QUEST. I. In what sense Government is from God?

I Reduce all that I am to speak of the power of Kings, to the Author or efficient. 2. The matter or subject. 3. The form or power. 4. The end and fruit of their Government; And 5. to some cases of resistance. Henc;

Quest. I. Whether Government be warranted by a divine Law?

The question is, either of Government in generall, or of the par­ticular species of Government; such as are Government by one on­ly, called Monarchy; the Government by some chief leading men, named Aristocracie; the Government by the people, going under the name of Democracie. 2. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the Office, to wit, Government, and the designa­tion of person, or persons to the Office. 3. What is warranted by the direction of natures light, is warranted by the Law of nature, and consequently by a divine Law; for who can deny the Law of nature to be a divine Law?

That power of Government in generall must be from God: IHow Govern­ment is from God. make good, 1. Because, Rom. 13.—1. there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. 2. God command­eth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers, Rom. 13. 5. Wherefore we must be subject not onely for wrath (or civill punishment) but for conscience sake, 1 Pet. 2. 13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as Supreme, &c.▪ Now God onely by a divine Law can lay a band [Page 2] of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt, and punishment, if they transgr [...]sse.

2. Conclus. All civill power is immediately from God in its root.Civill power in the root im­mediately from God. In that, 1. God hath made man a sociall creature, and one who in­clineth to be governed by man; then certainly he must have put this power in mans nature: so are we by good reason taught by Aristot. po­lit. l. 1. c. 2. Aristotle.

2. God and nature intendeth the policie and peace of mankinde, then must God and nature have given to mankinde, a power to com­passe this end; and this must be a power of Government. I see not then why John Prelate, Master Maxwel the excommunicate P. of Rosse, who speaketh in the name Sacro sanc. reg. majestas, c. 1. p. 1. of I. A [...]magh, had reason to say, That he feared that we fancied, that the Government of Superiours was onely for the more perfit, but have no Authoritie over or above the perfit, Nec Rex, nec Lex, justo posita. He might have imputed this to the Brasilians, who teach, That every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as Molina to. [...]. de justit. disp. 22. Molina saith.

QUEST. II. Whether or not, Government be warranted by the Law of nature.

AS domestick societie is by natures instinct, so is civill societie naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary, in modo, in the manner of coalescing. Politick power of Government, agreeth not to man, singly, as one man, except in that root of reasonable nature; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a societie, it is naturall, that they joyn in a civill so­cietie, though the manner of Union in a politick body; as Bodin. de rep. l. 1. c. 6. Bo­dine saith, be voluntary, Gen. 10. 10. Gen. 15. 7. and Suarez to. 1. delegib. l. 3. c. 3. Suarez saith, That a power of making Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequentia ad formam, Not by any speciall action or grant, different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politick body: which Union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will,

We are to distinguish betwixt a power of Government, and aCivill societie [...]ow naturall. power of Government by Magistracy. That we defend our selves from violence by violence, is a consequent of unbroken and sin-lesse nature; but that we defend our selves by devolving our power over in the hands of one, or more Rulers, seemeth rather positively morall, then naturall, except that it is naturall for the childe to ex­pect [Page 3] help against violence, from his father: For which cause IPower of Go­vernment, and of Govern­ment by Magi­strates diffe­rent. judge that learned Senator Vasquez il­lust. quaest. l. 1. c. 41. num. 28, 29. Ferdinandus Vasquius said well, That Princedom, Empire, Kingdom, or Iurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secundary law of Nations, and not from the law of pure Nature. L. 2. in princ. F. de inst. & jur. & in princ. Inst. Cod. tit. c. jus nat. 1. disp. The Law saith, there is no law of Nature agree­ing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason in Na­ture, hath a Boar dominion over a Boar, a Lyon over a Lyon, a Dragon over a Dragon, a Bull over a Bull: And if all Men be born equally free (as I hope to prove) there is no reason in Nature, why one Man should be King and Lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the forecasten Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of Man over Man, to be as it were Artificiall and Po­sitive, and that it inferreth some servitude, whereof Nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to pa­rents, and the wife to the husband; and the Dominium est jus quoddam. l. sin. ad med. C. de long. temp. prest. l. qui u­sum fert. Civil subjecti­on formally not natures Law. Law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. 2. This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their Bre­thren to be Kings, and Captains of the Lords people, is ascribed, not to Nature, (for King and Beggar spring of one clay-mettall) but to an act of Divine bounty and grace, above Nature, so Psal. 78. 70, 71. He took David from following the Ewes, and made him King and feeder of his people, 1 Sam. 13. 13.

There is no cause why Royallists should deny Government to be naturall, but to be altogether from God, and that the Kingly power is immediatly and only from God; because it is not naturall to us to subject to Government, but against Nature, and against the hair for us to resign our liberty to a King, or any Ruler or Rulers; for this is much for us, and proveth not but Government is naturall; it con­cludeth that a power of Government tali modo, by Magistracy, is not naturall, but this is but a Sophisme; a [...], ad illud quod est dictum [...], this speciall of Government, by resignation of our liberty, is not naturall; Ergo, power of Government is not naturall; it follow­eth not, a negatione speciei non sequitur negatio generis, non est homo, Our consent to Laws not ante­cedently natu­rall. ergo non est animal. And by the same reason I may by an antecedent will, agree to a Magistrate and a Law, that I may be ruled in a poli­tick Society, and by a consequent will onely, yea and conditionally onely agree to the penalty and punishment of the Law; and it is most true, no man by the instinct of Nature giveth consent to Penall Laws as Penall, for Nature doth not teach a man, nor incline his spi­rit to yeeld that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his [Page 4] blood shed, except in this remote ground, a man hath a disposition, that a veine be cutt by the Physitian, or a Member of his body cut off, rather then the whole body and life perish by some con­tagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a naturall dispo­sition is the neerest prevalent cause, and disposer of the businesse▪ When therefore a communitie by natures instinct and guidance, in­cline to Government, and to defend themselves from violence; they do not by that instinct formally agree to Government by Magi­strates; and when a naturall conscience giveth a deliberate consent to good Laws, as to this, He that doth violence to the life of a man, by man shall his blood be shed, Gen. 9. 6. He doth tacitely consent that his own blood shall be shed; but this he consenteth unto consequent­ly, tacitely, and conditionally. If he shall do violence to the life of his brother: Yet so as this consent proceedeth not from a disposition every way purely naturall. I grant, reason may be necessita­ted to assent to the conclusion, being as it were forced by the preva­lent power of the evidence of an insuperable and invincible light in the premises, yet from naturall affections there resulteth an act of self-love, for self-preservation. So David shall condemn another rich man who hath many Lambs, and robbeth his poor brother of his one Lamb, and yet not condemn himself, though he be most deep in that fault, 1 Sam. 12. 5, 6. yet all this doth not hinder, butGovernment by Rulers a se­condary Law of nature. Government even by Rulers hath its ground in a secondary Law of nature, which Lawyers call, secundariò jus naturale, or jus gentium secundarium; a secondary Law of nature, which is granted by Plato, and denied by none of sound judgement in a sound sense, and that is this, Licet vim virepellere, It is lawfull to repeal violence by violence, and this is a speciall act of the Magistrate.

2. But there is no reason, why we may not defend by good rea­sons, that politick Societies, Rulers, Cities, and Incorporations, have their rise and spring from the secundary Law of nature: 1. Be­cause by Natures Law, Family-Government hath its warrant; and Adam though there had never been any positive Law, had a power of governing his own family, and punishing malefactors; but as Ad Tanne­rus, m. 12. tom. 2. disp. 5. de peccatis, q. 5. dub. 1. num. 22. Tannerus saith well, and as I shall prove God willing, this was not properly a Royall or Monarchicall power; and I judge by the reasoning of Sotus 4. de justit. q. 4▪ ar. 1. Sotus, Lod. Moli­na, to. 1. de just. disp. 22. Molina, and Victoria in relect. de potest. civil. q. 4. art. [...]. Family Go­vernment and civil different. Victoria. By what reason a Family hath a power of Government, and of punishing Malefactors, that same power must be in a societie o [...] men, Suppose that soci [...]tie were not made up of Families, but of single persons; [Page 5] for the power of punishing ill-doers doth not reside in one single man of a familie, or in them all, as they are single private persons, but as they are in a familie. But this argument holdeth not but by pro­portion; for paternall government, or a fatherly power of parents o­ver their families, and a politick power of a Magistrate over many families, are powers different in nature, the one being warranted by natures law even in its species, the other being in its spece and kind warranted by a positive law, and in the generall only warranted by a law of nature.

2. If we once lay the supposition, that God hath immediately byCivill govern­ment, by con­sequent, natu­rall. the law of nature appointed there should be a Government; and mediately defined by the dictate of naturall light in a communitie, that there shall be one, or many Rulers to governe the Communitie; then the Scriptures arguments may well be drawn out of the schoolRom. 13. of nature: as, 1. The powers that are, be of God; therefore natures light teacheth, that we should be subject to these powers. 2. It is against natures light to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Not to feare him to whom God hath committed the sword, for the terror of evill doers. 4. Not to honour the publike rewarder of well-doing. 5. Not to pay tribute to him for his worke. Therefore I see not but G [...]rruvi­as, tr. 2. pract. quest. 1. n 2, 3, 4 Go­varruvias, Soto lo [...]. [...]t. Soto, Suarez de Reg. lib. 3. c. 4. n. 1, 2. Suarez, have rightly said, that power of Government is immediately from God, and this or this definite pow­er is mediately from God, proceeding from God by the mediation of the consent of a Communitie, which resigneth their power to one or moe Rulers: and to me Barclaius con. Monarcho­ma, l. 3. c. 2. Barclaius saith the same: quamvis po­pulus potentiae largitor videatur, &c.

QUEST. III. Whether Royall Power and definite forms of Government be from God?

THe King may be said to be from God and his word in these seve­all notions. 1. By way of permission, Ier. 43. 10. Say to them, thus The King from God, un­derstood in a foure [...]old sense. saith the Lord of hoasts the God of Israel, Behold I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon, my servant, and will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royall pavilion over them. And thus God made him a Catholick King, and gave him all Nations to serve him, Jer. 27. 6, 7, 8. though he was but an unjust Tyrant, and his sword the best title to those crownes.

2. The King is said to be from God, by way of naked approba­tion. God giving to a people power to appoint what Government they shall thinke good, but instituting none in speciall, in his Word. This way some make Kingly power to be from God in the generall, [Page 6] but in the particular to be an invention of men, negatively lawfull, and not repugnant to the Word; as the wretched Popish ceremo­nies are from God. But we teach no such thing: let Sacrosan. reg. maj. the sa­cred and royall prerogative of Christian Kings c. 1. q. 1. p. 6, 7. Maxwell free his Master Bellarm. de locis, l. 5. c. 6. not. 5. Politica universè consi­derata est de ju­re divino, in particulari con­siderata est de jure gentium. Bellarmine and other Iesuites, with whom he sideth in Romish Doctrine: we are free of this. Bellarmine saith that politick power in generall is warranted by a Divine law; but the particular formes of politick power, he meaneth Monarchie, with the first, is not by Divine right, but de jure gentium, by the law of nations, and floweth immediately from humane election, as all things, saith he, that appertein to the law of Nations. So Monarchie to Bellar­mine is but an humane invention, as Mr. Maxwell his Surplice is: and D. Ferne, sect. 3. p. 13. saith with Bellarmine.

3. A King is said to be from God, by particular designation, as he appointed Saul by name for the crown of Israel. Of this here­after.

4. The Kingly or Royall office is from God by divine institution Royall power is of divine in­stitution. and not by naked approbation: for first, we may well prove Aarons Priesthood to be of divine institution, because God doth appoint the Priests qualification from his familie, bodily perfections, and his charge. And we take the Pastor to be by divine law and Gods insti­tution, because the Holy Ghost, 1 Tim. 3. 1, 2, 3, 4. describeth his qualification, so may we say that the Royall power is by divine insti­tution, because God mouldeth him, Deut. 17. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren, &c. Rom. 2 13. There is no power but of God, the powers that be, are ordained of God. 3. That power must be ordained of God as his own ordinance, to which we owe subjecti­on, for conscience, and not only for feare of punishment: but every power is such, Rom. 13. 4. To resist the Kingly power, is to resist God. 5. He is the Minister of God for our good. 6. He beareth the sword of God to take vengeance upon ill-doers. 7. The Lord expresly saith, 1 Pet. 2. 17. Feare God, honour the King, v. 13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreme, 14. or unto governours, as unto those that are sent by him, &c. Tit. 3. Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers: and so the fift Commandement layeth obedience to the King on us, no lesse then to our parents. Whence I conceive that power to be of God, to which by the morall law of God, we owe per­petuall subjection and obedience. 8. Kings and all Magistrates are Gods, and Gods deputies and lieutenants upon earth, Ps. 82. 1. 6, 7. [Page 7] Exod. 22. 8. Exod. 4. 16. and therefore their Office must be a law­full ordinance of God. 9. By their Office they are feeders of the Lords people, Ps. 78. 70. 71. 72. the shields of the earth, Ps. 47. 9. nursing fathers of the Church, Ps. 49. 23. Captaines over the Lords people▪ 1 Sam. 9. 19. 10. It is a great Iudgement of God, when a Land wanteth the benefit of such ordinances of God, Esay 3. 1, 2. 3. 6, 7. 11. The execution of their office is an act of the just Lord of heaven and earth, not onely by permission, but according to Gods revealed Will in his Word; their judgement is not the judgement of men, but of the Lord, 2 Chron. 19. 6. and their Throne is the Throne of God, 1 Chron. 19. 21. 12. Hi [...]romy in L. 4. Com­ment. in I [...]rem. Hi [...]rom saith, to punish murtherers and sacrilegious persons is not bloud-shed, but the mini­stery and service of good Lawes. So if the King be a living law by Office, and the law put in execution which God hath commanded, then as the Morall Law is by divine institution, so must the Of­ficer of God be, who is Custos & vindex legis divinae, the keeper, preserver, and avenger of Gods Law, and Basilius Epist. 125. Basilius, this is the Princes Office, Vt opem [...]erat virtuti, malitiam vero impugnet, when Paulinus Treverensis, Lucifer Metropolitane of Sardinia, Dionysius Mediolanensis, and other Bishops, were commanded by Constantine to write against Athanasius, they answered, Regnum non ipsius esse, sed dei, aquo acceperit, the Kingdom was Gods, not his; as Athanasius Epist. ad solita. Athanasius saith: Optat. Me­levitanus. Lib. 3. Optatus Milevitanus helpeth us in the cause where he saith with Paul, VVe are to pray for heathen Kings. The genuine end of the Magistrate saith Epiphanius▪ [...]. 1. tom. 3. He­res. 40. Epiphanius, is ut ad bonum ordinem uni­versitatis mundi omnia ex deo bene disponantur atque administrentur. But some object, if the Kingly Power be of divine institution, then shall any other government be unlawfull and contrary to a divine institution, and so we condemne Aristocracy, and Democracy as un­lawfull. Ans. This consequence were good, if Aristocracy and De­mocracy were not also of divine institution, as all my arguments prove; for I judge they are not Governments different in nature, if we speake Morally and Theologically, onely they differ politically and positively; nor is Aristocracy any thing but diffused and inlarged Monarchy, and Monarchy is nothing but contracted Aristocra­cy, even as it is the same hand, when the thumb and the foure fin­gers are folded together, and when all the five fingers are dilated, and stretched out, and where ever God appointed a King, he never appointed him absolute, and a sole independent Angell, but joyned alwaies with him Iudges, who were no lesse to judge according to [Page 8] the Law of God, 2 Chron. 19. 6. then the King, Deut. 17. v. 15. And in an obligation morall of judging righteously, the conscience of the Monarch, and the conscience of the inferiour Iudges are equal­ly, with an immediate subjection under the King of Kings, for there is here a co-ordination of consciences, and no subordination, for it is not in the power of the inferiour Iudge to judge, Quoad specifica­tionem, as the King commandeth him, because the judgement is neither the Kings, nor any mortall mans, but the Lords, 2 Chro­nicles 19. 6, 7.

Hence all the three formes are from God, but let no man say, if they be all indifferent and equally of God, societies and Kingdomes are left in the dark, and know not which of the three they shall pitch upon, because God hath given to them no speciall direction, for one rather than for another. But this is easily answered, that a repub­lick appoint Rulers to governe them, is not an action indifferent,How and in what sence any forme of Go­vernment is indifferent. but a Morall action, because to set no Rulers over themselves I conceive were a breach of the fift Commandement, which com­mandeth government to be one or other. 2. It is not in mens free will that they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey, or not to obey the acts of the Court of nature, which is Gods Court, and this Court enacteth that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow, if they appoint no government; also it is proved else where, that no Mo­rall acts in their exercises and use are left indifferent to us; so then, the aptitude and temper of every Common-wealth to Monarchy, ra­ther then to Democracy, or Aristocracy is Gods Warrant, and nea­rest call to determine the wills and liberty of people to pitch upon a Monarchy, Hic & nunc, rather then any other forme of Govern­ment, though all the three be from God, even as single life and Marriage are both the lawfull Ordinances of God, and the consti­tution and temper of the body is a calling to either of the two; nor are we to think that Aristocracy and Democracy are either unlawfull Ordinances, or mens inventions, or that those societies which want Monarchy doe therefore live in sins.

But some say, that Peter calleth any form of Government, an humane Ordinance, 1 Pet. 2. 13. [...]. Therefore MonarchyHow Govern­ment is an Or­dinance of man, 1 Pet. 2 3. can be no Ordinance of God. Answ. Rivetus in d [...]eal. Mand. 5. pa. 194. Rivetus, It is called an Ordinance of man, not because it is an invention of man, and not an Ordinance of God, but respectu subjecti; Pisc. in loc▪ Piscator, Not because man is the efficient cause of Magistracie, but because they are men [Page 9] who are Magistrates. Diodat. annot. Diodatus, Obey Princes and Magistrates, or Governours made by men, or amongst men. Oecumenius Quod hominum dispositione con­sistit, & huma­nis suffragii [...] creatur. Oecumenius, an hu­mane constitution, because it is made by an humane disposition, and created by humane suffrages. Dydimus. Dydimus, presides presidents made by men. Cajetan, officium regimi­nis, quia huma­nis suffragiis creatur. Cajetanus, Estius in loc. Estius, Every creature of God (as Preach the Gospel to every creature) in authority. But I take the word every creature of man, to be put 1. Emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to Magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lords sake: Therefore Betrandus tom. 4. Bib. Betrandus Cardinalis Edn [...] ­sis saith, he speaketh so for the more necessity of merit; and Gloss. ordi­nar. Glossa Ordinaria saith, Be subject to all powers, Etiam ex in­fidelibus & incredulis, Even of infidels and unbeleevers. Lyranus. Lyra­nus, For though they be men, the image of God shineth in them; and the Syriack▪ as Syriak. Lorinus saith, leadeth us thereunto, Lorin. in l [...]. [...] Lechullechum benai anasa. Obey all the children of men that are in authority. 2. It is an Ordinance of men, not effectively; as if it were an invention, and a dream of men: But 2. subjectively, because exercised by man. 3. Objectively, and [...] for the good of men, and for the externall mans peace and safety especially; Whereas Church-Officers are for the spirituall good of mens souls. And Durandus lib. de orig. juris Durandus saith well, Civill power according to its institu­tion is of God, and according to its acquisition, and way of use, its of man. And we may thus farre call the forms of Magistrates, an humane Ordinance, That some Magistrates are ordained to care for mens lives, and matters criminall, of life and death, and some for mens Lands and estates; some for commodities by Sea, and some by Land; and Magistrates according to these Determinations or humane Ordinances.

QUEST. IIII. Whether the king be only and imediatly from God, & not from the people.

THat this question may be the clearer, we are to set down these Considerations.

1. The question is, Whether the Kingly Office it self come fromHow the King is from God, and how from the people. God; I conceive it is, and floweth from the people, not by formall institution; as if the people had by an act of reason, devised and excogitated such a power: God ordained the power; it is from the people onely by a virtuall emanation, in respect that a community having no Government at all, may ordain a King, or appoint an A­ristocracie. But the question is, concerning the designation of the person? Whence is it that this man, rather then this man, is crowned [Page 10] King? and whence is it, from God immediatly, and onely, that this man rather then this man, and this race or family rather then that race and family is chosen for the Crowne? or is it from the people also, and their free choise? for the Pastor and the Doctors Office is from Christ onely; but that Iohn rather then Thomas be the Doctor or the Pastor, is from the will; and choice of men, the Presbyters and people.

2. The Royall power is three wayes in the people; 1. Radical­lyRoyall power three wayes in the people. and virtually, as in the first subject. 2. Collativè vel communica­tivè, by way of free donation, they giving it to this man, not to this man that he may [...]ule over them. 3. Limitatè; They giving it so, as these three acts remain with the people; 1. That they may measure ou [...], by ounce weights, so much Royall power, and no more, and no lesse. 2. So as they m [...]y l [...], [...], and set banks, and marches to the [...]xccrc [...]. 3. That [...]y give it ou [...], con­ditionatè, upon this, and this condition that t [...]y take again to themselves what they gave ou [...], upon condition, [...] [...] condition be violated: The first I conceive is cleere, 1. [...] [...] every [...]ing creature have radically in them a power of [...] [...]o de­fend themselves from violence, as we see Lyons have [...], so [...] How Royall power is radi­dically in the people. beasts have hornes, some clawes; men being reasonable creatures, united in societie, must have power in a more reasonable and hono­rable way to put this power of warding off violence, in the hands of one or moe Rulers, to defend themselves by Magistrates. 2. If all men be borne, as concerning civill power, alike; (for no man com­meth out of the wombe with a Diadem on his head, or a Scepter in his hand) and yet men united in a societie may give crown and scep­ter to this man, and not to this man; then this power was in this uni­ted societie, but it was not in them formally, for they should then all have been one King, and so both above and superiour, and below and inferiour to themselves, which we cannot say: therefore this power must have been virtually in them, because neither man, nor commu­nitie of men can give that which they neither have formally, nor vir­tually in them. 3. Royalists cannot deny, but Cities have power to choose and create inferiour Magistrates, ergo, many Cities united have power to create an higher Ruler; for Royall power is but the united and superlative power of inferiour Judges, in one greater Judge, whom they call a King. The people make the King.

2 Conclus. The power of creating a man a King, is from the peo­ple, 1. Because those who may create this man a King, rather then [Page 11] this man, they have power to appoint a King. For a comparative action doth positively inferre an action, if a man have a power to marry this woman, not that woman; we may strongly conclude, ergo he hath power to marry, now, 1 King. 16. The people made Omri King, and not Zimri; and his sonne Achab, rather then Tibni the sonne of Sinath. Nor can it be replyed this was no law­full power that the people used, for that cannot elude the argument, for, 1 King. 1. the people made Salomon King, and not Adonijah, though Adonijah was the elder brother; thev say, God did extraor­dinarily both make the Office, and [...]es [...]gne Salomon to be King, the people had no hand in it, but approved Gods fact. Answer. This is that we say, God by the people, by Nathan the Propher, and the servants of David, and the states crying, (God save King Salomon) made Salomon King; and here is a reall action of the people. God is the first Agentin all acts of the Creature, where a people maketh choise of a man to be their King, the States doe no other thing un­der God but create this man, rather then another; and we cannot here find two actions, one of God, another of the people; but in one, and the same action; God by the peoples free suffrages & voices cre­ateth such a man King, passing by many thousands, and the people are not patientes in the action, because by the authoritat [...]ve choise of the States, the man is made of a private man, and no King, a publick person, and a crowned King, 2 Sam. 16. 18▪ Hushai said to Abso­lom, nay but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide, Iudg. 8. 22. The men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule thou over us, Iudg. 9. 6. The men of Se­ [...]hem made Abimeleth King, Iudg. 11. 8. 11. 2 King. 14. 21: The people made Azariah King, 1 Sam. 12. 1. 2 Chron. 23. 3.

2. If God doth regulate his people in making such a man King, The people create a King according to the Scripture. not such a man, then he thereby insinuateth that the people have a power to make such a man King, and not such a man. But God doth regulate his people in making a King. Ergo the people have a power to make such a man King, not such a man King. The Proposition is cleare, because Gods Law doth not regulate a non-ens, a meere no­thing, or an unlawfull power; nor can Gods holy Law regulate an unlawfull power, or an unlawfull action, but quite abolish it, and interdict it; the Lord setteth not downe rules and waies how men should not commit Treason, but the Lord commandeth loyalty, and simply interdicteth men of treason▪ 2. If people have then more po­wer to create a King over themselves, then they had to make Pro­phets, [Page 12] then God forbidding them to choose such a man for their King, should say as much to his people; as if he would say, I com­mand you to make Esaiah & Ieremiah Prophets over you, but not these and these men. This certainly should prove that not God onely, but the people also with God made Prophets; I leave this to the considerati­on of the godly. The Prophets were immediatly called of God, to be Prophets, whether the people consented that they should be Pro­phets, or not. Therefore God immediatly, and onely sent the Pro­phets, not the people; but though God extraordinarily designed some men to be Kings, and annoynted them by his Prophets, yet were they never actually installed Kings, till the people made them Kings. I prove the assumption, Deut. 17.—14. When thou shalt say, I will set a King over me, like all the nations round about me. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren shalt tho [...] set King over thee, thou maist not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother. Should not this be an unjust charge to the people, if God onely, without any action of the people, should immediatly set a King over them? Might not the people reply, We have no power at all to set a King over our selves, no more then we have power to make Esaiah a Prophet, who saw the visions of God, to what end then should God mocke us, and say, make a brother, and not a stranger King over you?

3. Expresly Scripture saith, that the people made the King, though under God, Iudg. 9. 6. The men of Sechem made Abimelech King, 1 Sam. 11. 15. And all the people went to Gilgall, and there they made Saul King before the Lord, 2 King. 10. 5. We will not make any King. This had been an irrationall speech to Iehu, if both Iehu and the people held the Royalists Tenet, that the people had no power to make a King, nor any active or causative influence therein; but that God immediatly made the King, 1 Chron. 12. 38. All these came with a perfect heart to make David King in Hebron; and all the rest were of one heart to make David King; on the words Lavater com. in Part 12▪ 38. Hodie quo que in liberis urbibus, & gencibus, magi­stratus secundum dei verbum, Exod. 18. & Deut. 1. cli­gendi sunt, non ex affecti [...]us. La­vater saith, the same way are Magistrates now to be chosen; now this day God by an immediate Oracle from Heaven appointeth the Office of a King; but I am sure he doth not immediatly designe the man, but doth onely mark him out to the people, as one who hath the most royall indowments, and the due qualifications required in a lawfull Magistrate, by the Word of God, Exod. 18. 21. Men of truth, hating covetousnesse, &c. Deut. 1. 16, 17. men who will judge causes betwixt their brethren righteously, without respect of per­sons, [Page 13] 1 Sam. 10. 21. Saul was chosen out of the Tribes according to the Law of God, Deut. 17. they might not choose a stranger, and Abulensis, Serrarius, C [...]rnelius a lapide, Sancheiz, and other Popish Writers think that Saul was not onely anoynted with Oyle, first privately by Samuel, 1 Sam. 10. 1, 2. but also at two other times before the people, once at Mizpeh, and another time at Gilgal by a Parliament, and a Convention of the States, and Samuel judged the voices of the people so essentiall to make a King, that Samuel doth not acknowledge him as formall King, 1 Sam. 10. 7, 8, 17, 18, 19. though he honoured him, because he was to be King, 1. Sam. 9 23, 24. while the Tribes of Israel and Parliament were gathered to­gether to make him King according to Gods Law, Deut, 17. as is evident. For Samuel, v. 20. caused all the Tribes of Israel to stand before the Lord, and the Tribe of Benjamin was taken; the Law pro­vided one of their owne, not a stranger to raigne over them; and be­cause some of the States of Parliament did not choose him, but being children of Belial, de spised him in their heart, v. 27. therefore after King Saul, by that victory over the Ammonites, had conquered the affecti­ons of all the people fully, v. 10, 11. Samuel would have his coronation & election by the Estates of Parliament renewed, at Gilgall, by all the people, v. 14, 15. to establish him King. 2. The Lord by Lots found out the Tribe of Benjamin. 3. The Lord found out the man, by name, Saul the sonne of Kish, when he did hide himselfe amongst the stuffe, that the people might doe their part in creating of the King, whereas Samuel had annoynted him before; but the Text saith expresly that the people made Saul King, and Calvin, Martyr, Lavater, and Popish Writers, as Serrarius, Mendoza, Sancheiz, Cor­nelius a Lapide, Lyranus, Hugo Cardinalis, Carthusius, Sanctius, doe all hence conclude that the people under God, make the King.

I see no reason why Barclaius, l. 3. cout. Monar­ [...]homach. 8. c. 3. Barclaius should here distinguish a power of choosing a King, which he granteth the people hath, and a power of makinga King, which he saith is only proper to God. Answ. Choo­sing of a King, is either a comparative crowning of this man, not thisMaking a king and choosing a king, not to be distinguished. man; and if the people have this, its a creating of a King under God, who principally disposeth of Kings and Kingdomes: and this is e­nough for us. The want of this, made Zimri no King: and those whom the Rulers of Iezreel at Samaria, 2 King. 10. refused to make Kings, no Kings. This election of the people made Athaliah a Prin­cesse: the removall of it, and translation of the crown by the people [Page 14] to Ioash, made her no Princesse: for I beseech you, what other cal­ling of God hath a race of a familie, and a person to the crowne, but only the election of the States? There is now no voice from hea­ven, no immediately inspired Prophets, such as Samuel and Elisha, to annoynt David, not Eliab; Solomon, not Adoniah. The [...] or the [...]roick spirit of a Royall facultie of governing, is, I grant, from God only, not from the people: but I suppose that maketh not a King; for then many sitting on the throne this day, should be no Kings; and many private persons should be Kings. If he meane by the peoples choosiag, nothing but the peoples approbative consent, posterior to Gods act of creating a King; let them shew us an act of God making Kings, and establishing royall power in such a familie, rather then in such a familie; which is prior to the peoples consent, distinct from the peoples consent, I believe there is none at all.

4. Arg. Hence I argue▪ if there be no calling or title on earth to tie the Crown to such a Familie and Person, but the suffrages of the peo­ple; then have the line of such a familie, and the persons now, no calling of God, no right to the crown, but only by the suffrages of the people, except we say that there be no lawfull Kings on earth now, when Propheticall unction and designation to Crowns are ceased, contrary to expresse Scripture, Rom. 13. 1, 2, 3. 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

But there is no title on earth now to tye crownes to families, to persons, but onely the suffrages of the people: for, 1. Conquest without the consent of the people, is but royall latrocinie, as we shall see. 2. There is no propheticall and immediate calling to King­domes now. 3. The Lords giving of Regall parts is somewhat; but I hope Royallists will not deny but a child young in yeares and judg­ment, may be a lawfull King. 3. Mr. Maxwell his appointing of the Kingly office, doth no more make one man a lawfull King, then an­other: for this were a wide consequence. God hath appointed that Kings should be; ergo, Iohn a Stiles is a King; yea, ergo, David is a King: It followeth not. Therefore it remaineth only, that the suffrages of the people of God is that just title and divine calling that Kings have now to their crownes. I presuppose they have gifts to governe from God.

5. If the Lords immediate designation of David, and his annoin­tingDavid not a King, because anointed by Samuel. by the divine authoritie of Samuel, had been that which is alone without the election of the people, made David formally King of Israel, then there were two Kings in Israel at one time; for Samu­el [Page 15] annointed David, and so he was formally King, upon the ground layed by Royallists, that the King hath no royall power from the peo­ple: and David after he himselfe was annointed by Samuel, divers times, calleth Saul the Lords anointed, and that by the inspiration of Gods spirit, as we and Royallist [...] doe both agree. Now two lawfull supreme Monarchs in one Kingdome, I conceive to be most repug­nant to Gods truth, and sound reason; for they are as repugnant as two most Highs, or as two Infinites. 2. I [...] sh [...]ll follow, that David all the while betwixt his anointing by Samuel, and his coronation by the suffrages of all Israel at Hebron. 1. Was in-lacking, in discharging and acquiting himselfe of his royall duty, God having made him for­mally a King, and so laying upon him [...] ch [...]rge to execute justice and judgement, and defend Religion, which he did not discharge. 2. All Davids suffering upon Davids [...]art must be unjust, for, as King, he should have cut off the murtherer Saul, who killed the Priests of the Lord; especially seeing Saul by this ground must be a private mur­therer, and David the only lawfull King. 3. David, if he was formally King, deserted his calling in flying to the Philistims; for a King should not forsake his Kingdome upon no hazards, even of his life, no more th [...]n a Pilot should give over the helme in an ex [...]remeBy the peoples election one is made of no King a King. storme: but certainly Gods dispensation in this warranteth us to say no man can be formally a lawfull King, without the suffrages of the peo [...]le: for Saul, after Samuel from the Lord anointed him, remai­ned a private man, and no King, till the people made him King, and elected him. And David, anointed by that same divine autho­ritie, remained formally a Subject, and not a King, till all Israel made him King at Hebron. And Salom [...]n, though by God designed and ordained to be King, yet was never King, till the people made him King, 1 King. 1. ergo, there floweth something from the power of the people, by which he who is no King, now becommeth a King, formally, and by Gods lawfull call; whereas before the man was no King, but as touching all royall power a meere private man. And I am sure birth must be lesse then Gods designation to a crowne, as is cleere. Adoniah was elder then Salomon, yet God will have Salo­mon, the younger by birth, to be King, and not Adoniah. And so Mr. Symons and other Court-Prophets must prevaricate, who will have birth without the peoples election to make a king, and the peo­ples voyces but a ceremonie.

6. I thinke Royalists cannot deny but a people ruled by Aristo­craticall Magistrates, may elect a King, and a King so elected is for­mally [Page 16] made a lawfull King by the peoples election, for of six apt and gifted to reigne, what maketh one a King, and not the other five? Certainly God disposing the people to choose this man, and not a­nother man, it cannot be said but God giveth the Kingly power im­mediately, and by him Kings raigne, that is true. The Office is im­mediately from God, but now the question is, what is that which formally applyeth the Office and Royall Power to this Person, ra­ther then to the other five as meet. Nothing can here be dreamed of, but God inclining the hearts of the States to choose this man, and not this men.

QUEST. V. Whether or no P. P. the Author of Sac. San. Regum Majestas, called the sacred and Royall Prerogative of Kings, proveth that God is the immediate Author of Soveraignty, and that the King is no creature of the peoples making?

COnsider first that the excommunicated Prelate saith, cap. 2. p. 19. Kings are not immediatly from God, as by any speciall Ordinance sent from Heaven by the ministery of Angels and Prophets, there were but some few such; as Moses, Saul, David, &c. yet something may immediatly proceed from God, and be his speciall worke without a revelati­on or manifestation extraordinary from Heaven, so the designation to a sacred function is from the Church, and from man; yet the power of Word, Sacraments binding and loosing, is immediatly from Jesus Christ. The Apostle Matthias was from Christs immediate constitution, and yet he was designed by men, Act. 1. The soule is by creation and infu­sion, without any speciall ordinance from Heaven, though nature beget­eth the body, and disposeth the matter, and prepareth it as fit to be con­joyned with the soule, so as the father is said to beget the sonne. Ans. 1. The unchurched Prelate striveth to make us hatefull by the title of the Chapter, That God is (by his title) the immediate Author of Soveraingty; and who denyeth that? Not those, who teach that the person who is King, is created King by the people, no more then those who deny that men are now called to be Pastors, and Deacons immediately, and by a voice from Heaven, or by the ministery of An­gells Kings elected & made by the people, though the Office in the abstract be immediately of God. and Prophets, because the Office of Pastors and Deacons is im­mediately from God. 2. When he hath proved that God is the imme­diate Author of Soveraingty. What then? shall it follow that the soveraigne in concreto may not be resisted? and that he is above all Law; and that there is no armour against his violence but prayers and [Page 17] teares. So God is the immediate Author of the Pastors, of the Apostles Office, ergo, it is unlawfull to resist a Pastor, though he turne robber? ergo, the Pastor is above all the Kings Lawes? this is the Iesuite and all made, ergo, there is no Armour against the robbing Prelate but prayer and teares. 2. He saith in his Title, that the King is no Crea­ture of the peoples making. If he meane the King in abstracto, that is, the royall dignity, whom speaketh he against? Not against us, but against his owne father Bellarmine, who saith Bellarmine l. 5. c. 6. not 5. De Laicis. that Soveraignty hath no warrant by any divine Law. If he meane that the man who is King is not created and elected King by the people, he contradicteth himself and all the Court Doctors. 3. It is false that Saul and David, their originall of Royalty was onely from God by a speciall Ordi­nance sent from Heaven; for their office is, Deut. 17. 14. from the written Word of God, as the killing of Idolaters, v. 3, 7. as the Of­fice of the Priests and Levites, 8, 9, 10. and this is no extraordinary Ordinance from Heaven, more than that is from Heaven which is warranted by the Word of God. If he meane that these men, Saul, and David, were created Kings by the onely extraordinary revela­tion of God from Heaven, it is a lye; for beside the Propheticall a­noynting of them, they were made Kings by the people, as the word saith expresly; except we say that David sinned in not setting him­selfe downe on the Throne, when Samuel anoynted him first King; and so he should have made away his Master King Saul out of the world; and there were not a few called to the Throne, by the peo­ple; but many, yea all the Kings of Israel and Iudah. 4. The Prelate contendeth that a King is designed to his royall dignity, immediatly from God, without an extraordinary revelation from Heaven, as the man is designed to be a Pastor by men; and yet the power of Preaching is immediatly from God, &c. but he proveth nothing, except he prove that all Pastors are called to be Pastors immediatly; and that God calleth and designeth to the Throne such a person immediatly, as he hath immediatly instituted by the power of Preaching, and the Apostleship, and hath immediatly infused the soule in the body, by an act of Creation; and we cannot conceive how God in our daies, when there are no extraordinary revelations, doth immediatly create this man a King, and immediatly tie the crown to this family rather then to this; this he doth by the people now, without any Propheti­call Vnction; and by this medium, to wit, by the free choice of the people. He needeth not bring the example of Matthias more than of any ordinary Pastor, and yet an ordinary Pastor is not [Page 18] immediatly called of God, because the Office of an ordinary Pastor is from God immediatly, and also the man is made Pastor by the Church.

The P. Prelate saith, a thing is immediatly from God three waies.Sacr [...]. Sa. reg. Ma. 5. 2. pag. 20. 21, 22, 23. 1. When it is solely from God, and presupposeth nothing ordinary or hu­mane, antecedent to the obteyning of it. Such was the power of Moses, Saul, David. Such were the Apostles. 2. When the collation of the po­wer to such a person is immediatly from God, though some act of man be antecedent; as Matthias was an Apostle. A baptized man obtaineth remission and regeneration, yet aspersion of water cannot produce these excellent effects. A King giveth power to a favourite to make a Lord or a Baron, yet who is so stupid as to averre the honour of a Lord commeth immediatly from the favourite, and not from the King. 3. When a man hath by some ordinary humane right, a full and just right, and the approbation and confirmation of this right is immediatly from God.

The first way, Soveraignty is not from God. The second way, Sove­raignty is conferred on Kings immediatly, though some created act of E­lection, succesion, conquests intervene, the interposed act containeth not in it power to conferre Soveraignty; as in Baptisme, Regeneration, if there be nothing repugnant in the suscipient, is conferred, not by water, but immediatly by God. In sacred Orders designation is from men, po­wer to supernatur all acts from God: election, succession, conquests re­motely and improperly constitute a King. To say in the third sence that soveraignty is immediatly from God, by approbation or confirmation onely, is against Scripture, Prov. 8. 15. Psa. 82. 8. Ioh. 19. then the people say; you are Gods, your power is from below. And Pauls, (ordai­ned of God) is (approved and confirmed onely of God) the power of de­signation, or application of the person to royalty is from man; the power of conferring royall power, or of applying the person to royall power is from God. A mans hand may apply a faggot to the fire, the fire onely maketh the faggot to burne.

Ans. 1. Apostles both according to their Office, and the designa­tion of their person to the Office were immediatly and onely from God, without any act of the people, and therefore are badly cou­pled with the royall power of David and King Saul, who were not formally made Kings, but by the people at Mizpeh and Hebron, 2. The second way God giveth Royall Power by moving the peo­ples hearts to confer royall power, and this is virtually in the people, formally from God. Water hath no influence to produce grace, Gods institution and promise doth it; except you dream with your [Page 19] Iesuites, of opus operatum, that water sprinkled, by the doing of the deed conferreth grace, nisi ponatur obex, what can the child doe, or one child more then another baptized child, to hinder the flux of remission of sins, if you meane not that Baptisme worketh as Phy­sick on a sick man, except strength of humours hinder? and there­fore this comparison is not alike. The people cannot produce so no­ble an effect as royalty, a beame of God. True, formally they cannot, but virtually it is in a society of reasonable men, in whom are left beames of authoritative Majesty, which by a divine institution they can give, Deut. 17. 14. to this man, to David, not to Eliab; and I could well say the Favorite made the Lord, and placed honour in the man whom he made Lord, by a borrowed power from his Prince; and yet the honour of a Lord is principally from the King. 3. It is true, theelection of the people conteineth not formally Royall dig­nitie, but the Word saith, they made Saul, they made David King: so virtually election must conteine it. Samuels oyle maketh not Da­vid King, he is a subject after he is anointed; the peoples election at Hebron maketh him King; 2. differenceth him from his brethren; 3. putteth him in Royall state; yet God is the principall agent. What immediate action God hath here, is said and dreamed of, no man can divine, except Prophet P. Prelate. The [...] Royall authori­tie is given organically by that act by which he is made King: an­other act is a night-dreame, but by the act of election David is made of no King, a King. The collation of [...] Royall gifts, is im­mediately from God: but that formally maketh not a King, if So­lomon saw right, servants riding on horses, Princes going on foot. 4. Judge of the Prelates subtiltie, I dare say, not his own, heThe people have a reall action more then approba­tion in ma­king a King. stealeth from Spalato, but telleth not, The applying of the person to Royall authoritie, is from the people; but the applying of Royall authori­tie to the person of the King, is immediately and only from God: as the hand putteth the faggot to the fire, but the fire maketh it burne. To apply the subject to the accident, is it any thing else but to apply the accident to the subject? Royall authoritie is an accident, the person of the King the subject: the applying of the faggot to the fire, and the applying of the fire to the faggot, are all one, to any not forsa­ken of common sense. When the people applyeth the person to the royall authoritie, they but put the person in the state of royall autho­ritie; and this is to make an union betwixt the Man and royall au­thoritie; and this is to apply royall authoritie to the person. 5. The third sense is the Prelates dreame, not a Tenet of ours; we never said [Page 20] that soveraigntie in the King is immediately from God by approba­tion or confirmation only, as if the people first made the King, and God did only by a posterior and latter act say Amen to the deed done, and subscribe, as Recorder, to what the people doth: so the people should deale kingdomes and crownes at their pleasure, and God behoved to ratifie and make good their fact. When God doth apply the person to royall power, what? is this a different action from the peoples applying the person to royall dignitie? It is not i­maginable: but the people by creating a king, applyeth the person to royall dignitie; and God by the peoples act of constituting the man king, doth by the mediation of this act convey royall authoritie to the man, as the Church by sending a man, and ordaining him to bee a Pastor, doth not by that, as Gods instruments, infuse supernaturall powers of preaching: these powers supernaturall may be, and often are in him before he be in orders; and sometimes God infuseth a supernaturall power of government in a man, when he is not yet a king, as the Lord turned Saul into another man, 1 Sam. 10. 5. 6. neither at that point of time when Samuel anointed him, but after that, v. 5. After that thou shalt come to the hill of God, 6. the spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee, and thou shalt prophecie with them, and shalt be turned into another man. Nor yet at that time when he is formally made King by the people; for Saul was not King formally, because of Samuels anointing, nor yet was he King because another spirit was infused into him, v. 5, 6. for he was yet a privat man, till the States of Israel chose him King at Mizpeh. And the word of God useth words of action to expresse the peoples power, Iudg. 9. 6. And all the men of Sechem gathered together, and all the men of Millo, [...] regnare fecerunt, they caused him to be King. The same isThe same word that is a­scribed to the people in ma­king a King, 2 Sam. 16. 18. is given to God, 1 King 12. 28. said, 1 Sam. 10. 15. they caused Saul to reigne, 2 K. 10. 5. [...] We shall not King any man, 1 Chron. 12. 38. They came to Hebron [...] to King David over all Israel, Deut. 17. three times the making of a King is given to the people. 7. When thou shalt say, [...] I shall set a King over me: if it were not their power to make a King, no law could be imposed on them not to make a stranger their King, 1 King. 12. 20. all the con­gregation Kinged Jeroboam, or made him King over all Israel, 2 King.Kinging of a person ascribed to the people. 11. 12. They Kinged Joash, or made Ioash to reigne. 6. The people are to say, You are Gods, and your power is below, saith the Prelate: what then? ergo, their power is not from God also: It followeth not, subordinata non pugnant. The Scripture saith both, the Lord [Page 21] exalted David to be King, and, All power is from God: and so the power of a L. Major of a Citie: and the people made David Kings in a spe­ciall manner from God, but it followeth not, ergo, not from the peo­ple. King also, and the Citie maketh such a man L. Major. It is the Ana­baptists argument; God writeth his law in our heart, and teacheth his own children, ergo, bookes, and the ministerie of men are need­lesse: So all Sciences and lawfull arts are from God: ergo, Sciences applied to men, are not from mens free will, industrie and studies. The Prelate extolleth the King, when he will have his Royaltie from God, the way that John Stiles is the husband of such a wo­man.

P. Prelate. Kings are of God, they are Gods, children of the most Ib. c 24. High, his servants, publike Ministers, their sword and judgement Gods. This he hath said of their royaltie in abstracto, and in concreto; their power, person, charge, are all of divine extract, and so their authoritie and person are both sacred and inviolable. Answ. So are all the congregation of the Iudges, Psal. 82. v. 1. 6. all of them Gods: for he speaketh not there of a congregation of Kings. So are Apostles,Kings are from God, yet from the peo­ple also. their office and persons of God; and so the Prelates (they thinke) the successors of the Apostles▪ are Gods servants, their ministerie, word, rod of discipline not theirs, but of God: the judgement of Iudges, inferiour to the King, is the Lords judgement, not mens, Deut. 1. 17. 2. Chro. 19. 6. Hence by the Prelates Logick, the persons of Prelates, Majors, Bailiffes, Constables, Pastors, are sacred and inviolable above all lawes, as are Kings. Is this an extolling of Kings? 2. But where are Kings persons, as men, said to be of God, as the Royaltie in abstract [...] i [...]? The Prelate seeth beside his booke, Psal. 82. 7. But ye shall die as men.

P. Prelate. We begin with the Law, in which as God by himself pre­scribed the essentialls, substantialls, & ceremonies of his pietie & wor­ship, gave order for justice & pietie, Deut. 17. 14 15. the King is here originally & immediately from God, and independent from all others, (set over them) Them, is collective, that is, all & every one. Scripture knoweth not this State principle; Rex est singulis major, universis mi­nor. The person is expressed in concreto, whom the Lord thy God shall choose. This peremptorie precept dischargeth the people, all, and every one, diffusively, representatively, or in any imaginable capacity to at­tempt the appointing of a King, but to leave it entirely and totally to God Almighty.

Answ. Begin with the Law, but end not with Traditions. If God by himselfe prescribed the essentialls of pietie and worship, the other [Page 22] part of your distinction is, that God not by himself, but by his Prelates, appointed the whole Romish Rites, as accidentalls of pietie. This is the Iesuites doctrine. 2. This place is so far from proving the King to be independent, and that it totally is Gods to appoint a King, that it expresly giveth the people power to appoint a King: for the setting of a King over themselves, such a one, and not such a one, makes the people to appoint the King, and the King to be lesse and dependent on the people, seeing God intendeth the King for the peoples good, and not the people for the Kings good. This text shameth the Pre­late, who also confessed, P. 22. That remotely and unproperly suc­cession, election, and conquest maketh the King, and so its lawfull for men remotely and improperly to invade Gods chaire.

P. Prelate: Jesuites and Puritans say, it was a priviledge of the Jews that God chose their King. So Suarez, Soto, Navarra.

Answ. 1. The Jesuites are the Prelates brethren, they are under one Banner, we are in contrary Camps to Iesuites. 2. The Prelate said himself, Pag. 19. Moses, Saul, and David, were by extraordina­ry revelation from God; sure I am, Kings are not so now. The Jews had this priviledge, that no nation had. 1. God named some Kings to them, as Saul, David, he doth not so now. 2. God did tie Roy­altie to Davids house by a Covenant, till Christ should come, he doth not so now. Yet we stand to Deut. 17.

P. Prelate. Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings reign. If the people hadThe place, Prov. 8. 15. proveth not but Kings are made by the people. right to constitute a King, it had not been King Solomon, but King Adonijah. Solomon saith not of himself, but indefinitely (By me) as by the Author, efficient, and constituent, Kings reign. (Per) is by Christ, not by the people, not by the high Priest, State, or Presbytery, not Per me iratum, by me in my anger, as some Sectaries say. Pauls [...], an Ordinance by high Authoritie not revocable: So Sinesius useth the word, Aristotle, Lucilius, Appian, Plutarch, [...] in me, and by me, as Doctor Andrews. Kings indefinitely, all Kings: none may di­stinguish where the Law distinguisheth not, they reign in concreto: that same power that maketh Kings, must unmake them.

Ans. 1. The Prelate cannot restrict this to Kings only, it extendeth to Parliaments also. Solomon addeth [...] and Consules, [...] all the Sirs, and Princes [...] and Magnificents, and Nobles, and more [...] and all the Iudges of the earth, they reign, rule, and decree justice by Christ. Here then Majors, Sheriffs, Pro­vosts, Constables, are by the Prelate extolled as persons, sacred, ir­resistible: Then, 1. the Iudges of England rule not by the King of [Page 23] Britain, as their Author, efficient, constituent, but by Iesus Christ immediately, nor doth the Commissary rule by the Prelate. 2. All these, and their power, and persons, rule independently, and im­mediately by Iesus Christ. 3. All inferiour Iudges are [...], the Ordinances of God not revocable. Ergo, The King cannot deprive any Iudge under him; he cannot declare the Parliament no Parliament; once a Iudge and alwayes, and irrevocably a judge. This Prelates poor pleading for Kings deserves no wages. Lavater intelligit superiores & inferiores Magistratus, non est potestas nisi a deo, Vatablus confiliarios. 2. If the people had absolute right, to choose Kings by the Law of Israel, they might have chosen ano­ther, then either Adonijah, or Solomon, but the Lord expressely, Deut. 17. 14. put an expresse Law on them, that they should make no King, but him whom the Lord should chuse: Now the Lord did either by his immediately inspired Propher, anoint the man, as he anointed David, Saul, Iehu, &c. or then he restricted, by a re­vealed promise, the Royall power to a family, and to the eldest by birth: and therefore the Lord first chose the man, and then the people made him King: birth was not their rule, as is clear, in that they made Solomon their King, not Adonijah the elder; and this proveth, that God did both ordain Kingly Government to the King­dom of Israel, and chose the man, either in his person, or tied it to the first born of the Line. Now we have no Scripture, nor Law of God, to tie Royall dignitie to one man, or to one family; produce a warrant for it in the Word, for that must be a priviledge of the Iews, for which we have no Word of God, but we have no immediately inspired Samuels, to say, Make David, or this man King; and no Word of God to say, Let the first born of this family, rather then another family sit upon the throne; Therefore the people must make such a man King, following the rule of Gods Word, Deut. 17. 14. and other rules shewing what sort of men Iudges must be, as Deut 1. 16, 17, 18. 2 Chro. 19. 6, 7. 3. It is true, Kings in a speciall manner reign by Christ. Ergo, Not by the peoples free election. The P. Prelate argueth like himself: By this Text, a Ma­jor of a Citie, by the Lord, decreeth justice: Ergo, He is not made a Major of the Citie, by the people of the Citie. It followeth not, 4. None of us teach that Kings reign by Gods anger. We judge a King a great mercy of God to Church, or State: But the Text saith not, By the Lord, Kings and Iudges do not onely reign and decree justice, but also murther Protestants, by raising against them an Army [Page 24] of Papists. And the word, 5. [...], Powers, doth in no Greek Author signifie, irrevocable powers; for Ʋzziah was a lawfull King, and yet 2 Chron. 26. lawfully put from the throne, and cut off from the house of the Lord: And Interpreters on this place, deny that the place is to be understood of Tyrants: so the Chaldee Pa­raphrase turns it well, Potentes virga justitiae: so Lavater, and Di [...] ­datus, Tho [...]. 12. q. 93. art. 3. and Thomas saith, this place doth prove, That all Kings, and Iudges, Laws, derivari a lege aeterna, are derived from the eternall Law. The Prelate eating his tongue for anger, striveth to prove, That all power, and so Royall power, is of God: but what can he make of it? we beleeve it, though he say Sectaries prove, by [...], That a man is justified by faith onely: so there is no powerPag. 30. but of God onely: but feel the smell of a Iesuite; it is the Secta­ries doctrine. That we are justified by faith onely; but the Prelates, and the Iesuites goe another way, not by faith onely, but by works also. And all power is from God onely, as the first Author, and from no man. What then? Therefore men and people inter­pose no humane act in making this man a King, and not this man: It followeth, And let us with the Prelate, joyn Paul and Solomon together, and say, That Soveraigntie is from God, of God, by God, as Gods appointment irrevocable. Then shall it never follow: it is un­separable from the person, except you make the King a man immor­tall: as God onely can remove the Crown; it is true, but God onely can put an unworthy, and an excommunicated Prelate from Office and Benefice, but how? Doth that prove, that men and the Church may not also in their place, remove an unworthy Church­man, when the Church following Gods Word, delivereth to Satan? Christ onely as head of the Church, excommunicateth scandalous men: Ergo, The Church cannot do it, and yet the Argument is as good the one way, as the other; for all the Churches on earth cannot make a Minister properly, they but design him to the Mini­stery whom God hath gifted and called: But shall we conclude, ergo, no Church on earth; but God onely, by an immediate action from Heaven, can deprive a Minister? how then durst Prelates ex­communicate, unmake, and imprison so many Ministers in the three Kingdoms: But the truth is, take this one Argument from the Pre­late, and all that is in his Book, falleth to the ground, to wit, Sove­raigntie is from God onely. A King is a creature of Gods making onely; and what then? Ergo, Soveraigntie cannot be taken from him: So God onely made Aarons house Priests. 2. Solomon had [Page 25] no Law to depose Abiathar from the Priest-hood. Possibly the Prelate will grant all; the place, Rom. 13. which he saith hath tortured us, I refer to a fitter place, it will be found to torture Court Parasites.

I goe on with the Prelate, c. 3. Sacred Soveraignty is to be preser­ved, and Kings are to be prayed for, that we may lead a godly life, 1 Tim. 3. What then? 1. All in authority are to be prayed for, even Par­liaments, by that text Pastors are to be prayed for, and without them sound religion cannot well subsist. 2. Is this questioned, but Kings should be prayed for; or are we wanting in this duty? but it followeth not that all dignities to be prayed for are immediatly from God, not from men. Prelate, Prov. 8. Solomon speaketh first of the establish­ment of Government, before he speake of the workes of Creation, ergo better not be at all, as be without government. And God fixed govern­ment in the person of Adam before Evah, or any else came into the world; and how shall government be, and we enjoy the fruits of it, ex­cept we preserve the Kings sacred Authority inviolable? Ans. Moses, Gen. 1. speaketh of Creation before he speaketh of Kings, and Mo­ses speaketh, Gen. 3. of Adams sins before he speakes of redemption through the blessed seed; ergo better never be redeemed at all, as to to be without sin. 2. If God made Adam a governour before he made Evah, and any of Mankind, he was made a father and a hus­band before he had either sonne or wise. Is this the Prelates Lo­gick? he may prove that two eggs on his fathers Table are three this way. 3. There is no government where soveraignty is not keptinvio­lable. It is true, where there is a King, soveraignty must be inviolable, What then? Arbitrary government is not soveraignty. 4. He inti­mateth Aristocracy, and Democracy, and the power of Parliaments, which maketh Kings to be nothing but Anarchie; for he speaketh here of no government, but Monarchy, P. Prelate, there is need of grace to obey the King, Ps. 18. 43. Ps. 144. 2. It is God who subdueth the people under David. 2. Rebellion against the King i [...] rebellion against God. Pet. 2. 17. Prov, 24. 12. Ergo Kings have a neare alliance with God.

Ans. 1. There is much grace in Papists and Prelates then, who use to write and Preach against grace. 2. Lorinus your brother Iesuite will with good warrant of the texts inferre, that the King may make a conquest of his own Kingdomes of Scotland and Eng­land by the sword, as David subdued the Heathen. 3. Arbitrary governing hath no alliance with God; a rebell to God, his Country and an Apostate hath no reason to terme lawfull defence against cut-throat Irish, rebellion. 4. There is need of much grace to obey Pastors, inferiour Iudges, masters, Col. 3. 22, 23. ergo their power [Page 26] is from God immediatly, and no more from men then the King is created King by the people, according to the way of Royalists.

P. Prelate. God saith of Pharaoh, Exo. 9. 7. I have raised thee up. Eli­sha from God constituted the King of Syria, 2 King 8. 13. Pharaoh, Abi­melech, Hiram, Hazael, Hadad, are no lesse honoured with the compella­tion of Kings, then David, Saul, &c. Ier. 29. 9. Nebuchadnezer is honoured to be called by way of excellency Gods servant, which God giveth to David, a King according to his owne heart; and Esay 45. 1, 2. Thus saith the Lord to his anoynted Cyrus, and God nameth him neere a hundreth yeare before he was borne, Esay 44. 28. He is my shepheard, Daniel 2. 19, 20. 17. 24. God giveth Kingdomes to whom he will, Dan. 5. 8. and p. 37. Empires, Kingdomes, Royalties are not disposed of by the composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and worke of God, Hos. 13. 11. I gave them a King in my anger, I tooke him away in my wrath: Iob, He places Kings in the throne, &c.

Ans. Here is a whole Chapter of seven pages for one raw argument ten times before repeated, 1. to Exod. 9. 7. I have raised up Pha­raoh, Paul expoundeth it, Rom. 9. to prove that King Pharaoh was a vessell of wrath fitted for destruction, by Gods absolute Will; and the Prelate following Arminius, with treasonable charity, applyeth this to our King. Can this man pray for the King? 2. Elisha anoynted but constituted not Hazael King, and foretold he should be King; and if he be a King of Gods making, who slew his sicke Prince, and invaded the Throne by innocent bloud, judge you. I would not take Kings of the Prelates making. 3. If God give to Nebuchadnezer the same still of the servant of God, given to David, Ps. 18. 1. & 116. 16. and to Moses, Ios. 1, 2. all Kings, because Kings are men accor­ding to Gods heart. Why is not royalty then founded on grace? Nebuchadnezer was not otherwise his servant, then he was the hammer of the earth, and a tyrannous conquerour of the Lords peo­ple, and all the Heathen Kings are called Kings. But how came they to their Thrones for the most part? as David and Hezekiah? but God anointed them not by his Prophets; they came to their King­domes by the peoples election, or by blood and rapine; the latter way is no ground to you to deny Athaliah to be a lawfull Princesse, she and Abimelech were lawfull Princes, and their soveraignty as immediatly and independently from God, as the soveraignty of many heathen Kings. See then how justly Athaliah was killed as a bloody usurper of the throne; & this would licence your brethren the Iesuites to stab heathen Kings, whom you will have as well Kings as the Lords anointed, though Nebuchadnezer & many of them made [Page 27] their way to the Throne, against all Law of God and man, through a bloudy patent. 4. Cyrus is Gods anointed and his Shepheard too, ergo his Arbitrary government is a soveraignty immediatly depen­ding on God, and above all Law; it is a wicked consequence. 5. God named him neare a hundreth yeare ere he was borne, God named and designed Judas very individually, and named the Asse that Christ should ride on to Ierusalem, Zach. 9. 9. some moe hundred yeares then one. What, will the Prelate make them independent Kings for that? 6. God giveth Kingdomes to whom he will. What then? this will prove Kingdomes to be as independent and immediatly from God, as Kings are; for as God giveth Kings to Kingdomes, so he gi­veth Kingdomes to Kings, and no doubt he giveth Kingdoms to whom he will; so he giveth Prophets, Apostles, Pastors to whom he will; and he giveth tyrannous conquests to whom he will: and it is Nebuchadnezer, to whom Daniel speaketh that, from the Lord, and he had no just title to many Kingdomes, especially to the Kingdome of Iudah, which yet God the King of Kings gave to him, because it was his good pleasure; and if God had not commanded them by the mouth of his Prophet Ieremiah, might they not have risen, and with the sword have vindicated themselves and their own liberty, no lesse then they lawfully by the sword vindicated themselves from under Moab, Iudges 3. from under Iabin, Iaakin King of Ca­naan, who twenty yeares mightily oppressed the children of Israel, Iudges. 4.? now this P. Prelate by all these instances making Heathen Kings to be Kings by as good a title as David and Hezekiah, condemneth the people of God as rebells, if being subdued and conquered by the Turke, and Spanish King, they should by the sword recover their owne liberty, and that Israel, and the savi­ours which God raised to them, had not warrant from the law of na­ture to vindicate themselves to liberty, which was taken from them violently and unjustly by the sword; but from all this it shall well follow that the tyranny of bloudy conquerours is immediatly and only dependent from God, no lesse then lawfull soveraignty; for Ne­buchadnezers soveraignty over the people of God, and many other Kingdomes also was revenged of God as tyranny, Ier. 50. 6. 7. and therefore the vengeance of the Lord, and the vengeance of his Temple came upon him and his land, Ier. 50. 16, 17. 18. 28, 29. 30. It is true, the people of God were commanded of God to submit to the King of Babylon, to serve him, and to pray for him, and to doe on the contra­ry was rebellion; but this was not because the King of Babylon was their King, and because the King of Babylon had a command of [Page 28] God, so to bring under his yoak the people of God. So Christ had a Commandement to suffer the death of the Crosse, Iohn. 10. 18. but had Herod and Pilate any warrant to crucifie him? none at all. 7. He saith, Royalties even of Heathen Kings are not disposed of by the composed Contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and worke of God. But the Contracts of men to give a Kingdome to a person, which a Heathen community may lawfully doe, and so by contract dispose of a Kingdom, is not opposite to the immediate hand of God, appointing Royalty and Monarchy at his owne blessed liberty. Lastly he saith, God tooke away Saul in his wrath; but I pray you did God onely doe it? then had Saul because a King, a Patent Royall from God to kill himselfe, for so God tooke him away; and we are rebells by this, if we suffer not the King to kill himselfe. Well pleaded.

QUEST. VI. Whether the King be so from God onely both in regard of his So­veraignty, and of the designation of his person to the Crown, as that he is no waies from the people, but by meere approbation?

Dr. Ferne, a man much for Monarchy saith, Though Monarchy hath its excellency, being first set up of God, in Moses, yet nei­therDr. Fern, 3. S. 13. Monarchy, Aristocracy, nor any other forme, is jure divino, but we say (saith he) the power it selfe, or that sufficiency of authority to governe, that is in a Monarchy, or Aristocracy, abstractly considered from the qualification of other formes, is a flux and constitution subor­dinate to that providence; an ordinance of that Dixi, or silent word by which the world was made, and shall be governed under God. This is aThe formes of Government not from God by a naked act of Providence, but by his ap­proving will. great debasing of the Lords anoynted, for so soveraignty hath no warrant in Gods Word formally as it is such a government, but is in the world by providence, as sin is, and as the falling of a Sparrow to the ground; whereas Gods Word hath not onely commanded that government should be, but that fathers and mothers should be. 2. and not only that politick Rulers should be, but also Kings by name, and other Iudges Aristocraticall should be, Rom. 13. 3. Deut. 17. 14. 1 Pet. 2. 17. Prov. 24. 21. Prov. 15. 16. 3. If the power of Monarchy and Aristocracy abstracted from the formes be from God, then it is no more lawfull to resist Aristocraticall Government, and our Lords of Parliament, or Iudges, then it is lawfull to resist Kings.

But heare the Prelates reasons to prove that the King is from the people by approbation only.

[Page 29] P. Prelate. The people, Deut. 17. is said to set a King over them cap. 4. pag. 41. only, as 1 Cor. 6. The Saints are said to judge the world, that is, by consenting to Christs Iudgement. So the people doe not make a King by transferring on him soveraignty, but by accepting, acknowledging, re­verencing him as King, whom God hath both constituted and designed King. Answ. This is said, but not a word proved: for the Queen of Sheba, and Hiram acknowledged, reverenced and obeyedSoveraigntie not from the people by sole approbation. Solomon as King, and yet they made him not King, as the Princes of Israell did. 2. Reverence and obedience of the people is relative to the Kings lawes, but the peoples making of a King is not relative to the laws of a King; for then he should be a King giving laws, and commanding the people, as King, before the people make him King. 3. If the peoples approving and consenting that an elected King be their King, presupposeth that he is a King designed, and constituted by God, before the people approve him as King; Let the P. Prelate give us an act of God now designing a man King: for there are no immediate voyces from heaven, saying to a people, This is your King, before the people elect one of sixe to be their King. And this infalli­bly proveth that God designeth one of sixe to be a King, to a people who had no King before, by no other act but by determining the hearts of the States to elect and designe this man King, and passe any of the other five. 4. When God, Deut. 17. forbiddeth them to choose a stranger, he presupposeth they may choose a stranger: for Gods law now given to man in the state of sinne, presupposeth he hath corruption of nature to doe contrary to Gods law: Now if God did hold forth, that their setting a King over them, was but the peoples approving the man whom God shall both constitute and de­signe to be King, then he should presuppose that God was to de­signe a stranger to be the lawfull King of Israel; and the people should be interdicted to approve and consent, that the man should be King whom God should choose: for it was unpossible that the people should make a stranger King, (God is the only immediate King-creator) the people should only approve and consent that a stranger should be King; yet upon supposall that God first constitu­ted and designed the stranger King, it was not in the peoples power that the King should be a Brother rather then a stranger; for if the people have no power to make a King, but doe only approve him, or consent to him, when he is both made and designed of God to be King, it is not in their power that he be either brother or stranger, and so God commandeth what is simply impossible. 2. Consider the [Page 30] sense of the command by the Prelates vaine Logick: I Iehovah, as I only create the world of nothing, so I only constitute and designe a man, whether Iew, or Nebuchadnezzar a stranger to be your King; yet I in­hibit you under the pain of my curse, that you set any King over your selves, but only a brother. What is this, but I inhibite you to be cre­ators by omnipotent power? 5. To these adde the reasons I pro­duced before, that the people by no shadow of reason can be com­manded to make such a man King, not such a man, if they only con­sent to the man made King, but have no action in the making of the King.

P. Prelate. All the acts reall and imaginable, which are necessary for the making of Kings, are ascribed to God: Take the first King as a ruling case, 1 Sam. 12. 13. Behold the King whom you have chosen and desired, and behold the Lord hath set a King over you. This election of the peo­ple can be no other but their admittance or acceptance of the King whom God hath chosen and constituted, as the words, whom ye have chosen, imply, 1 Sam. 9. 17. 1 Sam. 10. 1. You have Sauls election and constitution, where Samuel as Priest and Prophet anointeth him, doing reverence and obeysance to him, and ascribing to God, that he did appoint him supreame and Soveraigne over his inheritance. And the same ex­pression is, 1 Sam. 12. 13. The Lord hath set a King over you: which is Psal. 2. 6. I have set my King upon my holy hill of Zion. Neither man nor Angel hath any share in any act of constituting Christ King, Deut. 17. The Lord vindicateth as proper and peculiar to himselfe, the desig­nation of the person. It was not arbitrary to the people to admit or re­ject Saul so designed; it pleased God to consummate the worke by the acceptation, consent and approbation of the people▪ ut suaviore modo, that by a smoother way he might incourage Saul to undergoe the hard charge, and make his people the more heartily [...], without grumbling and scruple, reverence and obey him. The peoples admittance possibly added something to the solemnitie, to the pompe, but nothing to the essentiall and reall constitution or necessitie; it only puts the subjects in mala fide, if they should contraveen, as the intimation of a Law, the coronation of an hereditary King, the inthronization of a Bishop. And, 1 King. 3. 7. Thou hast made thy servant King, 1 Sam. 16. 1. I have provided me a King, Psal. 18. 50. He is Gods King, Psal. 89. 19. I have exalted one chosen out of the people, v. 20. He anointeth them, 27. adopteth them. I will make him my first borne, Psal. 82. 6. the first borne is above every brother severally, and above all, though a thousand joyntly.

Answ. 1. By this reason, inferiour Iudges are no lesse immediate [Page 31] Deputies of God, and so irresistible, then the Kings, because God took off the spirit that was on Moses, and immediately powred it upon the seventy Elders, who were Iudges inferiour to Moses, Num. 11. 14. 15. 16. Answ. 2. This P. P. cannot make a Syllogisme: If all the acts necessary to make a King, be given to God, none to the people; then God both constituteth and designeth the King. But the former the Scripture saith, ergo, if all the acts be given to God, as to the prime King-mak [...]r, and disposer of Kings and Kingdoms, and none to the people in that notion, then God both constituteth and designeth a King. Both major and minor is false. The major is as false as the very P. Prelate himselfe. All the acts necessary for war­making, are in an eminent manner given to God, as 1. the Lord fight­eth for his people. 2. The Lord scattered the enemies. 3. The Lord slew Og King of Bashan. 4. The battell is the Lords. 5. The victorie the Lords; ergo, Israel never fought a battell. So Deut. 32. The Lord alone led his people; the Lord led them in the wildernesse; their bow and their sword gave them not the land: God wrought all their workes for them, Esa 26. 12. ergo, Moses led them not; ergo, the people went not on their own leggs through the wildernesse; ergo, the people never shot an arrow, never drew a sword. It followeth not. 1. God did all these as the first, eminent, principall and effica­cious pre-determinator of the creature, (though this Arminian and Popish Prelate mind not so to honour God.) 2. The assumption is also false; for the people made Saul and David Kings; and it wereThat Kings in an eminent act of divine pro­vidence, have their crownes from God, hin­dreth not but they have their crownes from the people also. ridiculous, that God should command them to make a brother, not a stranger King, if it was not in their power whether he should be a Iew, a Scythian, an Ethiopian, who was their King, if God did on­ly without them both choose, 2. constitute, 3. designe the person, and performe all acts essentiall to make a King, and the people had no more in them but only to admit and consent, and that for the solem­nitie and pompe, not for the essentiall constitution of the King. 3. 1 Sam. 9. 17. 1 Sam. 10. 1. we have not Saul elected and constituted king, and Samuel did obeysance to him and kissed him, for the honor Royall which God was to put upon him: for before this propheti­call unction, 1 Sam. 9. 22. he made him sit in the chiefe place, and honored him as king, when as yet Samuel was materially King, and the Lords Vicegerent in Israel. If then the Prelate conclude any thing from Samuel his doing reverence and obeysance to him as King, it shall follow that Saul was formally King, before Samuel, 1 Sam. 10. 1. anointed him, and kissd him; and that must be before he [Page 32] he was formally King, otherwise he was in Gods appointment King, before ever he saw Samuels face; and it is true, he ascribeth ho­nour to him, as to one appointed by God to be supreame Soveraigne, for that which he should be, not for that which he was, as c. 9. 22. he set him in the chiefest place, and therefore it is false, that we have Sauls election and constitution to be King, 1 Sam. 10. for after that time the people are rebuked for seeking a King, and that with a pur­pose to disswade them from it, as a sinfull desire, and he is chosen by Lots after that, and made King, & after Samuels anoynting of him, he was a private, man, and did hide himselfe amongst the stuffe, v. 22. 3. The Prelate if of ignorance, or wilfully I know not, saith, the expression and phrase is the same, 1 Sam. 12. 13. and Ps. 2. 6. which is false; for 1 Sam. 12. 13. it is [...] behold the Lord hath given you a King, such is the expression, Hos. 13. 11. I gave them a King in my wrath; but that expression is not Psal. 2. 6. but this [...] but I have established him my King; and though it were the same expression, it followeth not that the people have not hand any other way in appointing Christ their head; (though that phrase also be in the word, Hos. 1. v. 11.) then by consenting,Phrases ascri­bing the ma­king of Kings in a peculiar manner to God prove not that the free will of the people hath no hand in the making Kings. and beleeving in him as King; but this proveth not that the people in appointing a King, hath no hand but naked approbation, for the same phrase doth not expresse the same action, nay the Iudges are to kisse Christ, Ps. 2. 12. the same way, and by the same action that Samuel kissed Saul, 1 Sam. 10. 1. and the Idolaters kissed the calves, Hos. 13. 2. for the same Hebrew word is used in all the three places, and yet it is certaine the first kissing is spirituall, the second a kisse of ho­nour, and the third an Idolatrous kissing. 4. The anoynting of Saul cannot be a leading rule to the making of all Kings to the worlds end; for the P. Prelate forgetting himselfe said, that onely some few, as Moses, Saul, and David, &c. by extraordinary manifestation from Heaven were made Kings, pa. 19. 5. he saith it was not Arbitra­ry for the people to admit, or reject Saul so designed. What meaneth he? it was not morally arbitrary, because they were under a law, Deut. 17. 14, 15. to make him King, whom the Lord should choose. That is true, but was it not arbitrary to them to breake a law Physically? I think he who is a professed Arminian will not side with Manicheans and Fatalists so, but the P. Prelate must prove it was not Arbitrary, either Morally or Physically to them not to ac­cept Saul as their King, because they had no action at all in the ma­king of a King, God did it all, both by constituting and designing the [Page 33] King, why then did God, Deut. 17. give a Law to them to make such a man King, not such a man, if it was not in their free wil to have any action or hand in the making of a King at all? but that some sonnes of Belial would not accept him as their King, is expresly said, 1 Sam. 10. 27. and how did Israel conspirc with Absolom, to unking and dethrone David, whom the Lord had made King? If the Pre­late meane it was not Arbitrary to them physically to reject Saul, he speaketh wonders, the sonnes of Belial did reject him; ergo they had physicall power to doe it: If he meane it was not arbitrary, that is, it was not lawfull to them to reject him, that is true; but doth it fol­low they had no hand nor action in making Saul King, because it was not lawfull for them to make a King in a [...]infull way, and to re­fuse him whom God chose to be King? then see what I inferre. 1. Then they had no hand in obeying him as King, because they sinne in obeying unlawfull commandements against Gods Law; and so they had no hand in approving and consenting he should be King, the contrary whereof the P. Prelate saith. 2. So might the P. Prelate prove men are patientes, and have no action in violating all the Commandements of God, because it is not lawfull to them to violate any one Commandement. (6) The Lord Deut. 17. vindi­cates this as proper and peculiar to himselfe to choose the person, and to choose Saul. What then? ergo now the people choosing a King have no power to choose or name a man, because God anoynted Saul and David by immediate manifestation of his Will to Samuel; this consequence is nothing, & also it followeth in no wise, that therefore the people made not Saul King. 7. That the peoples approbation of a King is not necessary▪ is Bellarmines and Papists saying, and that the people chose their Ministers in the Apostolick Church, not by a necessity of a divine Commandement, but to conciliate love betwixt Pastor and people. Papists hold that if the Pope make a p [...]pish King the head and King of Britaine against the peoples will, yet is he their King. 8. David was then King all the time that Saul presecuted him; he sinned truely in not discharging the duty of a King, onely because he wanted a ceremony, the peoples approbation, which the Prelate saith is required to the solemnity and pompe, not to the necessity and truth, and essence of a formall King. So the Kings Coronation Oath, and the peoples Oath must be Ceremonies; and because the Prelate is perjured himselfe, therefore perjury is but a ceremony al­so. 9. The enthronization of Bishops is like the Kinging of the Pope; the Apostles must spare Thrones, while they come to Heaven, [Page 34] Luk. 22. 29, 30. the P. Prelates with their head the Pope must be en­throned. 10. The hereditary King he maketh a King before his Coronation, and his Acts are as valid before as after his Coronation; it might cost him his head to say that the Prince of Wales is now no lesse King of Britaine, and his Acts, Acts of Kingly Royalty, no lesseProphesies of Christ ex­pounded by the P. Prelate of prophane Hea­then Kings. The P. Prelate expoundeth Prophesies of David, Solo­mon and Iesus Christ as true of prophane heathen Kings. then our Soveraigne is King of Britaine, if Lawes and Parliaments had their owne vigour from royall Authority. 11. I allow that Kings be as high as God hath placed them, but that God said of all Kings, I will make him my first borne, &c. Psalm 89. 26, 27. which is true of Solomon as the Type, 2 Sam, 7. 1 Chro. 17. 22. 2 Sam. 7. 12. and fulfilled of Christ, and by the Holy Ghost spoken of him, Heb. 1. 5, 6. is blasphemous; for God said not to Nero, Iulian, Dioclesian, Belshazer, Evilmerodach, who were lawfull Kings. I will make him my first borne; and that any of these blasphemous Idolatrous Princes should cry to God, he is my Father, my God, &c. is Divinity well beseeming an excommunicated Prelate. Of the Kings dignity above the Kingdome I speake not now; the Prelate pulled it in by the haire, but hereafter we shall heare of it.

P. Prelate. God onely anoynted David, 1 Sam. 16. 4. the men of Bethleem, yea Samuel knew it not before. God saith, with mine holy oyle have I anoynted him, Ps. 89. 91. 1. He is the Lords anoynted Sacro sancta Maj. 43. 44. 2. The oyle is Gods, not from the Apothecaries shop, nor the Priests Viall; this oyle descended from the Holy Ghost▪ who is no lesse the true Olive, then Christ is the true Vine; yet not the oyle of saving grace, as some Fantasticks say, but holy, 1. From the Author God. 2. From in­fluence in the person, it maketh the Person of the King sacred. 3. From influence on his charge, his function and power is sacred. Ans. 1. The Prelate said before Davids anoynting was extraordinary; here he draweth this anoynting to all Kings. 2. Let David be formally both constituted and designed King divers yeares before the States made him King at Hebron, and then 1. Saul was not King, the Pre­lateThe P. P. maketh all the Heathen Kings to be anoynted with grace from Heaven. will tearme that treason. 2. This was a dry oyle, David his person was not made sacred, nor his authority sacred by it; for he remained a private man, and called Saul his King, his Master, and himselfe a subject 3. This oyle was no doubt Gods Oyle, and the Prelate will have it the Holy Ghosts, yet he denieth that sa­ving grace, yea (p. 2. c. 1) he denyeth that any superna­turall gift should be the foundation of Royall dignity, and that it is a pernitious tenent. So to me he would have the Oyle from Heaven, and not from Heaven. 4. This holy oyle [Page 35] wherewith David was annointed, Psalme 89. 20. to Aug. in locum, unxi m [...] ­num fort [...]m, ser­vum obedienten [...] ideo in co posui adjutorium. Au­gustine, is the oyle of saving grace: His own deare brethren the Papists say so, and especially Lyra. Gra­tia est babitua­lis, qui [...] stat pu­gil contra di [...] ­bolum. Lyranus, Gloss. or­d [...]. & Glossa ordinaria, Hu­go Cardinalis, Olco laetitiae qu [...] prae consortibu [...] unctus fuit Christus, Ps. 45. Hugo Cardinal, Bellarm. [...]. his beloved Bellarmine, Lorinus. and Lorinus, Cal­vin, Musculus, Marlorat. If these be Fanaticks (as I think they are to the Prelate) yet the Text is evident, that this oyle of God was the oyle of saving grace, bestowed on David, as on a speciall type of Christ, who received the spirit above measure, and was the anoin­ted of God, Ps. 45. 7. whereby all his garments smell of myrrhe, aloes, and cassia, ver. 8. and his name Messiah is as an oyntment powred out, Cant. 1. 2. This anointed shall be head of his enemies. 3. His dominion shall be from the sea to the rivers, v. 25. 4. He is in the covenant of grace, v. 26. 5. He is higher then the Kings of the earth. 6. The grace of perseverance is promised to his seed, v. 28, 29, 30. 7. His kingdome is eternall, as the dayes of Heaven, vers. 35. 36. 8. If the Prelate will look under himselfe to Theodatus. Diodatus, and Ainsworth, annot. Ainsworth, they say, this holy oyle was powred on David by Sa­muel, and on Christ was powred the Holy Ghost, and that by 1 Sam. 16 1. 13, 4 Luk. 4. 18. 21. 10. 3. 34. war­rant of Scripture, and Iunius [...] ­not. in loe. Junius, and Mollerus com. ibid. Mollerus saith with them. Now the Prelate taketh the Court way, to powre this oyle of grace on many drie Princes, who without all doubt are Kings essentially no lesse then David. He must see better then the man who finding Pontius Pilate in the Creed, said, he behoved to be a good man: so because he hath found Nero the tyrant, Julian the apostate, Nebuchad­nezzar, Evil-Merodach, Hazael, Hagag, all the Kings of Spaine, and I doubt not, the Great Turke, in the 89 Psalm, v. 19, 20. so all these Kings are anointed with the oyle of grace, and all these must make their enemies necks their footstoole; all these be higher then the Kings of the Earth, and are hard and fast in the covenant of grace, &c.

P. Prelate. All the royall ensignes and acts of Kings are ascribed to God. The Crown is of God, Esa. 62. 3. Psal. 21. 3. in the Emperours coyne was an hand putting a crowne on their head: the Heathen said they were [...] as holding their Crownes from God▪ Psal. 18. 39. Thou hast girt me with strength (the sword is the embleme of strength) unto battell. See Iud. 7. 17. their scepter, Gods scepter. Exod. 4. 20, 17, 9. we read of two rods, Moses and Aarons; Aarons rod budded; God made both the rods; Their judgement is the Lords. 2 Chron. 19. 6. their throne is Gods, 1 Chron. 19. 21. The Fathers called them, sacra vesti­gia, sacra majestas; their commandements, Divalis jussio. The Law [Page 36] saith, all their goods are res sacrae., Ergo, our new Statists disgrace Kings, if they blaspheme not God, in making them the derivatives of the people, the basest extract of the basest of irrationall creatures, the Multitude, the Communaltie.

Answ. This is all one Argument from the Prelates beginning ofPlaces, Esa. 62 3. Ps. 21 3. spoken of the Church and Christ, by the P. P. expoun­ded of profane Kings. his booke to the end; In a most speciall and eminent act of Gods providence, Kings are from God; but therefore they are not from men, and mens consent: It followeth not. From a most speciall and eminent act of Gods providence, Christ came into the world, and tooke on him our nature: ergo, he came not of Davids loynes. It is a vaine consequence. There could not be a more eminent act then this, Psal. 40. A body thou hast given me; Ergo, he came not of Da­vids house, and from Adam by naturall generation, and was not a man like us in all things except sinne. It is tyrannicall and dominee­ring Logick. Many things are ascribed to God only, by reason of a speciall and admirable act of providence: as the saving of the world by Christ, the giving of Canaan to Israel, the bringing his people out of Egypt, and from Chaldea, the sending of the Gospel to both Iew & Gentile, &c. But shall we say, that God did none of these things by the ministerie of men, and weake and fraile men? 2. How proveth the Prelate that all royall ensignes are ascribed to God, because Esa. 62. the Church universall shall be as a crown of glorie, and a royall di­adem in the hand of the Lord; ergo, baculus in angulo, the Church shall be as a seale on the heart of Christ. what then? Hieronymus, Procopius, Cyrillus, with good reason render the meaning thus: Thou O Zion, and Church, shalt be to me a royall Priesthood, and a holy people. For that he speaketh of his owne Kingdome and Church, is most evident, v. 1. 2. For Zions sake I will not hold my peace, &c. 3. God put a crown of pure gold on Davids head, Psal. 21. 3. therefore Iulian, Nero, and no elective Kings, are made and designed to be Kings by the people: He shall never prove this consequence. The Chald. par. Chaldee paraphrase applyeth it to the reigne of King Mes­siah. Diodat. an. Diodatus he speaketh of the kingdome of Christ. Ainsworth. Athanasius, Eu­sebius, Origen. Augustine▪ Dydimus. Ains­worth maketh this crowne a signe of Christs victorie. Athanasius, Eusebius, Origen, Augustine, Dydimus, expound it of Christ and his kingdome. The Prelate extendeth it to all Kings, as the blasphe­mous Rabbines, especially Ra. Salomon, deny that he speaketh of Christ here: but what more reason is there to expound this of the crownes of all Kings given by God (I deny not) to Nero, Julian, &c. then to expound the foregoing and following verses as applyed to [Page 37] all Kings? Did Julian rejoyce in Gods salvation? did God grant Nero his hearts desire? did God grant (as it is, v. 4.) life eternall to Heathen Kings, as Kings? which words all Interpreters expound of the eternitie of Davids throne, till Christ come, and of victorie and life eternall purchased by Christ, as Ainsw. an. in v. 5. Ainsworth with good reason expounds it. And what though God give David a Crown; ergo, not by second causes, and by bowing all Israels heart to come in sinceritie to Hebron to make David King, 1 King. 12. 38. God gave corne and wine to Israel, Hos. 2. shall the Prelate and the Anabaptist inferre; Ergo, he giveth it not by plowing, sowing, and the art of the husbahd-man? 3. The Heathen acknowledged a Divinitie in Kings; but he is blind who readeth them, and seeth not in their wri­tings, that they teach that the people maketh Kings. 4. God girt David with strength, while he was a private man, and persecuted by Saul, and fought with Goliah, as the title of the same beareth; and he made him a valiant man of warre to breake bowes of steele; ergo, he giveth the sword to Kings, as Kings, and they receive no sword from the people. This is poore Logick. 5. The P. Prelate sendeth us Judg. 7. 17. to the singular and extraordinarie power of God with Gideon: and I say, that same power behoved to be in Oreb and Zeba, v. 27. for they were [...] Princes, and such as the Prelate from Pro. 8. 15. saith, have no royall power from the people. 6. Moses and A­aron their two rods were miraculous. This will prove that Priests are also Gods, and their persons srcred. I see not (except the Prelate would be at worshipping of Reliques) what more royall Divinitie is in Moses his rod, because he wrought miracles by his rod, then there is in Elias his staffe, in Peters napkin, in Pauls shadow. This is like the strong symbolicall Theologie of his fathers the Jesuites, which is not argumentative, except he say that Moses as King of Je­surum wrought miracles; and why should not Nero, Caligula, Pha­roah, and all Kings rods then dry up the red sea, and work miracles? 7. We give all the stiles to Kings that the Fathets gave, and yet we thinke not, when David commandeth to kill Ʋriah, and a King commandeth to murther his innocent subjects in England and Scotland, that that is Divalis jussio, the command of a God; and that this is a good consequence, What ever the King commandeth, though it were to kill his loyallest Subjects, is the commandement of God, Ergo, the King is not made King by the people. 8. Ergo, (saith he) these new Statists disgrace the King. If a most New Statist sprung out of a poore pursevant of Kraill, from the dunghill to the Court, [Page 38] could have made himselfe an old Statist, and more expert in state af­faires, then all the Nobles and soundest Lawyers in Scotland and England, this might have more weight. 9. Therefore the King (saith P. P.) is not the extract of the basest of rationall creatures. He mea­neth, fex populi▪ his owne house and linage; but God calleth them his owne people, a royall Priesthood, a chosen generation, and, ps. 78. 71. will warrant us to say the people is much worthier before God, then one man, seeing God choose David for Iacob his people, and Israel his inheritance, that he might feede them, Iohn P. P. his fathers suf­frage in making a King will never be sought. We make not the mul­titude, but the three Estates including the Nobles and Gentry to be as rationall creatures, as any Apostate Prelate in the three King­domes.

QUEST. VII. Whether or no the P. Prelate the aforesaid Auth [...]r doth by force of rea­son evince, that neither constitution nor designation of the King is from the people?

THe P. Prelate aymeth (but it is an empty ayme) to prove that the people are wholly excluded. I answer only Arguments not pitched on before, as the Prelate saith.

P. Prelate. 1. To whom can it be more proper to give the rule over men, then to him who is the onely King truely and properly of the whole world? 2. God is the immediate Author of all rule and power that is amongst all his creatures, above or below. 3. Man before the fall re­ceived dominion, and empire over all the creatures below immediatly, as Gen. 1. 28. Gen. 9. 2. ergo we cannot deny that the most noble go­vernment (to wit Monarchy) must be immediatly from God, without any Contract or compact of men. Ans. The first reason concludeth not what is in question; for God only giveth rule and power to one man over another; ergo he giveth it immediatly, it followeth not. 2. It shall as well prove that God doth immediatly constitute all Iudges, and therefore it shall be unlawfull for a city to appoint a Major, or a shire a Iustice of peace. 3. The second argument is in­consequent also, because God in creation is the immediat Author ofThe excellen­cy of Kings maketh them not of Gods only constitu­tion and desig­nation▪ all things, and therefore without consent of the creatures, or any act of the creature, created an Angell a nobler creature then man, and a man then a woman, and men above beasts; because those that are not, can exercise no act at all. But it followeth not; ergo all the workes of providence, such as is the government of Kingdomes are done immediatly by God, for in the workes of providence, for the [Page 39] most part in ordinary, God worketh by meanes; it is then as good a consequence as this. God immediatly created man, ergo he kee­peth his life immediatly also without foode and sleepe. God imme­diatly created the Sunne, ergo God immediatly without the mediati­on of the Sunne giveth light to the world. The making of a King is an act of reason, and God hath given a man reason to rule him­selfe; and therefore hath given to a society an instinct of reason, to appoint a governour over themselves, but no act of reason goeth be­fore man be created; ergo it is not in his power whether he be crea­ted a creature of greater power then a beast or no. 4. God by crea­tion gave power to a man over the creatures, and so immediatly; but I hope a man cannot say, God by creation hath made a man King over men. 5. The Excellency of Monarchy (if it be excellen­ter then any other government, of which hereafter) is no ground why it should be immediatly from God, as well as mans dominion over the creature; for then the worke of mans redemption being more excellent then the ray [...]ing of Lazarus, should have been done immediatly without the incarnation, death and satisfaction of Christ (for no act of God without himselfe is comparable to the worke of redemption, 1 Pet. 1. 11, 12. Col. 1. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.) and Gods lesse excellent workes, as his creating of beasts and wormes should have been done mediatly, and his creating of man immediatly.

P. P. They who execute the judgement of God, must needs have the power to judge from God. But Kings are Deputies in the exercises of the Iudgements of God, ergo, the proposition is proved. How is it imagi­nable that God reconcileth the world by Ministers, and saveth man by them, 1 [...]or. 5. 1 Tim. 4. 16. except they receive a power so to doe from God? the assumption is, Deut. 1. 17. 1 Chro. 19. 6. Let none say Moses and Iehosaphat speake of inferiour Iudges, for that which the King doth to others, he doth by himselfe; also 5. The execution of the Kingly power is from God, for the King is the Servant, Angell, Legat, Minister of God, Rom. 13. 6, 7. God properly and primarily is King, and King of Kings and Lord of Lords, 1. Tim. 6. 15. Rev. 1. 5. 21. 27. 29. 20. all Kings related to him, are Kings equivocally, and in resemblance, and he the only King. Ans. That which is in question is never concluded; to wit, that the King is both immediatly constituted and designed King, by God onely, and not by the mediation of the people▪ for when God reconcileth and saveth men by Pastors, he saveth them by the intervening action of men, so he scourgeth his people by men, as by his sword, Psal. 17. 14. and hand, staffe, and rod, Esay 10▪ 5. his hammer. Doth it follow that God onely doth immediatly [Page 40] scourge his people, and that wicked men have no more hand and action in scourging his people, then the Prelate saith the people have an hand in making a King? and that is no hand at all, by the Prelates way.

2. We may borrow the Prelates argument: inferiour Iudges exe­cute the judgement of the Lord, and not the judgement of the King; ergo, by the Prelates argument, God doth only by immediate power execute judgement in them, and the inferiour Iudges are not Gods ministers executing the judgement of the Lord. But the Conclusion is against all truth, and so must the Prelates argument be. And that inferiour Iudges are the immediate substitutes and deputies of God, is hence proved, and shall be hereafter made good, if God will. 3. God is properly King of Kings, so is God properly causa causa­rum, the cause of causes, the life of lifes, the joy of joyes. What, shall it then follow, that he worketh nothing in the creatures by their mediation, as causes? Because God is light of lights, doth he not enlighten the earth and aire by the mediation of the Sun? then God communicateth not life mediately by generation, he causeth not his Saints to rejoyce with joy unspeakable and glorious, by the inter­vening mediation of the Word. These are vaine consequences. Soueraignty, and all power and virtue is in God infinitely: And what vertue and power of action is in the creatures, as they are compared with God, are in the creatures equivocally and in re­semblance, and [...] in opinion, rather then really. Hence it must follow, 1. that second causes worke none at all, no more then the people hath a hand or action in making the King, and that is no hand at all, as the Prelate saith, And God only and immediately worketh all workes in the creatures, because both the power of working and actuall working commeth from God, and the crea­tures in all their working, are Gods instruments: and if the Prelate argue so frequently from power given of God, to prove that actu­all reigning is from God immediately, Deut. 8. 18. The Lord giveth the power, to get wealth: will it follow that Israel getteth no riches at all, or that God doth not mediately by them and their in dustrie get them? I thinke not.

P. Prelate. 6. To whom can it be due to give the Kingly office, but to him only who is able to give the indument and abilitie for the office? now God only and immediately giveth abilitie to be a King, as the Sa­cramentall anointing proveth, Josh. 3. 10. Othniel is the first Judge after Joshua; and it is said, And the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and [Page 41] and he judged Israel; the like is said of Saul and David. Ans. God gave royall indowments immediatly, ergo he immediatly now ma­keth the King. It followeth not, for the species of government is not that which formally constituteth a King, for then Nero, Caligu­la, Iulian should not have been Kings, and those who come to the Crowne by conquest and blood, are essentially Kings, as the Prelate saith; but be all these Othniels, upon whom the spirit of the Lord com­meth? then they are not essentially Kings who are babes and chil­dren, and foolish and destitute of the royall endowments, but it is one thing to have a royall gift, and another thing to be formally cal­led to the Kingdome, David had royall gifts after Samuel anoynted him, but if you make him King, before Sauls death, Saul was both a traytor all the time that he persecuted David, and so no King, and also King and Gods anoynted, as David acknowledgeth him; and therefore that spirit that came on David, and Saul, maketh nothing against the peoples election of a King, as the Spirit of God is given to Pastors under the new Testament, as Christ promised; but it will not follow that the designation of the man who is to be Pastor, should not be from the Church and from men, as the Prelate denyeth that either the constitution or designation of the King is from the people, but from God onely. 2. I beleeve the infusion of the spirit of God upon the Iudges will not prove that Kings are now both con­stituted and designed of God solely, onely, and immediatly; for the Iudges were indeed immediatly and for the most part extraordina­rily raised up of God, and God indeed in the time of the Iewes was the King of Israel in another manner then he was the King of all the nations, and is the King of Christian Realmes now, and therefore the peoples despising of Samuel, was a refusing that God should reigne over them, because God in the Iudges revealed himselfe even in matters of Policy, as what should be done to the man that gathe­red sticks on the Sabbath day, and the like, as he doth not now to Kings.

P. Prelate. Soveraigntie is a ray of divine glory and majestie: but this cannot be found in people, whether you consider them joyntly, or singly; if you consider them singly, it cannot be in every individuall man; for Sectaries say, That all are born equall with a like freedom: and if it be not in the people singly, it cannot be in them joyntly; for all the contribution in this compact and contract which they fancie to be humane composition, and voluntary constitution, is onely, by a surren­der of the native right that every one had in himself; from whence [Page 42] then can this majestie and authoritie be derived? Again, where the obligation amongst equals is by contract and compact, violation of the faith, plighted in the contract, cannot in proper termes, be called disobe­dience, or contempt of authoritie▪ it is no more but a receding from, and a violation of that which was promised, as it may be in States or Counties confederate. Nature, reason, conscience, scripture, teach, That disobedience to Soveraign power is not onely a violation of Truth, breach of Covenant, but also high disobedience and contempt, as is clear, 1 Sam. 10. 26. So when Saul, Chap. 11. sent a yoak of Oxen, hewed in pieces, to all the Tribes, the fear of the Lord fell on the peo­ple, and they came out with one consent, 1 Sam. 11. 17. so Job 11. 18. He looseth the bonds of Kings, that is, he looseth their authoritie, and bringeth them in contempt; and he girdeth there loyns with a girdle, that is, he strengthneth their authoritie, and maketh the people to re­verence them. Heathens observe, that there [...] some divine thing in Kings. Prophane Histories say, that this was so eminent in Alexander the great, that it was a terrour to his enemies, and a power­full Loadstone to draw men to compose the most seditious Counsels, and cause his most experienced Commanders, embrace, and obey his counsel, and command. Some stories write, that upon some great exigence, there was some resplendent majestic in the eyes of Scipio. This kept Pharoah from lifting his hand against Moses, who charged him so boldly with his sins. When Moses did speak with God, face to face in the Mount, this resplendent glory of Majestie so awed the people, that they durst not behold his glory, Exod. 34. This repressed the fury of the people enraged against Gideon from destroying their idol, Judg. 6. And the fear of man is naturally upon all living creatures below, Gen. 9. So what can this reverence, which is innate in the hearts of all subjects toward their Soveraigns be, but the Ordinance unrepealable of God, and the naturall effect of that majestie of Princes, with which they are endowed with from above?

Ans. 1. I never heard any shadow of reason while now, and yetAntonin. de dominis Archi­epis. de dom. l. 6. c. 2. n. 5, 6. seq. (because the lie hath a latitude) here is but a shadow, which the Prelate stole from M. Antonius de Dominis Archiepisc. Spalatensis, and I may say confidently, this Plagiarius hath not one line in his booke which is not stollen; and for the present Spalato his argu­ment is but spilt, and the nerves cut from it, while it is both bleeding and famed. Let the Reader compare them, and I pawn my credit he hath ignorantly clipped Spalato: But I answer, 1. Soveraigntie is a beam and ray (as Spalato saith) of divine majestie, and is not either [Page 43] formally or virtually in the people. So he. It is false, that it is not virtu­ally in the people: for there be two things in the Iudge, either infe­rior or supream (for the argument holdeth in the majestie of a Parli­ament, as we shall hear) 1. The gift or grace of Governing (the Ar­minian Prelate will offend at this.) 2. The Authority of governing: 1. The gift is supernaturall, and is not in man naturally, and so not in the King; for he is physically but a mortall man, and this is a gift received; for Salomon asked it by prayer from God. There is a ca­pacitie passive in all individuall men for it: as for the officiall au­thoritie it self, it is virtually in all, in whom any of gods image is remaining, since the fall, as is clear; as may be gathered from, Gen. 1. 28. yea, the Father, the Master, the Judge, have it by Gods institution in some measure, over son, servant, and subject, though it be more in the supreme Ruler▪ and for our purpose, it is not re­quisite that authoritative majestie should be in all. (What is in the Father and Husband, I hope to clear) I mean, it needeth not to be formally in all, and so all are born alike and equall: But he who is a Papist, a Socinian, an Arminian, and therefore delivered to Satan by his mother Church, must be the Sectarie, for we are where this Prelate left us, maintainers of the Protestant Religion, con­tinued in the Confession of Faith, and Nationall Covenant of Scotland, when this Demas forsook us, and embraced the World. 2. Though not on single man in Israel be a Judge, or King by na­ture, nor have in them formally any ray of Royaltie, or of Magi­straticall Authoritie; yet it followeth not, that Israel Parliamenta­rily convened, hath no such authoritie, as to make Saul King inHow Sove­raigntie is in the people, and how not. Mizpah, and David King in Hebron, 1 Sam. 10. 24, 25. 1 Chro. 11. 1, 2. Chap. 12. 38, 39. One man alone hath not the Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven, (as the Prelate dreameth) But it followeth not, that many convened in a Church way, hath not this power, Matth. 18. 17. 1 Cor. 5. 1, 2, 3, 4. One man hath not strength to fight against an Army of ten thousand: doth it follow? Ergo, An Army of twenty thousand hath not strength to fight against these ten thousand: So one Paul cannot Synodically determine the question, Acts 15. It followeth not; Ergo, The Apostles, and El­ders, and Brethren, convened from divers Churches, hath not power to determine it in a lawfull Synod: And therefore, from a disjoyned and scattered power, no man can argue to a united power: So not any one man is an inferiour Ruler, or hath the rayes and beams of a number of Aristocraticall Rulers: but it followeth not. Ergo, All [Page 44] these men combined in a Citie, or Societie, have not power in a joynt Politicall body, to chose Inferiour or Aristocraticall Rulers. 3. The P. Prelates reason is nothing. All the Contribution (saith he) in the compact body to make a King, is onely by a surrender of the native right of every single man, (the whole being onely a voluntary constitu­tion.) How then can there be any majestie derived from them? I answer. Very well. For the surrender is so voluntary, that it is also naturall, and founded on the Law of nature, That men must have Governours, either many, or one supreme Ruler: And it is volun­tary, and dependeth on a positive institution of God, Whether the Government be by one supreme Ruler, as in a Monarchie, or in many, as in an Aristocracie, according as the necessitie and temper of the Common-wealth do most require. This Constitution is so voluntary, as it hath below it, the Law of nature for its generall foundation; and above it, the supervenient institution of God, or­daining, That there should be such Magistrates, both Kings, and other Iudges, because without such, all humane societies should be dissolved. 4. Individuall persons in creating a Magistrate, dothA Communi­ty doth not surrender their right and li­bertie to their Rulers, so much as their power active to do, and pas­sive to suffer unjust vio­lence. not properly surrender their right, which can be called a right; for they do but surrender their power of doing violence to these of their fellows in that same Communitie; so as they shall not now have Morall power to do injuries without punishment; and this is not right or libertie properly, but servitude: for a power to do violence and injuries, is not liberty, but servitude and bondage. But the Prelate talketh of Royaltie, as of meer Tyranny, as if i [...] were a proper Dominion, and servile Empire, that the Prince hath over his people, and not more paternall and fatherly, then lordly, or masterly. 5. He saith, Violation of faith plighted in a contract a­mongst equals, cannot be called disobedience, but disobedience to the authoritie of the Soveraign is not onely breach of Covenant; but high disobedience and contempt. But violation of faith amongst equals, as equals, is not properly disobedience; for disobedience is betwixt a superiour and an inferiour: but violation of faith amongst equals, when they make one of their equals their Iudge and Ruler, is not onely violation of truth, but also disobedience. All Israel and Saul while he is a private man seeking his fathers Asses, are equals by Covenant obliged one to another; and so any injury done by Is­rael to Saul in that case, is not disobedience, but onely violation of [...]aith; but when all Israel maketh Saul their King, and sweareth to him obedience, he is not now their equall, and an injury done to [Page 45] him now, is both a violation of their faith, and high disobedience also. Suppose a Citie of Aldermen, all equall amongst themselves in­dignitie and place, take one of their number, and make him their Major and Provost; a wrong done to him now, is not onely against the rules of fraternitie, but disobedience to one placed by God in authoritie over them. 6. 1 Sam. 11. 7. The fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent to obey Saul. Ergo, God hath placed authority in Kings, which is not in people: It is true, because God hath transferred the scattered authorities that are in all the people, in one Masse; and by vertue of his own Ordinance, hath placed them in one man who is King. What followeth? Ergo, God conferreth this authoritie immediately upon the King, without the mediation of any action of the people; yea, the contrary ra­therGods losing of the bond of Kings, by the mediation of the peoples dispising him, proveth against P. P. that the Lord taketh and giveth Royall Majesty mediately. followeth. 7. God looseth the bond of Kings; that is, when God is to cast off Kings, he causeth them to lose all authoritie, and maketh them come in contempt with the people. But what doth this prove? That God taketh away the majestie and authority of Kings immediately; And therefore God gave to Kings this autho­ritie Immediately, without the peoples conveiance? Yea, I take the Prelates weapon from him. God doth not take the authority of the King from him immediately, but mediately by the people their hating and dispising him, when they [...]ee his wickednesse, as the peo­ple see Nero a Monster, a prodigeous blood-sucker; upon this, all the people contemn him, and dispise him, and so the majesty is taken from Nero, and all his Mandates and Laws, when they see him trample upon all Laws divine and humane; and that mediately by the peoples heart, dispising of his majestie, and so they repeat and take again that aw-some authoritie, that they once gave him: And this proveth, that God gave him the authoritie mediately, by the consent of man. 8. Nor speaketh he of Kings onely, but Vers. 21. He powreth contempt [...] super munificos. Pineda. Aria. Mont. super Principes. Upon Nobles and great men. And this place may prove, That no Iudges of the earth are made by men. 9. The Heathen say, That there is some divinity in Princes, as in Alexander the great, toward his enemies, and Scipio: But this will prove, That Princes and Kings have a Superiority over those who are not their native Subjects; for something of God is in them, in relation to all men, that are not their Subjects. If this be a ground, strong and good, because God onely, and independently from men, taketh a­way this majestie; as God onely, and independently giveth it, then [Page 46] a King is sacred to all men, subjects, or not subjects; then it is un­lawfull to make war against any forraign King and Prince, for in invading him, or resisting him, you resist that divine majestie of God, that is in him; then you may not lawfully flee from a tyrant, no more then you may lawfully flie from God. 10. Scipio was not a King. Ergo, This divine majestie is in all Iudges of the earth, in a more or lesse measure. Ergo, God onely and immediately, may take this spark of divine majestie from inferiour Iudges: It follow­eth not. And Kings certainly cannot infuse any sparkle of a divine majestie, on any inferiour Iudges; for God onely, immediately in­fuseth it in men. Ergo, It is unlawfull for Kings to take this divini­tie from Iudges, for they resist God, who resist Parliaments, no lesse then those who resist Kings. Scipio hath divinity in him, as well as Cesar, and that immediately from God, and not from any King. 10. Moses was not a King when he went to Pharaoh, for he had not as yet a people; Pharaoh was the King, and because Pharaoh was a King, the Divines of Oxford must say, His Majestie must not, in words of rebuke, be resisted, more then by deeds. 11. Moses his face did shine as a Prophet receiving the Law from God, not as a King: and is this Sunshine of Heaven upon the face of Nero, and Julian? It must be, if it be a beam of Royall Majestie, if this prat­ler say right, but 2 Cor. 3. 7. this was a majestie typicall, which did adumbrate the glory of the Law of God, and is far from being a roy­altie due to all Heathen Kings. 12. I would our King would evidence such a Majestie in breaking the Images and Idols of his Queen, and of Papists about him. 13. The fear of Noah, and the regenerated, who are in Covenant with the Beasts of the field, Job. 5. 23. is upon the Beasts of the earth, not by any approbation only, as the people maketh Kings, by the Prelates way; nor yet by free con­sent, as the people freely transfer their power to him, who is King. The creatures inferiour to man, have by no act of freewill, chosen man to be their Ruler, and transferred their power to him, because they are by nature inferiour to man, and God by nature hath sub­jectedThe subordi­nation of crea­tures naturall, not voluntary as is the sub­ordination of people to Kings and Ru­lers. the creatures to man, Gen. 1. 28. and so this proveth not, that the King by nature is above the people, I mean the man who is King; and therefore though God had planted in the hearts of all subjects, a fear and reverence toward the King; upon supposall, that they have made him King: It followeth not, That this au­thoritie and majestie, is immediately given by God to the man who is King, without the interveening consent of the people; for there [Page 47] is a native feare in the Scholler to stand in awe of his Teacher, and yet the Scholler may willingly give himselfe to be a disciple to his Teacher, and so give his Teacher power over him. Citizens naturally feare their supreame Governour of the City, yet they give to the man who is their supream Governour, that power and Authority which is the ground of awe and reverence. A Servant naturally fea­reth his Master, yet often he giveth his liberty, and resigneth it up voluntarily to his Master, and this was not unordinary amongst the Iewes, where the servant did intirely love the Master, and is most ordinary now when servants doe for hyre, tye themselves to such a Master; and Souldiers naturally feare their Commanders, yet they may, and often doe, by voluntary consent make such men their Commanders; and therefore from this it followeth no way, that the Governour of a City, the Teacher, the Master, the Com­mander in War have not their power and authority only and imme­diatly from God, but from their inferiours, who by their free con­sent appointed them for such places.

P. Prelate. This seemeth, or rather is an unanswerable Argument,7. Arg. pag. 51. 52. The place Gen. 9. 5. He that sheddeth mans blood, &c. No man hath power of life and death, but the Soveraign Power of life and death; to wit God, Gen. 9. 5. God saith thrice he will require the blood of man at the hands of man, and this power God hath committed to Gods Deputy, who so sheddeth mans blood [...] by man shall die, by the King, for the world knew not any kind of goverment at this time, but Monarchiall; and this Monarch was Noah; and if this power be from God, why not all soveraigne power? seeing it is Homogeneous, and as [...]rists say in indivisibili posita, a thing in its nature indivisible, and that cannot be distracted, or impaired, and if every man had the power of life and death, God should not be the God of Order.

The P. Prelate taketh the paines to prove out of the text that a Magistracy is established in the text. Ans. 1. Let us consider this unanswerable Argument, 1. It is grounded upon a lye, and a con­jecture never taught by any but himselfe; to wit, that [...] by, or in, or through man, must signifie a Magistrate. 2. and a King onely. 3. This King was Noah, never interpreter; nay not com­mon sence can say, that no Magistrate is here understood but a King; the consequence is vaine, his blood shall be shed by man, ergo by a Magistrate, it followeth not, ergo by a King, it followeth not: there was not a King in the world yet as; some make Belus the fa­ther of Ninus the first King, and the builder of Babylon, this Ni­nus is thought the first builder of the City, after called Ninivie, and [Page 48] the first King of the Assyrians, so saith Quint. Curtius, l. 5. Quintus Curtius and o­thers; but grave Authors beleeve that Nimrod was no other then Belus the father of Ninus, so saith Aug. dc civ. Dei, l. 16. c. 17. Augustin, Euseb. in exo. Cronic. Hierome, Hieron. in c. 2. Hos. Eusebius, Euseb. l. 9. de prepar. Evan. c. 3. Hieronym. And Clemens recog. l. 4. Eusebius maketh him the first founder of Babylon: So saith Pirerius in Gen. c. 10. v. 8, 9. disp. 3. n. 67. Illud quoque mihi fit percre­dibile, Nimrod fuisse eundem, at (que) enim quem alii appellant Belum patrem Nini. Clemens, Euseb. pro­log l. 1. Chron. Pirerius; and Iose­phus saith the same. 1. their times, 2. their cruell natures are the same. Paul Oro­sius. l. 1. de Or­mesta mundi. Calvin saith, Noah yet lived while Nimrod lived: and the Scripture saith, Nimrod began to reigne, and be powerfull on the Earth. And Babel was [...] the beginning of his king­dome. No writer, Moses nor any other can shew us a King before Nimrod. So Hieron. in traditio Hebrei in Gen. Eusebius, Tostat. A­bulens. in Gen. c. 10. 9. 6. Paul. Orosius, Calvin com. Hieronym. Iosephus in c. 10. Ge. Iose­phus say that he was the first King. And Luth. cò. ib. Tostatus Abulens. and our own Musculus. Calvin, Ainsw. com. Luther, Morlar. Musculus on the place, and Pircrius in Gen. c. 9. v. 3, 4. n. 37. Vatablus hath divers interpretations; In homine, id est, in conspectu omnium & publicè, aut in homine, i. e. hominibus testificantibus. alii▪ iu homine, i. e. propter hominem, qui [...] occidit hominem, jussu magistratus. Cajotan expoundeth [...] contra hominem, in despight of man. Ainsworth, make him the first King, and the founder of Babylon. How Noah was a King, or there was any Monarchicall government in the world then, the Prelate hath alone dreamed it: There was but Familie-government before this. 2. And if there bee a Magistracie heere established by God, there is no warrant to say it is onely a Monarchie: For if the Holy Ghost in­tendeth a policie: it is a policie to be established to the worlds end, and not to bee limited (as the P. Prelate doth) to Noahs (h) Calvin com. in c. 9. Gen. dayes: all Interpreters upon good ground establish the same poli­cie that our Saviour speaketh of, when he saith, He shall perish by the sword, who taketh the sword, Matth. 26. 52. So the Netherlands have no lawfull Magistrate, who have power of life and death, because their Government is Aristocraticall, and they have no King. So all acts of taking away the lives of ill-doers, shall be acts of homicide in Holland: how absurd? 3. Nor doe I see how the place in the native scope doth establish a Magistracie. (s) Calvin saith not so: & Interpreters deduce by consequence the power of the Magistrate from this place. But the Text is generall: He who killeth man, shall be killed by man: either he shall fall into the Magistrates hand, or into the hand of some Murtherer: so Calvin, (t) Marlorat. And he speaketh (saith (w) Pirerius) not of the fact and event it selfe, but of the deserving of murtherers; and it's certaine, all murtherers fall not into the Magistrates hands; but he saith, by Gods and ma [...]s(q) Calv. com. Quanquam hoc loco non simpliter fertur lex politica, ut plectantur homicidae. (r) Calv. in lect. [Page 49] laws. Ergo, They ought to dye, though sometime one murtherer kil­leth another. 4. The Soveraign power is given to the King, ergo, it is given to him immediately without the consent of the people. It fol­loweth not. 5. Power of life and death is not given to the King only, but also to other Magistrates, yea, and to a single private man in the just defence of his own life. Other arguments are but what the Pre­late hath said already.

QUEST. VIII. Whether the Prelate proveth by force of reason, that the people can­not be capable of any power of Government?

P. Prelate. God and nature giveth no power in vain, and which may not be reduced into action; but an active power, or a power of actuall governing, was never acted by the Communitie; therefore this power cannot be seated in the Communitie as in the prime and pro­per subject; and it cannot be in every individuall person of a Commu­nitie, because Government intrinsecally and essentially includeth a spe­cified distinction of Governours, and some to be governed; and to speak properly, there can no other power be conceived in the Communitie naturally and properly, but only potestas passiva regiminis, a capacitie or susceptabilitie to be governed, by one or by moe, just as the first mat­ter desireth a forme. This obligeth all, by the dictate of Natures law, to submit to actuall government: and as it is in every individuall person, it is not meerly and properly voluntary, because howsoever nature di­ctates, that government is necessary for the safety of the society, yet e­very singular person, by corruption and selfe-love, hath a naturall a­versenesse and repugnancie to submit to any; every man would be a King himselfe: This universall desire, app [...]titus universalis aut natu­ralis, or universall propension to Government, is like the act of the un­derstanding assenting to the first undeniable principles of truth, and to the wills generall propension to happines in generall, which propension is not a free act, except our new Statists, as they have changed their faith, so they overturne true reason, it will puzzle them infinitely to make any thing in its kinde passive, really active and collative of positive acts and effects. All know, no man can give what he hath not: an old Phi­losopher would laugh at him who would say, that a matter perfected and actuated by union, with a forme, could at pleasure shake off its forme, and marrie it selfe to another: they may as well say, every wife hath power to resume her freedome, and marrie another, as that any such power active is in the Communitie, or any power to cast off Monarchie.

[Page 50] Ans. The P. Prelate might have thanked Spalato for this Argu­ment, but he doth not so much as cite him, for feare his theft be de­prehended, but Spalato hath it set downe with stronger nerves, then the Prelates head was able to copie out of him. But M. Anto. de domini. Arch. Spalatens. l. 6. c. 2. n. 5. 6. [...] potius he­b [...]t [...] na [...]ra, non t [...]m vim active rectivam aut gubernativam, quam inclinatio­nem passive re gibilem (ut ita loquar) & gu­bernabilem, qua volens & libens sese submittit rectoribus &c. Iac▪ de Almain, and Almain. de potest. & La. 1 q. 1. c. 1. 6. & q. 2. 3, 5. Navarrus, with the Parision Doctors said in the Concell of Paris, that politick power is immediately from God, but first from the community; but so, that the community apply their power to this o [...] that Government, not of liberty, but by naturall necessity, but Spalato and the Plagiarie Prelate doe both looke be­side the booke. The question is not now concerning the vis rectiva the power of governing in the people, but concerning the power of government, for these two dister much, the former is a power of ru­ling and Monarchicall commanding of themselves, this power is not formally in the people, but only vertually; and no reason can say, that a vertuall power is idle, because it cannot be actuated by that same subject that it is in, for then it should not be a vertuall, but a formall power. Doe not Philosophers say such a Hearb ver­tually maketh hot▪ and can the sottish Prelate say, this vertuall power is idle, and [...]vaine given of God, because it doth not for­mally(c) Navarrus heate your hand when you touch it. 2. The P. Prelate who(d) Nem. don▪ iud. not. 3. n. 85. In any commu­nity there are active and pas­sive power to government. is excommunicated for Popery, Socinianisme, Arminianisme, and is now turned Apostate to Christ, and his Church must have changed his faith▪ not we, and be reasonlesly ignorant to presse that axi­ome, that the power is idle that cannot be reduced to acts; for a gene­rative power is given to living and sensitive creatures, this power is not idle though it be not reduced in act, by all and every indivi­duall sensitive creature. A power of seeing is given to all who na­turally doe, or ought to see, yet it is not an idle power, because divers are blind, seeing it is put forth in action in divers of the kind; so this power in the community is not idle, because it is not put forth in acts in the people, in which it is vertually, and is put forth in action in some of them, whom they choose to be their Go­vernours; nor is it reasonable to say that it should be put forth in action by all the people, as if all should be Kings and Governours. But the question is not of the power of governing in the people, but of the power of Government, that is, of the power of making Go­vernours and Kings, and the community doth put forth in act this power, as a free, voluntary, and active power, for 1. a Commu­nity transplanted to India or any place of the world, not before in­habited have a perfect liberty to choose either a Monarchy, or a [Page 51] Democracy, or an Aristocracy; for though nature incline them to Government in generall, yet are they not naturally determina­ted to any one of those three, more than another. 2. Israel did of their free will choose the change of government, and would have a King, as the Nations had, ergo they had free will, and so an active power so to doe, and not a a passive inclination only to be governed, such as Spalato saith agreeth to the first matter, 3, Royalists teach that a people under Democracy, or Aristocracy have liberty to choose a King, and the Romanes did this, ergo they had an active power to do it, ergo the Prelates simile crookes, the matter at its plea­sure cannot shake off its forme, nor the wife cast off her husband being once married; but Barclaius, Grotius, Arnisaens, Blackwood, and all the Royalists teach that the people under any of these two formes of Democracy or Aristocracy, may resume their power, and cast off these formes and choose a Monarch, and if Monarchy be the best government as Royalists say, they may chose the best, and is this but a passive capacity to be governed? 2. Of ten men fit for a King­dome they may designe one, and put the Crowne on his head, and refuse the other nine, and Israel crowned Solomon and refused Ado­niah. Is this not a voluntary action, proceeding from a free active, elective power? It will puzzle the pretended Prelate to deny this, that which the community doth freely, they doe not from such a passive capacity, as is in the first matter, in regard of the forme. 3. It is true that people through corruption of nature are averse to sub­mit to Governours, for conscience sake, and as to the Lord, because the naturall man remaining in the state of nature can doe nothing that is truely good, but it is false that men have no active Morall power to submit to superiours, but only a passive capacity to be go­verned, he quite contradicteth himselfe, for he said before, c. 4. pag. 49. that there is an innate feare and reverence in the hearts of all men naturally, even in Heathen toward their Severaign; yea as we have a naturall morall active power to love our Parents and supe­riours (though it be not Evangelically, or legally in Gods Court, good) and so to obey their commandements, only we are averse to penall Lawes of superiours; but this proveth no way, that we have only by nature, a passive capacity to government; for Heathens have by instinct of nature both made Lawes morally good, submit­ted to them, set Kings and Iudges over them; which clearely pro­veth that men have an active power of Government by nature. [Page 52] 4. yea, what difference maketh the Prelate betwixt men and beasts, for beasts have a capacity to be governed, even Lyons and Tigers; but here is the matter, if men have any naturall power of Go­vernment, the P. Prelate would have it with his brethren Iesuites and Arminians to be not naturall, but done by the helpe of univer­sall grace, for so doe they confound nature and grace. But it is certaine our power to submit to Rulers and Kings as to rectors, and guides and fathers, is naturall, to submit to Tyrants in doing ills of sinne, is naturall, but in suffering ills of punishment its not naturall. 5. No man can give that which he hath not, is true, but that people have no power to make their Governours, is that which is in questi­on, and denyed by us. 6. This argument doth prove that people hath no power to appoint Aristocraticall Rulers more then Kings, and so the Aristocraticall and Democraticall Rulers are all inviolable and sacred, as the King. 2. by this the people may not resume their freedome if they turne tyrants and oppressors; this the Prelate shall deny, for he averreth, p. 96. out of Augustine, that the people may without sin change a corrupt Democracy into a Monarchy.

P. Prelate. If Soveraignty be originally inherent in the people, thenPag. 95, 96. Democracy, or Government by the people, were the best Government, because it commeth nearest to the fountaine and streame of the first and radicall power in the people, yea and all other formes of government were unlawfull; and if Soveraignty be natively inherent in the multi­tude, it must be proper to every individuall of the community, which is against that false Maxime of theirs, Quisque nascitur liber, every one by nature is borne a free man, and the posterity of those who first con­tracted with their elected King, are not bound to that Couenant, but upon their native rest and liberty, may appoint another King without breach of covenant. The posterity of Ioshua, and the Elders in their time, who contracted with the Gibeonites to incorporate them, though in a serving condition, might have made their fathers government nothing.

Ans. The P. Prelate might thanke Spalato for this Argument al­so,Spalatensis, I­bid. pag. 648. for it is stollen, but he never once nameth his name, lest his theift should be deprehended; so are his other Arguments stollen from Spalato, but the Prelate weakeneth them, and it is seene, stol­len goods are not blessed. Spalato saith then, by the law of nature every Common-wealth should be governed by the people, and by the law of nature, the people should be under the badest Govern­ment▪ but this consequence is nothing; for community of many fami­lies [Page 53] is formally and of themselves under no government, but may choose any of the three, for popular government is not that where­inPopular Go­vernment is not that in which the whole people are Governors. People by na­ture, are equal­ly indifferent to all the three forms of Go­vernment. all the people are Rulers, for this is confusion, no government, because all are Rulers, and none are governed and ruled; but in popular government many are chosen out of the people to rule, and that this is the worst government, is said gratis, without warrant, and if Monarchy be the best of it selfe, yet when men are in the state of sin, in some other respects, it hath many inconveniences. 2. I see not how Democracie is best, because neerest to the multi­tudes power of making a King; for if all the three depend upon the free will of the people, all are alike a far off, and alike neer hand, to the peoples free choice, according as they see most conducible for the safety and protection of the Common-wealth: And seeing the forms of Government are no more naturall, then politick Incorpo­rations of Cities, yea, then of Shires: But from a positive instituti­on of God who erecteth this form, rather then this, not immediate­ly now, but mediately by the free will of men; not one cometh for­mally, and e [...] naturâ rei, neerer to the fountain then another, except that materially Democracie may come neerer to the peoples power, then Monarchie, but the excellencie of it above Monarchie, is not hence concluded; for by this reason, the number of four should be more excellent then the number of five, of ten, of an hundreth, of a thousand, or of millions, because four cometh neer to the number of three, which Aristotle calleth the first perfit number, cui additur [...] of which yet formally all doe alike share in the nature and essence of number. 2. It is denied, that it followeth from this antecedent, The people have power to chose their own Governours. Ergo, All Governments, except Democracie, or Government by the people, must be sinfull and unlawfull. 1. Because Government by Kings is of Divine institution, and of other Iudges also, as is evi­dent by Gods Word, Rom. 13. 1, 2, 3. Deut. 17. 14. Prov. 8. 15, 16. 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14. Psal. 2. 10, 11, &c. 2. Power of chosing any form of Government, is in the people: Ergo, There is no Government lawfull, but popular Government; it followeth no wayes, but pre­supposeth that power to chose any form of Government, must be formally actuall Government, which is most false, yea, they be con­trary, as the prevalency or power, and the act are contrary, so these two are contrary, or opposite; neither is Soveraigntie, nor any Go­vernment formally inherent in either the Communitie, by nature, [Page 54] nor in any one particular man, by nature; and that every man is born free, so as no man, rather then his brother, is born a King andSpalato 16. August. de lih. arb. l. 1. c. [...]. Si depravatus populus rem pri­vatam Reipub. preferat. atque haheat venale suffragium cor ruptusque ab iis qui honores a­mant, regnum in s [...]factiosis con­s [...]eleratisque committat; non ne item rectê, si quis tunc extile­rit vir bonus qui plurimum posfit, adimat huic populo po­testatem dandi honores, & in pavcorum bo­norum, vel etiam unjus red regat arbitri­um? Pag. 97. sacr. sanc. regum majest. Ruler, I hope, God willing to make good, so as the Prclate shall never answer on the contrary. 3. It followeth not, that the Poste­ritie living, when their Fathers made a Covenant with their first elected King, may without any breach of Covenant on the Kings part, make voyd and null their Fathers election of a King, and chose another King, because the lawfull Covenant of the Fathers in point of Government, if it be not broken, tieth the children; but it cannot deprive them of their lawfull libertie naturally inherent in them to chose the fittest man to be King: But of this hereafter more fully. 4. Spalato addeth, (the Prelate is not a faithfull theef) If the Communitie by the Law of nature, have power of all forms of Government, and so should be, by nature, under popular Government, and yet should refuse a Monarchy, and an Aristocracie; yet Augustine addeth, If the people should preferre their own private gain to the pub­like good, and sell the Common-wealth, then some good man might take their libertie from them, and against their will er [...]ct a Monarchie, or an Aristocracie: But 1. the Prelate and Augustine, supposeth the people to be under Popular Government; this is not our case, for Spalato and the Prelate presupposeth by our grounds, that the peo­ple by nature, must be under Popular Government; Augustine dreameth no such thing, and we deny that by nature, they are under any form of Government. 2. Augustine in a case most considerable, thinketh one good, and potent man, may take the corrupt peoples power of giving Honours, and making Rulers from them, and give it to some good men, few, or many, or to one; then Augustine lay­eth done as a ground, that which Spalato and the Prelate denieth, That the people hath power to appoint their own Rulers; other­wayes, how could one good man take that power from them? And the Prelates fifth Argument, is but a Branch of the fourth Argu­ment, and is answered already.

P. Prelate, Chap. 11. He would prove, That Kings of the peoples making, are not blessed of God. The first creature of the peoples making, was Abimelech, Iudg. 9. 22. who reigned onely three yeers, well neer Anti-Christs time of endurance; he came to it by blood, and an evil spirit rose betwixt him, and the men of Sechem, and he made a miserable end. The next was Ieroboam, who had this Motto, He made Israel to sin, the people made him King, and he made the same [Page 55] pretence of a glorious Reformation, that our Reformers now make, new Calves, new Altars, new Feasts are erected; they banish the Levites, and take in the scum and drosse of the vulgar, &c. 3. Every action of Christ, is our instruction; Christ was truely a born King, notwith­standing, when the people would make him a King, he disclaimed it, he would not be an arbiter betwixt two brethren differing.

Answ. I am not to follow the Prelates order every way, though God willing, I shall reach him in the fore-going Chapters. Nor purpose I to answer his treasonable railing against his own Nation, and the Iudges of the Land, whom God hath set over this seditious excommunicated Apostate. He layeth to us frequently the IesuitesThe P. Prelate holdeth the Pope not to be the Antichrist, but that as Pa­pists say, the Antichrist shal be one single man. Tenets, when as he is known himself to be a Papist: In this Argu­ment he faith, Abim [...]lech did reigne onely three yeers, well neer Anti-Christs reign: Is not this the basis, and the mother principle of Popery, That the Pope is not the Antichrist? for the Pope hath con­tinued many ages. 1. He is not an individuall man, but a race of men, but the Antichrist, saith Belarmine, Stapleton, Becanus, and the nation of Iesuites, and Poplings, shall be one inviduall man, a born Iaw, and shall reign onely three yeers and a half. But 1. The Argument from successe, proveth nothing, except the Prelate proveThe bad suc­cesse of Kings chosen by the people proveth nothing, be­cause Kings chosen by God had bad suc­cesse, through their own wic­kednesse. their bad successe to be from this, because they were chosen of the people. When as Saul chosen of God, and most of the Kings of Israel and Judah, who undeniably, had Gods cal [...]ing to the Crown, were not blessed of God, and their Government was a ruine to [...]oth people and Religion, as the people were removed to all the King­doms of the earth, for the sins of Manass [...]h, Iere. 15. 4. Was there­fore Manasseh not lawfully called to the Crown? 2. For his in­stance of Kings unlawfully called to the Crown, he bringeth us, whole two, and telleth us, that he doubteth as many learned men do, Whether Ieroboam was a King by permission onely, or by a commission from God. 3. Abimelech was cursed, because he wanted Gods calling to the throne, for then Israel had no King, but Iudges ex­traordinarily raised up by God, and God did not raise him at all, only he came to the throne by blood, and carnall reasons moving the men of Sechem to advance him: The Argument presupposeth, that the whole lawfull calling of a King, is the voices of the people; This we never taught, though the Prelate make conquest a just title to a Crown, and it is but a title of blood and rapine. 4. Abimelech was not the first King, but onely a Iudge; all our Divines with the [Page 56] Word of God maketh Saul the first King. 5. For Ieroboam he had Gods Word and Promise to be King, 1 King. 11. 34, 35, 37, 38. But in my weak judgement he waited not Gods time, and way of coming to the Crown; but that his coming to the throne was un­lawfull, because he came by the peoples election, is in question. 5. That the peoples Reformation, and their making a new King, wasThe P. Prelate condemneth King Charles his ratifying in Parliament, 2. An. 1641. the proceed­ings of Scot­land in this present Refor­mation. like the Kingdom of Scotlands Reformation, and the Parliament of Englands way now, is a traiterous calumny. For 1. It condemneth the King, who hath in Parliament declared all their proceedings to be legall. Rehoboam never declared Ieroboams Coronation to be lawfull, but contrary to Gods Word made war against Israel. 2. It is false that Israel pretended Religion in that change, the cause was the rough answer given to the supplication of the Estates, complain­ing of their oppression, they were under in Solomons reign. 3. Re­ligion is still subjected to policie by Prelates and Caveliers, not by us in Scotland, who sought nothing but Reformation of Religion, of Laws, so far as they serve Religion, as our Supplications, De­clarations, and the event proveth. 4. We have no new Calves, new Altars, new Feasts, but professe, and really do hazard life and estate, to put away the Prelates Calves, Images, Tree-worship, Al­tar-worship, Saints Feast-dayes, Idolatry, Masses; and nothing is said here but Jesuites, and Cananites, and Baalites, might say, (though salsly) against the Reformation of Iosiah: Trueth and purity of worship this yeer, is new in relation to Idolatry the last yeer, but it is simpliciter older. 5. We have not put away the Lords Priests, and Levites, and taken in the scum of the vulgar, but have put away Baals Priests, such as excommunicated Prelate Maxwel, and other Apostates, and resumed the faithfull servants of God, who were deprived and banished, for standing to the Protestant Faith sworn too, by the Prelates themselves. 6. Every action of Christ, such as his walking on the Sea, is not our instruction in that sense, that Christs refusing a Kingdom, is directly our instruction: And did Christ refuse to be a King, because the people would have made him a King? that is, non causa pro causa; he refused it, because his Kingdom was not in this world, and he came to suffer for men, not to reign over man. 7. The Prelate and others who were Lords of Session, and would be Iudges of mens Inheritances, and would usurpe the sword by being Lords of Counsell, and Parliament, have refused to be instructed by every Action of Christ, who would not judge betwixt brother and brother.

[Page 57] P. Prelate. Jephtah came to be a Iudge by Covenant, betwixt him and the Gileadites; here you have an interposed Act of man, yet the Lord himself in authorizing him as Iudge, vindicateth it no lesse to himself, then when extraordinarily he authorized Gideon and Samuel, 1 Sam. 12. 11. Ergo, whatsoever act of man interveeneth, it contri­buteth nothing to Royall Authority, it cannot weaken or repeal it.

Answ. It was as extraordinary that Jepthah a bastard, and the sonne of an harlot, should be Iudge, as that Gideon should be Iudge. God vindicateth to himselfe, that he giveth his people favour in theThat any are supreme Iudg­es, is an emi­nent act of speciall provi­dence, which hindereth no [...] but that the King is made by the people. eyes of their enemies; but doth it follow, that the enemies are not agents, and to be commended for their humanitie in favouring the people of God? So Psal. 65. 9, 10. God maketh corne to grow; there­fore clouds, and earth, and sun, and summer, and husbandry con­tributeth nothing to the growing of corne. But this is but that which he said before. We grant that this is an eminent and singular act of Gods speciall providence, that he moveth and boweth the wills of a great multitude to promote such a man, who by nature commeth no more out of the wombe a crowned King, then the poorest shep­herd in the land: and it is an act of grace to endue him with he­roick and royall parts for the government. But what is all this? doth it exclude the peoples consent? in no wayes. So the works of supernaturall grace, as to love Christ above all things, to beleeve in Christ in a singular manner, are ascribed to the rich grace of God: but can the Prelate say, that the understanding and will in these acts are meere patients, and contribute no more then the people contribu­teth to Royall authority in the King, and that is just nothing, by the Prelates way? And we utterly deny, that as water in baptisme hath no action at all in the working of remission of sinnes, so the peopleThe people not patients, in making a King, as is water in pro­ducing grate baptisme. hath no influence in making a King, for the people are worthier, more excellent then the King, and they have an active power of ruling and directing themselves toward the intrinfecall end of humane po­licie, which is the externall safety and peace of a societie, in so far as there are morall principles of the Second Table for this effect written in their heart, and therefore that royall authoritie, which by Gods speciall providence, is united in one King, and as it were over­gilded and lustered with Princely grace and royall endowments, is diffused in the people, for the people hath an after-approbative con­sent in making a King, as Royalists confesse, water hath no such a­ction in producing grace.

QUEST. IX. Whether or no Soveraigntie is so from the people, that it remaineth in them in some part, so as they may in case of necessitie resume it?

THe Prelate will have it Babylonish confusion, that we are divided in opinion. Jesuites (saith he) place all Soveraigntie in the com­munitie. Of the Sectaries; some warrant any one subject to make away his King, and that such a worke is no lesse to be rewarded then when one killeth a wolfe: Some say, this power is in the whole Communitie: some will have it in the collective body, not conveened by warrant or writ of Soveraignty, but when necessitie (which is often fancied) of re­forming State and Church, calleth them together. Some in the Nobles, and Peeres, some in the three Estates assembled by the Kings writ, some▪ in the inferour Iudges.

I answer: If the Prelate were not a Iesuite himselfe, he would not bid his brethren take the mote out of their eye: but there is no­thingBarclaius contr. Monarch. l. 4. c. 10. p. 268. ut hostes publicos non solù ab uni­verso populo, sed [...] singulis etiam impeti oaedi (que) jure optimo posse tota Antiquitas censuit. here said but which Barclaius said better before this Plaga­rius. To which I answer, We teach that any private man may kill a a Tyrant voyd of all title: and a great Royalist Barclaius saith so also. And if he have not the consent of the people, he is an usurper, for we know no externall lawfull calling that Kings have now, or their familie to the Crown, but only the call of the people; all other calls to us are now invisible and unknown, and God would not command us to obey Kings, and leave us in the darke, that we shall not know who is the King: the Prelate placeth his lawfull calling to the Crown in such an immediate, invisible, and subtile act of omnipoten­cie, as that whereby God conferreth remission of sinnes by sprink­ling with water in baptisme, and that whereby God directed Sa­muel to annoint Saul and David, not Eliab, nor any other brother. It is the Devill in the P. P. not any of us, who teach that any private man may kill a lawfull King, though tyrannous in his government. For the subject of Royall power, we affirme, the first, and ultimate,How the peo­ple is the sub­ject of Sove­raigntie. and native subject of all power is the Communitie, as reasonable men naturally inclining to a societie: but the ethicall and politicall subject, or the legall and positive receptacle of this power is vari­ous, according to the various constitutions of the policie. In Scot­land and England, it is the three Estates of Parliament, in other Na­tions some other Iudges or Peeres of the Land. The Prelate had no more common sense for him to object a confusion of opinions to us, [Page 59] for this, then to all the Common-wealths on earth, because all have not Parliaments, as Scotland hath; all have not Constables, and Offi­cials, and Churchmen, Barons, Lords of Councell, Parliaments, &c. as England had. But the truth is, the Communitie orderly convee­ned, as it includeth all the Estates civill, have hand, and are to act in choosing their Rulers: I see not what priviledge Nobles have above Commons in a Court of Parliament, by Gods law; but as they are Iudges, all are equally Iudges, and all make up one congregation of Gods. But the question now is, if all power of governing (the Prelate, to make all the people Kings, saith, if all Soveraignty) be so in the people, that they retaine power to guard themselves against Ty­ranny? And, if they reteine some of it, habitu, in habit, and in their power? I am not now unseasonably, according to the Prelates order, to dispute of the power of lawfull defence against tyranny; but I lay down this maxime of Divinitie; Tyranny being a worke of Sa­than, is not from God, because sinne either habituall or actuall, is not from God, the power that is, must be from God; the Magistrate as Magistrate, is good, in nature of office, and the intrinsecall end of his office, Rom. 13. 4. for he is the Minister of God for thy good; and therefore a power ethicall, politick, or morall, to oppresse, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and is no more from God, but from sinfull nature, and the old serpent, then a license to sinne: God in Christ giveth pardons of sinne; but the Pope, not God, giveth dispensations to sinne. 2. To this adde, If for nature to defend it selfe be lawfull, no Communitie, without sin, hath power to alienate and give away this power: for as no power given to man to murther his brother, is of God, so no power to suffer his brother to be murthered, is of God; and no power to suffer him­selfe (à fortiori) far lesse can be from God. Here I speake not of phy­sicall power, for if free will be the creature of God, a physicall power to acts which in relation to Gods law are sinfull, must be from God.

But I now follow the P. Prelate. Some of the adversaries, as Bu­chanan, Sac. Reg. Maj. The sacred and royall prero­gative of Kings c. 9. p. 101. 102. say that the Parliament hath no power to make a law, but on­ly a [...] without the approbation of the Communitie. Others, as the the Observator, say, that the right of the Gentry and Commu­nalty is intirely in the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Com­mons, and will have their Orders irrevocable. If then the commonStollen from Barclaius. people cannot resume their power, and oppose the Parliament, how can Tables and Parliaments resume their power, and resist the King?

[Page 60] Answ. The ignorant man should have thanked Barclaius for this Argument, and yet Barclaius need not thanke him, for it hath not the nerves that Barclaius gave it. But I answer, 1. if the Par­liament should have been corrupted by fair hopes (as in our age we have seene the like) the people did well to resist the Prelates ob­truding the Masse Booke, when the Lords of the Counsell pressed it against all Law of God and man, upon the Kingdome of Scotland, and therefore it is denyed that the Acts of Parliament are irrevoca­ble, the observator said they were irrevocable by the King, he be­ing but one man, the P. Prelate wrongeth him, for he said onely,The power of Parliaments. they have the power of a Law, and the King is obliged to con­fent, by his Royall Office to all good Lawes, and neither King nor people may oppose them. Buchanan said Acts of Parliament are not Lawes obliging the people till they be promulgated, and the peo­ples silence when they are promulgated is their approbation, and maketh them obligatory Lawes to them; but if the people speak against unjust Lawes, they are not Lawes at all, and Buchannan knew the power of the Scottish Parliament, better then this ignorant Sta­tist. 2. There is not like reason to grant so much to the King, as to Parliaments, because certainly Parliaments who make Kings under God, or above any one man, and they must have more authority and wisedome then any one King, except Solomon (as base flatte­rersThe Parlia­ment hath more power then the King. say) should returne to the thrones of the earth. And as the power to make just Lawes is all in the Parliament, only the people have power to resist tyrannicall Lawes, the power of all the Parlia­ment was never given to the King, by God, the Parliament are as essentially Iudges as the King, and therefore the Kings deed may well be revoked, because he acteth nothing as King; but united with his great or lesser Councell, no more then the eye can see, be­ing separated from the body. The Peeres and Members of Parlia­ment have more then the King, because they have both their owne power, being parts and speciall Members of the people, and also they have their high places in Parliament, either from the peoples ex­presse, or tacite consent. 3. We allow no Arbitrary power to the Parliament, because their just Lawes are irrevocable, for the irre­vocable power of making just Lawes doth argue a legall, not an ir­reovocable Arbitrary power; nor is there any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortall man, but of the Covenant betwixt King and people hereafter.

[Page 61] P. Prelate, If Soveraigne power be habitually in the community so, C. 10. pag. 105. as they may resume it at their pleasure, then nothing is given to the King but an empty title, for at the same instant he receiveth Empire and Soveraignty, and layeth downe the power to rule or determine in matters which concerne either private or publick good, and so he is both a King and a Subject. Ans. This naked consequence the Prelate sayeth, and proveth not, and we deny it, and give this reason, the King receiveth Royall power with the States to make good Lawes, and 2. power by his royalty to execute those Lawes, and this power the community hath devolved in the hands of the King, and States of Parliament, but the community keepeth to themselves a power to resist tyranny, and to coerce it, and eatenus in so far is Saul sub­ject, that David is not to compeare before him, nor to lay downe Goliahes sword, nor disband his Army of defence, though the King should command him so to doe.

P. Prelate. By all Polititians, Kings, and enferiour MagistratesC. 16. 105, 106, 107. are differenced by their different specifice entity, but by this they are not differenced; nay a Magistrate is in a better condition then a King, for the Magistrate is to judge by a knowne Statute and Law, and cannot be censured and punished but by Law. But the King is censurable, yea disabled by the multitude, yea the basest of sub­jects may cite, and convent the King, before the underived Majesty of the community, and he may be judged by the Arbitrary Law thut is in the closet of their heart, not only for reall misdemeanour, but for fancied jealousies—It will be said, good Kings are in no danger—the contrary appeareth this day, and ordinarily the best are in greatest danger; no Government except Plato'es Republick wanteth incommodities, subtile spirits may make them, apprehend them. The poore people bewitched, fol­low Absolom in his treason, they strike not at Royalty at first, but labour to make the Prince, naked of the good counsell of great Statesmen, &c.

Ans. Whether the King and the under Magistrate differ essenti­ally,Iudges and Kings differ. we shall see. The P. Prelate saith all Polititians grant it, but he saith untruth; he bringeth Moses, and the Iudges, their power to prove the power of Kings; and so either the Iudges of Israel and the Kings differ not essentially, or then the Prelate must correct the spirit of God tearming one booke of Scripture [...] Kings, and another [...] Iudges, and make the booke of Kings the booke of Iudges. 2. The Magistrates condition is not better then the Kings, because the Magistrate is to judge by an knowne Statute and [Page 62] Law, and the King not so. God moulded the first King, Deut. 17. 18. when he sitteth judging on his Throne, to looke to a written Cop­py of the Law of God, as his rule. Now a power to follow Gods Law is better then a power to follow mans sinfull will: so the Prelate putteth the King in a worse condition then the Magistrate, not we, who will have the King to judge according to just statutes and lawes. 3. Whether the King be censurable and deposable by the multitude, he cannot determine out of our writings. 4. The com­munities law is the law of nature, not their arbitrary lust. 5. The Prelates treasonable raylings, I cannot follow; he first saith, that we agree not ten of us to a positive faith, and that our faith is nega­tive, but his faith is Privative, Popish, Socinian, Arminian, Pelagi­an and worse, for he was once of that same faith that we are of. 2. Our Confession of Faith is positive, as the confession of all the reformed Churches, but I judge he thinketh the Protestant Faith of all the reformed Churches but negative. 3. The incommodities of Government before our reformation were not fancied, but prin­ted by Authority, all the body of Popery was printed, and avowed as the Doctrine of the Church of Scotland and England, as the lear­ned Author, and my much respected brother evidenceth in his Ludensium, [...], The Canterburian selfe conviction. 4. The Parliament of England was never yet found guilty of Trea­son. 5. The good Counsellers of great States-men, that Parliaments of both Kingdomes would take from the Kings Majesty, are a faction of perjured Papists, Prelates, Iesuites, Irish cut-throates, Strafords, and Apostate subverters of all Lawes divine, humane, of God, of Church, of State.

P. Prelate. In whom so ever this power of Government be, it is the Cap. [...]5. p. 147 148. onely remedy to supply all defects, and to set right what ever is disjoyn­ted in Church and State, and the subject of this super-intending power must be free from all errour in Iudgement and Practice, and so we have a Pope in temporalibus; and if the Parliament erre, the people must take order with them, else God hath left Church and State reme­dilesse. Ans. This is stollen from Barolaius also; 1. but the same Bar­claius Barclaius contra Monarchum. l. 5. c. 12. Idem. l. 3 c. ult pag. 2, 3. saith, Si Rex regnum suum alien [...] ditioni manciparit, regno ca­dit. If the King shall sell his Kingdome, or inslave it to a forraigne power, he falleth from all right to his Kingdome: but who shall exe­cute any such Law against him, not the people, not the Peeres, not the Parliament; for this Mancipium ventris & aulae, this slave [Page 63] saith, p. 147. I know no power in any to punish or curbe Soveraignty, but in Almighty God. 2. We see no super-intending power on earth in King or people infallible, nor is the last power of taking order with a Prince who inslaveth his Kingdome to a forraigne powerPeople may resume their power in some cases, not be­cause they are infallable, but because they cannot so ea [...]i­ly erre as one man. placed by us in the people, because they cannot erre; Court flatte­rer [...] ▪ who teach that the will of the Prince is the measure of all right and wrong, of Law and no Law; and above all Law must hold that the King is a temporall Pope, both in Ecclesiasticall and Civill mat­ters; but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves, (the law of Nature having given to them a contrary internall principle of selfe preservation) as a Tyrant who doth care for himselfe, and not for the people. 3. And because Extremis morbis extrema re­media in an extraordinary exigent, when Achab and Iezabell did undoe the Church of God, and Tyrannize▪over both the bodies and consciences of Priest, Prophet, and people, Elias procured the con­vention of the States, and Elias with the peoples helpe killed all Baals Priests, the King looking on, and no question, against his heart. In this case I thinke its more then evident that the people resumed their power. 4. We teach not that people should supply all defects in Government, nor that they should use their power when any thing is done amisse by the King, no more then the King is to cut off the whole people of God, when they refuse an Idolatrous service obtruded upon them against all Law; the people is to suf­fer much before they resume their power, but this Court slave will have the people to doe what he did not himselfe, for when King and Parliament summoned him, was he not obliged to appeare? Non-compearance when lawfull, royall, and Parliamentory power summoneth, is no lesse resistance, then taking of Forts and Castles.

P. Prelate. Then this super-intending power in people, may call a King to accompt, and punish him for any misdemeanour, or act of in­justice. Why might not the people of Israels Peeres, or Sanedrin have convented David before them, judged and punished him for his▪ Adul­tery with Bathsheba, and his murther of Uriah; but it is holden by all, that Tyranny should be an intended universall, totall, manifest destruction of the whole Common-wealth, which cannot fall in the thoughts of any but a mad man. What is recorded in the Story of Nero his wish in this kind, may be rather judged the expression of transpor­ted passion, then a fixed resolution.

Ans. The P. Prelate contrary to the scope of his booke, which is [Page 64] all for the subject and seat of Soveraigne power, against all order hath plunged himselfe in the deep of Defensive armes, and yet hath no new thing. 1. Our law of Scotland will warrant any subject, if the King take from him his heritage, or invade his possession against Law, to resist the invaders, and to summon the Kings intruders before the Lords of Session for that act of injustice: Is this against Gods Word, or Conscience? 2. The Sanc­drim did not punish David; Ergo, it is not lawfull to chal­lenge a King for any one act of injustice: from the practice of the Sanedrim, to conclude a thing lawfull or unlawfull, is logick; we may resist. 3. By the P. Prelates doctrine, the law might not put Bathshebah to death, nor yet Joab the neerest agent of the mur­theringThat the San­edrim puni­shed not David, Bathsheha, Ioab, proveth no­thing in law, as a fact or non fact is not law. of innocent Ʋriah, because Bathshebaes adulterie was the Kings adulterie, she did it in obedience to King David: Joabs mur­ther was Royall murther, as the murther of all the Cavaliers; for he had the Kings hand-writing for it. Murther is Murther, and the murtherer is to dye, though the King by a secret Let alone, a private and illegall warrant command it. Ergo, the Sanedrim might have taken Bathshebaes life, and Joabs head also: and consequently the Parliament of England, if they be Judges (as I conceive God and the Law of that ancient and renowned Kingdome maketh them) may take the head of many Joabs and Jermines, for murther; [...]or the command of a King cannot legitimate murther. 4. David himselfe, as King, speaketh more for us then for the Prelate, 2 Sam. 12. 7. And Davids anger was greatly kindled against the man, (the man was himselfe, v. 7. Thou art the man) and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this, shall surely dye. 5. Every act of injustice doth not un-King a Prince before God, as every act of uncleannesse doth not make a wife no wife before God. 6. The Pre­late excuseth Nero, and would not have him resisted, if all Rome were one neck, that he might cut it off with one stroke (I read it of Cali­gula; If the Prelate see more in Historie then I doe, I yield.) 7. He saith, the thoughts of totall eversion of a Kingdome, must only fall on a mad man. The King of Britaine was not mad, when he declared the Scots Traytors, because they resisted the service of the Masse; and raised an Army of Prelaticall cut-throats to destroy them, if all the Kingdome should resist Idolatry, (as all are obliged.) The King sleeped upon this Prelaticall resolution many moneths: passions in servor have not a dayes raigne upon a man. And this was not so [Page 65] cleare as the sun, but it was as cleare as written printed Proclama­tions, and the pressing of Souldiers, and the visible marching of Cut-throats, and the blocking of Scotland up by sea and land could be visible to men having five senses.

Covaruv. a▪ great Lawyer, saith, 1. that all Civill power is penes (a) Covarruvi­as, tom. 2. pract. quest.▪ c. 1. n. 2. 3. 4. remp. in the hands of the Common-wealth. 1. Because Nature hath given to man to be a sociall creature, and impossible he can preserve himselfe in a societie, except he being in communitie, transforme his power to an head. 2. He saith; Hujus vero civilis societatis & resp. rector ab alio quam ab ipsamet repub. constitui non potest justè & abs (que) Tyrannide. Siquidem ab ipso Deo constitutus non est, [...]ec electus cui­libet civili societati immediatè Rex aut Princeps. Arist. polit. 3. c. 10. saith, It is better that Kings got by election then by birth; because Kingdomes by succession are verè regia, truly Kingly: these by birth are more Tyrannicall, masterly, and proper to Barbarous Nations. And Covarruvias, tom. 2. pract. quest. de jurisd. Castellan. Reip. c. 1. n. 4. faith, Hereditary Kings are also made hereditary by the tacit con­sent of the people, and so by law and consuetude.

Spalato. Let us grant (saith he) that a societie shall refuse to have a Governour over them, shall they be for that free? in no sort: butSpalato de rep. eccles. l. 6. c. 2. n. 32. there be many wayes by which a people may be compelled to admit a governour; for then no man might rule over a Communitie against their will. But nature hath otherwise disposed, ut quod singuli nollent, universi vellent, that which every one will not have, a Commnnitie naturally desireth. And the P. Prelate saith, God is no lesse the authorSa. sa. maj. The sacred and royall prero­gative of Kings c. 7. p. 82, 83, 84. of Order, then he is the author of Being; for the Lord who createth all, conserveth all; and without government all humane societies should be dissolved and goe to ruine: Then government must be naturall, and not depend upon a voluntary & arbitrary constitution of men. In nature, the liveles creatures inferior give a tacit consent & silent obedience to their superiour, and the superiour have a powerfull influence on the inferiour. In the subordination of creatures, we ascend from one superior to ano­ther, till at last we come to one supreme, which by the way pleadeth for the excellencie of Monarchie. Amongst Angels there is an order: how can it then be supposed that God hath left it to the simple consent of man to establish a heraldrie of sub & supra, of one above another, which nei­ther nature nor the Gospel doth warrant? To leave it thus arbitrary, that upon this supposed principle, Mankind may be without government at all, is vain; which paradox cannot be maintained. In nature God hath [Page 66] established a superiority inherent in superior creatures, which is no ways derived from the inferior by communication, in what proportion it will, and resumeable upon such exigents as the inferior listeth: therefore neither hath God left to the multitude, the communitie, the collective, the representative or virtuall body, to derive from it selfe, and commu­nicate s [...]veraigntie, whether in one or few, or more, in that measure and proportion pleaseth them, which they resume at pleasure.

Answ. 1. To answer Spalato: No societie hath liberty to be without all government, for God hath given to every societie (saith Covarr. to. 4 pract. quest. c. 1. [...]. 2. Covarruvias) a faculty of preserving themselves, and warding off violence and injuries; and this they could not doe, except they gave their power to one or many Rulers. But all that the Prelate buildeth on this false supposition, which is his fiction and calumnie, not our doctrine, to wit, that it is voluntary to man to be without all govern­ment, because it is voluntarie to them to give away their power to on [...] Government how both na­turall, and also voluntary. or moc Rulers, is a meere non-consequence. 1. We teach that Go­vernment is naturall, not voluntary; but the way and manner of Go­vernment is voluntarie: All societies should be quickly ruined, if there were no Government: but it followeth not therefore, God hath made some Kings, and that immediately, without the intervee­ning consent of the people, and ergo, it is not arbitrary to the people to choose one supreme Ruler, and to erect a Monarchie, or to choose moe Rulers, and to erect an Aristocracie. It followeth no way. It is naturall to men to expresse their minde by humane voyces; Is not speaking of this or that language, Greeke rather then Latine, (as A­ristotle saith) [...] by humane institution? It is naturall for men to eat; ergo, election of this or that meat is not in their choise. What reason is in this consequence? and so its a poore con­sequence also; Power of Soveraigntie is in the people naturally; ergo it is not in their power to give it out in that measure that pleaseth them, and to resume it at pleasure. It followeth no way. Because the inherencie of Soveraigntie is naturall, and not arbitary, ergo, the alienation and giving out of the power to one, not to three, thus much, not thus much, conditionally, not absolutely and irrevocably, must be also arbitrary. It is as if you should say, a father having six children, naturally loveth them all, ergo, he hath not freedome of will in ex­pressing his affection to give so much of his goods to this sonne, and that conditionally, if he use these goods well; and not more or lesse of his goods, at his pleasure. 2. There is a naturall subordination [Page 67] in nature, in creatures superior and inferior, without any freedomeThere is a sub­ordination of creatures natu­rall, and go­verment must be naturall, and yet this or that forme is voluntary. of election: the earth made not the heavens more excellent then the earth, and the earth by no freedome of will made the heavens superior in excellencie to it selfe. Man gave no superioritie of ex­cellencie to Angels above himselfe: the Creator of all Beings did both immediately without freedome of election in the creature, cre­ate the being of all creatures, and their essentiall degrees of superio­rity and inferiority, but God created not Saul by nature King over Israel; nor is David by the act of creation, by which he is made a man, created also a King over Israel; for then David should from the wombe and by nature be a King, and not by Gods free gift. Here both the free gift of God, and the free consent of the people inter­veene: indeed God made the office and royaltie of a King above the dignitie of the people; but God by the interveening consent of the people maketh David a King, not Eliab; and the people maketh a covenant at Davids inauguration, that David shall have so much power, to wit, power to be a Father, not power to be a Tyrant; power to fight for the people, but no power to waste and destroy them. The inferior creatures in nature give no power to the superi­our, and therefore they cannot give in such a proportion power. The deniall of the positive degree, is a deniall of the comparative and superlative, and so they cannot resume any power: But the desig­ning of such a man, or such men to be Kings or Rulers, is a rationall voluntary action, not an action of nature, such as is Gods act of cre­ating an Angell a nobler creature then a man, and the creating of man a more excellent creature then a beast: and for this cause the argument is vaine and foolish: for inferior creatures are inferior to the more noble and superior by nature, not by voluntary desig­nation, or, as Royalists say, by naked approbation, which yet must be an arbitrary and voluntary action. 3. The P. Prelate commen­deth order, while we come to the most supreme: hence he com­mendeth Monarchie above all governments, because it is Gods go­vernment. I am not against it, that Monarchie well tempered is the best government, though the question to me is most problema­tick; but because God is a Monarch, who cannot erre or deny him­selfe, therefore that sinfull Man be a Monarch, is miserable logick: and he must argue solidly forsooth by this, because there is order (as he saith) amongst Angels, will he make a Monarch and a King-Angell? His argument, if it have any weight in it, driveth at that, [Page 68] even that there be crowned Kings amongst the Angels.

QUEST. X. Whether or not Royall birth be equivalent to divine unction?

SYmmons holdeth, that Birth is as good a title to the Crowne, asEdward Sym­mons, in his loyall subjects beleefe, sect. 3. p. 16. Royaltie not transmittable from father to sonne. Vpon what tearme a peo­ple chooseth a Familie to reigne over them by suc­cession. any given of God. How this question can be cleered, I see not, except we dispute that, Whether or not Kingdomes be proper patrimo­nies derived from the father to the sonne? 2. I take, there is a large difference betwixt a thing transmittable by birth from the father to the sonne, and a thing not transmittable. 3. I conceive, as a per­son is chosen to be a King over a people, so a familie or house may be chosen, and a Kingdome at first choosing a person to be their King, may also tye themselves to choose the first borne of his body: but as they transferre their power to the father, 1. for their owne safetie and peace, (not if he use the power they give him, to their destruction) the same way they tye themselves to his first borne, as to their King. 2. As they chose the father not as a man, but a man gifted with Royall grace, and a Princely facultie for government; so they can but tye themselves to his first borne, as to one graced with a facultie of governing: and if his first borne shall be borne an idiot and a foole, they are not obliged to make him King; for the obligation to the sonne can be no greater then the obligation to the father, which first obligation is the ground, measure and cause of all posterior obligations. If Tutors be appointed to governe such an one, the Tutors have the Royall power, not the Idiot; nor can he governe others, who cannot governe himselfe. That Kings goe not as heritage from the father to the sonne, I prove; 1. God, Deut. 17. could not command them to choose such a one for the King, and such a one who sitting on his throne shall follow the direction of God speaking in his word, if birth were that which gave him Gods title and right to the Crowne; for that were as much as such a man should be heire to his fathers inheritance, and the sonne not heire to his fathers crown, except he were such a man: But God in all the Law morall or judiciall, never required that the heire should be thus and thus qualified, else he should not be heire: but he requireth that a man, and so that a familie should be thus and thus qualified, else they should not be Kings: and I confirme it thus: The first King of divine institution must be the rule, paterne and measure of all the rest of the Kings, as Christ maketh the first Mariage, [Page 69] Mat. 19. 8. a paterne to all others, and Paul reduceth the right administration of the Supper to Christs first institution, 1 Cor. 11. 23. now the first King, Deut. 17. 14, 15. is not a man qualified by naked birth, for then the Lord in describing the manner of the King and his due qualifications, should seeke no other but this; You shall choose onely the first borne, or the lawfull sonne of the former King. But seeing the King of Gods first moulding is a King by election, and what God did after by promises and free grace giveThe Thron [...] by speciall pro­mises of God▪ made to David and his seed, Ps. 89. no ground to make birth in foro dei a iust title to the Crowne. to David and his seed, even a throne till the Mesiah should come, and did promise to some Kings, if they would walke in his Com­mandements; that their sonnes, and sonnes sonne should sit upon the Throne, in my judgement is not an obliging Law, that sole birth should be as just a title, in foro Dei, (for I now dispute the question in point of conscience) as royall unction. 2. If by divine institution God have impawned in the peoples hand a subordinate power to the most High, who giveth Kingdomes to whom he will, to make and create Kings, then is not sole birth a just title to the Crowne. But the former is true; both by precept, Deut. 17. 1. and God expresly saith, Thou shalt choose him King, whom the Lord shall choose. And if it had not been the peoples power to create their own Kings, how doth God after he had designed Saul their King, yet expresly 1 Sam. 10. inspire Samuel 17. to call the people before the Lord at Mizpeh, to make Saul King? and how doth the Lord v. 22. expresly shew to Samuel, and the people, the man that they might make him King? and because all consented not that Saul should be King, God will have his Coronation renewed, v. 14. Then said Samuel to the people, Come, and let us goe to Gilgall, and renew the Kingdome there. 15. And all the people went to Gilgall, and there they made Saul King before the Lord in Gilgall. And how is it that David anoynted by God is yet no King, but a private subject, while all Israel make him King at Hebron?

3. If royall birth be equivolent to royall unction, and the best title, 3 Arg. M. Symmons, Loyall Sub­jects beliefe, Sect. 3. p. 16. and if birth speake and declare to us the Lords appointment and Will, that the first born of a King should be King, as M. Symmons and others say; then is all title by conquest, where the former King standeth, in title to the Crowne, and hath an Heire, unlawfull. But the latter is against all the nation of the Royalists, for Arnisaeus, Barclay, Grotius, Io. Roffensis Episco. the Bishop of Spalato, Dr. Ferne, M. Sym­mons, the excommunicate Prelat, if his poore learning may bring [Page 70] him▪ in the roll, teach that conquest is a lawfull title to a Crowne. I prove the Proposition, 1. because if birth speake Gods revealed Will, that the Heire of a King is the lawfull King, then conquest cannot speake the contradicent Will of God, that he is no lawfullTitle to a Crown by con­quest must be unlawfull if truth be Gods just Title to a Crowne. King, but the conquerour is the lawfull King. Gods revealed Will should be contradictory to himselfe, and birth should speake it is Gods Will, that the Heire of the former King be King, and the con­quest being also Gods revealed Will, should also speake that that Heire should not be King. 2. If birth speake and reveale Gods Will that the Heire be King, it is unlawfull for a conquered people to give their consent that a conquerour be their King. For their con­sent being contrary to Gods revealed Will, (which is, that birth is the just title) must be an unlawfull consent. If Royalists say, God the King of Kings who immediately maketh Kings, may, and doth transferre Kingdomes to whom he will, and when he putteth the sword in Nebuchadnezers hand, to conquer the King and Kingdome of Iudah, then Zedikiah or his sonne is not King of Iudah, but Nebu­chadnezer is King, and God being above his Law, speaketh in that case his Will by conquests, as before he spake his Will by birth; this is all can be said. Ans. They answer black treason in saying so, for if Ieremiah from the Lord had not commanded expresly, that both the King and Kingdome of Judah should submit to the King of Royalists who hold conquests a iust title to the Crowne, teach mani­fest treason a­gainst our So­veraigne King Charles and his Heires. Babylon, and serve him, and pray for him, as their lawfull King, it had been as lawfull to them to rebell against that Tyrant, as it was for them to fight against the Philistimes, and the King of Ammon; but if birth be the just and lawfull title, in foro Dei, in Gods Court, and the only thing that evidenceth Gods Will without any election of the people, that the first borne of such a King is their lawfull King, then conquests cannot now speake a contrardictory Will of God; for the question is not whether or not, God giveth power to Tyrants to conquer Kingdomes from the just Heires of Kings, which did raigne lawfully before their sword made an empty Throne; But whether conquest now, when Jeremiahs are not sent immediatly from God to command? for example; Britaine to sub­mit to a violent intruder, who hath expelled the lawfull Heires of the royall Line of the King of Britaine, whether I say doth conquest in such a violent way, speake that it is Gods revealed Will, called Voluntas signi, the will that is to rule us, in all our Morall duties to cast off the just Heires of the blood Royall, and to sweare homage [Page 71] to a conquerour, and so as that conquerour now hath as just right, as the King of Britaine had by birth▪ This cannot be taken off by the wit of any, who 1. maintaine that conquest is a lawfull title to a Crowne, and 2. that royall birth without the people election speaketh Gods regulating Will in his Word, that the first borne of a King is a lawfull King by birth; for God now a daies doth not say the contrary of what he revealed in his Word. If birth be Gods regulating Will, that the Heire of the King is in Gods Court a King, no act of the conquerour can anull that Word of God to us, and the people may not lawfully, though they were ten times subdued, sweare homage and allegiance to a conquerour, against the due right of birth, which by Royalists Doctrine revealeth to us the plaine contradictory Will of God. It is, I grant, often Gods De­cree revealed by the event, that a conquerour be on the Throne, but this Will is not our rule, and the people are to sweare no Oath of Allegiance contrary to Gods Voluntas signi, which is his revealed Will in his Word regulating us.

4. Things transferrible and communicable by birth from father4. Arg. Onely bona for­tunae, not ho­nour is trans­mittable from father to son. to sonne, are onely, in Law, those which Heathen call bona fortunae, riches, as lands, houses, monies and heritages; and so saith the Law also. These things which essentially include gifts of the mind, and honour properly so called, I meane honour founded on vertue, as Aristotle with good reason maketh honour praeminum virtu [...]is, can­not be communicated by birth from the father to the sonne; for roy­all dignity includeth these three constituent parts essentially, of which none can be communicable by birth. 1. The royall faculty of governing, which is a speciall gift of God, above nature, is from God. Solomon asked it from God, and had it not by generation from his father David. 2. The royall honour to be set above the people because of this royall vertue, is not from the wombe, for then Gods spirit would not have said, Blessed art thou O Land, when thy King is the sonne of Nobles, Eccles. 10. 17. this honour springing from vertue, is not borne with any man, no [...] is any man borne with either the gift, or honour to be a Iudge; God maketh high and low, not birth. Nobles are borne to great estates, if judging be he­ritage to any, it is a municipall positive law. I now speake in point of conscience. 3. The externall lawfull title, before men come to a Crowne must be Gods Will, revealed by such an externall signe, as by Gods appointment and warrant is to regulate our will, but [Page 72] according to Scripture nothing regulateth our will, and leadeth the people now that they cannot erre, following Gods rule in making a King, but the free suffrages of the States choosing a man whom they conceive God hath endued with these royall gifts required in the King whom God holdeth forth to them in his Word, Deut. 17. now there be but these to regulate the people, or to be a rule to any man to ascend lawfully (in foro Dei) in Gods Court to the Throne; 1. Gods immediate designation of a man by Propheticall and Di­vinelyViolent con­quest cannot regulate the consciences of people to sub­mit to a con­querour as their lawfull King. inspired unction, as Samuel annoynted Saul, and David; this we are not to expect now, nor can Royalists say it. 2. Con­quest, seeing it is an act of violence, and Gods revenging Justice for the sinnes of a people, cannot give in Gods Court such a just title to the Throne, as the people are to submit their consciences unto, except God reveale his regulating will by some immediate voice from Heaven, as he commanded Iudah to submit to Nebuchad­nezer as to their King by the mouth of Ieremiah; now this is not a rule to us, for then, if the Spanish King should invade this Iland, and as Nebuchadnezer did, deface the Temple, and instruments and meanes of Gods Worship, and abolish the true worship of God, it should be unlawfull to resist him, after he had once conquered the Iland, neither Gods Word, nor the Law of nature could permit this; I suppose even by grant of adversaries, now no act of violence done to a people, though in Gods Court they have deserved it, can be a testification to us of Gods regulating Will; except it have some warrant from the Law and testimony, it is no rule to our conscience to acknowledge him a lawfull Magistrate, whose sole law to the Throne is an act of the bloody instrument of divine wrath, I meane the sword. That therefore Iudah was to submit, according to Gods Word, to Nebuchadnezer, whose conscience and best warranted calling to the Kingdome of Judah was his bloody sword, even if we suppose Ieremiah had not commanded them to submit to theNaked birth is inferiour to the divine unction, which yet made no man a King, without the peoples e­lection. King of Babylon, I thinke cannot be said. 3. Naked birth cannot be this externall signification of Gods regulating Will to warrant the conscience of any to ascend to the Throne, for the Authors of this opinion make royall birth equivalent to divine unction, for David anoynted by Samuel, and so anoynted by God, is not King, Saul re­mained the Lords anoynted many yeares, not David, even anoynted by God; the peoples making him King at Hebron founded upon divine unction, was not the only externall lawfull calling that we read of, [Page 73] that David had to the Throne, then royall birth, because it is but equivalent only to divine unction, not superiour to divine unction, it cannot have more force to make a King, then divine unction. And if birth was equivalent to divine unction, what needed Ioash who had royall birth, be made King by the people? and what nee­ded Saul and David, who had more then royall birth, even divine unction, be made Kings by the people? and Saul having the vo­call and infallible testimony of a Prophet, needed not the peo­ples election, the one at Mizpeh and Gilgall, and the other at Hebron.

5. If royall birth be as just a title to the Crowne as divine uncti­on, and so, as the peoples election is no title at all; then is it unlaw­full that there should be a King by election in the world now: but the latter is absurd, so is the former. I prove the Proposition, because where conquerours are wanting, and there is no King for the present, but the people governing, and so much confusion aboundeth, they cannot lawfully appoint a King, for his lawfull title before God must either be conquest, which to me is no title, (and here, and in this case there is no conquest) or if the title must be a Propheticall word immediatly inspired by God, but this is now ceased; or thirdly the title must be royal birth, but here there is no royall birth, because the government is popular; except you i­magine that the society is obliged in conscience to goe and seek the sonne of a forraine King to be their King. But I hope that such a royall birth should not be a just title before God to make him King of that society, to which he had no relation at all, but is a meere stranger. Hence in this case no title could be given to any man to make him King, but onely the peoples election; which is that which we say. And it is most unreasonable that a people under popular Government cannot lawfully choose a King to themselves, seeing a King is a lawfull Magistrate, and warranted by Gods Word, be­cause they have not a King of royall birth to sit upon the throne.

Mr. Symmons saith that birth is the best title to the Crowne, be­cause Symmons loyall Subiects beleef. Sect. 3. p. 16. after the first of the family had been anoynted, unction was no more used in that family, (unlesse there arose a strife about the King­dome, as betwixt Solomon and Adonijah, Ioash and Athalia) the el­dest sonne of the pred [...]cessor was afterward the chosen of the Lord, his birth-right spake the Lords appointment, as plainly as his fathers unction. Ans. It is a conjecture that unction was not used in the [Page 74] family, after the first unction, except the contest was betwixt two Brethren, that is said, not proved, for a King. 23. 30. when good Iosiah was killed, and there was no contest concerning the Throne of that beloved Prince, the people of the Land took Iehoahaz his son and anointed him, and made him King in his fathers stead; and the Priests were anointed, Levit. 6. 22. yea, all the Priests were anoin­ted, Num. 3. 8. yet read we not in the History, where this or this▪ man was anointed. 2. In that Adonijah, Solomons elder Brother was not King, it is clear, That Gods anointing, and the peoples e­lecting,Birth a typical designment to the crown. made the right to the Crown, and not birth. 3. Birth de facto did design the man, because of Gods speciall promises to Da­vids house; but how doth a typicall discent made to David, and some others by Gods speciall promise, prove, that birth is the birth­right, and lawfull call of God to a Crown in all after ages? For as gifts to reign, goeth not by birth, so neither doth Gods title to a Crown go.

M. Symons. A Prince once possessed of a Kingdome coming to him by inheritance, can never, by any, upon any occasion be dispossessed there­of, without horrible impietie, and unjustice. Royall unction was an indeloble Character of old, Saul remained the Lords anointed till the last gaspe; David durst not take the right of Government actually into him, although he had it in reversion, being already anointed there­unto, and had received the spirit thereof.

Answ. That is the question, If a Prince once a Prince by in­heritance, cannot be dispossessed thereof without unjustice: For if a Kingdom be his by birth, as an inheritance transmitted from the father to the son, I see not but any man upon necessary occasi­ons,If a Kingdom were by birth, the King might fell it. may sell his inheritance; but if a Prince sell his Kingdom, a very Barelay and an Hug. Grotius with reason will say, he may be dispossessed and dethroned, and take up his indeleble Character then. 2. A Kingdom is not the Princes own so, as it is unjustice to take it from him, as to take a mans purse from him; the Lords Church (in a Christian Kingdom) is Gods heritage, and the King onely a shepheard, and the sheep in the court of conscience, are not his. 3. Royall unction is not an indeleble Character; for neither Saul nor David were all their dayes Kings thereby, but lived many dayes private men after divine unction, while the people anointed them Kings, except you say, 1. That there were two Kings at once in Israel. 2. And that Saul killing David, should have killed [Page 75] his own Lord, and his anointed. 4. If David durst not take the right of Government actually on him, then divine unction made him not King, but onely designed him to be King: the peoples election must make the King.

M. Symons addeth, He that is born a King and a Prince, canSymons, sect. [...]. pag. 7. never be unborn, Semel Augustus semper Augustus; yea, I beleeve the eldest son of such a King is in respect of birth, the Lords anointed in his fathers life time, even as David was before Sauls death, and to deprive him of his right of reversion, is as true unjustice, as to dis­possesse him of it.

Answ. It is proper onely to Jesus Christ to be born a King, sure I am, No man bringeth out of the womb with him a Scepter, and a Crown on his head. Divine unction giveth a right infallibly to a Crown; but birth doth not so, for one may be born here to a Crown, as was hopefull Prince Henry, and yet never live to be King. The eldest son of a King, if he attempt to kill his father, as Absolom did, and raise forces against the lawfull Prince, I conceive he may be killed in battell, without any unjustice. 2. If in his fa­thers time he be the Lords anointed, there be two Kings, and the heir may have a son, and so there shall be three Kings, possibly four; all Kings by divine right.

The Prelate of Rochester saith, The people and nobles give no rightJoan. Epis [...] Roffens. de po­test. Papae. l. 2. c. 5. to him, who is born a King, they onely declare his right.

Answ. This is said, not proved. A man born for an inheritance, is by birth an heir, because he is not born for these Lands, as a mean for the end, but by the contrary, these Lands are for the heir as the mean for the end: But the King is for his Kingdom, as a mean for the end, as the watch-man for the Citie, the living Law for peace, and safetie to Gods people; and therefore is not heres hominum, An heir of men, but men are rather heredes regis, heirs of the King.

Arnisaeus. Many Kingdoms (saith he) are purchased by just war,Arnisaeus de authorit. prin­cip. c. 1. n. 13. and transmitted by the Law of heritage from the father to the son, beside the consent of the people, because the son receiveth right to the Crown, not from the people, but from his parents, nor doth he possesse the Kingdom, as the patrimony of the people, keeping onely to himself the burden of protecting and governing the people, but as a proprietie given to him lege regni, by his parents, which he is obliged to defend and rule, as a father looketh to the good and welfare of the family, yet so also as he may look to his own good.

[Page 76] Answ. We read in the Word of God, That the people made Solomon King, not that David, or any King can leave in his Testa­ment, a Kingdom to his son. 2. He saith, The son hath not the right The heir of a Crown hath the Crown as the patrimony of the King­dom, not of the King his father. of reigning, as the patrimony of the people, but as a proprietie, given by the Law of the Kingdom, by his parents: Now this is all one, as if he said, The son hath not the right of the Kingdom, as the patrimony of the people, but as the patrimony of the people, which is good non-sense; For the proprietie of reigning, given from father to son, by the Law of the Kingdom, is nothing but a right to reign, given by the Law of the people, and the very gift and patrimony of the people, for Lex regni, This Law of the Kingdom is the Law of the people, tying the Crown to such a Royall Family; and this Law of the people is prior and ancienter then the King, or the right of reigning in the King, or which the King is supposed to have from his Royall father, because it made the first father, the first King of the Royall Line. For I demand, How doth the son succeed to his fathers Crown, and Throne? Not by any promise of a divine Covenant, that the Lord maketh to the father, as he pro­mised, that Davids seed should sit on his throne, till the Messiah should come: this, as I conceive, is vanished with the Common­wealth of the Iews, nor can we now finde any immediate divine constitution, tying the Crown now to such a race: nor can we say, this cometh from the will of the father King, making his son King: For 1. there is no Scripture can warrant us to say, The King ma­keth The choice of a family to the Crown, resol­veth upon the free election of the people, as on the fountain-cause. a King, but the Scripture holdeth forth, that the people made Saul, and David, Kings. 2. This may prove, That the father is some way a cause, why this son succeedeth King; but he is not the cause of the Royaltie conferred upon the whole Line; because the question is, Who made the first father a King? Not himself; nor doth God now immediately by Prophets anoint men to be Kings, then need force, the people choose the first man, then must the peoples election of a King, be prior and more ancient then the birth-law to a Crown: And election must be a better right then birth. 2. The question is, Whence cometh it that not onely the first father should be chosen King; but also whence is that, where­as it is in the peoples freewill to make the succession of Kings go by free election, as it is in Denmark and Pol; yet the people doth freely choose, not only the first man to be King, but also the whole race of the first born of this mans Family to be Kings. All here [Page 77] must be resolved in the free will of the Communitie; now since we have no immediate and propheticall enthroning of men: it is evi­dent, That the lineall deduction of the Crown from father to son, through the whole line, is from the people, not from the parent.

Hence I adde this, as my sixth Argument, That which taketh6. Argum. away that naturall aptitude, and natures birth-right, in a Commu­nitie given to them by God and nature, to provide the most effica­cious, and prevalent mean for their own preservation and peace in the fittest Government, that is not to be holden, but to make birth the best title to the Crown, and better then free election, taketh away and impedeth that naturall aptitude, and natures birth-right of chosing, not simply a Governour, but the best, the justest, the more righteous, and tyeth, and fettereth their choice to one of a house, whether he be a wise man, and righteous, and just, or a fool and an unjust man; therefore to make birth the best title to the Crown, is not to be holden.

It is objected: That parents may binde their after Generations, to choose one of such a line; But by this Argument, their naturall birth­right of a free choice, to elect the best and fittest, is abridged and clip­ped, and so the posterity shall not be tyed to a King of the Royall Line, to which the Ancestors did swear. See for this, the learned Author, Sect. 4. p. 39. of Scripture, and Reasons, pleaded for defensive Arms.

Answ. Frequent elections of a King, at the death of every PrinceElection of a family to the Crown law­full may have, by accident, and through the corruption of our nature, bloody, and tragicall sequels, and to eschew these, people may tie and oblige their children to chose one of the first born, Male or Fe­male, as in Scotland and England, of such a line; but I have spoken of the excellencie of the title by election, above that of birth, as comparing things according to their own nature together; but give me leave to say, That the posterity are tyed to that Line, 1. Con­ditionally: So the first born, ceteris paribus, be qualified, and have an head to sit at the helm. 2. Elections of Governours would be performed, as in the sight of God; and in my weak apprehension, the person coming neerest to Gods judge, Fearing God, hating covetousnesse, and to Moses his King, Deut. 17. one who shall read in the Book of the Law, and it would seem now, that gracious morals are to us insteed of Gods immediate designation. 3. The genuine and intrinsecall end of making Kings, is not simply governing, but governing the best way in peace, honesty, and godlinesse, 1. Tim. 2. [Page 78] Ergo, These are to be made Kings, who may most expeditely pro­cure this end: neither is it my purpose to make him no King, who is not a gracious man, onely here I compare title with title.

7. Argument. Where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not binde themselves, or the consciences of the posterity. But God hath not bound any nation irrevocably, and unalterably to a Royall Line, or to one kinde of Government. Ergo, No nation can binde their conscience, and the conscience of the posterity, either to one Royall Line, or irrevocably and unalterably to Mo­narchy. The proposition is clear.

1. No Nation is tyed, jure divine, by the tie of a divine Law to a Monarchy, rather then to another Government. The Parisian Doctors prove, That the precept of having a Pope is affirmative, and so tyeth not the Church, ad semper, for ever; and so the Church is the body of Christ without the Pope; and all oaths to things of their nature indifferent, and to things, the contrary where­of is lawfull, and may be expedient and necessary, lay on a tie onely conditionally, in so far, as they conduce to the end. If the Gibeo­nites had risen in Joshuaes dayes, to cut off the people of God, I think no wise man can think, that Joshua and the people were tyed by the oath of God, not to cut off the Gibeonites in that case: For to preserve them a live as enemies, was against the intent of the oath▪ which was to preserve them alive, as friends demanding, and sup­plicating peace, and submitting. The assumption is clear If a Na­tion seeth that Aristocraticall Government is better then Monar­chy, hic & nunc: That the sequels of such a Monarchy is bloody, destructive, tyrannous, that the Monarchy compelleth the free subjects to Turcisme, to grosse Idolatry, they cannot by the divine bond of any oath captive their naturall freedom, which is to choose a Government, and Governours, for their safetie, for a peaceable and godly life; or fetter and chain the wisdom of the posterity unalterably to a Government, or a Royall Line, which hic & nunc, contrary to the intention of their oath, proveth destructive, and bloody. And in this case, even the King, though tyed by an oath to govern, is obliged to the practices of the Emperour Otho. And as Speed saith, of Richard the second, to resign the Crown, for theSpeed, Hist. pag. 757. eschewing of the effusion of blood: And who doubteth but the second wits of the experienced posterity, may correct the first wits of their fathers; nor shall I ever beleeve, that the fathers can [Page 79] leave in legacie, by oath, any chaines of the best gold to fetter the after wits of posteritie to a choice destructive to peace and true Godlinesse.

To these adde; 8. That 1. an heritor may defraud his first borne of his heritage, because of his dominion he hath over his heritage: A King cannot defraud his first-borne of the Crown. 2. An heri­tor may divide his heritage equally amongst his twelve sonnes: A King cannot divide his Royall Dominions in twelve parts, and give a part to every sonne; for so he might turne a Monarchie into an Aristocracie, and put twelve men in the place of one King. 3. Any heritor taken captive, may lawfully oppignorate, yea and give all his inheritance as a ransome for his liberty; for a man is better then his inheritance: but no King may give his Subjects as a price or ransome.

Yet I shall not be against the succession of Kings by birth, with good limitations; and shall agree, that through the corruption of mans nature, it may be in so far profitable, as it is peaceable, and preventeth bloody tumults, which are the bane of humane societies. Consider further for this, Aegid. Romanus, l. 3. de reg. princi. cap. 5. Turrecremat. and Joan. de terra Reubea, 1 tract. contr. Rebelles, ar. 1. [...]on. 4. Yet Aristotle the flower of Natures wit, l. 3. polit. c. 10. pre­ferreth Election to Succession; He preferreth Carthage to Sparta, though their Kings came of Hercules. Plutarch in Scylla, saith, he would have Kings as dogs, that is, best hunters, not those who are borne of best dogs. Tacitus, lib. 1. Nasci & generari à Principibus, fortuitum, nec ultra aestimantur.

QUEST. XI. Whether or no he be more principally a King, who is a King by birth, or he who is a King by the free election and suffrages of the people?

VVIthout deteining the Reader, I desire liberty to assert, that,

1 Assert. Where God establisheth a Kingdome by Birth, that go­vernment, hic & nunc, is best: and because God principally distri­buteth Crownes, when God establisheth the Royall line of David to reigne, he is not principally a King, who commeth neerest and most immediately to the fountaine of Royaltie, which is Gods im­mediate will; but God established, his & nunc, for typicall reasons [Page 80] (with reverence of the learned) a King by birth.

2 Assert. But to speake of them, ex natura rei, and accordingA King by e­lection com­meth neerer to the first King then a King by suc­cession. to the first mould and paterne of a King by law. A King by electi­on is more principally King (magis univoce & per se) then an he­reditarie Prince; 1. Because in hereditary Crownes, the first familie being chosen by the free suffrages of the people, for that cause ulti­matè, the hereditary Prince commeth to the throne, because his first father, and in him the whole line of the familie was chosen to the Crowne, and, propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. 2. The first King ordained by Gods positive law, must be the mea­sure of all Kings, and more principally the King, then he who is such by derivation. But the first King is a King by election, not by birth, Deut. 17. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set (him) King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, (One) from amongst thy bre­thren shalt thou set over thee. If the free will of the people be not the neerest cause of the first moulded King, God could have made no positive law to choose such a man, not such a man; for all positive lawes presuppose free election. 3. The Law saith, Surrogatum fru­itur privilegiis ejus, in cujus locum surrogatur: He who is substituted in the place of another, enjoyeth the priviledges of him in whose place be succeedeth. But the hereditary King hath Royall priviledges from him who is chosen King. Salomon hath the Royall priviledges of David his father, and is therefore King by birth, because his father David was King by election. And this I say, not because I think sole birth is a just title to the Crown, but because it designeth him who indeed virtually was chosen, when the first King of the race was chosen. 4. Because there is no dominion of either Royalty, or any other way by nature, no more then an Eagle is born King of Eagles, a Lyon, King of Lyons; neither is a man by nature, born King of men: and therefore, he who is made King by suffrages of the people, must be more principally King, then he who hath no title, but the womb of his mother.

Doct. Fern is so farre with us to father Royaltie upon the peoplesD. Fern, part 3. sect. [...]. p. 14. free election, as on the formall cause▪ that he saith, If to design the person, and to procure limitation of the power in the exercise of it, be to give the power; we grant the power is from the people, but (saith he) you will have the power originally from themselves; in another sense, for you say, they reserve power to depose and displace the Magi­strate, sometime they make the Monarch supreme, and then they devest [Page 81] themselves of all power, and keep none to themselves, but before esta­blished Government, they have no politique power, whereby they may lay a command on others, but onely a naturall power of private resistance, which they cannot use against the Magistrate.

Ans. But to take off those by the way, 1. If the King may chooseIf the people may limit the King, they may give him power A. B. an Ambassadour, and limit him in his power, and say, Doe this, and say this to the forraigne State you goe to, but no more; halfe a wit will say the King createth the Ambassadour, and the Ambassadours power is originally from the King; and we prove the power of the Lyon is originally from God, and of the Sea, and the fire is originally from God, because God limiteth the Lyon in the exercises of its power, that it shall not devoure Daniel, and limiteth the Sea, as Ieremiah saith, when as he will have its proud Waves to come thither, and no farther, and will have the fire to burne those who throwe the three Children into the fiery furnace, and yet not to burne the three Children, for this is as if Doctor Ferne said, the power of the King of six degrees, rather then his power of five is from the people, therefore the power of the King is not from the people, yea the contrary is true. 2. That the people can make a King supreame, that is, Absolute, and so resigne natures birth-right; that is, a power to defend them­selves is not lawfull, for if the people have not absolute power to destroy themselves, they cannot resigne such a power to their Prince. 3. It is false that a community, before they be established with formall Rulers, have no politicke power, for consider them as men onely, and not as associated, they have indeed no politicke po­wer; but before Magistrates be established, they may convene and associate themselves in a body, and appoint Magistrates; and this they cannot doe if they had no politicke power at all. 4. They have virtually a power to lay on Commandements, in that they have power to appoint to themselves Rulers, who may lay com­mandements on others. 5. A community hath not formally power to punish themselves, for to punish is to inflict Malum dis­conveniens naturae, an evill contrary to nature; but in appointingA community have not power formally to punish them­selves. Rulers, and in agreeing to Lawes they consent they shall be puni­shed by another upon supposition of transgression, as the child wil­lingly going to schoole submitteth himself in that to Schoole­discipline, if he shall faile against any Schoole Law; and by all this tis cleare, a King by election is principally a King▪ Barclay then [Page 82] faileth, who saith, No man denyeth but succession to a Crowne byBarclay cont. Monarcham▪ c. 2, p. 5▪ 6. birth is agreeable to nature; it is not against nature, but it is no more naturall, then for a Lyon to be borne a King of Lyons.

Obj. Most of the best Divines approve an hereditary Monarch, rather then a Monarch by election. Ans. So doe I in some cases, in respect of Empire simply it is not better, in respect of Empire now under mans fall in sin; I grant it to be better in some respect. So Salust In Iugurth. Natura mortalium imperij avida. Tacitus, Hist.The elective King and the hereditary King better and worse, every one then another, in divers rela­tions. 2. Minore discrimine princeps sumitur, quam queritu, there's lesse danger to accept of a Prince at hand, then to seeke one a farre off. 2. In a Kingdome to be constituted, election is better; in a consti­tuted Kingdome birth seemeth lesse evill. 3. In respect of liberty election is more convenient; in respect of safety and peace, birth is safer and the nearest way to the Well. See Bodin, De Rep. l. 6. c. 4. Thol. ozan, De Rep. l. 7. c. 4.

QUEST. XII. Whether or not a Kingdome may lawfully be purchased by the sole title of conquest?

THe Prelate averreth confidently that a Title to a KingdomeSac. sanc. Reg. Maiest. c. 17. p. 158. by Conquest, without the consent of the people, is so just and evident by Scripture, that it cannot be denyed; but the man bringeth no Scripture to prove it. Mr. Marshall saith, a conquered Kingdome Letter p. 7. is but c [...]ntinuata injuria, a continued robbery. A right of conquest is twofold; 1. When there is no just cause. 2. When there is just rea­sonTwofold right of conquest. and ground of the war; in this latter case, if a Prince subdue a whole Land, which justly deserveth to dye, yet by his grace who is so mild a conquerour they may be all preserved alive. Now amongst those who have thus injured the conquerour as they deserve death, we are to difference the persons offending, and the wives, children especially not borne, and such as have not offended. The former sort may resign their personall liberty to the conquerour, that the sweet life may be saved; but he cannot be their King properly, but I con­ceive that they are obliged to consent that he be their King, upon this condition, that the conquerour put not upon them violent and tyrannicall conditions that are harder then death: now in reason we cannot thinke that a tyrannous and unjust domineering can be Gods lawfull meane of translating Kingdomes, and for the other part; the [Page 83] conquerour cannot domineere as King over the innocent, and espe­cially the children not yet borne.

1. Assertion. A people may be by Gods speciall Commande­ment, subject to a conquering Nebuchadnezer, and a Caesar, as to their King, as was Iudah commanded by the Prophet Ieremiah to submit unto the yoake of the King of Babylon, and to pray for him, and the people of the Iewes were to give to Caesar the things of Cae­sar; and yet both those were unjust conquerours: for those Tyrants had no command of God to oppresse and raigne over the Lords peo­ple, yet were they to obey those Kings, so the passive subjection was just and commanded of God, and the active unjust and tyra­nous, and forbidden of God.

2. Assert. This title by conquest through the peoples after con­sent may be turned into a just title, as its like the case was with the Iewes in Caesars time, for which cause our Saviour commanded to obey Caesar, and to pay tribute unto him; as Dr. Ferne confesseth.Sect. 7. p. 30. But two things are to be condemned in the Doctor: 1. That God manifesteth his Will to us in this worke of providence, whereby he translateth Kingdomes. 2. That this is an over-awed consent; now to the former I reply, if the act of conquering be violent andVniust con­quest is no sig­nification of Gods appro­ving Will. unjust, it is no manifestation of Gods regulating and approving Will, and can no more prove a just title to a Crowne, because it is an act of Divine providence, then Pilate and Herod their crucifying of the Lord of Glory, which was an act of Divine providence, flow­ing from the Will and Decree of Divine providence, Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. is a manifestation that it was Gods approving Will, that they should kill Jesus Christ. 2. Though the consent be some way over-awed, yet is it a sort of Contract and Covenant of loyall sub­jection made to the conquerour, and therefore sufficent to make the title just; otherwise if the people never give their consent, the conquerour domineering over them by violence hath no just title to the Crowne.

3. Assert. Meere conquest by the sword without the consent of the people, is no just title to the Crowne; 1. Because the lawfull title that Gods Word holdeth forth to us, beside the Lords choosing and calling of a man to the Crowne, is the peoples election, Deut. 17. 15. all that had any lawfull calling to the Crowne in Gods Word,1 Arg. as Saul, David, Solomon, &c. were called by the people, and the first lawfull calling is to us a rule and paterne to all lawfull callings. 2. A [Page 84] King as a King, and by vertue of his Royall Office is the Father of2 Arg. the Kingdome, a Tutor, a Defender, Protector, a Shield, a Leader, a Shepheard, an Husband, a Patron, a Watchman, a Keeper of the peo­pleMeere violent domineering is contrary to the rules of gover­ning, over which he is King, and so the Office essentially includeth acts of fatherly affection, care, love and kindnesse to those over whom he is set, so as he who is cloathed with all these relations of love to the people, cannot exercise those officiall Acts on a people a­gainst their will, and by meere violence. Can he be a Father, and a Guide, a Patron to us against our will? and by the sole power of the bloudy sword? a benefit conferred upon any against their will is no benefit: Will he, by the awsome dominion of the sword be our father, and we unwilling to be his sonnes? an head over such as will not be menbers? will he guide me as a Father, an Hus­band against my will? he cannot come by meere violence to be a Patton, a Shield, and a defender of me through violence. 3. It is3 Arg. Violence hath nothing in it of a King. not to be thought that, that is Gods just Title to a Crowne which hath nothing in it of the essence of a King; but a violent and bloody purchase, which is in its prevalency in an oppressing Nymrod, and the cruellest tyrant that is, hath nothing essentiall to that which con­stituteth a King: for it hath nothing of Heroick and Royall wise­dome and gifts to governe, and nothing of Gods approving and regulating will which must be manifested to any who would be a King, but by the contrary cruelty hath rather basenesse and witlesse fury, and a plaine reluctancy with Gods revealing Will, which for­bideth murther, Gods Law should say, (Murther thou, and prosper and raigne) and by the act of violating the sixt Commandement, God should declare his approving Will, to wit, his lawfull call to a Throne. 4. There be none under a Law of God who may resist4▪ Arg. a lawfull call to a lawfull Office, but men may resist any impulsion of God stirring them up to murther the maniest and strongest, and cheife men of a Kingdome, that they may raigne over the fewest, the weakest, and the young and lowest of the people against their will, therefore this call by the sword is not lawfull. If it be said, that the Divine impulsion stirring up a man to make a bloody conquest, that the ire and just indignation of God in Iustice may be declared on a wicked Nation, is an extraordinary impulsion of God, who is above a Law, and therefore no man may resist it. Ans. then all bloody Conquerors must have some extraordinary re­velation from Heaven to warrant their yeelding of obedience to [Page 85] such an extraordinary impulsion. And if it be so, They must shew a lawfull and immediate extraordinary impulsion now; but it is certaine, the sinnes of the people conquered, and their most equall and just demerit, before God, cannot be a just plea to legitimate the Conquest: for though the people of God deserved vastation and captivitie by the Heathen, in regard of their sinnes, before the throne of Divine Iustice, yet the Heathen grievously sin­ned in conquering them, Zach. 1. 15. And I am very sore displeased with the Heathen that are at ease: for I was but a little displeased, and they helped forward the affliction. So though Iudah deserved to be made captives, and a conquered people, because of their i­dolatry, and other sinnes, as Ieremiah had prophecied; yet God was highly displeased at Babylon for their unjust and bloody Con­euest, Jer. 50. 17, 18, 33, 34. c. 51. 35. The violence done to me and to my flesh, be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Jerusalem say. And that any other extraordinary impulsion to be as lawfull a call to the Throne as the peoples free election, we know not from Gods word, and we have but the naked word of our Adversaries, that William the Conquerour, without the peoples consent, made himselfe by blood, the lawfull King of England, and also of all their posteritie; And that King Fergus conquered Scotland. 5. A King is a speciall gift of God, given to feed and defend the peo­ple5 Arg. A King given to a people by a bloody Con­quest, must be a judgement, not a blessing, and so not p [...] se a King. of God, that they may lead a godly and peaceable life under him, Isal. 78. v. 71, 72. 1 Tim. 2. 2. as it is a judgement of God, that Israel's without a King for many dayes, Hos. 3. 4. and that there is no Iu [...]ge, no King, to put evill doers to shame, Iudg. 19. 1. but if a King be given of God, as a King by the acts of a bloody Conquest to be avenged on the sinfull land over which he is made a King, he cannot be given, actu primo, as a speciall gift and blessing of God to feed, but to murther and to destroy; for the genuine end of a Con­queror, as a Conqueror, is not peace, but fire and sword. If God chang [...] his heart to be of a bloody Vastator, a father, Prince, and fee­der of the people, ex officio, now he is not a violent Conquerour and he came to that meeknes by contraries, which is the proper worke of the omnipotent God, and not proper to man, who as he cannot worke miracles, so neither can he lawfully worke by contra­ries: and so if Conquest be a lawfull title to a Crown, and an ordi­nary calling, as the opponents presume; every bloody Conquerour [Page 86] must be changed into a loving father, Prince and feeder; and if God call him, none should oppose him, but the whole Land should de­throne their own native Soveraigne (whom they are obliged before the Lord to defend) and submit to the bloody invasion of a strange Lord, presumed to be a just Conqueror, as if he were lawfully called to the Throne both by birth and the voyces of the people. And truly they deserve no wages, who thus defend the Kings Prerogative royall: for if the sword be a lawfull title to the crown, suppose the two Generals of both Kingdomes should conquer the most and the chiefest of the Kingdome now when they have so many forces in the field, by this wicked reason the one should have a lawfull call of God to be King of England, and the other to be King of Scotland; which is absurd. 6. Either conquest, as conquest, is a just title to6 Arg. the crown, or as a just conquest. If as Conquest, then all conquests are just titles to a Crown; then the Ammonites, Zidonians, Canaa­nites, Edomites, &c. subduing Gods people for a time, have just titleStrength, as prevailing strength, is not law or reason. to reigne over them; and if Absolom had been stronger then David, he had then had the just title to be the Lords Anointed and King of Israel, not David; and so strength actually prevailing, should be Gods lawfull call to a Crown. But strength, as strength victoriou [...], is not law, nor reason: it were then reason that Herod behead Jo [...] Baptist, and the Roman Emperors kill the witnesses of Christ Ieus. If Conquest, as just, be the title and lawfull claime before Gods court, to a Crown; then certainly a stronger King for pregna [...]t na­tionall injuries, may lawfully subdue and reigne over an in [...]ocent posteritie not yet borne. But what word of God can, 1. wa [...]rant a posteritie not borne, and so accessarie to no offence against t [...]e Con­querour (but only sin originall) to be under a Conquerou [...] against their will, and who hath no right to reigne over them, but the bloo­dy sword? for so Conquest, as Conquest, not as just, maketh him King over the posteritity. But 2. the fathers may ingage theFathers cannot dispose of the liberty of the posteritie not borne. posterity by an oath to surrender themselvos as loyall subject▪ to the man who justly and deservedly made the fathers vassals by the title of the sword of justice. I answer, the fathers may indeed dis [...]ose of the inheritance of their children, because that inheritance [...]elong­eth to the father as well ar to the sonne; but because the liberty of the sonne being borne with the sonne, (all men being bo [...]ne free from all Civill subjection) the father hath no more power to resigne the libertie of his children, then their lives; and the father, as a fa­ther [Page 87] hath not power of the life of his child, as a Magistrate heA father as a father hath not power of life and death. Hugo G [...]otius de iute belli & pacis l. 2. c. 4. n. 10. may have power, and as something more then a father, he may have power of life and death. I heare not what Gro­tius saith, Those who are not borne have no accidents, and so no rights, Non entis nulla sunt accidentia; then Children not borne have neither right, nor liberty, and so no injury (may some say) can be done to Children not borne, though the fathers should give away their liberty to the conque­rour, those who are not capable of Law, are not capable of injury contrary to Law. Ans. There is a virtuall alienation of rights and lives of children not borne unlawfull, because the children are not borne; to say that children not borne, are not capable of law and injuries virtuall, which become reall in time might say, Adam did not an injury to his posterity by his first sin, which is contrary to Gods Word: so those who vowed yearely to give seven innocent children to the Minotaure to be devoured, and to kill their children not borne to bloody Molech, did no acts of bloody injury to their children; nor can any say then that fathers cannot tye themselves and their posterity to a King by succession, but I say, To be tyed to a law­full King is no making away of liberty, but a resigning of a power to be justly governed, protected and awed from active and passive vio­lence. 7. No lawfull King may be dethroned, nor lawfull King­dome7 Arg. dissolved; but Law and reason both saith, Quod vi partum est imperium, vi dissolvi potest. Every conquest made by violence may be dissolved by violence: Censetur enim ipsa natura jus dare ad id omne, sine quo obtineri non potest quod ipsa imperat.

It is objected, that the people of God by their sword conquered seven nations of the Canaanites, David conquered the Ammonites for the dis­grace done to his Embassadours. So God gave Egypt to Nebuchadne­zar for his hire, in his service done against Iudah; had David no right [...]ver the Ammonites and Moabites but by expecting their consent? yee will say, A right to their lands, goods and lives, but not to challenge their morall subjection, well, we doubt not but such conquerours will challenge and obtain their morall consent; but if the people refuse their consent, is there no way? for providence giveth no right. So D. Ferne, so Part 3. Sect. 3. p [...]g. 20. Arnisaeus de au­thoritat. Pri [...] ­cip. c. 1. n. 1 [...] Arnisaeus. Ans. A facto ad jus non valet consequentia, God, to whom belongeth the world and the fulnesse thereof, disponed to Abraham and his seed the Land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordai­ned that they should use their bow and their sword, for the actuall [Page 88] possession thereof; and the like divine right, had David to theThe peoples and Davids conquest of Canaanites, A­monites, and Edomites, do not prove con­quest to be a good title to a Crown. Edomites and Ammonites, though the occasion of Davids taking possession of these Kingdoms by his sword, did arise from particu­lar and occasionall exigences and injuries; but it followeth in no sort, That therefore Kings now wanting any word of promise, and so of divine right to any Lands, may ascend to the Throns of other Kingdoms then their own, by no better title then the bloody sword. That Gods will was the chief patent here, is clear, in that God forbad his people to conquer Edom or Esau's possession, when as he gave them command to conquer the Ammorites. I doubt not to say, if Joshua and David had had no better title, then their bloody sword, though provoked by injuries, they could have had no right to any kingly power over these Kingdoms: and if onely successe by the sword, be a right of providence, it is no right of pre­cept. Gods providence, as providence without precept or promise, can conclude a thing is done, or may be done, but cannot conclude a thing is lawfully, and warrantably done, else you might say the selling of Joseph, the crucifying of Christ, the spoiling of Job were lawfully done. 2. Though Conquerors extort consent, and oath of Loyaltie; yet that maketh not over a Royall right to the Conque­rour, to be King over their posterity without their consent. 3. Though the Children of Ammon did a high injury to David, yet no injury can be recompensed in justice with the pressure of the constrained subjection of Loyaltie to a violent Lord; if David had not had an higher warrant from God then an injury done to his messengers, he could not have conquered them. But 1. The Ammonites were the declared enemies of the Church of God, and raised forces against David, when they them­selves were the injurer's and offenders; and if Davids Con­quest will prove a lawfull title by the sword to all Conquerours, then may all Conquerours lawfully do to the conquered people, as David did; that is, they may put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and cause them passe through Davids con­quest of the Ammonites more rigorous then that it can legitimate Crowns by [...]onquest. the Brick-kilne. But I beseech you, will Royalists say, that Conque­rours who make themselves Kings by their sword, and so make themselves fathers, heads, defenders, and feeders of the people may use the extreamest Tyranny in the world, such as David us [...]d a­gainst the children of Ammon, which he could not have done, by the naked title of sword-conquest, if God had not laid a Com­mandment [Page 89] of an higher nature on him to serve Gods enemies so? I shall then say, if a conquering King be a lawfull King, because a Conquerour, then hath God made such a lawfull King, both a fa­ther, because a King, and a Tyrant, and cruell, and lyon-hearted oppressour of these whom he hath conquered; for God hath given him Royall power by this example, to put these, to whom he is a2 Sam. 12. 30. 31. father and defender by office, to torment, and also to be a torturer of them, by office, by bringing their backs under such Instruments of crueltie, as saws and harrows of iron, and axes of iron.

QUEST. XIII. Whether or no Royall dignitie have its spring from nature, and how that is true (every man is born free) and how servitude is contrary to nature?

I Conceive it to be evident that Royall dignity is not immediately, and without the intervention of the peoples consent given by God to any one person. 2. That conquest and violence, is no just title to a Crown. Now the question is, If Royalty flow from nature, if Royalty be not a thing meerly naturall, neither can subjection to Royall power be meerly naturall; but the former is rather civill, then naturall: and the question of the same nature is, Whether subjection or servitude be naturall?

I conceive, that there be divers subjections to these that are a­bove7 sorts of su­perioritie and inferioritie. us, some way naturall, and therefore I rank them in order thus. 1. There is a subjection in respect of naturall being, as the effect to the cause, so though Adam had never sinned, this mo­rality of the fifth command, should have stood in vigour, that the son by nature, without any positive Law, should have been subject to the father, because from him he hath his being, as from a second cause: But I much doubt, if the relation of a father, as a father, doth necessarily infer a Royall or Kingly authority of the father over the son; or by natures Law, that the father hath power of life and death over, or above his children, and the reasons I give, are, 1. Because power of life and death is by a positive Law, presup­posingPower of life and death from a positive law, not from the superioritie of father & chil­dren. sin, and the fall of man; and if Adam standing in innocency, could lawfully kill his son, though the son should be a Malefactor, without any positive Law of God, I much doubt. 2. I judge, that the power Royall, and the fatherly power of a father over his children, shall be found to be different, and the one is founded on [Page 90] the Law of nature, the other to wit, Royall power on a meere posi­tive Law. The 2. degree or order of subjection naturall, is a sub­jection in respect of gifts, or age: so Aristotle, 1 Polit. cap. 3. saith, [...]. that some are by nature servants: his meaning is good, that some gifts of nature, as wisedom naturall, or aptitude to govern, hath made some men of gold, fitter to command, and some of iron, and clay, fitter to be servants and slaves. But I judge this title to make a King by birth, seeing Saul whom God by supervenient gifts made a King, seemeth to ow small thanks to the womb, or nature, that he was a King, for his crueltie to the Lords Priests speaketh nothing but naturall basenesse. Its possible Plato had a good meaning, Dialog. 3. de legib. who made six orders here. 1. That fathers command their sons. 2. The noble the ignoble. 3. The elder the younger. 4. The masters the servants. 5. The stronger the weaker. 6. The wiser the ignorant. 3. Aquinas 22. q. 57. art. 3. Driedo de libert. Christ. l. 1. pag. 8. following Aristotle, polit. l. 7. c. 14. hold, though man had never sinned, there should have been a sortA dominion antecedent and consequent. of dominion of the more gifted, and wiser, above the lesse wise and weaker, not antecedent from nature, properly, but consequent, for the utilitie and good of the weaker, in so far, as it is good for the weaker to be guided by the stronger, which cannot be denyed to have some ground in nature: but there is no ground for Kings by nature here. 1. Because, even these who plead, that the mo­thersKings and sub­jects no natu­rall order. womb must be the best title for a Crown, and make it equiva­lent to Royall unction, are to be corrected in memory, thus; That it is meerly accidentall, and not naturall, for such a son to be born a King, because the free consent of the people making choice of the first father of that Line to be their King, and in him making choice of the first born of the family, is meerly accidentall to father and son, and so cannot be naturall. 2. Because Royall gifts to reign are not holden by either us or our adversaries, to be the specifice essence of a King; for if the people Crown a person their King, say we, if the womb bring him forth to be a King; say the oppo­nents, he is essentially a King, and to be obeyed as the Lords annoin­ted, though nature be very Parca, sparing, and a niggard in bestow­ing Royall gifts: Yea, though he be an idiot, say some, if he be the first born of a King, he is by just title a King, but must have Curators and Tutors to guide him, in the exercise of that Royall right that he hath from the womb. But Buchanan [Page 91] saith well▪ He who cannot govern himself, shall never govern Buchan. de jure Regni apud Sco­les. A man is born consequenter, in a politique [...] ­lation. others.

1 Assert. de facto, As a man commeth into the world a member of a politick societie, he is by consequence borne subject to the laws of that societie; but this maketh him not from the wombe and by nature subject to a King, as by nature he is subject to his Father who begat him; no more then by nature a Lyon is borne subject to another King-Lyon; for it is by accident that he is borne of pa­rents under subjection to a Monarch, or to either Democraticall or Aristocraticall governours, for Cain and Abel were borne under none of these formes of Government properly: and if he had been borne in a new planted Colonie in a wildernesse, where no govern­ment were yet established, he should be under no such Govern­ment.

2 Assert. Slavery of servants to Lords or Masters, such as wereSlavery not naturall. of old amongst the Iews, is not naturall, but against nature; 1. Be­cause slaverie is malum naturae, a penall evill, and contrary to na­ture, and a punishment of sinne. 2. Slaverie should not have been in the world, if man had never sinned, no more then there could have been buying and selling of men; which is a miserable conse­quent of sin, and a sort of death, when men are put to the toyling paines of the hireling, who longeth for the shadow, and under iron harrowes and sawes, and to hew wood, and draw water continually. 3. The originall of servitude was, when men were taken in warre, to eschew a greater evill, even death, the captives were willing to undergoe a lesse evill, slaverie. S. Servitus, 1. de jur. Pers. 4. A man being created according to Gods image, he is res sacrae, a sa­cred thing, and can no more by natures law be sold and bought, then a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God. S. 1. Instit. do invtil. scrupl. l. inter Stipulantem. S. Sacram. F. de verber. Ob­ligat.

3 Assert. Every man by nature is a freeman borne, that is, by na­tureEvery man by nature free borne in re­gard of civill subjection. 1 Arg. no man commeth out of the wombe vnder any civill subjection to King, Prince, or Judge, to master, captaine, conquerour, teacher, &c. 1. Because freedome is naturall to all, except freedome from subjection to Parents: And subjection politick is meerly acciden­tall, comming from some positive lawes of men, as they are in a po­litique societie; whereas they might have been borne with all con­comitants of n [...]ure, though borne in a single familie, the only na­turall [Page 92] and first societie in the world. 2. Man is borne by nature free2 Arg. from all subjection, except of that which is most kindly and naturall, and that is fatherly or filial subjection, or matrimoniall subjection of the wife to the husband, and especially he is free of subjection to a Prince by nature; Because to be under jurisdiction to a Iudge or King, hath a sort of jurisdiction. Argument. L. Si quis sit fugitivus F. de edil. edict. in S. penult. vel fin. especially to be under penall lawes now in the state of sinne. The learned Senator Ferdinandus Vasquez saith, l. 2. c. 82. n. 15. Every subject is to lay down his life for the Prince: now no man is borne under subjection to penall lawes or dying for his Prince. 3. Man by nature is borne free, and as free as3 Arg. beasts; but by nature no beast, no Lyon is born King of Lyons; no Horse, no Bullock, no Eagle, King of Horses, Bullocks, Eagles; nor is there any subjection here, except that the young Lyon is subject to the old, every soul to its damme, and by that same law of na­ture no man is borne King of men, nor any man subject to man in a civill subjection by nature, (I speake not of naturall subjection of children to parents) and therefore Ferdi. Vasquez. illustr. quest. l. 2. c. 82. n. 6. said that Kingdomes and Empires were brought in, not by Natures law, but by the law of Nations: he expoundeth himself else­where to speak of the law of nature secondary, otherwise the prima­rie law of Nations is indeed the law of Nature, as appropriated to man. If any reply, that the freedome naturall of beasts and birds who never sinned, cannot be one with the naturall freedome of man who are now under sin, and so under bondage for sin: my answer is, That the subjection of the miserie of man by nature, because of sinne, is more then the subjection of beasts, comparing spece and kind of beasts and birds with mankind, but comparing individuals of the same kinde amongst themselves, a Lyon with Lyon, Eagle with Eagle, and so Man with Man; in which respect, because he who is supposed to be the man borne free from subjection politike, even the King borne a King, is under the same state of sin, and so by rea­son of sinne, of which he hath a share equally with all other men by nature, he must be, by nature, borne under as great subjection pe­nall for sinne (except the King be borne voyd of sinne) as other men; Ergo, he is not borne freer by nature then other men, except he4 Arg. come out of the wombe with a Kings crown on his head. 4. To be a King, is a free gift of God, which God bestoweth on some men a­bove others, as is evident, 2 Sam. 12. 7, 8. Psal. 75. 6. Dan. 4. 32. and [Page 93] therefore all must be borne Kings, if any one man be by nature a King borne, and another a borne subject. But if some be by Gods grace made Kings above others, they are not so by nature; for things which agree to man by nature, agree to all men equally; but all men equally are not borne Kings, as is evident; and all men are not equally borne by nature under politique subjection to Kings, as the Adversaries grant; because those who are by nature Kings, can­not be also by nature subjects. 5. If men be not by nature free from5 Arg. politique subjection, then must some, by the law of relation, by na­ture be Kings; But none are by nature Kings, because none have by nature these things which essentially constitute Kings, for they have neither by nature the calling of God, nor gifts for the throne; nor the free election of the people, nor conquest: and if there be none a King by nature, there can be none a Subject by nature. And the Law faith, Omnes sumus naturâ liberi, nullius ditioni subjecti. l. Ma­nu [...]iss. F. de just. & jur. S. jus autem gentium, Ius. de jur. nat. We are all by nature free. and D. L. ex h [...]c jure cum simil. 6. Poli­ticians 6 Arg. Politque soci­etie naturall in radice, free in modo rei. agree to this as an undeniable truth, that as domestick society is naturall, being grounded upon Natures instinct; so Politique soci­etie is voluntary, being grounded on the consent of men; and so po­litique societie is naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary and free, in modo, in the manner of their union: and the Scripture clea­reth to us, that a King is made by the free consent of the people, Deut. 17. 15. and so not by nature. 7. What is from the wombe, and7 Arg. so naturall, is eternall, and agreeth to all societies of men: but a Mo­narchie agreeth not to all societies of men; for many hundred years de facto, there was not a King, till Nimrods time, the world being governed by families, and till Moses his time we find no institution for Kings, Gen. 7. and the numerous multiplication of mankind did occasion Monarchies, otherwise Fatherly government being the first, and measure of the rest, must be the best; for it is better that my father governe me, then that a stranger governe me; and there­fore the Lord forbad his people to set a stranger over themselves to be their King. The P. Prelate contendeth for the contrary. Every Sac. sanct. Reg. ma. c. 12. p. 12▪ man (saith he) is borne subject to his father, of whom immediately he hath his existence in nature: and if his Father be the subject of another, he is borne the subject of his fathers superiour. Answ. But the con­sequence is weake, every man is borne under naturall subjection to his father, ergo he is borne naturally under civill subjection to his [Page 94] fathers superiour or King, it followeth not; yea because his father was borne only by nature subject to his owne father, ergo he was subject to a Prince or King only by accident, and by the free con­stitution of men who freely choose politick government, whereas there is no government naturall, but fatherly or martiall, and there­fore the contradictory consequence is true.

P. Prelat. Obj. 2. Every man by nature hath immunity and li­berty from despoticall and herill Empire, and so may dispose of his owne at will, and cannot inslave himselfe without his owne free will; but God hath laid and cannot inslave himselfe without his owne free will; but God hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, and nature also laid this necessity on him, therefore this soveraignty cannot protect us in righteousnesse and honesty, except it be intirely indowed with soveraigne power to preserve it selfe, and protect us.

Ans. The Prelate here deserteth his owne consequence, which is strong against himselfe, for if a man be naturally subject to his fa­thers superiour, as he said before, why is not the sonne of a slave naturally subiect to his fathers superiour & master? 2. As a man may not make away his liberty without his own consent, so can he not without his owne consent give his liberty to be subject to penall Lawes, under a Prince without his owne consent, either in his fa­thers or in the representative society in which he liveth. 3. God and nature hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, a naturall necessity from the wombe to be under some government, to wit, a paternall government, that is true; but under this govern­ment politique, and namely under soveraignty, it is false; and that is but said, for why is he naturally under soveraignty rather then Aristocracy? I beleeve any of the three formes are freely chosen by any society 4. It is false that one cannot defend the people, except he have intire power, that is to say, he cannot doe good, except he have a vast power to doe both good and ill.

Obj. 3. It is accidentall to any to render himselfe a slave, being P. Prelate. occasioned by force or extreame indigence, but to submit to Govern­ment congrnous to the condition of man, and is necessary for his hap­py being, and naturall, and necessary by the inviolable Ordinance of God and nature. Ans. If the father be a slave, it is naturall and not accidentall, by the Prelates Logick, to be a slave. 2. it is also acci­dentall to be under Soveraignty, and sure not naturall, for then Aristocracy and Democracy must be unnaturall, and so unlawfullPolitick Go­vernment how naturall. Governments. 3. If to be congruous to the condition of man be all [Page 95] one with naturall man (which he must say if he speake sense) to beleeve in God, to be an excellent Mathematician, to swim in deepe waters, being congruous to the nature of man, must be naturall. 4. Man by nature is under government Paternall, not Politique properly, but by the free consent of his will.

Obj. 4. Luke 11. 5. Christ himselfe was [...] subject to P. Prelate. Sac. sanct. Mai. p. 126. his Parents, the word that is used, Rom. 13. ergo none is exempted from subjection to lawfull government, Ans. We never said, that any was exempted from lawfull goverment; the Prelate and his fellow Iesuites teach that the Clergy is exempted from the lawes of the ci­vill Magistrate, not we; but because Christ was subject to his Pa­rents, and the same word is used, Luk. 11. that is, Rom. 13. it will not follow therefore, men are by nature subject to Kings, because they are by nature subject to parents.

Obj. 5. The father had power over the children by the Law of God and nature to redeeme himselfe from debt, or any distressed condition, by inslaving his children begotten of his owne body, if this power was not by the right of nature, and by the Warrant of God, I can see no other, for it could not be by mutuall and voluntary contract of children and fathers, Inslaving of children by the parents not naturall. Ans. 1. Shew a law of nature, that the father might inslave his chil­dren by a Divine positive law presupposing sin, the father might doe that, and yet I thinke that may be questioned, whether it was not a permission rather then a law, as was the Bill of devorce, but a law of nature it was not. 2. The P. Prelate can see no Law but the law of nature here, but it is because he is blind or will not see; his rea­son is, it was not by mutuall and voluntary contract of children and fathers, ergo it was by the law of nature; so he that cursed his fa­ther was to dye by Gods Law. This law was not made by mu­tuall consent betwixt the Father and the Sonne, ergo it was a law of inature, the Prelate will see no better. Nature will teach a man to inslave himselfe to redeeme himselfe from death, but that it is a Dictate of nature that a man should inslave his sonne, I conceive not. 3. What can this prove, but that if the sonne may by the law of nature, be inslaved for the father, but that the sonne of a slave is by nature under subjection to slavery, & that by natures law, the con­trary whereof he spake in the page preceding, and in this same page.

As for the Argument of the Prelate to answer Suarez, who la­boureth to prove Monarchy not to be naturall, but of free consent, because it is various in sundry nations, it is the Iesuites Argument, not ours▪ I owne it not. Let Iesuites plead for Iesuites.

QUEST. XIIII. Whether or no the people make a Person their King conditionally, or absolutely? and whether there be such a thing as a Covenant tying the King no lesse then his subjects?

THere is a Covenant Naturall and a Covenant Politick and Ci­vill, there is no politick or civill covenant betwixt the King and his Subjects, because there be no such equality (say Royalists) be­twixtThe King un­der a naturall, but no civil ob­ligation to the people, say Royalists. the King and his people, as that the King can be brought under any civill or legall obligation in mans Court, to either necessitate the King civilly to keepe an Oath to his people, or to tye him to any punish­ment, if he faile, yet (say they) he is under naturall obligation [...]n Gods Court to keepe his Oath, but he is comptible only to God, if he violate his Oath.

Asser. 1. There is an Oath betwixt the King and his people, lay­ing on, by reciprocation of bands, mutuall civill obligation upon the King to the people, and the people to the King, 2 Sam. 5. 3. So [...]ll the Elders of Israel came to the King to Hebron, and King David made a Covenant with them in Hebron before the Lord, and they an­uoynted David King over Israel, 1 Chron. 11. 3. And David made a covenant with them before the Lord, and they annoynted David King over Israel, according to the Word of the Lord by Samuel, 2 Chron. 23. 2. And they went about in Iudah and gathered the Levites out of all the Cities of Iudah, and the chiefe of the fathers of Israel, and they c [...]me to Ierusalem. 3. And all the congregation made a covenant with the King Ioash in the house of God, 2 King. 11. 17. and Jehoiada made a covenant betwixt the Lord and the King, and the people that they should be the Lords people, between the King also and his people, Eccles. 8. 2. I counsell thee to keepe the Kings commandement, and that in regard of the Oath of God; then it is evident there was a co­venant betwixt the King and the people. 2. That was not a cove­nant that did tye the King to God onely, and not to the people, 1. because the covenant betwixt the King and the people is clearly differenced from the Kings covenant with the Lord, 2 King. 11. 17. 2. there were no necessity that this covenant should be made pub­lickly before the people, if the King did not in the covenant tye and oblige himselfe to the people; nor needed it be made solemnly be­fore the Lord is the House of God. 3. It is expresly a covenant, that was between Ioash the King and his people, and David made a [Page 97] covenant at his Coronation with the Princes and Elders of Israel; therefore the people give the Crown to David Covenant-wise, and upon condition that he should performe such and such duties to them; and this is cleare by all Covenants in the Word of God, even the Covenant between God and man is so mutuall; I will be your God, and yee shall be my people. The covenant is so mutuall, that if the people breake the covenant, God is loosed from his part of the co­venant, Zach. 11. v. 10. 2. The covenant giveth to the beleever a sort of action of Law, and jus quoddam, to plead with God, in re­spect of his fidelity to stand to that covenant that bindeth him by reason of his fidelity, Esay 43. 26. Es. 63. 16. Daniel 9. 4, 5. and farre more a covenant giveth ground of a civill action and claime to a people and the free estates against a King, seduced by wicked counsell to make war against the Land, whereas he did sweare by the most high God, that he should be a father and protector of the Church of God. 2. All covenants and contracts between man and man, yea all solemne promises bring the covenante [...]s under a Law, and a claime before men, if the Oath of God be broken as the Covenant betwixt Abraham and Abimelech, Gen. 21. 27. Ionathan and David, I Sam. 18. 3. the spies professe to Rahab in the cove­nant that they made with him, Iosh. 2. v. 20. And if thou utter this our businesse (say they) we will be quit of thine Oath, which thou hast made us to swear. There be no mutuall contract made upon certain conditi­ons, but if the conditions be not fulfilled, the party injured is loosed from the contract. Barclay saith, That this covenant obligeth the If the conditi­on without the which one of the parties would never have entered in covenant, be not performed, that person is loosed from the covenant. Arnis. de au­thorit. prin. [...]. [...]. n. 6. 7. King to God, but not the King to the people. Ans. It is a vaine thing to say that the people and the King make a covenant, and that David made a covenant with the Elders and Princes of Israel; for if he be obliged to God only, and not to the people by a covenant made with the people, it is not made with the people at all, nay, it is no more made with the people of Israel, nor with the Chaldeans, for it bindeth David no more to Israel, nor to Chaldea, as a cove­nant made with men. Arnisaeus saith, when two parties contract, if one performe the duty, the other is acquitted. Sect. Ex hujusmod ubi vult just. de duob. reis, l. 3. F. because every one of them are obliged fully. Sect. 1. Iust. cod. to God, to whom the Oath is made (for that is his meaning) and if either the people performe what is sworne to the Lord, or the King, yet one of the parties remaineth still under obliga­tion, and neither doth the peoples obedience exempt the King from pu­nishment, [Page 98] if he faile, nor the Kings obedience exempt the people, if they faile, but every one beareth the punishment of his owne sin; and there is no mutuall power in the parties to compell one another to performe the promised duty, because that belongeth to the Pretor or Magistrate, before whom the contract was made. The King hath jurisdiction over the people, if they violate their Oath, but the people hath no power over the Prince, and the ground that Arnisaeus layeth downe is that, 1. The King is not a party contracting with the people, as if there were mutuall obligations betwixt the King and the people, and a mutuall coactive po­wer▪ on either side. 2. That the care of Religion belongeth not to the people, for that hath no warrant in the Word (saith he) 2. We read not that the people was to command and compell the Priests and the King to re­forme Religion and abolish Idolatry, as it must follow, if the covenant be mutuall. 3. Iehoiada, 2 King. 11. obligeth himselfe and the King, and the people, by a like law to serve God, and here be not two parts, but three; the high Priest, the King, the People, if this example prove any thing. 4. Both King and people shall finde the revenging hand of God against them, if they faile in the breach of their Oath; but with this difference, and every one of the two, King and people by the Oath stand obliged to God, the King for himselfe, and the people for them­selves, but with this difference, the King oweth to God proper and due obedience as any of the subjects, and also to governe the people accor­ding to Gods true religion, Deut. 17. 2 Chro. 29. and in this the Kings ob­ligation differeth from the peoples obligation, the people, as they would be saved must serve God, and the King for the same cause, 1 Sam. 12. But besides this, the King is obliged to rule and governe the people, and keepe them in obedience to God; but the people is not obliged to governe the King, and keepe him in obedience to God, for then the people should have as great power of jurisdiction over the King, as the King hath o­over the people, which is against the Word of God, and the examples of the Kings of Iudah; but this commeth not from any promise or cove­nant that the King hath made with the people, but from a peculiar obligation whereby he is obliged to God as a man, not as a King.

This is the mystery of the businesse, but I oppose this in these The people & Princes in their place are obli­ged to maintain Religion and Iustice, no lesse then the King. Assertions.

1. Assert. As the King is obliged to God for the maintenance of true Religion, so are the people and Princes no lesse in their place obliged to maintaine true Religion, for 1. the people are rebuked because they burnt Incense in all high places, 2 King. 17. 11. [Page 99] 2 Chron. 33. 17. Hos. 4. 13. And the reason why the high places are not taken away, 2 Chro. 20. 33. is given, for as yet the people had not prepared their heart unto the God of their fathers; but you will reply, elicite acts of maintenance of true Religion are commanded to the people, and that the places prove; but the question is De actibus imperatis, of commanded acts of Religion, sure none but the Magi­strate is to command others to worship God according to his Word. I answer, in ordinary only, Magistrates (not the King on­ly) but all the Princes of the Land, and Iudges are to maintaine Religion by their commandements, Deut. 1. 16. 2 Chro. 1. 2. Deut. 16. 19. Eccles. 5. 8. Hab. 1. 4. Mic. 3. 9. Zach. 7. 9. Hos. 5. 10. 11. and to take care of Religion; but when the Iudges decline from Gods way, and corrupt the Law, we finde the people punished and rebuked for it, Ier. 15. 4. And I will cause them to be removed to all Kingdomes of the earth, because of Manasseh the sonne of He­zekiah King of Iudah, for that which he did in Ierusalem, 1 Sam. 12. 24. only feare the Lord—25. But if yee doe still wickedly, yee shall be consumed, both yee and your King. And this case [...] grant is extra­ordinary, yet so as Iunius Brutus proveth well and strongly, that Religion is not given only to the King, that he only should keep [...] it, but to all the inferiour Iudges and people also in their kind; but because the estates never gave the King power to corrupt Religion,In so far as the King presseth a false Religion on the people, catenus, in so far they are under­stood not to have a Kingly power. and presse a false and Idolatrous worship upon them, therefore when the King defendeth not true Religion, but presseth upon the people a false and Idolatrous Religion, in that they are not under the King, but are presumed to have no King eatenus so farre, and are presumed to have the power in themselves, as if they had not appointed any King at all: as if we presume the body had given to the right hand a power to ward off strokes, and to defend the bo­dy, if the right hand should by a Palsie, or some other disease be­come impotent, and be withered up; when ill is comming on the body, it is presumed that the power of defence is recurred to the left hand, and to the rest of the body to defend it selfe, in this case as if the body had no right hand, and had never communicated any power to the right hand at all. So if an incorporation accused of Treason, and in danger of the sentence of death▪ shall appoint a Lawyer to Advocate their cause, and to give in their just defences to the Iudge; if their Advocate be stricken with dumbnesse, because they have losed their legall and representative tongue, none can say that [Page 100] this incorporation hath loosed the tongues that Nature hath given them, so as by Natures law they may not plead in their own just & lawfull defence, as if they had never appointed the foresaid lawyer to plead for them. The King, as a man, is not more obliged to the publick and regall defence of the true Religion, then any other man of the land; but he is made by God and the people King, for the Church and people of God's sake, that he may defend true Religion, for the behalfe and salvation of all. If therefore he defend not Re­ligion for the salvation of the soules of all in his publick and royall way, it is presumed as undeniable, that the people of God, who by the law of nature are to care for their own soule, are to defend in their way, true Religion, which so nearly concerneth them and their eternall happinesse.

2 Assert. When the covenant is betwixt God, on the one part, and the King, Priests, and people on the other part, it is true, if the one performe for his part to God, the whole duty, the other is ac­quitted; as if two men be indebted to one man ten thousand pounds, if the one pay the whole summe, the other is acquitted: but the King and People are not so, contracting parties in covenant with God, as that they are both indebted to God for one and the same sum of compleat obedience, so as if the King pay the whole summe of o­bedience to God, the people is acquitted; and if the People pay the whole summe, the King is acquitted: for every one standeth obli­ged to God for himselfe; for the people must doe all that is their part, in acquitting the King from his Royall duty, that they may free him and themselves both from punishment, if he disobey the King of Kings: Nor doth the Kings obedience acquit the people from their duty. And Arnisaeus dreamed, if he believed that we make King and People this way partie contractors in covenant with God. Nor can two co-partners in covenant with God, so mutually compell one an­other to doe their duty; for we hold, that the covenant is made be­twixt the King and the People, betwixt mortall men; but they both bind themselves before God to each other. But, saith Arnisaeus, It belongeth to a Pretor or Ruler, who is above both King and People, to The covenant between King and People gi­veth a coactive power to each other. compell each of them; the King to performe his part of the covenant to the people, and the people to performe their part of the covenant to the King. Now there is no Ruler but God, above both King and People. But let me answer: The consequence is not needfull, no more then when the King of Iudah and the King of Israel make a covenant to perform [Page 101] mutuall duties one to another: no more then it is necessarie that there should be a King and superior Ruler above the King of Israel and the King of Iudah, who should compell each one to doe a duty to his fellow King; for the King and People are each of them above, and below others in divers respects: The People, because they cre­ate the man King, they are so above the King, and have a virtuall power to compell him to doe his duty: and the King, as King, hath an authoritative power above the People, because Royaltie is for­mally in him, and originally and virtually only in the People; there­fore may he compell them to their duty, as we shall heare anon; and therefore there is no need of an earthly Ruler higher then both, to compell both.

3 Assert. We shall hereafter prove the power of the people a­bove the King, God willing. And so it is false that there is not mu­tuall coactive power on each side.

4 Assert. The obligation of the King in the covenant, flowethThe covenant bindeth the King, as King, not as he is a man only. from the peculiar obligation nationall betwixt the King and the E­states, and it bindeth the King, as King, and not simply as he is a man. 1. Because it is a covenant betwixt the people and David, not as he is the sonne of Jesse, for then it should oblige Eliab, or any other of Davids brethren; yea, it should oblige any man, if it oblige David as a man: but it obligeth David as a King, or as he is to be their King, because it is the specifice act of a King, that he is obliged unto, to wit, to governe the people in Righteousnesse and Re­ligion with his Royall power. And so it is false that Arnisaeus saith, that the King, as a man, is obliged to God by this covenant, not as a King. 2. He saith, by covenant the King is bound to God as a Man, not as a King. But so the man will have the King, as King, under no law of God, and so he must either be above God, as King, or coequall with God; which are manifest blasphemies: for I thought ever, the Royalists had not denyed, but the King, as King, had been obliged to keep his oath to his subjects, in relation to God, and in regard of na­turall obligation; so as he [...]mneth before God, if he breake his co­venant with his people: though they deny that he is obliged toThe covenant tyeth the King to the People politically as well as to God naturally or religiously. keep his covenant in relation to his Subjects, and in regard of poli­tique or civill obligation to men. Sure I am, this the Royalists con­stantly teach. 3. He would have this covenant so made with men, as it obligeth not the King to men, but to God. But the contrary is true. Beside the King and the Peoples covenant with the Lord, [Page 102] King Joash made another covenant with the People, and Jehoiada the Priest was only a witnesse, or one who in Gods name performed the rite of annointing, otherwise he was a subject on the peoples side, obliged to keep allegiance to Joash, as to his Soveraigne and Master. But certainly, who ever maketh a covenant with the peo­ple, promising to governe them according to Gods word, and upon that condition and these termes receiveth a throne and crown from the people, he is obliged to what he promiseth to the people, Omnis promittens facit alteri, cui promissio facta est, jus in promittent [...]m; Who ever maketh a promise to another, giveth to that other a sort of right or jurisdiction to challenge the promise. The covenant be­twixt David and Israel were a shadow, if it tye the people to alle­giance to David as their King, and if it tye not David as King to govern them in righteousnesse; but leave David loose to the people, and only tye him to God; then it is a covenant betwixt David and God only: But the Text saith, It is a covenant betwixt the King and the People, 2 King. 11. 17. 2 Sam. 5. 3.

Hence our second Argument. He who is made a minister of God, 2 Arg. not simply, but for the good of the subject; and so he take heed to walk in Gods law as a King, and governe according to Gods will, he is in so far only made King by God, as he fulfilleth the condition; and in so far as he is a minister for evill to the subject, and ruleth not according to that which the book of the Law commandeth him as King, in so far he is not by God appointed King and Ruler, and so must be made a King by God conditionally: But so hath God made Kings and Rulers, Rom. 13. 4. 2 Chron. 6. 16. Ps. 89. 30, 31. 2 Sam. 7. 12. 1 Chron. 28. 7, 8, 9. This argument is not brought to prove that Jeroboam or Saul leave off to be Kings, when they faile in some part of the condition; or as if they were not Gods Vicegerents to be o­beyed in things lawfull, after they have gone on in wicked cour­ses: For, the People consenting to make Saul King, they give him the Crown, pro hac vice, at his entry, absolutely: there is no condi­tion required in him before they make him King, but only that he covenant with them to rule according to Gods law: The conditi­ons to be performed, are consequent, and posterior to his actuall co­ronation, and his sitting on the Throne. But the argument presup­posing that which the Lords word teacheth, to wit, that the Lord and the people giveth a crown by one and the same action; for God formally maketh David a King by the Princes and Elders of Israels [Page 103] choosing of him to be their King at Hebron; and therefore seeing the people maketh him a King covenant-wise, and conditionally, so he rule according to Gods Law, and the people resigning their power to him for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life under him, and not to destroy them, and tyrannize over them; it is certain God giveth a King that same way, by that same very act of the people; and if the King tyrannize, I cannot say it is beside the inten­tion of God making a King, not yet beside his intention as a just pu­nisher of their transgressions; for to me as I conceive, nothing ei­ther good or evill falleth out beside the intention of him, who doeth all things according to the pleasure of his Will; if then the peo­ple make a King as a King conditionally for their fafety, and not for their destruction (for as a King he saveth, as a man he destroyeth, and not as a King and Father) and if God by the peoples free election make a King, God maketh him a King conditionally, and so by covenant; and therefore when God promiseth 2 Sam. 7. 12. 1 Chron. 28. 7, 8, 9. to Davids seed, and to Solomon a Throne, he promiseth not a Throne to them immediatly, as he rai­sed up Prophets and Apostles, without any mediate action and con­sent of the people, but he promiseth a Throne to them by the medi­ate consent, election, and covenant of the people; which condition and covenant he expresseth in the very words of the people, cove­nantHow the cove­nant is condi­tionall, and what breach dissolveth the▪ covenant. with the King, so they walke as Kings in the Law of the Lord, and take heed to Gods Commandements and Statutes to doe them▪ Obj. But then Solomon falling in love with many outlandish women, and so not walking according to Gods Law, loseth all royall dignity and Kingly power, and the people is not to acknowledge him as King, since the Kingly power was conferred upon him, rather then Adonijah, upon such a condition, which condition not being performed by him, it is presumed that neither God, nor the people under God, as Gods instru­ments in making King, conferred any royall power on him. Ans. It doth not follow, that Solomon falling in love with strange women doth lose Royall dignity, either in the Court of Heaven, or before men; because the conditions of the covenant upon which God by the people made him King must be exponed by the Law, Deut. 17. now that cannot beare, that any one act contrary to the Royall Office, yea that any one or two acts of Tyranny doth denude a man of the Royall dignity that God and the people gave him, for so David com­mitting two acts of tyranny, one of taking his owne faithfull sub­jects [Page 104] wife from him, and another in killing himselfe, should denude himselfe of all the Kingly power that he had, and that therefore the people after his Adultery and Murther were not to reknowledge David as their King, which is most absurd; for as one single act of unchastity is indeed against the matrimoniall covenant, and yet doth not make the woman no wife at all, so it must be such a breach of the Royall Covenant, as maketh the King no King, that anulleth the Royall Covenant, and denudeth the Prince of his Royall au­thority and power, that must be interpreted a breach of the Oath of God, because it must be such a breach upon supposition, whereof the people would not have given the Crowne, but upon supposition of his destructivenesse to the Common-wealth, they would never have given to him the Crowne.

Obj. 2. Yet at least it will follow, that Saul after he is rejected of God for disobedience, in not destroying the Amalekites, as Samuel spea­keth to him, 1 Sam. 15. is no longer to be acknowledged King by the people, at least after he committeth such acts of tyranny, as are 1. Sam. 8. 12, 13, 14, 15. &c. and after he had killed the Priests of the Lord, and persecuted innocent David without cause, he was no longer either in the Court of Heaven, or the Court of men to be acknowledged as King, seeing he had manifestly violated the royall covenant made with the people, 1 Sam. 11. v. 14, 15. and yet after those breaches David ac­knowledgeth him to be his Prince, and the Lords annoynted. Ans. The Prophet Samuel his threatning, 1 Sam. 17. is it not exponed of actuall unkinging and rejecting of Saul at the present; for after that, Samuel both honoured him as King before the people, and prayed for him, and mourned to God on his behalfe as King, 1 Sam. 16. 1. 2. but the threatning was to have effect in Gods time, when he should bring David to the Throne, as was prophesied, upon occasion of lesse sinne, even his sacrificing and not waiting the time appointed, as God had commanded, 1 Sam. 13. v. 13, 14.

2. The people and Davids acknowledgment of Saul to be theOne or two tyrannous acts deprive not a King of his Royall right. Lords annoynted, and a King, after he had committed such acts of Tyranny as seeme destructive of the Royall Covenant, and incon­sistent therewith, cannot prove that Saul was not made King by the Lord, and the people, conditionally, and that for the peoples good and safety, and not for their destruction; and it doth well prove that those acts of blood and tyranny committed by Saul, were not done by him as King, or from the principle of Royall power [Page 105] given to him by God and the people. 2. That in these acts they were not to acknowledge him as King. 3. That these acts of blood were contrary to the covenant that Saul did sweare at his inauguration, and contrary to the conditions that Saul in the covenant tooke on him to perform at the making of the Royall covenant. 4. They prove not but the States who made Saul King, might lawfully dethrone him, and annoint David their King. But David had reason to hold him for his Prince, and the Lords Anointed, so long as the people recalled not their grant of Royall dignity, as David or any man is ob­liged to honour him as King whom the people maketh King, though he were a bloodier and more tyrannous man then Saul. Any Ty­rant standeth in titulo, so long as the People and Estates who made him King, have not recalled their grant; so as neither David, nor any single man, though six hundred with him, may unking him, or detract obedience from him as King; So, many acts of disloyaltie, and breaches of lawes in the Subjects, though they be contrary to this Covenant that the States make with their Prince, doth not make them to be no Subjects: and the Covenant mutuall standeth thus.

3 Arg. If the people as Gods instruments, bestow the benefitThe covenant between King and people conditionall. of a Crown on their King, upon condition that he will rule them ac­cording to Gods word; then is the King made King by the people conditionally: but the former is true; Ergo, so is the latter. The assumption is proved thus: because to be a King, is to be an adopted father, tutor, a Politick servant and Royall watchman of the State; and the Royall honour, and Royall maintenance given to him, is a reward of his labours, and a Kingly hire. And this is the Apostles argument, Rom. 13. 6. For this cause pay you tribute also; (there is the wages) for they are Gods ministers, attending continually upon this very thing; There is the worke. Qui non implet conditionem à se promissam, cadit benefi [...]io. It is confirmed thus. The people either maketh the man their Prince conditionally, that he rule according to Law; or absolutely, so that he rule according to will or lust: or, 3. without any vocall transactions at all, but only brevi manu, say, Reigne thou over us, and, (God save the King.) And so there be no conditions spoken on either side; Or, 4. The King is obliged to God for the condition which he promiseth by oath to performe to­ward the people; but he is to make no reckoning to the people, whether he performe his promise or no; for the people being infe­riour [Page 106] to him, and he, solo Deo minor, only next and immediate to God, the people can have no jus, no law over him by vertue of any covenant. But the first standing, we have what we seeke; The se­cond is contrary to Scripture. He is not Deut. 17. 15, 16. made ab­solutely a King to rule according to his will and lust; for, [Reigne thou over us] should have this meaning; Come thou and play the Ty­rant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us: which is against naturall sense: nor can the sense and meaning be according to the third, That the people without any expresse, vocall, and positive co­venant, give a Throne to their King to rule as he pleaseth; because, 1. it is a vain thing for the Prelate and other Mancipia Aulae, Court­bellies, to say Scotland and England must produce a written authen­tick covenant betwixt the first King and their People, because, say they, its the Lawes word, De non apparentibus & non existentibus eadem lex; that covenant which appeareth not, it is not. For in po­sitive covenants that is true, and in such contracts as are made ac­cordingThough there be no positive written cove­cant (which yet we grant not) yet there is a naturall, tacite, and im­plicite cove­nant betwixt the King and ths people. to the Civill or Municipall lawes, or the secondary law of Nations: But the generall covenant of nature is presupposed in ma­king a King, where there is no vocall or written covenant, if there be no conditions betwixt a Christian King and his people, then those things which are just and right according to the law of God, and the rule of God in moulding the first King, are understood to regu­late both King and People, as if they had been written: and here we produce our written covenant, Deut. 17. 15. Josh. 1. 8, 9. 2▪ Chr. 31▪ 32. 1. Because this is as much against the King as the people, and more; for if the first King cannot bring forth his written and authentick tables to prove that the Crown was given to him and his heires, and his successors absolutely and without any conditions, so as his will shall be a law, ca lit causa, he loseth his cause (say they) The King is in possession of the Royall power absolutely, without any condition, and you must put him from his possession by a law. I answer, this is most false; 1. Though he were in mala fide, and in unjust possessi­on, the law of Nature will warrant the people to repeal their right, and plead for it, in a matter which concerneth their heads, lives, and soules▪ 2. The Parliaments of both Kingdomes standing in posses­sion of a nomothetick power to make lawes, proveth cleerely that the King is in no possession of any Royall dignitie conferred ab­solutely and without any condition upon him: and therefore it is the Kings part by law to put the Estates out of possession. And so [Page 107] though there were no written covenant, the standing law and pra­ctice of many hundreth acts of Parliament, is equivalent to a writ­ten covenant.

2. When the people appointeth any to be their King, the voyce of Nature exponeth their deed, though there be no vocall or writ­ten covenant; For that fact of making a King, is a morall lawfull act warranted by the word of God, Deut. 17. 15, 16. Rom. 13. 1. 2. and the law of Nature: and therefore they having made such a man their King, they have given him power to be their father, feeder, healer, protector; and so must only have made him King conditio­nally, so he be a father, a feeder, and tutor. Now if this deed of ma­king a King, must be exponed to be an investing with an absolute, and not a conditionall power; this fact shall be contrary to Scripture, and to the law of Nature: for if they have given him Royall powerIf the King be made King absolutely, he is made such an one contra­ry to the word of God and nature of his office. absolutely, and without any condition, they must have given to him power to be a father, protector, tutor, and to be a tyrant, a mur­therer, a bloody lyon to waste and destroy the people of God.

3. The Law permitteth the bestower of a benefit to interpret his own mind in the bestowing of a benefit, even as a King and State must expone their own Commission given to their Ambassadour, so must the Estates expone whether they bestowed the Crown upon the first King conditionally or absolutely.

For the 4th. if it stand, then must the people give to their first elected King a power to wast and destroy themselves, so as they may never controle it, but only leave it to God and the King to rec­kon together, but so the condition is a Chimera (We give you a Throne, upon condition you swear by him who made heaven and earth, that you will govern us according to Gods Law; and you shall be an­swerable to God only, not to us, whether you keep the covenant you make with us▪ or violate it;) but how a covenant can be made with the peo­ple, and the King obliged to God, not to the people, I conceive not. 2. This presupposeth that the King as King cannot doe any sin, or commit any act of tyranny against the people, but against God only; because if he be obliged to God only as a King by vertue of his cove­nant: How can he faile against an obligation where there is no ob­ligation? but as a King he owe no obligation of duty to the people, and indeed so doe our good men expound that Psal. 51. Against thee, thee only have I sinned, not against Ʋriah; for if he sinned not as King against Ʋriah, whose life he was obliged to conserve as a [Page 92] King, he was not obliged as a King by any royall duty to conserve his life. Where there is no sin, there is no obligation not to sin, and where there is no obligation not to sin, there is no sin: By this the King as King is loosed from all duties of the second Table, being once made a King, he is above all obligation to love his neighbour as himselfe, for he is above all his neighbours, and above all man­kind, and only lesse then God.

4. Arg. If the people be so given to the King, that they areThe people are not given to the Kings kee­ping so as they be his owne, as sheep or mony are given. committed to him as a pledge, oppignorated in his hand, as a pupill to a Tutor, as a distressed man to a Patron, as a flocke to a Shep­heard; and so as they remaine the Lords Church, his people, his flocke, his portion, his inheritance, his vineyard, his redeemedones, then they cannot be given to the King as Oxen and Sheepe, that are free­ly gifted to a man; or as a gift or summe of gold or silver, that the man to whom they are given may use, so that he cannot commit a fault against the oxen, sheepe, gold or mony, that is given to him, how ever he shall dispose of them.

But the people are given to the King to be tutored and protected of him, so as they remaine the people of God, and in covenant with him, and if the people were the goods of fortune (as Heathens say) he could no more sinne against the people then a man can sin against his gold; now though a man by adoring gold, or by lavish profusi­on and wasting of gold may sin against God, yet not against gold; nor can he be in any covenant with gold, or under any obligation of either duty or sin to gold, or to livelesse and reasonlesse creatures properly, therefore he may sin in the use of them, and yet not sin against them, but against God. Hence of necessity the King must be under obligation to the Lords people in another manner, then that he should only answer to God, for the losse of men, as if men were worldly goods under his hand, and as if being a King he were now by this Royall Authority priviledged from the best▪halfe of the law of nature, to wit, from acts of mercy, and truth, and covenant kee­ping with his brethren.The King could not buy or sell, borrow or contract debt if his co­venant with men did not bind him.

5. Arg. If a King because a King were priviledged from all covenant obligation to his subjects, then could no Law of men lawfully reach him for any contract violated by him, then he could not be a debtor to his subjects, if he borrowed mony from them, and it were utterly unlawfull either to crave him mony, or to sue him at Law for debts, yet our Civill Lawes of Scotland tyeth the [Page 93] King to pay his debts, as any other man; yea and King Solomons traffiquing, and buying and selling betwixt him and his owne sub­jects would seeme unlawfull; for how can a King buy and sell with his subjects if he be under no covenant obligation to men, but to God only. Yea then a King could not marry a wife, for he could not come under a covenant to keepe his body to her only, nor if he committed adultery, could he sin against his wife, because being im­mediate unto God, and above all obligation to men, he could sin a­gainst no covenant made with men, but only against God.

6. If that was a lawfull covenant made by Asa, and the States ofThe covenant sworn by Asa and all Iudah, 2 Chron. 15. obligeth the King. Iudah, 2 Chron. 15. 13. That whosoever would not seeke the Lord God of their fathers, should be put to death, whether small or great, whe­ther man or woman: this obligeth the King for ought I see, and the Princes, and the people, but it was a lawfull covenant, ergo the King is under a covenant to the Princes and Iudges, as they are to him; it is replyed, If a Master of a Schoole should make a law, who­ever Barclay. shall goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty obtained of the Master, shall be whipped, it will not oblige the Schoole-master that he shall be whipped, if he goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty; so neither doth this Law oblige the King the supreame Law-giver. Ans. Suppose that the Schollars have no lesse hand and authority magi­steriall in making the law, then the Schoole-master, as the Princes of Iudah had a collaterall power with King Asa about that law; it would follow, that the Schoole-master is under the same law. 2. Suppose going out at Schoole doores were that way a morall neglect of studying in the Master, as it is in the Scholars, as the not seeking of God is as hainous a sinne in King Asa, and no lesse deserving death then it is in the people; then should the Law oblige Schoolma­ster and Scholler both without exception. 3. The Schoolemaster is clearely above all lawes of discipline which he imposeth on his Scho­lars, but none can say that King Asa was clearely above that law of seeking of the Lord God of his fathers. Diodorus Siculus, l. 17. saith, the Kings of Persia were under an oath, and that they might not change the Lawes; and so were the Kings of Egypt and Ethiopia. The Kings of Sparta, which Aristotle calleth just Kings, renew their oath e­very moneth. Romulus so covenanted with the Senate and People. Carolus V. Austriacus, sweareth he shall not change the Lawes, without the consent of the Electors, nor make new lawes, nor di­spose or impledge any thing that belongeth to the Empire. So read [Page 110] we, Spec. Saxon. l. 3. Act. 54. and Xenophon Cyriped. l. 8. saith,Alber. Gentilis in disput. Regal. l. 2. c. 12. l. 3. c. 14; 15. 16. Hug. Grotius de jure belli, & poc. l. 2. c. 11, 12, 13. Arnisaeus d [...] authorit. prin­cip. c. 1. n. 7. 8. 10. Haenon. disp. 2. there was a covenant between Cyrus and the Persians. The nobles are crowned when they crown their King, and exact a speciall Oath of the King. So doth England, Polonia, Spaine, Arragonia, &c. Alberi. Gentilis. Hug. Grotius, prove that Kings are really bound to performe Oathes and contracts to their people; but notwithstanding there be such a covenant, it followeth not from this, saith Arnisaeus, that if the Prince breake his covenant and rule tyrannically, the people shall be free, and the contract or covenant nothing. Ans. The covenant may be materially broken, while the King remaineth King, and the sub­jects remaine subjects, but when it is both materially and formally declared by the States to be broken, the people must be free from their Allegiance; but of this more hereafter.

Arg. 7. If a Master bind himselfe by an Oath to his servant, he shall not receive such a benefit of such a point of service; if he vio­late the Oath, his Oath must give his servant Law and right, both to challenge his Master, and he is freed from that point of service; an Army appointeth such a one their Leader and Captaine, but they re­fuse to doe it, except he sweare he shall not betray them to the ene­my, he doth betray them, then must the souldiers be loosed from that contract; if one be appointed Pilate of a ship, and not but by an Oath, if he sell the Passengers to the Turke, they may challenge the Pilate of his Oath; and it is cleare that 1. the estates should re­fuse to give the Crown, to him who would refuse to governe them according to Gods Law, but should professe that he would make his owne will a Law, therefore the intention of the Oath is clearely conditionall. 2. When the King sweareth the Oath, he is but King in fieri, and so not as King above the States of Kingdomes, now his being King doth not put him in a case above all civill obligation of a King to his subjects, because the matter of the Oath is, that he shall be under them so farre, in regard of the Oath of God.

Arg. 8. If the Oath of God made to the people doe not bind him to the people to governe according to Law, and not according to his will and lust, it should be unlawfull for any to sweare such an Oath, for if a power above law agree essentially to a King as a King, as Royalists hold, he who sweareth such a Oath, should both sweare to be a King to such a people, and should sweare to be no King in respect by his Oath he should renounce that which is essen­tiall to a King.

[Page 111] Arnisaeus objecteth; Ex particularibus non potest colligi conclusio u­niversalis, some few of the Kings, as David & Ioash, made a covenant with the people; it followeth not that this was a universall law. Ans. Yea, the covenant is Deut. 17. and must be a rule to all; if so just a man as David was limited by a covenant, then all the rest also.

QUEST. XV. Whether or no the King be Ʋnivocally, or only Analogically, and by proportion a father?

IT is true, Aristotle Polit. l. 3. c. 11. saith, That the Kingly powerIoan. Roffens. de potest. pap [...]. l. 2. c. 5. Adam suppose he had lived till now should not have bin King of the whole earth because [...] father. is a fatherly power; and Iustin. Novell 12. c. 2. Pater quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius sit, tamen pater est. But I doe not beleeve that, as Royalists say, that the Kingly power is essentially and univocally that same with a paternall or fatherly power; or that Adam as a father, was as a father and King, and that suppose A­dam should live in Noahs daies, that by divine institution and with­out consent of the Kingdomes and communities on earth, Adam hoc ipso, and for no other reason but because he was a father, should also be the universall King, and Monarch of the whole world; or sup­pose Adam were living to this day; that all Kings that hath been since, and now are, held their Crownes of him, and had no more Kingly power then inferiour Iudges in Scotland have under our soveraigne King Charles, for so all that hath been, and now are lawfull Kings should be unjust usurpers; for if fatherly power be the first and native power of commanding, it is against nature that a Monarch who is not my father by generation, should take that po­wer from me, and be a King over both me and my children.

But I assert, that though the Word warrant us to esteem Kings King a father Metaphorical­ly only. fathers, Esa. 49. 23. Jud. 5. 7. Gen. 20. v. 2. yet are not they essenti­ally and formally fathers by generation, Num. c. 11. v. 12. Have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them? and yet are they but fathers metaphorically; 1. By office, because they should care for them as fathers doe for children, and so come under the name of fa­thers in the fifth Commandement; and therefore rigorous and cru­ell Rulers are Leopards and Lyons, and Wolves, Ezech. 22. 27. Zeph. 3. 3. If then tyrannous Judges be not essentially and formally Leopards and Lyons, but only metaphorically, neither can Kings be formally fathers. 2. Not only Kings, but all Iudges are fathers in defending [Page 112] their subjects from violence and the sword, and fighting the Lords battells for them, and counselling them. If therefore Royalists argue rightly, A King is essentially a father, and, fatherly power and royall power are of the same essence and nature; As therefore he who is once a father, is ever a father, and his children cannot take up armes against him to resist him, for that is unnaturall, & repugnant to the 5. Comman­dement: So he who is once a King, is evermore a King, and it is repug­nant to the fifth Commandement to resist him with armes. It is an­swered, that the Argument presupposeth that Royall power, and Fatherly power is one and the same in nature, whereas they differ in nature, and are only one by analogie and proportion: for so Pa­stors of the Word are called fathers, 1 Cor. 4. 15. it will not fol­low, that once a Pastor, evermore a Pastor; and that if therefore Pastors turne wolves, and by hereticall doctrine corrupt the flock, they cannot be cast out of the Church. 3. A father, as a father, hathA fatherly power and a politike pow­er are not one and the fame. not power of life and death over his sonnes, because, Rom. 13. by divine institution the sword is given by God to Kings and Iudges: and if Adam had had any such power to kill his sonne Cain, for the killing of his brother Abel, it had been given to him by God as a power politike, different from a fatherly power: for a fatherly pow­er, as such, is formally to conserve the life of the childaen, and not to take away the life: yea, and Adam, though he had never sinned, nor any of his posteritie, Adam should have been a perfect father, as he is now indued with all fatherly power that any father now hath; yea should not God have given the sword or power of punishing ill doers, since that power should have been in vaine, if there had been no violence, nor bloodshed, or sinne on the earth: for the power of the sword and of lawfull warre, is given to men now in the state of sinne. 4. Fatherly government and power is from the bosome and marrow of that fountaine law of nature; but Royall power is not from the law of nature, more then Aristocraticall or Democrati­call power. D. Ferne saith, Monarchie is not jure divino, (I am notD. Ferne, par. 1. sect. 3. pag. 8. of his mind) nor yet from the law of Nature, but, ductu naturae, by the guidance of nature. Sure it is from a supervenient commande­ment of God, added to the first law of nature, establishing Fatherly power. 5. Children having their life and first breathings of nature from their parents, must be in a more intire relation from their father, then from their Prince: Subjects have not their Being natu­rall, but their civill, politique and peaceable well-being from their [Page 113] Prince. 6. A father is a father by generation, and giving the being of nature to children, and is a naturall head and root, without the free consent and suffrages of his children, and is essentially a father to one childe, as Adam was to one Cain: but a Prince is a Prince by the free suffrages of a community, and cannot be a King to one only, and he is the politique head of a civill Corporation. 7. A father, so long as his children liveth can never leave off to be a father, though he were mad, and surious, though he be the most wicked man on earth. Qui genuit filium non potest non genuisse filium, what is once past cannot by any power be not passed, a father is a father for ever. But by confession of Royalists, as Barclay, Hug. Grotius, and Arni­saeus and others grant, if a King sell his subjects by sea or land to other nations, if he turne a furious Nero, he may be dethroned, and the power that created the King under such expresse conditions, as if the King violate them by his owne consent, he shall be put from the Throne, may cease to be a King, and if a stronger King conquer a King and his subjects, Royalists [...]ay the conquerour is a lawfull King; and so the conquered King must also lawfully come downe from his Throne, and turne a lawfull captive sitting in the dust. 8. Learned Polititians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, Defens. part. 1. num. 153. Ioannes de Anania in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid. teach that the father is not obliged to reveale the conspiracy of his son against his Prince, nor is he more to accuse his son, then to accuse himselfe; because the father loveth the sonne better then himselfe. D. Listi qui­dem. Sect. Fin. quod. met. caus. & D. L. fin. c. de cura furiosi, and certainly a father had rather dye in his own person as choose to dye in his sonnes, in whom he affecteth a sort of immortality, In specie, quando non potest in individuo: but a King doth not love his subjects with a naturall or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which secondeth the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well being, must also differ proportionally.

The P. Prelate objecteth against us thus, stealing word by word Sacr. sanct. Reg. Maiest. c. 7. pag. 87. Arni­saeus de potest. princip. c. 3. u. 1. 2. from Arnisaeus: When a King is elected Soveraigne to a multitude, he is surrogated in the place of a common father, Exod. 20. 5. Honour thy father; then as a naturall father receiveth not Paternall right, power, or authority from his sonnes, but hath this from God, and the ordinance of nature, nor can the King have his right from the commu­nity. 2. The maxime of the Law is, Surrogatus gaudet privilegiis ejus cui surrogatur, & qui succedit [...]n locum, succedit in jus. The [Page 114] person surrogated, hath all the Priviledges that he hath, in whose place he succeedeth, he who succeedeth to the place, succeedeth to the right; the adopted sonne, or the bastard who is legittimated, and commeth in the place of the lawfull borne sonne, commeth also in the priviledges of the lawfull borne sonne; a Prince elected commeth to the full possession of the Majesty of a naturall Prince and Father, for Modu [...] acquirendi non tollit naturale jus possidendi (saith Arnisaeus, more fully then the poore Plagiarius) the manner of acquiring any thing taketh not away the naturall possession, for how ever things be acquired, if the title be just, possession is the Law of Nations; then when the King is chosen in place of the father, as the father hath a divine right by nature, so must the King have that same: and seeing the right proprietor (saith the Pamphleting Prelate) had his right by God, by nature, how can it be, but howsoever the designation of the person is from the disordered com­munity, yet the collation of the power is from God immediatly, and from his sacred and inviolable ordinance. And what can be said against the way by which any one elected obtained his right, for seeing God doth not now send Samuells or Elisha's to anoynt or declare Kings, we are in his ordinary providence to conceive the designation of the person is the manifestation of Gods Will, called Voluntas signi, as the Schooles speake, just so as when the Church designeth one to sacred orders.

Ans. 1. He that is surrogated in the place of another, due to him, by a positive Law of man, he hath Law to all the priviledges that he hath in whose place he is surrogated, that is true. He who is made Assignee to an Obligation for a summe of money, hath all the rights that the principall party to whom the Bond or Obligation was mad [...], he who commeth in the place of a Major of a City, of a Captaine in an Army, of a Pilot in a ship, of a Pope, hath all the priviledges and Rights that his predecessors had by Law. Jus succedit juri, persona jure predita personae jure preditae. So the Law, so far as my reading can reach, who professe my selfe a Divine; but that he who succee­deth to the place of a father, by nature, should injoy all the naturall Rights and Priviledges of the person to whom he succeedeth; I beleeve the Law never dreamed it, for then the adopted sonne comming in place of the naturall sonne, hath right to the naturall affection of the father; if any should adopt Maxwell the Prelate, should he love him as the Pursevant of Craile, Maxwell his father loved him? I conceive not; hath the adopted sonne his life, his being, the figure bodily, the manners of the sonne in whose place he is adop­ted? [Page 115] or doth he naturally resemble the father as the naturall sonne doth? The Prelate did not read this Law in any approved Iurist, though he did steale the argument from Arnisaeus, and stole the cita­tions of Homer and Aristotle out of him, with a little Metathesis: A naturall sonne is not made a sonne by the consent of Parents, but he is a sonne by generation, so must the adopted sonne be adop­tedSee Aristotle saith the Pre­late, Eth. 8. 10. pol. 1. c. Ho­mer. Odys. 1. he might have said, see Arnisaeus loe. tit. without the free consent and grace of the father adopting: so here the King commeth in the place of a naturall father, but I con­ceive the Law saith not that the elected King is a King without con­sent of the subjects, as the naturall father is a father without con­sent of his sonnes. 2. Nor is it a Law true, as once a father alwaies a father, so once an elected King, alwaies a King, though he sell his subjects, being induced thereunto by wicked Counsellors. 3. If the King have no priviledges, but what the naturall father hath in whose place he commeth, then as the naturall father in a free King­dome hath not power of life and death over his sonnes, neither hath the King power of life and death over his subjects, this is no Law. 4. This maxime should prove good, if the King were essentially a father, by generation and naturall propagation, but he is onely a father Metaphorically, and by a borrowed speech. A father non gene­rando, sed politicè alendo, tuendo, regendo, therefore an elected Prince commeth not in the full possession of all the naturall power and rights of a naturall father. 2. The P. Prelate speaketh disgracefully of the Church of God, calling it a disorderly community, as if he him­selfe were borne of Kings, where as God calleth the King their Shepheard, and the people, Gods flocke, inheritance and people; and they are not a disorderly body by nature, but by sin; in which sense the Prelate may call King, Priest and people, a company of Heires of Gods wrath, except he be an Arminian still, as once he was. 3. If we are in ordinary providence now, because we have not Samuels, and Prophets to anoynt Kings, to hold the designation of a person to be King, to be the manifestation of Gods Will, called voluntas [...]igni, is Treason, for if Scotland and England should designe Maxwell in the place of King Charles our native Sove­raigne (an odious comparison) Maxwell should be lawfull King for what is done by Gods Will, called by our Divines (they have it not from Schoolemen, as the Prelate ignorantly saith) his signi­fied will which is our rule, is done lawfully, there can be no greater treason put in print then this.

QUEST. XVI. Whether or no a despotiticall and masterly dominion of men and things, agree to the King, because he is King.

I May here dispute whether the King be Lord, having a masterly dominion both over men and things. But I first discusse shortly his dominion over his subjects.

It is agreed on by Divines, that servitude is a penall fruit of sinne, and against nature. Institut. de jure personarum, Sect. 1. & F. de statu hominum. l. libertas; Because all men▪ are borne by nature of equall condition.

1 Assert. The King hath no proper, masterly, or herile domini­onThe King as King, hath no masterly domi­on over the people, but on­ly fiduciarie. over his subjects: his dominion is rather fiduciary and mi­nisteriall, than masterly.

1. Because Royall Empire is essentially to feed▪ rule, defend, and to governe in Peace and Godlinesse, 1 Tim. 2. 2. as the father doth his children, Ps. 78. 71. He brought him to feed Jacob his people, and Is­rael his inheritance, Esa▪ 55. 4. I gave him for a leader and commander to the people, 2 Sam. 5. 2. Thou shalt feed my people Israel, 2 Sam. 5. 2. 1 Chron 11. 2. 1 Chron▪ 17. 6. And so it is, for the good of the peo­ple, and to bring those, over whom he is a feeder and ruler, to such a happy end; and, as saith Althusius, polit. c. 1. n. 13. and Marius Salomonius, de princ. [...]. 2. it is to take care of the good of those over whom the Ruler is set, and, conservare est, rem illaesam servare, to keep a thing safe. But to be a Master, and to have a masterly and herile power over slaves and servants, is to make use of servants for the owners benefit, not for the good of the slave, L. 2. de leg. L. Servus de servit. expert. Danae polit. l. 1. Tolossan. de Rep. l. 1. c. 1. n. 15, 16. therefore are servants bought and sold as goods, jure belli. F. de statu hominum, l. & servorum.

2. Not to be under Governors and Magistrates, is a judgement of God, Esa. 3. 6 7. Esa. 3. 1. Hos, 3. 4. Iudg. 19. 1, 2. But not to be un­derTo be a King, is by office, and actu primo, to defend, save, feed, and not to hurt or inthral. a master, as slaves are, is a blessing, seeing freedome is a blessing of God, Ioh. 8. 33. Exod. 21. 2. v. 26, 27. Deut. 15. 12. so he that killeth Goliah, 1 Sam. 17. 25. his fathers house shall be free in Israel, Ier. 34. 9. Act. 22. 28. 1 Cor. 9. 19. Gal. 4. 26. 31. Therefore the power of a King cannot be an herile and masterly power; for then to be un­der a Kingly power, should both be a blessing, and a curse and just punishment of sinne.

[Page 117]3. Subjects are called the servants of the King, 1 Sam. 15. 2. 2 Chron. 13. 7. 1 King. 12. 7. Exod. 10. 1, [...]. Exod▪ 9. 20. but they are not slaves, because, Deut. 17. 20. they are his brethren: That the Kings heare be not lifted up against his brethren. And his sonnes, Esa. 49. 23. And the Lord gave his people a King as a blessing, 1 King. 10. 9. Hos. 1. 11. Esa. 1. 26. Ier. 17. 25. And brought them out of the house of bondage, Exod. 20. v. 2. as out of a place of miserie. And therefore to be the Kings servants, in the places cited, is some other thing then to be he Kings slaves.

4. The Master might in some cases sell the servant for money, yea for his own gain he might doe it, Nehem. 5. 8. Eccles. 2. 7. 1 King. 2. 32. G [...]n 9 25. Gen. 26▪ 14. 2 King. 4. 1. Gen. 20. 14. and might give away his servants; and the servants were the proper goods and riches of the master, Eccles. 2. 7. Gen. 30. 43. Gen. 20. 14. Job. 1. 3. 15. But the King may not sell his Kingdome or Subjects, or give them away for money, or any other way; for Royalists grant that King to be a Tyrant, and worthy to be dethroned, who shall sell his peo­ple: for the King may not delapidate the rents of the Crown, and give them away to the hurt and prejudice of his successors, L. ult. Sect. sed nostr. C. Comment. de lege, l. pet [...]. 69. Sect. fratrom de lege, 2. l. 32. ul [...]i­mo. D. T. and farre lesse can he lawfully sell men, and give away a whole Kingdome to the hurt of his successours, for that were to make merchandize of the living Temples of the Holy Ghost. And Arnisaus, de authorit. Princip. c. 3. n. 7. saith, Servitude is praeter natu­ram, beside nature; he might have said, contrary to nature, l. 5. de stat▪ homin. Sect. 2. Iust. de jur. perso. c. 3. & Novel. 89. but the subje­ction of subjects is so consonant to nature, that it is seen in Bees and Cranes. Therefore a dominion is defined a facultie of using of things to what uses you will. Now a man hath not this way an ab­solute dominion over his beasts, to dispose of them at his will; for a good man hath mercy on the life of his beast, Prov. 12. 10. nor hath he dominion over his goods to use them as he will, because he may not use them to the dammage of the Commonwealth, he may not use them to the dishonour of God; and so God and the Magistrate hath laid some bound on his dominion. And because the King being made a King, leaveth not off to be a reasonable creature, he must be un­der a Law, and so his will and lust cannot be the rule of his powerA King not o­ver men as rea­sonable men. and dominion, but law and reason must regulate him. Now if God had given to the King a dominion over men as reasonable creatures▪ [Page 118] his power and dominion which by Royalists is conceived to be above Law, should be a rule to men as reasonable men, which would make men under Kings no better then bruit beasts; for then should sub­jects exercise acts of reason, not because good and honest, but be­cause their Prince commandeth them so to doe; and if this cannot be said, none can be at the disposing of Kings in politick acts liable to Royall government, that way that the slave is in his actions under the dominion of his master.

The Prelate objecteth out of Spalato, Arnisaeus, and Hug. Gro­tius,Prelat [...]. Sacr. sanct. mas. c. 16. p. 15. Hugo Grotius hath the same de jur. bel. & pacis, l. 1. c. 3. (for in his booke there is not one line which is his own, except his raylings) 1. All government and superioritie in Rulers is not prime­ly and only for the Subjects good: for some are by God and Nature appointed for the mutuall and inseperable good of the superiour and in­feriour, as in the government of husband and wife, or father and sonne; and in herili dominio, in the government of a Lord and his servant, the good and benefit of the servant is but secondary and consecutively in­tended, it is not the principall end, but the externall and advent [...]tious, as the gaine that commeth to a Physitian, is not the proper and inter­nall end of his art, but followeth only from his practice of Medicine.

Ans. The Prelates logick tendeth to this; some government tendeth to the mutuall good of the superior and inferior, but Royall Government is some government, ergo nothing followeth from a major propositi­on, Ex particulari affirmante, in prima figura. Or of two particular propositions. 2. If it be thus formed, every maritall government, and every government of the Lord and servant is for the mutuall good of the superiour and inferiour: But Royall Government is such, ergo &c. the assumption is false, and cannot be proved, as I shall anon cleare.

2. Obj. Solomon disposed of Cabul, and gave it to Hiram, ergo a conquered Kingdome is for the good of the conquerour especially. Ans. Solomons speciall giving away some Titles to the King of Tyre, being a speciall fact of a Prophet as well as a King, cannot warrant the King of England to sell England to a forraine Prince, because Willi­am made England his owne by conquest; which also is a most false supposition: and this he stole from Hugo Grotius, who condemneth selling of Kingdomes.

3 Object. A man may render himselfe totally under the power of a Master, without any conditions: and why may not the body of a peo­ple doe the like? even to have peace and safety, surrender themselves [Page 119] fully to the power of a King? A lord of great Mannours may admit no man to live in his Lands, but upon a condition of a full surrender ofA compelled surrender of liberty tyeth not. him, and his posterity to that lord. Tacitus sheweth us it was so anci­ently amongst the Germans, and the Campanians surrendered them­selves fully to the Romans.

Answ. What compelled people may do to redeem their lives with losse of liberty, is nothing to the point; such a violent Conque­rour who will be a father and a husband to a people, against their will, is not their lawfull King; and that they may sell the liberty of their posteritie, not yet born, is utterly denied as unlawfull; yea, a violentated father to me is a father, and not a father, and the poste­ritie may vindicate their own liberty given away unjustly, before they were born: Qua omne regnum vi partum potest vi dissolvi.

Object. 4. But (saith Doct. Fern) these which are ours, and given awa [...] to another, in which there redoundeth to God by donation a speci­all interest, as in things devoted to holy uses, though after they be abused, yet we cannot recall them. Ergo, If the people be once forced to give away their liberty, they cannot recall it; far lesse, if they willingly resign it to their Prince.

Answ. This is not true, when the power is given for the con­servation of the Kingdom, and is abused for the destruction there­of, for a power to destruction was never given, nor can it by rati­onall nature be given. 2. Mortifications given to religious uses by a positive law, may be recalled by a more divine and stronger law of nature, such as is this: I will have mercy and not sacrifice. Suppose David of his own proper heritage, had given the Shew­bread to the Priests, yet when David and his men are famishing, he may take it back from them against their will. Suppose Christ man had bought the Corns, and dedicated them to the Altar, yet might he and his Disciples eat the Ears of Corn in their hunger. The vessels of silver dedicated to the Church, may be taken and be­stowed on wounded Souldiers. 2. A people free may not, and ought not totally surrender their liberty to a Prince, confiding on his goodnesse; 1. Because liberty is a condition of nature, that allA surrender of ignorance and mistake, is some way un­voluntary and obligeth not. men are born with, and they are not to give it away, no not to a King, except in part, and for the better, that they may have peace and justice for it, which is better for them, hic & nunc. 2. If a people trusting in the goodnesse of their Prince, inslave themselves to him, and he shall after turn Tyrant; a rash and temerarious [Page 120] surrender obligeth not, Et ignorantia facit factum quasi involun­tarium: Ignorance maketh the fact some way unvoluntary; for if the people had beleeved that a meek King would have turned a rouring Lyon, they should not have resigned their liberty into his hand; and therefore the surrender was tacitely conditionall to the King as meek, or whom they beleeved to be meek, and not to a tyrannous Lord; and therefore, when the contract is made for the utilitie of the one party, the law saith their place is for after wits, that men may change their minde, and resume their liberty, though if they had given away their liberty for money, they cannot recall it; and if violence made the surrender of liberty, here is slavery, and slaves taken in war so soon as they can escape, and return to their own, they are free. D. Sect. item. e [...] Justit. de rerum divin. l. nihil. F. de capt. l. 3. So the learned Ferdin. Vasquez illustri. l. 2. c. 82. [...]. 15. saith, The bird that was taken, and hath escaped, is free; nature in a forced people, so soon as they can escape from a violent Conqueror maketh them a free people: and si solo tempore (saith Ferd. Vasquez, l. 2. c. 82. n. 6.) justificatur subjectio, solo tempore facilius justificabi­tur liberatio.

Assert. 20. All the Goods of the Subjects belongeth not to theThe Goods of the Subjects not the Kings. King: I presuppose, that the division of Goods doth not necessa­rily flow from the law of nature, for God made man before the fall, Lord of the creatures indefinitely; but what Goods be Peters, and not Pauls, we know not. But supposing mans sin, though the light of the Sun and Air be common to all, and religious places be proper to none, yet it is morally unpossible, that there should not be a distinction of meum & tuum, mine and thine: and the decalogue forbidding theft, and coveting the wife of another man, (yet is she the wife of Peter, not of Thomas by free election, not by an act of natures law) doth evidence to us, that the division of things is so far forth, (men now being in the state of sin) of the law of nature, that it hath evident ground in the Law of nations; and thus farre naturall, that the heat that I have from my own coat and cloak, and the nourishment from my own meat, are physi­cally incommunicable to any Quod jure gentium dici­tur. F. de justi tia & jure. l. ex hee. Quod partim jure civili. Iu­sti. de rerum divisio. sect. singulorum.. But I hasten to prove the Propo­sition: If 1. I have leave to premit, that in time of necessitie all things are common by Gods Law: A man travelling, might eat Grapes in his neighbours vineyard, though he was not licenced to carry any away. I doubt if David wanting money, was necessitated [Page 121] to pay money for the Shew-bread, or for Goliahs sword, supposing these to be the very Goods of private men, and ordinarily to be bought and sold: natures Law in extremity, for self preservation, hath rather a Prerogative Royall above all Laws of Nations, and all civill Laws then any mortall King; and therefore by the civill Law, all are the Kings, in case of extreme necessity; in this mean­ing, any one man is obliged to give all he hath for the good of the Common-wealth, and so far the good of the King, in as farre as he is head and father of the Common-wealth L. item si verberatum. F. de rei vindicat. Ias. plene m. l. Barbarius. F. de o [...]fici. praetor. all the goods of the people are the Kings in a fourfold noti­on, but not in propriety.. 2. All things are the Kings, in regard of his publike power, to defend all men, and their Goods from unjust violence. 3. All are the Kings in regard of his Act of conservation of Goods, for the use of the just owner. 4. All are the Kings in regard of a legall limitation, in case of a dammage, offered to the Common-wealth, justice requireth con­fiscation of Goods for a fault; but confiscated Goods are to help the interessed Common-wealth, and the King, not as a man (to be­stow them on his children) but as a King; to this we may referre these called bona cadu [...]a & inventa, things losed by Shipwrack, or any other providence, Ʋlpian. tit. 19. t. c. de bonis vacantibus. C. de Thesauro. Subjects are propriators of their own Goods. Argum. 1.

And the Reasons why private men are just Lords and proprietors of their own Goods, are, 1. Because by order of nature, division of Goods cometh neerer to natures law, and necessity, then any King or Magistrate in the world; for because it is agreeable to nature, that every man be warmed by his own fleece, nourished by his own meat; therefore to conserve every mans Goods to the just owner, and to preserve a communitie from the violence of rapine and theft, a Magistrate and King was devised. So it is clear, men are just owners of their own Goods, by all good order, both of nature and time, before there be any such thing as a King or Ma­gistrate. Now if it be good that every man enjoy his own Goods, as just proprietor thereof for his own use, before there be a King, who can be proprietor of his Goods, and a King being given of God for a blessing, not for any mans hurt and losse; the King com­eth in to preserve a mans Goods, but not to be lord and owner thereof himself, nor to take from any man Gods right to his own Goods.

2. When God created man at the beginning, he made all theArgum. 2. creatures for man▪ and made them by the law of nature, the proper [Page 122] possession of man, but then there was not any King formally as King; for certainly Adam was a father before he was a King, and no man being either born, or created a King over an other man, no more then the first Lyon, and the first Eagle, that God created, were by the birth-right, and first-start of creation, by nature, the King of all Lyons, and all Eagles to be after created; no man can by natures law, be the owner of all Goods of particular men: And because the law of nations founded upon the law of nature, hath brought in meum & tuum, mine and thine, as proper to every particular man, and the introduction of Kings cannot overturn natures foundation; neither civility, nor grace destroyeth, but perfiteth nature: and if a man be not born a King, because he is a man, he cannot be born the possessour of my Goods.

3. What is a Character, and note of a Tyrant, and an oppressingArgum. 3. King as a Tyrant, is not the just due of a King as a King: But to take the proper Goods of Subjects, and use them as his own, is a proper Character, and note of a Tyrant, and an oppressour. Ergo, the proposition is evident. A King and a Tyrant are by way of contradiction contrary one to another: the assumption is proved thus, Ezek. 45. 9. Thus saith the Lord, Let it suffice you, O Princes of Israel: remove violence and spoil, and execute judgement and justice, take away your exactions from my people, saith the Lord, Vers. 10. Ye shall have just ballances, and a just Ephah, and a just bath. If all be the Kings, he is not capable of extortion and rapine, Micah 3. 2. God complaineth of the violence of Kings: Is it not for you to know judgement? Vers. 3. Who eat the flesh of my people, and flea their skins from off them, and they break their bones, and chop them in pieces, as for the pot, and as flesh within the chaldron, Isai. 3.The answer of Hybreas to a extorting Prince Autoni­us. Argum. 4. Species enim furti est de ali­euo largiri, & beneficii debito­rem sihi acqui­rere, L. si pig­nore, sect. de furt. 14. Zeph. 3. 3. and was it not an act of tyranny in King Achab, to take the vineyard of Naboth, and in King Saul? 1 Sam. 8. 14. to take the people of Gods fields and vineyards, and olive-yards, and give them to their servants? Was it a just fault that Hybreas ob­jected to Antonius, exacting two tributes in one yeer, that he said, If thou must have two tributes in one yeer, then make for us two Summers and two Harvests, in one yeer? This cannot be just; if all be the Kings, the King taketh but his own.

4. Subjects under a Monarch could not give alms, nor exercise works of charity; for charity must be my own, Isai. 58. 7. Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry? &c. Eccles. 11. 1. Cast thy bread into [Page 123] the waters; and the Law saith, It is theft to give of another mans to the poor: yea, the distinction of poor and rich, should have no place under a Monarchie, he onely should be rich.

5. When Paul commandeth us to pay tribute to Princes, Rom. 13.Argum. 5. 6. because they are the Ministers of God, he layeth this ground, That the King hath not all, but that the subjects are to give to him of their goods.

6. It is the Kings place, by justice to preserve every man in hisArgum. 6. own right, and under his own fig-tree. Ergo, Its not the Kings house.

7. Even Pharaoh could not make all the victuall of the land hisArgum. 7. own, while he had bought it with money: and every thing is pre­sumed to be free. Allodialis, free land, except the King prove that it is bought or purchased. L. actius, C. de servit. & aqua. & Joan. And. m. C. F. de ind. & hosti. in C. minus de jur.

8. If the subjects had no proprietie in their own goods, but allArgum. 8. were the Princes due, then the subject should not be able to make any contract of buying and selling without the King, and every subject were in the case of a slave. Now the Law saith, L. 2. F. de Noxali. act. l. 2. F. ad legem aquil. When he maketh any Covenant, he is not obliged civilly to keep it, because the condition of a servant, he not being sui juris, is compared to the state of a beast, though he be obliged by a naturall obligation, being a rationall Creature, in regard of the law of nature, L. naturaliter, L. si id quod, L. in­terdum, F. de cond. indebit. cum aliis. 2. The subject could not by Solomon be forbidden to be suretie for his friend; as King Solomon doth counsell, Prov. 6. 1, 2, 3. he could not be condemned to bring on himself poverty by sluggishnesse, as Prov. 6. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. nor were he to honour the Lord with his riches, as Prov. 3. 9. nor to keep his Covenant, though to his losse, Psal. 15. 4. nor could he be mercifull and lend, Psal. 37. 26. nor had he power to borrow; nor could he be guiltie in not paying all again, Psal. 37. 21. For subjects under a Monarch, can neither perform a duty, nor fail in a duty, in the matter of Goods; If all be the Kings, what power or dominion hath the subject in disposing of his Princes Goods? See more in Petr. Rebuffus, tract. congruae portionis, num. 225. pag. 109, 110. Sed quoad dominiumrerum, &c.

QUEST. XVII. Whether or not the Prince have properly a fiduciarie, and ministeriall power of a Tutor, Husband, Patron, Minister, head, father of a fa­mily, not of a Lord or dominator?

THat the power of the King is fiduciarie, that is given to himThe Kings po­wer fiduciarie. immediatly by God in trust, Royallists deny not; but we hold that the t [...]ust is put upon the King by the people. 2. We deny that the people give themselves to the King as a gift, for what is free­ly given cannot be taken againe; but they gave themselves to the King as a pawne; and if the pawne be abused, or not used in that manner as it was conditionated to be used, the party in whose hand the pawne is intrusted, faileth in his trust.

1. Assertion. The King is more properly a Tutor then a Father,The King a Tutor. 1. Indigencie is the originall of Tutors, the Parents dye; what then shall become of the Orphan and his inheritance? he cannot guide it himselfe; therefore nature devised a Tutor to supply theDifference be­tween a father and a Tutor. place of a father, and to governe the Tutor; but with this consi­deration, the father is Lord of the inheritance, and if he be distressed, may sell it, that it shall never come to the sonne, and the father for the bad deserving of his sonne may dis-inherite him; but the Tutor being but a borrowed father, cannot sell the inheritance of the pu­pill, nor can he for the pupills bad deserving, by any dominion of Justice over the pupill, take away the inheritance from him, and give it to his owne son; so a Community of it selfe, because of sin, is a naked society that can but destroy it selfe, and every one eate the flesh of his brother, therefore God hath appointed a King or governour, who shall take care of that community, rule them in peace, and save all from reciprocation of mutuall acts of violence, yet so, as because a trust is put on the Ruler of a community, which is not his heritage, he cannot dispose of it as he pleaseth, because he is not the proper owner of the inheritance.

2. The Pupill when he commeth to age, may call his Tutor to an accompt for his administration; I doe not acknowledge that as a truth, which Arnisaeus saith, De authoritate. prin. c. 3. n. 5. The Common-wealth is alwaies minor, and under Tutory, because it al­way hath need of a curator and governour, and can never put away its governour, but the pupill may grow to age and wisedome, so as he may be without all Tu [...]ors, and can guide himselfe, and so may call in questi­on [Page 125] his Tutor, and the pupill cannot be his Iudge; but must stand to the sentence of a superiour Iudge, and so the people cannot judge or punish their Prince, God must be Iudge betwixt them both.

But this is 1. a begging of the question, every comparison halteth, no community but it is Major in this, that it can appoint its owneA free Com­munity no pu­pill or minor. Tutors, and though it cannot be without all Rulers, yet it may well be without this or that Prince and Ruler, and therefore may re­sume its power, which it gave conditionally to the Ruler for its owne safety and good, and in so farre as this condition is violated, and power turned to the destruction of the Common-wealth, it is to be esteemed as not given; and though the people be not a poli­tique Iudge in their owne cause, yet in case of manifest oppression, nature can teach them to oppose defensive violence against offen­sive: a community in its politique body is also above any Ruler, and may judge what is manifestly destructive to it selfe.

Obj. The Pupill hath not power to appoint his owne Tutor, nor doth he give power to him, so neither doth the people give it to the King. Ans. The Pupill hath not indeed a formall power to make a Tutor, but he hath vertually a legall power in his father, who appointeth a Tutor for his sonne, and the people have vertually all Royall power in them, as in a sort of immortall and eternall fountain, and may create to themselves many Kings.

Asser. 2. The Kings power is not properly and univocally a Mari­tallThe Kings po­wer not pro­perly Maritall or husbandly. and husbandly power, but only Analogically, 1. The Wife by nature is the weaker Vessell, and inferiour to the man, but the Kingdom, as shall be demonstrated is superiour to the King. 2. The Wife is given as an helpe to the man, but by the contrary the man here is given as an helpe and father to the Common-wealth, which is presumed to be the wife. 3. Maritall and husbandly power is naturall, though it be not naturall, but from free election that Pe­ter is Anae's Husband, and should have been, though man had never sinned: but Royall Power is a politick constitution, and the world might have subsisted, though Aristocracy or Democracy had been the only and perpetuall governments. So let the Prelate glory in his borrowed Logick, he had it from Barclay. It is not in the power of the Wife to repudiat her Husband, though never so wicked, she is tyed to him for ever, and may not give to him a bill of Divorcement, as by Law the Husband might give to her; if therefore the people sweare loyalty to him, they must keep, though to their hurt. Ps. 15. Aas. There's [Page 126] nothing here said, except Barclay and the Plagiarie prove, that the Kings Power is properly a Husbands power, which they cannot prove, but from a Simile that crooketh; but a King elected upon conditions, that if he sell his people, he shall lose his Crown, is as essentially a King, as Adam was Evahs Husband, and yet by grant of parties, the people may devorce from such a King, and dethrone him, if he sell his people; but a Wife may never devorce from her Husband, as the Argument saith. And this poore Argument the Prelate stole from Dr. Ferne, part 2. Sec. 3. pag. 10, 11. 2. The keeping of Covenant though to our hu [...]t, is a penall hurt, and losse of goods, not a morall hurt, and losse of Religion.

Assert. 3. The King is more properly a sort of Patron, to defendThe King a Patron rather then a Lord. the people, and therefore hath no power given either by God or man to hurt the people, and a Minister or publick and honourable servant, Rom. 13. 4. for he is the Minister of God to thee for good; he is the Common-wealths servant objectively, because all the KingsThe King an honourable servant. service, as he is King, is for the good, safety, peace and salvation of the people, and in this he is a servant. 2. He is the servant of the people Representatively, in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to doe Royall service. Obj. He is the ser­vant of God, ergo he is not the peoples Servant, but their soveraigne Lord. Ans. It followeth not, because all the service the King as King performeth to God, they are acts of Royalty, and acts of Royall service, as terminated on the people; or acts of their Soveraigne Lord, and this proveth that to be their Soveraigne, is to be their servant, and watch-man.Royall power only from God, and only from the peo­ple in divers respects.

Object. 2. God maketh a King only, and the Kingly power is in him only, not in the people. Ans. The Royall power is only from God, immediatly, Immediatione simplicis constitutionis, & solum a Deo solitudine primae causae, by the immediation of simple constitution, none but God appointed there should be▪ Kings; but 2. Royall power is not in God, nor only from God; immediatione applica­tionis regiae dignitatis ad personam, nec a Deo solum, solitudine▪ causae applicantis dignitatem, huic, non illi, in respect of the applying of Royall dignity to this person, not to this.

Object. 3. Though Royall power were given to the people, it is not given to the people, as if it were the Royal power of the people, and not the Royall power of God, neither is it any other waies bestowed on the people but as on a beame, a channell, an instrument, by which it is derived [Page 127] to others, and so the King is not the minister or servant of the people.

Ans. It is not in the people as in the principall cause; Sure all Roy­all power that way is only in God; but it is in the people as in the in­strument: and when the people maketh David their King at Hebron, in that same very act, God by the people using their free suffrages and consent, maketh David King at Hebron: so God only giveth raine, and none of the vanities and supposed gods of the Gentiles can give raine, Ier. 14. 22. and yet the Clouds also give raine, as nature, as an organ and vessell out of which God powreth down raine upon the dry earth, Amos 9. 5. and every instrument under God, that is pro­perly an instrument▪ is a sort of Vicarious cause in Gods room, and soThe King the servant of the people both objectively & subjectively. the people as in Gods roome, applyeth Royall power to David, not to any of Sauls sonnes, and appointeth David to be their Royall Servant to governe, and in that to serve God, and to doe that, which a Communitie now in the state of sinne cannot formally doe them­selves: and so I see not how it is a service to the people, not only objectively, because the Kings Royall service tendeth to the good, and peace, and safety of the people; but also subjectively, in regard he hath his power and Royall authoritie which he exerciseth as King, from the people under God, as Gods instruments: and there­fore▪ the King and Parliament give ou [...] Lawes and Statutes in the name of the whole people of the Land. And they are but flatterers, and belye the Holy Ghost, who teach that the people doe not make the King; for Israel made Saul King at Mizpeh, and Israel made David King at Hebron.

Object. 3. Israel made David King, that is, Israel designed Da­vids person to be King, and Israel consented to Gods act of making David King, but they did not make David King.

Ans. I say not that Israel made the Royall dignitie of Kings:By one and the same act the Lord of Heaven, and the People make the King according to the physicall realitie of the act. God, Deut. 17. instituted that himselfe: but the Royalist must give us an act of God going before an act of the peoples making David King at Hebron, by which David of no King is made formally a King: and then another act of the People, approving only and con­senting to that act of God, whereby David is made formally of no King to be a King. This Royalists shall never instruct, for there be only two acts of God here; 1. Gods act of annointing David by the hand of Samuel; and 2. Gods act of making David King at He­bron: and a third they shall never give. But the former is not that by which David was essentially and formally changed from the state [Page 128] of a private subject, and no King, into the state of a publike Judge and supreme Lord and King, for (as I have proved) after this act of annointing of David King, he was designed only and set apart to be King in the Lords [...]it time; and after this annointing, he was no more formally a King then Doeg or Nabal were Kings, but a subject who called Saul the Lords anointed and King, and obeyed Saul as another subject doth his King: but it is certaine God by no other act made David King at Hebron, then by Israels act of free electing him to be King and leader of the Lords people, as God by no other act sendeth down rain on the earth, but by Gods melting the clouds, and causing raine to fall on the earth: and therefore to say Israel made David King at Hebron, that is, Israel approved only and con­sented to a prior act of Gods making David King, is all one as to say Saul prophecied, that is, Saul consented to a prior act of the Spirit of God who prophecied: and Peter preached, Act. 2. that is, Peter approved and consented to the Holy Ghosts act of preaching. Which to say, is childish.

Assert. 4. The King is an head of the Commonwealth only me­taphorically, The King head of the Com­munitie only metaphorically by a borrowed speech, in a politique sense, because he ruleth, commandeth, directeth the whole politique body in all their operations and functions. But he is not univocally and essentially the head of the Commonwealth. 1. The same very life in number that is in the head, is in the members: there be divers distinct soules and lives in the King, and in his Subjects. 2. The head naturall is not made an head by the free election and consent of armes, shoul­ders, leggs, toes, fingers, &c. The King is made King only by the free election of his people. 3. The naturall head, so long as the per­son liveth, is ever the head, and cannot cease to be a head while it is seated on the shoulders: The King, if he sell his people, their per­sons and soules, may leave off to be a King and Head. 4. The head and members live together, and dye together: the King & the people are not so; the King may dye, and the People live. 5. The naturall head cannot destroy the members, and preserve it selfe: but King Nero may waste and destroy his people. D. Ferne, M. Simmons, the P. Prelate, when they draw arguments from the head, do but dream, as the members should not resist the head. Naturall members should not, or cannot resist the head, though the hand may pull a tooth out of the head, which is no small violence to the head. But the members of a Politique body may resist the Politique head. 2. This or that [Page 129] King is not the adequate and totall Politique head of the Common­wealth: and therefore though you cut off a Politique head, there's nothing done against nature. If you cut off all Kings of the Royall line, and all Governors Aristocraticall, both King and Parliament, this were against nature; And a Common-wealth which would cut off all Governors, and all Heads, should goe against nature, and run to ruine quickly. I conceive a societie of reasonable men cannot want Governours. 6. The naturall head communicateth life, sense, and motion to the members, and is the seat of externall and internall senses: the King is not so.

Hence Assert. 5. the King is not properly the head of a family,The King but metaphorically only Lord of the familie. for, 1. (as Tholossa saith well de Rep. l. 5. c. 5.) Nature hath one in­tention in making the thumbe, another intention in making the whole hand, another in forming the body: so there is on [...] intenti­on of the God of nature in governing of one man, another in gover­ning a Familie, another in governing a Citie: nor is the thumbe King of all the members: so domestick government is not Monar­chicall properly. 1. The mother hath a parentall power as the fa­ther hath, Prov. 4. 5. & 10. 3. & 31. 17. so the 5. Command saith, Ho­nour thy father and thy mother. 2. Domestick government is naturall, Monarchicall politique. 3. Domestick is necessary, Monarchicall is not necessary, other governments may be as well as it. 4. Domestick is universall, Monarchicall not so. 5. Domesticall hath its rise from naturall instinct without any farther instruction: a Monar­chicall government is not, but from election, choosing one Govern­ment, not another.

Hence that is a fiduciarie power, or a power of trust, whereinThe King not heire nor pro­prietor of the Kingdome. 1. the thing put in trust is not his own proper either heritage or gift, so as he may dispose of it as he pleaseth, as men dispose of their goods or heritage. But the King may not dispose of men as men, as he pleaseth; nor 2. of Lawes as he pleaseth; nor 3. of governing men, killing or keeping alive, punishing and rewarding, as he pleaseth.

2. My life and Religion, and so my Soule, in some cases, are com­mitted to the King as to a publick Watchman, even as the flock to the feeder, the Citie to the Watchmen: And he may betray it to the Enemy. Ergo, he hath the trust of Life and Religion, and hath both tables of the Law in his custodie, ex officio, to see that other men then himselfe keep the Law: But the Law is not the Kings [Page 130] own, but given to him in trust. 3. He who receiveth a Kingdom con­ditionally, may be dethroned if he sell it, or put it away to any other is a fiduciarie Patron, and hath it only in trust. So Hottoman, quest. ill. 1. Ferdinand. Vasquez, illust. quest. l. 1. c. 4. Althusius polit. c. 24. n. 35. so saith the law of every Factor or Deputy, l. 40. l. 63. procur. l. 16. C. dict. 1. Antigonus dixit Regnum esse nobilem servitutem. Ty­berius Caesar called the Senate, Dominum suum, his Lord. Suetonius in vita Tiberii, c. 29.

QUEST. XVIII. What is the law of the King, and his Power? 1 Sam. 8. 11. This will be the manner of the King who shall reigne over you, &c.

THis place, 1 Sam. 8, 9. and v. 11. The law or manner of the King The place, 1 Sam. 8, 9, 11. discussed. is alleadged to prove both the absolute power of Kings, and 2. the unlawfulnesse of resistance: therefore I crave leave here to vindicate the place, and to make it evident to all, that the place spea­keth for no such matter. 1. Grotius de ju. bel. & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. n. 3. Hug. Grotius argueth thus: that by this place, the people oppressed with injuries of a Tyrannous King, have nothing left them but prayers and cries to God; and therefore there is no ground for violent resisting. Barclaius contra Monar­chom. l. 2. p. 64. Potostatem in­telligit non [...]a [...] quae competit ex praecepto, neque etiam quae ex permissu est, quatenus liberat à peccato, sed quatenus paenis legalibus [...]ximit operantem. Barclay will have us to distinguish inter officium Regis, & potestatem, between the Kings office, and the Kings power: And he will have the Lord here speaking, not of the Kings office, what he ought to doe before God, but what power a King hath beside and above the power of Judges, to tyrannize over the people, so as the people hath no power to resist it. He will have the Office of the King spoken of Deut. 17. and the Power of the King, 1 Sam. 8▪ and that power which the People was to obey and submit unto, without resisting. But I answer, 1. It is a vaine thing to distinguish betwixt the office and the power; for the power is either a power to rule according to(c) Barclaius contra Monar­cho. l. 2. p. 56, 57. Gods law, as he is commanded, Deut. 17. and this is the very office or officiall power which the King of Kings hath given to all Kings under him: and this is a power of the Royall office of a King, to governe for the Lord his maker; or this is a power to doe ill, andThe power & office of the King, badly disterenced by Barclay. tyrannize over Gods people: but this is accidentall to a King, and the character of a Tyrant, and is not from God: and so the Law of the King in this place must be the Tyranny of the King, which is our very mind. 2. Barclay. Reges sine dominatione ne concipi quidem possunt.—Iudices dominationem in populum minimé habebant. Hence it is cleare that Barclay saith, that the Iudges of Israel, and the Kings [Page 131] are different in essence and nature; so that domination is so essen­tiall to a King, that you cannot conceive a King, but he must have do­mination, whereas the Iudges of Israel had no domination over the people. Hence I argue that, whereby a King is essentially distin­guished from a Iudge, that must be from God; but by domination, which is a power to oppresse the subject, a King is essentially di­stinguished from a Iudge of Israel. Ergo, Domination and a power to do Acts of Tyranny, as they are expressed, Verse 11, 12, 13. and to oppresse a subject, is from God, and so must be a lawfull power; but the conclusion is absurd, the assumption is the doctrine of Bar­clay: The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the Iudge and the King was from God, for God gave Moses a lawfull calling to be a Iudge, so did he to Eli, to Samuel, and Deut. 17. 15. the King is a lawfull Ordinance of God: If then the Judge and the King, be both lawfull Ordinances, and if they differ essentially, as Bar­clay saith; then that specifice forme which distinguisheth the one from the other, to wit, Domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God, which is blasphemous; for God can give no morall power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a Law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holinesse of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispence with sin (God avert such blasphemies.) Now if the kingly power be from God, That which essentially and specifically constituteth a King, must be from God, as the Office it self is from God: And Barclaius, l. 3▪ c. 2. Barclay saith expressely, That the kingly power is from God, and that same which is the specifice form, that con­stituteth a King, must be that which essentially separateth the King from the Iudge, if they be essentially different, as Barclay dreameth. Hence have we this jus Regis, this Manner or Law of the King, to tyrannize and oppresse, to be a power from God, and so a law­full power; by which you shall have this result of Barclayes in­terpretation, That God made a Tyrant as well as a King. 3. By this difference that Barclay putteth betwixt the King and the Judge, the Judge might be resisted; for he had not this power of domination, that Saul hath, contrary to Rom. 13. 2. Exod. 22. 28. and 20, 12.

But let us try the Text first [...] the word cannot in­force us to expone [...] a law; our English rendreth, Shew them the manner of the King. Arr. Mon. Haec erit ratio Regis. Arri. Montanus turneth it ratio Regis. [Page 132] I grant the Seventy render it, 70. Inter­pret. Vatabul. judica [...]is judicium & consuetudinem, i. mores & ib. bis moribus & hac consuetudine utentur erga vos reges. [...]. The Chalde Paraphrase saith, Statutum regis. Chald. Para. [...]. 70. Interp. 70. Interp. Hieronimus tran­slateth it jus regis; so Calvin: but I am sure the Hebrew both in words and sense beareth a consuetude; yea, and the word [...] signifieth not alwayes a law, as Josh. 6. 14. They compassed the citi [...] [...] seven times. 70. [...]. 2 King. 17. 26. They know not the manner of the God of the Land, Vers. 33. They served their [...]n gods, after the manner of the Heathen. [...] It cannot be according to the Law or right of the Heathen, except [...], be taken in an evill part. 70. [...]. Vers. 34. Ʋntill this day they do after these manners, 1 Kings 18. 28. Baals Priests cut themselves with Knives [...] after their manner. 70. [...], Gen. 40. 13. Thou shalt give the cup to Pharaoh, according as thou wast wont to do. [...], Exod. 21. 19. He shall deal with her after the manner of daughters, 1 Sam. 27. 11. And Da­vid saved neither man nor woman alive, to bring (tydings) to Gath, saying, So did David, and so will his manner be, [...]. It cannot be, they meaned that it was Davids law, right, or priviledge to spare none alive, 1 Sam. 2. 13. And the Priests custome with the people was, &c. [...] This was a wicked custome, not a law, and the 70. turneth it, [...]; and there­fore [...] is not alwayes taken in a good meaning: so P. Mar­tyr. coment. 1 Sam. 8. ve­rum jus regium describit in Deut. apud Sa­muelem autem usurpatum. P. Martyr, He meaneth here of an usurped law, saith he; Calvin Calvin. conc. 1 Sam. 8. Non jus a deo prescriptum, sed tyranidem. He speaketh not of Gods, law here (saith he) but of tyranny. Andr. Ri­vetus in decal. [...]. 20. Exod. in [...]. mundat. p. 195. And Rivetus, [...] sig­nifieth not ever jus, law. Sed aliquando morem sive modum & ratio­nem agendi, The custome and manner of doing, so Junius Junius an­not. in 1 Sam. 2 13. and Tremellius. Diodatus annot. 1 Sam. 8. 3. Diodatus exponeth jus; This law, namely (saith he) that which is now grown to a common custome, by the consent of nations, and Gods toleration. Glossa interlinearis. The interline glosse (to speak of Papists) exactionem & dominationem; The extortion and domina­tion of King Saul is here meant. Lyra in locum, hic accipitur jus large sumptum quod reputatur jus propter malum abusum. Nam illa quae dieuntur hic de jure. Reg is, magis contingunt per Tyranidem. Lyra exponeth it tyranny. Tostatus Abulens. in 1 Reg. 8. q. 17. deq. 21. Tostatus Abulens. He meaneth here of Kings indefinitely, who oppressed the people with taxes and tributes, as Solomon and others. Cornelius a Lapid. in locum. Cornelius a lapide: This was an unjust law. Cajetan. in locum. Cajetanus▪ [Page 133] calleth it, tyranny. Hugo Car­dinal. in loc. Hugo Cardinal, nameth them, exactiones & servitutes, exactions and slaveries: And Serrarius in locum. Serrarius, he speaketh not here, Quid Reges jure possint, What they may do by right and law; Sed quid audeant, What they will be bold to do, and what they tyrannically decern against all Laws of nature and humanitie. And so Thom. A­quin. l. 3. de Regni Prin­cip. c. 11. speaketh Tho. Aquinas: Mendoza, jus Tyranno­rum. So also Mendoza, saith he, speak­eth of the law of Tyrants: and Clemens Alexand. pag. 26. amongst the fathers, Clemens Alexandrinus saith on this place, Non humanum pollicetur dominum, sed insolentem daturum minatur tyrannum, He promiseth not a humane Prince, but threatneth to give them an insolent Tyrant; and the like also saith Beda, l. 2. expo. in Samuel. Beda. And an excellent Petrus Re­buffus tract. de incongrua. prert. p. 110. Osiander, he setteth not down the Office of the King, what he ought to be, but what man­ner of King they should have. Pelican. that ruled by will, not by law. Willet. Such as decline to Ty­ranny. Borhaius, Ty­rants, not Kings. Lawyer, Pet. Rebuffus saith, Etiam loquitur de Tyranno qui non erat a Deo electus. And that he speaketh of Sauls Tyrannicall usurpation, and not of the law pre­scribed by God, Deut. 17. I prove, 1. He speaketh of such a power, as is answerable to the Acts here spoken of; but the Acts here spoken of, are Acts of meere tyranny, Vers. 11. And this will be the manner of your King, that shall reign over you, he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his Chariots: Now to make slaves of their sons, was an Act of Tyranny. 2. To take their fields and vineyards, and oliveyards from them, and give them to his servants, was no better then Ahabs taking Naboths vineyard from him, which by Gods law he might not lawfully sell, except in the case of extreme povertie, and then in the yeer of Jubilee, he might redeem his own inheritance. 3. Verse 15, 16. To put the people of God to bondage, and make them servants, was to deal with them, as the Tyrant Pharaoh did. 4. He speaketh of such a law, the execution whereof should make them cry out to the Lord, because of their King: but the execution of the just Law of the King, Deut. 17. is a blessing, and not a bondage which should make the people cry out of the bitternesse of their spirit. 5. It is clear here, that God is by his Prophet, not instructing the King in his duty, but as Rabb. Levi Ben. Gersom. in 1 Sam. 8. Pezelius in exp. leg. Mosai. l. 4. c. 8. Tossan. in not. Bibl. Bosseus de Rep. Christ. potest. supra regem, c. 2. n. 103. Bodin. de Rep. l. 1. c. 19. Breutius, homil. 27. in 1 Sam. 8. Mos regis non de jure, sed de vulga [...]â consuetudine. Rabbi Levi Ben. Gersom saith, Terrifying them from their pur­pose of seeking a King, and foretelling the evil of punishment that they should suffer under a tyrannous King; But he speaketh not one word of these necessary and comfortable Acts of favour, that a good King by his good Government was to do for his people, Deut. 17. [Page 134] 15, 16. But he speaketh of contrary facts here; and that he is disswading them from suiting a King, is clear from the Text. 1. Be­cause he saith, Give them their will; but yet protest against their unlawfull course. 2. He biddeth the Prophet lay before them the tyranny, and oppression of their King; which tyranny Saul exer­cised in his time, as the story sheweth. 3. Because how uneffectu­all Samuels exhortation was, is set down, Verse 19. Neverthelesse, they would not obey the voice of Samuel, but said, Nay, but we will have a King over us; if Samuel had not been dehorting them from a King, how could they be said in this, to refuse to heare the voice of Samuel? 6. The ground of Barclay and Royalists, here is weak,Doct. Ferne, p. 2. sect. pag. 55. For they say, that the people sought a King like the Nations, and the Kings of the Nations were all absolute, and so Tyrants; And God granted their unlawfull desire, and gave them a Tyrant to reign over them, such as the Nations had. The plain contrary is true, they sought not a Tyrant, but one of the speciall reasons why they sought a King, was to be freed of Tyranny; for 1 Sam. 8. 3. Because Samuels sons turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted judgement; therefore all the Elders of Israel gathered themselves to­gether, and came to Samuel, to Ramah, and their they sought a King. 7. One could not more clearly speak with the mouth of a false Pro­phet, then the Author of active and passive obedience doth, while heActive and passive, Obed. pag. 24. will have Samuel here to describe a King, and to say; yee have formerly committed one errour in shaking off the yoke of God, and seeking a King; so now beware you fall not in the next errour, in cast­ing of the yoke of a King, which God at your own desire hath laid on you; for God hath onely power, both to make and unmake Kings; therefore prepare your selves patientlie to suffer and bear. Answ. For if he were exhorting to patient suffering of the yoke of a King, he should presume it were Gods revealed and regulating will, that they should have a King; But the scope of Samuels Sermon, is to disswade them from a King, and they by the contrary (Verse 19. say they) Nay, but we will have a King; and there not one word in the Text, that may intimate patience under the yoke of a King. 2. There is here the description of a Tyrant, not of a King. 3. Here is a threatning and a prediction, not any thing that smelleth of an exhortation.

Object. But it is evident, that God teaching the people how to be­haveD. Ferne. 3. p. Sect. 2. pag. 10. themselves under the unjust oppressions of their King, he sets [Page 135] down no remedy but tears, crying to God, prayer, and patience; there­fore resistance is not lawfull.

Answ. Though this be not the place due to the doctrine of Re­sistance,Learned Au­thors teach that Gods Law, Deut. 17. and the [...] a manner of the King, 1 Sam. 8, 9. are opposite one to another, so Gerson in trin­prin [...]. sac. adu. lat. par. 4. Alp. 66. lit. l. cons. 8. Buchan. de jure regni. apud Scot. Chasson. cat. glo. mundi cons. 24. n. 162. cons. 35. Tho­loss. l. 9. c. 1. Rossen. De polus Rep. c. 2. n. 10. Magdeburg. in trac. de. off. ma. Crying to God not the only remedy against a tyrant. yet to vindicate the place; I say, there is not one word of any lawfull remedy in the Text, onely it is said, [...], Et clamatis in illa die a faciebus regis vestri: It is not necessarily to be exponed of praying to God, Iob 35. 9. by reason of the multitude of the oppression, They make the oppressed to cry, [...] clamare faciunt, Isai. 15. 4. And Heshbon shall cry. [...] The armed souldiers of Moab shall cry out. There is no other word here, then doth expresse the idolatrous prayers of Moab, Isai. 17. 12. and Habbak. 2. 11. The stone shall cry out of the wall [...], Deut. 22. 24. You shall stone the maide [...], because she cryed not [...]; but she is not to be stoned, be­cause she prayed not to God, Ps. 18. 4. Davids enemies cryed, and there was none to save, even to the Lord, and he heard not. 2. Though it were the Prophets meaning, they cryed to the Lord, yet it is not the crying of a people humbled, and in faith speaking to God in their troubles, Zach. 7. 13. They cryed, and I will not heare, therefore Royalists must make crying to God out of the bitternesse of affliction, without humiliation and faith, and such prayets of sinners as God heareth not, Psal. 18. 41. Ioh. 9. 31. Esay 17. 12. to be the only remedy of a people oppressed by a Tyrannous King; now it is certaine, God prescribeth no unlawfull meanes to an oppressed people, under their affliction, therefore it is cleare here, that God speaketh only of evills of punishment, such as is to cry in trouble, and not be heard of God, and that he prescribeth here no duty at all, nor any remedy. 3. All Protestant Divines say; Ex particulari non valet argumentum negativé, from one particular place, a negative argument is not good. This remedy is not written in this particular place, therefore it is not written at all in other places of Scripture; so 1 Tim. 1. 19. The end of excommunication is, that the party excommunicated may learne not to blaspheme, ergo the end is not also that the Church be not infected, it followeth not, the contrary is cleare, 1 Cor. 5. v. 6. D. Ferne and other Royalists teach us, that we may supplicate and make prayers to a Tyranous King. 2. We may fly from a tyranous King: but neither supplicating the King, nor flying from his sury shall be lawfull meanes left by this Argument, because these meanes are no more in this text (where Royalists say the spi­rit [Page 136] of God speaketh of purpose of the meanes to be used against Tyranny) then violent resisting, is this text.

Barclay, Ferne, Grotius, Arnisaeus, the P. Prelate following them saith, An ill King is a punishment of God, for the sins of the people, Ferne par. 3. pag. 95. Resisting of tyrants, and patience not inconsistent. and there is no remedy but patient suffering. Ans. Truely it is a silly Argument. The Assyrians comming against the people of God, for their sins, is a punishment of God, Esa. 10. 5. 12. 13. But doth it fol­low that it is unlawfull, for Israel to fight and resist the Assyrians, and that they had warrant to doe no other thing, but lay downe Armes, and pray to God, and fight none at all? Is there no lawfull resisting of ills of punishment, but meere prayers and patience? The Amalikites came out against Israel for their sinnes, Senahkerib against Ezekiah, for the sins of the people. Asa his enemies fought against him for his sins, and the peoples sins; shall Moses and the people, Hezekiah, Asa, do then nothing but pray and suffer? Is it un­lawfull with the sword to resist them? I beleeve not, Famine is often a punishment of God in a Land, Amos. 4. 7, 8. is it therefore in fa­mine, unlawfull to till the earth, and seeke bread by our industry and are we to doe nothing but to pray for daily bread? It is a vaine Argument.

Observe therefore the wickednesse of Barclay, contra Monarch. l. 2. p. 56. for he would prove, that a power of doing ill, and that without any punishment to be inflicted by man, is from God; because our Lawes punish not perjurie, but leaveth it to be punished of God, l. 2. l. de Reb. cred. Cujacius, l. 2. obs. c. 19. And the husband in Moses his law, had power to give a bill of divorce to his wife, and send her away; and the husband was not to be punished. And also Stewes and work-houses for harlots, and to take usurie, are tolerated in many Christian Com­monwealths, and yet these are all sorts of murthers, by the confession of Heathen: Ergo, (saith Barclaius) God may give a power for Tyran­nous acts to Kings, so as they shall be under no punishment to be inflicted by men.

Ans. All this is an argument from fact. 1. A wicked Magi­stracie may permit perjurie and lying in the Common-wealth, andThe Law of the King not a permissive law as was the law of devorcement that without punishment; and some Christian Commonweales, he meaneth his own Synagogue of Rome, spirituall Sodome, a cage of uncleane birds, suffereth Harlotrie by Law, and the whores pay so many thousands yearely to the Pope, and are free of all punishment by Law, to eschew homicides, adulteries of Romish Priests, and o­ther [Page 137] greater sinnes: Therefore God hath given power to a King to play the Tyrant, without any feare of punishment to be inflicted by man. But 1. if this be a good argument, The Magistrate to whom God hath committed the sword to take vengeance on evill doers, Rom. 13. 3, 4, 5, 6. such as are perjured persons, professed whores and harlots, hath a lawfull power from God to connive at sinnes and grosse scandals in the Commonwealth, as they dreame that the King hath power given from God to exercise all acts of Tyranny without any resistance. But, 1. this was a grievous sinne in Eli, that he being a father and a Iudge, punished not his sonnes for their uncleannesse, and his house, in Gods heavy displeasure, was cut off from the Priest­hood therefore. Then God hath given no such power to the Iudge. 2. The contrary duty is lying on the Iudge, To execute judgement for the oppressed, Iob 29. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. Ier. 22. 15, 16. and per­verting of judgement, and conniving at the heynous sinnes of the wicked, is condemned, Num. 5. 31, 32. 1 Sam. 15. 23. 1 King. 20. 42, 43. Esa. 1. 17. & 10. 1. & 5, 23. and therefore God hath given no power to a Iudge to permit wicked men to commit grievous crimes, without any punishment. As for the Law of Divorce, it was indeed a per­missive law, whereby the husband might give the wife a bill of di­vorce, and be free of punishment before men, but not free of sinne and guiltinesse before God, for it was contrary to Gods institution of Mariage at the beginning, as Christ saith: and the Prophet saith,Mal. 2. that the Lord hateth putting away. But that God hath given any such permissive power to the King, that he may doe what he pleaseth, and cannot be resisted: This is in question. 3. The Law spoken of in the Text, is by Royalists called, not a consuetude of Tranny, but the divine law of God, whereby the King is formally and essentially distin­guished from the Judge in Israel: Now if so, a power to sinne, and a power to commit acts of Tyranny, yea, and a power in the Kings Sergeants and bloody Emissaries to waste and destroy the people of God, must be a lawfull power given of God: for a lawfull power it must be, if it commeth from God, whether it be from the King in his own person, or from his servants at his commandement, and by ei­ther put forth in acts, as the power of a bill of Divorce was a power from God, exempting either the husband from punishment before men, or freeing the servant, who at the husbands command, should write it, and put it in the hands of the woman. I cannot beleeve that God hath given a power, and that by Law, to one Man to command [Page 138] twenty thousand Cut-throats to kill and destroy all the Children of God, and that he hath commanded his Children to give their necks and heads to Babels sonnes without resistance. This I am sure is another matter then a Law for a bill of Divorce to one woman, maried by free election of a humorous and unconstant man. But sure I am, God gave no permissive law from heaven, like the law of Divorce, for the hardnesse of the heart, not of the Iewes only, but also of the whole Christian and Heathen Kingdomes under a Mo­narch; that one Emperour may, by such a Law of God, as the Law of Divorce, kill, by bloody Cut-throats, such as the Irish Rebels are, all the Nations that call on Gods name, men, women, and sucking infants. And if Providence impede the Catholike issue, and dry up the seas of Blood, it is good: but God hath given a law, such as the law of Divorce, to the King, whereby he, and all his, may without resistance, by a legall power given of God, who giveth Kings to be fathers, nurses, protectors, guides, yea the breath of nostrils of his Church, as speciall mercies and blessings to his people, he may (I say) by a law of God, as it is 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. cut off Nations, as that Lyon of the world, Nebuchadnezzar did. So Royalists teach us.

Barclaius l. 2. cont. Monarchoma. pag. 69. The Lord spake to Samuel the Law of the King, and wrot it in a booke, and laid it up be­fore the Lord. But what Law? That same law which he proposed to the people when they first sought a King: but that was the Law con­temning Precepts rather for the peoples obeying, then for the Kings commanding, for the people was to be instructed with those precepts, not the King. Those things that concerned the Kings duty, Deut. 17. Moses commanded to be put into the Arke, but so if Samuel had commanded the King, that which Moses, Deut. 17. commanded, he had done no new thing, but had done againe what was once done, actum egisset, but there was nothing before commanded the people concerning their obedi­ence and patience under evill Princes. Ioseph. Antiq. l. 6. c. 5. he wrote [...], the evills that were to befall them. Ans. It was not that same Law, for though this Law was written to the people, yet it was the Law of the King: and I pray you, did Samuel write in a booke all the Rules of Tyranny, and teach Saul and all the KingsThe law of the King written in a booke, [...] Sam. 11. not the law of Ty­ranny. after him (for this book was put in the Ark of the Covenant, where also was the booke of the Law) how to play the Tyrant? And what instruction was it to King or people to write to them a book of the wicked waies of a King, which nature teacheth without a Doctor? [Page 139] Sanctius saith on the place, These things which by mens fraud, and to the hurt of the publick may be corrupted, were kept in the Taberna­cle, and the booke of the Law was kept in the Arke. Cornelius a La­pide saith, It was the Law common to King and people, which was commonly kept with the booke of the Law, in the Arke of the Covenant. Lyra contradicteth Barclay, he exponeth Legem, legem regni non se­cundum usurpationem supra positam, sed secundum ordinationem Dei positam, Deut. 17. Theodat. excellently exponeth it the fundamentall Lawes of the Kingdome, inspride by God to temper Monarchy, with a liberty befitting Gods people, and with equity toward a Nation—to withstand the abuse of an absolute power. 2. Can any beleeve Samuel would have written a Law of Tyranny, and put that booke in the Arke of the Covenant before the Lord, to be kept to the posterity, seeing he was to teach both King and people the good and the right way, 1 Sam. 12. 23, 24, 25. 3. Where is the Law of the Kingdome called a Law of punishing innocent people? 4. To write the duty of the King in a booke, and apply it to the King, is no more super­fluous, nor to teach the people the good and the right way out of the Law, and apply generalls to persons. 5. There is nothing in the Law, 1 Sam. 8. 9. 11. 12. of the peoples patience, but rather of their impatient crying ou [...], God not hearing nor helping; and no­thing of that in this booke, for any thing that we know, and Iosephus speaketh of the Law, 1 Sam. 8. not of this Law, 1 Sam. 12.

QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people?

IN this grave question divers considerations are to be pondered. 1. There is a Dignity materiall in the people scattered, they be­ingIn what consi­derations the King is wo [...] ­thier then the people, and the people worthier then the King. many representations of God and his Image, which is in the King also, and formally more as King, he being indued with formall Ma­gistraticall and publick Royall Authority, in the former regard this or that man is inferiour to the King, because the King hath that same remander of the Image of God that any private man hath and something more, [...]e hath a politicke resemblance of the King of Heavens, being a little God, and so is above any one man.

2. All these of the people taken collectively having more of God, as being representations, are according to this materiall dignity ex­cellenter then the King, because many are excellenter then one, and the King according to the Magistraticall and Royall Authority he hath, is excellenter then they are, because he partaketh formally of [Page 140] Royalty, which they have not formally.

3. A meane or medium, as it is such, is lesse then the end, thoughA meane as a meane inferi­our to the end. the thing materially that is a meane, may be excellenter; every mean as a meane, under that reduplication hath all its goodnesse and ex­cellency in relation to the end, yet an Angell that is a meane, and a ministring Spirit, ordained of God for an heire of life eternall, Heb. 1. 13. considered materially, is excellenter then a man, Psal. 8. 5. Heb. 2. 6, 7, 8.

4. A King and leader in a military consideration, and as a Go­vernour and conserver of the whole Army, is more worth then ten thousand of the people, 2 Sam. 18. 3.

5. But simply and absolutely the people is above, and more ex­cellentA King inferi­our to the people. Argum. then the King, and the King in Dignity inferiour to the peo­ple; and that upon these Reasons. 1. Because he is the meane or­dained for the people, as for the end, that he may save them, 2. Sam. 19. 9. a publick shepheard to feede them, Ps. 78. 70, 71, 72, 73. the Captaine and Leader of the Lords inheritance, 1 Sam. 10. 1. to de­fend them, the Minister of God for their good, Rom. 13. 4. 2. The PilotArgum. 2. is lesse then the whole Passengers, the Generall lesse then the whole Army, the Tutor lesse then all the children, the Physician lesse then all the living men whose health he careth for; the Master or Tea­cher lesse then all the Schollars, because the part is lesse then the whole: the King is but a part and a member (though I grant a very eminent and Noble Member) of the Kingdome. 3. A ChristianArgum. 3. people especially is the portion of the Lords inheritance, Deut. 32. 9. the sheepe of his pasture, his redeemed ones, for whom God gave his blood, Act. 20. 28. And the killing of a man is to violate the Image of God, Gen. 9. 6. and therefore the death and destruction of a Church, and of thousand thousands of men is a sadder and a more heavy matter then the death of a King, who is but one man. 4. A King as a King, or because a King is not the inheritance of God,Argum. 4. nor the chosen and called of God, nor the sheepe or flocke of the Lords pasture, nor the redeemed of Christ, for those excellencies a­gree not to Kings, because they are Kings; for then all Kings should be indued with those excellencies, and God should an be ac­cepter of persons, if he put those excellencies of Grace upon men for externall respects of highnesse and Kingly power, and worldly glory and splendor; for many living Images and representations of God, as he is holy, or more excellent then a politique representation [Page 141] of Gods greatnesse and Majesty, such as the King is; because that which is the fruit of a love of God, which commeth nearer to Gods most speciall love, is more excellent then that which is farther re­mote from his speciall love; now though Royalty be a beame of the Majesty of the greatnesse of the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; yet is it such a fruit and beam of Gods greatnesse, as may consist with the eternall reprobation of the party loved, so now Gods love from whence he communicateth his Image, representing his owne holinesse, commeth nearer to his most speciall love of election of men to glory.

5. If God give Kings to be a ransome for his Church, and if heArgum. 5. The Church b [...]cause the Church of more worth then the King because King. slay great Kings for their sake, as Pharaoh King of Aegypt, Esa. 43. 3 and Sihon King of the Amorites, and Og King of Bashan, Ps. 136. 18, 19, 20. if he plead with Princes and Kings for destroying his people, Esa. 3. v. 12, 13, 14. if he make Babylon and her King a threshing-floore, for the violence done to the inhabitants of Zion, Ier. 51. 33, 34, 35. then his people as his people, must be so much dea­rer and more precious in the Lords eyes, then Kings because they are Kings, by how much more his Justice is active to destroy the one, and his Mercy to save the other. Neither is the Argument ta­ken off, by saying the King must in this question be compared with his owne people; not a forraigne King with other forraigne people over whom he doth not Raigne, for the Argument proveth that the people of God are of more worth then Kings as Kings; and Ne­buchadnezer and Pharoah for the time were Kings to the people of God, and forraigne Kings are no lesse essentially Kings, then Kings native are.

6. Those who are given of God as gifts for the preservation ofArgum. 6. the people, to be Nurse-fathers to them; those must be of lesse worth before God, then those to whom they are given, since the gift, as the gift, is lesse then the party on whom the gift is bestowed. But the King is a gift for the good and preservation of the people, as is cleare, Esa 1. 26. And from this that God gave his people a King in his wrath, we may conclude, that a King of himselfe, except God be angry with his people, must be a gift.

7. That which is eternall, and cannot politically die, yea whichArgum. 7. must continue as the dayes of heaven, because of Gods promise; That is more excellent then that which is both accidentall, tempo­rarie and mortall. But the People is both eternall, as People, be­cause [Page 142] Eccles. 1. 4. one generation passeth away, and another generation People in the spece immor­tall, King not so. commeth: And as a people in covenant with God, Ier. 32. 40, 41. in respect that a People and Church, though mortall in the individuals, yet the Church, remaining the Church, cannot dye; but the King, as King, may, and doth dye: It is true, where a Kingdome goeth by succession, the Politicians say, the man who is King, dyeth; but the King never dyeth, because some other, either by birth or free electi­on, succeedeth in his roome. But I answer, 1. People by a sort of necessity of nature succeedeth to People, generation to generation, except Gods judgement, contrary to nature, intervene to make Ba­bylon no people, and a land that shall never be inhabited, (which I both believe and hope for, according to Gods word of Prophecie) But a King by a sort of contingencie succeedeth to Kings: for na­ture doth not ascertaine us there must be Kings to the worlds end; because the essence of Governours is kept safe in Aristocracie and Democracie, though there were no Kings. And that Kings shouldIf sinne had never been, there should have been no need of Kings. necessarily have been in the world, if man had never fallen in sinne, I am not, by any cogent argument, induced to beleeve. I conceive there should have been no Government but these of Fathers & Chil­dren, Husband and Wife; and (which is improperly Government) some more gifted with supervenient additions to nature, as gifts and excellencies of Engines. Now in this point, Althusius polit. c. 38. n. 114. saith, the King in respect of office is worthier then the peo­ple; (but this is but an accidentall respect) but as the King is a man, he is inferior to the people.

But, 8. he who by office is obliged to expend himselfe, and toArg. 8. The King is to expend his life for the people, and so inferior to them. give his life for the safety of the people, he must be inferior to the people. So Christ saith, the life is more then rayment or food, be­cause both these give themselves to corruption for mans life: so the beasts are inferiour to man, because they die for our life, that they may sustaine our life: And Caiaphas prophesied right, that it was better that one man die, then that the whole Nation perish, Joh. 11. v. 50. and in nature, Elements against their particular inclination de­fraud themselves of their private and particular ends, that the Com­monwealth of Nature may stand, as heavy elements ascend, light descend, lest nature should perish by a vacuitie. And the good shep­herd, Ioh. 10. giveth his life for his sheep. So Saul and David both were made Kings to fight the Lords battels, and to expose their lives to hazard for the safetie of the Church and people of God. But the [Page 143] King by office is obliged to expend his life for the safety of the people of God; he is obliged to fight the Lords battels for them, to goe betwixt the Flock and death, as Paul was willing to be spent for the Church. It may be objected, Jesus Christ gave himselfe a Ransome for his Church, and his life for the life of the World, and was a gift given to the world, Ioh. 3. 16. & 4. 10. and he was a meane to save us: And so what arguments we have before produ­ced to prove that the King must be inferior to the people, becauseA meane is considered re­duplicatively and formally as a meane, and materially, as thething which is the mean: in this latter sense the mean may be of more worth then the end, but not so in the former sense. he is a ransome, a meane, a gift; are not concludent. I answer: Consider a meane reduplicatively, and formaliter, as a meane, and secondly, as a meane materially, that is, the thing which is a meane. 2. Consider that which is only a mean, and ransome, and gift, and no more; and that which, beside that it is a meane, is of a higher nature also. So Christ formally as a meane, giving, 1. his temporall life; 2. for a time; 3. according to the flesh: For, 1. the eternall life; 2. of all the Catholike Church to be glorified eternally; 3. not his blessed Godhead and glorie, which, as God, he had with the Father from eternitie. In that respect Christ hath the relation of a servant, ransome, gift, and some inferioritie in comparison of the Church of God: and his Fathers glory, as a meane, is inferior to the end, but Christ materially, in concreto: Christ is not only a meane to save his Church, but as God, (in which consideration he was the immor­tallA meane may be considered as a meane on­ly, and as more then a meane. Lord of life) he was more then a meane, even the author, efficient and Creator of heaven and earth: and so there is no ground to say that he is inferiour to the Church; but the absolute head, King, the chiefe of ten thousand, more in excellencie and worth then ten thousand millions of possible worlds of men and Angels. But such a consideration cannot befall any mortall King; because, consider the King materially as a mortall man, he must be inferior to the whole Church, for he is but one, and so of lesse worth then the whole Church, as the thumbe, though the strongest of the fingers, yet it is inferior to the hand, and far more to the whole body, as any part is inferior to the whole. 2. Consider the King reduplicative, and formally as King, and by the officiall relation he hath, he is no more then but a Royall servant, an officiall meane, tending, ex officio, to this end, to preserve the people, to rule and governe them; and a gift of God, given, by vertue of his office, to rule the people of God: and so any way inferiour to the people.

9. Those who are before the King▪ and may be a People with­out [Page 144] a King, must be of more worth then that which is posteriour,The people may be with out the King, but not the King without the people. and cannot be a King without them. For thus Gods selfe suf­ficiency is proved, in that he might be, and eternally was blessed for ever, without his Creature, but his creature cannot subsist in being without him. Now the people were a people many yeares, before there was any government (save domestick) and is a people where there is no King, but only an Aristocracy, or a Democracy; but the King can be no King without a people. It is vaine that some say, the King and Kingdome are relatives, and not one is before ano­ther; for its true in the naked relation, so are father and sonne, Master and servant, Relata simul natura; but sure there is a prio­rity of worth and independency for all that, in the father above the sonne, and in the master above the servant, and so in the people a­bove the King, take away the people, and Dyonisius is but a poore Schoole-master.

2. Asser. The people in power are superiour to the King, 1. be­cause10. Argum. every efficient and constituent cause is more excellent then the effect. Every meane is inferiour in power to the end, so Iun. Brutus, q. 31. Bucher l. 1. c. 16. Author. Lib. De offic. Magistr. q. 6. He­naenius disp. 2. n. 6. Ioan. Roffensis Epist. De potest. pap. l. 2. c. 5. Spa­lato de Repu. Ecclesiast. l. 6. c. 2. n. 31. but the people is the efficient and constituent cause, the King is the effect, the people is the end; both intended of God to save the people, to be a healer and a Physi­cian to them, Esay 3. v. 7. and the people appoint and create the King out of their indigence, to preserve themselves from mutuall violence. Many things are objected against this, 1. That the effici­ent and constituent cause is God, and the people is only the instru­mentall cause; and Spalato saith, that the people doth indirectly only give Kingly power, because God, at their act of election, ordinarily giveth it. Ans. The Scripture saith plainly, as we heard before, the people made Kings, and if they doe, as other second causes produce their effects, it is all one that God as the principall cause maketh Kings, else we should not argue from the cause to the effect amongst the creatures. 2. God by that same action that the people createthThe people wortheir as the [...]t [...]stituent cause then the King, who is the effect. a King, doth also, by them, as by his instruments create a King, and that God doth not immediatly, at the naked presence of the act of popular election, conferre Royall dignity on the man, without any action of the people, as they say by the Churches act of conferring Orders, God doth immediatly without any act of the Church, in­fuse [Page 145] from Heaven supernaturall habilities on the man, without any active influence of the Church, is evident by this, 1. The RoyallArgum. 1. power to make Lawes with the King, and so a power eminent in their states representative to governe themselves, is in the people, for if the most high acts of Royalty be in them, why not the power also? and so what need to fetch a Royall power from Heaven, to be immediatly infused in him, seeing the people hath such a power in themselves at hand? 2. The people can, and doth limite, and bindArgum. 2. Royall power in elected Kings, ergo they have in them Royall po­wer to give to the King; those who limit power, can take away so many degrees of Royall power, and those who can take away po­wer, can give power; and it is unconceiveable, to say that peopleVnpossible that people can limit Royall power, but they must give Roy­all power. can put restraint upon a power immediatly comming from God, if Christ immediatly infuse an Apostolick spirit in Paul, mortall men cannot take from him any degrees of that infused spirit; if Christ in­fuse a spirit of nine degrees, the Church cannot limit it to six degrees only; but Royalists consent that the people may choose a King, upon such conditions to raigne, as he hath Royall power of ten degrees, whereas his Ancester had by birth a power of foureteen degrees. 3. It is not intelligible that the Holy Ghost should give Commande­mentArgum. 3. to the people to make such a man King, Deut. 17. 15, 16. and forbid them to make such a man King, if the people had no active influence in making a King at all, but God solely and immediately from Heaven did infuse Royalty in the King without any action of the people, save a naked consent only, and that after God had made the King, they should approve only with an after-act of naked ap­probation. 4. If the people by other Governours, as by heads of fa­milies,Argum. 4. and other choise men, governe themselves, and produce these same formall effects of Peace, Justice, Religion, on themselves, which the King doth produce, then is there a power of the same kind, and as excellent as the Royall power in the people, and no reason, but this power should be holden to come immediatly from God, as the Royall Power, for it is every way of the same nature and kind, and as I shall prove, Kings and Iudges differ not in nature and spece, but it is experienced that people doe, by Aristocraticall guides, governe themselves, &c. so then, if God immediatly infuse Royalty, when the people chooseth a King, without any action of the people, then must God immediatly infuse a beame of governing on a Provost and a Bailiffe, when the people choose such, and that [Page 146] without any action of the people, because all Powers are, in ab­stracto, from God, Rom. 13. 2. and God as immediatly maketh inferi­our Iudges, as superiour, Prov. 8. 16. and all promotion, even to be a Provost or Major, commeth from God only, as to be a King, ex­cept Royalists say, all promotion commeth from the East, and from the West, and not from God, except promotion to the Royall Throne, the contrary whereof is said, Ps. 75. 6, 7. 1 Sam. 2. 7, 8. not only Kings, but all Judges are Gods, Ps. 82. 1, 2. and therefore all must be the same way created and moulded of God, except by Scripture Royalists can shew us a difference. An English Prelate gi­vethExcept. 2. Ioan. Rossens. De potest. pap. l. 2. c. 5. Reasons, why People, who are said to make Kings as efficients, and Authors, cannot unmake them: the one is, because God as chief and sole supreame Moderator maketh Kings, but I say, Christ as the chiefe Moderator, and head of the Church, doth immediatly conferre abi­lities to a man to be a Preacher, and though by industry the man acquire abilities, yet in regard the Church doth not so much as in­strumentally conferre those abilities, they may be said to come from God immediatly, in relation to the Church, who calleth the man to the ministery, yea Royalists, as our excommunicated Prelate learnedThough God immediately create Kings without the people, yet can the people un­make Kings. from Spalato, say that God, at the naked presence of the Churches call, doth immediatly infuse that from Heaven, by which the man is now in Holy Orders, and a Pastor, whereas he was not so before; and yet Prelates cannot deny, but they can unmake Ministers, and have practised this in their unhallowed Courts: and therefore though God immediatly without any action of the people make Kings, this is a weake reason, to prove they cannot unmake them. As for their undeleble character, that Prelates cannot take from a Minister, it is nothing, if the Church may unmake a Minister, thoughThough God should imme­diately give a talent and gift for Prophecy­ing, as he gave to Balaam, Caia­phas and others, yet they may lose that talent by digging it in the earth, and be deprived by the Church. his character goe to prison with him: we seeke no more but to anull the reason. God immediatly maketh Kings and Pastors, ergo no power on earth can unmake them; this consequence is as weake as water. 2. The other cause is, because God hath erected no Tribunall on earth higher then the Kings Tribunall, ergo no power on earth can unmake a King; the Antecedent and consequence is both de­nyed, and is a begging of the question: for the Tribunall that made the King is above the King. 2. Though there be no Tribunall for­mally regall and Kingly above the King, yet is there a Tribunall vertuall eminently above him in the case of tyranny, for the States and Princes have a Tribunall above him.

[Page 147] 3. To this the constituent cause is of more power and dignity thenExcept. 3. [...]. sanc. Ma­jes. c. 9. p. 98. 99 Arnis [...]us De au­thorit. princip. cap. 1. [...]. 1. the effect, and so the people is above the King. The P. Prelate bor­rowed an answer from Arnisaeus, and Barclay, and other Royalists, and saith, If we knew any thing in Law, or were ruled by reason; Every constituent (saith Arnisaeus and Barclay more accurately then the P. Prelate had a head to transcribe their words) where the con­stituent hath resigned all his power in the hand of the Prince whom he constitutes, is of more worth, and power, then he in whose hand they re­signe the power: so the proposition is false. The servant who hath consti­tuted his Master Lord of his liberty, is not worthier then his Master whom he hath made his Lord, and to whom he hath given himselfe as a slave; for after he hath resigned his liberty he cannot repent, he must keepe covenant though to his hurt: yea such a servant is not only not a­bove his Master, but he cannot move his foot without his Master. The Governour of Britaine (saith Arnisaeus) being despised by King Philip, resigned himselfe as Vassall to King Edward of England, but did not for that make himselfe superiour to King Edward: indeed he who con­stituteth another under him as a Legat, is superiour; but the people doe constitute a King above themselves, not a King under themselves, and therefore the people are not by this made the Kings superiour, but his inferiour.

Ans. 1. It is false that the people doth, or can by the Law of nature resigne their whole liberty in the hand of a King, 1. they cannot resigne to others that which they have not in themselves, Nemo po­test dare quod non habet, but the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to exercise those tyrannous acts spoken of, 1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, &c. for neither God, nor Natures Law hath given any such power. 2. He who constitu­teth himselfe a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnaturall fact of alienation of that liberty, which he hath from his Maker, from the wombe, by violence, constraint, or extreame necessity, and so is inferiour to all free men, but the people doth not make them­selves slaves when they constitute a King over themselves, be­cause God giving to a people a King, the best and excel­lentest Governour on earth, giveth a blessing and speciall fa­four, Esay 1. 26. Hosea 1. v. 11. Esay 3. 6, 7. Ps. 79. 70, 71, 72. but to lay upon his people the state of slaverie, in which they re­nounce their whole libertie, is a curse of God, Gen. 9. 25. Gen. 27. 29. Deut. 28. 32. 36. But the people having their liberty to make any [Page 148] of ten or twenty, their King, and to advance one from a private stateThe people putting a King above them­selves, retaine the fountain­power, and so are superior to the King. to an honorable throne, whereas it was in their libertie to advance another, and to give him Royall power of ten degrees, whereas they might give him power of twelve degrees, and of eight, or sixe, must be in excellencie and worth above the man, whom they consti­tute King, and invest with such honour: as Honour in the fountain, and honos participans & originans, must be more excellent and pure then the derived honour in the King, which is honos particip [...]tus & originatus. 2. If the servant give his libertie to his master, ergo, he had that libertie in him; and in that act, libertie must be in a more excellent way in the servant, as in the Fountaine, then it is in the master: and so this libertie must be purer in the people then in the King: and therefore in that, both the servant is above the master, and the People worthier then the King: and when the people give themselves conditionally and Covenant-wise to the King, as to a Publique servant, and Patron, and Tutour, as the Governour of Bri­taine, out of his humour, gave himselfe to King Edward; there is even here a note of superioritie; Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of libertie, by which he was superiour, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himselfe infe­rior. 3. The People constituteth a King above themselves, I distin­guish, supra se, above themselves, according to the fountaine power of Royaltie, that is false; for the fountaine-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. because they give it to the King, ad mo­dum recipientis, and with limitations, ergo, it is unlimited in the peo­ple, and bounded and limited in the King, and so lesse in the King then in the people. 2. If the King turne distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebu­chadnezzar, it is certaine the people may put Curators and Tutors over him, who hath the Royall power. 3. If the King be absent, and taken captive, the People may give the Royall power to one, or to some few to exercise it as custodes regni. And 4. if he die, and the Crown goe by election, they may create another with more or lesse power: all which evinceth, that they never constituted over them­selves a King, in regard of fountaine-power; for if they give away the fountaine, as a slave selleth his libertie, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a King above them, quoad potestatem legum executi­vam, in regard of a power of executing lawes and actuall govern­ment, [Page 149] for their good and safetie: but this proveth only that the King is above the people, [...], in some respect; but the most eminent and fountaine-power of Royaltie remaineth in the people, as in an immortall spring, which they communicate by succession to this orUlpian l. 1. ad Sc. Tupil. Po­pulus omne su­um imperium & potestàtene confert in Re­gem. Bartolus ad l. hostes 24. f. de capt. & host. that mortall man, in the manner and measure that they thinke good: And Ʋlpian and Bartolus, cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived, secondary and borrowed pow­er of executing lawes, and not of the fountaine power, which the people cannot give away, no more then they can give away their ra­tionall nature; for it is a power naturall, to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created Being: For, if the People give all their power away, 1. What shall they reserve to make a new King, if this man dye? 2. What if the Royall line surcease? there be no Prophets immediately sent of God, to make Kings. 3. What if he turne Tyrant, and destroy his Subjects with the sword? The Royalists say, they may slie: but when they made him King, they resigned all their power to him, even their power of flying; for they bound themselves by an oath (say Royalists) to all passive and law­full active obedience: and, I suppose, to stand at his Tribunal, if h [...] summoned the three Estates, upon Treason, to come before him, is conteined in the oath, that Royalists say, bindeth all, and is contra­dictorie to flying.

Arnisaeus▪ a more learned Iurist and Divine then the P. Prelate, answereth the other Maxime, The end is worthier then the meane lea­dingArnis. c. 3. n. 10. to the end, because it is ordained for the end. These meanes, saith he, which referre their whole nature to the end, and have all their ex­cellencie from the end, and have excellencie from no other thing but from the end, are lesse excellent then the end; that is true, such an end as medicine is for health. And Hugo Grotius, l. 1. c. 3. n. 8. Those meanes which are only for the end, & for the good of the end, and are not for their own good, also are of lesse excellencie, and inferior to the end. But so the assumption is false. But those meanes which beside their relation to the end, have an excellencie of nature in themselves, are not alwayes infe­rior to the end. The Disciple, as he is instituted, is inferior to the Ma­ster; but as he is the sonne of a Prince, he is above the Master. But by this reason, the shepherd should be inferior to bruit beasts, to sheep. And the master of the familie is for the familie, and referreth all that he hath for the entertaining of the familie: but it followeth not therefore the fa­milie is above him. The forme is for the action, therefore the action is [Page 150] more excellent then the forme, and an accident then the subject or sub­stance? And Grotius saith, Every government is not for the good of an­other, but some for its own good, as the government of a master over the servant, and the husband over the wife.

Ans. I take the answer thus: Those who are meere meanes, and only meanes referred to the end, they are inferior to the end: but the King, as King, hath all his officiall and relative goodnesse in the world, The King, as King, a meane and inferior to the people. as relative to the end. All that you can imagine to be in a King, as a King, is all relative to the safety and good of the people, Rom. 13. 4. He is a minister for thy good. He should not, as King, make himselfe, or his own gaine and honour, his end. I grant, the King, as a man, shall dye as another man, and so he may secondarily intend his own good; and what excellencie he hath as a man, is the excellencie of one mortall man, and cannot make him amount in dignitie, and in the absolute consideration of the excellencie of a man, to be above many men and a whole Kingdome: for the moe good things there be, the better they are, so the good things be multiplicable, as a hundred men are better then one: Otherwise, if the good be such as cannot be multiplied, as one God, the multiplication maketh themThe King both as a man, and as a King inferior to the people. worse, as many Gods are inferiour to one God. Now if Royalists can shew us any more in the King then these two, we shall be obliged to them; and in both, he is inferiour to the whole.

The Prelate and his followers would have the Maxime to lose credit; for then (say they) the shepherd should be inferior to the sheep: But in this the Maxime faileth indeed. 1. Because the shepherd is a reasonable man, and the sheep bruit beasts, and so must be excellen­ter then all the flocks of the world. Now as he is a reasonable man, he is not a shepherd, nor in that relation referred to the sheep and their preservation, as a mean to the end; but he is a shepherd by accident, for the unrulinesse of the creatures, for mans sinne, with­drawing themselves from that naturall dominion that man had over the creatures, before the fall of man: in that relation of a meane to the end, and so by accident, is this officiall relation put on him; and according to that officiall relation, and by accident, man is put to be a servant to the bruitish creature, and a meane to so base an end. But all this proveth him, through mans sinne, and by accident, to be under the officiall relation of a meane, to baser creatures then him­selfe, as to the end, but not as a reasonable man. But the King, as King, is an officiall and Royall meane to this end, that the people [Page 151] may lead a godly and peaceable life under him. And this officiall rela­tion being an accident, is of lesse worth then the whole people, as they are to be governed. And I grant, the Kings sonne, in relation to blood and birth, is more excellent then his Teachers: but as he is taught, he is inferiour to his Teacher: but in both considerations the King is inferior to the people; for though he cōmand the people, and so have an executive power of law above them, yet have they a fountain power above him, because they made him King, and in Gods intention he is given as King for their good, according to that, Thou shalt feed my people Israel: & that, I gave him for a leader of my people.

4. Saith the P. Prelate: The constituent cause is excellenter thenExcept. 4. Sacr. sanct. maj. c. 9. p. 98. the effect constituted, where the constitution is voluntary, and dependeth upon the free act of the will, as when the King maketh a Vice-Roy or a Judge, durante beneplacito, during his free will: but not when a man maketh over his right to another; for then there should be neither faith nor truth in covenants, if people might make over their power to theirObserve here, that the P. P. yieldeth there is a free cove­nant, by which the people re­signe their power to the King: but whether Roy­all power, or some other, he dare not assert, lest he destroy his own prin­ciples. To sweare non-selfe-pre­servation, and to sweare self­murther, all one. 5 Reply. Sac. sanct. maj. c. 9. p. 129. stollen from Barclaius, l. 5. c. 12. King, and retract and take back what they have once given.

Ans. This is a begging of the question: for it is denyed that the people can absolutely make away their whole power to the King: It dependeth on the people that they be not destroyed. They give to the King a politique power for their own safetie, and they keepe a naturall power to themselves, which they must conserve, and can­not give away; and they doe not breake their covenant, when they put in act that naturall power to conserve themselves; for though the people should give away that power, and sweare, though the King should kill them all, they should not resist, nor defend their own lives; yet that being an oath against the sixth Command, which enjoyneth naturall selfe-preservation, it should not oblige the con­science; for it should be intrinsecally sinfull; and it's all one to sweare to non-self-preservation, as to sweare to selfe-murther.

5. If the people (saith the Prelate, begging the answer from Barclay) the constituent be more excellent then the effect, and so the people above the King, because they constitute him King. Then the Counties and Corporations may make voyd all the Commissions gi­ven to the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Commons, and send others in their place, and repeal their Orders, therefore Buchanan saith, that Orders and Lawes in Parliament were but [...] pre­paratorie consultationis, and had not the force of a Law, till the peo­ple give their consent, and have their influence authoritative, upon the [Page 152] Statutes and Acts of Parliament. But the observator holdeth that the legislative power is whole and intire in the Parliament. But when the Scots were preferring Petitions and Declarations, they put all power in the collective body, and kept their distinct tables. Ans. There is no consequence here, the Counties and Incorporations that send Com­missioners to Parliament, may make voyd their Commissions and anull their Acts, because they constitute them Commissioners; if they be unjust acts, they may disobey them, and so disanull them, but it is presumed God hath given no morall power to doe ill, nor can the Counties and Corporations give any such power to evill, for they have not any such from God, if they be just acts,The people cannot make a­way their po­wer to the King irrevocably they are to obey them, and cannot retract Commissions to make just Orders. Illud tantum possumus quod jure possumus, and therefore as power to governe justly is irrevocably committed by the three estates who made the King, to the King, so is that same power committed by the Shires and Corporations to their Commissio­ners, to decree in Parliament, what is just and good irrevocably▪ and to take any just power from the King which is his due, is a great sin; but when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, it is lawfull to throw a sword out of a mad-mans hand, though it be his owne proper sword, and though he have due right to it, and a just power to use it for good, for all fiduciary power a­bused may be repealed; and if the Knights and Burgesses of theThe people may resume the power they gave to Com­missioners of Parliament, when they a­buse that power. House of Commons abuse their fiduciary power to the destruction of these Shires and Corporations, who put the trust on them, the observator did never say that Parliamentary power was so intire and irrevocably in them, as that the people may not resist them, anull their Commissions, and rescind their acts, and denude them of fidu­ciary power, even as the King may be denuded of that same power by the three estates, for particular Corporations are no more to be de­nuded of that fountain-power of making Commissioners, and of the self preservation, then the three estates are. 2. The P. Prelate com­meth not home to the mind of Buchanan, who knew the fundamental Lawes of Scotland, & the power of Parliaments, for his meaning was not to deny a legislative power in the Parliament, but when he cal­leth their Parliamentary declarations [...] his mea­ningBuchanan not understood by the P. P. is only that which Lawyers and Schoole-men both say, Leges non promulgatae non habent vim legis actu completo obligatoriae, Lawes not promulgated doe not oblige the subject while they be promulgated, [Page 153] but he falsifies Buchannan, when he saith, Parliamentary Lawes must have the authoritative influence of the people, before they can be formall Lawes, or any more then [...] or preparatoryTables lawfull when the se­cret Counsell is corrupted, and Parlia­ments are denyed. 6 Rep. Barc. l. 4. conc. Monarcho. c. 11 pag. 27. notions. And it was no wonder, when the King denyed a Parlia­ment, and the supreme Senate of the secret Counsell was corrup­ted, then that the people did set up Tables, and extraordinary ju­dicatures of the three estates, seeing there could not be any other government for the time.

6. Barclay answereth to that, The meane is inferiour to the end, it holdeth not, the Tutor and Curator is for the minor, as for the end, and given for his good; but it followeth not that therefore the Tutor in the administration of the minor or Pupils inheritance is not superiour to the minor. Ans. 1. It followeth well that the Minor virtu­ally, and in the intention of the Law is more excellent then the Tu­tor, though the Tutor can exercise more excellent acts then the Pupill, by accident, for defect of age in the Minor, yet he doth ex­ercise those acts with subordination to the Minor, and with cor­rection, because he is to render an account of his doings to the Pu­pill comming to age: so the Tutor is only more excellent, and supe­riour in some respect, [...] but not simply, and so is the King in some respect above the people.

The P. Prelate beggeth from the Royalists another of our Ar­guments,7. Rep. Saer. sanc. Mai. c. 13. p. 130. stolen out of Arnisaeus de jure Majest. cap. 3. n. [...]. pag. 34. Quod efficit tale, est magis tale. That which maketh ano­ther such, is farre more such it selfe; if the people give Royall Power to the King, then farre more is the Royall Power in the people. By this (saith the Prelate) it shall follow if the observator give all his goods to me, to make me rich, the observator is more rich; if the people give most part of their goods to foment the Rebellion, then the people are more rich, having given all they b [...]ve upon the Publicke Faith. Ans. 1. This greedy Prelate was made richer then ten poore Pur­sevants, by a Bishopricke, it will follow well; ergo the Bishopricke is richer then the Bishop, whose goods the curse of God blasteth. 2. It holdeth in efficient causes, so working in other things as the vertue of the effect remaineth in the cause, even after the producti­on of the effect. As the Sunne maketh all things light, the Fire all things hot, therefore the Sun is more light, the Fire more hot; but where the cause doth alienate and make over, in a corporall man­ner, that which it hath to another, as the hungry Prelate would have the Observators goods, it holderh not; for the effect may [Page 154] exhaust the vertue of the cause, but the people doth, as the fountaine,Quod ofsicit [...]ale, &c. hold­eth when the agent maketh not away all its vertue by alic­nation. derive a streame of Royalty to Saul, and make him King, and yet so as they keepe Fountain-power of making Kings in themselves; yea when Saul is dead to make David King at Hebron, and when he is dead to make Solomon King, and after him, to make Rehoboam King: and therefore in the people there is more fountaine power of making Kings then in David, in Saul, in any King of the world; as for the Prelates jeere about the peoples giving of their goods to the good cause, I hope it shall by the blessing of God inrich them more, whereas Prelates by the Rebellion in Ireland (to which they assent, when they counsell His Majesty to sell the blood of some hundred thousands of innocents killed in Ireland) are brought from thou­sands a yeare, to begg a morsell of bread.

The Prelate answereth that Maxime, Quod efsicit tale, id ipsum8. Rep. Sacr. sanc. Mai. pag. 131. est magis tale. That which maketh another such, it is it selfe more such. It is true, De principio formali effectivo (as I learned in the Ʋni­versity) of such an Agent as is formally such in it selfe, as is the effect produced. Next, it is such as is effective and productive of it selfe, as when fire heateth cold water, so the quality must be formally inherent in the Agent, as Wine maketh drunke, it followeth not, Wine is more drunke, because Drunkennesse is not inherent in the Wine, nor is it capa­ble of drunkennesse; and therefore Aristotle qualifieth the Maxime with this, Quod efficit tale est magis tale, modo utrique insit. And it holdeth not in Agents, who operate by donation, if the right of the King be transferred from the people to the King. The donation devest­eth the people totally of it, except the King have it by way of loane, which to my thinking, never yet any spoke—Soveraignty never was, never can be in the Community; Soveraignty hath power of life and death, which none hath over himselfe, and the community conceived without government, all as equall, endowed with Natures and native liberty, of that community can have no power over the life of another. And so the Argument may be turned home, if the people be not tales, such by nature (as hath formally Royall power, he should say) they cannot give the King Royall Power. Also none hath power of life and death either eminenter or formally, the people either singly or col­lectively have not power over their owne life, much lesse over their neighbours.

Ans. 1. The Prelate would make the maxime true of a for­mall cause, and this he learned in the University of St. Andrewes, [Page 155] he wrongeth the University, he rather learned it while he kept thePropter quod unumquod (que) &c. not under­stood by the P. P. Calves of Craile, the wall is white from whitenesse, ergo whitenesse is more white by the Prelates learning; never such thing was taught in that learned University. 2. Principium formale effectivum is as good Logick, as principium effectivum materiale, formale, finale. The Prelate is in his acuracy of Logick now, he yet maketh the causality of the formall cause all one with the causality of the efficient, but he is weake in his Logicks. 3. He confoundeth a cause equivocall, and a cause univocall, and in that case the Maxime hol­deth not. Nor is it necessary to make true the maxime, that the qua­lity be inherent in the cause, the same way. For a City maketh a Major, but to be a Major is one way in the City, and another way in him who is created Major; and the Prelates Maxime would helpe him, if we reasoned thu [...]: The people maketh the King, ergo the people is more a King, and more formally a Soveraigne then the King. But that is no more our Argument, then the simile that Maxwell used, as neere heart and mouth both. Wine maketh drunk the Pre­late, ergo Wine is more drunk. But we reason this, the Fountaine­power of making six Kings is in the people, ergo there is more fountain-power of Royalty in the people then in any one King; for we read that Israel made Saul King, and made David King, and made Abimelech King; but never that King Saul made another King, or that an earthly King made another Absolute King. 4. The Prelate will have the Maxime false, where the Agent worketh by do­nation, which yet holdeth true by his owne grant, c. 9. pag. 98. The King giveth power to a Deputy, ergo there is more power in the King. 5. He supposeth that which is the Basis and foundation of all the question, that people devesteth themselves totally of their Foun­taiue power, which is most false. 6. Either they must devest them­selves totally (saith he) of their power, or the King hath power from the people, by way of loane, which to my thinking never any yet spake. But the P. Prelates thinking is short, and no rule to Divines and Lawyers, for to the thinking of the learnedst Jurists this power of the King is but fiduciary, and that is (whether the Prelate thinke it, or thinke it not) a sort of power by trust, pawn'd or loane. Rex di­rector The King hath Soveraignty by loane and i [...] trust. Regni, non proprietarius, Molinae. in consuet. Parisi. Tit. 1. 9. 1. Glos. 7. n. 9. The King is a life-renter, not a Lord, or proprieter of his Kingdome. So Novel. 85. in princip. &c. 18. Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator & defensor jurium regni, non proprietarius, con­stat [Page 156] ex eo quodnon posset alienare imperium, oppida, urbes, regionésve, velres subditorum, bon [...]ve regni. So Gregory, l. 3. c. 8. de Repub. per c. 1. Sect. praeterea, de propo. feud. Hottoman. quest. illust. 1. Ferdinan▪ Vasquez. l. 1. c. 4. Bossius de princip. & privileg. illius, n. 290. The King is only a steward, and a defender of the lawes of the Kingdome, not a proprietor, because he hath not power to make away the Impire, Cities, Townes, Countries, and goods of the Subjects: and, bona com­missa Magistratui, sunt subjecta restitutioni, & in prejudtcium suc­cessorum alienari non possunt, per l. ult. Sect▪ sed nost. C. Comment. de leg. l. peto 69. fratrem de leg. 2. l. 32. ult. d. t. All the goods committed▪ to any Magistrate, are under Restitution: for he hath not power to make them away to the prejudice of his successors. The Prelates thoughts reach not the secrets of Jurists, and therefore he speaketh with a warrant; he will say no more then his short-travel'd thoughts can reach; and that is but at the doore. 7▪ Soveraigntie is not Soveraigntie how in the Communitie, how not. in the Communitie (saith the P. Prelate.) Truly it neither is, nor can be, more then ten, or a thousand, or a thousand thousands, or a whole Kingdome can be one man; for Soveraigntie is the abstract, the Soveraigne is the concrete: Many cannot be one King or one Soveraigne: a Soveraigne must be essentially one; and a multitude cannot be one: but what then? may not the Soveraigne power be eminently, fontaliter; originallp and radically in the people? I thinke it may, and must be, A King is not an under-Iudge, he is not a Lord of Councell or Session formally, because he is more: The people is not King formally, because the people is eminently more then the King; for they make David King, and Saul King. And the power to make a Lord of Councell aud Session, is in the King (say Royalists.) 8. A Communitie hath not power of life and death. A King hath power of life and death, (saith the Prelate) What then? ergo, a Com­munitie is not King. I grant all. But (poore man!) Ergo, the power of making a King, who hath power of life and death, is not in the people. It is like Prelates logick. Samuel is not a King; ergo, he cannot make David a King. It followeth not, by the Prelates ground. So the King is not an in inferiour Iudge: What? ergo, Power of life and death, how in the Com­munitie. he cannot make an inferiour Iudge. 9. The power of life and death is eminently and virtually in the people, collectively taken▪ though not formally. And though no man can take away his own life, or hath power over his own life formally; yet a man, and a body of men hath power over their own lives, radically and virtually; in [Page 157] respect they may render themselves to a Magistrate, and to Lawes, which if they violate, they must be in hazard of their lives, and so they virtually have power of their own lives, by putting them un­der the power of good lawes for the peace and safety of the whole. 10. This is a weake consequence: None hath power of his owne life, Ergo, far lesse of his neighbours (saith the Prelate.) I shall de­nie the consequence. The King hath not power of his own life, that is, according to the Prelates mind, he can neither by the law of na­ture, nor by any Civill law. kill himselfe: Ergo, the King hath far lesse power to kill another. It followeth not: for the Iudge hath more power over his neighbours life, then over his own. 11. But, saith the P. Prelate, The Communitie conceived without government, A Communi­tie of it selfe, wanting Ru­lers, is a Poli­tique body, and how. all as equall, endowed with natures and native libertie, hath no power of life and death, because all a [...]e borne free, and so none is borne with dominion and power over his neighbours life. Yea but so, Mr. P. Prelate, a King considered without government, and as born a free man, hath not power of any mans life, more then a Commu­nitie hath: for King and Begger are borne both alike free. But a Communitie in this consideration, as they come from the wombe, have no Politique consideration at all. If you consider them as with­out all policie, you cannot consider them as invested with policie: yea if you consider them so as they are by nature, voyd of all poli­cie, they cannot so much as adde their after-consent and approbati­on to such a man to be their King, whom God immediately from heaven maketh a King: for to adde such an after-consent, is an act of government. Now as they are conceived to want all government, they cannot performe any act of government. And this is as much against himselfe, as against us.

2. The power of a part, and the power of the whole is not alike, Royaltie never advanceth the King above the place of a member: And Lawyers say, The King is above the subjects, in sensu diviso, in a divisive sense he is above this or that subject: but he is inferiour to all the subjects collectively taken, because he is for the whole Kingdome, as a meane for the end. Object. If this be a good reason, that he is a meane for the whole Kingdome, as for the end; that he is therefore inferiour to the whole Kingdome: then is he also inferior to any one subject; for he is a meane for the safety of every subject, as for the whole Kingdome. Answ. Every meane is inferior to its com­pleat, adequate and whole end: and such an end is the whole King­dome [Page 158] in relation to the King: but every man is not alwayes inferi­our to its incompleat, inadequate and partiall end. This or that sub­ject is not adequate, but the inadequate and incompleat end in re­lation to the King. The Prelate saith, Kings are Dii Elohim, Gods;Sacr. sanc. maj. c. 4. p. 43. and the manner of their propagation is by filiation, by adoption, sonnes of the most high, and Gods first borne. Now the first borne is not above every brother severally: but if there were thousands, millions, number­lesse The propaga­tion of Kings is by filiati­on, saith the P. P. A speech that hath nei­ther sense nor reason. Filiati­on is later then propagation: one must be propagated ere he be a sonne. numbers, he is above all in precedencie and power. Answ. Not only Kings, but all inferiour Iudges are Gods, Psal. 82. God standeth in the congregation of the Gods, that is not a congregation of Kings. So Exo. 22. 8. the master of the house shall be brought, [...] to the Gods, or to the Judges. And that there were more Iudges then one, is cleare by vers. 9. and if they shall condemne [...] jar­shignur, condemnarint, Joh. 10. 35. [...], He called them Gods. Exod. 4. 16. Thou shalt be to Aaron [...] as a God. They are Gods analogically only. God is infinite, not so the King. 2. Gods will is a law, not so the Kings. 3. God is an end to himselfe, not so the King. The Iudge is but God by office, and representation, and conservation of the people. 2. It is denyed that the first-borne is in power before all his brethren, though there were millions. That is but said. One, as one, is inferior to a multitude: as the first-borne was a Politick Ruler to his brethren, he was inferiour to them po­litically.

Object. 3. The collective Vniversitie of a Kingdome are sub­jects, sonnes, and the King their father, no lesse then this or that sub­ject is the Kings subject. For the universitie of Subjects are either the King, or the King subjects: for all the kingdome must be one of these two; but they are not the King, Ergo, they are his subjects.

Answ. All the Kingdome in any consideration is not either King or Subjects. I give a third: The Kingdome collective is nei­ther properly King nor Subject: but the Kingdome embodied in a State, having collaterall or coordinate power with the King.

Object. 4. The universitie is ruled by lawes, Ergo, they are inferior to the King who ruleth all by law.

Answ. The Universitie properly is no otherwise ruled by lawes, then the King is ruled by lawes. The Universitie formally is the compleat Politick body, indued with a nomothetick facultie, which cannot use violence against it selfe, and so is not properly under a Law.

QUEST. XX. Whether or no inferiour Judges be univocally and essentially Judges, and the immediate Vicars of God, no lesse then the King, or if they be onely the Deputies and Vicars of the King?

IT is certain that in one and the same Kingdom, the power of the King is more in extension, then the power of any inferiour Iudge: but if these powers of the King, and the inferiour Iudges differ intenfivè and in spece, and nature, is the question, though it be not all the question.

Assert. Inferiour Iudges are no lesse essentially Iudges, and the immediate Vicars of God, then the King. 1. These who judge inInferiour Iudges no lesse Gods imme­diate Vicars then the King. the room of God, and exercise the judgement of God, are essential­ly Iudges, and the Deputies of God, as well as the King: but in­feriour Iudges are such. Ergo, The proposition is clear, the formall reason, why the King is univocally and essentially a Iudge is, because the Kings throne is the Lords throne, 1 Chron. 29. 23. And Solomon sate on the throne of the Lord, as King, instead of David his father, 1 King. 1. 13. It is called Davids throne, because the King is the Deputy of Iehovah, and the judgement is the Lords: I prove the assumption. Inferiour Iudges appointed by King Iehoshaphat have this place, 2 Chro. 19. 6. The King said to the Iudges, Take heed what ye do, [...], for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord: then they were Deputies in the place of the Lord, and not the Kings Deputies in the formall and officiall acts of judging. 7. Wherefore now let the fear of the Lord be upon you, take heed and do it, for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, or taking of gifts.

Hence I argue, If the Holy Ghost in this good King, forbid in­riour Judges wresting of judgement, respecting of persons, and taking of gifts, because the judgement is the Lords; and if the Lord him­self were on the Bench, he would not respect persons, nor take gifts; then he presumeth, that inferiour Iudges are in the stead and place of Jehovah: and that when these inferiour Iudges should take gifts, they make (as it were) the Lord, whose place they represent, to take gifts, and to do iniquitie, and to respect persons: but that the holy Lord cannot do. 2. If the inferiour Iudges in the act of judging, were the Vicars, and Deputies of King Jehoshaphat, he would have said, Judge righteous judgement; Why? For the judge­ment [Page 160] is mine, and if I the King were on the Bench, I would not re­spect persons, nor take gifts; and you judge for me the supreme Judge, as my Deputies: but the King saith, They judge not for man, but for the Lord. 3. If by this they were not Gods immediate Vicars, but the Vicars and Deputies of the King, then being meer servants, the King might command them to pronounce such a sentence, and not such a sentence as I may command my servant and deputy, in so far, as he is a servant and deputie, to say this, and say not this: but the King cannot limit the conscience of the inferiour Iudge, because the judgement is not the Kings, but the Lords. 4. The King cannot command any other to do that, as King; for the doing whereof, he hath no power from God himself, but the King hath no power from God to pronounce what sentence he pleaseth, because the judgement is not his own, but Gods: And though inferiour Iudges be sent of The consci­ence of the in­feriour Iudge is immediate­ly subordinate to God, not to the King either mediately, or immedia [...]ely. the King, and appointed by him to be Iudges, and so have their externall call from Gods deputy, the King; yet because judging is an act of conscience, as one mans conscience cannot properly be a deputy for another mans conscience, so neither can an inferior Iudge, as a Iudge, be a deputy for a King: therefore the inferiour Iudges have designation to their office from the King; but if they have from the King, that they are Iudges, and be not Gods deputies, but the Kings, they could not be commanded to execute judgement for God, but for the King: and Deut. 1. 17. Moses appointed Iudges, but not as his deputies to judge and give sentence, as subordinate to Moses: For the judgement (saith he) is the Lords, not mine. 6. IfGrotius de jure Belli & pac. l. 1. c. 4. Nam omnis facultas gubernandi in Magistratibus, summae potestati ita subjicitur ut quicquid contra voluntatem summi imperan­tis faciant, id defectum sit [...]a facultate, ac proinde de proactu privato habendum. all the inferiour Iudges in Israel, were but the deputies of the King, and not immediately subordinate to God, as his deputies, then could neither inferiour Iudges be admonished, nor condemned in Gods word for unjust judgement, because their sentence should be nei­ther righteous, nor unrighteous judgement, but in so far, as the King should approve it, or disapprove it; and indeed, that Royalist Hugo Grotius saith so, That an inferiour Iudge can do nothing against the will of the supreme Magistrate, if it be so: When ever God com­mandeth inferiour Iudges to execute righteous judgement, it must have this sense, Respect not persons in judgement, except the King command you, crush not the poor, oppresse not the fatherlesse, except the King command you. I understand not such policie: Sure I am, The Lords commandments, rebukes, and threats, oblige in conscience the inferiour Iudge as the superiour, as is manifest in these Scrip­tures, [Page 161] Jerem. 5. 1. Isai. 1. 17, 21. and 5. 7. and 10. 2. and 59. 14. Jere. 22. 3. Ezek. 18. 8. Amos 5. 7. Micah 3. 9. Habak. 1. 4. Le­vit. 19. 15. Deut. 17. 11. and 1. 17. Exod. 23. 2.

Grotius saith, It is here as in a Categorie: the middle Spece is in Grotius ibi. spe­cies intermedia, si genus respici­as, [...]st species, si speciem infra positam, est ge­nus: ita magi­stratus illi, infe­riorum quidem ratione habita sunt publicae, personae, at sup­per [...]ores si con­siderentur, sunt privati. respect of the Superiour a Spece, in respect of the inferiour a Genus; so inferiour Magistrates in relation to these who are inferiour to them, and under them, they are Magistrates or publike persons, but in relati­on to superiour Magistrates, especially the King, they are private per­sons, and not Magistrates.

Answ. Jehoshaphat esteemed not Iudges appointed by himself private men, 2 Chron. 19. 6, 7. Yee judge not for men, but for the Lord. 2. We shall prove, that under Iudges are powers ordained of God. 3. In Scotland the King can take no mans inheritance from him, because he is King: But if any man possesse Lands belonging to the Crown, the King by his Advocate must stand before the Lord-Iudges of the Session, and submit the matter to the Laws of the Land; and if the King for propertie of Goods, were not under a Law, and were not to acknowledge Iudges as Iudges, I see not how the subject in either Kingdoms have any proprietie. 4. I judge it blasphemie to say, That a sentence of an inferiour Iudge must be no sentence, though never so legall, nor just, if it be contrary to the Kings will, as Grotius saith.

He citeth that of Augustine: If the Consul command one thing,Grot. 16. and the Emperour another thing, you contemn not the power, but you choose to obey the highest: Peter saith, He will have us one way to be subject to the King, as to the supreme, sine ulla exceptione, without any exception, but to these who are sent by the King, as having their power from the King.

Answ. When the Consull commandeth a thing lawfull, and the King that same thing lawfull, or a thing not unlawfull, we are to obey the King, rather then the Consull: so I expone Augustine. 2. We are not to obey the King and the Consull the same way, thatInferiour Judges truely Judges in re­lation to the King. is with the same degree of reverence and submission; for we owe more submission of spirit to the King, then to the Consul; but magis & minus non variant speciem, more or lesse varieth not the natures of things: but if the meaning be that we are not to obey the in­feriour Iudge commanding things lawfull, if the King command the contrary, this is utterly denyed: But saith Grotius, The inferiour Judge is but the Deputie of the King, and hath all his power from him; [Page 162] therefore we are to obey him for the King. Answ. The inferiour Iudge may be called the Deputy of the King, (where it is the Kings place to make Iudges) because he hath his externall call from the King, and is Iudge, in foro Soli, in the name and authority of theThe inferiour judge, how the Deputy of the King. King; but being once made a Iudge in foro poli, before God, he is as essentially a Iudge, and in his officiall acts no lesse immediately subjected to God, then the King himself.

Argum. 2. These powers to whom we are to yield obedience, because they are ordained of God; these are as essentially Iudges, as the supreme Magistrate the King; but inferiour Iudges are such. Ergo, Inferiour Iudges are as essentially Iudges, as the supreme Magistrate. The proposition is Rom. 13. 1. For that is the Apostles Arguments; whence we prove, Kings are to be obeyed, because they are powers from God: I prove the assumption. Inferiour Ma­gistrates are powers from God, Deut. 1. 17. and 19. 6, 7. Exod. 22. 7. Jere. 5. 1. and the Apostle saith, The powers that are, are ordained of God.

3. Christ testified, that Pilate had power from God as a Iudge (say Royalists) no lesse then Caesar the Emperour, Iohn 19. 11. and 1 Pet. 2. 12. We are commanded to obey the King, and these that are sent by him, and that for the Lords sake, and for conscience to God,Inferiour Iud­ges powers ordained of God. Rebuked for perverting judgement. and Rom. 13. 5. We must be subject to all powers that are of God, not onely for wrath, but for conscience.

4. These, who are rebuked, because they execute not just judge­ment, as well as the King, are supposed to be essentially Iudges, as well as the King; but inferiour Iudges are rebuked, because of this, Ierem. 22. 15, 16, 17. Ezek. 45. 9, 10, 11, 12. Zeph. 3. 3. Amos 5. 6, 7. Eccles. 3. 16. Micah 3. 2, 3, 4. Jerem. 5. 31. Ierem. 5. 1.

5. He is the Minister of God for good, and hath the sword not in They are the Ministers of God. vain, but to execute vengeance on the evil doers; no lesse then the King, Rom. 13. 2, 3, 4. He to whom agreeth, by an Ordinance of God, the specifick acts of a Magistrate, he is essentially a Magi­strate.

6. The resisting of the inferiour Magistrate in his lawfull com­mandmen [...]s,To resist them is to resist God. is the resisting of Gods Ordinance, and a breach of the fifth Commandment, as is disobedience to parents, and not to give him tribute, and fear, and honour, is the same transgression, Rom. 13. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

[Page 163]7. These stiles of Gods, of Heads of the people, of Fathers, of Physi­cians, and healers of the sonnes of the most High, of such as Raign and Decree by the wisdome of God, &c. that are given to Kings, for the which Royalists make Kings onely Iudges, and all inferiour Iudges, but deputed, and Iudges by participation, and at the second hand, or given to inferiour Iudges, Exod. 22. 8, 9. Ioh. 10. 35. TheseThey are Gods who are appointed Iudges under Moses, Deut. 1. 16. are called in Hebrew or Chaldee, 1 Kings 8. 1, 2. Chap. 5. 2. Mic. 3. 1. Iosh. 23. 2. Num. 1. 16. [...] rasce, [...] fathers, Act. 7. 2. Iosh. 14. 1. c. 19. 51. 1 Chro. 8, 28. Healers, Esai. 3. 7. Gods, and sonnes of the most High, Psal. 82. 1. 2. 6. 7. Prov, 8. 16, 17. I much doubt, if Kings can infuse Godheads in their Subjects. I conceive they have from the God of Gods these gifts, whereby they are inhabled to be Iudges, and that Kings may appoint them Iudges, but can do no more, they are no lesse essentially Iudges then themselves.

8. If inferiour Iudges be Deputies of the King, not of God, and have all their authority from the King, then may the King limit the practise of these inferiour Iudges. Say that an inferiour Iudge hath condemned to death an Paricide, and he be conveying him to the place of execution, the King commeth with a force to rescue him out of his hand, if this inferiour Magistrate beare Gods sword for the terrour of ill doers, and to execute Gods vengeance on mur­therers, he cannot but resist the King in this, which I judge to be his Office: for the inferiour Iudge is to take vengeance on ill doers, and to use the coactive force of the sword, by vertue of his Office, to take away this Paracide, now if he be the Deputy of the King, he is not to breake the jawes of the wicked, Iob 29. 17. not to take venge­ance By this the Parliame nt of both King­domes ought to put to death cut-rhroat-▪ Cavaliers [...]ai­sing warre a­gainst the sub­ject, though the King com­mands the contrary. Sac. Sanc. mai. c. 4. pag. 46. on evill doers, Rom. 13. 4. nor to execute judgement on the wicked, Ps. 149, 9. nor to execute judgment for the fatherlesse, De. 10. 18. ex­cept a mortall man his Creator, the King say, Amen. Now truly then God, in all Israel, was to rebuke no inferiour Iudge for perverting judgement, As he doth, Exod. 23. 2. 6. Mic. 3. 2, 3, 4. Zach. 3. 3. Numb. 25. 5. Deut. 1. 16. For the King onely is Lord of the conscience of the inferiour Iudge, who is to give sentence, and execute sentence righ­teously upon condition, that the King the onely univocall and pro­per Iudge, first, decree the same, as Royalists teach.

Heare our Prelate: How is it imaginable that Kings can be said to Iudge in Gods place, and not receive the power from God? but Kings Iudge in Gods place, Deut. 1. 17. 2 Chro. 19. 6. Let no man stumble, [Page 164] (this is his Prolepsis) at this, that Moses in the one place, and Iehosa­phat in the other speake to subordinate Iudges under them, this weake­neth no waies our Argument, for it is a ruled case in Law; Quod quis facit per alium, facit per se; all Iudgements of inferiour Iudges are in the name, authority, and by the power of the supreme, and are but com­municatively, and derivatively from the Soveraigne power.

Ans. How is it possible that inferiour Iudges, Deut. 1. 17. 2. Chron. 19. 6. can be said to judge in Gods place, and not receive the power from God immediatly, without any consent or covenant of men? So the Prelate. But inferiour Iudges judge in the Gods place, as both the P. Prelate and Scripture teach, Deut. 1. 17. 2. Chro. 19. 6. Let the Prelate see to the stumbling conclusion, for so he feareth it proves to his bad cause. 2. He saith the places, Deut. 1. 17. 2 Chro. 19. 6. prove that the King judgeth in the Roome of God, because their Deputies judge in the place of God. The Prelate may know, we would deny this stumbling and lame consequence; for 1. Moses and Iehosaphat are not speaking to themselves, but to other inferi­our Iudges, who doth publickly exhort them. Moses and Iehosaphat are perswading the regulation of the personall actions of other men, who might pervert Iudgement. 2. The Prelate is much upon his Law, after he had forsworne the Gospell, and Religion of theHow the King judgeth by in­feriour Iudges. Church, where he was baptized. What the King doth by another, that he doth by himselfe; but were Moses and Jehosaphat feared that they should pervert Iudgement in the unjust Sentence pronoun­ced by under Iudges, of which Sentence they could not know any thing? And doe inferiour Iudges so judge in the name, authority, and power of the King, as not in the Name, Authority and Power of the Lord of Lords, and King of Kings? or is the Iudgement the Kings? no, the Spirit of God saith no such matter, the Iudgement executed by those inferiour Iudges, is the Lords, not a mortall Kings, ergo a mortall King may not hinder them to execute Iudgement. Obj. He cannot suggest an unjust Sentence, and command an inferi­our Iudge to give out a sentence absolvatory on cut-throates, but he may hinder the exocution of any sentence against Irish cut-throates, Ans. It is all one to hinder the execution of a just sentence, and to suggest or command the inferiour Iudge to pronounce an unjust one, for inferiour Iudges by conscience of their Office, are both to judge righteously, and by force and power of the sword given to them of God, Rom. 13. 2, 3, 4. to execute the sentence, and so God [Page 165] hath commanded inferiour Iudges to execute Iudgement, and hath forbidden them to wrest Iudgement, to take gifts, except the King Command them so to doe.

Master Symmont, The King is by the Grace of God, the inferiour Simmons loyall subjects beleif. Sect. 1. pag. 3. Iudge is Iudge by the grace of the King, even as the man is the image of God, and the woman the mans image▪ Ans. This distinction is neither true in Law, nor conscience; not in Law, for it distingui­sheth not betwixt Ministros regis, & ministros regni. The servants of the King are his domesticks, the Iudges are Ministri regni, non regis; the Ministers and Iudges of the Kingdome, not of the King. The King doth not show grace, as he is a man, in making such a man a Iudge, but Iustice as a King, by a Royall Power received from the people, and by an Act of Iustice, he makes Iudges of deserving men, he should neither for favour, nor bribes make any Iudge in the Land. 2. It is the grace of God that men are to be advancedThe honour of an inferiour Iudge com­meth neither from East, nor from West, more then from the King. from a private condi [...]ion to be inferious Iudges, as Royall Dignity is a free gift of God, 1 Sam. 2. 7. The Lord bringeth low, and lifteth up, Ps. 75. 7. God pu [...]t [...]th downe one, and seteth up another. Court flat­terers take from God, and give to Kings; but to be a Iudge inferi­our, is no lesse an immediate favour of God, then to be King; though the one be a greater favour then the other. Magis honos, and Ma­joc honos are to be considered.

9. Arg. Those powers which differ gradually, and per magis & Argu. 9. Power of Kings and of inferiour Iud­ges differ gra­dually, not spe­cifically. minus, by more and lesse only, differ not in nature and spece, and constitute not Kings and inferiour Iudges different univocally. But the power of Kings and inferiour Iudges are such, there­fore Kings and Inferiour Iudges differ not univocally. That the powers are the same in nature, I prove 1. by the specifice acts, and formall object of the power of both, for 1. both are pow­er ordained of God, Rom. 13. 1. to resist either, is to resist the ordi­nance of God, v. 2. both are by Office a terrour to evill workes, v. [...]3.The specifick acts and for­mall object of Kings and in­feriour Iudges are the same. 3. both are the Ministers of God for good. 2. Though the King send and give a call to the inferiour Iudge, that doth no more make the inferiour Iudges powers in nature and spece different, then Mini­sters of the Word called by Ministers of the Word, have Of­fices different in nature. Timotheus Office to be Preacher of the Word differeth not in specie, from the Office of the Presbytery, which layed hands on him, though their Office by extension, be more then Timothies Office. 3. The peoples power is put forth in [...] [Page 164] [...] [Page 165] [Page 166] those same acts, when they choose one to be their King and supreame Governour, and when they set up an Aristocraticall Government, and choose many, or more then one, to be their Governours▪ for the formall object of one or many Governours is Iustice and Religion, as they are to be advanced. 2. The forme and manner of their op­peration is, brachio seculari, by a coactive power, and by the sword. 3. The formall acts of King and many Iudges in Aristocracy, are these same, the defending of the poore and needy from violence, the conservation of a Community in a peaceable and a godly life, The same ob­ligation of con­science that ly­eth on the King in all things, lyeth on the inferi­our Iudge. 1 Tim. 2. 2 Iob 29. 12, 13. Esay 1. 17. 4. These same Lawes of God that regulateth the King in all His Acts of Royall Govern­ment, and tyeth and obligeth his conscience, as the Lords Deputy to execute Iudgement for God, and not in the stead of men, in Gods Court of Heaven, doth in like manner tye, and oblige the conscience of Aristocraticall Iudges, and all inferiour Iudges, as is cleare and evident by these places, 1 Tim. 2. 2. not only Kings, but all in authority [...] are obliged to procure that their subjects leade a quiet and peaceable life, in all godlinesse and honesty. All in conscience are obliged, Deut. 1. 16. to judge righte­ously between every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with them. 17. Neither are they to respect persons in judgement, but are to heare the small as well as the great, nor to be affraid of the face of men, the judgement administred by all, is Gods. 2. Chro. 19. 6. All are obliged to feare God, Deut. 17. 19. 20. to keepe the words of the Law, not to be lifted up in heart above their brethren, Esay 1. 17. Ier. 22. 2, 3. Let any man show me a difference according to Gods Word, but in the extention that what the King is to doe as a King in all the Kingdome, and whole Dominions, (if God give to him many) as he gave to David and Solomon, and Ioshua, that the inferiour Iudges are to doe in such and such Circuits, and limited places, and I quit the cause, so as the inferiour Iudges are little Kings, and the King a great and delated Iudge, as a compressed hand or fist, and the hand stretched out in fingers and thumbe, are one hand, so here. 4. God owneth inferiour Iudges as a congregation of Gods, Ps. 82. 1. 2. for that God sitteth in a congregation or Senate of Kings or Mo­narches I shall not beleeve, till I see Royalists shew to me a Common­wealth of Monarches convening in one Iudicature; all are equally called Gods, Ioh. 10. 35. Exod. 22. 8. if for any cause, but because all Iudges even inferiour are the immediate Deputies of the King of [Page 167] Kings, and their sentence in Iudgement as the sentence of the Iudge of all the earth, I shall be informed by the P. Prelate when he shall answer my reasons, if his interdicted Lordship may cast an eye to aInferiores Iu­dices sunt im­propriè Vicarii Regis, quoad missionem exter­nam ad officium, sed immediati Dei vicarii, quo­ad officium in quod missi sunt. Barcl. l. 2. contr. Monarchom. p. 56, 57. Arnisaeus de au­thorit. Princ. c. 3. [...]. 9. Marant. disp. 1. Zoan. tract. 3. de defens. Mynsin g. obs. 18. cent. 5. Symmons, sect. [...] p. 2. The Iudges of Israel, and the Kings after them, differed, but not essen­tially. poore Presbyter below, and as wisedome is that by which Kings raigne, Prov. 8. 15. so also v. 16. by which Princes Rule, and No­bles, even all the Iudges of the earth; all that is said against this is: That the King hath a Prerogative Royall, by which he is differen­ced from all Iudges in Israel, called jus regis [...] for (saith Bar­clay) The King as King essentially hath a Domination and power a­bove all, so as none can censure him, or punish him but God, because there be no thrones above his, but the throne of God. The Iudges of Israel, as Samuel, Gedeon, &c. had no domination, the dominion was in Gods hand. 2. Wee may resist an inferior Iudge (saith Arnisaeus) otherwise there were no appeale from him, and the wrong we suffer were irre­parable, as saith Marantius. And all the Iudges of the earth (saith Edw. Symmons) are from God more remotely, namely (mediante Rege) by the mediation of the Supreame, even as the lesser starres have their light from God by the mediation of the Sun. To the first I an­swer, There was a difference betwixt the Kings of Israel and their Iudges, no question: but if it be an essentiall difference, it is a question: for, 1. The Iudges were raised up in an extraordinary manner, out of any Tribe, to defend the people, and vindicate their libertie, God remaining their King: the King by the Lords appoint­ment was tyed, after Saul, to the Royall tribe of Judah, till the Messiahs comming. God tooke his own blessed libertie to set up a succession in the ten tribes- 2. The Iudges were not by succession from father to sonne: the Kings were, as I conceive, for the typi­call eternitie of the Messiahs throne, presignified to stand from ge­neration to generation. 3. Whether the Iudges were appointed by the election of the people, or no, some doubt, because Iepthah was so made Iudge: but I thinke it was not a law in Israel that it should be so: but the first mould of a King, Deut. 17. is by electi­on. But that God gave power of domineering, that is, of Tyran­nizing, to a King, so as he cannot be resisted, which he gave not to a Iudge, I thinke no Scripture can make good: For by what Scrip­ture can Royalists warrant to us that the people might rise in armes to defend themselves against Moses, Gideon, Eli, Samuel, and other Iudges, if they should have tyrannized over the people: and that it is unlawfull to resist the most Tyrannous King in Israel and Iudah? [Page 168] Yet Barclay and others must say this, if they be true to that principle of Tyranny, That the jus Regis, the law or manner of the King, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. & 1 Sam. 10. 25, doth essentially difference betwixt the Kings of Israel, and the Iudges of Israel: but we thinke God gave never any power of Tyranny to either Iudge or King of Israel; and domination in that sense was by God given to none of them. 2. Arnisaeus hath as little for him, to say the inferior Magi­strate may be resisted, because we may appeale from him: but the King cannot be resisted, quia sanctitas Majestatis id non permittit, the sanctitie of Royall majestie will not permit us to resist the King. Ans. That is not Pauls argument, to prove it unlawfull to resist Kings, as Kings, and doing their office, because of the sanctitie of their Majestie, that is, as the man intendeth, because of the supreme absolute and illimited power that God hath given him. But this is a begging of the question, and all one as to say, the King may not be resisted, because he may not be resisted: for sanctitie of Majestie, if we beleeve Royalists, includeth essentially an absolute supremacie of power, whereby they are above the reach of all thrones, lawes, powers, or resistance on Earth. But the Argument is, Resist not, be­cause the Power is of God. But the inferiour Magistrates power is of God. 2. Resist not, because you resist Gods ordinance, in resisting the Iudge: But the inferior Iudge is Gods ordinance, Rom. 13. 1. Deut. 1. 17. 2 Chro. 19. 6. 3. Mr. Symmons saith, all Iudges on earth are from the Kings, as starres have their light from the Sun. I an­swer, 1. Then Aristocracie were unlawfull, for it hath not its powerSacr. sanct. maj. c. 7. p. 81, 82. from Monarchie. Had the Lords of the Philistims, have the States of Holland no power but from a Monarchie? Name the Mo­narch. Have the Venetians any power from a King? Indeed our Prelate saith from Augustine, Confess. lib. 3. cap. 8. Generale pactum est societatis humana, obedire Regibus suis: It is an universall covenant of humane societie, and a dictate of nature, that men obey their Kings. I beg the favour of Sectaries (saith [...]he) to shew as much for Aristocracie and Democracie. Now all other governments to bellies borne at Court, are the inventions of men. But I can shew that same warrant for the one as for the other, because it is as well the dictate of nature, that People obey their Iudges and Rulers, as it is that they obey their Kings. And Austin speaketh of all Iudges, in that place, though he name Kings; for Kingly government is no more of the law of nature, then Aristocracie or Democracie: nor [Page 169] are any borne Iudges, or Subjects at all: There is a naturall apti­tude in all to either of these, for the conservation of nature, and that is all. Let us see that men naturally inclining to Government, in­clineNature is a [...] neare to Ari­stocracy as to Monarchy, for the wise cannot be under the husband, as a subject under a Monarch, she by the fift Commande­ment ha [...]h a joynt [...]headship with the husband. rather to Royall Government, then to any other. That the P. Prelate shall not be able to show. For fatherly government be­ing in two, is not Kingly, but nearer to Aristocracy; and when many families were on earth, every one independent within them­selves, if a commune enemy should invade a tract of Land governed by families, I conceive, by natures light they should incline to de­fend themselves, and to joyne in one politique body for their owne safety, as is most naturall; but in that case they having no King, and there were no reason of many fathers all alike loving their own families and selfe preservation, why one should be King over all, ra­ther then another, except by voluntary compact; so it is cleare that Nature is nearer to Aristocracy before this contract, then a Mo­narchy: and let him shew us in multitudes of families dwelling to­gether before there was a King, as cleare a warrant for Monarchy, as here is for Aristocracy, though to me both be lawdable and law­full ordinances of God, and the difference meerely accidentall, being one and the same power from the Lord, Rom. 13. 1. which is in di­vers subjects in one, as a Monarchy, in many as in Aristocracy, and the one is as naturall as the other: and the subjects are accidentall to the nature of the power. 2. The Starrs have no light at all, but in actuall aspect toward the Sun, and they are not lightsome bodies by the free will of the Sunne, and have no immediate light from God formally, but from the Sun, so as if there were no Sun, there should be no Starres. 3. for actuall shining and sending out of beames of light actusecundo, they depend upon the presence of the Sun, but forIudges inferi­our depend on the King, in fieri when the constitution▪ of the Kingdome is such, but not in facto esse nor in their essence. inferiour Iudges though they have their call from the King, yet have they gifts to governe from no King on earth, but only from the King of Kings. 4. When the King is dead the Iudges are Iudges, and they depend not on the King for their second acts of judging, and for the actuall emission and putting forth their beames and raies of justice, upon the poore and needy, they depend on no voluntary aspect, information or commandement of the King, but on that im­mediate subjection of their conscience to the King of Kings. And their Iudgement which they execute is the Lords immediatly, and not the Kings, and so the comparison halteth.

Arg. Our 10th. Arg. If the King dying, the Iudges inferiour re­maineArg. 10. [Page 170] powers from God, the Deputies of the Lord of Hoasts ha­ving their power from God, then are they essentially Iudges; yea and if the estates in their prime representators, and leaders, have power in the death of the King, to choose and make another King, then are they not Iudges and Rulers by derivation and participati­on,Inferiour Iudges, after the King is dead, as also the States of Par­liament remain Iudges. or unproperly, but the King is rather the Ruler by derivation and participation, then these who are called inferiour Iudges. Now if these Iudges depend in their Sentences upon the immediat will of him who is supposed to be the only Iudge, when this only Iudge dyeth, they should cease to be Iudges: for Expirante mandatore ex­pirat mandatum, because the Fountaine Iudge drying up, the streames must dry up. Now when Saul dyed, the Princes of the Tribes remaine by Gods institution Princes, and they by Gods Law and Warrant, Deut. 17. choose David their King.

11. If the King through absolute power doe not send inferiourArg. 11. Iudges, and constitute them, but only by a power from the people; and if the Lord have no lesse immediate influence in making inferi­our Iudges, then in making Kings, then is there no ground that theGod, not the absolute Prince, maketh the inferiour Iudges. King should be sole Iudge, and the inferiour Iudge only Iudge by derivation from him, and essentially his Deputy, and not the imme­diate Deputy of God. But the former is true, ergo so is the latter. And first that the Kings absolute Will maketh not inferiour Iudges, is cleare, from Deut. 1. 15. Moses might not follow his owne will in making inferiour Iudges whom he pleased: God tyed him to a Law, v. 13. that he should take wise men, known amongst the people, and fearing God, and hating covetousnesse. And these qualifications were not from Moses, but from God; and no lesse immediatly from God then the inward qualification of a King, Deut. 17. and therefore it is not Gods Law that the King may make inferiour Iudges only, Durante beneplacito, during his absolute will; for if these Divine qualifications remaine in the seventy Elders, Moses at his will could not remove them from their places. 2. That the King can make heritable Iudges more then he can communicate faculties and parts of judging, I doubt, riches are of fathers, but not promotion, whichNo heritable Iudges accor­ding to Gods Word. is from God, and neither from the East, nor the West. That our Nobles are borne Lords of Parliament, and Iudges by blood, is a positive Law. 3. It seemeth to me from Esay 3. 1, 2, 3, 4. that the inferiour Iudge is made by consent of the people, nor can it be cal­led a wronging of the King, that all cities and Burroughs of Scotland [Page 171] and England, have power to choose their owne Provests, Rulers, and Majors. 4. If it be warranted by God, that the lawfull Call of God to the Throne, be the election of the people, the call of inferi­our Iudges must also be from the people, mediatly or immediatly: So I see no ground to say that, the inferiour Iudge is the Kings Vicegerent, or that he is in respect of the King, or in relation to supreme Authority, only a private man.

12. These Iudges cannot but be univocally and essentially Iudges, no lesse then the King, without which in a Kingdome Iustice is Phy­sically unpossible: and Anarchie and violence and confusion must follow, if they be wanting in the Kingdome. But without inferiour Iudges, though there be a King, Iustice is Physically unpossible, and Anarchie and confusion must follow, &c.

Now this Argument is more considerable, that without inferiour Iudges, though there be a King in a Kingdome, Iustice and safety are unpossible, and if there be inferiour Iudges, though there be no King, as in Aristocracy, and when the King is dead, and another not Crowned, or the King is Minor, or absent, or a captive in the enemies Land, yet justice is possible, and the Kingdome preserved; the Medium of the Argument is grounded upon Gods Word, Num. 11. 14, 15. when Moses is unable alone to judge the peo­ple,Inferiour Iudges more necessary in a large Kingdom then the Kfng, and fo Aristo­cracy in that more sutable to the naturall end of govern­ment then Mo­narchy. seventy Elders re-joyned with him, 16. 17. so were the Elders adjoyned to helpe him, Exo. 24. 1. Deut. 5. 23. c. 22. 16. Iosh. 23. 2. Iudg. 8. 14. Iudg. 11. 5. Iudg. 11. [...]. 1 Sam. 11. 3. 1 King. 20. 7. 2 King. 6. 32. 2 Chro. 34. 29. Ruth 4. 4. Deut. 19. 12. Ezech. 8. 1 Lament. 1. 19. then were the Elders of Moab thought they had a King. 2. The end naturall of Iudges hath been indigence and weaknesse, because men could not in a society defend themselves from violence, therefore by the light of nature they gave their power to one, or more, and made a Iudge, or Iudges to obtaine the end of selfe preservation. But Nature useth the most efficacious meanes to obtaine its end, but in a great society and Kingdome the end is more easily attained by many Governours, then by one only; for where there is but one, he cannot minister Iustice to all, and the farther that the children are removed from their father and tutor, they are the nearer to violence and unjustice. Iustice should be at as easie a rate to the poore, as a draught of water▪ Samuel went yeare­ly through the Land to Bethell, Gilgall, Mizpeh, 1 Sam. 7. 16. and brought Iustice to the doores of the poore. So were our Kings of [Page 172] Scotland obliged to doe of old; but now justice is as deare as gold. it is not a good argument to prove inferior Iudges to be only Vi­cars and Deputies of the King, because the King may censure and punish them when they pervert judgement. 1. Because the King, in that, punisheth them not as Iudges, but as men. 2. That might prove all the Subjects to be Vicars and Deputies of the King▪, be­cause he can punish them all, in the case of their breach of lawes.

QUEST. XXI. What power the People and States of Parliament have over the King, and in the State?

IT is true, the King is the head of the Kingdome; but the States of the Kingdome are as the temples of the head, and so as essenti­allyPrincipes sunt▪ capitis tempora, Rex vertex. parts of the head, as the King is the crown of the head.

Assert. 1. These Ordines Regni, the States, have been in famous Nations: so there were fathers of families, and Princes of Tribes amongst the Jewes: The Ephori amongst the Lacedemonians, Polyb. hist. l. 6. The Senate amongst the Romanes: The forum Superbi­ense amongst the Arragonians: The Parliaments, in Scotland, Eng­land, France, Spaine. 2 Sam. 3. 17. Abner communed with the El­ders of Israel, to bring the King home. And there were Elders in Is­rael, both in the time of the Judges, and in the time of the Kings; who did not only give advice and counsell to the Judges and Kings, but also were Iudges, no lesse then the Kings, and Iudges; which I shall make good by these places: Deut. 21. 19. The rebellious Son isElders of a land joyntly in Parliament, must have as much, if not more, (vis uni­ta fortior)▪ then when they are divided in se­verall tribes, [...]ities, shires: but, divided, they are as es­sentially. Iudg­es, as the King. The whole must have more power in extension, then the part. Jer. 38. 25▪ they had power a­gainst the Kings will, to put Ieremiah to death. Iere­miah saith, Doe whatsoever see­meth good to you, v. 10. The power of conveening Parliaments, in the Estates, without the King. Ps. 122. 2, 3. Why are thrones set for judgement for all the tribes, if only the King judge. brought to the Elders of the Citie, who had power of life and death, and caused to stone him. Deut. 22. 18. The Elders of the Citie shall take that man, and chastise him. Iosh. 20. 4. But beside the Elders of every Citie, there were the Elders of Israel, and the Princes, who had al­so judiciall power of life and death, as the Iudges and King had. Josh. 22. 30. Even when Ioshua was Iudge in Israel, the Princes of the Congregation, and heads of the Thousands of Israel, did judicially cognosce whether the Children of Reuben, of Gad, and of halfe the tribe of Manasseh, were apostates from God, and the Religion of Israel. 2 Sam. 5. 3. All the Elders of Israel made David King at Hebron: and Num. 11. They are appointed by God not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses, but, v. 14, 17. to beare a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased. Jeremiah is accused, c. 26. 10. upon his life, before the Prin­ces, [Page 173] Iosh. 7 4. The Princes sit in judgement with Ioshua, Iosh. 9. 15. Ioshua and the Princes of the Congregation sware to the Gibeonites, that they would not kill them. The Princes of the house of Israel could not be rebuked for oppression in judgement, Mic. 3. 1, 2, 3. if they had not had power of judgement. So Zeph. 3. 3. And Deut. 1. 17. 2. Chron. 19. 6, 7. They are expresly made Iudges in the place of God. And 1 Sam. 8. 2. without advise or knowledge of Samuel the supreme Iudge, they conveene and ask a King: and without any head or superior, when there is no King, they conveene a Parlia­ment, and make David King at Hebron: And when David is ba­nished, they conveen to bring him home againe: when Tyrannous Athalia reigneth, they conveene and make Ioash King, and that without any King. And Iosh. 22. there is a Parliament conveened, and, for any thing we can read, without Ioshua, to take cognisance of a new Altar. It had been good that the Parliaments both of Scot­land, and of England, had conveened, though the King had not in­dicted and summoned a Parliament; without the King, to take or­der with the wicked Clergie, who had made many idolatrous Altars: And the P. Prelate should have brought an argument to prove it unlawfull, in foro Dei, to set up the Tables and Conventi­ons in our Kingdome, when the Prelates were bringing in the gros­sest idolatrie into the Church, a service for adoring of Altars, of Bread, the worke of the hand of the Baker; a God more corrupti­bleTables in Scot­land lawfull. then any god of silver and gold.

And against Achabs will and minde, 1 King 18, 19. Elias causeth to kill the Priests of Baal, according to Gods expresse law. It is true, it was extraordinary; but no otherwise extraordinary then it is at this day. When the supreme Magistrate will not execute the judge­ment of the Lord, Those who made him supreme Magistrate under God, who have, under God, soveraigne libertie to dispose of crownes and kingdomes, are to execute the judgement of the Lord, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. 1 Sam. 15. 32. so Samuel killed Hagage, whom the Lord expresly commanded to be killed; because Saul disobeyed the voyce of the Lord. I deny not but there is necessitie of a cleere warrant that the Magistrate neglect his duty, either in not conveening the States, or not executing the judgement of the Lord. 3. I see not how the conveening of a Parli­ament is extraordinarie to the States; for none hath power ordi­nary when the King is dead, or when he is distracted, or captive in [Page 174] another land, to conveene the Estates and Parliament, but they on­ly; and in their defect, by the law of Nature, the people may con­veene. But, 4. If they be essentially Iudges no lesse then the King. as I have demonstrated to the impartiall Reader, in the former Chapter; I conceive, though the State make a positive law, for Orders cause, that the King ordinarily conveene Parliaments; Yet, if we dispute the matter in the court of Conscience, the Estates have intrinsecally (because they are the Estates, and essentially Iudges of the Land) ordinary power to conveene themselves: 1. Because when Moses, by Gods rule, hath appointed seventie men to be Ca­tholike Iudges in the Land, Moses upon his sole pleasure and will, hath not power to restraine them in the exercise of judgment gi­venThe inferiour Iudges are not subject in their conscience to the King, in their acts of judgement, ei­ther, quoad spe­cificationem, to give unjust sentences at his will; nor quo­ad exercitium, to execute, or not execute judgement for the oppressed. them of God: for as God hath given to any one Iudge power to judge righteous judgement, though the King command the contra­ry; so hath he given to him power to sit down in the gate, or the bench, when and where the necessitie of the oppressed people cal­leth for it: For, 1. the expresse commandement of God, which saith to all Iudges, Execute judgement in the morning; involveth essenti­ally a precept to all the Physicall actions, without which it is im­possible to execute judgement: As namely, if by a divine precept the Iudge must execute judgement; ergo, he must come to some publique place, and he must cause partie and witnesses come before him, and he must consider, cognosce, examine in the place of judge­ment, things, persons, circumstances: and so God who comman­deth positive acts of judgeing, commandeth the Iudges locomotive power, and his naturall actions of compelling by the sword the par­ties to come before him: even as Christ who commandeth his ser­vants to preach, commandeth that the Preacher and the People goe to Church, and that he stand or sit in a place where all may heare, and that he give himselfe to reading and meditating, before he come to preach. And if God command one Iudge to come to the place of judgement, so doth he command seventie, and so all Estates to con­veen in the place of judgement. It is objected, That the Estates are not Iudges ordinary and habitually, but only Iudges at some certaine occasions, when the King, for cogent and weighty causes, calleth them, and calleth them not to judge, but to give him advise and counsell how to judge. Ans. 1. They are no lesse Iudges habitually then the King, when the common affaires of the whole Kingdome necessita­teth these Publique Watchmen to come together: for even the King [Page 175] judgeth not actually, but upon occasion. 2. This is to beg the que­stion, to say that the Estates are not Iudges, but when the King cal­leth them, at such and such occasions: for the Elders, Princes and Heads of families and Tribes, were Iudges ordinarie, because they made the King. And 2. the Kingdome, by God, yea, and Church, Iustice and Religion, so far as they concerne the whole Kingdome, are committed not to the keeping of the King only, but to all the Iudges, Elders, and Princes of the Land: And they are rebuked as e­vening wolves, lyons, oppressors, Ezech. 22. 27. Zaca. 3. 3. Esa. 3. 14, 15. Mic. 3. 1, 2, 3. when they oppresse the people in judgement, So are they, Deut. 1. 15, 16, 17. 2 Chron. 19. 6, 7. made Iudges, and therefore they are no more to be restrained not to conveene, by the Kings power, (which is in this, accumulative and auxiliarie, not privative) then they can be restrained in judgement, and in pronouncing suchVnjust judge­ing, and no judging at all, are sinnes in the States. a sentence, as the King pleased, and not such a sentence: Because as they are to answer to God for unjust sentences, so also for no just sentences, and for not conveening to judge, when Religion and Iustice, which are fallen in the streets, calleth for them. 3. As God in a law of nature, hath given to every man the keeping and selfe­preservation of himselfe, and of his brother; Ca [...]n ought in his place to be the keeper of Abel his brother. So hath God committed the keeping of the Commonwealth, by a positive law, not to theJunius Brut. q. 2. p. 51. vind. contr. Tyran. King only, because that is impossible, Num. 11. 14, 17. 2 Chron. 19. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1 Chron. 27. 4. If the King had such a power as King, and so from God, he should have power to breake up the mee­ting of all Courts of Parliament, Secret Councell, and all inferior Iudicatures: And when the Congregation of gods, as Ps. 82. in the midst of which the Lord standeth, were about to pronounce just judgement for the oppressed and poere, they might be hindred by the King; and so they should be as just as the King maketh them, and might pervert judgement, and take away the righteousnesse of the righteous from him, Esa. 5. 23. because the King commandeth: And the cause of the poore should not come before the Iudge, when the King so commandeth. And shall it excuse the Estates, to say, We could not judge the cause of the poore, nor crush the Priests of Baal, and the idolatrous Masse-Preltes, because the King forbad us. So might the King breake up the meeting of the Lords of Session, when they were to decerne that Naboths vineyard should be restored to him; and hinder the States to represse Tyranny: And this were as [Page 176] much as if the States should say, We made this man our King, and with our good will we agree, he shall be a Tyrant. For if God gave it to him as a King, we are to consent that he enjoy it. 5. If Barclay and other flatterers have leave to make the Parliament but Counsellers and Advisers of the King; and the King to be the only and soleThe Parlia­ment Iudges not advisers only. Iudge: 1. The King is, by that same reason, the sole Iudge, in re­lation to all Iudges; the contrary whereof is cleere, Num. 11. 16. Deut, 1. 15, 16, 17. 2 Chron. 19. 6. Rom. 13. 1, 2. 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14. Yea but (say they) the King, when he sendeth an Ambassadour, he may tye him to a written Commission; and in so far as he exceedeth that, he is not an Ambassadour: and cleare it is, that all inferiour Iudges, 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14. are but sent by the King, ergo, they are so Iudges, as they are but messengers, and are to adhere to the Royall pleasure of the Prince that sent them.

Ans. 1. The Ambassadour is not to accept an unjust Ambassage,Ieferiour Iudges not the Legats, or Ser­vants, or Mes­sengers of the King. that fighteth with the Law of nature. 2. The Ambassadour and the Iudge differ, the Ambassadour is the King and States Deputy, both in his call to the Ambassage, and also in the matter of the Ambassage; for which cause he is not to transgresse what is given to him in Writ, as a Rule; but the inferiour Iudges, and the high Court of Parliament, though they were the Kings Deputies (as the Parlia­ment is in no sort his Deputy, but he their Deputy Royall) yet it is only in respect of their call, not in respect of the matter of their Com­mission, for the King may send the Iudge to judge in generall accor­ding to the Law, and Iustice and Religion, but he cannot depute the sentence, and command the conscience of the Judge to prononnce such a sentence, not such, the inferiour Iudge in the act of judging is as independent, and his conscience as immediatly subject to God, as the King, therefore the King owes to every sentence his appro­bative suffrage as King, but not his either directive suffrage, nor his imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, 6. If the King should sell his Country▪ and bring in a forraigne Army, the estates are to convene, to take course for the safety of the Kingdome. 7. If Da­vid exhort the Princes of Israel to helpe King Solomon in governingPublick Go­vernment be­longeth to the States, and El­ders as to the King. the Kingdome, in building the Temple, 2 Chron. 32. 3. Ezechiah tooke counsell with his Princes, and his mighty men in the matter of holding off the Assyrians, who were to invade the Land, if David 1 Chron. 13. 1, 2, 3, 4. consult with the Captaines of thou­sands, and hundreds to bring the Arke of God to Kireath jearim, if [Page 177] Solomon 1 King. 8. 1. Assemble the Elders of Israel, and all the Heads of the Tribes, and the chief of the fathers to bring the Arke of the Tabernacle, to the congregation of the Lord. And Achab gather to­gether the States of Israel, in a matter that nearely concerned Reli­gion. If the Elders and people, 1 King. 20. 8. counsell and decree, that King Achab should hearken to Benhadad King of Syria, and if Ahasuerus make no Decrees, but with consent of his Princes, Ester, 1. 21. nor Darius any Act without his Nobles and Princes, if Hamor and Schechem, Genes. 34. 20. would not make a Covenant with Iacobs Sons, without the consent of the men of the City, and Ephron the Hittite would not sell Abraham a buriall place in his Land without the consent of the children of Heth, Gen. 23. 10. Then must the estates have a power of judging with the King or Prince in matters of Religion, Iustice, and Government, which concerne the whole Kingdome; but the former is true by the Re­cords of Scripture, ergo, so is the latter.

8. The men of Ephraim complaine that Iephtah had gone toArg. 8. warre against the children of Ammon without them, and hence rose warre betwixt the men of Ephraim, and the men of Gilead, Iud. 12. 1, 2, 3. and the men of Israel [...]iercely contend with the men of Iudah, because they brought King▪ David home againe without them, pleading that they were therein dispised, 2 Sam. 19. 41, 42, 43. which evinceth that the whole States have hand in matters of pub­lick government, that concerne all the Kingdome; and when there is no King, Iudg. 20. The chiefe of the people, and of all the Tribes goe out in battell, against the children of Benjamin.

9. These who make the King▪ and so have power to unmake himArg. 9. in the case of Tyranny, must be above the King in power of Go­vernment; but the Elders and Princes made both David and Saul Kings.

10. There is not any who say that the Princes and people, 1 Sam.Arg, 10. 14. did not right in rescuing innocent Ionathan from death, against the Kings Will, and his Law.

11. The speciall ground of Royalists is to make the King the ab­soluteArg. 11. supreame, giving all life and power to the Parliament and States, and of meere grace convening them. So Ferne, the Author of Ossorianum, p. 69. but this ground is false, because the Kings power is fiduciary, and put in his hand upon trust, and must be mi­nisteriall, and borrowed from these who put him in trust, and so his [Page 178] power must be lesse, and derived from the Parliament: but the Parliament hath no power in trust from the King, because the time was, when the man who is the King, had no power, and the Parlia­ment had the same power that they now have; and now when the King hath received power from them, they have the whole power that they had before. That is, to make Lawes, and resigned no po­wer to the King, but to execute Lawes, and his convening of them is an Act of Royall Duty, which he oweth to the Palia­ment by vertue of his Office, and is not an act of grace, for an act of grace is an act of free Will, and what the King doth of free Will, he may not doe, and so he may never convene a Parliament. But when David, Salomon, Asa, Ezekiah, Iehosaphat, Achas convened Parliaments, they convened Parliaments as Kings, and so Ex debito & virtute officii, out of debt and Royall Obligation, and if the King as the King, be Lex animata, a breathing and living Law, the King as King must doe by obligation of Law, what he doth as King, and not from spontaneous and Arbitrary grace. 2. If the Scripture holds forth to us a King in Jsrael, and two Princés and Elders who made the King, and had power of life and death, as we have seene; then is there in Israel Monarchy tempered with Aristocracy; and if there were Elders and Rulers in every City, as the Scripture saith, here was also Aristocracy and Democracy. And for the warrant of the power of the Estates I appeale to Iurists, and to approved Authors. Argu. l. aliud. 160. §. 1. De Iur. Reg. l. 22. Mortuo de fidei. l. 11. 14. ad Mum. l. 3. 1. 4. Sigonius De Rep. Iudaeor. l. 6. c. 7. Cornelius Bertramo, c. 12. Iunius Brutus Vindic. contra. Tyran. §. 2. Author Libelli de jur Magistrat. in subd. q. 6. Althus. Politic. c. 18. Calvin Institut. l. 4. c. 20. Pareus Coment. in Rom. 13. Pet. Martyr in Lib. Iudic. c. 3. Ioan. Marianus de rege Lib. 1. c. 7. Hottoman de jure Antiq. Regni Gallici l. 1. c. 12. Buchanan De jure Regni apud Scotos.

Obj. The King after a more noble way representeth the people, then the Estates doth; for the Princes and Commissioners of Parliament have all their power from the people, and the peoples power is concen­tricated in the King.

Ans. The Estates taken collectively doe represent the people both in respect of Office, and of persons, because they stand Iudges for them; for many represent many, ratione numeri & officii, better then one doeth. The King doth unproperly represent the people, [Page 179] though the power for actuall execution of Lawes, be more in the King, yet a legislative power is more in the Estates. Neither will it follow, that if the Estates of a Kingdome doe any thing but counsell a King, they must then command him; for a legall and judiciall ad­vice hath influence in the effect to make it a Law, not on the Kings Will, to cause him give the being of a Law to that, which without his Will is no Law, for this supponeth that he is only Iudge.

Obj. What power the people reserveth, they reserve it to them­selves in unitate, as united in a Parliament; and therefore what they doe out of a Parliament is tumultous.

Ans. I deny the consequence, they reserve the power of selfe pre­servation out of a Parliament, and a power of convening in Parlia­ment for that effect, that they may by Common Counsell defend themselves.

QUEST. XXII. Whether the power of the King as King be absolute, or dependent and limited by Gods first mould and paterne of a King?

DOctor Ferne sheweth us it was never his purpose to plead forFerne par. 3. Defence. Sect. 3. pag. pag. 1 [...]. absolutenesse of an Arbitrary commandement, free from all Morall restraint laid on the power by Gods Law; but only he stri­veth for a power in the King that cannot be resisted by the subject. But truely we never disputed with Royalists of any absolute power in the King, free from Morall subjection to Gods Law 1. Because any bond that Gods Law imposeth on the King, it commeth wholly from God, and the nature of a Divine Law, and not from any volun­taryThe question is not, if the King be so ab­solute as he is freed from all Morall re­straint com­ming from Gods Law. contract, or covenant, either expresse, or tacito, betwixt the King and the people who made him King, for if he faile against such a covenant, though he should exceed the cruelty of a King, or a man, and become a Lion and a Nero, a Mother-killer, he should in all his inhumanity and breach of covenant be countable to God, not to any man on earth. 2. To dispute with Royalists, if Gods Law lay any Morall restraint upon the King, nor to dispute whether the King be a rationall man, or no; and whether he can sin against God, and shall cry in the day of Gods wrath (if he be a wicked Prince) Hills fall on us, and cover us, as it is Revel. 6. 15, 16. and whether Tophet be prepared for all workers of iniquity; and cer­tainly I justifie the Schoole-men in that question: Whether or no God could have created a rationall creature, such a one as by na­ture [Page 180] is impeccable, and not naturally capable of sinne before God? if Royalists dispute this question of their absolute Monarch, they are wicked Divines.

2. We plead not at this time (saith the Prelate stealing from Gro­tius,Sacr. sanc. Maj. cap. 14. p. 1 [...]3. Barclaius, Arnisaeus, who spake it with more sinewes of rea­son) for a (masterly, or) despoticall, or rather a slavishing Sove­raignty, which is Dominium herile, an absolute power, such as the great Turke this day exerciseth over his subjects, and the King of Spaine hath over, and in his territories without Europe: we maintain only regiam potestatem, quae fundatur in paterna, such royall fatherly So­veraignty as we live under▪ blessed be God, and our predecessors. This (saith he) as it hath its Royall Prerogative inherent to the Crowne naturally, and inseparable from it, so it trencheth not upon the liberty of the person, or the property of the goods of the subject, but in, and by the lawfull and just acts of jurisdiction.

Ans. 1. Here is another absolute power disclaimed to be in the King, he hath not such a masterly and absolute liberty as the Turke hath. Why? Iohn P. P. in such a tender and high point as con­cerneth soule and body of subjects in three Christian Kingdomes, you should have taught us 1. What bonds and fetters any covenant or paction betwixt the King and people layeth upon the King, why he hath not as King the power of the great Turke. I will tell you▪ The Great Turke may command any of his subjects to leape into a mountaine of fire, and burne himselfe quick, in conscience of obe­dience to his Law. And what if the subject disobey the Great Turk? if the Great Turke be a lawfull Prince, as you will not deny. And if the King of Spaine should command forraine conquered slaves to doe the like. By your Doctrine neither the one, nor the other were obliged to resist by violence, but to pray, or fly, which both were toNo resisting of the most Tur­kish Tyran by the Royalists way. speake to stones, and were like the man, who in case of ship-wrack, made his devotion of praying to the waves of the sea, not to enter the place of his b [...]d and drowne him. But a Christian King hath not this power; Why, and a Christian King (by Royalists doctrine) hath a greater power then the Turke (if greater can be) he hath power to command his subjects to cast themselves into Hell­fire; that is, to presse on them a service wherein it is written: (Adore the worke of mens hands in the place of the living God) and this is worse then the Turkes commandement of bodily burning quick. And what is left to the Christian Subjects, in this case, is the [Page 181] very same, and no other then is left to the Turkish and forraigne Spanish subject; Either flee, or make prayers▪ There is no more left to us. 2. Many Royalists maintaine, that England is a conque­redAn absolute King more ab­solute then the Great Turke, by Royalists way. Nation. Why then, see what power, by law of Conquest, the King of Spaine hath over his slaves, the same must the King of Eng­land have over his subjects. For, to Royalists, a title by Conquest to a Crown, is as lawfull as a title by birth or election. For lawful­nesse, in relation to Gods law, is placed in an indivisible point, if we regard the essence of lawfulnesse: And therefore there is nothing left to England, but that all Protestants who take the oath of a Pro­testant King, to defend the true Protestant Religion, should, after prayers, conveyed to the King through the fingers of Prelates and Papists; leave the Kingdome empty to Papists, Prelates and A­theists.

3. All power restrained, that it cannot arise from ten degreesNo law at all, by Royalists way, to im­pede a King from a super­inundation of overflowing Tyrann [...] ▪ to foureteen, from the Kingly power of Saul, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. to the Kingly power of the Great Turke, to fourteen; 1. must either be restrained by Gods law; 2. or by Mans law; or 3. by the innate goodnes and grace of the Prince; or 4. by the providence of God. A restraint from Gods law is vaine: for it is no question between us and Royalists, but God hath laid a morall restraint on Kings, and all men, that they have not morall power to sinne against God. 2. Is the restraint laid on by mans law? What law of man? 1. The Roy­alist saith, 1. The King, as King, is above all law of man. Then (say I) no law of man can hinder the Kings power of ten, to arise to the Turkish power of foureteen. 2. All law of man, as it is mans law, is seconded either with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall coaction, such as Excommunication; ▪or with Civill and temporall coaction, such as is the Sword, if it be violated. But Royalists deny, that either the sword of the Church in Excommunication, or the Civill sword, should be drawn against the King. 3. This law of man should be produced by this profound Iurist, the P. Prelate, who mocketh at all the Statists and Lawyers of Scotland. It is not a covenant be­twixt the King and People, at his Coronation: for though there were any such covenant, yet the breach of it doth binde before God, but not before man: nor can I see, or any man else, how a law of man can lay a restraint on the Kings power of two degrees, to can­cell it within a Law, more then on a power of ten, or fourteene de­grees. If the King of Spaine, the lawfull Soveraigne of those over-European [Page 182] people, (as Royalists say) have a power of foureteene de­grees over those conquered Subjects, as a King; I see not how he hath not the like power over his own Subjects of Spaine, to wit, even of Foureteen: for what agreeth to a King, as a King, (and Kingly power from God he hath as King) he hath it in relation to all Subjects, except it be taken from him in relation to some Sub­jects, and given by some law of God; or in relation to some other Subjects. Now, no man can produce any such law. 4. The nature of the goodnesse and grace of the Prince, cannot lay bonds on the King, to cancell his power, that he should not usurpe the power of the King of Spaine toward his over-Europeans. 1. Royalists plead for a power due to the King, as King, and that from God; such as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. 1 Sam. 10. 25. But this power should be a power of grace and goodnesse in the King, as a good man; not in the King, as a King, and due to him by law: And so the King should have his Legall power from God, to be a Tyrant. But if he were not a Tyrant, but should lay limits on his own power, through the goodnesse of his own nature; No thankes to Royalists that he is not a Tyrant: For, actu primo, and as he is a King, (as they say) he is a Tyrant, having from God a Tyrannous power of ten degrees, as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8. and why not of foureteen degrees, as well as the Great Turke, or the King of Spaine? if he use it not, it is his own personall goodnesse, not his officiall and Royall power. 4. The rastraint of Providence laid by God upon any power to doe ill, hin­dreth only the exercise of the power not to breake forth in as Ty­rannous acts as ever the King of Spaine, or the great Turke can exercise toward any. Yea, Providence layeth Physicall restraint, and possibly morall, sometimes, upon the exercise of that power that Devils, and the most wicked men of the world hath: but Royalists must shew us that Providence hath laid bounds on the Kings power, and made it fatherlie, and not masterly; so that if it the power ex­ceed bounds of fatherly power, and passe over to the dispoticall and masterly power, it may be resisted by the Subjects. But that they will not say. 4. This paternall and fatherly power that God hath given to Kings, as Royalists teach, it trencheth not upon the libertie of the Subjects, and propertie of their goods; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of Jurisdiction (saith the P. Prelate:) Well; Then it may trench upon the libertie of soule and body of the Subjects; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of of jurisdiction: But none are to judge [Page 183] of these acts of Iurisdiction, whether they be just or not just, but the King, the only Iudge of supreme and absolute authoritie and power. And if the King command the idolatrous service in the obtruded Service-booke, it is a lawfull and a just act of jurisdiction: For to Royalists, who make the Kings power absolute, all acts are so just to the Subject, though he command Idolatrie and Turcisme, that we are to suffer only, and not to resist. 5. The Prelate presumeth that Fatherly power is absolute: But so if a father murther his childe, he is not comptable to the Magistrate therefore; but being absolute over his children, only the Judge of the World, not any power on earth can punish him. 6. We have proved that the Kings power is pa­ternall or fatherly only, by analogie, and improperly. 7. What is this Prerogative Royall, we shall heare by and by, 8. There is no restraint on Earth, laid upon this fatherly power of the King, but Gods law, which is a morall restraint. If then the King challenge as great a power as the Turke hath, he only sinneth against God; but no mortall man on earth may controll him, as Royalists teach: and who can know what power it is that Royalists plead for, whether a dispoticall power of Lordly power, or a fatherly power? If it be a power above law, such as none on earth may resist it; it is no matter whether it be above law of two degrees, or of twenty, even to the Great Turkes power.

These goe for Oracles, at Court▪ Tacitus. Principi summum re­rum arbitrium Dii dederunt, subditis obsequii gloria relicta est. Sene­ca. Indigna digna habenda sunt, Rex quae facit. Salustius. Impun [...] quidvis facere, id est, Regem esse. As if to be a King, and to be a God, who cannot erre, were all one. But certainly, these Authors are taxing the Licence of Kings, and not commanding their power.

But that God hath given no absolute and unlimited power to a King, above the law, is evident by this:

Arg. 1. He who in his first institution, is appointed of God, by1 Arg. against Absolutenesse of Kings. office, even when he sitteth on the throne, to take heed to read on a written copie of Gods law, that he may learne to feare the Lord his God, and keep all the words of this law, &c. He is not of absolute power above law. But, Deut. 17. 18, 19▪ the King, as King, while he sitteth on the Throne, is to doe this; Ergo, the Assumption is cleare: for this is the law of the King, as King; and not of a man, as a man. But as he sitteth on the Throne, he is to read on the booke of the Law: and ver. 20. Because he is King, his heart is not to be lifted up [Page 184] above his brethren. And as King, v. 16. he is not to multiply horses, &c. So Polititians make this argument good: They say, Rex est lex viva, animata▪ & loquens lex: The King, as King, is a living, brea­thing,Why the King a breathing Law? three reasons. and speaking Law. And there be three reasons of this: 1. If all were innocent persons, and could doe no violence one to ano­ther; the Law would rule all, and all men would put the Law in execution, agendo sponte, by doing right of their own accord; and there should be no need of a King to compell men to do right. But now, because men are, by nature, averse to good lawes, therefore there was need of a Ruler, who by office should reduce the Law in­to practice: and so is the King the Law reduced in practice. 2. The Law is ratio sive mens, the reason or minde, free from all perturba­tions of anger, lust, hatred, and cannot be tempted to ill; and the King, as a man, may be tempted by his own passions; and therefore as King, he commeth by office out of himselfe to reason and law; and so much as he hath of Law, so much of a King; and in his re­motest distance from Law and Reason, he is a Tyrant. 3. Abstracta concretis sunt puriora & perfectiora. Iustice is perfecter then a just man, Whitenes perfecter then the white wall: so the neerer the King comes to a Law, for the which he is a King, the neerer to a King; Propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. Therefore Kings throwing lawes to themselves, as men, whereas they should have conformed themselves to the Law, have erred. Cambyses the sonne of Cyrus, because he loved his own sister, would have the ma­riage of the brother with the sister, lawfull. Anaxarchus said to Ale­xander, grieved in minde that he had killed Clytus: Regi ac Iovi Themin atque Iustitiam assidere: Iudgement and Righteousnesse did alway accompanie God and the King in all they doe. But some to this purpose say better; The Law, rather then the King, hath power of life and death.

Arg. 2. The power that the King hath (I speak not of his gifts)2. Argument against an ab­solute King: The People have no abso­lute power o­ver themselves, and so cannot make over any such power to the King. he hath it from the people, who maketh him King, as I proved be­fore: but the people have neither formally nor virtually any power absolute to give the King, all the power they have, is a legall and naturall power to guide themselves in peace and godlinesse, and save themselves from unjust violence, by the benefit of Rulers. Now an absolute power above a Lawis a power to doe ill, and to destroy the people, and this the people have not themselves, it being repugnant to nature, that any should have a naturall power in themselves to [Page 185] destroy themselves, or to inflict upon themselves an evill of punish­ment to destruction. Though therefore it were given, which yet is not granted, that the people had resigned all power that they have into their King, yet if he use a Tyrannicall power against the peo­ple for their hurt and destruction, he useth a power that the people never gave him; and against the intention of nature: for they in­vested a man with power to be their father, and defender for their good, And he faileth against the peoples intention in usurping a [...] over power to himselfe, which they never gave, never had, never could give, for they cannot give what they never had, and power to destroy themselves they never had.

3. Arg. All Royall Power, whereby a King is a King, andArg. 3. differenced from a private man, armed with no power of the sword, is from God.

But absolute power to Tyranize over the people, and to destroyAgainst an ab­solute Prince. them, is not a power from God: Ergo there is not any such royall power absolute. The proposition is evident, because that God who maketh Kings, and disposeth of Crownes, Prov. 8. 15, 16. 2 Sam. 12. 7. Daniel 4. 32. must also create and give that Royall and Offi­ciall power, by which a King is a King, 1. Because God created man, he must be the Author of his reasonable soule; if God be the Author of things, he must be the Author of their formes, by which they are, that which they are. 2. All power is Gods. 1 Chro. 29. 11 Matth. 6. 13. Ps. 62. 11. Ps. 68. 35. Dan. 2. 37. And that absolute power to Tyrannize, is not from God. 1. Because if this MorallPower Tyran­nicall is not from God. power to sinne be from God, it being formally wickednesse, God must be the Author of sinne. 2. What ever Morall power is from God, the exercises of that power, and the acts thereof must be from God, and so these acts must be Morally good and just; for if the Morall power be of God, as the Author, so must the acts be. Now the acts of a Tyrannicall power are acts of sinfull unjustice and oppression, and cannot be from God. 3. Polititians say, There is no power in Rulers to doe ill, but to helpe and defend the people, as the power of a Physi [...]ian to destroy; of a Pilot to cast away the ship on a Rock, the power of a Tutor to wast the inheritance of the Orphan, and the power of father and mother to kill their children, and of the mighty to defraud and oppresse, are not powers from God. So Ferdinand Vasquez illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 26. c. 45. Pruckman d. c. 3. §. Soluta potestas. Althus. pol. cap. 9. n. 25.

[Page 186] Barclaim, Grotius, Doct. Ferne, (The P. Prelates wit could come Barclaius contr. Monarcho. l. 2. pag. 62. up t̄o it) say, That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortall man can lawfully resist it, is from God; and the King hath this way power from God as no subject [...]an resist it, but he must resist the Ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God.

Answ. The Law saith, Illud possumus quod jure possumus, Papinus That evasion removed, Ty­rannicall pow­er is not from God, but a power to do ill, so as no mortall man may resist, is from God. F. filius, D. de cond. Just. The Law saith, It is no power which is not lawfull power. The Royalists say, power of Tyranny in so farre as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from God; but what is the other part of the distinction; it must be, that Tyranni­call power is simpliciter from God, or in it self it is from God, but as it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from God: now to be punishable by subjects, is but an accident and tyrannicall power is the subject, yea, and it is an separable accident; for many Tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained, such a Tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting Emperours: Now if the Tyrannicall power it self was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered; and shall not this fall to the ground as false, which Arnisaeus de autho. princ. c. 2. n. 10. Dum contra officium facit, Magistratus non est Magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24. n. 4, 5.—Et de ho [...] neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribit, Ma­rant. disp. 1. num. 14. When the Magistrate doth by violence, and without law any thing, in so farre doing against his Office, he is not a Magistrate; then say I, that power by which he doth, is not of God. 2. None doeth then resist the Ordinance of God, who resist the King in Tyrannous acts. 2. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject▪ nor restrained, be from God. Ergo, the Tyrannicall power itself, and without this accident (that it can be punished by men) it must be from God also; but the conclusion is absurd, and denied by Royalists. I prove the connexion: For if the King have such a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, King Davids power to kill innocent Ʋriah, and defloor Bath­shebah, without the accident, of being restrained or punished by men, is either from God, or not from God; if it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh Commandment, which God gave to David, and not to any subject, and so David lied when he confessed this sin▪ and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin; and Kings because Kings, are under no tye of duties [Page 187] of mercy and truth, and justice to their subjects, contrary to that which Gods Law requireth of all Judges, Deut. 1. 15, 16, 17. and 17. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. 2 Chro. 19. 6, 7. Rom. 13. 3, 4. If this power be from God, as it is unrestrainable and unpunishable by the subject, it is not from God at all; for how can God give a power to do ill, that is unpunishable by men, and not give that power to do ill; it is unconceiveable: For in this very thing that God giveth to David, a power to murther the innocent, with this respect, That it shall be punishable by God onely, and not by men, God m [...]st give it as a sinfull power to do ill, which must be a power of dispensati­on to sin, and so not to be punished by either God, or man, which is contrary to his revealed will in his word: If such a power as not restrainable by man, be from God, by way of permission, as a power to sin in divels, and men is, then it is no Royall power, nor any Ordinance of God, and to resist this power, is not to resist the Or­dinance of God.

Argum. 4. That power which maketh the benefit of a King, toArgum. 4. Against an ab­solute Prince. A King as a King must be a plague, i [...] God be the Creator of an absolute Prince. be no benefit, but a judgement of God, as a making all the people slaves, such as were slaves amongst the Romans and Jews, is not to be asserted by any Christian: but an absolute power to do ill, and to Tyrannize, which is supposed to be an essentiall and constitutive of Kings, to difference them from all Judges, maketh the benefit of a King no benefit, but a judgement of God, as making all the people slaves. That the major may be clear, It is evident to have a King, is a blessing of God, because to have no King is a judgement, Judg. 17. 6. Every man doth what seemeth good in his own eyes, Judg. 18. 1. and 19. 1. and 21. 25. 2. So it is a part of Gods good providence to provide a King for his people, 1 Sam. 16. 1. so 2 Sam. 5. 12. And David perceived that the Lord had established him King over Israel, and that he had exalted his Kingdom, for his people Israels sake, 2 Sam. 15. 2, 3, 6. 2 Sam. 18. 3. Rom. 13. 2, 3, 4. If the King be a thing good in it self, then can he not actu primo, be a curse and a judgement, and essentially a bondage and slavery to the people: also the genuine and intrinsecall end of a King is the good, Rom. 13. 4. and the good of a quiet a peaceable life in all godlinesse and honesty, 1 Tim. 2. 2. and he is by Office, custos utrius­que tabulae, whose genuine end is to preserve the law from violence, and to defend the subject; he is the peoples debtor for all happy­nesse possible to be procured by Gods sword, either in peace or [Page 188] war, at home or abroad. For the assumption, it is evident. An ab­solute and Arbitrary power is a King-law, such as Royalists say God gave to Saul, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. and 10. 25. to play the Tyrant, and this power Arbitrary and unlimited above all Laws, is that which 1. Is given of God. 2. Distinguisheth essentially the Kings of Israel from the Iudge, [...]aith Banclay, Grotius, Arnisaeus. 3. A constitutive form of a King, therefore it must be actu primo a bene­fit, and a blessing of God: but if God hath given any such power absolute to a King, as 1. His will must be a law, either to do or suffer all the Tyranny and cruelty of a Tyger, Leopard, or a Nero, and a Julian, then hath God given actu primo, a power to a King as King, to inslave the people and slock of God, redeemed by the blood of God, as the slaves among the Romans and Iews, who were so under their masters, as their bondage was a plague of God, and the lives of the people of God under Pharaoh, who compelled them to work in brick and clay. 2. Though he cut the throats of the people of God, as the Lionnesse Queen Mary did, and command an Army of souldiers to come and burn the Cities of the Land, and kill man, wife, and children; yet in so doing, he doth the part of a King, so as you cannot resist him as a man, and obey him as a King, but must give your necks to him, upon this ground, because this absolute power of his is ordained of God; and there is no power, even to kill, and destroy the innocent, but it is of God, so saith Paul, Rom. 13. If we beleeve Court-Prophets, or rather Lying-Spi­rits, who perswade the King of Britain, to make war against his three Dominions. Now it is clear, that the distinction of bound and free, continued in Israel even under the most tyrannous Kings, 2 Kings 4. 1. yea, even when the Iews were captives under Aha­suerus, Esther 7. 4. And what difference should there be between the people of God under their own Kings, and when they were captives under Tyrants, serving wood and stone, and false gods, as was threatned, as a curse in the Law, Deut. 28. 25, 36, 64, 68. If their own Kings by Gods appointment have the same absolute power over them; and if he be a Tyrant, actu primo, that is, if he be indued with absolute power, and so have power to play the Ty­rant, then must the people of God be actu primo, slaves, and under absolute subjection, for they are relatives, as lord and servant, con­querour and captive. It is true, they say, Kings by office are fathers, they cannot put forth in action their power to destroy: I answer, it is [Page 189] their goodnesse of nature, that they put not forth in action, all their absolute power to destroy, which God hath given them as Kings; and therefore thanks are due to their goodnesse, for that they do not actu secundo play the Tyrant; for Royalists teach that by vertue of their office, God hath given to them a Royall power to destroy. Ergo, The Lords people are slaves under them, though they deal not with them as slaves, but that hindereth not, but the people by condition are slaves: so, many Conquerours of old, did deal kindely with these slaves whom they took in war, and dealt with them as sons, but as Conquerours they had power to sell them, to kill them, to put them to work in brick and clay: so say I here,The goodnesse of an absolute Prince in not putting forth his power in actuall de­stroying of the people, hinder­eth not the power to be actu primo, Tyrannicall. Royall power and a King, cannot be a blessing, and actu primo a favour of God to the people; for the which they are to pray, when they want a King, that they may have one, or to praise God when they have one. But a King must be a curse and a judgement, if he be such a creature as essentially, and in the intention and nature of the thing it self, hath by office a Royall power to destroy, and that from God; for then the people praying (Lord give us a King) should pray (make us slaves, Lord, take our Libertie and power from us, and give a power illimited and absolute to one man, by which he may (if he please) waste us and destroy us, as all the bloody Emperours did the people of God.) Surely, I see not but they should pray for a temp­tation, and to be led in temptation when they pray God to give them a King, and therefore such a power is a vain thing.

Argum. 5. A power contrary to justice. 2. To peace and theArgum. 5. Against abso­lute Princes. An absolute Prince against justice, peace, reason, law, &c. good of the people. 3. That looketh to no law as a rule, and so is unreasonable, and forbidden by the Law of God, and the Civill Law, L. 15. filius de condit. Instit. cannot be a lawfull power, and cannot constitute a lawfull Iudge; but an absolute and unlimited power is such: How can the Iudge be the Minister of God for good to the people, Rom. 13. 4? If he have such a power as a King given him of God to destroy and waste the people?

Argum. 6. An absolute power is contrary to nature, and so un­lawfull;Argum. 6. Against an ab­solute Prince. for it maketh the people give away the naturall power of defending their life against illegall and cruell violence, and maketh a man who hath need to be ruled and lawed by nature, above all rule and law; and one who by nature can sin against his brethren,It is against▪ nature. such a one as cannot sin against any, but God onely, and maketh him a Lion and an unsociall man. What a man is Nero, whose life is [Page 190] poesie & paintry, Domitian only an Archer. Valentinian only a Pain­ter, Charles the 9th. of France only an Hunter, Alphonsus Dux Ferra­riensis only an Astronomer, Philippe of Macedo only a Musitian, and all because they are Kings? This our King denyeth when he saith, Art. 13. There is power legally placed in the Parliament, more then sufficient to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny. But if they had not power to play the Lions, it is not much that Kings are Musitians, Hunters, &c.

7. God in making a King to preserve his people, should give li­bertyArg. 7. Against an ab­solute Prince, contrary to the fift Comman­dement. without all politick restraint, for one man to destroy many; which is contrary to Gods end in the fift Commandement, if one have absolute power to destroy soules and bodies of many thousands.

8. If the Kings of Israel and Iudah were under censures andArg. 8. Against an ab­solute Prince. The King re­maineth a bro­ther when he is King, and may be rebuked, may not take his neighbours vineyard from him. rebukes of the Prophets, and sinned against God and the people in rejecting these rebukes, and in persecuting the Prophets, and were under this Law not to take their neighbours wife, or his Vine­yard from him against his will, and the inferiour Iudges were to accept the persons of none in Iudgement, small or great; and if the King yet remaine a brother, notwithstanding he be a King, then is his power not above any Law nor absolute: for what reason? 1. He should be under one Law of God to be executed by men, and not under another Law? Royalists are to shew a difference from Gods Word. 2. His neighbours, brother, or subjects may by vio­lence keepe back their Vineyards, and chastity from the King: Na­both may by force keepe his owne Vineyard from Achab; by the Lawes of Scotland, if a subject obtaine a Decree of the King of vio­lent possession of the Heritages of a subject, he hath by Law, power to cast out, force, apprehend and deliver to prison these who are Tenants, brooking these Lands by the Kings personall Commande­ment.A Damsell forced by the King may vio­lently resist. If a King should force a Damsell, she may violently resist, and by violence, and bodily opposing of violence to violence, defend her owne chastity. Now that the Prophets have rebuked Kings is evident. Samuel rebuked Saul, Nathan David, Elias King Achab. Ieremiah is commanded to Prophesie against the Kings of Iudah Ier. 1. 18. and the Prophets practised it, Ier. 19. 3. c. 21. 2. c. 22. 13, 14, 15. Hos. 5. 1. Kings are guilty before God, because they submitted not their Royall power and greatnesse to the rebukes of the Prophets, but persecuted them.

[Page 191]2 Deut. 17. 20. The King on the Throne remaineth a Brother, Psal. 22. 22. and so the Iudges or three Estates are not to accept of the Person of the King, for his greatnesse, in Iudgement, Deut. 1. 16, 17. and the Iudge is to give out such a sentence in Iudgement as the Lord, with whom there is no iniquity, would give out, if the Lord himselfe were sitting in Iudgement; because the Iudge is in the very stead of God, as his Lievtenant, 2 Chron. 19. 6, 7. Ps. 82. 1, 2. Deut. 1. 17. And with God there is no respect of persons, 2 Chro. 19. 7. 1 Pet. 1. 17. Act. 10. 34. I doe not intend that, any inferiour Iudge sent by the King, is to judge the King, but these who gave him the Throne, and made him King are truely above him, and to judge him without respect of persons, as God would judge himselfe, if he himselfe were sitting in the Beanch.

3. God is the Author of Civill Lawes and Government, and hisNo sufficient meanes against all cruelties and unjust vio­lences, if an ab­solute Prince be from God, all goe to con­fusion. intention is therein the externall peace and quiet life, and godli­nesse of his Church and people, and that all Iudges according to their places be Nurse-fathers to the Church, Esay 49. 23. Now God must have appointed sufficient meanes for this end; but there is no sufficient meanes at all, but a meere Anarchy and confusion, if to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby at his pleasure he may obstruct the fountaines of Iustice, and command Lawyers and Lawes to speake not Gods mind, that is Iustice, righte­ousnesse, safety, true Religion, but the sole lust and pleasure of one man. And 2. this one having absolute and irresistible influence on all the inferiour Instruments of Iustice, may by this power turne all into Anarchy, and put the people in a worse condition, then if there were no Iudge at all in the Land. For that of Polititians, that Ty­ranny is better then Anarchy, is to be taken Cum grano salis; but I shall never beleeve, that absolute power of one man, which is actu primo, Tyranny is Gods sufficient way of peaceable government. Therefore Barclaius saith nothing for the contrary, when he saith,Barclaius cont, Monarch. l. 2▪ pag. 76, 77. The Athenians made Draco and Solon absolute Law-givers, For, a facto adjus non valet consequentia. What if a roving people trusting Draco and Solon to be Kings above mortall men, and to be gods, gave them power to make Lawes written, not with Inke, but with blood: Shall other Kings have from God the like Tyrannicall and bloody power from that, to make bloody Lawes? Chytreus, Lib. 2. and Sleidan citeth it. l. 1. Sueton. Sub paena periurii non tenentur fidem sevare regi degeneri.

[Page 192]9. He who is regulated by Law, and sweareth to the three E­states9. Argument against an ab­solute Prince. The conditi­ons tacite or expresse, upon which the Prince recei­veth the crown fight with all absolute pow­er. to be regulated by Law, and accepteth the Crown Covenant­wise, and so as the Estates would refuse to make him their King, if either he should refuse to sweare, or if they did beleeve certainly that he would breake his oath; he hath no illimited and absolute power from God or the People: for, faedus conditionatum, aut pre­missio conditionalis mutua, facit jus alteri in alterum: A mutuall conditionall Covenant giveth law and power over one to another. But from that which hath been said; The King sweareth to the three Estates, to be regulated by Law; He accepteth the Crowne upon the tenor of a mutuall covenant, &c. for if he should, as King, sweare to be King, that is, one who hath absolute power above a Law; and also to be regulated by a Law: he should sweare things contradictorie, that is, that he should be their King, having abso­lute power over them, and according to that power to rule them: and he should sweare, not to be their King, and to rule them, not according to absolute power, but according to Law. If therefore this absolute power be essentiall to a King, as a King; no King can lawfully take the oath to governe according to Law: for then he should sweare not to reigne as King, and not be their King; For how could he be their King, wanting that which God hath made es­sentiall to a King, as a King?

QUEST. XXIII. Whother the King hath any Royall prerogative, or a power to dis­pence with Lawes? And some other-grounds against absolute Monarchie.

A Prerogative Royall, I take two wayes: 1. Either to be an actPrerogative taken two wayes. of meere will and pleasure, above, or beside Reason or Law: Or, an act▪ of dispensation, beside, or against the letter of the Law.

Assert. 1. That which Royalists call the Prerogative Royall of Princes, is the salt of Absolute Power; and it is a supreme and highest power of a King, as a King, to doe above, without, or con­trary to a Law, or Reason: which is unreasonable.

1. When Gods word speaketh of the power of Kings and Iudges, Deut. 17. 15, 16, 17. Deut. 1. 15, 16, 17. and elsewhere, there is not any footstep, or ground for such a power: and therefore (if [Page 193] we speake according to conscience) there is no such thing in theNo Preroga­tive Royall in the Scripture. world: And because Royalist [...] cannot give us any warrant, it is to be rejected.

2. A Prerogative Royall must be a power of doing good to the people, and grounded upon some reason or law: but this is but a branch of an ordinarie limited power, and no prerogative above or beside law. Yea, any power not grounded on a reason different from meere will or absolute pleasure, is an irrationall and brutish power; and therefore it may well be jus personae, the power of theJus personae, jus corouae. man who is King; it cannot be jus coronae, any power annexed to the Crown: for this holdeth true of all the actions of a King, as a King. Illud potest Rex, & illud tantum quod jure potest. The King, as King, can doe no more, then that which upon right and law he may doe.

3. To dispute this question, Whether such a Prerogative agreeThe question touching Pre­rogative Roy­all, vaine. to any King, as King; is to dispute whether God hath made all un­der a Monarch, slaves, by their own consent: which is a vaine que­stion. 2. Those who hold such a Prerogative, must say, the King is so absolute and illimited a God on earth, that either by law, or his sole pleasure beside law, he may regularly and rationally move all wheeles in Policie; and his uncontrolled will shall be the axeltree on which all the wheeles are turned.

4. That which is the garland and proper flower of the King of Prerogative Royall of Roy­alists, Gods due. Kings, as he is absolute above his creatures, and not tyed to any law, without himselfe, that regulateth his will; That must be given to no mortall man, or King, except we would communicate that which is Gods proper due, to a sinfull man; which must be idolatrie. But to doe Royall acts out of an absolute power above Law and Reason, is such a power as agreeth to God, as is evident in positive lawes, and in acts of Gods meere pleasure, where we see no reason with­out the Almightie, for the one side, rather than for the other; as Gods forbidding the eating of the tree of knowledge, maketh the ea­ting, sinne, and contrary to reason; but there is no reason in the ob­ject:Acts founded upon the sole [...] pleasure of the Agent, proper to God. for if God should command eating of that tree, not to eat, should be also sinne. So Gods choosing Peter to glory, and his re­fusing Judas, is a good and a wise act, but not good or wise from the object of the act, but from the sole wise pleasure of God; because, if God had chosen Judas to glory, and rejected Peter, that act had been no lesse a good and a wise act, then the former. For when there [Page 194] is no law in the object, but only Gods will, the act is good and wise, seeing infinite wisdome cannot be separated from the perfect will of God: but no act of a mortall King, having sole and only will, and neither law nor reason in it, can be a lawfull, a wise, or a good act.

Assert. 2. There is something which may be called a PrerogativeA threefold dispensation. by way of dispensation. There is a threefold dispensation; one of power, another of justice, and a third of grace. A dispensation of power, is, when the will of the Law-giver maketh that act to be no sinne, which without that will would have been sinne: As if Gods commanding Will had not interveened, the Israelites borrow­ing the eare-rings and jewels of the Egyptians, and not restoring them, had been a breach of the 8 Commandement: and in this sense no King hath a Prerogative to dispence with a Law.

2. There is a dispensation of law and justice, not flowing fromA dispensati­on, 1. of sole pleasure, 2. of justice, 3. of grace. any Prerogative, but from the true intent of the Law. And thus the King, yea the inferiour Judge, is not to take the life of a man, whom the letter of the Law would condemne; because the Justice of the Law, is the intent and life of the Law: and where nothing is done against the intent of the Law, there is no breach of any Law.

The Third is not unlike unto the Second, when the King expo­nethA twofold ex­poning of the Law by grace. the Law by Grace: and this is twofold; 1. Either when he exponeth it of his wisdome and mercifull nature, inclined to mercy and justice; yet according to the just intent, native sense and scope of the Law, considering the occasion, circumstances of the fact, and comparing both with the Law: aud this dispensation of grace I grant to the King; As when the tribute is great, and the man poor,In re dubia pos­sunt dispensare Principes, quia nullus sensus presumitur, qui vincat princi­palem, l. 1. Sect. initium ib. the King may dispense with the custome. 2. The Law saith, In a doubtfull case the Prince may dispense, because it is presumed, the Law can have no sense against the principall sense and intent of the Law.

But there is another dispensation that Royalists doe plead for, and that is, a power in the King, ex mera gratia absolutae potestatis regalis; Out of meere grace of absolute Royall power, to pardon crimes, which Gods law saith, should be punished by death. Now this they call a power of Grace; but it is not a power of meere Grace.

But, 1. Though Princes may doe some things of Grace, yet not of meere Grace: because, what Kings doe, as Kings, and by vertue [Page 195] of their Royall office, that they do ex debito officii, by debt and rightKings, as Kings, cannot doe things of meere grace, because they must doe all ex debito officii, by necessitie of their office. of their office; and that they cannot but do, it not being arbitrarie to them to doe the debtfull acts of their office: But what they doe of meere grace, that they doe as good men, and not as Kings: and that they may not doe. As for example: Some Kings, out of their pretended prerogative, have given foure pardons to one man, for foure murthers: Now this the King might have left undone with­out sinne; But of meere grace he pardoned the murtherer, who killed foure men. But the truth is, the King killed the three last; because he hath no power in point of Conscience, to dispute with blood, Num. 35. 31. Gen. 9. 6. These pardons are acts of meere grace to one man; but acts of blood to the Communitie.

2. Because the Prince is the Minister of God for the good of the subject; and therefore the Law saith, He cannot pardon, and free the guilty, of the punishment due to him. Contra l. quod favore, F. de leg. l. non ideo minus. F. de proc. l. legata inutiliter. F. de lega. 1. And the reason is cleare; He is but the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill. And if the Judgement be the Lords, Rom-13. 4. not mans, not the Kings, as it is indeed, Deut. 1. 17. 2 Chron. 19. 6. he cannot draw the sword against the innocent, nor absolve the guil­tie, Prov. 17. 15. except he would take on himselfe to carve and dispose of that which is proper to his master. Now certaine it is, God only, univo­cally and essentially, as God, is the Judge, Ps. 75. 7. and God only and essentially King, Ps. 97. 1. Ps. 99. 1. and all men in relation to him, are meere ministers, servants, legates, deputies: and in relation to him equivocally and improperly, Iudges or Kings, and meere cre­atedKings, equivo­cally Kings. and breathing shadowes of the power of the King of Kings. And looke as the Scribe, following his own device, and writing what sentence he pleaseth, is not an officer of the Court in that point, nor the pen and servant of the Iudge: so are Kings, and all Iudges, but forged intruders, and bastard Kings and Iudges, in so far as they give out the sentences of men, and are not the very mouthes of the King of Kings, to pronounce such a sentence as the Almighty himselfe would doe, if he were sitting on the Throne or Bench.

3. If the King from any supposed prerogative Royall, may doe acts of meere grace, without any warrant of Law, because he is a­bove Law, by office: then also may he doe acts of meere rigorous Iustice, and kill and destroy the innocent, out of the same supposed [Page 196] Prerogative; For Gods word equally tyeth him to the place of aThe King may as well do acts of meer cruelty, from his sup­posed Preroga­tive, as acts of meer grace to one man, out of the same fountain. meere minister in doing good, as in executing wrath on evill doers, Rom. 13. 3, 4. And reason would say, he must be as absolute in the one, as in the other, seeing God tieth him to the one, as to the o­ther, by his office and place▪ yea by this, acts of Iustice to ill-doers, and acts of reward to well-doers, shall be arbitrary morally, and by vertue of office to the King, and the word Prerogative Royall saith this; for the word Prerogative is a supreme power absolute▪ that is loosed from all Law, and so from all reason of Law, and de­pending on the Kings meer and naked pleasure and will; and the word Royall or Kingly, is an Epithete of office, and of a Iudge, a created and limited Iudge, and so it must tye this supposed Prero­gative to Law, Reason, and to that which is debitum legale officii, and a legall duty of an office; and by this our masters the Royalists make God to frame a rationall creature, which they call a King, to frame acts of Royalty, good and lawfull, upon his own meer pleasure, and the super-dominion of his will, above a Law and Reason. And from this it is that deluded Counsellours, made King James (a man not of shallow understanding) and King Charls, to give pardons to such bloody murtherers, as James a Grant, and to go so far on, by this supposed Prerogative Royall, that King Charls in Parliament at Edinburgh, 1633. did command an high point of Religion, That Ministers should use in officiating in Gods service, such Habits and Garments as he pleaseth; that is, all the Attire and Habits of the idolatrous Masse-Priests, that the Romish Priests of Baal useth in the oadest point of idolatry (the adoring of Bread) that the earth has; and by this Prerogative, the King commanded the Service Book in Scotland, An. 1637. without or above Law and Reason. And I desire any man to satisfie me in this, If theIf Prerogative may over leap Law in one, why not in twenty▪ Kings Prerogative Royall, may over-leap Law and Reason in two degrees, and if he may as King, by a Prerogative Royall, command the body of Popery in a Popish Book; If he may not by the same reason, over-leap Law and Reason by the elevation of twenty de­grees; And if you make the King a Iulian (God avert, and give the spirit of revelation to our King) may he not command all the Al­caron, and the Religion of the Heathen and Indians? Royalists say, The Prerogative of Royalty excludeth not reason, and maketh not the King to [...] as a brute beast without all reason; but it giveth a power to a King to do by his Royall pleasure, not fettered to the dictates of a [Page 197] Law; for in things which the King doth by his Prerogative Royall, he is to follow the advice and counsell of his wise counsell, though their counsell and advice doth not binde the Royall will of the King. I answer, it is to me, and I am sure to many Learneder, a great question; If the will of any reasonable creature, even of the damned angels, can will, or chose any thing which their reason corrupted, as it is, doth not No Tyrant can do any th [...] most cruell act, but under the notion of apprehended good. dictate, hic & nunc to be good. For the object of the will of all men is good, either truely, or apparently good to the doer; for the devill could not suite in marriage souls, except he war in the cloths of an Angel of light; sin as sin cannot sell, or obtrude it self upon any, but under the notion of good. I think it seemeth good to the great Turk▪ to command innocent men, to cast themselves over a precipie two hundreth fadom high in the Sea, and drown them­selves to pleasure him: So the Turks reason (for he is rationall, if he be a man) dictateth to his vast pleasure, that that is good which he commandeth.

2. Counsellours to the King, who will speak what will please the Queen, are but naked empty Titles, for they speak que placent, non que prosunt; what may please the King whom they make glad with their lies, not what law and reason dictateth.

3. Absolutenesse of an unreasonable Prerogative, doth not deny Counsell and Law also; for none more absolute, de facto, I cannot say de jure then the Kings of Babylon, and Persia: for Daniel saith of one of them, Dan. 5. 19. Whom he would, he slew, and whom he would, he kept alive, and whom he would, he set up, and whom he would, he put down; and yet these same Kings did nothing, but by advice of their Princes and Counsellors, yea, so as they could not alter a decree and law, as is clear, Ester 1. 14, 15, 16, 17, 21. Yea Darius de facto an absolute Prince, was not able to deliver Daniel, because the Law was passed, that he should be cast into the Lions den, Dan. 6. 14, 15, 16.

4. That which the spirit of God condemneth as a point of Ty­rannyPretended Prerogative Royal of Roy­alists Tyranny Polanus in Da­niel, c. 5. 19. Rollocus, com. 16. ib. in Nebuchadnezzar, that is no lawfull Prerogative Royall: but the spirit of God condemneth this as Tyranny in Nebuchad­nezzar, That he slew whom he would, he kept alive whom he would, he set up whom he would, he put down, this is too God-like, Deut. 32. 39. So Polanus, Rollocus, on the place, say, he did these things, Vers. 19. Ex abusu legitime potestatis; for Nebuchadnezzars will in matters of death and life, was his Law, and he did what pleased [Page 198] himself above all Law beside, and contrary to it: and our flatterers of Kings draw the Kings Pretogative out of Ʋlpians words, who saith, That is a Law which seemeth good to the Prince; but Ʋlpian was far from making the Princes will a rule of good and ill, for he saith the contrary, That the Law ruleth the just Prince.

5. It is considerable here, that Sanches defineth the absoluteTh. Sanches de matr. tom. 1. l. 2. dis. 15. n. 3. est arb [...]rii pleni­tudo, nulli ne­cessitati sub­jecta, nullius (que) publici juris regulis limita ta. Baldus, l. 2. n. 40. C. de servit. & aqua. Sue [...]oni. in Ca­lign. cap. 29. memento tibi omnia, & in omnes licere. Coelius Rodigi, l. 8. Lect. An­tiq. c. 1. power of Kings to be a plenitude and fulnesse of power, subject to no necessity, and bounded with rules of no publick Law, and so did Bal­dus before him: but all Politicians condemn that of Caligula (as Suetonius saith) which he spake to Alexander the Great▪ Remember that thou maist do all things, and that thou hast a power to do to al men, what thou pleasest: And Lawyers say, that this is Tyranny: Chilon one of the seven wise of Greece (as Rodigi) saith better, Princes are like gods, because they onely can do that which is just. And this power being meerly Tyrannicall, can be no ground of a Royall Prerogative: There is another power (saith Sanches) absolute, by which a Prince dispenseth without a cause in a humane law; and this power, saith he, may be defended: but he saith, What the King doth by this absolute power, he doth it validè, validly, but not jure by Law; but by valid acts the Iesuite must mean Royall Acts, but no acts void of Law and Reason (say we) can be Royall Acts; for Royall Acts are acts performed by a King, as a King, and by a Law, and so cannot be Acts above, or beside a Law. It is true, a King may dispence with the breach of an humane Law, as a humane Law, that is, If the Law be death to any, who goeth up on the Walls of the Citie, the King may pardon any, who going up, discovereth the enemies ap­proach, and saveth the Citie. But, 1. The inferiour Iudge accord­ing to the [...] that benigne interpretation that the soul and in­tent of the Law requireth, may do this as well as the King. 2. All acts of independent Prerogative are above a Law, and acts of free­will having no cause or ground in the Law, otherwayes it is not founded upon absolute power, but on power ruled by Law and Reason: but to pardon a breach of the letter of the Law of man, by exponing it, according to the true intent of the Law and benign­ly, is an act of legall obligation, and so of the ordinary power of all Iudges; and if either King or Iudge kill a man for the violation of the Letter of the Law, when the intent of the Law contradictethVasquez, illust. quest. l. 1. c. 26. n. 2. the rigid sentence, he is guilty of innocent blood. If that learned Ferdin. Vasquez be consulted, he is against this distinction of a [Page 199] power ordinary and extraordinary in men; and certainly, if you give to a King a Prerogative above a Law, it is a power to do evill, as well as good; but there is no lawfull power to do evill, and Doct. Ferne is plunged in a contradiction by this, for he saith, Sect. A contradicti­on in Ferne. 9. pag. 58. I ask when these Emperours took away lives and goods at pleasure, Was that power ordained by God? No. But an illegall will and Tyranny: But, Pag. 61. The power though abused to execute such a (wicked) commandment, is an Ordinance of God.

It is objected 1. For the lawfulnesse of an absolute Monarchy.Treaties of Monarchicall Government. c. 2. pag. 6, 7. The Easterne, Persian, and Turkes Monarchy, maketh absolute Mo­narchy lawfull, for it is an Oath to a lawfull obligatory thing, and judgment, Ezech. 17. 16, 18. is denounced against Iudah, for breaking the Oath of the King of Babylon, and it is called the Oath of God, and doubtlesse was an Oath of absolute subjection, and the power, Rom. 13. was absolute, and yet the Apostle calleth it an Ordinance of God. The soveraignty of Masters over servanes was absolute, and the Apostle exhorteth not to renounce that title as to ridged, but exhorteth to mode­ration in the use of it,

Ans. That the Persian Monarchy was absolute, is but a facto ad jus, and no rule of a lawfull Monarchy, but that it was absolute, I beleeve not. Darius who was an absolute Prince (as many think)The King of Persia not ab­solute. but (I thinke not) would gladly have delivered Daniel from the power of a Law, and Dan. 6. 14. And he set his heart on Daniel to deliver him, and he laboured till the going downe of the Sun to deliver him, and was so sorrowfull, that he could not breake through a Law, that he interdicted himselfe of all pleasures of Musitians, and if ever he had used the absolutenesse of a Prerogative Royall, I con­ceive he would have done it in this, yet he could not prevaile: But in things not established by Law, I conceive Darius was absolute, as to me is cleare, Daniel 6. v. 24. but absolute not by a Divine Law, but, De facto, quod transierat in jus humanum, by fact, which was now become a lrw.

2. It was Gods Oath, and God tyed Iudah to absolute subjection,The Oath of Iudah to the King of Baby­lon tyed them notto renounce naturall selfe preservation. ergo people may tye themselves. It followeth not, except you could make good this inference, God is absolute, ergo the King of Babylon may lawfully be absolute; this is a blasphemous consequence. 2. That Iudah was to sweare the Oath of absolute subjection in the lati­tude of the absolutenesse of the Kings of Chaldea, I would see pro­ved; [Page 200] their absolutenesse by the Chaldean Lawes was to command murther, Idolatry, Daniel 3. 4, 5. and to make wicked Lawes, Dan. 6. v. 7, 8. I beleeve Ieremiah commanded not absolute subjection in this sence. But the contrary, Ier. 10. v. 11. They were to sweare the Oath in the point of suffering; but what if the King of Chaldea had commanded them all, the whole holy Seed, men, women and children, out of his Royall power, to give their neckes all in one day to his sword, were they obliged by this Oath to prayers and teares, and only to suffer? and was it against the Oath of God to defend themselves by Armes? I beleeve the Oath did not oblige to such absolute subjection, and though they had taken Armes in their owne lawfull defence, according to the Law of Nature, they had not broken the Oath of God. The Oath was not a tye to an absolute subjection of all and every one, either to worship Idols, or then to fly, or suffer death. Now the Service-booke commanded in the Kings absolute authority all Scotland to commit grosser Idolatry, in the intention of the work, if not in the intention of the Comman­der, then was in Babylon. (We read not that the King of Babylon pressed the consciences of Gods people to Idolatry) or that all should either fly the Kingdome, and leave their inheritances to Pa­pists and Prelates, or then come under the mercy of the sword of Papists and Atheists by sea or land. 3. God may command against the Law of Nature; and Gods Commandement maketh subjection lawfull; so as men may not now, being under that Law of God, defend themselves. What then? Ergo we owe subjection to absolute Princes, and their power must be a lawfull power, it no waies is consequent. Gods Commandement by Ieremiah made the subjecti­on of Iudah lawfull, and without that Commandement they might have taken Armes against the King of Babylon, as they did against the Philistines, and Gods Commandement maketh the Oath law­full. As suppone Ireland would all rise in Armes, and come and de­stroy Scotland, the King of Spain leading, then we were by this Ar­gument not to resist. 4. I [...] is denyed, that the power, Rom. 13. as abso­lute, is Gods ordinance. And I deny utterly that Christ and his A­postles did sweare non-resistence absolute to the Roman Emperour.

Obj. 2. It sesmeth, 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19. if well doing be mistaken by the reason and judgement of an absolute Monarch for ill doing, and we punished, yet the Magistrates will is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be submitted unto, because such a one suffereth by Law, [Page 201] where the Monarches Will is a Law, and in this case some power must judge. Now in an absolute Monarchy all judgement resolveth in the Will of the Monarch, as the supreame Law: and if Ancestors have submitted themselves by Oath, there is no repeale, or redresment.

Ans. Who ever was the Author of this Treatise, he is a bad de­fender of the defensive warres in England, for all the lawfulnesse of warres then must depend, on this. 1. Whether England be a conquered Nation at the beginning? 2. If the Law-will of an ab­solute Monarch, or a Nero be a reasonable Will, to which we must submit in suffering ill, I see not but we must submit to a reasonable will; if it be reasonable will in doing ill, no lesse then in suffering ill. 3. Absolute Will in absolute Monarches is no Iudge De jure, but an unlawfull and a usurping Iudge. 4. 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19. Servants are not commanded simply to suffer (I can prove suffering formally not to fall under any Law of God, but only patient suffering. I except Christ, who was under a peculiarServants are not by 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19. inter­dited of selfe­defence. commandement to suffer.) But servants, upon supposition that they are servants, and buffeted unjustly by their Masters, are by the A­postle Peter commanded, v. 20. to suffer patiently. But it doth not bind up a servants hand, to defend his owne life with weapons, if his Master invade him, without cause to kill him: otherwise if God call him to suffer, he is to suffer in the manner and way as Christ did, not reviling, not threatning. 4. To be a King and an absolute Master, to me are contradictory; a King essentially is a living Law. An absolute man is a creature, that they call a Tyrant, and no law­full King; yet doe I not meane, that any that is a King, and usur­peth absolutenesse, leaveth off to be a King: but in so far as he is ab­solute, he is no more a King, then in so far as he is a Tyrant. ButDeclar. at New Market, Mar. 9. 1641. further, the King of England saith in a Declaration. 1. The Law is the measure of the Kings Power. 2. Parliaments are essentially Lord Iudges to make Lawes essentially, as the King is, ergo the King is not above the Law. 3. Magna Charta saith the King, can doe nothing, Magna Charca against an ab­solute Prince. but by Lawes, and no obedience is due to him, but by Law. 4. Prescrip­tion taketh away the title of conquests.