SIR,

I Have of late heard much of a Common-wealth, but know not what it meaneth: I preſume your late comming from Oxford, can ſomewhat informe me what it i • , and its my earneſt deſire to know?

A Common-wealth is a multitude of Men, ruled by one government.

Our Auntient acquaintance encouraged me to demand this queſtion of you, and I now perceive by your ſhort Anſwer, which is ſo knotty and difficult to my underſtanding, that you have a deſire to renew our old familiarity, by more queſtions from me; I ſhall the ref • re deſire, if your leaſure will permmit, to unfold to me in our country Language, what this word Government is? a • d not anſwer me by Scholaſticall reſolutions, which make me farther of from being informed, then when I firſt demanded the queſtion.

My friend and Country man, by your laſt queſtion, I am ſenſible, you either go about to inquire of my proficiency at the Vniverſity; or elſe do propound the queſtion throughly to be informed; friend, inregard of your former love to me, I will make bold to borrow ſo much time, if your patience will give audience throughly to inſtruct you in this matter, by a more larger unfolding the particulars of this your Quere, that ſo I may not put you to unneceſſary Questions.

Sir I am greatly beholding to you that you have not forgotten your old friend, but are willing to have diſcourſe with him, I pray proceed to the Anſwer, and I ſhall attentively give eare.

Government is a ſetled order of Commanding and obeying; Order is maintained by three things, viz. Religion, Lawes, and Magiſtrates: the definition of Religion, I preſume you know, but becauſe of my promiſe to you; and to avoin multitude of queſtions, I will deſcribe it what it is.

Religion is that worſhip of God publickely profeſſed and practiſed, and is maintained by Lawes and Magiſtrates.

Do all Nations agree that there is a God?

Yea; all Nations agree in thoſe three Propoſitions.

1 That there is a God:

2 That God is the puniſher of offences and rewarder of vertues.

3 That whatſoever is a God ought to be worſhiped.

Is there not a difference amongſt Nations concerning God?

The difference of Nations, conſiſteth in theſe two points.

1 In their opinion, what is God, Chriſtians, Jews and Turks, do all hould there is but one God.

The Heathens in times paſt, and now many of the Americans: as alſo the people far Northward do hould that there are many gods and worſhip them accordingly.

2 The ſecond difference amongſt Nations is, In the manner of worſhipping of God, and ſo the Chriſtian Jewes, and Turks, do mainly differ.

VVhat is the Center of a Commonwealth?

The Center of a Commonwealth, where the hearts of all men in the ſame State doe meet, is Religion. The force of Lawes is ſhewne only upon occaſions. The better ſort of the people will be ſure to obſerve them. Lex non eſt juſto poſita. The Law is made for the offendor: as for offendors, Law can lay hold no farther then prooffes may be made of offences: Scelera ta • tum Probata lege puniuntur Religion holdeth a perpetuall strength, and aweth the couſcience, reſtraining facta, dicta, cogitata, by the power of the which, Nemo nocens, ſe judice, abſolvitur.

VVhat is the chiefe diſturbance in a Common wealth?

Nothing ſooner divideth a State, then diſtraction in Religion, as may appeare in old ſtories, by the diſtraction, as the Egiptians who worſhiped ſeverall Gods in their Countries, and of latter times, by the ſtrange Tumults in Germany, the Civill Warres in France, and the ſad condition of England Scotland, and Ireland, at this time.

VVhat then is the beſt way to maintaine Amity in a State?

The greateſt band of unity in a State, is unity and conformaty in Religion, neither can any State ſafely ſuffer divers Religions to be publickly maintained, or men of different Religion, from that which is maintained, to have any power to work a change.

Shew me by what Divine power, Magiſtrates can enforce contentious men to conformity, in the publick exerciſe of Religion?

You now put me to it indeed; but I will not now take it upon me to reſolve you in ſuch a point; our only diſcourſe now is, what the greateſt Polititians hold for the ſupportation of a Weale-publick or State.

I may not then pin my faith, on what you relate, but I am to take it as the writing of ancient States-men, who labor to uphold that Government, they have ſet up, or have lived under, I pray then go on, and ſhew me what Nations have been moſt ſtrict in enforcing men to outward conformity?

The Spaniard is the moſt obſervant of this, of all Nations, maintaining an Inquiſition, not only to cenſure dicta •• facta, of any that ſ • em to differ from them, but to ſearch the very thoughts of men, whom by any means they ſuſpect different.

Are the Turks ſo ſevere, to thoſe that live with in their Territories?

Noe, The Turks howſoever they inquire into no man, meerly for Religion, if he do not ſcandalize theirs; yet they ſuffer neither Chriſtians, nor Iews, nor any oppoſite to their Religion, to have either Armor or Authority.

Did the Ancient Romans make VVarre for Religion?

The old Romans in their manifold Conqueſts, never pretended occaſion of quarrell, by difference of Religion: but either revenge of wrong offered to their Citizens, or to their State, or elſe the releeving of their Confederates oppreſſed, or maintaining of their weak Neighbours.

Did the Romans regard the Religion of their Enemies?

The Religion of their Enemies, they had of it reverend eſteem; howſoever they ſtrictly obſerved Patrios Ritus, yet they often brought home Peregrinos Deos, and in the beſieging of Cities, they had many Ceremonies and expiations, ad evocandum TVTELARES LOCI DEOS, to ſhew they fought not againſt their Gods, but deſired they wold not ſuccour their people & ſo ſhould be reverenced in the Roman Territory.

After the Roman Empire was growne to the height and could not ſuſtain their own greatnes, & the civil weeds ſprang, all thoſe Rites were omitted or forgotten. Ambition openly profeſſed that it fought pro imperio neither was there any cauſe pretended between the concurrences, but the getting of the Empire. On thoſe terms the world paſſed until Mahomet deviſed a new and ſtrange Religion in the Eaſt parts, which ſet the world in a mighty difference, laying two grounds to encourage his followers, the firſt that whoſocever dyed in War againſt the Chriſtians or other Enemies to the Mahometan law, did inſtantly paſſe to all pleaſure and delight in Paradiſe. The ſecond that death was ſo neceſſarily ordained to men, that no violence would end a man before his time, nor wearines avoid it at the time. Of this Mahomet the Saracens firſt and after them the Turks, a mighty people, borrowed their Religion. Of him their Haman family learned to cover the fire of Ambition, with the Aſhes of Religion, & under pretence to propogate it, to perſwade their followers both to fight an d to dye reſolutly?

I partly beleeve that the Pope and his Predeceſſors have hither to walked by the Mahometan rule you laſt diſcourſed of.

The Papacy, in the generall, have very much followed this courſe or Rule, as you call it; concealing all their privat revenges and ambitious deſires, under the pretence of the Catholick cauſe: And that with that confident perſwaſion and credulity of their fellowes, that many of the Papiſticall Souldiers, if he hath a croſſe on his back, and the Papisticall benediction over his head, think that either they are not of danger in earth, or if they dye, they have a preſent paſſage to Heaven, at leaſt ſhall paſſe through Purgatory, and ſo eſcape Hell.

In this point there is great difference betwixt the preſent and ancient Romans, that the old Romans had a reverend opinion of the Religion of all Countries, though different from them, and would never ſuffer any deſpight or wrong to be ſhewed to the Co • quered under that name of Religion, which is not in particular mens power to take or leave as they liſt.

The preſent Papiſts make their decrees, the Rules of all truth in Religion, and thoſe that are different, they curſe, and miſchiefe by all means they can i • vent, accounting, them Atheiſts, Miſer eants, and Hereticks &c. which violent proceeding hath enforced the like vehemency in the oppoſites to iudge of him and his, in like ſort, which hath been the ſole cauſe of the great diſtraction in Chriſtendome, and laid it ſo open to the Mahometans.

There is no miſchiefe that works ſo dangerouſly as that which is carried with a Colour of Religion. Simulata ſanctitas duplex iniquitas. For that nothing can carry a multitude ſo forcibly, as blind zeal and ſuperſtition in any cauſe undertaken. In times past, Sortorius a Roman, razſed Portugall, & the better part of Spaine, defeated the Roman Armies, working credit with his followers by pretending conference with Diana, by means of a white • art. Mahomet by his Dove and Bull of late times, the Seriffo in Africa under a pretended Holineſſe, gate firſt his ſtrength, by which he turned the lawfull Prince out of the State, and ſetled himſelfe and his. John of Leyden at one time, and Muncerus at another time, raiſed thoſe great Tumults in Germany.

Sir, in your deſcription of Government, I remember you told me that order was maintained or ſupported by thoſe three things, Religion, Law, and M • giſtrates, you have given me ample ſatisfaction concerning Religion. I deſire you would now diſcover to me what Law is?

Lawes are certaine Rules written, or cuſtoms continued, by which the light of perſons, actions, or things are determined.

Ius triplex est. 1 Ius naturae, Is the light of nature, by which we know what is wrong, being offered unto us, and that the ſame • s wrong, being committed by our ſelves againſt others. 2 Ius Gentium, T • e Law obſerved by all Nations, how difference ſo ever, and is the rule d • iding right betweene men of ſundry Common-wealths; and it ſpecially concerns Leagues, Contracts, Captives &c. 3 Ius Civile, Is that by which the Citizens of every ſtate are ruled, and it is of two ſorts. 1 Ius Commune, Or Ius Iuſticiae, the Common Law which is conteyned in the letter of the Law, or in the Cuſtomes of the Country, and this in particular caſes may ſometimes be the cauſe of wrong, as is often ſpoken, Summa Ius, ſumma Injuria. 2 Ius Equitatis, The Law of Equity, when a particular caſe by reaſon of ſome circumſtance, deſireth help and eaſe againſt the rigor of the Law; ſuch was Ius Pretorium amongſt the Romans, and the Court of Chancery with us in England.

In the Caſe where the ſtranger ſaved the City by mounting on the Walls, and encouraged the Citizens to keepe the Towne againſt the Enemy, contrary to the Law, Peregrinus in mures ſi aſcenderit Capitale eſto: the action in it ſelfe moſt honourable, it by the letter of the Law, Capitall.

Beſides all theſe there is Ius Prerogative, which reſteth wholly in them, be they one or more, in whom the Supreame power and Authority reſteth. Such have Princes in abſolute Monarchies, and ſuch a Power had the people of Rome, wh • n the State was Popular, to receive appeals from any of their Judges, to call matters determined by Law to a new audience, to ſuſpend the execution of any ſentence, or to pardon the puniſhment: Such alſo hath been the accuſtomed power of the Parliaments of England.

The Law is neceſſary for every State, for that Leges fiunt propter homines; homines non fiunt propter Leges. Men are not made to ſatisfie the Law in its rigor, but Lawes are made for the ſafety and preſervation of men. Salus Populi ſuprema Lex.

Doe all Nations agree in their Lawes?

Noe.

How then are their Lawes to be diſcerned or known?

There are two Rules by which the Lawes and Cuſtomes of Countries are to be diſcerned.

1. By the Law of Nature, ſpoken of before, by that light. by which we know what is right or wrong, either in doing or ſuffering. Altrine facias, quod tibi factum nolis; in this all good eſtates agree, in the ſubſtance, framing their poſitive Lawes againſt Atheiſme, Murther, Adultery, Theft, &c. Things in the light of Nature Condemned. Nations alſo differ in the puniſhment and means of reſtraining which is not in Nature defined. If any Law in a State be made againſt this of Nature, it muſt needs be inconvenient as implicating a contradiction in the Government to other Lawes. For that the whole Law of nature, is moſt agreeable, and conformable, in all the ſeverall parts unto it ſelfe.

2. The ſecond Rule by which the Law of Nations are diſcerned; is, by the Suppoſition of the State, that is; by comparing the Law or Cuſtom, with the maine government in Practiſe, for if a Law be made which holds not on ſcope with the preſent Government eſtabliſhed, it muſt needs breed variance and diſcord, and in the end ſome occaſion for one party to aſſaile the other. As it muſt needs happen to a Monarchy, if the people get any power to deale in the State; but moſt commonly in a popular State, if either they continue their great Offices for too long a time, or yeild too great authority, by Decree, to any one man. Sy •• a firſt, and afterwards Caeſar gate the whole ſtate into their hands, by the name of perpetuall Dictators. Auguſtus, by a more populer name, Tribune of the people.

By this I underſtand, that its a dangerous thing, ſuddenly to alter a ſtanding Law, or cuſtome of a Nation or State; for you ſay that divers diſtractions and broyles do enſue thereupon?

Auntient Lawes and cuſtomes, are not to be ſuddenly changed, though they be but of ſmall importance. Plato thinks that the change of Muſick ought not to be ſuffered, least that ſhould alſo change mens conditions. Amongſt the Thurans whoſoever attempted a new Law, must perſwade it with a Halter about his neck, with which he was to be hanged, if he failed in ſhewing the neceſſity of it.

New Lawes are ſeldome received with intire conſent, and hardly obſerved at the firſt, if there be not great neceſſity; which neceſſity ſeldom appeareth, but with hazard, which may breed much danger before the Law be eſtabliſhed.

What you have allready ſpoken concerning Law ſufficeth. I ſhall now intreat you, for my more cleare and diſtinct apprehenſion, to reſolve Magiſtraty into the ſeverall heads and branches thereof?

Magiſtracy, is a power in men which boldeth all in obedience to Religion and Law.

You are againe harping on your old ſtring, the power of Magiſtrates in matters of Religion, but I beleeve you will not now reſolve me, in regard you • ave denyed me formerly?

I told you before, and I tell you againe, I cannot now reſolve you, becauſe it is a matter of great conſequence, and the greateſt Schollers are (if I may ſo ſay) to their Ne plus ultra, concerning this thing, but I ſhall • re long take ſome opportunity to give you my thoughts herein, I will let it paſſe now and proceed to the matter in hand, relating to Magiſtrates.

Magiſtrates are of two ſorts.

1. Supreame, who have the firſt place in Honour, and the cheifeſt in power to inforce obedience, that Religion and Lawes may be obſerved.

2. Subordinate, be all Magiſtrates that have del • gate power, from the Supreame authority, to hold men in obedience in their ſeverall places.

In the ſupreame Magiſtrate is eſpecially conſidered, capacity of the State. which is two wayes.

1. By his owne underſtanding and experience, knowing and intending what to adviſe in all occurrences, which is almoſt impoſſible in the variety of accidents which befall in State buſineſſe; yet ſuch we read Auguſtus to have beene; who kept written with his own hand large remembrances, of all his Legions, Officers, Rents, Cuſtomes, Allyes, Leagues &c.

2. By Election of advice, propounded by others, which appeareth in the choyce of the beſt Councellors, and in the choice of beſt Councell in hard matters, neither blind by weakneſſe of judgement, nor inclined by partiall affection: for the Princes choice is the life of any advice be it never ſo wiſe. If we looke into any of their falls, they muſt have fallen not for want of fit Counſell propounded, but for want of Judgement, or partiall affection in the choice of that Counſell which they followed. Quinec ſibi poteſt recte conſulares, nec aliis bene conſulentibus auſcultare velit, extremi eſt ingenij.

What are the generall Suppoſitions holden by the wiſeſt Magiſtrates?

1. To prevent all inconveniences, in the beginning, and not to think thoſe things which ſeverally to the vulger ſort ſeeme little, to be little., being joyned together. Inſenſible vapors, do breed horrible Tempeſts, and ſmall grains great heaps.

2. In avoiding inconveniences, to have ſpeciall regard to the manner of avoyding them. In making their people obedient and quiet, not to ſuffer them ſo to forget Armes that they may be a prey, to their forraigne Enemies, in making themſelves ſtrong againſt the Enemies, carefully to provide againſt diſobedience and mutining, which often happeneth amongſt Military people.

3. Not to ſuffer any one part, how good ſo ever in ſhew to attaine an overſwaying power, or dependance, which cannot be brought and holden in order, and obedience, if oppoſition ſhould happen, occaſio facit ambitioſis. And mens powers are more certainly ruled, then their wills.

4. To diſtinguiſh warily offences and good deſerts, rewards and puniſhments, that neither great deſerts may breed Inſolency, or hope of impunity for future offences, nor offences take away all hope of reward for future vertues.

5. Eſpecially to have men, from their beginnings, to be brought up to the Common-wealth in which they live. Legum optimarum nulla est utilitas niſi ſint, qui ad Rempub. informentur.

6. It is impoſible, in civill caſes, ſubject to ſuch variety of times and other circumſtances, alwayes to finde out optimam ex bonis: It is often times enough to take that which is mimimum ex malis &c. In thoſe paſſages there is not reſpect alwayes to be had to the greater part, nor yet to the better part, but to the whole State intirely conſidered: Pars quicquid est totius eſt.

I conceive thoſe ſix foregoing ſuppoſitions or Rules are peculiarly incident to the ſupreame Magiſtrate, but how ought a ſubordinate Magiſtrate to be qualified?

Three things are to be conſidered chiefly in a ſubordinate Magiſtrate:

1. That they do affectionatly love the State eſtabliſhed.

2. That they have ſufficient power to execute that which is required by their Office.

3. That their parts be anſwerable to that charge which they undertake, in the Common-wealth. Viz. Valour and Bounty fit for a Souldier, Wiſdome and Juſtice for a Judge, Frugality and honeſty, for an Officer of account.

What are the accidentall differences of States?

They are two.

1. Good, Bad.

2. We • k Strong.

How or in what reſpect • are Common-wealths ſaid to be Good or bad?

Three wayes. 1. In reſpect of their good or bad Lawes, ſo the Lacedemonian Reſpublick, was thought wanting, which by Lawes permitted Theft, and Adultery. 2. In reſpect of Good or Bad Magiſtrates, ſo the Lacedemonian Reſpublike was holden the beſt, in that the Magiſtrates moſt ſtrictly obſerved the Lawes and Cuſtomes of their C • untrey, and the ſuppoſition of their State, which was Ariſtocraticall, and Military. 3. In reſpect of both, as all good Common-wealths, whoſe Lawes agree with the Law of Nature, and the Magiſtrates acting according to the Lawes

Is the Law, alwayes to be executed according to the letter of I?

No fo it is neither ſafe that Law alone ſhould rule which can not diſtinguiſh of times, occaſions, nor actions. Neither is it ſafe that Magiſtrates ſhould rule alone without Law, for men are ſo ſubiect to hatred love, feare, paſſion reward &c. It is beſt where both have their place, for that Law directeth beſt actions; but diſcretien and true iudgement beſt diſtinguiſheth circumſtances.

How ſhall a man diſcerne the ſtrength of a State?

By obſerving theſe three things.

1. Whether it be ſtrong in the frame it ſelfe of preſent Government, ſo if Monarchy is held more ſtrong, and in leſſe hazard of diſtraction and diviſion then a popular ſtate.

2. Whether it be ſtrong by continuance of time, having long holden on forme, ſo New Principalities are weak, as wanting time to confirme them; Auncient Principalities are ſtrong, where the peopl have been inured to reverence and obedince, Monarchy could not have been taken from the Aſſyrians, if Sardanapalus had not been a beaſt, nor from the blood of the Ceſars, if Nero had not been rather a Monſter then a Man.

3. Whether it be ſtrong only by vertue, Wiſdome, and Valour • of them, which are in preſent Authority. So only New Principalities have ſtrength by them which raiſe them, Such was the Greſian Monarchy, which appeared in the world, and vaniſhed againe like lightning; the ſtrength whereof wholy conſiſted in Alexander, and with his death periſhed.

What are the reall differences of Common-wealths, and from whence have States their Denomination?

The reall difference of Common-wealths are taken from the different order in com • anding and obeying; the Name of every State is given according to the Supreame and highest Authority.

Wherein is the Supreame Authority manifeſted?

In theſe foure things.

1. Poteſtas belli et pacis.

2. Poteſtas vitae & Necis.

3. P • . faciendar. legum.

4. Po. Creandor. magiſtrat.

By theſe foure powers, States are determined in themſelves, and diſtinguiſhed one from another.

In whom thoſe four powers, or moſt of them do reſt, whetherin on • , • ome few, or in many, in them is the ſupreame Authority, and they give the Name to the State. If they be abſolute in any, the ſtate of them is called an abſolute Monarchy, or Ariſtocraty &c. If they be partly in ſome, and partly in others, then the State is ſaid to be a mixt Commonwealth.

According as theſe powers are dive • ſly ſetled, ſo States are r • ally diſtinguiſhed.

If thoſe powers be in one perſon, well uſed, to the good of the people under him, the State is called A Monarchy.

If in the perſon of one, abuſed, to the profit only of that one, and of his who hath the Authority in his hands, its called A Tyranny.

If in ſome few, well uſed to the common ſafety it is called, An Ariſtocraty.

If in ſome few abuſed, to the profit and pleaſure of ſome few. An Oligarchy.

If the fore ſaid powers, be in the multitude, well uſed, to the ſafety of all, Law having power above the people, i • s then called, A good Democraty.

If in the multitude, abuſed to faction, and the ſetting up the baſeſt of the people, the multitude over-ruling Law, A bad Democraty.

Which of theſe Governments do you eſteem the beſt?

Heretofore moſt Hiſt • rians were of the iudgement that regulated Monarchy, was the beſt, but the State of England, as now it ſtands, admits not ſuch weak iudgements as mine to diſtinguiſh.

SIR, I ſee you are ſilent in your thoughts, I pray tell me what you account the worſt.

The worſt State is a Tyranny, as being oppoſite to the beſt, Bonum & malum in ſuo g • n • re maxime diſtant.

I have heard of an Anarchy, I pray what government is that?

Anarchy is no State, but a confuſion of all order, much wo • ſe then the worſt Tyranny, which well appeared at Rome, after the death of Nero, when all men did what they liſt, which cauſed an honourable Senato • to ſay, that if that miſorder ſhould continue, they ſhould have occaſion to wiſh for Nero againe. It is better living where nothing, then where all things are lawfull.

I remember you told me, th • t if the forementioned powers were in one perſon, it was an abſolute Monarchy; by which I conceive there are ſev • rall kinds of Monarchi • s?

A Monarchy is the government of one to the preſervation of all, But Monarchies are of two ſorts.

1. Abſolute where the chi • f doth rul • all cauſes by his abſolute Authority, not any way d • t • rmin • d by Law, and the • e are good, ſo ſa • re as the Authority is well uſed, and the cheif doth hold it, Salus populi ſuprema L • x. For government was before poſitive Lawes, and in Nature, there is abſolute priority and power of the Father over his Children.

2. Limited, and that three manner of wayes.

1. By Lawes a lore, where the Subject may have lawfull audience, and he • p in Law, for holding, or recovering his right againſt the Prince.

2. By Ove • ſeers alone, where there be Offic • rs of State, which may demand • e • ſon, wh • n the cheif ſtretcheth his power to the the d • trime • t of the Subject, ſuch have been the Electors in Germany.

3. By Lawes and Overſeers, as in times paſt in France, when the twelve pe • res held their places, and their Parliaments had their full power for the proceſſe of Lawes.

Juſt Prin • ipalities are generally mai • tained by hould • ng the favour and love • f the Subject.

Imperium eſt in voluntate obſequentium.

What meanes is a Governour to uſe to gaine the love and affection of his people; and being gained; how isit to be kept, and preſerved?

The peoples love is houlden by theſe meanes.

1. By being Religious, to wards God, for that men will never ſeek, nor deſire the overthrow of them, whom they are perſwaded to be g ••• ded with divice pro • ection.

2. By ſhewing • a • e of the puli •• ſafety not of privat gaine, me • doe moſt willingly contribute, when they are perſwaded that money is either imployed or reſe • ved for publick benefit.

3. By b • ilding publick works, and r • leiving publick misfortunes.

4. By beſtowing honours and rewards upon men of great worth by deſert • .

5. By referring all matters of Juſtice and puniſhment to their offences, never ſhewing contentment in the ſhame or miſery of any.

6. Generally, by bounty, magnanimity, and all ho • ourable and vertuous actions.

Tyranny you ſay is the worſt of governments, I ſhall earneſtly deſire, you would branch it forth, into its ſeverall parts, by which I may perceive the iniquity of it.

Tyranny is the government of one man according to his own will, and reſpecting only his owne profit, Tyrants have uſed two wayes to ſupport and uphold their Tyranny.

1. By taking away all deſire and knowledge of altering their government, which is thus done. Firſt by working puſillanimity. Ignorance, and diſtruſt in the people; which is acted five manner of wayes.

1. By taking away all Schooles, and diſcipline; by which men might underſtand what is right or wrong; A thing practiſed by the Turks &c. 2. By taking away all ſocieties and fraternities, by which they might be acquainted one with another. 3. By placing Guards in the ſtrongeſt places, by which they might ſuppreſſe any ſudden attempt. 4. By placeing privy ſpies to entrap ſuch as talk of State matters, and ſo make all jealous of one another. 5. By often making ſhew of forraigne forces, which may be feard to be ready if any need require.

2. By taking a way all power from the people, which is thus wrought:

1. By baniſhing or putting to death, or ſhutting up in Priſon the men of account and their ofspring, that no male contents may know where to finde a leader that the people would follow; the houſe of Bela took this courſe in the Moſcovite State, It was Perianders Counſell to Thraſibulus; the houſe of Ottiman is ſo jealous, that the Grandſenior never thinks his Eſtate ſure, before he hath cut of his Brethren. 2. By utterly impoveriſhing their Subjects by exactions. Dionyſius in 5 years ga • t all the treaſury of Sicily into his hands. 3. By maintaining diſſcention between the great men and the Commons, or of the greater men between themſelves, taking part with neither, that they may know and uſe the griefes and wants of all. 4. By not ſuffering the great men to live at home, but attend there, where the higher power do obſcure them, or if they be imployed to keep their Children as Hoſtages, ſo uſeth the Magnus Mogor in Aſia. 5. To commit no truſt to the Natives, or men of great blood or kindred, but to Eunaches or ſtrangers, ſuch as can not be popular, nor hold place, but by their Tyranny, ſuch are the Turkiſh Baſſaes. 6. To ſuffer no man to beare Armes, but their ſworn Souldiers, to give Lands only to ſuch, the inheritance depending ſtill at their proper diſpoſition, the Moſcoveticall and Turkiſh practiſe, the one to his Gentlemen; the other to his Timariots; All other are ſlaves to them, as they are to their cheif Lord.

By what properties ſhall I know • King from a Tyrant?

Theſe four differenses will diſtinguiſh them.

1. Kings were firſt choſen out of the beſt, and by the beſt, to guard them, and to rule the raſh multitude.

Tyrants had their beginning ex Demagogis; ſuch as flattered the people, and ſtirred them up againſt the worthyeſt perſons, and ſo under ſhew of protecting of them, made away, all ſuch as might with ſtand them, Piſiſtratus at Athens, Dionyſius at Syracuſe.

2. The ſecond ſcope of a King is vertue and honour.

The ſcope of a Tyrant, profit and pleaſure.

3. A King is the protector of all, Rich, and poore, that on neither doth, nor ſuffereth wrong of the other.

A Tyrant only regardeth the profit and ſecurity of him ſelf, and his leaving others open to al wrongs.

4. The truſt of a King is in his Subjects, and of them he maketh his Guard.

The truſt of a Tyrant is only in ſtrangers, and to them he commits his ſafety.

How are Principalities overthrown?

Two wayes.

1. By forraign power, when one ſtate aſſayleth and overthroweth another, the conquered receiveth ſuch government as the Conqueror thinketh meet, ſo the Romans ov • rthrew many Kingdoms, and turned them into principalities; to be governed by their Lif • tennants.

2. By Domeſtic • ll ſeditions, which are commonly raiſed by theſe occaſions, in number Six.

1. By the Iuſtice of the Rulers. 1. In Injuries towards th • ir perſons, which is acted two manner of wayes. 1. In murthering, and raviſhing their Kinsfolks. As the Tarquines at Rome. 2 In beating like ſlaves men of account. 2 In oppreſſing with exactions, ſo far that by • xtream poverty, ſubjects grow deſperat, having nothing to loſe, but their • fe, whereof want hath made them weary.

2 By contempt of them.

You formerly told me, that Ariſtocraty was the power of Ruling in ſome few, well uſed, to the Common ſefety: I pray acquaint me of what ſort of the people they are or ought to be?

Ariſtocraty, is a gou • rnment of the beſt, for the ſafety of all, but there are three kinds.

1 The firſt, where reſpect is had, to both wealth, and vertue, in the cheif of all Officers.

2 The ſecond where reſpect is only had of wealth, this inclyneth to an Oligarchy.

3 The third, where reſpect is only had of virtue, leaving it free to all, to make way to the cheif places, this inclineth to a Democraty.

What means have been uſed to maintain and uphold States Ariſtocratic •• .

Theſe Nine Maximes have beene h • ld • nd practiſe'd.

1 Comp • lling the Nobility to bring up their Children in feats of Armes, and politick Diſcipline, ſuffering the r • ſt to do as they liſt.

So the Lacedemonians brought up all their Children in publick places, together, where they learned exerciſe of Armes and knowldege of government.

2 Conſtraining the Nobility upon great pe • al • y, to be preſent at their publick Aſſemblies, ſuffering the reſt to attend their profit and buſi • eſſe.

3 Receiving the Citizens into their ſp • ciall patro • ages, that in Popul •• quarrells, every man ſeverally might pacifie his Clyents, or followers, this was often practiſed by the Senators of Rome, to uphold their State.

4 Suffering none to continue in the greateſt Offices for long time, that he might procure too many dependents, or w • ak • n his oppoſites.

5 Giving noe man that honour whch others might not hope to obtain.

6 Imploying them which were too great, in forraign buſineſſe, that abſenc • might make them forgotten.

7 Keeping Offices of Honour, wholly amongſt the No • ility, leaving them of petty matters and gain to the people.

8 Suppreſſing the firſt occaſions of quarrells amongſt the greateſt men, To that end to hold friendly meetings in places indifferent, where pacifications may be made.

9. Holding the people in fehre of publick danger • , to make an enemy if there were none, by that means, to draw from home ſuch as were mutinous: A thing much practiſed by the Roman Senate, while their power held.

You have declared nine Maxims or Sophims, that are the props of an Ariſtocraticall State, but by what means is that government overthrown and changed?

Three things alter and change an A • iſtocraty.

1. The Sedition of the great men, when their numbers do ſo increaſe, that the Honours to be devided, are not enough to ſatisfie their Number, the Lacedemonian, for remedy of this, ſent the Parthenians into Italy which built Tarentum.

2 The Tranſgreſſion of that ſuppoſition in not making vertuea mean between the wealth of the great men, and liberty of the people; yeelding too much to the peoples liberty, makes the State Democraticall, but wholy to wealth Oligarchicall.

3 Negligence in ſmall matters, ſuffering inferior Officers to be perpetuall, which after giveth example and occaſion that the greateſt likewiſe ſhould be ſo.

By this it is evident to me that Ariſtocraty may be turned into a State Democraticall or Oligarchycall: my requeſt is, that you would more fully ſhew me what Oligarchy is, and wherein it differeth from the State laſt mentioned?

Oligarchy is a Government of ſome few to their owne profit; and it may be branched forth into 4. kinds.

1 Where all cheife Officers, are choſen only by valution of wealth and poſſeſſions.

2 Where men of middle wealth, are admitted to Offices, but the preceedent Magiſtrate c • huſeth his ſucceſſor.

3 Where, the Magiſtrates ſucceed, as in Inheritances, The Son in his Fathers place.

4 Where all power is in ſome few, which rule above Law as they liſt, and this is like the worſt kinde of Democraty.

How is this Rule▪ of Government kept from fall or ruine?

The Fabrick of this government is preſerved from fall or ruine, by thoſe Axioms or Sophiſmes, as Sir Walter Rawleigh calls them, in his Book, called the Prince of State, which are theſe.

1 By ſuffering no Elections, to paſſe either by Lot or by Common ſuffrages, but by a ſet number.

2 By ſuffering no choice to be made, but out of certaine, which likewiſe had ſuch a valuation of goods.

3 By making their Officers perpetuall or of long continuance.

4 By maintaining great Troopes of Horſe, impoſed on them in Authority, which make a Terrible ſhew, and can not be maintained but with great wealth ſo did the Eretrians and Chalcedonians. But Ariſtrocratyes and De • ocratyes have rather maintained foot-men for their Souldiers. As the Lacedemonians, the Romans, and at this day the Swiſſers.

5 By keeping the people poore and without Armes, that they might neither know how to arme themſelves, or give, pay to them which ſhould take Armes in their behalfe.

6 By raiſing many Warres, or rumors of Warres; Common people are eaſily awed in publique dangers.

7 By making Marriages only with themſelves, where Marriages are Communicated, the greater ſort is leſſe eſteemed.

8 By providing means of employment in Warres, or Colonyes, when their Iſſue groweth too great, and all can not be in honour.

I conceive thoſe political Fabricks are deſtroyed, and brought to nought, by fewer means and wayes: they are upheld like a houſe built by many hands, yet one man or two can pluck it downe. My requeſt now is, that you would ſhew and unfold unto me the occaſions of Oligarchyes fall?

1 By them that are not in Authority. As at Heraclea and Maſſilia, where the younger Brethren roſe againſt the Elder, for that they were excluded from the Common-wealth.

2 By them in Authority, theſe five wayes. 1 Either by reaſon of the ſmal number, the Father and Son, or two Brethren can not be in Office together. 2 When the few in place would yet have fewer. 3 When the few having Luxuriouſly ſpent their goods and Eſtates, ſeek to ſpoile the Common Treaſury. 4 When of thoſe few which Rule, all can not come to the Chiefeſt place. 5 When they in Authority by any occaſion fall at diſſention and aſſayle onn another, the weaker fetching in the people for his Guard, maketh either a Tyrany or a Democraty.

3 By Accident two wayes. 1 In time of Warre through diſtruſt in the people, thoſe few enforced to hire fortaigne Souldiers, which committed to one that is populer, with them makes himſelfe Lord of all. 2 In time of peace, when the people and thoſe few being at variance, commit themſelves to a third, which oppreſſeth them both.

I remember in your deſcription of States, you mention a two fold Democraty; I requeſt your patience to unfold to me the particulars thereof, and what difference hath been uſed in their Election of cheife Officers.

A Democraty, is a Government of all, to the good of all, or elſe A government of a multitude which are the greater part of the State, to that end they propound to themſelves, and this is called a bad Democraty, and of neere kin to Tyranny.

As concerning their choice of State Officers, they had divers faſhions of Liberties.

1 In ſome; all might be capable of the higheſt Offices, and all had voices in the Choice.

2 In others; all had ſuffrages, but yet they made their choice by certaine eſtimation of wealth.

3 In ſome all might be Rulers, Ita ut Lex dominetur.

In others all might rule. Ita ut Populus dominetur.

In my Judgement, thoſe popular States, that are not governed by the Rule or Square of Law, can have no ſtrength, neither can their baſis be well fixed.

A popular State, hath neither ſtrength nor goodneſſe in the frame it ſelfe; beſides it is ſubiect to ſuch daily factions and diſſention and making way for every impudent flatterer to grow mighty, by fawning on people, and ſlandering them whoſe good vertues and fortunes for their greatneſſe might be occaſion of envy.

How then is it ſupported, if it want ſtrength and goodneſſe?

The ſtrength of it only conſiſteth in the goodneſſe, morall vertues and civill parts of their Citizens, and according to the divers ſorts of people popular States doe differ.

1 The moſt ancient is of Husbandmen ſuppoſed the beſt, becauſe their life being laborious and full of buſineſſe, they have leaſt leiſure to mutiny from their private cares. So the Medians are reported to have lived before Deiocius altered their government.

2 The ſecond of Shephards much like the former for their kind of life.

3 The third of Arti • ans and Merchants &c. which muſt needs be full of innovations through their continuall whiſpering and private devices at their meetings.

4 The other is a mixture of all thoſe kinds together. Ariſtotle condemneth utterly the laſt; and yet wee read not of any of the firſt, any thing memorable: The Athenians admitted of all ſorts to the choice of Magiſtrates, the making Lawes, and to their great cenſure, when they baniſhed any by Oſtraciſme.

So did the Romans in the latter times howſoever the auncient did hold it a ſufficient commendation to be commended. As Bonus Colonus & ſtrenuus miles.

What baniſhment was that Oſtraciſme, and for what time, and what the Tranſgreſſion that made men liable there: unto?

It was a kinde of baniſhment uſed aamongſt the Athenians, and the party exiled was to remaine ten yeares in Exile, which was thus executed; by delivering Shells, with the names of the perſons condemned written therein; It was uſed not ſo much to puniſh other Offences, as to ab • te the immoderate power of the Noblemen.

What are the pretexts of a popular State, and what meanes doe they uſe to maintaine the ſame?

The ſuppoſition of a popular State pretendeth two things, which in themſelves are plaufible.

1 Equality.

2 Liberty.

The means of maintaining their ſuppoſition have beene theſe ſeaven.

1 By chooſing all Magiſtrates by the voices of all, and out of all. Ne quis ſit excluſus á Republica.

2 By giving no power to any Magiſtrate, to put any to death, though condemned by Law, if they appealed to the people. Vt libera ſi • provocatio ad Populum, abſoluta Poteſtas in Populo.

3 By cauſing all to know the uſe of Armes, that they neither ſhould feare Forraigne forces or powers, nor one pa • tie to ſtand in awe of another.

4 By ſuffering no man to continue long in Office, and to be called to an account, his Office being ended and expired.

5 By diminiſhing the power of them which were growne to great by what meanes ſoever. As the Athenians uſed their Oſtraciſmus, The Syrac • ſans their Petaliſmus, the parties name written in Olive leaves, upon which he was to be exiled.

6 The more ſimple, otherwiſe. If hee can but underſtand their Lawes, and cuſtomes to ſee execution on Offendors, the fitter and ſaf • r for a popular Eſtate. In ſome Democraties the chiefe Officer hath beene tied to ſuch kindes as are mechanicall.

7 By compelling all to be at Aſſemblies, eſpecially the meaner ſort, who in ſome popularities have been invited by rewards.

Sir, I have exerciſed your pa • ience long, and I feare I am to bold with you; but your freeneſſe of diſcourſe hitherto, encourageth me to demand, or requeſt ſome other few reſolutions before your departure.

The time I have ſpent with you, I account it not l • ſt, for I have made a two fold gaine thereof, by renewing our old acquaintance, and thereby our loves.

2 By bringing to my remembrance what I have read out of divers auntient Authors concerning STATE-POLICIE. I ſhall willingly reſolve you, if your d • mandes come within the reach of my weake Learning. I pray proceed to your Queſtion.

How are Democraticall States alterd?

Democraties are changed into Oligarchyes, by the banding of them, in great favour with the people; if they can agr • e betweene themſelves: if they diſagree, the one aſſ • yling the other, the conqueror rayſe a Monarchy.

The Popular State of Rome, by the confederacy of Craſſus, Pompy, and Caeſar, proved in effect Oligarchicall, All things being acted as they would have them.

Af • ir Craſſus death, Pompy and Caeſar falling at variance, one aſſayling the other, the Conqueror drew the whole State to himſelfe.

After Caeſars death it became againe Popular. The new Triumverate made it Oligarchicall, their diſſentien, Monarchicall againe.

What things are thoſe, without which, neither of thoſe • orementioned States, can be ſupported, or continue without ruine.

Ariſtotle ſayeth, Sex ſunt quae dicuntur neceſſaria Alimenta, Artificia, Arma, Pecunia, Sacra, Judicia. Moreover elſe where he ſaieth. Quinque ſunt arcana quae in poteſtate ſuperioris Magiſtratus reſervare ſolent Reſp. Therefore it behoveth the Supreame power of any State, to have a ſpeciall care, that thoſe ſix things be duly had in regard, and according to the reſpective qualities and number of their Subiects.

ALIMENTA.

Nouriſhment which is to be conſidered.

1 By what kind the people deſire to be maintained.

2 Where they have that which they fancie or moſt deſire, from home; or from other Countries.

3 With what eaſe or difficulty the Victualia, deſired may be gotten, • t what rates, and what quantity is requiſite.

VVhat were theſe Salii?

They were the Prieſts oſ Mars the gods of Battl • , who bearing Ancilia or Targets and Sheilds dancing about the City in token of Triumph.

VVhat is to be obſerved concerning Magiſtrates?

Foure things.

1 VVho hath the power of chooſing them.

2 VVho are capable, who are not?

3 VVhat cauſes are in their power? what not.

4 By what their powers are • nlarged or reſtrained.

So long as the power of the Senate of ROME availd, though the people did chuſe, yet they did chuſe their great Officers, onely ex Patritiis, out of thoſe that came from the loynes of Senators, who though they determined all matters, yet there was ſtill liberty to appeale to the p • ople.

Afterwards all were made capable and any of the Tribunes might hinder any act of the Conſul, or decree of the Senate.

JVDJCJA. 1 Either criminall; as in caſes of life and death. 2 Or Civill; as of perſonall or reall actions, which concerne matters of Treſpaſſe and Title

The manner of proceeding whether the Tryalls be. 1 De facto only 2 De Iure only. 3 De Iure & de facto, together.

There are five Maxims, or ſecrets as you call them, peculiar to the ſupream power or chiefe Magiſtrate in regulating A State or weale publick. I pray diſcover the particulars thereof, and how they become ſo neceſſary?

Thoſe five. Conciones, Magiſtratus, Juditia, Arma, & Exercitia. Require a more abler Statiſt then my ſelfe, to diſcover their power or uſe; and will take up longer time then now can be ſpared, or our patience quietly attend. In regard of the prolixity, I will only give you the branches thereof, but leave the demo • ſtration of each particular, untill another opportunity ſhall preſent it ſelfe.

CONCIONES. Aſſemblies or Counſells.

1 Generall. As that Des eſtats gene • aux in France, and the Parliaments in England.

2 Their Ordinary Counſells for ordinary Occurrences.

VVhere in we are to conſider.

I told you before, that Oligarchyes conſtrained the rich men to be preſent at their great Aſſemblyes, on paine of penalties.

Democratyes, ſometimes by rewards, invited the meaner ſort at their generall Aſſemblies, to make their preſence the greater, and that they ſhould not altogether looſe their private profit • which is moſt regarded by the multitude, by omitting their private affaires and following of publique.