SECT. I.

PAg. 1. ad [...]em. He saith, He chose rather to bear the Calumnies in it (viz. my printed Sheet) than to stir in a Wasps Nest.

Answ. Upon a serious perusal of his Reply, I do not find that he hath shown wherein I have been guilty of one Calumny against him; and for what I have charged him with, he not only in substance and effect, takes with the Charge, but doth much more charge himself there with, than I have done, throughout his Reply; and particularly this doth appear from what he hath said in p 50. of his Reply, where he hath expresly these following words, [in answer to what I drew you only by way of Consequence, upon his Opinion; and I did not charge it directly upon him, hoping he would have deny'd the consequence, but He readily grants it] thus, Nor (saith he) shall I part with mine Opinion, viz. That the Origine and Cause of the necessity of the first sin is more to be derived from God, than from Man himself; nay, farther, (saith he) that the whole cause of the futurity o [...] it is owing to the divine Decree, though still the whole sin and blame of it is due to Adam, for that in the accomplishing of his A [...]pstacy he abused his own free Will, and voluntarily transgressed the Command. Let the intelligent and impartial Reader judge whether in these words he hath not only confirmed my Charge, but has exceeded what I charged him with in his granting my Consequence, which I did not positively and directly load him with, as neither did I with any other of my Consequences, [...]s that by his [...] on it would follow, that God was the Author of [...]: This I only inferred by consequence, taking it for [...]ran [...]ed, that he would not allow such a consequence to follow from his Opinion; and that therefore by fair Dispute he was obliged to depart from his Opinion, from which [...] consequence [...]id [...] ­nu [...]nely follow. Its true, he still deny [...] that God is th [...] Author of [Page 2]sin, in express words; but what difference is there in reality betwixt Gods being the Author of sin, And That the Origine and Cause of the necessity of the first sin is more to be derived from God [...] from Man himself; nay, that the whole cause of the futurity of it is owing to the divine Decree, I perceive not; For though Author [...] Cause in the English Language are two different words, yet as they have but one signification in English, in respect o [...] Efficiency, [...] one Greek word, both in the New-Testament (Heb. 5.9.) and in other Greek Authors, is expressive of both, viz. the word [aitois] Again, his words above quoted by me at large out of his pag 50 carry in them a plain inconsistency, viz. ‘That the whole cause of the futurity of Adams sin is owing to the divine Decree; and yet, the whole sin [...]nd blame of it is due to Adam.’ But that th [...] whole sin and blame of it was due to Adam, and yet God th [...] whole cause of the futurity of it, and that it is owing to the divine Decree, is such an inconsistency, that, I think, none ca [...] deny, but such who are resolved to deny the first Principles o [...] humane Understanding; and all dispute with such is but lo [...] labour, for Contra negantem Principia non est D [...]sputandum, we ough [...] not to dispute with men who deny the first Principles; as if on [...] should say, The whole cause of Ʋ [...]a [...]'s Death was owing to David, yet the whole sin and blame of it was due to him or them that immediately killed him, and David was altogether innocent▪ for as inconsistent as this assertion is, and repugnant to the first Principles of humane Understanding, so is that other of Mr. Willard, I think, in the judgment of all intelligent Persons, wh [...] are not byassed with his Opinion.

The like injustice he hath used to me, in his second page, in his charging me, ‘That I had so fouly represented the matter, that he was prevailed on to give the world a fair account of it;’ He adds, ‘That he might, were it worth the while, complain of the dis-ingenuity of the man, but all that have to do with him in a way of Controversie, are well acquainted with that.’

Answ. All this is only said, but without the least shadow of Proof, and therefore that Matchiavelian Rule, Fort ter Cal [...]ni [...]e, &c. which he would charge upon me, rebounds wholly on himself, but his affirmation, That all that have to do with me in a way of Controversie, are well acquainted with my dis-ingenuity, is such [Page 3]a Calumny and [...]orious Falshood, that few, I think, of his own Gang in New-England will assent to; and Thousands who are acquainted with the late printed Controversies I have been en­gaged in, which has been altogether against the Quakers, (except in two single Ski [...]mishes, one with him, and another with Mr. Increase Mather) will affirm the contrary; and I think, I can almost appeal to Mr. Increase Mather himself, and most of their way in New-England, in my printed Controversies against the Quakers, whether Mr. Willard hath not charged me very unjustly. Indeed he hath in this his Charge not a little gratified the Quakers, but he hath in this his so doing as much disobliged all true Christian Professors, who have read my Books of Controversies against the Quakers, who have generally commended my sincerity in what I have done in way of Controversie against them, for above these ten years past, and which is more than all, that I have the Testi­mony of a good Conscience within me, to my sincerity. There­fore what Mr. Willard hath charged me in this, seems to be in prejudice against me, for my former engagement in Controversie against him, and some of his Brethren at Boston, when I was under the Profession of a Quaker; and though as I have freely acknowledged, and do now acknowledge, in divers points of my Controversie then with the Boston Ministers, I was blame worthy, and in error, yet I erred through ignorance, and not willfully, and having obtained Mercy and forgiveness of God, through Faith and Repentance, it would be very dis-ingenuous and unchristian in Mr. Willard to object that against me.

Pa [...]. 2. He saith, "My Narrative (viz. that contained in my printed Sheet) "is not a Disputation, but a Remonstrance against "something that [...] him with

Answ. That it is a Remonstrance against him, I grant, but that it is not also a Disputation, he hath not shown; for most part of that sheet is Argumentative, and contains such Arguments against his Opinion, that he has given no sollid Reply unto, but either Evasions or such Concessions that sink him deeper in the mire.

To my calling it A dangerous and hurtful Opinion maintained by him, he Replys, ‘That a thing may be dangerous per se, and per [...], and that if there be any danger in this, it is only in the latter sense,’ shall be endeavour'd to be made appear an [...]n.

[Page 4] Answ. Whether his performance be according to his promised endeavour, shall be lest to the judicious and impartial▪ Read [...]rs. But whereas he seemeth to disown that he maintained any such Opinion as the Title of my printed sheet beareth; and that this was neither asserted by him, T [...]tidem verbis, i. e. in so many words, nor that which was said, insisted on, &c. is a poor evasion, and a very unjust ground to fix a Calumny upon me; for I was so far from asserting he did so affirm, to all I charged on him, totidem [...]erbis, that in pag. 2. of my printed sheet, I said, ‘I did not hear them (viz. either the Students or Mr. Willard) affirm that all sinful Actions of the Creature are determined of God, so that they act them necessarily, so as by any explicit Speech to as [...]rt it, but their manner of answering and arguing doth clearly [...]oug [...] prove it was their Opinion.’ The Calumny therefore that he chargeth on me lyeth at his own door; for tho' I charged not the Opinion in full upon him, tot dom Verbis, as I expressed it sufficiently, I did not yet the equivalent of it, in other words, [...] did charge upon him, and I do still charge upon him, and (as I have shown) he hath charged himself yet more than I had do [...], as in the above Quotation given by me, out of his pag. 50. doth plainly appear.

Pag. 4. ‘He never yet professed himself to be [...] Independent, not yet a Presbyterian, believing there may be mistakes in both parties.’

Answ. And a little, I think, he has professed himself to be of any other Profession commonly known in Christ [...]n [...], wherein he seemed to be very singular. But why doth he not [...]fess him­self to be an Independent? for both the Name and Reason [...] seems to belong to him These called Independent are so called because they acknowledge no Superiour over them in the Church, under Christ, appointed by him, so as to have any Ec­clesiastical Rule or Authority over them; the which Definition of an [...], seems to agree as fully to M. Willard as to any profest Independents, seeing he neither owns E [...]iscopacy nor Pres­by [...] to be superiour to him; and if he own the People to be his Superiours, he is Independent still.

SECT II.

PAg. 7, 8. He charges it on me, ‘That I seem to make it [...] Novelty, and a thing of prejudice to the better part of good men, that the Decree of God is immutable, and that man hath a free Will, and that it is not impeded in its proper Liberty by this Decree, which is maintained by the greatest Protestant Divines.’

Answ. In this Mr. Willard hath very unfairly and dis-ingenuously represented me, as if I had denyed the Decree of God about Adam's sin, or the sins of his Posterity, or that Gods Decree is immutable; neither of which I did deny in my printed sheet, but on the coutrary I expresly and positively said, pag. 3. ‘That the Thesis it self, taken in a sound sence, I grant most willingly to be true, viz. That the Immutability of Gods Decree doth not take away the liberty of the Creature;’ for it was not the T [...]esis tha [...] I would have impugned, taken in a sound sence, but the Consectaries inferred from the Thesis, that I would have impugned, and did impugne in my printed Sheet, which Mr. Willard did allow to follow, and which I judged, and still judge, he ought not to have allowed. Also, in my pag. 2. I did say, ‘I willingly grant, that there is frequently a divine Determination of the Will both of Men and Angels in good Actions, and that the said Determina­tion can well consist with the liberty of the Will.’ But why Mr. Willard has taken so little notice of this, that he chargeth the Contradictory on me, I leave to impartial Readers, whether it be not without all ground, to render me very erroneous and heter [...]dox, and contrary to the greatest Protestant Divines.

But for my further Vindication, well agreeing with what is said in my printed Sheet, I affirm,

First, That all Gods Decrees are immutable.

2dly, That the Decrees of God about the sin of Adam, and all other sins of men, do not take away the liberty or free-will of the Creatures, whether Men or Devils.

[Page 6] 3dly, That Gods Decree about the sin of Adam, and all other sins of Men and Devils, is permissive, and yet not barely permis­sive, but [...]ffective, in a most powerful manner; yet not so, as that the Cause of the Futurity of the sin of Adam, or of other Men and Devils, is owing to the same, but upon the infallible Fore-knowledge of the Futurition of their sins, through Gods permission, in a most wi [...] and powerful manner, setting bounds and limits to them, and powerfully disposing and ordering the [...] to his Glory, and the good of his Chosen, even all the Heirs of Salvation.

4thly, That though the Decree of God about the sins of Adam, and other men, is not Subjectively, or with respect to God, Conditional, yet Objectively, and with respect to second Causes, and the connection of the Means and the End, is Conditional, according to that noted saying of Aq [...]nas, well approved by [...] Authors, Deu [...] [...] hac p [...]pter hoc, et hoc propter hoc, sed [...] ho [...] [...]on [...] hoc; and to this Mr. Willard seemeth to agree, when he saith, It is a Truth, That God hath decreed Hypotheses, but [...] hypothetically.

[...]. But by these Propositions laid down by me, wherein (as [...] judge) I agree with all sound Protestant Divines, as well as with the Church of England, it doth not follow, that either Adam or other men sinned necessarily, either by Gods Decree, or by determining their Wills necessarily to sin, by the actual execution of his Decree in time.

In the First and Second of these Propositions Mr. Willard seems to agree with me, as also in the Fourth, but in the Third and Fifth lyeth a great difference betwixt us, especially in that part of the Third, where I say, The cause of the futurity of the sin of Adam, or of other men and Devils, is not owing to the divine Decree, and also in the Fifth, throughout, we greatly differ.

Pag. 9. Whereas he saith, ‘I do not, totidem verb [...], profes­sedly deny the Truth of the The [...]s defended by the Respontent, [Page 7]though it is manifest in the whole, that my Pick was against that.’

Answ. In this he greatly wrongs me, and that most dis-ingenu­ously, for I was so far from denying the Truth of the Thesis, professedly totidem verbis, that professedly totidem verbis, I did grant it, in a sound sence, to be true, viz. ‘That the immuta­bility of the Decree doth not take away the liberty of the Creature.’

Pag. 9. He chargeth me afresh with another thing, which he calleth a meer Calumny, viz. ‘That according to him, the Fall of Adam,’ according to Gods Decree, was necessary. And a little after he saith, ‘They deny evermore the Decree to be any Cause of sin; for the Decree is an immanent Act, whereas the divine Act which is causal of any thing out of himself, is a transient Act.’

Answ. In this he wrongs me several ways, as well as he con­tradicts himself; for, first, I did not charge him to hold, that the fall of Adam was necessary, simply and only by virtue of Gods Decree; for beside the Decree, which is an immanent Act in God, I did add both in my Title and Explanation, Gods Determination both o [...] the Will of Adam, and of all other men to sin; Which Determination of God, if any such were, that did cause men necessarily to sin, was a transient act. But, 2dly, It no wise followeth, that because Gods Decree is an immanent Act, that therefore it is not any Cause of sin, if such a Decree were, decreeing, That Adam was necessarily to sin. This is very false Philosophy, as well as no true Divinity in Mr. Willard, as if an immanent act in God could be no cause of any thing, adextra, or without him; for though it be not the next and immediate Cause, yet it is the first and remote Cause of the transient Act, and of all Gods Works, ad extra. For I ask Mr. Willard, Was not his Will and Purpose to write his Book, call'd, A Peply, &c. an immanent Act in him? and yet I suppose he will not deny but it was the remote Cause of it, though his Hand and [...]en were the m [...]re in mediate and next Causes of it▪ [...]ut as I have find, as in this [...]e wrongs me, so he contradicts himself, in having said, pag. 5 [...]. ‘That the whole cause of the infallible Futurity of the first sin, is owing to the divine [Page 8]Decree.’ But how can it be owing to the divine Decree, if the divine D [...] [...] cause of it, not so much as remotely, let me put him in mi [...] of the [...] Causa Causa est Causa C [...]suti, which [...] come afterwards further to be discoursed of. And will Mr [...] deny that Gods love is the Fountain and original Cause of all the good that God giveth as, accor­ding to that in Jer. 31.3. I have loved thee [...], therefore with loving Hudness have I drawn thee; Which points both at the Cause and Effect; the Cause, Gods Ever­lasting Love, which is an immanent Act, and the Effect follows, Therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee.

Pag 10. After some Distinctions about the Terms Necessity and Necessary, which were not very needful, but to swell his B [...]k, as he doth oft, else where, multiply words to little other purpose, for he might have given the whole substance of his Answer in less than one Sheet, which he hath [...] to above four; He grants my Charge against [...] to be true, in a right sense, and he doth not how wherein I give it a wrong sense, [...]. ‘That every free Act of the reasonable Creature is decermined by God, so that whatever the Crea­ture acteth freely, it acteth the same necessarily.’

Pag. 12. He saith, ‘This we do not assert, nor assent, that God determines m [...]n to sin, tho' he doth determine those Actions in which they do sin.’

A [...]sw. But how is it, that forgetting himself, he saith, pag. 52. ( [...] times noted) ‘That the origine and [...] of the necessity of the first sin, is more to be derived from God, th [...] from [...] himself.’ He [...] not say, of the Act [...] which [...] sin, is it of the necessity of the first [...]in. There­fore [...], in charging n [...] to fix [...], what [...]e doth not own. And for his distinction [...] the Act [...]on, and the sin of to. Action, it is a groundness [...], for every [...] Gods Commands, is sin, as Theft, M [...] A [...]aitery, &c. which very actions are sins.

SECT. III.

PAg. 13. To my saving, That there is frequently a divine De [...] ­ [...]n [...]ti [...]n of the Will, both of Men and Angels in good Actions, and that this may consist with the [...]erty of the Will, he infers, ‘That if I intend a Ph [...]sical Determination, I can [...] reconcile this to my Notion of the Liberty of the Will, &c.’

A [...]. By his [...]eave, this is Gratis dictur [...], with ut proof, and be mistakes my Notion of Free-Will, as it consisted [...] all abso­lute indifference, that I assign to the Will; it be mean it with an indifference to do evil, as well as good. I mean no such indiffer­ence absolutely nor universally; for God, and Christ, and all holy Angels and glorified Saints, have a most free Will, but only to do good, and not to do any evil; and as the Schools speak, they have the Liberty of acting this, or not acting it according to the exigence of Time and Place, and other Circumstances, called com­monly, L [...]ertas indiv [...]ductions, or Contradictiones, but they, [...] God, Christ, holy Angels and glorified Saints, [...] that called Libertas Specification's or Contra [...]e [...], i.e to do both good and evil. And though men in a mortal state have this liberty, and Adam had it in his first estate, yet had God determined him to stand, and not permitted his Fall, it should not have taken away his liberty, but rather encreased and enlarged it, as holy Angels and glorified Saints, and the glorified Manhood of our Saviour have more perfect liberty of Will than we have, yea, indeed most perfect liberty, and yet without the indifferency to sin. The best freedom is from sin, and not to sin, J [...]. 8.36.

Pag. 13. ‘But (saith he) if he designs it only in a [...], he doth but paralogize, and impo [...] a S [...]phism on his [...] Reader.’ And a little after he saith, ‘This Determination doth not respect the moral goodness of the Action, but the Entity of it.’

Ans [...]. I designed it both in a Physical sense at sometimes, and in a moral sence at other [...], and when understood [...] mortal sence, it is not to paralogize, nor to impose a Sop [...] on the [Page 10]Reader, as he affirms, [...] doth not prove. And he but Magiste­rially saith, without proof, ‘That the Determination in this case doth not respect the [...] of the Action, but the entity of it.’ I judge, most true Christians will contradict him in this; for when God by some powerful influence mores our Wills, and determines them to love and obey him, as well as morally to perswade us by excellent Reasons and Motives, is not God to be praised for this? and therefore that Determination doth respect the moral goodness of those Actions, and not the meet Entity of them.

Pag. 14. He expostulates with me, ‘That seeing I granted the Thesis, and only would have impugned the Consectaries, why I would not give them a better Scheme or this affair?’

Answ. It was time enough to have given him a better Scheme of this Affair, when he is convinced that his own Scheme of it is not good; for it is not common for men to embrace a Truth until they be willing to forsake the Error that is Contradictory to it.

Pag. 14, 15, 16. After he hath discoursed in many words con­cerning the indifferency of the Will (to no great purpose to the present Controversie) he concludes, as it were, with some great Philosophical Mystery, I think denyed by none, that are not Mad and beside themselves, That the Will hath no indifference in actu secundo, which is to say, When it is determined, it is not indifferent, but doth necessarily act, when it acteth, as Whatever is, where it is, necessarily is; So whatever acts, when it acts, it neces­sarily acts: Is not this (Reader) profound Philosophy of Mr. Wi and President of the Colledge of Cambridge in [...]-England! Or was this any part of the Dispute betwixt us, or having any tendency to bring it to a fair issue? He grants I did not insist upon it, neither (saith he) shall he but as I did not insist upon it, so nor did I touch upon it; though I still b [...]ame his Notion of liberty of Will, that it consisteth only in the [...]ubency o [...] [...] of the Will to act, primar [...] [...] maliter; for at this rate Children before they have the free exercise of the liberty of Will, and Mad-men, are free Agents, and act freely; nor [Page 11]doth his [...]ubenti [...] Pationis help him; for if he mean the reason­able Faculty, Children and Mad-men have it; if he mean true Reason in a [...] secund, then no man when he sins acts freely, all sin being contrary to true Reason. Beside, if the Notion of the Liberty of the Will consist only in a Lubentia, i. e. Tubency or Spontaneity of the Will, Prima [...]io et formaliter, as he asserts, then Mr. Willard Notion of free-Will will consist not only with the fatal Stoick Necessity, but with the Necessity that [...]trologiers impose upon human Actions, from the Planets and Stats.

Pag. 16 He thinks to infer a Contradiction upon me, from my saying, ‘That God who is the first Cause of all created Beings, doth not determine the Will of Man, so that he necessarily produceth any sinful action, unless I will deny some actions as actions, to proceed from God, as the first Cause of them, and so supposeth that there is some real Entity, whereof God is not the first Cause; the absurdity that I say, not Blasphemy whereof, is intollerable, he saith.’

Answ. Here Mr. Willard is warm to purpose, but to no purpose of true Reason; for, first, though God be the true, and I think, the only cause of all created Beings, such as all Sub­stances are, whether Spirits or Bodies, yet, he [...], many Philosophers say, That Actions of created Beings, are not pro­perly Beings, but Modes of Beings, which I never heard called an intollerable Absurdity, not to say Blasphemy. But not to contend with him about this, whether Actions of created [...] are Beings, or only Modes of Beings, let it be granted [...] that they are a sort of Being, doth it therefore follow, that God is so the cause of them, that he doth determine the Will of Man, so that he necessarily produceth any sinful Action? How proves he this Consequence? surely no ways at all, but dictates Magisterially, pro more s [...]o, after his old manner. Admit that God is what is called Causa fine q [...]a no [...], because without Gods general influence, that gives the ability to the Creature to act, (even in sinful actions, for in him we live, and move, and have our Being) no Creature can do any sinful Action; it doth not therefore follow, that God doth so determine the Will of man, [Page 12] [...] of any Creature necessarily to produce any sinful Action; for as to Gods general influence or concourse with Creatures, however so immediate, it no more necessitates the Creatures to produce sinful actions, than the general immediate influence of the Sun by its heat or warmth upon Mankind (without which no man could act) doth necessitate a man to commit Murder or Adultery; for the praise or dispraise of humane actions we d [...] not attribute to the general influence of general Causes, but to what is special, as when by the general influence of the Sun and the Earth, and the Rain, in one spot of ground good fruit is produced, and in another Hemloc [...], or other poy [...]nous things, the proper Causes of these are referred to their specifical Seeds and Principles, and not to their more general and universal Chuses. Shall we say, that because Adam begat Cain, and Cain killed his Brother Abel, that therefore Adam was the Cause of Cain's murdering his Brother, or that therefore Cain did necessarily commit that Murder? By no means.

SECT. IV.

PAge 17. But he thinks to overthrow my Position, by his in­stancing. That the best Actions of the best of men in this Life, have sinful defect cleaving to them.

Answ. But this instance is quite remote from the purpose and case in hand, which was only concerning sinful Actions, that are wholly and altogether sinful, and which are such per se, and not per accidens, such as the good Actions of good men, which have sinful de [...]ect cleaving to them per accidens, and not per [...]e, as he himself distinguisheth in another place, though misapplyed in that place by him.

Pag. 17. He alledgeth, ‘I produce nothing new, but [...] has been so often urged by Pelagians, [...] and [...]e­ [...]monstrants, and has been as oft answer [...] by such as have [...] the defence of the same Conclusions, which I charge upon [...].’

Answ. Herein again he is very unfair and disingenuous, as if [...] ver [...]e betw [...] him and the was any part of prope [...] [Page 13]Controversie betwixt [...]elagians, J [...]su [...], [...] and the Remon­s [...]ants on the one hand, and Orthodox Protestant Divines on the other hand; which is utterly false; for many hundred Divines, all sound Protestants, who are neither chargeable with being Pela­gians, nor Jesuits, nor Socinians, nor Remonstrant [...], are his A [...]ta­ [...]sts in this Controversie, as well as I; nor did I ever know, [...] it was ever any part of the Pelagian Controversie, though [...] suppose I have read as much upon that Controversie, and perhap [...] more than be hath done; nor are they chargeable with being Jesu [...]ts, Socinians and [...]monstrants, who hold some things in com­mon with them: E. G. They all deny that God is the Author o [...] [...], but doth it therefore follow, that to deny God to be the Author of sin, is any Jesuitical or Socinian Error, or [...] o [...], Pelagian Error? May I not more justly recriminate, That to say, Adam and all men do neces [...]arily sin, is Hobb s [...]? for indeed it is the express Doctrine of H [...]bbs, which he defends with th [...] like Arguments, and very near the same words, with [...]ose th [...] Mr. W [...]kard, as appears in a large Dispute betwi [...]t the learne [...] Bishop Bramhall and T. Hobbs in print (the Book was printed at London, A [...]no 1655.) And suppose I have produced nothing New, I am sure he has produced as little New to defend his Opinion, tho' I think some of his Assertions are more absurd and gross than are commonly deli [...]ered by his Assoc [...]tes, and in that respect may be called New. And though neither the Controvers [...], nor the mannagement of it [...] N [...]w to many, yet [...] think it is new [...] in these America [...] parts, yea, so new, that to my certain knowledge, divers, both Presbyterians and others could not be perswaded [...]hat Mr. Willard or any Preacher in New-England did ever hold such an Opinion, until their reading his Book hath fully convinced them, with which they are not a little surprized.

P [...]g. 18, 19, 20, 21. After many Wranglings, Twistings and Turnings, like a Fish in the Net, in answer to my first Argu­ [...]. ‘That if God doth so determine the Will of Man, that he necessarily produceth any sinful Action, it will follow, that God is the Author of sin. I proved my Consequence thus, That if the Cause of a Cause is the Cause of the caused Thing, [Page 14]as God is the Cause of the Determination of mans Will to that sinful Action;’ so that Determination is the Cause of the same. To this he answereth, [...] restrain the Maxim to Causes that are essentially subordinated, and assure us, that it is false in things that are only by [...], or contingently [...].

Answ. He doth not fairly represent what Logicians say in the case; for the Maxi [...] holds not in Causes essentially subordinate, unless when the subordinate Cause is necessarily determined by the superiour Cause. For all good Divines, as well as good Philoso­phers, hold. That all Creatores are essentially subordinated to God Almighty in their Beings and Actions, and yet he is not that Author of their sinful Actions. And if Mr. Willard doth [...] own the essential Subordination of Creatures to Almighty God, but only by accident and contingently subordinated, it is a great Error; for it impugnes the great dependency that all Creatures have upon God Almighty, and renders the Creatures a sort of Independents one way, as Mr. Willard himself is another way. But, if Creatures be only by accident and contingently subordi­nated to God, then it may happen, that they may act without any dependence on him, and consequently they may act without any Determination of God, so as necessarily to produce any sin­ful Action. But though the affirming of the essential Subordi­nation of Creatures to God Almighty, doth not infer his deter­mining them necessarily to produce sinful actions, yet the denyal of such essential Subordination of Creatures to God in their Actions, will plainly infer, that they are not under the accessity of any Determination to sinful Actions.

Again, the abovesaid Maxim holds good in Causes not essen­tially subordinated, as when the Devil tempted Eve to sin, and Eve tempted Adam, both the Devil and Eve were moral causes of Adam's sin, and both culpable; and yet neither was Adam essentially subordinated to Eve, nor Eve to the Devil; nor was there any Subordination in the case at all, of our first Parents to the Devil, in their primitive state of Creation.

SECT V.

[...]g. VVHereas I argued against the Distinction used by the Asserters of Mr. Willards Opinion, That God is the Physical Cause of the Action, but not the Moral Cause, and that God determines the Will only in the [...] of the Action, but not to the Formale, by my [...], first, That in many sinful Actions, there is no distinction between the Materiale and the Formale of the Action, as in all acts or Hatred against God and our Neighbours. To this be Replys, Th [...] this [...] very Chimerical Action, that hath neither Matter nor Form di­stinguishable.

Answ. Here again he speaks Dictator-like, without all [...] of Reason; for, morally speaking, what real distinction can we make betwixt the inward act of the Mind, which is a [...] of God and our Neighbour, and the sinfulness of it? for, are [...] some sinful Action, such as Hatred of God and our Neighbours, intrinsecally and essentially evil and sinful? Whether the sin­fulness of them be rather a Deficiency than an Efficiency, is not material in the present Controversie; for Actions, as [...] as Things may be essentially deficient, as [...] are essentially (negatively at least) deficient of the Perfections of Man, though they have no moral Deficiency. And all Divines, as well as moral Philosophers, distinguish be wi [...]t Actions that are intrinsecally [...] and sinful; and others that are extrinsecally such; as also be­twixt Actions intrinsecally good, as the Love of God and our Neighbour, and acts of Veracity, Sobriety, Humility, Justice, and other Actions that are good extrinsecally, only because they are commanded by some positive Precepts of God Almighty, such as many Precepts of Moses Law were, as that of Circumci­sion and the Sacrifices, and Observation of the Jewish Festivals.

Pag. 22. He Rambles again from the purpose, when he [...] us, ‘That there are no Actions done by sinful men, but have sin inseperably accompanying them, as in the best Actions of the best of men;’ for it is one thing, what sin cleaves to [Page 16]good Actions of good Men, per accidens, and the sin that cleaves to the evil Actions of evil men [...] s [...], i. e. by themselves.

Pag. 23, 24. Whereas I argued, secondly, Te [...] [...] of the sinful Action is necessarily connected with the [...] of it, and i [...] the next immediate and necessary effect [...], Therefore, according to the above-mentioned [...], God, who is the cause of the sinful Action, according to the [...] of it, is also the cause of it, according to the [...].

Pag. 24. He saith, The [...] of this [...] respecting [...] mentioned Axions) [...] overthrown.

Answ. That this is but a Brag, I have above shown, and prov'd the solidity of it, beyond exception, which I need not [...] again [...].

Pag. 25. He [...], The [...] of a sinful Action, as in that of [...], is [...] the Action, and that the Action, and [...] [...] of [...] things is [...].

Answ. [...], first, That the Exorbitancy of a sinful [...]ction, [...] [...], is a sinful Action, implyeth a Contradi­ction; [...] than [...] might be both sinful and not sinful at once.

Again, [...], Suppose a Distinction, yet seeing the Exorbitancy is the necessary effect of the Action, if God be the Cause and Author of the Action, [...] is the Cause and Author of the sinfully [...] of it.

Pag. 26. He saith, ‘It is a common received Doctrine in [...] of our [...] Churches, and Accademies, that God concur [...] [...] every operation of second Causes, so as immediately [...] by himself to influence upon every Action of the Creature.’

Answ. But all this proves nothing, that all sinful Actions of men necessarily come to pass by Gods determining mens Will necessarily to produce any sinful Actions.

[Page 17] Pag. 27. He adds, ‘And that there is not only a [...] but also a previous [...] of God [...] acknowledged.’

Answ. That he saith, this previous Con [...]se, or rather [...] of God, to sinful Actions, is the commonly received Doctrine i [...] the most of our Protestant Churches and Accademi [...]s, is in him [...], as well as a [...] Assertion, and without all proof; however, [...] a place case, that it is his Opinion, and therefore the more un [...] [...] in him to blame me for charging it upon him.

SECT. VI.

[...]. He proceeds to argue, ‘That God cannot be under such [...] a Law as makes it unjust in him to determine the sinful actions of men, by several Mediums and Arguments.’

Answ. But he states not the Ques;tion fairly. [...]. God is not, [...] cannot be under a Law, though his own essential Justice, Truth and Goodness is a Law to him [...], It is not against the essential Justice, Truth and Goodness of God, so to determine the sinful Actions of men, upon his fore-knowledge of their [...]turity, as to over-rule them to his Glory, bound and limit them by his Power and Wisdom, as he doth bound the proud Waves of the Sea, and determines or confines them within their Banks. And in this sence, according to Scripture stile (Acts 2.23. chap. 4.28) I own Gods determining the sinful Actions of men; but not so as thereby men are necessitated to produce them, which is his corrupt sence and gloss upon the word Determin [...] on and Determinate, which has an innocent sense, according to Scrip­ture stile, as above given by me; whereas his sense of it is most absurd, being repugnant to Gods essential Truth, Justice and Goodness, and other his essential Perfections.

Pag 27. His first Argument. is from Gods All-difficiency.

Answ. But allowing, in a sound sence, Gods All-efficiency, [...]en so far, as that God hath an actual [...], [Page 18]and all their operations, yet all this proves not that this all­sufficiency of God, or his actual influence upon men, and their operations doth so determine them, that they necessarily produce their sinful actions, no more, than because the Sun with his beat or warmth, has an actual immediate influence on all men, to enable their Bodies to act both good and evil, as well as it hath on Vegetables and Brutes, that therefore men are necessarily determined by the Sun to produce their actions, whether good or evil; for the influence of the Sun, however immediate upon men, leaves them to an indifference to act, or not to [...], until by the free election and motion or their [...]. They determine themselves; and no less doth the general [...] of God Almighty leave men to an indifference, as to all sinful actions, at least to act, or not to act, at they determine themselves accor­dingly; but with this difference, that the Sun is but a secondary general Cause of humane actions; whereas God Almighty [...] first and supream Cause over all, but no Proper immediate Cause of the sinful action, being in the case not the necessitating Cause, but what School-men call Cause fine qua non. God indeed is the cause of the immediate ability whereby man produceth a sinful action, and the immediate Cause of that immediate Ability, but not of the sinful action of man it self, because, when man sineth, he abuses that power and ability which God giveth him to act, and the abuse of that ability is not of God, but of Man himself; and therefore I judge it ought not to be said not thought, that God is properly a cause of any sinful actions; for seeing God hath, by his revealed Will, commanded men not to commit any sinful action, it cannot be thought, that by his secret Will, he willeth men to produce it, and to produce it necessarily, as Mr. Willard hath affirmed. And seeing God has decreed men to produce sinful actions, by Mr. Willards Opinion, as in pag. 50. of his Book, That the Origine and Cause of the Necessity of the first sin is more to be derived from God than from Man himself: This his Opinion necessarily infers Two Wills in God, contradictory the one to the other; for by his Decree, which is his secret Will, he willeth men to commit all the sinful actions which they do commit, and by his Revealed Will he doth not will them to commit them, but forbiddeth them; which at [Page 19]it is a plain Contradiction, so it is contrary to that Veracity, Truth. Justice and Goodness, that is essentially in God, by a secret Will to will one thing, and by his Revealed Will to will the quite Contradictory; as this is repugnant to the Veracity and Sincerity of a good earthly King, to will secretly that his Subjects to [...]it such actions as trespass against his Laws, which at his revealed Will, so it is no less, but rather much more repugnant to God essential Veracity, Sincerity, Justice, Goodness, and other [...] Perfections.

SECT. VII.

AS for the Comparison Mr. Willard brings, pag. 25. to show the distinction betwixt the Action that is sinful, and the sin­fulness of it T [...]is (saith he) is frequently illustrated by a Mans riding a lame Horse, he puts forward the Horse to go, but his going laws is not [...] the Rider, [...] Lameness.

Answ. This Comparison is same in divers respects. For, first, one main part of the Controversie betwixt us, was about the Cause and Necessity of [...], that first sin of all committed by him. Now before [...] was not lame, but sound. But if God Almighty [...] so determine the sound Will of Adam, that he [...] necessarily produce that sinful Action of eating the fobidden Fruit, he was the Physical Cause of that Action, and consequently the Moral; even as when a man, suppose a Smith, [...] a Horse, pricketh him, both knowingly and wil­lingly in one of his sect, the Horse indeed is lame, but the cause of this lameness is the Smith, both the Physical and Moral Cause; for because he did it both knowingly and willingly, therefore the Smith is very blame worthy, and consequently the Moral Cause of that Lameness; and by the like necessary Consequence, by Mr. Willard's Opinion, God is not only the Physical, but the Moral Cause of Adam's sin and lameness; which is must afford and blasphemous. But th [...] [...] not directly on M. [...] Opinion, but to be the necessary and [...] Opinion, which therefore I would have [...] very dangerous and hurt [...] ▪ Again [...] Horse forward, with a Will [...] [Page 20]strowed with Iron Nails and Pricks, that he knoweth will lame his Horse, or any other way use his Horse, to cause him go lame, so as to be the Physical cause of his Lameness, he is thereby blame worthy, and consequently the Moral Cause of his Lameness. And indeed, in so for the similitude quadrates, that as the Rider puts forth his Horse to go, who brought him forth sound out of the Stable, yet out of his meet Will, he either pricks him in the foot, or some other way causeth him to go [...], both knowingly and of set purpose, the Horse-man [...] Rider is not only the Physical, but the Moral Cause of the Horses Lameness, and the man is only Morally blame-worthy, but [...] the Horse. So if God determined the Will of Adam, so as necessarily to produce that sinful Action of eating the forbidden fruit, as he was the Physical Cause of it, he was no less the Moral Cause thereof, seeing whatever God doth, he doth both knowingly and willingly. And, lastly, He that rideth upon a lame Horse, suppose he is not the cause of his lameness at first, yet if he put him on to ride a a Journey, he will be the cause of his being more lame (as i [...] known by common experience) and not only the Physical but the Moral Cause thereof. And by the like Consequence, if God Almighty determine the Wills of sinful men, so as to necessitate them to produce sinful actions, as thereby they become the more sinful, so he is more the cause thereof, both Physical and Moral. Thus I think Mr. Willard had better spared his Com­parison of a lame Horse, which has the more exposed and dis­advantaged his Cause, as I appeal to the judicious and impartial Reader.

Pag. 29. His second Medium, to prove his Opinion, is from the Nature of Gods universal Government over all Creatures, and their Actions: The substance of which Argument is com­prehended in th [...]se words of his pag. 29. ‘Nothing (saith he) is more notorious than that God not only useth the Instru­mentality of sinful men, but even of their sinful actions, in the great Affairs of the World, whereby he accomplisheth his purposes of his Praise.’

Answ. All this, in a sound sense, is readily granted; but that [Page 21]it doth therefore follow, That God doth so decree or determine the Wills of men to produce their sinful Actions, and that necessarily, is no ways apparent, more than that it will follow, that because a Carpenter or Joyner useth some crooked Iron Instruments to work by, that therefore he made them; or that because a good and wise King useth some of his Subjects wicked actions to be an instrumental occasion to make good Laws, for the Reforming his Subjects, by the severe Punishments provided by those Laws against wicked actions, that it therefore followeth, that the said King did determine any of his Subjects to commit those wicked Actions, so as they are necessitated to commit them.

SECT. VIII.

HIs third Medium, to prove his Opinion, is from Gods Willing, (as he words it) that sin should be in the world, and from his fore-knowledge of it.

Answ. That the Will of God about sin, and sinful Actions of Men and Devils, is permissive, and not only barely permissive, but effective, in the sound sence above given by me, so as in a most powerful and effective manner to bound and limit, and dispose of mens sins to his praise, by his Soveraign over-ruling Arm, i [...] granted; and that he hath a most perfect and infallible fore-know­ledge of all mens sins, that ever were to come to pass in time; but still, Mr Willard begs the Consequence, That therefore by Gods Decree, and his Determination of mens Wills, they neces­sarily produce all their sinful Actions; which, I say, is no true nor proper Conclusion, and for which he giveth no shadow of proof.

Pag. 30 His fourth Medium is from the Divine Prediction of future things, which, he saith, is an evidence of the certain futurity of them. New whence (saith he) should this Futurity proceed? neither from his simple Intelligence, nor from his Omnipotency, and conse­quently he infers, [...]t must be entirely determined by his Will; for [Page 22]which he quotes Ephes. 1.11. That God worketh all things after the Counsel of his own Will.

Answ. That all the Works of God are wrought by him, after the Counsel of his own Will, is granted; but that the sins and evil that Men or Devils work, are the work of God, or to be attributed to him, as to their proper Cause, is denyed; for then he would be the Author of them; for of whatever Work any Agent is the proper Cause, of the same he is the Author. Sin and Evil and Wickedness are said in Scripture to be the works of sinful Men and Devils, but all the Works of God are good, Psal. 111.7. The Works of his hands are Verity and Judgment, and Ps. 33. [...]. All his works are done in Truth. Nor doth the divine Prediction of future things prove his Opinion. And in answer to his Question, we must first distinguish of the several sorts of future things; for some of them were Substances, and of these, some Sestets some Bodies, and some Comp [...]ded of Bo [...], as Men. Again, some are Actions proceeding from Substances, as their proper Cause, some whereof are necessary Agents, and not free, as the actions of Beasts, Fowles and Fishes; others are free, as the Actions of Men. Now to answer directly to his Question, The Futurity of all created Substances, is entirely from God, both from his Power and Will, and also from his Wisdom and Goodness. And the Futurity of the Actions of necessary Agents, is from the Futurity of the Agents themselves. And the Futurity of the Actions of free-Agents, that are sinful (or generally indifferent) is from the Futurity of the free Agents themselves, such as Men and Angels are; for as the Branches, Leaves and Fruit of a Tree lie hidden in the Seed or Root of it, so all Actions, whether of necessary or of free Agents, lie in the Agents themselves, as in their Seeds and Roots or Principles, before they be brought forth into act or effect. And as it doth not surpass Mans knowledge to know what Actions will proceed from necessary Agents, and that by certain knowledge, in great part, so nor doth it surpass Gods knowledge, to know most certainly and infallibly what Actions will proceed from free Agents, such as Men and Angels, for this far surpassing knowledge, or fore knowledge of God concern­ing the actions of free Agents, must needs be granted to God, [Page 23]who is infinite in Knowledge, as well as in all other Perfections▪ otherwise wherein should be, in this case, excell the finite Un­derstandings of Men, who can fore-tell the actions of necessary Agents, in great part, and that certainly? But to say that God fore­knows the futurity of the sinful actions of free Agents, because be has decreed them to come to pass, (after which Decree they become as necessary as the actions of any necessary Agents) is to give to God Almighty a very imperfect kind of Knowledge, little above that of Men and Angels. Beside that, such a Notion doth impugne the perfection of Gods Holiness, as well as of his Knowledge.

Thus, I think, I have given a more perfect Scheme of the matter, than Mr. Willard hath done, and so far satisfied his De­mand, if he will be reasonably satisfied.

SECT. IX.

FRom pag. 32. to pag. 40. Mr. Willard is so nauseously tendious about the Distinction of the Materiale and the Formale of fin­ful actions, (which I have so fully above shewed,) makes nothing for the defence of his Opinion, that for me to enlarge upon it, by noticing his Impertinencies, would render me equally tedious and guilty of Tautologizing with him. Only I cannot omit to take notice of some of his Impertinencies upon this Head.

To my Arguments in my printed Sheet, repeated by him, pag. 33. ‘What a just and good man forbids another to do, he cannot, or at least he ought not to perswade him to do, other­wise he would do unjustly, therefore what God forbids a man to do, it is repugnant to his Justice to determine that man to do.’

This be quarrels with, as loosely formed, and as savouring of a Quaker. But he is held so fast in the Net by it, that in vain he seeks to get out. It is the ordinary Policy of weak Disputants, to cry out against the weakness of their Opponents Arguments, though ever so strong. But how does he answer?

First, He tells his Reader, T [...]at a just Man and good, during his state of Imperfection, may so [...]b [...]d a man to do his Duty. But what is [Page 24]to the purpose? My Argument was not what a good or just Man might happen to do through humane imperfection, but that be cannot, in point of Justice, perswade him to do, what he for­bids him; and therefore I carefully added, [Or at least ought not to perswade him to do.

Secondly, He saith, To argue from the Creature to God, in point of Justice, bath already been detested of Folly. But he meerly saith it without all real proof. Nor do I find any thing like a proof of it, but in pag. 30. of his Book, where he saith, ‘God is not eyed to the same Laws that man is, who cannot purposely suffer another to sin, when he can prevent it, without involving himself in Guilt; so that thor [...] is no injustice in God to suffer that, which if man should suffer, he should be unjust.’ And what he again saith, pag. 3 [...]. ‘That God hath a dispensing Power, at least in regard of some of his Laws, as in the case of the Israelites borrowing the Egyptians Jewels, and Abraham's offering up his Son.’

A [...]sw. Although there are certain positive Laws, to which God hath tyed men, that be hath not tyed himself to, as in disposing the Estates or Lives of men, according to his good pleasure, which is always according to excellent Wisdom and Justice, he being the g [...]ent Proprietary of all things both in Heaven and Earth, yet whatever assential Laws of Truth, Justice and Goodness be has bound us to, in all these he is a Law to himself, so that be cannot lye nor deceive, being contrary to his essential Truth, Jussice and Condness; and as contrary it is to the same, to com­mand and will one thing by his revealed Will, and will the quite contradictory by his secr [...] Will. And that God permits men to fin, is no wise contrary to his essential Truth, Goodness and Justice, because he can bring good out of it, which we cannot do. But to determine men to sin necessarily, and yet not only blame them, but punish them so severely for it, is evidently against his essential Truth, Justice and Goodness, according to that above quoted place, Gen. 18.23, 25. which he meerly evades, but doth not fairly answer.

Pag. 34. Here Mr. Willard doth greatly wrong me, by falsly quoting the words of my Argument, and then upon his [...]alse [Page 25]Foundation charging me with proving idem per idem, a meer Tautology; for thus he quotes me, If it be unjust, then it is unjust, and much more so in God. But these were not my words, nor way of arguing, but thus, pag. 4. of my printed Sheet, ad sin. ‘If to perswade or advise a man to do what is forbidden him, be unjust, therefore for God to determine the Will of Man to what is forbidden by God, is unjust, or rather much more unjust.’ Here it is evident the Argument is not idem per idem; for both the Antecedent and Consequent are different Proposi­tions; and the stress or my Argument lies not meerly upon what is just or unjust by positive written Precept, with which God can dispence, but upon essential Justice, both in God and Men, that he cannot dispense with.

Pag. 36. He puts another Wrong upon me, ‘That by the Materiale of the sinful Action, I must intend an action which is sinful, as it is an Action;’ and so he chargeth me with a Contradiction in the Expression. And thus I know not how oft he useth the Distinction of an action Qua sinful, and of an action Qua action, as in pag. 38. Again, in pag. 24 he saith, ‘The sinfulness of the action doth not arise from the nature of the action, as it is an action, but from the moral Deficiency of the Agent.’

Answ. His thus distinguishing betwixt an action Qua sinful and Qua action, is nothing to his purpose; for though an action is not sinful, as an action, otherwise all mens actions would be sinful per [...]se, yet every finful action is finful, as it is such an action in specie, and also in individuo, though not in genere, barely considered as an action. As every wicked Man is a wicked Man, not as a Man, yet as [such] a Man, having committed such Wicked­ness. And though we may distinguish betwixt the finfulness of an action, and the action, as it is an action, mentally, yet there is no real distinction, ex parte rei, betwixt the finfulness of the action, and the action it self considered in specie, as well as indi­vidually, under all due Circumstances.

SECT. X.

IN pag. 36. he hath another great impertinency, b [...] way of Objection, against my former Argument, ‘That [...] only doth God advise, but command all men to pray, and yet the Prayer of the Wicked is an abomination.’

Answ. I have already, I know not how oft, answered to such Impertinencies, that we ought to distinguish betwixt what is sin­ful per se, and what per accidens. The matter of the Prayer that God commands to wicked men, is not finful, but the mann [...] how wicked Men perform it, as in Hypocrisie and bar [...]? Formality, which God never commanded. But dare Mr. Willard say. That God commands the matter or Material [...] of sinful actions, as Murder, Rapine, Adultery? doth he not expresly forbid it? And yet to decree and determine the Wills of men to commit these actions, which he hath forbid, is to reflect most reproach­fully on Gods essential Truth, Justice and Goodness.

Pag. 40. Here again Mr. Willard most unjustly chargeth me to hold a Principle which I do no wise hold, and which I never gave him any just ground to think, I hold; as where he saith, ‘Nor doth Mr. Keith acknowledge Gods Determination in our sence, any more to a good than to an evil Action; for he sup­poseth that it would destroy the Deity of that little Idol Free-Will, which he cannot endure; and therefore all the Determi­nation which he will allow in either, is only Moral, and that is but Metaphorical, if not Catechrestical.’

Answ. I have expresly, as he knoweth in his Conscience, owned Gods Determination of the Wills of Men and Angels frequently in good Actions, and that the said divine Determination can well consist with the liberty of the Will, to wit, that called Libertas Individuation [...]s, and I did really mean it in a Physical fence, and not in a Moral only, though not excluding the Moral in good actions, as nor doth Mr. Willard. But if Free-Will be such an Idol in his sence, why is he so earnest to reconcile Gods immutable [Page 27]Decree about men [...]sin [...], with the free Will of the Greature? had he not much more easily throw away wh [...] he calls the Not of Free-Will, and then no need of any Essay to reconcile those two Parties; as indeed by the true Consequence of hi [...] Opinion, he hath loft nothing but the bare Name and shadow of it, and what is that but an Idol?

And beside all this, according to Mr. Willards definition of Free-Will, it will agree to God Almighty; for thus be de [...]n [...] the Liberty of the Will, p. 14. [...] forma­liter libertas sit a est, i. e. Liberty (v [...]. of the Will) is primarily, and formally placed in the Lubency of Re [...]son. An [...] pag. 1 [...] he saith, That in a free Agent [...] away, but as long as he still acts spontaneously, be acts freely. Which Definition would agree to God Almighty, though he were conceived to be a most necessary Agent, both in the Creation of the World, and in his Decree to create it, according to Mr. Willards Notion of Free-Will. And how Mr. Willard will free himself from this Consequence, and from Se [...]i [...] Necessity, that consequentially he imposeth upon God Almighty himself, I desire him well to consider.

Pag. 51. Nor is he less injurious to me, in making me acknow­ledge, the failing of my Memory in many points, in my printed sheet, which he, good man, doth easily forgive in me. But I made no such acknowledgment, as that my Memory failed me in many points. I only say, In some points, for shortness of Memory, I may not have brought forth their Arguments so rightly. But upon my due comparing his printed Book of four sheets with my printed sheet, I find not that be hath charged me with [...] failure of Memory justly in any one thing.

Pag. 44. To my Argument, That on the suppo [...]tion of Adam [...] Fall being necessary, and also the fall of Angels▪ that then they must have excuse. His answer, in substance, is, p. 45. That which takes away all excuse from men, when they sin, is, that they sin volun­tarily. But to this I have above [...]swered; for at this rate both Stoical Fate; and that of A [...]olog [...], who hold, that the stars, by their influence [...] men [...]larily to all their finful [Page 28]actions, is as consistent with Mr. Willards Notion of free-Will, as that of Gods Decree, and actual determining mens Wills ne­cessarily to sin; for neither the Stoicks nor Astrologers think that men sin by any co-action or compulsion of Will, but that still they sin voluntarily. As when Zeno, the Sect Master of the Stoicks, beat his Slave for stealing, and the Slave excused the fact, That he was Necessitated to do it. And said the Master, I am Necessitated to beat thee for it; yet both of them did voluntarily what they did, according to Mr. Willards Notion. But as Bishop Bramhall well observes in his dispute with Mr H [...]bbs, if the [...]ve had forced the Rod out of his Masters hand, and continued beat­ing him severely, until his Master had owned he was under no necessity of beating him, he had, in fact, confuted him.

As for the rest of his Book, as indeed the far greatest part of the whole, being meer Banter and Satyr, with bitter Reflections and idle Impertinencies, I shall not spend either time or Paper to make much answer thereto, having sufficiently answered to all that seemed material; and what of matter in the latter part, (particularly from pag. 45. to pag. 51) is contained, is fully answered, in substance, in the fore-going Sections of this Book. And I conclude, as before, That I wish from my heart, such [...] dangerous and hurtful Opinion may be exploded from the Col­ledge of Cambridge in New-England, which is so per se, and not ger accidens, and therefore to be avoided.

SECT. XI.

AS for Mr. Willards Appendix at the end of his Book, from pag. 60. to p. 66. wherein his gives Quotations out of the 17th Article of the Church of England, and the Convocation at Dublin in Ireland, Auno 1615. and some other Doctors of Divinity and Bishops formerly in the Church of England, to prove the Immutability of Gods Decree, about the sinful actions of men, and its agreement with the liberty of the Will, and the distinction of the Materiale and Formale, as to sinful actions, by what the School-men call Distiuctio Rationis, which yet is no real distinction, ex parts re [...] and extra entellecbum, he might have [Page 29] [...]spred his pains, for all this is granted, in a found fence, by me; and none of all this is any real part of the Controversie betwixt Mr. Willard and me, as to substance of Doctrine, but mostly in Circumstance of Phrase, at most, if so much. And as to that Passage of the Convocation at Dubline in Ireland, quoted by him, ‘God from all Eternity did, by his unchangeable Counsel, ordain whatsoever comes to pass, yet so as thereby no Violence is offered to the Wills of the reasonable Creatures, nor the contingency of second Ca [...]s is taken away, but rather established,’ ought to be explained by that other Passage, quoted by Mr. Willard out of Bishop Davenant his answer to H [...]d, where the Bishop saith, The divine Decree moveth no man, much less [...]rress [...] determineth him to these wicked Actions. This, I think, is point blank Contradictory to Mr. Willards Opinion; for if God determines not men to sinful actions irresistibly, then those sinful actions do not necessarily follow from either Gods Decree or Determination of them. And as to the signification of the word [to Ordain] it is taken two ways, one way in a fase sence, as signifying not any necessary determining them to come to pass, but upon Gods intallible fore-fight of their coming to pass, through his permission, his ordering and disposing them, and over-ruling them to his glory. The other way, in a wrong sence, as to sign [...] God determining them necessarily to come to pass, which I cannot approve. And for the Term [Necessary] when understood with respect to sinful actions, by necessity of Logical Consequence, but not Physical Consequence, as the con­clu [...]ion of a Sy [...]ingism, That is also granted; but that doth no ways prove nor [...]vour Mr. Willard's Opinion. Nor do I find in all the Quotations made by him, any Passage that so much as seems to favour that most scandalous assertion of Mr. Willard, That the Or [...]gine and Cause of the Necessity of the first fin is m [...]re to be derived from God, than from Man himself. And to be sure there is nothing in the Articles of the Church of England, that favours it in the least, n [...]t in her Liturgy, or Homilies. And, la [...], if any thing could be found in any particular Authors or Writers in the Church of England, [...] [...]em to favour Mr. Willards Notions, it doth not affect the [Page 30]Church, so as thereby to fix the same upon her. Nor was it proper for Mr. Willard to bring into the Controversie betwixt him and me, th [...] notions of particular Writers in the Church of England, about Reprobation; for that was no proper part of the Controversie betwix [...] us; for in all my printe [...] Sheet there is nothing said or disouted about Gods Decrees either of Election. or Reprobation And as conc [...]ning Predestination to everlasting Life, of all that shall be savod, as I have signed to it with my Hand, (as contained in the 17th Article of the Church of England) as to all tho Thirty Nine, so I believe it, and all the other with my Heart.

But how unwary and inconsiderate hath Mr. Willard been, to quote in his Book, [...] 63. two Passages out of Bishop Dav [...], in answer to Howard, as making for him, which evidently make against him. The first is this;

‘The immutability of Gods [...]rnal Decree, is a thing un­questionable, but that God hath made any Decree of Repro­bation, whereby Reprobates are NECESSITATED or CAUSED to live and dye in for, is utterly false.’

The other is this;

‘Neither doth he over-rule, by any Decree of his, the Wills of Reprobate and Wicked Mens that their Liberty is extinguish­ed, or a Necessary of committing this or that particular sin i [...] imposed on them.’

Note here, Reader, the words Necessary and Necess [...]ated to sin, so much in reality pleaded for by Mr. Willard, in sensu Composite, and [...] parte Dei, and his Physical determining men necessarily to sin or sinful actions, plainly exploded by Bishop Davenant. What think ye, good Readers, was not Mr. Willard napping when he quoted those Passages, which fulfills that Proverb, A [...] ­q [...]ande [...].

And whereas I had once in my Printed Sheet used the word, [ya mo [...]e] which I explained this, i. e. to determine them to do evil; and once again in another place I used the word [M [...]ved] which I there explained thus, or determined them so to do, [...]. to sin, Mr. Willard very unfairly chargeth me with a fallacy, for using the word Moved (as [...] in signification with [...] ­cermined) [Page 31]pag 54. of his Book. And to render me impertinent, he puts a false sense upon the word Moved, far other than I intended, as if by moving and determining I intended Gods per­swading men to sin, whereas I really intended it in a Physical sense. But still I affirm, that it reflects as much on the esten [...]ial Justice of God, Physrcally to determine men, so as necessarily to sin, as to perswade them by any moral Swasion, and doth as much excuse the sinner, and render sin, yea, the greatest sins light as a feather, and the whole mass or aggregate of them; for as I did argue in my printed Sheet, If men sin necessarily, they might have excuse, for Necessity hath no Law. Upon which Axio [...] he puts this odd gloss, That it ONLY intends, that when Men are in extream need they will regard no Laws. But that it ONLY intends that sence of his, or chiefly, is said without all proof; The genuine sence of it is, That what men are necessitated to do, it can be against no Law of God, nor just Law of men to do, unless men have brought that Necessity upon themselves.

But whereas he saith, What if he should invert is, and say, All Necessity hath a Law, for Necessity is in some sence a Lawes it self.

Answ. Here Mr. Willard hath well enforced my Argument against himself; for if Necessity be a Law to it self, and that all Necessity hath a Law, then seeing, (according to his Opinion) God doth Determine men to commit all the sins they do commit, and that they commit them of Necessity, as well as Adams first sin was of Necessity, and owing to the divine Decree, as he hath affirmed; then s [...]eing this Necessity is of God, and is a Law, it is a Law of God, and consequently all sin is a fulfilling of a Law of God, and so it is sin, and no sin, by a genuine Cons [...]quence from his Opinion, which how scandalous it is to assert, I leave to all intelligent and impartial Readers to judge, and even to Mr. Willard himself, when he is a wakoned out of his Nap.

SECT. XII.

THough Mr. Willard near the beginning of his Book seemed to make his Opinion he defended at the Commencement in Cambridge in New-England, July 1, Auno. 1702. to be but a matter of no greater Moment than (pag. 7 & 8 of his Book) ‘A Logical Notion, and [...]ot a Matter of Faith, so as not to think those who agree not with him and his Brethren therein, to be condemned by them as Inorthodox, who use other measures to explicate and confirm the same Truth, viz. 1. That the divine Decree is Immtit [...]ble. 2. That the reasonable Creature enjoys a liberty which is not destroyed by this.’ To which I have all along [...]onted, and do still assent, and therefore by Mr. Willards Charity, [though I use other Measures to explicate and confirm the same Truths, as I think I have fairly done, particularly in Sect. 2, 7 & 8.] [...]e ought not to condemn me as Inorthodox. Yet as forgetting all this, in pag. 52. for my saying, It were more commendable and profitable to the Colledge of Cambridge in New-England, and the Students thereof, that they do not hear the aforesaid Doctrine about Gods determining Creatures to sinful actions, or having heard it, to be taught earnestly to abhor and avoid it's Hereupon he thus assaults me, viz. Here (saith he) is a notable Engine offered to subvert the Truth, and betray our People [viz. them of New-England] to be­come an easie Prey to those that disseminate Pelagianism, Soclnianism and Jesuitism. Judge Reader, how greatly in­consistent is this (as false as it is an uncharitable) Censure of me, with his former pretended Modesty and Charity. So that what then was but a Logical Notion, and no matter of Faith, nor any ju [...]t cause to render a man Inorthodox, who agree not with him and his Brethren in their explicating and confirming the Doctrine of Gods immutable Detree, and its consistency with the Free Will of the Creature, is now a subverting the Truth, and betraying the People of New-England to become [Page 33]an easie prey to those that disseminate Pelagianism, Socinian­ism and Jesuitism. But in this he either bewrays his great Ignorance, or some what much worse; for the denyal of Gods Determining Creatures to sinful actions, is no part of Pelagianism, Socinia [...]ism or Jesuitism, nor was ever so judged by learned Orthodox Divines. However, Mr. Willard in pag. 54. of his Book, m [...]kes that Doctrine that asserts Gods determining Crea­tures to commit necessarily sinful actions, to be his Crown and Glory.

I hope, after these plain Quotations out of Mr. Willards Book, he will not again charge me with so f [...]lly representing him, and printing Calumnies against him, seeing he hath given forth to the World in print all that I have charged him with, and what is much worse, as by the several Quotations faithfully given by me out of his Book, doth plainly appear.

What again he chargeth against me in pag. 56. for my saying, ‘That the aforesaid Doctrine of Gods determining men to sinful actions, drove me from the Society of the Presbyterians, & prepared my way for turning to Quakerism,’ it fully as severe and uncha­ritable, as well as falfe as the former, viz. as for that reason [of the Presbyterian Doctrine that teacheth Gods determining men to sinful actions] to renounce Christianity and Reason it self also, and to herd with a People who are a sink of Heresies old and new, &c. for though the above-said Presbyterian Doctrine, drave me from many of them, who held it and taught it, and prepared my way for turning to Quakerism, yet I say it, to Gods praise, who won­derfully, in mercy, preserved me, I was never so far desiled with their Errors, as to renounce Christianity, or so much as one Fundamental Article of the Christian Faith, as I have sufficiently proved out of my Books, writ by me when under the Profession of a Quaker; Nor did I renounce my Reason, but through Gods mercy, retained it in good measure, as well as true Christianity in the main, though in too many other things belonging to the superstructure, I was, through humane fraity, corrupted and darkned in my understanding by them; and I thank God, who has, in his great mercy, by his Grace recovered me.

[Page 34] And because I said in my printed sheet, That occasion hereby will be give [...] to men who love their su [...], to excuse themselves by this Doctrine, viz. of G [...]s determining men to sinful Actions, [...]e exclaimeth, What pitiful [...] edling serts of arguings are these? He [...]echons that if any, by this Doctrine of his, and his Brethren, love their sin [...]; and take occasion thereby to excuse themselves in their sins, it would be the abuse of the Doctrine, and not the true and proper use of it, and consequently that it is dangerous only per accidens, and not per se, if there be any danger in it, [...] be faith, pag. 3.4. But lot the intelligent and impartial Readers diligently compare what is writ pre and contera on both fides, in our two Books, and I doubt not but they will find that the said Doctrine of Gods determining men to sinful Actions, so no thereby they do necessarily commit them, is dangerous per se, as many other are, and therefore to be avoided.

SECT. XIII.

NOr is he less underitable to class my Undertaking against ‘ [...]s [...]d Doctrine, with the Policy of Julian the Apostate, to shut up the Schools of Learning from the Christians, lest they should otherwise furnish themselves with Weapons against the Paga [...] Idolatry, which be sought to restore to the World. If Mr. Keith, (saith he) could obtain this, what Tri­ [...]mph would be and his Friends make?’

Answ. Whether by the obtaining [This] he means the shutting up all Christian Schools, as was the Policy of Julian the Aposta [...]e, (which I think few will believe of me, and I hope none; for I p [...]y God pres [...]e and bless all true Christian Schools, and water them with the Daw of his heavenly Benediction, th [...] they may grow and multiply, and bring forth many who may be Instruments of his glory both in Church and State) or whe­ther [...] mean, That I and my Friends of the Church of England would have the Colledge of Cambridge in New-England shut up, I am not very imputificate. But if he mean this last, I [...] him [Page 35]and his Brethren plainly, I would not have it shut up, but reformed, and the Masters of it also, from some of their hurtful Principles, if any such Masters be there, beside Mr. Willard himself, such as the above-said Principle is, of Gods Determining Men to all the sinful Actions they commit, so that they Necessarily commit them, after God Almighty has so decreed them to commit them, and his Decree is Eternal, or from Eternity; and therefore the Necessity of committing them is not Hypothetical and Conditional, as he some where seems to insinuate, to deceive his Reader, but Absolute and Positive, as the Decree it self is. But if they do not Reform, if so be they are of Mr. Willards Opinion, in this and other hurtful Notions, very prejudicial to Youth, that they may, in Gods due time, be purged out, and other men of better Principles, as well as of more Christian Charity and Temper, put in their room. Nor am I ashamed to profess, that this is my desire, as well as it is my hope, that in due time it will come to pass (though I wish no violence nor harm to any of them) that Cambridge in New-England, for true Christian Learning and Piety, both in Masters and Schollars, may resemble Cambridge in Old England, as near as a wise and virtuous Daughter resembles a wise and virtuous Mother, and New-England it self, in the like Gifts and Endu­ments may resemble her Mother Church, the Church of England, as it is by Law established.

His Surmize against me, pag. 58. of his Book, ‘That there was a Mystery in it, my turning to the Quakers, and some that have known more of my Circumstances, than he can pre­tend to, do [...]ive another account of the reason of what he calls my former Apostacy, viz. as if it had been on some worldly account, or disappointment of some worldly Pre­serment, as some have in Corners whispered and muttered against me, first indeed some Presbyterians, and after I left the Quakers, they also have whispered the like against me, but which none of them did ever dare to offer to prove;’ and now at last Mr W [...]ard has licked up their Vomit, to spew it forth thus upon me, which I reject as a most false and impious [...]l [...]nder, both in them and him. And it is a sufficient De­monstration [Page 36]of the Unchristian Spirit and Tem [...] of Mr. W [...]llard thus slyly, in print to se [...]k to defame and shoot his Arrows, against me in the dark; but I am armed against him and them, and put them to D [...]siance, if they dare and can to prove what they thus suggest, otherwise let them be cloathed with Shame.

SECT. XIV.

IN my Re-view of Mr. Willard Book, among his many unfair and unjust Insinuations against me; as well as positive Abuses, I find in pag. 41. he very unjustly sospects me, whether I hold That God in [...]nseth Grace into the faithful, whereby he hath a Principle of gracious Operation given [...]in, which whether or no (saith he) my Antagonist will acknowledge, is to be suspected. But to case him of his Suspicion, I tell him, I do cordially believe, as well as acknow­ledge, which at its first infusion is as a grain of Mustard-seed, but afterwards, by the blessing of God, and the operation of his holy Spirit, in the diligent use of the Means of Gods appoint­ment, by them who have it given them, it grows up, by degrees, to be a Tree of the greatest of all Herbs.

Again, I find in pag. 48. he saith, ‘Adams Fall, before it came to pass, was future, how else should God know it to be so [...] And if he did not know it, how was it that he laid in a Remedy against the fatal Consequents of it, in some, before it was in act.’

Answ. That Adams Fall, before it came to pass, was certainly future, and that God most certainly and infallibly had a fore­knowledge of it, and therefore by his eternal Counsel and Purpose laid in a Remedy against the fatal Consequents of it, is granted, but that from thence it doth follow, that God did Necessitate Adam, or any man fince, to commit any sinful Action, or that God had decreed the futurity either of Adams sin, or did, in time, determine their Wills necessarily to sinful Actions, doth no ways follow. Therefore Mr. Willard might have spared his Consequence that he draws upon th [...] [...]upposal, That God did [Page 37]not know the Futurity of Adam. sin, viz. That (upon that Sup­posal) if Adam had pleased he might have defeated the whole Com­ [...] of Man's Redemption: I gave him not the least ground to make any such Supposal, That God did not certainly and infallibly fore-kno [...]to [...]t Alan [...] would sin; therefore here, as oft else-where, (as the Proverb is) Mr. Willard makes to himself a ma [...] [...]o Straw, and then fights against it, and so unprofitably wastes both Time and Paper, and puts me to this Labour, which is not altogether in vain to me, were it but to detect his impertinency, and his unschollar-like way of arguing against what his Opponent doth not deny, but affirm as well as he No [...] doth it follow what certainly is future, is necessarily future by any Antecedent Necessity to its futurition; for Certainty is one thing, and Neces­sity is another.

But let Mr. Willard answer me a Question or two, 1. Could not God, if he had pleased, decreed to have preserved Adam from falling? for I hope he will not say, that God did necessarily decree him to fall, although it is conustent enough with his Principle, That freedom o [...] Will, and Necessity, to act both im­manently and transiently, do well agree together; for [...] that God did necessarily decree Adam to fall, yet by Mr. Willards Principle, he did voluntarily and freely decree it, or to use his phrase in another case, he did decree it Lubenter, or cum Lu [...]ent [...]d, i. e. with a Lubency of Will.

2. If God had pleased by his Decree, to preserve Man from falling, Man would certainly have stood, and not have fallen, and Man had stood, willingly, without any constraint or com­pulsion of his Will; but doth it therefore follow, that either God having decreed to keep Man from falling, or A [...]an being made willing, and well pleased to stand, would have deceated the whole Contrivance of Man's Redemption? How could th [...] be defeated, which, on the Supposition of God's having [...] Adam to stand, and not to fall, would never have been d [...]; nor would there have been any need o [...] any such Decree, if Adam had stood; for the whole needs not the Physitian, and it Adam had stood, he had needed no Physitian n [...]r Red [...]? But yet upon the certain Futurity of A [...] [...] tain and infal [...]ose Fore-knowledge of it, it pl [...]a [...]ed God, [...] [Page 38]eternal Council and Purpose to provide a Saviour and Redeemer for him and his lost Posterity; and seeing God has, according to the Riches of his Grace, so [...]posed the contrivance of mane Redemption, it could not have been de [...]ated.

And thus, I hope, I have sufficiently shewed, both the Futu­rity of Mens sinful Actions, and Gods certain and infallible Fore­knowledge or them, in another Glass than that of Gods Decree absolutely determining the Necessity of them, without either establishing a Stoical [...]ate, or the Jesuits Scientia Media, one of which he would by Consequence inter on me, but without all ground. And as to Stoical Necessity, or what is equally absurd, I think I have above proved Mr. Willards Notion of Free-Will is sufficiently consistent with it.

But that God hath Not necessitated or determined men ne­cessarily to commit such sinful Actions, or decreed them to commit them by any secret Will or Decree, which had he done, would be contrary to his revealed Will he hath spoke by his holy Prophets, and commanded in the holy Scriptures, appears very evidently from many places of Scripture, particularly Jer. 19.5. They have built also the high Places of Baal, to burn their Sons with fire, for burnt Offerings unto Baal, which I commanded not (saith the Lord) nor sp [...]ke it [consequently not according to his revealed Will] neither came it unto my Mind [consequently nor did he decree, purpose or will it, that they should be necessitated to any such wicked Action] see the Parallel places, Jer. 7.31. and Chap. 32. v. 35. in the Old Testament, and in the New Testa­ment, James 1.13, 14 Let no man say when he is Tempted, I am Tempted of God, for God cannot be Tempted with Evil, neither Temp [...]eth [...]e my man; but every man is Tempted when he is drawn away of his own Lust, and enticed. By the words [Tempted of God] I think cannot well be understood any moral Swasion or Com­mand of God, to sin; for such a Supposition I never heard the worst of Hereticks or Blasphemers charged with; but a sort of People there were in England about forty years ago, called, Ranters, some Reliques whereof are yet extent, who (like some Gnesticks in St. James's time) did hold, That God did inwardly [Page 39]move or [...]citement [...] to all the sinful act [...] they commit, so that they did comm [...] them necessarily, one of which, of that Gang, did within these sew years print a Book at London, which he called, Clavis A [...]re [...], or The Golden Key, which I have read, (and for which he was put into Prison by the Magistrates there) wh [...] in he asserted such an Opinion, which I think differs nothing from Mr. Willard. Notion, except that he readily did acknowledge it to be a necessary Consequence from his Opinion, That God was the Author of all sinful Actions, as well as of all good; wherein he seems to have been more ingenuous, in granting that Consequence, than. Mr Willard, who, though he grants the Antecedent, yet denys the Consequence: that [...] only l, but Thousands of as rational and learned men as Mr. Willard is, do think does necessarily and genuinely follow that absurd Opinion.

SECT. XV.

BEcause Mr. Willard doth positively assert in his Book, That most of our Protestant Churches are of his Opinion, the Church of England not excepted, for which he has, as y [...], produced no Authority but that of his own Devising, I intend here in the close to re [...]e some few Passages out of a learned Author, as well as pious, a true Member and Son of the Church of England, to wit, Bishop Bramhall, who was Bishop of Lo [...]don-Derry in Ireland, who maintains the contrary Perswas [...]on, in his Book, called, A Defence of true Liberty, from Ante­redent and Extrinsical Necessity, in answer to a Book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, entituled, A Treatase of Li­berty and Necessity, wherein the said Mr. Hobbs doth as much agree with Mr. Willard as one Egg can be like another, and I suppose Bishop Bramhall knew the Doctrine of the Church of England, as of other Protestant Churches, as [Page 40]well, and much better than Mr. Willard doth. He writes thus in his Book against Mr. Hobbs, viz.

Pag. 60. ‘He (to wit, Mr. H [...]bbs) makes Adam to have had no Liberty from Necessity before his fall, yea, he pro­ceeds so far, as to affirm. That all humane Wills, his and ours, and each propension of our Wills, even during our Deliberation, are as much Necessitated as any thing else whatsoever, that we have no more Power to forbear those Actions which we do, than the fire hath not power to burn.’ [Note, How like this of Mr. Hobbs is to that of Mr. Willard in his Reply to me, see his page 43.]

‘I confess (saith Bishop Bramhall) I hate this Do­ctrine from my heart, and I believe both I have Rea­son so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder the Horrible Consequences which flow from it. It destroys Liberty, and dishonours the Nature of Man. It makes the second Causes and outward Objects to be the Rackets, and Men to be the Tennis-Balls of Destiny. It makes the first Cause to be the Introducer of all Evil and Sin into the World, as much as Man, yea, more than Man, by as much as the Motion of the Watch is more from the Artificer, who did make it, and wind it up, than either from the Spring, or the Wheels, or the Threed, if God by his Special Influences into the second Causes, did Necessitate them to operate, as they did. And if they, being thus determined, did Necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly, not by an Accidental, but by an Essential Subordination of Causes to whatsoever he did; then one of these two Absurdities must needs follow, either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in the World, because it pro­ceeds [Page 41]naturally, necessarily and essentially from God, or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of Evil than Man, because Man is extrinsically, inevitably deter­mined, but so is not God. And in Causes essentially subor­dinate [viz.’ as I have above noted, when the subordinate Cause is determined necessarily by the superiour Cause] ‘the cause of the Cause is always the Cause of the Effect. What Tyrant did ever impose Laws that were impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and punish them for break­ing those Laws which he himself had necessitated them to break, which it was no more in their power nor to break, than it is in the power of the fire not to burn. Excuse me, [saith Bp. Bramhall] if I hate this Doctrine with a perfect Hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God and Man, which makes men to Blaspheme of Necessity, to Steal of Necessity, to be Hang'd of Necessity, and to be Damn'd of Necessity; and therefore I must say, and say again, Qu [...]r­quid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi, It were bett [...]r to be an Atheist, to believe no God, or to be a Man [...]chee, to believe two Gods a God of good, and a God of evil, or with the Heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods, than thus to charge the true God to be the proper Cause and the true Author of all the Sins and Evils which are in the World.’ And pag. 91. ‘He who denys all Liberty from Necessitations, should be scourged until he becomes an humble Supplicant to him who whips him, and confess that he hath power either to strike, or to hold his hand.’ Cum multis al [...]is.