SIR,

I Have of late heard much of a Common-wealth, but know not what it meaneth: I preſume your late comming from Oxford, can ſomewhat informe me what it i • , and its my earneſt d • ſire to know?

A Common-wealth is a multitude of Men, ruled by one government.

Our Auntient acquaintance encouraged me to demand this queſtion of you, and I now perceive by your ſhort Anſwer, which is ſo knotty and difficult to my underſtanding, that you have a d • ſire to renew our old familia • ity, by more queſtions from m • ; I ſh • ll therefore deſire, if your leaſur • will permit, to unfold to me in our country Language, what this word Government is? and not anſwer me by Scholaſticall reſolutions, which make me farther of from, being informed, then when I firſt demanded the queſtion.

My friend and Country man, by your laſt queſtion, I am ſenſible, you either go about to inquire of my proficiency at the Vniverſity; or elſe do propound the queſtion throughly to be informed; friend, • nregard of your former love to me, I will make bold to borrow ſo much time, if your patience will give audience throughly to inſtruct you in this matter, by a more larger unfolding the particulars of this your Quere, that ſo I may not put you to unneceſſary Queſtions.

Sir, I am greatly beholding to you that you have not forgotten your old friend, but are willing to have diſcourſe with him, I pray proceed to the Anſwer, • nd I ſhall attentively give eare.

Government is a ſetled order of Commanding and obeying; Order is maintained by three things, viz. Religion, Lawes, and Magistrates: the definition of Religion, I preſume you know, but becauſe of my promiſe to you; and to avoid multitude of queſtions, I will deſcribe it what it is.

Religion is that worſhip of God publikely profeſſed and practiſed, and is maintained by Lawes and Magiſtrates.

Do all Nations agree that there is a God?

Yea; all Nations agree in thoſe three Propoſitions.

1. That there is a God:

2. That God is the puniſher of offences and rewarder of vertues.

3. That whatſoever is a God ought to be worſhiped.

Is there not a difference amongſt Nations concerning God?

The difference of Nations, co • ſiſteth i • th • ſe two points.

1. In their opinion, what is God, Chriſtians Iews and Turks, do all hould there is but one God.

The Heathens in times paſt, and now many of the Americans: as alſo the people farre Northward, do hould that there are many Gods, and worſhip them accordingly.

2. The ſecond difference amongſt Nations is, In the manner of worſhipping of God, and ſo the Chriſtian Jewes, and Turks, do mainly differ.

What is the Center of a Commonwealth?

The Center of a Commonwealth, where the hearts of all men in the ſame State doe meet, is Religion. The force of L •• es is ſh • wn • only upon occaſions. The better ſort of the people will be ſure to obſerve them, Lex non eſt juſto poſita. The Law is ma • e for the offendor: As for offendors, Law can lay hold no farther then prooffes may be ma • e of offences: Scelera tan • um Probatalege P • n • untur. Religion holdeth a perpetuall ſtrength, and aw • t • the Conſcience, reſtraining facts, dicta, cogitata, by the power of the which, Nemo nocens, ſe judice, abſolvitur.

What is the chiefe diſturbance in a Common wealth?

Nothing ſ • oner divideth a State, th • n diſtraction in Religion, as may appeare in old ſtories, by the diſtraction, as the Egiptians who worſhipped ſeveral Gods in th • ir Countries, a • d of latter times, by the ſtrange Tumults in Germany, the Civill Warres in France, and the ſad condition of England, Scotland, and Ireland, at this time.

The greateſt band of unity in a State, is unity & conformity in Relig • or, • either can any State ſafely ſ • ff • r divers Religions to be publiq • ely mai • tained, or men of different Religion, from that which is maintained, to have any power to work a charg.

Shew me by what Divine power, Magiſtrates can enforce contentious men to conformity, in the publique exerciſe of Religion?

You now put me to it in deed; but I will not now take it upon me to reſolve you in ſuch a point; our onely diſ • ourſe now is, what the greateſt Politit • a • s hold for the ſuppa • tation of a Weal • -publick o • State.

I may not then pin my faith, on what you relate, but I am to take it as the writing of antient State • men, who labor to uphold that Government, they have ſet up, or have lived under, I pray then go on, and ſhew me what Nations have b • en moſt ſtrict in enforcing men to outward conſormity?

The Spaniard is the moſt obſervant of this, of all Nations, m • i • taini • g an Inquiſition, not only to cenſure dict • & facta, of any that ſe • m to differ from th •• , but to ſearch th • very •••• g • ts of 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 by any m • ans th • y ſ • ſp • ct different.

Are the Turks ſo •••• re, to thoſe 〈◊〉 live with in their Territorie • ?

No • . The T • rks ••• ſo • ver 〈◊〉 inquir • into no man, ••• rly for Religio • , if he do not ſcandalize theirs yet they ſuffer neither Chriſtians, nor Iews, nor any • pp • ſi • s to their Religion, to have either Ar • or or A • thority.

Did the Ancient Romans make Warre for Religion?

The old Romans in their m • nif • ld Conqueſts, never pretended occaſion of quarr • ll, by difference of Religion: but either revenge of wrong offered to their Citizens, or to their State, or elſe the roleeving of their Confederates oppreſſed, or maintaining of their weak Neighbours.

Did the Roma • s regard the Religion of their Enemies?

The Religion of ••• ir Enemies, they had of it rever • nd eſteem; how ſoever they ſtrictly obſerved Patri • s Rit • s, yet they often brought home Peregrinos Deos. and in the beſieging of Cities, they had many Ceremonics and expiations, ad evocandum tutelares loci Deos,to ſhew they ſought not against their Gods, but d • ſired they would not ſuccour their people, and ſo ſhould be reverenced in the Roman Territory.

After the Roman Empire was grown to the height, and could not ſuſtaine their own greatneſſe, and the Civill weeds ſprang, all thoſe Rites were omitted or forgotten. Ambition openly profeſſed, that it fought Pro imperio, neither was there any cauſe pretended between the Concurre • ces, but the getting of the Empire. On th • ſe termes the world paſſed untill Mahomet deviſed a new and ſtrange Religion in the Eaſt parts, which ſet the world in a mighty difference, laying two grounds to encourage his followers, the firſt, that whoſoever dyed in War againſt the Chriſtians or other Enemies to the Mahometan Law, did inſtantly paſſe to all pleaſure and delights in Paradiſe. The ſ • cond that death was ſo neceſſarily ordained to men, that n • violence would end a man befo • e his time, nor wearineſſe avoid it at the time. Of this Mahomet the Saracens firſt, and after them the Turks a mightie people borrowed their Religion. Of him ther Haman family l • arned to cover the fier of Ambition, wish t • e Aſhes of Religion, and under pretence to propogate it, to perſwade their followers both to fight and • o dye reſolutely?

I partly beleeve that the Pope and his Pred • c • ſſors have hitherto walked by the Mahometan Rule you laſt diſcourſed of.

The Papa •• , in th • generall, have very much followed this courſe or rule, as you call it; concealing all their privat revenges and ambitions deſires, under the pretence of the Catholick cauſe: And that with that confident perſwaſion and c • edulity of heir fellowes, that many of the Pap • ſticall Souldiers, if he hath a Cro •• e o • his back, and the Papiſticall benediction over his head, think that either they are not of danger in earth, orif they dye, they have a preſent paſſage to Heaven, at leaſt ſhall paſſe through Pur • gatory, and ſo eſcape Hell.

In this point there is great difference betwix • the preſent and anci • nt Romans, • hat the ol • Romans had a reverend opinion of the Religion of all Countries, though different from them, and would never ſuff • r any deſpight or wrong to be ſh • w • d to the Conq •• r • d under that name of R • ligion, which is not in perticular mens power to take or leave as they liſt.

The preſent Papiſts m • ke their decrees, the R • les of all truth in Religion, and thoſe that are different, th • y curſe, and miſ • hiefe by all m • ans th • y can invent, accounting them Atheiſts, Miſcreants, and Hereticks &c. which violent proceeding hath enforced the like vehemency in the oppoſites to judge of him and his, in like ſort, which hath been the ſole cauſe of the great diſtraction in Chriſtendome, and laid it ſo open to the Mahometans.

There is no miſchiefe that works ſo dangerouſly as that which is carryed with a Colour of Religion. Simulata ſa • ctitas duplex iniqu • tas. For that nothi • g can carry a multitude ſo forci • ly, as blind z •• l and ſuperſtition in any cauſe undertaken. In times paſt, Sortorius a Roman, raiſed Portugall, and the better part of Spaine, defeated the Roman Armies, wo • king credit with his followers by pretendi •• confer • nce with Diana, by means of a White hart. Mahomet by his Dove and Bull of late times, the Seriff • in Africa under a pretended Holineſſe, gate firſt his ſtrength, by which • e turned the lawfull Prince out of the State and ſetled himſelfe and his. John of Leyden at one time, and Muncerus at another time, raiſed thoſe great Tum • lts in Germany.

Sir, in your deſcription of Government, I remember you told me that order was maintained or ſupported by thoſe three things, Religion, Law, and Magiſtrater, you have given me ample ſatisfaction concerning Religion. I deſire you would now diſcover to me what Law is?

Lawes are certaine Rules written, or cuſtoms continued, by which the right of perſons, actions, or things are determined.

D • e all N •• ions • gree in their Lawes?

Noe.

How then a • their Lawes to be diſcerned or known?

There are two Rules by which the Lawes and Cuſtom • s of Countries are to be diſcerned.

1. By the Law of Nature, ſpoken of before, by that light, by which we kno what is right or wrong, either in doing or ſuffering. Altrine facias, quod tibi factum nolis; in this all good eſtates agree, in the ſubſtance, framing their poſitive Lawes againſt Atheiſme, Murther, Adultery, Theft, &c. Things in the light of Nature Condemned. Nations alſo differ in the puniſhment and means of reſtraining which is not in Nature defined. If any Law in a State be made againſt this of Nature, it muſt needs be inconvenient as implicating a contradiction in the Government to other Lawes. For that the whole Law of nature, is moſt agreeable, and conformable, in all the ſeverall parts unto it ſelfe.

2. The ſecond Rule by which the Law of Nations are diſcerned; is, by the Suppoſition of the State, that is; by comparing the Law or Cuſtom, with the maine government in Practiſe, for if a Law be made which holds not on ſcope with th • preſent Government eſtabliſh • d, it muſt needs breed variance and diſcord, and in the end ſome occaſion for one party to aſſaile the other. As it muſt needs happen to a Monarchy, if the people get any power to deale in the State; but moſt commonly in a popular State; if either they continue their great Offices for too long a time, or yeild too great authority, • y Decree, • o any one man. Sylla firſt, and afterwards Caeſar gate the whole ſtate into their hands, by the name of perpetuall Dictators. Auguſtus, • y a more populer name, Tribune of the people.

By this I underſtand, that its a dangerous thing, ſuddenly to alter a ſtanding Law, or cuſtome of a Nation or State; for you ſay that divers diſtractions and broyles do enſue thereupon?

Auntient Lawes and cuſtomes, are not to be ſuddenly changed, though they be but of ſmall importance. Plato thinks that the change of M • ſick ought not to be ſuffered, least that ſhould alſo change mens conditions. Amongſt the Thurans whoſoever attempted a new. Law, must perſwade it with a Halt • r about his neck, with which he was to be • anged, if he failed in ſhewing the neceſſity of it.

New Lawes are ſeldome • eceived with intire conſint, and hardly obſerved at the firſt, if there be not great neceſſity; which neceſſity ſeldom appeareth, but with hazard, • hich may breed much danger before the L • w be eſtabliſhed.

What you have allready ſpoken concerning Law ſufficeth, I ſhall now intreat you, for my more cleare and diſtinct apprehenſion, to reſolve Magiſtracy into the ſeverall heads and branches thereof?

Magiſtracy, is a power in men which boldeth all in obedience to Religion and Law.

You are againe harping on your old ſtring, the power of Magiſtrates in matters of Religion, but I beleeve you will not now reſolve me, in regard you have denyed me formerly?

I told you before, and I tell you againe, I cannot now reſolve you, becauſe it is a matter of great conſequence, and the greateſt Schollers are (if I may ſo ſay) to their Ne plus ultra, concerning this thing, but I ſhall • re long take ſome opportunity to give you my thoughts herein, I will let it paſſe now and proceed to the matter in hand, relating to Magiſtrates.

What are the generall Suppoſitions holden by the wiſeſt Magiſtrates?

1. To prevent all inconveniences, in the beginning, and not to think thoſe things which ſeverally to the vulger ſort ſeeme little, to be little., being joyned together. Inſenſible vapors, do breed horrible Tempeſts, and ſmall grains great heaps.

2. In avoiding inconveniences, to have ſpeciall regard to the manner of avoyding them. In making their people obedient a • d quiet, not to ſuffer them ſo to forget Armes that they may be a prey, to their forraigne Enemies, in making themſelves ſtrong againſt the Enemies, carefully to provide againſt diſobedience and muti • ing, which often happeneth amongſt Military people.

3. Not to ſuffer any one part, how good ſo ever in ſhew, to attaine an overſwaying power, or dependance, which cannot be brought and holden in order, and obedience, if oppoſition ſhould happen, occaſio facit ambitioſis. And mens powers are more certainly ruled, then their wills.

4. To diſtinguiſh warily offences and good deſerts, rewards and puniſhments, that neither great deſerts may breed Inſolency, or hope of impunity for future offences, nor • ff • nces take away all hope of reward for future vertues.

5. Eſpecially to have men from their beginnings, to be brought up to the Common-wealth in which they live. Legum optimarum nulla est utilitas niſi ſint, qui ad Rempub. informentur.

6. It is impoſible, in civill caſes, ſubject to ſuch variety of times and other circumſtances, alwayes to finde out optimam ex bonis: It is often times enough to take that which is mimimum ex malis &c. In thoſe paſſages there is not reſpect alwayes to be had to the greater part, nor yet to the better part, but to the whole State intirely conſidered: Pars quicquid est totius eſt.

I conceive thoſe ſix foregoing ſuppoſitions or Rules are peculiarly incident to the ſupreame M • giſtrate, but how ought a ſubordinate Magiſtrate to be qualified?

Three things are to be conſidered chiefly in a ſubordinate Magiſtrate:

1. That they do affectionatly love the State eſtabliſhed.

2. That they have ſufficient power to execute that which is required by their Office.

3. That their parts be anſwerable to that charge which they undertake, in the Common-wealth. Viz. Valour and Bounty fit for a Souldier, Wiſdome and Juſtice for a Judge, Frugality and honeſty, for an Officer of account.

What are the accidentall differences of States?

They are two.

1. Good, Bad.

2. Weak, Strong.

How or in what reſpects are Common-wealths ſaid to be Good or bad?

Three wayes.

1. In reſpect of their good or bad Lawes, ſo the Lacedemonian Reſpublick, was thought wanting, which by Lawes permitted Theft, and Adultery.

2. In reſpect of Good or Bad Magiſtrates, ſo the Lacedemonian Reſpublike was holden the beſt, in that the Magiſtrates moſt ſtrictly obſerved the Lawes and Cuſtomes of their Countrey, and the ſuppoſition of their State, which was Ariſtocraticall, and Military.

3. In reſpect of both, as all good Common-wealths, whoſe Lawes agree with the Law of Nature, and the Magiſtrates acting according to the Lawes

Is the Law, alwayes to be executed according to the letter of I?

No. fo it is neither ſafe that Law alone ſhould rule which can not diſtinguiſh of times, occaſions, nor actions. Neither is it ſafe that Magiſtrates ſhould rule alone Without Law, for men are ſo ſubiect to hatred love, fcare, paſſion reward &c. It is beſt where both have their place, for that Law directeth beſt actions; but diſcretion and true iudgement beſt diſtinguiſheth circumſtances.

How ſhall a man diſcerne the ſtrength of a State?

By obſerving theſe three things.

1. Whether it be ſtrong in the frame it ſelfe of preſent Government, ſo if Monarchy is held more ſtrong, and in leſſe hazard of diſtraction and diviſion then a popular ſtate.

2. Whether it be ſtrong by continuance of time, having long holden on forme, ſo New Principalities are weak, as wanting time to confirme them; Auncient Principalities are ſtrong, where the peopl have been inured to reverence and obedince, Monarchy could not have been taken from the Aſſyrians, if Sardanapalus had not been a beaſt, nor from the blood of the Ceſars, if Nero had not been rather a Monſter then a Man.

3. Whether it be ſtrong only by vertue, Wiſdome, and Valour • of them, which are in preſent Authority. So only New Principalities have ſtrength by them which raiſe them, Such was the Greſian Monarchy, which appeared in the world, and vaniſhed againe like lightning; the ſtrength whereof wholy conſiſted in Alexander, and with his death periſhed.

What are the reall differences of Common-wealths, and from whence have States their Denomination?

The reall difference of Common-wealths are taken from the different order in commanding and obeying; the Name of every State is given according to the Supreame and highest Authority.

Wherein is the Supreame Authority manifeſted?

In theſe foure things.

1. Poteſtas belli et pacis.

2. Poteſtas vitae & Necis.

3. Po. faciendar. • egum.

4. Po. Creandor. magiſtrat.

By theſe foure powers, States are determined in themſelves, and diſtinguiſhed one from another.

In whom thoſe four powers, or moſt of them do reſt, whether in one, ſome few, or in many, in them is the ſupreame Authority, and they give the Name to the State. If they be abſolute in any, the ſtate of them is called an abfolute Monarchy, or Ariſtocraty &c. If they be partly in ſome, and partly in others, then the State is ſaid to be a mixt Common-wealth.

According as theſe powers are diverſly ſetled, ſo States are really diſtinguiſhed.

If thoſe powers be in one perſon, well uſed, to the good of the people under him, the State is called A Monarchy.

If in the perſon of one, abuſed, to the profit only of that one, and of his who hath the Authority in his hands, its called

A Tyranny.

If in ſome few, well uſed to the common ſafety it is called,

An Ariſtocraty.

If in ſome few abuſed, to the profit and pleaſure of ſome few.

Which of theſe Governments do you eſteem the beſt?

Heretofore moſt Hiſtorians were of the iudgement that regulated Monarchy, was the beſt, but the State of England, as now it ſtands, admits not ſuch weak iudgements as mine to diſtinguiſh.

SIR, I ſee you are ſilent in your thoughts, I pray tell me what you account the worſt.

The worſt State is a Tyranny, as being oppoſite to the beſt, Bonum & malum in ſuo genere maxime diſtant.

I have heard of an Anarchy, I pray what government is that?

Anarchy is no State, but a confuſion of all order, much worſe then the worſt Tyranny, whi • h well appeared at Rome, after the death of Nero, when all men did what they liſt, which cauſed an honourable Senator to ſay, that if that miſorder ſhould continue, they ſhould have occaſion to wiſh for Nero againe. It is better living where nothing, then where all things are lawfull.

I remember you told me, that if the forementioned powers were in one perſon, it was an abſolute Mon • rchy; by which I conceive there are ſeverall kinds of Monarchies?

A Monarchy is the government of one to the preſervation of all, But Monarchies are of two ſorts.

1. Abſolute where the chi • f doth rule all cauſes by his abſolute Authority, not any way determined by Law, and the • e are good, ſo farre as the Authority is well uſed, and the cheif doth hold it, Salus populi ſuprema L • x▪ For government was before poſitive Lawes, and in Nature, there is abſolute priority and power of the Father over his Children.

2. Limited, and that three manner of wayes.

1. By Lawes a lore, where the Subject may have lawfull audience, and he • p in Law, for holding, or recovering his right againſt the Prince.

2. By Overſeers alone, where there be Officers of Sta • e, which may demand • enſon, wh • n the cheif ſtretcheth his power • o the d • triment of the Subject, ſuch have been the Electors in Germany.

3. By Lawes and Overſeers, as in times paſt in France. when the twelve peeres held their places, and their Parliaments had their full power for the proceſſe of Lawes.

Juſt Principalities are generally maintained by hould • ng the favour and love of the Subject.

Imperium eſt in voluntate obſequentium.

Wh • t meanes is a Governour to uſe to gaine the love and affection of his people; and being gained; how is it to be kept, and preſerved?

The peoples love is houlden by theſe meanes.

1. By being Religious, towards God, for that men will never ſ • ek, nor deſire the overthrow of them, whom they are perſwaded to be gua • ded with divine pro • ection.

2. By ſhewing Care of the pulike ſafe ty not of privat gaine, men doe moſt willingly contribute, when they are perſwaded that money is either imployed or reſerved for publick benefit.

3. By building publick works, and releiving publick misfortunes.

4. By beſtowing honours and rewards upon men of great worth by deſerts.

5. By referring all matters of Juſtice and puniſhment to their offences, never ſhewing contentment in the ſhame or miſery of any.

6. Generally, by bounty, magnanimity, and all honourable and vertuous actions.

Tyranny you ſay is the worſt of governments, I ſhall earneſtly deſire, you would branch it forth, into its ſeverall parts, by which I may perceive the iniquity of it.

Tyranny is the government of one man according to his own will, and reſpecting only his owne profit, Tyrants have uſed two wayes to ſupport and uphold their Tyranny.

1. By taking away all deſire and knowledge of altering their government, which is thus done. Firſt by working puſillanimity. Ignorance, and diſtruſt in the people; which is acted five manner of wayes.

1. By taking away all Schooles, and diſcipline; by which men might underſtand what is right or wrong; A thing practiſed by the Turks &c.

2. By taking away all ſocieties and fraternities, by which they might be acquainted one with another.

3. By placing Guards in the ſtrongeſt places, by which they might ſuppreſſe any ſudden attempt.

4. By placeing privy ſpies to entrap ſuch as talk of State matters, and ſo make all jealous of one another.

5. By often making ſhew of forraigne forces, which may be feard to be ready if any need require.

2. By taking a way all power from the people, which is thus wrought:

1. By baniſhing or putting to death, or ſhutting up in Priſon the men of account and their ofspring, that no male contents may know where to finde a leader that the people would follow; the houſe of Bela took this courſe in the Moſcovite State, It was Perianders Counſell to Thraſibulu • ; the houſe of Ottimau is ſo jealous, that the Grandſenior never thinks his Eſtate ſure, before he hath cut of his Brethren.

2. By utterly impoveriſhing their Su • jects by exactions. Dionyſius in 5 years gatt all the treaſury of Sicily into his hands.

3. By maintaining diſſcention between the great men and the Commons, or of the greater men between themſelves, taking part with neither, that they may know and uſe the griefes and wants of all.

4. By not ſuffering the great men to live at home, but attend there, where the higher power do obſcure them, or if they be imployed to keep their Children as Hoſtages, ſo uſeth the Magnus Mogor in Aſia.

5. To commit no truſt to the Natives, or men of great blood or kindred, but to E • naches or ſtrangers, ſuch as can not be popular, nor hold place, but by their Tyranny, ſuch are the Turkiſh Baſſaes.

6. To ſuffer no m • n to be • re Armes, but their ſworn Souldiers, to give Lands only to ſuch, the inheritance depending ſtill at their proper diſpoſition, the Moſcoveticall and Turkiſh practiſe, the one to his Gen • le • en, the other to his Timario • s; All other are ſlaves to them, as they are to their cheif Lord.

By what properties ſhall I know a King from a Tyrant?

Theſe four differen • es will diſtinguiſh them.

1. Kings were firſt choſen out of the beſt, and by the beſt, to guard them, and to rule the raſh multitude.

Tyrants had their beginning ex Demagogis; ſuch as flattered the people, and ſtirred them up againſt the worthyeſt perſons, and ſo under ſhew of protecting of them, made away, all ſuch as might with ſtand them, Piſiſtratus at Athens, Dionyſius at Syracuſe.

2. The ſecond ſcope of a King is vertue and honour.

The ſcope of a Tyrant, profit and pleaſure.

3. A King is the protector of all, Rich, and poore, that on neither doth, nor ſuffereth wrong of the other.

A Tyrant only regardeth the profit and ſecurity of him ſelf, and his leaving others open to al wrongs.

4. The truſt of a King is in his Subjects, and of them he maketh his Guard.

The truſt of a Tyrant is only in ſtrangers, and to them he commits his ſafety.

How are Principalities overthrown?

Two Wayes.

1. By forraign power, when one ſtate aſſayleth and overthroweth another, the conquered receiveth ſuch government as the Conqueror thinketh meet, ſo the Romans ov • rthrew many Kingdoms, and turned them into principalities; to be governed by their Lif • tennants.

2. By Domeſtic • ll ſeditions, which are commonly raiſed by th • ſe occaſions, in number Six.

1. By the Iuſtice of the Rulers.

1. In Injuries towards th • ir perſons, which is acted two manner of wayes.

1. In murthering, and raviſhing their Kinsfolks. As the T • rquin • s at Rome.

2 In bea • ing like ſl • ves men of account.

2. In oppreſſing with exactions, ſo far that by • xtream poverty, ſubjects grow deſperat, havi • g nothing to lo • e, but th • ir If • , whereof want hath made them weary.

2 By contempt of th • m.

1 For their folly, and incapacity of ſtate.

2 For eſſeminate manners, as Sard • n • palus.

3 For Drunkenn • ſſe, as C • mbiſis and Dioniſius Junior.

3 By feare of death or diſgrace in the ſubject.

1 Either through knowledge or ſuſpicion of anger conceived in the Cheif himſelf.

2 Or fe • re of ſland • r from them which are about him in Authority.

4 By hope of profit and w • al • h, which moveth ſpecially baſe Rebells, which pretend a community of all.

5 By Amb • tion or deſire of Honour, the moſt dangerous motive, for that it poſſeſſeth only great ſpirits, which are of reſolution, to their • utmoſt power, As S • aev • la which a • t • mpted upon King Po ſ • nna, and t • e Confed • rats that ſlew Caeſar in the Senat.

6 By deſire of change in Religion, which hath only moved men in theſe latter times, being never made a pretence or motiv, f • r either forraign Conqueſts, or Dom •••• call ſ • ditions, before Mabomet. Pa •• t ſupra.

You formerly told me, that Ariſtocraty was the power of Ruling in ſome few, well u • e • , to the Common ſefety: I pray acquaint me of what ſort of • he people they • re or ought to b • ?

Ariſtocraty, is a gou •• n • e • t of the beſt, for the ſafe • y of all, but there ar • three kinds.

1. The firſt, where • reſpect is had, to both wealth, and vertue, in the cheif of all Officers.

2 The ſecond where reſpect is only had of wealth, this inclyneth to an Oligarchy.

3 The third, where reſpect is only had of virtue, leaving it free to all, to make way to the cheif places, this inclineth to a Democr • ty.

Theſe Nine Maximes • ave bee • e held and practiſ • d.

1 Compelling the Nobility to bring up their Children in feats of Armes, and politick Diſcipline, ſuffering the r • ſt to do as they liſt.

So the La • edemonians brought up all their Children in publick places, together, where they learned exerciſe of Armes and knowledge of government.

2 Conſtraining the Nobility upon great penalty, to be preſent at their publick Aſſemblies, ſuffering the reſt to attend their profit and buſineſſe.

3 Receiving the Citizens into their ſp • ciall patro • ages, that in Popular quarrells, every man ſeverally might pacifie his Clyents, or followers, this was often practiſed by the S • nators of Rome, to uphold their State.

4 Suffering none to continue in the greateſt Offices for long time, that he might procure too many dependents, or weak • n his oppoſites.

5 Giving noe man that honour whch others might not hope to obtain.

6 Imploying them which were too great, in forraign buſineſſe, that abſence might make them forgotten.

7 Keeping Offices of Honour, wholly amongſt the Nobility, leaving them of petty matters and gain to the people.

8 Suppreſſing the firſt occaſions of quarrells amongſt the greateſt men, To that end to hold friendly meetings in places indifferent, where pacifications may be made.

9. Holding the people in fehre of publick dangers, to make an enemy if there were none, by that means, to draw from home ſuch as were mutinous: A thing much practiſed by the Roman Senate, while their power held.

You have decla • ed nine M • xims or Sophims, that are the props of a • Ariſtocraticall State, but by wha • means is that government overthrown and changed?

Three things alter and • hange an A • iſtoc • aty.

1. The Sedition of the great men, when their numbers do ſo increaſe, that the Honours to be devided, are not enough to ſatisfie their Number, th • Lacedemonian, for remedy of this, ſent the Parthen • an • into Italy which built Tarentum.

2 The Tranſgreſſion of that ſuppoſition in not making vertuea mean between the we • lth of the great men, and liberty of the people; yeelding too much to th • peoples liberty, makes the State Democraticall, but wholy to wealth Oligarchicall.

3 Negligence in ſmall matters, ſuffering inferior Officers to be perpetuall, which after giveth example and occaſion that the greateſt likewiſe ſhould be • o.

By this it is evident to me that Ariſtocraty may be turned into a State Democraticall or Oligarchycall: my requeſt is, that you would more fully ſhew me what Oligarchy is, and wherein it differeth from the State laſt mentioned?

Oligarchy is a Government of ſome few to their owne profii; and it may be branched forth into 4. kinds.

1 Whereall che • fe Officers, are ch • ſen only by valuation of wealth and poſſeſſions.

2 Where men of middle wealth, are admitted to Offices, but the preceedent Magiſtrate c • uſeth his ſucceſſor.

3 Where, the Magiſtrates ſucceed, as in In • eritances, The Son in his Fathers place.

4 Where all power is in ſome few, which rule above Law as they liſt, and this is like the worſt kinde of Democraty.

How is this Rule of Government kept from fall or • uine?

The Fabrick of this government is preſerved from fall or ruine, by thoſe Axioms or Sophiſmes, as Sir Walter Rawleigh calls them, in his Book, called the Prince of State, which are theſe.

1 By ſuffering no Elections, to paſſe either by Lo • or by Common ſuffrages, but by a ſ • t number.

2 By ſuffering no choice to be made, but out of certaine, which likewiſe had ſuch a valuation of goods.

3 By making their Officers perpetuall or of long continuance.

4 By maintaining great Troopes of Horſe, impoſed on them in Authority, which make a Terrible ſhew, and can not be maintained but with great wealth ſo did the Eretrians and C • alcedonians. But Ariſtrocratyes and Democratyes have rather maintained • foo • -men for their Souldiers. As the Lacedemonians, the Romans, and at this day the Swiſſers.

5 By keeping the people poore and without Armes, that they might neither know how to arme themſelves, or give pay to them which ſhould take Armes in their behalfe.

6 By raiſing many Warres, or rumors of Warres; Common people are eaſily awed in publique dangers.

7 By making Marriages only with themſelves, where Marriages are Communicated, the greater ſort is leſſe eſteemed.

8 By providing means of employment in Warres, or Colonyes, when their Iſſue groweth too great, and all can not be in honour.

I conceive thoſe political Fabricks are deſtroyed, and brought to nought, by fewer means and wayes: they are upheld like a houſe built by many hands, yet one man or two can pluck it downe. My requeſt • ow is, that you would ſhew and unf • ld unto me the occaſions of Oligarchyes fall?

Oligar • hies are overthrowne three • ayes

1 By them that are not in Authority. As at Heraclea and Maſſilia, where th • younger Brethr • n roſe againſt the Elder, for that they were excluded from the Common-wealth.

2 By them in Authority, theſe five wayes.

1 Either by reaſon of the ſmal number, the Father and Son, or two Brethren can not be in Offi •••• gether.

2 When the few in place would yet have fewer.

3 When the • ew having Luxuriouſly ſpent their goods and Eſtates, ſeek to ſpoile the Common Treaſury.

4 When of thoſe few which Rule, all can not come to the Chei • eſt place.

5 When they in Authority by any occaſion fall at diſſention and aſſayle onn another, the weaker fetching in the people for his Guard, maketh either a Tyrany or a Democraty.

3 By Accident two wayes.

1 In time of Warre through diſtruſt in the people, thoſe few enforced to hire forraig • e Souldiers, which committed to one that is populer, with them makes himſelfe Lord of all.

2 In time of peace, whe • the people and thoſe few being at v • riance, commit themſelves to a third, which oppreſſeth them both.

I remember in your d • ſcription of States, you mention a two fold D • mocraty; I requeſt your patience to unfold to me the particulars thereof, and what difference hath been uſed in their Election of cheif • Officer • .

A Democr • ty, is a Government of all, to • he good of all, or elſe A government of a multitude which are the greater part of the State, to that end they propou • d to themſelves, and this is called a bad Democraty, and of neere kin to Tyranny.

As concerning their choice of State Officers, they had divers faſhio • s of Liberties.

1 In ſome; all might be capable of the higheſt Offices, and all had voices in the Choice.

2 In others; all had ſuffrages, but yet they made their choice by certaine eſtimation of wealth.

3 In ſome all might be Rulers, Ita ut Lex dominetur.

In others all might rule. Ita • t Populus dominetur.

In my Judgement, thoſe popular States, that are not governed by the Rule or Square of Law, can have no ſtrength, neither can their baſis be well fixed.

A popular State, hath n • ither ſtrength nor goodneſſe in th • frame it ſelfe; beſides it is ſubiect to ſuch daily factio • s and diſſention, and mak • ing way for every impudent flatterer to grow mighty, by fawning • n people, and ſlandering them whoſe good vertues and fortunes for their greatneſſe might be occaſion of envy.

How then is it ſupported, if it want ſtrength and goodneſſe?

The ſtrength of it only conſiſteth in the g • odneſſ • , morall vertues and civill parts of their Citizens, • nd according to the divers ſorts of people popular States doe differ.

1 The moſt ancient is of Husbandmen ſuppoſed the b • ſt, becauſe their life being laborion, and full of buſineſſe, they have leaſt leiſure to mutiny from their private cares. So the Medians are re • o • ted to have lived before Deiocius alte 〈…〉 government. 〈…〉 •• cond of Shephards much like 〈…〉 for their kind of life. 〈…〉 third of Artiſans and Merchants 〈…〉 muſt needs be full of innova 〈…〉 roug • their continuall whiſperi • g 〈◊〉 private devices at their meeti ••• .

4 〈◊〉 other is a mixture of all thoſe kinds 〈◊〉 . Ari • totle condemneth utterly 〈…〉 ; and yet wee read not of any of 〈◊〉 firſt, any thing memorabl • The Ath •• ians admitted of all ſorts to the choice 〈◊〉 Magiſtrates, the making L • wes, and to 〈◊〉 great cenſure, when they baniſhed 〈◊〉 by Oſtraciſme.

So did the Romans in the latter times howſo • ver the • uncient did hold it a ſufficient commendation to be commended. As Bonus C • lon • s & ſtrenuus miles.

What baniſhment was that Oſtraciſme, and • or what time, and what the Tranſgreſſion tha • made men liable thereunto?

It was a kinde of baniſhment uſed • amongſt the Athenians, and th • party exiled was to remaine ten yeares in Exile, which was thus executed; by delivering Shells, with the names of the perſons cond • mned written therein; It was uſed not ſo much to p • niſh other Offences, as to abat • the immoderate power of the Noblemen.

What are the pretexts of a popular State, and what meanes doe they uſe to maintaine the ſame?

The ſuppoſition of a popular State pretendeth two things, which in themſelves are plaufible.

1 Equality.

2 Liberty.

The means of maintaining their ſuppoſition have beene theſe ſeaven.

1 By chooſing all Magiſtrates by th • voices of all, and out of all. Ne quis ſit excluſus á Republica.

2 By giving no power to any Magiſtrate, to put any to death, though condemned by Law, if they appealed to the people. Vt libera ſit pr • vocatio ad Populum, abſ • luta Poteſtas in Populo.

3 By cauſing all to know the uſe of Armes, that they neither ſhould feare Forraigne forces or powers, nor one pa • tie to ſtand in awe of another.

4 By ſuffering no man to contin • e long in Office, and to be called to an account, his Office being ended and expired.

5 By diminiſhing the power of them which were growne to great by what meanes ſoever. As the Athenians uſed their Oſtraciſmus, The Syracnſans their Petaliſmus, the parties name written in Olive leaves, upon which he was to be exiled.

6 The more ſimple, otherwiſe. If hee can but underſtand their Lawes, and cuſtomes to ſee execution on Offendors, the fitter and ſaf • r for a popular Eſtate. In ſome Democraties the chiefe Officer hath beene tied to ſuch kindes as are mechanicall.

7 By compelling all to be at Aſſemblies, eſpecially the m • aner ſort, who in ſome popularities have been invited by rewards.

Sir, I have exerciſed your patience long, and I feare I am to bold with you; but your freeneſſe of diſcourſe hitherto, encourageth me to demand, or requeſt ſome other few reſolutions before your departure.

How are Democraticall States alterd?

D • mocraties are •• a • ged into Oligarchyes, by the banding of them, in great favour with the people; if they can agr • e betweene themſelves: if they diſagree, the one aſſ •• yling the other, the conq • eror rayſe a Monar • hy.

The Popular State of Rome, by the conf • d • racy of Craſ • us, Pompy, and Caeſar, proved in effect Oligarchicall, All things being act • d as they would have them.

Aft • r Craſſus death, Pompy and Caeſar falling at variance, on • aſſayling the other, the Conqueror drew the whole State to himſelfe.

After Caeſ • rs deat • it became againe Popular. The •• w Tri • mverate m • d • it Oligarchicall, their diſſ • nti •• , Mon • rchicall ag • in • .

What things are thoſe, without which, neither of thoſe forementioned States can be ſupported, or continue without ruine.

Ariſtotle ſayeth, Sex ſunt quae dicuntur neceſſaria Alimenta, Artificia, Arma, Pecunia, S • cra, Jndici • . Moreover • lſe where he ſaieth. Quin • ue ſunt • rcana quae in poteſtate ſuperioris M • giſtratus reſervare ſolent Reſp. Ther • for • it behoveth the Supreame p ••• r of •• y State, to h • ve a ſpecia •• ca •• , that thoſe fix thi • gs be duly • ad inreg • rd, and according to the reſpective qualiti • s and numb • r of their Subiects.