Prometheus Christianus: OR, A TREATISE Shewing the FOLLY and VANITY of ATHEISM, AND Containing the Solution of the main Arguments of the SOCINIANS, the ARRIANS, the DEISTS, and other Ʋnitarians, which have a direct and im­mediate Tendency to the Utter Ruin and Subversion of the very Foundation of Christianity.

Whereunto is annex'd, The Refutation of some Dogmatical Points of a Modern Author relating to the TRINITY.


LONDON Printed, and are to be Sold by Rich. Baldwin, near the Oxford-Arms in Warwick-Lane. 1695.


FInding the Innumerable number of Heterodoxi­cal and Prophane Er­rors which in these dis­solute Times make the Novel­lists to Swarm with the fre­quent new Accesses of their Proselytes, I deem'd it expe­dient to Propose the Grounds of their several Errors, and so to Refute them, which here I undertake.


SHewing the Nullity and Vanity of the Atheists, Page 1
The Main Objection of the Heterodox Unita­rians is fully propos'd and solv'd by the Or­thodox Trinitarians. p. 5
A farther Attempt of the same Adversaries is propos'd and solv'd, p. 11
The Objections against Circumincision solv'd, p. 13
Wherein the rest of the Unitarian's Arguments are propos'd and solv'd, p. 16
Certain Absolete Opinions of another Au­thor are propos'd and solv'd, p. 19
Two other Opinions of the same Author are pro­pos'd and solv'd, p. 23.

Prometheus Christianus: OR, A TREATISE Shewing the FOLLY and VANITY OF ATHEISM.

SECT. I. Shewing the Nullity and Vanity of the Atheists.

THIS Prophane and Pernicious Error hath drawn many a Soul to their utter Ruine and Perdition; for their Position is, That there is no Supreme Deity nor Godhead existent, to govern and regulate the Natural and Moral Transactions of this Universe.

The Grounds of their Doctrine are setled upon their insatiable Avidity to satisfie the Suggestion of their Sensual Appetite, not invoking the least Dictamen of Reason to their support and conduct. Hence they let the Reins loose to all Lasciviousness, Delight, and Pleasure that Sence can dictate to them.

To convince these Miscreants of their dull and stu­pid Error, I must first desire them to take a survey of the admirable Products and stupendious Variety of this inferiour Orb. Let them consider, that there can be no Effect without a Cause; and, where will they find a Cause that is impower'd to produce such va­riety of Creatures as do embellish the Globe of the Earth with such due Subordination, Stability, and Natural Instinct, for the preservation and propagation of each Species in their kind? Let them consider, that there is no created Power that hath any Proportion to be is no created Power that hath any Proportion to be the Cause of such admirable Effects; for it exceeds the Capacity of all Created Power, whether Human or Angelical, to produce one Blade of Grass, or one Leaf of a Tree, in perfection, much more to create such a copious number of Vegetables and Animals as furnish this World for the use of Man. All this argues the Certainty and Infallibility of the Existence of the Ori­ginal Cause of such variety of Products, and convin­ceth, that it must be an Omnipotent, All-wise, Prudent and Provident Creator.

Then let the dull and stupid Atheist cast his Eyes up to Heaven, and contemplate the Variety of the superiour Orbs of the Sun and Moon, with the rest of the Planets and their Attendants, with the fix'd Stars that are immovably seated in the Firmament, which are more in number than the Sands of the Sea: Let the Atheist consider how all these, by their rapt mori­on, [Page 3]are daily carried in their Sphere round this in­feriour World once every day, without leaving their stations where they were first fixed: let him consi­der moreover the regular and constant motion of the wand'ring Planets and their Concomitants, how they are all rapt by the First Mover round this World once every day, while at the same time, by their natural motion, they are in progress of effect­ing their natural course, which the Moon accom­plisheth in Eight and twenty Days, the Sun in one Year, the rest of the Planets in a longer time; and thus by their various Aspects and benign Influences communicate to us all the Blessings of a munificent and benign Creator, as Corn, Wine, Oyl, and all the Fruits of the Earth, which are abundantly sufficient not only for Man's necessary support and mainte­nance, but also for his pleasure and delight: Which made St. Chrysostom say, In paginis Coelorum legitur divinitas; In the Book of the Heavens is read the Divinity. And St. Augustine crys out, O altitudo sa­pientiae & scientiae Dei! O the altitude of the Wisdom and Science of God!

Add to this the general and universal Consent and Agreement of all Nations contain'd in the whole extent of this Universe, whereof there is not one Nation that denies the Existence of a Deity. Now, if this general Perswasion should prove false or de­ceitful, to whom could this Error and Deceit be im­puted, but to Him that imprinted this general Belief and Perswasion into the Minds of all Nations, it being wholly impossible that the Great Omnipotent Creator of the Universe, whose Providence is infinite, and who is Veracity and Truth itself, should de­ceive [Page 4]any one, and, by reason of his Omniscience, should be deceived himself, who penetrates the most abdit and most secret Recesses of the superiour and inferiour World by his Omniscience? Yea, it is the Opinion of most learned Divines, that it is im­possible that any one Person, having attain'd to the perfect use of Reason, should be ignorant of the Being of a GOD.

Now, if all this will not convince the Atheist of his black Error, I will give him a Metaphysical De­monstration à priori for the Being of a GOD.

And first, I will settle the true Notion of a Deity or Godhead; secondly, I shall prove the Pos­sibility of the Object of this Notion; and thirdly, I shall demonstrate the real Existence of it.

As to the first; a True GOD is that, and only that, which hath all Perfections possible, and no De­fect; and whatsoever hath all this, is compleatly God; and whatsoever faileth of any part of this, is not, nor cannot be GOD. This being presup­pos'd, as the Ground and Subject of my Demonstra­tion, I thus proceed to prove the possibility of it, which was the second thing propos'd:

  • All that which is not a Chymerical Fiction is possible.
  • This Object is no Chymerical Fiction.
  • Therefore this Object is possible.

Nothing can be here deny'd but the minor or second Proposition, which I thus prove:

  • [Page 5]A Chymerical Fiction hath a great Defect, to wit, its impossibility to exist.
  • This Object hath no Defect.
  • Therefore this Object is possible.

Now for the third thing propos'd, which was, to demonstrate the Real Existence of it:

  • All that which is possible, and hath no Defect, is existent.
  • This Object is possible and hath no Defect.
  • Therefore this Object is existent.

The major or first Proposition of this last Syllogism cannot be deny'd; the rest is clear and evident: and therefore I here leave the inconsiderate Atheist to ponder the Force and Energy of this Demonstration, and so I proceed to the Socinians.

SECT. II. The Main Objection of the Heterodox Unita­rians is fully propos'd and solv'd by the Orthodox Trinitarians.

HERE our Adversaries do agree with Ʋs, in the acknowledgment of One Only Omnipotent and Infinite Wise GOD; but they deny the Divinity of the Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, ac­knowledging [Page 6]but one Hypostasis or Suppositum in the Deity. To prove which, they propose this following Argument,

  • The Divine Nature is the Father.
  • The Son is the Divine Nature.
  • Therefore the Son is the Father.

So likewise, to prove the Holy Spirit to be but one and the same Person with the Son, as they suppose, they have prov'd the Father and the Son to be but One Person: and thus they reduce the Trinity of the Persons to only one Hypostasis or Personality. To effect this, they frame this Syllogism,

  • The Divine Nature is the Son.
  • The Holy Spirit is the Divine Nature.
  • Therefore the Holy Spirit is the Son.

By these two Syllogisms they intend to reduce the Paternity of the Father, the Filiation of the Son, and the Passive Spiration of the Holy Spirit, to be but one Hypostasis or Personality, grounding themselves upon that Orthodox Principle of ours, That there is a real Identity between the Deity and each of the Three Persons, without which Identity they could not be Divine.

For Answer to this Achilles or efficacious Argu­ment, (as the Socinians do suppose) I reply by de­nying the Consequence of both Syllogisms; for nei­ther of them concludes, for want of the distribution of the medium or middle Term, which is the Divine Nature.

[Page 7] To this the Socinians answer, That the two fore­mention'd Syllogisms are both expositary, and there­fore do conclude with greater Perspicuity and Cer­tainty than either of the Moods contained under the three Figures which Aristotle hath setled for the Rules of Disputation; which likewise is the Opinion of all Philosophers and Logicians since Aristotle's Time: The reason is, because an expositary Syllo­gism hath all its three Terms singular, and neither of them capable of Multiplication; so that the di­stribution of the medium is needless: as in this Syllo­gism,

  • This Angel is sent from God.
  • Gabriel is this Angel.
  • Therefore Gabriel is sent from God.

In this Syllogism grant the Premises, and deny the Consequence if you can: And a Thousand more such Examples might be produc'd, wherein the di­stribution of the medium is superfluous.

To this I answer, by granting the Force of an expositary Syllogism, but denying that either of the two first Syllogisms is expositary; for, though the medium in them both, which is the Divine Nature, appears singular, yet it is capable of Multiplication, by reason that it contains not only all the Infinite Perfections and Attributes of the Deity, which are all singular, and constitute but one singular Divine Substance, yet the Deity contains in it also the No­tional Predicates and Relative Perfections of Three Persons which are really distinct from each other: And therefore, if the medium be not distributed, [Page 8]the Syllogism is not in form, and concludes no­thing.

Here the Socinian, out of a civil compliance, ra­ther than lose his fast hold, will accommodate him­self to the Genius of his Adversary, by distributing his Medium, which he thus effects:

  • All that is contain'd in the Deity is the Fa­ther.
  • The Son is contain'd in the Deity.
  • Therefore the Son is the Father.

This Syllogism is in form, and concludes right­ly; neither can you deny the major; for you ac­knowledge, that the Deity is one singular, indivisible and individual Substance: you grant also a real Iden­tity between the Father and the Substance of the Deity; therefore by a rigid necessity you must grant a real Identity between the Father and the whole Real Substance of the Deity; for, it contains no Parts nor Particles really distinct from each o­ther.

I answer by distinguishing the major, All the ab­solute Perfections contain'd in the Deity are the Fa­ther; I grant it. All the notional Predicates and re­lative Perfections contain'd in the Deity are the Father; I deny it: for the Filiation of the Son, and the passive Spiration of the Holy Spirit, are contain'd in the Deity, and yet are really distinct from the Father.

[Page 9] To this the Socinian replies, That according to this distinction we must admit two Parts really di­stinct from each other, whereof the one is Identi­fied with the Father, the other not: where, of force, we must swallow a plain Contradiction, or admit two Parts in the Deity really distinct from each other, and both compleatly endow'd with the Deity; which is to admit two Gods, and so to de­throne and ungod the Omnipotent, who is the great Creator, Framer, and Preserver of the whole Uni­verse.

To answer this Objection, I do declare, That it is very remote from our Thoughts to admit in the Divinity more than one Real and Divine Substance; so that your Allegation of our granting Two Gods is frivolous and injurious to us.

As to the other part alledged in the Objection of admitting a Contradiction, Scotus, with all his School of the Scotists, do answer you, That here is no appearance of a Contradiction by reason of a Distinction which they call distinctionem mediam, or Ex Natura rei; that is, not real, but more than formal; which hath no dependance upon the opera­tion of the Understanding. By this they distinguish between the Divinity and the Notional Perfections of the Persons: so that the Extreams of your pre­tended Contradiction are not the same.

Many other Learned Divines do admit of a Vir­tual Distinction between the Deity and the Notio­nal or Relative Predicates of the Persons; by which your pretended Difficulty vanisheth to Smoak.

[Page 10] But because I have in the Treatise of the Trinity impugned and rejected both these Opinions, my Answer is, That a formal Distinction, which is made by the Understanding, and supposed by the very Objection, is sufficient to evacuate this preten­ded Difficulty; for hereby it will appear, that the pretended Contradiction is not ejusdem de eodem, as the Philosophers say; that is, both parts are not of the same Predicate, in order to the same Subject, which is necessary to make up a formal Contradi­ction, as all Philosophers do require. So that we neither do admit Two Parts really distinct in the Deity, nor are we hereby forc'd to swallow a Contradiction, as our Adversaries do most falsly pretend.

SECT. III. A farther Attempt of the same Adversaries is Propos'd and Solv'd.

HERE the Socinian begins to faint, as having run himself out of breath, and spent the best part of the Vigour and Energy of his Intellectual Faculty to support his Position, yet will not leave his Cause so incompleatly accomplish'd, and there­fore doth summon up the remainder of the Force and Vigour of his Understanding to accomplish his Design. And thus he proceeds.

The Doctrine contained in the Answer to my last Objection is not consistent with what you have for­merly acknowledg'd in this Dispute, which is, That there are Three Hypostases, which are all Notional Predicates, belonging to the compleat Constitution of the Three Persons, which are really distinct from each other, and yet all Three compleatly furnish'd with all the Perfections of the Divinity, by a real Identity with it. How then doth this consist with the admitting no more than one singular and nu­merical Substance in the Divinity; for you admit [Page 12]Three distinct Persons really Identified with the same Divinity?

To solve this, I must have recourse to the Do­ctrine of Circumincision. The Object in question may be consider'd several ways; but, to accommo­date my self to the Fancy of the Socinians, I must consider it by way of Circumincision; for when it is so taken, then the Divinity includes the three Hypo­stases, namely, the Paternity of the Father, the Filia­tion of the Son, and the passive Spiration of the Holy Spirit, as it were inveloped and implicated within it self: and under this Consideration it is numerical­ly but one singular and individual Substance, be­cause all the Hypostases, Relations, and Co-relations of the Persons are really identified with the Divinity, and so make but one Substance with it.

And it is in this sence the Council of Laterane, cited by me at large in the first Section of the first Disputation of the Treatise of the Trinity, Cap. fir­miter, and Cap. daemianus De summa Trinitate, defines, That the Deity, with all its Relations and Perso­nalities, constitute but unam summam rem, that is, but one chief Being; for, in this sence the notional and relative Perfections of the Persons are not to be con­fider'd. And this is the true meaning of Circumin­cision.

But if you will dissolve the Circumincision, and take abroad and unfold all that is in it, then the Personalities of the Three Persons will appear really distinct from one another, and yet are the same in­dividual Substance with the Deity. And herein con­sists the Mystery of the Divine Trinity, which all [Page 13]the extent of Nature cannot furnish us with one Example to parallel: so that from the different acceptions of the same Object you raise a different sense of it; and hence ariseth the Difference be­tween you and your Adversary: for, if you do not cautiously distinguish between the absolute and no­tional terms, you must needs confound the objective Signification of them, which notwithstanding are very different from each other, and this grounds a Confusion in your Understanding.

SECT. IV. The Objections. against Circumincision Solv'd.

BUT the Socinian is not satisfied with this Do­ctrine of Circumincision, but objects, That we grant, with the Council of Lateran, but One Reality made up of the Divinity and the Three Persons; and yet we admit, That when the Circumincision is unfolded and taken abroad, there are Three Persona­lities really distinct from each other: Which in­volves a plain Contradiction; for we assert, The whole is but One Reality, una summa res, only One Reality; and yet we likewise assert, That there are [Page 14]more Realities contained in it: which is a plain Con­tradiction.

To this I answer,

That these Two Propositions there, is but One Reality.

There is more than One Reality. These two are not contradictory, if taken in a different sence; for the first is meant by Circumincision, the second by Extension; which hinders the Contradiction.

Here the Socinian replies, That these several Ac­ceptions, or different Senses of the same Object, are but different Considerations of the Understanding, which constitute only Formalities; why then do you obtrude them in this Discourse, where we dispute only of Realities, which is a meer Trick and Eva­sion to involve the whole matter into obscurity and confusion, which in a fair way of disputing ought not to be done?

Here the Socinian is brisk, and confident of his own Cause; yet give me leave to answer, That my Solution of the Difficulty propos'd is very pro­per; for, the Divinity is a singular and indivisible Substance, and by a real Identity is the same thing with the Three Persons; so that all together consti­tute but One Reality: whereas, if you consider the Persons apart, you will find Three Realities distinct, whereof the one is incarnate, the other two are not; which is an evident sign of a real Distin­ction.

Here the Socinian replies again, alledging, That to solve one Contradiction we incurr another: for, we say, That one Person is incarnate, the other not: so that of the same Reality we say, This Rea­lity [Page 15]is incarnate, and this same Reality is not incar­nate.

And thus we prove both parts of the Contra­diction:

  • The Father is not incarnate.
  • This Reality is the Father.
  • Therefore this Reality is not incarnate.

The affirmative part of this Contradiction we prove thus:

  • The Son is incarnate.
  • This Reality is the Son.
  • Therefore this Reality is incarnate.

I answer by denying the two 'fore-mention'd Propositions to be contradictory, for the negative Proposition is verified only of the Father and the Holy Spirit, not of the Son: whereas the Affirma­tive is verified only of the Son, not of the Father, nor the Holy Spirit. Whence you may plainly per­ceive the pretended Contradiction is not ejusdem de eodem; it is not of the same Predicate, in order to the same Subject, which is repugnant to the known Rule of Contradictories, for else these two would be contradictory. Man is like other Animals, and Man is not like other Animals; for, as being a li­ving sensible Creature, he is like other Animals, and as being endow'd with Reason, he is not like other Animals; and yet his Animality and Ratio­nality are but two Formalities, distinguish'd only by the Understanding. Now, if the passing from one Formality to another hinders the force of a Contra­diction, [Page 16]much more will it hinder, by passing from one Reality to another; for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinguish'd from each other.

But now the Socinian is ready to prosecute his Design farther, which we shall declare in the next Section.

SECT. V. Wherein the rest of the Unitarian's Arguments are Propos'd and Solv'd.

HERE the Socinian pretends to drive us to another great Inconvenience, which is, to de­duce out of the precedent Doctrine a necessity of admitting Three Gods; for we admit Three Hyposta­ses or Relations really distinct from each other, and every one of them to be compleatly furnish'd with the Divinity; and each of them constitutes a compleat Godhead, for they being Three in num­ber, there must of necessity be admitted Three Gods.

To this Objection I answer, That the denomina­tion of GOD signifies principally and in recto the Divinity, and in obliquio the Hypostases or Relations, and is thus resolved; The Divinity fubsisting by [Page 17] Three distinct Hypostases. Now, because there is but one singular and individual Divinity, there can be but one singular and individual Godhead. Whereas the denomination of a Person signifies principally and in recto the Hypostases or Person, and is thus resolv'd; The Hypostases or Subsistonce of the Divinity. So that there being Three Hypostases or Personalities di­stinct, there must be admitted Three distinct Persons of one numerical Divinity.

Another Objection which they muster up against us is this: We teach that the Persons of the Father and the Son are really identified with the Deity, and the same thing with it, and yet we declare, that the Father and the Son are two Realities really distinct from one another; which contradicts that first Principle, known by the Light of Nature, Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se; They that are the same thing with a Third, are the same thing among themselves. Wherein all the Art of Syllogisms is grounded.

I answer by admitting that Principle, as being known by the Light of Nature, and that the Syllo­gistical Art is grounded in it; but, I deny that our Doctrine is not consistent with the Verity of it: for, if you consider the Three Persons as contained in the Deity, and really the same thing with it, they all together make up but One Reality, for in this manner you do not consider the Persons as related to one another, but only as identified with the Deity, which is by Circumincision. And in this sence the Council of Lateran hath defined it to be but one [Page 18]thing, or one individual Substance, by reason of the identity of the Persons with the Deity.

And here I leave the Socinians to consider more nicely and minutely the Difference between the ab­solute and notional Expressions in this Matter, and their Objective Significations, which will prevent any farther progress in framing any more Objections in this matter against us.

SECT. VI. Certain Absolete Opinions of another Nove­list are Propos'd and Solv'd.

A BOOK fell lately into my Hands, in the pe­rusal whereof I found certain Paradoxical Opinions destitute of Reason, and back'd on­ly by the single Authority of the Author, whereof one was, the description of the Essential Parts and Nature of an Individuum, which he defines to be nothing else but a Self-Consciousness, or an exact Cor­respondence with it self; which he produceth no Rea­son to prove, neither did I ever hear or read of any such definition of an Individuum; for, all Antiquity doth agree in this definition, That an Individuum is Indivisum in se & divisum à quolibet alio; that is, it is undivided in it self, and divided from any thing else: of which Definition this Author makes no men­tion, and therefore doth not impugn it.

The first Refutation of this Author's new Opi­nion is as followeth:

A Self-Consciousness of a thing with it self, ar­gues relation of the thing to it self, which is [Page 20]impossible, for a relation cannot subsist, except it mediates between two Extreams distinct from each other; the one is that whereon the relation is founded, the other is that to which it is terminated; but between a thing and its self there is no distin­ction, for a thing and its self are the self-same nu­merical Object, which cannot admit of any rela­tion, and consequently is uncapable of any Self-Con­sciousness.

The Second Refutation.

There can be no Self-Consciousness but by the Vi­tal Acts produced by the Internal Faculties, which must have an exact Conformity with the Natural Inclination of the thing from whence they proceed; so that here can be no Self-Consciousness of any Ob­ject to itself, but of the Acts to their Cause.

The Third Refutation.

This Self-Consciousness comes too late to constitute the Essential Notion of an Individuum; for, sepa­rate this Self-Consciousness from the Origin whence it proceeds, and I demand, whether this Origin, as now divested of its Self-Consciousness, be not an In­dividuum: if so, then you have the Individuum com­pleatly constituted independent of this Self-Conscious­ness; for, either you must constitute the whole Es­sence of your Self-Consciousness in a certain col­lection of Vital Acts, which are really distinguish'd from the Substance of the thing whose Self-Con­sciousness it is, or else you must conceive it to be [Page 21]really identified with its Subject whereon it is groun­ded; if the first, you have the Ground and Subject remaining divested of its Self-Consciousness. Now, I demand, whether this Substance that remains sepa­rated and divested from its Self-Consciousness be an Individuum or not? If it be, then you have the whole and adequate Essence of an Individuum, inde­pendent and precedent to your Self-Consciousness: But if it be not an Individuum, then it must be a Plurality; which is against common sence, for it is a singular numerical Substance, undivided in itself, and divided from any thing else, and therefore an Individuum. But if you chuse the second by a real Identity with the Substance, which is the Ground and Foundation of it, then you must by a Metaphy­sical Distinction prescind it, and slice it as a For­mality from its Subject. And so, by your Under­standing, consider that Substance as mentally sepa­rated from its Self-Consciousness, and you will find a singular and numerical Substance, which is undivi­ded in its self, and divided from any thing else: which is the essential Definition of an Individuum.

Here I might introduce other inanimate Crea­tures, as, the Elements, Metals, Stones, and the like, which have no collection of Vital Acts, wherein to place your Self-Consciousness, and yet they are all In­dividuums; as appears by the definition by me given.

Another Opinion I find in this Author, whereby he asserts, That a Horse is a Person; not regulating himself by any Definition or Description of a Per­son, but goes on in a talking way, and still remains in the Praeliminaris of the Question in debate, without [Page 22]ever penetrating into the Heart of the Difficulty, or touching the Sore: so that by this not arguing, but talking way of Writing, nothing can be substantial­ly proved, nothing efficaciously impugned: Where­fore this Author not having given any definition nor description of a Person, I have nothing here to re­fute, but his Absolete Position of introducing unreaso­nable Brute Beasts into the number of Persons, in or­der to which, I must here give an essential definition of a Person, which is this: Rationalis naturae individua & completa Substantia; that is, A Compleat, Rational, and Individual Substance. By which definition all Ʋnreasonable Creatures are excluded from the notion of Persons; and only GOD, the Angels, and Men, are admitted.

SECT. VII. Two other Opinions of the same Author are Pro­pos'd and Solv'd.

A THIRD Opinion I find in this Author, whereby he affirms to be contained in the Deity Three Infinite Minds, not proving nor at­tempting to prove his Position by any Argu­ment.

This Doctrine, and the Consequence of it, I can­not brook; for, by admitting Three Infinite Minds in GOD, he will hardly avoid the admitting of Three GODS: which were Blasphemy to assert, and which I thus prove:

The Mind is a Vital Faculty, belonging and ap­pertaining to the Ʋnderstanding; a Term not notio­nal nor relative, but absolute and singular in the Deity; and therefore to admit Three Infinite Minds, is the same as to admit Three Infinite Ʋnderstand­ings, which being an Absolute Attribute, can no more be multiply'd than the Godhead itself, which is common to all the Absolute Attributes of the Deity, which all together make but one Substance [Page 24]with GOD himself; whence I conclude, that the admitting of Three Infinite Minds in GOD, is of dangerous consequence, and not easily to be main­tained, for it hath a direct Tendency to Pa­ganism.

A Fourth Opinion of this Author is, That the Unity of the Three Divine Persons consists essenti­ally in the Mutual Consciousness of them to each o­ther, whereby the Three Divine Persons are made One by their mutual correspondence and exact agreeing in the Faculties of their Understanding and Will with each other.

This Opinion is no more prov'd by Reason nor Authority than his former Opinions, but meerly as­serted, which Opinion I thus impugn: Separate at least with your Understanding this Mutual Conscious­ness from the Three Persons, and there will remain Three Substances without their Unity: These Three Substances are either created or increated; if the first, then the Three Persons are meer Creatures; which is rank Socinianism: if the second, then they must be really identified with the Divine Nature; and if so, then in vain do you seek for another Unity, for you have here the strictest Unity that pos­sibly can be, namely, by a real Identity with the Divine Nature, which is precedent to your Mutual Con­sciousness. And this is the True Notion and Orthodox Doctrin of the Divine Trinity.

Besides, this Unity that you affix to the Divine Persons is only moral or metaphorical, no better than it would be between three Men or three Angels; which is a great Indignity to the Infinite Perfecti­on [Page 25]of the Great God, who has in himself all Per­fections possible, and no Defect.

Note briefly here, That an Object of Three Substan­ces or Persons must first have its compleat Being be­fore it is capable of your Mutual Consciousness: Con­sider it therefore in its original Existency, which was from all Eternity, and ponder with your self if there were not in that state an Ʋnity in the Trinity, and Trinity in Ʋnity, without the least mention or co­operation of your Mutual Consciousness.

And here I conclude this Treatise of the Ever Blessed and Most Sacred Trinity; all which, and every part thereof, I humbly submit to the Judgment and Censure of Those upon whom it is incumbent to regulate the Faith, Belief and Doctrine of the Protestant Church of England.


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