I Was troubled not a little, to heare that you are so much troubled with the Covenant, as that your taking thereof and leaving all your meanes are put in the ballance. Your particular doubts if they were knowne, might no doubt receive particular satisfacti­on. Now at large, I conceive that as the publike difference of the State, so your private scruples may concerne, either the Ecclesiasticall Government, or the Poli­tike power of king and Parliament. In the former, you are loth perhaps to vow the extirpation of the Prelacy; In the other, you may stick at preserving the Rights of Parliament, and Liberties of Kingdome (which are your owne) with your estate and life; which as some interpret, is by a warre against the King that may seem unlawfull.

To begin with the former, give me leave to aske, whither you do thinke our Hierarchy to be prescribed by Gods Word, as alone necessarie for the Church; or only the best and most convenient, but that other formes of Church government be lawfull and allowable as well as that. If you conceive out late forme, absolutely necessary and alone,

[Page 2]1 You will finde it impossible to make good the whole frame of that Government, by any Scripture. Episcopacy it selfe, Diocesan Episcopacy doth labour much in proving its Originall Title to be divine. And the reverend Bishop whoJos. Nor. The Peace-maker, Sect. 6. undertooke that proofe, doth now acknowledge this forme not to be essentiall to the being of a Church, though much im­porting the well or better being of it. As for Deanes, and Chapters, Archdeacons, Chancellours, Commisseries, &c. much lesse can they plead any warrant from Gods Word.

2 It is too evident, that this government hath been verie much abused, by the pomp and pride, the avarice and sloth of the Clergie, by their too neare complyancy with the Idola­trous Church of Rome, by their medling too much in Civill and State aff [...]ires, improper for their calling; but especially, by the abominable corruption and fowle dealing of Chancel­lours, Commissaries, Registers, Proctors, and Apparators in Ecclesiasticall Courts. To say nothing of the Clergies depen­dance upon, and flatterng service to the Kings Court, in rai­sing the Kings power to the prejudice of the Kingdome, as it is generally conceived.

3 By that opinion of the divinitie of our late Government, you must needs condemne all other Protestand Churches, espe­cially those which are best reformed, and most agreeing with us in Doctrine, for want of that Government and Discipline, which alone, you say God hath appointed in his Church. But I hope you will be advised better, then to entertaine such a conceit, as may occasion so great a breach between us and all the true Churches of God, as if we alone were to set up lad­ders and go to heaven; other Nations, some for want of true Doctrine, others of Government and Discipline excluded all.

But if you do allow of other formes of Government as no way crossing, but agreeable to the Word of God, why should it be any scruple of conscience, in such an indifferent case, to joyne with the maine body of this Kingdome, in pulling down the Prelacy as an old decayed house, which is no way neces­sary, but hath been much abused and given great offence to many, yea conceived to be inconvenient for the safety of the [Page 3] Kingdome, and in setting up another forme, agreeable to Gods Word, more safe and pleasing to the people of the Land, and more complying with the best of the Protestand Churches a­broad? for you may observe how ever you vow your best endeavour, to extirpate the Hierarchy which the better and more religious sort of the whole Land, have much and long distasted; yet you do not vow to set up any other particular forme, but onely in generall, the best according to the Word of God, and example of the best and Reformed Churches, Which me thinks everie good man should desire and endea­vour of himselfe, though no Covenant were proposed, much more should he joyn with his whole Countrey, going before him, and calling for his assistance

Perhaps you may thinke (to come unto the other maine point) that there wanteth authority sufficient in these pro­ceedings; you may scruple at joyning in a Covenant, much more in Armes, and there to hazard your life and state against the King, as it seemes to many. And here indeed, there will be some worke to perswade you to a right understanding of things; so much hereto sore has the Kings power been cried up, especially by the Clergie, the choicest flowers of whose preferments did onely grow at Court, and the Parllament cri­ed downe as fast, especially by such as were desirous to prey upon the Kingdom without controule.

Now then first I say, that neither the Covenant nor the Arms are taken against the King, but for him both. In the Co­venant it is exprest, To defend the Kings Majesties person, and authoritie. And the Armes do speake as much, being sti­led for the King and Parliament; however the king being mis-advised by evill Councellours, do seeme in person to ap­peare against them. But had there been any evill intention a­gainst his Majestie, there might have been set up another Ma­jestie before this time: For my part, I am undoubtedly per­swaded, if he should really and fully comply with his Parlia­ment, he should have as glorious a Government, but far more easie, contented & sweet, then hitherto he hath ever enjoyed. A Physitian giveth his Patient a potion that seemeth bitter, [Page 4] and he is verie loth to take; and if the disease be unruly, he is bound too, without any evill will or meaning to wards him, but only for his health and good. Eares that have been long ac­quainted with the descanting musicke of flatterie, will at first much distast the harsh and plaine notes of truth, though indeed more truly harmonious.

I know verie well, there is no passing for me thus. It will be demanded, Who made the Parliament the Kings Physiti­ans? Or how may any Subjects take up Armes, though not against his Person, yet against his will? Yes: If truth may be spoken without offence, whereunto the Statutes for Trea­son heretofore gave small freedome. The Parliament may be called the Kings Physitians, and may also take up Armes, espe­cially in their owne defence, against his will, for his or the Kingdomes good.

Take wee that common Axiom for the ground of all, that Rule eternall, as the Peace-maker Sect. 22. sayes, which in a Kingdome, where tyranny prevaileth not, is unquestionable; Salus po­puli suprema Lex: The good and safetle of the people, and Kingdome, is the most fundamentall Law of all government. There cannot be well conceived any other aime or end, where­fore people should choose them Kings, or any other forme of Rule, but only for their owne defence and well-fare; and cer­tainly not for the good of their Kings or Governours prima­rily, but only in relation to their owne, and as it is involved in the common good of all. What Tyrants aimed at, who for­ced men under their subjection, as Nimrod and the like, it is no way materiall to speak of, when we deale upon lawfull and just Governments, such as our owne. A learned Doctor, Dr. Fearne in Conscience satisfied, Sect. 5. pleading the Kings cause, though hee hath heaped many er­rours about the originall of Government, which as occasion is offered, I shall discover, yet seemeth ingenuously to grant this Axiom, That the safetie of the Common-wealth is the highest end; and unto that end all other are meanes, and that the Higher Power ought to minister unto that end. And the Apostle Rom. 13. 4. doth plainly speak as much, He is the Minister of God for thy good, that is, the good of the Subject, of the People. [Page 5] The Minister of God he is called, because of Gods generall Or­dinance; the Minister of man also hee may be called, be­cause of the particular, whereof St. Peter speaks, Submit your selves unto all manner Ordinance of man. To say Kings are the ordinance of man subjectivè, or for the qualification of their power, may seeme rather a shift, than a credible exposition or answer. It is not likely St. Peter did dreame of either.

Now this being granted, that the well-fare of the People governed, is the originall and finall cause of all Government and Governours, even of Kings; see what building may be raised upon this foundation, what consequences depend upon it in generall: and so we will descend to our owne particular.

First, it followeth hence, That the Kingdome is not ordai­ded for the Kings use, benefit, or good; but the King is ordai­ned for the Kingdomes use, as the chiefe and supreme ordinarie meanes, to precure the Peoples well-fare and safetie. For that millions of men, of the same mold and temper, should be or­dained for the benefit of one, as it is most unnaturall and unrea­sonable, so doth it relish too much of the Tyrant and Slave.

Secondly, If the Kingdome or Peoples safetie be the highest end, and the King only the chiefe ordinarie meanes provided for this end; as the end is more noble Keckerm. System. Log. lib. 1. cap. 18. Canon. 5. de fine primario, ex Aristot. mag. mor. 1. 7. and excellent, and to be preferred before the means, as they are meanes; so is the whole Kingdome superiour to the King, and the King, though Singulis major, universis minor, Lesse than all in generall, though greater and above all in particular. And therefore in case it were necessarie, either for the King alone, or the whole Kingdome to be destroyed, who will not think it more just and reasonable, that one should save all, being ordained for their safetie, rather than all should perish to save one? Thou art worth ten thousand of us, say the people 2 Sam. 18. 3. to King David; but not worth thirteen hundred thousand, 2 Sam. 24. 9. for all that. It is true, the meanes materially may be better than the end: But I say as meanes, they are subordinate and inferiour. Now a King or Governour in his best notion is but a meane for the Subjects happinesse. It was indeed our Saviours infinite, but volunta­rie goodnesse, that being in the forme of God, &c. hee would [Page 6] so far emptie and debase himselfe, as to be the meane of mans salvation. Let us hold to humane, or naturall means. I know it is objected, the King is the Head and Highest, therefore no way inferiour. How the King is the Head and Supreme, is elsewhere declared. But a politike Head is much different from the naturall. This being taken off, the body dyes. Till that all government be taken away, the politike body dyes not. How­ever the Head bee highest in place, the Body is above it in dignitie, especially because it beares the Heart, the principall part by Aristotles Philosophy, Fountaine of Life, Mint of the Spirits, and prime Seat of the Soule.

Thirdly, if this were the condition of Government at the first institution, it must be the condition of all just and lawfull Governments unto this day, the Rule being eternall of Salus Populi: and wheresoever there is any failing or defect herein, there is so great a declination to Tyranny, more or lesse. And therefore it is most considerable how a Kingdome began, or what prerogatives and authoritie the King had allowed him from the beginning; if all be employed and referred to this maine end, all is well, and the Government good, otherwise it doth regenerate, and may be corrected, however it began.

Fourthly, the naturall end of Government needs not be set downe in a written convention or compact, as some Consc. satis­fied, Sect. 3. would have it; For beside, that when Government began in most Nations, they had no writing at all: It is impossible to ima­gine or conceive, that reasonable creatures should submit themselves to the rule and command of others, for no end, or any other end, beside their owne good. This cannot then but be supposed in all Governments, though no such convention appeare in writing.

Fifthly, if this end be disappointed, and they which have authoritie and power given them by the people, for the peo­ples good, impugne, crosse, and hinder the same, by spoyling, oppressing, and destroying them, that power and authoritie ceaseth ipso facto; there needeth no resuming of it, as some would have: For being given in relation to an end, that end failing, the meanes do fall of themselves. Nor can it be sup­posed, [Page 7] that any reasonable creatures would give authoritie and power against themselves, and to their owne hurt, or intended at first to continue the same to their owns destruction, which was given only for their defence and preservation. It fares too often with States, as with the Horse in the Fable,

Men are not tyed to the ordinarie Law of Horses, but if Belle­rophon will drive his Pegasus up to Heaven an unnaturall course, Pegasus may be bold to turne off his Rider upon the earth.

Sixtly, the peoples safety being the end of all just Govern­ments, if that should be invaded by the Governours or Kings themselves, whom they have trusted over them, some meanes must needs be allowed them, to preserve and recover the s [...]me. Otherwise mankind, may easily be frustrated by fraude or vi­olence, of the maine end, for the preserving whereof, they subjected themselves to Rulers, and that without all remedy: which as I conceive, ought not to be supposed. Now in such Kingdomes or Governments, as have Parliaments, Diets, and such full Assemblies of the States, these meanes of preserving Salus Populi, are more plaine, easie, and expedite, then else­where, because such generall Assemblies can both judge truly of such wrongs, and breach of common Liberties, and readily provide remedies for the same▪ both which are more slowly and hardly done, where such publike Assemblies are wan­ting: and therefore they be much more subject to tyrannies and oppressions, then the others are. But whensoever it ap­pears unto the Kingdome or Bodie of the people clearly, that the Governours in stead of procuring their good and safety, do spoile and oppresse them, as the obligation of rule and and sub­jection is presently void, the end failing upon which it was grounded, so they have liberty to provide for their owne wel­fare, either by reforming what was amisse, or by limiting and qualifying the Authority and Prerogitives of those Rulers, or removing that Government, or those evill Governours (in [Page 8] case of extreame necessity) and placing others is more hope­full meanes for the publike good; In all which, they may law­fully make use of their owne Strength, Power, and Armes, or any other, as occasion shall require. For that the chiefe end of all Government ought not to be frustrated and dis-ap­pointed. D. Fearne argues, because elect Monarches did suc­ceed Paternall Government, therefore they succeeded in the same right and condition free from coertion, and removalls as fathers were, and so meant under the names of fathers in the fift Com­mandement. But how followes it, because they followed Fa­thers, therefore they did follow in the same condition every way. Fathers have a naturall obligation, and a naturall affecti­on; strangers have not so, Fathers have no other Interest but their childrens good, strangers have, no it is certaine that ne­ver Fathers had any jurisdiction and power of the sword, or if ever they had, and grew tyrannous, its as certaine their chil­dren might cast off their Government, though not their Fa­therhood. As for the fift Commandement it belongs no more to Kings then other Governours, yea, and Teachers, Ma­sters, and other Superiours, whereof none so unmovable as Parents.

Seventhly, and last of all, That end must regulate Reckerm. System. Log. lib. 1. cap. 18. Canon. 4. de fine ult. ex A­ristot. Polit. 1: 6. & de Caelo 2. [...].74. all the meanes so, as they may best conduce for the attaining of the same. The King then being but a meanes, his Au­thoritie and Power must be regulated accordingly, as the people shall think meetest for their owne safety; and there­fore in our State as the Kingdom or people have 1. Intrusted their King with the cha [...]ge of seeing the Lawes executed, and obeyed, which are provided for their safety: so they have given Authority to the Parliament, by a neerer trust, both to devise and make new Lawes, abrogating the unusefull, and declaring the doubtfull and obscure, with the Kings consent in all, who is the chiefe Minister in executing the same. 2 So likewise to visit and correct all abuses in the State, yea to exa­mine the Kings owne proceedings whether he hath rightly discharged his great trust, and to controule his actions in case they swerve or decline from the bias of the publike good: and [Page 9] here is the Physick I speak of. 3 Which controuling, if it be withstood, and find strong lets and opposition, they may law­fully take up Armes without and against the Kings will, upon occasion. Fourthly and lastly, in case there should fall a diffe­rence between the King and his Parliament, upon or concer­ning the Premisses, it is the safest way for a subject both in conscience and common wisdome, to adhere unto the Par­liament.

I know you may doubt of, and question all these four par­ticulars according to those principles of Divinity and State, which a great faction of your shire and some other places have ignorantly followed. I will therefore endeavour to make them all good, and clear severally thus:

That the King is intrusted by the Realme with his Au­thoritie, doth appeare partly, because from thence he hath his power: partly, because he cannot receive his Authoritie or Power from anie other: and lastly, because the Kingdome hath received a Superiour Authoritie to examine and controule his proceedings.

The first reason is, The King hath his Power from the Kingdome and therefore his Authoritie. I must crave leave to distinguish these termes, which commonly are confounded and obscure this whole businesse. Authoritie then, is a right or lawfulnesse to command, and to challenge obedience; such as all Governours and Magistrates have, more or lesse. But Power is a lawfull ability to force obedience, if upon chal­lenge and command it be denyed. These are two different things, because they may bee, and are many times separated; One may have a just and lawfull right to command, that wants compulsive meanes for coertion. Others may have great strength to force, commonly called power, that are destitute of authority to command: and power is that which in all Go­vernments bears the greatest sway; and therefore in the Scrip­ture Rom. 13. and elswhere, it is taken concretively, for the Governours and Magistrates themselves, which have power at command, to force obedience unto their commands. Now there is no doubt, but the King hath full authority to command [Page 10] according to law, all such as by law are subject into him. But if upon his commands obedience be denyed, whence I pray, hath he▪ a lawfull ability to force it? whence hath he power to make his authority good▪ but from the people? of himself he cannot have it, being but one man, not having the strength of anie more; whereas this ability doth require the strength of many. Vis unita fortior, vis om [...]ium unita fortissi [...], many hands are abler then one; but the hands of all, ablest of all. To keep a strong guard for this purpose, especially of strangers, Aristotle and all that write of Politie will tell you, that it is the propertie of Tyrants; nor is such ability P [...]test [...]s but Vis, vi­olence not power, because unlawfull. And to keep an Army on foot continually, under other pretences thereby to affright and force his subjects, is little better: Therefore the Kings power must needs come from his owne peoples hands, and strength, and from the same people must needs come his au­thoritie therefore. If any other should give him authoritie, that were not able to make it good by power, it were given him but in vaine; nor were the people bound to make that good, which themselves give not. Whence he hath his power then, from thence he must needs receive his authority also, even from the Kingdome.

Nor indeed can hee receive it from any other. I heare some speak, and preach, and write also, but see no proofe, that Kings have their authoritie and power immediately from God. And sure, if they could fetch downe fire from Heaven, as Elias did, or strike men dead with the breath of their mouths, as S. Peter did, for disobedience; I should grant their power descended immediately from Heaven. But wee neither see, nor heare of any such miracles wrought by Kings. No power then imme­diately from God, and therefore no authoritie, otherwise than all other Magistrates have. For as by Gods wisdom Kings do raigne, and Princes decree justice, Prov. 8. 15. Even so by the same, do the Nobles rule, and all the Judges of the earth, ver. 16. And Rom. 13. 1. There is no Power but of God, that is, as it is expounded in the same place, not only ordained, but ordred by God, secundùm sub & supra, in severall ranks, higher & lower. [Page 11] Kings then have their power from God no more than inferior▪ Governours, Caesar Ioh. 19. 11. no more than Pilate. So far as God ap­proveth of, and hath ordained all Societies of mankind, and Go­vernments and Governours, both high and low, so far all au­thoritie, and all power that is employed in discharging and maintaining the same, is in generall from God; but imme­diately from the People, executing the Ordinance of God. And therefore S. Peter, Eph. 2. 13. sayes plainly thus, Everie Governour, both high and low, supreme and subordinate, is [...], an humane ordination, or creature. Now then to answer as the Doctor does, that this is taken subjectively, in regard of the power it selfe, which is from God causally, and placed in man as the subject, or els to be understood of the qualifications, and severall waies of executing that power in severall termes of Government. These may seem rather shifts▪ then solutions or expositions, the former being strained against the former meaning of the words; the latter such as (it is not likely) S. Peter ever dreamt of, being both against the straine of Interpreters. For were it so that God immediately gave unto Kings their ruling power; First, no other forme of Govern­ment were lawfull, so that Aristocracies, and Democracies, be­ing humane inventions, as Dr. Feanne Consc. satif­fied, Sect 3. sayes, would have no▪ warrant from God for their proceedings▪ and for want of such divine authoritie and power, as many [...]elons as they exe­cuted, so many murthers they committed; and as many fines or mulcts as they levied, so many robberies. Mee thinks our neighbours, the States of Holland, the Swissers, Grisons, and free Cities of Germany, should not▪ rolish well this new do­ctrine. Secondly, if Royall Authoritie came altogether from Heaven, it should by right be the verie same upon all the earth▪ But we find it far otherwise; no two States in the world al­lowing their Princes the verie same authoritie, in all points. In some things (perhaps) the Spanyard hath▪ more than the▪ English, in some others the English more than he, the French more than both, the Dane, Swede, Polander▪ and Scottish▪ lesse than any of them. The Turk, Chinoys, and other such▪ absolute Princes, more than all these. Yet all Kings▪ Do some (I pray) take lesse authoritie than God allowes them, or do o­thers▪ [Page 12] take more? How may it be knowne, how far Gods al­lowance goes? No Scripture doth resolve it. And I presume, there came no Angell from Heaven to order it. These limita­tions and qualifications of power, Dr. Fearne Consc. satis­fied, Sect. 3. sayes, are meer inventions of men. But is it lawfull for men to limit, or quali­fie that, which God himselfe hath otherwise, and more fully ordred? Certainly, if this be unlawfull, as it cannot be other­wise, if God himselfe be the immediate Author of Royall Au­thoritie, then all the Realmes in Christendome do verie much offend. For in all, the absolute power of Kings is limited, though in all diversly. This is acknowledged to proceed from the People, as correcting Gods Ordinance, which without all doubt, is not in any Peoples power to do. And therefore all Kings may take upon them, nay ought indeed to take upon them, an absolute and arbitrarie power, nor is it any treason to perswade them therunto, if that be from God, and these limia­tions & qualifications, meere inventions of men. I know not whither wee shall run anon, by following this new doctrine. Yet some where I have seen thirteene, I cannot say, proofs, (they were so weak) but offers, to make good the immed [...] Commission of Kings from heaven; all so short and wide from the mark, that I should wrong the Reader to repeat them. For either in generall they show, that Kings & all Goveronrs indeed are authorized by Gods generall Ordinance, & the par­ticulars of them assigned by God his especiall providence, or els they concern Moses and the Kings of the Israelites, which doth no way concerne other Kings: when I heare such an ex­presse testimonie for others, as I read Deut. 17. 15. for those Kings, Thou shalt make him King over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose, it will be credible to me, that God hath an immediate hand, if not in their authority, yet in their personall assignement: And till we have some more likely proofe then hitherto I have seen, give us leave to suppose still, that those men who have limited the authority of Kings (by their owne confession) did first give the same. I find no proofe at all, that such authoritie comes from God: till then I may well sup­pose, that those men who have limited the authoritie of Kings, did at first give it.

[Page 13]Last of all, if the King were not entrusted with his Com­mand, by the Kingdom, how could the Kingdom have Au­thority, to examine and controll his proceedings, in the dis­charge thereof? But this Authority they have, and do en­trust the Parliament therewith; as now I am to prove upon the second point; upon which the former point will necessarily follow.

Secondly, that the Parliament hath full Authority from the Realm, to examine the Kings proceedings, and to controll them if irregular, that is, either trespassing against the known Laws, or otherwise encroaching upon the Subjects liberty and safety, common experience, and the continuall practise of Parliaments doth make it evident. Indeed his Person they do not strike at, and to blemish his dignity and honour, they do spare all that may be, in the eyes of Subjects and stran­gers; that he may still retain his full glory and lustre, both at home and abroad. And it is presum'd, that he does nothing personally, and therefore nothing against the Laws, but one­ly by Ministers and Agents. But all his unlawfull acts by such Ministers, they do reverse, and punish the Instruments them­selves, though immediately commanded by the King. Now this they can no otherwise do, but as they are authorized by the Kingdom; whereof the Noblemen are a part themselves, the House of Commons, chosen by the Commons of the Land. Nor indeed can they well have any other abuses to reform, but such as the King either commands, or approveth, and connives at. For all others commonly, are redressed by the King, and ordinary Courts of Justice. But such enormities, as grow at Court, either by command, or toleration and connivence, the Parliament onely can redresse. And therefore have Courtiers so much possest His Majesty against Parlia­ments, as if they did eclipse his Glory, because they may not themselves grate upon the Subjects, and play Rex quietly, without question and censure of Parliament. Dr Ferne, Cons. satis­fied. Sect. 4. seems to allow the Parliament no Authority, but onely an assentin making Laws with His Majestie. But this power of visiting the publick abuses, both in Court and Kingdom, is every [Page 14] whit as great, and as necessary a Power, for maintaining of Salus Populi. And beside the command of the Subjects purses, in granting of Subsidies, which onely belongs to the Parlia­ment, is a great and very considerable Authority. As for ma­king Laws, if weele speak properly, the King doth rather as­sent to them, who bring the Acts ready penn'd and Voted, then they to him. Certainly a great providence and blessing of God it is, that we have the benefit of Parliaments, to purge out such corruptions, as will daily grow, in so great a poli­tick body. Otherwise, in a few yeers (as by dear experience we have lately found) by the flattery, and craft of mischie­vous wits, working for their own covetous and evill ends, the liberty of the Subject, and the safety of the Realm, would be quickly undermined and overthrown.

Thirdly, But if the Parliament should be withstood, or di­sturb'd; if opposition made to hinder them, in reforming the abuses of Court and Countrey, and providing due means for the safety of the people, (which was my third point) must they sit still then, and quietly suffer such abuses as they can not reform? And shall the safety of the State suffer, through their weaknesse and disability? No doubt but Salus Populi, the welfare of the Realm, which is the chief end of Govern­ment, ought to be better provided for, then so. If such obsta­cles come in their way, as can not be removed by ordinarie means, no doubt but the Kingdom is to allow them power, to make the Authority good, where with they have entrusted them, and to preserve their own safety. Otherwise the Autho­rity is all in vain, because every opposition and disobedience may hinder the execution and discharge thereof; and so the publick weal may suffer without all remedy. As Philoso­phy saies, Frustra est potentia, que nunquam reducitur in actum: Such a natural faculty is in vain, which cannot be actuated; so is that Authoritie in a State, which every disturbance may frustrate and disappoint. Now as Aristotle sayes of God and Nature, so it is to be presumed of a Kingdom, that it doth nothing in vain; and therefore, that together with Autho­ritie, it gives power also (having all the power in its own [Page 15] hands) to enable the discharge thereof. This power can be no other then Posse Regni, the Militia of the Kingdom; Quid enim contra vim, sine vi fieri potest. Forcible opposition must have forcible resistance. This Posse Regni then in case of ne­cessity, the Parliament may, and ought, to raise and employ, even without the King, if he do crosse himself, or joyn with such as disturbe them in their proceedings.

I know here comes in a great out-cry, against Rebellion; as if it could be no lesse, for any to take up Arms, without, or against the Kings will. And true it is in some sence. Un­derstand the right thereof, and then judge. For private men, of their own heads; nay more, for Magistrates, Officers, Go­vernors, be they never so many, never so great, which derive their Authoritie from the King, and therefore in respect of him are as private men, to raise a War by their own Autho­rity, without him, much more against him is legall Rebel­lion. But the Parliament derives their Authoritie, not from the King, though he be entrusted with assembling and dis­solving them: no more then a Trumpeter gives authority to fight, when he gives the Signall. But all their Authoritie doth come from the Kingdom; whereof one part is present personally, the Nobles, and the other part by their choice Atturneys. And all these, have so much a neerer trust from the Kingdom, then the King himself, as all their private In­terests, are more concentrick to Salus Populi, the publick good. For the King hath a proper center of his own to move about; he hath private ends, and different Interests from the people, for his Prerogatives, and Family. In regard whereof, though he hath a very great trust, yet may they not in any discretion, give him so neer a trust, as to the Parlia­ment. And therefore the Parliament taking up Arms, and au­thorizing others, for their own defence, being threatned, hindered, and disturbed in their proceedings, and Salus Po­puli, the common Liberty not yet secur'd, which had lately been so much wrong'd, they are no waies liable to the charge of Rebellion, nor any that joyn with them to vindicate the Kingdoms Interest; but those rather, who presume to turn [Page 16] the Arms of the Kingdom against it self, and against the Parliament, for discharging faithfully and zealously that trust, which the Kingdom hath reposed in them. Now against the former, private men, and others of Authority, that hold from the King, the Scriptures, which are alledged common­ly out of Rom. 13. and other places, may have place; and the Statutes of the Realm also. But against the Parliament, who themselves are of those higher powers, whereof St Paul speak­eth, no Scripture doth speak, nor hath any Statute force.

You may demand perhaps, why the Parliament never took up Arms before, if it be a thing so lawfull. Tis true. Though in behalfs of Parliaments much blood hath been shed in this Land, yet hath it not been usuall for the Parliaments them­selves to manage a War, because it hath been hitherto in some sort impossible. For the Kings having the trust of cal­ling and dissolving, have ever used, to call slowly, and dis­solve speedily, upon the least offer of distaste. I remember an old ryme to this purpose, Much complain'd of, little amend­ed. Subsidies granted, Parliament ended: so that many of the common sort beleeved, there was no other use of, nor busines for a Parliament, but to grant Subsidies. No thinking for them of a War, that were so uncertain of their own continu­ance. Now these present Arms were begotten by Necessity, and brought forth by Opportunity. The Parliament intend­ing a through-reformation, and corruptions being grown to a great head, through so many nullities, and so long discon­tinuance of Parliaments, they were not able to compasse their intents, without the discontents of many. For to redresse publick Inconveniences, it could not be, but many personall mischiefs must be endured in private. This bred great store of Malignants; and they threatned great stormes of danger to the Reformers: At last, the King himself was drawn away, with intent to disturb all by Arms; as did appear by the L: Digbies Letter, by the Kings guard (as some * call it) raised at Ysrk, and other discoveries. Now unlesse the Parliament, would suffer the wheel to carry all back again with violence, [Page 17] which they had done, and expose themselves and heirs to utter ruine, for their good service, they must needs defend themselves and their proceedings, and secure their own and their Countreys safetie, with the Arms and power of the Countrey which had entrusted them. Yet had they under­taken this all in vain, if Gods providence, and their own wisedom, had not extraordinarily provided them an oppor­tunity. For if things had stood as heretofore, the King might have suddenly dissolved the Parliament, and exposed them all, to the fury of discontented Malignants. But they seeing at first, what a Hydra of corruptions they were to en­counter withall, in a through-reformation, obtained of His Majestie an Act, for continuation of this Sitting, untill they had finished all their designes. Having this assurance, they resolved to venture the hazard of a War, rather then to be­tray their own, and the Kingdoms safety. 'Twas not their desire, but fear; Being unwilling and forc't thereunto, accor­ding to the goodnesse of their Cause, God hath prospered their endeavours, and judged on their side. And it may be well hoped, this short War, will occasion a long and a happy Peace. It is the travail of our Kingdom, for the time pain­full. But when the Man-childe is born into the world, and the thorough-reformation perfected, no doubt, but there will be much and lasting joy over the whole Land, for the short sorrow that it hath endured.

Fourthly, Now to come unto that which was proposed in the last place; In such a difference betweene the King and Parliament, as now is fallen, that it is safer to trust our selves on the Parliaments side, both in conscience and wise­dome, thus it may appeare. 1. Though it were doubtfull or obscure, on which side the justice of this Cause did stand; yet let us consider, that the highest point of Supreame au­thority in this Kingdom doth consist in repealing and ma­king of Lawes. As for executing them after they are made, with other circumstances of government, calling Assemblies,Dr Fearne Cons satisfied. Sect. 4. Treating with forreine Princes, sending Embassies, Ap­pointing officers of state, and Judges of Courts &c. In all [Page 18] which the Parliament also may interpose, if they sinde it ex­pedient for the common safety, these are but small matters in comparison of enacting obligatory Lawes. This highest and Supreame authority of the Realme, is placed in a full Parliament; though for the execution of Laws, and ordinary Administration, the supremacy be in the King alone and al­so in relation to the Pope, to forreign Princes and States as the oath of Supremacy and Alleagiance doe declare. And this full Parliament doth consist of three parts, the King, the Peeres, and the House of Commons. But they must all agree, and goe together. Neither the King and Commons without the Nobility, nor yet the King and Nobles without the Commons can doe it. Now in such equall and coordinate powers, if upon a difference one should stand against two, is it not safter in Conscience for a subject, to joyne with two of them against one, then with one against two? especially to joyne with those two, which have the neerest trust, of preser­ving our liberty & safety recommended to them? Secondly, The Parliaments cause, doth cleerly appeare to be more ju­stifyable. For all their proceedings have been warrantable, as by the first ground of all government, in maintayning populi salutem, the publicke good, so according to the setled constitution of this kingdome, in reforming grand enormi­ties; and when they could not otherwise secure themselves or the kingdome; in taking the power of the kingdome, which had entrusted and authorized them, to make their Acts good against Delinquents and Malignants; & all such as went about to reverse or disturbe their proceedings, and destroy their persons. On the other side, the King deserted them, purposely, to joyne with such Delinquents and Ma­lignants, in armes against them, to hinder them, and in them the publike good. What then can there be safer for a mans conscience to rest upon, then the goodnesse of a cause in such a maine difference? The Parliament did but their duties; and for doing that, were in danger of utter undoing. The King voluntarily forsooke them, with intention (as it is con­ceiv'd) to have destroyed them, had He prevailed. Was it [Page 19] not just then for them to defend themselves, with the power of that kingdome, in whose cause and service they were like to suffer? Lastly, in ordinary wisdome, is it not fitter for one of us, ordinary subjects, to adhere unto those, who maintaine our Interests and liberty, & of whose Assemblies our children may be members; then to venture our lives and fortunes for the Prerogative, wherein neither we, nor our children have any hope of Interest, but is rather prejudi­ciall, and to the great disadvantage of us and ours, as it hath been managed? Nay more; for us to desert the Parlia­ment by neutrality, who doe hazard their lives and estates for us and our good, without any private hope or end of their owne; much more to appeare against them, to the ha­zard of our owne lives and fortunes, can it be any thing bet­ter then foule unthankefulnesse, and extreme folly? By this time, I hope, Sir, you have receiv'd so much content and sa­tisfaction, to the principall doubts, that petty scruples shall not worke upon you so far, as to make you liable to those two illiberall vices. Tis true. They are not many yeares, since you left the University, where young wits, doe use to dreame of nothing but Bishopricks and Archbyshopricks. But you are become a man and put away childishnesse; you are setled in a place, where to do God, his Church, and your Country service. I know your meekenesse and ingenuity, is far from their ambitious humour, who rellish nothing, but Dignities in the Church, and Court preferments: contem­ning the meane rusticity of countrey ministers. I pray let these men themselves enjoy their humour. Doe you but fol­low your owne quiet and milde temper, I doubt not, but what I have written may prevaile, though for want of time and bookes not written with that diligence, as the weight of the matter did require. Let me intreate you, seriously to consider of these things; And the All-wise God give you a right understanding in them all.