By William Lucy, Bishop of S. Davids.

LONDON: Printed by S. G. and B. G. for Edward Man at the White Swan in S. Pauls Church-yard, 1673.


To the Reader.


BEfore you go further into this Treatise, I think it fit to premonish you of three things. First, How it is writ. Secondly, Why by me. Third­ly, Why now put out: Concerning the first, expect no other but to read the strongest Discourse in Politiques, betwixt Mr. Hobbs and me, that ever was writ; for the Art of Polity (being more properly signified by the name of Prudence) is always, by those who writ of it, from Plato and Aristotle downward, until you come to the very last, is naturally powder'd with senten­ces, and interlarded with Histories; for it being not a Science whose demonstrations come from ne­cessary causes, where posita causa most certainly fol­lows the effect, or grant the effect, you must own the cause from whence it came; but a prudence, which disposeth men to a wise conformity, not by the force of a necessary efficacy, but by the perswasions which fear and love induce to, which are not necessary, but arbitrary; men in the manage of such affairs do most discreetly, when they produce the sentences of wise men who have gone before, and by great expe­rience, found those sentences effectual in such occasi­ons: and because there is nothing new under the Sun, therefore Histories of our Fore-fathers, in like condi­tions, are most excellent Guides for the prudent di­posure of our lives, who indeed do but repeat what they have done: but Mr. Hobbs, presuming upon the greatness of his own wit; which indeed is great, (and [Page] it is a thousand pities he bestow'd it so ill) scorns to tread in beaten paths, and thinks by the strength of his own fancies to make his feet leave such an impression, as all others shall follow him, not he them. I must follow him, for whosoever is to be confuted, must have it done out of his own Princi­ples, and therefore I fall upon him with only down­right reasons; therefore if at any time my Pen hath dropt a sentence, or a story unawares, which was op­posite to the business, (which I believe is very seldom) I though it not worth the mending, but let it pass: And so having shew'd the Reader why I writ so un­politically of Politiques, I pass to the se [...]ond Adver­tisement.

The second Premonition is a question why I should write of this piece, and my Answer is short, having spoke to the former part of his Leviathan, it was proper for me not to step over this, but take him in order as he writes: But a man may object, and some have objected that were acquainted with my under­takings, that this is not so proper f [...]r a Bishop (whose time should be taken up with his Profession, which is Divinity) to meddle with such State affairs. I answer, that Mr. Hobbs his writings are so inter­lined with so much Heterodox (shall I say) or Heretical and Atheistical Divinity, that it befits none so well as a Divine t [...] meddle with them. And again, I said, that although there is a Generation that think we should be Fools in any thing else, yet let them know, that if so, we must be Fools in that likewise, as well as other things: for Theologia Diuinity, is not only Scientia, Knowledge, but as ma­ny of the School-men, Mr. Hobbs h [...]s good friends, [Page] speak, it is Sapientia, we may render it in English Wisdom, which is the highest knowledge, whose principles are the highest and first Rules which habi­tually are imprinted in man, and whose conclusions are the premises of other inferiour Sciences: And they say moreover, that this which is called Schola­stica Theologia, School Divinity, differs from Na­tural only in this, that it adds one principle to the other, which is the Faith in the revealed Will of God, which I am forced to fight for in this Treatise with Mr Hobbs: And because this is the nature of this great Wisdom of Divinity, it may prescribe the Rules to all Sciences and Prudencies, and all con­ditions of men, from the King to the Cobler, how they may live and demean themselves vertuously: But besides this, let those men consider, that there is one piece of a Divines study (without which he will be lame and very deficient) which must needs teach him a great deal more of this Prudence, then I have need to use in this Discourse, unless he be a very dull man, which is Ecclesiastical Story, wherein he shall find such acts and subtilties practised by Hereticks and Schismaticks, (whom I have always observed to be more crafty, though not wiser then the Orthodox part) such applications to Emperours, to Emperesses, to Favourites at Court, such cloaking evil intentions with pious pretences, such artificial slandering the persons of their Adversaries, that he cannot but know the polity, yea the base crafts of men, and knowing them to be such, may the better learn to avoid those snares which have catched men heretofore, and will (if not prevented) do so again; yea shall find that many times the wisdom of learned and pious Bishops [Page] have been the prop and stay of both the Empires, East and West; and which is more, even in the practick peace of Polity, you shall find Bishops exe­cute them in the most excellent manner for wisdom and courage, that ever any men did: I write not this to invite men of that condition to muddle them­selves with the trivial affairs of this world, no, as S. Paul to the Philippians 3.20. Our conversation is in heaven. The word which we render Conversa­tion, is in the Original [...], which is excellent­ly noted by Beza, that it is that kind of Conversati­on which agrees to the Polity, of such as are Citizens of the heavenly Hierusalem: So that although the Apostle aff [...]rms this of all men who aspire to Christian perfection, that such men should live and converse in that Polity, which conduceth to the establishment of that spiritual society, which are parts of that Kingdom, yet in a more especial manner, it agrees to them who are exalted to that high dignity in that society, that the Polity of their abilities should be applied to the advance of that Kingdom; and in or­der to that, when the benefit or ill of a sublunary King [...]om or Commonwealth shall conduce to that Kingdom in heaven, it will become such men to in­terpose their counsels in a way most proper for them to imploy themselves in: But my intent in writing this is to shew, that a poor old man, sitting in his Study, and principally applying that study to Divi­nity, may easily by that study give advice and ad­monition to greater doubts then are in his Politiques, which indeed are gross mistakes, from the first corner stone he laid in the Foundation, to the top-tile in the Roof.

[Page]But then it may further be enquired, why I put out these Papers now, and not before: My Answer is, That about three years past, when I came up to the Parliament, I brought up a rough draught of either all, or most of these sheets, thinking at lei­sure time, in the intervals of business, I might smooth them over, but then I was informed that he was about such a work himself, to c [...]rrect his own Er­rours, which I should have been most glad to have seen. O Mr Hobbs, if this comes to your hands, give me leave to tell y [...]u that would be a glorious work, and let me say to you as the Philosopher did to him, who blushed coming out of a Tavern, Blush not to come out, but going in: Humanum est er­rare, but perseverare: Nay, I may say it is the most glorious work of a Christian to repent, every man may erre, but none but a pious man can repent: I would to God you would do it, and do but consider how you oppose in your Opinions the whole Catholique Church in many things, which never Christian man did before you: You write as if your Leviathan were the B [...]ok in which the Rosiecrusians in their Fama speak of, which should be able to instruct men sufficiently in all things, both Theological and Phi­losophical, were all the books in the world lost be­sides, and a Pythagorean ipse dixit might suf­fice for your Scholar: But good Sir, think that there have been wise men in Philosophy, in Policy, in Di­vinity, before your book was writ, yea before you were born, or thought of doing this great work your self, and save me the labour of tiring my old de­crepid Age with such unhappy cnotentions, which else, at such leisures as I can snatch from my greater [Page] duties, I shall be writing to some other misconceipts of yours.

Reader, I intreat you to forgive this diversion to Mr. Hobbs, and further only know, that I have ta­ken care that his words should be put down strictly in a diverse Letter; and I desire this may be print­ed in Quarto, to be joyn'd (by them who have the other) to my first Piece, and then I have done, who am

Your Brother in Jesus Christ Will: St. David.

Imprimatur iste Tractatus a Reverendo Confratre nostro Gulielmo Domino Episc. Manevensi elucubratus

Humfr. London

A SECOND PART OF Observations, Censures, and Confutations OF DIVERS ERRORS IN Mr. Hobbs HIS LEVIATHAN. Beginning at the seventeenth Chap­ter of that Book.

CHAP. 1. The Introduction to the whole Discourse.

I Have briefly touched the chief heads of his first Part. And am now arrived at his second, part, which is entituled of Common-wealths, and this part be­gins at the seventeenth Chapter of the whole Book superscribed of the causes, generation and definition of a Common-wealth.

He begins with the final cause most rightly, which is cau­sa causarum, and sets the whole at work. And I find no [Page 2] fault with what he writes concerning that.

Secondly, I approve what he saith at the bottom of the 85. page, That small numbers joyned together cannot give them security to live peaceably. Small is a Relative, small in respect of their Neighbours, of whose injury they may justly be af­fraid, unless they are supported with Natural, or Artificial For­tifications, or their number may be equalled by the weight of the internal vertue, or gallantry of the Inhabitants; some way or other it must be made up.

Thirdly, I approve what he saith, pag. 86. That be the Peo­ple never so numerous (I may add or strong) yet if their acti­ons are directed by their own particular Judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no Defence, nor Protection. His Reasons likewise I approve.

Fourthly, I censure not his Conclusion in the same page; That the Government for their Good, must not be for one Life or Battel, but Perpetual.

Fifthly, He makes a very Ingenious Discourse upon the difference betwixt those sociable Creatures, as Bees, and Ants, (which Aristotle calls Political) and hath very handsom ap­plications concerning them, to the middle of the 87. page; but then I must begin to examine him with less approbati­on: In the Margent there is noted, the generation of a Com­mon-Wealth, and it begins thus.


SECT. I. This Generation censured, first from that Word only, which cannot be true.

THE only way to Erect such a common Power, as may be able to defend them from the Invasion of Foreigners, and the Injuries of one another; and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own Industry, and by the fruits of the Earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their Power and strength upon one man, or upon one Assembly of men, [Page 3] that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will, which is as much as to say to appoint one man or Assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledg himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act or cause to be acted in these things, which concern the common peace, and safety, and therein to submit their wills every one to his will and their Judgment to his Judgment. Thus far he, A bold and strange assertion in that severe Language; (the on [...]ly way) what? (Mr. Hobbs) no other? Certainly there have been many Common-wealths in the World which have lived peace­ably and quietly, and enjoyed the fruits of their Labours, and have abounded with all the comforts of their association; And yet I dare speak it with confidence there was never any thus generated, that is to appoint one man or Assembly to bear their Person, and to allow themselves to be Authors of his Actions, to submit their Wills to his Will, and their Judg­ments to his Judgment.

SECT. II. A Supream cannot receive his Authority from the Peo­ple.

1. COnsider here (for fear I may forget it hereafter) that the King or Supreme, by him, is but the Person (as he most improperly styles him) and they (the Multitude) the Au­thors of what he doth; so that he acts only by their Authori­ty (as you may see those words expounded in the 16. Chap. pag. 81. and 82.) so that by him the People give the Supreme Authority, which is a mighty diminution to all Supreme Au­thority, and indeed an Incroachment upon the Praerogative of God, by whom (and whom alone) Kings reign, and Princes bear rule; so that as we rightly say, that all Authority in a Kingdom is derived from the King, who is the Fountain of all Authority he makes a circle in it, and saith, the head of this Fountain is derived from the People.

SECT. III. It is impossible they should do it.

BUT let us examine the possibilities of it, Nihil dat quod non habet, either formaliter, eminenter or Virtualiter. No­thing can give what it hath not Formally, Eminently, or Vir­tually; Certainly neither of these can be affirmed of the Peo­ple, if they have it any of these ways it must be Conjunctim or divisim, either as severed or conjoyned; either as distinct, or united, but neither of these: if severed, then either every man had this Power, or a few, or one alone; the first branch of this Division will abide the chief Dispute with him, because he hath said before, That every man hath right to every thing, to all things, to all riches, persons, wives, lives, what you will before they are covenanted into a body, this hath been confuted heretofore, yet this very occasion will be able to shew the absurdity of it further.

SECT. IV. The Multitude cannot make a Leviathan, because he had all their rights before.

FOr which let us lay a Foundation, suppose this Kingdom were unsetled, and yet now endeavouring to be setled, and all the People being free and and without Covenant, have right to all the things in the world, these are met together to chuse a Leviathan (as he terms him) for setling their beings most securely. In this Election what did they give him? you will say the Authority over them all, that is nothing; he had that before by the Law of Nature: I but he will say he hath upon this Election their Rights; Their Rights are no more than what he had before; he had by nature right to slay, take, make use of any thing conducing to his contentment; though they were a hundred Millions, they can give him no [Page 5] more than what he hath even by Nature. I but he will reply he had Right before, but now he hath Power; I answer, the Question here is not about Power, but Right; Power may be in Rebels, Usurpers, but not Right, that is only in the law­ful Soveraign; but suppose we should examine his Power by these preceeding directions: I doubt we shall find it most weak and unconstant.

SECT. V. Their Power is most uncertain.

FOR if from the People they will vary with their un­setled resolutions; for they who made the first, being once taught that the Right of making Kings is in them, will easi­ly be perswaded that the unmaking is in their hands likewise, and reassume that Power again: Take that most abundant instance which that unhappy time, we lately lived in, affords us, when Mr. Hobbs was first undertaken by me, when this Doctrine of his was infused into the Kingdom, they altered and changed the Government four or five times in a moment. A very short space of time, and none of those Leviathans lacked the assents of the People, who at the least pretended with the highest protestations, that men could make, that they would live and dye with them, in the maintenance of their Rights; and yet in one six weeks they made likewise such another pro­testation to the next Usurpers. Here you may discern how weak a Foundation this popular Covenant yields to his Leviathan, nor need he boast more of the strength, than the Right of his Authority, for certainly any buzze put into the Peoples head of misgovernment (which no Government can be free from in the execution) will put Seditious Spirits into them; and men who love to fish in troubled Waters may with ease raise these Rumors: so that it seems to me, to appear that such a tottering and unconstant foundation as the Peoples universal Covenant, should not be the support of such a mighty structure, as is a Leviathan, which should be perpetual.

[Page 6]What I have said of the whole, may more abundantly be affirmed of any part, because they will be as unconstant as the whole, or more.

SECT. VI. The People cannot give Power conjunctim.

AND for what was interposed of the People Conjunctim, is impossible (according to his Principles); for there can be no Conjunction before this Covenant, they are accor­ding to his Doctrine at War one with another until that; And it is a strange thing to imagine that so many several heads contending one with another about Superiority, and the in­grossing the World to their particular Interests, should con­center with one mind, to the exaltation of the same Person, or Persons to whom they would submit themselves, and their conditions by a total desertion of them both. Nay indeed a man cannot do it, for it being Jus naturale a natural Right, as he himself hath expressed before, Chap. 14. pag. (65) and (66) (to which I have spoke already something) he cannot lay down his Natural Right, until he lay down his Nature: and therefore indeed he cannot, by this Doctrine, give away his Right to be King, to any other: but if he can devest himself of his Nature, yet he in express termes, saith, That a man cannot give over his Right to resist by force, wounds, and imprisonments with which he cannot live contentedly: and may not the same be said of a Kingdom? perhaps that man cannot live content­edly without being King; surely then it is not probable to think that men will so put off their Jura naturalia; neither indeed can they do it by his Polity.

SECT. VII. The manner of the Resignation makes it impossible.

BUT then consider the Resignation it self; it is far more unreasonable to think that reasonable men should do it. Consider the particulars; To own all Leviathans actions as if every particular of the People were Author of it, To submit their Judgments to his Judgment, their Wills to his Will. I thought it had been obedience enough for Subjects to submit their persons to his Government, but to own all his actions which may be wicked was not to be exacted from any Subject; yea, if we will allow his Doctrine, delivered before, it is worse; for then we must be Authors of his acti­ons; he but our person imployed in them (as he speaks pag. (82) and therefore not his own. I but saith he, in order to their peace. I cannot assent to that, for many Supreams have done horrid things in order to the publique Peace, as Mur­ders, Sacriledges, oppressions, to which although my per­son may submit, yet neither shall my Judgment approve, nor my will consent; for although when he doth wickedly, I will not do so too, and Rebel; yet neither will I by consent to them justifie his Acts by conspiring in his sin: his Vertues shall not save me, and, I am confident, his vices can­not damn me, which yet they would, if I assented to them. I go on with him; This is (saith he) more than con­sent or Concord, it is a real Ʋnion of them all in one and the same person, made by Covenant of every man with every man in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my Right of Governing my self to this man, or assembly of men on that Condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner:) If this be the only way to live in Peace, I chuse War, which is the hatefullest thing in the World, but Sin. But this last Phrase of Authorizing all his Actions whom I cannot rule nor controul, nay per­haps not come at to Petition, is such a forsaking of Humanity, [Page 8] and contempt of the glorious means of Salvation, as no man, with a face of Piety, dare affirm to be fit, I shall handle these things more fully shortly.


SECT. I. This cannot be the only way to establish a Govern­ment.

THIS done (saith he) the multitude so united in one Per­son is called a Common-wealth, in Latine Civitas. (Thus he.)

But if this only make a Common-wealth, or Civitas, there was never any in the World, nor ever will be, as shall be shew­ed more largely hereafter. More true is that which follows, This is the Generation of that great Leviathan: I mean his Book; for to vent this extremly wicked folly he wrote this Book; and except in this Book, a Common-wealth was ne­ver called Leviathan: a name from which never man expect­ed good, he proceeds; (or rather to speak more Reverently) of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and safety. I answer we owe him nothing; there was never such a Power Erected: I shall omit what follows in that Chapter, and come to his [...] 8. Chapter which is page 88.


SECT. I. His definition of a Common-wealth disproved, first because not practicable.

HE begins with a definition of a Common-wealth by Institution thus, A Common-wealth is then said to be in­stituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and Covenant, eve­ry [Page 9] one, with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men, shall be given by the greater part the Right to present the Person of them all (That is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall Authorize all the Actions and Judgments, of that man, or assem­bly of men in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

This is but a Dream of his, there was never such a thing, nor is it practicable; this Book was writ in English, and there­fore proper for English men: suppose then we were in the first State, without a Soveraignty, we are none of the greatest Common-wealths in the World, yet is it possible that here in this Kingdom there should convene such Multitudes of men, such an Universality as by him is required to make this Cove­nant, which he labours to prove in his second part De Corpore Politi. Cap. 3. Numb. 2. because saith he, there, Nor can an action be Attributed to the Multitude, unless every mans hand, and eve­ry mans will (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. It seems he would have it in writing, that he requires every mans hand to be put to it. And so likewise Num. 3. The first thing therefore they are to do is expresly every man to consent to do something; by which something he understands this pro­ject of Leviathan, so that it is evident he means every parti­cular, singula generum, which is an imposible fiction; the very meeting is impossible. And then that all these who meet with so many self-ends; and particular Interests, and so many weak capacities should consent in any thing is most in­credible. I will give him all the Scope I can, he may say that they may meet, as they do to elect Knights for the Parliament, they may meet in Shires and choose Representatives which may act for them; I could ask who must divide those Shires? that must be done by a Supreme. Then consider, if that should be granted, they must choose little Leviathans first, which must represent those their particular Shires, before the great one is chosen: And then, consider this hath a great unfitness, if not an impossibility with it, which was fore-seen by our State, and therefore only such men who had forty shillings free-hold [Page 10] were adjudged fit to have voices in these Elections: which heretofore was a very considerable Estate; and yet I believe scarce ever half of those met at any Election. But then let us look about and we shall find much the greater company without the lists of that condition, besides Women and Chil­dren, which have as great Interests in the Common-wealth as others. So that this fancy of his, was not only not practised, but not practicable in such a Kingdom as this of ours; When men write Romances they should write things possible to be, and then they are useful to the Reader, for they are of such things which a mans life may meet with, at some time or other; but impossible fictions are such as can be profitable to no man, and therefore it was a vain thing for him to deliver such a con­ceipt, and not vain only but ill, to deliver it in such a peremp­tory Rule as to make it seem the only way of Instituting a Soveraign.

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs his definition inconsistent with Reason

BUT let us proceed, and we shall find it appear by every word more inconsistent with reason. Can a man think that men, such numbers, would ever consent so fully to forsake themselves and their own reason and wills, as to submit them­selves either to man or men in such an ample manner as to esteem his Princes Judgment or his Will, for his own. In that great height of Infallibillity to which the Pope in many mens Judgments is attained, they put the Pope in Cathedrâ when they say he is Infallible, and afterwards dispute what that Cathedra is: But out of this Cathedra he may err in his Judg­ment, and they must not approve of that, he may sin with his will and they must not consent to that. But Mr. Hobbs confines his Leviathan to no Chair, but absolutly pronounceth him free from Error both in Judgment and Will. Nay that is not all, but we must allow, yea authorize his Errors in both; and this is the Foundation upon which all his Politiques are built; [Page 11] by which let a man endeavour all vertue and Religion in his own person, yet he may perpetrate all the horrid villanies in the World in anothers person, whose actions he is bound to Authorize, and then, by them, and for them perish everlast­ingly, which I am perswaded not only no Christian, but no Turk, Mahometan, Indian, the most barbarous persons in America, or any unknown Country can be induced to do, and yet this by him is made the ground-work of all Politique Government.

SECT. III. Right not derived by this supposed Institution from the Consent of the People.

HE proceeds (from this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him or them on whom Soveraign Power is conferred by the consent of the People Assembled).

To this I have answered that there was never any such thing, and therefore no right, or faculty can be derived from hence, nor indeed ever will be: Ex nihilo nihil fit, that which hath no being, cannot cause any thing. Nay, I may say further, that there was never any Power conferred by the People (of which I expect an opportunity to speak more fully hereafter) for although we may find Common-wealths altered and set up by the Rebellious force, and violence of great numbers of the people, yet those who got the Soveraignty at such times, had it not by any such Institution, as is here describ­ed by the peoples authorising that Person to these Actions he is exalted to; but from the Peoples subserviency obtained by his wit or fraud to his great Ambition. Here I might put an end to his Politiques with a little enlargement upon this Subject, for the Foundation being destroyed the building must fall. But I will touch upon his Inferences, which will make this Foundation appear more weak.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his first Inferrence affirmed, the Sove­raign absurdly termed the person of the People..

HE first infers that (because they Covenant, it is to be under­stood that they are not bound by a former Covenant to any thing repugnant thereunto) This must be most true, not of this Covenant only, but all other Covenants. No man can alie­nate any Estate twice without his leave to whom he aliena­ted it first; and so where one has disposed his allegiance to one, he cannot take it away and dispose it to another afterward. I like the conclusion that follows also thus. (And consequent­ly they that have already instituted a Common-wealth being there­by bound by Covenant to own the Actions and Judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his per­mission. And therefore they who are Subject to a Monarchy, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the con­fusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their Person from him, that beareth it, to another man, or Assembly of men. This hath truth with it, out of the grounds formerly spoke of. But this senseless name of calling their Soveraign, their person, or to found the Allegience to their Soveraign upon their Cove­nant, which never was nor could be, is to make it extreamly weak; and his reason is most illogical and without force, (for saith he) They are bound every man to every man, to own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that one man which is injustice) I do not understand the consequence of this Argu­ment, That if one man dissent all the rest should break the Covenant made to that man, for his dissenting may break his Covenant, but why it should make them break their Cove­nant is not vissible to me.

SECT. II. His expression, of giving the Sovereignty to him that bears their person, further censured.

HIS following discourse is not more reasonable than this (And they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that heareth their person; And therefore if they despose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is Injustice.) That phrase, (Given him the Soveraignty who bears their person) is not rational, for according to his own Doctrine, it is the same thing to be Soveraign, and bear their person; if he had spoke logically according to his doctrine, his phrase should be who is their person, for so he makes the Soveraign to be the person of the Common-wealth, not to bear it, which is ano­ther thing. But then mark you what a slight thing he makes Rebellion only a little Injustice, for so that word Injustice may extend it self, to any the least Injustice, He takes that from him that was his; a poor piece of business every little Theft doth so.

SECT. III. The irrationality of Mr. Hobbs his arguing further discovered. Covenants may be made immediate­ly with God.

HE adds another reason very weakly; Besides saith he, If he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign be killed or punished by him for such attempts, he is author of his own pu­nishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do. And because it is Injustice for a man to do any thing for which he may be punished by his own Authority, he is also upon that title unjust). Certainly (Reader) you may wonder at the strange unreasonableness of this Arguing. This proves [Page 14] by his supposed Institution no faultiness in this Treason; for suppose a Soveraign shall punish a Subject for speaking truth, he doth it according to his institution by the Authority given by that Subject, and that Subject is Author (according to his Doctrine) of killing himself for Truth, as well as for Treason, because he is Author of all his Actions, and there is as much injustice in the one as in the other; especially considering ano­ther Inference, which he makes, and will be discoursed on hereafter; That a Supream can do no Injustice. But he adds not another argument, but an answer to another Objection. I will speak to that, his words are (And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, not made with men, but God; this is also unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth God's Person, which none d [...]th, but God's Lieute­nant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own Consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition) Thus He. This I yield unto so far, that it is sinful and wicked to engage in any Covenant with God against his Soveraign, but his means of obtaining it, I deny. He scarce ever speaks or names God, but with an Er­ror: in particular here; what a false affirmation is this to say, That there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body who representeth Gods person, which none doth but Gods Lievtenant who hath the Soveraignty under God. Certainly a man may make Covenant with God, betwixt God and his own Soul, in private, in his Chamber; before men, in Com­pany; divers are recorded in Scripture, and pious men often use it, and practice it accordingly, and when these Covenants are holy and devout God blesseth them, and those persons are obliged to those duties. But it is true in the case in which he instanceth all such Covenants are wicked in the making, and most abominable in the performance; for it is a Covenant with God in himself, to destroy him in his deputy; a Covenant with God in Heaven, to oppose him on Earth; the iniquity lyeth not in this, That the Soveraign is the peoples Person: for then the height of the sin lyes in this, that the people are [Page 15] affronted; but in this other way, God; in his way it is but an injury to such as themselves; but in this it is to our politique Fa­ther, to whom under God we owe all our obedience; and is the first command of the Second Table with promise in this World. Of this Nature are those contracts betwixt man and woman, concerning Marriage, those promising Oathes which men make one with another, which oblige the contractors in a strong tye; for breach of which they shall answer at the last day. And now, I go on with him; this which follows, and much of that which immediately preceded is pag. (89).

SECT. IV. Mr. Hobbs his Second Inference examined, and cen­sured. The Soveraign obliged to protect the Peo­ple from Injuries, and Invasions. His reasons, to at­test this Inferrence, refuted.

HIS Second Inference is because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make their Sove­raign, by Covenant, only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; There can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the S [...]veraign, and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pre­tence of forfeiture is freed from his Subjection. His conclusion is again true in the material part, but his inference is faulty; for his conclusion I am perswaded, that none of his Subjects can be freed from their Allegiance to him by any act of his, unless dereliction of his Government, and that may abide a Dispute too. But to raise this conclusion out of that Ground, because he made no Covenant with them is exceeding weak. First, There is the same reason, by his Doctrine, betwixt him and the Subject; for the Subjects (in the very Paragraph which was but now transcribed,) make their Covenant one to ano­ther, and not to the Soveraign, so that there must be the same reason out of the Nature of the Covenant, that the Subject should not forfeit his Right to him, as he to the Subject, for the Covenant being only made one to another, the breach of [Page 14] [...] [Page 15] [...] [Page 16] that Covenant is only one with another: but I am bold to affirm it an impossible case, as he imagines it, that there must be mutual approbations betwixt both, and all. For, certainly it cannot be imagined, that such a generality of men, as must convene to do such an Act, should submit to such a total dere­liction of themselves, without some promise, or Covenant on his part; that he will protect them from injuries at home, and Invasions from abroad; but he being exalted above all other Earthly Powers is subject only to the King of Kings, which is God, who will Judge him: but the Subjects are examinable, responsible, and condemnable by him. But he labours to in­fringe this reason in his following discourse thus, That he who is made Soveraign makes no Covenant with his Subjects before hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole Multitude as one party to the Covenant, or he must make a several Covenant with every man; with the whole as one party, it is im­possible; because as yet they are not one person). I will not put down his reason against his second branch, because I shall not need to dispute against that, having shewed the possibility of the first. But I will begin with his division, and deny that it is necessary that the Covenant should be made with the whole as one party, or with every particular severally; for there is a Medium participationis, which is more reasonable than either; for without doubt the Fathers of Families were Natural Governours from the beginning of the World, and they had by the Law of Nature Absolute Government over their Families, these when they find themselves not able in lit­tle distinct bodies to defend themselves, may treat amongst themselves how by an Union they may make themselves strong, against forreign and domestique dangers, and to that end erect a Supream over themselves; and this certainly hath a greater shew of Reason, then any of his thoughts, that every person who hath no Judgment nor Authority should be introduced to make a Covenant for so high concernments. Therefore that division was not good which did not comprehend the totum di­visum. Then for his Argument that he could not Covenant with the whole as one person, because as yet they were not a per­son. I answer, first that they neither are, nor in truth will [Page 17] ever be one person, but because by his unimaginable conceipt they are after their Covenant represented so by him, I will answer to himself; That first this Company meet together, then they consult upon that great work of choosing a Soveraign, the business is concluded upon by both parties, Soveraign and People, first they engage for their Patrs; then he may Covenant for his, and this is no otherwise then is apparent in all contracts, one must speak first, and after another, so in marriage first one speaks and then the other; and in all bar­gains, which yet are conditional until the second word con­firms the contract. Nor is it possible, as I have said, to think that men would so deliver themselves to anothers will, from whom they have no promise or the least verbal engagement to govern them justly and prudently. What he speaks against his Covenant with the several persons, I let go, thinking it impossible


SECT. I. The difference between the Soveraign's making a Co­venant, and taking his Authority upon a Covenant; A Soveraign may Covenant to Govern justly, and yet not forfeit his Soveraignty, if he breaks that Co­venant

AND I pass to another Argument by which he would prove, That a Soveraign can make no Covenant, which begins towards the bottom of his 89. pag. thus (besides if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraign at his Institution, and others or one other of his Sub­jects or himself alone pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no Judge to decide the Controversie.) First, I blame him here for putting no difference betwixt Covenanting in taking his Authority, and taking it upon Covenant. The first may be, and, without question, must be, in any Institution of Go­vernment: the second cannot be discreetly done by any; for it would leave a mighty gap to let in Treasons. Observe it [Page 18] in all contracts, Titius lets Land to Sempronius, he hath di­verse Covenants for to observe, which he may implead Sem­pronius for, and yet never a one to forfeit his Estate; come more closly. The Subject in this Institution of his Contracts is to perform all obedience, yet although he offend in many things, there be few such as exempt him from the just protecti­on of the King, from further injuries then that Legally ex­acts, how much more must it needs be that the King should lose the total obedience of the Subject, though he should break his Covenant, and unless such a Clause were put into his Covenant, there was no pretence of reason for it; and it were as much against Reason, to put such a Clause into his Cove­nant. I have delivered my opinion of this before. The King of Heaven will Judge him severely for his breach of Covenant, to whom he must be left. That which follows is true, If there should be such a Covenant, and no Judge to determine, it would re­turn to the Sword again, and every man recovereth the right of Pro­tecting himself by his own shrength contrary to the design of the Institution] This is true, but I do not approve what follows, It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by precedent Covenant] to grant a Covenant in the Institution of Soveraignty is most right, to wit, that he will Govern his People Legally and Just­ly or the like, without doing of which no person is fit to be Soveraign; but to Covenant, to lose his Soveraignty if he do otherwise, which he seems to understand generally by this word Covenant, is absolutely naught and unfit, because it must needs produce Confusions and Distractions in the Government, for the People upon any hardship they suffer, though never so just, will repine against their Superiours, and blame them, and upon any surmise of faultiness in them, would be ready upon such pretence to desire, and endeavour a Change of Government be it Monarchical or Aristocratical.

SECT. II. The Impiety of Mr. Hobbs his assertion, that Cove­nants have no force but from the Vindicative Power of the Sword, Discovered.

THen what follows is wicked, in my Judgment [The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is, upon Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, That Covenants being but words and breath have no force to oblige, contain or protect any man, but what it hath from the Publick Sword, that is from the united hands of that man or assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty and whose actions are avowed by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united,] This speech hath some semblance of truth with it, if he had confuted the World into Atheisme, who think there is no God, noe reward or punishment hereafter; and per­haps it might find some entertainment amongst men given over to base sensuality, fordid worldly people, who have no sense of honour or vertue, because such men value no contract, which consists not with their unhappy Condition, but with men which believe there is a God, who governs heaven and earth, and will judge all one day (which sure the generality of men do) with men that have felt any sting of Conscience, and have felt the happiness of nil conscire tibi, this breath of theirs hath such power with God, that in things of such high na­ture as this is, what they covenant on earth is confirmed in heaven, and is so esteemed by them; and because it is so e­steemed, millions of men do and have thought it better for them to forsake all worldly felicity, then to violate such Co­venants, and by preserving them, Kings and their Kingdoms have lived in peace and prosperity, but by the breach of them came to ruine and destruction: so that this which he calls but breath, at the same instant that it comes out of the mouth of man, it is engraved in their hearts, and recorded in Gods Eternal Registry in heaven.


SECT. III. The Sword hath no power but from the Covenant (ac­cording to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine) it may com­pel, but is not properly the obliging cause of obedi­ence.

VVHat is added, That the breath of the Covenant is an ill foundation of Monarchy, and hath no power of obliging but from the publick Sword.] I did wonder why he did use such various and such emphatical expressions against the Authority, which is derived from a Covenant; for this u­nited force of the publick Sword, according to his Doctrine, must be derived from that Covenant, which by him is made the sole foundation of Government: And if a Covenant (which by him is but breath) hath no obliging power, nei­ther can the publick Sword which is derived from that Cove­nant have any; if he instead of other Verbs which he used there, had interpreted this one of Compel, that this Cove­nant without the publick Sword had no power to compel any man to obedience, it might have received some credit; be­cause when we lose these vertues of fidelity and obedience, it is only the publick Sword which by force can make them submit; but yet that which the Sword can justly compel any unto, must be by the obliging vertue of the Covenant. But whereas he placeth the obliging power in the Sword, he gives all right of interest to it, then which nothing can be more destructive to Monarchy: Let Kings know that their Swords may rust, or loose their edge, and then he who hath the keenest Sword may plead the best right. This encouraged the late Rebels, who having got a longer Sword then the King, upon that Title, preserved their Usurpation to the utmost they could. And the wickedness is very apparent, for by his Doctrine whosoever can force his Superiority, may justifie his exercise in it, which is the greatest encouragement Rebellion can desire: But perhaps that phrase (The Publick Sword) [Page 21] may bear him out in it, for by this he understands the Nati­onal Power in that Man, or Assembly of men, which hath the Soveraignty, all whose actions are acknowledged by them all. What a foolery is this? Was there ever any Rebellion in which the Rebels did not deny to approve the actions of the Supreme they rebel against? And suppose that impossible Fi­ction of the universal meeting and assent to that Covenant, yet when the same persons renounce, who made that Cove­nant, how can the Sword authorize his actions, which pre­tend his power from the breath of this Covenant? which yet being but a Breath (as Mr. Hobbs terms it) is long since gone and perished, and a new Breach started up in its place: The right of the Sword is given by the breath of the Covenant, with promise to own his actions; that Breath is gone; they breath contrarily and revoke it, if any man can get the Sword, he will make them blow such an other Breath upon his Sword, as they did upon the first Supreme. The truth is, Mr. Hobbs makes the power of Government to consist imme­diately in the Sword; but that founded upon a Breath, which is blown away with any little cross wind; and certainly this makes a most unhappy institution and settlement of any right. That which follows in the top of the ninetieth page, I let pass, as not material to any thing preceding or following after, and I pass to his third Inference, which begins thus.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his third Inference examined; No man to be destroyed for his dissent to the unjust actions of others. Mr. Hobbs his Political Inquisition more severe then that for Religion.

THirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to own all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. This is a very sad con­dition, either he must own all the actions his Soveraign doth, [Page 22] or justly be destroyed; I believe never Murder was so justified upon such terms before; own all his actions? No Christian, no honest man will do it; his Soveraign may be Antichristi­an, a Hobbist, whose actions no Christian man can avouch; he may act foolishly, which no wise man can authorize; he may act wickedly, which no honest man can consent unto, (or else justly be destroyed by his fellow Subjects) which he un­derstands by that word (the rest) destruction is the greatest mischief can come to a man, and is never inflicted but for some mighty crime, which I do not find this man charged with, but only a dissenting or protesting against the general Vote; a thing often done in Parliaments, and yet no such Sentence passeth upon the Dissenter, nor were it just to do it; men are not bound to be all of one mind: Mr. Hobbs would make his Inquisition for Politiques more severe then any In­quisition for Religion: But he hath reason for what he writes (for, saith he) If he voluntarily entred into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently thereby declared his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain.) I thought by what went before he must have declared his assent; but now it seems it is enough if he be amongst them; but what if he be not amongst them, (as I have shewed it is impossible all should) what condition is that man in? He proceeds with his proofs, And therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore unjustly.) Suppose all this, Shall a man be destroyed for every breach of Covenant, or every unjustice? Certainly Mr. Hobbs, if he were a Law-maker would out-do Draco, or the bloudiest that ever acted in that kind: This is a foolish consequence, that because he did unjustly he should justly be destroyed. He goes on (And whether he be of the Congregation or not, and whether his con­sent be asked or not, he must either submit to their Decrees, or he left to the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.) The mad­ness of this condition of war before this Covenant I have spoke to heretofore, but that he may justly be destroyed by any with whom he will not joyn in the Covenant is wicked: [Page 23] We have in England, I believe, abundance of strangers of For­reign Nations, which neither have nor will enter into such a Covenant, may they be justly killed? Nay, amongst those millions which are the Kings Subjects; there was never man entred this or the like Covenant; may we justly kill one ano­ther? Nay, I think, few would make such a Covenant; may all these be knocked on the head thus? This hath such a force of injustice, that men with humanity about them cannot con­sent unto. I leave this therefore and come to his 4th Inference.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his fourth Inference censured and refuted from his own conclusions. He that impowers ano­ther to do justly, though he make him Pleni-poten­tiary, is not guilty of his unjust actions; his first reason refuted.

FOurthly (Because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the actions and judgments of the Soveraign institu­ted: it follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects, nor ought he by any of them be accused of injustice.) Accused, What doth he mean by that? to be con­victed, arraigned, condemned? This certainly he cannot, because the power of Judgment supposeth Superiority, which cannot be over the Soveraign in his own Kingdom. But let us observe the consequence of this Argument out of these im­possible premises, that because by his fancy of the Institution every subject is Author of all his actions, he can do no inju­ry to any of them; certainly this doth not follow by his own Doctrine; for put the case, that the Supreme doth authorize a Judge to hear and determine such causes, doth the Supreme only do injustice in it, when the Royal Authority gives power to the Judge, who acts unjustly by that Authority, which was given him by the Supreme, or the Judge likewise who abu­seth that Authority? I believe no man will affirm it; or if he [Page 24] do, he must destroy Mr. Hobbs his conclusion, which makes the Kings acting by the Authority of the peoples grant, not to of­fend in himself; for (which is his reason before spoke to) if the Author do solely perform, not the Actor or the person who immediately operates, which he delivered before, the King not the Judge doth unjustly, when by his Authority the Judge decrees wickedly: But he proceeds with another reason, (for saith he) He that doth any thing by Authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose Authority he acts. This is not true generally, a Judge judgeth by the Authority of the Supreme, but if he Judge unjustly (yea, judgeth a cause against the King perhaps unjustly) he then doth the King an injury by his own Authority. Again, a Ge­neral with Plenipotency to kill, slay, &c. from the King, he turns now his Army to the Kings destruction perhaps, doth not he then do the King an injury by his own power?

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs his second reason invalid from the falsity of his supposition. Consent or dissent gives not the stamp of Justice or Injustice. He that gives power to do any act, may complain of ill Execution of that power.

HE goes on. (But by this Institution of a Commonwealth, every particular man is Author of what the Soveraign doth, and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author, and therefore ought not accuse any man but himself, nor himself of injury, because to do an injury to himself is impossible.) It is first observeab [...]e here, (which runs throughout the whole Politiques) that it is built totally upon that foundation which neither is, nor is probable to be in any, but is impos­sible to be in a great Commonwealth, and therefore must needs fall of it self: But supposing that impossibility, let us consider his inference, every man is Author of what the So­veraign [Page 25] doth; the reason of that is before expressed, be­cause he covenants to avow his actions: Now if he do avow them, it follows not, that therefore they shall be just; ma­ny a man owns that act which is unjust, his owning of it makes it neither just, nor unjust: These are qualities inherent in the act, not adherent to others Opinions, or acceptance, or disacceptance of them: I but (saith he) Consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author.] I return, that he may do that, and complain that he himself hath done amiss, men do, and it is vertuously done of him who doth it, but much rather of that which he acts by anothers hand; that which may be good in the Institution, may be spoiled and hurt in the Execu­tion; and although they did institute him with such a power, yet his mannagement of it may be ill and unjust, and that they may complain of.

SECT. III. A man may do an injury to himself. Mr. Hobbs his di­stinction between Iniquity, and Injustice, or Inju­ry, disproved and censured.

UPon this ground will appear the faultiness of what fol­lows, which is [And therefore ought not to accuse, any man but himself, no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to a mans self is impossible.] To the first piece I have shewed, that though he were Author of Leviathans Power, yet his evil usage of that power may be complained of. To the se­cond, I think a man may injure himself, when a rich man through niggardliness shall deny his belly or his back those ex­pences which were necessary for the support of his health, he deals unjustly with himself; when another foolishly desperate shall adventure his life upon idle and frivolous occasions, he deals unjustly with himself, by hazarding so Noble a Creature upon so base and unworthy a prize: These things, and multi­tudes of more, are unjust dealing towards a mans self: But he [Page 26] hath a nice distinction at the bottom of this Paragraph; It is true, that they that have Soveraign Power may commit Iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification.] I would he had expounded the proper signification: At the first I was a­mazed at this distinction, and did doubt there was some great and excellent Notion in it, but duly considering the words, I find they were airy, and do signifie no more diffe­rence, then if I had affirmed Mr. Hobbs, or the Writer of Leviathan, said this, or that, meerly nominal: For what is iniquity but unequal dealings? which in him who is bound to deal equally in distribution, or commutation, is injustice; and indeed injustice is nothing else; and injury, what is that? but not just, or right; and I am sure injustice is nothing else: But where some Law directs this or that, he doth otherwise: This is the proper and genuine-sense of the words, and unless he had shewed us some more proper use of them, there is no reason why we should be forced from this common acceptati­on. Here now I might justly break off from further discourse of this business, having answered what he objects; but be­cause I would give some satisfaction to the Reader in this Conclusion, I shall a little insist further, and shew, that Le­viathans, or Supremes, may do unjustly.

SECT. IV. A Soveraign may do injustice by himself, and by his Ministers impowred, and not punished by him.

IT will be a strong foundation for this discourse to produce the Actions of the King of Kings, God himself, which I may do in the eighteenth of Genesis; ye may observe there, that God was pleased to reveal to Abraham his intended de­struction of Sodom; Abraham after he had undertaken to plead for them, in the twenty fourth verse, puts the Question, Peradventure there will be fifty righteous within the City, wilt thou also destroy, and not spare the City for the fifty righteous that are therein? Then in the twenty fifth verse, That be far [Page 27] from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous shall be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? In which you may observe, that Abraham in a bold manner did dare to intimate, that God himself should have done a­miss, not right, but unjustly, in punishing the righteous with the wicked; and shall we be afraid to say that Leviathan can do unjustly, when they shall slay the righteous as the wick­ed, which many of them have done? If we consider all the Species, and several sorts of injustice, we shall find that they may, and have perpetrated them: They have broke the equi­ty of distributive Justice, in preferring base and unworthy people, and neglecting, yea punishing vertuous men; for Commutative Justice, they have taken against Law and Equity other mens Estates, they have neglected to pay their due debts, and what can be more unjust then those? they may therefore do unjustly, nay what is more, by how much their power is greater, by so much they are enabled to do more in­justice; and I may add, other mens injustice may prove theirs, not only out of his vain principles, because all Judges in his Dominion act by his Authority, even in those Causes where they judge wickedly: But because he is the Supreme, and should take care for his inferiour Officers that they do their duties, which if he knows they do not, and yet neglect to correct them for amendment, they will prove his wicked­ness. We know the Judgment upon old Eli, who was a ver­tuous and good man in himself, and the Leviathan of that Nation then, yet the Judgment of God was upon him for not using severe Justice to his Sons, when he knew their faults; as you may observe in 1 Sam. 2.27. So that it is ap­parent, that they may do injustice more then others; and in­deed if he cannot be unjust, neither can he be just, for contra­ries are belonging to the same subject; he who cannot be vi­cious, cannot be vertuous, and contrary acts in any man will by degrees eat out any vice or vertue, nor can men call it ver­tue in any who cannot do ill. But I think there is now enough said to this, I will pass to his fifth Inference, which is this.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his fifth Inference. The Proposition as­serted. The reason of this Inference weak, and invalid.

FIfthly, and consequently to that which was said last, No man that hath Soveraign Power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects be punished.] This conclusion is most true, because he is Supreme; and to put to death, or punish, are acts only of Supremacy: But his reason, and the only means which he useth to obtain this excellent conclusion, is so false, that unless it should be confuted, we may think so excellent a truth had a weak support; his rea­son follows [For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraign, he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself.] I have oft spoke of this; by this consequence a King cannot punish a wicked Judge, a rebellious General, and the like, as I have often said before: And if the Supreme should urge to these instances, that this Judge, or this General, acted implicitly against the Authority granted by the Supreme, the same answer may be returned to him from his Subjects when he doth that which is contrary to their good or peace; so that although this conclusion is most necessary to the establish­ment of peace and happiness in any Kingdom, yet when it is urged only by such fallacious Inferences, it makes the Rea­ders imagine, that the greatest and most weighty things in Po­lity are dubious.

SECT. II. He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all the means to attain that end, but only to such mediums as are just and legal.

HE infers presently upon the bottom of this conclusion, And because the end of this Institution is the peace and de­fence of them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means, it belongeth of right to him. Whatsoever man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraignty to be Judge of the means of peace, and defence, to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done.] I spare putting down every word: For answer here­unto, know, That as I have oft observed he exceedingly often abuseth this general Rule; he who hath right to the end, hath right to some means, but not to all: A man hath right to his house, in anothers possession, right to get it peaceably by Law, and not by force: A Supreme, or under him his Judge, hath right to punish Felons, but he hath no right to butcher any man without a legal Tryal, no though the fact were seen by him; so that he hath right to all legal means to obtain this end, but not any other: Let us change the person, and this will appear most manifestly, every man hath right to the peace and good of the whole Kingdom, without which he cannot live contentedly, and happily, and he ought to use his endea­vour for the obtaining and preserving it, but it must have this little addition of lawful means; if he have right to procure it by illegal means, it will open a gap, and give countenance to all Rebellion; for there was never any Rebellion which had not that specious pretence of the peace and good of the Publick, which otherwise could not be obtained; and there­fore although he who hath right to the end, hath right to some means of obtaining it, yet not to all: And this I am confident may fully satisfie the following part of that Para­graph.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his sixth Inference examined and censu­red. The Soveraigns Commands, in point of Reli­gion, submitted to the Commands of God.

NOw I am come to the 91 page, where he proceeds: [Sixthly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what are condu­cing to peace, and consequently on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withall in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the Doctrines of all Books before they be published.] The drift of all this Inference is to place the Government of Religious Doctrine in establishment of Doctrine in Religion, whether by preaching, or printing, to be in the Soveraign. I shall have opportunity to enlarge upon this conclusion hereafter, when I shall meddle with his Divi­nity, but will not let it pass now, but speak a little to make way for that. Consider then first, that a hundred thousand men meet together to institute a Soveraign (for out of his for­mer Institution of a Commonwealth he deduceth these Infe­rences) these men are either of one Religion, or divers; (for Religion all people have) if of one Religion, it is not possible for men to think, that they should be so careless of the great­est and dearest concernment in the world, as to throw it away to anothers dispose, without any Covenant or promise to pre­serve it for them. Let us in our thoughts run over the uni­versal world, and consider the various judgments in Religion, Christians, Jews, Mahumetans, and the several sorts of Gen­tilismes, with their several Subdivisions, we shall find none that hold so mean a price upon their Worship of God, as to part with it upon such ridiculous terms, as to subject them­selves so totally to a Leviathan, as not to have any engage­ment for their duty towards their God; and most of them would rather put themselves upon their protection by his Pro­vidence, [Page 31] then to offer up his good pleasure a Sacrifice to their worldly preservation, by an arm of flesh. But if they are of divers Religions (which is a most dangerous Enemy to the peace of any Kingdom) they certainly will either agree for an absolute tolleration, or else one being countenanced (which most surely must be the Supreme Religion) the rest may enjoy their own upon certain conditions, and then he deals unjustly when he violates that condition, when he shall command o­ther Opinions to be broached, or them, to be punished other­ways then was agreed upon before. But let the Reader consi­der here are divers actions intermixed, some of which the Soveraign may act in his own person, and some which he must act by Commissions: Of the first sort are limitation of popular Orators; his meaning is our Preachers, who are the Publick Speakers to the People, of whom it is affirmed, that he must j [...]dge on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withall in speaking to multitudes of people, that this cannot exact an absolute obedience, and that the Sove­raign may offend in all these, will be evident, if we lay the Scene among Turks, and the Moguls, commanding not to preach Christ; and it be granted, that they punish all them who do so, will Mr. Hobbs say this is just? It may be he will; but I am sure the Apostles were of another mind, when (Acts 4.18.) they were commanded not to preach in the Name of the Lord Jesus; they answered (in the nineteenth verse) Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more then unto God, judge ye. The answer was of invin­cible force, implying thus much, That ye, be ye what you will, Leviathan, or what can be imagined to have Com­manding Authority, ye are Gods Deputies; if when God Commands any thing, you give a cross Command, judge which should be obeyed? If when the King in express terms commands one thing, and his Lieutenant commands another, which should be obeyed? The case is so betwixt the greatest King, Soveraign, or Leviathan in this world, and God; judge ye then: They could reply nothing to this answer of the Apo­stles, none did endeavour to do it, but immediately went to Club-Law, Threats and Menaces, and let them go; so that it [Page 32] is clearly evident, that Soveraigns in such Commands may do unjustly, and are not to be obeyed in their unjust Commands by vertuous men, who may, and must suffer obediently, though they ought not to act obediently. I must add no more at this time, hereafter will be a greater opportunity.

SECT. II. Books justly examined before published. Such a Com­mission wanting when Mr. Hobbs his Book was printed. His reason of this Proposition asserted.

IN the second sort of Acts, he is in the right; they ought and have Authority to grant Commissions to some who shall examine the Doctrine in all Books before they are published.] This is most reasonable, for else Libels, scandalous to the Reli­gion, and present Government, would fly abroad, to the di­sturbance of the Kingdom; and it is impossible for the Su­preme to do it himself; and certainly had there been such a Commission here in England when this Book was to be print­ed, it would never have been allowed, no not in any well­governed Nation in the World. His reason for this is very strong likewise, for the actions of men proceed from their Opinions: And surely, although he hath only inforced this in order to peace, yet it is evident, that the practicks of any vertue are best regulated by the Opinions of wise men, as all the actions of a mans life.

SECT. III. Bishops the most competent Judges of Books (especial­ly in Divinity) so also of Doctrines and Publick Orators, or Preachers to the people.

THis therefore hath usually been allotted to such men, whose Function requires the Study of such things from [Page 33] them, I mean Bishops, the Reverence of whose judgments, and the honour of whose persons, may gain a submission to their determinations. This I speak for Preaching, for Books in Divinity; others have their proper spheres to move in ac­cording to their Professions. He proceeds.

SECT. IV. Mr. Hobbs his Assertion affirmed; his expressions of regulating Doctrines by Peace censured; some kind of Peace among Devils.

ANd although in matter of Doctrine nothing ought to be re­garded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to the re­gulating the same by peace; for Doctrine repugnant to peace, can be no more true, then Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature.] I am of his mind, that in matter of Doctrine, the truth, and only truth is to be considered; and I am confident, that truth and peace will certainly meet together. But methinks that is not handsomely spoke, when he saith, that Doctrine should be regulated by peace, without doubt peace is an excellent Box to preserve truth when it is setled; it is a Child, a Daughter, and fruit of truth, for true Doctrine brings peace wheresoever it is; but it cannot so regulate a Doctrine, as to enforce this conclusion, That because these men live in peace amongst one another, therefore they have the truth of Doctrine preserved amongst them: For there may be a peace amongst men who are Rebels, nay amongst the Devils themselves (for ought I know) I am sure it appears to be the force of our Saviours argument, when they said, He casteth out Devils through Beelzebub the Prince of Devils, that a Kingdom divided against it self cannot stand: Therefore their King­dom, being a lasting Kingdom, must have peace in it. But yet it is a more probable argument, that because truth naturally tends to peace, therefore where is peace and quiet, it is rea­sonable to think there is truth.

SECT. V. The former conclusions repugnant to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine; Peace not consonant to the Law of Na­ture, according to his assertion; the true reason of the former conclusion.

BUt the Argument by which he proves it did not become his mouth or pen; for saith he [Doctrine repugnant to peace can be no more true, then peace and concord can be against the Law of Nature.] This I say did not become him, for he hath delivered it for a Maxime in Politicks, That by the Law of Nature every man only considers himself, and is at war with all the world besides, and hath right to do what he will with it.] But peace and concord are artificial things introduced by the wit of man for his greater security: So that if truth and peace agree no better, then peace, and the Law of Nature, as he hath stated it, it is little or not at all. But the truth is, that truth of Doctrine bring all peace, peace with God, by sub­jecting our wills to his Sacred Revelations in the regulation of our actions; peace with men by that blessed Doctrine of Charity, by which we are commanded, as much as in us lies, to have peace with all men, peace in our own souls, by subdu­ing those carnal, sensual, rebellious affections which are in man, to the obedience to reason. So that without doubt truth doth naturally produce peace, but is not therefore regu­lated by it.

SECT. VI. The former expression of regulating all Doctrines by peace further examined and censured: Divine Truths and Doctrines not regulated by peace. In Politicks this expression not improper.

THat properly regulates another, which directs and shews the way by which that other should walk, or else is the [Page 35] Rule by which it should be drawn: So we say, he is re­gulated by this Law, who is directed and commanded by it, to do this or that: And this hath the same signification in moral as in natural things. A Square which the Carpenter u­seth for the direction of his work, regulates that work, and the same doth a Law; but that in the indagation of any Di­vine Truth, as of Divine Attributes, the nature of Faith, of Prayer, and the like, that a man should square it out by peace, or that he should regulate them by it, is a strange as­sertion: Nay it is so in Mathematical truths, and Physical also. If a man should enquire, whether the Sun be bigger than the earth, must he regulate his examination by the rule of peace? Or if he enquire in Nature, whether a first matter or Atomes be the foundation, the principle of the World, out of which it is made? must this be compared and guided by the consent it hath with peace? It is true, had he confined his truths to politick truths, it might have good acceptance, be­cause the end of Politicks is the governing man in peace and happiness; but he is so far from that, as he points principally at Divine truths (as will appear) in the prosecution, of which it cannot be a rule, much less a sole and only rule, as he seems to make it.

SECT. VII. Mr. Hobbs his expression of new truths censured: Truth always the same; the object of Truth some­times obscure: New Truths, and new Lights, phrases equally affected.

IT is true, that in a Commonwealth whereby the negligence and unskilfulness of Governors and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive; yet the most sudden and rough busling in of a truth that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes a­wake the war.] I think with him, that it is through the neg­ligence and unskilfulness of Governors and Teachers, that false Doctrines are received: But I do not approve that phrase [Page 36] of a New Truth, there is no such thing, but of particulars, that this fire burns is new, but that fire will burn combustib [...]e matter, when applyed to it, is an eternal truth, of which sorts of truth he seems to write. This kind of speech seems to concur with that lately affected language of new lights, when there is no new light, but always Divine Graces light­ed Spiritual, and Humane Intellect Natural Truths: The truths are the same, and the lights the same by which we dis­cern them, but the objects may lye in darkness, and not be discerned, till their proper light be brought to them.

SECT. VIII. His Assertion of the busling in of truth awakes the War, examined, and shewed to be repugnant to his former Conclusions.

THe next phrase to be considered is, This busling in of Truth d [...]th not break the Peace, but awake the War.] It seems then when men live in peace, they are at war, but only lye asleep, when I should think that the unquiet disposition of war could never let it sleep, and the quiet sweet dispositi­on of peace makes it look like sleep: But he gives reason for it (for saith he) Those men who are so remisly governed, that they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion, are still in War, and their condition not Peace, but a cessation of Arms for fear of one another, and they live as it were in the Precincts of Battel continually.] This was wittily expressed by him; but he did not remember, that the Covenant in the institution put them in a state of peace, when now he placeth peace only in the mannagement of that Government, which if it be, there's another reason from hence to be added to what went before, that the Supreme ought to Covenant with his Sub­jects concerning his Government, which is obstinately denied by him.

SECT. IX. Doctrines among Christians not to be introduced by force. Cessation of Arms not the height of Peace. Remisness, in matter of Opinion, not the only cause of Mutiny or Rebellion.

COnsider those that are so remisly governed, as they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion.] This should not concern Christians, whose Opinions and Doctrines must not be introduced by Arms of Steel and force, but of reason and sufferings; and as our Great Master, our blessed Saviour, planted it with his death, so must we cherish and water it with our own, not others blood: It is not to be sowed or reaped by Swords, but sufferings, and the reason of those suf­ferings. But be it of what opinion it will, this Argument doth not become him, because he makes war to be the natural state of all mankind, which if it be, it will return, unless you take the very nature away in which it is rooted, otherwise it only suppresses the outward acts of violence or war, but not extinguisheth the being of it. Again, he makes his peace obtained by the Covenant in the Soveraigns Institution, to be nothing else but a cessation of Arms, for fear men should not else enjoy their conveniencies or well being. Now then, if this be the height of any peace, they who are governed thus remisly, as he speaks, are in as good a state of peace as any others are. I grant that remisness of Government, is an oc­casion that loose people are incited to foster discontents, and malicious people encouraged to take up Arms. But this may be imputed to all remisness, as well as that of Opinions, and ought not to be bounded by it.

SECT. X. Mr. Hobbs his fallacies in arguing discovered. To be Judge, and to constitute Judges, are distinct; the latter more advantagious to the Commonwealth, in point of Doctrines.

HE thinking that this is clear, deduceth further thus; It belongs therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power to be Judge, or constitute Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civil wars.] Observe here, Reader, is a fallacy that runs throughout his whole Book, which I have often marked before, and now must again, which is, that he makes his conclusion deduced out of his discourse, another from that which he pro­posed. His Conclusion proposed is this; Sixthly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty to be Judge of what Opinions are averse, and what conduce to peace.] Observe it is in his own person, now it is to be Judge, or constitute Judges. There is a great diffe­rence betwixt the performance of this act in his own person, and by Officers. It is not probable, that a man or men taken up with so many and great thoughts of politick affairs, can have leisure to get abilities for such a purpose, or if he had, can he attend them? Therefore as I said before, so I say a­gain, he ought to imploy in that great business, men fitted by their proper Studies and endeavours to such a design. We will go on.


SECT. I. The impossibility of the former imagined Institution of a Leviathan further discovered, from the pow­er given him by Mr. Hobbs in the propriety of E­states, attained before the Institution.

SEventhly, (saith he) To the Soveraignty is annexed the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man knows what good he may enjoy, and what actions he may do without being molested by his fellow Subjects; and this is it men call Propriety.] To understand this we must return back, and consider, that this is spoke of a Commonwealth consti­tuted, after his impossible imagination, by a multitude of peo­ple, of which there was never any president, nor is ever likely to be: The impossibility of which will yet appear more manifest, by the examination of this Paragraph. To that purpose let us conceive a multitude of people met together upon such a design, as he proposeth, of chusing a Leviathan; all these people either had estates, or had none, but only their beings in the world; or else some had estates, some had none. To think that in such a multitude no man should have any thing of his own, were most unreasonable. And again, to ima­gine that there were no necessitous men amongst such a num­ber of men, were ridiculous, it must needs therefore be, that some had estates, and some none. Let us then proceed accord­ing to his own Rule, that the prime and principal Law of Na­ture is for every man to look to himself, and his own accom­modations; and for that reason it is (and the sole reason by him alledged) why men incorporate into a Body Politick. This being supposed (as it is by him) can any man think that such men who had estates, would make themselves in an equal condition with those who had none, and leave them at the disposal of a Leviathan when he is constituted, whereby they [Page 40] should be levelled with them who had no estate; or rather in the constitution of their Commonwealth, provide to have them secured by some Covenant or other, that they might not be worse afterwards, then they were when they covenanted for it, yea loose that which perhaps with great pains and in­dustry they had acquired, which if they do in their constitu­ting a Commonwealth, the Soveraign hath not right to di­spose, and give cross Rules to that Covenant afterwards, he having formerly assented to that Covenant. For if we consi­der his Politicks, we shall find the only end, why men imbo­dy themselves into a Commonwealth, to be the securing themselves to live comfortably, enjoying their own without molestation, or to that purpose. Think then how it is possi­ble for a man with such thoughts about him, in that way to throw himself, and all he hath, clearly to anothers disposal, without any condition or Covenant. For although all things under the Sun are subject to change, and the strongest En­tails find means to be frustrated, yet providence, and careful men, in such a constitution of so high a Nature, would fore­see that possibility, and have some forecast, how and by what ways that should be done, which indeed must needs make the multitude of the people unfit men for such a work, who have not wisdome to foresee or provide for such accidents.

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs his supposition of men met together with­out a propriety, examined. The impossibility of this Fiction, according to his own grounds, from the contradictions which follow upon it.

BUt he seems to go another way, and settles this building of his Commonwealth upon the foundation of a sort of men which have no propriety in any thing, or suppose a hundred thousand (a less number will scarce make a good Ci­ty) all these having no interest in the world, besides their being (which is as unimaginable as any of the rest) which [Page 41] yet is affirmed by him in the following words [For before Constitution of Soveraign Power, as hath already been shewed, all men had right to all things, which necessarily causeth war, and therefore this propriety being necessary to peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the act of that Power in order to peace.] This is a strange corceit, that men in war have right to their Enemies Country before they have conquered it, and when they have conquered it, shall have right to very little: both which by him are most true. For before the chusing a Sove­raign they are at war with all the world, and have a right to all the world, yet when they have conquered any piece, it must be in the Soveraigns power to give them propriety only in what he pleaseth. I know he may object to this, that he saith, the Supreme may give Rules, that is, make such Laws by which men may know what is their propriety, but not that he shall give the propriety. But for answer to this, let him know, that the Legislative Power can take away, and alter them, as well as make them; and then it amounts to as much, as if he had given the propriety its self, for he can do it when he will. And let us consider, that those men who by nature have right to all the world, yet by this industriously uniting themselves into a Commonwealth, gain but this, that whereas before they had right to every thing, now they have right only to this little pittance which is allotted them.

SECT. III. Mr. Hobbs his illogical deductions. Propriety in the state of War. What propriety is; it may be without peace, as peace may be without propriety.

HE proceeds [And therefore this Propriety being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is an act of that Power in order to the Publick Peace.] Surely there is no manner of Logical consequences in this, therefore of his; for let us consider to what this therefore relates, can it look forwards to all mens rights to come? and because of that, [Page 42] therefore propriety should be an act of the Soveraign? These have no conjunction one with another, no, nor because they are in war one with another; for Nations that are in war one with another, have right of some; and people that have right to many things, may have right likewise to what they have of some: So that this therefore hath nothing before to build it self upon; and indeed, in Logick, it should have been deduced out of the premises. But let us see if there be any thing in this new sentence that can countenance this Pro­position, That propriety is an act of the Soveraign. The first words that may seem to make for it, will be these (That Propriety being necessary to peace) therefore Propriety is an act of Soveraignty.] This follows not. First, because Pro­priety may be where there is war, therefore it cannot be ne­cessary to peace, I take Propriety for a peculiar right and title which a man hath to any goods.) This a man may have at that instant when he hath war with another. And again, he may live in peace in this Kingdom, both with his Neighbour, and all the rest of the Nation, and have propriety in nothing, but his being in the world: So that if peace can be without pro­priety, and propriety without peace, it cannot truly be said that propriety is necessary to peace. And then that Proposi­tion which is the foundation of an argument failing, the Ar­gument likewise falls to the ground.

SECT. IV. Propriety not depending only upon Soveraign power. The propriety of the Soveraign independent. His consequence again redargued. Propriety the Act of Law.

THe second words which may give any semblance of an Argument (if any) are depending upon Soveraign power] and such a Soveraign power as he makes his to be, there is none in the world but men have propriety without it, there­fore no necessary dependance upon this, without which it [Page 43] can be, and is. Again consider, the Soveraign himself hath a propriety of his own, and his propriety hath no depen­dance upon any: but then consider that if it be so, and he will have it understood of Subjects only, or that the Sove­raign hath his propriety by right of his Soveraignty, because there is a Soveraign constituted; and that the propriety of all others hath a dependance upon this Soveraign power; yet it doth not follow, that that propriety is an act of Soveraign­ty. It may well be supposed, that propriety may be setled by Contract before the constitution of the Commonwealth, and then the Soveraign only looks and takes care for the right ob­servation of those Laws, which were consented unto con­cerning propriety; and propriety is the Act of those Laws, and he the Protector and preserver of them: So that this con­sequence is not deduced out of any thing which is set down by him. And these few words which are added are of no force (in order to the publick peace) for although he may direct, yea inforce them to the publick peace, yet propriety it self is an act of those Laws which settles it, not of him which go­verns.

SECT. V. Many things good or evil in their own Nature, and therefore not alterable by Humane Laws.

HE goes on; These Rules of Propriety (or meum and tu­um) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful, in the actions of Subjects, are the Civil Laws, that is to say, the Law of each Commonwealth in particular.] The Rules of Propriety, that is, of the particular estate, are without question the Laws of each particular Commonwealth; but for good or evil, there are many things so framed in their own Nature, that it lies not in the power of Humane Laws to make such things good or evil, contrary to their beings, as to love, fear, and worship God, no Humane Law can make it evil; or to hate or despise him, no Humane Law can make it good. And so [Page 44] for lawful and unlawful things, which either by the Law of God in our hearts, or that communicated to us in his holy Book; these are Laws besides the Civil Law of the Nation, which the Civil Law cannot alter, or make good or evil, o­therwise then that goodness or illness which they received from the Law Divine. That which follows in that Para­graph, is nothing but an Exposition of Civil Law; how it is understood by him, which I conceive not to be material to his design, or mine, and therefore I let it alone, and come to a new Inference.


SECT. I. The Soveraign obliged to take care for the decision of Controversies, and accomptable to God as for his own, so also for his Officers neglect.

EIghthly (saith he) Is annexed to the Soveraign the Rights of Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civil or Natural, or concerning Fact; for without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject from the injuries of another.] That is true which he speaks, so that he understands by it not a natural immediate Agent, but a mo­ral political act by his Deputies and inferiour Officers, as Judges; and then it is not only a right which he may, but a duty which he ought to do. And I may go further then Mr. Hobbs here, and say, that he shall be responsible to the great King of Kings, for not taking care that those his Offi­cers do his duty of Justice in deciding causes. Jethro, Moses Father-in-law gave him good counsel, not to take that bur­then (impossible for his shoulders to bear) upon himself a­lone, but divide it to others, and keep weighty causes only to himself.

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs ninth Inference affirmed, Soveraigns in ordinary emergencies to use ordinary means. Salus Populi Suprema Lex.

NInthly, &c. (saith he) (truly Reader I am tired with tran­scribing his words distinctly.) The drift of this ninth Inference is to say, That the Soveraign hath right to the Mi­litia of his Kingdom, and so of all means to maintain his Army: and he saith right, without this, all others are no­thing. The Subjects cannot be protected either from forreign or domestick injuries. This is true, but yet he hath right on­ly to use right means for this. I speak not of cases of necessi­ty, Salus Reipublicae est summae Lex, but in the ordinary man­nage of affairs, he must reserve himself questionless to the ordinary ways.

SECT. III. The choice of Councellors, &c. in the Soveraign: Mr. Hobbs his reason of this Conclusion refuted.

FOr his tenth Inference, which is his right of chusing Councellors, Officers of his Army, and the like, I agree with him; but not for his oft confuted reason, because he hath right to the end, he must have right to the means; for he can­not have right to get his right ends by crooked means, but be­cause he is Supreme, and is the Fountain of all Power in his Realm. But yet there are in many Kingdomes great Offices belonging to Families, as Generals, Chamberlains, and the like; and those cannot justly be laid aside out of those places that they are born to, and have by Inheritances, without great and just cause of disinheriting be produced.

SECT. IV. The eleventh Inference affirmed, where there is no Law, there is no transgression, and consequently no punishment.

HIs eleventh is most true, That to the S [...]veraign is com­mitted the power of punishing, and rewarding according to Law, or if there be no Law (I fear to joyn with him here) to punish where is no Law, according as he shall judge meet to conduce to the deterring of men from doing disservice to the Commonwealth.] This I like not, sin is the transgression of a Law; where no Law, no sin, therefore no punishment.

His last Inference is after a long preamble, That it belongs to the Soveraign Power to give Titles of Honour.] I agree with him in this clause; but observe that his twelfth, eleventh, tenth, ninth Inferences, are all page 92.

SECT. V. Mr. Hobbs his Objection and Answer approved. Kings more incommodated then Subjects from the bur­then of their Crimes, and their account to the King of Kings.

I Have thus briefly touched upon these particular Inferences, which he calls the right of a Soveraign; and having cen­sured them, any man may easily look through that which follows in that Cap. but in the latter end of that Cap. page 94. he seems to answer an Objection: [A man may here object, that the condition of Subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxi­ous to the lusts, or other irregular passions of him or them who have so unlimited a power in their hands; and commonly they who live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy, &c. not con­sidering (saith he) that the estate of man can never be without [Page 47] some incommodity or other.] I think he speaks truth in almost all this whole Paragraph; but as a Christian man who is as­sured there is a God, a Heaven, and Hell; I may say that as all Subjects must, whilst they are in this world, have incom­modities; so Kings have many more, their Crowns are made of Thorns, and their Scepters too heavy almost for men to bear, because they have a mighty accompt to make up to their King, the King of Kings, of the good or evil in their Go­vernment, with which words I end this Cap. and come to his next, which is Cap. 19. entituled thus, Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Soveraign Power.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his expression of Representative not pro­per, and diminutive of Soveraignty. Two Questi­ons raised about the divisions of Commonwealths, left to the judgment of others.

HE begins this Cap. with an Exposition of that ancient division of a Commonwealth into Monarchical, Ari­stocratical, and Democratical, which he affirms to be the only forms by which any Commonwealth is governed; and in the bot­tom of this 94 page, he proves it thus [For the Representa­tive must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is ei­ther the Assembly of all, or but of a part. When the Representa­tive is one man, then it is a Monarchy; when an Assembly of all that will come together, then it is a Democracy, or popular Com­monwealth; when an Assembly of a part only, then it is Aristo­cracy: Other kinds of Commonwealths there can be none, for ei­ther one, or more, or all must have the Soveraign Power, which I have shewed to be indivisible.] I will not here contend against that word Representative, which I have oft already spoke against, and cannot be a fit word to express a Soveraign, for it makes him to be but an Image or Creature of the people, [Page 48] whose Supreme he is. But for that division of a Common­wealth, which he proposeth, although it is so honoured by the universality of Writers in Politicks, that it were not mode­sty in any particular man to deny it, yet give me leave to put a Question (I will not be peremptory in it) Why, since a Commonwealth is the whole Body Politick, and consists in the whole Regiment, from the King to the Cottager, why there may not be thought of some division in respect of subordina­tion, as well as in respect of the Supreme. But I will leave the answer to some younger head, who may have leisure to examine it, and raise another Question: Since the division is made only out of the quantity or number which constitute a Supreme, why may not some things be thought upon con­cerning the quality of it, which may give a new and another illustration to that condition of a Supreme? For although this term of the quality of a Supreme is not usually expressed in the notion of the thing, yet the matter and sense of that word is often delivered by them, as Tyranny for Monarchy; by the first of which, they understand a Monarch governing without Law, so Oligarchy for Aristocracy, as Mr. Hobbs ex­presseth in the following words, page 95.

SECT. II. Tyranny and Monarchy different forms of Govern­ment. Miscalling alters not the nature of the thing. Oeconomical Government consistent with Anarchy.

THere be other names of Government in the Histories and Books of Policy, as Tyranny, and Oligarchy; but they are not the names of other forms of Government, but of the same forms misliked.] Indeed in the first, they are divers forms to govern by Laws, or without Laws, differing forms, differing in the very essential acts of Government. In the second you may find a great difference in the persons, the one being en­abled to his place by his vertue, the other by riches only, or such like accommodations. But let us consider what he adds [Page 49] (for saith he) They who are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny, and they who are displeased with Aristocracy, call it Oligarchy; they who find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy (which signifies a want of Government) and yet I think no man believes a want of Government to be any new kind of Government.] I believe what he saith hath truth, they will miscall them so; but yet this proves not, that these miscallings are not founded upon a truth, A vertuous man is branded with calumny, and yet for all that a vertuous man and a vici­ous man differ, although the vertuous man be abused; so dif­fer these Governments one from another. What he speaks of Democracy and Anarchy was ingenious, but unapplicable to any the other. And although in the strictness of that word A­narchy, it is not possible to allow any Government, yet if it be applied to Political Government, it may notwithstanding (granting it there) consist with Oeconomical Government. And when a Democracy is grown loose, that the Authority in relation to the whole Commonwealth is lost, yet Govern­ment may be found in Families. What he adds is not of great moment, when he saith, Nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they dislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.] Where is the parity of reason betwixt any thing that went before, and this, to produce that saying of his (for the same reason?) and there is no reason for this, that the liking, or disliking, which are extremely outward things, to the essence of any thing, should produce a difference in the thing it self.

SECT. III. The Authors Opinion of this division. The denomina­tion of mixed bodies (as in natural, so in political) à principalion. The strange mixture of the Go­vernment of Lacedaemon. The Monarchy of Darius mixed with Aristocracy.

ANd now Reader, having passed some Notes, I will proceed to set down my own judgment and Opinion of this so much honoured division, which although out of the Reverence I bear to the consent of so many learned men in it, I dare not deny that it is a good division; yet methinks in political stories I can observe, that take these in their pure and simple natures, there's scarce one of them purely such, in any one Country of the whole world; and therefore I may say of them, as Philosophers say of the Elements, they are the matter of which this great Globe of this sublunary world is composed; and yet not found distinct in their pure nature, in any creature in the world, but are denominated such à principalion; as when heat is in any great degree, then it is called fire; when cold and moisture are intense, it is then water; or else (as the Mathematicians speak) Saturn is Lord of this House, because he is predominant; yet the power of his influence is more or less, according to the assi­stance or detriment he receives from other Planets. So when one is chief or Lord of the House, either a Monarchical chief, or Aristocratical, yea I may add a Democratical or popular Government, it is denominated from that which is princi­ple, although one or both the other may be joyned in the influence, and concur in the Government over the whole. I think this appears most true to any man who hath perused sto­ries; nay they are so conjoyned and mixed one with the o­ther sometimes, that it is exceeding hard to say which is the predominant, and disputes amongst learned men are raised, what name to give some Supremes. You may find a common [Page 51] instance in Lacedaemon, where there was a King, a Senate, and in many things the people came in for their shares, learned men know not which to call it. Look if you please upon Monarchy; there is none I think so absolute in the world, to which all he speaks may be applied; (I mean all those marks of Soveraignty which have been before touched upon) I will give the Reader one instance in one of the greatest Mo­narchs that ever was, or is in the world, I mean Darius in the sixth of Daniel, you shall find at the seventh verse, that all the Presidents of the Kingdom, the Governors, and the Princes, the Councellors, and the Captains, consulted toge­ther to establish a Royal Statute, and to make a firm Decree, that whosoever shall ask a Petition of any God or man for thirty daies, save of Darius himself, should be cast into the Lyons Den. I will not descant upon the Decree, being the most abominably wicked that possibly could be made by a man who did acknowledge a God as Darius did: For how could he think that God would bless him, acting so crosly against his Honour, as to forbid prayers to him? Mr. Hobbs indeed might have concurred with him, that thinks no prayers have preva­lence with God, but that all things are governed by immuta­ble necessity. But Darius could not be of that mind, who forethought that God could, and would deliver him: Neither could Daniel be of that mind, who would not leave praying for all the terrors of the world. Well, the Decree is out, ac­cording to the Laws of the Medes and Persians, which is unal­terable; when the Law was out, and Daniel found to be a transgressor against it, we shall find in the thirteenth verse, that these Princes presented the crime to the King, and requi­red Justice against him; in the fourteenth verse the King is said to labour until night to deliver Daniel, and was displea­sed with himself. Surely before he was aware he had consent­ed to such a Law as was mischievous to a person of that great integrity and excellency, as Daniel was; and this Law which he had made, must be Author of so great a Crime, as to shed not only Innocent, but vertuous blood; and therefore he la­boured until Sun-set with those men who joyned with him in the making that Law to deliver Daniel: But they, in the fif­teenth [Page 52] verse, being fierce against Daniel, urged the immutabi­lity of the Decree, that it was a Law confirmed by him ac­cording to the Laws of the Medes and Persians, which may not be altered; and indeed the argument is of great force: For if Laws made by any Supreme may be violated before they are repealed, what security can any Subject have of any thing he enjoys? And surely in keeping and preserving the Laws they have made, they do imitate their great Master the King of Kings, and Supreme of Supremes, from whom they have all their Authority, and by whom they reign, who although by his infinite power he can do what he pleaseth, yet out of his infinite goodness he cannot deny himself, or alter the word which is gone out of his mouth, falli non potest, mentiri non potest; so that all his Words, and Covenants, and Promises, are Yea and Amen. Such should Supremes be; such was Da­rius that just King; no doubt but he could have sent a party of Souldiers, and have taken Daniel out of their power; but having made the Law, which bound him to the execution, he would perform it, although it were never so contrary and a­verse to his disposition. From all which you may discern, that this great Potentate had his power limited by a Law which he could not justly violate. Now look upon him, and see him in the following part of his story, of a most absolute and unli­mited power, where it was not restrained by Law. In the latter end of that Cap. you may observe, that when the King had perceived that God had delivered Daniel from the Lyons, and he had taken him out of the Den. At the 24 verse the King commanded, and they brought those men who had ac­cused Daniel, and cast them, and their Wives, and Children, into the Lyons Den, that is, the Presidents and the Princes, which was the greatest act of power exercised upon the great­est persons which were in that greatest Kingdom, and all this meerly arbitrary.

SECT. IV. The result of the former example. No Government de facto purely Monarchical; and therefore not sus­ceptible of all the properties of Monarchical Go­vernment required by Mr. Hobbs. Darius bound to the execution of those Laws which himself had made.

MY Collection here is, That there is no Supreme upon earth, which hath no commixion of any the other principles in all those particular rights, which Mr. Hobbs re­quires as properties of Supremacy; for the Legislative is one, and the controul of the Execution is another. Here you see at the making of this Decree, there was Aristocracy mixed with Monarchy by the Princes, for they petitioned the King to make this Law, but the King gave life to it with his Fiat. That this was so appears, because if Darius alone had done, and they had had no interest in this Legislation, he who had made it, might have recalled it of himself, when he discovered the mischief which it produced; but it is said that he strove and laboured to have saved him, but those Princes (who it seems had some influence in making the Law) resisted, and would not give way to it: Then mark the second particle, which is next of moment in the Law it self; that is the execution, he could not be spared from that. And although in many poli­ties, the Supreme may, and hath power to dispence with the execution of severe Justice, yet it seems this great King had his hand tyed in respect of that, and could not justly do it, when upon their Petition he had established that Law. Let no man censure this conclusion until he hath read the whole, for it is not proper for me to prevent my method in any fol­lowing discourse, to satisfie every doubt which may interpose in the mean time, but to preserve every particular until I come to its proper place.

SECT. V. The general reasons of the precedent conclusions. That Government best which is suited to the disposition of the people. Some people fit only for subjection.

BUt to conceive a general reason for what I speak, consi­der with me, that the people must be governed as best suits with their condition, for the multitude without doubt would be too hard for any Supreme, if they knew how ad­vantagiously to dispose of themselves: And it is an easie thing with ambiguous language to sow discontents amongst the multitude against any present Government; and therefore all Politicians, besides Mr. Hobbs, do shew that some Nati­ons are fit to be ruled with a severe hand, some with a more remiss one, some fit for Monarchy, some for Democracy. The Fastern Nations best agree with those Monarchies un­der which they live, which are the most absolute in the world, but other Countries would not endure that Yoak. It is a most ancient observation in this difference of Countries, that some are so dull (I dare not name them for fear of of­fending, though others have done it) as they are only fit to obey, not to govern.

SECT. VI. The former conclusion further asserted. The Ephori amongst the Lacedaemonians first introduced by Theopompus.

BUt for this conclusion let it suffice what Aristotle writes of Theopompus, and out of him other later Writers, that he being King of the Lacedemonians first set up the Ephori there; his Wife upbraided him with it, that he should leave his Kingdom with less power to his Successors, then he had [Page 55] received it from his Ancestors, he answered, that he should leave it more lasting. Perhaps he was deceived in it; but yet it meant this truth, that the people being sweetned with the imagination that they have some interest in the Govern­ment, they will put their necks more willingly under the Yoak. The story is told in the fifth of his Politicks, Cap. 11. which shew that it may be, and may be profitable to receive this commixion,

SECT. VII. No Government absolutely pure. Mr. Hobbs his Po­liticks calculated for Utopia.

BUt then go further and examine the flourishing Com­monwealths of the whole world, and you shall find them so mixed, nay that mixture so equally poised, that it will be hard to find the predominant from which it may re­ceive its name, as was the cause of the Lacedemonians di­sputed amongst divers Authors, whether Monarchical, Ari­stocratical, or Democratical, and none so absolutely pure, as that we may say this Element is without commixion, that Planet hath alone influence; and this he seems himself to grant in his 98. page, concerning the practises in the world, although he writes now an Ʋtopia, a pattern which he would have all to follow. He goes on, page 95.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his conclusions deduced from Principles founded in the Air. Absolute liberty not actually to be found in any people. Several petite Common­wealths raised out of the Ruines of the Roman Em­pire. None of these without mixture, nor durable. His exposition of Representative again redargued, as an ill foundation of Government, Religion, and Propriety. The formerly mentioned Commonwealths preserved by Laws.

IT is manifest (saith he) that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to one man to represent them every one, as well, &c. The first observation which I make here, is an unhappy practise which he useth in this place, and often in this Book, which is to suppose things hard to be found in practicks, and by that fallacy to lay a founda­tion in the Air, and then raise an imaginary structure upon it. This supposal of his, that men are in an absolute liberty, is very rarely to be found; for all men that are in the world, as soon as they are born, are Subjects, unless we may con­ceive a man born King of that Country he is in. I would fain find out such a possibility, where such a number of men fit to make a Commonwealth may be at liberty; and I have found out one where it hath been practised, I mean that of the Roman Empire, when it was broken and ruined, many people for fear were driven away to shift for themselves, or perhaps overseen, or neglected by the Conquerors. These men, one or other, being thus left to themselves, their law­ful Emperour, and his Posterity, to whom they should obey, being destroyed, or altogether unable to give them any sup­port, these men are left to shift for themselves: A Govern­ment they must have, or grow wild; they conspire in that, [Page 57] and then set up many Commonwealths in Italy, and those adjacent parts. But give me leave to tell Mr. Hobbs, that he shall hardly find in any of them existing any pure element of Politie without commixion. And I shall tell him more, that these Commonwealths having no support, but that weak foundation of the peoples Constitution, were upon all occa­sions of tumults (which were very often) diverted from their first settlement, and had new ways of Government esta­blisht in their place. I will tell him further, that no Supreme in all these was ever called a Representative, or a Leviathan: And therefore Mr. Hobbs did much amiss to lay this as a foundation for all that light stuff which follows, yea of his whole Book, and of all Commonwealths, which can only be founded upon such an extraordinary occasion, neither then in such an absolute manner as he supposeth: For never did a­ny of these submit their Religion, their Estates or Lives, as he would injoyn, but had them preserved by Laws.

SECT. II. The Barbarous Murder of King Charles the First, the direct issue of this Doctrine of Mr. Hobbs, viz. That the Soveraign is but the Representative of the People.

THat which follows immediately about our Representa­tive in the House of Commons, I let pass, until I come to the middle of that page and paragraph, toward the latter end, which he begins thus: [I know not how this so manifest a truth should of late be so little observed, that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was a­lone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King (I can add to him, was acknowledged so by all the World) was notwithstanding never considered as their Represen­tative.] He saith, he knows not how; I will tell him, because a King in no Language, nor in any Country, is taken for a [Page 58] Representative: And further, that all those injuries which are done to him (for he means King Charles the First) had their pretence from this horrid Doctrine of his, that Kings had their power from the people: And if he will, that they made him their Representative, and not liking his Represen­tation, they deposed him, and would be represented by one more like themselves. In the latter end of that paragraph, he gives most dangerous counsel to him who had the present Go­vernment in his power (to instruct him in the nature of that Office.) But God be praised the danger of that intendment is over, and I let it pass. In the following part of that Cap. he very excellently well discourseth of those three Elements of Government, and most rationally gives the superiority to Monarchy. Then he enters into a discourse of electing Kings, and Temporary Powers, as Dictators in Aristocracy, and both Aristocracy and Democracy, which I let pass as not so mischievous as other things. And now I come to his 20. Cap. page 101. at the bottom, which is thus enti­tled, Of Dominion Paternal and Despotical.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his digression censured. His first Proposi­tion untrue. His supposition of a General Assembly to consent to the Soveraignty of the Conqueror un­practicable.

A Commonwealth by accuisition is that, where the S [...]veraign Power is acquired by force; as it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together, by plurality of voices, for fear of death or bonds, do auth [...]rize all the actions of that man; or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.] Now I am in the 102. page. This is a strange digression from his Title; What hath this acquisition to do with Dominions Pa­ternal or Despotical? but let it pass, I will examine his defi­nition. It is not true, that all acquisition of a Kingdom is [Page 59] by force, sometimes it is got by craft and knavery, we know how Absalom got the Kingdom. There may be other instan­ces, but let that go, acquisition by force is but one species of acquiring Kingdomes. But then see what follows, [It is then acquired by force, when men singly, &c.] as before expressed. I dare boldly say he can shew me no considerable Kingdom that either is or was so acquired. I have confuted this in my former discourse, concerning the Institution of a Common­wealth, and those arguments will be of more force against this manner of acquiring. Suppose an Enemy should conquer France or Spain, do you think he could or would assemble all the Nation together to subscribe, or any way express their intentions of this his most unjust request to own all his acti­ons, and make him their person? it is beyond possibility to i­magine any such thing. Look upon David, Alexander, Pom­pey, any of those Conquerors in the world, did they ever act any such thing? I am confident we read of none, and yet they attained Kingdomes, and got Dominions. But let us proceed to the next Paragraph.

SECT. II. Fear not the only motive to consent to obedience in the Institution of Commonwealths. No obligation from fear, when that fear is removed. The fear of God the greatest security of obedience.

ANd this kind of Dominion or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, only in this, that men who chuse their Soveraign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: But in this case they subject themselves to him they are afraid of.] Mr. Hobbs doth attribute very much to fear; however, in the last case, I think it not amiss: A vanquisht Nation seldome subjects themselves to an Enemy, but out of fear of the Conqueror. But concerning the for­mer, the motive is as much the love of their own happy and quiet condition, together with the hope and expectation of [Page 60] many other conveniences which will accrew to them and their Families by it: But (saith he) in both cases they do it for fear; which is to be noted by them that hold all such Covenants as proceed from fear of death, or violence, void; which if it were true, no man in any kind of Commonwealth could be obliged to obe­dience.] Thus far he, and indeed if there were no other obli­gation but these fears he speaks of, there were no obligation to bind any man when he may secure himself: For let the Reader observe, that the fear he speaks of are fears of men, one of another in an instituted, and in his acquired Kingdom for fear of the Conqueror. Here is put down no fear of God, which is the obliging fear; for the rest men may have worldly plots to escape, and rid themselves of the dangers of War, but he can have none to acquit himself of Gods anger, which is the great weight, and the only one which presseth man to obedience.

SECT. III. Mr. Hobbs his Proposition asserted. His reason of this Proposition censured. Contracts against the moral Law ipso facto void.

HE proceeds [It is true, that in a Commonwealth once in­stituted or acquired, promises proceeding either from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Laws: But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right to the thing promised.] Here is a Proposition, and the reason of it. The Proposition I speak to first, and allow it to be true, not only in a Commonwealth instituted or acqui­red, but in any estate of mankind: Whosoever promiseth an unlawful thing is not obliged to the performance; and the reason is, that the Moral Law of Nature being written in mens hearts, whatsoever engagement is made against it, is ipso facto invalid, whether he did it by fear or no, being (as he rightly speaks) an act without his ability to perform, and [Page 61] of that which was otherwise disposed of by the Moral Law. But consider, Reader, what this is to his purpose, the sense pre­ceding was, That all Commonwealths were founded upon fear, whether instituted or acquired: From thence he spake against such as hold Covenants made for fear of death, or violence, void.

SECT. IV. Of Covenants arising from fear in things lawful, but against Equity. Of mixed Contracts and Actions, of just, and lighter, or unwarrantable fears in a­voidance of Contracts.

I Looked to have him prove they were not; but instead of that he affirms, they are v [...]id in an instituted Common­wealth, when they Covenant for an unlawful thing.] But sup­pose they covenant to do a thing that is lawful? when it is in its self lawful, although full of many inconveniencies, as that Thieves should with oaths and imprecations make a man swear to alienate his estate from his Wife and Children, it is lawful for him to do it, but it would be a most wicked act to keep such a Covenant; not because (as his reason is) that he had no power to do it; for he had by all those Laws which he seems to acknowledge, which are the Laws of the King­domes wherein he lives; but the reason is that which he will not acknowledge, that Covenants made upon such terms are not free, but mixed actions, which are done with a relu­ctancy, and not plen [...] consersu. For although he that throws his goods into the Sea, to save his Ship and his life, doth that act willingly, that is principally so, yet because it is with a reluctancy, and against his love of his riches, which weighs the ballance heavier on the other side, it is neither violent, nor willing, but a mixed action, yet willing princi­pally, because it is chosen; and upon this reason it is, that this act done by such considerable fear, is expounded not ob­ligatory: As if a Maid surprized by such means should pro­mise Marriage upon terrors of death if she did not so Cove­nant; [Page 62] if she finds she should be unhappy in such a Match, without doubt she is not bound to perform it, because it was not fully a willing or rational act, but mixed; but yet if it had been a voluntary act, and with full consent, she ought to keep her Covenant: Which shews, that many times forced acts or obligations made by terrour of death, or with strong probabilities of great mischief, if refused, may when that fear or terror is removed, and upon repentance of such Co­venant, be lawfully denied, and are not obligatory: But if it be for fear of some little danger, such as may not cadere in constantem vicum, it doth excuse no body. And now I let pass the latter end of that Paragraph, and proceed to the next, in the margin of which I find.

SECT. V. The case of a conquered and instituted Kingdom not the same. The best art of a Conquerour is to se­cure his Victory By what means such a security may be obtained.

THe rights and consequencies of Soveraignty the same in both.] That is, both in an instituted and an acquired Soveraignty, in which his marginal note is the whole pith of that Paragraph; for he only sets down the particulars formerly treated of, and discoursed upon before by me, and offers at no one argument, but at the latter end he saith; [The reasons whereof are the same which are alledged in the pre­cedent Cop.] He says they are the same, and I say they can­not be the same: For if there were such a thing as his insti­tution of a Soveraignty, yet the case of a conquered Nation must needs differ from it, for either the Conquest is fully and compleat, (which seldome happens) or else the well-nigh-conquered Nation comes to a Treaty for their condi­tions, which may be to enjoy their ancient Laws some­times, sometimes accept of new, sometimes pay a tribute to the Conquerour, who gives them leave to live under their [Page 63] former Race of Kings; sometimes have Deputies and Vice-roys set over them, impowred by the Conquerour; sometimes they accept of Garrisons to bridle them; sometimes their words are taken; and then if there be an absolute Victory, they must be ruled solely by the will of the Conquerour. And in none of these is the condition of a conquered Kingdom the s [...]me with an Instituted: And surely the more conform their conquered condition is to their former state, the more lasting it will be, and otherwise it is in danger to decay quickly; for there is no discretion more becoming a Conque­ror, then to make his Victory certain and durable: Nor is that any way to be atchieved so easily, as by discerning the temper of those men which he is to deal with, nor can their temper be so well understood by any thing, as by their cu­stomes; for the commonalty of men not being able to chuse for themselves, must and will be contented with that Go­vernment which they are used to, though perhaps another may be easier in its self. So that it is evident (I think) to be ap­prehended, that the same rights and consequencies of Sove­raignty which belongs to a Supreme by Institution, do not belong to one by Conquest.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his method censured, his contradictions noted. Of the right of Dominion from Generation. Paternal Dominion not flowing from the consent of children. Infants cannot consent. Paternal Domi­nion flowing from the Laws of God and Nature. Scripture vilified by Mr. Hobbs.

IN the next Paragraph he comes to treat of Dominion Pa­ternal how attained, as the Margin directs. My first note shall be upon his method. He had treated in the precedent Cap. of Dominion by Institution, then the Title of this Cap, [Page 64] was of Dominion Paternal and Despotical. In all the prece­ding part of this Cap. he hath handled only Dominion by ac­quisition, and that (without consideration of what he had writ before) he defined to be such as is got by force. Now he confutes himself in the first words of this Paragraph; which are [Dominion is acquired two ways, either by Generati­on, or by Conquest.] That by Generation, I am sure, cannot be called by force; therefore either his definition of acquired Dominion is not good, or that Dominion by Generation is not an acquired Dominion. He proceeds [The right of Do­minion by Generation, is that which the Parent hath over his Children, and is called Paternal.] A high Mystery expounded; that the Government of Parents should be called Paternal: But his next words confute this immediately, which are [And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child, because he begot him.] How then can Paternal Dominion be acquired by Generati­on? which he immediately before affirmed, when he said, Dominion is acquired two ways, by Generation, and by Con­quest: (but, saith he) from the Childs consent, either express, or by other sufficient Arguments declared.] Let us consider this, and examine what consent a Child can give in his Infancy; certainly no otherwise then a Pig, or any Infant Beast; he can wish for a Teat, and cry for it when he lacks it, and be satisfied with any that is offered. If this Doctrine of his were true, the Child did chuse his Nurse who gave him suck, not the Mother who gave him being. At the first in his Infancy he cannot distinguish betwixt his Parents, and therefore can have no election nor consent (I mean rational consent) to one more then another to be his Guardian, yet the Parent hath Dominion over that Child, and like other Go­vernours, shall give an account one day of that Stewardship, and of his behaviour towards him. Let us go on, and ob­serve the Child grown up with a smattering of Reason; Can any man think that the Parent should not govern that Child, who hath not prudence enough to govern himself, but much passion to make him unruly, and therefore needs to have a Governour? Well, let us go further, and bring the Child to [Page 65] one and twenty years of age, when he is generally thought fit to govern his estate, if he have any, yet even then, until his death, he owes obedience to his Parents, and they have Dominion over him, whether he consent or not: And who­soever denies this, denies not only Scripture (which is no­thing with Mr. Hobbs) but even Humanity, which hath ex­pressed her tenderness of this duty in all Ages, as will appear [...]ore fully hereafter.

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs his Chain of contradictions discovered.

BUt good Reader observe with me how many contradicti­ons are crouded together in one page. First an acquired Dominion is by force, and that contradicted; because that a Dominion is acquired by Generation, which is not a forced, but a most natural act; and that is again contradicted, be­cause not Generation, but consent gives the Dominion; and this which he calls consent, is not such a thing as belonged to an acquired Dominion, for that consent is only a consent to that Government for fear of the Conquerour; but this con­sent is for love of his own accommodation, or out of that reverential awe which Children have to their Parents; and this is in nothing like the other. And surely if it participated of either, it most resembled the consent which he imagines to be in an instituted Commonwealth, and therefore not to be ranked under the Acquisite.

SECT. III. Mr. Hobbs his constant abuse of Scripture noted. The command of the Mother to be obeyed in subordina­tion to the Father, in whom the obedience of chil­dren is terminated. His iterated quarrelling with Scripture. Rules of Government to be proportion­able to general emergencies.

BUt let us go on with him (for saith he) As to the Genera­tion, God hath ordained to man a helper, and there be al­ways two that are equally Parents: The Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to them both, and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible, for no man can obey two Masters.] To begin where he ends. He doth abuse Scripture wheresoever it crosseth his way, as it doth very often: No man can serve two Masters, but in every Family a man serves a Master and a Mistress: There cannot be two Supremes.] But in an Oe­conomical Dominion the Man is above the Woman, and if the Woman command contrary to the Man, the Mans com­mand is to be obeyed, and the Woman her self is to be obedi­ent to the Man, the Mother to the Father: I but, saith he, they are equally principles of Generation; therefore if the right of Dominion be an appendant to Generation, it must equally belong to them both. I will not dispute the nature of Gene­ration, which Philosophers and Physitians have abundantly done; but suppose that in the case it exacts an obedience to them both, yet with a subordination to the Father, which must clearly appear in this, because the Woman her self must be obedient to the Father, as will appear in the two first prin­ciples of Generation, Adam and Evah, God gave them that Law, Thy desire shall be to thy Husband, and he shall rule over thee, Gen. 3.16. Now then if the man rules the woman, then in the subordination of Government, she cannot equally share in that Dominion with him, who is Governour of her: So that although the Child hath from his Generation two per­sons [Page 67] to obey; yet this obedience is terminated in one, the Fa­ther who is Supreme, to whom the Mother also is subject: He proceeds [And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the man only, as being of the m [...]re excellent Sex, they mis­reckon it; for there is not always that difference of strength and prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war.] Thus this Author hath a spight to Scripture, and hopes with a flash of wicked wit to divert men from that due observance which they ought to have of those duties which are there required, or at the least to diminish that rational obedience which men should give to it. It may be some do attribute the obedience to the man only, out of this regard, that he is the Nobler Sex, and why not? He is so un­doubtedly; for although it may happen out in particulars, that the Woman may be more prudent or strong then her Hus­band, yet certainly the generality is not so; and the rules of governing and obeying are not to be taken from a few parti­cular instances, but the common condition of the Sexes. Ser­vants may be wiser or stronger then their Masters, Subjects then their Kings, children then their Parents, yet these sa­cred Laws of governing and obeying must not be varied for such few particular instances.

SECT. IV. The brawling of Man and Wife improperly called war. War only between Nations. VVisdom, not strength, enable to Government. VVives submit to their Hus­bands, by the Law of God, under the first and se­cond Adam. St. Pauls Argument from the Law of Nature explained.

WHat he saith that this cause must be determined by war, is ill expressed. For first the contention betwixt man and wife, cannot properly be called war, but brawling or fight­ing at the worst. War is betwixt Nations in the genuine sig­nification. I remember Aelian tells a story of the Sacae, that [Page 68] when a Man and a Maid married, they were to fight at the first, and he or she that conquered, was afterwards served by the other for the term of their lives. This was a pretty gam­bal, whether true or false it is not much material; I read it only in him; but surely a most unreasonable practice. Is the power of Government proper to strength or wisdom? Can any man think that a Bull or a Horse is fitter to govern a man, then he them, because they are of more strength, though he have more wisdom? But surely for us that are Christians, there is no need to fly to such poor little instances, or customs, or the accidental prudence or strength of the woman; if she have more wit, let her use it to the gaining and winning him to vertue; if she have more strength, let her use it to the assi­stance of her Husbands weakness: by that means her excel­lencies will be imployed to their right uses; she shall be a helper to him, not a Ruler over him. I need not here repeat what of late I delivered concerning this Doctrine out of Gen. 3. But that Gods Command is clear to this purpose, not only in Adam, but those that are descended from the second Adam, consider what S. Paul writes in the fifth to the Ephesians, v. 22. Wives submit your selves to your own Husbands, as unto the Lord. But methinks Mr. Hobbs should answer to this, that this is on­ly a positive Law; yet I can reply to that, that it is universal, or what is equivalent, indefinite, and comprehends all wives. But then go further, and read the Apostles Argument in the following verse; For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, e­ven as Christ is the Head of the Church. Thus the Apostle ar­gues from the Law of Nature: First, that by the Law of Nature the rest of the body submits to the Head; so must Wives do to their own Husbands. Then this is exemplified from Christi­anity in the manner of his Headship, such a Head as Christ is over his Church; which I hope no Christian will say, but that it must submit to, and be governed by him. And I hope, both Nature, Gods Law, and Christian duty, may be sufficient to de­termine this controversie without war: And I may add, that since all Nations have consented to it, sure we ought not now to demur upon the case, because Mr. Hobbs interposeth his Authority with little or no reason.

SECT. V. This Paragraph contrary to Mr. Hobbs his principles, and the supposed institution of a Commonwealth; but yet most true, not from Mr. Hobbs his reason, but the Law of God. Fathers of Families have the disposition of their Families. The invalidity of Mr. Hobbs his reasons. His example of the Ama­zons inconcludent.

HE proceeds: In Commonwealths this controversie is decided by the Civil Law; and for the most part (but not always) the sentence is in favour of the Father, because for the most part Commonwealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mo­thers of Families.] Now I am come to page [...]03. but I would fain know how the Fathers, rather then the Mothers, should come to be Erectors of Commonwealths? Certainly if Com­monwealths were instituted (as he feigns) by the general suf­frage of all who had interest in the Government, then women as well as men, Mothers as well as Fathers, had the manage­ment of that business, for they have their interest in the pub­lick constitution as well as men. But he hath let fall an excel­lent truth which is clear against the whole Body of his Poli­ticks, which is, that the Fathers of Families, not the Rabble, were the Erectors of Commonwealths: For if they did (as I am confident with him here they did) then his former dis­course which is built upon the institution of a Commonwealth by the universal consent of all who have interest in it must fail; for not the Fathers and Mothers only, but even the meanest child or servant, may challenge their shares in it. And certain­ly the Fathers of Families could not be the Erectors of Com­monwealths, but only out of this regard, that they were the chief in their Families, and by that reason had right to dis­pose of himself and them. And here let the Reader consider, that Mr. Hobbs never remembers that great Authority given by God to Moses, which regulated him and his Posterity ma­ny [Page 70] Generations; nor the confirmation that Law laid from our Saviour in the New Testament, which are obligatory to us in all Ages. He only clouds the truth with this pittiful poor rea­son, or rather shew of reason, only that men were the Law­makers, and they were partial to their own Sex; No, Master Hobbs, God was the Law-maker, who is no accepter of per­sons, or Sexes, but in an infinitely wise manner disposeth all things in the best and surest method that may be, according to his most just Laws, But because he said (but not always) that is, that the Fathers of Families were not always the Erectors of Commonwealths, intimating that some Commonwealths were erected by the Mothers of Families, I should thank him, or any man else, who can shew me any such in the world. It may be he will fly to that beggerly instance which he gives pre­sently of the Amazons; but let it suffice for them (if there were any such) that they were Widdows, or single Women, not united in Marriage, and so not subject to Husbands, and therefore were free to dispose of themselves as they pleased, and might have made what just Laws they thought fit for their condition; but if they were joyned in marriage to Hus­bands, they must then subm [...]t to that yoak, and be governed in their domestick affairs according to his discipline. The di­spute is here betwixt Husband and Wife, not betwixt man and woman, Wives must submit to their own Husbands, not every woman to every man.

SECT. VI. Mr. Hobbs his contradiction again censured. Antipo­dial Government introduced. His conclusions not consistent one with another. Contracts (with Mr. Hobbs) but words, and advantaged by power, may lawfully be broken. Lawful Contracts sealed in Heaven.

HE goes on: But the Question lieth now in the state of meer Nature, where there are supposed no Laws of Matrimony, [Page 71] no Laws for the education of children, but the Law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the Sexes one to another, and to their children. This is inconsistent with what he hath former­ly taught, and I have confuted; viz. That naturally men are at war, every man with every man: Well then, in this state before they are covenanted into a Commonwealth, all things, all rights are tryed by force, and it may happen that the man who conquers this day may fall sick and grow weak, and then the Woman may be Victor, and so the case may be altered; or both may grow old or sick, and their children master them both, and so bring in an Antipodial Government: And then let any man think, whether the wise constitution of Nature can agree with such abominable follies? and how weak, ac­cording to his Doctrine, this conclusion is: In this condition of meer nature (saith he) either the Parents between themselves dis­pose of the dominion over the child by contract, or do not dispose thereof at all: If they do dispose thereof, the right passeth ac­cording to the contract. This distinction cannot be denied, ei­ther they must, or they must not contract: If they dispose (saith he) the right passeth according to the contract. But let him remember the state and condition he speaks of, is in mans na­ture, before any imbodying themselves into a Commonwealth. Then let him look back to what he hath writ, Cap. 17. page 85. Covenants without the Sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. And again in the same page; Theref [...]re notwithstanding the Law of Nature, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully relye upon his own strength, and art for caution against all other men.] Let us put these together; the right passeth by contract, saith he, in this 20. Cap. Contracts are but words, and have no force to bind, saith he, in his [...]7. Cap. unless a Commonwealth be erected; therefore no Cove­nant gives an active right to any thing, without the Sword in a Magistrates hand to make it good: So then the Sword rules every man in that state, before a Commonwealth is instituted, may lawfully relye upon his own strength or art for caution. So that although the word be out in that state, and the Con­tract made, yet if the Husband or the Wife can find strength [Page 72] or art to avoid it, they may lawfully use it, and to defraud and force each other to the breach of this Covenant is law­ful. So that according to his principles, there is no considera­ble strength in the state of Nature to keep any to their promises; but according to mine it is not so, who am assured that those lawful Contracts made on earth are sealed in heaven; and the God of truth so loves truth, that he approves it in all conditi­ons of men; and therefore these bargains ought to be obser­ved, unless it may happen out, that they are contrary to the Divine Law, as that a man should divest himself of all his Oeconomical right which God hath placed in him, and the woman by such power should usurp a Superiority, when God hath commanded her to be subject: So that a man may, as I think, absolutely conclude, where there is no Common­wealth, a veracity is exacted by God in such contracts, which are not against some Divine Law; where there is a Common­wealth these bargains are confirmed as are not contrary to their Civil Laws.

SECT. VII. Mr. Hobbs his example of the Amazons, further shewed to be impertinent.

HE proceeds, and gives an instance; We find (saith he) in History, that the Amazons contracted with the men of Neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for Issues, that the Issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves; so that the Dominion of the Females was in the Mother.] Here is an instance from a Lawless Conjunction, where man and woman meet together, like beasts, to enjoy that carnal familiarity, but not like rational creatures to co­habit together in an Oeconomical Discipline. Amongst them there were only the first names, Man and Woman, not Husband and Wife, which began our discourse. It is of Women re­nouncing mens society, who neither themselves, nor their children, lived in the same Nation, nor under the same Go­vernment [Page 73] with these whom they did converse with; and so if they had kept the Male-child, the father could no ways come to lay claim to it, or any thing in the Amazonian Coun­try. And yet consider once more how weak and inconsistent his discourse is, which contradicteth it self in almost every page. He discoursed of men in me [...]r nature just before, and presently after, as his words are, which men which are without all union in a Commonwealth; and here in the middle of his discourse he gives his instance for proof of his Conclusion from the conversation of the Amazonians with their Neigh­bouring Countries, both which were incorporated into seve­ral Commonwealths: For it is evident from what is written of the Amazonians in Histories, that their Commonwealth had many distinct Laws and Customes from other Nations (if there were any such.) But let us go on with him.

SECT. VIII. His supposition of the state of Nature without Matri­mony censured. His reasons refuted. The Father of the Family hath dominion of the Child born out of Matrimony.

HE enters now upon the second part of his distinction: If there be no Contract (saith he) the dominion is in the Mo­ther: For in the condition of meer nature, where there are no Ma­trimonial Laws, it cannot be known who is the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother; and therefore the right of dominion o­ver the child dependeth upon the will of the Mother, and is conse­quently hers.] Here you find the state of nature again, where are no Matrimonial Laws: But stay, there was never such a time or place, for God gave the Law of the Wives subjection to her Husband in Paradise, Gen. 3.16. of which I have for­merly treated. It was the first Law he gave after their eating the forbidden fruit; therefore there was no such time or state of men, in which there was no Law concerning Matrimony. But if he understand by this word Law, only Humane Politick [Page 74] Laws, he receives his answer, that where no Politick Laws restrain it, there most abundantly Divine Laws are without controul. But he hath reason for what he writes (Because no man can tell who is Father of the child, but the Mother only; therefore he is at her dispose) I would ask whether the child was born in Marriage or no? if so, then the child is his fa­thers, and he is bound to maintain him; but if not, he is Fi­lius Populi (unless the Woman produce the Father) and the people must father it, and provide for it. But he will answer in the meer state of nature, without Politick Sanctions, there is no Marriage. I reply there was never such a state, but there were some forms by which men accepted their Wives in­to that union; or if no Laws, yet custom and constant usage grew into a Law, and they were thus appropriated one to the other. But suppose the Infant (he speaks of) were born without any such conjunction, the Woman either lived in her Fathers house, or was her self alone Mistress of a family. If the first, she and the Child were at the Fathers dispose; if the second, and the Father unknown, he is hers only. But he and I might have spared the troubling a Reader with this dis­course in this question; for the question was raised about man and wife in the same family, who should govern the child, not about such spurious Generations, where the man and wo­man live in distinct families. He urgeth further; Again (saith he) seeing the Infant is first in the Mothers power, so as she may either nourish or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather then any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is hers.] Let us first exa­mine this little Particle (First) that must be understood of the first instant of the childs birth, because that gives him his first being in the world: But then is not the same power in the Midwife, who may either stifle the child, or preserve it? And then an equal share of duty from this reason will be owing to her as well as the Mother. Then consider that phrase (if she nourish it) what is that? give it suck? But suppose she doth neither expose it, nor give it suck, by reason of some infirmi­ty or weakness which she hath, but put it out to Nurse, shall the Nurse have any interest in the dominion over the child? I, [Page 75] but (he may answer) that this must be by the Mothers provi­dence, and then she is Author of that childs preservation: No (say I) but the Father who must either direct, or at the least willingly permit the Mother to do it; for the Mother being under the Fathers dominion, she cannot act any considerable matter either to her self, or for her child, without the Fathers leave.

SECT. IX. No Law impowring the woman to expose her child. The Law of Nature favourable to Infants. Power or abi­lity cannot give the character of Justice to unjust a­ctions. The consequences of Mr. Hobbs his con­clusions discovered, and the contrary asserted. The Mother gets no dominion over the Child by not ex­posing it.

NExt let us consider what power the Mother hath to ex­pose her child; Id potest, quod jure potest; she hath no power, but by some Law which gives her that power. I am confident he cannot find any National Law which gives the Woman authority to act any such thing, or if he could, what would it avail him? because he disputes of such who are not imbodied into a Commonwealth, much less can he pretend to the Law of Nature, which dictates nothing more clearly then the Love of Parents to their children. I but he will say, she hath power, that is, she is able to do it: If such a malicious disposition were discovered, the Husband hath power to re­strain it: But suppose such a horrid wickedness may be in the Woman, and a power, yea an opportunity of acting it, doth she gain dominion, because she doth it not? by that reason Wives may have dominion over their Husbands, Children o­ver their Parents, Servants over their Masters, Subjects over their Kings, for all these have or may have power, though no right to murder or slay the other, which is very odious to the consideration of any man who thinks upon either Oecono­micks [Page 76] or Politicks; nay there is none of those more abhorring to nature, then the Mothers exposing her child. I therefore conclude against that member of his distinction, that although a Mother may be so impious as to expose her child, yet be­cause she hath no right to do it, she gains no right of domini­on by not doing it.

SECT. X. Mr. Hobbs his deviation from the matter proposed. Children exposed and nourished by others, owe not filial duties to them that nourish them; preservati­on not so great a benefit as being. Romulus his re­spect to them that nourished him, not filial duty, but gratitude and kindness.

HE proceeds upon that supposal: [But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it.] First (good Reader) consider with me what this is to his purpose? The question raised was betwixt the Father and Mother of a Family, who should have the domi­nion over their child; now it is betwixt the Mother who brought a child into the world, and a stranger who nourish­eth it: If the Wife have it (as I have shewed) the Husband hath it, because he hath dominion over the Wife, therefore of whatsoever likewise is subject to her dominion. Now he produceth an instance where neither hath it: Then (saith he) the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. I shall answer it: If there be such Monsters who for fear, or for that Tyrant daughter of fear, shame, shall expose their child, as (sure there are) without doubt they do as much as in them lies put off all their Parental interest, and devest themselves of all fi­lial duties belonging to them, and it is as undoubted a truth, that for that time which they are so nourished and relieved (yea indeed all the daies of their life) they owe and ought to pay great kindness and respect to such deliverers (though not filial) because the benefit is exceeding great which they [Page 77] have received from their Patrons, but not so great as from their Fathers; for the Parent gives him his very being, the other but his preservation. Now as the being of man, or any thing, is the fountain of all the good which can come to that man, so must the gift of that exceed all other, else his Physi­tian may be his Father, his Cook, or his Apothecary, which conduce to his preservation. But suppose he should be expo­sed not by his Parents, but by any other means, as Romulus, although preserved and educated by Faustulus and Lupa, and owed them a mighty kindness for that preservation, yet this kindness when he came to be a man, ceased to be filial duty towards them, such as was due if proceeding from a Paternal dominion over him, and rather became a great kindness and benignity towards them.

SECT. XI. Mr. Hobbs his reasons of the former assertions weigh­ed, and refuted. Obedience, where it crosses, first due to the Parent. The weaknese of Mr. Hobbs's inferen­ces noted. His conclusion censured. Oecominical Laws must be submitted to National.

HE adds [For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end for which one be­comes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedi­ence to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.] I an­swer, preservation (as the Philosopher speaks) is continuata creatio or generatio; so that the very being of any thing is the substance which is preserved, and that must needs be more ex­cellent then such an acci [...]ent as preservation It is true, a ch [...]ld ought to obey him who hath nourished him, but not in such a degree as to a Parental relation, when that obedience shall cross the obedience to the Parents: [Preservation of life is the end (saith he) for which one man becomes subject unto another.] But consider what preservation that is, with that which is to come; upon this ground the unvanquished man submits him­self [Page 78] to the Conquerour, that he may protect his future being, and preserve him from future danger; but this subjection is not to him who hath preserved him, but to him who will preserve him; or if this subjection be due, yet not such, nor contrary to that of his Parents. But I must not tire my self nor my Reader with such needless discourses upon errors which fall of themselves without any dispute, only entreat the Rea­der in perusing them to consider his inferences how they de­pend one upon another, and that will be light enough to shew him the weakness of them. He goes on; If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child is in the Fathers power, &c.] It is not worth the transcribing; he now runs from Parents barely under the Law of Nature, to such as are in setled Common­wealths; to all which one answer will serve, that they must be according to the National and peculiar Laws belonging to that Commonwealth; for Oeconomical Laws must submit to National. The next learned note of his is, [He that hath do­minion over the Child, hath dominion also over the children of that Chi [...]d.] I must confess a most true and excellent observati­on, and such as he will hear of hereafter, and so I let it pass for this present. The next conclusion he enters upon, is the right of succession to Paternal dominion, which (he saith) pro­ceedeth in the same manner as doth the right of succession to Mo­narchy, of which he had spoke in the precedent Chapter.] I will dispute nothing about this. The Customes and Laws of every Nation direct the Inhabitants to what they must obey; every condition fits not every place, yea though they may be better in themselves, yet not to such people which are accustomed to other.

SECT. XII. Mr. Hobbs his immethodical procedure censured. Man­cipia quasi manu capta. Servitude introduced by Conquest. The right of servitude abolished amongst Christians. After the heat of war, and a settlement made, commonly meliorated and erected into Te­nures. Mr. Hobbs his conclusions contrary to Ari­stotles Politiques. The horrid consequence of this Doctrine discovered.

AT the bottom of this page, and the beginning of page 104. he enters into a discourse of Dominion by Con­quest: In this he seems very erroneous in his method, as well as his substance: He entitled this Chapter of Dominion Pater­nal and Despotical. In the first part of this Chap. he disputed about Dominion by acquisition, which he defined to be such as is got by force or conquest; and he shewed then that there is no difference betwixt Dominion by institution, and that by acquisition, but only the difference of their fears Then he treated of Dominion Paternal, (I wonder he did not call it Maternal, for that he endeavoured to make it) now again he comes to Dominion acquired by War, which must needs appear to any man an immethodical method. But let us pass on, and come to censure divers passages in his Discourse: [Dominion (saith he) acquired by Conquest or Victory in War, is that here which some Writers call Despotical, from [...], which signifieth a Lord or Master, and is the dominion of the Master over his servants.] He speaks truth when he saith, that dominion acquired by Conquest is such, if it be understood of one that is (Mancipium) taken in War; Mancipium as it were manu captum taken by your hand in War, surely such a per­son is a servant, or if you will use a more unworthy term, a Slave; the Conquerour may sell him, or do what else he will with him, which is the condition of these despotical [Page 80] servants (though this right all Civilians agree to be ceased amongst Christians.) But then if after a while these con­quered men are left to themselves to Till the ground, and live peaceably upon it, and perhaps are governed by Vice-Roys, or such other means as Politiques prescribe, they then cease to be servants or slaves, and come to be Colonies, and live under a Civil Government. We may observe this in the Conquest that David, Alexander, Pompey, Caesar, all the great Monarchs of the World; so that they shall not for ever be under a despotical, but at the last grow into a Civil Govern­ment; as Arist. and from him all learned Politicians termed it, until Mr. Hobbs appeared. But Reader, I must here beg leave to look back again upon what he writ at the beginning of this Chap. for the confusedness of his method must needs make my discourse somewhat such, who follow him closely foot by foot. He there affirms, that these two Governments by Institution and Acquisition, differ not but in the manner of fear; that by Institution is obeyed for fear of one another; that by Acquisition is obeyed for fear of the Conqueror; then the condition of all Subjects in the most civil estate is slavery: The Supreme may kill, ruine, destroy, beggar any of them, without Law, other then his own will, nay he may do it rightly, then which never was there a more horrid Propositi­on uttered in Politiques, and if these two Dominions be the same which he affirms there, and Dominion by Acquisition have the power to do so as he affirms here, it must needs be so with all Subjects according to his Doctrine.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his fictitious contracts with the Conqueror censured. Women by his conclusion obliged to pro­stitute themselves to the Conqueror. The horror of this Doctrine, and improbability of this contract.

I Return now to the place where I left: [And this Dominion (saith he) is then acquired to the Victor, when the vanquish­ed to avoid the present stroak of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure.] It was well he added (or by sufficient signs) for I think few men in any Conquered Nation did ever express such words, nor indeed would half the people in any conquered Nation do it. But consider, Reader, that in a conquered Nation, women must do it as well as men, and then all those women must prosti­tute their bodies to the lust of the Conqueror by contract, which is most abominable; and indeed that is almost expres­sed in that sentence, where it is said, That he shall have the use of their bodies at his pleasure. Let us once again look back and consider that formerly repeated conclusion, That the same must be the state of an instituted Commonwealth: Then all their bodies, their Wives (their lives excepted) are at his dispose, yea at the dispose of his pleasure, and that justly, which is most abominable. He proceeds: And after such Covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before.] If he is no ser­vant before he make such expression, I think a conquered Na­tion will never generally be subdued to that servitude. It is true, some particular persons may stoop so low for fear of death, but the generality of any considerable Nation can ne­ver subscribe to it, or surely if they could, would they, for death is more eligible then many accidents which may happen to a man under such a Covenant.

SECT. II. Sense desired in this Paragraph. A Slave more a slave in Fetters then upon his Parol. Mr. Hobbs his in­consistencies censured. Conquest gives no right where the War is not just.

BUt he offers at reason to prove this assertion: For (saith he) by this word Servant, whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from the word servare, to save (which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive which is kept in prison or bonds till the owner of him what took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him.] I shall censure this first for apparent nonsense; Can any man tell who he is that is called here the owner of him that took him? E­very man knows that he who takes a Captive is owner of the Captive, but who is owner of that owner no man can tell. At the first I thought it false printed, and (of) put for (or) so that then it should have been read, the owner or him that took him; and that (or) might have been an explication of that word owner; but this cannot be so, because he adds this (or) immediately after, or he that bought him of him that took him; so that it seems to me a meer irrational Proposition, to say, the owner of him that took him, &c. This I observed, because the Reader should consider how much care is to be u­sed in reading such Paradoxes as this Gentleman writeth. But mark this, although this was introduced with a (for) yet it proves nothing; his Proposition he was to prove was, That the Captive was a servant or slave when he was set at liberty, and not before.] How is that enforced from this discourse? he may say that clause is not before: No, say I; for (whether it be de­rived from servire or servare) he is more a slave to his owner, when he is compelled to work in fetters, or bonds, then when he is left to his Parol; for I am sure he serves more slavishly, and is saved more securely in that condition than the other. He procceds; For such men (commonly called slaves) have no [Page 83] obligation at all; (I believe, they are slaves not bound with any thing but fetters) and may break their bonds or prison, and kill or carry away captive their Master justly.] 'Tis true, because he is trusted with nothing by him, not with himself; but one (saith he) that being taken hath corporal liberty allowed him, and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Ma­ster, is trusted by him.] This man, if secure, is a Captive by Mr. Hobbs, and a servant, but not the other. I am opposite to him, and put him in mind how little this agrees with his for­mer discourse about the Covenant of him who is vanquisht: In this last, it is one that covenants not to run away, and to do no violence; but in the first it was to resign his whole body and be­ing to his pleasure. These are very thwarting discourses to hap­pen in so little distance, and this last hath much more easie terms then the other. He next enters into another Paragraph, It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.] That covenant giveth no right, when the justness of the cause did not warrant the War; for (as he elsewhere) No man when he hath covenanted to one before, hath right to make the same covenant to another; no man can give that again which he hath first given to another.] Co­venant upon Conquest may gain possession, but not right, when the cause of War was not just, Reader, you and I may think our selves tired with these dull discourses, and therefore I let pass all the rest of that Paragraph, and that which follows, and will only drive at the fundamental, which being shaken, the building will fall of its self. At the bottom of this page he begins a new old business. [In sum, the rights and consequen­ces to both paternal and despotical dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution, and for the same rea­sons, which reasons ore set down in the precedent Cap.] which Chapter and reasons have been examined heretofore, and therefore I will not trouble the Reader with unnecessary repe­titions.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his harsh conditions imposed on the Conque­rors subjects assistants in the war. Subjects newly conquered to be restrained with more severity, then those to whom custom has made their yoak more pleasant and easie. A difference to be made between those that are of a doubtful, and others who are of a known and certain obedience. The difference be­tween Civil and Despotical Government.

HE proceeds: [So that for a man that is a Monarch of di­vers Nations, whereof he hath in one the Soveraignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds.] I am confident (as I have formerly writ) there was never such a Soveraign, either by Institution or Conquest, as he sets down; he hath shewed none, nor I believe can shew any example of either, or a possibility how either should be composed. But suppose those now (as in his Ʋtopia is imagi­ned) why then (saith he) for such a Monarch who is Monarch of these two Nations, to demand of one more then of another by the title of Conquests, as being a conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance in the rights of Soveraignty.] Now I am at the 105 page, he hath passed a free and liberal censure upon such So­veraigns; but let him know (that if it were possible that there were two such Kingdomes) it were very hard if such as adventured their lives and fortunes with their King, and had a subordinate share in the Conquest, should after the Conquest be no better but in the same condition with those whom they conquered, and by them were conquered. It is true, an easie yoak, and time (the Mother of Experience) may reduce them into one condition, when it shall be observed that they who are conquered, are gained to a liking of the customes and [Page 85] manners of their Conquerors, and that mutually their good is beneficial one to the other; then it is wisdom in a Conque­ror to put them in a parity of condition, but at the first sub­duing any Nation Regni novitas, will enforce some severity, though perhaps afterwards Tros, Tyriusque mihi nullo discri­mine agetur, they are grown one, and ought to be so go­verned: I but saith he, that were ignorance of government; I say no, but great wisdom to put a difference betwixt a forced obedience, and that out of duty betwixt them who are of a known, and others of a doubtful fidelity. But he gives a reason for what he writes; for (saith he) he is absolutely over both alike: Let that be granted, yet amongst his true and na­tural subjects, he may justly and prudently dispence his fa­vours and displeasures variously, according to their differing merits and demerits, or other prudential rules, amongst which this is one, not too far to trust a newly reconciled Ene­my, and much less an Enemy newly conquered.

SECT. II. Servitude not equally absolute in a civil or setled Go­vernment, as in despotical. The right of servitude antiquated among Christians.

SEcondly, that supposal may be denied, that he is equally absolute over both; he governs one despotically as servants or captives which are taken in the War, and the other civil­ly; and this is Aristotles distinction, and received with ap­plause by all latter Writers, till we come to Mr. Hobbs, the one are governed like slaves, the other like subjects; or else (saith he) there is no Soveraignty at all. Away with such a hateful speech, odious to all Nations; No Soveraignty but arbitrary? No subjection but slavish or servile? Certainly no society of men can abide such language: Look amongst Chri­stian Kingdoms, and we shall find servitude (I think) ba­nished every where by the universal consent of all Nations, who have received the Doctrine of Christianity: Those we [Page 86] call servants, indeed are free, at least not such servants as he and I have discoursed of; yet they are subjects to their Ma­sters, and they have dominion over them, but not such as a Conqueror hath over a vanquished man; nay Kings them­selves, nor can any other Supreme, take away by right an in­nocent mans life, and yet they are Soveraigns, and have not ab­solute power over them,

SECT. III. Mr. Hobbs his inconsequences further censured. The absurdity and iniquity of his conclusion in this Pa­ragraph, which is yet shewed to be other where as­serted by him.

I But (saith he) And every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own Sword, which is the condition of war] There was never man writ such disjoynted things. How can this follow, if a King cannot kill an honest man lawfully, then he may protect himself lawfully with his own Sword? as if it should be, because a Supreme may do ill unlawfully, there­fore I may do ill lawfully? But I am sure he hath said more then once, That no mon can so divest himself of his own power and right to defend his own life and happy being in it, as that he may not deliver himself, if he can, by killing or doing any thing to any man.] Against which Propositions I have already spoke heretofore, and shewed how men may and have done it; so that that wicked conclusion, which for the absurdity of it, he would have to discountenance the difference betwixt the Government of a conquered and an instituted Nation, though not allowed by me, is yet approved by him elsewhere, which was a main fault in him.

SECT. IV. This Paragraph reserved to its proper place. Scripture honoured even by those who approve it not. Master Hobbs his inconcludent deductions from the 20th of Exodus censured.

HE begins the next Paragraph, By this it appears that a great family, if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of its self, as to the rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy.] I will question nothing in this Paragraph at this time; but let the Reader bear in mind, that there is such a thing for which I shall call Mr. Hobbs to an account hereafter. In the following Paragraph he labours to bring Scripture for what he hath taught: It is an honour to Scripture, that it is like Vertue, commended even of those that will not follow it. But it may be Mr. Hobbs objects it against us who do confide in it, and not produceth it to satisfie himself, that his Do­ctrine is consonant to Scripture. I will examine this there­fore; for surely if the Scripture be for him, I am also, al­though to me it appears never so erroneous, according to mine own reason: He begins; Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point: To Moses, the Children of Israel, say thus, Exod. 20.19. Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, least we die. This is absolute obedience to Moses] thus he. A strange deduction out of this Text, where is no one word of obedience, much less of absolute obedience as to a Supreme. But I will help what I can, Deut. 5.27. there this self-same business being re­peated, it is added, We will hear it, and do it. There obe­dience is mentioned implicitly: To understand this therefore consider with me, that the Children of Israel having the Law delivered to them by God in such a terrible manner in Mount Sinai, with Thunder, Lightning, Trumpets, and the like, they were terrified and afraid to have such an immedi­ate converse with God, they thought it mortal, it being ne­ver [Page 88] before seen in the world; and therefore they entreated Moses to go betwixt God and them, and receive Gods Will from him, and deliver it them, and they would obey. Here is nothing of obedience to Moses, but to God only; they trusted that Moses would relate Gods Laws to them truly, which indeed they had great reason to do. If the rest be like this, I shall have little trouble with it.

SECT. V. The first of Sam. the 8.11, 12. explained. The diffe­rence between the right of the King, and the right of a King. Kings of several Kingdoms may have several rights in the same Country. Divers Kings may have different rights, as the same Kings may also at several times. The genuine signification of these words cited by Mr. Hobbs.

FOr the right of Kings, saith God himself, by the mouth of Samuel, 1 Sam. 8.11, 12. This shall be the right of the King you will have to raign over you.] I stop here, because I have some things to examine in this particle before I go fur­ther. First then consider, that it is not said, this shall be the right of a King, that would have made it Jus Regale; and being indeffinite would have constituted it to belong to every King; but it shall be the right of your King. Many things may be the rights of one Countries King, which are not of another; yea many things may belong to one King of a Country, which did not belong to another King of the same Country, yea to the same King at another time. I urge this only against him, because he urges this place to prove the right of Kings, which it doth not do (if truly quoted) but only the right of a King of Israel, and it may be not that neither, but only the right of the next King; for it is said, of the King that shall reign over you, in the singular number, not in the plural. Nay it is most certain, that God, by whom Kings reign, and from whom they have their Authority, may give what Authority [Page 89] he pleaseth to one, and not to another, the Plenipotency of which Commission I shall more fully shew hereafter. Well then, let it however be granted, that this Text is truly pro­duced, yet it proves not his conclusion, that this is the right of all Kings. And now I must blame Mr. Hobbs, who profes­seth obedience to the Supreme Magistrate, and the Laws and Cu­stoms of this Country; and yet here against the Declaration of the Supreme Magistrate, the Laws and Customs of this same Country, in the urging of this Text, which (as he interprets it) varies from that translation which is approved by the Su­preme Magistrate, the Laws and Customs of this Nation, and is only read in the vulgar Latin; our Translation reads it, This will be the manner of the King that shall reign over you. There is a great difference betwixt this shall be the right, and this will be the manner.

SECT. VI. The former Text further illustrated. The force of the Hebrew word compared with other places of Scrip­ture. Cajetans interpretation censured. The distin­ction of ordinary and extraordinary right impro­perly used for the clearing of this Text. The word right taken for practise. The 17 of Deuteron. 14.16, 17, 18. verse explained. The King to have two Copies of the Law, and obliged to keep it. Ezek. the 46.18. explained. The former conclusion asserted from the whole Discourse.

THere is a great dispute amongst Criticks in the Hebrew Tongue, what is the true sense of the word Mishpot, which is rendred by Mr. Hobbs (Right,) and by our Tran­slators (manner, or custom;) but certainly it cannot but be yielded, that it is used in both senses. But our Translators do very often render it as here, so Psalm 19.132. as thou usest to do unto those that love thy name: But it is not material to [Page 90] alledge more Quotations; this Text will enforce this inter­pretation; for in the 18 verse it is said, Ye shall cry out in the day because of your King which ye shall have chosen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day. Consider here, that men do not clamour and cry out upon Justice, when it is executed but upon injustice. I know there are other Expositions given be­sides his or mine, as that of Cajetan, that it is not said, the right of the Kingdom, which is a Law, but of the King; as if Kings would esteem this right. But this is scandalous to Kings, to many of whom, I doubt not, but Justice and Mercy are as dear as to any men in the world. There is another Exposition with a distinction, that there is an ordinary and extraordina­ry right: This Text sets down the extraordinary right; to which I say I allow the distinction; many things may be right and lawful for Kings to do upon extraordinary occasions, which would not be just in his ordinary Government. But how can a man conceive that these things should relate to ex­traordinary occasions, to make Perfumes, or to run before his Chariot, to gather in his Harvest? as if there should be exi­gencies of these poor trifles, or the honour of a Kings Reve­nue could not yield such a return as might make every man fit for such an imployment, ambitious of his entertainment. I think this may suffice for the exposition of this Text, to shew that it was spoke of the practise, not the right of their Kings: but if not, look the seventeenth of Deut. at the four­teenth verse, where you may see the passage foretold, When thou art come into the Land, &c. and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me. The very language which these men used, ver. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall chuse; and so goes on to describe the Laws for their Kings in the following part of that verse, and the 16, 17, and 18. ver­ses: But there is none of these things reckoned there; and in the 18 and 19 verses, he is commanded to get him a Copy, or a double Copy (as some would have it) of this Book, which is Deuteronomy; one Copy to lye by him, and another to car­ry about with him, as our marginal hath it, and is most con­sonant (methinks) to the Text, which saith, He shall read [Page 91] therein all the daies of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these sta­tutes to do them. So that a King ought to take care to keep the Law of the Land, which to them was Deuteronomy. And from thence the madness of their Exposition will appear, who think that the Law which was spoken of, was this Law af­terwards spoken of by Samuel: But alas! that needs no great study either to know or practise; this therefore must needs be the sense of it. But if this will not serve the turn, you may read in the 46 of Ezek. ver. 18. some part of the Kings Law delivered clear opposite, to one clause delivered here; that is, That the Prince shall not take of the peoples inheritance by oppres­sion, to thrust them out of their possession, but he shall give his sons inheritance of his own possession, that my people be not scat­tered every man out of his possession. Now this is clean contrary to that which is said, He will take your fields, and your vine­yards, and your Olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. This certainly is unjust for a Prince to do by Ezekiel; and therefore these places must be reconciled, which may easily be done by our Translation, understanding the word (Mishpot) for a custom or usage, for so Sam. describes what will be done; but the Prophet Ezekiel, from God com­mands, what is right and just to be done. And thus I think Mr. Hobbs hath got little advantage for his conclusion out of the Scripture.

SECT. VII. The History of Saul quoted by Mr. Hobbs, improved a­gainst his Novel Institution, and that other conclusi­on of his, That a man may kill any man in right of himself. Prayers and tears the weapons of Chri­stians.

BUt I will try how I can advance this History against di­vers desperate and horrid Opinions of his. First of his electing a King by the people, which he makes to be the only [Page 90] [...] [Page 91] [...] [Page 92] way by which he is established in his Throne; a thing (as I have said before) never done nor practicable; and here we find it otherwise, for God chose that King Saul; and indeed it was the Law it should be so, Deut. 1 [...].15. Nay, to come closer, (as I shall shew hereafter) it is impossible, that the people who had no power given them from God, should give it to a King; none sure but the All-powerful God can give men power one over another. And as this story confutes his abominable prin­ciples which destroy the foundation of Government, so it doth that horrid and treasonable conclusion of his which plucks down all Government, and hath been the Author of almost all Treasons that ever were; that is, that in defence of a mans life, or himself, from such hardship as may render his life irksome to him, a man may take arms, or kill any man, or do any thing which may rescue him from it. I have spoke to this before, how unchristian a speech it is; but now consi­der how destructive of peace it is in a setled Commonwealth. There are no Traytors but pretend their Liberties are invaded, they have no safety in their condition: The Tyrant (for so they will term any against whom they rebel) takes away their fields, their children illegally, and the like, he doth without Law. The next (they tell us) is their life, they will provide therefore against that, and kill him: No, saith this His [...]ory, when your King abuseth you with such oppression, there is no such consequence to be drawn from the whole context, that men should whet their Swords, and be avenged. There is no power above that of the Kings, much less is there any such in his own Subjects: But men in such a case must fly to the King of Kings, who according to his infinite Wisdom, Justice and Mercy, will consider and help them when he thinks fit. There is no appeal from a King, but to his King; and then when your own sins call for his judgments (as it was here) he will not hear your cryes; which strongly intimates, we must not fight, but cry in that day when such things are done unto us; prayers and tears are the only weapons allowed Christians in that case: Righteous men must not think to go to heaven with pleasure and delight, by pride and strugling against their Superiours, but with patience, suffering quietly; by Faith, [Page 93] believing Gods mercies and promises; by hope, that in his good time he will deliver them when he thinks fit, gently submitting our selves under the mighty hand of God, who out of his infinite wisdom suffers us justly to be so punished, that in his good time he may exalt us.

SECT. VIII. The former conclusions illustrated from the fact of Ahab. The condition of Subjects, according to Ma­ster Hobbs his Doctrine, the same with Slaves ta­ken in War. The people transfer no power to the King besides that which God had given him. Sa­muels words not positive, but menacing. God him­self concerned in the Election of Samuels Govern­ment. Exorbitant power, or absolute dominion, not deduceable from this Text. Mr. Hobbs his conclu­sions fitted to the Rapine of the late Rebels in Eng­land, whose actions he seems to approve.

YEt consider once more, if this had been the right of Kings, what a foolish as well as a wicked King had A­hab been, who when by right he might have taken Naboths Vineyard, would mourn and afflict himself, because Naboth would not let him have it. And indeed you may observe there, that Naboth conceived no such right; for else he would not have denied to yield that upon a good valuable consideration, which was due by Law. Well, this Text being thus exami­ned, and some inferences made upon it, let us now consider his collections out of it: [This (saith he) is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants] which is the last clause of the seventeenth verse. Let a man consider here what Mr. Hobbs hath writ of servants in the for­mer page, (where he sets down, that men vanquished in war are servants, and what their servitude is) and he shall find all [Page 94] Subjects to be in a miserable condition, such as will little dif­fer from being in war; for what can war do? it can but sub­ject mens estates, their wives, children, and their lives, to a Conquerors will; and that, by this Gentleman, they are in al­ways, even in peace; yea by that very reason, that they are imbodied into a Commonwealth. But he proceeds further: [Again; when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other Nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars.] I looked for these words, but find them not either in ours or other Translations; but indeed the sense is in the nineteenth and twentieth verses: And so I let it pass: His collection is [Here is confirmed the right that Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature, in which is contained as abs [...]lute power as one man can possibly trans­fer to another.] But hark you Mr. Hobbs, what is the mean­ing of that phrase transfer? can it be thought, that the peo­ples assent transfer'd any Authority which God did not give? Certainly that is a greater Exaltation then ever man dreamt of until now. But I am confident that the people took this as a menace of Samuel, to deter them from having a King, agree­ing to the language used in the ninth verse by God to Samuel, Protest solemnly to them, or against them (as it is in the margent of our Translations) so they thought it a menace or threat; and that you may conceive from the nineteenth verse, which begins— Nevertheless, that is, for all that menace, or nequa­quam, as the vulgar Latin, by no means will we be terrified, but will have a King like other Nations; they would be in this fashion; but where can they find that fashion used in the world? they had lived in Aegypt, and Pharoah oppressed them mightily, mistrusting them to be a dangerous people, and a people that lived apart from the Aegyptians, and had no com­munication with them. But I do not read, that they took the Land of Goshen from them, which had formerly been given them by the King of Aegypt; and those horrid oppressions were most wonderfully revenged by God upon Pharoah and his Aegyptians, when the Israelites cryed to him for help, because they were undeserved: But saith Samuel; You in this [Page 95] case shall cry, and not be saved, because you provoke these mischiefs, being under a most excellent Government, the im­mediate protection of God himself; in which regard he saith in the seventh verse to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. And al­though there were some miscarriages by Samuels Govern­ment, that his Sons did not behave themselves well under him; yet you may find in the twelfth Cap. third ver. when Samuel resigned up his Government to Saul, he could cal them to witness, whether he had taken any mans Oxe or Ass from him, or defrauded or oppressed any man; and at the fourth verse they acquit him. So that for men thus to reject the Go­vernment of God, by such a pious and excellent person as was Samuel, for some discontents and rebellious humors which were in their fancies, and exchange him for they knew not whom, was such an unpardonable fault, that God threat­ned by Samuel, that he would not hear their cryes when they clamoured out for these evils; which not their folly only, but impiety had brought upon them: So that methinks there can be no inference deduced here to shew the justness or right of this exorbitant power, which he pretends to in this word ab­solute. He hath the power of Judicature, but that power is to determine what is right, and to whom the Vineyard be­longs, but not to take it to himself. He hath the power of the Militia to fight with the Enemy; nay, he may by it force (and rightly ought to use that power to force) men to render to every man their own; but he cannot rightly take away any mans estate from him, otherwise then the Law directs; and he who saith he can do it to others, if he felt such unjustness done to himself, would quickly learn that Lesson, that it is excellent Justice, that Artifex necis arte periret sua; then he would abhor his own Doctrine. This was well fitted for the sequestrations and seisures which were made of mens estates when he wrote this Book for them.

SECT. IX. Solomon's Prayer (1 Kings 3.9.) explained. Master Hobbs his Logick desired in his deductions from this Text. Judges must govern or determine ac­cording to Law.

BUt Mr Hobbs hath Scripture out of Solomon's Prayer, (1 Kings 3.9.) Give to thy Servant understanding to judge thy people, and to discern betwixt good and evil; (saith he) therefore it belongeth to the Soveraign to be Judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil, which Rules are Laws; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power.] I could question his place of Scripture if I were given to wrangle, for in terminis he cannot shew it there, but there is the sense. I let it therefore alone, but consider his Logick: He saith, Because he is to be Judge, and to prescribe the Rules of discerning betwixt good and evil, which Rules are Laws.] For my part I think this consequence is so far from a necessary deduction out of the premises, as I conceive the contrary is absolutely true; because he is Judge, he must take those rules which are pre­scribed him, but not make his rule. Consider with me, I beseech you Reader, that every Judge must be a Judge either in a constituted Commonwealth, betwixt men who live in that Polity, or else where there is no Commonwealth, and where men live only according to the dictates of Nature: In the first every Judge hath the National Laws of that Country to be his guide, and he must judge according to them, and not make Laws of his own head to judge the cause is committed to him. For the second, he hath the Law of Nature to guide him to that which shall appear most equal, according to that rule. He who draws a line by a rule, doth not make the rule, the Judge is such, his Decrees are regulated by the Laws according to which he decrees, but doth not make those Laws: So that al­though I think it true, that a Soveraign is the Supreme Judge, and that he hath likewise the Legislative power, yet not be­cause [Page 97] he is Judge: for these two are distinct faculties apper­taining to the same person, as will appear more fully here­after.

SECT. X. The impertinencies of the remaining part of this Pa­ragraph censured. Matth. 21.2, 3. not truly cited by Mr. Hobbs. His inferences upon this Text re­torted upon him. The true intention of these words mistaken by Mr. Hobbs, and his argument thence invalid.

THe rest in that Paragraph is such trash as never was read; not fit to foul paper with, 'tis so impertinent. In the lat­ter end of it he comes close to his business thus; —And that the Kings word is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: for he himself, as King of the Jews, commanded his Disciples to take the Ass, and the Asses Colt, to carry him into Jerusalem: Read the Text, Mat. 21.2, 3. The words as he writes them are, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a She-Ass tyed, and her Colt with her, untye them, and bring them to me: And if any man ask you what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them, and straightway they will let them go.) Thus he writes that Text most false in many places. But I will consider the matter in hand, and stick to his Inferences. (They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title, nor whether he be Judge of that necessity, but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.) Thus he. And I could wish he would acquiesce in the will of the Lord, for then he would never have vented so many abominable falshoods as he hath. But to my busi­ness; I first retort this ad hominem, be it true or false; This argument is not proper from his mouth, who (page 262.) de­nies that our Saviour had any Kingdom in this world whilst he was in it) therefore he did not now send for this Ass by a Kingly right; (I mean to speak to that in its proper place:) [Page 98] but now he who denies his Kingdom, cannot here justly urge this for a president to Kings: I (but he will say) he spoke that of our Saviours Manhood; I reply, if he spoke this of him as God, it is no president for Kings; for undoubtedly God hath reserved cases to himself, by which he can and doth di­spose of all things in this world how he pleaseth, (as will be shewed hereafter) and not only of things in Kingdoms, but of Kingdoms themselves; and therefore this instance is no president. But then let us consider the fact: Our Saviour sent for an Ass and her Colt, they were goods belonging to a­nother man; and the up-shot of all was, when the right owner questioned why they loosed them, and they told him it was for the use of the Lord, which was the Apostles lan­guage concerning Christ, he being a person famous for many Miracles, and much Piety, as that Story will shew, the right owner let them go, and let them use them; and it is most reasonably thought, that our Saviour having made use of them in that great Solemnity he was then going about, resto­red them afterwards, when it was finished. But mark, the owner gave way to his use of them; he did not take Naboths Vineyard from him without his consent: This is a weak way of arguing, from an act by the owners consent, to prove it lawful against his will; if the right owner gives way to a­nother to use his goods, there is no fault in it, and this proves no more.

SECT. XI. Mr. Hobbs his fallacious arguing from Gen. 3.5. discovered: The difference of the case stated in respect of Divine and Humane Power. Act. 4.19. explained. Obedience to Humane Power command­ed in licitis & honestis. Mat. 23. verse the 23. il­lustrated from the former case of S. Peter, and S. John. Mr. Hobbs his argument from Adams discourse in Paradise not conclusive.

WE will proceed with him. To these places (saith he) may be added Gen. 3.5. You shall be like Gods, know­ing good and evil.) Let the Reader consider this was the De­vils language: Then ver. 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the Tree of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?) A man may justly wonder what he could collect from hence: His discourse is unnecessary, but the sense is this, that our first Parents, by an ill gloss of the De­vil, misinterpreted the command of God, which caused Gods displeasure; whereby (saith he at the bottom of that page) it is clearly (though Allegorically) signified, that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Sub­jects to be censured or disputed.) See the fallacy of this arguing, from the infinite power of Gods Wisdom, Justice and Equi­ty, to the finite power of man; betwixt which the diffe­rence is evident, and so decided in the case of S. Peter, and S. John, Acts 4.19. Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you, more then unto God, judge ye.) The story is this, (as you may read in the former part of that Chap. ver. the 5.) their Rulers and Elders, Annas and Caiphas, con­vented the Apostles before them, and after consultation about the business, commanded them in the 18. ver. not to speak at all, nor teach in the name of the Lord Jesus) nay, say the A­postles) whether it be fitter to obey God or you, judge ye.) It is [Page 100] so clear a case, that God who is your Governour more ab­solutely, then you are ours, must be obeyed before you, that you cannot deny it. This will be opposed to his case; the difference betwixt obedience to Gods Commands, and mens, is mighty; the one from an infinite Justice, and known to be so, the other from a finite, and known also to be so; that of Gods from an infinite power, and known to be such; that of mans from a finite, and known to be such. It must not there­fore follow, that because Gods Commands are obeyed with­out examining, mans must. This may likewise give the true sense of that place urged by him out of the 23. of S. Mat. 2, 3. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chair; and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe, and do.) This he urged for unquestioned obedience to Superiours, and re­ceives its answer from the passage of the Apostles, who denied their obedience in this point: it must be therefore in licitis & honestis, not in things crossing with Gods Commands in his written word, or his Commands by the Law of Nature: A servant must not obey his Masters Oeconomical Laws, where they are contrary to the National: A Child must not obey his Natural Parents, commanding contrary to his Politi­cal: A man is not to obey a Constable commanding against his King, nor a King against God; his argument there­fore drawn from this instance of Adams misconstruction of Gods Commands, is not of force: That therefore we may not expound or discourse upon mans commands, is not well collected out of his premises.

SECT. XII. Mr. Hobbs his conclusion not deducible from the premises. The former place of the 23. of S. Mat. further explained out of Petrus Gallatinus. Ari­stocratical Power not vested in the Scribes and Pharisees.

HE concludes that page; So that it appeareth plainly to my understanding, both from Reason and Scripture, that the [Page 101] Soveraign Power, whether placed in one man (that which fol­lows is page 107.) as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in popular and Aristocratical Commonwealths, is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.) My first observation is, that he hath no one place of Scripture, but only from that place of S. Mat. where obedience to the Scribes and Pharisees is mentioned, which can look towards Aristocraty or Demo­craty, of which I spake just now: And surely he doth not think that the Scribes and Pharisees had an Aristocratical Go­vernment over the Jews, for they were under the Roman Monarchy at that time, and could not put a man to death by their own Law (as they protested at our Saviours Tryal,) in that then there was no Juridical Power amongst them, no So­veraign Authority: Nay, Petrus Gallatinus de arcanis Catho­licae veritatis, Lib. 4. Cap. 6. shews at large, how not only the Jews were captivated by the Romans, the Kingdom transla­ted, given from one of their own Nation to Herod who was an Alien, but likewise their Sanhedrim (which was until then continued from Moses his time) taken away; and when he had slain them all but one Baba, he was not of Authority to erect one more rightly constituted by the Law of Moses, and the Jewish Tradition. At the last he cites this place, Mat. 23.2. and saith it ought to be read, The Scribes and Pharisees have sate in Moses's Chair. The word in the Origi­nal is [...], which being in the first Aorist, is often (I confess) used in the present tense, but the story (being a matter of fact) seems to oppose it: I know therefore no rea­son why it should be forced from its genuine sense; yet how­soever let it go, it shall be taken in the present tense, and I will make all agree. He further shews, that after Herod had slain all but this Baba, and put out his eyes, he erected ano­ther Sanhedrim of his own, in which it was likely those who were members of it, were allowed to meddle with some mat­ters of small consequence: Amongst these the Scribes and Pharisees were mixed, and by that Authority might, accord­ing to their proud nature, possibly usurp the dignity of sitting in Moses his Chair; and yet (he shews) that forty years be­fore the last destruction of the Temple, these also were taken [Page 102] away. Well then, it appears clearly, that here was no Aristo­cratical Government amongst them, they were governed Mo­narchically by Caesar, and under him by Herod. This inferi­our Councel had no part of Moses his judicature of life and death; nay, that power which they had was variable, ac­cording to the will of the Monarch. But because I am in now, I will add a word or two against his urging this place, for the absoluteness of their Dominion, out of the following words,—Whatsoever they shall bid you observe, that observe, and do it. Now this word whatsoever, must have relation to the former words, whatsoever they teach you out of Moses; let not their vicious lives or hypocrisie make you refuse the whole­some Doctrine which they teach; but if they teach you false Doctrine (as they will) that comes not out of Moses his Chair, but ex Cathedrâ pestilentiae, as the Psalmist phraseth it, Psal. 1.2. and therefore our Saviour often forewarns them, not only of the life, but doctrine of the Pharisees, in the 16. of Mat. 6. take heed of the leaven of the Pharisees, which in the 12. verse is expounded the doctrine; and in this very Chap. verse 4. They bind heavy burthens, and grie­vous to be born, and lay them upon mens shoulders; and in the 13. verse, they were said to shut up the Kingdom of Heaven a­gainst men; which must be by their doctrine: In the 16th verse, They are called blind guides, which must also be by their ignorance in doctrine or teaching; and if the blind lead the blind, they will both fall into the ditch: So likewise in the same verse he reproves their false doctrine about Oaths; wherefore this (whatsoever) must be understood of whatso­ever according to that they pretend: So out of Moses his Chair, what they from his Authority shall appoint to be ob­served, must be observed; but when they produce doctrine contrary to that, they must be disobeyed; their wicked lives shall not prejudice their godly doctrine, nor shall Moses his Chair countenance their wicked doctrine or commands; for if so, S. Peter, and S. Paul (before spoken of) were to blame, who disobeyed their commands; and the inhumane Murther of our Saviour might be justified, which was acted by their direction. Well, I need speak no more to this, it is [Page 103] apparent, that this neither can prove Aristocraty, nor deli­ver an infallible unerring rule for them to be regulated by. And as he was to blame to found Aristocraty upon any of these places of Scripture, so surely upon this hyperbolical expression, That the power of every one of these Supremes is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.) For then all Supremes have a like power, (which certainly is not apparent) and at all times; for if such a greatness belong to a Soveraign as a Soveraign, then in no Soveraign, or at any time, can it be missing: Then the Subject cannot have right to rescue himself from bonds, or such hardship which may render his life odious to him, as he often perswades; for such absolute power may be imagined to be made.

SECT. XIII. Mr. Hobbs his Hyperbolical Power scarce any where to be found, and yet no such state of War, as he imagines, hath followed de facto. His subsequent question answered by another. Mr. Hobbs his Do­ctrine the foundation of Sedition. Disputes con­cerning Governments dangerous, but not to be pre­vented.

HE proceeds; (And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it (which is perpetual war of every man against his Neighbour) are much worse.) Thus far he: What a strange wild asseveration is this? Mr. Hobbs (I am perswaded) hath lived in divers Commonwealths, yet did he never find in any this absolute Hyperbolical Power of a Soveraign; nor did he see any where, that every man was at war with his Neighbour. That which follows in that Paragraph I let pass, because confuted by what hath been writ heretofore, there being no new matter in it, and pass to the next, which he thus begins: (The greatest objection is that of the practise, [Page 104] when men ask where and when such power has by Subjects been acknowledged.) Truly a wise question, and shrewdly propo­sed, and to which he makes an unsatisfactory answer, which is; (But one may ask them again, when and where hath there been a Kingdom long free from Sedition and Civil Wars?) That word long is a word of so large a capacity, a man can hardly find any time which he cannot say is short: But let that pass; he may consider, that Civil War and Tumults arise from divers occasions; sometimes from diverse Titles, some­times from private injuries, sometimes when people are taught, that they may vindicate themselves from oppression by their own private force and strength; sometimes when they shall be taught, that they are the Fountain of all Power; and therefore they may take away, as well as give: which two last are the Fundamental Props of his whole Leviathan, and naturally produce Rebellion towards Superiours. He goes on — And in those Nations, whose Commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed but by Forreign War, the Subjects never did dispute of Soveraign Power.) He should have done a great work if he had instanced in those Nations, and had proved they never disputed that point. In answer to this; The less dispute there is about it, 'tis by so much the safer: But who can hold men that have reason, from di­sputing the reason of these great affairs which so nearly con­cern them?

SECT. XIV. Mr. Hobbs his bold censure of those who have written before him. His Principles destructive to Humane Society.

BƲt (saith he) howsoever an argument from the practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the Causes and Nature of Commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance there­of, are invalid.) A bold assertion, and censorious of all the world, in a Subject of which hundreds of learned men have discoursed much more safely and rationally then himself, and declared those things which he calls the Causes and Nature of Commonwealths, much more excellently then he, (as may appear to any man who will peruse them.) Which Writers, although they may have infirmities and errours, yet I never read one man, who maintained in Politiques, Principles so destructive to Humane Society as himself: But he gives an instance to confirm his answer to that argument; For (saith he) though in all places in the world men should lay the foun­dation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be infer­red, that so it ought to be.) He saith truth; but his instance is like his conclusion which he would illustrate by it: and when he can shew me that all men have built their houses upon the Sand, I will yield, that all Nations in the world have founded themselves upon weak supports; but until then, he shall excuse me from thinking one or the other.

SECT. XV. The Rules in Politiques not founded upon Demonstra­tions. The judgments and humours of men equally various. The Rule of Government must follow the present occurrences.

HE again: The skill of making and maintaining Common­wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetick and Geometry, not (as Tennis-play) upon practise only; which Rules neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curi [...]si [...]y or the method to find out.) The first clause of this affirmation must be exa­mined; first, where he saith, the skill of making and ruling Commonwealths, consists in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetick and Geometry;) Rules, without doubt, all prudential actions are governed by; but to say like Arithmetick and Geometry, is more then can be justified, for their Rules are most cer­tain, the demonstrations out of them most undeniable; but the affairs of Politique Government most weak, the subjects (which it treats about) most unconstant, which is men uni­ted: and because the judgments of men, their humours, their passions, are all obnoxious to variation, there can be no certain Rules which can meet with all accidents at home, or abroad with other Nations, which are variable one as the other; but much and many designs must be daily changed, according to divers occasions; and indeed they are so many, that no wit of man can foresee all: Let Achitophel himself advise never so cunningly, yet if Absolon do not follow it (which no man can foreknow, but by guesses) his directions can effect nothing; and therefore there is no conformity in the Rules of the Mathematicks, and these of Politiques; the one like the subject most immutable; the other like its sub­ject most uncertain. The last clause of that Paragraph and Chap. is nothing but a great Rant, and express contempt of all other Writers, and an implicite magnifying his own Po­litiques: [Page 107] To which I may justly say, it would have become other mens mouths or pens better than his own; and what I think of it is this; that if his former expression be true of them, that they have built upon Sand, I may say, his building is upon Quagmire: building upon Sand will support a building until storms fall, but his will not support an Edi­fice, but fall of its self; the very Foundation sinks, without any other weight upon it, or violence to it. And so I have run over this Chap. and thought to have gone no further in his Politiques, but the Title of the next Chap. enticeth me on, which is, Of the Liberty of Subjects.


SECT. I. Mr Hobbs his Comment upon his own Text censured. Libertas coactionis, & necessitatis: the second proper only to men.

HE begins this Treatise thus: (Liberty, or freedom, signifi­eth (properly) the absence of opposition (by opposition I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate Creatures, than to rational.) Consider, Reader, what a strange perplexed kind of writing this is, where he is forced to write a Comment upon his own Text. To begin with him: (Liberty, or freedom) What need of freedom here, when the subject he treats of is Li­berty? Secondly, What need of that Parenthesis to expound opposition? If he had not affected a deceitful way of wri­ting, he might in fewer words, and much more clearly, have said, Liberty signifies (properly) the absence of external impe­diments of motion: But if his contempt of such Learning had not made him neglect to read it, he might easily have known there is a liberty à Coactione, from constraint, and a liberty from necessity. The first is that, and that only which he de­fines; but the second, which is the more noble part of liber­ty, is left out by him, and that is peculiar to men alone a­mongst [Page 108] all sublunary Creatures. He proceeds to illustrate his conclusions; (For whatsoever is so tyed, or invironed, as it can­not move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liber­ty to go further.) This I agree to, this is liberty from con­straint; and so I agree to his whole discourse, in exemplify­ing that, which I would say is ingenious, but that it explains what no man denies; therefore I let alone what follows to the bottom of this page, and so come to page 108, which be­gins thus.

SECT. II. M. Hobbs his Free-man not actually to be found in the whole world. His unhandsom censures of those who have used the word Liberty or Freedom, in a sense different from himself. The activity of heat hin­dred by cold; neither of them bodies. Spirits hin­dred in their motion. Freedom used in a passive acception.

ANd according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, A Free-man, is he, that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to do what he has a will to do.] This is freedom and great liberty; but I doubt he will not find any Subject in the world having this liberty. He might have given this Chap. another title, for there are no subjects which are not confined from this liberty. Well, he goes on, and I wait upon him: But (saith he) when the words Freedom and Liberty are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused.) It was unkindly and unhandsom­ly said, to affirm it abused, since it hath been the language of all men who have written of any spiritual things; which certainly, having no bodies to hinder them, must needs be free, according to his own conceit. I hope in a fuller manner to handle the nature of Spirits; therefore I will not meddle now with it, only I will mind him of that common Pro­verb [Page 109] amongst us, denoting a spiritual freedom in that which is no body, and that is, Thought is free; and yet this thought is a spiritual thing, having no dimensions; but because no Humane Laws can restrain, confine, or judge of mens thoughts, they are free. But he produceth a reason for what he had writ (for that which is not subject to motion, is not sub­ject to impediment;) What he means by motion, I know not; but if he means that, which according to the common ac­ceptation of Philosophers it importeth, that is, not only lation or changing of place, but that which makes any change in any thing, which (he knows) are commonly reduced to six species: then he might have observed, that that heat which warms a mans hand is not a body, and yet may be impeded and hin­dred by cold from its activity, or that motion of calefaction. Well then, some things besides bodies have motion, and may have that liberty (which he speaks of) confined by ex­ternal things. But because his Philosophy points at a con­tempt of Spirits, whose motion is not so clearly discerned as that of bodies, especially in that succession in which bodies move; and I think he means only local motion; I dare af­firm that Spirits move, in their way, from one place to ano­ther, in a spiritual manner, and are at one time in a place, in which they were not before; and many times have spiritual impediments; of which I reserve a fuller discourse hereafter. But at this present, my affirmation is as good as his negation, especially countenanced with such a general consent of Phi­losophers, as cannot be counterpoised by any thing that can be produced for the contrary opinion. Well then, let us ex­amine that which follows— Therefore (saith he) when 'tis said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those who walk in it without stop.) This expression will not serve his turn; that phrase, The way is free, doth not mean a liberty of the men who walk in it without stop; for prisoners in bonds may walk in it without stop, who are far from freedom; nor is it yet used abusively, but passively, which that word freedom doth bear, (though hardly that word liberty, which he applies to it.) So that the meaning is, the way is of an open condition, not appropriated to any [Page 110] particular owner, so as to forbid you legally to pass there; nor is this an abusive speech, but this word liberty is seldom used but (with such addition as may expound it) in a passive sense, for some power to act, although freedom in others.

SECT. III. The instance of a Gift, not at all to Mr. Hobbs his purpose. A double acceptation of the word Gift. The vulgar phrase, of Gift is free, abused in either sense. Metonymies the Elegancies of common Lan­guage.

ANd (saith he) when we say a Gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Gift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it.) Consider, good Reader, how this instance disagrees with his undertaking; which is, first, that freedom applied to any thing but bodies is a­bused; Secondly, his medium by which he proves that it is, for that which is without motion is without impediment. Now his second instance is, because a gift is called a free gift. Let us consider that a gift, is either the thing given (which is of­ten called the gift of such a man) or else the very act of gi­ving it. In the first acceptation he cannot say, it was bodies, nor a body, that hath no motion, like to a high way; (of which before) it may be a horse, a dog, or any living crea­ture. Then secondly, take it for the act of giving, that is, a motion of the mouth, or hand by writing, it is a motion of a man, that therefore cannot be pertinent. But then he ex­pounds right, when he says it signifies the liberty of the giver, who was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it) It is true Mr. Hobbs; but yet this is no abusive speech but a Me­tonymie, the effect for the cause; which figures are so far from being an abuse, as they are the Elegancy of common Language; and indeed have so prevailed upon every mans tongue and pen, that a man can hardly speak or write signifi­cantly without them, unless he would tye himself to strict Logical and Metaphysical notions and expressions.

SECT. IV. Mr. Hobbs his third instance censured. Freedom of Speech diversly accepted. His illustrations most uncertain, and deviating from his matter.

HIs third instance: (So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice or pronuntiation, but of the man whom no Law had obliged to speak otherwise then he did.) First, I think he is mistaken much in the sense of this phrase (free speech) for we shall find it two ways used in our common conversation of men with men; sometimes in a virtuous sense, as, he did preach freely, deliver the truth without fear of men, for that bondage of fear is a great captivity; sometimes in a worse sense, when we use to say, such a man is one of a free conversation, he speaks freely; not that he speaks things as no Law hath forbid to speak otherwise, but without consideration; he gives no Law to his own tongue, one (as we otherwise phrase him sometimes) without fear or wit, and it is within an inch of sauciness. Now freedom of speech doth not relate only to the outward Laws, but to the ability sometimes of Language; and yet I may add, he was to blame when he denied the use of it concerning the bodily pronuntiation, for we use to say, he is free from stam­mering; and for stammering, he hath an impediment in his speech. Let the Reader forgive me for medling with such trifles as these are, which in this place I do, because he may observe how crude and indigested his discourse is, and how uncertain even his illustrations are, which ought to be of a clearer evidence. But now I come to his Lastly; which in­deed I guess to be the work he aimed at, and this only a Preamble to the Liberty of Subjects, which indeed it con­cerns not.

SECT. V. Of freedom and liberty again; These two contrary to his former acception of the words, now distin­guished by Mr. Hobbs. The word will taken in a double sense, equally with understanding, by the Philosophers. The common notion justified against Mr. Hobbs. The subjectum quod, and the subje­ctum quo of liberty in the will. A twofold act of the will (confounded by Mr. Hobbs) explained and asserted. God only can do what ever he has inclination to.

LAstly, (saith he) from the use of the word Free-will, no liberty can be enforced of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.) What? from the use of this word Free-will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination! I wonder why by his discourse, because it is no body, which he conceives to be the only free thing; but that hath been refuted: other things are as free as bodies, according to his conceit of free­dom, because other things produce alteration, and may be impeded in their operations. But perhaps he puts a diffe­rence here betwixt freedom and liberty, which before he conjoyned; and conceives that the freedom of the will, which may not be stopt or hindred in its operations, is a di­stinct thing from its liberty of doing, or not doing, of elect­ing this, or refusing that: And although he allows the first, that it is free, without stop to operate; but hath no liberty to operate, or not operate, or to refuse one, and chuse another; this I apprehend to be his meaning, as will appear presently, his whole discourse pointing at it. To understand which, let the Reader consider with me, that this word will is ta­ken two ways; for a faculty in the Soul, by which it produ­ceth [Page 113] divers acts, as to will, or nill, chuse, or refuse. And se­condly, for the prime act of this faculty, which is to will, for so Philosophers do with the understanding. Intellectus is the faculty by which a man understands any thing, and the prime act of the understanding, or indeed the chief habit by which it understands any thing. The habitus principiorum, is called Intellectus: Thus sometimes the same name is applied to the faculty, and the chief operation of the faculty. I speak this, because he more then once abuseth this notion with some derision; but however, until we can learn more significant terms to express our notions by, we must be con­tent with such as are in use. Now consider, here he takes will for the act, or the operation of the faculty, not the fa­culty it self: that is evident, because he expounds it, as if they were one by desire and inclination. Now those two, de­sire, and inclination, are actual motions, or at the least, ten­dencies to motions: Now (saith he) of these there is no li­berty, but the liberty of the man. It is true, the man is the subjectum quod, or the Soul of man in which the faculty of the will is, but the will is the faculty which is the subjectum quo, the immediate subject by which the man is free; and by this faculty the man is enabled to work this act of wil­ling freely. But yet consider with me a little, that the will being the instrument which man useth to obtain his happi­ness, hath a twofold act; one respects the end, which is happiness, the other the means, by which this happiness is to be obtained: The first is natural, and necessary; as natu­ral, as for the eye to see colours, for the fire to burn. There cannot be a man who would not be happy, he may be mista­ken in the thing so as to count this or that to be happiness, which is not, but he would be happy. The second, which is conversant about the means, is Election, and that act is free for a man to chuse, or not chuse, to chuse one, and refuse another. Now concerning the second there is abundance of liberty; concerning the first, he might confound will, desire, and inclination; but concerning the second, he may will, or rationally desire that which he hath no inclination to, yea is a verse to in his natural inclination; and therefore in that [Page 114] regard they were very ill joyned together; and it was a Gam­bal of him, and what follows is most odious to all reason and experience; for explaining himself, what he meant by the liberty of man, which (saith he) consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. Consider this strange proposition; Was there ever any man of such a liberty, such a power, that he finds no stop in doing what he hath a will to do. The greatest Emperour that ever was, could never say so; they have stops in themselves, their own reasons and consciences forbid them to do many things they would do, their short and weak arms stop them from doing many things they are inclined to do, only God is capa­ble of this liberty, whose infinite wisdom can find out all things, and infinite goodness desires nothing but what is most excellent, and infinite power can do all what he hath an inclination to: It was therefore a most strange speech, and I cannot but wonder how such things can pass amongst rea­sonable men for Philosophy; and being in, I think it my duty to shew such a thing to a heedless Reader.

SECT. VI. Of mixed actions, will, desire, and inclination, di­stinguished; confounded by Mr. Hobbs. Of goods cast into the Sea, for the preservation of the Ship and Passengers. The dictate of Reason often diso­beyed, and the will violently carried by the sensual appetite. Denominations are a principaliori.

SO now we will pass on to the next Paragraph; I expect more of this stuff: It begins (Fear and Liberty are con­sisting) (I believe they are in a mixture) as (saith he) when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for fear the Ship should sink.) This instance is commonly given to mixed actions, which are compounded of voluntary and involuntary; here is a part of both; he doth throw his goods into the Sea, this makes it voluntary; he doth it grudging, that makes [Page 115] it involuntary, yet it seems the predominancy is in the will. But now consider with me, that these terms (which he handled before, and confounded together) you may now find distinguished, they are will, desire, and inclination: these three (to speak properly) differ, according to a three­fold estate in man, Natural, Animal, and Rational: Ac­cording to the first, he hath inclination to tarry and remain in the world, with the like; agreeing to the second, he desires meat, drink, to walk, to talk, and do all things which are pleasant to him: According to the last, to act such things as reason shall dictate: Nay he may have an inclina­tion to many things which Reason can say are not fit; take the highest instance which can be given, that is, to live; when Reason shall shew him, that it is not fit to live upon such dishonest terms as are offered. So likewise he may have an animal desire of pleasure, which being found not fit by Reason, the rational will controuls it. Thus we see those three Appetites; and to keep close to his instance, man hath an inclination and a natural appetite to live, and hath a sensual desire of his riches, by which he hopes to live to the satisfaction of his sensual appetite; but Reason pre­scribes, that life is to be preferred before all the pleasures in the world. So that here he saith right, one may have a will to throw his riches into the Sea, but his sensual desire is against it, and that makes it have a degree of unwilling­ness. Consider again, that this act of throwing his goods into the Sea, is in its own nature an unwilling act; for no man would desire to cast that away, which with so much hazard and pains he had got; but in the particular, when it comes to be yoked with that greater mischief of loosing his life, then it is chosen before the other, and yet it is oft grieved for when it is passed and gone, which is a shrewd objection against the willingness of it; for no man is ratio­nally grieved for doing what he will; but be it as he will, yet the rational will, the sensual desire, and the natural in­clination, are not the same; and although the rational will in that act doth command, yet in many it doth not, being violently carried away with the other; So that he saith [Page 116] truth, when he saith, —casting his goods into the Sea was a willing action, although there was an earnest desire to the contrary; and there was, by reason of that, some mixture of unwillingness in it; yet denominatio à principaliori, the predominant part gives the denomination invincibly: So likewise what follows in another instance, of him who pays his debts only to avoid imprisonment:) And what in the con­clusion of that Paragraph, he saith, That generally all acti­ons which men do in Commonwealths for fear of the Law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit) therefore cer­tainly they had liberty in themselves, they might do, or not do them.

SECT. VII. The deficiency of Mr. Hobbs his instance of water passing in its channel. Libertas coactionis, & ne­cessitatis, further explained. Liberty properly ad opposita.

NOw I come to a new business: Liberty (saith he) and necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.) This instance is not full; for although there is a freedom to run in the channel, yet the banks of the channel so confine it, that the water can run no where else; like a man who hath his shackles knocked off, yet is confined to his chamber still, and is a prisoner there. But to understand this, consi­der with me, that this liberty which he speaks of concern­ing the water, is a true liberty, so far as I explained it, ac­cording to his definition, which is a liberty to run in the channel without external impediments; but absolute liberty it is not, because both it is impeded from overflowing the channel by the banks, and likewise because it is restrained by its nature, so that it is not absolutely liberty. There is li­bertas à coactione, a liberty from constraint of outward causes, [Page 117] but there is no liberty à necessitate, from the necessity of its nature, without which there is no proper liberty any other­wise then a prisoner hath to live in Gaol: But liberty is ad opposita, to things of divers nature, where the Internal Prin­ciple hath power to do this, or that; or at the least, to do, or not to do, as he speaks at the end of the last Paragraph; —The doer had liberty to omit. Now the water hath freedom to do, it is not hindred from running in the channel; but not so much liberty as School boys take one towards ano­ther, when the weaker Boy should chuse the best, the stron­ger would give him the worst, and bid him chuse that or none; for the water hath not liberty to run, or not to run, but only liberty to run.

SECT. VIII. Mr. Hobbs his former instance to voluntary actions. His liberty to have, or not to have written and dispersed, these impious Doctrines.

HE proceeds: (So likewise in the actions which men vo­luntarily do.) It is not so in the actions which men vo­luntarily do; there is no necessity for them to do their vo­luntary actions; they can chuse whether they will do them or not; that man who doth vertuously, can chuse, and do vitiously: And so contrarily, he could have chosen whether he would have writ these wicked Doctrines which he hath taught: If not, let him confess it, and I will prove him not to be a Man, but a Beast, and fit to be used as a Beast, yea worse then a Beast, to be like a stone which naturally descends, or water which necessarily runs down its Chan­nel, and so ought to be used like it; for indeed there is no one thing more peculiar to man then this liberty.

SECT. IX. Mr. Hobbs his Reason of the former Assertion inva­lid. Of the first and second causes. Men actively, other creatures passively, capable of commands, Fools and Mad-men incapable of commands.

BUt he gives a reason for what he speaks: (And yet, be­cause every act of mans will, and every desire and incli­nation proceedeth from some causes, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes) proceed from necessity.) The force of this Argument is invisible; for though this will doth proceed from a cause, as he expresseth it, yet if that imme­diate cause from which it proceeds be not necessary, yea, if any one Link in the Chain of Causes be free, and not necessa­ry, the effect is not necessary; for the arbitrariness of any one will make the effect such: But this liberty of the Agent (he speaks of) looks only upon the immediate cause, which in humane actions is free, and may not be done; yea, very often the Agent may chuse the contrary: That the first cause works with all second causes, is as certain as any thing in the Mathematicks; for there cannot be a second, or a third, or any number, but it proceeds from a first: And yet because the first hath an influence upon the rest, it follows not that they are Cyphers, but each out of that foundation hath its several operations: So in this, the first cause is Causa generalis, and works with second causes which are derived from it: But they have their several ways and powers of working; Natural, according to their natural inclination; Animal, according to the peculiar disposition of those Souls which inhabit them; only man hath a free nature amongst bodily things, in that resembling the Great Cause of Cau­ses, he is the Principle of those actions which he doth as a man voluntarily, and therefore is capable of Commands a­ctively to do, and the other Creatures passively to be done, [Page 119] or used, and Man is used as a Master, or Owner under God, of them, a Steward who must give an account of such of them as come within the sphere of his Dominion. Let any man tell me, how a man can be capable of commands, if he were like them necessitated: No man commands Fools, Mad­men, or Infants; we might account them Fools, or Mad, who should do it; but, if he would have them act any thing, he must work upon their predominant passion, as we would do with Beasts, because there is in them a deficiency of this high Power, to be Master of their own actions. It cannot be then, that all those Precepts, Councels, Commands of God, should be given to him who hath no power to o­bey: And from thence we must needs conclude, that they have a liberty to do, or not to do. But let us follow him.

SECT. X. Mr. Hobbs his Supposition impossible, without a Reve­lation. The force of the word-See.- His Hypothesis granted. His Inference would not follow. Causes not otherwise to seem, then as they are in their own Nature.

SO that (saith he) to him who could see the connexion of those Causes, the necessity of all mens voluntary actions would ap­pear manifest.) This conclusion is founded upon an impossi­ble supposal; there is no possibility that a man in this world should see that Chain of Causes, in Heaven hereafter he may, but here he cannot without a mighty strange Revela­tion. But suppose he could? This word See denotes a clear apprehension; What would follow then, but that he should see such causes necessary which are necessary, and such free which are free; he would see them as they are, not see them in a representation false, and so not agreeing to their con­dition.

SECT. XI. Of Gods concurrence with humane actions. No man a sinner if necessitated to sin. Divine disposure necessitates not to Evil. God not the Author of those actions which are contrary to his commands. He is truly the Author of those actions he adviseth. Gods concurrence further illustrated, from the in­flux of the Sun. Liberal Agents not necessitated by the ordinary concurrence of God.

HE proceeds: (And therefore God that seeth and dispo­seth all things, seeth also, that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, and no more, nor less.) Certainly, al­though I think very many men are too bold to discourse of both Gods Knowledge and Will, as they do, which are things too high for the weak sight of man to look clearly into, yet men may confidently say, as his Knowledge cannot be de­ceived, to judge falsly, so his Will cannot be deceived, in willing that which is not good; and therefore because men are free Agents in what they do, and must give an account of their actions to him, and be judged according to them by him, it is not possible to conceive, that he should know them other then free, which liberty was his own gift. And for his will, since it hath pleased God in his holy Word to reveal to us Rules by which we may know what is his will for us to do, in doing which we please him, and that he likes us; as also what is against his will, in doing which we shall anger and offend him, and he will punish us, although God be not only a general, but the first cause which works with and in us; yet it is not possible for man to think, that God doth in that concurrence determine mans actions to such things which he himself hath declared evil, and against his will, and which he will punish; and therefore it was too bold an Assertion to say, That man doth no more or less, [Page 121] then he is necessitated by Gods will, which is to make no man a sinner; for although (as he spake) God disposeth all things, and that disposure must needs be to infinitely good and wise ends, even the evils and things against his Rules of good­ness, yet his disposure orders such men, according to their evil actions, to suffer, not makes them do evil that they may suffer. But perhaps he explains this (For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore Au­thor of them.) Nay, I will tell him more, men may do, and many men do many things, not only which God hath not commanded, but which God hath forbidden, and hath com­manded they shall not do; and surely then he is less Author of them: But if a man do an act of advise or counsel of Gods without a Command, yet that Gods Counsel is Au­thor of. Now these actions which are against Gods Com­mand, without doubt he is not Author of; if he were, he could not justly punish them: But I would fain make out his sense, which is this, he doth not do it by Authority given by God, but against it; Well then, Gods Authority is a­gainst evil, but his power worketh this evil. So he seems to affirm in his following words; (Yet they can have no pas­sion nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause.) True indeed, God is the first general cause, but not the second and particular. The Sun is an univer­sal cause, it shines upon the Earth, Trees, Plants, and is the cause of their fertility, but diversly, according to the diver­sity of Constitutions it concurs with; so doth God, as he is the first and general cause (meeting with several conditions) operate severally, to the production of those several effects which are produced by them, with things necessary, before he produceth necessary effects. But, as the Suns concourse doth not determine this thing to this, and that to that ef­fect; so doth not the general concourse of God determine this or that appetite to this or that object, in this or that manner; but when it meets with things so disposed, it con­curs in the production of that effect to which it was so di­sposed; so that God concurring with free Agents, makes them no more necessary, then his concurring with necessary [Page 122] Agents makes them free: It is the same infinite Power of God which constituted both, and his concurrence destroys neither in its ordinate working: (I speak not of his extra­ordinary operation, whereby he can and doth controul all the frame of Nature, when and how he pleaseth, nor doth Mr. Hobbs): Nay, I may say, that God himself being abso­lutely free, bounded with no limits, having nothing above, or about him, which can stop or hinder his Almighty hand from working, it is much more reasonable to think, that his concourse should make even necessary Agents free, and not to be bounded by their natures which he had given them, rather then that this most free Agent should against himself make those which he had constituted in a free na­ture to be necessary, because they are by that more like himself, which every Agent endeavours: Nay, in his ex­traordinary works, he doth often, for the present, shake off those bonds which his former Donation had confined them to; so that by his extraordinary concourse, he makes them cease from their former operations, which by their natures they were necessitated to do; as the fire not to burn, the water not to run down its channel, and the like, which are apparent to every man. So then, though Gods will and concurrence is a cause of those actions, yet not being a terminating cause, but concurring with that nature which he had given them, that concurrence doth not necessitate that operation which he had given to man, viz. freedom to do, or not to do. But he proves the contrary in his fol­lowing words, which are these.

SECT. XII. The consequence of this Paragraph examined. His meaning conjectured and refuted. Every devia­tion contradicts not the Power and Omnipotency of God. Voluntas facere & fieri distinguished in God. Men not justly punished with Damnation, if necessitated to sin. Mr. Hobbs censured for obtru­ding those Doctrines in Divinity amongst his Po­litical Discourses. The actions of the King and Subject alike necessitated by Mr. Hobbs his Chain of Causes.

ANd did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the li­berty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotency and liberty of God.) I do not observe how this consequence can be deduced out of the premises; for if God endowed man with liberty and free power in his na­ture, why should it follow, if God do not necessitate his actions, that mans will would cross and impede the power and liberty of God? For the will of God is, that man should act freely: the free actions therefore are according to his will, and the necessitation would be contrary to his will. But, I think, he means, that if mans free power could sin against the will of God, then man should be able to con­tradict and stop his Omnipotency and Liberty. To understand this therefore, consider with me, that Gods Dominion o­ver this World, is like that of a King in a Kingdom; he gives Laws and Rules to the Subjects, which if they ob­serve, they shall live happily under him; but if not, he will punish and afflict, yea perhaps destroy the offending parties: It is an opposition to the Kings power, that when men break his Laws, and he shall go about to punish them, they shall then rebel against him, and oppose the power of the [Page 124] County, or of the Kingdom, or that power which he mu­sters up to do Justice upon them; then indeed his power is contradicted and impeded. God, whilst men live here with these natures, hath given Rules, and governs them by such Laws as he hath appointed them for their good; if they observe those Laws, happy are they, but he seldom puts in his Omnipotency to make men do the one or the other, never to make men break his Laws; he ordinarily doth not vary the nature of man, or any thing. Men may and may not keep his Commandments, (I do not now di­spute of the nature of Grace, or any thing of that kind) they that do not, shall be punished, as the other blessed; and then comes in his Omnipotency; if man could resist or impede that, that were contradicting his power; but these sins only oppose his concourse which inclines, but not necessitates a mans nature; so that there is Gods voluntas facere & fieri, his will which we should do, which it is im­possible for God to oppose; and there is his voluntas facere, to do himself, which it is not possible for man to oppose: The first appears in this life, the second in the other; nor is it any contradiction to the Divine Power which hath so e­stablished it, and without which it were impossible for his Power to joyn with his Justice in punishing Offenders at the last day; for how can a man justly be punished for what was not in his power to do otherwise, yea much less can he punish him in Justice, who makes him commit that fault which he punisheth, which God must do, if he (with his co-operation in the act) determines mans power to that evil which he punisheth, and for which condemneth him to Hell. Certainly, this is the most abominable impu­dent Doctrine for sinning that ever was read in any Author that ever writ of this Subject, and the most derogative from that infinite Essential Goodness that should cause, or make men do evil; for no more then fire can cool or act against its nature, no more can God, who is essentially good (goodness it self) act that which is evil. It is in vain for a man to say, it is not evil, God doing it; for it is an evil which God hates and punisheth, and therefore must be evil [Page 125] in his esteem. I do not now speak of that Language used by some, of Gods afflictions working with some men, which comes not in this discourse to be disputed of; but that God doth work these sins which he punisheth, this is abhorrent to the thought of a Religious man. And now, I must censure Mr. Hobbs, not only for ill and false Doctrine, but for having such a delight in it, as in this place unnecessa­rily to obtrude it, where there was no reason for, nor use of it; for let any man consider what this hath to do with liberty of the Subject, which is the Head he undertook to treat of; the liberty of the Subject is neither more or less for his linking of his actions to God Almighty; nay, if his discourse be true, Subjects have as great liberty as Kings, for all their actions are alike necessitated by this Chain.

Here Reader, I thought to have ended with his Politicks, having, as I think, digged up his Foundation, and then the Building must fall; but meeting so many wicked interpre­tations of Scripture, and so many abominable conclusions in Divinity intermixed with his Political discourses, I am for­ced to proceed with some of them, lest the Reader should be unhappily seduced, but not prosecute them word by word, as I have done; but skipping from one hill to ano­ther, leaving the lesser work, and Mole-hills, to be censu­red by any man who hath more leisure and spare time; and to that purpose remove with me to the next page 109. about the middle, where he begins thus.


SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his impious Proposition in this Para­graph, discovered and censured. Injustice and in­iquity the same. The Subject not Author of the a­ctions of his Soveraign. The Soveraign, granting the former Proposition, cannot kill an Innocent justly. No man hath power to take away his own life justly. Neither Subjects nor Kings have right to any thing but from God, who gives not power to either to shed Innocent Blood. The Law of Na­ture, deserted by Mr. Hobbs, to the murther of an Innocent. His disapprobation of Scripture cen­sured.

NEvertheless we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the Soveraign Power of Life and Death is either abo­lished or limited.) I conceive, by Soveraign Power, he means the power of the Soveraign, and that Authority not limi­ted by any Law, which being violated, he should do un­justly: (for this sense the sequel of this discourse will ap­parently justifie) and then I say it is a wicked Proposition, as will appear by the examination of his reasons, which he enters upon in the following words: (For it hath been al­ready shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can do to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury): Yes, he hath shewn it with a nice and learned distinction, betwixt Injustice and Iniquity; concern­ing which, I may justly say they are hardly two words, but not two things, as I have shew'd. But what doth he mean by a Soveraign Representative here? I think he hath deliver­ed, that all Soveraigns are Representatives of the people; What he can mean by this addition of Representative, I know not; but he explains himself in the words follow­ing; [Page 127] Because (saith he) every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwise then as he himself is a Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature.) The first part I have spoken to heretofore, and shewed, that every Subject is not Author of the Soveraigns acts; where, he saith, he hath shown it: But now I shall go further, and prove, that if they were Authors of his acts, yet by their Authority he cannot kill an Innocent justly; which I do thus, — The peo­ple cannot authorize him to act any thing, which they themselves have not just power to do; but the people con­junctim, or divisim, have no just power to take away an inno­cent mans life; therefore they cannot authorize him. The major is grounded upon that invincible Axiom, No man gives what he hath not; therefore if they have not that power, they cannot give it. The minor will be proved thus; — Before a Commonwealth be instituted, no man hath just power to take away anothers life, as is most evi­dent. I, but they may answer, every man hath power over his own, which every man may yield to the Soveraign. I rejoyn; No man hath just power to take away his own life, he may give his goods, but not his life; God is the God of life, and hath given no private man Authority to cut off his own life, and therefore undoubtedly he cannot give power to another, which he hath not himself. And if there were no other argument against his popular Constitu­tion of a Supreme, this were enough for confutation of it; for there must be a power of life and death in a Common­wealth upon the emergency of great iniquities, it cannot subsist else. And so I pass to the second part of that con­clusion, which is, (Otherwise then as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature:) There is much folly (if not wickedness) in these few words. First, I say, neither Kings, nor any man, hath right to any thing, but as they are Gods Subjects: The earth is the Lords, and all that is in it; and to whom he giveth it, they have right to such pieces, and none else: He is King of Kings, with a much greater Prerogative then they can have over [Page 128] their Subjects: They can have no power therefore or right to act any thing which is not a power delegated from him; and certainly he can never shew me any power given to Kings by God to shed innocent blood. Secondly, it is a strange phrase used by him (and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature:) First, because the Law of Nature, in par­ticulars, is to preserve, not to take away life in general; and concerning Commonwealths, to reward Virtue, and punish Vice; when this wicked book would have it the Law of Nature, to kill an Innocent, yea a virtuous person. Second­ly, consider (that being bound, because he is Gods Subject, to the Law of Nature) and only that he should not be bound to Gods positive Laws in Scripture, a distinction which he him­self makes use of, and therefore may more powerfully be retorted to him; but he loves not Scripture, and this odious expression of his is most abominable.

SECT. II. Mr. Hobbs his Proposition in this Paragraph exami­ned and censured. His dubious expressions disco­vered from his former Assertions, and refuted. Scripture seldom cited by Mr. Hobbs, but to give a colour and Authority to Impiety. Jephta's rash Vow examined. The execution of that Vow impi­ous. Jephta's Sacrifice no President for others.

HE goes on: (And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Commonwealths, that a Subject m [...]y be put to death by the Command of the Soveraign Power, and yet neither [...]o the other wrong.) There is one shift in this Proposition by which it may be justified, as thus; That a Soveraign may pu­nish a Delinquent, who formally did him no wrong, or an inconsiderable one, that is, to the Prince himself; but for an injury to another of his Fellow Subjects, as for robbing, or burning his Neighbours house. But (as it seems) by that argumentative word therefore, which must relate to the precedent matter, he may do it, when the [Page 129] murthered Party hath done no wrong to any body, and then it is wickedly false, he gives instances two or three. We will examine them next [As (saith he) when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed, in which and the like cases, he that so dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless put to death without injury] I could wish he would let Scripture alone, for he loving it not with a due reverence, seldom names it, but to countenance some wick­edness, as here. This story is recorded Judges the 11. And Mr. Hobbs I am perswaded did know how it is with sharp­ness disputed by Divines whether he sacrificed her, or made a Votary of her. I will embroile my self in no unnecessary controversies, but will grant all he requires in that dispute, that he did sacrifice her; what follows then? that he did it justly? certainly no, the actions of bad Kings, yea the bad actions of good Princes cannot be justifiable precedents for following ages. The world and the particular men in it are compounded of good and evil; there is not any man so bad as hath no good, but that he may be worse; nor any man so good, but he may be better; he hath some ill actions falling from him. That is it which I speak of this very gallant person, Jephta, he might have such an ill action out of a foolish mistaken Zeal, that that rash vow of his was to be kept; it was a foolish and a rash vow; for (for my part) I cannot guesse what he could imagine, what he could conceive, should come out of his doors which should be fit for a sacrifice to God; Domestick creatures, as dogs, ser­vants or children, are all of them hated by God for sacrifices. Calves, Rams, Cows, Goats &c. which are the proper things for sacrifices, are not domestick inhabitants; but to shed innocent blood in offering his daughter for a sacrifice was without doubt most impious; and this is reckoned by Da­vid in Psalm 106. verse 38. amongst the abominations of the Israelites that they shed blood, in their offering up their Sons and Daughters to Divels. I, but it may be ob­jected, that he had vowed it to God. A vow made to do evil is ipso facto void; God never confirmed it; he ought not to keep it, but to repent for making it; this was to shed [Page 130] innocent blood which was a sacrifice fit for none but the Divel, from whom the instigation to it proceeded; so that if Jephta did kill her for a sacrifice, he did wickedly. There is a certain humour in many men, who will be peremptory in some point of religion that they may seem godly, who value not much the reality of it: they will keep a rash, or (which amounts to the same) a not well advised oath, although to sin, when they will neglect obedience to do righteously; this was evident in King Saul, you may find 1 Sam. 14.24. Saul curseth any man who should eat any food until eventide; here was a most rash curse, and the 27. verse, Johnathan who knew nothing of this curse of his Fathers eats a little honey; in the 44. verse, Saul swears again, that he shall surely dye: what a horrid injustice had this been in Saul to slay that gallant person, a man of so much honour and worth, for the satisfaction of his rash oath? You shall find in the next Chap. that Samuel gave Saul a commandment from God to do execution upon Amalek, and then he can in the 9. verse spare Agag and the best of their cattle; see the same humour in both, that which God had prohibited, murther, even upon his own son, he would have committed, although against Gods law, because it was agreeing with that religion which he had instituted for God, to wit his oath; but then upon the same reason he spared Agag when God commanded his destruction, because it suited better with his phancie that they should make a glorious sacrifice to God of what they had taken: and therefore in the 22. v. Sam. gives him this heavy reproof, Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord? behold to obey is better than sacrifice. When God hath given laws for mens actions it is a disobedience to in­vent witty ways of our own which cross them, to spare what God would have us destroy, and destroy that which God would have us save. This was the humour of Sauls religion. I dare not censure Jephta, he was a person of as spotless integrity as any I find amongst the Judges, unless Samuel; but if he did kill his daughter, I may justly say it was a most unjust act, and a satisfaction of his fancy in religion (which imagined what he had sworn in re illicita, [Page 131] must be performed although against Gods law, which forbids kill­ing which in sacrifice required no such thing) but not a religi­ous act; nor can this be a precedent for others, nor a justi­fication of others in doing the like, although a better man than he be joyned with him, which is David; and so I come to his second instance.

CHAP. XX. SECT. III. The murther of Uriah discussed. Mr Hobbs his distin­ction censured. Killing of an innocent contrary not only to the equitable part, but the very letter of the law of nature. The law not the executioner kills a Criminal. No power given by Uriah to David to kill him being an innocent. Mr. Hobbs his errors multiplied from his fictitious institution of So­veraignes by popular election. Uriah not impow­ered to dispose of his own life.

HIs words are, [In which and the like cases he that so dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury put to death.] I have shewed the contrary: it is an injury to put any man to death for that which he had liberty (that is) was not bound by law, not to do, and such a law which enjoyned such a penalty for the breach of it. Again he [And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an innocent Subject.] What a Tautologie is this? I thought he had dis­coursed of a Soveraign Prince all this while; if not, it is more abominable. I, but he hath reason for what he hath delivered, for (sath he) Though the action be against the law of nature as being contrary to equitie (as was the killing of Uriah by David) yet it was not an injury to Uriah; but to God. A very fine and delicate distinction, of which I [Page 132] have spoke before. But now concerning this language, as it is used here, though the action (saith he) be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equitie.] First, Reader, consider, if he take equity (as many times it is) for a mitiga­tion or a gentle exposition which moderates the extream rigor of the law, this surely may be deduced out of the law of na­ture, then (saith he) it is against the law of nature, because against the kind and charitable exposition of the law of na­ture only; but without question killing an innocent is most directly contrary to the very letter of the law of nature and the full sence of it, for although he makes nothing of the positive law of God in this discourse, yet the ten command­ments being by all understood to be an illustration or ex­plication of that law writ in our hearts (as he himself seems to allow hereafter) therefore that law being clear, Thou shalt not kill, and this killing an innocent being the most detestable of all other, it is most clearly not only a­gainst the equity but the letter, that is that sence which the law intends; for the law of nature directs and commands that vertue and vertuous men should be rewarded and incoura­ged, and vice punished. Thou shalt not kill for the satis­faction of thy passion, whom the law doth not direct; but if the law command killing, lest the Common-wealth be hurt by so wicked a person, lest vice may be nourished, then the law kills, not thou who art an executioner of the law. And therefore to kill an innocent is a monstrous crime, whom no law kills; he gives an instance again, as was the killing of Uriah by David, yet it was not an in­jury to Uriah, but to God: yes, the greatest injury could be done to him. No saith he, not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself. Shew that concession or gift from Ʋriah and it will go a great way to my satisfaction, nay certainly there was never such a concession from Uriah or any Subject, that the King shall kill him being an innocent. It is not good for the Com­mon-wealth that any have such a power, because by such a wicked act the Commonwealth loseth a worthy member as was Ʋriah; but that abominable false foundation of the [Page 133] only way of instituting a Common-wealth by the popular election, that impossible error leads him into many more; but suppose Ʋriah yielded such a power, yea if it had been done by such a consent as he expressed, yet they had no pow­er over their own lives; and therefore could not impower him over them; especially when embodied into a Com­mon-wealth; for his country hath a share in every Subjects life, and good subjects well-being, by which it is amended and bettered; so that he must needs do an injury to others by such an act; for it is wrong and again all justice, that man should suffer by weldoing. This may suffice for the first piece of that sentence, now we will examine the se­cond.

CHAP. XX. SECT. IV. Davids sin in murthering Uriah, a sin against God, because an injury to man. St. Ambrose explain­ed. David his soveraignty freed from the punish­ment of sin, but not from the guilt of it. Rom. 13.4. the first epistle of St. Peter 2.14. explain­ed. The former assertions proved against Mr. Hobbs, by the authority of St. Basil, St. Chrysostome, St. Hierom, and St. Augustin The authors sence of these words, tibi soli peccavi. Mr. Hobbs his va­riation from the authority and reading of England. The former conclusions recapitulated and asserted a­gainst Mr. Hobbs from the meaning of this text.

A And yet to God; because David was Gods Subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature.] Well, now let us consider, why this was iniquity; for no other reason [Page 134] certainly but because it was injustice done to another man. The law of nature prescribes all, (and nothing but) in justice: if it be towards God it is called religion, which payes to God the duty which we owe him, and is set down in the four first commandements of the Decalogue; but all the justice which is due to man, is set down in the six latter. I must then tell him, that that act of Murther in David was not a sin against God, but only out of regard that it was an injury to man; for, therefore the law of nature written in mens hearts, and the positive law of God was a­gainst it, because it was unjust for man to do it; so that the reason why it was an offence against God, being only, because it was an injury to man, it must follow that it can­not be an injury to God, but it must likewise be an inju­ry to man. I, but (saith he) it was against God, because King David was Gods subject. Yet give me leave, although King David was Gods subject, yet it doth not follow that in murthering his fellow subjects he did no injury to them, no more than the Kings subjects, officers or Judges under him may be said in condemning innocent blood to injure only the King, and not the person whom he so murthered: it is most evident therefore, that that sin was against both God and man. But he brings scripture for what he writes: which distinction, David himself when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. Which text you may read Psalm. 51.4. and to understand the sence of it, let us reflect upon the story of this Psalm, as it is recorded, with 2 Sam. 12. where we may observe, that after he had committed these hainous sins of adultery and murther, God sent Nathan the Prophet to him, and he told David his own story, under a Parable of a Rich man, who took a poor mans lamb from him to entertain his friend with it. This was a picture of Davids crime; was not this injustice? Consider then in the 9. verse, where he acquaints the King with Gods sentence against him, he doth not lay to his charge only that he had offended God, but that he had killed Ʋriah the Hittite with the sword, and had taken his wife to be his wife, and had slain him with the sword of the Children of Ammon: so that the [Page 135] sins of David were against men; for though all sin is against God, even the trespass against men is therefore a sin, be­cause against Gods law; yet it is a sin against men, and therefore prohibited by Gods law because unjust to men. I speak of all such sins, which are suâ naturâ in their own nature sins, of which kind murther is; then let us look to the 14. verse of this Psalm. Deliver me from blood-guiltiness O God. Blood-guiltiness, what is that? Nothing but the guilt of that sin which he had committed by that murtherous act of killing Ʋriah, and therefore as a murtherer is guilty of the crime, untill he is absolved of his Judge, and his only Judge God Almighty had acquitted him; he untill then was guilty of blood, of murthering Ʋriah. Well then un­doubtedly that was an unjust act, let Mr. Hobbs say what he will or can. But I will do him right, he goes not alone in this opinion; but hath St. Ambrose, a person of great honour both for judgment and integrity, along with him; and because I will urge this argument to the full, I will say he was no Court parasite; one who would flatter Kings into sin, as was evident in that contest he had with the Emperour Theodosius, in which was apparent both an in­comparable Emperour, and a pious and zealous Prelate. This St. Ambrose utters some things in his book called Apologia David like Mr. Hobbs, where in his tenth Chap. at the beginning he expounds these words [tibi soli peccavi] Rex utique erat, nullis ipse legibus tenebatur, I have sin­ned only to thee, for he was a King, he was held or con­fined by no laws; because (saith he) Kings are free from the bonds of laws, neither by any laws are they called to punishment, being safe by the power of Empire. This a man would think abundantly full, but yet he never used Mr. Hobbs his Phrase, to say he did not unjustly. But his first speech must be understood that he was not with held by any humane laws: for Mr. Hobbs confesseth that he is responsable for the breach of divine laws, by the law of na­ture. Secondly, that speech of his, that Kings are freed from the bonds of their faults; that must be understood of such bonds, as imprisonments, or such punishments which by hu­mane laws are injoyned offenders; and that is clearly ex­pounded [Page 136] by his last sentence, that they are by no laws called to punishment, being safe in the power of Empire, that is, safe from the questioning of their subjects; so that his whole sence is this, That David as a King was not respon­sable for his subjects to any man, nor lyable to any punish­ment for them. I could speak more to this, and shew how that S. Ambrose produced another exposition presently after: but certainly neither he nor any man but Mr. Hobbs will say it was not injustice; it is suâ naturâ unjust, to punish with the greatest punishment, death, an innocent person. Nor doth his being a King, make it less injustice, but rather ag­gravate it; because his chief office under God, and for which he is constituted by God, is, to distribute justice e­qually, and reward the vertuous, and punish the evil, as St. Paul excellently and clearly speaks, Rom. 13.4. He is the minister of God to thee for Good (that is, to thee who dost that which is good, as he speaks in the 3. verse) but if thou dost evil be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God; a Revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. So likewise St. Peter 1. Epist. 2.14. makes it their business to punish evil doers, and the praise of them who do well. Now if these be the contents of the commission from God to these his Deputies, they must needs be guilty of injustice who punish citra condig­num, where there was no desert of it; and they who are Kings, so much the more, by how much it is their par­ticular duty to take care of the contrary. I have now clear­ed the sence of S. Ambrose as I guess, but lest any scru­ple might remain from his authority, with any man, who might mistake his sence, I will therefore weigh down the Scales with the weights of others, his near contemporaries, of no less honour in Christendom than himself. And the first I shall present you with, is St. Basil, the great, (so he is call­ed) in his scholia upon this verse of this Psalm: Tibi soli peccavi cùm multis & magnis donis tuis sum positus: Since I enjoy many and great gifts of thine, but have returned con­trary things: he doth not say here that he had not sinned against Uriah; he had indeed offended against him, and a­gainst his wife, but the greatest prevarication was com­mitted [Page 137] against God himself, who had chosen him, and con­stituted him King, and therefore he rightly added, and done this evil in thy sight; thus far St. Basil. The next which I shall produce, shall be St. Chrysostom upon this Psalm, and this verse, and he agrees very much with St. Basil. To thee only have I sinned, Many (saith he) and great benefits have I received from thee, but I have returned them with contrary things, for these things which by thy law are interdicted, I have not doubted to commit: neither doth he say, that I have not hurt Uriah, for he had both hurt him and his wife, but the greatest iniquity was against God. Thus far St. chrysostum. Next consider St. Hierom; Tibi solùm peccavi, to thee only have I sinned, for to thee every man sins when he sins, because thou art only with­out sin, as the Apostle speaks, Rom. 3.4. God is true but e­very man a lyar; or else David saith, I have sinned and thou only art without sin, as saith the Prophet Isaiah 53. Who did no sin nor was guile found in his mouth. St. Au­gustin likewise harps upon the same string. To thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, what is this, saith that heavenly man? Had not he adulterated ano­thers wife and slain her husband? Did not all men know what David had done? What is that he saith then, to thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight? (He answers) because thou only art without sin; he is a just pu­nisher who h [...]th nothing in himself to be punished; he is a just reprehender who hath nothing in himself to be repre­hended. Here you may see how holy and learned men (living near together about one time with St. Ambrose, men famous in their generations, and to whom the Church of Christ owes exceeding much for the propagation of the Gospel) gave their sense of this text of scripture as well as he; and St. Augustin was one who honoured St. Ambrose living and dead: yet you see varies from him in his judgment in this point. Give me leave to shew my sense of these words and then conclude. And first I will allow Mr. Hobbs his reading, to thee, which is not according to our translation, which is against thee; and certainly by men learned in the Hebrew both amongst the ancient and modern writers, with [Page 138] a great content it is acknowledged to be true; yet it pro­fits his cause nothing to read it as he doth; insomuch that Bellarmine in his Comment upon this Psalm, saith, To thee only have I sinned, he doth not say, against thee only; he had offended against Ʋriah, against Bathsheba, he had scanda­lized the people; but to thee only, as Judge, and none else can judge and condemn me, as he illustrates it. So that although Mr. Hobbs varies from his own rule of scripture, yet he gets nothing to his cause by it. But to proceed in ex­pounding; I ask leave and beg pardon of such eminent men from whom I may seem to differ; for my part, I do not think that David here acts the part of a King, or so much as thinks of his great Regality (if he did, it was to ag­gravate not to extenuate his sin) but of a penitent; and in his penitence is a pattern to other men, as well as Kings, how they should demean themselves; even Kings in those duties are reconciling themselves to their King, in respect of whom they are poor and mean people; and if they should consider themselves Kings, they should by this increase their humility, considering that he who owes so much to God should be so ungrateful and unmindful of him, The Prophet there­fore now considering his offence to God cryes out. To thee only have I sinned; before, Nathan the Prophet had visited him, and told him of his faults, he thought he had sinned only to man, and therefore to hide his first sin with Bath­sheba, he added another of murther, by which he thought his shame of the other might be hid from men, which was possible; but now clean contrary when he is acquainted with the wrath of God for his sin, now he cares not for his sin to men, so he may be right with God, and to that end penned this Psalm, to be sung in Churches; and to God utters those lamentable complaints; that he is besmea­red with blood; that his bones are broken; that he hath need of Gods great and many mercies; that his heart is broke, yea contrite; that he is all unclean and must be washed, and washed again; that he begs God to purge and make him clean, although with hysop and sharp medicines. Here is the perfect character of a true penitent; many a man is sorry for his sin, because it breeds him shame and [Page 139] wordly evil; but this doth him no good: but King David is grieved for sin because sin; because against Gods law which he hath transgressed; he cares not what this world thinks of him, so God be appeased and reconciled to him; and therefore that this may be done, he only begs his pardon and thinks only of him, To thee only &c. do thou acquit me, I care for nothing else. And surely, this is the most certain test of a true repentance, when a man grieves that he hath offended God, and values nothing but that offence; not that Bathsheba was a woman which he injured, but that he took the members of God and made them the members of an harlot; not that Ʋriah was a man, and that a gallant person, but that he was the Image of God, which he destroyed: those and the like meditations are the issues of true and hearty repentance; but yet consi­der, (as I have said before) these things were sins to God, and God is therefore offended with them because they are breaches of his laws concerning man with man in parti­cular; you may find this most emphatically expressed by Nathan in the pronouncing Gods sentence against David, where the punishment is proportioned to the offence, 2 Sam. 12.10. Now therefore because thou hast killed Ʋriah the Hittite with the sword of the Ammonites, as it was expressed in the 9. verse, therefore the sword shall never depart from thy house: then for his sin with Bathsheba, verse 11. and 12. I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of the sun, for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun. Then, because by this deed he had given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, his child by her was adjudged to death, as it is in the 14. verse. So that it is evident by his punish­ments that he sinned against men; and it is a most vain thing to collect from hence that a King can do no injustice to his subjects, for certainly it is injustice in a King to but­cher barbarously any man, which without danger he may save, how much more his own subjects which he is bound to preserve, and his vertuous subjects whom he ought to re­ward. I have been long in this: Mr. Hobbs hath another in­stance [Page 140] for the lawfulness of supremes to do any thing with­out injustice.

CHAP. XX. SECT. V. Mr. Hobbs his instance of the Common-wealth of Athens examined.

IN the same manner the people of Athens, when they ba­nished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice. The Athe­nians thought so; but doth Mr. Hobbs think so? For although he brings this for an argument to prove the arbitrary power which Supremes have over their Subjects lives, yet the scorn he puts upon it within few lines (which I shall speedily mention) shews his contempt of it; and no doubt, but the Athenians themselves, al [...]hough in the doing of it were delighted with such acts of power, yet when it was done, and the lack of such a worthy person to assist at the helme of the State, did make them sensible of the unhappiness of that act; they would repent of it and detest it, and find it is most unjust and im­prudent; unjust, because distributive justice ought with all ca­resses and politick blessings to reward vertuous men; but to banish them is a heavy punishment due to evil doers; and it is imprudent to banish such, for by that means the Common­wealth loseth his assistance and perhaps finds that man an unhappy enemy, who would have been a stedfast friend. He goes on. And yet they never questioned what crime he had done, but what hurt he would do, No, they never questioned what he had done, or what he would do; for how could Aristides (whose glory consisted in justice not in armes) be mistrusted to endeavour hurt to the state? for that vertue (which he was so honoured for,) is so far from destroying, that it is the very soul and life of a Common­wealth, or rather I may term it, the spirits, which under the soul act with every part in the performance of their se­veral [Page 141] duties, and where that is lacking, the inhabitants of a Common-wealth will be like walls built with loose stones without mortar, which with ordinary storms will fall asunder and perish. I will not trouble my self with the words which follow; briefly he instanceth in Ostracism which was used there, by which sometimes an Aristides was ba­nished for his vertue and justice; sometimes a scurrilous Jester as Hyperbolus. Let us consider this Ostracism, that is a legal act proper to that government, not a meer arbi­trary, but a legal priviledge granted the people, that when there was an occasion of any such danger, they had their votes in it. Now the proposition by him to be proved was that such an act as this might justly be done by the supreme only by his will, which can never by any Logick be inforced hence; and yet I can say further, that even the laws of for­raign nations may be censured by such as are not subject to them, and have been in all ages without breach of duty or civility. I joyn this therefore with that other Gre­cian city famous for its politie, that of Lacedaemon, in which it was one of the arcana imperii, that when their country Tenants grew too numerous, that they feared they might endanger the City, they would in a night go out, and slay thousands of them; this was a most barbarous thing, for subjects lives should be tender to Magistrates, and the lives of vertuous subjects pretious; and therefore I fear this Athenian custom of Ostracism is the worse, because an Aristides was worth thousands of common people, and therefore think such a law was most unworthy a wise state, and not fit to be acted in any, where there is no law for it.

CHAP. XX. SECT. VI. This paragraph, giving liberty to a person justly con­demned, to resist the execution of the sentence given against him, the grand incitement to rebellion; con­trary to the dictate of St. Paul, and practice of e­minent Martyrs.

I Pass from this to page (111.) In the midst of that page having discoursed of the liberty of subjects, how that they have right to any such thing which they have not passed away by covenant, he at the end of that page seems to give instances thus. If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to dis­obey. Truly in my judgement some pieces of this are great en­couragements to Treason; as that particle, to resist them who assault him. Certainly if a man may do it for his own defence, he may do it for others, who are men of a like condition in their humanitie, and it may be, in their sin; and then it must follow where are many guilty persons they may lawfully combine and stand to each other in their de­fence; and in order to that, do what mischief they can for their safety. Now St. Paul seemed to be of another mind when Act. 25.11. he told Festus, if I have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to dye; it is a sign of a rebellious spirit to resist authority, to which he should be subject; and for ought I know, the pretence of most rebelli­ons in the world, is their own defence, against imagined personal dangers. Had his doctrine be true, the Crown of Martyrdom had lost those thousands who filled the Roman Army, and could by this pretence have defended themselves; [Page 143] they chose rather to water and fructifie the seed of Gods word by their blood; they thought it an injust war, to defend their just lives; how much more in an unjust cause should men less dare to do it?

CHAP. XX. SECT. VII. Mr. Hobbs his institution of a Common-wealth again examined and censured. The absurdity and evil con­sequences of his doctrine.

WE pass now to his page 112. in the 7. line. Again, the consent of a Subject to Soveraign power, is con­tained in these words, I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions. I have already and I think fully treated of the follies, weakness and wickedness of this imagination of his heretofore, which he makes the foundation of his whole Poli­tiques. He proceeds; in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty. What an impious proposi­tion is this? that he who had before affirmed, that man by nature had right to any goods, any life, any thing which conduced to his own contented life before a Common-wealth was instituted, hath now, by these words which institute and give form and being to his doctrine of a Common-wealth; these, not liberties only, but licenses, but abominations must not be abridged or restrained. But mark his reason—for (saith he) by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my self when he commands me. So that it seems, the au­thorizing he speaks of is of the supremes actions, not his com­mands; and then surely his former proposition is not good, men are restrained by nothing of the Soveraign commands, where his own interest is personally opposed to it. If this be not insufferable doctrine in any well governed Common-wealth, I know not what is; for by this any man may act any thing which may conduce to his contented living; nay, [Page 144] what is more, he hath right to do it: and if so, what a condition would a Common-wealth be in? a King accord­ing to his doctrine may without injustice kill any man which he thinks fit, and a subject hath right to kill him when he thinks it conduceth to his good; for naturally every man hath this right by his doctrine, and so cannot be supposed by any contract to part from his natural right; all this is evident out of the beginning of the 14. Chap. where he defines the right of nature thus, The right of nature, which writers com­monly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say of his own life; and consequent­ly of doing any thing which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means to conduce thereto. And there is much more to this purpose, of which I have already treated in my notes upon that Chap. So that it is clear by his doctrine, That the constitution of a Common-wealth enables the Soveraign to act nothing by right, more than another man, because that constitution doth not restrain the right of nature, and the right of nature impowers every man to act any thing which shall appear to him for his particular advantage, by his Book: I shall treat no more of this now.

CHAP. XX. SECT. VIII. Mr. Hobbs his contradictions discovered and censu­red. His conclusions tending to disloyalty.

I Will step to the next paragraph; but first consider that in the beginning of this I last discoursed about, he saith, The consent of a subject to soveraigne power is contain­ed in these words, [I authorise, and take upon me all his actions. Now in this he saith, No man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself, or any other man; and consequently the obligation a man may sometimes have, (upon the command of the Soveraign) to execute any dangerous or dishonourable affair, dependeth not upon the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof, Mark, Reader, how immediately he contradicts himself, first his consent is con­tained in these words &c. Secondly it is not contained in the words but in the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof. He indeed put them both together in the preceding page towards the bottom of that page, and there you may find him telling what the end is, Namely the peace of the subjects within themselves and their de­fence against a common enemy. Now then since he gives the subject this latitude of interpreting the commands of his soveraign, it is not credible that he will judge his own ruine or hurt, or that of his Father, Wife, Children, dear Friends shall conduce to the peace of the subjects with­in themselves; so that there then he hath safe refuge for mischiefe by right, and he may refuse to obey upon such grounds as he speaks, and do it rightly.

CHAP. XXI. Liberty given to criminals to assist one another against the sword of justice, the greatest incentive to the late rebellion. The murther of Charles the first legitimated by Mr. Hobbs his conclusions.

I Wish my self at an end of this, but his gross errors make me stop at more particulars than I intended. Look down towards the conclusion of this page you shall find that at the beginning of that paragraph he concluded it unjust in the defence of another man to resist the sword of the Common-wealth. But (saith he) in case a great many men together have already resisted the soveraign power un­justly, or committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the libertie then to joyne together and assist and defend one ano­ther? Certainly they have; for they but defend their lives, which the guilty may as well do, as the innocent. Let the Reader consider here what a justification this was of those men who bore unjust armes at that time when he writ this book in English. It is true he allows the first rising to be unjust, but all that damnable prosecution of that war, even that act which I never think upon but with horror, the murther of king Charles the first was lawful by him, for when they had drawn their swords in rebellion, their lives were forfeited, and then all the future prosecution was just because in defence of their lives. I but page. 113. (where I am at the bottom of that paragraph) he gives a fair pretence for what he speaks: which is, The offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered, the plea of self defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful. A goodly piece of nicetie! if a soveraign do not give his subjects pardon for their re­bellion, [Page 147] they may continue on; and only the first act is unjust; all other murthers, rapines, iniquities of men are not to be reckoned in the catalogue of unjust actions; as if one sin preceding, which causeth the following, might also justifie them: and for offering pardon, he knows they have answered, that that cannot serve them, as long as there is power in the offended partie to make his revenge, and justifie his proceeding against them; and unless they take away that, there is no security for them. These things I thought to have passed by; but being so abomina­ble, it was necessary to lay hold upon them, at the least with this animadversion. And now I pass over twenty more, and leap to his 26. Chap. 148.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. I. Mr. Hobs his endeavour to render the Christian re­ligion suspected. Of the assurance we have of re­velations. The difference of assurance from the object, from the acts. Assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The assurance of faith greater than that of science. The assurance we have of the truth of Christian religion by divine revelation, from the things themselves revealed, from the manner of their delivery, and the persons who delivered them to us. The particulars of the crea­tion described by Moses, not possible to be known without divine revelation. An argument from reason to confirm the former assertion.

WHich Chap. is entitled of Civil laws, but treats of all laws, and divers distinctions of them, but in this page about the middle of the page he enters into a discourse of divine positive laws, which he distinguisheth [Page 148] from natural laws, that the one are eternal (I will cavil at no­thing) that is, he means, always consisting with men to whom they are given; the other had a beginning; the one are universal to all men that have humane nature; but (he saith) the positive are instituted in time, and to particular persons or nations, and declared for such by those, whom God hath authorised to declare them. But (saith he) this authority of man to declare what be these positive laws of God how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of laws, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God. I transcribe all this, because the reader by it should understand from what ground he raiseth two questions, which he answering unchristianly, will require a better satisfaction from my pen. The questions are these. How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? Two noble questions to be disputed against heathens, and because upon all occasions he takes advantage to make him­self seem such, (whether he be or no, God knows) I shall endea­vour to refute him; But withall give the reader this cauti­on that throughout his Book he violently forceth himself to such disputes as may render Christian religion suspected, as if he had an ambition to make this, Bable shall I say, or impious treatise of his, to be authentick; for what ne­cessity had he here to raise those doubts? It had been enough for him and his whole design to shew that the holy Bible had manifested those positive laws to us, and never to have raised such scruples whereby a man may doubt (as it seems he doth) whether these laws are divine or not. Consider therefore his answer for the first question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a revelati­on particularly to himsef, it is evidently impossible; and I answer it is possiible; we will try it out; and first let us consider this leading term for this discourse, which is [assu­red] how a man can be assured; the power of that word must be explained. There is a diversity of assurances, Ma­thematical, [Page 149] physical, moral, all which have their several force, and differ only by degrees. In the first kind we are assured that two and two make four; and the like; in the second that fire will burn, whose nature doth (if not hindred) break out into the act; in the third that when I see a debauched man stay with a company of drunkards a long time at a Tavern I can be assured that they will be inflamed with drink; so like­wise when a pious man hears the bell tole to prayers, he will go to Church. Thus our assurance is varied, accord­ing to the object which it is busied about. But there is another diversity drawn from the difference of this act, which produceth assurance; as thus, there is an assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The certainty of science is drawn from the certainty of the medium by which it is proved, and is exceeding great; by some esteemed greater than that of faith; at the least of a greater evi­dence; although for my part I am not of that mind; for it being a most clear and absolute truth that God is in­finitely verax as well as verus, true speaking, as well as true being, and faith (I mean divine faith) being an ad­hesion to what God speaks, it is not possible to be a falsehood, & then there is the greatest argumentative evidence that can be of the truth of such a proposition which God hath delivered: but I will not involve my self in niceties. That which is proper to my immediate discourse is, that science is, from natural op­perations, of natural causes; faith (divine faith) from supernatu­ral, from God; which must be more certain in it self, & by faith made more certain to us; opinion is only probable, which may be other; and this probability either relates to science, as it is probable such causes will produce such effects, or such effects proceed; from such causes or else it relates to faith, and it is then, when a good honest man speaks any thing, it is by faith probable to be true; but yet it may be otherwise; only divine faith admitts of no falsehood in its self, and requires no doubting or hesitation in us. Now although this assurance of opinion and probability be the least, yet it yields us such an assurance, as we build the greatest moral and politick actions (which are practised amongst us) upon it. As when a man is dead, his hand [Page 150] and seale passeth away his estate; witnesses are dead likewise; these are probable arguments only; but being the greatest that the subject question can yield, the greatest matters must be regulated by such probable arguments. I can say the like of oathes, they have neither a Physical certainty, nor do they produce a divine faith; but yet when we have hand and seal, and Oath, Mr. Hobbs will not say I think, that we have no assurance. How then can he say that we have no assurance that these are divine revelations, which are delivered in the Bible? (for that is the sence of the question which he proposeth) but that we have great assurance is that which I affirm. I shall not here meddle with School nice yes, nor with any thing about infused faith, but only the acquired faith, which we have of these truths. Many learned men have debated this question with great variety of Learning, which may be perused in their Comments upon the 3. of the sentences Dist. 24. as likewise many times in Prolog. and 22. of Aquinas, question, 1. as also in Ima. secundae, with many particular treatises to that purpose. I turn the reader to these places which with ease he may per­use, and find amongst them, what he reads not with me, who intend to deliver such things here, as they have scarce touched upon. My arguments shall be drawn, first from the things delivered in this book; Then from the manner of the delivery, and Thirdly from the persons who deli­vered these things; in all which I shall not meddle with those particular Books, or Chapters of Books which are controverted betwixt us and the Church of Rome; I think it incomparably handled by my much honoured and truly Re­verend Brother Iohn Lord Bishop of Durham; but my de­sign is to shew that the bulke of Christianity and our faith is delivered in such a manner, in respect of the things delivered, of the manner of the delivery, and of the per­sons who delivered them, that it is most rational for a man to assure himself that these were divine revelations, if it be not absolutely impossible that they should be other. I will begin with the things delivered; and first with the beginning of the Bible, the first book of Moses, the 1. Chap. of Genesis, where we find the Creation so delivered, [Page 151] as it was not possible for man to do it without revelation. Men might, and men have by reason (even Philosophers) guessed and proved that the world was created; but to say when, and set it down in such a method, as that a man may find the year in which it was done, this was never under­taken by any, nor could any man do it, but by divine revelation. Yet you may think, that Adam being made a perfect man, might know the instant when he first appear­ed in the world, and communicate that to Seth, and he downward: but could Adam, without revelation, know, that he was made of earth? Nay could Adam, without reve­lation, know, how Evah was taken out of him, or all the works of God which were wrought in the 6. dayes be­fore he was made? this could not be, this story of the Creation must need be a revelation, no man of himself could search it out. But I am afraid Mr. Hobbs will say, it is false; no Christian ever said it was so, but I suppose my self to have to do with an heathen, not an Atheist but a Theist at the best. Well then, it is most reasonable for any man to think, this story to be true; because it is rational for a man to think, that since God will and must be worshipped by men, and it is impossible for men to know, what wor­ship is proper to be given him, unless he tells them; It is then most reasonable for a man to think, that God will pre­scribe how that worship is to be performed, and therefore caused this whole book to be writ for mens instruction; and in it sets down this work of his creation, to shew man the foundation of all his duty, from whence it is derived, that he owes God his being, soul, and Body; that he should be humble, who was taken out of the dust, and to dust he must return, that he that made him can destroy him, and the like; which God being pretended to do no where else, it is most reasonable to think it is done here.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. II. The doctrine of the new Testament, and particularly the incarnation of our blessed Saviour, and the manner of it not possible to be known without a revelation. The truth of the incarnation evicted from the miraculous Life and Actions of our blessed Saviour, and the prophecies of the Old Testament, and especially of Isaias. The Jewes witnesses of the truth of the Books of the Old Testament.

SO then this being a truth fit for a man to know, it being impossible for man to know it without a revela­tion, a man may justly be assured that it was revealed by God, and so I will pass to the New Testament where we will consider the conception of the blessed Virgin as rela­ted there, and so not possible to be recorded, but from a divine revelation. Men might be assured from the Prophets who writ before of it, that there should be such a thing, and that it should be about that time; but that it should happen now, and that this should be the Virgin which should be the mother of our Saviour, that none could tell but by revelation, no not she her self. It is true, when she found her self with child, she might wonder how that should come about, since she knew not man; as she an­swered the Angel who foretold it to her Luke the 1. and the 24. but that it should be so contrived and perfected as it was by the overshadowing of the Highest, this she could not have known, but by a revelation. But I doubt Mr. Hobbs will answer this was not so, his wicked wit seems to imagine such a thing, I will prove it therefore by the glorious fruit of her womb, which shewed it self to arise from such a stock, and living and dying as he did, he could not be less than descended from such a supernatural generation. [Page 153] Well then, he was so conceived as is taught; and this could not be taught but by divine revelation, therefore he who taught it had divine revelation. I must not spend time in particulars; look upon all the Prophecies in the whole Book of God, so many, as their time is expired, we find them all fufilled; the Prophecies made to Abraham, of the children of Israels long captivity in Aegypt, and their extraction thence, and plantation in the land of Canaan, of all the great transactions of the highest affairs of the world; The erection and destruction of all the great Monarchies which were punctually fore­told and accomplished, and foretold long before; could these be foretold by any other way than by divine revelation? Cer­tainly it could not be; nor can the wit of man think how it should be done. Jaddus the high Priest shewed Alexander his own story foretold by Daniel. Let us consider how the Pro­phets long before prophesied of Christ, how the Prophet Isaiah writ like an antedated Evangelist, differing only in these words [shall and did] only in the time. Let us consider, how not only those great and remarkable passages, of his birth, his miracles, his death, his resurrection, (but even such little things as the piercing of his side, the parting of his garment, & casting lots for his vesture, his burial, were foretold hundreds of yeares before. Let Mr. Hobbs or any other heathen tell me how these could be foretold without divine revelation. But perhaps he will say, as before, these were not true books nor prophecies, but fained since Christianity. No, even the Jewes themselves yet remaining in the world do consent unto them, and are preserved by God, a glorious witness of these truths, who are the greatest enemies of Christianity.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. III. The former assertion further proved from the piety of the doctrines taught in the scriptures, and excellency of the matter contained in them. The power of the word of God, and efficacy of Scripture above the reach of Philosophie.

BUt then consider the doctrines taught here, they are so full of religious piety to God, so full of such excellent moral conversation betwixt men, that the wit of man could not invent them, there must needs be divine revelation in them; there was never any thing delivered by men, meer men, with­out divine revelation, that had not imperfections in it; he who reads the Philosophers may find it. I do not love to rake their Dunghills, and shew their filth; but the duties taught in this book are so divine, and so like God, from whence they came, that they are able to make a man absolutely good if practised. Wherefore as a tree may be known by its fruits, as the heart of man by his language; so these Books may be known to be Gods by the heavenliness of the matters delive­red in them; which have such a power of sanctity in them, as is able to make such as receive them of a more Godly dis­position than other men; yea than themselves, at o­ther times, before they received these doctrines. I could treat of a strange Metamorphosis in Saul to Paul, who was a persecutor, a destroyer, and when converted with this doctrine accounted it joy to suffer and be persecuted for this cause. As also of King David, who to hide the shame of his adultery, committed Murther, and slept securely in his sin; yet when awakened from that stupidity he was in, and taught his state by the Prophet Nathan, he cares for no shame of this world, so God be pleased, cares for nothing but the shame of his sin, and made his penitence for it to be chaunted out in all ages, for all Churches in the 51. Psalm. So that there is a strange power and force in the word of God [Page 155] to turn men to godliness, which no other hath; And the great and mighty effects wrought by this scripture, do fully evince it to be divine, having divine power annexed to them. Thus having shewed that the doctrines contained in scripture are fit for a man to believe they are divine, and by divine revelation, yea that they could not proceed from a pen which was not guided and assisted by the holy spirit, we therefore may have assurance that they were such. I shall come next to shew how we may be further assured from the manner of their delivery.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. IV. The second Argument from the difference of the Style of the Scriptures from the books of Philosophers. The propositions and conclusions in Scripture not so much deduced from reason, as asserted from the Majesty of God, not disputing or endeavouring to perswade, but commanding to do. The rewards and punish­ments proposed in scripture of eternal truth, impossi­ble to be propounded, or given but by God himself.

LEt a man look upon all the doctrines of the Philoso­phers concerning God, his essence, his attributes, con­cerning the Creation, we shall find that they laboured still to prove what they spoke, and by reason to convince mans understanding. Only I must confess, Trismegistus in his Pomander makes his discourse which is most divine to be revelation (and four ought I know it may be so, much of it) but otherwise they all go upon ratiocination; and the reason is, because such things ought not to be assented to which are not either proved or revealed by God, which is the most invincible evidence that any truth can have. But now Moses and those holy writers inspired by God in their compiling those holy Books only affirm this, and this with­out [Page 156] arguing the reasons of it, because they were divine, not humane words; likewise in all those moral duties, which concern men, they are writ with the majesty of the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Do this or this, not disputing, as Plato and Aristotle, how it conduceth to the present happiness, but exacting obedience. It is true when the Prophets disputed with the Gentiles, or Apostles with Jewes or Gentiles who believed not their report, they confuted the one by reason, or out of their own authors, and the other out of the former Scriptures; because all proofs must be made ex concessis, and out of such premisses they would con­firm these Conclusions. God exacted a belief, and this he doth with the greatest arguments and most forcing that are possible, by Praemium and Poena reward and punishment; but such as never King or Emperour either did or was able to propose, by eternal happiness or misery; which nothing can doe but God alone. And this is done to those who will receive, or not receive his word. Well, the words contained here are delivered with such an exaction as never man pro­posed the same truths in; and required with such promises, as never man did meet with nor could perform; we must needs therefore be assured they are divine.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. V. The third Argument from the sanctity and integrity of the persons who delivered these truths. The mi­raculous conduct of the Children of Israel by Moses. The objection of his assertation, of dominion, an­swered. The predictions of the Prophets not possi­ble without a divine revelation. The truth and cer­tainty of their predictions objected.

ANd so I come to the persons who delivered these truths to us, who will give us as full assurance as any thing else of [Page 157] the certainty. The persons were of most eminent integrity, and affirmed that these writings were delivered them from God. I will begin with the first. Moses a man who approved his con­versation with God, and Gods approbation of him by most cer­tain signs; first by those mighty wonders which he wrought in Aegypt before Pharaoh, & upon him and his in their journey; afterwards by his wonderful conduct of the Children of Israel through the wilderness, the like of which was never known; The bringing water out of the rock, feeding that mighty Host with bread and flesh; the miraculous stopping the mouths of Korah, &c. why should we imagine that this man should lye, and say, he received this law from God, when he did not? Yes, to make himself King among them. Indeed the rebells (last spoke of) did object that, but God confuted it by a miraculous destroying them, and we see although whilst he lived he went betwixt God and them, delivering prayers to God for them, and bringing Gods will to them, yet we find not that he acquired any high matters for himself; the Priesthood which was to be a perpetual dignity he put Aaron into; the Politique government he bequeathed to Josuah; and we do not find him contriving more than an ordinary proportion for his Children, which shews that he had no self end in any thing he did. Nay we may read in the 32. of Exodus, 10. when Moses interceded with God for favour to the Children of Israel, God made him answer, let me alone that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them, and I will make of thee a great Nation; Never­theless Moses was not bribed with this for his own interest to forsake Gods glory: but presently after presseth God for his own honour to have pitty upon the Israelites, as you may read vers. 11. &c. where methinks he did like Abraham offer his whole posterity to Gods glory and honour; which sheweth that Moses had no sinister ends in his actions, but only the glory of God; which certainly could not rise out of such a proud lye, as to take upon him divine revelations, where there were none.

Next let us consider the Prophets, they were men that adventured their lives and suffered miseries for those truths they foretold and taught; yea they were sure of it; and [Page 158] they who followed their counsels according to these revelati­ons which God made to them, it was well with them; and mischief followed them who did otherwise. Those things which they foretold did come to pass accordingly, both con­cerning the Jewes and all other nations, yea the whole world; why should not we be assured that these things came from God, which they say were revealed by him, since we see them true in all those works which they forespoke of?

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VI. Of the doctrine of the Apostles, the efficacy of their preaching; The power of Tongues, their sufferings and patience, not possible but from divine inspira­tion. A further assertion of the same argument à posteriori, such effect not producible but from a di­vine law.

IF we descend to the Apostles we shall find they were a sort of men of mean extraction and education; how could it be possible that they unless by revelation, should attain to such an efficacy of preaching, as to be able to convince the whole world, and preach this divine Philosophy? How came they by the power of Tongues to be able to travel through the world, and preach to every man in his own language, but by the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost? Why would they undertake the work through such cruel persecutions foretold them, that they should be as sheep amongst wolves, but that it was a duty enjoyned them from the Holy Ghost? and they were sure that he who promised it, would make good their reward in heaven hereafter, for here they were to have miseries. Truly I know not what can be opposed against this, but that both from the matters delivered, rom the manner that they are delivered by, and from the persons who delivered them, we have as great an assurance that these truths were [Page 159] revealed to them by God, as can be wrought by humane faith. Yea but let us consider further, and it is scientifical à posteri­ori, from the effect to the cause; for if it be not possible that these effects should come from any cause but God, as indeed I think it not possible, then it is demonstrated that these must be revelations, and we have a mighty assurance of them.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VII. Another argument, ad hominem, Mr. Hobbs his assu­rance of his being born at Malmsbury, not comparable to this of the verity of the holy scriptures. Some doubts of the place of Mr. Hobbs his birth, from the erring of his doctrines from Christianity. The attestation of the Gospel from the sufferings of the Saints and Martyrs. The encrease and continuance of it in despite of persecution. The Scriptures not possible to be written by bad men, in regard their design is to destroy the Kingdom of Satan. Good men would not obtrude a Lye upon the world. Faith resolved into divine revelation. The rest is a preparation to this faith, and conclusion of this point.

LEt Mr. Hobbs tell me, what assurance he hath of any thing? He saith in the beginning of this Book that he is Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury; I think he is as sure of this as of any thing; but I am much surer, and so may any man be, that this Scripture was writ by divine revelation, than he can be of that; first for his place, that he was of Malmsbury which is a town in Wiltshire, where Christianity is professed, where men are assured of the Scrip­tures that they are by divine revelation, How should it breed such a monster, who would bring all their hopes of heaven, their faith in Gods promises to be dubious? as if they were not promised. But he is Thomas Hobbs, how knows he that? perhaps his mother told him so, and the midwife; I know not [Page 160] whether after he came to the years of discretion, he ever talked with them; but if he did, it is but a weak Testimony in respect of ours which was and is affirmed by such divine and incomparable persons as the Apostles and Prophets were. His Mother, and the Midwife, although true persons, yet were apt to be deceived, and it may be he was a supposititious Child; how oft have such things been done? when contrariwise these men who have delivered infalible truths many ages before they came to pass, cannot be conceived to have any Error. I, but per­haps, he will say, he is like his father in his countenance, in his speech; certainly not so like, as these truths are to that incom­parable essence, which we call God; than which nothing more fully expressed these divine perfections, unless it was his perso­nal word. I, but his Christening is registred in the Church Book of Malmsbury, a good legal evidence; and perhaps he enjoyed his fathers estate by this; I know not, but certainly there is a possibility of Error in it, because the Church Book may be counterfeited, and many a man hath intruded into o­ther mens estates by unjust means; but our evidence is record­ed (may I say) or ingraven in these volumes which have been attested in every age since the first writing with the Blood of many martyrs; which can be affirmed of no Church Book in the world; worms and Cankers may eat them, and thieves may break through and steal them and counterfeit them, but these are subject to no corruption, but by the providence of God have been, and will be preserved so long as the world stands, and endures. So I think evidently that it appears that we have as full an assurance that these Scriptures are Divine, as men can have of any thing in this world which they re­ceive by hear-say. Nay let us go further, & examine whether we have not a Demonstration from the effect to the cause, we know such a man was our friend by his voice when he speaks, another by his style, as the report is of St. Thomas Moore with Erasmus, aut Erasmus aut Diabolus. Yea Critiques every where dis­cerne Authors by their Styles; may not we, think you, discern God by these heavenly writings, which are more than humane? When we hear a man discoursing of high points in Philosophy learnedly, we know such an effect cannot proceed from a Country-education at the Cart and Plough, it requires another study and industry. When the Scripture teacheth us [Page 161] things higher than the natural wit of man can reach to, as I have shewed it must needs come from a higher strain than our natural Condition could deliver to us. I will conclude with one word; The Scriptures must be writ by good or ill men; ill men could not do it, it teacheth those doctrines which destroy the Devil, and his Kingdom, all evil; if good men writ it, they would not lye to say they were inspired by God when they were not; they would not deliver such things for assured truths which none could know but God, if God did not teach it them. Upon these invincible Grounds I think I may say that we have a mighty assurance that these are divine revelations, which he wickedly affirms we have no assu­rance of. But it may be objected, if the demonstration be so evident, why do not all men receive it? for the under­standing is made after such a manner, as the Eye, when you shew it colours, the Eye must see them; so shew by demonstration a truth to the understanding, it must needs assent. For my part I do not apprehend that man hath liberty in his understanding to accept or refuse truths which are laid open to it, neither do I think that which is called liberum arbitrium is only a freedom of the will but a re­sult out of them both; however it is not in the under­standing alone, nor is this belief of ours that these things are revealed only an act of the understanding, but of the will which refuseth to heare the voice of the Charmer charme he never so wisely. Sometimes a malitious Will will not permit a man to study, and think of these argu­ments, which the more he studyeth, the more he will approve: sometimes when he hath studyed them it will make him seek further, and being not delighted with that reason which is proposed, it will not be satisfied with it; so that there is a submission to these reasons offered, which is necessary to our assent to them. And certainly that is much by such arguments as shew the happiness men have in being under Gods Government; for then men will seek what and wherein he will bless them, and when he finds that these Scriptures, and these only, are rational for a man to think are his own dictates, he will willingly [Page 162] submit to them. But contrariwise when a proud man shall think, that he and he only is faber not fortunae only but of his own happiness, and that he need not seek to God for assistance, then he sligh [...]s all these discourses and listens not to them. But still a man may say, it seems that resolution of our faith is into this way of arguing. I answer noe, our faith is resolved into the divine revelations, that God hath said this, or that; this is but a preparation for that foundation; when a wise and vertuous man tells me any thing, I believe it for the esteem of him, and that is my last resolution of that faith because such a man speaks it: but before this I must be prepared for this, with an ac­quaintance that this is such a man and I must know he speaketh it. These preparatoy Acts are necessary for the introduction of that Act of faith in him; but faith in him is the foundation of my belief in that sentence, it is evidently so in this Case, we believe these divine truths absolutely, and the last resolution of them is into this, that God hath revealed them; but yet it may be enquired, whether these Arguments be necessary to our assent to these divine principles, or not. Certainly to a man who should be converted from Paganisme, Ʋt prudenter credat, that he be not carryed about with winds of Doctrine, it is fit, he should have these or some other equivalent. Arguments to induce him to them: But to a man born in the Church, and bred up in the Christian religion, it is comfortable to his faith when he finds it attended with such invincible reasons, and he is able to understand them; But if not, simplicity of faith and obedience to God will be blessed by him. It will not be expected that I should engage in more niceties of this kind. I hope it appears that we have assurance of these divine revelations. It was therefore not only a bold, but impious and wicked affirmation of him to say it is evidently impossible for a man to be assured of the revelation to another without a revelation particularly made to himself. But he proceeds to answer some seeming proofes brought to affirm the assurance of these revelations, I will put them down in order and examine his answer. The first is drawn from miracles and is thus set down in the place last cited.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VIII. Mr. Hobbs his answer to the first proof retorted: Miracles defined.

FOR though a man may be induced to believe such reve­lation, from the Miracles they see him d,] that is the first Objection) he answers [Miracles are marvellous wores: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another] This answer of his (to speak ad hominem) doth not become him, as I shewed in my first piece page 19. He had said that Concerning the worlds magnitude and beginning he was content with that doctrine which the Scripture perswaded and the fame of these miracles which confirm them, the Countreys custom and the due reverence to the Laws. There you will allow Miracles to confirm them, that is the Scriptures, why now should you not be content with [...]hem? They are now, when you writ this, as good, as famous as evident, as they were then, when you writ the other. Well, we will examine the force of Miracles, and see what content they can give a a rational man; and before I go fur­ther, we will consider what we understand by this word Miracle. We do conceive a Miracle to be a work above the reach and power of nature, and extraordinary; not on­ly a strange and wonderful thing to the common observation of men, but above the power of all those things which God hath made produceable by natural causes, so that it is not on­ly strange that nature should do it, but impossible it should produce this effect, which is miraculous. And when I say This miraculous effect, I mean by it, not the work only, as [Page 164] to cure a lame man; (such a man perhaps may be cured by natural means physically applied) but to cure him at a di­stance, with a word speaking, is miraculous; and is a work beyond natures power: So that then we understand by a Mi­racle, what is either in its self or in the manner of doing be­yond Nature. The last term is extraordinary, there are ma­ny works beyond the power of Nature, which are ordinarily wrought by God in a most ordinate way, in an infallibly settled course, as they relate to Heaven; which are the giving his Graces to such as are penitent, or pray, or which observe their duties in the use of the Sacraments, with the like, which being ordinate by his sacred Covenants are most certain; and being so, although above Nature, yet are no Miracles be­cause certain and ordinate.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. IX. Miracles produced to confirm an untruth are a Lye, and blasphemy against God: This Proposition confirmed. Mr. Hobbs his confederacy with the Devil. Matth. 4.3. explained. Our blessed Saviours use of Mira­cles, for the confirmation of his Gospel. Mr. Hobbs his Logick desired. The apprehensions of men alter not the nature of Miracles.

THus the Nature of Miracles being explained. I think it appears clearly, that because nothing but the God of Nature who made this nature, and could have made another, can act beyond or beside that order which he hath settled things in; therefore he must needs be the Author of these effects which are above the reach of Nature, of which kind Miracles are. And thus if he should produce them for the confirmation of falshood, it would be as apparent a Lye, as any false Proposition delivered by words; which certainly were abominable blasphemy in any man to affirm.

The force of this Argument will appear from the Devil, who was and is as able a Logician as Mr. Hobbs; and al­though he dissemble and labours to make men believe there is no such thing; yet I doubt they two do underhand confe­derate too much together. Howsoever let us consider an Argument of the Devils, by which he required an assurance of our Saviour's being the Son of God, and consequently God, Matth. 4.3. where the Devil tempting him, said, If thou be the Son of God command that these stones he made [Page 166] bread. A man might have objected, suppose he should com­mand, and the effect follow, how would this prove him the Son of God? An Angel, or a meer man assisted by God might have done this. But consider now if he had done it upon the Question, and had not been the Son of God, be­cause it must be done by the extraordinary power of God, not by his ordinary power, therefore God in doing it must have confirmed a lye, which it is not possible for God to do, and upon the strength of this Argument of the Devils, we may be assured, that Miracles used to prove any Conclusion are an invincible Argument; for the Devil is abundantly able to dispute And therefore in the last verse of Saint Mar's Gospel, it is reported that after Christ had given Comm [...]ssi [...]n to the Eleven, they went forth and preached every where t [...]e Lord working with them, and confirming the word w [...] signs following; where we may observe as the Devil urged it for an Argument, so our Saviour used it for an Argument in the planting of the Church; which is enough for proof of this Conclusion, that the Miracles wrought by our Saviour and his Apostles here, were such Arguments as did enforce be­lief of what they spake I could expatiate in this noble Theme of Miracles, and fall upon divers most Scholastick discourses; but rather chuse to apply my self close to him who answers, [That what is wonderful to one may not be so to another.] The force of which answer lies in this, (That there may be many counterfeit Miracles, which may appear true to one and may be found false by another; and therefore because men may be deceived they have no assurance from them. To this I can say that Mr. Hobbs is not so good a Lo­gician here as the Devil; for the Devil disputed from the real force of the Argument, but Mr. Hobbs draws his Answer from the apprehension of the Hearer or Spectator; when it thunders man a man is busie & hears it not, Doth it not there­fore thunder, because he doth not hear it? The Sun ariseth and shineth out in the morning when I am in bed and see it not, Doth it therefore not shine because I discern it not? When a man who hath weak Eys or troubled with the Jaundice comes into a Room, many colours are there which he perceives [Page 167] not; or if he do, they appear yellow to his Eyes, Are they therefore yellow? But this and no other is his consequence against Miracles, because some apprehend them not, there­fore they are not, or do not send out that proof which na­turally flows from them. Many fallacious Arguments are used; (He hath used many,) and because they are fallacies, Are therefore perfect Demonstrations not good? His An­swer therefore is not Logical in saying that these things ap­pear marvellous to one, which do not to another. Let a man consider the possibility, or rather impossibility which Nature hath to do such a work, and if he be not learned enough to discuss with a Cause, let him consult with Learned men who are able to judge of it, and he shall by that find whether God hath in an extraordinary manner any hand in it or no; but the Answer which he makes may be returned to all Arguments, whatsoever one understands another doth not therefore they are not good, nor give assurance. And [...]o I have finished the first Argument which he framed against himself and answered weakly.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. X. Mr. Hobbs his second Argument examined; The truth of Divine revelation to the Apostles, asserted from the gift of Tongues.

AND I pass to his second Argument and Answer, which is at the bottom of that page; and the Argu­ment is drawn to prove that these were Divine revelations from the Sanctity of the Persons who delivered it. He an­swers that [that may be feigned.] I reply, It is improbable, which were enough: but I think I may go further and say it is impossible: for the first clause, that it is improbable, we may discern Reason for it. First, in the Persons the Apo­stles who delivered these Revelations, and affirmed they were such, it is not probable they should be counterfeited; all counterfeiting is for some end, some worldly end (for a man cannot think to get Heaven by counterfeiting and lying) but the Apostles could have no worldly end in what they did, the asserting of these Revelations being the ready way to miseries and unhappiness, which was fore­told by their great Master, our most blessed Saviour. We have seen in this distracted world in which we have lived, now and then a man proud with an imagined Enthusiasme, persevere in an abominable lye even to death: but for so ma­ny to do it, and suffer for the relation of the same story, it cannot be imagined. And then consider that they were men blessed by God, in having these Revelations, and the relating them: I say relating them: for because the Doctrine was to be divulged to all Nations by them, God assisted them with the gift of Tongues, by which they were able suddenly to re­late in their own Language to every Nation the wonderful things which concerned their salvation; And from hence I will draw the impossibility of their feigning their san­ctity in the delivery of these Revelations; for as the Re­velation was from God, so the very delivery of them [Page 169] by the power of Tongues, was from God, who cannot countenance and make good a lye; But yet certainly al­though their might be a possibility of being other, (I grant that for Arguments sake which I allow not) yet when there is no probability of the contrary, we have great assurance of that truth and his answer is most wicked, as well as weak drawn from a possibility of feigning and counterfeiting in the Apostles.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XI. Mr. Hobbs his third Argument from the wisdom of the Apostles confirmed: The miraculous consent of men to the revelations published by them; An Argument from the propagation of Christianity against the opposition of the whole world: A serious application and vow for Mr. Hobbs his conversion.

A Third Argument which he endeavours to put off, is drawn, from the extraordinary wisdome, or extraordi­nary felicity of his actions, all which (saith he) are marks of Gods extraordinary favour. His answer to this is at the bot­tom of that page thus, The visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason, that a­nother has had a supernatural revelation of Gods will but on­ly a belief, everyone (as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser) a firmer or weaker belief. Thus far he. I now answer to the first, which concerns their wisdome; I do not remem­ber that I have read the wisdome of these men to be produced for proof of their revelations; yet because he has put it down and given one answer to it, I will urge something for it, that it was and is a great convincing argument, that such poor igno­rant illiterate fishermen should attain, or rather be en­dued from above with such wisdome, as to be able to confute the greatest and best studied Philosophers, and reduce them to [Page 170] consent to their revelations; this must need prove that these men were assisted by some knowledg above Nature. But let that pass since he makes no answer: but for the other, the suc­cess of Christianity, that is a most rational argument; and his answer confutes himself, for whereas he saith [the visible felici­ties of this World are most often the work of God by natural & or­dinate causes] I retort it to him, that the felicities of this world hapning to these men were nothing but that general propaga­tion of the Gospel, which was wrought against the force and power of all natural causes; all the Emperours, Kings, and Princes of this World fighting against, and suppressing it, with all the force and tyranny which they were able to use, so that their strength grew by oppression, & Sanguis Martyrum was Semen Ecclesiae. And M. Hobbs cannot think, that that was a natural seed. And so I will conclude this discourse for this time, hoping that God will so assist him that he may see his own error, and with his own hand blot out all these un­worthy doubts which he hath cast upon Christianity.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XII. Mr. Hobbs his second Question propounded, and dis­cussed; his assumption not clear; the Argument changed and the Reader eluded by him. His manifest declension of the divine positive Law, and imposure of humane Laws in opposition to them, censured. The Law of Nature commands obedience to the positive law of God. The pretensions of all Nations to divine institution, ob­served.

ANd here I thought to have knocked off with the satis­faction of the first Quaerie; but as I said before he made two enquiries, the first concerning the assurance of these revelations; I have spoke to that. The second is [how a [Page 171] man can be bound to obey the Laws so revealed] This (he saith,) is not so hard, for if the Laws declared be not against the Law of Nature, which is undoubtedly Gods Law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act. Thus far Mr. Hobbs: but indeed he utters (in my judgment) a most ob­scure doctrine, [...]r if clear, he speaks very weakly. 'Tis ob­scure, for although the Law of Nature do oblige, yet it is not apparent to every man, what this Law of Nature is; no not to learned men; for in many cases it is disputed, vvhether such or such actions are according to the Lavv of Nature or no; And therefore although the major proposition be un­questionably true, that the Lavv of Nature is instituted by God, yet the assuming of a Minor to it, [this is the Lavv of Nature] may be full of dispute, and from thence it vvill be hard to conclude. Again consider, that vvhen the questi­on vvas put in the former page, it vvas concerning the obe­dience to the revealed lavvs of God, hovv a man may be bound to obey them, of vvhich he affirmed that vve could have no assurance, and that I have immediately before re­futed: but novv his vvhole discourse runs upon mans obe­dience to humane Lavvs. Thus the Notion and Conceipt shuffled and changed, a Reader is distracted, and vvhilst he finds something seemingly proved, he thinks the undertaken proposition is clear: for vvhere hath he satisfied, yea but seem­ingly, this Question, How a man can be bound to obey the Revelations? But (saith he) if he undertake to obey a Law which is not against the Law of Nature, he is bound by his own Act. That is, that Act by vvhich (he saith rather than thinks) he instituted a supreme, and that Act only reflects up­on humane Lavvs established by the supreme vvhich he insti­tuted. But I do not finde this expressed there in that lati­tude he novv formes it, but rather I thought that he vvould have supposed that the supreme should be obeyed in such things as cross not the Lavv of God vvhatsoever, either na­tural or positive, but it seems novv he must be obeyed in all vvhich is not against the Lavv of Nature onely; he vvould have the Scriptures and positive Lavvs laid aside. By this if a King shall command us not to be baptized, not to [Page 172] receive the Communion, or, like Darius not to pray to God, for a certain time, not to repent &c. (vvhich are not acts of the Lavv of Nature, but positive Lavvs) vve should not doe them, vvhich must needs be most odious to any Christian man. But indeed had not Mr. Hobbs distinguished these tvvo the positive, and natural Lavvs of God before in the former page, and raised these doubts, to disgrace the po­sitive laws of God, I could have answered that there is no Law more Natural, than that we should obey the positive Laws of God; for he being the supreme power, must needs have that authority to make Laws for the government of men; and this is universally received. All Nations in the World pretend to have divine Laws for their direction, I mean, positive divine Laws; onely Mr. Hobbs denyeth it clearly in this place. Let us examine what follows.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XIII. Obedience founded upon the belief, or acknowledgment of his power that commands. Mr. Hobbs his complacency in quarrelling with Religion. The want of reason in his proofs discovered, and censured. Faith commanded by God, urged by promissory and penal Laws. The dread­ful punishment of such as believe not, or disturb other mens belief with frivolous arguments. God the search­er of hearts and punisher of evil thoughts contrary to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine.

HE is bound, saith he, to obey it but not bound to believe it. A strange proposition: for take his particle [i] how you please, for obedience to divine or humane Laws, he can be bound to obey none, when he hath no belief: for he cannot have an obligation to divine Laws, unless he believe they are given by God, nor can he perform obedience to humane [Page 173] Laws, unless he have a belief that they are made by the su­preme power. So that obedience in all kinds supposeth a belief of that authority which commands. But again con­sider, what he means by this word, belief, He is bound to o­bey, but not to believe. Certainly (as I said,) he must believe the authority that commands, and 'tis as true, that he must believe that that authority commands this Act, or else he can have no ground for his obedience. This man had a mind to be quarrelling at Religion, but could not find ex­pressions to do it. But he proves his conclusion, for (saith he) Mens belief, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God ordinary, or extraordinary. The vainest and weakest Argument that e­ver was urged. First, in Logick it cannot follow; because they are subject to the operations of God, they therefore are not subject to commands, as Charity, and all the restraint of exorbitant lusts are subject to his operations, are they not therefore subject to commands? This is a pitiful infe­rence, but then consider further; that faith, and the cogitati­ons of men are commanded by God, that faith is com­manded first, Heb. 11.6. Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him. Now it is necessary that he who requires us to come, must in that exaction require such things as are necessary to ob­tain it; and therefore faith without which Heaven cannot be attained. And God hath given a blessed promissory Law that he will bless such as do believe; and penal also, that he will punish such as do not believe. For the first, John 3.15, 16. Whosoever believeth in him, (that is in Christ) should not perish but have eternal life. The same is added in the 16 verse. God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not pe­rish but have everlasting life. Here is a Law made concern­ing happiness, an eternal Law concerning an eternal life, all terms indefinite. The same is repeated in the 18 verse of the same Chap. but with the addition of the penal Law, He that believeth not is condemned already. As likewse our [Page 174] Saviour, Mark 16.16. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not, shall be damned; and this is no more but a promise performed by God, which was made Deut. 18.15. urged by St. Peter Acts 3.22. A Pro­phet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your Bre­thren, like unto me, him shall you hear in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you. (v 23.) And it shall come to pass that every Soul which will not hear that Prophet shall be destroyed from among the People. Let Mr. Hobbs and his Followers read these three words and tremble, Condemned, Damned, Destroyed who believes not, &c. What shall such be who have not only this privative infidelilty, but a positive, which opposeth and disturbs the faith of such as do be­lieve, with foolish and unnecessary Arguments? Faith is commanded and exacted by God, upon a dreadful penalty. So likewise John 3.23. This is his commandement that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ. There in express terms, this belief is commanded: and as I have shewed, obedience could not be given to other Laws, if faith did not preceed, which is the first step towards Heaven. I need not speak of other cogitations of the Heart, as Pride, Self-conceitedness, Covetous, desiring others goods, &c. are all prohibited by God, and he will punish them. Mr. Hobbs was therefore to blame very much in saying that faith and the interiour cogitations are not subject to Gods commands; had they been humane Laws of which he spoke it had been somewhat to the purpose: men cannot know, and therefore cannot punish the interiour cogitations, and so not make Laws for them; but God knows and searcheth the heart and reins, and will punish them, and therefore it is fit for him to give commands concerning them.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XIV. External and inferiour Acts subject to divine regulati­on. Faith, the fulfilling of that Law which com­manded it. Vain-glory and fear equally impeding practical Faith.

BUt it seems there is more in this argument of his, where he saith, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. I have spoken somewhat to this a little be­fore, where I shewed that other vertues which cannot be denyed to be commanded, are subject to the operations of God, who worketh both to will and to doe; who creates and preserves: and although he gives the will, yet if he goe not on in the operation, it will never come to per­fection; so that by this consequence God can command nothing because he cooperates in the performance. He pro­ceeds with the same proposition, in other terms, and I will follow him. Faith of supernatural Law (saith he) is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same. Faith of that su­pernatural Law (which concerns Faith) must needs be a fulfilling of it, (if it be such as is according to the Law of Faith, as St. Paul phraseth it Rom. 3.27) But only (saith he) an assenting to it. What if it be but only an assenting to it, (yet I can shew other operations of faith besides that) yet if that assenting be the act which God re­quires in his command of faith, faith is the fulfilling of that Law which exacts it. And yet give me leave to add one note more, Although faith were a meer act of the un­derstanding, an assent (as he terms it) yet because this assent is impeded by many vices in the Soul, which untill they are mastered, the Soul cannot break out into a full and com­pleat assent unto the divine propositions, it comes in regard [Page 176] of them under this notion of a command. You may ob­serve, John 12.43, 43. Nevertheless among the chief Ru­lers many believed, but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the Synagogue; for they loved the praise of men, more than the praise of God. Mark, in this they are said to believe, being convinced in their understandings of the truth of the doctrine, they had a credulity of the things, but vain-glory hindred them from practising accordingly, the praise of men; as likewise a wicked love of it, and I may add another passion, fear, out of that Phrase because of the Pharisees, i. e. because they feared them; and it is the same which he speaks of the Parents to him who was cured of the blindness, John 9.22. These words spoke his Parents because they feared the Jewes. These words, that is, that shifting of the con­fession of Christ; so that unworthy fear, love, pride, are impediments to faith. I know it may be objected here, that it is spoke of the confession of faith, not the act or habit of faith; and these other things may hinder these outward acts of faith which do not choak its being, and nature. I answer, it is true; but withall it cannot be a true and right faith which is ashamed, or afraid to express it self; for a true faith of divine perfections, is such as must be­lieve the divine perfections infinitely excellent, and his veraci­ty so likewise; and therefore he must needs be confident that when he honours him, God will bless him, and so can­not fear any thing in this world. This I hope may suffice for the satisfaction of the Reader in this.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XV. Faith a duty to God against Mr. Hobbs his assertion; his constant endeavours to asperse the duties of Chri­stianity. Miracles the ordinate means of faith. The use of the means necessary to the attaining of the end.

HE goes on, and saith, And not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth. Faith is not a duty which we exhibite to God! such a language as was never heard from a Chri­stian, no not from a Jew, a Turk, or an Heathen if he were not an Atheist. If he thought there were a God, he must needs think that faith is due to him. Who would fear him, trust in him, if he doth not believe his promi­ses and threats? If he think he is the chief good, he must think him true in all his sayings; that they are according to his intentions; and that he is able to make good what he intends. Who can honour him, but he that believes he is, or would honour him but he that believes he is a re­warder of them who seek him? It is the duty which he who hath, cannot lack the rest; and he who hath not, doth no­thing upright. But it seems he utters his mind clearly in this sentence which he did more obscurely otherwhere, la­bouring throughout this discourse to weaken our faith. Well let us go on, but, saith he, it is a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth: what therefore no command concerning it? he may say the same of Hope and Charity; and indeed of all the things of this World; the Earth is the Lords, and all that is in it, and to whom he pleaseth he giveth it, but is there therefore no command concerning these things? Consider, Reader, that although faith be Gods gift, yet God gives it according to those rules which he [Page 179] hath set down: faith is introduced by hearing, by such setled wayes as God hath appointed to produce it: and there­fore I do think that no man living can shew me faith, where that faith was not wrought by God in his ordinary way of working: and therefore one part of his distinction which he used before, either by Gods operation ordinary or extra­ordinary, might have been spared, if applyed to the immedi­ate operation. I know the conversion of St. Paul may be objected, and the like, where God wrought his faith by a miraculous manifestation of himself to him: yet consider that the conversion of St. Paul was produced immediatly by that miracle which was in a most setled course of Gods working b [...] hearing and seeing; for hearing the word, or reading it, seeing some vision, or miracle, are most ordi­nate means by which God bestoweth that blessing upon his servants, by preaching, by visions, by miracles. And I do not believe that any man in the world can perswade me that he hath a right and religious faith, who never heard or saw any thing which did perswade him to it. Again, consider that there are three things, which make a gift profitable be­sides; the giving, the receiving and the right use of it: the first only concerns God, the two latter men. Now suppose that the Sun (which alone can do it) should shine, if men will remain in their prison, keeping the doors and windows shut, they shall not be able to see by that gift of light; yea if he open the windows of his house, and shut those of his body, he shall not see. Out of these ariseth the faultiness of infidelity, that men shut out that means which God gives them to believe; they will not hear or read the word of God, they scorn his miracles, and all those glorious reve­lations which have been made to his servants. When the hands of God are open to give, and the hands of men not so to receive, and when he sows his seed of righteousness, and the pleasures and the cares of the World choak it, then the duty of faith is subject to a command although given by God.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVI. Ʋnbelief the greatest breach of Gods Law. St. John 3.18, and 19. explained. The justice of God in the con­demnation of men for want of faith. The case of Abraham, Genesis 17.10. elucidated. The power of Parents asserted.

HE proceeds, As also unbelief is not a breach of any of his Laws, but a rejection of them all. This was witty, and a good way of arguing; contrariorum eadem est ratio, contraries do illustrate one the other. But consider Reader, is not the rejection of a Law, a breach of a Law? Suppose a man should think (as some have) that no su­preme hath power to make Laws for life and death; he steals, and by the Law concerning Thievery, is to be execu­ted; doth his rejection of that Law make his felony no breach of that law, which is against it? Certainly it is the great­est breach, it tears the Law in pieces; and is the greatest vio­lation of it that may be. To this purpose our Saviour most clearly, John 3.18. He who believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the Name of the only be­gotten Son of God. So that according to Mr. Hobbs his Tenent here is a condemnation, but no just one, because, not for the breach of some Law. There must be therefore some divine Law exacting faith, which this infidelity doth break. But then Mr. Hobbs would reply to our Saviour, that faith is a gift, and why dost thou punish me for the want of that which is only a gift? Read the 19 verse, and our Savi­our doth answer him, And this is the condemnation that light is come into the World, and men love darkness rather than light; the light is the light of faith, and Gods graces which he gives to men, by which they may apprehend di­vine truths: which yet they do not, because they love dark­ness rather than light; love not this light of faith, which [Page 180] discovers to them the obliquity of their sinful worldly de­sires. So that it is apparent that although God gives this light, his grace; yet men preferring the world before it, it is unprofitable. This was the case of these Jews which our Saviour spoke to, Iohn 5.44. How can ye believe which re­cieve honour from one another, and seek not the honour which cometh from God. So that mens preferring worldly things before the things of God, causeth them not to re­ceive or make use of Gods revelations. But Mr. Hobbs hath Scripture for what he writes, Gen. 17.10. This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee, and thy seed after thee Now (saith he) Abrahams seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should de­clare to them for Gods Law. It is true (what he saith) that Abrahams seed had not the revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party in this Covenant. But what can be deduced further from this, than that which is the or­dinary condition of contracts? A man gives his estate to a­nother, and to his posterity for ever, upon a condition that they shall pay such and such acknowledgments, which if they perform that estate shall be theirs; but if not, the con­tract shall be void. Yes, saith Mr. Hobbs, there is more, they are bound to obey whatsoever Abraham should declare for Gods Law I see nothing in these words which enforce any such thing: but only the observation of circumcision: thi [...] God calls his Covenant, being a sign thereof, and this Covenant consisteth in this, that God would be Abrahams God, and his seeds after him, and that he would give them the Land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. The meaning of all which, was, that he would in near and dear respects fa­vour and protect them, as you may read in the 7 and 8 verses of that Chapter. So that here in this is no more implyed, but that if they observe circumcision God would bless them; there is no mention of accepting for Gods Laws whatsoever Abraham should deliver; and therefore he might have spared his following discourse [which (saith he) they could not be but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who [Page 181] (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have soveraign power over their Children and servants. This I say might have been spared, for if the Cove­nant went no further than I have expressed, (as without doubt it did not) there needs no soveraign power to be forced to it. But I am of his mind that they who are Parents, (where is no other established soveraignty) have that supreme power over their children and servants: which one conclusion will confute the whole body of his Politiques, as I intend to shew hereafter.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVII. The obedience of Abrahams Family to Gods Laws, depen­ded upon that to him, as Father of the Family. Mr. Hobbs his consequences drawn from this proposition not rightly deduced. His constant varying from the English translation observed, and censured. Reason a­gainst former deductions. The intire obedience of the Israelites to the dictates of Moses, rather from the conference of his divine inspiration, as a Prophet, than his soveraign power. The Authority of scrip­ture depends not upon the declaration of the soveraign. The worshippers of Baal not excused from the com­mand of the King of Israel. The reasons of Mr. Hobbs his former assertion disproved. The com­mands of the soveraign justly opposed, when contrary to the Christian faith. Mr. Hobbs his Atheistical conclusions censured.

BUt he hath another piece of Scripture which you may read, Gen 18.18, 19. Again where God saith to A­braham, In thee shall all Nations of the Earth be blessed: for [Page 182] I know thou wilt command thy Children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteous­ness and judgment; It is manifest the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Soveraign. Thus far Mr. Hobbs. I answer, 'tis true that this obedience of Abrahams family to himself, de­pends upon their filial obedience to him as their Father, and his commanding them depends upon his soveraign power o­ver them as their Father But what? can it be collected hence, that if Abraham had commanded dishonest things, i. e. such actions as were against any will of God, revealed any other way to them, that they should have obeyed him? Certainly no; nay, the contrary is here intimated, for there­fore God promised to bless him and his posterity, because he did know that Abraham would command them vertuous things, to keep the way of the Lord. But mark here, Mr. Hobbs still varyes from the English lection, and that to the worse; for it is not what he writes, to keep, but, he will command them, and they shall keep the way of the Lord. So that the sense is; because God foresaw his fatherly care, and their filial duty in these righteous actions, he would bless them. He prosecutes this conclusion with another Scrip­ture thus; At mount Sinai, Moses only went up to God, the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared unto them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Exod. 20. Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us lest we die? By which two places, (saith he) it sufficiently appears that in a Common-wealth a Subject that has no certain and assured revelation, particularly to him­self concerning the will of God, is to obey for such the com­mand of the Common-wealth. (That is, by his Logick, the soveraign of the Common-wealth.) How this conclusion can be drawn out of these two places of Scripture, I cannot i­magine. Why it should not, I shall give these reasons. First, that although these two particular cases were to be under­stood, as he conceits; yet they are but particular cases, which concerned those only affairs which were under their proper [Page 183] management; and there is no one word which points at them, to make them presidents for others, or to give an uni­versal rule for all others. Secondly, whereas he saith that in a Common-wealth a Subject should do thus (as he sets down in one of his instances,) to wit, that of Abraham, there was no Common-wealth; setled, but only a noble family; many things may be proper to a family, which are not for a Common-wealth nay indeed the government of the Israe­lites under Moses was, as yet, not a pefect established Com­mon-wealth, but only in fieri, the Common-wealth was in moulding, the Laws for the government were in making. Then consider, in Moses his case (for I have writ enough concerning the other the People said they would hear Moses; and good reason for it because they discerned that he had conversation with God; that Gods terrour was so great that no man durst injure him by doubting his Laws, who had such near converse with God, as he had, when called up to the top of the Mount; and therefore might be trusted on his relation. And therefore it seems their promise of hearkning to whatsoever Moses should deliver for Gods Law, was to him, as a Prophet, rather than as a King; which indeed was (in that regard) more to be considered. And certainly those dictates of the holy Scripture for our practi­ces which are delivered by King David or Solomon, have not that great obligation upon us as they were Kings, but Pro­phets; nor are the books which are Scripture and comman­ded to be so received amongst us, therefore of divine au­thourity, because Kings declare them to be such; but con­trariwise, Kings declare them to be such, because they are such. And, (good Reader) consider further, that this reason of Mr. Hobbs might have excused all the worshippers of Baal: all the idolatries and abominations committed in the reign of Jeroboam, and the rest of those wicked Kings over Israel. For if the People were to receive that, and that only for the word of God, which their supremes authorized, then they authorizing those, and only those commands which were directed to those impieties, were so to be accepted and obeyed, unless they had particular revelation (which [Page 184] in general, the common people never had) and then how could God justly punish them for violating those Laws which he had given them (as he did often) when their Kings exacted otherwayes? But he gives reason for what he hath delivered; for (saith he) if men were at liberty, to take for Gods commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams, and fancies of private men; scarce two men would a­gree upon what is Gods commandements; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the commandement of the Common wealth. Alas poor man, what a dream and fancy hath he vainly uttered! this is like to what he affirmed before, that we have no assurance of revelations, unless we had par­ticular revelations our selves. And what I opposed to that will serve for this; Were all those Councils, all those Fathers, all the consent of the Christian Church, nothing but dreams? all the blood of holy Martyrs nothing but fancies? yea the blood of Christ whereby he hath subdued all the Kings of this Christian World, nothing but dreams and fancyes? which yet are those Medium's by which men oppose Kings, (and ought to do it) when they command contrary to our Chri­stian Faith. Certainly Mr. Hobos said right when he affirm­ed, That private men must not oppose their dreams or fancies to the Laws of the Land wherein they live. But under that Notion, he doth amiss, when he terms our assent to the revealed vvill of God (clearly and intelligently apprehended) a dream or fancy. But because he terms it the Lavv of the Common-vvealth, vvhich hath some sense according to his impossible principles, viz. That the supreme represents the vvhole, I vvill tell him it is a phrase of speech never used by any Author before: for a Common-vvealth consists in the ordination of all the members of it, supreme and inferiour; the supreme is soveraign, the inferiour are subjects; but by a common vvealth here he only understands the soveraign. But let us proceed vvith him; out of the former confuted pre­misses he dravvs this conclusion: I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Moral Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature) all subjects are bound to obey that for di­vine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Laws of the Common-wealth. [Page 185] Certainly the Moral Lavv, or the Lavv of Nature, doth not bid us be baptized, or receive the holy Com­munion, nay it doth not command us to make a profession of our faith in Jesus Christ. The Law of Nature did not command Daniel, Shedrack, Meshack, and Abednego, to refuse the voluptuous meat which Nebuchadnezar allowed them, and fed upon pulse and water; but the fear that they should break the Law of God by obeying the King; I mean, the positive Law which God had not writ in their Natures, but in Tables; so that this conclusion of his was most Heathenish.

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVIII. Mr. Hobbs his further reasons to prove the former as­sertions examined and censured. His diminution of the authority of the divine positive Law, and constant vilifying of scripture censured. The Law of Nature restrained by the divine positive Law. Obedience in Religious dutyes not founded in the command of the soveraign, but of God. The perswasion of the Turks, that the Alcoran contains the Law of God, not the command of the Grand Signiour causes their confor­mity to it. The difference betwen the commands and acts of Christian Princes, and their subjects, from those of other Religions. All other Societies, as that of Theeves, illegitimate combinations. Mr. Hobbs his doctrine abhorrent to Christianity.

BUT he labours further to prove it. Which also (saith he) is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not a­gainst the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the Name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is no [Page 186] reason men should be the less obliged by it, when it is propound­ed in the Name of God. I answer, that whatsoever is not a­gainst the Law of Nature, may be made Law by God, i. e. his positive Law; but many Laws are limited, not only by Gods Laws of Nature, but his positive Laws likewise, which have as great force as the other to whomsoever they are revealed. (Now I am in the 150 page) let the Reader consider again, how he takes occasion to lessen the authority of Scripture. I am perswaded he can produce no Christian writer from our Saviours time downward, that ever delivered so unworthy a conceipt of the positive Law of God: it is as if he should say, we should obey a Constables command against the Kings command by Statute; for the difference is much less betwixt the King and a Constable, than betwixt the greatest King in the World and God. The common Law which I con­ceive to be an unwritten tradition, is like the Law of Na­ture, the Statute Law like the positive Laws: It is lawful (not considering a statute) for a man to act any thing not against the common Law, but if a positive, i e. a statute Law in­tervene, it is no longer lawful by any private power to act that, which otherwise had been lawful. Thus until a po­sitive Law of God interpose, whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature is lawful; but when that positive Law is manifest, it is necessary that that likewise be obeyed; and no humane Law of mans making can have right to dispense with it. He proceeds [besides, there is no place in the world, where men are permitted to pretend other commandements of God, than are declared for such by the Common-wealth. Chri­stian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth 'tis e­quity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternal Law of God, that every man equally enjoy his Liberty.] Here is an Argument drawn à facto ad jus; Because this is done, therefore it is rightly done; and an equal weight put upon the acts of Heathens, and worshippers of the Sun, Moon, &c. with that of Christians who only worship the true God. As if because Kings justly punish those who violate [Page 187] the Laws of those Kingdomes which they are intrusted with, therefore Thieves justly may destroy such as break the Laws of their Combination, when indeed the first are just, but the other most unjust The case seems to be the same here; for all those are combinations of Thieves, who rob God of his due honour required by him, & the Christians only act by the Law of God. So that here we may discern a great difference in the right of the two actings of the Chri­stian and the Heathen; but then consider what is the ground of them both, we shall find it different from what Mr. Hobbs delivers. He conceiveth the reason to be this, why de­linquents are punished, because they swerve from the Law of the supreme: but it is clearly otherwise; The Christi­an doth not therefore receive the holy Communion, or re­pent of his sin, or do such like heavenly duties, because the supreme Magistrate requires them, but because he finds those duties exacted by God in his positive Laws; and if the Magistrate shall controul it, he knows God must be obey­ed before man, when he requires contrary to God. And the same reason persvvades the Turk concerning his Alcoran, vvhich he vainly imagineth to be the divine Lavv; and if the Grand Signior himself do contradict that Lavv they vvill not obey him, upon that reason. And surely the same Argu­ment prevails vvith all other Nations vvho have their Reli­gion by tradition; it is not the Lavv of man, but the imagi­ned Lavv of God vvhich they subject themselves unto in di­vine performances. And therefore though soveraigns punish such transgressions vvhich are against those Lavvs vvhich they have established for divine; yet it is therefore because they are esteemed divine. Therefore they made such Lavvs, not that they could think that they ought to be esteemed di­vine because they established them. I vvill add but one ob­servation more, vvhich is this; That although he saith, that all Nations practise this, that is, that they allovv only such divine Lavvs, vvhich they have established to be such; yet I be­lieve no Nation in the World, (no Christian I am assured) would have allowed this doctrine to be published, but only such as were in that distracted condition as our poor Nation [Page 188] was when he published it. For since every Christian King­dome professeth a conformity to divine Law, it cannot be imagined that they durst obtrude such an impossible thing to be credited as that they could make divine Laws, but only confirm and exact an obedience to them. Nay, I can think the same of all, even Heathen Nations. So that it is a conclusion abhorring to Christianity, yea humane Nature wheresoever it is planted with any Religion. For since all do conceive God to be an infinite able and wise Governour even of Kings, supremes, and kingdomes, how can they think it safe for them out of humane obedience to subject his rules to the controul of his Subjects, which all Kings and Potentates are? I have handled this Paragraph verbatim, and although there are many more expressions (in this case) which may deserve censure, yet I pass them over, and in­deed did think here to have concluded his Politiques, and so not to have passed any further censure upon them in this place. But there are some egregious errors hereafter which must not be passed over with silence. I will also skip o­ver his twenty seventh and twenty eighth Chapters, as con­taining things in general less malitious, and I will enter upon his twenty ninth Chapter which he intitles

Of those things which weaken or tend to the dissolution of a Common-wealth. CHAP. XXIII.

SECT. I. Mr. Hobbs his second Paragraph purged. The signi­fication of the word, Judge. Inferiour Judges apply the determinations of Laws concerning good and evil to particular persons and facts. Private men have ju­dicium rationis, and therefore may determine upon their own ratiocination. No man to intrude upon the office of a judge, but by deputation from the Sove­raign.

THe first of these I let pass, as having spoken something of it already materially, and begin with his second which he enters upon page 168. towards the bottom of that Page which begins thus. In the second place, I ob­serve the diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, that every private man is Judge of good and evil actions. To purge this do­ctrine from all poyson, observe first; that this word, Judge, sounds like a legal Officer, and truly (to speak properly) I think the supreme legislative power is the Judge of politick good and evil; the other subordinate Judges are only Judges of the application of the supreme to particular cases; for instance thus. The legislative power commands that no man shall steal; if he do he shall be thus and thus punished; the Judge applyes this sentence of this evil to Titius, who is brought before him, and accused of this crime; the le­gislative [Page 190] determins and judgeth, that it is evil in general; but the Judge upon his Bench determines, that this person is guilty of this evil; in neither of which a private man hath right to pass a conclusive sentence concerning other men. But yet give me leave to tell the Reader, that in both these he hath judicium rationis, a rational sentence in his own thoughts, as thus; before a Law is made, he judgeth that this would be fit to be made, and so may discretely interpose with the legislative power to advise them to act according to those reasons which appear to him as perswasive, for else the Legislator will lack that great assistance which he may receive from the premonitions of prudent men, who, many times, (although they are not lifted up to the dignity of such as sit at the Helm) yet have either by study or ex­perience equal abilities with them.

And in the second (viz.) the application, when a private man shall stand by at the pleading or hearing a cause, he perceiving that the Judge carries himself partially to one side, and doth pass his sentence accordingly, this private man can­not chuse but judge in his Soul, that this was a wicked sen­tence; As contrarily when it is justly carried with indifference, he may judge with himself that this was a righteous judgment. But the intruding into the Office of a Judg is altogether unfit without a special deputation to it But since God hath pleased to give man that most excellent faculty of ratiocination both in Natural and Political affairs, he shall desert humanity who should deny himself the exercise of that ability. Nay he may indeavour (if he can) to avert that execution of that sen­tence, when it is wickedly pronounced; as was the case of Daniel, in the unrighteous sentence decreed upon Susanna; but still not to usurp a judicatory power without lawful au­thority. But, even in these cases, there must be left judici­um rationis and discretionis, a power of reason and judicial discretion to think upon and consider, what is right: but he seems to deny that truth concerning the private actions of that particular man whether it shall be good to do this or that; for so he proceeds.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. II. The former assertion of private ratiocination further cleared in Acts commanded against the Law of Nature, or the positive Laws of God. Mr. Hobbs his ar­gument retorted against himself.

THis is true, saith he, in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no civil Laws; and also under civil govern­ment, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. Consider now, Reader, that by the Law, he understands here the civil Law. Consider then that the Laws of any Nation may be against the Law of Nature; in which case he himself hath limited the power of civil Laws. A man is commanded by the National Law to act against the Law of Nature, shall not this private man judge it unfit for him to do that? And without question, in many particulars, the po­sitive Law of God in Scripture is as clear to many men, as that Law written in mens hearts; and therefore in such cases there is no doubt but as God hath imparted to men the pow­er of reasoning, so he hath given men Laws by which they should regulate themselves according to his directions, & they must and ought to use that reason in the guidance of their actions by his rules. But then, concerning the civil Laws themselves, a man may judge in private of them, whether they are prudential or no; yea, every man who is versed in Politicks, will judg and think so of them, and sometimes judge they are not prudent, and yet give no disturbance to the peace of the Kingdome: but think it more prudent to be subject to an imprudent Law, than for it to hinder the end of all Laws, which is the peace and quiet of the Kingdom. But now consider further, Turpe est doctori cum culpa redar­guit ipsum. He hath writ a book of Politie, he hath censu­red all the civil Laws in the World, he is a private man, and [Page 192] hath (I believe) no legislative power; why should he take upon him to forbid others to act that which he himself doth in that very place where he forbids them? And yet give me leave to add one Note more; this judging he speaks of must be about his Actions in the future, whether, what he is about to do will be a good or an evil action. Is it possible for a man to live honestly and not to judge of such actions wherein there is any scruple whether they are good or evil? Suppose the civil law (as he would have it) were the only rule to walk by; yet every private man must judge whether this or that act which he is about to undertake, be according to that rule or no. And perhaps he may, in many cases, find work enough for all the wit he hath to regulate himself ac­cording to that rule: and although he calls this the poyson of a Common-wealth; yet I dare boldly say it is that bread which doth most wholesomly nourish, support and maintain a Common-wealth, (viz.) that every man should consider and judge what is legal, and fit for him to do. Let us go on with him.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. III. Of the rule of Actions. The Law of Nature, the measure of humane Actions, in opposition to the Civil Laws, where the case is contradistinct. In­stances of Civil Laws commanding unjust things; If the Civil Law command any thing against the Di­vine Law, or the principles of Faith and Reason. Mr. Hobbs his arrogancy in venting principles contrary to the received opinion of the whole World noted and censured. The case stated and determi­ned. Good Men obedient to bad Laws, not in acting according to them, but by suffering the pe­nalties inflicted by them.

BƲt (saith he) otherwise, it is manifest, that the mea­sure of good and evil actions, is the Civil Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwaies representative of the Common-wealth. Here are two Propositions, I shall handle them apart, they are both indiscreet, and very im­pertinent to the Question The first is, that the Civil Law is the measure of our Actions the measure is in­definite without any limitation: what not the Law of Na­ture? shall not that be a measure? How shall a man be able to commit Treason then se defendendo against the Civil Law? (which is one of his popular Aphorisms de­livered in many places of this Book:) for if the Civil Law be the measure of his actions, he must not violate that for the pretence of the Law of Nature: I urge this ad hominem as an invincible argument against his wicked doctrine, but see it overthrown out of most received prin­ciples; It is possible that the Civil Laws may be wicked [Page 194] and dishonest, and so against the Law of God; as even in this Nation, they have made sacrilegious Laws; shall not I judge in my self whether it be fit for me to act according to these Laws? The Law made in Queen Maries days which shed so much innocent blood, it was fit for every man in that time to suffer rather than to con­spire with them. And therefore he must be judge him­self what is vertuous for him to do; and that Law is not a rule to guide him safely by. Let this suffice for the first proposition. The second is, And the Judge is the le­gislator, who is alwaies representative of the Common-wealth. What an impossible Judge for such doubts is here deli­vered? Make the legislator what you will, King, or Senate or what you please; The question to be determined may be whether it is fit for Titius, at this hour or instant, to act according to this Civil law concerning which the scruple ariseth? whether it be not against the Divine law? the du­ty is instant, now required; It is not possible for this man to obtain leave to enquire of the legislator; or if he could, is it not probable that the legislator may not be at leisure to answer such doubts? It cannot be therefore that the le­gislator can be a proper Judge of such questions; Titius alone must do it himself: neither indeed is it possible for any legislator to foresee all such particular scruples which may arise out of general rules; and therefore there is a necessity for every man to be judge of good and evil, concerning his own particular actions what he should do. But he reduceth great mishaps and ill conse­quences which follow upon this doctrine, which must be examined. From this false doctrine (saith he) men are dispo­sed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth. And why not, good Reader? There is no man that hath reason with him when he studyeth a Law-book, or indeed any other (besides the holy Scripture) but he considers whether that law or discourse be agreeing to the principles of Faith and Reason, whether it be consonant with equity: if a man have not his judgement free to himself, how comes is about that Mr. Hobbs hopes to pre­vail [Page 195] with his discourse against all the laws in the Christian World, but that he himself thinks there is a freedome of judgement left amongst men to determine by their reason what is good or evil? But then he adds, [And after­wards to obey, or disobey them as in their private judgment they shall think fit, whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and weakned.] Certainly every man living will obey or disobey as he thinks fit; and this is done by vertuous and good men without distracting or weakning the Common-wealth. For if a vertuous man find the Civil law con­tradicting Gods law either in Nature or Scripture, he can­not think it good moraliter for him to act according to its direction. But his opposing of an established law shall be with submission to the penalty, not contending marti­ally against it, for the accommodation of this present con­tented being, which is his doctrine; and by this means the Common-wealth will suffer no distraction, but rather confirmation and establishment; when a mans private evil shall be patiently endured, rather than the peace of a kingdom shall be disquieted. I speak no more of this because the sence is much the same with that doctrine which he censured next and condemns.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. IV. Mr. Hobbs his proposition everted. Conscience defi­ned and distinguished. Of conclusions secondarily or remotely deduced from the first principles. No conscience properly and strictly erroneous, but being such (according to the vulgar acception of the phrase) however obliges. The case put upon the misinterpreta­tion of Scripture, supposed to prohibite swearing, though for the confirmation of a truth, and the er­ror asserted to be obliging. Two objections answered and the proposition fully cleared; our Saviours com­mand of not swearing at all, examined, and eluci­dated. Of promissory or assertory Oaths. The para­graph and question concluded.

ANother Doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, is, That whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin, and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil. Certainly the proposition is true, whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin; for Conscience includes in its Name and Nature Science, so that there can be no Conscience, without there be a knowledg of the condition and circumstances to which his Conscience is applyed. I would be loth to involve my self into many intricate Questions. But intreat the Reader to consider, that Conscience is the conclusion of a practical Syllogisme, in which the Major is either the Act of a principal law of Nature, or some general rule equivalent to it. To un­derstand this, observe, that there are two innate qualities in man, which the Philosophers call, Habitus Principiorum, habits of principles which do so evidence themselves that [Page 197] no rational man doth hear such truths clearly delivered, but he presently assents to them: that which is about speculative things they term intellectus, because it is in the prime operation of the understanding; of which Nature are these, That the whole is greater than a part; two and two make four: There is no man that heareth such propo­sitions clearly delivered who doth not presently assent to them. There is another quality which is called by them Synteresis, which is the habit by which we readily assent to practical things, as in the other to speculative, of which Nature are these; That good is desirable, evil to be eschewed; God is to be obeyed in his commands, and the like. Now there is no man, who, as soon as he hears these Axiomes clearly delivered, but doth without ambi­guity presently yield an assent to them. Out of these prin­ciples when a man makes true collections and deductions, that conclusion is Conscience, as thus:

All evil is to be eschewed;

Adultery is evil;

Therefore Adultery is to be eschewed.

Such a man who thus argues, acts against his Consci­ence when he commits Adultery. But not only so when a conclusion is immediately deduced out of Synteresis; but that which is more remotely deduced out of it; as take the conclusion of the former syllogisme;

Adultery is to be eschewed:

This particular Act, with this forbidden Woman, is A­dultery.

Therefore this is to be eschewed.

Sure he who commits that sin acts against his Conscience, and so as far as any man can go, with right arguing, so far his Conscience obligeth him Now if we would ar­gue from strong reason, a man may say, there is no such thing as an erroneous Conscience, because if it be not Science, it cannot be Conscience, which supposeth Science and a right drawing out the Conclusion, which proceeds from these evident principles; and then most certainly Mr. Hobbs must be in the wrong, who affirms that it is [Page 198] not sin to act against his Conscience. But let us take Conscience as in the usual way it is taken, not for the con­clusion of a direct and certain arguing, from these known and evident principles, (of which before:) but for that conclusion which any man, according to his ability, draws out of these principles although mistaken, and not logi­cally or truly done. (I understand not by this word [logi­cally] the art of logick, but that natural ratiocination, of which the artificial is an assistant only.) Well then, the question is, whether that a man who acts against that light which he hath, that shews him this particular is unlawful, is sin in him who so acts, although this light be not a true but a bare shew of Conscience; and not true Science, or deduction which must be drawn from the principles of Synteresis by true ratiocination? And certainly the opinion is most right and true, and founded upon the strongest principles of reason that can be. For it is a most un­doubted Axiom which he hath delivered, that laws bind only by the force of their sufficient promulgation. So that if they are made only, they exact no obedience until they be pro­claimed; nor then, unless the Proclamation be such as the obliged party may take notice of it; for no man can be bound to that which he cannot know; he cannot obey, unless he know what to obey; nor can he know, unless he have a Revelation to shew it him; so that, with­out question, the very law of Nature could not bind, but that there is a Synteresis that enlightens mans Soul, and makes the goodness of that law manifest. Well then, this man must needs sin who acts against that light he hath: put that case which is common amongst us, A man by misunder­standing the Scriptures thinks that they command him, not to swear: therefore when he is convented before a Judge to attest a truth by that most religious act, of calling God to witness what he saith to be true, or to punish him, if it be false; if this man so conceive these places of Scripture, as if they should render his swearing in any case unlawful, if he do swear, he sins against that light he hath, and it may most justly be imputed to him for sin: for he who thinks, and believes it is the law of God which prohibits it, and [Page 199] yet will do otherwise, prefers men before God, this world before the other, which is the fountain from whence all ini­quity proceeds.

I know but two objections of any moment, which can be made against this conclusion, which I shall satisfie presently. The first is, if a man doth sin in acting against his erroneous Conscience, then a man may sin in acting ac­cording to Gods commandements; because that he may mistake Gods command, and in doing so when he acts ac­cording to the true meaning of Gods command he must sin: which may seem most strange at the first view.

For answer I will consider this Phrase, Act according to Gods command. To understand this know that he who o­beys Gods commands, must do it as a man scienter know­ingly. A man cannot pretend to obedience in any act which is done by chance, or ignorantly. Such acts there­fore which are done when a man thinks otherwise of the Law of God or the principles of the Law of Nature, than the truth is, though he do the Acts materially di­rected by them; yet erring in the principles which God hath given him for his guide (I mean the light of his un­derstanding which should shew him the vvay) he doth not act them formally vvell; he doth bonum, but not bene, a good act but not well, according to Gods law formally. As for a man to do a good act vvell, requires a completion of all circumstances, he must do it for a right end. In which first qualification the erroneous man who acts against the light of his Synteresis, must needs miscarry, because he cannot think he acts for the glory of God, vvhen he thinks contrary to the revealed will of God: and indeed it might be shevved hovv he erres in every circumstance, Quis, Quid, Cui, Cur, Quomodo, Quando, (Quis.) What? the Creature go against the revealed will of the Creator?. &c. But I desist, the rest are obvious. Well then, I answer this ob­jection, that he who acts the thing commanded against his erroneous Conscience, although he do that vvhich is ma­terially good, yet in not doing it vvell he sins.

The second objection is, that if he vvho hath an erro­neous [Page 200] Conscience must not act against it, such a man is ne­cessitated to sin; for he must either act according to his Conscience or against it; in either of which he sins, as in the instance before given; A man whose Conscience tells him that he may not swear, this man is brought before a Judge to give evidence in a Cause of moment, if he do it, or not do it, he sins: but surely the Nature of sin is such, that it is impossible to sin in any act which he cannot choose but doe; for sin supposeth a possibility not to sin.

For answer to this I shall say, that there is no impossibi­lity in the case proposed, for that man may lay aside his er­rour and consider that God hath given a command to swear by his Name, Deut. 6.13. and elsewhere; the words there are, thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and serve him and swear by his Name. Not that he commands us to swear, but supposing swearing to be necessary in all politiques for the deciding controversies, he commands that when we swear, we should swear by his Name, because it is a re­ligious act, and ought to be referred to none but himself only; yea God himself hath sworn, Gen. 22.16. By my self I have sworn, saith the Lord, so like wise Psalm 100.4. The Lord hath sworn, and many like places. It cannot therefore be ill in it self to swear, nor can we think it a priviledge or prerogative of Gods to swear: Holy men in all ages have done it: for you may find Abraham divers times, as Gen 21.22. He sware in the Covenant with A­bimelech. So likewise Isaac, either with the same or ano­ther Abimelech, Gen. 26.31. I need not name more pla­ces of the same Nature. But to whatsoever may be ob­jected of this kind out of the Old Testament, these may reply, that our Saviour hath instituted a New Law (Mat. 5.33.) where in the 34 verse he saith, But I say unto you, swear not at all; It is true he so requires them. But let us consider that St. Paul (whose life and actions after his con­version are so eminently excellent, and without blame) di­verse time swears, yea in his Epistles, which were a greater fault than in ordinary discourse, because 'twas done upon [Page 201] consideration. Nay, in those Epistles which he was directed by the Holy Ghost to write, for the good of the Church of Christ. So you may observe Rom 1.9. God is my wit­ness: so likewise, 2. Cor. 1.23. I call God for record upon my Soul. Phil 1.8. God is my record. And now it is not possible for any man to think, that so vertuous a man in a premeditated act, as an Epistle writ for a publick good, and in that act, guided by the holy Ghost, should commit a sin against that Christ, whose Gospel and Laws he preach­ed and taught every where, with hazard of his life, if that Law were to be understood in that latitude and ex­tent in which it is taken. Any man who considers this, must needs cast about to see, if learned men, (who through­out the whole Christian World have practised with St. Paul) have given any such exposition upon these words of our Saviour as may consist with the universal practice of mankind, and doing that he may find this fully explained so, as fit to shew our Saviours design, which was not in this to controul the practice of his servants. The diffi­culty will lye in these two Phrases, the Negative in the (34) verse, and the Affirmative in the (37) verse. First for the Negative, sweare not at all; to apprehend this consider, that these universal, as also indefinite terms are with much caution to be extended, and to be expounded in Scripture according to that consent they have with other places, and the Analogie of Faith. In the 21 verse of this 5 Chap. of St. Matthew, it is said, thou shalt not kill, and lest some should say, there is no universal sign preceding as in my Text, consider the following words which make it as large as this in my Text, Whosoever killeth shall be in dan­ger of the judgement. And yet surely it is lawful for an Executioner to hang according to the Law of the Land, and so to kill any man who is condemned, when he hath re­ceived a command to do it. So likewise it is lawful for a Souldier in defence of his Country, and for any private man to kill any private man in defence of himself. So likewise the same we may say of our Saviours words, John 10. and the 8. All that ever came before me, were [Page 202] Thieves and Robbers. Here are as full and large words as possibly can be; but a man may say, what were the Pa­triarchs, the Prophets, and St. John the Baptist Thieves and Robbers? Certainly no; it is easie to observe many more of the like Nature, and I think one answer will serve them all; thou shalt not kill voluntarily, but upon necessity, or command, (that is) a Natural or Moral necessity, for a command from lawful Superiours introduceth a Moral ne­cessitie of obeying. And so for that in St. Iohn, all that came of themselves, unsent by God, were Thieves and Robbers. But Iohn the Baptist, the Patriarchs, and the Prophets were men sent from God. And so for those Swearers, swear not all, that is, of your selves, unless you are commanded by Superiour Powers, unless to confirm some great and considerable truth; which way all vertu­ous and holy men have ever understood this Text, as their practice assures us; and so that place in St [...]ames the 5. must abide the same exposition. And although much more may be said for the exposition of thi [...] Negative command of our Saviours; yet I conceive that this is sufficient, and so pass to the Affirmative precept in the (37) verse, But let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. Here it [...]eems that as our Saviour before forbad swearing by his Negative, swear not at all, so here he insinuates the same by his Affirmative, but let your communication be yea, yea, and nay, nay; and he gives a reason for it, for what is more than these com­eth of evil. Thus the Argument being enforced, I answer clearly, that in the Translation of the English there is a full gloss upon the Text which expounds it clearly; for so it is read [let your communication] which intimates that their com­mon conversation should not be powdred with Oathes, which is far distant from those just occasions where oathes are exacted by the commands of Superiours, or the ur­gency of some great and weighty business which needs a strong affirmation to assure the credulity of it; and the O­riginal which is ( [...]) enforceth no more but let your Speech be yea, &c. And the reason which is added in the [Page 203] Text makes this interpretation good (for what is more than these cometh of evil;) it is not sin, it is not Evil, but cometh of Evil; which is evident, for no man swears in conversation, but either because he doubts his own repu­tation, if he do not swear, or because other men are di­strustful, both which arise out of the evil of humane fals­hood, which makes him apt to lye. This Text being thu [...] opened let us consider what will result out of it, in the Negative first, and then out of the Affirmative pre­cept; In the Negative we may find that it is opposed to a practice of the Jews, who (by some tradition or other) imagined that it was no sin to swear, but to swear falsly on­ly. So that if a man performed his promise which he swore he would do, it was no sin; and it seems there­fore to be spoken only of promissory Oaths, not of such which were made to give Testimony of matters of fact; if so, then there is no prohibition of such Oaths which are for the decision of controversies, commonly called Assertory Oaths; and then again, it may justly be con­ceived, that they (that is the Jews) thought (out of some tradition or other) that it was only unlawful to swear by God but not by the Creature, for our Saviours instan­ces are only in them, Thou shalt not swear by Heaven, by Earth, by Ierusalem, by the Gold of the Altar, or thy Head. Which he sheweth relatively to reach even the Creator himself: so that for these considerations it must be under­stood that it excludes not assertory Oaths vvhich decide controversies, that it extends not to such Oaths vvhere God is religiously called to witness any thing. And then for the second the affirmative precept, it reacheth to our Communication and common conference one with another, that Gods most Sacred Name be not slightly or in vain taken by us; but that either some great business more than ordinary, or else some supreme power must exact it from us. So then this being thus expounded, it must needs appear that in this case, a man may justly depose his errour, and he cannot be necessitated to sin, when he hath an er­rour in his Conscience. And truly it is an excellent rule [Page 204] for the practice of a mans life, when he shall find a ge­neral practice of good and holy men in all Ages to practise any thing which he is offended at, to suppress that averse­ness in himself, and with study and pains to cast about which way he may reconcile himself to that common practice, and not without strong and evident grounds (which will hardly be possible) oppose that which the uni­versal practice makes us know, that the universal Church un­derstood as they practised; for if there be an Error in such a practice, a man may find something to excuse himself with er­ravimus cum patribus; but in the other, nothing but pride and self conceipt, which makes him oppose these pra­ctices: and surely in these cases it is a safe rule for any man when he finds a place of Scripture which seemingly opposeth the universal doctrine of the Church, which is and hath been so heretofore, to look about how that Scripture may be expounded according to the Analogy of faith and good manners or usage of the Catholick Church, which then must be the sense, and the other (though more apparent at the first) not the true meaning; and by this means he shall not act contrary to his Conscience, but if he do, he must sin.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. V. Every man Judge of his own Actions, whether accord­ing to the positive Divine Laws, or the Law of Nature. Mr. Hobbs his consequencies observed and censured. His absurd expression of a publick Conscience rejected. Opinion and Conscience distin­guished. Thoughts not possibly to be regulated by humane Laws. The external manage of Opinion. The proper subject of Regulation. The necessity of distraction from diversity of Opinions unless ob­truded upon others. This Argument retorted ad hominem.

HE proceeds, And it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil. It doth (say I) for so every man will be, in what concerns his own practice; and must needs be so, for else how can he judge that he doth right or no unless he may judge it? and if there were no Law but what he speaks of, the Ci­vil, he must judge whether his actions be according to that or no when he acts: But Mr. Hobbs acknowledgeth a superiour Law to that, to wit, the Law of Nature, and I have shewed another the positive Law of God, and he must in both these use judicium privatum, his private judge­ment, whether his actions accord or no with these supe­riour Laws. Now in all these he must judge and be re­sponsible for that judgement, whether he judge by such rules as ought to guide a prudent man: but he gives a reason for what he speaks, for a mans Conscience and his Judgement is the same thing: and as the judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. [Page 206] This doth not follow, because he may erre therefore he should not be guided by it. A man may have a false light shewed, or his eyes may be weak, as our eyes, who are old men, are; must he therefore not make use of that light and sight which he hath? Nay rather he must be more careful in the diligent using of his eyes, and more seriously examining the light which is offered to them. But in all these offers of reason which he makes in this Case, they may be applyed to that judgement which he must make concerning the Law of Nature, or the Civil Law (which he allows a man must judge) whether his acti­ons be according to them, and what is the meaning of them as well as what is the meaning of the positive Law of God, and he must and will, if he be a vertuous man, act accordingly. Therefore (saith he) though he that is subject to no Civil Law, sinneth in all he doth against his Conscience, because he hath no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Com­mon-wealth, because the Law is the publick Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. I cannot find how to apply this discourse closely to the question, for he who is not imbodied in a Common-wealth (saith he) is ruled by his reason, (but hark you) that reason ought to be ruled by the Law of Nature, according to his own doctrine; and according to mine, by whatsoever is a known positive Law of God. Likewise, although there is no Civil Law. And I will tell him farther that no Ci­vil or Politick Law can have power to bind him to the breach of any of these, and therefore what he speaks of a publick Conscience is an unheard of Language, and not pro­per to be applyed to Conscience, and most undoubtedly only educeable out of that before unheard of, and most im­possible principle of constituting a supreme, which hath been abundantly confuted in my former discourses. Let the Reader take notice that I am now in page the (169.) (Otherwise in such diversity as there is of private. Consci­ences, which are but private Opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the so­veraign [Page 207] power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.) In this clause he sets down the mischiefs (as he thinks) which may happen to a Common-wealth by di­versities of Consciences, or Opinions. But before I pro­ceed I will take notice of a mistake whereof he is guilty, when he saith, That private Consciences are but private O­pinions. To this I say there may be such Consciences which arise only out of private Opinions, which ought to be overswayed with the greater weight of publick Au­thority: but there are other Consciences which are drawn out of the evident Law of Nature, or clear text of Scrip­ture; these are so strong foundations to build Conscience upon, that a Conscience erected upon one or both of them cannot be shaken, by that which he calls a publick Conscience: howsoever, it is an improper Phrase used by him to call Conscience, Opinion, or Science; for it is ra­ther a Conclusion deduced out of either, as I have shew­ed. But then when he is angry in these Politicks with di­versities of Consciences or Opinions (as he terms them) I would fain have him consider, how any Common-wealth should be able to make a Law to regulate mens thoughts, for they can judge of them only by outward acts, it is on­ly God who can search the hearts and reins, and therefore he only can make Laws for them. Men may confine the external manage of Opinions and Consciences, which is fit the legislative should do, in all such things which might impede or trouble the well government of a Common-wealth, and punish the expression of them: but let all the power in the World make what Laws they can, men will think what appears most reasonable to their under­standings: thoughts are far from the controul of any Le­viathan wha [...]soever. And although it is true in some part, that distractions in Common-wealths arise from di­versity of Opinions; yet it is not true what he saith, the Common wealth must needs be distracted by them; for so long as they are but Opinions, they do no harm but to those Persons who have them; but if they justify their Opinions to the withdrawing others or themselves from [Page 208] obedience than they are dangerous. And therefore the Le­viathan although he cannot know mens Consciences, and therefore not judge of them, must not make Laws for them: yet because he can know and judge of the out­ward act, which may disturb the peace, he must be severe both in making Laws against, and punishing those faults: yet I cannot chuse but wonder, how he who dares pub­lish so many doctrines against all the Leviathans in the World, should not allow others the liberty of thinking a­gainst them.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VI. Faith and sanctity both inspired and acquired. Free­will and grace co-operating to the salvation of Men. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments against this Opinion re­futed. Faith and sanctity entitle not any man to go­vernment. The means of salvation most certain. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments against the former assertion retorted.

HE proceeds in another Paragraph, It hath been also commonly taught, that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspira­tion or infusion. I will not trouble my self to turn Au­thours where to find a defender of this proposition, but set down my judgement and then answer his cavil at it: my judgement is, that faith and sanctity are both inspi­red and acquired; faith is the Gift of God, as the A­postle speaketh, Eph. 2.8. so likewise sanctification, 1 Cor. 1.30. and yet they are acquired; and in the Parable of the Talents Mat. 25. we may observe, that the use of Gods gifts is blessed by Almighty God with a further en­largement; multitudes of Scriptures might be produced, [Page 209] which would but dull the Reader. So that in this case it is no otherwise than it is with almost all the affairs in the World; neither the grass, nor the plants grow without light and influence from the Heavens; nor can the Hea­vens make them grow unless there be a specifical vertue in the Plant to adapt that influence to that particular opera­tion which is in it. Neither can the Heavens without the Earth, nor the Earth without the Heavens, bring forth the least fruit, according to that Heavenly speech of St. Ber­nard, Table liberum arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur; Tolle gratiam, non erit unde. Take away free choice, and there will be nothing which can be saved (for no inferiour thing without that faculty is capable of Heaven, that being like the specifical vertue of Plants which co-operates with the general influence from above:) but take away grace there is no means by which these supernatural acts should be performed; that being the influence by which it is en­abled to produce these blessed acts of faith and sanctity. So that I say, faith and sanctity are both infused and acquired. Now we will inquire into his exceptions against the ab­surdity of this opinion (as he conceives,) [which granted, (saith he) I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith.] If the Opinion were, as he sets it down, I can tell him why? that is for the satisfaction of others: but he goes on, Or why, every Christian should not be also a Prophet. I will tell him, because faith and sanctity, and prophecy are divers things, which may and do oft exist apart; and therefore one of them may be, and is oft with­out the other. Again he saith, Or why any man should take the Law of his Country rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his actions. I answer, because there are many vain suggestions into the Soul of Man, which are often apt to perswade a man that they are inspirations by God; and therefore we are commanded to try the Spirits, and ex­amine those suggestions whether they agree with such stand­ing rules which ought to guide our actions, amongst which the National law is one. He goes on, And thus (saith he) we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good [Page 210] and evil. I answer as before, there is no man but will judge of good and evil, if he be an honest man and guide his actions by that judgement, but yet as a private man, if he be such He again, [Or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all Civil Government.] I see no consequence in this, for although a man may be inspired, and can know he is so; yet that inspiration can only serve his own turn, un­less he can produce arguments to make me assured of it likewise; and then although a man may be inspired with faith and sanctity, which is the matter in dispute; yet that hath nothing to do with the direction of any other mans actions, unless he can produce some urging argument to assure us that he is inspired, with authority to direct us, which anothers faith and sanctity cannot do; for men may be faithful and holy, and yet have no Authority to govern. He goes on thus, to shew by discourse that faith and sanctity are not infused thus [Faith comes by hear­ing, and hearing by those accidents which guides us, into the presence of them who speak to us.] Faith comes by hearing, but it is by hearing the word of God, which is Vehi­culum Spiritus, and brings the Spirit with it; for certain­ly as Heaven is more necessary to us, and of greater con­sequence than all the things of this world; so the means of obtaining it are, without doubt, more certain than any thing in the world. And therefore faith, and the means of getting faith which is most ordinately by hearing, and no doubt but reading likewise, which are the means by which men may be acquainted with the will of God; so likewise [hearing comes by those accidents (as he speaks rightly) which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us.] What can be deduced out of this, but that a man using such means as hearing, and such accidents as bring him into that presence; God blesseth them and pours into them those graces which enable them with faith and sancti­fication. I but (saith he) which accidents are all contri­ved by God Almighty; and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concurr to every effect, [Page 211] unobservable.] All this is nothing to the purpose, that is, to prove that faith and sanctity are not infused: for whe­ther God contrives those means, or man, which beget faith, or whether those means which bring us to hearing be natural, or supernatural, yet God blesseth them; our eyes are natural which see it; our ears are natural which hear those things, which bring us to faith and sanctity; yea our understanding is natural which apprehends them, but God blesseth both the one and the other (as his ho­ly will hath appointed) with supernatural graces. He goes on. [Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent.] Let that be granted: [but yet they are not Miracles.] And that is true likewise, for Miracles, as they are supernatu­ral, so they are things beyond the ordinate and set way of Gods working; which these holy operations of his are not, but most congruous to his set and prescribed way of acting them, upon such productions according to his Covenants. He proceeds [but are brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit] It is true; and yet these are wayes of Gods prescribing, and which he blesseth; therefore he adds [And these three O­pinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the World proceeded chiefly from the Tongues and Pens of unlearned divines; who joyning the words of holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that sanctity, and natu­ral reason cannot stand together.] Give me leave, Reader, to retort this discourse to his Person, who not long since in the 26 Chap. page 149. maketh faith not a duty, but a gift of God, and saith it is barely an operation of God's, as likewise internal sanctity. And there put me to the trouble of proving mans concurrence in these acts; and I may assuredly affirm, that he is there exceeding guilty of what he chargeth ignorant Divines with here, (viz.) incongru­ous putting places of Scripture together, and as much as in him lies to make men believe that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together; for if faith be only a [Page 212] gift and no act in the receiver, or use of it, insomuch as no command can be given concerning that or sanctity, as he speaks there, certainly natural reason hath nothing to do with it; and as there I was forced to prove the concur­rence of man in these Heavenly duties, so here to justifie his former doctrine, I must prove the co-operation of God which he seems to deny. Let the Reader put that with this, and he shall find the affirmative part true, and the negative false in both.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VII. Soveraigns obliged by the positive Laws of God. The Laws of Nations, The Law Natural, The Royal Laws, or Laws of government obligatory to the soveraign. The soveraign free from penal Laws.

A Fourth opinion, repugnant to the Nature of a Com­mon-wealth, is this, That he that hath the soveraign power is subject to the Civil Laws. Truly I conceive by this Gentleman that he imagines. Soveraigns to be strange things, which must be subject to none, but the Law of Na­ture, for so he expounds it presently, not to the positive Law of God, which having (by him) no assurance that it is such, but from the supreme, he can no further be ob­liged by it, than he pleaseth. And so that Devilish speech of that wicked woman to her imperial Son, would be made good, Quod libet, licet. But this term [Subject] troubles me to find out what he means thereby, if he mean not, to be guided by it, or else he offends; without all doubt he ought to be ruled by the positive Law of God, and not only by the Natural Law, he ought to be ruled, that is, guided by his own Civil Laws, which he hath made, or given life unto. For how can he expect an observance from others, who will not keep his Laws himself? But if [Page 213] he means by Subject, subject to penalty; that cannot be, I am confident, in a well contrived Common-wealth; be­cause all penalty for breach intimates an inferiority, and as he rightly speaks aftewards, He who punisheth, either bo­dily, or with shame, or with whatsoever, is in that act supe­rior to him who is punished. But his dispute is out of his own principles, which have been twenty times confuted, that is, He that is subject to the Law, is subject to the Common-wealth, that is, to the Soveraign representative, that is, to himself. This is a weak argument because he is not the representative of the Common-wealth, but the head, and rules it. One word more, there may be Laws in a Common-wealth for Kings, and for Subjects, he must be guided by these which are the Royal Laws, the Laws of governing, although not by these which are inferiour, and Laws for Subjects; he must be allow­ed those prerogatives which are not fit for Subjects to have: But yet he ought to observe the rules of govern­ing. This, I conceive, is enough for what he hath de­livered in that Paragraph. He begins another thus.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VIII. Propriety derived from the soveraign of soveraigns. The quiet enjoyment of Estates. The reason accord­ing to Mr. Hobbs of the imbodying of men. The propriety of the Subjects. The foundation of the publick interest. It excludes not the prerogative of the soveraign. The title of the King of England in many cases decided by the Judges. Mr. Hobbs his indulgence to the late usurped power observed.

A Fifth doctrine, which tendeth to the dissolution of a Common-wealth, is that every private man has an ab­solute propriety in his goods; such as excludeth the right of the soveraign. I do not know what he means by this term [absolute.] Certainly both private and publick men have their rights depending upon the Soveraign of Sove­raigns; and all they have is at his dispose. But other­wayes certainly it tends to the dissolution of a Common-wealth, to deny an absolute propriety in private men, and to affirm that in no Common-wealth a Subject can have such propriety, for it being the reason, (according to his own Philosophy) why they imbodied themselves into a Common-wealth, that so they might enjoy the fruits of their labours peaceably, not only plough and sow peace­ably, but reap the fruits of that pains they take, and call it there own: It cannot be denyed, that that justly can be denyed them; and if it be they are in such a state as they were without the fruits of their vertuous labours. It is true in the Eastern Monarchies, I read they have not in­heritances as they have here, but pro termino vitae, and then all return to that sea out of which they came, but it is o­therwise in our European Countryes throught, and the [Page 215] Laws of every Nation are justly to be observed; but still according to that right which each person hath: and this propriety is so naturally dear unto every man, as there can be no wiser Laws made for the publick than such, as private men shall be bettered by them, for then every man will more industriously endeavour the publick good, when his private benefit results out of it. I but (saith he) such as excludeth the right of the Soveraign. Indeed I think in that he said more rightly than he meant; for cer­tainly the Soveraign hath a right of a Soveraign, over all his kingdom, or dominion; nay, the propriety of a So­veraign (that is his legal propriety) over his Subjects, is over their estates, to determine their Controversies, to have do­minion over their Persons, legally to punish, according to his just prerogative. But the title of propriety in his estate, is belonging to the subject in all such things as are not included in the supremes legal prerogative. So that when he has granted Laws which do limit the extent of his power, and indulge the vertuous industry of his subjects, he cannot justly infringe them and call that his right, which he hath condescended not to use. And upon this reason, with us, the Title of the King in many occasions is decided by the Judges in point of Propriety And therefore he did ill in publishing this book in Engli [...]h, (so that it principally concerns us,) and at that time when the liberties and pro­prieties of the Subject were so abominably invaded by the usurped powers, as if he would provoke them to out-do them­selves, and oppress more, and more lawfully, than was pre­tended. He proceeds.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. IX. The soveraign protects the subject in the enjoyment of that right and Propriety which the Law gives him. The rights of soveraignty, not of propriety necessary for the performance of the royal Office, and pro­tection of subjects. Publick necessity justifies the invasion of propriety. The partition of the soveraign­ty among the Optimates not destructive of it, accor­ding to Mr. Hobbs his own tenents. The responsa prudentûm of high esteem among all Nations.

EƲery man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other Subject. This is granted upon all sides, and (saith he) he has it only from the soveraign power; without the protection whereof, (now I am in Page 170.) every other man should have equal right to the same. This is not truly spoke; for the protection of the soveraign doth not make, or give right to any thing, but enables him to use the same; the law gives the right & the soveraign protects us in the enjoying that which the Law hath given. But I wonder at his meaning in what follows, which is, But if the right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot perform the Office they have put him into. That must be understood of the right of the Soveraignty, but not of propriety: if he be not allowed the prerogatives belonging to soveraignty, he cannot protect them; but if he be denyed the right of propriety, he cannot well destroy them; but surely may protect them with his justice, and with his power. He expounds himself [which is to defend them both from forraign Enemies, and from the injuries of one ano­ther; and consequently there is no longer a Common wealth] [Page 217] A strange inference, unless he have right to their Estates he cannot defend them &c. Surely many Soveraigns have defended and do defend their subjects, and yet have not propriety to their Estates. He who hath a propriety in an estate may use it how he will to his own advantage or content. But this Supremes cannot do with their sub­jects justly; there may be a case of extremity, where Sa­lus Reipublicae must be suprema lex; put the case an Enemy invades the Kingdome, the land of some particular subject lyes fit to make a Fort of; the King by force takes it for the publick benefit; not out of propriety that it belongs to himself, but that it belongs to the Common-wealth, to whose publick benefit all private interests and proprieties must submit. But I may term the right of such accidents to be an universality rather than a pro­priety, the universal right of the Common-wealth, not the particular right of one or another. That which fol­lows to this purpose, receives the same answer, In offices of judicature and the like. I pass to a sixth Doctrine which, (he saith) is plainly and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth: and 'tis this, that the soveraign power may be divided. What he means by division, I cannot readily apprehend; if he means that it may not be divided into sundry persons, then he hath overthrown himself, when he constitutes other Government besides Monarchy, as A­ristocracy, and Democracy, which are in divers persons, but united; if he means (which he seems to do by his following discourse) two several Kings in the same king­dome, I think it cannot subsist, because of distractions as he intimates; but the fountain of the errour, I think is not well derived from the Lawyers, who, (saith he) en­deavour to make the Laws depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power. Which way this should conduce to the dependance of the Law upon their learn­ing, I see not; he himself hath discoursed that the re­sponsa prudentum were alwayes in high esteem among the Romans, as the opinion of the Judges are amongst us; and all men have a great reverence of them in all Nations. [Page 218] But these responsa declare what is Law, and they will cease to be prudentes, when they abuse the Law. He be­gins another Paragraph.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. X. The Paragraph asserted. Not the form of Government, but the execution of good Laws makes a Nation hap­py. The history of the Grecians and Romans vin­dicated against Mr. Hobbs. Mr. Hobbs his Precepts in his Leviathan; much more seductive and encouraging to rebellion than the forementioned Histories. The abuse of good things ought not to take away the use of them.

AND as false doctrine so oftentimes the example of diffe­rent government in a Neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to the alteration of the form already setled. In this truly I am of his mind; for when men see a neigh­bour prosper in that kind of life he leads, he is apt to pry into the wayes by which he so thrives, and then taking the same course hopes to find it as beneficial to him­self, as it hath proved to the other. I approve the dis­course throughout, and therefore need not transcribe any more. But yet would have been glad to have read some way, by which this evil, being known, might be hindred or avoided, and truly I can think upon none but by ma­king our selves more industrious than our Neighbours, by better rewarding vertue and industry, and punishing vice and sloth than they. There is scarce that people whose fundamental principles are not such as may make the Kingdom happy under that government, if they were used to the best advantage; so that it is not the form of [Page 219] Government only, but the disposure in that form which felicitates a Nation, and so the making and execution of good Laws at home will redress the inconvenience which comes from a Neighbouring Nation. He enters upon a new Paragraph, [And as to rebellion in particular a­gainst Monarchy, one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading the Books of policie, and Histories of the An­tient Greeks and Romans.] I wonder he had not put in the Old Testament likewise; but certainly he is out in it: for these Books (he speaks of) do teach Kings and Su­premes how to govern and avoid those Rocks upon which their predecessors have been split; they teach Subjects to avoid all rebellion, the most happy and prosperous of which brings confusion if not destruction to that Nation where they are, and very frequently ruine to themselves and their Families, who are Ring-leaders in such actions; But if books which encourage to rebellion must be laid aside, then let Leviathan be buried in silence; which I have, and shall shew shortly, not by example only, but precept to justify more rebellion than ever any Author did; I but, saith he, (from which (that is these books) young men, and all others as are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great ex­ploits of War atchieved by the conductors of their Armies, receive withal a pleasing Idea of all they have done besides.] I think this may be done, and that these excellent stories which relate the gallant and exemplary virtues of many, may, yea must likewise with them record the vices of others yea, many times the faults of vertuous men, without which ne­ver man lived, but our ever blessed Saviour. But what then? shall the Bee lose its hony, because the Spider may suck poyson out of the same flower? shall we avoid the Sun-shine because many are scorched by it? By this means we should avoid all good things, for there are none so good but foolish and wicked men have made ill use of them; even the mercies of God and all his glori­ous attributes have by some been applyed to evil. This Argument follows not therefore, because weak and ignorant [Page 220] men have ill digested these excellent meats, therefore bet­ter stomachs should not use them; without doubt these stories have abundance in them to shew vertuous men how to lead their lives, and expose them and lay them down pro focis & aris, which his self-seeking doctrine will not allow. And yet these had been the most proper dictates from him, who writes Politicks as conducing more to the publick good than any self-preservation which he so much labours for. But a little after he proceeds to shew their folly who make ill use of them, which I allow; but pre­sently again he in the bottom of that page seems to ar­gue thus.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XI. Truth desired in this Paragraph. Tyrants distinguished. An Ʋsurper justly killed by any subjects for the deliverance of his lawful Soveraign. Lawful sove­raigns not to be deposed or murthered for their ill government, but left to the justice of God. The for­mer conclusion asserted. A further vindication of the Books and Histories of the Grecians and Ro­mans.

FRom the reading (I say) of such books, men have un­dertaken to kill their Kings. Surely I believe among all the declarations that such Traitors have made, never any one made his study of such writers justify those horrid acts; Because (saith he) the Greek and Latine writers in their books and discourses of Policy (I am now in the 171 p.) make it lawful and laudable for any man so to do; provided be­fore he do it, he call him Tyrant. I would have wished that he had named his Authours, for then I could have discerned whe­ther he had abused them or no; to turn and examine all Authours [Page 221] were too tedious for me; yet something I may say in ge­neral, that I believe no man of honour for learning and po­licy, did either amongst the Greeks or Romans affirm, that if he hath called a Monarch a Tyrant, it is laudable for him to kill him; for certainly no man can found the justi­fication of such a Villany upon his foolish calling him such, but his being such. Now, as I remember, they make Tyrants of two sorts; such as invade the king­dome and usurp it from the right owner; and no doubt but any of those Subjects that owe obedience to their lawful King, may vindicate him and their fellow subjects from that unjust invasion. The other way of Tyran­ny is by such a man who is a lawful King, by his succession or election according to the Laws of the Realm, but go­verns arbitrary by his will, not the Law: Now because his right of title and possession, puts him above the reach of legal (though he can never be out of the reach of pri­vate) judgement; and seeing it is not lawful for a man to kill any one upon a private judgement, therefore it can­not (ex abundanti) be lawful to kill him, but leave him, Deo ultori: so that if he find such doctrine amongst the Greeks and Romans, he may rationally judge them amiss, and it is no more reasonable for men to be barred the great happiness of the wisdome contained in these books, because fools make ill use of them, than to barr men a sober and healthful use of wine because vitious men abuse it by drunkenness. He goes on [from the same books (saith he) they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion, that the subjects in a popular. Common­wealth enjoy liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all slaves.] I wonder why he should impute this to the Greek and Latine, more than to the Italians, Germans, or Dutch stories. Certainly most people when they find their own condition hard, are willing to change, and think any other would be better; and it is the same with all other Common-wealths, as well as Monarchies; And therefore he truly added what follows [I say, that they who live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; [Page 222] not they that live under popular government: for they find no such matter. But as I said before why this should be im­puted to the Romans, and Grecians only; not to the Ita­lians, Germans, and others who live equally with them in Common-wealths, I cannot discerne; and therefore cannot chuse but be offended with that which follows most hyperbolically false.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XII. Mr. Hobbs his impossible remedy to a supposititious dis­ease. The learning of the Grecians and Romanes a­gain vindicated. Mr. Hobbs his opinion of the necessity of forbidding the use of the Greek and Ro­man Authors no where to be found but in Julian the Apostate.

IN summe, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more pre­judicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such Books to be publickly read, without presently applying such corrctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their venome. Here he sets down a monstrous disease and applyes an impossible salve: that is, that our Grammar Schools (where these books are taught) should be supplyed throughout this large kingdome with men of Mr. Hobbs his suffici­ency; (for I think none else would serve his turn) none else having discovered this fault in these books, and yet in all the World who are delighted with learning, these books are taught in the initiation of scholars, both Chri­stian and others. Only, I remember Julian the Apostate made a Law by which he thought to have gotten as much ground upon Christianity, as by any that he ever made, which was, that no Christian should read any humanity-books, nor have them read to them. Mr. Hobbs should [Page 223] have been his Chaplain What follows in that Para­graph is nothing but a comparing this disease in a com­mon-wealth with the biting of a mad Dog in an humane body, which I willingly enough assent unto, and so let it pass, and move to the next Pargraph which begins thus.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XIII. This Paragraph of Mr. Hobbs when the powers are made contra-distinct and opposite to one another af­firmed from the Primitive practices. The decrees of the antient Councils not passed into Laws, till they were confirmed by the Emperour. The Authors rea­son of this truth superadded.

AS there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Souls in a man; so there be also that think there be more Souls (that is more soveraigns) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a supremacy against the soveraignty; Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civil. Certainly this word against, makes this faulty, and therefore we shall find that in the primitive times de­crees of Councils themselves grew not into laws, but by the confirmation of Emperours. But the consideration of this Paragraph I leave to the Doctors in the Church of Rome whom it principally concerns, but not us, whose Ecclesiastick Laws are confirmed by the Civil, and there­fore need not this dispute: And yet I can add one clause to confirm his conclusion (stronger I think, than any he produced,) which is, that dominion is over persons not parts; he who hath dominion over the Soul hath dominion over the body, which is governed by the Soul; and he who hath dominion over the body hath likewise dominion over the Soul, without which it cannot act any obedience [Page 224] or disobedience. And so I let this alone for the present, and come to the next disease, which is page (172.)

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XIV. Mr. Hobbs his reflection upon the Government of England observed and censured; his parallel from the diversity of Souls not enforcing. The comparison of leavyes of money not rightly applyed to the nutri­tive faculty. The power of conduct not well resembled to the Motive faculty in the soul.

IN the midst of that page this disease begins thus. Some­times also in the meer Civil Government, there be more than one Soul; as when the power of leavying money, (which is the Nutritive faculty) has depended upon a general assem­bly; the power of conduct and command (which is the mo­tive faculty) on one man; and the power of making laws, (which is the rational faculty,) on the accidental consent not only of those two, but also of a third. There he turns his spleen against our Government in England, without name­ing it, but clearly intimating that state and condition which is fundamental to the constitution of our King­dome. I cannot imagine why, unless he had a mind to provoke the then present Usurper to be most tyranni­cal in his Government. For certainly this Government as established in Magna Charta at the first, was setled with so grave and weighty consideration, and such a serious manner of confirmation, as never any but the Law of God delivered on Mount Sinai (with thunder and such astonishments) and in it self so prudent, that nothing can reasonably more conduce to the perpetuity of a king­dome. But let us see what he saith (there is (saith he) more than one Soul.) I think it would trouble his Philo­sophy to answer these Arguments which are brought by [Page 225] those Philosophers who assert there are more in every man, as also to prove the contrary. But I let that alone, there is no enforcing that from this establishment; for all these several operations (which he speaks of) do arise from the same Soul, so that the lowest, even the giving of mo­ney to our King, is by his Authority, and that power is ensouled (as I may speak) by him. But as he is the Soul by which his subjects are enabled to leavy such mo­ny for his necessity and the necessities of the king­dome; so they are the body which must act by this pow­er, he enables them, for without his assent they cannot leavy that money from any but their own particular purses; this he compares to the Nutritive faculty, and indeed not amiss; for as that faculty is dispersed throughout the whole man and each part of him which doth receive nourish­ment; so these are dispersed throughout the whole king­dome, and indeed they in particular, and the whole king­dome in general receives nutriment in being protected in prosperity and safety, which the Monarch is enabled to do by these supplies. But yet he is mistaken in the ap­plication, when he calls this an act of the nutritive fa­culty, (viz.) to leavy money, that is afterwards an act of the King, who makes use of that assistance, to that pur­pose; this in the first act of bare leavying mony, looks like an act of exhausting or consumption rather than nu­trition. But as wise nature disposed those contributions, which the singular parts sometimes afford the fainting stomach by a return to their advantage afterwards so doth the wisdome of a King make those payrings from the o­ther parts produce their greater happiness and plenty: but still observe, this is not as if there were many, but one Soul. All is acted by the supreme power which enables the other to perform, what he doth. From hence he passeth to the King, (The power of conduct and command is (which is the motive faculty on one man.) Why he should call this the motive faculty I do not perceive, since that is Philosophically seated in the sensitive or ani­mal part; but the power of conduct or command must [Page 226] certainly be in the supreme and rational part, for where that is, it commands and governs the sensitive so that they move or acquiesce according to its conduct. But I would he had set down what he means by this faculty and how far he meant it, there would then have been something to be understood. There is no doubt but the King hath the power of conducting even in those things he named before and in those which follow, none of which can be a [...]ed without him, and therefore ought to have a higher faculty allowed him than that of Motion.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XV. Mr. Hobbs his reflection upon the House of Lords and Commons in Parliament. His supposed danger for want of the consent of one or either of these refuted. All humane constitutions subject to error. Govern­ment rightly so stiled, though without power to take away the lives or estates of Subjects. The several E­states in Parliament termed factious by Mr. Hobbs. No government absolutely and practically pure accord­ing to the definition of Politicians, but denominated from the predominant part. The soveraign not the representative of the Common-wealth, no more than the head is of a man. His instance of the Ʋnity in the holy Trinity impertinent. Ʋnity in subordina­tion.

ANd the power of making Laws (which is the rational faculty) on the accidentall consent not only of those two but also of a third. By the third he means the house of Lords, and here be understands that these three ma [...]e the rational part, which without doubt was necessarily requi­red to the act of conduct, as before; but he attributes no­thing [Page 227] in particular to the Lords; let them vindicate them­selves, and the House of Commons themselves, I shall only meddle with the inconveniences which arise out of this policie which he begins immediately to fall upon, this endangereth the Common-wealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Laws This danger I never found, but many times the stop of evil Laws, which have been projected by private men, or perhaps might pass one house, & faults which have been ob­served by one which were not taken notice of by the other. A multitude of Councellors gives safety to laws; a weaker understanding many times sees that which a greater over­looked: that which appears lovely to some, may be known to be faulty by others. But certainly these two houses being compounded of men of all conditions who must needs be acquainted with all the unhappinesses in the Go­vernment, cannot but be thought most fit to have the ex­aming and passing Laws for the Government. He goes on, but often for want of such nourishment as is most necessary to life and motion.] I doubt this can hardly be made out where the necessity of such contributions shall be made appear, but at such times when his rebellious principles have been infused, for without doubt where such necessities are the necessities of the Kingdome, and the King lacks the supplies proper to such motions as war defensive and offensive, the very state and condition of every man is endangered, and his doctrine of self-preser­vation will compel men to it, although they cast one eye upon the publick. But such things he will say have been done: it is true that the niggardliness of the People to such expences have brought the kingdome to destruction, I can call it no less; the same may be said of some Kings whose too much frugality has made them lack both men and hearts to serve their occasions. There is nothing humane that is not subject to error, and a possibility of being mistaken. But certainly this as little as any, because this assembly (as he calls them) are men selected for their estates and prudence, and because they are prudent, it is likely they are able, and because of their estates, it is [Page 228] reasonable to think that they should be willing to give their best assistance to the publick good. He goes on, for although few perceive that such government, is not go­vernment, but division of the Common-wealth into three factions, and call it mixt Monarchie Indeed I think that never man did conceive that this Government is not Go­vernment. Mr. Hobbs doth govern his servants, yet his government is limited with many more bounds than this is, and yet that is a government; he cannot take their cloaths from them, or their Estates, much less their lives or limbs, yet he is their Governour. And though he saith only a few did perceive, yet I think until he wrote this none did ever perceive three factions; factions do oppose one another, they are not joyned, neither do they co-operate in the same effect, as these do in all things which are done by them. And in this business it seems not to be a co-operation of equal shares in the work, but like an universal cause working with particular causes. The Sun with the same light shines upon a Rose, a Violet, and a Primrose. Yet with these particular specifical causes pro­duceth those various effects with those several subordinate powers to his, but they were not instituted for factions, nor are such, but subordinate to him, and to concurr with him in the legal settlement of that is good for the pub­lick it was therefore very ill phrased of him, to call the factions a mixt Monarchie. For my part I am of the O­pinion which I have expressed before, that there is no Government in the World so pure, that it hath no mix­ture in it, either Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, but the denomination in all these is from the predominant part; yet, (saith he) the truth is, that it is not one Inde­pendent Common-wealth, but three Independent factions. A­gain, factions; this needs not unless he can infuse factions, which I hope, he shall never be able to do either with this book or any other; and (saith he) not one represen­tative Person, but three. The vanity of this language I have heretofore spoken to. In a Monarchie the Monarch can­not be called the representative Person of the Common-wealth, [Page 229] no more than the head can be termed the repre­sentative of man, he is the head of this body politick, and governs it, but not represents it. He is so fond of that conceipt (as indeed it is the foundation of his whole po­litie) that the error mixeth it self in almost every page. But let us go on with him. [In the kingdome of God there may be three Persons Independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth.] Yes by him there may be twenty, a hundred, or a thousand, and indeed are so many; for as he makes a Person to be a man who represents another as Moses did God (of which I have treated at large in my former part against him) certainly there was a thousand such which represented him in his Kingdome in this World; and therefore this instance is nothing to the purpose, especially concerning the representation here treated of. Yes (saith he) this is without breach of unity in God who reigneth. There can be no doubt of it, for though God be repre­sented by a thousand several men, his unity is the same. And I may say of a King though he be represented in divers Provinces by divers Vice-royes, yet he is the same King and the only King. But where men reign that are subject to diversity of opinions (saith he) it cannot be so. What doth he mean by that? I think that where divers men are supremes that have divers opinions, there will be breach of Unity; For perfect Unity there is none such but in God, who being without composition is absolutely not one on­ly in the concrete, as created things are, but Unity which nothing else is, as there is no one man who is so at unity in himself, as not to differ from himself, now judging one thing, then another; yea at the same time, he may have combustion in himself by diversity of Arguments which a­rise in his thoughts at the same time so that he cannot imagine any perfect Unity amongst men: but yet when there is a subordination, that reduceth them to the nearest method of unity that may be; therefore where there shall be many supremes without subordination, there can be no unity: But where there is a subordination there [Page 230] we may find the greatest unity that this subject is capa­ble of, which will appear by my answer to what follows.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVI. The house of Commons not the King representative of the People. The King only the soveraign; the Peers the Councellors of the King. Mr. Hobbs his un­worthy expression of there soveraigns censured. The odiousness of his comparison of t [...]o men growing out of the sides of another, observed. The danger of cutting off those sprouts, assimilated to the removal of the two houses of Parliament.

THerefore (saith he) if the King bear the Person of the People, and the general Assembly also bear the Person of the People, and another Assembly bear the Person of a part of the People, they are not one Person and one Soveraign, but three Persons and three Soveraigns. I answer, the King is not the representative of the People, but their Sove­raign; neither doth he act any royal thing by their Au­thority, but by his own right; the House of Commons are the representative of the People, that is, the Com­mon People, when by the Soveraign they are called, and elected by them pro tempore, during their sitting in Parlia­ment: and as their beginning is by the Kings Writ, so their determination is by his dismission. This shews that although they may represent the People, yet he, not they, are Soveraigns. The house of Lords which he means by those who represent a part of the People, represent no body, but their posterity, for whom they act, other­wise they do that business the King calls them for, that is, to advise with him in the great and difficult affairs of the Kingdome; they are as Councellors not Soveraigns; [Page 231] he only Soveraign: and neither one house nor other sits in their sphere, but when he calls them, nor stayes after his dismission; nor when they are there can act any ma­terial matter concerning the Kingdome, (only advise and inform) but what he who is their Supreme and So­veraign enables them to do. So then there is but one So­veraign in England; though he most unworthily threw in such proud speeches to make them three He proceeds, and I with him. To what disease in the Natural body of a man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side with an head, armes, breast and stomach of his own; If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact. Thus he I answer, there is no need of this fancy of his to compare every publick disease with a natural, but if he had studied King CHARLES the first his most incomparable Book he would have found this composure not to have been a disease, but a perfect con­stitution of a healthy body: but since he makes this comparison, I shall tell him, that in such a man take a­way or cut off that humane sprout which grows out of the principal man, even he will quickly dye. I doubt not, but believe confidently it would be so with this politie.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVII. The propriety of the subject again asserted against Mr. Hobbs. His objection of the difficulty of raising mo­ney answered. The inconvenience of investing all propriety in the Crown. The convenience and de­corum of raising money in a parliamentary way. His late Majestie CHARLES the First, his incompara­ble essay to this purpose recommended to the author of the Leviathan. Mr. Hobbs his disaffection to the government of this Kingdom censured.

I Am now in p. the (137.) where, after he hath confessed that these diseases which have been hitherto named are of the greatest and most present danger: (that is his phrase) although a man would think that this form of Govern­ment that hath lasted so many hundreds of years could not be in so suddain or present danger; however he now en­ters upon others which, tho' less, are not unfit to be looked into. He begins, [as first, the difficulty of raising of mo­ney for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of War,] I must confess this is of dan­gerous consequence. [This difficulty ariseth from the Opi­nion, that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods exclusive of the Soveraigns right to the use of the same.] I have heretofore taught that men have proprieties in their estates, yet in cases of necessity, as in War, any mans house may be made a fort, any mans land digged to make a trench, with multitudes of the like Nature, according to the necessities and exigencies of the Common-wealth There­fore this propriety without necessity cannot be dangerous, nay, a man may say, that without this propriety we should [Page 233] not have a legal, but arbitrary Government, and that which he himself hath supposed to be the reason why a Com­mon-wealth is instituted would be frustrated, which is that men may peaceably sow and reap, and enjoy the profits of their industrie; which if the supreme might lawfully take away together with their estates for the support of his con­dition, it would quickly come to pass that an Estate in­vested in the Crown may be the prey of other Subjects, as it was with the Church revenue, which although in Queen ELIZABETHS time it was alienable to none but the Crown, yet we know that from thence it passed to mean Tenents, until King JAMES most happily gave a stop unto it, by enacting that there should be none after­ward passed to the Crown: so that this cannot fitly be termed a hinderance, without which a Common-wealth loseth the end for which it was instituted. But give me leave to speak to the main proposition it self. Why should it be difficult to raise just summes for the defence or good of the publick? every man hath an interest in it, and they are reasonable creatures, which will consider both their own and the publick benefit. I, but he will say it hath been so; let this be granted, it is true that all sins and wickednesses have been too, and certainly this is a mighty great one. But let him consider, whether this way of their consent to the performance of this duty be not a decent way of doing it. For first, we may consi­der that few Persons of great estate do know their own estate, much less a Monarch of a great kingdom. How then can he be able to give a just esteem of every private mans estate to proportion him justly to that service? this cannot be done but by such Persons who are universally acquainted with the generality; and without an equality upon some legal measure the Tax will be unjust and the execution (no doubt) worse. Secondly as to the making a Tax for such a supply the Commonaltie are necessary, for by them the Collection will be more speedy than by any other means, and therefore I think it a difficulty which may easily be taken away, by letting them see, what [Page 234] necessity there is of such an aid, (I mean not to meddle with these disputes,) and then no doubt but they will be so prudent in the execution of their trust, as to give a proper assistance, or else they are mad or worse. I will con­clude this point with that passage in those incomparable di­rections which that ever to be honored King CHARLES the First gave his son in his own words (which none else can imitate nearly, much less match) speaking of the Laws of this land which he should govern by, saith, [Which by an admirable temperance give very much to subjects industry, liberty and happiness, and yet reserve enough to the Majesty and prerogative of any King who ownes his People as subjects, not as slaves.] And I may say who can add any thing to what this most incomparable King hath writ down which is matchless? Yea what he speaks afterwards of the shifts Kings are put to, and the Comparison Mr. Hobbs makes of this disease to an ague, I let pass, and do only affirm that such discourses savour of an ill disposition to this go­vernment, and as I can guess, can tend to no good; nei­ther then when they were first printed nor afterwards. I mean to trouble the Reader no further with his observa­tions of these lesser diseases, as he terms them, in a Com­mon-wealth, but come close to a censure of this which I have formerly noted in this Book.

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVIII. The conclusion of all; the Authors just censure of this book of Mr. Hobbs.

FIrst I affirm, that it is not a book to be tolerated by Kings or supremes: because according to his doctrine con­cerning the original of all such there is none in the Univer­sal World: for if it be necessary (as he saith it is in the 17 Chap. where he handles the generation of Common-wealths, and in the 18 Chap. where he sets down the institution of a [Page 235] Comm [...]n wealth, and in the 13 Chap. This only is the wa [...] to erect a Common wealth, which way, &c. Now if this be the only way which have shewed not only not to be practised but not practicable, there not only is none in the World, but there can be none hereafter, and therefore this doctrine is not to be tole­rated, either by them who think themselves supremes, or may hereafter be such, because they neither are nor shall be such supremes as he describes, and they (by his doctrine) ought to be.

Again it is to be abhorred by supremes, because it leaves too easie and open a gap, yea a countenance for rebellion: for if the Law of Nature be only to take care for a mans own particular (as he saith it is) and that every man should endeavour and ought by any means to free himself from death or wounds, or a­ny thing which may render his life unhappy, how easie it is for these suggestions to be whispered in the ear, of people upon any mishap in government, without which none can be, let the rea­der think. (I will not teach him.) So that by this doctrine the de­liverance from private misery may justify the execution of a pub­lick ruine. So that whether we look upon the generation of su­premes, (concerning which there neither is nor can be any such,) or upon the preservation thereof, there is according to his doctrine, no security in the throne of soveraignty, but it may justly be disturbed by their subjects upon any terrors struck in them from a jealousie that they may be deprived of their con­tented being.

Now as this book is dangerous for Kings and Supremes; so it is in some conclusions destructive to the Comfort & happy be­ing of subjects, when he takes away their propriety: for if they have no title to the enjoyment of their lives and estates, but these must be at the will of the Lord only (that is of the supreme) which he affirmed but a little before, then the very end of poli­ty is lost, which is that men may quietly enjoy the fruits of their own vertue and industry, may sow and reap, work and receive the benefit of their labour without fear of loss or injury. It is true that there is an impossibility that there should be any such thing, but to that man who is guarded by Gods providence, who alone can foresee and deliver a man from all danger: But yet humane providence, with good Laws and Vertuous execution of them may protect men in safety against all humane oppression, [Page 236] which in wisely settled Common-wealths ought to be done; and although a Supreme may by force wring from a subject what is his, yet he doth it unjustly and shall be responsible for it to his su­preme▪ which again he hath denyed by saying that a Soveraign can doe nothing unjustly. So that in such a Case there is no room for any man who may have his Estate taken away without injustice, (that is, justly without breach of Law.) It is not fit then to be to­lerated by Soveraignes, or Subjects.) I may yet go further and af­firm it not fit to be tolerated by Christians, because it robs them of all Assurance of heaven, and all the Covenants of God by say­ing that they have no assurance that their holy Books are reveal­ed by God, which if it were true, their confidence and trust in Gods promises are vain, and all the Religion performed to our Blessed Saviour, which only depends upon that assurance they have of the Revelation made in that Book.

Lastly, it is not to be tolerated by those Theists who think there is a God; because all such do think that this God hath many glo­rious attributes; Is infinite in Essence, infinite in all his attributes, power, wisdom, justice, mercy; all which do propagate in men a fear and love of him, and are in themselves so excellent, that the least of them (if any one may be said the least) is to be valued by every knowing man beyond a world: yet his legislator, his su­preme must have power to Eclipse this glorious Sun, and to have so much as he will, and no more be revealed of him.

Again, this glorious God is by all Theists apprehended to be the governour of Heaven and Earth, rewarder of good men and a punisher of all such as work wickedness, when he makes him to reward only and punish his own decrees and acts, not those of men; And therefore I think it a Book not to be suffered amongst Christians, and I am confident, would not be tolerated amongst such kingdomes which do not acknowledge our Saviour, but only one God.


To Mr. Hobs, or the Reader, or both; I de­dicate this short POSTSCRIPT.

CAP. I. A short Introduction declaring the reason of this POSTSCRIPT.

IN my Epistle before this Treatise, I have said that I heard of some amendments Mr. Hobs would make in his Leviathan, and upon that stop'd these papers which were intended for the Press; being desirous rather that he should do it himself with his own hand, than I; a work which would be very beneficial to his own soul, and more satisfactory to those Readers upon whom his name had gain'd an Authority; but after a tedious expectation, I found nothing corresponding to my Expectation. Wherefore I urged this Treatise to the Press, where I thought to have it Printed when I came to London; but I was no sooner arrived, than a cru­el Cold locked me up in my Chamber, which gave me leasure to enquire after him whilest these Notes were Printing, and found that he had Printed his Leviathan in Latine, which I never before had notice of; I sent for it and viewed it, hoping that it might prove the designed retractation as St. Aug. calls his, or at least a recogniti­on as Bellarmine calls his of the like nature; but truly I found little to that purpose, only the virulency of some English Phrases, now and then more gently expressed in Latine; And at the latter end, which was not in the Title, I found an Appendix consisting of three Chapters, the first of which was of the Nicene Creed, the second of He­resie, the third an Answer to some Objections against his Leviathan.

[Page 2]In these three I hoped to have found much matter which might shew his Ingenuity, in the true censuring his own writings; but indeed very little, what I find I shall deliver here, especially reflecting any such thing as hath already passed my pen, for other things which will deserve whole and entire discourses, I shall reserve to a future consideration, as God shall please to spare me life, and my Episcopal duties afford me leasure.

CAP. II. Of things omitted in this Discourse.

I Begin with his Chapter upon his Nicene Creed which he enters upon in his 328 page, where I omit his observation upon that Phrase (I believe in) and that likewise which is in the bottom of the precedent, and the subsequent Page, about the exposition of that phrase, which is not in the Creed, that is, Deus est, God is, which is not in the Creed, for the language of the Creed is (I believe in one God the Father Almighty) in which it is not said there is a God, but supposed, and he affirmed to be one, and he the Father Almighty, so that if we must be forc'd to make one or more propositions of it, they must be these (I believe there is one, and only one God, and that he is Father Almighty,) where is, is a copula not a substantive as he makes it; and upon which he makes his discourse, but I let it pass as he might well have done being nothing conducing to his or my dis­pute, 'tis true, à tertio adjacente ad secundum valet argu­mentum, and therefore when I affirm there is one God, it must be imply'd there is a God, but this proposition there is one only God, supposeth and implicitely affirms it not by any express propositions.

CAP. III. The Nature of Light examined.

I Come to page the 330. which opposeth something that I have delivered, there you shall find in the let­ter (a) which signifieth the Opponent, a question ask­ed, Quid est lumen? and answering himself, lumen ut mi­hi videtur phantasma est, non res existens. This propositi­on I have opposed in my first part, Cap. 4. Sect. 2. where I have divers arguments for it, and the Reader may ob­serve my Answers to his Arguments, no one of which is touched here, but a strange new Argument, which I now proceed to examine; whether I may term it argument or illustration of his conclusion I care not, which is thus fra­med; Exempli gratia si inter oculum & Candelam vitrum sta­tuas, cujus superficies ex multis planis constat, certo modo dis­positis, multae tibi videbuntur candelae, scimus tamen unicam ibi esse candelam veram, & proinde caeteras omnes mera esse phantasmata, idola, hoc est, ut dicit sanctus Paulus nihil. For my part I cannot observe where the force of this Argu­ment lies, to prove that lumen, or light, is a meer Phan­tasm or nothing, this light shews the Candle, or if he will, represents it, now what represents another must be like it; but nothing cannot be like a thing, being clean contrary, or rather privatively or negatively opposed to it, therefore if light were nothing, it could not repre­sent the Candle; but perhaps the force may be couched in these words, Multae tibi videbuntur Candelae, there shall many candles appear, to wit, by the reflection of those many plains of glass, but surely this no way enforceth his conclusion, for every one of these plaines (for all I know) represents the true Candle, and are so far from be­ing nothing, as they must therefore be something; be­cause they represent something; but they may by a false reflection multiply the Candle, and make it seem many; what if it does? Does the erroneous representing make [Page 4] the representor nothing? certainly no; for then every man who tells a lye should say nothing; for that lye is a false representation; we see that light makes us see the Candle from whence it comes; and indeed any body else in the Room where it is; truly, if it be not abused by some Hocus Pocus tricks, or such devices as those jug­ling glasses he mentions, but the abuse lies in the plains in the glass, which returns the representing light wrong ways, not in the light it self, which is retorted, he might therefore from hence fitter call that nothing, which abu­seth the medium, than the light which is abused; he pro­ceeds in the same place with a strangely unnecessary dis­course to this purpose as it seems to me, neque tamen (saith he) earum una est verior Candela, quam reliquae quatenus ap­parent. I need repeat no more if there be strength in any part of his discourse it is in this; but here is none, for although none of these Images of the Candle, is the Can­dle, yet they are things, such things as did represent the Candle, for the Candle could not be represented to the eye, by that which is nothing, the thing that represents another and that which is represented are two, but both of them must be things, or neither; but now it may be replyed to me that this is not Mr. Hobs his opinion, but the Objectors, I answer with Mr. Hobs who is personated by (b) ita est so it is, so that although (a) seemed to object this, yet Mr. Hobs assents to it.

CAP. IV. The Nature of Hypostasis.

ANd in the 331. he proceeds thus, Sed Patres Ecclesiae illis temporibus, tum ante, tum post concillium Nicenum, in scriptis suis vocem Hypostasis videntur alio modo interpretare, my­sterium Trinitatis Christianis omnibus intelligibile reddere cupien­tes. The meaning of this is, that the Fathers, both before and after the Council of Nice, gave another sence of the word Hypostasis, and (saith he) They thought best to do it by the similitude of fire, light, and heat, the fire they refer'd to the Father, the light to the Son, the heat to the holy Spirit, in which similitude (saith he) the congruity would perhaps be accu­rate, but that fire, splendor, (here he changes the term light) heat, neither are substances, nor were thought so by the Fathers, chiefly such as were Aristotelians (of which kind he can produce very few Ancient) unless (saith he) Ignis po­natur pro ignito, fire be put for a fiery thing.

SECT. II. That a Particular Fire is an Hypostasis.

I Will stop here, and make this Note that I can guesse, that never man before him said that a particular fire was not an Hypostasis, for Hypostasis being nothing but an individual substance which then is the subiect of acci­dents, no man can deny that to fire, yes (saith he) unless fire be put for a fiery thing, certainly there is no man that sees or reads this word fire, but it represents to him a fiery thing, as when he reads these words, Earth, Water, Aire, they make him think of Earthy, Watry, Airy things, there is the same reason for fire, and what he puts down that Aristotelian Philosophers should be of his mind, I am perswaded he can produce none that ever affirmed that a particular fire was not an Hypostasis; but [Page 6] he has reason for what he speaks, and therefore follows this discourse with (enim) homo enim, & ignem, & lumen, & calorem extinguit quoties libet. The sum of this is, that be­cause a man can at his pleasure extinguish Fire, Heat, and Light, and that so infirm a thing as man is, should extin­guish so substantial Creatures created by an omnipotent God, and so reduce it to nothing, We are not commanded to believe it, neither is it credible; these are his very words as near as I can translate them, and I think they are truely done.

SECT. III. His Discourse Censured for changing his Termes.

NOw I can observe one thing, which is too frequent a fallacy throughout his Book, which is a changing his Termes, which ought not to be when a man brings a Philosophical reason for what he speaks; this appears in those main and substantial Termes of this discourse, to wit, extinguishing fire in the first proposition, and that inlarging which fallows extinguisht, & ad nihilum redigere, to annihilate it. Oertainly as nothing can create but God, so nothing can annihilate but he himself, for annihilation is reducing a thing to nothing, as Creation is a produ­cing some creature, or bringing a thing out of nothing; now although nothing can annihilate but God, yet not only man, but many inferiour creatures to man can ex­tinguish creatures of his, as in particular, water or earth can extinguish fire, and both watry and earthy bodies, this extinguishing is putting out the Candle, a choaking the Fumes, but annihilation destroys the very matter, which no Aristotelian will allow to be possible for any cre­ated thing to do, and therefore he was much to blame in a deceitful manner, to mingle Truths and Falshoods as if they were one thing.

SECT. IV. His Argument Confuted.

BUt now let us consider his Inference, which is, that it is not credible that so infirm a thing as man should destroy the works of God: Alas! what a pittiful Plea is this, if man by his own sole power should do it; this might look like an argument, but if man doth it by Di­vine assistance, as the first and moving cause, why should it be hard to think so; I hope the Almighty cannot be denyed to have a power of granting such powers; or if he should, we may produce those invincible instances which are formerly given, and thousand more to prove the contrary, where God hath given to creatures infe­riour to man, abilities to do such works, as water, earth, and the like; yea, fire hath such a power to dry up water, to destroy wood, and the like. And indeed, let him but consider how any man hath a power given him of God, by which he is enabled to destroy another man, a much more noble creature than fire, and then it need not be thought strange that he should have the abilities to do the less; there is enough I think spoke to this.

CAP. V. His Answer to quid est Hypostasis examined.

I Will skip to page 339. where you shall find in the midst of that page a question put by (A) What is it which the Graecians mean by Hypostasis, and the answer fra­med thus, Quum aliquid intueris quod vocas album, in En­glish thus, When you behold any thing which you call white, you impose that name to a substance or a body subject; suppose marble, although the sharpness of your sight cannot penetrate the substance of marble, or any other thing; all this I let pass as a [Page 8] supposed Truth, and serves but for an Introduction to what follows; which is album igitur, a white thing, therefore is the name of a body which is subsisting by its self, not the name of a colour; he is out here very much without doubt, it is the name both of the body and the colour, a body coloured; as when we see a man in his cloaths cloathed; it is more and another thing then when we see him naked; so when I see a body adorned with white, it is more then when I see only a body which may be in any other colour besides white; He proceeds & impositum, this name is imposed for a certain appearance, or as the Graecians speak [...] or [...], which seems to be somewhat, but is nothing indeed.

SECT. II. That Colour is a Real thing.

SUre here again he crosses both me and himself, he cros­seth me in that I have delivered in my first part of Censures upon his Leviathan, Cap. 4. Sect. 2. himself as you may observe Sect. 3. I will begin with himself, he affirms colour to be nothing but perturbed Light, or light by reflection from some uneven body. Now then, if this be so, then co­lour is light, then it must be something, not a meer phan­tasme, a nothing as he tearms it; nay, I dare affirm, if it be but a phantasme, yet it is something, ens intentionale, although not a reale, an intentional, although not a real thing; for first consider, it is the work of a noble power, the Phancy, if we take it for the operation, which is the art of Phancying any thing, but if you take it for that eminent effect which is wrought by that operation, and left in the memory, it must be something, and has an abode and being there, it must needs be something therefore, so that if we consider these colours only in the Phansie, they are something if we consider them as he hath taught us, in that being they have without our heads, they are real things; but to write to that which most especially re­flects upon me my self, that colour is nothing, I could [Page 9] wish the reader so much leasure as to peruse what I have writ in my former treatise, and he will find that Mr. Hobs hath neither answered those arguments I there produced, nor confuted any answer I gave to his arguments; I will add something more, and consider (good Reader) if it be not rational; that which not only works real effects, (which I have formerly shewed invincibly that Colours do) but like­wise in its self suffers change must needs be something; for nothing cannot be changed, it is a pure non-entity, and will be so alwayes, and when it is changed upon any supposition of such a thing, it must be changed to something: Now colours we see changed from white, to redder or greener, and therefore must needs be something: If he shall say, it is but a diverse ima­gination, we shall cleare that by the examination of his following discourse, which is this, Quam apparitionem, which apparition without some cause and foundation we sufficiently understand is impssible, viz. white can­not be without some substance to subsist to the ap­parition which is its cause, and as Logicians speak, its subject here is a great deal of truth in this discourse, but I can find nothing that Proves his conclusion, which is, that colour is nothing, nay, I will retort his discourse to him and prove his conclusion false by it, which thus I do, That which subsists to White must subsist to something, or else that which requires or needs something to subsist to it, must be something, for nothing is nothing, and needs nothing to subsist to it, nor can any thing be said to subsist to nothing, for any entity added to nothing, makes it something, which is most abhorring to nothing. Again, whatso­ever hath a cause is somthing, but these Apparitions have a cause according to him here and elsewhere, for as he makes refracted light in other places to be the cause, so here he makes the subject to be the cause of them, the major is evident, for nothing can cause nothing, for although God by his almighty hand can annihilate any thing what he pleaseth, yet that anni­hilation [Page 10] is not so properly a production of nothing, as a destruction of a Being; for there is no existence of that nothing, either to or in another, but a take­ing away of that Being which did formerly exist; so that there can be no Existence of nothing, and there­fore to say that nothing is supported or subsisted by a Substance, seems to be a contradiction: That which follows in this Paragraph, is nothing to his purpose, I let it pass therefore, and come to Page 340. and skip divers things which indeed might deserve a sharp Censure, and prosecute only such things which op­pose what I have heretofore judged mistakes in him, and to that purpose in the formerly 340. Page, you may perceive, that the Objector (A) puts the Que­stion.

CHAP. V. His Definition of Substance by Ens Examined.

QƲid ergo est Substantia? what is substance? and he is answered by (B) Idem quod Ens, the same with a thing, that is, whatsoever is truly existing, distinct from phan­tasme and name; this definition or description of sub­stance I must blame, it being only a fuller and clearer expression of that of which I immediately before dis­coursed, that all these things which we commonly call accidents, are nothing but imaginations, or meer names put to nothing existing, and I will oppose to this that which he delivered in the preceeding page, where he saith, that the Latines call the subject of these accidents, eus, subjectum, suppositum, substantiam, basom, & fundamentum. Let me urge hence, whatsoever is a foundation is a foundation of somthing, there­fore these must be somthing to which substance is the foundation: consider a little (good Reader) that I may [Page 11] make all things clear to the most easy capacity; can the Reader think that that heat which scorched his or my hand is nothing? I speak not of those poin­ted Attomes, of which some write that they cause heat, but this heat which you and I feel so sensibly, can any think it is nothing? or that cold which be­nums my hand now whilst I am writing, is that no­thing? why should we then be troubled with nothing? or that sharpness which enabled the knife or bullet to peirce my flesh, is that nothing? or that they are meer names? which certainly, as such hurt no man, or that they are meer phantasmes? can any man think that the meer phantasme of one man can warm, cool, or hurt another? I remember, I think, I have read in Parnelsus, That if one mans inward man be too hard for ano­thers, he may with an engine, as he describes, draw another to him many miles distance. I am not peremptory in the Author, having not my books about me, but I have certainely read it, but did never hear or read that by his fancy, a man could cool or warm another, or support such a burthen as we see Carpenters or Buil­ders do by a Mathematical disposing of those mate­rials which they use: Nay, give me Leave to tell the Author of this Paradon, that no man can think that those habits which dispose any man to a ready acting vertuously or vitiously are nothing, or but fancies or names. Nay, I will tread one step further, if his doctrine were true, those promised joyes of Heaven, which we hope for, and those dreaded torments of Hell, which wicked men are threatned with by God, should be no­thing but empty names or fancies, which appeares a most horrid thought to a Christian man; for these are not bodies, and therefore by him at the best but fancies. I will here make this observation, that when men vent extravagant opinions, and such as are not usual in Philo­sophy, intending perhaps they should not proceed be­yond their own condition, (which is only Philosophy) and give plausible reasons to perswade those opinions, [Page 12] they believe not, nor can foresee, what ill consequencies they may have in Divinity, but they are like new Laws, which may seem reasonable at first, but nothing but time and experience can assure the benefit of them.

SECT. II. Many Errors in his citing Scripture for his Opinion.

ANd now Reader give me leave to look a little back upon what I skipt before, which is at the top of Page 340. his Answer to that question, how is Hypostasis taken in the new Testament? His Answer is, after the same manner as it is by other Writers, that manner is it which we just now treated of: And then consider what fearful con­sequencies will follow out of his instances; his first is, Heb. 1.3. Our Saviour is called the Character of his person, here (saith he) the word Hypostasis (or person as we render it) that is the substance to the Image of that substance: And then observe by this Philosophy, Christ is nothing, being not the substance; and he adds, to make his conclusion more apparent, he is in the same place called splendor, the splendor of the Divine glory, (that is his Translation) and therefore he adds, five, or which is the same, lumen de Lucido, light out of a lucid body (so I render his words, for Lucidum or the light body, is the subject or substance, and light is the accident, or nothing rather which proceeds out of it; so that by this Philosophy, the Father should be a substance, and the Son but an accident, or nothing: Let us go on with him, Heb. 1.11. And the first faith is called the Hypo­statis of things hoped for, that is (saith he) for the Speech is Metaphorical) Faith is the Fundament of hope: Now Reader, by his Philosophy, Faith should be a substance, a body, (for he allows no other substance but bodies) which without doubt is a quality inhaerent in the Soul, and by him the things hoped for, or (to give him what scope his words can bear) the hope of future blessings which is founded upon faith is nothing, or at the best but [Page 13] a Phancy: He produceth another Text, 2 Cor. 9.4. where I do not find the word Hypostasis, nor any thing re­lating to his intent: But now, that the Reader may dis­cern how these Texts are abused by him, I will lend such assistance to him as my present conceipt administers to my self; let him consider how in the first to the Hebrews the 3. it is said, that the Son of God is the brightness of his glory, here first is not any mention of Lumen de Lucido, of Light proceeding out of a Lucid body, as he expres­seth it; but the splendor or most Illustrious appearance of that unutterable Glory, which was manifested by the Incarnation of the Son of God, and his conversation a­mongst us in the flesh, which indeed clouding and vail­ing the extremity of that infinite glory which was in the Deity, with his humanity, he made it more clearly and brightly appear to us then it could have been discerned by humane eyes without it, and in that regard he may well be said to be the brightness of his Glory, because it made that glory which was invisible in its self, visible to us, and those glorious Attributes with it, which were not possible for Nature to reach; or any way compre­hend to be apprehended by Faith in him, the Son; And in all this we find neither substance, nor substantiated, which should be founded upon it; But then to proceed to the second passage in that verse, which he made the first, (and the express Image or Character of his person) conceive Reader if you can, how it is possible to make an Image of substance meerly substance, not cloathed with any accident, colour, figure, or any such thing which is subject to sense, for these are the only things by which we can Caracterize any thing, and these are not in God, this Image or Character thereof must needs be some sub­stantial thing, and that must needs be some substantial thing, and that must be represented to the understand­ing, (not the sense) which only can apprehend substan­ces, especially abstracted from all accidents; then con­sider whose Character it must be, to wit Gods, who is infinite, immense, unimmaginable, unintelligible, not to [Page 14] be represented by any thing less than himself, it must needs therefore be another of the same, another it must be, because the Representors and the Represented must be Two, the same it must be, because nothing, no Art or Conceipt or any thing, can imagine any thing to Cha­racterize God but God; here then in clear termes are two Persons and one Nature; and not his imagination of a substance and accident, or indeed nothing.

Then we will explain his second place, Heb. 11.1. faith is there the Hypostasis of things hoped for, we read it sub­stance, there will be no difference about that, he ingeni­ously confesseth it to be a Metaphor, and surely so it is, and the likeness consists in this, that as a substance is it out of which accidents are produced, which supports and maintains them; so hope (as he expounds it) or the things hoped for, that is the blessings of God either in this or the other world (for Gods blessings in this world may be hoped for) arise out of Faith, in which God hath founded them, and which is the sole and only thing by which God hath Covenanted to continue and preserve them to us; thus taking it Metaphorically, as he, but then take it litterally, as the Schools distinguish subjectum quo, and subjectum quod, a subject by which this subsists in ano­ther, and a subject which supports really the inherent ac­cident; so may I speak of substance, or fundamentum, the foundation of hope without doubt is the reasonable soul of man, out of which this act or habit is produced, and to which it doth adhere or inhere; this soul is the subje­ctum or fundamentum quod, but faith the substance, or fun­damentum quo; by the mediation of which, hope is there fixed and setled; for he that hopes for blessings from God, without Gods revealed promises, which are appre­hended only by faith, trusts in his own wit, not in God: thus this Text being explained, there is no violation of­fer'd to any Term, but each word hath its proper and genuine signification, and it lays open a clear and mani­fest truth, which cannot be denyed; but contrary wish by his explanation, every word is wrested out of its pro­per [Page 15] sense and meaning; for faith which is an accident, a habit, must be a substance, hope to exist in the Aire where is no foundation, no substance to support it.

SECT. III. Some other things Examined.

HE comes next in that 340 Page to enquire, Quid est essentia? which is answered, it is not distinguished from substantiae; the next quaere is, what is substans, the same with ens, the same with a thing; that is, whatsoever is truly existing, distinct from fancy and name: Here the Reader may discern how violently he prosecutes the former conceipt, that there is no real thing besides sub­stance, as if to inhere, or adhere, were not to exist, but only subsistance were existance; but I shall prosecute this no further now, it being a conclusion to which I do not remember that I have objected any thing heretofore, which are the only things I intended to vindicate in this paper; next he enters upon a long discourse how the Greeks and Latines have distorted names as he termes it, which I omit upon the same reason before, although a most unhappy perswasion of his; But in pag. 342. in his discourse of a person, he opposeth what I have delivered in my 34 Cap. against his sixteenth, which I find much alter'd in his Latine Edition, and if the Reader will trouble himself so much as to peruse that Treatise of mine, he will find that Mr. Hobs hath added nothing here that was not in the former, nor answered any thing of my discourse, which I doubt not to affirm, doth much more clearly explain the nature of a person, then any thing he hath put down for it; and I will pass the rest of this Cap. as not opposing my former censures of him; so likewise his second Cap. of Heresie, which was only writ to excuse himself from Heresie, which I never charg'd him with as I remember, and do here so far ac­quit him, that I think he never can be judged for one a­mongst [Page 16] us, nor ever will be, for by him a man may deny any Truths if Leviathan exact it; yea, he must be of Le­viathans Religion, and then he can never be judged an Heretick, because Leviathan must be supream judge, but withal, I think he doth deliver Heretical Doctrine; and that that very conclusion is one, according to the Laws established in our Nation: And I will pass to his third Cap. which is Intitled of certain objections against Levi­athan, and is entered upon Page 359.

CAP. I. His Exordium Censur'd.

HE begins this third Cap. which concerns the objecti­ons against Leviathan, with the story of these last unhappy times, where he raiseth the cause of the War, only from the difference between the Episcopal men and Presbyterian: I will not undertake to rake up that Ken­nel, although perhaps I might be able to speak some­thing pertinent, but this I dare affirm, that although the Rebellious party had an animosity against the Epis­copal, as they had against all Authority, until they had made themselves sole Governors; yet their cheif aime was to pluck down the Regals, and in order to that, it was necessary first to take down Episcopy, which was a support of it; and indeed you shall find that almost all Treasons do pretend Religion; that under the cloak of holyness, they may cover such horrid impieties as must be acted by such parties: It is in vain toe give instances which are much too frequent: but then as he well ob­serves, P. 359. towards the bottom, when the Episcopacy was plucked down, Nulla amplius potestas nemansit inter Anglos. There was no power left among the English of dis­cerning Heresy, but all Sects appeared in writing, and pub­lishing what divinity every one would. I believe him and [Page 17] the mischeife of the indulgence is yet sensible amongst us, well upon that opportunity saith he Page 360. the Author liveing at Paris used that Liberty in write­ing: But oh! how much more honourable had it been for him to have writ against it, and to have foreseen those unhappy events, which might have been easily discerned without the help of his Mathematicks: but I go on, & jura quidem Regalia, (saith he) the rights of Kings, he hath egregiously defended both in temporal and and spiritual matters: here I must pause, and in a little, put down somethings more Largly delivered in the preceeding Treatise; he hath supervindicated the Kingly authority in spirituall things, for he hath made him above God himself; so that if God himself command one thing in his word, and the King command another, we must obey the King; he hath done as much in tem­poral things; for although God by his infinite pow­er confirms the Laws of men, concerning meum & tuum, in appropriation of their temporal estates; yet he gives Ahab leave rightly to take Naboths vine­yard; Nay I speak it freely, as he hath exalted it in some things too high, so in some conditions he hath made it nothing, in regard that he hath made every man King of the whole world by nature, which na­tur cannot be put off whilst he is a man; and there­fore whatsoever any man, either by fraud or force, can get from him, is but a just acquiring that which was his natural right; consider then, whether this be egregiè vindicare jura Regalia, egregiously to vindicate the Regal rights, but (saith (A) for all this is spoke by the Objector) whilst he endeavoured to prove this out of Scripture, he lapsed into unheard Opinions, which by most Divines are accused of Heresie and Atheisme; certainly the Objector spoke truely, and (B) puts him to the proof, what are those opinions saith he, and so now I will apply my self to such things as reflect upon my former Treatise, omitting such other unhand­some expressions, which if I live, I am likely in a fuller way to treat of.

CAP. II. In which is censured his Definition of Religion.

THat which immediately follows his making God a Body, which is abominable, but I will not speak of it here but page 361. towards the bottome he enters upon a third Objection, which I have censur'd in my former Treatise, Cap. 13. Sect. 4. which is thus framed by (A) the Objector, Timor inquit invisibilium potentiarum, the fear of invisible powers, whether those powers be feigned by the man who fears, or conceived from Fables publickly permitted, is Religion; but from them which are not publickly permitted, Superstition; quando vero, when the powers which are feared are true, it is true Religion.

Thus far the Objection; and first I commend his Latine Edition better then the English, for in his Latine Edition he changed this word (Fables) which is used amongst us for a vain or foolish relation, and put in Hystories, which hath a more graceful acceptance; so that the sense is, that Religion is drawn from Histories publickly permit­ted, which is a milder expression, although the best will be bad enough, as you shall see presently.

That fear, and reverential fear of these invisible pow­ers, is an Act of Religion, I think no wise man will de­ny, but that Religion should be shallowed up with fear, and should be nothing else (as he seems to require) is too much; for therefore in that 6 Cap. where these words are, (as that Cap. consists of nothing but definitions, and these definitions pointed at in the Margent) he puts in the Margent against this (Religion) so that this was his definition of Religion, of which it is but one single Act, there being many more of a higher nature proceeding out of it; for Religion being as I defined it, and as it is [Page 19] generally used, that part of Justice by which we give God that Honour and Worship is due to him; certainly, faith in what he speaks, trust and hope in what he pro­miseth, Love of those excellencies which we discern in him, are much more requisite and due to God then any fear, but a Reverential fear which flowes out of those other; fear opposeth trust, and faith, and love: and con­sider again, he divides Religion only according to the divers application of this fear to the object; so that one way it is Religion, another Superstition, if conceived of Histories, permitted Religion, if otherwise Superstiti­on; when the powers are true powers, it is true Religi­on; any man may draw the other conclusion out of these premises, if the powers be false, it is false Religion.

SECT. III. The Termes are so put as cannot agree in the Definitum, with some Scriptures examined.

AGain, consider that he puts these Termes Powers In­visible, without any limitation; so that the fear of Angels or Devils is Religion; for although he seems to be against the spirituality of those dominions good or bad, (of which, God willing, I mean to treat more fully hereafter) yet he doth not deny them to be invisible, and then the fear of them must be Religion, which in­deed is only due to God, and therefore not to be ad­mitted in that generality; but this is only an objection by (A) let us see what (B) answers; His answer is thus, Idem asseritur, the same is asserted by Ecclesiastes, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom. I will not examine the place where it is, I remember the sentence perfectly, but do wonder what he can collect hence for his purpose; this fear Ecclesiastes speaks of, is the fear of the Lord, his, of invisible Powers; there are other powers invisible be­sides, which are governed and commanded by him, and [Page 20] therefore he deserves all awe, fear, and reverence from us; but they, some of them, I mean the ill Angels or Devils, hatred and contempt as is evident; so that the fear of the Lord is one thing, and the fear of the Invisible powers is another, much more large then the former: Again, Ecclesiastes saith, That the fear of the Lord is the begin­ning of wisdom, when without question Religious worship is that which perfects a man so far as he is capable of per­fection in this world, and is the perfection of wisdom; and therefore out of this Text it cannot be deduced, that the fear of Invisible powers is Religion, which is mans chief perfection: Consider good Reader the truth of Ecclesiastes, how it consists with what I have deliver'd; when a man shall be taught that there is an invisible Agent, who by his Almighty power, and Infinite wisdom, made and still governs this Universe, and will one day judge us men according to our works; then he trembles at the apprehension of it, and that causeth him to seek out which way he may please him, and stop the fury of his wrath from falling upon him, and act accor­dingly: Thus wisdom is begun, but afterwards this same man out of these beginnings, proceeds to search out Gods will and believe it, to trust and rely upon his promises, to be enamoured with God, and delighted with his excellencies, with following Acts far exceed in the worship of God and his Honour, that first of fear only; so that although the fear of God may introduce and begin Religion, yet unless a man go further, it is not Religion, nor that it is can that Text prove, but he hath another Text which I wonder what he can do with it to this purpose, which is,

SECT. IV. How that Text the Fool hath said in his Heart there is no God, can be applied to his purpose.

THat the Fool hath said in his heart there is no God; certain­ly if he said so in his heart, he could not fear God, but that because he thinks there is no God, he could not fear him; therefore should Religion consist in fear? he that thinks there is no such thing, cannot oppose, be an­gry with, or hate God; doth Religion therefore consist in these? and yet there is less consequence in it, if a man will consider his proposition to be proved hence, it is not that fear is the Religion paid to God, but to invisi­ble powers; many a man who did not think there was a supream God governing all, did think that there were invisible powers to which they paid their Religious Du­ties, as most of them to Semedei, and Heroes, and good Genii, and the like; so that men may have Religion who say in their hearts there is no God; that is, such as he is generally conceived to be, an infinitely able, and wise Creator, and Governor; yea, some that thought there was a God who had infinitam v [...]rtutem, by which he gover­ned the world, yet would not allow him infinitam poten­tiam, to make it out of nothing; of which nature I con­ceive Aristotle to be, so that although he and others may think there is no such God as we conceive, yet they might have Religion to such as they conceived to have some peices of these Divine excellencies; so that that seems to me an objection but weakly answered by him.


ANd I pass to a fourth Objection made at the bottom of the same page, which is out of the sixteenth Cap. of the same Leviathan, when having treated of per­sons, and what things may be personated, he at the last affirms, etiam Dei veri, the true God may be personated as he was first by Moses, who governed not his people but Gods, saying, thus saith the Lord; I have discoursed at large upon this expression of his in the 30. Cap. of my first Notes upon his Leviathan, Sect. 11. and those which follow, it would have become him to have given at the least some obser­vations upon what I said, but he hath not; and I must refer an Impartial Reader to that, but I must observe that this clause is left out in his Latine Edition, and instead thereof, put, that the true Gods person is and hath been born, for in his proper person he created the world, this is put instead of Moses his bearing his Person; Good Reader see how he hath amended the matter, did God in Creating the World bear the Person of God? It is a Phrase unheard of in any Divinity Writer; he that bears the person of any man or thing, must be another from that thing which he bears, but in this he destroys his bearing the person of God, when he affirms, he did it in his own, in propriâ personâ, in his own proper person; so that his alteration is to the worse, but I return from whence I came, to Moses again, in which I referr'd the Reader to my former discourse so far, that he affirms the Son to be, as it seems, the Second Person in the Trinity after Moses, and that of the Holy Ghost, all which I have spoke of at large, and now let us review his answer to this Objection, it may be the Candor of his Exposition will take away the scan­dal of his Assertion, and that begins in the last line of that Page, and so follows on in the next, and is this.

SECT. II. His Question of our Catechisme Examined.

VIdetur Author hoc loco, the Author seems in this place to explain the doctrine of Trinity, although he do not name the Trinity: I stop here, he hath outgone himself in his English Leviathan, for I did not so far dive into his thoughts, when I spoke of Moses re­presenting God, but one, how that could be un­derstood: but now it seems abominable that Moses should be placed as a person in the Trinity; well, let us see his answer further in this place, that (saith he) the Authour did labour to explain the Trinity, was pia vo­luntas, but erronea explicatio; it was a pious desire, but an erroneous explication; surely it is a pious desire in any man, to endeavour to explain any Divine truth, out certainly it cannot be imagined, that a man of his parts, and learning, could be so overseen in so high a Point of Divinity, as to think that such a person ought to pass for the father, but that he would steal a discredit of that great and most universally received truth, by interposing such a cloud before it; for (saith he) Moses because he after some manner seems to bear the person of God, (as do all Christian Kings) he seems to make him one person of the Trinity, valde negligenter, this was exceeding negligently done: and pittiful repentance for such a crime, to blaspheme God, and call man God, (for so must each person in the Trinity be) no, it looks not like repentance, but a vain excuse, which near upon amounts to a justification, but he proceeds, If (saith he) he had said that God in his proper person had made the world, in the person of his Son, had redeemed man­kind in the person of the holy Ghost, had sanctified his Church, be had said no more then is in the Catechisme put out by the Church: certainly he is much out in this saying, for the Catechisme of the Church of England, has no [Page 24] such saying, as God in prop iâ personâ, God in his pro­per person did make the world, this expression pro­priâ personâ is not there, nor I think in any confession of any Christian Church, to be used for the Father; all three are proper Persons, no one more then other, neither doth the Catechism use that very phrase Person in that whole answer, for it is thus, I believe in God the Fa­ther, who hath made me, and all the world, not that he made it in propriâ personâ, for it was the work of the whole Tri­nity, and the God, who is the whole Trinity, is the Al­mighty Father which made the world, no one word which signifieth one person to be more proper then ano­ther: Secondly, in God the Son, who hath Redeemed me and all mankind; it is true, this Redemption being a glorious effect of the Death and Sufferance of Christ, which must needs be acted in his humanity, which was united to his Divinity, to the second Person in the Tri­nity, hath a most proper termination in the Son; so that I do yield it must be implyed that it was acted in the Son, but it is not expressed; and therefore, although it was materially the same, yet formally it was not, and he said more then was in the Catechism; and for the last, it is not said in the Catechism that God in the Person of the Holy Ghost did Sanctify his Church, but in God the Holy Ghost who sanctifieth me, and all the Elect People of God, which although God the Holy Ghost in the Ca­techism be the same with the third Person, yet he is not called so there, and we may mark, that although these three Persons are put down in the Catechisme, as foun­tains of those great Blessings comminicated to man; yet no where is any called proper person of God more then the other, nor is any of those blessings appropriated to any person exclusively, shutting out the other; so that although it is said, God the Father, who made me, it is not said without the Son of which abundance of Scrip­ture affirms he made the World, and Mr. Hobs dealt un­handsomly with our Catechism, when he forced such a sense upon it.

SECT. III. Another Answer Censur'd.

BUt perhaps he hath a better Exposition afterwards, for when the Objector immediately after urged that Mr. Hobs used that Language in divers places, he answer­ed, That all of them might receive that Exposition; but he a little further explains himself thus, Vel si dixisset, or (saith he) if he had said God in his proper person, had constituted him­self a Church by the Ministry of Moses, in the person of his Son had redeemed the same; in the person of the holy Ghost, had sanctified the same, he had not erred: Thus far he, but it seems to me strange that both these should be without Errors, for they are extreamly different; in the first God in his proper person to Create the World, and the se­cond in his proper person by the Administration of Moses to constitute a Church; but that phrase of, in his pro­per person, is unheard of amongst any who are not with it called Hereticks; for if God the Father did any of those great works in his proper person, then the Son did not operate in them, which is against the whole sense of Scripture, Joh. 1.3. All things were made by him, and with­out him was nothing made that was made, Of which I have treated at large in my former Piece with much more, which is to be seen in every Writer upon this Subject, or else the same must be the very person of the Father, which is horrid Divinity, or else not a proper, but an improper person of the Deity, which is alike hateful: Then consider his next proposition, that God in the per­son of the Son did redeem the same; what is that he calls the same? surely that was the Church of the Israelites only, for Moses constituted no other Church; then Christ Re­demed them only, when before in the former opposition, according to our Church Cat [...]chisme he Redeems Man­kind, which is much larger then the Church which Moses constituted; and then last of all, when he saith, that [Page 26] God in the person of the Holy Ghost did sanctifie the same, it is too narrow for his former proposition, which was, that in the Person of the Holy Ghost, God did San­ctifie the Church which is much larger then the Syna­gogue which was constituted by Moses; and when he said he had not Erred, if he had phrased it after that man­ner, I say it is evident he had erred, and erred grievously in expressing himself either of these ways.

CAP. V. Joh. 1.1. Explained.

I Pass now to Page 364. where at the top is objected, that in his 43. Cap. he should say, Joh. 1.1. that the word there, and so likewise in the 14. verse, doth signifie a pro­mise, and that promise is the same with the thing promised; that is, Jesus Christ, [...] it is Psalm 105.19. and the 40.13. and other places; I will not dispute this further, I have writ at large concerning this place, and do answer to him both in this objection, and to his Justification of it in his answer, that avails him nothing towards his dis­grace of the Divine Nature of this word, if it should be allowed such a sense: for that he was the person is evi­dent out of his gloss, and let that person be eternally with God, and be God as the Text speaks, that he should make all things, and the like he must needs be that per­son which we conceive he [...]s, and referring the Reader to what I have formerly writ, where the genuine sense of that word is exprest; I pass to the next objection which immediately follows, and crosses one conclusion of mine in this Treatise, though I know not punctually where, my papers being now with the Printer.

CAP. VI. Whether it be Lawful for a Faithful man to deny Christ, Examined.

THe Conclusion by the Objector set down, is drawn from an answer to a Question, What? If a faithful man should be commanded by his Prince to deny Christ, what should he do? he saith, it is lawful to obey his Superiors by the Example of Naaman the Assyrian, who was by the Prophet bid go in Peace, which words, saith the Objector, seem to me not a per­mission, but a form of Valediction: Mr. Hobs justifies the con­clusion, and begins his answer fortasse, perhaps it is so, if he had answered any thing else, either approving or disproving h [...]s Petition, but in this place it can be understood of nothing but a Permission: I will stop here for this present, and exa­mine it, first what the offence was that he seems to pa­rallel with the denying of Christ; the Story is Recor­ded in the second Book of Kings, Cap. 5. where in the 17. vers. you may observe that Naaman professing thy Servant, will from henceforth neither offer burnt Offer­ings or Sacrifice to other Gods, but unto the Lord. By burnt Offerings and Sacrifice, we must understand all Religious worship which was due to God, for so it was to him, but then in the 18. verse, he begins to make a scruple, that his attendance upon his Master at his Ido­latrical worship, may seem to be a Divine worship, be­cause it might seem to have an affinity with it, and in this doubt he prays a pardon thus, In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmo [...] to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow my self in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy Servant in this thing: Mark you this▪ it was a tender nicety in this man▪ who was but little acquainted with true Religion, and but newly converted to one Article of Faith, that the Lord [...] God; [...]t certainly I find not so great fault in this action as Mr. Hobs seems to do, in comparing it [Page 28] with the denyal of Christ; for first, it is not said he did worship Rimmon, but only that he went into the house, and bowed in the house, not to Rimmon, but if he had, I think I may boldly say, that Idolatry, worshiping a false God, is not so bad as to deny a true one; and therefore, if he had worshipt Rimmon it had not been so bad, as to deny Christ; but I deny that he did worship, or in that act shew so much as a practical Idolatry; for to bow to Baal, to bow to Rimmon, is the sin of Idolatry, not to be in the house where Baal or Rimmon was, or to bow in that house, which yet is all that is desired by him; If Elisha had the thoughts which I have, that valedictions may seem to imply a tacite assent of his to what he said, he going no further in worshiping Rimmon; but he proves it farther from the practise of the Primitive Church.

SECT. II. The Canons of the Councel of Nice Examined.

I Will set down his words, You know (saith he) that there were many Christians a little before the Nicene Synod good men, but not most valiant, who being threatned with Deaths or Torments, renounced their Christianity, what punishment do you think was appointed them in that general Synod at Nice? In the 19. Canon of that Councel, it is Decreed, that be who should do that (is his Phrase, which is deny his Christianity) without Tor­ments or danger, should return to the Catechism: Here I will pause, and indeed did when I read it, for I was well ac­quainted with that Councel, and the story of it, but re­membred no such easie Penance, whereupon being not in my Study, I borrowed Binnius, and there found in his two first Lections no such thing in the 19. Canon of either, as he speaks of, or relating to it; in the 11. of both the vulgar Editions, and the 19. of Pisanus I did; it would be tedious to transcribe the words, but what is material will easily appear in the canvassing his discourse; consi­der therefore first, that in his answer to the question, [Page 29] he said it was lawful to obey his Prince, commanding to deny Christ; how can any thing in this Cannon prove it to be such, if it were only, as he said, condemning to be amongst the Catechismens, this supposeth it a fault for which a man should be amongst the Catechismens, this supposeth it a fault for which he should be banished the Communion, and on such terms as they were, it could not be, unless they had thought it a hainous crime; then I observe, that in that Eleventh Canon, as the vulgar, it is said of those which prevaricated, without necessity, or without the taking away their goods, or danger of the life, as was done under the Tyranny of Lucinius; here is not Mr. Hobs his case, Licinius persecuted Christians se­verely, which being discerned by many a fearful Christi­an, they would deny Christ before they came to suffer for him, rather than put themselves in that hazard, just as Mr. Hobs would have men; afterwards repenting of that fault, they would seek admittance into Gods mercies communicated in the Church; what thinks the Councel? Thus, although such men are adjudged unworthy of hu­manity, yet let benevolence be administred to them, or as the other Reading, although they are unworthy of mercy, yet let them have humanity shewed them: Here you see what a severe judgment was past upon these men for this Crime, that they are unworthy of any mercy in themselves who should deny Christ, to flatter Princes; but let us see the humanity judged, fit to use towards them; it is true, the Church should imitate God, who hath shut the Gates of Heaven to no penitent Soul, but because the Church cannot have the All-seeing Eye of God to discern who is penitent, but by the outward ex­pressions; therefore the Councel sets down what shall be thought a sufficient evidence of it. That which he termes (redire ad Catechumenos) to return the Catechu­mens was somewhat, but not half his work▪ for saith that Councel, quicunque, whosoever do truly Repent, let him spend three years inter audiculos, amongst the hearers, which were the Catechumens; for they were admitted [Page 30] to hear the Catechistical Sermons Preached before they went to Prayers, but not to the Communion of Prayers, which kind of Penance too many men amongst us punish themselves with; but this is not all, then let him detest himself seven years more with all contrition, nor hath the Councel done yet, let them communicate with the people two years more in Prayer; so that here are twelve years Penance, and if in this time he relapsed, he was to begin again, and as it is expressed in other cases, not un­til his death to receive the Communion; and if he reco­ver, to be where he was when he did receive it; because that out of Christian piety the Eucharist was given him for his viaticum, (as it is called) to strengthen him in his long Journy he was to go; after all this, consider good Reader what a miserable shift Mr. Hobs was put to, when he took this Canon for to countenance such a horrid con­clusion; that it is fit in obedience to man to deny Christ, when this Canon most sharply punisheth that horrid Sin, and he that will read but the next Canon, which is the 12. shall find the like severity used to them, who having at first left the Military girdle stoutly, would afterwards put it on; the story was thus, the Emperors for a reward of their gallantry would give deserving Souldiers a girdle, and by it many priviledges: But if they were Christians, and would not renounce their Faith, this girdle was taken from them, and with it, all priviledges; divers, after they had refused it upon these accursed terms, being over allured by the pleasures and honours of the world, would desire it again, and then this Councel pas­seth the like judgment upon those as the former; so that all kinds of denying Christ was most hateful to those Fa­thers, and sentenced as a most grievous sin, having a most severe pennance injoyned it; but hear Mr. Hobs again.

SECT. III. Peters Denial of Christ Examined.

IT were a Sin (saith he) in an Apostle or Disciple, who had undertaken to Preach the Gospel against Christs Enemies, and in Peter a great fault, but of infirmity, and easily pardon'd by Christ: where good Mr. Hobs was the infirmity evident, in Peter more then any other person; sure you have no Scri­pture ground for it, he was forewarned by our Saviour, and so armed against it, yet (saith he) it was easily for­given by our Saviour: Good God what easiness do we find, it was not without Repentance, and how sharp that was, we cannot tell, the word of God notifies that he wept bitterly; and how powerful those tears wrought upon our Saviour we know, so that it was hardly spoke of him, and more then he could know to say it was easily; and worse in his conclusion, when he said that horrid sin might be committed without a fault, and that it was lawful to do it; I am sure that severe sentence which the Councel of Nice lay upon it, and the bitter tears of St. Peter, are no arguments for it; and the whole course of Divinity delivered by our Saviour and Apostles, makes against it, and the constant practise of holy and religious men: for our Saviour, Luk. 9.23. If any man will come after me, he must deny himself, and take up the Cross and follow me. Mark you, it is deny himself, not Christ, it is take up his Cross, not cast it away and reject it; his Cross, that is, all affliction which is upon him, as in this case he must either Sin or bear it; thus it is laid upon him; as like­wise there are other cases, but this is one and a main one. Again, Mat. 33. He who denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father who is in Heaven. What more pe [...]tinent and close against his conclusion; and you may perceive, that as we demean our selves towards Christ here, he will so demean himself towards us hereafter; if we suffer for him, we shall raign with him; if we forsake him to save this life, we shall have no share in his life or death hereafter; [Page 32] and surely if a man might lawfully deny Christ, it was a strange folly, yea madness in all those glorious Martyrs, who suffered such torments rather then they would de­ny their Saviour. I have spoke of this before in this very Treatise, and I see nothing opposed to any thing there which was brought against his or for my conclu­sion; this might have been therefore spared.

SECT. IV. A Digression to Mr. Hobs.

BUt now Mr. Hobs, I again bespeak you, leave off the Justification of such horrid Errors as this; consider, if you intend to act according to this Doctrine, you can have no part in Christ, he will reject you at the last day; consider again that you have taught, and by that teaching have tempted others to be of that Error, to love and pre­fer this temporal life, before that eternal: An Atheistical practice which men may easily be induced to entertain and practise, when there is little reason produced for it; and consider with your self, that although this is one of the greatest sins a man can commit; yet according to that ever honoured Councel in the Canon cited by you, there is room for you in the Church here, and in Heaven here­after, if you prove penitent; Repent therefore of this your wickedness, that God may according to his Sacred Covenant, have Mercy upon you; Judge your self, that you be not judged of the Lord; and make amends for this publick Scandal you have given to the Church of Christ; which I think since the first Conversion never had any so publickly professed this Doctrine before Leviathan; do it therefore in some publick Treatise, and that in English, whereby there may be amends to those who have been seduced by your Doctrines, and so Farewell; This is all which concerns me in this Appendix of yours at this time, therefore I meddle with nothing else.

AN Alphabetical Table, Of the Principle CONTENTS. In which C. denotes the Chapter, and S. the Section.


  • THe promises to Abraham and his seed, Cap. 22. Sect. 16. Page. 178.
  • Why his Family was obliged to obey Gods Commmands? C. 22. S. 17. P. 181.
  • Whence are Actions, just or unjust? C. 8. S. 2. P. 24.
    • not from Consent or Dissent, C. 8. S. 2. ibid.
  • Mixed Actions, what they are, C. 19. S. 6. 114.
  • External and Internal Acts subject to Gods command, C. 22. S. 14. 175.
  • Agag spared, C. 20. S. 2. 130.
  • Subjects not freed from their Allegiance, C. 5. S. 4. P. 15.
  • Of the Amazons Common-wealth, C. 16. S. 57. p. 70. 72.
  • St. Ambroses contest with Theodosius, C. 20. S. 4. 134.
  • Apostles, their gift of Tongues Miraculous, C. 22. S. 10. 168.
  • Their Learning Miraculous, Cap, 22. S. 11. 169.
  • Appetite over-rules the VVill, C. 19. S. 6. 115.
  • Aristides Banished, C. 20. S. 5. 141.
  • No taking Armes against the King, C. 16. 8. 7. 72.
  • Assurance of revelations, C. 22. 8: 1. 148.
  • What is Assurance? C. 22. 8. 1. 149
    • how many ways it may be had, C. 22. S. 1. idem.
    • that of faith greater then of Sciences, C. 22. S. 1. 150.
    • what we have of Christian Religion, C. 22. S. 1. idem.
  • [Page]Athenians used Ostracism, C. 20. S. 5. 140.
  • He who acts by anothers Authority, may do injury to him by whose authority he Acts, C. 8. S. 1. 23.


  • The worshippers of Baal not excused by the command of the King of Israel, C. 22. S. 17. 183.
  • Bishops most competent Judges of Books in religion and of Preaching, C. 10. S. 3. 32.


  • The Canons of the Church of England confirmed by Laws, C. 23. S. 13. 223.
  • When one is said to be a Captive, C. 17. S. 2. 82.
  • To whom a Captive belongs, ibid.
  • The first cause doth not necessitate, Cap. 19. Sect. 9. 10. 11. 1 [...]. 118.
  • The chaine of causes not to be discerned; C. 19. S. 10. 119.
  • The injuries done to K. Charles I. had their rise from Mr. Hob's doctrine, C. 14. S. 2. C. 21. 57.
  • Children ought to love those that nourished them C. 16. S. 10. 76.
  • VVhether they can give consent in their Infancy, C 16. S 1. 64
  • Christianity to be introduced by reason and sufferings, and not by force, C. 10. S. 9. 37.
  • M [...] only actively capable of commands, C. 19. S. 9. 118.
  • The difference between the commands of God and of men, C. 18. S. 11. 99.
  • External and Internal, Acts, subject to Gods command, C. 22. S. 14. 175.
  • Conduct and Command how like the Motive faculty, C. 23. S. 14. 224.
  • Commons the Representative of the People, C. 23. S. 16. 2 [...]0.
  • The Division of a Common-wealth into Monarchy,
  • [Page] Aristocracy and Democracy examined, C. 13. S. 1. 2. 4 [...]. 49.
  • How fathers rather then mothers did erect them, C. 16. S. 5. 69.
  • Rules to govern them not certain and demonstrative, C. 10. S. 14. 105.
  • Mr. Hobs's Commonwealth no where to be found, C. 4. S. 1. 9.
    • — not consistent with Reason, C. 4. S. 2. 10.
    • — he first called it a Leviathan, C. 3. 8.
  • VVhat is Dominion by Conquest? C. 16. S. 12. 79.
    • — how it becomes despotical. C. 16. S. 12. 88.
  • When one is said to be Conquered, C. 17. S. 1. 81.
  • What power the Victor hath over the Conquered, C. 16. S. 12. 79.
  • Covenant upon Conquest may give possession, but not right when the cause of the vvar is not just, C. 17. S. 2. 82.
  • Conscience, what it is? C. 23. S. 4. 197.
    • Whatsoever is against it is sin, C. 23. S. 4. 198.
    • what is an erroneous, C. 23. S. 4. 199.
    • how it obligeth, ibid.
  • VVhether there be a publick conscience? C. 23. S. 5. 205.
    • how private consciences differ from private opinions, ibid,
  • Controversies; the Soveraign ought to take care of deci­ding them, and is accountable to God for the neglect thereof, C. 12. S. 1. 44.
  • Covenant not a breath, C. 6. S. 2, 3. C. 16. S. 6. 19. 20. 71.
    • whence their Obligation, C. 6. S. 2. C. 16. S. 6. 65. 71.
    • the first obligeth, C. 5. S. 1. 12.
  • They may be made immediately with God, C. 5. S. 3. 13.
  • If made with God against the Soveraign, they do not oblige, ibid.
  • Not necessary that the Covenant in government should be made with all as one person, or severally with every one, [Page] Cap. 5. Sect. 4. 15.
  • The Prince may Covenant in taking his authority, and not take it upon Covenant, C. 6. S. 1. 17.
  • The sword hath no power but from the Covenant, C. 6. S. 3. 20.
  • Creation, the description of it by Moses, not to be known but by revelation, C. 22. S. 1. 152.


  • Darius, his Kingdom not every way absolute, C. 13. S. 3. 4. 50. 53.
  • Denominations are a principatiori, C. 19. S. 6. 114.
  • Desire, the difference betwixt it, the will and inclination, ib.
  • Disputes concerning Government dangerous, 18. S. 3. 86.
  • Doctrines which are peaceble only true, C. 10. S. 7. 35.
  • By the negligence of Governours and Teachers, false Do­ctrines are received, C. 10. S. 7. 35.
  • Christian Doctrines to be introduced by reason and suffer­ings, and not by force, Cap. 10. Sect. 9. 37.
  • Dominion, not the same in an instituted and acquired King­dom, C. 15. S. 5. c. 16. s. 12. c. 17. s. 1. 62. 79. 81.
  • All— not acquired by force, Cap. 16. Sect 1. 64.
  • VVhat is Paternal. Cap. 15. Sect. 1. 58.
  • Whether a Child can give consent in his Infancy, C. 16. S. 1. 65.
  • VVhat is Dominion by conquest, C. 16. S. 12. 79.
  • VVhat — over the conquered, C. 16. S. 12. C. 17. S. 1. 80. 81.
  • How it becomes despotical, Cap. 16. Sect. 12. 79.
  • Dominion by Conquest, vid. Conquest.


  • End, he who hath right to the End, how he hath right to the Means Cap. 9. Sect. 2. 29.
  • England; one only Soveraign in England. Cap. 23. s. 16. 230.
    • The good constitution of the Realm, c. 23. s. 5. 16. 229. 230.
    • Especially in relation Taxes, cap 23. sect. 17. 232.
  • Ephori, first introduced amongst the Lacedaemonians, and why cap 13. sect. 6. 54.
  • [Page]Equity, what it is? cap. 20. sect. 3. 132.


  • Faith resolved into divine revelation, c. 22. s. 7. 161.
    • Commanded by God, c. 22. s. 13. 14. 15. c. 23. s. 6. 173. 175. 177. 209.
    • 'Tis wrought by ordinate meanes. c, 22. s. 15. 177.
    • 'Tis both inspired and acquired, c. 23. s. 6. 209.
    • Faith and Prophecy different things, ibid.
    • It comes by hearing, cap. 23. sect. 6. 218.
    • Its impediments, cap. 22. sect. 14. 175.
  • Father to be obeyed before the Mother, cap. 16. sect. 3. 66.
    • where he is unknown to whom the Child belongs, c. 16. s. 8. 73.
      • greater respect due to him, then to him who nourished the Child, cap. 16. sect. 10. 76.
  • Fear, whether it induceth obedience? cap. 15. sect. 2. 59.
    • 'Tis an impediment to Faith, cap. 22. sect. 14. 175.
  • Free, and Freedom, vid. Liberty.


  • Generation more excellent then Preservation, c. 16. s. 11. 77.
  • Glory, vain-glory an impediment to Faith. c. 22. s. 14. 176.
  • God only the Author of Power, c. 18. s. 7. c. 20. s. 1. 92. 127.
    • not the Author of those things which are contrary to his commands, cap. 19. sect. 1. 120.
    • His positive laws to be obeyed, cap. 22. sect. 12. 171.
    • where that obedience is founded, cap 22. sect 13 172,
    • Good; humane Laws cannot make some things good or evil, cap. 11. sect. 5. 43.
  • Gospel, Its success Miraculous, cap. 22. sect. 11. 169.
  • Goverment, remisness of it an occasion of tumults, c. 10. s. 9. 37.
    • The Formes thereof ought to be suited to the disposition of the People, cap. 13. sect. 5. 54.
    • 'Tis profitable that the people hath some interest in it, cap. 13. sect. 6. 54.
    • [Page]Mr. Hobs's imaginary foundation of it, c. 14. l. 1. 55.
    • Disputes about Government dangerous, c. 18. s. 13. 104.
  • Gifts are free, cap. 19. sect. 3. 110.


  • History useful for Princes, cap. 23. sect. 10. 11. 119. 121.
    • Especially the Greek and Roman, c. 23. s. 10. 11. 12. ibid.
  • Mr. Hobs's Commonwealth no where to be found, c. 4. s. 1. 9.
    • 'Tis not consistent with reason, cap. 4. sect. 2. 10.
    • He first called it Leviathan, cap 3. 8.
    • His imaginary foundation of Government, c. 14. s. 1. 56.
    • He gave dangerous Council to the Protector, c. 14. s 2. 57.
    • full of contradictions, cap. 16. sect. 2. 65.
    • Magnifies his own Politicks, cap 18 sect. 14. 105.
    • Incourageth Rebellion, cap. 20. sect. 8. 145.
    • He makes the Estates in Parliament factious, c 23. s. 15. 227.
    • VVhat assurance he hath of his being born at Malmsbu­ry, cap. 22. sect. 1. 148.
    • The Authors opinion of his Book, c. 23. s. 18. 235.
  • Honour; Titles thereof conferred by the Soveraign, cap. 12 sect. 4. 46.
  • Husband, the head of the VVife, cap. 16 sect. 4. 68.
  • Hyperbolus banished, cap. 20, sect. 5. 141.


  • Jephthas Vow, cap. 20. sect. 2. 129.
  • Jews witnesses of the old Testament, cap. 22. sect. 2. 152.
    • — their Government ceased, cap. 18. sect. 12. 101.
  • Incarnation of Christ not to be known but by revelation, cap. 22. sect. 5. 157.
  • Inclination distinct from the will and desire, c. 19. s. 6. 115.
  • Incorporate; why men Incorporate into bodies Politick? cap. 11. sect. 1. 39.
  • Infant, whether it can give consent? cap. 16. sect. 1. 64.
  • [Page] Injury, VVhat it is? cap. 8. sect. 3.
    • How a man may injure himself? cap. 8. sect. 3. 25.
  • Injustice, what it is? ibid.
    • A Soveraign may do it, cap. 8. sect. 4. 27.
  • Innocents not justly punished, cap. 2. sect. 3. 4.
  • Israelites, why obeyed they Moses? cap. 22. sect. 17. 182.
  • Judge what it is properly to Judge? cap. 23. sect. 1. 190.
    • Not the same to be a Judge, and constitute a Judge, cap. 10. sect. 10. 38.
    • He is to observe, not make a Law, cap. 18. sect. 9. 96.
    • Every one is Judge of good and evil, cap. 23. sect. 5. 6. 207. 209.
  • What Judgement private persons may pass upon publick actions, cap. 23. sect. 1. 2. 3. 190. 19. 193.


  • Kingdom. VVhat is an acquired Kingdom, c. 15. s. 58.
    • Not always acquired by force, ibid.
    • The condition of a conquered Kingdom not the same with an instituted, cap. 15. sect. [...] 62.
  • Kings, v. Supremes, and Soveraigns.
    • Only accountable unto God, c. 5. s. 4. c. 6. s. 1. 15. 17.
    • Their account unto him great, cap. 12. s. 5. 46.
    • Not punishable by the People and why? c. 9. s. 1. 28
    • Their power in matters of Religion, c. 10. s. 1. 30.
    • That subject to the commands of God, ibid.
    • No absolute obedience due to them, c. 18. s. 4. &c. 87.
    • No taking Armes against them, cap. 16. sect. 7. 72.
    • They not only sin against God, cap. 20. sect. 4. 134.
    • Their power about preaching and Printing, c. 10. s. 2. 32
    • They have not right to whatsoever the subject possesseth cap. 18. sect. 8. &c. 93.
  • Kill. VVhen lawful to kill, cap. 23. sect. 4. 196.
  • [Page] Lacedaemon. VVhether that state was Monarchical, cap. 13. sect. 3. 7. 50 5 [...].
  • Laws. Humane Laws cannot make something good or evil, cap. 11. sect. 5. 34.
    • Positive Laws of God to be obeyed, c. 22 s. 12. 171.
    • Where that obedience is founded, cap. 22. s. 13. 173.
    • How far the the Civil Law and Law of Nature are the Measure of our Actions, cap 23. sect. 3. 193.
    • The Execution of good Laws make a Nation happy, cap. 23. sect. 10. 19.
    • Laws for private interest conduce much to the publick good, cap. 23. sect. 8. 218.
  • Liberty, What it is? cap. 19. sect. 1. 107.
    • —from Coaction, cap. 19. sect. 1. 7. 108. 116.
    • —from necessity, cap 19. sect. 1. 7. 107.
    • Who is properly a free-man? cap. 19. sect. 2. 109.
    • Not proper only to bodies, cap. 9. sect. 2. 3. 109. 110.
    • VVho or what is the subject of it? cap. 19. sect. 5. 112.
    • VVhat is the Liberty of Man, cap. 19. sect. 5. 13.
  • Life, None hath power over his own life, c. 20. s 1. 127.
  • Likeing or disliking produce not difference in the things themselves, cap. 3. sect. 2. 48.


  • Majority. He who dissents from it ought not therefore to be destroyed, cap. 7. sect. 1. 22.
  • Man, Superior to VVoman. cap. 16. sect. 3. 66.
    • The Nobler Sex, ibid.
    • Whether he hath power to do any thing in defence of himself, cap 18. sect. 7. 92.
    • He only actively capable of Commands, cap. 19. sect. 9.
  • Mancipium, what it signifies, cap. 16. sect. 12. 79.
  • Marriages; No state without rules about it, cap. 16. s. 8.
    • One born out of it is filius populi, ibid.
  • Means. How he hath right to them who hath right to [Page] the end, cap. 19. sect. 2, 116.
  • Militia belongs to the Soveraign, cap. 12. sect 2. 45.
  • Miracle, What it is? cap. 22. sect. 8. cap. 23. sect. 6. 163. 209.
    • God the only Author of them, cap. 22. sect. 9. 165.
    • Never wrought to confirm a lye, cap. 22. sect. 9. 166.
    • The gift of tongues miraculous in the Apostles, cap. 22. sect. 11. 169.
    • As also their Learning, ibid.
    • And the success of the Gospel, ibid.
  • Mishpol. What it signifies cap. 18. sect. 6. 7.
  • Mixed Actions what they are? cap 19. sect 6. 115.
    • Bodies denominated from the predominant, c. 13 s. 3. 50.
  • Monarchy how distinguished from Tyranny, c. 13. s. 2. 48.
    • None so absolute as Mr. Hobs Phansies, cap. 3, sect. 3. 47. cap. 23 sect. 15. 50. 227.
  • Money, How the levying of it is like the Nutrive faculty? cap. 23. sect. 14. 224.
  • Moses, His integrity, cap. 22. sect. 5. 157.
    • Why the Israelites, obeyed him? cap. 22. sect. 17. 182.
  • Mother, Not to be obeyed before the Father, c. 16. s. 3. 66.
    • What power she hath over the Child, cap. 16. sect. 8. 9. 174. 175.
    • Whether the Child is first in her power? cap. 16. sect. 8. 174.
  • Murder. A Sin a gainst God and Man, cap. 20. sect 4. 139.


  • Nourish. Greater respect due to the Father then to him who nourisheth the Child, cap. 16. sect. 10. 76.
  • Numbers. Small Numbers joyned together may live peacea­bly, cap. sect. 1.


  • Oaths lawful to take an Oath, cap. 23. sect. 4. 197.
  • Obedience, better then sacrifice, cap. 20. sect. 2. 129.
    • No absolute obedience due to Kings, cap. 18. s. 4. &c. 87.
    • [Page] What obedience due to the commands of God and of Men, cap. 18. sect 11. 99.
  • Ostracism in use at Athens, cap. 20. sect. 5. 140.


  • Parents love their Children naturally, cap. 16. sect 9. 75.
    • Their power over their Children, cap. 22. sect 16. 179.
  • Paul His conversion, cap. 22. sect. 15. 177.
  • Peace. Wherein it consisteth, cap. 10. sect. 1. 30.
    • the fruit of Truth, cap. 10. sect. 5. 34.
    • Truth not always regulated by it, cap. 10. sect. 4. 5. 6. 33. 34.
    • Peaceable Doctrines only true, cap. 10 sect. 4. 33.
  • Whether it be consonant to the Laws of Nature, cap. 10. s. 5. 34.
  • People not give Authority to the Prince, c. 2. s. 2. 3 4. 6. c. 14. s. 2. c. 20. s. 13. s. 23. s. 16. P. 3. 4. 5. 6 57. [...]03.
    • If they could, it were dangerous to the Prince, cap. 2. s. 5. 6.
    • Supreme not their Person, c. 2. s. 2. c. 5. s. 12. 3.
    • All do not consent to give power to the Supreme, cap. 4. 9. 69. sect. 1. cap. 16. sect. 5.
    • Not the Authors of Right, cap. 4. sect. 3. 11.
    • Profitable that they have some interest in Government, cap. 13. sect. 6. 54.
  • Pharisees, they and the Scribes not Soveraigns, c. 18. s. 2. 85.
  • Power, v. Authority.
    • It comes from God, cap. 20. sect. 1. cap. 18. sect. 7.
    • Not from the People, v. People.
    • Whether one hath power to do any thing in defence of him­self; cap. 18. sect. 7. 92.
  • Prayers and Tears the Christians remedy, cap. 16. sect. 7. 72.
  • Preaching, the Kings power about it. cap. 10. sect. 2. 32.
  • Preservation, what it is? cap. 16. sect. 11. 77.
    • Generation more excellent then it, cap. 16. sect. 11. 78.
  • Prince, v. King, supreme, Soveraign, —may erre, cap. 4. sect. 2. 10.
  • Printing. The Kings power about it, cap. 10. sect. 2. 32.
  • Promises in unlawful things oblige not, cap 15. sect. 3. 4. 60. 61.
    • [Page]Whether upon fear oblige? cap. 15. sect. 4. 61
    • Prophecy different from faith, cap. 23. sect. 6. 29.
  • Propriety, what it is? cap. 11. sect. 3. 43.
    • How introduced, cap. 11. sect. 2. 40.
    • Not necessary to Peace, cap. 11. sect. 3. 42.
    • It may be bo [...]h in Peace and [...]ar, ibid.
    • Not depending upon the Soveraign Power, cap. 11. sect. 3. 4 43
    • Men in war have not a propriety to their Enemies Country before it be Conquer'd, cap 10. sect. 2. 32.
    • Whence the propriety of the Soveraign, cap 11. sect. 4. 43.
    • Whether this conduce to publick peace cap. 23. sect. 8. 9. 17. 214.
  • Protection of the Soveraign doth not give propriety, cap. 23. sect. 9. 216.


  • Reason sometimes disobeyed, cap. 19. sect 6. 115.
  • Rebellion no small injustice, cap 5 sect 2 13.
  • Rebells allways pretend oppression, cap. 16. sect. 7. 72.
  • Religion. Princes power in matters of Religion, cap. 10. sect 1 30.
    • The assurance of Christian Religion, cap. 22. sect. 1. 2. 3. 151. 88.
    • —from the manner of Deliverance, cap. 22. sect. 2. 152.
    • —The Doctrines delivered, cap. 22. sect. 3. 154.
    • —The different Style, cap. 22. sect. 4. 155.
    • —The Punishment and Rewards proposed, ibid.
    • —The sanctity of the persons who delivered it, cap. 22. sect. 5. 6. 156.
    • —The sufferings of the Saints, cap. 22. sect. 7. 159.
  • Revelations. The assurance of them, cap. 22. sect. 1. 148.
    • What things not to be known but by revelation, cap 22. sect. 1. 2. 3. 148. 88.
  • Right. Not derived from the consent of the people, cap. 4. sect. 3. 11.
    • He who hath right to the End, how to the means, cap. 9. [Page] sect. 2. 29.
  • Romulus preserved by Faustulus, cap. 16. sect. 10. 76.


  • Sacrifice, obedience better then it, cap. 20. sect. 2. 129.
  • Samuel rejected, cap. 18. sect. 5 &c 8.
  • Sanctity inspired and acquired, cap 23. sect. 6. 209.
  • Sanhedrim ceased, cap. 18. sect 12. 101.
  • Saul. chosen, cap. 18. sect. &c. 88
    • Spareth Agag, cap. 20. sect. 2. 230.
  • Scribes and Pharisees not the supreme magistrates, cap 18. sect. 2. 85.
  • Scripture, its Authority not depending upon the Soveraign, cap. 22. sect. 17. 18. 181. 185.
  • See. What the word signifies, cap. 19. sect. 10. 119.
  • Servants, when one is a Servant, cap. 17. sect. 2. 82.
    • their condition that differing in peace from what they suffer in War according to Mr Hobs, cap. 18. sect. 8. 93.
  • Servitude banished from [...]mongst Christians, cap 18 s. 2 82.
  • Sin. None necessitated to it, cap. 19. sect. 1. 2. 107 108.
  • Small numbers joyned together may live peaceably, cap. 1. p. 1.
  • Sodom, Its destructi [...]n, cap. 8. sect. 4. 26.
  • Soveraign, v. King supreme.
    • He is not the person of the People, cap. 2 sect. 2. cap. 5, sect. 1. 2. p. 3. 12. 13.
    • He may doe unjustly, cap. 8. sect. 4. 26.
    • His power about deciding Controversies, cap. 12. sect. 1. 44.
    • Hath right to the Malitia, cap. 12. sect. 2. 45.
    • To chose Counsellors and Officers, ibid.
    • Yet not always Officers, ibid.
    • Hath power to Punish and Reward, and confer Honours, cap. 12. sect. 4. 46.
    • Not the representative of the people, cap. 13. sect. 1 cap. 14. sect. 1. 2. cap. 23. sect. 15. 16. 47. 56. 57, 227. 230.
    • Obliged by their own Promises cap 13. sect. 3. 50.
    • Why they are Chosen, cap. 15. sect. 2. 59
    • His Rights in an instituted and acquired dominion not the [Page] same, c. 15. s. 5. c. 16. s. 12. c. 17. s. 1. 62. 79. 81.
    • No such soveraignty by institution as Mr. Hobs phancies, cap. 18. sect. 1 8. 4.
    • Whether the Soveraignty be equally absolute in an instituted and acquired Dominion, cap 17. sect. 2.82.
    • Not lawful to resist them when they command against ones own interest, cap. 20. sect. 7. 1 3.
    • Their commands may be opposed when contrary to the Chri­stian faith, cap. 22. sect. 17. 181.
    • He cannot make Law whatsoever is against the Law of Na­ture, cap. 22. sect. 18. 185.
    • How he is subject to Laws Divine, c. 23. s. 7. 212.
    • How Subject to the Civil Laws, ibid.
    • The partition of soveraignty not destructive to it, cap. 23. sect. 9. 216:
    • Only one Soveraign in England, cap. 23. sect. 16. 230
  • Speech is free, cap, 19 sect. 4. 111.
  • Spirits more, cap. 19. sect. 109.
  • Subjects not Authors of their Governors Actions, c. 2▪ s. 17. c. 4 s 1. c. 15. s. 1. c. 20. s. 2. 3. 8. 58. 126.
    • The cannot be free from the Allegiance, and why? cap. 5. sect, 4. 15.
    • Not submit themselves without any contract on the Gover­nours part, cap. 5. sect. 4. cap. 11. sect. 15. 39.
    • Not bound to own all the Actions of a Supreme, cap. 7. sect. 1. cap. 8. sect. 1. 21. 23.
    • All men born Subjects. cap. 14. sect, 1. 56.
    • Difference between the Subjects of an instituted and conquer­ed Nation, cap. 18 sect. 84.
  • Supremes All do not consent to give power unto them, cap, 4. sect. 1. cap. 16. sect. 5. 8. 69.
    • Not Covenant with all in Government, cap. 5. sect. 4. 5.
    • Not take their Government upon Covenant cap 6 s. 1. 17.
    • The Subject not bound to own all his Actions, cap. 7 sect. 1. cap. 8. sect. 1. 21. 23.
    • Not lawful to resist him in ones own defence, cap. 20. sect. 6, cap. 21. 142. 146.
  • Sword hath no power but from the Covenant, cap. 6. s. 3. 20.
    • [Page]That it can give power is dangerous to Princes ibid.
  • Thoughts are free, cap. 19. sect, 2. 108.
    • Not lyable to humane Laws, cap. 23. sect. 5.25.
  • Truth, whether it is to be regulated by Peace? cap. 10. sect. 4. 5. 6. 33. 34.
    • In matters of doctrine it is only to be considered, c. 10. s 4. 34.
    • Peaceable Doctrines only true, ibid
    • Peace and the fruit of it, cap. 10. sect 5. 34.
    • No universal Truths are now, cap [...]0 sect. 7. 35.
  • Tumults. Remisness of Government an occasion of them, cap. 19. sect. 9. 37.
  • Tyranny Whether it and Monarchy be the same form of Government, cap. 13. sect. 2. 48.
  • Tyrants of two sorts, cap. 23. sect. 11. 220.


  • Unbelief, 'Tis a breach of Gods Law, c. 22. s. 16. 230.
    • Men justly Condemned for it, ibid.
    • Its Punishmen, cap. 22. sect. 13. 172.
  • Understanding taken two ways, c. 19. sect. 5. 112.
  • Voluntas facere & fieri, cap. 19. sect. 12. 123.
  • Vows, rash, sinful, not obliging, cap. 20. sect. 2. 128.
  • Uriah Murdered, cap. 20. sect. 3. 4. 131. 133.


  • War, wh [...]t it is properly, cap. 16. sect. 4. 67.
    • Whence arise Civil VVars, c. 18. s. 3. 14. 15. 103. 105. 106.
  • Water, how it is said to be free, c. [...]9. s. 7. 1 [...]6.
  • Ways, how they are free, cap. 19. sect. 2. 108.
  • Wife subject to the Husband, cap. 16. sect. 4. 67.
  • Will, what is the freedom of it, cap. 19. sect. 5.112.
    • 'Tis conversant about the End and the Means, ibid.
    • Overruled by the Appetite, cap. 19. sect. 6. 1 [...]4.
    • the difference betwixt it, desire and inclination, ibid.
  • Woman inferior to Man cap. 16 sect. 3 66.
    • Not bound to prostitute their bodies, cap. 17. sect. 1. 81

The Texts of Holy Scriptures Illustrated or Cited.

Cap. Vers.
1.C. 2. S. 1.
2 [...].16.ibid.
 18.04. &c.
32.10.11, &c.22.05.
6.1 [...].23.4.
17.14. &c.18.6.7.
1 Samuel.
2.27. &c.8.4.
11.12. &c.18.5.6.
12.3 4.18.8.
2 Samuel.
12.1. &c. 9.10. &c. 20.4.
1 Kings.
St. Matthew.
25.14. &c.23.4.
St. Mark.
St. Luke.
St. John.
1 Corinth.
2 Corinth.
1 St. Peter.
St. James.


PAge 3 Line 24 read 81 l. 30 r. all authority, p. 4 l. 2 r. impossibility, l. 24 r. you will say, l. 26 r. this election, p. 5 l. 31 r. eems to me, p. 9 l 25 r. impossible, p 11 l. 2 [...] r. fraud, p. 13 l. 5 r depose, p. 17 l. 6 r. parts, p. 19 l. 2 r. vin­dictive, l. 13 r. it, l. 22 r. sibi for tibi, p 41 l. 5 r. conceipt, l. 8 r. conquered, l. 31 r. therefore, p, 49 l. 13 r. any of the other, p. 50 l 3 r principaliori, l. 20 r. principaliori, p. 53 l 14 r. had done it, p. 54 l. 16 r. other, p 6 l. 6 r. ex­pressed, l. 8 r. more, l 20 r. participate, l. 21 r. resembles, p. 67 l. 5 r. misreckon, p. 68 l. 19 r. but in those, l. 30 r. exemplyfied, p. 69 l. 11 r. 103 p. 71 l. 17 r. dispose, p. 74 l. 14 r. to a law, p. 77 l. 7 r. guift, l. 17 r. his, l. 16 r. Oe­conomical, l. 23 r. creatio, l. 25 r. accident, p. 79 l. 14 r. about, p. 80 l. 8 r. conquest of, p. 86 l. 11. r. and so eve­ry man, l. 28. r. by, p. 87 l. 12 r. that like Vertue it is com­mended l. 14 r. and produceth it to satisfy, p. 90 l. 3 for and r. but, p. 92 l. 19 r. safety, p 94 l. 11 r. find, p. 109 l. 21 r spirits, p. 116 l. 15 r. passing, p. 133 l. 10 r. against, l. 21 r. And, p. 137 l. 12 r. Chrysostom, p. 140 l. 15 r. although, p. 146 l. 29 r. self, p. 148 l. 36 r. possible, p. 144. l. 31 r. pro­ceed, for causes r. causes, p. 155 l. 23 r. divine, l. 24 for four r. for, p. 160 l. 8 r. infallible, p. 163 l. 14 r. custom, l. 16 for them r. them, l. 17 r. famous, p. 169 l. 6 r. weak, l. 13 r. published, l. 30 for one r. no, p. 172 l. 27 r. obey it, l. 281 r. it, p. 173 l. 7 r. authority, p. 174 l. 12 r. infidelity, p. 180 l. 26 r. this, p. 184 l. 21 r. Hobbs, p 190 l. 24. r. to it, p. 203 l. 8 r. thus, p. 225 l. 28. r. afterwards, l. 25 r. (which is the motive faculty) p. 226 l. 9 r. acted, p. 227 l. 17 r. ex­amining, p. 228 l. 32 r. independent, p. 235 l. 3 r. which I have shewed, l. 14 for it is r. is it.

In the Postscript.

p. 12 l. 10 r. other writers, l. 21 r. (so I render his words, l. 26 r. Heb. 11.1, p. 14 l. 3 r. representor, p. 17 l. 12 r. preced­ing, l. 34 r. certainly the objectors, p. 21. l. 16 r. genii, p. 24. l. 31 r. communicated, p. 26 l. 23 1. he is, p. 29 l. 13 r. Licinius, p. 29 l. 34 r. thought, l. 35 r. return to the.

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