigation and Commerce there, exactly fix'd: and not only all other Subjects of Spain were totally excluded from the East Indies; but the Castillans themselves were for ever excluded from all Commerce and Navigation within the Limits of the Hollanders; as These were likewise prohibited from entring into those of the Castillans.

And, before this, the absolute exclusion of all the Inhabitants of the Netherlands, from all Trade or Commerce in the East or West Indies, was in the Year 1598 made an express Article in the Act of Cession of the Low-Countries by Philip II. King of Spain, upon the Marriage of his Daughter Isabella to the Arch-Duke Albert: The Eighth Article of which Cession is this, That ‘The [Page] Arch-Duke and Arch-Dutchess themselves, and their Successors, shall not exercise any Navigation, and Commerce in the East and West Indies, under the Penalty of being deprived of those Provinces; and if any of their Subjects shall act contrary to this, they shall be punished with Rigour, in some Cases even with Death itself, &c.’ Neither was this at that time at all complain'd of by the States of those Low-Countries, even when several other Conditions of the Reception of those new Governours were remonstrated against, as so many Grievances upon the People of those Provinces. Neither was there afterwards any Protest made by any Persons concerned, against this Exclusion, whilst the King of Spain was concluding the Treaty of Munster with the United Provinces. This shews that the present Complaint of the Hardship of such Exclusion is new and artificial; and come many Years too late, as it comes after solemn Treaties made, and renewed, in express Confirmation of this Exclusion.

To proceed; After the Treaty of Munster, an Accident happened, which plainly shewed, how the Fifth Article of that Treaty was understood, not only by the Dutch, but by Spain also One Bastien Brower, a Subject of Spain, either of B [...]abant, or of Flanders, had obtain'd a Permission from the King of Spain, to go to the Coasts of China where he carried on a very profitable Trade. When this came to the Knowledge of the HighCouncil in India, belonging to the Dutch East-India Company, they made a solemn Resolution immediately, and sent it as an Order to the Commanders [Page]of all their Ships, and to all their Subjects, to take this Man Prisoner; and if he defended himself, to use force against him. This had its Effect. The Man never appeared any more to give them farther Trouble. Other Subjects of Spain desisted from all such Voyages. The Crown of Spain never complained of this Conduct; and by this Silence, plainly gave Testimony to the Justice of that Resolution, as founded upon the Treaty of Munster.

In the Year 1667, by a Treaty between Britain and Spain, all Privileges of Commerce and Navigation in both the Indies, were granted to his Britannick Majesty's Subjects, in as full and ample manner, as they were granted to the Hollanders in the Treaty of Munster. And in the Year 1713, a Treaty of Commerce was concluded at Utrecht between the Queen of Great Britain, and this present King of Spain: By the First Article of which it is declared, That, ‘the Treaty of Peace, Commerce, and Alliance concluded at Madrid, in 1667, is ratified and confirmed by this Treaty;’ and it is added, that, for the greater ‘Strengthening and Confirmation of the same, it has been thought proper to insert it Word for Word in this Place.’ Then follows that former Treaty thus ratified and confirmed.

In the Year 1724, but one Year before this New Alliance at Vienna, this same King of Spain was so sensible of his Obligations, lying upon him from the Treaty of Munster alone, that he presented, by his Ambassador at London, a Memorial against the Emperor's Attempts upon Trade from Ostend; in which he insisted, that the Assair of [Page]the Ostend Company should be brought before the Congress at Cambray, in order to have the said Company abolished, before he could in Conscience think of confirming the Cession of the Netherlands to the Emperor: And urges, that, if this Confirmation should be made by Spain, ‘without reserving expresly to it self the exclusive Right on the Navigation to the Indies, in general, and without Exception; the States-General would be rightly entitled to demand Satisfaction of Spain, for having thereby made a great Infraction of the Treaty of Munster, and would be disengaged from the reciprocal Obligation to abstain from the Navigation of the Spanish Indies.’ That is, in other Words, that if he, the King of Spain, should not support the Dutch (and consequently the English also) against the Emperor's new Establishment at Ostend; that then, I say, he himself should be justly charged with a most dishonourable Breach of Faith, and Violation of solemn Treaties. Thus stands the Engagements of Spain, with regard to the English and Dutch, in the Affair of their Trade to the Indies, and the Emperor's new Attempts at Ostend. Let us now consider the Obligations and Engagements of the Emperor himself.

The Grand Alliance 1701, between the Emperor Leopold, King William, and the States-General, is built upon this very Fountation of the English and Dutch Trade to the Indies, as upon a main Ground of that Alliance. It opens itself with reciting, that upon the Death of Charles II. King of Spain, without Issue, the Emperor claimed the Right of Succession to his Countries, as belonging [Page]to the Austrian Family; and, after other Particulars, it follows, ‘so that without some Remedy applied, the Emperor will lose his Pretensions; the Empire lose its Fiefs in Italy; and the ENGLISH and UNITED PROVINCES be deprived of the free Use of their NAVIGATION and COMMERCE in the INDIES, and other Places,’ &c.

Hence it appears, 1. That the Emperor's Family claiming by Hereditary Right these Provinces, could not rightfully claim any Powers, but what were vested and remained in Charles II. the King of Spain, to whom they were to succeed; nor possess them, but upon the Conditions, upon which the deceased King himself had possessed them: And that the Emperor neither could, nor did, claim any thing that his Predecessors, Kings of Spain, had parted with by solemn Treaties; and therefore neither could, nor did, claim those Countries, but upon the some Terms and Contitions of Trade, on which King Charles II. of Spain had enjoyed them, agreeably to solemn Treaties with other Powers. 2. That the Preservation of the Trade in the Indies, to the English and Dutch, upon the Foot they enjoyed it, and in the Manner it was carried on, to the Death of King Charles II. of Spain, was one ground, and a main one, of the Grand Alliance; and that the Emperor's Pretensions to the Low-Countries were supported by the English and Dutch, upon this, amongst other Conditions, that the Emperor should reciprecally support their Trade to the Indies, on the Foot they had constantly enjoyed it. 3. It having been already proved, that Holland ever since [Page]the Treaty of Munster in 1648, and England ever since the Treaty of Madrid in 1667, have carried on their Trade to the East Indies, to the Exclusion of the Subjects of the Netherlands, by Virtue of those Treaties; it follows, That, in consequence of this, and by Virtue of this Grand Alliance it self (by which the Emperor's Claim to these Countries is allowed, and the Claim of the Allies to their Commerce also insisted on) the Emperor did in Effect oblige himself and his Family, whenever in Possession of these Countries, to take upon themselves all the Obligations which the Kings of Spain, to whom they succeeded, were under, to England and Holland, by former Treaties; and to support this main End of the grand Alliance, relating to the Commerce of the Allies, (expressly mentioned in it,) as well as their own Pretensions: and, instead of invading them themselves, to defend them against all Invaders, according to the Obligations of those former Treaties. Nay, it was likewise expressly stipulated, in this grand Alliance, supposing it to end successfully; That the Spanish Netherlands should be (not the Property of the Emperor absolutely, and without any Conditions; but) a Barrier to the United Provinces. So that we see, the Emperor, in the grand Alliance itself, considered his own Right to the Netherlands, with a View to the Trade of his Allies; and that the Spanish Low-Countries were established in that Alliance, as a Defence and Guard to those Allies, whose Trade is now going to be ruined from them.

But these Obligations are not only the real Intent and Consequence of the grand Alliance: But it is declared in express Words, in the Barrier Treaty [Page]concluded at Antwerp, in 1715, between his present Britannick Majesty, this present Emperor, and the States-General, Art. 1. That ‘the Emperor (this present Emperor) should enjoy the Spanish Netherlands, as they were enjoyed, or ought to have been enjoyed, by the late King Charles II. conformably to the Treaty of Ryswick.’ That is, with the same Privileges, and the same Obligations, neither greater nor less.

After all these solemn Stipulations and Treaties here recited, is it conceivable, what has now been done in the Face of the World? — That Emperor, who was under all his Father's Obligations: who could not succeed, even by his Title of Hereditary Right, to these Low Countries, but under the same Engagements with those Kings of Spain to whom he succeeds: Who himself, in his own Person, has declared, in a solemn Treaty, that He enjoys these Countries no otherwise, than as they were enjoyed by the late King of Spain; that is, under the same Restrictions and Obligations to which that King was engaged: That same Emperor, instead of protecting the Commerce of the English and Dutch from the Invasions of others, himself openly invades it; instead of punishing any of his Subjects in the Netherlands for Attempts of Trade to the East-Indies, or restraining them, as he is strictly obliged to do, He has himself erected a Company, and endowed it with great Privileges, on purpose to Trade thither; and, instead of yielding to the just Remonstrances of injured Neighbours, he has set them at Defiance, and strengthened himself with a new Accession of the Power and Riches of Spain, to [Page]back this unjustifiable Seizure of those Rights of Commerce, which are the established and peculiar Privileges of other Countries. Such has been the Conduct of the Emperor.

And the part which Spain has acted, with regard to Ostend, and the Spanish Netherlands, is, if possible, still more extraordinary; and more out of the common Road of dealing with Treaties and Alliances. For thus it is, — That King of Spain, who enjoys his Kingdom under the Stipulations of the Treaties made by his Predecessors: — who has confirmed them all himself, in his own Person:— He, who in one Year declared it would be a Breach of his Treaties, for Him ever to acquiesce in the Establishment of the Ostend East-India Company: That same King, the next Year, does much more than this. He undertakes, by this new Alliance, to support the Emperor in this very Establishment. Not only this; but he grants to these very Ostenders, and all other Subjects of the Emperor in the Spanish Netherlands, what he had no Right to grant to them, had they remained his own Subjects; nay, he grants them Privileges of his Ports and Places in the Indies, greater than are allowed to the English and Hollanders themselves: And this, not only with respect to the East-Indies. but the West-Indies also. For by the 2d and 3d Articles of the Vienna Treaty of Commerce, a Liberty is granted to them, to frequent, and Trade in, the Ports of the Spanish West Indies; Or, supposing this not directly granted, in express Words, yet they are at least permitted to enter into those Ports for victualling or repairing their Ships: which will come to the same Thing. For if they may [Page]enter into, and remain in those Ports, till they have provided themselves with all Necessaries, the Nature of the Bullion Trade is of that sort, that no Precaution can prevent that Commerce.

I am sensible it may be objected here, that the Liberty granted to the Emperor's Subjects, by the Treaty of Vienna, to enter into the Ports of Spain in the West-Indies, in case of Distress of Weather, or for refreshing themselves, &c. is no more than what was formerly granted to his Majesty's Subjects by the Treaty of Madrid, concluded in 1670. But it is well known, that the Liberty granted by that Treaty, has ceased for many Years; and that, in order to prevent the Abuses that might be committed from such a permission, and that one Nation might not be more favoured than another on any Pretext whatsoever in the Trade to the West-Indies, sufficient Care was taken of that Matter in the 8th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which it is expressly stipulated, and declared in the following Words: Whereas among other Conditions of the general Peace, it is by common Consent established, as a chief and fundamental Rule, that the Exercise of Navigation and Commerce to the Spanish West-Indies, should remain in the same State it was in the Time of King Charles II. of Spain, and that therefore this Rule may hereafter be observed with inviolable Faith, and in a Manner never to be broken, and thereby all Causes of Distrust and Suspicion concerning that Matter may be prevented and removed; it is especially agreed and concluded, that no License, or any Permission at all, shall at any Time be given to the French, or any other Nation whatever, in any Name, or under any Pretence, directly; or indirectly, to SAIL, [Page] Traffick, &c. to the Dominions subject to the Crown of Spain in America; except what may be agreed by the Treaty, or Treaties of Commerce, (there referred to) and the Rights and Privileges granted in a certain Convention called, El Assiento de Negros. And the same Condition is likewise stipulated in the 34th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, between the King of Spain and the States. And there needs no other Argument to prove, that it was always understood by the Court of Spain itself, in the Sense of not suffering any Ship to enter into any Port of Spain in the West-Indies, on any Pretext whatever, but to observe, That the English and Dutch are never permitted, though under the greatest Distress of Weather, or want of Provisions, to put into any of those Ports; but their Ships if they come in, are constantly confiscated: and upon this very Account, that, if once Entrance were permitted, the Traffick could not but follow. Yet notwithstanding that this is a fundamental Rule of the Treaties of Utrecht, and an Article of the general Peace, which is strictly observed with regard to all other Nations; it is notoriously violated, in Favour and Preference of the Emperor's Subjects.

It is further to be observed, that with regard to the Articles of Commerce between Spain, England, and Holland, the Liberty to the English and Dutch of entring into the Spanish Ports, was always expresly restrained to the Ports of Europe. But no such Restriction is once mentioned in the late Treaty of Vienna, with regard to the Emperor's Subjects. Nay, all the Privileges allowed to Britain, are in express Words allowed to these; without [Page]so much as an Exception to the South-SeaShip, and the Assiento Contract: Whereas in the Treaty of Utrecht with the Dutch, that Exception was expressly made. Thus has the King of Spain granted all our Privileges, and greater, to the Subjects of the Emperor; and instead of protecting Great Britain, and the United Provinces, in their Rights of Commerce, according to former Treaties, he has now declared himself to be obliged and determined to protect, by Force, the Emperor and his Subjects, in their Invasion of those Rights. And, from all this put together, it must be as evident, as Words and Facts compared can make any thing, That the Two Courts of Vienna and Madrid have founded their New Alliance, as far as it respects Trade, on the Destruction of all publick Faith, the Infraction of Treaties, and the Violation of all that can hold together Nations in Peace, and mutual Benevolence.

After so plain a Proof of the great Injustice of the Attempt of the Imperial Court upon Trade, from the Spanish Netherlands; and of the King of Spain's determined Encouragement of it: It would not be improper here, to consider at some length, the Importance and Consequence of this Conduct to our selves; were it not that This has been set in so strong a Light already, as to make it much less necessary; and particularly, in a short Treatise, Intitled, The Importance of the Ostend Company considered. Yet, before I pass from this Subject, I must mention some few particular Consequences of this new Establishment at Ostend, and of the new Treaty of Commerce (by which so large Privileges are granted to the Subjects of the Netherlands) [Page]with regard to our Trade; and in the end to our Liberties, and our Religion, themselves.

The United Provinces, it is plain from their whole Conduct, esteem themselves undone in their main Concern, if this Company be supported. And if They are undone in their Trade, it is well known to all, who are acquainted with the Track of Merchandize, that the Gain of their Loss in Trade will not accrue to England, but fly to those Countries where this Evil began. As to the EastIndia Trade particularly; the same Rival, which ruines That in Holland, must by the same Methods inevitably ruine it in England. Nay, it must ruine it sooner and more effectually here: Not only because Holland has the sole Property of the Spice Trade, besides other Advantages; but because the Dutch Merchandizes are free from the Burthen of Customs; whilst our Customs give the greatest Encouragement to the Ostenders to run, and put off, a multitude of their Goods in England. The Damage and Ruine must be the same, as to our West-India Trade, from the Privileges granted by the Vienna Treaty of Commerce to the Emperor's Subjects: The Privilege of entring into the Spanish Ports in the West-Indies, and by unavoidable Consequence, of trading there, where neither English or Dutch are ever permitted to enter upon any pretence; and the comprehensive Privilege of enjoying all Rights which Britain enjoys, without any Exception; and, by Consequence, of interfering with, and hurting, not only our Assiento Contract, but every Instance of Commerce with Spain, which we have a Right to by repeated Treaties.

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Nor can the Evil stop here, but must of Necessity insinuate it self into many other of the most important Branches of our Trade, which have a mutual and indossolvible Connexion one with another. The convenient Situation of the Spanish Netherlands between the North and the South of Europe, for all the Purposes of an extended Trade:— The Advantage of the Ports of Ostend and Newport, which, though none of the best, yet may vye with those of Holland; and will be as convenient Harbours for Privateers, as ever Dunkirk it self was, when the time shall come for an avowed and forcible Interruption to Our Trade and that of Holland: The Goodness of their Rivers for communicating all Merchandizes, at the most easy Rates, from Town to Town, and the later Addition of several large Canals & Causeways, where the Rivers are wanting:— The Fruitfulness of the Country, and the easy Price of all Provisions, very advantagious to all Manufacturers:— The Liberties and Privileges of the Towns, which still subsist; very inviting to the same Manufacturers:— The Genius of the People, very well fitted for all the Improvements of Trade and Manufactures:— And, to animate them, the Experience and History of past Times, which will shew them, that they have formerly, with a little Encouragement from their Governours, flourished in Manufactures both Woollen and Linen, besides those many which they still retain) the Woollen now again reviving to a Degree of Goodness at Limbourg, so as already to under-sell the Dutch themselves; and the Linnen more easily revived by the Advantage of the great Quantity [Page]of Flax growing in these Countries:—And this Experience of former Days, pointing out to them likewise the Possibility and Probability of their carrying their Navigation to a greater Pitch, in the Number and Strength of their Shipping, increasing by degrees, as it always does, in proportion to Manufactures and Fisheries; and the faster, as these Countries lie nearer and more convenient for enticing Fishermen and Sailors, as well as Manufacturers themselves, from hence, upon all Occasions; and also for the clandestine Importation of Wooll from England and Ireland, to carry on their Designs. These, and many more Particulars shew, that, as one Branch of Trade leads to another, and one Trial encourages another; and as all Commerce is of a spreading and communicative Nature, where it meets with proper Materials, and proper Encouragement; so this must probably be the Case, if the Beginnings of Evil be not looked after: That not only our own East and West-India Trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruined by the Ostend Company, which will be the immediate Effect of it; (or rather is so already in a great Degree) but also, that the Contagion will spread to many other Branches of the British and Dutch Trade; and convey along with it the Riches, the Strength, and the Naval Power, to the same Spanish Netherlands.

But were it so, that Holland alone would be the Sufferer by the Ostend Trade (which is far from being the Case) yet the Ruine of Holland must carry along with it, in the end, the Ruine of Britain. For, as these two Nations, remaining United, are indeed the Turn of the Ballance of [Page] Europe, whenever they join themselves to any other great Power of Europe; and Both of them together, but barely sufficient for this Purpose: Whatever ruines the Trade, that is, the Riches and Strength of these, destroys at the same time the Evenness of that Ballance, which alone can keep Europe in any tolerable Order. And whatever Ruines any One of these Powers, does as truly destroy the sufficiency of that Strength, by which alone that Ballance is preserved. And what then must be the Consequence? Where the Trade and Riches of these, or either of these, settle, there settles the Power with them; and that Power removed from them, must be the Destruction of the Ballance; and the Destruction of that Ballance, must be the loss of the Liberties of the rest of Europe, and particularly, as Occasion shall offer, of the Liberties of Great Britain.

And I need not add, that the same Popish Power, which will gain all this Strength, (for it is in a Popish Power that all this must Centre,) will have the same Strength, and a greater Will, to extirpate every Appearance of Protestantism, of what Denomination soever, out of Europe; without Exception to any one Church above another: Only with the fatal Exception of a more sure and quick Blow to that Church, a great part of whose Revenues, as well as the Riches of a Multitude of its Members, arise from the Dissolution of Monasteries, and the Alienation of Abbey-Lands; and whose unpardonable Crime it will be, to have been the great Support of the Reformation, and the Bulwark of the Protestant Cause against Popery. For where can that Church, or where can the Protestant Religion, hope, [Page]I will not say, for Countenance, but for Sufferance; when the whole Protestant Power in Europe, which in its present Condition, is little better than a Creature with Pain and Difficulty struggling for Life, shall be broken to Pieces by Acquisitions, made by other Powers, of Riches and Force: Acquisitions, which will be a double Strength against it, as they are taken from Those who alone have a Will to protect it, and added to Those who have a Zeal to hurt and oppress it. And that this must be the End of such Beginnings, suffered to proceed with Success, and gathering Strength every Step they go, is as plain, and as true, as, That proper Food will give Strength gradually to the weakest Man, capable of receiving it; too great to be resisted at last by the strongest Man, who suffers it to be taken from himself; and who by that Loss of Nourishment grows weaker and weaker, as well as by the Strength added by it to the other.

I will now say a Word more peculiarly relating to Great Britain; and the Concern this Nation has, in its present Circumstances, in the Fate of its Trade, or of any of the Branches of it. The two last Wars abroad, upon which not only our own Safety, but that of the Liberties of all Europe, depended, and by which they were preserved; together with the continual Attempts of our Enemies, since the general Peace, to load us with the Chains of Popery and the Pretender, have run Great Britain into a vast Expence: and this Expence has left behind it an immense Debt; and this Debt, so justly due to the Creditors of the Publick, must be paid, both out of strict Duty, if there be any such [Page]thing as publick Justice, and out of Interest, if we have a Mind ever again, in any Extremity, to be trusted. This lies as a great and heavy Burthen upon the Minds of all true Lovers of their Country: And, I know, that for the sake of this single Point, and from their earnest desire of seeing so great a Good accomplished, without any Interruptions, Many of the best Friends to the Publick are ready to regret any Opposition made to the Designs of this New Alliance, as the first Step to a War; and to ask, How much better, to bear the Inconveniencies mentioned; to submit to the Loss of Gibraltar; to be contented with all the Consequences of the Ostend Trade; to connive at all the Designs of such Powers united; than to put any Stop to our Prospect of a gradual Payment of our Debts?—Our main Business, they argue, is to free our selves from that Load. The sinking Fund is a good Beginning; and, if not hindred by Quarrels with Powers abroad, must go on to diminish our Debt. This Payment of our Debt, we should look after, as our Strength in future Times, and our greatest Force against our Enemies; and not shew our selves so concerned about the Points just now mentioned.

On the other Side, I cannot help entirely differing from all this. Nay, I cannot forbear to urge this very Opposition to the New Alliance, as the only certain Method of taking any one Step farther towards this great Good; as so absolutely necessary, that without it, there is an End of all Hope of it. And I contend for the most vigorous Opposition to the Designs of this New Alliance, for this very Reason, because we are in Debt; and [Page]must be for ever in Debt; and shall never probably have it in our power to pay any Part more of that Debt, if those Designs go on unopposed and unresisted.

For in the first Place, They who argue against it, from this Consideration, leave out a main Point; and a Point which comprehends all other Evils in it and that is, the continued Attempts of putting the Pretender upon us: Which must succeed, unless we shew our selves determined to oppose any Power engaged in Support of such Designs. And if this one thing succeeds, it is of small Importance to our Debt, what our Trade will be after this is effected. Every one can see that a Debt, contracted in order to keep out Him and his Family for ever, will never be paid, but by one universal Blot spread over the Face of the whole Accompt; if He should ever be settled here, against whom this Debt has raised Armies, and mann'd Fleets, and faught many successful Battles. What Good therefore, towards the Payment of our Debt, will a supine Negligence do? or what Account can the Creditors of the Publick hope to find, from not opposing an Alliance which may otherwise too probably end in the establishing a King here, under whom the least Evil will be this, That the Creditors of the Publick will be sure of losing at once their whole just Debt, and the Interest of it?

But, putting the Pretender wholly out of the Question, as a Person not in Being; Or, supposing our selves secure from every future Attempt in his Favour: yet, the Case with Respect to the Payment of the Debt, must very soon be the same; [Page](however it may happily differ in many other Particulars) if the Conditions of these New Treaties at Vienna, both Publick and Private, are, through our supine Negligence, suffer'd to be fulfilled. For, what is the sinking Fund from which we hope for Relief? It is the Surplus of the Produce of the Customs and Excises, after the Payment of the Civil List, and of the Interest of the National Debt. These Customs are the Appurtenances of Trade and Commerce. Take away any Part of this Trade, or diminish it in any Branch; just so much in Proportion you diminish or take away from these Customs. The first thing therefore, that must feel the Diminution of our Trade, is the Produce of our Customs; and the first thing that must feel the Diminution of our Customs, is the Sinking Fund: because the Civil List and the Interest of the National Debt must first be paid, before any Surplus at all can be laid apart for the Payment of the Principal. Let therefore your Trade decay; permit the New Company at Ostend, to make your own East and West-India Trade utterly impracticable; and suffer your own Commerce to be by Degrees transplanted, and to flourish, in the Netherlands, under the Advantages and Encouragements in those Parts just now mentioned; besides the Prohibitions upon your own Manufactures every Day increasing upon you: and this alone will immediately prevent any such Surplusage from remaining. For what Need of Words? As Customs are the Appendages of Trade, they must decay with it: As the Sinking Fund depends entirely on the Abundance of Customs, this must first vanish upon their Decrease. What then must immediately become of [Page]he principal Debt? And indeed, very soon after his, what must become even of the Interest of it: when the Customs, which are the Fund for the Yearly Payment of that Interst, are themselves [...]anish'd away? And I will add, never after this to be recalled again.

For here is the real Difference between the two Methods of proceeding, now under our Consideration. First, as to that of vigorous Opposition [...] the Measures of the New Alliance; if we should allow to Those who thus argue against it, that it may possibly bring on, in its natural Course, an Interruption to Trade, and a Diminution of Customs; and consequently a Stop to that Payment of the National Debt which depends upon the abundance of these Customs: Yet, this is but a Temporary Stop. If these vigorous Measures meet with Success, and the Blessing of Providence attend upon them, the Course of Trade opens itself again with Vigour; and, the Customs reviving in Proportion, the Sinking Fund must of Necessity do so too. And if this Method of Vigorous Opposition should not be successful; the Case could not be worse than it must be without it. For in [...]te other Method; That of Supine Negligence, [...]ad of yielding to all Demands without the Attenpt of any Relief; our Conduct has but one cetain Event possible, as to the Point now before us. The Sinking Fund must, with the Decrease of the Customs, vanish immediately: and so must, soon after it, the Annual Interest of our Debt. And then, the longer the Ostend Company continue; its Commerce, the stronger and more extended must it grow; and the more extended that [Page]is, the more confined must our East and West-India Commerce be, in all their Branches, till they dwindle into nothing; and the more the Sweet of Trade are tasted in the Spanish Netherlands, and the Austrian Countries too, the more improbable or rather impossible it will be, ever to recall it into these Parts, upon any such Terms as can make the Customs, once ruined, revive in England. In a Word, in one Way, the Diminution of the National Debt may be interrupted by a vigorous Opposition to the Measures abroad: but then will revive again, and go on in its proper Channel [...] In the other Way, the same Diminution, and Loss of the Means of paying the Debt, and even the Interest of it, will be the Fate of this Nation and that, with this unhappy Aggravation; that if the Loss comes this Way, it is never to be retriev'd; nor any Hope left of that Payment so the future.

As others therefore are moved by a Regard to this great Good to the Nation, to be averse to a Methods of vigorous Opposition; I cannot help being moved by the same Regard, the very contrary Way: and what They fear, because we have such a Debt upon us, which ought to be paid; that I wish, for the same Reason, because we are in Debt; and that Debt ought to be paid; and that Debt cannot be paid without such an Oposition as may preserve our Commerce upon a Fandation granted to it by the most solemn Treties, the only Purchase of the Toil and Expence of Britain; and such a Foundation, as alone can enable us to go on in a gradual Justice to the Creditors of the Publick.

[Page] And in such a Method of proceeding, This ought to be our great Support and Confidence, that it is not an arbitrary Contention against the Rights of any other Nation in the World; nor a Contest of our Trade, merely as our great Advantage, or as the Instrument of paying the National Debt, and securing the National Happiness; but really and truly a Contention for our strict Right and Due, invaded with an high Hand by other Powers, against the Faith of Treaties, as well as the Force of the highest Obligations. Nor can we conceive a more abject Servility of Conduct, than for a People so long fam'd for Commerce and Bravery, to see their Darling Good, and peculiar Glory; the Pledge of their Liberty, and Life of all their Property, just going to be forcibly and unrighteously torn from them; and tamely to look on without one Struggle for so great a Blessing, or one hearty Effort against the Invaders of it. What can we become, if we give our Consent to such Ruine by our own supine Indolence and Insensibility; and suffer our selves to be stripp'd of our boasted Strength and Ornament at once; but a Nation, the most despicable of all Nations under Heaven; exposed to the Contempt and Insults of the World about us here below, and render'd utterly unworthy, by our own Conduct, of the Care of Providence above us?

IV. After all this said upon the Consequence of this New Alliance, with a particular Respect to the Protestant Establishment, the Possessions, and the Commerce, of Great-Britain; it will be very proper now to touch upon another Article of the Secret Part of it, in which, not only Britain, but [Page]all Europe in general, is extremely concern'd: I mean the Marriages agreed upon, between the Emperor and Spain; which, added to the comprehensive and extended Trade now likely to be transplanted into the Netherlands, must constitute a Power in one Family beyond all that we have known, Formidable and Irrisistible. The Marriages I speak of, are those of the two Arch Dutchesses, Daughters to the present Emperor, with the two Infants of Spain, Sons to the King by his present Queen. And that these are agreed upon, as a main and essential Point in this New Alliance, We have the following Proofs.

1. Immediately after the Signing the Publick Treaty of Peace at Vienna, Ripperda very freely talk'd of the Marriage of Don Carlos, the eldest Son of the present Queen of Spain, with the eldest Arch Dutchess, as a fixt Matter; and that the Prince of Asturias was disregarded in this Alliance, because of his ill Health, as he pretended at that Time: and a little while after, he spake as openly and positively about the Marriages, both of Don Carlos and his Brother. One of his Conversations was very Remarkable, and full of such Circumstances as will not let Us doubt of the Truth of the Subject of it. ‘The King's Ministers in Spain, and the whole Spanish Nation, (says He) are bitter against me: but I laugh at all that. The Queen will protect me. I have done her such Services that she can't abandon me: for thus the Matter stands. The Proposals of the Imperial Court were of a Marriage with the Prince of Asturias, and my first Instructions from Spain were for the Prince of Asturias; but it was I, [Page]who got that Destination chang'd. I wrote to the Queen to engage the Prince of Asturias, without Delay, to a Daughter of Portugal, that he might not stand in the Way of Don Carlos: And it was I that found the Way of turning all this Affair to the Advantage of her two Sons. And do you think I have much to Fear after such Services?’

2. This agrees exactly with the Language of the Court of Madrid: Where, after the Treaty of Peace was known to be Sign'd at Vienna, this Alliance with the Emperor was freely spoke of, as the Queen's own Transaction entirely; enter'd into, and conducted by herself; and the Marriage of Don Carlos spoke of, at first, without reserve or Appearance of Secrecy, as a Matter agreed upon. Nor did any one Person, who frequented the Court of Spain, make the least Doubt of it.

3. This will help us to Account for other Parts of the Conduct of Spain: which, without this, will be wholly unaccountable, and out of the Road of all Policy. For instance, Suppose only these Marriages, or That alone of Don Carlos with the eldest Arch Dutchess; and this will shew us, Why that Court could be brought to discard the Neutral Garrisons, and all other Securities furnish'd by the Quadruple Alliance for the Establishing her Son, the same Don Carlos, in Italy; and to trust to the Emperor's naked Word in so great a Point: viz. Because by this Marriage it would come about, that the Emperor, by securing those Dominions in Italy for Don Carlos, would secure them, at the same Time, for the Issue of his own Daughter; and so must of Necessity, for the Sake of his [Page]own Interest, and the aggrandizing his own Family, be sincere and zealous in this Affair. On the other Side, the same Supposition of this Marriage gives a reasonable Solution, Why the Court of Spain has consented to, what the Spanish Ministers at the Congress would not hear of, the Guaranty of the Succession in Germany, as lately establish'd in the House of Austria: viz. Because it comes about by this Marriage, that being Guarantee to the Emperor's Succession in his Austrian Dominions, is no more than being Guarantee for the Queen's own Son Don Carlos, the future Husband of the eldest Arch Dutchess; and that Self Interest must make Spain, under its present Administration, sincere in this Guaranty. And upon any other Bottom, we may safely defy the World to give a Solution of these and several other Appearances, in this New Alliance.

I need not go farther, and appeal to any Words that may have been dropp'd in Confidence, at the Court of Vienna itself, upon the Subject of these Marriages; and that, with a particular Pleasure and Satisfaction express'd in them, Since we have so much, and so strong, Evidence of the Reality of it, from the Mouth of Ripperda, who made the Treaty; and from the Language of the Court of Spain itself; as well as from the utter Inconsistency and Unaccountableness of the proceedings of that Court, without this Supposition.

I acknowledge indeed, That at Vienna, when it began to appear that what had been said upon this Head had allarm'd Europe; and when, in particular, the great Aim was to keep the Dutch from acceding to the Treaty of Hanover; which [Page]might be hasten'd by so terrible an Appearance: Then, the whole Affair of these Marriages was utterly disown'd; nay, in Order to deny these Marriages, it was absolutely denied that there was any such Thing in Being, as a secret Treaty between the Emperor and Spain. I am not afraid of relating this, after all the Proofs before given of the Reality of a secret Treaty, and of this Article in it; nor at all unwilling that it should work as much as it can, and have all the Weight it ought to have: For I am confident, that, as this Conduct convinced not one Person at Vienna; and made not the least Impression upon the Dutch Minister, or his Masters; so it will make no Impression upon Any who have read what I have before laid down, unless it be this, That they who can act an unjustifiable part, can, without Scruple, and with the same Ease, bring themselves to a peremptory and absolute Denial of it, till the proper Time comes for their open Avowal of it.

But as this Article of these Marriages must remain undoubted; we cannot help spending a few Thoughts upon the Consequences of them, or of the first of them only. There is but one Life, that of the Prince of Asturias, between Don Carlos and the Crown of Spain, after the Death of the present King. There is only the same Life between Don Carlos and the Crown of France; should the present King there dye without Issue Male; and the Renunciations not take place: both which Events may happen.

And as to the vast Hereditary Dominions of the House of Austria, Don Carlos will come to them [Page]by Right of his Wife. And as Experience has shewn us, for many Ages, that whoever is Master of these Dominions, and the Power that attends them, has been, and must be Emperor, notwithstanding its being an Elective Crown: Don Carlos, by marrying the eldest Arch Dutchess, cannot sail of being Emperor. So that Don Carlos may possibly be at once, Emperor, King of France, and King of Spain: and have the vast Strength and Riches of all these Powers united and center'd in him.

I have thus sufficiently shewn the many and complicated Evils of this New Alliance between the Emperor and Spain; and the just Apprehensions, and well-grounded Fears, which the Court of Great Britain could not but entertain, from all Appearances and all Advices, about the Nature and Tendency of it, with Regard to the present Establishment of the Crown of Great Britain; to our Possessions; our Commerce; our Religion; our Liberties, and those of all Europe; and, in a Word, to every Thing that ought to be Dear to Us. And now, Let any Persons amongst us, who know how to prize these inestimable Goods, which alone make Life itself valuable, survey this New Alliance in every Part of it: and judge, ‘Whether ever hitherto any one Scheme has appear'd in Europe, of a Destruction so universal, and of a Ruine so extended, as This (taking the whole together) appears plainly to be.’

It is time now for us to enquire, What has been the Conduct of the Court of Great Britain, upon the View of all these Evils.

1. The first step they took was to renew, by a Treaty, the Defensive Engagements subsisting [Page]between Great Britain, France, and Prussia. But this Treaty was not set on foot till some Months after the New Alliance between the Emperor and Spain; and after the best Intelligences, and most mature Consideration, of the Tendency of that Alliance. And as this Treaty, made at Hanover, has long been publick in the World; I need not observe that it is a Treaty entirely Defensive between Britain, France and Prussia, for the mutual support of each other, against Injuries; and not at all for the invading, or injuring, any Nation under Heaven.

2. Particular Regard was shewn to the States General, in the framing of the Treaty of Hanover: to which they have since acceded. The next care was to invite the Crown of Sweden into this Alliance; that Kingdom having so often and so successfully appeared in Defence of the Protestant Religion, and of the Liberties of Europe. And the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, whose Family has done such signal Service to the Protestant Cause, readily offer'd a good Body of Troops, in support of this Alliance.

These are the Steps which the Court of Great Britain thought fit to take as soon as possible, after the Danger we were in, appeared evident beyond all contradiction.

3. As the Parliament of Great Britain found their Country immediately threatn'd in its greatest Concerns from these Treaties of Vienna; Both Houses gave his Majesty all Assurance of support in whatever He should think fit to do in the present critical Conjuncture. And accordingly it was necessary now to consider in earnest, what was most proper to be done. The Court of Great Britain [Page]had evident Proof that nothing could influence the Two New Allies to Terms of Reason, but to shew a vigorous Spirit against every pernicious or suspicious part of such an Alliance. And as all Appearances, in all parts, convinced them, That nothing could so effectually guard against approaching Evils, as the dispatching sufficient Squadrons of Ships to several Places; and as they were sensible that our Fleet, now the best in the World, could never be of any Account, either towards our Glory or our Safety, but upon such an Occasion; They did, with all possible Diligence, fit out Three Squadrons of Men of War: One for the West-Indies, One for the Coasts of Spain, and One for the Baltick.

It will now be ask'd, as it has been indeed already, What beneficial Effect has this Method had? What Good have we gain'd, or what Evil have we prevented, by these Grand Appearances of our Fleets abroad? And if an Answer may be reasonably expected, by Those who ask these and the like Questions; so is it also a just Expectation, That, They should be as ready to receive a Reasonable Answer to them, as they are to ask them.

As to the Treaty of Hanover; I will suppose, no Apology can be expected for That, after such a surprizing and formidable Conjunction of the Two Powers of the Emperor and Spain; the Design, and the Articles of which Conjunction appear'd every Day more and more terrible to their Neighbours. The Contracting Parties in the Hanover Treaty must have been taxed with Infatuation and Insensibility, beyond the common Pitch of Those Evils, if They had not enter'd into a strict and hearty [Page]Concert for their own Self-Defence, in such Circumstances, of present Invasion of the Trade of some of them; and of Forebodings of future Evil to them All.

But as the Question here at home, chiefly, if not solely, refers to our Naval Armaments from England; What have They produced, or, for what Reasons were they sent? The Answer is very plain. As to the Squadron sent to the WestIndies; I believe there is no one who has an Estate in those Parts, or is concern'd in any Trade thither, who did not think it highly necessary to have a Strong Squadron in those Seas, for securing our Commerce; which must otherwise have been inevitably ruined, by the Depredations and Violences committed by the Spaniards for several Years past without Redress. And if the sending of the said Squadron has prevented the Return of the Galleons: no Man who is in the least conversant in the Affairs of Europe, can make any doubt but that this Incident has been the only Thing that has hitherto prevented a War in Europe, by depriving the Courts of Vienna and Madrid of the means of putting in execution the dangerous Schemes they had projected.

The Squadron sent to the Coasts of Spain, was sent to prevent any Attempt from that Country, to disturb Us at Home: The Court of Great Britain being assured, beyond all doubt, as I have before particularly related, that an Offensive Treaty was concluded at Vienna; and that an Attempt was design'd from Spain, and preparations making for it, at that Time, in Favour of the Pretender.

[Page] And the Squadron sent to the Baltick was sent to prevent very great Evils in those Parts; there being no room to doubt, that the Czarina's real View was to go with a Fleet directly to Stockholm, and under a Pretence of demanding the Use of the Ports, and the Assistance of Sweden for the Recovery of Sleswick to the Duke of Holstein, actually to dethrone the present King of Sweden, and make that Nation absolutely dependent on Muscovy. It was therefore judg'd of the utmost Importance to prevent this, by sending a strong Squadron into the Baltick; not only as it was the preserving a Friendly Power, and a Power Necessary to the Balance of the North: but particularly, because Sweden could not but be consider'd in the Nature of a Frontier and Barrier to Britain itself, to such a Degree, that if that Ringdom were once either made subject to Russia, or Dependent upon it, Britain itself must be in Apprehension of Attempts from the Russian Ravagers, coming with their Fleet from Gottenburg to our Northern Coasts: an Evil not to be guarded against, after the Subjection of Sweden, but by the Expence, either of a constant Fleet upon those Coasts, or an Armed Force in those Parts of our County, which lie most open to such Attempts.

The Designs and Views in sending out these Squadrons being so unexceptionably Good; supposing that, through the Dispositions of Providence, and the Opposition of Winds and Weather, Success had not attended upon any One of these Squadrons; nay, that Great and Extraordinary Misfortunes had followed them all: yet, They who are not so weak as to argue from Success alone; [Page]They who know the Uncertainty of Seas, and Winds, and Weather, and have too much Understanding to think the Event only to be the true Criterion of Judging about the Wisdom of any Project; all Persons, I mean of good Sense, should, methinks, have been ready, even in such a Case, to have applauded what was done upon so good Grounds, and with Views so much for the Honour and Safety of their Country. But, God be thank'd, this is not the Case. Every one of the Armaments has had Success equal to the Goodness of the Errand they were all sent upon; and even, beyond Expectation. For, as to the Squadron in the West Indies; it has not only protected the Trade of His Majesty's Subjects in those Parts from the Depredations of the Spaniards; but also the Galeons with their Stores of Money, the Strength of the New Alliance, and the like of all the Projects concerted in it, are kept back: and those Attempts disappointed which would have been made, and perhaps succeeded, had such Riches come to their Aid. The Execution of the Schemes laid in Spain for an Invasion of Great Britain, in Favour of the Pretender, was, at that Time, prevented by the Appearance of a British Fleet upon the Spanish Coasts: and all the Evils and Disorders, as well as Expence, avoided, which an Attack of that Sort must have occasion'd, even supposing it repulsed from hence; and the utter Ruin and Destructon, that must have ensued, had it succeeded. And by the Squadron in the Baltick, the Czarina's whole Force of Ships and Galleys was kept in, within the Bounds of Safety to themselves and their Neighbours; [Page]Her destructive Designs against Sweden, with all their ill Consequences to Britain and to other Countries of Europe, prevented from Execution in every Instance: and, after all the boasted Strength of the Ships and Seamen in the Service of that Crown, Russia itself, and all Europe convinc'd, that twenty British Men of War can, upon any Occasion, make them disappear as if they were not, and shelter themselves in their own Ports as if they had no Views but those of Quiet und Security.

But here is the great Advantage to Those who make such Enquiries as these we have been now considering, without a Disposition to be satisfy'd: That Evils prevented, go for no Evils; and because they were not visibly perceiv'd by our Eyes, nor sensibly felt by our Nerves, before we find them at a greater Distance from us, therefore, They who are in the Disposition of Satyr (so much easier than Praise) will probably think themselves at Liberty to deny this Freedom from such Evils to be at all the Effect of the Measures taken; and to presist in it, that no such Evils would have come, or could have been justly fear'd, if these Methods had not been taken. And in this Manner, I own, They may talk for ever against all possible Light; if the whole Scene which I have, in the former Part of these Papers, laid before them, be not of Force enough to work another Perswasion in them. Yet, one Thing, I will affirm, ‘That we, and other Nations are, at present, actually free from the Evils and Attempts I have mention'd, since these vigorous Measures have shew'd themselves in the View of Europe; and that They themselves cannot say it was certain, (as others will not say, it was in the least probable) that We [Page]should have been free from those Evils and those Attempts, had not these Measures been taken.’

Thus therefore, stands the Affair of these three Squadrons. They were sent upon Designs of the last Consequence, and exceedingly Honourable, to Great Britain: And they have had the Success of fully answering the Ends proposed.

It was not, we see, to assert the Sovereignty of the Seas, merely by shewing themselves in several Parts of the World in a Form superior to that of other Nations, that these Armaments were fitted out. The asserting our Sovereignty of the Seas, as a Point of mere Speculation, at a great Expence, and without any other View, may, perhaps, be a Subject fit for Men of Wit to be pleasant with, and to entertain themselves and their Friends upon. But to assert the Sovereignty of the Seas, as a Point of Action, upon a just Occasion: — To shew this Sovereignty in the Sight of those Nations, who are making their own Strength at Sea the Instrument of Ruine to their Neighbours: — To shew it, in Opposition to those Nations who are contriving to convey Mischief to ourselves, and Assistance to our Enemies, by the Sea itself: — If this be not the proper Business, and the peculiar Glory of Britain, as the greatest Maritime Power now in Europe; then our Navy is itself a Ridicule upon ourselves; an Ostentation only, kept up at a vast Expence; and a Piece of Vanity, unworthy of a Grave and Wise Nation. But no more upon this Part of the Subject.

Another Question will be ask'd, What has been, and must be, our Expence upon this Occasion? And it will be added, Are we alone to bear such Burthens, [Page]without a Proportion of Expence from those who are our Allies; whilst Those whom we are opposing, seem to be at little, or none at all? To the first Branch of this Question, What is our Expence? It is certainly enough to answer in General, Let it be what it will; if it be necessary for our own Security, and that of Europe; if it be incurred for the Preventing the greatest Evils, and as the only Means of procuring a better State of Things: it may justly be said, to be not at all comparable to the Necessity for it; not to be put in the Balance against the Mischiefs which might have arisen from the Want of it; and very much beneath the Good which has and will come from it. The whole Point to every true Briton is, Whether it was necessary, fitting, and reasonable: — They that think it probably so, must be pleased with it. They that think it a mere Piece of Gaiety in Those who preside; or an hasty Blunder in the Dark; will have other Resentments about it: But they must first think them mere Madmen, or mere Idiots, before they can come to this. In the mean Time, till something of this Sort appears, we cannot but think, That, if the attempting to guard ourselves and our Neighbours from very great and comprehensive Evils, be laudable; and if the preventing the Beginnings of those Evil can make an Expence necessary, fitting, and reasonable; then the Expence upon the present Occasion is certainly so.

But as [...] in general is Satisfaction enough, of whatever Sort or Degree the Expence is; provided is be a Lesser Evil than what it has hitherto kept off: so it will not be disagreeable to remark, [Page]That the Expence upon these Naval Armaments is of such a Nature, and accompanied with such Circumstances, as to make it much the more tolerable in the Eyes of every Briton. The Expence is chiefly an Expence amongst ourselves; and such as only circulates Money from one Hand to another. The Victualling so many Ships is the Advantage of our own Farmers and Graziers. The Rigging out and equipping them, gives Money to our own Builders and Workmen. The putting them into Motion when they are so repair'd, is known to be of Service to the Ships themselves: which otherwise lie still, and often receive such Damage, as at the End it costs more to rectify. The Employing so many Seamen is still employing our own Subjects; and giving our Money to our own Country-Men: besides the great future Benefit arising from this Necessity itself; as they are kept in Action by it, and inured to the Service of their Country, and the more fit to defend it upon all Occasions to come. So that the Expence of our Naval Defence, which is the true and natural Defence of Britain; tho' it, indeed, must be a Burthen to those who pay towards it, as all Payments are: yet it is a Burthen with this Advantage to the Publick, that it sends not our Money abroad; it loses it not to the Nation; it removes it indeed out of one Pocket into another, but it is still our Money, and remains among ourselves. The Community and Body of Subjects taken together are not the Poorer for it; tho' the Persons paying it to others, are so: and if it be for their own necessary Defence, and for the Safety of all the Rest of their Possessions, All [Page]honest Men among them will be glad, They are so.

But then our Expence, tho' great, is not alone. The Dispositions made by France, ever since the Signing of the Treaty of Hanover, have more than kept pace with us, in the largeness of the Expence. The first Step taken by the most Christian King was, to augment his regular Troops with Twenty five Thousand Men; and this in such a Manner, that they were presently ready for Action upon any Occasion. At the same Time he order'd a Levy of the Militia, to the Number of Sixty Thousand Men: and appointed these to be commanded by the Ancient Officers reform'd of his old Troops; not to mention Twelve Thousand Invalids, put into good Order, and double Officer'd, for the Defence of such of his Cittadels and Forts as they are proper for. These, and other Dispositions, which have been made to put France into a Condition to support a War, if it should be necessary, amounted, for this last Year, by a certain Calculation, to fifteen hundred and sixty thousand Pounds Sterling; and if the Militia should be obliged to march out of their Provinces to the Frontiers, it will amount to a far greater Sum. And by this Method it comes to pass, That these sixty thousand Militia, and twelve thousand Invalids, remaining in Garrisons and fortified Places, as the Service shall require; That King can send into the Field, without Inconvenience, 165000 Men of his Regular Troops. Such has been for some Time the Disposition there, in Order to shew the New Allies, that France is not only in earnest, but in a well disposed Condition [Page]of disputing any Attempts against itself, or its Allies.

The United Provinces indeed, came but lately into the Alliance, from the Frame of their Constitution, naturally begetting Delays and prolonging their Debates; and not from any Want of the Sense of their Dangers, and the Necessity of their acceding to the Treaty of Hanover. For from the Time of their Accession to that Treaty, they have shewn a Warmth and Vigour worthy of the Occasion. They have agreed unanimously upon such Augmentations of their Land Forces, as by next Spring will make them above 50000 effective Men: And the necessary Measures are taking for their having a Fleet at Sea of Twenty Men of War. Besides which Expence, relating to these Augmentations, They have been at a very great Charge in providing their Magazines, and putting their Barrier and Frontier Places into a good Posture of Defence. But whoever reads the late Resolutions and Representations of the States General; and sees with how deep a Concern, and in how pathetical a Manner, they speak of the Calamities now threatning themselves, and the rest of Europe; declaring their Ruine must lye at their own Door, if all the Provinces do not, in a Case of such Necessity, consent to act the Part of Men in a vigorous Defence of themselves, and readily concur in ‘What, in the Opinion of their High Mightinesses, is indispensably necessary to the common Safety and Preservation; and without which the Well-being, Liberty and Religion of the whole Republick, will be put to the Venture.’ [Page]Whoever reads this, and much more said and inculcated by Them with a particular Vehemence, will not think, that They are not determin'd to defend themselves by all necessary Measures against the Dangers now hanging over their Heads.

At the same Time, those Powers, which have raised this Allarm, and occasioned this defensive Expence to their Neighbours, cannot stir one Step in their own offensive Designs, without a very considerable one to themselves. His Imperial Majesty, besides the many Promises of another Sort, which He has bestow'd around Him, has entered into real Obligations which cannot be performed but at a very great Expence. To the Elector of Cologne he has engaged to pay 600,000 German Florins a Year, for two Years; to the Elector of Bavaria, the same; to the Elector Palatin and of Treves the same; and to the Duke of Wolfenbuttle 200,000 Florins; besides what is stipulated to others. Add to these his own great Expences, in recruiting and in refitting his whole Army, and preparing every thing of all Sorts, necessary for Action: An Expence in the whole so great! that nothing but the vast Advantages It is to receive from his new Alliance, and the Expectation of Remittances from Spain, could have induced him to think of it. And what then must the Expence of Spain be; which has not only it's own Army to put in Order and augment; not only it's own Towns and Coasts to guard; but the Emperor's Demands to answer? And what a State of things must the Necessities of Spain it self, together with the Demands [Page]of the Emperor, bring that King, and his Country into; even if his Flota with it's usual Cargo of Money should come Home safe: when it is well known, that, before these new Expences, (the Effect of the New Alliance) all the Civil and Military Officers belonging to that Crown, and their whole Army, were in great Arrears; and all the Royal Revenues anticipated for a Year and a Half; and that the whole Nation was in a State of very great Poverty and Distress? And if such immense Expences can be run into with Zeal, for the the Injury and Oppression of other Countries: surely, an Expence, much smaller in itself; and directed solely to the Defence and Preservation of ourselves in the Rights and Properties we are justly in Possession of, cannot be thought unworthy of the British Nation; nor unjustifiable in Those who have already begun it, only because they thought it absolutely necessary. But still other Questions arise upon this Subject.

It may be asked, Could not the Court of Great Britain all this while have tryed other Methods, than allarming Europe with Fleets? The Methods of a friendly Congress, or Proposals of a more peaceable and amicable Nature? Was there no Way of proceeding, but demanding of the Emperor, the sole Propriety of Trade; and engrossing it to Britain and Holland: as if other Nations had no Right to the World, besides our selves? In which Way of talking there is something very right, and something very wrong. For certainly it must be granted, that we ought to prepare ourselves with Vigour to oppose Injury; as well as to be ready to propose, or receive, any reasonable Methods of Accommodation. [Page]To do the first, without a Dosposition shewn to the latter, I acknowledge, would have been unjustifiable. To do the latter without the first, had been Weakness and Folly: and could have proceeded from nothing but a Total Ignorance of the plainest Rules of political Conduct; which have long ago established It as a certain Maxim, that the best Way to Peace upon such Occasions, is with the Sword prepared for the Day of Necessity; and that those Powers, who can suffer themselves to invade or demand the Rights of others, will laugh at all Accommodations offered, when they see them unaccompanied with such Appearances as shew the Resolution of Those others to defend their Rights by Force, if Reason cannot prevail.

I answer therefore, to these and the like Questions. 1. It never could have been justified, in the Court of Great Britain, to have made Proposals of Accommodation, without the most vigorous Measures taken, which alone could make them effectual. 2. In some of the Pretences and Demands of this new Alliance, no Equivalent, no Accommodation, could be proposed. In the Case of the Demand of Gibraltar; whilst the Nation seems universally to concur, that no Sum of Money, nor any other Place of Strength abroad, can be any Equivalent to it: what could be proposed, but a Resolution to defend the Nation in its just Possession of it; especially, since the whole present Conduct of Spain may assure us, by a fresh Evidence, that it is of the utmost Importance; and that, if that Place were once gone out of our Hands, we should have still less Hope of seeing Treaties observ'd, or of hindering ourselves from being more and more injured, on that side, in our Commerce? [Page]3. In the other great Case, that of the Emperor's new Establishment at Ostend, the Court of Great Britain never went upon such an arbitrary Maxim as, That other Nations ought not to be permitted to begin and extend their Commerce wherever they rightfully could, as well as ourselves; or that we had any Right to oppose such Attempts: But upon these undoubted Maxims of Truth and Right,— That Treaties are to be observed; — That, when any Country is excluded by Treaties from any particular Branch of Commerce, it is not to be authorized and supported in carrying on the said Branches of Commerce in violation of the said Treaties; and — That those Powers which have, by repeated Engagements, obliged themselves to defend and support the British and Dutch Trade, are justly to be opposed when they themselves come to be the Invaders and Destroyers of it. Agreeably to all this, 4. As the Court of Great Britain has taken such vigorous Measures as shew the Resolution of Self-defence: so, has it never been wanting either to propose, or to receive, any reasonable Method for the Accommodation of this Matter, to the Emperor's Satisfaction; if He could be satisfied with any thing, but a Trade in open Contradiction to all Treaties.

In particular, It was sufficiently intimated to the Court of Vienna, that the British Court pretended to nothing in this Affair, but to defend the Right of Trade belonging to Britain by Treaties; far from assuming to themselves any Right of controlling the Emperor, or his Subjects, in any Attempts, not contrary to those Treaties: That therefore, if the Emperor would remove this Company, and the Seat of Trade, now at Ostend, to Trieste, or any other Place in his Dominions, which [Page]did not heretofore belong to the Spanish Monarchy; Britain was ready quietly to acquiesce. And the same was offer'd to the Court of Madrid, in the form of a Proposal, when his Catholick Majesty had just begun to espouse the Emperor's Interest, in this Affair of Ostend.

But tho' the Court of Spain not only acknowledged the Reasonableness of the Proposal; but made great Professions of Hope that it would be accepted; yet, at the same Time, it was declared, That Spain was under Engagements to stand by the Emperor, even supposing his unreasonable Refusal of it. And at Kienna, the Intimation made no Impression at all: The Resolution there, by this appearing plainly to be, The Support of the Ostend Company, and Trade from the Netherlands, against all Stipulations.

But however this ended at Vienna and Madrid; It must have this Effect at London, to convince all Persons, that no one, either real or pretended, Provocation from Britain, gave the first Occasion for this new Alliance; (one End of which was the Establishment of the Emperor's new and unwarrantable Designs in Trade:) So the Court of Great-Britain, in the midst of all Preparations for the Defence of this Nation's Rights, has not neglected to try other Methods of a peaceable and amicable Nature; but shewn a readiness to do any thing, even for present Peace, except to give up the Advantages, Rights and Priviledges of Britain, of more Importance than present Peace: and these Advantages founded upon Treaties; which therefore, They who preside are obliged to guard and defend, as a sacred Depositum, not only out of Love to their Country, [Page]common to Them with all others, but out of peculiar Duty and Obligation; as they are intrusted with this Guardianship and Defence, by the Publick; and as an Account of this Trust may justly be demanded of them.

If then, nothing reasonable, in the Way of Accommodation, has been wanting on their Part; They will not easily be blamed, (it is to be hoped rather, they will be highly commended) for This, that They have not permitted themselves to be misled by any smooth Words without Meaning; or to be hindred from taking all necessary Precautions, by any Amusements of Congresses, or Embassies, or Negotiations, only thrown in their Way to gain Time to others, and to lose it to themselves: Since it is evident, that irreparable and irretrievable Evils might have come from the not taking these necessary and timely Precautions. And were it so, that They had spent their whole Time in sending and receiving fruitless Messages backwards and forwards, in such a critical Conjuncture; we may venture to say, we know the Persons who would have been the first to charge, (and very deservedly too) the Ruine of this Nation upon them; and to have demanded Justice against them for such a Conduct, in such a Time of Danger to their Country.

And indeed, supposing this to have been the Case; supposing the Court of Great Britain, in such a Situation; with such repeated Advices from all Parts; with such Demonstrations of Danger from abroad, as put out of all Doubt the true Nature and Designs of so formidable an Alliance as that of the Emperor and Spain: I say, supposing this Court, surrounded with all these [Page]Evidences, to have entered into no Measures of Defence with any neighbouring States and Princes; to have taken no Steps towards preventing the Mischief threaten'd; to have sent out no Naval Armaments, either to preserve any friendly Powers, or to quash any Attempts of others; Who would not rise up, and demand an Account of such a Conduct from Those who alone are to answer for it? Who would not join in saying, ‘Is this the Usage fit to be given to a brave and considering People? Is this the watchfulness of Those, whose Duty it is to attend to every distant View of Danger? Or, do They think so meanly of us and the whole Nation, that we can see nothing but what we feel; and that we have a Sense of no Evil, but what is present: Or, that we are so made, that a little Expence would affright us from preserving our all; or, reduced to so low a Condition of Poverty, that we can't purchase or furnish out even Self-defence to our selves? Were not other Princes and States threatned by the same Danger; and ready to unite with us? Must our Fleet, the Glory (as it is call'd) of this Land, lie still and decay, rather than be made our Bulwark? Our Fleet, falsly call'd our Glory, but indeed our Shame, whilst it is laid aside as useless, at a Time when That alone might make us look too formidable in Europe, to be insulted or affronted? Or, does even this Expence which circulates chiefly amongst ourselves, appear too formidable to a Nation which those around it envy, as the Centre of Riches and Plenty? But why do we speak of Expence? It is this Method of [Page] Indolence, and Inactivity upon such an Occasion, which must bring after it an Expence much greater in it self; and much more hazardous in its Effect; as Time shall add Strength to the Danger threaten'd: an Expence, which must increase our Debt, and at the same Time diminish the Hope of paying it. What Account can we give of such a Treatment of this Nation? As we can find none in all the known Measures of Political Prudence; we must search for it somewhere else. — There must be secret Reasons for such a Conduct; and perhaps these may lye in the Riches of Spain, suffered to come safely home, to strengthen and consolidate the most dangerous Conjunction that ever yet appeared in Europe’.— This and much more might justly be urged, upon the Supposition of a negligent and unactive Conduct in this Crisis of Danger. And what Reply to make to it, I profess I think it utterly impossible to tell.

But this is not the Case. The Court of Great Britain has acted quite another Part; and enter'd into that Method of vigorous Selfdefence, by which alone, in all human Wisdom, there can be the least Hope of preventing or repulsing any dangerous Attempts against all our highest Concerns: And a Method, to which No other Principle could possibly have directed Those who have chosen it, but That of an honest Regard to the Possessions, the Trade, the Rights, the Well-Being, and the Being itself, of this now happy and envied Nation.

FINIS.

§

§

[Page]

[Page]

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE REASONS OF THE CONDUCT OF Great Britain, With Relation to the Present State of AFFAIRS IN EUROPE.

Published (here) for the Information of the Inhabitants of New-England.

BOSTON: Re-printed by T. Fleet, for B. Eliot, just below the Town-House, 1727.

Information about this book

Title statement

An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe. Published (here) for the information of the inhabitants of New-England.

Hoadly, Benjamin, 1676-1761.

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Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

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Ann Arbor, MI :

Date

2009-04.

ID [DLPS]

N02431

ID [TCP]

N02431

ID [STC]

Evans 2880

ID [NOTIS]

APY4749

ID [IMAGE-SET]

2880

ID [EVANS-CITATION]

99031901

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Early American Imprints, 1639-1800 ; no. 2880.

Notes

(Evans-TCP ; no. N02431)

Transcribed from: (Readex Archive of Americana ; Early American Imprints, series I ; image set 2880)

Images scanned from Readex microprint and microform: (Early American imprints. First series ; no. 2880)

Source

— An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe. Published (here) for the information of the inhabitants of New-England., Hoadly, Benjamin, 1676-1761..

Extent

103, [1] p. ; 18 cm. (8vo)

Re-printed by T. Fleet, for B. Eliot, just below the Town-House,,. Boston: :: 1727.. (Attributed to Benjamin Hoadly in the Dictionary of national biography.)

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Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.