Autokatakrisis, or, Self-condemnation, exemplified in Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hickman. With occasional reflexions on Mr Calvin, Mr Beza, Mr Zuinglius, Mr Piscator, Mr Rivet, and Mr Rollock: but more especially on Doctor Twisse, and Master Hobbs; against whom, God's purity and his præscience ... with the sincere intention and the general extent of the death of Christ, are finally cleared and made good; and the adversaries absurdities ... are proved against them undeniably, out of their own hand-writings. With an additional advertisement of Mr Baxter's late book entituled The Groatian religion discovered, &c. By Thomas Pierce rector of Brington in Northampon-shire.

'ΑΥΤΟΚΑΤΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ, OR, Self-Condemnation, EXEMPLIFIED In Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hickman. WITH OCCASIONAL REFLEXIONS On Mr Calvin, Mr Beza, Mr Zuinglius, Mr Piſcator, Mr Rivet, and Mr Rollock: BUT MORE ESPECIALLY On DOCTOR Twiſſe, and MASTER Hobbs; AGAINST WHOM, God's Purity and his Praeſcience, and his Eternal Decrees according to Praeſcience, (commonly called Reſpective or Conditional Decrees) with the ſincere intention and the general extent of the Death of Chriſt, are finally cleared and made good; And the Adverſaries Abſurdities (confeſſed by themſelves to be unexcuſable) are proved againſt them undeniably, out of their own hand-writings.

WITH An ADDITIONAL ADVERTISEMENT Of Mr Baxter's late Book Entituled The Grotian Religion diſcovered, &c.

By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of Brington in Northampton-ſhire.

London, Printed by J.G. for R. Royſton at the Angel in Ivy-lane, 1658.

TO THE READER. Chriſtian Reader,

THAT I preſume to entertain thee with this Additional Importunity in vindication of thoſe things ſo largely inſiſted upon already in ſeveral Tracts, to wit the Truth and Goodneſs of God's Decrees, and the things that are conſequent thereunto, there is this (amongſt other reaſons) to be alledged for an excuſe, that 'tis intended to be the last. Or if I live to grow worthier of bringing my thoughts into the light, as it is not likely to be in haſte, ſo I hope it will be in ſome other kind.

I wiſh that ſome had remembred whileſt they were men of ripe years, what we all have been taught in our ſeveral childhoods, that there are four ſorts of things which ſhould not be drawn into diſpute; but either be granted, or rejected, as ſoon as named. And I had once a very pleaſing, but (it ſeems) a vain hope, that it could never become a Queſtion, See the right Reverend Biſhop Bramhal his catching of the Leviathan, particularly from p. 467. to p. 473. Whether or no there is a God? or, Whether God is a Spirit? or, Whether the holy Spirit of God can be the ſoveraign Author of all uncleanneſs. To be barely sceptical in ſuch things as theſe, is ſure a crime of greater moment then to be cheriſhed with impunity, or to be ſuffered to paſs abroad without being put unto a ſtand.

But it ſeems we are fallen into that Age of the World, wherein the worſt of Queſtions have not onely been rudely ſtarted, but blaſphemouſly ſtated in the very worſt ſenſe too. The moſt unwholſom Doctrines that can be named, have not onely been brewed in the private phantaſies and brains of unlearned men, but have publickly been broached by men of parts; and running out at their Pens, have been given for Drink to the giddy People.

Reader, thou wilt find, in the enſuing Treatiſe, ſtrange contradictions of divers men, both againſt the Scriptures and themſelves too. Thou wilt find them ſaying that ſins are the works of God, that God is pleaſed with them, that God doth will them with a perfect willingneſs, and that they make for God's glory. All directly againſt themſelves, who having ſaid ſuch things in many places of their works, have alſo ſaid ſometimes they never ſaid them. And all directly againſt the Scriptures, which ſay that ſins are the works of the Devil, that they are grievous to God Almighty, that he wills them not, but abhorres them, and that he is extremely diſhonoured by them. Thou ſhalt find it acknowledged and avowed to have been publickly taught by famous men, whom thou wilt find to be juſtified in their very worst ſayings, and not onely ſo, but even owned for orthodox and claſſical Authors; I ſay, by ſuch men as theſe thou ſhalt find it confeſſed to have been taught,If in a multitude of examples the Reader deſires to be directed to one or two, he may ſatisfie himſelf, ch. 3. ſect. 13 & ſect. 27. n. 2, 3, 4, 5. that God in plain terms is the Author of ſin, that he not onely wills it, but impells men to it, and makes them ſin by coaction. And yet with a turn of the tongue, thou wilt find a bold Artiſt trying to lick them all clean. For though ſuch things (ſaithLook forward on c. 3. ſect. 27. he) have fallen from the pens of the Orthodox, yet they have not underſtood them in any flagitious or unconſcionable ſenſe, nor have they uſed to do it often, and the Jeſuites have done it as well as they, and they have ſaid the contrary at other times: and ſo without any more ado, ſalvares eſt, ſaltat ſenex. Thou wilt find men obtruding new Creeds upon the Church. One inſerting this Article, that God is no Spirit; Another this, that God is the maker of all things real, and ſo (by a conſequence unavoidable) of all the wickedneſs in the world. In a word, thou wilt find, that we Iſa. 6.5. dwell in the midſt of a people of unclean lips, who Ezek. 22.26. put no difference between the holy and profane. It is impoſſible (ſaith Job 14.4. Job) to bring a clean thing out of an unclean; much more impoſſible (ſay I) to bring any thing unclean from the Spirit of purity. It is a leſſer wickedneſſe of the two, to aſcribe unto the Devil ſome good works of God, then to charge God fooliſhly with the evil works of the Devil. It is a very great ſin, for men to bear falſe witneſſe againſt their neighbours: 'tis yet a greater, to be falſe witneſſes 1 Cor. 15.15. for God. It is a greater ſin yet to be falſe witneſſes againſt him: but ſure 'tis the greateſt ſin of all (by2 Pet. 3.16. wreſting and corrupting his ſacred word) to make him bear falſe witneſs againſt himſelf.

Had ſuch impieties as theſe been onely practiſed in private corners (as the Feasts of Bacchus heretofore) I had contented my ſelf to have mourned over them in ſecret, like one of the Lam. 2.10. Elders of the daughters of Zion, I had ſate upon the ground and kept ſilence: having the words of the Prophet Amos as it were ſounding in mine ears, The Amos 5.13. prudent ſhall keep ſilence in that time, for it is an evil time. I ſhould then have reaſoned within my ſelf, Mat. 7.6. that no man living can be obliged to caſt what is holy unto * Doggs, or to give the * Pearl of reproof to Swine, (if yet my charity could have ſuffered me to think mine Adverſaries ſuch.) For why ſhould I draw upon my ſelf the implacable hatred of evil doers, in caſe I had reaſon to expect a very great prejudice to my ſelf, without any the leaſt hope of being profitable to others?

But when I ſaw ſuch things proclaimed in Gath, and as it were written with a Sun-beam in the ſtreets of Askelon; when I found it taught byDamus Deum eſſe cauſam particularem uniuſcu juſque actus. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 40. col. 2. Doctor Twiſſe and his followers (Mr. W. and Mr. B.) that God is the cauſe in particular of every act, nay the natural Cauſe, and the Mr. B. c. 3. p. 11. ſoveraign Author of the act of ſin; nay that he wills and works, not in the act of ſin onely, but in the Mr. W. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12. ſin of the Act too, whoſe very pravity and deformity doth make way for God's glory; and when I found it acknowledged by Doctor Twiſſe, Ex quibus quàm facile quae • o fuit viris iſtis indoctis, quales erant Libertini colligere D • um Aucrorem faiſſe omnium ſcelerum quae ab hominibus perpetrantur. Vin. Gr. l. 2. ſect. 1. p. 52. that ſuch illiterate men as the Libertines then were (and as the Ranters now are) might very eaſily collect even from this one Doctrine, [The Act of ſin is from God] that God himſelf is the Author of all the wickedneſſe in the World; when I found it granted byOf lib. and Nec. p. 26. & Q. p. 11. Mr. Hobbs himſelf, that evil uſe may be made of ſuch bold aſſertions, and that though he thought them to be true, and ſo to be inwardly believed, yet he thought them too dangerous to be ſpoken aloud, much leſſe fit to be preached and printed too, (forgetting that himſelf had even preached them in print, and that in the very ſame books wherein he confeſſeth the danger of them;) when I conſidered how great an odium had been derived from theſe doctrines upon the Proteſtant name, through the dexterities of the Jeſuites, and other Emiſſaries of Rome, who have charged the whole body of the Reformed Church with the particular misbehaviours of ſome very unſound and unruly members; when I conſidered that thoſe Doctrines had ſtopt the way to reconcilement betwixt the Lutheran Churches, and thoſe that follow the way of Calvin, they See Doctor Jackſons Exact Collect. l. 10 ſect. 6. p. 3188. not agreeing (ſay the Lutherans) in the worſhip of one God, becauſe the God of the Lutherans is onely the Author of what is good, whereas the God of the Calviniſts is owned by them to be the Author of what is morally evil; laſt of all, when I conſidered the tremendous dignity of my calling, which is not onely to be a ſhepherd, and a * Watchman in Iſrael, Ezek. 33.7, 8. & ch. 34. v. 2, 10. (and as ſuch to be accountable as well forIbid. other mens lapſes as for mine own) but alſo a 1 Cor. 4.1. ſteward of the myſteries of the living God, (however unworthy and2 Cor. 2.16. inſufficient for ſo inſuperable a work;) I ſay when I ſeriouſly conſidered theſe ſeveral things, and compared them all with one another, I had not the courage to be afraid of my fellow-creatures, the fear of whom did ſeem to me to be a deſperate boldneſs: for what greater boldneſſe can there be, then to ſtand in ſo great a fear of them who can at the Mat. 10.28. most but deſtroy the body, as not to ſtand in fear of him who can caſt both body and ſoul into Hell? It is not a true love of God, which is not able to Joh. 4.18. caſt out the fear of men. I know what Ecclus. 2.12, 13. wo is to them who have fearful hearts and faint hands, and what will be ſaid at the judgment-ſeat, unto the ſinner that goeth two wayes? I know the Rev. 21.8. fearful and unbelieving ſhall have their portion in the lake of fire and brimſtone. I know it was one of thoſe ſins which the Prophet did not think he could ſufficiently bewail, (unleſſe his Jer. 9.1. head were all water, and his eyes a fountain of tears, that he might weep day and night, Verſ. 3. Iſa. 58.1. NOT TO BE VALIANT for the TRUTH. Iſaiah was bid to cry aloud without ſparing, and to lift up his voice like a Trumpet in ſhewing the people their tranſgreſſions. Should I preſume to be afraid of the wrath of men, and in an aw of their perſons forbear to tell them of their ſins, (for ſome mens Doctrines become their ſins, if 'tis a ſin to blnſpheme and diſhonour God) I might well cry out, as the ſame Prophet did, Iſa. 6.5. Vae mihi quia lacui, id eſt, quia peccata non liberè reprehendi. Grot. in locum. WO IS ME FOR I • AM UNDON. And that for the very ſ •• e reaſon which the Prophet gives of his outcry in the following words, becauſe I am a man of unclean lipps. That is, (as the learnedſt Annotators have explained the place) I have been guiltily afraid to tell the great ones of their iniquities. Many are tickled with an opinion of their Policy and Prudence, when 'tis but cowardize and coldneſſe in the cauſe of God. Wo be to ſuch, for they are undon.

But neither indeed can I pretend to have been valiant in my encounters, whom even mine Adverſaries themſelves have made unable to be afraid. For I have ſpoken no harder things of what I have found in their writings, then their Maſters have ſpoken of the ſame, when they have found them in the writings or mouths of others. And this I doubt not but they will grant me, that Henbane is not the wholſomer for being found to grow in a ſpecious Garden, no more then a Tul • p is the uglier for having grown out of a Dunghil. Nor is El • ſphemy the better for being found in he Works of a Chriſtian Writer, any more then Pontius Pilate for hav ng been mentioned in the Creed. When I find men Jam. 2.7. bl • ſpheming that worthy name, which (I hope) ſhall ever be dearer to me then my life; and when I find them Pſal. 73.8. corrupting others (as the Pſalmiſt ſpeaks) even by verſ. 9. ſtretching forth their mouth unto the h • avens, and that their verſ. 8. talking is againſt the moſt H • gh; and when many of the verſ. 10. people do fall unto them, whereout th • y ſuck no ſmall advantage; I cannot but be offen • ed at what is ſpoken, without partiality to them that ſpeak. Whether I find it in the Jeſuites (as ſometimes I do,) or in the rigid Pre • byterians, (as I have many times don.) or in the d wnright Libertines, (as who does not?) I deſire to give it its proper name. When Mr. Calvin writ againſt Quintin and Pocquet, and other perſons of quality who were domeſtick ſervants to the Queen of Navar, See Calvins Epiſt. 62. compared with what follows. he made no ſcruple to call them Libe • tines, Qui • gnorab • nt quid ſibi vel • et Lib rt • norum nomen, id Quintini nomi • e cogn • turi ſunt. Exp • dit Be • luas tam p •• nicioſas no â aliq â • nſigni • i. Blaſh • m • s x cra • il • s ſ • a • gunt. — Non ſolùm Ch •• s;t nam Relig onem, ſ d e •• am omnem human • tat • m quae hactenus inter Tu • cas, &c Calv. adverſus Libers. c. 4. and (what is more) pernicious b • aſts, charged them with ex • crable blaſphemy, then which no villany was greater, no poyſon worſe, as tending (ſaith the) to the ſubverſion, not of the Chriſtian Religion onely, but even of that ingenuity and civil nature, which hath hitherto prevailed amongſt Turks and Infidels. The making of God to be an Author and Cauſe of ſin, Voetius confeſſeth to be [Voetius in Method. Resp. Calum. p. 1136. abſurd, and ſottiſh, and implying a contradiction, horrid, blaſphemous, ſcandalous, againſt all Theologie and the conſent of Chriſtendom, againſt the light of nature, and the dictates of reaſon.] If Voetius ſay thus, much more may I. Again, to ſay that God hath impoſed a neceſſity of ſinning upon his creatures, is concluded byHiſt. Gotteſch. c. 11. p. 173. R g. 5. Remigius, to be a charging God fooliſhly as the Author of ſin, which Doctor Whitaker affirmes to be a very Dr. Whitaker contra D • raeum. l. 8. ſect, 1. p. 524. great blaſphemy. Nay whether it is not the greateſt to be imagined, let the Reader conjecture by that which followes.

1. The greateſt blaſphemy is that, which aſcribes to God (as the Principal Cauſe and Contriver) the very worst of the worſt that can be poſſibly imagined. 2. That is the worſt of the worſt which is the very worſt thing in the Devil himſelf. 3. The Devil hath nothing worſe in him then a neceſsity of ſinning, or an impoſsibility to abstain from ſin. 4. Therefore to ſay that God Almighty did eternally cauſe, or contrive, decree, or praedeſtin a neceſsity of ſinning, in a great part of the Angels, and in the greateſt part of mankind, is the greateſt blaſphemy to be imagined.

That this is frequently to be met with in a great variety of Writers, the intelligent Reader needs not be told. And ſuch a variety he will meet with in the following Treatiſe. For though that rigid Ternary of Presbyterians, Mr. W. Mr. B. and Mr. H. may ſeem to be the chief in my conſideration, yet my Reader will much miſunderſtand me, if he thinks that Writers of their Pitch could have drawn ſo many ſheets from me, upon the ſole account of their own atchievements. Had I ſpent ſo great a ſhare of my precious time upon but two or three Aggreſſors of no greater fame and conſideration, I had done much more then I could have anſwered, if not to my conſcience, yet at leaſt to my diſcretion. Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in their ſeveral ſongs to the ſame Tune, (which they both intitle their vindications,) were of themſelves ſufficient to be the principal occaſions of this my enterpriſe, but the impulſive cauſes were much more worthy: For I look upon theſe two, as on a couple of Chymists, whoſe very Quinteſſence and Elixir of ſtrength and ſubtilty, I clearly diſcover to have been fetched from the publick Elaboratories of the greateſt Artiſts, both of the upper, and lower way; and in a more eſpecial manner of Mr. Calvin and Doctor Twiſſe, whoſe good Latine they have turned into no good Engliſh; and what for many years together they had been gathering, they have at once produced in the great, and in the profuſeneſs of their humour have ſhed it abroad amongſt the people. It hath been therefore my chiefeſt aim, to enfeeble thoſe Armories and Magazins, from whence theſe Combatants have borrowed their choiceſt weapons, whether engaged in their offenſive, or defenſive quarrells.

I have allowed Mr. W. the firſt and chief place in my conſideration, (I mean in reſpect of Mr. B. and Mr. H.) firſt becauſe he is a perſon of the greateſt gravity and theSo ſaith Mr. B. in his Neceſ. V.n.c. • . p. 32. l penult. grayeſt haire, and one who was verſed in theſe Controverſies (as Mr. Barlee ſaith often) Introduct. p. 3 & ch. 3. p. 18. before I was born or brought forth into the l • ght; before I had a head or an eye; one who ſubſcribed the 39. Articles Ibid. p. 40. before there was any ſuch thing in the world as Mr. T. P. Laſtly ch. 2. p. 34. Old enough and wiſe enough to be my father. When I obſerved Mr. B. upbraiding to me my want of years, Ibid. p. 49. more then any other thing, not one y in theſe pages which I have cited, but in many more which I conceal, (calling me one while, a c. 2. p. 41. Demure Junior, and another while, a c. 2. p. 53. Juvenal Divine) ſometimes objecting his Ch. 2. p. 27. own antiquity, and Mr. W's extremely often, as if he thought that old age were the ſtrongeſt The weakneſs of it is viſible in the S • nner Impleaded, p. 300, 301. argument in the world againſt what ever had been alledged by one who followed them into the world at ſome years diſtance; I comforted my ſelf with the remembrance, that I did not chuſe my nativity, nor was I the Lord of my own Horoſcope, and in regard I was as old as I was able to be by any means, it would no be reckoned as my fault, that I could not plead my longevity for the advantaging of my cauſe. It a • pears by the words of1 Tim. 4.12. S. Paul to Timothy, that a Prieſt is too apt to be deſpiſed for his youth. And to remove that ſtumbling-block out of the old man's way, he ſhall know that our Lord and Saviour did not quite attain to my years in his Peregrination upon the earth. S. John and S. Timothy were both but young men, when yet the firſt was an Apostle, and the ſecond a Biſhop. If Argumentation and Orthodoxy were to be reckoned by a man's age, I am ſure the old Serpent would go beyond them. And though I my ſelf am far from it, yet the truth which I aſſert hath Age enough to become an Argument. Quod primum verum eſt. Tertul. So that from this day forwards, I hope the difference of years betwixt my adverſaries and me, (which they have hitherto more inſiſted on in all the • r publick and private chat, then upon any one thing which they have conceived to be of uſe) ſhall be no longer an ingredient in our diſpute. yet this is one reaſon, why Job. 32.4, 6.7. Mr. W. comes firſt into my conſideration. Another reaſon is, becauſe he publickly made me a ſecond challenge from the Preſſe, when I had in modeſty and in mercy refuſed his firſt, as having been backward and unwilling to expoſe his age to inconvenience, (for which reaſon alſo I have been ſparing to Mr. Cawdrey, notwithſtanding his publick and grand abuſes) but finding he thought himſelf unanſwerable in that he ſaw he was not anſwer • d, I ſtraight concluded it a charity, to undeceive him. A third reaſon • s, becauſe he profeſſeth in his Preface to his firſt book (which he hath boldly repeated in his ſecond) that he Ext. of Div. Prov. is Praef. p. goes h • gh • r, then other Divines of his party, in making God have an active hand in the actions of ſinful men. How much higher then the moſt, the Reader ſhortly will ſee and wonder. Adde to this, my having heard, that upon ſome weak Readers his book hath made ſome ſtrong impreſſions. So that men of no skill, who are of narrow capacity, and very ſlow of apprehenſion, are not long to be truſted with that temptation. Again, I find that Mr. B. doth rely on Mr. W. as upon one of his Corr. Corr. Ep. Ded. p. 8. Majorites, to whoſe Protection and Patronage he choſe to dedicate his former Book, (to wit his firſtborn, the excellency of his ſtrength) and whoſe graciousIbid. aſsiſtance he then implored. Mr. W. anſwers to the call, ownes himſelf for a Majorite, comes in to the reſcue of Mr. B. (as Milo ran to ſet his ſhoulders as an equal prop to the falling houſe, which cruſhed him into Quiddini for his preſumption) and 'tis but fit he ſhould firſt be heeded, whom common Fame hath ſet uppermoſt in the thoughts of men.

Next I proceed to Mr. B. his ſecond part (as he calls it) becauſe I was bound to it by promiſe, which I was loath not to perform. Then I antidote Mr. Hickman becauſe he invenomed Mr. Barlee, and intermeddled in his affaires to ſuch a deſperate degree, that if he preacheth as he hath printed, his Diſciples (of all others) have the greateſt need of a preſervative. I have often to do with Dr. Twiſſe, becauſe they often tranſlate his words, and once moſt ſolemnly they bring him to me with a defiance. Not to mention all particulars (with whom I have to do as occaſion ſerves) I have many reflexions on Mr. Hobbs, becauſe he jumps ſo often with my Aſſailants, as if he had borrowed from their writings, or they from his. What I have more to premiſe I will diſpatch in few words.

If I ſeem too much inlarged in explaining ſome things, It is partly becauſe I have to deal with ſuch diſputants, as cannot be confuted but by being firſt taught; and partly becauſe it often happens, that their Maſter's confutatian doth ſtand in theirs.

I do many times refer to what I have publiſhed already, as well to avoid prolixity, and vain repetitions, as to exempt my Reader from paying often for the very ſame matter in ſeveral volumes.

I have reckoned with my Aggreſſers both ſeparately and jointly. My two firſt Chapters and Introduction are chiefly addreſſed to Mr. W. My third to Mr. B. and Mr. H. My fourth to Dr. Twiſſe, Mr. W. and Mr. B.

I have ſo diſpoſed of the whole, as that all their concernments may be ſeen diſtinctly and apart. But yet ſo many were my occaſions to ſhew their differences and agreements, and their mutual colliſions more eſpecially, (the running of their heads againſt each other to the great indangering of their brains, which I verily believe will hardly ever leave akeing, untill they accept my way of cure, ch. 3. ſect. 9.) that Mr. B. is eminently concerned in all I ſay to Mr. W. and Mr. W. equally concerned in all I ſay to Mr. B. and Mr. Hickman commonly concerned in what I ſay to both the former, and their greateſt Masters are concerned in what I ſay to all three.

If I ſeem to have been pungent in laying open ſome ſorer parts, I deſire my Reader to look well upon the Caſe, to conſider the duty of a Chirurgion, and then to imagine (if he is able) how ſuch Phagedaenous and eating ſores can be taken away without being touched, and that with either the Launce, or Cauſtick. When an inveterate Ulcer hath been long skin'd over, there is no way to cure it without ſearching it to the bottom: which though painful to the Patient, yet being in order to his eaſe, and (which is more) his ſafety too, he ought to be thankful to that diligent and impartial hand, which for ſome ſhort time doth ſeem to hurt him. The ratio curandi cannot alwayes be ſuch, as I can alwayes deſire, and w • ſh it might be; It muſt be ſuch, as the malady requires, and calls for. But when my preſent Methods ſhall be found to have taken a good effect, ſo as the obſtinate Tumour ſhall relent and ſuppurate, and finally caſt forth its Core, together with the dreggs of the peccant hu •• or, I ſhall gladly prepare another kind of compoſition, whoſe every line ſhall be a lentive.

May the perſons the moſt concerned conſider well what is ſaid in the following ſheets, and The Lord give them underſtanding in all things. 2 Tim. 2.7.

The general Contents of the Introduction, ſhewing the manifold Abſurdities and Contradictions, which iſſue out from the Denial of Gods eternall, reſpective or conditional Decrees.

Sect. 1, 2. THe neareſt way to end a Controverſie, is to ſtrike altogether at the Root of error. Sect. 3. The grand error touching Gods Decrees, and its numerous off-ſpring, is rooted in the miſtake of two things, The falſe conceits of Praeſcience and Praedetermination. Sect. 4, & 5. The ſpeedy way to Conviction, made plain and open by a manifeſtation of three things. Sect. 6. The three things undertaken ſolemnly to be proved. Sect. 7. The ſame men affirm it to be both blaſphemy, and truth, to ſay that God is the Author or Cauſe of ſin, that he wills and works ſin, &c. Sect. 8. Nothing but their Principles of Gods Decrees can lead them to blaſphemies of ſuch a Nature. Inſtances briefly ſet down from Calvin, Zuinglius, Zanchy, Piſcator, P. Martyr, Beza, Borrhaus, Triglandius, Dr. Twiſſe, Mr. Hobbs, Mr. Whitfield, and Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hick. Sect. 9. How the violent ſtreams of blaſphemy may be quickly dried up in their ſeveral channels. Sect. 10. Mr. Whitfields whole Fabrick plucked up by the Foundation. His explication of what he means by conditional Decrees. His proviſion for a Flight from his whole undertaking. He is equally unfortunate whether he intended ſenſe or non-ſenſe. He is equally unhappy, whatever he means by the word Condition. Sect. 11. His firſt Argument compared with his Expoſition of Conditional Decrees as he profeſſeth to underſtand them. He is as unhappy in his beſt as in his worſt meaning. His way of arguing in his beſt ſenſe againſt Conditional Decrees, is as much againſt the Trinity of perſons in the Godhead. He argues againſt his own Maſters and Brethren, Beza, Wollebius, Dr. Reynolds. Directly againſt Saint Paul, and againſt the Eternity of Gods foreknowledge. And in a flat contradiction to himſelf; alſo againſt Dr. Twiſſe, and even againſt the Tenet for which he argues. He is fain to make Gods decrees to be Actus D • i ad iutra, againſt his own party who teach them to be ad extra. He makes Gods Actions to be God himſelf (and ſo infers many Gods) even againſt his own Maſters, Gomarus and Wollebius. Five blaſphemous Abſurdities which that abſurdity doth infer. He makes God himſelf to be Reprobation it ſelf. Sect. 12. An eaſie way to Mr. W's Reformation conciſely opened and pointed at. To his pretended Arguments againſt Conditional Decrees are confronted two Arguments for conditional Decrees. The firſt is grounded on the Confeſſion of all the contrary party, and according to the tenour of the ſeventeenth Article of the Church of England exhibited to us in the laſt clauſe of the Article. The ſecond is grounded on another Confeſſion of the contrary party in their definition of Gods Decrees. Sect. 13. Mr. W's miſtake of the thing in queſtion repreſented in clearer and fairer colours.

The general Contents of the ſeveral Chapters.

Chap. I.

Sect. 1. MAſter W's fanciful Creation of three general Objections. The diſtruſt he puts in his cauſe. His ſtudied aiming beſide the mark. He overthrows his own rampire. His ſecond overthrow of himſelf and of his Abſolute Decrees.

Sect. 2. His third overthrow of himſelf by a moſt crimſon contradiction. He enters on that which Mr. Calvin judged the worſt part of Libertiniſm. His new contradiction about the manner of Gods working. His down right Libertiniſme. Libertines no Chriſtians. A Dilemma as a touch ſtone to try his meaning. The determination of mans will to wicked actions is not Gods work. He inferreth God to be worſe then the Author of ſin. His meaning ferreted out of his words. His abuſe of Scripture to ſerve his turn. He ſpeaks worſe of God then can be truely ſaid of Satan. His ugly Doctrine of God ſpoken out by Mr. Barlee.

Sect. 3. His third general Anſwer a meer majeſtick miſtake.

Sect. 4. He deſcends from Generals to Particulars, beginning with the charge of making God the Author of ſin, and with a Tergiverſation, and Impoſition on the Scripture. He aſperſeth God with the decreeing of ſin in the firſt attempt of his excuſe. His memorable Anſwer to his own Objection. His meaning caught in a Dilemma. His foul uſe of the word Permiſsion, and its odious impropriety repreſented in other colours. The common Poultice for a ſore Doctrine.

Sect. 5. He moulds a new Objection againſt himſelf, and grants what his Doctrine is charged with. His Anſwer conſiſts in ſhifting the duty of a Reſpondent, and ſpeaking quite another thing. He confounds the Permiſsion of ſin with ſin, and tries to blot his Doctrine fair. His abuſe of Saint Auſtin. He argues that God doth will ſin perfectly, becauſe he wills the permiſſion of it. And fain would have Scripture to ſpeak againſt God by ſpeaking his activity in the production of ſin. 1. From the ſelling of Joſeph. 2. Pharaoh's obduration. 3. The Candanites hardening. 4. Abſaloms defiling his Fathers Concubines. 5. Shimei's curſing David. 6, 7, 8. Three other Texts. 9. The Egyptians hatred of Iſrael. 10. Gods being ſaid to deceive the Prophet. 11. Giving up to vile affections. 12. Giving eyes not to ſee. 13. Sending deluſion. 14. The Nations making league with the Romans. All which Scriptures are explained and vindicated from the frightful miſapprehenſions of this Miſtaker.

Sect. 6. Mr. W. moſt groundleſly infers God to ſit ſtill, and to be an idle Beholder, if he is not buſie in the efficiency of ſin.

Chap. II.

Sect. 1. OF the common Hebraiſme by which ſuch verbs are active in ſound are onely permiſſive in ſignification: by the admiſſion of which Rule the foul Abſurdities aforeſaid would be avoided, and Scripture expounded 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Mr. W's. manifold unhappineſs in rejecting that Rule. He makes contradictions in Scripture, and overthrows his own intereſt in other caſes. He is convinced by that which he cannot but confeſs. His woful ſhifts in expounding Scripture, and the miſchiefs enſuing on it. His Maſters contradict themſelves by not obſerving the Hebraiſme. Mr. W. makes light to be a ſin, and inceſt to be no ſin, by making a parity of Gods working in either caſe. He is beaten with his own weapons by any Atheiſt Dialogue-wiſe, condemned out of his own mouth. Scripture interprets Scripture againſt Mr. VV.

Sect. 2. His return to his firſt method of forging Objections to himſelf. He is at odds with Doctor Twiſſe. To make men ſin is a a ſin of the worſt ſize, yet aſcribed unto God by that ſort of men.

Sect. 3. The eaſe and ordinary perverſion of the Scriptures. Mr. W. miſtakes the errors for the perſons of ſome Proteſtants, and confounds them with the Papiſts. His party clamour againſt themſelves, and affront God with an Epitrope. Mr. W's. clamours againſt Proteſtant Divines. He jumps in ſo doing with the Jeſuited Papiſts.

Sect. 4. His fouleſt imputation caſt upon the Scriptures. Saint Peters caveat touching Pauls Epiſtles. The literal plalnneſs of ſome Scriptures doth make them difficult to ſome. A ſhort direction to the means of remedy, or prevention, removing a ſtumbling-block out of the peoples way.

Sect. 5. Mr. W. either means, that God hath a hand in evil, becauſe in good; or that the act of ſin is not the ſin; or that God is the proper cauſe and efficient of ſin; and that he means the laſt is proved by a Dilemma. Humane learning a good foundation for a Divine.

Sect. 6. Mr. W's. rare eſſayes to ſeparate the wickedneſs from the act of the wicked act.

Sect. 7. His firſt eſſay is a bare Dictate, including eight groſs abſurdities: Of actions Natural and Unnatural. Of nature Corrupted and Uncorrupted. Mr. VV. denies Gods Omnipotence, and makes him the proper cauſe of ſin.

Sect. 8. His ſecond eſſay is an Impertinence beyond example; or what is ſo much worſe, as that it ought not to be named. He is forced to be pertinent, and his anſwer challenged.

Sect. 9. His third eſſay is a continuance of his Tergiverſation, and inferreth God the efficient of ſin. Mr. VV. vindicated from his abuſes put upon himſelf. The probable cauſes of his chiefeſt aberrations. Five Expedients propoſed to undeceive him.

Sect. 10. His fourth eſſay makes the wickedeſt actions to be good, and from God.

Sect. 11. His fifth eſſay doth betray him to a confeſſion, that he maketh God the Author of ſin. He miſtakes a moral for a natural action, and is hampered in ſome Dilemma's. The method by which he is led into all his blaſphemies.

Sect. 12. Sin is inſeparable from the ſinful action, which Mr. VV. ſeems to ſee by his Tergiverſation. He makes an Accident the ſubject of Inheſion to an Accident. Confounds the act of differing with the paſſive power of being parted. Makes Davids lying with Bathſhebah no ſin. And the ſin of Adultery ſeparable from it ſelf.

Sect. 13. He ſheweth his cauſe is deſperate, by ſpeaking purpoſely beſide the purpoſe. He attempts the waſhing of wet from water, roundneſs from a Globe.

Sect. 14. Mr. VV. affirms that God doth will and work ſin, and hath a hand in effecting it, and that ſin makes for Gods glory. Concludes ſin to be good, or Gods working it as evil. Feigns God to work evil to a good end. Q. Whether he infers not God to be a ſinner. His inconſiſtence with Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and with himſelf. He frames not his propoſitions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his propoſitions.

Sect. 15, & 16. Mr. W's. great forgery in that little which he cites. His foul ſenſe of Gods determination that ſin ſhall be done. His impious expreſſion or Gods having a hand in ſin, and the Importance of that phraſe.

Sect. 17. His groſs error in the notion of Gods permiſſion. His tremendous notion of Alworking providence without exception of wickedneſs.

Sect. 18. He puts himſelf afreſh into his old ſtreights betwixt groſs blaſphemy, and extraordinary impertinence. He affirms that God hath an active hand in the ſins of Oppreſsion, Rebellion, Murders, Trechery, Violence, and VVrong How the Great Turk proceeds on thoſe maximes. He juſtifies the Ranters, by aſcribing all our Engliſh changes to the hand of God. God is cleared from careleſneſs or weakneſs, with which he is charged by Mr. VV.

Sect. 19. God is cleared from willing and effecting what he hateth. A caſe put to ſhew the danger of Mr. VV's. Doctrine in order to practice.

Sect. 20. Mr. VV's. dangerous miſapprehenſion of that figurative ſentence, that God doth puniſh ſin with ſin. His making God the proper cauſe of the greateſt ſins: which he alſo extends to the very ſin of the act, the pravity it ſelf. He treads a ſtep beyond Calvin worſt.

Sect. 21. The deſperate nature of Mr. VV's. Salvo's. And the hardneſs of his Emollients. His open profeſsion that Gods ſecret will is quite contrary to his revealed will in reſpect of the very ſame objects.

Chap. III.

Sect. 1. MAſter B's. Confeſsion of the Fact of which he pleads not guilty. His making God the Author of ſin, and worſe then ſo, in his endeavours to ſpeak as warily as his principles will ſuffer him.

Sect. 2. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes without the poſſibility of gaining by it. His inconſiſtency with himſelf, with Mr. VV. and Mr.Hick. He betrayes himſelf many wayes in his proviſion for an eſcape, making God (verbatim) the ſoveraign Author of ſins both of omiſsion and commiſsion. Grants the whole charge, or underſtands not a moral act. His mixture of blaſphemies with contradictions on the right and left hand.

Sect. 3. He is aſhamed to cite his own words truly. Proves himſelf conſcious to himſelf of being left without excuſe, in charging God with being a Tempter unto ſin. Pretends a want of leiſure to excuſe or extenuate his blaſphemy, yet baulks it at his greateſt leiſure. He accuſeth God of that which is the worſt quality of Satan. Flatly contradicts the Scripture. Commits the worſt of contradictions as well as blaſphemies.

Sect. 4. He is enraged that his meaning ſhould be meaſured by his words. Slanders ancient and modern, both Papiſts and Proteſtants. Saint Auſtin in particular. And implies it a ſin for corn to grow.

Sect. 5. His uncharitable reflexion on his own Dr.Twiſſe. The Doctors words cited.

Sect. 6. Mr. B's. ſeverity to himſelf, proving his falſhoods by ſelf-contradictions. He unavoidably chargeth God with ſin in himſelf; irrefragably proved from Heb. 6.18. He implies his blaſphemies common to him with his party. He is convicted by Dr. Twiſſe of making God the Author of ſin.

Sect. 7. He makes no difference betwixt the act of Adultery, and Marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both: worſe then the Encratitae.

Sect. 8. The undeniable blaſphemies which enſue upon the Doctrine of unconditional Praedeſtination. The great Diſeaſe of making God the Author of ſin. The original Cauſe of the Diſeaſe. The Patient proved extremely ſick of the Diſeaſe by his own acknowledgement of the Cauſe. Four ſhort Arguments to confirm it.

Sect. 9. The eaſie and infallible means of cure to all that are not reſolved to continue ſick. The nature of Knowledge opened, and diſtinguiſhed from Decree. Gods abſolute Decree doth cauſe a neceſsity of event, but his foreknowledge doth not, nor poſſibly can it. The Abſurdities which would follow if it were ſo. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is paſt. The wide difference ſhewed between a neceſsity of conſequence, and a neceſsity of the conſequent. 'Tis vain for the Adverſaries to quit the firſt error, unleſs they quit the ſecond alſo. D. Reynolds his concurrence with T. P. in this point, Gods praeſcience doth not praeſuppoſe a praedetermination. But rather praedetermination doth connotate praeſcience, if not praeſuppoſe it. The cauſe of the error ſhewed and removed. The Application to the preſent caſe, and a way opened to reconcilement.

Sect. 10. Mr. B's. unavoidable conſequential blasphemies, that God determined all wickedneſs before be could foreknow it. His ignorant uſe of the words, Futurition, Will, certain, Counſel. A threefold blaſphemy, beſides a ſelf-contradiction.

Sect. 11. His poſitive Doctrine of Gods ordaining ſin both original and actual. Non-ſenſe added to Blaſphemy.

Sect. 12. His ſelf-contradiction in denying and alſo affirming that he maketh God the Author of ſin. He is convicted by his own words, and the Aſſemblies, and Mr. W's. and Dr. Twiſſe, and Mr. Hobbs, which laſt is juſtified by Mr. W.

Sect. 13. Mr. B's. 10000. curſes upon himſelf and his Maſters, with his confeſsion of the blaſphemy of which he was accuſed. The like confeſsion of his owned Maſters, together with their Commiſſions of the crime confeſſed.

Sect. 14. His confeſsion of faith touching Gods commerce with ſin. He profeſſeth openly to believe, that God is the cauſe of ſinfulneſs it ſelf.

Sect. 15. Concerning the efficient cauſe of ſin. The ſtate of the caſe from the beginning. Sin proved to have a true efficient cauſe, and by Mr. B's. confeſsion, who alſo denies it. How his railings in lieu of anſwers do ſtrike at S. James, but hit himſelf and his party, of Jam. 1.15.

Sect. 16. Of the poſitive entity of ſin, clearly proved.

Sect. 17. Mr. B's. firſt Argument to prove the goodn'ſs of ſin, in which Mr. Hick. is equally concerned. The noyſomneſs of the Diſeaſe. The purging out of the peccant humour. Of metaphyſical and moral bonity. The dangerous effects in Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. of being but Smatterers in Metaphyſicks. Dr. Twiſſe his foundation of irreſpective decrees a thin Sophiſme. How a lye is verum, as much as ſi • bonum. Albertus Magnus his words explained, and Auſtin's vindicated from the impertinence of the Citation.

Sect. 18. The moſt remarkable impiety of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a ſecond Argument. Inferring the Godhead of ſin on one hand, or its being Gods creature on the other. Mr. H. miſerably toſt by the two horns of his own Dilemma. A way opened to his reſcue from his ineffable dangers. He is ſhewed a medium betwixt God, and Gods Creatures, where he could ſee none. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer Atheiſm it ſelfe to be the Creature of God, or God himſelf. Sins poſitive things, becauſe inward habits. Man the Author of ſome poſitive things, and God of ſome privatives. Mr. H. confounds Negative and privative, as well as privative and privation. To harden our own hearts, and conſent unto temptations are poſitive things. Our deſtruction from our ſelves a poſitive thing. Sin ſpoken of in Scripture as a poſitive thing. Mr. Hick. convinced by his own party. He will confeſs he hath blasphemed in caſe that ſin is ſomething poſitive, which is further proved many wayes. The ſad effects of forging God to be the maker of all things real without exception.

Sect. 19. Mr. B's. firſt chip hewen out of Mr. H's. block. He foiſts into the Creed the word Real, and makes it ſupply the place of good. Provides a Creed for the Libertines, viz. that God is the maker of all ſins, if ſins are things real, (and things not real, implies a contradiction.) The different methods of our reaſonings, and what comes of it. They aſcribe the filthieſt of poſitive Entities unto God. A • c convinced by the Aſſemblies confeſsion of Faith. Are farther uncovered by being ſuppoſed to be catechized.

Sect. 20. His ſecond chip of the ſame block. Inconſiſtency with himſelf, and making all ſinful actions to be wrought by God. His unſuccesful Relyance on the Jeſuits.

Sect. 21. His third chip more pitiful then the former.

Sect. 22. His fourth chip the moſt lamentable of all. His arguing concludes him Pelagian, or Libertine. He is impertinent on purpoſe to make God the Author of ſin.

Sect. 23. By his fifth chip he denies Gods Praeſcience of all wickedneſs, unleſs he alſo praedetermined it.

Sect. 24. His impoſitions upon the Scripture. The Schoolmen. Auſt • n. His new degree of Arminianiſm.

Sect. 25. Mr. Hick's. Heatheniſh expreſſion of ſins 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

Sect. 26. Of Calvins Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the Devil and all that are wicked to Conceive & execure their evil dving.

Sect. 27. Mr. B's. affected Tergiverſation in his chiefeſt concernments. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is (in plain terms) the Author of ſin. How Mr. B. holds the ſame, even in that which he confeſſeth to be the proper notion of the word Author. He accuſeth Calvin in excuſing him for ſaying that God doth will ſin. And Piſcator as well as Calvin, for ſaying that God doth thruſt men into wickedneſs. He confeſſeth his Maſters do ſome times teach a coaction from God to ſin. He forgeth new Texts upon the Scripture.

Sect. 28. He turns his back to the prime charge, and tacitly yields the whole cauſe.

Sect. 29. Of Adams inclination to ſin before he ſinned. The birth and growth of the very firſt ſin, with the very wide difference betwixt the inclinations of the ſenſitive appetite, and the will.

Sect. 30. The whole importance of the word Author. How the Adverſaries ſay worſe, then if they had only ſaid verbatim, God is the Author of ſin. Mr. Roll • cks ſtrange Salvo.

Chap. IV.

Sect. 1. OF the ſignal fallacy ſwallowed firſt by Dr. Twiſſe, then by his followers. Mr, W's eſſay to cover it. The Fallacy ſhewed in its deformity. The firſt cauſe of the whole miſtake about the order of intentions and execution. That cauſe removed, and the fallacy left naked. Mr. W's. indirect courſe to excuſe Dr. Twiſſe in contradiction to him. Dr. Twiſſe his error of Co • rdination in things ſubordinate.

Sect. 2. Mr. W's. forgery of objections in other mens names.

Sect. 3. Mr. W's. ſecond part diſplayed, and Univerſal Redemption vindicated, as to the true intent and extent of Chriſts death, from the feeble utmoſt of his attempts, in a ſubdiviſion of eight Paragraphs.

Sect. 4. How the Presbyterians do nouriſh Socinianiſm in contracting Chriſts death, and perverting Scripture. Daille, Camero, Am • rald, why they forſook their party abridging the benefit of Chriſts death, Received rules for the interpreting of words, and ending controverſies. The extream abſurdity of dutiful misbelief exploded hy the Lord Primate. Mr. W's. reproch caſt upon Chriſtendom, and the Goſpel of Chriſt. Europe, Aſia, Africa, and America inferred by Mr. W. to be the leaſt part of the world.

Sect. 5. Univerſal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by S. Auſtin and Prosper, to the ſtopping of Mr. W's. and Mr. B's. mouths.

Sect. 6. The concluſion, giving reaſons why no more time is to be loſt in this employment.

AN INTRODUCTION To the three firſt Chapters Concerning the impious, and unexcuſable, becauſe blaſphemous, and unavoidable, both Contradictions, and other Abſurdities, which iſſue out from the Denial of Gods eternal reſpective or conditional Decrees.

SECT. 1.

The neereſt way to end a controverſie is to ſtrike altogether at the root of error.When once an Error is grown fruitful, and hath run it ſelf out into ſeveral Branches, it is commonly found (by ſad experience) to grow the thicker for being lopp't. There is not an Error in all Theologie, which doth ſeem to have taken ſo deep a Root, or to have ſpread ſo ſturdy Branches, or to have born ſo lewd a fruit, as that many-headed Error, whoſe extirpation out of the Church ought ſo much the rather to be deſir'd, becauſe it hath ſhed ſuch a fatal and deadly influence upon a multitude of Profeſſors who have lately ſate under its ſhade. Of thoſe that have exerciſed themſelves in ſo good a work, I may call it my Lot, and my Neceſſity, to have been one of the meaneſt. Faithfulneſs and Affection have been my chiefeſt qualifications; and I eſteem it a priviledge, as well as duty, to have done God ſervice in any meaſure. But in every good Labourer, there is a skill and prudence, as well as induſtry and faithfulneſſe, to be required. It is not enough to be doing and working, in a meer oppoſition to ſloth and idleneſſe; but by contrivance and forecaſt, to do a great deal of work in a little time.

Sect. 2.

I am not quite ſo ſenſible of that unqueſtionable Aphoriſm ſet down by Solomon, Eccleſ. 12.12. much ſtudy is a wearineſſe to the fleſh, as of the words going before it, in making many books there is no end. This I knew a long time ſince, but it is now that I conſider it and lay it ſeriouſly to heart. And therefore now I determine to make an end of the Task impoſed on me, not contenting my ſelf with a bare Reſiſtance, but proceeding to a Diſpatch, of that Hydra-like Error of which I ſpake. I will no longer amuſe my ſelf with ſtriking off now and then a Head, which (beſides that they are many) are very apt to be ſucceeded by many others growing up out of the very ſame Trunk; but rather compendiouſly endeavour to ſtrike the Monſter into the heart, which (beſides that it is but one) is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the firſt part that lives, and the laſt that dies in every creature.

Sect. 3.

The grand Error about God's Decrees and its numerous offſpring is rooted in the miſtake of two things.The falſe conceit of God's preſcience, and predetermination, makes up the error of irreſpective and unconditional Decrees (I do not ſay of the moſt natural, but) of the moſt voluntary actions and effects; neither reward nor puniſhment, nor ſin it ſelf being excepted. This I take to be the heart, imparting life and activity to every member and limb of that body of error, whoſe moſt affectionate friends and abettors have conſpired to find me my late imployment. With this grand error, all the reſt which grow from it muſt live and die. In this Mr. Whitfield hath put his chief truſt. Upon this he hath been poreing (as his admirers have • oaſted) theſe thirty years. In his Apologie for • his, he hath publickly choſen to diſplay his whole ſtrength; as if by this he were deſirous that eve • y part of the controverſie ſhould be decided. I • ccept his challenge, and heartily thank him for the • ontrivance; He having given me an occaſion of taking much a neerer way to my journeys end then I firſt intended.

Sect. 4.

The ſpeedy way to conviction.For if I prove out of his mouth, and out of the mouths of his predeceſſors, that what they publickly acknowledge to be blaſphemouſly falſe, doth unavoidably follow from their eſpouſed notion of God's Decrees; then can he not chuſe but acknowledge, that ſuch a notion of God's Decrees muſt needs be dangerouſly falſe. He muſt confeſs that his book is an inſufferable Libel againſt his Maker; and ſuch, as againſt which he muſt publickly enter his proteſtation. Now that it is falſe and blaſphemous, to ſay that God is the Author or cauſe of ſin, both in thoſe very terms, and in others as bad, and in many others much worſe, is ever acknowledged by themſelves in ſome parts of their Writings, (wherein forgetful of their Doctrines they conſider nothing but duty) who yet in other parts of their own writings, (wherein forgetful of duty they reaſon onely from their Doctrines) do moſt dogmatically deliver it for very great truth.

Sect. 5.

Made plain and open by a manifeſtation of three things.In great affection to the moſt vulgar and leſs intelligent Readers (whoſe deliverance and liberty from the worſt kind of thraldom I do eſpecially aim at in what I publiſh) I will uſe the greateſt plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſpeech, which by ſtudy and meditation I am able to contrive. Our whole Diſpute will be concluded by a moſt cogent demonstration of theſe three things.

Firſt, that it is granted by the Adverſaries themſelves to be both falſe and blaſphemous, to ſay that God is the Author or Cauſe of Sin.

Secondly, 'tis affirmed by the very ſame Party to be neither falſe nor blaſphemous, but a moſt neceſſary truth, to ſay that God is the Author or Cauſe of Sin.

Thirdly, it cannot be denied by the aforeſaid Party, that what they ſometimes confeſs to be both falſe and blaſphemous, they would not at other times affirm to be neither falſe nor blaſphemous, but that they find it to be the natural and unavoidable iſsue flowing out from their Principles of Gods Decrees.

Sect. 6.

The three thingsI do ſolemnly take upon me, after mature deliberation, undertaken ſolemnly to be proved. (and in a full comprehenſion of the ſeveral evidences and proofs) to make a cogent demonſtration of thoſe three things. A demonſtration ſo cogent, that the moſt ſtomachful adverſaries ſhall not be able to gainſay it, unleſs they will ſay, that they never ſay what they ſay, and that they have not printed what they have printed, or that the world lieth in darkneſs, ſo as we cannot read either their Latine, or their Engliſh, but onely dream that we read what indeed we do not. Either they will, or they will not, proceed to thoſe later degrees of madneſs. If they will, they will prove the liberty of their wills to ſpeak againſt their own light, and againſt their own ſpeakings, and againſt their teſtimonies of conſcience, and againſt the witneſs of other mens eyes as well as of their own; and what is this, but to ſin as with a Cart-rope, to turn Grace backward, to bid righteouſneſſe ſtand afar off, and to ſay, we will be ſtubborn in ſpight of evidence and conviction? Thus it is if they will proceed to the degrees of madneſſe above ſpecified. And if they will not (as ſure they will not,) then in ſpight of themſelves, and their own perverſneſſe, they muſt fly by way of Refuge to theſe following confeſſions. Firſt, That they have publiſhed ſelf-contradictions beyond compare, affirming what they deny, and denying what they affirm, calling that by the name of blaſphemy which they profeſſe to think Orthodox, and aſſerting that for true Divinity (with one ſtroke of their pen) which (with another daſh of the ſame pen) they call the Doctrine of Devils. Their Second Confeſſion muſt be this, that being proved to have printed ſuch contradictions in ſeveral parts of their Writings (as their occaſions did require, or their neceſſities enforce them) they are obliged indiſpenſably to declare their laſt thoughts, and to name that part of their contradiction to which they will finally adhere, and in adherence to which they will quit the contrary from this day forward; whether the affirmative, or the negative part of the contradiction; whether that which is for God, or that which is againſt him. If the later, they are declaredly Libertines and Ranters, and I ſhall wiſh for nothing more then the publick'ſt trial in the World to prove them ſuch; there being nothing now wanting but a ſufficient publication and notification of the thing, to effect its ſolemn 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or total Baniſhment out of the World. Thus it is if they adhere to the later part of their contradiction. And if they adhere unto the former, (which God of his mercy, and by his grace, may be pleaſed to work in them both to will, and to do,) I know not how they can eſcape an entire converſion unto the truth: or how obſtinacy it ſelf can ſlip its neck out of the collar, which the Soveraignty of Light hath ſitted for it, and in a willing ſubmiſſion unto which the ghoſtly freedom of the obſtinate doth chiefly ſtand.

The ſame men affi • m it to be both blaſphemy and truth, to ſay that God is the Author or cauſe of ſin. Sect. 7.

To prove the three things of which I ſpake (in my laſt Paragraph but one) and to prove them ſo largely as I deſire, is not the buſineſſe of this place, but of my following Chapters, (of the ſecond and third more eſpecially) to which I now am but writing my Introduction. I will therefore ſay no more here, then what may ſerve to ſtay the appetite of any poſſible impatient and longing Reader.

Firſt, That the Adverſaries do grant it to be both falſe and blaſphemous, to ſay that God is the Author or cauſe of ſin, Note the double conceſſion of Mr. B. Firſt, that his Maſters do call it an excerable blaſphemy, p. 129, &c. and yet they teach in other places, 1. That God is the Author of ſin, 2. Wills Sin, 3. Impells to it, 4. Forceth men to it, p. 132, 133. where he labours to make it good. I have abundantly proved in my Defence of God's purity chap. 4. Sect. 6. p. 30, 31. and ſhall farther do it in this following work, in particular chap. 3. ſect. 13. & 27. Nor can they poſſibly eat their words, but at the peril of renouncing the whole stream of Church-Writers, both ancient and modern, of whom I have given a large ſpecimen in my Divine Purity Def. ch. 4. ſect. 5. p. 22, &c. to p. 29. And yet

Secondly, That the ſame party do affirm it to be neither falſe nor blaſphemous, but a moſt neceſſary truth, to ſay that God is the Author or cauſe of ſin, I have more abundantly made apparent in Three diſtinct Tracts, viz. Correct Copy p. 9, 10, 50. eſpecially Div. Philanthropy defended ch. 3. ſect. 34. p. 132. &c. to p. 139. & ſect. 35. p. 141. and again Div. Purity def. ch. 4. ſect. 3. p. 19, 20. And I ſhall do it yet more effectually in the ſecond and third Chapters of this following Work, in particular ch. 3. ſect. 13. & 27. And therefore

Thirdly, That they would not ſo frequently and affectionately contend for that very Doctrine, which ſometimes (though very rarely) they confeſſe to be falſe & blaſphemous, but that they find it muſt follow from their eſpouſed Principles of God's Decrees (ſo as they ſee they muſt relinquiſh either both, or neither, I have abundantly evinced in the Div. Pur. def. ch. 4. ſect. 7. p. 33, &c. to p. 39. eſpecially from the citations out of Doctor Twiſſe, Du Moulin, Remigius, and the other friends of Gotteſchalc, Biſhop Cuthert Tunſtal, and above all, out of Proſper, whom they many times dream to have been their Patron, and therefore cannot gainſay him without Diſcomfort. And again I ſhall evince it in ſeveral parts of the following work; and in particular ch. 3. ſect. 8. & 10. Beſides that the thing is ſo conſpicuous of it ſelf, that I may venture to make the Adverſary the ſole Iudge of the Buſineſſe. For

Nothing but their Principles of Gods Decrees can lead them to blaſphemies of ſuch a nature. Sect. 8.

I demand of any man living, what ſhould move ſuch learned men as Huldericus Zuinglius, Doctor Twiſſe, Piſcator, Zanchy, Triglandius, Beza, Calvin, Martyr, Borrhaus, and many others, to teach poſterity in their printed works, [ That God doth make men tranſgreſſors, For the ſeveral pages of their works, ſee the Div. Philan. def. ch. 3. ſect. 34. eſpecially the Div. Purity def. ch. 4. ſect. 3. p. 19, 20. & ſect. 6. p. 31, 32. and is the Author of adultery, and that murder is the work of God, and that ſinners do ſin by the force of Gods will; that God predeſtines men to ſin, and to ſin quatenus ſin; that he is the Author of evil, not onely of puniſhment, but of ſin too; that he is the cauſe not onely of humane actions, but of the very defects and privations; that he effecteth ſins, that he exciteth, and tempteth, and All the excuſe Mr. B. makes for the ſaying that God doth compel men to ſin, is that they uſe it but ſeldom. See what ſhall be ſaid ch. 3. ſect. 27. num. 5. compelleth men to ſin, and a world the like ſtuff; I ſay, what moved them to print ſuch loathſom Doctrines? Was it that they eſteemed them as flowers of Rhetorick, or witty ſentences, or pretty conceits, or well-ſounding periods, or ſoul-ſaving preachments, or Hoſanna's to the moſt High? This cannot be, no not ſo much as to be imagined.

What invited Mr. Hobbs to ſay [ That Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Neceſſi • y, p. 23, 24. ſin may be neceſſarily cauſed in man by God's ordering all the world; that God doth will it and neceſſitate it, and Id. in Animadverſ. p. 11. & 107. & 106. cauſe men to erre, and is the principal Agent in the cauſing of all actions? (which he who ſaith doth alſo ſay, that he findes no difference betwixt the action and the ſin of that action, from which great truth he ſhould have inferred, that God cannot be the cauſe of ſinful actions, not that he is the cauſe of ſins.) What made the p. 36, 37: Comforter of believers to ſay, that God is the Author of ſinfulneſſe it ſelf, and hath more hand in mens ſinfulneſs then they themſelves? Were theſe Writers afraid leſt men ſhould think too reverently of God, too hardly of the Devil, and too profanely of themſelves? or were they moved with an itch to revive the Doctrine of Carneades, and to make men believe that ſin is nothing but a name invented by Eccleſiasticks, and that the thing (call'd ſin) is juſt as good as the thing call'd virtue, as being equally the work of God? 'tis very hard to think this. Or if this was one of their reaſons, yet it was not certainly the first. But I have yet a harder Queſtion.

What ſhould move Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in the very books which they have printed on purpoſe to vindicate their Doctrine from all the horrible abſurdities wherewith they ſtood charged, and wherein they knew it concerned them to ſpeak as warily as they were able, as knowing that they were liable to be publickly called to an account, what (I ſay) ſhould move them, at ſuch a time▪ and in ſuch a manner, to affirm that [ God For Mr. W's ſeveral pages where theſe things are taught, ſee the firſt and ſecond chapters of the following work, eſpecially the ſecond; and in that for inſtance Sect. 14. doth will and work ſin; that he hath an efficiency in ſin; that in all the wickedneſs in the world God hath a hand, a working hand, yea the chief hand; that ſin doth make for Gods glory; and that it hath a reſpect of good; and that God hath a hand in effecting it; yea that God doth act in it as a natural cauſe; that God decreed the ſin of Adam, and ſo ordered the whole buſineſs that he ſhould certainly fall; that it was neceſſary the firſt man ſhould ſin; that the Goſpel doth ſtirr up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, and hardens mens hearts, and God intends it ſhould do ſo, and ſends it for this very purpoſe; that of ſinful actions God is the Author and proper Cauſe; yea that he doth both will and work in the Sin of the Act, becauſe not onely the action ſimply conſider'd, but the very Pravity and Deformity of it makes way for Gods glory? ] What moved Mr. Barlee to adde his ſuffrage to Mr. Whitfield, and to ſay in plain terms, [ That For Mr. B's ſeveral pages where theſe things are taught, ſee the third whole chapter of the following work, and the Index of the Divine Philanthropy Def. which will direct to the reſt. God is the Soveraign Author of the material part of ſin, which is the doing or leaving undone not onely a natural, but moral act; ſuch as David's lying with Bathſhebah, or Cain's killing Abel, (as Doctor Twiſſe himſelf interprets the material part of ſin) nay farther, that God is the cauſe of the very Obliquity of the Act of Sin; that God exciteth men to the act of adultery; that he ſtirreth them up to unjuſt acts, as a man puts ſpurrs to a dull Jade; that he tempts men to ſin; and a world the like blaſphemies? Nay what made him and Mr. Hick. to tell the World,See what ſhall be ſaid ch. 3. Sect. 18. that if ſin is a poſitive Entity, either God is the Creator of ſin, or elſe ſin it ſelf is God? ] Did this prodigious pair of Writers think that theſe were quaint Apophthegms which they were loth ſhould die with them? or was it their purpoſe to ſtrengthen the hands of evildoers, and to tickle the ears of our Engliſh Libertines, who weare the new name of Ranters? or was their project the ſame with that of Mr. Hobbs? or did they mean by theſe things to adminiſter comfort to believers, whether Fiduciaries, or Solifidians? were they fearful that Satan ſhould be ſlandered, as the very firſt Fountain and ſource of ſin? or that ſinners ſhould think too meanly of their ſins, as if they had not a brave extraction? or are they inwardly haters of that very party which they are outwardly of? and have they taken this courſe to make them hateful to all beſides? or do they really believe that theſe are the profitable and pithy truths, in which the Godly of the land ought to be throughly grounded? or are theſe the inſtances of their care and circumſpection, in ſuch a defence of their Doctrines, as might not give any diſtaſte to pious minds? or do they think that theſe ſpeeches concerning God are the moſt ſupple, and the moſt popular, that their Principles will bear, and ſo exhibited as Abſterſions and Vindications of their Divinity? or do they count it a fine thing to contradict themſelves ſolemnly and in Print, by ſaying that God is This and That, and then by ſaying they never ſay it? O me propè laſſum juvate poſteri! If none of theſe were their inducements, (as my charity forbids me to think they were) what other account can be rendred (even by ſuch as would plead in favour of them) but that they teach ſuch things through the neceſsity of their affaires? they are ſo naturally flowing from their conceit of God's praeſcience, and of his praedetermination (before his praeſcience) of all events without exception, and ſo of his abſolute Decrees of reward andNote, that abſolute Reprobation muſt needs be confeſſed to be a very ſore puniſhment, in whatſoever ſenſe they pleaſe to take it. puniſhment, without the conſideration of their being in Chriſt by Faith, or out of Chriſt by infidelity, of their abiding in Chriſt by perſeverance, or out of Chriſt by impenitence unto the end; That whil'ſt they hold theſe Premiſses, they cannot poſſibly eſcape the black and terrible concluſion ſo lately mentioned. They muſt either part with their firſt Principles, or elſe they find (by many experiments) that the ugly inferences will follow, do what they can to the contrary. Having ſwallowed it for a Maxime, that God's praeſcience of all things doth preſuppoſe his praedetermination (as Mr. B. tells us) and that he foreknew nothing but becauſe he firſt had decreed it, (as Mr. Calvin) they find it neceſſary to infer, that God abſolutely decreed and praedetermined all the wickedneſs in the World. Thus their Principles, rather then they, (or they by ſerving their Principles) have brought thoſe monſters into the light. And if they ſincerely do hate the ſequels, they muſt bid farewel to the antecedent. For when it is affirm'd, that two and two make five, it muſt be inferr'd, that five and but four, four being the product of two and two: which Downright Maccovius was ſo ſenſible of (who was as learned and as Zealous as any one of that Party) that he honeſtly confeſsed in the Synod at Dort, that if they did not maintain God's willing of ſin, and his ordaining men to ſin as ſin, they muſt come over to the Remonſtrants.

How the violent ſtreams of blaſphemy may be quickly dried up in their ſeveral channels. Sect. 9.

Now that all thoſe black and noiſom streams may no longer guſh out of their pens, I find the moſt effectual and ſpeedy courſe will be to damm up the Fountain, or Headſpring of the effluxions. This is done on ſet purpoſe in the eighth and ninth Sections of the third Chapter of this Book. And there my Reader is to begin, if he will take my counſel; becauſe he will there be entertained, not with the nature onely, and cauſe, and malignity of the diſeaſe, but (if I am not much miſtaken) with the proper method and means of cure too. For thus I reckon within my ſelf, if God's foreknowledge of all events, and ſo (by conſequence) of all the wickedneſſes in the world, be proved not to praeſuppoſe his praedetermination of them, then it is proved in the ſame instant, that he did not abſolutely decree the being of ſin; but (on the contrary) that he conditionally decreed the permiſsion of its being, which he foreſaw would have a being by the ſinner's determination of his own will to it, if he did not forcibly hinder the ſinner's Free-will, which he eternally decreed he would not do. And in this is wrapp't up another proof as undeniable, to wit, that all God's Decrees are not abſolute or irreſpective or unconditional, (as my adverſaries preſume to limit the power of the Almighty) but ſome of his deceees, namely thoſe which reſpect the acts of voluntary agents, with the rewards or puniſhments which do enſue, muſt needs be reſpective and conditional, that is, ſecundùm praeſcientiam, according to his foreknowledge and eternal conſideration, For whatſoever is found to be, in time, either the cauſe of man's puniſhment, or the condition required to his reward, that did God from eternity both foreknow and fore-conſider; and according to that eternal foreknowledge and conſideration of the temporal cauſe of the one, or condition requiſite to the other, he did eternally decree both to puniſh and to reward.

Mr. W's whole Fabrick pluckt up by the foundation. Sect. 10.

Whether Mr. Whitfield did understand this, or not, or whether he found it ſo clear a thing as not to be able to make a ſhew of any colourable reſiſtance, but by diſſembling his underſtanding, and putting all his confidence in his affectation of a miſtake, let his dearest friends judge by that which followes. For he layes the foundation of all his ſtructure in theſe moſt ſignal and extraordinary lines:

Arguments againſt Conditional Decrees.

By Conditional Decrees we underſtand ſuch as wherein the condition doth not onely go before the execution, Mr. W's explication of what he underſtands by conditionall Decrees. or effecting of the things decreed, but before the Decree it ſelf, before the eternal act of God's will, and that purpoſe within himſelf, whereby he hath determined that ſuch or ſuch things ſhall be, p. 2. lin. 21, 22, &c.

His proviſion for a flight from h • s whole undertaking. Num. 1. Obſerve (Good Reader) how ſublimely his building is deſign'd to riſe, by him whoſe very baſis is purpoſely laid within the clouds. He profeſſeth to frame Arguments againſt conditional Decrees, not as I underſtand them, or any man living of my way; but as He and his Peers are Poetically pleas'd to underſtand them. And what is this but to make proviſion, that all his book may be no better then a vain-glorious Tergiverſation? boaſting his strength, in running away from the general Title of his book? bravely threatning to diſpute, yet poorly declining the thing in queſtion? Durſt he have writ againſt my Doctrine of Conditional Decrees (as it ſeems he dares againſt his own) he durſt have cited my words, wherein my meaning might have appear'd. Which why durſt he not do, but becauſe he found that my words were not liable to exception? He knew he was deſtitute of Arguments againſt Conditional Decrees, as I have alwayes understood them; but as he underſtands them, he can order them at his pleaſure. A goodly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; and much good do't him with all his conqueſts, in that war which he wageth against himſelf.

He is equally unfortunate whether he intended ſenſe or non-ſenſe.2. But what are Mr. W's conditional Decrees, againſt which Mr. W. prepares to argue? he tells us [They are ſuch, as wherein the condition doth go before the Decree it ſelf.] Did he intend this for non-ſenſe, or did he not? If he did, how mean and abject an opinion muſt he have had of his enterpriſe, who thought it not ſafe to ſpeak ſenſe for fear the people ſhould underſtand him? if he did not, it ſeems he thought it good ſenſe, to ſay, that the condition in the Decree was before the Decree it ſelf wherein it was. Had he not imbarqued himſelf in a moſt deſperate Adventure (as very ſhortly he will find) he would have told us that a Decree is therefore ſaid to be conditional, becauſe it is made with a condition annexed to it, or concomitant with it, or in a foreſight of ſomething, in reſpect of which it is decreed. For thence it is that the word conditional is commonly explained by the word reſpective, as abſolute is (on the contrary) by irreſpective. For example, God foreſeeing or foreknowing that Adam and Cain would determine their wills to ſin, (the one in eating, as the other in killing, what was forbidden) decreed to permit, and to puniſh both. In which caſe his Decree is called reſpective or conditional, becauſe it was made in a praeſcience and praeconſideration, that they would both determine their wills to ſin: which praeſcience was concomitant becauſe coaeternal with his decree. Whereas according to Mr. W. God did abſolutely decree that Adam ſhould eat againſt praecept, and that Cain ſhould kill his brother. Which if he ſhall venture to deny, and ſay he holds (as I do) that God did onely decree to permit them to ſin, in a foreknowledge that they would freely and voluntarily do it, if not forcibly hindred from uſing the freedom of their wills; he will then be exactly of my opinion, and overthrow his whole fabrick by ſubverting and even nulling his whole foundation. For to decree one thing in intuition of another, (and both from eternity, reſpecting their objects which ſhall be in time,) is to make a reſpective or conditional decree. Now becauſe when God is ſaid to decree and foreknow, he is implied eo ipſo to decree ſomething, and foreknow ſomething, 'tis plain, the things now in time which were decreed and foreknown from all eternity, were ſome way preſent to the Almighty when he foreknew and decreed them, becauſe the act implies the object about which it is converſant. And how can that which is meerly temporal have been eternally preſent with the Almighty, but by its Idea or Exemplar in mente Dei? as the work of every rational and adviſed Agent is conceived by the Agent, before effected; the intelligible platform or conception is preſent with the workman, whil'ſt the work it ſelf or thing executed is yet but future. And here it is duly to be conſidered, that as the temporal thing which God eternally decreed was every whit as future when God decreed it, as any temporal thing which God foreknew when he eternally foreknew it; ſo his eternal foreknowledge was as eternal, as his eternal decree. Again it is duly to be conſidered, that as now in time, the ſin doth go before the puniſhment, ſo from all eternity God foreknew this priority of the ſin, and poſteriority of the puniſhment. Nor could he poſſibly decree the ſecond, until he had foreknown the firſt. Nay he muſt needs have decreed to puniſh ſinners, according to his foreknowledge that they would ſin; becauſe whatſoever he did decree, he did knowingly, and wiſely, and righteouſly decree, neither cruelly, nor by chance, or at a venture. So that God's foreknowledge was ſimultaneous with his decree, as having been coaeternal; neither was before the other in order of time (for that would imply a contradiction) although in order of nature his foreknowledge of ſin did praecede his Decree to puniſh ſinners, and his foreknowledge that man would determine his will to ſin, did praecede his decree to permit that man's determination. Now I proceed to ſhew more of Mr. W's unhappineſſe, into which he hath freely caſt himſelf, either by not comprehending, or by diſſembling his comprehenſion of theſe ſo plain and obvious things.

3. He is equally unhappy whatever he means by the word Condition.3. Forſooth he means ſuch Decrees, by Conditional Decrees, whoſe condition goes before the Decree it ſelf, as well as before the execution of the Decree.] Very well. But what does he mean by the condition? As being in act a temporal thing, or onely in Idea, as being eternally in God's foreknowledge? If the firſt, then his meaning is wonderful, and never enough to be celebrated with admiration. For his project is but to prove, that temporal is not before eternal; and that that which comes after God's Decree at an infinite diſtance, could not poſſibly go before it. A very viſible truth, but a moſt inexcuſable Ignoratio Elenchi. If he ſhall ſay he means the ſecond, he muſt alſo tell us his meaning of the word [before.] Does he mean a condition before in time, or before onely in order? If the former, he implies a contradiction, by implying in eternity a priority of time: and when he ſaith that the condition is (underſtood by him to be) before the Decree it ſelf, he implies another contradiction, by implying an eternal conditional Decree to have been a Decree, before conditional; for ſuch it was, if the condition was in time before the Decree. But if he ſhall ſay he means the later, then he firſt of all infers that God is the Author of all the wickedneſſe in the World, by his denying the poſsibility of ſuch Decrees, (as in part hath been ſhewed, and ſhall be ſhewed in great plenty;) and ſecondly he ruines the utmoſt force of his firſt Argument, which therefore now ſhall be compar'd. For his next words are theſe;

Sect. 11.

Mr. W's firſt Argument to be compared with his expoſition of conditional Decrees, is he underſtands them. That ſuch a Decree as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of God, if we conſider him in regard either of his eternity, immutability, omnipotency, ſimplicity, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear;

That which is abſolutely eternal had nothing going before it, for it is abſolutè primum: but all God's Decrees (being acts within himſelf, and therefore not really differing from himſelf) are abſolutely eternal: therefore they can have no condition or conſideration of any thing without himſelf going before them, p. 2. and 3.]

Num. 1. Now his abſurdities grow numerous, 1. He is as unfortunate in his beſt, as in his worſt meaning. as well as groſſe: for either he here bewrayeth his former meaning to have been, of a priority of time in eternity it ſelf, and ſo he is enwrapped in all the miſeries ſo lately mentioned; or elſe he muſt ſay in his defence, that he onely here means a priority of order, as I and others are wont to do. I am content to allow him the utmoſt favour that he can wiſh; I will ſuppoſe he means ſenſe, and the very beſt that can be meant: yet as things go with him, I cannot chuſe but make him appear to be as unhappy in his beſt as in his worſt meaning. And when I have done, he ſhall take his choice. For let him ſtick to what he will, and ſay he means what he can, or can be prompted by his Abettors to ſay he means, yet he hath ſo ordered the matter, that the meaſure of his calamities will be on every ſide equal. For admitting he here means a priority of order, from the impoſſibility of which in that which is abſolutely eternal, he argues the impoſſibility of Conditional Decrees, we find him fallen without redreſſe into theſe following abſurdities.

2. His way of arguing in his beſt ſenſe againſt Conditional Decrees is as much againſt the Trinity of perſons in the Godhead.2. Firſt his arguing is againſt the Trinity of the Godhead: for the Father is the firſt Perſon, the Son the ſecond, the Holy Ghoſt the third and by a priority of order (though not of time) the firſt is before the ſecond, as the ſecond before the third. So that according to Mr. Whitfield, the ſecond and third perſons cannot be abſolutely eternal; for whatſoever is ſo, is abſolutè primum (ſaith Mr. W.) but the ſecond and third perſons are not both the firſt perſon; therefore (according to Mr. W.) they are not abſolutely eternal. But by his favour the three perſons are coaeternal, yet they differ in order, as the firſt from the ſecond, and the ſecond from the third; nay they differ alſo in their proprieties, and in their manner of working. The Father exiſting and working from himſelf, the Son from the Father, the Holy Ghoſt from both, as the Adverſaries agree. But that which is of it ſelf onely, is before that which is of another, in ſome reſpect; therefore that which is eternal may have ſomething going before it by a priority of order. Again, God's Eſſence is in order of nature before his attributes, and his attributes before his actions, yet God did act, and had attributes from all eternity. There muſt be Ens before Tale, and a ſubject before a praedicate, eſpecially in Conjugates, where the praedicate is by way of adjunct; as when we ſay God is juſt, we imply his Being in the firſt word, and his attribute in the third. And as there muſt be men, before they can be happy, ſo God's decree that there ſhall be men, is (by one kind of priority) before his decree that they ſhall be happy. We intend the end before the means, God both at once; yet ſo, as that the one is in order of nature before the other. And this is confeſſed by Mr. W. p. 42. Arg. 3. viz. [That Divines do uſually place an order in God's decrees wherein one thing goes before another.]

3. He argues againſt his own M • ſt rs and Brethren.3. Next his way of arguing is againſt his own Masters as well as brethren: Calv. Loſt. l. 3 c. 23. ſect. 7. fol. 325. for Mr. Calvin placeth God's Decree before his praeſcience, and ſo dothBeza ad Rom. 11 4. Beza; and Mr. Barlee ſaith, Gods praeſcience praeſuppoſeth his praedestination, c. 3. p. 13. Doctor Reynolds more truly thus,D. Reyn. of the Paſſions, c. 42. p. 545. The actions of our will were foreknown becauſe our will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and election. Wolleb. in Theol. compen. l. 1. c. 3. p. 29. Wollebius (more plainly then any other) affirms God's will to be conſidered as the efficient cauſe, and his Decree as the effect: and again he ſaith,Id. ib. c. 4. p. 35. that God's praedeſtination doth praeſuppoſe his decree. So that according to Mr. W. all theſe are enemies to the abſolute aeternity of God's praeſcience, or of his praedeſtination; ſome placing his praedeſtination before his praeſcience, and ſome his decree before his praedeſtination, and ſome his will before his decree, even as the cauſe before the effect.

4. He argues directly againſt S. Paul, as well as againſt the eternity of God's foreknowledge.4. Again, his way of arguing is not onely directly bent againſt the eternity of God's foreknowledge, as alwayes ſuppoſed by himſelf to be after his decree, but more unhappily againſt the words of S. Paul, who in the very ſame period doth imply God's purpoſe and counſel, (and ſo his knowledge) to be in order of nature before his praedeſtination, Eph. 1.11. In whom (that is in Chriſt) we alſo have obtained an inheritance, being praedeſtinated [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] according to the purpoſe of him who worketh all things [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] according to the counſel of his will. Where his counſel is as the Rule by which he acts, which is in order of nature before his action, his action being according to the Rule of his counſel: from whence it is evident, that God did not firſt Decree, and then conſult or conſider, but both together, becauſe both from eternity, yet ſo, as that his counſel or conſultation was in order of nature before his Decree; he having wiſely decreed, for this reaſon onely, becauſe he decreed according to his counſel; not by hap hazzard, but according to his knowledge and conſideration, that it would tend to his glory, without which it is evident he would never have decreed it. And therefore ſaith the ſame Apoſtle (2 Theſſ. 2.13.) God hath from the beginning choſen you to ſalvation (he doth not ſay abſolutely, but) through ſanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the Truth: which God foreknew when he choſe them. And according to foreknowledge they were choſen or elected, as S. Peter ſaith expreſſely 1 Pet. 1.2. as 'twere defining or explaining a conditional election. And S. Paul doth put foreknowledge before Praedeſtination, Rom. 8.29. which may fitly be compared with Rom. 11.2. and Act. 2.23.

5. He argues in a fl • t contradiction to himſelf, and againſt Doctor Twiſſe. 5. His way of arguing is contradictory to himſelf, and to Doctor Twiſſe, with whom he joyns in a confeſſion, [ That there is in God's Decrees prioritas Rationis (p. 6. Arg. 4.) and becauſe (ſaith he) in order of nature the end goes before the means, and we can apprehend no other way, therefore that order is uſually attributed unto God in his Decrees, that firſt he decrees the end, and then the means, p. 7. Doth M. W. here mean by Prioritas Rationis, one of the quinque modi priorum commonly known to all the World, or doth he not? If he doth, he ſhould have told us which, and have confeſſed that his Argument p. 3. is againſt his own Doctrine p. 6. But if he doth not, then either he aſſerteth a ſixth way of priority, which no man living can imagine, or elſe he ſpeaks of a verbal priority, as oppos'd to real; and then his fetch is no deeper then this, that there is no priority in God's Decrees, except no priority: and becauſe it is ugly to ſay there is none, except none, he therefore expreſſeth his meaning of none, by prioritas Ration is. Juſt as Wollebius and others do firſt affirm that God'sDecretum reverâ eſt ipſiſſima Dei voluntas: docendi tamen causâ, voluntas ut cauſa efficiens, Decretum verò ut effectum conſideratur. Loco ſuperiùs paulò cit. p. 29. Decree is really his will, ipſiſsima voluntas, his very very very will; and then docendi gratiâ, conſiders his will as the efficient cauſe of his Decree, and his Decree as the effect of his will. This is ſtill Mr. W's practice. To bring about his little ends, and to effect impoſsibilities, he conſiders God's Decrees as ſuch in ſome places (as p. 6, 7, 42) which he profeſſeth in other places to be impoſsible that they ſhould be, (as p. 3, & 44.) And what is this but to acknowledge that they cannot procure for their Doctrines any colour of truth, but by grounding their Diſcourſe upon the moſt declared falſhoods?

6. He argues againſt the Tenent for which he argues.6. His Argument is ſubverſive of his own dear Tenent for which he argues: Becauſe if God Note, that Mr. W. proceeds to ſay (p. 3.) God could not foreſee Faith, or any other grace in man, before man had any being in the World, as if he either denied all foreſight in God, or underſtood not what foreſight means. Again he ſaith, p. 42. that the foreſight of ſin cannot go before God's Decree. foreknew nothing but becauſe the firſt had foreordained it, (which is the ſaying of the whole party) his praeſcience then would be conditional of his Decree, and ſo there would be place for a cendition in eternity, which Mr. W. whileſt he inſerrs, endeavours to prove to be impoſsible. This is rare: impoſsible one way, and yet another way unavoidable. Again, when he ſaith, that God decreed to permit ſin, he either means, that God decreed the permiſsion onely, in praeſcience of the ſin; or that he decreed as well the ſin, as the permiſsion. If the later, he either means that the Decree was of the permiſsion before the ſin, or of the ſin before the permiſſion, Let him avow which he will, he muſt either avow a conditional Decree, or that his Doctrine is blaſphemous, and that it is but his Parties ſalve, when they ſay that God decreed to permit men to ſin, and mean his decreeing that men ſhould ſin.

7. He is fain to make God's Decrees to be actus Dei ad intra, againſt his own party, who teach them to be ad extra. 7. His memorable Parentheſis [that God's Decrees are acts within himſelf, and therefore not really different from himſelf, p. 3. hath quite undone him many wayes. For firſt, he means that God's Decrees are not onely immanent, but alſo actus ad intra, as he ſaith in terminis p. 37. But this is lamentably falſe, his own Teachers being witneſs: for thoſe are actus Dei ad intra, which relate to nothing without God; as his contemplation of himſelf, the generation of his Son, the proceſsion of the Holy Ghoſt. But thoſe are actus Dei ad extra, which are referred to any thing without the Godhead; ſuch are God's Praedeſtination and Creation, which reſpect his creatures, whereof the former is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and the later 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , but both ad extra, for immanent and tranſient are the diviſive members of actus or opera Dei ad Extra; as every Novitius in theſe controverſies can well inform him. If he did not know the difference betwixt immanent and ad intra, or is a ſelf-contradicter betwixt his p. 3. and p. 37. he alone is to anſwer for it. But this is the leaſt of his abſurdities; For

8. He makes Gods actions to be God himſelf againſt his own Maſters and common ſenſe.8. The very thing which he affirmes to be actus Dei ad intra, p. 37. and here an act within himſelf, he affirmes to be no other then God himſelf. But that God himſelf ſhould be an act of God, within God, is a ſtrange conception. Let him conſult his Maſter Wollebius, and he will ſay that God's Decree is an internal Decretum Dei eſt interna voluniatis Divinae Actio p. 28. action of the Divine will. Again let him ask his MaſterGomar. T. 3. Diſp. 9. Theſ. 29 Gomarus, and he will ſay that God's Decree is an action, and therefore not God, and therefore different from God: ſo inconſiſtent he is with ſuch as gave him his Lawes. But he is alſo inconſiſtent with common ſenſe; For

9. Five blaſphemons abſurdities which that abſurdity doth inſer.9. If God's Decree is not really different from himſelf, and ſo really is himſelf, then 1. He depends upon himſelf as upon a free Agent, which was at liberty once to have decreed, or not decreed the redemption of the world, and by conſequence at liberty to have been, or not to have been. 2. It would alſo follow, that God was the efficient cauſe of himſelf, becauſe of his Decree, and ſo in order of nature before himſelf. 3. It would follow, that God could not chuſe but Decree, becauſe he could not chuſe but be himſelf; and ſo that his Decree is falſely defined by all Divines of all Parties, except Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Whitfield. 4. It would follow, that the generation of God the Son would be God himſelf, as being actus Dei ad intra, whereas Decretum is but ad extra. 5. It would follow, that the Son might be ſaid to have begot the Father, and the Father to have proceeded from the Son and the Holy Ghost, becauſe the eſſence of God is equally common to each perſon in the Trinity. But theſe are things which are blaſphemouſly abſurd; therefore God's actions are not his eſſence, and therefore different from his eſſence, and by conſequence from himſelf.

10. He makes God himſelf to be Reprobation.10. Mr. W. forgetting what he here ſaith, by that time he comes to p. 44. will have it there to be [ Improper to ſay that God doth decree to reprobate, as if he ſhould decree to decree; where as reprobation it ſelf is the Decree, p. 44.] Were I not ſtriving to put an end to my Introduction, I would examine whether he knew what is the Engliſh of decernere, and whether he pleads not for my notion of God's Decrees againſt his will. But I will onely obſerve, how he firſt affirmes God to be the ſame Being with his Decree, (p. 3.) and now his Decree to be Reprobation it ſelf (p. 44.) ſo that according to Mr. W. God is Reprobation, and Reprobation is God.

Sect. 12.

An eaſie way to his Reformation conciſely open'd and pointed at.That I may not ſeem to dwell in the very door, I will ſpeak as conciſely as I am able. 1. Mr. W. ſeems to have a prejudice againſt the coaeternity of God's conſideration, according to which he did decree, becauſe its object is temporal and without himſelf. As if the object of his Decree were not the ſame. 2.Certè omnis voluntas eſt respectiva, ſicut & ſcientia. Doctor Twiſſe confeſſeth, (l. 2. p. 24. col. 2.) that the will of God, as well as knowledge, muſt needs be reſpective. And if of one object, why not of another? if in one kind, why not in another? 3. If he could, and did, nay could not but conſider the ſins of Angels, or of Men, whileſt he decreed their Reprobation, what ſhould move men to ſay, that he decreed their Reprobation without any conſideration of their ſins, which yet he could not but conſider, as being wiſe and omniſcient? If he did not foreſee the fall of Adam, before he decreed to give his Son, yet this they will grant, that he did not decree to give his Son before he foreſaw the fall of Adam; which is as much as I deſire, if they will alſo grant that he had a reſpect to the fall of Adam, when he decreed to give his Son. 4. Again, let them grant, that cauſa exemplaris is before the efficient by any kind of priority, (ſuch as is granted by themſelves at other times) and even that will ſuffice to undeceive them. Of twenty Arguments which I could urge, and as it were build upon the ruines of Mr. W's whole Fabrick, I ſhall lay down but two from the general confeſsions of the adverſe Party.

1. They do unanimouſly confeſſe, that God's promiſe is conditional; and that his promiſe, though made in time, was decreed to be made from all Aeternity; The firſt Argument for conditional Decrees grounded on the confeſſion of all the contrary party, and according to the Tenor of the ſeventeenth Article of the Church of England, exhibited to us in the laſt clauſe of it. and that it was decreed to be ſuch as it is, a conditional promiſe. For, ſay they, (Mr. W. p. 37. and Mr. B. Correp. Corr. p. 86, 87.) God doth not onely determine the thing it ſelf that ſhall be done, but the manner how it ſhall be done.] Now if God's promiſe is conditional (as all acknowledge) God eternally decreed that he would make it (what it is) a conditional promiſe: which yet he could not do, but by conſidering the condition, as well as the promiſe to which it cleaves; for elſe he had not conſidered it as a conditional promiſe, nor could he be inconſiderate, in any thing, or circumſtance, which he decreed: and a Decree of any thing in conſideration of a condition, is exactly the thing I mean by a Conditional Decree. And what is thus argued from the promiſes of God which are conditional, may equally be argued from his conditional threats for his conditional Decree of Reprobation. Nor is there place for cavil in this plain Argument; for as the promiſe was decreed, ſo alſo was the condition; and as the condition was foreknown, ſo alſo was the promiſe. Again, as the promiſe was eternally in Idea or conception, ſo alſo was the condition. And as the condition is temporally in act or exiſtence, ſo alſo is the promiſe. And hence plain Readers may ſee the mind of the ſeventeenth Article of the thirty nine.

The ſecond Argument for conditional Decrees from another confeſsion of the contrary party in their definition of God's Decrees.2. It is unanimouſly confeſſed by the adverſe Party, (as a prime ingredient in its definition) that God's Decree is an action of his Divine will depending on God as a free Agent. And by a conſequence unavoidable, that God was free (from all eternity) to decree, or not to decree, to elect, or not to elect. For if he was not once free, how can he be ſaid to have elected? And how unlikely are thoſe men to thank God for their election, whoſe Principles do infer that he could not poſſibly have done otherwiſe? But to elect of neceſsity, or to chuſe without a freedom, implies a groſſe contradiction in adjecto. It will and muſt be therefore granted, that if God did decree any thing, he was free to decree it before he actually decreed; and if he choſe or elected any one, he was free to elect before he actually elected. I ſay [Before] for this reaſon; becauſe when he actually elected, he was not free to elect, and what he actually decreed, he was no longer free to decree. And the reaſon of my reaſon is moſt irrefragable, it being this, that what is done already cannot remain not yet done. That which is paſt, or preſent, cannot be future: and he who hath choſen, cannot ſtill be to chuſe the numerical thing which he hath choſen. This implying another Contradiction. It will be granted then on all ſides, that when God had determined his will ad hoc, it did not ad hoc remain undetermined. And becauſe it was once completely free, or undetermined, 'tis plain that his Being and his Liberty were before his actual Decree: which being granted, there is nothing to hinder (by the very confeſsion of the Adverſary) but that his Decrees might be conditional.

Sect. 13.

Mr. W's miſtake of the thing in Queſtion repreſented in cleerer and fairer colours.But if Mr. W. and his Partiſans will mean what they pleaſe by conditional Decrees, and then confute their capricious meanings, and intitle others to thoſe overthrowes, which (with paines and charges) they give themſelves, I will leave them in their afflictions from this time forward. For what is to be done with ſuch a Diſputant, who undertaking to demonſtrate that a man cannot poſsibly be an animal, ſhall begin his enterpriſe with this explication of his meaning?

[By the word Animal, we underſtand ſuch as wherein the animality doth bear the chief ſway. And becauſe of animals there are two ſorts, (& vox 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 muſt be diſtinguiſhed into its different ſignificata) I mean that ſort which is commonly called by Logicians Animal irrationale.

That ſuch an Animal as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of man, if we conſider him in regard either of his riſibility, or rationality, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear.]

This is juſt the caſe of Mr. W. repreſented onely in more viſible, but fairer colours. It is a more important truth, that God's Decrees of election and reprobation are conditional, then that a man is an animal. And Mr. W. preparing to write againſt them, hath opened his meaning of the word conditional, as I have largely ſhew'd. How irreſitible is the truth of conditional Decrees, which the Adverſaries themſelves cannot tell how to gainſay, untill they have created themſelves a ſubject, and called it ours? How deplorable are the endeavours of ſuch opponents, whoſe chiefeſt refuge and ſtrength is to mistake the very ground on which the Defendant is known to stand? Upon fairer terms then ſuch as theſe, I will at any time undertake to make it appear to Mr. W. that two and two amount to ten, or that five and five put together do make but four. I am ſecure of the ſucceſſe whenſoever it ſhall pleaſe him to ſhew his ſtrength, becauſe I find the task is eaſier to prove that two and two are ten, then to prove that God's Decrees are all irreſpective or unconditional: which though the chiefeſt of that Party have aſſerted as well as they have been able, yet have they done it in ſuch a manner, as if they were afraid to have it believed. And this I haſten to make apparent in the following Chapters.

CHAP. I. Concerning his Fanciful Creation of Three General Objections; and his Propoundings in General in way of Anſwer, p. 19, 20.

SECT. I.

AS Mr. Whitfield found it his ſafeſt way, to ſ • end no leſſe then eighteen • ages, 1. M. W's diſtruſt which he puts in his cauſe. be •• des his E • iſtle to the Reader) upon a Subject of his own choice, before his courage would ſerve him to ſplit himſelf u • on the Rocks, which he pretended to attempt in his valiant Title; ſo when he is brought to his proper Task (t • nquam Bos ad Ce •• ma) of anſwe • ing ſuch Ob • ections as had been made againſt his Doctrines in the Divine Philanthropie defended, he is fain to ſhrug three times together, before he is able to fall on.

Firſt he tells us, It is agreeable to right reaſon, that God being a moſt free, abſolute, and omnipotent Agent, he might deſign the creatures that were of his own making to what ends himſelf ple • ſed, without giving account to any, &c. (p. 19. Num. 1.) And this he calls his first Generall Anſwer, or thing propounded by way of Anſwer.

2. His ſtudied aiming beſide the mark.Secondly, But to whom, or to what, or upon what occaſion, no man living can imagin, much leſſe can he. Where dwells the man who ever dream't of ſuch an Objection againſt the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Soveraignty of God? not in any of their houſes, who aſcribe thus much to the Sapreme Civil Magiſtrate, that he is [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] unaccomptable upon earth, much more to the Omnipotent, that he is ſuch even in Heaven. This general Objection was fram'd at Bugbruck, by that creator of Chimaera's who loves to fancy an Enemy, and then to fight him; when he cannot anſwer what is objected, he objects ſuch things as he can anſwer. It is the cream of his ſtrength, that he feels his own weakneſſe, and therefore deals with a proportionable Objection. That which comes out of his Forge, he thinks is fit enough to paſſe between his Hammer and his Anvil. But then he ought to conſider, that he ſhould feign no more Objections than he can diſſipate with his practice as well as with his Pen.

3. Yet overthrowes his own Rampire.For Thirdly, If God was pleaſed that his Mercy ſhould be over Pſ. 145.9. Pſ. 103.8. Pſ 145.8. Pſ. 86.15. all his works, and might do what he pleas'd, (as Mr. W. confeſſeth) why does he daringly exclude the greateſt part of mankind from any imaginable ſhare of that rich mercy? The leaſt degree of Gods mercy hath ſome of comfort: But is it a comfort to the Reprobates, that by a peremptory Decree they are rendred incapable of Heaven, and ſure of Hell, without reſpect unto their ſins, and yet inevitably ſinful without repentance, that ſo they may not be damn'd for nothing? Why then do men, who are as wormes, advance themſelves againſt God, denying his M. whitf. p. 2. l. ante-pen. penult. ult. & pag. ſeq. 1. Eternity. 2. Immutability, 3. Omnipotency, 4. Simplicity, and all his other perfections, becauſe he was pleaſed to decree the end of his rational creatures, in an eternal conſideration of the reſpective means? If God determin'd from eternity that Cain and Judas ſhould beGen. 4.14, 16. Mat. 25.30. Act. 1.25. caſt out of his preſence, in regard of their Murder and Impenitence, (and no otherwiſe) what is that to Mr. Whitfield? Job 33.13. Why doſt thou ſtrive againſt him, for he doth not give account of his matters? as Elihu pleaded for God in another caſe. TheProv. 16.4 • Lord hath made all things for himſelf, them that are good, for the day of good things, them that are (a) wicked, for the day of evil; yea in an eternal foreknowledge and conſideration of their wickedneſs. If God was pleas'd to give his Son to be a ranſom for all the World (upon their ſeveral performances of no impoſſible conditions) why ſhould a Calviniſt be offended, that all others are ſavable as well as he, whoſe bodies areJob 33.6. formed of as good a clay, and whoſeEccl. 12.7. ſouls can pretend to as high a pitch of extraction? why ſhould theMat. 20.15. Creatures eye be evil, becauſe his God is exceeding good, and it ſeems much more, than Envy and Avarice can well endure? Let Mr. Wh. therefore ceaſe from contriving Objections againſt himſelf; or if his Invention muſt needs be buſie, let him conjure up no more than he is able to exorcize; norWiſd. 1.12. pull diſgraces upon his Doctrine, with the work of his hands. But withall let him be told, that as God was not bound to give account of his wayes to any creature, (and as little to thoſe of the Kirk, as to thoſe of the Synagogue,) ſo when it pleaſed him (of his mercy and free love to Mankind) to reveal as much of them, as lies open to our eyes in his written Word, who dares call him to account for giving account of his Diſpenſations? if God is pleaſed in ſome Caſes (and that as an inſtance of his freedom) to becomeIſa. 5.3, 4, &c. Ezek. 18. accountable to his creatures, and to become likeHeb. 4.15. Mat. 8.17. one of us (ſin alone being excepted) he is not to give an account to any.

4. His ſecond overthrow of himſelf, and of his abſolute decrees.Fourthly, What is added by Mr. W. That God might appoint his creatures to ſuch ends as ſhould make moſt for his glory, is very true, and very impertiment, and very much to the downfal of his Poetical Reprobation. For to decree men to puniſhment without reſpect unto their ſins, makes not ſo much for Gods glory, as to decree them to puniſhment in conſideration of their ſins: Unleſs Mr. Wh. is of opinion, that 'tis a more glorious thing to torment a creature as a creature, then to puniſh a ſinner as being ſinful; of that eternal Decrees are not every way anſwered by their Temporal executions. God created Mankind as he was mighty, but decreed to reprobate and elect as he was in •• nitely juſt. For Reprobation in all ſenſes (negative, or poſitive) imports a very ſore puniſhment, as every puniſhment imports a ſin, for which the puniſhment is inflicted. That is moſt for Gods glory, which is moſt for his justice and Mercy too: but to decree a man's miſery, for the meer ſhewing of a Soveraignty over the work of his hands, (and therefore to decree it without reſpect unto ſin) hath nothing in it of Justice, much leſſe of Mercy; and ſo is incompetible to • im, who could not chuſe but be alwayes (from all eternity) at once a Juſt and a Merciful Soveraign: it being deſtructive of his glory (and by conſequence of his Being) that any one of his Attributes ſhould (for an Article of time) exclude the other. From whence it followes that Mr. Wh. hath confuted all his own Doctrine in leſs than two lines. Nor can he be otherwiſe diſintangled from his own dear 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Lime-twiggs, unleſs he can prove that Gods diſhonour doth make moſt for his glory: or unleſſe he will adde to his other miſeries, that to be ſinful by a Decree, or to be puniſhed without ſin (which by the way is a contradiction) tends nothing at all to Gods diſhonour. But for ſuch things as theſe Iſhall reckon with him hereafter: I haſten now to his Second General.

His third overthrow of himſelf by a moſt crimſon contradiction.Sect. 2.

His ſecond Propounding (as he words it) in way of General Anſwer to no-body-knowes-what (nor doth he venture to tell us what) General Objection, doth very happily run thus; That which the Scripture plainly, clearly, and poſitively aſſerteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, though we cannot diſcern the manner how he doth it: and p. 19. bear witneſs Reader, againſt anon; for when he comes to thoſe Scriptures, which do plainly, cleerly, and poſitively aſſert, that Chriſt hath died for all men, and taſted death for every man, and is the pro • itiation for the ſins of the whole world, and the like, then the Caſe is alter'd with him; and in a flat oppoſition to what he here tells us, It is (ſaith he) a very weak way of arguing, to argue from the ſignification of words; eſpecially ſuch words as have various ſignifications; as all men, every man, the world, the whole world, and the reſt, which are oft-times uſed, not to ſignifie every particular man and woman, but a part of them onely, (p. 71, 72.) Well fare the Disputant indeed, vvho vvill never lay down the Cudgels, ſo long as he is able to break his ovvn ſhins with them; let his cauſe be never ſo bad, he vvill not fall from his principles, ſo long as ſelf-contradiction can hold him up: rather then others of his kind ſhall be as ſaveable as He, the whole world muſt ſignifie the ſmallest part of it; and we muſt not argue from the ſignification of words, we are not bound to adhere unto the letter, (p. 72.) So abominable and impious is Univerſal Redemption, that it cannot ſtand with Gods wiſedome (ſaith Mr. Whitfield) not be conſiſtent with other Scriptures, nor can it agree with the Analogy of Faith, (p. 73.) Any vvay of expoſition muſt be invented and embraced, rather then Chriſt muſt be admitted to have died for mankind. But here on the contrary ſide, vvhen Mr. W. deſires to prove, that God hath a hand in all ſin, an efficiency in ſin, that ſin is Gods work, and that God is actively the cauſe of ſin, (and more ſuch ſtuff, as ſhall be ſhevved and cited in its proper place) this is ſuch comfortable Doctrine to a man of his life and converſation, that all Texts of Scripture muſt be taken according to the Letter, vvhoſe outſide and Letter doth ſound this vvay: any thing muſt be ſvvallovved againſt the Analogy of Faith, and against the plain tenour of all other Scriptures, rather then God muſt be exempted from the cauſality of ſin. Mr. W. then muſt needs argue from the ſignification of words, vvhich to do in other caſes he calls a very great weakneſs, (p. 71.) This is the man of mettle, vvho cannot poſſibly be conquered, he is under the protection of ſo much frailty: or grant him conquered, he muſt not poſſibly be caught; for if he cannot out at the door, he vvill eſcape at the window. Yet I vvill follovv him ſo far, as to lay ſome hold on him; and vvill not vvillingly let him go, until he ſhall promiſe a Recantation. For if in any one caſe, it may be pertinent in this to uſe the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Greek proverb, That for a wicked man to prosper in making God the fountain and ſource of wickedneſs, vvill be apt to turn to Gods diſcredit. The name of God will be Rom. 2.24. blasphemed among the Gentiles, if ſuch Theology as this ſhall paſs abroad among • t Chriſtians vvithout control. Obſerve hovv he goes on, p. 19.

2. It rather becomes us humbly to acknowledge our Ignorance 0688 0136 V 2 in the manner of Gods working, 2. Mr. W. enters upon the worſt part of Libertiniſm, as Mr. Calvin himſelf judged it. Contra Libert. c. 3. then to deny any of his works, then to deny that he worketh all things, &c. —then to deny that he worketh most determinately, certainly, and infallibly, in the various and mutable motions of mans will. And to ſhew his meaning to be no better then that of Beza, Piſcator, and the reſt of his Teachers, viz. that ſinful works are ſome ofZuingl. in Serm. de Prov. c. 5 & 6. Gods works, and that heBeza adverſ. Caſtell. Aphor. 1. & 6. See The Divine Purity deſended. p. 21. 30. worketh all things, whether good or evil, without any the least exception, and that God doth determine the will of man to the moſt ſinful Act which he committeth, he addes many things to make it evident that this indeed is the ſcope at which he here drives. For he tells us a little after, that when God is ſaid in Scripture to harden mens hearts, to ſend them ſtrong deluſions, to bid Shimei curſe David, to bid the evil ſpirit go and deceive Ahab, to turn the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, to have given up the Gentiles to vile luſts, to put into the hearts of the ten Kings to give their power unto the beast, and the like, (p. 22.) we muſt not expound ſuch Texts by the common Hebraiſm, but take them as literally as we do thoſe other wherein God is ſaid to make the earth, to form the light, to create man, and the like, (p. 23.) He alſo ſaith that Gods permiſſion of ſin is not without action and operation, (p. 21.) that he must needs have ſome efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he doth both will and work it, (p. 26.) that he hath a hand in effecting of it, (p. • 6.) And gaping ſo wide as he does, (nay wider then all this, as ſhall be ſhewed in due time,) how can we fail to know his meaning by his gaping? Let us then contemplate the large Dimenſions of his ſwallow, that at laſt we may demand what it is will ſtick with him.

3. His now contradiction, about the manner of Gods working.3. Firſt, an huge Contradiction goes down very glibly; for as ſoon as his ignorance is acknowledged as to the manner of Gods working, (p. 19.) he deſcribes the manner of it, and ſets it down as dogmatically, as if he had been an eyewitneſs, and of counſel to that ſecret and hidden will of God, which the men of his way are wont to oppoſe to his revealed one. He ſaith conſentingly out ofNegari non poteſt, illum aliquo modo procurare negotium, cujus conſilio & decreto genotium geritur. Piſcat. ad Am. Collat. Vorſt. ſect. 17. Piſcator, (but bluſht to put it into Engliſh) that God doth procure the buſineſs of ſin] by whoſe counſel and decree the buſineſs is managed or carried on, (p. 21.) my more diſtinctly as to the manner, in another ſhred of Latine, which he calls a true Rule, but puts it not into Engliſh. The true Engliſh of it is this, That Deus agit in peccato, non tanquam cauſa moralis, ſed tanquam cauſa naturalis. God doth act in ſin, not as a moral, but as a natural cauſe, (p. 25.) that is to ſay, He doth not ſo act as to perſwade onely (which yet is bad enough of it ſelf, and the worst that the Devil can arrive unto) but in ſuch a natural way, as to neceſſitate the ſinner; (which is infinitely worſe then to perſwade him.) Nor will it advantage him to ſay, that God decreeth, and procureth, and is the natural cauſe of the poſitive act of every ſin, but the accidental cauſe onely of the ſin it ſelf, (as He and Mr. Barlee ſhall be ſhewed to ſay in plain terms.) For Davids lying with Bathſheba was the poſitive act of Adultery, and ſin it ſelfe, (but Davids lying without Bathſheba was no ſin at all, either in whole or in part) which if Mr. Wh. cannot deny, as I am ſure he cannot, (and do challenge him to do if he thinks he may, or dares to do it) then muſt be confeſs it to be his Doctrine, that God was the natural cauſe of Davids lying with Bathſheba, and that that poſitive act of Adultery was Gods work, and his Creature; becauſe of poſitive acts (he ſaith) that God is the proper efficient cauſe, (p. 24.) This lies on him unavoidably, unleſs he can ſeparate the poſitive act of Davids lying with Bathſheba, from Davids ſin of Adultery, which was his lying with Bathſheba, and nothing elſe: which I ſhall ſhew he cannot do (if ſo groſs a viſible needs ſhewing) when I diſcover how Mr. Hicks betrayed Mr. Barlee into a Blaſ • hemy (no leſs then ſins being God, if a poſ • tive act) and hovv Mr. B. vvas even vvith him, by ſending his Treachery to the Preſs. So much for Mr. W's. nevv ſelf-contradiction.

4. His downright Libertiniſm.4. Next Mr. W. muſt be obſerved to ſpeak the language of the Libertines 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to a ſyllable, as I lately intimated, but novv ſhall openly expreſs. Saint Paul having ſaid, God worketh all things, (Eph. 1.10.) meaning all the Graces of the Holy Ghoſt, of vvhich alone he there ſpeaks (as Calvin himſelf confeſſeth,) the Libertines concluded (as Efficit omnia, id eſt, omnia ſine exception • . Beza in locum. 1. Facinus, puta Adulterium aut homicidium, eſt Dei Auto. is, Motoris. Impulſoris opus. Zuing. de Prov. c. 6. 2. Deus videri poteſt cauſa, non modò humanarum actionum, verùm etiam D • fectuum atque Privationum quae ipſis inhaerent. Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2. 3. Deus efficit ea quae peccata ſunt. Sturm. de Praedeſt. Theſ. 16. 4. Idem facit Deus, ſcilicet, procurat adulterium, maledicta, mendacia. Piſcat. reſp. ad Apolog. Birtii, p. 143. 5. Omnes peccatores & flagitioſi, vi voluntatis Dei faciunt quicquid faciunt. Id. Reſp. ad Tauffr. p. 65. 6. Deus efficaciter agit ſeu efficit, & ſuâ efficacitate perag • t omnia, ſine ullâ prorſus quantulâcunque exceptione. Beza contra caſtel. Aphoriſm. 1, 6, 7. Beza did, and as Mr. W. novv doth) that all their ſins vvere Gods works. For that vvas their rule, vvhich is novv Mr. Whitfields, that what the Scripture both plainly and poſitively aſſerteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, (p. 19.) not admitting any Hebraiſms, or other figures of ſpeech, or reſtrictions and limitations of univerſal terms, but taking all by the Letter to ſerve their turn, as Mr. Wh. doth to ſerve his, (p. 23.) Hence are thoſe ordinary Doctrines amongſt the men of that batch: 1. That adultery or murder is the work of God the Author. 2. That God may ſeem to be the cauſe, not of humane actions only, but of the very defects and privations which cleave unto them. 3. That God effects thoſe things which are ſins. 4. That God procures adultery, curſings, lyings, &c. 5. That all wicked men do all that they do by the force of Gods will. 6. That God efficaciouſly acteth or effecteth, and by his efficacity performeth all things without any the least exception. From vvhich very ſaying, being pronounced by the Libertines, Mr. Calvin diſcovers tvvo horrible, but unavoidable ſequels. 1. That there is not any difference betwixt God and the Devil. 2. That God, by this Doctrine, is tranſmuted into the Devil. Calv. ad e • ſ. Libert. cap. 13. & 14.) Novv vvhen the Calviniſts and the Libertines do teach the very ſame thing, vvhy ſhall not I hate it in the Calviniſts, as Calvin hated it in the Libertines? nay, vvhy not more? ſince a Blaſphemy is the worſe (not one vvhit the better) for proceeding out of a learned and a leading mans mouth.

—Tanto conspectius in ſe Crimen habet, quanto melior qui peccat habetur.

Nor doth it move me that ſome Calviniſts vvill take it ill at my hands (vvhileſt others not rigid vvill take it vvell) for no doubt but the Libertines took it as ill of Mr. Calvin. The Treaſure that I covet is not their Favour, but their Amendment. Let this precede, and that vvill follovv unavoidably. I therefore ask Mr. Whitfield, A Dilemma as a touch-ſtone to try his meaning. Is his meaning the ſame vvith Beza's and Peter Martyr's, and the reſt in my margin, vvhen he ſaith, we muſt not deny that God worketh all things, or is is not? If he ſay, Yes, he is a Libertine, and Mr. Calvin ſhall be my witneſs; and then let him renounce the Chriſtian name and Religion, that the Rom. 2.24. Name of Christ be not blaſphemed among the Gentiles. For we who are Christians do aſſert, that God worketh not all things without exception, good or bad, but all things only which are good, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all things vvhich become him. All the reſt are the1 Joh. 3.8. works of the Devil, and of his genuine Children, vvho are reſolved to do their Job. 8.41, 44. Fathers works. This vvas Chriſts Doctrine, this vvas Saint Johns, and Saint John (believe me) vvas a Chriſtian. All Gods works are done in Pſal. 33.4. Truth, therefore lyes are none of his: and ſoPiſcat. loco paulo ſuperius citato. Piſcator vvas out. The Lord is Pſal. 145.17. holy in all his works, Adultery and Murder are therefore none of Gods vvorks:Zuing. loc. jam citat. Zuinglius therefore vvas deceived by his Doctrine of Decrees, and Mr. W. by Zuinglius. The Lord ſhall Pſal. 104.31. rejoyce in his works, but hath Pſal. 5.4. no pleaſure in wickedneſs: therefore Martin Borrhaus ſpake very madly, when he dared to ſay that Borrhaus in Exod. cap. 4. p. 448. ſins do pleaſe God; and Mr. Wh. more madly, when he ſaith that God doth will ſin with a perfect will. p. 22. We ſee what muſt follow if Mr. W. ſhall anſwer, yes, to my Dilemma. But if his anſwer ſhall be, No, then he muſt burn his own Books, and all thoſe Books from whence he made up his Cento, and publickly ſubſcribe to the truth of mine. If he ſhall ſay his meaning is (p. 22.) that Gods will, of which he ſpeaks, is onely objected on the wiſe permiſsion or patient ſuffering of all ſins, and not upon the ſins themſelves, why then did he entitle his book againſt me, and not againſt Mr. Barlee, or againſt his unconverted ſelf? He and I will ſhake hands, if he will ſay he meant thus, and not as Doctor Twiſſe, whoSee the place cited Correct Copy, p. 10. ſaith, that the will of God doth paſs, not onely into the permiſſion of the ſin, but into the ſin it ſelf which is permitted. Utrum horum mavelit, accipiat: Let him now take his choice, and ſpeaking diſtinctly to my Dilemma, let the world know what he is for, without any Tricks or Tergiverſations. But I will tell him for his ſecurity, that he were better be tryed by the waters of jealouſie, if his meaning ſhal be found in the former part of the Dilemma; by how much a leſſer evil it is, for Num. 5.21. the thigh to rot and the belly to ſwell, then for a man but to mean (or ſay in his Pſal. 14.1. heart) that adultery and murder are the works of God. And therefore timely let me adviſe him to uſe the Num. 19.13. waters of ſeparation, that the uncleanneſs of ſuch Doctrines may not be on him.

5. The Determination of mans will to wicked actions is not Gods work.5. In the next place let us conſider what he means by thoſe words, God worketh most determinately, certainly, and infallibly in the various and mutable motions of mans will. I do but paſſingly take notice of his unſcholar-like uſe of the word Infallible, as if he knew not its meaning, or did not conſider its Derivation (the fault is too ſmall to be obſerved in a Writer of his bredth and thickneſs) I will rather try him by another Dilemma. Doth he mean that God doth ſo work on the wills of men, as to determin them of neceſſity to all their objects and actions, both good and evil? or doth he not mean this, but rather grant that mans will doth determine it ſelf? If the later, all is well; he hath no more to do next, but to abandon hisEſpecially Mr. Barlee, and his brother Hickman, who ſay, that whatſoever poſitive thing is not from God is God. c. 3. p. 112. The apex of Blaſphemy, as ſhall be ſhewed hereafter. party, and burn his books: whereas if the former is his meaning, (as hitherto it hath been) I know not what to do for him, to lighten the weight of his calamities, which will preſs him down deeply, do what I can: For firſt he implyes a contradiction, as I demonſtrated to a perſon of greater worth. And therefore here I repeat it not, but refer him to theSee The Divine Purity defended. ch. 8. ſect. 2. p. 80, 81, 82. & ſect. 5. p. 86, 87. place where he cannot fail of it. Next it inferreth unavoidably, that God is the natural cauſe of all the wickedneſs in the world. For example, ſuppoſe a wicked man hath conceived Adultery in his mind, or committed it in his Heart (as our Mat. 5.28. Saviour ſpeaks.) If God did predetermin that wicked man to that phyſical Act of Concupiſcence, and the will of that man to a conſent, as well as the appetite to a complacency, he was not onely the cauſe, but the ſole cauſe of the Adultery. Nay farther yet, if the inward intention of the end is the determination of the will to the firſt act of ſin (as the ſubtileſt of them do ſay,) and if that Inten • ion, or whatever elſe is the Determination of the will, and the Determination it ſelf, is a poſitive act (which none can deny,) and if God is the Creator or Maker, or proper cauſe, of whatſoever thing is poſitive (as theſe precious ones do affirm;) He is not onely concluded the ſole cauſe of the Adultry in his Creature, [Verum etiam id ipſum quod dicere nolo] but alſo that which is worſe, and ineffably blaſphemous. And here I ask Mr. Wh. was that adulterous thought or intention ſo determined to its object, in that reſpect evil, or was it not? If in that reſpect evil, he accuſeth God; if not evil in that respect, he acquitteth the wicked man; and unavoidably inferreth, that there was never any Adulterer, Murderer, or the like, but was carried to the doing of all his wickedneſs with a good intention, a good deſire, a very good determination of his will. And reaſon good too; For the Determination of mans will (they ſay) is Gods work, or Gods ſhare in the procurement and accompliſhment of ſins. And Gods part in the buſineſs they ſay is good. But then they leave man no ſhare at all in his impieties: if they do, let them name it, which they never yet did. Indeed they talk in the general, [that God is the Note this diſtinction which Mr. Barlee makes ch. 3. p. 55. natural cauſe of the meer Act of ſin, and a meer Accidental Cauſe of the obliquity of the act of ſin.] But bid them inſtance in ſome particular, then they ſee that they are blind, and quickly ſpeak themſelves ſpeechleſs. VVhen a man hates God, or Levi • . 24.15. curſeth God, or any otherwiſe blasphemes againſt him, let Mr. Wh. or Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. be asked, which is the act of that ſin? and which is the obliquity of the act of that ſin? you ſhall have them as mute as three dead Fiſhes. If the curſing of God is a whole ſin, it is an act of ſin, or an obliquity of an Act, or both together, and that either ſeparably or inſeparably: If onely an act, where is the obliquity? if onely an obliquity of an act, where is the act it ſelf? (for all the whole ſin is the curſing of God, nor more, nor leſs) if both together, and ſeparably, let them make that ſeparation in words, or dumb ſigns, that we may hear, and conceive it. But if both are inſeparably together, let them confeſs the thouſand blasphemies, and the ſix hundred contradictions, which have and may be detected in all their Doctrines and Diſtinctions; and after confeſſion, let them amend too; I ask no more.

6. His meaning ferreted out of his words.6. It may from hence be collected, what is meant by Mr. W. when he immediately addeth, [that God worketh moſt holily in thoſe very Actions wherein man works unrighteouſly, p. 19.] Even the ſame withSee Correct Copy, p. 10. Zuinglius (abetted alſo byTwiſſ. Vind. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. p. 36, 37. Dr. Twiſſe) that the very ſame ſin, viz. Adultery or Murder, as it is the work of God the Author, Mover, and Impeller, it is not a crime, but as it is of man, it is a great one; which is onely to ſay, that ſin is Gods work, but God is no ſinner. He is the Author of ſin in others, but ſins not himſelf. He co-operates with the ſinner to the effecting of his ſin, but being God he is not guilty. That this muſt be the meaning of Mr. W. I can demonſtrate by many Arguments. 1. By his denying Scientia media (though I am not ſure he underſtands it) and holding with Mr. Calvin, that God foreſaw nothing, but becauſe he fore-ordained it. 2. By hisNote that in his Epiſtle to the Reader he argues the later from the former with a [muſt.] conceſſion, that there is the ſame reaſon of the fore ſight of ſin and the Decree of Reprobation, with the foreſight of Faith, and the Decree of Election. But 'tis the Doctrine of him, and all his party, that Faith is the proper effect of Election, and not foreſeen untill decreed. Ʋpon the very ſame ground (to uſe his own words in my violentum) he doth and muſt hold, that God did not foreſee ſin, until he had decreed it too. Nor will it leſſen the abſurdity, to ſay that God decreed to permit ſin onely, unleſſe by permiſſion he means a ſufferance, or a wiſe not hindering: if ſo, he is right, but then he muſt burn Doctor Twiſſe his books, and retract his own: it being their conſtant doctrine, That God's permiſſion of ſin is efficacious. Nay no Twiſſ. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1 p. 142, 143, &c. leſſe efficacious is God's decree in the permiſsion of evil, than in the production of good: ſo very ſore are their very ſalvo's. Thirdly, His meaning may be evinced, (as by all other paſſages of his book, which I have, and ſhall cite, ſo) by comparing his preſent words with the nature of ſin it ſelf, which is found to conſiſt in ſuch an indiviſible point, that to ſay, God works in it, is to ſay as much as that he works it. As for example, To hate God is a ſin, or a ſinful action (two expreſſions for one thing). The very ſinfulneſs of the ſin doth intirely conſiſt in the hating of God; not in God without hating, (for he is purity it ſelf) not in hating without God as the object of it (for hatred in it ſelf is a thing indifferent, and as apt to be good as evil, and even communicable to God, who hateth ſin with a perfect hatred) but in the union and application of that act to that object. As the nature of man conſiſts not in a body one • y, nor onely in a ſoul, but in the union of the one with the other; ſo that the ſinfulneſs of that ſin of hating God, is nothing elſe but the union of that act with that object. And that is punctum indiviſibile: for ſin it ſelf is a Phyſical abstract at theNote that there is no ſuch thing as pecceit • in any Profane, or Sacred Writer. groſſeſt, of which ſinfulneſs at leaſt is an abſtract Metaphyſical; which admitting not any Compoſition, cannot farther be abſtracted ſo much as in imagination. How then can God work in the hating of God, and that no leſſe than as a natural cauſe, (for ſo he doth, ſaith Mr. W. p. 25.) without being the cauſe of the ſin it ſelf, when in the hating of God there is nothing but ſin? Here I exact of Mr. W. to tell the World what he means, or to ſatisfie for his words, of which he dares not tell the meaning. But again 4. He gives us notice of his true meaning (if not of the meaning which he will own) by three Texts of Scripture, which he applies to the purpoſe of which I ſpake: for thus run his words;

7. His abuſe of Scripture to ſerve his turn.7. How elſe can it be ſaid when Joſephs brethren ſold him into Egypt out of envy, that God ſent a man before? &c. And when David numbred the people, it is ſaid not onely that Satan ſtood up against Iſrael, and provoked David to number the people, 1 Chron. 21.1. but that the Lord moved David againſt them, in that he ſaid, go number Iſrael, 2 Sam. 24.1. By theſe he ſeeks to make it credible, that God doth work in the wickedſt actions as a natural cauſe, although theſe Texts do prove the contrary. To the firſt and moſt impertinent of the two allegations, I have f • oken ſoIn the Divine purity defended, ch. 7. Sect. 6. p. 63, 64, 65. largely to Doctor Reynolds, that Mr. W. muſt fetch his anſwer thence. To the ſecond, conſiſting of two contradictory Texts (as to the letter) I make an eaſe return, by ſhewing the literal inconſistence of the one with the other, unleſſe the firſt may be allowed to explain the ſecond. For when the very ſame thing is ſaid to be done by God, and by Satan, either one of the two muſt needs be figuratively ſpoken, or elſe there will be [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] irreconcileables in Scripture, not onely [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] the bare appearances of Diſcord: elſe farewel to Torniellus, and all other Writers in that kind, who reconcile the Scriptures which ſeem to differ and contradict. Firſt I take it for granted, that the word of God is not chargeable with any ſelf-contradictions; That the very ſame action cannot at once be good and evil, Divine and Deviliſh; That God and Satan cannot do the ſame works. From whence it followeth of neceſſity, that when God is ſaid toActivum pro Paſſivo, ut ſaepè, inquit Grotius in locum. move David to number the people (2 Sam. 24.1.) the meaning muſt be, He * permitted Satan to move David. For ſo the Scripture explains it ſelf afterwards (1 Chron. 21.1.) by ſaying that Satan provoked David to that deed. Another example will make it plainer. It is ſaid of the Devil (the God of this world) that he hath blinded the mindes of unbelievers, lest the light of the Goſpel ſhould ſhine unto them (2 Cor. 4.4.) Again it is ſaid of our God who cannot endure the leaſt ſin, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardned their hearts, that they ſhould not ſee with their eyes, &c. (Joh. 12.40.) where becauſe the two ſenſes of thoſe two Texts cannot poſſibly be the ſame, the former muſt needs be active, and the later onely permiſsive. It is to be ſeriouſly conſidered, whether any ſuch men can be fit for the Miniſtry, to be intruſted with the Key of Knowledge, to be Stewards of the Myſteries of the living God, who are not able to diſtinguiſh betwixt thoſe Scriptures which differ moſt; but help the people to confound the works of God, and of the Devil. I confeſſe my indignation is very great at this inſtant, whil'ſt I obſerve M. W. (in a bookSo he profeſſeth in his Epiſtle to the Reader, p. 2, & 3. intended for the unlearned) to preſent the letter of ſuch Texts without the leaſt explication, nay oppoſite Texts without the leaſt offer of reconcilement, nay teaching that God hath anP. 24. efficiency in ſin, andP. 19. worketh in the worſt actions as a natural cauſe, and 25. He ſpeaks worſe of God then can be truly ſaid of Satan. determines the wills of men to every event; whereas the Devil himſelf cannot contribute ſo much to ſin, by the utmoſt force of his Temptations: He can but perſwade, and incline, as a moral agent, which cannot neceſsitate to wickedneſſe, as the natural doth. And if his pariſhioners, or others as void of learning, ſhall ask him the manner of God's working and efficiency in ſin (that they may know how it differs from the Devils manner of working in the very ſame ſin, and from the manner of working in which the ſinner himſelf worketh) behold his anſwer is onely this, [ It beſeems us humbly to acknowledge our ignorance in apprehending the manner of his working (p. 19.) and again, we be not able to apprehend his ſecret and wonderful manner of working in evil actions, p. 23. lin. ult. ] How then, Good Sir, ſaith the amazed Catechumeniſt? what ſhall we do in this Caſe, when our light is darkneſs? where ſhall we ſeek knowledge, when our Prieſts lips cannot preſerve it? Mr. W's anſwer is at hand, P. 24. lin. 3, 4. Though he doth it miro & ineffabili modo, as Auſtin ſpeaks, yet we are not to deny the doing of it. But firſt the people are abus'd with Auſtins name, who never ſaid any ſuch thing; HisP. 20. lin. 1. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 100. words are quite contrary: id non fit, that is not done beſide the will of God, which is done againſt it. Mark Reader, He doth not ſay, what God doth, but what is done against Gods will by Gods permiſſion, which is not beſide his will to permit it. Next ſuppoſe Auſtin had ſaid any ſuch thing, had not that been one of his many Errors? But thirdly, 'Tis well Mr. W. will yield any authority to Austins Enchiridion, which is perfectlyAuguſt. Enchir. c. 98. deſtructive to Mr. W's Doctrine. Well, Mr. W. declares his ignorance to the unlearned Quaeriſt, touching the manner of God's working and efficiency in ſin, as a natural cauſe (which being preciſely his own expreſſions, do put us in mind of his contradiction, whilſt he confidently defines in ſome places, what he profeſſeth not to know in others, as being wonderful and ineffable.) Make but room for Mr. Barlee, and he will help his Fellow-labourer to make it out with a wet finger. [Mr. B's Neceſ. vin. ch. 3. p. 12. He that cannot or will not tell how God may be ſaid to excite men to the Act of Adultery, which to the Adulterer ſo excited is ſin, ☞though not to God, neither will he tell how God without ſin doth ſtir up men to the act of lying with their lawful Wives; ad utrumque ejuſdem generis excitatio & concurſus. Idabid. for the excitation and concurrence to both is of the ſame kind. ] Obſerve the growth of this Student ſince his Correp. Correction. He there expreſſed his Divinity of God ſtirring up men to ſin, by his putting ſpurs to a dull Jade. Now he tells us [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] in downright terms, that God hath the ſame concurrence to the moſt unlawful, and the moſt lawful actions. S. Paul no ſooner ſaid, Marriage is honourable, but immediately added, and the bed undefiled, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , immaculate, pure, and ſpotleſſe: but Adultery is Rebellion againſt the Monarch of all the world. And yet he ſtirs up the wicked to the unclean Act of Rebellion againſt Himſelf by the ſame incitation (ſaith Mr. B.) whereby he excites his loyalleſt ſubject to the moſt blameleſſe thing that can be named; not onely not forbidden, but commanded by God for propagation; whereas Adultery is an Act which God forbids by his law, and from which he reſtraines by his Grace, diſſwades by his Spirit, and which his children cannot commit, but by reſiſting his Grace, and by grieving his holy Spirit, by whom alone we are ſealed unto the day of Redemption. But M. B. may ſay, that I now torment him before his time. I therefore return to his majorite, whoſe third general Anſwer doth now enſue.

Sect. 3.

Mr. Whitfield ſaith, Mr. W's third General Anſwer a m • er Majeſtick miſtake. [ that the ſumme of what Mr. P. or any of his Predeceſſors in this controverſie about Gods abſolute Decree hath objected against it, is included in that which the Apoſtle objects againſt himſelf, ſpeaking of his ſubject, Rom. 9.14. Is God unjuſt? and, who hath reſiſted his will? which he anſwers with an Abſit, & quis tu es? — And if we ſhould give no other anſwer but this, it might ſuffice, p. 20.] What will not ſome be bold to ſay, rather then want wherewith to gain-ſay? Firſt he forgeth a certain Tale, and gives it the Name of a Third general Anſwer. If he had called it a Whirligig, his impropriety had been leſſe; for the Queſtion there is the contrary to what it is here. There it was of God free mercy, which well might be without mans merit: Here it is of his wrath, which cannot be without our demerit. No leſſe are the wandrings of Mr. W. But Secondly, Where was he told, that this is the ſumme of whatſoever hath been objected againſt his mythical Decree? He neither names his Author, nor gives his Reaſon, nay ſpeaks preciſely againſt his knowledge, and crudely dictates (stilo ſatis praetoriano) This is the ſumme. I anſwer with more Truth, but much leſſe Majeſty, that this indeed is the ſumme of all their ſubter-fuges and ſalvo's, Quis tu es? Who art thou, O man, who objecteſt againſt God, that he hath not an efficiency and hand in ſin? This was the very laſt plank which Mr. Hobbs was fain to betake himſelf unto, when he found himſelf ſhip-wreckt by the moſt learned Biſhop Bramhall, in his book of Liberty and Neceſſity, p. 20. The ſhift is common to the Libertines and Ranters, with Mr. Hobbs, and Mr. W. and Mr. B. &c. This is the ablest of their Anſwers, when nothing elſe will do the work, to ſay that God would have it ſo becauſe he would, and however contrary to his word, yet 'tis a part of his ſecret will, (revealed onely to that Tribe) at which the reſt of mankind muſt content themſelves vvith 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and muſt hold themſelves confuted vvith the [Quis tu es] of the Presbyterians. Thirdly, It is his other abſolute leaſure, to ſay that Saint Paul did ſpeak of this ſubject, Rom. 9.14. It is enough to ſay No, and that 'tis ſenſeleſs to imagin it. But I vvill tell him farther, thatNon fuit levis offenſio, quòd tam pauci Judaei credierunt.— Nomen populi Dei objiciebatur Apoſtolo.— Haec eſt (meo judicio) occaſio harum diſputationum. Melanchth. in Praef. ad cap 9. ad Rom. Saint Paul is there diſputing againſt the male-contented Jewes, vvho vvere very much offended that the Gentiles ſhould be received, and the Jews rejected (the greateſt part of them) vvho hitherto vvere vvell knovvn to be Gods peculiar and choſen people. This (ſaith Melanchthon) vvas the occaſion of that vvhich follovves. AndNon aliud vult Paulus, Rom. 9. • 0, 11. quàm docere, Gratiam univerſalem eſſe; contra Judaeos, qui culpâ ſuâ exciderunt Grat • â, &c. H • mming. Praef. in Expoſit. Epiſt. ad R • m. See Doctor Ham. Annot. upon that Chapter. Hemmingius thus, That S. Paul intented nothing elſe (v. 10, 11.) but to teach that Grace vvas univerſal, and extended alſo to the Gentiles: This vvas contrary to the Doctrine vvhich vvas then eſpouſed by the Jewes, as novv it is by the Conſiſtorians. Were this a place and a time to argue from the genuine and demonſtrable ſenſe of that Chapter (vvhich of it ſelf vvould make a Volume) there could nothing prove more deſtructive to Mr. W's Doctrines, then that one Chapter; and that not onely according to S. Paul's ſenſe, but even according to the ſenſeleſneſs vvhich the2 Pet. 3.16. unlearned and the unſtable are vvont to wreſt from that Scripture. Fourthly, The Quis tu es may fit my mouth a great deal better then Mr. W's. If God vvas pleaſed to puniſh none in his eternal Decree vvithout reſpect unto their ſins, and to Tit. 2.14. give himſelf a ranſom for all mankind, Quis tu es, Who art thou O man that replieſt againſt God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Why was I not decreed and neceſſitated to bliſs from all eternity? why have I not grace irreſistible? why ſhouldſt thou leave it in my povver to be unhappy? vvhy ſhould any kind of wickedneſſe be able to put me into a state of damnation? or vvhy ſhould all men be capable of eſcaping Hell, as vvell as I and my party? vvhat have moral honeſt men to do vvith heaven? vvhy vvere they not rejected before they were? The Puritanical Jewes vvere apt to mutter to this effect, but let not Chriſtians be ſo irrational. This vvere anſvver ſufficient to all the illnatur'd murmurings of carnal men. But for the good of the vulgar (for ſome of vvhom Mr. Wh. may be too hard) I vvill apply my 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to the particular dangers novv ſpread before them.

Sect. 4.

Mr. VV. ſaith truly,He deſcends from Generals to Particulars, and begins with the charge of making God the Author of ſin. [ that the firſt and princi • al objection againſt the Doctrine of abſolute Decrees, is, that it makes God to be the Author of ſin, p. 20.] But doth he ſay hovv vve prove it? No, he durſt not do that; Hovv then ſhould he have anſvver'd? He therefore proves it his own way, taking on him the perſon of T. P. or the like; but does not ſo much as pretend to have read the objection vvhich he propoſeth to be anſvvered. And to one who ſpeaks leſſe then nothing it is not fit to ſpeak much, although it is hard to abſtain from ſpeaking. The last part of his objection is ſomevvhat honeſtly fram'd, [if God decrees the Being of ſin, then he is the Author of it] Let us obſerve hovv he anſvvers it, for in that vve ſhall ſhortly find a very great jeſt.

Firſt he ſaith vvhat vvas never denied I think by any, I. He begins with a Tergiverſation, and impoſition on the Scripture. that God doth permit ſin, and hath decreed to permit it. But then he addes (vvhat is moſt falſe, unleſſe it be carefully explain'd) [The Scripture is plain, that God decrees thoſe actions, which when men do, they do very ſinfully, (p. 20.)] 1. He here addes to the vvord of God: there's no ſuch Scripture. 2. He ſlides from vvhat he ſaid of God decreeing to permit, and (vvithout any tranſition, or pretenſe for the change,) pronounceth quite another thing, that God decrees the ſinful actions, or ſins themſelves; for that theſe are ſynonymous I ſhevved before. But let his own words ſhame him y theſe degrees. Davids lying vvith Bathſhebah vvas an Action, vvhich vvhen he did, he did very ſinfully. Such Actions ſo done Mr. W. ſaith that God decrees. The Action ſpecified vvas Adultery, and that vvas ſin: and ſo according to M. W. God decreed that ſin, that Adultery, that actual lying vvith another mans wife, that action vvhich, vvhen David did, he did ſinfully. The inſtance vvhich he gives Act. 2.23. & ch. 4.27, 28. is croſs to his purpoſe; for tvvas in a foreſight and conſideration that Chriſt vvould be crucified by the Jevves, if not violently hindred, upon vvhich God determin'd he vvould not hinder, and ſo (by a conſequence unavoidable) that the thing ſhould be done by his permiſſion. And therefore the firſt Text Act. 2.23. affords an excellent expoſition to the ſecond, Act. 4.27, 28. for 'tis ſaid there expreſly, he vvas delivered by the Counſel and foreknowledge of God. The vvord 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to determine doth no vvay exclude, but ſuppoſe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to foreknow. And this vvas the anſvver of Juſtin Martyr to Tryphon, as I have elſevvhere noted, and ſpoke ſo much by vvay of anſvver to this very objection of Mr. W. that I muſt ſend him thither for a fuller account, though vvhat I have novv ſaid is ſomevvhat more then I ovv'd him. [See Sinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. p. 258. to p. 264.] And becauſe the vvords of that Father vvere not there given at large, I have here thought fit to ſet them dovvn in the Margine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Juſt. Mart. contra Tryph. p. 370. porrò illam objectionem, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ita ſolvit Juſtinus.. I am very vvell pleaſed, that the ſame is objected againſt my Doctrine, vvhich vvas objected by vvicked Tryphon againſt that learned Apoſtolical and holy Father. What is added by Mr. W. of God permitting ſin to be, is onely for me, and againſt himſelf, unleſſe he vvill declare that he is juſt as I am, and fairly publiſh his Retractations.

2. His memorable anſwer to his own objection. 2. But vvher's his Anſvver to this Objection, [That if God decrees the Being of ſin, then he is the Author of it?] Novv comes the jeſt. His Anſvver to it is fully and vvholly thus:

Pag. 21. But though God hath decreed that ſin ſhall be, and therefore hath decreed to permit it, without☜ which it could not be, yet it doth not follow that he is the Author of it.

Doth he mean by Gods decreeing that ſin ſhall be, His meaning caught in a Dilemma. that he decreed it abſolutely, and antecedently to his preſcience that it would be, if the ſinners will were not hindered be ſome violent means? or that he decreed not to hinder it upon his eternal foreknowledge that the ſinner would determine his will to ſin, if not miraculouſly impeded? Which ſoever he ſhall ſay, it will be equally pleaſant (and he muſt ſay one, for there is not a third.) If the former, he makes God to be the firſt and principal cauſe of every ſin, but denyes the ſequel of his being the Author: which is as if he ſhould ſay, Paul was a rational creature, but it doth not follow he was a man. Sophroniſcus did beget Socrates, but yet was not his Father. The Jewiſh high Prieſts were the firſt and principal contrivers and procurers of the murdering of Chriſt (to which Judas and the Romans were inſtrumental) but it doth not follow they were the Authors of that murder. Thus Mr. W. with the ſame breath, denyes what he affirms, whileſt he affirms it, if he owns the former meaning of his words. And if the later, he yields the whole cauſe, by overthrowing the foundation of all his Doctrines; which is the placing Gods Decree before his Knowledge, his preordination before his preſcience; which although the moſt againſt Reaſon and Philoſophy of any thing that can be nam'd, hath been ſwallowed by the Calviniſts from Mr. Calvin's ownIdeo praeſciverit quia ſic ordinavit. Calv. Inſt. l. 3. c. 23. ſect. 7. fol. 325. See Div. Pur. c. 7. p. 74. mouth. Thus it fares with Mr. W. if he means either of thoſe two ſenſes. If he can think upon a Third, I will ſpeak to it when he ſhall name it. But be his ſenſe what it can be, it was faulteringly done, to baulk the words in the Objection, and to ſubſtitute others in the Anſwer; and unskilfully reſolv'd, to obtrude a bare Denial, without pretending a dram of Reaſon to give it at leaſt a little weight: nay, he hath not ſo much as an evaſion to ſupply the room of an Anſwer; never an Orthodox put-off. The total of his anſwer (to bate the other flawes in it) is the ſyllable [No. It doth not follow, For it doth not.]

3. And becauſe he mingles the word [permit] in this and many other places, 3. His ſoul uſe of the word permiſſion. Of which ſee Div. Philan. Def. ch. 3. p. 129, 130, to p. 139. & ch. 4. p. 53, 54. as a neceſſary Emollient to aſſwage the hardneſs of his ſayings, the Reader muſt once more be put in mind what is meant by [permiſſion] in the writings of this and ſuch like Authors. Their common accom • t of their meaning is by the word efficacious: and if we ask how far forth Gods permiſſion of ſin is efficacious, Doctor Twiſſe is Prolocutor, and tells the ſenſe of the Party. Gods Decree (ſaith he) is no leſs efficacious in the permiſſion of evil, ☞ then in the production of good. But in the production of good, they all affirm with one mouth that Gods Decree is abſolute, irreſpective, and irreſistible; nor is it leſs (ſaith that Doctor) in the permiſſion of ſin. That Mr. W. thinks the Doctor Orthodox, his Book forbids us to disbelieve; for he ſaith that God hath a hand in ſin, and a hand in the effecting of it, (p. 26.) that he hath ſome efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he acteth or worketh in ſin (not as a moral Agent by diſſwading from it, but) as a natural cauſe promoting the Being and Act of ſin, (p. 25.) that Gods permiſſion of ſin is accompanied with Action and Operation, (p. 21.) and all this in the ugly ſenſe, as I ſhall ſhew more and more in the following Sections. And therefore his uſing the word permiſſion doth but aggravate his guilt, untill he ſhall declare, that he takes it in a paſſive and negative ſenſe, ſo as to ſignifie the ſuffering, and not hindering of ſin. But then he muſt adde a Recantation of thoſe unſober expreſſions, with which the word Permiſſion is inconſiſtent.The odious impropriety repreſented in other leſs odious colours. For ſuppoſe a man ſhall command or excite his Son to ſteal a Horſe, and that ſo effectually, that the Horſe is ſtolen by that Son upon his Fathers excitation; can the Father be thought to ſpeak truth or ſenſe, if he ſhall plead that he did onely permit his Son to ſteal by an efficacious permiſſion, which could not be reſisted becauſe of its efficacy and force? Or will it avail him to plead not guilty, by ſaying he had but a hand in that ſtealth, or an efficiency in it, or that he onely commanded and ſtirred up his Son to that vile Action, but was not the Author of that ſin which cleaved to the Action, nor was it he, but his ſon who ſtole the Horſe? Reader, this is the Caſe, but repreſented in fairer colours then Mr. W's Doctrine doth deſerve. For he and hisNote that thoſe Authors are defended by Mr. W. and Mr. B. as well as imitated and followed. Teachers have ſaid of God, that he decreeth, willeth, commandeth, determineth, ſeduceth, exciteth, ſtirreth up, impelleth, tempteth, effecteth, and maketh men to ſin, and that not onely as a moral cauſe (as ſome) but as a natural cauſe alſo (as others) as the Author of ſin (ſay ſome) to ſin quatenus ſin (ſay others.) All which, and much more, I have formerly ſhewed in three distinct Tracts, to which I muſt ever refer the Reader, though I am ever adding to my Supellex. And let this ſerve for their Emollient, made up of contrary ingredients (as Emplastra and Cataplaſmes may ſometimes be) for the diſcuſſing the peccant Humour (at leaſt for the concealing the ugly face of the Diſeaſe.) The firſt Ingredient is Active, and they allay it with a Paſſive, which is the ſecond. The firſt they think hath too much of Poſitive in its Nature, and ſo they qualifie it with that which hath ſomewhat of Negation in it. They adde permiſſion to efficacious, to ſave their credit; and efficacious to permiſſion, for the ſalving of their cauſe. Their Dictionaries can tell them (and they who never read Tully, may eaſily look into Nizolius) thatNote that to permit is not the Engliſh of permitto; any more then to occide is the Engliſh of occido. But permit is purely Latine, made uſe of in Engliſh; as occide is Latine, not made uſe of in Engliſh. And as to occide is in Engliſh to kill; ſo to permit is in Engliſh to ſuffer. permitto and ſino are words of one ſignification. Sino ſignifies to ſuffer, or permit; Permitto ſignifies to permit or ſuffer. Judge how ſore that part of their Doctrine is, to which an efficacious permiſſion (that is an active ſufferance, or an operative not-hindering) hath been onely applyed by way of Poultice. But ſome Patients are ſo unhappy, that either they tear off the Poultice from the Oedematous Tumour, or elſe they adde to the compoſition as much as robs it of its anodynous and healing virtue. This will appear in the next Objection which Mr. W. hath raiſed againſt himſelf, as fitteſt (he thought) to fall before him.

Sect. 5.

Object. [But if he hath willed and decreed it, 1. Mr. W. moulds, a new objection againſt himſelf, wherein he grants what his Doctrine is charged with. his Decree is an energetical, and operative Decree, therefore he hath ſome hand in working and effecting of it, as Calvin, Piſcator, and others teach, who are for the abſolute Decree. Negari non poteſt illum aliquo modo procurare negotium, cujus conſilio & decreto negotium geritur, ſaith Piſcator: and if his Decree be operative, ſo as he hath any hand at all in the working of it, then he must needs be the Author of it. p. 21.] Bear witneſs, Reader, that this is alſo an Objection of his own making up againſt his own Doctrine; which no doubt but he did with as much tenderneſs as he could, in ſpecial regard unto the weakneſs both of the Anſwerer and the cauſe. Yet even thus it is ſuch, as we ſhall find by and by he is not able to elude. But firſt obſerve his acknowledgement, that Calvin and Piſcator, and the reſt of his way, do in good earneſt maintain the ugly premiſſes in the Objection, viz. that God hath willed and decreed ſin, and hath ſome hand in working and effecting of it; & negari non poteſt, it cannot be denyed (ſaith Piſcator) but that God procures the buſineſs, and that it is tranſacted by his Counſel and Decree. Theſe things, I ſay, he doth not offer to deny in any part of his Anſwer, but doth his utmost to make all good (as ſhall immediatly be ſeen;) he onely denyes (and 'tis a naked denyal without the leaſt reaſon) that they do hence infer God to be the Author of ſin. Mark well his Anſwer, or rather his ſhifting himſelf of it in lieu of an Anſwer.

2. His Anſwer conſiſts in ſhifting the duty of a Reſpondent, and ſpeaking quite another thing.Anſw. For Anſwer of this, two things are to be cleared. 1. That Gods permiſſion is not ſuch a bare permiſſion as is without all action and operation. 2. That though his permiſſion is accompanied with ſome kind of operation, yet he is no Author of ſin. p. 21.]

This is an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an atchievement never to be forgotten. For in the Objection, there was not a ſyllable of Gods Permiſſion, which yet in his Anſwer is All in All. The Objection was of Gods willing, decreeing, working, effecting, procuring ſin, and the like. The Anſwer ſtandeth in the clearing of Gods permiſſion, and ſhewing it is not unac ompanied. Here then I muſt ask him (as before I did) doth he mean that Gods permiſſion is efficacious, and accompanied companied with thoſe things which are ingredients in the Objection, viz. decreeing ſin by an operative energetical Decree, willing and working, procuring and effecting it, (which is all the language of his Predeceſſors?) or doth he not mean any ſuch things? If the firſt, I take hold of his confeſſion, and will demonſtrate that he doth worſe then if he meerly call'd God the Author of ſin. If the ſecond, he doth not anſwer, but ſneak from giving any anſwer. He layes down a Cuſhion, and ſits beſide it. And if when one thing is objected, he ſhall anſwer to quite another, he is no ſitter for a Disputant then a man that's deaf, who if he is askt what's a clock? will anſwer, a Windmill, or a Pump. But let him be granted to have a pertinent meaning (however his words are nothing leſſe) yet the ſtate of his affairs will be but ſo much the worſe: For by that he diſcovers, how many diſmal myſteries are cloſely couched in the word Permiſſion; enough to ſhew the great uſefulneſs of what I ſpake on that ſubject a few minutes ſince. Now then let us obſerve how he clears his two things, which he calls in his margin by the name of two Arguments.

3. His firſt part of his eſcape, clearing his firſt thing with a very great blot.3. [ That Gods permiſſion of ſin is accompanied with ſome kind of operation, appears, becauſe when he permits ſin he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it: then there is ſome act of his will about it. p. 21.]

Mark his notable paſſage à genere ad genus. The permiſſion he ſpeaks of, is in relation to ſin; but the will of God he here ſpeaks of, is in relation to the permiſſion. Did he take permiſſion to be a ſin, or not? If he did, he chargeth God with that ſin, which (were it ſuch) would denominate him a ſinner. And this would be blaſphemy in its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . For the avoiding of which, if he ſhall ſay he did not, then he muſt ſay he is a ſhifter, not a Diſputant or Respondent in any ſenſe; for the thing he is to clear (and 'tis a task he impoſed upon himſelfe, without being bid,) is Gods permiſſion of SIN attended with operation (not his permiſſion of his PERMISSION, which is perfect nonſenſe, and yet implyed by Mr. W. unleſs he profeſſeth to be impertinent) which in ſtead of clearing, he gives the ſlip, by ſaying that God doth willingly permit it. Where the willingneſs relates to the permiſſion of ſin, (which permiſſion is no ſin) not at all unto the ſin which is permitted. Which if he did not diſcern, O the depth of his Apprehenſion! if he did, and yet paſs'd it, O the depth of his Diſſimulation! whether he did, or did not, he hath done a ſtrange thing; for thus he argues, [God doth willingly permit ſin, therefore there is ſome act of his will about it.] About what, good Sir, is the Act of Gods will? about the permiſſion ſpoken of, which is Gods? or about the ſin permitted, which ſin is the Devils and his Inſtruments? The firſt is as impertinent, as the ſecond is blaſphemous. And though 'tis plain that Mr. W. doth mean the ſecond, yet he offends againſt Logick, as much as againſt Theology: for thus he argues; God doth will to permit ſin, which to do is no ſin; therefore he willeth ſin, which cannot be divided or diſtinguiſhed from ſin: which is to ſay in effect, Gods will is converſant about what is good (ſuch is permiſſion) therefore it is converſant about what is evil (ſuch is ſin permitted.) Becauſe he doth not will ſin (but onely to ſuffer or to permit it, or not to hinder the ſinners will) therefore he doth will it. One part of a contradiction is his proof of the other. But though he miſcarries (to a prodigy) in his way of probation, yet he diſcovers his affection to his opinion, that God doth velle peccatum, immediately will ſin, and that with a perfect will, as he goes on p. 22.

4. His abuſe of St. Auſtin.4. Thus then he advanceth (if that can be in a Circle wherein he onely runs round.) HeDeus permittit aut volens, aut nolens & invi •• s; non certè invitus, quia id eſſet cum Triſtitiâ, & potentiâ ſe majorem haberet: Si volens permittit, eſt genus quoddam voluntatis. Enchir. aed Laur. p. 100. cites a paſſage out of Austin, in which he confeſſeth that that Father doth grant but this, [that God hath ſome kind of will in the permiſſion of ſin, p. 22.] So grants Arminius, and Pelagius, and all mankind. But what then (Mr. W?) A will in the permiſſion is not a will in ſin; for Gods permiſſion is of a contrary nature. If Austin had ſaid, that God hath a will in the effecting of ſin (which is contrary to his holy wil) he had then ſaid ſomething to bear you out, or rather he had fallen into the ſame ditch with you. But Auſtin doth not, nay durſt not ſay, that ſin (permitted) is according to Gods will; for he ſaith that ſin isFit contra voluntatem. Id. Ibid. againſt his will; and that at the very ſame time, when he ſaith he hath a will in the PERMISSION of ſin. Now be it remembred by the Reader, that Mr. W. doth mean an efficacious permiſſion when he ſpeaks of Gods permitting ſin. And how much he meanes by efficacious, I lately ſhewed. Together with that, compare his proceſs.

5. His arguing that God doth will ſin perfectly, becauſe be perfectly wills the permiſsion of it.5. If any kind of will, this muſt needs be a perfect will; for no imperfect will agrees to God, who is perfection it ſelf: and how can he be ſaid to will any thing without any Act of his will? p. 22.] Now the Doctrine comes more into the light. Gods efficacious permiſſive will (as Mr. Barlee and others are wont to word it) is the ſame to ſin, as to ſinleſſneſs, ſaith Mr. Whitfield: for more then perfect it cannot be when objected upon the beſt things; nor is it leſs then perfect (ſaith Mr. W.) when objected upon the worſt: (for from Gods will to permit ſin, he argues Gods willing ſin.) Which reaſoning of his is ſo excellently abſurd, that it demonſtrates the contrary to what he ſeeks to prove by it. For becauſe nothing in God is imperfect, and whatſoever he willeth he willeth in perfection, therefore he willeth not ſin at all; it being of his perfection, that he cannot will ſin; and the greateſt imperfection in the worſt of all Creatures, that they are able to will ſin with a perfect willingneſs. And what a Divine muſt he be, who ſhall ſay the ſame of God, which is the very worſt thing that can be ſaid of the Devil, that he willeth ſin with a perfect will? If to evade this whirlpoole, Mr. W. ſhall ſay, he meant the permiſſion onely, nor the ſin permitted, then 'tis the least of his misfortunes, that he hath onely made Anſwers to the Man in the Moon, and then he will be ſplitted on the leſs dangerous Rock. But to make good his meaning, he muſt abjure his whole Book: for to ſay that Gods decree is energetical onely (not permiſſive) and to ſay that he decreeth the being of ſin (which is his and his Teachers Doctrine) is in conſiſtent with meer permiſsion; which is not an exertion, but a ſuspenſion of the will, from interpoſing any Impediment which might forcibly hinder the Creatures choice. Nay one thing I muſt adde for the vindication of Gods holineſs, & for the inſtruction of Mr. W.(whoſe meer want of inſtruction I have the charity to hope is his greateſt ſtumbling-block) That though God doth not hinder a man from ſinning by any ſuch phyſical impediment, whereby the man is rendered not able to ſin wilfully, yet even then he doth hinder by ſuch moral impediments, whereby the man is rendered able not to ſin wilfully.

6. He ſtrives to prove Gods Activity in the production of ſin from Gods own word.Now let us ſee how he clears the ſecond thing he propoſed in ſtead of Anſwer to the Objection. [Scripture-Expreſsions do constantly hold forth Gods manner of working in ſin, by way of action. It doth not ſay, God ſuffered Joſeph's Brethren to ſell him into Egypt, but that God ſent him, Gen. 45.8. It doth not ſay, God ſuffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12, &c. p. 22.] Here he tells us that the Scriptures hold forth, what before (p. 19.) and after (p. 23.) he profeſſeth to be ineffable and incomprehenſible, viz. the manner of Gods working in ſin. This is his firſt degree of miſery. Again, he takes thoſe Texts meerly according to the Letter, which Mr. Barlee himſelfe confeſſeth to be figuratively ſpoken, givingNeceſ. Vind. ch. 3. p. 55. this reaſon for it, [ that God according to the Letter of many of thoſe Texts, ſeems to be made a moral cauſe of ſin as ſin. ] So that now Mr. W. hath plaid ſuch a prank, as his own fellow-laborer muſt needs condemn in him. This is his ſecond. Again he ſaith, that this is conſtantly held forth in Scripture by way of action, Conſtantly, good Sir? how can that be? Did not God tell Iſrael, that becauſe he had purged them, and they were not purged, they ſhould Ezek. 24.13. not be purged from their filthineſs any more? that is to ſay, he would leave them to themſelves, he would permit or ſuffer them to be filthy, he would not cleanſe them against their wills? Which one Text is ſufficient to have taught Mr. W. the true importance of all thoſe at which he ſtumbles. And from thence it is evident what is meant by the School-men, when they ſay that God puniſheth ſin with ſin: which muſt thus be negatively expounded by Gods forſaking ſuch ſinners, withdrawing his grace ſo long reſiſted and abus'd, not clenſing them any more from their beloved filthineſs. Let M. W. anſwer to this Queſtion; Doth the Scripture expreſs or hold forth the real command of the holy Ghoſt, in uſing that imperative, Rev. 22.11. Let him that will be filthy, be filthy ſtill? Or was our Saviour acceſſary to the Jewiſh murder, in ſaying, Joh. 2.19. which compare with Mar. 14.58. deſtroy this temple, meaning the Temple of his body? To have commanded it in the ſenſe (as he did in the letter) had been a kind of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , laying hands upon himſelf; yet the Jewes (like Mr. W.) were ſo intent upon the letter, that they took an occaſion from thoſe words to bear falſe witneſſe againſt our Saviour. [We heard him ſay, I will deſtroy this Temple made with hands, &c. Mar. 14.58.] But enough of Mr. W's degrees of miſery in his poſition, come we now to his examples.

1. From the ſelling of Joſeph.His firſt (Gen. 45.8.) is moſt remarkably impertinent to that for which it was produced: for in ſtead of ſaying God ſold Joſeph into Egypt (in which ſale of Joſeph his brethren ſinned) he confeſſeth that Joſeph did onely ſay unto his brethren, that God had ſent him: nay he ſpake it with an Antitheſis to his Brethrens action, and to a contrary ſcope to what Mr. W. directs the words. Reader, conſider, and ſtand amazed at his matchleſſe inconſiderateneſſe in this particular. Joſephs ſpeech runs thus, See the Divine Purity Def. c. 7. p. 63, 64, 65. [God hath ſent me before you, to preſerve you a poſterity in the earth, and to ſave your lives by a great deliverance: ſo now, it was not you that ſent me hither, but God, and he hath made me a Father to Pharaoh, and Lord of all his houſe, &c. v. 7, 8] He ſpeaks of nothing but the good which God had done for him, upon occaſion of that evil which they that ſold him had done against him. Yet this is urged by Mr. W. for Gods Activity and work in ſin.

2. From Pharaohs obduration.His ſecond Inſtance is not quite ſo ridiculous. [Exod. 9.12.] but tis ridiculous enough. For though God is ſaid to harden Pharaohs heart by doing ſomewhat, yet was it not by working in ſin, but by removing puniſhments, and all other means of his recovery, which had ſo long been afforded him, and all in vain. It was ſaid before, Pharaohs heart was hardned, Ex. 7.22. which implies the permiſsion, not efficiency of God. Nay farther it was ſaid, That Pharaoh hardened his own heart, Ex. 8.15. Again after that, it was ſaid that Pharaoh ſinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his ſervants, Ex. 9.34. (whom God is ſaid to have endured with much long-ſufferance, Rom. 9.22.) as 'twere on purpoſe to deliver us from the very poſsibility of erring groſſely, when we afterwards reade, God hardened his heart. And how did God do it? ſure not as Pharaoh, nor as Satan, by any activity or efficiency of obduration, (for Satan hardned Pharaohs heart, as well as Pharaoh himſelf) but by a total and final withdrawing of his Grace, Indurabo cor Pharaonis, id eſt, ſinam indurari, non flectam genuinam impii cordis duriciem, Melan. in Praef. ad Comment. in c. 9. ad Rom. leaving him in a ſtate of irremediable wickedneſſe, by ſuch a kind of dereliction by which the damned are left in Hell. Nay even this very dereliction and leaving Pharaoh to himſelf, (the certain conſequence of which was his final obduration) was awarded to him as a puniſhment for his having hardened his heart ſo often, when God by his Meſſengers and their Miracles had often called him to repentance. Compare Gods words to Iſrael, Pſ. 95.8.

3. From the Canaanites hardning.His third Inſtance is taken from Joſh. 11.20. but more irrationally then the former. For it is ſaid there expreſſely, the Canaanites hardened their hearts; which becauſe they could not have done if God had not ſuffered them, it is therefore ſaid it was of the Lord: for had he given them a cogent and irreſiſtible Grace, or deſtroyed their human nature, their hardening their heart could not have been. And for God Indurare quem ſi liberet, emollire potuiſtes, eſt non emollire— & paulò ſupetiùs, roli it Deus in perditis ſalvificam vim explic • re. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 117. In eundem ſenſum Auguſtin. in Epiſt. 105. ad Sirtum. Idque fatente Calvino Inſtil. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. ſol. 95. not to hinder, or not to ſoften their hearts, which the Text ſaith expreſſely they had hardened againſt Iſrael, was no more then to permit what they committed by their option; and this for ends of his providence, that his people Iſrael might deſtroy thoſe wicked Canaanites for their ſins, the meaſure whereof they had filled up. But beſides it muſt be noted (to ſhew the impertinence was the greater) that for the Canaanites thus to harden their hearts against Iſrael, that is, to oppoſe and reſiſt them coming to take away their land, could not be cenſured as a ſin in them, unleſſe they had a revelation that God had given their land to his People Iſrael; which as it appears not in Story (for ought I can learn) ſo if it doth, then Gods revealing it to them was far from having any hand in the hardening of their hearts: all he did was not ſoftning what he found obdurate; and not to ſoften, is not to have any hand; the negative to that which is affirmed by Mr. Whitfield.

4. From Abſalom's defiling his Fathers Concubines.His fourth Inſtance is taken from 2 Sam. 12.12. in which he ſeems to be unhappier then in all the reſt which went before: for obſerve how he applies it. [ It is not ſaid, God ſuffered Abſalom to defile his Fathers Concubines, but he tells David, what thou haſt done ſecret, I will do in the ſight of this ſun, p. 22.] Now if it is literally meant (as Mr. W. contends) that God did do the ſame in publick which David had done in private, the blaſphemy is ſuch as cannot modeſtly be named: for what was that which David did in ſecret, but his adultery with Bathſhebah? And can it be poſſibly imagined, that God could do the ſame thing openly? yet ſo run the words, [what thou haſt done I will do.] vvhich undeniably proves, that the vvords are ſpoken by an Hebraiſm (vvhich M. W. very ſhortly vvill be found in the Act of denying) and are permiſſive onely in ſenſe, though active in ſound. For God could not do actively in the ſight of the Sun, vvhat David had done in ſecret. (That is ſuch a groſſe and impious thought as ſome Heathens conceived of their carnal Jupiter.) And if Mr. W. had but read unto the end of the Story (vvhich vvas at the moſt but the completion of Gods Propheſie) 2 Sam. 16.22. He vvould there have found, that it vvas Abſalom vvho did vvhat Mr. W. applies to God. A Tent was ſpread upon the top of the houſe, and Abſalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of all Iſrael. This (Reader) is the ſin, vvhich Mr. W. urgeth as an inſtance, [vvherein the manner of Gods working is held forth to us by way of action, p. 22.] But not to ſpeak more of the impiety, behold the unskilfulneſſe of the Reſpondent. I will do this thing (ſaith God to David v. 12.) And what was this thing? It is expreſſed (v. 11.) I will raiſe up evil againſt thee, that is, the evil of puniſhment. I will take thy wives and give them, that is, permit Abſalom to enjoy them. There was not the leaſt need of any more from God, becauſe Abſalom of himſelf was ready enough to do it, his own Jam. 1.14. fleſh was ſufficient to draw him on. And beſides his own fleſh, he had Ahithophel at his ear to ſet him forward (ch. 16. v. 21.) nay both he and Ahithophel had the Devil at their elbows to urge and tempt them.Fruſtra fit per plures quod fieri poteſt per pauciores. Was not all this enough to bring the wickedneſſe to paſſe, but God himſelf muſt be affirmed to have a hand in it, an efficiency in it, to work, to act, to operate in it, and that as a natural (which is a neceſſitating) cauſe? yet by all theſe expreſſions Mr. Wh. doth teach us his thoughts of God. I commend one thing to his conſideration. It is acknowledged by him, and by all his party, that if God withhold or withdraw his Grace from any one of his creatures indued with reaſon, the creature is prone of himſelf to do abundantly evil. Let them content themſelves with that then, and go no farther, untill they can imagine ſome reaſon why.

5. From Shimei's curſing David.His fifth Inſtance is taken from Gods being ſaid by David to have bid Shimei curſe David, 2 Sam. 16.10, 11. of which I have ſpoken twice already in print, and both times largely. Firſt, to Mr. B. in my Defence of the Divine Philan. ch. 4. §. 35. p. 47, 48, 49. And afterwards afreſh to Dr. Reynolds in my Defence of the Divine purity, ch. 7. §. 8. p. 71, 72. To thoſe two places I referr Mr. W. and to that which I ſhall ſay ch. 2. Sect. 1. Anſw. 5. that I may not do like him, in printing the ſame book under two Titles, and letting it paſs for two books, when 'tis indeed but one repeated.

6, 7, 8. From three Texts already anſwered in equivalence.So his ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth Inſtances, from 1 King. 22.22. & Job 1. & Iſa. 63.13. are anſwered out of the Anſwers which I have given to the five inſtances now immediately preceding, as alſo out of my Anſwers to D. Reyn. chap. 7. Sect. 8. particularly pag. 69, 70.

9. From the Aegyptians hatred of Iſrael.His ninth Inſtance may be referred to the foreſaid places, and ſo indeed may the reſt: but becauſe in the ninth, at leaſt a blind man may ſtumble, I will therefore add, That Gods turning the hearts of the Aegyptians to hate his people (Pſal. 105.25.) was his doing that which provoked them to jealouſie and fear: that was firſt, and from that theyOderint quem metuunt. naturally turn'd to hatred. But what was that which God did, which did provoke them to that jealouſie, fear, and hatred? even what was very good (v. 24.) for he increaſed his people exceedingly, and made them ſtronger then their enemies. He bleſſed and multiplied his people Iſrael, for which the envious Aegyptians did fear, and hate, and conſpire againſt them, Exod. 1.9, 10.

10. From God's being ſaid to deceive the Prophet.His tenth Inſtance from (Ezek. 14.9.) doth ruine the drift for which he brings it: for as he who loves, teaches, reades, or hears, (in the literal ſenſe without a figure) muſt needs be a lover, teacher, reader or hearer; ſo he who doth deceive without a figure, muſt without a figure be a deceiver. But becauſe it is blasphemy to ſay, that God is really a deceiver, it muſt needs be figuratively ſpoken, and underſtood by the Hebraiſm ſo often mentioned by the moſt learned and unqueſtionable Writers, when it is ſaid in that Text [I the Lord have deceived him:] what will be thought of Mr. W. who diſclaimes the Hebraiſm in that and in all the like caſes? A word to the wiſe is here ſufficient; but let him know, that in the judgment of all the Fathers, and by the granted meaning of other Scriptures, it is apparent that the meaning muſt needs be one of theſe two. Either deceiving is nothing elſe but Gods permitting the falſe Prophet, for his wickedneſs, to be deceived by the Deceiver, that is, the Devil; or delivering him up to his own corrupt heart, which is willing of it ſelf to be deceived, and accordingly it followes in the very next words, [I will ſtretch out my hand upon him, and will deſtroy him.] Or elſe that of Grotius may fitly take place. It ſhould be rendred (ſaith he) not, I have deceived, but, I will deceive him, (viz.) by giving him ſuch an end as he expects not.

11. From giving up to vile affections.His eleventh Inſtance Rom. 1.26. is of the ſame importance with the former Inſtances above. By giving up is meant forſaking, Tradere in deſideria ſignificat deſertionem. Malanchth. in cap. 9. ad Rom. pag. 132, 133. no longer calling them from vile affections. See The Sinner impleaded part 1. ch. 1. p. 9. where Austins Expoſition in the Margin is the ſame with mine.

12. From giving eyes not to ſee.His twelfth Inſtance from Rom. 11.8, 9. doth onely ſerve him to let us know that he reads the Engliſh Tranſlation onely, and miſtakes the meaning of the Tranſlators: for there is no ſuch thing in S. Pauls own words as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , though our Engliſh Bibles read, [he gave them eyes that they ſhould not ſee.] It is in the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , eyes of not ſeeing, or not to ſee, or eyes which ſee not. The ſenſe is evidently this, that the major part of the people who made not uſe of that grace which God had offered, and reſisted Chriſt when he was preached in their ſtreets, did grow ſo obſtinately blind (God withdrawing the means ſo long reſisted, and ſo much abuſed,) as to fulfil the prediction of the Prophet Eſay, ch. 29. v. 10. or at leaſt to parallel the caſe of which the Prophet there ſpeaks. And this doth farther appear from S. Pauls Pſal. 69.23. citation of the Pſalmist v. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not ſee: words ſpoken by David, not as a Curſe, but a Propheſie, that the things intended for their Verſ. 22. welfare would become their trap. Their very Table (whoſe proper end was to refreſh and feed them) would by their wickedneſſe be made theirIbid. ſnare: And even the preaching of the Goſpel (reſiſted by them) would accidentally advance their induration. If Mr. W. read the note ofNon accidit haec induratio, niſi interveniente Dei Decreto. Beza in Rom. 11.8. Beza, and alſo took it by the worſt handle, he alone muſt anſwer for it.

13. From ſending deluſion.His thirteenth Inſtance from 2 Theſſ. 2.10, 11. makes me think that his Concordance is his chief Commentator: for had he compared that Text with the whole Context (which your Concordance-Preachers ſeldom do) he had found the ſenſe to have been this, That becauſe they received not the love of the truth Mark the Chaſm or Ellipſis which muſt of neceſſity be thus filled up [Which truth was offer'd to the end that they might be ſaved.] that they might be ſaved, (p. 10.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for this cauſe (or to puniſh this wickedneſs) God will ſuffer the man of ſin (v. 3.) whoſe coming is after the working of Satan with all power and ſignes and lying wonders (v. 9.) to come upon them with ſuch advantages of ſtrength and ſubtilty, as would gain credit vvith them, being not wonderfully reſtrained. God is ſaid to ſend, what he (can, but) doth not hinder from being ſent. We are taught to pray, Lead us not into temptation, when yet our meaning is, ſuffer us not to be led, or leave us not helpleſs in our temptations, permit us not to be tempted above our ſtrength, let thy Grace be ſufficient for us: and thence it followes, but deliver us from evil. Thus our Saviour may be ſaid to have ſent the Devils into the herd of ſwine, becauſe when they beſought him, he gave way to their prayer; when they ſaid, Suffer us to go, he anſwered, Go. Of which the meaning muſt needs be this, I ſuffer you to go; for he granted what they ask't, and they ask't for ſufferance.

14. From the Nations making league with the Romans.His fourteenth and laſt Inſtance from Rev. 17.17. doth onely proclaim him to be unqualified for ſuch myſterious parts of Scripture. And I am heartily glad upon this occaſion, that Doctor Hammonds Annotations are writ in Engliſh, that the loweſt Reader may diſcern, how quite beſide his ovvn purpoſe Mr. W. hath ſeized on that Text alſo, vvhich is onely a propheſie of S. John, foretelling an eminent and remarkable Act of Gods providence, in that all the nations ſhould firſt confederate with the Romans, and yet aftervvards breaking off ſhould execute vengeance upon thoſe Romans, and that Alaricus the King of the Goths and Vandals ſhould ſo ſuddenly retire after his conquest and captivity of Rome, as if he had purpoſely been ſent by the ſpecial Providence of God, to deſtroy the Idolaters, and preſerve the Christians.

Sect. 6.

From all which it is evident, How Mr. W. moſt groundleſly inferreth God to fit ſtill, p. 23. and to be an idle Beholder, p. 26. that none of thoſe active expreſſions alledged by Mr. W. (in his 22. page) can be pretended to denote Gods working in ſin; more then his puniſhing of it doth (vvhich yet is active) vvhen he caſts the ſinner into hell. The conſequent to vvhich is the ſinners continuance to all eternity in his ſins. Nor doth it follovv (vvhat he ſaith p. 23.) that if God hath no manner of working in ſin, See more of this ſubject Sect. 17, 18, 19. he ſits ſtill as a spectator. For he is working in divers reſpects; as by the motions of his Spirit diſſwading from ſin, and alſo by his word, both writ and preached. Again he is working in over-ruling, ordering, and diſpoſing ſins committed to many excellent advantages, to which he is able by his wiſdom to make them ſerve. But all this is nothing to his active working in ſin, or his having a hand in it, (as Mr. W. phraſeth it) but on the contrary, it ſhews that he hath no hand in it: for overruling ſins to good, ſuppo • eth them committed, and when it is ſaid (as it is commonly) that God draweth good out of evil, the meaning is, (not that he maketh it to be good in one reſpect, which is evil in another, as ſuch men dream, but) that upon man's doing evil he takes an occaſion of doing good: ſuch was the ſaving of the world upon occaſion of that murder which▪ the wicked ones committed in killing-Chriſt. And as good things are made an occaſion of evil, yet are not evil, (as I lately ſhewed) ſo are evil things made an occaſion of good, yet are not good: which ſome men not deſcerning, are betrayed into the worſt and uncleanneſt ſpeeches; as, that adultery, or murder, as it is the work of God, its Author, mover, and impeller, is no ſin at all, but onely as it is of man: which though the ſaying of Zuinglius, a great Maſter of thoſe men, yet 'tis abetted and approved by Doctor Twiſſe in particular; and in particular by Mr. Barlee, and aequivalently by Mr. Whitfield alſo. If any others of their way ſhall renounce the Doctrine, let them do it in print, and then the World will forgive them. Having ſhewed that God is no idle ſpectator, (as the brethren do both ſpeak) becauſe he reſtrains from ſin, and (when he ſuffers it) doth overrule it (as hath been ſhewed) and doth alſo note it in his book (as the Prophets ſpeak) and doth ſatisfie his juſtice in the puniſhment of ſin, as well as exerciſe his mercy in forgiving it to the contrite and penitent ſinner, and giveth the continuance of a Being unto his creature, by whoſe free-will the ſin is made; I will adde this little, that it were much a leſſer evil in Mr. W. and his partners, to ſay that God ſitteth ſtill as a ſpectator onely; then to aſperſe him with a working and activity in ſin: for as to the commiſſion of the ſin it ſelf, God is truly a meer ſpectator. The Sinners ſole will determines it ſelf unto the Sin.

CHAP. II. Of Mr. W's Attempts to help Mr. B. by replying a few things to the Divine Philanthropie defended, which now at laſt he doth particularly conſider, and not till now.

Sect. 1.

TO ſuch Texts of Scripture as are literally taken by that ſort of men,Mr. W. begins with the end of that book, to which his Title-page pretended a Reply. who do not onely take the boldneſs to bear falſe witneſs againſt God, by charging his Majeſty with having a high hand in ſin, but moſt lewdly alſo do indeavour to make him bear falſe witneſs againſt himſelf, I did amongſt many other things (which Mr. Whitfield ſtudiouſly omitteth, that he may ſpeak to that onely which he thinks is leaſt above his ſtrength,) afford my Correptory Corrector this ſhort note of Inſtruction,

Divine Philanth. defended, c. 4. p. 48. That by a common Hebraiſm, ſuch verbs as are active in ſound, are onely permiſſive in ſignification: by the admiſſion of which Rule, thoſe horrible abſurdities would be avoided, and Scripture expounded 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

To which part of my Anſwer,M. W's wonderful reply in behalf of M. B. Mr. Wh. adventures this ſad Reply. This he dictates, but doth not demonſtrate, nor bring the leaſt patch of an Argument to prove it, neither will all his skill in the Hebrew enable him to do it. And may he not by this ſhift evade the cleereſt and ſtrongeſt Scriptures that are brought againſt him, by telling us that they ſignifie quite another thing then the nature of the words doth import, if we will believe him? 2. Why may he not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expreſſions are uſed; as when the Lord ſaith, I form the light, and create darkneſs, I make peace, and create evil, Iſa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands ſpread out the heavens, Pſal. 12? Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraiſmes, interpret theſe verbs that are active in ſound to be permiſſive onely in ſignification, and ſay that God hath permitted light and darkneſs to be created, and ſuffered the earth to be made, and the heavens to be ſpread out? p. 23.]

How many wayes Mr. Wh. hath uncovered himſelf in theſe words before the face of all people, I could never have ſhewed, if himſelf had not made it thus needful for me; which I beſeech his beſt friends to carry alwayes in their mindes, that they may not accuſe me of ſeverity in any one of the particulars which now enſue.

His great unskilfulneſs in the things of a Divine.Firſt he uncovers his no-acquaintance, not only with the Hebrew, but with the plainQuod autem in Scripturis legitur, Indurabo cor; item Tradidit eos in capiditates, & ſimilia; haec figura ſermonis facilè poteſt explicari, ſi quis obſervet naturam Hebraici ſermonis: certum eſt enim has figuras habere ſignificationem permittendi. Melanchth. in Comment. in c. 9. ad Rom. fol. 132. edit. Argentorati A. D. 1536. ſpanhemius & Dallaeus huc accedunt. Latine Writers by whom the Idiotiſmes of Hebrew have been obſerved. How elſe could he complain that I did not demonſtrate the Sun at Noon? I expected that Lay-men ſhould believe me as a Divine, in ſetting down that as a granted Rule; and that Divines ſhould receive it upon their knowledge that it was true. But 'twas my fault not to remember that of the Clergy, as well as Laity, there are ſeveral ſorts; and that many of the former are very ignorant, whereas many of the later have perfect knowledge. Be it ſo, that Mr. P. hath but a little skill in Hebrew, (who yet hath more then Mr. Wh. if he hath none) yet if any man living, ſure Hugo Grotius had a great deal. And Grotius hisDecepiſti, i. e. ſiviſti decipi. Saepe enim apud Hebraeos, verba ſono activa, ſignificatu paſsiva ſunt. Grot. in Jer. c. 4. v. 10. Annotations are guided much by that Rule. Nec figurae illae verborum in ſermone Hebraico pugnant cum ſententia quam dixi, Indurabo cor Pharaonis, & ſim • les: certum eſt enim, Hebraicâ phraſi ſignificare eas permiſsionem, non voluntatem efficacem: Mel. in loc. de cauſâ pecc. p. 49. Melanchthon (I am ſure) was a great that Rule. It ſhall ſuffice me to ſay that in my Anſwer to Doctor Reynolds (ch. 7. p. 67, 68, &c.) I have proved the uſe of this Rule in the interpretation of ſuch Texts, by the verdict of all the Fathers, by that of S. Auſtin in particular, by the exact Biſhop Andrews, nay by the publick acknowledgments of the moſt skilful Hebreicians of Mr. Wh's own party, even Philippes de Morney, and Peter the Calviniſt of Florence. I farther proved it by Scriptures agreed upon by all the World to be onely capable of that conſtruction. All which if Mr. W. did never ſee, nor what I ſaid toDiv. Philan. c. 1. p. 23.24. ch. 4. à p. 37. ad finem uſque. Mr. Barlee, I am not guilty of his omiſſions. And if he really did ſee, but made as if he did not, it is a commiſſion he muſt repent of. Here lies the wonderful 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of this ſhrewd undertaker. Once I mentioned and onely mentioned the aboveſaid Hebraiſm, but in divers places I fully proved it; Mr. Wh. finding the naked mention, cries out I dictate, but do not prove; butNote that my proof was in the firſt chapter (p. 23, 24.) my naked mention in the fourth, (p. 48.) ſo as he paſſed by the firſt, before he fell upon the ſecond. finding alſo my ample proof, of that he wiſely makes no mention. From whence we may rationally infer, that all the fault was in his Will, and not (this bout) in his Underſtanding.

Secondly, He uncovers his moneths mind to the literal ſenſe of thoſe Texts,His frightful adherence unto the letter: which ſay (according to the letter) that God did2 Sam. 16.10. bid Shimei curſe David, which was to do wickedly, and Ezek. 20.26. polluted the people in their own gifts, and2 Sam. 13.11, 12. raiſed up evil, and Ezek. 14.9. deceived, and Jer. 35.1, 2, 3, 4. tempted, and Iſa 63.6. made men drunk; which (according to the letter) do ſeem to charge God with the efficiency of ſin. And yet (ſaith Mr. Wh.) ſuch verbs as thoſe muſt be actively, not permiſſively, underſtood; for this (he tells us) is a ſhift, by which a man may evade the cleerest Scriptures, by telling us that they ſignifie quite another thing then the nature of the words doth import. So unwilling is the old Eph. 4.22. man (as the Apoſtle ſpeaks) that God ſhould be cleered from all impurity, and the word of God reſcued from blaſphemous contradictions, that he will rather reproch the antient Fathers of the Church, as well as the modern upholders of it, with ridiculous ſhifts and evaſions, then ſubmit to the judgment of common ſenſe. For ſaith not the Scripture in other places, that God is of Habak. 1.13. purer eyes then to behold evil, and cannot look on iniquity; and will have Pſ. 94.20. nothing to do with the ſtool of wickedneſs; and who is not a God that hath Pſal. 5.4. pleaſure in wickedneſs; and that all his wo • ks are Gen. 1.31. very good; and that ſin by one Rom. 5.12. man entred into the world; and that all the wickedneſs in the world, the luſt of the fleſh, the luſt of the eye, and the pride of life,1 Joh. 2.16 is not of the Father, but of the world; and that Jam. 1.13.14. God tempteth no man: that he Iſa. 1.14. cannot indure ſin, and hates it, and isibid. & M • l. 2.17. weary to bear it; and all things which may expreſs, not onely his perfect unwillingneſs to be diſhonored by ſin, but his utmoſt Zechar. 8.17. hatred and deteſtation? Now when two ſorts of Scripture do contradict each other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in reſpect of the ſurface and letter of them, there muſt be a way to reconcile them, or they will not be thought to be every where true, nor by conſequence the1 Tim. 3.15. word of God. They cannot be otherwiſe reconciled, then by taking one of the two in aNote, M. W. himſelf conf • ſſeth, • . 48. that ſome Texts would contradict each other if literally taken. figurative ſenſe, and ſo the reconcilement is very eaſie. Now whether the figurative ſpeaking is in the firſt ſort of Texts, which do ſeemingly and literally aſperſe the goodneſs of our God, or in the ſecond fort of Texts, which do really and plainly clear the goodneſs of God from all aſperſions, let the Reader judge betwixt me and Mr. Whitfield. Nay Mr. Barlee himſelf, although he ſometimes judgeth on Mr. W's ſide (as in hisSee Divine Philanthr. ch. 1. p. 24, 25. Correptory Correction, p. 69.) yet at laſt he is forced to judge againſt it: for he ſaith in plain terms (as I lately obſerved) in this his laſt print, [that God according to the letter of many Texts ſeems to be made a moral cauſe of ſin as ſin, ch. 3. p. 55.] ſo that Mr. W. and Mr. B. are as much at odds in their very conspiracy and conjunction againſt a third perſon, as Mr. B. is at odds with his deareſt ſelf.

His overthrowing his own intereſt in other caſes.Thirdly, If M. W. admits of Hebraiſms in any parts of Scripture, much more muſt he do it in thoſe we now ſpeak of; where if they are not admitted, the inconvenience will be greater then any where elſe. But no doubt in ſome parts he will not dare not to admit them, for fear of being cenſured a direct enemy to Christ, and to take part with the Socinians, nay (which is worſe) with ſuch as Julian, and the profane Helvidius. For how many propheſies of Chriſt are read by us in the Preterperfect Tenſe, the Hebrew Idiotiſm being retained in the Engliſh by our Tranſlators? Iſa. 9.6. there are two Hebraiſms at once, which no creature can deny who doth acknowledge that Text to have a proſpect upon Chriſt: [unto us a child is born] for [unto us a child ſhall be born.] And when the Jewes object (as they do often) that Chriſts name was Jeſus, not wonderful, counſellor, the mighty God, the everlaſting Father, the Prince of peace; which yet (according to the letter) is affirm'd to be the name by which he ſhould be called who is there ſpoken of (Iſa. 9.6.) what can Mr. W. alledge for himſelf, unleſſe he mind them of the moſt vulgar Hebraiſm, by which the Name is put to ſignifie the Being? A man is ſaid by the Hebrews to be called thus and thus, to whom ſuch titles and epithets do well agree. SoCited from Iſa. 7.14. Mat. 1.23. [They ſhall call his name Emmanuel] would be literally truer of theIſa. 8.3. compared with verſ. 8. child of the Propheteſs given to Ahaz for a ſign, then of Jeſus Chriſt the ſon of Mary, which yet according to the Hebraiſm is truer of Christ then of that child. Again, if our Greek copies of S. Mark did read 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Mar. 3.29. (as well they may, becauſe the ancie • t Manuſcrip • s were found to do ſo, and out of them the vulgar Latine) what other reaſon could be rendred for our tranſlating the words thus [in danger of eternal damnation] rather then [in danger of eternal ſin] but that ſin, by an Hebraiſm, is ſet to ſignifie the puniſhment of ſin? Nay, it is much more probable (in the judgment of Grotius) that S. Mark himſelf writ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [of ſin] and that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [of judgment or condemnation] was nothing elſe but Interpretamentum Hebraiſmi, the Expoſition of that Hebraiſm which was uſed by S. Mark, who is known by all to have been an Helleniſtick Writer; I ſay, by all, excepting ſuch as Mr. W. who complains of hard words in a moſt plain Engliſh Writer. Again, if Helvidius his three objections (from Mat. 1. verſ. 18. & verſ. 25.) againſt the Virgin Maries being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (as the Greek Fathers are wont to call her,) a perpetual Virgin, ſhould be urged by ſome Helvidian again • t Mr. W. he would be thankful to that man who ſhould help him to anſwer unto the third, that there were three 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among the Hebrews, the Principality, the Priesthood, and the right of Inheritance, which were all the privileges of the firſt-born, and in reſpect of which our bleſſed Saviour was ſo called. How much gladder ſhould he be, to underſtand ſuch Texts by the common Hebraiſm, whoſe literal acception is of ſo dangerous importance as hath been ſhewed, if he did not [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] live in vaſſalage to an opinion, which cannot otherwiſe be defended, then by making God to have a hand in ſin?

He is convin • ed by that which he cannot but confeſs.Fourthly, M. W. cannot but confeſſe, that the verb ſino is an active, that is to ſay, of the active voice, and yet its ſignification is onely paſſive, for it onely ſignifies to ſuffer. And when the Devils beſought our Saviour, [ Mat. 8.31. ſuffer us to enter] they did not command him, but begg'd his leave, although they ſpake in the Imperative or commanding mood. Our Saviour ſaid to the Haemorrhois (Mat. 9.22.) Thy faith hath made thee whole: which was not literally, but figuratively true. S. Peters words to Aeneas were not figuratively, but literally true, [ Act. 9.34. Jeſus Chriſt maketh thee whole:] and if Chriſt healed the later, much more evidently the former. Thus when we are ſaid to be juſtified by Gal. 3.24. Faith (in S. Pauls phraſe) and by Jam. 21. & 24. works (in S. James) neither is literally true, without the help of a diſtinction or explication; for in exact propriety of ſpeech, we are juſtified by Rom. 8.33. God, and by God alone. And Mr. W. might have known, that there is nothing more common in the opening of Texts, then to diſtinguiſh the literall from the rational importance.

The miſchiefes which enſue upon his way of expoſition.Fifthly, Whereas Mr. W. alledgeth, [that the c • eareſt Scriptures may be evaded by this ſhift, &c.] I will ſhew him by ſome inſtances what kind of miſchiefs have enſued by his way of apprehending thoſe Texts of Scripture, whoſe Hebraiſm he ſlanders with the name of ſhift. One of his own examples is (p. 22.) David's ſaying of wicked Shimei, that the Lord had 2 Sam. 16.10, 11. bid him to curſe his Soveraign, quite contrary to that which the Lord had commanded, [ Exod. 22.28. compared with Jer. 19.5. Thou ſhalt not revile the Gods, nor curſe the Ruler of thy people.] nay Shimei being penitent2 Sam. 19.20. Quomodo dixit Dominus Semei maledicere David▪ non jubendo, &c. Auſtin. degra & lib. arbit. c • 0. confeſſed his ſin a little after. In this caſe, ſay I, either David was miſtaken, (as well he might be who could commit ſuch ſcarlet ſins) and thought that Shimei might really be ſent by God in that meſſage (as Nathan before ch. 12.) to pronounce that curſe which David confeſſedly had deſerved; and in particular caſes, it is manifeſt that God can diſpenſe with his precepts to the ſons of men, who yet muſt never pretend to any ſuch diſpenſation, unleſſe they can prove it to us by miracles, and ſhew that the counter-precept was revealed to them from Heaven, which till then muſt be concluded to have been ſent up from Hell: elſe any man may ſay, that God hath commanded him to kill, as well as to curſe the Rule of his people, or whatever elſe is forbidden. But Shimei had nothing to ſhew for it, nay he had afterwards ſomething to ſhew against it. And therefore if David was not miſtaken, he muſt needs have ſpoken by an Hebraiſm; it being impoſſible that David ſhould be an abſolute Reprobatarian, and ſo imagine that God could bid a man ſin. God could have ſent a curſe to David for his ſins, by what Meſſenger he had pleaſed, as well by Shimei as by Nathan; but then that curſe had been Gods, and not his Meſſengers. Shimei could not have ſinned in the delivering of his meſſage, whileſt he did as God bid him: yet 'tis apparent by the Text, that Shimei ſinned againſt Gods Precept, Exod. 22.28. From whence it followes unvoidably, that the words of David are onely permiſſive in ſignification, though active in ſound. Nay this (ſaith irrefragable Melanchthou) is the true Haec eſt ve • a Grammatica interpretatio, & nihil habet abſurdi: Tradere in deſideria ſignificat deſertionem: Deus deſerit impins, & ſinit • eo • furere, & non cohibet eorum furorem. Indurabo, id eſt, ſinam indurari, non flectam impii cordis duritiem. Melanchth. in cap. 9. ad Rom. ſol. 133. Grammaticall interpretation of ſuch Scriptures, and hath nothing in it of abſurd; becauſe the moſt active expreſſions imaginable do by an ordinary figure onely ſignifie deſertion, and ſufferance, a not reſtraining of mens fury, and a not turning of their hearts. But alas! Melanchthon was a poor ſhifter to Mr. Whitfield. He was onely admired for his learning and holineſs, by the moſt learned and the moſt holy of the Chriſtian world; he was courted and conſulted by no greater perſons then Kings and Princes: whereas Mr. W. is obliging the greateſt Emperour of the Eaſt, and in a zealous contention for the Mahumetan Decree, confutes Melanchthon and his Hebraiſme, and all the Pillars of the Church, (both ancient and modern) with the leaſt puff of his breath. [By this ſhift the cleareſt Scriptures may be evaded.] Mr. W. and the Scotiſh brethren, and James Naylors worſhippers, and Andrew Smith, with Coppinger, Artington, and the reſt, are for a literal underſtanding of Gods bidding Shimei to curſe King David. God did not onely permit, but was active and operative and efficacious in the villany, ſay theſe Expounders: nay, decreed it abſolutely (ſay they) from all etermity, antecedently to his praeſcience of Shimei's will. And in conformity to theſe dreams, Coppinger ſaid he was commanded by the Spirit of God to murder the Privy Counſellors of Queen Elizabeth: a ſecond had a call to ſlay the Miniſters: and a third, who could not write or read, was to be the executioner of the Lords moſt holy will. (Dang. Poſit. l. 4. c. 10. p. 164.) The ſame command was alledged by them who adored James Naylor: and when Andrew Smith, at prayer time, had ſtabb'd the Quarter-Maſter Farley in Farfar Church, he very ſeriouſly proteſted, that Chriſt commanded him to do it. Mr. Egerton was a Miniſter of no ſmall note in the Presbyterie, to whom when Coppinger had revealed his extraordinary call to execute vengeance upon the Magiſtrates, Mr. Egerton would not diſcourage him in his intentions: To uſe his own words,Dang. Poſit. l. 4. ch. 14. p. 174. [he would not hinder the zeal of Coppinger, and ſhould be loth to quench the Spirit of God in him.] Again, the Miniſters of the Kirk, when they had cauſed the people to take up armes againſt the Exod. 22.28. Ruler of the People, ſaid they wereSpotſ. Hiſt. Scot. l. 2. p. 330, 331. moved thereunto by the Spirit of God, (without the ſhift of an Hebraiſm, you may be ſure.) I know not whether Eldavid was brought up in the Doctrine of irrespective Decrees; but of this I am ſure, that when he gave himſelf out to be the fore-runner of the Meſsias, he ſaid he did it (without an Hebraiſm) by the See The ſelf-Revenger Exempl. ch. 1. p. 3, 4. commandment of God. The time would faile me, if I ſhould ſpeak of all the Impoſtors whom I have met with, from Numa Pompilius to Mahomed, and ſo downwards, who did all pretend (without an Hebraiſm) to a ſecret revelation of Gods command. I will conclude with one inſtance, which (in ſeveral pertinent reſpects) will be as good as a thouſand; and which having touched upon elſewhere for another purpoſe, I ſhall exhibit more fully, and with a new application. This Story is to be had either in Knox his Hiſt. of the Church of Scotl. p. 143, 144, 145 or in Biſh. B acreſts: Dang. Poſ. l. 4. ch. 15. p. 177, 178. Norman Leſly (who was ſon to the Earl of Rothſey) had fallen out with the Cardinal who was withal the Archbiſhop of S. Andrews, upon a private cauſe (faith Buchanan) between them two. He, together with James Melvin, and Peter Carmichael (zealous Reformers of Religion in the Kingdom of Scotland) forcibly brake into the Castle, and into the chamber of the ſaid Cardinal; where they found him ſitting in his chair, and crying out in theſe words, [I am a Prieſt, ye will not ſlay me?] Leſly ſtrook him once or twice, and ſo did Peter. But Melvin (ſweet man!) perceiving them both to be in choler, (and being himſelf in cold blood) withdrew them from their temerity, which he reproved in theſe words: [This work and judgment of God, although it be ſecret, ought to be done with great gravity.] and then preſenting to the Archbiſhop the point of his ſword, he preached thus; [Repent thee of thy former wickedneſs, &c.—Note that the Hiſtorian is Mr. Knox, who calls this Murder, the work of God; and writes in his margin, The Godly Fact and words of James Melvin. we from God are ſent to revenge it: for here before God I proteſt, that neither the hatred of thy perſon, nor love of thy riches, moveth me to ſtrike thee, but onely thy being an enemy againſt Jeſus Chriſt and his holy Gospel.] Having ſo preached, he fell to practice; firſt running him through ſeveral times with a Stog-ſword (to ſhew it was not any hatred of hi • perſon) and then ſeizing on all his Goods, Plate, and Jewels, (to ſhew it was not any love to his Riches.)

Let it now be but remembred, how the men of Mr. Knox and Mr. Melvin's way do diſtinguiſh of Gods ſecret and revealed Will, what they acknowledge themſelves to mean by that diſtinction, and in what manner they do apply it, and how without any Hebraiſm they underſtand ſuch Texts of which I am ſpeaking; let this, I ſay, be remembred by the conſidering Reader, and then he hath met with the Application.

Sixthly, 6. Mr. W's. Maſters commit contradictions by not obſerving the Hebraiſm. For want of uſing the ſaid Hebraiſm in giving the ſenſe of ſuch Texts whoſe letter ſeems to make God to be the Author of ſin (as Mr. Barlee ſaith, c. 3. p. 55.) it is wonderful to behold, into how many abſurdities, and civil wars, the Commanders in Chief of that party have unawares betrai'd themſelves.Piſcator in Reſp. ad duplic. Vorſt. par. i. p. 325. & in praefat. enuntiato 6. Piſcator flatly denies, that God doth will whatſoever he commands; and yet he flatly confeſſeth, we ought to grant and believe, that God will have to be done by us whatſoever he commands, and to be omitted by us what he forbids. Again, Doctor Twiſſe, although he ſaith inTwiſſ. Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 10. c. 1. ſect. 12. p. 140. ſome places, that Gods ſecret will may be contrary to his precept or revealed will, which is improperly called his will; yet he ſaith in other places, that God muſt need; will whatſoever he commands: for thus he argues, [Idem l. 2. adverſ. Arm. C • im. 3. ſect. 5. p. 150. Col. 2. God cannot be denied to have willed that Shimei ſhould cu • ſe David, becauſe the Scripture profeſſeth that God commanded Shimei to curſe him.] But now Spanhemius, of the ſame party (and as eminent as either) doth wholly deny what is granted (and alſo denied) by thoſe two; ſaying poſitively, thatSpanhemius in Exercitat. de Grat. univerſ. p. 147. God doth ſometimes command what yet he wills not that it ſhou'd be done: adding this for an inſtance, that they who neve • ſhall repent, are yet commanded by God to do what God intends they never ſhall do. Laſtly, Dallaeus, at leaſt as learned as either of them, and a profeſſed Anti-Arminian, confutes all Three in a moſt excellent manner; andNon poſſum non admirati duos illos ſummos viros propoſitionem hanc, Deus ea vult quae jubet, quâ eae quae ipſis probantur argumentationes totae nituntur, alibi fortiter negare. Dal. Apol. pro duab. ſynod. part. 2.104. admires at the two former, that men of their learning ſhould abjure in ſome places, what at other times and places they make the Baſis of their reaſonings, viz. That God doth will what he commands. What ſhould be the reaſon of ſuch enormities? They could not think it a fine thing for Brethren to be at odds, nor did they purpoſely ſtudy for ſelf-contradictions. Why then did they run ſuch deadly Riſques? It was ſure becauſe they could not help it. When they had ſwallowed the great Camel, they could not ſtrain at ſuch Gnats. When a man begins in irreſpective unconditional Decrees, he cannot poſſibly foreſee at what abſurdity he ſhall end. Dato hoc uno ſequuntur mille. AndDallaeus his ingenuity in leaving his brethren when they leave reaſon. therefore Dallaeus was ſo ingenuous as to acknowledge, what a man of his judgement could not but know, that all thoſe Actives above mentioned muſt be explained byDeus voluit indurare, id eſt, non- • mollire Pharaonem. Ibid. p. 118. In eundem ſenfum Polanus Partit. Theolog. l. 1. p 75, 76. permiſſion. He farther addes this obſervation, That the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which is the word expreſſing the Induration of Pharaoh's heart, (Deut. 29.4.) is of that conjugation which is commonly called Hiphil; and verbs of that conjugation, by theSunt interdum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſive 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 potiùs quàm 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , verba hujus generis. Sp • n. Exerc. p. 214. confeſſion of Spanhemius (a prime Author with Mr. W.) are many times rather privative then poſitive. So that when it is ſaid, God hardned the heart of Pharaoh, the meaning is, he did not ſoften it, but permitted it to it ſelfe. I hope Mr. W. will not ſay, that the Orthodox Preacher at Charenton is a ſhifter, much leſs his admired Profeſſor at Leyden, whom the Preacher at Charenton hath well confuted.

☞ Seventhly,Mr. W. makes Light to be ſin, or Abſalom's filthineſs to be none, by making a parity of Gods working in either caſe. Mr. W's greateſt unhappineſs i • in the ſecond part of his Anſwer before recited. Mark his words, good Reader: [ Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expreſsions are uſed? as when the Lord ſaith, I form the light, I create darkneſs, Iſa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands ſpread out the heavens, Pſal. 12. Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraiſms, interpret theſe verbs which are active in ſound, to be permiſsive onely in ſignification, and ſay that God permitted light and darkneſs to be created, and ſuffered the earth to be made, &c? p. 23] I have thus recorded his words in the ſeventh part of my Anſwer, though I had ſet them down in the beginning of the Section, becauſe they are the moſt memorable I ever met with, and are alone ſufficient to make a penitent Author of Mr. W. For, firſt, I demand of his deareſt Friends and Partizans (who will certainly condemn him for this adventure, in whatever elſe they may excuſe him) Is the caſe the ſame in thoſe other Texts and theſe? Is Light a ſin? Or is it no ſin to be hard-hearted, to defile the Concubines of a Father, to curſe the Ruler of the people, and the like? The Texts expounded by an Hebraiſm, were ſuch as I ſpake to in the fifth Section of the former Chapter, which to take according to the Letter, is adjudged by Mr. Balee to be an impious Fact, if it is an impious Fact to aſperſe God with the cauſality of ſin as ſin. But when it is ſaid, God formed the light, and created darkneſs, it cannot be pretended that the literal acception of the words doth ſo much as ſeem to make God the Author of ſin. I therefore challenge Mr. Whitfield to publiſh his reaſons for his pretended parity of Reaſon, by which he hath publickly affirmed, we may interpret Gods creating of light and darkneſs, of his permiſsion to create them, as well as his hardening Pharaoh's heart, and his deceiving the falſe Prophets, of his permiſsion and not hindering, that the former ſhould be hardened, and the later deceived.] If he hath no reaſon to give (and ſure if he had we ſhould here have heard of it) I then require him, in the name of God, to take off the ſcandal which he hath given to many credulous ſoules for whom Chriſt died. Let him either declare it to be his Doctrine, that God had as really an hand in Shimei's curſing his King, in Abſalom's polluting his Fathers Concubines, in the Egyptians hatred of his Iſrael, in ſending ſtrong deluſion, in putting it into the hearts of the ten Kings to do wickedly, (as he interprets the Text Rev. 17.17) and as really an hand in Pharaoh's obduration, as in creating the light and the darkneſs, in making the earth, and in ſpreading out the heavens; or if he dares not declare this, then let him print his confeſsion (to adequate the Plaiſter unto the wound) that he onely ſpake out of his ſtomach, and not out of his reaſon, becauſe he was reſolved to contradict my Anſwer to Mr. Barlee, and knew not how to do it better. He could not be otherwiſe revenged on me, then by venting himſelf againſt the Scripture: wherein he conjectured very truly, if he took that courſe to make me ſmart; becauſe there is nothing ſo grievous to me, as to find a profeſſor of Chriſtianity to turn Gods word againſt the holineſs of his will. But whileſt I pray for his amendment, I will neceſſitate his confeſsion, or confuſion of Face, and that by this following violentum, by which in the perſon of a Jew, or rather of an Atheiſt, I will turn his weapon upon himſelf. Secondly, therefore let us imagine, that Mr. Whitfield is to defend the two Natures of Chriſt, Divine and Humane, againſt the perſonated Atheiſt, who ſhall thus object againſt them both.

Ath. That which is really a Tree cannot be really a Man, Mr. W. beaten with his own weapons by any Atheiſt who ſhall oppoſe him. much leſs really a God: But Chriſt is really a Tree. And thus I prove it. That which is a true Vine (not a fictitious one) is very really a Tree▪ But the Scripture ſaith plainly, that Chriſt is a Vine (Joh. 5.5.) nay a True Vine (v. 1.) Therefore Chriſt is really a Tree.

Mr. VVh. Thoſe words of Scripture are onely ſpoken by a figure, and parabolically, which amongſt the Hebrews was an uſual way of expreſsion. Chriſt did onely repreſent his relation to his members by that which is ſeen betwixt the Vine and its Branches.

Ath. This indeed you dictate, The Atheiſt replyes in Mr. W's. own words, p. 23. but not demonſtrate; nor do you bring the leaſt patch of an Argument to prove it. And may you not by this ſhift evade the cleareſt and ſtrongeſt Scriptures when brought againſt you, by telling us they ſignifie quite another thing then the nature of the words do import, if we will believe you?

Mr. W. I tell you Chriſt was a Jew, amongſt whom it was common to deliver themſelves in Parables, as you may ſee throughout the Old Teſtament as well as New. And indeed all Nations have uſed Apologues and Tropes, not onely to ſignifie, but to imprint their mindes upon the hearers.

Ath. VVhy may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, The Atheſt replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 23. where the like expreſsions are uſed? as when the Lord ſaith, I and my Father are one, Joh. 10.30. Or when the Scripture ſaith that Chriſt ſaid, I am the true Vine, why may we not ſay that the Scripture ſpeaketh by a Parable, and brings in Chriſt ſpeaking by a Proſopopoeia, as divers Authors of Mythology do make Dialogues and Diſcourſes betwixt Trees and Rivers? For how can a True Vine ſpeak indeed, and ſay, I am a True Vine?

Mr. W. But 'tis granted by all ſtory, as well ſecular as ſacred, and by men of all Religions, as well falſe as true, that Chriſt did truly speak and teach in the Synagogues of the Jewes, and in many other both publick and private places.

Ath. That doth onely infer, that Chriſt was a ſpeaking and didactical Tree, not that he was not a Tree at all; for if he really ſpake, this was one of his real ſpeeches, That he ſaid he was a True Vine. Had he ſaid onely a Vine, you might have ſaid he onely meant he was a Figurative Vine: But to anticipate that evaſion, he ſaid, I am the True Vine. And as when it is ſaid, [God hardened Pharaohs heart, The Atheiſt replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 22. deceived the falſe Prophet, and the like, the Scripture doth hold forth the manner of Gods working in ſin by way of Action; ] ſo when it is ſaid, that Chriſt ſaid, I am the true Vine, the Scripture doth hold it forth by a verb ſubſtantive, which denoteth exiſtence, and not Phraſeology. AsAgain Mr. W's. own words, p. 22. it is not ſaid, God ſuffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12. ſo it is not ſaid, I am a metaphorical Vine, or I am called, or accounted, or compared to a Vine, but I am the true Vine, Joh. 15.1.

Mr. VVh. But how can thoſe words be literally meant, which infer ſuch an abſurd and unintelligible thing, as that a Tree ſhould be rational, and yet a Tree ſtill? This implyes a contradiction, for Chriſt to go about doing good, by preaching, healing, and exemplary life, and yet to be a True Vine in the literal notion of the word.

Ath. But that which the Scripture plainly, clearly, The Atheiſt replies in Mr. W's own words, p. 19. and poſitively aſſerteth, you ought not to deny, though you cannot diſcern the manner how it can be; It rather beſeems you humbly to acknowledg your ignorance in apprehending the manner, then to deny the thing.

Let the Reader now judge, whether the Atheiſt in this Dialogue hath not replyed to Mr. W. as much like a Diſputant, as Mr. W. hath done to me. Nay, whether there is not this difference betwixt the two caſes, that it is much a leſſer evil, to ſay that Chriſt is a Vine without a Figure, then to ſay that God without a Figure did harden Pharaoh's heart, and will that Abſalom ſhould do filthily againſt his Father, and Maledicere Davidi actus eſt malus, à pietate, & charitate, adeoque & à Dei voluntate alienus. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 103. bid Shimei curſe David, and deceive the Prophet, and the like. Again, it was ſaid by our Saviour, I am the true Vine; but it was never ſaid in Scripture, that God was a true hardener of Pharaoh's heart, or that he did truly deceive the Prophet.

Eighthly, Since Mr. W. asks, 8. Mr. W. condemn'd out of his own mouth. [why may we not interpret • ther Scriptures in the like manner, &c.] to which I have given at leaſt a ſatisfactory Anſwer, and ſhewed him the wofulneſs of his Queſtion by an Argument ad hominem, and ſince he jeers me with my Hebraiſms (which yet are his Maſters as well as mine;) I will now proceed to juſtifie my ſelf, and to condemn him out of his mouth. For when he comes to deny Univerſal Redemption, and to reſiſt the Scriptures which are point-blank againſt him, he is then ſo gracious as to uſe theſe words; Scripture must be interpre • ed by Scripture: and though we are not to recede from the literal ſenſe when it will agree with other Scriptures, and with the Analogy of Faith; yet when it is defective both theſe wayes, we are not bound to adhere to the Letter, p. 72. Very good: I thank Mr. W. for this juſtice, in the diſpenſing of which he doth not ſpare his own ſelfe. For if the words of SaintHe is the propitiation for our ſins; and not for ours onely, but alſo for the ſins of the whole world. 1 Joh. 2.2. John were two wayes defective as to the Letter, as neither agreeable with other Scriptures, nor with the Analogy of Faith, (as Mr. W. liberally dictates) how can all thoſe Texts whoſe Letter ſeems to make God the cauſe of ſin as ſin (ſaith Mr. Barlee) be either agreeable to other Texts, or to the Analogy of Faith? Are any Scriptures inconſiſtent with the words of Saint John in the Letter? not one in any appearance; but all on the contrary do ſound the ſame way. Or with what Analogy of Faith are Saint Johns words unagreeable? even the Faith of Mr. W. and them of his Creed. But I haveSee the ſecond thing replied in this Section. proved by examples, that the Letter of thoſe Scriptures which are cited by Mr. W. to prove that God hath a hand in ſin, are inconſiſtent with thoſe others by which God is affirmed to have no hand in ſin; nor can it agree with the Analogy of any Faith but Mr. Whitfields. If the Letter of the Scripture may be two ways defective, (as Mr. W. tells us it may) where is it likely ſo to be, if not in the places of which we ſpeak, ſince nothing is dearer to God Almighty, then the inviolable honour of his Purity and his Truth? And if we are not bound alwayes to adhere unto the Letter (as Mr. W. alſo granteth, to ſerve his ends) why doth he hold himſelf to it where it is moſt to be forſaken? becauſe 'tis more for his turn, that God ſhould be operative and active in all the wickedneſſe in the world, then that Chriſt ſhould die for all mankind? If that is not his reaſon, let him tell me what is. And if that is his reaſon, we know the length of his foot. Judge (good Reader) of this mans Doctrines.

9. Again, 9. How Scripture interprets Scripture againſt Mr. W. if Scripture muſt interpret Scripture (as Mr. W. alſo doth acknowledge) I deſire no more to prove my Hebraiſm. For all thoſe Scriptures of Gods hardning Pharaoh, bidding Shimei curſe David, delivering up to vile affections, ſending deluſion, and the like, receive the ſame interpretation (which I have given) from the words of S. Paul (which are alſo Scripture) who told the People of Lycaonia, that [God in times paſt Act. 14.16. which compare with Act. 17.30. Rom. 2.4. 1 Cor. 10.13. 1 Pet. 3.22. Exod. 34.6. Act. 13.18. ſuffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes.] Their wicked wayes were wholly their own, and they alone did walk in them without Gods help: he gave them their being, life, and motion, which were very good things, but he had not the leaſt hand in the determination of their wills to wickedneſs, or their conſenting to their temptations; he onely ſuffered them with patience to walk in the wayes which they had Iſa. 66.3. choſen, to wit, their own wayes, which were called their own, becauſe they choſe them. And here 'tis fit that I meet again with Mr. W. For as he ſaid (p. 22.) that it was not ſaid, God ſuffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it; ſo here I ſay on the other ſide, it was not ſaid by S. Paul, God excited, or commanded, or decreed all nations to walk in their own wayes, but that he ſuffer'd them to do it. Come we then to a tryal of Scripture by Scripture, which to do for the benefit of common people (whom I am ſure in my writings I moſt conſider) I wil compare 2. Scriptures, by placing one on the right hand, another on the left; that men may ſee ſo much the better, which of the two muſt be the Rule, by which the other is to be guided; which the Touchſtone, by which the other is to be tried; which the Standard, with which the other is to comply.

Wherefore God alſo gave them up to uncleanneſſe, through the lusts of their own hearts, to diſhonour their own bodies between themſelves, Rom. 1.24. For this cauſe, God gave them up to vile affections, v. 26. God in times paſt ſuffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes, Act. 14.16. He endured with much long-ſuffering the veſſels of wrath fitted for deſtruction, Rom. 9.2. (that is, fitted by themſelves, by thoſe their ſins, which God endur'd or ſuffer'd.)

They are both the ſayings of S. Paul, as well the Active on the left hand, as the Paſſive on the right. By which of the two, which of the two muſt be expounded? when God is ſaid to have given up to uncleanneſs, is it not onely meant that he ſufferd them to be unclean? or when he is ſaid to have ſuffer'd them to walk in their own wayes, is it alſo meant that he had a Note that p. 26. Mr. W. ſaith of ſin, that God doth both will and work it, and hath a hand in effecting it. hand and efficiency (to uſe the phraſes of Mr. W.) in ſuch their doings? Res ipſa loquitur, The Caſe it ſelf ſpeaks it ſelf. For, firſt, the uncleanneſs, and vile affections, were the uncleanneſt and vileſt that can be thought on: and how could God have a * working or * active hand in ſuch villanies, more vile then which the Devil himſelf cannot invent? Secondly, They were before habituated in the practice of their uncleanneſs, and that is rendred for the reaſon why God gave them up: Theſe are alſo M.W's expreſſions. as appears by the wherefore v. 24. and for this cauſe v. 26. But what ſenſe is it to ſay, that God did actively and operatively give them up to filthy habits, to which they had given up themſelves too long before? or admit they had not, yet what madneſſe is it to ſay, that becauſe their tempter and their own hearts had made them admirably wicked, God ſhould therefore be active to make them worſe? Thirdly, There isNote, I mean the conf ſſion of M.W's Teachers, who know any thing of thoſe matters; not of himſelf, who hath printed either his ignorance that there is any ſuch thing, or at leaſt the diſſimulation of his knowledge. confeſſedly an Hebraiſm, by which actives in ſound are permiſſives in ſignification; but no ſuch Hebraiſm, or other figure, by which paſſives in ſound are actives in ſenſe. Fourthly, For God to ſuffer or indure the ſins of men is exactly agreeable to the Analogy of Faith; but to will and work ſin, or to have an hand in the effecting of it (as M.W's words are) is according to the Analogy of what is worſe then infidelity. From all which it is apparent, that the Scripture in the left Column muſt be interpreted by that in the right. And now I will add ſome more Examples.

1. If the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have That is, I have permitted him to be deceived: or (as Grotius) I will deceive him by giving him ſuch an end as he expects not. deceived that Prophet, Ezek. 14.9. 1. Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour, and love no falſe oath; for all theſe are things that I hate, ſaith the Lord, Zech. 8.16, 17. 2. Behold I will That is, I will expoſe it to the luſts of the Gentiles, and not reſtrain them from profaning it. profane my Sanctuary, Ezek. 24.21. 2. He ſhall not profane the Sanctuary of his God. He ſhall not come nigh unto the Altar, that he profane not my Sanctuaries, for I the Lord do ſanctifie them, Lev. 21.12, 23. 3. I That is, I ſuffer'd them to commit ſacrileges, or to make ſacrilegious ſacrifices. polluted them in their own gifts, Ezek. 20.26. 3. Thou art of purer eyes then to behold evil; neither canst thou look on iniquity, Hab. 1.13. 4. I That is, I with drew my Grace from them, ſo that contemning my laws they made laws unto themſelves. gave them ſtatutes which were not good, Ezek. 20.25. 4. The Commandment of the Lord is pure, and inlightening the eyes, Pſal. 19.8. The Law is holy, and the Commandment holy, juſt, and good, Rom. 7.12. 5. God ſhall That is, I will ſuffer Magicians to deceive them: or will not hinder deluſion from being ſent. ſend them ſtrong deluſion that they ſhould believe a lie, that they all might he damned who believed not the truth, but had pleaſure in unrighteouſneſſe, 2 Theſ▪ 2.11, 12. 5. Thou art not a God ha • hath pleaſure in wickedneſs, neither ſhall any evil dwell with thee, Pſal. 5.4. Thou deſirest truth in the inward parts, Pſal. 51.6. The fruit of the Spirit is in all truth, Eph. 5.9. As I live, ſaith the Lord, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil wayes, why will ye die? Ezek. 33.14. 6. O Lord, why haſt thou That is, why wouldſt thou ſuffer us, by our being oppreſſed with a long tyrannie, to faint in our duties, and to forſake thy law? made us to erre from thy wayes, and hardned our heart from thy fear? Iſa. 63.17. 6. Ye have wearied the Lord with your words, Mal. 2.17. Will ye ſteal, murder, and commit adultery, and ſwear falſely, and come and ſtand before me in this houſe, which is called by my name, and ſay, We are delivered to do all theſe abominations? Jer. 7.9, 10.

Now what opinion they were of concerning Gods Decrees, who wearied him with their words, and ſaid they were delivered to commit all thoſe abominations, (and that in an active ſenſe, without an Hebraiſm,) is very obvious to be imagined. Again, whether it implies not a moſt blaſphemous contradiction, for God to will what he hateth, and to decree what he forbiddeth, & to ſet forward what he hindereth, (as far as promiſes, and threats, and perſwaſions come to) and to have a willingneſs of the ſame thing of which he is perfectly unwilling, every A B C darian may well inform us. And then (by a conſequence unavoidable) whether the Scriptures on the right hand are not theNote, that what is ſpoken by an Hebraiſm, Iſ. 6.10. Shut their eyes, and ſo repeated by S. John, he hath blinded their eyes, Joh. 12.40. is cited thus by our Saviour, Their eyes they have cloſed, Mat. 13.15. and ſo 'tis explained by S. Paul, Act. 28.27. Touch-ſtone, and the Rule whereby to try and to interpret the other Scriptures on the left; And whether thoſe on the left hand are not ſpoken by the Hebraiſm of which I ſpake, and to be meant of Gods permiſſion, not of his working or efficiency (as Mr. W. tell us;) And whether my way of underſtanding the Scriptures on the left hand is not perfectly agreeable to thoſe Scriptures on the right, to the Analogie of Faith, to the judgment of right reaſon, to the conſtant aſſertion ofNote, that I exclude from the univerſalily of the Fathers all ſorts of Libertines, by whatſoever Titles they are diſtinguiſhed. all the Fathers, nay to the dictate of common ſenſe, I leave it to be determined by the indifferent Reader.

Well therefore ſaid S. Paul to the Heathens of Lycaonia, that God had ſuffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes: for had he ſaid (with Mr. W. p. 26.) that God did will and work ſin, and had an hand in effecting of it, the Lycaonians might rather have ſton'd him, then have been ready to do Act. 14.18. ſacrifice. S. Paul therefore added, (that they might not think ill of God for ſuffering the wickedneſſe of the Nations) that although God had ſuffered them to walk in their own wayes, yet he left not himſelf without a witneſs, in that he did good (v. 17.) which had not eaſily been believed, had he ſaid to thoſe heathens (as Mr. W. to us) that Note, that M.W, makes this his medium whereby to prove Gods hand in effecting ſin, p. 26. lin. 5, 6, 7. ſin does make for Gods glory, who in that reſpect doth both will and work it, and hath an hand in effecting of it. It being hard to believe, that ſin, which is Gods diſhonour can make for his glory, or that God, who is all purity, can will and work ſin. Hard (I ſay) for a Heathen to believe ſuch ſtuff, but impoſſible for a Chriſtian, who believes his Saviour affirming plainly, Mat. 7.18. that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. There is an infinite difference betwixt ſins making for Gods glory, and Gods taking occaſion from ſin (which diſhonors him one way) to glorifie himſelf ſome other way. The Jews murdering of Chriſt did not make for Gods glory, (for 'twas the greateſt diſhonour could have been done him, that they ſhould commit ſuch a wickedneſs whom God had owned for his people) but God did glorifie his Mercy, his Wiſdom, and his Justice, in accepting the death of Chriſt for the propitiation of all our ſins. I ſay, in accepting the death, not the murdering of Chriſt. As Ch • iſt did willingly lay down his life, and ſuffer himſelf to be put to death, he was the ſacrifice of the world, and that did make for Gods glory: But as the Jews did violently take away his life, they were murderers in the higheſt, and that did make for Gods diſhonour. No ſober man did ever ſay, that God can make evil good; but ſome have ſaid, that God can draw good out of evil, which is quite another thing. Nor do they mean by ſo ſaying, that God draws good out of evil, as we draw water out of a ditch, but that from mens doing evil he takes an occaſion of doing good.

Sect. 2.

Mr. W. proceeds to a new Objection, but of his own invention,His return to his firſt method of ſerging objections to himſelf. not taken out of my writings, or out of any mans elſe; for if it had, he would have cited the place where it is legible. And yet he confidently ſaith, [He further objects p. 23.] ſo that here I muſt as confidently accuſe him of Forgery, and charge him to make me ſatisfaction. But what ſuperchery is this, to intitle his book againſt mine, and to omit a hundred things which I did really there object, and to forge a ridiculous objection, and (which is the top of the Commiſſion) to call it mine? I have already been too tedious in ſpeaking to his Chimaera's throughout my firſt Chapter, and will now be ſhorter to make amends.

1. He is at odds with D. Twiſſe. Firſt, I obſerve 'tis his opinion, [ that though God worketh not in the ſame manner in evil actions as he doth in good, or as evil men themſelves do, yet me muſt not deny that he hath any work at all in evil actions, ſince himſelf doth ſo often and ſo expreſly affirm it: p. 23, 24.] Dr. Twiſſe and Mr. W. are at odds, for the DoctorSee Correct Copy, p. 10. ſaith undauntedly, that Gods decree is no leſs efficacious in the permiſſion of evil, then in the production of good.

2. To make men ſin is a ſin of the worſt ſize.2. To ſay that God doth not work in ſin as ſinful men themſelves do, is no more then to ſay, that God doth nor ſin, or is not a ſinner, but onely makes men ſinners, asSee Correct Copy, p. 10. Zuinglius expreſly ſpeaks, whom Mr. W. defendeth p. 24. but to ſay that God did decree ſin, and praedeſtine men to ſin, and work ſin in men as a phyſical cauſe, and compel men to ſin, ſo as they cannot but commit it, is worſe then truly can be ſaid of any ſinner; neither Man nor Devil can compel any one to ſin. Tarquin could raviſh Lucretia, but could not compel her to be laſcivious. The Devil could torment and plunder Job, but not compel him to be impatient. Now that thoſe men do teach, that men are compelled by God to ſin, (beſides myDiv. Philanth. ch. 3. Sect. 34. p. 132, &c. Catalogue of examples) I can prove by theQuoties quenquam impelli à Deo aut cogi dicunt, rhetoricè potiùs loquuntur, &c. Twiſſe. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. ſect. 1. Crim. 3. c. 1. p. 29. confeſſion of Doctor Twiſſe, who doth acknowledge, and excuſe that very expreſſion in his own party. Beſides, Jeroboam did not work in Iſraels ſins in the ſame manner that they did, (becauſe he was not them) but 'twas the worſt part of his Character, that he made Iſrael to ſin, (2 King. 15.18, 24, 28.) yet he neither did, nor could compel them. It was the worſt part of the unbelieving Jews, that they stirred up the Gentiles, and made their mindes evil affected againſt the brethren (Act. 14.2.) yet they proceeded not to compulſion. Nay, it was reckoned by Nathan as the worſt thing in David, that by the ſins he had committed, he had given occaſion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme (2 Sam. 12.14.) which was far from coaction or compulſion, the very terms applied by thoſe men to God. And therefore Deodate himſelf, though the chief Miniſter of Geneva, denies that God is ſo much as theDeodat. in Prov. 16.4. occaſion of ſin; much leſſe could he judge him to be the cauſe, or the coactor.

3. Yet aſcribed unto God by that ſort of men.3. Though it is ſaid by M. W. that the manner of Gods working in ſin is ſecret, & not to be apprehended, (p. 23.) yet he and his predeceſſors have deſcribed the manner of it, in the moſt plentiful manner that any deſcription can be made in. They ſay [ he tempts, and proſtitutes, and acts, and operates, and works, and wills, and ſeduceth, & draws, and commands, and compells, and moves, and drives, and ſtirrs up to ſin, as a natural cauſe (ſay ſome;) as a moral cauſe (ſayothers;) as an efficient cauſe of the ſinful act, as an accidental cauſe of the obliquity of the act, as a man puts spurrs to a dull Jade, and as a man is excited to enjoy his own wife, &c.] All theſe expreſſions I have met with in Mr. W. partly, and partly in Mr. B. yet theſe are far from being All; they are but All which I can remember in the preſent haſte that I am in. But whoſoever ſhall examine my ſeveral Catalogues in other books, and compare them with what they find in this which now I am upon, will ſay that all this is truth, yet not the whole truth.

Sect. 3.

1. The eaſie and ordinary perverſion of the Scriptures. But Mr. W. proceedeth thus. [ But all thoſe Scriptures mentioned, it may appear what little reaſon Mr. P. had to make ſuch a clamour againſt thoſe our Proteſtant Divines, —as if they made God to be the Author of ſin, when he knows that they poſitively profeſſed, and ſome of them strongly proved the contrary, p. 24.] So he ſaith, and ſaith onely. But 1. I have proved in my Sect. 1. of this Chapter, that the abuſe of thoſe Scriptures is a great portion of the impiety. Suppoſe that ſome Lucian ſhould make a Cento out of the letter of the Scriptures, as Auſonius did out of Virgil; would the impiety of the thing be any whit the more excuſable, becauſe he could ſhew that his expreſſions were all from Scripture? or would it not rather be ſo much the worſe? 'Tis known that Proba Falconia compoſed a hiſtory of the Life of Chriſt, and a good part alſo of the Pentateuch of Moſes, from out of the works of Virgil a Heathen Poet. And out of the very ſame Virgil (however ſo chaſt in his expreſſions, that he hath won the Title of the Parthenian Poet) Auſonius very wittily, but yet moſtIngenioſum, ſed adeo foedum, ut neque Scriptore nec Auditore dignum ſir. Scaliger l. 6. p. 825 deteſtably, made up the filthieſt Feſcennine that hath been read. Again, the Empreſs Eudoxia writ the life of our Saviour in the words of Homer, (a blinder Heathen then Virgil was.) And were it not every whit as poſſible, to patch up the life of Achilles in a Rhapſodie collected from the holy Pen-men of our Gospel? If Mr. Wh. will know what may be done in this kind, let him conſult the Capilupi, both Laelius, and Julius, ſet out by Henry Meibomius; and Otho Gryphius of Ratisbon; or Lilius Greg. Gyraldus; or whom elſe he pleaſeth. Let me mind him alſo of this, that all the Hereſies in Chriſtendom have ſuck't out a nouriſhment to themſelves from the ſincere milk of the word, although immediately flowing from the breaſt of truth. So great a difference is to be found amongſt the ſeveral digeſtions of the very ſame meat.

Mr. W. miſtakes the Errors for the Perſons of ſome Proteſtants, and confounds them with the Papiſts.2. I did not clamour againſt Proteſtant Divines, but againſt the heatheniſh aſſeverations which had been publiſhed in the writings of Presbyterians and Papiſts, not only Dominicans, but Jeſuits alſo, for which IS • e Div. Phil • n. ch. 1. ſect. 5. p. 27, 28. produced the confeſſions of Doctor Twiſſe and Mr. Barlee. But being a Proteſtant my ſelf, I had by ſo much the greater reaſon to declare againſt the blaſphemies of any Proteſtant Divines, that I might not be acceſſary ſo much as by my ſilence; and that ſome Papiſts might ceaſe to ſay (what they commonly have done) that thoſe horrible Doctrines are indiſcriminately the Proteſtants, and that quà tales. Nor can I but think it well worth my labour, if I have made it more known then it was before, that whatever diſhonours have been done unto the Proteſtant Name, by thoſe of the Kirk, or the Conſiſtory, or their adherents here in England, yet the dutiful Sons of the Church of England have ever been free from any part of that guilt. Beſides, the chief exclaimers againſt the Presbyterians (for Proteſtant Divines is an equivocal expreſſion, and comprehends thoſe Proteſtans whom I aſſert, as well as thoſe whom I oppoſe) were the other ſort of Presbyterians, I mean the Arminians & Remonſtrants in the Low Countreys, who ſtill remained Preſbyterian in point of Diſcipline (for ought I can learn) although they left their own party for the enormities of their Doctrine. Farther yet; My clamours were no greater againſt the Dogmatical ſort of Calviniſts, then were their own clamours againſt each other; nor indeed ſo great, as I conceive I have evinced uponSee The Div. Purity defended, ch. 4. ſect. 6. p. 31, &c. another occaſion. And how Doctor Twiſſe in particular hath made his clamours againſt his Brethren, I haveSee the Div. Philan. Def. c 1. p. 12. & ch. 3. p. 123, 124, 125. acquainted Mr. Barlee when he wanted that knowledge.

3. His party clamour againſt themſelves, and affront God with an Epitrope.3. What Mr. W. plead for them, doth make their caſe ſo much the worſe: for if they ſay in ſome places, that God is much more then the Author of ſin (as the word Author may be expounded;) and again in other places, that he is preciſely the Author of it (both which I have ſhewed again and again;) and yet do ſay in a third ſort of places, that God is not the Author of ſin; they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſelf-condemners, and contradictors, and have juſtified me in all my ſayings, as well when I accuſe them of breathing hot and cold too, as when I accuſe them of breathing all Fire. Beſides, to ſay that God decreed ſin by an Abſolute Decree, that he wills and works it, that he is the cauſe of it, that he hath a hand and efficiency in it, tempts, excites, and compells men to it, but yet he is a good God, and therefore not the Author of it, what is this but to affront him with a diſhonourable Epitrope? If my memory doth not deceive me, it was in a ſpeech against Verres, where Cicero uſed ſuch kind of Rhetorick: Sit fur, ſit ſacrilegus, ſit flagitiorum omnium vitiorumque Princeps; at eſt bonas Imperator & felix. Cic. in Verr. Be it ſo that he is a Thief, a ſacrilegious perſon, the Patron in chief of all villanies and vices, yet however he is a good and a happy General, &c. I clearly find that Mr. W. and many others of that way, do not hitherto underſtand the full importance of the word Author, its derivation, or uſe in claſſick Authors. I ſhall therefore make that a peculiar buſineſs, when I ſhall come to demonſtrate, that I did uſe them with tenderneſs in ſaying no more of their Doctrines then plainly this, That they did make the God of purity to be the Author of ſin. What can I think of that man, who ſhall tell me that I lye, and yet affirm when he hath done, I am a very true speaker? I cannot but think him a very bitter Rhetorician, and that he mocks me by an Epitrope. Doctor Twiſſe apologizeth (as I lately ſaid) for the men of his way, by ſaying that their ſpeeches are but Rhetorical, when God is ſaid by any of them toSee the D • v. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26. compel men to ſin. And when that Doctor doth plainly ſay, [that there is on Gods part aTwiſſ. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 1. ſect. 2. Cr. 3. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156. prostitution to ſin required, which proſtitution cannot be perfected without temptations leading up to the act of ſinning,] 'tis likely he would alledge that he did yet deny God to be the Author of ſin. But then I ſhould think it a ſhrewd Epitrope, than which I cannot conceive a greater diſhonour to the Almighty.

4. Mr. W's. clamours againſt Proteſtant Divines.4 Mr. W. muſt call to mind, what clamours he and his party have commonly made againſt Protestant Divines, by calling them Enemies to the Grace of God, and Introducers of Atheiſm, without a tolerable colour of reaſon for it, nay quite against it; ſince they are enemies to Grace, who ſacrilegiouſly incloſe it, and ſeek to rob it of its extent; and they are rather the Introducers of Atheiſm, who repreſent God to be ſuch, as cannot modeſtly be owned: for when men have been taught ſuch Notions of God, which as ſoon as they believe, they cannot conceive him to be good, they think it modeſty to infer that there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . no God at all, and that the notions which they were taught were but the characters of a Chimaera.

5. And jumps in ſo doing with the Jeſuited Papiſts.5. What Mr. W. ſaith in his parentheſis [that ſome of his Authors were inſtruments in advancing the work of Reformation, p. 24.] it moſt concern'd him to have conceal'd: for in that he joynes hands with the moſt Jeſuited Papists, who did purpoſely infect ſome noted Proteſtants with their invention of irreſpective Decrees, that they might have ſome little colour for which to defame our Reformation; betraying ſome Proteſtants into the mire, upon a deſign to accuſe them of being dirty. But we know, as well as Ariſtotle (from whom we learnt it) that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may be faulty, and yet the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 without all blame. Again, we inſiſt upon Melanchthon, and the other brave perſons of the Auguſtan Synod; upon the Orthodox Biſhop Tunſtal, who helpt to begin our Reformation; upon the Confeſſors and Martyrs (ſuch as Cranmer, Cooper, Latimer, and the like) who carried it on here in England. As we think not the worſe of Christianity, for what is ſpoken by Zoſimus of Conſtantine the Great; ſo neither do we conceive our Reformation to be concerned in the perſonal Aberrations of Mr. Calvin, or Zuinglius, any more then in the vices of King Henry the eighth. If there were any ſound arguing from ſome particular Reformers, unto the general work of the Reformation, or from the ſame mans errors in one kind, to his being erroneous in all others, (then which ſort of arguing there is nothing more ſilly) Geneva and Helvetia muſt looke to that. But Luther in Saxony preceded both in that work; who though he fell into the errors of other men at the firſt, yet he exchanged them for the truth in his riper years, as well as Melanchthon and other Worthies.

Sect. 4.

1. His fouleſt Imputation caſt upon the Scriptures. Mr. W. ſaith further, [ that what expreſſions they uſed in this ſubject, were but the ſame in effect with Scripture-expreſſions, yea not altogether ſo high, p. 24. 1. This is ſo admirably falſe, that I wonder how he durſt ſay it. And becauſe it is the Word of God upon which he hath caſt this foul aſperſion, In the name of God I do require him, either to make good his words by a collation of the particulars, or to take away this ſtumbling-block in as publick a manner as here he ſets it in the peoples way. 2. If he ſhall make a Parodia of Holy Writ, which is a Rhapſody invers't, and ſo endevour to palliate this ghaſtly ſpeech, the fraud will be the more viſible, by having on it ſo thick a cloak. And 3. If he is really of opinion, that the ſenſe and mind of the Scriptures (though not the words) doth not onely go as high, but higher too, then the expreſſions of his party, and of himſelf, whileſt they ſay, [ that God doth make men tranſgreſſors, and that adultery is his work, that he tempts men unto ſin, nay compells them to it, that he wills and works it, nay that he preordained men to ſin as ſin, that not onely the Action it ſelf, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way to Gods glory, and a world the like ſtuff;] If he thinks that this was meant by the Apoſtle Saint Paul in his Epiſtles, God gave them up to uncleanneſs, Rom. 1.24. and God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſion, 2 Theſſ. 2.11. (which yet is infinitly different from thoſe expreſſions I juſt now mentioned) I think it a duty incumbent on me, to admoniſh the followers of Mr. W. that they take great heed to that important Advertiſement which is given them by Saint Peter; and that they accommodate it at leaſt to this occaſion. It being likely,2 Pet. 3.16. Saint Peters Caveat touching Pauls Epiſtles. That there are divers things in S. Paul's Epiſtles, which being hard to be underſtood, they that are unlearned and unſtable are apt to wreſt to their deſtruction. The matter we ſee is of no ſmall moment. A man may wreſt Gods word (not to ſome little inconvenience onely, but) to the greateſt miſchief to be imagined, the eternal deſtruction of Body and Soul. Scripture is eaſily miſtaken; miſtakes of Scripture are not eaſily rectified; and being not rectified, they do pervert the word of God, which is the River of Life, not onely into a dead, but a killing Letter. Thoſe two ſayings of Saint Paul were both cited by Mr. W. (p. 22.) in the behalf of his own and his Teachers Doctrines. The ugly Nature of thoſe Doctrines I have many times ſhewed: what he now ſaith of them, and of the Scriptures compared with them, the Reader hath ſeen in the beginning of this Section. And whether or no he is a wreſter, good people judge.

I know 'tis ſaid by Mr. W. (p. 19.) that in the places above mentioned the Scripture doth plainly, and clearly, and poſitively aſſert what God doth; and ſo by conſequence he may ask, what can be eaſier then a ſhort ſentence wherein there is never a hard word? Every man who hath been cheated may know the meaning of deluſion, and every child who can but go on an errand can tell us what it i • to ſend. Saint Peter ſpeaks of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , difficult things to be underſtood in the Epiſtles of Saint Paul. But what need we have a Key when the Door is open?

2. The literal plainneſs of ſome Scriptures doth make them difficult to ſome. 2. But here the unlearned and the unſtable muſt be informed, that in the plainneſs of ſome Texts the greateſt difficulty conſiſts. And dangers are greateſt, when leaſt ſuſpected: which no doubt is the reaſon why many ſtumble in plain ground, becauſe they there take no heed unto their footing. Nothing ſeems to be plainer then thoſe words of our Saviour, My Father is greater then I: And, This is my Body, This is my Blood; My Fleſh is meat indeed, and my Blood is drink indeed. Yet from the plainneſs of the former, how many have ſtumbled into Arianiſm? and from the plainneſs of the later, how many have fallen into the error of Tranſubſtantiation? And from the literal plainneſs of ſuch words, God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſion that they ſhould believe a lye, how many have ſtumbled and fallen head-long into that worſt of errors, that God hath an hand and efficiency in ſin? Even by thoſe and the like expreſſions, Mr. W. hath made us ſee (ſuch hath been his own blindneſs) that ſuch plain Scriptures are hard, becauſe they are plain: hard as to the ſenſe becauſe ſo plain, as to the Letter. But we know that Satan is the ſpirit of Deluluſion; that the Magicians there alluded to were the Emiſſaries of Satan, and not of God; that God is the ſpirit both of holineſs and Truth; that ſin and Satan are none of Gods Meſſengers; that Simon Magus (that man of ſin, v. 3, 9.) was Satans Apoſtle, and ſent by Satan, but not by God, who did onely not hinder him from being ſent; that Saint Paul's own words are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (not ſtrong deluſion, but) the working of errour, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to the believing of a lye, which ſignifies nothing but the event; it is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that they may believe a lye, which might ſeem to the illiterate to note the end of an intention. But ſuppoſe it had been [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That,] yet Mr. W. muſt have lookt into the whole importance of the word; and I do earneſtly beſeech him (ſince he takes upon him to be a Shepherd, nay aNote that He and Mr. B. did joyn in that prank of a mock-ordination of Miniſters. ſender out of Shepherds into Chriſt his Fold) that he will vouchſafe to know the difference betwixt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the conjunction [That] as it is cauſal (and ſo in moſt places) or meerly conſequential, (and ſo in many:) this one diſtinction will preſerve him from falling in many plain paths of Scripture (plain I mean as to the Letter) and in the path where he is fallen (2 Theſ. 2.11.) it will contribute to help him up: whereas for want either of knowing, or at leaſt of heeding this little thing, hee hath frequently fallen, and very foully.

3. A ſhort direction to the means of remedy or prevention. 3. I will finally reinforce my Admonition upon the vulgar, that they take great heed in their peruſal of many Scriptures; not that any Scriptures can be unſound or dangerous in themſelves, but becauſe they are capable of being wreſted. Some are unlearned, and ſome. unſtable, and the rather unſtable, becauſe unlearned. Theſe muſt not be intruſted (by us or by themſelves) with the leſs fordable paſſages of the waters of Life. I could give my inſtances in many Scriptures, but Saint Peter gives his in the Epiſtles of Saint Paul, that Learned Preacher of the Gentiles, whom none but ſuch as are learned ſhould dare to read without a Clavis. The Tremendous miſtakes of the Texts above mentioned (Rom. 1.24, 26. 2 Theſ. 2.11.) and of the greateſt part of the ninth Chapter to the Romans, (to name no more) may ſerve for a warning to the ignorant and ſeduced people of the Nation, not to preſume on ſuch places without an Interpreter at their Elbow; I mean a qualified, authentick, uncontroulable Interpreter, and ſuch as may eaſily be had, and be as eaſily uſed by Engliſh Readers, that is in a word, Doctor Hammond's Annotations upon the whole New Teſtament.

Sect. 5.

1. Mr. W. either means that God hath a hand in evil, becauſe in the contrary. Mr. W. incurs another danger, which he alſo calls an other Argument. Some will laugh (I am ſure) but others (I hope) will rather weep at it. His words are theſe, That God hath ſome hand in the Acts of ſinful men, appears, becauſe the ſubſtratum or ſubject of ſin, namely, the natural motion or action whereunto the ſin cleaveth, is that whereof he is the proper cauſe and efficient: therefore he muſt needs have ſome efficiency in it, p. 24.] If by the Subſtratum he means the man who is the ſubject of ſin, Look forward on c. 3. ſect. 14. God indeed is the cauſe of man, but man is not a motion, much leſs a ſin. If by Motion, Act, and Action, he means that which is natural, as the act of walking, eating, digeſting, ſpeaking, thinking, and the like; God again is the cauſe of theſe, but not of any thing that is ſinful; it being no more ſinful to walk, eat, ſpeak, or think, then to be as God made us, not onely moveables, but men. So that if Mr. W. doth mean no more, he ſpeaks not a ſyllable to the purpoſe, but plainly deſerts his undertaking. And to prove that God hath a hand in evil, becauſe he hath a hand in that which is good, is to ſay a thing is, becauſe it is not; or that it is thus, becauſe it is quite otherwiſe. By ſuch Logick as this, he may ſay, that the Devil hath a hand and efficiency in good, (giving this for his reaſon) becauſe he is the efficient and proper cauſe of evill. And indeed it is much leſs impious, to aſcribe ſomething of Nature to that perverter of nature, then the leaſt perverſion of nature to the God of all grace.

2. Or that the Act of ſin is not the ſin;But 2. It appears by the ſcope and tenour of his Book, that when he ſaith, God hath a hand in the Acts of ſinful men, he certainly means, the ſinful Acts, which ſinful Acts are the Acts of ſin, or (to ſpeak it in other words) the ſins themſelves; for that theſe are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , three expreſſions of the ſame thing, will be made undeniable by this example. The act of ſinful David was the Act of lying with Bathſhebah. The Act of lying with Bathſhebah was the ſinful Act, to wit, the Act of Adultery, and ſo the ſin. For whether we ſay, that his lying with Bathſhebah was his Adultery, or his Act of Adultery, we ſay the ſame thing, and we find them promiſcuous in all men diſcourſes of the thing. Now that his Adultery, or his Act of lying with Bathſhebah, was the ſin it ſelf which he committed, (not the Subſtratum, or Subject of his ſin, diſtinguiſhable from it tanquam accidens à ſubjecto, aut res à re,) I am confident Mr. W. will not dare to deny: It being granted by men of all ſides, that to pollute another mans Wife is Adultery it ſelf, and that Adultery is the ſin it ſelf which is called by that name, and by that diſtinguiſhed from other ſins.

3. Or that God is the proper cauſe and efficient of ſin; and this proved by a Dilemma.3. From whence it followes unavoidably, that Mr. W. affirms God to be the proper cauſe and efficient of ſin it ſelf. Nor can he eſcape it, let him go which way he will, to the negative, or the affirmative of what I ſaid juſt now. For let him anſwer to my Dilemma. Was David's lying with Bathſhebah (by which ſhe was impregned) the meer ſubſtratum or ſubject of his ſin of adultery, or the very ſin of adultery it ſelf? If Mr. W. ſhall ſay the firſt, then it is cleerly his Doctrine, that God was the proper cauſe and efficient of David's lying with Bathſhebah. (for 'tis his poſitive aſſertion, that of the motion or action to which the ſin cleaves, God is the proper cauſe or efficient.) And if Mr. W. ſhall ſay the ſecond, then he muſt run into the very ſame miſchief, or yield me up the whole cauſe, and bid particular defiance to Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. which will ſoon appear by this other Dilemma. Was Davids lying with Bathſhebah (which is granted to be the very ſin of Adultery in the ſecond member of the firſt Dilemma) an Act, or an Action, or a Motion, or a poſitive thing? or was it none of theſe four? If he ſhall ſay, it was an act, an action, or a motion, then again he calls God the proper cauſe or efficient of the ſin it ſelf, Davids lying with Bathſhebah: (for if the Reader will look back, he ſhall find all three in the ſubject of this Section) and withal it implies a groſſe contradiction, to ſay that that is the ſin it ſelf, which was ſaid before to be the ſubject onely of ſin to which the ſin cleaves. If he ſhall ſay, that Davids lying with Bathſhebah was a poſitive thing (which he cannot but ſay, if he ſhall ſay it is the other three) then either he muſt acknowledge that Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. are blasphemers in grain, for having ſaid expreſly, that Mr. Hick's words in a letter to Mr. B. printed by Mr. B. ch. 3. p. 112. whatever poſitive thing is not from God is God, or elſe he muſt ſay it was the creature of God, or elſe he muſt ſay it was God himſelf. For ſo it follows in the two brethren,Ibid Look forward on, ch. 3. Sect. 18. there is no medium betwixt Deus & Creatura: making no diſtinction betwixt Gods creatures and the Devils, but concluding that Davids lying with Bathſhebah, if a poſitive entity, was as much Gods creature as David himſelf was. But if to avoid theſe rocks, Mr. W. ſhall throw himſelf on the later horn of the Dilemma, and ſay that Davids lying with Bathſhebah was no act, action, motion, or poſitive thing; that will toſſe him out of all reaſon; not onely ſet him at enmity with the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the common maximes of all mankind, and even the judgment of common ſenſe, but alſo infer that ſin is nothing, and ſo that ſinners are either not damned at all, or damned for nothing, or damned for ſomething beſides their ſins.

4. Humane learning a good foundation for a Divine.4. I will not here exagitate his wants of knowledge in Phyſiologie, (which would adminiſter occaſion of much diſcourſe) becauſe his errors in Divinity are too apt of themſelves to make me tedious. I will onely obſerve, how needful 'tis for a Divine to lay his foundations of knowledge in humane learning, or at leaſt to preach onely by way of exhortation to depart from evil, and to do the thing that is good, but not to meddle in matters beyond their ken. The ſad effects of ſuch meddling I have ſhew'd already, and am now to ſhew further in the enſuing Paragraph. For what I ſpake as a Phyſician to ſhew Mr. B. the immediate cauſe of his diſeaſe, Mr. W. either could not, or would not comprehend, and doth his utmost to nouriſh the peccant Humours. Mark him well as he goes on.

Sect. 6.

Mr. W's rare eſſayes to ſeparate the wickedneſſe from the Act of the wicked Act. [Object. Against this Mr. P. objects, that it is as impoſſible to ſeparate the wickedneſs of the Act from the Act which is wicked, as to ſeparate roundneſs from the globe, and to ſeparate ſinfulneſs from the ſin as from the ſinful act, p. 24.] 1. This is now the ſecond morſel of my Philanthropy, which he hath ventured to faſten his Teeth upon: that the Reader may ſee, how much oftner I have occaſion to confute Mr. W's inventions, then to defend mine own Doctrine delivered in that Book, which his boaſting Title-page pretends to combat. 2. He had not • he courage to cite my words right, or to acknowledge in the Errata that his citation was wrong: For 1. he cites them all from ch. 4. p. 48. where I had ſaid nothing like it: nor hath it coſt me a little trouble to find the pages of my book where ſuch words are to be found; which truly is matter of juſt complaint: and now at laſt I have found them in two diſtinct pages at great diſtance, whereas he hath cited them as from the ſame, and as ſpoken in the ſame period, p. 48. but the former part is p. 42. and the later p. 43. and each in the midſt of the ſeveral pages. 2. He hath left out the word [wicked] which he found in my ſentence before the firſt mention of the word [Act;] which is the leſſe excuſable, becauſe he cites ſo few things from me. 3. He takes not any notice of what Lurg'd for the proof of thoſe few words, but barely ſets down the words themſelves: which being a great Tergiverſation in a pretender to confute me, deſerves no other reply then to be ſent for ſatisfaction to my three whole See the Div. Philan. defended, ch. 4. p. 42, 43, 44. pages upon that ſubject. Yet that he may not be able to ſay I ſlight him, I will ſhew him his unhappineſſe in every part of his Anſwer, though not ſo much of his unhappineſſe, as I could eaſily diſcover if I would loſe ſo much time.

Sect. 7.

His firſt eſſay is a bare dictate including a manifold abſurdity, no leſs then 8. His 1. Anſwer is this [ God is little beholding to him for ſo denying him to be the Author of the evil that cleaves to the actions of nature, as withal to deny him to be the Author of nature; for maintaining his purity, by denying his omnipotency, p. 24, 25.] Firſt, 'Tis an ugly expreſſion, to ſay that God is little beholding to me for any thing, as if for ſomething he might be poſſibly beholding: when I have done my beſt for the honour of God, I have done but my duty; which being my duty but in part, and infinitely far from what I ow him, I muſt ſay (when all is done) I am an Luk. 17.10. unprofitable ſervant. 2. But yielding Mr. W. his naughty terms, how much leſſe can it be ſaid that God is beholding to Mr. W. who would ſo maintain him to be the Author of nature, as to make him alſo the Author of things against Nature? How much rather is Satan beholding to him, for ſo aſſerting Gods omnipotence, as to aſperſe his purity, and ſo by conſequence to plead for Satan? 3. It goes ill enough with Mr. W. that what he ſaith, he ſaith only, without an offer of any proof; to which it were ſufficient to ſay the contrary with the ſame confidence, and to charge or challenge him to provide his proof againſt hereafter: yet even thus he is worſted, by the meer oppoſition of dictate to dictate; becauſe 'tis leſs wicked to aſcribe ſome work of God unto the Devil, then to aſcribe the proper work of the Devil unto God. Of actions natural and unnatural. Nature corrupted and uncorrupted. 4. But I will more then dictate: though he doth not; for I will mind him that the word Nature, which of it ſelf is good when God is called the God of Nature, is often ſet in oppoſition to Grace, and is us'd to ſignifie the corruption of Nature, at leaſt by way of connotation: which Mr. W. not conſidering, (as ſomething or other is ſtill the cauſe of aberrations from the truth) confounds the Actions of Nature with unnatural actions. To ſpeak, indeed, is the work of Nature, but ſure it is not a ſin to ſpeak: To pray ſincerely is the work of Grace, and ſure it is not a ſin to pray ſincerely: But to blaſpheme againſt God, is neither a work or an action of Grace or Nature; yet is it a work or action as really as the former; that is, a work of the Devil, ungracious, and unnatural, against the God of Grace and Nature. Now the difference is wide betwixt ſpeaking in general, and ſpeaking in particular to the glory of God, and particular ſpeaking againſt Gods glory. For the laſt of theſe, I demand of Mr. W. is that action of blaſpheming or ſpeaking againſt God, an action of Nature, or is it not? If he ſaith Yes, he doth bewray it to be his doctrine, that God is the Author of blaſpheming againſt God; which blaſ • heming, as 'tis an action, ſo 'tis a ſin too: If he ſaith No, then he confeſſeth there are actions which are not of Nature, unleſſe he will ſay that to blaſpheme is no action: if the former, he pulls down with both hands what he erected onely with one; if the later, then according to his reaſoning, either to ſpeak is not an action, or to blaſpheme is not to ſpeak: and ſo the farther he proceeds, the wo • ſe it fares with him. 4. Where now was the ground of Mr. W's ſaying that I deny Gods omnipotence? Even my dutiful denial that God is the Author of ſuch actions, as blaspheming, curſing, fighting againſt God, David's lying with Bathſhebah, Cain's killing Abel, and the like. He may by the ſame Logick accuſe the Apoſtle of denying God's omnipotence, and that in contradiction to the word of God: for our Saviour ſaith, with God nothing ſhall be impoſſible, Luke 1.37. but the Apoſtle ſaith, It is impoſſible for God to lie, Heb. 6.18. The reconcilement ſtands in this, that our Saviour ſpake of good things onely: for of evils it is true, that 'tis impoſſible for God to be either Principal or acceſſory. Now becauſe I maintain, that God cannot will, or work ſin in his creatures, Mr. W. proclaims that I deny Gods omnipotence. And this is juſt the very calumny of AtheiſticalOrig. contra Celſ. l. 4. Celſus againſt Origen. But I haveSee Correct Copy, p. 22, 23. elſewhere ſhewed, that if God were-able to be the Author of ſuch actions, he were able not to be God, which were onely a power of being impotent. There are many things of which the Scripture ſaith, God cannot do them. As he cannot deny himſelf, 2 Tim. 2.13. He cannot lie, Tit. 1.2. What God hath promiſed abſolutely he cannot but perform, Heb. 6.18. Ge. 18. • 5. Gen. 19.22. Heb. 6.10. And therefore I am the aſſerter of Gods omnipotence, becauſe of his purity, and Mr. W. is the man who diſputes againſt both. 6. He again is the man that denies Gods omnipotence, who denies him to be able to decree the end in conſideration of the means; or to make a rational creature with ſuch a liberty of will, as to be able to determine his will ad hoc, to this or that forbidden object, without an efficiency from his creator. 7. What kind of Theiſt may he be thought, who doth not think that the creating and governing of a world, and the being the Author of all good things, are proofs enough of an omnipotence, unleſſe the filthieſt actions to be imagined may be admitted for Jewels in that rich Diadem?

Sect. 8.

1. His ſecond eſſay is an impertinence beyond Example: His ſecond Anſwer runs thus: [ Doth not the Scripture tell us expreſly, that in him we live, move, and have our being? Act. 17.25. As he is the Author of our being, ſo alſo of thoſe Natural motions that ariſe from our being, p. 25.] Thus the ſame Fallacy continues his error which made him erre. And here I might repeat my former Section, if that were as ſeemly, as otherwiſe fit: but referring my Reader thither, I here will adde 1. My amazement at the impertinence: for I had ſaid, It is impoſſible to ſeparate the wickedneſs of the wicked act (to wit, of Blaſphemy, Adultery, or the like) from the act which is wicked. And Mr. W. (inſtead of inſtancing in any one wicked act, and ſhewing how the wickedneſs may be ſeparated from the act of wickedneſs, or (which is all one) the wicked act) doth onely tell us of things which are no wicked acts, viz. our living, moving, and being in God, &c.

2. Or what is ſo much worſe, as that it ought not to be nam'd.2. If he pretends that he is not impertinent, he is infinitely worſe, as the ſhalloweſt Reader can infer: for if the Apoſtle there ſpake of wicked acts (which to think is moſt unpardonable) let him perform his enterpriſe, by ſhewing which is the wickedneſs, and which the act, and by ſhewing the ſeparation, which he denies to be impoſſible.

3. He is enforced to be pertinent, and his Anſwer challenged.3. But let us inforce him to be pertinent, and challenge his Anſwer to this Queſtion, Doth the Scripture any where ſay explicitely, or implicitely, that in God we blaſpheme, and murder, and commit adultery? ſuch as theſe are confeſſedly the wicked acts to which I alluded in my objection. Again, I ask Mr. W. Can the wickedneſs of an actual blaſpheming be poſſibly ſeparated from the act of blaſpheming? Can the wickedneſs of Davids congreſs with Bathſhebah be poſſibly ſeparated from the act of his congreſs with Bathſhebah? Since his Anſwer of neceſſity muſt be Yes, or No, I am bound in duty both to God and my neighbours, to exact thus much of Mr. W. That he will either ſhew how this may be done, or confeſs in print that he hath undertaken impoſſibilities, and that his firſt abſurdity being ſwallowed, this is one of the thouſand which follow after. Had he been able to ſhew it, or had he but thought he had been able, he would ſure have tried, and offer'd at it at leaſt; he would have taken ſome one wicked act for his inſtance, diſplaid his tooles, and begun his diſſection, and made us perceive this ſeparability, if not the ſeparateneſs it ſelf, at leaſt with the eyes of our Metaphyſical underſtandings. But becauſe he hath meerly propos'd an objection, and forſaken it, ſpeaking as far from his Theme as he could deviſe, I muſt needs believe, he underſtood his own weakneſs, and felt the ſtrength of the objection; yet I am checkt in my belief, by finding his anſwers grow worſe and worſe, as I think will appear by what now follows.

Sect. 9.

His third Eſſay is a continuance of his Tergiverſation, and inferreth God the efficient of ſin. His third Anſwer is this [ Was not Natures work the ſame in Adam when he ate the forbidden fruit, as when he did his neceſſary food? and in David, when he lay with Bathſhebah, as when he lay with his lawful wife?— It is a true Rule, Deus agit in peccato, non tanquam cauſa moralis, ſed tanquam cauſa naturalis, p.25.] Now he makes us a diſcovery of his mind.

1. He had ſaid a little before (Anſw. 1.) that God is the Author of the actions of nature: look forward on Sect. 12, 13. and a little before that, that of natural motions and actions to which ſin cleaves, God is the efficient and proper cauſe (p. 24.) now he addes, that natures work is the ſame in the moſt unlawful and lawful actions; and exemplifies his meaning, not onely after, but before the Fall alſo. From whence his Tenent muſt be concluded unavoidably this, That God was the efficient and proper cauſe of Adam's eating the forbidden fruit, as well as of his eating his neceſſary food; and as much the efficient and proper cauſe of David's lying with Bathſhebah, as of his lying with lawful wife. He ſhall be greater then great Apollo, if he can ſhew the leaſt flaw in this deduction. Now to ſeparate the act of Adam's eating forbidden fruit, from the wickedneſs of the act, which conſiſted in eating forbidden fruit, Mr. W. doth not ſo much as trie. And if he cannot do it hereafter neither, (as I am ſure he cannot, becauſe it cannot be done) then it is cleerly his opinion, (at leaſt his Doctrine,) that God is the efficient and proper cauſe of all ſin.

2. Nature depraved and undepraved are oppoſite things.2. It was the work of undepraved nature, for Adam to eat his neceſſary food, before he eat the unneceſſary forbidden food. But to eat the forbidden was the ruine of nature, and not the work: I mean that nature wherewith God made him (not ſimply a man, but) an innocent man. And by Adam's eating that prohibitum, Mr. W. muſt not think to ſay, he meant the motion of Adam's jawes onely, without his conſent to the temptation, or his determination of his will to a forbidden object; for the eating the forbidden fruit was plainly the predicate in Mr. W's propoſition, as Adam was the ſubject of it: not, eating, without forbidden fruit, nor eating fruit, without forbidden. And if twenty words are in the predicate (as poſſibly they may) they all can make but one term, and are equally coupled to the ſubject, by a never-failing verb ſubſtantive, either expreſſed, or implied.

3. Adam ſion'd before he eat in the determination of his will to eat.3. Beſides, Adam ſinned before he eat, in the determination of his will to eat: and if that was alſo the work of Nature, as well as his volition to eat of any lawful fruit, (as Mr. W. muſt ſay, or eat up what he hath ſaid) then according to Mr. W. God was the efficient and proper cauſe of that ſin alſo, which lies in puncto indiviſibili, perhaps more intelligibly then others may.

4. Mr. W. vindicated from his abuſes put upon himſelf.4. Becauſe Mr. W. hath been abuſed by himſelf, in the miſapprehenſion of his own Rule, I think it my duty to diſabuſe him. And I ſhall do it by ſaying no more then this: 1. That as God doth give, and continue the being of his creature, with the natural endowments of ſuch a being, (ſuch as Life, Loco-motive, Reaſon, and Will, in his creature called Man) he doth not work as a moral, but as a natural cauſe. 2. But as he moves his creature by his grace to chuſe a right uſe of all his Faculties, in applying his actions to their proper objects, he onely works as a moral cauſe. 3. And as he ſuffers or permits his creature to determine his will to forbidden objects, and in purſuance of that choice, to apply his faculties to execute what the will hath decreed, (be it to kill, to blaſpheme, to hate God, or the like) in this third caſe, he neither worketh as a natural, or moral cauſe, but ſuffers his creature to pervert and abuſe his Faculties of Nature into a contrary thing to that which God made them. As for example, Adam's Faculty to will was the work of God, and (under God) of Nature, a very excellent and noble Faculty: But Adam's applying that faculty to the forbidden fruit (which was his choice, or act of willing that numerical thing) was neither the work of God, nor of Nature, (Gods handmaid) but the work of Adam againſt God, and againſt that Nature which God had given him; and which Adam, with Satans help, did deprave, or pervert into another thing. Yet am I willing that Mr. W. ſhould ſay that there was in it the work of Nature, if he will ſay that he means that work of that Nature, which could not be poſſibly the work of God, but of Adam onely in one reſpect, and of the Devil in another.

5. Five expedients propoſed to undeceive M. W. by pointing at the cauſes of his miſtakes.5. The not diſtinguiſhing rightly betwixt Nature and Nature, Gods Handmaid and his Rebel, Nature created by the good will of God, and Nature corrupted by the wicked will of the creature, doth ſeem to me a prime cauſe of Mr. W's errors in this affair. Another cauſe doth ſeem to be his want of a ſteady conſideration, that Adam's ſin did begin in the firſt averſion of his will (which was his rational appetite) from God and his Precept, unto the creature which was forbidden. His determining of his will (per actum imperatum) to the forbidden object, was the ſame ſin in its growth. His actual eating in obedience to that Empire of his will, was the ſame ſin in its perfection. In each of which three acts God had no hand at all: which becauſe Mr. W. did not diſcern, the third cauſe of his errors doth ſeem to be, his not continuing to meditate, or to remember, that the Being of ſin is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the habitude andThis confeſſed by Dr. Twiſſe himſelf, in Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 2. Crim. 3. Sect. 1. p. 155. Col. 2. relation and indiſſoluble connexion of a voluntary act to a forbidden object: after a fancied ſeparation of which two, we cannot ſo much as fancy the ſin to be. For conſider Adam's eating as unapplied to forbidden fruit, and ſo it cannot be conceived to be a ſin, any more then the eating of a natural Agent, it being as natural to eat, as to grow by eating. Which makes me gueſſe a fourth cauſe of Mr. W's error to be this, that either he did not exactly know, or not inceſſantly bear in mind, that the ſame man (as to ſeveral actions) is both a natural and a voluntary agent. We eat and drink as we are animals; but we faſt and pray, and do our duties, or eat and drink againſt Precept, as we are men: the former as we are ſpiritual, and the later as carnal men. But Mr. W. in his inſtances of Adam and David, did confound the brutiſh with the rational property of the men. The fifth cauſe of his miſcarriage doth ſeem to be, his not animadverting that ſin is a concrete, in reſpect of ſinfulneſs, and notes the ſame thing in one word, which ſinful act doth note in two; which I will make him apprehend (do what he can to the contrary, beſide; not reading what I am writing) by ſhewing that a ſin, and a ſinful Note that what is ſaid of a ſinfull Act, is as true if applyed to action or motion, which are alſo Mr. W's Termes. act, have the ſame enunciation in all propoſitions to be imagined. Ex Gr. It is as true a praedication (and in ſenſe the ſame) to ſay that David's lying with Bathſhebah was his ſin, as to ſay it was his ſinful act. Again, as true a praedication, (and in ſenſe the ſame) to ſay it was his adultery, as to ſay his adultery was his ſin. Mr. VV. ſhall find upon every turn of the tongue, that theſe terms are convertible, and that in Recto: and finding that, he will confeſs, that either he muſt ſeparate the ſame thing from it ſelf, or acknowledge his making God to be efficient of ſin. Thus far am I brought beyond what I was bound to, or at firſt intended, by the meer ſtrength of my deſire to convert my Aggreſſor, whil'ſt I confute him.

And having done thus, I ſhall onely put him in mind of his concurrence with Mr. B. as well as of his diſcord with Doctor Twiſſe. 1. He concurres with that of Mr. B. [That Gods concurrence and excitation to the Act of adultery, and to the husbands lying with his lawful wife, is the ſame, ch. 3. p. 12.] 2. He is at diſcord with Doctor Twiſſe, who ſaith thatSee Correct • Copy, p. 10. God doth ſo adminiſter the occaſions of ſin, and doth ſo urge them, that they ſmite the ſinners mind, &c. which is to act in ſin as a moral cauſe, whereas Mr. W. affirms his acting to be as a natural cauſe only. I will not exagitate the noyſome inſtance by which he clears his meaning to us, nor will I ſhew how he hath gratified his carnal Readers. I rather haſten to his enſuing words.

Sect. 10.

His fourth eſſay infers the wickedeſt Actions to be good, and from God. His fourth Anſwer is, [ That every new action and motion is a new Entity; now all entities and beings are from the firſt Being, and ſo far forth they are good, p. 25.] Apply his generals to particulars, and he is ever undone. The firſt Rebellion againſt God that ever was, was a new action or motion, and ſo a new entity; and therefore (ſaith Mr. W.) was from the firſt Being, and ſo far forth was good. Thus every new filthineſs or elaborate ſenſuality which Petronius invented for Tiberius, hath Mr. W's commendation for the goodneſs of its being, and the Divinity of its extraction. It was deſcended (ſaith Mr. W.) from the firſt Being, which is God. 2. His ſentence out ofIpſum quantulumcun que eſſe bonum eſt, quia ſummum eſſe eſt ſummum bonum. De verâ. Relig. c. 4. Auſtin is either quite beſide the purpoſe (He ſpeaking onely of Gods Creatures, and not of Satans) or taken on purpoſe by the left handle, that Auſtin (as well as Scripture) may be pretended as a Factioner againſt Himſelf: For the ſin againſt the Holy Ghost is a Being, as being really ſomething, becauſe the cauſe of damnation without hope of reprieve. But Saint Auſtin could not argue the leaſt goodneſs in that ſin, from the greateſt goodneſs of that God againſt whom it is committed. 3. But it is added by Mr. W. [That if any natural act (quà actus) proceedeth not from the God of Nature, there must be a Creature without a Creator, Ibid.] But 1. Blaſphemy, or the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt, is not a natural act, but an act contra-natural, and yet it is a real act. 2. When God is called the God of Nature, it is to be meant of good Nature. 3. Blaſphemy is an act of malicious Nature, againſt the Nature of God, and againſt the God of good Nature; but blasphemy as blaſphemy (or that act as that act) proceedeth not from God: and yet it is not a Creature without a Creator; for men and Devils are the Creators of all ſorts of blasphemy; which Mr. W. and theMr. Hickm. and Mr. B. ſpoken of before, & hereafter, c. 3 ſect. 18. two brethren will have to be created by God himſelf, or to be an Independent Creature. This is therefore a ſixth cauſe of his and their aberrations, that they do not diſtinguiſh (with the Scriptures) betwixt the Joh. 3.8. works of the Devil and the Pſal. 103.22. works of God.

Sect. 11.

His fifth Anſwer is the moſt to his diſadvantage, unleſs the confeſſion of his guilt may lead the way to his repentance: 1. His fifth eſſay doth inſnare him with an implicit confeſſion that he maketh God the Author of ſin. for believe me, Reader (though to believe it is very difficult) theſe words which follow are all his own. [ Doth not Mr. P. by this Doctrine make God the Author of ſin? for if God be the Author of all natural Actions, (as hath been proved,) and it be impoſſible (as he teacheth) to ſeparate the ſin from the action, then he that is the Author of the Action, muſt needs be the Author of the ſin alſo which is unſeparable from it, p. 25.] Thus he thinks he hath laid a Net for Mr. P. whileſt Himſelf is caught in it,Look forwards on ch. 3. ſect. 12. Num. 4. & ſect. 18. and cannot poſſibly get out. For 1. He confeſſeth moſt explicitly (though not in any humble Form) that if it is proved to be impoſsible to ſeparate the ſin from the ſinful action (which I have often proved to be impoſſible) he cannot chuſe but take God to be the Author of ſin. Here then again he muſt be ſummoned, to ſhew us how David's ſin, to wit, his Adultery, can be ſeparated from his ſinful action, to wit, his lying with Bathſhebah: which until he ſhall perform, I muſt declare him (out of his Book, which is as much as from his own mouth) to be an Aſſertor of that Blaſphemy, which yet he doth many times diſown, though not ſo often as he owns it. 2. He is fain to miſcal things to countenance his miſtakes, or elſe he knows not a moral action. 2. To make a ſhew of having inſnared me, he is fain to call thoſe things by the name of natural actions, which he knew at that inſtant I have ever call'd ſins, or ſinful actions, or acts of ſin, unnatural actions, or acts againſt nature. But what he could not diſcern in the ſins or ſinful actions of Adam and David, I will compel him to ſee clearly by theſe following Queries, to which I ſhall earneſtly expect his Anſwer.Mr. W. hampered in ſ • me Dil • mm's. Is a mans lying with a beaſt a ſin, or not? If not a ſin, how then was it Exod. 22.19. forbidden upon pain of death? If a ſin, is it an Action, or not an Action? If not an action, what is an action? and how defined? But if it is an action, is it a natural action, or an action unnatural and againſt Nature? If a natural action, why ſaith Mr. W. that God is the efficient and proper cauſe, and now the Author of all natural actions? and ſo by conſequence of a mans lying with a beaſt? If, to avoid that blasphemy, he ſaith it is not a natural, but an unnatural action; why then did he ſay (Anſ. 3.) that Natures work was the ſame, as well in wicked as lawful actions? If he flies from that too, (now he is ſcared with the danger) then let him ſay he is converted, and abjure his own Book, and joyn with me againſt Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. who ſay that ſin is God, if a poſitive thing. To make ſure work, I will appeal to Saint Paul, whether it hath not of old been found very poſſible, to Rom. 1.26. change the natural uſe into that which is against Nature, yet that change includes Action, but contra-natural. So again to worſhip Jer. 2.27. ſtones, and to ſerve the Rom. 1.25. Creature more then the Creator, Witchcraft and Incest, are all againſt Nature: But ſome of the Gentiles did by Rom. 2.14. Nature the things contained in the Law; whileſt other mens actions were unnatural, becauſe as2 Pet. 2.12. natural brute Beaſts, and not as men, they ſpake evil of things they underſtood not.

3. The method by which he is led into all his blaſphemies.3. It is moſt apparent at every turn, that the main thing to be diſcuſſed, is, whether the ſin can be ſequeſtred from the ſinful Action. If it can, I muſt acknowledge my error, and make amends if I am able. But if it cannot, then Mr. W. and his party muſt do the like. My Method is, firſt to lay it as my Principle, That God cannot be poſſibly the Author of ſin; and thence to infer, that he cannot be the Author of a mans lying with a Beast, which is a real act, and yet a ſin: and my reaſon is, becauſe I cannot conceive, much leſs deſcribe, how that ſin (called Beſtiality) which conſiſteth in lying with a Beaſt, can be ſeparated from that in which it perfectly conſiſteth. But Mr. W's. Method is, firſt to lay it as his Principle, that God is the Author of every real act, and ſo by conſequence of a mans lying with a Beaſt; which becauſe he knows to be a ſin, of which he would not ſay plainly that God is the Author, he is fain to infer (as far as naked words come to) that the ſin (which is the Devils part) may be ſeparated from the ſinful act, which act is Gods part, ſaith Mr. W. This (I ſay) he often dictates, but gives no reaſon, nor offers to try how it can be: nay clearly, though implicitly, doth make it appear that it cannot be, whileſt he pretends to ſhew it can be. For obſerve hi • next words, & hold from ſmiling if you are able.

Sect. 12.

1. The ſin is inſeparable from the ſinful action; which Mr. W. ſeems to ſee by his Tergiverſation. Compare this with c. 3. ſect. 18. [ But I ſuppoſe he is not ſo dull-ſighted, but if he pleaſed he could eaſily diſcern a difference between the action and the evil quality of it, p. 25.] This is his new Tergiverſation, which is intended by its Author to do the office of a proof. In ſtead of trying to make me ſee what I affirm to be inviſible, he contents himſelf to ſay, that I can ſee it if I pleaſe. By the ſame Logick I may prove, that he can ſtand in London, and hear the graſs growing in this part of the Country; the medium to prove it being this, [Sure he is not ſo heavy-eared, but that he could hear it, if he pleaſed.] To diſcern anyNote, Reader, that I uſe the word Difference as an act of my bounty to Mr. W. againſt whom it lies upon me to prove no more then that there is no ſeparability of Davids ſia called Adultery, from his lying with Bathſhebah, which was his Action as well as Sin. difference betwixt David's lying with Bathſhebah and his Adultery, or betwixt his Adultery and his Sin, is at leaſt as impoſſible as to hear the graſs growing at 60 miles diſtance. If Mr. W. can ſee a difference, where dull-ſighted mortals can ſee nothing but Identity, he muſt lend them his eyes and his perſpective, that they may ſee it as well as he; or ſupply them with Faith, by which at leaſt they may believe that he can ſee what they cannot. Had he thought he ſpake rightly, why did he not deſcend to ſome one pertinent Instance, as that which I have given, or any other? It is a very ill ſign when a man hides himſelf inDolus latet in generalibus. generals, which are known to be nothing but ſecond notions.

2. He ſpeaks as if be thought an Accident could be the ſubject of Inheſion unto an Accident.2. He ſpeaks of an action, and its quality, as if he conſidered not the predicaments they both are in; and thought that action is the ſubject in which quality is inherent, and from which it may be parted, as a ſeparable accident from a ſubstance. So that before I go further, it may be needful to mind him of theſe four things. 1. That action and quality are both accidents. 2. That an Accident is not the ſubject of Inheſion unto an Accident. 3. That ſome Accidents are ſeparable from their ſubject of Inheſion, (as artificial colours upon a wall) and ſome inſeparable, (as Riſibility in a man.) 4. That every Action implies a Quality, according to which the Agent acts. Thus Calefactio muſt needs imply Calor: Nor is it poſſible to imagine the act of heating without Heat. Thus Hatred is a quality, and to hate God is an Action: Nor is it poſſible to ſeparate the hating of God (which is the action) from the hatred of God (which is the quality, without which the action can have no Being.) Yet betwixt theſe two there is a difference, though no poſsible ſeparation; which ſhews the groſs Fallacy Mr. W. hath put upon himſelf, in making no difference between a Difference and a Separability. Many things are inſeparable from many things, betwixt which notwithſtanding there is a difference: which I would make to appear by uncontrolable examples, if I thought ſo meanly of Mr. W. as to think he needs them. But if he will tell me his wants, I promiſe ſpeedily to ſupply them.

3. He confounds the act of differing with the paſſive power of being parted.3. This doth lead me to complain of a great injuſtice in Mr. W. who doth imply me to have ſaid (what he knows I did not) that I cannot diſcern the difference between the quality and the action; whereas my words were theſe only, (and ſo cited by himſelf) That 'tis impoſsible to ſeparate the wickedneſs of the wicked act from the act which is wicked. As if, when I ſay, it is impoſſible to ſeparate the three perſons in the Trinity (commonly called Individual) the one from the other; Mr. W. ſhould anſwer, I am not ſo dull-ſighted as not to diſcern there is a difference between the first Perſon and the ſecond, the ſecond and the third: whereas 'tis he is dull-ſighted, who diſcerns not the difference betwen the act of differing in Individuals, and the paſsive power of being parted.

4. He believes not (or diſſembles) that David's action with Bathſhtbah was his ſin.4. But though I am bound to ſay no more, then that the wickedneſs of the wicked action cannot be ſeparated from the action which is wicked; and again, that the ſin cannot be ſeparated from the action which i • ſinful (as Mr. W. p. 25. Anſ. 5. l. 30, 31, 32. ſaith it can) yet I juſt now added, and ſtill adde, there is no difference. For Davids lying with Bathſhebah was his action, which action was his ſin, which ſin was his wickedneſs. The whole world lieth in wickedneſs, that is, in Sin. To prevent a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I give this notice to Mr. W. that if the word VVickedneſs is not always ſynonymous with ſin, yet it is ſo often; and ſo I now uſe it.

5. He makes the ſin of adultery to be ſeparable from it ſelf.5. Becauſe the words of Mr. W. are very homonymous and uncertain (of ſeveral aſpects, and to be taken or miſtaken as many ſeveral wayes) I will tell him what I diſcern, and where I ceaſe to be diſcerning. I diſcern a groſs difference between the ſin and the ſinner (though from ſome kinds of ſinners ſome kinds of ſin cannot be parted.) I diſcern another difference between the action, and the quality by which the action is good, or evil, or indifferent, (neither morally good, nor morally evil.) Again, I diſcern a clear difference between one evil action and another; as between Davids Adultery, and his Murder. But I diſcern no difference between the ſame evil action, and it ſelf; as between Davids lying with Bathſhebah, and his Adultery. Nor is it credible that ſuch difference ſhould be, much leſs be diſcernable, when even the acuteſt of Mr. W's own party (among whomLibert. & Neceſſ. p. 23. where note, that Mr. Hobbs ſeems to have borrowed his Argument, which proves his own doctrine blaſphemous, from Doctor Jackſon, l. 10. c. 6. fol. 3013. Mr. W. ſpecks purpoſely beſide the purpoſe, by which he tacitely confeſſeth his cauſe is deſperate. Mr. Hobs hath no low place) have not onely profeſſed that they cannot diſcern any difference betwixt the ſin and the ſinful action, but they have clearly diſcerned there can be none. Nay Mr. VV. doth here demonſtrate that he cannot diſcern the leaſt difference, whileſt he tells me, that if I pleaſe, I can diſcern it. For mark how ſtrangely he ſpeaks to my ſimilitude.

Sect. 13.

[ The roundneſs may be ſepara • ed from the Globe, and yet the matter of it remain ſtill, when it is put into another Form, p. 25, 26.] Hence he diſcovers, that he knew his cauſe desperate, and did wilfully miſtake his proper Task, becauſe he ſaw it impoſſible to be performed. For firſt he leaves out the later end of my ſentence, by which the ſenſe is to be governed, and the ſcope of it to be taken: which had he not wilfully omitted, he could not certainly have ſaid what here he ſaith. My words were far from being thus, [A Globe may be deſtroyed, and ſo its roundneſs be taken away; or, the roundneſs may be ſeparated from the Globe by the Globes ceaſing to be a Globe, and its matter caſt into ſome other form] but on the contrary, thus, [See the Div. Philanth. def. ch. 4. p. 42. The roundneſs cannot be ſe • arated from the Globe which is round.] Which laſt words I did adde on purpoſe, to note the continuance of the ſubject of the roundneſs ſpoken of, and to preſerve my ſimpleſt Reader from the very poſſibility of that miſtake, which Mr. W. out of ſubtilty hath here moſt reſolutely committed. Having mentioned a Globe, I needed not have added round, had it not been for ſuch Readers as do not know or con • ider, that nothing not round can be a Globe. Nor did I imagine that Mr. W. could have been of their number, who not conſidering a Globe is round, or elſe not a Globe, (which is a loathſom contradiction) can dream that roundneſs may be ſeparated from the Globe, becauſe the Globe with the roundneſs may be ſeparated from the matter in which it was, to wit the braſs or the wood, which may be caſt or ſhap't into ſeveral figures. To ſeparate roundneſs from the Globe, is neither more nor leſs impoſſible, then to ſeparate roundneſs from roundneſs, which is ſo much more then to ſquare the Circle, that many have ventured upon the one, (as well as M. Hobbs,) whereas none but M. Whitfield hath ever thought of doing the other. And yet his way of attempting it is at leaſt as admirable as his attempt: For inſtead of proving againſt my words, that the roundneſs may be ſeparated from the Globe which is round, (ſo as it ſtill may remain a Globe) he ſaith the Globe may be caſt, as to the matter of it, into another form; and what is this but to ſay, the Globe is not immutable, but may ceaſe to be a Globe, by being turned into a conical, or a cubical Figure? But Mr. W. knew that this was contrary to the ſubject of which I ſpake, and inconſistent with the caſe of which we are ſpeaking: for it is not our Queſtion, whether a ſinner can be converted and become a Saint, or whether his ſin can be done away and deſtroyed, and his actions which were wont to be very evil, be very much altered unto the better: But whether the ſin can be ſeparated from the ſinful action, ſo as the action ſhall remain when the ſin is gone from it. As whether David • s ſin can be parted from his adultery, or his adultery from his lying with Bathſhebah, it being ſuppoſed and granted, that he is lying with Bathſhebah, and that the doing ſo is adultery, and that adultery is a ſin. This being the Caſe, and Mr. VV. ſpeaking not of it, but of quite another thing, I therefore condemn him out of his own mouth, for having ſpoken againſt a truth, even whileſt he ſaw it was unreſiſtible. For he who ſits beſide the Cuſhion, no leſs the twenty yards wide, even after he took it into his hands as if he meant to ſit on it, cannot be thought to ſit beſide it becauſe it is not conſpicuous, but becauſe it is conſpicuouſly ſo full of prickles, or any otherwiſe ſo frightful, as that he dares not adventure on it.

2. His wonderful attempt to waſh wet from water.2. To ſhew Mr. W. both his danger, and his diſhonour in ſuch his dealings, let him name any one thing in any part of his doctrines wherein he will affirm an inſeparability, and I will preſently enforce him to confute himſelf out of himſelf. I will prove by an argument ad hominem (which he at leaſt will not reſiſt) that Mr. W. may be ſeparated from Mr. W. nay, I will prove with more colour, that the difference is wide betwixt twenty and twice ten, becauſe that is but one number, but this is two. I will prove the ſeparability of his proper paſſion from his formal reaſon, and again of his formal reaſon from that eſſential whole to which it gives its specification. I will prove that a diſeaſe, however incurable, may be cur'd; becauſe it is poſſible to kill the Patient. There is nothing ſo impoſſible, but may be proved to Mr. W. to be the contrary, if he will but take his own coin for current, which here he puts off to others without a bluſh. If his marvellous error hath been through ignorance, or inadvertency, (which yet I cannot conceive) he ſhall do well to ſtudy the nature of conjugates, and denominatives, of adjuncts and ſubjects, of common and proper accidents; and if he will trie but to put his preſent ſenſe into a Syllogiſme, he ſhall find four terms in the Premiſſes, or Ignoratio Elenchi in the concluſion: he ſhall not eſcape one of the two, let him go which way he will.

3. The three lines of his preſent Section, which ſhut it up, p. 26. are cabbage (not onely twice, but) twenty times boyl'd, and from the firſt to the laſt is gratis dictum.

Sect. 14.

Mr. W. affirms God to will and work ſin, and to have a hand in effecting of it, upon his ſuppoſal that ſin makes for Gods glory. Mr. W's five Eſſayes, inſtead of Anſwers to my Objection, being now at an end, he proceeds to a fourth Argument as he calls it in the Margin) whereby to prove his beloved Doctrine, of God's efficiency in ſin. And thus it runs: So far as ſin makes for the glory of God, ſo far he may both will and work it; for if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how ſhall it make for his glory? p. 26.] Firſt he layes for his foundation a moſt palpable falſhood, That ſin doth make for God's glory. This is his poſtulatum he will needs have granted, and therefore gives no reaſon, or colour for it. Obſerve the manner of his ſpeech: he ſaith not paſſively, ſin is made an occaſion upon which God is glorified; but actively, ſin doth make for the glory of God. Nor doth he ſay, that ſin makes for it per accidens, from whence he could not infer, God wills and works it; but by making this inference, he implies that ſin doth make per ſe for God's glory. Is not he likely to infer ſtrange things, whoſe very Principle implies a contradiction? To ſin, is to rebel againſt the Maker of that Law, of which it is a tranſgreſſion: to rebel againſt him, is to diſhonour him: there is nothing but ſin by which the God of all glory can be diſhonoured: And to ſay that God's diſhonour does make for his glory, is the ſame as to ſay, that that is for his glory which is against it. Thus the Ranters and Libertines are taught to plead for their ſins, that they do not commit them as God thereby is diſhonoured; but (in the contrary notion) as they make for God's glory: they rebel not againſt him, but take up armes; or if it muſt be called a rebellion, yet they rebel againſt him in his defence onely, to the end they may make him a glorious God; they fight againſt him in loyalty, that his pardoning mercy may ſhine forth in its higheſt luſtre. They in the times of the Apoſtles, who did evil that good might come of it, and ſinned the more, that grace might abound, were led to ſin by their opinion, that ſin did make for Gods glory. The Carpocratians thought it their duty as well as incereſt, to fill up the meaſure of their ſins, by which God was to be glorified. And many have attempted to pull theThou ſhalt not revile the Gods, nor curſe the Ruler of thy people, Exod. 22.28. Gods out of their Thrones, (that is, the Rulers of the people) profeſſing to do it for their good, and for the glory of God Almighty.

2. He concludes ſin to be good, or God's willing and working it as evil. See what I, ſhall ſay Sect. 19. of this Chapter. 2. When Mr. W. ſaith, that ſin doth make for Gods glory, he doth certainly mean that ſin is good, at leaſt, ſo far as it makes for Gods glory, becauſe he preſently addes, that God ſo far may will and work it. Which if he ſhall venture to deny, he will then bewray it to be his doctrine, that God may will and work ſin as ſin, and that ſin as ſin doth make for Gods glory. For whatever is the object of Gods will, or the effect of his working, or hath a tendency to his glory, muſt needs be taken in one notion of the two, as good, or as evil. If as good, then Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. are quite undone by Mr. W. who will either have God the Author of it, or elſe will conclude its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . And again, Mr. W. is undone by himſelf, becauſe he would ſeparate the ſin from the ſinful act, for this very reaſon, that the act onely is good, but not the ſin. If he ſhall ſay, by way of refuge, that God doth will ſin as evil, (not as good) how then doth he will it as it makes for his glory, unleſs Mr. W. will ſay, that it makes for his glory as it is evil? and if this laſt, then ſin as evil muſt needs be good, becauſe as ſuch it does that in reſpect of which (ſaith Mr. W.) God wills and works it. And if God doth will, my work ſin as it is evil, then it is not onely good as w ll as evil, whileſt it is evil, but good eatenus, ſo far forth as it is evil; good, becauſe evil; that is, good, and not good: nay it therefore is good, becauſe it is not. Into ſuch kinds of miſchief hath Mr. W. ingulft himſelf.

3. He feigns God to work evil to a good end.3. Upon this foundation, that ſin makes for God's glory, obſerve how he raiſeth his ſuperſtructure. He ſaith that God may both will and work ſin: not one, but both; not will or work, but will and work it. Here behold a barefac't ſpeaker. The Sinner and his Satan can have no more ſaid of them: God and they are ſaid to differ in their aimes, not at all in their actions. All do will and work ſin: but God doth both (ſaith Mr. W.) as it makes for his glory; the Sinner and Satan do both, but not for Gods glory; Let Satan paſs; but how few ſinners are there, who will and work ſin, to the end that God may be diſhonoured? I believe, and hope there are no ſuch ſinners. Nay, how many ſinners have ſworn (with hands lifted up to the moſt High God) that they have will'd and workt thoſe very things, which they have afterwards confeſſed to have been damnable ſins, without reſpect unto ſelf, and meerly as making for the glory of God? we have our Saviours words for it, and Paul's example. Our Lord foretold his own Diſciples, that Joh. 16.2. whoſoever ſhould kill them would think they did God ſervice. And 'twas in Philip. 3.6. zeal to religion that Paul perſecuted the Church before his converſion of name and temper. He was cruel as he was godly, a rigid Verſ. 5. Phariſee, and in his way Verſ. 6. blameleſs. Of theſe it will not be denied then, that they did will and work ſin (not as ſin, but) as it made for God's glory, as they conceived. The ſad conſequences and uſes which ſome have made of this Doctrine, I have ſhewed partlySee the Div. Philanth. Def. ch. 4. p. 42. elſewhere, and ſo forbear.

4. Q. Whether he inferrs not God to be a • ſinner.4. He doth not onely make ſin to be the object of Gods will, (which is deſperately bad) but the effect of his working, which ſounds much worſe. To work ſin doth define and denominate a ſinner, witneſs the words of our Saviour to the condemned Reprobates, Depart from me ye that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Mat. 7.23. work ſin, or Tranſgreſsion. The Devils chief ſinning is his making others to become ſinners, and thence he hath purchaſed the name of Satan, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Tempter. Nor doth it excuſe Mr. W. to have ſaid that God doth work ſia as it makes for his glory. For beſides the abſurdities which I ſhewed in that ſhift, he muſt remember that the end is but one circumſtance of many, which are all required to make a good action:Bonum eſt ex causâ integrâ, malum ex quolibet defectu: the least defect is enough to deprave an action, and the greateſt perfection is but enough to make it every way blameleſs. Beſides, the end is extrinſecal to the eſſence of an action, in reſpect of the matter and the form, which make it up. And if it is impoſſible for a good man to work ſin to a good end, (interim ut ſit bonus ſecundum quod vult) much leſs can God work it in order to his glory. Further yet it muſt be noted, that as ſome things are evil, becauſe forbidden by God; ſo others have been forbidden by him, becauſe they were in their nature antecedently evil. And how can God work ſins which are ſo naturally ſuch, (as the blaſpheming, curſing, and hating of God himſelf) that the purity of his being is an eternal Law unto himſelf againſt ſuch working? Let Mr. W. make reflexion upon his words.

5. He is inconſiſtent with M. H. and Mr. B.5. If God doth work ſin, in as much as it makes for his glory, then ſin is his work in the ſame reſpect in which he works it. And if ſo, it is a poſitive thing, which Mr. H. and Mr. B. will by no means indure; for then (ſay they) it muſt be God, unleſs it be granted to be his Creature. Thus the Brethren betray each other, and each himſelf, both into moſt frightful and inextricable ſtreights.

6. Inconſiſtent with them and with himſelf too.6. That we may not be able to wrong the meaning of Mr. VV. he gives his reaſon for his blaſphemy: [For if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how ſhall it make for his glory? p. 26.] Elſewhere he ſaith, God hath an efficiency in ſin, and a hand in ſin; but now he tells us in plainer terms, God hath a hand in effecting ſin. Then ſin (it ſeems) is the effect, of which God is the efficient; and yet at other times they tell us, that ſin hath no efficient, but onely a deficient cauſe. So irreconcilable they are with one another, and with themſelves. As the wicked men effect ſin, Mr. VV. grants it diſhonours God. And therefore to the end that it may make for his glory, M. VV. tell us, he himſelf muſt have a hand in effecting of it; for ſo he expoſtulates, if he doth not do ſo, how ſhall it make for his glory? A well-taught child would anſwer thus; If ſin cannot make for Gods glory, unleſs God hath a hand in effecting it, then the firſt cannot be, becauſe the ſecond is impoſſible. So common it is for thoſe men to begin their reaſonings at the wrong end; witneſs this laſt violentum.

7. He frames not his Propoſitions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his Propoſitions:7. What at firſt he ſaith God may do, he now inferreth that he must do. And what is that, but to will and work ſin, and to have a hand in effecting it? how elſe (ſaith he) ſhall it make for his glory? that is, how elſe ſhall Mr. VV's principle be true? Mr. VV's maximes muſt be true, though God muſt be blaſphemed to help make them out. The original of his error I ſhewed long ſince, in his not apprehending what is meant by Gods taking occaſion to glorifie himſelf, partly by puniſhing, partly by pardoning, partly by ordering the ſins of men. In all which caſes it is not ſin, but Gods juſtice in puniſhing, his mercy in pardoning, and his wiſdom in ordering, which do make for his glory.

Sect. 15.

Mr. VV's next thing, which I know not what to call, but is called by him a fifth Argument in his margin, is the ſame which was ſpoken by Mr. B. to whom I gaveSee the Div. Philanth. ch. 3. p. 129. to. p. 140. a large Anſwer; and the ſame which was ſpoken by the Superintendent Mr. Hobbs in his egregious Num. 12. p. 107. lin. 1. Animadverſions (or rather Tergiverſations) on the learned Biſhops Reply; nay the ſame which was ſpoken by Mr. VV. himſelf, no longer ago then p. 23. to which I gave a whole Section in the cloſe of my firſt Chapter. And it amounts to no more then an expreſſion of his fear, that God will be found an Idle Spectator, and an Idle Beholder, (they are his own words) unleſs hebe granted to will and work ſin. Againſt which he proceeds to frame, and anſwer an Objection; which that he may anſwer the leſs unhappily, he faſhions it to himſelf in theſe following words.

Sect. 16.

1. His great forgery in that little which he cites. Sect. 16. [Mr. P. thinks to ſhift himſelf from this argument by telling us, That God doth wiſely order and diſpoſe of ſin after the committing of it, but doth not determin that it ſhall be done, or hath any hand in the doing, p. 26.] 1. Theſe words he cites from my Div. Philan. Def. c. 3. p. 129. where I cannot find them, nor in any other page of any thing which I have written: So that here I muſt demand more reparations for more injury. My words were theſe; [That God, beſides his permitting of our ſins, doth diſpoſe and order them to the beſt Advantage.] VVhat Mr. VV. hath foiſted in, and how he hath forged the whole period, I need not ſay; the Reader ſees it.

2. His foul ſenſe of Gods determining that ſin ſhall be done.2. God, according to his praeſcience that ſin would be voluntarily done, if not miraculouſly hindered, did determin not to hinder, & ſo conſequentially or conditionally, that ſin ſhould be done by his permiſsion, that is, God determined to permit it to be done. Where permiſsion, not ſin, is the object of Gods determination. But Mr. B's Doctrine was, (and Mr. VV's is) that God did abſolutely and antecedently determin its being done, and determin the wills of men to do it, and that he could not foreſee it but becauſe he decreed it, and that his will of evil was as efficacious as his will of good. In a word, that he doth ſo determine its being done, as to have an efficiency and a hand in the doing of it. Nay in plain terms, that he doth work it. And working (we know) is acting, doing, cauſing, at leaſt deſigning, or contriving ſin.

3. His impious expreſsion of Gods having a hand in ſin, and the importance of that phraſe.3. VVhat he means by Gods determining ſin, he explains in the next words, by his having a hand in it; which is a moſt formidable expreſsion, and never enough to be deteſted. For he who only permits ſin cannot be ſaid to have an hand in it. Nor 2. he who ſuffers another to tempt for the exerciſe of the conſtancy, or patience, of a Job, or a Joſeph. Nor 3. he who withdraws grace for ſin committed, to puniſh former deſpights which had been done to grace given. Nor 4. he who delivers up to Satan by way of Diſcipline, to bring unto Repentance the Preſumptuous, or the Secure. But to have a hand in ſin, is to be a partner in it, or an Acceſſory, whether by commanding, or counſelling, or contriving, or countenancing, or carrying on the buſineſs by ſecret impul •• ons and excitations; all which are but a few of our Adverſaries phraſes. And becauſe Mr. W. is a frequent uſer of this expreſſion, I will once for all deſire my Reader to note the horrible importance of it. It is the obſervation of the moſt Learned who have commented upon Scripture, that Gods great efficacy in working is expreſſed by Finger; his greater efficacy by Hand; his greateſt by Arm. When Moſes turned the duſt of Egypt into Lice by the power of God, ſhewing it ſelf in his weakneſs, the Magicians told Pharaoh, It was the Exod. 8.19. which compare with Luk. 11.20. finger of God. When Job ſpake of Gods power by which he created the world, and by which he doth ſustain it, he ſaid, Job 12.9. which compare with Act. 11.21. The hand of the Lord had wrought it. And when the Mother of our Lord would expreſs the very greateſt, that is, the moſt to be admired of all Gods works, his own conception and Incarnation in the Body of Mary, ſhe ſaid that God had ſhewed ſtrength with his Luk. 1.51. Arm. And ſo without more ado I leave my Reader to judge both of the phraſe and meaning of Mr. W. when he ſaith that God hath a hand in ſin; which becauſe I denied and diſproved alſo, Mr. W. tells me again, what he told me twice before, that God is inferred to be a meer Spectator. Obſerve his words.

Sect. 17.

1. Mr. W's groſs error in the notion of Gods permiſsion. [ But then ſtill it followes, that he ſtands as a meer ſpectator in regard of the greateſt part of actions that are done in the world. — But how can this ſtand with the All-wiſe and All-working providence of God, (without which a ſparrow falls not to the ground) that he ſhould stand looking on, &c. and determine: nor do any thing while they be done and paſt, onely afterwards imploy his wiſdom in ordering of them? p. 26, 27.] Though 'twere ſufficient to refer him to what I have ſaid of Gods permiſſion in divers Tracts already publiſht, which if he hath read, he is utterly inexcuſable for what he here ſo crudely, and yet ſo frequently, venteth: yet I will tell him once more, what I told him ſo lately (Chap. 1. Sect. 6.) but onely now I will do it in plainer terms, that I may leave him no pretence of miſapprehending or overſeeing my meaning in it. I do not mean that God permits ſin with ſuch a neglectfulneſs, and unconcernedneſs, as the Epicureans are wont to dream of, who feign a God ſitting with his back towards the world; but I mean a moſt uſeful and a moſt wiſe Permiſſion, becoming the wiſdom as well as goodneſs of that onely wiſe God, who will not hinder what he ſees, and hateth perfectly while he ſees it, becauſe it is better that he ſhould bring that good out of evil which he can and doth, then that he ſhould not ſuffer any evil to be done. I never ſpeak of a bare permiſſion, as that excludes every thing elſe, but onely as it excludes Gods working, or decreeing, or willing ſin. God doth not onely permit, but puniſh evil, and diſpoſe of it to good, as the murdering of Chriſt to the ſalvation of the world: yet God had no more a hand in that de villiſh murder, (non impediendo efficaciter) then I have a hand in the falling down of any houſe which I do not underprop.

2. His tremendous notion of all-working providence:2. Mr. W. oppoſeth to a meer looking on, the all-working Providence of God, which is the language of the Libertines, without any diſtinction of good or evil, and ſhews us what he means by Gods having a hand in all the wickedneſs of the world. The inſtance he gives of a ſparrow falling to the ground is moſt impertinent to the ſubject of his ciſcourſe, unleſſe he can prove it to be a ſin for a ſparrow ſo to fall, which if he could do, he w • uld alſo prove that God doth neither will nor work it. His following words are moſt inſipid, becauſe he knowes 'tis granted, that God did foreſee ſin before it was; and ſuſtains the Being of his creature whilest 'tis committing; and being committed, overruleth it alſo to ſome advantage. But what is this to hisThis hath been ſpoken of ch. 1. ſect. 2. determining the will of the ſinner to the ſin, which is the boldly-irreligious Tenet, of which its Patrons cannot give us any excuſable accompt?

Sect. 18.

1. M. W. newly puts himſelf into his old ſtreights, betwixt groſs Blaſphemies and extraordinary Impereinence. Mr. W. profeſſeth to give inſtances in ſome of his former examples, and ſo with a bare repetition fils up the [page 27. and part of p. 28.] That I may not repeat, as he hath done, I ſend back my Reader to the fifth Section of my firſt Chapter. Onely here I obſerve, he ſaith that God had the chief hand in Joſephs being ſent into Egypt. If he means his brethrens ſin in ſelling Joſeph to ſtrangers, (not knowing or caring to what place they would carry him) then the blaſphemy is apparent: if he means not that, but another thing, Gods doing good unto Joſeph in his affliction, then the impertinence is as ſignal. As if when the queſtion is, whether the Phyſician hath any hand in the Patients Diſeaſe, the Reſpondent ſhould ſay, Yes, he hath the chief hand, becauſe he is not onely a ſpectator, or looker on, but adminiſters ſuch things as cure his malady, and perhaps reſtores him to better health then before he fell ſick. I have reaſon to be as weary of diſputing with ſuch Reſpondents, as any workman could be at the Tower of Babel; where when he call'd for ſtone, he was ſupplied with morter, and when for morter, they brought him stone.

2. Affirms God to have a hand in oppreſsion;2. Mr. W. goes on to Pharaohs oppreſſion of the Iſraelites, which he affirmeth God to have had aNote that in his Preface to his Extent of Gods Providence, he profeſſeth to underſtand it of Gods active hand. hand in, becauſe he had determin'd it, and foretold it many years before. What [it] doth he mean that God determin'd? If Pharaohs will to his oppreſſion, behold the blaſphemy; if the permiſſion of the oppreſſion, mark well the impertinence. To foretel is far from having a hand in the event. The Phyſician foretells when his Patient ſhall have a paroxyſme in a Chronical diſeaſe, even whileſt he is preſcribing the uſual means of prevention. Mr. W. muſt ſtudy the difference betwixt the end of an intention, the event of a Prophecy, and the effect of a cauſe; and not imagine that Iſaiah had any hand in the birth of Cyrus, becauſe he foretold it an hundred years before Cyrus was born.

3. And in rebellion.3. Mr. W. ſaith, that God had a hand in that, which is call'd rebellion, 1 Kings 12.19. And to ſay that he ſaith this, is a word enough for the wiſe. Again, that God hand a hand in the deſtruction of Samaria, Iſ. 10.3. But what then? was it a ſin for God to deſtroy ſuch ſinners, who were the people of his wrath, becauſe hypocritical, v. 6? And might he not do it by what instrument he pleaſed, by giving a right, as he did to Iſrael over the Canaanites, or by permitting the violence, as he did to Aſſyria over Iſrael? But what hath Mr. VV. got by this? was Aſſyria the happier for being the Rod of Gods anger, v. 5? No; the Rod, when it is uſed, is commonly caſt into the Fire; and to be burnt is worſe then to be beaten.

4. In murders, treacheries, violence and wrong.4. Mr. W. ſaith farther p. 28. That when dominion hath been devolved from one hand to another, it hath ſeldom been done without much violence and wrong, yea, without murders, treacheries, and blood-ſhed. To which he preſently addes, that God had a hand in ſuch things. If he means in thoſe unjuſt things, he ſpeaks according to his Principles as well as Mr. Hobbs; if otherwiſe, he is but impertinent. I wiſh that that were the worſt. But becauſe it is ſaid, that God doth give Kingdomes to whom he will (Dan. 4.14.) he muſt be brought to a remembrance, that God is ſometimes ſaid to give Kingdomes in the Letter, as when he gave Iſrael the land of Canaan: but ſometimes onely by an Hebraiſm, as when he permitted the Aſſyrians to hold his people in captivity for ſeventy years; though I do not remember that God was ever ſaid in Scripture to have given the Kingdom of Iſrael unto Aſſyria. Beſides, God giveth riches to whom he will, yet gives it not literally to them that ſteal, to them that ſeize on their neighbours goods by fraud, or violence. For then whoſoever hath the ſtrongest arm, and hath added to that the longeſt ſword, might live among •• his neighbours like a great Pike in a Pond, and ſay he doth but take what God hath given him. The King of Spain and the Great Turk would probably love to hear ſuch Preachers, as would thus promote the univerſality of their Empire. And the later proceeds upon the very ſame Maxime with Mr. W.

5. He juſtifies all our Engliſh Ranters by aſcribing all our changes to the hand of God.5. Wh • t is added touching the changes which have happened here at home, I need not ſpeak unto at all. It being cle • r already, that as all actions are wicked which are againſt the will of God, revealed to us in his commandments, (affirmative and negative,) ſo God abhorrs all ſuch, and is ſo far from having a hand in them, that he will certainly lift up his hand againſt them, if not remarkably in this world, yet infallibly in the next: for the longer he is in lifting up his hand, he lifts it up ſo much the higher, and by ſo much more heavily he lets it fall. How quickly do mens opinions run out of their heads into their hearts, and thence into their hands too, I mean, their actions? I am perſuaded that Mr. W. had hardly taken a ſequeſtration, if he had not believed that God had had a hand in it.

6. God cleared from careleſneſs or weakneſs.6. But mark how he goes on: To deny that God hath a hand (in the proper ſubject of our debate) were (ſaith he) to make God a very weak and impotent, or a very remiſs and careleſs Governour of the world, &c. p. 28. Bona verba quaeſo. Ne ſaevi, magne Sacerdos. Muſt it be weakneſs in God not to have a hand in wickedneſs? No, 'tis an argument of his power, as well as purity. See the prodigious groundleſneſs of ſpeaking thus concerning God, exhibited at large in the ſixth Section of my firſt Chapter, and in the ſeventeenth of this. God indeed gives man his power to will, and to do: but man being left [in manu conſilii ſui] in the hand of his own counſel, doth determine his will to ſuch and ſuch actions as God forbids, rather then to ſuch as God commands, to wit, Adulteries, Murders, Extortions, and the like. As God forbids theſe actions which are ſins, ſo he gives Grace to abſtain from the doing of them, and all things elſe, except an irreſistible impeding of us. He farther diſpoſeth and ordereth the things done to good, and that in many reſpects, as I have See the Sinner impleaded, part. 2. ch. 2. p. 262. elſewhere ſhewed. This in all, but more in ſome, of whom we have Pharaoh for an example, whom he did not onely withdraw his Grace from, but condemned alſo to live, (when he might have ſent him as quick into hell, as he did Corah and his company) being delivered up finally unto an utter obduration, I will ſhut up this Paragraph with that of Moſes to Iſrael, Deut. 9.4. Speak not thou in thine heart, For my righteouſneſs the Lord hath brought me in to poſſeſs this land— Verſ. 5. Not for thy righteouſneſs, or for the uprightneſs of thine heart, doſt thou poſſeſſe it, but for the wickedneſs of theſe Nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee. Veſ. 6. Not for thy righteouſ • eſs, for thou art a ſtiff-necked people.

Sect. 19.

God hath no hand in w lling or effecting what he hates. M.W. now proceeds to undertake a new Objection which he doth not cite from any part of my writings, or any mans elſe; but it ſeems it is ſuch as he thought he could anſwer, and 'tis briefly this: God hates all ſin, and therefore can have no hand at all either in willing or effecting of i • ; for no man will have any hand in doing what he hates, p. 28.] Firſt, I obſerve he doth not deny what is objected, in ſo much as he owns it to be his Doctrine, that God hath a hand in willing and effecting what he hates. Secondly, I obſerve that he doth not anſwer the Objection, but onely puts [Anſw.] before his words, which are partly an Evaſion or Tergiverſation, and partly a Grant of the thing objected. The Evaſion is thus, [Though he hates it, yet he permits it.] And why is he ſaid to permit ſin, which he hates, rather then to permit righteouſneſs, which he loves, but becauſe he hath not any hand in the former, as he hath in the later? And what an Argumentator muſt he be thought, who goes to prove that God doth will and work ſ • n, by ſaying, he permits it? that is in effect, becauſe he neither wills, nor works it? His reaſon is worſe, which is taken from Gods getting glory by ſin, ibid. for God gets nothing by any mans righteouſneſs (if we ſpeak exactly) much leſs by his ſins. Or if we may ſay by a Figure, that God gets glory by our thankſgivings, yet ſure by our blaſphemies he gets nothing but diſhonour. Becauſe God takes occaſion of doing good, upon our doing evil, (which good conduceth to his glory) it ſeems Mr. W. is of opinion, that God gets glory by the evil: then which I cannot imagine a more intolerable miſtake.A caſe put to ſhew the danger of Mr. W's Doctrine. He who concludes he is a veſſel of abſolute election, and that he cannot fall totally or finally from Grace, may corrupt himſelf ſtrangely by ſuch a maxime, as that ſin makes for. Gods glory, or that God may get himſelf glory by it; and be apt to plead, upon his committing of adultery or inceſt, that he did not do it as 'twas forbidden by the word (which isThis is the Doctrine of Dr. Twiſſe & others, particularly owned by Mr. W. p. 47. improperly called the will of God, ſay they,) but as God did ſecretly will it, as it made for Gods glory, or to the end that God might get himſelf ſome glory by it. He did it not out of luſt, or as a ſin, but to procreate a Saint, and increaſe the number of the godly, and withal to glorifie that diſcriminating mercy, which could not be exerciſed in the pardoning of ſuch ſins, if they were not committed by them in whom they are capable of being pardoned, that is to ſay, by the Elect. I put this Caſe, to fright men out of thoſe premiſſes, from which (if God reſtrain them not) they have been known by experience to draw ſuch horrible concluſions. And had I not been able to give examples, I ſhould not have thought this method needful. Mr. W. tells us plain enough, (both p. 26. and here too) that ſo far as ſin makes for Gods glory, God may both Note that all are his own expreſſions, • .26, & 28. which muſt be compared: to which purpoſe, look on what I h • ve ſaid ſect. 14. of this Chapter. will, and * work it, and have a hand in 〈◊〉 effecting, or * working of it. And though ſin be in it ſelf evil, yet it may have ſome reſpect of * good. As for that which he calls a true Rule, and what he hath out of Auſtin against himſelf, I will not exagitate his unhappineſſe therein, (as I muſt alſo forbear to do it in many other particulars,) meerly for fear I ſhould be endleſs.

Sect. 20.

Mr. W. proceeds to a ſixth Argument, wherby he proves his great willingneſs to prove that God hath efficiency and hand in ſin; Mr. W's dangerous miſ-apprehenſion of that figurative Sentence, That God doth puniſh ſin with ſia. but more then his willingneſs to prove it, he proveth not. For his Argument is but this, [ That God puniſheth one ſin with another; and puniſhment is more then a bare permiſſion. It were ridiculous to ſay, that a Judge onely permitteth a malefactor to be arraigned, condemned, and executed, p. 28. lin. ult. p. 29. lin. 1, 2, 3, 4.] Firſt, it is not any where ſaid in Scripture, that God doth puniſh one ſin with another; but 'tis a ſentence of the Schoolmen, as commonly known to be catachreſtical as any beggar knowes his own diſh, and hath neither truth nor ſenſe in it, unleſs it be figuratively meant. For God puniſheth the ſinner and not the ſin. Nor doth he imprint ſin on him as the Lictor doth ſtripes, but withdraws his grace, and leaves the ſinner to himſelf, whereupon he ſinneth without reſtraint. But I have ſpoken of this in See the Sinner Impleaded, c. 1. p. 9. another place, where I have alſo recorded S. Auſtins ſuffrage for the truth.

2. His making God the proper cauſe of the greateſt ſins.2. But Mr. W. hath ſo prodigiouſly miſunderſtood that ſentence, or elſe ſo guiltily diſſembled his underſtanding, as to expreſs Gods puniſhing of ſin with ſin by the poſitive actions of a Judge, in his arraigning, condemning, and execution of malefactors: which is to make God the Author and proper cauſe of the greateſt ſins in the world, ſuch as are the later ſins which are called the puniſhments of the former. It being frequently the Doctrine of Mr. W. that of all poſitive actions God is the Author and Ext. of Gods Prov. c. 4. p. 11. proper cauſe. But Idolatries, and Adulteries, Blaſphemies, and Murders, and the ſins not to be named (Rom. 1.26.) are poſitive actions, and puniſhments, in the Schoolmens ſenſe; and ſo according to Mr. W. God is blaſphemouſly inferred to be their Author and proper cauſe.

3. Which he alſo extends to the very ſin of the act.3. Now we ſee what moved him to ſay in print, [That God muſt Ibid. p. 12. Iin. 1, 2. needs ſome way both will and work in the ſin of the Act.] Mark well, good Reader: He doth not ſay (as at other times) the act of ſin, or the ſinful act, but the ſin of the act, meaning the pravity, and deformity and obliquity it ſelf, as he explains himſelf in the next two lines, wherein he ſaith that God gets glory to himſelf by that very pravity and deformity.

4. He treads a ſtep beyond Calvins worſt.4. Mr. W. in this doth tread a ſtep beyond Calvin, not onely"†" Calv. Inſtit. l. 1. c. 18. ſect. 1. fol. 68. followes him through thick and thin. For though Mr. Calvin ſpeaks broadly, [ that the wicked man, whileſt he acteth, is Id. ib. ſect. 2. fol. 69. Apparet cer â deſtinatione Dei fuiſſe impulſos. Fateor quidem interpoſitâ Satanae operâ ſaepe Deum agere in Reprebis; ſed ut e jus impulſu Satan ipſe ſuas partes agat. — unde hoc, niſi quod à Deo manat efficacia erroris, ut mendacium credant? &c. Ibid. Summa haec ſit, quum Dei voluntas dicitur rerum omnium eſſe cauſe, — ut non tantùm vim ſuam exerat in electis, ſed etiam reprobos in obſequium cogat. Ibid. Et jam ſatis apertè oſtendi, Deum vocari eorum omnium Authorem, quae iſti cenſores volunt otioſo tantum ejus permiſſu contingere. Id. ib. ſect. 3. p. 7. acted by God; and that the Aſſyrians were thruſt on [to rob and plunder by the ſure deſtination of God; and that God doth act in the reprobates by the interpoſition of Satan's help; that Satan by God's impulſe may act his own part alſo; and that the efficacy of error proceeds from God; and that when he caſts men into filthy deſires, he is the chief Author of his juſt vengeance, (that is, of ſin in Mr. W's ſenſe) and Satan onely the Miniſter; and that the will of God is the cauſe of all things; and that his providence doth not onely exert its force in the elect who are ruled by his holy Spirit, but doth alſo compell the reprobates to be obſequious; and that God is called the Author of all thoſe things which the cenſorious will have to happen by his idle permiſſion onely: though theſe are frightful expreſſions, and applied in ſuch a manner as not to be capable of excuſe, yet Mr. VV. (as I ſhewed) hath ſtept beyond him.

5. TheVeteres religioſiù interdum ſimplicem veritatis confeſſionem in hac parte reformidant. — Ne Auguſtinus quidem illâ ſuperſt • tione interdum ſolutus eſt, quemadmodum ubi dicit, indurationem & excaecationem non ad operationem Dei, ſed ad praeſcientiam ſpectare. Calv. Inſt. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95. Ancient Fathers were afraid to aſcribe that to God's working which they ſaw could onely be the object of his praeſcience, and his permiſſion; and this by the confeſſion of Mr. Calvin himſelf, who as he calls it their ſuperſtition, ſo he confeſſeth that S. Austin was not alwayes free from it. But Mr. Calvin in deſpight of the Fathers piety, which he brands with the Title of Superstition, doth very dogmatically pronounce of thoſe later ſins of men which are called the puniſhments of the former, that as they are puniſhments, God isIdem. l. 1. c. 18. Sect. 2. Author praecipuus, the prime or chief Author, and that the Devil is onely ſubſervient to him, Satan verò tantù Miniſter. And though he ſaith that the Ancients were ſomewhat too religious in their fear of ſpeaking the ſimple truth, (as he calls it) yet he confeſſeth their fear was very ſober, becauſe the thing which they feared was theIdem ib. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95. opening a paſſage unto impiety, of irreverently defaming the works of God. Now what it was which miſled Mr. VV. and Mr. B. from that holy fear of thoſe Fathers, to ſpeak of God in ſuch a fearleſs and frightful manner, (as I have partly already ſhewed, and am partly to ſhew in my following Chapter) I believe moſt Readers do judge as I do.

Sect. 21.

1. The deſperate nature of Mr. u's Salvo's, and the hardneſs of his very emollients. Mr. W. having now done with the prime part of his enterpriſe, wherein he hath often made God to be the Author of ſin, and often very much worſe, goes on talking to himſelf, from p. 29. to p. 35. in an indeavoured excuſe of what he hath hitherto delivered. And in the very entrance on that attempt, he makes himſelef unexcuſable, by dropping out ſuch excuſes as ſtand in need of an excuſe, but cannot find one. 1. Though Gods permiſſion of ſin is an operative permiſſion (ſaith Mr. W.) yet he is not the Author of the evil permitted. His reaſon is, becauſe what the wicked do wickedly, God doth holily, p. 29. Which is only to ſay, that God is not the Author of ſin in Himſelf, not that he is not the Author of ſin in others. The Queſtion is not whether God is a Tranſgreſſor, but whether he makes men Tranſgreſsors, as Zuinglius publickly affirmeth. Not whether David's lying with Bathſhebah was a good Adultery, and ſo no ſin, in as much as it was the work of God, and in as much as God did impel him to it (as Zuinglius alſo ſpeaks.) This is not the Queſtion, but the ſordid begging of the Queſtion, and a taking that for granted, which we deny and abominate with all our might, as moſt blaſphemous and irrational. The Queſtion is, whether God impelled David to that Adultery, or did work in the ſin of that act, (as Mr. W. ſpeaks) which whileſt I deny as a moſt impious and a moſt ſenſeleſs propoſition, he muſt firſt of all prove and make apparent, before he comes to infer upon it, that the very ſame thing which man doth wickedly God doth holily and juſtly: For God doth it not at all, nor can he do it, becauſe he is God.

2. What he ſaith of the Phyſicians occaſioning the ſickneſs, yea the death of the Patient, 2. by giving Phyſick which meets wi ha malignant Humour, who yet cannot be ſaid to be the Author of thoſe effects, p. 29, 30. is as impertinent a ſimilitude as he could eaſily have choſen, and ſhews he conſiders not of what he ſpeaks, or underſtands not any thing of the word Author, or ſeeks to amuſe his illiterate Reader.

3. He hopes to excuſe himſelf by uttering theſe following Aphoriſmes, 3. which paſs with him for fan and ſoft and ſuppling ſpeeches. 1. God may be ſaid to adminiſter occaſions of ſinning, and ſo to have ſome kind of hand in it, The mollifying expreſsions of the harſh ſpeaker. by his word, and by his works, p. 30. 2. The Law hath an efficacy in ſtirring up ſinful motions, p. 30. 3. The good word of God doth accidentally ſtir up the corruption that is in mens wicked hearts, p. 31. 4. Christs preaching, and Stephens preaching had an EFFICIENCY in ſtirring up the wrath of their Hearers, p. 31. 5. The good word of God doth ſtir up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, p. 31. Thus he puts upon himſelf that thick and palpable Fallacy, non cauſae pro cauſâ. Becauſe when the word of God is preached, the evil affections of the wicked are ſtirred up, he concludes that Gods word doth ſtir them up. As if my writing were the cauſe of thoſe things which come to paſs when I am writing. Again, he doth not diſtinguiſh betwixt the giving of occaſions, and taking occaſions when none are given. God hath ſpoken and done thoſe exceeding good things, from which men have ſnatched an occaſion of evil; but to adminiſter or give occaſions of doing wickedly, is ſo ill a phraſe, that it is very unskilfully applyed to God (to ſay no worſe.) And I had hoped that theſe times had taught the unlearnedſt to diſtinguiſh betwixt Scandalum datum, & acceptum; Acceptum, ſed non datum. Though David was pardoned his ſin of Adultery, yet becauſe by that deed he had given great occaſion to the enemies of the Lord to blaſpheme, his Infant Child did ſurely dye, 2 Sam. 12.13, 14. If Mr. W. did not conſider that there is ſuch a thing as the ſin of ſcandal, or did not know what ſcandal is, and wherein it ſtands, he may both know and conſider it another time. He, who in doing what is lawful, intends to make another man ſin, as well as he who doth it by doing what is unlawful, without out intending any ſuch thing, is properly ſaid to give occaſion, to ſcandalize, to lay a ſnare in his Brothers way.

4. His open profeſsion that Gods ſecret wil is contrary to his revealed will, in reſpect of the very ſame objects.4. I am urged to enlarge upon another paſſage in Mr. W. where he ſaith, that the wicked in their evil actions doe that which is contrary to the revealed will of God, though the ſame things which he wills, viz. by his ſecret will which they know not, p. 34. But I count the number of my pages, and am exhorted to ſpend but little time againſt a man of no greater ſtrength, and have already acquainted him with enough of his unhappineſs; and whatſoever I ſhall omit of his other miſadventures, I ſhall abundantly meet with in my Account of Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. whom I intend for the Subjects of the following Chapter.

CHAP. III. Of Mr. Barlee's forging God to be the Author of Sin, and very much worſe then ſo too, in his very endeavours to ſpeak as warily as his Principles will ſuffer him.

Sect. 1.

BEing now to conſider the Doctrinal part of Mr. Barlee's Book, which he Intitles, A Neceſſary Vindication, or full Abſterſion, I muſt begin with his Third Chapter: where omitting his Buffonery, (as that which ſerves to no end, but to proclaim him to the world for the moſt lantentable Zanie that ever pretended to ſtir up laughter) I will immediately addreſs my ſelf to the uncovering of his Doctrines; and of thoſe in the firſt place, which have moſt endear'd him to Mr. Whitfield, by forging God to have a hand in all the wickedneſs in the World without exception; and not onely to be the Author, but (which is much more frightful) the Neceſſitator of ſin.

His firſt Abſterſion in this kind (for ſo he was reſolved to word it,His acknowledgment of the crime for which be Apologizeth. and the Printer it ſeems did let him have his own will) is a plain acknowledgment of the Crime with which he ſtands charged. For ofDiv. Philan. c. 3. from p. 1 • 3. to p. 139. all thoſe Authors and Aſſertions which I objected to Mr. B. as to a Follower and a Diſciple, he profeſſeth to diſown no more then two. His words are theſe, [I will onely except againſt monſtrous Leviathan Hobbs, and the Book which he calls Comfort for Believers. Theſe I diſown from ever having been my Maſters, c. 3. p. 7.] Away with theſe two then; they are excepted againſt. But for Zanchie, Borrhaus, Piſcator, Beza, Zuinglius, and Martyr, and all the other ingredients in that long Catalogue, Mr. B. avows them to be his Masters. Ingenuum eſt agnoſcere per quos profeceris. But it is taught by thoſe Authors, (in the veryIbid. pages by him cited) That both the Reprobates and the Elect were preordained to ſin as ſin; That God is the Author of ſin in general, of Murder and Adultery in particular; That he is the cauſe of ſin; and in particular the cauſe of Incredulity; That God doth thruſt men on unto wickedneſs, and the like. Therefore theſe and the reſt (from p. 133. to p. 139.) are avowedly the Doctrines of Mr. Barlee. And why Mr. Hobbs is out of favour, who hath not ſpoken ſo noiſomly as theſe have done (for ought I have hitherto obſerved) I cannot gueſs at the reaſon, unleſs he hath offended by his comparative reſervedneſs.

Sect. 2.

1. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes, without the leaſt poſſibility of gaining by it. His next Absterſion (c. 3. p. 11.) hath the unhappineſs to begin with a very bold falſhood, in contradiction to his ovvn and his Readers eyes. For he profeſſeth [ every where (in his Correp. Correction) to have carefully diſtinguiſhed theſe three things; leaſt poſſibility of gaining by it. 1. The material part of ſin, 2. The formal part of ſin, 3. The ruling and overruling the ſin and ſinner. This he profeſſeth to have done in all the places which I directed unto, and fears not to ſay, that his heedful Readers may eaſily ſee it. Either he is confident of no ſuch Readers, or elſe he hath a worſe confidence to affirm point-blank he cares not what: For when he ſpake of Gods tempting men to ſin, p. 79. he ſaid, he was not at leiſure to tell in what ſenſe: nay, he did peremptorily pronounce, that God doth not onely determine all things and actions (without exception) but their ſeveral modalities too: and that of all ſuch modalities God is the ſupreme cauſe, p. 86, 87. So that according to Mr. B. God was not onely the Determiner and ſoveraign Cauſe of David's lying with Bathſhebah, which was a Thing or Action, but of every Circumſtance or Modality, and ſo of the ſinfulneſs it ſelf, the application of David's will to the forbidden object, and of every point of Aggravation with which the Adultery was loaded. Now though the broad-eſt-mouth'd. Libertine muſt ſtudy hard to ſpeak worſe, yet this was one of Mr. B's. moſt careful ſpeeches.

2. He profeſſeth his care for the clearing of God from having any efficiency in ſin, 2. His inconſiſtency with himſelf, with Mr. W. and Mr. Hick. as ſuch (p. 11.) yet it was flatly his language, as well as Mr. VV's. (p. 24.) that God muſt needs have ſome efficiency in ſin. And his Maſters ſay, in ſin as ſin, as hath been ſhewed. If by the word [as ſuch] he means another modality, then he either contradicts what was ſo lately cited from him, or elſe it is his Divinity, that God is the cauſe of ſin as ſuch. But this again is a contradiction to his clearing God from it. If he means (as Mr. VV.) that God doth will and work ſin, not as it is ſin, but as it makes for Gods glory; then he is liable to all thoſe miſeries into which Mr. VV. hath plunged himſelf, and condemns himſelf out of his own mouth, as well as out of Mr. VV's. and Mr. Hick. out of both. In a word, he is ruined ſeven ſeveral wayes; for an Acquaintance with which I ſend him back to my ſecond Chapter Sect. 14.

But. 3. Let us come to the utmoſt of his Acumen and his Care. He ſaith, [that the material part of ſin, 3. He betrayes himſelf many ways in his very proviſion for an eſcape. Look forward on Sect. 7. and 12. of this Chapter. is the doing or leaving undone ſome poſitive natural or moral act, and of that he calls God the ſoveraign Author, p. 11.] So that if Davids Adultery or lying with Bathſhebah was a poſitive act either natural or moral (which he cannot deny) he is declaredly of opinion, that God was the ſoveraign Author of it. Again, he calls it a part of ſin, whileſt he calls it the material part of ſin; and addes, that God is the Author of it: but every part of the whole muſt needs participate the nature of the whole, (eſpecially in Accidents:) and even ſo he makes God to be the Author of ſin, not only in equivalence, but even in thoſe very terms. Nor will it help him to ſay, materiale▪ ſubſtratum; for by that he muſt mean either the ſubstance or the action, either David himſelf, or his lying with Bathſhebah. If the former, he is undone; for 'tis to ſay, that a ſubſtance is a part of an accident, and that David himſelf was a part of his Adultery. If he flies unto the later, he is worſe undone then in the former; for 'tis to ſay, that the Action which is confeſſedly poſitive, is a part of that which (according to him and Mr. Hick.) is meerly privative; and that Davids lying with Bathſhebah was but part of his Adultery, or at leaſt that his Adultery was but part of his ſin. If to avoid theſe Abſurdities, he ſhall ſay the very truth, that the Action it ſelf, to wit, Davids lying with Bathſhebah, was indeed his whole Adultery, and ſo his whole ſin; then his miſeries are as preſſing as when he ſpake the greateſt falſhood, unleſs he cry peccavi, and yield the whole cauſe: For either he muſt deny that Davids lying with Bathſhebah was a poſitive thing, or ſay that God was the Author of it (as here he doth) or elſe he muſt ſay that Sin is God (which is his own Inference, c. 3. p. 112.) or he muſt ſpit in the face of his pious friend Mr. Hick. who betrayed him to that ſenſeleſs blaſphemous Inference. Now let him go which way he pleaſeth, he vvill find in concluſion (perhaps before I have done vvith him) that the laſt of the four is much the ſafeſt.

4. He ſaith that God is but a permiſſor of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , wherein he ſpeaks as I would have him. 4. He knows not how to diſſent from my Doctrine, but by charging God as the author of ſin. Again, he ſpeaks my ſenſe in the third particular, of Gods governing, ruling, and over-ruling both the ſin and the ſinner. So that our difference muſt lie in the firſt particular of the three, or there is no difference at all, but he is exactly of my opinion. If this later, why then was I the ſubject of his Correptory Correction? if the former, he is the ſubject of his own. For he knows I ever granted, that the Being of the Creature depends on God, and ſo the power to act, as well as liberty to chuſe. It muſt therefore be in ſomewhat elſe that Mr. B. thinks fit to differ from me. And what can that be but this, that God doth determin the will of the ſinner to the ſin, and is the Author either of doing, or omitting, thoſe things which are not to be done, or left undon? the very blaſphemy with which I charged him.

5. He doth profeſſe to make God the ſoveraign Author of doing, 5. He grants the whole charge, or underſtands not a moral act. or leaving undon, not onely natural, but moral acts. So that in caſe he knows the difference betwixt a natural and moral act, he muſt acknowledge it for his Doctrine, that God is the ſoveraign Author of all ſins, both of omiſſion and commiſſion.

6. Yet no ſooner hath this Abſterſor divided ſin into two parts, 6. He ingulfs himſelf in contradictions on the right hand, and on the left. (material and formal) but ſtraight he addes, that the ſecond alone is properly ſin, (p. 11.) and ſo in one ſhort breath he implies a couple of contradictions. For if he means, the ſecond part is alone the whole ſin, how then is it a part? if he means that that alone is part of the ſin, how then is it a ſecond? He muſt either prove, that two parts are but one part, or that one onely is both together, or that one half is the whole, or that the whole is no more then the formal part; or elſe he muſt confeſs, that 'tis impoſſible to ſeparate the act from the ſin (as David's lying with Bathſhebah from his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for breach of precept) and that Mr. Hick. hath abus'd him more then any man living, by making him lean upon a weapon which is often running through his elbow.

Sect. 3.

He is aſham'd to cite his own words truly. His third Abſterſion defiles him all over, and proves him conſcious to himſelf of ſuch a guilt, as admitteth of nothing in its excuſe. He pretendeth onely to have ſaid, [ He was not at leiſure in reference to Jam. 1.13, 14. fully to open in what ſenſe God may ſeem, and yet not be the Author of ſin, p. 11.] But his words were quite otherwiſe, how God may be ſaid to Correp. Corr. p. 79. tempt men unto ſin. Which here he durſt not repeat, but puts the word ſeem to ſupply the place of that Blaſphemy.

And here ſix things are very obſervable. 1. That he thought it a blaſphemy beyond his power even to palliate, 1. He proves himſelf conſcious to himſelf of being left without excuſe. to have charged God with being a Tempter, and a Tempter unto ſin too. For why ſhould he falſifie his own words, if he thought them innocent? why had he not the courage to be honeſt in the citation, if he thought his words had been excuſable. He could not think it a gallant thing to be caught condemning himſelf in print without a confeſſion that he had erred: and therefore he anchored upon this, as his leſſer miſerie of the two, hoping perhaps that I might probably overlook it; and of all other Readers he was ſecure, that they would not compare his ſecond book with his firſt.

2. It was ſtrange that he had the leiſure to write a book of thirty ſheets, the leiſure to rail, and to raiſe reports, 2. He pretends a want of leiſure to excuſe or extenuate his blaſphemy. the leiſure to charge God impiouſly with the tempting of men to ſin, but not the leiſure to ſhew how, ſo as not to infer him the Author of ſin: at leiſure to lay a ſtumbling-blook before the people, but not at leiſure to remove it out of the way. It was highly for his intereſt, to have indevoured the clearing of thoſe words from blaſphemy; why then was he wanting in any the leaſt of ſuch indeavours? even becauſe he found it a moſt unfaiſible attempt. But inſtead of confeſſing it was impoſſible to be done, he thought it handſomer to ſay, he had not leiſure to do it in.

3. Be it ſo that he was not at leiſure in his first book, 3. Yet be baulks it in his ſecond book, wherein he pretends a vindication, and cannot pretend a want of leiſure. yet how comes it to paſſe he was not at leiſure in his ſecond? Does he think it a vindication, to let us know that he is capable of no excuſe? or will he ſay that nothing ayles him, becauſe he is deſperately ſick? Either let him repent, and make ſome publick ſatisfaction for calumniating God as a Tempter unto ſin, or let him try to reconcile it with the analogy of faith, or let him declare himſelf a Libertine without delay. And if he writes another book, I do early beſpeak him to be at leiſure, and to repeat his own words without further fraud, or Tergiverſation.

4. Had he onely ſaid that God doth tempt men, 4. He forgeth God to be a Satan, and ſhewes the bottom of his doctrine of Gods decrees. he might have opened in what ſenſe, by ſaying not unto ſin. But having ſpecified the object, as well as the act, by ſaying he tempts men to ſin, he hath left nothing to be opened; having opened his whole heart, and ſhewed us the inſide, the kernel, the very marrow of his Divinity, as to the ſubject of our debate. For to tempt men unto ſin, is the definition of Satan, and the worſt that we can ſay of the Devil himſelf. The word tentare of it ſelf is very innocent, and ſignifies to prove, or to try, or to bring as 'twere unto the Touch-ſtone. But when applied unto ſin, it onely ſignifies to ſeduce, or debauch the perſon that is tempted. Vincentius Lirinenſis, out of the Latine Tranſlation Deut. 13.3. doth read the Text thus,Sed objici poteſt, cur à Deo non prohibetur doceri, quod à Deo prohibetur audiri? Quia (inquit) Tentat vos Deus. Vin. Lir. cap. 15. quia tentat vos Deus, and that is all; he doth not adde, ad peccandum: and our Engliſh Tranſlators have fitly rendred the paſſage thus, The Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your ſoul, Deut. 13.3. And in this ſenſe it is that God is ſaid to tempt Abraham, Gen. 22.1. that is, by way of proof and trial, as the Apoſtle himſelf explains it, Heb. 11.17. By Faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Iſaac.

5. But to tempt men unto ſin, 5. He ſets himſelf againſt the Scripture, and flatly contradicts S. James in particular. is ſo far from being ſpoken of God in Scripture, that it ſaith the quite contrary in the very place by him cited, Let no man ſay when he is tempred, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man, Jam. 1.13. At ſuch enmity Mr. B. doth ſtand with S. James, that what the Apoſtle ſaith we may not ſay of God Almighty, Mr. B. ſaith we may ſay of him. Let the Reader believe which of the two he thinks good. I for my part believe S. James.

For 6. To ſay that God doth tempt men to ſin, 6. He implies the worſt of contradictions, as well as blaſphemies. implyes a dull contradiction, as well as Blaſphemy. It ceaſing eo ipſo to be a ſin, when God is ſaid to tempt to it. Admit that God had bid Abraham to kill his Son (whereas he bad him onely offer him, Gen. 22.2. and diſtinctly forbad the killing of him, v. 12.) it had then been a ſacrifice, and not a ſin. Or had it then been a ſin, Abraham muſt not have done it; or if he muſt, he muſt have been ſinful by Gods command; it had been his duty to do wickedly, as ſome of our modern men teach. But as it is ſaid to be impoſſible for God to lye, (Heb. 6.18.) becauſe to lye is ſimply evil; and for God to do evil, implyes the worst contradiction: ſo is it alſo as impoſſible for God to tempt us unto ſin, becauſe to tempt unto ſin is as ſimply evil, as to lye; and for God ſo to do, implyes the worst contradiction. Nay, the tempting men to ſin, is one of the very worſt ſins which men or Devils can commit: which when Mr. B. aſcribed to God, he was neceſſitated to ſay, he was not at leiſure to tell in what ſenſe. It being as much as to ſay, he was not at leiſure to facilitate things impoſſible, to verifie falſhood in its extremity, to reconcile both parts of a contradiction, and to make a blaſphemy a very good buſineſs. To do theſe things, Mr. B. hath not been at leiſure any time theſe three years, and yet as little at leiſure to confeſs, and repent, and amend his life.

Sect. 4.

Since he is deſtitute of Excuſes, 1. He is enraged that his meaning ſhould be meaſured by his words. Look forwards on Sect. 27. where he is ſhewed confeſſing, what is properly the Author of ſin. I will take ſome notice of his complaints. His firſt is, [that I was uncharitable and irrational in inſinuating, that he would have done it in a way which would have aſperſed God with mans ſin, p. 11.] Firſt, he knowes I did not expound his meaning, but alledge his words onely, his ſaying God may be ſaid to tempt men unto ſin; leaving every Reader to judge of his meaning by his words: for by his looks or dumb ſigns, I knew not how it was poſſible to gueſs his meaning. Was I irrational 〈◊〉 this, that I recited his words, and medled not with his meaning, yet ſuppoſed his meaning to be according to his words? I know but one meaning or ſignification of his words; nor doth he yet ſo much as try to ſet down a ſecond. Suppoſe a man ſhall affirm that four and four do make twelve, and I ſhall tell him he is miſtaken, they make but eight; will he tell me I am irrational in inſinuating his meaning to be as bad as his words? yet this is our caſe in other colours. Or when the Libertines ſaid, God worketh all things without exception (which Mr. Beza ſaid as well as they) was Mr. Calvin uncharitable, when he concluded theirLook back to chap. 1. Sect. 2. Num. 4. meaning to be blaſphemous in three reſpects? I direct this Queſtion to Mr. Barlee.

2. He ſlanders Antient and Modern both Papiſts and Proteſtants.2. He ſaith his words might be explained, as ancient and modern Interpreters, both Pontifician and Proteſtant, have done, p. 12. But yet he names not any one, either ancient or modern, in the writings of whom any ſuch words are to be found, much leſs their Interpretings of any ſuch words. And I require him to tell me of any one or more of them, who have ſaid that God doth tempt men to ſin, or who have ſhewed that ſuch words may have a tolerable meaning: or if he cannot do this, let him publickly ſatisfie for the ſlander which he hath caſt upon ancient and modern writers. There is not a Libertine, or a Ranter, but may ſay the ſame thing for the greateſt blaſphemy to be thought on: calling all men irrational and uncharitable creatures, who ſhall think their meaning to be amiſs; and referring in general to Ancients and Moderns, who being taken in their particulars did never dream of any ſuch thing.

3. He ſlanders S. Auſtin in particular: and implies it a ſin for corn to grow.3. Nay Mr. B. is more unhappy in his generality; for he proves irreſiſtibly, he never read any ſuch thing, becauſe in his marginal citation there is not one word of it, though pretendedly brought even for that very purpoſe. What other reaſon can be imagined, why Mr. B. ſhould refer to the words of Auſtin, and ſet them down in his margin, but becauſe he either did not underſtand them himſelf, or hoped that ſuch of his Readers as know no Latine might ſuppoſe that Saint Auſtin had been as blaſphemous as himſelf? mark the dealing of the Diſputant. Saint Auſtin ſaith, that Nature is good in as much as it is Nature, and that Nature is evil in as much as it is vicious; Ergo, God may be ſaid in ſome way to tempt men unto ſin, according to Auſtin. Is not this a rare Logician? But mark him farther; Auſtin inſtanceth in making ſtolne corn to grow (p. 12.) what then? why then according to Auſtine (ſaith Mr. W.) God may be ſaid to tempt men unto ſin. Auditum admiſſi Fletum teneatis amici? either he thinks it a ſin for corn to grow when it is ſtolne, and that it grows upon being tempted, or elſe he ſpeaks as impertinently as the art of man can deviſe; and hath nothing to excuſe it but (what is very much worſe) his opinion that the Thief was tempted by God to ſteal that corn, which being ſtolne, God makes to grow. As if the growing of ſuch corn were the peculiar bleſſing of the Almighty upon the Thief, in reward of that ſtealth to which he yeilded, when ſo divinely tempted as Mr. B. ſuppoſeth him to have been. This is not ridiculous, for 'tis deplorably ſad, and ſhould ſtir up the pity as well as indignation of all that read it.

Sect. 5.

1. His uncharitable reflexion on his own Dr. Twiſſe. His next complaint is, [ that I was ſupercilious in overlooking that which he directed me to out of Doctor Twiſſe, p. 12.] Firſt, in the page which he referres to, he cites not a ſyllable from Doctor Twiſſe, (as in other places he doth, and as no doubt he would have done, if he had thought it for his Intereſt) but magiſteriallyCorrep. cor. p. 79. ſaith, [Let him conſult with Doctor Twiſſe againſt Mr. Hoard, from p. 17. to p. 28.] a Book I never yet ſaw, nor know where to bo • row, and why I ſhould buy it at his pleaſure, I know no reaſon. If Dr. Twiſſe in thoſe pages accuſeth God of tempting men to ſin, and then excuſeth him by ſaying, that 'tis not a ſin to be a Tempter unto ſin (which yet we know is a ſin in grain, and ſo, as incompetible to God as any thing elſe that can be named) I ſhall be as ſorry for the Doctor as now I am for his Timothy, and think the Blasphemy but ſo much the worſe. But if the Doctor ſaith no ſuch thing, Mr. B. is guilty of having perſecuted the dead with his invention.

2. Doctor Twiſſe his own words cited.2. If Mr. B. will needs know what was delivered in good earneſt by Doctor Twiſſe, concerning the ſenſe and the manner of Gods temp • ing men to ſin (as Mr. B. words it) I will tell him out of my memory of the Doctors own words, not (as he) from my invention; that in caſe I ſhall by accident do the Author ſome hurt, it may be impoſſible for me to do him wrong. The Doctor taking upon him to ſhew G ds concurrence to the commiſſion of ſin, doth affirm in plain terms, [ That Cùm tamen manifeſtum ſit, ulteriorem aliquam, per occaſiones agendi ſuppeditatas, ad peccata (ut it a dicam) proſtitutionem requiri, quae ſine tentationibus ad peccandum inducentibus abſolvi non poteſt. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. ſect. 2. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156. beſides his denial of efficacious Grace, there is, by occaſions of acting offered, a farther proſtitution to ſins required, which proſtitution cannot be perfected without temptations inducing to ſin, ad peccandum (the word is) to the Action of ſinning. ] Would you have him explain his meaning? he doth it thus;Licet Deo, & occaſiones quidvis agendi ſubminiſtrare, eaſque ita movere, & agere, ut animum hominis pulſent, & imaginationem afficiant verè, juxta quoſcunque gradus aut utilitatis, aut &c. Id. Ibid. p. 156. Col. 2. [God doth ſo move and put on the occaſions which he ſubminiſters, that they ſmite the mind, and truly affect the imagination, according to all thoſe degrees, either of profit, or pleaſure, or opportunity of acting, repreſented to the ſinner in thoſe occaſions. ] I have ſhewed my knowledge of Doctor Twiſſe his opinion, in the moſt accurate of his writings againſt Arminius. But his medlings with Mr. Hoard I never read. Had Mr. B. produced his words as I have done, they had perhaps been as little to his advantage: yet ſtill they come ſhort of Mr. B's. in point of broadneſs at leaſt, if not of ſenſe.

Sect. 6.

6. Mr. W's. proof of his falſhoods by his ſelf-contradictions. It is another of his complaints, [ That I did barely repeat his ſeveral ſayings, without any the least ſhew of confutation, when they were wary enough, and commonly enough received, p. 12.] Here his falſities are loaded with his ſelf-contradictions. 1. A little before he had accuſed me of irrational and uncharitable inſinuations, and often told me of wreſting his words; yet now he ſignally confeſſeth, that I did barely repeat his words. And could I poſſibly have uſed him with greater equity and compaſſion, then to ſhew his Doctrines by their own light only, without thoſe Gloſes, Inferences, and Aggravations, with which I might eaſily have expoſed them to greater ſhame? What doth he now but proclaim me the faireſt Adverſary, and the moſt tender, that he could poſſibly have provoked?

2. He unavoidably chargeth God with ſin in himſelf, as may irrefragably be proved from Heb. 6.18. 2. Admit it were true (what is moſt falſe) that I did barely ſet down his words, but never added a confutation; this had but tended unto his greater diſadvantage. For how groſly blaſphemous muſt thoſe words be, which were ſufficiently puniſhed by being ſhewed? And how apparently falſe muſt that have been, the very diſcovering of which I could think enough for a Confutation? If I accuſe a man of ſaying, that God doth tempt men to ſin, I need no other proof, then the page of the Book wherein the words lie printed; it being taken for granted, that the words are Blaſphemy in the higheſt; it being no leſs then to ſay, that God is Satan, or a ſinner. For to tempt men unto ſin is a greater ſin then to lye, and hath a blacker mark put upon it throughout the Scriptures: but 'tis a great blaſphemy to ſay, that God doth lye; and a greater, by conſequence, to ſay he tempts men to ſin. VVhy ſaith the Scripture, It is impoſsible for God to lye, but becauſe it is impoſſible for God to do evil? And for the very ſame reaſon, it is impoſſible for God to tempt men to ſin. And though the making this appear in its native colours, muſt needs be pungent to Mr. B. yet how can I help it, when he complains of me to the world, that I repeatd his words, but did not confute them?

3. He little needed a confutation.3. How little reaſon he had to complain of that, the Reader may ſee in many places of my Div. Philanthropie defended. And the Index will help him to make quick work of his experiment. But ſome of his words were ſo conſpicuouſly blaſphemous, that I thought it ſufficient to h • ng them out upon a Gibbet; they having a natural propenſ • on to ſcare the Reader with their appearance. If a School-boy ſhould ſay, that God did tempt him to be a Truant, (citing the words of Mr. B. for his ſecurity) his Maſter would certainly think it fitteſt to confute him only with a Ferular.

4. When he is moſt unwary he is wary enough, and implies his blaſphemies common to him with his party.4. In that he ſaith his words were wary enough to be uttered even in print, he leaves us to imagine how much more he may ſay in his private Pulpit, and how much more in his private Parlour, where he is leſs kept in awe, then when he appears upon the Theatre. And when he addes, that ſuch words are commonly enough received, he needs muſt mean his own Party; for which the moſt rigid will hardly thank him, and the moderater ſort will caſt it off as a ſlander. When Mr. B. had ſaid, that God doth ſtir up men to unjuſt acts, he opened his mind by this ſimile, even as a man puts ſpurs to a dull Jade. And though he confeſſeth that the expreſſions of Mr. Calvin, Zuinglius, and Dr. Twiſſe, may be poſſibly too high, (p. 8.) nay that they ſpake with ſomeCorrept. Corr. p. 56. fearfulneſs of what they ſpake, nay though the Fathers of the Church were religiouſly afraid to ſpeak the like (by the confeſſion of Mr.Calv. Inſtit. l. 2. c. 4. ſect. 3. ſol. 95. Calvin) and though Mr. B. doth approve, yea defend their expreſſions, as well as adde to their number as black as any, yet now he boaſts that they were wary enough, and he hath nothing (happy Creature!) for which to crave mercy.

5. He is convicted by Dr. Twiſſe of making God the Author of ſin.5. What he preſently addes of his words and meaning at other times, when he denies that God is the Author of ſin, doth but adde to his impiety a ſelf-contradiction. My proof of which ſhall be taken partly from himſelf, and partly from Dr. Twiſſe. It is ſaid expreſly by himſelf, (p. 11.) That God is the ſoveraign Author of the material part of ſin; Fornicatio notat peccatum, non tantùm ſecundum formale ejus, quà peccatum eſt; ſed & ſecundum materiale ejus, quà actus eſt. Twiſſ. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. Digr. 2. c. 14. p. 155. and as expreſly by Doctor Twiſſe, that Fornication denoteth ſin, not onely according to its formal part, but alſo according to its material part. Or if he had not ſaid it (as he hath) in thoſe very words, yet he approved of thoſe words in Borrhaus and Zuinglius, and ſaid it often himſelf in words equivalent, yea divers times in very much worſe; which however I have already made plain enough, yet in the Tract of my account I ſhall make it much plainer.

Sect. 7.

He makes no difference b • twixt the act of adultery, and of marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both. Look forward on c. 3. ſect. 12. Now (Reader) obſerve how our intimate acquaintance begins to unboſome himſelf to us. His words and ſyllables are theſe; He that cannot or will not tell, how God may be ſaid to excite men to the act of adultery, which to the adulterer ſo excited is ſin, though not to God, neither will he tell how God without ſin doth ſtir up men to the act of lying with their lawful wives (for it is ad utrumque but ejuſdem generis excitatio & concurſus) unleſs he makes himſelf guilty of ſomething of ſinful concupiſcence, which alwayes more or leſs ſince the fall cleaves to the act, p. 12.] Here is matter for a whole Volume, if I could think it fit to give the reins to my pen upon ſuch a large ſubject; but many things do admoniſh me to ſtudy brevity and diſpatch. I will therefore firſt ſend back my Reader to what ILook back to ch. 1. ſect. 2. num. 7. & ch. 2. ſect. 9. ſpake (upon occaſion offered to me by Mr. W.) to theſe very words. Next I will ſet down the Branches of Mr. B's Doctrine herein cont • ined. As 1. That God may be ſaid to excite (that is in Engliſh, to ſtir up) men to the act of adultery. 2. That that to which the adulterer is ſo excited is a ſin. 3. That (by a conſequence immediate and unavoidable) God may be ſaid to excite or ſtir up men to ſin. 4. That Gods concurrence and excitation is of the very ſame kind, both to the lawful and unlawful act; to the matrimonial, which he commanded, and to the adulterous, which he forbad. Now that he who exciteth any agent to any act, is properly ſaid to be the Author of that to which he exciteth, is evident to as many as underſtand the word Author, and the uſes of it in Cla • ſick Writers; of which that none may be ignorant, I do intend very ſhortly to make proviſion. And having ſaid but thus much, I ſhall onely ask of Mr. B. what ſinful concupiſcence is that he ſpeaks of (as unavoidable and inſeparable) in a mans lying with his wife, according to Gods moſt holy and mo • t wiſe Inſtitution, for the procreation of children, that he may train them to the ſervice and glory of God? Is it lawful, commanded, pronounced honourable in Scripture, and undefiled, and (after all this) is it ſinful too? This was the horrible doctrine of the Encratitae, from whom the Fathers were wont to vindicate the Catholick Doctrine of Original ſin. But Mr. B. is worſe then the Encratitae, becauſe he holds this Doctrine, and is yet the husband of two wives. He may perhaps have ſpoken truth in the noiſome inſtance of his own ſecrets, (which yet I wonder he would thus publickly reveal,) but from his particular experience of himſelf, he was moſt ſhamefully advis'd to draw a gneral concluſion.

Sect. 8.

He treads not many ſteps farther, 1. The undeniable blaſphemies which enſue upon Mr. B's. doctrine of praedeſtination. but he ſtumbles and falls down, and bruiſeth himſelf, in a moſt deplorable and piteous manner. And I deſire to make it the more illuſtrious, that Lookers on may take warning by his miſhap; yea that himſelf (if it is poſſible) may no longer be able to endure his Doctrines. The Caſe ſtands thus: I had ſaid in myCorrect Cop. p. 49. Notes, [ God foreſees I will write, not of neceſſity, but choice; ſo that his foreſight doth not make an abſolute and peremptory neceſſity, but inferrs a neceſſity on ſuppoſition.] Mr. Barlee ſaith, that this is ſenſleſs; and as if he thought that neceſſity had been the Engliſh of Praedestination, he changeth my words in this manner: [It is ſenſeleſs to ſay that Praeſcience doth infer a Praedeſtination, p. 13.] In oppoſition to which he ſets down this as a maxime, [ That Note, that he affirmeth (in It's p. 61.) that the will in reſpect of Gods decree is neceſſarily determ • ned to will. Praeſcience of a thing future muſt needs praeſuppoſe a Praedeſtination, or a Praedetermination of it, pag. 13. lin. 26.] Here it is that I deſire the ſeduced Reader will give attention. This is one of the firſt ſtones at which the men of that way are wont to ſtumble: if this is happily removed, both they that are ſtaggering will ſtand upright, and they that are down (if they are not ſtomachful and childiſh) will ſurely riſe. Since Mr. B. hath been my Patient, I have often told him what he ayles, but he thought that the malady was ſomewhat too loathſome to be acknowledged. I will therefore now perform two things: Firſt, I will manifeſt his diſeaſe, together with the great cauſe, and then I will plainly demonſtrate the means of cure.

2. The great diſceaſe of making God the Author of ſin.2. The Diſeaſe (as I have frequently obſerved) is this; That he and his Maſters do moſt openly, clearly, and unexcuſably make God to be the Fountain, Author, or Cauſe of ſin, of all ſin, of every ſin, without exception; as much the Author of it as the ſinner himſelf, and as much as Satan who tempts him to ſin, and in ſome reſpects much more then both. VVhich before I come to demonſtrate, I will name the Cauſe of this Diſeaſe; which being premiſed, muſt needs be followed by its effects.

3. The original cauſe of the diſeaſe.3. The Cauſe of it is this; That they believe Gods praeſcience or fore-knowledge of all things and events, to be neither praevious to, nor ſimultaneous with, but directly after his praedetermination of them. Mr. Calvin expreſſed it thus; See the Divine purity defended, ch. 7. ſect. 8. p. 74. that God did therefore fore-know all things, becauſe he fore-ordained all things: of which I have ſpoken on another occaſion. And now Mr. Barlee expreſſeth it thus, [Gods praeſcience of a thing future must needs praeſuppoſe a praedestination, or a praedetermination of it.]

4. The Patient proved extrembly ſick of the diſeaſe by his own acknowledgment of the cauſe. Look ſorward on the tenth Section of this Chapter. 4. That Mr. B. is ſick of the diſeaſe I mentioned, I now prove out of his words, which declare the Cauſe to be reigning in him. And to make the ſhorter work of it, I ſhall proceed to conviction by this Dilemma. Doth he believe Gods praeſcience of ſin, or not? If he doth not, then all his own party will ſend him packing to the Anticyrae, every mouth will be opened full wide againſt him: he will not therefore dare to ſay No to my Dilemma. And if he ſaith Yes, his calamity will be greater; for adhering to his Maxime, he muſt confeſs his Doctrine to be this, That God did praedetermine ſin, antecedently to his praeſcience or fore-knowledge of ſin. To make it plain by Syllogiſm;

1. He who holds that Gods praeſcience of what is future muſt needs p eſuppoſe his praedetermination of it, holds that the praedetermination praecedes the praeſcience.

2. But Mr. B. doth declaredly hold the former.

3. Therefore he alſo doth hold the later.

This being made thus evident to the moſt ignorant of his Favourers, and undeniable to the moſt obſtinate, I will now go on to prove my Neceſſary Aſſertion, That Mr. B. is ſick of the moſt loathſome and the moſt dangerous Diſeaſe, of making God to be the Author and Cauſe of ſin.

5. Four ſhort arguments to confirm it, left for every Reader to enlarge upon in his thoughts.1. If God foreſaw nothing, but as being firſt fore-appointed or predetermined by himſelf, then he foreſaw not any mans determination of his will to ſin, until himſelf had predetermined that mans determination of his will to ſin. Now if the Devil is the cauſe of another mans ſinning, by meerly inclining his will to ſin, and if the ſinner himſelf is another cauſe of his ſin by meerly determining his will to ſin, (though not as ſin, but under the notion and appearance at leaſt of good;) how can God be thought leſs, if from all Eternity (before the Man or the Devil had any exiſtence) he had predetermined doth the temptation of the one, (which is the ſin of the Devil) and the ſin of the other (who yields himſelf captive to that temptation) yea, the determination of both their wills to both their ſins? Yet thus he did (ſaith Mr. B.) at leaſt in ſigno rationis, before he could be able to foreſee the one or the other.

2. If he who ſhall command or adviſe a man to do a thing which he knows to be forbidden, and ſo a ſin, cannot poſſibly be conceived to be leſs then a concauſe, and coadjutor; what then muſt he be concluded, who doth abſolutely and irreſiſtibly predetermine and tye up the will to ſin?

3. God in his Law doth forbid the whole moral act, (to wit, Adultery or Murder) and the liberty of the Agent to commit it; (Thou ſhalt not do this or that:) he doth not onely forbid the obliquity of the Act abſtracted from the Act, (as the repugnance of killing an innocent with the Law, which ſaith, Thou ſhalt not kill, abſtracted from killing;) for this laſt is impoſſible to be ſo much as conceived, much leſs to be ex parte rei, and implies a groſs contradiction. God forbids us to blaſpheme, he doth not forbid us to blaſpheme amiſs, implying it poſſible to blaſpheme aright. So that if he predetermines the will of man, (or man as a voluntary Agent) to the poſitive Act of blaſpheming, he predetermines to that which he forbids, that is, to ſin. And if the union of the pravity with the Act doth move God to forbid that the Act it ſelf be freely done, how can he then predetermine that it ſhall be done freely? or admitting that he can, who is then the Author of ſin? It is hard to ſay, whether the impoſſibility on one hand, or the abſurdity on the other, is more obſervable in the Caſe.

Impoſsibilium nulla eſt obligatio.4. If God is not, by his predetermination of ſin, the Author of ſin, who is then the Author of it? Man cannot be, for in that caſe he cannot ſin. For can he poſſibly hinder the for bidden Act from having a pravity or filth, on ſuppoſition that it be free, and known to be forbidden? Or can he ſo order the matter, that there ſhall not be an Entity of the Act, a wilfulneſs of the Agent, nor a teſtimony of conſcience againſt the thing done? No, this is impoſſible, the predetermination being ſuppoſed: or elſe it is a being too ſtrong for God; which is blaſphemous, as well as impoſſible. How then can God be conceived to exact any thing of his Creature, who doth the thing that is forbid, being predetermined to the Act which is forbidden, and to every circumſtance of the Act? What is ſaid of man, may be repeated of the Devil; and if neither of them can be the Author of ſin, according to Mr. B's. Maximes, the Reader knowes what to think of Him and Them.

Sect. 9.

To remove the cauſe of this Noyſom and Inveterate Diſeaſe, and to keep it from being Deſperate, 1. The eaſie and infallible means of cure to all who are not reſolved to contine ſick. at leaſt from being Epidemical, I muſt clear the point of Gods Praeſcience to my leſs inſtructed and common Readers, ſuch as Mr. W. and Mr. B. appear to be. And becauſe they are reckoned as chief men of their party, there muſt needs be great numbers who partake with them in their greateſt wants. Firſt, they ſeem not to conſider that Praeſcience is nothing elſe but the Latine word for foreknowledge, or elſe not to know what knowledge naturally importeth; and ſo diſcern not preciſely wherein Gods Knowledge doth differ from his Decree. How elſe could they imagin (withMr. W. diſcovers his opinion, that whatever God foreknowes muſt neceſſarily come to paſs (and ſo all ſins) as well as whatever he decrees, doth the like. Mr. W.) that Gods foreknowledge doth neceſſitate as well as his decree? or how could they dream (with Mr. B.) that Gods foreknowledge of what is future (and ſo of all ſins) is after his praedetermination? two groſs abſurdities, not repugnant onely to reaſon and common ſenſe, but inconſistent with one another, yet both affirm'd by the ſame ſort of men. By Mr. Hobbs, amongſt others, in his Animadverſions on Biſhop Bramhal. In his Anſw. to an Object. p. 40. of his Extent of Div. Prov. Mr. B. c. 3. p. 26. and Mr. Hobbs, p. 108.

2. They will ſoon quit the firſt, if they have but the patience to conſide • , 2. The nature of knowledge opened, and diſtinguiſhed from decree. that ſcientia eſt habitus concluſionis, as ſimplex intelligentia is principiorum. VVhen the mind is in poſſeſſion of any concluſion immediately flowing from the premiſſes, and united to them by an eſſential tye, then the rational Agent is ſaid properly to know. Scire eſt per cauſam ſcire. To know is not to make either the cauſe or the effect; but to find out the effect by the cauſe (as in Demonſtration à priori,) or to track the cauſe by the footſteps of the effect (as in Demonſtration à poſteriori.) This is great plainneſs to ſuch as know but a little Latine; but I labour for them who underſtand none at all: to them I ſpeak thus. To know is properly an Act of the Intellect; but to decree or determine is an Act of the Will. The Act of knowing preſuppoſeth the object, which needs muſt be knowable by a priority of nature, before it is poſſible to be actually known. There may be ſcibile, or a thing knowable, where there isNote that ſcibile and ſcientia are only Kelata ſecundum à ci, and are not capable of being both ways converted per converſionem ſimplicem, in reſpect of us who are not omniſcient. In which reſpect only this thing is ſpoken. not yet ſcientia or an actual knowledge of it, (ſuch as a very great part of the habitable world, until Chriſtopher Columbus and Americus Veſpuſius had begun their Diſcoveries.) But an actual knowledge cannot poſſibly be imagined before an object knowable, nay muſt imply its being actually known. And though the object is future (as in all foreknowledge) yet even then it muſt be actual in its Idea, and made preſent unto the mind by its intelligible ſpecies. In which reſpect it was rightly affirmed by thePlotin. Enn. 5. l. 9. c. 13. & Enn. 6. l. 3. c. 1. Platonicks, that before the Creation of this viſible world, there was in Gods mind a World Intelligible, that is, an Exemplary Cauſe, an idea or Platform, according to which the world was made. But now to Decree is another thing, as being an act of the will, and being ſuppoſed to be abſolute, is (for that very reaſon) effective alſo. For though Gods Decree alone (abſtractively conſidered) will not cauſe a neceſſity; yet his decreeing to do, being alwayes followed with his doing what he decreeeth, muſt needs (in ſenſu iſto compoſito) neceſſitate the object which is decreed.

3. Gods foreknowledge doth not make things ſimply to be, and therefore makes them not to be of neceſsity. 3. Though Gods abſolute decree of doing any thing doth cauſe a neceſsity of the event, yet his foreknowledge doth not, nor poſsibly can it. But his Decree (I ſpeak of) muſt needs do both. This may be illuſtrated by a Phyſicians foreknowledge of alteration in the Patient upon a critical day, which yet hath nothing of efficiency in its coming to paſs. But if the Phyſician doth decree to work a change in the Patient, by ſuch or ſuch means as he reſolves on, he is then the Author of ſuch a change; and if it be with a purpoſe to diſpatch the Patient, it is not his prophecy, but his murder.

4. If Gods foreknowledge did imprint a real neceſſity on the things foreknown, 4. The abſurdity which would follow if it were ſo. this portentous abſurdity would unavoidably follow, that he muſt act in nothing freely, but in every thing as a neceſsitated and limited Agent. A blaſphemy not to be eſcaped but by the denial of his omniſcience from all Eternity, which is every whit as great a blaſphemy. And to the ſame inconvenience the irrespective predeſtination muſt needs be ſubject.

5. If Gods foreknowledge did neceſſitate the things foreknown, it was either ſimply as foreknowledge, 5. Other abſurdities which would follow. or as Gods foreknowledge in particular. Not as the firſt, becauſe then the foreknowledge of every man that can propheſie would be the cauſe of things future which he foretells. Cyrus then had been beholding to the Prophet Iſaiah for his birth, becauſe the Prophet foreknew it a hundred years beforehand. Not as the firſt therefore; nor yet as theNote, that God foreknew what himſelf would chuſe to do; yet did not neceſsitate himſelf. He eternally foreknew that he would in time let Adam fall; and not onely let him, but help him to riſe unto repentance: yet who dares ſay he was neceſſitated to either? ſecond, becauſe the act is not the cauſe of the object, but by a priority of order (as I ſhewed before) the object of knowledge is before the act, how long ſoever it may be after by a poſteriority of Time. It muſt firſt have been true, that there ſhould be ſuch a man as Cyrus, or elſe it had not been poſſible for the holy Prophet to have foreknown it. God foreknew all things that are good, as being certain that he would do them; and he alſo foreknew all things that are evil, as being certain that wicked Agents would freely do them, if they were not hindered; and as certain that he would not hinder, but permit, or ſuffer them to be done. Both were preſent to his omniſcience from all eternity.

6. There is no quicker way to make this point moſt plain and eaſie, 6. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is paſt. then by bidding the obſtinate to conſider, that knowledge is as properly of things paſt, as future. But it implies a contradiction, for a preſent act of knowledge to neceſsitate or cauſe a thing quite paſt. The Almighty knows at this inſtant that Adam fell, as well as he knew from eternity that Adam would fall. Now all acts of true knowledge muſt needs imply infallibility; elſe it cannot be perfect knowledge, but ſome other thing; as confidence, belief, opinion, ſuspicion, or ſhrewd conjecture. From whence it follows, that all acts of true knowledge do infer a neceſſity, although they cannot make any, to wit, a neceſsity of conſequence ariſing from the truth of a propoſition. But ſuch a neceſsity is inferred from every true knowledge of what is paſt as well as from a foreknowledge of what is coming: which my hasty Adverſaries having not hitherto conſidered, they have inceſſantly confounded it with the antecedent and abſolute neceſsity of the conſequent, even ſuch as is conferred by every cauſe on its effect. And therefore next I muſt enforce them (do what they can to the contrary) to diſcern a palpable difference betwixt theſe two; and to diſcern it ſo clearly, as not to be able to diſſent, however able to conceal it by a diſsimulation.

7. Before I ſhew the Caſe in God, I will provide ſome light for the weaker-eyed Reader to ſee it by. 7. A manifeſtation of the wide difference between a neceſſity of conſequence from the antecedent to the ſequel, and a neceſsity of the conſequent impoſed by the cauſe upon the effect. This is conſpicuous to All, that if I hear a man blaſpheme againſt his Maker, it doth neceſſarily follow that he blasphemeth; for if he doth not, I do not hear him, it being impoſſible to hear what is not to be heard: but this being granted that I do really hear the man blaſpheme, his blaſphemy is inferred by a moſt neceſſary ſequel. Yet this is onely a Neceſſity of Conſequence, ariſing from the Truth of a Propoſition; wherein the reality of my hearing his blaſphemy being ſuppoſed, the reality of the blaſphemy doth unavoidably follow. But my hearing him blaspheme doth not neceſsitate his blaſpheming; for it would be what it is, if I did not hear it. And though I hear him blaſpheming whilest he blaſphemes, yet in order of nature his blaſpheming hath the priority; for he muſt be to be heard, before I can hear him. From whence it is manifeſt, that here is not any abſolute or antecedent neceſsity, or a neceſsity of the thing, as of the conſequent or effect. But his blaſphemy is a voluntary and contingent Action. Now by this it will be eaſie for the thickest capacity to diſcern, that if God foreknew from eternity this blaſphemy of the man, then by a neceſsary conſequence the man doth really blaſpheme: For if he doth not, God could not poſſibly foreknow he doth. But this is only a neceſsity ariſing from the truth of that Propoſition, That God's foreknowledge is infallible, or not capable of erring, and that what he foreknows is very really foreknown. It is not a neceſsity of the exiſtence of the thing, imprinted in the blaſphemer by Gods foreknowledge; but ſtill the blaſphemy is a voluntary and contingent action: which it could not be, if the man did commit it by an antecedent Neceſsitation. And if he did, ſuch antecedent Neceſsitation muſt have flown from God's Omnipotence, and not at all from his foreknowledge. It being the nature of knowledge, not to produce its object, but to ſuppoſe it. God doth contemplate by his knowledge what he effecteth by his power. But it is not in his power to be effective of ſin, much leſs in his foreknowledge to be neceſsitative of blasphemy, which whoſoever ſhall affirm, will be a very unskilful and dull blaſphemer. For

8. As Gods Decree is Actio ad extra, ſo is his foreknowledge alſo; 8. Foreknowledge therefore doth not neceſſitate. yet (by the Mr. Wh. p. 37. Where note that M. W. doth call Gods decree, Actus Dei ad Intra, which in another man had been a ſtrange miſtake. Note alſo, that Gods knowledge of himſelfe is actio ad intra, though his foreknowledge of us is actio ad extra. confeſsion of the Adverſary) it doth not ponere quicquam in ob • ecto: being an action within himſelf (ſaith Mr. W.) it works not any thing upon the Creature, and therefore doth not neceſsitate; for whoſoever neceſsitates, does make neceſſary, not infer it onely. He makes a neceſſity in the thing which he neceſsitates, not onely infers it in a propoſition which another makes of things contingent. If the Adverſaries expound the word Neceſsitative, not by effective, but illative, then firſt they ſpeak non-ſenſe before they expound it, and after the Expoſition they give up their Cauſe. Firſt they ſpeak nonſenſe, in ſaying that Gods foreknowledge doth antecedently neceſſitate the being of ſin, when it infers onely that it will be; and next they give up their Cauſe, in confeſſing that there is not an antecedent neceſsity of all events, but a ſuppoſitive neceſsity of ſome, or a neceſſity of conſequence, ariſing onely from the truth of a propoſition, whoſe Antecedent doth of neceſſity infer the Sequel.

9. Having ſnewed the difference betwixt an abſolute cauſal and a conditional conſequential Neceſſity, and freed the praeſcience of God from the vulgar and ſenſeleſs imputation; 9. It is vain for the Adverſaries to quit the firſt error, unleſs they quit the ſecond alſo. how will the men of that way be ever able to free themſelves? For admit they quit the firſt great error of making Gods praeſcience to neceſsitate ſin, yet ſtill they live in the miſery of the ſecond, which is their abſolute decree and praedetermination of all events. For this can never be freed from laying abſolute neceſsity, having that influence on the effect which praeſcience cannot be thought to have. As if I decree that my ſervant ſhall rob my Neighbour, I do contribute more towards it, then if I onely foreſee that he will voluntarily do it: and ſuppoſing my decree to be irreſiſtible (as 'tis ſuppoſed to be in God) it muſt produce a Cauſal Neceſsity. The common Note here, that Mr. W. holding the doctrine of Free-will, which he try's to reconcile with his abſolute decree of all things, was betrayed (poor man!) into this ſad ſpeech; [God having decreed the Fall of Adam, it was neceſſary that this ſhould come to paſſe; but it was alſo neceſſary that it ſhould come to paſſe freely] Ext. of Div. Prov. c. 9. p. 42. and again he ſaith [It was neceſſary that the firſt man ſhould ſin, upon ſuppoſition of Gods Decree, and that he ſhould ſin freely. Ibid. p. 40. See the Divine Purity Defended, c. 8. p. 80, 81, 82. ſhift is too ſhameful to ſerve in ſtead of an excuſe. For if God did abſolutely decree that man ſhould voluntarily ſin, (which they are oftenTreatiſe of the Paſsions, &c. ch. 42. p. 544, 545. fain to ſay, though it implies a Contradiction) then he might poſſibly have forborne the commiſſion of it (becauſe he did voluntarily commit it) which yet was abſolutely impoſsible, if God had abſolutely decreed it.

I think it fit in this place to inſert a paſſage of Doctor Reynolds, Dr. Reyn. his concurrence with T. P. in this point. both becauſe he doth condemn and ſeverely cenſure the very ſame error which I at this inſtant do write againſt, and alſo becauſe he is a perſon whom Mr. W. and Mr. B. conclude to be of their party.Note, that he means an Hypothetical Neceſsity, or of the conſequence, as appears by his laſt words. His words are theſe, Others there have been yet more impious, which ſeek to faſten all the corruptions of their wills on ſomething above the Heavens, even the eternal foreknowledge and the providence of God. As if my foreknowledge that on the morrow the Sun will riſe, or that ſuch men as theſe ſhall one day be brought to a moſt ſevere doom, were the cauſe working a neceſsity of the next day, or the laſt Judgement. It is true indeed, Gods praeſcience implies a neceſsity after that manner as he foreknows; but this is Neceſſitas onely Infallibilitatis, in regard of his undoceivable knowledge, which ever foreſees things as they will certainly come to paſs, by the free or natural working of the Agents whence they proceed. It is not neceſſitas coactionis, or DETERMINATIONIS, whereby the will of man is, without any other diſpoſition or propenſion in it ſelf, enforced or unſpontaneouſly determined to the producing of ſuch effects. The actions of our will are not therefore neceſſarily executed, ☜ becauſe they were foreknown; but therefore they were foreknown, becauſe our will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and election.] Now how contrary this is to Beza, Wollebius, and Mr. W. in particular, all do know who have read theſe four: And how contrary in general to all the enemies of Arminius, all can tell who have any acquaintance with them all. It is evident by the laſt period, that Dr. Reynolds pleadeth for free-will as much as I have ever done.

I ſhall conclude this Subject by putting the Adverſary in mind, that the Engliſh of Infallible is undeceivable, whereas the men of that way do uſe it to ſignifie irreſistible: which is as groſs a miſtake, as if they ſhould hearken with their eyes, or try to ſee with their ears. Were it not for the aſsiſtance of ſuch obſtinate miſtakes, they would want wherewith to mutter againſt the Cogency of Truth. Two ſhort propoſitions will ſubdue their error, if it lies not protected by an invincible perverſeneſs.

1. What God decreed to effect, will come to paſs unavoidably, and by a neceſsitation, becauſe his abſolute will and his power cannot poſſibly be reſiſted. 2. But what he onely decreed to permit, will contingently come to paſs; yet (in caſe he hath foreſeen it will come to paſs) with a certainty of event, becauſe his foreknowledge is infallible, and cannot poſſibly be deceived.

What he decreed to effect is every way good, but what is morally evil he decreed onely to permit, and patiently, but wiſely, to ſuffer Men and Devils to effect, (that is, not to hinder forcibly from being effected,) and being effected by the wilfulneſs of Men or Devils, to over-rule and order to the beſt advantages and ends to which they are capable of being made to ſerve.

10. Now I come to ſhew the ſenſeleſneſs of the next great error, 10. Gods praeſcience doth not of neceſsity praeſuppoſe a pradetermination. which Mr. B. expreſſeth in theſe words, [That praeſcience of a thing future muſt needs praeſuppoſe a praedeſtination, or a praedetermination of it, p. 13.] It ſeems the man did not know, & even his Maſters did not conſider, that cauſa exemplaris is in order of nature before the efficient, and thought that God could decree to do ſomething, before he knew what he would decree to do. If God did praedetermine before he foreknew, he praedetermined at a venture he knew not what. For he knew it not, until he had praedetermined it, if it was needful for his praeſcience to praeſuppoſe his praedetermination. But it is blaſphemy to ſay what unavoidably doth infer, That God decreed he knew not what, until he had actually decreed it. God knew all things, which yet he cannot be conceived to have done, if any thing can be conceived before his knowledge. From the firſt moment of Eternity (with pardon to the word Moment, which I onely uſe to reveal my meaning, as Unum in Metaphyſicks is ſaid to be momento primo, verum, ſecundo, bonum, tertio,) God knew himſelf, his own eſſence, attributes and actions, his actions ad intra as well as ad extra; therefore he knew he would decree, as well as what he would decree, and how he would decree it. He knew he would decree a world; and in that, all voluntarily, as well as natural Agents. So that though this viſible world was temporal, yet the platform of it (the intelligible world) was eternal: it being, before it was created, in mente Dei conceived. For he did not know nothing, when he knew he would create it, at an infinite diſtance from its creation. He knew it eternally, but created it in time; betwixt which two there is an infinite diſtance. As he knew what, ſo alſo how things would be, and how himſelf would decree them. Somethings abſolutely, as the being of man; other things conditionally, as the puniſhment of man: which could not poſſibly be conſidered, much leſs decreed, without reſpect unto ſin, which the very word Puniſhment muſt praeſuppoſe. Beſides, if Gods praeſcience preceded not his Decrees of Election and Reprobation, there was not a • moment in Eternity in which he was free to elect or reprobate: For the freedome to chuſe muſt needs precede the act of choice; and to deny God his freedom in his elections, is as impious as irrational.

11. But rather praedetermination doth connotate praeſcience, if not (in ſome ſenſe) praeſuppoſe it alſo.11. Well then, It being blaſphemouſly irrational, to ſay that God did praedetermine he knew not what, or before he knew what, (in any ſenſe) 'tis plain his praedetermination praeceded not his praeſcience, and by conſequence his praeſcience praeſuppoſed not his praedetermination; but rather his praedetermination (of what he did praedetermine) did connotate his praeſcience, if not praeſuppoſe it. Let this one thing be well conſidered, that though we cannot ſay with truth or modeſty, God decreed or praedetermined any one the leaſt thing which he did not know; yet we may ſay with great truth, that he knew what he wouldThis is confeſſed by Mr. B. l. 3. p. 22. not decree, as well as what he would. And again, Verum, the object of the Intellect, is in order of nature before Bonum, the object of the Will. So as his praeſcience in ſome ſenſe praeceded his decree (by a priority of order) but his decree in no ſenſe praeceded his praeſcience. Nay in a perfectly wiſe Agent, who doth nothing but according to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Eph. 1.11. counſel of his will, according to knowledge and conſultation, it is not conceivable by the moſt preciſe and metaphyſical abſtraction, how a praedetermination can be before praeſcience. As in order of Dignity, Wiſedom goes before Power, ſo in order of Naeture, Advice does go before Action, and the act of the Understanding before that of the Will. A wiſe reſolution doth praeſuppoſe Knowledge. To determine before advice and conſideration, is counted raſhneſs and folly in mortal men, and ſo is impiouſly imputed to the All-wiſe God.

12. The cauſe of the error ſhewed, and removed.12. The cauſe of the error in Mr. B. and his Maſters, doth ſeem to me to be this, that even whileſt they uſe the word Future, they do conſider it as paſt. And though their ſpeech is of a praeſcience or foreknowledge in God, yet their reaſoning is clearly of a poſt ſcience or after knowledge. Becauſe they know the wiſeſt Agent cannot tell what he hath done, until he hath done it; they therefore conclude of the wiſest Agent, (even God himſelf) that he cannot tell what he will do, untill he actually doth it. God worketh alwayes from eternity hitherto, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , even till now, Joh. 5.17. ſaith our Saviour: and what he now worketh, he knew he would work from all eternity, even whileſt he determined that he would work it. He did not firſt determine, and then know, but determined according to his knowledge. Thus far indeed the men of that way may ſafely ſpeak; that Gods Decree of Creation was before his knowledge of a world actually created: for before a thing can be known as actually done, (as the actual creation of the world, or the world created) God muſt needs have decreed that he would do it. But withall let them conſider, that we are ſpeaking of Gods knowledge of what is future, not yet in act; and therefore call it his foreknowledge, which contemplates what will be, in the preſence only of its Idea. And his Decree of Creation could not poſſibly be before that Idea of a world to be created. Man in ſome things hath a ſimilitude with his maker. And as a man cannot decree to make a Watch (or any other piece of work) before the image of that Watch is in his mind; ſo God himſelf could not decree to create a world, before he knew it in its exemplar, and conceived how it ſhould be: and that for the reaſon before ſpecified, becauſe he could not decree [vagum quid & indefinitum] he knew not what.

13. The Application to the preſent caſe, and away opened to reconcilement.13. I will apply my diſcourſe to the caſe in hand. God muſt needs have decreed that he would permit ſin, before he could know or conſider it as actually permitted. But 'tis one thing to know it in Ideâ, or in exemplari, as a thing which may be, if God will, and ſo may not be, if he will not; and quite another thing, to behold it as actually being: for this is after his decreeing that it ſhall be, if it be ſuch on which his decree can paſs, as the creating of a world, and the permitting of ſin; but upon ſinning it ſelf the decree of God could never paſs: and therefore for that, I muſt reſume what I lately ſaid, that God eternally foreknew what he did not decree the being of, as well as all which he did decree. As he knew he would create one world, ſo he knew he would not create a hundred. As he knew he would ſuffer or permit us to ſin, ſo he knew he would not tempt, not incite us, not neceſſitate us to ſin. As he knew, whileſt he decreed, that he would give us free-wills; ſo he knew, whileſt he decreed, that he would not take that freedom from them; and he knew what he did not, yea what he could not decree, our many impious abuſes which we voluntarily make of this our freedom.

Now let my Adverſaries recount, as well how far I go their way, as where I leave them, and for what Reaſons. 1. Let them conſider that I ſay (as well as themſelves) that (in order of nature, though not of time) God did firſt decree to make or do things before he knew them as actually made or done. 2. Let them conſider that I leave them by adding this, that God decreed nothing future before he foreknew it in Idea; and foreknew, but decreed not, the Acts of ſin, ſuch as Adultery, Murder, Blaſphemy, and the like. 3. Let them conſider my Reaſons (to name no more) are theſe two: firſt, it is impiouſly irrational, to make God to have decreed he knew not what; and next, it is worſe, to make him the Author or Cauſe of Sin. Let them admit of ſo much as may conſiſt with the wiſedom and goodneſs of God. And for any thing elſe, I will not ſtrive with them. But till that ſhall be done, I muſt proceed to diſcover their grievous failings.

Sect. 10.

I can paſs no further then the two and twentieth page of Mr. B. without obſerving him teaching,Mr. B's. unavoidable conſequential blaſphemy, that God determined all wickedneſs before he could foreknow it. [ That the things which God foreknows will have a certain futurition; he foreknows them all by vertue of his own will and counſel, whereby from all eternity he determines their futurition, and without which he could not know that they ſhould certainly be, p. 22.] Firſt he ſpeaks of Futurition, 1. His ignorant uſe of the word Futurition. as if he thought it ſignified Exiſtence; for he talks of Gods knowing what will be future; whereas that which will be, is future now, whileſt yet it is not, but hereafter it will be preſent. Had he ſaid wateriſh water, he had committed a leſs abſurdity.

2. Of the word Will. 2. He talks of Gods knowing by vertue of his Will, as if he knew not the difference betwixt the Underſtanding, whoſe proper object is truth or falſhood; and the Will, whoſe proper object is good or evil, (good onely of Gods will, and evil alſo of ours.) He might as well have ſaid, that God did will by vertue of his knowledge, and indeed much better; becauſe 'tis natural for the Will to follow the judgement of the Intellect. The ſight of the object is before the purſuit, or elſe the purſuit is in the dark. If Mr. B. had ſaid, that he ſees by vertue of his hands or feet, he had been leſs to be blamed, becauſe he had but made himſelf a Monſter; and with himſelf he may be bold, but not with God.

3. Of the word Certain. 3. He talks of Certain, as if he thought it had been all one with Neceſſary; or if he knew what he ſpake, (as probably he did) he hath blaſphemed unexcuſably. For God foreknew that all the wickedneſs in the world would very certainly be (it had not elſe been foreknowledge, but falſe conjecture, if what he ſeemed to foreknow had been uncertain:) and ſo 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. That God could not foreknow all the wickedneſs in the world, unleſs by his will he had firſt determined its futurition.

4. Of the word Counſel. 4. He talks of Gods Counſel, as if he knew nothing of the word; For he ſaith that God foreknew by vertue of his Counſel, as well as Will: whereas Counſel cannot be Counſel, but by vertue of Knowledge. In the abſence of Knowledge there muſt be Error and Unadviſedneſs, but conſultation or Counſel there cannot be. Thus his Doctrine of Decrees hath made plain Engliſh a ſtranger to him.

5. His threefold Blaſphemy, beſides his ſelf-contradiction.5. But the moſt notorious thing in his preſent ſpeech, is his making God to will ſin, and his not allowing that God could otherwiſe foreſee it, then by decreeing its coming to paſs. Which firſt, is blaſphemouſly contradicting to the word of God, who ſaith he wills not the wickedneſs of a ſinner, (Pſal. 5.4.) Next,Look back on the eighth and ninth ſect: of this Chapter. 'tis blaſphemouſly contradicting to the Oath of God, who ſwears he wills not the death of a ſinner, (Ezek. 33.11.) Thirdly, 'tis no leſs then blaſphemouſly to infer, that the narrow knowledge of man is more extenſive then the knowledge of God: For man doth know many things which he doth not will or determine; whereas God (ſaith Mr. B. with his Condiſciples, and Predeceſſors) never knew any thing in the world but what he willed and determined; nay (which is yet a greater madneſs) that he never knew, or could know any thing, but becauſe he willed and determined its future being. Fourthly, 'tis repugnant to the common Rule by which his own dear party are wont to be guided at other times, to wit, that the Will doth neceſſarily follow (not go before) the practical Judgement of the Intellect or Underſtanding.

Sect. 11.

Not many lines farther, 1. Mr. B's. poſitive Doctrine of Gods ordaining all ſins, both original and actual. he forgets himſelf thus, [ As for future moral evil things, whether original or actual ſins, God foreknew them all in the ſame moment of Eternity, becauſe even then he did by his permiſſive and ordinative will determine that they ſhould fall out, p. 22.] Here let him diſtinguiſh, that his juſt meaning may appear. Does he mean Gods ordering onely of all ſins, or his ordaining them alſo? If ſo, then it is blaſphemy; if not ſo, it is contrary to the Aſſemblies Catechiſm, and Confeſſion of Faith too, and as contrary to himſelf. For it is ſaid by that Aſſembly, that God by the counſel of his own Will, did freely and unchangeably Aſſem. Confeſ. of Faith, c. 3. Artic. 1. ordain whatſoever comes to paſs. And again, ſay they, He hath Aſſem. ſhort Catech. p. 158. Edit. Lond. 1656. foreordained whatſoever comes to paſs. Thus the Aſſembly of Divines. And Mr. B. himſelf affirms Gods Praeſcience to be ſubordinate to his Decree both in the moments of Time and Nature, p. 23. l. 5. Agreeable to which is the Pulpit-Doctrine of Mr. Caſe: [ This is the M. Caſe his Sermon, Intituled, The vanity of glorying in the fleſh. p. 58. plot of Divine Providence, which he hath been * contriving from the dayes of Eternity; the miſcarriage of the first Covenant was not of improvidence, but of * ordination.] But Doctor Twiſſe and Mr. Whitfield will have it thus;Non tantùm voluiſſ • Deum ab aeterno dicimus, ſed conformiter ita operatum eſſe in tempore, & totum negotium ita adminiſtraſſe, ut revērâ peccaret Adamus. Vin. l. 2. p. 27. cited by Mr. W. in Ext. of D. Prov. p. 10. God did not onely will [the ſin of Adam] from Eternity, but conformably to it did ſo work in time, and ſo adminiſter the whole buſineſs, as that Adam might [or ſhould] really [or effectually] ſin. Mr. W. approves of this extremely, and tranſlates it ſo, as to leave out the word whole, (which is in the Latine of great Importance) and renders reverâ by certainly, by which he meant unavoidably, if he meant at that as at other times. Thus we ſee 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. his Brethren, and his Maſters alſo, that God ordained all ſins both original and actual, and that he foreknew them, becauſe he foreordained them.

2. By this the Reader may judge, 2. Mr. B's. Nonſenſe added to Blaſphemy. what ſenſe he puts on the word Permiſsive, when he adds Ordinative to it for explication. If the man ſhould have ſaid, that the world was created by Gods permiſsive and ordinative will, he had onely ſpoke non-ſenſe, and had but moved his Readers laughter. Whereas in ſaying that original and actual ſins were determined to fall out by Gods permiſſive and ordinative will, he adds blaſphemy to non-ſenſe, and cannot but ſtir up his Readers wrath.

Sect. 12.

In his c. 3. p. 55. he hath done a ſtranger thing then when he denied his own hand, 1. Mr. B's. ſelf-contradiction in denying, and yet affirming that he maketh God to be the Author of ſin. becauſe he denies what he hath printed, to wit, that he pleaded for a literal ſenſe of thoſe Texts, of which he now at laſt ſaith, [That God according to the letter of many of thoſe Texts, ſeems to be made a moral cauſe of ſin as ſin, p. 55.] Yet in his Corrept. Corr. p. 69, 70. he did heartily plead againſt me (for my charging thoſe men with too literal Expoſitions of ſuch Texts) that the ſenſe of Scripture was but one, Look back on Sect. 7. of this Chap. and on Sect. 2. Num. 3. and that the Grammatical; and withal jeered me for teaching him to recede from the words, and to approch nearer unto the genuine ſenſe; ending his jeer too, with credat Judaens apella, non ego: all which he now denies, to my great amazement. 'Tis true indeed, he added theſe words, Where the Letter is not plainly metaphorical, typical, or contrary to ſome other plain places, and the clear Analogy of Faith: all which condemns him ſo much the more, becauſe he ſaid this of other Scriptures (like Mr. W.) which ſay that Chriſt did taſte death for every man, and the like; but not of thoſe Texts whoſe Grammatical ſenſe he there defended. For he referred to the Texts reckoned up by himſelf, p. 103. and what ſhould they be, but Mat. 20.28. & 26.28. Heb. 9.28. Rom. 5.18. concerning Gods mercy and love to mankind? not thoſe, whoſe naked Letter doth ſeem (to ſuch as he is) to make God the Author or Cauſe of ſin. So that now more then ever, I admire his Conſcience, which would ſuffer him to ſpeak ſo very plainly againſt his knowledge.

2. He is convict-by his own words, by the Aſſemblies, and by Mr. W's.2. I will convince him out of his mouth: for when he mentioned the Analogy of Faith, did he not mean that Faith which is owned by him and his party? And is it not one of the Articles of their publick Confeſsion of Faith (which I lately cited, ſect. 11.) That God did foreord in whatſoever comes to paſs? Doth not Mr. W. (his Majorite) contend moſt ſtifly for a literal ſenſe of thoſe Texts which he would have to make God to will and work ſin? (p. 19. 20.) and doth not that Majorite Mr. W's. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12. elſewhere teach the people in Print, [ that God must needs ſome way both will and work in the Ibid. ſin of the Act, becauſe not onely the action it ſelf, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way for Gods glory? Ibid. p. 11. That as ſin makes for his glory, he hath a hand in effecting it? and that Ib. p. 44. ſin by accident makes much for his glory? That God did Ib. p. 40, 42. decree the ſin of Adam, and that his ſin was therefore neceſſary? * That God intends his Goſpel ſhould harden mens hearts, and cloſe their eyes, and ſhut their ears, and that he ſends it for this very purpoſe? Laſtly, doth he not ſay, Ib. 45. that in all the ſins which are committed by men, God hath a ſecret working hand? and in this his laſt Book, he chief hand too? (p. 27.) Thus I convince him out of his own mouth, and Mr. W's.

3. He is convicted out of his own and Dr. Twiffe his words alſo.3. I will next convince him out of his own and Dr. Twiſse his mouth alſo. Firſt, for his own part he profeſſeth, that he maketh God the ſoveraign Author of the material part of ſin, p. 11. Now becauſe from Dr. Twiſſe he learn'd his diſtinction betwixt the material and formal part of ſin, and becauſe I well remember what the Doctor ſaith of it, let us next conſider that Doctors words. Futtum omne duo netat, viz. actum contrect • ndi ſive ſurripiendi • es alienas, & actus hujus deformitatem, quatenus ſc. lege divinâ nobis interdi • itur rebu • alienis ſur ipiendis. Sic & Homicidium duo conſignifica • , & actum interficiendi hominem, & illicitam ejus conditionem, ſive cum lege Dei repugnantiam. Similiter Adulterium duo connotat, nimirum actum c ncumbendi cum alienâ, at que hujus actus turpitudinem. Twiſſ. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. D • gr. 2. cap. 14. p. 155. [ Theft doth note two things, the act of ſnatching away another mans goods (the material part of the ſin,) and the deformity of this act, in as much as we are forbid by the law of God to ſnatch away another mans goods, (the formal part of the ſin.) So alſo Murder doth ſignifie two things at once, the act of killing a man, and the illegal condition of that act, which is its repugnance with the law of God. Likewiſe alſo Adultery doth connotate two things, to wit, the act of lying with another mans wife, and the flagitious turpitude of this act.] Theſe three are the examples which the Doctor gives us of his diſtinction betwixt the material and formal part of ſin. Compare theſe words with Mr. B's. above cited, (and with the Doctors in divers places of his Books.) and Mr. B. muſt confeſs his printed Profeſſion to be this, That God is the ſoveraign Author of any mans robbing his Neighbours goods, of any mans destroying his Neighbours perſon, and of any mans lying with his Neighbours wife. Or to inſtance in particulars, it is the publick profeſſion of Mr. B's. Faith (a ſpecial Article of his novel Creed) That God was the ſoveraign Author of Achan's ſtealing the golden wedge, of David's lying with Bathſhebah, and of Cain's killing Abel. Now ſince 'tis granted by all the world, that the firſt was Theft, the ſecond Adultery, the third Murder, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the ſoveraign Author of Theft, of Adultery, and of Murder. And becauſe 'tis alſo granted by men of all ſides, That Theft is a ſin, Adultery a ſin, and Murder a ſin, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the ſoveraign Author of the firſt ſin, of the ſecond ſin, of the third ſin, and ſo (by a parity of reaſon) of all the ſins in the world.

4. He is convicted out of his own, and Mr. Hobbs his mouth; Mr. Hobbs his words being juſtified by Mr. W.4. In the laſt place I will condemn him, not onely out of his own mouth, but out of Mr. Hobbs his alſo. Firſt Mr. B. (as I ſhewed before) doth make his Confeſſion of Faith in the first perſon ſingular, and ſpeaks dogmatically thus; [I make God] and what is it that he makes him? he tells us in the next words, [I make God to be the ſoveraign Author.] But of what doth he make him the ſoveraign Author? He tells us that in theſe words, [of the material part of ſin.]. And what doth he mean by the material part of ſin? he tells us diſtinctly in the ſame breath, [either the doing, or the leaving undone ſome poſitive Natural or MORAL Act, p. 11.] What moral Act for example? he tells p. 12. the Act of Adultery. And how makes he God the Author of that Act? he tells us in the ſame breath, by exciting men to it. What kind of excitation (or ſtirring up) doth he mean? he told us that in his firſt appearance upon the ſtage, even as a man pu • s ſpurs to a dull Jade, Correp. Corr. p. 61. Now let us compare Mr. Hobbs his words, who is as able a Calvinist (as to theſe points) as their party hath lately had. He, after all his meditation [ Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Neceſſity, p. 23, 24. cannot find any difference between an Action, and the ſin of that Action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the ſin of David in killing Uriah; nor when one is the cauſe both of the Action and of the Law, how another can be the cauſe of the diſagreement between them, no more then how one man making a longer and a ſhorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them.] Whether Mr. Hobbs doth argue thus from his heart, as being really ſeduced by Mr. Barlee's principles which he defends, or doth onely talk it from his Teeth outward, as playing the Drole with Religion upon the grounds which are given him by rigid Preſbyterians, I leave each Reader to paſs his own judgement. But ſure his deduction is duly made from the error of abſolute praedeſtination, of praedetermination antecedent to praeſcience, and ſo the neceſſitation of all events. And I wonder if any of that patry who have granted and given him his premiſses, will adventure publickly to deny his concluſion. Well, we have the Confeſsion of Mr. Hobbs, what that Doctrine doth unavoidably infer, which is common to him with Mr. W. and Mr. B. But becauſe Mr. B. hath given him an Epithet, and a Praenomen, and expreſſed his deteſtation by calling him c. 3. p. 7. Monſtrous Leviathan Hobbs, I will adde to his the like confeſſion of Mr. W. [ That if 'tis impoſsible to ſeparate the ſin from the action, Look back onth. 2. ſect. 10. then he that is the Author of the Action muſt needs be the Author of the ſin alſo which is inſeparable from it, p. 25.]

Sect. 13.

Notwithſtanding all which hath been proved, 1. Mr. B's. 10000 curſes upon himſelf and his maſters. And his implicit confeſsion, that that is blaſphemy which I have called by that name. Look forwards on Sect. 27. Num. 2, 3, 4, 5. of this Chap. where Mr. B. confeſſeth & tryes to juſtifie what here he poureth his curſes on. and will be proved yet farther, from the printed words of Mr. B. that God is made by him to be the Fountain and Cauſe of ſin, yet like a deſperate Malefactor, he falls a curſing in theſe words, [I wiſh miriads of Anathematiſmes to light upon him who holds it, be he who he will be, if he repent not the ſooner, p. 54, 55.] One Miriad had been enough (if he who writ Myriad and did not mend it in the Errata, underſtood what it meant) it being no leſs then 10000. yet more then ſo many curſes, the man who ſaid he never curſed, doth pour at once upon himſelf, and upon the chief men of his way, on ſuppoſition that they ſtill do what I have proved them to have done. If their opinion is contrary to their words, (which is the onely excuſe he can pretend to) it doth but aggravate their guilt, and ſpeak them wilful. He who ſhall deny his having aſperſed his neighbour with the ignominie of Theft, becauſe he did but charge him with having invaded another mans goods, will onely make himſelf capable of ſo much a greater condemnation. I am ſorry that Mr. B. hath put himſelf under a curſe; but am heartily glad he dares not own what he hath written, becauſe I hope he will find it needful, to hate thoſe principles, which led him to write ſuch Poenitenda.

2. The like confeſſion of his owned Maſters, together with their Commiſſions of the crime confeſſed.2. The like Confeſſion hath been made by Mr. Calvin, and Dr. Whitaker, and many more; whoſe words do riſe up in judgement againſt themſelves and their party, as they do juſtifie my charge in the ſevereſt part of it throughout my Books: which that the ſtomachfullest Adverſary may not be able to deny, I will confront their own words to their own words, and to the words of their friends, in two parallel Columns; ſetting down on the left hand the Adverſaries Confeſſion, that it is indeed a horrid Blaſphemy, to ſay that God is the Author, or Cauſe, or Neceſsitator of ſin; and linking with it on the right hand the Adverſaries Commiſsion of the very ſame crime confeſſed by them.

Mr. Calvin's Confeſſion.

De maleficiis Deo Authore perpetratis, locutus, Certe (inquit) ut quidvis contra tam prodigioſam Blaſphemiam dicatur, libenter patiar, modò ne immerito immiſceatur nomen meum. Calv. de occult. Dei Providentiâ p. 736.

Idem Calvinus in Libertinos cap. 13. ait, ex hoc Articulo, Deum ſcilicet omnia operari, Tria admodum horrenda conſequi; quorum primum hoc eſt, Nullum inter Deum & Diabolum diſcrimen fore. Et porrò cap. 14. in eoſdem, Ipſum à ſe abnegari oportet, & in Diabolum tranſmut ari.— Et cap. 4. Execrabilis Blaſphemia dicitur.

Remigius, although a Patron of Gotteſchalc's Cauſe, concludes againſt the whole party in theſe following words.

— Nulli neceſſitatem impoſuerit ut malus eſſet. Hoc enim ſi feciſſet, ipſe utique eſſet Auctor malorum, &c. Hiſt. Gotteſch. cap. 11. p. 173.

Mr. Calvin's Commiſsion of the Crime confeſſed.

Et jam ſatis apertè oſtendi, Deum vocari eorum OMNIUM AUTHOREM, quae iſti Cenſores volunt otioſo tantùm ejus Permiſſu contingere. Calv. Inſt. l. 1. c. 18. ſect. 3. p. 70.

De Aſſyriis praedatoribus iniquiſſimis locutus, apparet (inquit) certâ deſtinatione Dei fuiſſe impulſos: fateor Satanae operâ interpoſitâ ſaepe Deum agere in reprobis; ſed ut ejus IMPULSU Satan ſuas partes agat.— A Deo ipſo manat efficacia erroris ut mendaciis credant, &c. Vindictae ſuae (projectionis, ſcilicet, in foedas cupiditates) praecipuus eſt AUTHOR, Satan tantùm miniſter.— voluntas Dei rerum omnium cauſa.—Reprobos in obſequium cogit. Id. ib. ſect. 2. fol. 69. Idem facinus Deo, Satanae, homini aſſignari, abſurdum non eſt. Ibid. l. 2. c. 4. ſect. 2. p. 95. Obſtinatio cordis Divina fuit ad ruinam praeparatio. Ib. ſect. 3. p. 96.

Fruſtra de praeſcientiâ lis movetur, ubi conſtat ordinatione potius & nutu omnia evenire. Ib. l. 3. c. 23. ſect. 6. fol. 324.

Hic (ſcilicet peccator) juſto illius (ſcilicet Dei) IMPULSU agit quod ſibi non licet. Id. l. 1. c. 18. ſect. 4. fol. 71. Idem conſulatur contra Pighium, de aeter. Dei Praedeſt. p. 118. ubi Deum peccati Authorem facit.

Doctor Whitaker's confeſſion in reference to the whole party, without exception.

Si Calvinus, aut Martyr, aut Quiſquam noſtrûm affirmet, Deum eſſe Authorem & cauſam peccati, non repugno quin ſimus OMNES HORRENDAE BLASPHEMIAE ſceleriſque Rei. Whitak. l. 8. contra Duraeum, ſect. 1. p. 524. Doctor Fulk confeſſeth the ſame in his Defence of the Engliſh Tranſlation, p. 500.

Mr. Whitfield himſelf doth now confeſs it to be a Crime, and a great Crime, to make God the Author of ſin, p. 2. l. 2. And Mr. Barlee multiplies his Curſes on all that do it, (as hath been ſhewed) and calls it a ſottiſh unholy opinion, c. 3. p. 132. although they both are deeply guilty, not onely by approving it, and defending it in others; but by doing it alſo themſelves in the moſt open expreſsions, in which an Author of ſin can be deſcribed.

The Parties Commiſmiſſion of the Crime confeſſed.

Unum atque idem facinus, puta Adulterium, aut Homicidium, Dei AUTHORIS, motoris, Impulſoris opus eſt. Zu • ng. in Serm. de Prov. c. 6. Deus Angelum vel Hominem Tranſgreſſorem facit. Id. ib. cap. 5. Dictis hiſce Zuinglianis D. Twiſsus patrocinium ſuum commodat. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 2. p. 37.

Aliter Satan malorum quàm Deus, five de malo quod in culpâ, ſive de eo quod in poena cernitur, loquamur, AUTHOR judicatur eſſe. Borrhaus ad Iſa. cap. 28.

Fatemur Deum non modo ipſius operis peccaminoſi, ſed & intentionis malae AUTHOREM eſſe, &c. D. Twiſſ. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 36.

Deus homines ad ſuas pravas actiones incitat, ſeducit, jubet, indurat, trahit, deceptiones immittit, & quae peccata gravia ſunt efficit. Martyr in Jud. 3. verſ. 9. p. 45.

Ad peccatum quà peccatum praeordinati ſunt tam electi, quàm reprobi. Trigland. Defenſ. fol. 87.

Mr. W. and Mr. B. have equall'd all the reſt, if not out-done them; as my Reader hath partly ſeen, and will ſee yet farther in the ſeveral Sections of my ſecond and third Chapters, where I have faithfully exhibited, and ſhall exhibit, their words and pages.

It were a task too eaſie to write a juſt volume, in confronting the Confeſsions to the Commiſsions of that party. But of things ſo nauſeous, I think it enough to let every Paſſenger have a taste. And I am call'd away by Mr. Barlee's next words, affirming God to be the cauſe of the very obliquity of the act of ſin, in his very attempt of an Abſterſion. That I may not poſſibly do him wrong, I will tranſcribe his own words, and make them the top of another Section.

Sect. 14.

His confeſsion of Faith touching Gods commerce with ſin. His Apology for himſelf, and for his Creed, is verbatim thus; I do every where make it evident, that I do onely believe God to be a Natural Cauſe of the meer Act of ſin (without which it is impoſsible that any ſin can be committed,) but that he is onely a meer accidental • auſe of the obliquity of the act of ſin, wherein alone the formality of ſin is conſiſting, and from whence alone ſins Denomination ought to be taken, p. 55.] This is his wary way of ſpeaking, and this (he tells us) is his Belief, 1. That God is the cauſe of ſin; both of that which he calls the material p. 11. part of ſin, or the poſitive act, & of that which he calls the formal Ibid. part of ſin, or the obliquity of the act. God (ſaith Mr. B.) is the cauſe of both parts, and ſo of the whole ſin, of which they both are components. But 2. he tells us, that God is not the natural cauſe of both, but the accidental cauſe of the one, and the natural cauſe of the other. A fair confeſsion of his Faith. For Cain's killing Abel, and David's lying with Bathſhebah were poſitive acts, and each of them (ſaith Doctor Twiſſe) materiale peccati; ſo that of them Mr. B. believeth God to be the natural cauſe. And ſuppoſing it poſſible to ſeparate their obliquities, he believeth God to be the cauſe of them alſo. For although he calls it accidental, he cannot mean that it is none; for then he would have ſaid, that God is no cauſe at all of the obliquity of the act: whereas he now ſaith the contrary, that God is a cauſe of the obliquity, becauſe an accidental cauſe; nor will the knownPōſito uno Conjugatorum ponitur alterum. Et ſi Conjugatorum unum uniconveniat, alterum etiam conveniet alterit Rule of Conjugates allow him any the leaſt evaſion. The Queſtion is not what kind of cauſe of the obliquity they affirm God to be, natural or moral, per ſe or per accidens, but whether or no he is a cauſe. And to this Mr. B. makes anſwer in the affirmative. Nor can he be imagined to argue thus, God is not a natural, but an accidental cauſe; therefore no cauſe at all. For that were to argue that a thing is not, becauſe it is; and that a propoſition is falſe, becauſe it is true: We may argue by ſuch Logick, that Mr. B. is not a man, becauſe he is not a patient, but an angry man. And to deny that God is the Author of that obliquity, of which he affirms him to be the cauſe, is the ſame thing as to ſay, he is indeed the Author of the obliquity, but the Author of the obliquity he is not; for whatſoever is the cauſe of any thing in any kind of cauſality, is ſo far forth the Author of it as it is the cauſe, according to the uſe of the word Author in all Claſſick Writers, as I ſhall ſhew in due time.

How Mr. B. makes God the natural cauſe of ſin it ſelf.And if that which he calls the Act of ſin, (as the act of curſing or hating God, of David's lying with Bathſhebah, and the like,) is nothing elſe but the ſin it ſelf in its whole eſſence, (as indeed it is, and I have demonſtrated before,) then his beliefe muſt needs be this, that God is the natural cauſe of ſin; which is worſe then to believe him the moral cauſe onely, by how much it is worſe to neceſsitate any man to wickedneſs, then onely to tempt and perſwade him to it. He who neceſſitates, being the ſole cauſe of it; and he who perſwades, the concauſe onely. I will ſay no more here, becauſe I have enlarged ſo muchLook back on ch. 2. ſect. 5. already on an occaſion offered by Mr. W. I will onely adde a word to Mr. B's. citation in his Margin; If he is to be judged a moral cauſe of any ſin, who moves any one to it, by help or counſel, favour or perſwaſion, (as † Dominicus à Soto doth truely ſpeak,In moralibus prorſus eſt judicaturque cauſa, qui lege, ope, conſilio, favore vel perſuaſu movet quempiam ſive ad bonum ſive ad malum. Domin. à Soto de Nat. & Gra. l. 1. c. 12. how falſly ſoever in ſome other things) then God is alſo accuſed of being the moral cauſe of ſin, by Mr. B. and his party, who have publickly taught, that God doth tempt men to ſin, and ſo far favour the regenerate in the very worſt ſins they can commit, as that they cannot fall totally, much leſs finally from grace. I have ſhewed the former in the third Section of this Chapter; and the later long ago in the Div. Purity defended ch. 14. ſect. 2. p. 128, 129, &c.

Sect. 15.

Mr. B's. moſt ſignal and moſt deſperate attempt, from p. 111. to p. 121 Now I proceed to that part of Mr. B. which will ſave me the labour of ſaying more, and make him wiſh (ere it be long) that he had ſaid nothing at all, but that he had rather been born dumb. For 'tis that wherein he engageth, not his own credit onely, (if he can poſſibly imagine that he hath any yet left him) but the credit of his friends too, amongſt whom Mr. Hick. of Mag. Coll. is branded by him for a chief. Nor onely ſo, but he engageth very deeply his ſoul and conſcience, which ought (I am ſure) to be deareſt to him. Now that himſelf and his Abettors may not fail of comprehending the breadth and depth of the Calamity into which he hath ingulphed and plunged himſelf; and to the end that he may find it much the moſt for his Interest, to make a publick Recantation, and to act2 Cor. 7.11. revenge upon himſelf, I will (as briefly as I am able) premiſe the ſtate of the affair betwixt him and me, that ſo the life of his unhappineſs may at laſt appear in the greater luſtre.

2. The ſtate of the caſe from its Original.2. I had proved, in myCh. 3. p. 110. to p. 116. Defence of the Divine Philanthropie, that the ſinner is the efficient cauſe of ſin, in confutation of Mr. B. who denied that ſin had any efficient cauſe at all, but onely (forſooth) a deficient cauſe. I ſay, I had proved the efficient of ſin by a great number of Arguments, whereof each was ſo cogent, that neither Mr. B. nor M. W. nor Mr. Hick. had the courage to venture on a ſolution. I do heartily wiſh that my Reader will here peruſe thoſe ſeven pages in my D. Philan. Defended, from p. 110. to p. 116. where he will find my Theſis proved by ſo many convincing Demonſtrations, as have not left the Adverſary the leaſt colour for a Reply. And becauſe ſome Readers may not have that Book in their poſſeſſion, whileſt others are unwilling to neglect the work they are upon, I will here recapitulate (but very briefly) what there is proved in ample manner.

3. Proof • that ſin hath an efficient cauſe.3. 1. If man is the cauſe of ſin, and not efficient, he is the material formal, or final cauſe; if the Deficient is none of theſe, (as none will ſay it is) it is no cauſe at all. If ſin hath no cauſe, it hath no real being, much leſs can it be the cauſe of puniſhment: and ſo God is inferred to puniſh men without cauſe. 2. Where there is no efficient, there is no effect, that is, there is nothing: and ſo (according to Mr. B.) men are either not damned, or damned for nothing. 3. If the ſinner is but deficient as to the being of ſin, he is leſs the cauſe of it then God is inferred to be by them, who ſay that Gods will of ſin is efficacious, and irreſiſtible, as that which predetermines, decrees, and neceſsitates ſin; and efficacious, ab efficiendo, is prevalent, forcible, &c. 4. Mr. B. confeſſeth (in a ſober fit) that the ſinning creature is the Corrept. p. 79. efficient cauſe of ſin, although he ſaith (in a fit of paſſion) that ſin hath Ib d. p. 55. no efficient cauſe. 5. He often mentions theIbid. p. 79. Being of ſin, as when he ſaith that God p. 178. ordained it. Whereby he infers it to be effected, and ſo to have an efficient. 6. If he ſaith (as at other times he doth) that ſin conſiſts wholly in a deficiency, he infers (what is worſe) that no creature can effect ſin, nor by conſequence commit it. 7. Whileſt he affirms Gods abſolute ordination of ſin in one breath, and that ſin hath onely a deficient cauſe in another breath, he chargeth on God all the cauſality of ſin, of which he allowes it to be capable. 8. As when he breaths hot, he ſaith that God ordained and determined ſin; ſo when he breaths cold, he ſaith that God can ordain nothing but good; which is to infer that ſin is good: And to what is good he allows an efficient cauſe. 9. If ſins of omiſſion (as not praying, and not giving almes, &c.) had but a deficient cauſe, yet ſins of commiſsion (as curſing and ſacrilege, &c.) have a cauſe efficient with a witneſs. 10. Admitting that ſin were a privative Entity, it would not follow that it hath not any efficient cauſe. For he who deprives a man of life, or ſight, is the efficient cauſe of death, or blindneſs. And darkneſs (the privative of light) was one of the works of Gods Creation, Gen. 1.4, 5. of all which he was the efficient cauſe. 11. What is privative in one reſpect may be poſitive in another; as our ſickneſſes and ſins do daily teach us. Murder is not onely privative of vertue, but alſo conſtitutive of vice; and muſt have ſomething in it of poſitive, to make it differ in ſpecie from all other ſins, and in degree from all other murders. Of ſome we ſay, they are not good; whileſt others are not onely poſitively, but ſuperlatively evil. 12. Every privation preſuppoſeth an habit to which it ſtands in oppoſition: but a man may be covetous who never was liberal. 13. An Agent morally deficient in the performance of a Duty doth effect that evil action which is ſo morally deficient. For 1. The Adulterer is the efficient of his filthy Act, which is his ſin. 2. The Devil is the Father of lyes, and a Father is an efficient. 3. A man (through grace) is the efficient cauſe of a good Action. And Mr. B. is worſe then a Pelagian, if he will ſay that man is more efficient of good then of evil. 14. Mr. B. Corrpt. 111. confeſſeth (in a lucid interval) that there may be ſomething poſitive in a privation. 15. Puniſhment is a poſitive Entity, and owned to have an efficient cauſe. But Mr. B. ſaith often that ſin is a puniſhment. 16. Whileſt he denies his making God the Author of ſin, becauſe ſin (forſooth) hath no efficient, he unavoidably infers, 1. Either that God is not the Author of death; or 2. that he is the Author of ſin, if of death; or 3. of both; or 4. of neither. 17. If when they ſay that God is the cauſe of ſin, they do not infer he is the Author, becauſe the cauſe is but deficient, they plead no more for God then for the Devil; for if nothing is an Author which is not efficient, and if ſin hath no efficient, then neither Men nor Devils can be the Authors of ſin.

4. In ſtead of anſwering theſe things, 4. Mr. B's impertinencies, and railings in lieu of Anſwers, do ſtricke obliquely at S. James. Mr. B. talks thus, p. 111. ſect. 3. Firſt, that my opinion of ſins having a poſitive Entity, and an efficient cauſe is a dreadful opinion. Secondly, that there is no queſtion between us about any thing elſe: (which if true, then my evincing this concludes the Controverſie between us.) Thirdly, that he trembles more at the thought of commiting ſin, then many of my party, if not my ſelf, at the open acting of it. Fourthly, that Gods judicial hand appears against me. Fifthly, that my concluſion (out of S. James, ch. 1. v. 15.) is 1000. times more for Gods being the Author of ſin, then the words of his party which I have cited. Sixthly, that Gods juſt hand is upon me. Seventhly, Quem perdere vult Deus hunc dementat, p. 112. Theſe are his general Anſwers thruſt up together into one Paragra • h. Before I come to his particular Anſwers (which are infinitely worſe) I will intreat my Reader to com • are my ſeventeen particulars with Mr. B's. ſeven, and with what I ſhall now ſay from the expreſs words of S. James, who ſaith, that Jam. 1.15. luſt having conceived bringeth forth ſin. The conception of luſt is before expreſſed by a mans being drawn away, and enticed by his luſt (v. 14.) The Spirit ſolicit • the Will on one ſide, luſt on the other. If luſt prevailes and carries away the wills conſent, then luſt conceives; or (which is all one in effect) the Will is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . drawn away, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . deceived, or overreached by Luſt: not onely invited, but inſnared and wrought upon by the invitation, ſo as to give up its conſent. Luſt by this doth conceive, and then bringeth forth ſin, as the Parent the Child. VVhat is ſin therefore, but the production of the will conſenting to Luſt, or drawn away by it? The production (I mean) of the evil will, which by thus conſenting becomes evil. Now this being the upſhot of what I mean by the efficient cauſe, and poſitive entity of ſin; againſt whom hath Mr. B. ſpent the expreſſions of his Pet? againſt we onely, who ſpake from S. James, or againſt S. James alſo, from whom I ſpake?Note how the bittereſt of his cenſures do hit himſelf and his party. Nay, hath he not ſpent them upon himſelf, who hath confeſſed, even in Print, the very ſame things which here he railes at? He hath openly affirmed, both that the ſinning Creature is the efficient cauſe of his ſin, (Corrept. p. 79.) and that there ☞may be ſomething of poſitive in a privation, (Ibid. p. 111.) Nay are not all his railings againſt all his own party, who ſay that God dothLook back on ch. 2. p. 90. efficere peccata, and not onely will, but M.W's. own words p. 26. of which I have ſpoken ch. 2. ſect. 14. and alſo ſect. 20, 21. work ſin, and that he hath a hand in * effecting ſin? Sure theſe are very frequently the expreſſions of his Maſters, as well as Brethren: and therefore judge (good Reader) whether S. James and Mr. P. or Mr. B. and his party, are the pertinent objects of Mr. B's. Invectives, eſpecially his laſt expreſſed inQuem perdere vult Deus hunc dementat. Of the poſitive Entity of ſin. Latine, [1. Dementation ſent from God; and 2. as a token of Reprobation.]

Sect. 16.

To the Preface which he makes to his more particular Diſcuſſion, wherein he onely takes occaſion to call it a horrible opinion, that ſin as ſin in reſpect of its obliquity, hath a poſitive entity and efficient cauſe, p. 112. lin. 9, 10. I have but three things to ſay. 1. That if it were ſo indeed, he would be utterly unexcuſable for having embraced that opinion in that part of his Prints ſo lately cited; or for railing at an opinion which himſelf confeſſed to be true: or if he hath ſince ſeen his error, why was not his ſecond volume a Recantation of his first? And what will he do to Mr. W. for ſaying that God had a hand in effecting ſin, whereby he inferred, that ſin had an effective or efficient cauſe? 2. He cannot ſay he ſpeaks of the formal part of ſin as ſin, and not of the whole ſin, becauſe he ſpeaks of ſin in respect of its obliquity, which he is wont to call the formal part of ſin. And 'tis non-ſenſe to ſay, that ſin as ſin in reſpect of its ſin, or that obliquity as obliquity in reſpect of its obliquity, hath not a poſitive entity, or efficient cauſe. So as he dares not deny, but that ſin doth ſignifie the integrum peccati, or whole filthy act (ſuch as Cains killing Abel, or David's lying with Bathſhebah) whoſe repugnance with Gods Law is called obliquity. And becauſe that ſin is an oblique, or crooked, or irregular action, Mr. B. concludes it no poſitive Entity. 3. But to reſt on him to ſobriety and common ſenſe, I ſhall need only to ask him, whether Rectitude is not a poſitive Entity. If he ſaith yes (as I am ſure he needs muſt) what ſhew of reaſon can he pretend, why obliquity is not as much ſo as Rectitude? how much more that whole ſin, of which obliquity is accounted the formal part? Is not a Circle, quà talis, as poſitively a figure, or a round figure, as a right line is a right line? Is not crookedneſs or gibboſity in any mans ſhape as poſitively ſuch, as ſtreightneſs or clean making? When a crooked parent begets a child which is alſo as crooked, is he leſs a poſitive and efficient cauſe, then if he and his child were both well ſhaped? When Adam begat Cain in a ſtate of ſin, (with Satans image in ſtead of Gods, as ſome of the Fathers have expreſſed it) was not the cauſe and the effect too, as truely poſitive, as if they both had been ſinleſs? An action flowing from an Agent hath as poſitive an Entity, as the Agent himſelf from whom it flowes. The ſin of Murder is an Action; as Cain's killing Abel: So is the ſin of Adultery; as David's lying with Bathſhebah. Nor any whit the leſs ſuch, in reſpect of their being irregular actions; any more then a wicked man is the leſs a man for being wicked. David's lying with Bathſhebah before ſhe was his wife, was as poſitive an Entity, and had a cauſe as efficient, as David's lying with Bathſhebah after ſhe was his wife; which alone is ſufficient to fill Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. with confuſion of Face, and to compel them to Recantations, unleſs they will ſhelter themſelves under Rantiſm and Libertiniſm, by ſaying that David's lying with Bathſhebah was no adultery, or ſuch an adultery as was no ſin, or that it was a very good ſin, becauſe a poſitive Entity, and that which had an efficient cauſe. For Mr. B's. firſt Argument doth follow thus:

Sect. 17.

If ſin as ſin be a poſitive Entity, 1. Mr. B's firſt Argument to prove the goodneſs of ſin, in which Mr. Hick. is equally concerned. then it is a thing in it ſelf good. For every poſitive thing is good. It is to all Scholars well known, that unum, verum, bonum convertuntur, p. 112.] Firſt, he cannot but confeſs, that if ſin is a thing poſitive, he ſeeks to prove (by this Argument) that ſin is good. But that it is a thing poſitive, I have abundantly proved in my two last Sections, and himſelf hath confeſſed in his Correptory p.79. & p. 111. both before cited and compared with one another. Correction; therefore he cannot but confeſs, that all the force of this Argument is onely to prove that ſin is good.

2. A thing that is privative in one reſpect, is alſo poſitive in another, 2. The noyſomeneſs of the Diſeaſe. as every Sciolist knows and Mr. B. hath virtually confeſſed. Every Scioliſt can tell, that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another; that what is privative of life or ſight, muſt needs be poſitive of death or blindneſs. The Darkneſs which God created was not more privative of the Day, then it was poſitive of the Night. Nay, doth not Mr. B. confeſs as much? for in ſaying that the ſinner is theCorrep. p. 79. efficient cauſe of his ſin, he doth grant it to be a thing. And in ſaying, there may be ſomething of Ib. p. 111. poſitive in a privation, he doth more then grant it to be a poſitive thing. I therefore ſay, more, becauſe a privation is but the abſtract of privative. And the Tranſgreſſion of the Law, which is ſin, is not a meer privation of vertue, but a poſitive thing, which is privative of vertue, & poſitive of vice. Sin is ſo perfectly a concrete, that unleſs it is a concrete, it cannot be conceived to be a ſin: No, no more then a concrete can be conceived to be a concrete when it ceaſeth to be a concrete. The moſt Poetical brain cannot fanſie the leaſt ••• ial difference betwixt David's lying with Bathſhebah, and his adultery with Bathſhebah, at the time of her being Uriah's wife. So that now Mr. B. muſt confeſs, that the leaſt part of his blaſphemy is no leſs then this, that ſin is good as it is poſitive of evil, although it is evil as it is privative of good. This being the Printed Article of his unchriſtian Creed, [THAT EVERY POSITIVE THING IS GOOD.]

3. The purging out of the peccant Humour.3. Having ſhewed him the noyſomneſs of his Diſeaſe, I will now remove the peccant Humour by which it appears to have been fed, to wit, his Ignorance, or Inadvercency, that bonum metaphyſicum, which is converted with ens, hath quite another ſignification then bonum morale. And being Aristotles phraſe (who was neither a Prophet of the old Teſtament, nor an Evangeliſt of the new) ſhould rather have been rejected as unſound and unſafe, then have been uſed by a Prieſt to prove the goodneſs of ſin. For the Libertines and Ranters (who are as little verſed in Metaphyſicks, and in Ariſtotle's meanings, as Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. or Mr. Hobbs) are not onely very ignorant of theBonitas moralis, naturalis, tranſcendentalis, paſſim leguntur apud id genus Scriptores. difference betwixt good and good, but they cannot eaſily be taught it. And a Carneadiſt will be glad to introduce an opinion that ſin is good, by calling it Bonum Metaphyſicum, or Tranſcendentale. Mr. B. muſt now be taught (that he may not debauch his Diſciples) that the adaequate ſubject of Metaphyſical Science is ens quatenus ens, reale illud; not omnimodo poſitivum quatenus poſitivum. And ſo, in one ſenſe it comprehendeth Vide Scot. Quodl. 3. Art. 1 Res, and Vide Monlorium de Univerſ. cap. 7. Aliquid. And Mr. B's. very obliquity (he knows) is really ſome thing: but then again he muſt be taught, that Bonum in Metaphyſicks, which is converted with Ens, doth not ſignifie Good in Engliſh, any more then Canis (the Star) doth ſignifie the Dog which walks about with four feet in our Engliſh ſtreets and apprehenſions, though that (in Latine) is Canis too. The difference is not the leſs betwixt malum (an Apple) and malum (an Evil) andIn accuſativo. malum (an maſt) becauſe they are expreſſed in the very ſame letters. Bonum, in Engliſh, doth ſignifie good, as oppos'd to evil. But in Metaphyſicks no more then ens in ordine ad appetitum. And that ſin is ſuch, Mr. B. knows by ſad and minutely experience; and ſo before he is aware, he hath proved the thing which he indeavoured to diſprove, by his very indeavours to diſprove it, viz. that ſin is a poſitive thing.

4. Dr. Twiſſe his Foundation a thin Sophiſme.4. Upon this lamentable Sophiſm, as lame and as naked as it appears, Dr. Twiſſe hath founded his Doctrine of irrespective Reprobation. Becauſe, forſooth, there is aliqua bonitas (nimirum entis) in damnato, but none in annihilato, therefore God (ſaith the Doctor) who may annihilate for nothing, may damn his Creatures alſo for nothing; this being (ſaith he) the leſſer evil. Chuſe now (good Reader) whether thy Saviour, or Doctor Twiſſe, doth beſt deſerve to be believed. Doctor Twiſſe tells us that it is better to be tormented in Hell for ever, then to be turned again to nothing. Our Saviour tells us the contrary, Mat. 18.6. & Mat. 26.24. Mar. 14.21. where he ſaith in effect, that it is better to be annihilated, then to be damned. By the Logick of that Doctor, it ſhould be better alſo to do wickedly, then not to do any thing at all, and ſin would be good by being ſomething.

5. How a lye is verum as much as ſin bonum. 5. If non-ſenſe is to be ſpoken in the ſtyle of Metaphyſicks (as miſunderſtood by a Hobbiſt or a Presbyterian) then indeed we muſt ſay, that ſin is bonum metaphyſicum, and that a lye by conſequence is metaphyſicum verum. Then which if Mr. B. doth mean no more, the Reader ſees what he hath gained. But if by Good he means bonum morale, let him prove that Parricide, Inceſt, Witchcraft, or Blaſphemy, muſt either be naked privations, or moral good things; for according to his dreamings, they muſt either be nothing, or no ſins, or moral vertues, or ſins and moral vertues too. And ſo the Devil, who is not a bare privation, muſt be with Mr. B. a moral good.

6. Now I muſt ſhew him the ſenſe of his Latine Citations in the Margin. 1. Albertus Magnus his ſpeech hath thus far truth in it,6. Albertus Magnus his words explained.

Perfectius eſt agere, quàm eſſe. Id quod non eſt à ſe nec poteſt à ſe manere in eſſe, multò minus poteſt agere à ſeipſo. Et cùm actus malus ſecundum converſionem ad materiam ſit ſimpliciter actus egrediens à potentiâ activâ perfectâ ſecundum naturam, ideo non egreditur ab eo, niſi ſecundum quod movetur à cauſâ primâ, alioqui ſequeretur duo principia eſſe. Alb. Mag. in Pet. Lomb. Senten. 2. Diſp. 37.

that actus malus is not ſo from the man, as if he could ſimply agere à ſeipſo, if God did not give him the power of being and acting as a very free Agent. But this being ſuppoſed, it is meetly the work of mans own will (which God hath left thus free, that is, determinable by it ſelf) to determine his Will to this or that which is evil. So again it is true, quod non egreditur abeo, niſi ſecundum quod movetur à cauſâ primâ, if he means by movetur, his having the power of being and acting as a man, both given and continued by God unto him: which is abundantly ſufficient to avoid the duo principia, if he means coaeterna: otherwiſe 'tis certain, that God is the principle of good onely, and Lucifer onely of evil. Thus the Citation makes not for Mr. B. but in two reſpects it makes against him: for actus malus is actus, and egredient from that power which is enabled to act (as that is more perfect then barely to be) and ſo as to need a dependence from the firſt cauſe, which muſt infer the Agent to be more then deficient; for to a meer deficiency there needed not his moveri à cauſâ primâ. 2. Mr. B. doth here aſſert, that man had his power to ſin from God, Mr. B. (taught by Mr. Rivet) doth moſt avowedly make God the Author of ſin. nor will he deny that that power hath a poſitive entity; but he had argued before (c. 2. p. 54.) That if the power to ſin was from God, God muſt unavoidably be the Author of ſin, which beſides the great impiety, bewrayes a ſottiſhneſs in the blaſphemer: for the power to ſin being (in order of time, as well as of nature) before the being of ſin, it followes that ſuch a power is not onely no ſin, but 'tis impoſsible that it ſhould be; elſe Adam muſt have been ſinful whileſt he was innocent, and ſinned before he ſinned, becauſe he had the power to ſin, before it was poſsible for him to ſin, or for that power to be reduced into act. Mark now the arguing of Mr. B. from his See the Div. Philan. ch. 4. ſect. 24. p. 24. friend Mr. Rivet. If that power or capability which neither was nor could be ſin, was from God, then God was unavoidably the Author of ſ • n, that is, he was, becauſe he was not; it was neceſſary, becauſe impoſſible. This 'tis to be a rigid Conſiſtorian. He and Rivet muſt either ſay,Look forward on ſect. 29. that Adam actually ſinned before he had the power to ſin, or that it is part of their belief, that God is unavoidably the Author of ſinne.

7. S. Auſtins words moſt impertinently cited.7. Saint Auſtin's ſpeech of Natura vitioſa in ſenſu diviſo, in which are ſeparated thoſe two things, natura and vitium, is nothing at all to the purpoſe of ſin, whoſe very being is evil, and hath not the leaſt moral bonity in it; of which alone we here ſpeak. There is no doubt, but Nature is good when it is not evil, and evil when it is vicious: but what is this to the poſiciveneſs or privativeneſs of ſin? This is but one of Mr. Bis. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

Sect. 18.

I now proceed to the ſecond Argument, which is the moſt horrible of all: ☞ The moſt remarkable blaſphemy of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a ſecond Argument. it is hard to ſay, whether more impious, or more unſcholarly. And as if one Presbyterian had not ſufficed to make it ſufficiently abſurd, Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. have joined their forces. But Mr. Hick. is the Chieftain in this exploit, (if Mr. B. hath not done him wrong) becauſe it came out of his Forge, and was ſent from Oxford to Brockhole to be hammered on by Mr. Barlee. Obſerve (good Reader) the words and ſyllables of the men.

If ſin is a poſitive Entity, IT IS GOD; for as a very Note that Mr. B. in his margin, explained whom he meant in theſe large Characters. Mr. H. HICK. of his own Colledge, p. 112. learned pious friend of mine wrote to me not long ſince very well, Whatever poſitive thing is not from God, is God; there being no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura. In truth every poſitive thing muſt be Creator, or Creature; and who now is the Manichee, maintaining an independent evil principle? p. 112.

Before I ſhew how many wayes this brace of Presbyterians have been unhappy in this conjunction of their abilities expreſſed in five or ſix lines, I will take a ſhort notice of the Authority and Repute which is acquired to Mr. Hick. by his being noted (in the margin) to be a man of mine own Colledge. For ought I know, he may be alſo in poſſeſſion of mine own Fellowſhip, and mine own Chamber, and mine own meat and drink, and thoſe yearly Revenues which are mine own too: and for which I may the rather expect to have ſome ſatisfaction, becauſe it ſeems the Viſitors made him one of my Receivers and Uſufructuaries (for my legitimate Heir or Succeſſor they could not make him.) And I have reaſon to be glad that he is thought ſuch a pious and learned man: becauſe if he is pious, he will the ſooner pay me my Arrears; and if he is learned, he will not object againſt my known and indiſputable right. But of his Learning and Piety both at once, I am now to make ſome eaſie trials.

1. Firſt he concludes the Devils Pride (not onely to be good, but) to be God; 1. How Mr. Hick, inferrs the Godhead of ſin, which I durſt not repete, but that I cannot confute it otherwiſe. for the Devils pride is a poſitive thing (as I have lately made apparent, Sect. 15, 16. and ſhall farther demonſtrate by and by.) And being the very filthineſs of the filthieſt ſpirit, it cannot poſſibly be from God, or one of Gods Creatures. And if not ſo, then (ſay the Brethren) it muſt needs be God. For ſo run their words, [whatever poſitive thing is not from God, is God, there being no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura, God and his Creature.] The Devils pride is as poſitive a thing as his lyes are, and as much from the Devil, and as really a ſin, and ſo as infinitely far from being one of Gods Creatures. But Gods word tells us, that Joh. 8.44. lyes are from the Devil, and not from God. The Devil alone is theIbid. father of lyes, whereas God on the contrary is the ſpirit of Joh. 16.13. truth. And as a lye in particular is the child of the Devil, (for relata dicuntur ad convertentiam) ſo ſins in general are the1 Joh. 3.8. works of the Devil: and ſo they are called in many places of Scripture by the name of Mic. 6.16. Gal. 5.19. Eph. 5.11. Col. 1.21. Heb. 9.14. Rev. 9 20. works; as 'twere on purpoſe to ſhew us that they are poſitive things. The works of darkneſs, the works of the fleſh, the works of mens hands, dead works, the works of the Devil. Nay farther yet, ſo far are thoſe works from being Gods Creatures, that the Son of God was manifeſted in the fleſh, that he might deſtroy the works of the Devil, 1 Joh. 3.8. And yet thoſe works muſt needs be poſitive things, even for this very reaſon, that they are capable of deſtruction: privatio eſt habitûs privatio, and vacuum vacui implicat locatum. Every privation is of ſomething poſitive; and not to be ſo implies a palpable contradiction. He who ſhall prove there is a vacuum in nature, becauſe there is vacuum vacui, will ſay no more in effect, then that there is a vacuum, becauſe there is not a vacuum. And ſo a privation of a privation is nothing elſe but a poſition, that is, not a privation. So that unleſs Mr. Hick. will embrace the ſuds of a contradiction, he muſt confeſs that to be poſitive, which God came to deſtroy; and that he came to deſtroy, not his own works, but the Devils; and that the works of the Devil are nothing elſe but ſins: upon which he muſt recant his moſt deplorable way of arguing, and make ſome kind of ſatiſfaction for his ſo ſcandalous an attempt; or elſe he muſt own his propoſition in one part of it, or in another; either by ſaying that the Devils works are Gods Creatures, (and ſo from God) or that he thinks they are God himſelf.

2. I do ſo pity the Malefactor, 2. It way opened to the undeceiving of M. Hick. by ſhewing him a Medium where he could ſee none. Look back on ch. 2. ſect. 7. even at this very inſtant whileſt I am perſecuting his crime, that though in conſcience and duty I am bound to ſhew it in every part of its deformity, (that the weaker ſort may be warned againſt the killing Doctrines of ſuch Inſtructers) yet am I unwilling to go farther in ſhewing the dangers (nay real miſchiefs) into which he is fallen, and fallen headlong, by his own wilful precipitation of himſelf and others, (for I hear he is a perſon who hath many more followers then Mr. B.) until I have ſhewed him a way whereby he may ſcrabble out of the miſery wherein he lies. He muſt know there is a medium betwixt God and his creatures, (and I wonder what ayl'd him that he ſhould ſay there is none) even the works of the Devil, which the Son of God himſelf came to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . diſſolve and diſſipate, 1 Joh. 3.8. Men and Devils have their creatures, which are not God's: ſuch are all their Pſal. 106.3. inventions, with which they are ſaid to go a * whoreing, and with which they Verſ. 29. provoke God to anger, and on which God is ſaid to have taken Pſal. 99.8. vengeance. God made men upright, but they have ſought out many inventions (Eccleſ. 7.29.) Man and his natural faculties are the creatures of God, but the abuſes and pollutions of thoſe natural faculties are man's own creatures. Res in Metaphyſicks hath three acceptions; in the firſt of which it comprehendeth entia rationis, as oppos'd to Nihil: ſo that when a man hath chimaera's in his head, as golden Mountains, Eutopia's, Hirco-Cervi, Centaures, Models of houſes to be built hereafter, or perhaps never, falſe apprehenſions of God, Atheistical conceits and imaginations, and all manner of lies; Man (in that caſe) is the creator of thoſe entia rationis, whether meerly groundleſs, or wicked notions. We know that to lye, is a poſitive thing; yet Saint Paul affirms it to be impoſſible to be the Creature of God, Tit. 1.2. Heb. 6.18. It was one inſtance of Gods Almightineſs, that he created Men and Angels with ſuch a liberty of will in conjunction with Ratiocination, as to be able to have their Creatures too; although thoſe Creatures muſt needs be vain, whoſe Creators are finite, and Creatures too. Nay ſo evident it is; that men are really Creators, that they ſeem to be ſuch in the proper notion of the word, as Creation ſignifies the Production of ſomething out of nothing; for there are entia rationis ratiocinantis, which have not ſo much as fundamentum in re. But why do I talk Metaphyſically to ſuch a Scholar as lies before me, who ſeems ſo great a ſtranger to it, that I may very well take up the proverbial verſe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ;

My deſign is to convert, and not confound him, and therefore I will uſe a greater plainneſs. When a witty Pſal. 14.1. & Pſal. 53.1. Fool ſtrives to prove there is no God, and when a ſil • y Foole does believe it, (as wrought upon by the witty ones proof) Atheiſm then becomes his Creature. My will and my power to will this, or that, or another thing, is the Creature of God: but the determination of my will to that which God forbiddeth, and my averſion from God, and my diſlike of Gods will, and my loving or willing what God abhorreth, theſe are my Creatures, and I alone muſt anſwer for them, if I ſhall ever be ſo wretched as to abuſe my liberty by ſuch a looſeneſs. Concerning the many moſt real and poſitive things which were the Creatures of Nero, Tiberius, Petronius, and Domitian, and which to derive from Gods Will, or Creative Power, were a blaſphemy great enough to make a mans hair ſtand upright at the very thought of it, I have ſpokenThe ſinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. ſect. 12. p. 264, 265. elſewhere, and therefore now do but give a hint of them. Concerning theBiſhop Andrews Sermon of the worſhipping of Imaginations, p. 33, 37. vain imaginations created and worſhipped by Presbyterians, under the ſpecious name of the Apoſtles Doctrine, Government, Sacraments, and Prayers, Biſhop Andrews of bleſſed memory hath wiſely treated. God indeed made Gold and Silver; but for the Idols which were made of Gold and Silver (the meer invention of the Heathens by the help of Satan,) the Scripture tells us they were the work of mens hands, Pſal. 115.4. They that make them are like unto them, (v. 8.) It was God, who ſaid in the ſecond Commandment, Thou ſhalt not make to thy ſelf any graven Image. He did not ſay, Thou ſhalt not worſhip the graven Images which I the Lord thy God have made. God created the Earth out of nothing, and made metals out of the Earth: But the Idolaters themſelves did make their Idols out of thoſe metals. God made them men, but (by the help of the Devil) they made themſelves Idolizers of graven Images. God continued their being, life, motion, and every faculty or power to act as free Agents; but to apply their faculties to the making of Idols, to reduce their power into the act of worſhipping what they had made, to urite their wills with the accurſed thing, and to chuſe their own Gods, theſe were the inſtances of th • ir freedom, and humane creatures. When S. Paul ſaith plainly, there be Gods many, meaning falſe and fanciful Gods, (which were become the true God's Rivals in the greateſt part of the world,) he cannot mean that the true God had made ſo many falſe God • , but that they were creatures of the creature. And if mechanical works, (as Watches, Windmills, Fire-ſhovells, and Bellowes) are properly called the works 1 Cor. 8.5. of men, as to the ſhape and faſhion by which they are specified (although the materials of wood and iron, and the men themſelves, are the works of God onely,) how much more are thoſe spiritual and cannal works, Pride, Envy, Malice, Idolatry, Murder, Drunkenneſs, and the like, the works and creatures of Men and Devils? It was the ſaying of S. Auſtin (as I have read him cited by a moſt eminent Prelate of our own) Peccator non eſt inter opera Dei, a ſinner is no work of God: As a man, he is God's work; but as a ſinful man, he is his own; or if not his own, I am ſure the Devils, ſaith that great man. And when Auſtin ſaith (upon Luk. 15.7, 10.) that the joy of heaven extends no farther then the works of God, he doth imply that there are works which are not of God. Mr. Hick. therefore ſhould have made his diviſion thus, by a Trichotomy: All poſitive things are either 1. God, or 2. his creatures, or 3. things wrought by his creatures through the power which the Creator hath communicated unto them. And that the brethrens way of arguing the very Deity of ſin (from its being ſomething poſitive, yet none of God's creatures,) was the fantaſtick creature of the brethren, I farther proceed to make apparent and undeniable.

3. The ſin called Atheiſm is a poſitive thing, 3. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer atheiſm it ſelf to be the creature of God, or God himſelf. ns being a poſitive belief that there is no God, not a belief of nothing, nor a belief of any thing elſe, nor a privation of Godhead without belief, but (in ſenſu compoſito) a belief of no God; that is Atheiſm. Now I ask Mr. Hick. Is it from God as his creature, or is it not? If he ſaith that it is not, he muſt avow it to be God, or recant his argument: if he ſaith that it is, he muſt confeſſe he holds God to be the Author of ſin. He cannot deny it to be a poſitive thing, becauſe every belief is a ſpecies of quality, to wit an habit, or dispoſition of mind, and every 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 credere, or act of believing, is in the praedicament of action, and ſo a poſitive entity or thing. Nor can he ſay that all Atheiſm doth conſiſt in not believing there is a God, as that is oppoſed to the being of belief; for stones and trees would then be Atheiſts, as not believing there is a God: whereas Atheiſm on the contrary (however the word is compounded with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) is the poſitive belief that there is no God, and is competent to nothing below a man. That I may not here be miſtaken by ſuch as are not onely willing, but glad to fall into miſtakes (when nothing elſe is left to help them) I will explain my true meaning in what I ſpeak concerning Atheiſm, when I call it a belief that there is no God, and not a meer abſence of belief that there is a God. I take it for granted that there are none but have heard at leaſt there is a God, and that the being of a God is at leaſt believed by other men; from whence it followes unavoidably, that the ſuppoſed Atheiſts of whom I ſpeak, (who have heard of a God, and of believers that Heb. 11.6. God is, and yet for their own parts do not believe any ſuch thing) muſt needs have a poſitive belief that they have heard a falſe report, and that the Theiſts are erroneous, and that their fellow-Atheiſts are orthodox in that particular. Nevertheleſs I diſcern ſo wide a difference, betwixt irrational creatures which neither do, nor can, nor can be obliged to believe there is a God, and men who can, and ought alſo to believe it; that if it is poſſible for a man not to believe there is a God, without believing that there is no God, I pronounce him guilty of negative Atheiſm. But this I take to be impoſſible in any capable ſubject, which is able, and obliged to have an actual belief. And becauſe an infant of two dayes old hath not the exerciſe of reaſon, and is not capable of any poſitive belief, it followes that that infant is not guilty of Atheiſm in any ſenſe, (any more then the trees of which I ſpake) although he doth not believe there is a God. But admit the poſſibility of meerly negative Atheiſm in a ſubject capable of actual Faith, yet all will grant that poſitive Atheiſm is a ſin, and a greater ſin then the negative; which evinceth the thing that I am proving. Mr. Hobbs himſelf, though heMr. Hobbs his Leviath. p. 214. denies that there are ſpirits, which is the heart of Atheiſm, (for God is a Spirit, Joh. 4.24.) yet he ſaith thatId de Civ. c. 14. ſcot. 19. Atheiſm is an erroneous opinion, and ſo infers it to be a poſitive thing. Again, he ſaith that ſins areLib. & Neceſ. p. 23. actions; and that actions are things poſitive, his neareſt Confederates will not deny.

The like may be ſaid of all other ſins, eſpecially ſins of commiſſion; which being riveted in a man by long cuſtom and continuance, are commonly calledSins are poſitive things, becauſe inward habits. HABITUAL SINS. So then, Mr. Hick. cannot but confeſs, that vices are habits as well as vertues, (there is a habit of Drunkenneſs, as well as of Sobriety;) and that Habits are Qualities he cannot be ignorant, if he is but able to tell his fingers; and that a habit is a thing poſitive, his poſtpraedicaments have taught him, where a habit and a privation are ſet as oppoſite terms, ſuch as do mutually neceſſitate each others abſence: which being granted by all the world, Mr. H's. Dilemma hath caught him in this inextricable ſnare, that he muſt either do a publick penance, or confeſs his Belief to be one of theſe two things; [So many Sins, ſo many Gods; or ſo many Sins, ſo many Creatures derived from God.] He ſees his ſin in his puniſhment, and what a vain thing it is for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Beetles to fly in the face of Eagles; for ſuch a thing as Mr. Hick. to ſtrike at God, and his Purity, by giving ſin an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and laying his Child (when he hath done) at another mans door: For ſo I find by Mr. B. p. 114.

4. Man the Author of ſome poſitive things, & God of ſome privatives. Rom. 22.11. 4. The poſitive Entity of ſin may farther be evinced thus: There muſt be ſomething poſitive to make a man poſitively foul; which foulneſs ſuffers a privation when the man is cleanſed of his filth. Sin doth make a man filthy; God by his grace doth make him clean. The filth of ſin is many times ſo ingrained, that after Gods own cleanſings the habitual ſinner remains unclean. I have Ezek. 23.13. purged thee (ſaith God) and thou wast not purged; therefore ſhalt thou not be purged from thy filthineſs any more. Yet in a flat contradiction to Mr. Hick's Divinity, the filth which is poſitive is mans own Creature, whereas the cleanſing which is privative is Gods own work.

5. Mr. Hick. confounds Negative and Privative, as well as Privative and Privation.5. Whileſt Mr. Hick. denies ſin to be ſomething poſitive, he ſeems to make no difference betwixt a ſimple negative, and a privative properly ſo called. And again, confounds a privation properly ſo call'd, with a thing call'd privative ſecundum quid. He makes no difference betwixt not bleſſing, and curſing God; betwixt ceaſing to give alms, (which is one kind of ſin) and grinding the faces of the poor, (by rapine, oppreſſion, and extortion) which is another. He makes no difference betwixt not ſaving, and killing another man. And yet the men of his party do interpret Gods ſufferance or permiſsion of ſin, by efficacious and operative; from whence I thus argue: If to permit ſin onely (which is onely not to hinder) can be any way poſitive, becauſe efficacious; how much more is that poſitive which is called perſwaſion, or temptation unto ſin? yet temptation unto ſin is a horrible ſin in the tempter, though none at all in the perſon tempted.

6. To harden our own hearts and conſent unto temptations are poſitive things.6. Mr. H's. party are wont to ſay, that God doth harden a mans heart by way of action. So ſaith Mr. W. p. 22. How much more by way of action doth a man harden his own heart? and every action is a poſitive entity; Ipſum privare, as much as any. To conſent to a temptation, he knows is ſin; and he will not deny it to be a thing poſitive. But to conſent to a temptation is none of Gods off-ſpring, much leſs is it a God; by which Mr. H. may diſcern, that in the Net which he had laid he is Pſal. 9.15. & 35.8. caught himſelf. And his traiterous Child (I mean his Argument) hath done exactly unto him, as he Deut. 19.19. thought to have done unto his brother.

7. Our deſtruction from our ſelves a poſitive thing.7. Though it is God that made us, and not we our ſelves, (Pſal. 95.) yet our ſpiritual destruction is from our ſelves, and not from God, (Hoſ. 13.6. Wiſd. 1.13, 14.) And believe me, to deſtroy is a poſitive thing, as the woful effect can well inform us. And if the determination of the will to blaſpheme, or curſe God, (which will be granted by all Sects to be a poſitive thing) is not mans own work, but his Creators, who then is made by Mr. Hick. to be the Author of ſuch impieties?

8. Sin is ſo ſpoken of in Scripture, as to be every where concluded a very poſitive thing. 8. Sin ſpoken of Scripture as a poſitive thing. There are that ſin as with a Iſ. 5.18. Cart-rope, and Iſ. 30.1. adde ſin unto ſin. Chriſt Iſ. 53.10, 12 bare our ſins, and made his ſoul an offering for them. All ſin ſhall be forgiven, Mat. 12.31. except that againſt the Holy Ghost. We read of Gen. 20.9. Joh. 15.22. & 19.11. 1 Joh. 5.16.17 great and little ſins in compariſon. We alſo read (in proportion) of Mat. 23.14. Luk. 12.48. greater and leſſer damnation. Sin is the1 Cor. 15.56. ſting of Death, and death the Rom. 6.23. wages of ſin. And the cauſe cannot have a leſſer Being then the effect. Sin Rom. 7.8. wrought in me (ſaith the Apoſtle) all maner of concupiſcence. And perfectius est agere, quâm eſſe, ſaith Albertus Magnus. Sin hath its Rom. 7.8, 9. life, and death, and reſurrection. There is a Heb. 3.13. deceitfulneſs of ſin. And ſin is ſaid to have its Heb. 11.25. pleaſures. Sin is a thing to be Heb. 12.1. laid aſide, either totally, or for a time. There are that are Rom. 7.14. ſold under ſin, and are ſervants to it, and cannot 2 Pet. 2.14. ceaſe from it. Inſomuch that ſin doth rule and Rom. 5.21. & 6.12. reign over them. In a word, it is evident from the Scriptures, that from the time in which ſin did make its Rom. 5.12. entrance into the world, it was able to change the courſe of Nature. And could a ſimple privation, which is but the abſence of an Entity (ſuppoſed to have been preſent) have been the cauſe of all this?

9. Mr. Hick. convinced by his own party.9. Mr. Hick's own party acknowledge ſin to be a compound, made up of a material and formal part. The material part of it Mr. W. calls a natural act (p. 25.) Mr. B. both a natural and moral act, (p. 11.) Doctor Twiſſe gives his inſtance in the act of lying with another mans wife; All poſitive things. Nay, the formal part of ſin is a poſitive Entity, as themſelves have defined it; it being the reſult of two poſitive things, to wit, the repugnance of any Action with the Law of God. Nay, Mr. W. ſaith broadly, that God muſt needs both will and work in the ſin of the act, the very pravity it ſelf, p. 12. implying it to have an efficient cauſe.

10. He argues with the Libertines.10. Mr. Hick. argues like the Libertines, and as it were out of their mouths, whileſt he contends that all things poſitive are either Gods Creatures, or God himſelf. And ſo he comes to be concerned in what I ſaid to Mr. W. ch. 1. ſect. 2. p. 8, 9, &c. I leave the Reader to collect how Mr. Hick. would frame his Anſwers to any man that ſhould Catechiſe him in the very firſt Article of the Nicene Creed, he having diſcovered to all the world in what a latitude he underſtands it.

11. Mr. Hick. will confeſs he hath blaſphemed, in caſe that ſin is ſomething poſitive; which is many wayes proved.11. This Mr. Hick. will unavoidably confeſs, that if 'tis impoſſible to ſeparate the ſinful act from the ſin, as David's lying with Bathſhebah from his ſin of Adultery; nay that we cannot imagine or conceive how they can poſſibly be diſtinguiſhed; then ſin muſt needs be ſomething poſitive, and ſo is inferred by him, to be either Gods Creature, or God himſelf. But that there is not the leaſt difference betwixt the ſinful act and the ſin, (as betwixt the act of hating God, and the ſin of hating God, which is that act of hating God) I have manifeſted Look back on ch. 2. ſect. 12, & 13. and alſo on ſect. 9, & 11. of the ſame ch. 2. before to Mr. W. In all which Mr. Hick. comes to be equally concerned; and I refer him to four Sections pointed out in the * margin. To all which I adde theſe following proofs. 1. Sin being complexum quid (in the acknowledgement of all) cannot admit of an abſtraction, and yet remain the complexum which it was before abſtracted. God can ſeparate the ſoul of man from the body, but not the man from the man, who is the upſhot of their union. This would imply a contradiction; as, that the parts are united when they are ſeparated or not united. To make it plain and naked for the thickest heads, I ſhall uſe this example; David's ſin of Adultery was not poſſible to be meerly his repugnance with the Law, abſtracted from his lying with Uriah's wife; nor meerly his lying with Uriah's wife, abſtracted from its repugnance with the Law of God: But 'twas the product or reſult of both united. As a man is not his body onely without his ſoul, nor onely his ſoul without his body, but a compound conſiſting of ſoule and body. 2. The ſinful act being a Relative, whoſe very being (as ſuch) is in relation to the law which it tranſgreſſeth, it is as impoſſible to ſepara • e the one from the other, as to ſeparate a Father from his very relation unto a Son. 3. Mr. Hobbs hathLiberty and Neceſſ. p. 23. confeſſed (what his brethren of the Kirk will never be able to claw off, either by owning or diſowning,) that if God is the Author of the action, which is a breach of the law, as well as of the law of which it is a breach, he muſt be the Author of the breach, that is, the ſin, and of the very repugnance betwixt the law and the action by which it is broken; which ſhews the inſeparability of which I ſpeak. And becauſe the Author of all things requiſite to the being of any thing, muſt needs be the Author of the being; therefore, ſay I, God is ſo far from being, that 'tis impoſſible he ſhould be, the Author of any one action which is a tranſgreſſion of the law, that is, a ſin, but onely the Author of the man's free-will, and of his power to uſe his freedom, which power is innocent, as hath been S • ct. 18. Num. 7. ſhewed. The ſin begins not but with the abuſe of that power in the determining of the will to the forbidden and wrong object: which wrong determining of the will is the ſinners own action, and his alone, ſince he did freely chuſe it, whileſt yet the contrary was in his power to chuſe. The power to act being before the act, is therefore ſeparable from it, though the act being done against the law, is not ſeparable from the obliquity, which is, its being done againſt the law. 4. If it is ſaid that man hath a pravity in his nature, Who they are who make God the Author as well of original as actual ſin. Look forwards on the 27. ſect. num. 4. of this ch. which accompanies the action of which God is the Author, and ſo diſtinguiſhable from it, and that God doth but make the lame horſe go, which was lame before he made him go, and ſo is the cauſe of his going, but not of his lameneſſe; that will be found to be a Reed, which will run into the elbow of ſuch as ſhall dare to lean upon it: for when Adam was yet innocent, he was not as a lame horſe, and yet he ceaſed to be innocent; or (if you pleaſe) he grew lame by eating that which was forbidden. So that if God was the cauſe of his eating that forbidden fruit, he was alſo the cauſe of the ſin, which was nothing elſe but his eating the fruit forbidden, if he made him eat, he made him lame. Beſides, if a horſe which goes not, and hath onely an aptitude to go lamely, will of neceſſity go lamely if he be made to go at all; he who ſhall cauſe that horſe to go, will alſo cauſe him to go lamely: ſo will God be concluded the cauſe of ſin, if having firſt given us the power to act againſt his law, he ſhall alſo reduce that power into that act, ſo as that poſitive act ſhall be his creature; yet ſo it muſt be, (ſaith Mr. Hick.) if a poſitive act. And Doctor Twiſſe doth ſay as bluntly, [Damus Deum eſſe cauſam uniuſcujuſque actûs. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 40. we grant that God is the particular cauſe of every act.] Wherein this differs from that of the Libertines, let him tell us who can. 5. God hath forbidden in his law the poſitive acts of Stealing, Adultery, Murder, and the like, for which poſitive acts he will alſo caſt into Hell. It will be ill pleading for Cain that God alone was the Author of the poſitive act of his ſtabbing Abel, and of the law which forbad it, from which two the obliquity was an unavoidable reſultance. And if the ſin of blaſphemy is diſtinguiſhable from the act of ſpeaking againſt God, then did God forbid ſomething beſides the ſin, (which implies a horrible contradiction) and there may be a good act of ſpeaking againſt God, as well as an evil one; which again implies another contradiction. 6. When Mr. Hick.'s Maſters are wont to ſay, that God praedeſtin'd men to ſin, as the means of damnation, they do and muſt mean, to ſin as ſin, becauſe ſin is no otherwiſe the means of damnation; and divers of them do uſe that very reduplication. Now becauſe they teach alſo that God decreed the means as well as the end, they infer ſin as ſin to be a poſitive act, and therefore not diſtinguiſhable from it.

I have now done with Mr. Hick. as to this particular, which Mr. B. calls his ſecond Argument, u • on which I have the more enlarged, becauſe I perceive it to be the great block at which thoſe men are wont to ſtumble, and at which the Libertines have fallen down headlong. Again, I find it to be the block, out of which Mr. B. hath hewed ſo many chipps, and little ſplinters; which having flown into his eyes, have made him rageful as well as blind. This will very much appear by the following Sections, which for that very reaſon ſhall be ſo much the ſhorter.

Sect. 19.

Mr. B's. firſt chip hewn out of Mr. Hick.'s Block. Mr. B. thus debauched by his leading friend as hath been ſhewed, ſticks not to ſay in plain termes, He muſt either maintain God to be the Author of ſin, or elſe he muſt ſpeedily renounce the very firſt Article of his Chriſtian Creed, and ſay that God did not make heaven and earth, and all real things viſible and inviſible therein. That in him we do not live, move, and have our being, Act. 17.28. That every good and perfect gift in its kind is not from God, Jam. 1.17. p. 113.] Though this is a chip of the old block, and might be ſent for its reception to the former Section, yet in order to his cure, I will make him feel his infirmity.

1. He foiſts the word real into the Creed, and makes it to ſtand in the place of good, and infers God the maker of all ſins.1. The word reall is in neither Creed but foiſted in by M. B. and if he intends it as exegetical of all things viſible and inviſible, in the Nicaene Creed, he makes a Creed for the Ranters, who finding by experience that blaſphemies and adulteries are real things, and having been taught (by whom think you?) to believe that God is the maker of all things real without exception, conclude thoſe things to be very good. Such domeſtick Libertines muſt be taught that when God is ſaid to be the maker of all things, it is onely meant of all things that are good, which alone are poſſible to be made by God; not of all things that are real, whereof many are evil, and onely made by Men and Devils.

2. The different methods of our reaſonings, and what comes of it.2. Mark (Good Reader) before thou goeſt any farther, the different methods of our reaſoning, and the different effects. I lay it down as my Principle, that God is not the maker of ſin, therefore not of David's adultery; therefore not of that action called his lying with Bathſhebah; therefore not of every poſitive and real thing. But Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and the Libertines do build backwards thus: They lay it down as their Principle, That God is the maker of all things that are real without exception, therefore of David's lying with Bathſhebah, (acknowledged by all to be a real and poſitive thing) therefore of his Adultery, (unleſs his Adultery can be differenced from his lying with Bathſhebah) therefore of his ſin, (unleſs his ſin can be differenced from his Adultery.) Again, the Libertines argue thus; God doth decree ſin, therefore it is good. But I argue thus; Sin cannot be good, therefore God cannot decree it. Of ſo great concernment it is, that they be beaten out of their methods and wayes of reaſoning, and taught to begin at the right end.

3. They aſcribe all poſitive entities, however filthy, unto God.3. I who prove ſin to be a poſitive entity, do alſo prove it to be the work of men and Devils onely; whereas 'tis he and Mr. Hick. who do impute it unto God, on ſuppoſition of its poſitive entity. What he ſaith from Act. 17.28. is wholly impertinent, unleſs he thinks it to be a ſin to live, and to move, and to have a being. For that innocent liberty and power which we have from God, we alone do determine to the doing of evil. Much leſs pertinent is that from S. James (c. 1. v. 17.) unleſs he thinks that ſin can be a good and a perfect gift, or that every poſitive entity is ſuch.

4. They are convinced by the Aſſemblies confeſſion of faith, ch. 9. Artic. 1. 4. It is part of the Aſſemblies confeſſion of faith, [God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any abſolute neceſſity of nature determined to do good or evil. From whence it followes, that Adam's determination of his free will to the eating of forbidden fruit, (which was a poſitive entity) was meerly from Adam, and not from God. Unleſſe they will ſay, he had a neceſſity ſupernatural, though not from nature; which if they ſay, it will be at their perill. Again, 'tis granted by all, that man ſince the fall hath a liberty of will in things not moral, and in many things which are meerly moral; which inferres them to be the Authors of many poſitive Acts.

5. They are farther uncovered, by being ſuppoſed to be catcchized.5. If Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. were to be publickly Catechized, and firſt asked who made them men, 2. who made them ſinners, 3. who made them Priests, 4. who made their Dublets either long or ſhort-waſted, 5. who is wont to waſh their cloaths, to cleanſe their hands, and their feet, and to do ſome other much viler offices; they would not ſay (for ſhame) that God did make or do thoſe things, which they know to be poſitive and real Entities; but to each of thoſe Queſtions they would certainly return a ſevere Anſwer. Again, if they are askt, who made the ſhort-waſtedneſs of the Dublet aforeſaid, they will ſay, the ſame Taylor who made it a ſhort-waſted Dublet. Ask them then, who made the ſinfulneſs of the ſinful Action (to wit Davids lying with Bathſhebah) they will ſay, the ſame Agent who made the ſinful Action, that poſitive Entity, David's lying with Bathſhebah againſt the Law. Who made that poſitive Entity, or ſinful action? Even God, ſayMr. W. ſaith that of every poſitive act God is the proper efficient cauſe, p. 24. Mr. B. and Mr. H. the ſame and worſ, as hath been ſhewed. they; but (ſay I) the Adulterer, againſt the precept and will of God, and againſt that meaſure of his grace, which had been ſufficient to prevent it, if David had not been a reſolute and wilful ſinner. I conclude this Section with the confeſſion of Mr. W. [That he who is the Author of the Action, muſt needs be the Author of the ſin alſo which is unſeparable from it, p. 25.] But both himſelf and Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. do ſay, that God is the Author and maker of the action (as being a poſitive and real thing,) therefore according to their conceſſions they do all make God the Author of ſin.

Sect. 20.

Mr. B's. ſecond chip of the old block. Mr. B. hews out his ſecond chip thus, [ He muſt hold, that there be myriads of myriads of actions in the world which are not wrought by God, &c. p. 113. This ſecond chip is wonderful, if compared with the first; 1. His inconſiſtency with himſelf, and his inferring all ſinful actions to be wrought by God. for there he would have me bound up by my Theſis, to maintain that God is the Author of ſin, though here he makes me to hold, that there are 100000. of Actions not wrought by God: if the firſt were ſwallowed, there is no place for the ſecond; and if the ſecond, then no place for the firſt. For if I hold (as I do) that there are myriads of ſins, or ſinful actions, whereof not one can by any poſſibility be wrought by God, then by no poſſibility can I make God the Author of ſin. But now Mr. B. declares his Tenet, that all the actions in the world (however filthy and noyſome) are wrought by God. I ſay the contrary, that there is a world of wickedneſs which is none of Gods making, but of the Devils, and his party, whether in Hell or in Earth.

2. His unſuccesful reliance on the Jeſuites.2. Whileſt I deny that any ſinful actions are wrought by God, I do not deny that he permits them; and I have often ſhewed, how the ſinner depends on God, both for his power to live and move. What he ſaith of the ſeſuites may well be true; for they are kinſmen in theſe affaires. The Jeſuites, in waggery, did purpoſely propagate many blasphemies, ariſing from the Tenet of unconditional Reprobation, in many Proteſtant parts of the Chriſtian world, that by making them odious, they might fright men from thence into the Church of Rome. I find the obſervation in the Renowned and JudiciousExact. Coll. l. 10. ch. 39. ſect. 6. p. 3189. Dr. Jackson, whom Mr. B. put me upon reading, by his ſaying that I had read him, when indeed I had not. And ſince the Jeſuite Suarez is of ſo much Authority with his Couſin of the Kirk, I will obſerve out ofProprio & reali influxu concurrit Deus ad actus liberi Arbitrii ut reales actus ſunt, etiamſi ſaepiſſimè & intrinſecè mali ſint: nam cùm hi actus ſint verè res & effectus reales, neceſſe eſt ut ſaltem illam dopendentiam à Deo habeant, quae omnibus cauſarum ſecundarum effect bus generalis & omnino neceſſaria eſt. Suarez de concurſu, motione, & auxiliis Dei, lib. 2. Suarez, that the acts of Free-will are real acts, though evil, and the real effects of ſecond cauſes; which Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. are both intreated to chew upon. And again, I will obſerve, that Suarez gives thoſe acts but a general dependance upon God; whereas Doctor Twiſſe (as I lately cited him) makes God to be cauſa particularis uniuſcujuſque actus: which is worſe then the Jeſuite, though the Jeſuites and Dominicans are too too bad in their Aſſertions.

Sect. 21.

Mr. B's. 3d. chip more pitiful then the former. Mr. B. ſaith farther [ It will follow, that the more ſinful acts any commits, the more he is a Creator, and a kind of an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a God of himſelfe, p. 13.] Still a chip of the ſame block. But 1. what pretence hath he for this, when I have ſaid ſo often, that though the ſinner in ſome ſort may be called the Creator of his ſins, yet the evil which he doth, he doth by that power and freedom of will which he had from God? How then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in any ſenſe? 2. To be a God of evil, is a very ſad priviledge. And the word [God] is ſo far from ſignifying Him onely who is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that Exod. 22.28. men and1 Cor. 8.5. Idols are called Gods in Scripture; and Satan himſelf, the 2 Cor. 4.4. God of this world. And ſo the ſumme of Mr. B's. acumen is but this, That the more ſins a man commits, of the more ſins he is the Author. The more evil the Devil invents, the works of the Devil are ſo much the more. Very pretty. Look back on Sect. 18. & 19. Num. 5.

Sect. 22.

Mr. B's. fourth chip, the moſt lamentable of all. Mr. B. begins to be more extravagant then himſelf, (not onely more then other men) by arguing from the ſuppoſal of ſins being a thing poſitive, [That God did never concur to any the beſt action that ever the holieſt Saint did act, p. 113.] As wild a ſaying as this is, his reaſon for it is little leſs; it being no other then this, [That ſinful infirmity doth cleave to their holiest performances. Ibid.]

1. Mr. B's. arguing concludes him either Pelagian, or Libertine.1. If this were reduced into a Syllogiſme, it would overthrow his whole Fabrick, and that two wayes: for either it would argue him a Pelagian, in denying that our beſt actions are from the grace of God; or elſe a flat Libertine, in affirming our evil and good actions to proceed from God in equal manner. The ſumme of his arguing is this, That if ſin is not from God, the holieſt action of man is not from God. But firſt he muſt be minded of his leaſt unhappineſs, which is his great impertinence: for this is not the thing which here it lay upon him to prove, That ſin is from God, but that it is not a thing poſitive; whereas by ſtriving to prove it is from God, he proves it alſo a thing poſitive, againſt himſelf and his friend Mr. H. Hick. For in that they both ſay, whatſoever poſitive thing is not from God is God, they unavoidably imply, that whatſoever is from God is a poſitive thing.

2. His great impertinence is to no end, but to make God the Author of ſin.2. From hence it is evident and undeniable, that though Mr. B. in ſome places doth deny his derivation of ſin from God, yet his heart is ſo full, ſo brim-ful of it, that here he goes out of his way to ſhed ſome of it upon his paper; or if unknowingly it falls from him, it is ſtill a ſign he overflowes. If he thinks that the beſt actions of the holieſt men are the very ſins of infirmity which he ſaith doe cleave to them, he knowes his dangers above recited, and many more I need not name; but Iſa. 5.20. wo to him that calleth good evil, and evil good. If he means that the ſin is a diſtinct thing from it; why could he not diſtinguiſh betwixt the Sun and a Coal-pit? betwixt the pious action, which is from God, and the ſin annexed, which is from man? Gods concurrence is an equivocal word, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed. If it relates onely to good, God concurs to the very act; if to evil, God concurs not any otherwiſe, then by continuing to us the liberty & power to act with which he indued us as we are men. But to abuſe that liberty, and to reduce that power into any forbidden or evil act, is the unhappy and ſole priviledge of the depraved Creature.

Sect. 23.

Mr. B. ſaith farther, that if ſin is ſomething poſitive, Mr. B's. fifth chip denies Gods praeſcience of all wickedneſs, unleſs he alſo praedetermined it. and none of Gods Creatures, [It will overturn all Divine praeſcience of ſins; and how can that be foreknown by God, which is in no ſenſe praedetermined by him; in which he hath at all no hand? p. 113.] This is the ſame ſad beggery of the thing in Queſtion, without the leaſt offer of proof, which his cogent neceſſities have ſo often ſqueezed from him, and which I haveSee the eighth, ninth & tenth Sections of this third chapter. ſpoken to ſo largely in divers Sections. Though he hath ſeveral times confeſſed, that Deity it ſelf is overturned if praeſcience, yet here he profeſſedly overturns Gods praeſcience of any thing in the world, but what he firſt doth praedetermine, and hath a hand in. If God did not praedetermine (nor had any hand at all in) all the villanies in the world, (which none can imagine but Mr. B. and his party) then he could not foreknow them, ſaith the unclean Dictator. And ſo he caſts himſelf into his wonted ſtreight, of aſperſing Gods holineſs on the one hand, and his praeſcience on the other. To what he asks, and asks onely, I will fully (but briefly) anſwer, that God can foreſee what we will do, as well as what he will do himſelf. He may determine to give us power, and foreſee how we will uſe it. He gives us a power to act freely, and to determine our own wills; which would not be wills, much leſs our own wills, if determined by any thing except our ſelves. So much am I for Gods praeſcience, that I extend it to all things without exce • tion; as well to the evil, which he did not praedetermine, as to the good, which he did. But 'tis a great derogation to Gods infinite knowledge, to ſay it reacheth no farther then to his own decrees and executions: The very thing which the Socinians do ſo improve, as to deny Gods praeſcience of future contingencies. And whether Mr. B. with his party are not Socinians in this point (according to that method which they do conſtantly uſe in judging others) let them be their own Judges in cooler blood. If they deny it, 'tis at their peril; it being much a leſſer error, to think that God foreſaw no wickedneſs, then that he foreordained any.

Sect. 24.

Mr. B. concludes with an affirmation, 1. Mr. B's. Impoſitions upon the Scripture, (which he hopes may paſs with the eaſie multitude for a kind of ſixth Argument) that my opinion is contrary 1. to Scripture, which ſpeaks of ſin as of a privative, when it ſpeaks moſt properly; 2. to Auſtin, who pleads that ſin hath no cauſe efficient, but onely deficient; 3. to Schoolmen of all ſides and parties; 4. to his honoured and beloved Father Arminius, p. 114. The firſt is contrary to truth in the very judgment of common ſenſe, as I have largely made appear (and partly out of his own mouth) in the 15, 16, 17, and 18. Sections of this Chapter. But yet I will ask him this little thing, Doth the Scripture ſpeak properly when it ſaith that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh? and doth it not ſpeak properly when it ſaith that ſin is a work of the Devil, that the Devil is the Father of it, that Luſt conceiveth and bringeth forth ſin? True indeed, it is called Vanity; but ſo is Pſal. 39 11. Man too, who yet (I hope) is a poſitive entity nevertheleſſe. Nay Man at his Verſ. 5. beſt eſtate is altogether vanity: nay altogether Pſal. 62.9. lighter then vanity it ſelf. Sin indeed is called darkneſſe, but by a figure, and ſo are Eph. 5.8. men too. A man is no where called emptineſſe, no more is ſin. But ſin hath negative attributes (as every thing in the world hath) in reſpect of its having no moral goodneſſe. How many things are there, which God himſelf in Scripture is affirm'd not to be? yet Mr. B. will not deny him to be a poſitive entity.

2. The Schoolmer.2. As for the Schoolmen, if either they talk erroneouſly (as Mr. B. will confeſſe they often do) or are miſtaken by Mr. Barlee, (who is as good at that faculty as any man of his paſte) or were never read by him, (who doth not cite ſo much as one in this place,) who can help it?

3. S. Auſtin might erre as well in this as in many other things wherein Mr. B. will ſay he erred,3. S. Auſtin. Auguſt. lib. 12. De Civit. Dei cap. 7. ubi de causâ malae voluntatis agit, conferat • r um ejuſdem lib. 21. de Civitate Dei, cap. 24. ubi pa • um (inquit) veraciter dicitur quod dicitur (Mat. 12.32.) niſi eſſent, quibus etſi non in iſto, tamen rem • tteretur in futuro ſaeculo. His new degree of Arminianiſm and in the very ſame book which here he cites. I ſay he might, not that he does. For Mr. B. underſtood not his own citation, which being ſeemingly for him, doth make againſt him in reality. For Austin's ſpeech belongs onely to the cauſe of the evil will, not of every evil act of which the will is the cauſe. Again, it onely belongs to the cauſes that are without the man: and this is that which I would have, that God is far from being the efficient cauſe of an evil will; he is not ſo much as the deficient, becauſe he is not wanting in thoſe things that are neceſſary to make an evil will good: ſo far is Austin from pleading that ſin hath no efficient cauſe. Notwithſtanding all that he hath ſpoken, the impious man's own will is the efficient cauſe of his impiety.

4. Whereas he ſaith that my opinion is moſt contrary to Arminius, he contradicts a good part of both his books, wherein he ſaith that my opinions are c. 3. p. 25. all derived from Arminius. I had formerly proved by manyDiv Phi. def. c. 1. p. 12, 13, &c. inſtances, how far himſelf was an Arminian, and how impoſſible it was that I ſhould be ſo. Now he lends me another inſtance, wherein Himſelf and Mr. Hick, are at agreement with Arminius, and I am contrary to all three. But I am of opinion he wrongs Arminius, and makes him more Preſbyterian then indeed he was; had he read any ſuch thing: he would in all probability have ſet down the • lace. His caſe is ſad, whether he pretends to Truth or Falſhood. If to the firſt, he hurts himſelf and Mr. Hick. If to the ſecond, he ſlanders Arminius, and ſtabbs himſelf.

Sect. 25.

Having made this way for his own unhappineſſe,Mr. Hick's heatheniſh expreſsion of ſins, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , commended by Mr. B. for 1. learned, 2. witty, and 3. well written. by that variety of attempts to which Mr. Hick. (it ſeems) betray'd him; he acts the well-natur'd man, and even bleſſeth the Author of his unhappineſſe. He declares that Mr. Hick. is his cordial friend, who wrote well to him, told him learnedly and wittily, that Mr. T. P. is the firſt who gave ſin this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an extraordinary invention, p. 114.] Here is his tragical Exit for many reaſons. 1. Mr. Hick.'s ſaying that my invention is extraordinary, is no proof that Arminius doth ſay the contrary, or that Mr. Hick. did write well, or that his ſaying was both learned and witty. Each of theſe I deny, and have ſufficiently diſproved in my eighteenth Section. 2. He knowes that I had never mentioned any ſuch Heatheniſh expreſſion, as ſins 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; nor was it ever to be found in any Author but Mr. Hick. And he knowes that it was clearly his own invention; either ariſing from his opinion that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 was derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pono, and ſignified the poſicive entity of ſin, (which though a ſad miſcarriage of the Scholar, is yet the very beſt that his friends can make of it) or from his ſadder apprehenſion that ſin muſt needs have a Godhead, if it is none of God's creatures, and yet a poſitive thing. To believe the former were a huge act of charity; but there is no place for it with Mr. Hick. who hath forced me to the ſeverity of believing the later. 3. All Mr. Hick. hath diſplayed is his being overflown with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which (could its banks have contained it, would not thus have guſhed over on no occaſion, when 'tis plain that the effect could be nothing elſe but to drown his credit with a yellow, as well as his cauſe with a blacker Jaundiſe. But evenit malo male, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Erynnis (as they ſay) ſtill p • oves a virgin: for poor Perillus is the firſt who is likely to be tortured with his invention; and believe me, the brazen Bull was a leſſer miſerie, then to be found in the im • iety of making the fouleſt actions to be the Rivulets iſſuing out by a neceſſity from God the Source. What Spirit but an unclean one, can be the cauſe of uacleanneſſe▪ that is, of ſin? Who are they whom I have proved to have printed in plain terms, that God is the cauſe of that uncleanneſſe? When the Phariſees heretofore, who were the Jewiſh Puritans, or Preci • ans, and rec • oned themſelves the godly party of the land, had ſlandered our Saviour with having an unclean Spirit, (who, although he was God, did appear to them as he was man too) our Saviour told them (on that occa •• on) the danger of blaſpheming againſt the holy Ghoſt. Let them who love the Lord Jeſus in ſ • ncerity, and tender the ſafety of their own as well as of other mens ſoules, not onely read, but conſider, and then apply what is ſpoken, Mar. 3.28, 29, 30.

I now diſmiſſe the ſignal Paragraph which Mr. Hick. ſuggeſted to Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Barlee hath vented to all the People; which yet I ſhould not have diſmiſſed ſo ſoon, but that my Reader may be referred to ſeveral Sections for an enlargement, as ch. 1. ſect. 2. from p. 7. to p. 13. ch. 2. ſect. 5. p. 69, 70. ſect. 10. p. 79, 80, 81. ſect. 14. p. 88, 90. All which being conſidered, Mr. B. doth fitly diſlike the ſtile of Unfortunate Writer, for if it ever belonged to any, it doth to him and Mr. Hick.

Sect. 26.

Mr. B. having thus far miſcarried (by the help of Mr. Hick.) proceeds to plead for himſelf, A ſhort ſpeci ••• of M. B's. rem •• nt of Abſt rſions in ord r to the Readers and P • inrs • aſe. and his guilty M • ſters, in ſuch a treacherous manner both to them and himſelf, that to give my Readers an account of ſuch numerous failings, were to draw out the man's unhappineſſe to an intolerable length. And becauſe a Pigmy as well as Hercules may be judged of by a foot, I will leave the Reader, by that which followes, to gueſſe at the body of his abſterſions.

1. What I had cited out of Calvin's Inſtitutions, he affirmed to have been fetched from Calvin's Book De Providentiâ; and ſaid I did as good as name it. IDiv. Phila • . def. ch. 3. p. 127 &c. ſhew'd him the groſſeneſs of his miſtake, and prov'd the wilfulneſs of it, which raiſed the error into a ſin. Now by way of abſterſion, he confeſſeth the fact, p. 126. and complains he was miſ-led by his edition of Calvin, which he ſaith was different from mine. And (which ſhewes the wilfulneſſe of his laſt crime alſo) he is ſilent of the book De Providentiâ, and talks of nothing but Inſtitutions: which had he really conſulted, he muſt needs have met with the citation, as ſince he confeſſeth to have done. But this doth onely introduce his more incomparable Commiſſion. For

Of Calvin's Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the D vil, and all that are w cked to conceive and perpetrate their evil doing.2. I had cited other words from Calvin's Inſtitutions, and that from the page where now I ſee them, to wit p. 66. c. 17. l. 1. Edit. Genev. A. D. 1637. But it ſeems M. B. conceived the paſſage ſo unexcuſable, that inſtead of labouring to ſalve the matter, he daringly brake out in this equally ridiculous and desperate manner; [I will give all my books for a half-penny, which I ſhould be loth to part with for 150 l. if the fourth testimony be to be found in Calvin's book of Inſtitution in the place quoted by him, p. 126▪ To • uniſh the Malefactor for ſuch a • old diſhoneſty, I will not challenge all his books, (which yet are due to me for one half-penny) but record the words of Mr. Calvin, with the page and the lines wherein they lie. [Verùm ubi in memo iam revocant, Diabolum totamque improborum cohortem ſic omnibus partibus manu Dei, ☜ tanquam fr no cohiberi, ut nec concipere ullum adverſus nos maleficium, nec conceptum moliri, nec ad perpetrandum, ſi maxi • è moliantur, digitum movere queant, niſi quantum ille permiſerit, imo niſi quantum mandârit; nec compedibus tantùm ejus teneri ligatos, ſed ☞etiam ad obſequia praestanda fraeno cogi; habent unde ſe prolixè conſolentur. Calv. Inſt. l. 1. c. 17. ſect. 11. p. (ſeu potius fol.) 66. col. 2. lin. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Edit. Genev. 1637. And this was the fourth blaſphemous Inſtance which I produced in Engliſh, Correct Copy, p. 9. Thus the Malefactor is proved moſt guilty; and not onely ſo, but he ſtands condemned out of his mouth too. For when it is for his turn to skin over an ulcer, which he ſees cannot be cured, hep. 126. lin. 1, &c. ſaith, It appears by the pages which I quote out of Calvin, that he followes one Edition of the Institutions, and I another; his having been printed 1585. and mine no longer ago then 1637. Is this a man to manage a controverſie with any longer, who never regards what he utters, either to ſully another, or to abſterſe himſelf, ſo that he may but ſay ſomething, and become the Author of a book? 1. It ſeems my Edition is much later then his, and therefore probably more emendate. 2. Had it been true that my citation did not appear in his Edition, he ſhould not yet have concluded that it appeared not in mine own. 3. Had he not been reſolute in making a refuge of a mistake, he might have borrowed my Calvin, or at leaſt have ask't when it was printed. 4. Though the Printer erred in a punctilio, by putting ſect. 12. for ſect. 11. yet he made it no error by expreſſing the very page exactly right, which made the Section become needleſs; beſides that ſect. 11. and ſect. 12. are the very next neighbours to one another, and being both extremely ſhort, they cannot but both be ſeen at once, with one and the ſame caſt of the Readers eye: ſo utterly deſtitute of excuſes is the Merchant become in this adventure, which I have proſecuted thus at large for theſe three reaſons. Firſt in order to brevity, that other things may be compendiouſly and yet ſufficiently replied to, by the Readers being intreated to gueſſe at the Diſputant by this one inſtance; and how unworthy he is of my farther conſideration. 2. It appears by this inſtance, that whatſoever blaſphemous Doctrines I have publickly cited from that Tribe of Writers, I am proved to have truly and juſtly cited, by that man of all the world, who is moſt concerned to have them thought falſe; for in caſe he had found one real flaw, how would the Victor have triumphed, who is ſo full of ovations in being beaten? 3. It appears by this one inſtance, how aſhamed they are of thoſe Doctrines in their modest intervals, which in their Fits of courage they uſe to boaſt of. Mr. B. was unwilling either to praiſe or diſpraiſe what he found cited out of Calvin, viz. That the Devil and all other wicked ones, are not onely permitted, but commanded alſo; nor onely commanded, but compelled alſo [ad concipiendum, moliendum, perpetrandum maleficium] to conceive, to attempt, and to accompliſh their evil doing. I will not diſſect the words, much leſs read a Lecture on them, unleſs I ſhall poſſibly be invited by ſome worthier perſon then Mr. B.

Sect. 27.

Mr. B's. affected Tergiverſations in his chiefeſt con • cernments. That which next follows in Mr. B. from p. 127. to 137. is never enough to be admired. For pretending to anſwer that large Catalogue of Blaſphemies which I had collected out of his Maſters in my Defence of the Divine Philanth. c. 3. p. 132. to p. 140. he doth not ſo much as meddle with any one of the particulars of which the Catalogue is compoſed: but in ſtead of that, he performs theſe pranks. 1. Hep. 127. ſends the Reader to his firſt book, where there is not a ſyllable touching any one of them. 2.Ibid. He asks what it would conduce to the main Queſtion, though ſome out of divers owned claſſical Authors ſhould not prove to be exactly defenſible. 3. He ſaith,Ibid. if I will hold what they do, I ſhall explicate ſuch matters by as ſoft phraſes as I pleaſe. 4.p. 128. He complains that my Deſign was hateful in the making of that Collection. 5. He tells us that thep. 130, 131. Jeſuites, to wit, Bellarmin, Suarez, Pererius, Vega, have writ as boldly of God, as the Presbyterians ſo often cited; and that Arminius (who was alſo a Presbyterian) did ſomething like it. 6.Ibid. He complaines that my Indictment doth ſerve for nothing, but to make his Claſſical Authors odious (for ſo he commonly deſcribes the party) and to make room for ſuch as Grotius and Caſtalio. 7.Ibid. Ibid. He proteſts againſt Hobbs, and the Comforter of Believers, as no Proteſtants. 8. He calls the objection which is made againſt his Maſters, their making God the Author of ſin, an old muſty ſtale objection. 9.p. 132. He pleads (againſt matter of Fact, demonſtrated to the eyes and ears of all) that men ſo eminent for piety and learning were never like to be the Authors of ſo foul and ſottiſh an opinion. (Mark that, Reader. It is as if one ſhould prove that Peter did not deny Chriſt, becauſe of the unlikelihood that ſo great and good an Apoſtle ſhould do ſo wickedly. Or that Pelagius was no Heretick, nor writ againſt by Auſtin, becauſe Auſtin commended him ſo very much, which 'twas not likely he would have done, if he had thought him a Heretick.) 10.Ibid. He ſaith his Maſters are not like to need an Apology, like that of the Poet, Laſciva eſt noſtra pagina, vita proba eſt. 11. He granteth that his Maſters have taught in Print, 1.p. 132, 133. ☞ That God is the Author of ſin, 2. God wills ſin, 3. He impells to it, 4. He forceth men to it. Theſe things Mr. B. takes upon him to excuſe; and the manner of it is wonderful.

2. To the firſt of the four he anſwers thus; 1 p. 133. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is the Author of ſin. That he doth at no hand like it, that God ſhould be the Author of any culpable evil. Reader, obſerve his partiality, and ſelfcontradiction. When the Libertines pronounce the words, then he calls it, with Mr. Calvin, an execrable blaſphemy, (p. 129.) and curſes them that are ſo blaſphemous, (54, 55.) but now he finds the ſame blaſphemy in his own Maſters writings, the caſe is alter'd; and the worſt he ſaith is, [He doth not like it for his own part.] Like indulgent old Eli reproving his Sons for their ſacriledge and rapine, Nay, my Sons, it is no good report which I hear; why do ye ſuch things? 1 Sam. 2.23, 24. There's his partiality. And here he profeſſeth to diſlike what he frequently approves (as hath been ſhewed) commending the Authors for very Claſſical, and owning them for his Maſters. There's his ſelf-contradiction. But now he hath ſaid he likes not the blaſphemy for his own part (that's the word) he ſhews us how vehemently he likes it for thoſe other mens parts who are his Claſſical Authors. Firſt forIbid. Note, that of all who call God the Author of ſin, he names onely Zuinglius, omitting Borrhaus, who calls him the Author of the evil of ſin, as well as of puniſhment. Zuinglius he alledgeth, that a little Candor would interpret him to have meant that God is the Author of the evil of puniſhment, rather then of ſin. But Zuinglius his word is peccatum, which ſignifies ſin onely. And he doth inſtance in the ſins called Adultery and Murder, naming them Gods works, and calling God their Author. (See Corr. Copy, p. 10. & Philan. c. 4. p. 59, 60.) So that the beſt of Mr. B's. excuſe is this, that though Zuinglius calls God the Author of ſin (not ſpeaking a word of puniſhment in the place which I cited) and ſo muſt be confeſſed to have meant the evil of ſin, yet charity ſhould interpret, that he meant the evil of puniſhment alſo; and rather that then the other. Or 2. if Zuinglius did mean as he ſpake, he did not mean that God was a moral Author of ſin, Ibid. How Mr. B. makes God the Author of ſin in that which he confeſſeth to be the proper notion of the word Author. Look back on ſect. 3, & 4. of this Chap. ſo as the Devil is, by way of perſwaſion, but (it ſeems then) a natural Author of ſin, which is infinitely worſe, as acting by way of neceſſitation. But when Mr. B. ſaid that God doth tempt men to ſin, he ſpake of a perſwaſion; and now he ſaith, that to perſwade unto ſin doth infer the proper Author of it. So he is judged and condemned out of his own mouth again, to have properly made God the Author of ſin. 3. He ſaithIbid. it is not credible that Zuinglius ſhould mean any other Author or Cauſe of ſin, then non removens prohibens, or cauſa per accidens. But 1. I cited his words, and not his meanings (either beſide or against his words.) 2. His words will not ſignifie ſuch a meaning as this: Elſe, when the world is called Gods work, Mr. B. may ſay, God was but cauſa per accidens, and that the world was not properly his work. 4. Cauſa per accidens, if cauſa, is extreamly bad; and God is in no ſenſe the cauſe of ſin. 5. Removens prohibens he underſtands not, if I may gueſs by the Uſe he makes of it: For Zuinglius ſaith that God doth make men Tranſgreſſors, as well as that ſin is the work of God.

Laſt of all, he produceth ſome Popiſh Writers, Ibid. who write as groſly as Zuinglius the Presbyterian. And who did ever doubt of it? Sure none that knows their conſanguinity. Ocham and Gabriel do affirm, Ocham & Gabriel affirmant, quod Deus in rigore & proprietate Sermonis eſt cauſa peccati. Medin. in 1.2. q. 79. a. that God in a rigour and propriety of ſpeech is the cauſe of ſin. What then? Therefore the rigider ſort of Papists are like the rigider ſort of Presbyterians.

3. To the ſecond thing which he confeſſeth as his Maſters Doctrine, 3. Mr. B. accuſeth Calvin, in excuſing him, for ſaying, God doth will ſin. viz. that God doth will ſin, he ſaith theſe things, p. 134.1. That the meaning of the Orthodox hath been often explained. 2. That Calvin explains himſelfe. And how ſhould that be, but that though God doth will ſin, yet he wills it not as ſin? The horrid nature of which ſhift I haveLook back on ch. 2. ſect. 19. And ſee Div. Philanth. c. 4. p. 42. elſewhere diſplai'd. This is the fountain of thoſe unclean ſayings, That Adultery is good in as much as it is the work of God the Author; And that all ſins are good in as much as they make for Gods glory. That is from Zuinglius, and this from Mr. W. 3. He tells us that Mr. Calvins meaning is no worſe then the Schoolmens, naming a Papiſt in the margin,Look back on ch. 2. ſect. 3. p. 61. according to his wont. To ſhew a very great affinity betwixt the worſt ſort of Papiſts and Presbyterians, doth univerſally paſs with Mr. B. for an Absterſion. Yet this is the man who rayles ſo frequently at others for having any good thing common to them with the Papiſts.

4. To the third thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Maſters, 4. Mr. B. accuſeth Piſcator and Calvin, in his way of excuſing them for ſaying that God doth thruſt men into wickedneſs. viz. That God doth drive, or thruſt men on into wickedneſs, and that men do ſin by Gods impulſe, he hath returned four things, p. 134, 135.1. That neither Calvin nor Piſcator do underſtand it in a flagitious or unconſcionable manner. (And may it not be pleaded as well for the Phariſees, that although indeed they ſaid of Chriſt, He hath an unclean ſpirit (Mark 3.30.) yet they did not underſtand it in a flagitious ſenſe?) 2. That when himſelf had affirmed Gods ſtirring up the wicked to their wicked deeds, as a man puts ſpurres to a dull Jade, he brought the Simile to ſhew, that the man is the Author of the going of the horſe, but not of the halting. (The ſad eſtate of which ſhift I ſhewed veryLook back on ſect. 18. num. 11. of this Chap. lately, and therefore I forbear to repeat it here.) 3. That whatever Calvin and Piſcator do ſay in ſome places, yet they ſay the contrary in other places. (This doth juſtifie what I ſaid in myLook back on Introduct. ſect. 4, 5, 6, 7. Introduction: and the Logick here uſed is juſt the ſame, as if the Barbarians of Melita ſhould plead for themſelves, that though they call'd S. Paul a Murderer in one place, yet they did not wrong him, becauſe in another place they call'd him a God, Act. 28.4, 6. And ſo though Judas at one time betrayed his Maſter, yet he did not mean it in a flagitious ſenſe, becauſe at another time he did not betray him; yea and kiſſed him too when he did betray him. If Mr. B. ſpeaks Treaſon, ſuch Abſterſions as theſe will not avail him. 4. That whatever they ſay, they underſtand no more then Arminius. (What is this, but to acknowledge, that as Arminius was a Presbyterian, ſo the Presbyterians are for Arminius, whereſoever Arminius doth chance to erre, or ſpeak unhappily?)

5. To the fourth thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Maſters, viz. That men do ſin by Gods coaction, 5. Mr. B. grants that his Maſters do ſometimes teach a coaction from God to ſin. Look back on ch. 2. ſect. 2. p. 59, 60. &. ſect. 3. p. 62. (which by the way he doth diſtinguiſh from forcing and thruſting into ſin) he would ſeem to give a ſalvo by floundring again in this following manner, p. 135, 136. Firſt he ſaith, That Orthodox Writers do uſe it very ſeldom. Hold, good Reader, and bear me witneſs, that the man pleads guilty to the very worſt part of the Indictment. He confeſſeth that they do uſe to blaſpheme in this manner, by ſaying that God doth compel men to ſin, but onely alledgeth that they uſe it not often. And though I can prove they uſe it often, yet I am willing to paſs it by, if they will but recant, and promiſe never to do the like. The Queſtion was not, whether a few times, or many times they vent this blaſphemy; but whether or no they do it not ſometimes. Mr. B. ſaith, Yes, ſometimes, but ſeldom; not often, though now and then. Judas did not often betray his Maſter; but it was too much that he did it once. By ſuch a ſoft phraſe he ſlandered the Scriptures in his former Volume,☜He forgeth new things upon the Scripture. [The Scriptures ſay not much, or often, that God doth pradestine men to ſin, Corrept. Corr. p. 72. at the bottom.] which is a deſperate forgery impoſed on the word of God, for the Scriptures ſay not any ſuch thing, no not once, no not any thing like it; no nor the Fathers of the Church, who are ſlandered together with the Scriptures. (ibid.) 'Twas but a bold invention to leſſen the odium which lay upon his Divinity. Next he tells us, that whenſoever Orthodox Wriers douſe the word Coaction (in ſaying that God doth compel men to ſin) they moſtly at the ſame time acknowledge they ſpeak improperly, p. 135. (Which by the way is very falſe, and if it were true, 'twere too too bad, as I haveSee Div. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26. Look back alſo on ch. 2. of this book. elſewhere ſhewed) But what impropriety is that he ſpeaks of? even ſuch as implies a contradiction, and a condemnation of his own Party: for his words are theſe (and he takes them out of Paraeus) They underſtand it not of a coaction which deſtroyes the will of man, but of ſuch an one which proceeds from the fierce impetus and inclination of the ſinners will, p. 136. l. 1, 2. Here he miſcarries ſeveral wayes at once; for firſt he fights with Doctor Twiſſe and Doctor Reynolds, and with all the reſt of his Party, and with all mankind (except Paraeus) who confers it incompetent to the will to ſuffer any coaction. 2. If they meant by coaction, the ſinners own inclination and impe • us of will, they muſt have ſaid that the ſinner compells himſelf; which had been much better nonſenſe, then to have ſaid (as they are wont) that God compells him to ſin. To ſay, the will doth ſuffer coaction by its own inclination, is innocent non-ſenſe in compariſon: but to ſay that God compells men to ſin, is a horrid blaſphemy. Beſides, 3. He again confeſſeth the whole fact, by ſaying whenſoever they uſe to do ſo! as before he ſaid, [they uſe it ſeldom.] 4. He confeſſeth they do not alwayes acknowledge any impropriety, becauſe he ſaith, they do it moſtly: ſo that in ſome of his Maſters, and in ſome places of their works, he doth acknowledge as much guilt as I have ever cha ged their Doctrines with. 5. He doth not rightly tranſlate Paraeus, nay he is not ſo much as conſiſtent with him; forQui cogit invitos, is eſt cauſa p • ccati Qui verò cogit volentes, is perſe cauſa eſt boni, &c. Paraeus in C • ſtig. ad lib B • ll. de Am • ſſ. Grat. & ſtat. peccati. Note, th • t D •• Twiſſ doth conſeſs it to be their cuſtom, to ſay that men are compelled by God to ſin. Vin. Gra. l. 2. p. 1. c. 1. p. 29. Paraeus talks non-ſenſe in this following ſort: [He who compells men againſt their conſents, is the cauſe of ſin; but not he who compells men with their conſents.] To exagitate this as it deſerves would require a whole Volume. 6. As ſad as theſe ſalvoes appear to be, they are the beſt that he could borrow from the ableſt Abſterſors who went before him. And he concludes with this excuſe, that Bellarmine the Jeſuite and other Papiſts, are neer of kin in this caſe to the Presbyterians. As for the bold and groundleſs forgery concerning Bellarmine and my ſelf, I paſs it by, as being perſonal, of which I am ſure there is enough in the Self-Revenger.

Sect. 28.

Mr. B. turns his back to the chief part of the charge, and tacitly yields the whole cauſe. I now expected with great longing, what he would ſay to my fourth Chapter of the Divine Philanthropy defended, where he and his Maſters are moſt concerned, even from p. 36. to p. 65. But in ſtead of ſpeaking one ſyllable to thoſe twenty nine whole pages, he onely tells us he needs not do it, ſect. 3. p. 137. and pretends to render ſome reaſons why. As, 1. for fear of needleſſe repetitions: and 2. no body needs be ſolicitous what becomes of Doctor Twiſſe or Mr. B's particular expreſſions: 3. And this task hath been performed by other men (againſt his own knowledge, as his partialleſt friends will confeſſe) 4. And what is omitted by himſelf, he hopes before long will be done by another, p. 138. And thus he thinks he hath done like a brave Abſterſor, in refuſing to plead to the indictment.

Sect. 29.

1. Of Adam's inclination to ſin before he ſinned. Mr. B. being deſirous to ſhew his good will to Mr. Rivet, whom I had proved to be guilty of making God the Author of ſin, by ſaying the very inclination which Adam had to ſin, before he ſinned, could not chuſe but be vitious, and yet of God's making; is fain to commit a world of faults for the making a ſalve to that one ſore, from p. 139. to p. 144. The chief ingredients in his ſalve are thoſe that follow: 1. Rivet was a ſtrong Diſputant before Mr. T.P. was brought forth into the world: the ſame which he had pleaded for Mr. W. (as if the oldest men muſt needs be-moſt orthodox, and of quicker ſight then their juniors.) 2. Other eminent men have uſed that argument as well as he: (as if to erre in company, were either to be orthodox, or very neer it.) 3. He ſpeaks of concupiſcence, and luſt, which are a couple of ſins; whereas the queſtion is onely of Adam's inclination before his very firſt ſin. 4. He ſpeaks of luſt after the fall, Rom. 7.7. and which was in the will too; whereas the ſubject of the diſpute was before the fall, nor in the will, but in the appetite. And ſo he either underſtands not, or wilfully flies from the thing in queſtion. 5. He calls an inclination to ſin a weighty plummet inclining; at once an abstract and concrete in one and the ſame reſpect. 6. He ſaith that Adam, even before the fall, had the Devils image upon him, as well as God's, if his inclination to ſin was before his first ſin; as if he thought that potentia could not be before actus. 7. He confounds temptation to ſin with ſin. 8. He asks why I ſhould be ſhie of granting, that Christ had any inclination to ſin? (which why ſhould he ask, if he did not think that impious thing which he imputes to Caſtellio, without the leaſt citation from him?) 9. He confeſſeth he cannot tell how to ſalve thoſe abſurdities which I had ſhewed his opinion muſt needs betray him into, as progreſſus in infinitum, and prius primo. 10. He ſaith (out ofNulla peccati Adami in Adamo reddi eauſa poteſt, quae non ſit ipſa peccatum. Camero contra Epiſt. viri docti. p. 163. Camero) that there could be no cauſe of Adam's ſin which was not alſo it ſelf a ſin. And ſo his party, by conſequence, muſt needs be charged by him and Camero, with the crime of making God to be ſin it ſelf, as often as they call him the cauſe of ſin.

2. Concerning the birth & growth of the very firſt ſin; with the very wide difference betwixt the inclinations of the ſenſitive appetite, and the will. 2. Though I need not ſay more then what remains unaſſaulted in my Defence of the Divine Philanthropy (ch. 4. p. 23, 24, 25.) or more then what I have added in the eighteenth Section of this Chapter (Num. 6.) yet becauſe his underſtanding may be as dark in this Point, as his will crooked, I will endeavour to afford him ſufficient light. The inclination of the will to evil, differs much from that of the ſenſitive appetite, to which the Apple even in Paradiſe was very grateful. The will (we know) is the middle faculty betwixt the ſenſitive appetite on one ſide, and the reaſoning faculty on the other. The propenſion of the will to the ſenſitive appetite's propoſal of what forbidden, was the very beginning of Adam's ſin, it having been his firſt degree of averſion from God unto the creature: thus it was in Eve alſo, before it was in Adam, and was a ſin in her will ſome inſenſible time before her eating; but her fulneſs of conſent, and actual eating, and giving her husband to eat alſo, were all additions to that firſt ſin: which I call the firſt for this reaſon, becauſe nothing of ſin can be ſo much as imagined, before the propending of the will to the forbidden object; and becauſe it was in the will before it could be in the hand or mouth. The very next degree of ſin to the propending of the will, was Delectation; next, Moroſa Cogitatio; next, a plenitude of Conſent; next, the actual eating what was forbidden. But now the gratefulneſs of the ſweet to one ſenſe, and of fair to another, is leſs then the leaſt of thoſe degrees; and the inclination of the ſenſitive appetite could be no ſin at all, remaining onely in the ſenſe, and winning nothing from the will, which continued as yet in its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . But when the will of Eve was debauched by her appetite into an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (that is, a bending of her will the wrong way,) ſo as her mind did hang or hanker after the apple, that was clearly the beginning of her tranſgreſſion.

Sect. 30.

The importance of the word Author. To conclude the whole Chapter, and ſo to quit the whole ſubject, I muſt ſatisfie a complaint which Mr. B. hath made (c. 3. p. 129.) That I charged him and his Maſters with the crime of having ſaid a great deal worſe, and in much worſe terms, then that God is (verbatim) the Author of ſin. Now that he may not complain afreſh of his having complained to no purpoſe, and to the end he may beware of raſh complainings for the future, I will prove my charge in ſuch a manner, as not to leave his very abettors the poſſibility to diſſent. The moſt ſuccinct way to do it, will be to lay down the whole importance of the aequivocal word Author, and then to compare it with thoſe expreſſions which are confeſſed by Mr. B. to have been uſed by his Maſters, as well as Brethren.

1. Author quando que 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ſignificat, quandoque 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Priſcian. lib. 5. Idem valet quod 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Coel. Sec. Cur. Author eſt ut ſic dicam Factor, Laur. Val. l. 4. Hortator & Author, Cic. in partit, Orat. 52. Conſiliario & Authore aliquid inire, legitur apud Cic. ad Alt. l. 14.305.4. Suaſor & Author deditionis. Cic. 3. Offic. p. 147. Author eſt in quo eſt vis, poteſtas, & dignitas. Liv. l. 1. ab urbe cond. 72. Impero, Authorque ſumut me cuivis caſtrandum loces, Plaut. Aul. 7.73. ſuſpende, vinci, verbera, Author ſum, ſino, Idem Poenal. 3.17. Author • eſt à quo quis jus comparavit. Cic. 7. Verr. Authores pupillorum vocantur, in quorum adminiſtratione infirma aetas, reſque eorum ſunt, Paulus Juriſcon. Authores ſunt qui Authoritatem ſuam & decretum interponunt, Liv. l. 1. ab urb. cond. Viae Author qui viam monſtrat, aut qui ire jubet. Ovid. 3. Metam. Etiam Duces militum Authores vocabantur, Valla. l. 4.1. Author ſometimes doth ſignifie the firſt beginner of a work, ſometimes him who doth help advance it; ſometimes a factor, ſometimes onely a perſwader; ſometimes a ſole cauſe, ſometimes a concauſe; ſometimes a perſon of power and dignity, by whoſe advice or command a thing is done; ſometimes him who confers a right; ſometimes the guardian of a child under age; ſometimes him who doth abet or aſſert, or uphold another in any action: ſometimes he that ſhews the way is ſaid to be the Author of it: ſometimes he who appointeth or decreeth any thing, is called the Author of the thing decreed.

2. How the enemies of truth ſay what is worſe then that God is (verbatim) the Author of ſin. 2. Now from hence it is apparent, how many wayes Mr. B. and his Praedeceſſors have not onely made God the Author of ſin, but ſomething worſe too. Had they onely ſaid in plain terms (as I have ſhewed they have) God is the Author of ſin, they might have ſought for ſome excuſe or mitigation of the crime from the ſofteſt importance of the word Author. They might have ſaid they meant no more, then that God doth perſwade or tempt men to ſin, (as Mr. B's word was.) But notwithſtanding even that had been ſufficiently blaſphemous, Mr. B. His confeſſion is to be ſeen from his p. 133. to his p. 136. confeſſeth (as I haveLook back on Sect. 27. num. 5. ſhewed) that they aſſirm God's impelling and forcing men to ſin, his making men ſin by coaction, which Proſper profeſſeth to beProſper ad object. Vincen. 11. p. 341, 342. worſe then can be truly ſpoken of the Devil himſelf. Now though he who compells a man to ſin, is properly called the Author of it; yet becauſe the word Author hath other ſofter ſignifications, this muſt needs be much worſe then onely to ſay he is the Author.

3. Mr. Rolloc's ſtrange Salvo. 3. Nay in not many lines (p. 128.) before Mr. B. is ſo unhappy as to put me on this task, be cites a paſſage from Mr. Rolloc, thus excuſing and mollifying that Parties Doctrine; [ Non eſt Decretum malitiae quà malitia eſt, ſed quà bonitatis rationem habet. R. Rolloc. in Rom. 8.29. God's decree of ſinfulneſs in the abſtract, is not of ſinfulneſs as ſuch, but as it hath the nature of goodneſs in it.] His word is malitia, as the abſtract of malum, and himſelf explains it by Anomia, in the two lines going before. To ſhew how Mr. W. and Mr. B. have ſtretched the blaſphemy to its extremity, by teaching that God doth work ſin, as well as will it, and hath a hand in effecting. of it, that he makes it neceſſary, Dr. Twiſſe affirmeth, that Gods Incitation and Excitation to the act of ſin doth not onely influere in ipſum actum Creaturae, but alſo in ipſam voluntatem &c. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. c. 12. ſect. 2. p. 142. excites men to it, is the maker of all reall things without exception, and the cauſe of the obliquity it ſelf in abſtracto; I ſay, to ſhew this afreſh on this occaſion, were [actum agere] to make a needleſſe repetition of what hath been the ſubject of many Sections.

CHAP. IV. A notorious fallacy of Doctor Twiſſe and his Followers; with ſeverall failings diſcovered in Mr. VVh.

Sect. 1.

Of the ſignall Fallacy ſwallowed firſt by D. Twiſſe, then by his Followers. MY chief enterpriſe being performed in ſo large a manner, and the whole Tree of Error pluck't up by the root, it may ſeem a ſuperfluity to ſpend more time upon little twiggs, whoſe whole ſubſiſtence is from the root, and muſt therefore periſh together with it. Yet becauſe Doctor Twiſſe is a leading man, and hath built the higheſt Caſtle, on the moſt Airy Foundation, of any artificer in the kind; and becauſe Mr. W. was not contented, that the Doctors unhappineſſe ſhould go alone, but was deſirous to joyn his own too; I will regard him ſo much as to take him in.

1. Dr. Twiſſe his important fallacy which runs through his book. I had ſhewed the ſad fallacy which Dr. Twiſſe had put upon himſelf and his followers, through his miſuſage or mistake of that Logick Maxime, [What is firſt intended is last executed.] For either not underſtanding, or wilfully diſſembling his underſtanding (I cannot ſay which, though I am ſure of one of the two) what is the ſcope of that Maxime, and within what limits its truth is bound; he moſt unreaſonably concluded, that becauſe puniſhment is executed after ſin, therefore ſin was intended after God decreed puniſhment. The cauſe of his fallacy I ſhall ſhew anon, and how inconſiſtent he is with Mr.W. or with himſelf. I ſhewed that if the Maxime had univerſal truth in it, a thouſand ſuch abſurdities as this would follow; that if I firſt intend to take ſhip at Dover, and afterwards intend to ſail into France, I muſt (according to that Maxime, as 'tis miſtaken by Doctor Twiſſe) firſt ſail into France, and after that take ſhip at Dover.

2. Mr. W's eſſay to cover the fallacy in his p. 17, & 18. 2. To ſlubber over the buſineſſe, Mr.Wh. thus talks to admiration; [Is not the journey into France the firſt thing here intended, and in order to that to take ſhip at Dover?] Reader, obſerve to what a prodigie ſome men are able to tread awry. I had plainly put my caſe thus, that my firſt intention is for Dover (not reſolving yet to what Countrey I will ſail, much leſſe to what Port,) and my ſecond intention for France, particularly for Callis; in anſwer to which Mr. W. asks, Is not France firſt intended, and Dover next? and what is this but to ſay, that my firſt intention is my laſt, and my ſecond is my firſt? If he ſhall ſay, that France is the first thing intended by him, and Dover the ſecond, he will confeſſe the abſurdity with which I charge him: for I had ſpoken of my intentions, in putting the caſe at that time; not at all of any man's elſe, much leſſe of Mr. W's, a year or two after the time that my caſe was put.

3. The Fallacy ſhewed in its deformity.3. That he may plead no more for Doctor Twiſſe his miſhaps, nor eſcape a right apprehenſion of his own miſcarriage, (and that the party may yield their Palladium loſt) I will illuſtrate the Caſe with the greateſt perſpicuity I can imagin. Suppoſe a man here in England taking his life to be in danger, intends to go out of the Kingdom, he cares not whither, for preſervation from preſent peril: the firſt thing that he intends, is to take ſhip at Dover; then it being free to him to go whither he will, as to Flanders, or Holland, or any place elſe, he at laſt decrees to go to France: this then is laſt in his intention, and muſt therefore (by the Doctrine of Dr. T.) be the firſt in execution; then which there is nothing more impoſſible, and ſo nothing more abſurd. Again, a man intends to build a houſe, not to let it out to others, but to dwell in it himſelf, and after that intends to make it ſumptuous; in doing that he turns Bankru • t, and therefore determines to let it out: this is the laſt in execution, the ſumptuous furniſhing of it was next before that, building before that; will it now follow (as Dr. T. his Logick would have it) that he lets it out before he furniſheth it? and that he does furniſh it before he builds it? Once more, A man determines to take a ſervant; after he hath taken him, he findes him a knave, and ſo reſolves to put him away: muſt he therefore put him away before he takes him, becauſe his intention to take him was before his intention to put him away? yet ſuch is the arguing of Doctor Twiſſe, whoSi peccati permiſſio prius intenderetur quàm damnatio, ſequeretur in executione ut damnatio priùs ſieret quàm peccati permiſſo. Twiſſ. in Praeſat. ad Vin. Gr. p. 3. ſaith, that if God did decree to permit ſin, before he decreed to damn men for ſin, it would follow they muſt be damned, before they can ſo much as be permitted to ſin.

4. T • e firſt cauſe of the whole miſtake.4. As the cauſe of this Error was his taking that Maxime by the left handle, Quod primum in intentione, eſt ultimum in executione; ſo the cauſe of that alſo was his over-haſty imagination, thatNeque enim ullus intentionis ordo eſt, niſi ratione mediorum & Finis. Id. ibid. there is no order of intention, unleſs in reſpect of the end and the means; which he dictates tanquam ex Tripode, as an unqueſtionable truth, though there is nothing more viſibly and even palpably falſe. For there being many means to one end, (to wit God's glory) one of theſe means may be ſubordinate to another, and ſo, in mente Dei, before the other. God did not decree to create man to the end that he ſhould ſin; nor did he decree that man ſhould ſin, to the end he might be damned: but he decreed to create man, and to permit him to ſin, and to damn him for ſinning, to the end his glory might be advanced. And this isNeque enim damnotio poteſt eſſe finis à Deo intentus, quandoquidem D • us fac •• omnia propter ſe. Neceſſe eſt ergo ut gloria Dei ejuſque patefactio ſit finis actionum Divinarum. Idem ibid. acknowledged by the Doctor even in that very page.

5. That firſt cauſe removed, and the fallacy leſ • naked.5. To remove the Origin of the whole evil, I ſhall not need to ſay more then this: God foreſeeing that man would voluntarily ſin if he were not forcibly hindered, and decreeing not to uſe any forcible hinderance (which would not ſuit with the nature of a free and voluntary Agent) he alſo ſaw that Adam would make a wrong choice, and thereby fall from his ſtate of Innocence. This ſtate of Adam is to be looked on as a Diſeaſe, which ſtands in need of a Soveraign Remedy. The death of Chriſt is that Remedy which God decreed. And it cannot be imagined, that the Remedy ſhould be firſt in intention, before the Diſeaſe was foreſeen, or the very permiſſion of it decreed; though ſtill the Remedy is to be laſt in execution, as it was alſo in the intention. Therefore the Axiom muſt be ſo limited, as to be onely appliable to thoſe things, whereof the later is the abſolute end, and the former decreed as a means to attain it by. But thus it is not in mente Dei; for the permiſſion of ſin is not deſigned by God as a means of bringing in any former decree of giving Chriſt; but as that which is ſuitable to Adam's nature, created with a free elective faculty, commonly known by the name of Will. Now God foreſeeing that man will do what will be permitted to be done, doth alſo foreſee an opportunity of magnifying his mercy in giving Christ, and accordingly decrees to give him. And that before Adam falls, though not before he decrees to permit his fall, and actually foreſees that fall of Adam. From whence 'tis clear, thatQuod primum in intentione, eſt ultimum in executione. that Maxime is very abſurdly applyed unto the buſineſs of Gods decrees; as by numberleſs inſtances might be evinced. For what man will ſay, that the Creation of the world, which was the first thing in execution, was therefore the laſt in Gods intention? It was certainly praecedaneous, in mente Dei, to the fall of Adam. For how could Adam be conſidered as an actual ſinner, without being conſidered as ſomething capable of ſin? Indeed Mr. Perkins was ſo unhappy as to teach it for Divinity, Etiam ipſo Decreto creandi prius eſſe judicavi decretum praedeſtinandi tum ad ſalutem tum ad damnationem. Id. Ib. p. 2. col. 1. That Gods decree of damning was before his decree of creating man. And Doctor Twiſſe Ibid. confeſſeth that he was once of that mind. But Arminius clearly confuted Perkins; and Doctor Twiſſe doth ſeem to confeſs as much, calling Perkins his opinionIbid. rigidiorem ſententiam. Let it now be remembred, that there is a priority of order amongſt thoſe things whereof neither can be ſaid to be the end of the other, and the original cauſe of the errour is quite removed.

6. Mr. W's indirect courſe to excuſe Doctor Twiſſe in contradiction to him.6. But Mr. W. alledgeth, that Doctor Twiſſe underſtands the old maxime de finibus ultimis, non intermediis, p. 18.] If he did not look into the Doctors words, why would he ſpeak thus without any knowledge of the Fact? And if he did, why would he ſpeak againſt his knowledge? The Doctor applyes the maxime only to ſin and damnation, and things on this ſide damnation, but not to any thing beyond it. And that damnation is not finis ultimus, the Doctor ſtifly maintains in the place before cited. If Mr. W. think • it is, he contradicts the Doctor, whileſt he aſſerts him. It is agreed on all ſides, that the Glory of God is finis ultimus, to which the damnation of the impenitent is but a means. And therefore Mr. W. might have omitted his ill language which there he gives me, unleſs he had found ſome colour for it. If he did not fear his undertaking, why did he not cite the page or chapter, where I had ſpoken of the ſubject, that I and others might eaſily have found it out? I leave his beſt friends to judge of ſuch dealings.

7. Doctor Twiſſe his error of coordination, &c.7. But Doctor Twiſſe ſaith farther, that the decrees of permitting ſin, and of giving Christ, are co-ordinate, Ibid. p. 3.] In ſaying that, he did well to oppoſe Mr. Perkins, although not well to miſs the truth: It doth not follow that they are not ſubordinate, becauſe not ſo as Mr. Perkins feigned them: they are one after another in order of nature (though not of time) as the Diſeaſe is before the Cure, as well in nature as time; and though both are means to Gods glory, yet ſtill the Remedy muſt ſuppoſe the Diſeaſe, and one is naturally conceivable before the other. And ſo for the puniſhment of ſin, which is another means of Gods glory, it praeſuppoſeth ſin by ſuch a neceſſity of illation, that God cannot be imagined to decree a mans puniſhment, without regard to ſome offence, which the nature of puniſhment doth imply: which being the main thing that I objected to Mr. B. (ſpeaking ofSee D. Phil. ch 1. p. 5, 6. Poſt-deſtination) to which he durſt not re •• ly, nor Mr. W. in his behalf, I leave with the reſt of this Section, as a full Rejoynder to what he hath in his running Titles, concerning Poſt-deſtination, or Negative Reprobation, ſince the body of his Book is filled with Tergiverſations.

Sect. 2.

There being nothing now left of any moment in Mr. W. Mr. M's. forgery of objections in other mens names. I will diſcover his other failings in the feweſt words that I am able. In his p. 43. he makes a ſyllogiſme after an ugly manner in the third figure, and tells his Reader it is mine, nay he pretends to cite it from Philan. c. 4. p. 5. and calls it pitiful Sophiſtry: yet his own heart and the world ſhall be my witneſſes, that there is no ſuch thing in any part of any book which I have publiſhed; much leſs there where he pretends it. All my redreſs of ſuch wrongs, is to protest againſt them, and to require reparations from the perſon offending, and to direct my Readers to Philanth. c. 4. p. 5. where they will ſee what it was which made the enemy to ſly into ſuch lewd dealings for his defence. He and Mr. B. muſt either prove that Reprobation is no puniſhment, or elſe confeſs their cauſe is ruined.

Sect. 3.

In Mr. W's. ſecond part, which is all againſt conditional and univerſal Redemption, p. 53.Mr. W. of Chriſts death, p. 53. I obſerve theſe things with a running eye. 1. He denies that Chriſt died for all mankind. Not onely in contradiction to Scripture, and the Church of England, but to BiſhopSent. Daven. p. 10, 11. Davenant in particular, and even to Dr. Twifs, as Mr. Baxter ſhewes in his Praef. to his Diſp. p. 11, 13, 14. Next, he ſaith, that there is no conditional Election of all. Who ſaith there is any election of all? an election of perſevering believers is not of all. 3. Election and Redemption are not commenſurate, as he affirms. Redemption is not the fruit of Election, witneſs the poverty of his proofs, p. 54. His first is nothing to Redemption, no nor the ſecond. But on the contrary, Electing in Chriſt praeſuppoſeth Redemption, in Gods eternal foreſight, and our being conſidered as believers in Chriſt. No nor the third, for Redemption according to rich grace, (Eph. 1.7.) is not of a few; to the more it is extended, the richer 'tis. His fourth from Joh. 3.16. is yet more groſly againſt himſelf. God ſo loved the world, as to give his Son for the world, not the ſmalleſt part of it. Had that been the meaning, Saint John had ſaid, God ſo hated the world, that he denyed his Son to the far greater part of it, that not believing in him they might periſh, &c. Mr. W's. proofs p. 55. from the word [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſo] are moſt ridiculous of all; for ſo is expreſſive of the degree of the love, not excluſive of it, or of any man from it, but incluſive of all, &c. It ſeems the Preſbyterian love muſt be incloſed, or good for nothing; whereas ſincere love, the more extenſive it is, it is ever the greater, not the more reſtrained. What would he think if one ſhould ſay, he is ſo loving a Neighbour, that he hardly loves one in twenty? a man ſo kind, that he hates more then he loves? Redeeming love tends to eternal life, even to them that never come thither: and this is ſure the greateſt love, as being extended alſo to enemies, whereas the other is onely to ſuppoſed friends. But indeed betwixt infinites there is no compariſon. The compariſon made Joh. 15.13. is of finite mens loves; and yet even there the greateſt is that of laying down a life. Does Mr. W. think there are two greateſt?

2. His Anſwers to that Objection, p. 55. [The world is here the object of this love, therefore it cannot be meant of an electing love] are ſtrangely groſs. For (1) ſpecial love, with him, is nothing elſe but electing love: nor is there need in that notion, to ſay that all are the objects of it. It is but his begging of the Queſtion, to confound Electing with Redeeming love. Gods hating Eſau is comparatively meant, and is but loving him leſs then his brother Jacob: in which ſenſe we are obliged to Luk. 14.26. hate our Parents, our Wives and Children. Even Luth. in Gen. 33. Luther andMollerus in Mal. cap. 1. Mollerus did not doubt of Eſau's et eternal bliſs. Nor durſt Oecolampadius to account him a Reprobate, becauſe he knew thoſe words (Rom. 9.) were onely ſpoken by aOecolam. Edit. Criſp. 1158. Gen. figure. 2. He confeſſed the world doth either ſignifie in Scripture the whole univerſe of men, or the greateſt part, which is the worſt, (p. 55, 56.) and this moſt uſually he grants. But he ask, why may it not alſo ſignifie the fewest and the beſt too? as if he knew not the Rule, Analogum per ſe poſitum ſtat pro famoſiori. He ſaith a heap that hath more chaff then wheat in it, is uſually called a heap of wheat, (p. 56.) By deceitful Jobbers no doubt it may be, who cheat the Buyer. But would Mr. W. buy his Corn ſo? or think the man honeſt who ſhould ſo ſell a bag of Corrans, where 29. parts of 30. are very traſh? Joh. 6.33. there is bread ſpoken of, giving life to the world, that is to ſay, to all that eat it. And Rom. 11.15. the world is all except the Jewes, therefore by far the greater part. Then 2 Cor. 5.19. Reconciling the world, is meant of the whole world, but conditionally. The other Texts 2 Pet. 2.5. & 1 Joh. 5.19. which ſpeak of the world, and the whole world, are clearly meant of the greateſt part, not of the leaſt. So all fleſh, Joel 2.28. is meant of all Nations, all the earth, as well the Gentiles as the Jewes. Mundus Redemptionis, in Auſtin, is not mundus ſimply, but reſtrained to thoſe that are finally ſaved; which is not the notion of Redemption of which we are ſpeaking from Joh. 3.16. where God ſo loved the world (without reſtraint) that [quicunque vellet credere] whoſoever would believe, might have life everlasting.

3. His Anſwer to that Objection, p. 56. [The world is diſtributed into believers and unbelievers, &c.] is very woful. For 1. Is not the word Believing a reſtraint of the World? If ſo, then there are ſome who are not believing, and then there is a diſtribution: which Mr. W. denies. 2. If thoſe who are uncalled, our Saviour calls by the name of the world, then the world ſignifies not onely the Elect: for Mr. W. cannot ſay that all the uncalled are the Elect.

4. What he calls his ſecond Argument, p. 57. is gratis dictum, he crudely affirming, without the leaſt proof, that Chriſt died for none but whom he approved. Point-blank againſt Scripture, 2 Pet. 2.1. where Chriſt is ſaid to have bought them that deny him, and broach damnable hereſies, and bring upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction. Did he approve of ſuch men? or did he not dye for them whom he bought? Alas Mr. W!

5. His third Argument, p. 57. is thus eaſily retorted; That if it is as he would have it, Chriſt died for many who were already in Heaven. And his Anſwer to the Objection, p. 58. is ſomewhat worſe: For as he holds that they in Hell were decreed abſolutely to be damned; ſo he holds that they in Heaven were as abſolutely decreed to be ſaved. In both he is but a beggar of the thing in question: for I affirm thoſe decrees not to be abſolute, but reſpective.

6. As for his His Argument is this, If Chriſt died to purchaſe Faith, and all oth • r things needful, &c. then he did not die to purchaſe ſalvatton upon condition of believing, &c. fourth (p. 58) I deny the ſequel; but he takes leave to prove his Antecedent onely, which no man denies. In his Anſwer to the Objection, p. 59. he miſunderſtands the word Condition; which is not reſiſting, but uſing and improving Gods gifts and graces: and ſo God will give them the grace of faith, if they will humbly beg, or thankfully receive it. None can come except the Father draws; but when he draws, all may that will. And though no condition is required to Gods firſt grace, (p. 60.) yet the receiving of that is required to his giving of more.

7. His fifth Argument, (p. 60, 61.) if granted, proves my concluſion, that Chriſt died not onely ſufficiently, but intentionally for all; for that he died for all, the Scripture ſaith. But (2.) Chriſt hath not actually taken away impenit •• cy by his death, any farther then by purchaſing ſufficient grace to repent. 'Tis true, the blood of Jeſus cleanſeth us from all ſin, 1 John 1.7. but how? actually? or onely meritoriouſly? not ſo, but thus,Locis in • rà citandis. Num. 8. ſaith the late great Primate. He hath redeemed us from iniquity, Tit. 2.14. but by giving us grace to forſake iniquity. (Let Mr. W. mark that.) He ſaves his people from their ſins, (Mat. 1.) but we muſt be his then by our faithfulneſs to him, as well as faith, before he will ſave us from the puniſhment which our ſins will otherwiſe entail upon us. He hath ſo far delivered us, (Luke 1.74.) as to give us grace or power whereby to ſerve him. And though 'tis the pro • erty of the fleſh to reſiſt the ſpirit (as Mr. W. ſaith truly, p. 61.) yet 'tis the work of Chriſts ſpirit to mortifie the fleſh: which when we have done, even to that very Spirit we im • ute our conqueſt. Whereas he ſaith, to the great reproch of his Doctrine, A confeſsion to be recorded, as dropping from the p • n of the guilty party. [That Christ cannot be ſaid ſeriouſly to deſire the ſalvation of thoſe, from whom he will not remove thoſe things which he knows will hinder their ſalvation, p. 61.] I anſwer, that he could not ſeriouſly deſire it, if he did not give them ſufficient means: but this ☜ lights heavily upon them who deny ſuch a ſufficiency to the moſt of mankind, and ſo infer Gods offers to be ſerious onely to a few. I alwayes teach, that Chriſt is wanting to none in what is requiſite to their ſafety, if they are not wanting to themſelves. But though his deſire is ſerious, it is not paſſionate, or unreaſonable, ſo as to ſave men by force, either againſt, or without their wills. He doth not violently remove whatſoever hinders them from ſalvation by any acts of meer power, but deals with men as free Agents, who could not otherwiſe be fit for reward or puniſhment. He takes away the heart of ſtone where it is really taken away, and none but he can do that work: but he does it not irreſistibly, and therefore in many the ſtone remains not taken away, where yet he mercifully attempts it by ſuch kind of means, as are wiſe and congruous, and in themſelves ſufficient; onely the wilfulneſs of men doth keep them from being effectual alſo.

8. His ſixth Argument from Tit. 2.14. (in his p. 62.) deſerves not any Indignation, but very much Pity. For thoſe Believers whom Chriſt receiveth, he doth purge and purifie with Jam. 4.6. more grace. That all are not purged, is theirEzek. 24.13. See the Primates judgment of Chriſts death, p. 6. & 21. own fault onely. Chriſt ſatisfied for all upon the Croſs, but did not actually ſave them; as his Grace of Armagh doth often ſay. Application is not a neceſſary effect of Redemption; and that Mr. W. may alſo learn from the ſame Id. ibid. 22, & 16, & 38. writing of the ſaid Primate. Chriſt doth not leave it unto man onely to make the Application, yet gives him grace whereby to make it. And for what is ſaid p. 63. from 1 Joh. 2.1, 2. I anſwer thus, There is a twofold Advocation or Interceſſion of Chriſt, one on the Croſs, and one in Heaven. Again, one for ſinners, that they may repent; another for penitents, that they may finally perſevere. He had this prayer for his Crucifiers, Father, forgive them. But another for his Diſciples; Father, keep thoſe whom thou hast given me, (Joh. 17.11.) That kind of prayer was was not for the world, but for thoſe who came in from among the worldlings, (Joh. 17.9.) That former prayer was for Rebels who ſtood out; this later for obedient and loyal Subjects, who were already in his poſſeſsion.

9. His ſeventh Argument (p. 63.) from that promiſe of God, The ſeed of the woman ſhall break the Serpents head, (Gen. 3.) is a very ſtrong Argument of the Diſputers weakneſs; and ſerves for nothing in the world, but to proclaim the groſneſs of his miſtake. For the ſeed of the woman is Jeſus Chriſt, the object of true belief; not true believers. So that all falls at once, which he hath built on this bottom. Yet I will note one rarity for being a rarity indeed. ☞ Mr. W. ſaith that the Serpent doth not properly exerciſe his enmity againſt all men, but againſt the Elect onely, (p. 63.) And what moves him to ſay it, but his being reſolv'd to conclude this from it, Ergo, Chriſt died not for all, but onely for the Elect? But ſtay, good Sir, is not Satan their enemy, whom he tempts to ſin, and poſſeſſeth, and makes to cut themſelves with ſtones? or doth he not exerciſe his enmity againſt them whom he betrayes to the paines of Hell? Beſides, hath he a knowledge of the Elect (before the laſt audit) or hath he not? If he hath, from whence? or why will he tempt them at all, when he knows 'tis loſt labour? If he hath not a knowledge of them, how can he ſingle them out from all the Reprobates, to practice his enmity upon them?

10. His eighth Argument, (p. 64, 65.) is the worſt of all, as well as the laſt, it being nothing but a preſumption, that all the infants of the Heathen are unavoidably damned. Yet ask him what he thinks of himſelf and his party (who are exceedingly more ſinful then Heathen Infants) he will tell you they are Elect, and muſt be ſaved as unavoidably. Mr. B. is on this pin too, from his p. 144. to p. 147. But having cut them out work in See Div. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 25, 26. The ſelf-Revenger, ch. 1. p. 22, &c. and p. 32, 33. other places, I onely pity them in this, beſeeching God to endue them with grace and reaſon. I will but briefly forewarn others againſt the preſumption of paſſing judgement upon other mens ſouls, and rudely preſſing into Gods ſecrets. God acquaints us indeed with his manner of proceeding in certain caſes, as with thoſe to whom his word is preached; but of his dealing with others we are not qualified to judg, un leſs as far as we are led by general rules out of Scripture. As for example, [ He hath no pleaſure in the death of the wicked. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. He is a God ready to pardon, ſwift to ſhew mercy, and ſlow to wrath. His mercy is over all his works. His Commandments are not grievous. The ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall dye. The ſon ſhall not dye for the iniquity of the Parents. God requireth according to what men have, not according to what they have not.] He condemns not any man for not ſeeing, to whom he never gave eyes, or who never had light whereby to ſee. He condems not the deaf, for not hearing the Goſpel; nor the tender Infant, for not comprehending it, whileſt it is near. And how he will be pleaſed to deal with others, who are under the ſame Impoſſibility for want of preaching, he hath no otherwiſe told us then by parity of reaſon, that many are ſaved by Chriſts name, who never heard it; and by his merits, who never heard of them. I ſay not theſe things, as if the intereſt of my cauſe were concerned in it; I am ſure it is not: For if all the Heathen are damned for their unbelief, then am I ſtill in the right; it is not becauſe Chriſt is not offered, but becauſe they will not accept. And if they that are redeemed, are ſo conditionally, then what can hinder us from believing (eſpecially ſince God hath ſo often ſaid it) that the Heathens alſo were redeemed, as well as Chriſtians? And may it for ever be kept in mind (for many great and weighty reaſons) that 'tis not knowledge, but practice, to which the promiſes are made.

Sect. 4.

How they ſtrengthen Socinianiſm, who contract the benefit of Chriſts death. Mr. W. ſpends his remaining papes in a pretended Anſwer to Objections, in two of which I am concerned. The firſt (beginning p. 71.) I have already ſhewed to be deſtructive to what he had poſitively delivered, p. 19. Or if his p. 19. is owned by him, it is juſt as deſtructive to his p. 71, 72. & ſo I refer him to what I have ſaid, c. 1. ſect. 2. p. 4, & 5. But becauſe Mr. B. on the ſame ch. 3. p 84, 85, 86. ſubject doth alſo ſpeak the ſame ſenſe, (if it is ſenſe to ſay, that all and every man doth ſignifie very few in reſpect of all, and that the whole world notes the leſſer part onely,) I will adde a few things, to deliver them both at once from the preſent thraldom they are in.

1. Socinians and Presbyterians compared.1. If the world, and the whole world, ſhall be permitted to ſignifie the little flock onely, and not the Univerſe of men, a way is opened to the Socinians, to perſiſt in their courſe of robbing the Church of thoſe Texts which we alledge for the proof of Chriſts Divinity. One of the cleareſt Texts we have is Joh. 1.10. The world was made by him: Here by the world, ſay theVolkel. lib. 5. cap. 10. p. 446. Socinians, is not meant this Fabrick of Heaven and Earth, not yet the Univerſe of men throughout the world, but the ſtate of Bliſs in the life to come, which the Man Chriſt Jeſus hath purchaſed for us. And they have more to ſay for it, then the Presbyterians for their Whimſey, becauſe the Apoſtle doth call that future ſtate, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the world to come, Heb. 2.5. but he never uſeth the word World to ſignifie onely the Elect. Nay, as the Learned Daille doth acknowledge, (who is farre from being an Arminian) whenſoever the VVorld in Holy Writ doth not ſignifie Mankind, it clearly ſignifies the greater andNon ſolet Scriptura mundi nomen in figurato ſenſu abſolutè poſitum in bonam, ſed in deteriorem partem uſurpare. Dallaeus in Apol. pro Duab. ſyn. part. 1. p. 16. worſer part. Nay Mr. Daille Id. ib. p. 17. gives this for the firſt and chief reaſon why Camero and Amyrald, and other eminent Proteſtants, did depart from their brethren the Calvinists in this particular, and choſe rather to ſubmit to the plain Tenor of the Scripture as it was ever underſtood by the Primitive Church. Beſides, he gives notice to Spanhemius, Aperitur audacibus ingeniis licentia quoſlibet ſenſus divinis verbis affingendi, quae omnia pro libitu invertent, & ad peregrinas ſignificationes detorquebunt, ſi nobis hoc ipſi permiſerimus, ut mundi nomen ſimpliciter poſitum pro ſolis electis ſumamus, ſenſu, ut quivis videt, planè allegorico, & apud hominum, ſive Judaeorum, ſive Gentilium, Scriptores nove atque inaudito. Id. ib. p. 16., that if we ſuffer our own ſelves to underſtand the world of the Elect onely, (a trick never heard of, ſaith Daille, from any Writer in the World, whether Jew or Gentile) we ſhall encourage the bold and licentious people to make God's word a Noſe of Wax, and forge up on it what ſenſe they pleaſe.

2. Received Rules for the interpreting of words, and ending controverſies.2. Mr. W. doth confeſſe p. 72. and Mr. B. p. 84, 85. 1. That we muſt not recede from the literal ſenſe of Scripture when it will agree with other Scriptures. And 2. That Scripture-Phraſes muſt be interpreted according to the nature of the matter expreſſed by them. ] The former of theſe two I ſhewedSee D. Phil. ch. 4. ſect. 26. p. 31. ſo plainly, that neither of theſe brethren have offered any thing againſt it; and ſo they confeſſe, in equivalence, that in the literal ſenſe of thoſe expreſſions [all, every, the whole, &c.] the Texts I cited are to be taken. Then for the later, it is evident that the matter of Chriſt's procuring a ſalvability for all without exception, is of aSee the Sinner Impl. part. 2. c. 2. p. 272. to p. 279. favourable nature, both in reſpect of God and Man. Whereas the matter of God's leaving the far greateſt part of mankind under a desperate impoſſibility of being ſaved, is of anSee the Sinner Impl. part 2. c. 2. p. 280. to p. 284 odious nature in all reſpects. Now we have general 1. In non odioſis, ſumenda verba ſecundum totam proprietatem uſus popularis, &c. 2. In favorabilioribus, verba laxiùs ſumenda. 3. In odioſis, ſermo figuratus admittitur, quo onus vitatur, &c. Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, l. 1. cap. 16. Rules for the interpreting of any matters in dispute, by reaſon of any ambiguity which may be pretended to lie in words; and ſuch unqueſtionable Rules, as the law of all Nations (of what Religion whatſoever) is wont to go by in all Debates, that ſo Controverſies and Jarres may not certainly be endleſs; which yet they certainly will be, if there are not ſome ſtanding Rules, by which the words of all compacts are to be meaſured and made certain, as to their ſenſe and ſignification. Such Rules are theſe in the Civil law, (which is founded upon the Law of Nature.) 1. In things not odious, words are to be taken according to the whole propriety of popular uſe, The firſt Rule. ſo as the Maſculine may include the Foeminine, and the Indefinite the Univerſal. 2. In matters more favourable, words are to be taken in the moſt lax and wide ſignification that they will bear. The ſecond Rule. 3. In things of an odious nature, a figurative ſenſe muſt be admitted, The third Rule. to avoid rigor or abſurdity. And a greater reſtriction is to be uſed then for the rigid propriety of the wo • d.

Hence it is that as when God is ſaid in Scripture to harden the heart, to pollute his Temple, to profane his Sanctuary, and the like, I ſay 'tis figuratively ſpoken, and muſt be onely underſtood by the common Hebraiſm; ſo when Chriſt is ſaid to be the Saviour of the world, the Propitiation for the ſins of the whole world, the Saviour of all men, and to have taſted death for every man, and the like, I ſay 'tis meant in the propriety of thoſe univerſals; and if [whole] in one Text had not been added to [the world] as we know it is 1 Joh. 2.2. yet that Indefinite [the world] muſt have included the univerſal: my reaſons of both are taken à diversâ ratione materiae odioſae, & favorabilis. But now my Adverſaries (on the contrary) do take the words in their propriety where the matter is odious; and they contend for a Synechdoche (ſuch as never was heard of before the broaching of their Hereſie) where the matter is the moſt favourable to be imagined: unleſſe they think it no odious thing for God to be concluded the Author of ſin; and a thing very odious for the mercy of God to be over all his works, and for other men to be ſaveable as well as themſelves.

3. The extreme abſurdity of dutiful misbelief.3. Mr. B. confeſſeth (p. 87.) that in the general propoſal of the Goſpel to every creature Mar. 16.15. there cannot poſſibly lurk any mental reſervation, or inſincerity.] And that an untruth is to be believed by the commandment of him who is the God of truth, the Lord Primate calls theThe Primates Judgment of the true intent and extent of Chriſts death, p. 24, 25. extreme abſurdity into which the Arminians did drive the Calviniſts. Nor did he doubt but Mr. Culverwel was driven to the extremity on the right hand, by the Ib. p. 25. abſurdities which he diſcerned in this extremity on the left. For (ſaith the Primate) what would not a man flye unto rather then yield that Chriſt died in no wayes for the Reprobates, and that none but the Elect had any kind of title to him,p. 26. p. 27. and yet many thouſand Reprobates ſhould be bound in conſcience to believe that he died for them, and tied to accept him for their Redeemer and Saviour, yea, and ſhould be condemned to everlaſting torments for want of ſuch a faith, (if we may call that Faith which is not grounded on the word of Truth) whereby they ſhould have believed that, which in it ſelf was moſt untrue, and laid hold of that in which they had no kind of intereſt? Mr. W's Tenet, that only the leaſt part of the world ought to believe the Goſpel. Yet Mr. W. ſaith plainly that all men are not commanded to believe, but onely the leaſt part of the world, p. 75. thereby inferring, 1. That the greateſt part of the World do not ſin in not believing, as being not commanded to it; 2. That none of that greateſt part are damned for not believing; 3. Or if they are, they are damned for not doing that, which not to do is no ſin; 4. Or that they actually do ſin without offending againſt Praecept; 5. And ſo, by a conſequence unavoidable, that S. John hath falſely defined ſin to be [ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ] the tranſgreſſion of the law. He farther ſaith, His reproch caſt upon all Chriſtendom & the Goſpel of Chriſt. See Proſper de vocatione Gentium l. 2. c. 1, & 2, & 16. &c proving that God did never leave himſelf without a witneſs in any part of the world. Compare Act. 14.17. Pſal. 76. & Pſal. 118. Iſa. 60. that the Gospel is onely preached to the leaſt part of the world, ibid. as if he knew nothing either of Church-Hiſtory, or Coſmography; nor did believe any truth to be in the Propheſies of the Old Teſtament, or in the oeconomy of the New. It ſeems the 1. Proteſtants, and 2. Papiſts, and 3. Greeks, and 4. Muſcovites, 5. the Aſiaticks under the Patriarch of Jeruſalem, 6. the Melchites under that of Antioch, 7. the Armenians under 100. Biſhops, 8. the Jacobites (who are mingled with the Mahumetans through a great part of Aſia under their Patriarch at Caramite) 9. the Chriſtians under the Patriarch of Mozul about Aſſyria, Meſopotamia, Parthia, and Media, (accounted more then all the Papiſts) 10. the Georgians in Iberia, 11. the Circaſſians, 12. the Mengrellians, 13. the Chriſtians of all Natolia under the Patriarch of Conſtantinople, 14. thoſe in the Kingdomes of Cazan and Aſtracan under the Patriarch of Moſco, 15. the Maronites, 16. the Indians of S. Thome, 17. thoſe under the Patriarch of Alexandria, whoſe juriſdiction hath reached from the Gaditan ſtreights to the River Nile, 18. The Abaſſin Chriſtians in Aethiopia under their Abunna, 19. thoſe in Congo and Angola, 20. beſides all the Americans through New Spain, Caſtella nova, Peru, and Braſile, 21. beſides all the Engliſh, Dutch, and French Plantations in Mexicana, and the Iſlands on either ſide, (that is to ſay in fewer words) Europe, Aſia, Africa, and America, do paſſe with Mr. W. for the leaſt part of the World. It were eaſie to teach this bold affirmer (were there time, or neceſſity for ſuch a work) how much the greateſt part of the world was preached to by the Apoſtles, and Deacons, and other Diſciples of Chriſt, both in the firſt and ſucceeding ages of the Church. I have heard of one who thought the Sun never ſhined out of Spain and Italy. And now I meet with his peer, who thinks the Sunſhine of the Gospel doth reach no further then his ſtunted knowledge of what is done under the Sun. But grant him his dictate, he is ſtill undone in his doctrine: for the Goſpel is preached here in England and France, as well to the Reprobates as the Elect; which Reprobates are in duty to believe a lie, or elſe they are not commanded to believe, and ſo ſhall never be puniſhed for want of faith, or ſhall be puniſhed for that which cannot poſſibly be a ſin. One or more of theſe things muſt be admitted by Mr. W. if Chriſt died onely for the elect, as he poſitively affirms. Now conſidering the Tenent of that Tribe, that the Papiſts are Reprobates, and the Epiſcopal Proteſtants a kind of Papiſts (Caſſandrian Papiſts their word is) and Independents of all ſorts as bad as either, it may well become a Quaere, whether it is not his opinion, that Chriſt died onely for Presbyterians, and that none beſides are ſincerely commanded to believe. But I am not at lei • ure to ſift him ſo, as well I might.

Sect. 5.

Univerſal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by Saint Auſtin and Proſper. The laſt thing I am concerned to conſider in Mr. W. and Mr. B. is their nibling at that Rock of demonſtration, which I oppoſed againſt their error, in my Notes firſt p. 19. and next more largely in my Defence of God's Philanthropy, c. 4. p. 28, 29, 30. I mean that Rock of the Apoſtle, 2 Cor. 5.14. making it good againſt all oppoſers, that as ſure as all were dead in ſin, ſo ſure it is that Chriſt died for all. This is nibled at tenderly by Mr. W. p. 77. and yet more tenderly by Mr. B. p. 93. by both ſo tenderly, as if they diſcerned it to be a Rock, as firm and hard as the Marpeſian, and were fearful to venture their teeth upon it; eſpecially the man with the noyſom teeth, as knowing that ſuch would break the ſooneſt. To make ſhort work, I allow Mr. B. his Tergiverſation, and am content to be tried by the beſt Interpreters, 1. Omnes itaque mortui ſunt in peccatis, nemine prorſus excepto; five in originalibus, ſive etiam voluntate additis, vel ignorando, vel ſciendo, nec faciendo quod juſtum eſt; & pro omnibus mortuis vivus mortuus eſt unus, i.e. nullū habens omnino peccatum. Ex hoc probavit omnes mortuos eſſe, quia pro omnibus mortuus eſt unus.— In illo uno (ſc. Adamo) mortui ſunt omnes, ut moreretur alius unus pro omnibus. Et rurſus— A morte juſtiſſimae damnationis per unum mediatorem liberatur Genus Humanum.— Unus pro omnibus mortuus eſt, ergo omnes mortui ſunt. Concluſio haec Apoſtoli invicta eſt; ac per hoc, quia & parvulis mortuus eſt, profecto etiam parvuli mortui ſunt, &c. (as he pretends to be deſirous, p. 92.) even by thoſe whom he and Mr. W. ſhall grant to be the beſt Interpreters, as to this particular, to wit, S. Auſtin and Proſper. 1. S. Auſtin argues from that Text in the very ſame manner that I did, [viz. That Chriſt died for all without exception, becauſe all without exception were dead in ſin] no leſſe then ſix diſtinct times. Once, lib. 20. de Civ. Dei cap. 6. init. Tom. 5. p. 1340. again, lib. 6. contra Julian. cap. 4. Tom. 7. p. 432. and again, ibid. c. p. 434. and again, ibid. c. 5.9. p. 436. once more, ibid. c. 17. p. 442. col. 2. And in another book againſt Julian, although imperfect, l. 1. c. 62. Tom. 7. p. 24. and yet again, lib. de Corrept. & Gratiâ, cap. 16. Tom. 7. p. 541. And to this is conſonant what he taught in his Retractations, c. 3. lib. 1. Judaeos & Gentiles, Chriſti contemptores, vocatos fuiſſe eâ vocatione quâ vocati ſunt qui noluerunt venire ad Nuptias. And again in his very Retractations, Verum eſt omnino omnes hoc poſſe ſi velint, lib. 1. cap. 9. And to the ſame purpoſe in his Confeſſions there is a notable paſſage, lib. 8. c. 5. Tom. 1.

2. Proſper alſo doth prove that Chriſt died for all that were dead in ſin, 2. Nulla ratiò dubitandi eſt, Chriſtum pro impiis mortuum, à quorum numero ſi quis liber inventus eſt, non eſt pro omnibus mortuus Chriſtus. Sed prorſus pro omnibus eſt Chriſtus mortuus, &c Proſper de voc. Gen. l. 2. c. 16. p. 144, 145. and ſo for every ſon of Adam, unleſs there is any one of the number free from all ſin; for Christ (ſaith he) died not for ſuch: but he proves there cannot be any ſuch, and therefore none for whom Chriſt died not; and his chiefeſt proof is from 2 Cor. 5.14. which he expounds exactly, as I have done from the beginning; and he indeed was the firſt in whom I met with it, at leaſt three years before I ſaw it in S. Auſtin.

3. To ſave me the labour of ſaying more, Mr. B. hath dropped a confeſſion, which he ſaith is the confeſſion of all my adverſaries, That an offer of Chriſt is made to all unto whom the Goſpel is, and by commiſſion ought to be, preached, p. 87. he alſo confeſſeth that the offer is ſincerely made, ibid. This I lay hold on, though he ſaith the contrary ſhortly after, viz. That God in the means of Grace, doth not ſo much as make an offer of ſalvation to all, p. 90. Again, though he ſaith at one fit, that there was in Chriſts death a ſufficiency for all, even of a Note, that he had railed at me in his firſt book, for ſaying this very thing; and after blotted out his railing, in the North-hampton Copies of that Print, as reſolving to aſſert, in his ſecond book, what he condemned in his firſt. thouſand worlds, if there were ſo many, p. 91. yet at another fit he tells us, that God had not an intention to ſave all, p. 90. and yet in a third fit, he ſaith, the propoſal of the Goſpel to every creature is without reſervation or inſincerity, p. 87. and further yet, that it is peſsible, by vertue of Chriſts merits, for all men to be ſaved, p. 87. and how ſo? he ſaith very truly, in caſe of true faith and repentance: there he is alſo for conditional redemption to all the world, as exactly as I am. As for his flat contradictions to the Lord Primate, with whom he profeſſed to concur, and many other misfortunes upon this ſubject, I refer him to all his concernments in The Self-Revenger exemplified.

Sect. 6.

The Concluſion. I now conclude with ſome reaſons, why I loſe no more time in expoſing theſe Authors to more pity, and their Doctrines to more contempt. 1. I am told by men of knowledge, that their books are already become waſte paper, bought by a few onely of the many, and read contentedly by none at all. 2. I am importuned by divers not to conſider them over-much, who have not a dangerous plauſibility amongſt the vulgar, but to reſerve my ſpare houres for the moſt popular man of that party, who (as I am credibly informed) is doing his utmoſt to find me work. 3. They have adventured to nibble, (and but to nibble) at ſo few things in my Anſwer, that they do tacitely grant the greateſt part to have left no colour for a Reply. 4. A great part of their performances are viſible ſhifts, rather then ſerious oppoſitions; even mean tranſitions à genere ad genus, eaſie ſneakings ab Hypotheſi ad Theſin, at every pinch Ignorationes Elenchi, purpoſed ſittings beſide the Cuſhion, and many times betwixt two ſtools too, gratis dicta are their very leaſt frailties, as ſtudied forgeries are the greateſt; and I confeſs it is painful, to ſpend much time (with Domitian) in killing Flies. 5. When they are brought to ſuch ſtraits, that they find not a crevice or a key-hole whereat to attempt a creeping out, they yield themſelves up, and all for which they have contended, without ſo much as making any terms of mercy. As for example,Certiſſimum eſt nobis, Decreviſſe, ut non niſi nolentes atque impii perderentur, Twiſſ. Vin. Gr. l. 1. p. 100. Mr. B. profeſſeth He doth readily yield, that God did not abſolutely decree the Reprobation poſitive of any creature, but upon praeſcience and ſuppoſition of wilful rebellion and impenitence, p. 70, 71. nay he profeſſeth this to be the Doctrine of all Orthodox Writers, ancient and modern, p. 70. And why ſhould He be much talked with, who confeſſeth all in one breath, which he denieth in another? See the Div. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 4. eſpecially p. 5. yet no ſooner gets he looſe, but he denies the very thing which the neceſſity of his affairs had made him confeſs, and pleads (for want of a better excuſe) Lapſus linguae non eſt error mentis, p. 77. what cares he how he miſcarries, who can ſo eaſily make amends? 6. When this evader is ſo ſtomachful that he will not yield, and yet ſo deſpairing of ſucceſs that he will not reſiſt a cogent Argument, he makes no ſcruple to profeſs a Tergiverſation. As for example, when I had preſſed him with a See the Div. Phi. ch. 3. p. 65. Dilemma of huge importance, even evincing out of his mouth, that his Diſtinction of Poſitive and Negative Reprobation was but a ſhift, he contents himſelf with this return, [Mr. Barlee needs not anſwer that Dilemma, p. 81.] And ſo when he knowes not what to ſay to the convincing points of my reaſonings about the general extent and ſincere intent of Chriſt's death, he gives me the ſlip in theſe words, [ It would be ſuperfluous labour to spend more time and paper in giving more particular anſwers to his luxuriant diſcourſes, p. 93.] 7. Mr. W. and he and Mr. Hobbs are ſo frequently condemned out of their own mouths, that they would need no Confuters beſides themſelves, if all their Readers were but attentive. To give a few inſtances of many, Mr. W. ſaith p. 29. God is not the Author of evil, becauſe not cauſa per ſe, but per accidens. Yet in his extent of Div. Prov. p. 40. he ſaith that cauſa per accidens never works till cauſa per ſe ſets it on work.] Now becauſe it is not man who ſets God on work, it is plainly his meaning, that God is cauſa per ſe of ſin, and ſets man on work who is cauſa per accidens; which others call a deficient cauſe. Again, he confeſſeth in his laſt Work, p. 25. that if it is impoſsible to ſeparate the ſin from the action, then he who is the Author of the one, is alſo of the other. Yet he alſo confeſſeth p. 37. that the modi rerum are not really diſtinguiſhed from the things themſelves, but ſo neerly conjoined as they cannot be ſeparated. Nor can any reaſon be rendred why Doctor Twiſſe ſhould ſay,Mr. Hobbs his prodigious ſelf-contradictions. that Fornication denoteth ſin even ſecundùm materiale, except this one, that the ſin is inſeparable from the Act. In like manner Mr. Hobbs, though he ſaith inOf Lib. and Neceſſ. p. 23. one place, that ſins are actions, and inQuaeſt. Num? 12. p. 105. another place, that God is the cauſe of all actions, and in aIbid. p. 107. third place, that he is a principal Agent in the cauſing of all actions, yet he Ibid. p. 105, 106. denies him to be the Author of the actions which he cauſeth. And his reaſon for it is more prodigious then all the reſt; for God (ſaith he) cannot be ſaid to be the Author of ſin, becauſe he doth but neceſsitate it, not command or warrant it, p. 105, 106. yet even this laſt he contradicts too, by ſaying thatOf Lib. and Neceſſ. p. 22. power irreſiſtible doth juſtifie all actions. Now that which neceſsitates is power irreſiſtible, and that which juſtifies doth warrant, and he ſaith that that which warrants is the Author of ſin. (Qu. p. 106.) and that ſin muſt needs derive a neceſsity from God (p. 105.) and the greateſt men of his Principle do ſay that God commands men to ſin, which he confeſſeth is to call him the Author of ſin. (p. 106.) Nay heQ. p. 11. l. 7, 8, 9, 10. from the bottom▪ elſewhere profeſſeth, that a man muſt not SAY, God hath cauſed him to erre, and it is through the Lord that he fell away, but he may THINK ſo very well. And wo had been to Eccleſiasticus, had he denied it. Nor is there any thing more common with theſe men, then to ſay that ſin is neceſſary as decreed by God, although contingent as freely willed by man. Now neceſſary being that, which cannot chuſe but be, and contingent that, which either may or may not be; what is this but to ſay, it is neceſſary as decreed, but not neceſſary as not decreed? It cannot but be, and yet it might poſſibly not have been: it is contingent, and not contingent: which is as if they ſhould ſay, we cannot deny our Adverſaries Premiſſes, and therefore we muſt hold the one part of the contradiction; but we will not quit our own concluſion, and therefore we muſt hold the other part of the contradiction. Thus by their own way of arguing, they are men, and they are not: they are men, as being indued with Reaſon; and they are not, as being indued with none. Sure that ſort of men is no longer to be diſputed with, who have drank ſo deeply, and digeſted, and reduced alſo to practice, theQuamcunque duarum viarum primò diverſarum homines inicrint, recta tendunt ad ſuperos. Eſcobar. Theol. Moral. Tom. 1. in prael. cap. 3. See the Myſterie of Jeſuitiſme, Letter 5. p. 59, 60. and Additionals ſecond Edit. p. 70, &c. p. 90, &c. Jeſuites doctrine of Probability. 8. Laſt of all, for Mr. B. who hath ſpent ſo many whole ſheets in calling me Papiſt, Arminian, Socinian, Maſsilian, Pelagian, and what elſe he liſted, though I could make it undeniable, (even to him, and his Congerrones,) that he hath ſpoken of each, as if he knew nothing of any one, and could prove him irreſiſtibly (by an Argument ad hominem) to be a Hobbiſt, a Mahumetan, and of every other Sect of men, with whom he partakes in any kind; yet I ſhall imitate S. Auſtin, and take a ſhorter courſe with him: When that Father was accuſed by Secundinus for a Manichee, he purged himſelf in this manner; Secundinus ſaith I am a Manichee, and I ſay I am not. Let the Reader judge, which of us is herein to be believed. My caſe is the ſame, and I will take the ſame courſe. Mr. Barlee ſaith I am a Papist, Pelagian, Socinian, Sorcerer, &c. But I ſay No to all his ſayings: I leave it now to the Reader, to believe whom he pleaſeth, Mr. Barlee, or Mr. Pierce.

Extende manum, & tange, &c.

(Job. 1.11.)

Id eſt, permitte ut extendam manum, & tangam cuncta quae poſſidet; ut ſaepius in ſacris Scripturis tribuuntur Deo Actiones, cù ſolùm eas fieri permiſerit.

Auguſt. ad Simplician. l. 2. q. 2.

Either make the Tree good and his Fruit good, or elſe make the Tree corrupt and his Fruit corrupt,

Matt. 12.33.

For the Tree is known by his Fruit. Ibid.

An Additional Advertiſement To the Reader, July 26.1658.

MY preſent Tract being finiſhed and wrought off at the Preſſe, the Stationer ſends me (at this inſtant) a little book of Mr. Baxter's which addreſſeth it ſelf in the Title-page to no more then three men, to wit, Grotius, the new Tilenus, and Mr. Pierce; but in ſeveral paſſages of the thing his objections reach to many more; though, having onely run it over with a tranſient eye, I can remember no more particulars then Biſhop Bramhall, Doctor Sanderſon, Doctor Heylin, and Doctor Taylor. Had it not come a little too late, and were it not more in my humour, then it ſeems to be in Mr. Baxter's, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to prefer a good ſpeed before a great deal of haste, an hour or two had ſufficed to have made a Winding-ſheet for himſelf, at leaſt as ſuitable as that which he made for Popery. But as it is, I muſt declare to all thoſe perſons concerned in it with my ſelf, and to Tilenus the ſecond more eſpecially, (whom after all my inquiries I have not the happineſſe to know in the leaſt degree) that till the end of this Summer I ſhall not beſtow the leaſt though upon any part of Mr. Baxter; and that for theſe enſuing reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe I am praeengaged in divers matters of greater moment, which will take me up wholly the next three moneths. And if I return to any Diſpute in any kind whatſoever, as it will fall out croſs to my inclinations, ſo I reſolve to do it onely at times of leiſure and diverſion. For whileſt my time may be ſpent in ſome good imployment, why ſhould I loſe it in my leaſt neceſſary Defences?

Next, I deſire to underſtand what entertainment the thing will find with conſidering Readers: for if it ſeems to others what it doth to me, it will tend to nothing but the diſparagement of its Author. Nor need I vindicate Mr. Baxter from his ſeverities done unto himſelf. Beſides, that I reſolve, never to controvert a ſubject, untill the moſt ſober unbyaſſ't perſons ſhall think it publickly uſeful, as well as I.

Thirdly, I think it will be beſt to expect the final reſolutions of the other perſons concerned, eſpecially of the excellent Tilenus junior, whom Mr. Baxter hath blurr'd with his blackeſt ink: and if he poſſibly is alive to undertake his own cauſe, the world will find 'twill be but impar • congreſſus.

Again, I am told that Doctor Reynolds is at laſt reſolved to find me work: and in caſe it proves true, I ſhall remember the ſpeech of the King of Syria at Ramoth-Gilead, Fight ye not with ſmall or great, ſave onely with the King of Iſrael, 2 Chron. 18.30. He is ſo worthily reputed the Coryphaeus of that party (if yet he is not too worthy to be in earneſt one of them) that Mr. Baxter will follow him very contentedly at a very great and humble diſtance.

Fifthly I ought to think twice, before I meddle with Mr. Baxter, becauſe I find him ſo very liable, (I had almoſt ſaid in every line,) for as much as I can judge by my ſhort and curſory peruſal of him. And where advantages are too many, ſome conſideration is to be had how much of all that abundance is to be taken and left: for tis a thankleſſe office to acquaint a man with his unhappineſſe; and in the doing of that, I would not willingly be endleſs.

Sixthly, I am to meditate, in what manner of terms I ought to deal with Mr. Baxter. The deſires of my ſoul are to uſe him gently; but conſidering his guilt, I know not whether my indulgence may not be hurtful to his admirers, who may be apt to think well of his greateſt crimes, if they find me (like Eli to his ſons) too milde a Cenſor. Nor am I ſure that my ſoftneſs will not be miſchievous to himſelf; who may miſtake my longanimity for carnal fear, and ſo by ſinning yet more, may make a worſe thing happen unto him. I ſay not this without ground, becauſe I find him abuſing my former lenity, as if he imagin'd his being terrible had made me courteous. Chriſtian Reader, obſerve my reaſon: He doth now acknowledge to all the world, and withal profeſſeth [hePraef. ſect. 4. p. 3. muſt acknowledge, both my gentleneſs, and charity, and brotherly moderation in dealing with him.] But as if gentleneſs, and charity, and brotherly moderation were onely fit for a moral man, and were the glittering ſins of an Epiſcopal Divine, he behaves himſelf ſo unexpectedly in divers paſſages of his Book, as if he durſt not imitate the beſt things in me, and (in the point of charity) had thought it his duty to come behind.

I had done no worſe, then the clearing of God from thoſe ſlanders which the tongue of the wicked had raiſed againſt him, and the freeing my ſelf from thoſe other ſlanders which were raiſed againſt me for clearing God, (things confeſſed to be matchleſs and groundleſs ſlanders by the deareſt friends of Mr. Barlee, & now at laſt not denied by himſelf;) when yet Mr. Baxter thinks fit to ſay in the depth of his paſſion and partiality, [Mr. Baxter in his Praef. addreſſed to Mr. T.P. Sect. 20. towards the end of it. That he had rather die in the ſtate of David before Nathan ſpake to him, or of Peter after he had denied his Lord, (that is, in the ſtate of an Adulterer, Murderer, and one who projected the drunkenneſs of Uriah, and continued thus about a year in an impenitent ſtate,) then of Mr. Pierce that hath committed no ſuch ſin.] Nor doth he give the leaſt reaſon, beſides my writing that Book, and the reſt of my failings which are known to God onely. He doth not pretend to know the leaſt ſin in me, excepting my publick Writings againſt thoſe ſins of which I knew not that he was guilty, until (in this his late Book) he revealed it to me from the Preſſe. And that I have failings known to God (I will add, to my ſelf alſo) is no more then he might have ſaid even of David and Peter after the times of their repentance. Yet goes he not 5. pages farther, before his eruption into theſe ſtrange words. [I Ibid. ſect. 24. had rather my right hand were uſed as Cranmers then I ſhould have written againſt Puritans what you have done:] Yet it is known that I writ againſt no other Puritans, then ſuch as were defined at Hampton-Court to be Proteſtants frighted out of their wits: Such Puritans as are known to be painted ſepulchres, having a form onely of godlineſſe without the power of it. Such as were thought by judicious Hooker to be fit inhabitants for a wilderneſs, not for a well-ordered City: Such as have ever deſpiſed dominion, and ſpoken evil of dignities, have been commonly Boutefeus and men of blood, the Proverbial Autors and Fautors of Sedition and violence in Church and State. If Mr. Baxter doth know enough of the ancient Gnoſticks and Catharists, the Phariſees of Judaea, and rigid Jeſuits at Rome, (beſides what I have not now time to name,) he knowes the Puritans againſt whom I have written.

Laſtly, I find him ſo frequently unmasking himſelf to all his Readers, by pretending that the difference between me and my Antagoniſts is meerly verbal, and ſo acknowledging himſelf to be really of my opinions, yet calling me as well as others by the very ſame names, (Arminian and Pelagian,) which with equal reaſon are often faſtened upon himſelf, by not a few of his own Tribe; ſometimes ſhewing himſelf an Advocate for the crimſon ſins of other men, and not onely an Advocate, but an Encomiaſt of his own; concluding Grotius to be a Papiſt, for the very ſame reaſons for which himſelf (if he is juſt) muſt needs conclude him to be a Proteſtant, (unleſs he thinks as hardly of the Auguſtan Confeſsion, as of the Articles of the Councel of Trent) miſtaking at once the whole drift of Grotius his excellent Diſcuſsio Apologetici Rivetiani, and parcelling his miſtake into a great many Sections towards the making of a book; citing Grotius his Latine, and not tranſlating it into Engliſh, or tranſlating it ſo lamely (to ſay no worſe) as to conceal his true meaning from Engliſh Readers; I ſay ſo frequently do I diſcern Mr. Baxters uncoverings of himſelf, in theſe and many more reſpects, that for ought I yet know, theſe very hints which I have given for the intelligent Reader to inlarge upon unto himſelf, may be a ſufficient 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 againſt the Contagion of all his Volume. My peruſal of his book hath been ſo hasty (it having been brought me by the ſame Carrier by whom I am haſtily ſending this ſhort account unto the Preſſe) that although I can ſay I have run it over, yet I cannot ſay I have read it all. And therefore my Reader will be ſatisfied with this one inſtance of my experience. In his Sect. 21. p. 34, 35. Grotius is brought by Mr. Baxter ſpeaking thus in his Diſcuſsio: ⁂ Quare nunc planè it a ſentit Grotius, & multi cum ipſo, non poſſe Proteſtantes inter ſe jungi, niſi ſimul jungantur cum iis qui Sedi Romanae cohaerent; ſine quâ nullum ſperari poteſt in Eccleſiâ Commune Regimen. Ideo optat (mark this good Reader) ut ea divulſio quae evenit, & cauſae divulſionis tollantur. Inter eas non eſt Primatus Epiſcopi Romani ſecundum Canones, fatente Melancthone. —

The later part of theſe words (which are the chief) Mr. Baxter takes no notice of in the Engliſh account which he renders of them, onely contents himſelf to ſay Here you ſee that Grotius judged that the only way for union was for all Proteſtants to joyn with them that adhere to the See of Rome.] He is deeply ſilent as to the cauſes of the breach, which Grotius did wiſh might be taken away; and which he charged the Papiſts with. Vot. pro Pace p. 7, 8.

I have not a minute wherein to ſay more, then that for all his medlings and miſdemeanours about my laſt reckoning with Mr. Barlee, (in my 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Self-revenger exemplified) I ſincerely commiſerate his paſsion, I truly pardon his partiality, and I heartily pray for his amendment.

ERRATA.

PAge 6. lin 9. in marg. r. libert. c. 13. p. 7. l. 5. from the bottom. r. Mr. Hickman. p. 31. l. 15. after done r. in. p. 40. l. 8. in marg. r. 2 Sam. 12.11, 12. p. 50. l. 1. r. Joh. 15.5. p. 95. l. 3. from the bottom. r. had. p. 102. l. 9. r. himſelf. p. 113. l. 8. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 114. l. 28. in marg. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 149. l. 16. for reſt on, r. reſtore. 163. l. 1. in marg. after of r. in. p. 169. l. 10. for ſevere r. ſeveral. p. 171. l. 1. for. p. 13. r. p. 113. p. 176, l. 5. r. Erinays. p. 187. l. 5. after what, r. was. p. 197. l. 7. in marg. r. in Gen. p 203. 39. in marg. r. vitetur. p. 208. l 13. in marg. r. p. 844, 845.

THE END.