An enquiry into the danger and consequences of a war with the Dutch

An enquiry into the danger and consequences of a war with the Dutch

Table of contents

Title page

An ENQUIRY into the DANGER, &c.

I. It must be a War in Defence of Popery.

II. It must be ruinous to the Protestant Interest.

III. It must be a War, in which the greatest Success will be a Loss to Us.

IV. This War will be dangerous to the Protestant Succession.

V. It must be a War fatal many ways to Us, who are engag'd in it.

VI. It must be a War against the General Inclination of the People.

VII. That it will be a War, in which we are very likely to have the Disadvantage.

ERRATA.

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AN ENQUIRY Into the DANGER AND CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR With the DUTCH.

LONDON: Printed for J. Baker, at the Black-Boy in Pater-Noster-Row. 1712.

An ENQUIRY into the DANGER, &c.

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I CANNOT say that I am of the Number of those, who wish, that if we have a War with the Dutch they may beat Us; because it has something in it so unnatural, for an Englishman or a Britain to rejoyce in the Destruction of his own Country, and in the Triumph of our Neighbours of any kind over Us, that he cannot see it without Horror and Aversion; yet I cannot but say, I wish those, who talk with so much Satisfaction of a War with the Dutch, would look a little into the certain Consequences of such a War, whether Victory or Disadvantage on Our Side shall attend it.

I take a War with the Hollanders, to have this very unhappy Circumstance in it, That if we are beaten, it may be [...] ruin immediately, and if we conquer, it may be our ruin hereafter, so that in general, get or lose in the Field, we shall certainly lose in the War.

The immediate Loss of our Ships, of our Men, of our Trade, and the farther loading this Nation, with a mighty and insupportable Expence, are the common Topicks [Page] of those who argue in the usual Methods against this War; but though these are considerable, and shall have something said to them in their Course; yet these are the least of the Evils, which if our Fore-sight is not clouded by the Power and Influence of Parties found, may be by necessary and inevttable Consequences, to follow the entring at this time upon a War with the Dutch.

The Situation of the Dutch, their Strength at Sea, their Possessions in the East and West-Indies, and their reigning Influence in the North and East Seas, are Reasons why we must expect uncommon Mischiefs should attend our Trade in the beginning of such a War; this was always the Effect of a Dutch War, and it was remarkable, that in the last War with the Dutch we lost 2000 Sail of Ships great and small the first Year: No part of our Commerce is free from them or out of their reach: On the contrary, some of the best Parts of our Trade are in great Danger of being entirely lost to them, such as the East-India, African and East Country Trades in particular; it is apparent, if a due Enquiry were made, we should see small hope of continuing and preserving our Interest in them under a War with the Dutch; their Collonies of superiour Strength lying so near ours in the two First, and their Potent Alliances in the latter, enabling them effectually to supplant Us.

The Disturbance they always upon these Occasions gave us in our Home Trade, and the impossibility of our carrying it on, but with [Page] manifest Disadvantage, is a strong Argument to open our Eyes in the Case of a Dutch War; there are other Parts which respect our Coal and Salt Trade, our Corn Trade, our Hull and Lynn Carriage, our Trade to Scotland, and our Fishing Trade: In all which, the Interruptions of Commerce by a Dutch War have been such, as have been felt by all our People.

The Gentlemen who are so fond of this War with the Dutch, have perhaps not yet examin'd the Trading Consequences of it, and as they are Landed Men, and fancy they are no way dependent upon Trade, they have forgotten, what so often, and by so many unanswerable Arguments has been proved to them, viz. That as Trade only was the Original Cause of the encreas'd Value of Lands, and the high Rents which now the Gentlemen receive; so the decay and ruin of Trade, must of course sink the Value of Land, lower the Rents, and reduce the Tenant, to an incapacity to support the Landlord; by which means, a War will of course affect the Landed-man as well as the Merchant: Wherefore the Landed Gentlemen are desired to give themselves the Trouble to enquire into the following Particulars, as they are likely to be affected by a War with the States General.

First, Whether the Landed Men about New Castle upon Tyne, will not be effected by the interruption of the Coal Trade? Whether when Coals are at 4 l. a Chaldron at [Page] London, and on the Coasts, it will not considerably lessen the Consumption? And whether in the last Dutch War the Quantity of Coals carry'd out were not lessen'd above 50000 Chaldron in a Year?

Secondly, Whether the Landed Men bordeing upon all the Coasts, from Hull in the North, to the River Thames, and on to the Coast of Kent and Sussex, will not be affected by the Stop put to the vast Exportation of Corn to Holland, &c. the want of which Sale, must of necessity make the Price fall in England, by which the Tenant, not being able to get a Market for his Corn, is disabled to pay his Rent, or hold his Farm without an Abatement?

Thirdly, Whether the Stop, put to the vast Exportation of our Woolen Manufactures to Holland, and which will be interrupted, if not prohibited by a War, will not ruin Multitudes of our Manufacturers in the Country, leave the Poor without Employment, and prevent or greatly lessen, not the Consumption of Wool only, but the General Consumption of Provisions, by which the Landed Men's Estates, must of course be reduced, and their Rents remain unpaid?

These Things, if it was imagin'd, any Man could object against them might be farther enlarg'd upon, and the particular Trades which would suffer in such an Interruption [Page] of Commerce, might be examined, where it would appear.

That the great Trade of Broad Cloath, Kersies, &c. one of the greatest Branches of Trade in England, particularly at Leeds, Huthersfield, Wakefield, Hallifax, Bradford, Rochdale, and the adjacent Parts, and where it is by modest Computation supposed, Four Hundred Thousand People are employ'd and maintained in the Woolen Manafacture, that this great Trade is principally maintained and supported by the Exportation to Holland.

That the Stop to that Exportation, must of necessity encourage the Dutch, in the Making the same kind of Goods in their own Country, particularly at Leyden, where they have for some Years endeavour'd it, and are Daily improving.

That above Two Hundred Thousand Pound Value of the said Goods are Yearly exported to Holland.

That the North-Riding of York-shire, Bishoprick of Durham, and great part of Lancashire, and Westmoreland are supported, by breeding and feeding Cattle, for the Consuption of the West Riding; and if the Dutch Trade receive such a Check, or Interruption, the Consequence is evident; the poor People will want Employ, which want of Employ is immediately felt, in the Consumption of Provisions, and that again in the Rent of our Lands: And indeed it cannot be a little wonder'd at, to see the Landed Men in this Nation, value themselves [Page] so much, upon their running down our Trade, as if the Lands had no Dependance upon Trade, or that Lands cou'd hold up their Value, if our Trade were decay'd: This Article of the Dutch Trade, will satisfy any reasonable Person, that it cannot be; I pray God, we do not too fatally try the Experiment at this time, nor is this the least Reason why I mention this Argument at this time, that our Landed-Men may learn to know what made them rich, and what may again reduce them to what they were some Ages ago.

It is true, Trade has given us no Land, Britain is no larger than it was before; but it is not unworthy our Thoughts, and may be proper to recommend it to these Gentlemen to consider, That Trade has added a new Value to what we had before; the Rents of Lands are risen in time to such a Degree, that what was formerly worth 10 l. per Ann. is now worth 100 l. per Annum, and what has done this? What, but our Trade? Our General Commerce, which had it been more effectually covered, encouraged and understood, would have been able to have done much more.

Come we next to speak to the Corn-Trade; this is more sensibly understood by those Gentlemen, whose Estates lye near the Sea, more particularly upon the Coasts of Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, and the several Countries which border upon the Humber, or on the Navigable Rivers, emptying themselves into the Humber, as also upon the Coasts of [Page] Norfolk, such as Yarmouth, Cromer, Clye, Wells, Burnham and Lynn, the Navigations of the River Ouse, and the Towns of Wisbich, and Spalding in the Isle of Ely; again, on the Coasts of Sussex, Essex, and Kent, all which Counties, find their Daily Advantages from the incredible Quantity of Corn every Year exported to Holland, without which Exportation, it would be impossible for the Tenants in those Countries to vend the Corn they owe, and by Consequence, the Lands in those Counties, must either lye unmanur'o, or at least be laid down, and only employ'd in breeding of Cattle, a poor Trade and which is now left to the Northern and Western Parts of England, and to the Highlands of Scotland; the Consequence of which would be the lessening the Value of Land, sinking the Rents, and reducing the Estates of the Landed Men.

These would be some of the more immediate Consequences of a War with the Dutch, and are mention'd here, because as Mankind are more apt to be sensible of that Mischief most, which touches them soonest; it cannot but be very reasonable to expect, That these People, however at present unaffected with the Danger of a War with Holland, may think fit to change their Minds, when they examine more stricly into the thing, and shall find, that they will be immediately touch'd by it in the most sensible part.

There are several other immediate Cases, in which a War with Holland will affect us, in Matters of Trade, and which it having [Page] been so long ago, since we had such a War, our People are a little too apt to forget: But which if they please to recollect themselves, they will find, will more nearly touch them, than perhaps they are aware of, as especially the Price of Coals, touch'd at before, which will particularly affect the Inhabitants of this City and County's adjacent, where Three Pounds and Four Pounds a Chaldron have been accounted but a moderate Price for Coals, and which is occasion'd by the direct Situation of the Hollanders, whose Ports immediately opening to the North Channel, the Colliers Ships are in ten Fold more danger from them, than they can be from the French Privateers, in Case of a War with France. It is needless to enlarge how many other Trades this will affect, how much dearer it will make all such Goods as are wrought by Fire, but especially how severely it will pinch the midling Families of our Tradesmen and the Poor, who have no Relief in Case of Cold Weather about this City, there being no Woods and Forrests as in the Country, to supply them with Fewel, and who are put to inexpressible Hardships in the Winter for want of Coal.

The Rates of Salt, another Necessary of Life, is a Thing deserves our Consideration in Case of Trade; the City of London, and all this Part of England, being supply'd with Salt from New Castle upon Tyne, from whence the Danger being so great, the Price of Salt was frequently in the late Dutch War, although no Tax was then upon it, at 4 d. [Page] per Pound, and may now possibly be double that Price.

These are Matters of Trade, and indeed are but a small part of what might be said upon that Subject, but however, may serve to shew, That a War with Holland can never happen, without plunging us into many great Difficulties, such as will justify me in saying, That we ought never to engage in such a War, without such an absolute and unavoidable Necessity, as will abundantly make the bearing all these Inconveniences easy and rational to Us.

But alas! these are but the smaller Considerations in this Case, and are mentioned here in order to make good the first part of the Argument, laid down in the beginning of this Work: The more fatal Consequences of a War with the Dutch, are such as respect the Politick Concerns of Europe, and are of infinite Value to Us: I shall examin them apart.

I It must be a War in Defence of Popery.

II. It must be ruinous to the Protestant Interest.

III. It must be Dangerous to the Hannover Succession.

IV. It must be fatal many ways to us, who are to be engag'd in it.

V. It must be a War against the general Inclination of the People.

VI. It must be a War, in which the greatest Success will be a Loss to Us.

[Page] VII. It must be a War, in which we are very likely to have the Disadvantage.

VIII. It must be a very bloody War, that will be far from being carry'd on in Jest, as the present War with France has been, especially at Sea.

I cannot promise to go thorow all these effectually, in the short Compass of this Tract: However, I shall begin, and speaking more largely to those which are most necessary, I shall touch lightly the rest, and perhaps speak more effectually to them hereafter.

I. It must be a War in Defence of Popery.

I know it has been argued on many Occasions, That this War was not begun on account of Religion, it was the Argument the Papists and French Advocates strove to make use of all along, subtilly to engage the Zealous People the more sincerely in their Quarrel, and stir them up to Blood and Destruction: We find many Instances of this, in the Accounts of the last few Years, especially in the King of France's Letter to the Pope, relating to the Duke of Savoy, who was then newly come over to the Confederates, wherein he complains of his Royal Highness joining with Hereticks and the Enemies of God's Church, meaning the Prussian and Saxe-Gotha Troops, whom he calls Enemies to GOD and his Church, and which he says they impiously brought into Italy: But after all that has been said on that Head, [Page] tho' we are not now on the Foot of a Religious War, yet if we fight with the Dutch, we certainly fight against the Protestant Religion in Defence of Popery; perhaps it may not be immediately concern'd, but it is so in its visible Effects, and no Man can be so blind as not to see it. The Powers hereby protected are all Popish; Popish, even to Bigottry, especially the Spaniards. They have not only strengthened themselves against the Protestant Religion, but by the Destruction of the Protestants themselves, and that in the severest manner.

Let any Man but take a View of them separately in France; how has the French Governor expelled 400000 Protestants out of their Dominions, suffering all the Damages, which the loss of so many Subjects, and their moveable Estates, must of necessity be to a Nation, rather than not to root out the Protestant Religion; and indeed they have rooted it out of most part of the Nation, and one Age of Persecution more will most effectually do it. How have they since pursued the poor Remains of the Protestant Religion, in the Mountains of the Cevennes, and put all that have fallen into their Hands to Death, by the cruellest Torments imaginable? How have they lately done the same in the little Principallity of Orange, tho' in all probability they were to restore that Country upon a Peace? In Spain, how have we found the Aversions of the People, to our great Damage in the War there, while our Troops have been Maletreated by the [Page] Spaniards and Porteguese, even while we came there to assist them, rejecting their own Deliverance, I speak of those well affected to King Charles III. only because the Assistance brought them was carry'd on by Heretick Forces, and that the Protestants were so odious to them, that they could not bear to be deliver'd by them. These are the People we must fight for, when ever we take up Arms against the Hollanders; for these the Blood of English Men and Britains is to be spilt, and the Wealth of a Protestant Nation exhausted, and that not only for the People of these Nations, but for their very Religion too; could we distinguish between the Men and their Principles, between the Interest of the Nations, and the Interest of their Religion, it were the better to be born with: But our Case is extremly hard, for it is not so much the National Interest, as the Religious Interest that eventually will be the Concern of the War, and we fight even for Popery it self: The Propagation of the Bigottry and Superstition of those Nations being so twisted with their Power, that the latter never goes without the former, and they never did extend their Conquest and Dominions to any Place, where they have not established their Idolatry and Superstition, nay, nor where they have not apply'd themselves to expunge and race out the very Name of the Protestant Religion, and the least Remains of the Protestant Worship. This confirms the Head I am upon, that when ever [Page] the unhappy Hour shall come, that the Sword should be drawn in this Quarrel, it is drawn by the Nature and Consequence of the Thing, in Defence of POPERY; What Protestant then can think of this without Horror? How ruinous must this be to the Protestant Interest! How destructive to the Safety of Religion, to the Freedom of Conscience, and to the Prosperity of the Churches abroad! Of which by it self; but particularly, how dreadful a Work must this be for Protestants to do? With what Face can any Man, who is a Professor of the Protestant Religion, draw his Sword in such a Quarrel? And which is still worse, how can any Protestant put his Hand to the contriving and bringing to pass such a War. I have no Hand in, or Eye towards, who is, or is not concern'd in the Measures that have a Tendency to this; some say one side are guilty of it, some the other, and both seem to agree that it will be a Consequence of what is now doing; but I am desirous faithfully to represent to both Sides, what the meaning of a War with Holland is, what it implies, and what Effects will necessarily follow, that both Parties may lay their Hands upon their Hearts, and reflect with Seriousness what they are about, when they draw their Swords against their Brethren.

II. It must be ruinous to the Protestant Interest.

This is little more than the Reverse of the other as to the part of Religion, because [Page] the Defence of Popery must be the Ruin, or at least the Damage of the Protestant Religion; but I choose to call this the Protestant Interest, because tho' the Religious Interest depends upon it, and must follow the Fate of it upon all Occasions, yet the Civil and Politick Interest of the Protestants, is what I am now speaking of, and how far the present Case will affect it will soon appear: Nothing is more evident, than that the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, in Conjunction with the States General, are the main Strength of the Protestant Interest in the World. The Princes of Germany, with the Kings of Sweden and Denmark are considerable, it is true, and not at all to be despised; but alas! how long would all these, put together, be able to support the Protestant Cause, or to defend themselves against the Power of French and German Popery! How soon would the Light of the Protestant Religion in the World be extinguished, if the Popish Powers of Europe were combin'd against those few Northern Provinces! But the Center of Protestant Strength lies in the joint Forces, Power and Wealth of the Two Maritime Potentates, Great Britain and Holland, their Forces by Land have alone been able to match the Popish Powers of Europe, and to look the King of France in the Face, and their United Force at Sea is acknowledg'd to be superiour to all the known World, tho' all their Naval Strength was put together.

[Page] Upon this Strength the Protestant Interest, speaking of second Causes entirely depends, this makes the Protestants formidable to the World; this alone has restrain'd the Popish Powers of the World from over-running them many Ages ago: Farther than this, it may not be unnecessary to reflect, what Blows the Protestant Interest has already received in these 20 or 30 Years past, how much weaker it is by Consequence than it was before, and thereby how unable to resist the Effects of new Enemies, if join'd together; much more, how little need there is to have yet deeper Wounds made in their Interest, than was before: These things are evident in the following Particulars.

1. The Extirpation of the Protestants of France.

2. The Succession of the Roman Catholick House of Newburgh to the Palatinate.

3. The going over of the Elector of Saxony to the Romish Church.

4. The weakening and oppressing the King of Sweden, and divesting the Swedes (who are Guarrantees of the Treaty of Westphalia) of their Dominions in the Empire.

5. The Danger of a Popish Successor to the Crowns of Great Britain and Ireland.

In considering these Things, what Reflections must needs follow to any one, who [Page] with an impartial Eye, and a just Concern for the Protestant Interest, can look on the approaching Danger of a bloody War between Great Britain and the States General; what a mortal Wound this would be to the Protestant Interest, What a Breach it would make in the Protestant Strength, and how effectually it would expose the Protestant Cause to be over-run by the Arms and Interest of the Popish Princes, who we have always found ready to devour them.

Let those who want Examples to illustrate this, look back upon the Year 1672, when this Nation gull'd by the Arts and Politicks of Popish Councils, was drawn in to fight against the Dutch; How did it open a way to all those terrible Conquests, which the French King made upon the Dutch, by which he was within a Trifle of dissolving their State, and uniting them all to the Kingdom of France, and by which we had like at that time to have overwhelm'd the Protestant Religion in the World? And in a Word, by which this Nation also was at last brought to such a Desperate Point, that had not the Revolution fallen in to rescue us from the Danger, we had fallen into the Ballance of Power on the Popish Side, and had help'd to outweigh the Protestants, to their universal Destruction: This may serve to warn us all from falling into the like Blindness of Measures, and nothing is more wonderful, than to find our People so willing to run into it.

[Page] What can our falling upon the Dutch at this time imply? What can the Effect of it be? Will it not be an immediate weakening of them in their Defence of the Protestant Religion, and a direct strengthing their Enemies to destroy them? And will it not be an effectual weakening of us also, so as at last perhaps to render us both too weak to do that, tho' join'd together, which either of us are able to do now apart, in Defence of what is the mutual Interest of both?

Add to this how both Nations are already exhausted, and emptied by the long and continu'd Burthen of this heavy and expensive War, that as it has been these 22 Years dreining us, it will require twice that time at least to restore and recover us: So that we are in a much worse Condition to waste one another farther; since it will of course so entirely expend our Strength and Capacity for our mutual Defence, that it must render both Sides an easie Prey to the Enemy, as is happily express'd by the Fable of the two small Birds, who having been long fighting together, the Eagle came and snatch'd away both.

Let every considering Protestant summon his Reason, and in the most affectionate manner persuade the Nations, if it be possible, to avoid so dangerous a Step as this, which has a direct Tendency to destroy the Protestant Interest in the World, and which cuts off the Hands that should defend it; let them consider how the Enemies of our Religion would rejoice; how they would promise [Page] themselves from these Divisions and Distractions among Protestants, that one time or other they should break in and devour the whole Interest; let them remember that the like Strife among Christians, was the very thing that let Mahomet the Great into Europe, and gave leisure and opportunity to the Barbarians, to overthrow the Remains of the Grecian Empire, take Constantinople, and plant themselves and their Pagan Superstition on the Ruins of the flourishing Christian Churehes: This was the time the famous City of Constantinople was taken, and the Emperor Constantine slain in it, after a long Siege by the Turks: Not one of the Christian Princes of Europe sending the least Help, or stirring one Foot to the Assistance of the Christian Emperor, who lost his Life in the Storm of the City; not that the Christian Powers of Europe were not able to have reliev'd the City, and to have driven the Turk out of Europe, but they were universally embroil'd in furious Wars against one another, France was just rescuing its self out of the Hands of the English, under the weak and divided Reign of Henry 6th; and Germany was embroil'd in Wars between the Emperor Fredrick and the Pope, by which Means every Hand was employ'd, and that Power which should have protected the Christian Interest was weaken'd to that Degree, that the Christians were in no Condition to oppose the victorious Turks, but let them quietly over-run a great part of Europe. I would have all those, who are desirous of [Page] engaging these two Protestant Nations, in a War one with another, read that melancholy Story, and consider how exactly this would be the Case, between Papists and Protestants: Let them consider, what Depredations the Popish Powers of Europe would make on the Protestant Princes during such a time: Let them examin in what Posture we should be to protect the Protestant Interest, in Case of any Excursion of its Popish Enemies; how it would lessen the Figure the Protestants now make, weaken their Hands, render them Contemptible to their Enemies, and lay them open to the Attempts of those, who have been hitherto restrained only by fear, from devouring them.

3. Nor would Victory on either hand mend it, for the Protestant Interest being coucerned, but as one Body in the whole Quarrel would equally suffer, which Side soever obtained the Victory; and this leads me to the Third Head, viz.

III. It must be a War, in which the greatest Success will be a Loss to Us.

It will be to no purpose for any Side to boast of Victory in this War, since their very Conquest is their Loss, and they are just so much weaker in the Protestant Cause, as by their Conquest they have weaken'd their Brethren, since in their Common Interest they are but one Body, and have but one [Page] Strength, one Interest, and one Foundation upon which they stand; it is very unhappy that these things cannot pierce a little into our Thoughts, but that we are all intent at such a time as this, either on pushing on a War, or settling a particular Peace, and leaving the Views and Prospects of establishing Europe, we are turning our Eyes upon a Breach with our Protestant Allies; I do not desire to concern the present Debates among Us about War and Peace in this Matter, I have nothing to do with who directly, or who consequently push on a War with the Dutch, but directing my Speech to both Parties, I would faithfully represent to them, the Ruin and Distress that such a War would bring upon the Protestant Interest in general; how which Side soever get the better, Popery alone gains by the Victory; every Battle fought weakens the very Conqueror as Protestant, as much as it does those that are beaten: This is what I would move them to do, that they may if possible find out some happy Medium, either on one Side or other; I do not undertake here to say what, but I say, some happy Medium, to prevent the giving up the Protestant Cause to be devoured by the Popish Tyrants of the World; that Protestants may not whet their Swords against one another, as they already do their Tongues in a Dreadful and Implacable manner; That they would remember every Drop of Blood they shed in this Quarrel, leaves them just so much the less to oppose against Popish Power, when that Day [Page] shall come, as undoubtedly it will, when the Fate of the whole Protestant Interest may be try'd by the Sword, and the Forces of all Europe shall be divided in a Religious War; I can compare this unhappy Case of a War, between Britain and Holland, to nothing so well, as to the War between the Children of Israel, against their Brethren of the Tribe of Benjamin.

This is remarkable for the fury of it, as appears in the Tribes Swearing, binding one another by an Oath, or a great Oath as the Text hath it, That every Man that came not up to the Lord at Mizpeth, that is, to fight against Benjamin, should be put to Death; and another Oath they had also made, viz. That they would not any of them give their Daughters to a Benjamite.

The Story is too well known to repeat the Particulars, the War was carry'd on with great Fury, and was very bloody, as such Wars always are; it was so bloody that they spared neither Age, Sex or Condition, no, nor the very Cattle; but burnt down all their Cities, and all that came to hand, Judg. 20. 48. So that the Tribe of Benjamin was entirely cut off, only Six Hundred Men being left alive of the whole Race: And what Joy had Israel of this Victory! they had no sooner done it, but see the Title or Contents of the next Chapter. The People bewail the Desolation of Benjamin: vide Mr. Pool's Annotations and Contents, on Judges xxi.

[Page] Next see the manner of their bewailing it.

And the People came to the House of God, and abode there till even before God, and lift up their voices, and wept sore: And said, O LORD God of Israel, why is this come to pass in Israel, that there shonld be to day one Tribe lacking in Israel? And it came to pass, on the morrow, that the People rose early, and built there an Altar, and offered Burnt Offerings, and Peace Offerings.

And again, v. 6. And the Children of Israel repented them for Benjamin their Brother, and said, There is one tribe cut off from Israel this Day.

See here the mournful Satisfaction of Victory over our Friends! what is the English of it but this, There is one Tribe cut off from Israel? That is, should we now be invaded by the Heathen, by the Canaanites, the Philistines or the Midianites, or any of the Barbarous Nations; there is one Tribe less, to help defend the Borders of Israel: Our Brethren of Benjamin are cut off, and we are left naked on that Side, we are just so much the weaker by our Victory.

How exactly does this answer to the Case before us? Should either Side prevail, should we beat, should we conquer the Dutch, should the Heathen (French) fall in upon them, and over-run them entirely, as in 1672 they had almost done, by our infatuated Assistance, what would be our Joy in this Conquests? Should we not reflect on our selves after it, and repent our selves for Benjamin? Should we not say, why is this come to pass among Protestants, that a Tribe or Nation of Protestants is [Page] now lacking in Israel? Should we not lament for Benjamin, that a Tribe was cut off from the Protestant Strength?

On the other Hand, should this War fall heavy on Us, and though Ruin is what we pretend not to fear, yet might it not so weaken us, as to expose us an easy Prey to the Pretender and his Party, which would be the worst sort of Ruin; would not the Dutch themselves, and the whole Body of the Protestants of Europe, Bewail the Desolation of Benjamin, and repent them for having lost a Tribe from the Protestant Israel?

Let all those, as well of one Side or other, who are either hasty for, or indifferent in the Case of a War with the Dutch, look into these Things, and consider seriously what they are doing; consider the Consequence of a War, in which, whether conquering or conquered, the Interest of the Protestant Religion suffers, and the Strength of the Protestant Powers is weakned, and we shall all have Cause to bewail the Desolation of our Brethren.

IV. This War will be dangerous to the Protestant Succession.

By the Protestant Succession, I suppose all Men will understand me, to mean the Succession of the House of Hannover to the Crowns of Great Britain and Ireland, after the Demise of Her Present Majesty QUEEN ANNE, and I have good Reason, from the Iniquity of the Times, wherein Jacobite Distinctions [Page] are very subtle and many, to make this Explanation. Now let any Man but seriously examine the Consequences of a War, with the Guarrantees of that Succession, and what will he infer, but that however intentionally it may not be so, yet effectually and eventually, it will be a War against the Succession it self; not that I enter here into the Case, whether the Guarrantee of the Dutch were necessary, as was thought by way of Treaty: Let that be as it will, this is certain, That the Dutch as a Protestant State, Ally'd in Interest to both, viz. to the House of Hannover and to the British Nation, and their own Safety, absolutely requiring, that this Nation should never come into Popish Hands, are an undoubted Natural Security to the Protestant Succession, and unless their Power be broken by such a War as this, must be supposed always to be ready by a natural Consequence, to assist and support the said Succession, and all the Friends of it, with all their Might; they can do no other, if they are not like us infatuated and blind to their own Safety and Interest; nor is this the least part of our Security against the Pretender, and all the Jacobite Enemies of the said Protestant Succession, especially those of them who are Abroad.

Those then who propagate, whether openly or clandestinely, a Breach between the Two Nations, are so far real Enemies to the Hannover Succession, let their Views and Designs, Measures or Pretences be what they will, such, while they cry out Zealously [Page] for the Protestant Succession, would do well to tell Us, how shall the Elector of Hannover support his Right? How shall he come over hither with Forces and Armies in case of a contending Pretender, who may be privately convey'd hither before him? How shall he recover the Possession, or come to the Assistance of his Friends and their Interest, who may be oppress'd by a Jacobite Faction; if the Dutch are ruin'd, and their Naval Strength broken by that very Natition they should come to save?

A War with Holland, would in many respects therefore be a War against the Protestant Succession, as well as against the Protestant Religion; nay some who have examin'd that Affair very nicely, affirm with me, That there is indeed no other real Danger of the Hannover Succession, but the ruining the Dutch, for that whatever the Artifice of Parties may bring to pass, and however the High flying and Jacobite Party in League with France, and other Popish Powers, may form a Conjunction of Interest, so as to erect the Pretender; nay, tho' they were to set him upon the Throne, yet that there will always be such a Body, of the best, the wisest, and the most considerable People of this Nation, steady to the Interest of the House of Hannover, and firm to the Solemn Abjuration they have made of the Pretender, that on the first appearance of the Protestant Successor, with any reasonable Force to support them, they would show themselves able to overthrow all their Enemies, and restore [Page] the Nation to the Right Establish'd Successor, in spight of all the Opposition, that the Enemies of the Protestant Interest could make: But if the Dutch before this should be oppressed by a War, and their Naval Strength and Power broken by us, in vain we may stretch out our Hands to the Successor for help, who cannot without a Fleet yield us that Assistance, or do himself that Justice, which otherwise he is very well able to do, so that fighting against the Dutch, is cutting off the Right-hand of the Succession: On the other hand, should the Forces of Britain be broken or weaken'd in this War against the Dutch, still so much the less able we shall be to resist the Efforts of the Pretender, whether he comes back't by a French or a Spanish Power, or depending upon the Interest of his Jacobite Friends and Faction at Home; a Nation exhausted, impoverish'd, and tyr'd out with War, cannot be in so good a Condition to resist an Invader, nor so warmly inclin'd to engage in a new War, against Tyranny and Oppression, as while we are whole and in Condition; so that which way soever we take this War, and which way soever the Success of a Dutch War shall fall, it will be Dangerous if not Fatal to the Protestant Succession of the House of Hannover.

V. It must be a War fatal many ways to Us, who are engag'd in it.

[Page] This, besides what relates as before to the Protestant Interest, and the Hannover Succession, will be consider'd, as it respects our Commerce, our publick Credit, our exhausted Circumstances, and our general Civil Interest; what relates to Commerce, has been touch'd at already, and I may only add this, that as our Trade in general is already prodigiously sunk, by the long Interruption of 22 Years War; the Damage of which will not in some Ages, if Ever, be wholly repair'd; So a War with Holland at this time, would give such a Blow to that Part which remains, that in general our whole Trade would be overwhelmed in Difficulties and Confusions inextricable; the Employment of the Poor, by the Stop and Interruption of Commerce in the present Wars, has in several Parts of England been quite stopt, in others they are taken off of the Manufactures they were originally bred to. So that whole Towns remain now Destitute of so much as the appearance of those Manufactures they were formerly wholly taken up with; our Colonies Abroad, by the stop of the Consumption and Exportation of their Produce, occasion'd by the War, are oblig'd to leave Planting, as in Virginia in particular, and apply themselves to Manufactures, by which in a few Years the supply of Woollen Manufactures, which usually was sent from hence, will be effectually stopp'd. All these and many more will be encreased by a War with the Dutch, to whom, including Hamburgh, at this time, we export [Page] more of our Woolen, Manufactures than to all Parts of the World besides, tho' put together.

What then shall be the Condition of our People, when as before the Export of our Broad Cloth, Kersies, Serges and Stuffs, of which the Dutch now receive such great Quantities shall be stop'd, and when the poor People, who now live upon those Employments, shall be destitute of Work, and be left to seek their Bread? Let those People that think a War with Holland of no Consequence, consider of some Equivalent for this, and of opening some Trade for the vent of our Manufactures, which shall sufficiently supply the Poor with Labour, and raise Money effectually to pay them.

If these Things were consider'd, we should be more cautious, as well of coveting to make a War with the Dutch, as of pleasing our selves with the Hopes that the Dutch will force us to it.

I shall not touch at the Consequences, which some have already spoken to, in case the Dutch and the Emperor, pushing on the War without Us, should reduce France, and and recover Spain, not only without any Assistance from Us, but even against our Will, the many ways this may be fatal to Us, are better thought of in private, than made publick, and it is hoped the Prudence of our Allies may avoid pushing us to those Extremeties: But I cannot omit mentioning again, tho' spoken to before, how evidently such a War would open a Door to the Pretender, and [Page] expose these Nations, as a Prey to the Jacobite Interest, as well at Home as Abroad; for as some Men hope, so I cannot but see, that in case of a War with the Dutch, the Attempts of the Jacobite Party will be inevitable; nor can they be so blind to their own Interest, as not to know it; and this is the true Reason, that you cannot converse at this Time with a Jacobite, but you discover his most Passionate Desire of a War with the Dutch; all their Emissaries are busie, Exclaiming against the Dutch, and Exasperating our People against the Dutch, and if the States-General do stand out against the British Measures, or take any Step that seems a little disobliging, these Men, far from doing Justice on either Hand, set all their Emissaries at Work, to aggravate it, and make it appear worse than really it is: On the other Hand, the same Party in Holland act the very other Extreme, and there they exclaim against the British Measures, tell the Dutch they are Maltreated, that the British Parliament has used them barbarously; That the British Ministry impose upon them, and cram the Peace down their Throats, and the like: The Reason is evident, they seek nothing but a Breach, because they see clearly that a War is the only Step that can make way for their Interest, and open a Door to the Pretender.

VI. It must be a War against the General Inclination of the People.

[Page] This seems to want no Proof, even the Queen herself and the Ministry, however it may seem, are averse to it, and the Measures taken with the Dutch, however Calculated to carry on the Peace with the French, have plainly discover'd, that it is not the Inclination of the Ministry to break with the Dutch if they can avoid it; they cannot but see, that it will be Ruinous to our Trade, and that the Burthens must be intollerable that must follow, especially our present Impoverish'd Circumstances consider'd: Nor can it be Reasonable, that the Ministry, who give the Exhausted Condition of the Nation, as the best and first Reason for making a Peace with France, should at the same Time be so regardless of that exhausted Condition of the Nation, as to lead them into a War with Holland; this would be to deny what they had alledg'd before, and Contradict what was the main Argument given, for Convincing us of the Necessity of former Measures, viz. That the Nation was Reduced, Exhausted, Impoverish'd, and the like, and that some Ages were requir'd to restore our Circumstances, and this was acknowledg'd in many Cases to be true; but the People will, of course think themselves banter'd and jested with in all that, if we think fit now to run into another War, which may be every way as fatal and as chargeable as the other.

As to the Inclination of the common People, that has many Ways been try'd, the Aversions that formerly were in our People [Page] against a Dutch War, were too well known to those who observ'd it, viz. with what Backwardness they Engag'd! with what Reluctance they Listed! how the poor Seamen were dragg'd into the Service, like a Bear to the Stake! It would be too long to enter upon the Reasons and Considerations which moved this Aversion, the Thing speaks itself; they have been long our Friends and Confederates, have often Assisted, Relieved, Deliver'd Us in our Embroiled Circumstances, and we cannot without Reluctance, desire to fight against a People whom we have so often acted in Conjunction with: We have look'd upon them as our Friends, as our Brethren, in the late War, and it must be with Regret, that our People should rejoyce in contrary Extremes, and sheath their Swords in the Bowels of those, who they shook Hands with before.

Trade, our mutual Converse in Business, and the long Interwoven Interests of the two Nations, cannot but Contribute to this Inclination; and the Damage we shall feel, and that immediately too, will assist to form the Aversions which are in our Minds against the War, and make our People abhorr the Thoughts of it; but I need not insist upon this, which every Man knows to be Fact, and can trace the Original of; I come now to consider the two last Articles, viz.

[Page]

VII. That it will be a War, in which we are very likely to have the Disadvantage.

Not that I am of the Opinion that the Dutch will beat Us, as some People talk, and yet farther from pleasing myself with the Hopes of it, as some pretend we do; but if, as before, we shall be Losers, even by the Success we may pretend to have in it, what then must be the want of that Success, if such a Case also should happen? Let those who calmly Examin Things at all, look back on the Stop of Trade, Loss of Shipping, Ruin of Merchants, want of Employ for our People; mention'd before in this Tract, and judge for themselves, as to the Advantages to Us; but if we should have the worst of it at Sea also, as no Man can Answer for the uncertain Events of War; if our Navy should be Defeated, our Ships, which are our Strength, receive any fatal Blow, which we are not sure of the Disadvantages which will follow to us, are such, as I shall, in hopes they will never happen, conceal for the present.

Lastly, No more shall I think to terrifie any from a War with the Dutch, by telling them it will not be a War to be Trifled with; that the English and Dutch when they used to meet at Sea, do not use to make a Jest of it; fighting with the Dutch has always had a difference in it from fighting with other Nations: These fight at a distance, and lie and pelt one another, while they are a quarter of a Mile or half a Mile off, or pour in their small [Page] Shot upon one another, to pick off their Men; but when the English and Dutch formerly used to meet, three Sea fights have been fought with near 80 Sail of a side in one Summer, the great 3 Deck Ships of 100 Guns each, sink and burn by one another's Side, and the Squadrons lie Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm, pouring in their Cross-Bar, Double Head and Round, and tearing one another with that dreadful Fury, that nothing on Earth can be spoken of, to describe those Sea fights by; let those who remember the last Holland Wars, tell us, whether the hottest Action we have had at Sea during this War, can be compar'd to the Way of fighting between Us and the Dutch? And there is no Question to be made but the like must follow again, if a New War begin; This seems evident, that the Animosity between the Nations, is like to be as great as ever, and perhaps greater; and the War, if such a miserable Event should follow, will be Prosecuted with the greatest Fury that any War ever was between Us.

Having thus laid down the Consequences of such a War, it cannot be thought that any one in these Nations, who is a Friend to the Protestant Succession, to the Protestant Religion, to the general Interest of the Protestant Powers, to Trade, to the Poor, or indeed to themselves, can desire to have these two Protestant Nations engag'd with one another, especially at such a Time as this. It is an invidious Task to go about here to make Enquiry who are, or are not desirous of this War? Or who among us may, [Page] by pushing on their separate Schemes, bring it to pass by the Consequence of these Schemes, whether involuntarily or otherwise, it is too evident where this lies, to need an Enquiry, but as I have made this Piece hitherto independent, and look neither way, as to Parties, so it seems not at all needful: The Advice is to both, or all our Parties, that they would consider very well what they are doing, what Interest they are carrying on; whose alone will be the Advantage; to whom will be the Joy of such a War: For if these are our Dangers, and if all these Disadvantages threaten us by a War with the Dutch, it cannot be, but that a Proportion of Gain and Advantage will accrue to the Enemy, for what is our Loss, must on the other Hand be their Advantage.

I know, and easily foresee many Things will be objected here, and it may be necessary to speak to them all in their Order, tho' our Space at the end of this Work is too short, to say all that might be spoken—The Objections are such as these, viz. Tho' it be true, that the Consequences of a War with Holland, are, as you have said, yet what must be done? We are not to let the Dutch insult us, because it is our Disadvantage so many ways to have War. That if the Dutch reject the Measures proposed for their Advantage, and Ours too, and carry Things on to an extravagant Height, THEY force the War and not WE: That by doing what is incompatible with our [Page] Interest, they in Effect declare the War; so that it is They make War with the QUEEN, not the QUEEN with Them: That the Dutch are acted by a Faction from hence, who prompt and persuade them to stand out, and put them in hopes, that their doing so, may bring Things to a new Turn here, and put a new Face upon our Affairs, and that all these Things push the present Ministry upon the necessity of taking the Measures they now pursue, to preserve the present Government; and if the Dutch join with a Party here, who oppose Her Majesty's just Measures, they bring the War upon themselves, and that Party here are the Cause, and ought to bear the Blame of the War, and of all the Inconveniences and Damages that may follow.

It is not my Work here to argue for or against the Parties, as I said before, I am rather for giving all the Latitude to the Objectors on either Hand, and therefore I willingly, for Arguments-sake, allow all the Objection; but without entring into the Merit of the Case on the one Side, or the Other, the Consequences of the War, not the Necessity of it, is the present Argument before us.

If there is a necessity for a War with the Dutch, I am sorry for that unhappy Circumstance; but without entring into a Dispute of the Fact, my Draught of the Consequences lies as a Caution to all Parties to consider, with the utmost Seriousness, what that Necessity is, and if possible to remove those [Page] Causes, which bring that Necessity on; for if the Effects of a Dutch War are as before, we ought to be very well satisfy'd, that our Reasons for it are of sufficient Weight to ballance all the Evils that follow; and if on a due Enquiry it should be found that these Necessities are of our own making, and that we maliciously on both Sides push one another on to the Extremities, which in their own nature procure this Mischief. The Excuse of its being necessary will dwindle away into, and plainly discover, a wicked Plot to bring this War upon the Nation, even for the sake of those very Mischiefs that so necessarily attend it.

As to letting the Dutch insult us, and putting the Cause of the War wholly upon them; if this were true, or should appear, all that has been said will lye against the Dutch, and not against Us, and were I to write this in Holland, I would perhaps be able to shew the Dutch, how many ways a War with Britain may be fatal and dangerous to them, as well as to us Us: Many of the Arguments before-mention'd, hold good on their Side, as well as Ours. The Hannover Succession is, tho' something more remotely, as much their Concern as Ours; the Protestant Interest ought to lie as near their Hearts as ours. The Interruptions of Commerce, the Loss of Ships, Trade and Goods; These are Things they will bear their share of, no Question with us: If they gain by the War; if they Beat us, they will have as much Cause to mourn for [Page] their Victory as We for our Loss; and as the Author of the Review says very well, ‘"The whole War is but the same thing as a Man cutting off his Left Hand with his Right."’

The Advice is to them therefore, equally as to us, tho' not quite with the same Concern; they ought to study all the Methods possible to avoid this Breach; they ought to consider and duly weigh the General Protestant Interest, and rather abate in some of their Demands for Peace-sake, and to avoid the threatning Danger: In short, both Nations, and every Party or Faction in both Nations, ought to consider well what they are doing, and to what a desperate Condition the Protestant Interest will be reduced, and nothing but such unavoidable necessity as will justify them before God and Man, ought to be allow'd as a Reason for this War.

I might descend here to other Particulars, but as they seem to lead more directly into our present Party Disputes, which in this Tract, I purpose not to meddle with, I omit them, and choose to let this Animadversion respect every Side, that if possible it may be useful to them all; and may bring all Parties seriously to apply themselves, if possible, to heal this Breach now while it is young, and before the Wound festers, before it comes up to an Inflamation and Mortification, when all the Endeavours will but encrease the Misery, and be ineffectual to the Cure.

[Page] It is our present Misfortune, that our People on both Sides seem not to see into the Mischiefs of the present Case, the Willingness on one Hand, and the Unconcernedness at the Consequences on the other, which unhappily appear among our People with respect to a War with Holland are very surprizing, and it seems to me to signify, that neither of the Parties have duly weigh'd the thing: These Sheets are written, that they may not want a Light to see by in this Case, nor plead Ignorance of the Effects, when they may have brought them upon us too late.

As to those who profess it their Design to overthrow the present Settlement of this Nation, I mean the Enemies of the Revolution, the Friends of the Pretender, the favourers of Popery and Tyranny; these Sheets are not written for their Conviction, I do not so much reproach them with desiring a War with the Dutch, because it seems the only way to bring all their Desires to pass.

But this may be drawn from thence as a most direct Consequence, viz. That the present Popular Cry against the Dutch is a sad Token of the Growth and Encrease of Jacobitism among Us, and of the growing Interest of the Pretender.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

PAG. 11. The General Heads, III. and VI. being transposed; The Reader is desired to take Notice thereof, and read the one for the other.

Information about this book

Title statement

An enquiry into the danger and consequences of a war with the Dutch

Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.

Publication

Publisher

University of Michigan Library

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, Michigan

Date

2007 January

ID [DLPS]

004808970

ID [ESTC]

T5337

ID [DOCNO]

CW105531845

ID [TCP]

K022860.000

ID [GALEDOCNO]

CW3305531845

ID [CONTENTSET]

ECSS

ID [IMAGESETID]

0635300100

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— An enquiry into the danger and consequences of a war with the Dutch, Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731..

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40p. ; 8⁰.

printed for J.Baker,. London :: 1712.. (Anonymous. By Daniel Defoe.) (Reproduction of original from the British Library.) (Moore, 241) (Goldsmiths', 4952) (English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT5337.) (Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).)

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