CHAP. I. Shewing what hardness of heart is.

HArdness of heart may be said to be an evill quality of the soul, which makes it in a man insensible of the evill which he doth, or the evill which he shall suffer; when either he hath no feeling of it, or feels it not in that measure which he should do; then is his heart affected with hardness. It is mans duty to be sensible of the sin which he commits, and of the suffering [Page 2] which will most certainly follow after. God hath placed in his soul that faculty of Conscience for this very end and purpose, to give him warning and make him take notice of both these that he might be affected accordingly: Now when after the comitting of sin, there are no affections of grief, sorrow, and trouble of spirit stirring in him, when there is no feare to com­mit sin, nor care to prevent the evill that sin will bring, then is the heart heardned.

This hardness of heart is either naturall, or adventitiall and acquired; the first of these we all bring with us into the world, being either altogether insensible of our spirituall misery, by reason of sin and suffering, or not so sensible as we should be. Hence the heart of man is said to be a heart of stone.

Acquired hardness is that whereby the natural is increased and augmented; this may in some degree be not onely be in the worst but in the best of men, which is brought to passe either by custom in sinning, or by secret judgement, or by both; of this there are divers degrees, as

• 1. When a man takes liberty, voluntarily and frequently to do such things as he knows to be sinfull.
• 2. When he doth these against the frequent perswasions, ad­monitions, and cals of the word to the contrary.
• 3. Against such corrections, punishments and judgements which God shall inflict upon himself, or he shall see inflicted upon others for the same, or for the like sins.
• 4. When he shall do this against the stirrings and strivings, the checks or rebukes of his own Conscience.
• 5. When notwithstanding all these, he shall take up strong resolutions and confirmed purposes to do as he hath done, namely to maintain his own wil against Gods will. Thus may wicked men harden their own hearts; and thus i'ts often said of Pharaoh, that he hardned his heart, and would not let the peoplegoe, when he once saw that the judgement was past.
• 6. When he shall come to be past all sence and feeling of his sin, thus the Apostle speaks of some, that being past feeling, gave themselves to commit all uncleannesse with greediness, Eph. 4.10.

2. There may be an acquired hardnesse by the secret judge­ment of God. Thus its said here that the Lord hardned Pharaohs [Page 3] heart: and of Sihon, that the Lord hardned his spirit and made it obstinate, that he might give him into the bands of the Israelites, Deut. 2.30.

How this is done, more shall be spoken in the due place.

CHAP. II. Shewing that God is not, nor cannot be the author or proper cause of this, or any other sinne.

BY another and proper cause I understand causa perse, such a cause as is in it self, and in i'ts own nature tends to pro­duce, such or such an effect, as the Sun is the proper cause of light and heat, the water of moisture and the like: That God cannot thus be the cause of sin, may appear upon these follow­ing grounds.

Argu. 1. God is the Author of all good, and therefore he cannot be Author of evill, for out of the same fountaine cannot proceed sweet water and bitter, Jam. 3.11. As the Sun cannot be the proper cause of light and darkness, no more can the Lord be of good and evill.

2. Sin is a defect, now God is all act, yea he is actus purissimus & perfectissimus, the most pure and perfect act; therefore he can­not be the Author that which is a defect: for however sinne cleaves to mens actions, as the accident to be subject, yet it self is a meere defect in a privation of what should be.

3. Sin is contrary to those excellent qualities and properties which immediately flow from the nature of God is light, sin is darkness, 1 Joh 1.5.6. God is purity and holiness, Sin is pollution and filthiness, Jam. 1.21. God is righteous, yea righteousness it self, all sin is unrighteousness, 1 Joh 5.17. God is perfection in the highest degree, all sin is imperfection: now one contrary cannot be the proper cause of another.

4. God is said to be such a God as loveth not wickednesse, nei­ther can evill dwell with him; yea he hates all the workers of iniqui­ty, Psal. 5.4.5. he hates them because of their sinne: now he cannot hate that which himself is the Author and proper cause of.

5. He threatens in his word that he will punish all sinne and iniquity, that he wil not hold the wicked innocent, Exod. 34.7. but he wil visit the iniquities of the Fathers upon the Children, even unto the third and fourth Generation; that the wicked shall not goe unpunished, Prov. 11.21. they shall not escape, 1 Thes. 5.3. Now it cannot stand with his justice to punish that which himself is the Author and proper cause of.

6. Sin makes a reparation between God and the soul, Esay 59.2. It is an aversion of the soul from God: Now God can­not be the Author of that which is an aversion from him, for then he should deny himself, but he cannot lye or denye himselfe, 1 Tim. 2.13.

7. If God could be the Author of sin he himself might be said to be a sinner; if he were the Author of unrighteousness, he himself might be said to be unrighteous; to which the Apostle gives an absit, as a thing blasphemous to speak or think. Is God unrighteous which punisheth (saith he) God forbid: How then shall he judge the world? Rom. 3.5,6.

8. The Apostle saith, that he who committeth sin, is of the De­vil, 1 John. 3.8. and that Christ came into the world to dissolve the workes of the Devil. Now Christ came not into the world to dissolve the works of God, therefore sin is none of his work.

9. If God should be the Author of sin, then the difference betwixt good and evil would be taken away, both arising from the same cause in the same manner.

10. If God should be the Author of sin, then he should seem to dissemble and deale deceitfully with men; because he so often cals off, from this as a thing which he loathes and ab­hors, and mean while is the parent and producer of it.

By all these grounds it appeares that God cannot be the Author and proper cause of sin, though he hath some kind of hand in it.

CHAP. III. Shewing how God hath a hand in the sinful actions of men.

THe just and holy God may be said to have a hand in the unjust actions of sinful men divers wayes, as

1. By way of permission, when he suffers them to follow the sinful inclinations and dispositions of their own wicked na­tures, and so produce actions accordingly, without restrain­ing or hindring them. Thus it is said, he suffered the Gentiles to walke in their own waies, Act. 14.16.

A man may be said to have a hand in that which he willing­ly and wittily su [...]ers to be done when he hath power to hin­der it: This is granted on all hands, for if God should not suffer sin to be, it could not be committed. God is able to re­strain and hinder the committing of sin if he pleaseth, if any thing should be done whether he would or not, then were he not omnipotent.

2. By suffering Satan to tempt and provoke mon to sinne, and by his temptations to prevaile: thus it is said that he did deliver all that Job had into the hans of Satan, and then Sa­tan stirres up the Caldaeans and Sabaeans, to take away his Oxen and his Camels, and to kill his Servants Job 1.12,15,17. And he suffered Satan to enter in the heart of Judas, and to stir him up to betray his Master.

3. By with-drawing his grace from men, and not affording a continuall supply of his helpe for their support and sustenta­tion, that they may be preserved from falling. Thus it is said, he tooke away his spirit from Saul, 2 Som. 7.15. And that when the Embassadors of the King of Babell came to Heze­kiah, the Lord left him to trie him, that he might know all that was in his heart, 2 Chron. 22 31. The depraved nature of man is like to a ruinous house that his ready to fall, if it be not con­tinnally under-propped and upheld by some supporters; now God is not bound to yeild this support to sinful men, but he may with-draw his helping hand from them as he pleaseth, which when he doth, then are they ready to fall.

4. God often times punisheth one sin with another; thus he punisheth the abuse of the meanes of grace with hardness of heart, and the abuse of light with greater blindness. Thus it is said of the Jews, that God gave them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and eares they should not heare, Rom. 11.8. And of the Gentiles, that because they abused the light of nature; and when they knew the true God by the works of Creation, yet they did not glorifie him as God, but withheld the truth in unrighteousnesr; therefore he gave them up to vile affections to doe such things which were not seemely, Rom 1.21,26. And in the times of the Antichristian Apostacy, because men received not the love of the truth, therefore God did send them strong delusions to believe lyes, 2 Thes. 2.10,11. And thus much Bellarmine himself grants, for speaking of Absolons incest, he saith, Bellar. de Amis. grat. & Sta. Pect. lib. 2. c. 14. Deus decitur malum illud fecisse, non quia culpa Absoloxis sed qua paena Davidis erat. God is said to have done it not as it was Absolons fault, but as it was Davids punishment.

5. God may be said to have a hand in the sinful actions of the Creature, because he so ordereth them by his providence, that he suffereth sin to be committed in one kind rather then in another: thus he suffered Josephs brethren rather to sell their brother into Egypt, then to kill him: Thus Christ gave leave to the Devils, rather to enter into the Swine, then into men; Besides he so ordereth and over ruleth the actions of the sinfull Creature, as he makes them serve to good uses and pur­poses; yea some times to ends altogether differing, yea con­trary to what themselves intended. Thus he made the actions of Josephs brethen in selling him into Egypt for a slave, to be a meanes of his greater advancement: And Hamans emnity against Mordecay, and the Jews in getting a decree of the King for their destruction, to be a meanes of their greater safety and preferment; And the envy of the Jews against Christ, in pro­curing him to be put to a shamefull and cursed death, to be a meanes and occasion not onely of mans salvation, but also of Christs greater exaltation.

6 God hath a hand in the sin which man commits, so far as he doth sustain and support him in all his natural motions and actions; God being the Author of nature, doth support man in [Page 7] all, the actions of nature, and that not onely in good, but in evill actions. Sin being a defect or privation, and so a kinde of none entity, cleaves away to something that hath being, to some habite, to some action or motion, as the subject wherein it is seated. Now all natural actions and motions are in them­selves goods hence the rule holds true, that malum est in bono tanquam in subjecto, evill is in good, as in the subject of it. All natures workes are Gods works, In him we live, and move, and have our being, Act. 17.25. This is true not onely in regard of our External, but also of our internal motions and actions; not onely of the body, but of the mind: As we cannot move our hand or foot, or not our thoughts, wills and affections without him.

In every sinful action, there are two things conjoyned and included: The action it self, and the defect or deformity; the inordinacy, and obliquity of it: One of these is as it were the matter, the other the form of it, which Divines call the materi­ale and formale Pacti. The former of these is from God, the other from the corrupt will of the Creature. It is a true rule that De­us agit inpeccato non tanquam causa moralis sed tanquam causa na­turalis, God acts in sin, not as a morall, but as a natural cause; so faire onely as there is natures worke in any action. All new actions are new entities and beings, and all beings are from God, who is the first and most perfect being, and from whom all other beings proceed. All natural motions and acti­ons are creatures, and all creatures are the work of a Creator. Pet. Mart. loc. com­mun. loc. 14 sect. 19. Qui equid est, quatenus est, non tantum a creaturis sed per deum pro­dueitur saith Peter Martyr. Every thing that is, so far as it is, hath his production, not onely from the Creature, but from God. And so far as these actions are beings, and from God they are good. Augustin de Fera relig. cap. 34. Ipsum quantulum cun (que) esse bonum est, quia summun esse est summun bonum, saith Augustin. The very being of any thing though never so small is good, because the chiefest being is the chiefest good.

Object. If it be objected that in sins of Omission there is no action, therefore in these God hath no hand.

Ans. It may be answered though there be no outward action yet there is an action of the minde and wil: for when a man doth omit any duty, he omits it sciens & velens, upon deliberation he [Page 8] doth willingly choose rather to let it alone, then performe it.

Pet. Mart. loc. com­mun loc. 14. sect. 20. Homo corruptus vult non amare proximum, vult nonire adsaerum caelum, ac perinde videmus actum voluntatis; ille actus, quà astus na­tarae, a Deo est, (saith Peter Martyr.) A corrupt minded man will not love his neighbour, he will not go to the holy Assem­blies; this act of his will, so far as it is an act of nature, is of God.

Thus we have seen how God hath a hand in sin divers waies; The two first, are acts of his Soveraignty, whereby he acts as a fire Agem, as being bound to none. The two second, are acts of his justice, whereby he inflicts punishment upon such as deserve it. The two last, are acts of his power and providence, where­by he doth not onely sustaine the Creatures in their severall actions and motions, but guides these with the several adjuncts and accidents belonging to them, to such ends as seem best to his wisdom; and in none of these doth he appeare in any sort culpable.

CHAP. IV. Shewing that God hath a hand in the evill actions of men, more then by way of bare permission.

THat permission is excised by God, in the sinful actions of men, is by none denyed (for if he did not suffer them, they could not be). but whether this permission be accompanied with action whether he hath any kind of efficiency or working in the evill that is done by men, is the great question; the af­firmative part whereof may thus be proved.

Argu. 1. The Scripture expressions whereby God is said to have a hand in sin, are almost alway such as denote action, and not a bare permission onely. It doth not say that God suffered Pha­raoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardned Pharaohs heart, Exod. 9.12. It is not said that he suffered the Cananites to hearden their hearts against Joshua; but that it was of the Lord that they should harden their hearts to come against Israel, that they might destroy them, and they might have no favour, Josh. [Page 9] 11.20. It is not said that he suffered Absolon to commit wicked­nesse with his Fathers Concubins, but he tels David, What thou hast done in secret I will doe in the sight of the Sun, 2 Sam. 12.12. It is not said that he suffered the Egyptians to hate his people, but that he turned their hearts to hate them, Psal. 105.25. that he suffered the false Prophet to be deceived, but I the Lord have de­ceived him, Ezek. 14 9. that he suffered the Gentiles to follow their vile affections, but he gave them up to vile affections, Rom 2.26. that he suffered those who received not the love of the truth, to be led away with delusions, but he should send them strong delusions, to beleeve a Lye, 2 Thes. 2.11. When our Saviour directs us to pray against temptation, he doth not bid us pray that God would not suffer us to be led into temptation, but that he would not lead us into temptation. By these and many o­ther places, where Gods working in sin is held forth to us by way of action, it plainly appeares, that in the sinfull actions of men God doth exercise more then a bare permission: else why should the Scripture so constantly use such expressions as de­note action? The Scripture doth never so frequently and constantly speake improperly in any subject, where it might as easily have spoken properly.

Argu. 2. When God is said to harden Pharaohs heart, and Pharaoh is said to harden his own heart, if one of these may be taken by way of permission only, why not the other also, and so Pha­raoh should have no action in the hardning of his own heart; for though God doth act and worke in another manner then Pharaoh himselfe doth (as shall more largely be showne after­wards) yet the same expression being applyed to both, it plain­ly argues that action belongs to both in this hardning, though the manner of their acting be far different.

Argu. 3. It is granted by all, that God doth permit sin to be, o­therwise it could not be: Now if he doth permit, then he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it; for if he should not willingly permit it, th [...]n it should come to passe against his will: but it cannot stand with his omnipotency that any thing should come to passe whether he will or no: It is the true rule of Austin, August in enchirid. cap. 95. Nihil fit, nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, vel ipse faciendo vel permittendo ut fiat; There is nothing done but the omnipo­tent [Page 10] God will have it to be done, either by doing it himselfe, or by permitting it to be done by others. If he willingly per­mits it, then he wils it, (for an act of his will passeth upon it) if he wills it, look how far he wils it he works it; For he is in Heaven and doth whatsoever he will, Psal. 115.3. so far as he wils any thing shall be or come to passe, so far he acts in bringing it to passe; for his will is an active and operative-will. The acts of his will are actus ad intra, acts within himself; and all im­manent acts are of the same nature with himselfe, who is totus actus, all act: how then can it be conceived that such acts as these should be without action? All these immanent acts, name­ly the acts of his will, counsell, and purpose touching things which shall be as they are in him from all eternity, so in time he puts them forth in some outward action and working. Hence it is said, That he workes all things according to the counsell of his will, Ephes. 5.11.

Bella mine saith, Bellar. de amiss. grat. & statu pcti. lib. 2. c. 14. Deus est causa indurationis, non positivè sed nega­tivè seilicet permissive, God is the cause of hardning not posi­tively, but negatively; namely, by way of permission, so that he makes permission to be such a thing wherein God denies and withholds all action, and thus he saith God hardens; But to harden is an act, and how can an act be without action, so that this is nothing else but to bring in a clear contradiction for the blinding of the truth, yea, he saith further, Deus praesidet ipsis malis voluntatibvs, eas regit, gubernat, terquet, flectit, in iis invisibi­liter operando; God doth as it were sit President over the evill wils of men, and doth rule, governe, wrest and bend them by working invisibly in them. Is not here a manifest contradicti­on to his negative permission? for are not all these actions, and can there be action without action? Far more agreeable to truth is the assertion of Dr. Twisse speaking of this subject, Dr. Twisse vindict. l. 2 p. 27. Non tantum voluisse Deum ab aeterno dicimus, sed conformiter ita o­peratum esse in tempore, & totum negotium ita administrasse ut revera peccaret Adamus; We affirme, that God did not only will from all eternity, but did answerably so worke in time, and so or­der the businesse, that Adam should certainly fall.

Argum. 4. The Scripture saith that Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the people of Israel were gathered together against Christ, to do whatsoever [Page 11] the hand and counsell of God had determined before to be done, Acts 4.27,28. what these did to Christ in his suffering was sinfull in a high degree, yet it was done by the determinate counsel of God: and as it is in this, so it is in all other actions of the like na­ture; whatever is done in time is determined, and decreed before all time. Now the decrees of God are one [...]geticall de­crees, whatever he hath decreed shall be, he some way or other procures the being of it; so that though he be not the Author of it if it be evill, yet he hath some kind of efficiency and wor­king in it: for if he should leave it to others, and have no hand at all in the effecting of it, then the thing might never be, and so God might be disappointed of the thing which he de­creed. It is a true rule being rightly understood, Qua decrevit fecit. If God should decree to permit sin, and that this permis­sion should be without action, without doing any thing in it, then he should decree to do nothing which cannot stand with the nature of a decree.

Argum. 5. So far as sin makes for the glory of God, so far he hath a hand in effecting it (for he both decrees and workes all things which make for his glory, so far as they make for his glory: but sin by accident makes much for the glory of God; The Jews crucifying and killing of Christ made way for the glorious worke of our redemption. The Apostle saith that mans unrighteousnesse commends the righteousnesse of God, and that the truth of God abounds through our lye, unto his glory, Rom. 3.5.7. so far as sin is for God, so far it is from God. Of him, through him, and by him are all things, to him be honour and glory, Rom. 11. last.

Argum. 6. The Substratum or subject of sin, namely, the naturall motion or action whereto sin cleaves, is such a thing without which sin could not be (for an accident could not be without a subject) men could not use their tongus to deceit if they could not speak at all, neither could their feet be swift to shed blood if they could not go at all. But of this natural motion and acti­on God is the author and proper cause (as hath been shewed) if God wils to yield his concurrence to the substance of any act, it is plain that he wils that act should be done, now without this act the sin that cleaves to the act could not be; therefore he [Page 12] must needs likewise some way both will and-work in the sin of the act: especially, because in many evill actions, not onely the action it self simply considered, but the pravity and defor­mity of it, makes way, and is an occasion whereby God gets himself glory.

Argu. 7. If Gods permission of sin, should be a bare permission without action, then he should be a meere spectator of men in their sinfull actions, himself not doing any thing. And this would much diminish and strengthen the work of his provi­dence in ruling and governing the world, by excluding and shutting him out from having any working hand in the grea­test part of those actions that are done in the world; for the number of wicked men in the world being farre greater then the number of good men, the number of evill actions, must needs farre exceed the number of good actions: yea thus the actions of greatest consequence, as the mutation or over-throw of Kingdoms, States, Common-wealths, (which for the most part are done in a sinful way) should be exempted, and ex­cluded from the working of his providence.

Arminius saith, Quae deus ne (que) fiers vult, ne (que) non vult, ea per­mittit: Those things which God neither wils, nor wils not to be done, those he permits. But is not this to make God an idle spectator of the greatest part of actions that are done in the world? If a man stands and sees a thing to be done, which he neither would have to be done, nor would not have to be done; wherein he will neither helpe nor hinder; doth he not here stand as in idle spectator, as one not at all caring whether the thing be done or not? and yet such a kind of carriage do they attribute to God in regard of the greatest part of things done, who make his permission to be without action: yea, herein they do after a sort contradict themselves. For Arminius makes permission to be, Armin. in Perk. 134. efficacis impedimenti suspensio, the with-holding of an efficacious impediment, of such a thing as would certain­ly hinder the doing of a thing.

Bellarmine saith, Permittere est, gratiam efficacem qua peccatum vi­tetur negare. To permit, is to deny such effectual grace, as where­by sin may be avoided. But can this with-holding of an im­pediment, and this denyal of effectual grace be without any [Page 13] action, at least without the action of Gods will? and doth he not work answerably to his will?

Argu. 8. It is granted by the adversary, that God doth punish one sin with an other; Now is it not a ridiculous thing, to say that the judge permits onely punishment to be inflicted upon a Ma­lefactor? doth he not appoint it? and if it be not just, he ought not to permit it: There can be neither appointing, nor execu­ting of judgment and punishment without action.

By all these aguments it plainly appeares, that God doth exercise more then a bare permission in the sin which man commits.

This may further be confirmed by the testimony of the most Orthodox Writers: Excellent Calvin saith thus, Instit. lib. 1. cap. 18. Sect. 2. Deus indurat corda hominum non tantum permittendo sed etiam agendo. God hardneth the hearts of men, not onely by permitting, but by acting.

Lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 3. Deus dicitur indurare reprobos corum corda vertere inclinare impel­lere. Id quale sit, nequaquam explicatur si confugitur ad praescientiam & permissionem. God is said to harden reprobates, to turn their hearts to incline and move them. How this is done, is not sufficiently explicated, if we fly to praescience and permission onely.

Peter Martyr saith, Locj. Com. loc. 13. Sect. 16. Est permissio quidem sed aliquid amplius efficacibus illis loquutionibus ostenditur. There is indeed a permis­sion, but something more is held forth in these strong expres­sions (namely such as before were mentioned.)

Locj. com. loc. 13. Sect. 7. Si minus propriè loqui velineus, Deus poterit aliquo modo dici, aut initium, aut causa peccati, non propria quidem, sed ea quae removens prohibens appellatur. If we will speak improperly, God may be said some way to be either the beginning, or the cause of sin: no proper cause indeed, but that which is called the removing of what hinders.

Piscator saith, Ad Amic. coll. vorstij. Sect. 17. An vero negari potefl, illum procurare negotium cujus consilio & decreto negotium geritur? Can he be denyed to procure a business to be done, by whose counsell and determi­nation the thing is done?

Mr. Bayne saith, Bayne on the Lords Prayer. p 129. Gods sufferance is not to be understood without his action, he is a voluntary agent in the things he suffereth; we must [Page 14] not think his permission to be a pure permission, without action.

Yea, not onely our modern Divines, but that famous anci­ent Angustin himself gives a large suffrage to this truth. August, in Enchirid. ad laurent. cap. 100. Deus permittit (saith he) aut volens aut invitus, non certè invitus, quia id esset cum tristitia, & potentia se majorem haberet: si volens per­mittit, permissio est genus quoddam voluntatis. God permits a thing either willingly, or against his will; if against his will, this would be with pain and grief to him, and then he should have some other greater in power then himself; if he permits wil­lingly, then his permission is some kind of will.

Ibid. Sencti affliguntur secundum Dei voluntatem, 1 Pet. 3.17. at illi non possunt pati nisi alter agat. Qui unit passionem vult actionem, actio proficiscitur ab agente. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, 1 Pet. 3.17. They cannot suffer unlesse another acts; he that wils the passion, wils the action also, and action proceeds from an agent.

Here by the way we may take notice how ill Bellarmine a­grees with S. Austine in this point, for the writing of this sub­ject, and answering to that place, Act. 2.23. where it is said that Christ was delivered to be crucified by the determinate councell of God. He saith, Bellar. de Amis. grat. & statu. Pcti. lib. 2. cap. 13. Saepe accidit ut actio sit mala passio bo­na, Deus voluit passionem & patientiam sanctorum, non autem actio­nem eorum a quibus affliguntur. But this crosseth Austine, who saith that in the Saints suffering, who suffer according to the will of God, Qui vult passionem vult actionem, and it is contrary to right reason; for action and passion are one and the samemo­tion, one cannot be without the other, therefore he that wils the one, must needs will the other also.

Further, Austine speaking of that place, Rom. 1.26. where God is said to give men up to their vile affections: hath these words.

Contra. Iul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 3. Quid est quod dicit, cum desiderijs suis traditi dicuntur: relicti per divinam patientiam intelligendi sunt, non per potentiam in peccata compulsi? Quasi non simul posuit haec duo idem apostolus patientiam nempe & potentiam, Rom. 9. What is it which he saith, when men are said to be delivered up to their to their own affections and desires? are they to be understood as left onely by the di­vine patience, and not put forward to sin by the divine [Page 15] power, as though the same Apostle did not joyne both these together, namely patience and power, Rom. 9.22. Thus we see that this learned Father goes as high, or rather higher in his expressions, touching the manner of Gods working in sin, then those of our Divines have done, who are so much quar­rel'd against, by Bellarmine and Arminius. I know well that most of our Orthodox writers do seldom use that expression, that God did decree sin, or is the cause of it, but only that he did decree to permit sin: but their meaning must needs be, that he did decree that sin should be effected and brought about in such a way and manner, and by such meanes, as himself would not be the Author or proper cause of it, but onely a cause by ac­cident: For if they should mean that he would have no efficiency or working in it, then they should make him to exercise a bare permission in it, and so to be an idle spectator of all the sinful actions done in the world; which is an opinion that they al­together renounce and reject, as hath been already shewed.

Doctor Twisse hath a passage where he affirmes, that though God intends the evill action which man doth, yet he intends not the evill of the action: But that is meaning his, he doth not so intend it, as to be the Author of it, though he hath a work­ing hand in it, appears by many other places in his writings; as when he saith, Vindic. grat. lib. 2. pag. 156 Cum peccatum Adae eveniebat non nisi Deo volen­te eveniehat. When it sell out that Adam did sin, this fell out by the will of God. Excaecare est preouldubio, Effectum dare ut quis excaecaretur. To blind, is so to work & bring it about that a man should be blinded. Ibid. p. 87. An quae Satanas in sanctnm Job patravit Deo tantum permittente facta sunt? Annon Job profitetur Deum abstu­lisse quae dederat? Were those things which Satan did ill against Job, done onely by Gods permission? doth not Job profess that God had taken away what he gave?

Ib. p. 157. Decretum permissiuum nihilominus est efficax ad fines a Deo sibi praestitutos quam effectivum. The permissive decree is no less effica­cious for the ends fore appointed of God, then his working decree. These are the words of that learned man, by which it appeares, that his meaning in the former words, is not as if he denyed that God did decree the evill actions of men at all (for here he grants a decree, and that an efficacious decree) but [Page 16] only that he doth not so decree the evill of an action, as to be the author or proper cause of it; for if he should not at all in­tend the evill of mens actions, then the evill of those actions should fall out besides his intention; and then it should be either besides his knowledge, and so he should not be omnisci­ent, or against his will, and so he should not be omnipotent.

CHAP. V. Shewing more particularly the manner how the righteous God hath a hand in the unrighteous actions of sinfull men.

THat God is not the Author or proper cause of sin, and yet hath some kind of efficiency and working in it, hath been already shewed: it followes now to shew more particularly, the manner how he worketh in producing of it. The manner of Gods working in sinfull actions is secret and hidden, not easily to be apprehended, much lesse to be explicated; which made Austin speake thus of it, Contra Justinum Pelag. lib. 5 cap 3. Quanta est poena tradi passioni­bus ignominiae, sive deserendo, sive alio quoque vel explicabili vel inex­plicabili modo, &c. how great a punishment is to be given up to unseemly passions, whether this be done by way of deserti­on, or by any other explicable or inexplicable way; yet there is one way, which is not altogether above our apprehension, but therein we may in some sort discerne Gods manner of working in sinfull actions, and that is by administring occa­sions, by presenting such objects, and offering to men such things are in themselves lawfull and good, but they make an ill use of them, taking occasion by them to be stirred to evill in some kind or other.

Vindic. lib. 2. p. 133. Licet Deo ita se gerere in rerum omnium administratione ut mate­riam & occasionem objiciat unde homines naturaliter excitentur pro varia affectuum qualitate vel ad bonum vel ad malum saith Dr. Twisse God may so carry himselfe in the administration of things, as he may offer matter and occasion, whereby men may be exci­ted either to good or evill, according to the divers qualitie [Page 17] and tempers of their affections; yea, Bellarmine himselfe con­fesseth, Bellar. de amiss. gra­riae & sta. pcti. l. 2. c. 14. Deum immutare cor principum immittendo aliquam bonam cogitationem aut saltem indifferentem, ex qua tamen impediuntur a proposito suo & ita decipiuntur; That God doth change the mind of Princes, by putting some thought that is good, or at least indifferent, whereby they are hindred from their pur­pose, and so are deceived.

Thus God may administer occasions of sinning either in­wardly or outwardly; Inwardly by stirring up and suggest­ing such thoughts to their minds as are in themselves lawfull and good, or at least not evill, and yet they take occasion by them to be led to evill.

It was no ill thought for Josephs brethren to thinke that their Father loved him better then he did them, yet this was the occasion of their envy and hatred against him, Gen. 37.4. It was no ill thought for Pharaoh to think that if the Israelites should continue to multiply and increase as they began, they might in time grow too strong for him, and so depart out of his country whether he would or no; yet hence he takes occa­sion to oppresse them with heavie burthens, and to give com­mand for murthering their male children, Exod. 2.10.13,14. Shimei whose heart was full of rancor and bitternesse against David, because the Kingdom was translated from his tribe to the Tribe of Judah when he saw that David was in distresse, being driven from Jerusalem by the conspiracy of his son Absolon, and thinking it may be) that this came upon David as a just judge­ment of God for his unjust dealing with Ʋriah the Hittite, hence takes occasion to vent his splene by cursing of David, the the hope of impunity likewise helping him forward. Jeroboam thought if the people should goe up yearly to worship at Jeru­salem this might be a means to make them returne again to the house of David, this was no evill thought, yet hence he takes occasion to set up the Calves at Dan and Bethel, whereby he made Israel to sin, 1 Kin. 12.26,28. If the Jews thought that to morrow they should dye, that is, that destruction would shortly come (the Prophet having denounced it) this was no ill thought, yet hence they take occasion instead of fasting to fall to feasting; Let us eat and drink for to morrow we shal dye, say [Page 18] they, Isai. 22.13. The Jewes thought if they should let Christ alone all men would follow after him, this thought was not evill, but hence they take occasion of taking counsell to kill him, Joh. 11.48. Vind. lib. 2. p. 83. Deus non modo occasiones ministrat sed ad consilia ex occasionibus nata formanda concurrit, saith Dr. Twisse. i. e. God may administer occasions outwardly, and that both by his workes and by his word; By his workes divers wayes, as

1. By his works of mercy; Because sentence against an evill worke is not executed speedily (saith Solomon) therefore the hearts of the sons of men is fully set in them to doe evill, Eccles. 8.11. These things hast thou don (saith God) and I was silent, and thou thoughtest that I was such an one as thy selfe, Psal. 50.21. When God holds his peace at wicked men, when he doth not speake to them in his wrath, and vexe them in his sore displeasure, then they are ready to thinke that he likes of them well enough, and of their wayes and and courses, so that we see Gods patience and long suffering is an accidentall cause of mans security, of his pre­sumption and boldnesse in evill wayes. Magna peccandi illece­bra impunitatis spes (saith the Orators) hope of impunity is a great allurement to iniquity. And as his patience is an occasi­on of presumption, so is bounty of forgetfulnesse, yea, of re­bellion against God. When thou hast eaten and filled thy selfe be­ware thou forget not the Lord thy God, Deu. 8.10,11. (saith Moses to the people) Give me not riches least I be ful and deny thee, Pro. 30.9. When Jeshurun waxed fat then be kicked, then he waxed wan­ton and rebellious, Deut. 13.15. and it followes, Psal. 18. Thou hast forgotten God that formed thee?

2. By workes of justice Thus men men oftimes take occa­sion by the judgements and punishments which God inflicts upon them for sin, to breake out further into sin. The Lord led his people through the wildernesse, and caused them some­times to meet with want of water, other whiles want of bread, sometimes to be assailed by enemies, to humble and to prove them, that he might do them good in their latter end, Deut. 8.2. But the bad ones amongst them, hence tooke occasion to murmur and rebell against him: When the Lord powres the vials of his wrath upon the followers of the Beast, and the adherents of Ante-Christ, hence they take occasion to blaspheme God of Hea­ven [Page 19] for their paines and sores, and repented not of their workes, Rev. 16.10. when the King of Moab was brought to great streights, by the Armies of Judab and Israel, (to whom the Lord had pro­mised successe in their expedition against him) 2 Kings 2.17. he takes his eldest son and sacrifices him upon the wall, ver. 27.

3. By his works of providence. It was the worke of a fa­vourable providence which caused the Israelites so exceeding­ly to multiply in Egypt, yet hence Pharaob takes occasion to oppresse them and to murther their male-children. It was a worke of providence that brought David in his slight from Saul, to Abimelech the Priest for relief at such a time when Doeg the Edomite was with him, 1 Sam. 22.7. now hence he takes occasion by his false slaunders to stirre up Saul to kill all the Lords Priests at Nob, and to make him the instrument, 1 Sam. 23.18. It was a worke of providence that brought David to the sight of a woman washing her selfe in her garden, when he was walking upon the roof of his house in an evening; this was an occasion to him of entertaining thoughts of unclean­nesse, and of putting them forth into action, 2 Sam. 11.2,4. there was no fault at all in offering the occasion, but all the evil arose from David, for Joseph had as strong an occasion of­fered to allure him to the like sin, yet was not at all hurt by it, Gen. 39.9.

It was a work of providence that brought the wise men that came from the East, to Jerusalem to enquire after the King of the Jewes who was then borne, it was the speciall command of God to direct their going home another way, and not to re­turne againe to Jerusalem; yet Herod hence takes occasion to murther all the male children in Bethlem, and the bordering coasts, that were two yeares old and under, Mat. 2.16.

2. As God by his works administers occasion to men to breake forth into sinne, so he doth the like by his word; Thus he sent his word and command to Pharaoh, charging him to let the people of Israel goe, but hence Pharaoh tooke an occasion to grow stubborne and rebellious, and more to har­den his heart in a resolution not to let them goe, Exod. 5.2. I know not the Lord (saith he) neither will I let them go; yea, the ofner Moses came to him with command from God for doing it, the more he still hardned his heart against it; looke as a [Page 20] strong streame the more it is stopt the higher it riseth (though no new water be added to it) so it is in this case; Thus the Jewes the more they were warned by the Prophet of their Ido­latry, and that they should not goe downe into Egypt, Jer. 42.17. the more obstinate and wilfull they waxed both these wayes, Chap. 44.16 so when Christs hearers heard that which they thought touched themselves, it is said, they were filled with with wrath, and thrusting him out of the City they led him to the edge of an hill, with purpose to have throwen him downe headlong, Luk. 18.27. When Stephen preached so excellently to the Jews, they hurst with anger, and gnashed upon him with their teeth, run­ning violently upon him: Act 7.54.57. So that Christs and Stephens preaching was an accidentall cause of the wrath of these wicked men, as the stopping of a streame is the cause of the rising of it.

Hence the Apostle speaking of the Law, saith, where there is no law there is no transgression, Rom. 4.15. & that sin took occasion by the command, and wrought in him all manner of concupiscence; for without the Law sin is dead, but when the Law came sin revived, Rom. 7.8,9. that sin took occasion by the command and deceived him, verse 11. so that the Law quickned sin, put life into it, and set it on worke, it lying as it were dead before, and not stirring so strongly as it did after the comming of the Law; by all which it appeares that the Law is an accidentall cause of sin. Now so far as the Law workes it, God workes it, the Law being his agent and instrument.

Quest. But here it may be asked, how can it be that the Law which in it selfe is holy, just and good, should any way be the cause of evill?

Answ. This ariseth from the contrariety that is betwixt the good and holy law of God, and mans corrupt and wicked heart. there is nothing more pure and holy then the Law of God, (it being the perfect rule of righteousnesse, and an exact idaea of all purity and holinesse) there is nothing more corrupt and and impure then the wicked heart of man, it being the foun­taine of all pollution and filthinesse, Mat. 15.19. Jer. 17.9.) Now it is a true rule in Logick, Contraria juxta se posita magis elucescunt, when contraries are placed neer together, the contra­rieties of their natures doth more appeare and put forth it selfe; keep fire and water at a distance, and the contrari­eties [Page 21] of their natures doth not much shew it selfe, but bring them together, cast water upon the fire, or put coales of fire in­to the water, then they fight one with the other, and the stron­ger overcomes the weaker: so the more neer and close the most pure and holy word of God be brought and applyed to the corrupt and rebellious will of man, the more is the innate corruption and rebellion of it irritated and stirred up, and the more strongly doth it put forth it selfe. The more strongly the command was pressed upon Pharaoh touching letting the Israe­lites goe, the more strongly did his rebellious will rise up a­gainst it. This we may see true in the ordinary carriage of wicked men: Let a proud swearer, or filthy speaker be rebu­ked for their ill language, and they will the more breake forth into abusive speech. Thus we see how the Law and Word of God that in its owne nature tends to restraine and represse sin, may accidentally provoke and put men forward to greater eagernesse and violence in sinning; yea, not onely the Law but the Gospel may by accident be an occasion of greater evil. Thus our Saviour tels the Pharisees, that if they had been blind they had had no sinne, but because they said they did see therefore their sin remained, Joh. 9. last. if they had had no meanes of knowledge, their sin had not been so great, but now the light shined upon them, thereby their sin was increased, because they shut their eyes against it. Hence likewise the Apostle saith, that the Gospel was to some the savour of death, 2 Cor. 2.16. In it owne nature it did tend to life, but by accident it came to be an occasion of death to such as rejected it. Thus we see how God may be accidentally a cause of sin, namely, by admini­string occasion, and that both inwardly and outwardly, both by his workes and by his word; and Bellarmine himselfe is for­ced in a manner to acknowledge thus much; for he saith, Bellar. de amiss. grat. & statu. pcti. l. 2. c. 14. Pati­entia Dei aliquo modo indurat, Caeterum non dicitur excecare vel in­durare nisi per accidens sed ipsis homines abutentes rebus bonis seipsos obdurat. The patience of God doth after a sort harden men: but yet he is not said to blind or to harden but onely by accident, for when they doe abuse good things they har­den themselves. Here Bellarmine grants that God may bee said to blind and harden men by accident, when they abu­sing [Page 22] his Patience and long suffering take occasion from thence to harden themselves in sinne.

CHAP. VI. Shewing, that such causes as worke by accident, may have a true efficiency, and yet not be altogether blameless, in blame-worthy actions.

THat accidental causes may have a true efficiency, and yet not be faulty when the effect is faulty, may appear both by Reason and Scripture.

1. The rule of reason tels us, that whatsoever hath a vis, any power or vertue to bring forth an effect, is so far a cause of that effect; For causa est cujus vi res est. Now there be many things which have an efficiency in bringing forth such or such an effect, which yet cannot justly be blamed, though the effect be evill.

When a man stands so neare the fire that he scorcheth his legges, the fire hath a true efficiency in this scorching; yet not the fire, but the man onely is to be blamed: for though it be the natural property of the fire to burne, yet the end why the fire was made, was to warme, not to burn those that stand be­fore it; and that it scorcheth the mans leggs, it is his owne fault, because he did not stand further off when he might have done it: and the fire was onely an accidental cause of scorch­ing.

When a man weares a sword for his defence, and he in a Melancholike or mad humour, shall run the Sword into his own body; here not the Sword, but the man is to be blamed, because the end of wearing a Sword is the safety, not the hurt of the owner: and though it hath a true efficiency in hurting wounding him, yet the fault onely is his owne, be­cause he willingly turned the Sword against himself.

When a Physitian according to the true rules of Art, shall administer wholesome Physick to his Patient for such or such a disease, and this meeting with some hidden distemper or cor­rupt humour in the body, shall cause greater pain or (it may [Page 23] be) death; yet here neither the Physick nor Physitian are to be blamed, because the work of both these in their owne na­ture tended to health, and was fit to procure it.

When Jason had his impostume cured by the thrusting of a Sword into his body, by the hand of his enemy, this was no thank to his enemy, who intended not his health, but his death: so on the contrary it is no blame to the Physitian that intends health, and useth fit meanes to procure it, though death fol­lows by accident.

When the same Sun beames lights upon a Garden and a Dunghil, and raise a sweet smell from the one, and an ill sa­vour from the other; neither the Sun nor the beames thereof are to be blamed, because the efficacy of them did extend to both a like, but the different effect did arise from the difference of the matter whereon they did light.

The like instances also may be brought from Scripture, when a man is hewing wood with an Axe, and the head of the Axe slippeth from the helve, and slayes the stander by; here nei­ther the Axe nor the man are to be blamed, though they have an efficiency in the death of the other, because they are onely causes by accident; the scope of neither being to hurt the stan­der by, Deut. 19.5.

When King Uzziah went into the Temple of the Lord to burn Incense, Azariah with fourscore other Priests, went in after him and withstood him, telling him that it did not belong to him to burne incense to the Lord; then it is said Ʋzziah was wrath, 2 Chron. 26.16,17,18,19.

Here the Priests were causes of the wrath of the King, but no faulty causes, because they did but their duty, and their inten­tion was onely to hinder him from doing that which was un­lawful for him to do, but not to provoke him to anger and wrath.

When the Pharisees were filled with wrath against Christ, and the Jews breast with anger against Stephen, because they justly reproved them, they were accidental causes of their wrath and anger, but no faulty causes.

The Apostle saith, that the Law causeth wrath, Rom. 4.15. It causeth wrath by meanes of Transgression, (for transgression [Page 24] onely properly causeth wrath) as the Law is the cause of wrath, so likewise is the cause of transgression, namely an accidental cause, yet no faulty cause, for the proper end of the Law was neither to procure wrath, nor to procure transgression, but ra­ther to be a meanes to preserve man from both these, by dire­cting him so to walke as he might please God; so when he saith that the motions of sin were by the Law, (that is, were stirred up by the Law) Rom. 7.5. and that sin took occasion by the Com­mandement, and wrought in him all manner of conceupiscence, verse 11. here sin is said to be stirred up by the Law, and to take occasi­on by the Commandement of working concupiscence, and therefore the Law hath some kind of efficiency in producing of sin it is an accidentall cause but no faulty cause.

As the Law is in it selfe holy, and just, and good, Rom. 7.12. so it is good that it should be brought to mans understan­ding by the knowledge of it, and to his will and affections by the right application of it: but the more this is done (he be­ing lest to himselfe) the more doth it irritate and stir up cor­ruption in him, and his will (by reason of the contrariety that is in it to the holy Law of God) waxeth so much more stub­borne and rebellious as the Law is more closely applyed to it. When the Apostle saith, that beleevers are not under the Law, Rom. 6.14. and that they are delivered from the Law, that being dead (namely that corruption) wherein we are held, Rom. 7.6. this must needs be understood of the accidentall worke of the Law, whereby (by meanes of our corruption) it stirs up sin in us; for it cannot be understood of the Law as it is a rule of o­bedience (because then the Law should be wholly abolished, to which the Apostle gives an absit, do we then make the Law of none effect through faith, God forbid, Rom. 3.31.) neither can it be understood in this place of the condemning power of the Law: for though it be true that believers are freed from the curse and condemnation of the Law, yet this is an effect of justification, and hath reference to that, whereas the subject of the Apostles discourse in these two Chapters, where he speakes of freedom from the Law (namely the sixth and seventh) is altogether a­bout sanctification, and he brings many arguments to prove the necessary connexion of these two together, and this a­mongst [Page 25] the rest, because they were not under the Law they were delivered from it; they must not suffer sin to raigne in their mortall, because they were not under the Law but un­der grace, cap. 6.14. they were delivered from the Law (lust and concupiscence being kild in them, chap. 7.6. How were they not under the Law? how were they delivered from it? So far as they were truly sanctified they were no longer under the accidentall worke of the Law, whereby it had power to ir­ritate and stir up the rebellion and corruption of their natures, and so to cause sin more to abound in them, being implanted into Christ and made partakers of the vertue of his death and resurrection, their old man was crucified, and their body of sin destroy­ed, so as they should no longer serve sin, as they did before, chap. 6.6. while they were in the flesh the motions of sin which were by the Law (which were stirred up by having the Law brought nearer to them) did worke in their members to bring forth fruit unto death; but they were delivered from the Law (from that acci­dentall worke of the Law) that being dead wherein they were held, (their sinfull lusts being in part mortified) that they should serve God in newnesse of spirit, and not in the oldnesse of the letter, chap. 7.5.6. by both which places it appeares that the Law hath power to stir up sin and corruption in those that are in the a state of corruption that remaine as yet altogether unsanctified, and so it is an accidentall cause of sin, yet no faulty cause, that remaining still holy, and just and good.

In this sence likewise Christ saith of himselfe, that be came not to send peace but the Sword, that he came to set a man at vari­ance against his Father, and the daughter against the Mother, Mat. 10.34,35. that he came to set fire on the earth, Luk. 12.49. How is this to be taken, that Christ came not to send peace but the sword? is he not the Author and purchasor of peace? Is he not called the Prince of Peace? Isai. 9.6. Is it not said of him that he is our peace? Ephes. 2.14. how then doth he say, that he came not to send peace? these words must needs therefore be taken with similation: he came not to send peace; that is, not peace onely but the sword also: but especially, his co­ming was the cause of peace in another manner then it was of the sword. How did it cause the sword? this coming was not [Page 26] the proper cause of the Sword, but the sword (that is, wars and troubles) broke forth in the world occasionally upon his co­ming: for after that Christ came and the Gospel was peeached in the word; some there were that rejected it, others embraced and entertained it, beleived and obeyed it, and accordingly made profession of Christ and his truth; now those who did thu [...] came to be hated and maligned, yea to be persecuted, and ill intreated by the other: yea by this meanes it came to passe that those who were joyned together by the nearest bond of outward relation came to be divided, & be carryed on with the greatest enmity and ill affection one against another, so that the brother did deliver the brother to death, and parents their children, and children did rise up against their pa [...]ents and cause them to be put to death, Mat. 10 21. By which it is plaine, that Christ and his Gospel had a hand in both these, both in sending peace, and sending the sword, because the same expression is used in both; if there were a bare permission in sending the sword there was permission only in sending peace: if there was efficiency and working in the one, there was so also in the other (although after another manner.) In like manner, when Christ saith, that he came to set fire on the earth (to send persecution, and that his desire was this fire might be kindled, Luk. 12.49. It is plaine he hath a working hand herein, for what he intends and earnestly desires, that he likewise some way or other effectually procures.

Object. If it be asked how the same cause can bring forth contrary effects, how the same Christ and the same Gospell can bring both peace and trouble?

Answ. The answer is, that though Christ had a sufficiency and worke in both, yet in a far differing manner; for he is the au­thor and proper cause of peace, this he both purchased and prayed for, of this he is causa per se, of the other he is causa per accidens, an accidentall cause onely; the end of his comming and of causing his Gospel to be preached to be preached, being not to bring trouble and persecution, but this ariseth from the perverse refractory wils of wicked men, who therefore hate the light because their deeds are evill. As the same heat of the Sun softens the waxe, and hardens the clay, and the same light of the Sun helps a good sight to see better, but hurts sore eyes, [Page 27] so it is in this case. Thus also it is said that Christ is set or appointed for the rising and fall of many, Lu. 2.34. Not onely for the rising of some, but the fall of others; that he is the corner stone elect and precious be is made in head of the corner to believers, but a stumbling stone and rock of offence to those that are disobedient, 1 Pet. 2.7,8. He hath an efficiency in both these, for the text sayth he is made to both, but of the one he is the author and proper cause, and therefore altogether faultlesse and blame­lesse, their owne willfull unbeliefe being the proper cause of their stumbling.

CHAP. VII. Shewing that God may worke in the same blame-worthy acti­ons with Sathan and sinfull men, and yet himselfe be altogether blamelesse.

THat the holy God doth worke in the same action with the sinfull creature hath been already shewed: Not only Sa­than moved David to number the people but God also, 2 Sam. 24.1. Jacobs sons sold their brother into Egypt, so it is said, that God sent him thither, Psal. 10,17. when Jobs cattle were taken away by ill instruments, Job saith, the Lord tooke them away. Job 1.21.

Now it followes to shew yet further how the Lord may be blamelesse when he workes with the creature in the same blame-worthy actions. This hath been in part made plaine, by that which hath been shewed already, namely, that in all sinfull actions he is onely causa per accidens, an accidentall cause, no proper cause, which workes out of inward princi­ples, and according to its own nature; and this yet will more clearly appeare, if we consider the differences that are betwixt him and the sinfull creature in their working: though they work together in the same action, yet they differ in the ground in the manner, and in the end of their working.

1. They differ in the ground; the ground of all Gods acti­ons is his owne most holy will, his owne purpose and good pleasure. He worketh all things after the counsell of his owne will, [Page 28] Ephes. 1.11. Whatsoever pleased the Lord, that did he in heaven and in earth, Psal. 135.6. But evill instruments are guided by their owne wicked wills, and not by Gods will in their evill acti­ons, (for they do that which is contrary to his revealed will, and his secret will they know not) if they do the same things God wils yet not because he wils them, but upon other corrupt grounds, when a wicked man sins he seeks to fulfill the will of the flesh, but not at all to fulfill the will of God, Eph. 2.2. he doth that which seems good in his owne eyes, and not which seems good in Gods eyes.

2. They differ in manner of working; for in sinful actions God works with evil not as a moral cause but as a natural cause onely; God no where doth counsel or command, or perswade men to do evil, but altogether the contrary: But herein wick­ed men follow only the dictate of their depraved judgement, the sway of their corrupt will, the motion of their inordinate affections: or are carryed on by the counsels and perswa­sions, or examples of others that are like unto themselves.

It belongs to God (as the author of nature) to uphold the creature in all its naturall motions and actions. And he moves the creatures with a motion agreeable to their severall na­tures; as irrationall creatures, so also Angels and men: when he moves good men they work according to their natures, when he moves bad men, they worke also according to their natures, and this without any iniquity or injustice at all in God: for he is the author and proper cause of the motion: of the obliquity of it he is onely an accidentall cause (saith Dr. Twisse.)Vindict. l. 2 p. 86. True it is that in good actions he useth a further moti­on and concourse then he doth in other actions, for there he workes not only as the author of nature, but of grace, not on­ly by a generall influence of nature, but by an influence of spe­ciall grace; but in all actions he workes as the supporter of nature, whereas wicked men worke as the abusers of nature. Bellarmine grants, that Gods has an influx into all the actions that proceed from men, and yet that he is not the author of sin, because he hath onely a generall, no particular influx into the action wherein sin is committed, such an influx as is in­different either to good or evil. But by this reason as he is [Page 29] not the Author of evill, so he should not be the Author of good, and if God be the Author of nature, he must needs have a particular influxe into all natural actions, but into good acti­ons he hath a double influxe, namely, not onely a naturall, but a gracious influxe.

3. As they differ i [...] the ground and manner, so also in the end of their actings. The end of all Gods actions is himselfe, and his owne glory, He hath made all things for his owne sake, even the wicked for the day of evill, Prov. 16 4 for this purpose he stir­red up Pharaoh that he might shew his power in him, and might de­clare his name through all the earth, Rom. 9.17. and for this end doth he suffer with long patience the vessels of wrath prepared for de­struction, namely to make his power knowne, verse 22 Now the now the end which wicked men aime at in their actions is not God and his glory, but some unworthy and base respects of their owne; wicked men usually make themselves, and the sa­tisfying of their lusts the end of their actions: they prefer their owne glory before Gods, Is not this great Babel which I have built by the might of my power, and for the honour of my Majesty, (saith that proud King, Dau. 4.27. How far evill instruments when they worke in the same action together with God, doe differ from him in the ground and end of their working will yet further appeare if we shall look into some particular instances. When Sathan assayled Job with his temptation, he did it out of hatred against him, & to drive him to distrust and impatience, & so overthrow & ruine him. But God did this out of love, that thereby he might exercise his faith and patience, and make way for his greater advancement. When Satan mo­ved David to number the people, he did this out of malice a­gainst David and the people, and that hereby he might stir up the anger of God against them: But God did it to humble David, and to make it an occasion of inflicting just punishment upon the people for their many miscariages. When Josephs brethren sold him into Egypt, they did it out of envie and ha­tred, and that they might rid themselves of him; but God did it out of love to Jacob and his family, that it might be an occa­sion of Josephs preferment in Egypt, and so of preferring of Ja­cob and his houshold in the time of extreame Famine: when [Page 30] the Jewes high Priests and Elders, delevered up Christ to the Souldiers to be Crucified, they it out of envy and ill will, and that they might rid the world of him: but God did it out of love and good will to his Elect, that they might be saved and delivered out of their lost condition, so that the ends of evill instruments in those actions wherein they worke together with God, being altogether differing, yea sometimes contrary to Gods ends, they may be justly blame-worthy, when he is alto­gether blamelesse.

Object. But wicked men are blame-worthy though they propound good ends to themselves in the bad actions they doe, how then can God be blamelesse, when he concurs with them in the same actions, though his end be good?

1 Because he differs from them not onely in the end but also in the ground and manner of his working.

Answ. 2 There is not the same reason betwixt God and man, be­twixt the Creator and the creature. Man is bound not onely to aime at a right end, but also to be guided by a right rule, he is bound to regulate all his actions by the holy Law of God: but though man be bound to yeeld obedience to the Law, God is not bound to do it; for he made the law not for himselfe, but for the creature, not to put himselfe but man under the subjection of it: he having no other Law but his owne most righteous and holy will, Who shall say to him, What doest thou? Job 9.12. He giveth not an account to any of his matters, cap. 33.13.

If he be not to give an account to any then is he not subject to any Law, for whoever is subject to the Law must give an ac­count to some or other, else the Law would be of no use. So that this is sufficient to make all Gods actions good, because the end is alway good (namely, himselfe and his owne glory) If a man were free from all obligation of a Law, and onely bound to aime at the glory of God, or the good of his neigh­bour in the things which be doth then if he propounded these these ends to himselfe in all his dealings with God and men, he should be free from blame, but besides this he is obliged to live by a Law, to this law he owes subjection, which God doth not.

But God is a Law to himselfe.

If this be so understood, as that whatever is the ground and guide of his actions, it is within himselfe, then it is true: (for he borroweth nothing from without himselfe, which he makes the motive and ground of any of his actions, but all proceed from his owne good will and pleasure.) But if this be so taken as that whatever Gods law binds man to do, his nature binds him also to do the like; then it holds not, for the Law binds a man to do many things to which God is not bound: it binds man not onely not to commit sin, but also to hinder it (if he hath power to hinder it:) but God is not bound to this, yea, man is bound to employ all the skill and power that he hath to hinder the committing of sin; if it were so with God then there should never be any sin committed in the world, for by his omnipotent power he is able to hinder it;) besides, if there were no sin at all, he should loose a great part of his glo­ry, for as he is able to bring light out of darknesse, good out of evill, so he daily doth it. The Apostle saith our unrighteous­nesse commends the righteousnesse of God, and some sins by accident make much for the glory of God (as before hath been shewed.) Besides, the Law bindes man to doe all the good he can, to convert all his children and kindred, his friends and neighbours, if we were able to doe it; God is able to do this, but he doth it not, neither is bound to do it. God supporteth sinfull men in their sinfull actions, and supplyeth them with naturall strength for the acting of them, as in the actions of uncleannesse, of drunkennesse and the like: but man (if he were able) were bound not to do this; so that we see, God may do many things which his Law binds men not to do, & the other side may not do many things which by his Law men are obli­ged to do, and therefore he is not subject to it as men are, he is Dominus legis, non subditus.

True it is, that God is so a Law to himselfe that he can do nothing which is contrary to his one nature, as he cannot lye, he cannot deny himselfe; but there are some things forbidden in the Law, which are not contrary to the nature of God; Thus we see how God may worke in the same actions with the sinfull creature, and yet himselfe be altogether blamelesse; for look as when God gets himselfe glory by the actions of [Page 32] wicked men (as by the Jewes crucifying of Christ) it is no thanke to them because they never intended it; so on the other side, when they abuse his power and providence (supporting the strength of nature euen in sinfull actions) it is no blame to him, because he being the good of nature must sustaine nature in all her actions and motions; and because that as the evill which wicked men doe is onely an accidentall cause of his glory, so the good which he affords them, and the helpe which he administers in upholding their naturall strength, is onely an accidentall cause of the evill which they commit.

CHAP. VIII. Shewing how those Scriptures are to he understood which by the sound of words seeme to make God the author and pro­per cause of sinne.

THose Scriptures wherein the same sinfull actions are attri­buted both to God and men, and set forth by the same ex­pressions (as when God said, that what David had done he would doe, 2 Sam. 12.12.) seem to sound so as if both were a­like causes of these actions; therefore it will be needfull to speake something that may be helpfull to weaker apprehensi­ons for the right understanding of these Scriptures, and for clearing of Gods holinesse and justice, I shall instance onely in some of the principall of them, and what shall be held forth for the clearing of these may likewise be helpfull for giving sa­tisfaction to other places wherein the like expressions are used.

Object. In that place, Exodus 9.12. which was propounded for the subject of this discourse) it is said that God hardned Phara­ohs heart, afterward it is said that Pharaoh hardned his owne heart, verse 34. Now it may be asked, since the same action is attributed to both, how both were not causes alike in pro­ducing of it.

Answ. The Lord did this in another way then Pharaoh did it, he did it onely by administring occasion; he sent Moses with a per­emptory [Page 33] emptory command to Pharaoh to let his people go; this did irritate the natural pride and rebellion of Pharaohs heart, and stir up in him a stronger and more stubborn resolution not to let them go. As the command was holy, just and good, so it was good that it should be applyed to Pharaoh, by propound­ing it, and urging it upon him; but the more this was done, the worse he grew: for the command being holy, and his heart altogether unholy; these two being contrary, the nearer they were brought together, the more they did strive and fight one against another, this being the nature of contraries (as be­fore was shewed.) But here was no fault at all in the com­mand, for the proper end of the command was to informe Pharaoh of his duty, and to stir him up to the performance of it: But Pharaoh takes a contrary course, for whereas the end of the command was to make him willing to let the peo­ple goe, he takes occasion from it to grow more refractory; either because it put him in mind of the damage he should re­ceive by their departure, (they being so serviceable in ma­king brick for his buildings) or that it might appear that he thought not any (no not the great God) greater then him­self; and therefore he scorned to stoope and submit himself to any of his commands. By all which it appeares, that the com­mand was onely an occasion or accidentall cause of Pharaohs hardning, but no faulty cause at all. Now as the command did it, God did that being his agent, and he working by it. Neither God, nor his command, put any evill into Pharaohs heart, but by propounding good to him, and not imparting grace to perform it, he takes occasion to become more evill. Augustine Epist. 105. ad Sixtum. Deus obdurat non impartiendo malitiam sed non impatiendo grati­am, (saith S. Austine) God hardneth not by infusing any evil, but by not bestowing grace.

To this purpose, Doctor Twiss saith well; In his an­swer to Mr. Cotten. that when a man is moved to courses contrary to his corrupt humours, whether by the word of God, or his works, these motions being onely by way of perswasion; and he doth not by grace remove or correct those corrupt humours: in this case to move and to deny grace, is to harden. It is a good thing to move to good actions by outward perswasions, neither is God bound to con­fer [Page 34] grace inwardly, upon all those whom he doth thus per­swade outwardly.

Object. 2 It is said that God did, that which Absolon did when he de­filed his Fathers Concubines.

Answ. 1. As God did it, it was an Act of justice in punishing Davids sin with Ʋriahs wife, by suffering Absolon to commit the like sin with his wives.

2. God administred occasion of this action, by causing Da­vid to leave his Concubins to keep his house: There was no evill in this, but hence Ahitophel takes occasion to give that wicked counsell, and Absolon takes occasion to follow it in defiling his Fathers Concubines.

Object. 3. David saith, that God bad Shimei go and curse him, 2 Sam. 16.10.

Answ. This is not to be taken properly, as if Shimei had received a command from God to do this, but onely it sheweth the ef­ficacy of the divine administration of things, even in such things whereof God is onely a cause by accident.

2. God did administer occasion to Shimei, for his heart be­ing full of rancor against David; he seeing now David to be brought into distresse, thought this a fit time to vent bis ma­lice, because now he might do it with hope of impunity (as be­fore was shewed.

3. He did it as an Act of justice, David had caused the name of God to be blasphemed by the sins which he had committed, and the Lord suffers this wretch to curse and blaspheme him.

Object. 4. It is said that God turned the heart of the Egyptians to hate his people, Psal. 105.25.

Answ. He is said to doe this, not that he infused any hatred into their hearts, but in that he administred occasion, for he caused his people to grow and increase exceedingly both in number and in wealth: Now this gave occasion to the Egyptians to envy and to hate them: here the goodnes of God to his people stirred up evill affections in them; but this was long of their own wickednesse, no fault in Gods goodness.

Object. 5. It is said, that if the false Prophet be deceived, the Lord hath de­ceived him, Ezek. 14.9.

Answ. The deceiving of the false, is here attributed to God in these respects.

1. In that he with-drew his grace from him, and left him to the deceitfulness of his own heart, which was of it self rea­dy enough to run out into wayes of error.

2 He did this to punish the people because they rejected the doctrin of the true Prophets, and would not believe nor obey that truth which they held forth to them; both these were acts of justice.

3. By administring occasions for the judgements threatned by the true Prophets were not presently executed, hence the false Prophets took occasion to perswade that they should never be. But further, sometimes the true prophets did foretell a peace­able and flourishing estate of Judah and Jerusalem; as that Je­rusalem stould be called the throne of the Lord, and that all nations should be gathered unto it, Jer. 3.17. That Jerusalem should be a praise in the earth, Esay 62.6. That their Land should no more de­voure the inhabitants, Ezek. 36.14. These and many other like promises which were not to be fulfilled till the latter dayes; the false Prophets understood and applyed to the present times, and so thereby deceived both themselves and the people: but that they made a false interpretation or application of the do­ctrine of the true Prophes, the fault was onely in themselves, and not in the Doctine which the other had truly taught.

Object. 6. It is said that God gave up the Gentiles to vile affections, Ro. 1.26. and that he sent strong delusions to those that lived under the Antichristian Apostacy, 2 Thes. 2.2.11.

Answ. These Gentiles had vile affections of their own, and the other wanted the love of the truth, and that God left them to their vile affections, and to the deceitfulness of their owne hearts, or to the delusions of false Teachers; this was an act of Justice to punish the one for going against the light of na­ture, and, and the other for not receiving the truth in love, when it was held forth to them.

Object. 7. When the evill spirit offered himself to seduce Ahab, the Kord bids him goe and doe it, 1 King. 22.22. Here is more then a permission, here is a command; therefore here the Lord seemes to be Author of Ahabs being deceived by the evill spirit; what a man commands to be done, that he is Author and proper cause of.

Ans. 1. It is plaine by this Scripture, that the evill spirit was de­sirous to seduce Ahab (for he offers himself as an instrument to effect it) but that he had no power to do it without leave from God: Now when the Lord bids him go and do so, this hath but the force of a permission, as if he had said thou maist go and do the thing thou desirous to do, namely to perswade Ahab to go up to Ramoth-Gilead to battail, that he may fall there.

2. It may be answered, that all this which is here spoken by the prophet Michaiah, of the Lords sitting upon a Throne, and all the host of heaven appearing before him, and the question and answer here made, that all this, (I say) is delivered in a parabolicall way, and therefore cannot in every breach be ta­ken properly.

Locj. com­mun. loc. 14. Deus inducitur per prosopopeiam (saith Peter Martyr) God is brought in the person of a man, and speaking after the man­ner of men. Now in parables, the scope of the parable is chiefly to be looked at, and what truth it holds forth; neither is every parabolical application to be urged as a thing really done: as in the parable of the Rich Man, he is brought in as speak­ing to Abraham, and Abraham answering him again, which we cannot think was really done; so in this place, every circum­stance cannot be urged as a thing really acted, touching the Lords sitting on a Throne, and all the host of heaven shanding before him, and the question propounded and answered; but this is brought in by way of resemblance to Kings and Prin­ces, who when they have business of weight in hand, are wont to consult with their Nobles, and those about them. All par­ables are similitudes, and of them the rule is true, that in every similitude there is aliquid dissimile, there is something that is un­lide, and therefore they ought not to be stretched beyond their bounds, and so urged as if they agreed in every thing to that which they are brought to illustrate.

These are the principall Scriptuers wherein such expressions are used, as seem to make God the Author of sinne; for other like unto these, they may receive the like answer, namely that when God is said to do the same things which sinful men do, he doth it, either as the Author of nature and supporter of it in [Page 37] naturall actions, or as the righteous judge by withdrawing of his grace, and punishing one sinne with another, or by admi­nistring occasions; In all which he is altogether blame­lesse.

CHAP. IX. Containing an answer to some objections which arise from that which hath been before delivered touching the manner how God hath a hand in sinne.

IT hath been shewed before, that God doth not onely per­mit sinne, but that he doth willingly permit it, therefore his will is conversant about it, and his will is more then a velleietas, a meer wishing, what he permits, that he wils with an active will: against this it may be objected.

Object. 1. That will may be said to be evil whose act is evil, that act is evill which hath an evill object (for all acts receive their in­formation, and so their denomination from their object) when the act of a mans will is carryed after things unlawfull then is this act evill and so is the will whence it proceeds.

Answ. To this it may be answered, that sin is not so wholly and ab­solutely evill, but it may have some respect of good, it may have some good joyned with it,

1. For in sinfull acts natures worke is good (as hath been shewed) It is a true rule, that actus peccati in genere entis bonus est, in genere moris malus. The act of sin as it is an entity, it is good, in regard of the morall affection or quantity of it, so it is an evill.

Secondly, though in it selfe it be evill, yet it may be made a meanes an occasion of good, God is able to bring good out of it. Hence Augustine saith excellently, August. in Enchirid. cap. 96. Quamvis quae mala sunt in quantum mala sint, non sin bona, tamen ut non solum bona, sed eti­am sint & mala bonum est. Although evill things so far as they are evill are not good, yet it is good that not only good, but evill should be. Sin is in it self against the glory of God, there­fore he cannot will it as it is in it selfe, and in its owne nature, [Page 38] and as wicked men will it. But as the skilfull Physitian can so order and temper some poysons that though they be in them­selves destructive to nature, yet he can make them medicinall and helpfull; so the wise and mighty God is able to make that which is in it selfe against his glory, to be serviceable to his glory, he can worke out his owne glory from the work of mens actions, he can make them usefull to the best ends; and so far he may both will them and worke them, namely, as he can, and will bring good out of them.

Enchirid. cap. 100. Non sineret bonos fieri malis, nesi omnipotens etiam de malo facere p [...]t bene (saith Augustine) the good God would not suffer evill to be, unles he being omnipotent could bring good out of evil. To the same purpose he saith also in another place, De correp­es grat. cap. 10. Scivit Deus magis ad omnipotentissimam ejus bonitatem pertinere, etiam de malis benefacere, quam mala non sinere. God did know that it more be­fits his omnipotent goodnesse to bring good out of euill, then not to suffe any evill at all to be; yea, Bellarmine himselfe ac­knowledgeth that God did Ex lapsu hominis ingens bonum elice [...]e, did draw forth a wonderfull great good out of the fall of man. So that we see that sin (though evill in it selfe, may have some respect of good in it, and some way make for the glory of God now in this respect onely, God wils it, and this he may do and his will still be a just, holy, and righteous will.

Object. 2. If mans sin be the object of Gods decree, then mans sins ne­cessarily (for what God hath decreed must necessarily come to passe) and if the decree of God be the cause of this necessitie, then likewise it is the cause of that sin which followes upon it, and so God shall be the Author and proper cause of sin.

Answ. That Gods decrees do not take away the liberty of mans will may appeare many wayes.

1. Christs death was decreed, for he was delivered by the de­terminate counsell of God, Acts. 23. yet he dyed freely, for he saith of himselfe, that he laid downe his life when no man had power to take it from him, John. 10.17,18. he laid it downe willingly and freely; beside if he had not done thus. if Christs death had not been voluntary, it had not been an act of perfect obedi­ence, and so could not have been meritorious. The stedfastnesse and firme standing of the good Angels in their integrity is a [Page 39] free act, for they are not enforced to it, 2 [...] 2.13. yet this was [...] for they are elect Angels. The Saints are chosen to faith and sanctification, yet they beleeve and repent freely, not being led to it by any naturall or violent necessity. All our natu­rall motions and actions proceed freely from us: yet to deny these to be within the compasse of Gods decree, were to deny a great part of his providence, In him we live and move, Act. 11.28. Pro. 16.9. And what he doth in time he hath deter­mined to doe before all time.

2. Gods decree is, actus ad intra, one of those immanent acts which are alwayes within himselfe: and of these acts the rule holds true, that they do nihil ponere in objecto, they put no­thing into the object about which they are conversant; Gods decree alone (being an instrument within himselfe) works no­thing upon the creature, till it comes to execution, till some some way or other he doth put forth his purpose by some out­ward act: unlesse therfore it can be shewed how God in the ex­ecution of his decree, by some outward act upon man doth ne­cessitate mans will, his decree alone will never infer any neces­sitie upon it, and we find the contrary by experience, namely, that we are carryed forward to the committing of sin frely as we are to eat out meat, or drinke our drinke, or performe a­ny other action most agreeable to our natures, being led to it neither by any violent or naturall necessity.

3. Gods decree is so far from infringing the liberty of the second causes that it establisheth and strengthens them in their liberty: for he doth not onely discernere rem ips [...]m sed modum rei, not onely determine and decree the thing it selfe, but also the manner of it; he determines that somethings shal come to passe necessarily, other things freely and contingently. That neces­sary things shall come to passe by necessary causes, contingent things by contingent causes. All entilies and beings as from God, with all the adjuncts and properties that belong to them, and he worketh in all things according to the nature of the things: and therefore in naturall agents he causeth things to come to passe necessarily, in free agents contingently: so that though Gods will determine mans will, yet it determines to worke contingently and freely, Ʋt voluntas necessario movetur ad [Page 40] agendum ex suppositione motionis divinae, ita etiam necessari [...] movetur ad agendum libere, quia movet Deus voluntatem hominis conveniun­ter suae naturae [...] pag. 31. page 27. (saith Dr Twisse) as the will is necessarily mo­ved to act, upon supposition of the divine motion, so it is ne­cessarily moved to act freely, because God moves mans will in a way agreeable to its owne nature. Posito decreto necesse erat ut primus home peccaret, sed necesse erat ut peccaret liberè. Upon sup­position of Gods decree it was necessary that the first man should sinne, but it was also necessary that he should sinne freely.

4. Causes by accident, never worke necessarily, but con­tingently: the Sun sends forth light necessarily, but darkes weake eyes contingently. The Law is onely an accidental cause of sin (as before was shewed) and look how the law works it God workes it, and as he workes it so he hath decreed to worke it, therefore his decree inferres no necessity. Besides a cause by accident never workes, till causa per se such as is pro­perly, and in its owne nature a cause, sets it on worke. The Sword which a mad man weares will never move to hurt him, till he himselfe begins to move it. The wall will never hurt the glasse or pot, till the drunken man or some other dasheth it against the wall: no more will the Law of God ever hurt a man till he dasheth himselfe against it. Causes by accident are alwayes reducible to other causes; so the last resolution of sinne must be in the freewill of man as into the true and proper cause of it.

Object. But here it may be further objected, that if that which God hath decreed doth not necessarily come to passe, then his decree may be frustrated.

Answ. This Objection makes as much against Gods fore­knowledge, as against his decree, for as he cannot be disap­pointed in his decree, so he cannot be deceived in his foreknow­ledge; but it is granted on all sides, that God did foresee and foreknow Adams fall (as all other sins) before it was commit­ted; and therefore his foresight doth not hinder the free working of mans will, no more doth his decree.

2. It followes not that his decree may be frustrate and dis­appointed, though some things come to passe contingently, [Page 41] because although it be necessary that what God hath decreed should come to passe, yet not that it should come to necessari­ly: that it should be effected, Necessario modo & necessarijs medijs in a necessary manner, and by necessary meanes. God having decreed that not a bone of Christ should be broken, it was ne­cessary that this should come to passe, and that Christs leggs should be preserved from breaking, when the others were bro­ken that were crucified with him: but yet this came not to passe necessarily, for both Christs bones were in their own na­ture fragilia, talia quae frangi possint, such as might be broken, as also the Souldiers did freely abstaine from breaking of them, without any compulsion at all.

But it is not possible that the same effect should come to passe, both necessarily and contingently.

Yes, it is possible; as this effect hath reference to divers cau­ses, as the not breaking of Christs bones had reference to Gods decree and appointment, it was necessary (as hath been shew­ed) because that could not be disappointed; but as it had re­ference to the second cause, namely the free will of the Soul­diers, as it was not necessary but contingent. So on the other side, the Suns giving light in the aire, and the fire burning of combustible matter, are necessary effects as they have reference to the second causes, but contingent as they have reference to the first cause; for God doth freely, not necessarily concur with the Sun in his shining, and the fire in his burning

Hence arise these distinctions so frequent with Divines, of ne­nessitas absoluta & hypothetica, necessitas causae & consequentiae, an absolute and condition all necessity; a necessity of the cause, and of the consequence. The absolute necessity, or necessity of the cause is, when things are so fast and firmely tyed together by the order of the second causes, as according to the course of nature, the effect cannot come to passe otherwise then it doth: As if a man be a man, he must needs bea reasonable crea­ture; if fire be fire, it must needs have the property of burning; if a stone be a stone, the motion of it must needs tend down­ward. The conditionall or consequentiall necessity, is when there is no such fast linking together of the second causes, but that when they worke one way, there is a disposition in them [Page 42] to worke another way, though one thing doth certainly follow another, yet by no necessary causation, but by a free and contingent manner of working. Upon supposal of Gods Ordi­nation and appointment, the rising of the Sun follows the rising of the morning Star, and (in the Countries where we live) the comming of the warm summer, follows the comming in of the Swallows amongst us, and this by a consequentiall neces­sity, for it is never otherwise, but not by any absolute or cau­sall necessity. God having decreed and appointed concerning Esau and Jacob, that the elder should serve the younger, it was necessary that Jacob should get the birth-hood and blessing from his brother Esau; but this was effected by as contingent meanes as might be: for it was no whit necessary that Esau should come in hungry from hunting, that Jacob should have Pottage in a readinesse, that Esau should be desirous of them, and be willing to part with his birth-right for them; all these things were done freely on both parts: there was no necessity that Jsaac should mistake Jacob for Esau, and his savory meat for Esaus Veinson; but all this was done most freely (though guided by a secret providence.) God having determined that the Israelites should spoile the Egyptians of their Jewels, of Silver and Jewels of Gold at their departure out of Egypt, Exod 12.35. compared with Chap. 3.22. and 11.2. this must necessa­rily come to passe; yet it was done in a most free manner with­out any enforcement or necessity; for it is said they asked of the Egyptians Jewels, of Silver, and Jewels of Gold, and the Lord gave them favour in their eyes, that they granted their request, Chap. 12.34,35. So God having decreed the fall of Adam, it was necessary that this should come to passe, but it was also necessary it should come to passe freely: and accordingly he did freely and willingly yeild to the enticing perswasion of the Serpent, without any compulsion at all: For as the power of God, whereby he his able able to change the nature of things, doth not hinder the necessary working of necessary causes; so likewise the will of God, (whereby he hath deter­mined the event one way) doth not hinder the free and con­tingent working of contingent causes. Besides every necessary truth, is an eternall truth; this being a most true rule, that [Page 43] axioma necessacium est quod semper verum est ne falsum esse potest, a necessary proposition is that which is alway true, and can ne­ver be false, that man is a reasonable creature, was a necessary truth before man was born: That a Cain should kill his bro­ther, was no necessary truth before the thing was done; no more was it a necessary truth that Adam should eat the for­bidden fruit, before he had eaten it; and although it was a truth afterwards, yet no necessary truth: for no circumstance of time can change the nature of things, as to make a contin­gent truth to become necessary, or a necessary truth to become contingent. True it is that when a thing is done, it cannot be undone, (for a thing cannot be, and not be both at once) but it was not necessary that it should be done, if it be a thing of contingent nature. What I now speak or write, is necessary should be thus spoken or written when it is once done: but be­fore it was done it was not necessary that I should speake or write in this manner, or speak or writ at all, these being acts of freedom and liberty: so it is in all actions of the like nature, in all contingent actions.

Thus we see that Gods determination and decree doth no whit infringe or obstruct the liberty of mans will, and there­fore not withstanding such decree, man is no whit lesse blame­worthy, nor God at all faulty in the evill which man doth.

Object. A third objection which may be raised from what hath been delivered is, that God hath been said to be an accidentall cause of sin, if so, then the sinfull actions of men fall out besides his scope and intent: for that is said to be an effect by accident, quando aliquid p [...]aeter efficientis s [...]pum accidit, when some event happens besides the intent of the efficient: Now how can God will or decree sinne, if it fals out besides his scope and intents?

Answ. To this doubt answer may be made by distinguishing be­twixt intentio operis & operantis, the intention of worke and the workeman: Sin is besides the scope of the worke which God doth, but not besides his owne intent who is the agent and workeman. When he decrees sin shall be, he intends it shall be by such wayes and meanes, by which acts and workes (so far as he works in it) as in themselues and their own nature tend onely to good, and are meer accidentall causes of the evill [Page 44] which man does. The Law, and word of God, his mercies, judgements and all his dealing with men, in their owne nature tend to this end, namely, to make men better, nor worse; and if they be made worse by them, it is propter scopum, besides the scope and intent whereto these things in their owne nature tend. The Gospel in it selfe tends to life, when therefore it is the savour of death, it is besides the proper scope intent and of the Gospel: but though it besides the intent of the Gospel to be the savour of death, it is not besides Gods intent, for he both knows and intends in what effect the Gospell shall have: otherwise he should be defective in his wisedome and provi­dence: besides what power the Gospel hath to produce an ef­fect either way, it receives from him. Hence it is aid to be the power of God unto salvation, Rom. 1.16. the powerfull instrument which God useth to bring men salvation, which power he puts into it: and so likewise when he workes the other way it is power also. The Lord bids the Prophet Go make the hearts of this people fat, and make their [...]ares heavie, and shut their eyes, &c, Isa. 6.10. and how should he do this? namely, by preaching the word unto them; by which it appeares, that sometimes the word doth harden mens hearts, close their ears and shut their eyes; and that God intends it should do so, and sends it for this very purpose; yet the word in owne nature tends to soften their hearts, to open their eares, and eyes, to make them see and heare better; so that the word here is onely an accidentall cause (it being beside the scope and intent of the word to har­den:) yet this is not besides Gods intent, who in all his acti­ons, and in the use of such instruments as are imployed in them propounds to himselfe a most sure and certaine end. By all which appeares as the secret and just judgement of God, so his infinite wisedome and skill, who can worke out his owne ends by such meanes, as in their owne nature do tend a con­trary way.

CHAP. X. Shewing some usefull conclusions which do necessarily follow from what hath been spoken of this Subject.

Conclu. 1. IF God so ordereth things, that in all the sins which are committed by men though he hath a secret working hand, yet he workes in a most just and holy manner, and doth no­thing but what is right and good:

Hence it followes, that in all the sin which is committed, in all the evill which is done, either by our selves or others we lay all the blame on our selves or them, not imputing the least miscarriage on God, not so much as in our thoughts, He is just in al his wayes, and holy in all his workes; what ever he doth is well done, be the instruments never so bad by whom it is done.

In all the evill that befals us, we have no just reason at all to repine and murmur, to be impatient or discontent; for all his dealings with us, whether by his word or his workes, his mercies or his judgements, do in themselves tend to good: when therefore any evill comes we must take heed we do not charge God foolishly, Iob. 1.22. but remember that we have pro­cured these things to our selves (as the Prophet tels the people, Jer. 2.17.) Sin is the seed of sorrow: all the evill of suffering ariseth from the evill of sinning, and this ariseth onely from our selves: yea, though sometimes we suffer many evils alto­gether unjustly as they proceed from men, yet as they come from. God (who guides all the actions of men) they are done most holily, wisely and justly. Thus Daniel acknowledgeth in regard of himselfe and his people, O Lord, righteousnesse belongs to thee, open shame to us, Dan. 9.6. Thou art just in all that is [...]one upon us (saith Nehemiah) for thou hast done right, but we have done wickedly, cap. 9. last. Let God be true and every man a lyar (saith the Apostle, Rom. 3.4.) So let God be just and holy, and every man sinfull, wicked, and wretched abundantly worthy of all the evill which comes upon him.

Conclu. 2. Hence it follows, that we ought with all reverence to admire [Page 46] and to adore the infinite wisedome, justice and power of God, that is able to worke in the most blame worthie actions of sin­full men, and yet himselfe remaine altogether blamelesse: that is able to bring about the best ends by the worst meanes: that in many great works which have been done in the world, hath wrought out such ends, as have been altogether different, yea, sometimes contrary to the scope and intent of those who have been the principall actors and agents in them. Little did Jo­sephs brethren thinke that when they sold their brother for a slave, this should be the meanes of making him the greatest mam in all the Land of Egypt next to Pharaoh. Little did Ha­man thinke that when out of his hate and indignation against Mordecai, he gate a decree of destroying all the Jewes in the Kings Dominion in one day, that this should be a meanes and occasion of making them have a hand against their adversaries and of procuring liberty to destroy them? yea, of bringing himselfe to the Gallowes, Hest. 8.11.7.10.

Little did the Jewes thinke that their envie and hatred against Christ should be an occasion of redemption of man­kind, that when they spit upon him, buffeted him, beat him with rods, crowned him with thornes, caused him to suffer the shamefull and accursed death of the Crosse, that this should be a meanes of his greater advancement and exaltation: yet the Scripture saith, that because he made himselfe of no reputation, and humbled himselfe to the death of the Crosse, therefore God highly exalted him, and gave him a name above every man, Phil. 2.8. what reason therefore have we in way of admiration to cry out with the Apostle, Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisedome and ounsell of God, unsearchable are his judgements and his wayes past fin­ding out, Rom. 11.33.

Conclu. 3. Thirdly, hence it follows, that we ought to acknowledge with all thankefulnesse that infinite goodnesse of God, which doth not suffer us to goe on in a course of sinning, especially in such a sort as would ruine our soules, and drive us to destructi­on: for if he should it would be in vaine for us to complaine against him; he would easily acquit himselfe and justifie his owne proceedings: he would be justified in his words, and over­come when he is judged (as the Apostle speakes, Ro. 3.4.) he would [Page 47] easily convince us, that in all the evill which we have done, or shall suffer, the just blame lyes upon our, owne heads, and our destruction is of our selves: he would cause our mouthes to be stopped, and make us (as all the world) to be found culpable before him, Rom. 3.10, If he should enter into judge­ment with us, we should not be able to answer one of a thou­sand: what a mercy is it that he doth not suffer us to fall into sin so frequently, and in so fowle a manner as we are ready to doe, especially that he doth not charge our sins upon us. What reason have we to say with the Psalmist, Praise thou the Lord, O my soule, and all that is within me praise his holy name, who forgiveth all thine iniquities, and healeth all thine infirmities, who doth not deale with us after our sins, nor reward us after our iniquities; but as high as the heaven is above the earth, such is his mercy towards us; as far as the East is from the West, so far he doth remove our sins from us, Psalm. 103.1,3,10,11,12. to him alone be all glory now and ever.