Hereby it appears, That if Money could be increaſed ſo, as to be always equal in velue to what Mens Eſtates are otherwiſe worthWhereby for every twenty ſhillings that men have in their hands, one time with another, they would then have above One hundred pound, to the abundant Multiplication of Mens expences; and by conſequence of Trading., (though never ſo much multiplied by ſuch Increaſe of Money) it would be a means ſuddenly to Ingroſs all the Trade and Riches that the World could afford for Money.

Object. But would not ſuch plenty of Money produce ſome notable Inconvenience?

Anſw. If Mens hands were never ſo full of Money, the Inconvenience muſt either be, That there is ſo much the more kept by, or ſo much there more laid out.

The Money kept by, doth but imbolden Men to live the more comfortably, whereby Trade is the quicker.

The Money laid out, likewiſe doth no more harm, then what it doth by Increaſing Trade and Riches.

Object. But ſuch plenty of Money would raiſe the price of Commodity.

Anſw. No otherwiſe then by occaſioning more Commodity to be ſold in the year then formerly; in which reſpect any Increaſe of Trade whatſoever, is as much liable to raiſe the price of Commodity.

This Objection might be much more fully Anſwered, but that I here intend all poſſible brevity, refering to the aforeſaid Treatiſe.

I anſwer, If Mens Credit may be tranſmitted each to other in Bills, and ſetled upon ſuch firm Security, as Men may be willing (of their own accord) to accept thereof in ſtead of Money (as ſometimes they do Bills of Exchange) it muſt needs follow, That the Revolution of ſuch Bills would Increaſe Trade as much, as if the ſame were ready Money;

The rather, becauſe thoſe Bills are not like to be hoorded up as Money is.

And this (ſeeing Mens Credits are equal in value to what their Eſtates are otherwiſe worth, in Houſes, Lands, Ships, Goods, or whatſoever) muſt needs tend to Increaſe Trade and Riches, according to the proportion already premiſed.

To this end therefore, let it be admitted,

1. That ſome effectual means be diſcovered, for preventing the falſifying of the ſaid Bills, which I ſhall undertake to demonſtrate in due time.

2. That the ſecurity for making good any of theſe Bills (or all of them at once, if required) be as firm as that of the Chamber of London, Bank of Amſterdam, or any Bills of Exchange; viz. To make them good either in Money at the end of ſix Moneths, or in Commodity immediately: The way to effect which, I ſhall here diſcover.

And then (I ſay, in this Caſe) Men would be willing to accept of theſe Bills for Commodity in ſtead of Money, as I come now to prove.

1. That in Flanders this way of Trading upon Bills, is ordinary, and much preferred before that way of dealing upon Credit, here uſed.

2. If Men be willing here to part with their Ware upon the private Credit of one another (as now they do) they would much rather accept of ſuch ſecurity for their Ware, as that of the Chamber of London, &c.

3. Though Bills or Bonds be ſlighted, when the Security for Payment of them is not good; yet if the Security be unqueſtionable, Men are willing to part with Money, much more with Commodity upon ſuch Security.

4. If the Security for making good theſe Bills in Money within Six Moneths, were equal to that of the Chamber of London, Monyed men would advance ready Money for them, upon Rebatement of Intereſt; neither would any Man refuſe to take them for Commodity, at the rate they would yield in ready Money.

5. If moſt Men ſhould refuſe to take them, then the Trading would go all to thoſe that ſhould accept of them.

6. Hereby the Wiſer ſort of Men would accompt it their great advantage, to publiſh themſelves willing to take them with Rebatement of Intereſt, ſeeing at leaſt they have ſufficient Security for making them all good within Six Moneths; and, rebating for Intereſt, are able to procure ready Money for them.

7. As in theſe Reſpects few would refuſe them, ſo thoſe that ſhould accept of them, might eaſily put them off upon thoſe they conſtantly deal with, much rather then their own ſingle Credit: And if ſome be willing to take them, others will not refuſe them, becauſe they know whither to go with them.

IT were a weak Objection to alleage, That this were no other then to Imbaſe the Coyn, or put Paper in the place of Money; For

1. Theſe Bills need not be made currant by Law, (as baſe Money muſt) but by the Peoples Conſent.

2. Braſs or Leather Money hath not an Intrinſecal value; whereas there being ſufficient Security given to make good theſe Bills when required, it is equivalent to an Intrinſecal value.

3. The Counterfeiting (and by conſequence the Multiplying of Braſs or Leather Money beyond all bounds) could never yet be prevented; which as to theſe Bills may effectually be done, as I have already undertaken to make good.

4. There is no Inconvenience in this way of Trading upon Bills, which is not much more lyable to the ordinary way of dealing upon Truſt.

For, if a Man can take up Ware upon his bare word to pay at a certain time; what hurt can it do the Creditor, to take a Bill under his hand?

If a third Perſon knowing the Debitors Sufficiency, will accept of this Bill, with rebatement of Intereſt for that time in ſtead of Money, and thereupon furniſh the Creditor with Commodity; it not this better then if he had been forced to ſtay for the Money?

If this third Perſon take up as much Ware from this Debitor, as the Bill, with Rebatement of Intereſt, amounts to, and returns his own Bill for ſatisfaction; hath either the one or the other any prejudice thereby?

And thus, though Mens words cannot, yet their Credit in Bills may be tranſmitted to the ſecond, third, fourth, fifth hand, &c. whereby fully to ſupply the place of ſo much Money, to the abundant Multiplication of Trade and Riches; and that without the leaſt Inconvenience, other then what is already Incident to the ordinary way of Trading on Credit.

And that each of the Members be bound to make good his proportion of the Bills brought in to the ſaid Office, within (ſuppoſe) four Moneths time, after notice thereof left at his houſe in writing.

Now, this being the ſubſtance of the Ingagement (to omit other things) it will be needful in the next place, a little to open the nature thereof.

That ſo long as any of them go about in the place of Money, the ſaid ſix Moneths time doth not commence, but the Money due upon theſe Bills from the ſaid Company, is forborn.

And when the Bills ſhall be brought in, then they have ſix Moneths time to pay for the Ware which they did procure upon ſuch Bills.

And though all theſe Bills ſhould be ſent in at once, yet the ſecurity will be abundantly ſufficient to make them good within ſix Moneths, as ſhall be immediately proved.

Neither will the Company be any thing prejudiced thereby; for having procured Wave upon their Bills, before they parted with them, they are hereby onely required to pay for the ſame in Money, within the time appointed.

Yet it is not probable, that any conſiderable number of them will ever be brought in together; and thoſe that ſhall be ſo brought in, the Company exchanging for Money, may make uſe of immediately in ſtead of ſuch Money.

I ſay in this caſe, it can hardly be imagined, That one of the Undertakers amongſt an hundred, could ſo fail, as neither he nor his Sureties ſhould be able to make good the loſs.

2. It is not the failing of one in an hundred, that can make the loſs ſo conſiderable, but that the one per Cent. given for Inſurance, much more the whole eſtates of all the Inſurers, yea, and the eſtates of all the Undertakers, together with their Sureties, are fully able to make good.

3. It cannot be imagined, That thoſe few failers can both in themſelves and Sureties fail ſo, as not to make good the moſt part of what was borrowed by them.

Now, except the loſs be ſo great, as neither the ſailers with their Sureties, nor the whole Company of Inſurers, nor yet the whole Company of Undertakers with all their Sureties, be able to make good by their whole eſtates, the ſecurity for making good theſe Bills, according to the terms propoſed, is a firm as any which on earth can be given.

And how any ſuch loſs ſhould happen without ſome general confuſion, (by ſurpriſal of an enemy or ſuch like) cannot be imagined; To the danger of which, the ſecurity of the Chamber of London, mens trading on credit without theſe Bills, nay their eſtates in their own hands, is no leſs liable.

Yet I ſay, That the Loan of theſe Bills ſhall be much greater advantage to the borrowers, then if they were proffered the Loan of ſo much Money gratis.

For hereby the deal in ſuch a kinde of Money, as will be ſure not to go far about, without returning with as much in other Money upon their own hands (they being the onely perſons that are engaged to take it;) whereas thoſe that borrow the uſual currant Money now abroad, ſo ſoon as ever they lay it out, are never like to ſee it again.

Now this quick and thick Revolution of Bills (with as much in Money) through their hands, ſhall multiply their Trading to the utmoſt degree that they are poſſibly able to manage, as is fully cleared in my aforeſaid Treatiſe.

If the hazzard of being bound each for other, be objected:

I anſwer, The hazard is no whit greater then to be bound for the Chamber of London, or Bank of Amſterdam, in any thing wherein a whole Company of Inſurers ſhould be bound to ſave them harmleſs: For,

1. The whole Company of Undertakers have ſufficient Security from each particular Member.

2. If one Member amongſt many ſhould fail, both in himſelf and Sureties, the Inſurers muſt ſave the Undertakers harmleſs.

3. It is not to be doubted, but the Inſurers will be careful enough to take ſuch Security as the one per Cent. given for Inſurance, ſhall on time with another, more then make good all the loſſes incident to this undertaking; The contrary to which muſt not be granted.

4. If it might be admitted, that any ſuch thing could happen once in an age, wherein neither the one per Cent. nor yet the whole eſtates of the Inſurers, would be able fully to make good the loſs, yet not any one perſon alone, but the whole Company of Undertakers, are to diſcharge the reſt proportionably, wherein each mans ſhare would ſcarce be conſiderable.

5. The ordinary way of Trading upon Truſt, is liable to much greater hazard, which by this means will be made altogether needleſs.

For in the ſaid ordinary way of Trading, men uſe not either to take Security from their Debtors (muchleſs to inſure that Security) or to have any to bear the leaſt ſhare of the loſs, that frequently happens by truſting them.

Whereas thoſe of this Engagement, ſeeing they may have as much Trading with ready pay in Money and Bills, as they are able to manage, ſhall not need to truſt any man whoſoever.

Yet if the difficulty of procuring Security, and the hazard of being bound each for other, do ſtick in mens mindes;

I ſhall propoſe a way for removing of both, to thoſe whom it concerns, when need requireth.