[Page] [Page] A TREATISE OF Human Nature: BEING An ATTEMPT to introduce the ex­perimental Method of Reasoning INTO MORAL SUBJECTS.

—Durae semper virtutis amator,
Quaere quid est virtus, et posce exemplar honesti.

WITH AN APPENDIX. Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain'd.



LONDON, Printed for THOMAS LONGMAN, at the Ship in Pater-noster-Row, MDCCXL.


I THINK it proper to inform the public, that tho' this be a third vo­lume of the Treatise of Human Nature, yet 'tis in some mea­sure independent of the other two, and requires not that the reader shou'd enter into all the abstract rea­sonings contain'd in them. I am hopeful it may be understood by or­dinary readers, with as little attention as is usually given to any books of reasoning. It must only be observ'd, that I continue to make use of the terms, impressions and ideas, in the same sense as formerly; and that by [Page] impressions I mean our stronger per­ceptions, such as our sensations, af­fections and sentiments; and by ideas the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and imagina­tion.


  • PART I. Of virtue and vice in general.
    • SECT. I. MORAL distinctions not deriv'd from reason.
    • SECT. II. Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense.
  • [Page]PART II.Of justice and injustice.
    • SECT. I. Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue.
    • SECT. II. Of the origin of justice and property.
    • SECT. III. Of the rules that determine property.
    • SECT. IV. Of the transference of pro­perty by consent.
    • SECT. V. Of the obligation of promises.
    • SECT. VI. Some farther reflections con­cerning justice and inju­stice.
    • SECT. VII. Of the origin of government.
    • SECT. VIII. Of the source of allegiance.
    • SECT. IX. Of the measures of allegi­ance.
    • SECT. X. Of the objects of allegiance.
    • SECT. XI. Of the laws of nations.
    • SECT. XII. Of chastity and modesty.
  • [Page]PART III. Of the other virtues and vices.
    • SECT. I. Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices.
    • SECT. II. Of greatness of mind.
    • SECT. III. Of goodness and benevolence.
    • SECT. IV. Of natural abilities.
    • SECT. V. Some farther reflections con­cerning the natural virtues.
    • SECT. VI. Conclusion of this book.


PAge 40. l. 14. for principles read principle. p. 61. l. 12. for it read them. p. 127. l. 2. for propensity read propensities. p. 131. l. ult. for giving a sense read giving us a sense. p. 138. l. 22. for as the violent pas­sions hinder read as violent passion hinders. p. 154. l. 1. for but read for. p. 157. l. 19. for it read them. p. 158. l. 15. for subtle read subtile. p. 161. l. 1. for as the interest read as interest. p. 165. l. 2. for public read common. Id. l. 13. for public read common. p. 166. l. 27. for laws of interest read laws of society. p. 195. l. penult. for fidelity read infidelity. p. 230. l. 16. for touches read touch. Id. l. 27. for and read or. p. 246. l. 10. for our read his. p. 296. l. 2. for rise read rises. p. 303. l. 24. for perception read perceptions.

[Page]A TREATISE OF Human Nature.


PART I. Of Virtue and Vice in general.

SECT. I. Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason.

THERE is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse rea­soning, that it may silence, without convincing an antago­nist, and requires the same intense study to [Page 2] make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisite for its invention. When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the ap­pearance of the morning; and 'tis difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attain'd with difficulty. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reasoning, where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions, and where we often lose sight of all the most receiv'd maxims, either of philosophy or common life. I am not, however, with­out hopes, that the present system of phi­losophy will acquire new force as it ad­vances; and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions. Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision con­cerning it; and 'tis evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is, in a great measure, indifferent to us. What affects us, we conclude can never be a chi­mera; and as our passion is engag'd on the one side or the other, we naturally think [Page 3] that the question lies within human compre­hension; which, in other cases of this na­ture, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without this advantage I never should have ventur'd upon a third volume of such ab­struse philosophy, in an age, wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.

IT has been observ'd, that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judg­ing, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the term of perception; and consequently that term is no less appli­cable to those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every other operation of the mind. To ap­prove of one character, to condemn ano­ther, are only so many different perceptions.

NOW as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a question, with which we shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals, Whether 'tis by means of [Page 4] our ideas or impressions we distinguish be­twixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy? This will immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations, and reduce us to something precise and exact on the present subject.

THOSE who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an ob­ligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. In or­der, therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it be possible, from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction.

IF morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, 'twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and no­thing wou'd be more fruitless than that mul­titude of rules and precepts, with which all moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly [Page 5] divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, 'tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the under­standing. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are de­ter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation.

SINCE morals, therefore, have an in­fluence on the actions and affections, it fol­lows, that they cannot be deriv'd from rea­son; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and pro­duce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not con­clusions of our reason.

NO one, I believe, will deny the justness of this inference; nor is there any other means of evading it, than by denying that principle, on which it is founded. As long as it is allow'd, that reason has no influence on our passions and actions, 'tis in vain to pretend, that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason. An active principle [Page 6] can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings.

IT would be tedious to repeat all the arguments, by which I have prov'd, a that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection. 'Twill be easy to recollect what has been said upon that subject. I shall only recal on this occasion one of these arguments, which I shall endeavour to render still more conclusive, and more applicable to the pre­sent subject.

REASON is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this argeement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and reali­ties, compleat in themselves, and implying [Page 7] no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason.

THIS argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For it proves directly, that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it proves the same truth more indirectly, by shewing us, that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or ap­proving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence. Actions may be lauda­ble or blameable; but they cannot be reason­able or unreasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural propensities. But rea­son has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as con­science, or a sense of morals.

BUT perhaps it may be said, that tho' no will or action can be immediately contra­dictory to reason, yet we may find such a [Page 8] contradiction in some of the attendants of the action, that is, in its causes or effects. The action may cause a judgment, or may be obliquely caus'd by one, when the judg­ment concurs with a passion; and by an abusive way of speaking, which philosophy will scarce allow of, the same contrariety may, upon that account, be ascrib'd to the action. How far this truth or falshood may be the source of morals, 'twill now be pro­per to consider.

IT has been observ'd, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the only kinds of judg­ment, which can accompany our actions, or can be said to produce them in any manner; and it must be allow'd, that these judgments may often be false and erroneous. A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the contrary to what is imagin'd. A person may also [Page 9] take false measures for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, in­stead of forwarding the execution of any project. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way of speaking. But tho' this be acknowledg'd, 'tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far from be­ing the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. They ex­tend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally suppos'd crimi­nal, as being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blam'd, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of ob­jects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, ap­pears to me at a distance, and thro' mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious. Here is one error. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there [Page 10] any third one, which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings concerning actions. I ask, therefore, if a man, in this situation, and guilty of these two errors, is to be re­garded as vicious and criminal, however un­avoidable they might have been? Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality?

AND here it may be proper to observe, that if moral distinctions be deriv'd from the truth or falshood of those judgments, they must take place wherever we form the judg­ments; nor will there be any difference, whe­ther the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom, or whether the error be avoid­able or unavoidable. For as the very es­sence of morality is suppos'd to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason, the other circumstances are entirely arbitrary, and can never either bestow on any action the character of virtuous or vicious, or deprive it of that character. To which we may add, that this agreement or disagreement, not ad­mitting of degrees, all virtues and vices wou'd of course be equal.

SHOU'D it be pretended, that tho' a mi­stake of fact be not criminal, yet a mistake of right often is; and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer, that [Page 11] 'tis impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality, since it supposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real di­stinction in morals, independent of these judgments. A mistake, therefore, of right may become a species of immorality; but 'tis only a secondary one, and is founded on some other, antecedent to it.

AS to those judgments which are the ef­fects of our actions, and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions con­trary to truth and reason; we may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that 'tis only on others they have such an influence. 'Tis certain, that an action, on many occa­sions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a person, who thro' a win­dow sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this re­spect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judg­ment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mi­stake and false judgment by accident; and the falshood of its effects may be ascribed, [Page 12] by some odd figurative way of speaking, to the action itself. But still I can see no pre­text of reason for asserting, that the tenden­cy to cause such an error is the first spring or original source of all immorality a.

THUS upon the whole, 'tis impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, [Page 13] can be made by reason; since that distinction has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable. Reason and judg­ment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a [Page 14] passion: But it is not pretended, that a judg­ment of this kind, either in its truth or falshood, is attended with virtue or vice. And as to the judgments, which are caused by our judgments, they can still less bestow those moral qualities on the actions, which are their causes.

BUT to be more particular, and to shew, that those eternal immutable fitnesses and unfitnesses of things cannot be defended by sound philosophy, we may weigh the fol­lowing considerations.

IF the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the boundaries of right and wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects, or must be a matter of fact, which is discovered by our reasoning. This consequence is evident. As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were virtue discover'd by the understanding; it must be an object of one of these operations, nor is there any third operation of the understand­ing, which can discover it. There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by certain philosophers, that morality is suscep­tible of demonstration; and tho' no one has [Page 15] ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations; yet 'tis taken for gran­ted, that this science may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra. Upon this supposition, vice and virtue must consist in some relations; since 'tis allow'd on all hands, that no matter of fact is capa­ble of being demonstrated. Let us, therefore, begin with examining this hypothesis, and endeavour, if possible, to fix those moral qualities, which have been so long the ob­jects of our fruitless researches. Point out distinctly the relations, which constitute morality or obligation, that we may know wherein they consist, and after what man­ner we must judge of them.

IF you assert, that vice and virtue consist in relations susceptible of certainty and de­monstration, you must confine yourself to those four relations, which alone admit of that degree of evidence; and in that case you run into absurdities, from which you will never be able to extricate yourself. For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the relations, and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate object; it follows, that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit. [Page 16] Resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number; all these relations belong as properly to matter, as to our actions, passions, and volitions. 'Tis unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery b.

SHOU'D it be asserted, that the sense of morality consists in the discovery of some relation, distinct from these, and that our enumeration was not compleat, when we comprehended all demonstrable relations un­der four general heads: To this I know not what to reply, till some one be so good as to point out to me this new relation. 'Tis impossible to refute a system, which has ne­ver [Page 17] yet been explain'd. In such a manner of fighting in the dark, a man loses his blows in the air, and often places them where the enemy is not present.

I MUST, therefore, on this occasion, rest contented with requiring the two following conditions of any one that wou'd undertake to clear up this system. First, As moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, and are deriv'd from our situation with regard to external objects, the rela­tions, from which these moral distinctions arise, must lie only betwixt internal actions, and external objects, and must not be appli­cable either to internal actions, compared among themselves, or to external objects, when placed in opposition to other external objects. For as morality is supposed to at­tend certain relations, if these relations cou'd belong to internal actions consider'd singly, it wou'd follow, that we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves, and independent of our situation, with respect to the universe: And in like manner, if these moral relations cou'd be apply'd to external objects, it wou'd follow, that even inanimate beings wou'd be susceptible of moral beauty and deformity. Now it seems difficult to imagine, that any relation can be discover'd betwixt our pas­sions, [Page 18] volitions and actions, compared to ex­ternal objects, which relation might not be­long either to these passions and volitions, or to these external objects, compar'd among themselves.

BUT it will be still more difficult to ful­fil the second condition, requisite to justify this system. According to the principles of those who maintain an abstract rational dif­ference betwixt moral good and evil, and a natural fitness and unfitness of things, 'tis not only suppos'd, that these relations, being eternal and immutable, are the same, when consider'd by every rational creature, but their effects are also suppos'd to be necessarily the same; and 'tis concluded they have no less, or rather a greater, influence in direct­ing the will of the deity, than in governing the rational and virtuous of our own spe­cies. These two particulars are evidently distinct. 'Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, 'tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the con­nexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so [Page 19] necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take place and have its influence; tho' the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite. Now besides what I have already prov'd, that even in human nature no relation can ever alone produce any action; besides this, I say, it has been shewn, in treating of the under­standing, that there is no connexion of cause and effect, such as this is suppos'd to be, which is discoverable otherwise than by experience, and of which we can pretend to have any security by the simple consideration of the objects. All beings in the universe, consider'd in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other. 'Tis only by experience we learn their influence and connexion; and this influence we ought never to extend beyond experience.

THUS it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of eter­nal rational measures of right and wrong; because it is impossible to shew those rela­tions, upon which such a distinction may be founded: And 'tis as impossible to fulfil the second condition; because we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they really existed and were perceiv'd, wou'd be universally forcible and obligatory.

[Page 20] BUT to make these general reflections more clear and convincing, we may illu­strate them by some particular instances, wherein this character of moral good or evil is the most universally acknowledged. Of all crimes that human creatures are ca­pable of committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude, especially when it is committed against parents, and appears in the more flagrant instances of wounds and death. This is acknowledg'd by all man­kind, philosophers as well as the people; the question only arises among philosophers, whether the guilt or moral deformity of this action be discover'd by demonstrative reason­ing, or be felt by an internal sense, and by means of some sentiment, which the reflect­ing on such an action naturally occasions. This question will soon be decided against the former opinion, if we can shew the same relations in other objects, without the notion of any guilt or iniquity attending them. Reason or science is nothing but the com­paring of ideas, and the discovery of their relations; and if the same relations have different characters, it must evidently follow, that those characters are not discover'd merely by reason. To put the affair, therefore, to this trial, let us chuse any inanimate object, [Page 21] such as an oak or elm; and let us suppose, that by the dropping of its seed, it produces a sapling below it, which springing up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent tree: I ask, if in this instance there be wanting any relation, which is discover­able in parricide or ingratitude? Is not the one tree the cause of the other's existence; and the latter the cause of the destruction of the former, in the same manner as when a child murders his parent? 'Tis not suffi­cient to reply, that a choice or will is want­ing. For in the case of parricide, a will does not give rise to any different relations, but is only the cause from which the action is deriv'd; and consequently produces the same relations, that in the oak or elm arise from some other principles. 'Tis a will or choice, that determines a man to kill his parent; and they are the laws of matter and motion, that determine a sapling to destroy the oak, from which it sprung. Here then the same relations have different causes; but still the relations are the same: And as th [...] discovery is not in both cases attended with a notion of immorality, it follows, that that notion does not arise from [...]uch a dis­covery.

[Page 22] BUT to chuse an instance, still more re­sembling; I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human species is criminal, and why the very same action, and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If it be answer'd, that this action is innocent in ani­mals, because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude; but that man, be­ing endow'd with that faculty, which ought to restrain him to his duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is evi­dently arguing in a circle. For before rea­son can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect. Ac­cording to this system, then, every animal, that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame to human creatures. [...] the difference is, that our superior reason may serve to discover the vice or virtue, and by that means may augment the blame or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which depends only on the [Page 23] will and appetite, and which, both in thought and reality, may be distinguish'd from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same relations, with respect to each other, as the human species, and therefore wou'd also be susceptible of the same morality, if the essence of morality consisted in these rela­tions. Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceiv'd. Reason must find them, and can never produce them. This argument deserves to be weigh'd, as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.

NOR does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wil­ful [Page 24] murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your na­ture you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, ac­cording to modern philosophy, are not qua­lities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a con­siderable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our [Page 25] own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and un­favourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and be­haviour.

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning hu­man affairs; when of a sudden I am sur­priz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not con­nected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new rela­tion can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; [Page 26] and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

SECT. II. Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense.

THUS the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or senti­ment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and de­pravity are evidently perceptions; and as all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the other. Morality, there­fore, is more properly felt than judg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to con­found it with an idea, according to our com­mon [Page 27] custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other.

THE next question is, Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? Here we cannot re­main long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceding from vice to be uneasy. Every moment's experience must convince us of this. There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor any which gives us more abhor­rence than one that is cruel and treacherous. No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we re­ceive from the company of those we love and esteem; as the greatest of all punish­ments is to be oblig'd to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this plea­sure, which virtue conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice.

NOW since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures; it follows, that in all enquiries concerning these moral distinctions, it will be sufficient to shew the principles, which make us feel a satis­faction or uneasiness from the survey of any [Page 28] character, in order to satisfy us why the cha­racter is laudable or blameable. An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the plea­sure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a par­ticular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the sa­tisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular man­ner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments con­cerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply'd in the immediate pleasure they convey to us.

I HAVE objected to the system, which establishes eternal rational measures of right and wrong, that 'tis impossible to shew, in the actions of reasonable creatures, any rela­tions, which are not found in external ob­jects; and therefore, if morality always at­tended these relations, 'twere possible for inanimate matter to become virtuous or vi­cious. [Page 29] Now it may, in like manner, be ob­jected to the present system, that if virtue and vice be determin'd by pleasure and pain, these qualities must, in every case, arise from the sensations; and consequently any object, whether animate or inanimate, rational or ir­rational, might become morally good or evil, provided it can excite a satisfaction or un­easiness. But tho' this objection seems to be the very same, it has by no means the same force, in the one case as in the other. For, first, 'tis evident, that under the term plea­sure, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, as is requisite to make them be express'd by the same abstract term. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin'd merely by the plea­sure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? In like manner an inani­mate object, and the character or sentiments of any person may, both of them, give sa­tisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not to the other. [Page 30] Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as deno­minates it morally good or evil. 'Tis true, those sentiments, from interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run in­to one another. It seldom happens, that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can distin­guish betwixt his opposition to our interest and real villainy or baseness. But this hinders not, but that the sentiments are, in them­selves, distinct; and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these illusions. In like manner, tho' 'tis certain a musical voice is nothing but one that natu­rally gives a particular kind of pleasure; yet 'tis difficult for a man to be sensible, that the voice of an enemy is agreeable, or to allow it to be musical. But a person of a fine ear, who has the command of himself, can se­parate these feelings, and give praise to what deserves it.

[Page 31] Secondly, We may call to remembrance the preceding system of the passions, in or­der to remark a still more considerable dif­ference among our pains and pleasures. Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited, when there is any thing presented to us, that both bears a relation to the object of the pas­sion, and produces a separate sensation rela­ted to the sensation of the passion. Now virtue and vice are attended with these cir­cumstances. They must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others, and excite ei­ther pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions; which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate ob­jects, that often bear no relation to us: And this is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind.

IT may now be ask'd in general, con­cerning this pain or pleasure, that distin­guishes moral good and evil, From what principles is it derived, and whence does it arise in the human mind? To this I reply, first, that 'tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments are produc'd by an original quality and pri­mary constitution. For as the number of [Page 32] our duties is, in a manner, infinite, 'tis im­possible that our original instincts should ex­tend to each of them, and from our very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts, which are con­tain'd in the compleatest system of ethics. Such a method of proceeding is not con­formable to the usual maxims, by which na­ture is conducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, and every thing is carry'd on in the easiest and most simple manner. 'Tis necessary, therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general prin­ciples, upon which all our notions of mo­rals are founded.

BUT in the second place, should it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these prin­ciples in nature, or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd re­ply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal. If nature be oppos'd to mi­racles, not only the distinction betwixt vice and virtue is natural, but also every event, which has ever happen'd in the world, ex­cepting those miracles, on which our religion is founded. In saying, then, that the senti­ments [Page 33] of vice and virtue are natural in this sense, we make no very extraordinary discovery.

BUT nature may also be opposed to rare and unusual; and in this sense of the word, which is the common one, there may often arise disputes concerning what is natural or unnatural; and one may in general affirm, that we are not possess'd of any very precise standard, by which these disputes can be de­cided. Frequent and rare depend upon the number of examples we have observ'd; and as this number may gradually encrease or diminish, 'twill be impossible to fix any ex­act boundaries betwixt them. We may only affirm on this head, that if ever there was any thing, which cou'd be call'd natural in this sense, the sentiments of morality cer­tainly may; since there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly depriv'd of them, and who never, in any instance, shew'd the least approbation or dislike of manners. These sentiments are so rooted in our con­stitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, 'tis impossible to extirpate and de­stroy them.

BUT nature may also be opposed to arti­fice, as well as to what is rare and unu­sual; [Page 34] and in this sense it may be disputed, whether the notions of virtue be natural or not. We readily forget, that the designs, and projects, and views of men are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry: But taking them to be free and entirely our own, 'tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of nature. Shou'd it, therefore, be demanded, whether the sense of virtue be natural or ar­tificial, I am of opinion, that 'tis impossible for me at present to give any precise answer to this question. Perhaps it will appear af­terwards, that our sense of some virtues is ar­tificial, and that of others natural. The discussion of this question will be more pro­per, when we enter upon an exact detail of each particular vice and virtue a.

MEAN while it may not be amiss to ob­serve from these definitions of natural and unnatural, that nothing can be more unphi­losophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural. For in the first sense of the word, Nature, as opposed to miracles, both vice and virtue are equally na­tural; and in the second sense, as oppos'd to [Page 35] what is unusual, perhaps virtue will be found to be the most unnatural. At least it must be own'd, that heroic virtue, being as un­usual, is as little natural as the most brutal barbarity. As to the third sense of the word, 'tis certain, that both vice and virtue are equally artificial, and out of nature. For however it may be disputed, whether the notion of a merit or demerit in certain ac­tions be natural or artificial, 'tis evident, that the actions themselves are artificial, and are perform'd with a certain design and intention; otherwise they cou'd never be rank'd under any of these denominations. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that the character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue.

THUS we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. This decision is very commodious; because it re­duces us to this simple question, Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or unea­siness, in order to shew the origin of its mo­ral rectitude or depravity, without looking for any incomprehensible relations and qua­lities, [Page 36] which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination, by any clear and distinct conception. I flatter myself I have executed a great part of my present design by a state of the question, which appears to me so free from ambiguity and obscurity.

PART II. Of justice and injustice.

SECT. I. Justice, whether a natural or artifi­cial virtue?

I HAVE already hinted, that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; but that there are some virtues, that produce plea­sure and approbation by means of an ar­tifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. Of this kind I assert justice to be; and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short, and, I hope, convincing argument, before I examine the nature of the artifice, from which the sense of that virtue is derived.

[Page 38] 'TIS evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external per­formance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them.

AFTER the same manner, when we re­quire any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation shou'd be influenc'd by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. If we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast, tho' check'd in its operation by some cir­cumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame, and have the same esteem for him, as if he had actually perform'd the action, which we require of him.

IT appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs [Page 39] of those motives. From this principle I con­clude, that the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural motive or prin­ciple. To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. Before we can have such a regard, the ac­tion must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard.

NOR is this merely a metaphysical subtil­ty; but enters into all our reasonings in common life, tho' perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms. We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shews a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent. Were not natural affection a duty, the care of children cou'd not be a duty; and 'twere impossible we cou'd have the duty [Page 40] in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring. In this case, therefore, all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty.

HERE is a man, that does many benevo­lent actions; relieves the distress'd, comforts the afflicted, and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers. No character can be more amiable and virtuous. We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity. This humanity bestows a merit on the ac­tions. A regard to this merit is, therefore, a secondary consideration, and deriv'd from the antecedent principles of humanity, which is meritorious and laudable.

IN short, it may be establish'd as an un­doubted maxim, that no action can be vir­tuous, or morally good, unless there be in hu­man nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality.

BUT may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? I answer, It may: But this is no objection to the present doctrine. When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate him­self upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a cer­tain [Page 41] sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it. A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is still pleas'd to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty. Actions are at first only consider'd as signs of mo­tives: But 'tis usual, in this case, as in all others, to fix our attention on the signs, and neglect, in some measure, the thing signi­fy'd. But tho', on some occasions, a person may perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation, yet still this supposes in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious.

NOW to apply all this to the present case; I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restor'd in a few days; and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he de­mands the sum: I ask, What reason or mo­tive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obli­gation. [Page 42] And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civiliz'd state, and when train'd up according to a certain discipline and education. But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are pleas'd to call such a condition natural, this answer wou'd be rejected as perfectly unin­telligible and sophistical. For one in that situation wou'd immediately ask you, Where­in consists this honesty and justice, which you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from the property of others? It does not surely lie in the external action. It must, there­fore be plac'd in the motive, from which the external action is deriv'd. This motive can never be a regard to the honesty of the action. For 'tis a plain fallacy to say, that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an ac­tion honest, and at the same time that a re­gard to the honesty is the motive of the ac­tion. We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action, unless the action be an­tecedently virtuous. No action can be vir­tuous, but so far as it proceeds from a virtuous motive. A virtuous motive, therefore, must precede the regard to the virtue; and 'tis impossible, that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue can be the same.

[Page 43] 'TIS requisite, then, to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty, distinct from our regard to the honesty; and in this lies the great difficulty. For shou'd we say, that a concern for our private interest or repu­tation is the legitimate motive to all honest actions; it wou'd follow, that wherever that concern ceases, honesty can no longer have place. But 'tis certain, that self-love, when it acts at its liberty, instead of engaging us to honest actions, is the source of all inju­stice and violence; nor can a man ever cor­rect those vices, without correcting and re­straining the natural movements of that ap­petite.

BUT shou'd it be affirm'd, that the rea­son or motive of such actions is the regard to publick interest, to which nothing is more contrary than examples of injustice and dis­honesty; shou'd this be said, I wou'd pro­pose the three following considerations, as worthy of our attention. First, public in­terest is not naturally attach'd to the obser­vation of the rules of justice; but is only connected with it, after an artificial conven­tion for the establishment of these rules, as shall be shewn more at large hereafter. Se­condly, if we suppose, that the loan was se­cret, and that it is necessary for the interest of [Page 44] the person, that the money be restor'd in the same manner (as when the lender wou'd conceal his riches) in that case the example ceases, and the public is no longer interested in the actions of the borrower; tho' I sup­pose there is no moralist, who will affirm, that the duty and obligation ceases. Thirdly, experience sufficiently proves, that men, in the ordinary conduct of life, look not so far as the public interest, when they pay their creditors, perform their promises, and ab­stain from theft, and robbery, and injustice of every kind. That is a motive too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of mankind, and operate with any force in ac­tions so contrary to private interest as are frequently those of justice and common ho­nesty.

IN general, it may be affirm'd, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, indepen­dent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself. 'Tis true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of such an universal affection to man­kind, [Page 45] since this concern extends itself beyond our own species. An affection betwixt the sexes is a passion evidently implanted in hu­man nature; and this passion not only ap­pears in its peculiar symptoms, but also in inflaming every other principle of affection, and raising a stronger love from beauty, wit, kindness, than what wou'd otherwise flow from them. Were there an universal love among all human creatures, it wou'd appear after the same manner. Any degree of a good quality wou'd cause a stronger affection than the same degree of a bad quality wou'd cause hatred; contrary to what we find by experience. Men's tempers are different, and some have a propensity to the tender, and others to the rougher, affections: But in the main, we may affirm, that man in general, or human nature, is nothing but the object both of love and hatred, and re­quires some other cause, which by a double relation of impressions and ideas, may ex­cite these passions. In vain wou'd we en­deavour to elude this hypothesis. There are no phaenomena that point out any such kind affection to men, independent of their merit, and every other circumstance. We love company in general; but 'tis as we love any other amusement. An Englishman in [Page 46] Italy is a friend: A Europaean in China; and perhaps a man wou'd be belov'd as such, were we to meet him in the moon. But this proceeds only from the relation to ourselves; which in these cases gathers force by being confined to a few persons.

IF public benevolence, therefore, or a regard to the interests of mankind, cannot be the original motive to justice, much less can private benevolence, or a regard to the in­terests of the party concern'd, be this mo­tive. For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the ha­tred of all mankind? What if he be a mi­ser, and can make no use of what I wou'd deprive him of? What if he be a profli­gate debauchee, and wou'd rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? In all these cases, the original motive to justice wou'd fail; and consequently the justice itself, and along with it all property, right, and obligation.

A RICH man lies under a moral obliga­tion to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities. Were private be­nevolence the original motive to justice, a [Page 47] man wou'd not be oblig'd to leave others in the possession of more than he is oblig'd to give them. At least the difference wou'd be very inconsiderable. Men generally fix their affections more on what they are pos­sess'd of, than on what they never enjoy'd: For this reason, it wou'd be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing, than not to give it him. But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice?

BESIDES, we must consider, that the chief reason, why men attach themselves so much to their possessions is, that they consider them as their property, and as secur'd to them inviolably by the laws of society. But this is a secondary consideration, and depen­dent on the preceding notions of justice and property.

A MAN'S property is suppos'd to be fenc'd against every mortal, in every possible case. But private benevolence is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others: And in many, or indeed in most persons, must absolutely fail. Private benevolence, therefore, is not the original motive of ju­stice.

FROM all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and me­rit [Page 48] of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has establish'd a sophistry, and render'd it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and in­justice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conventions.

I SHALL add, as a corollary to this rea­soning, that since no action can be laudable or blameable, without some motives or im­pelling passions, distinct from the sense of morals, these distinct passions must have a great influence on that sense. 'Tis accord­ing to their general force in human nature, that we blame or praise. In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye the oeconomy of a certain species; and where the limbs and features observe that proportion, which is common to the species, we pronounce them handsome and beautiful. In like manner we always consi­der the natural and usual force of the pas­sions, when we determine concerning vice and virtue; and if the passions depart very much from the common measures on either [Page 49] side, they are always disapprov'd as vicious. A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where every thing else is equal. Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty al­ways follows the common and natural course of our passions.

TO avoid giving offence, I must here ob­serve, that when I deny justice to be a na­tural virtue, I make use of the word, natu­ral, only as oppos'd to artificial. In ano­ther sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and abso­lutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds im­mediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflection. Tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species.

SECT. II. Of the origin of justice and property.

WE now proceed to examine two que­stions, viz. concerning the manner, in which the rules of justice are establish'd by the artifice of men; and concerning the rea­sons, which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity. These questions will appear afterwards to be distinct. We shall begin with the former.

OF all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom na­ture seems, at first sight, to have exercis'd more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these ne­cessities. In other creatures these two par­ticulars generally compensate each other. If we consider the lion as a voracious and carnivorous animal, we shall easily discover him to be very necessitous; but if we turn [Page 51] our eye to his make and temper, his agility, his courage, his arms, and his force, we shall find, that his advantages hold pro­portion with his wants. The sheep and ox are depriv'd of all these advantages; but their appetites are moderate, and their food is of easy purchase. In man alone, this un­natural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity, may be observ'd in its greatest per­fection. Not only the food, which is re­quir'd for his sustenance, flies his search and approach, or at least requires his labour to be produc'd, but he must be possess'd of cloaths and lodging, to defend him against the injuries of the weather; tho' to consider him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities, which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities.

'TIS by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equa­lity with his fellow-creatures, and even ac­quire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho' in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy, than 'tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary [Page 52] condition, ever to become. When every in­dividual person labours a-part, and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work; his labour being em­ploy'd in supplying all his different necessi­ties, he never attains a perfection in any par­ticular art; and as his force and success are not at all times equal, the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery. Society provides a remedy for these three incon­veniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are less expos'd to fortune and accidents. 'Tis by this addi­tional force, ability, and security, that so­ciety becomes advantageous.

BUT in order to form society, 'tis re­quisite not only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of these advantages; and 'tis impossible, in their wild uncultivated state, that by study and reflection alone, they should ever be able to attain this know­ledge. Most fortunately, therefore, there is conjoin'd to those necessities, whose re­medies are remote and obscure, another necessity, which having a present and more obvious remedy, may justly be regarded as [Page 53] the first and original principle of human society. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes, which unites them together, and preserves their union, till a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring. This new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the parents and offspring, and forms a more numerous society; where the parents govern by the advantage of their superior strength and wisdom, and at the same time are restrain'd in the exercise of their authority by that natural affection, which they bear their children. In a little time, custom and habit operating on the tender minds of the children, makes them sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from society, as well as fashions them by degrees for it, by rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections, which pre­vent their coalition.

FOR it must be confest, that however the circumstances of human nature may render an union necessary, and however those passions of lust and natural affection may seem to render it unavoidable; yet there are other particulars in our natural temper, and in our outward circumstances, which are very incommodious, and are even contrary to the [Page 54] requisite conjunction. Among the former, we may justly esteem our selfishness to be the most considerable. I am sensible, that, generally speaking, the representations of this quality have been carried much too far; and that the descriptions, which certain phi­losophers delight so much to form of man­kind in this particular, are as wide of na­ture as any accounts of monsters, which we meet with in fables and romances. So far from thinking, that men have no affection for any thing beyond themselves, I am of opinion, that tho' it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself; yet 'tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken to­gether, do not over-balance all the selfish. Consult common experience: Do you not see, that tho' the whole expence of the fa­mily be generally under the direction of the master of it, yet there are few that do not bestow the largest part of their fortunes on the pleasures of their wives, and the educa­tion of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own proper use and enter­tainment. This is what we may observe concerning such as have those endearing ties; and may presume, that the case would [Page 55] be the same with others, were they plac'd in a like situation.

BUT tho' this generosity must be acknow­ledg'd to the honour of human nature, we may at the same time remark, that so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness. For while each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and ac­quaintance, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but be dangerous to the new-establish'd union.

'TIS however worth while to remark, that this contrariety of passions wou'd be attended with but small danger, did it not concur with a peculiarity in our outward cir­cumstances, which affords it an opportunity of exerting itself. There are three different species of goods, which we are possess'd of; the internal satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our body, and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry and good fortune. We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first. The second may be ravish'd from us, but can be of no advantage to him who [Page 56] deprives us of them. The last only are both expos'd to the violence of others, and may be transferr'd without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessities. As the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so the insta­bility of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief impediment.

IN vain shou'd we expect to find, in un­cultivated nature, a remedy to this inconve­nience; or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind, which might controul those partial affections, and make us over­come the temptations arising from cur cir­cumstances. The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose, or be taken for a na­tural principle, capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. That virtue, as it is now understood, wou'd never have been dream'd of among rude and savage men. For the notion of in­jury or injustice implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person: And as every immorality is deriv'd from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect must be judg'd of, in a great mea­sure, from the ordinary course of nature in [Page 57] the constitution of the mind; 'twill be easy to know, whether we be guilty of any im­morality, with regard to others, by consider­ing the natural, and usual force of those se­veral affections, which are directed towards them. Now it appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention is confin'd to ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance; and 'tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection, must not only have an influence on our behaviour and con­duct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue; so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a de­gree of partiality, either by too great an en­largement, or contraction of the affections, as vicious and immoral. This we may ob­serve in our common judgments concern­ing actions, where we blame a person, who either centers all his affections in his fami­ly, or is so regardless of them, as, in any opposition of interest, to give the preference to a stranger, or mere chance acquaintance. From all which it follows, that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves to [Page 58] that partiality, and give it an additional force and influence.

THE remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affec­tions. For when men, from their early e­ducation in society, have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it, and have besides acquir'd a new affection to company and conversation; and when they have observ'd, that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another; they must seek for a remedy, by putting these goods, as far as possible, on the same footing with the fix'd and constant advan­tages of the mind and body. This can be done after no other manner, than by a con­vention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the posses­sion of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and in­dustry. By this means, every one knows what he may safely possess; and the passions are restrain'd in their partial and contradi­ctory [Page 59] motions. Nor is such a restraint con­trary to these passions; for if so, it cou'd never be enter'd into, nor maintain'd; but it is only contrary to their heedless and im­petuous movement. Instead of departing from our own interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the pos­sessions of others, we cannot better consult both these interests, than by such a conven­tion; because it is by that means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well­being and subsistence, as well as to our own.

THIS convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the mem­bers of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement [Page 60] betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the sta­bility of possession the less deriv'd from hu­man conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveni­ences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And 'tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually esta­blish'd by human conventions without any promise. In like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteem'd sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value.

AFTER this convention, concerning ab­stinence from the possessions of others, is enter'd into, and every one has acquir'd [Page 61] a stability in his possessions, there immedi­ately arise the ideas of justice and inju­stice; as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unin­telligible without first understanding the former. Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is establish'd by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice. Those, therefore, who make use of the words property, or right, or obliga­tion, before they have explain'd the ori­gin of justice, or even make use of it in that explication, are guilty of a very gross fallacy, and can never reason upon any so­lid foundation. A man's property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural, but moral, and founded on justice. 'Tis very preposterous, therefore, to ima­gine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of men. The origin of ju­stice explains that of property, The same artifice gives rise to both. As our first and most natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions, and gives the preference to ourselves and friends, above strangers; 'tis impossible there can be natu­rally any such thing as a fix'd right or pro­perty, [Page 62] while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions, and are not restrain'd by any convention or agree­ment.

No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and con­cord. All the other passions, beside this of interest, are either easily restrain'd, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulg'd. Vanity is rather to be esteem'd a social passion, and a bond of union among men. Pity and love are to be consider'd in the same light. And as to envy and revenge, tho' pernicious, they operate only by inter­vals, and are directed against particular per­sons, whom we consider as our superiors or enemies. This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, uni­versal, and directly destructive of society. There scarce is any one, who is not actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not reason to fear from it, when it acts without [Page 63] any restraint, and gives way to its first and most natural movements. So that upon the whole, we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of society, to be greater or less, according to those we encounter in re­gulating and restraining this passion.

'TIS certain, that no affection of the hu­man mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to counter-balance the love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the possessions of others. Benevolence to stran­gers is too weak for this purpose; and as to the other passions, they rather inflame this avidity, when we observe, that the larger our possessions are, the more ability we have of gratifying all our appetites. There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection it self, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place up­on the least reflection; since 'tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy'd by its re­straint, than by its liberty, and that in pre­serving society, we make much greater ad­vances in the acquiring possessions, than in the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence. The question, therefore, concern­ing [Page 64] the wickedness or goodness of human nature, enters not in the least into that other question concerning the origin of society; nor is there any thing to be consider'd but the degrees of men's sagacity or folly. For whether the passion of self-interest be esteem­ed vicious or virtuous, 'tis all a case; since itself alone restrains it: So that if it be vir­tuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect.

Now as 'tis by establishing the rule for the stability of possession, that this passion restrains itself; if that rule be very abstruse, and of difficult invention; society must be esteem'd, in a manner, accidental, and the effect of many ages. But if it be found, that nothing can be more simple and obvi­ous than that rule; that every parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must establish it; and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be improv'd, as the society enlarges: If all this appear evi­dent, as it certainly must, we may conclude, that 'tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condi­tion, which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem'd social. This, however, hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they please, [Page 65] extend their reasoning to the suppos'd state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never cou'd have any reality. Human nature being compos'd of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; 'tis cer­tain, that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapa­citate men for society: And it may be al­low'd us to consider separately the effects, that result from the separate operations of these two component parts of the mind. The same liberty may be permitted to mo­ral, which is allow'd to natural philosophers; and 'tis very usual with the latter to consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two parts separate from each other, tho' at the same time they acknowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable.

THIS state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the golden age, which poets have inven­ted; only with this difference, that the for­mer is describ'd as full of war, violence and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and most peace­able condition, that can possibly be ima­gin'd. The seasons, in that first age of na­ture, [Page 66] were so temperate, if we may believe the poets, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and houses as a security against the violence of heat and cold. The rivers flow'd with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature spontaneously produc'd her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief advan­tages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not alone remov'd from na­ture; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confu­sion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only move­ments, with which the human mind was yet acquainted. Even the distinction of mine and thine was banish'd from that happy race of mortals, and carry'd with them the very notions of property and obligation, justice and injustice.

THIS, no doubt, is to be regarded as an idle fiction; but yet deserves our attention, because nothing can more evidently shew the origin of those virtues, which are the subjects of our present enquiry. I have al­ready observ'd, that justice takes its rise from human conventions; and that these are in­tended [Page 67] as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of cer­tain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited gene­rosity: And the situation of external objects is their easy change, join'd to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men. But however philosophers may have been bewilder'd in those speculations, poets have been guided more infallibly, by a cer­tain taste or common instinct, which in most kinds of reasoning goes farther than any of that art and philosophy, with which we have been yet acquainted. They easily perceiv'd, if every man had a tender re­gard for another, or if nature supplied abun­dantly all our wants and desires, that the jealousy of interest, which justice supposes, could no longer have place; nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of property and possession, which at present are in use among mankind. En­crease to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place with much nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings. The selfishness of men is animated by the few possessions we have, in propor­tion [Page 68] to our wants; and 'tis to restrain this selfishness, that men have been oblig'd to separate themselves from the community, and to distinguish betwixt their own goods and those of others.

NOR need we have recourse to the fictions of poets to learn this; but beside the reason of the thing, may discover the same truth by common experience and observation. 'Tis easy to remark, that a cordial affecton ren­ders all things common among friends; and that married people in particular mutually lose their property, and are unacquainted with the mine and thine, which are so neces­sary, and yet cause such disturbance in hu­man society. The same effect arises from any alteration in the circumstances of man­kind; as when there is such a plenty of any thing as satisfies all the desires of men: In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, and every thing remains in com­mon. This we may observe with regard to air and water, tho' the most valuable of all external objects; and may easily conclude, that if men were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, or if every one had the same affection and tender regard for every one as for himself; justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind.

[Page 69] HERE then is a proposition, which, I think, may be regarded as certain, that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin. If we look backward we shall find, that this proposition bestows an addi­tional force on some of those observations, which we have already made on this subject.

First, we may conclude from it, that a regard to public interest, or a strong exten­sive benevolence, is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice; since 'tis allow'd, that if men were endow'd with such a benevolence, these rules would never have been dreamt of.

Secondly, we may conclude from the same principle, that the sense of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and univer­sally obligatory. For since it is confest, that such an alteration as that above-mention'd, in the temper and circumstances of mankind, wou'd entirely alter our duties and obligations, 'tis necessary upon the common system, that the sense of virtue is deriv'd from reason, to shew [Page 70] the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas. But 'tis evident, that the only cause, why the extensive generosity of man, and the perfect abundance of every thing, wou'd destroy the very idea of ju­stice, is because they render it useless; and that, on the other hand, his confin'd bene­volence, and his necessitous condition, give rise to that virtue, only by making it requi­site to the publick interest, and to that of every individual. 'Twas therefore a concern for our own, and the publick interest, which made us establish the laws of justice; and nothing can be more certain, than that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments, without which every thing in nature is per­fectly indifferent to us, and can never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, there­fore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions.

Thirdly, we may farther confirm the fore-going proposition, that those impressions, which give rise to this sense of justice, are not na­tural to the mind of man, but arise from ar­tifice and human conventions. For since any considerable alteration of temper and cir­cumstances destroys equally justice and inju­stice; and since such an alteration has an [Page 71] effect only by changing our own and the publick interest; it follows, that the first establishment of the rules of justice depends on these different interests. But if men pur­su'd the publick interest naturally, and with a hearty affection, they wou'd never have dream'd of restraining each other by these rules; and if they pursu'd their own inte­rest, without any precaution, they wou'd run head-long into every kind of injustice and violence. These rules, therefore, are ar­tificial, and seek their end in an oblique and indirect manner; nor is the interest, which gives rise to them, of a kind that cou'd be pursu'd by the natural and inartificial passions of men.

TO make this more evident, consider, that tho' the rules of justice are establish'd merely by interest, their connexion with interest is somewhat singular, and is different from what may be observ'd on other occasions. A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand alone, without being follow'd by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a sedi­tious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer. Nor is [Page 72] every single act of justice, consider'd apart, more conducive to private interest, than to public; and 'tis easily conceiv'd how a man may impoverish himself by a signal instance of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with regard to that single act, the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe. But however single acts of ju­stice may be contrary, either to public or private interest, 'tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or in­deed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the well-being of every in­dividual. 'Tis impossible to separate the good from the ill. Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules. Tho' in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes in so­ciety. And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on ballancing the account; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary con­dition, which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be suppos'd in society. When therefore men have had experience enough to observe, that whatever [Page 73] may be the consequence of any single act of justice, perform'd by a single person, yet the whole system of actions, concurr'd in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous to the whole, and to every part; it is not long before justice and property take place. Every member of society is sensible of this interest: Every one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on con­dition that others will do the same. No more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice, who has the first opportunity. This becomes an example to others. And thus justice establishes it­self by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single act is perform'd in expectation that others are to perform the like. Without such a con­vention, no one wou'd ever have dream'd, that there was such a virtue as justice, or have been induc'd to conform his actions to it. Taking any single act, my justice may be pernicious in every respect; and 'tis only upon the supposition, that others are to imitate my example, that I can be induc'd to em­brace that virtue; since nothing but this combination can render justice advantageous, [Page 74] or afford me any motives to conform my self to its rules.

WE come now to the second question we propos'd, viz. Why we annex the idea of vir­tue to justice, and of vice to injustice. This question will not detain us long after the principles, which we have already establish'd. All we can say of it at present will be dis­patch'd in a few words: And for farther sa­tisfaction, the reader must wait till we come to the third part of this book. The natural obligation to justice, viz. interest, has been fully explain'd; but as to the moral obli­gation, or the sentiment of right and wrong, 'twill first be requisite to examine the natu­ral virtues, before we can give a full and sa­tisfactory account of it.

AFTER men have found by experience, that their selfishness and confin'd generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate them for society; and at the same time have observ'd, that society is necessary to the sa­tisfaction of those very passions, they are na­turally induc'd to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and commodious. To the imposition then, and observance of these rules, both in general, and in every particu­lar [Page 75] instance, they are at first induc'd only by a regard to interest; and this motive, on the first formation of society, is sufficiently strong and forcible. But when society has become numerous, and has encreas'd to a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote; nor do men so readily perceive, that disor­der and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and con­tracted society. But tho' in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that in­terest, which we have in maintaining or­der, and may follow a lesser and more pre­sent interest, we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, either mediately or im­mediately, from the injustice of others; as not being in that case either blinded by pas­sion, or byass'd by any contrary temptation. Nay when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still dis­pleases us; because we consider it as preju­dicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives un­easiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denomi­nated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon ju­stice and injustice. And tho' this sense, in [Page 76] the present case, be deriv'd only from con­templating the actions of others, yet we sail not to extend it even to our own actions. The general rule reaches beyond those in­stances, from which it arose; while at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral ap­probation, which attends that virtue.

THO' this progress of the sentiments be natural, and even necessary, 'tis certain, that it is here forwarded by the artifice of po­liticians, who, in order to govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human society, have endeavour'd to produce an esteem for justice, and an abhorrence of in­justice. This, no doubt, must have its ef­fect; but nothing can be more evident, than that the matter has been carry'd too far by certain writers on morals, who seem to have employ'd their utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind. Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some occa­sions, produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action; but 'tis impossible it should be the sole cause of the dictinction we make betwixt vice and virtue. [Page 77] For if nature did not aid us in this parti­cular, 'twou'd be in vain for politicians to talk of honourable or dishonourable, praise­worthy or blameable. These words wou'd be perfectly unintelligible, and wou'd no more have any idea annex'd to them, than if they were of a tongue perfectly unknown to us. The utmost politicians can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials, and give us some no­tion of moral distinctions.

AS publick praise and blame encrease our esteem for justice; so private education and instruction contribute to the same effect. For as parents easily observe, that a man is the more useful, both to himself and others, the greater degree of probity and honour he is endow'd with; and that those principles have greater force, when custom and edu­cation assist interest and reflection: For these reasons they are induc'd to inculcate on their children, from their earliest infancy, the principles of probity, and teach them to re­gard the observance of those rules, by which society is maintain'd, as worthy and honour­able, and their violation as base and infa­mous. By this means the sentiments of honour may take root in their tender minds, [Page 78] and acquire such firmness and solidity, that they may fall little short of those principles, which are the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply radicated in our inter­nal constitution.

WHAT farther contributes to encrease their solidity, is the interest of our reputation, after the opinion, that a merit or demerit at­tends justice or injustice, is once firmly esta­blish'd among mankind. There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our re­putation, and nothing on which our reputa­tion more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induc'd to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honour.

I SHALL make only one observation be­fore I leave this subject, viz. that tho' I as­sert, that in the state of nature, or that ima­ginary state, which preceded society, there be neither justice nor injustice, yet I assert not, that it was allowable, in such a state, to violate the property of others. I only main­tain, that there was no such thing as pro­perty; and consequently cou'd be no such [Page 79] thing as justice or injustice. I shall have oc­casion to make a similar reflection with re­gard to promises, when I come to treat of them; and I hope this reflection, when duly weigh'd, will suffice to remove all odium from the foregoing opinions, with regard to justice and injustice.

SECT. III. Of the rules, which determine property.

THO' the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely ne­cessary to human society, it can never serve to any purpose, while it remains in such ge­neral terms. Some method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish what particular goods are to be assign'd to each particular per­son, while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment. Our next business, then, must be to discover the reasons which modify this general rule, and fit it to the common use and practice of the world.

'TIS obvious, that those reasons are not deriv'd from any utility or advantage, which [Page 80] either the particular person or the public may reap from his enjoyment of any parti­cular goods, beyond what wou'd result from the possession of them by any other person. 'Twere better, no doubt, that every one were possess'd of what is most suitable to him, and proper for his use: But besides, that this relation of fitness may be common to seve­ral at once, 'tis liable to so many contro­versies, and men are so partial and passionate in judging of these controversies, that such a loose and uncertain rule wou'd be abso­lutely incompatible with the peace of hu­man society. The convention concerning the stability of possession is enter'd into, in order to cut off all occasions of discord and contention; and this end wou'd never be at­tain'd, were we allow'd to apply this rule differently in every particular case, according to every particular utility, which might be discover'd in such an application. Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts herself by more extensive views. Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally well receiv'd by her, and obtains with the same facility a decision in his fa­vours, even for what is entirely useless to him.

[Page 81] IT follows, therefore, that the general rule, that possession must be stable, is not ap­ply'd by particular judgments, but by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour. To illustrate this, I propose the following instance. I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition; and suppose, that being sensible of the misery of that state, and foreseeing the advantages that wou'd result from society, they seek each other's company, and make an offer of mu­tual protection and assistance. I also sup­pose, that they are endow'd with such saga­city as immediately to perceive, that the chief impediment to this project of society and partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper; to remedy which, they enter into a convention for the stability of possession, and for mutual restraint and forbearance. I am sensible, that this me­thod of proceeding is not altogether natural; but besides that I here only suppose those reflections to be form'd at once, which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees; besides this, I say, 'tis very possible, that several persons, being by different accidents separated from the societies, to which they formerly be­long'd, may be oblig'd to form a new society [Page 82] among themselves; in which case they are entirely in the situation above-mention'd.

'TIS evident, then, that their first diffi­culty, in this situation, after the general convention for the establishment of society, and for the constancy of possession, is, how to separate their possessions, and assign to each his particular portion, which he must for the future inalterably enjoy. This diffi­culty will not detain them long; but it must immediately occur to them, as the most natural expedient, that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present master of, and that property or constant possession be con­join'd to the immediate possession. Such is the effect of custom, that it not only recon­ciles us to any thing we have long enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us. What has long lain under our eye, and has often been employ'd to our advan­tage, that we are always the most unwil­ling to part with; but can easily live with­out possessions, which we never have en­joy'd, and are not accustom'd to. 'Tis evi­dent, therefore, that men wou'd easily ac­quiesce in this expedient, that every one con­tinue to enjoy what he is at present possess'd of; [Page 83] and this is the reason, why they wou'd so naturally agree in preferring it a.

BUT we may observe, that tho' the rule of the assignment of property to the present possessor be natural, and by that means use­ful, [Page 84] yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor wou'd any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution wou'd be excluded, and every injustice wou'd be authoriz'd and rewarded. We must, there­fore, seek for some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once establish'd; and of this kind, I find four most considerable, viz. Occupation, Prescrip­tion, Accession, and Succession. We shall [Page 85] briefly examine each of these, beginning with Occupation.

THE possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain; which is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or ta­cite, men restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity. The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint, is the cause why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and this affords us an easy reason, why we an­nex the idea of property to the first posses­sion, or to occupation. Men are unwilling to leave property in suspence, even for the shortest time, or open the least door to vio­lence and disorder. To which we may add, that the first possession always engages the attention most; and did we neglect it, there wou'd be no colour of reason for assigning property to any succeeding possession b.

THERE remains nothing, but to deter­mine exactly, what is meant by possession; and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagin'd. We are said to be in possession of any thing, not only when we immediate­ly touch it, but also when we are so situa­ted with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use it; and may move, alter, or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage. This relation, then, is a spe­cies of cause and effect; and as property is nothing but a stable possession, deriv'd from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men, 'tis to be consider'd as the same spe­cies of relation. But here we may observe, that as the power of using any object be­comes more or less certain, according as the interruptions we may meet with are more or less probable; and as this probability may in­crease by insensible degrees; 'tis in many cases impossible to determine when possession begins or ends; nor is there any certain standard, by which we can decide such controversies. A wild boar, that falls into our snares, is deem'd to be in our possession, if [Page 87] it be impossible for him to escape. But what do we mean by impossible? How do we separate this impossibility from an impro­bability? And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? Mark the precise limits of the one and the other, and shew the standard, by which we may decide all dis­putes that may arise, and, as we find by ex­perience, frequently do arise upon this sub­ject c.

BUT such disputes may not only arise con­cerning the real existence of property and possession, but also concerning their extent; and these disputes are often susceptible of no decision, or can be decided by no other fa­culty than the imagination. A person who lands on the shore of a small island, that is desart and uncultivated, is deem'd its posses­sor from the very first moment, and acquires [Page 89] the property of the whole; because the ob­ject is there bounded and circumscrib'd in the fancy, and at the same time is propor­tion'd to the new possessor. The same per­son landing on a desart island, as large as Great Britain, extends his property no far­ther than his immediate possession; tho' a numerous colony are esteem'd the proprietors of the whole from the instant of their de­barkment.

BUT it often happens, that the title of first possession becomes obscure thro' time; and that 'tis impossible to determine many controversies, which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or prescription na­turally takes place, and gives a person a suf­ficient property in any thing he enjoys. The [Page 90] nature of human society admits not of any great accuracy; nor can we always remount to the first origin of things, in order to de­termine their present condition. Any con­siderable space of time sets objects at such a distance, that they seem, in a manner, to lose their reality, and have as little influence on the mind, as if they never had been in being. A man's title, that is clear and cer­tain at present, will seem obscure and doubt­ful fifty years hence, even tho' the facts, on which it is founded, shou'd be prov'd with the greatest evidence and certainty. The same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time. And this may be receiv'd as a convincing argument for our preceding doctrine with regard to property and justice. Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to any object. But as 'tis certain, that, however every thing be pro­duc'd in time, there is nothing real, that is produc'd by time; it follows, that property being produc'd by time, is not any thing real in the objects, but is the offspring of the sen­timents, on which alone time is found to have any influence d.

[Page 91] WE acquire the property of objects by ac­cession, when they are connected in an inti­mate manner with objects that are already our property, and at the same time are infe­rior to them. Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring of our cattle, and the work of our slaves, are all of them esteem'd our pro­perty, even before possession. Where ob­jects are connected together in the imagina­tion, they are apt to be put on the same footing, and are commonly suppos'd to be endow'd with the same qualities. We readily pass from one to the other, and make no difference in our judgments concerning them; especially if the latter be inferior to the former e.

THE right of succession is a very natural one, from the presum'd consent of the pa­rent or near relation, and from the general interest of mankind, which requires, that [Page 93] men's possessions shou'd pass to those, who are dearest to them, in order to render them more industrious and frugal. Perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of rela­tion, [Page 94] or the association of ideas, by which we are naturally directed to consider the son af­ter the parent's decease, and ascribe to him a title to his father's possessions. Those goods [Page 95] must become the property of some body: But of whom is the question. Here 'tis evi­dent the persons children naturally present [Page 96] themselves to the mind; and being already connected to those possessions by means of [Page 97] their deceas'd parent, we are apt to connect them still farther by the relation of property. Of this there are many parallel instances f.

SECT. IV. Of the transference of property by consent.

HOWEVER useful, or even necessary, the stability of possession may be to human society, 'tis attended with very con­siderable inconveniences. The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, in distributing the pro­perties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from doubt and uncertainty. Of this kind is present possession upon the first establishment of society; and afterwards occupation, pre­scription, accession, and succession. As these depend very much on chance, they must frequently prove contradictory both to men's wants and desires; and persons and pos­sessions must often be very ill adjusted. This is a grand inconvenience, which calls for a remedy. To apply one directly, and allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him, wou'd destroy society; and therefore the rules of justice [Page 99] seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability, and this changeable and uncertain adjust­ment. But there is no medium better than that obvious one, that possession and pro­perty shou'd always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since the proprietor's consent, who alone is concern'd, is taken along in the alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to per­sons. Different parts of the earth produce different commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature fitted for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in any one, when they confine themselves to it alone. All this requires a mutual exchange and commerce; for which reason the translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature, as well as its stability without such a consent.

So far is determin'd by a plain utility and interest. But perhaps 'tis from more trivial reasons, that delivery, or a sensible trans­ference of the object is commonly requir'd by civil laws, and also by the laws of na­ture, according to most authors, as a requi­site circumstance in the translation of pro­perty. [Page 100] The property of an object, when taken for something real, without any re­ference to morality, or the sentiments of the mind, is a quality perfectly insensible, and even inconceivable; nor can we form any distinct notion, either of its stability or translation. This imperfection of our ideas is less sensibly felt with regard to its stability, as it engages less our attention, and is easily past over by the mind, without any scru­pulous examination. But as the translation of property from one person to another is a more remarkable event, the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that occa­sion, and obliges us to turn ourselves on every side in search of some remedy. Now as nothing more enlivens any idea than a present impression, and a relation betwixt that impression and the idea; 'tis natural for us to seek some false light from this quarter. In order to aid the imagination in conceiving the transference of property, we take the sensible object, and actually transfer its pos­session to the person, on whom we wou'd bestow the property. The suppos'd resem­blance of the actions, and the presence of this sensible delivery, deceive the mind, and make it fancy, that it conceives the myste­rious transition of the property. And that [Page 101] this explication of the matter is just, appears hence, that men have invented a symbolical delivery, to satisfy the fancy, where the real one is impracticable. Thus the giving the keys of a granary is understood to be the delivery of the corn contain'd in it: The giving of stone and earth represents the delivery of a mannor. This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws, and in the laws of nature, resembling the Roman catho­lic superstitions in religion. As the Roman catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of the Christian religion, and render them more present to the mind, by a taper, or habit, or grimace, which is suppos'd to re­semble them; so lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions for the same reason, and have endeavour'd by those means to satisfy themselves concerning the transference of property by consent.

SECT. V. Of the obligation of promises.

THAT the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is not natural, will sufficiently appear from [Page 102] these two propositions, which I proceed to prove, viz. that a promise wou'd not be in­telligible, before human conventions had estab­lish'd it; and that even if it were intelli­gible, it wou'd not be attended with any moral obligation.

I SAY, first, that a promise is not intelli­gible naturally, nor antecedent to human con­ventions; and that a man, unacquainted with society, could never enter into any engagements with another, even tho' they could perceive each other's thoughts by in­tuition. If promises be natural and intelli­gible, there must be some act of the mind attending these words, I promise; and on this act of the mind must the obligation de­pend. Let us, therefore, run over all the faculties of the soul, and see which of them is exerted in our promises.

THE act of the mind, exprest by a pro­mise, is not a resolution to perform any thing: For that alone never imposes any ob­ligation. Nor is it a desire of such a per­formance: For we may bind ourselves with­out such a desire, or even with an aversion, declar'd and avow'd. Neither is it the will­ing of that action, which we promise to perform: For a promise always regards some future time, and the will has an influence [Page 103] only on present actions. It follows, there­fore, that since the act of the mind, which enters into a promise, and produces its obli­gation, is neither the resolving, desiring, nor willing any particular performance, it must necessarily be the willing of that obligation, which arises from the promise. Nor is this only a conclusion of philosophy; but is en­tirely conformable to our common ways of thinking and of expressing ourselves, when we say that we are bound by our own con­sent, and that the obligation arises from our mere will and pleasure. The only question, then, is, whether there be not a manifest absurdity in supposing this act of the mind, and such an absurdity as no man cou'd fall into, whose ideas are not confounded, with prejudice and the fallacious use of language.

ALL morality depends upon our senti­ments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain man­ner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. A change of the obligation supposes a change of the sentiment; and a creation of a new obliga­tion supposes some new sentiment to arise. But 'tis certain we can naturally no more [Page 104] change our own sentiments, than the mo­tions of the heavens; nor by a single act of our will, that is, by a promise, render any action agreeable or disagreeable, moral or immoral; which, without that act, wou'd have produc'd contrary impressions, or have been endow'd with different qualities. It wou'd be absurd, therefore, to will any new obligation, that is, any new sentiment of pain or pleasure; nor is it possible, that men cou'd naturally fall into so gross an ab­surdity. A promise, therefore, is naturally something altogether unintelligible, nor is there any act of the mind belonging to it a.

[Page 105] BUT, secondly, if there was any act of the mind belonging to it, it could not na­turally produce any obligation. This ap­pears evidently from the foregoing reasoning. A promise creates a new obligation. A new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise. The will never creates new sentiments. There could not naturally, therefore, arise any obligation from a promise, even sup­posing the mind could fall into the absur­dity of willing that obligation.

THE same truth may be prov'd still more evidently by that reasoning, which prov'd justice in general to be an artificial virtue. No action can be requir'd of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty sup­poses an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it cannot be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without [Page 106] proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now 'tis evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any incli­nation to observe them. This is not the case with the natural virtues. Tho' there was no obligation to relieve the misera­ble, our humanity wou'd lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of hu­manity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human creature had that inclination, no one cou'd lie under any such obligation. But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their ob­ligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natu­ral virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions.

IF any one dissent from this, he must give a regular proof of these two propo­sitions, viz. that there is a peculiar act of the mind, annext to promises; and that con­sequent to this act of the mind, there arises an [Page 107] inclination to perform, distinct from a sense of duty. I presume, that it is impossible to prove either of these two points; and there­fore I venture to conclude, that promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities and interests of society.

IN order to discover these necessities and interests, we must consider the same quali­ties of human nature, which we have al­ready found to give rise to the preceding laws of society. Men being naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a confin'd generosity, they are not easily induc'd to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance. Now as it fre­quently happens, that these mutual per­formances cannot be finish'd at the same instant, 'tis necessary, that one party be con­tented to remain in uncertainty, and depend upon the gratitude of the other for a re­turn of kindness. But so much corruption is there among men, that, generally speak­ing, this becomes but a slender security; and as the benefactor is here suppos'd to bestow his favours with a view to self-interest, this both takes off from the obligation, and sets an example of selfishness, which is the true [Page 108] mother of ingratitude. Were we, therefore, to follow the natural course of our passions and inclinations, we shou'd perform but few actions for the advantage of others, from disinterested views; because we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection: And we shou'd perform as few of that kind, out of a regard to interest; be­cause we cannot depend upon their grati­tude. Here then is the mutual commerce of good offices in a manner lost among man­kind, and every one reduc'd to his own skill and industry for his well-being and sub­sistence. The invention of the law of na­ture, concerning the stability of possession, has already render'd men tolerable to each other; that of the transference of property and possession by consent has begun to render them mutually advantageous: But still these laws of nature, however strictly observ'd, are not sufficient to render them so service­able to each other, as by nature they are fitted to become. Tho' possession be stable, men may often reap but small advantage from it, while they are possess'd of a greater quantity of any species of goods than they have occasion for, and at the same time suffer by the want of others. The transfer­ence of property, which is the proper remedy [Page 109] for this inconvenience, cannot remedy it en­tirely; because it can only take place with regard to such objects as are present and in­dividual, but not to such as are absent or general. One cannot transfer the property of a particular house, twenty leagues distant; because the consent cannot be attended with delivery, which is a requisite circumstance. Neither can one transfer the property of ten bushels of corn, or five hogsheads of wine, by the mere expression and consent; be­cause these are only general terms, and have no direct relation to any particular heap of corn, or barrels of wine. Besides, the commerce of mankind is not confin'd to the barter of commodities, but may extend to services and actions, which we may ex­change to our mutual interest and advantage. Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid me to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain de­pend upon your gratitude. Here then I [Page 110] leave you to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.

ALL this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human nature; and as these passions and principles are inalterable, it may be thought, that our conduct, which depends on them, must be so too, and that 'twou'd be in vain, either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a view to public interest. And indeed, did the success of their designs depend upon their success in correcting the selfishness and ingratitude of men, they wou'd never make any progress, unless aided by omnipotence, which is alone able to new­mould the human mind, and change its character in such fundamental articles. All they can pretend to, is, to give a new direction to those natural passions, and teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion. Hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; be­cause I forsee, that he will return my ser­vice, in expectation of another of the same [Page 111] kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd him, and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is in­duc'd to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.

BUT tho' this self-interested commerce of men begins to take place, and to predomi­nate in society, it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices. I may still do services to such persons as I love, and am more particularly acquainted with, without any prospect of advantage; and they may make me a return in the same manner, with­out any view but that of recompensing my past services. In order, therefore, to distinguish those two different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, there is a cer­tain form of words invented for the former, by which we bind ourselves to the per­formance of any action. This form of words constitutes what we call a promise, which is the sanction of the interested com­merce of mankind. When a man says he promises any thing, he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it; and along with that, by making use of this form of words, [Page 112] subjects himself to the penalty of never be­ing trusted again in case of failure. A reso­lution is the natural act of the mind, which promises express: But were there no more than a resolution in the case, promises wou'd only declare our former motives, and wou'd not create any new motive or obligation. They are the conventions of men, which create a new motive, when experience has taught us, that human affairs wou'd be con­ducted much more for mutual advantage, were there certain symbols or signs instituted, by which we might give each other security of our conduct in any particular incident. After these signs are instituted, whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to exe­cute his engagements, and must never ex­pect to be trusted any more, if he refuse to perform what he promis'd.

NOR is that knowledge, which is requisite to make mankind sensible of this interest in the institution and observance of promises, to be esteem'd superior to the capacity of hu­man nature, however savage and unculti­vated. There needs but a very little practice of the world, to make us perceive all these consequences and advantages. The shortest experience of society discovers them to every mortal; and when each individual perceives [Page 113] the same sense of interest in all his fellows, he immediately performs his part of any contract, as being assur'd, that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by con­cert, enter into a scheme of actions, calcu­lated for common benefit, and agree to be true to their word; nor is there any thing requisite to form this concert or convention, but that every one have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements, and express that sense to other members of the society. This immediately causes that in­terest to operate upon them; and interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises.

AFTERWARDS a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind. This sentiment of morality, in the performance of promises, arises from the same principles as that in the abstinence from the property of others. Public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians, have the same effect in both cases. The difficulties, that occur to us, in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises, we either surmount or elude. For instance; the expression of a resolution is not commonly suppos'd to be obligatory; and we cannot readily conceive how the [Page 114] making use of a certain form of words shou'd be able to cause any material differ­ence. Here, therefore, we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the mo­rality to depend. But we have prov'd al­ready, that there is no such act of the mind, and consequently that promises impose no natural obligation.

TO confirm this, we may subjoin some other reflections concerning that will, which is suppos'd to enter into a promise, and to cause its obligation. 'Tis evident, that the will alone is never suppos'd to cause the obli­gation, but must be express'd by words or signs, in order to impose a type upon any man. The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, tho' he secretly give a different direction to his in­tention, and with-hold himself both from a resolution, and from willing an obligation. But tho' the expression makes on most occa­sions the whole of the promise, yet it does not always so; and one, who shou'd make use of any expression, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he uses without any intention of binding himself, wou'd not [Page 115] certainly be bound by it. Nay, tho' he knows its meaning, yet if he uses it in jest only, and with such signs as shew evidently he has no serious intention of binding him­self, he wou'd not lie under any obligation of performance; but 'tis necessary, that the words be a perfect expression of the will, without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must not carry so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of under­standing, we conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expression or verbal promise, if we accept of it; but must limit this conclu­sion to those cases, where the signs are of a different kind from those of deceit. All these contradictions are easily accounted for, if the obligation of promises be merely a human invention for the convenience of society; but will never be explain'd, if it be something real and natural, arising from any action of the mind or body.

I SHALL farther observe, that since every new promise imposes a new obligation of morality on the person who promises, and since this new obligation arises from his will; 'tis one of the most mysterious and incom­prehensible operations that can possibly be imagin'd, and may even be compar'd to [Page 116] transubstantiation, or holy orders a, where a certain form of words, along with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human crea­ture. But tho' these mysteries be so far alike, 'tis very remarkable, that they differ widely in other particulars, and that this difference may be regarded as a strong proof of the difference of their origins. As the obligation of promises is an invention for the interest of society, 'tis warp'd into as many different forms as that interest requires, and even runs into direct contradictions, rather than lose sight of its object. But as those other monstrous doctrines are mere priestly inventions, and have no public interest in view, they are less disturb'd in their progress by new obstacles; and it must be own'd, that, after the first absurdity, they follow more directly the current of reason and good sense. Theologians clearly perceiv'd, that the external form of words, being mere sound, require an intention to make them have any efficacy; and that this intention being once consider'd as a requisite circum­stance, its absence must equally prevent the [Page 117] effect, whether avow'd or conceal'd, whether sincere or deceitful. Accordingly they have commonly determin'd, that the intention of the priest makes the sacrament, and that when he secretly withdraws his intention, he is highly criminal in himself; but still de­stroys the baptism, or communion, or holy orders. The terrible consequences of this doctrine were not able to hinder its taking place; as the inconvenience of a similar doctrine, with regard to promises, have pre­vented that doctrine from establishing itself. Men are always more concern'd about the present life than the future; and are apt to think the smallest evil, which regards the former, more important than the greatest, which regards the latter.

WE may draw the same conclusion, con­cerning the origin of promises, from the force, which is suppos'd to invalidate all con­tracts, and to free us from their obligation. Such a principle is a proof, that promises have no natural obligation, and are mere artificial contrivances for the convenience and advantage of society. If we consider aright of the matter, force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope or fear, which may induce us to engage our word, and lay ourselves under any obliga­tion. [Page 118] A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him, wou'd certainly be bound to per­formance; tho' the case be not so much dif­ferent from that of one, who promises a sum to a robber, as to produce so great a differ­ence in our sentiments of morality, if these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and convenience.

SECT. VI. Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice.

WE have now run over the three fun­damental laws of nature, that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of pro­mises. 'Tis on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good cor­respondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society. What­ever restraint they may impose on the pas­sions of men, they are the real offspring of [Page 119] those passions, and are only a more artful and more refin'd way of satisfying them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions; and nothing is more obvious, than the convention for the observance of these rules. Nature has, therefore, trusted this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were sufficient to lead us. And to convince us the more fully of this truth, we may here stop a mo­ment, and from a review of the preceding reasonings may draw some new arguments, to prove that those laws, however necessary, are entirely artificial, and of human inven­tion; and consequently that justice is an artificial, and not a natural virtue.

I. THE first argument I shall make use of is deriv'd from the vulgar definition of justice. Justice is commonly defin'd to be a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due. In this definition 'tis suppos'd, that there are such things as right and pro­perty, independent of justice, and antece­dent to it; and that they wou'd have sub­sisted, tho' men had never dreamt of prac­tising [Page 120] such a virtue. I have already ob­serv'd, in a cursory manner, the fallacy of this opinion, and shall here continue to open up a little more distinctly my sentiments on that subject.

I SHALL begin with observing, that this quality, which we call property, is like many of the imaginary qualities of the peripatetic philosophy, and vanishes upon a more accu­rate inspection into the subject, when con­sider'd a-part from our moral sentiments. 'Tis evident property does not consist in any of the sensible qualities of the object. For these may continue invariably the same, while the property changes. Property, there­fore, must consist in some relation of the object. But 'tis not in its relation with re­gard to other external and inanimate objects. For these may also continue invariably the same, while the property changes. This quality, therefore, consists in the relations of objects to intelligent and rational beings. But 'tis not the external and corporeal rela­tion, which forms the essence of property. For that relation may be the same betwixt inanimate objects, or with regard to brute creatures; tho' in those cases it forms no pro­perty. 'Tis, therefore, in some internal re­lation, that the property consists; that is, [Page 121] in some influence, which the external rela­tions of the object have on the mind and actions. Thus the external relation, which we call occupation or first possession, is not of itself imagin'd to be the property of the object, but only to cause its property. Now 'tis evident, this external relation causes no­thing in external objects, and has only an influence on the mind, by giving us a sense of duty in abstaining from that object, and in restoring it to the first possessor. These actions are properly what we call justice; and consequently 'tis on that virtue that the nature of property depends, and not the virtue on the property.

IF any one, therefore, wou'd assert, that justice is a natural virtue, and injustice a natural vice, he must assert, that abstracting from the notions of property, and right and obligation, a certain conduct and train of actions, in certain external relations of objects, has naturally a moral beauty or deformity, and causes an original pleasure or uneasiness. Thus the restoring a man's goods to him is consider'd as virtuous, not because nature has annex'd a certain sentiment of plea­sure to such a conduct, with regard to the property of others, but because she has an­nex'd that sentiment to such a conduct, with [Page 122] regard to those external objects, of which others have had the first or long possession, or which they have receiv'd by the consent of those, who have had first or long pos­session. If nature has given us no such sen­timent, there is not, naturally, nor antece­dent to human conventions, any such thing as property. Now, tho' it seems sufficiently evident, in this dry and accurate consider­ation of the present subject, that nature has annex'd no pleasure or sentiment of appro­bation to such a conduct; yet that I may leave as little room for doubt as possible, I shall subjoin a few more arguments to con­firm my opinion.

First, If nature had given us a pleasure of this kind, it wou'd have been as evident and discernible as on every other occasion; nor shou'd we have found any difficulty to per­ceive, that the consideration of such actions, in such a situation, gives a certain pleasure and sentiment of approbation. We shou'd not have been oblig'd to have recourse to notions of property in the definition of ju­stice, and at the same time make use of the notions of justice in the definition of pro­perty. This deceitful method of reasoning is a plain proof, that there are contain'd in the subject some obscurities and difficulties, [Page 123] which we are not able to surmount, and which we desire to evade by this artifice.

Secondly, Those rules, by which pro­perties, rights, and obligations are deter­min'd, have in them no marks of a natural origin, but many of artifice and contrivance. They are too numerous to have proceeded from nature: They are changeable by hu­man laws: And have all of them a direct and evident tendency to public good, and the support of civil society. This last cir­cumstance is remarkable upon two accounts. First, because, tho' the cause of the estab­lishment of these laws had been a regard for the public good, as much as the public good is their natural tendency, they wou'd still have been artificial, as being purposely contriv'd and directed to a certain end. Secondly, because, if men had been endow'd with such a strong regard for public good, they wou'd never have restrain'd themselves by these rules; so that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in a manner still more oblique and artificial. 'Tis self-love which is their real origin; and as the self­love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are oblig'd to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system [Page 124] of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public; tho' it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors.

II. IN the second place we may observe, that all kinds of vice and virtue run insensi­bly into each other, and may approach by such imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to determine when the one ends, and the other begins; and from this observation we may derive a new argument for the fore­going principle. For whatever may be the case, with regard to all kinds of vice and virtue, 'tis certain, that rights, and obliga­tions, and property, admit of no such insen­sible gradation, but that a man either has a full and perfect property, or none at all; and is either entirely oblig'd to perform any action, or lies under no manner of obliga­tion. However civil laws may talk of a perfect dominion, and of an imperfect, 'tis easy to observe, that this arises from a fiction, which has no foundation in reason, and can never enter into our notions of natural ju­stice and equity. A man that hires a horse, tho' but for a day, has as full a right to [Page 125] make use of it for that time, as he whom we call its proprietor has to make use of it any other day; and 'tis evident, that how­ever the use may be bounded in time or de­gree, the right itself is not susceptible of any such gradation, but is absolute and entire, so far as it extends. Accordingly we may ob­serve, that this right both arises and perishes in an instant; and that a man entirely ac­quires the property of any object by occu­pation, or the consent of the proprietor; and loses it by his own consent; without any of that insensible gradation, which is remarkable in other qualities and relations. Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property, and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and injustice? After whatever manner you an­swer this question, you run into inextricable difficulties. If you reply, that justice and injustice admit of degree, and run insensibly into each other, you expressly contradict the foregoing position, that obligation and pro­perty are not susceptible of such a gradation. These depend entirely upon justice and in­justice, and follow them in all their varia­tions. Where the justice is entire, the pro­perty is also entire: Where the justice is im­perfect, the property must also be imperfect. [Page 126] And vice versa, if the property admit of no such variations, they must also be incom­patible with justice. If you assent, there­fore, to this last proposition, and assert, that justice and injustice are not susceptible of de­grees, you in effect assert, that they are not naturally either vicious or virtuous; since vice and virtue, moral good and evil, and indeed all natural qualities, run insensibly into each other, and are, on many occa­sions, undistinguishable.

AND here it may be worth while to ob­serve, that tho' abstract reasoning, and the general maxims of philosophy and law estab­lish this position, that property, and right, and obligation admit not of degrees, yet in our common and negligent way of thinking, we find great difficulty to entertain that opinion, and do even secretly embrace the contrary principle. An object must either be in the possession of one person or another. An ac­tion must either be perform'd or not. The necessity there is of choosing one side in these dilemmas, and the impossibility there often is of finding any just medium, oblige us, when we reflect on the matter, to ac­knowledge, that all property and obligations are entire. But on the other hand, when we consider the origin of property and ob­ligation, [Page 127] and find that they depend on pub­lic utility, and sometimes on the propensity of the imagination, which are seldom entire on any side; we are naturally inclin'd to im­agine, that these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation. Hence it is, that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the referees entire masters of the sub­ject, they commonly discover so much equity and justice on both sides, as induces them to strike a medium, and divide the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this liberty, but are oblig'd to give a decisive sentence on some one side, are often at a loss how to determine, and are necessi­tated to proceed on the most frivolous rea­sons in the world. Half rights and obliga­tions, which seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their tribunal; for which reason they are often oblig'd to take half arguments for whole ones, in or­der to terminate the affair one way or other.

III. THE third argument of this kind I shall make use of may be explain'd thus. If we consider the ordinary course of human actions, we shall find, that the mind re­strains not itself by any general and universal rules; but acts on most occasions as it is [Page 128] determin'd by its present motives and incli­nation. As each action is a particular indi­vidual event, it must proceed from parti­cular principles, and from our immediate situation within ourselves, and with respect to the rest of the universe. If on some oc­casions we extend our motives beyond those very circumstances, which gave rise to them, and form something like general rules for our conduct, 'tis easy to observe, that these rules are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions. Since, therefore, this is the ordinary course of human actions, we may conclude, that the laws of justice, be­ing universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be deriv'd from nature, nor be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination. No action can be either morally good or evil, unless there be some natural passion or motive to impel us to it, or deter us from it; and 'tis evident, that the morality must be susceptible of all the same variations, which are natural to the passion. Here are two persons, who dis­pute for an estate; of whom one is rich, a fool, and a batchelor; the other poor, a man of sense, and has a numerous family: The first is my enemy; the second my friend. Whether I be actuated in this affair [Page 129] by a view to public or private interest, by friendship or enmity, I must be induc'd to do my utmost to procure the estate to the latter. Nor wou'd any consideration of the right and property of the persons be able to restrain me, were I actuated only by natural motives, without any combination or con­vention with others. For as all property de­pends on morality; and as all morality de­pends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions; and as these again are only directed by particular motives; 'tis evident, such a partial conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality, and cou'd never be a violation of property. Were men, there­fore, to take the liberty of acting with re­gard to the laws of society, as they do in every other affair, they wou'd conduct them­selves, on most occasions, by particular judg­ments, and wou'd take into consideration the characters and circumstances of the per­sons, as well as the general nature of the question. But 'tis easy to observe, that this wou'd produce an infinite confusion in hu­man society, and that the avidity and par­tiality of men wou'd quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrain'd by some general and inflexible principles. 'Twas, therefore, with a view to this inconvenience, [Page 130] that men have establish'd those principles, and have agreed to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest. These rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature, which accommodate them­selves to circumstances, and have no stated invariable method of operation.

NOR do I perceive how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I see evidently, that when any man imposes on himself general inflexible rules in his conduct with others, he considers certain objects as their property, which he supposes to be sacred and inviolable. But no proposition can be more evident, than that property is perfectly unintelligible without first supposing justice and injustice; and that these virtues and vices are as unin­telligible, unless we have motives, inde­pendent of the morality, to impel us to just actions, and deter us from unjust ones. Let those motives, therefore, be what they will, they must accommodate themselves to cir­cumstances, and must admit of all the vari­ations, which human affairs, in their in­cessant revolutions, are susceptible of. They are consequently a very improper foundation [Page 131] for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature; and 'tis evident these laws can only be deriv'd from human conventions, when men have perceiv'd the disorders that result from following their natural and variable principles.

UPON the whole, then, we are to con­sider this distinction betwixt justice and in­justice, as having two different foundations, viz. that of interest, when men observe, that 'tis impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observ'd, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. 'Tis the voluntary con­vention and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be con­sider'd as artificial. After that interest is once establish'd and acknowledg'd, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself; tho' 'tis cer­tain, that it is also augmented by a new artifice, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of pa­rents, contribute to the giving a sense of [Page 132] honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others.

SECT. VII. Of the origin of government.

NOTHING is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, govern'd by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, 'tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common life, to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. 'Tis no less certain, that 'tis impossible for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched and savage condition, which is commonly represented as the state of nature. And as this interest, which all men have in the upholding of society, and the observation of the rules of justice, is great, so is it palpable and evident, even to the most rude and uncultivated of human race; and 'tis almost impossible for [Page 133] any one, who has had experience of society, to be mistaken in this particular. Since, therefore, men are so sincerely attach'd to their interest, and their interest is so much concern'd in the observance of justice, and this interest is so certain and avow'd; it may be ask'd, how any disorder can ever arise in society, and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to overcome so strong a passion, or so violent as to ob­scure so clear a knowledge?

IT has been observ'd, in treating of the passions, that men are mightily govern'd by the imagination, and proportion their affec­tions more to the light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly pre­vails above what lies in a more obscure light; and it must be a great superiority of value, that is able to compensate this advantage. Now as every thing, that is contiguous to us, either in space or time, strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than any object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Tho' we may be fully convinc'd, that the latter object excels the former, we are not [Page 134] able to regulate our actions by this judg­ment; but yield to the sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous.

THIS is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial ad­vantage, that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice. The con­sequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counter­ballance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it. They are, however, never the less real for being remote; and as all men are, in some degree, subject to the same weakness, it necessarily happens, that the violations of equity must become very fre­quent in society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain. You have the same pro­pension, that I have, in favour of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imi­tation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing me, that I should be the cully of my integrity, if I [Page 135] alone shou'd impose on myself a severe re­straint amidst the licentiousness of others.

THIS quality, therefore, of human na­ture, not only is very dangerous to society, but also seems, on a cursory view, to be in­capable of any remedy. The remedy can only come from the consent of men; and if men be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous, they will never con­sent to any thing, which wou'd oblige them to such a choice, and contradict, in so sen­sible a manner, their natural principles and propensities. Whoever chuses the means, chuses also the end; and if it be impossible for us to prefer what is remote, 'tis equally impossible for us to submit to any necessity, which wou'd oblige us to such a method of acting.

BUT here 'tis observable, that this infir­mity of human nature becomes a remedy to itself, and that we provide against our neg­ligence about remote objects, merely be­cause we are naturally inclin'd to that negli­gence. When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to what­ever is in itself preferable, without consider­ing its situation and circumstances. This gives rise to what in an improper sense we [Page 136] call reason, which is a principle, that is of­ten contradictory to those propensities that display themselves upon the approach of the object. In reflecting on any action, which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I al­ways resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be more conti­guous or remote; nor does any difference in that particular make a difference in my present intentions and resolutions. My di­stance from the final determination makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I affected by any thing, but the general and more discernable qualities of good and evil. But on my nearer approach, those circum­stances, which I at first over-look'd, begin to appear, and have an influence on my conduct and affections. A new inclination to the present good springs up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution. This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free my self from it. I may have recourse to study and reflection within myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation, and re­peated resolution: And having experienc'd how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient, by which [Page 137] I may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness.

THE only difficulty, therefore, is to find out this expedient, by which men cure their natural weakness, and lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity, notwithstanding their violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote. 'Tis evident such a remedy can never be ef­fectual without correcting this propensity; and as 'tis impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature, the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote. But this being impracticable with respect to all man­kind, it can only take place with respect to a few, whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice. These are the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers, who being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state, have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice; and be­ing satisfied with their present condition, and with their part in society, have an im­mediate interest in every execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of [Page 138] society. Here then is the origin of civil go­vernment and society. Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or o­thers, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their situation, and render the observance of justice the immediate in­terest of some particular persons, and its vio­lation their more remote. These persons, then, are not only induc'd to observe those rules in their own conduct, but also to con­strain others to a like regularity, and inforce the dictates of equity thro' the whole society. And if it be necessary, they may also inte­rest others more immediately in the execu­tion of justice, and create a number of offi­cers, civil and military, to assist them in their government.

BUT this execution of justice, tho' the principal, is not the only advantage of go­vernment. As the violent passions hinders men from seeing distinctly the interest they have in an equitable behaviour towards others; so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself, and gives them a remarkable partiality in their own favours. This incon­venience is corrected in the same manner as that above-mention'd. The same persons, [Page 139] who execute the laws of justice, will also decide all controversies concerning them; and being indifferent to the greatest part of the society, will decide them more equitably than every one wou'd in his own case.

BY means of these two advantages, in the execution and decision of justice, men acquire a security against each others weakness and passion, as well as against their own, and under the shelter of their governors, begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mu­tual assistance. But government extends farther its beneficial influence; and not con­tented to protect men in those conventions they make for their mutual interest, it often obliges them to make such conventions, and forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose. There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is pre­sent to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value. Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate conse­quence of his failing in his part, is, the [Page 140] abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thou­sand persons shou'd agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so com­plicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pre­text to free himself of the trouble and ex­pence, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others. Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences. Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any con­siderable part of their subjects. They need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme for the promoting of that interest. And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, tho' not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent that failure, because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote. Thus bridges are built; harbours open'd; ramparts rais'd; canals form'd; fleets equip'd; and armies disciplin'd; every where, by the care of government, which, tho' compos'd of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inven­tions imaginable, a composition, which is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.

SECT. VIII. Of the source of allegiance.

THOUGH government be an inven­tion very advantageous, and even in some circumstances absolutely necessary to mankind; it is not necessary in all circum­stances, nor is it impossible for men to pre­serve society for some time, without having recourse to such an invention. Men, 'tis true, are always much inclin'd to prefer pre­sent interest to distant and remote; nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any advantage, that they may immediately enjoy, in apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them: But still this weakness is less conspicuous, where the possessions, and the pleasures of life are few, and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society. An Indian is but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut, or to steal his bow, as being already provided of the same advantages; and as to any superior fortune, which may attend one above another in hunting and fishing, 'tis only casual and temporary, and will have but small tendency [Page 142] to disturb society. And so far am I from thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of society without government, that I assert the first rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice to this latter effect, than is requisite for the former. Men fear nothing from public war and violence but the resist­ance they meet with, which, because they share it in common, seems less terrible; and because it comes from strangers, seems less pernicious in its consequences, than when they are expos'd singly against one whose commerce is advantageous to them, and without whose society 'tis impossible they can subsist. Now foreign war to a society without government necessarily produces civil war. Throw any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall a quarrelling, while each strives to get possession of what pleases him, without regard to the consequences. In a foreign war the most considerable of all goods, life and limbs, are at stake; and as every one shuns dangerous ports, seizes the best arms, seeks excuse for the slightest wounds, the laws, which may be well enough observ'd, while men were calm, can [Page 143] now no longer take place, when they are in such commotion.

THIS we find verified in the American tribes, where men live in concord and amity among themselves without any estab­lish'd government; and never pay submission to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse to it, when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous inventions, their riches and pos­sessions have become so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice. Hence we may give a plausible reason, among others, why all governments are at first monarchical, without any mixture and variety; and why republics arise only from the abuses of monarchy and despotic power. Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be administred, by reason of the suddenness of every exi­gency, without some authority in a single person, the same kind of authority naturally [Page 144] takes place in that civil government, which succeeds the military. And this reason I take to be more natural, than the common one deriv'd from patriarchal government, or the authority of a father, which is said first to take place in one family, and to accustom the members of it to the government of a single person. The state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and must subsist with the con­junction of many families, and long after the first generation. Nothing but an en­crease of riches and possessions cou'd oblige men to quit it; and so barbarous and unin­structed are all societies on their first forma­tion, that many years must elapse before these can encrease to such a degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord.

BUT tho' it be possible for men to main­tain a small uncultivated society without government, 'tis impossible they shou'd main­tain a society of any kind without justice, and the observance of those three funda­mental laws concerning the stability of pos­session, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises. These are, there­fore, antecedent to government, and are suppos'd to impose an obligation before the [Page 145] duty of allegiance to civil magistrates has once been thought of. Nay, I shall go far­ther, and assert, that government, upon its first establishment, wou'd naturally be sup­pos'd to derive its obligation from those laws of nature, and, in particular, from that con­cerning the performance of promises. When men have once perceiv'd the necessity of government to maintain peace, and execute justice, they wou'd naturally assemble to­gether, wou'd chuse magistrates, determine their power, and promise them obedience. As a promise is suppos'd to be a bond or security already in use, and attended with a moral obligation, 'tis to be consider'd as the original sanction of government, and as the source of the first obligation to obedience. This reasoning appears so natural, that it has become the foundation of our fashionable system of politics, and is in a manner the creed of a party amongst us, who pride themselves, with reason, on the soundness of their philosophy, and their liberty of thought. All men, say they, are born free and equal: Government and superiority can only be estab­lish'd by consent: The consent of men, in establishing government, imposes on them a new obligation, unknown to the laws of na­ture. Men, therefore, are bound to obey their [Page 146] magistrates, only because they promise it; and if they had not given their word, either ex­pressly or tacitly, to preserve allegiance, it would never have become a part of their moral duty. This conclusion, however, when carried so far as to comprehend govern­ment in all its ages and situations, is entirely erroneous; and I maintain, that tho' the duty of allegiance be at first grafted on the obligation of promises, and be for some time supported by that obligation, yet it quickly takes root of itself, and has an original obli­gation and authority, independent of all contracts. This is a principle of moment, which we must examine with care and at­tention, before we proceed any farther.

'TIS reasonable for those philosophers, who assert justice to be a natural virtue, and antecedent to human conventions, to resolve all civil allegiance into the obligation of a promise, and assert that 'tis our own consent alone, which binds us to any sub­mission to magistracy. For as all govern­ment is plainly an invention of men, and the origin of most governments is known in history, 'tis necessary to mount higher, in order to find the source of our political du­ties, if we wou'd assert them to have any natural obligation of morality. These phi­losophers, [Page 147] therefore, quickly observe, that society is an antient as the human species, and those three fundamental laws of nature as antient as society: So that taking advan­tage of the antiquity, and obscure origin of these laws, they first deny them to be arti­ficial and voluntary inventions of men, and then seek to ingraft on them those other duties, which are more plainly artificial. But being once undeceiv'd in this particular, and having found that natural, as well as civil justice, derives its origin from human conventions, we shall quickly perceive, how fruitless it is to resolve the one into the other, and seek, in the laws of nature, a stronger foundation for our political duties than in­terest, and human conventions; while these laws themselves are built on the very same foundation. On which ever side we turn this subject, we shall find, that these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same foot­ing, and have the same source both of their first invention and moral obligation. They are contriv'd to remedy like inconveniences, and acquire their moral sanction in the same manner, from their remedying those incon­veniences. These are two points, which we we shall endeavour to prove as distinctly as possible.

[Page 148] WE have already shewn, that men in­vented the three fundamental laws of nature, when they observ'd the necessity of society to their mutual subsistance, and found, that 'twas impossible to maintain any correspon­dence together, without some restraint on their natural appetites. The same self-love, therefore, which renders men so incommo­dious to each other, taking a new and more convenient direction, produces the rules of justice, and is the first motive of their ob­servance. But when men have observ'd, that tho' the rules of justice be sufficient to maintain any society, yet 'tis impossible for them, of themselves, to observe those rules, in large and polish'd societies; they establish government, as a new invention to attain their ends, and preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution of justice. So far, therefore, our civil duties are connected with our natural, that the former are invented chiefly for the sake of the latter; and that the principal object of government is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature. In this respect, however, that law of nature, concerning the per­formance of promises, is only compriz'd along with the rest; and its exact observance is to be consider'd as an effect of the insti­tution [Page 149] of government, and not the obedience to government as an effect of the obligation of a promise. Tho' the object of our civil duties be the enforcing of our natural, yet the a first motive of the invention, as well as performance of both, is nothing but self­interest: And since there is a separate in­terest in the obedience to government, from that in the performance of promises, we must also allow of a separate obligation. To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to pre­serve order and concord in society. To per­form promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life. The ends, as well as the means, are perfectly distinct; nor is the one subor­dinate to the other.

TO make this more evident, let us con­sider, that men will often bind themselves by promises to the performance of what it wou'd have been their interest to perform, independent of these promises; as when they wou'd give others a fuller security, by super-adding a new obligation of interest to that which they formerly lay under. The interest in the performance of promises, be­sides its moral obligation, is general, avow'd, and of the last consequence in life. Other [Page 150] interests may be more particular and doubt­ful; and we are apt to entertain a greater suspicion, that men may indulge their hu­mour, or passion, in acting contrary to them. Here, therefore, promises come naturally in play, and are often requir'd for fuller satis­faction and security. But supposing those other interests to be as general and avow'd as the interest in the performance of a pro­mise, they will be regarded as on the same footing, and men will begin to repose the same confidence in them. Now this is ex­actly the case with regard to our civil duties, or obedience to the magistrate; without which no government cou'd subsist, nor any peace or order be maintain'd in large so­cieties, where there are so many possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or imaginary, on the other. Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves from our promises, and acquire a separate force and influence. The interest in both is of the very same kind: 'Tis general, avow'd, and prevails in all times and places. There is, then, no pretext of reason for founding the one upon the other; while each of them has a foundation peculiar to itself. We might as well resolve the obligation to ab­stain from the possessions of others, into [Page 151] the obligation of a promise, as that of alle­giance. The interests are not more distinct in the one case than the other. A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society, than obedience is to civil society or government; nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind, than the latter to their well-being and happiness. In short, if the performance of promises be ad­vantageous, so is obedience to government: If the former interest be general, so is the latter: If the one interest be obvious and avow'd, so is the other. And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of in­terest, each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other.

BUT 'tis not only the natural obligations of interest, which are distinct in promises and allegiance; but also the moral obliga­tions of honour and conscience: Nor does the merit or demerit of the one depend in the least upon that of the other. And in­deed, if we consider the close connexion there is betwixt the natural and moral obli­gations, we shall find this conclusion to be entirely unavoidable. Our interest is always engag'd on the side of obedience to magi­stracy; and there is nothing but a great pre­sent advantage, that can lead us to rebellion, [Page 152] by making us over-look the remote interest, which we have in the preserving of peace and order in society. But tho' a present in­terest may thus blind us with regard to our own actions, it takes not place with regard to those of others; nor hinders them from appearing in their true colours, as highly prejudicial to public interest; and to our own in particular. This naturally gives us an un­easiness, in considering such seditious and disloyal actions, and makes us attach to them the idea of vice and moral deformity. 'Tis the same principle, which causes us to disapprove of all kinds of private injustice, and in particular of the breach of promises. We blame all treachery and breach of faith; because we consider, that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises. We blame all disloyalty to magistrates; because we perceive, that the execution of justice, in the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises, is impossible, without submission to govern­ment. As there are here two interests en­tirely distinct from each other, they must give rise to two moral obligations, equally se­parate and independant. Tho' there was no such thing as a promise in the world, go­vernment [Page 153] wou'd still be necessary in all large and civiliz'd societies; and if promises had only their own proper obligation, without the separate sanction of government, they wou'd have but little efficacy in such soci­eties. This separates the boundaries of our public and private duties, and shews that the latter are more dependant on the former, than the former on the latter. Education, and the artifice of politicians, concur to be­stow a farther morality on loyalty, and to brand all rebellion with a greater degree of guilt and infamy. Nor is it a wonder, that politicians shou'd be very industrious in in­culcating such notions, where their interest is so particularly concern'd.

LEST those arguments shou'd not appear entirely conclusive (as I think they are) I shall have recourse to authority, and shall prove, from the universal consent of man­kind, that the obligation of submission to government is not deriv'd from any promise of the subjects. Nor need any one wonder, that tho' I have all along endeavour'd to establish my system on pure reason, and have scarce ever cited the judgment even of phi­losophers or historians on any article, I shou'd now appeal to popular authority, and oppose the sentiments of the rabble to any philoso­phical [Page 154] reasoning. But it must be observ'd, that the opinions of men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in a great measure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, a that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. And tho' our judgments con­cerning the origin of any vice or virtue, be not so certain as those concerning their de­grees; yet, since the question in this case re­gards not any philosophical origin of an ob­ligation, but a plain matter of fact, 'tis not easily conceiv'd how we can fall into an error. A man, who acknowledges himself to be bound to another, for a certain sum, must certainly know whether it be by his own bond, or that of his father; whether it be of his mere good-will, or for money lent [Page 155] him; and under what conditions, and for what purposes he has bound himself. In like manner, it being certain, that there is a moral obligation to submit to government, because every one thinks so; it must be as certain, that this obligation arises not from a promise; since no one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict adherence to a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that origin. Neither magistrates nor subjects have form'd this idea of our civil duties.

WE find, that magistrates are so far from deriving their authority, and the obligation to obedience in their subjects, from the foun­dation of a promise or original contract, that they conceal, as far as possible, from their people, especially from the vulgar, that they have their origin from thence. Were this the sanction of government, our rulers wou'd never receive it tacitly, which is the utmost that can be pretended; since what is given tacitly and insensibly can never have such influence on mankind, as what is per­form'd expressly and openly. A tacit pro­mise is, where the will is signified by other more diffuse signs than those of speech; but a will there must certainly be in the case, and that can never escape the person's no­tice, [Page 156] who exerted it, however silent or tacit. But were you to ask the far greatest part of the nation, whether they had ever consented to the authority of their rulers, or promis'd to obey them, they wou'd be inclin'd to think very strangely of you; and wou'd cer­tainly reply, that the affair depended not on their consent, but that they were born to such an obedience. In consequence of this opinion, we frequently see them imagine such persons to be their natural rulers, as are at that time depriv'd of all power and authority, and whom no man, however foolish, wou'd voluntarily chuse; and this merely because they are in that line, which rul'd before, and in that degree of it, which us'd to succeed; tho' perhaps in so distant a period, that scarce any man alive cou'd ever have given any promise of obedience. Has a government, then, no authority over such as these, because they never consented to it, and wou'd esteem the very attempt of such a free choice a piece of arrogance and im­piety? We find by experience, that it pu­nishes them very freely for what it calls trea­son and rebellion, which, it seems, accord­ing to this system, reduces itself to com­mon injustice. If you say, that by dwelling in its dominions, they in effect consented to [Page 157] the establish'd government; I answer, that this can only be, where they think the affair depends on their choice, which few or none, beside those philosophers, have ever yet imagin'd. It never was pleaded as an ex­cuse for a rebel, that the first act he per­form'd, after he came to years of discretion, was to levy war against the sovereign of the state; and that while he was a child he cou'd not bind himself by his own consent, and having become a man, show'd plainly, by the first act he perform'd, that he had no design to impose on himself any obligation to obedience. We find, on the contrary, that civil laws punish this crime at the same age as any other, which is criminal, of it­self, without our consent; that is, when the person is come to the full use of reason: Whereas to this crime it ought in justice to allow some intermediate time, in which a tacit consent at least might be suppos'd. To which we may add, that a man living under an absolute government, wou'd owe it no allegiance; since, by its very nature, it depends not on consent. But as that is as natural and common a government as any, it must certainly occasion some obligation; and 'tis plain from experience, that men, who are subjected to it, do always think [Page 158] so. This is a clear proof, that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance to be de­riv'd from our consent or promise; and a farther proof is, that when our promise is upon any account expressly engag'd, we al­ways distinguish exactly betwixt the two obligations, and believe the one to add more force to the other, than in a repetition of the same promise. Where no promise is given, a man looks not on his faith as bro­ken in private matters, upon account of rebellion; but keeps those two duties of honour and allegiance perfectly distinct and separate. As the uniting of them was thought by these philosophers a very subtle invention, this is a convincing proof, that 'tis not a true one; since no man can either give a promise, or be restrain'd by its sanc­tion and obligation unknown to himself.

SECT. IX. Of the measures of allegiance.

THOSE political writers, who have had recourse to a promise, or origi­nal contract, as the source of our allegiance to government, intended to establish a prin­ciple, which is perfectly just and reasonable; [Page 159] tho' the reasoning, upon which they endea­vour'd to establish it, was fallacious and so­phistical. They wou'd prove, that our sub­mission to government admits of exceptions, and that an egregious tyranny in the rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance. Since men enter into society, say they, and submit themselves to govern­ment, by their free and voluntary consent, they must have in view certain advantages, which they propose to reap from it, and for which they are contented to resign their na­tive liberty. There is, therefore, something mutual engag'd on the part of the magi­strate, viz. protection and security; and 'tis only by the hopes he affords of these ad­vantages, that he can ever persuade men to submit to him. But when instead of pro­tection and security, they meet with tyranny and oppression, they are free'd from their promises, (as happens in all conditional con­tracts) and return to that state of liberty, which preceded the institution of govern­ment. Men wou'd never be so foolish as to enter into such engagements as shou'd turn entirely to the advantage of others, without any view of bettering their own condition. Whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission, must engage himself, either [Page 160] expresly or tacitly, to make us reap some advantage from his authority; nor ought he to expect, that without the performance of his part we will ever continue in obedience.

I REPEAT it: This conclusion is just, tho' the principles be erroneous; and I flat­ter myself, that I can establish the same conclusion on more reasonable principles. I shall not take such a compass, in establish­ing our political duties, as to assert, that men perceive the advantages of government; that they institute government with a view to those advantages; that this institution re­quires a promise of obedience; which im­poses a moral obligation to a certain degree, but being conditional, ceases to be binding, whenever the other contracting party per­forms not his part of the engagement. I perceive, that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is invented with a view to a certain interest. I seek, therefore, some such interest more immedi­ately connected with government, and which may be at once the original motive to its in­stitution, and the source of our obedience to it. This interest I find to consist in the se­curity and protection, which we enjoy in political society, and which we can never at­tain, when perfectly free and independent. [Page 161] As the interest, therefore, is the immediate sanction of government, the one can have no longer being than the other; and when­ever the civil magistrate carries his oppression so far as to render his authority perfectly intolerable, we are no longer bound to sub­mit to it. The cause ceases; the effect must cease also.

SO far the conclusion is immediate and direct, concerning the natural obligation which we have to allegiance. As to the moral obligation, we may observe, that the maxim wou'd here be false, that when the cause ceases, the effect must cease also. For there is a principle of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men are mightily addicted to general rules, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc'd us to establish them. Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without con­sidering, that they differ in the most mate­rial circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. It may, there­fore, be thought, that in the case of alle­giance our moral obligation of duty will not cease, even tho' the natural obligation of interest, which is its cause, has ceas'd; and [Page 162] that men may be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical government against their own and the public interest. And indeed, to the force of this argument I so far submit, as to acknowledge, that general rules commonly extend beyond the prin­ciples, on which they are founded; and that we seldom make any exception to them, unless that exception have the qualities of a general rule, and be founded on very nu­merous and common instances. Now this I assert to be entirely the present case. When men submit to the authority of others, 'tis to procure themselves some secu­rity against the wickedness and injustice of men, who are perpetually carried, by their unruly passions, and by their present and immediate interest, to the violation of all the laws of society. But as this imperfection is inherent in human nature, we know that it must attend men in all their states and conditions; and that those, whom we chuse for rulers, do not immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind, upon account of their superior power and autho­rity. What we expect from them depends not on a change of their nature but of their situ­ation, when they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and the [Page 163] execution of justice. But besides that this interest is only more immediate in the ex­ecution of justice among their subjects; be­sides this, I say, we may often expect, from the irregularity of human nature, that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition. Our ge­neral knowledge of human nature, our ob­servation of the past history of mankind, our experience of present times; all these causes must induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude, that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice.

ACCORDINGLY we may observe, that this is both the general practice and principle of mankind, and that no nation, that cou'd find any remedy, ever yet suffer'd the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blam'd for their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip the second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. 'Tis certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that [Page 164] of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible. Nor is it less infallible, because men cannot distinctly explain the principles, on which it is founded. Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning: ‘"Govern­ment is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obe­dience. The moral obligation is founded on the natural, and therefore must cease where that ceases; especially where the subject is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the natural obli­gation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences."’ But tho' this train of reasoning be too subtile for the vulgar, 'tis certain, that all men have an implicit notion of it, and are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest; and at the same time, that human nature is so subject to frailties and passions, as may easily pervert this institution, and change [Page 165] their governors into tyrants and public ene­mies. If the sense of public interest were not our original motive to obedience, I wou'd fain ask, what other principle is there in human nature capable of subduing the natural ambition of men, and forcing them to such a submission? Imitation and custom are not sufficient. For the question still re­curs, what motive first produces those in­stances of submission, which we imitate, and that train of actions, which produces the custom? There evidently is no other prin­ciple than public interest; and if interest first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience must cease, when­ever the interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a considerable number of instances.

SECT. X. Of the objects of allegiance.

BUT tho', on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound politics and morality, to resist supreme power, 'tis cer­tain, that in the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, [Page 166] which always attend revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among mankind. As numerous and civiliz'd societies cannot sub­sist without government, so government is entirely useless without an exact obedience. We ought always to weigh the advantages, which we reap from authority, against the disadvantages; and by this means we shall become more scrupulous of putting in prac­tice the doctrine of resistance. The com­mon rule requires submission; and 'tis only in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place.

SINCE then such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy, the next question is, to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our lawful magistrates? In order to answer this question, let us re­collect what we have already establish'd con­cerning the origin of government and poli­tical society. When men have once expe­rienc'd the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society, while every one is his own master, and violates or observes the laws of interest, according to his present interest or pleasure, they naturally run into the in­vention of government, and put it out of [Page 167] their own power, as far as possible, to trans­gress the laws of society. Government, therefore, arises from the voluntary conven­tion of men; and 'tis evident, that the same convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and am­biguity in this particular. And the volun­tary consent of men must here have the greater efficacy, that the authority of the magistrate does at first stand upon the foun­dation of a promise of the subjects, by which they bind themselves to obedience; as in every other contract or engagement. The same promise, then, which binds them to obedience, ties them down to a particular person, and makes him the object of their allegiance.

BUT when government has been estabish'd on this footing for some considerable time, and the separate interest, which we have in submission, has produc'd a separate senti­ment of morality, the case is entirely alter'd, and a promise is no longer able to determine the particular magistrate; since it is no longer consider'd as the foundation of go­vernment. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission; and imagine, that such particular persons have a right to command, [Page 168] as we on our part are bound to obey. These notions of right and obligation are deriv'd from nothing but the advantage we reapt from government, which gives us a repugnance to practise resistance ourselves, and makes us displeas'd with any instance of it in others. But here 'tis remarkable, that in this new state of affairs, the original sanction of government, which is interest, is not admitted to determine the persons, whom we are to obey, as the original sanc­tion did at first, when affairs were on the footing of a promise. A promise fixes and determines the persons, without any uncer­tainty: But 'tis evident, that if men were to regulate their conduct in this particular, by the view of a peculiar interest, either public or private, they wou'd involve them­selves in endless confusion, and wou'd render all government, in a great measure, in­effectual. The private interest of every one is different; and tho' the public interest in itself be always one and the same, yet it becomes the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions of par­ticular persons concerning it. The same in­terest, therefore, which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in the choice of our magistrates, and binds us [Page 169] down to a certain form of government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to the utmost perfection in either. The case is here the same as in that law of nature concerning the stability of pos­session. 'Tis highly advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to society, that possession shou'd be stable; and this leads us to the establishment of such a rule: But we find, that were we to follow the same advantage, in assigning particular possessions to particu­lar persons, we shou'd disappoint our end, and perpetuate the confusion, which that rule is intended to prevent. We must, therefore, proceed by general rules, and re­gulate ourselves by general interests, in mo­difying the law of nature concerning the stability of possession. Nor need we fear, that our attachment to this law will diminish upon account of the seeming frivolousness of those interests, by which it is determin'd. The impulse of the mind is deriv'd from a very strong interest; and those other more minute interests serve only to direct the mo­tion, without adding any thing to it, or diminishing from it. 'Tis the same case with government. Nothing is more advan­tageous to society than such an invention; and this interest is sufficient to make us em­brace [Page 170] it with ardour and alacrity; tho' we are oblig'd afterwards to regulate and direct our devotion to government by several con­siderations, which are not of the same im­portance, and to chuse our magistrates with­out having in view any particular advantage from the choice.

THE first of those principles I shall take notice of, as a foundation of the right of magistracy, is that which gives authority to all the most establish'd governments of the world without exception: I mean, long pos­session in any one form of government, or succession of princes. 'Tis certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every na­tion, we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of a commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion, and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain. Time alone gives solidity to their right; and ope­rating gradually on the minds of men, re­conciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have a greater influence upon us than custom, or turns our imagina­tion more strongly to any object. When we have been long accustom'd to obey any set of men, that general instinct or tendency, [Page 171] which we have to suppose a moral obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction, and chuses that set of men for its objects. 'Tis interest which gives the general instinct; but 'tis custom which gives the particular direction.

AND here 'tis observable, that the same length of time has a different influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different influence on the mind. We natu­rally judge of every thing by comparison; and since in considering the fate of kingdoms and republics, we embrace a long extent of time, a small duration has not in this case a like influence on our sentiments, as when we consider any other object. One thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit of cloaths, in a very short time; but a century is scarce sufficient to establish any new go­vernment, or remove all scruples in the minds of the subjects concerning it. Add to this, that a shorter period of time will suffice to give a prince a title to any addi­tional power he may usurp, than will serve to fix his right, where the whole is an usurpation, The kings of France have not been possess'd of absolute power for above two reigns; and yet nothing will appear more extravagant to Frenchmen than to talk [Page 172] of their liberties. If we consider what has been said concerning accession, we shall easily account for this phaenomenon.

WHEN there is no form of government establish'd by long possession, the present possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may be regarded as the second source of all public authority. Right to authority is nothing but the constant possession of autho­rity, maintain'd by the laws of society and the interests of mankind; and nothing can be more natural than to join this constant possession to the present one, according to the principles above-mention'd. If the same principles did not take place with regard to the property of private persons, 'twas be­cause these principles were counter-ballanc'd by very strong considerations of interest; when we observ'd, that all restitution wou'd by that means be prevented, and every vio­lence be authoriz'd and protected. And tho' the same motives may seem to have force, with regard to public authority, yet they are oppos'd by a contrary interest; which consists in the preservation of peace, and the avoiding of all changes, which, how­ever they may be easily produc'd in private affairs, are unavoidably attended with blood­shed [Page 173] and confusion, where the public is interested.

ANY one, who finding the impossibility of accounting for the right of the present possessor, by any receiv'd system of ethics, shou'd resolve to deny absolutely that right, and assert, that it is not authoriz'd by mo­rality, wou'd be justly thought to maintain a very extravagant paradox, and to shock the common sense and judgment of mankind. No maxim is more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to submit quietly to the government, which we find establish'd in the country where we happen to live, without enquiring too curiously into its origin and first establishment. Few govern­ments will bear being examin'd so rigorously. How many kingdoms are there at present in the world, and how many more do we find in history, whose governors have no better foundation for their authority than that of present possession? To confine ourselves to the Roman and Grecian empire; is it not evident, that the long succession of emperors, from the dissolution of the Roman liberty, to the final extinction of that empire by the Turks, cou'd not so much as pretend to any other title to the empire? The election of the senate was a mere form, which always [Page 174] follow'd the choice of the legions; and these were almost always divided in the dif­ferent provinces, and nothing but the sword was able to terminate the difference. 'Twas by the sword, therefore, that every emperor acquir'd, as well as defended his right; and we must either say, that all the known world, for so many ages, had no govern­ment, and ow'd no allegiance to any one, or must allow, that the right of the stronger, in public affairs, is to be receiv'd as legiti­mate, and authoriz'd by morality, when not oppos'd by any other title.

THE right of conquest may be consider'd as a third source of the title of sovereigns. This right resembles very much that of pre­sent possession; but has rather a superior force, being seconded by the notions of glory and honour, which we ascribe to con­querors, instead of the sentiments of hatred and detestation, which attend usurpers. Men naturally favour those they love; and there­fore are more apt to ascribe a right to suc­cessful violence, betwixt one soverign and another, than to the successful rebellion of a subject against his sovereign a.

[Page 175] WHEN neither long possession, nor pre­sent possession, nor conquest take place, as when the first sovereign, who founded any monarchy, dies; in that case, the right of succession naturally prevails in their stead, and men are commonly induc'd to place the son of their late monarch on the throne, and suppose him to inherit his father's authority. The presum'd consent of the fa­ther, the imitation of the succession to pri­vate families, the interest, which the state has in chusing the person, who is most power­ful, and has the most numerous followers; all these reasons lead men to prefer the son of their late monarch to any other person b.

THESE reasons have some weight; but I am persuaded, that to one, who considers impartially of the matter, 'twill appear, that there concur some principles of the imagina­tion, along with those views of interest. The royal authority seems to be connected with the young prince even in his father's [Page 176] life-time, by the natural transition of the thought; and still more after his death: So that nothing is more natural than to com­pleat this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in possession of what seems so naturally to belong to him.

To confirm this we may weigh the fol­lowing phaenomena, which are pretty curi­ous in their kind. In elective monarchies the right of succession has no place by the laws and settled custom; and yet its in­fluence is so natural, that 'tis impossible en­tirely to exclude it from the imagination, and render the subjects indifferent to the son of their deceas'd monarch. Hence in some governments of this kind, the choice com­monly falls on one or other of the royal family; and in some governments they are all excluded. Those contrary phaenomena proceed from the same principle. Where the royal family is excluded, 'tis from a re­finement in politics, which makes people sensible of their propensity to chuse a so­vereign in that family, and gives them a jealousy of their liberty, lest their new monarch, aided by this propensity, shou'd establish his family, and destroy the free­dom of elections for the future.

[Page 177] THE history of Artaxerxes, and the younger Cyrus, may furnish us with some reflections to the same purpose. Cyrus pre­tended a right to the throne above his elder brother, because he was born after his father's accession. I do not pretend, that this reason was valid. I wou'd only infer from it, that he wou'd never have made use of such a pretext, were it not for the qua­lities of the imagination above-mention'd, by which we are naturally inclin'd to unite by a new relation whatever objects we find al­ready united. Artaxerxes had an advantage above his brother, as being the eldest son, and the first in succession: But Cyrus was more closely related to the royal authority, as being begot after his father was invested with it.

SHOU'D it here be pretended, that the view of convenience may be the source of all the right of succession, and that men gladly take advantage of any rule, by which they can fix the successor of their late so­vereign, and prevent that anarchy and con­fusion, which attends all new elections: To this I wou'd answer, that I readily allow, that this motive may contribute something to the effect; but at the same time I assert, that without another principle, 'tis impossible [Page 178] such a motive shou'd take place. The in­terest of a nation requires, that the suc­cession to the crown shou'd be fix'd one way or other; but 'tis the same thing to its in­terest in what way it be fix'd: So that if the relation of blood had not an effect in­dependent of public interest, it wou'd never have been regarded, without a positive law; and 'twou'd have been impossible, that so many positive laws of different nations cou'd ever have concur'd precisely in the same views and intentions.

THIS leads us to consider the fifth source of authority, viz. positive laws; when the legislature establishes a certain form of go­vernment and succession of princes. At first sight it may be thought, that this must resolve into some of the preceding titles of authority. The legislative power, whence the positive law is deriv'd, must either be establish'd by original contract, long pos­session, present possession, conquest, or suc­cession; and consequently the positive law must derive its force from some of those principles. But here 'tis remarkable, that tho' a positive law can only derive its force from these principles, yet it acquires not all the force of the principle from whence it is deriv'd, but loses considerably in the transi­tion; [Page 179] as it is natural to imagine. For in­stance; a government is establish'd for many centuries on a certain system of laws, forms, and methods of succession. The legislative power, establish'd by this long succession, changes all on a sudden the whole system of government, and introduces a new constitu­tion in its stead. I believe few of the sub­jects will think themselves bound to comply with this alteration, unless it have an evi­dent tendency to the public good: But will think themselves still at liberty to return to the antient government. Hence the notion of fundamental laws; which are suppos'd to be inalterable by the will of the sovereign: And of this nature the Salic law is under­stood to be in France. How far these funda­mental laws extend is not determind'd in any government; nor is it possible it ever shou'd. There is such an insensible gradation from the most material laws to the most trivial, and from the most antient laws to the most modern, that 'twill be impossible to set bounds to the legislative power, and deter­mine how far it may innovate in the prin­ciples of government. That is the work more of imagination and passion than of reason.

[Page 180] WHOEVER considers the history of the several nations of the world; their revolu­tions, conquests, increase, and diminution; the manner in which their particular go­vernments are establish'd, and the successive right transmitted from one person to another, will soon learn to treat very lightly all dis­putes concerning the rights of princes, and will be convinc'd, that a strict adherence to any general rules, and the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold less of reason, than of bigotry and superstition. In this particular, the study of history confirms the reasonings of true philo­sophy; which, shewing us the original quali­ties of human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies in politics as incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely subor­dinate to the interests of peace and liberty. Where the public good does not evidently demand a change; 'tis certain, that the con­currence of all those titles, original contract, long possession, present possession, succession, and positive laws, forms the strongest title to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and inviolable. But when these titles are mingled and oppos'd in different degrees, [Page 181] they often occasion perplexity; and are less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery. Who shall tell me, for instance, whether Germanicus, or Drusus, ought to have succeeded Tiberius, had he died while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be receiv'd as equivalent to that of blood in a nation, where it had the same effect in private fami­lies, and had already, in two instances, taken place in the public? Ought Germanicus to be esteem'd the eldest son, because he was born before Drusus; or the younger, because he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private fami­lies? Ought the Roman empire at that time to be esteem'd hereditary, because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation? Upon whatever prin­ciples we may pretend to answer these and such like questions, I am afraid we shall never be able to satisfy an impartial enquirer, who adopts no party in political controver­sies, [Page 182] and will be satisfied with nothing but sound reason and philosophy.

BUT here an English reader will be apt to enquire concerning that famous revolu­tion, which has had such a happy influence on our constitution, and has been attended with such mighty consequences. We have already remark'd, that in the case of enor­mous tyranny and oppression, 'tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; and that as government is a mere human inven­tion for mutual advantage and security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or moral, when once it ceases to have that tendency. But tho' this general principle be authoriz'd by common sense, and the practice of all ages, 'tis certainly impossible for the laws, or even for philo­sophy, to establish any particular rules, by which we may know when resistance is lawful; and decide all controversies, which may arise on that subject. This may not only happen with regard to supreme power; but 'tis possible, even in some constitu­tions, where the legislative authority is not lodg'd in one person, that there may be a magistrate so eminent and powerful, as to oblige the laws to keep silence in this par­ticular. [Page 183] Nor wou'd this silence be an effect only of their respect, but also of their pru­dence; since 'tis certain, that in the vast va­riety of circumstances, which occur in all governments, an exercise of power, in so great a magistrate, may at one time be bene­ficial to the public, which at another time wou'd be pernicious and tyrannical. But notwithstanding this silence of the laws in limited monarchies, 'tis certain, that the people still retain the right of resistance; since 'tis impossible, even in the most des­potic governments, to deprive them of it. The same necessity of self-preservation, and the same motive of public good, give them the same liberty in the one case as in the other. And we may farther observe, that in such mix'd governments, the cases, wherein resistance is lawful, must occur much oftener, and greater indulgence be given to the subjects to defend themselves by force of arms, than in arbitrary govern­ments. Not only where the chief magistrate enters into measures, in themselves, ex­tremely pernicious to the public, but even when he wou'd encroach on the other parts of the constitution, and extend his power beyond the legal bounds, it is allowable to resist and dethrone him; tho' such resistance [Page 184] and violence may, in the general tenor of the laws, be deem'd unlawful and rebellious. For besides that nothing is more essential to public interest, than the preservation of public liberty; 'tis evident, that if such a mix'd government be once suppos'd to be establish'd, every part or member of the constitution must have a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its antient bounds against the encroachment of every other authority. As matter wou'd have been created in vain, were it depriv'd of a power of resistance, without which no part of it cou'd preserve a distinct existence, and the whole might be­crowded up into a single point: So 'tis a gross absurdity to suppose, in any govern­ment, a right without a remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is shar'd with the people, without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their share against every invader. Those, therefore, who wou'd seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc'd all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.

IT does not belong to my present pur­pose to shew, that these general principles are applicable to the late revolution; and that all the rights and privileges, which ought [Page 185] to be sacred to a free nation, were at that time threaten'd with the utmost danger. I am better pleas'd to leave this controverted subject, if it really admits of controversy; and to indulge myself in some philosophical reflections, which naturally arise from that important event.

First, We may observe, that shou'd the lords and commons in our constitution, with­out any reason from public interest, either depose the king in being, or after his death exclude the prince, who, by laws and settled custom, ought to succeed, no one wou'd esteem their proceedings legal, or think themselves bound to comply with them. But shou'd the king, by his unjust practices, or his attempts for a tyrannical and despotic power, justly forfeit his legal, it then not only becomes morally lawful and suitable to the nature of political society to dethrone him; but what is more, we are apt likewise to think, that the remaining members of the constitution acquire a right of excluding his next heir, and of chusing whom they please for his successor. This is founded on a very singular quality of our thought and imagi­nation. When a king forfeits his authority, his heir ought naturally to remain in the same situation, as if the king were remov'd [Page 186] by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeit it for himself. But tho' this may seem reasonable, we easily comply with the contrary opinion. The deposition of a king, in such a government as ours, is certainly an act beyond all common autho­rity, and an illegal assuming a power for public good, which, in the ordinary course of government, can belong to no member of the constitution. When the public good is so great and so evident as to justify the action, the commendable use of this licence causes us naturally to attribute to the parlia­ment a right of using farther licences; and the antient bounds of the laws being once transgressed with approbation, we are not apt to be so strict in confining ourselves precisely within their limits. The mind naturally runs on with any train of action, which it has begun; nor do we commonly make any scruple concerning our duty, after the first action of any kind, which we perform. Thus at the revolution, no one who thought the deposition of the father justifiable, esteem'd themselves to be confin'd to his infant son; tho' had that unhappy monarch died innocent at that time, and had his son, by any accident, been convey'd beyond seas, there is no doubt but a regency wou'd have [Page 187] been appointed till he shou'd come to age, and cou'd be restor'd to his dominions. As the slightest properties of the imagination have an effect on the judgments of the people, it shews the wisdom of the laws and of the parliament to take advantage of such properties, and to chuse the magistrates either in or out of a line, according as the vulgar will most naturally attribute authority and right to them.

Secondly, Tho' the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne might at first give occasion to many disputes, and his title be contested, it ought not now to appear doubt­ful, but must have acquir'd a sufficient au­thority from those three princes, who have succeeded him upon the same title. No­thing is more usual, tho' nothing may, at first sight, appear more unreasonable, than this way of thinking. Princes often seem to acquire a right from their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a king, who during his life-time might justly be deem'd an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on the throne, and entirely change the antient form of government. Julius Caesar is regarded as the first Roman emperor; while Sylla and [Page 188] Marius, whose titles were really the same as his, are treated as tyrants and usurpers. Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and obligatory. Nor does the mind rest there; but returning back upon its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that right, which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related to­gether, and united in the imagination. The present king of France makes Hugh Capet a more lawful prince than Cromwell; as the establish'd liberty of the Dutch is no incon­siderable apology for their obstinate resistance to Philip the second.

SECT. XI. Of the laws of nations.

WHEN civil government has been establish'd over the greatest part of mankind, and different societies have been form'd contiguous to each other, there arises a new set of duties among the neighbour­ing states, suitable to the nature of that commerce, which they carry on with each [Page 189] other. Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be consider'd as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfish­ness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord. But tho' nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet as they are very different in other respects, no wonder they regulate themselves by different maxims, and give rise to a new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations. Under this head we may comprize the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of war, the abstaining from poison'd arms, with other duties of that kind, which are evidently calculated for the commerce, that is peculiar to different societies.

BUT tho' these rules be super-added to the laws of nature, the former do not en­tirely abolish the latter; and one may safely affirm, that the three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its trans­ference by consent, and the performance of promises, are duties of princes, as well as of subjects. The same interest produces the same effect in both cases. Where possession has no stability, there must be perpetual [Page 190] war. Where property is not transferr'd by consent, there can be no commerce. Where promises are not observ'd, there can be no leagues nor alliances. The advantages, therefore, of peace, commerce, and mutual succour, make us extend to different king­doms the same notions of justice, which take place among individuals.

THERE is a maxim very current in the world, which few politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authoriz'd by the practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons. 'Tis evident this is not to be understood of the lesser extent of public duties and obligations; nor will any one be so extravagant as to assert, that the most solemn treaties ought to have no force among princes. For as princes do actually form treaties among themselves, they must pro­pose some advantage from the execution of them; and the prospect of such advantage for the future must engage them to perform their part, and must establish that law of nature. The meaning, therefore, of this political maxim is, that tho' the morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons, [Page 191] and may lawfully be transgress'd from a more trivial motive. However shocking such a proposition may appear to certain philosophers, 'twill be easy to defend it upon those principles, by which we have ac­counted for the origin of justice and equity.

WHEN men have found by experience, that 'tis impossible to subsist without society, and that 'tis impossible to maintain society, while they give free course to their appetites; so urgent an interest quickly restrains their actions, and imposes an obligation to observe those rules, which we call the laws of justice. This obligation of interest rests not here; but by the necessary course of the passions and sentiments, gives rise to the moral obli­gation of duty; while we approve of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove of such as tend to its disturbance. The same natural obligation of interest takes place among independent kingdoms, and gives rise to the same morality; so that no one of ever so corrupt morals will ap­prove of a prince, who voluntarily, and of his own accord, breaks his word, or violates any treaty. But here we may observe, that tho' the intercourse of different states be ad­vantageous, and even sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as [Page 192] that among individuals, without which 'tis utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist. Since, therefore, the natural obli­gation to justice, among different states, is not so strong as among individuals, the mo­ral obligation, which arises from it, must partake of its weakness; and we must neces­sarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour.

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? I wou'd answer, that this is a question, to which we can never give any precise answer; nor is it possible to reduce to numbers the proportion, which we ought to fix betwixt them. One may safely affirm, that this proportion finds itself, without any art or study of men; as we may observe on many other occasions. The practice of the world goes farther in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtile philosophy, which was ever yet invented. And this may serve as a convincing proof, that all men have an implicit notion of the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural and civil ju­stice, and are sensible, that they arise merely from human conventions, and from the in­terest, [Page 193] which we have in the preservation of peace and order. For otherwise the dimi­nution of the interest wou'd never produce a relaxation of the morality, and reconcile us more easily to any transgression of justice among princes and republics, than in the private commerce of one subject with ano­ther.

SECT. XII. Of chastity and modesty.

IF any difficulty attend this system con­cerning the laws of nature and nations, 'twill be with regard to the universal appro­bation or blame, which follows their ob­servance or transgression, and which some may not think sufficiently explain'd from the general interests of society. To remove, as far as possible, all scruples of this kind, I shall here consider another set of duties, viz. the modesty and chastity which belong to the fair sex: And I doubt not but these virtues will be found to be still more con­spicuous instances of the operation of those principles, which I have insisted on.

[Page 194] THERE are some philosophers, who at­tack the female virtues with great vehe­mence, and fancy they have gone very far in detecting popular errors, when they can show, that there is no foundation in nature for all that exterior modesty, which we re­quire in the expressions, and dress, and be­haviour of the fair sex. I believe I may spare myself the trouble of insisting on so obvious a subject, and may proceed, with­out farther preparation, to examine after what manner such notions arise from educa­tion, from the voluntary conventions of men, and from the interest of society.

WHOEVER considers the length and feebleness of human infancy, with the con­cern which both sexes naturally have for their offspring, will easily perceive, that there must be an union of male and female for the education of the young, and that this union must be of considerable dura­tion. But in order to induce the men to impose on themselves this restraint, and un­dergo chearfully all the fatigues and expences, to which it subjects them, they must be­lieve, that the children are their own, and that their natural instinct is not directed to a wrong object, when they give a loose to love and tenderness. Now if we examine [Page 195] the structure of the human body, we shall find, that this security is very difficult to be attain'd on our part; and that since, in the copulation of the sexes, the principle of generation goes from the man to the wo­man, an error may easily take place on the side of the former, tho' it be utterly im­possible with regard to the latter. From this trivial and anatomical observation is deriv'd that vast difference betwixt the education and duties of the two sexes.

WERE a philosopher to examine the matter a priori, he wou'd reason after the following manner. Men are induc'd to la­bour for the maintenance and education of their children, by the persuasion that they are really their own; and therefore 'tis rea­sonable, and even necessary, to give them some security in this particular. This secu­rity cannot consist entirely in the imposing of severe punishments on any transgressions of conjugal fidelity on the part of the wife; since these public punishments cannot be inflicted without legal proof, which 'tis diffi­cult to meet with in this subject. What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on wo­men, in order to counter-balance so strong a temptation as they have to fidelity? There seems to be no restraint possible, but in the [Page 196] punishment of bad fame or reputation; a punishment, which has a mighty influence on the human mind, and at the same time is inflicted by the world upon surmizes, and conjectures, and proofs, that wou'd never be receiv'd in any court of judicature. In order, therefore, to impose a due restraint on the female sex, we must attach a pecu­liar degree of shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its injustice, and must bestow proportionable praises on their chastity.

BUT tho' this be a very strong motive to fidelity, our philosopher wou'd quickly dis­cover, that it wou'd not alone be sufficient to that purpose. All human creatures, espe­cially of the female sex, are apt to over-look remote motives in favour of any present temptation: The temptation is here the strongest imaginable: Its approaches are in­sensible and seducing: And a woman easily finds, or flatters herself she shall find, cer­tain means of securing her reputation, and preventing all the pernicious consequences of her pleasures. 'Tis necessary, therefore, that, beside the infamy attending such licences, there shou'd be some preceding backwardness or dread, which may prevent their first ap­proaches, and may give the female sex a [Page 197] repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties, that have an immediate rela­tion to that enjoyment.

SUCH wou'd be the reasonings of our speculative philosopher: But I am persuaded, that if he had not a perfect knowledge of human nature, he wou'd be apt to regard them as mere chimerical speculations, and wou'd consider the infamy attending infide­lity, and backwardness to all its approaches, as principles that were rather to be wish'd than hop'd for in the world. For what means, wou'd he say, of persuading man­kind, that the transgressions of conjugal duty are more infamous than any other kind of injustice, when 'tis evident they are more excusable, upon account of the greatness of the temptation? And what possibility of giving a backwardness to the approaches of a pleasure, to which nature has inspir'd so strong a propensity; and a propensity that 'tis absolutely necessary in the end to comply with, for the support of the species?

BUT speculative reasonings, which cost so much pains to philosophers, are often form'd by the world naturally, and without reflection: As difficulties, which seem un­surmountable in theory, are easily got over in practice. Those, who have an interest [Page 198] in the fidelity of women, naturally dis­approve of their infidelity, and all the ap­proaches to it. Those, who have no in­terest, are carried along with the stream. Education takes possession of the ductile minds of the fair sex in their infancy. And when a general rule of this kind is once establish'd, men are apt to extend it beyond those principles, from which it first arose. Thus batchelors, however debauch'd, cannot chuse but be shock'd with any instance of lewdness or impudence in women. And tho' all these maxims have a plain reference to generation, yet women past child-bearing have no more privilege in this respect, than those who are in the flower of their youth and beauty. Men have undoubtedly an im­plicit notion, that all those ideas of modesty and decency have a regard to generation; since they impose not the same laws, with the same force, on the male sex, where that reason takes not place. The exception is there obvious and extensive, and founded on a remarkable difference, which produces a clear separation and disjunction of ideas. But as the case is not the same with regard to the different ages of women, for this reason, tho' men know, that these notions are founded on the public interest, yet the [Page 199] general rule carries us beyond the original principle, and makes us extend the notions of modesty over the whole sex, from their earliest infancy to their extremest old-age and infirmity.

COURAGE, which is the point of honour among men, derives its merit, in a great measure, from artifice, as well as the chastity of women; tho' it has also some foundation in nature, as we shall see afterwards.

AS to the obligations which the male sex lie under, with regard to chastity, we may observe, that according to the general notions of the world, they bear nearly the same proportion to the obligations of women, as the obligations of the law of nations do to those of the law of nature. 'Tis con­trary to the interest of civil society, that men shou'd have an entire liberty of in­dulging their appetites in venereal enjoyment: But as this interest is weaker than in the case of the female sex, the moral obligation, arising from it, must be proportionably weaker. And to prove this we need only appeal to the practice and sentiments of all nations and ages.

PART III. Of the other virtues and vices.

SECT. I. Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices.

WE come now to the examination of such virtues and vices as are entirely natural, and have no dependance on the ar­tifice and contrivance of men. The exami­nation of these will conclude this system of morals.

THE chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are remov'd, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition. The most immediate effects of pleasure and pain are the propense [Page 202] and averse motions of the mind; which are diversified into volition, into desire and aver­sion, grief and joy, hope and fear, accord­ing as the pleasure or pain changes its situ­ation, and becomes probable or improbable, certain or uncertain, or is consider'd as out of our power for the present moment. But when along with this, the objects, that cause pleasure or pain, acquire a relation to our­selves or others; they still continue to excite desire and aversion, grief and joy: But cause, at the same time, the indirect passions of pride or humility, love or hatred, which in this case have a double relation of im­pressions and ideas to the pain or pleasure.

WE have already observ'd, that moral distinctions depend entirely on certain pe­culiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious. Now since every quality in our­selves or others, which gives pleasure, al­ways causes pride or love; as every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or ha­tred: It follows, that these two particulars are to be consider'd as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power [Page 203] of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility.

IF any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or cha­racter. It must depend upon durable prin­ciples of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceed­ing from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humi­mility; and consequently are never con­sider'd in morality.

THIS reflection is self-evident, and de­serves to be attended to, as being of the ut­most importance in the present subject. We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded. These alone are dura­ble enough to affect our sentiments concern­ing the person. Actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but 'tis only so far as they are such indications, that they [Page 204] are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame.

TO discover the true origin of morals, and of that love or hatred, which arises from mental qualities, we must take the matter pretty deep, and compare some principles, which have been already examin'd and ex­plain'd.

WE may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent move­ments in every human creature. When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind imme­diately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I per­ceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is convey'd to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion. Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, [Page 205] 'tis certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and con­cern in the patient and assistants, wou'd have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of pity and terror. No passion of another discovers itself immedi­ately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we in­fer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy.

OUR sense of beauty depends very much on this principle; and where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and deform'd. Thus the con­veniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, secu­rity, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects. Here the object, which is denominated beau­tiful, pleases only by its tendency to pro­duce a certain effect. That effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. To this principle, therefore, is [Page 206] owing the beauty, which we find in every thing that is useful. How considerable a part this is of beauty will easily appear upon reflection. Wherever an object has a ten­dency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. Most of the works of art are esteem'd beau­tiful, in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and even many of the pro­ductions of nature derive their beauty from that source. Handsome and beautiful, on most occasions, is not an absolute but a re­lative quality, and pleases us by nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable a.

THE same principle produces, in many in­stances, our sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty. No virtue is more esteem'd than justice, and no vice more detested than injustice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable or odious. Now justice is a mo­ral virtue, merely because it has that tendency [Page 207] to the good of mankind; and, indeed, is no­thing but an artificial invention to that pur­pose. The same may be said of allegiance, of the laws of nations, of modesty, and of good-manners. All these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society. And since there is a very strong sentiment of mo­rals, which, in all nations, and all ages, has attended them, we must allow, that the re­flecting on the tendency of characters and mental qualities, is sufficient to give us the sentiments of approbation and blame. Now as the means to an end can only be agree­able, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concern'd, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympa­thy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues.

THUS it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and that it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues. From thence we may presume, that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues; and that quali­ties acquire our approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind. This pre­sumption must become a certainty, when we [Page 208] find that most of those qualities, which we naturally approve of, have actually that ten­dency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the qualities, which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary ten­dency, and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable. For hav­ing found, that such tendencies have force enough to produce the strongest sentiment of morals, we can never reasonably, in these cases, look for any other cause of approba­tion or blame; it being an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that where any particular cause is sufficient for an effect, we ought to rest satisfied with it, and ought not to multiply causes without necessity. We have happily attain'd experiments in the artificial virtues, where the tendency of qualities to the good of society, is the sole cause of our approba­tion, without any suspicion of the concur­rence of another principle. From thence we learn the force of that principle. And where that principle may take place, and the qua­lity approv'd of is really beneficial to society, a true philosopher will never require any other principle to account for the strongest appro­bation and esteem.

THAT many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one [Page 209] can doubt of. Meekness, beneficence, cha­rity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equi­ty, bear the greatest figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their tendency to the good of society. This goes so far, that some philosophers have represented all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and edu­cation, when skilful politicians endeavour'd to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions of honour and shame. This sy­stem, however, is not consistent with ex­perience. For, first, there are other virtues and vices beside those which have this ten­dency to the public advantage and loss. Se­condly, had not men a natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it cou'd never be ex­cited by politicians; nor wou'd the words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us, as we have already observ'd. But tho' this sy­stem be erroneous, it may teach us, that mo­ral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interests of society, and that 'tis our con­cern for that interest, which makes us ap­prove or disapprove of them. Now we [Page 210] have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of our­selves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss.

THE only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the good, which results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion: Whereas a single act of justice, consider'd in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and 'tis only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is advan­tageous. When I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive; and so far as my succour extends, so far have I promoted the happiness of my fellow-crea­tures. But if we examine all the questions, that come before any tribunal of justice, we shall find, that, considering each case apart, it wou'd as often be an instance of humanity to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable them. Judges take from a poor man to give to a rich; they bestow on the dissolute the labour of the industrious; and put into the hands of the vicious the means [Page 211] of harming both themselves and others. The whole scheme, however, of law and justice is advantageous to the society; and 'twas with a view to this advantage, that men, by their voluntary conventions, estab­lish'd it. After it is once establish'd by these conventions, it is naturally attended with a strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society. We need no other explication of that esteem, which at­tends such of the natural virtues, as have a tendency to the public good.

I MUST farther add, that there are several circumstances, which render this hypothesis much more probable with regard to the natural than the artificial virtues. 'Tis cer­tain, that the imagination is more affected by what is particular, than by what is gene­ral; and that the sentiments are always mov'd with difficulty, where their objects are, in any degree, loose and undetermin'd: Now every particular act of justice is not beneficial to society, but the whole scheme or system: And it may not, perhaps, be any individual person, for whom we are concern'd, who receives benefit from justice, but the whole society alike. On the con­trary, every particular act of generosity, or [Page 212] relief of the industrious and indigent, is beneficial; and is beneficial to a particular person, who is not undeserving of it. 'Tis more natural, therefore, to think, that the tendencies of the latter virtue will affect our sentiments, and command our approbation, than those of the former; and therefore, since we find, that the approbation of the former arises from their tendencies, we may ascribe, with better reason, the same cause to the approbation of the latter. In any number of similar effects, if a cause can be discover'd for one, we ought to extend that cause to all the other effects, which can be accounted for by it: But much more, if these other effects be attended with peculiar circumstances, which facilitate the operation of that cause.

BEFORE I proceed farther, I must ob­serve two remarkable circumstances in this affair, which may seem objections to the present system. The first may be thus ex­plain'd. When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleas'd with it, and approve of it; be­cause it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure. But as this sym­pathy is very variable, it may be thought, [Page 213] that our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations. We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaint­ance, than with strangers: With our coun­trymen, than with foreigners. But notwith­standing this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judi­cious spectator. The sympathy varies with­out a variation in our esteem. Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from sympathy.

TO this I answer: The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or dis­gust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters. Now 'tis evident, that those sentiments, whence-ever they are deriv'd, must vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects; nor can I feel the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a person, who liv'd in Greece two thousand years ago, that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquaintance. Yet I do not say, that I [Page 214] esteem the one more than the other: And therefore, if the variation of the sentiment, without a variation of the esteem, be an objection, it must have equal force against every other system, as against that of sym­pathy. But to consider the matter a-right, it has no force at all; and 'tis the easiest matter in the world to account for it. Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaint­ance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse toge­ther on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those con­tinual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and al­ways, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. In like manner, external beauty is deter­min'd merely by pleasure; and 'tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We [Page 215] say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that reflection we correct its momentary ap­pearance.

IN general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our situa­tion of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and accord­ing to the present disposition of our mind. But these variations we regard not in our ge­neral decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable. Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kind­ness than Marcus Brutus, as represented in history; but we say not upon that ac­count, that the former character is more laudable than the latter. We know, that were we to approach equally near to that renown'd patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection and admiration. Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses; and indeed 'twere impossible [Page 216] we cou'd ever make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appear­ances of things, and overlook our present situation.

'TIS therefore from the influence of cha­racters and qualities, upon those who have an intercourse with any person, that we blame or praise him. We consider not whether the persons, affected by the qualities, be our acquaintance or strangers, country­men or foreigners. Nay, we over-look our own interest in those general judgments; and blame not a man for opposing us in any of our pretensions, when his own interest is particularly concern'd. We make allowance for a certain degree of selfishness in men; because we know it to be inseparable from human nature, and inherent in our frame and constitution. By this reflection we cor­rect those sentiments of blame, which so naturally arise upon any opposition.

BUT however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 'tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our pas­sions often correspond entirely to the present theory. 'Tis seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no [Page 217] way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare to meet with persons, who can pardon another any opposition he makes to their interest, however justifiable that op­position may be by the general rules of mo­rality. Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial con­duct, but that 'tis seldom we can bring our­selves to it, and that our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judg­ment. This language will be easily under­stood, if we consider what we formerly said concerning that reason, which is able to op­pose our passion; and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determina­tion of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection. When we form our judgments of persons, merely from the ten­dency of their characters to our own bene­fit, or to that of our friends, we find so many contradictions to our sentiments in society and conversation, and such an uncer­tainty from the incessant changes of our situ­ation, that we seek some other standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit of so great variation. Being thus loosen'd from our first station, we cannot afterwards fix ourselves so commodiously by any means as by a sympathy with those, who have any [Page 218] commerce with the person we consider. This is far from being as lively as when our own interest is concern'd, or that of our parti­cular friends; nor has it such an influence on our love and hatred: But being equally conformable to our calm and general princi­ples, 'tis said to have an equal authority over our reason, and to command our judgment and opinion. We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day: The meaning of which is, that we know from reflection, that the former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disap­probation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position.

I NOW proceed to the second remarkable circumstance, which I propos'd to take no­tice of. Where a person is possess'd of a character, that in its natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his cha­racter, even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from be­ing serviceable to his friends and country. Virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love, which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or desart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to [Page 219] all the world. Now this may be esteem'd an objection to the present system. Sympa­thy interests us in the good of mankind; and if sympathy were the source of our esteem for virtue, that sentiment of appro­bation cou'd only take place, where the virtue actually attain'd its end, and was bene­ficial to mankind. Where it fails of its end, 'tis only an imperfect means; and there­fore can never acquire any merit from that end. The goodness of an end can bestow a merit on such means alone as are com­pleat, and actually produce the end.

To this we may reply, that where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure, and is esteem'd beautiful, even tho' some ex­ternal circumstances be wanting to render it altogether effectual. 'Tis sufficient if every thing be compleat in the object itself. A house, that is contriv'd with great judgment for all the commodities of life, pleases us upon that account; tho' perhaps we are sen­sible, that no-one will ever dwell in it. A fertile soil, and a happy climate, delight us by a reflection on the happiness which they wou'd afford the inhabitants, tho' at present the country be desart and uninhabited. A man, whose limbs and shape promise strength [Page 220] and activity, is esteem'd handsome, tho' condemn'd to perpetual imprisonment. The imagination has a set of passions belonging to it, upon which our sentiments of beauty much depend. These passions are mov'd by degrees of liveliness and strength, which are inferior to belief, and independent of the real existence of their objects. Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to be beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances want­ing to render the cause a compleat one. General rules create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination.

'TIS true, when the cause is compleat, and a good disposition is attended with good fortune, which renders it really beneficial to society, it gives a stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended with a more lively sympathy. We are more affected by it; and yet we do not say that it is more vir­tuous, or that we esteem it more. We know, that an alteration of fortune may render the benevolent disposition entirely im­potent; and therefore we separate, as much as possible, the fortune from the disposition. The case is the same, as when we correct [Page 221] the different sentiments of virtue, which pro­ceed from its different distances from our­selves. The passions do not always follow our corrections; but these corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue.

'TIS observ'd by critics, that all words or sentences, which are difficult to the pro­nunciation, are disagreeable to the ear. There is no difference, whether a man hear them pronounc'd, or read them silently to himself. When I run over a book with my eye, I imagine I hear it all; and also, by the force of imagination, enter into the uneasiness, which the delivery of it wou'd give the speaker. The uneasiness is not real; but as such a composition of words has a natu­ral tendency to produce it, this is sufficient to affect the mind with a painful sentiment, and render the discourse harsh and disagree­able. 'Tis a similar case, where any real quality is, by accidental circumstances, ren­der'd impotent, and is depriv'd of its natural influence on society.

UPON these principles we may easily re­move any contradiction, which may appear to be betwixt the extensive sympathy, on [Page 222] which our sentiments of virtue depend, and that limited generosity which I have fre­quently observ'd to be natural to men, and which justice and property suppose, accord­ing to the precedent reasoning. My sym­pathy with another may give me the sen­timent of pain and disapprobation, when any object is presented, that has a tendency to give him uneasiness; tho' I may not be willing to sacrifice any thing of my own in­terest, or cross any of my passions, for his satisfaction. A house may displease me by being ill-contriv'd for the convenience of the owner; and yet I may refuse to give a shil­ling towards the rebuilding of it. Senti­ments must touch the heart, to make them controul our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them influence our taste. When a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and disagreeable; tho' we be fully assur'd of the solidity of the workmanship. 'Tis a kind of fear, which causes this sen­timent of disapprobation; but the passion is not the same with that which we feel, when oblig'd to stand under a wall, that we really think tottering and insecure. The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind: And the emotions they excite are of a like [Page 223] species with those, which proceed from the real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these emotions are so dif­ferent in their feeling, that they may often be contrary, without destroying each other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy are esteem'd beautiful upon ac­count of their strength, tho' we cou'd wish that they were entirely destroy'd. The imagination adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, from those which arise from our particular and momentary situation.

IF we examine the panegyrics that are commonly made of great men, we shall find, that most of the qualities, which are attributed to them, may be divided into two kinds, viz. such as make them perform their part in society; and such as render them serviceable to themselves, and enable them to promote their own interest. Their pru­dence, temperance, frugality, industry, assi­duity, enterprize, dexterity, are celebrated, as well as their generosity and humanity. If we ever give an indulgence to any quality, that disables a man from making a figure in life, 'tis to that of indolence, which is not suppos'd to deprive one of his parts and ca­pacity, [Page 224] but only suspends their exercise; and that without any inconvenience to the per­son himself, since 'tis, in some measure, from his own choice. Yet indolence is al­ways allow'd to be a fault, and a very great one, if extreme: Nor do a man's friends ever acknowledge him to be subject to it, but in order to save his character in more material articles. He cou'd make a figure, say they, if he pleas'd to give application: His understanding is sound, his conception quick, and his memory tenacious; but he hates business, and is indifferent about his fortune. And this a man sometimes may make even a subject of vanity; tho' with the air of confessing a fault: Because he may think, that this incapacity for business implies much more noble qualities; such as a philosophical spirit, a fine taste, a delicate wit, or a relish for pleasure and society. But take any other case: Suppose a quality, that without being an indication of any other good qualities, incapacitates a man always for business, and is destructive to his interest; such as a blundering understanding, and a wrong judgment of every thing in life; in­constancy and irresolution; or a want of address in the management of men and busi­ness: These are all allow'd to be imperfec­tions [Page 225] in a character; and many men wou'd rather acknowledge the greatest crimes, than have it suspected, that they are, in any de­gree, subject to them.

'TIS very happy, in our philosophical re­searches, when we find the same phaenome­non diversified by a variety of circumstances; and by discovering what is common among them, can the better assure ourselves of the truth of any hypothesis we may make use of to explain it. Were nothing esteem'd virtue but what were beneficial to society, I am persuaded, that the foregoing explication of the moral sense ought still to be receiv'd, and that upon sufficient evidence: But this evidence must grow upon us, when we find other kinds of virtue, which will not ad­mit of any explication except from that hypothesis. Here is a man, who is not re­markably defective in his social qualities; but what principally recommends him is his dexterity in business, by which he has extricated himself from the greatest difficul­ties, and conducted the most delicate affairs with a singular address and prudence. I find an esteem for him immediately to arise in me: His company is a satisfaction to me; and before I have any farther acquaintance with him, I wou'd rather do him a service [Page 226] than another, whose character is in every other respect equal, but is deficient in that particular. In this case, the qualities that please me are all consider'd as useful to the person, and as having a tendency to pro­mote his interest and satisfaction. They are only regarded as means to an end, and please me in proportion to their fitness for that end. The end, therefore, must be agree­able to me. But what makes the end agree­able? The person is a stranger: I am no way interested in him, nor lie under any obligation to him: His happiness concerns not me, farther than the happiness of every human, and indeed of every sensible crea­ture: That is, it affects me only by sym­pathy. From that principle, whenever I discover his happiness and good, whether in its causes or effects, I enter so deeply into it, that it gives me a sensible emotion. The appearance of qualities, that have a tendency to promote it, have an agreeable effect upon my imagination, and command my love and esteem.

THIS theory may serve to explain, why the same qualities, in all cases, produce both pride and love, humility and hatred; and the same man is always virtuous or vicious, accomplish'd or despicable to others, [Page 227] who is so to himself. A person, in whom we discover any passion or habit, which ori­ginally is only incommodious to himself, be­comes always disagreeable to us, merely on its account; as on the other hand, one whose character is only dangerous and dis­agreeable to others, can never be satisfied with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage. Nor is this observable only with regard to characters and manners, but may be remark'd even in the most mi­nute circumstances. A violent cough in another gives us uneasiness; tho' in itself it does not in the least affect us. A man will be mortified, if you tell him he has a stink­ing breath; tho' 'tis evidently no annoyance to himself. Our fancy easily changes its situation; and either surveying ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that means, into sentiments, which no way be­long to us, and in which nothing but sym­pathy is able to interest us. And this sym­pathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to be displeas'd with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in their eyes; tho' perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them.

[Page 228] THERE have been many systems of mo­rality advanc'd by philosophers in all ages; but if they are strictly examin'd, they may be reduc'd to two, which alone merit our attention. Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish'd by our sentiments, not by rea­son: But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of cha­racters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. My opinion is, that both these causes are intermix'd in our judgments of morals; after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty: Tho' I am also of opinion, that reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty. There are, however, instances, in cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment produces our approbation. Wit, and a certain easy and disengag'd behaviour, are qualities immediately agreeable to others, and command their love and esteem. Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for: Others may be resolv'd into principles, [Page 229] which are more general. This will best ap­pear upon a particular enquiry.

As some qualities acquire their merit from their being immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency to public interest; so some are denominated virtuous from their being immediately agreeable to the person himself, who possesses them. Each of the passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. The first is vir­tuous, the second vicious. This particular feeling constitutes the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs not be account­ed for.

BUT however directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness, which par­ticular qualities cause to ourselves or others; 'tis easy to observe, that it has also a con­siderable dependence on the principle of sym­pathy so often insisted on. We approve of a person, who is possess'd of qualities im­mediately agreeable to those, with whom he has any commerce; tho' perhaps we our­selves never reap'd any pleasure from them. We also approve of one, who is possess'd of qualities, that are immediately agreeable to himself; tho' they be of no service to [Page 230] any mortal. To account for this we must have recourse to the foregoing principles.

THUS, to take a general review of the present hypothesis: Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is call'd vicious. This pleasure and this pain may arise from four different sources. For we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is na­turally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself. One may, perhaps, be surpriz'd, that amidst all these interests and pleasures, we shou'd forget our own, which touches us so nearly on every other occasion. But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head, when we consider, that every particular person's pleasure and in­terest being different, 'tis impossible men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now in judging of characters, the only interest and pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person him­self, whose character is examin'd; or that [Page 231] of persons, who have a connexion with him. And tho' such interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and universal, they counter-ballance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend.

AS to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice, 'tis an evident consequence of the sen­timents of pleasure or uneasiness. These sentiments produce love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the original constitution of human passion, is attended with benevolence or anger; that is, with a desire of making happy the person we love, and miserable the person we hate. We have treated of this more fully on another occasion.

SECT. II. Of greatness of mind.

IT may now be proper to illustrate this general system of morals, by applying it to particular instances of virtue and vice, and shewing how their merit or demerit [Page 232] arises from the four sources here explain'd. We shall begin with examining the passions of pride and humility, and shall consider the vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just proportion. An excessive pride or over­weaning conceit of ourselves is always e­steem'd vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd virtuous, and procures the good­will of every-one. Of the four sources of moral distinctions, this is to be ascrib'd to the third; viz, the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of a quality to others, without any reflections on the tendency of that quality.

IN order to prove this, we must have re­course to two principles, which are very con­spicuous in human nature. The first of these is the sympathy, and communication of sentiments and passions above-mention'd. So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person ap­proaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree. And tho', on many occasions, my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sen­timents, and way of thinking; yet it seldom is so weak as not to disturb the easy course [Page 233] of my thought, and give an authority to that opinion, which is recommended to me by his assent and approbation. Nor is it any way material upon what subject he and I employ our thoughts. Whether we judge of an indifferent person, or of my own cha­racter, my sympathy gives equal force to his decision: And even his sentiments of his own merit make me consider him in the same light, in which he regards himself.

THIS principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that it enters into most of our sentiments and pas­sions, and often takes place under the ap­pearance of its contrary. For 'tis remark­able, that when a person opposes me in any thing, which I am strongly bent upon, and rouzes up my passion by contradiction, I have always a degree of sympathy with him, nor does my commotion proceed from any other origin. We may here observe an evi­dent conflict or rencounter of opposite prin­ciples and passions. On the one side there is that passion or sentiment, which is natural to me; and 'tis observable, that the stronger this passion is, the greater is the commotion. There must also be some passion or senti­ment on the other side; and this passion can proceed from nothing but sympathy. The [Page 234] sentiments of others can never affect us, but by becoming, in some measure, our own; in which case they operate upon us, by op­posing and encreasing our passions, in the very same manner, as if they had been ori­ginally deriv'd from our own temper and disposition. While they remain conceal'd in the minds of others, they can never have any influence upon us: And even when they are known, if they went no farther than the imagination, or conception; that faculty is so accustom'd to objects of every different kind, that a mere idea, tho' contrary to our sentiments and inclinations, wou'd never alone be able to affect us.

THE second principle I shall take notice of is that of comparison, or the variation of our judgments concerning objects, according to the proportion they bear to those with which we compare them. We judge more of objects by comparison, than by their in­trinsic worth and value; and regard every thing as mean, when set in opposition to what is superior of the same kind. But no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves; and hence it is that on all occa­sions it takes place, and mixes with most of our passions. This kind of comparison is directly contrary to sympathy in its opera­tion, [Page 235] as we have observ'd in treating of compassion and malice. a In all kinds of com­parison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar'd, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure; and therefore produces pain, when compar'd with our own. His pain, con­sider'd in itself, is painful; but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us plea­sure.

SINCE then those principles of sympathy, and a comparison with ourselves, are directly contrary, it may be worth while to consider, what general rules can be form'd, beside the particular temper of the person, for the pre­valence of the one or the other. Suppose I am now in safety at land, and wou'd wil­lingly reap some pleasure from this consider­ation: I must think on the miserable con­dition of those who are at sea in a storm, and must endeavour to render this idea as strong and lively as possible, in order to make me more sensible of my own happi­ness. But whatever pains I may take, the comparison will never have an equal efficacy, [Page 236] as if I were really on b the shore, and saw a ship at a distance, tost by a tempest, and in danger every moment of perishing on a rock or sand-bank. But suppose this idea to become still more lively. Suppose the ship to be driven so near me, that I can per­ceive distinctly the horror, painted on the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each others arms: No man has so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or withstand the motions of the tenderest com­passion and sympathy. 'Tis evident, there­fore, there is a medium in this case; and that if the idea be too feint, it has no in­fluence by comparison; and on the other hand, if it be too strong, it operates on us entirely by sympathy, which is the contrary to comparison. Sympathy being the con­version of an idea into an impression, de­mands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite to comparison.

ALL this is easily applied to the present subject. We sink very much in our own [Page 237] eyes, when in the presence of a great man, or one of a superior genius; and this humi­lity makes a considerable ingredient in that respect, which we pay our superiors, accord­ing to our c foregoing reasonings on that passion. Sometimes even envy and hatred arise from the comparison; but in the greatest part of men, it rests at respect and esteem. As sympathy has such a powerful influence on the human mind, it causes pride to have, in some measure, the same effect as merit; and by making us enter into those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of himself, presents that com­parison, which is so mortifying and disagree­able. Our judgment does not entirely ac­company him in the flattering conceit, in which he pleases himself; but still is so shaken as to receive the idea it presents, and to give it an influence above the loose con­ceptions of the imagination. A man, who, in an idle humour, wou'd form a notion of a person of a merit very much superior to his own, wou'd not be mortified by that fiction: But when a man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit, is presented to us; if we observe in him any extraordinary degree of pride and self-conceit; [Page 238] the firm persuasion he has of his own merit, takes hold of the imagination, and dimi­nishes us in our own eyes, in the same man­ner, as if he were really possess'd of all the good qualities which he so liberally attributes to himself. Our idea is here precisely in that medium, which is requisite to make it operate on us by comparison. Were it ac­companied with belief, and did the person appear to have the same merit, which he assumes to himself, it wou'd have a contrary effect, and wou'd operate on us by sympathy. The influence of that principle wou'd then be superior to that of comparison, contrary to what happens where the person's merit seems below his pretensions.

THE necessary consequence of these prin­ciples is, that pride, or an over-weaning conceit of ourselves, must be vicious; since it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable com­parison. 'Tis a trite observation in philo­sophy, and even in common life and con­versation, that 'tis our own pride, which makes us so much displeas'd with the pride of other people; and that vanity becomes insupportable to us merely because we are vain. The gay naturally associate themselves with the gay, and the amorous with the [Page 239] amorous: But the proud never can endure the proud, and rather seek the company of those who are of an opposite disposition. As we are, all of us, proud in some degree, pride is universally blam'd and condemn'd by all mankind; as having a natural ten­dency to cause uneasiness in others by means of comparison. And this effect must fol­low the more naturally, that those, who have an ill-grounded conceit of themselves, are for ever making those comparisons, nor have they any other method of supporting their vanity. A man of sense and merit is pleas'd with himself, independent of all foreign considerations: But a fool must al­ways find some person, that is more foolish, in order to keep himself in good humour with his own parts and understanding.

BUT tho' an over-weaning conceit of our own merit be vicious and disagreeable, no­thing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where we really have qualities that are valuable. The utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue, as well as its agreeableness to others; and 'tis certain, that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride, which makes [Page 240] us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our pro­jects and enterprizes. Whatever capacity any one may be endow'd with, 'tis entirely useless to him, if he be not acquainted with it, and form not designs suitable to it. 'Tis requisite on all occasions to know our own force; and were it allowable to err on either side, 'twou'd be more advantageous to over­rate our merit, than to form ideas of it, below its just standard. Fortune commonly favours the bold and enterprizing; and no­thing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves.

ADD to this, that tho' pride, or self-ap­plause, be sometimes disagreeable to others, 'tis always agreeable to ourselves; as on the other hand, modesty, tho' it give pleasure to every one, who observes it, produces often uneasiness in the person endow'd with it. Now it has been observ'd, that our own sensations determine the vice and virtue of any quality, as well as those sensations, which it may excite in others.

THUS self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requisite in a cha­racter. 'Tis, however, certain, that good­breeding and decency require that we shou'd avoid all signs and expressions, which tend [Page 241] directly to show that passion. We have, all of us, a wonderful partiality for our­selves, and were we always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular, we shou'd mutually cause the greatest indignation in each other, not only by the immediate pre­sence of so disagreeable a subject of com­parison, but also by the contrariety of our judgments. In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. No­thing is more disagreeable than a man's over­weaning conceit of himself: Every one al­most has a strong propensity to this vice: No one can well distinguish in himself be­twixt the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own merit is well­founded: For these reasons, all direct ex­pressions of this passion are condemn'd; nor do we make any exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit. They are not allow'd to do themselves justice openly, in words, no more than other people; and even if they show a reserve and secret doubt in doing themselves justice in [Page 242] their own thoughts, they will be more ap­plauded. That impertinent, and almost uni­versal propensity of men, to over-value themselves, has given us such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a general rule, wherever me meet with it; and 'tis with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even in their most secret thoughts. At least, it must be own'd, that some disguise in this parti­cular is absolutely requisite; and that if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of mo­desty and mutual deference in all our con­duct and behaviour. We must, on every occasion, be ready to prefer others to our­selves; to treat them with a kind of defer­ence, even tho' they be our equals; to seem always the lowest and least in the company, where we are not very much distinguish'd above them: And if we observe these rules in our conduct, men will have more indul­gence for our secret sentiments, when we dis­cover them in an oblique manner.

I BELIEVE no one, who has any prac­tice of the world, and can penetrate into the inward sentiments of men, will assert, that the humility, which good-breeding and decency require of us, goes beyond the out­side, [Page 243] or that a thorough sincerity in this particular is esteem'd a real part of our duty. On the contrary, we may observe, that a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour, and that there is no quality of the mind, which is more indispensibly requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind. There are certain deferences and mutual sub­missions, which custom requires of the dif­ferent ranks of men towards each other; and whoever exceeds in this particular, if thro' interest, is accus'd of meanness; if thro' ig­norance, of simplicity. 'Tis necessary, there­fore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be fix'd by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. 'Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And shou'd it be said, that prudence may suffice to re­gulate our actions in this particular, with­out any real pride, I wou'd observe, that here the object of prudence is to conform our actions to the general usage and custom; and that 'tis impossible those tacit airs of superiority shou'd ever have been establish'd [Page 244] and authoriz'd by custom, unless men were generally proud, and unless that passion were generally approv'd, when well-grounded.

IF we pass from common life and con­versation to history, this reasoning acquires new force, when we observe, that all those great actions and sentiments, which have become the admiration of mankind, are founded on nothing but pride and self­esteem. Go, says Alexander the Great to his soldiers, when they refus'd to follow him to the Indies, go tell your countrymen, that you left Alexander compleating the conquest of the world. This passage was always par­ticularly admir'd by the prince of Conde, as we learn from St. Evremond. ‘"Alexander,"’ said that prince, ‘"abandon'd by his soldiers, among barbarians, not yet fully subdu'd, felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire, that he cou'd not believe it possi­ble any one cou'd refuse to obey him. Whether in Europe or in Asia, among Greeks or Persians, all was indifferent to him: Wherever he found men, he fancied he had found subjects."’

IN general we may observe, that what­ever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem, or [Page 245] partakes largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, mag­nanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin. Accord­ingly we find, that many religious de­claimers decry those virtues as purely pagan and natural, and represent to us the excel­lency of the Christian religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philosophers, who so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this virtue of humility has been rightly un­derstood, I shall not pretend to determine. I am content with the concession, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, with­out breaking out into such indecent ex­pressions of vanity, as may offend the vanity of others.

THE merit of pride or self-esteem is de­riv'd from two circumstances, viz. its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves; by which it capacitates us for business, and, at the same time, gives us an immediate satisfaction. When it goes beyond its just bounds, it loses the first advantage, and even becomes pre­judicial; [Page 246] which is the reason why we con­demn an extravagant pride and ambition, however regulated by the decorums of good­breeding and politeness. But as such a passion is still agreeable, and conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person, who is actuated by it, the sympathy with that satisfaction diminishes considerably the blame, which naturally attends its dangerous influence on our conduct and behaviour. Accordingly we may observe, that an ex­cessive courage and magnanimity, especially when it displays itself under the frowns of fortune, contributes, in a great measure, to the character of a hero, and will render a person the admiration of posterity; at the same time, that it ruins his affairs, and leads him into dangers and difficulties, with which otherwise he wou'd never have been ac­quainted.

HEROISM, or military glory, is much admir'd by the generality of mankind. They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it. The in­finite confusions and disorder, which it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its merit in their eyes. When they wou'd op­pose the popular notions on this head, they [Page 247] always paint out the evils, which this sup­pos'd virtue has produc'd in human society; the subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, the sack of cities. As long as these are present to us, we are more inclin'd to hate than admire the ambition of heroes. But when we fix our view on the person himself, who is the author of all this mis­chief, there is something so dazling in his character, the mere contemplation of it so elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse it our admiration. The pain, which we re­ceive from its tendency to the prejudice of society, is over-power'd by a stronger and more immediate sympathy.

THUS our explication of the merit or demerit, which attends the degrees of pride or self-esteem, may serve as a strong argu­ment for the preceding hypothesis, by shew­ing the effects of those principles above ex­plain'd in all the variations of our judgments concerning that passion. Nor will this rea­soning be advantageous to us only by shew­ing, that the distinction of vice and virtue arises from the four principles of the advan­tage and of the pleasure of the person him­self, and of others: But may also afford us [Page 248] a strong proof of some under-parts of that hypothesis.

NO one, who duly considers of this matter, will make any scruple of allowing, that any piece of ill-breeding, or any expression of pride and haughtiness, is displeasing to us, merely because it shocks our own pride, and leads us by sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagreeable passion of hu­mility. Now as an insolence of this kind is blam'd even in a person who has always been civil to ourselves in particular; nay, in one, whose name is only known to us in history; it follows, that our disapprobation proceeds from a sympathy with others, and from the reflection, that such a character is highly displeasing and odious to every one, who converses or has any intercourse with the person possest of it. We sympathize with those people in their uneasiness; and as their uneasiness proceeds in part from a sym­pathy with the person who insults them, we may here observe a double rebound of the sympathy; which is a principle very similar to what we have observ'd on another occasion a.

SECT. III. Of goodness and benevolence.

HAVING thus explain'd the origin of that praise and approbation, which attends every thing we call great in human affections; we now proceed to give an ac­count of their goodness, and shew whence its merit is deriv'd.

WHEN experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the gene­rosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and fa­mily, or, at most, beyond their native coun­try. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sym­pathy [Page 250] with the sentiments of those, who have a more particular connexion with him. We are quickly oblig'd to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind, by reason of the perpetual contradictions, we meet with in society and conversation, from persons that are not plac'd in the same situ­ation, and have not the same interest with ourselves. The only point of view, in which our sentiments concur with those of others, is, when we consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those, who have any immediate connexion or inter­course with the person possess'd of it. And tho' this advantage or harm be often very remote from ourselves, yet sometimes 'tis very near us, and interests us strongly by sympathy. This concern we readily extend to other cases, that are resembling; and when these are very remote, our sympathy is proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame fainter and more doubtful. The case is here the same as in our judgments con­cerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance: But tho' the ap­pearance of objects to our senses be the ori­ginal standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually dimi­nish by the distance; but correcting the ap­pearance [Page 251] by reflection, arrive at a more con­stant and establish'd judgment concerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these dif­ferences in our calm judgments concerning the characters of men. Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, who are in a different situation from our­selves, and who cou'd never converse with us on any reasonable terms, were we to re­main constantly in that situation and point of view, which is peculiar to us. The in­tercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general inalterable standard, by which we may ap­prove or disapprove of characters and man­ners. And tho' the heart does not always take part with those general notions, or re­gulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.

FROM these principles we may easily ac­count for that merit, which is commonly ascrib'd to generosity, humanity, compassion, [Page 252] gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disin­terestedness, liberality, and all those other qualities, which form the character of good and benevolent. A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of life; and gives a just direction to all his other qualities, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society. Courage and ambition, when not regulated by bene­volence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. 'Tis the same case with judg­ment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind. They are indifferent in them­selves to the interests of society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, ac­cording as they are directed by these other passions.

AS love is immediately agreeable to the person, who is actuated by it, and hatred immediately disagreeable; this may also be a considerable reason, why we praise all the passions that partake of the former, and blame all those that have any considerable share of the latter. 'Tis certain we are in­finitely touch'd with a tender sentiment, as well as with a great one. The tears natu­rally start in our eyes at the conception of it; nor can we forbear giving a loose to the same tenderness towards the person who ex­erts [Page 253] it. All this seems to me a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin different from the prospect of utility and ad­vantage, either to ourselves or others. To which we may add, that men naturally, without reflection, approve of that character, which is most like their own. The man of a mild disposition and tender affections, in forming a notion of the most perfect virtue, mixes in it more of benevolence and huma­nity, than the man of courage and enter­prize, who naturally looks upon a certain elevation of mind as the most accom­plish'd character. This must evidently pro­ceed from an immediate sympathy, which men have with characters similar to their own. They enter with more warmth into such sentiments, and feel more sensibly the pleasure, which arises from them.

'TIS remarkable, that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship, where a person is attentive to the smallest concerns of his friend, and is willing to sacri­fice to them the most considerable interest of his own. Such delicacies have little influence on society; because they make us regard the greatest trifles: But they are the more en­gaging, the more minute the concern is, and [Page 254] are a proof of the highest merit in any one, who is capable of them. The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and pro­duce correspondent movements in all human breasts. Where friendship appears in very signal instances, my heart catches the same passion, and is warm'd by those warm senti­ments, that display themselves before me. Such agreeable movements must give me an affection to every one that excites them. This is the case with every thing that is agreeable in any person. The transition from pleasure to love is easy: But the transition must here be still more easy; since the agree­able sentiment, which is excited by sym­pathy, is love itself; and there is nothing requir'd but to change the object.

HENCE the peculiar merit of benevolence in all its shapes and appearances. Hence even its weaknesses are virtuous and amiable; and a person, whose grief upon the loss of a friend were excessive, wou'd be esteem'd upon that account. His tenderness bestows a merit, as it does a pleasure, on his melan­choly.

WE are not, however, to imagine, that all the angry passions are vicious, tho' they are disagreeable. There is a certain indul­gence [Page 255] due to human nature in this respect. Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution. The want of them, on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecillity. And where they appear only in a low degree, we not only excuse them because they are na­tural; but even bestow our applauses on them, because they are inferior to what ap­pears in the greatest part of mankind.

WHERE these angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices. All the pity and concern which we have for the miserable sufferers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it, and pro­duces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion.

EVEN when the vice of inhumanity rises not to this extreme degree, our sentiments concerning it are very much influenc'd by re­flections on the harm that results from it. And we may observe in general, that if we can find any quality in a person, which renders him incommodious to those, who live and converse with him, we always allow it to be a fault or blemish, without any farther examina­tion. On the other hand, when we enu­merate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts of his character, [Page 256] which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable hus­band, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And 'tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue.

SECT. IV. Of natural abilities.

NO distinction is more usual in all systems of ethics, than that betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues; where the former are plac'd on the same footing with bodily endowments, and are suppos'd to have no merit or moral worth annex'd to them. Whoever considers the matter accu­rately, will find, that a dispute upon this head wou'd be merely a dispute of words, [Page 257] and that tho' these qualities are not alto­gether of the same kind, yet they agree in the most material circumstances. They are both of them equally mental qualities: And both of them equally produce pleasure; and have of course an equal tendency to pro­cure the love and esteem of mankind. There are few, who are not as jealous of their character, with regard to sense and know­ledge, as to honour and courage; and much more than with regard to temperance and sobriety. Men are even afraid of passing for good-natur'd; lest that shou'd be taken for want of understanding: And often boast of more debauches than they have been really engag'd in, to give themselves airs of fire and spirit. In short, the figure a man makes in the world, the reception he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend almost as much upon his good sense and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. Let a man have the best inten­tions in the world, and be the farthest from all injustice and violence, he will never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate share, at least, of parts and understanding. Since then natural abi­lities, tho', perhaps, inferior, yet are on the [Page 258] same footing, both as to their causes and effects, with those qualities which we call moral virtues, why shou'd we make any distinction betwixt them?

THO' we refuse to natural abilities the title of virtues, we must allow, that they procure the love and esteem of mankind; that they give a new lustre to the other vir­tues; and that a man possess'd of them is much more intitled to our good-will and services, than one entirely void of them. It may, indeed, be pretended, that the senti­ment of approbation, which those qualities produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different from that, which attends the other virtues. But this, in my opinion, is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the catalogue of virtues. Each of the virtues, even benevolence, justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling in the spectator. The characters of Caesar and Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces love; the other esteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We cou'd wish to meet with the one character in a friend; the other cha­racter [Page 259] we wou'd be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner, the approbation, which at­tends natural abilities, may be somewhat different to the feeling from that, which arises from the other virtues, without making them entirely of a different species. And indeed we may observe, that the natu­ral abilities, no more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem: Wit and humour excite love a.

THOSE, who represent the distinction be­twixt natural abilities and moral virtues as very material, may say, that the former are entirely involuntary, and have therefore no merit attending them, as having no depend­ance on liberty and free-will. But to this I answer, first, that many of those qualities, which all moralists, especially the antients, comprehend under the title of moral virtues, are equally involuntary and necessary, with the qualities of the judgment and imagina­tion. [Page 260] Of this nature are constancy, forti­tude, magnanimity; and, in short, all the qualities which form the great man. I might say the same, in some degree, of the others; it being almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any con­siderable article, or cure itself of a passionate or splenetic temper, when they are natural to it. The greater degree there is of these blameable qualities, the more vicious they become, and yet they are the less voluntary. Secondly, I wou'd have any one give me a reason, why virtue and vice may not be in­voluntary, as well as beauty and deformity. These moral distinctions arise from the natu­ral distinctions of pain and pleasure; and when we receive those feelings from the general consideration of any quality or cha­racter, we denominate it vicious or virtuous. Now I believe no one will assert, that a quality can never produce pleasure or pain to the person who considers it, unless it be perfectly voluntary in the person who pos­sesses it. Thirdly, As to free-will, we have shewn that it has no place with regard to the actions, no more than the qualities of men. It is not a just consequence, that what is voluntary is free. Our actions are more voluntary than our judgments; but we [Page 261] have not more liberty in the one than in the other.

BUT tho' this distinction betwixt volun­tary and involuntary be not sufficient to ju­stify the distinction betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues, yet the former distinction will afford us a plausible reason, why mo­ralists have invented the latter. Men have observ'd, that tho' natural abilities and moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, there is, however, this difference betwixt them, that the former are almost invariable by any art or industry; while the latter, or at least, the actions, that proceed from them, may be chang'd by the motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame. Hence legislators, and divines, and moralists, have principally applied themselves to the regu­lating these voluntary actions, and have en­deavour'd to produce additional motives for being virtuous in that particular. They knew, that to punish a man for folly, or exhort him to be prudent and sagacious, wou'd have but little effect; tho' the same punishments and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a con­siderable influence. But as men, in com­mon life and conversation, do not carry those ends in view, but naturally praise or blame [Page 262] whatever pleases or displeases them, they do not seem much to regard this distinction, but consider prudence under the character of vir­tue as well as benevolence, and penetration as well as justice. Nay, we find, that all moralists, whose judgment is not perverted by a strict adherence to a system, enter into the same way of thinking; and that the antient moralists in particular made no scru­ple of placing prudence at the head of the cardinal virtues. There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation, which may be ex­cited, in some degree, by any faculty of the mind, in its perfect state and condition; and to account for this sentiment is the busi­ness of Philosophers. It belongs to Gram­marians to examine what qualities are en­titled to the denomination of virtue; nor will they find, upon trial, that this is so easy a task, as at first sight they may be apt to imagine.

THE principal reason why natural abili­ties are esteem'd, is because of their tendency to be useful to the person, who is possess'd of them. 'Tis impossible to execute any design with success, where it is not conducted with prudence and discretion; nor will the good­ness of our intentions alone suffice to pro­cure us a happy issue to our enterprizes. [Page 263] Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason; and they are the degrees of the same faculty, which set such an infinite difference betwixt one man and another. All the advantages of art are owing to human reason; and where fortune is not very capricious, the most considerable part of these advantages must fall to the share of the prudent and sagacious.

WHEN it is ask'd, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? whether one, that at first view penetrates into a sub­ject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint of application? whether a clear head, or a copious inven­tion? whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? in short, what character, or pe­culiar understanding, is more excellent than another? 'Tis evident we can answer none of these questions, without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any of his undertakings.

THERE are many other qualities of the mind, whose merit is deriv'd from the same origin. Industry, perseverance, patience, ac­tivity, vigilance, application, constancy, with other virtues of that kind, which 'twill be [Page 264] easy to recollect, are esteem'd valuable upon no other account, than their advantage in the conduct of life. 'Tis the same case with temperance, frugality, oeconomy, resolution: As on the other hand, prodigality, luxury, irresolution, uncertainty, are vicious, merely because they draw ruin upon us, and inca­pacitate us for business and action.

As wisdom and good-sense are valued, because they are useful to the person possess'd of them; so wit and eloquence are valued, because they are immediately agreeable to others. On the other hand, good humour is lov'd and esteem'd, because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself. 'Tis evi­dent, that the conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory; as a chearful good-hu­mour'd companion diffuses a joy over the whole company, from a sympathy with his gaiety. These qualities, therefore, being agreeable, they naturally beget love and esteem, and answer to all the characters of virtue.

'Tis difficult to tell, on many occasions, what it is that renders one man's conversation so agreeable and entertaining, and another's so insipid and distasteful. As conversation is a transcript of the mind as well as books, the same qualities, which render the one [Page 265] valuable, must give us an esteem for the other. This we shall consider afterwards. In the mean time it may be affirm'd in ge­neral, that all the merit a man may derive from his conversation (which, no doubt, may be very considerable) arises from no­thing but the pleasure it conveys to those who are present.

IN this view, cleanliness is also to be re­garded as a virtue; since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is a very con­siderable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this par­ticular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others, we may in this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the ori­gin of the moral distinction of vice and vir­tue in other instances.

BESIDES all those qualities, which render a person lovely or valuable, there is also a certain je-ne-sçai-quoi of agreeable and hand­some, that concurs to the same effect. In this case, as well as in that of wit and elo­quence, we must have recourse to a certain sense, which acts without reflection, and re­gards not the tendencies of qualities and characters. Some moralists account for all [Page 266] the sentiments of virtue by this sense. Their hypothesis is very plausible. Nothing but a particular enquiry can give the preference to any other hypothesis. When we find, that almost all the virtues have such particular ten­dencies; and also find, that these tendencies are sufficient alone to give a strong senti­ment of approbation: We cannot doubt, after this, that qualities are approv'd of, in proportion to the advantage, which results from them.

THE decorum or indecorum of a quality, with regard to the age, or character, or sta­tion, contributes also to its praise or blame. This decorum depends, in a great measure, upon experience. 'Tis usual to see men lose their levity, as they advance in years. Such a degree of gravity, therefore, and such years, are connected together in our thoughts. When we observe them separated in any person's character, this imposes a kind of violence on our imagination, and is disagree­able.

THAT faculty of the soul, which, of all others, is of the least consequence to the character, and has the least virtue or vice in its several degrees, at the same time, that it admits of a great variety of degrees, is the memory. Unless it rise up to that stupen­dous [Page 267] height as to surprize us, or sink so low as, in some measure, to affect the judgment, we commonly take no notice of its varia­tions, nor ever mention them to the praise or dispraise of any person. 'Tis so far from being a virtue to have a good memory, that men generally affect to complain of a bad one; and endeavouring to persuade the world, that what they say is entirely of their own invention, sacrifice it to the praise of genius and judgment. Yet to consider the matter abstractedly, 'twou'd be difficult to give a reason, why the faculty of recalling past ideas with truth and clearness, shou'd not have as much merit in it, as the faculty of placing our present ideas in such an order, as to form true propositions and opinions. The reason of the difference certainly must be, that the memory is exerted without any sensation of pleasure or pain; and in all its middling degrees serves almost equally well in business and affairs. But the least varia­tions in the judgment are sensibly felt in their consequences; while at the same time that faculty is never exerted in any eminent de­gree, without an extraordinary delight and satisfaction. The sympathy with this utility and pleasure bestows a merit on the under­standing; and the absence of it makes us [Page 268] consider the memory as a faculty very in­different to blame or praise.

BEFORE I leave this subject of natural abilities, I must observe, that, perhaps, one source of the esteem and affection, which attends them, is deriv'd from the importance and weight, which they bestow on the per­son possess'd of them. He becomes of greater consequence in life. His resolutions and actions affect a greater number of his fellow-creatures. Both his friendship and enmity are of moment. And 'tis easy to observe, that whoever is elevated, after this manner, above the rest of mankind, must excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation. Whatever is important engages our attention, fixes our thought, and is con­templated with satisfaction. The histories of kingdoms are more interesting than do­mestic stories: The histories of great empires more than those of small cities and principa­lities: And the histories of wars and revo­lutions more than those of peace and order. We sympathize with the persons that suffer, in all the various sentiments which belong to their fortunes. The mind is occupied by the multitude of the objects, and by the strong passions, that display themselves. And this occupation or agitation of the mind is [Page 269] commonly agreeable and amusing. The same theory accounts for the esteem and regard we pay to men of extraordinary parts and abilities. The good and ill of multitudes are connected with their actions. Whatever they undertake is important, and challenges our attention. Nothing is to be over-look'd and despis'd, that regards them. And where any person can excite these sentiments, he soon acquires our esteem; unless other cir­cumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable.

SECT. V. Some farther reflections concerning the natural virtues.

IT has been observ'd, in treating of the passions, that pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the mind, body, or fortune; and that these advantages or disadvantages have that effect by producing a separate im­pression of pain or pleasure. The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general sur­vey or view of any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives [Page 270] rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. We have assign'd four dif­ferent sources of this pain and pleasure; and in order to justify more fully that hypo­thesis, it may here be proper to observe, that the advantages or disadvantages of the body and of fortune, produce a pain or pleasure from the very same principles. The ten­dency of any object to be useful to the per­son possess'd of it, or to others; to convey pleasure to him or to others; all these cir­cumstances convey an immediate pleasure to the person, who considers the object, and command his love and approbation.

TO begin with the advantages of the body; we may observe a phaenomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous, if any thing cou'd be trivial, which fortified a con­clusion of such importance, or ludicrous, which was employ'd in a philosophical rea­soning. 'Tis a general remark, that those we call good women's men, who have either signaliz'd themselves by their amorous ex­ploits, or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigour of that kind, are well received by the fair sex, and naturally engage the affections even of those, whose virtue pre­vents any design of ever giving employment [Page 271] to those talents. Here 'tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females; at the same time that the women, who love and esteem him, have no prospect of receiving that en­joyment themselves, and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one, that has a commerce of love with him. This instance is singular, and merits our atten­tion.

ANOTHER source of the pleasure we re­ceive from considering bodily advantages, is their utility to the person himself, who is possess'd of them. 'Tis certain, that a con­siderable part of the beauty of men, as well as of other animals, consists in such a con­formation of members, as we find by ex­perience to be attended with strength and agility, and to capacitate the creature for any action or exercise. Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beautiful in our species, because they are signs of force and vigour, which being ad­vantages we naturally sympathize with, they convey to the beholder a share of that satis­faction they produce in the possessor.

SO far as to the utility, which may attend any quality of the body. As to the imme­diate [Page 272] pleasure, 'tis certain, that an air of health, as well as of strength and agility, makes a considerable part of beauty; and that a sickly air in another is always dis­agreeable, upon account of that idea of pain and uneasiness, which it conveys to us. On the other hand, we are pleas'd with the re­gularity of our own features, tho' it be nei­ther useful to ourselves nor others; and 'tis necessary for us, in some measure, to set our­selves at a distance, to make it convey to us any satisfaction. We commonly consider ourselves as we appear in the eyes of others, and sympathize with the advantageous sen­timents they entertain with regard to us.

HOW far the advantages of fortune pro­duce esteem and approbation from the same principles, we may satisfy ourselves by reflecting on our precedent reasoning on that subject. We have observ'd, that our approbation of those, who are possess'd of the advantages of fortune, may be ascrib'd to three different causes. First, To that im­mediate pleasure, which a rich man gives us, by the view of the beautiful cloaths, equi­page, gardens, or houses, which he possesses. Secondly, To the advantage, which we hope to reap from him by his generosity and libe­rality. Thirdly, To the pleasure and advan­tage, [Page 273] which he himself reaps from his pos­sessions, and which produce an agreeable sympathy in us. Whether we ascribe our esteem of the rich and great to one or all of these causes, we may clearly see the traces of those principles, which give rise to the sense of vice and virtue. I believe most people, at first sight, will be inclin'd to ascribe our esteem of the rich to self-interest, and the prospect of advantage. But as 'tis certain, that our esteem or deference extends beyond any prospect of advantage to ourselves, 'tis evident, that that sentiment must proceed from a sympathy with those, who are de­pendent on the person we esteem and respect, and who have an immediate connexion with him. We consider him as a person capable of contributing to the happiness or enjoy­ment of his fellow-creatures, whose senti­ments, with regard to him, we naturally embrace. And this consideration will serve to justify my hypothesis in preferring the third principle to the other two, and ascribing our esteem of the rich to a sympathy with the pleasure and advantage, which they them­selves receive from their possessions. For as even the other two principles cannot operate to a due extent, or account for all the phae­nomena, without having recourse to a sym­pathy [Page 274] of one kind or other; 'tis much more natural to chuse that sympathy, which is immediate and direct, than that which is re­mote and indirect. To which we may add, that where the riches or power are very great, and render the person considerable and important in the world, the esteem attend­ing them, may, in part, be ascrib'd to ano­ther source, distinct from these three, viz. their interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude, and importance of their con­sequences: Tho', in order to account for the operation of this principle, we must also have recourse to sympathy; as we have ob­serv'd in the preceding section.

IT may not be amiss, on this occasion, to remark the flexibility of our sentiments, and the several changes they so readily receive from the objects, with which they are con­join'd. All the sentiments of approbation, which attend any particular species of ob­jects, have a great resemblance to each other, tho' deriv'd from different sources; and, on the other hand, those sentiments, when di­rected to different objects, are different to the feeling, tho' deriv'd from the same source. Thus the beauty of all visible objects causes a pleasure pretty much the same, tho' it be sometimes deriv'd from the mere species and [Page 275] appearance of the objects; sometimes from sympathy, and an idea of their utility. In like manner, whenever we survey the actions and characters of men, without any particu­lar interest in them, the pleasure, or pain, which arises from the survey (with some minute differences) is, in the main, of the same kind, tho' perhaps there be a great diversity in the causes, from which it is de­riv'd. On the other hand, a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not the same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very inex­plicable in this variation of our feelings; but 'tis what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments.

SECT. VI. Conclusion of this book.

THUS upon the whole I am hopeful, that nothing is wanting to an accu­rate proof of this system of ethics. We are certain, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. We are also [Page 276] certain, that it has a great influence on our sense of beauty, when we regard external objects, as well as when we judge of morals. We find, that it has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation, when it operates alone, without the con­currence of any other principle; as in the cases of justice, allegiance, chastity, and good-manners. We may observe, that all the circumstances requisite for its operation are found in most of the virtues; which have, for the most part, a tendency to the good of society, or to that of the person possess'd of them. If we compare all these circumstances, we shall not doubt, that sym­pathy is the chief source of moral distinctions; especially when we reflect, that no objection can be rais'd against this hypothesis in one case, which will not extend to all cases. Justice is certainly approv'd of for no other reason, than because it has a tendency to the public good: And the public good is in­different to us, except so far as sympathy in­terests us in it. We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues, which have a like tendency to the public good. They must derive all their merit from our sym­pathy with those, who reap any advantage from them: As the virtues, which have a [Page 277] tendency to the good of the person possess'd of them, derive their merit from our sym­pathy with him.

MOST people will readily allow, that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous, be­cause of their utility. This way of think­ing is so natural, and occurs on so many oc­casions, that few will make any scruple of admitting it. Now this being once admit­ted, the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledg'd. Virtue is consider'd as means to an end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that principle, there­fore, we are to ascribe the sentiment of ap­probation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues, that are useful to society, or to the person possess'd of them. These form the most considerable part of mo­rality.

WERE it proper in such a subject to bribe the readers assent, or employ any thing but solid argument, we are here abundantly sup­plied with topics to engage the affections. All lovers of virtue (and such we all are in speculation, however we may degenerate in practice) must certainly be pleas'd to see [Page 278] moral distinctions deriv'd from so noble a source, which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of human nature. It requires but very little knowledge of hu­man affairs to perceive, that a sense of mo­rals is a principle inherent in the soul, and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those principles, from whence it is deriv'd, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. Those who resolve the sense of morals into ori­ginal instincts of the human mind, may de­fend the cause of virtue with sufficient autho­rity; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. Accord­ing to their system, not only virtue must be approv'd of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the prin­ciples, from whence it is deriv'd. So that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good.

THIS observation may be extended to justice, and the other virtues of that kind. Tho' justice be artificial, the sense of its mo­rality is natural. 'Tis the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders [Page 279] any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we natu­rally approve of it; and if we did not so, 'tis impossible any combination or convention cou'd ever produce that sentiment.

MOST of the inventions of men are sub­ject to change. They depend upon humour and caprice. They have a vogue for a time, and then sink into oblivion. It may, per­haps, be apprehended, that if justice were allow'd to be a human invention, it must be plac'd on the same footing. But the cases are widely different. The interest, on which justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all times and places. It can­not possibly be serv'd by any other inven­tion. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society. All these causes render the rules of justice stedfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature. And if they were founded on ori­ginal instincts, cou'd they have any greater stability?

THE same system may help us to form a just notion of the happiness, as well as of the dignity of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality. Who in­deed does not feel an accession of alacrity in [Page 280] his pursuits of knowledge and ability of every kind, when he considers, that besides the advantage, which immediately result from these acquisitions, they also give him a new lustre in the eyes of mankind, and are universally attended with esteem and appro­bation? And who can think any advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation for the least breach of the social virtues, when he considers, that not only his character with regard to others, but also his peace and in­ward satisfaction entirely depend upon his strict observance of them; and that a mind will never be able to bear its own survey, that has been wanting in its part to man­kind and society? But I forbear insisting on this subject. Such reflections require a work a-part, very different from the genius of the present. The anatomist ought never to emu­late the painter; nor in his accurate dis­sections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even something hideous, or at least minute in the views of things, which he presents; and 'tis necessary the ob­jects shou'd be set more at a distance, and be more cover'd up from sight, to make them engaging to the eye and imagination. An [Page 281] anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter; and 'tis even im­practicable to excel in the latter art, with­out the assistance of the former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can de­sign with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract speculations concern­ing human nature, however cold and un­entertaining, become subservient to practi­cal morality; and may render this latter sci­ence more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations.


THERE is nothing I wou'd more willingly lay hold of, than an op­portunity of confessing my errors; and shou'd esteem such a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than the most unerring judgment. A man, who is free from mistakes, can pretend to no praises, ex­cept from the justness of his understanding: But a man, who corrects his mistakes, shews at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour and ingenuity of his temper. I have not yet been so fortunate as to dis­cover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings deliver'd in the preceding volumes, except on one article: But I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all mistakes in the readers; and 'tis chiefly to remedy this defect, I have subjoin'd the following appendix.

[Page 284] WE can never be induc'd to believe any matter of fact, except where its cause, or its effect, is present to us; but what the na­ture is of that belief, which arises from the relation of cause and effect, few have had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my opinion, this dilemma is inevitable. Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of reality or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. That it is not a new idea, annex'd to the simple con­ception, may be evinc'd from these two ar­guments. First, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this idea of ex­istence can be annex'd to the idea of any object, or form the difference betwixt a sim­ple conception and belief. Secondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feel­ing or sentiment; in something, that de­pends [Page 285] not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. When we are convinc'd of any matter of fact, we do no­thing but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere reveries of the imagination. And when we express our incredulity concerning any fact, we mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling. Did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere conception, whatever objects were pre­sented by the wildest imagination, wou'd be on an equal footing with the most establish'd truths founded on history and experience. There is nothing but the feeling, or sen­timent, to distinguish the one from the other.

THIS, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth, that belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple con­ception, the next question, that naturally oc­curs, is, what is the nature of this feeling, or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind? This question is important. For if it be not ana­logous to any other sentiment, we must de­spair of explaining its causes, and must con­sider it as an original principle of the human [Page 286] mind. If it be analogous, we may hope to explain its causes from analogy, and trace it up to more general principles. Now that there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions, which are the objects of con­viction and assurance, than in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder, every one will readily own. They strike upon us with more force; they are more present to us; the mind has a firmer hold of them, and is more actuated and mov'd by them. It acquiesces in them; and, in a manner, fixes and reposes itself on them. In short, they approach nearer to the impressions, which are immediately present to us; and are therefore analogous to many other opera­tions of the mind.

THERE is not, in my opinion, any possi­bility of evading this conclusion, but by asserting, that belief, beside the simple con­ception, consists in some impression or feel­ing, distinguishable from the conception. It does not modify the conception, and render it more present and intense: It is only an­nex'd to it, after the same manner that will and desire are annex'd to particular con­ceptions of good and pleasure. But the fol­lowing considerations will, I hope, be suffi­cient to remove this hypothesis. First, It is [Page 287] directly contrary to experience, and our im­mediate consciousness. All men have ever allow'd reasoning to be merely an operation of our thoughts or ideas; and however those ideas may be varied to the feeling, there is nothing ever enters into our conclusions but ideas, or our fainter conceptions. For in­stance; I hear at present a person's voice, whom I am acquainted with; and this sound comes from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person, along with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existent at present, with the same qualities and relations, that I formerly knew them possess'd of. These ideas take faster hold of my mind, than the ideas of an in­chanted castle. They are different to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impression attending them. 'Tis the same case when I recollect the several incidents of a journey, or the events of any history. Every particular fact is there the object of belief. Its idea is modified differently from the loose reveries of a castle-builder: But no distinct impression attends every distinct idea, or conception of matter of fact. This is the subject of plain experience. If ever this experience can be disputed on any oc­casion, [Page 288] 'tis when the mind has been agitated with doubts and difficulties; and afterwards, upon taking the object in a new point of view, or being presented with a new argu­ment, fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion and belief. In this case there is a feeling distinct and separate from the con­ception. The passage from doubt and agi­tation to tranquility and repose, conveys a satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. But take any other case. Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion, while some interpos'd object conceals the rest of his body. Here 'tis certain, the imagination spreads out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders, and breast and neck. These members I conceive and believe him to be possess'd of. Nothing can be more evident, than that this whole operation is perform'd by the thought or imagination alone. The transition is immediate. The ideas presently strike us. Their customary connexion with the present impression, varies them and modifies them in a certain manner, but produces no act of the mind, distinct from this peculiarity of conception. Let any one examine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be the truth.

[Page 289] Secondly, Whatever may be the case, with regard to this distinct impression, it must be allow'd, that the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact, than of fictions. Why then look any farther, or multiply suppo­sitions without necessity?

Thirdly, We can explain the causes of the firm conception, but not those of any separate impression. And not only so, but the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole subject, and nothing is left to produce any other effect. An inference con­cerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object, that is frequently con­join'd, or is associated with a present im­pression. This is the whole of it. Every part is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more steady conception; and nothing re­mains capable of producing any distinct im­pression.

Fourthly, The effects of belief, in in­fluencing the passions and imagination, can all be explain'd from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle. These arguments, with many others, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, sufficiently prove, that belief only modifies the idea or conception; and renders [Page 290] it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression.

THUS upon a general view of the sub­ject, there appear to be two questions of importance, which we may venture to re­commend to the consideration of philoso­phers, Whether there be any thing to distin­guish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling or sentiment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object?

IF, upon impartial enquiry, the same con­clusion, that I have form'd, be assented to by philosophers, the next business is to ex­amine the analogy, which there is betwixt belief, and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception: And this I do not esteem a difficult task. The transition from a pre­sent impression, always enlivens and strength­ens any idea. When any object is presented, the idea of its usual attendant immediately strikes us, as something real and solid. 'Tis felt, rather than conceiv'd, and approaches the impression, from which it is deriv'd, in its force and influence. This I have prov'd at large. I cannot add any new arguments; tho' perhaps my reasoning on this whole question, concerning cause and effect, wou'd [Page 291] have been more convincing, had the follow­ing passages been inserted in the places, which I have mark'd for them. I have ad­ded a few illustrations on other points, where I thought it necessary.

To be inserted in Vol. I. page 153. line 12. after these words (fainter and more ob­scure.) beginning a new paragraph.

IT frequently happens, that when two men have been engag'd in any scene of ac­tion, the one shall remember it much better than the other, and shall have all the diffi­culty in the world to make his companion recollect it. He runs over several circum­stances in vain; mentions the time, the place, the company, what was said, what was done on all sides; till at last he hits on some lucky circumstance, that revives the whole, and gives his friend a perfect memory of every thing. Here the person that forgets receives at first all the ideas from the dis­course of the other, with the same circum­stances of time and place; tho' he considers them as mere fictions of the imagination. But as soon as the circumstance is mention'd, that touches the memory, the very same ideas now appear in a new light, and have, [Page 292] in a manner, a different feeling from what they had before. Without any other alter­ation, beside that of the feeling, they become immediately ideas of the memory, and are assented to.

SINCE, therefore, the imagination can re­present all the same objects that the memory can offer to us, and since those faculties are only distinguish'd by the different feeling of the ideas they present, it may be proper to consider what is the nature of that feeling. And here I believe every one will readily agree with me, that the ideas of the me­mory are more strong and lively than those of the fancy. A painter, who intended, &c.

To be inserted Vol. I. page 174. line 8. after these words (according to the foregoing definition.) beginning a new paragraph.

THIS operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho' no one has so much as suspected, that there was any diffi­culty in explaining it. For my part I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a [Page 293] loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being con­ceiv'd. But when I wou'd explain this man­ner, I scarce find any word that fully an­swers the case, but am oblig'd to have re­course to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the com­mand over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circum­stances of place and time. It may set them, [Page 294] in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible, that that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief, 'tis evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their con­ception, and in their feeling to the mind. I confess, that 'tis impossible to explain per­fectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagina­tion. It gives them more force and influ­ence; makes them appear of greater im­portance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.

A note to Vol. I. page 179. line 19. after these words (immediate impression.)

Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus mul­tum [Page 295] esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus, aut scriptum aliquod legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem: quem accipimus primum hîc disputare solitum: Cujus etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memo­riam solûm mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hîc Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor Polemo; cujus ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videamus. Equi­dem etiam curiam nostram, hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est major, solebam intuens Scipio­nem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae ducta sit disciplina. Cicero de Finibus, lib. 5.

To be inserted in Vol. I. page 218. line 21. after these words (impressions of the senses.) beginning a new paragraph.

WE may observe the same effect of poe­try in a lesser degree; and this is common both to poetry and madness, that the vivacity they bestow on the ideas is not deriv'd from the particular situations or connexions of the objects of these ideas, but from the present temper and disposition of the person. But [Page 296] how great soever the pitch may be, to which this vivacity rise, 'tis evident, that in poetry it never has the same feeling with that which arises in the mind, when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species of proba­bility. The mind can easily distinguish be­twixt the one and the other; and whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or persuasion. The case is the same with the idea, as with the passion it occa­sions. There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from poetry; tho' at the same time the feelings of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case it lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the at­tention. The difference in the passions is a clear proof of a like difference in those ideas, from which the passions are deriv'd. Where the vivacity arises from a customary con­junction with a present impression; tho' the imagination may not, in appearance, be so [Page 297] much mov'd; yet there is always something more forcible and real in its actions, than in the fervors of poetry and eloquence. The force of our mental actions in this case, no more than in any other, is not to be mea­sur'd by the apparent agitation of the mind. A poetical description may have a more sen­sible effect on the fancy, than an historical narration. It may collect more of those cir­cumstances, that form a compleat image or picture. It may seem to set the object be­fore us in more lively colours. But still the ideas it presents are different to the feeling from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment. There is something weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehe­mence of thought and sentiment, which at­tends the fictions of poetry.

WE shall afterwards have occasion to re­mark both the resemblances and differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm, and a serious conviction. In the mean time I cannot for­bear observing, that the great difference in their feeling proceeds in some measure from reflection and general rules. We observe, that the vigour of conception, which fictions receive from poetry and eloquence, is a cir­cumstance merely accidental, of which every idea is equally susceptible; and that such [Page 298] fictions are connected with nothing that is real. This observation makes us only lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction: But causes the idea to feel very different from the eternal establish'd persuasions founded on memory and custom. They are somewhat of the same kind: But the one is much in­ferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.

A LIKE reflection on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of our ideas. Where an opinion admits of no doubt, or opposite probability, we attribute to it a full conviction; tho' the want of resemblance, or contiguity, may render its force inferior to that of other opinions. 'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses, and makes us imagine, that an object at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye as large as one of the same dimensions at ten.

To be inserted in Vol. I. page 282. line ult. after these words (any idea of power.) be­ginning a new paragraph.

SOME have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in our own mind; and [Page 299] that having in this manner acquir'd the idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to disco­ver it. The motions of our body, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind, (say they) obey the will; nor do we seek any far­ther to acquire a just notion of force or power. But to convince us how fallacious this rea­soning is, we need only consider, that the will being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect. So far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and sepa­rable from the cause, and cou'd not be fore­seen without the experience of their constant conjunction. We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it: And 'tis evidently impossible to fix any precise bounds to our authority, where we consult not experience. In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor [Page 300] can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than external objects have. Since, therefore, matter is confess'd by philosophers to operate by an unknown force, we shou'd in vain hope to attain an idea of force by consulting our own minds a.

I HAD entertain'd some hopes, that how­ever deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concern­ing personal identity, I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good general reason for scepticism, 'tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in [Page 301] all my decisions. I shall propose the argu­ments on both sides, beginning with those that induc'd me to deny the strict and pro­per identity and simplicity of a self or think­ing being.

WHEN we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annex'd to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. Every idea is deriv'd from preceding im­pressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and in­dividual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.

WHATEVER is distinct, is distinguish­able; and whatever is distinguishable, is se­parable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceiv'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.

WHEN I view this table and that chim­ney, nothing is present to me but parti­cular perceptions, which are of a like na­ture with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers. But this ta­ble, which is present to me, and that chim­ney, may and do exist separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There is no contradiction, [Page 302] therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions.

IN general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All ideas are borrow'd from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore, are deriv'd from that source. Con­sequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But 'tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, with­out any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never be absurd with regard to per­ceptions.

WHEN I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever per­ceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.

WE can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If not, the [Page 303] addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.

THE annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other.

IS self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place, concern­ing the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For my part, I have a notion of neither, when conceiv'd distinct from particular perceptions.

PHILOSOPHERS begin to be reconcil'd to the principle, that we have no idea of exter­nal substance, distinct from the ideas of par­ticular qualities. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions.

So far I seem to be attended with suffi­cient evidence. But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when a I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which [Page 304] binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very de­fective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordi­nary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprize us. Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

[Page 305] IN short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct exist­ences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind per­ceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, how­ever, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more ma­ture reflections, may discover some hypo­thesis, that will reconcile those contra­dictions.

I SHALL also take this opportunity of confessing two other errors of less import­ance, which more mature reflection has dis­cover'd to me in my reasoning. The first may be found in Vol. I. page 107. where I say, that the distance betwixt two bodies is known, among other things, by the angles, which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other. 'Tis certain, that these angles are not known to the mind, and consequently can never discover the [Page 306] distance. The second error may be found in Vol. I. page 171. where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be differ­ent by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be com­prehended under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling, I shou'd have been nearer the truth.

THERE are two errors of the press, which affect the sense, and therefore the reader is desir'd to correct them. In Vol. I. page 332. line penult. for as the perception read a per­ception. In Vol. I. p. 447. line 5. for moral read natural.

A note to Vol. I. page 43. line 11. to the word (resemblance.)

'TIS evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance shou'd be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; tho' their perfect simpli­city excludes all possibility of separation or [Page 307] distinction. 'Tis the same case with parti­cular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the ge­neral appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which ex­cludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. 'Tis the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree.

To be inserted in Vol. I. page 88. line 19. after these words (of the present difficulty.) beginning a new paragraph.

THERE are many philosophers, who re­fuse to assign any standard of equality, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present two ob­jects, that are equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion. All defini­tions, say they, are fruitless, without the perception of such objects; and where we [Page 308] perceive such objects, we no longer stand in need of any definition. To this reasoning I entirely agree; and assert, that the only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv'd from the whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects. For 'tis evident that the eye, &c.

To be inserted in Vol. I. page 97. line 22. after these words (practicable or imagi­nable) beginning a new paragraph.

To whatever side mathematicians turn, this dilemma still meets them. If they judge of equality, or any other proportion, by the accurate and exact standard, viz. the enu­meration of the minute indivisible parts, they both employ a standard, which is use­less in practice, and actually establish the in­divisibility of extension, which they endea­vour to explode. Or if they employ, as is usual, the inaccurate standard, deriv'd from a comparison of objects, upon their general appearance, corrected by measuring and juxta position; their first principles, tho' certain and infallible, are too coarse to afford any such subtile inferences as they commonly draw from them. The first principles are founded on the imagination and senses: The [Page 309] conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less contradict these faculties.

A note to Vol. I. page 118. line 8. to these words (impressions and ideas.)

As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, with­out entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrass'd by any question. Thus, if it be ask'd, if the invisible and intangible distance, interpos'd betwixt two objects, be something or no­thing: 'Tis easy to answer, that it is some­thing, viz. a property of the objects, which affect the senses after such a particular man­ner. If it be ask'd, whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt them, touch or not: It may be answer'd, that this de­pends upon the definition of the word, touch. If objects be said to touch, when there is nothing sensible interpos'd betwixt them, these objects touch: If objects be said to touch, when their images strike contiguous parts of the eye, and when the hand feels both objects successively, without any inter­pos'd motion, these objects do not touch. The appearances of objects to our senses are [Page 310] all consistent; and no difficulties can ever arise, but from the obscurity of the terms we make use of.

IF we carry our enquiry beyond the ap­pearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty. Thus if it be ask'd, whether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always full of body, or of something that by an improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I must acknowledge, that I find no very de­cisive arguments on either side; tho' I am inclin'd to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar and popular notions. If the Newtonian philosophy be rightly un­derstood, it will be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be plac'd after such a manner, as to receive bodies betwixt them, without impul­sion or penetration. The real nature of this position of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with its effects on the senses, and its power of receiving body. Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.


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